IDENTITY IN CRISIS
The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention

Matthew R Ward
PhD Politics
The University of Edinburgh
2010
# Table of Contents

Declaration .......................................................................................................................................................... iii  
List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................................................... iv  
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................ vi  
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................................ vii  
1. Introduction: Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era ....................................................... 1  
2. A Lack of Definition: Towards an Analytical Understanding of Humanitarian Intervention .............. 10  
3. From the Abstract to the Concrete: Using Meta-theory to Inform Mid-level Theory ............................ 36  
4. A Framework for Action: Identity and Foreign Policy ............................................................................. 63  
6. Travelling Without a Map: US Non-intervention in Rwanda in 1994 .................................................. 128  
8. Identity under Audit: From Theory to Practice and Back Again ......................................................... 206  
Appendix 1: Somalia Timeline ......................................................................................................................... 226  
Appendix 2: Rwanda Timeline ......................................................................................................................... 238  
Appendix 3: Haiti Timeline ............................................................................................................................. 247  
Appendix 4: Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 272
Declaration

I declare that this thesis is entirely my own work, and that no part of it has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Matthew Ward

30 November 2009
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>American Broadcasting Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Armoured Personnel Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Congressional Black Caucus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Chief Military Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAS</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAPH</td>
<td>Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP</td>
<td>‘Grand Old Party’ (Republican Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>House Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITN</td>
<td>Independent Television News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICIVIH</td>
<td>International Civilian Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILOB</td>
<td>Military Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPR</td>
<td>National Public Radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSR</td>
<td>National Security Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Presidential Review Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRRE</td>
<td>Resolution, Redescription, Retrodiction, Elimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>Somali National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force (Somalia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Washington Post</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

This thesis examines the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention in the early post-Cold War era. Taking as its basis US policy towards Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti between 1992 and 1994, it develops a theory of humanitarian intervention based on constructivist and scientific realist principles. Using identity as the organising concept, the thesis examines the meta-theoretical precepts of constructivism and scientific realism, which are developed into a methodology for analysing questions of foreign policy. Incorporating critical insights from sequential path analysis, morphogenetic social analysis—the notion of a dynamic mutual constitution of structure and agency—and constructivist social theory, the case studies provide a useful new means of conceptualising humanitarian intervention as a foreign policy practice through an identity-driven analysis. The findings of the research shed much light on this practice and its future prospects. They also suggest new directions for a scientific realist/constructivist research agenda.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to all those people who have facilitated the writing of this thesis, whether directly by commenting on the work as it progressed or simply by providing more personal support over the course of my studies.

In particular, I would like to thank my two supervisors over most of the course of this project, Professor John Peterson and Dr. Seán Molloy, whose patience and guidance was of immeasurable assistance. I was fortunate indeed to have two supervisors whose approaches provided such a useful balance and whose comments upon early drafts and ideas pushed me in such interesting directions. In this context, I would also like to thank Dr. Andrew Thompson, whose supervision in the early stages of this project was both enthusiastic and thoughtful.

I was likewise fortunate to be a part of an excellent postgraduate community at Edinburgh University, which provided invaluable opportunities to present and receive comments upon my work as it progressed, as well as being a pleasant environment in which to spend the past few years.

Finally, I would like to thank my family, who have always been most supportive of my endeavours, but were particularly so during my studies. It has been a great pleasure to have been able to work towards the completion of this thesis so close to home and all that means. Thank you all.
Chapter 1

Introduction: Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era

It is often suggested that the post-Cold War era ended on September 11, 2001.\(^1\) A corollary of this argument suggests that, as this era ended, so too did the sun set on one of the more notable features of foreign policy action in this period: humanitarian intervention.\(^2\) Such arguments may have merit. Indeed, they seem largely borne out by the empirical record. While it is easy to point to a flurry of humanitarian interventions in the immediate post-Cold War period—northern Iraq, Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone would feature on most analysts’ lists—it is much more difficult to do so in the post-September 11 era. This decline is not for a lack of candidates. Civil strife in Sudan, Chad, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to mention but a few, would all seem to share the features of chronic civil strife coupled with grave humanitarian emergency that characterised most of the sites of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. In many of these places, too, the international community has been moved to action. In Darfur, an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force was replaced by a hybrid UN–AU force in late 2007. In the same year, the UN, in concert with the European Union, established another peacekeeping force on Darfur’s western border, in Chad and the Central African Republic. In Somalia, Ethiopian troops unilaterally intervened to support the provisional government, and an AU force was later established to support efforts to establish a stable environment in the country. And in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the UN mission has slowly evolved from a small group of military observers to one of the largest and most complex peacekeeping missions in its history.

But few would suggest that these actions constitute humanitarian interventions in the way we normally understand the term. It is difficult to put one’s finger on exactly why: perhaps

---

1 For nuanced views, see Buzan, “Will the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ Be the New Cold War?” 82(6) *International Affairs* (2006), 1101-1118; as well as some of the contributions to Booth and Dunne (eds.), *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002).

it is the lack of great power interventionism with which we have come to associate humanitarian intervention; perhaps the interventionary element is missing and these actions hew more closely to our understandings of traditional peacekeeping. Whatever the reason, these actions simply do not ‘feel like’ humanitarian interventions. This argument is, of course, problematic. If we are to argue that humanitarian intervention is dead, we should surely be able to establish quite what it is that has died. The literature on humanitarian intervention has struggled nobly with this issue. The definition of humanitarian intervention has been one of the major sites of disagreement on the subject, and there is a surfeit of different views, which perhaps itself has contributed to the murkiness of the issue. At the same time, the definition of humanitarian intervention was rarely the primary concern of those analysts who engaged with the issue. The notion of humanitarian intervention raised all sorts of sticky ethical, legal and operational questions and, to a great extent, it was these questions with which most scholars of humanitarian intervention were primarily concerned.

In this context, humanitarian intervention became one of the most contested concepts in international affairs. Its study became a battleground for competing and often incompatible visions of world order, its literature replete with paradoxes, dilemmas and disagreements. Some of the starkest challenges faced by scholars of international affairs have found their heuristic frame in the concept of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention has raised questions about the relationships and tensions between order and justice and how far these values are reflected in a pluralist or solidarist international society. It has raised legal and moral questions about the relationship between sovereignty and human rights, the two pillars of the UN Charter system, the foundation of the post-war legal order. Legal positivists and natural lawyers, and restrictionists and counter-restrictionists, have debated the legality of humanitarian intervention under international treaty law and international customary law. Debates have raged over the authority of the UN Security Council to

---


5 See, for example, Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention; Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate”, in Holzgrefe and Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention, 15-52; Delbruck, “A Fresh Look at
intervene in domestic conflicts under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\(^6\) Much fiercer have been the debates over the authority of states and other actors to do so unilaterally.\(^7\) Utilitarians, communitarians, social contractarians, cosmopolitanists and others have debated the morality of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.\(^8\) Questions have been raised about the meaning of self-determination, the weight of competing rights claims and the very nature of international rights, responsibilities and duties.\(^9\) The very basis of humanitarian intervention has been called into question in almost every conceivable way.

As such, most definitions of humanitarian intervention have been produced within the framework of such engagements, and consequently have been influenced by their subject matter. In particular, given the overriding focus within the literature on ethical and legal issues, there has been a tendency to focus on definitions in terms of ideal types, which could then be compared against some sort of legal or moral compass to see whether they measure up. As such, some studies have focused on the motivations for intervention to see whether they accord with standards of acceptable conduct;\(^10\) others have focused on the outcomes of intervention to see if they measure up with standards of desirability;\(^11\) while yet others have diligently sought to establish robust lists of criteria against which we can

---


\(^11\) See, for example, Teson, Humanitarian Intervention; Wheeler, Saving Strangers.
measure when and where such interventions are appropriate. The common factor linking such attempts, however, is a concern with establishing the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions, an effort which often seems to come at the expense of establishing the content of such interventions. If we are to establish what humanitarian intervention is, therefore, rather than what it ought to be, the question of the definition of humanitarian intervention may need to be revisited. I address this question in Chapter 2, where I develop an operational definition of humanitarian intervention, drawing on the existing literature but moving beyond it.

The purpose of such an enterprise is relatively simple: to clear the ground for an examination of why humanitarian intervention became so prominently engaged in as a practice at all. Without such an understanding, it seems premature to suggest that the era of humanitarian intervention is over. However, the simplicity of the question, as is often the case, belies the complexity of finding an answer. Indeed, surprisingly enough, few scholars have actually engaged directly with this question. A brief discussion of a few such studies only highlights the continuing paucity of concrete knowledge within the field upon which we can draw. Laura Neack approached the question in the context of UN peacekeeping missions between 1948 and 1990, assessing motivations on the basis of national interest and humanitarianism, and concluded that national interest was the primary motivating factor. Jakobsen, meanwhile, found national interest to be a vital factor in only one of the cases he analysed. Admittedly, Jakobsen assessed five rationales rather than two: international support, domestic support, national interest, the CNN effect and chances of success. However, at least one possible explanation for the divergence in findings is the differences in case studies—Jakobsen studied peace enforcement operations, a motley conglomerate including Kuwait (1990), Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994) and Rwanda (1994)—a point only confirming the need to establish a robust definition of

---

13 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse provide the best definition in this respect and I follow them on several important points. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996).
15 Understood here to mean the proposition that the news media has the power to set policy agendas and push states towards intervention through the impact of widespread and emotive reporting. See below for further discussion.
what is actually under consideration. Stephen Garrett, in his book *Doing Good and Doing Well*, devoted a chapter to the question of what prompts states to engage in humanitarian intervention. Providing a comparative analysis of a number of cases, purely limited to humanitarian intervention, Garrett concluded that humanitarian intervention occurs in cases where there is a mix of humanitarian and national interest motives, where a degree of empathy is felt for the sufferers of human rights abuses, and is also affected by the fear of disorder, the actions of the protagonists, and the personality of the leaders who chose to intervene, a complex mix indeed. While Garrett’s choice of case studies is perhaps more relevant to my current interests than those of Neack or Jakobsen, the weight of his conclusions are not aided by the rigour in his approach. Garrett is anecdotal in his choice of examples to support his arguments, citing individual cases in support of each of his arguments without subjecting each case to a test concerning each argument. Chomsky, meanwhile, adopts a neo-Marxist framework, which unfolds almost as a realist approach, in which he argues that states only ever engage in humanitarian intervention for personal profit.

While these examples hardly represent a coherent body of literature, at least one important point emerges from their comparison. Most analysts, it seems, view the question of why states engage in humanitarian intervention as a contest between national interests and humanitarian concern, or, in other words, as between realism and idealism, an ages-old debate in the context of international relations scholarship. The relevance of this enduring dichotomy appears supported by even a cursory glance across the relevant editorial pages of most Western newspapers. More importantly, however, we can deduce such a conception from an examination of two schools of thought that do constitute coherent bodies of theory: the English School and neoliberal institutionalist approaches to humanitarian intervention. The English School and neoliberal institutionalist approaches have dominated the literature on humanitarian intervention to an extent not seen in most other areas of study. While neither has directly shared the primary concern of this thesis, there is nevertheless much we can learn from them.

---

Unfortunately, a set of unhappy meta-theoretical commitments in mainstream international relations theory seems to suggest that attempting to engage in ‘inter-paradigm’ dialogue in this manner is not only difficult, but philosophically unsound.\(^\text{20}\) I engage with this issue in Chapter 3. Arguing from a scientific realist standpoint that it is not only possible but fruitful to attempt to bridge some of the discipline’s apparently insurmountable divides—on questions such as rationalism and reflectivism, materialism and idealism, structure and agency and causation and constitution—I expound my own position on these issues at the same time as developing a meta-theoretical framework within which the examination of humanitarian intervention can proceed. In the course of this enterprise, I engage directly with the neoliberal and English School approaches, and conclude that here, too, is evidence of the juxtaposition of realism and idealism. Though proponents of the two approaches would almost certainly not put it in this way, their fundamental ontological beliefs about the world suggest the dominance of contrasting conceptions of agency in their work. Drawing on neorealism as the basis for its explanatory framework, neoliberalism tends to treat agency in Hobbesian terms. Though far more flexible in its conception of agency (and, indeed, the relationship between agency and structure), I nevertheless argue that English School scholarship on humanitarian intervention, to a great extent though not exclusively, and primarily within the solidarist wing of that body of work, has tended to conceptualise agency in more Lockean terms. Clearly, the Hobbesian–Lockean divide is merely another way of conceptualising the realism–idealism divide.

The question nevertheless remains how such insights can be woven together to provide an analytical framework. Scientific realism continues to be useful in this regard. One of the best known exponents of the scientific realist approach is Alexander Wendt. While I disagree with Wendt on certain important philosophical points, as discussed in Chapter 3, Wendt’s seminal work on a *Social Theory of International Politics* remains one of the most important works in international relations theory of recent years.\(^\text{21}\) In particular, Wendt’s conception of the potential for a ‘via media’ between the rationalist and reflectivist paradigms seems to be of particular relevance to the problematics raised here. So too does Wendt’s elevation of the notion of identity as an organising concept for the study of international relations theory. Wendt’s three identity-based logics of anarchy—Hobbesian,


Lockean and Kantian—are clearly reflected in the dominant approaches to humanitarian intervention identified in Chapter 3, and identity would seem to be a fruitful dimension along which to examine the issue.

At the same time, the approach based on identity is not without its problems. Wendt’s work itself has been at least as heavily critiqued as it has been lauded (though criticism is its own form of flattery).\(^\text{22}\) In a much broader sense, identity itself is viewed by many, often on very good grounds, as a problematic concept. As Brubaker and Cooper noted in an important critique: “[i]dentity, we argue, tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity).”\(^\text{23}\) The extremely broad range of very different analyses that have been based on the notion of identity has done little enough to mitigate this shortcoming. Though an analysis of the varying understandings of identity and the core components of the concept would, in such circumstances, constitute a research project of its own, there is nevertheless a need to operationalise the concept of identity in a more satisfactory way if it is to be a useful tool in political research. I engage with this question in Chapter 4.

Equally, though there have been numerous uses of identity in international relations scholarship, few enough of them bear any similarity to the approach taken in this thesis. As popular with radical post-structuralists as it is with weak constructivists, identity has often taken on different shapes depending on the meta-theoretical commitments of its end-users. Even within weak constructivism, where this research can be broadly located, there are fundamental differences between scholars in regard to their approach to political research, opening the paradigm up to criticisms that it is less a theory than a school of thought, or that it suffers from a lack of methodological clarity.\(^\text{24}\) These criticisms are not without basis.

Nevertheless, the weak constructivism espoused in this thesis vests a great deal of its belief in its own viability on the basis of its flexibility, a natural consequence of which is a plurality of different approaches. At the same time, I would argue, there has indeed been a mainstream research agenda that has become established within the constructivist tradition,

\(^{22}\) See, for example, Guzzini and Leander (eds.), Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his Critics (Routledge, London, 2006).


\(^{24}\) A point accepted even by many of its advocates. See Kubulkova, Onuf and Kowert (eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1998).
albeit slowly and haltingly, and not as explicitly as within other paradigms.\textsuperscript{25} Largely, this has been along Wendtian lines. Wendt’s primary focus has been to develop a structural theory of international relations that addresses questions of systemic order and change. Arguably, the considerable bulk of constructivist research has proceeded from a related structural perspective. Consequently, at the same time that constructivists stress the importance of the mutual constitution of structure and agency, as discussed in Chapter 3, few enough constructivists actually seriously engage with the empirical applications of this notion. With such rich empirical ground to be tilled in purely holistic theories, it seems, vast tracts of theoretical ground remain fallow.

The structural approach that is so popular in much constructivist research is of only limited use to the question under examination in this thesis. To determine why states engage(d) in humanitarian intervention, it is first necessary to examine the empirical record in some concrete cases to find examples of such behaviour and to establish their basis. However, while structural theories may tell us important things about general trends in international life and provide key ideas that constitute a useful starting point for such analysis, they provide considerably less leverage when applied against particular events or occurrences. At the same time, however, it is a fallacy to suggest that structural theories cannot be used to derive causal propositions. Identity is an inherently structural notion, but, in Chapter 4, I use dominant understandings of identity derived from the analysis in Chapter 3 to reach some causal propositions for the ways in which identity may cause foreign policy action, in this case humanitarian intervention. In so doing, I do not move to an exclusively individualist approach to the research, but maintain the meta-theoretical commitment to a mutually constitutive notion of structure and agency developed in Chapter 3, and apply notions of morphogenetic social analysis to the development of the framework.\textsuperscript{26}

Of course, this framework does not have to be built in a total methodological vacuum; this study is hardly the first to consider the causal implications of identity.\textsuperscript{27} Nevertheless, such

\textsuperscript{25} For further discussion, see Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, 50(2) World Politics (1959), 324-348; Finnemore and Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, 4 Annual Review of Political Science (2001), 391-416.

\textsuperscript{26} See Archer, Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988).

\textsuperscript{27} See, for example, Ashizawa, “When Identity Matters: State Identity, Regional Institution Building and Japanese Foreign Policy”, 10(3) International Studies Review (2008), 571-598; Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo”, 5(1) European Journal of International Relations (1999),
efforts remain in their infancy, and there is much to do to develop an appropriate methodological framework to analyse such questions. In Chapter 4, I try to move beyond the extant focus on the nexus between identities and interest, which, though important, fails to capture, I argue, the complexity of the relationship between identity and foreign policy. In so doing, I draw upon the work of Christian Reus-Smit, which allows for an examination of this relationship along four dimensions: identity (idiographic reasoning); interests (purposive reasoning); dilemmas (ethical reasoning); and actions (instrumental reasoning). This framework, I argue, allows for a more robust understanding of the ways in which identity manifests in foreign policy and a deeper analysis of the causal pathways through which this process moves.

In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I then apply the framework developed in the earlier chapters to three cases studies of the politics of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era. Taking the policies of the United States as a useful starting point, I examine the US approach to three humanitarian crises over the period 1992–1994: in Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti. This case study selection provides us with two cases of intervention and one case of non-intervention against which to assess the merits of the theory. Taken individually, each of the case studies has something important to tell us about the ways in which policies of humanitarian intervention are formulated. More importantly, however, taken collectively the case studies tell us as much about the ways in which identities are articulated, re-articulated, affirmed and revised on the basis of the policies undertaken in their name as they do about policies of humanitarian intervention themselves. These findings are discussed at length in the final chapter, which draws together the distinct threads that run through the case study chapters into a coherent whole. In this context, there is considerable scope for a discussion of the merits of the scientific realist/constructivist approach to international relations theory in a more general sense. Such a discussion seems entirely timely.

29 While other states also undertook humanitarian interventions during this period, restricting the analysis to the changing approach of a single state removes potential confounding factors in terms of national variations. See Chapter 4 for further discussion.
Chapter 2

A Lack of Definition: Towards an Analytical Understanding of Humanitarian Intervention

I. INTRODUCTION

Amidst the maelstrom of conflicting ideas in the literature on humanitarian intervention, it is perhaps unsurprising that no clear picture of what humanitarian intervention actually consists of has yet emerged. Our understanding of what humanitarian intervention is, it seems, depends entirely upon our commitment to one or other of a myriad of principled issues. Yet, the extent of the divide on the central issues pertaining to humanitarian intervention is in fact misleading. This stems in large part from the fact that what is being discussed in the literature on humanitarian intervention is, to the greater extent, an ideal type. Discussion has focused largely on what humanitarian intervention should be, with what humanitarian intervention actually is being relegated to the role of comparator. Thus, the literature has tended to treat humanitarian intervention as a challenge to moral principles, legal precedents and operational doctrines, without also considering the challenges it poses to empirical explanation. For the most part, however, analysts of humanitarian intervention have at least agreed on the set of post-Cold War cases that are or were considered to be humanitarian intervention: the interventions into northern Iraq, Liberia, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor are viewed by most analysts as putative examples of humanitarian intervention.¹ I say ‘putative’ because the analyses of these interventions that have followed their identification have focused largely on how closely these interventions have resembled the imaginary ideal type. As such, a wealth of empirical evidence and a vast literature on the minutiae of these interventions has emerged. However, this evidence has yet to be put to systematic use in assessing whether or not these interventions share core components and, if so, what those core components actually consist of. The breadth of scholarly thought on the moral, legal and operational dimensions of humanitarian intervention has not been matched by a complementary branch of literature that assesses the empirical content of the practice of

¹ To take a representative example, this is the list of post-Cold War interventions included in the report of the ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect.
humanitarian intervention. In a sense, this is unsurprising. The study of humanitarian intervention is a relatively immature field, which largely, though not entirely, originated as a response to the emergence of a string of so-called humanitarian interventions in the immediate post-Cold War era. The questions that were being asked when this field of scholarship emerged as a serious body of literature in its own right—as discussed in Chapter 1—are important questions, which undoubtedly demanded (and still do) careful consideration, reflection and response. However, it remains almost inexplicable why, as this field developed, greater attention has not been paid to the empirical content of the humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era. What we are talking about here is not a lack of use of empirical evidence, description and interpretation, but rather the lack of systematic use of this data in an empirical sense. The question is one of the mode of analysis employed. Thus far, the empirical data has largely only been used in an anecdotal manner, to highlight an ethical, legal or operational issue or to chart the historiography of approaches to an issue. As of yet, a systematic comparative analysis of the content of the so-called humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era has yet to be undertaken.

One of the places in which the divide between the overriding normative orientation of the literature on humanitarian intervention and the lack of empirical analysis is most evident is in the question of the definition of humanitarian intervention itself. Although the search for an adequate definition of humanitarian intervention has been one of the central concerns of the legal and ethical scholarship on the subject, nothing approaching unity of opinion has yet coalesced in this regard. Again, moreover, this debate has remained entirely focused on ideal types. Quite understandably, in law and ethics a definition’s value stems from the extent to which it is able to determine the conditions under which an action is legitimate or illegitimate. Thus, the search for a definition of legitimate humanitarian intervention has largely been transformed into a search for criteria that might govern the application of humanitarian intervention.\(^2\) In other words, the question of the definition of humanitarian intervention has been subverted into a question of appropriate principles for humanitarian intervention. While such questions are undoubtedly important, they need to be matched by a branch of scholarship that is concerned with the practice of humanitarian intervention and a definition that assesses the parameters of what humanitarian intervention is, as well as what it should be. Indeed, such work is an absolute prerequisite for a profitable dialogue

---

\(^2\) See, for example, the debate over criteria in Farer, Archibugi, Brown, Crawford, Weiss and Wheeler, “Roundtable: Humanitarian Intervention After 9/11”. 
between the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention, between the idealism and the reality. In the remainder of this chapter, I will address the issue of what constitutes humanitarian intervention and develop an operational definition of humanitarian intervention that is appropriate and useful in analysing humanitarian intervention in an empirical sense. In doing so, I will break the concept of humanitarian intervention down into its component parts: the interventionary element and the humanitarian element.

II. THE PARAMETERS OF INTERVENTION

The form of intervention that is most commonly associated with the concept of humanitarian intervention is forcible military intervention.³ Thus, Holzgrefe defines intervention as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied”.⁴ Likewise, Sean Murphy defines humanitarian intervention as the “threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights”.⁵ These definitions are typical of those in the literature. Also fairly typical, however, is the fact that neither author actually explains the processes by which they arrived at such a definition. In particular, the rationale for restricting the concept of humanitarian intervention to instances of the ‘threat or use of force’ is particularly poorly explained in the literature as a whole. There is an implicit dichotomy that emerges in this approach, between military humanitarian intervention, on the one hand, and pure non-intervention, on the other. This is at particular divergence from reality, in which states (or other actors), when faced by a humanitarian crisis of a scale that seems to demand a response, have an entire range of policy options that they might employ, including economic sanctions, economic coercion, negotiation, diplomatic pressure, foreign aid, technical assistance, granting or withholding of recognition of a secessionist state, collective action through UN human rights mechanisms, etc., in addition to the options of military intervention or pure non-intervention. This has led certain scholars to try to broaden the remit of humanitarian

³ This is true both of popular perception and the academic literature. Analyses that take this approach include central texts such as Holzgrefe and Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention; Wheeler, Saving Strangers; Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention; Teson, Humanitarian Intervention.
⁵ Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 11-12.
intervention to include both forcible and non-forcible actions. As Ramsbotham and Woodhouse argue, this has the benefit of both recognising the full range of policy options, as well as using the “ordinary English word ‘intervention’ … in an ordinary, accurate way”.

The problem with such an approach, however, is that it may broaden the scope of the definition so much as to render the central concept practically meaningless. As Stanley Hoffmann observes, under such a conceptualisation, “[t]he subject [intervention] is practically the same as that of international politics in general from the beginning of time to the present … Anything can constitute an intervention, indeed even non-acts can constitute intervention.” While Hoffmann is entirely correct to be wary of the dilution of a concept to this kind of extent, there are nonetheless certain parameters that define intervention and make it possible to distinguish intervention from the general practice of international affairs. A useful starting point is to look at R. J. Vincent’s definition of intervention, which has become perhaps the most widely cited and authoritative statement of what constitutes intervention. Vincent asserts that intervention consists of:

Activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state. It is a discrete event having a beginning and an end and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state. It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful but it does break a conventional pattern of international relations.

There are three important elements in Vincent’s definition, which are shared by the literature on intervention more generally, that serve to distinguish intervention from other forms of international action: the action must be coercive; it must be convention-breaking; and it must be aimed at the authority structure of the target state. These three elements will be examined in turn before the discussion moves to some more general questions about the nature of humanitarian intervention.

---

A. Coercion or Compliance?

One of the most obvious but important characteristics of an interventionary policy is that it is a coercive act. As the International Court of Justice pointed out in the *Nicaragua* case, it is “the element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention.”\(^\text{10}\) Coercion, of course, is not limited to the use of military force. Among the various types of intervention discussed above, a number of the non-forcible variants constitute coercive intervention. Economic sanctions are a coercive means of attempting to enforce concessions on the target. Such sanctions were deployed against the Milosevic regime in the former Yugoslavia, in an attempt to force a resolution of the bloody conflict taking place in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^\text{11}\) The use of economic and political inducements and threats to secure compliance by a target group can also be coercive in nature. It is quite clear that the Australian government and its US ally used economic and political inducements and threats against the Habibie government in Indonesia in order to force that government to accept a military intervention in the problem region of East Timor.\(^\text{12}\) Equally, the delivery and provision of humanitarian aid may, depending on the context, amount to a coercive act. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is renowned for its policy of providing aid in conflict situations around the world regardless of state consent. It is indeed illustrative that MSF was born out of the Biafran civil war, in which the Nigerian government considered the provision of aid to the Biafran rebels to be a coercive and hostile act.\(^\text{13}\) However, the element of coercion does rule out a large number of international actions that might otherwise be described as humanitarian intervention. The delivery of humanitarian relief, foreign aid, technical assistance, good offices, negotiation and peacekeeping, for example, are all normally engaged in with the consent of the host government. As such, they cannot accurately be considered to be forms of intervention. Of course, in reality, international responses to crisis situations are likely to


\(^{11}\) For an analysis of the use of economic sanctions in conflict resolution, including the case of the former Yugoslavia, see Oudraat, “Making Economic Sanctions Work?”, 42(3) *Survival* (2000), 105-127.

\(^{12}\) Measures to induce the Habibie government to consent to a peacekeeping force included the United States severing ties to the Indonesian military, the United States and EU suspending arms sales to Indonesia, the IMF suspending the disbursement of $460 million in economic recovery funds, the World Bank freezing $300 million due for disbursement and public calls voicing support for an international force from the UN, United States, Australia and numerous other countries. See Wheeler and Dunne, “East-Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism”, 77(4) *International Affairs* (2001), 805-829; Robinson, “If You Leave Us Here We Will Die”, in Mills and Brunner (eds.), *The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention* (Basic Books, New York, 2002), 159-184.

\(^{13}\) For information on MSF’s philosophy and origins, see the MSF website at <http://www.msf.org>. 
comprise a combination of coercive and non-coercive actions. Thus, the 1991 intervention into northern Iraq to create safe havens for Kurdish refugees and the establishment of no-fly zones was primarily a coercive action, imposed upon the Iraqi state without its consent. At the same time, in April 1991, the Iraqi government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the UN, in which it was agreed that Iraq consented to the non-forcible provision of humanitarian relief in a number of issue areas, including disaster response assistance, and medical, food and relief supplies. While the US-led military operations—Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Southern Watch—were clearly coercive, the actions undertaken on the basis of the MoU were not. Of course, a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other actors also chose not to operate within the limits set within the MoU and engaged in non-forcible but coercive action within Iraq at that time.\(^\text{14}\)

Making the distinction between coercive and non-coercive action is crucial, especially in circumstances where a combination of the two appear. The element of coercion fundamentally transforms an action from one of assistance to one of compellence.\(^\text{15}\) Non-coercive action could therefore better be termed ‘humanitarian assistance’ than ‘humanitarian intervention’. This distinction is necessary for proper causal analysis as compellent action poses different challenges and follows different dynamics than does assistance, for a number of reasons. Primarily, the decision-making process is likely to be different. An act of assistance is more likely to be engaged in at a lower threshold of interest than is a compellent action: the choice to try and enforce one’s will on a recalcitrant adversary will be taken with much greater care than would a similar decision to aid a willing party. This is the case not only because such action runs contrary to the will of the target state and is thus more onerous to legitimate but also because coercion transforms a permissive environment into a non-permissive environment, in which it is much more difficult and hazardous to operate. Such should surely be the lesson of the US-led intervention in Somalia, which began promisingly with the at least grudging acquiescence of many of the warlords in Somalia but quickly metamorphosed into a clearly

\(^{14}\) For more on the consensual and non-consensual humanitarian actions in Iraq, see Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 69-86.

coercive and unwelcome presence, leading eventually to the climactic events in Mogadishu in October 1993.\textsuperscript{16}

The humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era have posed a different and awkward question about consent, however. As noted above, consent from the Habibie government for Australian intervention into East Timor was not initially forthcoming but only materialised following a period of political and economic inducement and threat on the part of Australia and the United States. As such, was consent in this case, extracted as it was under duress, meaningful and, more generally, is consent a useful or tangible mark of differentiation? This is, of course, a question with no firm answer. Clearly, there are cases in which consent is clear and unambiguous, just as there are cases in which non-consent is equally clear. However, a large number of cases are going to fall somewhere along the continuum between full and enthusiastic consent, at the one end, and absolute non-consent, at the other. There are at least three situations in which such ambiguity may be particularly striking: in the cases of states that are under external pressure to provide consent; in the cases of civil wars in which effective power is divided between two or more parties, one of whom refuses consent; and in the cases of so-called ‘failed states’, in which there is no identifiable authority capable of providing consent. Such ambiguity has led certain authors to assert that consent is a poor parameter by which to judge whether an act was interventionary or otherwise.\textsuperscript{17}

This is a premature judgment. Clearly, there is a problem in accurately identifying consent. However, part of the problem has stemmed from the legal connotations of consent, which has produced an overly formal emphasis on technical consent—i.e., the consent of the official government. This means that the consent of the Habibie government ought to be taken as meaningful, even though it clearly was not. Equally, under this formulation, in civil wars, only the consent of the government is at issue, not that of any opposition group. Thus, when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened in Liberia in 1991, at the behest of President Samuel Doe, consent was viewed as

\textsuperscript{16} Of course, this action should still be conceived of as having been coercive and non-consensual from the outset, as consent was ambiguous in political terms, with the powerful warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed in particular having opposed intervention from the outset. Moreover, the United States appeared determined to intervene regardless of the consent of the parties. For more discussion of the relevance of the political connotation of consent, see below. The change in attitudes was nevertheless important, as it affected the overall levels of permissiveness in the operational environment. For more, see Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?” 91 Foreign Policy (1993), 138-154.

\textsuperscript{17} See, for example, Hoffmann, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (University of Notre Dame Press, Chicago, 1997).
forthcoming, despite the fact that Doe controlled only part of the capital Monrovia and virtually none of the rest of the country.\textsuperscript{18} Finally, the emphasis on formal legal consent has caused the issue of consent to become viewed as entirely irrelevant in the case of so-called ‘failed states’, which lack an identifiable government. Thus, consent was not considered to be an issue in the US intervention in Somalia, even though the important Aideed faction opposed intervention from the outset and even after it became abundantly clear that US forces were no longer welcomed by most portions of the society.\textsuperscript{19}

Such conceptions of consent appear entirely too generous when viewed in light of the reality of the conflict situations in which intervention takes place. Indeed, history suggests that it is entirely possible to identify non-consensual situations in which formal consent has been granted if one shifts the referent of consent from the state to the nation. Thus, we can differentiate the political and legal meanings of consent.\textsuperscript{20} Consent in the legal sense, the consent of the ruling government, is not unimportant—indeed, the presence of formal consent may lower the political barriers to outside intervention.\textsuperscript{21} However, legal consent without political consent does not exclude action from being interventionary in nature. The political approach to consent must be predicated on the domestic political balance within a state rather than upon formal notions of right authority. Nonetheless, even from a political perspective consent may be ambiguous. However, considering the more difficult and delicate nature of non-consensual action, it appears analytically sound to consider semi-permissive environments to be non-consensual rather than consensual. There will always be cases in which it is difficult to readily identify the levels of consent; however, the very fact that there is debate and dispute in this regard is an indication of the prudence of an approach in which a high evidentiary burden must be borne in regard to consent.

\textit{B. Convention-Breaking or Business as Usual?}

Another way in which to distinguish intervention from other forms of international action is to assess whether the action is convention-breaking or simply business as usual.


\textsuperscript{19} Such is the argument made by the ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect.

\textsuperscript{20} The distinction between political and legal consent is made by MacFarlane, “Intervention in Contemporary World Politics”, 350 Adelphi Papers (2002).

\textsuperscript{21} As such, Geoffrey Robinson contends that Australia had been ready to send a force to East Timor since before the vote on independence but was unwilling to do so until the Indonesian government’s consent was forthcoming. See Robinson, “If You Leave Us Here We Will Die”.

Intervention (meaning as it does something that comes between two episodes) implies an unconventional mode of behaviour, which is a clear break from the norm. It is important to stress that conventional behaviour should not be conflated with legitimate behaviour. Illegitimate behaviour may become so regular and taken for granted that it can no longer be considered to be intervention.\(^\text{22}\) Thus, the British colonisation of India at the turn of the nineteenth century was an illegitimate and unconventional act. However, the following century in which Britain proceeded to govern and extract resources from India, though illegitimate by most standards, cannot be considered to be a continuing intervention, as it had become the normal state of affairs.\(^\text{23}\)

Equally, conventional action should not be conflated with non-coercive action. For example, the critical reports of such bodies as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group are very often coercive instruments aimed at altering the political authority structure of the target state.\(^\text{24}\) However, this practice has become so ubiquitous, such a normal part of international affairs, that it can hardly be termed intervention. As Vincent puts it, intervention “is a discrete event having a beginning and an end”.\(^\text{25}\) Acts cannot be considered to be convention-breaking unless in a concrete sense a particular action distinguishes itself from the norm, in terms of its breadth, depth or force. Thus, US criticism of the Sudanese regime for the human rights situation in Darfur cannot be considered to be convention-breaking, as such rhetoric is hardly a break from the norm.\(^\text{26}\) However, the early Cold War US practice of ‘psychological warfare’ in places such as Guatemala may be considered to be convention-breaking, as such practices clearly diverge from the normal conduct of international affairs.\(^\text{27}\)

\(^{22}\) This point is well made by Rosenau, “Intervention as a Scientific Concept”, 13(2) Journal of Conflict Resolution (1969), 149-171.

\(^{23}\) An interesting aside can be made here. There has been a tendency among critics of contemporary humanitarian intervention to describe it as a veiled form of neoimperialism. However, imperialism, which implies the direct or indirect control of the domestic affairs of a foreign nation, is far from synonymous with intervention. Intervention may lead to imperialism, but once an action passes from being a break from convention into a conventional system of control it is no longer an intervention. Indeed, the very act of intervention implies a lack of control of domestic power within the target state.

\(^{24}\) For such an argument, see Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics”, 55(4) World Politics (2003), 579-606.

\(^{25}\) Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, 13.

\(^{26}\) See, for example, Leopold, “US, UN Pressure Khartoum to Accept UN Darfur Force”, Reuters, 19 August 2006.

\(^{27}\) See Cullather, Secret History: the CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala (Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1999).
This highlights the fact that it is not the form of the action (i.e., military, diplomatic, economic or political) that here provides the reference point for analytical distinction but rather the extent to which such practice diverges from the normal everyday practice of international affairs. The class of action thus excluded is neither intervention nor is it assistance or non-intervention. Rather, it might better be labelled interference, a term which conveys the non-consensual, authority-oriented and ends-directed character of the act, but yet refrains from overemphasising the exceptional nature of the act. This distinction is important in analytical terms for this research: a radical policy break has a different nature to business as usual, regardless of the content of either set of acts, as it demonstrates a new determination to deal with an issue on different terms, often more aggressively.

C. Political or Neutral?

There is a third and crucially important basis on which we can differentiate interventionary acts from other acts that take a similar form: that interventionary action is always directed at the authority structure of the target state. This line of differentiation follows an ends-directed logic. Foreign policy behaviour can be classified as interventionary only if it seeks to change the domestic balance of power within a target state. Thus, intervention is an intrinsically political act that seeks to secure political ends.

In exploring this dimension, one should firstly stress the difference between an action that seeks to change a particular policy within a country and one that seeks to change the political balance of power. Only the latter constitutes intervention. Cross-border action that seeks to influence policy within another state is a fairly common form of action that, although presumptively an act of interference, does not carry with it the full implications of an interventionary act. Intervention seeks to change the very way in which policy is formulated within a state. This might take the form of a direct change in the personnel authorised to make political decisions, such as in the removal of the Cedras regime in Haiti or the Taylor regime in Liberia, a change in the distribution of political authority within the country, such as the power-sharing structures introduced to such arenas as Bosnia-

---

Herzegovina;\(^\text{29}\) a change in the scope of political authority, such as in the unique status conferred upon Kosovo or the full independence secured in East Timor;\(^\text{30}\) or a change in the machinery through which political decisions can be channelled, as in the promotion of democracy in places such as Sierra Leone and Liberia.\(^\text{31}\) What is important is that intervention seeks to change the ways in which political decisions can be made, not just the content of a particular set of policies. Thus, when Milton Friedman travelled to Latin America in the 1970s to promote an agenda of neoliberal reforms, which he claimed would improve the human rights of the people of the continent, his aim was only to change the content of economic policy in the countries which he visited, not the structure of political power. It is, of course, notable that the catalyst for this visit was the assumption of power by the Pinochet regime in Chile, a situation that Friedman did not oppose but whose economic direction he merely sought to influence.\(^\text{32}\) Such action is clearly not authority-targeted but policy-oriented.

This raises an important point about intervention: intervention is never a neutral act. Intervention seeks to alter the domestic balance of power within a state, an action that will always produce winners and losers, and is in this sense partisan. This analysis has important implications, as an intervention will always run contrary to the interest of at least one party, at least in part. Thus, intervention is likely to be confrontational and subject to higher costs than other similar forms of action. The environment in which intervention must take place is therefore less permissive and, as noted above, its modus operandi must therefore differ from other classes of action. This aspect of the character of humanitarian intervention is often overlooked (despite the fact that it is generally recognised within the literature on intervention more generally), yet it is crucially important. It is this aspect that most clearly differentiates humanitarian intervention from peacekeeping. The literature unfortunately tends to gloss over this fact, preferring to differentiate peacekeeping from humanitarian intervention on the basis of consent or the non-use of force. Although these factors are important hallmarks of the divide between peacekeeping and humanitarian


intervention, whose usefulness as a line of demarcation may once also have been more robust, in reference to present-day peace operations they seem insufficiently determinate. Peacekeeping forces may use force at times in the expedition of their duties. Indeed, with the advent of second- and third-generation peacekeeping, such action is increasingly becoming hardwired into the mandates of peacekeeping forces.\textsuperscript{33} Equally, as highlighted above, consent is generally difficult to assess accurately, with most environments being semi-permissive rather than permissive or non-permissive. By comparison, the question of whether cross-border action seeks to change the authority structure in a state is often much more apparent. Peacekeeping forces are traditionally introduced to monitor and support a pre-existing peace agreement or to provide the level of confidence in security conditions that is necessary for a peace process to take hold. Humanitarian intervention, in contrast, seeks to create a peace and a new distribution of power as a direct consequence of the military force that is applied in the target state. Again, the compellent character of intervention is key.

\textit{D. Forcible or Non-forcible?}

For an action to constitute intervention, it is necessary that all of the abovementioned elements be present; each on their own is insufficient. For example, criticisms of a government’s human rights record may be coercive and even sometimes aimed at the authority-structure of the target state but are not necessarily convention-breaking; international assistance in the drafting of a plan for power-sharing may be convention-breaking and aimed at the authority structure of a state but not coercive; and the severing of diplomatic ties may be both convention-breaking and coercive but not necessarily aimed at the political authority structure of a state. As such, none of these actions constitute intervention. What we are left with is a much smaller class of actions that nonetheless still encompasses forcible and non-forcible variants, including direct military intervention; the threat of force; economic sanctions; the funding, arming and supply of opposition groups; assassination of leaders; covert intervention; recognition of a secessionist state; etc. Nothing said so far has served to explain the overwhelming dominance of the approach under which military intervention is considered to be the sole content of the concept of humanitarian intervention. One can nonetheless identify several reasons why such an approach may have so firmly taken hold.

\textsuperscript{33} See Findlay, \textit{The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations} (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002).
The first refers to the occasions for intervention. It is often remarked that humanitarian intervention should be restricted to the most grave of situations, instances that, as Michael Walzer puts it, “shock the moral conscience of mankind”. Thus, in the search for criteria of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention, much has been written on the importance of force as a last resort, where other forms of intervention have proved or appear likely to be ineffective. Equally, certain authors have tried to restrict the applicability of intervention to certain classes of action, notably genocide and ethnic cleansing, to which it is implied the only solution may be the use of force. While the context for intervention is important, as I will describe below, these considerations speak not to the nature of intervention itself but to the specifics of the situations in which intervention may take place. They can be decided only on the basis of a case-by-case analysis. They tell us nothing specific about the content of intervention itself.

Another consideration may be the actors involved in military intervention and the consequent implications for the power dynamics of military intervention. In the sense that military intervention seeks to impose one nation’s will upon another through force of arms, it may be a necessary condition that the intervening nation be more powerful than the target state. Thus, Hedley Bull writes that: “[a] basic condition of any policy that can be called interventionary in this sense is that the intervener should be superior in power to the object of the intervention: it is only because the former is relatively strong and the latter relatively weak that the question arises of a form of intervention that is dictatorial or coercive.” Thus, military humanitarian intervention has tended to set the world’s powerful nations (often major Western powers but also aspiring regional hegemons) against the world’s peripheral nations. As such, humanitarian intervention is a projection.

---

38 Of the so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’ of the post-Cold War era, five states are notable for their engagement in humanitarian intervention. The United States, which led interventions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo; the United Kingdom, which led an intervention in Sierra Leone and participated in northern Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo; France, which led an intervention into Rwanda and participated in northern Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo; Australia, which led an intervention into East Timor and participated in northern Iraq; and Nigeria, which led interventions into Liberia and Sierra Leone. All are major powers or aspiring regional hegemons. Other major troop contributing countries include Pakistan and India, both of whom could be said to harbour geopolitical ambitions.
of hard power that creates tangible rifts between the powerful and the powerless. This is not so clearly the case with non-military intervention. Thus, Western criticisms of Russian (military) policy in Chechnya have produced only marginal fluctuations in Western–Russian relations, whereas a policy of military intervention to defend the rights of Chechnyans against the ‘Russian aggressor’ would have taken on immense proportions.\footnote{More recently, one can also note the refusal of NATO leaders to consider Georgia’s request for membership during the period of tension between Russia and Georgia in early 2008, as this would have moved the relationship between Georgia and the West from tacit support to a military alliance, with all the implications the latter would have.}

This reality is important and does indeed highlight many of the normative connotations of a policy of humanitarian intervention, taking on as it does neoimperialist overtones, in addition to its obvious implications for issues such as sovereignty and self-determination. Again, however, the issue is one of context rather than nature. There is nothing to suggest that the powerful might not intervene against the powerful, should the rationale be strong enough. Neither is the actual incidence of a power differential always as apparent as is often suggested. For example, ECOWAS’ interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone under Nigerian leadership set an aspiring regional hegemon against two weaker and largely failing states. However, the predominance of Nigerian power was less than clearly marked, as is evidenced by the fact that these interventions, despite considerable levels of commitment in terms of manpower and finances, were unable to secure control of more than isolated portions of the countries involved.\footnote{See Yoroms, “ECOMOG”}

The incidence of power differentials does serve to highlight some of the more contentious aspects of humanitarian intervention and is thus useful in the kinds of normative enquiry that dominate the literature, but it does not tell us anything intrinsic about intervention. Whether the issue of power differentials applies is an empirical question that is dependent upon the context for intervention, it is not a feature of intervention itself.

Perhaps the most substantial factor to divide military and non-military interventions is the level of commitment required to sustain such action. Although costs may attach to certain non-military interventions, such as economic sanctions or the funding, arming and supply of opposition groups, these pale in comparison to the costs associated with a policy of full military intervention. As a consequence, the decision to undertake a non-military intervention may be insuperably easier to reach than one which contemplates military intervention. In essence, military intervention is the ultimate form of intervention, in which
a state decides that it is willing to take on significant financial costs and risk to its servicemen and women in order to achieve its policy goals. Thus, it may indeed be useful in practice to differentiate between military and non-military intervention, not only because the two may involve different forms and levels of decision-making but also because the latter form is where the many challenges and dilemmas of humanitarian intervention are posed at their starkest. It is important, however, to state that this is an operational rather than a definitional distinction. There is nothing intrinsic about military humanitarian intervention to differentiate it from its non-military forms. However, its modus operandi may be significantly different and this justifies an analytical separation of the two forms. As such, this analysis will focus on military humanitarian intervention, as this form of intervention appears to provide the most fertile ground for an analysis of the complicated dynamics of humanitarian intervention. In the following analysis, ‘humanitarian intervention’ will be taken to mean ‘military humanitarian intervention’ unless explicitly stated otherwise.

III. THE PARAMETERS OF HUMANITARIANISM

While the literature on intervention displays some consensus on the characteristics of intervention and is thus useful in highlighting the parameters of interventionary action, the literature on humanitarian intervention has been much less clear and decisive as to what it is that makes humanitarian intervention ‘humanitarian’. There have been two main schools of thought in regard to what constitutes the humanitarian component of humanitarian intervention: one which privileges motives, and one which privileges outcomes.

A. Do Motives Matter?

One of the most widely cited examples of a motives-based approach to understanding humanitarian intervention is the definition provided by Wil Verwey: “the threat or use of force … for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a serious violation of human rights”.41 Verwey has become emblematic of a school of thought that suggests that it is the humanitarian motives of the intervening state that defines whether or not an intervention was humanitarian. Such a position flows from the very reasonable proposition that an exception to the normative prohibition on the use of force across state borders had been carved out on the basis that the act itself was altruistic or selfless, hardly the kind of action

---

that the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention were created to exclude from international relations. However, the intuitiveness of this proposition also disguises a number of significant difficulties with this approach.

Firstly, it has been far from clear from the analyses of a number of authors just what is meant by ‘humanitarian’ motives. In fact, Verwey is among the clearest on this point, although his argument seems at odds with most of the rest of the literature. Verwey’s understanding of ‘humanitarian’ flows from the understanding of ‘humanitarian’ employed by the major Western humanitarian relief agencies. Essentially, Verwey understands ‘humanitarianism’ to be characterised by the four central tenets of the Red Cross system: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and universality.\(^{42}\) While the explication of what it means to act in a humanitarian manner is to be welcomed, there is a problem with this particular formulation in that it may be somewhat parochial. Fundamentally, such an approach conflates principles for humanitarian action with the content of humanitarianism itself. Humanity, neutrality, impartiality and universality are no more than operational guidelines that have been adumbrated by a certain set of actors in order to channel their actions towards humanitarian ends. These principles are widely held, to be sure, but are not immune from challenge, as is evident from MSF’s split from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) following the Biafran civil war, in which it was these very principles that were brought into dispute.\(^{43}\)

Moreover, there is a sense here that humanitarianism is or must necessarily be apolitical or purely altruistic (a sense that is often also shared by other authors who do not subscribe to this formulation). This conception is, of course, at odds with the definition of intervention given above and represents a misappropriation of the term. As Ramsbotham and Woodhouse rightly point out: “the projection of armed force across a border against the will of the target government in response [is], by its nature, political through and through”.\(^{44}\) It is an impossibility for an action that is ‘humanitarian’ in the sense that Verwey describes to also be interventionary in the sense that I have described above. Thus, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse conclude: “[n]o wonder analysts who employ such criteria conclude that there have been no examples of forcible humanitarian intervention at all”.\(^{45}\)

\(^{42}\) For a discussion of these values, see Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, *Humanitarian Intervention*.
\(^{43}\) See the MSF website, at <http://www.msf.org>.
\(^{44}\) Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 57.
\(^{45}\) *Ibid.*
It seems that Verwey’s analysis of what it means to act in a humanitarian manner has the sole benefit, in the context of humanitarian intervention, of being explicit. This is a feature that is notably absent from other discussions of humanitarian motive, which seem to take the concept as a given, when it is anything but. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in a lengthy philosophical discussion as to the precise nature of humanitarianism but an understanding must nevertheless be explicated. It appears from the bulk of the literature that what is generally understood by humanitarian motive is roughly coincidental with Kant’s third categorical imperative, that human beings should be treated as ends in and of themselves. This seems to be the kind of conception that, for example, Michael Walzer is developing when he talks about the importance of having “regard for the purposes of the oppressed”. This approach is at least prima facie compatible with the idea of humanitarian intervention being an intrinsically political act. Nonetheless, the question remains whether humanitarian motives are the most appropriate manner of identifying the humanitarian content of a particular intervention. In fact, the humanitarian motives approach, even with humanitarianism more satisfactorily defined, is subject to a number of difficulties in terms of its applicability.

The first problem is an epistemic difficulty in that it may be impossible to infer motives accurately. With no accurate gauge of the motives of intervening states available to onlookers, the pluralist objection of the potential for abuse in a doctrine of humanitarian intervention rears its head. As such, the motives approach seemed to some to militate for a prima facie case against humanitarian intervention on the rule utilitarian basis that an exception to the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention would lead to abuse, lowering overall utility. The problem with this response is well put by the Argentine international lawyer Fernando Teson, however. Teson argues that, in reality, the rule utilitarian rejection of humanitarian intervention depends upon:

[A]n empirical rather than a principled claim. It depends on the truth of the proposition that governments always, or almost always, abuse when they intervene abroad, even if they say

---

46 Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays* (Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983).
47 Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 104.
they are intervening on grounds of humanity, and even if the actual result of the intervention is to restore human rights.49

In a later passage, Teson also makes the important point that:

In any case, it is not clear what is meant by ‘abuse’ and ‘partiality’ in this argument … Some legal scholars approach this problem as one of disinterestedness. In this view, a necessary condition for the justification of humanitarian intervention is that the interveners act out of purely humanitarian concerns. A state acts abusively by this standard if it entertains a hidden agenda—if its principal motives are selfish.50

That a state should be expected to engage in humanitarian intervention on purely selfless grounds sets the bar of legitimacy perhaps insurmountably high. As Michael Walzer puts it: “[a] pure moral will doesn’t exist in political life, and it shouldn’t be necessary to pretend to that kind of purity”.51 Thus, most motives-oriented scholars have retreated from a position based on selflessness and have moved instead towards a more realistic view that admits other motivations, albeit still privileging humanitarian motives. Thus, for example, Bhiku Parekh defines humanitarian intervention as “an act wholly or primarily guided by the sentiment of humanity, compassion or fellow-feeling and is in that sense disinterested”.52 Likewise, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argues that because “motivations are inevitably mixed … the humanitarian rationale need not be exclusive, but it must be explicit”.53 Although these positions represent an improvement on the pure motivations problem, however, they do nothing to alleviate the epistemic problem. Motivations remain impossible to infer; indeed, in an approach that allows for mixed motivations, further confounding factors arise in terms of what weight should be given to the humanitarian motive and what the evidentiary burden of proof to be met is.

B. Do Outcomes Matter?

In addition to the difficulties ascribed to the motives approach above, a further criticism of this approach can be raised. An exclusive focus on motives tells us nothing about the consequences of action. Thus, an intervention that is prompted by humanitarian motives

50 Ibid., 112.
52 Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention”, 54. Emphasis added.
53 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect.
but is so inappropriate or so poorly planned or executed that it in fact causes more suffering than it alleviates would remain legitimate under a motives-based schema. Fernando Teson argues that:

This methodology is unacceptable. If we are concerned with human rights we must look most primarily at whether the intervention has rescued the victims of oppression, and whether human rights have subsequently been restored.\textsuperscript{54}

This approach is what I have called the ‘outcomes’ approach and has the advantage that it situates the locus of legitimacy in the sufferers of rights abuses themselves. If an intervention has alleviated the suffering and restored the rights of the victims of oppression then it can be deemed to be humanitarian. There are many merits to such an approach, predominant among which is an escape from the (supposed) need to demonstrate pure motives and the related epistemic problem. The shortcoming of this approach is that it introduces a dangerous consequentialism from which, once committed, it is difficult to escape. Nicholas Wheeler, a prominent outcomes-oriented author, is aware of this potential and adds the caveat:

I am not arguing that the society of states should praise those governments that are fortunate in achieving this happy coincidence of non-humanitarian motives, means and outcomes. But I am arguing that, because they save lives, such interventions should be legitimated by states and not condemned or sanctioned.\textsuperscript{55}

Unfortunately, in practice, the line between legitimation and praise is sufficiently thin that the charge of consequentialism creeps back in. The outcomes approach would legitimate any action that happens to produce a humanitarian outcome, no matter what the nature of the act. This opens the door for states acting out of selfish motives to undertake almost any type of intervention against a state with a poor human rights record, assuming the intervention causes less damage than the prior rights abuses within the state and, incidentally, ends them. Thus, a state that abuses the rights of its citizens opens the door for almost any kind of action against it. This seems entirely too permissive and hardly the kind of result that the exception to the rules on non-intervention was intended to allow for. Leaving aside the desirability of such a test for a moment, it is difficult to see how such a test is even feasible in practice. Is it even possible to compare diverse rights abuses such as repression of civil liberties, denial of political freedoms, arbitrary detention, rape, torture,

\textsuperscript{54} Teson, \textit{Humanitarian Intervention}, 113.
\textsuperscript{55} Wheeler, \textit{Saving Strangers}, 39.
mutilation and murder? What weight do we grant to each of these manifold obscenities? Is it possible to satisfactorily evaluate outcomes in any but the most cut and dried of cases? The contemporary cases of humanitarian intervention have been anything but straightforward in this regard and it is hard to see how an outcomes approach can be anything but subjective in evaluating the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.

If retrospective evaluation of the humanitarian outcomes of intervention is, in certain cases, difficult to the point of impossibility, prior evaluation of the likely humanitarian outcomes of an intervention is even more fraught with difficulty. Such has been the demand of the outcomes-based approach in legitimating intervention prior to its inception: that the party considering intervention have a reasonable expectation of a humanitarian outcome. The indeterminacy of expectations of outcomes in cases of military intervention should need no explanation: outcomes depend on a complex and unpredictable mix of factors and can be significantly determined by unforeseen events. A striking example involves the current US-led war in Iraq, in which a speedy victory was both predicted and announced, and the post-war reconstruction of the country was largely expected to proceed smoothly. Whether or not US policy-makers should reasonably have expected the extent of the turmoil that has wracked the country since the 2003 invasion is a matter for debate, but it seems entirely unclear whether an accurate prediction of the outcomes of the intervention could have been expected prior to the war.

These shortcomings pose severe difficulties in the application of the outcomes approach. However, a more fundamental deficiency must also be considered. Here, we have an approach that tends to liken purposive acts according to their results, without sufficient consideration of the nature of the act itself. A useful illustration is the Kantian analogy of a burglar who breaks into a house with the intention of stealing property but in so doing inadvertently prevents a murder from taking place. The positive results of the burglar’s actions say nothing about the content of those actions. Under an outcomes schema, we run the risk of equating such an act with that of a firefighter saving a person from a burning building or a simple bystander saving a child from drowning in a lake. Action cannot be categorised solely on the basis of its outcomes lest we be left with a hollow concept, the objects of which bear no essential relation to each other. A reasonable expectation of outcome is a useful normative criterion that may guide when and where intervention

---

56 Though not by all: many within the State Department and US Army War College harboured concerns, but these were largely sidelined.
should take place. However, if we are concerned to investigate humanitarian intervention as an analytical concept, the outcomes approach has little to offer.

C. Intentions Matter

Thus far, I have documented the substantive deficiencies of the motives and outcomes approaches. However, more pertinent to this research is my contention that neither category is analytically meaningful. Both have been developed through the lens of a normative orientation towards humanitarian intervention: they treat humanitarian intervention as it ought to be rather than as it is. This creates problems when we try to apply these strictures to a flawed reality. To move beyond these issues it is necessary to redefine humanitarian intervention in terms that might adequately describe the core content of those interventions that we have come to consider to have been humanitarian interventions. Alex Bellamy offers a solution to this problem in terms of a focus on intentional action rather than altruistic motives or commendable outcomes. In many senses, this can be seen to be a pragmatic solution to the motives–outcomes debate, as it occupies a constructive middle ground between these two positions. However, the problem with this, as with many pragmatic solutions, is that the solution runs the risk of collapsing into one or other of the categories from which it was initially distinguished. Therefore, it is worth taking some time at the beginning of this section to properly delineate what we mean by motives, intentions and expectations of outcomes.

Such questions have been poorly addressed within the humanitarian intervention literature (indeed, have often been treated as self-evident). However, mercifully, the same is not true in ethical and legal philosophy more generally. The distinctions between motives and intentions have been extensively treated in philosophical circles; equally, the criminal law has much to tell us about the interplay of motives, intents and outcomes. Let us start by defining what we mean by motives: in psychology, motive is often used to refer to desires or drives, but in philosophy the term is more closely equated with reasons for action. One acts out of motives such as jealousy, avarice, humanitarianism, etc.; these are the reasons for action. However, motive cannot yet be seen as the cause of action, only as a context to action. A motive such as jealousy may suggest a number of courses of action, the particular action chosen may depend upon other considerations, such as the best way to achieve one’s

goals. Thus, motives are roughly equivalent to reasons and provide the context to action rather than the definite cause of action.

Intention, in contrast, has been defined as “a course of action that a person has adopted as well as an objective, end or goal”.58 As such, motives represent the reasons for action whereas intentions indicate the course of action decided upon. In this context, one could say, being motivated by jealousy, I intend to murder the object of my jealousy. This criminal analogy serves to highlight the distinction between motives and intentions yet further. The motive of jealousy does not determine my decision to commit murder. In response to the same motive I may elect a course of action that does not involve murder, such as blackmail, assault, theft, persuasion, etc. Likewise, the intent to commit murder is not logically dependent on a motive of jealousy. I could equally be motivated by revenge, avarice, anger or even hedonism. This distinction is crucially important to the criminal law. Motive is important to police work, as it provides context to action, through which one might plausibly deduce the facts of the situation. However, in a courtroom, motive becomes less relevant: it is the intent that is important. Murder remains murder irrespective of the motive,59 but without the intent to murder, the killing of another may become manslaughter only.

We must also distinguish intention from an expectation of an outcome. The second part of the definition of intention given above describes intention as “an objective, end or goal”. In some senses this could be construed as an expectation of an outcome: I intend to take this or that action because I expect it to have this or that outcome, which is my goal. However, one can identify the difference between intended outcomes and unintended outcomes. An intended outcome is an outcome one desires to achieve, as it serves an objective, end or goal. An unintended outcome, conversely, may indeed be the product of purposive action but it is not the product that is intended. This is not to say that it is necessarily unforeseen, only that it is not the objective of the purposive action. I may expect that I may face arrest for the commission of murder but it was never my intent to seek arrest as an objective by committing murder. Nor need the unintended consequences always be perverse. I may take aspirin with the intention of ridding myself of a troublesome headache and by doing so I

58 Scheer, “Intentions, Motives and Causation”, 76 Philosophy (2001), 397-413, at 398.
59 Although in sentencing, motive may affect the level of punishment prescribed. In this sense, again, motive is relevant to how good or bad an act is, not to the nature of the act itself.
may also achieve the (beneficial) unintended consequence of lowering my risk of heart attack through aspirin’s effects in thinning the blood.

If we are concerned with the character of purposive acts themselves, we must be concerned with the intended consequences rather than the unintended consequences. The latter may tell us much about how beneficial or detrimental, how good or bad, an act actually was but it does not tell us what the nature of the act itself was. The nature of the act is a function of the intended consequences of action only. The unintended consequences may even play no part in the decision itself if they are not seen to impinge in any significant way upon the course of action selected. This distinction is highlighted by Robert Merton: “[i]n considering purposive action, we are concerned with ‘conduct’ as distinct from ‘behavior’, that is, with action which involves motives and consequently a choice between various alternatives”.  

Again, our discussion raises the question of multiple possible courses of action, one of which is chosen on the basis of its suitability for achieving desired outcomes.

The implications of this paradigm shift for investigations of humanitarian intervention is perhaps more profound than is initially apparent. Taking Bellamy’s focus on intentions as a starting point, it becomes possible to argue, as I do here, that humanitarian intervention may be a product of diverse motivations, which may or may not include humanitarian motives. Equally, the nature of humanitarian intervention is not dependent upon its outcomes. Under an intentions schema, it is perfectly possible to imagine a humanitarian intervention taking place in which humanitarian motive was entirely absent. Humanitarian crises, even if confined within one state, pose real and severe security problems for other states in the international system. The flow of refugees across borders may cause political and economic problems for neighbouring states, as in the case of India in 1971, where the influx of millions of Bengali refugees fleeing Pakistani repression caused severe economic and political problems to take hold. The development of intra-societal fissures and tensions may cause similar tensions to intensify in other states, as in the cases of Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where tensions between Tutsis and Hutus were intensified by the ethnic conflict taking place in neighbouring Rwanda.  

---

small arms, looted resources and finances that often accompany civil wars may destabilise neighbouring states by providing opportunities for criminal and violent networks to take root in a nation’s society, as in Macedonia, where the presence of plentiful amounts of small arms, Kosovar Liberation Army bases and Albanian organised crime networks, mainly involved in smuggling, eventually became the basis for the establishment of militias among Macedonia’s own ethnic Albanian minority.63

Perhaps most tellingly, given the current international focus on issues of transnational terrorism, there has been a growing awareness that failed and conflict-ridden states may provide a haven for transnational terrorist groups.64 Such has been the emergent perception in Washington in regard to the ongoing civil war in Somalia, but this reality is nothing new: to cite but one example, Algerian militants involved in that country’s bloody civil war carried out numerous terrorist attacks in France during the mid-1990s.65 Overlaying these issues is the ever-present danger that conflict may spread across borders, as it has in so many instances, from Liberia to Sierra Leone, from Rwanda to the Congo, Sudan to Chad, etc. In response to these threats, states may well opt to engage in intervention out of a concern for their own parochial interests, yet nonetheless decide that the optimum way to secure those interests is to engage in an intervention that secures peace and human rights within the target state. The crucial point is that such action might be prosecuted in the complete absence of any concern for the human rights of the citizens concerned but that, if intervention was undertaken with the intention of securing peace and human rights within the target state, this action could therefore be classified as humanitarian intervention, irrespective of the motives that impelled intervention.

Equally, I have highlighted above the difficulties in assessing the likelihood of a positive humanitarian outcome prior to intervention. If one intends to intervene to protect human rights, one is also likely to expect positive outcomes. However, if such outcomes are not secured, as has happened many times, this cannot be grounds for the declassification of an

64 For an analysis of the emerging linkage between development and security on the part of international actors, see Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (Zed Books, New York, 2001).
65 On the growing concern with international terrorism in Africa’s weak states, including Somalia, see Lyman and Morrison, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa”, 83(1) Foreign Affairs (2004), 75-86. For an analysis of France’s experience with international terrorism, including that perpetrated by Algerian groups, see Shapiro and Suzan, “The French Experience of Counter-terrorism”, 45(1) Survival (2003), 67-98.
action as humanitarian intervention. The outcomes of interventionary action are indeterminate, an issue that is particularly pertinent when one is considering humanitarian outcomes. Certain outcomes are easier to predict than others. For example, US military planners may have had high levels of justified confidence in their ability to defeat the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq militarily. However, the question of whether this could also have been achieved in tandem with rights protection and promotion is a murkier one indeed. One cannot accurately predict the actions and reactions of human agents and therefore one cannot accurately predict the likelihood of a humanitarian outcome in all but the most clearcut of cases. As such, an intention to protect and promote human rights through intervention may not always be accompanied by a positive humanitarian outcome. However, if we are concerned with the type of action rather than its consequences, intention should be a sufficient condition for classification of an intervention as humanitarian. Greater depth may indeed be added by a sensitivity to the potential for humanitarian outcomes but this is a normative element. Reasonable expectations and positive outcomes may tell us whether an intervention was, in the event, well planned and appropriately directed (i.e., whether or not the decision to intervene was a good or bad one) but they do not speak directly to the nature of the act itself. For the latter, we should primarily be concerned with the intentions of the actor.

Both the motives and the outcomes approach have important implications for the quality of intervention and may indeed be useful in research that is directed towards normative evaluations of humanitarian intervention. However, both are problematic if we try to apply them to empirical questions. If we are concerned to investigate the nature and dynamics of the so-called humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era, we are better served by an approach that does not require these kinds of normative judgments. This is not to say that the intentions approach is inapplicable to normative questions nor that one can necessarily be entirely value-free in the application of this approach, but that the intentions approach does not intrinsically require one to simultaneously pass judgment on whether an intervention was good or bad in order then to empirically examine it. As such, the intentions approach provides a superior basis for empirical analysis of the phenomenon of humanitarian intervention.
IV. CONCLUSION

In the foregoing, I have been careful to try and classify actions according to their intrinsic characteristics without falling into the trap of widening the scope of my definitions so much that they lose all meaning. However, by removing humanitarian outcomes and, particularly, humanitarian motives from my definition of humanitarian intervention, I may have left myself open to the criticism that I have done exactly that. By removing the need for altruism or, indeed, compassion in any form from the definition of humanitarian intervention, there is a danger that humanitarian intervention loses its conceptual distinction. In other words, under the approach that I have advocated here, is there anything left to differentiate the contemporary humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era from other periods of self-interested intervention that were undertaken under the veneer of a humanitarian or altruistic patina, such as the ‘white man’s burden’ or ‘mission civilisatrice’ of the nineteenth century, or the policies of containment or the ‘putting out of prairie fires’ of the Cold War? Equally, how different were the interventions undertaken in the name of the ‘war on terrorism’, which also were presented as forwarding humanitarian and idealistic goals? There is, as yet, no definitive answer to this question, which will depend in large part on greater empirical research into the dynamics of these actions. However, as Fixdal and Smith put it, “[g]iven that humanitarian intervention contains aspects of both realism and idealism and is a topic born of the post-Cold War, it offers us a new context and a different set of problems and issues to examine in exploring this old debate”.

