
REC-WP 13/2010



Working Papers on the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe

Fertility, Female Participation in Employment and Reconciliation Policies in Spain

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RECWOWE Publication, Dissemination and Dialogue Centre, Edinburgh

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About the author

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Abstract

Different aspects of decisions regarding parenthood are analysed. From an institutional perspective, reconciliation policies and features of the female labour market are studied, as well as the values and life views that may affect the decision to become a parent. From a micro-perspective, a multivariate model of proportional hazards is created from the 2004-2007 Spanish EU-SILC, where likelihood of pregnancy is analysed according to specific employment, personal, and family situations. Results are not conclusive, because the Hypothesis of Fertility Positive Turn was not confirmed directly for cases with a steadier work status. However, educational level does have a continuous effect, that is, women with university degrees, and especially employed ones, are more likely to become parents.

Keywords

Fertility, Female employment, Reconciliation policies, Spain, Positive fertility turn, EU-SILC, Proportional hazard regression models

Introduction

Low fertility rate has been a problem in Spain for more than 20 years. In 1998, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) reached its lowest point in history (1.16 children per woman), and has slightly recovered since then. At the beginning of the 21st century, the problem of a threshold rate considered to be particularly dangerous was solved (TFR below 1.3 being considered the 'lowest-low' fertility rate, Kohler *et al.*, 2002); and, during the first decade, the fertility rate has been experiencing a slow but constant increase. However, the problem of low TFR is far from being solved. The TFR in 2008 was still low, for it did not attain 1.5 (2.1 is needed for the reproduction of generations), and the slight rise of fertility rates in Spain was attributed to the demographic behaviour of foreign women (more than 20% of newborns in Spain in 2008 had a foreign mother). It is expected that in a few years these women will adopt the demographic patterns of the host country, as usually occurs with immigrants arriving in western countries.

Certain conditions are taken into consideration before entering into motherhood/fatherhood (Hobcraft & Kiernan, 1995: 27): being in a partnership; having completed full-time education and training; owning a home; being employed and having an adequate income, and, less concretely, a feeling of security. In Spain, these conditions are specified in a set of factors that, even though viewed from different perspectives, always point towards a similar result: the delay in emancipation of young people from the parental home and the decision to have children.

Having presented the delay in the process of emancipation and the lower fertility rate that seems to result, it is important to be aware of the effect of the possible factors involved in the decision to have children. What is the role of cultural and institutional contexts (and specifically, work organization) in this phenomenon and in its future development? What are the socio-demographic, employment, cohabitation and family factors associated with the decision to become parents in Spain during the first decade of the XXI century? These are some of the most important questions concerning Spanish society, which has not reached the generation reproduction rate since 1980 (Spanish National Statistical Institute, INE).

This working document is divided into five parts. After a brief theoretical introduction, where some views relating to fertility and the situation of employed women are selected, the second part focuses on the development of the institutional Spanish context. Three aspects are presented: family/work reconciliation policies, institutional characteristics of the Spanish labour market, and gender norms of the population. The third part analyses the decision of Spanish women to enter into motherhood. To do so, the family and labour situations of pregnant women are studied.

This paper ends with two sections containing conclusions and suggesting areas for future research. The conclusions section includes the research results that are sufficiently contrasted to allow certain recommendations for public policies. The last section containing suggestions for areas for future research focuses on situations in which the decision to enter into parenthood is based on factors of which, due to lack

of institutional transparency and a shortage of data and adequate research, there is little knowledge.

Fertility and female employment: theoretical selection

Theories explaining connections between female employment and fertility may be classified according to the classical dimensions in the Social Sciences. First, depending on whether a global or personal unit of analysis is chosen, we may talk about micro and macro levels. Second, considering which general explanatory factors are emphasized, we may talk about more socio-cultural approaches, which will be based on value systems and family and/or marriage models. These include: institutional approaches more focused on family policies and access to public and private services, and economic approaches – from a micro perspective – based on the cost-benefit analysis constituting rational choice models in Sociology. As it is known, borders within theoretical approaches are more analytical than real, meaning that if we want to understand a phenomenon as complex as fertility we need to consider both micro and macro levels, explanations provided by the theory of rational action, and values and the institutional context.

The general model of social change, probably the broadest approach, analyses the modernization process in western societies. Concepts such as Ulrich Beck's second modernity and risk society, Giddens' reflexive modernization, or Bauman's liquid society have many ideas and conclusions in common. In the demographic field, we have the theory of the second demographic transition (Van de Kaa, 1987; 2001), according to which, in western societies at the beginning of the 21st century, relationships between men and women tended to weaken and involve less commitment than in the past. Moreover, an increase in the number of childless couples, a delay of entry into motherhood/fatherhood, and a decrease in the number of children per family occurred. In other words, marriage and the first child were postponed. There was more cohabitation and higher divorce rates, while fertility fell. These changes in demographic patterns appeared along with important changes in attitudes and views on personal relationships, birth rates, and family.

It is necessary to add to these general characteristics of the process of social change, the appearance of a new view on motherhood/fatherhood. Contrary to 'quantity of children', which characterizes the traditional family and society model, modern society is characterized by 'quality children', that is, a reduction in the number of children while investing more in their education, a strategy appropriate for the wage increase of the industrial and service society. It can be said that in modern societies, which are characterized by a general control of fertility and an increase in consumption standards, expectations rise and so do parents' responsibilities over their children. We must add one last factor, typical of second modernity families (Beck & Beck-Gensheim, 1998), to this growing responsibility connected with having children: the idea that motherhood and fatherhood is a gratifying activity requiring time and effort. In this context, it is easy to understand the decision to delay the entry into parenthood until the proper moment.

The problem with the theory of the second demographic transition is that it gives no explanation as to why Spain has a lower fertility rate than France, Denmark, Sweden or other countries, where the change of values was stronger and took place earlier.

Other analytical approaches look at the influence of the institutional context, national cultures, and political measures, which is why there is a fundamental difference in the approach to the comparative analysis of the relationship between female employment and fertility in the countries of the European Union. Amongst the different perspectives, patterns of gender division of labour seem most prominent. Since the 1980's, the Social Sciences – especially the feminist theoretical frameworks – have created models relating the three institutions in the West responsible for personal wellbeing: the family, the state and the market. This perspective views care as a fundamental activity in any human society. Therefore, its organization shapes a certain type of family and subsequently a type of society. The underlying idea is that the turning point in social change is an increase in female employment. As a result, household work – especially childcare – previously the sole responsibility of mothers/wives and undervalued by society, has to be transferred to other institutions.

A study by Pfau-Effinger (2004: 55 and following) proposes five classical-ideal models, both theoretical and empirical, of cultural values describing how mothers arrange motherhood and employment in western societies.

- 'The family economic gender model', typical of agrarian families or a family business in which care would be neither a specific activity, nor the sole responsibility of a particular person; there is no need to be specially qualified.
- 'The male breadwinner/female home carer model'. Also called Parsonian Family or Gender Role Specialization, in which the woman (mother and wife) is solely responsible for care tasks and is also expected to be qualified and have the knowledge needed for these activities in a (quasi) natural way.
- 'The male breadwinner/female part-time carer model', is based on the idea that the family, particularly the woman, must share the responsibility of house keeping with other institutions such as the Welfare State, the market, or non-profit organizations.
- 'The dual breadwinner/state carer model', is based on the idea that care must be provided by institutions outside the family (the state, the market, or non-profit organizations).
- 'The dual breadwinner/dual carer model', like 'The dual breadwinner/state carer model', is based on the idea of a symmetric and equal integration of men and women, both in their professional careers and care tasks. In this model, parents are supported by external institutions, such as the state, the market, it and non-profit organizations. The main difference from the previous model is that, in terms of labour market organization, it assumes the parents' dual responsibility of attending to paid work and housekeeping is structurally supported by the labour system (Pfau-Effinger, 2005: 329).

In this study, the author considers that there are two paths of development for traditional families. (1) Modernization of the male breadwinner family model, as has occurred in Great Britain, Norway, Holland and Western Germany, through the popularization of part-time work for women. At present, this model is changing based on a new parental cultural model in which fathers are more involved in childcare, and (2) the model of dual breadwinner and external childcare developed in France, Denmark, Sweden and Finland.

