Regional and National Identity Mobilization in Canada and Britain:
Nova Scotia and North East England compared

Allan Craigie

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The following thesis is the result of my own work only, unless otherwise acknowledged.

Allan Craigie
PhD Candidate
University of Edinburgh
Abstract

Examining Canada and Britain from 1990 to 2004, the thesis explores how the surge in minority nationalist agitation that occurred in Quebec and Scotland changed the political environment in Canada (outside Quebec) and England allowing regional elites to advance political agendas which mobilized regional and national identities. The thesis considers the role of democratic institutions at the regional level in shaping political demands through a comparative study of regional and national identity mobilization in Nova Scotia and the North East of England.

The thesis contends that the relationship between minority and majority nations is dialectical; nationalism stems from fundamentally different interpretations of the state and is not the ‘fault’ of either nation. Using this claim as the basis for analyzing elite debate at the centre and in the regions, the dissertation systematically examines regionalism within the majority nation by investigating debates at the national and regional level. The work looks at parliamentary debates, campaign material, newspaper accounts and elite interviews; and as identity mobilization and political debates are targeted at the electorate, survey analysis is undertaken to see whether elite debate resonated with the masses.

The thesis demonstrates that regionalism is a component of the ongoing (re)conception of nation within the majority nation, and that during periods of strong minority nationalist agitation, a political environment is created which allows elites in the majority nation to mobilize national and regional identities. Regional identity mobilization is shown to be part of the nationalism of the majority nation; as the dominant conception of the state within the majority encompasses the minority nations as co-nationals and equal citizens, regional elites are able to use the minority nations as examples of successful agitation without subscribing to their interpretations of the state. Regional levels of democracy did not alter the nature of regionalism in either state and though the demands issued may have been different, the underlying concerns were the same: a lack of voice and efficacy.
For Melissa, whose love and support was unending; and Alanna and Ewan, who were not here for the introduction, but have made the conclusion all the more special.
Acknowledgements

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Lastly, while everyone named above has contributed to this work, I am solely responsible for any errors of interpretation or fact contained herein.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOA</td>
<td>Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIMS</td>
<td>Atlantic Institute of Monetary Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>British Election Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNA</td>
<td>British North America</td>
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<tr>
<td>BQ</td>
<td>Bloc Québécois</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>British Social Attitudes</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>Confederation of British Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>CES</td>
<td>Canadian Election Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHST</td>
<td>Canadian Health and Social Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>Comparative Manifesto Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COQ</td>
<td>Canada (outside Quebec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Conservative Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDS</td>
<td>Ethnic Diversity Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEF</td>
<td>Environics Focus Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENENg</td>
<td>Effective Number of Ethnonational Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESRC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>First Past the Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>Government Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOR</td>
<td>Government Office Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>House of Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>House of Commons</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHi</td>
<td>Herfindahl-Hirschman index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPC</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPQ</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Member of the Legislative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>Member of the Scottish Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSSD</td>
<td>Most Similar Systems Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NE</td>
<td>North East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NECA</td>
<td>North East Councils Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODPM</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEI</td>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PQ</td>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA/RC</td>
<td>Regional Assembly/Regional Chamber</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Regional Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RoCOQ</td>
<td>Rest of Canada (outside Quebec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rest of England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSCNU</td>
<td>Nova Scotia Special Select Committee on National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>Scottish National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUC</td>
<td>Scottish Trades Union Congress</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Overview

October 31st, 1995, was a day etched into the minds of many Canadians as the day the Canadian federation nearly dissolved (Choudry 2007: 627). Canadians from coast to coast watched the results of the Quebec referendum on ‘sovereignty,’ or ‘independence,’ depending on how one interpreted the question. Quebeccois were asked to decide the fate of their province. Yet they not only attempted to determine the fate of the Quebeccois nation, whether they realized it or not they were also determining the fate of Canada. Though the Quebeccois narrowly voted in favour of remaining in Canada, this was not to be the end of the story, as nationalism in Quebec has remained one of the defining aspects of Canadian politics (Rotstein 1995: 372).

In every day usage, the terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are often seen as synonymous, yet they refer to two very different concepts. In the modern world states may be national, bi-national, multi-national or, theoretically, they may not correspond to any nation. Conversely, nations may form sovereign states or regions within states; they may spread over multiple states, or they may be dispersed. The aim of this work is to provide insight into the relationship between majority nationalism in Canada, and regionalism within Canada’s majority nation. Canada is an example of a state in which one nation holds dominance over the others because it contains the majority of the population of the state. This is what O’Leary refers to as the ‘staatsvolk’ (2001): the dominant group upon which the state is based. In addition to a clear staatsvolk, Canada possesses a minority nation, Quebec, which enjoys a strong and vibrant culture and active nationalist movements.

Secessionist sub-state nationalism, as seen in Quebec, is not limited to Canada. While Quebeccois nationalists were active in Quebec, their Scottish counterparts were doing the same across the Atlantic. Although the Scots, even with the victory of the Scottish National Party in the 2007 Scottish elections, have yet to challenge the British state in a manner similar to the Quebeccois in Canada, the nature of the British state was problematized in much the same way. Because of this, Quebec and Scotland have long proved useful comparisons for the study of sub-state
nationalism in the present (see McEwen 2002, Coates and Henderson 2005) and in
the past (Kennedy 2007). Consequently one might assume that the comparison of
England and ‘English Canada’ would prove popular for the study of majority
nationalism or regionalism as distinct from minority nationalism. However, this has
not been the case. While notable works explore majority nationalism in either
Canada or Britain (Resnick 1995, 1994, McRoberts 1997, 1995, Hazell 2006a and b,
Colls 2002, Kumar 2006, 2003), and regionalism within one of the two (Tomblin
2004), the comparison of Canada and Britain does not appear to have been
undertaken. In Canada and Britain the nationalism of the majority nation is not the
proverbial ‘squeaky wheel’ that draws attention. It is often what Billig refers to as
‘banal nationalism’ (1996): the hidden nationalism of coins, national flags, and
weather maps, which constantly reinforce the dominant view of the state within the
majority nation. This is not to say that members of the minority community would
interpret it as ‘banal’, rather it is to say that members of the majority nation are not
consciously expressing nationalist sentiments. Understanding majority and state-led
nationalism as an overlooked ‘background noise’ helps to explain this lack of
academic inquiry, but it does not excuse it. This work attempts to begin bridging the
gap in the wider understanding of regionalism and nationalism in Canada and Britain
by examining the relationship between minority nationalism and regionalism and
nationalism in the majority community, as well as the role of regional democracy on
how regional identities are mobilized.

Comparative studies have many strengths, two of which are of particular
importance to this project. Firstly, although two case comparisons cannot reveal
universal truths, they can produce information which can be tested against other cases
to build towards said truth. Secondly, by exploring one case in comparison with
another, information is revealed that would otherwise have remained hidden, such as
the role of English Canadian provinces in shaping national identity. Lipset (1991)
argues that the only way to properly understand one’s own society (in his case, the
USA), is to compare it to another. In Continental Divide Canada was used as the
comparison to better understand the unique political culture of the United States.
Following Lipset’s logic, this thesis attempts to gain knowledge of Canada by
comparing Canada and Britain between 1990 and 2004, when both states were experiencing strong sub-state nationalist agitation, which allowed identity to be politicized in all parts of the state. To understand regionalism within majority nations, Nova Scotia, a province in so-called ‘English Canada,’ and the North East of England, an English Government Office Region (GOR), were examined through extensive fieldwork combined with in-depth study of elite debate and public opinion.

While Canada and Britain are alike in many ways, the state structures are fundamentally different: Canada is a multinational federation whereas Britain is a unitary state. Britain is referred to as a ‘union state’ to identify that each of the constituent elements is governed differently from the centre (Bogdanor 1999: 14-15). Although a great deal of administration is conducted at the regional level in England, it lacks regional democratic legitimacy. This is a key difference between Canada and Britain. Following Przeworski and Teune’s logic (1979), the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) method of conducting a comparison allows for the exploration of the role of regional level democracy in both regionalism and majority nationalism. In particular, it allows the following to be addressed:

Hypothesis: Within multinational democracies, which have experienced a recent surge in minority nationalism, a political environment is created in the majority nation which allows regional elites to promote political agendas that mobilize regional and national identity, and in so doing the presence or absence of regional democratic institutions will shape the demands and the manner in which they are made.

1.2 Researching Regionalism and Majority Nationalism: Goals and Research Questions

This work is not an analysis of identity; it is an analysis of territorial identity mobilization, and the role of democratic institutions within that mobilization. It does

Note that this study examines Britain, and not the United Kingdom. Britain best describes the main island of the British Isles, upon which is found England, Wales and Scotland, while the United Kingdom includes the province of Northern Ireland. The politics of national identity and the state are more complicated in the United Kingdom than they are in Britain. This research focuses on Britain, and accordingly the term Britain is used throughout this work with the express exclusion of Northern Ireland.
not explore the causes of regionalism; it examines how regional actors attempt to mobilize regional identity for political purposes. The goal of this research is to test the hypothesis to shed light on the manifestation of regional identity in hegemonic nations, determining its impact on the political process. Regionalism is understood in the project as part of the larger process of majority and state-led nationalism. During the 1990s Canada and Britain experienced increased nationalist agitation culminating in the respective referendums on independence in Quebec and devolution in Scotland. While these two events captured public attention at home and abroad, interest was drawn to sub-state nationalism from other avenues as well. In Canada this occurred through political and legal activities such as the Clarity Act, the Regional Veto Act and the Supreme Court Reference re Quebec Secession. In Britain it came about through talks on elected regional assemblies in North East England, the Good Friday Accords and the devolution oriented Labour campaign of 1997. In both states, attempts at constitutional change were generally in response to perceived challenges of minority nationalists.

Stating that powerful nationalist movements existed in both Britain and Canada can be confusing as ‘nationalist’ may mean different things to different people. In Canada the Bloc/Parti Québécois are seen as nationalist, but the Liberal Party of Quebec also works in the interest of the Quebec nation and advocates increased devolution from the centre to Quebec (Meadwell 1993: 203-4). As nationalist may not be synonymous with independence, this work treats all who advance the status of a single sub-state nation as nationalist, and, in this sense, all the major parties in Scotland and at the provincial level in Quebec are deemed nationalist, even the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party (whose members may bristle at the label) is distinctly Scottish and works in the best interests of the Scottish nation.

Both majority and minority nationalism contributed to the political environment in which regional elites found themselves. Minority nationalism in Quebec and Scotland was part of a dialectical relationship with ‘English Canada’ and England. In this relationship neither the minority or majority nations initiated the tensions inherent in multinational states, rather both advanced their interpretations of the state. In turn, regional actors in the majority nation advanced their own
interpretation of the state. This was part of the on-going (re)creation and (re)negotiation inherent in any nation. It is hypothesized that regional institutions had an impact on how regionalism manifested itself, in turn impacting majority nationalism. For this research regionalism is defined as:

The mobilization of regional identity by political elites as a vehicle for their desired political outcomes.

Regional institutions, such as the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, offered Nova Scotian political elites something that regional elites in the North East lacked: a platform to express their voice. Regional elites in the North East could only express themselves in their local councils and the Westminster Parliament, neither of which have a regional mandate. To fully examine the hypothesis as stated above, the following research questions will be addressed:

RQa. Does a sense of regional identity exist in the regions? Do concepts of regional identity complement or compete with a sense of national identity?

RQb. Do regional and national elites interpret the state as multinational or as a single unified people? Is there a relationship between how elites at the centre and in the regions interpret the nature of the state?

RQc. Do the minority nations have a role in identity articulation in either the majority nation or the regions? If so, what role do the minority nations play?

RQd. Based on the assumption that a sense of regional identity exists, is it politicized? How it is politicized? What do regional elites demand?

RQe. What role do regional levels of democracy play in regional identity mobalization?

RQf. Does elite debate resonate with the masses?

1.3 The Staatsvolk in Canada and Britain

Much reference is made above of majority communities, and on the surface these may seem easy to define. ‘English Canada’ and England are clearly the dominant groups in their respective societies… or are they? Counter-intuitively, defining the majority community is difficult because of their dominant position within their respective states. O’Leary (2001) refers to groups with such dominance
as the *Staatsvolk*, the people whom the state is structured around. Accordingly, both ‘English Canadians’ and the English have historically had difficulties separating concepts of Canada and Britain from ‘English Canada’ and England. As Resnick notes “In their heart of hearts” English Canadians think of themselves only as Canadian, without any qualifications as to what kind of Canadian they are (1995: 85). Indeed, ‘English Canada’ is a problematic term; much ink has been spilt debating its utility. Some argue the term is a valid description of the Canadian provinces outside Quebec; others argue that given the linguistic and cultural diversity outside of Quebec, this term does not reflect reality. Moreover, some are concerned that the ‘British’ overtones of the term ‘English Canada’ alienate those of non-British extraction.²

It is widely accepted that the major political cleavage in Canada is based around language yet this does not mean that language is a causal variable. If so-called ‘English Canadians’ see all of Canada as their national grouping and Quebec sees ‘English Canada’ as part of their ‘other,’ it is not surprising that this led to tension within the political order, and although it may manifest itself along the language divide, it is not caused by it. ‘English Canadians’ do not differentiate between English speaking and French speaking Canadians when controlling the state apparatus. As a result, the Canadian government engaged in a process of nation-building which denied the distinctiveness of Quebec within the proclaimed cultural diversity of Canada, relegating the Quebecois to just another minority (Seymour 2000: 250), not recognizing Quebec as a sub-state nation and holder of democratic legitimacy in its own right. Language was not the problem, but it became a clear marker of the distinction denied to Quebec as the sole majority French speaking jurisdiction in North America. Accordingly, ‘English Canada’ as a culturally defined entity does not sit well with Quebec as a territorially defined entity (McRoberts 1995: 10); ‘English Canada’ exists within, and ‘French Canada’ beyond, Quebec.

² In a similar manner, when this author explained his research to a Scottish National Party Member of the Scottish Parliament, the MSP objected to the use of the term ‘English Canada’ in that he felt the term denied recognition of the role of the Scottish in shaping and building Canada.
The competing terms ‘Rest of Canada’ (and its variants) and ‘English Canada’ each contain different assumptions about the fundamental divisions in Canada (McRoberts 1995 7-8). This author, after reflection, concluded that there are too many francophones outside of Quebec to fairly call Canada outside of Quebec ‘English Canada.’ Indeed, later chapters demonstrate ‘English Canada’ is used by nationalists in Quebec to advocate a worldview that does not exist: that Quebec is French speaking and the other provinces are English speaking. As this thesis explores territorial identities, a territorial identity marker will be used: Canada (outside Quebec). As Canadians (outside Quebec) only conceive of themselves as being Canadian, ‘outside Quebec’ is placed in brackets to emphasize that Canada is not only the primary, but the sole, national loyalty for the Canadian staatsvolk.

In comparison, Britain’s staatsvolk, the English, would seem to be easier to identify, yet more than three hundred years of British history has blurred the distinction between England and Britain. While England is easily defined on a map, ‘Englishness’ is entwined with ‘Britishness’—so much so that some English people have trouble divorcing the two concepts (Condor 2000, McCrone and Kiely 2000, Barnett 1997, Crick 1991, Kearny 1991). Colls (2002) argues that Britain is England writ large, and England is so dominant that it is difficult to identify non-British markers of English identity (Marquand 1995, Kumer 2003).

In both Canada and Britain, then, the staatsvolk were not just a clear majority of the population, they had become one with the state in many regards. O’Learly notes a staatsvolk’s dominance is such that it cannot be easily challenged by the minority nation. This dominance, though, provides room for accommodating national minorities, as accommodation cannot challenge the hegemony of the staatsvolk. Within Canada and Britain there was a clearly dominant staatsvolk, and elites from both appeared content to accommodate minority nations. With regard to the English, that even meant allowing their national identity to be consumed within a larger British one (Kumar 2006). Accordingly, when national identities were being debated and renegotiated within the dominant groups, the minority sub-state nations played a key role. They were seen as an important part of the state, with the majority nation willing to accommodate them. Yet they were more than simply ‘regions,’ as nations
in their own right they were bearers of popular sovereignty and holders of political legitimacy (see Mann 1995, 1993 and Poggi 1990, 1978).

Though not nations in their own right, regions are a territorially defined unit, and regional identity is an emotional attachment to that unit. As stated by Tomblin (2004a), the term ‘region’ has many different meanings, but in this thesis it refers to the territorially defined space between the state and local level. This definition, however, is still imprecise, as more than one level may exist. As such, this work examines regions with corresponding government structures to address the research questions introduced above.

In Canada there are ten provinces and depending on how one interprets the state, anywhere from four to eleven regions. In Britain the term province appears to be restricted to descriptions of Northern Ireland. England, one of the four nations of Britain, and the one that this study focuses on, is divided into nine GORs for the purposes of administration. Within these regions are the Government Offices (GOs), which represent central government departments, and Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) mandated to develop the regional economies. In addition, there are Regional Assemblies (RAs) (which will be abolished in 2010) whose members are appointed. As government administration is key to this project’s definition of ‘region,’ a Canadian province and an English region will be compared. Both will be termed ‘regions’ for simplicity’s sake, although the term ‘region’ is not usually applied to Canadian provinces.

1.4 Contribution of Thesis

As Watts notes, while multinational states may be difficult to manage, there are examples of long lived multinational federations (Watts 2007: 229). While the British North America Act (1867) did not create an independent state in a manner that would be understood today, it did create something more than a British colony.¹

¹ London, a city-region, will maintain its elected level of government.

² The Canadian Constitution is legally called the Constitution Act (1867), but prior to 1982 it was known as the British North America Act (1867). This work will use the term British North America Act when referring to events that took place in 1867, as would referring to what happened in 1867 as the Constitution Act would be misleading and not convey that it was not an independent state that the framers of
When Britain was formed it did not erase the national sentiments of its member nations. Nationalism, in a political sense, is a movement based on the best interests of a nation, not its independence or autonomy. In this case, the Treaty of Union of 1707, which created the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and the various treaties that have culminated in the European Union may have limited the sovereignty of states in that membership places limits on state actions, but it could be argued that this was done in the interest of member nations. This is seen in the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) current program for independence in Europe; the SNP simply does not see the European Union as a threat to the Scottish nation and the state-building project it advances. Yet it appears that since the vast majority of nationalist movements have linked the independence of their nations with achieving political independence and membership in the international community that nationalism and independence have become conflated. This helps explain why majority/state-led nationalism is such an under-researched phenomenon. There does not appear to be any reason why a nationalist movement cannot be integrationist as long as its national interests are being met and its national distinctiveness is secure. However, it is true that ‘the squeaky wheel gets the grease’ and in this sense it is often the more romantic, contentious, or violent nationalisms that receive the majority of academic attention.

According to Seymour, because there is no singly accepted concept of nation, researchers will opt to choose one definition and ignore the rest (2000: 228). For almost all objective criteria that one tries to use to define nations there are cases which disprove it. The only criteria of nationhood that seems to escape this is Gellner’s point that nations exist only when co-nationals recognize each other as such (1983). In fact, Seymour argues that nations cannot be scientifically investigated the way one investigates atoms or other such phenomena as by definition the nation is subjective (2000: 237), yet nations are not subjective in the minds of their members. A cursory glance over 20th Century history reveals that nationalism and the pursuit of national interest has been one, if not the, driving forces behind world history.

Confederation had in mind in 1867.
An important distinction for this work is to think of nationalism not as devolutionist/secessionist nationalism, what Billig (1995) calls ‘hot nationalism,’ but as majority and minority nationalism. Both minority and majority nationalism have the same underlying concept, namely the advancement of the interests of the nation. Where the two differ is in the corresponding indicators of the concept, which should come as no surprise as majority and minority nationalism occur in fundamentally different contexts.

Equating minority nationalism with nationalism in general is erroneous. It assumes that the best interests of the nation can be found in some sort of autonomy, and overemphasizes the relationship between state and nation. It ignores the fluid and contextual nature of national identity, and that national identities may be layered in multinational states such as Canada and Britain. The assumption is made that in order to defend the interests of the nation one must align it with a state and increase the power of the state. This confuses the methods of obtaining a goal (the creation and maintenance of a state that corresponds to a nation) and the actual goal itself (preservation and advancement of the interests of the nation).

Given the interest in nationalism and the politics of identity within the academic community, one would assume that substantial investigation had been made into regionalism and regional identity from a political perspective. This, however, does not appear to be the case. While much work has been done on individual regions within states, there does not appear to be a large body of theoretical research on regions, especially theoretical reflection on regionalism within multinational states, a gap which this work attempts to bridge. In this sense, Gellner (1983) and the fictional Ruritarians provide an interesting framework for the study of centre-periphery relations in regard to regional identity, but he sees the outcome as the creation of a nation, not a region. Likewise Careless’s (1989) work examines how the Canadian political system developed through continuous expansion creating a hierarchical series of metropolises and hinterlands.

Regional identity appears to have developed in much the same way as national identity. For instance, McKay (1994) shows how the formation of regional identity in Nova Scotia followed patterns that scholars in nationalism identified in the creation of nations. He explicitly compares the processes to Anderson (1983) in the
oft-cited Imagined Community. Moreover, there are similarities between the cultural ‘neo-nationalism,’ as he refers to it, of Nova Scotia, and the cultural nationalism that Hutchinson (1999, 1987) identifies as being at work in Ireland. The regional identity of the North East of England seems to have formed in a similar way to Ruritarian national identity in Gellner (1983). Namely, there is a centre and periphery, economic disparity, and even differences in dialect and accent between the North East and the Home Counties of the South East of England.

This work suggests there is not a clear divide between regionalism and nationalism, rather the two are intrinsically linked as regionalism is a fundamental component of the continued re-negotiation of ‘nation.’ In this sense, regionalism in Nova Scotia and the North East of England is not opposed to Canada or Britain in the way that some strains of nationalism in Quebec and Scotland are. Rather, people residing in Nova Scotia and the North East simply interpreted their nation differently than those from other parts of Canada (outside Quebec) and England, with regionalism being part of larger processes of national (re)definition and nationalism within the majority nation.

1.5 Outline of Thesis

This thesis explores regionalism within the majority nation as part of the process of nationalism. Chapter Two introduces the concepts that this work operationalizes; building upon theoretical literature on nations and states, addressing why ‘regions’ are fundamentally different from minority sub-state nations. It shows that regions, while possessing distinct identities, are embedded within the nations in such a way that regional and national identity do not compete with each other; regions are both embedded within and indivisible from larger nations. While minority nations may be embedded within larger nations, as the bearers of popular sovereignty they are not indivisible from them. Regionalism is part of the continual process of (re)negotiation of national identity. With regard to majority nationalism, Chapter Two introduces the concept of ‘unionist’ and ‘pan-nationalist’ interpretations of the state, showing that while nationalism is often seen as being a function of minority nations, in reality it is expressed by both the majority and minority nations. Nationalism and conflict
between the majority and minority in liberal states is shown to be the fault of neither, rather conflict stems from the opposing interpretation of the state held by actors within the majority and minority nations.

Chapter Three details the methods and methodology employed. This chapter introduces the logic of the comparative study, demonstrating how the research builds upon the strengths of the comparative design while utilizing strategies to overcome the weaknesses of comparison. This chapter shows how the logic of the Most Similar Systems Design is used in the comparison between Canada, a multinational federation, and Britain, a union state which only recently devolved democratic institutions to the minority sub-state nations. The key variables under consideration are introduced, and how these variables are controlled by using the MSSD to compare Canada and Britain is explained. Additionally, it introduces and explains the data sources used.

Chapter Four acts as a bridge between the theoretical and methodological chapters and the empirical chapters by expanding upon why Canada and Britain were used for comparison. It details the histories of Canada and Britain, showing how economic, social and political variables are controlled. Here it is shown that the political environment during the period under investigation, 1990-2004, was such that regional actors in Nova Scotia and the North East attempted to couple regional identity to political agendas.

Chapters Five and Six take very similar forms, but analyze the data from different perspectives. Chapter Five analyzes elite debate at the centre to demonstrate how identities were mobilized and to determine which interpretation of the state was dominant within statewide political discourse. This chapter utilizes an analysis of parliamentary debate and election manifestos to illustrate how elites at the centre set discursive boundaries for regional actors as they adhered to their interpretations of the state. It demonstrates that in both states, while different political actors and parties may hold different views as to the nature of the state, state level interpretations of the state were broadly pan-nationalist. This creates boundaries for debate within the regions of the majority nations while framing the minority sub-state nations as ‘internal others;’ Quebec and Scotland became at once one of ‘us’ and an identifiable ‘them.’
Chapter Six shifts the focus of the research from the statewide to the regional level, using the challenge of the sub-state nation to reveal the conception of the state held by regional elites. Using interview data, transcripts of legislative debates, regional campaign material and an analysis of regional media, this chapter investigates elite opinion in Nova Scotia and the North East. It shows that debates at the centre created boundaries for debate within the regions, limiting how regional actors mobilized regional identity. While regional elites attempted to use the examples of the minority sub-state nations, due to the regions being embedded within, and indivisible from, larger nations, regional elites did not have the same breadth of political tools as nationalist elites within the minority nations. Instead, regional actors were able to utilize a different strategy; they were able to emphasize the ‘Canadian-ness’ and ‘British/English-ness’ of their regions. These appeals to national solidarity emphasized that while the regions were distinct from other parts of their respective nations, this did not make them any less a co-national. In both regions it is shown that elites felt their region lacked voice (using Hirschman’s 1970 term). This is especially interesting because the elected level of government in Nova Scotia means the province has an infinitely greater capacity for voice than the North East. In both regions actors looked to the sub-state nations and saw effective use of voice, which encouraged them to use the sub-state nations as examples to emulate and allies in dealing with the centre.

Shifting focus to yet a different level of analysis, Chapter Seven examines survey data in Canada and Britain determining if debate at the regional and national level resonated with the masses. The data presented indicates that while there was some sense of grievance in both Nova Scotia and the North East, that this did not correlate with a sense of regional identity—even though regional identities were strong in both regions, much more so than the Canadian (outside Quebec) and English average. This chapter substantiates the claim that regional identities are embedded within larger national ones, as neither the Nova Scotia or the North Eastern identity was found to compete with Canadian or English/British identities. It highlights the problems that regional political elites encountered when attempting to link regional identities with a sense of political grievance; specifically that while people in the regions may have not been overwhelmingly supportive of the constitutional status
quo, no single option for change was overwhelmingly supported in either case. In both regions, elites could not harness a clearly mobilized regional identity to connect to the policies that they were advancing.

Chapter Eight, the conclusion, synthesizes the information from the empirical chapters to show how they address the hypothesis and the research questions. It highlights themes from each chapter that are common throughout the analysis, and in doing so demonstrates that the relationship between regional level democracy and identity mobilization is very complicated. It indicates that regional democracy does not give the region voice per say, as regions in and of themselves do not have voice, actors do. Regional level democracy instead allows actors who hold competing interpretations of the regional interest to use their voice. It was shown that regional level democracy in and of itself did not increase political efficacy or perceived regional voice. In both regions the demands by political elites were very similar and were based around a lack of both voice and efficacy within the governing structures of their states. What was seen in both states is not a desire to lessen the ties with the rest of the nation, rather to strengthen them; integrationist regionalism.
Chapter Two: Regionalism and Majority Nationalism

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the relationship between region, nation and state in order to comprehend how identities based upon these can become politicized. Understanding the mobilization of identity requires understanding what identities are and how identities, which are inherently personal, intersect with society, coalesce around territorially defined units, and manifest politically. This chapter introduces three key concepts used in this project. The first is the bounded network, establishing who is one of ‘us’ and who is not. This study examines political communication within these bounded networks. The second is ‘nested identities,’ namely that regional identities are nested within national ones and indivisible from the nation. Regions are part of larger nations, and as such they belong to the bounded networks that create the nation. Yet they also have their own series of bounded networks, and by understanding the relationship between these political debates in Canada and Britain can be understood vis-à-vis regional identity mobilization. The final concept is that of opposing interpretations of the state, referred to as the ‘unionist’ and ‘pan-nationalist’ interpretations. It is through conflict between these two interpretations of the state that the political environment changes vis-à-vis regional political actors politicizing regional identity. This chapter begins by discussing identity and the individual, showing how identities are overlapping and contextual. It then explores the complex territorial aspects of identity with regard to regions, nations, and states. As regions, nations and states are the focus of this exploration, this chapter needs to develop a clear conceptual understanding of them that can be operationalized in later chapters. Finally, it turns to how territorial identities become politicized. It explores the role of nationalist discourse in Canada (outside Quebec) and England, and regionalism in Nova Scotia and the North East of England as a part of the identity mobilization of the ‘staatsvolk.’
2.2 Identity

Identity is a complex phenomenon. It is key to the articulation of ‘self,’ but all the markers of identity are made in relation to ‘others.’ Taylor (1989) argues that identity is what allows people to define themselves as individuals. Yet identity is also social, as it is through social experiences that humans develop the identity markers that denote them as individuals (MacCormick 1999: 189). Through identity individuals articulate what is important and what is not (Taylor 1989: 30). Thus, while identity may be about defining the ‘self,’ it is constructed with regard to that which is outside of the individual. The self exists only in relation to other selves—‘self’ cannot be defined without reference to those who surround it (Taylor 1989: 35). Man is only relevant as an identity marker in relation to woman, working class in relation to middle class, white to black, straight to gay, minority to majority. Identities are meaningful only in relation to their contrasting identities and are inherently collective and relational.

Individuals may only become aware of certain aspects of their identity when confronted by a contrasting identity, bringing their own identity into focus. For example, a member of the Canadian nation need not use national identity as a marker to identify him- or herself in relation to fellow Canadians, but when removed from the national environment (for example, while conducting a PhD in Scotland), that individual may become very aware of his or her national identity and use this collective identity as a marker to define his or her individuality. Beyond self-categorization, identity markers serve as a medium for making sense of personal circumstances (Hearn 2007: 664). They give people conceptual shortcuts, helping them make sense of the world.

While individuality presupposes social existence (MacCormick 1999: 192, Cohen 1996: 803), individuals are not simply products of society. Society has a significant impact upon how people behave and identify; according to Knoke (1990: 19-20) people acquire norms through social learning, initiation and pressure for conformity. Though identity is the framework from which individuals determine where they stand on questions of good, worthwhile, or admirable (Taylor 1989: 27), the relationship is in fact dialectical. Individuals, as members of collectives,
“interpretively construct” their identities through their unique experiences with them (Cohen 1996: 812). Individuals are actors in their own right, making conscious decisions, which in turn have an impact upon society (Folts 1981: 40 see also Mann 1993: 725). Deutsch (1966a: 166) refers to this kind of process as a “feedback loop.” In essence, while society shapes individuals, individuals shape society and both grow and evolve. Individual members of the nation establish communication networks through the transmission of common ideas, thoughts and beliefs, forming the basis of the coherence of societies and cultures (Deutsch 1966: 87).

Identity, then, is personal and subjective, but it is also objective as it employs many markers, which can be uncovered through observation. The first step in studying identity is to understand identities as the product of interaction, recognizing them as the construct of bounded networks of social communication.

**Bounded Networks**

Deutsch (1966a) argues there is no universal human identity, as people’s identities are formed around lived experience. It is necessary for a ‘them’ to exist, as any definition of a group is inherently exclusionary (Whitaker 1992: 198). Given that identities do not include everyone, this indicates that these networks have borders and boundaries. As Foltz (1981: 39) states: “Who studies systems studies boundaries.” Bashevkin (1991) argues that in order for there to be an ‘us’ we have to have an understanding of the ‘other.’ The ‘us’ needs ‘them’ in order to survive. But in Britain and Canada, while England and so-called ‘English Canada’ may be important to Scottish and Quebecois conceptions of self, the converse may not be true in the majority nation. The Canadian (outside Quebec) and English conception of the national community may include Quebec and Scotland (McRoberts 1997, Kymlicka 2001, Kumar 2006).

Physical distance plays a role in identity as the further away someone is from an individual, the less likely it will be for that person to identify with him or her simply due to there being less contact between them. What contact there is would be overshadowed by greater contact with those closer. As noted below, even new technologies allowing instant global communication may have only a limited ability to mitigate the role of geography. Yet distance is not the only reason there is no
universal identity. The problem with identifying with everyone is that it takes away from the uniqueness of the identity being recognized, depriving it of worth. This is why sub-state national minorities either guard their special status when they have it, as in Spain’s historic communities (Giordano and Roller 2004: 2176), or seek special recognition and oppose uniformity, as in Quebec. Yet, geography is malleable and helps link identity and territory (Kauffman 1998); shaping and bounding networks of social and political communication. Billig (1995) argues geography helps define who is in the ‘in’ group and who is in the ‘out’ group as geography provides physical borders.

Borders are important as they shape internal communication lines, demarcate regulatory boundaries, and provide physical references to divide those on either side and create distinctive traditions and “local chauvinisms” over time (Stewart 1994: 23-4). Borders are “spatial and temporal records” of the bounded networks of human interaction (Donnan and Wilson 1999: 34). While these borders may not always be clear, as cross border identities may mix, they provide markers as to who is and is not ‘one of us.’ While Hobsbawm (1996: 262) argues that ‘they’ are recognizable as ‘not we’, usually by colour, language or physical characteristic, he may be looking at the wrong starting point of the process of ‘othering.’ These characteristics (especially language) often come after the networks are formed, not before. Eugene Weber’s (1976) work on French nationalism in the late 19th Century exemplifies the importance of bounded networks and lines of communication in establishing a common frame of reference and shared identity.

E. Weber (1976) shows how groups in France who were geographically isolated, not on the frontiers of France but simply outside the major lines of communication, had no real concept or understanding of the French nation; many did not even speak French. Only after the lines of communication reached them (or, as the bounded networks expanded to include them) were they absorbed into the French nation. This is very similar to the process that Careless (1989) identified in Canada, where the state expanded outward, not in the sense of expanding circles based around a core, rather by the state implanting itself and growing up around and between these implantations, building the geographic boundaries and physical infrastructure of the bounded networks. These lines of communication are so significant that
E. Weber (1976: 208) argues roads and railways are more important to emancipation than any political revolution.

It may appear that bounded networks are what is commonly referred to as civil society; while they are related, a conceptual difference exists. The concept of civil society refers to a level of society between the state and the individual which is independent of the state (Shills 1991). Though a great deal of literature addresses how identity can be formed and mobilized through civil society (Morton 1999, Greenfeld 1990, 1987, Hutchinson 1987) the idea of bounded networks goes beyond civil society. It includes the intertwining state and social structures which operate within the borders of the networks. Accordingly, while civil society is an important component, so too are state structures such as the Nova Scotia Department of Education or the GO for the North East. Despite the fact that these structures are not part of civil society, they interact with it, clearly marking the boundaries of the territorial networks.

Mann (1995: 45-46) demonstrates that these networks involve almost all manners in which humans interact. He cites diverse channels of communication such as business contracts, government records, army manuals, and coffee house discussions, each of which transmit all sorts of information (such as values, customs, news, etc). According to Deutsch (1966a), the basic building blocks of networks of social communication are individuals and the strength of these bounded networks is the relative efficiency of communication amongst individuals. All human interaction requires communication, and the more complex the interaction, the greater the need for rich, varied, quick, accurate communication (Deutsch 1966a: 91).

**Networks as Communication**

The importance of communication within bounded networks is substantial. According to Keat and Urry (1982: 173-4) everyday understanding is possible due to the existence of a large variety of shared background assumptions and conventions between those communicating. As communication requires understanding, the role of language in creating networks of social and political communication would intuitively seem paramount; communication occurs through language. Anderson’s (1983) concept of print capitalism indicates that shared language, especially
vernacular as opposed to high language, is fundamental for the formation of a shared identity. Only when symbols and references attain the status of “common currency,” becoming recognizable in everyday language, does shared identity become communicable (Cubbit 1998). Taylor (1989) argues individuals are inducted into personhood through a language, a tool of the community. In the 1960s, Deutsch (1966a: 43-44) argued language is preserved by special techniques and institutions, such as language structures, grammar, dictionaries, schools, print and radio. Challenging the borders of communication networks in the 1990s, Dahlgren (1993: 17) argued that satellite TV may be creating international communities. Nowadays people have immediate access to an endless range of information through the internet, allowing for “reciprocal and fluid communication between the house or workplace and the multifaceted world” (Moreno 2002: 8).

The creation of these international communities is most clearly seen through the internet and the rise of activities such as email, instant messaging, and social networking sites. These allow people to communicate cheaply and quickly with people across the planet, and even engage in virtual games with them. These technologies may appear to challenge the communication networks in a territory, giving people access to all sorts of data. Hall argues these trends may not stand up to proper scrutiny and measurement (2000). He notes that when measuring economic interactions the state is still the most dominant actor, a position of dominance that supranational institutions such as the European Union have not been able to challenge. Individuals in the early 2000s may have access to information from around the world, but what has a greater impact upon creating and maintaining a shared identity is what impacts them most directly, such as local and national news. Even the internet may not be as divorced from territory as one may intuitively think. If one accepts the logic of Billig’s ‘banal nationalism,’ (1995) the internet may be seen as another means of transmitting nationalism. Banal nationalism is the expression of national identity through day-to-day things, such as images on coins, flags in front of schools, weather maps, and the like. This is not the ‘hot’ nationalism
that ‘others’ have;\(^5\) rather, when recognized, it is seen as patriotism. According to Urminsky (2008), an individual’s ISP (Internet Service Provider) is identifiable, meaning that the state they are located in is available to advertisers who in turn use this information to target the individual, acting as a constant reminder of one’s physical location.\(^6\) The debates on globalization and the role of the state in the modern era are complex, but the point here is that the nation and the state have a very strong capacity to maintain their dominance in modern society.

Returning to shared language, while Anderson (1983) and Taylor (1989) focus on language, it would appear that these arguments should be expanded to include dialect or even common frames of reference, which can be shared by distinct communities. The Irish and the Scottish are examples of nations which share a language with their neighbours, the English, while maintaining distinct national sentiments. As Clark humourously notes, although Canadians seem “indistinguishable from the Americans the surest way of telling the two apart is to make the observation to a Canadian” (1965). There are many Canadians whose mother tongue is French but who still share the same national sentiment as their English speaking co-nationals; as Cohen (1996) notes, national identity is interpreted by the individual. Likewise, the distinctive accents found in the North East of England and the use of colloquialisms in Nova Scotia are part of the shared language in these two regions. These examples indicate that shared language is not the sole factor in creating shared identities and bounded networks. Instead it suggests that while language is part of the shared background assumptions outlined by Keat and Urry above, these conventions can transcend language or be shared by only some members of a language community. As will be seen in Chapter Six, Nova Scotian elites see the French-speaking Acadian community in their province as being integral to their cultural understanding of the region.

In the establishment of bounded networks, the starting point is often seen as being language or shared symbolic discourse (see above as well as Kymlicka 2001,\(^3\))

\(^5\) By ‘hot’ it is meant the very visible nationalism generally associated with minority nationalism.
\(^6\) For example, when one types in the non-geographical www.google.com as a web address in the UK it is automatically redirected to www.google.co.uk.
Kuper 1999, Cubbit 1998, Llobera 1998, Blommaert 1996, Simon 1996, Taylor 1989, and Elviken 1931). In general, these authors see language as the common ‘glue’ that unites a society, as language is the means of communicating the common ideas and norms that form the basis for shared identity. If a common language does not exist, then these norms and values cannot be transmitted (for example, McRoberts argues one of the failures of Trudeau was his lack of understanding the relationship between culture and language, 1997). Others argue that civil society acts as a catalyst for shared identity (Yoshino 2001, Morton 1999, Faulk 1998, Hutchinson 1987). As civil society is the level between the citizen and the state, it mediates the relationship between the state and the nation. The common theme amongst these authors is that collective identities are built upon the interwoven networks formed by actors within civil society. Still others emphasize the importance of common institutions to the understanding of bounded networks (Begin 2003, Nairn 2000, Favell 1998, Jewel 1994 Greenfeld 1987). Institutions in many ways combine elements of both language and civil society and give potential identity communities something to coalesce around. As will be seen in later chapters, elites in the North East and Nova Scotia mobilized around institutions, or in the case of the North East the possibility of institutions, to create a focus for identity.

Each of the above group of authors identifies a key element in identity formation/mobilization, suggesting that there may not be one overarching variable. Authors such as Billig (1995) and Crick (1979) argue that there are no objective criteria as each nation is unique. In this regard, Gellner’s (1983: 7) point that the only criterion for nationhood is that people within the nation recognize each other, exemplifies the ‘imagined’ nature of the community (to use the language of Anderson 1983). There is no one set of objective markers shared by each identity community in territorial identity formation and mobilization. Even the geographic markers that form the basis of Deutsch’s (1966a) understanding of nation are of only limited value. Many countries share borders that have no obvious geographical feature, one of the most prominent being the so-called ‘longest undefended border’ in the world, the Canada-USA border. Yet all of the above-mentioned authors identify groups of people who engage in discourse with each other, ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups with clearly delineated boundaries, both social and physical. Deutsch (1966a ch2) argues that
while the main networks of language, geography, economics and population may not perfectly overlap, as long as they overlap enough a territorial identity will emerge.

All of the points raised are important components of territorial identity, but none of the individual elements are as important as “the mutually reinforcing and self-sustaining pattern of the whole” (Deutsch 1966a: 28). It cannot be stressed enough that this ‘whole’ is not free floating; it is anchored to territory and territory becomes the bond that holds the other parts of the communication network together. By examining how these bounded networks intertwine, overlap and share borders, the next section links the personal-social dimension of identity to a territorial conception of identity.

2.3 Regions, Nations, States

Territorial identities are unique amongst people’s identities. While all identities are attached to larger groups, territorial identities are further attached to a defined piece of land. Deutsch (1996a) and Mann (1993) offer invaluable insight into the role of identity networks. Both allude to the fact that there will be all sorts of networks that do not correspond to state borders. In fact, in most states bounded networks are not neatly mapped onto state borders. Furthermore, smaller bounded networks exist within states, bounded around smaller geographical units. J. Smith (2002) notes each Atlantic Canadian province has its own set of provincial economic, social and political networks. Based on the argument presented by Deutsch and Mann, these smaller bounded networks will harden over time to develop a clear sense of identity. In the example of Atlantic Canada, each of the four provinces pre-dates Confederation (the creation of Canada) by generations. Mann’s (1993) framework allows for the existence of networks within networks. As such, they contribute to the make up of the state but do not compete with each other or the state. Instead, these networks reinforce each other and over time help develop a sense of common identity in the state.

This section discusses the three types of territorial unit under study: the state, the nation and the region. To develop a theory of region and regionalism, this section begins by considering the difference between state and nation. It is important to
clearly define these two concepts first, as in order to understand what regions are, one has to have a clear understanding of what they are not. As the vast majority of states in the modern era are multinational (Hobsbawm 1996: 257), the discussion needs to address how states can deal with diverse populations, how territorial identities in states are mobilized, and the ways the state can deal with them. By exploring the relationship between majority and minority nations, one sees how the political environment changes vis-à-vis regional actors within the majority nation. Through examining the nature of nations this chapter highlights the key differences between sub-state nations and sub-national regions within the majority nation while addressing the place of the region within the nation.

*States and Nations I: States*

Of the three units of analysis (state, nation and region) states are the only one with a purely political definition in the strictest sense. States are a historical phenomenon, the product of human interaction and not nature (McLennan et al. 1984: 1). States are not made or built, rather a “concrete historical process leading to the emergence of a state has typically been protracted, tentative and circuitous and have presented a wide discrepancy between understandings and outcomes” (Poggi 1978:98-99). While Mitchell (1991: 77) argues states are hard to define and are often defined in opposition to society, Mann (1993) is influenced by Weber’s (1974) definition of the state, namely it is the organization that possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a given territory. According to Mann, the state is a political organization which:

1. Has a differentiated set of institutions and personnel,
2. Embodies centrality in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a centre,
3. Has a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises power, and
4. Has some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force (1993: 55).

Mann further argues that as states have defined territory, another set of political relations exists outside of the state; states inhabit a world of states (Mann 1993, see also Poggi 1990: 19-23). Poggi claims the state is the highest level of power in
existence and that no power can override a state (Poggi 1990: 24). While Mann alludes to this in his fourth point, the use of force and the coercive power of the state is an aspect of the state that Poggi does not shy away from. He argues that the foundation of political power is coercion (Poggi 1990: 6, also 1978). The concept of modern state is about power: “the state has many other functions, but fundamentally it is about rule” (McLennan et al. 1984: 14). The power of the state includes the power to employ force to ensure conformity to its rules. Force is not the only means of governing. For example democratic states govern through the consent of the governed, yet force is something that even democratic states cannot renounce (McLennan et al. 1984: 15).

Mann argues that states are of primary importance in the modern world, performing five functions that no other organization can attempt to do;

1. Wage massive routine war,
2. Provide communication infrastructure for both the military and capitalism,
3. Be the site of political democracy,
4. Guarantee social citizenship rights encroaching into the private sphere, and

Put simply, the state is the “chief political instrument for getting things done” (Deutsch 1966a: 4), and it “reserves to itself the business of rule over a territorially bounded society” (Poggi 1978: 1). In doing this, the state attends to the paramount social interest—preserving the collective’s very existence (Poggi 1978: 100).

While this discussion makes it seem as if states are single actors speaking with a unified voice, the state is both an actor and a location (Mann 1993: 46): An actor in the sense that it operates with an institutional voice, and a location in that institutions and individuals operate within it. Mann (1993: 75) further notes, “far from being singular and centralized, modern states are polymorphous power networks stretching between centre and territories.” The state is not a single organization, it is a “vast, diverse, complex organizational environment” (Poggi 1990: 184). The state is not a single power, it has many centres of authority, and can be thought of as a “chain or hierarchy of powers” (McLennan et al. 1984: 17). While the chain or hierarchy may be clearer in some states, especially federal ones, they exist in all states.
Different ministries within a state develop distinct administrative “styles, clienteles, policy traditions and biases in the relation and training of personnel,” in turn rivalries and policy differences develop between them, making coordination difficult (Poggi 1978: 94). This was most clearly seen in the work of Stein and Lang (2007) who, in their discussion on the Canadian war effort in Afghanistan, demonstrate how the three government agencies charged with overseeing Canadian interests there (the Canadian Forces, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and the Canadian International Development Agency) were unable to work well together and coordinate their activities due to different bureaucratic cultures. Chapter Six will show that not only do the federal government and the government of Nova Scotia have a difficult time working together, they actually compete with each other over the provision of services (and loyalty) in the province.

The state has not always been the large organization it is today. It only began undertaking major civilian functions in the 19th Century, sponsoring communications systems such as canals, roads, post offices, railways, telegraph systems and most significantly, schools (Mann 1993: 730). The modern state has massively enlarged its institutional infrastructure and has come to play a much greater role in society, enhancing all aspects of its power. In presenting the huge increase in state expenditure between the Napoleonic War and the First World War, Mann (1993) demonstrates how states began to penetrate society more and more, engaging the people in both the public and private spheres in new ways. Indeed, the example above from E. Weber (1976) shows that French state-building was completed only fairly recently. Indeed, the development of the modern state has gone hand in hand with modernity (Poggi 1990: 35).

*States and Nations II: Nation*

While the above discussion on the state is built upon widely accepted (yet not unproblematic) definitions, defining the nation is much more difficult (Gellner 1983: 5). If the state is a set of political institutions, what does that leave for the nation? According to Smith, the fundamental features of a nation are;
1. Historic territory or homeland,
2. Common myths and historic memories,
3. Common mass public culture,
4. Common legal rights and duties for all members, and

Smith argues that this definition of nation sets it apart from the state as the state refers to public institutions, while the nation signifies a cultural and political bond uniting a political community. Yet points four and five bring the state into the definition. This is especially true for the fourth point, as it is hard to imagine how legal rights would exist outside the framework provided by a state, as rights and duties imply coercion, the realm of the state. Gellner (1983: 7), a modernist as opposed to Smith, an ethno-symbolist, offers a definition of nation that is rather subjective and requires individuals to think of themselves as a part of the nation. He argues nations exist when 1) people share the same culture, referring to a system of ideas, signs, associations and ways of behaving and communicating; and 2) members of a nation recognize each other as such. Renan (1882: 4) states, “the essence of a nation is that individuals have many things in common, and that they have forgotten many things.” Accordingly Gellner’s two criteria and Smith’s first three, while coming from very different starting points, converge to form the basis that this project will use in its understanding of ‘nation’ as a distinct entity from ‘state.’

Conceptually differentiating state and nation is especially important, for, as Cohen notes, there are differences between the way the state represents the nation and how individuals interpret it. He argues that the power of national symbols lies in providing individuals with the means by which to think, rather than in compelling them to think in certain ways (Cohen 1996: 812). This appears to suggest that national symbols set the boundaries of thought but not what is located within these boundaries. This should come as no surprise, for if nations are flexible and able to change over time, the markers of a nation should be able to change over time, with the concept of ‘nation’ remaining static. Much of Hutchinson’s work (2001b, 1999, 1994a, 1987) demonstrates how Irish national identity was competed over, but the fact that Ireland was being redrawn was never brought into question. Likewise, Igartua (2006) argues that in Canada (outside Quebec) there has been a fundamental
reorganization of the way Canadians interpret Canada. It was always clear that while Canada was being discussed, it was national identity that was being debated.

That national identity is a product of human communication networks centred on individuals is clear. As Hearn (2007: 671) emphasizes:

National identity is reproduced along a series of relations as individuals reach out through the various forms of social organizations that frame their particular lives and circumstances, to draw on the larger cognitive category in ways that make it personally relevant.

In other words, individuals internalize the “rites” of the nation and make them their own (Cohen 1996: 807). As indicated above, nations are influenced by actors’ interpretations of them through the reproduction of history and ideas within these networks. This is a key difference between a nation and a state; one can conceive of a state without a history, because a state is a set of formal arrangements, but as Hobsbawm (1996: 255) notes, nations without pasts are contradictions, what makes a nation is its past. Deutsch (1960) links the past to the future, arguing that a nation without a past would be directionless.

Accordingly, histories and myths of national identity are neither static nor timeless, and are never left to their own devices; rather they are managed in the continual production of national identity (Cohen 1996: 806). Indeed, it is not just remembering that is important: “Forgetting history, or even getting history wrong, is an essential factor in the formation of a nation” (Renan 1882). Moreover, the interpretation of past events will be informed by the present (Cohen 1996: 807). As such it is not simply about remembering or forgetting, but realizing that the present influences the past just as the past influences the present and the future.

Nations, however, are more than just histories, myths, and assumptions separate from the physical world and existing only in the minds of its members. The nation links with territory differently than the state. While states link to territory through their abilities to govern and coerce, a nation is more than the limits of the state, it is a “homeland” which is a “repository of historic memories and associations, the place where ‘our’ sages, saints and heroes lived, worked, prayed and fought”

7 This, of course, is a purely academic exercise as states are created through a long historical process in which the outcomes are not always matched by the intentions of actors (Poggi 1978:98-99).
making the homeland unique amongst all other homelands (Smith 1991: 9). Although Smith approaches this from an ethnonationalist perspective, it should be noted that from a modernist perspective the importance of territory is no less important as it is where ‘we’ live, it is ‘our’ home. As stated earlier, the networks established in the modern era need to be ‘grounded’ in territory.

Nations bring together the people with a sense of equality that is not necessary for a state. Nations allow people to present themselves as part of “one horizontally equal space without rank or privilege,” conferring sovereignty not on the institution of a state, but through a popular sovereignty conferred on the people; hence the people are the nation (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 1). Smith once again brings the state back into the definition when he argues that “the nation has a community of laws and a single political will” and “there is a sense of legal equality amongst the citizens of the nation” (Smith 1991: 10). Yet from this one can extrapolate an understanding that nations are based upon common sets of understandings and norms, uniting people within the framework of equality and a common political identity. Mann’s work (1993) is enlightening, as he argues progress comes not from classes that cut across national and state borders, but from nations working within the “cage” that is the state. While Mann uses a nation-state model that does not account for a difference between nation and state, this does not detract from the soundness of his argument.

The creation of the nation is like the creation of identity in general; it is a multi-faceted and varied process taking many forms. It can be top down, as Greenfeld (1990) demonstrates in Russia. From the bottom up, as Gellner (1983) argues with the fictional Ruritarians. Or it can be lateral with impetus from other nations, as Keating (1998) contends. It has been argued that England was the first modern example of a nation and that the ideology of nationalism diffused outward from England to other states (Colls 2002, Royle 1998, Hutchinson 1994b, Elton 1992, Greenfeld 1990, 1987). All other nations developed as a reaction to England, or a reaction to other nations that reacted to England; a type of domino effect. Newer nations had England’s example to follow, and as such England became the first ‘them’ to the developing and differing ‘us’ of the modern era. This phenomenon
emphasizes the relational nature of identity, showing how national identity may only crystallize when confronted with another national identity.

The Relationship between State and Nation

The distinction between nation and state is found in the types of networks they encompass, with the nation founded on social networks and the state on political networks. While these networks overlap in reality, and in a pure ‘nation-state’ such as Germany they may be indistinguishable, recognizing them as different provides a starting point for this discussion. How do these two sets of networks interface with each other? The state requires legitimacy in order to govern, and legitimacy is granted through the nation as the repository of popular sovereignty. State and nation are not synonymous, but they are intertwined in such a way that nation became the basis for state. Understanding this relationship is fundamental to understanding how national and regional identities become politicized in modern states. This in turn details what happens when the state and the nation do not map on to each other or when there is more than one nation within the state.

The creation of states and nations was part of the process of transforming society from the pre-modern to the modern era. As states grew, they needed to legitimize their rule, and as a result they were framed as the political expression of nations. This is because ‘nation’ has several connotations making it a suitable collective identity for a state: 1) it “has a primordial ring to it,” and 2) it is based on other emotional bonds (Poggi 1990: 26). Haas (1986: 708) argues that nationalism is intertwined with modernity, and Mann (1995: 62) argues that nationalism arose out of the democratization of the processes of modernization (see also Yack 1999: 115). As nations became seen as rightful holders of popular sovereignty, states benefited from framing themselves as nations (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 12).

According to Mann (1993: 251), people are trapped in a “cage” that is the state; movements for human progress can only operate within a state’s borders as this is the only way to mobilize for change (as mentioned earlier, Mann equates states and nations, but a careful reading of Mann shows that in this context he means nation in the sense that it is used here). As people live in these ‘state-cages’ the drive to
improve the lives of the people within them creates the desire for democratization (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 1). As Anderson pertinently asks, “where is the tomb of the unknown Marxist?” (1983). According to Mann (1993), nationalism is not the wrong tactic adopted by the working class who should focus instead on class issues; it is the only way for people to improve their lives.

States need nations as the successful transition to modernity happens when resources are found in the traditional culture upon which to anchor change and new practices, and modern democracy requires that laws result from collective decisions (Taylor 1998: 203-205). This means that as long as a tie between statehood and nationhood persists, the advantage of a nation running its own state is substantial (Tilly 1994: 144), as the only way for people to achieve meaningful change in the organization of society is through the state. The nation is seen as the state’s ultimate constituency—the nation is the holder of sovereignty (Poggi 1990: 61-2). Hence, groups organize along national lines in order to achieve change, and the ‘nation’ becomes the locus of change within the state. Even if there is no pre-existing nation, the state must go about creating one. This point is illustrated by the famous quote about the unification of the Italian peninsula and the creation of Italy: “We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians” (Massimo d’Azeglio in Hobsbawm 1996: 257).

Nation and state are two separate entities in theory. However, for a state to achieve legitimacy in practice, especially democratic legitimacy, it must be seen as the expression of popular sovereignty. It is the nation, not the state, which is the bearer of popular sovereignty, suggesting a political dynamic to nations. The following section on the constitutional organization of states begins to show how understanding the difference between ‘nation’ and ‘state’ is fundamental to understanding region, as constitutions are the basic ‘glue’ holding states and nations together, in turn defining the place of the regions.

**Territorial Identities and the Organization of the State**

According to Cheffins and Johnson (1993: 83), constitutions serve three purposes: 1) they allow for the creation of the basic organs and institutions of the state; 2) they detail the powers of the public institutions and their relations with each
other and with the public; and, 3) they provide the processes by which laws are made and the limitations on the power of public officials. This interpretation of constitutions is founded on what Tierney (2007) would argue is a mistaken implication that there is a single ‘people’ for which the constitution applies. Accordingly, another attribute of constitutions must be; 4) they describe who the people(s) of a state are and in doing so provide the political mythology necessary for the smooth functioning of a state.

Lijphart (2004: 96-7) notes that experts on divided societies and constitutional engineering broadly agree that deep divisions pose a grave problem for democracy, that it is generally more difficult to establish and maintain democratic government in divided societies. With regard to the accommodation of territorial difference, the most intuitive type of government system for this would be a federal system as the purpose of federalism is conflict management (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 7). If federalism cannot manage accommodation of multiple nations, it is difficult to imagine a system that could (Burgess 2006 in Lecours and Nootens 2008: 7). Lijphart (2004: 104) agrees with this point, although he sees federalism as being part of an overall strategy of consociationalism within divided societies.

The foundation of consociational theory is that divided territories with antagonistic peoples are “effectively, prudently, and sometimes optimally, governed according to consociational principles” (McGarry and O’Leary 2006a: 43-44) which are:

1. Executive power sharing—each of the main communities share in executive power;
2. Autonomy or self-government—each community enjoys some measure of autonomy, particularly for cultural concerns;
3. Proportionality—each is represented proportionally in key public institutions and benefits proportionally from government expenditure; and,
4. Veto-rights—each is able to prevent change that adversely affects their vital interest (McGarry and O’Leary 2006a: 46).

As Studlar and Christensen note, due to its unique mix of institutions and practices, Canadian democracy is difficult to classify (2006: 837). Lijphart (1999) classifies Canada as a majoritarian-federal democracy, the least common type. On the surface Canadian democracy, a direct offshoot of the Westminster system, appears to be majoritarian, yet it is also a federal system, which possesses some
consociational elements. These elements can be found in the formal and informal constitutional mechanisms of the Canadian state. Formally, the federal system grants each province autonomy over certain policy spheres, and informally, through the official languages policies of the federal government, (which allow full French-Canadian participation in the system), the regionally balanced cabinets, the fact that Quebec is granted three out of nine of the Supreme Court justices, and so forth.