---

66 “The phrase ‘putting out prairie fires’ was used by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower to describe his modification to the Truman doctrine of containment, and was notably used in Iran and Guatemala in 1953 and 1954, respectively.

67 Fixdal and Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War”, 284.
Chapter 3

From the Abstract to the Concrete: Using Meta-theory to Inform Mid-level Theory

I. INTRODUCTION

It is not yet possible to talk of a theory of humanitarian intervention. At first glance, the issue appears to be related to the long-standing debate in international relations between realism and idealism. Proponents of humanitarian intervention often seem to imply that its agents have somehow transcended the narrow narcissism of world politics in pursuit of a progressive agenda. Those who challenge such a view stress the immutability of material self-interest in international politics and/or the pageantry of those who veil their power political agendas with proletarian reference to human rights and universal principles. Yet these are both extreme and unexamined positions. As Jakobsen puts it: “a systematic, comparative analysis of the factors triggering these interventions has yet to be undertaken”. In Chapters 1 and 2, I suggested that the question of why states have chosen to engage in humanitarian intervention may be important in terms of understanding some of the changes that have taken place in international affairs since the end of the Cold War, as well as to assess the likely frequency and type of interventions in the coming years. Despite the recent interposition of September 11 into the political landscape, this remains a pertinent question; indeed, has become all the more pertinent if we accept the proposition that, despite being fundamentally different types of intervention, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have shared many of the same logics as the humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era.

In this chapter, I will provide the groundwork for the development of a theory of humanitarian intervention, which may help to shed some light on the transformations of the past two decades. In order to map out the terrain within which such an enterprise should be located, I will engage with some fundamental issues of the philosophy of social science.

---

1 Jakobsen, “National Interest, Humanitarianism”, 205.
2 A point most sophisticatedly put by Rieff, At the Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention (Simon and Schuster, New York, 2005). Others have even asked whether we can class these wars as humanitarian interventions. See, for example, Roth, “Was the Iraq War a Humanitarian Intervention?” 5(2) Journal of Military Ethics (2006), 84-92.
An engagement with these meta-theoretical issues is a necessary first step in the development of theory, as our answers to questions of ontology, epistemology and axiology will fundamentally determine the kinds of questions we ask of social life, how we ask them, which methods we should use to investigate them and how our answers should be presented and understood. Just as empirical investigation lacks substantive meaning when shorn of a theoretical framework, so too does theory demand a properly explicated meta-theoretical framework in order to be fully meaningful. In the remainder of this chapter, I will map out the contours of my approach to the research by engaging with three of the main problematics (or, better, debates) within the philosophy of social science: the materialism–idealism debate; the agency–structure debate; and the constitution–causality debate. In doing so, I will explicate my position in terms of two meta-theoretical positions: scientific realism and thin (or Wendtian) constructivism. Although Wendt himself subscribes to a version of scientific realism, it is necessary to distinguish the two, as the scientific realism that Wendt adduces differs from more conventional understandings of scientific realism in certain important respects. In particular, Wendt’s explicitly positivist methodology constrains some of scientific realism’s more critical insights into social life in terms of causal complexity and the dialectical relationships between structure and agency and causality and constitution, particularly in terms of historicity. As the remainder of this chapter should demonstrate, I hew more closely to the traditional understandings of scientific realism on these important questions. Nevertheless, once shorn of its positivist methodology, Wendt’s realist–idealist ontology is not only compatible with scientific realism, it also has much to offer in developing the kinds of rich, thick understandings of

---

3 For a discussion of scientific realism, see the special issue of Millennium: Various, “Forum: Scientific and Critical Realism in International Relations”, 35(2) Millennium: Journal of International Studies (2007), 343-416. See also Patomaki and Wight, “After Postpositivism: The Promise of Critical Realism?” 44(2) International Studies Quarterly (2000), 213-237; Patomaki, After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of International Politics (Routledge, London, 2002); Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006); Collier, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (Verso, London, 1994); Wendt, Social Theory. For a discussion of thin constructivism, see Wendt, Social Theory; Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (Columbia University Press, New York, 1996). Rather than belabouring the necessary distinction between the thin Wendtian variant of constructivism and its more radical counterparts, in what follows I shall simply use the less toothsome moniker of constructivism to refer to this particular brand of constructivism and rather specify any other variants of constructivism that should come under discussion as and when is necessary.

causal complexes that make scientific realism such a compelling position from which to analyse international affairs.

In what follows, I will develop some of the insights of scientific realism and constructivism by unpacking some of the issues surrounding the materialism–idealism debate, the agency–structure debate and the constitution–causality debate. It has become the norm, especially following the not uncontroversial address given by Robert Keohane to the American Political Science Association in 1988, to frame these debates in terms of a seemingly incontrovertible set of epistemological and methodological divisions between rationalists and reflectivists. Given that the literature on humanitarian intervention has been dominated by two primary schools of theory—the English School and neoliberal institutionalism—which correspond to these two approaches to the study of international relations, many of the arguments I will use in this chapter will be framed in these terms. However, such an approach brings with it the dangerous tendency to create ‘straw men’ to be deconstructed. This is not the aim of this chapter, which is rather to explore the potentials and pitfalls inherent in trying to develop an explanatory theory of humanitarian intervention. Thus, two points of explanation are necessary to flesh out the aims of this chapter.

Firstly, both the English School and neoliberal institutionalism have provided important insights into humanitarian intervention but neither has engaged in a sustained effort to explain its practice. As such, I will explore the insights these theories might bring to the development of such an explanatory framework, as well as the space left vacant by their different theoretical priorities, in order to draw out a viewpoint that builds upon, rather than challenges, their conceptions of humanitarian intervention. Secondly, it should be expressly noted that this enterprise is entirely coherent with my methodological pluralism. In using scientific realism and constructivism to inform my theoretical approach to the study of humanitarian intervention, I am explicitly engaged in an effort to break free from the unrealistic constraints of the kind of calcified thinking inherent in framing the rationalism–reflectivism, materialism–idealism, agency–structure and constitution–causality debates in terms of problematics. Whether one prefers Wendt’s metaphor of a ‘via media’ or Wight’s rejection of this term in favour of ‘restructuring’ the debate such that a ‘via media’ is not necessary, both scientific realism and Wendtian constructivism are

---

5 See Keohane, “International Institutions”.
engaged in an attempt to transcend the traditional dichotomous view of international relations scholarship such that inter-paradigm dialogue is not only possible but fruitful. Thus, my use of English School and neoliberal institutionalist theory aims not to sustain this dichotomous view but to synthesise the apparent approaches, with the important caveat that the research question should dictate the methods, not any set of *a priori* commitments.

Thus, in Section II, I address the materialism–idealism debate, engaging with some of the traditional rationalist and reflectivist conceptions of social ontology and epistemology. In doing so, I take the Wendtian line that, while many of the most important entities in social life are ‘socially constructed’, the social world cannot be conceptualised as ‘ideas all the way down’. Rather, I advocate a realist ontology, which accepts a ‘rump’ materialism, in virtue of which material entities have objective qualities that are both independent of discourse and resistant to inappropriate discourse as to their nature. However, my ontology incorporates many idealist insights regarding the socially constructed nature of much of the social world, including the contention, shared by thin and thick constructivists alike, that many of the most important effects of material entities are mediated through discourse. I argue also for a ‘deep’ realism, which accepts the reality of unobservables—a necessary step for causal theorising properly understood—irrespective of their socially constructed nature. Even socially constructed phenomena may be apprehended by the observer as objective facts. Contra Wendt, however, and in line with scientific realism, I maintain an insistence on epistemological relativism: arguing that there is a reality ‘out there’, about which our theory attempts to engage, does not necessitate having a corresponding belief that we can ever fully ‘know’ the nature of that reality. We can have better or worse theories about the subjects with which we engage but never absolute truths. The role of science is to seek added confidence in the approximate truth of our postulates through evidential enquiry but, as we can never fully know how closely our theories correspond with reality, this process is, as Wight points out, “potentially infinite”.

In Section III, I engage with the agency–structure debate and, in particular, the fairly common practice of epiphenomenalism. I argue here, in line with both scientific realism and constructivism, that neither agents nor structures are reducible to the properties of the other but rather that they are mutually constitutive while retaining important properties and characteristics that are irreducible to their interaction. Thus, I reject the post-structuralist

---

claim that agents and structures are indivisible as strongly as I reject the extreme
individualist and holist claims to the ontological primacy of either structure or agency. In
developing this conception, I argue that much constructivist scholarship, while laudable for
highlighting the interrelationship between agency and structure, has failed thus far to fully
explore the dynamic relationship between agency and structure. Thus, moving beyond
Wendt, who prefers to locate his analysis in the structural domain, despite a recognition
that constructivism could be applied to both agency and structure, I draw upon the work of
Margaret Archer and Walter Carlsnaes to elucidate a dynamic, morphogenetic conception
of agency and structure that fully exploits the potentially rich ground to be explored in
terms of the interaction between them, as well as the consequent implications for foreign
policy decision-making.7

Finally, in Section IV, I discuss questions of causality and constitution, arguing for a
dialectical relationship between them, in which one creates the conditions for the other’s
possibility. In particular, I argue that the Wendtian argument that we need to separate out
causal and constitutive theory only tells part of the story. Certainly, an important analytical
distinction to raise is that constitutive theory provides explanations of what an entity is
whereas causal theory describes what it does; nevertheless, it is unnecessary to separate
causal and constitutive theory so stringently in terms of their ‘effects’. A constitutive
theory may not depict causal flows but a constitutive relationship may nevertheless have
causal effects.8 Equally, I engage with post-structuralist arguments on the ‘impossibility’
of causation,9 arguing instead for a scientific realist conception of the ubiquity of causality
if we move beyond the strict positivist definition of causality in terms of constant
conjunctions of events. Indeed, scientific realism is centrally concerned with causality, but
takes important steps forward in our understanding of what causation is by adducting
notions of multiple and complex causality, the reality of unobservables and the centrality
of interpretation to causal analysis, all steps that bring scientific realism much closer to
post-positivism than positivism, though still capable of engaging in dialogue with both.10

---

7 See Archer, Culture and Agency; Carlsnaes, “The Agency–Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis”,
8 See Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations.
9 See, for example, Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (Routledge,
10 See Kurki, “Critical Realism and Causal Analysis in International Relations”, 35(2) Millennium: Journal of
II. ON MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM

The materialism–idealism debate has been one of the longest running in the philosophy of the social sciences, although it has gained particular importance following the major post-positivist turn from the 1960s onwards. It has been unfortunately riven by some terminological confusion, however, with some treating the issue merely as a continuation of the realism–idealism debate in international relations theory. I argue here that the two should not be confused. Although there are some points of overlap between these two debates, there is much more that divides them than unites them. Even a cursory examination of the classical realism of Morgenthau and Carr or Machiavelli and Hobbes shows a significant element of idealism in their theories, just as an examination of the liberalism of Bentham, Mill or Locke reveals a healthy dose of materialism. The conflation of these two debates is probably rather the product of the behavioural and post-positivist revolutions in social science scholarship, both of which posited the unreality of unobservables, thus consigning ideas to the category of the non-real. Though fundamentally opposed in their ontological views of the world, behaviouralists and post-positivists nonetheless share a common epistemology and axiology. For behaviouralists, this takes a rather more moderate form: they argue that, given that we cannot apprehend unobservables, we can never therefore truly know that they exist. Post-structuralists take this further, arguing that even observable entities are only known to us through the mediation of discourse and thus science offers no privileged insight into them. As Wendt puts it, “epistemological anxiety makes for strange bedfellows”. Likewise, the two groups share a common axiology, in that both privilege epistemological issues over ontological ones (a view not shared by scientific realism). This led to the view that, given that we cannot apprehend unobservables, we can have no objective knowledge of their existence; therefore, they cannot truly be said to exist. Epistemology thus ineluctably leads to tacit ontology—or, in other words, idealists cannot be realists. In what follows, I argue that this need not be the case.

---

11 Although this is an important extension of the behaviouralist epistemological standpoint, I will keep to a discussion of unobservables for the time being. A discussion of external realism in all its forms will follow.
12 Wendt, Social Theory, 49.
13 See, for example, Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations.
14 The post-positivist argument extends to observables, which have no greater ontological status than observables, given our epistemological fallibility. Indeed, the problem of apprehension itself is at the centre of the problematic.
In particular, the inference of ontology from epistemology is, I contend, an ecological fallacy. There is a gap in the logic between arguing that the social world is inherently unknowable to us and arguing that it therefore cannot be said to have an objective existence. Scientific realism turns the behaviouralist/post-positivist axiology on its head, arguing for the primacy of ontological matters. Even so, an explanation for why the social world should be assumed to exist, even if we can never truly know it, is required. Perhaps the strongest positive argument for “external realism” is Putnam’s argument on the ‘miracle of science’. According to this line of argumentation, if there were not an external reality to which our theories correspond, the ability of natural science to manipulate the entities found in that world would be nothing short of a miracle. Of course, this is not a watertight argument; if the social world is entirely of our own making, as the more extreme versions of post-positivism may seem to contend, then there is no reason to suppose that our scientific theories should not succeed, given that both the theories and the world to which they apparently refer are products of our own construction. However, the ‘miracle’ argument is further supported by Andrew Sayer’s argument on the “evident fallibility of our knowledge—the experience of getting things wrong, of having our expectations confounded, and of crashing into things”, which suggests that the external world is not entirely of our own making or we should not so often be wrong about it. Both arguments provide provisional support for a claim to external realism but, given that scientific realists, along with all but the most ardent positivists, accept the epistemological limitations of our knowledge, it is, in fact, a claim that can never be incontrovertibly verified. For the behaviouralist and the post-positivist, this is where the matter should end; if we cannot know it, then what is the point of assuming that it exists? Scientific realism takes a more practical view on the matter. Even if we accept that the world is never truly knowable to us, we can nonetheless have better or worse theories about it, as the miracle and fallibility arguments show. Moreover, in a practical sense, the entire enterprise of science loses its meaning if we discard the assumption of external realism; if there is no real world ‘out there’ that our theories seek to describe, then there is little point in having theories at all, as they simply become meaningless jumbles of data and discourse.

15 Meaning that there is an external reality that exists independent of our knowledge of it.
17 Sayer, Realism and Social Science (Sage, London, 2000), 2.
18 Of which Wendt, apparently, is one.
Having dispensed with the extreme epistemological arguments of the behaviouralist and post-positivist camps, it is worth considering rationalism and reflectivism more generally, as most within these broader groupings would eschew such absolutist arguments. Nonetheless, although many rationalists accept the existence of ideational entities and many reflectivists material entities, there is still a tendency to grant ontological primacy to one or the other. Thus, most rationalists argue that the majority of explanations of international relations can be given by relation to material factors whereas most reflectivists argue that ideational factors should have ontological primacy. While by no means a forum for this debate, the literature on humanitarian intervention, as is the case for the international relations literature more generally, shows evidence of the influence of this debate in the different approaches of the English School and neoliberal institutionalist approaches.

As Alex Bellamy notes: “[i]n recent years, debates about the legitimacy and efficacy of humanitarian intervention have predominantly been the domain of the English School or ‘International Society’ approach to International Relations”. A primary concern of English School scholars is the extent to which the international system can be considered to be a ‘society of states’. In perhaps the most famous English School tract, The Anarchical Society, Hedley Bull explains that:

A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.

Just as the existence of a society of states depends upon the existence of common interests and common values, so too does the content of the rules of the society of states depend upon the contents of those understandings. In this regard, Bull identifies two (potentially conflicting) understandings of the values held by the society of states: a society based upon order; and a society based upon justice. It is these conceptions to which we refer when we talk of pluralist or solidarist conceptions of international society. For the English School,

---

19 Bellamy, “Humanitarian Responsibilities”.
therefore, it is idealism that has ontological primacy; the mode of explanation is to describe patterns of interaction in the international system by reference to shared understandings, rules and norms or, in other words, ideational factors. There is nothing inherent in the English School ontology that rejects material explanation *per se*; rather, it is simply an area that is set aside in favour of a focus on ideational elements. Indeed, the English School recognises both the (material) anarchy of the international system and the (ideational) pluralism/solidarism of international society. As Tonny Brems Knudsen puts it: “[t]hus, the overall ontological position of the English school is one that explains the possibility of conflict with the anarchical structure of the international system, and the possibility of peace and order with the element of international society”.

Nevertheless, despite such ontological openness, English School theory has tended to grant ontological primacy to ideational factors, as is certainly quite understandable given the overriding focus on international society. Materialism, when it does come into the analysis, tends often to be a means of mopping up unexplained variance rather than an explanatory component on an equal footing with idealism. To use an example from the humanitarian intervention literature, Nicholas Wheeler, one of the foremost scholars in the field, seeks to explain the increased incidence of humanitarian intervention in post-Cold War international society through an explanation based upon an emerging normative consensus as to the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention; thus, he argues that “legitimacy is constitutive of international action”. The argument is that the norm of humanitarian intervention and its acceptance within international society confers legitimacy on its practice, thus making it possible. Fine so far. However, when it comes to his case studies, Wheeler encounters a certain amount of variance in the actual practice of humanitarian intervention despite considerable coherence in the extent to which the norm has by now become accepted within international society. It is at this point that Wheeler brings in a number of material explanations for the variance in outcomes—such as self-interest,

---

22 See, especially, Bull, whose ideas on international anarchy have much resonance with those of contemporary neorealism, but contrast Wight, who argues for an almost entirely cultural international system. One can also point to interesting materialist/idealistic ideas on power within English School scholarship, such as Bull’s emphasis on the importance of recognition in conferring great power status and Wight’s conception of the determination of such status by underlying material capabilities. *Ibid*; Wight, *Systems of States.*


25 *Ibid.* See, especially, the chapters on Rwanda and Bosnia but also, conversely, the chapters on Northern Iraq and Somalia.
institutional constraints and domestic politics— which serve to explain the unexpected variance. There is, of course, nothing ontologically untoward about so doing—indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an explanatory framework that does not take at least some notice of such factors—but these elements are nevertheless absent from Wheeler’s overall theoretical framework, which is centrally concerned with the ideational factors at play.

A similar criticism can be made of neoliberal institutionalism’s approach to the role of ideas in social explanation. As a rationalist theory, neoliberal institutionalism shares many of its core theoretical assumptions with neorealism (as such, Keohane and Martin describe neoliberalism as the “half-sibling of neorealism”), including a materialist conception of the anarchic structure of the international system, an assumption that states are self-regarding entities concerned mainly with their own security—thus, the ‘self-help’ conception—and a belief that states are rational utility maximisers. Beyond the strict confines of neorealism, however, neoliberal institutionalists assert that the cooperation problem implied by the self-interest assumption can, to an extent, be overcome by the role of institutions in international affairs. Institutions are defined as a set of “rules, norms, principles and procedures, around which actor expectations converge”, an inherently idealist conception and indeed not dissimilar from the norms, rules and intersubjective understandings with which English School scholarship is concerned. However, despite the influence of idealism within neoliberal scholarship, such factors are only defined in instrumental terms, as intervening variables capable only of facilitating changes in payoff structures. Neoliberals advance multiple claims about the ways in which institutions may facilitate cooperation: through iteration, issue linkage and multi-level games, burden-sharing, identification of defectors and delineation of sanctions for defection, etc. However, despite this emphasis on the plurality of ways in which ideational factors may

26 It should be noted that none of these factors are intrinsically material. However, Wheeler tends to treat them in instrumental terms, as a materialist would.
28 Krasner, International Regimes (Cornell University Press, London, 1984), 1. Actually, this is Krasner’s definition of a ‘regime’. Whether and to what extent institutions differ from regimes has been a matter for some debate but it is not one that will be taken up here. For the simple purposes of comparison, Oran Young defines an institution as “recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge”, a similar enough definition for us simply to treat regimes and institutions synonymously for the purposes of this discussion. Quoted in Axelrod and Keohane, “Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions”, 38(1) World Politics (1985), 226-254, at 252.
29 For a good overview of neoliberal theory regarding institutions’ contribution to cooperation, see the special issue of World Politics 38(1), (1985) and, in particular, Axelrod and Keohane, “Cooperation Under Anarchy".
influence political outcomes, neoliberals are wary of moving beyond the treatment of ideas as instrumental considerations, highlighting only the ways in which such ideational structures affect states’ abilities to realise their interests, defined materially in terms of power.\(^{30}\) As such, any consideration of the ways in which actors consciously or unconsciously interpret their interests as a consequence of ideational, cultural and social processes are explicitly excluded. To explicate this further, it is worth considering what is perhaps the most thoroughgoing treatment of ideas within a rationalist framework: Goldstein and Keohane’s *Ideas and Foreign Policy*.\(^{31}\) In this interesting volume, Goldstein and Keohane are concerned to demonstrate the extent to which ideas may function as independent modes of explanation from material factors. As such, they define the null hypothesis as the extent to which variation in foreign policy can be explained by factors other than ideas, i.e., power and interest. By framing the question in this way, however, although they demonstrate a considerable role for ideas, they are able only to demonstrate the extent to which ideas influence *behaviour*, not the extent to which they may influence interests themselves (see below). As such, the materialist can still argue that ideas are at most “relatively autonomous” from material factors, which still determine interests in the final analysis.\(^{32}\) Again, in an inverse to the English School approach, ideas are used only to mop up unexplained variance left out by a purely materialist analysis.

Thus, although both the English School and neoliberal institutionalism have generated important insights into the nature and patterns of humanitarian intervention, they both make different claims as to the ontological primacy of material and ideational factors, which renders them unable (or, rather, unwilling) to engage in effective contemplation of the interrelationship between the two. In order to gain maximum leverage against the question of why states engage in humanitarian intervention, it is necessary to have a methodology that is capable of handling both material and ideational factors in a balanced manner. For the fervent reflectivist or rationalist, this is not only ontologically impossible but anathema.

\(^{30}\) As the remainder of this section should show, power and interests need not be defined materially, indeed, usually are not even by those who describe them as material forces. However, given that neoliberals do so, we shall treat them here ‘as if’ they are material factors.


Nonetheless, such a methodology has emerged in recent years from the third debate in the form of weak or thin constructivism. This school of thought emerged from an internal debate within the reflectivist camp. Although in agreement that ideas are an important—indeed, the paramount—factor in social analysis, the debate within the reflectivist camp centred around the ontological issue of whether there is an objective reality that exists independent of discourse. The question, as Alexander Wendt puts it, is whether reality is “ideas all the way down”.

This debate produced a splinter within the reflectivist camp, known as ‘weak’ constructivists, who argued that, while ideas structure much of social life, material objects nonetheless have intrinsic qualities that distinguish them even when shorn of all social content. This shift has profound ontological import, implying as it does a commitment to external realism and an ability to work with material factors within an overall ideational framework. Despite this ontological shift, however, weak constructivism has maintained its focus on social construction, and the roles of ideas and identities, largely to the detriment of material factors.

The materialism that most weak constructivists concede is usually only a ‘rump’ materialism, with only minimal causal force. Nonetheless, there is an acceptance that ideas are often rooted in material factors, just as material factors often only take on specific relevance when constituted by ideas. For example, on the one hand, a Bank of England ten pound note has little intrinsic material value; it is only worth ten pounds because of an intersubjective recognition of this being its worth. On the other hand, such recognition would not be possible were it not for certain intrinsic material properties that distinguish the piece of paper itself as a Bank of England ten pound note. With such an ontology, constructivism is capable of handling arguments from both materialism and idealism.

The ‘weak’ constructivism that I espouse also incorporates a scientific realist understanding of the reality of unobservables. There has been a tendency within the international relations literature to treat material facts as ‘objective’ and ideational facts as

---

33 Wendt, Social Theory.
34 This stems from at least three considerations. Firstly, most constructivists believe that ideas are more important than material factors in social explanation. Secondly, many feel that the emphasis in IR scholarship historically has been on material factors to the exclusion of ideas, thus suggesting that those working within an ideational framework should concentrate almost exclusively on ideas, as these remain the most neglected sources of explanation in IR scholarship. Thirdly, as constructivism is a relatively immature field of enquiry, many constructivists have felt it necessary to defend their fledgling philosophy. The criticism from within reflectivism has been that constructivism is not sufficiently ideational in its approach while the criticism from rationalism has been that ideas do not provide much added value to material explanations. Both sources of criticism militate towards a more ideational approach.
‘subjective’, thus suggesting that ideational factors cannot be, in a certain sense, real. I disagree. Though ideational factors are ‘socially constructed’ and thus are dependent upon human agency for their existence in the first instance, there nonetheless comes a point when ideational structures become mind-independent phenomena, which the observer apprehends as objective environmental factors, thus maintaining the crucial subject–object distinction that is necessary for a scientific realist epistemology. Ideas cannot simply be ‘wished away’; consequently, they can form the basis for scientific examination. This epistemology, when related to the ontology given above, entails a belief that science provides a privileged insight into the world in which we live. Some theories, some explanations, are better than others and it is the role of science to evaluate which are which through empirical examinations of the available evidence. This more than anything informs my approach to social science research; explanation should be a consequence of rigorous and empirically valid examination of the available evidence.

However, constructivism is more than simply a compromise between the more extreme positions of rationalism and reflectivism. Constructivism has much that is unique and interesting to say about the sources and explanations of social action. In fleshing out more clearly the value-added of a constructivist approach, it is worth considering in more detail what is meant by a ‘rump’ materialism. In particular, we need to problematise the traditional conception within international relations scholarship as to what constitutes material and ideational factors.

While constructivism accepts that material factors have properties and causal powers that are intrinsic to them and unaffected by any meanings we may ascribe to them—as Wight rather caustically points out, no matter what our discourses say about them, water will be little use in running our cars just as petrol will be little use in putting out fires—35—it also argues that the larger part of a material factor’s effects are a function of the ideas that attach to them.

Of particular interest to the topic at hand is the concept of interest—typically considered to be a material factor but which constructivism shows in large part to be constituted by ideas. The dominant rationalist approach in international relations scholarship has tended to treat interest as a material factor, whether as a function of a (biologically determined) human nature, the material forces of production or the distribution of capabilities. The first

---

35 Wight, "A Manifesto for Scientific Realism".
criticism that can be leveled at such an approach is that it ignores the extent to which some of these conceptualisations may themselves be social constructions. The realist who emphasises the selfish lust for power of fallen man tends to gloss over the fact that a lust for power cannot be derived directly from any basic human biological needs but must be learned in a social context. We do not emerge from the womb lusting after power but learn through experience and the influence of ideas that power may be desirable.\textsuperscript{36} A more sophisticated version of this argument is that, even if we accept, for example, that egoism is a direct consequence of a materially determined human nature, such a propensity is in fact “directionless”\textsuperscript{37} without certain beliefs about how to pursue one’s self-interest. This implies more than just simply a belief about the most appropriate method with which to pursue one’s goals—which would be compatible with materialism—but beliefs about what is in fact desirable. As Wendt puts it, “it is the perception of value in an object that constitutes the motive to pursue it, not some intrinsic biological imperative”.\textsuperscript{38} Thus, while the material can tell us some things about the content of interests, most of the work is still being done by ideas, making many materialists tacit idealists.

A second criticism relates to the determinism of rational choice theory. Although interests may be defined differently by various rational choice theorists because they make different assumptions about the nature of the world, one of the key features of rationality is not that decision-making is rational in the sense of being justifiable but that it is rational in the sense of being consistent with a set of desires and beliefs, the latter being given by the theorists’ assumptions. This has led to the criticism of classical realism, for example, that it takes a pessimistic view of the potential for positive change in international life as it assumes the selfish drives of human nature are ineluctable. A more trenchant critique, however, is that this requirement renders human agency somewhat irrelevant in a certain sense. There is no room in this model for the human mind to individually settle upon what desires to have and whether or how to act upon them. As such, agents simply become

\textsuperscript{36} Equally, the Marxist who emphasises the determining role of the forces of production neglects the fact that what does most of the work in such theory is the relations of production rather than the brute material forces themselves. Relations of production, such as capitalism, are quite clearly social constructions rooted in ideas, thus stripping away the materialist base to the argument.


\textsuperscript{38} Wendt, Social Theory, 123.
“throughputs” for desires and beliefs, as Martin Hollis puts it.\textsuperscript{39} This is fundamentally at odds with a common sense understanding of how human agents actually work.

Thus, constructivism criticises the traditional materialist–deterministic view of interests in favour of a contingent idealist conception. Although constructivism recognises that certain interests are a direct function of material factors (such as an interest in survival), it argues that many of the more interesting elements of interest are made up of idealistic meanings ascribed to material factors or of ‘ideas much of the way down’. In actual fact, this has often at least been obliquely recognised within the wider international relations literature. One of the central explications of the national interest in the international relations literature is that provided by Hans Morgenthau, who defines interest in terms of power.\textsuperscript{40} This, as alluded to above, constitutes Morgenthau’s materialist assumption about interests: interests are a function of the lust for power inherent in human nature. However, Morgenthau recognises that such an approach provides only a limited set of incontrovertible interests, which he calls fixed interests, beyond which a whole range of sub-national, other-national and supra-national interests may form the variable part of the national interest.\textsuperscript{41} Nonetheless, Morgenthau was doubtful of the ability of ‘science’ to provide any insights into the variable component of the national interest, presumably because it is both variable (which compromises the rationality assumption) and idealistic (which compromises the assumption of materiality). Yet it is not ‘science’ that is incapable of providing any insight here but rationalist science. In an interesting reflection of Morgenthau’s schema (though Wendt is silent on whether he sees the relationship), Alexander Wendt also divides national interests into two categories, which he calls objective and subjective interests.\textsuperscript{42} A state’s objective interests are a function of a state’s basic needs, such as survival, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem. These are mind-independent interests that exist irrespective of whether they are recognised as such or not.\textsuperscript{43} Beyond a state’s objective interests are a whole range of subjective interests, which are “the beliefs that actors actually have about how to meet their identity

\textsuperscript{40} Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace} (Knopf, New York, 1948).
\textsuperscript{41} Morgenthau, “Another ‘Great Debate’: The National Interest of the United States”, 46(4) \textit{American Political Science Review} (1952), 961-988.
\textsuperscript{42} Wendt, \textit{Social Theory}.
\textsuperscript{43} Of course, a failure to recognise and act upon such basic interests may jeopardise the continued existence of the state, but the point is that these interests exist whether the state recognises them or not.
needs, and it is these which are the proximate motivation for behaviour”. Thus, constructivism allows for a dynamic conception of interest in that it recognises that interests may vary depending upon the culture, ideas and interpretations of actors or, in other words, upon their identity. This notion dovetails nicely into some of the dominant arguments surrounding the emergence of a new practice of humanitarian intervention, in that many have argued that humanitarian intervention represents an example of how states have come to redefine their interests in terms of emerging (and often collective) identities. In Chapter 4, I will argue that identity is the crucial factor that will allow us to connect the material and ideational arguments—and, in particular, those derived from the English School and neoliberal approaches—surrounding why states might engage in humanitarian intervention into an operational framework of analysis.

III. ON AGENCY AND STRUCTURE

A second major debate that has taken place within the social science literature has been the agency–structure debate. Again, there has been some terminological confusion in discussion of this debate due to the coincidental prevalence of ‘levels of analysis’ talk in international relations scholarship, with some arguing that they refer to the same thing and others that there are fundamental differences between the questions being asked. For example, Hollis and Smith argue that the levels of analysis problem is not just about the nature of structure and agency but about the relationship between and ontological primacy of either agency or structure. Thus, they argue that one must choose between a ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ approach to theory, in terms of which structure must be reducible to the properties and interactions of agency or vice versa. Although, as Alexander Wendt argues, this does not reflect the traditional understanding of the levels of analysis problem, it does reflect the predominant response to it—namely, an adherence to one or other form of epiphenomenalism. Certainly, this is the treatment provided by Waltz, whom Wendt chooses as his own conversational partner in talking about the agency–structure problem (as he terms it). Waltz’s Theory of International Politics is famous for its argument that the properties of units are reducible to the effects of the system structure.

---

44 Wendt, Social Theory, 232.
This kind of epiphenomenalism is what Margaret Archer rather critically refers to as ‘downwards conflation’ or ‘upwards conflation’, in that the properties of agents are inferred directly downwards from those of structure or, conversely, the properties of structure upwards from agency. Such approaches are fairly common but neglect the independence that each level has from one another. The argument that agents’ properties are entirely reducible to structure results in a highly deterministic analysis, in which the ‘free will’ of agents is almost entirely constrained. This approach then runs into difficulties in explaining structural change, as the independent and dependent variables thus become confused. Likewise, the argument that system properties are entirely reducible to the properties and interactions of agents neglects the extent to which agential action is constrained and enabled by environmental factors and is unable to explain the ‘stickyness’ of agent properties.

Both the English School and neoliberal institutionalism tend towards epiphenomenalism. The neoliberal institutionalist position is the clearest on this score, so it is with this that I will begin. As was stated in the previous section, neoliberals start their analysis from an identification of anarchy as the prevailing ordering system of the international system. Given that there is no hierarchical authority to moderate behaviour and/or disputes, neoliberals assume that the international system is therefore a self-help system, in which states may rely only on themselves for their security and/or improvement of their position. As such, states are considered to be (Hobbesian) self-regarding entities, a notion that is directly derived (if not uncontroversially) from the properties of the system.

The English School also tends towards epiphenomenalism (although this is not a necessary consequence of the English School ontology). Starting from a concern with international society, the English School has tended to describe the state of international society first and derive its understanding of agent properties directly from this understanding. Given that the English School is capable of conceptualising multiple types of international society—most prominently, pluralist or solidarist—it is therefore capable of conceptualising

---

48 Archer, *Culture and Agency*.  
49 Tonny Brems Knudsen, for example, argues that it is perfectly possible to have an English School structurational approach to the agency–structure debate. Structuration will be discussed below. See Knudsen, “The English School”.  
50 Though pluralism and solidarism represent the primary lenses through which English School theory tends to examine international society, there are other approaches within the school, such as, notably, Martin Wight’s ‘three traditions’, as well as more contemporary contributions such as Buzan and Hurrell. See Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1991); Buzan, *From
multiple types of agency. A pluralist conception of international society is likely to lead the English School theorist to a similar conception of agency to neoliberals—i.e., self-regarding. Conversely, a solidarist conception is likely to have a different result. Thus, William Bain, talking of trusteeship, first highlights that “the foremost obligation of trusteeship demands that preponderant power be exercised for the benefit of the disadvantaged”.\(^{51}\) Consequently, he conceptualises agency in terms of other-regarding obligations, rooted in a Lockean conception of natural equality. “Locke, persuaded by Hooker’s claim that equality among men imposes an obligation of mutual love, argues that every man is to bound to preserve himself and, in a departure from Hobbes, to act so far as he is capable to ‘preserve the rest of Mankind’”; “[i]t is this obligation of mutual love, an obligation that arises from the natural equality of men, which informs Kerr’s argument and sanctions the legitimacy of trusteeship”.\(^{52}\)

Likewise, Chris Brown, talking of the agency required to fulfill the will of the ‘international community’, posits first that “[u]se of the term ‘international community’ implies the possibility of altruism and self-sacrifice on the part of states” and that therefore the “moral agency” required to fulfill the (solidarist) will of the international community may only be found in the concept of a ‘coalition of the willing’ that shares a high degree of ideological coherence, an inherently Kantian notion.\(^{53}\) Thus, the English School may have multiple notions of agency. However, within the English School literature on humanitarian intervention, the dominant though not exclusive tendency is to view the growing international consensus on humanitarian intervention as an emerging intersubjective norm indicative of a strong but tempered element of solidarism.\(^{54}\) Thus, the (implicit) views of agency of such prominent English School scholars of humanitarian intervention as Nicholas Wheeler, Alex Bellamy and others seem to cohere most closely to a Lockean

---


\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) It should be pointed out that Brown is rather sceptical both of the extent of ideological coherence within the notional ‘international community’ as well as the prospects for a moral agency to perform its collective will. It is simply conceptualised as a possibility that, however remote, does occasionally materialise. Brown, “Moral Agency and International Society”, 15(2) Ethics and International Affairs (2006), 87-98.

\(^{54}\) Of course, though there are arguably more English School writers who view humanitarian intervention as evidence of a ‘solidarist moment’ (if not the ‘solidarist moment’), there are still many pluralists who remain. See, for example, Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty”, 6(1) International Journal of Human Rights (2002), 81-102; Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention”, 18(1) International Political Science Review (1997), 55-74.
conception of a society in which agents owe each other mutual responsibilities even if they do not quite share absolute ideological consonance.

The contrast between the Hobbesian perspective of neoliberal institutionalists and the dominant Lockean conception of English School theorists is most interesting in the context of the humanitarian intervention debate, especially when we relate it back to the realist–idealist conceptions discussed earlier, as they provide alternate conceptions of the nature of state agency, which may be developed into alternative propositions for explaining the incidence of humanitarian intervention. However, it is impossible to provide a balanced analysis from the epiphenomenalist perspective, as, if agency is given by structure, it is only structure that has independent variance, not agency. Thus, structure remains the primary focus of analysis. The problem that this entails is that structural analysis, while capable of explaining aggregate tendencies at the system level, cannot account for variance in the actual practices of states at the unit level. If the epiphenomenalist account is to hold true—and agents are entirely reducible to the properties of structures—we would not expect such variance in outcomes at the unit level but rather conformity among units to the properties and logics of appropriateness given to them by the system level. However, it has generally been a truism—and one accepted even by such structural determinists as Waltz—that the variance in outcomes at the unit level can only be explained through analysis at the unit level itself. This suggests that agency has at least some independence from structure and the relationship requires further examination. Moreover, if we conceive of agency as having a degree of independence from structure, there is the possibility of comparing multiple—conflicting and complementary—types of agency within the same structure, which may then be measured against each other or explored for interactions and synergies.

Fortunately, the epiphenomenalist perspective does not, of course, exhaust the possible answers to the levels of analysis question. A third solution is what Archer refers to as ‘central conflation’, in which the properties of agency and structure are said to be mutually constitutive but are so tightly and inextricably co-bound that they become analytically inseparable. This view derives from Giddens’ concept of ‘structuration’, an important and sophisticated contribution that goes some way to unraveling the dualistic nature of

55 And especially when read in the context of Carr’s discussion of the realism–idealism debate in the Twenty-Year’s Crisis.
structure and agency. As Giddens puts it: “[b]y the duality of structure, I mean the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and ‘exists’ in the generating moments of this constitution.” This view can be seen in certain post-structuralist analyses of foreign policy and humanitarian intervention. Thus, Lene Hansen argues that “identities [structure] are thus articulated as the reasons why policies should be enacted, but they are also (re)produced through these very policy discourses [agency]: they are simultaneously foundation and product”; “identities are produced, and reproduced, through foreign policy discourse, and there is thus no identity existing prior to and independently of foreign policy”.  

There are two important elements to these conceptualisations that are worthy of further examination. Firstly, there is an issue with the tightness of the relationship between structure and agency here. The conceptualisation is inherently relational; as Archer puts it, this “proscribes any discontinuous conceptualization of structure and action—the intimacy of their mutual constitution defies it”. Likewise, Taylor argues that this means that “social relations are internal relations, the relata not being even definable independently of their relations”. Therefore, we cannot talk of either structure or agency, only structuration, a continuous flow of conduct that defies any notion of division. As a consequence, neither agency nor structure has explanatory autonomy; to understand outcomes we must focus only on the mutually constitutive relationship between them and how this contains ‘conditions for being’. This is important insofar as it transcends the dualism between voluntarism and determinism that is characteristic of the epiphenomenalist approach, but it has important consequences for analysis. In particular, it collapses the subject–object distinction that is so crucial for causal analysis, as will be discussed in Section IV.

Moreover, Archer and Carlsnaes highlight the temporal problem with such a conception. It is notable that both Giddens and Hansen make references to a temporal dimension above—

---

59 Archer, *Culture and Agency*, 75.
“simultaneously”, “generating moments”, “not existing prior”, etc. By doing so, they explicitly reject the notion that structure and agency may work on different time intervals. While not denying the historicity of certain identity representations, post-structuralists nevertheless argue that each identity representation must be considered to be a de novo articulation, which may draw upon prior articulations but bears no intrinsic relationship to the latter. Again, this downplays the extent to which agents are constrained by their environments and, in particular, the resistance that must be surmounted by certain identity representations that break radically with a prior (structurally given) set of identity representations. In their empirical work, post-structuralists are often sensitive to the difficulty of constructing such a radical break from their past, but such sensitivity seems entirely at odds with the given ontology; either one recognises the structural constraints within which identity representations are formulated and the consequent difficulty of establishing such a radical break or one must affirm that agents are entirely free to formulate their identity and no identity representation is more or less valid than any other. Only the former seems empirically defensible. As Meyer puts it:

Actors do not start with a blank sheet, when they are faced with a problem or an opportunity to act, but draw on pre-existing and usually stable schemata, beliefs and ideas about the external world and deeply ingrained norms about appropriate behaviour.

In this sense, there is an element of path dependency in the evolution of identities, in the simple sense that ‘history matters’, but more importantly in the sense that prior identity representations may reinforce particular notions of identity or ‘lock in’ certain schemata into the structural reservoir of identity-related beliefs, as well as providing paradigms for change. The notion of path dependency is, however, problematic, but there is much that can be rescued from a consideration of its relevance, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

The final solution to the agency–structure debate that I will consider here is the concept of a dynamic though partially independent relationship between agency and structure. This perspective derives mainly from Giddens’ structuration conception, but has been further developed by Archer and Carlsnaes to incorporate a dialectic between structure and

---

agency, a temporal dimension to their relationship and thus is able to encapsulate a historical analysis of the dynamic interplay between the two.\textsuperscript{63} Drawing on the concept of morphogenesis, Archer develops a more sensitive framework for analysing the ways in which structures condition actions and actions in turn elaborate those structures, in an endless but temporally divisible cycle. As Archer puts it:

> The emergent properties which characterize socio-cultural systems imply discontinuity between initial interactions and their product, the complex system. In turn, this invites \textit{analytical dualism} when dealing with structure and action. Action, of course, is ceaseless and essential both to the continuation and further elaboration of the system, but subsequent interaction will be different from earlier action because conditioned by the structural consequences of that prior action. Hence the morphogenetic perspective is not only dualistic but sequential, dealing in endless cycles of structural conditioning/social interaction/structural elaboration—thus unraveling the dialectical interplay between structure and action. ‘Structuration’, by contrast, treats the ligatures binding structure, practice and system as indissoluble, hence the necessity of duality and the need to gain a more indirect purchase on the elements involved.\textsuperscript{64}

Structures thus condition actions, which then elaborate structures, which then condition actions, and so on in an endless progression. Conceiving of the agency–structure relationship in such terms allows us to engage in a deep analysis of the relationship between agency and structure, the attendant effects of one on the other and the consequences for political outcomes. In short, it allows us to analytically separate the agency–structure dynamic at various stages of its mutual constitution and isolate conditions, actions and events for investigation.

This dynamic conception of agency–structure is perhaps the closest to that suggested by Wendt, who argues that:

> A key implication of the argument … about the agent-structure relationship was that theories of international relations must have foundations in theories of both their principal units of analysis (state agents and system structures). Such theories are more than simply convenient or desirable: they are necessary to explain state action. This requirement follows directly both from the scientific realist’s conception of explanation as identifying causal mechanisms, and from the ontological claims of structuration theory about the relationship of agents and structures. If the properties of states and systems structures are both thought to be causally

\textsuperscript{63} Archer, \textit{Culture and Agency}; Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem”.

\textsuperscript{64} Archer, \textit{Culture and Agency}, 61.
relevant to events in the international system, and if those properties are somehow interrelated, then theoretical understandings of both those units are necessary to explain state action.  

However, despite stressing the analytical necessity of paying due attention to the properties of both agency and structure, Wendt fails to develop this into a comprehensive research programme. Rather, he chooses to adopt an almost purely structural approach to analysis, arguing that this is the most profitable route for constructivism, in its infancy, to take. This approach is unproblematic in the sense that it is necessary to isolate various conditions, entities, process, etc., for analysis in the first instance but, at times, Wendt seems to slip into language that suggests that this kind of structural analysis is the core of the constructivist research programme. If it is, it is not one I subscribe to. It is fairly clear from a broad survey of the constructivist literature, however, that structural analysis has indeed thus far taken pride of place in the constructivist toolbox. Such should hardly be unexpected given both the infancy of constructivism as a school of international relations theory and the current vogue in the discipline regarding structural analysis. However, if constructivism is to move forward and its research agenda develop towards its full potential, there needs to be a re-engagement with agency. Only if this side of the constructivist potential for analysing social relations is developed can we begin to engage in full-scale analyses of the dynamic interplay of structures and agents, a move which has enormous potential for enriching our understanding of international life. In this research project, I will therefore give full attention to the role of agency in constructivist analysis within the confines of a dynamic, morphogenetic agency–structure ontology. In particular, I will highlight the role of agency and its attendant consequences for structural elaboration in three case studies of post-Cold war humanitarian intervention, an enterprise that will be more fully fleshed out in Chapter 4.

IV. ON CAUSATION AND CONSTITUTION

The rationalism–reflectivism debate has also thrown up a third set of issues regarding the relative importance of constitutive or causal theory. While causal questions tell us why or

---

66 For example, he states “[t]hat is the distinctive claim of a holist or structuralist ontology, which I defended in this book”, among many other such references. Wendt, Social Theory, 372.
67 See, for example, Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn”; Finnemore and Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program”.
68 Checkel makes a similar argument. See Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn”.

58
how something occurred, constitutive questions tell us what something is or how something is possible. The two are theoretically distinct but not incompatible. This debate, too, has often come under different terminological guises, in particular that advanced by Hollis and Smith between explanation and understanding. As Hollis and Smith put it, the (causal) explanation story is “an outsider’s, told in the manner of a natural scientist seeking to explain the workings of nature and treating the human realm as part of nature.” Conversely, the (constitutive) understanding story is “an insider’s, told so as to make us understand what the events mean, in a sense distinct from any meaning found in unearthing the laws of nature”. While Hollis and Smith, and indeed many others, take a pluralist conception of this dichotomy, arguing that both explanation and understanding have a role to play in social science research, for many others, this has become a virtual zero-sum game. In the rationalist–reflectivist debate, there has been a tendency for rationalists to emphasise the importance of causal theory whereas reflectivists emphasise the importance of constitutive theory, sometimes to the exclusion of all else.

The reason for this zero-sum logic relates to the (apparent) conditions of possibility for causal and constitutive theory. The traditional view of causality holds that the subject–object distinction, which, as previous sections should demonstrate, is far from intrinsic to many social science ontologies, is a fundamental prerequisite for causal theory. Thus, Wendt, adhering to the traditionalist view, outlines three necessary conditions for causal theory to work. If we take causality to mean ‘X causes Y’ or ‘if X, then Y’, we must necessarily assume the following three things: (1) that X and Y exist independent of each other; (2) that X precedes Y in time; and (3) that, but for X, Y would not have occurred. The first two conditions pose problems for post-positivist ontologies, while the last poses problems for a positivist ontology. I will address these problems in turn.

In Section III, I discussed at length the post-structuralist conception of the duality of structure and agency and the contemporaneous nature of identity and foreign policy. According to Hansen, therefore, we cannot talk of identity as being a causative factor in foreign policy, as I intend to do, as “for discursive causality to be considered an actual causal effect, one needs to separate two variables and to observe each independently of the other. This, however, is precluded by post-structuralism’s insistence on the ontological

---

69 Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding, 1.
70 See Wendt, Social Theory; King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Enquiry (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994).
significance of discursive practice: identity is produced, and reproduced through foreign policy discourse, and there is no identity existing prior to and independently of foreign policy discourse".\footnote{71} Thus, the crucial subject–object distinction referred to in Wendt’s first necessary condition is collapsed and causation is theoretically impossible. Likewise, Hansen maintains that “identities are simultaneously a product of and the justification for foreign policy”, thus collapsing the necessary temporal separation alluded to in Wendt’s second necessary condition. However, as should be clear from the discussion in Section III, there is no necessity to collapse these distinctions in this way: if we conceive of the agency–structure debate in a morphogenetic fashion, we can observe a subject–object and temporal distinction between the two, thus making causal theorising perfectly legitimate.

The positivist problem with the third of Wendt’s necessary conditions harks back to the discussion in Section II on the materialism–idealism debate and the reality of unobservables. The proposition ‘but for X, Y would not have occurred’ has an important theoretical link missing if we reject the reality of observables. For X to truly be said to have caused Y, there must be some missing causal mechanism or complex\footnote{72} by virtue of which X works its effect to produce Y. For positivists of the Humean strain, this has led to an emphasis not on causation but on correlation, or constant conjunctions of events. Thus, the most we can do is to talk ‘as if’ X caused Y (an instrumentalist approach) when, in reality, there is no evidence to suggest that it has done so. As I discussed in Section II, there is no reason for our epistemological anxiety to push us towards such an unsatisfactory state of affairs. Simply because we can never incontrovertibly know that the causal complex exists is no reason to eliminate the possibility of its existence. Indeed, such thinking serves only to constrain a deeper causal enquiry. As Colin Wight points out, the problem with ‘as if’ thinking is that it precludes an investigative interest in the causal complex itself. “For the instrumentalist, being able to do X on the basis of Y provides sufficient justification for Y. The [scientific] realist, on the other hand, wants to know why Y allows us to do X and engages in further examination of Y. The instrumentalist stops when Y works. This might be good advice to the technologist, but surely not for the

\footnote{71}{Hansen, Security as Practice, 26.} \footnote{72}{Throughout, I prefer to use the term ‘causal complexes’, as, following Milja Kurki, I agree that the phrase ‘mechanisms’ carries with it the implicit positivist connotation of a mechanistic set of universal constant conjunctions, which scientific realism rejects, despite the fact that the term causal mechanisms is often (indeed, usually) not used in such a sense. While there is a case to be argued for the rescuing of the mechanism metaphor, the unfortunate scope for misinterpretation might nevertheless render such an effort futile. See Kurki, “Critical Realism”.

60
Scientific realism advocates a belief in the deep reality of unobservables. This allows us to question our assumptions in an analytical manner and engage in deep, complex causal analysis. We may not always know the ‘truth’ of our beliefs about deep reality, indeed may at times be forced to make ‘as if’ assumptions about the causal complexes with which we are dealing, but these always function only as “heuristic placeholders that will eventually be superseded by the realism principle”.73

Constitutive theories, meanwhile, “have a different objective, which is to account for the properties of things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist”.74 As such, they have also been described as ‘property’ theories, in that they seek to describe how the properties of an entity are constituted.75 As Wendt points out, property theories are static in that they do not seek to depict the conjunction of events through time but to present a ‘snapshot’ of the entity in question, by virtue of which the properties of the entity can be described. The snapshot metaphor would seem again to collapse the temporal distinction necessary for causal theory, meaning that constitutive theories cannot incorporate causal effects. As Alexander Wendt observes: “[s]ince causal relationships involve transitions from one state to another, property [i.e., constitutive] theories (which are static) cannot be causal theories, even if we can derive causal hypotheses from them”.76 On the face of it, this seems plausible. However, Colin Wight criticises Wendt for making the distinction between constitutive theories and causal effects. As Wight argues: “DNA has certain causal powers in virtue of its constitution, and it makes no sense to refer to these as constitutive effects and to set them in opposition to causal effects”.77 What seems to be at issue between Wendt and Wight here is at what point the constitutive effect becomes operational. Taking Wendt’s master and slave example, Wight argues that the master–slave relationship (a constitutive relationship) exists prior to and independent from the identification of any particular master or slave and thus cannot be said to violate the subject–object or temporal asymmetry requirements for causal logic. As such, we can talk of the causal effects of constitutive relationships. It is not clear how far Wendt’s own understanding is from Wight’s, in that Wendt does say that one “can derive causal

74 Ibid., 383.
76 Cummins, cited in ibid., 105.
77 Wendt, Social Theory, 86.
78 Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations, 117.
hypotheses from” constitutive theories. However, given that preceding sections have emphasised the temporal asymmetry between structural conditioning and agent behaviour, it seems far more appropriate to talk in Wight’s terms than Wendt’s. The idea that constitutive theories cannot have causal effects seems to be much more closely tied to the post-structuralist contention highlighted above that identity representations are always formulated de novo. Our morphogenetic conception of structure and agency rather argues that identity representations are appropriated from structural conditions but that these identity representations then in turn may elaborate social structure. The particular master–slave relationship is thus abstracted from a temporally precedent abstract master–slave relationship and thus the constitutive relationship may have attendant causal effects.

This distinction will become important in Chapter 4, where I will highlight the parameters for an identity-based theory for the practice of humanitarian intervention. I argue that certain logics of appropriateness are to be found in intersubjective understandings of appropriate conduct at the structural level. These understandings are then mediated by identity representations, which cause foreign policy decisions.

V. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have highlighted some of the important ontological, epistemological and axiological foundations upon which my research is premised. It now remains to flesh out the insights gleaned from this discussion into an operational theory of humanitarian intervention. In Chapter 4, I will provide a theory of state identity, identify several dominant logics of appropriateness to be found at the level of the international system and provide a framework through which identity representations mediate these logics to result in foreign policy behaviour. I place particular emphasis on the agential dimensions of this process, for reasons outlined above, but also outline ways in which the theory can be expanded to encompass a more dynamic conception of the foreign policy decision-making process, which takes into account both structure and agency and their attendant interaction effects. Finally, in Chapter 4, I will provide an outline of the methodology that will inform the empirical side of the research.
Chapter 4

A Framework for Action: Identity and Foreign Policy

I. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A CAUSAL THEORY OF IDENTITY

A. Identity as a Concept

The concept of identity has become an ever more popular analytical tool in the social science literature. Virtually unmentioned as recently as twenty years ago, identity has suddenly become the variable of choice—be it dependent or independent—for an increasing number of emerging theses on topics as varied as ethnic conflict, Europeanisation or abortion policy. Identity has been used, more or less explicitly, by post-structuralist, constructivist and rationalist approaches, and has been treated in a variety of different manners. For some, identity is a foundational concept for understanding the political make-up of states;¹ for others, identity is the source of political interests in international society;² and for yet others, it is a political practice that sustains, produces and reproduces itself.³ These are just a few of the many and varied approaches to identity, for which there is hardly room to provide a full survey here.⁴ Yet, perhaps because of the ubiquity and variety of uses of the concept of identity, the concept itself remains poorly defined and analytically loose.⁵ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to resolve what has now become a deep and divisive debate surrounding the analytical content of the concept of identity, so a sketch of the terrain will have to suffice.

At least one of the problems faced in coming to an analytical definition of identity is the fact that there is an explicit acceptance of the multiplicity of identity. Actors do not have just one core identity, but multiple, often conflicting identities. Indeed, actors may have

¹ See, for example, Wendt, *Social Theory*.
³ See, for example, Campbell, *Writing Security*; Hansen, *Security as Practice*.
⁵ See Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond Identity”, 1.
multiple identities of multiple types, such as ‘collective’, ‘corporate’, ‘national’, ‘role’, ‘relational’, etc. The types of identity we are likely to be interested in are therefore likely to vary depending on the research question with which we are interested, which, as mentioned above, can itself take a plethora of forms. Nevertheless, most conceptions converge around the core notion provided by Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein that identity relates to “the image of individuality and distinctiveness (selfhood) held and projected by an actor”. It is a self-image, “rooted in an actor’s self-understanding”, but it is not arrived at in isolation. A common thread running through the identity literature is that identity is usually—though not necessarily always—formed by a process of interaction between conceptions of the ‘self’ and conceptions of the ‘other’, usually conceived of as the dangerous or undesirable other, but not necessarily so. The ‘other’ might be an object of admiration that the self wishes to emulate. It could equally be an abstract notion rather than a concrete entity, such that one compares the self with an abstract archetype of a certain pattern of behaviour, rather than a concrete example. This latter conception is particularly relevant in the context of this research and will be returned to below.

In the context of the state—the key actor in most international relations scholarship, including this study—the use of the concept of identity is complicated further. The starting point for most descriptions of the analytical content of identity is the individual. While in much international relations scholarship, a simple analogy is drawn between the individual and the state, such that the state is assumed to have the unitary qualities of an individual for the purposes of analysis, it is widely recognised that this is problematic and a simplification for the purposes of parsimony. However, the complications multiply when we try to import identities based on self-understandings on to this mythological beast. It is fairly redundant to say that states are incapable of thinking, interpreting or understanding, much less conceiving of their own identity. Therefore, if we are to apply the concept of identity to the state, we must do so in a slightly different manner than we would as regards an individual. Whereas an individual is capable of having an identity as a unitary actor, a state is not. The self-understandings that constitute state identity are in fact the understandings of the actors within the state, who believe themselves to constitute the state or to be acting as agents on behalf of the state. The state’s identity, therefore, if it can be

---

6 Wendt, Social Theory.
8 Wendt, Social Theory, 224.
conceived of at all, must be conceived of in terms of the intersubjective understandings of these actors regarding the individuality and distinctiveness of their state and what it represents in international society. As such, state identity is a structural notion, which can only be understood in terms of the intersubjective understandings of individuals within the state, rather than the subjective understanding of the state itself.

This poses an empirical problem in terms of how we can identify and delineate the parameters of state identities. One of the most useful and theoretically valid ways of doing so is to examine the two dimensions of content and contestation.\(^9\) Content refers to the meaning of an identity, whereas contestation refers to the degree of agreement or difference as regards such content. By examining the content of identity representations, we can delineate the parameters of what the group believes itself to be, how it understands its purposes, how it differentiates itself from others and how it makes sense of the world and its place and role in it. By examining the degree of contestation of identities, we can evaluate the strength of various discourses of identity, the potential outcomes of conflicts between competing identities, the integrity and ‘stickiness’ of identities and the evolution, production and reproduction of identities. The content and contestation of identity is therefore an empirical question: the salience and intensity of identities can only be understood in the site-specific context of empirical application.

\(\text{B. Identity as a Causal Variable}\)

To operationalise identity as a causal variable for use in an empirical evaluation of the development of policies of humanitarian intervention, however, we must still delineate the causal pathway by which identities influence policy. This enterprise is complicated somewhat by the relative dearth of explicitly causal analyses based upon identity. As noted in the previous chapter, many scholars working with identity explicitly reject the notion of causality,\(^10\) while many others who recognise the causal potential of identity nevertheless choose to focus their research on other consequences of identity.\(^11\)

At least one approach is to adopt what Ashizawa calls the “value-action framework”.\(^12\) This framework comprises three key components—values, preferences and foreign policy

---

\(^9\) See Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston and McDermott, “Identity as a Variable”.

\(^10\) See, for example, Hansen, *Security as Practice*; Campbell, *Writing Security*.

\(^11\) See, for example, Wendt, *Social Theory*.

\(^12\) Ashizawa, “When Identity Matters”, 577.
actions—and is based upon the common foreign policy analysis approach that holds that it is understanding an actor’s reasons for action that gives us analytical purchase on the problematic quantity of causality.\textsuperscript{13} Identities provide the intellectual context within which we assess the worth of various modes of actions. In other words, they provide us with “a motivational disposition toward a particular action (or more precisely, the meaning of particular action)”.\textsuperscript{14} This can be conceptualised in terms of a value, or a ‘pro-attitude’ towards specific modes of action.\textsuperscript{15} This value then determines, in a causal manner, a state’s ‘preference’ for certain foreign policy outcomes. Once preferences have been so established, it remains for the policy-maker to enact foreign policy actions that seek to realise these preferences. Though the value–preference relationship is seen as causal, the preference–foreign policy action relationship is not. Rather, this latter is a teleological relationship that involves a means–ends calculation, in which ends (or preferences) are defined in the first instance, and means (foreign policy actions) are calculated as a best fit to achieve such ends.

There is much that is valuable in this conception. Firstly, it rightly introduces the notion that there is not a direct link between identity and foreign policy action, with values and preferences introduced as intervening variables between identity and foreign policy. Secondly, it also rightly emphasises the contingency of foreign policy action on the basis of identity: a specific identity will not always militate towards the same foreign policy action; a multitude of foreign policy actions may derive from a particular identity depending on the specifics of the case. However, it is problematic in that it concedes the teleological nature of the relationship between preferences and foreign policy actions to instrumental calculation that is uninfluenced by identity. In a sense, this framework just becomes a form of ‘thick’ rationality, in which we infer preferences first and then leave the means–ends calculation to the black box of rational calculation. Though not necessarily always inappropriate, I argue in what follows that this understates the extent to which identity influences means–ends calculations, such that both means and ends must resonate with identities and interests in a more complete analysis of the relevance of identity to foreign policy action.

\textsuperscript{13} See Chapter 2 for related discussion.
\textsuperscript{14} Ashizawa, “When Identity Matters”, 581.
\textsuperscript{15} Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980).
A similar approach to modeling the causal role of identity is to focus on the nexus between identity and interest. Though not dissimilar to the conception of values and preferences, this formulation has deeper roots in the international relations literature, not limited to the perspectives of constructivists. In Chapter 3, I noted the parallels between Morgenthau’s conception of fixed and variable interests and Wendt’s conception of objective and subjective interests. In this context, the variable and subjective portion of a state’s interests may be given by identity, though Morgenthau would certainly not have put it so. More controversially, a strong argument might be made that key differentials between offensive and defensive realism, or between neorealism and neoliberalism, may inhere in differing conceptions of human nature or, in other words, state identity. There is a clear parallel between the notions of rival and enemy in Wendt’s conception of Lockean and Hobbesian states and the notions of defensive and offensive realism concerning the ways in which states think about their position in the world and their relationships to other states. Similarly, though not the only difference, a fundamental distinction between neorealism and neoliberalism inheres in their differing conceptions of how states view themselves and others, which leads to different logics of anarchy, particularly in the approaches to relative and absolute gains. Though most offensive and defensive realists or neorealisits and neoliberals would conceive of these notions as objective accounts of basic human nature, if one problematises the notion of an ‘objective’ human nature, as constructivism does, they may be viewed more as constructions of identity. The nexus between identities and interests, it seems, even though many would not conceive of it this way, is deeply embedded in the international relations literature.

So too is it firmly—and explicitly—rooted in the constructivist literature. Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein argued in the influential *Culture and National Security* volume that identities “both generate and shape interests” because “actors often cannot decide what their interests are until they know what they are representing”. Martha Finnemore

---


17 Wendt seems to make a similar observation in Wendt, *Social Theory*, 261, fn.41.

18 See Rousseau for an argument that found that adherence to relative or absolute gains paradigms varied both according to the belief system of the relevant actor and the perception of the nature of the opponent in iterated prisoner’s dilemma games, a strikingly similar notion to the idea of self–other conceptions in the identity literature. Rousseau, “Relative or Absolute Gains: Beliefs and Behavior in International Politics”, Unpublished Report, University of Pennsylvania, 1999, available at <http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~rousseau/ABSREL5.PDF>.

19 Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity and Culture”.
similarly argued that “[t]he state interests are defined in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate. That normative context influences the behaviour of decisionmakers [sic] and mass publics who may choose and constrain those decision-makers”.  

Other constructivist writers argue that identities “‘underlie’, ‘shape’ and ‘imply’” interests. However, despite its popularity, this model has rarely been used to illustrate the next necessary step between the identification of interests and their operationalisation into foreign policy actions. Indeed, many of its adherents would argue, as Michael Barnett does, that “[i]dentify, however, does not cause action but rather makes some action legitimate and intelligible and others not so”. Just as the value-action conception leaves the analysis of foreign policy decisions to post facto instrumental reasoning (or some other analytical logic), so too does the identity–interest conception.

A more fully realised model by which we can examine the causal relationship between identity and foreign policy is provided by Christian Reus-Smit in *The Politics of International Law*. Reus-Smit identifies four modes of reasoning in political deliberation: idiographic; purposive; ethical; and instrumental. Idiographic reasoning refers to questions about who we are (identity); purposive reasoning refers to questions about what we want (interests); ethical deliberation refers to questions of how to situate interests and actions within norms of appropriate behaviour (dilemmas); and instrumental reasoning refers to questions of how to achieve goals through action (foreign policy). This last category incorporates two modes of reasoning—resource-instrumental and strategic-instrumental—the former being concerned with the question of what resources are required to achieve outcomes and the latter being concerned with the particulars of policy to achieve those outcomes. These four modes of reasoning provide a basis for analysing the political deliberations that lead from identity to policy. They are hierarchical, in that idiographic reasoning pre-structures purposive reasoning, which pre-structures ethical deliberation, etc. But the relationship of hierarchy is more important than a simple top-down approach, in that, as Reus-Smit identifies, these elements are held in a relation of supervenience towards one another. Borrowing from Wendt, who argues that “supervenience is a nonreductive

---


relationship of dependence, in which properties at one level are fixed or constituted by those at another. Reus-Smit makes an important theoretical move in identifying the relationship of supervenience. This notion allows us to chart the relationships between these modes of reasoning into a single complex whole.

The model thus recognises the importance of the identity–interest nexus, but allows us to move beyond this simple relationship into an analysis of the case-specific considerations that translate into policy. It has perhaps too often been the case that reflectivists will limit their analyses to the top tiers of this four-tier model, while conceding (or rejecting entirely) the instrumental ground to rationalists. Meanwhile, rationalists tend to reject (or assume away) the higher ground, leaving the field to reflectivists. This model provides the basis for a coherent and integrated approach to the relationship between identity and foreign policy, crucially gelled by the concept of supervenience.

The relationship of supervenience allows us to identify that interests are indeed ‘both generated and shaped’ by identities, but so too is ethical and instrumental deliberation. Foreign policy deliberation is more than simply the rational calculation of means once ends have been established; means too are arrived at through a process of content and contestation as regards their congruence with dominant identities and interests, as well as norms of appropriate conduct. Nor is the process necessarily unidirectional. It may be possible to identify instances where ethical or instrumental deliberation prompts actors to reflect upon and possibly redefine their interests and even identities. Indeed, it is the crucial intersections between these modes of reasoning that are the primary source of interest for the political analyst. Politics is the complex whole of these four modes of reasoning, and it is at the interstices that most of the action takes place. As political deliberation evolves, the four modes of reasoning will become more tightly interwoven, their relationships more densely configured, such that certain policy outcomes become increasingly likely, if not inevitable.

II. REALISM AND IDEALISM IN NATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE

If, as argued in the previous chapter, policies of humanitarian intervention are justified by appeal to state identity, a theory of humanitarian intervention must identify the basic

---

identity discourses that form the basis of such appeals. This task is made considerably simpler by the main thrust of the foregoing analysis: that most studies of humanitarian intervention, implicitly or explicitly, have tended to emphasise a disjuncture between realist and idealist arguments.\(^{25}\) This dichotomy, an enduring focal point of much international relations scholarship over the years, provides us with an appropriate starting point for an identification of two basic discourses that are likely to inform policy debates on humanitarian intervention: what I call the nationalist and internationalist ethics of responsibility or, in other words, the national security and internationalist states. The nationalist and internationalist ethics of responsibility have appeared elsewhere in the international relations literature in various guises. Carr referred to realism and idealism in approaches to foreign policy,\(^ {26}\) Hedley Bull to pluralism and solidarism,\(^ {27}\) Wendt to Hobbesianism and Lockeanism\(^ {28}\) and, in a recent study published after work on this research project was commenced, Coicaud and Wheeler refer to the universalist and particularist ethics of responsibility,\(^ {29}\) a conception that has significant resonance with the ideas presented here. There are subtle but important differences between these various articulations of this dichotomy, given that the respective authors were concerned with fundamentally different social questions. Nevertheless, there is also an important sense of continuity between them, as each emphasises the dichotomy between approaches that emphasise the self versus those that emphasise the other or, more precisely, the collective. However, in the interest of precision in the use of terms, I will refer throughout the remainder of this study to the universalist or internationalist versus particularist or nationalist conceptions of the state, as the most appropriate terms to this analysis.