One feature that both models share is that childcare does not pose a problem. In the first model, care obligations are equally shared by both parents while in the second one, there is an external carer outside the home that is strong enough to support the family. Therefore, it is assumed that women have the right and need to be employed, and childcare is not their sole responsibility. This idea is implicit in the phenomenon of positive turn in fertility, a concept that already has some tradition in this field (Andersen, 1991; Hobson & Olah, 2006). It attributes the recovery of fertility rates in some western countries to policies or social institutions allowing women to combine family responsibilities with employment. Countries with lower fertility rates are those in which women have to endure the work-childcare conflict.

The analysis of changes in family models places the cultural values of an industrialized area or country in a specific stage of its history, specifically in the transition from Role Specialization Model to an egalitarian model. Anna Cabré proposed that, the more sudden the change, the greater the risk of imbalance, as the pace at which concerned institutions change can vary (Cabré, 2007: 20). Furthermore, situations become complicated when central institutions such as schools, the labour market, or the family support different family models and gender values (McDonald, 1997, mentioned in Cabré, 2007). In this context, mothers must cope with possible conflicts between their responsibilities as workers and childcarers in an informal and private way, while being helped by the extended family (Tobío, 2002). In such a situation, a *familistic* culture (grandmother) gives support by allowing mothers to seek employment. The Spanish care model is understood as an 'ambivalent *familism*' (a concept used by Chiara Saraceno -1994- for Italy).

'*Familism*' is characterized by two aspects. First, it is characterized by 'family' as a welfare guarantor, in which the female figure is in charge of taking care of minors, as well as elders and/or dependents. Second, it is characterized by shortcomings of public policies related to dependents' care. In this context, new female generations are in a situation that is structurally defective, given that it is difficult to combine a successful professional career – often demanding a lot of time and effort – with motherhood, if one is the only agent responsible for this task. Paradoxically, the concept known as '*familistic* welfare' – the most typical welfare model in southern Europe – is closely related to low fertility (Moreno, 2005; 2007).

Finally, in connection with the micro analysis of the increase in the use of contraceptives, it is easy to analyze the decision to have children according to the theories of rational action. Fabrizio Bernardi and Miguel Requena (2003) pointed out an important aspect of the decision to have the first child: difficulties finding a partner and becoming economically independent, especially when it comes to owning a house, unemployment or precarious employment. When it comes to the decision to have the second and subsequent children, they established five aspects to be

considered. (1) *Benefits*, depending on the desired family model – the three family models within Hakim’s Preference Theory (2005), i.e., work centred, family centred, and adaptive – and on the number of children. Benefits may be instrumental (a means for achieving a goal) or more expressive (a goal in itself). Expressive benefits seem more important with the first child (as well as the second one) whereas instrumental ones will be more important with the subsequent children. (2) *Direct Costs*. (3) *Opportunity Costs* such as missed income, fewer job opportunities, less time available, etc. Empirical evidence suggests that indirect marginal costs are higher with the first child and decrease when the number of children is already high. (4) *Uncertainty* regarding employment prospects reduces the number of long-term commitments such as marriage and entry into parenthood. (5) *Gender equality*, that is, an equal division of childcare. The Theory of Gender Equality states that the first child results in a considerable reduction of female job opportunities due to little male participation in childcare-related tasks. The lack of domestic assistance services and childcare results in women tending to forgo a second child, or to delay pregnancy. This presumption of the gender equality argument only refers to the second and subsequent children, as only after the first child do women become fully aware of the lack of institutional childcare support.

Richard Easterlin enriched the new economic view on fertility with his development of the concept of ‘intergenerational relative income’. This is a marker, linked to fertility, measuring ‘the relation between the present income of young married couples and the level of income they had when they were teenagers living with their parents’ (Rodríguez Sumaza, 1997: 109). In other words, Easterlin introduced a new aspect to the analysis of economic research, an aspect that, until now, only appeared in sociology: expectations. The idea is that young people who enjoy a specific level of affluence will be more prone to think that parenthood will reduce their affluence and prevent them from providing their children with the quality of life that they had experienced.

In summary, we see that the decision to become a parent in Spain must be analysed in the context of the important changes linked to the second demographic transition led by the more developed western countries. But, in addition, fluctuations in the replacement rate, which has great social importance, especially when the TFR is below 1.3 (this being considered ‘demographic suicide’) are affected by each national institutional context, particularly to the extent that female employment is generalised and motherhood balance is provided. This theoretical approach is found in the following section, which develops the Spanish institutional context in which the decision of whether to have children is made. The above introduction was needed to assess the final purpose of this working document, which is the micro-analysis of the impact that the male and female labour market situation has on fertility.

The Spanish Institutional Context

When it comes to decision of whether to enter into parenthood, it is the institutional context that defines and classifies the options available (time for having

children, number of children, possible change in the duration of paid work, time devoted to childcare, etc.) by making certain choices more advantageous than others. As indicated in the theoretical framework, western countries are in the middle of the family model change process. Therefore, new symmetric or egalitarian couples' roles are changing, especially for women. The problem is that the pace at which the involved institutions are changing is different, resulting in uncertainty and in the delay/decrease of fertility. In Spain, it is particularly interesting to analyse the different speeds of these changes within public institutions, specifically: the delays and weaknesses of family/work reconciliation policies, work time organization and poor job security for young women, and changes in everyday life, particularly in terms of gender values.

Reconciliation Policies

Until a few years ago, Spanish political measures aimed at family/household reconciliation have been characterized by a 'dispersion, a predominance of the program content approach regarding budgetary commitment, as well as an imbalance between the prominence of strictly labour-based measures to tackle shortage of services and supporting infrastructure for child-caring and for dependents' (Economic and Social Council, ECOSOC 2003: 180). Actually, when we compare public funding spent on family and children aid programs in some European countries, it is clear that Spain's spending in 2000 was among the lowest (see graph below) and it was clearly lower than the average European spending. However, the first few years of the 21st century have seen a clear rise in public interest in these programs, particularly considering percentage of social costs devoted to these programs. Although, taking the GDPs into account, Spain is still far from the EU's average spending amount.

	% of costs in social benefits		% GDP	
	2000	2007	2000	2007
European Union (25)	8.3	7.9 (p)	2.1	2.0 (p)
Euro area (13)	8.4	8.1 (p)	2.2	2.1 (p)
Germany	11.2	10.6 (p)	3.2	2.8 (p)
<i>Spain</i>	<i>4.9</i>	<i>6.0 (p)</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>1.2 (p)</i>
France	9.1	8.5 (p)	2.5	2.5 (p)
Italy	3.8	4.7 (p)	0.9	1.2 (p)
Poland	5.0	4.5	1.0	0.8
Sweden	6.9	6.0 (p)	1.8	1.5 (p)
United Kingdom	9.0	10.2 (p)	2.7	3.0 (p)

Table 1: Public spending on family and children aid programs

Source: Eurostat. (p) provisional value.

The measures related to reconciliation can be divided into those having an effect on labour relations and arrangement of working hours (to be reviewed in the next section), and those involving the direct action of public authorities, such as when providing equipment or support measures to childcare or dependents. In this group, several measures stand out: maternity/paternity leaves, both paid and unpaid, but that guarantee return to workplace; childcare benefits; and economic aid by means of Social Security bonuses via taxation or cash compensatory support (although the budget has risen lately with these measures, the total amount of money is still too low when compared to the rest of Europe).

Finally, in relation to the set of actions implemented to provide reconciliation, a major change in citizens' preferences stands out. For example, when women residing in Spain are asked about a series of measures that could foster an increase of birth rates, their preferences are the following: 'To give special economic benefit to families with more than two children' (28.1%), 'to promote part-time work for mothers' (27.8%) and 'to increase the number of playschools inside workplaces' (27%)". Only 7.2% of the women polled considered extending maternity leave to be the most effective measure, trailing the percentage of women preferring an increase in tax reductions for children (8%) (CIS, 2004 question 15).