Lijphart (2004: 103) argues collegial cabinets in parliamentary systems facilitate the formation of power-sharing executives, they do not by themselves guarantee that power sharing will be instituted. In the Canadian case this ‘collegial’ system appears to have withstood the test of time. In contrast, the British case has not only traditionally lacked a multi-level structure, it has also lacked meaningful consociational elements outside of the territorial Secretaries of State and their corresponding Offices.

For a multinational state to be successful, it must begin by recognizing what it means to be multinational. As argued by Tierney (2007: 733), the very structure of traditional debates concerning the constitutional arrangements of democracy are based on the problematic “unitary demos thesis,” that the state constitutes a single people or nation. Simeon (2006a) discusses the “federal ideal,” in which federalism manifests itself differently, partly based on the understanding of ‘federalism’ held by actors within the system. This means that for federalism to be successful as a source of conflict regulation within a multinational federation, it needs to acknowledge from the beginning that it encompasses more than one demos or group of people that is democratically sovereign.

According to Choudhry (2007: 612), constitutions can simultaneously serve two functions which at first glance may appear at odds, accommodation and integration. He argues the terms accommodation and integration are potentially misleading as both have the same end-goal in mind, the territorial integrity of the state. Federal systems allow constituent units to have sovereign power over certain state functions, allowing for the accommodation of difference. This allows power to be divided vertically between the centre and the constituent components, but it also divides power horizontally within the central level. While minority nations may have majority control over the policy spheres assigned to their level of government, the
state still needs to strike some sort of balance within central decision making. Within federal systems there are still shared responsibilities which have an impact on the interests of the members of the constituent nations. In order to influence the decision making process, members of these nations have to engage in the statewide political process, integrating elites from all sub-state nations into the common decision making process.

Not only is a constitution an expression of the power relations in a society, it is an expression of the compromises that led to its creation (Boismenu 1996: 99). As Cairns (1995) states, they are tools of recognition and the denial thereof. Constitutions, however, cannot detail every aspect of the state apparatus, and this can lead to constitutional grey areas and friction between the different levels of government (Cheffins and Johnson 1993: 84). Simeon’s (2006a) ‘federal ideal’ refers to more than just the institutional arrangements in a society, it also refers to the way in which society expects its system to work. He argues that the reason different federal systems, such as Canada, Australia, Germany and the United States, manifest federal relations so differently is not due solely to their institutional make up, but also to the different views held by people within these societies of how the federal system should operate. Since constitutions cannot cover all aspects of institutional relations, if actors in the member nations can be flexible, these grey areas can be managed through negotiation. Yet, in multinational states there may be more than one understanding of the nature of the constituent peoples of the state. According to Choudhry (2007: 632), who uses the example of Quebec in Canada, this can manifest itself in two conflicting issues: whether there should be asymmetrical governance, and whether the minority sub-state nation should receive recognition and in what form.

Keating (1998) asks the question ‘What’s wrong with asymmetrical government?’, which he answers by explaining that asymmetrical governments can provide both the accommodation needed to satisfy minority nations, and the integration necessary for the state to operate effectively. Keating, however, does not appear to take into account differing conceptions of the state. Taylor (1991) argues that “deep diversity,” what Gagnon and Iacovino (2007) call “differentiated citizenship,” the recognition that there is more than one legitimate way of seeing the
state and that the protection of minority rights through a different relationship with
the state is also legitimate, is required in multinational states in order to allow for this
simultaneous accommodation and integration. Still, it is not clear if “differentiated
citizenship” can accommodate fundamentally different interpretations of the state.
The call for ‘deep diversity’ may not take into account the difference between
administrative asymmetry and symbolic symmetry, which may be important to actors
within the majority nation who may not recognize that their state is multinational with
multiple demos

This leads to the question of constitutional reform. Whitaker (1992: 191)
argues that in federations this process is more difficult due to the restrictions
federalism places on constitutional reform and the fact that federations are inherently
conservative in nature. In a similar vein, Simeon (2006b: 34-6) argues that although
federalism may inhibit/slow the growth of the welfare state, it can also slow its
weakening. Taken together, these points indicate that in divided societies rapid non-
consensual change is obstructed. Indeed, this argument holds true of any system
where the reform of the constitution is more difficult than passing regular legislation.
While Whitaker recognizes that there are similar constraints on governments in
unitary states, in a federation these are formalized in the constitution. This is a very
significant point, and the term ‘formalized’ may not actually present the difficulties in
their truest form; instead the term ‘fossilized’ may more accurately reflect the
constraints in constitutional reform. Much like a fossil is an object of the past
solidified in the present, so too is a constitution; it represents the end result of the
bargaining processes that lead to its creation and the norms and values held by those
bargaining at the time. However, as society changes, the constitutional order may
prove to be ineffective in dealing with the problems that these changes bring about.
On the one hand constitutions limit the ability of the majority nation to implement
major change without the consent of the minority. On the other hand, given that
identities are fluid and contextual, the inability of a constitutional order to be flexible
in an inherently dynamic system of identities may increase the frustration of the
majority or minority nations or both.
Finally, this section turns to a discussion of the ‘region.’ It comes last because in order to understand what a region is, one has to understand what a region is not so as to avoid confusing ‘region’ and ‘sub-state nation.’ What, then, is the difference between a regional and a national identity? As both are subjective entities based around a series of bounded networks, the key difference is that of primary political loyalty and political legitimacy. Nations essentially emerged as movements for democracy but were confronted with a choice, to democratize either the centre or the local regional seats of government (Mann 1993: 249-50). While Mann’s work focuses on the different organizations that work at the centre of the state, his argument is also an important analytical tool for understanding regional identities. Deutsch, according to Rokkan (1981: 70), teaches researchers to look for centre-building networks and to study the effect that the print media and educational institutions have on fashioning territory wide identities. ‘Centre,’ however, need not mean capital, as states may have more than one centre (Foltz 1981: 31). Regions can also have more than one centre; the regional centre and the national centre can both exist with diffuse networks surrounding them.

‘Region’ is a territorial space, but ‘regional identity’ implies a common sense of community, system of interaction and communication, and network of interconnected state-society institutions (Tomblin 2004a: 11). While regional identity may be difficult to define, there is evidence for an explosion of regionalism in Europe (Tomaney and Ward 2001: 8); in Canada regions are constitutionally enshrined as provinces. Many of the markers used to identify a region are similar, if not the same, as those used to define a nation. The extent to which a sense of regional identity takes root depends on a combination of internal and external factors (Tomblin 2004a: 12). Mann (1993: 79) refers to the state as an entity with “many mansions”: it is multifaceted and has many competing interests in it. Yet these interests can coexist without competing or interacting with each other. Different groups may wield great power in some clusters, but not in others (Deutsch 1966a: 76). In this sense, there are clusters of national elites whose concerns are nationwide, but also clusters of elites whose concerns are regional in scope and interest.
As outlined in the previous section, state and nation may belong to separate analytical categories but they are bound together just as region is bound to nation in a different, yet similar, manner. While nations may compete with states, regions do not compete with nations; they are one of the networks that make up the nation. Sub-state levels of government, such as Canadian provinces or English GORs are prime examples of regional networks. They have clearly bounded networks of social and political communication, but operate within the borders of larger nations and states.

Regions are embedded in wider nations and encourage loyalty amongst their members. Yet regional loyalty is embedded within the national loyalty and the national loyalty extends beyond the region. Within both there are clear ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups but with regard to the region, people from other parts of the nation can be both ‘us’ and ‘them’ at the same time. According to Morril (1995) one should not be surprised that regional identities exist, as modern societies are large and complex.

As discussed, states are massive institutions that need not have a single voice; “for the state to crystallize into a singular systemic system would require extraordinary organizing abilities and extraordinary political interest by civil society” (Mann 1993: 80).

Because regions are different (either subjectively or objectively) from each other, but embedded within the nation, it should come as no surprise that there will be regional differences in political demands which come from differing conceptions of what the nation or state is (Cheffins and Johnson 1993: 84, Marquand 1995: 278). Elkins and Simeon (1979: 130) argue that if you take people from the same social category but from different nations and they hold different assumptions, then national culture is the mitigating factor. This argument would hold true across regions as well. One could argue that regional culture is the cause of differences (remembering that culture includes history, values, and norms based around a bounded network).

To understand how regions differ from sub-state nations this section now turns to a discussion on where the primary political loyalty of regional actors can be found.

**Primary Political Loyalty**

The state is, to put it simply, the primary source of political action and coercion. Yet its legitimacy to coerce is derived from it being the representative of
the nation, as the nation is the repository of political legitimacy through popular sovereignty. Therefore, the region is not a political actor/institution, which is able to coerce. Nor is the region a holder of popular sovereignty—it is a part of the nation which holds that sovereignty. The region may possess markers that make it distinct, and individuals in the region may interpret the nation differently than their co-nationals in other parts of the nation (the personal nationalism of Cohen 1996 and Hearn 2007), but it is still part of the nation. Meadwell notes the difference between regionalists and nationalists is that “regionalists want to improve their position within existing institutional arrangements… without losing completely those components of center-periphery relationships which they value” (1991: 402). In this sense, that which has value is the nation itself—membership in the nation is a cultural good. The fact that the region is part of the nation is especially relevant with regard to differentiating it from a minority nation. Returning to the earlier discussion on the relationship between nation and state, it was shown that national identity produced the solidarity that unites the population and allows the state to function. If the state was linked to the population through something other than the nation and its corresponding cultural bonds, say through some sort of classical patriotism, then the relationship between region and state would be very different.

At the risk of oversimplifying the term patriotism, an abridged version of the concept of patriotism outlined by Taylor (1998: 201) will be used. He argues that patriotism can have the same meaning it had for the ‘ancients;’ a love of fatherland and what fatherland represents, a love based upon law. Patriotism unites people not founded upon a common culture, but out of their common love for a political system granting them their freedom and respecting their dignity. Taylor (1998) argues that the modern democratic state needs a healthy degree of patriotism, a strong sense of identification with the polity and a willingness to give oneself for it. According to Viroli (1997), patriotism contradicts nationalism as patriotism is outward looking while nationalism is inward looking. He agrees with Taylor that nationalism has become the “most ready motor of patriotism” (1998: 202) and has left patriotism at the margins of modern political thought (Viroli 1997: 160). Though it may be at the

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8 Although in devolved/federal systems a regional tier of government may hold some power of coercion, this power still stems from the centre, the constitution.
margin of political thought, it suggests the possibility of a loyalty to the state divorced from national sentiment.
If states in the modern era did have patriotism in the sense of loyalty to institutions, as opposed to the cultural and collective underpinnings of national identity, then the region would still be embedded in, though no longer indivisible from, the nation. It would be conceivable for a region to separate and create even better structures for its citizens. Yet as patriotism is a form of civic nationalism, there are shared and unifying cultural norms, which unite citizens across regions, ensuring that secession is not an option for the region. While Mann (1993) demonstrates how a series of bounded networks can be formed at a regional level, because individuals residing in the region engage in a wider national norms, histories and myth-building, regional identity is an ‘embedded identity.’ In other words, the individual lives in both the region and the nation simultaneously. As it is the nation, not the state, that is the bearer of popular sovereignty, the region is part of a larger national sovereignty, and it is to the nation, not the state or region, that individuals give their primary political loyalty.

Yack (1999) advances a similar argument to Mann (1993), and brings the concepts of nationalism and patriotism together. He argues that as people are bound within the confines of the nation, the plea for “constitutional patriotism” only makes sense if it is grounded within cultural horizons of the nation (Yack 1999: 108, also Kymlicka 2003). Billig (1995) identifies patriotism as the day-to-day expression of national sentiment, which he terms ‘banal nationalism.’ Nationalism in established states becomes background noise, and when it is consciously acknowledged it is termed patriotism. Nationalism is not what ‘we’ have, it is limited to the fringes, to the ‘others’, what ‘we’ have is patriotism (Billig 1995: 55). In this sense the ‘greater good,’ or ‘love of country,’ patriots appeal to, is formed by the communication networks that make up the nation upon which functioning states are based.

Lecours and Nootens (2008: 1) argue nationalism is implicit when concealed by the label of patriotism. Indeed, the greatest challenge against the concept of patriotism may not even come from political theory, but from anthropology and the study of culture. Kuper (1999) points out that it is national culture that shapes a state’s policies and the outcomes of these policies. The section dealing with constitutional management in multinational states demonstrated that majorities often see their outlook as ‘value neutral’ and based on a purely universal-liberal definition.
of ‘good’ which underpins state institutions, yet this does not hold up to direct scrutiny. Within modern democratic states one could not find systems as different from each other as those of the USA, Britain or France, yet all three are democracies. Each of these democracies is different and these differences are in large part a result of culturally distinct attitudes of how the state should be organized. If the liberal state were neutral with regard to issues of ‘good,’ and ‘good’ could be divorced from culture, it would seem to follow that one would find a convergence of democratic practice and structures amongst western democracies. As there is no convergence, liberal democratic states may present themselves as not being based upon cultural understandings, but this is done “by pretending to be a neutral locus of relationships between citizens” (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 2, my italics). Building upon Yack’s (1999) logic, patriotism may be seen to be possible if one sees the world as a collection of nation-states when in reality these are extremely rare. It is by understanding that even when disguised as constitutional patriotism, loyalty to the state is actually loyalty to the nation upon which the state is founded.

Accordingly, the difference between a region and a sub-state nation is that members of a region conceive of themselves as belonging to a larger nation, and that nation is the primary political loyalty. In the case of a sub-state nation, it may belong to a larger state, but it may or may not necessarily belong to a larger nation, and the sub-state nation is the primary political loyalty. So, while regionalism and nationalism can manifest themselves in a similar manner, a region will not seek independence because regional actors see themselves as a part of the larger nation. In fact, territorial movements centred on regional identity may actually seek greater integration into the national community. The Maritime Rights movement of the 1920s was about integration into the Canadian economy (Savoie 2006: 36) and the original slogan of the Western based Reform Party of Canada was ‘The West Wants In.’

Although one commonly thinks of regionalism as being about a demand for more power, it can manifest itself in other ways. Working ‘for’ one’s region, can work ‘against’ another region, stopping another region from gaining a comparative advantage (Tomaney 1999: 76). As will be seen in later chapters, in both Nova Scotia and the North East, regional movements seemed divided on whether they
should seek autonomy or integration (although as Choudhry (2007) above notes, both are possible within the same constitutional framework).

Tomblin (2004b: 82) claims local, sub-state and state communities do not voluntarily give up control of the policy process except under conditions of complete failure, where there is no incentive to defend the status quo. Yet just because political actors are loath to give up power does not mean that the units they represent are bearers of popular sovereignty. As politicians are power maximizers, (Hopkins 1996), disputes between levels of government are not necessarily based on the politics of identity.

The locus of primary political loyalty is the difference between the nation and other territorialized political loyalties. Regional actors recognize the sovereignty of the wider nation over them. The region is both embedded in the nation, and indivisible from it. Hirschmann’s (1970) ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’ helps conceptualize the key differences between nations and regions, especially between a sub-state minority nation and a region. His logic suggests minority nations have a potential political strategy that a sub-state region lacks, the exit option. While one can conceive of an independent Nova Scotia or North East England from a purely intellectual point of view, the regions are clearly embedded in a greater sovereignty, and attempts to increase ‘voice’ at the regional or state level is limited by their loyalty.

If the region were divisible from the nation it would be a manifestation of popular sovereignty, which, as has been argued, would make it a nation. Accordingly, if a regional movement advocates for political sovereignty, it may have attained a form of ‘national consciousness.’ Determining whether regions can evolve into nations is, however, beyond the scope of this project. Cohen (1996) argues each person interprets the nation differently, therefore regional actors would be seen as interpreting the nation from a regional point of view, though they still belong to the same national networks. Regional actors essentially inhabit two different sets of bounded networks, one for the nation and one for the region. This point is extremely useful to the upcoming discussion on the politicization of territorial identity and majority nationalism. People who subscribe to the regional identity will also subscribe to the national one; they will not be able to conceive of them separately. As
national identity is politicized, so too is regional identity, as any debate on the nation automatically includes the place of the region within it, highlighting regional understandings of the nation.

2.4 The Politicisation of Territorial Identity: Nationalism and Regionalism

To further understand the region as a part of the larger nation, this section explores how territorial identity mobilizes and the place of the region within the process of territorial mobilization. Given that a) ‘universal norms’ are articulated in a culturally understood and mitigated environment, b) nations and states rarely correspond fully, and c) it is the nation, not the state, upon which popular sovereignty and political legitimacy rest, one can see the genesis of conflict along territorial lines in states.

In vernacular English, the term ‘nation-state’ is often used, but as an analytical term it is dangerously misleading. Regionalism is a part of the process of identity mobilization within the state. By understanding how identity is mobilized along national lines one gains understanding of how identity is mobilized along regional lines; ‘region’ is a component of the identity mobilized within the majority community. As majority identity is mobilized vis-à-vis the minority, understanding regional identity mobilization in a multinational state requires examining how friction occurs between the different nations within the state. This friction shapes the political environment in such a way as to allow regional actors to advocate for regional concerns, as it is through the process of national identity politicization in the majority nation that regional identity is politicized.

The discussion begins by examining how regional actors use the political environment to harness regional identity. This is followed by discussing ‘majority nationalism,’ an oft overlooked phenomenon. Finally, the discussion introduces

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9 This logic is presented in relation to a multinational state, yet within a nation-state such as Germany which may lack the majority-minority nation dynamic, identity does not remain static over time. All national identities change and evolve, and regional actors interpret the nation through the lens of the region. No state is completely uniform, as such territorial identity mobilization has the potential to emerge in nation-states as well.

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opposing interpretations of the state in multinational states which manifest in two competing discourses; unionism and pan-nationalism. This expands upon the network framework presented earlier as debate around the state will privilege one or the other, giving regional political actors the opportunity to articulate a viewpoint based upon their embedded place within the nation.

Identity Mobilization

By exploring the relationship between majority and minority nations, one may be able to tease out why the problematization of territorial identity occurs and how regional and national identities can be mobilized. When the political environment changes, the ability of political actors to act changes. Mobilization does not happen spontaneously, an incentive has to emerge to encourage it, or a disincentive has to be removed that was constraining it. The politics of identity are about persistent grievances, inequalities and past wrongs (Hutchinson 1999: 399), but these are not necessarily objective. They are based on the abstract notion of legitimate rule (Chaterjee 1993: 203, Fidler 1991: 6-7), and do not necessarily occur only in economically disadvantaged parts of the state, but also in developed parts of the state where a sense of identity has been maintained (Keating 1988: 235). Yet this does not address the question of what makes a certain time period ‘ripe’ for mobilization? This section explores the importance of the political environment in understanding regionalism, creating a framework for analysing elite debate.

Territorial identity mobilization is a process whereby political elites advance their policy goals by linking them to people’s attachments to their particular territory —be it locality, region or nation. It occurs alongside a breakdown in prevailing arrangements of “territorial management” (Keating 1988: 11). Territorial management here means the balancing of the demands and competing interests of different nations within multinational states as well as competing regional demands within the different nations. Territorial management is not static; it is linked to the evolution of the state through time and changes in the wider society will have an impact upon it. For instance, Choudhry (2007: 632) points out that a challenge facing Canada is that society has changed fundamentally since the original division of powers in 1867. While historically the state did not involve itself in the day-to-day
operation of society, as Canadian society changed some of the most expensive policy
spheres of the state fell into provincial jurisdiction while the required revenue
generating powers fell within the jurisdiction of the federal government. This created
a situation in which both orders of government competed with each other, and this
competition did not take place along national lines. Provinces whose elites felt they
lost out in this process may have begun to feel aggrieved, but debate between
different orders of government is healthy (Simeon 2006b: 40), as different orders of
government can “keep each other honest” (Weinstock 2006). Grievance and identity
alone are not sufficient to provoke mobilization, but they are tools that regional actors
can use (Lanigan 2001: 104). Analysts of social movements argue that mobilization
depends on the networks in which participants are embedded; movements “operate
within frames set by a historical accumulation of shared understandings” (Tilly 1998:
455). Accordingly, actors located in regional networks may have different
interpretations as to the nature of the state than actors in either the minority nation or
different parts of the majority.

According to Tarrow (1998: 2-6), contentious politics is triggered when
changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives for political actors
to tap into “deep rooted feelings of solidarity or identity.” Collective action requires
solidarity (Meadwell 1989:140), and “social mobilization” is the term used to
describe the process of change when countries move from traditional to modern
societies; a process Deutsch (1961: 493-4) argues increases impersonal contact as
well as exposure to mass media, changes in residence, and political participation (also
Anderson 1983). While there is an emotional component to this, it is not solely an
emotional response; there is no emotional-rational dichotomy. The feelings of
solidarity within movements of territorial mobilization are not irrational as emotions
create goals by reinforcing the actors’ worldview (Amizade and McAdams 2001). To
better understand how the changing political environment influences regionalism, this
section briefly discusses the literature surrounding ‘political opportunity structure.’

Changing Political Environment

Wahlstrom and Peterson (2006) note ‘political opportunity structure’ is a
concept first introduced by Eisinger in 1973 but it has been heavily influenced by
McAdam (1982) and Tarrow (1994). According to McAdam et al. (1996), the analysis of political opportunity is an attempt to analyze “the political circumstances that have an effect on the emergence, structure, scope and success of social movements.” Essentially it is a study of the changing constraints and incentives experienced by political actors.

McAdam (1996) (in Wahlstrom and Peterson 2006: 364) argues there are four basic factors that have an impact on political opportunity;

1) The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system,
2) The stability of the broad set of elite alignments that underpin a polity,
3) The presence of elite allies, and
4) The state’s capacity and propensity for repression (p 27).

The first point deals with the ability of social movements to enter the system. As both Nova Scotia and the North East are part of democratic societies, their elites are already within the system, and these elites are able to use democratic means to harness regional identity to advance their political objectives. The second point addresses the stability of institutional power structures and whether the major constituent groups within the state are in agreement on fundamental issues. That both Canada and Britain are home to powerful sub-state nationalist movements challenging the state indicates that elite alignment is fluid in both states. The third factor, elite allies, is particularly interesting as later chapters demonstrate that the minority nations were often seen as allies for advancing regional concerns.

Repression, the fourth point, may not seem to apply to liberal democratic states, yet one should not dismiss the ability of governments to use their resources to advance their agendas and constrain those who hold opposing views, especially with regard to movements challenging the legitimacy of the state. While this is not repression in an authoritarian sense, democracies can create constraints through a variety of means. This can be done through the organization of state structures and practices, such as when Labour adopted an Additional Member System of electing Members of the Scottish Parliament for the purpose of keeping the Scottish National Party out of power (see Chapter Four). It may also occur through the staatsvolk controlling the dominant discourse surrounding the nature of the state, framing the state along their interpretations. McAdam’s four points allow one to extrapolate how the political
environment may change for regional actors in the majority nation; in particular, as identity becomes politicized due to friction between the majority and minority nations, debate of what the state is and what its underpinning values are are introduced to the statewide political discourse.

The key to understanding how the political environment relates to regional movements is in understanding that political environments are not static; if identity is an ongoing process (Hall 1996), then the political environment vis-à-vis identity is fluid and evolving as well. However the basic organizational structure of a state is much less fluid. As argued above, constitutional orders are based on past compromise, and may not be reflective of the current social dynamics. While constitutional arrangements may help constrain the political environment for minority national actors, this assumes two things: 1) constitutional arrangements will accommodate minorities while integrating the minority and majority nations at the state level, and 2) both the minority and majority nations can reach agreement on who or what the constituent elements of the state are. However, a temporal dynamic intersects the above two points, namely that societies change over time. Just because agreement is reached on these issues in the year X, in the year X + N this may no longer be viable, especially if during the N period there are major changes in the way the state and society interact. This is especially important given that many of the multinational states of the modern era were created in the 19th Century or earlier. When one takes into account major changes that have occurred since then, especially since the end of the Second World War and the rise of the welfare state, the success of multinational states may not be found in their constitutional arrangements, but rather in the ability of the elites of constituent nations to regulate the inevitable conflicts that arise.

Majority Nationalism

As regions are embedded within, and indivisible from, larger nations; regionalism should be understood as part of the nationalism of the nation. Simeon’s (2006b) argument that national standards are derived through debate between different orders of government is useful here. As national identities are the result of constant debate between the different parts of the nation, regionalism is part and
It is fundamentally different from minority nationalism in that it is a part of the continual renegotiation of national identity. To understand regionalism this section examines how identity within the majority nation becomes politicized.

Hechter (2000) outlines four ways in which nationalism manifests. *State-building nationalism* is the state attempting to assimilate culturally diverse territories. *Peripheral nationalism* is resistance to state-building nationalism. *Irredentist nationalism* is when a state attempts to expand its boundaries to incorporate co-nationals. *Unification nationalism* is the merger of culturally homogenous but politically divided territory into a single state. He also mentions patriotism, which he does not classify as nationalism although he recognizes it as a movement centred on the greatness of the nation (Hechter 2000: 15-17). According to Tilly nationalism takes two forms, *state-led* and *state-seeking* (1998: 475-6, 1994: 133). State-led nationalism includes the creation and imposition of a dominant language, origin myth, symbols, rituals, memberships, education routines, and obligations. State-seeking nationalism occurs when representatives of a population group claim autonomy or independence as “distinct coherent cultural identity” (1998: 476). Mann (1995: 46) argues that there are three types of nationalism: 1) *state reinforcing*, in which the state and the nation match up, 2) *state subverting* in which the state is bigger than the nation, and 3) *state creating* in which the state is smaller than the nation (Mann 1995: 46).

Patriotism, state-building/-led/-reinforcing nationalism are all cases in which the dominant nation use its position within the state to impose its culture on the state as a whole. This, however, should not be interpreted to mean that the state is actively engaging in a cultural-ethnic genocide. It is not even to say that it is actively illiberal, rather that it is imposing the majority nation’s liberalism on the territory of the state.

That majority nationalism is overlooked in the wider literature on nationalism is seen in the following quote:

State-led nationalism has been rare in human history; over the roughly 10,000 years that states have existed somewhere in the world, most rulers have settled for assigning priority within their domains to their own cultural definitions and reading of their own interests, but coexisting more or less comfortably
with composite subject populations having distinctive charters, cultures, and social routines (Tilly 1998: 476).

The first point that needs to be addressed is that how the state was ‘governed’ historically is irrelevant to an understanding of states and nations in the modern era. Ten thousand years ago when rulers ruled by divine right over illiterate and immobile peasantry, issues of popular sovereignty and political legitimacy were immaterial. The discussion on the relationship between state and nation demonstrated that while the state maintains control through its ability to coerce, its legitimacy to coerce stems from it representing the nation, the bearer of popular sovereignty. What may have been immaterial historically is now universal and fundamental.

Dominant groups in a multinational state, the staatsvolk, may not express their nationalism consciously. Billig (1995) refers to this process as ‘banal nationalism.’ Yet as Deutsch (1966b: 6) notes, governments must obtain the compliance or active support of the largest groups in a territory and the majority of the population in order to maintain the legitimacy of the state. Accordingly, as the state and the largest groups become intertwined the majority community will express its understanding of the way society should be organized (with corresponding interpretations of ‘good’ and just’) through the state.

“Dominant nationalism” usually entails the transfer of the staatsvolk’s (or its elites’) interpretations of self onto the state, turning the state into the expression of their nation (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 3). The state becomes the medium by which the majority community’s identity is transmitted. As indicated above, even so-called universalistic liberal norms are culturally dependant. As the majority community expresses its culturally based understandings of liberal values through the state, the minority community could interpret that as state-building majority nationalism. Individuals can only be truly free in an environment in which their culture and their values are respected, and while most modern states would argue that they rule according to universalistic norms, minority groups may argue against this (Kuper 1999).

Majority nationalism is especially dangerous for political cohesion in a state if the minority group begins to feel that a) their way of seeing things is different from the majority, b) that this is generally not understood or recognized by the majority,
and c) the majority is not willing to alter forms of debate to accommodate this difference, leaving the minority systematically unheard, its voice unable to penetrate public debate (Taylor 1998: 204). Returning to Billig (1995), what legitimizes the nationalism of the majority community is that it is the dominant nationalism in the state, and as such it reinforces the state. This is the opposite of minority nationalism, which challenges the state. Considering nationalism as a minority phenomenon makes its relationship with the state mainly antagonistic (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 4). It ignores the dialectical relationship between the majority and minority nation as they react to each other. To understand how this challenges the state, this section will address how citizens give consent to be governed.

Consent of the Governed

The survival of political institutions is directly related to people’s perceptions of their legitimacy (Anderson and Mendes 2005: 92): the governed must give their consent. In a democratic state, the first key component of legitimacy is rule of the people through fair, regular, and free elections. A key second component is the consent of the loser. For a democratic state to be legitimate, the simple concept of majority rule is not sufficient. The perceived effectiveness of institutions is equally important to institutional arrangements in managing relations between national groupings. As Barry (1975b: 485) notes:

The crucial point is that the institution of collective decision making by a simple majority of the popular vote is in itself the antithesis of ‘amicable agreement’ as ‘amicable agreements’ must be negotiated among people who either trust one another or do not need to because they can apply sanctions against defaulters.

In a stable liberal democracy elections are designed to produce winners and losers, and the losers must see the outcome as legitimate (Anderson and Mendes 2005, Nadeau et al. 2000, Nadeau and Blais 1993).

Through the electoral process all democracies are designed to create political inequalities among citizens and political elites at regular intervals (Anderson and Mendes 2005: 93). Liberal democracies have three basic premises that help mitigate some of the problems that may arise from this: 1) democratic equality, all citizens are entitled to one vote; 2) people will not always be in the minority, people will win in
some decisions and lose in others; and 3) belonging to a shared national community mitigates being the loser, as belonging to the nation unites citizens at a deeper level (Lecours and Nootens 2008: 12). Support of the loser is a less obvious part of democratic systems, requiring people to support the outcome of decisions unfavourable to them. But the viability of the political system rests on the support of substantial numbers of people who are displeased with the outcome of an election (Nadeau and Blais 1993: 553).

In majoritarian multinational states, the consent of the loser can be interpreted to mean the consent of the minority nations to be governed through state structures which will have to be responsive to a majority population residing in another nation. As Taylor (1998: 204) notes “if it appears that in some systemic way, there are obstacles to certain sections of the population being heard, then the legitimacy of democratic rule in that society is under challenge.” Dominance is neither positive nor negative, it just is, but it can have positive or negative consequences (Careless 1989: 52). Accordingly, state institutions need to be sympathetic to the aspirations of national minorities, and be interpreted by both national minorities and majorities to be fair and equitable. As discussed in the earlier section on constitutions, this is a complex and difficult process.

Being part of the majority or minority after an election may impact attitudes about the general workings of democracy (Nadeau et al. 2000: 10). If the majority of the population in a minority nation is constantly on the losing side in the democratic decision making process this may bring the legitimacy of the state into question. Winning and losing matters because the stability and the functioning of the system “depend on actors’ incentives for institutional change” (Anderson and Tverdova 2001: 323). Being deprived of voice and being in a minority position creates that incentive. Accordingly, the winning and losing that is a fundamental component of democratic politics may have the result of framing the minority nation as a perpetual ‘loser’ in the system. For example, Scotland could be seen in this light during the Thatcher/Major era. Chapter Four discusses how a so-called Doomsday Scenario

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10 This, of course, can be mitigated through the introduction of consociational elements in the constitution, but this requires the staatsvolk to accept that the state is actually multinational.
emerged during this time, when Scotland was subjected to a government in Westminster that lacked substantial Scottish representation. In this light, it is difficult to see how actors within the minority nation would not interpret the working of the state as state-/nation-building nationalism of the majority.

Indeed, the reaction to majority nationalism may be interpreted as minority nationalism when, instead, it is a defence of the status quo against changes being made by the other nation (see Greer 2007). Yet instead of this being an example of state-subverting nationalism (sub-state minority nationalism in its traditional sense), it should be seen in the light of the perspective of actors in the minority nation who view the intrusion of the state as a threat to their identity. By challenging the assumptions held by actors in the staatsvolk, minority nationalism forces elites to address fundamental questions as to the nature of the state. From the perspective of the majority nation, this would appear as an orthodox manifestation of minority nationalism. Actors in the majority nation may not recognize their role in the politicization of identity. Rather than minority nationalism bringing the nature of the state into question, it is the dialectical relationship between majority and minority nations, which does this.

Building upon the dialectical relationship, this discussion now highlights the need for a sense of balance amongst the constituent units in multi-national states. A lack of balance may lead to divergent aims as conflicting interpretations of the state come to a head. This section concentrates on the importance of understanding the different interpretations of the state, examining the potential problems created by the conflation of nation and state: 1) the Tyranny of the Majority, and 2) a Divergence of Aims, both of which are exacerbated by 3) Assumed Homogeneity in the state. This section suggests that concepts of nation and state become intertwined in multinational states and this is where the identity ‘fault line’ lies. When this fault line becomes active, changing the political environment of the state, opportunity presents itself to regional elites creating the opportunity within the political environment to harness regional identity for political ends. To understand this, the following synthesizes the arguments presented above and leads to the two distinct interpretations of the multinational state.
Tyranny of the Majority

As stated above, democracies are not solely defined by majority rule. The consent of the loser is fundamental to a functioning democracy. In order to be interpreted by national minorities and majorities to be fair and equitable, state institutions need to be sympathetic to the aspirations of national minorities who are faced with a political system in which they can never form a majority of the population. The perceived effectiveness of institutions is equally important to institutional arrangements in managing relations between national groupings.

Yet saying that institutional arrangements need to be perceived a certain way and designing those institutions is easier said than done. Earlier the difficulties in developing workable constitutional arrangements in multinational states were demonstrated. This is exacerbated by the need to ensure that ‘voice’ is maintained by the minority nation within the democratic process. The accommodation/integration of the minority nation is a complex process in which it is relatively easy for the majority nation to inadvertently impose its will on the minority nation.

Divergence of Aims

Balance is central to understanding that multinational states need to accommodate different norms and values, and the eventual outcomes (or aims) of these societies. Creating winners and losers in multinational states can be of particular concern to the minority nation(s), especially if they continually find themselves on the losing side of interpretations of ‘good’ or ‘just.’ It was argued that liberalism and what is ‘good’ is interpreted through a cultural lens. Accordingly within multinational states, the people of the different nations may hold different interpretations of what constitutes ‘good.’ Both may articulate conceptions of good within a liberal-democratic discourse, but they could have different outcomes as they could be based on different assumptions.

Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, one sees how this could result in situations where elites in the majority and minority nations simply desire different outcomes from the state or desire the same outcomes but disagree on the means. If actors in the majority nation do not recognize the multi-national character of the state, the reaction within the minority nation may be regarded as a form of nationalism and
a danger to the state. Majority actors will not take the role of the staatsvolk (themselves) into account in this process of identity mobilization. Balancing distinctive aims within a single state may require what was referred to as ‘deep diversity’ or ‘differentiated citizenship;’ that there is more than one legitimate way of interpreting the state and that groups can have different yet equally legitimate relationships with the state. Yet for this to be successful the staatsvolk would need to recognize that there is more than one legitimate ‘demos’ within the state.

Assumed Homogeneity

Recognizing the existence of multiple demos in a single state is no simple feat. As mentioned earlier, states become the agent of the staatsvolk, and much of the literature indicates that staatsvolk do not see their distinctive positions as being based on cultural norms. As dominant nations take control of the state, state institutions assume a homogeneous sense of nation superimposed upon the state. Modern states derive their legitimacy from being the political voice of the nation. If a state does not recognize the multi-demos aspect of multinationalism, the state becomes the voice of the majority nation, rather than the sum of the majority and minority nations working in concert. Returning to balance, if elites treat the state in a way that does not adequately allow its constituent nations to flourish, then the state itself may become a source of political conflict.

This discussion has shown that national identity mobilization is not just a minority nation phenomena, it is a majority one as well. The ‘friction’ between the majority and minority is not the ‘fault’ of either. The perspectives of both the minority and majority may be equally valid; they simply have different basic assumptions as to the nature of the state. As the first section argued, identities are fluid and contextual, and territorial identities are often contested. Accordingly identities are contested within nations as well as between nations within the state. As a part of the contestation of national identity, regional elites can use the questioning of ‘identity’ and ‘the state’ to mobilize regional identity for political purposes.
Unionism and Pan-Nationalism

Competing interpretations of the state, exacerbated by the position of the staatsvolk, may cause conflict as the state may act in a manner inconsistent with the interpretation of the state held by the minority nation(s); in turn leading to the start of the process of territorial identity mobilization. This is not the minority nation’s ‘fault’ and it should not be viewed as a strategy to extract resources from the state, what Dion (2001) (as a government Minister), termed “separatist blackmail.” It comes from competing interpretations of the state and the consent of the minority nation to be governed by a state structure dominated by the majority, and the ability of the state to balance the interpretations.

This section examines the impact these changes have on how elites articulate their worldview, in particular how elites frame concepts of state. In the above, one can see the roots of two overlapping interpretations of the state. This chapter has argued that within the different nations there may exist different interpretations of the state and the place of the nation(s) within it. From this two opposing ‘pure types’ interpretations of the state emerge; unionist and a pan-nationalist. While in reality, these may exist as two poles along a continuum; here they will be developed as two separate concepts, allowing later chapters to demonstrate how parties and actors may encompass elements of both.

Unionist interpretations privilege the concept of the partnership (compact, union, etc.) between the constituent nations of the state. This interpretation of the state recognizes the existence of multiple demos within the multinational state and the multiple sources of legitimacy this implies. It sees the state as being formed by its constituent elements, where sovereignty lies. This is similar to Hechter’s unification model of nationalism in which the nation and state are created from the bottom up as members come together (2000). The difference is that the constituent nations keep their national identities and loyalty to the state is mediated through membership in a constituent nation. This most proximates the idea of classical/constitutional patriotism presented above. It is not founded upon a common culture; rather members of the constituent nations hold their loyalty to the state as the protector of

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11 Unionist in this case should not be thought of along the same lines as the term used in British political discourse, i.e. support for the Union.
their personal freedom and dignity. Unionism departs from classical patriotism as it recognizes that the community of the state is not built around a common national identity, but that a citizen’s relationship with the state is mediated through membership in a constituent nation. The state need not be culturally neutral, rather it incorporates multiple cultures. By respecting its individual citizen’s dignity, it ensures the member nations’ dignity is respected as well.

Similar to theories of state-building nationalism, pan-nationalist discourse envisages the union that creates the states as the creation of both a new unified national whole and a single demotic people. It encourages loyalty and allegiance to the centre, along the lines of the model of civic-nationalism outlined by Yack above. State-building nationalism is a top down process whereby the state and nation expand outward from the centre. It focuses on overarching and statewide objectives and identities. While a unionist interpretation of the state sees sovereignty divided amongst its component nations, pan-nationalist interpretations see the state as the representative of a single unified demos, representing a single source of democratic legitimacy.

As the nation is always being redefined and redrawn (Resnick 1994: 71, Hall 1996: 2) current interpretations of ‘the nation’ are the interpretations of the segments of the nation holding power, controlling the national discourse and the manner in which the nation is defined. Not every member of majority or minority nations will hold a unionist or pan-nationalist interpretation of the state. Instead these two interpretations compete against each other in elite debate. In this context, Hazell’s (2006a, 2006b) work with regard to the English Question is enlightening. He argues that one’s understanding of the ‘English Question’ (the place of England within a devolved Britain) is dependent upon the questioner’s understanding of the nature of the problem. This provides a very clear example of how different interpretations of the nation and state influence not just the answers to questions on the nature of the state, but the questions themselves. As these competing views are about the fundamental nature of the state, when they enter political debate they provide the opportunity for regional actors within the majority to express their

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interpretations of the state. These debates do not only shape the political environment for regional elites to mobilize territorial identities, they set up and ‘frame’ how mobilization will be structured. While creating opportunity, these debates constrain how this opportunity can manifest itself.

Unionist and pan-nationalist discourses are a result of the dialectical relationship between not only the constituent members of the state, but the constituent members and the state. The key difference between sub-state nationalism and regionalism within the majority community is that the sub-state nationalists can bring an independence discourse to bear on the debates. This forces the statewide discourse in a direction that regionalism, which stems from debates internal to the staatsvolk, cannot.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced three key concepts that will be operationalized throughout the study; 1) bounded networks, 2) nested identities and primary political community, and 3) competing interpretations of the state: unionist and pan-nationalist. Bounded networks are the starting point of this research, as it is through examination of the bounded networks that make up the province of Nova Scotia and the North East of England GOR, regions nested within Canada (outside Quebec) and England, that the research questions will be addressed. As will be shown in the following chapters, Nova Scotia and the North East encompass many of the criteria laid out for the existence of bounded networks: regionally based government structures and academic institutions, regional print cultures and economic and social histories, distinctive geographic features, and most importantly, an accepted understanding amongst the members that they form some sort of community.

Yet these regional networks exist within larger networks of the both the staatsvolk and the state. They do not only exist within these networks, they are an essential part of them. The regions are, to use the terms outlined above, nested and indivisible. They are a part of a larger nation, and the nation, not the region, is their primary political community, the ‘demos’ from which democratic legitimacy springs.
It is the intersection of these bounded identity networks in statewide discourse that this thesis investigates.

Finally, the above discussion outlined three ways in which the concept of nation and state become conflated, introducing the ‘unionist’ and ‘pan-nationalist’ interpretations of the state. These are central to understanding how debates surrounding the nature of the state in Britain and Canada developed and how these debates altered the political environment vis-à-vis regional political actors, allowing them to attempt to mobilize regional identity.

While this chapter may have presented a long, and at times complex, explanation of the state and nation within a multinational state, this was necessary, as regions do not exist outside of a national framework. While it may be possible to attempt to work out an understanding of the region divorced from the concepts introduced above, it would be decontextualized and would ignore the political environment regional actors find themselves in. Indeed, given that the basic framework for understanding state, nation and region presented in this chapter is used throughout this thesis, it would have been remiss not to give such a detailed explanation of the concepts.

The political environment relating to territorial identity mobilization is highly complex in multinational states. This complexity must be addressed to understand that while regions are arenas of political and social communication, regional identity mobilization cannot manifest itself in the same way as sub-state national identity, since members of a region think of themselves as belonging to a larger demotic people, the nation. Accordingly, the next chapter details how these regional communication networks can be investigated.
Chapter Three: Researching Regions and Majority Nations

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter identified the key theoretical themes operationalized in this exploration of national and regional identity mobilization. This chapter describes how these areas were analyzed, focusing on: 1) how the comparative approach strengthened this work; and, 2) how the analysis of regional identity mobilization within the majority nation was conducted. This comparative project examines regional and national identity mobilization through analysis of elite debates, interviews and survey data. This chapter explains how these methods and methodologies enabled the hypothesis and research questions to be examined.

Hypothesis and Research Questions

As there are few states in which ‘state’ and ‘nation’ perfectly overlap, friction occurs between the constituent members of the state as the majority and minority nations express differing views of the nature of the state. This causes change to occur in the political environment, giving regional political actors in the majority nation the opportunity to mobilize regional and national identity. This is not to say that regionalism needs minority nationalism in order to manifest itself, rather that minority nationalism provides an opportunity for regional political actors to mobilize regional identity as well as potentially influencing the manner in which it manifests. This work does not examine regionalism per se. Rather, building upon the understanding that a region is part of a larger nation, it seeks to understand the relationship between majority and minority nationalism, regionalism as a part of majority nationalism, and the role played by regional level democratic institutions.

Concepts of regionalism in general seem overly influenced by concepts of nationalism (or even conflated, as in Greer 2007). The previous chapter established that regions are part of a larger demos and that regionalism has different political constraints than nationalism. Regionalism is part of a larger debate within the nation as to what the nation is. Accordingly, to help further understand majority
nationalism, regionalism, and the role of regional democracy in identity mobilization, this thesis must first address the following research questions.

RQa. Does a sense of regional identity exist in the regions? Do concepts of regional identity complement or compete with a sense of national identity?

RQb. Do regional and national elites interpret the state as multinational or as a single unified people? Is there a relationship between how elites at the centre and in the regions interpret the nature of the state?

While the first part of RQa may seem obvious, it is the building block of this work and must be addressed directly. The sum total of RQa and RQb allows this research to build an understanding of how the elites and masses at the centre and in the regions interpret their respective states. This is key in addressing the central hypothesis;

*Hypothesis:* Within multinational democracies which have experienced a recent surge in minority nationalism, a political environment is created in the majority nation which allows regional elites to promote political agendas that mobilize regional and national identity, and in so doing the presence or absence of regional democratic institutions will shape the demands and the manner in which they are made.

This is not to say that elites consciously engage in either regionalism or majority nationalism. It is possible that appeals to identity are so engrained in regular political discourse that they are ‘banal’ (Billig 1995). Regardless, to test the hypothesis, a focused comparison of Canada and Britain between 1990 and 2004 was conducted. During this period strong nationalist agitation was emanating from the minority nations as well as strong regional agitation from within segments of the staatsvolk. In the following discussion and in Chapter Four it will be shown that Nova Scotia and the North East are extremely well placed to address this hypothesis. This is due to a variety of factors designed to maximize the potential of the comparative design (see below on the Most Similar Systems Design), most notably 1) the strength of nationalism in Quebec and Scotland during the period under study, 2) the nature of regional level administration within England and Canada—English regions being administratively decentralized while lacking regional democratic accountability, and 3) the debates surrounding the constitutional order in Canada and Britain.
**Possible Expectations**

The above hypothesis suggests certain outcomes;

1. Minority nationalism will politicise regional and national identity in the majority nation,

2. Politicized identity in the majority nation will create a political environment favourable to regional identity mobilization

3. Regional democratic institutions will provide greater voice for both the regions themselves as well as actors within the regions

These expectations in turn guide the following research questions;

RQc. Do the minority nations have a role in identity articulation in either the majority nation or the regions? If so, what role do the minority nations play?

RQd. Based on the assumption that a sense of regional identity exists, is it politicized? How it is politicized? What do regional elites demand?

RQe What role do regional levels of democracy play in regional identity mobilization?

In addition to the above hypothesis, expectations and research questions, a final avenue that must be explored is the relationship between elites and the masses.

Within liberal democracies it is reasonable to assume that public action taken by political elites is a part of the contestation for power, that public debate is the nexus between the elites and the masses. Therefore, a final research question needs to be addressed.

RQf. Does elite debate resonate with the masses?

The final research question is particularly important; this research is not merely investigating the competition for power amongst elites; it examines a particular manner in which power is competed for; through the mobilization of identity. An examination of any attempt at mobilization inherently demands an investigation of those who elites are attempting to mobilize. Given that political elites engage in the political process to achieve power, one would expect elite debate to resonate with the masses.
Operationalizing the Research Questions – Research Design

Research design is “an action plan for getting from here to there” (Yin 1994: 19). As Oppenheim (1992: 5-6) notes, the need for appropriate research design arises when one wants to generalize from one’s findings as opposed to merely describing events and is concerned with making problems researchable by setting up the study to “produce specific answers to specific questions.” As Chapter Two suggests, identities are built around communication networks. Accordingly, to operationalize the research questions, this project employs research strategies designed to examine elite political communication triangulated through an analysis of survey data to determine if, and how, elite debate resonates with the masses.

The research questions and hypothesis indicates a complex relationship between the majority and minority nations, a relationship that in turn impacts regions within the majority nations. Addressing the hypothesis and research questions demands; 1) multinational democracies which have experienced a recent surge in minority nationalism, and 2) a comparative study of regionalism in which all but the independent variable (regional democracy) are held constant. A single case study could have been used to examine national and regional identity mobilization, but as this project investigates the role of regional democracy, a two case comparative approach was required to test the hypothesis along the lines of an experimental model. The discussion on the comparative design below outlines in detail why a two case approach was deemed best. To explain the research design, this chapter is divided into two sections. First it makes the case for choosing a comparative study, demonstrating how a two-case comparison enabled an exploration of different aspects of nationalism and regionalism as well as regional level democracy while providing an in-depth analysis of the peculiarities of each case. Second, it introduces the choices of data and explains how it was analyzed.

3.2 Comparative Design

A comparative study allows the researcher to examine how a phenomenon manifests itself in different cases and assess which variables influence the phenomenon under study – regionalism as a component of majority nationalism and
the role of regional level democracy. This section is divided into two subsections to demonstrate how the comparative approach allows the research questions to be addressed. It begins by presenting an overview of the comparative method before examining the variables themselves: the dependent, independent, and control variables, demonstrating how the variables manifest in the cases and why they are excellent choices to address the hypothesis.

**Comparative Design**

Why Nova Scotia and the North East? This is a valid question given that the North East of England may have a reputation for regional identity mobilization, but Nova Scotia is generally not considered a hotbed of regionalism in Canada. Beyond why Nova Scotia and the North East, why two cases? To better understand the case selection, the specific cases and why a two case study was undertaken, and how this comparison was conducted, this sub-section discusses the Most Similar System Design, highlighting the challenges of comparative studies and revealing how these challenges were addressed in this particular study.

**The Most Similar Systems Design**

This work is not an analysis of identity; it is an analysis of territorial identity mobilization, and the role of democratic institutions within that mobilization. It is not about the causes of regionalism, rather it examines how regional actors attempt to mobilize regional identity for political purposes. As Lijphart (1971: 683) notes, the comparative method is a method of “discovering empirical relationships among variables, not as a method of measurement.” While examining regionalism within majority nationalism requires only one case, assessing the role of democratic institutions demands a comparative study and a two case comparison was undertaken to allow an approximation of experimentation through the logic of the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD).

Skocpol (1995: 376) argues that analytical studies will inherently lead to comparative studies, as comparison enables researchers to tease out data. She demonstrates that by analyzing differences and similarities one can examine the phenomenon under study. By looking at dissimilar cases which share the
phenomenon, one can deduce that the cause of the phenomenon lies in the similarities (Skocpol 1995: 377-378). Conversely, the MSSD logic is that if one takes two very similar cases and finds differences between them with regard to the phenomenon being studied, the explanation can be found in the differences (Przeworski and Teune 1979: 32). To understand how the MSSD was applied to this project, the logic of the MSSD as presented by Przeworski and Teune (1979) is discussed.

The focus of the MSSD is system level analysis; variations in the phenomenon are explained in terms of systemic factors. Similarities between the cases are control variables and differences, such as elected regional government, are explanatory variables (Przeworski and Teune 1979: 33). In determining the cases, the number of common characteristics sought is maximized and differences minimized (Przeworski and Teune 1979: 33). Accordingly, if differences are found in the phenomenon, the following implications can be ascertained:

1. Common factors are irrelevant in determining the difference in outcome, and
2. Any sort of difference corresponding to observed behaviour can be considered as an explanation for the behaviour (Przeworski and Teune 1979: 34).

So while the logic of the MSSD (approximating experimentation) directs those who apply it to a two case comparison, does this mean that a two case study is best? In this case, not only do the research questions and hypothesis strongly favour two cases to approximate an experiment, the data to be analyzed is extremely varied and complex. Adding other cases would reduce the analytic strength of this study by diverting resources away from the two cases. As will be seen, the two regions under study are extremely similar; adding another case would increase the probability of non-control variables being inadvertently introduced, reducing the explanatory power of this work.
Although comparison is an “imperfect substitute” for experimentation (Lijphart 1971: 684-5), creating an experiment to address the hypothesis is not possible. Instead, the MSSD was the best alternative in addressing the research questions. Accordingly, the decision was made to use a Canadian province and an English GOR. The purpose of the MSSD is to approximate an experiment, with one case acting as the control group for the other. Here, Nova Scotia, is exposed to the stimulus of regional democracy, while the other, the North East, is not. Chapter Four explains GORs and provinces in greater detail, but the key difference is that while both are a way of governing at a regional level, GORs having no regional democratic institutions, lack the legitimacy and authority found at the provincial level in Canada. Using the typologies developed by Swenden (2006), they are weakly decentralized levels of administration in a unitary state.

Bonnell (1980: 165) argues that there are essentially two types of comparisons, illustrative and analytical. Analytical comparison involves comparison between similar units, while illustrative comparison entails comparison between two similar groups and a theory. This study analyzed regions and states with the goal of developing a theory of regionalism and majority nationalism while contributing to a greater understanding of how politics is territorialized. Comparative studies link historically anchored observations with theoretical statements, allowing general theories to be constructed with explicit reference to factors operating at a system wide level (Przeworski and Teune 1979: 17). Yet comparison does more than develop theory; it can be used to “translate exercises that involve the transmission of meaning structure” (Bynner and Chisholm 1998: 138). By conducting a comparative study, political scientists gain understanding of not only what political actors are doing, but the reasons why they are doing it, allowing researchers to investigate the intended meaning of actions from the perspective of the actors themselves.

_Challenges of Comparison_

The problem with the comparative method, according to Lijphart, is that there are “many variables, small number of cases.” (Lijphart 1971: 685) He argues that the comparative method can be seen as a weaker form of analysis than statistical analysis because it deviates too far from an experimental model. Regardless of the fact that
comparisons can be statistical and that the MSSD is as close as one can get to an experimental model while exploring system wide factors, issues of comparing statistics across cases can be just as problematic as comparing anything else (see Bynner and Chisholm 1998: 132, Walker 1983).

Bynner and Chisholm (1998: 135-7) argue that when a comparison is done across states, it assumes certain universalities: that concepts in one of the cases exist in the other. The difficulty in this project was determining which indicators related to which concepts, and determining if the same indicators represented the same concepts in both cases. Bynner and Chisholm note that there are problems doing comparison across states, yet states themselves are diverse; these problems will occur within states as well. As will be seen, some of the demands articulated by elites in Nova Scotia and the North East appeared very similar to ones emanating from Quebec and Scotland. Yet actors in Nova Scotia and the North East possess a fundamentally different understanding of the state than actors in Quebec and Scotland, and the intended consequences of the demands reflect that difference. Not understanding the difference between sub-state nations such as Quebec and Scotland and regions such as Nova Scotia or the North East, could lead researchers to mistakenly apply the same conceptual framework to both minority nations and sub-national regions.

Expanding upon the challenges of comparison, Hammel (1980: 148) identifies the following areas as having the potential to be problematic in comparative methodology: 1) the identification and classification of the items to be compared; 2) the scope of the comparison in time and space; 3) the aims of the comparison; and 4) the design of the comparison. While the challenges posed by Hammel are significant, this research has taken the necessary steps to minimize the problems and maximize the strengths of this methodology. The most efficient way for this chapter to demonstrate how it meets Hammel’s challenges is to first overview the variables, and then addresses each of the objections in turn.

**Dependent Variable**

Regionalism is part of the nationalism of the majority nation. On the surface they may be seen as different, yet closer examination reveals that this is not the case. Majority nationalism is a product of the continual (re)production of national identity
and regionalism is a component of that (re)production. It is a part of the discussion on the nature of the nation. Accordingly, in the context of the hypothesis and research questions the dependent variable is territorial identity mobilization in the majority nation. As stated earlier ‘region’ has a variety of meanings, but here it is used to identify the level of government situated below the state and above the local. In Britain the devolved administrations and English GORs fit this classification of regions, as do Canadian provinces. In the North East and Nova Scotia regional identity corresponds to these levels of governance allowing investigation into the role of democracy, ensuring that both regions are controlled for in terms of regional administration. As Bond and McCrone contend, regional institutions without democracy are still able to harness identity markers (2004). As regional democracy will invariably encompass other regional institutions, GORs are examples of regions that have regional institutions without regional democracy. But what is ‘territorial identity mobilization? How does one test for it? At a regional level, is it a demand for more power or devolution, or the existence of friction between different orders of government? The evidence indicates that the answer to both questions is no. Hopkins (1996) argues the main source of conflict in a multi-level system is governments wanting to maximize power, which is not identity politics. As defined in Chapter One, regionalism is:

The mobilization of regional identity by political elites as a vehicle for their desired political outcomes.

Accordingly, testing for regionalism requires more than seeking out evidence of conflict between different orders of government or demands for autonomy. It demands an in depth study of regional elite to determine if and how elites use regional identity as vehicles for their political objectives, in essence advancing a regional agenda.

A ‘regional agenda’ may be found in any of the following: 1) political and or constitutional change to increase regional autonomy, 2) greater integration into central decision making, or 3) greater resources from the state. When former Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, for example, pushed for regional devolution across England, this could be interpreted as a modernization or efficiency drive on behalf of
the British government. When Joyce Quinn MP\textsuperscript{13} advocated for the same thing in her region, it was an expression of a regional agenda. Therefore, the three indicators above, need to be coupled with 4) an appeal to a collective regional identity. Regional democracy allows for regional autonomy by providing political voice (however one wants to interpret voice). Consequently one may assume that regions possessing democracy would be further integrated into decision making as they possess a vehicle for the articulation of provincial voice.

\textit{Independent Variable}

The independent variable is the ‘stimulus,’ which has an impact on if, and how, the dependent variable manifests. As the hypothesis is complex, the different components of it each have a different independent variable. In examining the role of regional democracy, regional democracy itself is the variable. With regard to the role of minority nationalism influencing regionalism and nationalism in the majority nation, the variable is the existence of strong minority nationalist movements.

Examining the relationship between minority nationalism and regionalism and nationalism within the majority nation requires only one case to investigate linkages between the two; evidence that elites at the regional or national level in the majority are mobilizing identity in reaction to the minority. In this sense, this study could be interpreted as two parallel examinations looking for evidence of this linkage in Canada and Britain, with one case reinforcing the findings from the other if consistent.