In this context, it is worth noting that the way in which I am using identity here is somewhat non-standard. Identity being a relational concept, as noted above—we define ourselves by contrasting our own identity with that of others—most analyses of identity tend to define identities in terms of selves and others. Thus, for example, US identity during the Cold War was often defined in terms such as the democratic and capitalist

\(^{25}\) This dichotomy between realism and idealism should be read in the sense implied by Carr in the Twenty Years Crisis rather than as the meta-theoretical question of materialist/idealist approaches to the study of social sciences. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis.

\(^{26}\) Ibid.

\(^{27}\) Bull, The Anarchical Society.

\(^{28}\) Wendt, Social Theory.

American self contra the authoritarian, communist Soviet other.\textsuperscript{30} The use of the self/other dichotomy to understand identity has tended thus to lead to analyses of identity in terms of a virtuous self and a radical, threatening other. However, this paradigm is not the only way we can think about identity. One can also think in terms of admirable others, which the self seeks to emulate. Thus, many analyses of Croatian identity have used the paradigm of Croatian identity being forged in reaction to two identities: the radical, threatening Balkan other, from which Croatia has sought to distance itself; and the admirable European other, with which Croatia has sought affinity.\textsuperscript{31} Nor does the other need to be a concrete entity. Thus, in the analysis offered here, the ‘other’ in the self/other relationship is an abstract idea, a model vision of what a state should be. This notion allows us to use the insights garnered in the previous chapter regarding the neoliberal institutionalist and English School conceptions of agency in terms of a Hobbesian state and a Lockean state, respectively, in order to inform the analysis in a concrete fashion. We may conceive of the Hobbesian state as a nationalist state and the Lockean state as an internationalist state, both of which are ideals to which a state might aspire. This paradigm has multiple benefits. Firstly, it allows us to indirectly draw upon the insights of the voluminous literature on humanitarian intervention that neoliberal institutionalism and the English School have produced. Secondly, it allows us to draw out our basic discourses by reference to an even more voluminous body of literature: for the Hobbesian state, the realist international relations literature; and for the Lockean state, the liberal internationalist international relations literature. By so doing, we are automatically presented with a much richer conception of the basic state discourses than any single study could ever possibly produce on its own. Finally, I argue that this conception may have great utility when it comes to applying it to the case study material. A number of analyses of humanitarian intervention have suggested that interventions may have been more self-regarding than other-regarding. For example, it has been widely argued that the US determination towards intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was driven more by considerations of maintaining its own influence in Europe and revitalising NATO than it was by the plight of the Kosovars themselves.\textsuperscript{32} Likewise, it has been argued in several places that US intervention in Somalia in 1992 was driven less by sympathy for the plight of starving Somalis and more by the need to deflect

\textsuperscript{30} See, for example, Campbell, \textit{Writing Security}.

\textsuperscript{31} See, for example, Razsa and Lindstrom, “Balkan Is Beautiful: Balkanism in the Political Discourse of Tudjman’s Croatia”, 18(4) \textit{East European Politics and Societies} (2004), 628-650.

\textsuperscript{32} For the strongest version of this argument, see Chomsky, \textit{The New Military Humanism}. 71
attention away from the controversial policy of non-intervention in Bosnia, coupled with a belief that the intervention in Somalia could be done at much lower cost than could Bosnia.\textsuperscript{33} Regardless of the accuracy of these arguments, it is clear that an analysis that simply adopts a standard virtuous self/radical other dichotomy would be unable to capture these introverted dynamics with the same clarity as would a self/other conception that draws upon abstract ideas of how states should behave.

A more specific overview of these two opposing ethics of responsibility confirms their salience to the debate over humanitarian intervention in virtually all of its forms. The nationalist and internationalist dimension is able to encompass such central debates on humanitarian intervention as the debate over a particularist/nationalist conception of sovereignty, on the one hand, and the universalist/internationalist demands of human rights, on the other. We can also see the nationalist/internationalist divide in debates within the study of sovereignty and human rights: the debate between the traditional conception of sovereignty as a non-abrogable right of the sovereign, and the modernist conception of the ICISS of sovereignty as a responsibility, with such responsibility being potentially extended to the international community. Likewise, this model has relevance to the debate within human rights discourse as to whether human rights are culturally relative, on the one hand, or universal, on the other.

In terms of individual actions, we can also see the nationalist/internationalist dynamic at work. For example, in another discourse analytical study of humanitarian intervention, Lene Hansen identifies two basic discourses that she believes dominated the discussions over intervention in Bosnia in 1991–1995: a Balkan discourse and a genocide discourse. If we look closely at the content of these two basic discourses, we find that they actually map very closely onto our nationalist/internationalist framework, in that the Balkan discourse emphasised particularist notions, the intractable nature of the Balkan conflict and the lack of Western responsibility for its termination, whereas the genocide discourse emphasised the universalist issue of genocide and the Western responsibility to prevent genocide, both as a consequence of membership to the 1949 Genocide Convention, as well as in terms of ethical commitments. Thus, we find that the nationalist/internationalist dichotomy provides a very useful framework for thinking about some of the debates and arguments about

\textsuperscript{33} See, for example, Western, \textit{Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media and the American Public} (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2005); Strobel, \textit{Late Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations} (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 1997).
humanitarian intervention and one which is able to encompass more specific and particularised sub-debates within an overall analytical framework. It thus provides us with a theoretically well-grounded and flexible starting point from which to begin the analysis. This nationalist/internationalist dichotomy also provides us with a well-informed and voluminous set of policy prescriptions, given that they can be related quite closely back to debates on appropriate state policy between realists and liberal internationalists over the centuries, as well as in recent times. We are able to quite easily identify a whole body of academic scholarship, policy prescriptions and official statements that indicate the likely/preferred course of action given a particular identity representation. In fairly simple terms, states espousing a nationalist identity in their foreign policy representations are less likely to engage in humanitarian interventions than states who espouse an internationalist identity.

In the following sections, I will outline the basic parameters of the nationalist and internationalist discourses, highlighting certain presumptive starting points through which the analysis is likely to flow. The idiographic, purposive, ethical and instrumental issues presented below represent fairly basic snapshots of the major positions likely to be taken by the universalist and particularist conceptions of the state in the context of what is likely to be relevant to the politics of humanitarian intervention. At this stage, they are presented in a very basic form only, providing a framework for analysis but going into no more detail as to specific content. The specific discourses that are going to emerge in the context of the case studies themselves may draw upon some but not necessarily all of the following (and in the case studies themselves, only the dominant discourses will be discussed, due to considerations of scope) and these discourses will take more concrete and specific forms.

34 Of course, the counter-argument to this is that by being so broad and amenable to manipulation, the nationalist/internationalist framework is too indeterminate to be of much use in analysis. This is, of course, a potential danger to any analysis: the broader the frame of enquiry, the more indeterminate one’s concepts are likely to become. While this danger should be recognised, however, it should not be over-emphasised. Not only are the nationalist and internationalist ethics I describe firmly rooted within an entire literature of international relations scholarship, making them both readily identifiable and fungible, but they also present, in good discourse analytical style, polar opposites, which are unlikely to be confused with one another. Any basic discourse is likely to subsume significant variation within it. For example, Hansen’s Balkan and genocide discourses—which are considerably more particular than the framework offered here—nonetheless encounter significant sophistications and variations (even combinations, which, indeed, may have the most interesting things to tell us about policy) in their everyday use. However, their roots in an extant body of literature and thought, as well as their dichotomous logics, renders them both readily distinguishable as well as analytically useful. I would argue that this is likely to be even more, not less, of the case with the nationalist/internationalist dichotomy, given the length and depth of their treatment in the literature.
based upon the specific context within which they arise. The following is therefore a framework only.

III. CONTENDING DISCOURSES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

A. Foreign Policy Role

1. The Universalist/Internationalist State

Within the universalist discourse, a number of key elements of foreign policy role emerge. Universalism implies a sense of solidarity with others in the international system, such that there are both shared interests between the self and the other, as well as empathetical understanding between the two. But what particular foreign policy role is implied by these ethical commitments remains a matter of interpretation. In the discourses on humanitarian intervention, I identify three main interpretations. The most forceful interpretation identifies the self as the leader, or a dynamic power within, a universalist order. In this conception, the state in question sees itself as a key player in a universalist order, with a responsibility to enforce the norms of international society and to protect the weaker members of that order. A more moderate interpretation identifies the self as simply a ‘member’ of the international community. The ‘member’ of the international community shares the values and interests of the group, but does not identify itself as having any particular responsibilities over and above any other state. It will be willing to participate, but not necessarily take the lead, in international actions sanctioned by the group. There is a much more passive role accorded to the state that views itself as a member of the international community; it will be much more reactive than proactive in its behaviour, content to follow, rather than take the lead. The third interpretation is of a state that identifies itself as a ‘laissez-faire’ state. The universalism of this state is modified by a belief in pluralism as a universal value. The ‘laissez-faire’ state rejects external interference in others’ affairs, valuing self-determination over most other values. Its ethic of responsibility is rooted in anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and pro-independence. These three basic genres of state identities are all universalist in the sense that they each express solidarity with an international community but their approaches are very different, and would predict different likely policy approaches. The ‘leader of the international community’ is likely to be much more forceful in its policy approach, as it sees itself as a

35 Not to be confused with the economic connotation of the term.
prime initiator of positive change, such that it is more likely than the other two to become directed towards a policy of humanitarian intervention. The ‘member of the international community’ is more likely to be more cautious in its approach, gauging the policy directions of others before it takes its own and more likely to be supportive of political intervention than military intervention, though it may participate in military interventions if this accords with the will of the international community. The ‘laissez-faire’ state is more likely to be a critic of policy than an initiator of policy. It will view its duty as being to safeguard the rights and duties of other states from external interference rather than to engage in external interference itself.

2. The Particularist/Nationalist State

The particularist/nationalist state is the traditional ‘national security’ state that is so often the archetype of realist security studies. The nationalist ethic of responsibility emphasises a state’s responsibility for its own well-being and the well-being of its citizens. But, again, the particularist ethic of responsibility may manifest in different forms. Mirroring the universalist triad given above, the most forceful pattern for a nationalist state to follow is that of a dynamic power. A dynamic state seeks to shift the balance of power in its favour, to improve its position in the international system and augment its well-being to the greatest extent possible. A more moderate particularist approach is provided by the status quo state, which is content with its position in the international order, but will seek to defend that position if threatened. The status quo state will nevertheless be engaged in international politics to the extent that it views the balance of power as a necessary component of its own stability, such that threats to the status quo will be seen as threats to its own position. Finally, an isolationist state may view itself as entirely disconnected from the international system, such that it may have no interest in international life beyond minimising any direct threats to itself that may emerge. Otherwise, it will be content to focus on its own domestic affairs and to secure and augment its own well-being through inward reflection, rather than outwards aggression. Again, these three genres of states suggest different likely policy approaches.\(^{36}\) The dynamic state is likely to be very forceful in its policy approach, such that any policy that it sees as likely to fulfill its interests will be pursued, regardless of the interests of others. This makes the dynamic state more likely

\(^{36}\) It should be noted that this conception of status quo, dynamic and isolationist states draws heavily on the work of Hans Morgenthau, who used a similar schema to chart variations in approaches to foreign policy. Following Morgenthau, this has become a commonly used schema. See Morgenthau, *Power Among Nations*. 
than the others to engage in intervention for political gain. The status quo state is likely to be more cautious. It will be prepared to engage in intervention under some circumstances, if its interest and status in the system is directly threatened by certain circumstances, but is more likely to pursue diplomatic initiatives than military initiatives, as the policy tools most likely to maintain the status quo. Indeed, the status quo state is more likely to resist external interference than engage in it. The isolationist state is the least likely to engage in any kind of intervention, being largely unconcerned with developments in the outside world. Unlike the status quo state, it is unlikely to resist external interference by other states in third party states, unless such action is likely to impinge upon its own parochial concerns.

**B. Interests**

1. *The Universalist/Internationalist Conception of Interests*

In the context of humanitarian intervention, one of the most prominent universalist/internationalist conceptions of interest manifests itself as a concern for human rights. The universalist discourse emphasises solidarity with others; thus, it is only natural that such solidarity should extend to cases where others are suffering gross abuses of human rights. A second manifestation of universalist interests inheres in a support for democracy. It is widely believed, especially among Western states, that liberal democracy is beneficial for societies, therefore those espousing a universalist discourse may emphasise democracy as a value to be promoted in and of itself. Thirdly, universalism may engender a concern with credibility. This concern takes two primary forms. Firstly, internationalists may be concerned to ensure the credibility of the international regimes that have been put in place to promote internationalist values. These regimes may be both concrete and abstract. Abuse of human rights may pose a threat to an international regime based upon respect for human rights, in much the same way as defiance of the UN may threaten the credibility of that institution. Secondly, credibility also involves a related concern with deterrence. It is often believed that the best way to ensure compliance with international norms is to deter deviance from these norms through the threat of sanction. For deterrence to work, this threat must be credible. Thus, there is a related interest in ensuring the credibility of the threat in order to ensure compliance with norms and to discourage deviance. A fourth internationalist interest is in peace and security. Internal conflicts may threaten the stability of the international system through the threat they pose
to the peace and stability of individual nations and regions. The internationalist discourse may emphasise an interest in maintaining international peace and security for its own sake, as well as for the sake of the maintenance of international stability. Finally, within the internationalist discourse, a sense of responsibility for past actions may generate interests worthy of actions. In many conflict-ridden regions, outside actors may have had a long history of engagement, be it positive or negative, which engenders a sense of specific responsibility beyond that engendered more generally by simple solidarity. Former colonial powers, former allies or former enemies may view themselves as having a special relationship with the subject, such that it is incumbent upon them to take a correspondingly special interest in the situation.

2. The Particularist/Nationalist Conception of Interests

Particularism/nationalism emphasises the state’s responsibility to itself and its citizens. The first and most important interest within the nationalist discourse is therefore national security. The well-being of the state’s citizens and its independence and security from outside threats must be protected. This interest may take various forms depending on the manifestation of the threat, but is most commonly expressed in the need for strong national defence. A second key conception of interest within the particularist discourse is access to key strategic and natural resources. In order for a nation to grow—and, indeed, survive—it is necessary for that nation to have access to the resources that allow it to do so. Thus, states will seek to protect their access to the key resources that have most salience to their own well-being and development. Primarily, this will take effect in respect of crucial resources such as oil, water, etc., but applies equally to resources such as markets, trading partners, specialised industries, etc. A nation’s economic well-being is perhaps as important as its military well-being, and the nationalist state will seek to protect and augment its economic strength. A nationalist state may also be concerned with the strategic value of particular geographic areas. Instability or unfriendly regimes in areas of particular geographic interest may threaten the well-being of the state and its ability to improve its position in the international realm. This interest may be of particular relevance in terms of areas that are geographically close to the state in question or its allies, as well as areas that are of more general geopolitical concern, such as the Middle East. A fourth particularist interest may concern a state’s support for a particular conflict party in a conflict situation. The dictates of the balance of power suggest it is incumbent upon the nationalist state to ensure a
beneficial balance of power on its behalf. Therefore, it is in a state’s interest to have friendly relations with as many foreign regimes as is possible. A conflict situation may jeopardise friendly relations by destabilising a friendly regime, as well as providing opportunities to improve relations through the support of a conflict party in its bid for power. A fifth concern may relate to democracy. In contrast to the universalist concern with democracy as a value in itself, based upon the benefits of democracy for the society in which it takes hold, a particularist concern with democracy may inhere in respect of a corollary of the democratic peace thesis. If it is believed, as it widely is, that democratic states are less likely to go to war with each other, a nationalist democratic state may see the benefit to itself in promoting democracy in other countries, thereby reducing the threat to itself that a totalitarian state may pose. Finally, the nationalist state may also be concerned with credibility. In order to deter threats against itself, the nationalist state may seek to maintain its credibility in order that others be dissuaded from attempting to usurp or damage its position. Again, this may take the form of protecting the credibility of the nation in a general sense, as well as ensuring deterrent capability.

C. Dilemmas

In the context of humanitarian intervention, three primary ethical dilemmas arise. The first concerns the consequences of chaos, the second the consequences of interventionism and the third the consequences of sovereignty.

One of the major themes to emerge from the discourses of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era was the conception of chaos or anarchy in peripheral states.\textsuperscript{37} It was widely argued that, freed from the constraints of superpower rivalry, various ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ and ‘violent nationalisms’ had spilled over in countries in the periphery, resulting in chaos and anarchy in the regions concerned. The question of what relevance such chaos had to other nations, however, posed a serious ethical dilemma. Within the universalist discourse, this elicited, firstly, a concern for the damage being done to the host nation by the emergence of such conditions. The unravelling of societies was a significant cause for solidarist concern, given the repercussions for individuals and the nation itself. A corollary of this concern was the threat that the anarchy might spill over to neighbouring countries, destabilising entire regions. Balanced against these concerns, however, was the

\textsuperscript{37} Indeed, Michael Ignatieff describes chaos as the ‘meta-narrative’ of the post-Cold War era. Ignatieff, “The Stories We Tell: Television and Humanitarian Aid”, 10(1) \textit{The Social Contract} (1999), 1-8.
perception that outsiders might be able to do little to influence the situation. The connotation of chaos was that conditions might have deteriorated beyond the point where it was possible to devise any kind of workable solution to the problems or, indeed, whether outside intervention might itself be counter-productive. Chaos posed a dilemma in respect of a particularist discourse too. Though considerably less concerned by the potential damage to the host nation, the particularist discourse was particularly concerned with the threat of spillover and the threat this may pose to areas of strategic or economic interest, as well as the potential for areas of chaos to become areas of free operation for undesirable elements, such as drug traffickers or terrorists. But, again, balanced against the threat posed by chaos was the question of whether anything could be done to influence such a disorderly situation. For both discourses, therefore, chaos posed a dilemma as regards whether anything could or should be done by outside actors to try to affect the situation.

A second dilemma relates to the consequences of intervention. Intervention is a double-edged sword, which may produce effects both beneficial and detrimental, as well as expected and unexpected. A dilemma that faces policy-makers in the context of intervention is therefore whether intervention or non-intervention is the more appropriate option given the dangers of intervention. In respect of the universalist discourse, the dangers to the target country are emphasised. A policy of non-intervention will leave the target country to continue on its trajectory towards anarchy, with all the potential damage that may entail for the state in question. However, a poorly planned or inadequate intervention, or one that appears to be unwarranted outside interference, may prove to be counterproductive. The dilemma is therefore raised as to whether to allow a country to descend into anarchy or to take the risks that one’s actions may compound the problems that country faces. Within the particularist discourse, the dilemma of intervention concerns the damage to the intervening nation that a policy of intervention or non-intervention may entail. A policy of intervention may pose a risk of depletion of resources, loss of credibility through failure to effect an outcome or the possibility of becoming involved in a wider war in which the state has no particular interest. At the same time, a policy of non-intervention may likewise pose a threat of a loss of credibility, of a deterioration of relations between the two states, or other interested parties, and a deterioration of a situation that may ultimately be damaging to the intervening state. Thus, the dilemma is therefore raised as to whether to intervene in the face of risks to one’s own well-being or to allow a situation to develop that may affect one’s well-being more in the long run.
A third ethical dilemma in the context of intervention relates to sovereignty. It has been a widely held norm within the international community since at least the Treaty of Westphalia that intervention in the sovereign affairs of another nation is not permissible. The veil of sovereignty, in the context of humanitarian intervention, is thus seen as a possible obstacle to outside intervention to resolve situations of conflict and anarchy. At the same time, sovereignty is seen as a key component of international stability, preventing as it does unwarranted outside interference in a state’s domestic affairs, and raising the costs of aggression. In terms of the universalist discourse, the ethical dilemma arises as to whether gross abuses of human rights provides a sufficient reason to violate a nation’s sovereignty, or whether that sovereignty is sacrosanct and a value to be protected in and of itself. In terms of the particularist discourse, the focus is again on the damage that may accrue to the intervening nation from its violation of sovereignty. The nationalist state may be tempted to ignore the strictures of sovereignty in order to secure its own interests within other states, but may nevertheless be concerned that doing so may weaken the fabric of the sovereign international system such that violations of its own sovereignty may be considered actionable by others.

D. Instrumental Action

1. Resource-Instrumental Deliberation

In the context of military humanitarian intervention, one of the most obvious—and critical—resource-instrumental questions that is likely to arise is the question of the risk to personnel involved in such action. There are two dominant approaches to the issue of risk to personnel. The first is to emphasise the need to protect personnel, a consideration that is likely to militate towards military intervention, the second is to emphasise the imperative not to unnecessarily risk personnel, which is likely to militate against military intervention. A second resource-instrumental question that must be asked is what level of commitment is warranted by the demands of the interest the state may have in the target country. Just as a specific identity does not dictate a specific policy, neither does a specific interest. States will evaluate how much this interest means to them, and what kind of level of commitment should flow from such an analysis. Policies are always costly in some regard, whether it be in terms of power resources, finances, prestige, etc., and a state will evaluate the commitment required to enact a policy against the commitment warranted by its interest before engaging in any such policy. A third resource-instrumental question that will be
addressed is the question of effectiveness. A state may have a number of policy options it
could employ in respect of a certain situation; as such, it is likely to evaluate the
effectiveness of policy options, or policies that are in progress, to ascertain whether they
are likely to achieve the goals dictated by its interest at a reasonable level of commitment.
A fourth resource-instrumental question that is raised is the question of multilateralism.
When enacting foreign policy, states have a choice between attempting to impose or
enforce policy unilaterally, which may have benefits in terms of control, or multilaterally,
which may have benefits in terms of burden-sharing. The benefits and detriments of
multilateralism will therefore likely be considered. Finally, the issue of consistency may
also arise. Given that resources are always limited and more situations suggest policy
responses than there are resources to enact policies, states will be concerned with where
they choose to employ those resources, and whether those choices reflect reasoned
commitments based upon consistent criteria.

2. Strategic-Instrumental Deliberation

In the specific context of the study of humanitarian intervention, three dominant strategic-
instrumental options present themselves upon consideration of cases that may be
candidates for such intervention: non-intervention; intervention and military intervention.
The first of these, non-intervention, should be considered as much of a policy option as the
other two and should not be differentiated from a non-decision. Often times, a policy of
non-intervention will be the product of a reasoned decision, in that policy-makers will have
evaluated the merits of intervention or military intervention and rejected them as
alternatives, coming to the conclusion that non-intervention is the preferable option.
However, even if a decision is simply deferred, or a positive decision not reached due to
lack of consideration, the result and, indeed, the circumstances are the same. The state still
does not intervene in any form and, if indeed the situation does arise where a state simply
does not consider the possibility of formulating any kind of policy in regard to a specific
situation, this can still be equated to a policy of non-intervention, as the lack of evaluation
of options suggests simply that there is not sufficient interest to warrant intervention. The
second of these strategic-instrumental options, intervention, should be distinguished from
military intervention. As noted in Chapter 2, military intervention is only the most extreme
form of intervention to alter political realities across borders. In between non-intervention
and military intervention are a whole host of policy options, including economic sanctions,
arms embargoes, delivery of humanitarian relief, support for a conflict party, mediation, traditional peacekeeping, etc. For a range of reasons, a state may decide that adopting a policy of intervention, rather than a full-blown military intervention, is the more satisfactory option. Finally, the third option, which is the one we are most concerned with in the context of this research, is the option of military intervention, when a state decides that it has sufficient reason to employ the use of its military forces across the borders of the target state.

IV. IDENTITY IN ACTION

A. Methodological Framework

1. Congruence and Process-tracing Applied

Having identified the logics of appropriateness through which identities may suggest appropriate policy courses, we must nevertheless still elucidate how we can trace the causal processes through which this takes place in practice. Perhaps the most useful framework for analysis is provided by Alexander George’s focus on the “causal nexus” between beliefs and decision-making.\(^{38}\) Using this method, George enumerated two procedures through which we can assess the causal influence of ideational factors on policy outcomes: congruence and process tracing. According to George, by “establishing ‘congruence’ between the content of given beliefs and the content of the decision(s)”, we may infer that “[i]f the characteristics of the decision are consistent with the actor’s beliefs, there is at least a presumption that the beliefs may have played a causal role in this particular instance of decision-making”.\(^{39}\) Of course, by establishing congruence, all we have done is to establish some sort of correlation, which does not necessarily entail a causal link. As such, process tracing provides “a more direct and potentially more satisfactory approach”:

Process-tracing seeks to establish the ways in which the actor’s beliefs influenced his receptivity to and assessment of incoming information about the situation, his definition of


\(^{39}\) Ibid., 105-106.
the situation, his identification and evaluation of options, as well as, finally, his choice of a course of action.\footnote{Ibid., 113. For more on process tracing, see George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison”, in Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy (Free Press, New York, 1979), 43-68; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005).}

This method would seem to provide a useful means of assessing the connection between identity and foreign policy that coheres exceedingly well with the theoretical framework established thus far. However, as Albert Yee points out, “[d]elineating ‘the steps in the process by means of which’ beliefs influence and shape the cognitive operations of decision makers does not reveal how these beliefs influenced decision-makers to take these steps”.\footnote{Yee, “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies”, 50(1) International Organization (1996), 69-108, at 77. The embedded quote is from George, “The Causal Nexus”, 105.} One possible solution to this problem, according to George, is to provide some kind of “nomothetic explanation” based on quasi-experimental procedures to support the veracity of the causal claim.\footnote{George, “The Causal Nexus”, 106-107.} However, experimental design in qualitative analysis is notoriously difficult and suffers from serious drawbacks.\footnote{For further discussion, see Yee, “The Causal Effects of Ideas”.} Moreover, this method assumes the kind of Humean law-like regularities that, as discussed in Chapter 3, are rarely if ever found in contingent social action.

If process tracing is to be rescued from this potential shortcoming, therefore, we must look to an alternative means of establishing causal connections. Albert Yee suggests the adoption of the notion of causal mechanisms, a suggestion which George himself later embraces.\footnote{See ibid; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development.} The idea of examining the causal mechanisms through which ideas become operationalised in policy resonates well with the scientific realist approach espoused in Chapter 3. As Daniel Little argues: “[t]o claim that C caused E is to claim that there is a causal mechanism leading from the occurrence of C to the occurrence of E”.\footnote{Little, Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science (Westview, Boulder, 1991), 37.} This provides a clear reflection of the scientific realist argument adduced in Chapter 3 that, in order to provide deep causal analysis, we need to move beyond the instrumentalist ‘black box’ conception of causation rooted in the Humean notion of constant conjunctions of events towards an investigative interest in the causal complex itself.

Scientific realism also provides us with an important toolkit through which we can investigate the development of such causal complexes. Following Bhaskar’s notion of the
RRRE (Resolution, Redescription, Retrodiction and Elimination) method of explanation, scientific realist thought has emphasised the importance of establishing causal connections through the use of “historical narrative in which a multiplicity of transitive verbs maps a complex causal sequence”. Historical narrative provides a particularly useful method for making sense of the importance of contingent events, sequentiality and causal mechanisms, as it allows the researcher to provide “a scene by scene description of the particular causal paths” through which ideational factors may become manifested in policy outcomes. It also allows us to strike “a welcome balance between causal generalization and historical detail”.

2. Problems of Path Dependency

Raising the notions of contingency, sequentiality and causal mechanisms also brings us back to the idea raised briefly in Chapter 3 that processes of identity formation may be path dependent processes. However, as I alluded in Chapter 3, using the notion of path dependency is not without its dangers. Despite the increasing popularity of path dependency as an analytical tool in social science research, the concept itself is poorly defined. On the one hand, many simply take path dependency to mean the simple proposition that “history matters” or that “the past influences the future”, a proposition with which we can be in easy agreement, but which provides very little analytical purchase in and of itself. In an effort to develop more conceptual clarity, on the other hand, some analysts have tried to tighten the definition quite significantly. For example, Margaret Levi argues that: “[p]ath dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high”. This notion adduces that “initial steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction such that over time it becomes difficult or impossible to reverse direction”, and is related to the economic notion of ‘increasing returns’ and ‘transfer costs’ that solidify

52 Mahoney, “Path Dependence”, 512.
the place of certain institutional arrangements in a social system once they have been
established.\textsuperscript{53} As such, path dependency here is a self-reinforcing mechanism, and path
dependent analysis provides “strong tools for understanding continuity”, which are
unfortunately “not matched by equally sophisticated tools for understanding political and
institutional change”.\textsuperscript{54} As Jeffery Haydu puts it: “[i]f at turning points history is full of
serendipity, along ensuing paths it becomes a steamroller”.\textsuperscript{55}

Yet there seems to be little to suggest in a theoretical sense that path dependency should be
solely conceived of in the sense of self-reinforcing mechanisms. While advocates of such
an approach may rightly be worried about ‘concept stretching’, there seems to be little to
justify such a narrow conception. For example, Paul Pierson, a noted commentator on path
dependent analysis and an advocate of the narrow approach, argues that:

[T]here are two compelling reasons for focusing special attention on processes that exhibit
increasing returns. First, such processes characterize many important parts of the social
world. Second, social scientists are developing theory that makes the investigation of the
causes and consequences of increasing returns a particularly promising area of inquiry.\textsuperscript{56}

There is nothing inherently wrong with Pierson’s argument—many of the most interesting
path dependent processes may indeed involve increasing returns—but simply because this
provides a promising avenue for research (even if it is the most promising avenue) seems
hardly enough reason to stifle other avenues on an \textit{a priori} basis. At least part of the
rationale behind this move, one suspects, is that one of the dominant uses of path
dependent analysis is to explain ‘deviant’ cases.\textsuperscript{57} If one follows the
rationalist/instrumentalist mode of enquiry and is generally concerned with efficient
decision-making and causal regularities, path dependency may indeed provide a useful
means of explicating inefficient outcomes that are not predicted by theory, by emphasising
the ways in which contingent events then produce increasing returns to an initially
inefficient policy choice, thus explaining its continuity on the basis of rational principles.
All very well. But if one is unencumbered by such philosophical baggage, there may surely
be a desire to account for change as well as continuity through path dependent analysis, or

\textsuperscript{53} For further discussion, see Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependency, and the Study of Politics”,
94(2) \textit{American Political Science Review} (2000), 251-267.
\textsuperscript{54} Hogan, “Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach”, 39(3) \textit{Canadian Journal of Political Science}
\textsuperscript{55} Haydu, “Making Use of the Past”, 353.
\textsuperscript{56} Pierson, “Increasing Returns”, 253.
\textsuperscript{57} For further discussion, see Mahoney, “Path Dependence”.

85
at least something similar. Certainly, this is the position taken by a second grouping of path
dependent analysts, who stress that, in addition to self-reinforcing sequences, path
dependency may throw up reactive sequences, “chains of temporally ordered and causally
connected events” that “are marked by backlash processes that transform and perhaps
reverse early events”.58 This seems a useful notion for accounting for change within social
systems, which, as scientific realism asserts, are open systems that are subject to just such
change.

3. Critical Junctures or Turning Points

The mechanism by which these self-reinforcing and reactive processes are initiated is
through the interposition of ‘critical junctures’, ‘turning points’ or ‘formative moments’, in
which ‘exogenous shocks’ produce “structurally induced unsettled times [which] can
provoke possibilities for particularly consequential purposive action”59 and “establish
pathways that funnel units in particular directions”.60 A critical juncture represents a point
in time where specific events within a causal pathway fundamentally alter the dynamic
within which deliberation may occur, either by ‘locking in’ the causal pathway to a
specific route, through increasing returns, or by providing openings for change or policy
innovation. Following a critical juncture, then, the environment within which decision-
making must take place is fundamentally changed and debate must then take place within
the parameters of the new context.

The use of critical junctures as an analytical tool provides a useful means of
conceptualising how causal pathways can become locked into or diverge from initial
trajectories, allowing us to engage in context-sensitive causal analysis. And a brief look at
some of the stories of humanitarian intervention seems to confirm its potential relevance.
To give but one example, the kind of effect that shocks such as massacres can have on the
causal pathway has been widely noted in the literature on humanitarian intervention.
Richard Haas provides an interesting examination of US policy leading up to the
intervention in Bosnia in which the policy environment changed significantly as a result of
certain high profile events, including the 1994 bombing of the Sarajevo marketplace, as

58 Ibid., 526.
59 Katznelson, “Periodization and Preferences: Reflections of Purposive Action in Comparative Historical
Social Science”, in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social
60 Hogan, “Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach”, 660.
well as the fall of the safe areas of Gorazde and Srebrenica and the massacre that took place in the latter, events which fundamentally changed the ways in which the Clinton administration then conceived of policy.\textsuperscript{61} Likewise, much has been written about the 1999 Račak massacre in Kosovo and its effect on the determination of members of the NATO alliance to respond forcefully.\textsuperscript{62} In a similar vein, the deaths of peacekeeping troops themselves has had notable effects on policy. In Rwanda, Belgium withdrew its peacekeeping contingent within the first days of the genocide there in 1994, following the murder of 10 of its peacekeepers, effectively rendering the ongoing mission toothless. In Somalia, the United States initially ramped up its commitment following the May 1993 attacks on peacekeepers in which 24 Pakistani peacekeepers lost their lives, before then ending its commitments following the deaths of 18 of its own personnel. Indeed, casualties in peacekeeping missions have had noticeable effects in many of the cases.

However, one of the problems with the use of critical junctures, particularly in the path dependency literature, is the fact that their incidence is not accounted for within the theoretical framework itself. Rather, they are treated as exogenous or contingent events. While contingency is acceptable under the scientific realist model, the ways it is employed is not always satisfactory in the path dependency literature. For example, Mahoney argues that the choice of a particular policy from a range of options may be viewed as a contingent event if it is inexplicable by theory.\textsuperscript{63} This suggests less that the outcome is contingent than that we have poor theories about it. Even, however, if we accept that certain critical junctures may involve events which are inexplicable under the theory with which we are predominantly concerned, though they may be explicable under other theories, there are deeper problems with the contingency approach. By accepting critical junctures as contingent events, we make no effort to understand how they are related to other elements of the theoretical framework, or how they may exert influence on other elements of the causal pathway. For example, given the dominant application of path

\textsuperscript{61} Haass, \textit{Intervention}.

\textsuperscript{62} An interesting examination of the Račak massacre is provided by Chomsky, who argues that the massacre was staged by US operatives in order to justify the later intervention. Chomsky, \textit{The New Military Humanism}. In a 2003 interview with a former ICTY prosecutor who wishes to remain anonymous, I was told a similar story. The prosecutor said that the team that exhumed the Račak grave found that the bullet holes on the victim’s bodies were not matched by those on the clothes they wore. This individual suspected the KLA of staging the massacre rather than the United States, dressing its own dead fighters in civilian garb to shock the world at the brutality of Serbian atrocities, but the effect is the same. Both anecdotes, whatever truth they contain, suggest that there is a belief among many that high-profile events such as massacres may crucially alter the stakes involved in intervention.

\textsuperscript{63} See Mahoney, “Path Dependence”, 513-514.
dependent analysis to the explanation of deviant or suboptimal outcomes, path dependent analysis has tended to focus on the effects of single critical junctures on the causal pathway, such as Mahoney’s suboptimal policy choice, which occludes consideration of how there may be multiple critical junctures in a causal chain, and how earlier events may actually “precipitate later crises, structure available options, and shape the choices made at those junctures”. Moreover, it leaves to contingency elements that can usefully be theorised, such as the ways in which structures induce the ‘unsettled times’ and the ways in which agents react to critical junctures. This approach prevents us from engaging in meaningful comparison of cases in which such ‘contingent’ events appear. In the following section, I argue that these shortcomings can be mitigated by marrying the notion of critical junctures and path analysis to the morphogenetic analytical framework introduced in Chapter 3, allowing us to move beyond the rather narrow and problematic path dependency literature and to engage in deeper sequential decision analysis.

4. Agency, Structure and Paths

In the preceding chapters, I have raised notions such as sequential decision paths, contingency, intended and unintended outcomes of policy and the dialectic between agency and structure. Here, these ideas converge. I am not the first to raise the connection between morphogenetic social analysis and critical junctures, but here I seek to move beyond such recognition to elucidate how this recognition can be operationalised into a methodology for examining sequential decision paths.

The first theoretical step in delineating this model is to recognise that policies are rarely the outcome of a single decision, but are rather the product of a series of interlinked decisions, punctuated by critical junctures or key events, with the dynamics of each stage being fundamentally affected by the consequences of the preceding stage. When policies are conceived or enacted, they set off a chain of events in which the policies are discussed, debated and evaluated. Critical junctures then provide openings for change or continuation based upon the effectiveness, suitability or reception of such policies.

In the context of the theoretical framework explicated here, this means that structures provide the context for political deliberation in which agents interpret their identities and interests. On the basis of such interpretations, policies are conceived or enacted that seek to

---

64 Haydu, “Making Use of the Past”, 353.
65 See also Greener, “The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies”, 25(1) Politics (2005), 62-72.
reflect those identities and interests. We can therefore conceive, following Carlsnaes, of a decision-making process as taking place within three dimensions: a structural dimension; a dispositional dimension; and an intentional dimension. The structural dimension refers to the structural context within which policy deliberation takes place. This dimension includes, primarily, the identity setting within which the debate must be framed, as well as the objective conditions—i.e., the set of environmental and material conditions within which the policy event is situated. The dispositional dimension refers to the ways in which actors interpret their interests and ethical values within this structural environment. And the intentional dimension concerns the ways in which actors formulate policy in the context of these structural and dispositional factors. We can think of these dimensions as being nested, in that the higher levels set the context within which the parameters of debate at the lower levels must take place. Idiographic debate takes place within the structural level, which defines the parameters of debate on purposive and ethical issues in the dispositional level, which in turn constrains and enables resource-instrumental and strategic-instrumental deliberation in the intentional level. The product of this nested model of deliberation is foreign policy action. This model is illustrated in Figure 1 below.

**FIGURE 1: MODEL OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION**

---

66 See Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem”.

---

89
However, some policies may serve identity needs better than others, and the enactment of policies will provide room for the evaluation of policies against a state’s identity needs, leading to evaluation of either the policy itself or the identity that produced it in an empirical setting. In other words, a new stage of the decision-making process commences, in which ideas about identities in the structural domain are re-evaluated, as are agents’ interpretations of their identity needs, which leads to a new process of deliberation on policy. Sometimes, this process may simply reflect incremental change, as identities, interests and policies are fine-tuned through a lengthy process of morphogenetic change. At other times, however, change is more abrupt, as critical junctures, which often themselves emerge from the intended or unintended consequences of policy conception, provide the catalyst for reflection upon the salience of the identities, interests or policies thus enacted. In this process, the dialectic between structure and agency is the key to understanding the dynamics of the process, which is illustrated in Figure 2 below.

**Figure 2: Dynamic Agency–Structure Model of Foreign Policy Decision**

Source: Adapted from Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem”.

It can be seen here that the nested deliberation shown in Figure 1 is part of a larger cycle in which the effects of agency (the foreign policy decision) in turn influence the structural and dispositional dimensions within which later foreign policy decisions are made, which in turn influence the agent’s approach to the next foreign policy decision, which in turn influences the structural and dispositional elements once again, as the cycle begins anew again and again.

Structures provide the context within which decision-making takes place, constraining, enabling or conditioning certain policy directions. But, as Blyth puts it, “structures do not

---

67 This figure adapts Carlsnaes ‘three dimensions’ framework to incorporate the idiographic, purposive, ethical and instrumental modes of reasoning referred to above.
come with an instruction sheet”, 68 meaning that there must be a role for agency in interpreting structural imperatives. As policies are enacted through agents’ interpretations in the dispositional and intentional domains, there follows a period of reflection in which the appropriateness of these interpretations are evaluated by policy actors. Critical junctures in this context then provide catalysts for invigorated reflection, as the question of the appropriateness of the interpretations are given impetus by some kind of interposition in the causal pathway. At such moments, “the politics of persuasion comes to the fore”, 69 as agents seek to reinterpret the interplay of the structural, dispositional and intentional dimensions.

This analysis requires a focus on agency, as there is an explicit concern with the ways in which members of political communities interpret the relevance of identities, interests, policies and events. It also requires a consideration of structure, as intersubjective understandings of culture and identity pre-structure the context within which such interpretation may take place, constraining and enabling the range of possible outcomes. In this sense, Finnemore and Sikkink emphasise the need for emerging norms to “resonate” with intersubjective understandings of appropriate behaviour. 70 This helps us to explain why some interpretations of identities, interests and policies are more readily accepted than others.

In the context of the theory outlined in the earlier sections of this chapter, we can take this notion a little further. As idiographic, purposive, ethical and instrumental arguments develop through a policy cycle, they will exhibit greater or lesser resonance with the other components of the policy complex. As policy deliberation develops, the resonance of the different levels of discourse with each other will become a key factor in the stability of the policy discourse itself. Critical junctures may provide the impetus for a reinterpretation of the idiographic discourse, which will then feed into reinterpretation of the lower levels of discourse. Alternatively, critical junctures may provide the impetus for re-evaluations of the extent to which lower order discourses resonate with an affirmed idiographic discourse. In this respect, I highlight the need to identify positive and negative synergies between the

---

levels of discourse. If two levels of discourse establish positive synergies, they ‘resonate’ with each other, and provide stable bases for the establishment of policy. If, however, they do not resonate with each other, negative synergies will emerge, which threaten the stability of a policy discourse and may lead to re-interpretation of the offending level of discourse to bring it into line with the dominant discourse. Critical junctures may highlight the presence of these positive or negative synergies, but the causes of change are vested in the model itself.

B. The Case Studies

In order to assess the utility of the theory presented here, I will examine the evidence presented by three case studies of US involvement in potential cases of humanitarian intervention. I limit the analysis to US foreign policy for considerations of scope. While it would be both interesting and valid to see how approaches to humanitarian intervention differ among states—and, indeed, between states and international organisations, given the increasing practice of such institutions in this field, particularly ECOWAS, the AU and the EU—it would require a much greater number of case studies for such an approach to be effective, as well as a good deal more flexibility in dealing with the empirical materials, given the differences of social organisation in different states. Such an approach would be both a useful and valid direction for the research to go down, and could plausibly form the basis for further research, but it remains for the plausibility of the above theory to be tested before any such wider study could be considered. I choose to focus on the United States as the test case for a number of reasons. Firstly, the United States was an active participant in the majority of cases involving possible humanitarian interventions during the post-Cold War era. It did intervene in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, and was associated with possible interventions in Rwanda, Liberia and Sudan, among others. It is also generally the first country to whom the international community looks when there is a need for military power to enforce collective objectives, as it is and remains the preeminent world power in the modern era. As such, it provides a particularly fruitful site for the research.

I will examine US involvement in potential humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti. These case studies have been chosen because they provide a robust case
selection in terms of the ‘most similar’ case study design.\textsuperscript{71} The case studies are closely related in terms of time, having taken place between 1992 and 1994. Indeed, the case studies overlap to a considerable degree. As political deliberation over intervention in Somalia built in the United States during 1992, leading to the December 1992 intervention decision, the issue of Haiti had already appeared on the US policy radar, following the 30 September 1991 military coup against Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. As the US intervention in Somalia deepened and evolved towards the tragic events of October 1993, so too was US involvement in Haiti deepening and evolving, with the ill-fated Governor’s Island Agreement signed on 3 July 1993 and the embarrassing retreat of the USS Harlan County from Haiti, sent to effect this agreement, but withdrawing in the face of opposition from within Haiti, taking place on 12 October 1993, a mere week after the infamous ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident in Mogadishu on 3 October. In 1994, as the United States readdressed itself to Haiti, Rwanda presented itself as a serious foreign policy issue. The 6 April 1994 assassination of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira triggered the Rwandan genocide, an issue that would need to be dealt with contemporaneously with the ongoing issue of Haiti. However, whereas the United States did intervene in Haiti on 19 September 1994, the same approach was not taken for Rwanda.

In the case study chapters themselves, the analysis is divided into various ‘phases’, reflecting the recognition discussed above that a foreign policy decision is not a single isolated event, but rather the culmination of a series of decisions, be they non-decisions, differentiated decisions, multiple decisions of the same type or increasing or decreasing levels of commitment to a decision path. In each of the case study chapters, I identify three major decision phases, though other numbers might have equally been used depending on the dynamics of the decision path itself in the empirical context. Through the case studies, I make use of detailed historical narrative to trace the causal pathways through which identity manifested itself in a particular policy decision. Though detailed and context-specific, this narrative is nevertheless theoretically driven, as only the most salient issues are addressed in the context of the theoretical framework developed above.

\textsuperscript{71} See Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1846); Przeworski and Teune, Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Krieger, Malabar, 2000). Unfortunately, these authors use different language, with Przeworski and Teune using the language of ‘most similar systems’ design and Mill using the ‘method of difference’ to refer to the same logic. I use Przeworski and Teune’s language here.
C. The Empirical Materials

Any analytical study of identity must make a methodological choice regarding where the discourses of identity are deemed to be located. In terms of foreign-policy decision-making, the sources of appropriate discourse might vary depending on what it is that the researcher wishes to discover. For example, David Campbell’s work on *Writing Security* is concerned largely with understanding the ways in which identities are constructed through the articulation of radical selves/others, even in private, within the official foreign policy establishment.\(^\text{72}\) As such, he concentrates only on identity representations that emanated from within the elite and, specifically, the executive. While such an approach may do much to highlight the dynamics of intra-group identity politics, Campbell chose not to take into account oppositional, popular or other perhaps dissenting voices. Though consistent with his aims, as well as explicitly articulated, this type of approach may nevertheless exclude a possible multiplicity of policy actors who may influence identity politics, and is certainly not the only way to approach such research. There are, indeed, multiple possible discourse analytical frameworks through which we may engage with identity politics; the choice of which to use must be predicated on our research aims and the content of our subject matter. As a useful guide, Lene Hansen illustrates three potential research models: model 1, which focuses on “official foreign policy discourse and centers on political leaders with official authority to sanction the policies pursued”; model 2, which also takes into account “political oppositional parties, the media, and corporate institutions”; and models 3A and 3B, which also take into account “material not explicitly engaging official policy discourse or which is concerned with policy but has a marginal status”.\(^\text{73}\) Indeed, one can envisage numerous possibilities beyond or combining these models and the choice is best left to the subject matter to determine.

The subject matter of humanitarian intervention suggests we should be concerned not just with official foreign policy discourse, but also with discourse emanating from political opposition parties, the media, international and nongovernmental organisations, as well as public opinion. Though the executive remains the primary decision-maker, humanitarian intervention remains a contested issue, with support and opposition to policies of humanitarian intervention emanating from various sectors of society. There is an abundant

\(^\text{72}\) Campbell, *Writing Security*.

\(^\text{73}\) Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 60-63.
literature on the role of the media in influencing policies of humanitarian intervention.\textsuperscript{74} Likewise, a number of studies have noted the potential influence of Congressional actors on the development of such policies.\textsuperscript{75} Indeed, the strength of the US Congress as a policy actor within the US domestic system is so well established as to be almost redundant even to mention. Finally, human rights organisations and advocacy groups have been extremely active on such issues, and have often been mentioned as key actors in policy deliberation.\textsuperscript{76} Indeed, in recent years, such groups have harnessed the power of the internet and now regularly organise massive petitions, funding drives and policy campaigns on these issues. A specific research project on the influence of such initiatives has the potential to be of great interest. However, in the time period considered, such activities were less ubiquitous, and little data from these groups was in any case available, so a full examination was unfeasible. Nevertheless, much advocacy at this time was engaged in through the media itself, so the analysis is able to capture much, though unfortunately not all, of the activities of these groups.

In the case study chapters, I therefore examine representations made by members of the executive in major policy speeches, press conferences, press releases, question and answer sessions and, where available, internal documentation. In the context of Congressional opinion, I examine policy debate in the House and the Senate contained within the Congressional Record, as well as the hearings of Congressional committees, major policy speeches, press conferences and press releases issued by members of Congress. In respect

\textsuperscript{74} Though considerations of scope preclude a lengthy examination of this so-called ‘CNN effect’ literature here, it should be noted that this literature has had mixed results. Early post-Cold War ideas regarding media influence that suggested a strong and direct link between media coverage and policies of humanitarian intervention (see, for example, Kennan, “Somalia: Through a Glass, Darkly”, \textit{New York Times}, 30 September 1993) have largely been debunked (see Livingston and Eachus, “Humanitarian Crises and US Foreign Policy”, 12(4) \textit{Political Communication} (1995), 413-429; Robinson, \textit{The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention} (Routledge, London, 2002); Strobel, \textit{Late Breaking Foreign Policy} and the more established ideas of indexing and cues (see Bennett, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States”, 40(2) \textit{Journal of Communication} (1990), 103-125; Hallin, \textit{The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam} (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989), respectively), the understanding that the media tend to follow, rather than precede, the foreign policy establishment in paying attention to particular issues, have largely been affirmed. Nevertheless, this latter point does not mean that the media has no influence on the process, only that it does not usually set the agenda. Revised versions of the CNN Effect, such as Robinson’s ‘weak’ CNN effect and Robert Entman’s model of \textit{Projections of Power} remain plausible, though relatively untested. See Robinson, \textit{The CNN Effect}; Entman, \textit{Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy} (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003). However, the findings of this research provide some conditional support for the plausibility of these notions.

\textsuperscript{75} See, for example, Mermin, “Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media Driven Foreign Policy”, 112(3) \textit{Political Science Quarterly} (2001), 385-403.

\textsuperscript{76} See, for example, Natsios, \textit{US Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies} (Praeger, Westport, 1997).
of the media, I choose to focus on the contribution of the print media, as the most regular, voluminous and accessible source of media opinion. In particular, I examine media articles from the Washington Post and the New York Times, not because they are the highest circulation papers in the United States or because they provide a balance between left-wing and right-wing views, but because they are widely received as the two most influential newspapers within the policy elite. Finally, although identity debate is largely influenced by debate within a state, it is recognised that outside influence from the international society is also relevant, though it may be somewhat weaker than the effect domestic societal deliberation has on a state’s identity. Therefore, I look at Security Council deliberation and the activities of the UN Secretary-General as the most important source of such influence, though other sources are not excluded. In all, over 6,000 documents are analysed across the case studies.

V. CONCLUSION

In the chapters that follow, I will apply this framework to the empirical material. Though all of the idiographic, purposive, ethical and instrumental considerations presented in the framework above were found to be present in the case studies, emphasis of certain of the elements remained muted. As such, and in light of the wealth of data that was turned up, specific focus is given in these presentations to the dominant discourses, those that influenced the parameters of the debate and, ultimately, policy. The following chapter examines the US intervention in Somalia in December 1992, after which the analysis turns to the cases of Rwanda and Haiti.

---

77 A balance between left-wing and right-wing views or use of high circulation papers is, indeed, anyway difficult to achieve. The highest circulation paper in the United States is the USA Today, though it is far from clear whether it is the most widely read, given that much of its circulation is to hotels in the United States and around the world. Next is the Wall Street Journal, which has a specific focus on financial issues, rendering it somewhat unsuitable for an analysis such as this one. The New York Times, which I use, is the third highest circulation paper, and allegedly left-wing in its orientation. However, in the top 10 circulation newspapers in the United States, the only allegedly right-wing paper is the New York Post, which, although popular, enjoys the vast majority of its patronage within the New York metropolitan area only, rendering it somewhat unsuitable also. I therefore eschew these choice dimensions and focus on level of influence, which the Washington Post and New York Times provide.

78 For Somalia, more than 1,300 documents, for Rwanda, more than 1,200 documents and for Haiti, more than 3,800 documents. The Haiti case study uses more documents for two reasons: firstly, it takes place over a longer time period (two years rather than the less than one year in respect of Somalia and Rwanda); and, secondly, as there were simply more documents that fell within the data collection parameters for this case than the others. Identical data collection methods were used across the three case studies.
Chapter 5

Into the Brave New World: The US Intervention in Somalia in 1992

I. INTRODUCTION

The US intervention in Somalia in 1992 provides an interesting first case study against which to test the merits of the theory developed in the previous chapters. Indeed, the search for an explanation of the US decision to intervene in Somalia has already generated a considerable amount of academic speculation, perhaps in large part because it appears, on the surface, to run contrary to the expectations of established theories. In particular, the classical realist position that states will use military force in order to further their interests, defined in terms of power, seems hard to reconcile with intervention in Somalia, a military action in a faraway land of little or no strategic or economic value to the United States, with little prospect of power political profit.

In the absence of an explanation that resonated with existing ideas about the rationales for the use of military force abroad, there followed a scramble to arrive at satisfying explanations, some less convincing than others. Among those who were unwilling to simply jettison the realist demand for a strategic-political rationale, it was suggested that the intervention was being used to put pressure on the Bashir regime in Sudan in its dealings with the SPLM; could be viewed as a pre-emptive strike against the emergence of a potentially hostile radical Islamic government in Somalia itself; was the first step in a new neo-imperialist program to establish US control in the third world; or, in a more Marxist vein, might even stem from more inward-looking concerns, such as the military-industrial complex and the desire to showcase the beach-landing capability of the US Marines, who had not had a suitable opportunity to flex their amphibious muscle in the recent Persian Gulf War.¹

Few of these rationales were taken particularly seriously. Of those that were, three explanations dominate: that the intervention in Somalia demonstrated the new-found power of the media to set the policy agenda and drive foreign policy;\(^2\) that it represented an attempt by President Bush to increase his political capital on the eve of the Republican National Convention and, later, to secure his legacy before his term as president came to an end;\(^3\) or that it represented the triumph of humanitarian ideals over old particularist concerns, with humanitarian compassion driving the policy agenda towards Somalia. Though none of these explanations was unconvincing, neither were they particularly theoretically satisfying, as none seemed capable of providing a predictive rule of international relations theory that could be defended against the empirical record.\(^4\) Somalia, it seemed, was destined to be considered an anomaly.

In what follows, I chart the emergence of US policy towards Somalia through the lens of the theory presented in the previous chapters. The role of the media, Bush’s ‘legacy’ and the humanitarian imperative all transpire to have importance for the final outcome of the debate over intervention in Somalia, but each can be better understood through a conceptualisation of the role of identity in generating interests, framing debates and, ultimately, formulating policy. The importance of Bush’s legacy can more usefully be formulated in terms of identity itself; in terms of Bush’s ‘new world order’ vision, a vision of US identity and foreign policy role that came to be shared within the US policy community. One element of the new world order suggested an abiding American interest in humanitarian goals, which indeed played an important role in US consideration of the Somalia question, but this interest flowed directly from, rather than in isolation to, the internationalist identity of the new world order discourse. And, in the analysis that follows, the media does indeed play an important role, by highlighting and giving immediacy to existing policy concerns regarding Somalia, particularly in terms of instrumental policy. But, again, it emerges that the way in which the media influenced the policy debate most

\(^2\) See Kennan, “Somalia: Through a Glass, Darkly”.


\(^4\) For a time, it seemed that the ‘CNN Effect’ might be developed into such a rule. However, empirical evaluations of the proposition of a CNN Effect, at least in the fairly simplistic sense in which it was first adduced, failed to produce much more than qualified support for the proposition. See Robinson, *The CNN Effect*; Livingston and Eachus, “Humanitarian Crises”. In recent years, some more sophisticated analyses have developed the notions in these early studies into more defensible theories, but these remain in their infancy, and have moved on considerably from the proposition described here, that news coverage can fundamentally drive the policy agenda. See, for example, Entman, *Projections of Power*. 
crucially was by forcing policy-makers to reflect on the integrity of their vision of US identity as it was being reproduced through foreign policy action. Indeed, these three themes, previously entertained by other commentators, can be woven together through the use of the via media into a far richer patchwork of policy deliberation that is fundamentally driven by identity.

In this chapter, I divide the analysis into three sections, which correspond to different periods in the US approach to Somalia. This division reflects the theoretical commitment raised in the previous chapters regarding the importance of sequentiality and critical junctures in the causal chain. The analysis thus demonstrates how policy debate may be fundamentally altered by endogenous and exogenous shocks. In each of the sections, I address the ways in which questions of foreign policy role, interests, ethical dilemmas and instrumental calculations emerge within the policy discourse on Somalia. The result is a complex whole that demonstrates the ways in which identity drove policy in Somalia, through a process of content and contestation, and interlinked and dynamic synergies between the different levels of discourse. The first section covers the period between January 1992 and June 1992, in which the embryonic response to the Somalia conflict emerged and would later be challenged. The second section charts a shift in attitudes towards the appropriate response between July 1992 and August 1992, as increasing pressure to respond adequately manifested more strongly in the political discourse and, ultimately, in the 14 August decision to airlift humanitarian relief to Somalia. The final section considers the period between August 1992 and December 1992, as the failures of the relief effort became increasingly apparent and increasingly widely criticised, leading finally to the president’s authorisation of a massive intervention force in early December 1992.

II. OPENING GAMBITS: JANUARY–JUNE 1992

A. Foreign Policy Role: New World Order versus Pentagon Paper

As America entered 1992, it found itself in a period of reflection. It had recently emerged from a successful and widely supported war to reverse Iraqi aggression against Kuwait (as well as to subsequently protect Shi’ite and Kurdish refugees in Iraq itself) and from a longer and colder war of attrition with its old enemy the Soviet Union. In 1992, it found

Due to considerations of scope, however, attention is focused only on those elements most critical to the causal complex.
itself preeminent among world powers, and generally more well regarded globally than had been the case but a few years earlier. It was a natural time for the US establishment to reflect upon its identity, its position in the world, and the roles and responsibilities that would attend thereon. In particular, two dominant strands of interpretation of the United States’ foreign policy role in the world emerged: one based on Bush’s vision of a ‘new world order’ and containing strong universalist overtones; and one based upon the so-called ‘Pentagon Paper’, a strongly neoconservative policy programme containing clear particularist overtones. The contents and strengths of these two policy paradigms would largely dominate the emerging debate on Somalia, structuring the discursive ground, and the outcome of the contest between proponents of these two divergent visions would echo through into later, more policy-focused debates, restricting and enabling certain discourses, and rendering certain policies more likely.

1. The ‘New World Order’

US President George H.W. Bush’s “Towards a New World Order” speech before a joint session of Congress in September 1990 set the early tone for idiographic debate on America’s foreign policy role in the post-Cold War era. Bush’s speech covered all sorts of issues, from globalisation, power politics and economic interdependence, through Balkanisation and the rise of new nationalisms, to the domestic economy, technological advancement and integration. The speech emphasised both the challenges and opportunities inherent in the unique nature of the prevailing situation, and some broad parameters through which policy might flow. Thus, the ‘new world order’ speech marked more of a sketch of the terrain than a cohesive political programme. Nevertheless, this allowed for scope for interpretation on the part of various actors, and it is the meaning that the concept of ‘new world order’ had for those driving US foreign policy that is most clearly at stake here.

The dominant interpretation of the new world order was a universalist vision for a harmonious international society. At least three primary features of the new world order emerged from the discourse: strong American leadership in the post-Cold War world; a collective internationalist approach to dealing with global problems; and a universalist

---

6 The Pentagon Paper would later become the blueprint for the 2002 “National Security Strategy”, whose authors—including Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney—were instrumental in the drafting of both.

ethic of responsibility between nations. These three key elements came for many to define the vision of the new world order, a vision that was used widely in support of deeper engagement with Somalia.

The new world order discourse, as the theory presented in this thesis suggests is probable of internationalist identities, provided a blueprint for engagement with crisis-ridden countries in the periphery. The imperative of collective intervention flowed from the collective internationalist identity of the new world order discourse, a notion that was fundamentally suited to the situation in Somalia. But in order for this identity to become operationalised through foreign policy, it would first have to establish its dominance over alternative identity formulations, of which the vision contained in the Pentagon Paper was the most significant rival, and then become established through the dispositional and intentional dimensions by establishing corresponding discourses on interests, ethics and actions.

2. The ‘Pentagon Paper’

The collective internationalist vision inspired by interpretations of the ‘new world order’ speech was not the only reaction to the new and unique situation in which the United States found itself during this period of reflection in the early part of 1992. A significant counterpoint to this theme emerged in early March 1992, when a Pentagon draft strategy document was leaked to the press. This document, too, emphasised the new challenges faced by the United States in the post-Cold War era. However, despite the similarity in starting point, the Pentagon Paper came to very different conclusions. The Pentagon Paper stressed a dynamic neoconservative vision of America’s role in the post-Cold War era, in which the primary aim of the United States should be the maintenance of its pre-eminence as a world power. This overriding objective called not for a return to isolationism but a dynamic engagement overseas. Indeed, the Pentagon Paper explicitly addressed the need to engage with regional instabilities, though from the standpoint of the United States’ own particularist interests. The relevant section is worth quoting at length:

---

The second objective is to address sources of regional conflict and instability … While the US cannot become the world’s ‘policeman’, by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations. Various types of US interests may be involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to US citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and threats to US society from narcotics trafficking.\textsuperscript{10}

Though calling for a dynamic engagement overseas, the Pentagon Paper programme was fundamentally unsuited to a policy of intervention in Somalia. Of the wide-ranging array of objectives outlined in this document, all were ultimately particularist and few if any could be brought to bear in regard to the Somalia situation. Should the Pentagon Paper’s vision of US identity come to dominate the debate, the prospects for intervention in Somalia would be poor. However, general reactions to the leaked Pentagon Paper were critical. In Congress, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) called the Pentagon Paper “myopic, shallow and disappointing. … In the long run, it will be counterproductive to the very goal of world leadership it cherishes.”\textsuperscript{11} And David Scheffer, a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote in the New York Times that the Pentagon Paper “unwittingly isolate[s] US forces from the real enemies—internal aggression and human rights atrocities—that collective internationalism is confronting”.\textsuperscript{12}

In the face of these and other criticisms, the authors and supporters of the Pentagon Paper were forced to retreat from some of its most controversial positions. Pentagon Spokesman Pete Williams sought to soften the hard edges of a document that was never intended for public consumption: “[t]he United States is not looking for a unilateral role in the world. … What we are saying is that we want to stay involved with our allies. We want to remain part of the community of nations. … The defense planning guidance does not say, will not say, [that] we are abandoning collectivism”.\textsuperscript{13} This “tactical withdrawal” from some of the apparent implications of the Pentagon Paper was significant. It put those who wished to

\textsuperscript{13} Tyler, “Senior US Officials”.
argue for a particularist approach to US foreign policy on the defensive. And, in fairly short order, any potential for the Pentagon Paper to drive US foreign policy became extinguished, as the ‘new world order’ discourse came to dominate the idiographic domain, becoming the linguistic touchstone for US identity and setting the boundaries within which policy debate should take place.

In early 1992, US policy-makers had identified two very different potential contents for US identity, which had been heavily contested. However, through this process of content and contestation, one had clearly emerged as the dominant interpretation. This early dominance of a clearly internationalist identity discourse over an equally clearly nationalist discourse fits well with the theory outlined in the previous chapters, as it suggests a stronger likelihood of humanitarian intervention than the converse. However, in order to become operationalised in foreign policy action, this identity discourse in the structural domain would need to find mediation through the dispositional and intentional domains or, in other words, would need to give rise to corresponding lower order discourses on interests, ethics and actions.

B. Interests: Undirected Humanitarianism

Somalia began to impinge upon the policy agenda in early 1992, but had not yet become immediate enough, at least within the United States, to demand any serious reflection upon US interests in forging a response to the crisis. Nonetheless—and as is hardly surprising given the nature of the issue—compassion for the humanitarian suffering of the Somali people dominated attention. Such compassion found ready purchase in the context of an idiographic commitment to universalism. Moreover—as was the case with the collective internationalist propositions of the ‘new world order’ discourse—the strength of this humanitarian discourse in the early framing of the debate would mean that all later discussion of the Somali crisis would have to proceed from this very starting point.

At first, discussion of the humanitarian imperative in Somalia took the form of a search to convey the extent of the crisis in appropriate terms. By early 1992, the UN estimated that at least 20,000 Somali civilians had lost their lives as a consequence of the crisis, and that at least 300,000 had been displaced, facts that became stock phrases for those addressing
Beyond the dry numbers used, more visceral imagery was also used. The situation in Somalia was variously described as “an urban nightmare of war, lawlessness and impending famine”, “a grim symbol of human tragedy, misery and degradation”, “a tragedy of heartbreaking magnitude”, etc. However, the depiction that would come to be most associated with the Somali crisis was the less graphic but no less powerful characterisation by USAID Assistant Administrator Andrew Natsios that “this is the worst humanitarian crisis in the world right now, with no exceptions”. In the period that followed Natsios’ pronouncement, a number of other figures echoed his words. For example, Congressman Alan Wheat (D-KA), Senator Dave Durenberger (R-MI) and Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates all described the crisis in Somalia as the world’s worst in the US Congress. The concept likewise became a stock phrase used in numerous media articles.

The effect of this structuring of the discursive ground went beyond simply an emphasis on the gravity of the situation, but provided a source of linking and differentiation. Characterising the Somali civil war as a humanitarian crisis associated the Somali situation with other such crises, while, at the same time, differentiating it from those same crises, by characterising it as the worst in the world. This characterisation allowed room for a

---


15 Richburg, “In Somali Capital”.


18 Washington Post, “For the Record”, Washington Post, 4 February 1992. The phrase ‘world’s worst humanitarian crisis’ has since become a popular way to ascribe particular gravity to one situation or another. Most notably, it has been used in recent years in connection with the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.


21 The identification of processes of linking and differentiation is an important theme in much post-structuralist scholarship, following Derrida’s ideas on language as a system of differential signs. Commonly used in identity-based research to delineate identities through notions of the self–other dichotomy, given that Derrida’s concern was with language itself and not identity, there seems no reason it should not be applied in terms of framing effects also, as is the case here. For further discussion of linking and differentiation, see Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Verso, London, 1985); Hansen, Security as Practice.
complementary discourse, which differentiated Somalia from, in particular, the crisis in Bosnia, and allowed for a truly universalist discourse to emerge, in which it was held that starving Africans must be equally worthy of attention as emaciated Europeans. This discourse would become crucially important in steering the course towards US intervention in Somalia. As the debate matured into its second phase, the international community would come under increasing criticism for the lack of attention paid to Somalia in comparison to Bosnia, while debate within Congress and the Bush administration would likewise juxtapose the two conflicts, with appropriate universalist discourses supervening on the debate, and conclude that intervention in Somalia was the more appropriate course of action. These debates will be addressed in Sections III and IV of this chapter.

C. Instrumental Action: The Limits of Political Intervention

The emergence of a universalist identity discourse and a definition of interests in Somalia in terms of support for human rights is strongly suggestive of a potential for intervention according to the theory outlined in the previous chapters. However, in the early part of 1992, there was little in the way of what could be termed ‘policy’ towards Somalia. Nevertheless, it is striking, given the speed and determination with which this policy option emerged later in the debate, that, before June 1992, the question of military intervention was rarely, if ever, raised, and then only by implication. The nascent approach to Somalia’s woes in early 1992 was that this was a situation that called for, at most, a measured political intervention.