These differences of opinion highlight the complexity of the phenomenon, and we see that reconciliation may be promoted by using several components. This leads us to one of the cornerstones of these policies: the importance of ideology¹. One must never mistake reconciliation policies for gender equality policies. An important example is maternity leave for childcare. A long and well-paid maternity leave, as well as post-leave job security guaranteed by law, may promote fertility; however, non-compulsory paternity leave (men only) may cause gender discrimination in the labour market, because employers would choose men to avoid replacing them for paternity reasons while productivity remains the same.

Paternity leave

Spanish law covers different types of paternity leave. Maternity/paternity leave has recently changed as a result of the 2007 Gender Equality Law². As of January 2010, maternity leave in Spain is 16 weeks, of which the mother must take the first six weeks immediately after giving birth. If desired, she may transfer some or all of the remaining ten weeks to her partner once some eligibility requirements have been checked. In addition, men are allowed two weeks of unpaid paternity leave (only for the father) until the child is three years old, and the right to part-time work until the child is eight years old.

During maternity/paternity leave, Social Security pays 100% of the *basis of assessment* of the last common salary, that is, the amount of money received during the leave is directly related to a person's wage. In order to be entitled to the leave and to its benefits, women must be working (as employers, employees or self-employed) or must be receiving unemployment benefits. They also must have paid taxes to Social Security for at least 180 days during the last seven years prior to the leave or 360 days during their entire working life).

The mother's age affects the work experience requirements for maternity leave: those under 21 need not comply with any of the previous contribution requirements to Social Security, while mothers from 21 to 26 years old must comply with half of the general working experience requirements. Mothers who do not comply with prior work requirements are entitled to the first six weeks with a maximum pay of €499.20 per month. The length of the leave may also change according to exceptional situations such as a multiple birth, a child with a particular disability, or if the baby must stay in a hospital.

Paternity leave has recently been extended (Gender Equality Law of 2007). New fathers are entitled to two different types of leave. The first is a two-day leave for a birth within the family, to be paid by the employer, and the leave may last four days if the employee has to travel. The most recent leave is paid by Social Security and lasts two weeks, with the same eligibility requirements as maternity leave. On January 1st 2011, paternity leave will be extended to four weeks (9/2009 Law of October 6th).


In Spain, information on beneficiaries of maternity/paternity leave is scant and poorly detailed. Moreover, the information sources for paid 16-week maternity leave are different than those for the leave of absence (unpaid leave) available until the child is three years old.

When it comes to paid leave, mothers can share or give their partners the last ten weeks of their maternity leave, but this happens only in 1.5% of cases. A common explanation of this fact is a rational decision based on male employees having higher wages, and therefore not requesting paternity leave because doing so would reduce their household's total income. In the case of Spain, however, this common explanation cannot be true, as the amount received during the leave is related to the income of the parent on leave. This fact suggests this sort of leave is mostly linked to women *regardless* of whether they earn more or less than men. Moreover, the new two-week paternity leave³ of the 2007 Gender Equality Law does not seem to be taken often enough by fathers, given that, in 2008, 518,967 babies were born but only 279,756 men requested paternity benefits.

When employees are asked whether their company hinders a male employee's paternity leave, most of them think there are no hindrances (49.9%), while 10% think there are hindrances. However, we must emphasize the large percentage of those who are unsure (34.4%). Such data suggest a large contingent of the population does not give this issue any consideration. The reason why these rights are not always exercised, particularly for men, is probably the 'validity of prevailing values in the employment world, where taking a career break brings serious consequences in terms of prestige, loss of practice, professional assessment, etc.' (ECOSOC, 2003: 183). In the case of leaves of absence, the ECOSOC adds the fact that, because men usually earn more, they are 'sanctioned' to be the last ones to ask for it. And without a doubt, the biggest reason why men tend not to take paternity leaves of absence is the persistence of a cultural pattern in which women have a monopoly over care responsibilities.

The Labour Force Survey (EPA) shows that, out of the total working population that did not work during the reference week, the percentage of men (as opposed to women) who are on paid leave due to the birth of a child is always small. However, the effect of the last measures of the Gender Equality Law is significant since, before

its adoption, the percentage of male beneficiaries of paternity leave was about 4%, compared to approximately 10% in 2007.



Graph 1 Percentage of men enjoying paternity leave

Source: Labour Force Survey (EPA) - INE

Men who take paternity leave share specific characteristics. One of the most remarkable characteristics is the strong overrepresentation of workers from the public sector, because, whereas this category represents 18.4% of the total male labour force, it represents 33.8% of all paternity leaves. Members of cooperative societies often exercise their right to this leave, too. Looking at the various activity sectors, the one having the largest female presence—the service sector—is precisely the one in which men are most likely to take leaves. In contrast, the construction sector—with the largest male presence—has the lowest amount of men taking paternity leave and within this sector women are proportionally more likely to do so. This phenomenon may be related to the high percentage of self-employed workers in the construction industry and the fact that self-employed workers are less likely to take paternity leaves. A thorough analysis of employment features related to paternity leave requires multivariate techniques in order to study *caeteris paribus* the influence of each factor in the absence of certain data that, until 2008, were impossible to obtain.

	Males		Females	
	Total	Paternity leave	Total	Maternity leave
Self-employed worker: total	17.9	9.1	10.4	6.2
Employer	5.8	--	3.2	2.6
Businessperson (without wage earners) or independent worker	11.1	5.2	6.4	3.5
Member of a cooperative	0.6	3.9	0.2	--
Family assistance	0.5	--	0.6	--
Employees: total	82.1	90.9	89.6	93.8
Public sector employees	18.4	33.8	25.6	15.7
Private sector employees	63.6	58.4	64.0	78.2
Other professional situation	0.1	--	0.0	--
Agriculture	4.0	--	2.6	--
Industry	25.8	22.1	10.5	14.7
Construction	14.9	6.5	1.8	3.5
Services	55.3	71.4	85.0	81.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 2. Distributions of maternity/paternity leave according to sector of activity and professional status

Source: EPA- INE (2009-TIII)

Information about beneficiaries of unpaid maternity/paternity leave was provided by Irene Lapuerta and colleagues (Lapuerta, 2009) using data from the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (MCVL). These data confirm the low incidence of unpaid maternity/paternity leave (roughly 3% of the total working population with children under age 3, increasing to 6% for women alone). Lapuerta also observed that sectors with a large number of workers on leave are among the most privileged in the labour market: employees with open-ended contracts, full-time jobs, higher education and public sector employees. However, mothers with worse working conditions – employees in the private sector with temporary employment contracts – are less likely to go on such leaves.

Childcare Services

A reason for the increase in fertility rates may be the rise of childcare services in the market, the turning point ('positive-turn') observed in other European Countries, as previously mentioned⁴. A typical argument is that an availability of quality childcare services has a positive impact on female participation in paid work. Childcare services could increase fertility rates by making maternity cheaper in terms of income and career opportunities⁵.

The Barcelona Summit in 2002 concluded with two objectives in relation to childcare services in the EU: to provide childcare for at least 90% of children

between 3 years old and the mandatory school age, and at least 33% of children under 3 years of age, by 2010.

So far, Spain has fulfilled the goals of the 2002 Barcelona Summit. The State recognizes the right of children between 3 and 6 years old (compulsory education begins at age 6) to attend school, so that childcare services are fully covered from the age of 3 or 4. When it comes to children under three, 42% are cared for only by their parents and 39% attend playschools or similar centres (20% stay in such centres less than 30 hours/week while 19% stay more hours). 27% of all babies have informal care, and 21% of the babies receiving informal care are cared for by direct relatives (mostly grandparents) with an average time of care of 22.7 hours/week (Plantenga et al. 2009 with EU-SILC 2006). In short, there is a problem in baby care between age 0-3, as there is not enough space in public childcare centres, and the cost of private care is too high for many parents.

The availability of nursery schools seems to be a significant factor considered by Spanish women when they are deciding whether to keep working after having a child (Baizán, 2007: 428 and following). In fact, female employment is correlated with increases in nursery school coverage for children between 0-3 years old. That is, dividing the coverage of nursery schools into quartiles, the second quartile shows an 18% increase in participation when compared to the first quartile; a 39% increase in the third quartile and 74% the fourth. When the analysis is limited to women with children under three years old, which is considered the group most affected by the availability of nursery schools and kindergarten, the effect of coverage is similar, and we see an important effect of educational level: women having upper-secondary education are almost three times more likely to find employment compared to women with only primary education. University degrees increase this likelihood 8.9 times.