While Nova Scotia and the North East both have strong regional identities, Nova Scotia has an elected, and in many ways sovereign, level of government. The North East has an unelected and weakly powered RA, drawn up of local councillors and elements of civil society. The Nova Scotia House of Assembly is a key institution within the social and political networks that make up Nova Scotia. Political competition at the provincial level focuses on it, and parties and civil society

\textsuperscript{13} Baroness Quin of Gateshead in the County of Tyne and Wear was the Member of Parliament for Gateshead East between 1987 and 1997 and Gateshead East and Washington West from 1997 –2005. A constant advocate for regional devolution she even resigned her seat in Westminster to run for the Assembly.
are oriented towards the competition of power within it. In the North East there is no regional level competition for power, the closest to this being the 2004 Regional Assembly referendum. In this sense, Nova Scotia has a clear ‘target’ of political debate which forms the heart of Nova Scotian political networks. The North East, however, is fractured. It has weak regional institutions and only recently has civil society begun organizing at a regional level, which may have more to do with the RDA than the RA. For example, Dixon (2006: 180) notes that “until relatively recently there has been little representation of business interests by private sector associations in regional government and governance.” Using business as an example, she notes that civil society has generally been organized around the centre and the local lacking a capacity for regional interaction.

**Control Variables**

In order to ensure that the logic of the MSSD was followed, cases were required in which all variables but regional democracy were isolated and controlled for. Deutsch (1966a) identifies four key areas around which networks (here territorial identity communities) crystallize: 1) economy, 2) population, 3) geography, and 4) language. As this study looks at regions and majority nations it required both states and the regions within them to match along these points. At the regional level it required that the cases be economically similar; have relatively stable populations with similar patterns of immigration and emigration; be geographically distant from the national centre, and physically proximate to the minority nations (recognizing distance in Canada and Britain may mean different things); and share a common language with the rest of the majority nation. In addition, in keeping with the logic of the experimental design, regions with administrative institutions were required, with one possessing and one lacking democratic legitimacy. With regard to the majority nation, liberal democratic multinational states were required that contained active minority nations.

Chapter Two outlined how the political environment in multinational states changes due to the relationship between the majority and minority nations. One can see this in any overview of the recent past in Britain and Canada. Both states experienced periods of introspection into ‘who we are’ in the 1990s and beyond, yet
this may have been more pronounced in Canada as Nova Scotia and Atlantic Canada faced the prospect of being isolated from the rest of Canada if Quebec seceded. Yet the North East shares a border with Scotland and these issues appeared more salient there than in the rest of England (at least at an elite level), as elites were very aware that their region was isolated from the centre (Curtice 2006).

While regionalism and regional identity are difficult to define and measure (Tomaney and Ward 2001: 8-9), in Canada regional identity may be easier to recognize as the regions exist in tandem with existing power structures: the provinces (Preston 1985: 5). In England, while regions lack democratic institutions, regional identities exist, which may act as triggers for regionalism (Lanigan 2001: 104-5). Both regions under study have similar economic histories and, with the creation of the RDAs in England, institutions charged with addressing the regional economy. In addition to the economic similarities, both have relatively stable populations with relatively low levels of immigration but a fair amount of economic emigration to richer parts of the state. Both are distant from central decision making, and although Nova Scotia would be cut off from Canada by Quebec seceding, the North East’s position as a periphery of England would be exacerbated if Scotland separated. Finally, in both cases there is a common language, English, which not only functions as a common means of communication, but each region has a unique dialect and way of life. While Chapter Four examines this changing political environment in greater detail, it is important to note that Canada and Britain, and Nova Scotia and the North East within them, were chosen due to their similarities based on Deutsch’s (1966) four points mentioned above.

Deutsch’s (1996a) four points outlined above enabled the project to isolate and control for all but the role of democracy at the regional level. This meant that a two case comparison in general, and Nova Scotia and the North East of England in particular, are suitable candidates for comparison according to the MSSD. This subsection will now address each of Hammel’s challenges and demonstrate how they were overcome. To recap, Hammel (1980: 148) identified the following as potentially problematic: 1) the identification and classification of the items to be compared; 2) the scope of the comparison in time and space; 3) the aims of the comparison; and 4) the design of the comparison.
The Identification and Classification of the Items to Be Compared

Problems of comparison do not merely exist in qualitative comparisons. Walker (1983) demonstrates that there are problems associated with any comparison, even ones based on statistical evidence. For instance, if the methods used in collecting data are different, the numbers produced will not be directly comparable. In Walker’s example, different police jurisdictions used different methods for measuring crime (the concept); while the indicators of the concept appeared comparable, in reality they were not. As Walker notes:

> variation in the demographic characteristics of different police force areas over the country and in the policy of different chief constables means that the statistics of offences, clear-up rates, offenders and sentencing from different areas are not comparable in many ways. (Walker 1983: 292)

Accordingly, while interpretive research methodologies may be easy targets for those who reject subjective research, most research has subjective elements to it. Shankman argues that human interaction is by its very nature guided by interpretation (1984: 262). Human beings make their decisions for action based upon their interpretations of the world around them (Cohen 1996 and Hearn 2007). Different individuals are more than capable of seeing the same event and coming to different conclusions about its meaning and significance. The interpretive and subjective nature of human action is a factor of the human condition, and is not in and of itself either negative or positive, it just is. Problems that arise in comparing evidence are not limited to qualitative evidence or emotional, empathetic or motivational understanding. Walker shows that this can apply equally to linguistic and technical understanding. It is by ensuring that one’s variables are correctly identified and controlled that one is able to overcome the challenges identified by Lijphart above (1971), and in doing so approximate scientific experimentation.

As this project examines questions of what and how, as well as why, an attempt to understand motivation is important. For example, in arguing that secessionists in Quebec are using “separatist blackmail” Dion (2001), (as Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs), fails to understand the root cause of nationalist sentiment in Quebec. By failing to address the why, Dion (2001) draws the wrong conclusions about secessionist demands. Minority nationalist demands are more than attempts to
extract greater resources from the state, as their demands stem from a fundamentally different conception of who the demotic people of the state are (returning to Tierney’s (2007) term). Similarly, in this analysis the what and the how (as in what is happening and how is it manifesting itself) is subsumed by the why (as in why is this happening). By attempting to tease out the perspectives of elites, this work seeks to move beyond merely describing regionalism to explaining why it manifests itself in the way it does.

Does it mean the same thing for an English speaking Canadian to indicate that he is Canadian and not Nova Scotian, as it does for someone from the North East to identify as British and not North Eastern? On the surface, crime statistics seem easily comparable, yet when Walker (1983) looked into the meaning of the statistics, they reflected different underlying concepts. What had appeared to be strong indicators of one concept instead became indicators of different concepts of crime. If this is a problem encountered within a culture, it follows that it would be as prevalent, if not more so, between cultures. As will be shown in Chapter Seven, both Nova Scotia and the North East have stronger regional sentiments than their co-nationals in Canada (outside Quebec) and England, but this tells the researcher only the relative strength of regional identity in Nova Scotia in relation to Canada (outside Quebec) and the North East in relation to England. It says nothing about the relative strength of Nova Scotian identity vis-à-vis North Eastern identity.

The risk of taking a concept and applying it to all cases regardless of fit, and then altering the concept to make it fit, is identified by Sartori as “conceptual stretching” in which ideas and concepts are stretched to fit all cases, and in doing so concepts are reduced to “vague amorphous conceptualisations” (1970:1034). He argues:

Thus far the discipline has largely followed the line of least resistance, namely “conceptual stretching.” In order to obtain a world-wide applicability the extension of our concepts has been broadened by obfuscating their connotation. As a result the very purpose of comparing—control—is defeated, and we are left to swim in a sea of empirical and theoretical messiness. (Sartori 1970: 1053)

Collier and Mahon (1993: 845) argue that the merit of Sartori’s approach is that it encourages the researcher to be attentive to the context, without abandoning
comparison. Accordingly, as the hypothesis is complex, this project has been clear in outlining the different variables in order to minimize problems and meet Hammel’s first challenge. It overcomes the limits of subjectivity through a robust and varied selection of data, incorporating the principle of triangulation, as well as developing a sound understanding of the particular contexts of the separate cases.

**The Scope of the Comparison in Time and Space**

Good comparative designs are compromises as case selection is refined and groups reconsidered (Bechhofer 2000: 52). For practical reasons, the selection of countries is rarely random. As cross national studies are quasi-experimental, tactical choices are made with regard to the best combination of countries given the researcher’s resource limitations (Przeworski and Teune 1979: 32). This research required states that had two key criteria: 1) vocal minority nationalist movements, and; 2) regions with strong regional identities. While the choice of cases is not self-evident (Bechhofer 2000: 44), this work seeks to better understand Canada, requiring a state to compare Canada against and Britain was a logical choice.

Sartori’s (1970: 1040) advice in regard to conceptual stretching during the initial round of concept formation was met through a careful process of case selection. Canada (outside Quebec) and England are both divided into nine regions/provinces, allowing for a total of 81 possible two case comparisons. In Canada, Ontario was quickly discarded due to its large size and centrality, as was London (a city-region) and the South East of England for similar reasons: they form an English ‘core.’ The Western Provinces followed suit because of their distance from Quebec, the wealth in British Columbia and Alberta, and the large native populations in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. This left Atlantic Canada, and to control as many variables as possible, the North of England became the logical choice for comparison to an Atlantic Province.

Not all of England has strong regional identities as found in Canadian provinces (outside Quebec), yet this was not necessary. Instead, some regions within England had to have strong regional identities mapping onto administrative divisions, such as the three northern GORs, particularly the North East. Labour had intended to hold referenda in all three Northern GORs, but they were called off in the North West
and Yorkshire and the Humber ostensibly due to problems encountered with postal voting, leaving the North East as the remaining option for study. Unofficially, speculation is they were called off because polling indicated a lesser chance of success in these two regions (Hazell 2006a: 9, Tickel, John and Musson 2005: 3). As the North East was going to have the referendum and shares a border with Scotland, it became the obvious candidate. Fortunately, the North East also appears to have the greatest amount of secondary literature of the three northern GORs.

In Atlantic Canada, Prince Edward Island was quickly discarded due to its small size, and New Brunswick due to its bilingualism. This left Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. While Newfoundland and Labrador arguably has the strongest provincial identity in Canada outside Quebec, it was felt that ‘the Rock,’ as it is colloquially known by its inhabitants, may already be a sub-state nation in its own right. Entering the Federation in 1949, it did not participate with the rest of Canada (outside Quebec) in some of the most important nation building events in Canada’s past. While it did participate in the building of the health care system and the creation of the Canadian welfare state, which the logic of McEwen indicates would be very important to creating a shared identity (2002). Newfoundland’s experiences in the First and Second World War were markedly different. Participating alongside Canada as a co-equal British Dominion, its war history differed fundamentally from Canada’s (see Colley (1992: 323) on wartime experiences and identity): for example the slaughter of Newfoundland’s soldiers at Gallipoli compared to the success of the Canadian Corps at the Battle of Vimy Ridge. This left Nova Scotia as the clear choice.

With regard to the temporal parameters of the study, the year 1990 was used as a start point and 2004 as an end point. A limited number of primary sources after 2004 were used as they help shed light on the understandings of prominent actors during the period under study. With sub-state nationalism on the rise, constitutional change and negotiation taking place, important referenda being held and the overall challenging of traditional frameworks of the state, this period allowed for an analysis of the hypotheses and research questions as the political debates were clearly centred on issues of identity. Hammel’s second challenge to comparative methodology was avoided through clearly demarcated physical and temporal parameters.
The Aims of the Comparison

The aim of this comparison is to examine regionalism as a part of the majority nationalism within multinational states during periods of strong nationalist agitation, and what role regional democratic institutions have upon the trajectory of regionalism. As stated above, this is not an examination of identity; it is an examination of identity mobilization. As networks of communication form the basis of the markers used in territorial identity mobilization, this work studies political communication within regional networks. As Chapter Two outlined, these markers create identity by placing individuals within a social context. Individuals possess many types of identities and have a unique relationship with each of the markers that make up his or her identity (see Hearn 2007 and Cohen 1996). As such, it is important to keep in mind the logic of McCrone (2000:306), who states, “we may choose to present ourselves in a particular way, but the signs we give off may be interpreted differently by others, and they in turn may choose to construct who we are in different ways again.” Individuals act in a manner consistent with the way they wish to be seen, but cannot control, only influence, how others see them. If actions are not interpreted in a manner consistent with the intention of the original actor, the original actor becomes, from a socially constructed perspective, a different individual with a completely different set of motivations.

A challenge to analyzing political debate within these networks stems from the state being made up of a variety of social and political networks (Mann 1993). While contributing to the makeup of the state, these networks lack overall consistency and many do not even interact with each other. Accordingly, analyzing political communication requires a clear focus on what is being studied, and which of these networks of communication is being studied. In this project, the issue was overcome by using a wide range of data sources and analyzing the competition for power within the regions in order to narrow the focus. As Yin (1994: 80) states, a good study will attempt to use as many data sources as possible.

The challenges that McCrone identifies as implicit to this kind of research are met through the use of the triangulation of both methods and data sources. Analyzing only communication or actors would reveal only part of the picture, but by analyzing political communication and conducting elite interviews, this research gains a fuller
understanding of how regional and national identity was mobilized. As the region is an embedded and indivisible part of the majority nation, understanding the region requires understanding the nation it belongs to. By studying elite discourse at the centre and in the region, this work is situated to research the relationship between the majority and minority nations and the role of regional democracy. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that projections of identity are the interpretations of those who currently hold power within identity networks. Accordingly, survey data was used to triangulate this work. As the markers used to highlight identity may be contested, it is important not to study the markers brought forward in the identity debates, but rather the (perceived) power relations expressed within the debates.

Hammel’s third challenge was tackled with a clear theoretical framework and research design.

The Design of the Comparison

A strength of the interpretative approach is that one has the potential to recognize the subjective element and in doing so attempt to work around it to minimize problems. In this sense, using the logic of the MSSD, this project studies a subjective phenomenon while minimizing the shortfalls and problems of subjectivity. Yet two case studies are not always seen as the best way of analysing a phenomenon. Lijphart (1971: 686-690) suggests expanding the number of cases. Expansion, though, would reduce, not expand, the explanatory ability of this work, spreading resources further and devoting less attention to the specific cases. Geertz (2003[1973]) refers to “thick description,” and while this project is not an anthropological study of the type discussed by Geertz, his point about immersing oneself in the culture of the case is extremely important. This helps limit conceptual stretching and allows researchers to gain a nuanced understanding of the cases. Here, expanding the number of cases would be counterproductive, as understanding the meaning and intentions of actors requires in-depth analysis. The two-case comparison allows the researcher to simulate an experiment while keeping the cases contextually grounded. As Skocpol recommends (1995: 360), by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches and triangulating between the two, this project becomes sensitive to the cases.
According to Bynner and Chisholm (1998: 132) comparisons across cultures require a “Weberian strategy” for researching social life in that “the need for societal understanding becomes a virtual pre-requisite for any proper scientific interpretations of findings.” Keat and Urry (1982: 145) argue that the Weberian strategy attempts to “marry” naturalistic insistence upon causality and anti-naturalist demand for interpretive understanding of subjective meaning. One cannot understand the current place of Nova Scotia or the North East within their respective nations and states without understanding, for example, the Maritime Rights Movement in Nova Scotia (Forbes 1979) or the North/South divide in England (Jewell 1994). Accordingly, Chapter Four situates the cases within their historical contexts.

Historical context is essential as it allows for interpretation, as opposed to pure description. While describing what is being said is important, it is through historical context that the researcher is able to assess intentions. Action devoid of intention is meaningless; the difference between explaining (what happened) and understanding (why it happened) lies in motives (Rosenberg 1988: 83). Motives, however, are difficult to discern. Although it is possible to simply ask political actors why they did something, the answer they give will be the answer they want the researcher to hear. They may (intentionally or not) exclude information or exaggerate their importance (Berry 2002: 681). To overcome this, one has to ensure that the research is placed within its proper historical and social context, as well as use different approaches to ensure a proper understanding of the issues. Quantifiable data is not sufficient to explain motive. In order to determine motive there must be a level of subjectivity and interpretation involved, which can be tested against the measurable data.

Keat and Urry (1982: 148) argue that a researcher’s ability to understand is limited and shaped by their personal history. It was only after living, working, and teaching in Scotland for a number of years that this researcher began to fully appreciate the power of political socialization. Concepts that Canadians may take for granted, such as multilevel governance and differences in rules, regulations, services and the like across sub-state borders appeared to be foreign concepts to many people in Britain. In this sense, Simeon’s (2006a) point about federal ideals or cultures may have a counterpart in the British unitary system; a unitary ideal. This stems from the
fact that all non-Westminster elections in Britain have historically been viewed as second order while in Canada they could be considered parallel first order elections. In the North East, people simply do not have a history of separating local from national, as all politics seem to stem from Westminster.

As Merton (1972: 22) points out, people are both insiders and outsiders at the same time. It is only in relation to the networks being explored that one can be classified as either. Take for example, this researcher’s interview with Prof. John Tomaney, the leader of the ‘Yes’ campaign in the 2004 North East referendum. Although this researcher was not part of the regional networks, both the interviewer and interviewee are academics with similar research interests and on top of that, both are white, male, and speak English as a first language. Though certain identity markers were not shared, others were, making this researcher an insider with regard to some markers, and an outsider with regard to others. Returning to a point from Chapter Two, identities are contextual, and given some of the responses and non-verbal cues received during the interview with Prof. Tomaney, it appeared that the interview was not simply between a regional ‘insider’ and non-regional ‘outsider,’ but between people who shared a common interest in regionalism, as well as the dynamic between an aspiring academic interviewing an established one. The interaction of different identity networks, some shared, some not, within a single interview was clear.

Not being part of a group, though, does have its advantages. Merton (1972: 30) argues that people can be consumed within their group’s assumptions, unable to escape them. Not being from Nova Scotia or the North East allowed this researcher to approach the regions with a view unbiased by regional understandings, myths or prejudice. As Toqueville states with regard to the United States, “there are certain truths which Americans can only learn from strangers” (in Merton 1972: 33). Overall, the fact that this research was conducted mostly as an ‘outsider’ should be interpreted as a positive. The researcher was free of assumptions about the world shared by ‘insiders’ in Nova Scotia and the North East, allowing for a questioning of local assumptions. Yet being aware that these assumptions were not shared forced the researcher to ensure he had a thorough understanding of the region before conducting the interviews.
Returning to the challenges raised by Hammel (1980), the above demonstrates (Chapter Four will go into greater detail) that the cases were chosen on solid comparative principles, addressing the need within the MSSD to find the Most Similar System. This research design directly addresses the subjective nature of the work through a robust analysis of the context of the cases, allowing for a strong argument to be made that the identified dependent variable is indeed dependent, and that it was not another variable unknown to this research that was causal. These cases were clearly bounded geographically and temporally. Both regions have clear borders and in both cases the timeline is one in which there was much introspection as to the nature of the state. The aim of the comparison is clear: to assess regionalism within majority nations as well as the role that elected regional levels of government have in the phenomenon’s manifestation. Finally, the design of the comparison, as this chapter demonstrates, is intended to ensure that the research is as robust as possible. By triangulating its data sources this work ensures that there is no ‘misreading’ of data, as the triangulation inherently strengthens the analysis.

Is it possible to draw universal lessons from a two case comparative study? The answer is, unfortunately, no. That this kind of study lacks the ability to generalize does not make it any less important. The logic of comparing what are in essence two case studies is highlighted by Mitchel, who argues, “we infer that the features present in the case study will be related in a wider population not because the case is representative but because our analysis is unassailable” (Mitchel 2000: 177). So while Elkins and Simeon (1979: 131) argue that one cannot assess the relative importance of cultural or structural explanations from one case or a single collective, this comparison helps create a framework for a theory on the relationship between minority nationalism, majority nationalism and regionalism, and the role of regional democracy in identity mobilization while ensuring the resources to conduct in-depth studies were available. The comparative method is not perfect, but, by carefully selecting the cases and studiously applying the logic presented above, the analysis presented is sound from a theoretical and analytical perspective.
To properly examine the above variables, this project drew its evidence from two broad categories: 1) political debate and 2) public opinion. These were chosen to gain a thorough overview of elites and public attitudes within the regions and their respective nations. Political debate took the form of a) political documents, b) transcripts of political debates and the reporting thereof, and c) elite interviews. In order to explain the strategies used in the collection and analysis of data, this section is divided into four sub-sections, each dealing with a specific data source. Data alone, however, cannot answer research questions (Antaki et al. 2003: 5). To ensure the accuracy of this research, it was essential for robust and scientifically sound analysis of the data. Accordingly, each of the following sub-sections will introduce the data and discuss the techniques used in its analysis. First, though, there will be an overview of the particular challenges surrounding the use of data in the social sciences in general, and this project in particular, detailing how they were overcome

**Data Challenges**

To understand the challenges produced by different types of data, one must understand the forms data takes. Blaikie (2000) identifies three sources of data for a social researcher: 1) primary data (the term self-collected primary data is used here) which researchers collect themselves; 2) secondary data (this researcher prefers to think of it as other-collected primary data), raw data collected by another researcher; and, 3) tertiary information (the term secondary will be used here), data that has already been analyzed by another researcher.

Data collected and analyzed by the researcher is the least problematic (assuming a robust and thorough research design). It is from the other two sources of data that problems outside of the researcher’s control may arise. While this project had an abundance of data, there were many potential problems stemming from the fact that much of the data was collected or organized by others. Blaikie notes three ways data collected by others may be problematic;

1. Previous research was done with different research questions in mind,
2. Not all areas of interest may be covered, and

The second point was particularly salient with regard to survey data. The issues studied were not queried in surveys in the majority of years under study in Britain, and relative loyalty as examined in the “Moreno question” (see Moreno 2006, Henderson 2007) was not asked in Canada outside of Quebec. Consequently, this required a creative use of the data (see Chapter Seven).

Webb et al. (1981: 163) demonstrate the challenges presented by data collected by others, stating that errors may be introduced through individual record keepers, the methods used, recording or filing mistakes, and historical or temporal changes. Furthermore, differences in record keeping systems may make some data non-comparable (see Walker (1983) above). The impact of the record keeping of others was extremely evident during this research. In Nova Scotia the majority of documentary primary data was collected at the Nova Scotia House of Assembly Legislative Library. In the North East, before the main newspapers began keeping on-line digital archives, the work was directed by the unseen hands of archivists working in the Tyne and Wear archives and the Local History Library in Newcastle. The research, especially with regard to the newspaper reports analyzed, was directed by the archivist’s cataloguing decisions. This is important to note not only for this researcher’s gratitude to these institutions, but this researcher is painfully aware of the gatekeeper role played by them. As Macdonald notes, researchers are not always aware of the reasoning behind all of the decisions made (2002: 208), and one cannot help but wonder if different archivists, working with the same material, would have made different decisions.

The use of secondary data is fundamental to any academic inquiry. The logic of this research design encourages immersion in secondary literature. It is unfortunate, especially with regard to Nova Scotia, that the regions have not received as much academic enquiry as their rich histories warrant. Secondary data has not only helped shape the researcher’s understanding of the issues facing these regions, it has also highlighted gaps in the literature, which grounds this work in the wider academic discussions on these regions.

An important aspect of secondary data is that in addition to the intended information, it provides information beyond what is being presented in the data.
Dibble (1963: 206) argues that there is an implicit assumption that documents are produced by individuals and not by social systems. In this sense, research conducted by those within the regions themselves is inherently part of the region building process. As stated earlier, ‘insiders’ have views that ‘outsiders’ do not. Texts, even academic ones, may be influenced by these views. This is not to say that the quality of academic research is weakened, rather these views may inform the questions and focus taken. This is most notable with regard to the literature on regionalism in the North East, as one of the leading scholars investigating regionalism and devolution in the North East, Prof. John Tomaney from the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, was also the chair of the ‘Yes’ campaign in the 2004 regional devolution referendum. While this is a very visible example, in Nova Scotia and the North East academic and political networks frequently overlapped.

To overcome the challenges of individual data sources, the principle of triangulation, in which the phenomenon is analyzed along two (or more) axes to ensure that the findings are consistent, was used. The data sources were selected based on the principle that elite debate is part of the democratic competition for power. MacDonald (2001: 208) identifies four types of triangulation: 1) data triangulation, 2) investigator triangulation, 3) theory triangulation, and 4) methodological triangulation. He states that option (3) is next to impossible, (and given that this is work is a Ph.D. thesis conducted solely by one researcher with limited resources, option (2) was eliminated). Accordingly, options (1) and (4) were used to guide the research.

Data triangulation was achieved through the variety of information sources. Different types of documentary sources were used (see below), allowing investigation of identity mobilization from different perspectives within elite political discourse. This form of triangulation ensured a robust analysis of elite debate and a thorough understanding of elite viewpoints. Data triangulation was reinforced by methodological triangulation in which the analysis of documents and elite interviews was triangulated with an analysis of survey data. Researching elite opinion exclusively was one manner in which to approach the research questions, as elites are the ones who formulate ideas and then attempt to mobilize support. Elite discourse,
by its very nature, is directed towards a wider audience and there is an implied
dialogue between elites and masses. It is important, therefore, to examine the masses
as well As Connor (1990: 95) notes, territorial mobilization is not merely an elite, but
rather a mass, phenomenon. Modern democratic states gain their legitimacy as the
embodiment of the people.

By addressing the same questions from two different approaches, one of two
outcomes was expected; the two methods would produce similar findings, or they
would not, meaning that an explanation of the discrepancy would be necessary. As
later chapters will show, this is not a straightforward either/or scenario. The results
are very complex, some reinforcing each other and others leading to different
(although not mutually exclusive) conclusions.

From the survey of the literature surrounding different types of data, the
strengths and weaknesses of the data sources used have been highlighted,
demonstrating an awareness of the problems associated with the choices made.
Based on this literature it is apparent that the best approach to dealing with data
challenges is openly acknowledging them, minimizing their impact and strengthening
the conclusions. This section will now move to a discussion of the individual data
sources, the strategies used to analyze them, and how the problems identified here
were overcome.

Party and Political Publications

Both Canada and Britain are democracies, and one of the ways that
democratic competition for power has evolved is for parties to produce
manifestos/platforms to outline their plans for government. The nature of democratic
competition in federal Canada is different from unitary Britain. During the period
under study there were Nova Scotian provincial elections in 1993, 1998, 1999, and
2003; federal elections in 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2004 (followed shortly thereafter in
2006); a Canada wide referendum in 1992; and a Nova Scotia referendum in 2004 (on
Sunday shopping). The North East was part of British wide General Elections in
publications, Macdonald’s (2001: 207) point about the necessity of analyzing
documents within their social context became very relevant, although it is the
political context that has to be kept in mind. Pogorelis et al. (2005: 993-4) survey literature on manifesto research and outline several reasons why manifestos should be studied: the media focus on the pledges contained within them; they allow for greater objectivity than other methods of studying political party positions, such as interview and media accounts; they present a full picture of party stances; and they allow the researcher to study positions over time. Party and political publications fall into three broad categories, outlined below. Given that party and political publications and records of parliamentary debate and newspaper accounts were analyzed in the same manner, a discussion of their analysis will occur at the end of the description on political debates and newspaper accounts.

Statewide Party Manifestos

Statewide party manifestos are used by political elites to communicate with the whole of the state, yet they target specific parts of it as well. It is a distinct possibility that they are not read by the vast majority of the population of Canada and Britain, being read instead by party activists and the media. In saying this, they are still part of the debate at the elite level. The platforms/manifestos were analyzed beginning with the 1992 British election and ending with the 2004 Canadian federal election. In Britain, during this period, the party system was stable and the two major parties, Labour and the Conservatives, were studied. In Canada, the Liberal Party of Canada was stable, but the other major party, the Canadian Alliance, and its predecessor the Reform Party of Canada, competed with the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada for the centre right vote from 1993 until they merged with the creation of the Conservative Party of Canada in 2004. In Britain the researcher was fortunate enough to have access to an electronic archive of the party manifestos, but in Canada neither the parties nor the House of Commons Library were able to fill in some of the gaps.

It should be noted that while these were presented as ‘statewide’ manifestos by the parties, in Canada the manifestos are produced in English and French, and only the English manifestos were studied. While there is the possibility that the manifestos may be different in English and French, given that this project is interested in Canada (outside Quebec) the point raised by McRoberts (1997), that
French is increasingly concentrated in Quebec and English outside Quebec, this should not be problematic. In Britain, ‘British’ manifestos were in fact targeted at England as each party produced separate manifestos in the minority nations.

**Regional Campaign Material**

Regional campaign material took a different focus in Nova Scotia than in the North East, with more material produced in Nova Scotia due to regular elections at the provincial level. While political parties were somewhat organized at the regional level in England, there were no elections outside of general elections which were (ostensibly) all British campaigns. While parties were active in local elections in Britain, local campaigns took on national significance as they appeared as true second order elections in a near “pure type” understanding of second order elections. This leaves only one instance of what could truly be deemed a regionwide competition for power in the North East, the 2004 referendum, but even that appeared as a second order event.

**Other Documents**

In addition to manifestos, other documents were consulted that, while difficult to classify, nevertheless were important to this research. Examples are the Nova Scotia government’s “Campaign for Fairness” (http://www.gov.ns.ca/fairness/), the joint submission by all three Nova Scotia party leaders to the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada (Cameron et al. 1992), and Gordon Brown’s speech on Britishness to the Fabian Society in 2006 (Brown 2006). These were discovered, then selected for inclusion during archival research as it became apparent that they allowed for a greater understanding of elite opinion while providing additional sources from which to judge the other sources.

**Records of Parliamentary Debates and Newspaper Accounts**

For the Canadian and British Houses of Commons and the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, Hansard is available online and fully researchable from the early 1990s
In this instance a challenge faced was information overload. Through a constantly refined search of both the Canadian and British Hansards, examining constitutional and quasi-constitutional issues, approximately 10,000 pages of parliamentary debates in Britain and Canada were returned, which were then analyzed in light of the research questions.

In Britain these included the devolution Bills for Scotland and Wales, the Bills setting up Regional Assemblies and Development Agencies, a failed Conservative backbench Bill to hold a devolution referendum for England, and the Bills leading to the 2004 North East Assembly referendum. In Canada, the Clarity Act and the Regional Veto Act were used. It is a notable difference between Britain and Canada that much more was being debated in the British House of Commons than its Canadian counterpart due to the amount of political activity which took place at the provincial level in Canada. This was more notable in Quebec with regard to the referendum and the questioning of Quebec’s place within the Canadian federation, but each province was also home to a great deal of debate on the nature of the Canadian state. To supplement the debates, questions to Ministers dealing with constitutional and identity issues were examined. In the Nova Scotia House of Assembly there was little available with regard to provincial identity, the notable exception being the failed Provincial Sovereignty Bill and the transcripts of the Nova Scotia Select Committee on National Unity, a committee which toured the province in an attempt to engage the people of Nova Scotia in discussion of the Calgary Declaration.

With regard to the Nova Scotia Select Committee on National Unity, it must be noted that the provincial government did not translate the French submissions, and this researcher’s French was not of an acceptable level to interpret them for academic study. Many Acadian submissions, though, were made in English for the benefit of non-French speakers taking part in the debates. However, given 1) the small size of the Acadian population, 2) the fact that many Acadian presenters presented in English, and 3) the fact that many sources of data were built into the research design,

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14 Hansard is the record of parliamentary proceedings. To differentiate between British and Canadian Hansard within the text, (Can) will follow HC.
it was not felt that the language barrier would have any effect on the final analysis of
debate in Nova Scotia.

Newspapers accounts were used as they present political debate, and in doing
so provide two sources of information. Firstly, as independent institutional actors,
newspapers play an important role in the shaping of public opinion, both through how
news is presented and what news is presented (the gatekeeper function). Secondly,
newspapers act as a conduit through which regional actors can make their appeals.
Newspapers play a major role in the shaping of the bounded networks that make up a
territorialized identity network (see Anderson 1983). In both Nova Scotia and the
North East regional level newspapers reached broad audiences and provided a
substantial amount of information for this project.

In the North East, three newspapers were analyzed; the *Newcastle Journal*, the
*Northern Echo* and the *Evening Chronicle*. Each of these papers covered the debates
surrounding the North East Assembly and regional devolution, with the Journal
taking on the role of political actor with the ‘Campaign for the North.’ After 2001
each of the papers provided an online archive of their articles, enabling researchers to
use a key word search in order to find relevant information. The key words used in
searching these archives were “north”, “east” and “assembly”. These produced every
article in which these words appeared, many of which were not relevant to this
project. These articles were then narrowed down to focus on debates surrounding the
(elected and un-elected) North East Assembly. The Local History archives at the
Newcastle City Library were used to provide information prior to 2001. These
archives held a selection of articles dealing with the debates surrounding the
establishment of the (un-elected) North East Assembly, and the referendum for an
elected Assembly, the earliest dating from 1986.

It is unfortunate that the two main Nova Scotia papers, the *Chronicle Herald*
and the *Daily News*, did not have similar on-line accessibility, but the Librarian of the
Nova Scotia House of Assembly Library granted complete access to all of the
materials archived in the Library. This included all of the articles from Nova Scotian
newspapers collected under subject headings such as ‘Quebec Separatism,’ ‘The
Constitution,’ ‘ACOA,’ and so forth. As mentioned earlier, archivists act as
‘gatekeepers.’ However, given the abundance of clippings from both the major and minor papers of the regions, it was felt that the archivists kept comprehensive records.

In both cases, newspaper articles were used to create a picture of how elites felt their region was situated within their nation and state, as well as to gain insight into the importance of identity issues for regional actors. Macdonald (2001: 198-99) notes that newspapers as sources have three major drawbacks; 1) errors, 2) distortion, and 3) they are produced with audiences in mind. Macdonald claims errors may be either technical or factual. Technical errors, such as missing parts of the original document were not encountered during this research, and the concern regarding factual errors was minimized due to the fact that the interest of this research is interpretation, not fact. Distortion may stem from the preferences of writers or editors and is very relevant here, as much of the project relies on what and how newspaper reporters, journalists and editors chose to report. For example, the Newcastle Journal’s ‘Campaign for the North’ indicated the newspaper was not neutral with regard to regional interests. Tickell, John and Musson (2005) argue that in the North East the newspapers were fairly neutral during the referendum campaign. While this may be true, in the years leading up to the campaign the newspapers chose to make regional devolution an issue. The regional newspapers decided to ‘run’ with stories on regional devolution and actively take part in the debates. From this perspective the regional papers clearly lack neutrality. This, though, is a problem only if one wishes to use newspapers for factual research. As this research examines regional views, the biases found in newspapers can contribute to the political views that this work investigates. This bias leads neatly to the third point raised by Macdonald: audience context. Newspapers exist to make a profit, which may create either a conscious or sub-conscious desire to appeal to their worldviews. While this bias may be problematic for those using newspapers for factual information, for this project it is a positive point.

Macdonald identifies the following problems a researcher encounters when using and analyzing documents: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (MacDonald 2001: 204). As the sources of the documents are known, issues surrounding authenticity and credibility will be negligible. Issues of meaning and representativeness were particularly relevant. The majority of this research focused
on political elites, who draw upon mass support for legitimacy in democratic states and elites all claim, in some way or another, to be representative of the people.

Silverman identifies four ways in which documents can be analyzed; content analysis, analysis of the narrative structure, ethnography, and ethnomethodology (2001: 122-3). This work employs content analysis as it deals with what the documents state. It is also influenced by ethnography, as how issues of identity were introduced were also examined. The main goal in using content analysis is determining which themes are common throughout the regions, which are not, and which are found in one case and not the other. In analyzing the content, the logic of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) was examined, but after reflection, it was decided not to use this methodology as it was not felt to be compatible with the research questions and hypothesis.

The logic of the CMP is that parties position themselves in a political space by taking ownership of particular issues as opposed to taking opposing positions on the same issues (Petry and Pennings 2006: 101). At first glance this may appear a valuable tool here, as the CMP approach is “directly based on the salience theory, which makes it suitable for analysing the salience aspect of party campaigning” (Pogorelis et al. 2005: 995). The strength of the CMP comes from analyzing issue strength of a party vis-à-vis other issues held by the party. As such, it was felt that the CMP logic would be the wrong tool to use in this project. In particular, Pogorelis et al. (2005: 1000) note that with regard to issues that are quite specific, the salience approach is not appropriate, and that generalities are better. Given that manifestos were tested for interpretations of state, nation and region, further weight is added to the decision not to adopt CMP methods. These challenges were exacerbated by the fact that in Canada there are both French and English language manifestos and in Britain there is no British statewide manifesto.

In the end, it was decided the best way to analyze written texts was through immersion in the documents, extracting concepts and building an overall picture of elite opinion. Each document/source was read in order to gain an overview of the issues and all the excerpts of how region and nation were presented were noted. These excerpts were then ‘bundled’ into similar themes and once all the ‘bundles’ of data from all the sources were gathered, they were examined to determine how
regional and national actors interpreted their states, nations, regions and the place of the minority nations. This allowed the identification of common themes without sacrificing the contextual nature of them.

**Elite Interviews**

Yin argues that researchers should always attempt to gather information from the people involved in the events under scrutiny unless the researcher is studying the “dead past” (Yin 1994: 8). As this study began during the period under study, and most of those involved are still alive (many are still politically active), attempts to conduct elite interviews were made. Goldstein states that there are three main reasons for conducting elite interviews:

1. To gather information from a sample of officials in order to make generalizable claims,
2. To discover a particular piece of information or a particular document,
3. To inform or guide work that uses other sources of data (Goldstein 2002: 669).

As limited secondary literature exists with regard to either region, this research incorporated elite interviews to inform and guide the work, providing context and filling gaps in other data sources. To guide the reader through the logic of employing elite interviews, this discussion addresses the purpose of the interviews, how subjects were selected, how the interviews were conducted, and how they were analyzed.

While much research effort was focused on elite interviews, these interviews were, in the end, of limited utility to the study. Rather, the data from parliamentary transcripts, manifestos and survey analysis contributed a great deal more than anticipated to the final research. Accordingly, this section on interviews will outline the intended purpose of the interviews, then conclude with a brief discussion as to why the data collected from them is used relatively infrequently within the thesis.

**Selection**

The interviews in the North East took place in the 2005/2006 academic year. Regional political elites operating at the regional, state and European level were interviewed to gain insight into their perspective of the North East and its place in England. The respondents were selected initially by their public involvement in the
devolution debates in the North East. Enquiries were made to those active in the region, and to the head of the ESRC’s Devolution and Constitutional Change Program, Prof. Charlie Jeffery, in order to identify prominent and likely interviewees. The initial response was very positive amongst the ‘Yes’ campaign, the Liberal Democrats, and campaigners with academic backgrounds. It was much more difficult to meet with either Labour politicians or ‘No’ campaigners. Neil Herron, the chair of the unofficial ‘No’ campaign, was a very prominent exception. It should be noted that many of the actors in the official ‘No’ campaign were from outside of the North East. For example, the director and administrative support for the ‘No’ campaign was provided by the London based New Frontiers Foundation (Sandford and Hetherington 2005: 96).

In Nova Scotia, interviews were conducted during the summer of 2006. The summer was chosen as both the federal and provincial legislatures would be in recess, and federal politicians would be working in the province, not Ottawa. It was not possible to predict that the Nova Scotia Premier would call a snap election to be held three weeks prior to the researcher’s arrival. This made arranging interviews with Nova Scotia Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) very difficult, but on the ground they were very accommodating. In Nova Scotia, politicians from every party were more than willing to participate in this study, but due to the researcher being resident in Halifax, an NDP stronghold, interviewing NDP members was made easier. One particular day, for example, four NDP members were interviewed in Halifax, while interviewing a rural Conservative member required a full day trip. As such, the NDP were over-represented in the interview sample, but this was in no way due to unwillingness to participate on the part of the provincial Conservatives or Liberals, or uncooperative.

15 There were two ‘no’ campaigns in the North East, the official one headed by Sir John Elliot and the unofficial one headed by Neil Herron. As Mr. Herron’s group was the longest running anti-devolution organization in the region, predating the referendum and the official ‘No’ campaign for years, many members of the yes side seemed to feel that he had more of an impact than the official ‘no’ side, putting a personable and local face to the campaign.
Members of Parliament of the NDP or Conservative Party of Canada. Liberal MPs, though, did seem unwilling to participate.\textsuperscript{16}

In both regions academics were interviewed for two reasons. Firstly, academics interested in the kinds of research questions being asked in this project will inevitably be involved in the political processes of the regions in some way. Secondly, interviewing academics increased the snowball effect, whereby they were able to direct me to other interviewees in their network and additional documentary data. The Department of Political Science at Dalhousie University was most helpful in this research, from the number of individual members willing to speak on these issues, to the Department sponsoring the researcher during his time in Halifax and granting access to university resources.

The end result was an interview pool that reflected political and demographic diversity, as far as the small numbers of interviewees would allow with the Liberal Democrats in the North East and New Democratic Party in Nova Scotia being over-represented.\textsuperscript{17} Figure 3.1 lists the types and numbers of respondents from each region. While this may be a small pool of regional political elites to draw upon (especially in the North East), as Goldstein notes, even if one is unable to get a representative sample of elites, those conducting elite interviews will still know a great deal about them and their views (Goldstein 2002: 671-672).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lrr}
\hline
Type of respondent & Nova Scotia & North East \\
\hline
Category 1 & 3 & 1 \\
Category 2 & 3 & 3 \\
Category 3 & 8 & 3 \\
Category 4 & 8 & 5 \\
\hline
Total & 22 & 12 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Figure 3.1}
\end{table}

Source: Author’s interview pool

\textsuperscript{16} The author suspects that this may have to do with the Liberals having lost the federal election in January of that year, ending 13 consecutive years of Liberal government in Canada.

\textsuperscript{17} These parties may have been more willing to participate as they both experienced recent success in the regions, rely on student votes, and, as third parties, receive less academic attention than other parties.
As shown in Figure 3.1, there were four categories of interviewees. As the political structures in the regions were so different, direct comparisons of actors were not possible. Instead, each of the four categories represents a similar ‘type’ of respondent. Category 1 represents those with a ‘regional’ mandate. In Nova Scotia they included current and former provincial Ministers and a former Speaker of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, in the North East a local councillor who was a former deputy leader of the unelected Regional Assembly made up the category. Category 2 represents those with responsibilities that straddled the local and regional. This included MLAs in Nova Scotia, as they are responsible to both their constituents as well as the province as a whole; in the North East it included local councillors/council leaders who were active at a regional level or in the devolution campaign. Category 3 represents MPs from Nova Scotia and the North East, as well as a North East Member of the European Parliament: representatives from the region but whose mandate stretched from the local to the state or beyond. Category 4 encompasses party activists, regional/political campaigners, academics, and a public servant in the Nova Scotia ministry of intergovernmental relations. These were clustered together due to the sizable overlap between the academics and political activists in both regions. A total of 36 semi-structured interviews were conducted, with Nova Scotians appearing more willing to participate in the interviews than those from the North East, resulting in nearly twice as many Nova Scotian interviews.

Method

The semi-structured format of the interviews allowed respondents to discuss issues of importance to them. As Aberbach and Rockman (2002: 675) humorously state, “people find talking about themselves about as fascinating as any subject they know”. This strategy allowed respondents to ‘open up’ and discuss the place of their region and nation in their own words. It was determined that allowing respondents to discuss issues they felt comfortable with would encourage openness, and respondents would continue to speak freely when the questions became more directly relevant to the research. Additionally, Oppenheim remarks that interviewers need to be prepared for the respondent to start to open up with more information once the interview is ‘officially over’ (1992: 75). This advice was heeded and some of the most
enlightening information obtained occurred when one interviewee gave the researcher a tour of the council building after the interview.

Being prepared means not only getting the most out of the interview, but also establishing credibility for future interviews (Goldstein 2002: 671). This was extremely important with regard to the open-ended interviews conducted. Engaging with the respondents required a high level of familiarity with the issues facing the North East and Nova Scotia. The interviewer must neither intimidate the interviewee nor “appear dim” (Leech 2002: 665). Also, as the interviews were also used to gain access to other respondents, it was clear that without a high degree of familiarity with the region, respondents would not forward the interviewer to other contacts.

As the respondents were well placed elites, all intimately knowledgeable about regional concerns, it was imperative that the researcher have as thorough a grounding in the politics of the region as possible to avoid the situation described below:

The danger here is that—especially when dealing with highly educated, highly placed respondents—they will feel that they are wasting their time with an idiot, or at least will dumb down their answers and subject the interviewer to a Politics 101 lecture. (Leech 2002: 665)

Leech also states, “what you already know is as important as what you want to know.” (2002: 665), which highlights the importance of a clear understanding of what questions needed to be asked (Oppenheim 1992: 100). After conducting the secondary research and beginning the primary research, it quickly became clear that the interviews should be done in as open-ended a manner as possible to gain insight into the views of regional actors and improve the conceptualization of the work (Leech 2002: 665, Oppenheim 1992: 67-70).

**Analysis**

Antaki et al. (2003: 2-4) note that one cannot simply summarize elite interviews or compile interesting quotes; one has to actually analyze them and hold them to theory. But deciding how to analyze the interviews depends upon the reasons for conducting them. Much like the documentary sources were analyzed for the purpose of examining key themes, so too were elite interviews. As elites were
queried from the perspective of their own agendas to encourage maximum flow of
to encourage maximum flow of information, it made direct comparisons between elites difficult. Since these interviews were used to inform this work, they were analyzed with the aim of ‘fleshing out’ the earlier examination of documents to build an impression of elite views and to gain insider knowledge of the political process. This was done in a similar manner to the documentary analysis: the interviews were broken down into bundles and the bundles were then grouped together thematically to help build a picture of overall elite opinion within the region. Yet in doing this, it was discovered that the data collected from interviewees was much less robust and filled in less gaps in the other literature than was hoped for. While some of the findings were extremely interesting (especially the emphasis on Acadian culture in Nova Scotia), the majority of the data gleaned from the interviews reinforced data collected by other means, rather than contributing to the pool of data. Of course, this was not surprising given point made by Goldstein (2002: 671-672), that much of elite opinion is already publicly available.

Survey Data

As Henderson notes (2004: 602), individuals do not possess political culture, regional variants or sub-cultures, they possess attitudes which “allow us to examine what the dominant political culture might look like.” Accordingly, to test for territorial identities, survey data must be examined. Survey data, by its very nature is quantitative while the other sources used are qualitative. Though the statistics were compiled by the institutions conducting the surveys (each with their own agendas), they were ultimately generated by the masses as measures of public opinion.

Initially six survey sets were used to collect data. In Canada, the Canadian Election Studies (CES) (including the 1992 Referendum study), the quarterly Environics Focus Canada (EFC) survey, and the Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS) were used. In Britain, the British Election Surveys (BES) and the annual British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) and the one time Regional Referendum Study (2005) were employed. While the British surveys and the CES and EFC were easily accessible, the EDS is a restricted Statistic Canada survey, and access to it required a peer reviewed application through the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
of Canada. While confirming the high level of belonging Canadians feel for both Canada and their provinces, the EDS became unavailable for this project as Statistics Canada regulations state that one cannot use data if the unweighted data from a single cell is less than 10. In recreating the Moreno table as per the logic of Henderson (2007), cells with no sense of belonging towards either Canada or the province fell below 10. For entirely different reasons, the BES was not used as the BSA, a yearly survey was deemed a better source to examine questions over time.

These surveys allowed a broad range of questions to be examined (far more than appear in this work), but presented unique challenges in overcoming the low number of respondents in Nova Scotia and the North East of England. Where possible, the data has been presented over time, to demonstrate that the overall patterns are consistent, even if the numbers are low. Otherwise, the different years have been grouped together to produce a larger ‘n’ value, the number of respondents, for the data. Neither method is perfect, but both approximate a much larger ‘n’ value than what was available in the regions. These methods, combined with the fact that the surveys were weighted differently and for issues that were not examined in this project, meant that it was determined that unweighted data would be used. While this is not the norm in statistical analysis, it was felt that the benefits of using unweighted data outweighed the negative consequences.

Chapter Seven analyzes the survey data, and as such discussion of the finer points used in the analysis of this data will be held in that chapter, merely overviewed here. The two focuses of survey analysis in this thesis were 1) to gain an understanding of how the masses interpret their identities and place within the state; and, 2) triangulating against the analysis of elite debate to determine if and how elite discussion resonates with the masses. These were achieved through simple cross tabulations and correlations to test the strength of regional identity against that of national identity in Nova Scotia and Canada (outside Quebec) and the North East and England/Britain. This provided a starting point in understanding whether a difference in attitude exists between the regions and their co-nationals. Once this was established, the data was used to examine constitutional preferences in the regions, levels of political efficacy, and overall faith in the system. This was cross tabulated and correlated where possible to levels of regional identity and regional attachment.
It must be noted that relative strength of attachment is not comparable between regions in different states; it is only comparable with regard to co-nationals. The numbers only indicate that Nova Scotia has a higher degree of provincial attachment than the rest of Canada (outside Quebec). This data is not sufficient to judge if Nova Scotians are more or less attached to the region than respondents in the North East.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the methodological focus of this study and the research design: a comparative qualitative examination of elite debate triangulated with an analysis of survey data designed to approximate scientific experimentation using the Most Similar Systems Design. Within the qualitative examination three sources of data were used to triangulate the findings and elite interviews offered depth to the research while minimizing the problems associated with qualitative work. This chapter has examined literature surrounding the comparative approach taken to highlight its strengths and demonstrate knowledge of and strategies for dealing with its weaknesses.

Building upon the examination of bounded networks, in order to test the hypotheses, this chapter demonstrated the logic of undertaking a two case comparative work. By isolating and controlling as many variables as possible, this project is able to test the impact of regional democracy on regionalism. The hypotheses and research questions imply a series of complex relationships between the state and the sub-state nations, amongst the sub-state nations (both minority and majority) and between the nations and the regions. This chapter also discussed issues surrounding the data used outlining not only the data sources, but the challenges of each source and how these challenges were overcome. By doing the above, this chapter demonstrated how regionalism in Nova Scotia and the North East can be tested and prepares the reader for the next chapter, which contextualizes the two cases.
Chapter Four: Canada and Britain Compared

4.1 Introduction

Chapter Two suggested a balance has to be achieved amongst the constituent elements in a multinational state in order to avoid friction. Chapter Three outlined the need for a ‘Weberian’ strategy (Keat and Urry 1982: 145), which requires a thorough examination of the background of the cases. This chapter examines how elites have historically attempted to achieve balance by delving into the history of Canada and Britain, beginning with an examination of the British North America Act (1867)\(^{18}\) and the Treaty of Union (1707). These events represent a critical juncture in the development of the Canadian and British states. The BNA Act and the Treaty of Union not only allowed for the creation of new states out of old ones, it set the trajectories of the constituent nations/colonies in markedly different directions than in the past. Compromise and debate led to the creation, and guided the evolution, of both Canada and Britain, in turn allowing for differentiated citizenship within their constituent nations. A discussion on Scottish and Quebecois nationalism shows how these minority nations responded to changes in the state structures. This chapter rounds off with a discussion of regional politics in Canada and Britain. It examines regional politics within Nova Scotia and North East England and highlights the regional identities that exist in England and Canada (outside Quebec), and their political outlets. Canadian provinces are established political actors in their own right, while in Britain regions were the focus of constitutional discussion, as such ‘region’ is entwined throughout Canadian debates but needs to be teased out much more than in Britain where regions are the focus of debate.

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\(^{18}\) While the technical name of the Act is now (post 1982) the Constitution Act (1867) for the purposes of this thesis the term British North America Act (1867) will be used to demonstrate the mindset of the framers of the Act and the political elites in Canada at the time.
4.2 The Changing State in Britain and Canada

Canada and Britain were created by the merger of pre-existing political units is apparent from any cursory examination of their histories, yet this is sometimes overlooked when examining these two states in the modern era. In North America the British North America Act (1867) was the culmination of negotiations between, and the Confederation of, three British colonies: the United Province of Canada (which became the provinces of Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, creating the Dominion of Canada. This was shortly followed by the membership of Prince Edward Island and British Columbia (the remaining British Colony, Newfoundland, did not join until after the Second World War, after it had existed as a separate Dominion). The prairie provinces and Alberta were created by Act of the federal parliament from land purchased by Canada from the Hudson’s Bay Company. The United Kingdom of Great Britain was created through the Union of The Kingdoms of Scotland and England in the Treaty of Union (1707) and was preceded by over 100 years of sharing the same monarch. As Canada and Britain were created as mergers, this section outlines their ability to be flexible with regard to their constituent units.

In Canada it has always been unclear if the contractual pact exists between four colonies or two peoples (Vipond 1995: 98-99), or indeed, two people in four colonies. In Quebec, Confederation is seen as a compact between two different nations, the French Canadian (now the Quebecois) nation and the English Canadian nation, which was very British in orientation. In other parts of Canada it is seen as a compact between provinces. Thomas (1997) argues that differing views of Compact Theory are the result of an intentional misunderstanding in the BNA Act (1867). He argues that the Fathers of Confederation tacitly agreed not to discuss fundamental

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19 Upper and Lower Canada existed as separate colonies until they were united to form the United Province of Canada in 1841, and in turn this colony was split in two to form the basis of Ontario and Quebec in 1867. Accordingly, one could argue that three or four provinces formed Canada, depending on whether one views the province of Canada as one or two colonies.
questions on the nature of the state for the sake of reaching agreement. This sidestepping is apparent in that it was not until after Confederation that debates surrounding the nature of the state began (McRoberts 1997). In addition, as Canadians were British in 1867, and as the BNA Act (1867) was an act of the British Parliament, such debate may have seemed illogical.

The BNA Act (1867) created a federal system in which political power was divided between the provinces and the federal government, ensuring the survival of mid-level or sub-state elites and their corresponding political networks. The Treaty of Union (1707) did not divide power between levels of government in the newly created British state, but neither did it wipe out a complete level of elites in Scotland as it left many aspects of Scottish social life outside politics. While allowing a Scottish (as opposed to British) civil society to flourish north of the border (Greer 2007, Morton 1999), political sovereignty was to begin and end at the parliament in London. The concept of parliamentary supremacy was an English, not Scottish, constitutional practice, and the maintenance of English constitutional practice in Britain has ensured that parliamentary supremacy cannot be challenged. England has historically been governed through a centralized legislature, but with devolved administration to parish, borough and shire counties as well as the cities (Royle 1998: 9). Accordingly, not all political decisions are made in Westminster; decisions that most impact people’s lives in a visible manner (for example, garbage collection or the location of schools) are taken outside Parliament. Regardless, the appearance of all politics beginning and ending at Westminster may have been a powerful force in socializing the English as to how Britain should be governed.

Mitchell (2002: 758) notes that by the late 20th Century, the administration of Britain was unusual in that it was largely divided along functional lines in England, but with a territorial aspect in the rest of Britain: the Scottish, Northern Ireland, and Welsh Offices. In the 1960s and 1970s Labour introduced regional planning structures (Tomaney 2002: 1), yet the first substantive, perhaps even constitutional, change that occurred in England was in 1994 when the Conservatives added a territorial dimension to the administration of the state in England with the GORs. While designed to coordinate government activity at a regional level, this was part of
a process of regionalization across the whole of Britain that began in the 1880s with the development of the Scottish Office and suggests British elites have historically been willing to “view government matters by the differential impact on geographical areas rather than purely functionally” (Mitchell 2002: 758).

The agreement reached in 1707 was not one of assimilation or nation formation (although a British nation did emerge), it was about accommodation and incorporation (Nairn 2000: 132, Denver et al. 1997:13). While Scotland lost many aspects of statehood, it kept some that were, and are, very important to national identity: the Kirk (Church of Scotland), the universities and education system, and the legal system which would form the basis of the policy spheres of the Scottish Parliament (Greer 2007). Similarly in Canada, the BNA Act (1867) allowed Quebec to keep the institutions that it needed in order to survive and protect the French fact in North America. In 1707 and 1867 two multinational states were created (or a pseudo state in the case of Canada) and structured in such a way that the identities of their constituent nations could be maintained.

Choudhry (2007), notes that constitutions can serve both to accommodate and integrate, dividing power between different orders of government (or in the case of Britain, through institutional autonomy for Scotland) and strengthening the state by allowing territorial distinction, ensuring that the constitutional order will not break easily under stress. Prior to the First World War, the Canadian and British governments did not become involved in the daily lives of the citizenry; this enabled the state to avoid fundamental issues of ‘who we are.’ But by the end of the Second World War central policy would leave little choice but to force these kinds of questions upon the citizenry. Both the war effort and the state’s undertakings required appeals to national solidarity (Belanger and Lecours 2008). The First and Second World Wars divided Canadians along linguistic lines while in Britain it united the nations of Britain (this work will not touch upon Ireland and the First World War). Although the creation of the welfare state was successful in British state-building, replacing the Empire as the uniting force after the Second World War, welfare state-building was an affront to provincial rights in Canada. Accordingly, Quebec has opted out of many programs when given the opportunity to do so, most
notably the Canada Pension Plan (see Simeon 2006a), making Quebec the only sub-state jurisdiction in the world to run its own universal pension plan (Greer 2007).

As the state began making greater demands of the citizenry, elites within the constituent nations (majority and minority) began making more demands of the state. As argued earlier, a lack of balance opens identity ‘fault lines.’ By the 1990s, Scottish and Quebecois nationalism were powerful political forces, and regionalism in both countries was on the rise (especially in Western Canada). Elites within the dominant nations advanced their agendas, running counter to the interpretations held by elites in the minority nations and threatening the balance in both states. Yet somehow balance appears to have been maintained. It is remarkable that both Canada and Britain have such flexible state structures while maintaining myths of uniformity (at least until devolution in Scotland). This section now examines this flexibility in the Canadian and British contexts, to reveal how these states deal with their multination makeup.

*Canada: The Changing Nature of Federalism*

Differentiated citizenship in Canada exists along different axes: a religious axis in Ontario with regard to the constitutional privileges of Roman Catholic education; ethno-cultural axis, such as the place of Aboriginals in Canada; or even historical-territorial axis, one of the most remarkable being the equality between Prince Edward Island and Ontario in certain constitutional and non constitutional milieus. Differentiated citizenship does not only exist along territorial axes, but territorial lines provide the most visible differences in a citizen’s relationship with the state. This section focuses on ways in which the Canadian state is able to adapt to meet the needs and aspirations of both Quebec and Canada (outside Quebec) and the limits of adaptation by focusing on three key events.