The earliest—and indeed clearest—high level call for political intervention in Somalia came in January 1992 from Senators Nancy Kassebaum (R-KA) and Paul Simon (D-IL), who would become key advocates of the Somali cause, in a New York Times editorial. They recommended that: a special envoy to Somalia should be appointed; a cease-fire should be called for by the Security Council; and an arms embargo should be established. Such was a fairly close mirror of the actions that were indeed undertaken by the Security Council during this period.

24 On 23 January 1992 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 733, which imposed an arms embargo on Somalia and called for the Secretary-General to mediate the conflict. Under James Jonah’s mediation, a
This format remained the preferred approach to dealing with Somalia’s ills. There was little talk of peacekeeping, and such talk as there was took place behind the scenes. On 11 March 1992, the UN Secretary-General released a report advocating the dispatch of a UN technical team to Mogadishu to assess mechanisms to “ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance”. This was approved in the Security Council’s Resolution 746 of 17 March 1992. However, the Council’s Resolution was a watered down affair. It made implicit reference to the possibility of assessing modalities for a peacekeeping force, but explicit reference was excised between circulation of the draft resolution and approval of the final draft, allegedly at the behest of US negotiators. In open debate on the draft resolution, however, a number of African delegates explicitly called for the deployment of peacekeeping troops, and suggested that a lack of action would be perceived by African states as though their problems were “of limited concern to the international community, and particularly the United Nations”.

This argument was redolent of the consistency argument employed elsewhere—and to great effect—regarding the international community’s responsibility to devote as much attention to Africa as it did elsewhere (see Subsection B above and Sections III and IV below). Indeed, the UN, and particularly the United States, came in for some round criticism for their lack of purpose in responding to the Somali crisis. In line with this mounting criticism, on 7 April 1992, the US Congress passed the Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act, as well as House Resolution 422, both of which called for deeper attention to the human tragedy unfolding in Somalia, and for improvements in the delivery of relief supplies.

---

The Report of the Secretary-General of 21 April 1992 that followed was the first high level report to make a serious call for armed intervention in Somalia. The report called for the deployment of 50 unarmed military observers (MILOBs), as well as a 500-strong contingent of UN ‘security personnel’.

Again, however, the move towards a more forceful role was met with some resistance. Resolution 751 of 24 April 1992 approved the Secretary-General’s recommendation to deploy MILOBs, but fell short of approving the UN security force in anything other than “in principle”. Instead, the Security Council called upon the Secretary-General “to continue his consultations … [and] submit his further recommendations to the Security Council for its decision”.

In hindsight, Resolution 751 represented a turning point for US policy towards Somalia, a critical juncture in the causal complex that led to intervention. Again accused of being the driving force behind the dilution of Resolution 751, the US government was quickly put on the defensive by a series of attacks. On 28 April, the New York Times wrote that: “[w]ith shameful penury, the Bush Administration balks at humanitarian intervention in Somalia because it might cost the United States $7.5 million”. The Washington Post was equally scathing: “Somalia, however, is now part of the Cold War's flotsam and jetsam … What is there left to think when the Bush administration derails the United Nations Security Council’s effort to send a small (500-member) peace-keeping force there?”

These and other similar criticisms resonated with the supervening identity discourse, but the US policy did not. As such, the US government was forced to react. On 9 May 1992, US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times criticising that paper’s coverage of US policy towards Somalia. Pickering wrote: “[t]he United States did not, as you assert, thwart a United Nations effort to send a 500-man security force to protect United Nations and private humanitarian assistance deliveries to Somalis. The United States supports deployment of the force”. Nor was Pickering alone in this response. On 19 May 1992, Assistant Secretary of State for International

---

29 UN Secretary-General, “The Situation in Somalia”.
31 Ibid.
33 Washington Post, “The Sorrows of Somalia”.
Organization Affairs John Bolton wrote a letter upbraiding the Washington Post for its coverage:

The Post wrote that the United States attempted to ‘derail’ the UN Security Council’s effort to send a 500-member security force to Somalia … In fact, the United States urged accelerated deployment of the force authorized in Security Council Resolution 751 … The United States has been continuously and urgently concerned with the severe humanitarian and political issues in Somalia.  

For the first time, senior members of the US government had explicitly and publicly voiced their support for a peacekeeping force for Somalia, largely in reaction to the criticism of the apparent failure to fully support Resolution 751. This would dovetail with other contemporaneous developments that changed the course of US policy, such as the accusation of favouritism towards Yugoslavia, increased media reporting on Somalia, as well as increased Congressional pressure for action. The explicit mention of support for peacekeeping in Somalia in the wake of Resolution 751 would therefore come to constrain the scope of the debate on US policy towards Somalia. With the discursive ground already receptive to a potential humanitarian intervention in Somalia, as the summer of 1992 unfolded, new world order motifs and support for humanitarian goals became more firmly entrenched and now linked to the increasing debate on instrumental policy options, setting the stage for the 14 August announcement of a humanitarian airlift by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, the first step on the path towards US intervention in Somalia.

---

37 It seems likely that these open statements of support for a more considered Africa policy were more than mere spin. On 15 June 1992, the US National Security Review (NSR) 30 called for an encompassing review of US policy towards Africa, making explicit mention of the need to develop policy to deal with civil war. White House, “American Policy Toward Africa in the 1990s”, NSR 30, 15 June 1992.
38 See Appendix 1 for a chronology of events. Notable amongst these developments were Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s intimation to the press that the United States was considering sending combat troops to Bosnia; US Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone’s 10 July “A Day in Hell” cable to Washington describing the desperate conditions on Kenya’s border with Somalia; New York Times Senior Correspondent Jane Perlez’s front page report on the appalling conditions prevailing in Somalia on 19 July (both Hempstone’s cable and Perlez’s report are said to have deeply affected Bush; see Western, Selling Intervention and War, 154; Natsios, cited in Strobel, Late Breaking Foreign Policy, 132); Senator Nancy Kassebaum’s testimony before the House Select Committee on Hunger; and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s criticism of the Security Council for its over-attention to Bosnia at the expense of Somalia.

A. Foreign Policy Role: What Kind of New World Order?

By June of 1992, the dominance of the ‘new world order’ discourse in idiographic debate on US identity and foreign policy role had become well established. The neoconservative urgings of the Pentagon Paper had been, if not consigned to the dustbin, at least back to the drawing board. Indeed, it is startling the extent to which, by this point in the year, new world order motifs dominated the debate, a development that served to narrow the discursive terrain in other areas too; debates on other purposive, ethical and instrumental issues would now have to be conducted within the context of a supervening idiographic commitment to collective internationalism.

As noted above, the US government entered the summer of 1992 under some attack for its (lack of) policy towards Somalia. Now it found its own ‘new world order’ discourse being mobilised against it on this basis. Newspaper reports of the time made arguments such as: “the United States must not abdicate global leadership to support humanitarian relief”; 39 “[m]any US legislators say the United States has a moral obligation to take the lead in the international movement to help Somalia”; 40 and “[t]he world is not helpless, nor are Americans wholly indifferent. All that is missing is leadership.” 41 The new world order discourse was now fully operationalised in support of a more activist foreign policy role in Somalia. 42

But the new world order language was most prominent in the two debates that took place in the Senate and the House on Bosnia and Somalia, respectively, on 10 August. Events in Bosnia had been pushing the policy debate. On 4 August 1992, a mortar attack in Sarajevo striking a funeral cortege for two slain orphans was captured on camera, 43 and, shortly thereafter, on 6 August, the now famous ITN footage of emaciated Bosniaks being held in a Bosnian Serb detention centre was broadcast worldwide, eliciting shocked comparisons with the Holocaust. As a consequence of these shocks, a policy of armed intervention in Bosnia became a topic of open debate. On 6 August 1992, President Bush held a press

conference in Colorado Springs in which he revealed that he was preparing a resolution that would authorise the use of force to protect humanitarian relief in Bosnia if necessary.\footnote{Bush, “Remarks on the Situation in Bosnia and an Exchange With Reporters in Colorado Springs”, 6 August 1992. It was at this stage that the United States also took the step of formally recognising Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia as independent states.}

Through 10 and 11 August, the Senate held extraordinary debate on authorisation for the use of military force in Bosnia. This debate was dominated by new world order motifs. Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) set the tone for this debate:

Mr. President, the world is groping toward a new world order, a new world civilization where we hope that international instrumentalities under the banner of the United Nations will be able to keep and enforce the peace on this Earth. We also seem to be groping toward a time when we recognize that the violent actions of leaders or groups in various countries that become genocide are of concern to the world and cannot be tolerated.\footnote{US Senate, “Authorization of Multilateral Action in Bosnia-Hercegovina”, Congressional Record, 10 August 1992, S12022.}

The need for US leadership in forging this new world order was also emphasised. Senator Joe Biden (D-DE), for example, called upon the United States to “exercise leadership in dealing with a situation which, in my view, if left unresponded to, will in fact set a pattern for the remainder of this century for a new world order that is not one in which any of us should look forward to participating”.\footnote{Ibid.}

There was some challenge to this new world order discourse on the part of those espousing a particularist discourse, but this challenge was generally weak, and found itself couched in universalist undertones. Senator John McCain (R-AR) was one of the strongest advocates of non-intervention in Bosnia. But his idiographic approach was cautious. Listing a number of other trouble spots in which the United States might similarly be asked to become involved, McCain warned that the empathy felt when viewing these crises must be kept in perspective, cautioning: “[a]re we now going to really become the world’s policeman? … [W]e must not fall into the trap of taking the lead every time, in every contingency”.\footnote{US Senate, “Bosnia”, Congressional Record, 10 August 1992, S11991.} The ‘world’s policeman’ motif, which had featured prominently in the Pentagon Paper, was also echoed by Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), who, though he admitted that his
“heartstrings are torn, too”, asked his colleagues to bear in mind the potential cost, both human and financial, of such action.48

Despite the strong particularist emphasis of the assessments of Senators Byrd and McCain, their statements also betray the extent to which the ‘new world order’ discourse had dominated the debate. There was an implicit acceptance underlying both statements that the United States should rightly be concerned with the suffering of others and might reasonably be expected to take the lead in a collective internationalist response. As such, opponents of the political programme the new world order discourse espoused were forced to fight the main battle on different terrain. Predominantly, this would take place within a resource-instrumental context, in which opponents of armed action in Bosnia and Somalia emphasised the cost of any potential action, but ceded the purposive and even idiographical higher ground to the universalist discourse. The sentiments of Senators McCain and Byrd were isolated examples of particularism in a discursive terrain dominated by universalism. Nor did they go unchallenged.

As the Senate debated US policy in Bosnia, the House considered the same question in respect of Somalia, debating its concurrence to Senate Concurrent Resolution 132, which called for the deployment of UN security guards to protect relief convoys in Somalia, a proposition that was met with near unanimous consent on the floor. And, again, the debate focused on the United States’ responsibility to take the lead in devising solutions. Congressman Tony Hall (D-OH), for example, urged the United States “to take the moral leadership at the United Nations to make Somalia a top priority”.49 Similarly, Congressman Doug Bereuter (R-NE) argued that: “if we are to consider ourselves a moral and civilised international society, it is a mission that must be undertaken. Indeed, if the United Nations is ever to realise its true potential as a force for peace, it must not shy away from the tragic and difficult problems such as the one now occurring in Somalia”.50

By this point, it is quite clear that the new world order discourse not only dominated the debate, it overshadowed every other perspective. The content of this identity was by now firmly established, and it faced little in the way of continuing contestation. America, it

48 US Senate, “Authorization of Multilateral Action”.
50 Ibid.
seemed, had determined for itself that its identity was as the leader of a collective internationalist world community, based on values of solidarity and respect for human rights. In the context of Somalia and Bosnia, this therefore militated for US leadership in addressing the ongoing humanitarian crises in those countries.

**B. Interests: Targeted Humanitarianism**

As noted above, although the humanitarian discourse of the early part of 1992 was a powerful refrain, which established humanitarianism as a significant policy concern for the United States, it was also relatively undirected. As the summer of 1992 wore on, however, the humanitarian discourse began to constitute a subventient discourse that emphasised the need for robust action in Somalia. As a fairly exemplary New York Times editorial put it: “Somalia’s agony underscores a more basic need: an effective, mobile UN peacemaking force, strong enough to quell the warlords”.51

So too did Congress tie the humanitarian imperative in Somalia to the necessity for a policy response. In the House, Congressman John Edward Porter (R-IL) put it simply: “[t]he reports of mass starvation coming out of Somalia are absolutely abominable. If there is a dire emergency in need of addressing, Somalia is it.”52 And one of the strongest calls for a response to humanitarian suffering in Somalia came from Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KA), who, on returning from her visit to Somalia, introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 132:

> Mr. President, an enormous human tragedy is unfolding in Somalia, a tragedy almost beyond the imagining of any American … It is, in the words of relief officials, ‘the single worst humanitarian crisis in the world’. Mr. President, I believe we have reached the point where action must be taken. … Hundreds of thousands of lives could be at stake.53

Again, we see a searching to convey the extent of the crisis, a linkage to the need for action and a differentiation of the crisis in terms of its status as the ‘worst’ humanitarian crisis in the world. In the context of the political focus of the time, this meant differentiation from the crisis in Bosnia, an important theme in the debate on Somalia, which now began to be

---

voiced more explicitly. As Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) argued: “the tragic picture in Bosnia … tears at our hearts, as it should. … But, Mr. President, the world’s greatest humanitarian tragedy right now is unfolding without television lights, without the press attention, and that is in Somalia”.54 So too did the Washington Post make this distinction: “[t]o give some scale to the appalling African tragedy, while close to 6,000 deaths have occurred in Bosnia since the vote for independence in March, the Somalian death toll is running well into the tens of thousands”.55

This process of linkage and differentiation was crucial in paving the path to intervention. By the summer of 1992, the idiographic and purposive debates highlighted above had set the general course for US policy. What remained was for the details of a particular policy to be identified and acted upon. The Bush administration was leaning towards action in either (or both) Bosnia or Somalia, but it was Somalia that became the ultimate focus, not simply because it was the ‘worst’ of the crises, but because this discourse resonated with debates on ethical and resource-instrumental grounds, which would serve to differentiate Somalia from Bosnia and make intervention in the former the more likely course of action. In particular, the idiographic commitment to universalism and the purposive differentiation of the Somalia crisis in terms of its status as the ‘worst’ humanitarian emergency supervened upon two related ethical and resource-instrumental questions: in ethical terms, was the idiographical claim to universalism consistent with a selective approach to intervention; and, in resource-instrumental terms, was one or other of the potential interventions likely to produce outcomes consistent with the United States’ universalist aims?

C. Ethical Dilemmas: Consistent Universalism

The issue of selectivity was raised at a crucial point in the policy cycle. Just as the potential for intervention in Bosnia seemed to be gaining ground, a number of policy actors began to criticise the United States for its over-attention to Bosnia at the expense of Somalia. The accusation of selectivity was one that would not sit well with a professed commitment to universalism, as, indeed, selectivity itself implies a form of particularism. This question was given extra emphasis and force when it was articulated by the UN Secretary-General.

55 Washington Post, “Indifference and Somalia”.
On 24 July, Boutros-Ghali chastised the members of the Security Council for devoting undue attention to Bosnia while Somalia was ignored. “‘The war of the rich’, was how Mr. Boutros-Ghali said many Africans describe the conflict in Yugoslavia, arguing that the faces seen on television are well fed compared to the victims in Africa”.56

Boutros-Ghali’s position resonated with and reinforced opinions that had been emerging for some time already.57 USAID Assistant Administrator Andrew Natsios, for example, had said only a few days earlier that he was “frustrated at the relative lack of attention the crisis gets, compared with the war in former Yugoslavia”.58 And a Washington Post editorial the previous week had noted:

[T]he contrast between the US policy of helping the people of Sarajevo while ignoring the plight of Somalis. … Administration officials have contended the US policy toward Somalia is the same as for Yugoslavia … Events in Sarajevo put the lie to that excuse. If the two situations are the same, where are the UN troops securing the Mogadishu airport, and where are the C-130s ferrying food and medicine to the women and children of Somalia, not only in Mogadishu, but in the rest of the country?59

The issue of selectivity thus largely followed a universalist direction, with the suffering of different peoples in different corners of the world being held to be equally worthy of attention. Nevertheless, there was some resistance in the form of particularist arguments. In debate on the Senate floor, for example, Senator Bob Dole (R-KA) took up where McCain and Byrd had left off, using the Pentagon Paper imagery of the ‘world’s policeman’ to warn of the dangers of reacting to every ethnic conflict that arises. Again, however, it was the potential costs that dominated Dole’s thoughts. Unable to posit a difference between Somalia and Bosnia, Dole’s argument warned that reacting to one conflict might therefore provide grounds for involvement in yet others.60 Such arguments largely conceded the

---

ethics of the situation, at least, to the universalist discourse: the commitment to universalism in the new world order discourse had effectively pre-structured the ethical ground towards the universal, consistency argument. Nevertheless, the particularist argument did have some resonance, especially when it began to fall back on an issue area (already implicit in Dole’s speech) where it was much more likely to hold its ground: the question of the risk to US servicemen and women from any potential intervention in Bosnia or Somalia.

D. Instrumental Reasoning: A Balance of Probabilities

1. Resource-Instrumental Reasoning: Fighting a Rich Man’s War on the Cheap

As debate matured on the dangers of US troops being sucked into a ‘quagmire’ in Bosnia, it quickly became established belief that Somalia was the less costly affair, a belief that would come to be shared by the Bush administration. As Strobel observed:

By August 1992, President Bush and his top aides had reached the unanimous conclusion that, to be meaningful, a US intervention in Bosnia would have to involve the deployment of hundreds of thousands of American troops on a mission that had no clear end point. That same year, images from Somalia were helping to break down resistance to a humanitarian-relief mission that seemed to have relatively few costs and risks by contrast.61

The potential cost, especially in human terms, remained a crucially important question that must be answered before intervention could take place. And in this issue area, at least, those espousing a particularist approach to the question were especially well-armed with symbolic imagery to support their contentions. For example, Senator Wallop warned of Bosnia: “[o]nce committed militarily, we will have an obligation to follow through. We will come limping home, as the Soviets did after Afghanistan, as America did after Vietnam.”62 Likewise, Senator Byrd chose Lebanon and the loss of US life there as his analogy, though to much the same effect.63

---

61 Strobel, *Late Breaking Foreign Policy*, 147.
The risks attached to committing US ground troops to Bosnia constituted a concern that was shared throughout the policy community. Though the particularist discourse had lost ground to the universalist discourse in the idiographic, purposive and ethical domains, the crucial resource-instrumental issue of the potential loss of US lives was not conceded. Indeed, at least in regard to Bosnia, it was largely agreed that any use of US ground forces would come at a possibly unacceptably high cost and be unlikely to easily achieve its aims. However, the same was not true of Somalia, which was believed to be both potentially effective and actionable at a comparatively low cost, serving to further differentiate the latter crisis from the former, and making intervention in Somalia the increasingly likely policy choice.

2. Strategic-Instrumental: Growing Belief in the Utility of UN Guards

In the early part of 1992, the dominant strategic-instrumental approach to Somalia had been to advocate limited political intervention. However, as the summer of 1992 matured, a growing consensus began to emerge around the need for security in Somalia as the primary requirement. It had been clear for some time that Somalia was on the brink of one of the worst famines in modern history, and one which was compounded by war and disease, with banditry and looting of relief supplies manifesting as a serious impediment to the delivery of relief.

But a condign analysis of the need for security did not automatically ensure a response. Though the prospect of a security force for Somalia was bolstered by the supportive idiographic, purposive and ethical discourses discussed above, a robust intervention was still far from being a priority for US policy. It was generally agreed that something should be done, but quite what was another matter. The resource-instrumental concern over the potential loss of life in any military intervention was a significant factor reducing the impetus towards such a course of action. This concern was reflected in the still considerable degree of hesitance regarding how exactly relief efforts should proceed in the face of the uncertain conditions on the ground. As the Secretary-General’s report of 22 July noted: “[t]he complexity of the situation and the inherent dangers of working in

---

Somalia … pose enormous operational difficulties for the United Nations in establishing a large-scale and effective presence”. Nevertheless, it was argued, “the threat of mass starvation … and the potential renewal of hostilities” required “an immediate and comprehensive response”. 65

The need to do something about the situation in Somalia was juxtaposed against the difficulties of doing so. Nevertheless, the resource-instrumental concerns were counterbalanced by the idiographic and purposive demands for action. This is well reflected in Senate Concurrent Resolution 132 on the Civil Conflict in Somalia, which was offered by 31 Senators, around a third of that body’s membership. Kassebaum’s introduction of the Resolution noted the problem of security, the need for action and weighed the latter against the potential risk, which, in the final analysis, was deemed to be “a risk worth taking”. 66

The outcome of this tension between competing demands manifested itself in policy. Though the discourse did not yet militate for full military intervention by the United States, the case had nevertheless been made for increased relief efforts, coupled with steps to deal with insecurity. This latter step might be achieved through the deployment of a UN security presence. Long thought to have been opposed by the Bush administration, such an operation was now openly approved. In a press conference on 27 July, White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater urged the UN to “move as quickly as possible to deploy an effective number of security guards to permit relief supplies to move into and within Somalia” and indicated the US government’s willingness to “contribute generously” to the funding of such an effort. 67 And the US government followed through on its promise. When, on 12 August 1992, the UN announced that agreement on the deployment of the 500-strong security force had been reached, the White House promptly offered a military airlift to get the UN guards to Somalia. 68 And, the next day, the White House went one further, by announcing that it intended to commence its own emergency airlift operations to Somalia, table a new Security Council resolution authorising “additional measures” to

---

65 UN Secretary-General, “The Situation in Somalia”.
66 US Senate, “Senate Concurrent Resolution 132”.
ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief and to convene a donor’s conference to improve the delivery of relief.69

It has widely been noted, as alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, that the timing of this new Bush policy towards Somalia coincided with the Republican National Convention, to be held on 17 August. Thus, it has been suggested that the operation may have been calculated to give Bush a political boost in a difficult election. This implication may have some merit. However, what is most important from a theoretical point of view is the rationale behind the move. In forging a new and daring Somalia policy, Bush introduced the issue of foreign policy into an election that had been dominated, if not overwhelmed, by domestic issues. Making foreign policy an issue would serve to remind the American electorate of Bush’s expertise in that field, most notably exemplified by the hugely popular Gulf War success, the very foreign policy issue that gave birth to the ‘new world order’ discourse. By raising the issue of Somalia in this manner, Bush reminded the US electorate that this was his vision of US identity—that he was the new world president—and embarked upon a course that, as the preceding analysis has shown, resonated with a discourse that permeated the structural, dispositional and now intentional domains.

The US government had now taken the first significant step towards intervention in Somalia. However, as the airlift commenced, this plan would quickly become exposed as an insufficient band-aid on a deep bleeding wound. The Bush administration’s decision to undertake the airlift made Somalia now a significant political issue back in the United States and effectively locked the United States into a robust Somalia policy. And, as greater attention was directed towards the US operation in Somalia, its flaws were exposed and Somalis continued to die in their thousands. Thus, a new policy discourse emerged, which emphasised the ineffectiveness of the relief operation. The United States had now committed itself to saving Somalia, but its efforts were apparently ineffectual. It is in this context that the radical decision to send up to 30,000 US ground troops to Somalia, made on 4 December 1992, becomes more comprehensible.

IV. A CREDIBLE COMMITMENT: AUGUST-DECEMBER 1992

By the late summer of 1992, idiographic and purposive debate on the Somalia issue was starting to tail off. Over the previous eight months of contestation, Americans had largely established a stable notion of the content of their identity and interests in Somalia. This discursive context had led to the 14 August decision to commence a military airlift of relief supplies. But, though a policy had now been enacted, it had been based on only limited instrumental debate. As the US airlift got off to a shaky start—and the ‘pull’ factor of a major US foreign policy initiative generated increased interest in the Somalia relief effort—a marked increase in instrumental questions regarding US–Somalia policy emerged. Firstly, the US airlift was widely and effectively critiqued for failing in its goals. And, secondly, the emerging consensus that the need for security in Somalia was at least as pressing as the need for food became cemented in the policy discourse, as armed gangs disrupted the delivery of humanitarian relief. It was these instrumental discourses that presaged the policy shift from a purely humanitarian intervention focused on the delivery of relief supplies, to an armed humanitarian intervention where US ground troops would ensure the effective delivery of relief supplies. And, supervening on the instrumental discourse were the implicit idiographic and purposive issues that, should the United States wish to establish itself as a leader of a new world order, it was necessary for that leadership to be credible. Thus, once committed to Somalia through the 14 August airlift decision, the United States needed to demonstrate its resolve to properly address the situation if it were to realise its identity through instrumental action. A retreat from Somalia in the face of the difficulties encountered would strike a discordant note with the overwhelmingly dominant discourse of the time.

A. Resource-Instrumental: Effective Relief

One of the most important factors influencing policy at this time was the media. After the first flush of enthusiasm (or, indeed, despair) regarding the notion that the media was capable of driving policy in the post-Cold War world, much influenced by the perception of media influence in the Somalia intervention, most analyses of the so-called ‘CNN effect’ have concluded that this influence has been overplayed. A number of studies have looked at the role of the media in regard to Somalia and concluded that media coverage followed, rather than precipitated policy action, the most obvious manifestation of this
being the huge jump in media coverage following the August 14 airlift announcement, in
comparison to what had gone before.\textsuperscript{70} This suggests that policy was driven by factors
other than media coverage, as, indeed, is the case argued here. However, this should not
entail a simple dismissal of the role of the media in the policy process, as to do so is to
ignore the massive leap in policy discourse that was required to move from a relatively
low-cost intervention in the form of delivery of relief supplies, to a high cost military
intervention involving a heavy commitment of US ground troops.\textsuperscript{71} The media was crucial
in this process. Once a policy in Somalia had been enacted, intense media interest was
quickly mobilised. And coverage largely focused on the failure of this policy in securing
the ‘new world order’ goals it sought to achieve. Consequently, this critique generated a
significantly heightened reflection on resource-instrumental and strategic-instrumental
questions, which were now brought more closely into line with the supervening discourses
on identity and interests: the material facts on the ground were given meaning by the
ideational context within which they were interpreted. If the United States was unable to
secure its stated interests in Somalia, it would be unable to reproduce its stated identity
through foreign policy action. This rationale provided the crucial impetus for stronger
action in the final phase of the decision-making process.

Media coverage that emphasised the ineffectiveness of the US airlift was intense as the
operation struggled to get off the ground or make any impact. Despite the fact that media
attention at this time was primarily focused on the US presidential election,\textsuperscript{72} over 80 news
articles appeared in the Washington Post and New York Times alone in this period that
made reference to the flaws in the airlift, many of which had the issue of effectiveness as
the main theme and many of which were front page news. The airlift faced a number of
problems as it attempted to get off the ground, including delays, poor targeting of
deliveries and, crucially, lack of provision (including security) for delivery of relief once it

\textsuperscript{70} See, for example, Livingston and Eachus, “Humanitarian Crises”; Strobel, \textit{Late Breaking Foreign Policy};
Robinson, \textit{The CNN Effect}.

\textsuperscript{71} In a relatively nuanced analysis, Robinson describes this as a ‘weak CNN effect’, which, though accurate
in terms of comparison with the strong CNN effect suggested by some other authors, nevertheless fails to
convey the full import of the media’s role in this period, which was arguably crucial. Robinson, \textit{The CNN
Effect}.

\textsuperscript{72} See, for example, Strobel, \textit{Late Breaking Foreign Policy}; Mermin, “Television News”; Robinson, \textit{The
CNN Effect}. 
hit Somalia. These issues, though they became increasingly apparent and, indeed, undeniable as the airlift progressed, had actually been well understood for some time. In late July, US experts had already come to the conclusion that the insecurity in Somalia would jeopardise any relief efforts: “United States disaster experts … said today that emergency airlifts proposed by the United Nations would not solve the problem of how to get food to tens of thousands of starving people … [and that] the major barrier to helping the hungry was the continuing fighting between rival clans”. Similarly, the lack of an effective security force capable of protecting relief supplies had been identified early on by US officials, who noted that the 500 Pakistani peacekeepers mandated by the Security Council to provide security to relief deliveries would be “insufficient to guard the food transported to areas outside the capital”.

As the US airlift got underway, however, these misgivings were further underscored by concrete evidence as specific problems arose. The first US relief flights into Somalia commenced on 28 August (around a week behind schedule). But it was quickly noted by the media that these flights targeted not the worst areas of suffering, but the safest. Relief agencies “accused the United States of wanting the publicity of staging a dramatic airlift without coordinating it with other relief efforts underway and without going to the most needy towns”. World Food Program Spokesman Paul Mitchell, when asked whether the US airlift was helping, replied “[i]s there any valued added? No.” And not nearly enough food was actually arriving in Somalia, a fact that caused Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) to comment that “an airlift is a sure sign of doing too little, too late. Our planes cannot begin to deliver anything like the 50,000 tons of food per month that is needed.”

---

73 Key issues in this context included disputes with the Kenyan authorities over permission to overfly Kenyan airspace, as well as disputes with the Red Cross over lack of provision for delivery of relief. See Appendix 1 for details.
78 Cited in ibid.
As the airlift progressed beyond these early missteps, it did indeed expand to other areas of Somalia and begin to move more food, but this did little to improve the perception of its ineffectiveness. Firstly, on expanding to more rural areas, it quickly became evident that “the country’s famine is far worse than previously believed and that current efforts, including an American airlift, are falling far short of what is needed to ease the crisis.”[^81] But the greatest problem that the airlift faced was security. Andrew Natsios, now named Special Coordinator for Operation Provide Relief, noted early on in the relief effort that: “[t]he problem here is not resources or food. It is security. It is the clan war. It is the anarchy.”[^82] The issue of security for the delivery of relief supplies continued to plague the ongoing effort, as attacks on aid convoys, looting of aid stations and suspensions of the relief effort became daily fodder for the news media.[^83] Indeed, many came to believe that the very influx of food supplies in the context of insecurity and famine may have precipitated even more violence. The front page of the Washington Post carried a story that opened: “[s]hooting and looting incidents last week at airfields that were receiving emergency food supplies illustrated a stark reality about this famine-wracked country: the US-led emergency airlift may actually be worsening the problems of lawlessness and anarchy in Somalia”.[^84]

It had become increasingly clear that a relief effort without the support of a security force was both ineffective and even dangerous. The obvious prescription was a beefed up UN security presence in the country. The 500 Pakistani peacekeepers that the United States had offered to airlift to the country had by this time arrived, but “three weeks after the full complement of troops arrived they have not been deployed and remain doing little that is visible except fetching water supplies for themselves”.[^85] In the face of this disastrous display, on 28 October 1992, UN Special Envoy Mohamed Sahnoun resigned his post, citing his frustration with ‘UN bureaucracy’ and protesting against the UN’s insistence that he secure the consent of General Aideed before deploying the 500 Pakistani peacekeepers. The time had come, it seemed to many, for a more forceful approach to Somalia’s problems.

[^82]: Richburg, “Solutions for Somalia”.
[^83]: See Appendix I for a chronology of events.
B. Strategic-Instrumental: Securing Relief

The proposition of a peacekeeping force for Somalia had received relatively widespread, albeit fairly uncritical, support prior to the problems that emerged in respect of the US airlift. But, as these problems emerged, the calls for a muscular peacekeeping presence became significantly more vocal, as well as better supported by a robust analysis of conditions on the ground. This was reflected in the UNSG’s report of 24 August, which argued that: “[t]he critical problem facing the United Nations in its humanitarian activities in Somalia is how to ensure the security of relief supplies at all stages, namely delivery, storage and distribution. … For this, effective security and ground arrangements are a sine qua non.”

This analysis was shared by many US policy actors. On 20 August, the Washington Post had written that “[s]ome US officials are said to hope for a beefed-up United Nations peace-keeping force deployed throughout Somalia to protect food convoys”.

In the Senate, Patrick Leahy argued that “UN troops, adequately armed and with orders to shoot back if fired upon, are the only hope, and they are long overdue”. And Congressman Eliot Engel urged “the President to communicate to the UN Security Council that the United States will consider participating in the deployment of armed UN guards to secure relief shipments [in Somalia]”.

This last quote is significant. Up until now, calls within the US policy community for a peacekeeping force for Somalia had been couched in generalities, espousing a US commitment to support, but not necessarily participate in, a UN peacekeeping force for Somalia. From October 1992, this began to change. The failure of the airlift had done more than highlight the need for a security presence in Somalia. It had also threatened the integrity of the United States’ emerging identity as the leader of a new world order. If this identity was to be preserved, the United States would be required to take action to realise it in the context of Somalia, its first major test since the Persian Gulf War. As a Washington Post editorial put it, “Desert Storm-type determination is warranted, and President Bush

---

86 UN Secretary-General, “The Situation in Somalia”.
88 US Senate, “Somalia”.
89 US House of Representatives, “Concerning the Situation in Somalia”.
should say so and act accordingly”.

A New York Times editorial of 19 November similarly noted: “[a]dministration officials already admit they need a ‘shoot-to-feed’ policy. Now they should act on what many of them privately believe—our own forces must do the shooting, and, if the UN dawdles, go it alone.” The next day, the same paper argued: “[f]orce—military force—must be used to protect the relief effort from the gangs. … A few thousand well-armed troops with a clear mission could make all the difference in Somalia.”

As this consensus began to emerge more and more forcefully, the Bush administration swung into action. On 25 November, the State Department announced a US offer to airlift the remaining 3,000 authorised UN security forces to Somalia. However, these troops would never arrive, as the Bush administration would quickly up the ante. The next day, on 26 November 1992, Lawrence Eagleburger was sent to the UN to offer that body an entire division of US troops (approximately 20,000) to protect humanitarian relief. After several days of debate, on 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council authorised such action under Resolution 794. And, on 4 December 1992, President Bush addressed the nation live on television and radio, confirming that the United States was now ready to commit a substantial force of ground troops to protect relief supplies in Somalia. It is worth quoting this address at some length:

Every American has seen the shocking images from Somalia. The scope of suffering there is hard to imagine. … In concert with the United Nations, we sent in the US Air Force to help fly food to the towns. … But in the months since then, the security situation has grown worse. … In many cases, food from relief flights is being looted upon landing … It’s now clear that military support is necessary to ensure the safe delivery of the food Somalis need to survive. … [W]e also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement … Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death.

Bush’s speech touched upon—and indeed was the logical conclusion of—all of the major themes of the policy discourse discussed in this chapter. It spoke of the need for American

leadership in collective internationalism, of the US interest in human rights, of the problems faced by the airlift and of the need for military intervention. By December of 1992, a discursive environment had emerged that demonstrated positive synergies between all of the idiographic, purposive, ethical and instrumental discourses, such that a policy of US intervention resonated with the demands of an emerging US identity. The elements of US identity discourse now formed a complex whole, which suggested that the realisation of that identity could only be achieved through the use of military force in Somalia.

It has been argued that Bush, by now a lame duck president with only around a month left in office, chose to intervene in Somalia as a means of securing his legacy. Again, however, even if such should be the case, what is most important here is how and why such a move makes sense. If we accept that the intervention was a means of securing the president’s legacy, we must necessarily ask how this particular action may have done so. It did so by highlighting the president’s foreign policy portfolio, the centerpiece of the Bush presidency, from nuclear non-proliferation and improving relations with the Soviet Union, to the stance against aggression in the Persian Gulf. And fundamentally underlying this foreign policy persona was the conception of Bush as the new world president, the leader of a nation of collective internationalist values acting in solidarity with the rest of a changing world. Intervention in Somalia fundamentally resonated with such an identity, and cohered with Bush’s prior foreign policy successes, such that they together symbolised an indivisible whole, a legacy indeed. America had chosen to intervene in Somalia, not because of some ineluctable pull elicited by the immutable demands of fixed interests or through the whim of an individual president, but through a collective identity-driven process of policy formulation. Indeed, one of the reasons the Somalia case has generated so much interest is for the very reason that it was far from inevitable. No traditional foreign policy interests seemed to militate towards a US intervention in Somalia, but this was the policy that emerged. And it emerged because it was entirely consistent with a shared understanding of who and what America was, a country committed to the establishment of a new world order, based upon shared principles of collective internationalism and human rights and secured through credible American leadership.
V. CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis of US intervention in Somalia provides strong support for the theory outlined in the previous chapters. In the early part of 1992, two dominant discourses, demonstrating a distinct cleavage between universalist and particularist ethics of responsibility, provided the setting within which contestation over the content of US identity took place. The eventual dominance of the universalist discourse, supported as it was by a subvenient discourse on support for human rights, suggested the strong possibility of a significant US response to the crisis in Somalia. However, in the absence of any synergies with lower order discourses, especially on the resource-instrumental and strategic-instrumental planes, such action was slow to emerge. It required the self-reinforcing critical junctures of July and August 1992 to alter the strategic environment and lock the United States into its path of engagement with Somalia as a means of realising its identity, such that military intervention became a significant possibility. The possibility of US military action in Bosnia and the corresponding criticism of the US attention to that crisis in contrast to Somalia served to focus the policy debate on those resource and strategic-instrumental questions more fully, but still a fundamental disjuncture remained between the idiographic and purposive imperatives and the instrumental concerns. It was crucially the perception of the failure of the US airlift that provided the opening for change that pulled those latter discourses into line with the now established supervening idiographic and purposive discourses. The resolution of all of the idiographic, purposive, ethical and instrumental discourses into a relationship of positive synergy provided the crucial linkage, establishing a causal complex through which a policy of military intervention became the primary means by which the United States could realise its stated identity.

The foregoing analysis establishes the strength of the identity-based approach to the analysis of rationales for humanitarian intervention, the necessity for synergies between different levels of discourse, as well as the importance of sequentiality and critical junctures. However, in the chapters that follow, the theory faces sterner tests. In the following chapter on US non-intervention in Rwanda, we are faced with the question of why, faced with a very similar problem—an African civil war featuring appalling human suffering—the US government retreated so far and so fast from the possibility of American intervention to secure the rights of the victims and to defend its own values. However,
despite the difference in response to such a similar situation, the case study on Rwanda serves to further illustrate some of the strengths of the scientific realist approach, particularly the notion that social systems are ‘open systems’, which are “susceptible to external influences and internal, qualitative change and emergence”, and the utility of the morphogenetic approach to mapping such change.\textsuperscript{94} This notion serves to remind us that the constant conjunction approach to causality is problematic, as it fails to take into account the possibility of system change. Rather, the importance of contextual analysis of causal complexes is highlighted, calling attention to the contingency of causal outcomes, without jeopardising the integrity of causal analysis itself.

\textsuperscript{94} Patomaki and Wight, “After Postpositivism”, 232.
Chapter 6

Travelling Without a Map: US Non-intervention in Rwanda in 1994

I. INTRODUCTION

The US non-intervention in Rwanda in 1994 provides a crucial test case for the theory outlined in the first half of this thesis. Empirically very similar to the Somalia case study, in that it involved a civil war in an African nation featuring massive human suffering among a civilian population, the Rwandan case nevertheless drew a strikingly different approach from within the US policy community.

The scale, the speed and the brutality with which the carnage in Rwanda unfolded has rightly generated serious and focused attention to the crisis that engulfed the small African nation in the space of a few short months in 1994. The primary focus of academic attention has been on those aspects that seem least comprehensible to those not directly involved in the proceedings. Firstly, much research has been devoted to the roots of the genocide itself, the ideology, motivations and political organisation behind one of the most horrific events of the already bloody twentieth century.¹ Secondly, commentators have also sought to understand how, in the face of such a violation of all norms of civilised behaviour, the international community felt able to simply step aside and allow the violence to proceed unhindered.² It is this latter question that has most relevance to the research being undertaken here.

Unsurprisingly, accounts that focus on the international community’s response to the genocide in Rwanda have tended to do so from the standpoint of morality. In hindsight, the tepid response of the international community to one of the most horrific genocides in history seems all but incomprehensible without focusing on the evasion of moral responsibility that such behaviour suggests. Later claims by politicians that they ‘did not

---

² See, for example, Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2000); Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002).
know’ the extent of the crisis have been roundly debunked, as have notions that there was minimal media coverage or interest in the Rwandan situation. As such, many came to the conclusion that members of the international community simply ‘did not care’ enough about Rwanda or its people to ‘do something’ about it. Whether focused on the UN and its Secretariat, the UN Security Council and its leading members or other more peripheral players such as the world media, most analyses have followed a common form: to identify relevant actors who may have had a moral responsibility towards the Rwandan people and to identify the ways in which this responsibility was, if not rejected, at least disregarded.

There is much that is both important and valid in such approaches. The lack of response to the Rwandan genocide cannot indeed be understood outside of this context. However, the identification of a culture of apathy leaves as many questions unanswered as it answers. As was identified in the previous chapter on Somalia, the international community and its members may indeed sometimes be moved to act—and act forcefully and courageously—on the basis of moral imperatives. Why then was there a culture of apathy towards Rwanda but not Somalia? Arguments based on morality alone can only provide a small part of the answer.

The following analysis provides an explanation based on the shift in US identity between 1992 and 1994, which accounts for the differences in approaches between Somalia and Rwanda. There is considerable support for the notion of a lack of empathy in discussions of the suffering of the Rwandan people, which is partly explained by humanitarian fatigue, but perhaps more importantly by a perception that little could be done about the situation, itself vested in an idiographic climate that stressed the dangers of well-meaning but inappropriate action. The problem was not a lack of empathy as such, but a fundamental discordance between the empathy observers felt and their analysis of the prospects for ending the suffering. This problem was compounded by a basic lack of sophisticated knowledge about Rwanda itself and the dimensions of the crisis unfolding there, as well as

5 A notable exception to this tendency to simply apportion ‘blame’ for the lack of a response to the genocide in Rwanda is Michael Barnett’s *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, which finds an ‘empathetic’ explanation in the bureaucratic culture that prevailed within the UN. While Barnett’s analysis tends to focus on the UN system, while this analysis concentrates on the policy of the United States, there are some important similarities between the approaches, as well as important parallels between the cultural imperatives that developed within the UN and the idiographic imperatives identified in this chapter.
a lack of attention to the potential for further violence prior to the outbreak of genocide in April 1994. Ultimately, however, it was the idiographic environment within which debate on Rwanda took place that determined the course of events more than any other factor. Indeed, it was identity that set the tone for all other considerations.

The following analysis is divided into three sections, reflecting different phases in the decision-making process. The first period covers January to April 1994, in which a small peacekeeping force was sent to Rwanda to monitor a cease-fire between warring factions, a period which generated very little outside attention. The second period covers April to May 1994, the first month of the genocide, and deals with the immediate reactions of the international community to the shocking carnage that ensued. The final period deals with May to July 1994, as the world community increasingly came to grips with the facts of what was happening in Rwanda, but not with what to do about it.

II. SETTING THE STAGE: JANUARY–APRIL 1994

A. Foreign Policy Role: A Rudderless Ship

By 1994, the collective internationalism that had propelled the United States towards intervention in Somalia had fallen into abject disrepute. This shift in the idiographic discourse was not simply the policy shift that attended upon a new presidency—indeed, for many, President Bill Clinton was a far more wholehearted partisan of collective internationalism than his predecessor had been—but was a reaction to the policies enacted in the name of collective internationalism. In particular, the debacles in which 18 US servicemen lost their lives in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, followed shortly by the embarrassing about-face of the USS Harlan County as it approached Port-au-Prince on 11 October 1993, quickly became symbolic of the failures of collective internationalism (see Chapter 7 for further discussion). As US involvement in Somalia had deepened throughout 1993, while public interest had waned, the visceral imagery broadcast on CNN of dead US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu shocked the nation. So too did the image of the world’s foremost military superpower retreating in the face of an angry mob wielding clubs on the docks of Port-au-Prince a few days later. Naturally, Americans looked for someone to blame.

The obvious place for the buck to stop was on the desk of President William Jefferson Clinton. But the buck did not stop there. Also blamed were the UN and, less directly but no
less effectively, the United States’ commitment to collective internationalism. In stark contrast to the period considered in the run-up to the Somalia intervention, by early 1994 references to collective internationalism as the driving force behind US foreign policy were virtually entirely absent. Collective internationalism had not so much been eclipsed by the persuasiveness of an alternative policy paradigm, but discredited as a direct consequence of the foreign policy actions enacted under its name. Here was a very clear example of the dynamic morphogenetic agency–structure relationship at work. The dominance of a collective internationalist identity at the structural level was what had driven the United States towards intervention in Somalia, but the effects of that foreign policy action at the level of agency had in turn transformed the structural domain, rendering it inhospitable to notions of collective internationalism (see Figure 2, Chapter 4 for an illustration of this dynamic).

However, consequently, there was no new pre-formulated idiographic discourse to replace the old. Indeed, in the early part of 1992, it is difficult to point to any coherent idiographic policy programme emanating from the US policy establishment. What was left was negative criticism. Media coverage described Clinton’s foreign policy performance at the end of his first year in terms such as: “inept to disgraceful”;6 “an almost Reaganesque display of cluelessness”;7 “naïve paternalism”;8 “speaking loudly and carrying a small stick”;9 and “muddling through”.10 Nor was this criticism simply the work of his political opponents. As the Washington Post noted: “Clinton may not have won full bipartisan support for his foreign policy, but he is drawing bipartisan criticism”.11 Only a very few politicians were prepared to defend Clinton’s foreign policy, but these advocates were given little enough to work with. Clinton’s own mode of defence of his policy record was to focus on the (mainly domestic) successes in his first year of office, such as cutting the budget deficit, enacting the Brady Bill (on gun control), tax cuts for small businesses, etc.

The only major foreign policy success to receive sustained attention was the establishment

---

Certainly, among the items listed are some that could be considered to be great successes for a freshman president. However, what this tactic fundamentally failed to convey was any sense of direction to or leadership of US foreign policy, leaving the field wide open to his critics.

The lack of any clear direction to US foreign policy was glaring. While it was recognised that “[t]he country is hardly at the stage of a great debate over foreign policy”, the administration was nevertheless still forced to admit that it was still “trying to think of what our bumper sticker would be about”. Clinton was “yet to encourage the kind of public debate about America’s place in the world beyond the Cold War that is needed if a new American consensus is to be found”. All that was left to fill this vacuum was the voice of his critics, giving the sense that Clinton was simply “feeling his way between the public’s isolationist and internationalist tendencies” (a point that had some merit; see Chapter 7).

The tone of this discourse critiquing Clinton’s performance was undeniably particularist, as attention focused primarily on the lack of forceful leadership in US foreign policy; and the lack of credibility inherent in a presidency that seemed to reverse its policy at the slightest hint of opposition. And, though the policy failure du jour varied as a focal point for criticisms—from most-favoured nation principle for China, North Korean nuclear ambitions, or Russia policy and the expansion of NATO—the examples of Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia remained constants, which were earnestly raised up as straw men at every available opportunity. This meant that one of the strongest elements of the critique of the

---

12 See, for example, the State of the Union address, which was widely lauded as an excellent address, but featured little or no consideration of foreign policy. Clinton, “State of the Union Address”, 25 January 1994.
13 Rosenfeld, “When a President”.
15 Hoagland, “Hung Up On Appearances”.
16 Rosenfeld, “When a President”.
19 See, for example, Simes, “Clinton’s Innocence Abroad”; Willis, “Clinton’s Year at Sea”; Herbert, “In America”; US House of Representatives, “Commerce, Defense, and Justice”; US House of Representatives, “Clinton Team Fumbles in China”.

of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and improvements in world trade.
Clinton’s administration’s foreign policy was directed at peacekeeping policy, which, it was argued, was too expensive and too inefficient. Moreover, Clinton became widely criticised for ‘subcontracting’ his foreign policy to the UN, an idea that gelled well with the concept of a lack of leadership in the US presidency. As Senator Bob Dole (R-KA) argued: “[t]he problem in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti was not the unilateral pursuit of United States national interests. Each of these foreign policy blunders was the result of the administration deferring to or depending on the United Nations to define US policy”.20

While many commentators have pointed out the fundamental inaccuracy of the rhetoric that blamed the UN for the failure in Somalia—the US servicemen that died on that day in October 1993 were operating under US command and control on a mission devised by the United States regarding which the UN had never been informed—the culture of skepticism towards the UN that emerged in US idiographic discourse in late 1993 and early 1994 was generally based on a much more condign analysis than this. The experiment in conflict resolution and nation-building that had taken place in Somalia had indeed failed in certain important respects. Most important among these were the lessons that the UN itself was poorly equipped to separate warring factions and that UN intervention in such circumstances risked the UN simply becoming a party to the conflict with the inevitable dangers to its personnel that this posed. For the UN, this merited a retreat from exuberant hopes for humanitarian intervention towards a reconciliation with the tenets of traditional peacekeeping—in particular, that the UN should only keep the peace when there was indeed a peace to keep. The second, related lesson to be learned from Somalia was that only a significant military power was capable of coercing a peace between warring factions, but that this process too ran the risk of incurring casualties, and few nations would be able to sustain an intervention in which their national interests were not directly affected in the face of such losses. For the United States, therefore—and, indeed, for most other similarly placed nations—this merited a retreat from universalism towards a more particular approach to engagement. As Congresswoman Constance Morella (R-MD) argued: “[w]e cannot continue to pursue foreign policies which have no merit or virtue and which put American men and women in harm’s way for purposes which do not serve any national policy”.21 The international community would have to pick and choose where

engagement might have positive outcomes and act accordingly, lest the prospects for the entire system be undermined. This hesitance regarding the efficacy of intervention would resonate throughout the debate on Rwanda and significantly colour the policy actors’ perspectives. And, crucially, it both generated and sustained a particularist idiography.

Though the content of US identity in early 1994 was hardly well articulated, there was little in the way of contestation concerning the general drift towards particularism. As such, America entered 1994 with a strongly particularist idiographic discourse that stressed the importance of forceful leadership in American foreign policy, the pursuit of particular US national interests, and a lack of confidence in the UN in general, and UN peacekeeping in particular. Equally, America entered 1994 with a president under fire for a lack of credibility in his foreign policy. As the New York Times put it: “[a]ssessments of the Clinton Presidency inevitably come down to one issue: can he be trusted?” In short, Clinton was being asked to enunciate his principles, and then stick to them. As 1994 progressed, the president would formulate a policy programme that resonated with the prevalent particularist identity discourse and, in demonstrating his resolve to adhere to those principles, firmly drew the country back from any kind of engagement with the crisis in Rwanda. As the theory developed earlier in this thesis suggests, the strength of this nationalist identity was a key factor determining the ultimate response to the Rwandan crisis—non-intervention.

B. Interests: or Lack Thereof

In retreat from the collective internationalism of the new world order era, in early 1994 Americans felt that their nation’s foreign policy should be focused on the big issues—those that directly affected America’s national interests and national security. These concerns were reflected in administration policy. As the New York Times observed: “the administration’s strategy, announced by Mr. Christopher in November, [is] to focus on big issues such as Russian reform and Middle East peacemaking and to treat crises in Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti as bothersome regional issues with little or no importance for America's national interests”.

Indeed, in the general atmosphere of anti-UN feeling, the United States was not only uninterested in such matters but was openly hostile to them. Peacekeeping, it was argued, was fast ballooning to an unmanageable scale, with new missions regularly being voted for in faraway countries, with little concern for the cost involved, or the effectiveness of the policy. This criticism manifested in the proposed Peace Powers Act, which sought to limit the executive’s ability to unilaterally tie the United States into peacekeeping commitments and was premised on a scathing critique of UN peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping, it was argued, “has become an exploding international entitlement program—with some 20 operations currently underway”. With “peacekeeping costs and deployments mushrooming, peacekeeping environments increasingly dangerous and hostile, and this administration’s increasing reliance on the United Nations for policy direction … the United Nations should be put on notice that the United States will not continue to pay an ever-escalating assessed contribution for UN peacekeeping”.  

This message was received loud and clear within the Clinton administration. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, speaking on the eve of a UN General Assembly meeting, heeded to the prevailing winds: “[m]ultilateral action is in order only when it serves the central purpose of American foreign policy—to protect America’s interests”. US national interests had become the necessary touchstone for participation in UN peacekeeping and morality had no place in such a decision. Robert Kaplan summed up the general mood: “[i]n a world of parish-pump genocides, morality cannot, by itself, provide a key to intervention. Only when morality intersects with obvious economic and strategic interests does a policy begin to emerge. Morality does not intersect with our economic and strategic interests anywhere in Africa”.  

In respect of Rwanda, this direction to US foreign policy held out little hope for any serious engagement, as, in Rwanda, a small, faraway country of which most Americans knew very little, an expensive new peacekeeping operation was underway, and no US national interest could be said to be involved. Beyond these simple facts, the dominant characterisation of the situation in Rwanda in the early part of 1994 was of a relatively stable situation moving towards resolution, hardly the kind of depiction likely to generate

---

further interest or attention. In the Security Council, the consensus was that: “recent events in Rwanda regarding the implementation of the peace process are encouraging. The ceasefire has indeed been respected; the parties have cooperated with each other and with the United Nations for the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement”.\textsuperscript{27} The conflict, most agreed, was “nearing a settlement”.\textsuperscript{28} The United States, for its part, remained almost entirely silent on the Rwanda question up until April 1994. If it disagreed with these assessments, it certainly did nothing to dispel the overall sense.\textsuperscript{29} Quite why this strange silence on the real conditions obtaining in Rwanda persisted is a point worthy of consideration. The later explanation was that the intelligence these policy actors had on Rwanda was relatively poor,\textsuperscript{30} but declassified intelligence from both the UN and the United States paints a different picture.

The most famous example is the code cable sent to UN headquarters by UNAMIR Force Commander Major-General Romeo Dallaire on 11 January 1994. The cable described a meeting with a confidential informant who was involved in training Interhamwe militia. The informant described deliberate attempts to destabilise the peace process and provoke further civil war. He also told Dallaire that he had been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali: “he suspects it is for their extermination. Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1,000 Tutsi”. Finally, he described the existence of major arms caches for distribution to members of the militia, many of which had already been disbursed. Though Dallaire recommended taking action on the basis of this intelligence, headquarters refused his request.\textsuperscript{31}

This example provides clear evidence that there was some early warning of the genocide to come, which was at odds with the characterisation of the situation as stable and moving

\textsuperscript{27} UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the UN Security Council”, S/PV.3326, 6 January 1994.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} In Security Council discussions of Rwanda up until April 1994, the United States’ representative did not make any statements, until the Security Council discussion of 5 April 1994, when the United States pushed to limit the extension of UNAMIR’s mandate (see below). See UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Three Hundred and Fifty-Eighth Meeting of the UN Security Council”, S/PV.3358, 5 April 1994; UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record”, 6 January 1994; UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the UN Security Council”, S/PV.3324, 20 December 1993.
\textsuperscript{30} For example, on a state trip to Africa in March 1998, President Clinton apologised to the Rwandan people for the West’s inaction during the genocide, arguing that he “did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror”. Cited in Power, “Bystanders to Genocide”, \textit{Atlantic Monthly}, September 2001.
\textsuperscript{31} Dallaire, “Request for Protection for Informant”, UN Code Cable, 11 January 1994.
towards full resolution. Though it was later revealed that this intelligence was not shared with members of the Security Council, a glance at the declassified US record shows that the US government was aware of similar developments. A February 1994 assessment of the Rwandan military by the American Embassy in Kigali noted that: “ethnic prejudices on both sides persist … some senior officers still see their destiny tied to the president and his party, many have noisy skeletons in their closets and fear prosecution for past corruption and incompetence with the RPF joining their ranks”. The Rwandan military, it was believed, could respond in three ways: it might “adjust to and accept its new role”; there might be “a mutiny among lower-level officers”; or there might even be “a coup either by those in support of the president” or by those “frustrated with the political impasse”. Of equally great concern, in a meeting with Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell expressed her “deep concern over the mounting violence in Rwanda”. Accompanying her was Director of the State Department’s Office of Central African Affairs Arlene Render, who revealed to Habyarimana that the United States was aware of the “the distribution of arms and arms caches” to the civilian population, which posed a “dangerous challenge to peace”. But little was said about these concerns in public. Only very late, as the genocide was about to commence, was much concern publicly expressed for the peace process in Rwanda. In his Progress Report of 30 March 1994, the UN Secretary-General noted that “the period under review has seen a rapid and dramatic deterioration in the security situation in Kigali”, and expressed “serious concern about increasing reports of the distribution of weapons to civilians”. However, in the same report, these worrying trends were softened by the observation that “despite the increased tensions and insecurity engendered by the political impasse described above, the cease-fire generally appeared to hold in the period under review”. For its part, speaking for the first time on Rwanda in the Security Council, the United States expressed its concerns over the “continuing delays in installing the transitional institutions”. Nevertheless, it observed, “the parties in Rwanda are very close to reaching agreement”.  

32 See Melvern, A People Betrayed.
34 Ibid.
Why then did both the UN and the United States, despite the evidence they held to the contrary, play down the problems facing Rwanda? It seems most likely that the characterisation of the situation as stable was a symptom of the primary idiographic and purposive concerns driving the two parties. For the UN, struggling to maintain its reputation in the face of setbacks in Somalia and Haiti, among others, it was keen to avoid any further blows to its prestige and so accentuated the positives. For the United States, trying to chart a policy towards UN peacekeeping in a climate of overwhelming skepticism towards that very process, it was eager to downplay the need for any major increase in resources for the UNAMIR mission, from which it was already pulling back. Though on the basis of the evidence so far presented, these assertions remain somewhat conjectural, they are well borne out by the actions of the parties as the crisis deepened. More importantly, however, they framed the early debate (such as it was) in important ways, which emphasised the overriding interest in a cost-effective and viable process, regarding which failure was worse than inaction. Before the outbreak of serious violence in Rwanda had even begun, the United States was pulling back from any serious commitment, and the UN was on the defensive.

C. Instrumental Action: Conditional Costing

1. Resource Instrumental: Cutting Costs

These idiographic and purposive discourses supervened upon a resource-instrumental concern with cutting costs, which was by now firmly embedded (see Chapter 7 for more discussion). An October 1993 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) had noted the increased strain being put on the international relief system by the swelling tide of ethnic conflicts and warned that “‘donor fatigue’ will lead to more selective responses to disaster situations”. 38 In the same month, the US Ambassador in Kigali had bluntly told the RPF that, though no one was opposed to the idea of a peacekeeping force for Rwanda, the UN was already overextended and enthusiasm was weak: “[t]he UN and its member states just have other preoccupations these days”. 39 A similar message was passed on to President Habyarimana by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who stressed the “financial constraints” the United States would have to work within in its involvement with

As time passed, these concerns deepened. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bushnell likewise told Habyarimana that Rwanda was in danger of losing all international assistance if the crisis continued to drag on. Unconvinced that the Rwanda peace process was a cost-effective exercise, the United States expressed even deeper concern in private. By March 1994, what small support may have existed for the Rwandan peace process had withered to nothing. As Bushnell confided:

The Security Council meeting which would decide whether to continue peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda was coming up fast … Next week she would meet with the interagency group that would decide the US position at the Security Council. Last summer she had to work very hard to convince skeptics that peacekeeping could work in Rwanda. Now she had absolutely nothing to bring to the table to override such skepticism.

2. Strategic Action: Conditional Support

With little impelling the United States to take a greater interest in Rwanda, and little belief in the efficacy of UN peacekeeping there, the urge was to pull back. When the United States finally did take action on Rwanda in the Security Council, it was to push for the renewal of UNAMIR’s mandate only on a conditional basis, with another review of progress within six weeks, a highly unorthodox measure. As in Somalia two years earlier, it was the United States that was seen as the driver behind this unconventional step back from full commitment to UNAMIR. However, it was a measure of the current particularist climate in US politics that, unlike the reaction to the Somalia pull-back in May 1992, there was no criticism of this move; indeed, there was virtually no attention paid to it whatsoever.

III. THE GENOCIDE BEGINS: APRIL–MAY 1994

A. Interests: The Pitfalls of Humanitarianism

The high profile downing of the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira on the evening of 6 April 1994, and the

---

41 US Embassy Kigali, “DAS Bushnell”.
42 Ibid.
43 Mandates for UN peacekeeping are normally set and renewed for a six-month period. The imposition of a conditional review of a mission on the basis of such a short period is a rarity. For the US position, see UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record”, 5 April 1994.
accompanying violence that followed it in Rwanda, pushed the Rwandan crisis—previously of little interest to the outside world—to the forefront of international attention. A simple numerical comparison provides ample evidence of the sea change that took place in terms of the attention given to the Rwanda crisis. Between 1 January and 6 April 1994, the day of the plane crash, only seven articles had appeared in the Washington Post or New York Times that mentioned Rwanda, of which only three dealt with Rwanda as the primary issue. Suddenly, five new articles appeared on 7 April, with a further three appearing on 8 April, eclipsing the sum total for three months in just two days. Rather than tailing off as the shock of this high-profile incident died down, this incident grabbed attention, which remained focused on the problems of Rwanda beyond the immediate story. A further 88 articles on Rwanda appeared in the two newspapers during the remainder of April, an average of more than four per day. Thus, the rocket attack on the plane carrying Habyarimana and Ntaryamira provides a clear example of the kind of shock that can alter the course of a causal chain.

The upsurge in violence that wracked Rwanda from 7 April onwards suggested the potential for a corresponding concern for humanitarian issues, but, though the humanitarian consequences of the violence were clearly acknowledged, in the early stages of the crisis they received little emphasis. The initial reaction of Western politicians to the increase in violence was to exhibit concern for the safety of their own nationals in Rwanda as much, if not more, than for the people of Rwanda. Indeed, the earliest high level policy statements concerning Rwanda expressed consternation at the assassinations, followed by concern for foreign nationals. On 7 April, the morning after the plane crash, President Clinton expressed his dismay over the assassination of Habyarimana and Ntaryamira, and condemned the murder of other Rwandan officials by security forces. The following day in remarks to the press, the president mentioned the subject in an aside, informing the press that he had held discussions with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and National Security Advisor on Rwanda, but stressing that “I want to mention it only because there are a sizable number of Americans there and it is a very tense situation

44 The US government, the UN and the foreign press have all been retrospectively criticised for their coverage of the crisis. See, especially, Steering Committee, “The International Response”; UN Security Council, “Report of the Independent Inquiry”.

… we are doing everything we possibly can to be on top of the situation to take all appropriate steps to try to assure the safety of our citizens there."  

Indeed, the first action to be taken by Western governments was to evacuate their nationals under military escort, a task that was accomplished within days. Once this early mini-crisis was dealt with, attention returned to Rwanda itself, but, in contrast to the empathetic treatment of human rights concerns in relation to Somalia in 1992, the treatment of humanitarian concerns in Rwanda followed a different course. In short, rather than emerging as an interest to be pursued, humanitarianism played out as a pitfall to be avoided, as the prevailing ideas in the structural domain gave meaning to the material facts, causing them to be interpreted in a specific light.

In terms of media coverage, though regular (indeed, heavy) reporting emerged from Rwanda, the portrayal of the violence did not focus on the massacres taking place as much as on other aspects, such as the civil war or the ensuing refugee crisis. And, when massacres were reported upon, they generally emerged in characterisations that deemphasised the need for or responsibility to respond. For example, on 8 April, both the New York Times and Washington Post reported on the violence on their front pages, but the headlines setting the tone for the articles described the events as a ‘rampage’, evoking an image of senseless and terrible, though likely short-lived, violence. The representation of the massacres as a rampage remained a common theme throughout most early analyses of the violence in Rwanda.

It also corresponded with the interim government of Rwanda’s argument that the violence was “a spontaneous reaction by the population”.

47 By 10 April, the evacuation was underway. France sent 460 paratroopers, who seized Kigali airport, Belgium sent 800 troops and the United States sent 360 marines to Bujumbura, the capital of neighbouring Burundi, as a contingency should they be needed. By 11 April, most of the foreign nationals had been evacuated, and the remaining few were escorted to safety within days.
More importantly, however, this characterisation deemphasised the need to respond, as this spontaneous rampage would likely blow itself out on its own soon enough.

A similar theme that emerged within the media in the early days of the violence emphasised the ‘tribal’ nature of the violence, and the unleashing of ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’, a characterisation that likewise deemphasised the need for a response, especially as it tied in well with an ethical debate on anarchy that rejected any responsibility to respond (see below). Reporters repeatedly returned to this motif, describing the violence as: “tribal carnage”;51 “a tribal bloodbath”;52 “a centuries-old tribal hatred that erupted”;53 “rampaging troops and gunmen looking to settle old tribal scores”;54 “ethnic warfare and reprisal killings”;55 “self-inflicted internecine horror”;56 etc.57 The effect of this imagery was to suggest that the violence was therefore somehow natural, the instinctive response of primitive peoples, and therefore difficult to check. Linking the idea of this primordial tribal violence to the concept of a rampage was the repeated use of imagery suggesting that this outbreak of violence was “only the latest convulsion in decades of ethnic warfare”,58 an apparently organic occurrence in the dark heart of Africa.59 In addition to linking the concepts of tribal violence and rampages, the idea of a convulsion implied an involuntary element to the violence; that it was a reflex symptom of the deeply ingrained ethnic hatreds that were native to the tribal populations of Rwanda. Such a characterisation again deemphasised the suitability of Western intervention, as they would not only need to tame ‘machete-wielding youths’, but would need to curb the natural instincts inherent to all Rwandans.

52 Richburg, “Westerners Begin Fleeing”.
54 Schmidt, “Terror Convulses”.
58 Wharton, “The Nightmare in Central Africa”.
59 See also Schmidt, “Troops Rampage”; Schmidt, “Terror Convulses”; Parmelee, “Americans Are Out”. 
There was some opposition to this mode of analysis. In the House, Congressman Edolphus Towns (D-NY) argued that “it is important that we not typify this as a tribal conflict, because it is in fact a political conflict among principals who happen to be from different tribes”. Likewise, Alison DesForges of Human Rights Watch criticised the mainstream coverage: “[a]s the piles of bodies mount in Rwanda, commentators are pulling out their generic analyses of violence in Africa: anarchy and/or tribal conflict”. But the very construction of these critiques only emphasises the extent to which the depiction of tribal violence had come to dominate discussions of Rwanda, with the effect that, at least at this stage, little interest was expressed in protecting the human rights of Rwandans.