Family Benefits and Tax Policies

The Spanish Central Administration has three main policies related with entering parenthood that are based on tax reduction⁶:

- €2,500 for child birth.
- A maximum €1,200/year tax reduction for working women with children under the age of three. This reduction is meant to promote employment among mothers instead of reducing the costs related to parenthood.
- In low-income families (€9,092/year in a household with one couple and two children, in 2006) there is a €291/year benefit for each child under 18.

Initiatives from Autonomous Communities must be added to these aids. In general, regional policies are subsidiaries from the state that give new resources, but no new formulas other than those established by the state may be created. For example, these policies aim at extending the so-called 'baby cheque' for births because, depending on the region, it can vary from nothing to an additional €1000. However, these aids are insufficient, because the expenses connected with childcare must be handled, almost exclusively, by families.

Other measures may promote -- or discourage -- employment among mothers. For example, there is a monthly bonus from the company quota of Social Security in


the event of employing a woman on a childcare leave (Royal Decree 5/2006 for boosting the employment rates, section 2 article 4).

The Social Security System in Spain does not determine a minimum retirement benefit. For this reason, part-time work or interruptions in employment have a bigger impact on retirement pensions in Spain than in countries where a minimum pension exists. Likewise, it is necessary to bear in mind that the Spanish Social Security System guarantees a widow's pension, an amount that rises to half of her retirement benefit. The retirement benefit and the widow's pension are incompatible, meaning that only one of them may be chosen. For a woman who did not contribute enough to Social Security, the widow's pension could be higher than her retirement.

Labour market, work hour organization and wage gap

As we showed in the theoretical section, the analysis of female paid work and its relation with fertility rates must be carried out within the division of gender labour models at home. In the graph below, we can see that these models are very different depending on the country. For instance, let us compare the countries where both spouses are full-time workers (The Czech Republic and Poland) to those where the 'primary breadwinner together with the secondary breadwinner model' has a strong presence (Germany, United Kingdom and to a lesser extent, France). In the latter countries, the division of gender labour of the couple is more dependent on the number of children at home, and the percentage of couples in which both members are full-time workers falls, while the number of children grows. Spain lies somewhere in between these two models. When couples have no children, the dominant model (51%) is that both spouses are working full-time, whereas couples with children have a high percentage of a 'secondary wage' (17% of all couples). Moreover, as the number of dependents rises, the adjustment is made by leaving jobs, rather than by reducing from full-time to part-time.

It seems that one of the best ways to reconcile family and professional activity is to organize work hours in a flexible way. Moreover, employers acknowledge that flexibility is one of the most efficient tools for keeping their staff (Pfau, 2002). In this section, after having described the progress of female paid work, some characteristics of the Spanish Labour Market that render this effort rather difficult, are developed. The organization of work hours, which are inflexible and very long (mostly due to the two-hour lunch break), the shortage of part-time work, and especially, a high rate of temporary jobs, are probably some of the main reasons for the high proportion of unemployed women nine months after giving birth who were working a year later (Gutiérrez-Doménech, 2002). Finally, in this section the wage gap between men and women in Spain will be also analysed.



Graph 1. Family Models of Gender Labour Division according to the number of children at home by countries. Sample: couples with at least one member working.

Source: Eurostat (web: "Number of private households by number of children and household composition" 2008). Own computations.


The dual female biography

In 2008, the female employment rate in Spain was 54.9%, a high or low figure, depending on what it is compared to. It is high considering that in 1998 the female employment rate was 35.8% – an increase of 19 points in 10 years! However, it is low considering that its equivalent in EU countries is higher (EU15 60.4 and EU27 59.1) and it is quite far from countries that were traditionally a reference for Spain (UK 65.8%, Germany 65.4%, France 60.7% - except for Italy 47.2%). In fact, the dynamics of female work in Spain, and especially, the relation between work and fertility, can only be understood considering 'the dual female biography' (Garrido, 1992).

The dual female biography refers to the generation gap that took place in Spain with the cohorts born in the 1950's and later. Two sorts of women coexist in today's

Spanish labour market, each having different socio-professional careers and profiles because of their generation. The first group belongs to the first big wave of female employment, which took place in Spain during the first part of the 1970's when the industrialization process and the economic boom started. During these years, women had a low educational level and were under strong pressure to have children. It is hardly surprising that they left the job market when they had children. The second wave was that of the women born after 1960. These women had enjoyed the feminist revolution, increase in university posts, development of the welfare state in Spain, and multi-level administration (primarily, Autonomous Communities in Spain, health and education), which meant that these women could face their professional prospects with sufficient educational resources in a market that offered more perspectives of female paid work.

A cohort analysis of female employment rates allows us to visualize this dual biography. In the following graph, we can see the 'quantum leap' in the behaviour of women born between 1951 and 1955 and in the group born a decade later (1960-65)⁷. The first group and the previous cohorts have their highest employment rate before the age of 24. This rate falls dramatically during the central years of fertility and slightly increases from age 35 onwards. In other words, these generations left the labour market to childrearing and they returned when their children started their education. The second group (those born between 1956 and 1960, and the succeeding generations) has a different pattern, as they do not leave the labour market to raise their children in such an overwhelming proportion (only 1 or 2 percentage points). Most of all, although they enter into the labour market later because of prolonged studies at age 25-29, over 70% stay active.



Graph 2: Female Labour Force Participation Rate by cohorts (fictitious)

Source: EPA. 1976TIII, 1980TIV, 1985TIV, 1990TIV, 1995TIV, 2000TIV, 2005 annual average.

In the context of a high number of young women available for paid work, entering into motherhood seems to have negative consequences. In response to the question of whether having children led to changes in their working life, 20.1% of the employed mothers polled answered that they stopped working, 32.6% reported reducing their labour participation rate, 24.1% said motherhood limited their promotion opportunities and 9.6% reported suffering some kind of employment discrimination due to motherhood (CIS, 2006 question 320). When asked, 58% of women believed that 'having a child becomes a hindrance in a woman's professional career' (CIS, 2006 question 614). This finding coincides with that of Gutiérrez-Doménech (2002), who analysed Spanish women before and after motherhood and found that one third of women who were working a year before becoming mothers were unemployed nine months later.

Flexibility in the work schedule

In Spain, the work schedule is commonly split into morning and afternoon (48% of all employees) with an average two-hour break for lunch, which extends the workday. Only 27% of employees have a continuous work schedule, with no lunch break, with the remaining women working rotating shifts or afternoon and night shifts with no breaks. This distribution differs depending on gender (a statistically significant difference), as split work schedules are more common among men (56.2% of male employees), whereas women who have continuous work schedules represent 37.1% of all female employees, followed by 36.3% of female employees with a split morning/afternoon work schedule (CIS, 2008, question 29).

There are flexible hours with an option to adapt or choose one's work schedule in 33.5% of all cases, and rigidly set starting and finishing hours in 65.6% of cases. An increasing proportion of women (68.2%) have a rigid timetable (CIS, 2008, question 30). It is not obvious how to interpret this phenomenon, because even though a small proportion of female employees can choose their work schedule, there exists a higher proportion of female employees who never exceed their designated number of working hours.

The percentage of employees that exceed their designated number of working hours is highly varied. Only 21.9% never do so, compared to 23.7% who do so every day or almost every day and 19.8% who do it at least once per week (CIS, 2008, question 31). As we saw earlier, gender differences are important because, whereas 30.2% of women never have to extend their work hours, 27.2% of men do it almost every day. It seems that women are working on posts with more rigid work hours, which has a negative side in that they have less flexibility to change what time they enter and leave work. However, it also has a positive side as they are less often asked to extend their work hours.

Part-time work

It is logical to assume that part-time work makes reconciling home life and work life easier. Thus, to obtain higher female employment rates, it would be appropriate to increase the number of flexible work schedules and part-time jobs. We are

considering Pfau-Effinger's model (2004, 2005) called 'The female part-time carer model of the male breadwinner family', previously linked to the last two models, in which the author establishes the existence of a symmetric partnership and caring for dependents is no longer the sole responsibility of women.