The first significant event is constitutional reform. In Canada, the 1990s began during a period of mega-constitutional negotiations (to use Russell’s (1993) term). While these negotiations were not successful, they suggest Canadian elites were willing to amend the basic framework of the Canadian state to balance different interpretations of the state. The second is the 1995 referendum in Quebec, which showed how Canadians (outside Quebec) were actively involved in the referendum,
both as individuals and as a wider society. It also addresses the consequences of such a narrow vote, which left Quebec’s place and the nature of Canada in question. The third event is ‘Plan B,’ in which the government attempted to placate soft Quebecois nationalists while placing procedural roadblocks in front of Quebec secession. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explain each of these events in detail, instead they are presented to illustrate the adaptability of the Canadian state and the interaction between Canada (outside Quebec) and Quebec in the changing the political environment.

**Constitutional Reform**

While constitutional reform has always been a major issue in Canadian politics (see Russell 1993), the 1980s was arguably the decade that witnessed the greatest debate around the Constitution. The decade began with the patriation of the Constitution from Britain and included a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This was a major break in Canadian constitutional practice, moving Canada from a British style parliamentary system in which parliaments are sovereign in their jurisdictions to an American style system in which judicial overview is expanded from questions of division of power to a rights based redress. This led to a rights-based conception of citizenship in Canada (outside Quebec) in which (English) Canadians felt a sense of ownership over the Constitution (McRoberts 1997, Cairns 1995, 1993).

Given that Quebec agreed to neither the amending formula nor the Charter, Quebecois elites felt the province was ‘left out’ of the Canadian Constitution. Yet while constitutional negotiations during this period focused on Quebec’s place in the federation, new concepts of citizenship had evolved in Canada (outside Quebec). Whether due to the Charter itself (Cairns 1995, 1993, 1991, McRoberts 1997), or social trends that the Charter was a part of (Nevitte 1996, Brodie and Nevitte 1993), as debates unfolded ‘third force’ (non-British and non-French ancestored) Canadians asserted their status (Resnick 1994: 69). Canada ceased to be a country in which ‘French’ and ‘British’ were the sole constituent peoples; everyone, regardless of origin, was to be equally Canadian. This ran counter to Quebec’s (perhaps self-appointed) role as protector of the French fact in North America, and a series of constitutional negotiations ensued.
The Meech Lake Accord was the initial constitutional settlement of these negotiations, and while agreed to by the Premiers of all ten provinces and the federal government, it failed to pass in all ten provincial legislatures. This was soon followed by the Charlottetown Accord, which had near unanimous elite agreement but was defeated in the Referendum of 1992. Whereas Meech Lake was an exercise in elite accommodation, the Charlottetown Accord attempted to bring Canadians into the process of constitutional reform through a national referendum. While the essence of constitutional debates in Canada did not change, as attempting (and failing) to come to a constitutional consensus is a time honoured Canadian tradition, Charlottetown broke from traditional methods of constitutional reform in Canada. The debates were elite, but for the first time the people had a veto through a referendum.

This opening of constitutional debates had two intertwined ramifications that need to be kept in mind. First, by engaging the people it reaffirmed the sovereignty the people of Canada have over the Constitution. The referendum was the genesis of laws in Alberta and Quebec prohibiting their governments from ratifying constitutional amendments without popular approval in a referendum. Second, while legally the Constitution does not need to be approved by the people of Canada, it may not be possible to return to the practice of elite accommodation as the ‘political class’ in Canada ceded ownership of the Constitution to the people. The referendum indicated a shift in the expectations of how democracy and constitutional change should take place; no longer would eleven white men drive constitutional change. Canada shifted from a representative and deliberative form of constitutional reform, in which elected Members act as the representatives of a sovereign people, to the sovereign people becoming directly involved in the process. In doing so, it allowed different conceptions of the people to be brought forward. This shift has meant that certain options for coming to constitutional agreement are no longer politically viable in Canada, further solidifying the constitutional regime and providing roadblocks to constitutional change. This constitutional evolution in Canada may indicate that substantive formal constitutional change is highly unlikely (Stein 1997: 308), perhaps impossible outside of an extreme situation, such as a province seceding.
Referendum of 1995

In October 1995, the people of Quebec were, for the second time in 15 years, asked if they wished to become independent. In 1980 there was a solid majority vote in favour of remaining in Canada, yet in 1995 the ‘non’ (pro-Canada) vote won by only the slightest of margins. Though the referendum of 1995 was a Quebec initiative that did not change the constitutional order directly, it was a flash point in which identities in Canada were politicized and it had long term constitutional significance.

During the Quebec election of 1994, PQ leader Jacques Parizeau promised to have a referendum within the first year of his mandate and in the face of unfavourable polling he kept his promise (Clark and Kronberg 1996: 678). As it appeared early on that the secessionists were trailing the ‘non’ vote, the Canadian government adopted a “strict silence” strategy, which appeared to have been accepted by the majority of the population of Canada (outside Quebec) (Walters 1999: 372, Clark and Kronberg 1996: 677). At the beginning of the referendum campaign, support for the ‘yes’ campaign was well below the 50% mark, but when popular leader of the Bloc Québécois, Lucien Bouchard, entered the campaign he raised the fortunes of the separatist campaign markedly (Clark and Kronberg 1996: 680). The fact that Chrétien was a signatory to the 1982 Constitution meant that the Quebecois may not have trusted anything offered by him (Clark and Kronberg 1996: 677), as this was what Trudeau had done during the previous referendum which left Quebec’s elites feeling betrayed. This left the defence of Canada to Quebecois federalists who emphasized economic, rather than emotional, philosophical, or moral reasons for Confederation. In turn secessionists were able to portray Canada (outside Quebec) as materially driven, willing to cut a deal with a new and independent Quebec (Stairs 1996: 6-7). Support for the ‘yes’ vote began to rise. The mood in the federal government and Canada (outside Quebec) began to change as the reality of a secessionist victory drew closer. This culminated with the image that many people

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20 It should be noted that while technically the wording of both referenda was not about separation, according to Whitaker (1995: 195) the Quebec referendum of 1980 muddied the waters as to what the question was to the point that one has to assume that “yes” meant independence. A similar logic would apply to the equally complex referendum question in 1995.
have of the Referendum, of 100 000 Canadians from across Canada flying a giant Canada flag and descending on Quebec to demonstrate their love of the province. While the effectiveness of the rally may be difficult to determine, it indicated the level of interest of Canadians (outside Quebec) and was accompanied by other such ‘love ins’ throughout the federation. And though a clear majority by either side may have ended the debate (or the Canadian state as it is currently constituted), the narrowness of the ‘non’ victory by the federalists, less than 51%, meant that the constitutional place of Quebec remained unresolved (Stein 1997: 309) and the constitutional order in Canada has remained politicized.

It should be noted that a certain amount of confusion may have surrounded the demands of the those who supported ‘yes’ in 1995. ‘Sovereignty’ appears to be an unclear concept in Quebec. Numerous polls during the referendum showed that 20-35% of Yes voters felt a sovereign Quebec would still be part of Canada (Dion 2001: 4). Polling in 1994 indicated that with regard to a sovereign Quebec, 27% of Quebecois thought they would continue to pay Canadian taxes, 27% thought that they would send MPs to Ottawa and 42% thought they would still be part of Canada (Howe 1998 in Fletcher 1998: 7).

That the referendum of 1995 was the second referendum in a generation in Quebec may seem to trivialize the referendum process, with continual referendums being held until the desired result is achieved (Jaques 2001: 41). However, the reality is much more complicated. People in Quebec may have felt betrayed by the actions of the federal government after the 1981 referendum, as Trudeau promised Quebeckers that a new deal would be made if they chose Canada, but the deal he forced on Quebec completely undermined Quebec’s traditional position within the Canadian constitutional order. Between the 1980 and 1995 referenda, Quebec experienced what many Quebecois thought of as the “illegitimate patriation of the constitution, the imposition of a new constitutional order, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord and the failure of the Charlottetown Accord” (Seymour 2000: 249). While Canada (outside Quebec) may not attempt to dominate Quebec, from Quebec’s perspective, the new constitutional regime could be seen as an expression of majority nationalism. While a surface reading of the process leading to the 1995 referendum may appear to trivialize referendums by the sovereigntists continually holding them
until they win, 1995 can be interpreted as Quebec’s people having a say on the imposed constitutional order.

Even though Quebec is the most powerful sub-state government in the world\(^\text{21}\) (Dion 1996: 179), nationalist elites felt that the only way for the Quebec national project to succeed was through the creation of an independent state. Even though constitutions can balance integration and accommodation, it appears to many in Quebec that the failure of Quebec and Canada (outside Quebec) to reach a consensus on Quebec’s place within Canada meant the necessary balance could not be found.

From the perspective of the Canadian state, the referendum tested Canada’s pluralism and tolerance, determining if Canada would be tolerant of the rejection of itself. It appears that the answer was ‘yes’ (Stairs 1996: 9). Instead of decrying the legitimacy of the event, Canadians (from outside Quebec) participated in it, giving implicit recognition of the right of Quebec to form its own independent country. This right became a part of the Constitution when it was recognized by the Supreme Court in the 1998 \textit{Reference re Secession of Quebec} and in turn given life in the federal Clarity Act. In this sense, although the referendum did not alter the Constitution of Canada, it did lead to a clarification of the constitutional rights of provinces to leave the federation.

With regard to this study, the importance of the 1995 referendum was not the referendum itself, but rather how Quebec was able to influence statewide debate to bring about constitutional change. It also demonstrated how the people of Canada (outside Quebec), who initially adopted the government’s strategy of silence, became engaged with the process. This not only legitimized the referendum, it provided statewide and regional elites the opportunity to advance their interpretations of the state, as seen in ‘Plan B’ below.

\[^{21}\text{While other sub-state jurisdictions may have more legislative power (for example, Scotland or American states), the power of the Quebec National Assembly is buoyed by its taxing powers, administrative powers, population size relative to the rest of Canada and the low number of provinces, and the ability of its electorate to mobilize along nationalist lines.}\]
Plan B

Although the events that followed the 1995 referendum did not formally alter the Canadian Constitution they need to be considered in the context of a wider understanding of constitutions to understand their significance. As outlined by Dyck (1993), the Canadian Constitution is not a single codified document, but the collection of a number of different laws, decrees and traditions. As stated by the Supreme Court in the *Reference re Secession of Quebec*:

> The Constitution is more than a written text. It embraces the entire global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional authority. A superficial reading of selected provisions of the written constitutional enactment, without more, may be misleading. It is necessary to make a more profound investigation of the underlying principles animating the whole of the Constitution, including the principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities. Those principles must inform our overall appreciation of the constitutional rights and obligations that would come into play in the event that a clear majority of Quebecers votes on a clear question in favour of secession. (Supreme Court 1998).

The Canadian Constitution includes the British North America Act (1867), now called the Constitution Act (1867), the amendments to that Act (including the 1982 amendments and beyond) and the collection of British statues and orders-in-council that are of constitutional significance (for example, the orders-in-council that created the provinces of British Columbia and Prince Edward Island and that added the North West Territories). Dyck also includes Canadian statutes, such as the Manitoba Act of 1870 and the Saskatchewan and Alberta Acts of 1905, the Supreme Court Act and the Supreme Court rulings on the Constitution, as well as non-codified conventions (Dyck 1993: 331-332). *The Reference re Quebec Secession* clearly falls into this understanding of the Constitution. Accordingly, the reforms that were included in Plan B need to be understood in this wider constitutional context. Three that are exceptionally pertinent for this study are the *Reference* itself, the Clarity Act, and the Regional Veto Act. In addition, the province-led Calgary Declaration needs to be discussed.

In 1998 the federal government asked the Supreme Court to rule on the legality of Quebec declaring its independence. The reference was claimed as a victory by all sides. It recognized that sovereignty rested in the people of both
Canada and the provinces, with neither being more legitimate than the other. While provinces do not have an explicit legal right to leave Canada, if a province did clearly express the will to become an independent state, the other provinces would have an obligation to negotiate that province out of the federation. The Court ensured that this would remain a political, as opposed to legal, issue by stating that what was a clear majority on a clear question was up to politicians, not the Court, to decide.

The federal government responded with the Clarity Act. While not dictating the wording of the question, it stated the Government of Canada would only recognize a ‘yes’ result of a referendum in which a clear majority voted on a clear question of independence. This set the bar higher than 50%+1 without stating what would be acceptable. Gagnon and Iacovino (2007) argue that this Act is both undemocratic and misleading. They believe that the referendum question of 1995 was clearer than a ‘Do you want Quebec to be independent?’ question, as the latter (do you want Quebec to be independent) deals in the abstract while the former dealt with the situation on the ground. Stairs (1996) notes the federal government represents all of Canada and cannot speak for any one group of provinces. As such, the federal government can only negotiate a break on a clear question of complete independence, and does not have the authority or legitimacy to do anything else, as implied in 1995.

The Regional Veto Act established by Act what the Quebec government had failed to secure through constitutional amendment, a constitutional veto. This Act gave each ‘region’ a veto over constitutional reform by prohibiting Cabinet Ministers from introducing constitutional amendments that did not have the approval of each of the five regions (B.C, the West, Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada). Yet as this was not constitutional, it lacked the symbolic force of constitutional ‘recognition’ that Quebec sought. The Act created a hierarchy of provinces and although Quebec was treated as one of the top tier of provinces, it was treated as just another Canadian region.

22 The wording of the 1995 question was “Do you agree that Québec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Québec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?”
While the federal government was taking a combative approach to Quebecois nationalism, the provinces moved towards accommodating Quebec with the Calgary Declaration (Seymour 2000: 11). According to the Ontario Government Legislative Library;

Disgruntled with the federal government’s strategy in the 1995 Quebec referendum, but wanting to demonstrate good will to Quebeckers on their own behalf, Canada’s premiers and territorial leaders—except for Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard—met in Calgary on 13 September 1997 to set out some broad principles for constitutional reform. After a full day’s meeting, the Premiers and territorial leaders released the Framework for Discussion on Canadian Unity (Glenn 1998).

While not part of the federal government’s strategy, the Calgary Declaration is important here as it may be the only time a clear Canada (outside Quebec) position has been articulated. It demonstrates how constitutional debates surrounding Quebec’s place can ‘spill over’ into Canada (outside Quebec), allowing regional actors to articulate their views of the Canadian state. The Calgary Declaration was about Quebec and the nature of the Canadian state; it was issued by the other nine provinces and passed in their legislatures, “often with considerable fanfare” (Courchene 2004: 10). In Nova Scotia the Declaration led to the creation of the Special Select Committee on National Unity which criss-crossed the province, engaging the population. The resulting motion supporting the principles of the Calgary Declaration in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly was passed unanimously (Nova Scotia: 9 June 1998).

Constitutional negotiation, the Quebec Referendum of 1995 and ‘Plan B’ have all shown that the Canadian state, while based upon a constitutionally enshrined framework, is flexible and capable of adaptation. The events outlined above suggest that the idea of ‘Canada’ is constantly up for debate and that during the 1990s the political environment was altered in such a manner that actors from regions within Canada (outside Quebec) could articulate their views on the nature of Canada. While none of the above deals with the place of regions directly, given the fact that in Canadian federalism each of the provinces is a constitutional actor, as will be seen in

23 The seven points of the Calgary Declaration can be found at www.exec.gov.nl.ca/currentevents/unity/unityr1.htm
Chapters Five through Seven, these debates allowed regional actors with regional mandates the opportunity to advance their regions concerns.

*Britain: A Union in Transition*

To understand Britain’s flexibility in dealing with challenges to the state three important political events will be examined. The first is devolution in Scotland, where wholesale political decision making was ceded from Westminster to the Scottish Parliament. The second is the creation of administrative structures at the regional level in England. The central state vested a great deal of administrative capability in GORs, RDAs, and RC/RAs as part of the government’s attempt to find an answer to the so called ‘English Question.’ Lastly, the 2004 referendum in the North East is examined. This was the final, and failed, attempt to alter the constitutional order vis-à-vis England in response to the ‘English Question.’ This examination provides an understanding of how the British state has changed over time to accommodate difference and how this has created problems in other parts of the state.

*Devolution in Scotland*

The story of the referendums of 1997 will not be told here, for while they are major events in British and, more importantly, Scottish and Welsh history, it is what happened before and after them that is of importance here. Historically, if Scotland and England produced similar electoral results political parties were able to govern without fundamental constitutional issues being a major concern. The regionalization and nationalization of politics has changed this. McAllister (1997) demonstrates that by the end of the Conservative era, vote swings no longer followed statewide patterns. Parties would simultaneously experience a rise in support in one area and a loss in another. The Thatcher and Major era demonstrated how distinct Scottish politics had become from the rest of Britain (Kellas 1999: 221-3),\(^{24}\) and when

\(^{24}\) This should not be interpreted, however, to mean that Scotland has historically shared a similar voting to pattern with England. Scotland’s unique voting pattern vis-à-vis the rest of Britain was evident as early as the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century; the Conservatives won only eight out of 60 seats in 1870 and seven in 1880 (Kellas 1999: 227). It was only with the splitting of the Unionists over the issue of Home Rule that Scotland developed a voting pattern more closely aligned to the British ‘norm.’
Scotland began to consistently vote differently, the ‘doomsday scenario’ emerged. This is when a governing party achieves a majority of seats in the House of Commons with little representation from Scotland (Denver et al. 2000:32-3).

By the time Labour returned to power in 1997, the demand for some form of self-government in Scotland was too great to ignore, and Labour made it one of their election platforms. Even the Scottish National Party, which had originally stayed out of the Scottish Constitutional Convention as it did not want “to be drawn into a devolutionist trap” (Mitchell 1996 in Greer 2007: 82-82), came onboard even though ‘unionist’ defence mechanisms were built into the proposed system.25 While devolution had been promised without a referendum, Blair’s decision to hold the referendum ensured that there would be no question as to the legitimacy of the Scottish Parliament.

While some argue that devolution was a fundamental change in the way the British state was governed (for example, Adams and Robinson 2002), Scottish distinctiveness has historically been catered to through machinery at both central and local levels with distinct policies (Denver et al. 2000: 13), as well as autonomy for distinct Scottish organizations (Greer 2007: Ch 3-4). While these organizations were not democratic, Bond et al. (2003) demonstrate how unelected bodies are able to harness identity. Greer (2007) argues that the drastic change was Thatcher’s challenge to the autonomy of Scottish institutions. Accordingly, devolution was an attempt to reintroduce the stability and autonomy that the Conservatives had removed from Scotland. Yet from a democratic and legitimizing viewpoint, it was radical in that the powers exercised at a territorial level in Scotland would be overseen and administered by people with a mandate solely for Scotland, and they would be visible in doing it, not cloaked by Westminster and Whitehall.

25 In 1997 Labour’s Scottish General Secretary and future First Minister of Scotland Jack McConnell stated that the German style Additional Member System was introduced to keep the SNP out of power (Bradbury and Mitchell 2001: 257). There is a certain amount of irony that he in turn lost Scotland to the SNP in the 2007 Scottish election.
Post devolution, a sense of disillusion gradually set in amongst the Scottish electorate as the parliament did not, indeed *could not*, live up to the extremely high expectations of the Scottish electorate (Denver 2003: 31). A disconnect appeared between a liberal oriented Scottish establishment which assumed itself to be representative of Scottish opinion, and average Scots who voted predominantly for social democratic parties, but are actually conservative in orientation (Bradbury and Mitchel 2001: 269). In addition, it is not clear if the new system is a first or second order system (see Jones 1999, McEwen 2003 and Paterson et al. 2001), calling into question whether politics is truly devolved in Scotland, or if British politics is merely being fought out at a Scottish level.

The disillusionment with the Scottish Parliament is important as Scotland’s place within the Union and its relationship with Westminster has remained politicized instead of being resolved. A term used to describe devolution is ‘settlement,’ which implies a static understanding of nation, state and constitution, yet these change and evolve over time. Devolution not only failed to provide a definitive answer to the place of Scotland within the Union, the ‘Scottish Question,’ it opened up debate on the place of England within a devolved Britain—the English Question (Hazell 2006a and b).

*Answering the English Question: Regional Institutions in England*

For all the discussion and analysis of the impact that devolution had on Britain, as Curtice and Heath (2006: 1) note, devolution in Scotland and Wales only impacts 15% of the British population, making it easy to ignore in other parts of the British state (i.e. England). This point is especially important here. While Quebecois nationalism dominated Canadian politics, Scottish nationalism did not influence British politics in the same manner. As Trench (2005) notes, the English Question is rarely asked and as Chapter Seven illustrates, the constitutional status quo is the preferred constitutional option in England. Yet discussing England in this manner misses two key points. First, while constitutional issues were of minor importance to English people in general, to some political elites they were fundamental. Second, while constitutional issues may have been far from the minds of most English people, it appears that devolution in Scotland gained importance the further north one went in
England. The relationship between geography and political preference is apparent. Curtice (2006: 123 see also Figure 7.15 in Chapter Seven), shows that support for the status quo was slightly less in the North than in the South, but that while support for all-England devolution was on par with regional assemblies in the South East, support for regional assemblies was twice as high as all-England devolution in the North East. Indeed, the North as a whole favoured this option much more strongly than the South. The only divergence was the South West, home to Cornwall, and London, a city-region where regional and civic identities may overlap. As Curtice (2006) notes, the support for regional devolution in the North East, as opposed to some other sort of all-English solution, stems from the North East being isolated from the South East.

In England devolution “is neither thought to be worthy of either emulation or envy” (Curtice and Heath 2006 4-7, Curtice 2006). There is no indication that devolution leads to an urgent need for structural change in England (Sandford 2002: 791). While this may have led to elite discussion on the English Question, it was not something the electorate in England engaged with. By the end of the Scottish Parliament’s second term in Holyrood, the Scottish Parliament (or more importantly the Labour dominated Executive) had yet to craft a set of politics that was substantively different from those of the British Parliament. Perhaps it is not surprising that the reaction in England was not that strong or that British politics is still the dominant politics in Scotland. This, however, does not mean that there was no reaction in England. Devolution was not a stand-alone constitutional change; it was part of Labour’s larger package of constitutional reform, a package that included devolution to the English regions as well as to Scotland and Wales. As such, devolution and constitutional change as a whole did impact upon the English.

A problem associated with devolution in Scotland, and to a lesser extent Wales and Northern Ireland, has been the English Question. According to Hazell (2006: 1), “the English Question is a portmanteau heading for a whole series of questions about the government of England.” He argues that opinions vary about not only the answer to the question, but also the question itself. The English Question, he claims, can be divided into the following groups of sub-questions:
1. England’s place within the Union. Does England need to find its own separate political voice to rebalance the louder political voice accorded to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland? Could this be supplied by an English parliament, English votes on English matters in the British Parliament, or independence for England?

2. Regional Devolution. Does England need devolution to break from dominance of Whitehall, either as an alternative or to supplement all-English devolution? Should this come through elected regional assemblies, functional regionalism, stronger local government or elected mayors?

3. The Status Quo. Are English people happy with the current settlement, with no specific recognition and no share in devolution? (Hazell 2006a: 2, Hazell 2006b: 38)

The first two points represent two different types of English Question. The first deals with recognition of England in relation to devolution in Scotland and Wales. The second builds upon recognition, but also deals with issues of governance, which would need to be dealt with regardless of devolution in the Celtic fringe (Hazell 2006a: 4-8). The third stems from the fact that the majority of English people may not be overly concerned with these constitutional issues. It is interesting to note that the evidence presented by Curtice (2006, 2005) seems to point strongly towards the third option, yet this seems to have little resonance either politically or academically.

Hazell (2006b: 41) outlines the support for the first and second questions. The first set of questions appears to be targeted by the Conservatives, the second by Labour. The two major British political parties see the challenges of devolution along fundamentally different lines, corresponding to their competing interpretations of the state. Labour has been in government for the duration of this question’s existence and pan-national solutions have been at the core of their constitutional changes. They offered devolution to the Celtic fringe, but not to England as a whole. Devolution is offered to parts of England, as Britain is the primary political community. Because Conservatives see the United Kingdom as a union of four nations, they advocate all English answers. Yet while the Conservatives have not had an opportunity to implement their constitutional preferences, Hazell (2006 b) argues they are not likely to as devolution to all of England would unbalance the Union (Tomaney 2000: 119). As a result, Labour has attempted to answer the English Question at the regional level. Accordingly, this section will now outline Labour’s regional constitutional reforms.
The 1980s highlighted the need to improve management at the regional level in England (Mawson 1998: 162). One North East academic, David Byrne (1992: 35), likened the relationship between the North East and the central government under Thatcher as “semi-colonial.” While there had been a decline of the concept of ‘region’ in the corridors of power in London during the height of the Thatcher years, in the regions themselves the idea did not disappear, re-emerging in the 1990s (Sharpe 1997: 134-5). The relationship between regionalism and Scottish and Welsh nationalist agitation during this time period is well documented. It was argued that a revival of English regionalism was initiated by the debates surrounding the place of Scotland and Wales in Britain (Stewart 1997: 137-8, Mawson and Spencer 1997: 160).

Though Labour championed the English regional movement, it was the Conservatives who laid the foundation with the GORs. This was a radical change in the nature of administration in Britain (Mawson and Spencer 1997: 174). GORs in England created a territorial model of service coordination as opposed to a purely departmentalized system of administration. Their mission was and is “to achieve high and stable levels of growth and employment, and to build an inclusive and prosperous society that can develop in a sustainable way” (Tomaney 2002a: 228). The history of the North/South divide has always been that the South is a ‘have’ and the North a ‘have not’ region (Jewell 1994: 2-4). The creation of RDAs was an attempt to overcome this divide and “transform England's regions through sustainable economic development.” (www.onenortheast.co.uk/page/onene/index.cfm). The Regional Chambers came into being to scrutinize RDAs; they are made up of 70% councillors and 30% stakeholders (unions, businesses, etc.) and all now call themselves Assemblies (Tomaney and Hetherington 2003: 66). Together RAs and RDAs were to coordinate strategic planning at a regional level.

Tomaney (2001: 116) argued that by the turn of the century these new Chambers were beginning to assert themselves as political actors in their respective regions through: 1) holding RDAs to account, 2) representing regions in conflicts.

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26 In addition, the role of the European Union cannot be ignored, as in order to receive EU structural funds, proposals had to be made within a regional context (Stewart 1997: 140-1), one reason for the creation of the GORs.
with central government, and 3) overseeing policy integration. However, it is unclear whether they were creating any sort of institutional legitimacy. While regional institutions may have a substantial impact upon the lives of the citizenry in the regions of England, the people appear unaware of the degree of regional administration that exists in England (Parks and Elcock 2006: 12). Accordingly, the institutional penetration of these organizations is questionable. Returning to the theoretical framework, one can see the need for popular legitimacy in order for institutions of governance to be effective. They do not need to be built around pre-existing cultural units, but the governed need to accept them as legitimate and a relationship must exist between the institutions and those who are governed by them.

RDAs have given English regions institutional voice (Bond and McCrone 2004: 4) but not a democratic voice. At best, the RAs are indirectly elected, lacking the clear line of responsibility to a politically engaged electorate that, for example, the indirectly elected Cabinet and Prime Minister has. The lack of clear lines of responsibility combined with a weak, and largely invisible, policy portfolio (not to mention the GOs operating independently of them), means that while administration may happen at a regional level, politics does not. However, it should be noted that as of yet the regional penetration of these organizations may be weak, they have a clear mandate to work on behalf of the regions.27

2004 Referendum

Heath, Rothon and Jarvis (2003: 56) argue that part of the problem regional organizations in England have in gaining legitimacy is that their borders are not natural borders, with people generally not appearing to have a high degree of affiliation to them. As such, regional institutions do not answer any of the questions raised by the asymmetrical nature of Labour’s constitutional reforms, most notably the West Lothian and English Questions. To address issues raised by these questions, referenda were to be held in the North to see if the indirectly elected Assemblies should become directly elected. While originally planning to hold referenda in all

27 In July 2007 the Government announced it was planning to phase out the Regional Assemblies (HM Treasury 2007). In the North East, though, the organic association of regional authorities would still exist.
three of the Northern GORs, in the end the Government proceeded only in the North East, a region the Government felt was safe (Hazell 2006: 9, Tickel, John and Musson 2005: 3).

In the 1970s when Scottish and Welsh nationalism was at the forefront politically, English regions received very little attention and regional elites were willing to derail devolution to protect their region’s interests (Sharpe 1997: 121). Elites in regions such as the North East were concerned that their regional interests were overlooked as national policies were, and are, dominated by middle England, which (like Scotland and Wales) is better able to deal with Whitehall (John, Musson and Tickel 2002: 734). It was hoped that the dynamic of the devolution process in the 1990s would generate demands for devolution in regions which had been previously lukewarm to it (Bond and McCrone 2004: 22).

It is unclear what impact the North East Constitutional Convention, modelled on the Scottish Constitutional Convention, had on the final devolution proposal presented by Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). In Scotland, devolution had a champion in Donald Dewar, the Scottish Secretary who became Scotland’s first First Minister. John Prescott, the Cabinet champion for devolution in England, did not have the luxury of a North East Office to democratize as Scotland had. This meant that he had to go to his Cabinet colleagues and ask them to cede power to the proposed assemblies.

While the powers to be vested in the elected assembly were minimal, Prescott’s ability to achieve what he did is remarkable given four mutually reinforcing factors working against him:

1. The Prime Minister was lukewarm to the idea of regional devolution (Parks and Elcock 2006: 9). If the Prime Minister had been strongly in favour of the concept, he could have used his authority to devolve power away from ministers and Whitehall.

2. Politicians are power maximizers. As Hopkins (1996) notes, by maximizing the power of their offices politicians can increase their ability to forward their agenda. The longer one has been in a particular office, the less likely one may be to cede power from it. Labour had been in power for over seven years by the time of the referendum. By this point in time, Labour was no longer an
‘outsider’ looking in on government, it was government. While some northern Members of Parliament wanted devolution to protect them from future Conservative governments; with Labour in power the immediacy of that need may have decreased.

3. The nature of the Labour Party. Just over 25 years before this referendum, Labour was split over the question of devolution in Scotland, where public demand was much higher. It must be noted that devolution as a policy is a challenge to the centralist socialist history of Labour in the post war period. If one of Labour’s goals is (or was) the crafting of a socialist British state, then devolution of decision making can be seen as a challenge to some of the principles of uniformity and British wide standards that Labour historically endorsed. Whereas devolution in 1997 can be interpreted as a strategic policy aimed at keeping the Union together (see Denver et al. 2000: 74, Lynch 2002: 123), there was no corresponding need with regard to the English regions.

4. There is no equivalent to the SNP in England. The SNP challenges Labour electorally as well as the legitimacy of the British political system. Prior to 1997, Labour had historically relied upon Scotland to deliver its majority governments, and losing Scotland would mean Labour could be relegated to permanent opposition (Bogdanor 1999). Devolution was adopted by Labour as a pragmatic way of dealing with the nationalists electorally, while buttressing the Union (Denver et al. 2000: 74, Lynch 2002: 123).

While the proposals on offer for the referendum in 2004 were weak, it can be argued that if successful they would have been more radical than Scottish and Welsh devolution as they represented a more “fundamental challenge … to the dominance of Whitehall over all aspects of English life” (Tomaney and Hetherington 2003: 57). Opposition, though, was more than mere opposition to a certain style of multi-level governance or the powers on offer; it came into conflict with people’s interpretations of England and the British state. Opposition spokespeople presented the proposals for elected regional assemblies as an attack on England’s ‘historic counties’ (Tomaney 2003: 55).

If one were to write a thesis on how not to conduct a referendum, the 2004 Referendum would provide an excellent case study. This is not to say that either side
was particularly ineffective (although in hindsight the ‘yes’ side made a few strategic mistakes), rather than the government could not have chosen a worse time to conduct the referendum. The results of the referendum were overwhelmingly against the proposals by a margin of nearly four to one. Dion (1996: 272) notes voters behave conservatively during referenda, yet in the North East people with the most knowledge of the proposals were the most likely to vote against them (Bond and McCrone 2004: 13). This suggests that the outcome was a result of more than the conservativeness of voters as the ‘no’ vote was not merely from people opposed to regional devolution in England in principle (although many were). People also voted ‘no’ because they wanted regional devolution and felt that this was not it. Additionally a host of other issues were involved in people’s decision making, including a general dislike of politics and politicians, not enough powers for the assembly, a weak ‘yes’ campaign, concern about Tyneside dominance and the ability to give the government a ‘bloody nose’ (Shaw et al. 2006: 9-10). Evidence pointed to a lack of economic dissatisfaction, bringing doubt to whether there would be much political dissatisfaction (Heath, Rothon and Jarvis 2003: 53).

People appear more likely to support regional government in principle (Bond and McCrone 2004: 12), and in this sense the ‘Yes’ campaign failed to transfer this potential ‘yes’ vote into a real ‘yes’ vote. As Donnan and Wilson (1999: 65) note, it is easy to ask someone about their identity but difficult to determine how their actions and identities are related. On the surface it would seem that when given the opportunity to manifest themselves politically, strong regional identities in the North East did not take hold. Yet translating enthusiasm amongst supporters for devolution into an effective political campaign was not an easy task and was made more difficult by the fact that it was difficult to address how the limited powers on offer would have an effective impact upon the region (Shaw et al. 2006 6).

The ‘yes’ campaign made use of the strength of regional identity in the North East while the ‘no’ campaign had an effective and simple message—it was a waste of money (Shaw et al. 2006 10). The North East has a vibrant and popular set of newspapers with strong relationships between regional political journalists and members of the ‘yes’ camp. Though supportive of regional government in principle, The Journal was against the proposals and while The Northern Echo was supportive,
its coverage was balanced and reflected the agenda set by the campaign groups (Shaw et al. 2006 12). This meant that the ‘yes’ campaign could not draw upon the media to add weight to its arguments. The fact regional papers spent so much time reporting on regional devolution in the long lead up to the referendum is indicative of the papers’ support of regional devolution in principle and their role in helping shape the regional agenda.

The failure of the referendum eliminated the regional answer to the English Question by ‘killing off’ the demands for elected assemblies for the foreseeable future while leaving the place of England within the Union unaddressed. While leaving the all-English option available, yet a federal or quasi-federal system based on the nations of Britain may not work because of the size of England (Tomaney 2000: 119). As Sandford (2002: 795) notes, devolution in Scotland and Wales was the answer to a specific desire from both nations which has no direct equivalent in England. It is unclear if such a desire existed in England or if there was enough of a concept of ‘difference’ in the English regions, even in the North East, for devolution to have succeeded with better structural conditions.

Following the referendum, there were additional consequences in the North East, most notably a split between the North East Assembly and the Association of North East Councils (Shaw et al. 2006 18), and the legitimacy of the Assembly itself came into question. After the 2004 referendum people in the region wanted to know why there was still an Assembly when the question had been voted down. According to Cllr Ian Mearns of Gateshead Council and a member of the North East Assembly, the impact of the referendum on the Assembly was to paralyze it; it was “struggling to find its feet” (Interview 2006). The referendum robbed the unelected Assembly of political legitimacy and forced it to retreat into its narrowly defined core functions. In this sense, the ‘no’ vote may have actually decreased what little effectiveness the RA had to act as a voice for the North East. Hazell (2006) argues that the extreme centralization of the state in England may be such that regional movements would have evolved without any impetus from Scottish, and to a lesser extent Welsh, nationalism. This, however, is immaterial as it did evolve in the shadow of these nationalist movements and there is an established link between the two, which cannot be ignored in discussions on regionalism in England.
The above suggests that the dialectical relationship between majority and minority nations outlined in Chapter Two keeps evolving. GOs, RDAs and RAs were created to increase economic performance and streamline government services at a sub-national level in England. In ‘carving up’ England, central government opened up discussions on what England was. By opening up the possibility of democratic institutions at the regional level, the Government engaged citizens in the discussions. While the referendum failed and current government policy seeks to disband the Assemblies in the near future, it appears that even though the British state is very old, it is still, in many ways, a work in progress where the discussion of ‘who we are’ and ‘what Britain is’ are yet to be resolved.

Overall, this section has highlighted the impact of the changing and evolving nature of the nation upon the state, and shown that actions and change in one constituent nation in a multinational state has political spill-over in the others. While the minority nations in Canada and Britain were demanding change, the context in which change was made was constantly shifting as perception of what the state is in Canada (outside Quebec) and England was constantly evolving. Though many of the institutional arrangements in Canada are set out in the codified Constitution, it was still able to be flexible. As the reader no doubt noticed, far more attention above focused on English regions than Canadian provinces. This was due to the fact that in Britain, the English regions were part of the debates on change even though they lacked voice. In Canada (outside Quebec), the provinces were not the focus of change. Rather provinces are established actors in their own right, participating in the discussions. It is interesting to note that the British constitution, which is not codified, may not be as flexible as the Canadian model due to a deeply engrained legitimizing parliamentary mythology in Britain. This indicates not only that agreement between the constituent nations on how the state should be constituted is difficult to come by, but that it may actually be impossible. Rather, accepted processes of dialogue and recognition between the constituent members playing a more powerful role in regard to the unity of the state than a legalized (and fossilized) constitutional order.
4.3 Modern Nationalism in Scotland and Quebec

The above discussions dealt with the processes internal to the majority nations in Canada and Britain. To understand an equally important reason why territorial identity was mobilized this section focuses on the minority partner in the dialectical relationship, Quebec and Scotland. This section charts the history of the nationalist movements in these two nations from the 1960s, when these movements began to gain force, to the present, demonstrating a very similar trajectory in both. Additionally, it attempts to show that Quebec and Scotland should not be interpreted as ‘instigators’ in the dialectical relationship. Rather, this section seeks to reveal how nationalism in these sub-state nations was a reaction to actions taken by the majority.

Prior to the nationalist upswing in Quebec in the 1960s, the Union Nationale was the major power in Quebec, reflecting an older, conservative, nationalism. Anti-liberal and communally-based, La Survivance, the traditional form of French Canadian nationalism, was dominant in Quebec provincial politics, with French Canadian life centred on the Catholic Church and the local parish (Gingras and Nevitte 1984: 5). The defeat of the Union Nationale in 1960 opened the doors for one of the most dramatic changes in Quebecois and Canadian society: the Quiet Revolution – the complete overhaul, modernization and secularization of Quebecois society. This radically modernized Quebec socially, economically, and politically.

The secessionist movement became prominent with the formation of the Parti Québécois (PQ) under former Quebec Liberal Cabinet Minster René Lévesque. The PQ became the leading force in Quebec nationalism and secessionist politics, rising to power with 41% of the popular vote in 1976 (Dion 1993). During the 1970s the PQ was a constant and strong factor in both federal and provincial politics. Yet this did not mean that there was consistent support for Quebec independence, as support for the PQ is not the same as support for independence (Lammert 2001: 145).

Note that the Liberal Party of Quebec is both a separate entity from the Liberal Party of Canada (Quebec) and a hard nationalist, yet notionally federalist, party. The Quebec political axis falls broadly along a federalist (LPQ) and secessionist (PQ) axis and LPQs supporters are found amongst the ranks of both the federal Conservatives and Liberals.
While the national status of Quebec has long been debated in Canada and acceptance of Canada as a multinational state is still debated, Britain’s history as a Union state meant the national status of Scotland was not challenged. For three hundred years after Union, Scotland was what some called a stateless nation; possessing the characteristics of a nation, it was not a state, but a (junior) partner in Britain (Keating 2003). Scottish nationalism had been on the political agenda in Scotland well before the 1960s with political parties in favour of home rule since the 1920s (Bennie et al1997: 17, Lynch 2001:7). The first electoral inroad came in the Hamilton constituency in 1967 when Winnie Ewing took the former Labour safe seat with 46% of the popular vote (Lynch 2002: 115-116), yet it was not until the electoral breakthrough of the SNP in 1974 that the major parties were forced to take notice and Labour adopted devolution as a strategy (Denver et al. 2000: 74, Lynch 2002: 123). It was during this period that two main political forces in Scotland, class and nation, aligned themselves and allowed the nationalist cause to make its breakthrough. According to Bennie et al (1997: 9), it was the welfare state that cemented Scottish loyalty to the Union post Second World War, replacing the Imperial project. The 1970s, a period in which the welfare state and the relationship between state and society was being reconsidered and reconfigured across the western world, ended with the PQ and the SNP having made a considerable impact on Canada and Britain (Lammert 2001, Lynch 2002).

In Scotland, the 1980s began on the heels of the failed devolution referendum and the election of the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher. The devolution referendum in 1979 was both a failure and a success for Scottish nationalism. It was a failure in that the referendum failed to garner enough votes to make it past the electoral threshold of 40% (although a majority of those voting did vote in favour of devolution), yet it established that sovereignty rested with the people of Scotland. While the sovereignty of the Scottish people is part of the Scottish constitutional tradition, the British state implicitly recognized it by engaging the Scots in such a fundamental question. This important stepping-stone for the Scottish nationalist movement was followed by the victory of the Conservatives under Margaret

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29 In order for the referendum to pass 40% of the overall electorate had to vote in favour of it; not voting was tantamount to a ‘no’ vote.
Thatcher. Thatcher challenged the post-war consensus and in doing so challenged the consensus upon which Scottish loyalty to the Union was based (although whether or not she initiated the challenge can be debated, Kavanagh 1990: 279). As British multinationalism has no constitutional mechanism for balance, the system works best when the parties are ‘national,’ and politics is fought nationally, with party fortunes behaving roughly the same throughout Britain, but statewide pattern deteriorated, and by 1987 reached a peak with the Doomsday Scenario (Denver et al. 2000:32-3).

Much like the 1979 referendum in Scotland, the Quebec referendum of 1980 was both a positive and negative event for the secessionist movement in Quebec. It was positive in that the referendum on Quebec’s independence displayed Quebec’s sovereignty. The Canadian state was willing to participate in a referendum crafted by the (secessionist) Government of Quebec, on a question chosen by them, on their timetable and under their rules. It was negative in that the secessionists were thoroughly defeated, receiving only 40% of the popular vote, leaving the secessionist movement dead for the time (Dion 1993: 38). After this defeat, nationalist leaders realized that they would have to extend a hand to Quebec’s new immigrant groups in order to achieve independence democratically (Salée 2002: 168). This reinforced the territorial conception of the Quebec nation over an ethno-linguistic one.

While nationalist (autonomist and secessionist) elites may have seen the 1980s as a low point for Quebec, both with the failure of the referendum and Meech Lake, as well as the imposition of the new constitutional order, this may not have been such a low point for the secessionist movement in Quebec. Not only did the referendum demonstrate the sovereignty of the people of Quebec, but by forcing a new constitutional order on Quebec against its wishes, the Canadian government played into nationalist hands. Dufour (2002/2003: 8) argues that if Quebec was given the constitutional recognition it desired during these stages of constitutional change, it would have been willing to “play the game” with the rest of Canada. As the Canadian state was unwilling to grant this recognition, the nationalist movement found itself in a political environment friendly to its cause.

Much like Britain under Thatcher had an extremely strong willed executive, so too did Canada under Trudeau (albeit from a different ideological starting point).
Just as Thatcher created the Doomsday Scenario in Scotland, Trudeau created a Quebecois version of it—the patriation of the Canadian constitution without the consent of the Quebec government. It can be argued that Trudeau made Quebec’s version even worse as it followed on the heels of the 1981 referendum in which Trudeau promised a new constitutional order for Canada—the 1982 Constitution was not what Quebeckers had in mind. When Prime Minister Trudeau patriated the Constitution, he did so with the support all provinces but Quebec. The new Constitution was presented as a “coup de force” to Quebec (Boismenu 1996: 100), and completely broke from Quebec’s understanding of the nature of Canada; a bi-national state in which Quebec, as representative of French-Canada, had a constitutional veto (Russell 1993). By instituting a Charter of Rights and Freedoms whose final arbitrator was the Supreme Court of Canada, the new Constitution created a system in which provincial jurisdiction and actions would be held accountable to a federally appointed institution. The Supreme Court would judge Quebec’s actions against standards Quebec never agreed to (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007). Chapter Two argued that ‘liberal-individualistic’ norms are interpreted through cultural understandings; liberal states practice their liberalism through the culturally shaped understandings of its citizens. Accordingly, the Constitution Act of 1982 caused great concern to Quebecois elites. In addition, one can see how Quebecois elites could frame what happened to be seen as the federal government and the ‘English Canadian’ provinces ‘ganging up’ on Quebec. The ‘separatist’ movement was resurrected; the Trudeau legacy was a Canada more deeply divided than ever (McRoberts 1997: 245).

Following in the neo-liberal footsteps of other western democracies Brian Mulroney led the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada to power in 1984. Leading a coalition of westerners and soft-nationalists from Quebec, one of Mulroney’s goals throughout his premiership was to bring Quebec into the constitutional fold. His failure emphasized the distance between the people of Quebec and Canada (outside Quebec) in their understanding of the Canadian state (see McRoberts 1997). The most important feature of Mulroney’s constitutional packages, for this discussion, was the distinct society clause. These interpretive clauses would be inserted in the Constitution to recognize Quebec as distinct within
Canada, giving constitutional recognition to Quebec’s national status (Breton 1988: 8). To many in Canada (outside Quebec), distinct society was seen as a concession against the rights enshrined in the Charter (Watts 1992: 796), rights due to all Canadians regardless of province of residence. Yet if the clause was about recognition of difference (worded so as to provide protection for Quebecois interpretation of ‘good’ and ‘just’), it had the ability to protect Quebec by alleviating its concerns about the majority nationalism of Canada (outside Quebec), at the same time ensuring protection for all under the Charter. As Tierney (2007) notes with regard to human rights in Scotland, all European states are subject to the European Human Rights Act but interpret it slightly differently. This lack of uniformity in human rights regimes does not mean that human rights are protected any less in different states, merely that there are slight differences in how they are protected. Bringing this argument to the Canadian context, recognition of Quebecois distinctiveness did not necessarily mean a weakening of human rights but it did require an acceptance of difference.

Due to political manoeuvring in Canada (outside Quebec), the Meech Lake Accord failed and the Government of Quebec started to look for new options, declaring that it would henceforth only deal with ‘English Canada’ (a political non-entity) on a one-to-one basis (Tuohy 1992: 85). While Quebec may have thought of Ottawa as the representative of ‘English Canada’, Stairs (1996) makes a valid point in stating that Ottawa always has to look after the interest of all members of the Canadian federation. Accordingly, the federal government cannot negotiate with Quebec on a one to one basis as the Canadian government also has responsibilities to Quebec as a component of Canada. In this sense, Quebecois elites put both the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada (as well as the other provinces) in an impossible situation; Quebecois elites were only willing to talk to an entity that had no capacity for voice.

By the end of the 1980s, the ‘fault lines’ between the majority and minority sub-state nations in Canada and Britain were beginning to crack. The possible problems identified in Chapter Two were beginning to manifest themselves. The nature of the state, always ambiguous in both Canada and Britain, was politicized.
By the end of this decade Quebec was pulling away from constitutional negotiations and looking for other options. Even the notionally federalist Liberal Party of Quebec became hard nationalist, although not secessionist. Scotland was politically marginalized with the majority of the Scottish population having no representation in government, and the British (Conservative) government appeared unresponsive to Scottish concerns. Of the two major parties in Scotland, Scottish Labour became soft-nationalist, seeking devolution while the Scottish National Party, was secessionist.  

In Scotland, the 1980s ended with the creation of a Constitutional Convention in 1989 (Denver et al. 2000: 33). The Convention ran until 1995 and included the Labour Party, The Liberal Democrats, the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC), local authorities and a range of civic organizations (Lynch 2001: 8). By the time the Conservatives realized that nationalism in Scotland was a serious political force, symbolic actions such as the repatriation of the Stone of Destiny in 1996 were not enough to stop the Labour landslide in Scotland the next year. The referendum in 1997 came during the “honeymoon period” of the Labour government that had taken over after 18 years of Conservative rule. While the referendum was a reversal of Labour policy of unilateral devolution, it was nonetheless supported by Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and after July 1997, the SNP. It was a resounding victory for devolution; 74.3% voted in favour of devolution and 63.3% in favour of the new parliament having tax varying powers (Lynch 2001: 6). If Dion (1996: 272) was correct in stating that voters in referendums tend to behave conservatively, then this was an overwhelming victory for devolution in Scotland.

In 1991 the Quebec Liberal Party (already nationalist while remaining federalist) adopted the Allaire Report, which called for the wholesale transfer of powers from Ottawa to Quebec (Dion 1993: 39, Liberal Party of Quebec 1991). Both of Quebec’s main parties were now hard nationalist, one overtly separatist, and the other strongly devolutionist. The 1993 Canadian federal election was indeed what Alan Cairns (1994) called “an election to be remembered.” This election saw the annihilation of the governing Progressive Conservative Party, which returned only

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30 Of the two second-tier parties in Scotland, the Liberal Democrats have always been a federalist party while the Conservatives saw Home Rule as a threat to the Union.
two MPs. It also saw the rise of the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois as major forces within the House of Commons. The Bloc Québécois, a party dedicated to the break-up of Canada, became the Loyal Opposition, winning 54 of the 75 seats in Quebec (Nevitte et al. 1996: 583). The 1993 election produced a Parliament that was reflective of the divisions that Trudeau created (McRoberts 1997: 220), centred on what Rotstein (1995: 372) identifies as the two major undercurrents in Canadian politics: Quebecois nationalism and ‘English Canadian’ populism. This election ushered in a period of relative stability for the governing Liberals, as the Reform-Progressive Conservative battle for the centre right, combined with the rise of the Bloc Québécois in Quebec, ensured that the Liberals did not face a serious challenge to their rule.

In Quebec, the PQ returned to power and in 1995 held another referendum. Polling was extremely close and the night of the referendum Parizeau expected to give a victory speech. Instead, the federalist forces managed to re-muster and launch a last ditch effort. With less than 51% of the popular vote in the referendum, federalist forces went on an offensive. As outlined in the sub-section ‘Plan B,’ the federal government responded in the House of Commons with the Clarity Act and Regional Veto Act, and at the Supreme Court with the Reference re Quebec Secession. While none of these attempted to generate a greater sense of being Canadian, they were designed to pose procedural roadblocks to the success of any future referendum.

This brief overview has explored Quebecois and Scottish nationalism as part of the dialectical relationship between the minority nations and the majority nations of Canada (outside Quebec) and England. It has shown that since the 1960s, nationalism in Quebec and Scotland has had an important impact on the political environments of Canada and Britain, gaining momentum in the 1960s and peaking in both states in the 1990s. Both minority nations managed to make their concerns heard at the centre and forced regional and national political actors to expend time, energy and resources in dealing with issues focused on Quebec and Scotland. However, it should be noted that these two sub-state nations introduced the challenges to the dominant interpretation of the state not because of changes within Quebec and Scotland, but partly in reaction to changes in Canada (outside Quebec).
and England. This is reflective of the dialectical relationship between majority and minority nations, but due to Quebec and Scotland’s minority positions, they are seen as challenging the status quo. With regard to regional actors, this discussion created discursive ‘space’ to articulate their interpretations of the state.

4.4 Regions in Canada and Britain

In Chapter Two, the theoretical argument began with the state, moved to the sub-state nations and finished with the regions to provide clarity on ‘states’ and ‘nations’ to help understand the place of region within the majority nation. Likewise, this chapter began by exploring the states of Canada and Britain, before examining how the interaction between the majority and minority sub-state nations has altered the political environment in Canada and Britain. This section examines Nova Scotia and the North East, as individual regions and within larger patterns of regionalism within Canada and Britain. This furthers the argument advanced in Chapter Three that they are excellent choices for comparison, as well as contextualizing the debate examined in later chapters.

While England may not have a history of powerful regional movements, regionalism is a fact of Canadian political life (Henderson 2004: 595). Canada may be seen as a case study in regionalized politics, with provincial politics so divorced from the federal that parties sharing the same name at both levels often have no substantive relationship with each other. While Hough and Jeffery (2003: 250) describe Canada as having a “very strongly decoupled” party system between the federal and provincial orders of government, they may overstate their point when they say that “national and regional election processes are uncoupled everywhere.” In some provinces this phenomenon is evident (most notably the four Western provinces and Quebec), yet this may not hold true in Atlantic Canada or Ontario where the federal and provincial parties appear to be more closely intertwined, although in a manner different than that of a traditional second order government. While lacking Canada’s history of regionalized politics, what is important in England is that regional identities exist, that some regions can claim distinctiveness which in turn
may act as a trigger for regionalism (Lanigan 2001: 104-5, Fowler, Robinson and Boniface 2001: 121).

In Canada, regions have political voices in their respective provincial governments and possess distinct political cultures due to distinct political institutions (Henderson 2004: 596). At the present time the regions of England lack substantive political voice (Royle 1998: 9) and possess weak institutions. This should not be interpreted to mean that because regions lack the capacity for voice, that regionalism or regional identities do not exist. On the contrary, the situation in the English regions is in some ways similar to Scotland before 1997; devolution and decentralization existed in the form of the Scottish Office (although the English regional framework lacks the power of the Scottish Office). Even before the Conservatives created the GORs, it was argued that the English regions were decentralized through the operation and importance of quangos (Harvie 1991). The rebirth of the regional movement in England in the 1990s coincided with an increase of sub-national quangos and a desire to democratize their decision making (Sharpe 1997: 135). While John Musson and Tickel (2002: 734) state that experience from France indicates that regional administration can turn into political regionalism, Sharpe (1997: 121) argues there has been relatively little agreement over the political role of regions in England, or even their boundaries.

In England the lack of regional ‘pedigree’ has meant that the concept of ‘region’ is contested. What sub-national regions are, where their boundaries are located, and the usefulness and need for a sub-national level of governance is all disputed. There is a great deal of variation between the regions, and the relationship between local, regional and national remains contested (Herrschel and Newman 2000 1186-7). Currently English regions fall into an administrative category of regions, as they are products of the central state created for the purposes of administration. Yet the boundaries of some coincide with older boundaries, making it debatable as to whether regions are simply administrative. Returning to the theories of the state presented by Mann (1993, 1996) and Deutsch (1966a), the central government in Britain has created bounded networks at the regional level in England. Civil society began organizing around these units (for example, chambers of commerce), reinforcing regional levels of identity. While an elected regional assembly was
defeated in the North East Referendum, this did not mean that these bounded networks were weakened. Indeed, the referendum itself was part and parcel of the creation of these bounded networks, engaging the people of the North East in a common activity.

Using Canada as an example, one notices that strong political loyalties, even national sentiment, were built without a popular base. ‘Canada’ as it is known today was built from a collection of diverse colonies, which for the most part had little to do with each other. Nova Scotia was much more closely aligned socially and economically with the New England states and British Columbia was on the other side of a largely impassable continent. Likewise, Alberta was created from the top down in 1905 and quickly developed a strong sense of provincial identity (see Macpherson 1962, Cooper 1985: 205). Yet no one would deny the strength of attachment to Canada felt in these provinces.

While Scottish, Welsh and Irish national agitation has overshadowed English regions (Sharpe 1997: 121), all Canadian provinces are guaranteed a voice due to their constitutional nature within the federal system. In Canada many of the regions predate the state and the nation. The four Atlantic Canadian provinces are older than Canada, with four capital cities, four economies, and four sets of political and social elites (Smith 2002: 143); and not all of these provinces entered confederation of their own free will. In the first provincial and federal election in Nova Scotia after confederation, 17 out of 18 seats in the House of Commons and 36 of the 38 seats in the provincial legislature went to anti-confederationists. One of the first things the new government of Nova Scotia did was to lobby the Imperial Parliament in London to repeal the BNA Act (1867) (Hardy 1959: 189-190). Nova Scotia even passed a secessionist motion in its House of Assembly in 1887, although Finbow (1995: 64) argues that this motion was to secure a better deal from Ottawa.

Regionalism in Canada and Britain appear different on the surface, but this is because the institutions and histories of the two states are so markedly different. While manifesting itself differently, the underlying concepts of regionalism are extremely similar. As Sartori (1970) notes with regard to cross-cultural comparisons, meaningful comparisons cannot simply “stretch” the concepts to fit the cases. Great care needs to be taken to ensure both concepts and indicators are clear. In both states,
peripheral regions appear to lack voice or efficacy; as such, when presented with the opportunity, regional and national elites advocate change. While structural variables may guide them along different routes in Canada and Britain, it needs to be emphasized that the underlying sources of regionalism appear to be very similar. This will be made clear in the following section dealing explicitly with Nova Scotia and the North East of England.

**Nova Scotia and the North East**

Nova Scotia and the North East are two peripheral regions, peripheral for similar reasons: both are small relative to their nations and states, both are geographically distant from central decision making in Ottawa and London, and both are overshadowed by much larger and much more vocal sub-state nations to which they are geographically very proximate. They even possess similar economic histories of coal mining, shipbuilding and heavy industry which went into decline after the Second World War. As a function of this situation, they can be thought of as ‘frontier’ regions of Canada (outside Quebec) and England. In addition, they are organic communities that pass on cultural attributes from generation to generation. While Henderson (2004: 607) argues that regionalism in Canada overlaps and cross-cuts provincial boundaries, both Nova Scotia and the North East are places of “social and habitual conditions” (Terkenli 1996 325-6). The people in these regions do not exist in isolation; they have families and friends who live alongside them. They belong to social, economic and political networks located in the regions. Both Nova Scotia and the North East are places people *live*, not merely *reside*, and the evidence points to strong cultural cohesion within the two regions. In saying this, identity and cultural cohesion are not triggers for regionalism; rather they are tools that regional actors can use to mobilize territorial identity (Lanigan 2001: 104).