Finally, media coverage also tended to treat the massacres simply as a byproduct of the civil war, which needed to be resolved if the killing was to be halted: a far stern task than simply protecting civilians from poorly armed militias and one which, most believed in the prevailing idiographic environment following Somalia, was beyond the capabilities of the UN and its members (many also implied the potential for a quick victory by the RPF, further reducing the impetus for outside action). The focus on the civil war was mirrored within the UN, which focused almost exclusively on this aspect. As Linda Melvern reports from interviews with participants, the Secretariat briefings given in private to Security Council members were fixated upon the re-ignition of the civil war and the need to establish a cease-fire. This tendency was also reflected in both the Secretary-General’s reports and in Security Council pronouncements. Though massacres were mentioned in

---

63 Melvern, A People Betrayed.
these venues, it was generally only in passing. For example, though the Secretary-General’s report of 20 April noted that the assassination of Habyarimana had “set off a torrent of widespread killings”, the “most urgent task” remained “the effort to secure a cease-fire through contacts with representatives of the armed forces and RPF”.\(^{64}\) It was not until very late on (indeed, until after the bulk of UNAMIR had withdrawn from Rwanda) that massacres were mentioned with any seriousness. Even then, however, the UN hesitated to call the violence genocide.\(^{65}\)

In private, however, the US government’s analysis of the situation in Rwanda was far more troubling than anything found in media or UN reports. On 6 April, the day of the plane crash, the US Department of State already believed that: “there is a strong likelihood that widespread violence could break out in either or both countries, particularly if it is confirmed that the plane was shot down”.\(^{66}\) A few days later, the Department of Defense noted its belief that “a massive (hundreds of thousands of deaths) bloodbath will ensue”.\(^{67}\) These assessments gelled with the information the US government had coming in from Rwanda. On 21 April, Monique Mujaramawiya, a Rwandan human rights activist who had been previously honoured by President Clinton at the White House, wrote to the president saying: “[a]lthough the situation in Rwanda now seems like anarchy, it is only a small group of extremists around the late President Habyarimana who have planned and intensified the massacres. … Their campaign is genocide against the Tutsis.”\(^{68}\) Likewise, the RPF in an open, though largely unremarked upon, letter argued that “the manner and scale of the massacres clearly leave no doubt whatsoever that the atrocities which have been committed amount to genocide”.\(^{69}\) Meanwhile, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which spoke up on Rwanda in a manner unprecedented in its history, had reported on the scale of the killing.

The ICRC delegate for Africa is certain at least 100,000 Rwandans have been killed since April 6, believes the actual number is closer to 300,000, and notes ICRC personnel in

---


\(^{65}\) See, for example, UN Secretary-General, “Letter from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council”, S/1994/518, 29 April 1994.

\(^{66}\) US Department of State, “Death of Rwandan and Burundi Presidents in Plane Crash Outside Kigali”, Memorandum, 6 April 1994.


country think the toll could be 500,000, according to Mission Geneva. The ICRC is concerned that the situation could worsen, citing some Hutu extremists who speak of a ‘final solution’ to eliminate all Tutsis.\(^70\)

This information appeared in a classified Department of State document entitled “Rwanda; Genocide and Partition” and contained the comment “the butchery shows no sign of ending”.\(^71\) Though it was yet to explicitly call the violence ‘genocide’ even in private, the US government had already noted its belief that the violence was ethnically motivated, its understanding of the scale of the killing and would also demonstrate its belief that the killing was being organised at the highest levels, an important component of the definition of genocide.\(^72\) Indeed, it was not afraid to say so to the perpetrators themselves:

Ambassador Rawson strongly disagreed with [Rwandan Ambassador] Uwimana’s claim that the killing was spontaneous and could not be stopped. He emphasized to Uwimana that the population is being ordered to kill by high-level officials in Rwanda and that these same high officials must immediately order the people to stop killing.\(^73\)

These analyses were at odds with the prevailing sense being expressed elsewhere that the massacres were connected with the civil war. Indeed, in another cable, Ambassador Rawson had criticised the Rwandan government for “wrongly equat[ing] the murder of civilians with combat between organized armies”.\(^74\) Yet, despite this evidence, in public the US government continued to link the massacres of civilians to the civil war. On 30 April, in a live radio address on Rwanda, President Clinton made just that connection, describing his shock and horror at the mass killings in Rwanda, and calling upon the

\(^71\) Ibid.
\(^72\) Article 2 of the 1949 Genocide Convention defines genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”. As such, the two key elements are that the actions must be directed against a specific national, ethnic, racial or religious group (though some would argue that this should also be extended to political groups, among others) and must be undertaken with the intention to destroy, in whole or in part, this group. The type of action undertaken may vary, and could include deliberate starvation, for example, as easily as direct violence, and the actual numbers affected by the action are not strictly relevant from a legal standpoint, though in empirical contexts the levels of deaths is often viewed as an important indicator of a policy of genocide. The requirement of intent is normally the most difficult to establish in the empirical context, and thus a concern for systematisation and organisation is a common means of establishing intent. By virtually any measure, the US analysis of the situation would correspond to a finding of genocide.
Rwandan army and the RPF to agree to an immediate cease-fire as the apparent solution to the problem.\textsuperscript{75}

This suggests that the United States was still, as was argued above, avoiding lending too much credence to reports of massacres and, particularly, shying away from using the word genocide, as would become much more concretely apparent in the final phase. None of these treatments improved the potential for any kind of robust response to Rwanda’s troubles. Instead, each of them played their own role in pulling the international community yet further back from any kind of intervention. If the notion of supervenience suggests that properties at lower levels of discourse are constituted by those at higher levels of discourse, there was little in the prevailing idiographic and purposive discourses that could produce a discourse recommending military intervention; such a discourse would not resonate with the higher levels of discourse.

**B. Ethical Dilemmas: The Logic of Anarchy**

The effect of these approaches to humanitarianism was to raise the question of what responsibility Western nations had to deal with the encroaching anarchy in Rwanda. This represented a key ethical dilemma in relation to humanitarian intervention: if anarchy is a recurrent feature of the post-Cold War world, what can and should be done about it, and what moral responsibility do outsiders have?

There are three dominant answers to this question. The first holds that anarchy is damaging to the host nation and that, on this basis, others nations have a responsibility to help. The second holds that anarchy within a particular nation brings with it the threat of spillover to other nations, thereby jeopardising regional security, and therefore other nations might have an interest in stemming, or at least containing, the problem. The third answer holds that anarchy is an endemic feature of pre-modern societies, the responsibility for and solution to which rests solely with the affected state.

While there were some arguments made in defence of the first two positions, it was answers that emphasised the third dimension that dominated, as would be suggested by the direction of idiographic and purposive debate. In the early part of the crisis, some feared spillover—particularly to Burundi, a neighbouring state with a similar ethnic balance and history, and whose president had also been killed in the assassination of 6 April—but these

\textsuperscript{75} Clinton, “Presidential Radio Address on Situation in Rwanda”, 30 April 1994.
arguments were not widespread, and quickly tailed off when it appeared that Burundi was remaining mostly calm.\textsuperscript{76} This left arguments emphasising the first and third answers, of which the latter not only dominated in terms of quantity, but in terms of the force with which the arguments were made. A 9 April New York Times article set the tone: “the bloodletting in Rwanda and Burundi runs through the history of both countries as fluidly as the meandering Akanyaru River that marks their common border”.\textsuperscript{77} In the coming days, this analysis would be used to argue against any outside intervention: “[a]s dismaying is the prospect of a conflict without end … at some point the world may need to ask, if these efforts fail, whether or not to stand aside if belligerents cannot agree. It has almost reached that stage in Burundi and Rwanda”;\textsuperscript{78} “[t]he disintegration of Rwanda into chaos and anarchy has evoked expressions of horror and sympathy from the international community—and a firm pledge to stay away”.\textsuperscript{79} These expressions of disinterest were not just found in the media, but reflected in elite policy. As National Security Advisor Anthony Lake put it:

[T]hese kinds of conflicts are particularly hard to come to grips with and to have an effect on from outside because, basically, of course, their origins are in political turmoil within these nations. And that political turmoil may not be susceptible to the efforts of the international community. So, neither we nor the international community have either the mandate, nor the resources, nor the possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind.\textsuperscript{80}

In this light, choices would have to be made as to where to intervene, if at all. And, fundamentally, these choices would not be predicated upon any moral questions regarding a responsibility to help, but on the basis of the goals to be pursued under the dominant US identity, which emphasised the particularist pursuit of national interests. Thus, it was argued in the media that “the United States has no recognizable national interest in taking a role [in Rwanda], certainly not a leading one”\textsuperscript{81} and by members of Congress that “I don’t think we have any national interest here … I hope we don’t get involved there. I don’t think we will. The Americans are out. As far as I’m concerned in Rwanda, that ought to be


\textsuperscript{77} Gray, “2 Nations Joined”.


\textsuperscript{81} Washington Post, “One, Two, Many Rwandas”. 
the end of it.” Thus, the emphasis on the intractable nature of the ancient ethnic hatreds of Rwanda, which resonated with the idiographic and purposive leanings highlighted above, militated against intervention in Rwanda.

C. Instrumental Action: An Orderly Retreat

1. Resource Instrumental: The New Casualty Aversion

The key resource-instrumental question that concerned policy-makers at this point was the risk to personnel involved in any continued UN action in Rwanda. Within a day of the assassination of Habyarimana, 10 Belgian peacekeepers had been murdered by Hutu extremists, bringing back memories of the 18 US servicemen killed in Mogadishu six months ago, almost to the day. In this context, Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes informed Boutros-Ghali that Belgium would be withdrawing its contingent from UNAMIR, fearing the continuing risk to its servicemen. In the circumstances, the Belgians also began to push for the full withdrawal of UNAMIR.

In the prevailing idiographic context, the US policy community was very sympathetic to the feelings of the Belgians. The US government believed that UNAMIR was in danger and that further lives might be lost. The US Department of State’s talking points on UNAMIR’s potential withdrawal argued: “[w]e do not believe that the warring parties in Rwanda are likely to respect UNAMIR’s mandate nor, in the present environment, are they capable of adequately ensuring the safety of UN peacekeeping personnel in Rwanda”. Likewise, there was little belief that any force could be at all effective:

UNAMIR cannot fulfill its mandate under the current circumstances and is unlikely to attract personnel or obtain equipment for an expanded operation. There is little evidence that the presence of UNAMIR troops is serving as a deterrent in Kigali … Even if the UNSC expanded the mandate and found additional forces capable of protecting the Rwanda

---

82 Senator Bob Dole (R-KA) speaking on CBS’ “Face the Nation”. Cited in Sciolino, “For West”.
83 Again, however, there was more than one potential response to this critical juncture for the Belgians. In the wake of the murder of its peacekeepers, there was some discussion in Belgium of possibly reinforcing UNAMIR, but this line of argument was defeated by arguments urging a withdrawal, as the overall ideational context of skepticism towards UN peacekeeping would suggest is likely. For discussion of the Belgian position, see Melvern, A People Betrayed.
population, it would be difficult to meet a key goal of peacekeeping operations: realistic criteria for ending the operation.\textsuperscript{85}

Though the United States had no troops involved itself, it was concerned that there not be a repeat of the debacle in Somalia, and therefore the primary goal must be the prevention of any further UN casualties: “[p]riority must be given to ensuring the safe withdrawal of UN peacekeepers and other international personnel and civilians in danger in Rwanda. To attempt to sustain a peacekeeping operation in the present environment would only undermine the Security Council’s responsibilities for international peacekeeping.” \textsuperscript{86}

2. \textit{Strategic Instrumental: Cutting One’s Losses}

Thus, as the Belgians pushed for the withdrawal of UNAMIR, the United States, for its own reasons, moved to support them.\textsuperscript{87} The Belgians were an important ally for the United States in their efforts to see UNAMIR withdrawn, as “[f]ew believe UNAMIR would be able to function without the Belgians”.\textsuperscript{88} As such, the United States gave the Belgians their full support. When it became clear that “Boutros-Ghali is putting the onus on the Belgians for seeking the withdrawal and termination” of UNAMIR, the United States decided to “make it clear that we strongly support this course—and this is not just a Belgian idea”.\textsuperscript{89} At this point, both parties favoured the full withdrawal of UNAMIR. Indeed, in internal discussions, US policy-makers noted their intention to “oppose any effort at this time to preserve a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda”.\textsuperscript{90}

However, there were some within the Security Council at this time who did want to preserve a UNAMIR presence. Notable among these were the Nigerian delegation, who told the United States that they would “never approve of the Council directing UNAMIR to withdraw”.\textsuperscript{91} Indeed, the Nigerians circulated a draft resolution calling for reinforcements to UNAMIR, and an expanded and revised mandate allowing for protection of civilians

\textsuperscript{86} US Department of State, “Talking Points”.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{89} US Department of State, “Phone Call to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali on Bosnia and Rwanda”, Memorandum, 13 April 1994.
\textsuperscript{90} US Department of State, “Talking Points”. See also US Department of State, “Phone Call to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali”.
and government officials.\textsuperscript{92} With the United States, and its closest ally Britain, firmly opposed to such a move, this resolution would never make it out of closed session. Nevertheless, the debate on the draft resolution revealed that there was some support for a revised mandate, though little support for expanding the size of the mission. More realistically, it revealed that “there is no support on the Council for a total withdrawal of UNAMIR”.\textsuperscript{93}

As these discussions were ongoing, they did so in the virtual absence of any options offered by the UN Secretariat itself. It was not until 20 April that any semblance of a plan was offered to the Security Council and, even then, there was no pressure within the Secretary-General’s office for an expansion of UNAMIR’s mandate. The Secretary-General’s Special Report tacitly supported the US line that: “[t]he dedicated personnel of UNAMIR, who have performed courageously in dangerous circumstances, cannot be left at risk indefinitely when there is no possibility of their performing the tasks for which they were dispatched”.\textsuperscript{94} In the circumstances, the Secretary-General offered the Council three options: (1) immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR, with a Chapter VII mandate; (2) withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR, with the force commander and a small security company remaining to try to negotiate a cease-fire; or (3) complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.

Though these options included the possibility of a revised mandate in line with Nigeria’s recommendations, there was little enthusiasm for this within the Secretariat. As mentioned above, the Secretariat continued to emphasise the civil war dimension to the crisis, which presented the Council with the massive task of separating two bitterly warring parties, and the potential for UN troops to be caught in the cross-fire, a prospect that would appeal to few. And it was the civil war, not the massacres, which the Secretary-General’s report deemed to be the primary target of any Chapter VII intervention, which was “predicated on the conclusion, described above, that … [w]ithout a cease-fire, combat … will continue and so will the lawlessness and the massacres of civilians.”\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{92} US Department of State, “UN Security Council Action in Rwanda”.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} UN Secretary-General, “Special Report of the Secretary-General”.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid. This advice totally ignored the potential for an intermediate position aimed at stopping the massacres of civilians, as pointed out by the Nigerian delegation on the Security Council floor: “[m]y delegation, in fact, would argue for a position intermediate between the Secretary-General’s options one and two. We see not so much the need to coerce the combatants into a cease-fire and force law and order as the need to maintain minimum safety for innocent civilians and to offer some protection, while pushing for a return to
With little enthusiasm for a massive reinforcement of UNAMIR, and in the face of significant opposition to its proposal to withdraw UNAMIR entirely, the US government accepted a British compromise resolution that withdrew the bulk of UNAMIR, suspended its operations but left a small, interim presence in Rwanda.\(^96\) However, this change in US policy did not reflect a change of heart. As an internal policy documents shows:

> UNAMIR is currently affording some degree of protection to 12,000 refugees in Kigali. We should not advocate (and we could not get agreement in the Security Council for) abandoning these people … UNAMIR is, thus, as a practical matter, stuck in Kigali until the situation there calms sufficiently for these people to disperse. Once this happens, however, we should urge an orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR forces.\(^97\)

On 21 April, the Security Council approved the British compromise resolution under Resolution 912, and voted to withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR, leaving only a token force in Kigali.

**IV. ON THE MARGINS OF GENOCIDE: MAY–JULY 1994**

**A. Foreign Policy Role: Selective Engagement**

Shortly after the Security Council vote to withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR, on 6 May, the US government released Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which specifically addressed UN peacekeeping, and called for a policy of ‘selective engagement’ consistent with US national interests, as well as low-cost and effective UN operations. While PDD 25 was not prompted by the situation,\(^98\) nor were its precepts a massive divergence from existing US policy on Rwanda, it would nevertheless have a significant effect on the final phase of decision-making towards Rwanda, as Rwanda would become the first peacekeeping mission to be subjected to the new policy.


\(^96\) US Department of State, “UN Security Council Action in Rwanda”.

\(^97\) Ibid.

\(^98\) This policy had been maturing for some time (see Chapter 7) and the broad strokes of the policy were already well known prior to May 1994. Indeed, both the New York Times and the Washington Post had been following the development of the doctrine, and new details of the latest manifestation of the policy document had been revealed in January and February 1994. See Schmitt, “US Set to Limit Role of Military in Peacekeeping”, *New York Times*, 29 January 1994; Williams, “Clinton Peacekeeping Policy”.

151
administration had been without a ‘bumper sticker’ to encapsulate their approach in early 1994, they had one now. Moreover, in view of the criticisms of Clinton in early 1994 for his inability to set a policy course and stick to it, here was a slogan Clinton was determined to defend to the bitter end. 99 Effectively, PDD 25 locked the United States in to its current policy path.

PDD 25 was an explicitly particularist doctrine. Its primary focus was on US national interests, narrowly construed. It also contained an implicit criticism of the multilateral system as being overly expensive and ineffective, making US participation in, or even support for, multilateral action contingent on reform. The primary policy prescription of the document was to set criteria for UN peacekeeping. These criteria were: whether the mission advances US interests; whether a threat to or breach of international peace and security exists (including “urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence”); whether there are clear objectives to the mission; whether a ceasefire is in place and the consent of the parties obtained; whether the threat to international peace and security is considered to be significant; whether the means to accomplish the mission are available; whether the political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable; and whether the operation’s anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation. 100

Rwanda seemed likely to score poorly against these criteria. Of those listed, only the threat to international peace and security in terms of an “urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence” and the unacceptability of the consequences of inaction were directly applicable to the Rwandan context. With the United States already fundamentally wary of intervention in Rwanda, the publication of this policy programme did not bode well for any change in approach to the Rwandan situation. Indeed, as reports of genocide in Rwanda became more and more common, the United States actively sought to stifle any potential connection between its own analyses of the situation and the two criteria in PDD 25 that suggested the United States might respond to such a serious humanitarian disaster.

99 A measure of this determination to see his policy enacted can be seen in the fact that on 3 May, even as the document was still in the final release stage, language appeared in a Security Council Statement on Peacekeeping that closely mirrored that of PDD 25, setting criteria for UN peacekeeping missions. See UN Security Council, “Statement by the President of the Security Council: An Agenda for Peace”, S/PRST/1994/22, 3 May 1994.

As far as the potential for US support for any peacekeeping mission not involving its troops was concerned, PDD 25 likewise would provide a stumbling block. Though notably different from the particularist discourse of the Pentagon Paper discussed in the Somalia case study, in some respects PDD 25 was even more particularist than its predecessor. While the Pentagon Paper would have shared concerns with PDD 25 over US participation in peacekeeping missions where US national interests were not directly involved, as well as with the cost-effectiveness and goal-effectiveness of multilateral UN operations, PDD 25 went one further by suggesting that US policy should be to oppose all UN peacekeeping missions where its criteria were not met, regardless of whether the United States was a participant or not. Though feasible within the Pentagon Paper doctrine, this was made explicit by PDD 25. And, during May–July 1994, as the Security Council revived its discussions about what to do about the situation in Rwanda, the United States, guided by PDD 25, would become a serious impediment to effective action.

B. Interest: Avoiding Genocide

PDD 25 had confirmed what was already apparent from the US approach to Rwanda throughout early 1994: the United States had no interest in Rwanda except in the eventuality that a massive humanitarian disaster should unfold in respect of which the consequences of inaction were unacceptable. Up to now, apart from a few dissenting voices who saw just such an eventuality, the extant policy of inaction had been relatively easy to sustain. By May 1994, however, the reports of atrocities filtering out of Rwanda were both too numerous and too shocking to ignore, and most observers began talking openly of ‘genocide’, a finding that carries obligations under the 1949 Genocide Convention, to which the United States is a party. Though the emerging belief that genocide was taking place in Rwanda did not presage a complete u-turn in terms of overall coverage of the crisis,\(^{101}\) it did represent a new strand to the discourse, which would grow over time and place the US government under increasing pressure to defend its policy towards Rwanda and the identity it had articulated as a ‘selective engager’.

As the Security Council voted to withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR from Rwanda, those critics who believed that genocide was taking place became more vociferous. Kenneth

---

\(^{101}\) The media, especially, continued to focus to a great degree on other issues, such as the civil war, the refugee crisis and, by this point, the question of whether any atrocities had taken place in areas controlled by the RPF.
Roth, director of Human Rights Watch, gave interviews with both the Washington Post and New York Times, describing the violence in Rwanda as “absolutely a case of genocide”; “[t]he symbolic force the Security Council may be about to authorize would be a thin veil over another massacre”. His colleague, Alison DesForges, also argued: “[w]e put the word genocide on the table. We don’t do it lightly. There is clearly here an intention an eliminate the Tutsi as a people … If people accept that this is genocide, the US is legally obligated as a signatory to the Convention Against Genocide to suppress and prevent it.” And for the first time, members of the US Congress, too, began to describe the events as genocide. Introducing Senate Resolution 207, Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) noted: “[w]e have all heard the grim reports … the eruption in Rwanda of brutal, systematic, and indiscriminate violence, resulting in the deaths of more than 100,000 people to date. These actions constitute genocide, and clearly violate all international standards of human rights.”

As reports of massacres continued—and even intensified—one into May, it was no longer possible to describe events in Rwanda as a spontaneous convulsion of tribal anger, and coverage began to reflect this. On 5 May, the Washington Post wrote: “[a]s terrified United Nations peace-keepers evacuated Rwanda, other nations consoled themselves with the hope that the butchers would grow weary of killing. This once seemed to us a likely prospect too, but it does no more. The savagery continues unabated.” A few days later, the New York Times ran a story detailing the organised and systematic nature of the killings, and arguing that the violence was planned and premeditated. As the killings continued throughout May, more and more people began to agree that what was taking place in Rwanda was genocide.

One group that could not agree, however, was the UN. The Secretary-General’s Letter of 3 May and Report of 13 May both contained references to ethnic massacres, but neither used the term ‘genocide’. It was not until the Secretary-General’s Report of 31 May that Boutros-Ghali would describe the violence as ‘genocide’. In the Security Council, heated

---

104 US Senate, “Crisis in Rwanda”, Congressional Record, 26 April 1994, S4922. However, the Resolution itself contained no mention of ‘genocide’, instead stating that the “systematic and indiscriminate massacre of civilians, estimated in the tens of thousands, is a crime against humanity”. See US Senate, “Senate Resolution 207—Relative to Rwanda”, Congressional Record, 26 April 1994, S4900.
discussions took place behind the scenes over whether to describe the violence as genocide. UN Resolution 918 of 17 May contained no such reference, though the delegations of New Zealand and the Czech Republic both made such reference in prepared statements delivered on the Security Council floor.

Leaving aside the fact that Rwanda was a member of the Council at this time, it seems likely that a major source of opposition to a classification of genocide was the United States. However, this was not because the US government was in any doubt as to the actual state of affairs. Internal Department of State analyses on 16 May and 18 May both came to the conclusion that genocide was taking place in Rwanda. Yet, in public, the United States continued to avoid labelling the genocide as such. An internal State Department Discussion Paper revealed the reasons why: “Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—genocide finding could commit the USG to actually ‘do something’”. A later, more in-depth, paper discussing this issue emerged on 21 May. Addressing the question of whether US officials should be authorised to state publicly that genocide had taken place in Rwanda, the paper argued that “[a] USG statement that acts of genocide have occurred would not have any particular legal consequences”. Nevertheless, the paper recommended that Department officials be authorised “to state publicly that ‘acts of genocide have occurred’ in Rwanda”. The reasoning behind this was practical:

Although lacking in legal consequences, a clear statement that the USG believes that acts of genocide have occurred could increase pressure for USG activism in response to the crisis in Rwanda. We believe, however, that we should send a clear signal that the United States believes that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda. If we do not … our credibility will be undermined with human rights groups and the general public, who may question how much evidence we can legitimately require before coming to a policy conclusion.

---

107 For discussion, see Melvern, A People Betrayed.
109 Interviews conducted by Linda Melvern appear to confirm this point. Melvern, A People Betrayed.
112 US Department of State, “Has Genocide Occurred in Rwanda?” Discussion Paper, 21 May 1994. A similar standpoint was taken by the Bush administration in 2005, when it classified the violence in Darfur as genocide. The position was that the Genocide Convention requires its parties to “undertake to prevent and to punish” crimes of genocide, but quite what actions are appropriate or necessary to do so are another matter entirely. The legal analysis is certainly sound.
113 Ibid.
This advice was taken, but a little too literally. Still hesitant, and now confused by the technicalities, US government officials doggedly stuck to the line that “acts of genocide” had been committed if pushed, but refrained from using the term voluntarily. This approach culminated in the rather embarrassing press conference held on 10 June by State Department spokesperson Christine Shelley, who, on characterising the violence as ‘acts of genocide’, was pushed by reporters to explain the difference between ‘genocide’ and ‘acts of genocide’, to explain how many ‘acts of genocide’ are required to constitute a genocide, and to admit that the US government had provided specific guidance not to use the term ‘genocide’ in isolation. This incident was quickly picked up on by the media and generated a flurry of criticisms. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, himself a lawyer, was quick to step into the breach, explaining that very afternoon that the distinction was erroneous, and that acts of genocide did constitute genocide, but significant damage had already been done.

C. Instrumental Action: The Reluctant Fundamentalist

1. Strategic Instrumental: A Question of Tactics

As it became ever more clear that what was happening in Rwanda was genocide, the demands of latent universalist sentiment began to grow and the pressure to ‘do something’ about Rwanda correspondingly increased. As in Somalia in 1992, the administration decision to oppose an effective peacekeeping force in Resolution 912 had drawn stiff criticism. As Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch put it “[t]his is yet another example of the United Nations sensing danger and running”. So too did William Schultz, executive director of Amnesty International, argue: “[w]e at Amnesty International are shocked by the assumption that the United States has no leadership role to play in the Rwandan crisis … The United States should press the UN Security Council and our European allies to expand the UN peace-keeping presence.” Likewise, Senators Paul Simon and Jim Jeffords (R-VT) wrote to President Clinton decrying the lack of action: “Mr. President:

115 Preston, “Death Toll in Rwanda”.
[w]e are concerned about the continuing disaster in Rwanda, and the failure of the international community to halt or even diminish the slaughter taking place there”.\textsuperscript{117}

However, in stark contrast to Somalia, where such criticism provided the impetus for a serious departure in the causal chain, leading the United States on the path to intervention in Somalia, it would have no such impact in the Rwandan case. This difference was a consequence of a key distinction between the two cases: whereas in Somalia, criticisms of inaction resonated with a pre-existing idiographic commitment to collective internationalism, such that positive synergies were developed between the different levels of discourse, allowing for the possibility of a policy that reflected those goals, the same circumstances did not hold in respect of Rwanda. Though a concern for humanitarianism was not precluded by the idiography of PDD 25, it would have to be situated in the context of overriding concerns with the costs of multilateral action, the risks to personnel involved and the need for US national interests, narrowly construed, to be involved, for US participation to be a possibility. As such, at no point did any party suggest that the United States should contribute troops to the UN operation. Likewise, though the United States had been and would continue to be criticised for its recalcitrance in respect of supporting a beefed-up UN presence, this did not amount to an outright rejection of the policy goals behind its resource-instrumental concerns, but rather criticism of the ways in which the policy goals were being put into practice. Thus, the United States was forced to compromise on some of its more conservative demands, but not alter the overall direction of policy.\textsuperscript{118} This provides very clear support for the proposition of the theory outlined in the previous chapters: it is identity, not interests or other lower level discourses, that fundamentally drives policy. Ideas provide the context for meaning, and for elements of the lower level discourses to have any significant effect, they need to establish positive synergies with the higher level discourses, or force re-evaluations of those discourses.

Nevertheless, it was widely agreed that the scale of human suffering in Rwanda was such that something needed to be done. Quite what was another matter. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was the first to bring new impetus to the process. On 29 April, only a week after the Security Council had voted for Resolution 912, the Secretary-General wrote a letter to the Security Council indicating that he had received “reports [of] strong

\textsuperscript{117} This letter was later placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Paul Simon. See US Senate, “Getting Rwanda Wrong”, Congressional Record, 10 June 1994, S6786.
\textsuperscript{118} See, for example, the long-running saga involving the United States’ conditions for providing armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to UNAMIR II. See Appendix 2 for further details.
evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians” in Rwanda, which “raise serious questions about the viability of the revised mandate which the Security Council gave to UNAMIR by Resolution 912”, and urged the Council to reconsider the decision. Most within the Council, especially those who had not been satisfied with Resolution 912 in the first place, agreed, and the Secretary-General was asked to report back on what action might be taken. The United States was among those who now felt that some action was necessary. On 3 May, the Washington Post reported that “White House and State Department officials said the administration has been galvanized by the horrifying massacres of innocent civilians caught in Rwanda's perpetual tribal power struggle … But they also said the US response is necessarily limited because money is short and US influence in Rwanda is minimal”. Likewise, on 9 May, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck, who had been sent to Rwanda in an effort to reinvigorate peace talks, wrote on his return that he had “come back persuaded that Rwanda is a test of our commitment to universal principles of human rights. I strongly believe the international community must demonstrate the same concern for Rwanda as we show in Bosnia lest we weaken universal standards”.

The US government certainly did believe something should be done, but this fell well short of active US engagement; indeed, the United States explicitly and repeatedly ruled out the participation of US troops, a point which met with little criticism. The preferred course of action, which the UN Secretariat broadly approved, was to seek an African force to intervene in Rwanda. However, the United States and the UN were not in agreement on the modalities of such a force. Firstly, the United States remained unconvinced that the required number of troops could be secured: “it seems to us highly improbable that possible troop contributors would agree to send people into Rwanda—unless an agreed upon and meaningful ceasefire is implemented.” Ultimately, the United States was largely correct in this assessment, but its differences with the UN were much greater. Boutros-Ghali favoured a plan to airlift the proposed troops into Kigali and to allow them to fan out through the country from there, on the basis that those most at risk remained in

119 UN Secretary-General, “Letter from the Secretary-General”.
120 Richburg, “Washington Begins to Act”.
the centre of the country. The United States was not in favour of such a plan, as it believed there was “an inherent contradiction between the Secretariat’s assumptions that there will be no cease-fire and the expectation that this will not be a peace enforcement mission”. Moreover, US officials argued, the proposed mandate “seems overly broad and would be more manageable if limited to creating a protective zone”.

The United States’ alternative plan was to establish safe zones along Rwanda’s external borders to accept refugees there and provide protection and humanitarian assistance. However, there were significant problems with this plan too, as was recognised in an internal interagency memo:

One of the main problems with the NSC/State thinking is that it puts a camp for refugees on the Burundi/Rwanda border, right in the path of escape for any renegade Hutu forces that might be pursued by the RPF. Those forces (which are the reason the people are in the camp in the first place) must go someplace, most likely through the camp, unless the PKO force turns them back (not a Chapter VI operation), or unless the PKO force takes them into protective custody (but you can’t put them in the camps full of people they have been killing). Even if the PKO force did take them into custody, what will they say to the RPF when they demand the PKO release the Hutu killers to them?

The concerns raised over both plans provide a strong illustration of the structural concerns noted earlier in the chapter over the utility of action. It was not just a lack of empathy that held US policy-makers back from further engagement with Rwanda, but an idiographically derived doubt that effective solutions could be reached through UN peacekeeping. Nevertheless, there was little support for the United States’ alternative plan within the Security Council, with the French and African delegations, in particular, deemed to have serious differences with the US approach and to be demanding immediate authorisation for the full force.

So, after much discussion back and forth, the United States consented to the Secretary-General’s plan, but with one important caveat. It insisted that the Secretary-General should “report as soon as possible on the next phase of UNAMIR’s deployment including, inter alia, on the cooperation of the parties, progress towards a cease-fire, availability of resources and the proposed duration of the mandate for further review and action, as required, by the Council”. Until such time, Resolution 918 only authorised a

---

125 Ibid.
‘first phase’ of deployment in which the force of military observers that had been withdrawn under Resolution 912 would be returned, and the mechanised infantry division of UNAMIR be brought up to full strength. This modification seriously watered down the original proposals, such that there would be no immediate or significant reinforcement to UNAMIR. Later, Dallaire would say that “he knew that, with Resolution 918, Rwanda had been abandoned”. 128

2. Resource Instrumental: Commitment Issues

What explained this strange reluctance to authorise a mission in which the United States itself was not being asked to participate on anything other than a conditional basis? The key issue was one of resources. The United States had committed itself in idiographic terms to ensuring that UN peacekeeping was a cost-effective affair, and it was determined to see this implemented in practice. Certainly, in some senses, the United States was correct in its assessments. Though UNAMIR II had been approved in principle, even had there been a mandate for immediate deployment, the necessary troops were not available. As Boutros-Ghali contacted African leaders to try to establish commitments, he met with little success. By the end of May, he had received firm offers of troops from only Ghana, Ethiopia and Senegal, and these were not nearly enough. 129 By 20 June, the situation had not changed dramatically. Now Ghana, Ethiopia and Senegal were joined by offers from Zambia, Zimbabwe, Congo, Malawi, Mali and Nigeria, but, of these troop offers, only the Ethiopian battalion would come fully equipped; the other offers were conditional on equipment requirements being met, something the UN could not do itself, but would need to rely on Western nations to provide. 130 It quickly became apparent that it would take at least three months for these contingents to be deployed, with even the first phase authorised under Resolution 918 still not scheduled until July. Understandably, Boutros-Ghali increasingly began to despair of the entire process, describing the continuing delays as evidence of the “extreme inadequacy” of the international community’s response and

128 Cited in Melvern, A People Betrayed, 198.
130 UN Secretary-General, “Letter from the Secretary-General”.

160
bemoaning the fact that even two months after the establishment of a revised mandate, the international community continued to “appear paralysed”.  

Others too began to criticise the process. “The delay and lack of leadership shown by the United States government in confronting genocide in Rwanda is appalling”, argued Kenneth Roth. Likewise, in the House, Congressman John Mica (R-FL) argued that “the United States [has] failed to act to avert a genocide of our time. This administration not only ignored the wholesale slaughter in Rwanda, it delayed action on creating an international force and allowed the killing to continue”, a point which Mica felt only re-emphasised the failings of Clinton’s foreign policy. But such criticisms were not yet enough to reverse the general flow of the overall idiographic climate, which continued to emphasise the need to ensure cost-effective and carefully planned action. As Chester Crocker wrote in the Washington Post: “[a] backlash against United Nations peace operations is in full swing in America. … The shift in tone from the 1992 campaign and early 1993 is striking.”

As such, the Clinton policy was, if not entirely accepted, largely acquiesced to, at least within the United States. A fairly exemplary New York Times article written shortly after the passage of Resolution 918 argued: “[t]he Clinton Administration has rightly resisted a clamor for instantly expanding a minuscule United Nations peacekeeping force to halt the human carnage in Rwanda. An ill-planned military debacle might only deepen the conflict there and jeopardize peacekeeping missions elsewhere”.

The exigencies of the situation in Rwanda demanded an ad hoc response with little time for full and careful planning. However, the US idiographic position on UN peacekeeping required the opposite. This situation largely ensured the inevitable stalemate that would arise.

The delays continued throughout May and June (and, indeed, into August) with little progress. With African nations unable to provide the necessary forces and equipment to establish the expanded UNAMIR, the deadlock could only be broken by the serious commitment of a Western nation. A Department of Defense analysis recognised this necessity, but noted the US government’s continued determination to avoid being drawn

---


into too great a commitment of resources: “[t]he USG so far does not plan to take the lead, but expects to be asked”.\footnote{US Department of Defense, “Rwanda Conflict Watch”, Update, 17 May 1994.} Ultimately, it was France that offered to play this role. In the latter half of June, apparently frustrated by the delays, France offered to provide troops and equipment for an interim force to provide security until UNAMIR II could be deployed.\footnote{See Reuters, “France May Move In to End Rwanda Killing”, New York Times, 16 June 1994 for early reporting on this eventuality.} Though there was considerable opposition to French involvement on the part of many actors, given France’s long and complicated history of relations with the Rwandan nation, no other options appeared to be available to the UN, and its members grudgingly acquiesced. Resolution 929 of 22 June 1994, which authorised a Chapter VII mission led by France, effectively ended any remote prospect of US intervention, though, clearly, such a prospect had been largely precluded from the outset. The US identity that had emerged in the wake of the Somalia debacle had emphasised conservatism in the US approach to multilateral operations, which was fundamentally at odds with any potential intervention in Rwanda. And, in the absence of any lower order discourses or critical junctures capable of changing the tone to US idiographic debate, such was the result.

V. CONCLUSION

At least four important conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis. Firstly, the analysis demonstrates the importance of the identity-based approach to foreign policy analysis. The empirical similarities between the Somali and Rwandan situations might have suggested a similarity in response. However, this was not the case. Though both situations involved African civil wars in which large numbers of the civilian population were seriously affected, US policy-makers were inclined to treat the two situations very differently. This difference can be explained by the differences in the prevalent identities that drove foreign policy during these periods. In 1992, the dominant identity of the United States was internationalist, whereas in 1994, the dominant identity was particularist. The theory outlined in the first half of this thesis suggested that internationalist identities would tend to be more supportive of humanitarian intervention than particularist identities, and such has been the case.

Secondly, the analysis demonstrates the importance of a scientific realist approach to structure. The notion that social systems are ‘open systems’, which are susceptible to
change, permits us to allow for fluctuations in identity and to take these into account in our analyses. Moreover, the morphogenetic approach to agency and structure provides us with an important mechanism by which we can see this process at work. The morphogenetic approach suggests that the acts of agents may influence the nature of structures (such as identity), which in turn may affect the nature of agency, in a continuous and dynamic process. Such appears to have been the case in the fluctuations in identity highlighted between the Somalia and Rwanda cases. The unintended results of the Somalia intervention seriously impacted upon US identity discourse, such that it threw idiographic debate virtually in reverse. Though certain similarities obviously existed between the Rwandan and Somali situations, such that comparisons would be inevitable, the dominance of the spectre of Somalia in US identity discourse even outside of the context of Rwanda is robust evidence of this process.

Thirdly, the analysis demonstrates the importance of the identity–interest nexus. Whereas US policy-makers viewed the protection of human rights in Somalia as a significant concern of US foreign policy, the approach to human rights abuses in Rwanda was to express sympathy and concern, but not to conclude that there was any serious US interest in preventing such abuses. The striking nature of this change over only two years casts doubt on the premise that states generally have ‘permanent interests’, let alone ‘permanent allies’. Certainly, some interests may be more or less stable than others, but most will be subject to a certain degree of variance. And this variance is dependent upon variances in identities, which may fluctuate over time. In the collective internationalism of the ‘new world order’ era, it was easy to establish humanitarianism as a significant policy interest for the United States. Though such would still have been feasible under the particularist idiography of selective engagement, the threshold was significantly higher and, ultimately, was not met in time.

Finally, the analysis confirms the importance of synergies between discourses. Though interesting parallels could also be drawn between the discourses critiquing the US reticence to approve peacekeeping forces for Somalia in May 1992 and for Rwanda in April and May 1994, in the Somali case the discourse was able to establish positive synergies with the higher level idiographic debate and thus force policy re-evaluations, whereas in the Rwandan case the discourse fell on barren idiographic ground and was unable to establish

---

137 The possible exception is an interest in survival, which, as Wendt points out, is a virtual constant in empirical terms. See Wendt, *Social Theory*, 235.
any purchase. Only in such a context is it possible to comprehend the drawn out delays and debates over the cost and modalities of the proposed Rwandan intervention force, which dragged on for months without any resolution, and without any significant constituency for more forceful US action emerging.

In parallel with the Somalia case study, the case study of US non-intervention in Rwanda provides important support for the precepts of the theory outlined in the first half of this thesis. However, the final case study, US intervention in Haiti in 1994, presents a different sort of challenge. Though the Somalia and Rwanda cases provided most similar cases in terms of their empirical features, they were nevertheless separated temporally by two years. In the case of Haiti, the United States opted to intervene in September 1994, only a few short months after the period considered in this chapter. Indeed, much of the period leading up to intervention in Haiti overlaps with that leading up to non-intervention in Rwanda. This coincidence provides the sternest test of the theory yet, in that, at least partially, the two will need to depart from similar idiographic precepts. Yet, it also promises to tell us much about the evolution of identity, as it allows us to fill the gaps between the Somalia and Rwanda case studies.
Chapter 7

Balancing the Equation: The US Intervention in Haiti in 1994

I. INTRODUCTION

The US intervention in Haiti in 1994 presents the most complex of the case studies examined here. Leaving aside for the moment the question raised in the previous chapter of how identity could have driven an intervention in Haiti so soon after it had precluded intervention in Rwanda, a point that will be examined in full in the body of this chapter, the Haiti case spurred the most wide-ranging and diverse set of explanations for US action of all the cases considered here. Unlike Somalia and Rwanda, there were no easy or superficial explanations for US behaviour. Indeed, the search for an explanation of the US intervention was confounded by a surfeit of apparently minor interests, none of which, as Republican critics of Clinton’s policy were quick to point out, amounted, on their own or collectively, to what could easily be described as a *cassus belli*.¹

Of the rationales that have been forwarded, a number are worthy of consideration. The first and most obvious is the Clinton administration’s most prominently stated rationale of the need to restore democracy to Haiti. The promotion of democracy and free markets had been a cornerstone of Clinton’s stated vision for the United States’ role in the world.² Yet critics were quick to point out that a preference for democracies alone could not explain why Clinton chose to make his stand in Haiti, rather than in, for example, Cuba or any of the other undemocratic nations or victims of coups across the globe.³ The critics had a point. While there should be no doubt that the Clinton administration did indeed seek to promote the spread of democracy, there was clearly something special that set Haiti aside from other potential candidates for such a forceful form of democratic activism. This chapter will show that the role of positive and negative synergies between different

---

¹ Indeed, the range of explanations is far too broad for all to be considered here, so only the dominant ones have been isolated for mention. For further discussion, see Girard, *Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 US Invasion of Haiti* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004); Pezzullo, *Plunging into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Diplomacy* (University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, 2006).
² See below.
³ For such an argument, see US House of Representatives, “Threatened Invasion of Haiti may be Politically Motivated”, Congressional Record, 21 July 1994, H5958.
idiographic, purposive and instrumental levels of discourse, as well as the role of critical junctures, was fundamental in moving Clinton’s America from a rhetorical commitment to an abstract ideal to a high-cost policy in a concrete case.

For those who did not support the democracy promotion thesis, however, there was an effort to identify alternative explanations for the US action. The easiest to dismiss was the idea that Haiti posed a national security threat. With an army totalling about 7,000 troops, poorly armed and poorly trained, the small Caribbean island nation could hardly pose any threat to the might of the United States—and nor did it seem inclined to do so. Perhaps the only threat the Haitian regime posed to the ‘security of the United States’ borders’ was the outward symptom of the country’s malaise, the mass exodus of Haitian refugees towards US shores. Again, however, though the issue of refugees was clearly a major one, which served to maintain the US government’s focus on Haiti, on its own it was hardly a basis for war. Despite the fact that there was precedent for refugees as a cause for war—India had cited ‘refugee aggression’ as one of the reasons for its intervention in Pakistan in 1973—the issue of refugees garnered far more attention than was perhaps merited by the empirical facts. Whereas in the case of India and Pakistan, some nine to ten million refugees had poured across the border, costing the Indian government millions every day and leading to severe health and economic problems in the border areas, the influx of Haitian refugees to US shores was pitiful in comparison (indeed, even in comparison to other sources of immigration to the United States). Though an estimated 50,000 to 150,000 tried to leave Haiti (for various destinations) after the 1991 coup, few made it to US shores. The majority of those heading for the United States did so in the immediate aftermath of the coup, during the Bush presidency, but Bush faced this ‘threat’ down by instating a policy of arbitrary return to Haiti for any refugees intercepted at sea. Beyond some embarrassing press, the Haitian exodus failed to seriously affect US immigration policy.

Clinton continued the Bush policy of arbitrary return. As a consequence, Haitian immigration to the United States fell to almost record lows. In 1994, the United States admitted only 664 Haitian refugees, while only an estimated 17,000 managed to enter the United States illegally in the period 1992–1996, a drop in the ocean compared to the over 1.6 million new illegal arrivals over the same period. As Girard puts it: “[h]ad he decided

---

4 To paraphrase President Clinton in his 15 September 1994 address to the nation explaining the United States’ reasons for invading Haiti. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Haiti”, 15 September 1994.

5 For a discussion of India’s justification of its intervention in Pakistan in terms of ‘refugee aggression’, see Wheeler, Saving Strangers.
to invade one country to stop immigration, Clinton would have been better off sending a Pershing-type expeditionary force across the Rio Grande.\textsuperscript{6} Despite a vocal Florida-based constituency raising fears of another ‘Mariel boatlift’,\textsuperscript{7} the extent of Haitian immigration never really posed much ‘threat’ to the integrity of US borders. At the same time, the issue of refugees did keep the Haiti issue on the political radar at times when it threatened to fade into the background, and open Clinton up to a strain of idiographic and purposive criticism from his domestic supporters, as well as his critics. This theme would prove important in the development of US policy towards Haiti, but not quite in the way many critics of the invasion of Haiti alleged.

Such critics alleged that the invasion of Haiti was, in fact, designed to appease the African-American political constituency, which was a critical component of Clinton’s domestic support base. However, there is little to suggest such a straightforward linkage. Though the Congressional Black Caucus was vocal in its pleas for a revised Haitian policy, few of Clinton’s policies actually gelled with what this group demanded. In respect of the final policy of military intervention, the Caucus was largely divided, with some advocating military intervention, but others equally wary.\textsuperscript{8} A policy of military intervention would therefore only be likely to appease a minority of a minority constituency. Where the Caucus was united was in its calls for a humane refugee policy, an area where Clinton was unwilling to make any but minor concessions. Indeed, in this area, Clinton’s policy was far more in line with the desires of his (mostly Republican) critics, who were adamantly opposed to the United States shouldering the financial (and perhaps cultural) burden of a massive influx of Haitian refugees. Despite the low levels of actual Haitian immigration to the United States, as noted above, at no point did the Clinton administration weaken its resolve to find any solution to the refugee issue but widespread asylum to the United States. Indeed, a review of Clinton’s policies against the demands of various domestic groups finds that they were at least, if not more, consistent with the arguments of other domestic groups than they were with those of the African-American constituency. This is not to say that this latter group had no effect in its extensive lobbying efforts, but rather

\textsuperscript{6} Girard, \textit{Clinton in Haiti}, 59. The figures are also from Girard.

\textsuperscript{7} The Mariel boatlift followed a period of severe repression in Castro’s Cuba in 1980, following which Castro agreed to allow any who wanted to leave to do so, prompting around 125,000 Cubans to leave the port of Mariel for US shores. As Governor of Arkansas, Clinton experienced first hand the political pressures wrought by that influx of refugees, as his decision to allow some of the refugees to come to Arkansas contributed to his defeat in his gubernatorial re-election campaign.

that US policy was driven by idiographic and purposive sentiment from the full spectrum of US political society; or, in other words, was driven by identity as it came to be formulated by a process of inter-group contestation.

As with the other case studies examined in this thesis, the explanations for US intervention in Haiti found in the existing literature are not without basis. Each explanation brings focus to what were clearly important issues. But, again, none provides a particularly satisfying explanation in isolation, or, indeed, in a non-theoretically based combination. The key to understanding how a set of seemingly innocuous factors conspired to drive the United States to war is, again, to use the via media to locate these within a theoretical framework in which identity drives policy, and in which positive and negative synergies between levels of discourse and the role of critical junctures play a significant role. The Haiti case does indeed constitute the most complex case considered in this thesis. As such, however, it is also the most illuminating.

II. A PEACEFUL SOLUTION: JANUARY–OCTOBER 1993

A. Foreign Policy Role: Weighing Up the Clinton Doctrine

1993 saw a number of contradictory tendencies emerge within US idiographic discourse. The US intervention in Somalia in 1992 had been the high water mark of the new world order discourse, but even at its apex the seeds of its decline were in evidence. As a presidential candidate, Clinton, as were most Americans, was generally supportive of the precepts of the new world order discourse, expressing support for collective internationalism, UN peacekeeping and the Somalia intervention itself.9 At the same time, the 1992 presidential election was a campaign mostly fought on the basis of domestic issues, with Clinton the candidate promising to ‘focus like a laser’ on the economy.10 If, as suggested in Chapter 5, Bush belatedly tried to refocus the campaign on his foreign policy successes and the support his ‘new world order’ programme engendered, it was ultimately a futile effort, with Clinton’s domestic focus enjoying more resonance with the priorities of American voters. As such, though universalism continued to provide the identity setting to

---


the emerging debate, it was balanced by a set of objective conditions in the structural domain—primarily economic—that were beginning to influence the ways in which policy actors would interpret the means by which they could realise their identity needs in the dispositional and intentional domains (see Figure 1, Chapter 4). However, despite Clinton’s serious attempts to focus as promised on domestic issues (later much maligned), he inherited a number of thorny foreign policy issues that pulled that focus and forced him to develop a new doctrine in keeping with the times, however half-heartedly.

1. Assertive Multilateralism

It was in this context that the new Clinton doctrine of ‘assertive multilateralism’ emerged.\(^{11}\) Assertive multilateralism was in some ways a thoughtful attempt to reconcile the contradictory impulses in the structural domain alluded to above. However, at the same time, these contradictions rendered the project inherently unstable, and this instability would correspondingly contribute to a seeming vacillation to US foreign policy in 1993–1994, which would have a serious effect on the two case studies in the time period examined here, Rwanda and Haiti.\(^{12}\)

On the one hand, assertive multilateralism mirrored the universalist preference for collective international solutions to the problems faced in the post-Cold War world. This meant a continuation of the United States’ stated interests in helping to solve the ethnic conflicts and humanitarian crises that plagued the early post-Cold War era, with continued emphasis on multilateralism and UN peacekeeping as an appropriate means of addressing such problems. On the other hand, the surfeit of crises that could claim the attention of the world’s only remaining superpower, now penurious, as well as the spiralling costs attendant on the UN’s new-found activism, militated for a more pragmatic approach, in which the United States would seek to share the burden with others, allowing it to attend to its domestic concerns without any snowballing foreign commitments. As Madeleine Albright characterised it: “[t]he challenge facing US security policy today … leaves us with what I call the two ostriches problem. One ostrich would rather not see any predators

\(^{11}\) Though it was US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright who coined the phrase in a Statement before the US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security, International Organization, and Human Rights, Washington, DC, 24 June 1993.

\(^{12}\) See Sterling-Folker, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Assertive Multilateralism and Post-Cold War US Foreign Policy Making”, in Scott (ed.), After the End: Making US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World (Duke University Press, Durham, London, 1998), for a similar notion of the contradictions inherent in assertive multilateralism, though the following analysis of the consequences of these contradictions diverges significantly from Sterling-Folker’s conclusions.
and plunges its head into the sand. The other hears the clamor of friends in need and miseries to assuage, and runs off in all directions at once”.  

Assertive multilateralism tried to chart a course between these two opposing positions, by continuing to pursue the ideals of a new world order, maintaining the United States’ leadership role in its development but spreading the burden of maintaining the new order among others. On the face of it, this seemed like a reasonable proposition, and met with considerable support. In debating the renewal of authorisation for US forces in Somalia in May of 1993, a number of members of Congress affirmed their support for the programme. As Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA) argued: “[w]ith the end of the cold war … we face a whole new international security situation, and in instance after instance we will find that American interests are best protected when we are part of action of a multilateral nature with the bulk of the burden and the bulk of the cost borne by others”. Similarly, Majority Leader Congressman Dick Gephardt (D-MO) noted:

> [T]he genuine historic nature of what we are doing. For the first time, the United Nations is providing the leadership and structure for an aggressive, multilateral humanitarian intervention operation, equipped for strong peace enforcement. And for the first time, American forces are serving under a new United Nations command structure. Both events are vivid reminders that the cold war way of doing business is over. We are in a new world, and the day of genuine multilateralism has dawned.

The influence of assertive multilateralism would have a significant effect on the ways in which US policy-makers believed the Haiti question should be pursued in 1993. Long criticised for a taking a ‘big stick’ approach to its hemispheric diplomacy, in Haiti the United States would be content to sit back and let the UN take the lead, at least in public. Haiti, it was argued, “should serve as a precedent-setting example of a new use of American power in the hemisphere: muscle dramatically deployed behind concerted international action in favor of democracy”. Through this approach, “American muscle

---

[should] be held in reserve—always visible, but deployed as little as possible to make a United Nations diplomatic offensive successful”.

2. Selective Engagement

If assertive multilateralism was a marriage of convenience between the contradictory dimensions to US idiographic thought, however, it was a union in which critics alleged that one partner dominated. If idealism was one face of assertive multilateralism, circumspection in the pursuit of such goals was the other face, and one which many thought was getting short shrift. The debate on continuing authorisation for the Somalia mission referenced above was far from one-sided, and is illustrative in this regard. Many Republican critics, and a number of Democrats too, warned against writing the administration—and, by implication, the UN—a ‘blank check’ to keep US troops in Somalia as long as they liked. While most applauded the original rationale for intervention in Somalia, by mid-1993 there was a growing concern that the United States might become overextended in the pursuit of such goals. As Congressman Gerald Solomon (R-NY) argued:

Mr. Speaker, if the United States is going to get into the business of providing security cover for every country that may need it while it attempts to develop its political institutions and its infrastructure, we could end up bogged down in many far corners of the world for indefinite periods. And that is what we are so concerned about because it questions American lives.

Congressman Bill Goodling (R-PA) summed up the mood of many when he asked his fellow members to “think of the precedent, the consequences, and the costs of this resolution”. While most could agree that “the United States has a continuing role as a world leader in this new era”, by mid-1993 most Americans were wary of committing themselves to a never-ending series of engagements with crisis-ridden countries in the periphery, of which there were seemingly a great many.

Much derided for his over-sensitivity to public opinion, America’s newest president was not unreceptive to these arguments. Though it would be fair to say that idiographic debate on America’s role in the world was allowed to drift throughout much of early 1993, there was nevertheless a noticeable change in tone from the Clinton presidency as the year

19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
progressed. By late June 1993, the president was arguing that: “[e]mphatically, the international community cannot seek to heal every domestic dispute or resolve every ethnic conflict. But within practical bounds, and with a sense of strategic priorities, we must do what we can to promote the democratic spirit and economic reforms that can tip the balance for progress in the next century.”\(^{21}\) Though disavowed by the administration at the time as ‘Brand X’ and not official US policy, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff’s off-the-record comments to reporters at a Washington luncheon were revealing of the new direction US policy was beginning to take when he admitted that “it was generally appropriate for the United States to pursue a less interventionist, more multilateral foreign policy, acting on its own only when vital interests close to home were threatened. And Washington must make every effort to keep the expenditure of American resources commensurate with the interests at stake.”\(^{22}\)

By the fall of 1993, as confusion persisted over the precise parameters of assertive multilateralism, the Clinton team felt it necessary to make its foreign policy position clear to the American public. In late September, therefore, its top officials made a series of high-level speeches over the course of a week, before Clinton was to make his own speech at the UN General Assembly.\(^{23}\) These speeches only served to further confirm the veracity of Tarnoff’s description of the direction of US policy. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake acknowledged America’s “humanitarian instincts”, but noted that “we must bring other considerations to bear as well: cost, feasibility, the permanence of the improvement our assistance will bring, the willingness of regional and international bodies to do their part, and the likelihood that our actions will generate broader security benefits for the people and the region in question”.\(^{24}\) UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright argued “[w]e believe, for example, that the UN decision-making process on peace-keeping must be overhauled. When deciding whether or not to support a UN peace-keeping or peace-making resolution, we are insisting that certain fundamental questions be asked before, not

---


\(^{22}\) Krauss, “The Clinton Budget; Arm-Twisting; When the President Rings, Mavericks Run for Cover”, *New York Times*, 29 May 1993.

\(^{23}\) “Loading the bases for the slugger”, according to a White House official. See Williams and Devroy, “Defining Clinton’s Foreign Policy; Spate of Speeches Will Seek to Kill Suspicions of US Retreat”, *Washington Post*, 20 September 1993.

\(^{24}\) Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement”, Address at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, 21 September 1993.
after, new obligations are undertaken”. 25 This list of fundamental questions bore a striking similarity to those that would later appear in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 (see Chapter 6). And Clinton himself would say, in a phrase that would later be turned against him: “[t]he United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world’s conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to UN peace-keeping, the United Nations must know when to say no.” 26

While the excerpts selected above highlight the reticence of the United States to over-commit to collective internationalism, its universalism had not been entirely abandoned. The speeches continued to stress the United States’ commitment to global leadership and to collective solutions to international problems. What had changed was the balance between the two faces of assertive multilateralism. If the United States had been overly idealistic in early 1993, by late 1993 it was veering towards a greater pragmatism, which reflected wider policy concerns in the US polity. Even before the events of October 1993, therefore, which would push the United States much further down this path, the trail had already been beaten, and did not hold much promise for robust engagement with Haiti. While the idealism of assertive multilateralism promised some form of engagement with Haiti, other more material concerns were likely to dominate the US agenda in early 1993. And, as the Haiti crisis moved towards a critical juncture in late 1993, the burgeoning conservative element of this doctrine would militate against any creeping over-commitment. Moreover, the content of assertive multilateralism had been poorly articulated, and the balance between its dimensions was highly contested, rendering it inherently unstable as an identity formulation. The contradictions inherent in assertive multilateralism would therefore allow for an easy transition to selective engagement in the wake of the critical juncture of October 1993, but, though the bumper stickers were different, the policy content had only been calibrated.

B. Interests: Democracy, But at What Cost?

Having trumpeted greater focus on domestic issues throughout his election campaign and transition, the last thing Clinton wanted on entering office was a messy foreign entanglement to pull focus. But Haiti would prove to be the biggest issue on Clinton’s desk

come inauguration day; indeed, even before. In the face of a mass exodus following the Haitian coup, President Bush had, in November 1991, reactivated the terms of a 1981 treaty with Haiti that allowed the United States to arbitrarily return any Haitians intercepted at sea to Haiti, a policy Clinton described on the presidential campaign trail as “cruel”, “illegal” and “immoral”. Clinton had argued that “[i]f I were President, I would—in the absence of clear and compelling evidence that they weren’t political refugees—give them temporary asylum until we restored the elected Government of Haiti”. These words would come to haunt him. Even before he entered the Oval Office, reports emerged from Haiti that thousands had begun building boats in anticipation of making the dangerous voyage to the United States on inauguration day. With as many as 150,000 believed to be poised to leave, the Clinton administration was faced with a major dilemma that had to be addressed before it even took up the reins of state. On the one hand, if it allowed the exodus to proceed unchecked, it could be faced with an unmanageable refugee problem in its first days of office, as well as the potential discomfort of watching large numbers drowning in the dangerous waters of the near Atlantic as they attempted to navigate the hazardous crossing in their makeshift vessels. On the other hand, it would be a politically embarrassing start to the first democratic government since Jimmy Carter if the Clinton team were to retreat from their stated collective internationalist ideals at the first sign of trouble. The compromise solution that the Clinton team came up with was clearly inspired by the doctrine of assertive multilateralism, and correspondingly marked by its contradictory nature.

Faced with a tricky situation, the Clinton administration refused to abandon its subvenient collective internationalist interests in democracy and human rights. Instead, it cited human rights as the reason for its reversal of position on the Haitian refugee issue. Defending his decision to continue the policy of arbitrary return, Clinton argued: “I did what I did because of the evidence that people in Haiti were taking the wood off the roofs of their houses to make boats that were of questionable safety, to pour in thousands of numbers to come to this country when we knew for sure hundreds of them would die on the high seas coming here”.29

28 Sciolino, “Clinton Says”.
Facing criticisms for this u-turn, Clinton assured the world that this did not presage a fundamental change in policy: “I still believe the policy should be changed. We are changing it … but I don’t think we can do it on a dime, on January the 20th.”

Nevertheless, words alone would not be enough to silence Clinton’s critics, who described the new policy as a “dramatic reversal of promises” and “unconscionable about-face”, which “betrays American values” and is “inconsistent with US refugee law and with the symbol of the Statue of Liberty”. Nor would words alone appease the one man Clinton needed to get on side if the new policy was actually going to stem the potential flow of refugees, Haiti’s deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

If the Clinton administration was to maintain the integrity of the United States’ identity as the leader of a collective internationalist order, it would need a more far-reaching policy programme. And one was easily available. Aristide himself had noted that “[c]onstitutional government remains the only solution to Haiti’s crisis and the only way to prevent the waves of refugees heading for the United States”. So too had the Washington Post argued that “[t]he outpouring of refugees from Haiti will continue as long as the country remains in the grip of anarchy and violence”. If the unconstitutional and repressive government of Haiti was responsible for the refugee flows, the obvious solution was to restore legitimate government to Haiti. Doing so would dovetail nicely with Clinton’s professed commitment to democracy as the centrepiece of his foreign policy programme. And promising to restore Aristide “as soon as conditions permit” would also secure the deposed president’s support in persuading his countrymen to be patient and remain in Haiti while the new policy was given time to work.

Despite the difficulties raised by the spectre of refugees, therefore, the United States had still clearly articulated its interests in Haiti—democracy and human rights—in a fashion

---

that synergised with the emerging idiographic discourse of assertive multilateralism. Nevertheless, like the idiographic discourse that gave rise to this articulation of interests, the US position was riven by contradictions: it would secure one set of human rights for Haitians whilst violating another. In trying to craft a policy to pursue these goals, the Clinton administration would continue to hew to the dictates of assertive multilateralism. Haiti would be the first test case of the new doctrine.

C. Instrumental Action: An Uneasy Compromise

1. Strategic Instrumental Action: Rotten Carrot, Broken Stick

If the United States was to achieve its goal of restoring democracy to Haiti and stemming the flow of refugees, it would need a carefully calibrated policy to achieve its goals. However, as Clinton’s critics would allege, the Haiti policy that did emerge showed a fundamental lack of balance. Whereas the United States had been quick to act on the refugee issue, the more immediate of its problems, it was much slower to enunciate a strategy for achieving its more long-term goal of restoring democracy to Haiti. Likewise, whereas the Clinton administration was highly assertive in its refugee policy, it was much less aggressive in putting pressure on the Haitian regime to allow for the return of Aristide.

In line with the doctrine of assertive multilateralism (see above), the UN was to take the lead in diplomatic efforts to restore Aristide to power, with US might held in abeyance. However, this arrangement only seemed to suggest a lack of initiative. Though some arrangements to facilitate the transfer to democracy were floated, there was little in the offering that seemed designed to actually prompt such a transfer to democracy. The first initiative pursued by UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo was to push for the deployment of human rights monitors to the country. The deployment of monitors, it was hoped, would address a number of US concerns: if the monitors could contribute to an improvement in the security situation in Haiti, human rights violations might decline, Haitians might feel less impetus to flee the nation and confidence throughout the nation might improve in the

38 The policy of arbitrary return and a flotilla of coast guard vessels deployed to enforce it were put into effect before Clinton had even been sworn into office.
39 The waters between Haiti and Florida were strictly policed and the policy of arbitrary return was (successfully) defended in the Supreme Court.
40 Though largely a UN initiative, the Clinton administration provided strong support and worked hard behind the scenes to persuade Aristide to write to the UN requesting such a mission. See Goshko and Farah, “Clinton Aides Try to Halt Haitian Flight: Deploying UN Observers, Appeal by Ousted Aristide Are Considered”, Washington Post, 12 January 1993; Farah, “Aristide Asks Haitians”; French, “Aristide Urges Big UN Observer Team for Haiti”, New York Times, 14 January 1993.
possibility for an orderly transition back to democratic rule. In a similar vein, in May the United States sponsored a resolution in the Security Council to provide for a 500-member international police force to be deployed to Haiti to ease the transition.\textsuperscript{41}

However, despite these well-meaning and potentially useful initiatives, by mid-1993 it still remained unclear quite why a transition to democracy was expected to take place at all. In the absence of other initiatives, human rights monitors and international police were unlikely to effect a change in the internal power structure of the Haitian state. Throughout January to June 1993, negotiations on the restoration of democracy to Haiti had been ongoing, but largely fruitless. While the mediators regularly stressed that a quid pro quo approach was being pursued, in which Aristide was to grant an amnesty to the participants in the coup, who would then voluntarily transfer power back to the exiled leader, quite wherein lay the stick (or, indeed, the carrot) that should persuade the Haitian regime that this was a deal worth taking was unclear. Though the Organization of American States (OAS) had instituted an embargo against Haiti in October 1991, it was a porous affair, and only applied to members of the OAS themselves. Certainly, Haiti’s economy had suffered as a consequence, but the junta was far from being on the brink of collapse.

Despite vocal calls for more robust pressure to be applied, it was not until June 1993 that the Clinton administration opted to ask the Security Council to impose a worldwide trade embargo. The results of the new sanctions, however, were immediate. Within a matter of weeks, the Haitian regime had agreed to negotiate the terms of a return to democracy and, on 3 July 1993, President Aristide and General Cedras, the leader of the military junta, signed the Governor’s Island Accords in New York, which provided for the return of Aristide to the presidency by 30 October 1993, and the concomitant resignation of the leading junta figures.

\textit{2. Resource Instrumental: Giving the Dog a Bone}

If the United States’ stated interests and policy goals in Haiti reflected the idealistic side of assertive multilateralism, its resource commitment to securing those goals reflected the injunction to pursue those goals through a consensual, multilateral framework in which the United States was a circumspect, almost passive player. Assertive multilateralism, it was hoped, could solve the Haitian crisis quickly and, crucially, painlessly. The idiographic

turn in US foreign policy suggested a subvenient lack of resource commitment to the Haitian crisis, which it was hoped could be picked up by the international community—in particular, the UN. Thus, the administration took a back seat in the early proceedings, providing verbal support for the process, but little in the way of material support. If this strategy was to work, it would be a great success for the new model of assertive multilateralism, but its failure would raise serious questions about the United States’ foreign policy role in the world.