There is an open discussion about whether work policies should promote part-time work. One argument in favour of promoting part-time work is Hakim's Theory of Preferences (2000; 2003; 2005), which declares that a certain percentage of women want to combine housework with paid work and will prefer part-time jobs if care-related tasks have increased.

Another argument in favour of part-time work is the assumption that countries with higher part-time work rates will also have higher female employment rates and higher fertility. As seen in Graph 2, instead of a direct relationship between these factors, we observe distinct groups of countries having different patterns. One group is primarily made up of countries from Eastern Europe, and is characterized by high female employment rates and low part-time work rates. This group has the lowest fertility rates. Scandinavian and Western European countries form a second group, with female employment rates over 70% and around 40% part-time female employees. Nevertheless, this is a very heterogeneous group regarding fertility behaviour, as the level of synthetic fertility rates varies from more than two children per woman to less than 1.4 in Germany. Finally, there are countries that are more difficult to classify or that represent models by themselves (Netherlands, Switzerland or Finland). In this context, Spain does not clearly belong to any group, as it has lower part-time work rates (at the expense of the female labour force participation rate) as well as lower fertility rates. In total, casuistry is highly varied, and although a relation amongst these three factors is observed, we cannot talk about causality.

Arguments against boosting part-time work are particularly gender-based because, to date, such measures are aimed mostly at women to allow them to spend more time doing family-related tasks (both child and dependent care). Popularization of female part-time work would have three main consequences: fewer professional career development possibilities, as part-time jobs usually have fewer training and promotion opportunities; a lower contribution to Social Security, which may result in economic problems during the retirement years; and less power within the couple as the central hypothesis of the Resources Theory consequently would be fulfilled (the one who earns more has more power), although its strength varies depending on the gender of the receiver (Stocks, 2007).

In Spain, as in the rest of the OECD member countries, part-time work is common among women (women make up 80% of all part-time employees). Out of all employees, only 4.2% of men work part-time, compared to 22.8% of women. As seen in the following chart, the weight of part-time work differs for men and women, depending on whether or not they live with a child under five years old. The most noteworthy aspect is that, for men, parenthood means more work pressure because the incidence of part-time employment falls, whereas, amongst women living with a child under five years old, the opposite occurs - part-time employment increases to 30%. As expected, childcare is the primary reason for part-time work amongst women with children under five, followed by not finding a full-time job. The latter, however, is the main reason among male workers who live with children under five

years old— a 10-point higher effect than their counterparts not living with children. Finally, care is a minor reason among males, although its importance increased compared to the group of part-time male earners who do not live with children.

	MALES		FEMALES	
	Living with children under 5 years	NOT living with children under 5 years	Living with children under 5 years	NOT living with children under 5 years
% part time workers	2.0	4.6	30.0	21.3
REASONS WHY WORKING PART TIME				
Following educational or training courses	11.4	27.3	.7	10.3
Sickness or incapacity	1.0	3.8	.1	1.7
Care of children, sick adults, disabled or the elderly	6.7	.5	51.2	9.9
Other family or personal obligations	3.5	3.4	11.7	13.5
Have not been able to find a full-time job	39.9	29.8	21.4	37.4
Does not wish to work full-time	6.0	10.5	7.9	12.9
Other reasons	30.6	24.0	6.9	13.9
Sickness or disability	.9	.6	.0	.5
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 3. Percentage of part-time workers and reasons why they work part-time when living with children under five years old

Source: EPA. IIT2008

	Without children under 5 years old				With children under 5 years old			
	Working full-time		Working part-time		Working full-time		Working part-time	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
They wish to work...								
more hours	6.7	5.8	36.5	37.6	9.7	4.7	48.2	28.7
less hours*,	5.0	6.9	1.6	1.1	5.9	12.5	.6	1.5
the same	88.3	87.3	61.9	61.3	84.4	82.8	51.2	69.8
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0


Table 4: Percentage of employees who wish to work more/less hours depending on whether they have children, if they work full or part-time and their gender

Fuente: EPA. IIT2008 * with proportional wage reduction.

When we analyse the preference of more or less work hours of these earners, we see that having a child under five years of age changes the answers both for men and women in the same way as we saw before: more work hours for men and less for women. A possible topic for discussion is the matter of how to assess the importance of these differences. For instance, 12.5% of mothers working full-time want to work fewer hours, compared to 6.9% of childless women. When it comes to men working full-time, there is a 3% increase in the group wanting to work more hours when they have children under five. For parents working part-time, 12% more men wish to have more work hours, while 10% more women wish to have fewer hours. Differences are statistically significant, but the fact that 28.7% of women working part-time and living with a child under five wish to work more hours should also be taken into account.

Temporary Employment

A high proportion of temporary employment in the Spanish labour market seems to be a hindrance to fertility. As seen in the subsequent graph, the age of the employee is an important factor when explaining temporary employment rates: almost 41.5% of female employees between the ages of 25 and 30 have temporary contracts, but the percentage reduces to 29.7% for the 31-40 year old group. Therefore, work experience makes it easier to obtain an open-ended contract as opposed to the risk of non-renewal of a contract due to pregnancy. This makes it logical to wait until having an open-ended contract before becoming pregnant. Also, women always have higher temporary employment rates than men of the same age – except for women under 19 and over 70, two very minor groups).



Graph 3: Temporary work rate for men and women

Source: EPA 2008TIII

Age is not the only influential factor in temporary employment rates. Another aspect that results in open-ended contracts is the time spent in the company

(Hernanz, 2002). On the other hand, working in small companies or on posts requiring little skill makes it harder to obtain open-ended contracts. Overall, it would not be fair to say that Spain has ‘fallen into the trap’ of temporary hiring, as this phenomenon is mostly related to age and work experience in the labour market and to personal work position. For instance, Hernanz (2002) performed a cohort analysis that revealed a decrease in temporary employment rates with increasing employee age. As indicated above, the significance of temporality in the analysis of the decision to have a child among Spanish women comes from the idea that it is harder for women to find a job while pregnant. This assumption is hard to prove with our data. However, by using the EPA longitudinal series and adding different years, it could be possible to analyse if mothers of young children, in comparison to other women, have more difficulties finding a job.

Daily living and gender roles

Spain is usually labelled as having a ‘*familistic* culture’. This is a way of categorizing interpersonal relationships that overlap with traditional gender relationships, division of gender labour, and patterns of female employment (Saraceno, 1994; Naldini, 2002; Moreno, 2005, 2007). The concept of ‘*familistic* society’ has two characteristics that are analytically separable, but empirically related, as we will later see: the concept of family as a unit of solidarity and especially its role in intergenerational support; and the fundamental role of women in this solidarity network.

Family is the most trusted institution according to Spaniards, who live with their family until they are almost 30. When they become independent, they usually live near their parents and in-laws. Most Spaniards consider family to be ‘very important’ in their life⁸. Furthermore, family is the main source of satisfaction, as 52.9% of all Spaniards are very satisfied with their family and 42.7% are quite satisfied. Other aspects (friends, partner, work, etc.) are notably below this score (Spanish Centre of Sociological Research CIS, 2008 question 9).

The transition of children into young age does not imply a generational conflict. The occurrence of the so-called ‘Family Bargaining’ is noteworthy (Meil, 2006a). Within this family institution, the decision-making process and relationships among generations revolves around new values such as self-autonomy and democracy. At present, the generational conflict hardly ever occurs. 59.3% of young people between 15 and 29 years old are very satisfied with their families, and 37% are quite satisfied. Actually, family is the institution providing the most satisfaction and most trusted by young Spaniards (CIS, 2008b, questions 4 and 5), a fact that probably promotes a delayed emancipation.

Since the 1980’s, young Spaniards have been emancipating later from their families of origin, mostly due to the strong economic crisis of those years, a crisis that was particularly difficult to this new contingent of the labour market. High unemployment rates during the 1980’s were gradually replaced by high rates of temporary employment and a high rotation between employment and unemployment, so it is hardly surprising that 2000 saw the lowest rates of emancipation (60.8% of those between 25 and 29 lived with their parents, and 26%

of those between 30 and 34 – data from EPA). During the first decade of this century, young people started to become independent earlier and in 2008, 46.5% of those between 25 and 29, and 21% of those between 30 and 34 still lived with their parents (see Table 1 in Appendix). Nevertheless, it seems that the biggest explanatory factor for this advance in emancipation is, statistically, the effect of immigration in that decade (the population of immigrants rose from 2.28 % in 2000 to 12% in 2009, according to the Municipal Register from January 1st). Thus, the Spanish Youth Council (CJV) attributes the drop in the rate of emancipation of young people in the last quarter of 2008 to the reduced number of immigrants (CJV, 2008).