While regionalism in England has historically been marginalized (Bond and McCrone 2004: 2), during the 1990s lobby groups were formed to speak for the regions of England. While ‘region’ was often code for declining regions (John, Musson and Tickel 2002: 740), organizations from civil society were building up regional interests during the Conservative years. This was explicitly evident in the North East with the North East Councils Association (NECA), the first Regional
Chamber of Commerce in England, the Northern TUC and so forth (Parks and Elcock 2006: 6-7). The success of the Scottish Constitutional Convention in paving the way for the Scottish Parliament encouraged the creation of similar organizations in England. The Campaign for a Northern Assembly was created in 1992 and played a role in establishing the North East Constitutional Convention after the 1997 referendums, while the Campaign for English Regions developed in 1999 as an umbrella organization to deal with the Government (Parks and Elcock 2006: 8, Tomaney 2000: 138-9). Even though Tony Blair represented a North East constituency, he personally was not keen on regional devolution (Parks and Elcock 2006: 9), yet after 1995 a strong regional policy appeared in Labour’s manifesto in all years leading up to the 2004 referendum (Wood 1998: 5).

The North East is perceived as enjoying a comparatively strong regional identity based on institutional and cultural distinctiveness (Bond and McCrone 2004: 5). Institutionally, the region is generally the poorest performing of the English regions (Parks and Elcock 2006: 5), at the same time its geographic and industrial history has helped shape its sense of identity (Tomaney and Ward 2001: 13, McCord 1998:109), leading to a strong regional coherence and the development of an identity that is urban and industrial, as viewed by people both inside and outside the region (Colls 1992: 2, Ward and Lowe 2001: 181). This may best be seen through the processes of intergenerational cultural learning which has led many in the North East to adopt traditional expectations of their lives and futures. For example, many male youths expect that they will work in the coalfields, even though they no longer exist (Nayak 2003 21-3).

This kind of traditionalism is found in Nova Scotia as well. In both cases, it is important to distinguish between traditional and conservative. ‘Conservative’ implies a set of beliefs, whereas ‘traditional’ in many ways refers to the socialized aspects of political support, for example family links (Stewart 1994: 51-55). In Nova Scotia it has been argued traditional politics are geared towards patronage and short term gain, but in the long run they are a major factor in the stability of the party system as the division of spoils has historically kept intergenerational loyalty high (Clancy et al 2000: 16). After the 1993 election and the collapse of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada in the rest of Canada, Atlantic Canada became the party’s last
holdout. The non-traditional New Democratic Party of Nova Scotia has its stronghold in Halifax. With people moving there from outside of the province (either other parts of the country or immigrants), a high concentration of students, and a high population turnover means weakened political family ties and opportunity for the NDP.

Carbert (2006) illustrates the strength of these social ties in Nova Scotian politics in her study on women’s political leadership in Atlantic Canada, where the small town nature of politics means that no vote is truly secret. In Nova Scotia, this traditional style of government was valued for its stability, predictability, cautious approach to change and respect for personal, rural and small town approaches (Clancy et al. 2000: 2). However, the Nova Scotian state can be seen as weak because of its lack of ability to implement policy due to entrenched interests (Clancy et al. 2000: 14-15). It was also seemingly rife with patronage. A recent biography of Angus L. Macdonald, arguably one of the most popular Premiers of Nova Scotia, describes in detail how, after defeating the governing Conservatives and winning the 1933 election, he immediately set up patronage committees in each provincial constituency in order to allocate jobs for the party faithful. According to Stephen Henderson (2007), almost a quarter of provincial government employees were hired and fired in this manner. While this system of government predated the professionalization of the civil service, it nevertheless suggests that in the Nova Scotian political system these attitudes and memories may last longer due to the traditional nature of politics and a stable population. While the North East does not have a level of government to compare it to directly, the deeply embedded support for the Labour Party there, coupled with the traditional outlook noted above, suggests similar levels of intergenerational political traditionalism.

It is important to note that a model of layering between the state/nation, region and locality is actually more complex than this three tier model presents (see also Mann’s 1996 five tier model in which only one level is identified below the state). While intellectually appealing, in that it divides the multi-level nature of identity into neat compartments, the situation on the ground is more complex for two reasons; 1) Nova Scotia and the North East are complex societies with internal cleavages, from competing interpretations of the ‘region’ and in the form of local allegiances, be they
city, town or sub-regional regions; and 2) They belong to other, larger, sub-state regions, namely Atlantic Canada and Northern England respectively.

Nova Scotia’s main cleavage exists between Cape Breton and the mainland (Stewart 1994: 137), while in the North East, the lower Tyne, Wier and Tees have long been dominant. In addition, the urban-rural divide is present in both regions. Because of Labour’s dominance in the North East this does not manifest politically, but in Nova Scotia this has led to a sharp divide in representation between rural and urban areas. The last election, 2006, saw the Government of Nova Scotia based out of rural areas and the Official Opposition based out of the capital, Halifax. Moving above the regional level, but still below the national, both Nova Scotia and the North East are embedded in what may be termed ‘mega-regions.’ In Canada the Maritimes or Atlantic Canada are often used to describe a mega-region of which Nova Scotia is part, while in Britain the North East is a part of a larger area known as the North. Nova Scotia is even a part of a trans-national region known as Atlantica (Gittell and Colgan 2004: 136, see Tomblin and Colgan 2004 and www.atlantica.org), which is made up of Atlantic Canada and the New England states.

Although sub-regional and mega-regional identities and cleavages exist, they are contested. While the North does not appear to be a contested concept academically, according to Scott Lynch et al. (1997: 8) there is no basis for aggregating all Atlantic Canadian provinces into a single entity known as Atlantic Canada. Tomblin (1995: 77-8) argues that Nova Scotia has a unique political culture and history in which politics and the economy revolve around provincial and federal, not regional (Atlantic/Maritime), identities. Finbow (1995: 75-6) argues that while each of the Atlantic Provinces has unique cultures and histories, he is comfortable using the aggregate term Atlantic Canada to describe the region. Savoie (2006) notes that while Atlantic Canada is a myth created by policy makers, the Maritimes is real. The fact that the Atlantic provinces each have their own power structures has meant that they have a political capacity for voice that is lacking at the regional level in England, but while Canadian provinces can work together for some goals, most

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31 A Cape Breton secessionist was elected to the Nova Scotia legislature in the 1981, 1984 and 1988 provincial elections.
notably ensuring equalization payments in the Constitution (section 36), such gains are rare as regional division inhibits closer integration (Finbow 1995: 69-70). In essence, it is the crystallized and formalized political and social networks (Deutsch 1966a) that exist at the provincial level in Canada and within the English GORs, especially the North East, that allow these regions to be socially meaningful, as opposed to mere administrative conveniences or coordinating bodies.

Both Nova Scotia and the North East are complex entities for which a full discussion is outside the scope of this thesis. Instead they have been introduced to demonstrate how the regions are best suited for comparison vis-à-vis the MSSD. Chapter Three highlighted Deutsch’s (1996) four key areas that networks crystallize around as being especially important for this work; 1) the economy, 2) population, 3) geography, and 4) language. The similarities between Nova Scotia and the North East in all four areas make them excellent choices for comparison. Both are peripheral, marginalized, and overshadowed by powerful and vocal sub-state nations. While regional cultures exist within each, so do cleavages below and above the regional level. Returning to the discussion on variables from Chapter Three, these are the control variables that have been identified in the process of case selection to ensure they do not contribute to the differences being examined in this project (Przeworski and Teune 1979). While they may appear to make the comparison of these two regions more complex, they support the choice of comparison as these provide a variety of avenues for the exploration of regional and national identities, as will be shown in Chapters Five through Seven.

4.5 Conclusion

The above has demonstrated that the problematization of identity and the corresponding politicization of the nature of the state is part of the dialectical relationship between the majority and minority nations in Canada and Britain. While on the surface it may appear that the ability of minority sub-state nations to influence national discourse is great, the role of the staatsvolk may be just as important to understanding territorial identity mobilization. Through the examination of the relationship between the majority and minority nations, as well as the regions within
them, this chapter suggests that the political environment changed in such a manner as to provide opportunity and context for regional elites to advance their interpretation of the state and their region’s place within it.

By highlighting the relevant background in two complex and dynamic multinational states, this chapter suggested that the ongoing (re)interpretation of the nation is a complex dynamic between the state, nation and region. This complex dynamic introduces questions regarding the legitimacy of the constitutional order and questions of ‘who we are’ into political debates. This chapter has also demonstrated that the question of the place of ‘region’ within the state framework was much more salient in Britain than in Canada. Yet because the role and question of regions was much more visible in England, should not be interpreted to mean that in Canada ‘region’ did not have a place in the debate. In fact, the opposite may be true. In Canada the role of the provinces was much more ‘banal’ (in the language of Billig) than region in Britain. Provinces are established political actors, and Canada is an established federation. As such, the role of the province is much more entwined throughout the debates than in Britain, where they were the focus of debates.
Chapter Five: Top Down Regionalization: Creating the Political Environment

5.1 Introduction

This chapter begins the empirical investigation of this study by analysing state-level elite debate; parliamentary debate in the Canadian and British Houses of Commons between 1990 and 2004, as well as the election platforms/manifestos of the major parties. This chapter is divided in three sections. The first examines institutional factors framing elite debate in Canada and Britain. It focuses on debates surrounding the place of Quebec and Scotland, as debates on the place of these two minority nations drew out how central elites saw their respective states. The second section explores how elites framed the nature of the state by examining the cases and outlining how state elites responded to secessionist and nationalist elites in Quebec and Scotland, which resulted in majority nationalism. The final section addresses how the sub-state nations were framed within the majority/state-led nationalist framing of the state. Here it is shown that Quebec and Scotland become ‘internal others;’ paradoxically both one of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the discourse of central elites. The comparison details the Canadian case first, and then compares the British one to it.

As Angus notes, discourse is not an argument, position or theory, it is “a space for discussion and debate in which many (often competing) positions are possible” (1997: 28, italics in original). By highlighting elite discourse, this chapter illustrates how concepts of balance and issues of fundamental fairness are introduced to statewide debate on basic constitutional frameworks in Canada and Britain. The exchange between majority state-led nationalism and minority nationalism creates opportunity for regional actors within the majority nation to mobilize territorial based identities as well as frame issues which regional actors can mobilize around. Before beginning the in-depth exploration, this chapter briefly revisits the problematization of identity in multinational states.
Problematization of Identity: Unionism and Pan-nationalism Revisited

By appearing to challenge the state order, Quebecois and Scottish nationalists appear to “problematize” identity in Canada and Britain in three significant ways.

1. Tyranny of the Majority. Democracies are not solely defined by majority rule, as the consent of the loser is key to a functioning democracy. In order to be interpreted by national minorities and majorities to be fair and equitable, democracies must ensure that the state is not merely the expression of the majority community—a Tyranny of the Majority.

2. Divergence of Aims. States comprising multiple nations need to manage the different outlooks held by actors within the various nations. States must find balance between competing nationally based interpretations of the state, the objectives of the state, and how the state should achieve those objectives.

3. Assumed Homogeneity. Canada (outside Quebec) and England are diverse societies and regional differences exist within both. While generalizing attitudes in both is a worthwhile exercise, giving researchers an understanding of general trends, sub-groups within these societies may have views that diverge from the ‘norm.’ The existence of these sub-groups, regions, within Canada (outside Quebec) and England allows for Quebec and Scotland to be ‘consumed’ in Canadian or British discourse: Quebec and Scotland become regions within a homogeneous nation-state marked by regional diversity, not nations in their own right. If state structures do not adequately allow minority nations to flourish, then the state itself may become a source of political conflict, leading to competition between ‘state’ and ‘nation,’ based around two competing interpretations of the state: unionist and pan-nationalist.

As outlined in Chapter Two, unionist and pan-nationalist interpretations are poles along an axis upon which different interpretations of the multinational state are based. Unionist interpretations of the state favour the constituent elements while pan-national interpretations favour the statewide identity.
5.2 Institutional Constraints on Discourse

Two structural factors are key to understanding the boundaries and constraints placed upon elite debate at the centre and in the regions. The first is the relative population size of Quebec and Scotland, which had an impact on the potential strength of their ‘voice’ within central institutions, notably the Houses of Commons. The second is the electoral geography of the two states, where the First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system encouraged parties to ignore large swathes of the state in the competition for power. These two factors are shown to territorialize politics independently of territorial cleavages although these cleavages do exacerbate them. This section addresses majority nationalism in Canada and Britain and, by establishing how state-led nationalism frames the state, begins to outline the constraints which are placed on regional actors.

Canada (outside Quebec) and England are diverse societies, and regional and sub-national differences exist within both. Some of the sub-groups within the dominant nation were just as large, if not larger, than the minority sub-state nations. In the 2001 census London had a population of 7,172,000, while Scotland and Wales combined had a population of approximately eight million. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the comparable size of the minority nations to regions within the wider state. In Canada, while Quebec commanded a much greater percentage of the population than the minority nations in the UK (almost 25%), it is still notably smaller than Ontario.

These size differences are important for they enabled Quebec and Scotland to be consumed within the wider Canadian and British discourses. Additionally, neither minority sub-state nation was in a position to veto the majority nation, whereas if elite consensus is found in the majority nation, it could have overridden the concerns expressed by the minority’s elites. This was especially true with regard to Scotland, which made up less than 10% of parliament (although as will be discussed below, Labour has traditionally been over-reliant on the Scottish vote helping increase the voice of Scotland vis-à-vis Labour).
### Figure 5.1 Population of the Canadian Provinces, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population 2005 (1000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland and Labrador</td>
<td>516,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>138,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>937,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>752,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>7,598,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>12,541,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>1,177,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>994,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>3,256,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>4,254,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon Territory</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Territories</td>
<td>43,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nunavut</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada (outside Quebec)</td>
<td>24,672,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>32,270,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/demo02.htm

### Figure 5.2 Population of English Regions/Minority Nations, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Nation</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>2,903,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>5,087,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>1,710,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>50,093,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>2,515,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>6,730,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>8,000,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>4,928,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>4,172,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>5,267,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of England</td>
<td>5,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>7,172,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire &amp; Humber</td>
<td>5,000,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United Kingdom</td>
<td>59,793,702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Approximate numbers due to website limitations

(Source: www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/commentaries/regions.asp)
The work of O’Leary is especially useful with regard to the importance of the relative size of national communities within multinational states. To synthesize his argument, he notes two important points; 1), in a stable majority federation an ethnonational group with a decisive majority has no reason to fear federalism as it has the ability to dominate due to its size, or be generous due to the fact that the minority cannot challenge its position. O’Leary has developed an index, the Effective Number of Ethnonational Groups (ENENg), designed to easily demonstrate how many influential ethnonational groups exist within a state and the relative power of each. 2) The staatsvolk can be seen to be dominant when the index indicates a score of two or less (2001: 285-288). This is what he refers to as “an iron law of nationalism and federation” and though he refers to multinational federations, the logic applies equally to multinational unitary states.

Without embarking on a detailed explanation of O’Leary’s equation, to find the ENENg in Canada and Britain one first applies the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHi) of effective parties in a political system to ethnonational groups and the ENENg is the reciprocal of the total HHi (ENENg = 1/HHi). The HHi is determined by multiplying an ethnonational group’s share of the population by itself (for example, Wales has 4.8% of the population, so .048 multiplied by .048 gives an HHi of .002). As seen in Figure 5.3 below, following this logic Canada (outside Quebec) and England are clearly dominant in the political system. Paraphrasing O’Leary, who makes the same point about the German speaking population in Belgium; this index allows Northern Ireland to be discarded for the purposes of this research without assigning arbitrary cut-offs, as the ENENg in the United Kingdom is the same with or without Northern Ireland (unless one takes it to the third decimal place).

As outlined in Chapter One, defining the dominant group in Canada is difficult. O’Leary identifies Anglophones as the dominant ethnonational group in Canada, giving Canada an ENENg of 1.96, effective parity between the two groups. This author does not agree that Anglophones alone make up the dominant group. As will be seen, French-speaking communities outside Quebec see themselves as being part of a larger Canadian nation with Canada being the defender of their language.
Claiming that the Quebecois, Acadians and Franco-Manitobans belong to the same ethnonational group runs counter to the history of these groups. Accordingly, as stated in Chapter One, the staatsvolk in Canada are Canadians (outside Quebec), the minority is the population of the province of Quebec. This is not only more consistent with the definition of Canada as articulated by elites in Quebec (both federalist and secessionist), but it is also consistent with the territorialization of identity in Canada. While this challenges O’Leary’s point that Canada needed consociational elements to survive as a stable democratic multinational federation because the ENENg approaches 2, it reinforces the argument that the majority can be generous with the minority, as it has no reason to fear it. This is especially true as in Canada the staatsvolk are not only dominant, they see the French language as being an integral part of their identity as well (McRoberts 1997, Kymlicka 2001).

Figure 5.3: HHi and ENENg in Canada and Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnonational Groups in Canada (2005) and Britain (2001)</th>
<th>Size (%)</th>
<th>HHi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada (Outside Quebec)</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>0.585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENENg Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: population figures taken from Figures 5.1 and 5.2, calculations author’s own.

This adaptation of O’Leary’s ‘iron law’ shows that elites from Canada (outside Quebec) and England may have incorporated the minority nation within their understanding of the wider state as neither Quebec nor Scotland was in a position to challenge the hegemony of the staatsvolk. As Tierny notes (2007), a key component of multinational states are multiple demos. Yet as the majority of the population resided in one nation, and neither minority nation had a veto, the majority nation could frame the state with the interpretation held within the majority nation.
With regard to the way the electoral system shapes territorial mobilization, on the surface it would appear that Proportional Representation (PR) would have the same problems with regard to the territorialization of politics as FPTP. This is due to the fact that in all PR systems, except for rare ones that use a statewide list, the state is still divided into electoral districts; they are merely larger than the single member districts found in FPTP. Yet unless the PR system has a very high threshold (reducing its proportionality), or all parties are regionalized (as in Belgium) there are strong incentives to campaign across the entirety of the state. The FPTP system employed in Canada and Britain meant vast swathes of the state were overlooked in the competition for power. For example, in Canada the province of Alberta historically votes Conservative, and in Britain the North East is a Labour stronghold. As Byrne states (1992), due to the fact that Labour cannot lose in the North East and the Conservatives cannot win, electoral and political attention by-passes the region.

FPTP encourages parties to ignore both their own and other parties’ strongholds. As parties have limited resources, it makes no sense to divert resources to constituencies that cannot be won or lost. In a PR system parties are encouraged to conduct a truly statewide campaign, as votes in all regions of the state will have an impact upon its final representation in the legislature.

The territorial nature of electoral competition strengthens the dominant position of the staatsvolk. During general elections in Britain the two major parties produced ‘British’ election manifestos that appeared, at face value, to be for all British people. While the Conservatives have a notional base in Northern Ireland, Labour does not contest seats there and both produce separate Welsh and Scottish manifestos. The ‘British’ manifestos were, in fact, targeted at the English voter. However, they were not ‘English’ manifestos in the same way that the Scottish manifesto was targeted explicitly at Scotland, rather the British manifesto was the English manifesto.

By not differentiating between the British and English manifestos, the parties blurred the line between England and Britain with the governance of England expressed as the governance of Britain. The position of the sub-state nations within the state are treated as exceptions to the implied ‘norm’ that is England. This is not only suggestive of a discourse which equates England with Britain, but by treating
England as the British standard, and Scotland and Wales as deviations, it left very little room for ‘England.’ This, however, may not be problematic if the English conceived of themselves as British. As David Davis\textsuperscript{32} stated that the “people of England value the Union extremely highly—so much so that they are prepared to subsume their Englishness for the Union’s greater good…” (HC 16 Jan 1998 C626). While this may seem altruistic, according to Kumar (2006), the reason English people subsume their identities into Britain is that Britain is a source of pride for the English; it is their creation and an \textit{expression} of their Englishness. Kumar argues Britain is an extension of England (the “European English Empire”); \textit{requiring} the English to “suppress the ordinary manifestations of nationalism” to hold this Empire together (2006: 6).

While the FPTP system in Britain encouraged British politics to be fought in England, in Canada it encouraged statewide parties to adopt and cater to regional strongholds, creating de-facto regional parties. This was especially true after the 1993 election; the national parliament could hardly be called ‘national’ as all of the parties were regionalized. The governing Liberal Party, which claimed to be the only national party because they were the only party to have representation in every province (at least until 1997), were in reality an Ontario based party with representation in other provinces. Figure 5.4 uses the 2000 election to demonstrate how the electoral system exacerbates regional differences. This figure recreates the election results from 2000 assuming that a PR system using province wide lists was employed.

\textsuperscript{32} Former Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Chairman of the Conservative Party and Conservative leadership contender in 2005.
Figure 5.4 Regional Voting in Canada, Real and PR, 2000 election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province (Seats)</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vote Percentage</th>
<th>Seat Total, Real</th>
<th>Seat Total, PR</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vote Percentage</th>
<th>Seat Total, Real</th>
<th>Seat Total, PR</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia (34)</td>
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<td>27.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>Quebec (75)</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC Party</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>PC Party</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BQ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta (26)</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>New Brunswick (10)</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Alliance</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC Party</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>PC Party</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td></td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BQ</td>
<td></td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan (14)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>Nova Scotia (11)</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>Alliance</td>
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<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC Party</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>PC Party</td>
<td>29.1</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BQ</td>
<td></td>
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<td>39.9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba (14)</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>Prince Edward Island (4)</td>
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<td>47.0</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>PC Party</td>
<td>38.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BQ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario (103)</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>+47</td>
<td>Newfoundland and Labrador (7)</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC Party</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-15</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PC Party</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td></td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BQ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elections Canada. Calculations are the author’s own, based on the province-wide electoral list system. The numbers are rounded, so the numbers in the PR column may not equal the number of seats in the province.

This figure demonstrates how the electoral system skewed party support, exacerbating regional voting patterns. What is not shown is how the misproportion of seats altered the popular perceptions of the parties, exacerbating the need for parties to appeal to their core regionally based supporters and increasing the difficulty in
breaking out of their regional strongholds. As one can see from the actual results in Figure 5.4, while the Alliance was not far off its proportional number (a difference of 8 seats), it only had two seats in Ontario and none east of the province. But as can be seen from the provincial breakdown in Figure 5.4, the difference in a proportional system would not simply have been the number of seats the Alliance received, the fundamental difference would have been where the seats came from. Rather than only 3% of its seats coming from outside the West, the provincial breakdown would have had over 42% of its seats coming from outside the West. Similarly, 72% of the Liberal seats came from Ontario, but under a provincial system this is reduced to 42% in Ontario. This indicates that under a PR system Canada would be much less regionalized as parties would expect to gain seats in all regions, directing resources (both financial and political) to all regions.

The problems of government and balance associated with multinational states are exacerbated in Canada and Britain due to their highly territorialized electoral system, which focused parties on territorial, as opposed to statewide, competitions for power. However, this aspect of territorialized politics is independent of the territorial identity divisions within the state. Though the multinational nature of Canada and Britain increased the territorialized competition for power, it is the state that created the geographical boundaries and the electoral system encouraged parties to target resources at key constituencies, ignoring wide swathes of the state. In both states, the basic functioning of democracy was directed along a territorial path by the electoral system, yet this was outside of the dynamics of identity politics, but in both cases parties were encouraged to focus electoral attention on the majority nation.

5.3 Opposing Interpretations of the State: Unionism and Pan-Nationalism in Canada and Britain

Canada and Britain are multi-national in two senses; 1) horizontally between the constituent nations, and 2) vertically between the constituent nations and the overarching statewide identity. Individuals in the majority and minority nations hold attachment to their sub-state nations and the wider Canadian and British states (see Henderson 2007, Moreno 2006, Kennedy 2007, and Chapter Seven). Often tensions
exist between these overlapping identities. Chapter Two suggested that, by and large, people within Quebec and Scotland held the minority nation as their primary political loyalty, whereas members of the majority saw the state as the focus of theirs. This has led actors within the minority sub-state nations to challenge state norms and institutions, engaging elites from the wider state. Political actors determined that the best way to accommodate Quebec and Scotland was through a change in institutions. Yet the change in institutions, while designed to accommodate the sub-state nations, had to balance the interpretations of the state held in the staatsvolk. As such the changes were reflective of the limits of accommodation within the majority nations.\footnote{While in Canada the proposed changes were not successful, it is the debates surrounding them that are analyzed.}

Examining debate surrounding the nature of the state revealed how the discourse at the centre bounded and framed the debate for regional actors. Below, Canadian and British statewide discourse is analyzed. The fundamentally different constitutional natures of Canada and Britain demand that they be analyzed separately to uncover commonalities. To contextualize the discourse and highlight the dialectical relationship between the minority and majority nations both sections begin with an analysis of the secessionist challenge during the period under study, followed by an analysis of elite responses, showing how elites in the majority nation framed the state. The final sub-section synthesizes the analysis, illustrating how the state was framed using the language of dominant nationalism.

\textit{State-level Interpretations of Canada and Britain}

It is not the sub-state nation as a whole that challenged the state but secessionist actors \textit{within} the minority nation who spearheaded the challenge. Indeed, in both sub-state nations prominent actors were extremely supportive of the Canadian and British states. No one would question the ‘Canadian-ness’ of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien or the ‘Britishness’ of Prime Minister Gordon Brown, even though they are respectively Quebecois and Scottish. The secessionist challenge came from actors within Quebec and Scotland who sought national independence. By challenging the state they contributed to the political environment, which allowed elites to articulate their interpretation of the state. It must be further noted that while
the wording used here may imply that the challenge originated with the minority nation, this chapter presents the views held within the majority nation by actors who may not realize the role they play in politicizing national and regional identities within the state.

It should be noted that not only secessionists challenge the state. The LPQ may have been a ‘hard nationalist’ party, but it was federalist. It called for a fundamental reordering of the Canadian constitution, devolving the vast majority of state power to Quebec. It must be emphasized that it is not the provincial wing of the Liberal Party of Canada, and does not run in federal elections. Similarly, Scottish Labour and the Liberal Democrats supported devolution in part as a means of defending the Union (Denver et al 1997, Lynch 2002). Although the Liberal Democrats have a history of advocating for the federalization of Britain, determining whether they should be classified as a nationalist party is problematic (Bogdanor 1999). This is not the case with regard to Scottish Labour. Although they are not ‘hard nationalist’ like the LPQ, Scottish Labour did advocate a distinctly Scottish interpretation of the British state. While the British Labour Party may have interpreted devolution in Scotland as part of a larger constitutional package, it does not appear that Scottish Labour did. This was especially clear with regard to A Claim of Right for Scotland: the declaration of intent of the cross-party Scottish Constitutional Convention. The Claim was solely concerned with the relationship between Scotland and the British State—it did not mention the rest of Britain (see Greer 2007: 82). In both Canada and Britain, the strongest and most fundamental challenge to the status quo, and to the legitimacy of the state, came from secessionist parties. Accordingly, central elites directed their responses at the secessionists.

Interpretations of the Canadian State

McRoberts (1997) argues that Trudeau, in his reformation of identity in Canada (outside Quebec), attempted to create a post-national identity with loyalty to the state centred around a set of political ideals; a non-national constitutional patriotism. Yet it is impossible to escape culturally (and nationally) defined interpretations of ‘good’

34 The Claim, in part, reads: "We acknowledge the sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of Government best suited to their needs."
and ‘just,’ and as a result patriotism becomes another term for civic nationalism (Yack 1999). Trudeau’s conception of the Canadian state became the foundation of the interpretation of Canada held by the majority of Canadians (outside Quebec), and a minority in Quebec, known as ‘pan-Canadian nationalism.’

As noted above, there are non-secessionist challenges to pan-Canadian nationalism in Quebec, but this section focuses on the secessionist challenge made by the Bloc Québécois because while the LPQ took a strongly Quebecois nationalist position, it did not make its voice heard within the House of Commons. At the statewide level, it was only the secessionist Bloc Québécois that advocated an alternative view of the federation. As such, this section begins by analysing the attitudes of Bloc Québécois members of parliament and their challenge to the Canadian state.

Quebecois Challenges to the Canadian State

Figure 5.5 shows the support for the BQ in Canadian elections from 1993 to 2004 (the BQ only runs in Quebec), and as can be seen they were the dominant force federally in Quebec. They outstripped all other parties in seat totals in all years and votes in all but one year. During this period the BQ was a powerful force, forming Canada’s Official Opposition from 1993 to 1997. Using this capacity for voice, BQ MPs appeared to use strategies in dealing with federalists. The first was to frame Canada (outside Quebec) as ‘English Canada,’ the second was to de-legitimize federalist French-Canadians (from inside and outside Quebec) by making it seem as if they had turned their backs on the Quebecois.

Quebecois minority nationalism is framed in reference to the majority nationalism of ‘English Canada. According to former BQ House Leader Suzanne Tremblay,

Because English Canada still does not understand Québec, the constitutional future is doomed and we will never be recognized as a people. According to the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, an essential requirement for Canada’s survival is a real association that can only exist between partners. (HC (Can) Dep 6 Dec 1995 c17290)

The threat of a homogenized state under ‘English Canada’ was clearly articulated by one Bloc Québécois Member who argued: “Québec is sick … of being a society at the
mercy of Ottawa’s and English Canada’s whims…” (Jean-Guy Chrétien (BQ) HC (Can) Deb 6 Dec 1995 c17310).

By using the term ‘English Canada’ to describe Quebec’s ‘other,’ these two MPs frame Quebec as the homeland of the French language to deny the Canadian state legitimacy over the French language. In framing Quebec’s other as ‘English Canada’ they explicitly evoked the language spoken by the majority in Canada (outside Quebec) implicitly identifying this as different from Quebec while denying other provinces and the federal government a role in protecting or advancing the French language.

Figure 5.5 Federal Election Results, Quebec 1993-2004

*  The PC Party numbers are only for 1993-2000
**  The Reform Party did not run candidates in Quebec in 1993, and its numbers include the Canadian Alliance in 2000 and the Conservative Party of Canada in 2004.
Source: Elections Canada On-Line
The BQ attempted to build upon this framing of Canada (outside Quebec) as ‘English Canada’ to challenge the legitimacy of the federal government in Quebec. This was done first by portraying Quebecois politicians who were not secessionist as traitors to the Quebec nation. They tried to delegitimize both individual federalist Quebecois Members of Parliament (also an electoral strategy), as well as the federation as a whole, by attacking the legitimacy of the ‘Canadian’ demos in Quebec. When reading the Hansard transcripts, one can almost sense the anger directed towards those within Quebec who held both a pro-federal and pan-national view. As a former BQ Finance critic stated:

> It is unfortunate because, throughout history, officials, members of conquered people, hastened to do the dirty work of the conquerors or their descendants. Here in the House of Commons, we have 26 Liberal members from Québec, two of whom, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, are doing the dirty work of the majority of English Canada against Québec. (Mr Yvan Loubier (Sant-Hyacinthe – Bagot, BQ) HC (Can) 10 Feb 2000 c1255)

The dirty work referred to here is the federal Clarity Act, and the language used strongly suggests that the perceived ‘collaboration’ was viewed as being traitorous. Colley’s (1992) comments on wartime imagery and the threat of the ‘other’ are extremely enlightening. She argues that being confronted with the ‘other’ can be a powerful way of building shared identities; “In the presence of an alien and contemptuous culture, they felt all of a sudden intensely British, brought together, almost despite themselves, by confrontation with the Other.” (p 311). She argues that Britain was brought together by a series of massive wars between 1689 and 1815, (p316) and that the second Hundred Years’ War helped craft the machinery of the British state (p321-22). Threat of invasion existed between 1743 and 1746, 1778 and 1780, 1797 and 1805 and again during the Second World War. Warfare and a threatening ‘other’ were powerful tools for building the British nation. The Bloc seemed to employ tactics utilizing this logic, framing ‘English Canada’ as a threatening, conquering, and occupying other.

Not only were Quebecois federalists framed as traitors, non-Quebecois Franco-Canadians who interpreted Canada as a whole as their primary political loyalty were framed as turning their backs on Quebec. This is seen in the following
quote from Don Boudria;\textsuperscript{35}

We, the francophones outside Quebec, the Acadians, the Ontarians and all the others, have been called all kinds of names, but are used to it. We do not like it, but we are used to it. We know those people. [Interruption: Hon. Member ‘Turncoat’] According to the Bloc members across the way, francophones outside Quebec are turncoats. (HC (Can) Deb 17 Feb 2000 c1115)

It has been noted that Canada (outside Quebec) has a sense of ownership over the French language (McRoberts 1997, Kymlicka 2001) and Canadians (outside Quebec) see the French language as a defining part of the pan-Canadian identity. When Bloc Québécois politicians attempted to frame non-Quebecois Franco-Canadians as “turncoats,” they alluded to the fact that these Franco-Canadians should be looking to Quebec, not Canada, as the homeland of the French language in North America. Moreover, referring to a non-Quebecois French speaker as a “turncoat” suggests that BQ MPs may have seen both the federal government and non-Quebecois federalist Franco-Canadians as agents of ‘English Canada.’ This may also imply that the conception of the Quebecois nation held by this (unknown) BQ MP may not have been purely territorial. Boudria was born in Quebec, but raised in Ontario and was a politician at the local and provincial level in Ontario before becoming a federal MP representing an Ontario constituency. That he was considered a turncoat suggests the unknown BQ member felt Boudria should be loyal to Quebec based upon territory of birth, even though he was raised and politically socialized outside of Quebec.

Quebecois identity, at least in the mind of this BQ Member, would seem not to have been purely civic.

In claiming sole ownership of the French language in North America, the BQ forced the Canadian state to respond. Stairs (1996) notes that secessionist politicians in Quebec do not pay attention to the spillover their demands have on the rest of Canada; but by challenging the legitimacy of the Canadian government to promote and defend the French language, they challenged the legitimacy of the Canadian government to protect and promote the language of nearly a million Franco-Canadians outside Quebec as well as the staatsvolk’s interpretations of the state. The BQ frames had an important impact on Canada (outside Quebec), as part of the

\textsuperscript{35} Then Government House Leader and onetime Minister responsible for La Francophonie.
dialectical relationship between Quebec and Canada (outside Quebec), elites in Canada (outside Quebec) articulated their interpretations of the state in response. The following sub-section addresses how Canadian (outside Quebec) elites framed the nature of the Canadian state in light of Quebecois nationalism.

**Canadian (outside Quebec) Interpretations of the Canadian State**

While Quebecois elites have historically interpreted Canada as a compact of peoples, the view in Canada (outside Quebec) was different. Federalists, especially the federal government (the LPC) responded to secessionists by emphasizing a pan-national vision of Canada. While there were five parties in the Canadian House of Commons during this period, for the reasons outlined in Chapter Three this analysis centres on the Liberal and Reform Party of Canada (and its successors), as these are the only federalist parties that are relevant based on Sartori’s use of the term (1976). 

Chapter Four outlined the endeavours of the federal government in challenging Quebec nationalists. Here parliamentary debates on the referendum of 1995 and ‘Plan B’ are examined to highlight how pan-national appeals were made, creating the boundaries of debate at the centre and in the regions. This sub-section begins by exploring the emphasis on Canada belonging equally to all Canadian citizens regardless of province or language. Next, it examines how elites appeal to people’s pride in their nation and attempt to harness this pride to their particular policies. Finally, it shows how the nature of Canada is debated outside Quebec on a state-province axis as opposed to a state-nation axis. Analysing these themes allows this research to explore how majority state-led nationalism manifested in Canada and created the parameters for debate within Nova Scotia.

**We Are All Canadian**

The importance of a state appearing to embody a nation was highlighted in Chapter Two (see Poggi 1990, Mann 1995). Elites interpret the state as being representative of a single Canadian nation and demos, framing it as home to both the French and English languages. They directly challenged secessionist framing of the

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36 A relevant party has either coalition or blackmail potential.
Canadian state as ‘English’ and lacking legitimacy vis-à-vis the French language. This was seen, for example, when Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of the Environment and former government Chief Whip, Karen Redman, stated:

Those critics claim that we, the members of parliament representing all Canadians, are subject to unilateralism of the secessionist leaders and have no choice to but stand idly by should our federation break up. (Lib) HC (Can) 10 Feb 2000 Col 1655

One even detects a certain Burkean understanding of the role of Members of Parliament. Much like Burke, she sees MPs as representing their constituencies as well as the (Canadian) nation as a whole (Burke 1774). While Burke does not address the issues of multinationalism directly, his argument strongly indicates that a sense of national solidarity is required in order for MPs to adopt the dual role of looking after the greater interests of the state/nation as well as the interests of the electors. Reform also argued ‘we are all Canadian,’ but in keeping with their roots in Western Alienation (Tomblin 1995, Flanagan 1995, Melnyck 1993, Manning 1992), they felt the Canadian state was failing in its duty to the Canadian nation spending far too much time on Quebec instead of other parts of the federation.

Due to Canada’s massive size and sparse population, Quebec’s nationalist movement and issues of Quebec separatism were not seen as being important by all. As Cohen (1996) and Hearn (2007) note, people’s interpretations of the nation stem from how they experience the nation as individuals. People in Western Canada do not have the same relationship with Quebec as Ontario or the Atlantic Provinces, which would have to deal with Quebec independence in a more real and immediate manner. Some Westerners felt the state focused on Quebec to the exclusion of ‘real’ problems facing them and their communities. As one Reform MP noted:

[P]eople from western Canada, particularly my area, look upon this more as a debate down east that does not make reference to them… As Westerners are looking at this debate this afternoon, many of the people in my constituency are asking what we are arguing about. They are losing their farms. To them this is not an important issue over their individual issues… (Roy Bialey (Ref) HC (Can) 13 Mar 2000 c1745)

This quote emphasizes not only the highly regionalized nature of the Canadian state, but the political ability Quebecois elites had to make their ‘voice’ heard at the centre.
in competition with other parts of the federation (an ability that is of particular concern to Nova Scotia elites, see Chapter Six).

While the Bloc Québécois framed Quebec as the only French speaking jurisdiction in North America, in response other Francophone Canadians accepted the pan-national identity as a way of protecting their own distinct heritage (Cardinal 2007, Foucher 2007). As Cardinal (2004) notes, bilingualism in Canada has been used by Canadian elites as a tool to foster national unity since the 1960s, but the federal language policy is in tension with Quebec’s. The federal government viewed language as individual and personal, while Quebec viewed it as territorial and collective. According to Foucher (2007) this has led to two different language policies in Quebec; one for the federal government and one for the provincial. This competition between the two orders of government claiming to be the defender of the French language had non-Quebecois franco-Canadians aligning themselves with the federal government. As a Franco-Ontarian Liberal, and former Minister for International Co-operation and Minister for La Francophonie (amongst other portfolios) stated:

I cannot accept the breakup of my country, of our country. We are all Canadians. We are part of a large family, and it is our ancestors, mine and those of the members over there who are trying to break up our country, who helped to build this great country. As a francophone member from Northern Ontario, I am proud of my language and I am proud of my beautiful country…
(Hon Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib) HC (Can) 14 Dec 1999 Col 1510)

While the two main parties broadly interpreted the state in a manner which recognized everyone as being equally Canadian, political actors were not the only actors who got a decisive say at the centre in Canada. As a federation, Canada has a constitutional court, the Supreme Court of Canada, to offer an impartial view of the nature of the state in disputes between the different orders of government.

To determine what view of the Canadian state was advanced by the Court, one need look no further than the Reference re Quebec Secession. Above, it was emphasized that Canada belongs to all Canadians, a position also adopted by the Supreme Court as the Court saw French and English speaking Canadians being equally citizens. Being a citizen of Canada was not mediated through membership in a language community, and Quebeccois could not claim to be disadvantaged;
For close to 40 of the last 50 years, the Prime Minister of Canada has been a Quebecer. During this period, Quebecers have held from time to time all the most important positions in the federal Cabinet. During the 8 years prior to June 1997, the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Official Opposition in the House of Commons were both Quebecers. At present, the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Chief Justice and two other members of the Court, the Chief of Staff of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian ambassador to the United States, not to mention the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, are all Quebecers. (Supreme Court of Canada 1998: 135(16))

In focusing on individuals, the Court indicated national sentiment was not an impediment to success in the Canadian federation. Yet while constitutional patriotism may be read in the Court’s decision, Kymlicka notes that Quebecois confidence, and in turn success, in the system is not related to their attachment to Canada. He states that over time, as confidence in Canadian institutions has increased in Quebec, Quebecois attachment to Canada has decreased (2003: 38). As such, the argument advanced by the Court above, that Quebecois are extremely successful, may not have been relevant to the Quebecois. Secessionists knew the state did not discriminate against them as Quebecois nationalism is fundamentally about the legitimacy to govern Quebec. Counter-intuitively it was the pan-national interpretation of Canada that became the foundation of Quebec (or any other province) succeeding the federation. While the Supreme Court ruled Canada was divisible, Quebec did not have the right to secede as a nation, rather;

The constitution is the expression of the sovereignty of the people of Canada. It lies within the power of the people, acting through their various governments duly elected and recognized under the constitution, to effect whatever constitutional arrangements are desired in Canadian territory, including, should it be so desired, the secession of Quebec from Canada. (Supreme Court of Canada 1998: para 85)

Canada is divisible because it is sovereign as a whole and can do whatever it chooses, even sever itself in two.

Canada the Great

As can be seen, the main federalist parties in the House of Commons and the Supreme Court advanced a pan-nationalist interpretation of the state. However, interpreting the state is a passive act; nationalism and regionalism require action. The
active component of majority nationalism comes from appeals to a pan-national sense of Canadian solidarity stemming from Canada’s national ‘greatness’ and the shared endeavours which crafted this ‘great’ state. Appeals to greatness are identified within broader nationalism literature, but has generally been examined with regard to minority nationalism. Hutchinson (2000) argues that nationalists hark to a ‘golden age.’ While he presents this as occurring in the past, for pan-Canadian nationalists the golden age may be in the present (see Kymlicka 2003: 360).

This appeal to Canada’s ‘golden age,’ its current (and self-ascribed) ‘greatness,’ functions to combat Quebecois nationalism by attempting to unite Canadians across language and regional divides. It differs from merely emphasizing commonalities as it appealed to a sense of ownership and belonging within the Canadian national project. As one Nova Scotian stated:

Over the last 128 years Canadians have built a country that is the envy of the world. We have built a land that is prosperous and a country based on shared values such as peace, compassion and tolerance. (John Murphy (Lib) HC (Can) Deb 30 Oct 1995 c15963)

According to this discourse, Canadian greatness is not just something Canadians can be proud of, it is something that others around the world can look to. Kymlicka argues that greatness on the world stage is a self-ascribed identity marker in Canada; “Canadians nurture and cherish an identity of good citizens of the world, and view their flag and passport as internationally recognized symbols of that goodness” (p360). During the period under study, two particular aspects of Canada’s self ascribed contribution to the world were emphasized by elites: multiculturalism and equality.

The fundamental overriding principle of being Canadian is equality for everyone. If we do not have equality for all of us then we have equality for no one. It is something that Canadians have fought for in two world wars, which the brave men and women in our armed forces fight for today, peace and equality in far off lands. (Mr. Keith Martin (Ref) HC (Can) 1 Dec 1995 Col 17095)

While the values identified as being ‘Canadian’ are of a universal-liberal nature, they were appealed to by calling upon Canadian frames and common memories, most notably with reference to overcoming a hostile environment in building Canada.
In general, when nationalists appeal to common sacrifice they allude to war or similar encounters with a clear and dangerous ‘other.’ The common sacrifice frame utilized in Canada appears to reference ‘wilderness’ and geography as the enemy that was defeated by the shared efforts of Canadians. Indeed, terms like ‘wilderness’ and ‘north’ are often used as Canada is so large that no single geographic marker fits (Marshall 2008). Kaufmann (1998) notes that images of ‘The North’ have had a major impact upon Canadian identity. This could be of particular importance to a settler society in which the official state-led nationalism may be wary of offending any immigrant groups (Granatstein 1998: 115).

When warfare is invoked, as it was by then Reform MP Keith Martin, it is tied to values advanced within Canadian nationalism. Martin linked Canada’s greatness and place in the world with a sense of common cause and sacrifice, and while using a militaristic frame, he did not identify any single group as the enemy, focusing on concepts of peace and equality for which Canadians struggle. This accords with Canadians’ self perception of their country as a peacekeeper as opposed to a war-fighter (Granatstein 1998, 1995 Bothwell 1998). Yet, as Granatstein notes (1998), this self perception is at odds with Canadian history. In this sense, ‘official’ Canadian nationalism supports Renan’s observation that nationalists often get history wrong (1882).

**Equal Citizens, Equal Provinces: the Unionist Interpretation of Canada**

The above sub-sections have highlighted consensus within the Liberal and Reform interpretations of the Canadian state. However, consensus regarding everyone being equally Canadian does not mean that both parties are in agreement on all aspects of equal citizenship. This is especially true with regard to the role of the provinces held by Reform. The Reform Party, in advocating for a uniform sense of citizenship across Canada exhibited a unionist streak, interpreting Canada as a union of equal provinces, not equal nations.

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37 Martin did not join the new Conservative Party of Canada when it was formed, although he was a contender for the Leadership of the Canadian Alliance. He sat as an Independent after the merger and ran, and was re-elected, as a Liberal in 2004.
The Reform Party expanded outwards from the West, appealing to a common sense of alienation across the federation. The founder and leader of the Reform Party, Preston Manning, argued that Canada needed:

… a fundamental rebalancing of the federal and provincial powers that focuses Ottawa on national and international matters, and gives every province the tools it needs, including jurisdiction over language and culture, to develop the unique and distinctive features of their economies and societies.
(Manning Speech 25 Nov 1996)

The rebalancing that Manning called for was not just in relation to Quebec. Although Manning believed there was a universal desire amongst all Canadians (regardless of province) to jettison what he refers to as ‘The Old Canada’ (Manning 1992), this alienation seemed to exhibit two apparently contradictory aspects. The first was a call for greater provincial autonomy, that the federal government should respect the constitutionally enshrined spheres of the provincial governments. At the same time, the Reform party was advocating for greater participation in central decision making for Western Canada, epitomized by its first slogan—“The West Wants In.”

Returning to Choudhry (2007), this would appear to have been an attempt to both integrate and accommodate; the Reform party advocated a position that granted autonomy to the provinces while integrating provincial elites at the statewide level.

Reform’s interpretation of the Canadian state seemed to inhibit it from a) accepting official recognition of Quebec distinctiveness that would enable Quebec citizens to enjoy a different relationship with the state than other citizens, and b) giving Quebec special powers to protect its unique culture. This is not to say that Reformers did not accept Quebec’s uniqueness, rather Reform’s interpretation of Canada did not allow for asymmetrical arrangements. Diane Ablonczy, then Reform Party whip (and current Secretary of State for Small Business and Tourism), stated:

All Canadians recognize Quebec’s cultural, social and historic distinctiveness but they do not want one province given special powers and status in the federation. (HC (Can) 1 Nov 1995 c16061)

Reformers advocated a position, which viewed each province as being unique, with Canada not only being founded by French and English speaking peoples. This was seen when Ablonczy noted, in the same speech as the quote above:
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island are equally proud of their social, historical, and cultural distinctiveness. In fact, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were two of the four original founders of our country, along with Ontario and Québec. (HC (Can) 1 Nov 1995 c16061)

The appeal to equality of citizenry was clearly articulated by then Reform MP Keith Martin; “The fundamental overriding principal of being Canadian is equality for everyone. If we do not have equality for all of us then we have equality for no one” (HC (Can) 1 Dec 1995 c17095). Equality of citizens was equated with equality of provinces, as seen when fellow Reform MP John Williams (MP for St Albert, Alberta) stated:

I cannot support distinct society for any province. I cannot support elevating one province over another... I believe in equality and fairness for every man, woman, and child in this country regardless of their race, colour, creed, origin, or abilities. (HC (Can) 6 Dec 1995 c17329)

The issue being debated may have been distinct society status for Quebec, but the underlying issue for these members was the equality of people. While the Liberal party appeared unwilling to mitigate Canadian citizenship through belonging to any group other than a Canadian one, this was not so in the case of the Reform Party. The position advanced by Reformers recognized the legitimacy of the provinces, but also provincial equality. This is a trend that has been commented on before; Canadians recognize Quebec’s distinctiveness but are unwilling to grant it constitutional recognition (Mendelssohn 2002: 76). In this sense, Reformers appeared to be advancing an interpretation of Canada articulated by former Progressive Conservative Party of Canada Prime Minister, Joe Clarke, who claimed Canada was a “community of communities.”

Reform’s unionist oriented discourse identified ‘culture’ as being something separate from the state. Returning to the pure-type definition of unionism advanced in Chapter Two, this appears to support an interpretation of Reform being unionist in their outlook as it is the constituent members who should be advancing culture. Yet one cannot escape the founding of Reform in Western Alienation. Their stance

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38 While Clarke was a Progressive Conservative, he did not join the Conservative Party of Canada after the merger of the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada.
against the federal government wielding power over culture could also be seen as a way of protecting, at the provincial level, their interpretation of Canada against state-led interpretations favoured in central Canada. This sense of alienation stemmed from the fact that other regions were left out of the official discourse, which concentrated on the dualism inherited from the legacy of the United Province of Canada, now Ontario and Quebec. This alienation was explicitly expressed by another Reformer, Val Meredith (MP for South Surrey-White Rock-Langley in British Columbia), who stated:

Alienation from the rest of Canada is not unique to Quebec. The hon. member should try living in British Columbia on the other side of the Rockies to know what real alienation is all about. (HC (Can) 14 Dec 1999 c1600)

Taken together, the comments by Meredith and Ablonczy appear to advance an agenda that saw alienation on the one hand and a drive to universalism on the other as a product of the political system unrelated to national identity in Quebec. Note, however, that while these MPs may have been appealing to a province oriented conception of the Canadian state, they were, in fact, crafting a pan-national sense of alienation, highlighting that people from every part of Canada feel alienated in the political system (Manning 1992).

Reform was willing to give all provinces the tools to advance culture because they felt that all provinces were unique. As a strong defender of provincial rights, Reform was by no means a centralist party, interpreting the federation as a federation of equal provinces and citizens, not a union of two peoples, nor a state in which the federal government was paramount. This interpretation of the Canadian state was unionist, but also pan-national; citizenship was defined on a statewide basis and mitigated through the provinces, not nations. The constitutional changes championed by Reform during this period, while pro-province, may have acted to strengthen the centre over the provinces. For example, the Triple E Senate (Elected, Equal and Effective) would have increased the legitimacy of federal decision making by fulfilling Choudhry’s condition that a successful constitution simultaneously accommodates and integrates (2007).
Conclusion on Canada Debates

The analysis of elite debate in Canada has shown that while there were competing views amongst federalists as to the nature of the state, there appeared to be near universal support for the ‘Canada as nation’ interpretation of the Canadian state. The Liberal and the Reform Party of Canada (and Reform’s successors) articulated different views of how Canada should be organized. Neither party interpreted Quebec’s national identity and legitimacy as being co-equal to that of either Canada (outside Quebec) or Canada as a whole. Elite debate during this period manifested itself along the lines of state-building nationalism and denied Quebec national legitimacy. Elites appealed to commonalities shared by all Canadians, epitomized by common cause, sacrifice and a sense of greatness. This interpretation was given the backing of the Supreme Court of Canada which interpreted the relationship between citizen and state as being direct. It has been noted that post 1982, citizenship in Canada (outside Quebec) was conceived as based upon an equality of citizens and provinces (Cairns 1995, 1993, 1991 Nevitte 1996, Brodie and Nevitte 1993). This re-conceptualization of Canada appears to have ensured that unionist interpretations from outside of Quebec were based upon a provincial, not a national, compact. With regard to regional debates, this suggests regional elites would be constrained in their ability to advocate a position that fundamentally differed from the state-led nationalism of the centre, yet ensured provinces a role in defining the nature of the Canadian state.

British Debates

The investigation of the British state begins with an exploration of how Scottish nationalists managed to indirectly challenge the state and leads to an examination of central responses to this challenge. The exploration is conducted in the same manner as in Canada, through an analysis of the debates themselves. Reference is made to Canada when applicable to help draw out lessons from both states.
Scottish Nationalist Challenge

Prior to 1999 and the creation of the devolved administrations, the only place official (and democratic) debate on both the future and nature of the British state could take place was in the House of Commons. While serious debate did take place outside of Westminster (the Scottish Constitutional Convention), this was outside the state’s constitutional framework, and needed political parties (Labour and the Liberal Democrats) to champion it inside the House of Commons. As such, while the SNP challenged the British state, it did so indirectly as the SNP never had meaningful representation in the House of Commons; the only time they became a ‘relevant party’ having an influence in the House was during a minority government in the 1970s.

The SNP’s lack of relevance, however, was inside the legislature; instead, it conducted its challenge from outside, challenging Labour’s hegemony in Scotland. The FPTP electoral system punished the SNP in Scotland due to the SNP lacking a strong regional base unlike the less popular Liberal Democrats who had a strong base in the Highlands and Islands enabling them to receive more seats with less popular support. As the SNPs popularity was spread throughout Scotland, it was in the interest of Labour MPs to keep the SNP at bay to maintain Labour’s hegemony in Scotland. Labour elites felt that this could be achieved through devolution, which would simultaneously accomplish two goals; 1) it would confront the SNP at the polls, and 2) it would buttress the Union in Scotland (Denver et al. 2000: 74, Lynch 2002: 123). Bogdanor (1999: 138) notes that only twice, prior to 1997, had Labour won a majority of seats in England; the Scottish secessionist challenge created the prospect of Labour becoming a permanent party of opposition. Accordingly, Scotland was disproportionately important to Labour’s success. Though the SNP challenged Labour in Scotland, its lack of relevance to the British state as a whole needs to be addressed. Given the small number of MPs that the SNP sends to Westminster (six at the time of writing, less than 1% of total MPs), they lack the ability to challenge the state. As such, efforts to confront the SNP have little

39 For example in the 2001 election, the SNP received 20.1% of the popular vote compared to 16.3 for the Liberal Democrats but the SNP only received five seats compared to 10.
resonance in England. This was best illustrated in the 1997 election vis-à-vis devolution.

As the 1997 general election ushered in both Labour and devolution, it may come as some surprise that the issue of devolution, which fundamentally changed the relationship between citizen and state in Scotland did not matter in England. This was seen not only in polling, but also in how little mention was made of it in academic studies of the 1997 election. The term 'devolution' has just three pages listed in the index in Butler and Kavanagh’s (1997) ‘The British General Election of 1997,’ two pages in Jones’s (1997) ‘Campaign 1997,’ and it is not even listed as a separate category in the index of Norris and Gavin’s (1997) ‘Britain Votes 1997.’ In Geddes and Tonge’s (1997) ‘Labour’s Landslide’ the category ‘devolution and devolved Parliament/assembly’ has a total of 25 pages listed in the index. These, however, are all found in three chapters that specifically dealt with constitutional issues; Fisher’s (1997) chapter on third and minor parties, Mitchell’s (1997) chapter on constitutional reform, and Tonge’s (1997) chapter on Northern Ireland. It did not appear in chapters dealing with more general, statewide issues.

During the campaign itself, Deacon, Golding and Billig (1997) show that the broad category of ‘constitutional issues’ received scant media attention, not even registering as a concern in public opinion polling in England (Whitely 1997: 44). Devolution had overwhelming support amongst the Scottish electorate but was not an issue for the English. In his examinations of public attitudes since devolution, Curtice (2006, 2005) has noted that the English people by and large do not care about the issue. When Conservative Prime Minister John Major attempted to use devolution to warn the English of dangers to the Union, it had no resonance, though he argued it was “teenage madness” that would destroy the Union (Brown 1997: 152). Major was convinced that his passionate defence of the Union in 1992 saved the Conservatives from defeat then, and during the 1997 election he attempted to “revive the spirit of Union in Scotland” (Taylor 2002: 84). That Major saved the Union was a myth that permeated the Conservative Party (Mitchell 1997: 140); it was the only major party to campaign for a constitutional status quo (Norris 1997: 9). This is not to say that supporting the status quo was merely an electoral strategy,
Major was truly concerned about the fate of the minority nations under a Labour government (Butler and Kavanagh 1997).

The Scottish National Party challenged the British state indirectly by challenging the Labour dominance of Scotland. While only resonating at an elite level in England elites are able to act as agenda setters. While devolution and the place of Scotland in the Union may not have been a mass issue, it did have a great impact on the two major parties. For Labour it was part of an (aborted) plan for regional devolution in England in addition to the minority nations. Much parliamentary time from 1997 to 2004 was spent discussing constitutional issues that were a direct result of the Scottish nationalist challenge to Labour in Scotland. While the nationalist challenge in Scotland was not nearly as powerful and visible in the majority nation as the Quebec challenge was in Canada (outside Quebec), it had a substantial impact on the British constitution.

Central Interpretations of the British State

To analyze how elites framed the British State, this sub-section is divided into three parts. Firstly, it shows how elites appealed to a sense of pan-national solidarity. Secondly, it explores the two ways the state is understood, as Britain or the United Kingdom. Finally, it tackles the apparent contradiction that Labour, the most pan-national party, advanced devolution in Scotland. Overall this section demonstrates that the dominant discourse in Britain was pan-national and how this discourse framed elite debate at the regional level.

British Solidarity

Both Labour and the Conservatives used appeals to a sense of British ‘greatness,’ yet emphasized this ‘greatness’ in different ways, demonstrating not only their divide on a left-right axis, but their fundamentally different conceptions of the nature of Britain. The Conservative appeal centred on a traditional concept of Britain and the Union. In their 1992 manifesto they stated: “Britain is far greater than the sum of its parts. Over many centuries its nations have worked, and frequently fought, side by side” (Conservative 1992: 66). This quote exemplifies the way in which the Conservatives framed the British state during the period under study. First, it
describes Britain as a Union of nations working in concert. Second, it states that the Union produces a synergy allowing all the Union nations to be more successful within the Union than without, justifying the Union without eroding the national sentiment of its nations. Third, it appeals to moments of past British greatness when member nations worked together in the face of an aggressive ‘other.’ While this quote explicitly brings to mind the common cause and sacrifice from the First and Second World Wars, Conservatives also used the Empire and Imperial imagery in describing the British state, as seen in the following example from Peter Brooke after the Labour victory of 1997;

The people have spoken. The battle of Isandlwana is over and the defence of the mission station at Rorke’s Drift is about to begin. At the heart of that defence will be the adherence to the principle that has been at the heart of the Conservative party for the past 300 years, not least on the constitution. (Peter Brooke HC 16 May 1997 c309-310)

Here Kumar’s (2006) point that Empire is seen as a ‘good thing’ in the construction of national identity in England is supported. As Hutchinson (2000: 653-5) contends, the past and the memory of it are powerful ways of influencing the present. Nationalist movements tend to look back to moments of historic national greatness. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that these unifying national images were used by state level elites in advancing the national identity of the state, appealing to people’s solidarity with the state while subtly reminding them of the ‘other.’