Unfortunately, the softly-softly approach only had the effect of suggesting that there was a lack of resolve on the part of the Clinton administration to finding a solution. Despite public statements that there would be “serious consequences if the process fails”, the Haitian military was given the definite “sense that the international community doesn’t have the strength to change things”. Within the United States, too, many doubted the level of commitment. Indeed, even sources within the Clinton Haiti team wondered aloud how determined the president was to resolve the crisis. In this atmosphere, the Haitian junta felt little need to pay any more than lip service to the notion of seeking a solution. As negotiations dragged on, a tactic of agreeing to measures and then changing the goalposts became a consistent feature of the Haitian regime’s dealings with the international community. In the absence of any demonstrable seriousness of purpose behind the international community’s efforts, the policy’s critics were right to argue that:

[T]he military-backed regime in Port-au-Prince has no incentive to negotiate. The latest negotiation breakdown is just the latest example in a … choreographed minuet, in which the military presents a sufficient degree of interest in negotiation to keep them limping along but

---

44 See, for example, US House of Representatives, “Situation in Haiti Grave as Ever”, Congressional Record, 12 May 1993, H2456.
46 A useful example of this practice is to found in the junta’s approach to the possibility of human rights monitors. The junta first agreed to Caputo’s proposals, then acted against the agreement, before denying ever having agreed in the first place. When Caputo returned to try to rectify the agreement, the junta came up with new conditions to be met, which the international community could hardly agree to. Eventually, the junta acquiesced to the monitors’ presence, but only after further negotiation, and once the monitors arrived they were not allowed to function properly. Similar patterns emerged in respect of the offer of amnesty for the coup and the acceptance of police monitors. See French, “Envoy Says Haiti’s Military Agrees to Allow a UN Observer Force”, New York Times, 18 January 1993; Farah, “Haitians Boycott Army-Backed Poll: Vote Seen as Disapproval of Government”, Washington Post, 19 January 1993; Associated Press, “Haitian Premier Rejects UN Terms”, Washington Post, 28 January 1993; French, “Mediation Effort in Haiti Collapses”, New York Times, 5 February 1993; French, “Haiti Removes Obstacles” for details.
at the last moment, when an actual agreement is to be reached, they retreat. There is very little incentive by those who currently control Haiti to negotiate themselves into exile, into poverty, into prison.\textsuperscript{47}

These sentiments were widely shared. Members of Congress argued that Clinton’s efforts were “totally inadequate” and that the members of the Haitian junta “have so much to lose that they are never going to voluntarily give up their control of Haiti”.\textsuperscript{48} The news media noted that “the [Haitian] military and its partners in the civilian elite apparently have concluded they can disregard their international critics even as they kill, jail and exile their domestic ones”.\textsuperscript{49} And Haitian officials argued that “[t]he confidence of the official US establishment in Washington working on Haiti is exceeded only by the skepticism of everyone else in Haiti. If you give the military any other than stark alternatives, they will nickel and dime you to death”.\textsuperscript{50} Even UN officials were by now unenthused by the US administration’s support for their efforts: “[t]he United Nations entered these negotiations at the behest of the United States, and will carry on as long as we have strong backing from Washington. They really want to play ball with the administration, but in the absence of something stronger,”\textsuperscript{51} “everyone else is going to withdraw and this is going to become an American problem again, all by itself.”\textsuperscript{52}

The problem, it seemed, was that the Clinton administration efforts were, though multilateral, hardly assertive. In the face of such a sustained and widespread critique of its policy direction, the Clinton administration needed to change tack, but even this move was slow and gradual. Though the news media touted reports suggesting that Clinton was prepared to get tough with the Haitian military—with plans for a tightening of the embargo, targeted sanctions, cancellation of visas and restrictions on commercial air traffic potentially in the offing—as early as April 1993, no decision was taken on this until June 1993. And the critics’ concerns regarding the lack of assertiveness of US policy appeared vindicated by the fairly immediate effects of the first really assertive move. Voted for under Resolution 841 of 16 June 1993, a new worldwide embargo was set to take effect by

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{47}{Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) speaking in the Senate. US Senate, “Passing of Democracy in Haiti”, Congressional Record, 28 May 1993, S6830.}
\footnotetext{48}{US House of Representatives, “Situation in Haiti Grave as Ever”.
\footnotetext{51}{French, “Clinton Faulted”.
\end{footnotes}
23 June. By 22 June, Cedras had written to Caputo indicating his willingness to participate in talks with Aristide with a view to the restoration of democracy.

The resulting Governor’s Island Accords of 3 July 1993, despite the time taken to reach this point, had the potential to be viewed as a major success for the US policy of assertive multilateralism. As Robert White, a senior member of Aristide’s negotiating team noted: “[t]his is, as far as I know, certainly the first time in the Western Hemisphere, that a sitting President who has been expelled has then been restored to power through international pressure. It is a tremendous success for all of the parties, Haiti, Caputo, the United States, certainly.”

Likewise US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright declared: “[w]e have shown we can be serious in response to serious problems. … It is a triumph for multilateral diplomacy. It is a triumph for the Haitian people.” Momentarily, at least, the United States appeared vindicated, despite its early missteps, and the mood was generally congratulatory.

While the Clinton administration was lauding the Governor’s Island Accord as “a sound agreement that provides for a peaceful transition to constitutional rule” and “a victory not only for the Haitian people but for the international community as well”, however, some serious questions remained about the actual prospects for its implementation. With the benefit of hindsight, many analysts would conclude that the Governor’s Island Accord, far from being the “sound agreement” trumpeted by the Clinton administration, was in fact “profoundly flawed”. At least three major shortcomings were immediately discernable. The first was that the embargo, the sole bargaining chip the international community held, was to be withdrawn before Aristide returned to power. Though the threat that the embargo might be reimposed remained, even a temporary suspension of sanctions would allow the Haitian leaders to import vital products—in particular, oil—and transfer any assets they might still hold abroad to safety, thus insulating themselves against the worst of any reimposed sanctions regime. Secondly, the Governor’s Island Accords left the military junta in power during the period leading up to Aristide’s return, thus putting them in a

---

position to influence developments on the island in a manner that might directly threaten the viability of Aristide’s return to power. Finally, beyond renewed sanctions, there was no other mechanism in place to enforce compliance with the agreement, and no planning for the eventuality that the military junta might not so easily relinquish power.

These shortcomings became increasingly apparent as the transition period progressed. As soon as the embargo was lifted and oil and other critical goods began to flow again, a new wave of repression hit the island: in addition to increased violence against civilians, parliamentarians found themselves unable to enact key legislation required to effect the transition as a consequence of threats and intimidation from paramilitary forces, threats that were given immediacy by the assassination of a number of high-profile Aristide supporters, many in broad daylight.57 By early October, the prospects for “a peaceful transition to constitutional rule” were looking increasingly dim.

This reality was recognised within at least some sections of the Clinton administration. When the UN authorised a lightly armed peacekeeping force for Haiti under Resolution 867 of 23 September 1993, consisting of civilian police, military trainers and military construction units armed only with sidearms and no mandate to interfere in violent disturbances, the United States offered to provide 600 troops to participate in military construction projects and in retraining of the Haitian military.58 However, in a public airing of dirty laundry, as these troops were being readied for departure, differences of opinion arose between the State Department and the Pentagon over their safety.59 On 3 October, 18 US servicemen had died on the streets of Mogadishu in the service of assertive multilateralism, and the Pentagon—as were many Americans—was suddenly wary of the idea of sending more troops into harm’s way, especially lightly armed troops. The USS Harlan County was due to leave for the Caribbean carrying 250 US troops to serve in the Haiti mission. After some delays in authorisation due to these disputes, the Harlan County set off on 9 October, but concerns remained about the safety of the troops on board.60 The

---

following morning, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin was being interviewed on ABC News about the mission. Badgered by the interviewer about the safety of the troops on board, Aspin made the diplomatic gaffe of suggesting to the reporter that the troops had powerful M-16 rifles with which to defend themselves.\(^{61}\) This was not the case, but certainly gave General Cedras all the excuse he needed to publicly oppose the troops’ landing as a violation of Haiti’s sovereignty and a violation of the terms of the Governor’s Island Accords. When the Harlan County arrived in Port-au-Prince harbour, it found that its designated berth had been taken up by another vessel and a crowd of angry demonstrators had assembled.\(^{62}\) Armed only with sidearms as the agreement dictated, the troops were in no position to force their way ashore, nor were their commanders, including the commander-in-chief, inclined to order them to do so. After waiting out at sea for a day until a decision was made, on 12 October the USS Harlan County withdrew from Haitian waters. With this action, the Governor’s Island Accords were essentially dead.

### III. THE PROBLEM THAT WOULDN’T GO AWAY: OCTOBER 1993-MAY 1994

#### A. The First Ostrich: Foreign Policy Role in Retreat

The twin catastrophes in Somalia and Haiti precipitated a disorderly retreat in US idiographic discourse. If the United States had felt itself to be economically constrained against greater international activism in early 1993, the events of October 1993 confirmed that there were significant political costs to be considered too. But though the Mogadishu and Harlan County affairs were the trigger for a critical re-evaluation of the United States’ role in the world, the lines of the retreat had already been drawn. Crucially, though there was room for differing interpretations of the significance of these material events, prevailing ideas in the structural domain conditioned US policy-makers towards a particular path. Greater selectivity in its foreign policy priorities had already been a key consideration leading up to October 1993; this process was now accelerated.

A microcosm of the continuities and changes in US idiographic thinking is provided by the eventual fate of Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 13. Initiated in February 1993,

---

\(^{61}\) See Girard, *Clinton in Haiti*, for an account of Aspin’s interview.

\(^{62}\) This demonstration had actually been planned for some time, and the CIA was reportedly both aware that it was to happen, as well as having received reassurances that the demonstrators would not actually prevent the US troops from landing. Allegedly, this information was never passed on to the Clinton White House, lending some credence to the widely held belief that the United States’ foreign intelligence arm opposed the return of Aristide to Haiti (see below for discussion of Aristide’s standing in the United States).
PRD 13 was to outline the incoming Clinton administration’s approach to UN peacekeeping. Early reports on the drafting of the review suggested an ambitious doctrine, in keeping with the more far-reaching goals of assertive multilateralism. Whereas much US thinking up to then had suggested that the United States should only participate in peacekeeping when it could make a unique military contribution, the initial drafts of PRD 13 suggested that the United States should be prepared to plan, train and participate in UN peacekeeping operations even where only general US interests were advanced, or where participation might mobilise greater involvement by other nations. Reflecting concerns over the increasing strain on the UN’s woefully understaffed Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the review also championed a strengthening of the UN’s capacity, including the potential for sharing of US intelligence with the UN. Under these circumstances, it was envisioned, the United States would not need to have any concerns about allowing its troops to serve under UN command and control, reserving the ability to disregard reckless tactical orders, but not overall strategy.\(^{63}\)

Though not yet sent to Clinton for approval, in June 1993 this doctrine had the broad support of senior figures at the State Department, Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the review continued, however, greater conservatism crept in through a process of incremental change. The idea of a standby force for UN peacekeeping, which Clinton as a candidate had endorsed and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin had suggested at his confirmation hearings was being considered by the administration,\(^{64}\) was quietly jettisoned, as the Pentagon “threw ‘a major dose of cold reason’ on [the] more ambitious proposals from the State Department and National Security Council staff”.\(^{65}\) While the policy as it developed through the second half of 1993 still envisioned US forces being placed under UN command and control, it now suggested that those forces should nevertheless maintain direct reporting channels up the US chain of command, and should be prepared to disobey UN orders for a wider range of reasons, including acts judged to be potentially illegal, beyond the scope of the mission’s mandate or “militarily imprudent or


\(^{64}\) See Girard, \textit{Clinton in Haiti}.

unsound”. This version of the policy was thought to be likely to be signed by Clinton sometime in August.

But as the situation in Somalia deteriorated in August 1993, the policy was put on hold. After Aideed attacked and killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 1993, the UN had engaged in increasingly aggressive operations against the Somali warlord. As these hostilities dragged on through the summer, four US military police were killed on 8 August, the first US casualties since the UN had taken over from the original US-led task force on 4 May. On 13 August, a further blow to the thinking of PRD 13 emerged when Italy’s Foreign Minister announced the withdrawal of its contingent of troops in the Somalia mission, criticising what he called ‘Rambo’ commanders in the UN mission, a barely veiled reference to the US Envoy to Somalia, retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe. If US troops were to be given the green light to disobey UN orders under certain circumstances, the thinking went, what was to stop other countries doing likewise, and with less sound judgment, potentially endangering US troops in the process?

In this context, PRD 13 remained unsigned up until the crucial events of October 1993, which provided the opening for more significant change. As public and congressional opposition rose against its precepts in the wake of these twin disasters, therefore, the review was subjected to even further review. By November 1993, the Washington Post reported, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake was engaging in new discussions with members of Congress on the direction of the policy review, which was now no nearer to being finalised. Indeed, it was not finalised until May 1994, at which point it appeared as PDD 25, a document that, as discussed at length in Chapter 6, enumerated strict criteria for US participation in UN peacekeeping operations and contained few of the idealistic precepts of the early drafts.

The evolution of PRD 13 is indicative of the tone of US idiographic discourse in this period (see also Chapter 6 for further discussion of idiographic debate in this period). The collective internationalism of the new world order discourse and assertive multilateralism had suffered a fundamental blow, from which it was initially unable to recover. As a new

---

67 Reaction to these casualties was mixed, however, with some calling for the United States to withdraw from Somalia, but equally many calling for the United States to commit more resources to the hunt for Aideed.
69 See, for example, the Nickles Amendment in US Senate, “Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1994”.

184
doctrine was being hammered out, the United States found itself in almost full retreat from any sort of engagement with the outside world, particularly when it came to solutions to second-tier conflicts. This gun-shyness was starkly evident in the US approach to the problem of Haiti, which in this period fell into abject disarray.

B. The Mouse that Roared: Maintaining the US Interest in Haiti

As far as most members of the US government were concerned, the United States no longer had any significant interest in Haiti by October 1993–May 1994. In the wake of the Harlan County incident, the United States did not immediately back down—threatening a blockade, targeted sanctions and supporting a new mission by Caputo to Haiti to try to revive implementation of the Governor’s Island Accord—but it was clear that the bite had gone out of the situation. By early November, when this half-hearted round of sabre-rattling had concluded with little effect, the United States began a quiet process of withdrawal from its stated commitment to Haiti. When France proposed a new Security Council resolution to tighten the embargo on Haiti at the end of October, the United States indicated it preferred to wait upon the outcome of the Caputo mission to Haiti. When on 6 November Caputo returned from Haiti empty-handed, Clinton indicated his preference for targeted sanctions over a tightened embargo. And, by 17 November, the United States indicated that it would undertake no new policy initiatives, but would simply try to wait out the Haitian generals under the existing sanctions regime.

These developments constituted a major change of tack for the US government. Having stated throughout early 1993 that it was committed to restoring democracy to Haiti, and was prepared to impose serious consequences on Haiti’s military leaders should they block a settlement, this new position had to be justified. Simply acknowledging defeat would be unacceptable for the world’s remaining superpower, so, as the turn of the year progressed, the United States generally used its earlier purposive arguments to suggest that a more robust response to the Haiti crisis was not in the interests of the United States. Though the interests themselves remained rhetorically consistent, the idiographic context within which they were framed had changed, and consequently so had the meaning these interests had for US policy.

---

The first and most obvious of these shifts in the context of interests was the rationale forwarded for the abandonment of the idea of a tougher sanctions regime. Whereas in early 1993 the United States’ support for human rights had dictated that it should restore democracy to Haiti as the most viable means of securing human rights for Haitians in the long-term, by November 1993 the human rights of Haitians were a reason for not imposing further sanctions, which would, as Clinton put it, “be more painful in the near term to the average Haitians who are already suffering”. By mid-November 1993, the United States felt able to justify its decision to undertake no new initiatives on similar grounds. As a senior State Department official intimated: “the administration is satisfied that relief organizations and volunteer groups have enough food and fuel in Haiti to stave off a serious humanitarian crisis for several months. That being the case … the administration has decided there is no urgent reason to force the pace of developments there.”

The interest had not changed, nor, indeed, had the circumstances; sanctions were at least as detrimental to Haiti’s poor and downtrodden in June 1993 as they would have been in November 1993. What had changed was the United States’ idiographical commitment. If in early 1993 the United States had been prepared to be assertive in its pursuit of the restoration of democracy in Haiti, in word if not in deed, by November all the United States was prepared to promise was conservatism. Without greater activism on the part of the United States in support of any peace process, sanctions really might only hurt the poor.

Of course, there was a strong element of dissimulation in this mode of argumentation. Clearly, US policy was not driven solely by its concern for the human rights of Haitians; more parochial concerns militated against a more robust policy too, but these remained in the hidden transcript. The casuistry of US purposive argumentation was even more apparent in its new approach to the question of democracy. Here, there was less wiggle-room to argue that an interest in democracy could be served by a policy of non-intervention. Instead, therefore, the US government began to distance itself from Aristide himself, who became subtly recast as undemocratic. This was not a difficult task. Aristide had always been a suspect figure to many within the US policy community. Clearly a populist, Aristide was also accused of anti-democratic practices during his brief tenure as

---

73 Cited in French, “Study Says Haiti Sanctions Kill Up to 1,000 Children a Month”, *New York Times*, 9 November 1993.

74 Lippman, “US Relaxes”.

186
president of Haiti, including excluding opponents from the political process, inciting mob violence and even ordering political assassinations. During early 1993, these allegations had been dismissed as “ideological overlay” on the understandable grievances that must inevitably be felt by the first truly democratic movement in a country that had known only repression and violence. In any case, the important fact was that Aristide had been elected by almost 70% of the Haitian populace, all the democratic credentials he needed, even if he had also been ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ in his dealings with the US government. In late 1993 and early 1994, however, questions were once again raised regarding Aristide’s suitability as the paragon of democracy in the Western Hemisphere, and these now fell on more favourable idiographic ground. By November 1993, Clinton was far more equivocal: “Aristide may not be like you and me, he’s had a very different life. But two-thirds of the Haitians voted for him, and he has shown a willingness to reach out and broaden his base. So I … disagree that the old CIA reports are conclusive.”

The CIA reports to which Clinton referred had been around since the Bush administration, but new life was breathed into them in October 1993. On 22 October, the CIA gave a classified briefing to members of Congress on Aristide in which the deposed Haitian president was described as being mentally unstable and responsible for gross human rights abuses. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) followed up by describing Aristide as a “psychopath”. Having supported Aristide through most of 1993, the Clinton administration had little choice but to distance itself from the reports, but nor did it deny the veracity of the reports either. As Clinton put it: “they were allegations. We don’t know if they were true or not.” Even assuming the timing and content of the CIA briefing was unconnected with the White House’s growing disenchantment with Aristide, it gave the Clinton administration an established basis for the rift that was growing between itself and Aristide. As the winter of 1993 wore on, Clinton administration officials continued to
make statements that were “less than enthusiastic about the Haitian leader”\textsuperscript{82} and signalled a significant waning of support for his return to power, a particularist concern for support for a conflict party dressed up in the clothing of a universalist concern for democracy.

But Aristide would not go away. He would become, as the New York Times put it, the “mouse that roared”.\textsuperscript{83} In early 1993, the United States and Aristide had reached a tacit quid pro quo agreement, where Aristide would support US policy towards Haiti as long as that policy sought to return him to power. As 1993 drew to a close and it became increasingly clear that the latter part of that equation no longer held, Aristide felt increasingly able to criticise the United States. And he was able to hit where it hurt: on refugee policy. In February 1994, Aristide broke his long silence on the subject, describing the US interdiction policy as a “floating Berlin Wall”, which violated international law, and threatening to unilaterally withdraw from the 1981 treaty upon which the policy was based.\textsuperscript{84} The assault on US refugee policy was embarrassing, as it exposed the hypocrisy of a US policy that was rhetorically based on a stated concern for human rights as a fundamental violation of those rights.

And Aristide had a strong and vocal constituency of support, particularly among, but not limited to, African-American members of Congress. While Congressman Joe Moakley (D-MA) described the policy as “absolutely morally untenable”,\textsuperscript{85} Congresswoman Carrie Meek (D-FL) argued that “Haitians have been singled out by a United States policy that discriminates against them as no other persecuted people have been discriminated against in our history”.\textsuperscript{86} This line of argumentation was particularly effective, as it struck directly at traditional American values, values which the Clinton administration professed to uphold. As Congressman Major Owens (D-NY) put it: “[t]he United States has always had a policy for treating refugees in a very liberal way. The Statue of Liberty is not the symbol of this country for no reason. It is because of the fact that we have always had open doors

\textsuperscript{86} US House of Representatives, “Plight of Haitian Refugees”, Congressional Record, 1 February 1994, E44.
to those who were suffering or persecuted.” Similarly Congressman John Mica (R-FL) asked: “has the United States, the United Nations and this Congress abandoned every standard of decency and international justice?”

By April 1994, this line of criticism had swelled to fever pitch, with voices across the political spectrum denouncing the policy. The ante was upped yet further when Aristide reiterated his criticisms, describing the policy as “racist” and contributing to a “holocaust” in Haiti. And, on 8 April 1994, Director of TransAfrica Randall Robinson announced: “[s]tarting Tuesday, I’ll be on a hunger strike until the administration reverses its automatic repatriation policy with regard to Haitian refugees. … The current policy is wrong, legally and morally, and Clinton is as culpable as all get-out.” While there was significant difference of opinion within the US policy community on Haiti policy in a broader sense, the issue of fair treatment for Haitian refugees was one area where many people could agree. And, as this pressure began to build, Clinton too was forced to acknowledge the problems in his administration’s policy. Reacting to Randall Robinson’s hunger strike, which received sustained media and public attention, Clinton, in a rare and bizarre admission of failure by a sitting president, admitted “I understand and respect what he’s doing … He ought to stay out there. We need to change our policy.” The time had come, it seemed, for a thorough review.

IV. THE COMMITMENTS WE MAKE: MAY-SEPTEMBER 1994

A. Foreign Policy Role: A Leadership Battle

The US retreat from international engagement over the winter of 1993–1994, like most retreats, resulted in casualties. The debacles in Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda had “caused a pendulum swing away from the muscular multilateralism of the administration’s first months to a posture too far in the opposite direction”. The consequences were manifold. In addition to the Haitians and Rwandans who lost their lives as the United States, and the rest of the international community with it, took a step back, a more abstract casualty was

the status of US leadership in the post-Cold War world. Despite major differences within
the US policy community over what direction the United States’ foreign policy role should
take, one element of US identity that virtually all could agree on was that the United States
should be—and should be seen to be—the preeminent leader in the international
community. By May 1994, this position was in serious jeopardy. Global opinion began to
question the United States’ ability and commitment to global leadership. At the root of this
problem was the United States’ inability to deal with second-tier conflicts. As Finland’s
Helsingin Sanomat put it: “[n]one of these places alone harmed vital US interests but
together they did. A great power’s credibility and prestige have been wasted without any
concrete results.”

But the problem was more than just the failures themselves, but the reaction within US
society to those failures. Though a retreat deep into the extreme end of selective
engagement was an understandable reaction to the painful mishaps under assertive
multilateralism, it also carried with it a fundamental paradox: how could a desire for global
leadership be reconciled with a fundamental casualty aversion? A foreign policy that
refused to admit the possibility of incurring casualties was not only unsustainable but
ultimately damaging in terms of credibility. As the Washington Post put it, such a policy
“carries a cost to our world leadership and risks dangerous miscalculation by potential
adversaries”. If the United States wanted to be viewed as a great power, it needed to start
to act like one. As Edward Luttwak explained:

In the past, while Great Powers would normally be able to rely on intimidation rather than
actual combat, that was only so because it was taken for granted that they would use force
when called for. Nor did a Great Power conceive of limiting its use of force to situations in
which genuinely ‘vital’ interests, i.e., survival interests, were at stake. Unless we are content
to cohabit with chronic disorder and widespread violence, a synthetic version of Great Power
‘law and order’ interventionism will have to be invented.

It was Clinton who took much of the blame for the United States’ fall from pre-eminence.
Derided for a lack of a clear foreign policy programme and equivocation in pursuit of his
goals, Clinton was under direct fire for his leadership of the nation (see Chapter 6 for

---

93 This represents but one among a plethora of similar arguments made in the foreign press. See US Senate,
94 For an argument of this nature, see Le Figaro cited in ibid.
95 Broder, “Report Card on Clinton”.
96 Luttwak, “Twilight of The Great Powers: Why We No Longer Will Die for a Cause”, Washington Post, 26
June 1994.
further discussion). Increasingly, Clinton was coming under personal pressure to articulate a foreign policy doctrine and then implement it. The first concrete sign of this had emerged in PDD 25, the first test of which had come in Rwanda.

The universalist sentiment for democracy and human rights that was starting to emerge in respect of Haiti was in fact mirrored in respect of Rwanda by the emerging genocide discourse (see Chapter 6). However, in the case of Rwanda, the United States appeared determined to remain aloof from Rwanda’s problems. Such remove was relatively easy to sustain. Beyond the humanitarian imperative, the United States had few identifiable interests in Rwanda, few Americans knew much about the situation, and nor had a significant constituency for action yet emerged. This stood in stark contrast to Haiti, where the interests had been well articulated and a vocal constituency for stronger action on Haiti was already established. Equally as important was the fact that the Haiti crisis allowed more time for such pressure to build. The genocide discourse in Rwanda had only first started to emerge in May 1994, and, by June, France had relieved the pressure this discourse was starting to produce by taking on the burden itself. In Haiti, the universalist discourse had been established for much longer and would continue to grow over a much longer period. The United States would be a reluctant engager in Haiti, but would do so as a consequence of burgeoning idiographic pressure.

In Rwanda, Clinton sought to provide leadership by demonstrating his resolve to ‘say no’ to the UN and to stick to the principles enunciated under PDD 25 (see Chapter 6). But leadership in the negative was not the kind of leadership Americans demanded of their president. In the wake of Rwanda, the question remained whether Clinton was capable of acting forcefully in the world when the situation demanded.97 As the Washington Post put it: “[i]f ever there was a man who needed to change the subject in a hurry, it is President Clinton. He needs to do something different. He needs a situation where he would be in control, where he could present himself as a forceful and, yes, moral leader, a decisive and forceful commander in chief”.98 But this injunction raised its own questions: forceful in pursuit of what? If non-intervention in Rwanda had been leadership in the negative, it was because the corollary could be found in the doctrine of selective engagement, which was a doctrine of the negative, “a peace-keeping policy couched entirely in terms of the things

97 Indeed, in hindsight, many would regret that the United States had not done more to aid Rwanda. Though this viewpoint was only starting to emerge as the Haiti crisis neared a climax, it was nevertheless present and may have played its own role in pushing the United States towards intervention in Haiti.

98 McGrory, “Buoying Haiti in Whitewater”.
America will not do”.99 The Washington Post answered its own question, by calling upon the president to demonstrate himself to be “a man of compassion who is showing the world that the United States keeps its promises and does the right thing by fragile democracies that have been hijacked”.100 This argument, indeed, captured a good deal of latent sentiment in the United States in the wake of the Rwanda non-intervention. Though its idealism had been dented by the events of the past year, it had not been destroyed. As Robert Kaplan put it:

Because who we are is bound up in our ability, however diminished, to overcome [the] ethnic animosities of our ancestral, blood-home-lands, we have to take a vigorous stand against such blood feuds overseas. … A coherent foreign policy designed to deal with violent anarchy is now absolutely essential, if, for nothing else, than to preserve our moral sense of ourselves: our Americanness.101

America was viewed as a land of values, and these values, though they had fallen by the wayside, remained a viable north star to guide US policy. In a lengthy monologue on the need to return to first principles, Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-GA) argued: “we need to reestablish both for ourselves here at home and in our ability to work around the world our commitment to the basic core values of American civilization”.102 And Senator Carol Moseley Braun (D-IL) argued: “[o]ur foreign policy has to have some meaning to it in order for it to work over the short or the long term. Protection of human rights, particularly in this hemisphere, it seems to me, should be at the top of the list of the motivations of our foreign policy.”103

However, despite the return to American idealism, this resurgence did not represent a straightforward return to the precepts of ‘assertive multilateralism’, but rather a further evolution, towards what has been described as ‘pragmatic idealism’.104 The United States had restored its faith in its fundamental values, but needed a new paradigm for the pursuit of those values. As Adam Roberts put it:

99 Matthews, “The Least Bad Choice”.
100 McGrory, “Buoying Haiti in Whitewater”.
101 Kaplan, “Into the Bloody New World”.
104 National Security Advisor Anthony Lake used similar terms to convey the new form of US engagement overseas, and the notion of ‘pragmatic idealism’ has since come to be viewed as an enduring American policy paradigm, with President Barack Obama, to whom Lake was later an advisor, often described as a pragmatic idealist.
We are at now a stage of retrenchment in American public attitudes to, and of administration policies, towards the UN. This retrenchment could serve a useful purpose: there is indeed a need to focus attention not on lofty schemes to completely transform international relations (schemes which can easily be harmful in their effects), but on a more mundane and practical evaluation of what the UN can actually achieve.\textsuperscript{105}

Under assertive multilateralism, the UN had been seen as a key vehicle for low-cost American engagement with the world, leading critics to argue that the United States had “abdicated … its role in the world to the United Nations”.\textsuperscript{106} This would no longer be the case. Though pragmatism dictated that “[e]ffective United Nations peace operations [could still] offer an alternative for the United States to share the burden of world peace with like-minded nations”,\textsuperscript{107} the key term was “effective”. The United States would still engage in multilateralism if this provided a useful vehicle for the pursuit of its interests, and the criteria of PDD 25 now constituted a useful guide to the parameters within which such action should take place. But the United States would no longer rely on multilateralism as a crutch to evade responsibility, but, crucially, would be forceful in the pursuit of those interests, now defined in terms of American ideals, taking its leadership role seriously.

This doctrine had clear applicability to Haiti; indeed, Haiti was at the root of the problem. As Congressman John Mica (R-FL) put it: “[h]ow can we be a leader of nations when we ignore the death of a nation in our own back yard?”\textsuperscript{108} In order to re-establish credibility, a new Haiti policy was necessary. The problem was, what kind of Haiti policy?

\textit{B. Resource Instrumental: In With the Old, Out With the New}

By May 1994, the US policy community was virtually united in the belief that a new Haiti policy was necessary. The affront to democracy and human rights so close to US shores was difficult to stomach, and there were constant painful reminders in the form of bedraggled Haitian refugees struggling to escape the island prison in their rickety wooden boats. Equally important, the Haitian generals had thumbed their noses at the might of the world’s only remaining superpower, leaving it looking ineffectual and ridiculous. But there were few easy answers to the question of how to achieve success in Haiti. Indeed, the

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
question of “how to remove the military, without inflicting more suffering on a nation that is already the poorest in the hemisphere … proved to be one of the most intractable US foreign policy challenges”. 109

On 8 May 1994, the Clinton team announced a series of new initiatives on Haiti, following a “comprehensive review” of policy. 110 But there was little that was new about its proposals. The centrepiece was a return to the UN Security Council to seek a resolution for a total trade embargo, which was authorised under Chapter VII in Resolution 917 of 6 May 1994, and would include restrictions on air travel, freezing of funds belonging to members of the junta and revocation of their visas. 111 Also announced were changes in asylum screening procedures for Haitian refugees, who would now be afforded asylum interviews if intercepted at sea. 112 For the most part, this was largely old policy in new packaging. 113

The old policy of sanctions, it was hoped, would, as it had in June 1993, quickly bring the military junta back to the negotiating table. But if a policy of sanctions had been problematic in the first two phases of US involvement in Haiti, it was, if anything, more so now. The sanctions regime had always been porous, allowing the military junta to circumvent its most deleterious effects. Of major concern was the country’s border with the Dominican Republic, which was like “a sieve; oil and goods continue to flow unimpeded from the Dominican Republic to Haiti”. 114 Dominican President Joaquín Balaguer had always been hostile to the sanctions regime, and, with little official sanction, a lucrative trade in illicit goods had developed across the border, enriching Dominicans and the Haitian elite alike. By now, the Haitian army had developed sophisticated “networks and structures … to get around the embargo”, 115 meaning that the only effect the embargo was having was “enriching the military at the expense of Haiti’s already

111 See Clinton, “Presidential Press Conference on Haitian Policy”; White House, “Fact Sheet on Haitian Policy”; Lewis, “UN Council Votes Tougher Embargo on Haitian Trade “, New York Times, 7 May 1994. The Clinton administration also continued to bolster the sanctions regime with additional targeted measures as the summer progressed, though it was criticised for doing so in a sequential and seemingly ad hoc manner, which reinforced the sense of an under-considered policy.
113 The only markedly new policy initiative was the announcement of asylum interviews for Haitian refugees, but this generated its own problems, as discussed below.
115 Farah, “Aristide’s Backers”.
impoverished masses”. While restrictions on air travel and visas meant the Haitian elite could no longer travel to New York to do their shopping, such restrictions were far from comprehensive, and Haitians could still travel to Paris for the same purpose right up until August. And while the freezing of assets had the potential to target those responsible for the political crisis in Haiti, by May of 1994 they had been given ample time to move those assets, leaving it an open question quite how effective such measures might be.

Of course, like the policies themselves, these failings were not new. What was new, however, was that the United States faced an almost total lack of credibility with Haiti’s military junta. If, in 1993, the Haitian leaders might have been persuaded that sanctions might only be the tip of the iceberg, “the moment the Harlan Country turned around, the United States lost all credibility”. It was by now clear that the Haitian junta “no longer think the Clinton administration is serious about anything they do or say”. In this context, Haiti’s de facto rulers were unlikely just to “throw up their hands and go”. Rather, they were more likely to “continue their sickening game of chicken with the United States—clinging to power as the suffering in Haiti goes from terrible to truly horrifying, betting that the US will lose its stomach for the embargo before it forces them out”.

What was more, the Haitian junta now had another card in their hand as a consequence of the only really new element of Clinton’s Haiti policy: asylum hearings for refugees intercepted at sea. As Congressman Porter Goss (R-FL) was quick to point out, the policy now featured “an explosive combination of tighter sanctions and looser asylum procedures likely to spark a new burst of Haitian refugees headed for Florida”. Goss’ analysis was prescient. As sanctions began to bite, a new wave of Haitian refugees headed for the seas. By July, the levels had reached around 800 to 1,000 a day, far more than the ad hoc refugee processing procedures could cope with, even as the United States struggled to find

118 Despite being questioned repeatedly and at length on this question, the Clinton administration never came up with firm figures as to the monetary value of the assets freezes.
120 Farah, “Aristide’s Backers”.
third countries willing to take in some of this massive outflow.\textsuperscript{123} The consequences of the burgeoning refugee problem were difficult to predict. As the Haitian junta may have been willing to bet, it could very well force the Clinton administration to abandon its failing Haiti policy, just as it had abandoned Rwanda. Or it could very well accelerate the United States’ search for alternative solutions.

\textit{C. Instrumental Action: The Last Resort}

The problem was, it was very easy to identify the problems with US policy, but much more difficult to identify solutions. An obvious solution was military intervention. Most agreed that a US military intervention could quickly topple the Haitian junta and its 7,000-strong army, but whether a stable democratic climate could be re-established in its place was open to question, and few Americans had the stomach for the lengthy occupation of Haiti that this might entail. But neither were the alternatives particularly palatable; indeed, few were even offered. Some argued that sanctions should simply be given time to work, but there was little to suggest that they ever would and, in the meantime, thousands of refugees were pouring out of Haiti as the military junta intensified its campaign of political intimidation and repression.

An influential group of Republicans, including former President Bush, Vice-President Dan Quayle and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, suggested that the United States should drop its support for Aristide’s return and instead press the Haitian junta for new elections with new candidates.\textsuperscript{124} This approach had the great advantage of removing from the equation a man whom many in the US policy community viewed as deeply suspect and as a polarising element in Haitian society. By this logic, the Haitian regime might be more willing to relinquish power if that did not mean returning power to its nemesis. Haiti’s new leader, moreover, might even be a more sympathetic figure towards the United States than the radical populist priest. However, the hope that this approach would actually return democracy to Haiti rested on the predicate that any new elections in Haiti would be free

\textsuperscript{123} This effort was largely unsuccessful. An agreement with Panama to house up to 10,000 refugees fell through in early July in the face of Panamanian domestic opposition, leaving the United States only with an agreement to anchor refugee processing vessels offshore in Jamaican territorial waters and an agreement with the Turks and Caicos Islands to allow for a processing centre on-shore. The United States continued its search through July and August, but met with little success.

\textsuperscript{124} US Senate, “United States Military Action in Haiti”, Congressional Record, 5 May 1994, S5245.
and fair, which seemed far from likely. At the same time, jettisoning Aristide would open up the United States to claims of imperialism if it were to simply ignore the internationally acclaimed elections of 1990, in which Aristide had won, freely and fairly, around 70% of the vote, a position that was hardly in line with its idiosyncratic commitments. Equally, it would open the Clinton administration, which had taken this line of argument in its support for Aristide from the beginning, up to yet further claims of vacillation and lack of resolve, a key idiosyncratic issue. Though tempting, this option was hardly realistic and lacked resonance with the dominant identity discourse.

A more subtle alternative was suggested by Congressman Porter Goss (R-FL), who recommended using the Île de la Gonâve, a sparsely inhabited island off the coast of Haiti, as a safe haven for Haitian refugees and as a base to which Aristide could be returned and from which he could re-establish his government and engineer his own return to power. This option could simultaneously solve the refugee problem and the Aristide problem: refugees could make the short crossing to the Île de la Gonâve in far greater safety than the longer crossing to the United States (and would no longer be a burden on US immigration); and once Aristide conceded to return to this patch of Haitian soil, the restoration of democracy would cease to be a US problem, but would be Aristide’s. Of course, there were also serious problems with such a plan. The Île de la Gonâve did have a contingent of Haiti’s military posted on it. While Haiti lacked an effective navy, and the gulf between the island and the mainland could easily be patrolled by US warships, preventing any reinforcement, the island would nevertheless have to be occupied by the United States for such a plan even to get off the ground. Additionally, the island lacked an adequate supply of drinking water and other necessities, meaning the United States would need to establish means of provisioning the island over the long-term. Nor was Aristide likely to be

125 On 11 May 1994, General Cedras had already appointed 80-year-old Supreme Court Justice and long-time supporter of the regime Emile Jonassaint to the post of ‘interim president’, and this figure was a possible junta-supported candidate in any new elections. Shortly thereafter, on 16 May, Jonassaint passed a presidential decree awarding himself the post of prime minister too, hardly the work of a true-blue democrat. Moreover, the idea of new elections was one favoured by the military regime itself, which began organising for new elections in July. It was likewise suggested that Cedras might be another possible candidate for president. In this context, one could hardly expect fresh elections to rectify Haiti’s democratic deficit. For details, see Downie, “Aristide Foe Installed As Haitian President: US Calls Move ‘Affront’ to Democracy”, Washington Post, 12 May 1994; Associated Press, “Haitian Premier Rebels, And Promptly Loses Post”, Washington Post, 17 May 1994; Rohter, “Haiti Plans Ballot Likely to Yield a Replacement for Aristide”, New York Times, 27 July 1994.

enthralled by a plan with such striking similarities to the disastrous Bay of Pigs expedition and with such similar prospects for success. The Île de la Gonâve proposal would deflect the problem away from US shores, but was unlikely to actually solve it. Nor did it solve the United States’ idiographic concerns, particularly the need to re-establish its leadership credentials. Though Goss pushed the idea on an almost daily basis in ‘special orders’ on the House floor, the Clinton White House seems never to have seriously entertained the idea.  

In this context, “the choices facing the Clinton Administration will be increasingly stark and agonizing: to admit defeat and call for a lifting of the embargo, to hold tight and bear responsibility for enormous suffering in Haiti with an uncertain prospect of eventual ‘victory’, or to invade”. None of the options were particularly palatable: “[i]ntervention would cut against the grain of public and congressional sentiment that the United States should not expose its soldiers to danger in small, out-of-the-way places such as Haiti. Conversely, a failure to act would undercut further the already low credibility of Clinton’s foreign policy.”  

The Clinton administration had always stressed that it would not rule out the use of force. During 1993, it had argued that the use of force was not under serious consideration because none of the parties to the Haitian crisis—Aristide included—wanted a solution by those means. But, by 1994, Aristide’s tune had changed. Constitutionally barred from explicitly calling for intervention, Aristide had nevertheless begun to hint that he would not object to such action. By May 1994, the Clinton administration had become more vocal in its refusal to rule out military force, but it never appeared to be particularly enamoured by the idea. Indeed, New York Times columnist William Safire described Clinton’s threat of force as “the most nail-nibbling, pusillanimous ‘threat’ ever uttered by a President of the United States: ‘we are doing our best to avoid dealing with the military option’”.  

---

127 The Goss Amendment did pass the House, however, by a narrow majority. Shortly thereafter, however, its opponents, with White House support, perhaps even urging, forced a revote on the amendment, which was ultimately rejected.
128 Carothers, “The Making of a Fiasco”.
Probably the ideal solution for Clinton was to float the idea of intervention in the hope that the threat itself would be enough to dislodge the military junta from power. However, lacking credibility as he was, this seemed unlikely to bear fruit. Indeed, even as the intervention neared, and US plans became more overt and talk of an invasion more explicit, the Haitian regime never seemed cowed. As such, it was only at the 11th hour, when US warships were already on their way, that the Cedras regime finally became convinced that the invasion was really going to happen. By then, of course, Clinton had already had to convince a sceptical US public that intervention was necessary.

Such would not be an easy task. While the prospect of military intervention was not without support in some sections of US society, opponents of military intervention were far more vocal and perhaps even more numerous. An illustration of the level of opposition the policy faced can be found in the number of amendments or resolutions offered by Congress that sought to express opposition to or limit in one way or another the president’s ability to use force in Haiti, which ran into double figures over May to September 1994. Though most were defeated, most were also opposed on the constitutional grounds that a president’s powers should not be so circumscribed by the US Congress, with many voting against the amendments while simultaneously expressing opposition to military intervention. One amendment that did pass was the Mitchell (and Others) Amendment of 29 June 1994, a ‘Sense of the Senate’ resolution (non-binding), which asked the president to seek Congressional approval before authorising an invasion of Haiti, which passed 93-4.

132 See Girard, *Clinton in Haiti*, Chapter 1, for a discussion of the last minute negotiations and the Haitian military’s unique form of intelligence on its imminence.
133 Girard suggests that perhaps one reason why the prospect of military intervention was able to gain ground was because opponents of intervention “paid little attention to the crisis as it unfolded” and “remained largely silent as the Haiti crisis reached its climax”. As such, these “months of silent indifference”, Girard argues, were “much less influential than the views expressed repeatedly over the previous two years by some of Clinton’s most essential allies”. See *ibid.*, 63. While Girard does not exactly make it clear quite what those latter “views” were, this analysis is not borne out by the empirical record. Few advocates of intervention were particularly vocal in the lead up to intervention, while its opponents were, both before and after the brief August recess that Girard claims stifled dissent.
134 These included the Dole-Mitchell Amendment, offered 5 May 1994; the Dellums-Hamilton Amendment, offered 24 May 1994; the Goss Amendment, offered 24 May 1994; the Mitchell (and Others) Amendment, offered 29 June 1994; the Gregg and Nickles Amendment, offered 29 June 1994; the Dole-Warner Amendment, offered 13 July 1994; the Dole Amendment, offered 3 August 1994; the Spector Amendment, offered 5 August 1994; the McCain Amendment, offered 14 September 1994; and the Mitchell-Nunn Amendment, offered 14 September 1994. A number of related amendments and resolutions were also offered.
Much of the opposition to a policy of military intervention was based on the president’s own formulation of criteria under PDD 25. Many opponents argued that the president could not meet his own test for when US troops should be deployed abroad. But this debate only highlighted the subjectivity of such criteria. Whether one believed that there was a US national interest in an invasion of Haiti depended greatly on whether one viewed democracy and human rights as central enough concerns of US policy to justify military force or mere luxuries, or whether one believed that the restoration of Aristide equated with the restoration of democracy. And whether one thought that there was a clearly defined exit strategy depended on whether one thought the UN could be depended upon to take over the responsibility for nation-building in the aftermath of a US invasion, or whether the United States would fall into the same trap it had fallen into in Somalia. Such subjectivity only highlighted the concerns of many in the US policy establishment, as discussed above, over the efficacy of selective engagement as a guide to US foreign policy. The criteria might provide a useful checklist in planning, but selective engagement said little enough on its own to be employed as a road map for US foreign policy. There was a need to establish some positive values within which such criteria could be applied and, for the Clinton administration, this meant the focus on democracy and human rights implied by the resurgent universalist dimension to idiographic discourse.

Nevertheless, the question of whether Haiti could meet the criteria of PDD 25 was clearly up for debate, and the Clinton administration also clearly sought to address these issues. The possibility of using military force had been floated for a full five months before the intervention actually came, leaving plenty of time for contingency planning. As Congressman Christopher Cox (R-CA) pointed out: “[t]his is the most preannounced invasion in history”. The Clinton administration sought and received a UN Security Council resolution, Resolution 940, as early as 31 July 1994, a full six weeks before the invasion. This resolution authorised a two-phase intervention, in which members of the UN would be authorised to intervene forcefully in Haiti to establish a permissive environment, following which a nation-building mission would be established under UN auspices.

---


providing, at least on paper, for the United States’ exit strategy. And the United States spent considerable energies over the summer persuading, cajoling and even pressuring allies to join its crusade, such that the components of a replacement force would be in readiness well before the intervention even took place. Though critics would rightly point out that this task was not easy, as there was considerable international ambivalence about the prospect of a US intervention, the more important point was that the United States was at least making the effort to conduct its due diligence, addressing, if not to everybody’s satisfaction, the injunctions of PDD 25.

What the president did not do, however, was to go to Congress to ask for permission. While the Clinton White House stressed it was not necessary to do so, more likely the president did not want to face the inevitable congressional opposition such a move would have entailed. Though it remained unclear whether the vote would go against Clinton, it would have certainly acted as a highly publicised forum for partisan attacks on his foreign policy. Key Republicans, especially those with an eye on a potential 1996 presidential campaign, had been taking every available opportunity to pillory Clinton. However, in some respects, those same critiques may only have reinforced the president’s determination to proceed with the invasion of Haiti. For example, former Secretary of Defense and presidential hopeful Dick Cheney argued that an “essential quality of leadership in statecraft is constancy of purpose”; “[a] President’s most important commodity as Commander-in-Chief is his credibility. Bold talk that is never followed up by bold action leads our adversaries to conclude we do not have to be taken seriously.” Similarly, former Secretary of State and presidential hopeful James Baker argued that “[t]he United States President should never, never, never, never threaten the use of force unless he is prepared to follow up”. Both men then went on to argue that the president should not follow through on his threat to use force against Haiti. It was no small irony that the logic

of both men’s statements might actually strengthen Clinton’s resolve to do just that. The horse had already bolted.

Rather than address Congress and ask for permission to invade Haiti, therefore, the president opted instead to address the nation, betting that politics would stop at the water’s edge and the nation would rally round on the success of the policy. Though a gamble, it was not laid without basis. It was the efficacy and potential costs of an intervention that were in question, much more than the ideals behind it. A successful action would do more to assuage these concerns than mere words ever could.141

In his speech, Clinton outlined the interests that the United States had in Haiti, which included human rights, democracy, stability in the hemisphere, to secure US borders and to “uphold the reliability of the commitments we make, and the commitments others make to us”.142 Acknowledging the injunction that the “United States cannot—indeed, we should not—be the world’s policeman”, and the fact that “many Americans are reluctant to commit military resources and personnel beyond our borders”, the president assured the nation that the mission would be “limited and specific” and that “the vast majority of our troops will come home in months, not years”.143 Finally, the president said to those who “believe that we shouldn’t help the Haitian people recover their democracy and find their hard-won freedoms … [that] the same was said of a people who, more than 200 years ago, took up arms against a tyrant whose forces occupied their land. But they … fought for their freedoms … and a new nation was born—a nation that, ever since, has believed that the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness should be denied to none”.144 The president’s speech was an appeal to US identity as it had been articulated (slowly and falteringingly, to be sure) over the past two years. The speech reflected the injunctions to conduct military operations in a discretionary manner, with a full view to the costs, objectives and potential pitfalls of any strategy. It also reflected the need for US leadership in the post-Cold War world, and the need for that leadership to be reflected itself in the credible use of US power in pursuit of US objectives. And, finally, but not least, it reflected the enduring power of American ideals such as democracy and human rights to guide and shape those objectives. If the integrity of this vision of America’s role in the

141 Indeed, in the aftermath of the invasion, and the success of the Carter-Powell mission that persuaded the Haitian regime to step down without a fight, assessments of the policy were generally favourable.
142 Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Haiti”.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
world was to be maintained, the United States must be prepared to make the hard choice to intervene in Haiti.

V. CONCLUSION

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the Haiti case was certainly the most complex of those considered in this thesis. In Somalia and Rwanda, we were able to identify the dominance of clearly universalist and particularist identities, respectively, which defined the context within which action took place along the lines posited by the theory outlined in Chapters 3 and 4. In both case studies, the content of the identities appeared relatively clear and, while contestation took place, a single clearly articulated identity was dominant at the crucial point in the causal chain. In Haiti, conversely, we see a much more complex idiographic context within which action took place, in which the contents of identities were never well articulated and contestation continued right up until the time of the decision. Elements of both universalism and particularism were present in US idiographic discourse over this time period, and there was considerable oscillation between the relative strengths of these strains of thinking. In the first period in early 1993, universalism dominated, but there was a burgeoning particularist element to US idiographic debate, which gained in force as the year drew on. In the second period between 1993 and 1994, the shocks from Mogadishu and Port-au-Prince jarred the United States violently towards the particularist end of the spectrum. By May–September 1994, the United States was slowly re-establishing a more balanced idiography, and universalism again came to the fore. In this context, the foreign policy decision here seems as much an effort to re-assert a flagging identity as the inevitable outcome of an overwhelming identity discourse, but the process appears no less driven by identity. Nevertheless, though it would not be unreasonable to characterise the Haiti intervention as more universalist than particularist, the idiographic context was clearly mixed, suggesting that the universalism–particularism divide should be treated less as a dichotomy and more as a continuum, a point that will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter.

The impact of critical junctures is also more marked than in the previous case studies. The events of October 1993 are the most glaring example of the ways in which events can significantly and, in some cases, dramatically alter the direction of the causal chain, but, in identifying this fact, we should not overlook the importance of the events of early 1994, which, though less dramatic, clearly pulled the United States back to consideration of a
problem it had equally clearly wished to wash its hands of, and, in the process, presented the United States with a dilemma it might be forced to solve in a manner it had no great desire to commit to. Though confirming the importance of critical junctures in causal chains, this also raises questions about the identification of such critical junctures, a point that will also be discussed in the following chapter.

In a related vein, the issue of sequentiality comes to the fore as being of critical importance. The discourses that dictated non-intervention in Rwanda also held in respect of one of the periods in the Haiti case study. At the time, these had a similar effect: to cause the United States to shrink from any form of serious engagement with the crisis at hand. However, in Haiti, this period had been preceded by a period of stronger engagement with the issue, and many of the positions and ideas established in that phase remained in currency despite the move to greater particularism. As such, the particularist argument had greater hurdles to overcome in establishing its dominance. Moreover, once universalism began to creep back in to US idiographic debate, there was already a strong foundation upon which to build an argument for greater involvement in Haiti, a fact that served to make the case for intervention in Haiti much stronger much sooner. Finally, the very limited time period within which US policy-makers were engaged with the question of Rwanda further circumscribed the possibilities for a universalist discourse to take hold. It is perhaps notable that by late July, the United States had authorised a relief mission to alleviate the suffering of refugees from the Rwandan genocide, featuring troops, equipment and relief supplies at a significant cost. Of course, by the time this took place, the genocide was over, but many expressed regret that such efforts had not been mobilised sooner. The timing of the two crises may therefore have much to offer in terms of explaining the differences in the response.

Finally, the case study confirms once again the point raised in the Rwanda case study that idiography influences the ways in which interests, even if rhetorically consistent, take on their meaning. The shift in the meaning of an interest in human rights and democracy under the shift in idiography between October 1993 and May 1994 mirrors the disjuncture between the treatment of human rights concerns in Somalia in 1992 versus Rwanda in early 1994.

145 See US Senate, “Rwanda”, Congressional Record, 1 August 1994, S10174
Collectively, the case study chapters provide important support for the theory developed in the first part of this thesis. But they also provide a number of opportunities for reflection on the ways in which we should conceive of many of the theoretical precepts outlined in that first part. In the final chapter, I will use examples from the case study chapters to draw out some of these findings in a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach advocated in this thesis, and its prospects for further refinement.
Chapter 8

Identity under Audit: From Theory to Practice and Back Again

I. Introduction

The preceding three chapters established promising levels of support for the theory outlined in Chapters 3 and 4. Perhaps more importantly, however, the application of the abstract principles of the theory to three concrete cases also raised a number of important theoretical points that develop our understanding of the principles of the theory as first derived. There is much that we can learn from the application of theory to subject matter, and this chapter will draw out the insights from the empirical portion of this thesis.

The second section will look at the utility of identity as a theoretical concept. One of the great advantages of the scientific realist identity-based model is that it allows us to work free from a priori assumptions about the types of data with which we may be concerned and, consequently, with the types of explanation that are admissible. At the same time, such flexibility also poses dangers for the viability of the concept of identity itself. If identity is capable of subsuming different types of data and producing complex and context-specific explanations, how are we to limit the parameters of identity such that it does not become bloated and of little utility? Similarly, if identity is multidimensional and fluid, can we rely on its validity as a conceptual tool at all? Finally, this section will look deeper into the multidimensionality of identity, and consider how adopting different levels of abstraction may be of more or less utility in our research methods.

In the third section, this chapter will examine the viability of the framework of analysis adopted in this thesis. In many respects, this framework provided a robust vehicle for the analysis, as it allowed us to identify the causal complexes at work in a manner in which a simple ‘identity equals action’ equation could not hope to do. The importance of identifying different levels of discourse—particularly at the purposive and instrumental levels—was a sustained feature of the empirical chapters. At the same time, this elevation of intervening variables raises the question of the relative importance of the components of the analytical structure. In other words, how much value is added by an identity-based approach, rather than a more classical approach that focuses on the nexus between interest
and policy? Similarly, the precise nature of the nexus between identity and subordinate levels of discourse is worthy of further examination. Here, the question of variability again raises its head. Beyond the question of causal pathways and critical junctures, which will be discussed in Section IV, what kind of change can we account for within the parameters of the framework itself? Or, in other words, what is the inter-relationship between the levels of discourse and how do they influence each others’ development?

A final set of insights relate to the concepts of sequentiality and causal pathways. A recurrent feature of the empirical studies was the identification of several phases of decision-making, demarcated by critical junctures. The recurrence of critical junctures raises difficult counterfactual questions about the contingency of causal outcomes. Anathema to positivists, contingency is embraced as a social reality by scientific realists. Nevertheless, if contingent causal analysis is to be theoretically useful, it is important to distinguish between the general and the specific, or between what may hold over a range of cases and what is unique to a particular case. Another important issue to address in this context is the question of what constitutes a critical juncture. The cases analysed evidence a range of different types of critical juncture, rendering a definition of the concept difficult. Finally, I will look at the conception of agency adopted in this research, and reflect on its utility for wider research. The evidence from the case studies provides significant support for the organic conception adopted here, as do speculations on the future direction such research might take.

II. IDENTITY IN CRISIS

A. A Bridge Over Troubled Water: Identity as Via Media

The preceding chapters establish identity as a useful organising concept within which to conduct foreign policy analysis. In each of the analyses, policy outcomes were arrived at that were consistent with—indeed, driven by—dominant interpretations of identity. At the same time, policies that were inconsistent with these identities were rejected or revised. However, beyond these important correlations, the adoption of identity as the independent variable also fulfilled another important theoretical role: it allowed us to evaluate competing explanations for policy within a coherent overall framework. Oftentimes, ontological, epistemological or axiological anxieties (see Chapter 3) have precluded such consideration of alternative explanations, as the explanations themselves, or the factors on
which they are based, are either rejected, discounted, distorted or ignored on a priori meta-theoretical grounds. One of the great strengths of the constructivist/scientific realist approach is that it provides a ‘via media’ such that these alternative explanations are not only admissible but may be embraced. The empirical chapters provide important support for such an approach.

In each of the case study chapters, I identified a number of alternative explanations that had previously been voiced for the policies in the empirical cases. These reflected a range of arguments, including humanitarianism, humanitarian fatigue, the CNN effect, domestic politics, national security, credibility, democratic activism and refugee flows, each of which followed a different logic of appropriateness, and among which there is a clear admixture between ideational and material factors.¹ The empirical chapters, furthermore, provided support for the contentions made by almost all of the arguments. At the same time, however, none appeared to be satisfactory either on their own or in a non-theoretically based combination. Crucially, however, a mode of explanation based upon identity as the key independent variable was able to not only deal with this panoply of factors, but tie them together into a coherent theoretical whole that provided a more robust explanation of the consequent political action. This capacity constitutes a key advantage to the theory developed in this thesis.

The key mechanism by which this was made possible was through the conceptualisation of identity formation as a continuous process of articulation in terms of content and contestation (see Chapter 4). None of the alternative explanations forwarded could explain the policy outcomes in isolation. However, the effect that they could—and often did—have was to prompt reflection on specific elements of discourse and allow for reflections on the integrity of those discourses, their relevance to identity needs and their resonance with other levels of discourse. At times, they also served as a focal point for contestation over the content of identities themselves.

This latter mechanism, meanwhile, highlights the fact that identities are, in many senses, inherently unstable. They represent not monolithic conceptions of a state’s foreign policy role, but structural possibilities within which re-articulation and rejection are equally as important as articulation and affirmation. The range of factors that may prompt such re-evaluations are potentially infinite in the same way that identities themselves are

¹ Or at least material factors commonly understood; see Chapter 3.
potentially infinite. This contingency means that the evolution of identities will be impossible to accurately predict. The best we can do is seek to understand the various manifestations of identity as they evolve, and then seek explanations based on these understandings. Such a recognition is not only borne out by the empirical record, but also represents a key understanding of the scientific realist approach that social systems are ‘open systems’ that are subject to such change.²

B. A House Built on Sand? Continuity and Change in Identity Discourse

This openness, however, raises questions about the viability of identity as a theoretical concept. If identities are variable and subject to (sometimes drastic) change (under the influence of a potentially infinite number of subjects), how much integrity does the concept itself actually retain? This question is given added impetus by the findings of the case study chapters, which showed considerable variation in the content of US identity discourse over an extremely short period of time. The shift from a clearly universalist identity that precipitated a humanitarian intervention in Somalia in late 1992 to a clearly particularist identity that precluded a humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in early 1994 appeared at first to be more like a revolution than an evolution. Though the modalities of this shift are accounted for in the empirical analysis itself, even advocates of an identity-based approach may ask how such variation can be accommodated without tacit admission that the concept of identity is largely hollow.

A superficial response would be to point to the time period upon which the study focuses: in the immediate post-Cold War era, ideas about how to engage with the wider world were clearly in flux, especially in the United States. With the Cold War over, US policy-makers needed to identify new paradigms for American engagement with the world, which were often hesitant, sometimes poorly thought through and regularly contested. This process was at its zenith during the period considered in the case study chapters. It is therefore highly probable that identity formulations during this period may have been far less stable than at other periods in history, such as the apparently more stable Cold War era, a fact that was often ruefully commented upon by American politicians themselves.

While not without merit, such an argument would require further evidence than that provided by this thesis itself, though anecdotal support may be found in the wider

² See Patomaki and Wight, “After Postpositivism”.
literature. What the evidence in this thesis does provide, however, is support for the notion that, though there was significant variation in the dominant identities, the parameters of idiographic debate remained broadly consistent. Though the dominant US identity discourse in 1992 (see Chapter 5) emphasised the internationalist role of the United States, a strong nationalist discourse of identity was also present, though ultimately sidelined. Likewise, though a strong particularist discourse dominated proceedings in early 1994 (see Chapter 6), it was not unopposed by a universalist current of dissent. The continuity of US idiographic concerns was most evident in the Haiti case study, despite the fact that this case also demonstrated the greatest variation. The elements of assertive multilateralism, selective engagement and pragmatic idealism were all largely the same. The contest was over the weight and structure to be granted to the component parts.

If, as suggested in Chapter 4, states or other entities always have multiple identities, these identities are likely to gain prominence or fall from people’s estimation depending on a wide range of factors. What is most notable about the identity formulations in the empirical portion of this thesis is not so much the variation in identity, but the stability of the conceptual building blocks upon which these identities were based. Certain themes, such as the leadership role of the United States, were common to virtually all of the identity representations. Others, such as the humanitarian ethic of responsibility, were ever present but rose and fell and shifted in meaning in different contexts. In a similar vein, the rhetorical language used to convey ideas about identity showed significant stability. Identity representations were regularly couched in terms that related to American history and values, including numerous references to such enduring landmarks as the Declaration of Independence or the Statue of Liberty. Likewise, certain key phrases, such as “the world’s policeman”, “moral authority”, “quagmire”, etc., remained in currency throughout, oftentimes long after the idiographic discourse with which they had first been associated had been supplanted. This evidence points towards a long history of US identity contestation based on broadly similar themes or, in other words, on enduring American values, however contradictory at times those values may be. Though the evidence in this thesis can only speak to the idiographic discourse in this period of US history, works such as Walter Russell Mead’s *Special Providence* lend outward support to such an analysis.3

---

This identification of the continuity and change in identity representations lends credence to many of the arguments forwarded in Chapter 3 on the scientific realist approach to structure, agency and causation. The criticism leveled against epiphenomenalist approaches that derive conceptions of agency from *a priori* understandings of the nature of structure (or vice versa) suggested that this can often lead to an uncritical and often static conception of both. Thus, most notably, neorealist and neoliberal conceptions of agency, it was argued, posit a Hobbesian conception of the nature of agency, which, given that the structural features upon which the analysis is based are constants, is viewed as an immutable fact of political life. The identification in the empirical cases of clear and sometimes even major variation in state identity problematises this assumption. Even if neorealists are right much of the time that states pursue a Hobbesian agenda—and they may well be—the incidence in this thesis of alternative agendas that cannot be fitted into such a framework suggests that there is much of interest that will remain beyond the grasp of such a static theory.

At the other end of the spectrum from epiphenomenalist approaches to the agency–structure debate, Chapter 3 engaged with post-structuralist notions of structuration. This approach argues that agency and structure are so tightly mutually constitutive that they in fact constitute an indivisible whole. The identification of significant continuities in identity formation problematises this assumption too. If identity is always a *de novo* articulation, which bears no intrinsic connection to prior formulations, then one would expect to see little in the way of structural constraints upon radical deviations from prior identity formulations. The case study chapters show that nothing could be further from the truth. The development of US identity between 1992 and 1994 did indeed undergo significant deviation, but these deviations were evolutions rather than revolutions, and were based upon pre-existing articulations of US identity. Moreover, significant resistance was apparent to identities that sought to break too radically with the past, and consistent modes of articulation showed that the formulation of US identity was seen as a continuous process—contested, no doubt, but along consistent lines—stretching back as far and further than the Declaration of Independence. This identification of a continuous tradition in identity formation, and an enduring structural reservoir of ideas about identity, also affirms the argument made in Chapter 3 on the possibility of identity-based causal analysis. Given that we are able to identify identity articulations that are both prior to and functionally independent from foreign policy action, the conditions of causality are not
violated. Foreign policy actions may represent a significant mode of identity articulation, but those identities exist prior to and independent from the actions themselves.

C. The Fox or the Hedgehog? The Dimensions of Identity

These are useful insights, but they also raise methodological questions about the modes by which identity-based analysis should be pursued. If we are to embrace both continuity and change, how best can we capture both within a coherent theoretical framework? Or, in other words, how far towards the abstract should we be prepared to move in order to capture continuities, and how far towards the concrete in order to capture change?

This thesis began with the proposition that we could analyse foreign policy roles along two dimensions: universalism and particularism. This approach represented a move to a high level of abstraction. Though the analysis did indeed follow these lines, the case studies nevertheless threw up much more concrete conceptions of identity, such as the ‘new world order’, ‘assertive multilateralism’, etc. Between these highly abstract and highly concrete positions, there is a world of possibility in terms of the level of abstraction that might have been adopted. Alexander Wendt, for example, suggests that we might analyse identity along three lines—Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian.\(^4\) Walter Russell Mead, in contrast, argues for the analysis of US foreign policy along four dimensions: Hamiltonianism, Wilsonianism, Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism.\(^5\) Both may provide useful alternatives to the approach adopted here.

In attempting to resolve this dilemma of the abstract versus the concrete, however, I suggest we should be guided by the scientific realist injunction to allow the research question to dictate the research methods. Greater abstraction may be more useful for certain types of work than others. Wendt’s typology may be particularly useful for addressing questions of identity and system change over a long historical period and encompassing a diverse group of states and issue areas. Mead’s typology may provide a more useful basis for analysing US foreign policy than a more abstract conception, but may prove less applicable to other cultures or systems. And a highly concrete conception of identity may be most useful in seeking to explain specific foreign policy actions with a level of sophistication that the abstract cannot provide.

\(^4\) Wendt, *Social Theory.*
\(^5\) Mead, *Special Providence.*
The empirical application of identity theory in this case study adopted a balance between the abstract and the concrete. The question asked at the beginning of the thesis was not how may we explain foreign policy in general or, indeed, how may we explain US foreign policy in particular, but how may we explain humanitarian intervention as a foreign policy practice? Though US foreign policy was chosen as a suitable site to commence this examination, the United States has not been the only nation or entity to engage in humanitarian intervention, and it was therefore desirable to adopt a programme capable of moving beyond the study of US policy (see below). Likewise, though there is much that is applicable to foreign policy and international relations theory more generally in this thesis, it was also desirable to tailor the approach as much as possible to the subject matter.

The universalism–particularism differential provided a useful dimension along which to view approaches to humanitarian intervention, which was justified by a review of the existing literature. This pre-sentiment was borne out by the application of the theory to the case studies. The theory predicted that policies of humanitarian intervention are more likely to be undertaken on the basis of universalist than particularist identities. This proposition seemed all but proved on the basis of the Somalia and Rwanda case studies. The Haiti case study provided a more difficult test, however. In this case, the identity that was articulated showed elements of both universalism and particularism. Though universalism in the end appeared the stronger element of the two, the enduring particularist undercurrent was impossible to ignore. This finding strongly suggests the importance of viewing such principles as lying on a continuum rather than as a dichotomy. It has been argued throughout that entities may have multiple identities, that these identities may be more or less salient in different issue areas, and that they may be more or less prominent or popular at different times or in different circumstances. It is no great stretch, therefore, to suggest that more or less extreme versions of certain identities may be articulated, as well as identities that draw upon more than one tradition.

Thus, though abstract principles may be of great use in making general statements about certain classes of action, they may be too unwieldy to explain specific events. If identities may be articulated in different forms, they will inevitably deviate from any preconceived notions of ideal form. But this is hardly a shortcoming. The ability to trace the contours of specific discourses of identity allows us to derive a more specific set of policy prescriptions than would ever be possible if we were to restrict ourselves to ideal forms.
This proposition comes out very clearly from the case study analysis. The delineation of specific idiographic doctrines allowed us to more carefully examine the logics of appropriateness in each case, and, thus, the possibilities for action or inaction.

III. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

A. A Moveable Feast? The Context of Meaning

These reflections bring us to a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the framework of analysis adopted in the research. As noted above, it was possible to identify significant variation in the identities that developed during the period under consideration. In contrast, however, many of the interests that were articulated over the same period were relatively constant. This analysis raises the question whether, despite the argument made above that continuity and change represents a strength rather than a weakness of the approach, if interests may remain relatively stable while identity varies, would a concentration on interests rather than identity then provide equally powerful and more parsimonious leverage on the questions at hand?

Many mainstream scholars would answer in the affirmative. Lord Palmerston’s famous remark that “Britain does not have permanent allies, only permanent interests” has long informed much realist thought on international relations theory. However, as noted in Chapter 3, not all realists are so sanguine about the immutability of interests, and they are right to be so. I argued in Chapter 3 that there is much variation in interests as a result of variation in the ideational factors that in fact constitute many so-called ‘material’ interests. Indeed, even interests that remain constant in a superficial sense may vary significantly in the meaning they have for actors as the ideational context within which they are interpreted itself varies.