When these children, already in their second youth, become emancipated from their family of origin, a great intergenerational support is observed. Particularly, the phenomenon of ‘modified extended family’ appears in Spain. Family members do not live together under the same roof, because the relocation of the new couples becomes a very strong social norm, but they do live nearby in order to provide and exchange mutual help. Thus, grandmothers’ (and grandfathers’) help⁹ allows parents to balance motherhood/fatherhood with their professional career. In fact, in 1998 the factor that helped working mothers combine their job and child-rearing the most was their mother’s help (26.7%) followed by partner’s help (24.7%), followed by living near the workplace, and lastly being helped by another family member (13.9% and 10.2% respectively) (Tobío, 2002, from research in 1998 about family/work balance).

Two important cultural explanations stand out when trying to understand why Spanish women have fewer children. One is the conflict between new gender equality values and the traditional gender roles. The other is the rise in living standards, expectations, and consumption needs.

Norms and gender roles

Probably the highest incompatibility between motherhood and female paid work is the fact that childcare is still the mother’s responsibility. Despite the imposition of the egalitarian speech, which has legal status in the form of “political correctness”, the daily reality of household and care tasks continues to be a burden bestowed solely on working mothers.

It has been shown in some European countries that the father’s role in household tasks and child care is closely related to the mother’s dedication to this care. It is not a simple situation, and several levels of interaction develop: commitment (e.g., feed the baby or play with him); access (cooking while the baby is playing nearby); and responsibility (being the one ensuring that the baby is cared for). When these aspects are taken into consideration, men are increasing their commitment and access, but they do not become more responsible for their babies, even if their wives have a paid job (Lamb, 1997; Hobcraft & Kiernan, 1995: 36). Following this line of reasoning, it is hardly surprising that the decision to have a second child for Danish women dedicated to their professional career depends greatly on whether their partner contributed significantly to taking care of the first child. Actually, in Denmark ‘the likelihood of a second child is doubled when he takes active participation in care’ (Esping-Andersen et al., 2007: 148). A similar

phenomenon is found in Sweden, where the likelihood of having a second child decreases if the father did not take the parental leave with his first child (Oláh, 2003).

In Spain, there exists a perfectly symmetrical family model, namely 'a family where both members of the couple have a paid job with similar work hours and both share household tasks and childcare'. This kind of organization is the most suitable for 65% of all Spaniards. The part-time work model is preferred by 15.6%¹⁰ of Spaniards, compared to 14.9% preferring the female home carer model (CIS, 2008 question 19). Since 1987, when the Spanish Centre of Sociological Research (CIS) began asking this question, a slight and steady increase in the number of people who want a symmetric family has been observed, with a simultaneous drop in those who prefer other options (Navarro, 2006: 126). The segmentation analysis allows us to identify social groups that relate to each preference. If the percentage of people identifying themselves with the ideal model of symmetric family is classified in descending order there are: childless women under 35 years old (92% of individuals of the group); both genders under 45 with university education, with children (92%); childless men under 35 years (80%); both genders under 45 and below university level of education, with children (70%); and both genders between 35 and 54 without children (69%). Less numerous groups in favour are: men 65 and above with children (34% of the entire group); and both genders between 45 and 64 with children living in cities of 50,000 inhabitants or less (43% of the entire group) (Navarro, 2006: 133).

As people are apt to say, it's easier said than done. The ideal of a symmetric family is far from the everyday reality, especially because household chores are not shared between men and women. Doing the laundry, deciding what to eat the next day, cooking, and cleaning are performed most often or always by women. There are only two tasks more or less equally shared between genders or performed at the same time: caring for family members who are ill, and shopping (36.6% and 35.2% of those polled, respectively). Nevertheless, care of sick people and shopping are not tasks that are shared often, given that in 33.1% of cases, care is always performed by a woman, and in 32.9% of cases, shopping is also her responsibility. The only task often or always done by men is small repairs at home (32.8% and 29.3%, respectively) (CIS, 2008 question 22). Furthermore, half of all women look after their children aged 14 or less by themselves and in 40% of cases they share these tasks with their partners. The partners are in charge only in 2% of all cases (CIS, 2004 question 9).

In other countries, differences between men and women in their devotion to household tasks are very visible. As observed in the previous table, differences are generally higher within the total population, especially in Italy and Spain (more than a three-hour difference between men and women) and they are clearly lower in Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom. When only the employed are taken into consideration, differences decrease but do not disappear. Interestingly, these differences in devotion to household tasks between employed men and women are higher in countries with a lower percentage of part-time employed women (Italy, Poland and Spain). This fact supports the theory of the "women dual burden" phenomenon in these countries.

	Total population (20 – 74 years old)			Only working population		
	Males	Females	Differences	Males	Females	Differences
Germany	2:21	4:11	1:90	1:52	3:11	1:59
<i>Spain</i>	1:37	4:55	3:18	1:20	3:29	2:09
France	2:22	4:30	2:08	1:53	3:40	1:87
Italy	1:35	5:20	3:85	1:10	3:51	2:41
Poland	2:22	4:45	2:23	1:53	3:58	2:05
United Kingdom	2:18	4:15	1:97	1:54	3:28	1:74
Sweden	2:29	3:42	1:13	2:23	3:32	1:09

Table 5: Devotion to household tasks (average hours and minutes)

Source: Aliaga (2006). (Using national time-budget surveys)

Standards of living

It seems that Spanish women want to have more children than they actually have. In a country where the rate of the reproduction of generations is not attained, the ideal number of children for 75.2% of women polled is two or three (41.2% want two, 23.1% want three and 10.9% two or three); only 2% do not want any and 4.2% want only one (CIS, 2006 question 611). To the question ‘Do you think that there are as many children as wanted, more children than wanted or fewer children than wanted in Spain’, in 1998, 47% of those polled responded that there were fewer children than wanted, and 80% thought it was because of economic reasons (CIS, 1998, question 16 and 17). In 2004, in response to the same question, the number rose to 61.1% (CIS, 2004 question 13). Again, the reason given most often was ‘the economic cost of children’, although the percentage of women citing this reason fell to 67.3%, and the second most cited reason was ‘the incorporation of women to work outside the home’ with 42.3% (the people questioned were allowed a maximum of two answers) (CIS, 2004 question 14).

Similarly, when women are asked about themselves, 51.9% think they will have fewer children than they would like (CIS, 2004 questions 16, 17 and 18). Again, the main reasons are ‘lack of adequate income’ and ‘problems with combining work with childcare’ in 37.7% and 25.1% of cases, respectively, followed by ‘lack of time to assist them’ (12.5%) and age (6.7%) (CIS, 2004 question 18).

Arguments in favour of having fewer children than wanted (economic reasons and lack of time) require a deeper explanation (these reasons are closely related to the problem of balancing work and family). Why are economic reasons given so often, even though the growth of domestic GDP has never been as high and sustainable as in the studied years?

An explanatory hypothesis could be that Spain belongs, in a cultural way, to this ‘club of rich countries’ in which, in order to maintain living and consumption standards, one needs a rather high income. It belongs to the rich world but materially

is below the benchmark European countries like France, the United Kingdom or Germany. Spain has high young unemployment rates, a high proportion of precarious employments and low wages. To summarize, young people from northern Europe, when they become independent from their parents, enter environments that are more economically secure. But, young people in Spain live in environments that create higher uncertainty, and if they want to leave the parental house and avoid losing purchasing power they are 'obliged' to solidify their life projects.