Whereas the Conservatives emphasized historic greatness and common sacrifice in their pan-British appeals to solidarity, Labour approached identity differently, appealing to the future and British potential. In his forward in the 1997 Labour manifesto, Tony Blair stated:

New Labour is the political arm of none other than the British people as a whole. Our values are the same: the equal worth of all, with no one cast aside; fairness and justice within strong communities. (Labour 1997: 2)

This quote epitomizes New Labour’s understanding of the British state. Firstly, it emphasizes the British, not constituent, nation. Secondly, while the norms and values

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are liberal-universal they are presented as the norms and values of the British people “as a whole.” In this sense, appealing to the common cultural values of all Britons acted to deny the political legitimacy of the individual Union nations. Thirdly, there is no appeal to the groups that make up Britain. Blair only mentions ‘communities,’ an ill-defined concept. This is in sharp contrast to the Conservatives who emphasized the Union nature of the state. Note also that Blair introduced the term ‘fairness,’ which is particularly important to regional elites, as will be seen in Chapter Six.

**Great Britain or a United Kingdom?**

The above indicates that the Conservative interpretation of Britain was unionist and Labour’s pan-national. However, both appealed to the British people as a whole; the key difference was whether the appeal was to Great Britain or the United Kingdom. In the vernacular these two terms seem interchangeable, yet they indicate two different interpretations of the British state while appealing to a greater whole. This signifies a convergence between the Conservatives and Labour who both see a single pan-national people. This convergence was seen when Conservative MP Stephen Day stated;

> I belong to a nation that has barely been mentioned by any hon. Members in the debate, because I am not English, Scots, Welsh or Irish – I am British, and very proud of it… We should remember that this is the British parliament. We already have a Scottish Parliament and this is it. There is already an English Parliament and this is it.” (HC 31 July 1997 c513)

Day did not claim that the Scots and the English should not have a voice or be represented; rather he argued that they were both already represented in the British parliament. While recognizing the existence of the constituent nations, he felt the British nation should take precedence; one cannot be English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish without being British. This brings to mind Cohen (1996) and Hearn’s (2007) interpretations of personal nationalism. British identity may be interpreted and lived through membership in one of the Union nations—the Scottish experience of Britain is Scottish and the English experience of Britain is English.

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41 MP for Cheadle 1987-2001 and Secretary of the Association of Conservative Clubs.
As Britishness may be more closely aligned with Englishness than other national identities (Crick 1991, Kumar 2006, 2003, Aughey 2001, Colls 2002), when Day emphasized his ‘Britishness,’ it may actually have been a factor of his ‘Englishness.’ Indeed, Colls argues that Britain was the result of England incorporating Scotland and Wales into itself and re-branding itself ‘Britain’ (Colls 2002: 377). This notion of England-as-Britain was seen when English Members of Parliament slipped between England and Britain, as Bernard Jenkins appears to;\textsuperscript{42}

England is the mother of Parliaments… Our Parliament here at Westminster has established countless constitutions for new nations around the world… (HC 30 June 2004 c318)

According to former North East Conservative MP Tim Devlin,\textsuperscript{43} “Scotland has a separate, national identity… Many Scots refer to their country as a nation.” (HC Deb 25 Nov 91 c526) Devlin did not suggest that England had a separate national identity; rather that Scotland had a separate identity from the British (i.e. English) norm. The Englishness of Britain was, according to Bogdanor (1999), recognized by Prime Minister Thatcher, who acknowledged that Britain was indeed English as England is the majority.

That concepts of ‘England’ and ‘Britain’ were often conflated within England is extremely important in understanding how elites interpreted the state, creating a homogenized sense of the British state in the minds of the English. This confused not only the place of England within Britain, but also of Scotland. This was exacerbated within wider devolution debates when Scotland and Wales were presented alongside English regions. In the 1992 Labour manifesto, Scotland and Wales were co-opted into England-as-Britain and presented alongside the English regions;

We will establish new Regional Development Agencies in England, strengthen Scottish Enterprise and the Welsh Development Agency and modernise regional incentives. Regional agencies will become powerhouses for industrial development, encouraging investment, technology and skills. (Labour 1992: 6)

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\textsuperscript{42} Former Shadow Secretary of State for Defence and Vice Chairman of the Conservative Party.

\textsuperscript{43} Notable for being a Conservative from the North East of England.
Scotland and Wales were initially presented as separate nations alongside England, but as the paragraph progresses it becomes clear that Scottish Enterprise and the Welsh Development Agency are on par with English RDAs. Scotland and Wales are part of Labour’s pan-national plan for the regions of Britain; they are British regions.

This discussion suggests that while the parties were influenced by unionist and pan-nationalist interpretations of the British state, they broadly converged in a pan-national interpretation that saw the British demos as being the only source of democratic legitimacy. The Conservatives leaned more towards a unionist interpretation of the British state than Labour, but nevertheless displayed pan-national tendencies alongside their unionism. With regard to identity appeals, the Conservatives, not surprisingly, took a ‘conservative’ approach, appealing to the historical successes of the Union. Labour took a future focused approach,\(^{44}\) presenting what the British nation and people could achieve (Kavanagh 1997: 30). In the end, both parties expressed pan-national interpretations of the state.

*Devolution without Recognition*

As the Conservatives based their understanding of the British state upon unionist interpretations, it may appear contradictory that Labour gave democratic institutional recognition to Scottish and Welsh distinctiveness through devolution. Counter-intuitively, closer inspection indicates Labour’s pan-national view was better placed to implement devolution. Blair was sceptical of devolution (Taylor 2002: 101-104, Parks and Elcock: 9), but supported it because it was a settled issue within the Scottish wing of the party.\(^ {45}\) Historically Labour has had a very ambiguous relationship with Home Rule. In Scotland some of the leading figures in the early Labour Party were extremely supportive. Thomas Johnston, for example, helped found the Scottish Home Rule Council (Fraser 2000: 145). Yet Johnston personally embodied Labour’s shift with regard to Home Rule. As Labour Secretary of State for

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\(^{44}\) This should not be read either in a pejorative manner with regard to the Conservatives, or a normative judgement with regard to Labour, it merely identifies the differing strategies employed in advocating differing interpretations of the British state.

\(^{45}\) This is not to say that no one from Scottish Labour was opposed to devolution; Tam Dalyell remained opposed to it, for example.
Scotland in Churchill’s wartime coalition, he experienced the power of this position in advancing the interests of Scotland within the British state (Bogdanor 1999:113). By the end of the war he was a staunch unionist, warning that a Scottish Parliament would have nothing to administer but “an emigration system, a glorified Poor Law and a graveyard” (Johnston 1952 in Bogdanor 1999: 138). This coincided with a desire in the Scottish trade union movement for national (statewide) bargaining to increase its power. Since then, Scottish Labour has had a very difficult relationship with Home Rule. It was not until the 1970s that Home Rule was once again on the agenda in the Labour Party, but many in the party remained sceptical of it (Denver et al. 2000: 7). This is not surprising as Labour played a more significant role than the Conservatives in integrating Scotland into Britain (Denver et al. 2000: 13). Indeed, while a successful policy in its own right devolution may represent Labour’s failure to craft a common statewide narrative of Britishness or even a unified concept of social citizenship—although given that Scotland has always had its own autonomous institutions, it is not surprising that a statewide British narrative did not penetrate as deeply in Scotland as it did in England.

To understand how Labour was able to grant devolution to Scotland one must examine Labour’s constitutional reform package and its discourse on the nature of Britain. This not only reveals how devolution was granted to Scotland, but contextualizes the place of English regions within Labour’s conception of the British state. If Scotland is regarded as a region of Britain rather than a Union nation (with corresponding political legitimacy), devolution does not pose as much of a challenge to the state as it would if one held a unionist interpretation of the state, especially if devolution is seen as part of a larger constitutional settlement involving the English regions. In this regard Hazell’s work on the English Question is most enlightening. Hazell argues the English Question differs depending on one’s interpretation of the Question, the problems it addresses, and the nature of the British state. The unionist answer to the English Question is all-England devolution, creating an English Parliament. Yet an English Parliament within the British state would be very lopsided, and in turn would completely unbalance the state (Hazell 2006a and b, Tomaney 2005: 117). Those who hold unionist interpretations cannot support devolution, as it would tear the union apart. Conversely, pan-national answers are
regional, and posing little threat to the integrity of the British state allow for rolling
devolution along the lines of the Spanish model (see Giordino and Roller 2004).

Labour’s ability to advance devolution is a direct consequence of the
dominance of the English staatsvolk, which is such that even Scottish Members of
Parliament used English markers to articulate their demands. A prominent example
was Gordon Brown who, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, appeared anxious to defend
his ‘Britishness,’ but used English markers to express his understanding of
Britishness. This was most apparent in his speech to the Fabian Society entitled ‘The
Future of Britishness.’ When discussing the constitutional problems facing the
British, he did not mention devolution. Rather, he argued:

…for fear of losing our British identity, Britain did not face up to some of the
great constitutional questions, whether it be the second chamber, the
relationship of the legislative to the executive, or the future of local
government. (Brown 2006)

He cited Britishwide concerns, but made no mention of issues that have an impact on
the minority nations, most importantly Home Rule: a constitutional question from the
19th Century, which sundered Ireland in two at the beginning of the 20th Century and
created the Scottish Parliament at the end of it. In the historical examples Brown
cited, British history is in fact English history;

…a golden thread which runs through British history, that runs from that long
ago day in Runneymede in 1215; on to the Bill of Rights in 1689 where
Britain became the first country to successfully assert the power of the
Parliament over the King. (Brown 2006)

Not only did he confuse Britain and England prior to the creation of Britain in 1707,
but he may have surprised his Scottish countrymen, who would likely have argued
that the Declaration of Arbroath is a much earlier example of limits placed upon the
monarch.46

While the values Brown conveyed in his speech are clearly of a universalistic
liberal norm, the examples used to convey them are English; Brown uses English
history to craft Britishness, normalizing the Englishness of Britain. Indeed, Renan’s

46 For the text of the declaration, go to
www.geo.ed.ac.uk/home/scotland/arbroath_english.html
(1882) observation that nationalists not only forget certain historical events, but often get them wrong, is worthy of note here, not because Brown is getting history wrong (a common occurrence in the debates), but by framing British history in this manner, he appeared to be appealing to the conception of the British state held by the English staatsvolk, saying ‘we are all the same.’

This narrative used by Brown was a necessary component of the devolution process, as devolution to Scotland and Wales proceeded not because they are nations deserving recognition (if so there may have been a stronger case for all-England devolution), rather Scotland and Wales had the strongest demand for devolution out of all the regions of Britain. Following devolution to Scotland and Wales came the creation of the Greater London Assembly as part of the first stage of devolution at the regional level in England; this was followed by an abortive attempt to devolve in all Northern regions and a failed attempt in the North East. The logic of the Supreme Court of Canada discussed earlier can be found in this process of differentiated devolution, namely that asymmetrical devolution proceeded because British people as a whole are sovereign and as such can organize the administration of Britain as they choose.

Dominant Interpretations and Majority Nationalism

The above sub-sections demonstrated that when nationalists in Quebec and Scotland challenged dominant interpretations of Canada and Britain, central elites responded with state-led nationalism. Elites in both states appealed to a pan-national conception of the state across the entirety of the state. How the appeal was made depended on the party’s interpretation of the state. The major statewide parties held different conceptions of the state, but their appeals focused on solidarity and equal citizenship for all. In Canada, the Liberals appealed to a pan-national (explicitly termed pan-Canadian) identity, while Reform and their successors appealed to federal, or unionist, conceptions of the Canadian state. In Britain, Labour used a strong pan-nationalist discourse focusing on Britain, while the Conservative rhetoric focused on the Union. Both unionist interpretations, federalism in Canada and the Union in Britain, were presented in a manner that framed every citizen as being equal.
This section appears to ignore the issues of regionalism as a component of majority nationalism, but this is not the case. It is by establishing how central elites framed the state that this section outlined the parameters of the debate surrounding the nation in which regional actors find themselves. The pan-national and unionist frames allowed regional actors to ‘place’ their regions within discourses of equality and fairness. These are further explained by examining how central actors framed Quebec and Scotland within majority nationalism.

5.4 The Framing of Quebec and Scotland

Exploring how elites at the centre interpreted the nature of their states was the first step in exposing how majority nationalism created the parameters in which regional elites articulated their positions. Central elites, while advancing a nation-state interpretation of the state, still had to deal with the place of Quebec and Scotland. This section examines how Quebec and Scotland are framed in elite debate, setting the stage for the next chapter which explores the place of the region within the majority nation. As the staatsvolk interpret the state as a state of equal citizens, how Quebec and Scotland are treated in this discourse of equal citizenship provides regional actors with the boundaries of discussion. This section demonstrates how majority nationalism dealt with minority nations by; 1) exploring the concept of ‘fairness;’ 2) examining how the sub-state nations can be seen as worthy of emulation by central actors; and, 3) by discussing how sub-state nations paradoxically become ‘internal others.’

Fairness

Elites within Canada and Britain who felt that citizenship should be undifferentiated were confronted by actors in Quebec and Scotland who advocated for what was seen as ‘special treatment.’ In response, a discourse of ‘fairness’ developed. ‘Fair’ is a very subjective concept, and when analyzing elite debate, this author was struck by its ambiguity. In the vernacular it is often interpreted to mean the same or equal. One Nova Scotia MLA noted during an interview that debates surrounding what is ‘fair’ can quickly lead to everyone being treated identically
regardless of circumstance. Fairness as a concept seems to be bounded on the one side by uniformity and on the other by recognizing needs and differences. In both Canada and Britain, debates on fairness appeared to be centred around discussions on political power and economic redistribution. At their core, both addressed issues of equality of citizenship, but they manifested themselves differently. Note that this section will not attempt to judge ‘fairness,’ instead analyzing elite interpretations of ‘fair.’

In Canada the threat of Quebec secession was extremely high during the period under study, with debate in Canada focused primarily on Quebec’s place within the federation rather than fiscal relationships. These debates highlighted an overarching consensus on equality in Canadian political discourse. Building upon the equality frame discussed earlier, it was seen as ‘unfair’ to treat groups of Canadians differently, especially within Reform’s interpretation of the state. One of the complaints raised by Reform was not only that Quebec was setting the national agenda, but that Canada (outside Quebec) was being denied a ‘voice’ in the debates. As Preston Manning stated:

Here we have a debate on the future of federalism and the country itself, but where has it occurred? Not directly, not forcefully, not thoroughly on the floor of the Chamber, but everywhere else. While the number one priority of the agenda of the people has been the future of their country… the Chamber has focussed on manganese as an additive to gasoline and the national horse act. (HC (Can) Deb 27 Oct 1995 c15934)

The objection to Quebec setting the national agenda outside the House of Commons was not limited to where the debate was taking place, but what was being debated. Manning, speaking just days prior to the 1995 referendum, was making reference to the Chrétien government’s ‘do nothing, say nothing’ approach (Walters 1999: 372, Clark and Kronberg 1996: 677). However, Manning’s desire for the nature of Canada to be publicly debated came true as the federal government launched a series of initiatives aimed at keeping Quebec in Canada. This allowed Manning to clearly set out his interpretation of the Canadian state;

…the biggest single objection to the inclusion of any distinct society clause for Quebec was that it would confer on the Government of Quebec powers not conferred on the other provinces. In other words, the concern was and is that
the distinct society clause would violate the concept of equality of the provinces (HC (Can) 29 Nov 1995 c16983).

While Manning did not reveal how he felt Quebec would get more powers (the clauses dealt with interpretation of power), ‘distinct society’ was seen as a challenge to the equality of the provinces. When read in light of Manning’s first quote, it appears the underlying concern is that Quebec would gain a more disproportionate voice and ability to drive the statewide agenda. This, as opposed to constitutional asymmetry (which already existed in Canada), appears to be the underlying concern vis-à-vis unfair treatment. To Reform, fairness means treating everyone equally—an interpretation that seems to have guided the Supreme Court (see above) as well as the LPC. This analysis suggests there is a convergence between the parties with regards to ‘fairness.’ Both parties linked equality of citizen to fairness, which was seen above in the way Liberals framed their interpretations of the state in debates on the Regional Veto Act. They were willing to give Quebec the veto it had historically demanded by also giving vetoes to five mega-regions (BC, the West, Ontario, Quebec, and Atlantic Canada). Quebec would get its veto, but only because it is no different than the others.

In the 1970s, during the lead up to the first devolution referenda, Tam Dalyell, MP for West Lothian, raised a question in the Commons which introduced the concept of political fairness and has since become known as the West Lothian Question. He questioned the fairness of a Scottish MP voting on legislation which would have an impact on an English constituency, when that same Scottish MP would have no power to vote for the same legislation in his own constituency as it would be devolved to the Scottish Parliament (then termed Assembly). While this argument has its intellectual problems (most importantly that devolution simply does not change how legislation that affects England is created, Taylor 2002), it appealed to an innate sense of fairness, questioning a system in which not everyone is treated

Prior to devolution Scottish MPs were over-represented in the British House of Commons while after devolution the number of Scottish MPs was reduced to a level proportionally equal to their population vis-à-vis England. If one is to count this as a change, then it has to be noted that this change increases the say that the English have over English laws.
in the same way while speaking to a uniform sense of political citizenship across the breadth of Britain.

The above logic allowed English Members to highlight England’s perceived unfair treatment post-devolution by questioning the asymmetrical nature of devolution. The claim was that England was unfairly treated because Scottish MPs continued to vote on all matters. This is an all-English interpretation of the English Question; Scotland receives recognition, and England requires equal recognition. This led to resentment amongst some elites, as seen when Conservative Shadow Transport Secretary Eric Forth stated:

> For as long as we can remember, there has been within Britain a pampered and privileged minority that has received every possible political advantage and yet has proved to be ungrateful. I refer, of course, to the people of Scotland. (HC 16 Jan 1998 c607)

The defence of fairness is seen in Conservative manifestos, which promise “only English and Welsh MPs will be entitled to vote on Government Bills relating to England and Wales. And English MPs alone will vote on remaining laws which apply exclusively to England” (Conservative 2001: 34). This would give England the recognition it lacked, with Westminster functioning simultaneously as an English and British parliament. Fairness would be achieved by rebalancing the Union, repairing the ‘damage’ caused by Labour. Accordingly, unionist interpretations may have viewed asymmetry as an immediate and pressing concern in the short term, but it was a long-term problem for pan-nationalists. As seen above, Labour’s long-term policy was to achieve symmetry through regional devolution throughout Britain.

While it may have been difficult to engage the electorate in debates around the constitutional issues discussed above, a simple way of appealing to concepts of fairness was through differences in government expenditure. This was easily achieved in Britain with the Barnett Formula, the funding formula which determines funding for Scotland and the English regions. Conversely, the Canadian system is very complex with a variety of federal-provincial and federal-individual payments (Clemens and Veldhuis 2007, Savoie 2006), which are coupled with the ability of provinces to generate their own revenue. For the purpose of identity mobilization and giving voice to political or economic grievance, that Quebec is not the most ‘have
not’ province may have helped mediate some resentment towards it. As will be seen in Chapter Seven, while the vast majority of people in Canada and Nova Scotia felt that Quebec was favoured within the federation, other provinces received more in per capita transfers from the federal government than Quebec. While Quebec may have been favoured, financial discussions vis-à-vis government expenditure did not factor that highly in Canada. In Britain though, the perceived unfairness of funding was brought to life politically through the Barnett Formula. The problems of this formula were addressed by a former Conservative Cabinet Minister and current life peer;

Given that Scotland will now have its own Parliament and Wales will have its own Assembly, does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that one of the greatest concerns for the English regions, and cause of great unfairness to them, is the Barnett formula? (John MacGregor Norfolk South HC 3 Dec 1997 c363)

The Barnett Formula was seen as providing unfair advantage to Scotland. Its problems are not described; it is simply presented as being unfair. This is not surprising as the Formula; “has attained totemic status with a variety of assumed meanings” (Mitchell 2003: 9-10). Two common assumed meanings are that it is 1) a mechanism designed to erode or equalize devolved nations’ spending, and 2) a mechanism to protect the devolved nation’s share of spending. It appears the Member quoted above held the second interpretation to be true and assumed everyone else did as well.

This identification of unfair funding saw the English as being disadvantaged. This was expressed when backbench Conservative MP Andrew Hargreaves, Conservative MP for Birmingham Hall Green, dramatically stated:

Every time a patient dies unexpectedly or while awaiting treatment in an English hospital – every day, every week; drip, drip, drip – we shall remind the public in England that the Labour party is holding power because of a surfeit of Scottish Members of Parliament who are spending two and a half times as much English taxpayers’ money on someone in Scotland as on a patient in Birmingham. (HC Feb c1120)

There are two important points to note here. The first is that it is almost implicit in the argument Hargreaves puts forward that Scotland and England are equal within the British union. By not taking into account the difference in size between the two nations, he made it seem that if funding were evenly distributed per capita across the
breadth of Britain that the English would have a huge influx of resources, which was simply not the case—large decreases of expenditure in Scotland would only equate to marginal increases in England at an approximate rate of 10:1 (the approximate ratio of English to Scottish population). The next point is that the fact money is spent unevenly across England did not seem to be taken into account as England was the frame of reference used and it was the English as a whole who were being appealed to. Table 5.6 examines identifiable territorial public expenditure across Britain.

Table 5.6 Identifiable territorial public expenditure across Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Wales</th>
<th>Northern Ireland</th>
<th>England</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.6 Identifiable Expenditure per capita by Territory and Region, 1999-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>English Regions</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>North East</th>
<th>North West</th>
<th>York. &amp; Humber</th>
<th>East Midlands</th>
<th>West Midlands</th>
<th>South West</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>London</th>
<th>South East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HM Treasury, taken from Heald and Short 2002: 748

If English regions as opposed to England had been examined it would have been hard to escape the fact that the differences between the English region that receives the highest per capita funding, London, and the lowest, the South East, is 29, which is actually greater than the difference between England and Scotland, 22.

Chapter Seven will show that in the North East the majority viewed the South of England as being most favourably treated and advantaged (although many believed Scotland was favoured as well), which seems to be contradictory to what one would expect given the differences in identifiable public expenditure. Elites at the regional level may have seen regional devolution as a way of compensating and competing against English co-nationals and allowing the region to set its priorities. As can be seen in the following from the Chair of the Northern Group of Labour MPs, the demand is for regions to be able to identify what they need in their regions;

Labour Members have a dream for an assembly in the north-east. A regional assembly would give the people of the north-east the power to set their own priorities, and the ability to take decisions to solve the problems that they want solved. (Dr. Ashok Kumar (Middlesbrough, South and Cleveland, East) HC 12 Nov 2003 : c109WH)
This discussion on fairness as part of the discourse used by statewide elites in Canada and Britain suggests that while elites appealed to innate senses of fairness, ‘fair’ was a subjective term and linked to elite agendas. In both states the balance of power between the nations, as well as fiscal relationships, were targeted by elites using the fairness frame. Elites from all parties agreed that being ‘fair’ was an appropriate objective, but there did not appear to be agreement on how to meet this objective. This allowed elites to frame the minority nations as receiving special treatment and in turn created discursive space for regional actors to enter the debate vis-à-vis the place of their regions within the state.

‘Us Too’: Emulation and Alliance

As Canadian provinces possess powerful political and administrative tools, the desire to emulate Quebec manifested itself not as a desire for greater power, but for recognition of the distinctiveness of other parts of Canada and a greater willingness to use provincial voice. When Val Meredith (above) noted that alienation was not unique to Quebec, she reinforced the pan-Canadian while drawing attention to alienation in other provinces. She argued that essentially Quebec’s position was not that different from British Columbia’s. This is significant with regard to the point made by Reform MP Roy Bialy above, who indicated that national unity issues were not relevant to the lived experiences of people in his region, indicating that he believed Quebec had too much voice within the federation and other parts of Canada needed to be able to make their voices and concerns heard also.

Not every province has a history of French-English duality. The recognition of Canada’s diversity beyond the French and English languages was something advocated by both major parties. Liberals MPs also used this logic, claiming there

were other groupings in Canada apart from the French and English (however defined). As noted by Liberal MP John Findlay\textsuperscript{49} during debates on the Clarity Act;

[H]e appears to have forgotten that although we talk about two founding nations, there are others, we also have aboriginal peoples… many Newfoundlanders consider themselves to be part of a fairly unique group. We have Acadians in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. (HC (Can) 13 Mar 2000 c1645-1650)

Here it appears that Quebec’s demands were consumed within wider debates on accommodation and diversity within Canada. O’Leary (2001) argues a staatsvolk’s position of dominance can grant it room to accommodate as it need not fear the minority. In this sense granting distinction to all cultural groups was less of a challenge to the staatsvolk’s hegemony than granting it to a select few, and allowed a discourse of equality throughout the state to be dominant with people associating the protection of their individual distinctiveness with a broader sense of citizenship within the pan-national community. While Kymlicka (1995) makes a very strong case for the distinction between “homeland” minorities and diasporas, to the individual citizen, this distinction may seem academic.

Usher (1995) argues that many cultures within Canada have been forced to sacrifice their historical legacies to protect the bilingual nature of the country. In this sense, the success of the Quebecois was emulated by others using the logic of fairness and equality. ‘Third force’ Canadians and other French speaking communities were able to look to Quebec defending its position. Yet because they interpreted citizenship in a pan-national sense, it allowed them to emulate Quebec’s tactics as they did not see fundamental differences between their particular community and the Quebecois, as they are all Canadian. In this sense, Quebec can be seen as a potential ally to members of the other groupings. As Acadian MP Francis LeBlanc (Lib) stated:

Protecting our language and culture has never been easy. We have had to fight, and we still do, to get our share of recognition. But we realized a long time ago that our chances of survival as a cultural community were much better if we joined forces with the francophones of Quebec, Manitoba and elsewhere in Canada. (HC (Can) 6 Dec 1995)

\textsuperscript{49} MP for Oxford, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, born in the Dominican Republic

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LeBlanc makes reference not to ‘we’ in a provincial sense of the term, but to ‘we’ the Acadians. He spoke of joining “forces with the francophones of Quebec” as an allied French speaking community, indeed it is not Quebec, but rather Quebec’s francophones he mentions. Quebec was presented not as a ‘homeland’ for the French language in North America, but as a fellow French speaking jurisdiction (albeit a much more powerful one). Additionally, recognition was framed as a commodity or resource of which the Acadians required a fair share. In this sense because French is seen by Canada (outside Quebec) as a defining element of Canada (McRoberts 1997, Kymlicka 2001), defending the French language was not seen as privileging one part of the state over the other, but as protecting something that belongs to all Canadians.

Similarly, when Durham MP Derek Foster50 (Bishop Auckland) informed his parliamentary colleagues that as Chairman of the North of England development council he had to compete against the Scots and Welsh, and that as a young MP in 1974 he saw that Scotland had many institutions that the English regions lacked (HC 1 Apr 1998 c1329), he was not merely stating a fact, he was exemplifying the process of diffusion by which policies and procedures are transmitted across borders (see O’Loughlin et al. 1998, Starr 1991, or Eyestone 1977). Scotland’s experience provided useful lessons for all parts of Britain. People may have seen it as advantaged, but this was acceptable as it benefited the entire British nation, reinforcing the Union in Scotland while providing an example for other British regions. The acceptance of the minority nation’s demands without the adoption of its interpretation of the state was discussed earlier with regional devolution being advanced as one of the possible responses to the English Question (Hazell 2006a and b).

Building upon the ‘fairness’ frame and the pursuit of regional voice, Richard Cabon, Minister for the Regions, Regeneration and Planning stated, “For far too long, the English regions have been disadvantaged compared with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland” (HC 14 Jan 1998 c372), “Our vision is for the English regions to grow and prosper alongside Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and within the

50 Now Baron Foster of Bishop Auckland.
European Union” (HC 14 Jan 1998 c381). His argument did not attack Scotland, rather it showed how the English regions, and Britain as a whole, could learn from the Scots. The advantageous position of the sub-state nations was seen, by some, as something to emulate. As North East MP Joyce Quin MP\(^{51}\) stated in the early 1990s:

The regions of England, unlike the nations of Scotland and Wales, do not have their own Cabinet Minister, separate structures or, indeed, such elements as a separate Question Time in the House (HC 6 Dec 91 c513). This desire to emulate Scotland’s capacity for voice was echoed over a decade later by Austin Mitchell MP, in the run-up to the devolution referendum in the North East. Demonstrating a desire for his region to be more like Scotland, he stated: “We have seen what synergy has produced in Scotland” (HC 11 Feb 2004 c1504).

In England, the desire for recognition amongst representatives of sub-state groupings did not appear as powerful, nor factor as highly, as in Canada. In some ways the complaint against special treatment (or the demand for ‘fairness’), could be seen as a demand for equality, yet the desire for recognition was much less pronounced. This is not surprising if regional actors saw Scotland as being a fellow British region. They may instead have focused on emulating Scotland’s institutional capacities, as seen when Austin Mitchell MP stated:

Our case is strong, and it will become stronger when we see the effects of devolution in Scotland and Wales. We must be there in queue and our place must be guaranteed (HC 16 May 1997 c306).

The ‘effects’ mentioned are the ability to advance economic concerns as opposed to cultural distinctiveness. He expected devolution in Scotland to succeed, and for this success to spill over the border, with Scotland leading the way for devolution for all of Britain.

Emulation in Canada and Britain appears to have been advanced not through a discourse of multinationalism, but rather through a discourse of equal citizenship for all. The equality frame, explained in the previous section, was used vis-à-vis Quebec and Scotland by the staatsvolk, and groups within the staatsvolk, to advance their individual and group agendas because in the end, everyone was viewed as being equally Canadian and equally British.

Emulation and fairness highlighted attitudes towards the (perceived) privileged position of the sub-state nations. The above suggests that unionist interpretations of the state appeared to have the most difficulty accepting asymmetrical arrangements, but in the long-term the pan-national frame advanced a discourse of equality of regions and citizens. In many ways, a pan-nationalist view can be more accommodating of asymmetrical arrangements, when there is a) at least a possibility of other parts of the state achieving similar powers, and/or b) it will not have an impact on, or threaten the integrity of, the state. The second criterion is especially important to understanding devolution in Scotland and Wales, and support for distinct society for Quebec, devolution in Scotland was in part designed to limit nationalist ambitions (Bradbury and Mitchell 2001, Denver et al. 2000, Lynch 2002), and the proposed constitutional amendments granting Quebec distinct society status were made for similar reasons (Dufour 2002/2003).

Common throughout the above discussion was the ‘othering’ of Quebec and Scotland, which was used in very different ways for similar reasons—to reinforce the different interpretations of the state presented by the various parties and actors. In parliamentary debates MPs from all parties made reference to Quebec and Scotland using the language of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ either explicitly or implicitly. This framed the sub-state nation as something that is not ‘here,’ but rather ‘there.’ ‘Here’ we have the status quo; ‘there’ they have, or are trying to get, something different. Because there is a difference between what ‘we’ and ‘they’ have, it needs to be rectified as difference is inherently problematic. What was done to rectify the situation was irrelevant, as was whether the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was fair or not. By defining ‘us’ and ‘them’ the discourses above accomplished the same thing; they presented the sub-state nation as an internal other: one of ‘us’ yet different. The seemingly privileged position of Quebec and Scotland forced elites to address the nature of the state and the place of the minority sub-state nation, and in turn the place of the majority nation within it. As state-led majority nationalism left no room for a separate Quebecois or Scottish demos, it created a situation in which sub-national actors in Canada (outside Quebec) and England were presented with examples of
regions that were able to advance their interests in a very successful manner. This discourse not only exemplified majority nationalism, ‘internal othering’ helped create the boundaries of debate in the regions of Canada (outside Quebec) and England, showing regional elites how to use voice to garner change in the system.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter explored the perspective of political elites at the statewide level, examining the confusion surrounding the question “Who are we?” in the majority nations. It suggested that elite debate focusing on the place of Quebec and Scotland spilled over into statewide political discourse, politicizing identity within the nations and the regions. While demonstrating consensus on what it meant to be Canadian or British, these debates highlight trends in both nations. These trends saw broad agreement in the majority nation that saw the state in broadly pan-national lines, emphasizing the commonalities of all citizens of Canada and Britain, regardless of geography.

In Chapter Two, unionist and pan-nationalist interpretations of the state were presented as ‘pure types,’ but in this chapter it was shown that they exist as two poles along a spectrum of interpretations of the state in Canada and Britain. While neither of these poles was met within statewide parties, in both states the two major parties competing for power at the centre leaned towards one of the two, converging at the pan-national end of the continuum. The evidence presented in this chapter strongly suggests that statewide elites viewed the state as the embodiment of a single nation. As mentioned in earlier chapters, there is a dialectical relationship between the majority and minority nations, but from the point of view of elites within the staatsvolk, the minority nation initiated the discussion. This chapter indicates that elites within the staatsvolk did not recognize the multinational character of the state, limiting their ability to understand their role within minority nationalist mobilization.

This chapter has shown that in response to the demands of Quebec and Scotland, discursive space opened up in both Canada and Britain, allowing questions of identity and the nature of the state to be brought forward. This provided the political space necessary for regional elites to advance their interpretations of the
state while placing political constraints upon them. As the dominant view in the hegemonic nation was pan-national, encouraging a conception of equal citizenship throughout, there was little room for regional elites to advocate along a different line. The next chapter demonstrates how debate at the centre framed regional elite interpretations of the Canadian and British states, setting the parameters of regional debate.
Chapter 6: Bottom Up Regionalization

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter showed that discussions surrounding the nature of the state allowed different conceptions of the state to surface while providing the boundaries of debate for regional actors. This chapter explores how regional elites framed their interpretation of the state when the nature of the state became problematized. As regions within Canada (outside Quebec) and England, Nova Scotia and the North East may have lacked the national character of the sub-state nations, most notably a distinctive demos, but this did not mean they were not distinct in their own right, merely that they belonged to larger national groups which were the focus of primary political loyalty.

In both regions discussions on the nature of the state highlighted the peripheral nature of the regions, though not only in a geographic sense. Both regions possess cultural distinctiveness mapped onto administrative state capacity, the difference being the North East lacks regional democracy. The goal of this chapter is to gain a broader understanding of how the changing political environment at the centre, created by the dialectical relationship between majority and minority nationalism, allowed regional actors to articulate a regional viewpoint.

The first section investigates how regional elites perceived their region’s relationship with the state, examining discourse surrounding centre-region relations. As the relationship between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ is more complex than a simple bi-lateral relationship between the centre and the region, the second section explores the impact the minority nations had on this discourse. By examining how the sub-state nations were framed in regional discourse, this section accomplishes two objectives; 1) it highlights the spill-over of statewide –debate into the regions, and 2) it teases out regional interpretations of the nature of the state. Overall this chapter demonstrates that during the period under study, elites at the regional level mobilized in a manner similar to the sub-state nations. However, the range of options available to the minority nation were not available to regional political elites, while actors from minority nations needed to protect the institutions of social solidarity that are bearers
of national identity. Before beginning this discussion, the chapter will turn to a quick overview of Nova Scotia and the North East of England as regions in Canada and Britain.

**Regions in Canada and Britain**

The basis of territorial mobilization is grievance (Hutchinson 1999: 399), but grievances are not necessarily objective; they are based on the subjective concept of legitimate rule (Chaterjee 1993: 203, Fidler 1991: 6-7). Neither Ottawa nor London were seen as “illegitimate” in Nova Scotia or the North East, as both were firmly embedded in the larger nations, but this did not mean that regional elites were satisfied with the status quo. Regionalism is a process of reform that seeks change *inside* the state as opposed to *outside* whereby regional actors attempt to link political objectives with regional identity. In Canada, there are clearly defined sub-state institutions, yet in England it is difficult to identify regions between the national and the local level (Herrschell and Newman 2000: 1199). The difficulty stems from a weakness of identity and lack of institutional capacity as English regions do not enjoy a long pedigree of institutions or regional networks (Bond and McCrone 2004: 2). When the Conservatives developed the GORs it was a departure from the centralized and compartmentalized nature of the civil service in Britain (Mawson and Spencer 1997: 174), bringing focus to government activity in the regions (Tomaney 2002: 228), and providing the framework for Labour’s regional reforms.

The changes brought about by the Conservatives gave England a type of devolution similar to that enjoyed by Scotland and Wales prior to 1997. The institutional changes that took place in the North East after 1997 continued the long history of regional institutional building in England (Benneworth and Tomaney 2002: 140). Royle (1998) points out that regional identity in England has never had a platform for expression; however, by the turn of the 21st Century, the English regions had become political actors in their own right. As Payne and Bennert (2003) note, creating RDAs required a substantial shift in responsibility away from a range of central government departments, even though RDAs lacked flexibility and authority. This led to two important shifts in the governance of England. The first is that RDAs, along with the GOs and RAs broke from traditional departmental government and
moved towards regional governance. The second is that while RDAs are talking shops, this talking is a part of the process of creating bounded regional networks.

English regions lacked the institutional voice of Canadian provinces. Canadian provinces have dedicated ‘champions’ whose job it is to voice provincial concerns. As discussed earlier, regional representation in the federal cabinet has always been important in Canada, but regionally based Cabinet Ministers have been replaced at the federal level with first ministers’ conferences (Bakvis 1991). Indeed, the democratic processes of government and opposition ensure that Premiers are defenders of the provincial interest and that the interaction between the federal and provincial government determines the national interest (Simeon 2006b).

Gaining voice was partly what the campaign for regional devolution was about. The devolution campaign (more accurately the collection of different campaigns) took what appears to be a two-pronged approach. One was a top down approach, focusing on formal constitutional issues culminating with the 2004 referendum. The other was a bottom up approach in which regional actors attempted to strengthen pre-existing regional networks and build new ones. Indeed, prior to devolution, many regions were already beginning to create their own regional organizations;

In the north, we created the North of England Assembly of Local Authorities which was the first regional representative organization, and we created our own regional development organization – the Northern Development Company. (David Clelland HC 20 Feb 1997 Col 1116)

This was not the only example of regionwide institutions being created organically. Cllr Ian Mearns, Deputy Leader of Gateshead Council, highlighted Newcastle Airport, which is owned by six local authorities in cooperation with the private sector, as an excellent example of cooperation in the region (Interview 2006). Labour hoped to build upon this organic, bottom up process once in power (Labour 1997: 13-14). In this sense, the North East provides an excellent study of the creation of bounded networks as one witnesses the creation of bounded networks from both a top down state-led and bottom up organic process.

Though Nova Scotian elites did not need to create organizations, they did find themselves involved in a dialogue with the federal government around fundamental
questions of the Canadian state, although the role of the provinces was never challenged. Given the history of many provinces, including Nova Scotia, pre-dates confederation (Smith 2002), their democratic legitimacy would be next to impossible to remove even if it were not constitutionally enshrined. That regions in England do not have the pedigrees of Canadian provinces is not the only issue that regional devolution advocates faced; there were also questions as to the boundaries of the English regions. Even in the North East, which appeared to have the strongest regional identity, the borders of the North East were still not perfectly clear by the time the devolution debate began. In Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council, for example, they debated whether or not they considered themselves part of the North East or Yorkshire and the Humber. As reported in the Northern Echo:

A new council regime agreed to stay in the North East Assembly despite protestation that the area had closer connection with Yorkshire. Councillors at Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council had considered leaving the North East Assembly, which aims to help to create Home Rule for the region. But on Tuesday, after a lengthy debate on the district’s cultural history, they decided to maintain membership. (Northern Echo “Council stays in assembly” 6 June 2003)

While voting to remain with the North East, this appears to have been driven by rational choice as opposed to having a sense of belonging vis-à-vis North East. While in the short term this may have indicated that the identity of the North East was ‘fuzzy’ at the borders, all identities evolve continually, and this may be a part of the process of regional network building. Keating, Cairney and Hepburn (2008: 3, 9-10) indicate that “territorial policy communities,” either territorially confined sectoral communities or cross-sectoral communities organized around regional interests, are able to ‘grow’ in newly devolved jurisdictions, They argue that in the North East the institutional changes there were met with some organization change at the regional level. That the solidification of the North East was relatively recent is important to this discussion for two reasons; 1) While Nova Scotia is a clear political entity, the North East was not, and 2) that while the North East was only determined recently, Nova Scotia is ancient—the First General Assembly of Nova Scotia started sitting in October 1758. Yet in saying this, some Cape Breton Islanders challenged Nova
Scotian identity in their part of the province, even electing a Cape Breton secessionist to the provincial legislature in the 1980s.

The idea of ‘region’ in Canada and Britain have two very different starting points. Exploring the institutional natures of ‘region’ in the two states allows one to understand how regional identity manifests itself politically and contextualize how territorial identities were mobilized.

6.2 Centre and Periphery

The relationship between the centre and the regions may best be revealed through examining debates on the topic of how state power should be organized in the state. This research is not an inquiry into the legal and financial relationship between the regions and their capitals, rather an examination of how regional actors interpreted these relationships. During the 1990s, constitutional debates, along with a restructuring of the fiscal relations of the Canadian state, forced Nova Scotian elites to re-conceptualize the relationship between the federal government and the province. This re-conceptualization penetrated Nova Scotian society, from a House of Assembly Special Committee criss-crossing the province to local community groups trying to address questions of national unity. Similarly, discussions on devolution in the North East demonstrated the hopes and expectations for change in the relationship between the North East and the centre. Over time, many leading figures in the North East came on side to the idea of devolution, and the main newspapers in the region took an editorial stance in favour of some sort of home rule for the North East; the Newcastle Journal even launched a Case for the North, becoming a political actor in its own right.

In both states there was a political environment allowing actors from all parts of the state to articulate their views. That much of the change was unsuccessful is not relevant here; it is the views on the nature of the state that are important. This section explores centre-regional relations through 1) the division of power; 2) regional disparities as identified by the regional actors; and, 3) how regional actors viewed these relationships and how regional voice was expressed.
Regional Elites and the Division of Power

Perceptions of intergovernmental relations in the North East and Nova Scotia are investigated by first examining interpretations of how power was divided and whether regional elites felt the region had an effective voice. This was followed by an exploration of regional disparities showing that regional actors generally felt their regions were disadvantaged vis-à-vis other parts of the state.

Nova Scotian elites saw the federation along the pan-national conceptions of citizenship outlined in the previous chapter. They appeared to believe in the equality of provinces and were relatively opposed to any restructuring of the federation that could change the relationship between citizen and state and weaken their position within the federation. As stated in Canada: A Country for All; the Report of the Nova Scotia Working Committee on the Constitution:

What we found was that the most acceptable of the options was a constitutional recognition of Quebec’s distinct society, provided that a) it be defined in terms similar to those of the federal position paper (i.e. language, culture and civil law); and b) the provinces remain as equal partners within Canada, recognizing that this requires that accommodation of differences. (Nova Scotia 1991: 20)

That Nova Scotian elites were adamant about ensuring equality of citizens and provinces is not surprising; as a ‘have not’ province it is in their interest to maintain strong federal commitments to ensure that all Canadians receive the same basic level of services (Tomblin 1995, Bakvis 1991: 299, MacDonald 2000: 393). According to former MLA Jerry Pye (2006), “the purpose of the federation is for people to look after each other.”

Attempts were made to defend Nova Scotia’s place from changes in the federal structure, but these changes did not just emanate from Quebecois nationalism, they were also found in the neo-liberal approach of the federal government. One of the prime economic focuses of the government was to eliminate the deficit, which some interpreted as threatening the role of the federal government in Nova Scotia. The failed New Democratic Party (NDP) Bill to Protect Provincial Sovereignty^52

^52 Here sovereignty refers to Nova Scotia not being dictated to by the federal government in provincial jurisdiction, especially though international treaty obligations.
provides an interesting example of how Nova Scotian elites viewed the place of their province in Canada. Though this bill was put forward by an opposition party and opposed by the other two parties, the underlying concepts and views expressed by both supporters and opponents of the bill were very similar. As one NDP MLA stated:

Why don’t we think about protecting provincial sovereignty right now and let the federal government know that the Province of Nova Scotia does not want it to negotiate with respect to essential public services like health and education. (Epstein HA 9 May 2001 p2959-60)

This statement touches upon two important points. Firstly, it noted that health and education are both constitutionally provincial responsibilities. Secondly, the bill was designed to protect Nova Scotia’s voice within the federation.

Part of the reason the bill failed was that those opposing it recognized the importance of the federal government within spheres of provincial jurisdiction. As such, they were adamant about protecting the federal government’s role in the province:

I am sure that our government would not want Ottawa to be allowed to download its responsibilities to the provinces and territories over having no federal role in health care. This bill opens the door to the destruction of Medicare in Canada and here at home. (Gaudet HA 9 May 2001 p2967-9)

Provincial actors were fully aware of the need for the federal government’s penetration into Nova Scotia, and were loath to challenge the federal government’s spending power. This returns to the point raised earlier by the Supreme Court with regard to the Constitution being the start point, not the end point, in understanding the division of power in Canada. This debate did not demonstrate fundamental disagreements about the nature of the Canadian state and Nova Scotia’s place within it, rather it highlighted broad elite consensus as to the type of society they thought Canada and Nova Scotia should be. The bill did not fail due to principles but due to

53 The ability of the federal government to spend as it chooses, coupled with the weak taxing powers of the provinces, means that to maintain decent standards in provincial policy spheres (such as education and health care), the federal government must fund them.
disagreement on how to achieve the principles, ensuring high standards of service provision within the province.

That two governments were involved in service provision had some interesting consequences, especially given that only one of those governments was constitutionally empowered to legislate in the fields in which both governments operated. Clearly neither side in the debate wanted to create walls between the different orders of government. Instead they focused on a cooperative model of federalism in which neither actor/level of government is able to act unilaterally. The points made by McEwen (2002) with regard to loyalty and identity being focused on the government that provides services are important here, as one can understand how the cooperative model evolved into a competitive model, with competition vis-à-vis being the visible provider of services. As one newspaper report stated:

Since 1989 Ottawa has seized more control of development spending in Atlantic Canada – buying TV and radio ads to increase its visibility – causing deep frictions with provincial officials. (Beeby 1994)

The fundamental difference between the way state power is divided between the state and the region in Canada and Britain is the sovereign nature of the Nova Scotia parliament. The powers of the Canadian provinces are not devolved from the centre; both the federal government and the provinces derive their power from the Constitution. Yet in functional terms, in both Nova Scotia and the North East the division of power is in constant flux. In Canada, the Constitution outlines the division of powers, but provinces continually enter into negotiations with the federal government and each other on service provision (Simeon 2007, Choudhry et al. 2007). In England the central government delegated much of its responsibility to regional quangos (Harvie 1999), yet unlike Canada, English regional administration lacked any bargaining power with the centre. In both regions there was substantial interplay between the region and the centre that regional actors could politicize. While Nova Scotia has formal mechanisms to express regional voice, in the North East elites had to first seek acknowledgement that a regional level existed. As Joyce Quin, a prominent former North Eastern MP wrote in the *Northern Echo:*

[T]he objectors to regional government often say that they don’t want yet another bureaucratic tier. However we already have a Government office for
the region, and the administration of many central government policies at regional level... We want to add democracy not bureaucracy (Quin 2001)

Whereas regionalism (even federalism) has a long pedigree amongst some segments of the English population (notably the Liberal Democrats), it only became embedded in elements of North East civil society during the Thatcher years. The resentment towards Thatcher and the Conservatives was evident still in the North East. Much like the Thatcher legacy propelled devolution in Scotland, it appeared to propel it in the North East as well. Regional autonomy was seen as the best way to protect against perceived harmful central policies and objectives which differed from regional ones;

It is important that local people are able to take robust, focused and principled decisions, because they know best what is needed. I never want a Westminster Tory Government to have that influence on my region again. We have a level of unemployment that was second to none... Our history is bitter, and we will never forget it. We will never trust a Westminster Tory Government again ever. (Dari Taylor (Lab) HC 21 July 2004 C419)

Shortly after the referendums in Scotland and Wales Jim Cousins, MP for Newcastle Central, responded to proposals for an all English parliament by arguing that the needs of the North East would be swallowed up by the concerns of the South East and London (Tomaney 1999: 81), an argument echoed by North Eastern interviewees. This logic led Northern MPs to insert the 40% clause in the 1979 referendum in Scotland, and created fear of an English parliament amongst North East regional elites. It epitomized the political position of the North East, overlooked between the South of England and Scotland. The frustration expressed by Dari Tayler above exemplifies the North East’s peripheral nature. This sense of difference from the South of England was highlighted by Newcastle Council Leader Peter Arnold who argued that it was due to the fact that Northumberland used to be a kingdom in its own right which has left a lasting impression on the region (Interview 2006).

In the North East there was a demand for greater local control by both supporters and opponents of devolution.54 Indeed, grouping people as ‘supporters’ or

54 The difference being how ‘local’ was interpreted; devolution supporters wanted regional powers, anti-devolution supporters wanted increased powers for local councils.

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‘opponents’ of regional devolution in the North East is difficult. As Bond and McCrone (2004) note, the ‘Yes’ campaign had a difficult time getting those supporting regional devolution in theory to support the proposals in practice. This is exemplified by Liberal Democrat Councillor Jerry Keating (interview 2006), a long-time devolution supporter in the North East who maintained that the proposed Assembly lacked any real powers and, against the directions of his party, sided with Neil Herron’s unofficial ‘No’ campaign. Yet in the North East, regardless of how elites were classified, the fact remains that the demand for power was not new, as this 1986 excerpt from the *Journal* indicates;

Labour MEP Joyce Quin and Roland Boyes MP for Houghton and Washington wrote in the Labour Weekly newspaper that there is a feeling of powerlessness in the North. “Most Britons feel a loyalty to their own areas as well as to Britain as a whole and there is a strong feeling that many political decision taken at national level could be taken closer to home.” (Craig 1986)

While the results of the 2004 referendum may be presented as a defeat of regional devolution in principle, in reality the electors voted for the specific proposals on offer. What the ‘no’ vote meant was not clear. While polling indicated that regional devolution in the North East was not supported by the majority of North Easterners (see Figure 7.16 in Chapter Seven), support for the status quo was not as overwhelming as the final vote tally in the referendum would have indicated. The confusion surrounding the ‘no’ vote was expressed by George Cowcher, chief executive of the North East Chamber of Commerce:

Week after week we were told by the nation’s most senior politicians that change was needed in the North East. The electorate was unconvinced by the under-strength proposals for an elected assembly, which appears to sell the region short. The Government must now formulate a new strategy to provide a real difference. (Young 2004)

Alan Hall, Regional Director of the manufacturers’ organization EEF Northern,55 said, “It was not going to be a regional powerhouse with the ability to make its own decisions and to be fair, this is probably why it didn’t want the yes vote.” (Young 2004). Both these representatives of prominent regional business organizations

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55 EEF is formally the Engineering Employer’s Federation, an advocacy organization for engineering, manufacturing and technology industries (http://www.eef.org.uk/northern/whoweare/default.htm).
identified the weakness of the proposals as being a fundamental component of the ‘no’ vote, indicating the proposals were not addressing regional concerns.

This indicates support for regional accountability, and occurred against a backdrop of widespread administrative devolution in England. According to Orban (1984: 38), there is an inverse relationship between domination and demands for power, demands increase as domination decreases (also Dion 1996). Accordingly, the rise of English nationalism (in its British or English manifestation) occurred as the English had an even greater say in governing England, as devolution meant Scotland received fewer Members of Parliament and less dedicated time in parliament, increasing the prominence and domination of England within Westminster.

Cllr. Mearns highlighted the paradox facing devolution supporters when he discussed the success his council had in the twenty years previous (Interview 2006). The improved quality of life in the North East seems to have had the effect of decreasing regional alienation. According to Neil Herron, North Easterners’ major concerns were not political, rather “who won the game last night” (Interview 2006). This is not unique to the North East; research in Canada clearly indicated that citizens do not understand multi-level government very well being concerned with the end product of government activity—policy and service provision, not how policy is formulated (Cutler and Mendelsohn 2001, Simeon 2006).

Many interviewees in Nova Scotia indicated that their constituents did not care about the intricacies of federalism. Nova Scotians were not concerned about who helped them or delivered services (Whalen interview 2006). Paris stated that when he was campaigning one of the biggest issues he encountered was a federal issue, the national gun registry (interview 2006). It was felt that the average citizen did not fully understand government, nor how to access it (Colwell interview 2006), and that the MLA was expected to be “the guy with the answers” (Estabrooks interview 2006). Indeed, this is a point highlighted by Simeon (2006: 4, originally 1971) that “demands from citizens do not necessarily respect constitutional lines of authority.” By looking at issues surrounding neglect and representation this section explores how regional elites feel their region is treated by the centre.

The problems created by success in the region pre-devolution were highlighted by devolution sceptic Steve Rankin, Regional Director of the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), who in an open letter to John Tomaney in the *Journal*, claimed that these problems put the ‘Yes’ campaign in the position of having to “talk down” the region (Journal Feb 6, 2004). The ‘Yes’ campaign sidestepped this problem by focusing attention on the lack of accountability of regional institutions, but in the end they were in a difficult position; they wanted greater democratic control, but how could they articulate this demand in a positive manner? To do this, the ‘Yes’ campaign looked outside the North East, to Scotland. Adopting this strategy meant that instead of highlighting regional concerns in isolation, they could highlight the positive outcomes of Scottish devolution as something to emulate and learn from.

Of note in Nova Scotia and the North East with regard to the division of power, is that dissimilar approaches indicated similar concepts. In the North East regional devolution supporters wanted to increase regional power to ensure people had the kind of relationship with the state that balanced regional autonomy with adequate service provision. This was the same in Nova Scotia where the division of power was less of an immediate concern than service provision.

*Division of Resources*

Building upon how regional elites believed the division of power should be organized, this section examines alienation and resentment in the regions by exploring how Nova Scotian and North Eastern elites interpreted the division of resources in Canada and Britain. In both regions there was a perception that neither received a fair share of central government expenditure, yet ‘fairness’ was never defined. It is beyond the scope of this project to assess ‘fairness,’ (instead see Savoie 2006 or Klosko 1992); rather it explores how regional elites interpreted ‘fair.’ Chapter Five established that ‘fair’ was a key frame used by central elites in Nova Scotia and the North East actors attempted to ensure their region received its ‘fair share.’ While institutional arrangements in both regions shaped how this perception was articulated, the theme of ‘voice’ was prominent.

As the North East lacked institutional voice, ‘fairness’ directed debate towards ensuring the region gained ‘voice.’ Its lack of ‘voice’ was seen as contributing to inequalities;
Government figures show the region losing out compared with nations and regions have already have a strong political voice of their own. For instance, under the controversial Barnett Formula, Scotland is awarded 1.1 billion pounds more in public spending than the North East to pay for services such as schools, hospitals and transport. (The Journal Nov 20 2002)

As noted earlier, the Barnett Formula had totemic status amongst elites in Britain, and it could not be avoided when discussions of ‘fair’ allocations of state resources were had;

Liberal Democrat leader Cllr Nigel Martin said, “the North East is not getting its fair share as far as things like the Barnett Formula are concerned. It is only by binding together that we will get a fairer deal.” (Northern Echo 2005)

Of interest in the above two quotes is that they had the same end-state in mind, levelling the playing field between the North East and Scotland. In both, differences in per capita spending were seen as simply wrong, leaving little room in the debate for factors that might justify or indicate a greater need. Some actors opposing regional devolution did not so much see the need to increase the North East’s abilities, as to reduce Scotland’s abilities vis-à-vis the region;

Said Martin Callanan, Tory euro candidate for North East “I agree with the point that something should be done to stop the Scottish poaching jobs, but they should simply be restrained. There should be a level playing field, not more players.” (Armstrong Jan 14, 1999)

In the North East the complicated issues surrounding resource allocation were never discussed in detail; instead differences were highlighted and presented as being wrong because they were different;

Health Secretary Alan Milburn publicly called into question funding rules which ensure public spending in Scotland is higher than in the North, which is one of the key issues in The Journal’s Case for the North (The Journal Home rule hopes rise after signal Apr 17 2002)

It appears the ‘Barnett Formula’ was used in the above quotes as code or shorthand for special treatment, with no explanation as to why Scotland should or should not receive more funding per capita (for example the geographical impact on costs), or how service delivery north of the Border could be more efficient, resulting in greater services for the same cost. With devolution, there was greater scrutiny of money spent in Scotland than in the North East as there was no North East equivalent to
Audit Scotland or the Scottish Parliament Audit Committee. According to one North East respondent, their has never been a proper needs assessment of the North East (Schmuecker interview 2005), which makes it striking that devolution campaigners never seemed to equate efficiency benefits with accountability in Scotland, suggesting money evokes an emotive response.

North Eastern discussions on the division of resources were not fundamentally different than the perceived challenges Nova Scotia faced. In Nova Scotia the concept of fairness was coupled with federal spending and transfers by provincial elites:

“We want to make sure that federal transfers are fair to the province of Nova Scotia” said provincial finance minister Bill Gillis, whose government just called an election. “We have challenges especially in health care and education” (Morris: 1998).

Former Nova Scotia Premier John Hamm explicitly invoked the concept in his “Campaign for Fairness” which demonstrated near universal elite consensus, receiving endorsement from all three parties in the provincial legislature (Nova Scotia 2001). The purpose of the Campaign is as follows;

The Campaign for Fairness is a campaign launched by Premier John Hamm in January 2001 to ensure that Nova Scotia receives its rightful share of the revenues generated through its offshore oil and gas development. These revenues are needed to develop long-term economic sustainability and reduced dependence on federal transfers for Nova Scotia. (http://www.gov.ns.ca/fairness/)

Within the interview sample in Nova Scotia, the majority of respondents did not feel Nova Scotia was treated fairly, yet noted by one MLA above, ‘fairness’ can turn into a discourse in which all provinces are treated the same, ignoring circumstance (Paris interview 2006).