This point comes out very clearly indeed from the empirical analysis. The dominant interest that ran through all of the case studies was an interest in human rights. Such dominance, of course, is hardly surprising given the subject matter, and merits no conclusions as to where human rights considerations rank in the panoply of a state’s interests. What is more interesting is the different meanings that the interest in human rights had in different idiographical contexts. In the US approach to Somalia, the human rights concern was vested in the context of a universalist commitment to engagement in the world. As a consequence, human rights concerns were couched in empathetical language,
with the obvious corollary that the United States had an interest in preventing or limiting the continuation of such suffering. In the US approach to Rwanda, however, though human rights concerns were equally prominent, they were articulated in the context of a much more conservative, particularist identity, featuring considerable scepticism about the ability of outside nations to influence human rights situations within other countries. As such, the human rights issues became recast as ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’—tragic, to be sure, but nevertheless an unfortunate feature of the ugly new world order that was not amenable to simple solutions. In Haiti, the context sensitivity of interests is even more apparent. In early 1993, the United States identified an interest in human rights that dictated a (conservative) long-term policy to alleviate suffering. By late 1993, however, the position was more like the dictum ‘first, do no harm’. Human rights remained an interest for the United States, but it was best secured through a hands-off policy. By late 1994, however, as idealism returned to the ascendancy, Americans could no longer tolerate the death by a thousand cuts taking place so near to their shores, and a new policy became not only possible, but necessary. Situating interests in the ideational context of identity discourse allowed the analysis to discern these shifts and confirms the importance of identity as the key independent variable in the analysis.

B. A Four Part Harmony: The Resonance of Discourse

Of course, policy-makers themselves don’t explicitly talk or think in terms of identities and levels of discourse. How do we then explain the process by which certain discursive claims are evaluated against identity needs, and thus validated or rejected? In Chapter 4, I raised the importance of resonance between levels of discourse, and this seems a viable approach. If a lower level of discourse has a positive synergy with the dominant identity discourse, its precepts resonate with the identity discourse and it is more likely to survive. In short, such discourses ‘feel right’. In contrast, discourses that have negative synergies with the identity discourse will ‘feel wrong’ and will likely be subjected to re-examination, revision and even rejection. In a similar vein, some discourses may not even begin to be articulated if they do not cohere with an overriding identity discourse, as the type of thinking they embody is simply too far ‘out of the box’.

This is not to say that discourses that establish such resonance are the most effective approach to a given problem, but rather that they have a high level of coherence with prevailing ideas about how the state should behave in the world. Identities, no more or less
than interests or policies themselves, may or may not provide the most appropriate means for dealing with a given issue. But they do structure the ways in which we think about problems, rendering certain discourses more or less likely to gain traction.

This represents a serious deviation from the rational choice model of decision-making. Under rationalism, agents are supposed to identify ends first and then adopt the most effective possible means to achieve them. The notion of resonance problematises this assumption. Effective means of approaching a situation may be rejected out of hand if they do not cohere with a given identity discourse. Thus, for example, critics were quick to point out that the humanitarian relief operation undertaken to alleviate the suffering of Rwanda refugees in the aftermath of the crisis there was far more costly and far less effective than an immediate intervention at the outset of the crisis—or even before—would ever have been. However, in the idiographic context of early 1994, such a response was unthinkable and never appears to have been seriously considered (see Chapter 6).

IV. CAUSAL PATHWAYS

A. The Butterfly Effect: the Role of Critical Junctures

The introduction of the notion of path analysis was a key theoretical move in the context of this thesis. Representing the idea that policy outcomes are rarely the product of single decisions, but rather of chains of decisions, and that certain events may cause deviance in these chains, path analysis proved to play a key role in the explanations of the cases that were examined. The advantages of this approach, however, are balanced by the difficulties of applying it. Introducing the notions of path analysis and critical junctures also implies the introduction of counterfactuals into the analysis. We are forced, therefore, to ask whether, had a certain event or occurrence not taken place, would the policy outcome still have been the same? This is an uncomfortable question for most causal theorists. Richard Ned Lebow describes counterfactuals as ‘forbidden fruit’, as they introduce notions of

---

6 See, for example, Atwood, “Suddenly, Chaos”; US Senate, “Preventing Future Rwandas”. It should also be noted in this context, however, that governments have never been particularly far-sighted in terms of their approach to conflict prevention, which, though many scholars agree is a far more cost-effective method of crisis management, nevertheless is often eschewed in the hopes that conflicts will right themselves on their own and never develop beyond the ‘early warning signs’. See Ward, “NGOs Acting as IGOs: Alternative Mechanisms for Direct Conflict Management”, in Weller and Wolff (eds.), Institutions for the Management of Ethnopolitical Conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2008), 219-244; Lund, “The Impact of Conflict Prevention Policy: Cases, Measures, Assessments”, Conflict Prevention Network Yearbook (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000); Carment and Schnabel, Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? (United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003).
contingency to causal analysis, anathema to most positivists, as well as threatening more holistic approaches to the study of international relations, in which the identification of regularities are the order of the day.\footnote{See Lebow, \textit{Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations} (Princeton University Press, Princeton, forthcoming 2010).}

In regard to the first of these problems, though positivists may reject contingency as an unacceptable infringement on the Humean conception of causality as constant conjunctions of events, scientific realists do not share this anxiety. As I discussed in Chapter 3, scientific realists take a different view of causality, which emphasises the importance of causal complexes and embraces contingency as an incontrovertible fact of social life. Nevertheless, though contingency is hardly forbidden fruit, the threat to holistic theory remains. Due to the acceptance of contingency, scientific realism is antipathetic to notions of ‘grand’ theory. It is simply not theoretically possible to reduce the complexity of social life to a simple set of propositions that brook no deviation, as the range of factors that may intervene on those propositions are potentially infinite. So, too, therefore, are the possible outcomes. At the same time, however, scientific realists do not reject out of hand the possibility of regularities. Without the presence of at least some regularity, indeed, it would be hard to conceive of the notion of a science at all. We would be left only with understanding; explanation would be precluded. This position, of course, reflects the extreme post-structuralist standpoint, which I have discussed in Chapter 3, and shares its difficulties.

We are left, therefore, with the need to establish theory in a context where outcomes lie somewhere between being law-like regularities and being absolutely unique. In a certain sense, of course, every outcome is indeed unique. At the same time, however, certain classes of action may contain more or less regular features, which we may identify as general trends. The stability or instability of such trends is an empirical question, and will vary depending on the subject matter. As such, scientific realist causal analysis can never be predictive. We can never say with certainty that ‘if $x$, then $y$’, because a whole host of (contingent) intervening variables remain to be accounted for.

In this thesis, I posited at the outset that the presence of a universalist identity increased the likelihood of policies of humanitarian intervention being adopted. This contention was borne out by the case studies and represents an identifiable regularity. At the same time,
however, critical junctures played a key role in each of the cases, and it is very easy to imagine situations in which, had these critical junctures not emerged, or had other critical junctures intervened, the outcomes might have been different. We are therefore unable to say that the presence of a universalist identity necessarily determine a policy of humanitarian intervention or, indeed, that its absence necessarily precludes such a policy. In this sense, we may conceive of causality as being driven by insufficient but non-redundant parts of an unnecessary but sufficient (INUS) condition, a notion that has been embraced within the scientific realist literature.  

B. The Angle of Repose: the Nature of Critical Junctures

If we accept the importance of critical junctures for causal analysis, with all the difficulties that entails for predictive theory, we must then establish what exactly we mean by a critical juncture. A common phraseology, which I have adopted at times, is to refer to critical junctures in terms of ‘shocks’. The language of ‘shocks’ suggests some kind of violent interruption of the causal pathway. Sometimes, this is the case—obvious examples are provided by the events of October 1993 in Somalia and Haiti, or by the assassination of Rwandan President Habyarimana. These dramatic and unanticipated events clearly came as a ‘shock’ to the prevailing approaches to policy at the time, and precipitated a significant change in the established causal path.

But not all critical junctures manifest as ‘shocks’ in this sense. In the Somalia case study, for example, I identified a critical juncture in early July 1992. However, this critical juncture was not a dramatic or shocking event; indeed, it was not even a single event. Rather, it was a series of more minor events, which combined to significantly influence the causal pathway (see Chapter 5). Such concatenations of events may perhaps more usefully be described as ‘tipping points’ than ‘shocks’, but their effects may be equally dramatic. That both ‘shocks’ and ‘tipping points’ may have important effects on causal pathways is abundantly clear from the case studies, in which important shifts are precipitated by both.

---

8 This observation draws on the work of John Mackie, who introduced the notion of INUS conditions to account for problems in the Humean conception of causal regularities. See Mackie, “Causes and Conditions”, 2(4) American Philosophical Quarterly (1965), 1-20. The conception of INUS conditions has been embraced, though not always uncritically, within the scientific realist school of thought. See, in particular, Kurki, Causation in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008); Patomaki, After International Relations; Collier, Critical Realism.

9 For an analysis that adopts the notion of tipping points in this sense, see Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics”.

218
The identification of at least two classes of interposition does, however, pose problems of identification in that some critical junctures may be obvious, others may be innocuous, and sometimes the former may transpire to have weaker effects than the latter. As such, how can we know a critical juncture when we see one?

From a materialist perspective, one would expect to treat critical junctures in terms of the juncture itself. For example, John Ikenberry, speaking of moments of systemic change, argues that “historical junctures … come at dramatic moments of upheaval … when the old order has been destroyed by war and newly powerful states try to re-establish basic organizing principles”. Underlying Ikenberry’s argument is the notion that the “dramatic moments of upheaval” “telegraph material incentives” to the “newly powerful states”, who then “try to re-establish basic organizing principles”. In other words, the key step is to identify the “historical junctures” themselves. Once this task is achieved, the logic of anarchy does the rest of the work. However, this approach still leaves us with the problem of identifying the juncture itself, a task that may not always be easy.

More importantly, however, a materialist approach fails to capture what is critically important: the meanings such events have for actors themselves. The Mogadishu incident of October 1993 provides a useful illustration in this context. Following this episode, the United States drew back from engagement with the world, as US policy-makers decided that the deaths of 18 US soldiers was too high a price to pay for stability in Somalia. This reaction appears fairly axiomatic. Yet it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which America reacted differently, viewing the deaths of its soldiers as a slight to its military prowess and sending reinforcements to engage in an intensified intervention against the perpetrators. Indeed, such an outcome was far more plausible than many conventional accounts might suggest. When four US soldiers died in Mogadishu in August 1993, the reactions of many (though certainly not all) US policy-makers, including Clinton, was to argue for intensified reprisals, and significant reinforcements were dispatched.

---


It was crucially the interpretation of the agents themselves that gave the critical juncture of October 1993 its meaning, and these interpretations cannot be ignored if we are to fully comprehend the import of such critical junctures. As such, though there will inevitably be difficulties in identifying critical junctures, we may perhaps best proceed by focusing first on the understandings of actors themselves within a structural context. The first sign of critical junctures may indeed be their effects themselves: divergences from dominant discourses or resistance to established modes of thinking. From there we can more effectively identify the interpretations of events upon which such deviations are based, including junctures that are less immediately obvious.

The morphogenetic approach to social analysis provides us with a useful set of tools in this regard. By adopting the morphogenetic approach, we are able to first identify the structural factors that condition agents to act in particular ways, through logics of appropriateness. We are then able to identify the ways in which agents interpret critical junctures on the basis of these structurally derived conditioning effects, before examining the consequences such interpretations have for the re-elaboration of structure in the final phase. This approach appears to constitute a crucially important mode of analysis, not just in respect of critical junctures, but in terms of approaches to continuity and change, and the formation of policies in international politics more generally.

C. The Devil is in the Details: the Constitution of Agency

A final point that should be considered in this context is the nature of agency itself. As discussed in Chapter 4, there is a long tradition in international relations research that treats the state ‘as if’ it is a unitary rational actor. However, though the state remained the primary unit of analysis in this thesis, it was not considered to be a unitary rational actor, but was treated in a more organic sense. An analysis based on identity suggests a role for wider interest groups than simply those in power at any given time. Though this latter group is in a powerful position to influence the development of identity, identity is a function of collective perceptions of self among all members of the political community, and robust analysis necessitates a focus on more than just executive deliberation. At the same time, some groups will be more influential than others in driving idiographic debate,

12 Though other options would be entirely possible and perhaps even desirable (see below).
and parsimony suggests a strong analysis should focus on the critical elements of idiographic debate without losing too much focus to extraneous data.

In this context, the research looked primarily at three sources of idiographic discourse: the executive, the legislature and the media. This decision was strongly borne out by the findings of the case studies. At various points, we were able to identify strong influences from each of these groups. In Somalia, the tone for idiographic debate was set by the executive, but it was Congress that most forcefully tied this debate into consideration of Somalia in particular, and the news media that prompted reflection on the integrity of this identity as it was being put into practice. Similar patterns emerged from the other case studies. In Rwanda, the executive, Congress and the media appeared in lockstep at first, but as the debate developed, both Congress and the media began to increasingly resist the executive discourse. Ultimately, this was not enough to change policy, but it did begin a process of re-articulation, which significantly influenced the idiographic terrain in late 1994, in which the Haiti intervention took place. In the Haiti case study itself, there was evidence of an unstable idiography, which was buffeted one way and the other by Congressional and media discourse through 1993 and early 1994, but by late 1994, the executive had once again moved out in front in terms of its articulation of US identity.

These findings provide strong support for the notion of a broad base for understanding the sources of identity. Indeed, depending on the circumstances, one might want to widen the base even further. Though attention was paid to the role of human rights organisations and advocacy groups, it was generally assumed that these groups used the news media as a vehicle for the dissemination of their views. An analysis that looks at contemporary peacekeeping policy, for example, might wish to revise this assumption. The advent of social networking groups has in many ways changed the ways in which people think about exchanging information. A small but relevant part of this amazing outgrowth is the incidence of online advocacy groups, some new, some old using new techniques. Groups such as Amnesty International, the Genocide Intervention Network, Avaaz and many more now run online campaigns in which interested parties can donate, sign petitions and take myriad other actions in support of one or other policies or ideas about appropriate state behaviour. This sector may provide just one interesting site for further research.

At the same time, however, the importance of popular and oppositional voices in driving the dynamics of the policy debate also suggests that there may be some value in a study
that compares cases in which such voices were present and those in which they were less prominent. One of the key mechanisms through which identity served to constrain and enable policy options was through the influence of different groups in disputing the resonance of policies or other levels of discourse with the dominant identity discourse, or forcing reevaluations of identity or other levels of discourse. This mechanism raises the audience costs upon governments to be seen to be engaging in action that resonates with overarching identity discourses, or face the costs of a failure to do so. Nevertheless, it is still possible to imagine situations in which policy deliberation is conducted largely in secret, excluding such public debate, and an identity-based theory in which this mechanism appears to play such a prominent role must therefore be open to the possibility of examining this further. At the same time, a model that adopts an organic conception of agency is a prerequisite for such efforts.

Finally, a secondary advantage obtains in the adoption of an organic conception of identity formation: flexibility. Though US foreign policy was chosen as an appropriate site to begin this research, it far from exhausts the possibilities. An analysis of British, French or Nigerian foreign policy, for example, might require a different approach, but an organic conception is flexible enough to adapt to such circumstances. More importantly, perhaps, it would also be possible to use this framework in analyses that do not focus on the state as the primary unit of analysis. The new-found activism of the reincarnated African Union, or of the EU under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), represent some of the most interesting recent developments in the context of this field of study. As discussed below, many of the most recent examples of muscular peacekeeping have been undertaken under the aegis of these two organisations. If the unitary rational actor model is problematic in the context of states, it is even more so in the context of international organisations. An organic approach, however, would have much to offer in respect of approaching the political orientations of these actors.

V. CONCLUSION

This analysis brings us full circle to the question raised in the very first paragraph of this thesis. Is there any reason to think that, as many have argued, the sun has set on humanitarian intervention? Unfortunately, nothing in this thesis can answer that question definitively; indeed, it has been consistently argued that predictive theory is an impossible
ideal. Nevertheless, certain reflections are merited by the findings of this research, which may go some way to addressing this question.

The continuity of certain features of idiographic thinking, even in the face of significant challenges, as discussed above, was a notable finding of the research. If we also accept the proposition that these features have been features of idiographic debate from long before the period examined here, there is therefore much to suggest that such features will endure beyond the present period. To be sure, September 11 represented a dramatic turning point, and it is hardly surprising that this should have prompted a turn towards particularism in foreign policy, especially in the United States. At the same time, the persistence of universalist justifications for the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq only reaffirms the enduring power of these ideas. Nevertheless, the war in Iraq, especially, has become most associated with particularism, and the undeniable failures of the consequent policies have doubtless engendered reflection upon the viability of the extreme form in which this policy programme was articulated. The election of Barack Obama under a banner of ‘change’ may be only the most obvious manifestation of such reflection.

At the same time as particularism appears to be falling into disrepute, however, the standing of universalism within the wider international society may also have suffered. Whereas during the post-Cold War period there seemed to be some grounds for optimism that levels of solidarity within international society were on the rise, in recent years international society has appeared increasingly fractured. This may have a significant effect on the prospects for humanitarian intervention. In Chapter 2, I asked whether, under the definition given, we could then distinguish the post-Cold War era of humanitarian intervention from earlier (or, indeed, later) periods of intervention that also featured humanitarian or altruistic justifications. The findings of the foregoing analysis may go some way towards answering that question.

The post-Cold War era of intervention was largely marked by the absence of any kind of identifiable grand strategy on the part of the major powers. During the nineteenth century ‘age of empire’, while there was certainly an intention to civilise and Christianise the colonies, at least in some cases, this was always secondary to the mercantilist demands of empire and the aggrandisement of the imperial metropole. Equally, while American and Soviet interventionism during the Cold War may have contained at least some elements of

---

13 See Rieff, *At the Point of a Gun*, for discussion.
an altruistic desire to promote democracy and ‘freedom’ or socialism and ‘emancipation’, this again was always secondary to the grand strategy of maintaining and defending spheres of influence. No such identifiable overall strategy appears to have marked the interventionism of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, while it is a simple matter in hindsight to ascribe self-interested motives to some such interventions, when one actually reflects upon the content of such motives they hardly appear to be the kinds of cassus belli upon which war is normally predicated. To borrow Lawrence Freedman’s phrase, they were ‘wars of discretion’, the prosecution of which were never a foregone conclusion.¹⁴

To an important extent, this appears to have changed since September 11. Whether and to what extent the new discourses of the ‘war on terror’ or the ‘clash of civilisations’ can provide the kind of enduring paradigms that marked the age of empire or the Cold War is certainly open to debate. Nevertheless, one can say with some certainty that such ideas have certainly coloured political thought in recent times. This may have significant effects. Whereas the lack of an overall grand strategy and the seemingly high levels of solidarism and respect for universalist norms of international life may have reduced resistance to intervention within the international community during the post-Cold War period, in an increasingly politicized international society such resistance may well resurface. The apparent disregard for the constitutive norms of international society in the rhetoric of the United States in the early stages of the war on terror may have weakened the fabric of this society,¹⁵ and the norm of humanitarian intervention, hardly firmly established, can only have suffered as a consequence. For example, though ultimately affirmed, the recent UN General Assembly debate in New York surrounding the idea of the ‘responsibility to protect’ highlights the continued concern of many third world nations for national sovereignty and the potential for abuse inherent in a norm of humanitarian intervention.¹⁶

In this context, the threshold for legitimation of humanitarian intervention may have been significantly raised, as faith in the universalist principles behind such action has been eroded. It would be hard indeed to conceive of US intervention, even if purely altruistic, being well received in many Muslim nations in the current political climate.

---


¹⁵ For a similar argument, see Dunne, “Society and Hierarchy in International Relations”, 17(3) International Relations (2003), 303-320.

In the meantime, however, notions of how to prosecute humanitarian intervention seem to have changed. In the case studies examined, we could see significant variation over the course of only two years in terms of beliefs in the appropriateness and effectiveness of types of intervention. This process was taking place before the period under consideration and continues today. Perhaps one of the reasons that humanitarian intervention appeared to be such a significant feature of the post-Cold War era was related to a growing belief in its efficacy. Such beliefs received serious dents over the course of the decade, notably in Somalia, but also elsewhere. As such, beliefs in the efficacy of different forms of intervention may well, and certainly appear to, have evolved. From notions of muscular peacekeeping in the late 1990s to notions of hybrid missions in the 2000s, policy doctrines, like the identities that spur them, are in a constant state of evolution. In this context, the great power interventionism that seemed to mark the humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War period seems at present to have given way to a more multilateral approach.

Thus, we can identify at this very time certain operations that, though they may not feel as much like their predecessors in the 1990s, certainly share key features. Missions such as MONUC in the Congo or UNAMID in Darfur have mandates and practices that arguably meet the definition of humanitarian intervention outlined in Chapter 2. At the same time, they also are different from the interventions examined in this thesis. And this difference may well be a good thing. The humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era were hardly universally successful and it is to be hoped that we may have learned some lessons from their shortcomings. Moreover, there may be more lessons yet to learn from the current crop of missions, as well as, indeed, the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which, once past the initial war-fighting periods, have required the uptake of tasks of striking similarity to those required by peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. If humanitarian intervention has evolved, there are reasons for it. It remains to be seen how this evolution will develop, what lessons will be learned and how they will be applied. But the concerns that drive such actions seem likely to remain.
### Appendix 1: Somalia Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 December 1990</td>
<td>US Embassy personnel are evacuated by US Marines from Mogadishu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 November 1991</td>
<td>The UN withdraws from Somalia in the face of fierce fighting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 January 1992</td>
<td>Senators Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) and Paul Simon (D-IL) author a NYT op-ed calling for political intervention (appointment of UN envoy, negotiation of cease-fire and arms embargo) in Somalia, but falling short of recommending peacekeeping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6 January 1992</td>
<td>Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs James Jonah makes a weekend fact-finding visit to Mogadishu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 January 1992</td>
<td>The UNSC passes Resolution 733, imposing an arms embargo on Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 February 1992</td>
<td>Representatives of Ali Mahdi and Aideed sign a cease-fire under UN auspices in New York. A more comprehensive agreement is to be negotiated in Mogadishu during Jonah’s visit at the end of February.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 February 1992</td>
<td>Shelling breaks out again in Mogadishu between factions loyal to Mahdi and Aideed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 February 1992</td>
<td>Jonah’s mission begins talks in Mogadishu. A cease-fire is signed on 3 March 1992, but clashes continue. Jonah leaves Somalia criticising the parties for their lack of commitment to peace and suggesting the UN might not continue to exert such efforts in the face of such intransigence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 March 1992</td>
<td>The NYT publishes excerpts from a leaked Pentagon policy guidance document that calls upon the United States to maintain its sole superpower status and to prevent the emergence of any rivals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 March 1992</td>
<td>The Report of the UNSG suggests the dispatch of a technical team to assess possible mechanisms to “ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 March 1992</td>
<td>Resolution 746 calls for the dispatch of the technical team suggested in the UNSG’s Report of 11 March. Implicit reference is made to the possibility of a peacekeeping force. Important changes from the draft resolution to the final draft include omission of text making such reference explicit, allegedly at the behest of the US negotiators. In debate on the UNSC floor, African delegates explicitly call for peacekeeping forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April 1992</td>
<td>The Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act is passed in the Senate, calling for humanitarian relief to be provided to the war-torn countries of the region, and calling upon the President to make such political initiatives towards peace as is deemed appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 April 1992</td>
<td>House Resolution 422 on the Crisis in Somalia is introduced, calling attention to the human tragedy, and calling for humanitarian relief efforts to improve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 April 1992</td>
<td>President Bush’s speech to the Society of News Editors emphasises support for democracy in the former Soviet bloc as the preeminent policy goal for the post-Cold War world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 April 1992</td>
<td>The UNSG releases a new Report on Somalia, calling for the deployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of 50 unarmed MILOBs and 500 armed “security personnel” to Mogadishu to observe the cease-fire and protect UN personnel, equipment and supplies, respectively. Any extension of the mission to areas outside Mogadishu would require revised personnel figures.

24 April 1992
Resolution 751, adopted unanimously by the UNSC, authorises the establishment of a UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), including the deployment of 50 unarmed MILOBs and, in principle, a security force, pending the final recommendations of the UNSG. Lack of definitive agreement on the deployment of a security force allegedly stemmed from concerns over the cost of such a force, in particular from US representatives.

28 April 1992
UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali appoints Mohamed Sahnoun as his Special Envoy to Somalia.

9 May 1992
US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering writes a letter to the editor of the NYT criticising the paper’s coverage of Somalia for suggesting that the United States was obstructing deployment of the 500-man security force or quibbling over costs and iterates the administration’s support for the Somalia mission, in particular, and UN peacekeeping in general.

19 May 1992
Senate Resolution 258 is issued, calling for a cease-fire in Somalia, as well as as mediation and relief efforts.

19 May 1992
Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton places an op-ed in the WP criticising the paper’s coverage of Somalia for suggesting that the United States was obstructing deployment of the 500-man security force or quibbling over costs and iterates the administration’s support for the Somalia mission, in particular, and UN peacekeeping in general.

6 June 1992
11 Somali factions agree to a truce to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid following a week long conference in Addis Ababa.

9 June 1992
In the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearings on Senate Resolution 2560, which proposes a shift in responsibility for funding UN peacekeeping from the Department of State to Defense, Cyrus Vance makes a strong statement in support of the bill, as well as in support of US participation in UN peacekeeping as a core component of national policy and interests.

15 June 1992
NSR 30 calls for an encompassing review of US policy towards Africa.

17 June 1992
UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali releases “An Agenda for Peace”, a far-reaching policy document that highlights his vision for UN peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and preventative diplomacy in the post-Cold War era.

22 June 1992
UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali writes to the President of the UNSC to inform him that Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco and Zimbabwe have all offered personnel to participate in the UN observer mission in Somalia. Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen (Pakistan) is appointed as Chief Military Observer (CMO) of UNOSOM.

24 June 1992
A host of Somali refugees abandon the Somalia-registered ship Gob Wein lying off the coast of Aden, Yemen, in an attempt to reach the shore. Around 150 die at sea and a further 30 on the beach.

25 July 1992
An Antonov aircraft formerly chartered by the WFP and still bearing UN
markings arrives at Mogadishu airport bearing Somali currency and arms destined for the faction controlled by Ali Mahdi Mohammed. General Aideed accuses the UN of bias and suspends his consent for the deployment of UN personnel.

29 June-1 July 1992 The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in Dakar, Senegal, agrees “in principle” on the need for an African peacekeeping capacity and forms a committee to look into modalities. One theme informing the discussions is the lack of Western interest in Africa.

30 June 1992 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney hints in a meeting with the press that the United States is considering sending combat troops to Yugoslavia.

1 July 1992 Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) speaks out in Congress against any US intervention in Bosnia, citing, primarily, the risk to American servicemen and women. Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) responds in support of a potential US deployment to Bosnia, and suggests a similar course might also be appropriate for Somalia.

1 July 1992 The Carnegie Endowment's National Commission on America publishes its final report, entitled Changing Our Ways: America and the New World, which criticises the lack of leadership currently being shown by American foreign policy, and also argues that military intervention may be necessary to deal with civil wars in which the destruction or displacement of large groups of people is taking place.

5 July 1992 Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen and three other members of the UN observer mission arrive in Mogadishu.

10 July 1992 US Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone files a cable back to Washington entitled “A Day in Hell” describing his visit to refugee camps for Somalis in the north of Kenya. Bush is known to have read the cable and to have written in its margins “this is a terribly moving situation. Let’s do everything we can to help.”

16 July 1992 Following assurances from Ali Mahdi that the currency delivered on the Antonov aircraft would not be circulated, Aideed reinstates his consent to the deployment of the UN observer force.

17 July 1992 In the absence of UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UNSC accepts a cease-fire in Yugoslavia negotiated by Britain's Lord Carrington, which would require the UN to deploy troops to locate and collect heavy weaponry in the conflict zones.

19 July 1992 The NYT carries a front page article detailing the extent of the starvation and human suffering in Somalia. Upon reading it, Bush is said to have requested a briefing from the State Department on the situation, upon which he noted that “he was very upset by these reports and he wanted something done, both in Somalia and northern Kenya”.

19-20 July 1992 Senator Nancy Kassebaum (D-KS) visits Somalia to gather information for a House Select Committee on Hunger hearing but is unable to visit Mogadishu due to security concerns. Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) applauds Kassebaum for her attention to Somalia and calls upon the Bush administration to respond to the situation more proactively.

21 July 1992 Omar Arteh Ghalib, Interim Prime Minister in the Ali Mahdi Mohammed administration, calls for the deployment of 10,000 UN peacekeeping troops.
22 July 1992 At the House Select Committee on Hunger hearings entitled “Somalia: the Case for Action”, Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), recently returned from Somalia, says she “strongly supports” deployment of a UN security force and opines that “the situation has reached the point where the UN should go forward with the security force with or without Gen. Aideed or Ali Mahdi’s consent”. Representative Bill Emerson (R-OH) calls upon the United States to pressure Arab nations to do more, and Representative Tony Hall (D-OH) calls upon the Bush administration to take the lead on Somalia.

22 July 1992 In his report on the situation in Somalia, UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali asserts that the UN must be concerned with the security and humanitarian situation throughout Somalia, not just in Mogadishu, and announces his intent to dispatch a technical team to investigate needs and modalities in the interior.

23 July 1992 Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) compares Somalia to Yugoslavia and asks why more isn’t being done in the former.

23 July 1992 The remainder of the UN observer mission arrives in Mogadishu.

24 July 1992 The NYT reports on a conflict between UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the UNSC, stemming from the former not being consulted about the Carrington accord for Yugoslavia, especially given that this would require UN resources, which he estimates at 1,110 extra troops. Boutros-Ghali categorises the Bosnia operation as “ill-conceived” and notes that it is perceived in Africa as a “war of the rich”, while Somalia suffers unnoticed.

26 July 1992 Director of USAID Andrew Natsios places an op-ed in the WP describing a previous op-ed in that paper as “scurrilous” for suggesting that the Bush administration’s policy towards Somalia was “racist” and that little was being done. Natsios highlights the ongoing provision of US-funded humanitarian aid, but admits that more can be done.

27 July 1992 White House Press Secretary Marlon Fitzwater iterates the administration’s support for UN efforts in Somalia and its commitment to ensure adequate funding for such efforts.

27 July 1992 Resolution 767 approves the UNSG’s proposal to send a technical team to assess needs outside Mogadishu and instructs the UNSG to mount an urgent airlift.

28 July 1992 Representative John Porter (R-IL) calls the situation in Somalia “a dire emergency in need of addressing” and urges the president and the UN to address Somalia’s needs, beginning with the need for security.

31 July 1992 Senate Concurrent Resolution 132 relating to the Civil Conflict in Somalia calls upon the president to work with the UNSC to ensure the deployment of the UN security force as quickly as possible. The resolution is offered by 31 Senators.

31 July 1992 A special task force on Somalia is formed within the State Department under the leadership of Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.

2 August 1992 Senate Concurrent Resolution 132 is agreed to.

4 August 1992 House Concurrent Resolution 352 is introduced, mirroring Senate Resolution 132 in its call for the deployment of a UN security force, with or without the consent of the conflict parties.
4 August 1992 A mortar attack in Sarajevo that strikes a funeral for two slain orphans is captured on film by BBC and Reuters. The children had been killed when a bus carrying around 50 orphans was struck by gunfire on 1 August 1992.

5 August 1992 An Amnesty International report on the situation in Somalia details massacres allegedly committed by former President Siad Barre’s SNF forces, as well as Gen. Aideed’s USC.

6 August 1992 UN representatives arrive in Mogadishu to assess the need for and modalities of a UN security force, remaining until 15 August.

6 August 1992 Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher places an editorial in the NYT calling for the use of military force in Bosnia.

6 August 1992 Footage of emaciated Bosnians held in a detention centre shot by ITN news is broadcast worldwide on television, generating comparisons with the Holocaust.

6 August 1992 President Bush holds a press conference in which he states that he is preparing a resolution that will authorise the use of force to protect humanitarian relief in Bosnia if necessary. He also fully recognises Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia as independent states, and advocates tightening economic sanctions against Serbia.

8 August 1992 In a news conference, President Bush refuses to be drawn on the question of whether the United States is advocating the use of military force in Bosnia.

9 August 1992 Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN) publishes an editorial in the WP calling for US intervention in Bosnia.

10 August 1992 Senate Resolution 330 calls upon the president to go to the UNSC to seek a resolution that authorises the use of military force in Bosnia, which may or may not include US forces. After extended debate and much disagreement, the resolution passes on 11 August 1992, by a margin of 74-22.

10 August 1992 While debate in the Senate is ongoing on Senate Resolution 330, the House debates Senate Concurrent Resolution 132, which calls for the deployment of UN security guards to protect relief convoys in Somalia. After near unanimous support for the resolution is voiced on the floor, the resolution is concurred with, by voice vote.

12 August 1992 The front page of the WP carries a major article criticising the lack of attention given to Somalia in comparison with the attention being given to Bosnia. A similar article appears in the NYT.

12 August 1992 The UN announces that agreement has been reached with the Somali factions on the deployment of 500 UN guards to Mogadishu.

13 August 1992 The UNSC approves a resolution authorising the use of “all necessary means” to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief and to open the detention camps in Bosnia.

13 August 1992 White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater announces that the United States will provide military airlift to the 500 UN guards authorised to deploy to Somalia.

13 August 1992 Democratic Candidate Bill Clinton makes a major foreign policy speech at the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles in which he criticises Bush’s foreign policy as inertia rather than initiative. In brief comment on multilateral peace operations, he iterates his support for international
peacekeeping and his long-standing desire to see more done in Bosnia. He also voices his support for the idea of a standby peacekeeping capacity for the UN—a “voluntary UN rapid deployment force”—a subject of some debate both within the United States and the UN following Boutros Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace”, which calls for the activation of Article 43 of the UN Charter, which provides for such a force.

14 August 1992 A Bush administration senior staff reshuffle is finalised, with James Baker ending his term as Secretary of State to become White House Chief of Staff and, many believe, Bush’s re-election campaign manager, and Lawrence Eagleburger filling the now vacant position of Secretary of State. The Bush administration is criticised for this reshuffle at such a sensitive time, as it appears to be putting election politics before foreign policy.

14 August 1992 White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater announces that, in addition to the standing offer to airlift UN security forces to Somalia, the White House intends to begin emergency airlift operations to deliver food to Somalia, table a new UNSC resolution authorising “additional measures” to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief and to convene a donors conference to improve the delivery of relief.

16 August 1992 The NYT reports that the United States is prepared to conduct airstrikes in Iraq should Saddam Hussein fail to open up Iraqi government ministries to weapons inspectors.

17 August 1992 A contingent of 30 US troops, the advance guard of a larger contingent tasked with expediting the US airlift, arrive in Mombasa, Kenya, the main base to be used for the airlift, to assess modalities. The airlift is scheduled to begin by 24 August.

20 August 1992 Stephen Hayes, Director of USAID’s Office of External Affairs places an op-ed in the WP criticising its coverage of 12 August (see above) that suggested that the United States was paying more attention to Bosnia than Somalia.

20-21 August 1992 The US plan to use airbases in Kenya is momentarily disrupted as the Kenyan government complains that the US government failed to ask their permission to overfly Kenyan airspace and that relief for Somali refugees in Kenya should and is being provided by the Kenyan government. The dispute is resolved by 22 August. The original plan for the airlift also has to be revised, as the airstrips in Kenya turn out to be not wide enough for the planes originally envisaged, and alternative means are not readily available. Meanwhile, in Somalia, Red Cross officials complain also of the poor planning of the airlift, citing the lack of provision for distribution of food aid once it arrives in Somalia, which the US government will leave entirely to other agencies. The dispute is not solved until 27 August. The original timetable for the airlift is delayed by at least a week on account of these problems.

22 August 1992 The first flight carrying US food aid—ten tons of beans and vegetable oil—flies from Mombasa to Wajir in Northern Kenya. It remains unclear when flights into Somalia itself will be able to commence.

24 August 1992 UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali issues his latest Report on the Situation in Somalia, in which he recommends an expansion of the UN security force to areas outside Mogadishu, comprising 4 units of up to 750 troops to be deployed in the 4 proposed centres of UN operational division, bringing the total recommended troop strength of UNOSOM to 3,500, including the 500
already authorised.

24 August 1992 Hurricane Andrew, the second most destructive hurricane in US history, strikes the Florida coast. The Bush administration will come in for severe criticism for its poor response to the relief effort, in which a four day lag preceded the provision of relief to the key election state.

28 August 1992 The UNSC unanimously approves Resolution 775, which authorises the deployment of an additional 3,000 security personnel and the establishment of four operational zones.

29 August 1992 Somali gunmen, supported by three tanks, attack UN vehicles at Mogadishu’s port, injuring two unarmed UN observers and killing some of the hired local guards, before making off with 25 trucks, 300 tonnes of food and 199 barrels of fuel, WFP’s entire supply for emergency operations in Somalia.

29 August 1992 In contrast to the bulk of reporting on the US airlift to Somalia, which has criticised the poor planning and effectiveness of the operation, the front page of the WP carries a story detailing the first shipment of US food aid to Somalia’s interior in broadly positive terms.

30 August 1992 A follow-up story, again on the front page of the WP, paints the first delivery of US aid to Somalia in more shades of grey than the initial story, noting the relative peace and security that prevails in Beledweyne, the site of the first and following three aid flights, when compared with other areas of Somalia. No plans are yet announced for delivery to other sites. The article also cites Andrew Natsios, USAID deputy administrator and coordinator of the Somali relief operation, as noting that security remains the key problem facing Somalia and the airlift, not the mere provision of food.

3 September 1992 The WP again carries a front page story covering the airlift to Somalia. This piece describes how the militia of Gen. Aideed is in control of the feeding centres in Baardheere and elsewhere, taking food for themselves first and treating the starving with minimal respect. Food is in short supply in Baardheere, as the United States does not want to airlift there for fear of according legitimacy to Aideed.

4 September 1992 The front page of the NYT carries a story detailing the widespread theft of food aid to Somalia and its resale on the black market. Around half of all food aid is believed to be looted and prices charged are at around a 500% mark up.

6 September 1992 The NYT carries another front page story detailing the US airlift. Citing reports that the famine in Somalia is turning out to be far worse than anyone had imagined, the article criticises the effectiveness of the airlift, which is falling far short of what is required.

7 September 1992 Another front page article in the NYT criticises the effectiveness of the relief operation in Somalia.

8 September 1992 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) speaks on the Senate floor of the need for more vigorous action in Somalia, including increased food aid, an adequate US diplomatic presence, and armed forces to protect relief convoys.

10 September 1992 Senators Claiborne Pell (D-RI) and Paul Simon (D-IL) voice their support for the idea of a permanent peacekeeping force to be made available to the UN. Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) is in the process of introducing a resolution
11 September 1992  Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Eliasson, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Mohammed Sahnoun and Executive Director of UNICEF James Grant meet with Gen. Aideed to try to secure the latter’s approval for the deployment of the additional UN security guards, but Aideed refuses.

12 September 1992  The front page of the WP again carries a story detailing the ineffectiveness of the airlift.

13 September 1992  Somalia remains front page news in the WP, this time detailing the effect of the war and famine on the nation’s children.

14 September 1992  The first 63 of the 500 UN security guards for Mogadishu arrive in Somalia’s capital. It is likely to be October before the contingent will begin to actually guard relief convoys.

15 September 1992  The United States sends 2,400 US Marines to the coast of Somalia to support the deployment of the 500 Pakistani peacekeepers.

17 September 1992  Responding to criticism of the ineffectiveness of the relief operation, the United States releases a six-point plan to improve the ongoing efforts, including selling cheap food to traders to reinvigorate the market supply of food, increasing the numbers of food centres, reinvesting in agriculture and trucking supplies into the interior under armed escort.

18 September 1992  A US plane unloading food in Beledweyne is hit by a bullet. The US suspends flights to the town, the first Somali town to benefit from the airlift due to its relative safety.

21 September 1992  The front page of the WP again details inefficiencies in the Somali relief effort, this time directed at the UN relief agencies.

21 September 1992  In an address to the UN General Assembly, President Bush promises to increase the level of commitment of the United States to international peacekeeping, including developing training programmes and specialist units within the US armed forces, reviewing funding, providing stockpiles of equipment, and improving logistical support capacities. Though he hints at potential support for the activation of Article 43 of the UN Charter, which provides for a standby peacekeeping capacity, no explicit statement confirms such support.

21 September 1992  A Red Cross feeding centre in Beledweyne is looted, with 789 tonnes of food stolen, virtually the town’s entire supply, as heavy fighting breaks out in the area.

22 September 1992  The WP continues its series on the problems of the UN with a front page article dealing with the soaring costs and inefficiencies associated with UN peacekeeping.

22 September 1992  The EC responds positively to President Bush’s UNGA speech in a joint declaration before the General Assembly, and calls for an expanded role for the UN in peacemaking, with particular emphasis on preventative diplomacy.

26 September 1992  A highly critical front page article in the WP leads with the opinion that the “US-led emergency airlift may actually be worsening the problems of lawlessness and anarchy in Somalia”.

2 October 1992  A WP front page article describes the ineffectiveness of the relief effort,
2 October 1992 Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) places his own newspaper article in the Congressional Record, which supports the limited use of force in Somalia and Bosnia, and suggests that a small number (around 2,000) of US military personnel should be placed on standby and the president to be authorised by Congress to use them as he sees fit to respond to situations such as Bosnia and Somalia.

2 October 1992 The House of Representatives passes House Concurrent Resolution 370, which calls upon the president to express to the UNSC the willingness of the United States to participate in the deployment of UN guards to Somalia, with or without the consent of the conflict parties.

2 October 1992 President Bush announces his intention to push for a no-fly zone over Bosnia and to toughen sanctions against Serbia.

4 October 1992 Somalia remains front page news in the NYT, this time focusing on the Somali clan structure, the forces controlled by Aideed and Ali Mahdi, and the looting of food by these forces.

5 October 1992 The front page of the WP details the work of nongovernmental aid workers and the dangers they face due to violence and food looting, as well as their inability to relieve the crisis in Somalia.

5 October 1992 Another attack in Beledweyne prompts the Red Cross to suspend food airlifts there.

5 October 1992 Under Presidential Determination No. 93-2, a further $500,000 is made available for the Somalia relief effort.

5 October 1992 Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) calls on the Senate floor for a stronger peacekeeping force for Somalia.

6 October 1992 The UNSC votes unanimously to set up a war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

6 October 1992 Under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1993, Congress calls upon the president to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims.

8 October 1992 Irish President Mary Robinson publicly decries the ineffectiveness of the relief operation in Somalia.

8 October 1992 Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) introduces a resolution authorising the president to use force if necessary to enforce a potential no-fly zone over Bosnia.

8 October 1992 The Senate concurs to House Concurrent Resolution 370, which calls upon the president to express to the UNSC the willingness of the United States to participate in the deployment of UN guards to Somalia, with or without the consent of the conflict parties.

10 October 1992 During the presidential debate in St. Louis, President Bush makes his strongest statement yet against armed intervention in Bosnia, a position supported by his opponents, Governor Clinton and Mr. Perot.

16 October 1992 Following closed consultations of the UNSC, during which the body heard a communication from Special Representative to Somalia Mohammed Sahnoun, the president of the UNSC made a press statement to the effect that the Council considers the rapid deployment of UNOSOM personnel to
be essential.

22 October 1992 Mogadishu airport is temporarily closed, as Somali gunmen demand payment to allow relief flights to land.

23 October 1992 The front page of the NYT revisits its coverage of Somalia, covering the effect of ongoing violence on the delivery of relief. A mild glimmer of hope is offered in the form of reduced death tolls in Somalia’s famine belts, thought to be due to the fact that the young and weak have already died and now only the strong are left.

26 October 1992 The US suspends relief flights to Baidoa after one of its planes is struck by gunfire.

28 October 1992 Gen. Aideed declares that the Pakistani battalion of UN guards will no longer be tolerated to patrol the streets of Mogadishu, orders the expulsion of the UNOSOM Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, Mr. Bassiouni, on the grounds that his activities run counter to the interests of the Somali people and his security can no longer be guaranteed, and warns that any forcible UNOSOM deployment would be met by violence and that the deployment of UN troops in Kismayo and Berbera is no longer acceptable.

28 October 1992 Special Representative Mohammed Sahnoun resigns his post in protest against insistence from UN headquarters that he secure the consent of Gen. Aideed before deploying the 500 Pakistani peacekeepers, who remain in their base in Mogadishu. His resignation comes amid increasing disruptions to the relief effort caused by violence and insecurity from armed groups.

2 November 1992 The front page of the NYT carries a story detailing the ineffectiveness of the Somali relief operation due to the violence between armed factions, and highlighting the lack of deployed peacekeepers as the reason for the failure.

2 November 1992 An editorial in the WP calls for the deployment of well armed and equipped peacekeepers to Somalia.

3 November 1992 Ismat Kittani is officially appointed as Sahnoun’s replacement as Special Representative to Somalia, a posting that has been known since at least 30 October.

3 November 1992 Governor Bill Clinton wins the US presidential election.

4 November 1992 A NYT editorial makes a strong call for a robust peacekeeping force for Somalia.

4 November 1992 President-elect Bill Clinton’s first major speech following the election victory focuses on foreign policy. Both Somalia and Bosnia warrant mention, though no particular policy direction is indicated.

6 November 1992 Two UNOSOM vehicles operating near the demarcation line between north and south Mogadishu are attacked, the occupants robbed and the vehicles stolen. The vehicles appear to be taken back to Ali Mahdi’s side of the city, though Mahdi denies any involvement.

7 November 1992 The UN and CARE abandon their feeding centres in Baardheere due to the security situation.

9 November 1992 New UN Special Representative Ismat Kittani arrives in Mogadishu, on the only flight to have been allowed to touch down at Mogadishu airport since its enforced closure on 22 October.

10 November 1992 The Pakistani battalion takes control of the airport.
11 November 1992  A convoy of 34 CARE trucks carrying 350 tons of wheat from Mogadishu is attacked by gunmen. 9 trucks are hijacked, 4 personnel killed, and the remainder make it to relative safety in Baidoa and Mogadishu. The attack on the convoy is at least partially thwarted by local townspeople, who, angered by looting, fight back to defend the grain supply.

12 November 1992  Gen. Aideed demands the withdrawal of the Pakistani battalion from the airport, on the grounds that those who agreed to the deployment had no authority to do so. Kittani counters that no further authority was necessary.

12 November 1992  After visiting several of the sites of the relief operation in Somalia, Special Representative Ismat Kittani makes highly critical comments regarding the current state of the operation.

12 November 1992  A Pentagon spokesman indicates the United States’ intent to hand off the airlift to a commercial company, with the US military potentially vacating the region by January 1993.

13 November 1992  The Pakistani battalion at the airport comes under heavy and sustained fire. Returning fire, it suffers no casualties.

19 November 1992  A NYT editorial makes a strong call for robust US intervention in Somalia, amid rumours that the Bush administration is considering just that.

19 November 1992  French troops exchange fire with Serbian forces in Bosnia, as fighting in the region intensifies.


24 November 1992  A relief plane carrying UN officials and journalists is attacked by gunmen in Kismaayo. Though the plane is carrying no food aid, the attackers make off with around $5,000 worth of cash and valuables taken from the passengers at gunpoint.

24 November 1992  National Security Directive 74 provides for increased US military preparedness for peacekeeping operations, but falls short of authorising a standby capacity for the UN such as that envisaged in Article 43 or “An Agenda for Peace”.

24 November 1992  Ali Mahdi is persuaded to reopen Mogadishu port to relief vessels. Nevertheless, a WFP ship approaching the port is shelled as it attempts to enter. Numerous vessels remain anchored offshore from Mogadishu as the port remains closed.

25 November 1992  The State Department announces a Bush administration offer to airlift the remaining 3,000 authorised UN security forces to Mogadishu. The story is carried on the front page of the WP.

25 November 1992  In a closed meeting, the UNSC reacts angrily to news of the 24 November shelling of a relief vessel. The Council asks UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali to provide a detailed report on the situation in Somalia, providing for “more tangible action to carry out the UN assistance to Somalia and restore some kind of normalcy to that country”.

26 November 1992  President Bush offers the UN up to a division (approximately 20,000) of US troops to protect humanitarian relief to Somalia. The decision is believed to have been made during an NSC meeting on 25 November.

27 November 1992  UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali sends a letter to the UNSC detailing the hazards faced by UN personnel in the field and the problems that are
derailing the relief operation, but continues to tacitly recommend tougher measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 November 1992</td>
<td>In a surprise move, Gen. Aideed indicates that he would welcome the proposed deployment of US troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 November 1992</td>
<td>UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali sends a letter to the UNSC outlining possible options for Somalia. Withdrawal, continuation of the current policy, and a security force restricted to Mogadishu are all criticised as possible options, leaving the US offer of troops under US command or a similar force under UN command as the endorsed options.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 December 1992</td>
<td>Egypt offers troops to participate in the potential Somalia mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 December 1992</td>
<td>The UNSC approves Resolution 794, authorising a UN security force under Chapter VII to use all necessary means to ensure the delivery of relief supplies. Morocco offers to contribute troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 December 1992</td>
<td>President Bush addresses the nation live on television and radio, and confirms that the United States will send a substantial military force to Somalia in accordance with Resolution 794.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Rwanda Timeline

October 1990  The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an army comprised mostly of Tutsi refugees who had fled Rwanda in the early 1960s in the face of ethnic purges, invades Rwanda from Uganda, but is unable to topple the Rwandan government due to support given to the latter by France, in the form of two parachute companies, among other things.

4 August 1993  The government of Rwanda and the RPF sign the Arusha Accords, a peace agreement providing for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government and power-sharing arrangements to put an end to Rwanda’s three year civil war.

4 October 1993  In a call on the US Ambassador, RPF representatives enquire about the status of the proposed UN intervention force along the Rwanda/Uganda border, and whether the United States would be prepared to contribute troops to that force. The Ambassador replies that while a force was not opposed within the UNSC, most were preoccupied with other issues. He viewed the possibility of US troops as highly unlikely.

5 October 1993  The UNSC passes Resolution 872 establishing the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to supervise and assist in the implementation of the Arusha Accords. The UNAMIR mission’s initial authorised strength is 2,500, the backbone of which is a 450-man contingent from Belgium. UNAMIR does not reach full strength for around five months due to piecemeal commitments from troop contributing countries.

8 October 1993  US Secretary of State Warren Christopher meets with Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana in Washington. The latter asks for US assistance in Rwanda’s economic recovery but not for US troops to be contributed to UNAMIR. Habyarimana does, however, discuss the composition of UNAMIR, noting offers by Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Belgium to provide troops. He suggests the addition of French troops would be welcomed, in order to provide ‘balance’.

6 January 1994  UNSC Resolution 893 approves the deployment of a second battalion of soldiers to the UNAMIR mission. In debate on the resolution, the UNSC generally expresses confidence in the progress of the peace process, though some concern over some incidents of violence is expressed. It is generally hoped that the deployment of the second battalion will mitigate these latter issues.

11 January 1994  UNAMIR Force Commander Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire sends a cable to UN headquarters detailing his contact with an informant who alleges to have been training Interhamwe militia. The informant says he is involved in mock demonstrations aimed at causing the RPF and/or Belgian troops to attack demonstrators, leading to renewed civil war and reprisals against Belgians, with the aim of forcing withdrawal of Belgian contingent. The informant claims to know of stockpiling and distribution of weapons to civilian militias, believed to be meant for ‘extermination of Tutsis’.

29 January 1994  The NYT carries a front page story detailing the new Clinton administration policy on peacekeeping that would limit US involvement to a narrow set of conditions. This policy would later emerge as Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which appeared on 6 May 1994.
23 February 1994  Rioting in Kigali results in at least 37 casualties, as violence follows the assassinations of two rival political leaders. In light of the unrest, the Republican Democratic Movement and the RPF announce a boycott of the peace process and President Juvenal Habyarimana postpones the naming of a transitional government.

13 March 1994  The US State Department releases a travel advisory recommending that US citizens not travel to Rwanda, citing increasing ethnic and political violence.

25 March 1994  Ceremonies scheduled for this date for the inauguration of the new broad-based transitional government do not go ahead due to continuing disputes over the government’s composition.

30 March 1994  Despite increased tensions, UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali continues to report that the ceasefire is generally holding, although a ‘rapid and dramatic deterioration in the security situation in Kigali’ is noted, and reports are acknowledged of the distribution of arms to civilians. Extension of UNAMIR’s mandate for another six months is recommended.

5 April 1994  Under Resolution 909, the UNSC extends the mandate of UNAMIR up to 29 June 1994, subject to a review within six weeks. The Rwandan representative welcomes this move. So too does the US delegation, though it expresses concern over the continued impasse in the naming of a transitional government, which it hints threatens the future of the UNAMIR mission.

6 April 1994  A plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira is shot down, killing everyone on board. Though it is to this day unclear who exactly was responsible for the rocket attack on the plane, this event is nevertheless viewed as the key catalyst leading to the subsequent genocide in Rwanda.

7 April 1994  Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana is assassinated. She was being protected by 15 UN peacekeepers, who laid down their arms in the face of armed opposition. Of these, 4 were Ghanians, who were released by the armed men, but the 11 remaining Belgian peacekeepers were executed and their bodies mutilated.

8 April 1994  In remarks to the press pool, President Clinton refers to the ongoing violence in Rwanda, but only in the context of the threat to US citizens in that country. The press briefing is dominated by questions on trade relations with Japan.

9 April 1994  French paratroopers land in Kigali airport to secure the area for the evacuation of foreign nationals. Belgian troops and US logistical support is expected to be forthcoming for the operation.

10 April 1994  After Serbs launch an attack on Gorazde, a UN ‘safe area’, NATO retaliates with an airstrike, provided by a US F-16 aircraft.

13 April 1994  Belgium writes a letter to the UNSC questioning the continuing rationale for UNAMIR in the prevailing circumstances in Rwanda and suggesting that, irrespective of the Council’s decision on the future of UNAMIR, Belgium will withdraw its troops following the execution of 11 Belgian peacekeepers and the perceived anti-Belgian sentiment in Rwanda.

13 April 1994  The evacuation of foreigners, mostly Belgians, from Rwanda is completed.

15 April 1994  In letters to the President of the UNSC and the UNSG, Belgium confirms its intent to withdraw from Rwanda and requests its release from the UNAMIR mission.
15 April 1994 The NYT runs the first major media article questioning whether Rwanda should be a candidate for international intervention. The article concludes that no Western power has the stomach for an intervention.

16 April 1994 In a closed session, the UNSC meets to decide whether to withdraw the peacekeepers from Rwanda.

16 April 1994 Zaire closes its border with Rwanda after over 10,000 refugees make the crossing, trapping many more in Rwanda.

17 April 1994 In an op-ed in the WP, Alison DesForges of Human Rights Watch argues that the slaughter of Tutsi civilians was part of a premeditated plan on the part of Hutu hardliners.

20 April 1994 The Rwandan army shells the Kigali sports stadium, where upwards of 4,000 civilians are sheltering from the violence, under tacit UN protection. At least 20 casualties are reported.

20 April 1994 UNSG Boutros-Ghali presents a Special Report on Rwanda to the UNSC. In it, he expresses his belief that there is no prospect for a cease-fire in the immediate future. As such he presents three alternatives on UNAMIR’s future for the UNSC’s decision: 1) immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR, with a Chapter VII mandate; 2) withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR, with the force commander and a small security company remaining to try to negotiate a cease-fire; 3) complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.

20 April 1994 President Clinton announces an initiative to broaden the use of NATO air power in defence of safe havens in Bosnia.

21 April 1994 The US Senate proposes an amendment to the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993 to end the US arms embargo against Bosnia.

21 April 1994 Bangladesh, one of the largest troop contributing countries to UNAMIR, addresses a letter to the UN calling for greater support and resources to be provided to its peacekeeping troops in Rwanda, or for them to be withdrawn to safety.

21 April 1994 Monique Mujaramawiya, a Rwandan human rights activist whom President Clinton had previously honoured at the White House and who had also recently escaped from Rwanda despite attempts on her life, writes a letter to Clinton urging the president to support a continued peacekeeping presence in Rwanda in order to stop what she describes as genocide.

21 April 1994 In Resolution 912, the UNSC opts for option 2 in Boutros-Ghali’s proposal: withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR with the Force Commander and Special Envoy to remain with a token security force to try to secure a cease-fire. Though the Resolution was adopted unanimously, the representatives from Nigeria, Oman and Djibouti each expressed concerns that not enough was being done. So too did the representative from Rwanda.

22 April 1994 The front pages of the NYT and WP both carry stories on Rwanda. The former discusses Resolution 912 and, while nominally neutral, is tacitly critical of the decision. The latter focused mainly on the deteriorating humanitarian conditions, noting that up to 100,000 were now believed to have died in the violence, with more at risk due to the pull-out of UN troops. Both featured highly critical comments from Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch.

23 April 1994 Media reports cite aid agency criticism of the UN pullout. The reportage no
longer equivocates over the perpetrators of the killings, the ethnic dimension to the killings or using the word ‘genocide’.

24 April 1994 The RPF announces a unilateral cease-fire, stating that it wishes to see the massacres stop, but refuses to negotiate with government officials.

25 April 1994 Details of PDD 25 are again commented on, with approval, by the WP, though the directive is yet to be released.

25 April 1994 The RPF commence a unilateral four-day cease-fire. However, a spokesman indicates that this will not stop their advance to ‘liberate’ the country, but rather is intended as a ‘last chance’ for government forces to halt the ongoing killings.

26 April 1994 Senate Resolution 207 Relative to Rwanda is introduced, which condemns the ongoing killings in that country and calls for exploration of options to halt the violence, including military options. In introducing the Resolution, Senator Paul Simon describes the killings in Rwanda as ‘genocide’, and implicitly criticises the withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR.

27 April 1994 Tanzania sends a letter to the UNSC confirming that the scheduled talks to be held in that country between the RPF and government forces did not go ahead due to the absence of any government representatives.

28 April 1994 Amid reports that the cease-fire is failing, government officials claim they are not in control of the paramilitary groups guilty of the ongoing killings and are unable to exert control while those groups fear a rebel takeover of the capital and their own troops are tied up fighting the RPF.

29 April 1994 On receipt of a report from UNAMIR providing evidence of preparations for further massacres in Rwanda, UNSG Boutros-Ghali writes to the UNSC recommending that it revisit its decision in Resolution 912 to reduce UNAMIR’s mandate. The letter suggests that reinforcing UNAMIR and contemplating forceful action may be the only viable means of preventing further massacres.

30 April 1994 The front pages of the NYT and WP both carry stories on Rwanda, discussing Bourtos-Ghali’s proposal and the prior US opposition to a larger force in Rwanda, as well as suggesting that the staggering figures of dead and displaced coming out of Rwanda may only be the ‘tip of the iceberg’.

30 April 1994 The UNSC releases a statement condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda, indicating its intention to consider Boutros-Ghali’s letter and asking the UNSG ‘to report further on action which may be undertaken with a view to assisting in the restoration of law and order’.

30 April 1994 President Clinton makes a national radio address in which he comments upon the situation in Rwanda. The address is limited to condemnation of killings and commendation of those seeking to further the peace process.

1 May 1994 A classified discussion paper drafted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense warns against moves to initiate investigations into possible genocide in Rwanda, as use of the term ‘genocide’ may imply an obligation for the US government to “do something”.

1 May 1994 An Amnesty International op-ed in the WP condemns the US government for its lack of leadership in addressing the situation in Rwanda, and calls for increased efforts, including a reinforced peacekeeping mission.

1 May 1994 The front page of the NYT reports that the Clinton administration is considering supporting military intervention in Rwanda by African states, but
has ruled out US military intervention. Another front page NYT article discusses the merits of intervention and non-intervention in humanitarian crises in the abstract.

2 May 1994  Questioned about possible US initiatives in Rwanda, White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers is equivocal, but indicates that the United States is at least pursuing a $15 million aid package, renewed peace talks and an arms embargo.

2 May 1994  Tanzania sends a letter to the UNSC informing that body that it hopes to resume peace talks between the RPF and the government. The letter also explicitly criticises the reduction of UNAMIR’s force strength.

2 May 1994  UNSG Boutros-Ghali starts to make enquiries among African states regarding their willingness to participate in an expanded African-based peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. The RPF states its opposition to a UN peacekeeping force and accuses Special Envoy Booh-Booh of bias.

3 May 1994  The UNSC, reflecting on the progress report on the Agenda for Peace recommendations, stipulates a list of factors that should be taken into account when assessing new peacekeeping missions, including a cease-fire to keep, clear political goals, a precise mandate and the safety of UN personnel, among others.

4 May 1994  The front page of the WP carries a story depicting the shocking extent of the Rwandan refugee problem, which is becoming increasingly heavily reported on.

5 May 1994  National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Wesley Clark unveil PDD 25, which is officially released the next day. The directive sets conditions for US participation in peacekeeping, including whether the mission advances American interests; whether there is a threat to international peace and security; whether it has a very clear mandate and objectives; and whether the forces and the funds are actually available for such an operation.

6 May 1994  UNAMIR Force Commander Romeo Dallaire suspends relief flights into Kigali airport as a plane is shot at while unloading. Earlier that week, four Ghanian peacekeepers had been injured in fire directed towards the airport. Fighting between the RPF and government forces has intensified in recent days.

8 May 1994  The front page of the WP carries a story suggesting that the slaughter in Rwanda was premeditated, organised and systematic in its targeting of Tutsi, though does not explicitly say ‘genocide’.

9 May 1994  The Rwandan Ambassador to the United States writes a letter to the editor of the WP criticising the media’s coverage of the crisis for its depiction of Hutu slaughtering Tutsi, when he claims that ‘hundreds of thousands’ of Hutu civilians have been killed by the RPF. He also criticises the UN for a lack of neutrality.

11 May 1994  As newly elected South African President Nelson Mandela expresses tacit support for the idea of an African force for Rwanda, the UN Secretariat circulates an ‘informal paper’ among members of the UNSC calling for a force of 5,500 troops for Rwanda. The United States is quick to criticise the plan for being too dangerous, as it foresees the insertion of troops into the heart of the conflict areas. Instead, the US advocates a force being used to create a ‘refugee protection zone’.
13 May 1994 UNSG Boutros-Ghali releases a report on the situation in Rwanda to the UNSC. The report confirms the recommendation of 5,500 troops to an expanded UNAMIR II, whose role would be to provide security for humanitarian relief, establish protected areas where displaced persons are concentrated and monitor border crossings. The report explicitly states that there would be no peace enforcement mandate for the force. It also talks at length about the problems facing displaced persons but does not mention ethnically targeted killing.

13 May 1994 Senators Paul Simon (D-IL) and Jim Jeffords (R-VT) write to President Clinton calling for more forceful action in regard to Rwanda, including reinforcing and improving the mandate of UNAMIR.

14 May 1994 The WP and NYT both report that, while broad agreement was reached on the UNSG’s proposed force for Rwanda in the UNSC, and authorisation is likely, the vote is delayed till the following week, as the United States has concerns and wants time to study the plan more carefully.

16 May 1994 The UNSC meets to discuss the situation in Rwanda. In open debate, the Rwandan representative lays the blame for the current crisis at the door of the RPF and Tutsis more generally. The proposed plan for a 5,500-strong peacekeeping force for Rwanda is generally approved, though some countries, particularly New Zealand and Nigeria, suggest that more should be being done. This comes in response to a watering down of the original proposal of the UNSG to allow for a phased deployment, with the major influx of troops coming in the second phase, potentially conditional upon developments. The revised proposal is approved as Resolution 918.

17 May 1994 The front page of the NYT reports that the dilution of the UNSG’s proposals came at the behest of the United States.

18 May 1994 For the second day running, the front page of the NYT carries a story on the United States’ opposition to a strong mandate for and speedy deployment of UNAMIR II.

18 May 1994 Reports in the US media emerge that suggest that the RPF may also be guilty of massacres of civilians, though on a smaller scale than the massacres by Hutu militias. At this stage, however, little concrete evidence is forthcoming.

19 May 1994 Though the United States has ruled out US participation in any peacekeeping force for Rwanda, President Clinton indicates that military force remains a possibility in respect of Haiti.

23 May 1994 After several days of heavy shelling, the RPF is reported to have secured Kigali airport, as well as Kigali’s Kanombe barracks, encountering minimal resistance.

24 May 1994 The Red Cross revises its estimates of the numbers killed in Rwanda’s violence to between 200,000 and 500,000. These figures are widely picked up on by the media.

24 May 1994 Despite assurances that a cease-fire would be observed by both the conflict parties to allow for the visit of Assistant Secretary-General Iqbal Riza, fighting continues in Kigali, forcing Riza to delay his scheduled visit. Riza does make it to Kigali the following day.

25 May 1994 In a major foreign policy speech at the US Naval Academy, President Clinton reiterates the administration’s new policy on peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, stressing the need for US interests to be at stake. Mentioning Bosnia, Rwanda and Haiti, Bosnia is the only one to receive sustained
attention, largely in terms of a defense of the administration’s current policy.

26 May 1994 In accordance with Resolution 918, the Clinton administration imposes an arms embargo on Rwanda, under Executive Order 12918.

26 May 1994 UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali criticises members of the international community for their lack of commitment to addressing the ongoing conflict in Rwanda, which he describes as a “scandal”, citing in particular the lack of offers of troops for UNAMIR II. The story is reported on the front page of the NYT, as well as inside the WP.

27 May 1994 Reports emerge from Rwanda suggesting that government forces, many of them deserters, are fleeing Kigali in the face of the RPF advance.

28 May 1994 In an encouraging sign that means are available to alleviate the suffering in Rwanda, UNAMIR evacuates two convoys of civilians, 402 Hutus and 290 Tutsis, respectively, out of Kigali and to relative safety.

30 May 1994 The Hutu-dominated interim government of Rwanda is believed to have fled its temporary base in Gitarama amid news that the RPF is on the brink of taking both that city (the second largest in Rwanda) and Kigali. Many now speculate that the RPF could quickly win the civil war, and that perhaps this poses the greatest hope for an end to the massacres.

31 May 1994 With UN Envoys Iqbal Riza and Maurice Baril having now returned from Rwanda, UNSG Boutros-Ghali releases his latest report on the situation in Rwanda. The report estimates that 250,000 to 500,000 have been killed in the violence, with a further 1.5 million internally displaced and another 400,000 in neighbouring countries. The report urges the prompt deployment of phase 1 of UNAMIR II, but estimates that, given current shortfall in offers of troops, equipment and airlift, this will take at least 4 to 6 weeks. The report makes repeated reference to the lack of commitments offered by national governments to the expanded UNAMIR II.

1 June 1994 As the RPF advances, more and more sites of large-scale massacres are uncovered, including a church in Nyarubuye where up to 20,000 people are believed to have been killed.

1 June 1994 The Vatican writes to the UNSC asking it to designate a church near Gitarama as a ‘safe haven’, as it fears that the 38,000 refugees sheltering there may be murdered by Hutu militias.

3 June 1994 The front page of the NYT picks up the story of the Nyarubuye massacre and, in an extensive story, reports of other similar massacres.

3 June 1994 Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen places an op-ed in the WP that is highly critical of Clinton administration policy towards Rwanda, arguing that support for a robust peacekeeping force should have been more readily forthcoming, both on the grounds of moral leadership, as well as realpolitik, in an oblique reference to PDD 25.

4 June 1994 14 African nations—Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe—offer troops for UNAMIR II, though do not specify how many. Previously, only Ghana, Ethiopia and Senegal had offered troops, totalling 2,100 of the mandated 5,500.