Considering the fact that there are highly defined life projects in Spain – probably more defined than in rich northern Europe – delay in fertility occurs without problems. Young people think that they need to finish their studies (most often graduate and post-graduate degrees), have a job (both members of the couple), own a house, and afterwards share that common project. This introduces two basic elements in our explanation, a precarious situation in the labour market and cost of housing, given that in the scheme of young Spaniards' emancipations, economic independence is followed by establishing an independent household. It is only after this long and problematic stage is overcome, that the decision to have children is considered. There is a delay in young Mediterranean people's emancipation. The idea that 'one gets married with all included' is very *latino* and therefore, being employed is essential. So the fact that the woman must stay at home (because she is unemployed) is paradoxically not a factor in the decision to have children, because it means postponing the arrival of security, which is only attained with a salary or double salary. So the need to ensure security in times of employment uncertainty and elevated housing costs does not contradict what appears to be a fact: parents facing difficulties combining family and work choose to have fewer children (Puy Cabetas, 2000).

Women of foreign origin

Almost 10% of women residing in Spain have a foreign origin. Most of these are young women, since the reason for emigration is usually unemployment (59% are between 25 and 44 years old), and the majority come from Latin America (55%). This collective is partly responsible for the slight rise of fertility over the last decade, as for instance in 2008 in Spain more than 20% of newborns had a foreign mother.


Although foreign women's views on family are similar to those of Spanish women, studies have indicated a greater variety in their valuation of motherhood (Delgado, 2007 on the basis of the 2006 Survey of Fertility and Values). For example, the kind of family they prefer is symmetric, and the ideal housewife family model is in the minority. Nevertheless, there are differences for each option, because whereas 77% of Spanish women choose a symmetric family, this option is reduced to 64% amongst foreigners, who in a higher proportion prefer the model of part-time female worker (21%) or housewife (10%). Also, opinions about the right of a woman to have a child without a husband or partner are vastly different: 57.5% of foreign women reject this option (hardly agree and completely disagree) compared to 7% of Spanish women. As for the importance given to family life, it is very or quite important to 87% of all Spanish women polled, while 38% of all foreigners think is not important at all or hardly important (17%).

The question of children is where the greatest differences between natives and foreigners are observed when it comes to reality, preferences or opinions. They show a lower awareness of the difficulties that raising children may cause for a mother's job. This is perhaps because these women emigrated in order to provide higher standards of living for their children. That is, it is their children who push them to work. Foreign women's ideal number of children is higher than that of Spanish women (2.48 versus 2.37) and also a higher number of children are born partly as a result of the different maternity calendar – although it has been shown that the calendar effect explains most of the fertility reduction of Spanish women.

Decision to have children

As we said in the beginning, the number of children per woman (TFR) in Spain has fallen tremendously from 1979 when it was 2.8 to 1994 when it was 1.2. During the 1990s, fertility rates remained very low, but a small recovery was observed in 2000. The slight increase of fertility coincides with the strong increase of immigration in Spain, and this immigration is actually one of the reasons for the recovery given that, in 2008, one out of five births was from a foreign mother (www.ine.es). Despite the fact that the TFR remains very low, all generations reaching the end of their reproductive life are averaging 1.7 children per woman. The strong decrease of the TFR is in large part due to the way this indicator is constructed, as it is very sensitive to delay in the calendar, given that it seems that the reproduction model is closer to two children than to only one child (Miret & Cabré, 2005).

The progress of fertility in Spain between 1985 and 2006 can be divided into three general patterns (Delgado, 2007: 89 and following. Data from Fertility Surveys of 1985, 1995, 1999 and 2006): Strong and persistent delay in the start of the reproductive stage; U-shape of infertility, with higher infertility rates in 1985 and 2006, when roughly 12% of women between 45 and 49 years had no children, and lower percentages in 1995 and 1999, when this proportion was only 7 and 6.3% respectively; an extraordinary change in the number of children, as it fell from almost 50% of women of 40 to 44 years with at least a three children, in 1985, to 17.7% in 2006. Thus, in the case of Spain, the low fertility rate is determined by the drastic reduction of families with three or more children, which results in having the first child at an older age (Ortega, 2001; Delgado et al, 2008: 1099). In other words, the age of entry into fertility and the number of children born is highly correlated: a delay in having the first child is associated with having fewer children (Frejka & Sardon, 2004; Delgado et al, 2006).



Graph 4: Fertility Rate and percentage of newborns of a foreign mother

Source: Vital Statistics, INE (www.ine.es)

Before the 1990's the popular belief was that the increase in female educational level and the growth of female participation in the labour market promoted the reduction of fertility. The conclusion at that time was that being a female worker and childrearing were generally incompatible roles in most developed countries (UN, 1983). However, the UN recognised three possible models. One was that the influence of paid work on birth rates was negative, and educational levels explain the difference of 0.18 children. The second was the 'U' curve, in which women left the labour market to raise their children and they returned when the children went to school. The third model was "atypical", or not possible to establish a clear relationship between these two variables, with Belgium and Spain included in this category (UN, 1983). A quarter of a century later, data from the generation of Spanish women who are almost past their reproductive age place Spain in the first group of countries. The average number of children of the cohort born between 1961 and 1965 was 1.8 in 2006, whereas women with upper graduate studies only averaged 1.4 (Delgado, 2007 – data from the Natural Population Turnover). This phenomenon was also observed in other research, as 24% of women holding a university degree between 36 and 40 years of age in 1999 did not have any children, while the proportion was reduced to 7.5% for women with primary education (Bernardi, et al, 2003 – data from the Fertility Survey 1998/99). Apart from educational level, working status seems to have an influence, as women born between 1961 and 1965 who were housewives in 2006 had a fertility rate of 2.0, compared to 1.6 children per woman in the group of employed women with a long-

term contract and unemployed women. Unemployed women with temporary contracts and self-employed ones are close to the mean (Delgado, 2007).

From a micro point of view with individual data, conflict between motherhood and paid work in the 1990's in the Spanish context is analysed from different perspectives. Anh and Mira (2001) studied the socio-demographic survey in 1991 and used proportional-hazards models to analyse the young Spanish male decision to enter into marriage and to have children. They observed that the strong employment crisis of those years had delayed both the age of getting married and the age of fatherhood. Specifically, being unemployed delayed both decisions, as did being employed part-time or on a temporary contract, although the latter factors had a smaller effect.

Gema Álvarez (Álvarez-Llorente, 2002), with data from EPA 1987-1993, assessed the effect of employment on fertility by neutralizing the unnoticeable differences in women, that is, by assuming that labour participation may change when children arrive (exogenous factor) but that this participation may also be affected beforehand by thoughts of one's future fertility (endogenous factor). In order to neutralize this endogenous factor she used an alternate probits model to firstly analyse female participation in the labour market and later observe which factors have an influence on a woman's likelihood of having her first, second or third child. Finally, she examined the effect of participation on the market on the basis of each previous probability. Results for women between 16 and 45 years and from 1987 to 1993 show that participation of a given woman in the labour market led to a delay of entry into motherhood. Furthermore, in the case of participating women, education had a positive impact on fertility. Possible solutions to childcare appeared to have an effect too, as it was observed that the presence of grandparents at home had a positive impact on participating women, as did the number of childcare centres in the Autonomous Community.

Only by treating the effect of participation on the decision to fertility as an exogenous factor was it observed that female participation considerably reduced the likelihood of having the first, second and third child. When participation is treated as an endogenous effect on the decision to fertility, its influence is reduced considerably, but it is still negative, which means that paid work and fertility are conflicting areas. The problem worsens when the female labour force participation rate suffers a continuous increase – whereas in 1990 55% of women between 30 and 34 years old were active, in 2000 the percentage rose to 70%. In other contexts in which female paid work becomes the social norm, the author concluded that fertility is associated to a woman's perceived easiness of consolidating her professional career, because she will delay motherhood until she achieves that professional status.

Sara de la Rica and Amaia Iza (2005) analysed data from the ECHIP, in order to isolate the effect of type of work contract (which they consider a proxy for employment security) on the decision to enter into motherhood. They concluded that women with temporary contracts (or those who do not participate in the labour market and so do not have any contract) are less likely to enter into motherhood than female workers with an open-ended contract. Similar results are obtained with the same data even when 'non-employed' status is split into housewife and unemployed (Baizán, 2006). Specifically, it is affirmed that both housewife status and stable

working status have a positive impact on fertility. Conversely, a precarious working status, specifically temporary employment and unemployment, leads to delay and reduces the number of offspring a woman has.