The Atlantic Provinces in general, including Nova Scotia, are termed ‘have not’ provinces as they are net beneficiaries of federal transfer payments.

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56 Between 2005 and 2007 this author worked in the Scottish Parliament as the Parliamentary researcher for the Deputy Convenor of the Scottish Parliament Audit Committee and personally witnessed both the Audit Committee and Audit Scotland hold public spending to account in Scotland.
Accordingly, Nova Scotian economic success is likened to economic independence. As local political observer Karen Janigan stated in the Sunday Daily News:

> Economic independence would make us less vulnerable to Ottawa’s financial (mis)management. Our fortunes tend to ebb and flow with the whims of the governing party. (Janigan 1997)

Her point about being controlled by the centre was also expressed by the provincial Minister of Finance Neil LeBlanc with regard to the position of Nova Scotia in relation to the rest of Canada;

> Comparisons to other provinces is not my main focus. My focus is how I run Nova Scotia and how we can make ourselves more independent from the federal government by governing our economy. (Brewster 2001)

This suggests that there are two (apparently) contradictory threads running through Nova Scotian discourse. On one hand, provincial elites did not want to chase the federal government out of province, welcoming the federal government’s ability to spend in areas of provincial jurisdiction. On the other hand, they appeared to want to lessen federal intrusion into the province by lessening Nova Scotia’s dependence on federal transfers.

**Zero Sum Games**

Discussions in both regions appeared to be centred on the premise that for one part of the country to benefit, another had to lose out; that there were no win-win situations and a zero sum game was being played. Many MLAs interviewed felt that much of the government finance structure encouraged competition between the provinces. One likened the system to giving the provinces a pot of gold and saying “you divvy it up” (Paris interview 2006). Others felt that funding through programs like ACOA was dependant upon whether or not the relevant Federal Minister came from your province (Estabrooks interview 2006).

Cody (1994), in his examination of Atlantic Canada during the Mulroney era, notes that powerful regional ministers in the federal government resulted in the perception that resources were diverted to their political strongholds. Bakvis (1991) brings the validity of this perception into question, noting that provincial premiers at First Ministers Conferences have eclipsed regionally based cabinet ministers as the
voice of the provinces at the federal level. Yet if Nova Scotian MLAs still perceive regionally based ministers as being the voice of their province at the federal level, they would act accordingly. The perception of interprovincial competition was exemplified when Premier Cameron stated: “we will very clearly be wanting the federal government to redirect some of the existing funding in Atlantic Canada to a more positive outcome” (in McLaughlin (1991) authors italics). It appears that the Premier felt there were limited funds for Atlantic Canada, that for Nova Scotia to benefit, another province had to lose out.

This concern about the fairness of resource allocation was seen in many aspects of Nova Scotian politics. For example, with regard to the Atlantic Innovation Fund, Jane Purves, the Nova Scotian Minister of Education, was

… concerned that the board overseeing the money has members connected to Newfoundland’s Memorial University, while there are no members from a Nova Scotia university. “Potentially… the point of view would be tilted towards Newfoundland as opposed to Nova Scotia or even New Brunswick or P.E.I.” (Jackson 2001)

The zero sum mentality appears to have existed in the North East as well, but as the region lacked institutional voice, the zero sum game is played out locally, undermining regional solidarity. Competition within the North East is strong, and was evident in discussion with regional elites and in the manner in which debates were presented in the regional media. For example, in the build up to the government’s White Paper Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalising the English Regions, which set out the government’s plans for devolution, there was much discussion in the regional press as to the location of the Assembly headquarters. It was feared Newcastle would dominate the Assembly, and when it came to the actual referendum, Liberal Democrat and ‘Yes’ campaigner Cllr Ron Beadle, stated that the yes side found this very difficult to overcome (interview 2005). As stated in The Journal:

The choice of Durham as regional capital will be seen as an attempt to avert rivalry between the major population centres of Tyneside, Wearside and Teeside over the location of the new body. (The Journal Sep 23 2003)

As Britain is a part of the European Union, factors external to the state forced the region to compete for regional funding grants as proposals for regional funding
needed to be made in a regional context (Stewart 1997: 140-1). As Sir Jeremy Beecham, leader of Newcastle Council from 1977 to 1994 and Chair of the Labour Party in 2005-6, stated:

It is high time we moved towards a less centralized system of government and one in which the regions have a proper role. This is especially important in applying for funds from Europe, which places great emphasis on the regions. (in Young 1990)

Regional devolution campaigners recognized that with devolution there would be no corresponding increase in funds, but they felt this was not necessary to increase the economic performance of the region. According to Brian Hall of the Campaign for a North East Assembly:

Of course, we need funding, but our whole history is littered with innovation and adaptation. An assembly would help realise that energy in terms of, for example, encouraging small business centres and firms with North East roots, taking away some of the headaches we see every month when firms with no headquarters move away” (Northern Echo 16 Dec 2002)

Hall believed there was more to an elected regional assembly than merely a voice asking for money. Yet these types of arguments, because they dealt with complex issues of strategy and growth, were countered by the anti-devolution campaign’s simple “there will be no new money” argument, reinforcing the zero sum game mentality (www.northeastnocampaign.co.uk/10reasons)

Chapter Two demonstrated that in the continued re-creation of identity, territorial identities are constantly debated and redefined, demonstrating the fluidity of the concept amongst its members. As Mann (1996) notes, territorial identity exists at many levels, and while he only explicitly mentions one level below the state in his five level analysis, in reality there can be many with the local level playing an important role in shaping people’s identities. Identities in the North East were based upon many different axes, with the urban-rural divide, and to a lesser extent, inter city rivalry, playing key roles.

Regional actors may not have felt that it was impossible to create wealth, but this was difficult to communicate to the electorate. This was best explained by the president of the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (AIMS), who highlighted this communication problem in relation to the debates surrounding natural gas in Nova
Scotia (Crowley Interview 2006). When Nova Scotia sells its natural gas, the overall net worth of the province does not change, it is merely transformed from oil wealth into currency. Yet if federal transfer payments are reduced by the same amount to Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia’s net worth decreases as a result. This is a complex issue which is difficult to explain to voters, who simply perceive Nova Scotia as becoming materially better off.

While the zero-sum logic was used by Nova Scotian actors to demand more resources, the logic could be turned on them. Building upon the competition model of intergovernmental relations mentioned earlier, central elites used the zero-sum logic against the province, arguing that the province was trying to deflect blame; ACOA should not be used as the scapegoat for the Nova Scotia government’s inability to attract inward investment to the province, says Cape Breton the Sydney’s MP Russell MacLellan (Liberal) “MP Alarmed as ACOA used as scapegoat” Cape Breton Post (1992) Nov 2

From this discussion on the relationship between the regions and the centre, one sees that regional actors in the North East and Nova Scotia felt the need to gain greater control over their regions. This control focused on government accountability in the North East and on financial independence in Nova Scotia. Yet it must be noted that in Nova Scotia there are two levels of government which can point fingers at each other, whereas in the North East while the RDA could take some responsibility for regional failure in theory, in practice its lack of power and undemocratic nature meant that only the central government could be held accountable. Actors in the North East did not appear to realize that regional levels of democracy can be used against the region by actors outside of it. Elites did not think that the average Nova Scotian cared what level of government delivered public services, as long as they were delivered, but it was important to Nova Scotian elites that they work towards lessening the federal government’s role in the delivery of services in the province. Accordingly, their discourse focused on what was good for the region, not what was good for the state. In both regions actors felt they lacked the power to chart their own course within the nation, and the central government lacked either the will or the capacity to properly manage the affairs of the region. While regional elites were not
always in favour of more power for the region, they focused on doing what was best for the region, highlighting the elite nature of these concerns.

**Neglect and Representation: Perceptions of Regional Elites**

In their submission to the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed Canada, the leaders of the three parties in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly noted that “the principle concern of most Nova Scotians and most Canadians is without any doubt the economy” (Cameron et al. 1992: 2). Nearly a decade later, the economy was still seen as the major concern of Nova Scotia, with Premier Hamm stating “Linguistic and cultural issues are not the greatest threat to the Canadian federation right now; it is the inability of the country to share the wealth from coast to coast” (in Simpson 2000).

Similarly, what drew the most attention (and ire) in the North East was the funding formula for Scotland: the Barnett Formula. In elite discourse The Barnett Formula existed on two levels; 1) administratively where the funding of certain territorial functions of state administration (i.e. health care, education, transport, etc.) is divided between the constituent nations of Britain, and 2) symbolizing the unequal treatment of the different parts of Britain. In England, and the North East in particular, it was seen as a way for Scotland to receive more funding than its per capita population allegedly deserved;

Campaign for the English Regions against unfair funding formula that benefits Scotland against the North East, and the post of Scottish Secretary. They claim funding should be based on need, not nationality. (The Journal Jan 14 2002)

In essence, while constitutional issues may have been at the forefront in both regions, political actors did not appear to believe that constitutional issues were what mattered most to the electorate. Rather, a theme that ran throughout the debates, was how political discussions inevitably had an impact on the regional economies.

Peripheries are outside of the daily lived experiences of elites at the centre. Using the same logic as Hearn (2007) and Cohen (1996), which demonstrated how regional actors interpret their regions through a regional lens, as central elites in Canada and Britain go about their daily business they experience the Canada and Britain of the centre. This leads to feelings of neglect amongst segments of the
population in the North East and Nova Scotia as their experiences are not reflected in central decision making. In Nova Scotia, provincial elites expressed views that the centre treats them as second class citizens:

[I]t suggests the richer members of our Canadian family are out of touch with their poorer relations” (Premier Savage in Whyte 1996)

…Nova Scotians believe that one of the rights of Canadian citizenship is the ability to expect that generally, there will be a common level of services from coast to coast. Otherwise, we are threatened with becoming several different countries – in fact, if not in name. (Premier MacLellan HA 1998 p1062)

The principle of equality of citizens and provinces advanced in Chapter Five is prominent within this discourse, embodying the belief that every Canadian should receive the same level of care regardless of address. This avoids what is known in Britain as a ‘post-code lottery;' that the standard of service one receives is different depending on where one lives. These examples indicate the concept of undifferentiated citizenship expressed by elites in the centre was used by Nova Scotian elites to advance regional interests.

Due to its relative poverty, Nova Scotia has traditionally been thought of as an ally of the federal government in inter-governmental negotiations (Finbow 1994: 465), yet after the 1997 federal election the Liberal Party of Canada went from having all but one of Atlantic Canada’s seats to having no seats in Nova Scotia. Under Prime Minister Chrétien, the federal government imposed substantial cuts to provincial transfer and equalization payments, increasing the tension between the federal government and the provinces (James and Lusztig 2002: 94), leading to the poor electoral performance of the governing Liberals (Cutler 2002: 348). Nova Scotians felt particularly hard hit by federal reforms of transfer payments and the Canadian Health and Social Transfer (CHST) after 1995. According to Alexa McDonough (interview 2006), former leader of both the Nova Scotia and federal New Democratic Party, these budgets were especially hard on the province. As one columnist put it:

The voter backlash against the government came in the wake of the severe spending cuts imposed by a deficit driven agenda that resulted in military base closures, drastic changes to the unemployment insurance system and the implementation of extensive user fees. (Underhill 2000)
This suggests that MPs in Nova Scotia needed to be concerned with the electorate, with the high turnover of MPs in Nova Scotia markedly different from the state of democracy in the North East. Yet while democracy in Nova Scotia and the North East is different, both are embedded within democratic states, the regions are represented in central institutions—Members of Parliament come from both regions. Literature from Canada shows that regional differences were historically managed by ensuring regional representation in the federal cabinet. According to Bakvis (1991), this tradition died away as the focus moved away from the cabinet and towards federal-provincial bargaining; yet as noted above, some MLAs still felt that regional ministers acted as provincial representatives in the cabinet.

Provincial governments appeared to provide voice to regional concerns. The centre was seen as something that could be called upon or lobbied by regional actors, and party competition attempted to demonstrate who could most effectively use provincial voice;

During its first mandate, a PC Government will enhance employment opportunities by … aggressively pursuing a federal commitment to upgrade the Port of Halifax to accommodate “Post-Panamax”57 shipping, modernize the Halifax International Airport and ensure year-round commercial ferry links are available to move our products to market. (Nova Scotia PC 1998: 5)

Once again, the federal government was seen as playing an important role in service provision in the region, and it was argued that the federal government should not cut back on this role. Indeed, not only did the Nova Scotia PCP encourage federal action within the province, it was willing to use provincial ‘voice’ to encourage it. This situation was not unique, as argued by Nova Scotia Liberals leader Wayne Gaudet:

I am sure that our government would not want Ottawa to be allowed to download its responsibilities to the provinces and territories over having no federal role in health care… I believe that Nova Scotians need better networking and co-operation between the provinces and between the provinces and the federal government. Our challenge as a nation and as a province is to develop the ability to rapidly respond to a constantly changing world and country. This has become the first condition for growth and progress. (HA Deb 9 May 2001 p2969)

57 Panamax shipping refers to the maximum size of ship that could pass through the Panama Canal; post-Panamax shipping refers to the increase in ship size after the planned expansion of the Panama Canal.
While theoretically providing Nova Scotia with two sets of political elites to advance its interests, this also allowed actors at different levels to point fingers at each other, as indicated above. In the North East, it was a different case.

The role of MPs from Scotland and England differed slightly due to the nature of the state. English MPs represented their constituencies, but also their class and party. Scottish MPs were also able to represent Scotland in a way which English MPs could not represent England or English regions (Harvie 1991). MPs in English regions do not have institutions they can appeal to or work with, in the way the Scottish MPs had the Scottish Office (Harvie 1991: 107).

Accordingly, North East elites felt that their region was neglected and lacking voice. The point made by Byrne (1992) resonates throughout the discussion on the North East, namely that neglect of the region is due to the way that electoral and party competition evolved, creating a situation where Labour could not lose and the Conservatives could not win. As stated by North East Conservative MP Peter Aitken (Hexham):

I don’t think the Prime Minister wants to lose an election in those two areas which have so many marginal seats so close to a General Election. It probably doesn’t matter to him so much what happens in the North East where there are not that many marginal seats. It’s a case of political opportunism (Jacobs 2004)

Neil Herron, leader of the unofficial ‘no’ campaign, wondered why, given a great number of Ministers come from the region, it is not more prominent in central decision-making; displaying regret over the lack of regional voice even though he opposed regional level devolution (interview 2006). Given that parties were able to bypass the region suggests minister’s constituencies may be irrelevant if it is a safe seat. Ministers from the North East were not expected to adopt a regional mandate in the manner of Canadian Cabinet ministers.

The low priority given to regional representation in England was most notable in the resignations of Joyce Quin, MP for Gateshead East and Washington West and Chris Mullin, the international development minister and MP for Sunderland South.

58 Now Baroness Quin. She announced her intention to stand for the regional assembly upon stepping down from Westminster.
Both resigned from government positions to better campaign for the interests of the region from the back benches:

I am hoping to speak up on issues affecting the region and basically adding my support for the cause. I think that would be more valuable than doing another ministerial job. (Quin in Journal Jun 12 2001)

At the time of writing, no Labour MP had responded to requests for an interview, but from what the regional media portrayed, regional MPs who did act in the region’s interests were not able to make inroads. Amongst devolution supporters the ability to express regional voice through the Cabinet and devolved institutions was something they aspired to;

Scotland and Wales not only have their own democratic governments but their own Cabinet ministers to make the case for continued preferential funding arrangements and public investment. The fact that the North East has neither is one of the main reasons why, under the iniquitous Barnett Formula, public spending per head is still higher in Scotland than in this region (The Journal Nov 13 2002)

In both regions actors expected ‘fair’ treatment from the central government, and this section illustrated the sense of neglect felt in the regions and the frustration of regional representatives at the weakness of their regional voice. However, elites in both Nova Scotia and the North East did not appeal to a separate regional identity in central-regional relations, but to a sense of fairness that would ensure that all citizens were treated equally. While elites in Nova Scotia were more explicit in outlining a pan-national view of citizenship and the state, the discussion on regional devolution with regard to Scotland indicated a similar concept of equal citizenship on both sides of the border. The pan-national identity advanced by provincial elites in Nova Scotia appears to have had two key points: 1) all citizens are equal and deserving of equality of state services regardless of residence; 2) as Canada is a federation, equality of citizenry was expressed alongside equality of provinces; all provinces should have equal access to resources to ensure that they could treat their citizens in the same manner. In quasi-federal Britain, this was expressed in a quasi-equality of regions and nations. This is very much in keeping within the boundaries of debate

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59 One Labour activist and member of the ‘Yes’ campaign explained that this was understandable; given that devolution was a Labour manifesto promise that was decisively defeated in the region, Labour MPs would be unwilling to discuss it.
established in Chapter Five. In both regions actors stated economic issues mattered most, yet it is important to note that it was constitutional debates, ostensibly initiated in reaction to sub-state nationalism (as part of larger debates between the majority and minority nations), which allowed these issues to be brought forward. Accordingly, the next section deals with how Quebec and Scotland are framed in Nova Scotia and the North East.

6.3 The Sub-State Nation as Other

A simple relationship does not exist between the centre and the region, determining the way Nova Scotian and North Eastern elites articulated their demands; Quebec and Scotland also have important roles to play. In both states questions of accommodation of the minority brought the nature of the state into focus. In Chapter Five it was suggested that Quebec and Scotland had a major impact on how national identity amongst political actors at the centre was mobilized. This section investigates the role played by the minority nations in shaping regional discussion, becoming ‘others’ within the regions as well as providing examples for regional elites to emulate.

‘Othering’ is the process whereby a territory outside one’s own becomes a reference used in defining ‘us.’ Quebec and Scotland can be seen as ‘others’ to Nova Scotia and the North East, although neither Quebecois nor Scottish elites attempt to influence their neighbours. Nevertheless, Quebec and Scotland influenced their neighbours in two major ways; 1) forcing their agendas on the central government, and 2) providing a discursive tool-kit for other regions. The argument against special treatment was prevalent in debates in Nova Scotia vis-à-vis Quebec’s constitutional place; it was argued that constitutional recognition of Quebec’s distinctiveness was acceptable as long as provinces remained equal and it was recognized that French and English languages existed throughout Canada (Nova Scotia 1991: 20-22). A willingness to accept Quebec’s uniqueness without letting that uniqueness become a basis for granting Quebec additional powers is a view common throughout Canada (Mendelsohn 2002: 76). Nova Scotian elites often looked at ways to ensure that Quebec did not receive a disproportionate amount of power. Quebecois demands to
radically change the Canadian federation could be seen as a direct challenge to the equality of citizens argument advanced in Nova Scotia.

The importance to Nova Scotia of Quebec remaining in Canada cannot be emphasized enough; the geographic position of Quebec between Atlantic Canada and the rest of Canada means that if Quebec separated from Canada “geography alone will cause us to be isolated and cut off” according to former PC Leader Terry Donahoe (Smith 1995). The economic ramifications would be an economic disaster for Nova Scotia and Atlantic Canada. Our concerns about the economy now would be nothing compared to our concerns about an economy destabilized by Quebec separating from Canada” (Cameron et al. 1992: 5).

Finbow (1995: 71) refers to this as the “Bangledeshization” of Canada. In this sense, Quebec was a threat to the region, and as indicated by Colley (1992), a threatening other is extremely useful in engendering a sense of ‘us.’

Although Quebec separatism posed an implicit challenge to the region, with Quebec acting as an internal other (MacKay 1999), Quebec could also be seen as a powerful ally to Nova Scotia in dealing with the central government. As noted in an editorial in the Chronicle Herald;

While Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty is insisting that any new transfers to the provinces be done on a strictly per capita basis; Quebec Premier Jean Charest will be looking for an expansion in equalization, because Quebec would then get a bigger share of the pie. And for Mr Harper, the key to winning a majority in the next election is winning seats the Bloc Quebecois now hold. So he will be keen to make Mr Charest happy. Nova Scotia and Newfoundland must hope Mr Charest is successful in insisting that some of the new money goes into equalization, and keep our throats clear so we are ready to scream like banshees if the Ontario boys try to monkey with our offshore deals. (“Election changed the water on the equalization beans” May 6, 2006)

As the boundary between Scotland and England is ancient, there is little cultural spill-over from Scotland in the North East, except perhaps for the interesting case of Berwick upon Tweed (see Kiely et al. 2000). Nova Scotia, however, is home to a small community of French Canadians, Acadians, who may have seen Quebec as a possible ally in the preservation of their cultural distinctiveness. While making up a small percentage of the population, about 4%, the Acadians had a large impact on
how Nova Scotians perceived themselves. Within Nova Scotia, Acadian communities struggle for recognition to keep their culture vibrant, resulting in a great deal of accommodation within the province. This was seen in the vast number of Acadian submissions to the Nova Scotia Select Committee on National Unity. Even in communities with no French Canadians, it was recognized that the Acadians are part of their cultural legacy. Even though Acadians no longer live there Bill Casey MP highlighted the Acadian legacy of his constituency (Cumberland-Colchester-Musquodoboit Valley) (Interview 2006). The importance of the Acadian community to Nova Scotia was further emphasized by the joint submission, mentioned previously, made by all three party leaders;

The coexistence of two great linguistic communities, the French-speaking and the English-speaking communities, is a fundamental characteristic of Canada. Nova Scotians are particularly aware of how interconnected the two communities have been throughout our long history, from the time the Acadians first settled on these shores in 1605 (Cameron et al. 1992: 4).

According to Paul Comea, Executive Director of Fédération Acadienne de la Nouvelle-Ecosse, Acadian elites were, “concerned that the rights we have earned in this country with a lot of hard work over the last 25 years will be affected. We are concerned about language policies” (Mellor 1995). This concern was echoed by Frank Sutherland, president of the Richmond PC Association who stated:

there are few illusions in this neck of the woods about long-term survival of bilingualism if Quebec withdraws from the federation. So Nova Scotian Acadians who live under perpetual threat of assimilation have a high stake in the latest round of unity discussions (1998).

Not only was it felt that Acadians needed Quebec for their survival, there appeared to be broad elite consensus that the small Acadian community was integral to the identity of Nova Scotia. According to Diana Whalen (Interview 2006) Acadians “are a part of Nova Scotia” (interview 2006), while the Minister for the Environment and Labour, Mark Parent, (interview 2006) made a point of mentioning special ridings were created to ensure Acadian representation in the House of Assembly. Former Speaker of the House of Assembly, Arthur Donahoe (interview 2006) stated that Acadians were an important part of the province’s makeup. In this sense, Quebec as an ally to the Acadians and their culture is important to Nova
Scotian elites in general, who see French Canadian culture as part and parcel of a bilingual and multicultural Nova Scotia, which is similar to broader Canadian views of the place of French in Canada (Kymlicka 2001: 263). Quebec was framed as a fellow French speaking jurisdiction without using hierarchical language, contributing to the conceptualization of a bi-lingual pan-national Canadian state. While elites attempted to protect French in Nova Scotia, it was not in isolation from larger debates on the protection of language in the rest of the federation.

As noted earlier, ‘in’ groups require ‘out’ groups. Labour created the institutions in the North East that helped create ‘us’ and reinforced the institutions of an easily accessible ‘them:’ Scotland. As indicated in Chapter Five, if Scotland is part of Britain in a similar way to the North East, then the logic indicates that the North East should be treated in the same manner as Scotland. This is not to say that there is an outcry of public support either for a repeal of the Scottish Parliament or further devolution in England, as public opinion in England accepts asymmetrical devolution (Trench 2005: 7). However, complaints, mostly within the Conservative ranks, ranged from Scottish devolution being unfair to the English, to asymmetrical devolution being an inherently bad constitutional framework. Yet there appears to be little evidence of antagonism towards Scottish and Welsh devolution in England (Curtice 2005 133), instead the antagonism is targeted towards special treatment or favour. North Eastern elites were aware of the different institutional arrangements that existed in Scotland influencing North Eastern discourse in at least two distinct ways; 1) Labour created an institution in the Scottish Parliament that was far from the thoughts of the majority of the English, but which was visible in the North East; and, 2) The Scottish Parliament’s legislative powers allowed policy divergence north and south of the Border.

In the North East there was a fear of Southern domination, which they felt Scotland could help offset. As such, regional elites saw Scotland as an ally, and wanted to avoid conflict with it. As stated by Robin Beveridge, principal policy officer at the North East Assembly with regards to a regional blueprint known as *Bridging the Gap*:

*Bridging the Gap* started life as a potential attack on the Barnett Formula but we realised that wasn't what we wanted to do… Attacking Barnett would get
us into a fight with potential colleagues in Scotland and Wales. And just asking for more money is not a positive message. (The Journal Assembly under fire on formula Jan 17 2002).

Scotland was both a positive and a negative example, used rhetorically by regional actors in the North East to forward their agenda. Anti-devolution campaigners portrayed devolution as having failed in Scotland, with the costs of the Scottish Parliament building playing a prominent role in referendum literature. Even positive media coverage presented the costs of the Parliament building negatively;

An elected North East regional assembly would use existing municipal buildings in a bid to avoid a repeat of the 400 million pound Scottish Parliament “fiasco”. According to Brian Hall of the Campaign for a North East Assembly (No plans to build costly assembly headquarters The Journal Sep 24 2003)

Sub-state nations could be portrayed in both a positive and negative light, as different actors choose to highlight different aspects of the sub-state nation. This is not surprising; as identities are both multi-faceted and constantly changing, there will be different aspects of the ‘other’s’ perceived identity for ‘us’ to focus on. In this sense, the Newcastle Journal was prophetic in its prediction of how the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ campaigns would pick out both the positive and negative aspects of devolution during the referendum;

If the Welsh Assembly is regarded by the “yes” camp as something to aspire to, the Scottish Parliament is seen by the “no” camp as proof of its drawbacks. (Lindford and Higgerson The Journal Feb 27 2004)

It appears that in the minds of many, the Scottish Parliament as a political institution became synonymous with the Scottish Parliament building. The conclusion drawn by those opposed to devolution in the North East was not that the North East did not have enough power, but that Scotland had too much. This was seen when Conservative Martin Callanan above argued that the Scots should be restrained. The concern about restraining the Scots is not new; keeping the institutional power of Scotland in check would ensure that the Scottish would not have the capacity to drown out the North East. But North Eastern pro-devolution elites abandoned this tactic in the 1990s. Instead elites adopted a strategy of emulating devolution in Scotland and Wales, what one observer comparing the Spanish and British cases
termed “Tea for All” (Giordano and Roller 2004): in Spain the term “Café para todas” is used to describe the asymmetrical constitutional arrangements in which the historic nationalities lead the way but devolution is available to all—coffee for everyone.

Although the issues presented in the North East and Nova Scotia were different, the underlying complaints were similar, the economic relationships between the sub-state nations and the regions were unbalanced, as such regional elites attempted to rebalance them. In both cases there appeared to be a sense of competing for limited resources, which adds more weight to the zero-sum game mentioned previously.

Not all negative discussion on the sub-state nations revolved around economic issues. Returning to the Acadians of Nova Scotia, they felt themselves “to be distinct from the French Canadians in Quebec” (Muise 1998), that Quebec did not offer them support to maintain their language (Rioux 1998). This lack of support extended to a lack of recognition of the unique Acadian culture, as former Progressive Conservative MLA Guy Leblanc stated:

> We are different from many other francophones outside Quebec. We are an isolated French community and we have survived with our culture, our language, our joie de vivre and our sense of nationalism… We don’t want, and it is not the Acadian way, to shun the Anglophone community. This is what we have often seen in Quebec and Acadians do not want to see this happen in their communities. (HA 13 Jan 1998 p13)

This lack of recognition strengthened the sense of Acadian distinctiveness within the larger French Canadian communities, as Suzanne Dugas, president of the Clare Citizens’ Group told the Nova Scotia Special Select Committee on National Unity:

> In Clare, the Acadians are being branded as francophones outside Quebec and this is not true representation of the Acadian heritage… [T]he Quebec people are trying to instil their values on the Acadians. The Quebec people have their values and the Acadians have their values. Some of them may be the same but some of them are not. (Dugas HA 13 Jan 1998 p13)

According to Resnick (1990:5), recognition is a two way street and, accordingly, Quebec’s lack of recognition of the uniqueness of other French speaking communities was perceived to be problematic. As competition existed between different levels of

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60 Clare is an Acadian community in Nova Scotia.
government (Simeon 2006b), this lack of recognition may have been a spill-over from intergovernmental competition between Canada and Quebec vis-à-vis the French language. Some representatives of the Acadian community in Nova Scotia felt as if the Quebecois were abandoning them and their distinct heritage. According to Henri-Dominique Paratte of the Conseil consultatif de l'École R.C. Gordon:

[T]he rhetoric of people like Jacques Parizeau has convinced people in Canada that there is indeed such a thing as English Canada as a total bloc. There isn’t. There are in Canada [outside Quebec] about 1 million francophones, that is more than the francophone number in Switzerland. So even if Quebec separated tomorrow, Canada as such has a number of French-speaking people that is probably larger than some of Canada’s provinces. This is an important element. (Paratte HA SSCNU 12 Jan 1998 Pg54-5)

This emphasizes the pan-national outlook of the Acadians with regard to the French language, whereas Quebec was “turning its back” on fellow French speakers. This challenges Quebec’s claim for distinctiveness, as the Acadians themselves are included in a pan-national French speaking population.

While there is no parallel to the Acadians in the North East, there are some key similarities in both regions. There appears to be the perception that the sub-state nations were acting with little or no regard for their neighbours. In both cases the sub-state nation was presented as an ‘other’ and a threat to ‘us.’ One can see how the actions of the sub-state nations were interpreted as having a negative impact on their neighbouring regions. Yet even though Quebec and Scotland’s actions were not always viewed as favourable in Nova Scotia and the North East, they were seen as being effective at getting their ‘voice’ heard. As a result, it is not surprising that some regional actors believe that the region should emulate the sub-state nations.

Emulation

As discussed in Chapter Two, diffusion is a process whereby ideas from one jurisdiction permeate borders (both intellectual and physical) and are taken up by other jurisdictions (O’Loughlin et al. 1998, Starr 1991, or Eyestone 1977). Elites in Nova Scotia and the North East saw in Quebec and Scotland examples of successful sub-state territorial agitation. If regional actors interpreted the sub-state nations as
being advantaged, they may have attempted to employ the strategies put forward by these two nations.

In the North East regional elites could model their movement on a successful Scottish one, but there were no substantive institutional differences for Nova Scotia to aspire to. Nova Scotia already had the same (constitutional) powers as Quebec; yet there was a desire to emulate Quebec’s ability to project its voice. This was explicitly stated by former Liberal Premier of Nova Scotia, Vince MacLean (1991) who, as Leader of the Opposition, stated “[I]t was impressive to see, hear and feel how committed Quebec is about what it wants for its future. Nova Scotia must begin to articulate its desires for the future with the same conviction.” Former Conservative Premier John Hamm stated nearly the same thing when he was Leader of the Opposition:

The premier has got to be encouraged to stand up and speak for Nova Scotians – because if he doesn’t, who does? … I hear other premiers making statements across the country which are putting forth provincial interest. Somebody has to give the provincial interest for Nova Scotia (in Hays 1995)

It became apparent that it was not the capacity for voice but the will to use voice that Nova Scotian elites felt should be emulated. As Nova Scotia has the same institutional capacity as Quebec, the above quotes indicate that premiers (appear) to lack the will to use it. This is particularly interesting as it is the democratic competition between Premiers and Leaders of the Opposition that encouraged them to act in this way, but while the premiers are encouraged to ‘speak up’ for Nova Scotia, this discourse is noticeably bounded within a loyalty to the Canadian state and nation. This limit on voice was clearly demonstrated in 1990, when the threat of Quebecois separatism was high. Premier John Buchanan pondered the future of Nova Scotia if Quebec seceded the federation: “There are only three alternatives… one, that the Atlantic Provinces form our own country; two, that we continue in a geographically fractured country; or three, join the United States.” (Underhill 1990) Within days the Premier was in front of the House of Assembly, reaffirming his loyalty to Queen and Country;

I am and always have been a fervent Nova Scotian and an ardent Canadian. I have always been and continue to be a supporter of the great federal system
and parliamentary democracy under the Queen, known as Canada. (in Fenduck and Morrison 1990)

Intellectually, one can understand why he broached the issue of Nova Scotia outside Canada, but the response emphasized the embedded nature of the region is so strong that challenges to it are simply not tolerated.

While Nova Scotia has the ability to use its voice, voice is aspired to in the North East. Upon joining the North East Development Agency Bill Midgley, a senior North East business figure, stated:

Next year the Scots will have their own elected parliament fighting for their interests. We have no elected body to champion the interest of the North East, yet that is precisely what we have needed over the past year… (Linford 1998)

Again Scotland was being used as an example to follow. As it was felt that the Scottish Parliament would give voice to Scotland, regional actors looked to Scotland and saw that ‘they’ had something that ‘we’ did not. In turn, these actors attempted to emulate Scotland in the hopes of creating a greater capacity for regional voice.

For regional devolution supporters, the example of Scotland became a tool that could be used to fight for devolution while avoiding talking down the region; they could turn the debate into one about fairness and the ability to compete with Scotland. In this sense, the experiences of the devolution lobby in Scotland became a blueprint for the devolution lobby in the North East. As noted by Don Price, the North East Constitutional Convention’ joint co-ordinator (Tighe 1999), the Convention was explicitly modelled on the Scottish one, complete with a clergyman (the Bishop of Durham) to lead it. Devolution supporters in the North East expected devolution in Scotland and Wales to quickly produce results. According to Gill Hale, member of the (unelected) North East Assembly:

I am convinced that once the benefits start rolling in for Scotland and Wales, the pressure will increase further in the North East for the people here to take much more control over our own lives (The Journal 1999)

Not only was Scotland seen in a positive light economically, but it was seen as a progressive example for the region to follow. For example Jane Thomas, secretary of the Campaign for the English regions stated:

We are very encouraged by the lead shown in Scotland, Wales and London. Their experience demonstrates that where power is devolved down to
inclusive democratically elected institutions, the position of women is transformed (The Journal 2002)

Although Curtice (2006, 2005) and Trench (2005) argue that devolution in Scotland was not something that the English paid attention to, this was not the case, at least at an elite level, in the North East.

Building upon the sense of neglect felt in the regions this section examined how debates centred on the division of power in the two states coupled with discussions on how to ‘fairly’ divide power between the centre and the sub-state nations, as well as the regions. This section demonstrated that Quebec and Scotland had a relationship with Nova Scotia and the North East, although as Stairs (1996) indicates, this relationship was inadvertent from the perspective of the sub-state nations. From the perspective of the sub-state nations these discussion took place between themselves and the centre, but there was a spill-over to their neighbouring regions and regional elites became involved in discussions about organizing the state in a way that was fair to all citizens. This allowed the sub-state nations to be seen as internal others, acting as allies for actors within the regions as well as competitors to be emulated.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter examined debates within the North East of England and Nova Scotia to determine how regional identity was politicized during periods of heightened nationalist agitation. The evidence presented indicates a complex relationship between the centre and the peripheries, the region and the sub-state nation, and within the regions themselves. By looking at how regional elites interpreted the structure of these relationships, a better understanding of the interplay between institutions and identity in the North East and Nova Scotia was achieved.

Institutions played a key role in the articulation of regionalism in a number of ways. The first section demonstrated how the institutional arrangements of the British and Canadian states exacerbated the peripheral nature of the two regions. While geography ensured that both regions remained peripheral, regional actors felt their regions lacked the institutional framework to advance regional interest. In both
cases regional elites demanded change and examples were provided by the minority nations. Quebec and Scotland became ‘internal others’ to Nova Scotia and the North East, not only challenging the conception of the state held by regional actors, but presenting economic threats through secessionist demands. The theme of ‘voice’ was prominent in the discourse in both Nova Scotia and the North East. While the North East did not have the institutional capacity for ‘voice’ that Nova Scotia did, it did not change the fact that in both regions actors felt there was not an effective use of regional voice. In the North East there was a demand for new institutions modelled after ones in Scotland (a dedicated Minister, an elected Assembly, etc.); in Nova Scotia actors looked to Quebec and saw a louder voice. Although Nova Scotia’s capacity for voice is just as great (in a legal-constitutional sense) as Quebec’s, the highest ranking politicians in Nova Scotia still felt that Nova Scotia was not making its voice heard.

This suggests that institutional capacity is not the sole requirement for effective voice; capacity has to be combined with the willingness to use it. Given that both the North East and Nova Scotia are firmly embedded in their respective nations, the political ability to use this voice may be constrained. This was most clearly demonstrated when the Premier of Nova Scotia publicly pondered the future of Nova Scotia, and presented the options of leaving Canada or joining the United States.

The role of sub-regional communities was threaded throughout these discussions, indicating that sub-regional inter-community conflict and loyalties were powerful political forces in Nova Scotia and the North East. This suggests that while there was a definite sense of ‘us’ in both Nova Scotia and the North East, there was a great deal of debate internal to the regions as to the nature of ‘us.’

It appears that a sense of ‘peripherality’ was an important component of regional identity mobilization, and that the existence of vocal sub-state nationalism within the state structure provided an encouraging political environment for mobilization, as sub-state nationalism challenged the status quo and opened up debate on fundamental questions on the nature of the state. Due to internal debates within the regions, which are not a primary focus of loyalty, the regions were unable to effectively use their capacity for voice.
This chapter substantiates the argument that nationalist agitation helps shape the political environment in a favourable way for regional identity mobilization. During the period of heightened agitation from Quebec and Scotland, regional actors in both Canada and Britain also campaigned vigorously for their regional viewpoints. While these two events may be unrelated, this chapter has shown how the relationship between the majority and minority nations within Canada and Britain has influenced regional discourses. In the North East, regional actors were explicit in their emulation of Scottish devolution, both the end result and the manner in which it came about. In Nova Scotia, elites were also clear about emulating the ability of Quebecois elites to make their voice heard. The fact that Nova Scotia’s ability to use its voice is immense compared to the North East did not stop elites there from attempting to increase it. It is clear that the changed political environment provided by nationalist agitation shaped the manner in which regional elites articulated their views and regionalism manifested itself. Yet due to the fact Nova Scotia and the North East are embedded in Canada (outside Quebec) and England, the opportunities were clearly bounded within the national discourse of these two majority nations, constraining the ability of regional elites and the direction regionalism could take.
Chapter Seven: Survey Analysis in Canada and Britain

7.1 Introduction

During British parliamentary debates regarding regional devolution in England, Eric Pickles, anti-regional devolution Conservative Member of Parliament for Brentwood and Ongar, argued that the people of England do not live in regions, they “live in counties, towns, and villages” (HC 26 Nov 2002 C268). This is a key argument made by those who oppose regional devolution. On the one hand it is factually incorrect as every citizen of England does, in fact, live in a GOR. Yet on the other hand, Pickles seems to imply that living in a region needs to be something more than a mere geographical fact, living also implies a meaningful experience of the region as well identifying with it. If the people of England lack these, then the argument made by Pickles, and other opposed to regional devolution, would be true.

The last two chapters examined how regional and national elites in Nova Scotia and the North East attempted to appeal to people’s sense of regional identity in advancing their policy objectives. Yet regionalism must be more than an elite phenomenon for it to be a meaningful expression of identity. Accordingly, this chapter examines public opinion in North East England and Nova Scotia to determine how citizens conceive of their region, nation, and state to confirm whether the elite debate examined in Chapters Five and Six resonated with the masses. This chapter uses data collected from the British Social Attitudes Surveys (BSA) from 1991 to 2005, the North East portion of the Regional Referendum Study 2004 (completed between November 2004 and February 2005), Environics Focus Canada (EFC) surveys from 1990 to 2005, and the Canadian Election Studies (CES) of 1993 to 2005.61

The first section examines identity in Nova Scotia and the North East to establish if there was a) a strong sense of regional identity, b) a variation between the regions and their co-nationals vis-à-vis regional identity, and c) a relationship between regional and national identities. Finding evidence of regionalism at a mass level requires first that the masses hold a sense of regional identity. The second section considers whether people in the North East and Nova Scotia had a sense of

61 Including the 1992 Referendum, which is embedded within the 1993 election study.
regional political efficacy by examining the political context and environment of Nova Scotia and the North East of England. It utilizes Hirschman’s (1970) concepts of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ to determine if a) respondents felt their voice was heard in the political system; and, b) whether they withdrew from the political process if they felt that it was not. The final section explores how people in Nova Scotia and the North East interpret the place of Quebec and Scotland within Canada and Britain, to gain an understanding of how the ongoing dialectical relationship between the majority and minority nation is perceived within these two peripheral regions of the staatsvolk.

A quick methodological note is required concerning the use of survey data here. Not all questions were asked in each survey set, and as the states under study administer their regions in fundamentally different ways—one is a federal system and the other is unitary—certain questions only pertain to one of the regions. As such, the majority of the comparisons in this chapter are made with similar questions in an attempt to reveal underlying attitudes and behaviours. An unfortunate limitation is that although a variety of survey sets were used in order to examine as many questions as possible (indeed, this chapter merely highlights a few of the key questions), not all the data sets had matching identity questions to enable correlations between respondents’ indicators of regionalism. Where possible, though, such comparisons have been conducted. In addition, where available (and where it is both useful and does not clutter the presentation of the data), the results from Quebec and Scotland are shown, allowing the reader to gain a sense of the different attitudes held by members of majority and minority sub-state nations.

An important point to address at the beginning of this chapter is in regard to the ‘n’ values, the number of respondents. Figure 7.1 displays sample years to show the total size of each survey, as well as the sample size in the regions analyzed. The data sets used similar numbers for all years, so only one year is shown here. With regard to the Regional Referendum Study, 2005 is the default year as this was the only year the survey was conducted. With regards to the sample from the other three data sets, they reflect a ‘typical’ year in the survey. As can be seen, some of the numbers in the North East in the BSA and especially Nova Scotia in both the CES
and EFC surveys are low. When subdivided into different identity categories, the numbers are reduced even further creating a challenge to analyzing the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Nova Scotia</th>
<th>Rest of Canada (outside Quebec)</th>
<th>Sample Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CES</td>
<td>3651</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>2262</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFC</td>
<td>2049</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1439</td>
<td>1999-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>North East</th>
<th>Rest of England</th>
<th>Sample Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSA Referendum Study</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CES 2000, EFC 1999-1, BSA 2001 and Referendum Study

The challenge posed by the low ‘n’ value, namely the high probability of sampling error, was met and overcome by using three complimentary methods. First the years were combined to create a ‘snapshot’, not of a single year as surveys normally produce, but of longer periods of time. This is most notable in Figure 7.18, below, in which the four EFC surveys in each year between 1990 and 1998 were added together, then each year was weighted equally and added together to produce the figure. This produced an approximate ‘n’ value in Nova Scotia of 4000—a sizable number of respondents by any means. Second the answers are displayed over time. While each of the responses in each year would be as statistically significant as one would expect for such low ‘n’ values, if the numbers are consistent, or show clear patterns at the regional level which are consistent with national ones, it suggests that the survey question is a reflection of regional opinion. This is seen in the right hand graph in Figure 7.11 below; Nova Scotia and Canada (outside Quebec) followed the same pattern over time, the key difference being the starting point. By showing both regional and national data following a similar pattern, this not only suggests that regional opinion changed in a manner consistent with the rest of Canada, it also indicates that opinion in the region was different than the rest of Canada (outside Quebec). The change over time was the same, yet the starting points were different. Third these two strategies are combined. Figure 7.13 not only allows the reader to see the changing patterns in Nova Scotia and the rest of Canada (outside Quebec), it
also gives all year averages for 1990 through to 1997. This provides the reader with a sense of change over time, while increasing the accuracy of the all year average. While none of the above measures completely overcome the challenges of the low ‘n’ values, they provide a framework for analyzing the data to address the hypothesis and research questions.

7.2 Citizenship and Identity in Nova Scotia and the North East

This section examines questions of citizens’ affinity to their region and locality, to determine if people in these regions have a stronger sense of ‘belonging’ to their regions than those in other parts of Britain and Canada, and to explore the relationship between regional and national identity. With regard to the North East, this sub-section utilizes three types of questions to assess how people perceive of their national and regional identities: 1) data taken from a question which asked people to indicate identities they felt applied to them (British, English, Scottish, Asian, European and so forth), focusing on the British and English responses; 2) the ‘Moreno’ five point scale,\(^{62}\) which allowed individuals to have varying degrees of overlapping English and British identity; and 3) questions that dealt with their regional and local communities. In the case of Nova Scotia, two methods were used to assess the strength of regional identity: 1) the three point citizenship question asked by Environics Focus Canada, which asked whether respondents felt more a citizen of Canada, their province, or both equally; and 2) by adopting Henderson’s (2007) method in recreating a Moreno style five point question by cross referencing two 100 point scales in which respondents were asked to rate their feelings towards Canada and their province. It should be noted that the wording and key identity terms were different in all the surveys, suggesting that they were testing different concepts. For example, the difference between ‘attachment’ and ‘belonging’; attachment implies a one-way relationship between the individual and the region, while belonging may imply a sense of reciprocity between the individual and the identity group.\(^{63}\) In

\(^{62}\) For more information on the “Moreno Question” see Moreno 2006.

\(^{63}\) This researcher would like to thank Prof Keith Banting of Queen’s University for pointing out this important distinction (2008, private conversation)
saying this, all survey research is limited by the questions available, and while not perfect comparisons, these questions as a whole allow for testing the strength and direction of the relationship between individuals, regional and national identities.

National Identities

Both Nova Scotia and the North East are part of larger nations; Nova Scotia is in Canada, and the North East belongs to two larger nations; England and Britain. This section examines attachment/belonging in each of the two regions vis-à-vis their larger nations to determine a) the strength of their national identity compared to that of their co-nationals, and b) in the case of the North East, which national identity is stronger. The theoretical outline presented in Chapter Two suggested that regional identities are both embedded within, and indivisible from, larger nations; they do not compete with national identities and one would not expect national identities to be weaker in regions with strong regional identities. Beginning with the North East, the graph on the left hand side of Figure 7.2 is the percentage of respondents who self identified as British; as can be seen, feelings of Britishness in the North East are similar to those found in the rest of England, and much higher than in Scotland.

Figure 7.2: Thinks of self as…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NE</th>
<th>ROE</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BSA 1996 - 2005

In Figure 7.2 English identity appears weaker than British identity in two senses. Firstly, fewer people subscribed to an English, as compared to British, identity in both England and the North East. Secondly, English identity was much more fluid than British identity, implying a weaker affinity with it. This is in sharp contrast to the relative stability of British identity. This suggests that Britishness was
more embedded within England than Englishness, and that Englishness may have required a greater stimulus, such as devolution in Scotland and Wales, to bring it to the surface. This may not be as odd as it first seems as Scotland has historically maintained distinctly Scottish institutions and has been governed through the Scottish Office and autonomous Scottish institutions, whereas the historical confusion of Britain and England is exacerbated by the fact that institutions of state in England were and are British (Greer 2007). As Bond et al. suggest, even institutions which do not consciously attempt to harness identities can do so (2003). As seen in Figure 7.2, it was after 1997, when identity was politicized by Labour’s plans for devolution, that English identity grew in strength and then tapered off. While this may make sense for England overall, in the North East it is counter-intuitive. One would imagine a region bordering Scotland would have a greater appreciation of difference between England and Scotland. People in the North East may have been more aware of differences between England and Scotland and emphasized their similarities through a British identity.

The data in Figure 7.3, in which the two national identities are examined in the context of a Moreno question (Moreno 2006), appears to contradict Figure 7.2. While noting that the years covered by Figure 7.3 are years in which English identity is strongest in Figure 7.2; Figure 7.3 indicates that when offered the opportunity to express the strength of their English and British identities in relation to each other, a majority of people in both the North East and England leaned towards English rather than British, although the vast majority felt both to some degree. An interesting point to note is that while the difference between North East and rest of England responses on either end of the table were not substantial, North Eastern respondents were more likely in all years to see themselves as being equally English and British (although if and how respondents conceptualize the difference between English and British is difficult to say, see for example Condor 2000).
In Canada the majority nation is much less clearly defined than England in Britain. While this thesis uses the term ‘Canada (outside Quebec)’ to identify this group, Canadians from outside Quebec self identify simply as Canadian (Resnick 1995: 85), and lack competing or overlapping national loyalties in the manner found in Quebec and Britain. In one sense, Canadian identity is similar to British in that both are statewide identities that remained relatively stable over time. When asked in the 1993, 1997 and 2000 CES to rate “how they feel about Canada” on a scale of 0-100, with 0 meaning that they “really dislike” Canada and 100 meaning that they “really like” Canada, the responses were extremely constant over time. In Nova Scotia the answer was 88 +/- 0.4 in all years. In the rest of Canada (outside Quebec) it was 88 +/- 4.0 in all years. The notable difference was Quebec, which was 67 +/- 3 in all years. Yet even though the response in Quebec was lower than that found in the rest of Canada, it was stable (and arguably positive towards Canada). The variance in Nova Scotia was much less than found in the rest of Canada (outside Quebec) with the overall mean feeling about Canada being very high and very constant.

Regarding national identity in both the regions and their majority nations, attachment to the overarching statewide national identity was extremely high and

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64 Each year was weighted equally as the sample sizes were so similar. The ‘+/-’ represents change over time. The same applies for the provincial attachment questions below.
stable over time. While a clear majority-national identity, such as the English one, has no obvious parallel in Canada, the fluidity of Englishness (even with its comparable levels of support to British in Figure 7.3) suggest that England and the North East were more British than English whereas strong feelings towards Canada existed throughout Canada (outside Quebec).

Regional Identities

The argument put forward at the beginning of this chapter by Conservative Eric Pickles is very relevant to the debate in England where the role of ‘region’ was highly contested. This is in sharp contrast to Canada where the pedigrees of many of the provinces are longer than that of Canada as a whole (see Smith 2002). While it may be generally given that provinces in Canada have strong identities, as Canadian constitutional debates focus on Quebec’s place within Canada and create a Canada-Quebec dichotomy, one may wonder whether this had an impact upon the identities of other provinces and the strength of provincial identity vis-à-vis Canadian. With political debate so heavily focused on the Canadian state and nation as a whole, it would be imprudent to assume that strong provincial identities existed without testing for them.

Figure 7.4 Attached to GOR and Pride in Region (%)

Figure 7.4 is particularly interesting as it demonstrates that people in the North East were very attached to their GOR, more so than the English average—even more than to their historic counties (although they still felt closer to their counties than people in other parts of England). This is especially interesting as opposition to regional government rested upon the key argument that people in England thought of
themselves as citizens of counties, cities and shires, not regions. The attachment to regions demonstrated in Figure 7.4 felt by the English in general, and North Easterners in particular, completely contradicts the assertion made by Eric Pickles at the beginning of this chapter.

It should be noted that discussion about an ‘English average’ with regard to attachment to region can be very misleading as this territorial identity is in and of itself highly territorialized. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, while the statistical average for England showed that the English do have regional identities, they are not evenly dispersed. Secondly, lack of regional identity seems to be based upon region of residence with people in the South having lower attachment to regional identities than people in the Northern regions. Those in the South East of England had the lowest attachment to their region (Bond and McCrone 2004).

While the majority of English people indicated some sort of regional attachment at a level comparable to their historic counties, the response given in regards to pride in the region, found on the right side of Figure 7.4, paints a slightly different picture. The “don’t think of self in that way” response was much greater than the “not at all close” response. While still indicating that a sizable number of people in England viewed themselves as having some level of pride in their region, it suggests a problem with the wording of the regional attachment question on the left. With regard to pride (the right hand table), respondents were given an easy way ‘out’ of being forced to identify with something that they did not identify with, unlike the questions dealing with attachment. Throughout the remainder of this chapter data is correlated against both regional attachment and regional pride as they have a strong correlation within the North East (.667 p < .005).

Moving from the North East to Nova Scotia, one sees in Figure 7.5 that the levels of attachment to provinces were remarkably high throughout Canada (and counter-intuitively, lowest in Quebec). Nova Scotians were shown to display a similar level of support to Canada as their fellow Canadians (outside Quebec). In Nova Scotia the feelings averaged at 86.7 +/- 1.2 while in the rest of Canada (outside Quebec) they averaged at 82.5 +/- 2.0. This indicates that while provincial attachment in Canada was very high, it was slightly lower than feelings towards Canada shown above (and only by the slightest of margins in Nova Scotia).
surprising result was that Quebecois had the lowest overall level of attachment to their province. As this thesis deals with territorial, as opposed to linguistic identities, these figures are not controlled for language in Quebec. Accordingly, it is conceivable that the sizable English speaking minority in Quebec pulled the numbers down.

Figure 7.5 How Respondent Feels towards Province


Relationship between Regional and National Identities

Now that it has been established that strong regional and national identities exist in both Canada (outside Quebec) and England, these must be examined in relationship to each other to address the hypothesis and research questions and determine whether or not regional identities are embedded in national ones, as is suggested in Chapter Two. In the North East and Nova Scotia regional affinity was essential for elite regional discourse to resonate with the masses. As stated in Chapter Two, the logic of ‘personal nationalism’ as outlined by Hearn (2007) and Cohen (1996) suggests that individuals’ regional identities shape their outlook on national/statewide issues. It is not important that the attachment to the region be higher than in the rest of the majority nation, merely that it be strong, as it is the strength of regional identity that provides the basis for regionalism.

In examining relative attachment in Canada, two sources of data were used. The EFC surveys, which use a three scale relative attachment question in 1990, 1991,
1994, 1996, and 1997 asking people if they were a citizen of Canada, their province, or both (one was also asked in 2000 but the format was slightly different, making comparisons impossible). These are compiled for all years in Figure 7.6 to compensate for the low ‘n’ values in Nova Scotia as outlined above. Henderson (2007), in her analysis of Quebecois identity, developed a method for turning the 0-100 scales discussed above in the 1993, 1997 and 2000 Canadian Election Surveys into a reconstructed Moreno Question by cross referencing feelings towards Canada and the respondents’ province (Figure 7.7).

Figure 7.6 Citizen of Canada, Province or Both, 1990-1997

![Citizen of Canada, Province or Both, 1990-1997 (%)](image)


Figure 7.6 indicates that Nova Scotians were less likely than those in Canada (outside Quebec) to indicate the “Canada only” position and more likely to indicate both a “citizen of province not Canada” and a “both equally” answer. What is not shown is the changing loyalties over time. In Nova Scotia, between 1990 and 1997, the response “Nova Scotia not Canada” dropped by 16.4 and “citizen of Canada” dropped by 10 while “citizen of both” increased by 20 points, resulting in a net gain in Nova Scotian citizenship of 3.6 and a net gain in Canadian citizenship of 10.

While the ‘n’ values in each year were too small to allow any meaningful conclusion to be drawn (hence the aggregate figure), it suggests an increased sense of Canadian citizenship during this period, but not at the expense of Nova Scotia citizenship.
Figure 7.7 is a reconstructed ‘Moreno Question’ using Henderson’s (2007) approach. This data is striking in that it clearly demonstrates that an overwhelming number of Canadians held attachment to both their province and the federation as a whole, strongly suggesting that they are not exclusive identities. This provides a different picture than the responses to the EFC questions, but when examined carefully, similar patterns emerge; people in Nova Scotia had a greater attachment to their province than their co-nationals in Canada (outside Quebec). The usefulness of Henderson’s method can be extended from comparing the foci of allegiance across provinces and national groupings in Canada, to testing the strength of these allegiances. In this sense, one is struck by the sheer number of responses which listed ‘100’ in both the provincial and Canadian attachment category; 24/90 in Nova Scotia and 239/2806 in Canada (outside Quebec). In Nova Scotia, the relationship between attachment to province and Canada in 1997 was .762 (p < .005) indicating that there was a very strong correlation between provincial and national identity in Nova Scotia. This is substantially higher than the (still strong) correlation of .515 (p < .005) in the

Respondents who indicated no feeling to Canada but any feeling to their province were placed in the ‘province not Canada’ category. Those who indicated a stronger feeling towards the province were placed in the ‘province greater than Canada’ category. Those who responded the same to Canada and province were placed in the Canada and province equally category. The inverse was done with regard to the other side of the Moreno scale.
rest of Canada (outside Quebec). The scores Canadians gave to both their provinces and Canada as a whole demonstrates two important details: 1) that Canadians were extremely loyal to both Canada and their province, and 2) that a sense of Canadianness did not detract from a sense of provincial identity, and vice versa.

In England, while recreating a regional Moreno Figure was not possible, correlating attachment to region and closeness to region with whether or not people identified themselves as British and English was. Questions from the 2005 Referendum Study allow for a correlation between attachment to the North East, England and Britain. Here there was a stronger correlation between attachment to the region and England (.670) than Britain (.555, both p < .005), though both are high.

Regional and National Identities in Nova Scotia and the North East

Where respondents in the North East had two national identities (British and English) as well as their regional identity, in Nova Scotia there were only two identities to be tested, the national (Canadian) and regional (Nova Scotian). While other researchers have discussed in depth the unique political cultures of Nova Scotia and the Maritimes/Atlantic Canada (See Carbert 2006, Stewart 1994, Harper and Vance 1992, Forbes 1979, and Chapter Four) and demonstrated that identities exist outside the federal/provincial formalized structure, this section has provided a framework to examine Nova Scotia as a stand alone region.66

Three key points can be deduced from the exploration of identities in the North East. First, in both the North East and England, there appeared to be a stronger and more consistent attachment to Britain than England, and this was more pronounced in the North East. Second, regional identity in the North East was much stronger than in the rest of England overall. Additionally, while regional attachment varies substantially across England, the majority of the English do possess a regional identity. Third, while the English identity appeared more strongly correlated with a regional one in the North East, this was only marginally more than with a British

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66 Due to the relatively small size of the Atlantic Canadian provinces, they are often researched as a whole instead of their constituent parts. Researchers examining individual provinces have to ‘tease out’ province specific information or rely on generalities applicable to all Maritime/Atlantic Canada.
identity. Much like the North East and England, in Nova Scotia and Canada (outside Quebec) the overarching statewide national identity was strong and constant during this period (1990-2004). Nova Scotia, like the North East, had a higher level of attachment to the province-region than was found in the rest of Canada (outside Quebec), which correlated very strongly with attachment to Canada. Being Nova Scotian and Canadian and being North Eastern and English/British were not mutually exclusive, substantiating the argument that strong regional identities within Nova Scotia and the North East do not compete with national ones.