8 June 1994 The new US-sponsored Resolution 925 is adopted by the UNSC. The Resolution calls for the speedy deployment of the troops now being offered by African nations, and drops the United States’ former insistence that these
be focused on protecting refugees along Rwanda’s borders, but allows them to deploy from Kigali outwards, as Boutros-Ghali had originally desired, but explicitly states that these shall not be used as a buffer force between the RPF and government forces. UNAMIR II’s mandate allows for the establishment of protected areas and the use of force in self-defense, including of protected areas. The Resolution also acknowledges “reports indicating that acts of genocide” have taken place. The term “genocide” appeared in the recent report of the UNSG and is now openly acknowledged by most members of the Council, the first time this has been done.

8 June 1994
Senator David Durenberger (R-MI) writes a letter to President Clinton urging the administration to do more to ease the humanitarian suffering in Rwanda.

9 June 1994
Though most of the required troops have been recruited for UNAMIR II, Clinton administration officials admit that it will take at least another month for the 50 APCs they have promised to supply the mission with to be made available and the troops trained in their use.

10 June 1994
In a now infamous press conference, State Department press spokesperson Christine Shelley describes the violence in Rwanda as “acts of genocide”, but, when pressed, refuses to classify the violence in Rwanda as genocide. It quickly emerges that State and NSC spokespersons were instructed to describe the violence only as acts of genocide. In the face of widespread criticism, Secretary of State Warren Christopher admits the same day that the distinction is erroneous, the Genocide Convention defining genocide in terms of various genocidal acts. The story is reported on the front pages of the NYT and WP.

12 June 1994
A fifth round of cease-fire talks ends with no tangible result. Though recent reports had suggested that the RPF were close to securing a military victory, recent analyses, including by UNAMIR Commander Romeo Dallaire, have noted a counteroffensive by government forces, who remain well-armed, and suggest that the conflict may continue for some time yet.

14 June 1994
The RPF and government forces agree to an immediate ceasefire at a summit of the Organization for African Unity. Despite the announcement of the cease-fire, armed clashes in Rwanda are still reported.

15 June 1994
Congressman Alcee Hastings (D-FL) proposes a resolution to classify the violence in Rwanda as genocide. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also prepares a letter to President Clinton urging that the administration recognise it as genocide.

16 June 1994
Senator David Durenberger (R-MI) calls on the Senate floor for more to be done by the Clinton administration to ease the humanitarian suffering in Rwanda.

16 June 1994
French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé announces that France may be prepared to intervene militarily if massacres continue in Rwanda.

16 June 1994
Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) calls the violence in Rwanda ‘genocide’ and calls upon the United States to live up to its commitments under the Genocide Convention. By now, numerous other senior figures are also describing the violence as genocide, including members of the Clinton administration.

17 June 1994
In a Memorandum to the President from Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the latter indicates that the United States is prepared to support France’s proposed intervention in Rwanda. Elsewhere, Belgium, Uganda, the Rwandan government and the RPF, among others, criticise and indicate
opposition to the plan.

19 June 1994 Despite the lack of enthusiasm for a French intervention, France announces that it intends to send troops to Rwanda’s borders in readiness for a potential intervention. France also indicates that Senegal is prepared to support the intervention with a contribution of troops. The troops could be in Rwanda within a week.

20 June 1994 A Letter from the UNSG indicates that, due to problems with securing contributions from various countries, UNAMIR II may not be in a position to pursue its mandate for another three months. As such, the letter suggests that the UNSC may want to seriously consider France’s offer.

20 June 1994 France sends a letter to the UNSG indicating its (and Senegal’s) willingness to send an intervention force to Rwanda pending the deployment of UNAMIR II, and requests a Chapter VII mandate.

21 June 1994 France circulates a draft resolution authorising a multilateral force to intervene in Rwanda under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for a period no longer than two months, pending the deployment of UNAMIR II, and asks the president of the UNSC to schedule a formal session to vote on this resolution on 22 June.

22 June 1994 The UNSC adopts Resolution 929, authorising the French and Senegalese intervention force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the vote on the Resolution, ten were in favour and five abstained.
Appendix 3: Haiti Timeline

16 December 1990 Aristide is elected in Haiti’s democratic elections, billed as the country’s first.

7 February 1991 Aristide is sworn in as president of Haiti.

30 September 1991 Aristide is overthrown by a military coup.

2 October 1991 House Resolution 235 is passed, which calls upon the United States to support democracy in Haiti.

24 May 1992 The WP reports that a team of Navy Seals was sent in to Haiti to rescue members of Aristide’s government who were in danger of their lives. The Pentagon neither confirms nor denies the report.

24 May 1992 President Bush signs an order providing for the direct repatriation of Haitians intercepted at sea.

2 June 1992 Marc Bazin is appointed prime minister by the military junta.

6 January 1993 A boat carrying 352 Haitians, the largest single number of illegal aliens ever to reach US shores, is indicted as it tries to enter the port of Miami. There is insufficient room for the refugees at Krome detention centre, where 160 of their compatriots are already undertaking a hunger strike to protest against discriminatory asylum policy, so they are dispersed throughout the Florida jail system. Meanwhile, the incoming Clinton policy indicates it will unveil a new Haiti policy before the inauguration, with better mechanisms for processing asylum claims, though the general direction of policy is unlikely to differ substantially from Bush policy. The story is reported on the front page of the NYT.

7 January 1993 In a rare collaboration between transitioning administrations, members of the outgoing Bush and incoming Clinton teams issue a joint statement on Haiti, voicing their support for UN mediation efforts aimed at reaching a political settlement in Haiti. The statement is intended to forestall any mass exodus of Haitians who may believe Clinton’s refugee policy is likely to be more lenient than Bush’s, on the basis that a settlement may be reached soon.

10 January 1993 Exiled Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide writes in the NYT of his hopes for a settlement in Haiti. He urges US support for the restoration of democracy, citing ending human rights abuses, refugee flows and drug trafficking as the major interests the United States might have in his return.

11 January 1993 After urging by members of the incoming Clinton administration, Aristide appeals to his countrymen not to attempt to sail to the United States. At the same time, it is revealed that the Haitian military junta has for the first time accepted the premise, at least in theory, of Aristide’s return.

14 January 1993 The newly announced Clinton team indicates that they will not alter Bush’s policy of forcibly repatriating Haitians without a hearing on the new president’s inauguration. The policy is conveyed directly to Haitians via Voice of America’s Creole service. Though this is billed as a ‘temporary’ measure, Clinton is widely criticised for backtracking on campaign promises.

16 January 1993 A flotilla of US coast guard vessels is moved to the waters off Haiti to
interdict any trying to make the crossing. The story makes the front pages of the NYT and WP.

17 January 1993  As Clinton’s inauguration approaches, multiple front page stories on both the WP and NYT question the credibility of Clinton’s campaign promises, his ability to ‘stay the course’ or to avoid rhetorical gaffes in his foreign policy pronouncements. This vein of criticism is the subject of repeated stories over the coming weeks.

18 January 1993  UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo announces that Haiti’s military junta has agreed to accept civilian human rights monitors into the country and on a framework for renewed talks. Meanwhile, however, the regime presses on with legislative elections despite Caputo’s appeal that these be postponed. The election is boycotted by all but members of regime-affiliated parties, meaning the regime can gain an easy majority in the Senate. Voter turnout is negligible.

19 January 1993  In a radio address, junta leader Gen. Raoul Cedras denies giving permission for monitors to deploy to Haiti.

20 January 1993  The outgoing Bush administration’s final global human rights report argues that political violence in Haiti is down from the initial levels after the coup, though admits that the refusal of Haiti’s military junta to investigate claims of abuse may have contributed to under-reporting.

20 January 1993  William Jefferson Clinton is inaugurated as the 42nd President of the United States. After heavy anticipation of a large scale flight of boat people from Haiti upon Clinton’s inauguration, very few actually leave.

21 January 1993  Despite uncertainty over whether the Haitian military junta will admit them, the UN and OAS announce that they expect to deploy a large number of observers, as early as within 10 days. Though neither organisation gives firm figures, around 400 observers are expected.

28 January 1993  Haitian Prime Minister Marc Bazin explicitly rejects the terms of a 22 January letter from the UN and OAS spelling out the proposed terms of the planned observer mission to Haiti. He denounces the mission as a violation of Haitian sovereignty.

29 January 1993  A letter is sent to the White House by 44 members of Congress indicating their support for a programme aimed at restoring Aristide to power.

31 January 1993  The WP reports that the Clinton administration commissioned the NSC to conduct studies into 29 foreign crises in an effort to establish policy. Of the 29, four are listed as urgent priorities: Haiti, Iraq, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.

1 February 1993  A number of Haitian refugees interned at Guantanamo Bay go on hunger strike to highlight their plight. The refugees are part of a group of 267 Haitians who have already been granted asylum but are barred from entering the United States because they or their relatives are carriers of the HIV virus, and US law prohibits the immigration of HIV-positive persons. As pressure develops to amend the law, the Clinton administration appears to back such a change. On 18 February, however, the Senate votes by a significant majority against any amendment to the law.

2 February 1993  The United States indicates its likely opposition to the Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia.

5 February 1993  UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo leaves Haiti after a three day trip in which
he was unable to secure the ruling junta’s support for the deployment of the
proposed observer mission. The regime set conditions for the deployment,
including recognition of the military regime, an end to the OAS embargo
and restrictions on the role of the observers, which would likely have
frustrated the mission’s objectives.

5 February 1993 In response to the news from Haiti, Clinton and Secretary of State Warren
Christopher both publicly voice their support for a process leading to the
return of Aristide. The latter holds a short meeting with the deposed Haitian
president.

6 February 1993 Congressman Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) writes in the WP of his support for
expanded in-country processing for Haitian asylum seekers, as well as a
process to end the political deadlock in the country.

8 February 1993 The NYT reports that, in a briefing given to the cabinet and senior aides at
Camp David on priorities for the new administration, President Clinton
makes no mention of any foreign policy issues, suggesting the president
will keep to his campaign pledge to focus on domestic issues.

9 February 1993 After days of diplomatic pressure, the Haitian government drops its
objections to the deployment of an observer mission.

15 February 1993 A team of 40 UN human rights observers, an advance party for the mission
expected to number in the hundreds, arrives in Port-au-Prince.

27 February 1993 The Clinton administration announces that the president will personally
meet with Aristide on 16 March.

2 March 1992 The Clinton administration goes to the Supreme Court to defend the policy
of arbitrarily returning to Haiti any asylum seekers interdicted at sea.

10 March 1993 Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meet with Aristide to
discuss the Haitian situation.

11 March 1993 Congressman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) introduces HR 1307, ‘The Haitian
Refugee Protection Act’, which calls for an end to the policy of arbitrarily
returning Haitian asylum seekers to Haiti without a hearing on refugee
status.

11 March 1993 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher announces the naming of
Lawrence Pezzullo as Special Advisor on Haiti.

12 March 1993 A man who had been granted asylum by the United States is arrested by
Haitian authorities at Port-au-Prince airport as he tries to board a plane to
the United States along with IOM officials, raising fresh doubts about the
viability of in-country processing.

15 March 1993 In an afternoon press conference at the White House, Press Secretary
George Stephanopoulos is grilled at length by reporters over Clinton’s Haiti
policy, primarily focusing on refugee returns, but also the effectiveness of
in-country processing, the status of HIV-infected asylum seekers, and
policy to restore democracy to Haiti.

16 March 1993 Prior to his meeting with Clinton, Aristide places an article in the NYT
calling upon the United States to set a date for his return to Haiti. In the
meeting, Clinton apparently persuades Aristide that a date-certain would
not best serve the negotiations, as any such marker should be dealt with in
the context of the negotiations.

26 March 1993 The UNSC passes Resolution 814 on Somalia, which provides for the
transfer of operations from the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the UN-led UNOSOM II. The new force’s mandate includes provisions for disarmament, national reconciliation and the establishment of a secure environment, matters which required—and were granted—extensive enforcement powers. Of the 28,000 US troops that were initially deployed under UNITAF, a 3,000 strong logistics unit will remain under UNOSOM II. Additionally, the United States undertakes to provide a 1,300 strong Quick Reaction Force (QRF) under US command, to deal with emergency situations.

28 March 1993 The NYT reports that the UN negotiating team is close to reaching an agreement on the restoration of democracy to Haiti.

1 April 1993 Senators Carol Moseley-Braun (D-IL) and Russ Feingold (D-WI) introduce Senate Resolution 89, which calls for invigorated US efforts towards the restoration of democracy in Haiti and fair treatment of Haitian refugees.

7 April 1993 The NYT reports that talks aimed at restoring Aristide to power in Haiti may have stalled because of Aristide’s refusal to countenance an amnesty for the coup plotters.

14 April 1993 The front page of the NYT carries a story suggesting a major breakthrough may have been reached in the talks aimed at restoring Aristide to Haiti, as the deposed president is said to have now agreed to offer amnesty to the coup leaders.

16 April 1993 In a move that comes as a surprise to most commentators, Haiti’s ruling military junta rejects Aristide’s offer of amnesty, jeopardising the prospects for mediation.

21 April 1993 The NYT reports that the United States is prepared to get tougher with the Haitian generals, with plans for a tightening of the embargo, targeted sanctions, cancellation of visas and restrictions on commercial air traffic potentially in the offing.

10 May 1993 As negotiations on Aristide’s return continue optimistically but uneventfully, reports surface that the UNSC is considering readying a team of 500 civilian police officers for Haiti, to keep the peace on the president’s return.

22 May 1993 In an effort to gain support for the proposition of an international police force for Haiti, UN and US envoys return to the island for a further round of talks.

25 May 1993 Haiti’s military junta reject the latest plans for the restoration of democracy to Haiti, including its resignation under amnesty and the deployment of an international police force to prepare the way for Aristide’s return.

25 May 1993 Senate Joint Resolution 45 Authorising the Use of United States Armed Forces in Somalia to Implement UNSC Resolutions 794 (1992) and 814 (1993) is passed by a vote of 243 to 179. The debate on the role of US forces in peacekeeping operations is lengthy, with some strongly supportive of a continuing US role in multilateral operations, while others argue for such burdens to be carried by other members of the UN. Those opposed to a continuing US role in Somalia use arguments that will later appear in PDD 25, but are outvoted on the floor.

27 May 1993 The NYT reports that Clinton plans to freeze the assets and revoke the visas of members of Haiti’s military junta.
28 May 1993 Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) calls on the Senate floor for the “threat and the reality of military force” to be used to underpin efforts to restore democracy to Haiti. Meanwhile, in an address at the City University of New York, Aristide calls for a tightening of sanctions.

4 June 1993 President Clinton announces that the United States will revoke the visas and freeze the assets of supporters of the Haitian military junta, and push for a tightening of sanctions against Haiti.

5 June 1993 In Somalia, Pakistani peacekeepers sent to investigate an arms depot belonging to Mohamed Farah Aideed are attacked by Aideed’s troops. 24 peacekeepers are killed and over 50 more wounded.

6 June 1993 The UN passes Resolution 837, which condemns the attacks on UN troops in Somalia and authorises all necessary means to bring those responsible to justice.

8 June 1993 A federal judge orders that 158 Haitian inmates at Guantanamo be released to “anywhere but Haiti” (likely the United States), and the camp be closed. The inmates have all already been granted asylum but had been barred from entry to the United States due to their HIV-positive status.

8 June 1993 Haitian Prime Minister Marc Bazin resigns as four key ministers in his government refuse to step down following his dismissal of them.

10 June 1993 The front page of the NYT reports that a UNSC resolution is pending that would impose mandatory sanctions on Haiti, including a worldwide embargo on oil. Aristide notes his belief in the potential effectiveness of this option.

10 June 1993 In a sign of deteriorating relations with an important political constituency, members of the Congressional Black Caucus refuse Clinton’s request to meet with him at the White House. Issues of contention between the parties include Clinton’s failure to support the nomination of black candidate Lani Guinier as Assistant Attorney General, budget policy and Haiti policy.

11 June 1993 Congressman Major Owens (D-NY) places an op-ed in the WP calling for a tightening of all forms of sanctions against the Haitian military regime worldwide.

11 June 1993 In a major foreign policy speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright outlines the United States’ approach to peacekeeping. The speech bears most of the hallmarks of the ‘assertive multilateralism’ approach, with a strong US interest in peacekeeping identified, concurrent with the benefits of the UN as a forum for pursuing US interests in this sphere. At the same time, some of the kernels of ‘selective engagement’ are present, with an identification of the need to strengthen and streamline UN peacekeeping on a number of procedural points, many of which appear later in PDD 25.

12 June 1993 The United States, in concert with UN troops, begins operations in Somalia under Resolution 837 against the facilities and assets of Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed.

16 June 1993 Haiti’s parliament, in a last minute effort to avoid an oil embargo, officially recognises Aristide’s presidency and asks him to name a new prime minister to replace Bazin. However, the parliament also sets steep terms for Aristide’s return, including acceptance of all political decisions taken in his absence and full amnesty for all coup participants, which Aristide rejects.
The international community, too, firmly rejects the move.

16 June 1993  The UNSC unanimously passes Resolution 841, which imposes a worldwide embargo on Haiti, including an embargo on oil and the worldwide freezing of assets held by supporters of the Haitian junta. The embargo is due to be in place by 23 June. The Resolution, however, stops short of authorising a naval blockade of Haiti.

17 June 1993  In his first live prime time press conference as president, President Clinton announces that the offensive operations conducted against Aideed’s forces in Somalia have now come to a conclusion. The president then proceeds to talk about a number of domestic issues at much greater length. This focus is reflected in the Q&A, where only two questions relate directly to Somalia, and most other questions are on domestic issues.

18 June 1993  The United States ships 87 Haitian boat people back to Haiti, the first since the 23 January order to forcibly repatriate Haitians intercepted at sea.

18 June 1993  The WP reveals that the Clinton administration is undertaking a major review of peacekeeping policy, in which it will likely seek to expand and improve the system for multilateral military action under the doctrine of ‘assertive multilateralism’. The policy review is being conducted under Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 13, a process that normally results in a presidential decision directive (PDD). However, in this case, no PDD emerges from the review, perhaps due to changes in the political climate through the latter half of 1993.

21 June 1993  In a major foreign policy speech centring on Russia, Clinton also outlines his overall foreign policy vision, with considerable emphasis placed on democracy promotion.

22 June 1993  Having lost the first of two court cases on Haitian refugee policy in a federal court, the Supreme Court upholds the legality of the Clinton policy of forcibly repatriating Haitian boat people intercepted at sea, as the law requiring asylum seekers to be granted hearings is held only to apply once they reach US shores.

22 June 1993  Only a day before the UN embargo is set to commence, Raoul Cedras, the lead figure in the Haitian military junta, sends a letter to UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo indicating his willingness to engage in talks with Aristide.

23 June 1993  Aristide accedes to Cedras’ request for talks, but sets conditions for his participation, including Cedras’ resignation and a date set for his own reinstatement. These conditions come close to derailing the talks, but are eventually withdrawn, with talks likely to be held within the week.

28 June 1993  Talks between Aristide and Cedras commence on Governor’s Island, New York, though the two are yet to meet face to face, shuttle diplomacy being used instead.

29 June 1993  Talks on Governor’s Island appear close to breaking down, as the military junta appears unwilling to give ground on key issues such as setting a date for Aristide’s return or its own resignation.

30 June 1993  Clinton announces Executive Order 12853, which blocks the property of the military junta and its supporters, as well as prohibiting any transactions with Haiti.

3 July 1993  An agreement is reached on Governor’s Island that provides for Aristide’s return. Under the settlement, Aristide is to nominate a new prime minister.
to establish a new government, at which point sanctions would be lifted, prior to Aristide’s scheduled return on 30 October. Cedras would resign his command days before Aristide’s return and an amnesty for participants in the coup would be granted. Issues such as the deployment of a multinational force are not settled under the agreement.

5 July 1993 Secretary of State Warren Christopher indicates that US troops will participate, if asked, in a multinational peacekeeping force for Haiti on Aristide’s return. The troops are expected to number no more than 1,000 and are expected to be limited to expert advisors.

17 July 1993 After a weekend-long meeting in New York, representatives of Haiti’s parliament and exiled president Jean-Bertrand Aristide come to an agreement restoring authority to the parliament in order to facilitate the naming of a new prime minister, the first necessary step under the Governor’s Island Accord.

22 July 1993 Clinton administration officials announce the United States will offer to send around 350 troops and military engineers as part of an international force to retrain Haiti’s army and assist in military construction projects, though the precise number remains speculative. Meanwhile, Clinton holds a short meeting with Aristide at the White House on progress in implementing the accords.

25 July 1993 In a letter to Haiti’s parliament, Aristide nominates Robert Malval to be the new prime minister. Malval is viewed as a political moderate, supportive of Aristide but also respected by many of the businessmen who supported the coup against Aristide, especially as he has shown himself prepared to criticise Aristide when he disagrees with the exiled president.

28 July 1993 Aristide writes to the UNSC requesting assistance in creating a police force and professionalising the army, with an estimate of 500-600 UN personnel required.

8 August 1993 Four US military police are killed by a remote-detonated explosive in Somalia. Reaction is mixed, with some calling for the United States to withdraw, while others call for the operations against Aideed to be pursued more vigorously. Clinton sits in the latter camp.

10 August 1993 US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright places an article in the NYT arguing that the United States should stay the course in Somalia.

10 August 1993 The NYT reports that the United States is considering sending special forces to Somalia to deal with the upsurge in hostilities.

13 August 1993 Italy announces it will withdraw its troops from UNOSOM II following major disagreements in terms of command and control. The following day, Italy’s Foreign Minister criticises what he calls ‘Rambo’ commanders in the UN mission, a barely veiled reference to the UN Envoy to Somalia, US Admiral Jonathan Howe (Ret.).

20 August 1993 UNSG Boutros-Boutros Ghali places an article in the NYT calling for support for UN peacekeeping operations and perseverance in the face of difficulties, with particular reference to Somalia. The article comes amid a flurry of criticism of the UN’s Somalia mission in the face of US casualties, Italian misgivings and continued failed efforts to apprehend Aideed. At the same time, Clinton is said to be considering sending new troops to Somalia at a time when many were expecting a US withdrawal.
25 August 1993  The UNSG presents his report on the multinational force for Haiti to the UNSC, recommending 567 police monitors, 60 military trainers and 500-strong military construction unit.

26 August 1993  Robert Malval wins final approval from Haiti’s parliament to take up the role of prime minister. The embargo will be lifted as soon as Malval takes up his office. Though no date has yet been set, it is expected to be within a week.

27 August 1993  As Malval flies to Washington to be sworn in by Aristide, the UNSC suspends the sanctions against Haiti under Resolution 861.

31 August 1993  The UNSC authorises under Resolution 862 the immediate deployment of an advance team of 30 personnel to assess requirements for the multinational force. The UNSG is asked to provide a further report on the precise costs, modalities, time-frame, etc., for the proposed mission.

31 August 1993  Malval is sworn in as prime minister in the Haitian Embassy in Washington, DC.

12 September 1993  Prominent Aristide supporter Antoine Izmery is dragged out of a church during mass and executed in broad daylight in the street outside in Port-au-Prince. The mass was being held in honour of victims of a massacre at another church five years earlier when Aristide was its pastor. Plain clothes police are suspected of committing the attack.

13 September 1993  Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat sign a peace agreement on the White House lawn, in a major foreign policy achievement for the Clinton administration.

15 September 1993  The prosecutor overseeing the investigation of the assassination of Antoine Izmery resigns after receiving death threats.

17 September 1993  Condemning the recent upsurge in violence in Haiti, the UNSC issues a statement warning that sanctions may be reimposed if security is not restored.

20 September 1993  In the first of a series of major foreign policy speeches that will culminate in President Clinton’s 27 September address to the UN General Assembly, Secretary of State Warren Christopher addresses Columbia University in a speech sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, and argues that the United States should remain committed to an internationalist leadership role in the world, using multilateralism as a tool where appropriate while maintaining an independent and interest-oriented foreign policy.

21 September 1993  Continuing the series of speeches, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake argues for America’s overriding interests in promoting democracy and free markets. He also highlights ethnic conflicts as a threat, arguing that the United States must be wary of becoming over-entangled, but that humanitarian or other interests may still dictate engagement.

21 September 1993  In the wake of increased political violence in Haiti, Aristide calls for the early resignation of the military high command and plainclothes policemen believed responsible, and suggests he might support the reimposition of sanctions if the UNSC so decides.

22 September 1993  The WP reports that PRD 13, which had been approved at the level of deputies and was expected to be signed into PDD 13 this week, is receiving renewed scrutiny at the cabinet level due to concerns over a congressional backlash, particularly in terms of the proposition of US troops serving
under UN command.

23 September 1993 Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MI) introduces an amendment to the Foreign Operations Act calling upon the president to reimpose sanctions on Haiti in light of the upsurge in violence. The amendment is agreed to with no opposition.

23 September 1993 Under Resolution 867, the UNSC approves the proposed peacekeeping force for Haiti, consisting of civilian police, military trainers and military construction units.

23 September 1993 In the third such speech, US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright addresses the use of force in the post-cold war world. The speech deals at length with UN peacekeeping, and iterates US support for peacekeeping and its willingness to act multilaterally when beneficial and unilaterally when necessary. The speech carries all the hallmarks of ‘assertive multilateralism’.

27 September 1993 President Clinton addresses the UN General Assembly in the culmination of the week’s speeches, with continued emphasis on the US interest in democracy. Clinton reiterates the strength of US support for UN peacekeeping and its belief in the efficacy of peacekeeping and multilateral action. The second major theme of the speech revolves around the need for reform of the UN, which Clinton addresses at length, but stresses relates to strengthening the UN rather than criticising or sidelining it.

28 September 1993 Defense Secretary Les Aspin announces that the United States will send 600 troops as part of the multinational force for Haiti. The troops will be involved in military construction projects and in retraining of the Haitian military.

30 September 1993 Clinton writes to Congress to indicate that he is not lifting the state of emergency with respect to Haiti, which leaves the possibility open that sanctions can be reimposed.

30 September 1993 In a speech on the Senate floor, Senator Bob Dole (R-KA) addresses Clinton’s speech, criticising the president’s application of his professed policy in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti, and arguing for much greater focus on the independent pursuit of US interests outside of the UN, which Dole describes as needing ‘reconstructive surgery’.

3 October 1993 Aristide declares a presidential pardon for the coup leaders.

4 October 1993 After a botched attempt to arrest senior members of Aideed’s militia leads to an overnight battle on the streets of Mogadishu between US forces and Somalis, 18 US servicemen are killed, and one captured and held hostage. Two US Black Hawk helicopters are shot down and a further three damaged in the fighting.

4 October 1993 Newly appointed Prime Minister Robert Malval argues that the Haitian military stands in violation of the Governor’s Island Accord due to its efforts to derail the process through intimidation and political stalling, and suggests that the international community may need to be prepared to reimpose sanctions.

4 October 1993 Col. Michel Francois, the head of the country’s military police and a member of the military junta’s ruling triumvirate, declares that he has no intention of stepping down as demanded of him by the Governor’s Island Accord.
5 October 1993 Further attacks take place in broad daylight in Port-au-Prince against Mayor Evans Paul, exacerbating concern over the prospects for an orderly transition of power.

6 October 1993 UNSG Boutros-Boutros Ghali recommends the appointment of US Colonel Gregg Pulley as head of the military component of UNMIH.

6 October 1993 The first components of UNMIH arrive in Port-au-Prince, comprising 26 Americans and 5 Canadians.

7 October 1993 In a live televised address to the nation, President Clinton, though he argues that the United States must not ‘cut and run’ in Somalia, lest it become ‘open season’ on American troops in the knowledge that a few casualties will cause the United States to withdraw, nevertheless declares that all US combat personnel will be withdrawn from Somalia by no later than 31 March 1994.

8 October 1993 The NYT reports that the State Department and Pentagon are now at odds over sending US troops to Haiti, with the latter concerned about sending more American soldiers into a potentially dangerous situation. The dispute causes delays in the departure of the USS Harlan County, carrying 250 US troops.

9 October 1993 The USS Harlan County finally leaves for Haiti.

11 October 1993 In a clear sign of retreat from the goals of Resolution 837, newly arrived (re-appointed) US Envoy to Somalia Robert Oakley meets with members of Aideed’s militia, as reports of a potential cease-fire gain in strength.

11 October 1993 A crowd waving clubs and other assorted weapons holds a demonstration on Port-au-Prince docks as the USS Harlan County tries to dock. Members of the welcoming party are harassed and, in the face of this demonstration, the USS Harlan County does not dock and remains moored out at sea. In response, the UN threatens to reimpose sanctions.

12 October 1993 In a press briefing, Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger all but confirms that the USS Harlan County will withdraw in the face of the demonstration in Port-au-Prince, and the deployment of the multinational force will be put on hold until a secure environment for their deployment can be demonstrated. In the meantime, the United States will push for the reimposition of sanctions.

13 October 1993 Under Resolution 873, the UNSC reimposes sanctions on Haiti. Meanwhile, the USS Harlan County withdraws to Guantanamo.

14 October 1993 Haiti’s Justice Minister, Guy Malary, is assassinated in Haiti.

14 October 1993 In an effort to demonstrate continued resolve, newly appointed US Ambassador to Haiti William Lacy Swing presents his credentials to Aristide, and the two make a joint statement committing themselves to the restoration of democracy in Haiti.

14 October 1993 In a press conference on Somalia, President Clinton hints that he might consider the use of a blockade to enforce sanctions against Haiti.

15 October 1993 President Clinton orders six warships to patrol the waters off Haiti in order to ensure that the embargo is being enforced. He also sends an infantry company to Guantanamo to “be on standby”. Meanwhile, a senior administration official refuses to rule out the use of US combat forces, but Pentagon officials take the bite out of threat by saying it is “highly
15 October 1993  The Senate approves Clinton’s Somalia plan, but it comes amid one of the most vitriolic debates in Senate history, with the president’s policy described as ‘sick’, ‘namby-pamby’, ‘claptrap’, ‘irresponsible’, ‘ill-defined’ and ‘amateur’.

16 October 1993  Under Resolution 875, the UNSC authorises under Chapter VII of the Charter the use by states of “such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary” to enforce the embargo.

16 October 1993  All but around 30 of the OAS human rights monitors are to be evacuated to the Dominican Republic, Dante Caputo announces.

17 October 1993  Aristide expresses his hope to still return to Haiti by October 30. He indicates that he expressed his desire to the UN that it should invoke Chapter VII of the Charter and says that if the embargo does not work, further measures should be considered, though he is quick to stress that he does not mean a peacekeeping force.

17 October 1993  It emerges that Cedras sent a letter to Dante Caputo on 15 October suggesting the Governor’s Island Accords may be ‘at a dead end’.

18 October 1993  As Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-KA) prepares a bill limiting the ability of the president to use troops in Haiti, the White House indicates it will fight the measure and refuses to rule out the use of military force. Meanwhile, the president signs Executive Order 1287, which reintroduces targeted sanctions against the military junta.

19 October 1993  President Clinton meets with Aristide and Malval. All sides reaffirm their commitment to Governor’s Island but little else of note emerges from the meeting.

19 October 1993  Congress rejects an amendment requiring Congressional authorisation for the placing of US troops under foreign command in UN peacekeeping operations. The Dole amendment requiring Congressional approval for the deployment of US troops to Haiti also looks likely to be rejected, and starts to be watered down.

21 October 1993  US and UN Envoys try to persuade Aristide to bring some of his political opponents into his cabinet in an effort to mitigate the hostilities between the two camps. While Malval seems wary of the idea, Aristide immediately rejects it.

22 October 1993  After a CIA briefing to members of Congress, rumours begin to circulate of a CIA report describing Aristide as mentally unstable and responsible for human rights abuses.

23 October 1993  UN aides warn Haiti’s rulers that unless Aristide is allowed to return by 30 October, they could face a total blockade of all commerce.

23 October 1993  Members of Haiti’s military junta meet with Malval and representatives of his civilian government in an apparent attempt to end the impasse that has led to sanctions.

25 October 1993  The UNSC calls for the resignation of Cedras and Francois, as called for under the Governor’s Island Accords, and threatens ‘further measures’ should the terms of the Accord not be honoured.

27 October 1993  A plan hammered out as a consequence of the meetings between Malval and the military junta, which requires the simultaneous signing into law of
two new bills granting amnesty and divorcing the police from the military, appears on the brink of failure as gunmen stake out parliament and legislators stay away in fear for their lives.

28 October 1993 In a speech before the UN General Assembly, Aristide calls for a total trade embargo against Haiti.

30 October 1993 UN Envoy Dante Caputo calls for renewed talks with the military junta to discuss means to revive implementation of the Governor’s Island Accord. Aristide indicates he is prepared to participate. Though France has already drawn up a draft resolution for a total embargo against Haiti, the United States is reported to be hesitant and waiting on the outcome of Caputo’s initiative. Meanwhile, pro-Army Haitian legislators threaten to establish a new government that excludes Aristide and his supporters.

1 November 1993 Reports emerge that participants in the coup against Aristide were on the CIA payroll, contributing to arguments that CIA assessments of Aristide may have been one-sided, as much of the information on which they were based came from Aristide’s opponents.

2 November 1993 In a change of tack, the White House is reported now to support, rather than a total trade embargo, more targeted sanctions against supporters of the Haitian regime.

6 November 1993 Caputo’s efforts to reinitiate a political dialogue fail as Haiti’s military rulers fail to appear at what was scheduled to be the start of two days of talks.

7 November 1993 Clinton confirms the White House’s preference for targeted sanctions rather than a complete trade embargo.

10 November 1993 44 prominent African Americans, including a number of members of Congress, implicitly criticise Clinton’s strategy on the restoration of Aristide, and several explicitly call for military intervention. Aristide notes that he is constitutionally barred from calling for US intervention but nevertheless implies his support by warmly thanking the participants for their sentiments.

17 November 1993 Administration officials reveal that the United States will not undertake any new initiatives towards Haiti and will simply try to wait the military junta out.

18 November 1993 The administration begins consultations with members of Congress on the parameters of its new peacekeeping policy, which will later emerge as PDD 25.

26 November 1993 Malval and Cedras meet for the first time since the failure of the Governor’s Island Accords, but little of substance emerges from the meeting.

27 November 1993 Malval announces he will resign in light of the failure of the Governor’s Island Accords.

3 December 1993 Malval urges Aristide to broaden the composition of his cabinet to include opponents, but Aristide is wary, and neither appear to believe this would result in Aristide’s return.

6 December 1993 Following talks with Aristide and on the morning of a meeting with Clinton, Malval indicates he may be prepared to stay on as acting prime minister after he resigns on 15 December. He also calls for renewed talks
on the restoration of democracy.

14 December 1993  Frances continues to push for a total trade embargo against Haiti, but appears to have secured little support from the United States.

15 December 1993  Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck suggests that there should be a thorough review of US refugee policy towards Haitians. The Clinton administration immediately rebukes Shattuck and indicates there will be no change in policy, but criticisms grow.

20 December 1993  As White House support for Aristide declines, with tepid comments from Secretary of State Christopher emerging in the week, Malval also publicly criticises Aristide for a failure to compromise. Malval has tried to restart talks between the military and Aristide, but Aristide, citing security concerns, clearly remains concerned that this will simply mean making more concessions. The US and UN Envoys, however, pressure Aristide to agree to the talks. Clinton, too, weighs in supporting renewed talks.

23 December 1993  With Malval’s plans for talks having collapsed due to Aristide’s refusal to participate, Aristide announces he will organise a conference in Miami on 15 January to discuss the restoration of democracy to Haiti, but US officials refuse to endorse it, as the military junta is not invited. There is also concern that the conference may focus on human rights and refugee issues.

27 December 1993  A mob attack and kill two civilian supporters of the military junta in Port-au-Prince and, in response, supporters of the military retaliate against inhabitants of a slum thought to be supportive of Aristide.

6 January 1994  Aristide intimates to the Miami Herald and WP that he would welcome a US intervention to restore him to power in Haiti, though he is constitutionally barred from asking for such. The Clinton White House responds, with Julie Reside, a State Department press officer, rejecting the suggestion and calling it ‘unhelpful’.

6 January 1994  Clinton suggests in comments to the press that his support for Aristide is waning, though the White House quickly backpedals on 7 January, saying they are sticking to the goal of reinstating the Haitian leader.

15 January 1994  At a conference organised by Aristide in Miami, the deposed Haitian president calls upon the international community to see him returned to office by 7 February, the 8th anniversary of the ouster of former Haitian dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier and the 3rd anniversary of Aristide’s own election. The following day, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, speaking from Geneva, rejects the timeline as unrealistic.

23 January 1994  The WP carries a front page story detailing the devastating effect of the embargo on Haiti’s poor.

29 January 1994  The NYT carries a front page story detailing the new Clinton administration policy on peacekeeping that would limit US involvement to a narrow set of conditions. This policy would later emerge as Presidential Decision Directive 25, which appeared on 6 May 1994.

5 February 1994  A shell explodes in a Sarajevo marketplace, killing 66 civilians and resulting in renewed uproar regarding the continuing civil war in Bosnia and the lack of an effective international response.

6 February 1994  Randall Robinson, Executive Director of TransAfrica and a notable activist for the restoration of democracy in Haiti, places an Op-Ed in the WP
expressing support for sanctions as a policy course and arguing that it is the military junta, not the sanctions, that are the cause of the malnutrition and human suffering in Haiti.

8 February 1994  Deposed Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide breaks his gentleman’s agreement with the US government not to criticise US refugee policy and describes it as a ‘floating Berlin Wall’ that is in violation of international law. The White House describes his statement as ‘mystifying’.

9 February 1994  NATO issues an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to remove their heavy weaponry 20km from Sarajevo by 21 February or face consequences.

11 February 1994  Haitian parliamentarians, backed by the United States, come up with a new plan to resolve the crisis in Haiti, which calls upon Aristide to name a new prime minister and a broad-based government that would pass legislation to prepare for the military junta to step down. Strikingly similar to the failed Governor’s Island Agreement, Aristide rejects the plan as being ineffective and unspecific, much to US chagrin. Under pressure from Washington, Aristide agrees to meet the parliamentarians on 17 February but remains unconvinced by the plan.

13 February 1994  The front page of the NYT carries a story about an explosion of a warehouse filled with contraband fuel in Port-au-Prince on 12 February, which highlighted the huge gaps in the embargo, from which members of the military junta were profiting due to their sale of black market gasoline. The report notes the lack of impact on the ruling elite, but the harsh impact on Haiti’s poor of the continuing embargo.

23 February 1994  In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Warren Christopher suggests that the deployment of US ground forces may be necessary to secure a peace deal in Bosnia. The United States is said to be prepared to provide a third of the troops for the proposed 50,000 strong force. Members of Congress greet the proposition with little warmth. At the same hearing, Christopher admits the United States is no longer planning to tighten sanctions on Haiti, as ‘there is no plan that we can be promoting effectively with the sanctions’.

23 February 1994  Two senior senators within Haiti announce they plan to form a new government without the participation of Aristide. The plan is criticised in virtually all sectors.

23 February 1994  Aristide presents an alternate plan for peace in Haiti in which he calls for the military junta to surrender power immediately, prior to the passing of amnesty laws and the naming of a new government.

6 March 1994  UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali meets with Aristide to try to secure the latter’s support for the US peace plan, but Aristide remains adamant that the plan will be counterproductive and withholds his support.

8 March 1994  The Henry Stimson Center releases a report based on the findings of a working group chaired by Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KA) and Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN) entitled ‘Peacekeeping and the US National Interest’, which finds peacekeeping to be in the US national interest and urges US support for peacekeeping along specified lines.

8 March 1994  Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Lawrence Pezzullo, President Clinton’s special adviser on Haiti, admits US policy towards Haiti is at an impasse in light of Aristide’s refusal to support the US-backed peace plan. Chairman of the Committee Senator Christopher
Dodd (D-CT) and Congressman Joseph Kennedy (D-MA), among others, publicly criticise the plan, which calls upon Aristide to name a parliament and pass an amnesty law prior to the military junta ceding power and under no set timetable. Kennedy suggests the need to back efforts to restore Aristide to power with a credible threat of force.

22 March 1994 The Congressional Black Caucus sends a bluntly worded letter to President Clinton criticising the weakness of his Haiti policy and calling for tougher action, including severing air links, revoking visas for the military junta and imposing sanctions on any country that breaks the embargo against Haiti. The letter is followed by highly critical comments against the White House in the press by numerous members of the CBC.

23 March 1994 Congresswoman Corrine Brown (D-FL) places an op-ed in the WP criticising US Haiti policy and calling for tougher intervention. Brown is a member of the Congressional Black Caucus, who are becoming increasingly vocal on Haiti.

23 March 1994 Congressman Ron Dellums (D-CA) and 38 other representatives table House Resolution 4114, which calls for increased sanctions against the Haitian junta and an end to interdiction and return of Haitian refugees.

23 March 1994 Under Resolution 905, the UNSC extends the mandate of UNMIH until 30 June 1994.

26 March 1994 Under pressure from its critics, the Clinton White House comes up with a new Haiti policy, which includes a tightening of the embargo, and jettisoning its earlier peace plan in favour of one that calls for the military junta to step down, a new prime minister to be named and an amnesty law passed on the same day. Warmly welcomed by many Congressional figures, the plan is closer to Aristide’s own ideas, but still leaves the question of whether the junta leaders will be allowed to remain in Haiti and continue to participate in politics unanswered, which Aristide views with misgivings.

1 April 1994 The NYT carries a strident article denouncing US Haiti policy and deriding the Clinton administration for a lack of credibility and the perception of such on the part of all of the parties to the Haitian conflict.

1 April 1994 The UN openly denounces the Haitian junta and its allied paramilitary organisation FRAPH for waging a campaign of terror against supporters of Aristide.

2 April 1994 The front page of the NYT carries an article documenting the same campaign of terror so recently condemned by the UN and highlighting the fate that awaits those who are returned as part of the US refugee interdiction program. Later that morning, State Department spokesman Michael McCurry admits to a rise in violence in Haiti and condemns the country’s ruling junta.

6 April 1994 Aristide sends a letter to Clinton informing the latter that he is abrogating the 1981 Refugee Treaty that allows the United States to interdict Haitian refugees at sea and return them to Haiti.

8 April 1994 Randall Robinson, Executive Director of TransAfrica, announces he is going to go on hunger strike in protest against President Clinton’s Haiti policy.

10 April 1994 After Serbs launch an attack on Gorazde, a UN ‘safe area’, NATO retaliates
with an airstrike, provided by a US F-16 aircraft.

14 April 1994
In Congressional hearings, amid growing criticism of Clinton policy towards Haiti, Congressman David Obey (D-WI) calls for US military intervention to restore democracy in Haiti.

15 April 1994
Clinton holds a morning meeting on Haiti. In a press briefing that afternoon, White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers, when asked if the administration is considering the Obey option, refuses to rule anything out, though maintains that this does not constitute a change in policy.

19 April 1994
Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and four cosponsors introduce the Haitian Restoration of Democracy Act, which calls for the imposition of a total trade embargo, an end to summary repatriation of Haitian refugees, who should instead be granted temporary protected status.

21 April 1994
In the face of continued Serb attacks on the protected area of Gorazde, the US Senate debates at length a motion to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against Bosnia.

21 April 1994
Aristide harshly criticises US Haitian policy, describing it as ‘racist’, ‘cynical’ and contributing to a holocaust in Haiti. Meanwhile, six democratic members of Congress are arresting after staging a sit-in in front of the White House to protest US Haitian policy.

22 April 1994
The White House indicates it will go before the UNSC to seek a total trade embargo against Haiti.

22 April 1994
A boat carrying 406 Haitian refugees is intercepted within US territorial waters but allowed to land in Florida, rendering its passengers eligible for asylum. The Clinton administration, however, stresses that this does not constitute a change in policy, but was due to the extraordinary circumstances of the case, in which many of the refugees were in serious need of medical attention.

25 April 1994
Haitian police kill 23 fishermen and merchants in Gonaïves over the weekend. The victims are believed simply to have been supporters of Aristide. Hundreds flee the area in fear of further violence.

26 April 1994
In a move designed to show it is serious about finding new solutions to the Haiti problem, the Clinton administration forces the resignation of US Envoy Lawrence Pezullo from his post. Pezullo was seen as a key architect of the current failed policy and was also unpopular with Aristide.

30 April 1994
Around 3,000 protestors march on the White House to demand that more be done to restore Aristide to Haiti.

2 May 1994
Asked by reporters whether the United States is considering military action if sanctions fail against Haiti, White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers refuses to rule the possibility out, but neither does she rule out the possibility in respect of Rwanda.

2 May 1994
Congressman Eliot Engel (D-NY) and members of the Congressional Black Caucus introduce the Governors Island Reinforcement Act of 1994, which would impose a total trade embargo on Haiti, as well as end the summary repatriation of Haitian refugees.

2 May 1994
Former President Bush speaks out on Haiti, calling for a shift in US policy, but recommending that the use of force be ruled out. Instead, Bush recommends ending the United States’ support for Aristide and using
diplomacy to press for new elections in Haiti.

3 May 1994 In a series of press conferences, President Clinton reiterates that the United States refuses to rule out the possibility of military intervention in Haiti, lending credence to the possibility. Meanwhile Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) calls on the Senate floor for US military intervention, while Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD) and Congressman Porter Goss (R-FL) stand in opposition. So too does ousted US Envoy Lawrence Pezzullo.

4 May 1994 Congressmen Doug Bereuter (R-NE) and Christopher Cox (R-CA) speak out against military intervention in Haiti.

4 May 1994 President Clinton is threatened with a sexual harassment suit by Paula Corbin Jones.

4 May 1994 The front page of the WP reports that, despite recent sabre-rattling, there is little support for a policy of military intervention within the Clinton administration.

5 May 1994 Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Bob Dole (R-KA) join the growing chorus of Republicans arguing against military intervention in Haiti, with the latter offering the Dole-Mitchell Amendment, which would limit the president’s ability to intervene in Haiti without congressional approval. Meanwhile, however, Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY) breaks party ranks by voicing support for military intervention.

5 May 1994 National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Wesley Clark unveil PDD 25, which is officially released the next day. The directive sets conditions for US participation in peacekeeping, including whether the mission advances American interests; whether there is a threat to international peace and security; whether it has a very clear mandate and objectives; and whether the forces and the funds are actually available for such an operation.

5 May 1994 Former US Envoy Lawrence Pezzullo publishes a highly critical article on US Haitian policy in the WP.

5 May 1994 In the 23rd day of his hunger strike to protest US refugee policy for Haitians, Randall Robinson is hospitalised. Meanwhile, the Clinton administration reveals that it will release the 400 Haitian refugees brought to US shores on 22 April, but argues that its basic policy remains in place.

6 May 1994 Three more democratic members of Congress chain themselves to the White House gates to protest the lack of a robust Haiti policy.

6 May 1994 The UNSC, under Chapter VII, adopts Resolution 917, which will apply a complete trade embargo on Haiti, including restrictions on air travel, freezing of funds belonging to members of the junta and revocation of their right to travel. President Clinton acts to implement the plan by the following morning under Executive Order 12914.

8 May 1994 After a ‘comprehensive review’ of Haiti policy, the White House announces new initiatives in its attempts to restore democracy to Haiti, including the naming of William Gray as Special Advisor to the President on Haiti, changes in asylum screening procedures (including asylum interviews for Haitian intercepted at sea, once facilities are in place) and a new emphasis on sanctions. The release also notes US interests in Haiti as comprising democracy, human rights and the protection of Americans
overseas.

9 May 1994
Following the administration’s announcement of a new Haitian policy, which could be viewed as a partial victory, Randall Robinson ends his fast.

11 May 1994
Cedras names 80-year-old Supreme Court Justice Emile Jonassaint as ‘provisional president’ of Haiti in an attempt to sideline Aristide. The White House criticises the move as “cynical, unconstitutional and illegal”.

13 May 1994
As the Organization of American States prepares a resolution condemning the appointment of a provisional president in Haiti, the United States is unable to get text refusing to rule out the use of force into the resolution, due to considerable opposition to the idea among Latin American nations. The United States was believed to have hoped for support, perhaps even extending to multilateral participation, should military intervention become an eventuality. Separately, France indicates that it would not consider participating in a military intervention.

13 May 1994
Former Bush administration NSC member Richard Haass makes the case for military intervention in Haiti in the WP.

15 May 1994
Randall Robinson places an article in the WP calling for US military intervention in Haiti.

16 May 1994
Senator John Kerry (D-MA) joins those advocating military intervention in Haiti with an article in the NYT.

17 May 1994
Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs during the Bush administration John Bolton writes in the WP arguing against intervention.

17 May 1994
Provisional Haitian President Emile Jonassaint appoints himself as prime minister by presidential decree, in an attempt to sideline acting Prime Minister Robert Malval, who had criticised Jonassaint’s appointment.

21 May 1994
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees agrees to assist with US refugee processing, lending an air of respectability to a much-criticised process.

24 May 1994
Increasing numbers of people begin to call upon the United States to provide safe havens for fleeing Haitian refugees. Randall Robinson suggests the use of Guantanamo as a safe haven, while in a bolder move, Congressman Porter Goss (R-FL) offers an amendment supporting the use of the largely uninhabited Île de la Gonâve off the coast of Haiti both as a safe haven for Haitians fleeing persecution and as a base from which Aristide can re-establish his government and seek a Haitian solution to the crisis.

24 May 1994
Two amendments are offered in the House of Representatives that would, among other policy recommendations, seek to stymie the potential use of military force in Haiti. The Dellums-Hamilton is defeated but the Goss Amendment (see above) passes by a slim majority.

25 May 1994
As US Navy vessels fire warning shots across the bows of two vessels attempting to flout the Haitian embargo, they intercept one, while the other escapes to shore. It emerges that a number of vessels have thus evaded the blockade since its imposition.

27 May 1994
UNSG Boutros-Ghali says he believes sanctions should be given several weeks to work before stronger measures are considered, but refuses to be drawn on whether he supports military intervention.
31 May 1994  After weeks of trying to find a third country where refugee processing of Haitian asylum seekers could be held, the United States reaches a deal with Jamaica. The agreement will allow the United States to anchor ships in Jamaican waters in order to conduct interviews.

1 June 1994  Brent Scowcroft places an article in the NYT arguing against military intervention in Haiti. Instead, Scowcroft, recommends ending support for Aristide, barring his return to Haiti, and from there trying to negotiate a new presidential election.

1 June 1994  The Clinton administration is considering a total ban on air traffic to Haiti. The existing ban had not covered commercial passenger flights.

2 June 1994  Aristide makes his strongest statement yet in support of military intervention. Still maintaining that the constitution bans him from directly asking for it, Aristide expresses doubts as to the potential effectiveness of sanctions and suggests a ‘surgical action’ may be more effective, citing the removal of Noriega in Panama as a precedent.

3 June 1994  An agreement is reached with the Turks and Caicos Islands, a British dependency, to allow for a refugee processing centre on Grand Turk Island.

7 June 1994  Administration officials announce that they have secured the cooperation of around a dozen countries that are willing to participate in a multinational force for Haiti. Though no details are released on the composition of the parties, France, Canada, Venezuela and Argentina are believed to be among the number. It is also believed, however, that some countries would not participate if the restoration of democracy comes from a US military intervention.

9 June 1994  Members of the House force a revote on the Goss Amendment that rejects military intervention in Haiti. This time the House reverses itself and the amendment is rejected, but again only by a narrow margin. Meanwhile, the House also votes on an amendment calling upon the United States to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina, which passes by a larger, but still not substantial, margin.

9 June 1994  Following a meeting held in New York on 3 June, the ‘Friends of Haiti’—Argentina, Canada, France, the United States and Venezuela—communicate their conclusions to the UN. In the letter, they recommend contingency planning for the holding of elections on the restoration of democracy to Haiti, as well as revised plans for a strengthened UNMIH.

10 June 1994  President Clinton announces that the United States will add two further measures to its economic campaign against Haiti’s military junta—banning all commercial air traffic and banning any financial transactions between the two countries. In the announcements, there is little mention of military intervention, prompting speculation that the United States may be pulling back from that option.

12 June 1994  Senior administration officials suggest they have the backing of a majority of Latin American nations for military intervention in Haiti should the eventuality arise.

13 June 1994  Haiti’s military junta-backed provisional president Emile Jonassaint declares a state of emergency, citing an ‘imminent threat of invasion’.

15 June 1994  Amid growing reports of feuds between Cedras and Police Chief Michel Francois, Francois’ brother suggests in a radio interview that his brother may be prepared to step down and that the military junta should implement
the Governor’s Island Accord rather than risk military intervention. By the
following day, Police Chief Francois has denied that there is any truth to his
brother’s statements.

20 June 1994 Though refusing to engage in direct negotiations, the Clinton administration
hints that it may be willing to arrange a comfortable exile for the members
of the military junta if they agree to step down. In a contradictory move,
however, US Envoy William Gray argues that the military junta should be
punished for their crimes.

21 June 1994 Under Executive Order 12922, Clinton tightens the embargo further,
blocking the US-based assets of all Haitians still residing in Haiti, which it
is hoped will put additional pressure both on those who have actively
supported the junta and on those who have profited by association with the
junta.

24 June 1994 The Clinton administration indicates that it is putting the final touches on a
plan for a UN peacekeeping force to smooth the transition when Aristide is
returned to power, which is likely to be in the region of 12,000-14,000
troops, including several thousand US troops, a much larger force than
many had envisioned. Clinton is believed not yet to have signed off on the
plan.

25 June 1994 Cedras is reported to have withdrawn $500,000 from Haiti’s central bank,
but it is unclear whether the withdrawal is to finance opposition to the
return of Aristide or a prelude to flight.

25 June 1994 Further confusing reports of a potential military intervention, Aristide
suggests on NPR that he would not return to Haiti if there was a military
intervention.

28 June 1994 Amid increasing reports of fractures within Haiti’s military high command
and the possibility of some or all of the major players being prepared to
step aside to end the crisis, reports emerge from Haiti that Cedras may be
willing to step down at the end of his term in October 1994.

28 June 1994 The exodus of Haitian boat people reaches its highest level in over a year as
around 1,200 are picked up by the coastguard over four days, while the
acceptance level for asylum claims also rises to around 30%. Critics
suggest these developments are a combined consequence of sanctions and
the more lenient processing system (i.e., US policy), but the administration
maintains they are due to heightened human rights abuses in Haiti. There
are also fears that the new processing system may be overwhelmed by the
influx, and Guantanamo is reopened as a processing centre in response.

29 June 1994 An amendment in the Senate that would require the president to seek
congressional approval before undertaking military intervention in Haiti is
defeated. The amendment, however, was offered as a rule of law rather than
a sense of the Senate, leading some to oppose it on constitutional grounds.
Later, the Senate voted 93 to 4 in support of a sense of the Senate resolution
asking Clinton to ask for congressional approval before deploying troops to
Haiti.

30 June 1994 Under Resolution 933, the UNSC votes to extend UNMIH’s mandate and
calls upon the UNSG to report to the UNSC on the requirements for an
expansion of the mission.

1 July 1994 Refugee levels have risen to 800 to 1,000 persons a day, putting increasing
strain on the system. Administration officials acknowledge the situation
may have accelerated contingency planning for military intervention, though the lack of a crisis action team or joint task force suggests this option is still some way off.

3 July 1994 US Envoy William Gray says on CBS that a military invasion of Haiti is not imminent, but refuses to rule it out entirely. At the same time, the Pentagon is said to be actively seeking commitments from other nations for contributions to a peacekeeping force to take over after any intervention.

5 July 1994 The United States announces that it has reached an agreement with Panama that the latter will host a ‘safe haven’ for up to 10,000 Haitian refugees who are eligible for asylum. Similar deals with two other countries are said to be likely.

6 July 1994 US forces undertake a training exercise that involves seizing airports and ports similar to those in Haiti, in a clear and acknowledged sign that US military forces are practicing for a potential intervention in Haiti.

7 July 1994 At the end of a summit, CARICOM leaders say they will support and provide troops for a peacekeeping mission in Haiti, but do not say whether this extends to an invasion. Meanwhile, Antigua promises to host 2,000 Haitians under the safe haven scheme, and Dominica and St. Kitts and Nevis may also follow suit.

8 July 1994 Only a few days after the Clinton administration’s announcement of the deal to relocate Haitian refugees to Panama, Panama reneges on the deal.

11 July 1994 Ernest Perez Balladares, Panama’s president-elect, says he may be willing to provide a safe haven for 5,000-10,000 Haitians upon assuming office.

12 July 1994 Haiti expels MICIVIH, the UN/OAS civilian observer mission. In response, the UNSC releases a statement saying that “this provocative step threatens peace and security in the region”, language that is redolent of Chapter VII.

13 July 1994 The Senate debates the Dole-Warner amendment, which calls for a bipartisan commission to travel to Haiti and examine conditions there with an eye to examining the United States’ policy options. Critics of the measure, however, argue that Congress might not have the commission’s findings until well into 1995, during which time intervention would be off the table. Meanwhile, Cedras states his support for the idea, presumably for the same reason. Eventually, the amendment is defeated by a vote of 57 to 42.

13 July 1994 US forces practice an invasion and rescue operation in the Bahamas. Administration officials suggest this is intended to ready them for rescuing American citizens, rather than for a full-scale invasion of Haiti.

14 July 1994 Aristide again calls for ‘swift and definitive’ action but reiterates that he is constitutionally barred from asking for military intervention.

14 July 1994 US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright identifies 11 nations that she says have pledged to participate in a multilateral force for Haiti after the military regime has left power. The countries, said to have pledged between 2,000 and 4,000 ‘military and/or police’ personnel, are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Panama, El Salvador, Honduras, Belize and Guyana.

15 July 1994 In a report on an expanded UNMIH, UNSG Boutros-Ghali recommends 5,000 combat troops, 6,500 combat support troops, an offshore reserve force of 3,500 troops, 60 military trainers and 550 civilian police. His plan
suggests that the need for coercive means cannot be ruled out, so the mission would need to be authorised under Chapter VII. The mission should proceed in two phases, with combat troops first establishing a secure environment, after which training and rebuilding should begin. The report notes the difficulties of establishing a truly multinational force, so suggests the alternative possibility of authorising a group of member states to conduct the mission, or allowing a group of states to conduct phase 1, before the UN takes over in phase 2.

20 July 1994

The WP reports on its front page that US officials have been in talks with the UN over the modalities of a possible invasion of Haiti, though a vote on a resolution authorising force is thought to be weeks away.

21 July 1994

In perhaps the clearest indication yet of the United States’ leaning towards an invasion of Haiti, White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers confirms that UN Ambassador Albright is seeking the support of UNSC members for a two phase resolution, which would authorise ‘any means necessary’ to create a permissive environment in Haiti, following which a nation-building mission could be established. Seeking UNSC approval will, however, take time, meaning an invasion is still not imminent.

21 July 1994

Supporters of Haiti’s military junta claim they have support in Washington, including from Senators Bob Dole (R-KA) and Jesse Helms (R-NC), even claiming they have enjoyed back channel communications, forcing Dole to strenuously deny the allegations on the Senate floor. Meanwhile, 100 members of Congress sign a letter asking the president to seek congressional approval before authorising a military intervention in Haiti.

21 July 1994

The UNSC authorises a peacekeeping mission in Georgia in which Russian troops are deployed, which Russian authorities had linked to the mission in Haiti, threatening to veto any resolution if Washington did not support them in Abkhazia.

24 July 1994

Congressman Ron Dellums (D-CA), a leading member of the Congressional Black Caucus, places an article in the NYT arguing against intervention, instead supporting continued sanctions, with increased pressure put on the Dominican Republic to enforce the embargo.

26 July 1994

The Haitian regime begins organising elections to find a replacement for Aristide, which are believed likely to be held in early November.

29 July 1994

In a letter to the UNSC, Aristide again calls for ‘prompt and decisive action’, but still shies away from explicitly calling for military intervention.

31 July 1994

The UNSC, under Resolution 940, approves a draft resolution put forward by Argentina, France, Canada and the United States, authorising option 3 in the Secretary-general’s report, a group of nations to go into Haiti to establish a secure environment before a UN force takes over the nation-building project. Though lacking voting rights, Mexico, Cuba and Uruguay ask to be heard in UNSC debate, and each take a strong stand against military intervention in Haiti. Brazil and China abstain out of concern for the content of the resolution, which passes by a vote of 12 to 0 (Rwanda is absent). The resolution sets no timeline for intervention.

2 August 1994

President Carlos Menem of Argentina asks his Congress for authorisation for Argentine troops to participate in a US-led invasion of Haiti. There is still no indication of whether Clinton intends to ask the US Congress. Meanwhile, Israel refuses a US request for troops.
3 August 1994  Senator Bob Dole (R-KA) offers an amendment stating that the UN resolution does not constitute authority under US law to invade Haiti, thus implicitly asking the president to seek congressional approval before authorising an invasion of Haiti. The amendment is approved unanimously. In debate, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) suggests he may force a vote on congressional authorisation for the Haiti invasion.

3 August 1994  The NYT reports further divisions between the State Department and Pentagon over Haiti. The debate revolves around whether to set a deadline after which force will be used and whether to offer inducements to tempt the military junta to step down. The Pentagon opposes a deadline and supports inducements, while State takes the opposite position.

4 August 1994  Faced with significant domestic opposition, Argentine President Carlos Menem is forced to withdraw his request for authorisation to participate in an invasion of Haiti, but indicates Argentina will still likely participate in a post-invasion peacekeeping force.

5 August 1994  Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), as threatened, offers an amendment prohibiting the use of force in Haiti unless congressional approval is given. The amendment is defeated, but much of the opposition is on constitutional grounds. Meanwhile, Clinton officials indicate an intervention is unlikely to take place until mid-September.

5 August 1994  Continuing its defiance of the international community, the Haitian regime announces it plans to put Aristide on trial for treason for his tacit support of military intervention in his letter to the UNSC of 29 July (see above).

6 August 1994  General Cedras states on CNN that he believes an invasion of Haiti is now inevitable, that the Haitian regime will resist and that Clinton will be responsible for any bloodshed.

11 August 1994  Clinton indicates that if the Bosnian Serbs do not accept the current peace plan by 15 October, he will go to the UNSC to ask for a lifting of the arms embargo, a move Congress has long demanded.

12 August 1994  With many Latin American nations wary of US intervention in Haiti, Venezuela indicates it is planning on sending a group of regional foreign ministers to Haiti to try to persuade the military junta to step down.

15 August 1994  800 Haitians who have been granted political asylum by the United States remain in hiding in Haiti in fear for their lives, as no transportation is available to take them out of Haiti.

15 August 1994  Around 20 US military police and 45 Haitians are injured in violence in the Guantanamo refugee camp, sparked off by frustrations among Haitians over poor living conditions. About 120 Haitians scale the barbed wire fences and attempt to escape by swimming across Guantanamo Bay, but are picked up by the coastguard.

16 August 1994  The United States closes two of its three refugee processing centres in Haiti due to its inability to secure transport out of the country for the now 1,857 refugees already approved for asylum.

16 August 1994  UNSG Boutros-Ghali says he will send an envoy to Haiti to ask the military junta to step down or face a US invasion, in an effort to avoid military intervention. The envoy will not enter, however, into negotiations or set a deadline for departure. The initiative is expected to happen within the next few weeks.
19 August 1994  In the face of a wave of repression in Cuba, increasing numbers of boat people head for US shores. In normal times, Cubans intercepted at sea are allowed to reach the US coast, rendering them eligible for asylum. In the face of this new wave, however, Clinton officials announce that Cubans intercepted at sea will be sent to Guantanamo, at least temporarily, after which either the Cuban Adjustment Act, allowing Cubans to change their status after a year, or safe havens may be utilised.

20 August 1994  Clinton moves to prohibit Americans from sending money to Cuba and to cut off all charter flights to the island in an attempt to put pressure on Castro.

23 August 1994  As fuel supplies run low in Haiti, the government refuses to distribute its remaining stockpiles, putting increasing pressure on already strained humanitarian operations.

29 August 1994  As the crisis with Cuba takes centre stage, administration officials admit this may have slowed the timetable for a potential invasion of Haiti.

30 August 1994  The Haitian junta rejects the proposed UN mission announced on 16 August, causing Boutros-Ghali to announce he has given up on diplomacy. Meanwhile, CARICOM backs the US invasion, with four of the seven members with armed forces pledging troops, totalling 260. In Haiti, another high-profile political assassination takes place, this time of a priest who supports Aristide.

31 August 1994  After days of delays, Haiti’s military junta finally releases fuel supplies for relief work. Meanwhile, senior administration officials warn Haiti’s military junta that if they have not voluntarily left power by the time the United States invades, they will be arrested and held for trial, but still no deadline is set.

2 September 1994  Clinton administration officials are now describing a military invasion of Haiti as a certainty.

5 September 1994  The news that the 2,100 troops sent to the Rwandan border to facilitate humanitarian relief are to be withdrawn by the end of September elicits expressions of regret in Congress that more is not being done.

7 September 1994  Clinton and his top aides meet to discuss plans for the invasion of Haiti. Meanwhile, administration officials continue to stress the inevitability of an invasion.

9 September 1994  A number of influential democrats suggest that Clinton does not need congressional approval for an invasion of Haiti. Meanwhile, US officials announce that the USS Eisenhower, an aircraft carrier, will be deployed to Haiti’s coast within the week. The Eisenhower’s deck space will largely be used for helicopters, to carry troops and equipment into Haiti.

12 September 1994  As Congress returns from recess, Haiti is a major talking point, with many calling for the president to come to Congress to make his case, and many others outright rejecting the need for intervention. Describing the potential invasion as a ‘police action’, however, administration officials say there is no obligation on the president to seek congressional approval.

14 September 1994  As congressional demands for consultation over an invasion of Haiti intensify yet further, Clinton aides announce that the president will address the nation on 15 September. With continued administration assertions that there is no need to have a debate on Congress, it looks increasingly unlikely that Clinton will go to that body for approval. Meanwhile, Senator John
McCain (R-AR) offers an amendment stating that there is no US interest in invading Haiti, and Senators George Mitchell (D-ME) and Sam Nunn (D-GA) offer an amendment withholding funds for the Haiti operation unless Clinton comes to Congress. The McCain amendment is defeated, while the Mitchell-Nunn amendment doesn’t come to a vote before Congress closes for Yom Kippur.

15 September 1994 President Clinton addresses the nation to spell out the rationale for an invasion of Haiti. Among the US interests, he lists human rights, democracy, immigration and upholding ‘the reliability of the commitments we make’.
Appendix 4: Bibliography


Adebajo, Adekeye, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau (Lynne Rienner, London, 2002).


Archer, Margaret, Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988).


Checkel, Jeffrey, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, 50(2) World Politics (1959), 324-348.


Clinton, President William, “Presidential Statement on Deaths of Rwanda and Burundi Presidents”, 7 April 1994.


Clinton, President William, “Presidential Radio Address on Situation in Rwanda”, 30 April 1994.


Clinton, President William, “Address to the Nation on Haiti”, 15 September 1994.


Kant, Immanuel, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983).


Lake, Anthony, “From Containment to Enlargement”, Address at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, 21 September 1993.


Leopold, Evelyn, “US, UN Pressure Khartoum to Accept UN Darfur Force”, Reuters, 19 August.


Melvern, Linda, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2000).


US Department of State, “Phone Call to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali on Bosnia and Rwanda”, Memorandum, 13 April 1994.