7.3 Efficacy and Alienation

While attachment and belonging are important to this study, studying regionalism (the mobilization of regional identities) demands an exploration of the relationship between political attitudes and regional identity. This will help gauge the impact of democratic institutions on regional identity mobilization, as well as determine whether regional identity is politicized at a mass level. A lack of efficacy, the perceived ability to make change, is perhaps the key building block of identity mobilization. Indeed, returning to the hypothesis, while it may be the dialectic between majority and minority nationalism that creates the political environment, for regional elites to advance a ‘regional agenda,’ it must, in some way, resonate with the masses. As defined in Chapter One, a ‘regional agenda’ is “the mobilization of regional identity by political elites as a vehicle for their desired political outcomes.” As noted in earlier chapters, nationalism stems from grievance; this logic applies to most political mobilizations. It is difficult to conceptualize a regionalism lacking a core belief that the region somehow lacks power, voice, or both. It seems unlikely that mobilization would occur when the people are satisfied with the status quo and there is no threat to it. As such, the framework provided by Hirschman (1970) in Exit, Voice and Loyalty is instructive. Regions such as Nova Scotia and the North East were ‘loyal’ to their states and therefore lacked the ‘exit’ option that was available to minority nations. ‘Voice’ is interpreted to mean citizens’ sense of having political efficacy within the political process. While the regions could not exit Canada or Britain (the fact that these regions were firmly embedded within their
larger nations was demonstrated in the previous section), *individual* citizens could exit through a lack of participation and alienation within the system. If low levels of efficacy or high levels of alienation are correlated with regional identity it suggests a politicized sense of regional identity.

Figure 7.8 People like me have no say in government

![Graph showing perception of voice in government](image)


Earlier chapters indicated that regional elites in the North East and Nova Scotia claimed their regions lacked ‘voice,’ that they were ignored in the political process. In the North East this resulted in a long running (and unsuccessful) attempt to establish some sort of elected regional assembly. In Nova Scotia it resulted in ‘standing up for Nova Scotia’ being a key political theme in the contestation for power in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly. Figure 7.8 examines people’s perception of how much voice they have within the system by asking respondents in both Canada and Britain if they felt that they had a say in government.\(^{67}\) It is logical to assume that a higher sense of efficacy would equate with an increase in people feeling they had a say in government. Accordingly, the higher the numbers in Figure 7.8, the lower the efficacy. The left hand graph in Figure 7.8 suggests a common lack of efficacy throughout Canada (outside Quebec), even though it did improve marginally during this period. It does not, however, provide a sense of Nova Scotian distinctiveness. What is distinctive are the comparably high levels of political efficacy.

\(^{67}\) It is important to note that in the Canadian data the level of government is not specified, leaving this as an overall indicator of political efficacy. However, given that the polling context is a federal election survey strongly suggests that the respondents were referring to the federal level.
efficacy in Quebec—hypothesized as the result of Quebec’s ability to make its concerns heard within the statewide arena. In the North East, the pattern was similar. Apart from a drop in 2004, the numbers were consistently high, with people in the North East and England generally not displaying a strong sense that they had a say in what government did. The difference between Canada and Britain was in relation to the views in the minority, not the majority, nation. The Scots displayed a similar attitude to the English: they lacked an overall sense of efficacy even though they managed to gain substantial concessions from the British state, most notably the devolved Scottish Parliament.

While efficacy was low throughout Canada (outside Quebec) and England this did not present an immediate problem to this study. If low efficacy correlated with regional identities, it would suggest a regional dissatisfaction that elites could attempt to mobilize around. However, this was not the case. In Canada, evidence does exist that shows that efficacy was weakly tied to province. In Nova Scotia, “attachment to province” correlated with “no say in government” at .375 (P=.075). A probability of 7.5% that the correlation is false between provincial attachment and no say in government is generally outside of a statistically acceptable band, but here it is presented as it does suggest a weak relationship. In the North East, however, no statistically significant correlations were discovered.

As efficacy was interpreted as people’s perception of how much influence they have over the political process, alienation shall be interpreted as how much interest or how involved people are. While the regions lacked the ‘exit’ option, analyzing alienation allows for an examination of political disengagement, enabling a testing of the correlation between political alienation and regional identity.
The right hand graph in Figure 7.9 examines levels of interest in politics in Britain, showing the total responses of those who answered that they had “a great deal of interest” or “quite a lot of interest” in politics. The Canadian Election Study asked people to rate their interest in politics on a scale of 0-10. A similar question was asked about the election for which the study was conducted. Looking at the Canadian figure, interest in politics was by and large the same in Nova Scotia as the rest of Canada (outside Quebec) and was only slightly less in Quebec. A similar pattern is shown with regard to interest in the election in Nova Scotia and the rest of Canada (outside Quebec), although here Quebec generally displayed lower interest in the election. What is striking in Figure 7.9 is that while the rate of interest in politics in the North East was similar to that found in the rest of England prior to 1997, after this time interest was markedly lower in most years. This is especially significant given the temporal parameter of this study. It was during the period in which the North East was relatively less interested in politics than the rest of England that regional institutions were created and an elected regional assembly entered the realm of possibility. This suggests not only a lack of connection between elites and the masses in the North East, but that they were moving in opposite directions. While between 2003 and 2005 there was a slow increase in interest so that by 2005 the North East had almost returned to pre 1997 levels, in 2004, the year of the referendum, overall interest in politics in the region was still below the English average. This suggests
that the post-1997 period may have been an aberration, but one which coincided with a high level of elite regional identity mobilization in the North East.

As noted, evidence of alienation alone is not evidence of a politicized regional identity, unless it can be correlated with regional identities, yet as with efficacy, no statistically significant correlation was discovered in either Nova Scotia or the North East. If a regional agenda requires a grievance framework to mobilize the masses along identity lines, this section has indicated that while political efficacy may have been low and alienation high in Nova Scotia and the North East (as well as their larger nations), there was little evidence linking regional identity with either.

This section suggests that the issue of voice, prevalent in elite discourse, may not have resonated with the masses. In turn, this seems to indicate regional elites would have had difficulty mobilizing the masses around a regional agenda. The findings are particularly interesting with regard to this thesis’ interest in the role of regional democracy as citizens of the region with democratic institutions, Nova Scotia, appear to feel just as alienated as citizens from the region lacking democratic institutions; the North East. However, just because regional identity did not appear to be correlated to withdrawal or alienation from the political system does not mean that there were no political issues upon which to build regionalism in Nova Scotia and the North East. If people in the regions felt that Quebec and Scotland were treated favourably by the state, this could have had a spill over effect in the form of constitutional ‘me-tooism’ in the regions.

7.4 The Sub-state Nations: Quebec and Scotland as ‘Others’

As this thesis explores regionalism as a component of majority nationalism during periods of in-depth constitutional (re)negotiation, it demands that the perceptions of the minority nations be examined. This final section explores interpretations of the nature of the Canadian and British states as expressed by the masses in Nova Scotia and the North East by placing particular emphasis on how Quebec and Scotland are perceived. Identities are often mobilized in relation to an ‘other,’ and in this sense Quebec and Scotland may have provided the ‘other’ necessary to overcome the low levels of efficacy and high levels of alienation
discussed above. The examination of the minority nations takes two forms. First, it examines how people felt the state (re)distributed resources to determine if citizens of the region felt the state acted in an equitable manner, and if not, if these views correlated with regional identities. Second, it investigates constitutional preferences in the regions to provide insight into how respondents interpreted the nature of their state and their place in it.

**Preferential Treatment**

If citizens feel state resources are fairly distributed, advancing the interests of all regions, regional actors will not have the opportunity to mobilize identity around an economic unfairness frame (recalling the appeals to fairness highlighted in earlier chapters). In both Canada and Britain, the (re)distribution of state resources was highly politicized. In Britain it was mythologized around the Barnett formula (Mitchell 2003) while in Canada equalization was mandated by the constitution. In Canada, transfer payments have always been politicized, but in Britain the Barnett Formula managed to de-politicize resource (re)distribution, at least until devolution to the minority nations of Britain. As noted in earlier chapters, economic interests and constitutional demands were strongly linked. (Re)distribution of state resources is a particularly visible aspect of a state’s the economic activities, and examining perceptions of redistribution will help determine whether the feelings of economic disparity expressed by elites in earlier chapters resonates with the masses.

In Canada the (re)distribution of resources by the Canadian state takes a variety of forms: equalization payments, transfer payments and direct state to citizen payments. The merits of these payments are highly debated (see Clemens and Veldhuis (eds) 2007, Savoie 2006); what is not debated is that Nova Scotia receives a sizable portion of its provincial revenue from the federal government (upwards of 45%, one of the highest percentages in Canada). Yet just because Nova Scotia was a net beneficiary of equalization did not mean that its citizens felt central government policy favoured them. Nova Scotians, for example, may have interpreted their government’s dependency upon transfers as a negative by-product of historical development policies of the federal government that favoured other parts of Canada. Interviews conducted with Nova Scotia elites substantiated this view. Nova Scotia
elites appeared to have a very long memory, often referring to Ontario by its pre-
Confederation name of ‘Upper Canada.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Rest of COQ</th>
<th>Total Nova Scotia</th>
<th>Total Canada</th>
<th>Both Equally</th>
<th>Nova Scotia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>87.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All year average</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>85.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 7.10 indicates that Canadians felt some regions of the country were better treated than others, with Nova Scotians more strongly believing this than other Canadians. Figure 7.10 also demonstrates that while people of all three citizenship categories (Nova Scotians, Canadian and both) had a high rate of feeling that the federal government favoured one part of the country over the other, that the stronger one’s Nova Scotian citizenship, the greater one’s sense that the centre favoured other regions. While in each individual year the responses are not statistically significant, the total all year average (with each year weighted equally) is, indicating that the stronger one’s Nova Scotian identity, the more likely it was that that person felt other provinces were being favoured. Given the data presented in earlier chapters, it may come as no surprise that the overwhelming response in all citizenship categories was that the federal government favoured Quebec and, to a lesser extent, Ontario. This is not surprising as much of the federal government’s energies during this period were concentrated on solidifying Quebec’s place within the Canadian federation, and Ontario, was in many ways during this period the economic engine of Canada.

It is interesting to note that Quebec consistently had the highest rates of people feeling that all regions of the country were treated equally and respondents not having an answer to this question. In 2004, 54% of Quebeois felt Quebec was treated the same as other provinces, compared to 38.4% in Nova Scotia and 37.5% in the rest of Canada (outside Quebec). Additionally, 30.1% of Quebec respondents felt their province was treated worse, compared to 52.7% in Nova Scotia and 37.8% in the rest of Canada (outside Quebec).
Figure 7.11 expands upon the data from Figure 7.10. Here, while in all years respondents throughout Canada felt their province was treated more or less the same as other provinces, this feeling steadily decreased between 1997 and 2004, while belief that their province was treated worse steadily increased. This same pattern was also found in Nova Scotia with the notable difference being the starting point – at the beginning of the decline a substantial minority of Nova Scotians already felt their province was not treated fairly, and by the end of the data examined, the majority of Nova Scotians felt the federal government treated their province worse, while in the rest of Canada (outside Quebec) only a slim plurality thought this.

In Nova Scotia, however, the belief that the province was treated unfairly did not correlate strongly with provincial identity. No statistically significant correlation was found between attachment to province and provincial treatment, although the cross tabulation in Figure 7.11 gives a visual indication that the feelings were fairly consistent across identity categories with one notable exception—those who had a higher provincial than Canadian attachment were less likely to think their province was badly treated. One would expect that citizens who felt their province was treated better than others would be those with a less Canadian outlook. This, however, was not the case, suggesting elites were unable to politicize the Nova Scotian identity of this segment of the population.

In Britain the distribution of resources is examined first by exploring how respondents viewed the distribution of resources territorially to gauge whether
respondents felt Scotland was favoured over England. Next, studying responses to a series of questions in the Regional Referendum Study will determine whether people in the North East saw other parts of England as receiving preferential treatment.

As indicated in Figure 7.12, the four year average of people feeling that Scotland received its fair share or less of government spending was just over 50% in the rest of England, and marginally higher in the North East. This indicates that the majority of the English population did not feel that Scotland was treated favourably—although a sizable minority did feel that way. The North East referendum study allows for an examination of how citizens of that region perceived the government treated other parts of England (Figure 7.13). Of the respondents, 68.5% felt that the government did not look after the long term interests of the region. More people felt that the North East was not being looked after by the government than thought Scotland was favoured, suggesting that it was not a grievance against the place of Scotland that was the driving force within the minds of people in the North East. When asked if the government looked after the interests of all parts of England more or less equally, 77.2% said that the government looked after some parts more than others, with the South of England overwhelmingly seen in the North East as being advantaged. Overall, people in the North East felt two locations were treated better by the central state: a substantial minority of people looked to Scotland, while an overwhelming majority felt that the South of England was better treated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Correlations to regional attachment (2003), p&lt;.05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belief that Scotland receives its fair share or less, 2000-2003</td>
<td>North East</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rest of England</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BSA 2000-2003
Figure: 7.13: Perceptions of Government Treatment in the North East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How much do you trust the UK government to work in the best long-term</td>
<td>Only some of the time and almost never</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interests of the North East region?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And how much would you trust an elected regional assembly for the North</td>
<td>Only some of the time and almost never</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East to work in the best long-term interests of the North East?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you say the government looks after the interests of all parts of</td>
<td>Looks after some parts more than others</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England more or less equally...?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you say that compared with other parts of the United Kingdom, the</td>
<td>A little less and much less than its fair</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East region gets pretty much its fair share of government spending</td>
<td>share of government spending</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What part of England do you think government looks after more than</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others?</td>
<td>The South of England as a whole</td>
<td>79.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Midlands</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The North</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Referendum Study 2005

Though the majority opinion in Nova Scotia and North East was that other regions were being favoured, an important difference between the two regions came to light. In Nova Scotia, Quebec, and to a lesser extent Ontario, were seen as receiving an unfair amount of state resources. In the North East negative public opinion was more strongly directed to the South of England than Scotland. In Canada the key ‘other’ was Quebec, a minority nation and ‘internal other,’ the minor ‘other’ was Ontario, the dominant region within the Canadian federation. In Britain, the South of England, analogous to Ontario, was primary, with the sub-state nation of Scotland being secondary. This suggests that in Nova Scotia there was a much stronger base for using the sub-state nation as a reference point for regional identity mobilization than there was in the North East.

**Constitutional Preferences**

Constitutional issues were salient in Nova Scotia and the North East for similar reasons, allowing for comparisons of how people felt the state should be structured. This information provides a strong indication of how citizens interpreted the nature of the state and valuable insight into how people think the state should, and just as importantly, should not, be organized.
Devolution to Scotland was arguably the largest constitutional change in Britain during the period under study (although, as argued in Chapter Four, academic debate indicates that this may not have had as strong an impact south of the border). The Scottish Parliament was established in 1999 and given primary legislative responsibility across a wide variety of policy areas, and the ability to change taxation rates marginally. Post-devolution the differentiation of citizens on either side of the border may have become more obvious to people in England as the fundamental governing order of Scotland changed. In Canada, although the formal constitutional order was not altered during this period, as Chapter Four indicated, debate as to the nature of the constitutional order flourished.

Figure 7.14 examines two ways in which people expressed dissatisfaction with the system of government in Britain. On the left are the negative responses to the question “Which of these statements best describes your opinion on the present system of governing in Britain?” On the right is a specific component of this, namely whether the voting system should change. As can be seen, in most years the majority of people in both the North East and the rest of England felt that the “system of government in Britain could be improved a lot/needs a great deal of improvement”. Even when this was not the majority held opinion, it hardly shows overwhelming support for the status quo. This strongly suggests an overall dissatisfaction with the government system and, by and large, the North East did not deviate significantly from the rest of England. As it had become clear by the mid-1990s that the Conservatives were headed towards the opposition benches, Figure 7.14 seems to indicate that the feeling that the system needs to be improved is related to whichever party is in power. This is especially true as one saw a decline in believing that the system needs to be improved leading into the change of government in 1997, but then a steady rise after 1999, after Labour’s ‘honeymoon’ period. However, no statistically significant correlations were discovered in the North East between either regional pride or attachment to the region, and within the rest of England, what statistically significant correlations found indicated no relationship.
With regard to changing the voting system, if one argues that the system of government in Britain needed to change, as the left hand graph indicates, then part of that desire for change may have been a desire to change the voting system, which determines who is represented in parliament and who will form government. Yet support for changing the voting system was much lower than belief that the system of government could be improved upon. In the North East a similar pattern was observed between the two questions: support for change dropped as the Conservatives approached electoral defeat, then began to rise again under Labour until it returned to the all English average. As noted in previous chapters, politics mostly bypasses the region as the Conservatives cannot win and Labour cannot loose there, yet Figure 7.14 indicates that at people in the North East did not see the voting system, which led to the region being bypassed, as being problematic. The rest of England samples appeared very consistent during this period, hovering around the 35% mark, but in the North East it dropped to below 20% in 1996. The low level of support immediately after Labour’s victory may have been related to the region’s position as a Labour stronghold, yet the North East data adds additional weight to the interpretation that demands for change within the system did not stem from a belief in fundamental structural problems, but from transient problems related to the governing party. The consistency across the rest of England in the face of government turnover implies that
belief that the voting system should change, regardless of outcomes, was held by only a (sizable) minority of the population.

Figure 7.15: Best method to govern England

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>As it is now</th>
<th>Regional Assemblies</th>
<th>English Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While Figure 7.14 indicates that people in both the North East and the rest of England felt the system was in need of change, it was not clear that it was major constitutional change that people sought. As indicated in Figure 7.15, the majority of people in the North East and England as a whole felt that England should be governed as it was, through the British parliament in Westminster. This number only dropped below 50% during two years in the North East, and even then the status quo was clearly the dominant choice.

Yet while the status quo was the dominant constitutional option in both the North East and the rest of England, analyzing support for the options for change is revealing. Support for elected regional assemblies was higher in the North East than in the rest of England until 2003, when they appeared to fall in line with each other. This was particularly interesting as the data for the 2004 survey was conducted between June and September 2004 (BSA 2004 User Notes: 1) prior to the referendum defeat, meaning that the survey was not influenced by the referendum results.

So while in total a sizable minority wanted some sort of sub-state level of government in England, opposition to the status quo was divided by the two options

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The exact wording of the question was:
“With all the changes going on in the way the different parts of Great Britain are run, which of the following do you think would be best for England
1 for England to be governed as it is now, with laws made by the UK parliament,
2 for each region of England to have its own assembly that runs services like health,
3 or, for England as a whole to have its own new parliament with lawmaking powers?”
4 (None of these) (BSA 2003)
for change, regional and all English devolution, having the effect of reinforcing the status quo. This meant that support for the status quo, while not overwhelming, easily outstripped the other two options. While opposition to the status quo was never marshalled in a single direction, Figure 7.15 suggests that a credible challenge could have been mounted in the North East, where in some years support for an elected regional assembly outstripped support for all-English devolution. In saying this, the 2004 referendum results indicated that they were not able to move beyond this core level of support (even taking into account that voters in referenda tend to behave conservatively, Dion 1996).

Figure 7.16

Scottish MPs should not vote in HofC on English issues (%)


The only constitutional change since devolution that appeared to have majority support was the Conservative’s response to the West Lothian Question, which would inhibit Scottish MPs in the House of Commons from voting on issues which were devolved in Scotland (Conservative 2001: 34). While Hazell (2006a and b) indicates that due to the problems this would create, it would not be implemented by any party, Figure 7.16 shows that in the North East, the rest of England and even in Scotland, people felt Scottish MPs should not be allowed to vote on English issues in the House of Commons. There are two important points to note with regard to this. First, though a majority of people may have felt that allowing Scottish Members of Parliament to vote on all issues was unfair, it was not an overwhelming majority. Second, the three-year average (each year weighted equally) indicates people in the North East were the most supportive of Scottish voting rights in the House of
Commons, even more supportive than the Scots. Attitudes in the North East appeared to deviate from the rest of England with regard to the rights of Scottish MPs in the House of Commons, yet this researcher was unable to discover any statistically significant correlations indicating that this belief was related to regional identities.

The above discussion on constitutional preferences and the system of government in the North East and the rest of England indicate a high level of dissatisfaction with the system. This dissatisfaction, though, was not found to be coupled with regional identity, suggesting that the demands articulated by regional elites in the North East did not resonate with the masses and that regional identity was not politicized in relation to these issues. This makes it difficult to address what role, if any, Scotland had in mobilizing identity in the North East or the rest of England.

In a context similar to that in Britain, Canadian constitutional questions during the period under study (1990-2004) centred upon the place of Quebec in the federation. Accordingly, this section turns to an examination of public opinion towards the 1992 referendum and the place of Quebec in Canada. Noting that the ‘n’ values are such that the numbers are not very statistically significant, Figure 7.17 suggests that Nova Scotians were less interested in the referendum than their fellow Canadians. When asked if they were “very”, “fairly”, “not very” or “not at all” interested in the referendum campaign? Nova Scotians appeared slightly less likely to be interested. This is surprising, as Nova Scotia’s geographic position in relation to Quebec would suggest that issues surrounding Quebec would have a much greater impact there.

Figure 7.17

![Bar Chart](image)

**Very and Fairly interested in the 1992 Referendum (%)**

Table: CES 1993
When correlating interest in the referendum with attachment to Nova Scotia, the results were not statistically significant, and Canada wide the correlation is .185 (p < .005). The end result of the referendum was that the overall vote in Nova Scotia was 51.1% against the proposals with a turnout of 67.8%. This level was below both the national vote, which was 54.2% against, and the 71.8% Canada (outside Quebec) turnout numbers (Elections Canada 2007). While opposition to the proposals was marginally greater than in the rest of Canada (outside Quebec), the lower voter turnout rate supports overall interest in the referendum being lower in Nova Scotia. However, these differences were only marginally lower than the Canadian (outside Quebec) average, and as such it is fair to say that Nova Scotia was by and large an ‘average’ province with regard to behaviour in the 1992 referendum.

While Nova Scotians were split with regard to the provisions of the Charlottetown Accord, near unanimous agreement could be found with regard to the place of Quebec within the Canadian federation. Figure 7.18 shows that the preferred option throughout Canada was the status quo. Between 1990 and 1998 almost every quarterly EFC survey asked respondents what they felt the constitutional future of Quebec should be. Each of these surveys and years were weighted equally to make the results shown in figure 7.18 very statistically significant. Between 1990 and 1998 the status quo had approximately 30% support in Quebec and 70% and higher in the rest of Canada (outside Quebec) and Nova Scotia. It is worthy of note that the number two option in Canada (outside Quebec) and Nova Scotia was Quebec independence. Special status or sovereignty-association was supported by only a negligible number of respondents, strongly indicating that the vast majority of people in Canada (outside Quebec) saw the Canadian federation as a federation of equal provinces. This attitude appears to have hardened over time in Nova Scotia. In 1991 the yearly average supporting the status quo for Quebec in Nova Scotia was 60%, by 1994 this had risen to 81.5% support (chart not shown) with the average support between 1994 and 1998 for maintaining the status quo for Quebec 76.6%.
As the threat of Quebecois secession grew, apparently so too did support in Nova Scotia for Quebec maintaining the constitutional status quo. This suggests that Nova Scotians overwhelmingly viewed each province as being equal within the federation while simultaneously supporting the thesis that a dialectical relationship exists between the majority and majority nation—an increase in support inside Quebec for independence (or some other fundamental change to the constitutional order) was met with a hardening of opinion towards Quebec and the strengthening of a pan-national interpretation of the Canadian state. The numbers from Quebec indicate there is a fundamental difference of opinion between Canada (outside Quebec) and Quebec as to the nature of the Canadian federation. While the majority of Quebec respondents chose a Canada option (the status quo, special status or sovereignty-association), the majority of Quebec respondents chose an option that saw Quebec as being more than just one province amongst ten.

While the above discussion indicates that Nova Scotians saw Canada as being a country of equal provinces, Figure 7.19 illustrates whether respondents saw sovereignty as resting at the provincial or federal level. Here it is seen that Nova Scotians and the rest of Canadians (outside Quebec) agree that Quebec did not have the right to separate from Canada unilaterally. Where Nova Scotians and Canadians (outside Quebec) differ was not in disagreeing that Quebec had the unilateral right to secede, but with the strength of that opinion. In Nova Scotia the approximate average
that strongly disagreed was 65%, but in the rest of Canada (outside Quebec) it was only 55%. As Nova Scotia and the rest of Atlantic Canada would be physically cut off from the rest of Canada should Quebec separate, it was not surprising that the feeling that the Canadian state was indivisible was more strongly felt there.

Regarding the constitutional issues facing Nova Scotia and the North East, it may be fair to suggest that both regions had a better idea of what they did not want than what they did. While in both regions the constitutional status quo was supported by the majority of the population, the only sizable majority was in Nova Scotia in terms of support for the status quo for Quebec. Yet opposition to the status quo did not evolve into support for any particular option for change, nor was a relationship found to exist between regional identities and any opinion, further evidence that regional identity was not politicized. Though the data presented indicates the North East and Nova Scotia wished their states to remain intact, no clear preferences were displayed as to how the system should change. This was especially true in England where the choice presented was two forms of devolution: an English parliament or regional assemblies. Support for the 1992 Charlottetown Accord in Nova Scotia was nearly evenly split on the issue. Yet the problems faced by those who advocated change may not have been the result of a lack of support for their proposals or even the cautiousness of voters (see Dion 1996). Rather it could simply stem from the fact that the average person did not engage in politics in a sophisticated manner. As noted in Chapter Six, many MPs and MLAs stated their constituents did not understand or
care about the complexities of the federal system—they merely wanted results, a point consistent with wider academic research. This may help explain why people find it easier to express what they do not like, as opposed to articulating what they do, which often leads to reinforcing the status quo.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed survey data in Canada and Britain along three separate, yet intersecting axes to determine whether, during a time of constitutional negotiations in Britain and Canada, a politicization of regional identity could be found in the North East of England and Nova Scotia. It began by analyzing regional and national identities to determine if regional identities existed and what relationship they had to national ones. While largely reinforcing other studies, it established that regional identities exist, are strong and did not compete with national identity. This supports the argument made in Chapter Two that regional identities are embedded in larger national ones.

Once this foundation was established, the chapter examined political efficacy and alienation using the logic of Hirschman’s *Exit, Loyalty and Voice* (1970). This logic indicates that if people lack an exit option, they will strive for greater voice. As grievance is a key building block of political mobilization, a lack of voice in a system may indicate a very solid foundation for regional identity mobilization amongst the masses if it correlates to regional identity. It was shown that while perceived efficacy is low and alienation is high in both regions, efficacy is at best weakly correlated with regional identity.

If Canada and Britain did not house powerful nationalist movements, the information above would suggest that the foundation for a regionalist movement with a popular base was weak. Yet nationalist agitation within Quebec and Scotland provided a ‘fairness’ frame for elites to use regarding the redistribution of wealth within the state and issues of citizenship equality across sub-national groups. Here a major divergence was discovered between public opinion in Nova Scotia and the North East. While Nova Scotia saw its neighbouring sub-state nation, Quebec, as being favoured within the federation, in the North East, though Scotland was seen as
advantaged, the South of England was seen as being more so. This meant that while people in Nova Scotia saw another nation as being the province’s primary source of frustration, in the North East it was their English co-nationals who caused frustration. In turn, this suggests the ability of North East elites to mobilize identity against an ‘other’ from a different nation was weaker than that found in Nova Scotia. Regarding constitutional preference and system of governance, Nova Scotians and North Easterners favoured the status quo, although it must be noted that support was not resounding in either region, rather the status quo was a default option due to lack of an agreed upon alternative.

Overall, regionalism in both Nova Scotia and the North East was strong at an elite level (Chapters Five and Six), but this did not appear to resonate with the masses. Both regions have a strong sense of their regional identity, yet they did not mobilize them around issues of identity. This was most prominent in the failed 2004 referendum in the North East in which the option for change was resoundingly defeated. Although the North East was extremely poorly placed for regionalism, Nova Scotia was better placed as its identity was positively correlated with political concerns, but as was seen in Chapter Six, elites appealed to a Canadian, not a Nova Scotian, identity.
Conclusion: Integrationist Regionalism

8.1 Introduction

Nova Scotia and North East England are regions within the majority nations of Canada (outside Quebec) and England in the multinational states of Canada and Britain. In both states the underlying constitutional norms are based upon understandings of the state dominant in the staatsvolk but contested by the minority. This caused elites in Quebec and Scotland to agitate for reform of the constitutional order in Canada and Britain, which in turn ‘spilt over’ in Canada (outside Quebec) and England at the statewide and regional level. Nova Scotia and the North East as part of Canada and Britain were involved in discussions about the nature of the nation and the state. Though possessing distinctive bounded networks of their own, regional networks are part of the system of bounded networks that make up the state (Deutsch 1966a, Mann 1995, 1993), which intertwine in such a way that nations are part of the region as much as the region is part of the nation. This is fundamentally different than a minority nation, as it is the nation, not the region, which is the locus of primary political loyalty. The relationship between majority and minority nations in multinational state is dialectical; changes in one nation are met with changes in the other. In turn, this has an impact on regions internal to the staatsvolk. This thesis examined two of these regions, Nova Scotia the North East of England, to address the following hypothesis;

Hypothesis: Within multinational democracies which have experienced a recent surge in minority nationalism, a political environment is created in the majority nation which allows regional elites to promote political agendas that mobilize regional and national identity, and in so doing the presence or absence of regional democratic institutions will shape the demands and the manner in which they are made.

To address the hypothesis the following six research questions guided this work;

RQa. Does a sense of regional identity exist in the regions? Do concepts of regional identity complement or compete with a sense of national identity?

RQb. Do regional and national elites interpret the state as multinational or as a single unified people? Is there a relationship between how elites at the centre and in the regions interpret the nature of the state?
RQc. Do the minority nations have a role in identity articulation in either the
majority nation or the regions? If so, what role do the minority nations play?

RQd. Based on the assumption that a sense of regional identity exists, is it
politicized? How is it politicized? What do regional elites demand?

RQe. What role do regional levels of democracy play in regional identity
mobalization?

RQf. Does elite debate resonate with the masses?

Returning to the issue of case selection, the reasons Canada and Britain were
chosen for this comparative study were two fold. Firstly, this examination is, at its
heart, an attempt to better understand the Canadian federation. Using the logic of
Lipset (1991), gaining insight into Canada is best accomplished through the adoption
of comparative methodology, in particular the Most Similar Systems Design as
outlined by Przeworski and Teune (1979). As such, another multinational state was
needed for comparison; Britain was the logical choice as both Canada and Britain are
multinational and share a number of similar characteristics. They are both first world
democracies, have (comparatively) ancient constitutional regimes, utilize the same
voting system and have the similar Westminster style parliaments. English is the
lingua franca of the majority nation in both, and both are predominantly Christian
nations, although they have been undergoing a process of multiculturalization. In
Canada and Britain between 1990 and 2004, the minority sub-state nations of Quebec
and Scotland experienced peaks in nationalist agitation resulting in a referendum on
independence in Quebec and devolution in Scotland. In neither state was the upsurge
of nationalism the result of processes entirely internal to Quebec and Scotland.
Powerful and ideological executives controlled by Thatcher and Trudeau orchestrated
major changes in the basic constitutional frameworks of Canada and Britain,
challenging the consensus that these multinational states were built upon.

The initial survey of the literature on regional and nationalist mobilization in
general, combined with the literature on the British and Canadian cases in particular,
indicated that there were at least three ways in which identity could become
problematized in multinational states, through: 1) Tyranny of the Majority, 2)
Divergence of Aims, 3) and Assumed Homogeneity. The above three ‘problems’
found in multinational states indicated that not only were the states open to different interpretations between and within the different linguistic groups, and that two interpretive ‘poles’ were found in Canada and Britain: a unionist interpretation of the state, and a pan-nationalist one. Unionism interprets the state by focusing on the state’s constituent units, whereas pan-nationalist interpretations focus on statewide identity and structures.

Unionist interpretations of Britain looked to the Union of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, but in Canada unionism encountered two interpretations of the state: a union of French and English speaking peoples, or a union of ten provinces. Both of these interpretations viewed Canada as the construct of its constituent units, the difference being in how the units were defined. The pan-nationalist understanding of the state saw the state as the expression of the citizenry of the entire state, Canada and Britain. While neither of these two interpretations of the state seemed to be inherently tied to particular ideological trends, it should be noted that in both states the Conservative parties leaned towards a unionist interpretation of the state, while the Liberals in Canada and Labour in Britain leaned towards the pan-nationalist. In both states there was a convergence between the parties as unionist leaning parties focused on the equality of citizens and member units, which equated to equal citizenship for all. This interpretation of the state dominated at the national, regional, and mass level in both Canada (outside Quebec) and England.

In both states the staatsvolk appeared unable to recognize that multinationalism by definition means multiple demos and sovereignties within the state. This was most obvious in Canada where recognition of Quebec’s status as a nation was not affirmed until after the period of study—it was even shown earlier how the Supreme Court of Canada was able to recognize the right of Quebec to secede based on a single sovereign Canadian demos. In Britain, while it is difficult to ignore its multinational makeup, nearly 300 years of Union under the English constitutional tradition of parliamentary supremacy and sovereignty meant conceptualizing any sort of power-splitting/sharing was difficult for English elites and masses. Yet these dominant positions in both states were challenged and it was by exploring the challenges of the sub-state nation as part of the dialectical
relationship with the staatsvolk, as well as the response within the staatsvolk, that the hypothesis and research questions were investigated.

**8.2 The Nation in the Region and the Region in the Nation:**

**Chapters Five through Seven Analyzed**

In investigating the hypothesis and research questions the chapters in this project were structured to examine debates at the centre, in the regions, and public opinion. This section synthesizes the findings from the empirical chapters to present a holistic picture of political events during the period under study, examining: 1) The place of Quebec and Scotland within Canada and Britain, 2) Citizenship and Identity in the Regions, 3) Concepts of Fairness, Equality and the Constitutional Order, and 4) Centre-Periphery Relations, Regional Alienation and Political Efficacy.

1) *The place of Quebec and Scotland within Canada and Britain*

As Quebec and Scotland were dominant throughout this thesis, they will be prominent in this concluding chapter. The question of the place of these minority nations within the constitutional framework of the state was fundamental to Canada and Britain during this period. Chapters Five and Six demonstrated how the political environment allowed differing views of the nation to surface within elite discourse; it allowed an examination of the differing strategies and tactics used by elites and indicated that an ‘internal othering’ of Quebec and Scotland took place. These two sub-state nations were presented as being both one of ‘us’ and one of ‘them’ at the same time. Quebec is part of Canada, and Scotland is part of Britain, yet the discourse allowed conflicting, perhaps even paradoxical, views to be held—a part of us yet separate.

This process of othering occurred through the use of both positive and negative descriptions of the sub-state nations. Elites who felt favourably towards the minority nations used them as examples of what could be achieved, while those who felt unfavourably towards them used them as examples of what needed to be avoided. In doing this, both those favourable and unfavourable to the minority nations were engaging in the process of othering as both descriptions are based on a difference
between the ‘us’ of the majority and the ‘them’ of the minority. As Quebec and Scotland are different from the norm but also one of ‘us,’ these differences were problematic, and balance needed to be maintained. Discourses of equality of citizenship were dominant in the staatsvolk, which in Canada meant curbing Quebec’s constitutional demands and in Britain meant attempts to either emulate or ‘reign in’ Scotland’s institutional changes.

Although Scottish and Quebeccois distinctiveness was recognized by elites, elites in Canada (outside Quebec) and England appeared uncomfortable with asymmetrical constitutional arrangements. In Canada this ensured that Quebec remained a province like the others, and in Britain devolution to Scotland created a problem in England, the English Question, which resulted in numerous attempts to rebalance the British state, both at an all England and regional level. Yet while asymmetry on the one hand appeared problematic, on the other, when asymmetrical arrangements were advocated, it was because they were seen as good for the state as a whole. Asymmetry, though, has two important components; 1) as the sub-state nations are both ‘us’ and ‘them’, protecting the minority nation protected something that belongs to ‘us;’ and 2) asymmetry was to be temporary. In Canada when elites were willing to grant specific powers to Quebec, it was usually with the caveat that all provinces could acquire them if desired. While most accounts of devolution in Scotland look at it as a stand alone event, it was part of a larger all-Britain devolution package. This not only emphasized the dominant singe-demos pan-nationalist interpretation of the state, it emphasized the dialectical nature of the relationship between minority and majority in Canada and in Britain as changes in one component part were met with changes in another.

With regard to the multinational nature of the state, little recognition of the place of the majority nation was found in debates, particularly in Canada. Rather the state was presented as neutral and the sub-state nation as aberrant to the norms of Canada (outside Quebec) and England. This was most clearly seen in Canada with statements like “I think we are all Canadians” and appeals to Britishness in Britain (especially given, as noted in Chapter Seven, that Britishness appears to be the dominant identity in England).
2) Citizenship and Identity in the Regions

While in Canada (outside Quebec) it never seemed to be contested that provinces possessed distinctive identities, in England this was not the case. As fairly recent constructs, whether or not English regions possessed distinctive identities was highly debated at the centre, but in the North East it appeared to be taken for granted. This was notable even within the unofficial ‘no’ campaign, as it was framed around the region, not other forms of identity. Yet while regional identity existed in both Nova Scotia and the North East, it was stronger than the average regional identities held by their co-nationals; this was important as it meant that the potential existed for regional elites to harness regional identities. Yet while regional identities did exist, it was not clear they were politicized in a meaningful way.

The relationship between regional and national identity appeared to be reinforcing, as regional identity did not compete with the national one. In Nova Scotia, Canadian identity was also very strong; in the North East, regional identity existed alongside both an English and British identity. While difficult to measure, it did appear that English identity was less strong and more fluid than British identity in the North East and England. In both states, regional identity was articulated as being part of the national one. One could not be Nova Scotian without being Canadian; North Eastern identity was embedded in England, which was in turn embedded in Britain. This is not surprising as it was not only predicted in the theoretical construction but, as will be seen below, this is how regionalism manifests itself. While elites in both regions attempted to harness regional identity to achieve their particular political goals, it was not clear if the masses were politicized in the same way. This suggests that regional elites were disconnected from the people they represented. Yet because there was a disconnect does not mean that a regional movement or regionalism cannot exist as the power of elites to control the discourse and the political agenda is great and elites, by their nature, have the ability to influence debate and public opinion as well as frame the debate.

3) Fairness, Equality and the Constitutional Order

In both states, fairness was a prevalent theme. Balance was desired between all elements within both states, but it was difficult to accomplish due to the
overarching pan-nationalist discourse, dominant in the majority nations of Canada (outside Quebec) and England, which grounded interpretations of ‘fairness’ in ‘sameness.’ Elites did not appear able to move beyond concepts of undifferentiated citizenship. As noted above, they were only willing to adopt asymmetrical arrangements if they were part of larger changes that would apply to all regions/provinces if so desired.

Simeon (2006a) uses the term ‘federal culture’ to describe the reasons that federations take so many forms. He argues that people’s basic understanding of how a state should work influences how it does work. The concept of a federal culture can be expanded to address a ‘state culture;’ norms and understandings that inform people’s understandings of the relationship between citizen and state.

As the dominant pan-national interpretations of the state found in Canada (outside Quebec) and England see Canada and Britain as states in which equal citizenship is shared by all, citizenship (the set of obligations and responsibilities between the citizen and state) was seen as uniform. This limited the ability of the staatsvolk to accommodate Quebec and Scotland asymmetrically in the long-term. The equality and fairness discourses outlined in this work did not appear to be easily decoupled from ‘sameness’, although the failure of Labour to implement its regional reforms in England may result in a highly asymmetrical arrangement in Britain in the foreseeable future.

Issues of fairness and balance articulated by elites resonated with the masses; people in both regions seemed to view their region as being treated unfairly, especially with regard to state expenditure. A difference, though, was that people in Nova Scotia saw the ‘internal other’ as being favoured while in the North East it was their co-nationals in the South of England. The difference between the two regions extended to the constituent order of the state. Polling data in Nova Scotia indicated an ‘in’ or ‘out’ attitude regarding Quebec, with an overwhelming majority of those polled supporting the status quo for Quebec within the Canadian federation. This differed from the North East where people were mainly indifferent to devolution in Scotland, appearing less likely to want to limit Scottish voting rights in the House of

70 In accordance with the three broad categories of citizenship outlined by Faulks (1998: 2): legal, philosophical and socio-political.
Commons than either their English co-nationals or even the Scots (although this was a matter of degree, as limiting voting rights for the Scots was still majority opinion). Nova Scotians thought Quebec was most favoured within the federation, with Ontario a distant second. With regard to issues of fairness in the North East, Scotland did not generate the kind of negative feelings that Quebec did in Nova Scotia. Though a substantial minority of people in the North East did think Scotland was favoured, this was dwarfed by those who felt the same with regard to the South of England. In Nova Scotia, Quebec was seen as receiving preferential treatment, but the evidence indicates that people by and large felt Scotland did not receive an unfair amount of government expenditure. While this does not directly demonstrate how North Easterners felt about the position of their region, it indicates that there was little negative spill over from Scotland, in turn appearing to deny regional elites a source of grievance and a clear ‘other’ in a minority nation around which to build a regional movement.

4) Centre Periphery Relations, Regional Alienation and Political Efficacy

Any movement that attempts to mobilize around territorial identity is going to have to deal with questions of the relationship between the centre and the region. As Hutchinson (1999: 399) indicates, territorial mobilization is about grievance, and in both Nova Scotia and the North East elites attempted to link problems they interpreted with regard to the centre to regional identity. In Nova Scotia and the North East, elite calls for change were highly influenced by their sub-state neighbours. To elites at the centre and the regions, they acted as examples (both positive and negative), and a theme of voice dominated the regional discourse vis-à-vis the relationship with the centre state.

While elite discourse at the centre was focused on the place of Quebec and Scotland, by default this meant that it was a discussion on the nature of Canada and Britain as a whole. Both Nova Scotia and the North East are embedded in democratic states, yet neither state has a formal mechanism by which regional interests are taken into account at the national level. Some respondents in Nova Scotia felt regionally based Cabinet ministers offered voice to Nova Scotia at the federal level, yet this contradicts the research into regionally based ministers which indicates they do not
act as regional spokespeople or give regions voice. Instead they have been replaced by first ministers conferences. These answers, though, help substantiate research that indicates the Atlantic Provinces have a more traditional political outlook and strong familial socializations (See Carbert 2006, Clancy et al. 2000). In Canada, the real voice for the regions is now found with the premiers, who, due to the rise in the importance of first minister’s conferences, are now the spokespeople for the regions at the federal level (Bakvis 1991). Yet while Nova Scotia had this type of representation and North East did not, elites in both complained of a lack of voice and political efficacy.

8.3 Identity and Democracy: the Research Questions and Hypothesis Revisited

The last section brought together the common themes from the empirical chapters; this section advances one step further, applying the lessons learned to each of the Research Questions to address the hypothesis directly.

RQa. Does a sense of regional identity exist in the regions? Do concepts of regional identity complement or compete with a sense of national identity?

It was apparent that strong regional identities existed in both Nova Scotia and the North East. This was true at an elite and a mass level. Regional identity was found to be strong in absolute terms, but also in comparison to other regions in Canada (outside Quebec) and England. Chapter Two argued that regional identities are not in competition with national ones as regions are embedded within and indivisible from larger nations. The evidence presented supports that claim. With regard to Nova Scotia and the North East, regional and national identity did not compete with each other, and the evidence suggests that they may actually have reinforced each other. Alienation was integrationist in character, with regional identity being mobilized for the regions to have a greater say in the administration of the state, not to pull away from it.

RQb. Do regional and national elites interpret the state as multinational or as a single unified people? Is there a relationship between how elites at the centre and in the regions interpret the nature of the state?
In Nova Scotia and the North East, as well as in Canada (outside Quebec) and England, elites saw the state as embodying a single nation. While some elites did recognize the compact/union nature of the state, the pan-national interpretation was dominant in elite discourse in both the regions and the centre. It appeared as if the framing of the state at the centre placed boundaries upon regional actors, as regional actors were partaking in the same debates as central elites. Although these debates were part of the nations’ continual reconceptualization of self, the conception forwarded by regional actors is based on their experience of the nation from a regional perspective.

RQc. Do the minority nations have a role in identity articulation in either the majority nation or the regions? If so, what role do the minority nations play? It appears that the minority sub-state nations of Quebec and Scotland played a key role in identity articulation in the staatsvolk as a whole as well as in the regions. It was shown that the dialectical relationship between the minority nations and the staatsvolk mobilized identity in both majority and minority as change in one was met with change in the other. Yet it was noted that elites in the majority nation did not necessarily recognize their role in this process. They saw the state as liberal and culturally neutral while minority sub-state national actors saw it as a challenge to their interpretation of the state and possibly their interpretation of ‘good’ and ‘just.’ This meant that actors in the minority nation were seen as being ‘at fault’ for initiating a challenge to the status quo.

RQd. Based on the assumption that a sense of regional identity exists, is it politicized? How it is politicized? What do regional elites demand?

The politicization of identity appeared to operate at two levels, elite and mass. Chapter Seven indicated that while regional identity was strong, there was a very weak politicization of regional identity at the mass level. Mobilization, however, is also an elite phenomenon and elites in both regions mobilized along identity lines. This may have been most obvious in the North East as the region was the focus of constitutional change, but it was no less prevalent in Nova Scotia where elites attempted to harness provincial identity to their political agendas. It is important to
note that regional identity may have been mobilized against perceived structural/constitutional problems, but it was *never* mobilized against the nation as the regions were firmly embedded within their nations. This was exemplified by a Nova Scotian premier being forced to declare his loyalty to Canada in front of the Nova Scotia legislature due to his suggestion, (within a hypothetical context of Quebec independence) that Nova Scotia would become independent of Canada in some manner. It was shown that while the demands articulated by elites differed, it was due to differences in institutional arrangements channelling the manner in which demands were articulated rather than the complaints the demands were addressing.

**RQe** What role does regional levels of democracy play in regional identity mobilization?

Out of all the research questions, it is the answer to this one that is perhaps the most surprising. Regional levels of democracy and the corresponding legislative competencies found in Nova Scotia by default ensured that the vast majority of issues being debated within the province were fundamentally different from those in the North East; indeed, as Nova Scotia already has an elected regional government its elites did not need to advocate for one. In saying this, as Chapter Three noted there is a difference between indicators and concepts, and in this sense while the indicators of regional discontent in Nova Scotia and the North East were different, they indicated very similar concepts. In both regions, regional elites expressed a desire to increase regional voice as well as expressing a corresponding lack of regional efficacy. While the institutions of Nova Scotia and the North East channelled these in different directions, they did not appear to lessen the sense of either. While it was not possible to gauge comparative levels of efficacy and lack of voice between Nova Scotia and the North East, there was no indication that regional democracy in Nova Scotia lessoned either.

**RQf** Does elite debate resonate with the masses?

The answer to this question is quintessentially Canadian. The answer is yes… and no. Yes, in that the frames outlined in Chapter Five appeared to be accepted by the masses in Nova Scotia and the North East, as well as their respective majority
nations. No, in that elite debate at the regional level, which attempted to harness regional identity with political agendas, did not appear successful. This reinforced the argument that regions are embedded in the nation as the nation is their primary political loyalty. It suggests that statewide elites had a greater capacity to influence individuals in the region, reinforcing the primacy of the nation. Additionally, as regional identity did not compete with national ones, it appeared that regional identity could not challenge national identity for primacy.

This thesis undertook a theoretically and empirically detailed study of national and regional identity mobilization in Nova Scotia and the North East to investigate the role of regional level democracy in regional identity mobilization addressing the following:

**Hypothesis:** Within multinational democracies, which have experienced a recent surge in minority nationalism, a political environment is created in the majority nation which allows political elites to couple their political agendas with regional and national identity, and in doing so the existence of regional democratic institutions will shape both the demands linked to identity and the manner in which they are made.

To conduct this investigation, it was necessary to understand theoretically the difference between minority sub-state nations and regions within the staatsvolk. While at one level it may be intuitive that Quebec or Scotland could become functioning independent states but not Nova Scotia or the North East of England, many aspects of social and political life are counterintuitive. As such, this thesis first explained theoretically why Quebec could become independent while Nova Scotia could not. This theoretical model focused on the embedded nature of bounded regional networks within national ones, demonstrating that the nation, not the region, is the bearer of primary political loyalty. This was seen in contrast to minority sub-state nations which are themselves the bearer of primary political loyalty with corresponding sovereignty and political legitimacy.

In outlining the difference between region and sub-state nation, this thesis produced a theory of the state, nation and region. This indicated that there is a dialectical relationship between the majority and minority nations within the confines of the state; actors within both attempted to achieve their political objectives by appealing to the solidarity inherent in the national community. It was through
developing this understanding of the nature of state, nation and region and the manner in which identity is politicized that one can understand the constraints that regional actors find themselves in. While it may have been possible to create an understanding of region divorced from the dynamics of majority and minority nationalism, this would have ignored the fundamental constitutional questions faced by elites in Nova Scotia and the North East and their respective states as they dealt with the place of Quebec and Scotland within the constitutional order.

The above hypothesis, as noted in Chapter Three, suggests certain expectations;

1. Minority nationalism will politicise regional and national identity in the majority nation,
2. Politicised identity in the majority nation will create a political environment favourable to regional identity mobilization
3. Regional democratic institutions will provide greater voice for both the regions themselves as well as actors within the regions

The answers to the above research questions have demonstrated that the first two expectations were met. Minority nationalism did politicize regional and national identities in the staatsvolk, although it must be again emphasized that the staatsvolk also had a role in initiating this mobilization, although not realizing it. In turn, it was demonstrated how the reaction in the staatsvolk to minority nationalism enabled a political environment favourable to regional identity mobilization. The real surprise was found vis-à-vis the third expectation, the role of regional levels of democracy.

In both Nova Scotia and the North East, the relationship between regional level democracy and regional identity mobilization was complex. Firstly, regional elites in both appeared to have fundamentally the same complaint, a lack of regional voice. It would no doubt shock regional devolution activists in the North East that a sub-state level of government as powerful as a Canadian province would have similar complaints with regard to regional voice and efficacy. This suggests that if the role of regional democracy is to increase efficacy and voice for the region, democracy alone is insufficient to accomplish this goal. Democrats, though, may take heart that there is an important caveat to this; regional democracy appeared to increase voice in conjunction with democratic central institutions. Regional democracy had the
capability to present a regional voice if and when broad elite consensus could be found. This was most notable in Nova Scotia as actors from all parties broadly agreed that the place of Nova Scotia was within the Canadian nation and actors from all three parties appealed to Canadian national solidarity. Regional democracy gave voice to appeals to national solidarity and acted as a reminder to the rest of the nation that the region, as part of the nation, was deserving of the responsibilities and benefits of membership within the national community. In this sense, though regional democracy in Nova Scotia may not have provided a greater ‘voice’ for the region in the manner in which regional devolution supporters in the North East appeared to suspect it would, it may have acted to integrate the region. Additionally, regional level democracy in Nova Scotia created elites, the Nova Scotia cabinet, who were able to engage federal and provincial ministers as equals. Barry (1975a) identifies federalism as a component of consociationalism and in this regard the ability of Nova Scotian elites to mobilize regional voice meant they could, as the representatives of Nova Scotia, help craft Canadian national interest. In this sense, regional level democracy can almost be seen as providing the check and balance against the House of Commons that the Canadian Senate, due to its democratically illegitimate selection process, simply cannot. Nova Scotian ‘voice’ acted to integrate the region into central decision making.

Secondly, while the arguments presented above, and even the way it is phrased in this thesis, makes it appear as if regions possess voice, they do not. Full stop. This needs to be emphasized, as in both Nova Scotia and the North East it is regional actors who possess voice. Regions may possess institutions that enable actors to speak for the region, and there may be dominant views within the regions, but like any identity community, regions are arenas of identity contestation where individual visions of the region compete with each other to gain favour with members of the region. In both Nova Scotia and the North East there was vigorous debate about how to move the region forward and what it meant to be Nova Scotian and North Eastern. Regional level democracy in Nova Scotia, rather than focusing and harnessing regional voice, ensured that differing actors with differing opinions had a platform to present them.
While in Canada democratic institutions created a forum for debate, the North East lacked this. As such, debates in the North East could only happen at Westminster or a sub-regional level (the only time that a clear regional debate took place was the 2004 referendum). While elites in the North East tried to model their movement upon the extremely successful Scottish Constitutional Convention, they appeared unable to generate the legitimacy of the Scottish one. Debates in Nova Scotia were about the use of voice, while debates in the North East were about gaining voice. It is interesting to note that while the voice of Nova Scotia is immense compared to the North East, Nova Scotian actors and the masses did not appear to think voice was effectively used. This strongly suggests that capacity for voice must be coupled with the will to use it. As both Nova Scotia and the North East are embedded in larger primary political loyalties, voice and the debates surrounding it acted to direct debate away from a secessionist/autonomist route, and towards an integrationist route. This was apparent in Nova Scotia, but in the North East ‘voice’ was also about integrating the interests of the North East into the decision making processes of the state.

It should be further noted that regional level democracy in Nova Scotia also appeared to create competition between the different orders of government. As Simeon notes (2006b), competition is good as it helps determine the national will. This in turn helps overcome the inherent deficiencies in the electoral system, ensuring that it is not only the needs of key constituencies that the central government takes into account. Yet through comparison with Nova Scotia this indicates that there may have been two consequences that regional devolution campaigners in the North East may not have anticipated. Firstly, regional level democracy deprived Nova Scotia of the ability to simply blame the central government for the region’s problems. Accountability in the region means just that, that accountability rested within Nova Scotia. As was seen in Nova Scotian debates, the central government competed with the provincial government and elites at the centre were able to point their proverbial fingers at the provincial level of government, much as regional elites in Nova Scotia and the North East are able to point their fingers at the centre. In addition, because democracy is about the competition for power, it institutionally enshrined a competition for power that encouraged regional actors to finger point at each other.
For example, the official opposition in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly provided a platform to attack the Nova Scotia government for failing the people of Nova Scotia. The House of Assembly, at the time of writing, houses three different political parties, which each attack each other, and between levels parties that would appear to be in alliance with each other can point fingers at each other as well. While in the North East the devolution campaign may have attempted to frame itself as representing a broad consensus favouring regional devolution, in reality this was not the case. The polling data presented in Chapter Seven demonstrated that the status quo was dominant in the electorate and all-England devolution had sizable support as well. Intercity rivalry was shown to be rife in the region, and while one cannot say with 100% certainty, it would seem that the evidence from both the North East and Nova Scotia suggests regional devolution in the North East may have highlighted regional differences which Labour hegemony in the region masked.

Building upon the idea of accountability, although regional devolution campaigners in the North East advocated for an elected regional assembly that would work on behalf of the region, evidence from Nova Scotia indicated that people within the province did not understand the complex dynamics of multilevel governance. This means that while regional elites in the North East thought they could create a system in which there were clearly demarcated lines of accountability and responsibility, in practice this may be impossible to achieve within any system of multilevel government. This is regardless of the fact that actors are power maximizers who will always try to increase their power resulting in competition between the different orders of government. The Nova Scotia electors, to whom regional actors in Nova Scotia are accountable, did not appear to understand what to hold the Nova Scotia legislature accountable for. This is not unique to Nova Scotia, but given Nova Scotia is a comparably ancient system of multilevel government, one can only imagine the problems that would be faced in a new system.\textsuperscript{71} Instead of creating clear lines of responsibility, the evidence suggests regional level democracy dispersed accountability within the system, making it more difficult for electors to hold political elites to account.

\textsuperscript{71} Indeed, this author is painfully aware of these problems after working as a Parliamentary researcher for a Member of the Scottish Parliament.
Chapter Three discussed a major limitation of comparative research: that one cannot draw universal conclusions from comparison due to the limited number of cases. This case study was limited to two regions: Nova Scotia and the North East of England. While the logic of the selection of these two cases under the MSSD was such that one could not have asked for better cases, the states that the regions are embedded in are so similar that in many ways it is difficult to apply the lessons learned to other cases, especially with regard to exploring regionalism in other multinational states that have dissimilar variables or regions within single nation-states, such as Germany.

This, however, is the direction this project suggests the research should take. The lessons learned here would be of particular interest to the study of nation-states as they lack the politicization of identity based around the constitutional struggles of a minority sub-state nations such as Quebec or Scotland. As such, they lack the ‘internal other’ that was prevalent in Canada (outside Quebec) and England. Or do they? Germany, for example, may have an internal other with regards to the former East Germany or Bavaria. Other states like Spain, where violent nationalist movements exist, would provide another interesting avenue of approach. This project demonstrated that regionalism was inherently integrationist; how, then, would it manifest itself not only in a context of heightened nationalist discourse, but in a militarized and violent environment as well? Would regions in the staatsvolk still look to the sub-state nation as something to emulate if they feared elements of it? Would the process be the same if the minority nation was not seen as something to emulate or ally with? How would regional level democracy work in states outside of the first world? These are just some of the larger questions as to the relationship between democracy, regionalism, and nationalism that have been left unanswered by this research. Yet it is hoped, that by exploring the understudied relationship between regionalism and nationalism on the one hand, and regionalism and mid-level democratic institutions on the other, that this thesis has made its own small contribution to the subject.
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