Finally, Teresa Martín (2010) – with retrospective data of the 1995 Fertility Survey – analysed which specific occupations are more related to women having their first, second and third child. Results show that health and education professionals are exposed to a higher risk of having a third child, which the author interprets as these professional domains providing a balance between motherhood and paid work.

Own Model

With a view on the development of public policies that provide an increase of the fertility rate in Spain, the focus moves to the reproductive behaviour of women who are now, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, in their main reproductive ages. The initial hypothesis is to confirm ‘the positive turn’: the moment at which the trend shifts and female labour force participation rate correlates positively with fertility. If this turn occurs, it is expected that it will be related to social changes in the past decade: the desire and decision of women to participate in the labour market, the need of a dual income home to have access to higher standards of living, and also the increase of temporary hiring and unemployed rates resulting in job insecurity. In general, it is expected that fertility will be higher in those situations providing a balance between paid work and motherhood.

The key independent variable in this model is economic activity. Specifically, the employment status in January, during the tax year (the year prior to the survey), is used. The goal of the model is to analyse the employment situation when the decision to have children was taken at least nine months before giving birth, so the later employment situation is known and chosen. The activity situation will allow us to test between different hypotheses. A higher probability for women who are full-time workers of becoming pregnant once or more would support the change of trend hypothesis, because paid work is advantageous for having children as it provides income, which increases financial security (Change of Trend Hypothesis –**H₁**). On the other hand, the risk of having children for female part-time workers and housewives will allow us to observe if these women are more oriented towards motherhood according to Hakim’s theory of preferences (Preference Hypothesis –**H₂**). However, the assessment of the reproductive behaviour of unemployed women is not always uniform. Finding a lower probability of pregnancy would support the Theory of Security, assuming women suffer more insecurity in the labour market and delay motherhood (Stability Hypothesis–**H₃**). Or, unemployed women may have the best chances if they have contributed to social security as wage-earners for two years, since they are then entitled to two years of unemployment benefit, which, added to the four months of paid maternity leave, create a period of economic security that is very advantageous to the personal care of the baby in its first year of life (Hypothesis about the incompatibility of paid-work and the care of babies –**H₄**). Finally, there can be a ‘fictitious’ unemployment situation, much closer to non-activity, in the sense that women claim to be unemployed because it is a situation created from a subjective self-definition, as it is possible that the kind of job they want has certain

features that are not realistic (features such as schedules, location, salary, etc). This option is found in households where the woman is the secondary wage earner and, therefore, it would be related to the Preference Hypothesis $-H_2$. Due to these effects (mostly negative) that unemployment has on fertility, it is expected that it is not a significant explanatory factor.

Another independent variable is the type of union (only women living with a partner will be analysed). Couples will be distinguished from each other according to the type of union. Married couples are in a relationship demanding more stability than registered partnerships, which may help to corroborate the hypothesis that the decision to enter into motherhood is influenced by the feeling of security in life (Stability Hypothesis $-H_3$).

Other variables will be used mostly as control variables. The educational level attained is expected to be relevant, as the female (as well as male) labour market is strongly influenced by educational level. Women with a low educational level are more likely to be housewives, whereas those with a university degree are most likely functioning in the labour market. In models created with the sample of women who already have had their first child, the control variables introduced are the number of children and whether there is any child under three years of age at home (always at the moment of becoming pregnant), as it is understood that fertility behaviour is influenced by these contexts.

Besides these basic models, there are also regression models in which the same variables of the mothers' partners are introduced, with the intention of analysing the possible interaction or influence of the father's characteristics. (There are models without results due to the extremely low burden of the couple's employment instability resulting in models that do not converge).

Finally, with the aim of analysing the impact of job characteristics on fertility, regression models are also created only with the sample of women that in January of the past year were working and did not change their situation/status during that year. As shown in

Table 10 and 13 in the appendix, in these models, the sample was drastically reduced because more than 20% of the women changed status (interestingly, 24% of women having their first child changed from working to not working); to that we must add that non-active and unemployed women were also removed resulting in a drastic reduction of the sample. Relevant variables are those that explain employment characteristics, particularly the security shown in the employment relationship, as it is expected to meet the pattern of the 1990s, so those women with a fixed-contract are more likely to decide whether to get pregnant or not (Stability Hypotheses $-H_3$). The duration of workday (Hypotheses concerning the incompatibility of paid work and care of babies $-H_4$) occupational category is also introduced. The occupational category allows us to support different hypotheses, although to a certain extent they are contradictory, because a high probability in higher posts may be interpreted as the work benefitting from better working conditions (income and work organization) so they make motherhood easier, and low posts have the opposite interpretation (Stability Hypothesis $-H_3$ and Change in Trend Hypothesis in a sense $-H_1$). So, on the other hand, a lower probability of women having children in high responsibility jobs could suggest that, when women develop a professional career, they need to

make a choice between career and motherhood (Hypothesis concerning incompatibility of paid-work and care of babies – H_4).

To summarize, the risk of pregnancy was analysed in the group of women between 19 and 45 years of age at the time of the interview (from 2004 to 2007) and having a partner. The sample was sub-divided into the group of those who were childless and the group of those having one child. The dependent variable was having one child (1) or none (0). Specifically, the sample was created by selecting those cases in which a member of the home was born the same year as the survey or in the second half of the previous year. Because of problems with sample size, children born before the third quarter of the year prior to the survey were taken into consideration, so in the worst scenario (one twelfth of births) we asked about woman's employment situation in January and the baby was born in July. Different models were created (up to eight) according to the sample selected and the variables implemented:

- Model 1: All women without children. Only female characteristics
- Model 2: All women without children. Male and female characteristics
- Model 3: All women with one child. Only female characteristics
- Model 4: All women with one child. Male and female characteristics
- Model 5: Employed women without children. Only female characteristics
- Model 6: Employed women without children. Male and female characteristics
- Model 7: Employed women with one child. Only female characteristics
- Model 8: Employed women with one child. Male and female characteristics

Included in the appendix is the frequency distribution of dependent variables from the regression models. Specifically, models 1 to 4 are presented in Table 12, and models 5 to 8 in Table 13.

The EU-SILC dataset was used¹¹. This database has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are its semi-longitudinal character, the vast size of the sample, its comparability across the EU countries, the extent of its economic questions (especially about the perception of public aid) and the fact that the units of analysis are both the individual and the household. Moreover, in the case of Spain, it will allow to observe the incidence of the new reconciliation policies. Its disadvantage for fertility and labour market studies is the fact that the EU-SILC is not designed for this purpose, so certain areas remain unaddressed. Longitudinal files have been used from 2004 to 2007. Specifically, we chose the year the woman had her child, and for the women who had not had any children, the year 2007 was used.

The technique used is Cox Regression or Proportional-Hazards Analysis (also known as Relative-Hazards Analysis) where the temporary dependent variable will be the mother's age. This technique has certain issues when it comes to the weighting scheme of the sample, thus the weight method used in Cox Regression in SPSS is only able to interpret weighted cases as a number of replied cases. In other words, this proceeding cannot process cases without whole weights. This becomes a problem at the moment that the weighting variable in the EU-SILC, in its longitudinal files, not only weights upon the cases but also rises to the power of the population. Because this system is completely inadequate to assess the significance of coefficients in regression models, a weighting variable is estimated, which does not

artificially increase the number of sample cases of the model. However, if decimals are removed, rounding the weight off causes almost 15% of the cases with a weight value lower than 0.5 to be lost. To avoid this, the weight value was increased by 0.20 and then the weight was rounded off afterwards, so that less than 5% of cases were lost, although it is true that the sample increased by 20% in an artificial way. This is why the meaning of coefficients must be understood properly.

Analysis of models

Table 8 shows the relative pregnancy hazards for women between 19 and 45 years of age and living with a partner. It is observed that for married women, relative risk of having a first child is 49% greater than for women whose union does not have a legal status. When looking at the risk of having the second or third child, marital status is no longer relevant, probably due to sample selection, because only 7% of women living with a partner and having a child are not married.

When the risk of having the first child is analysed, we observed that the rest of the characteristics were not statistically relevant for the model, therefore we may conclude that the desire to have the first child does not appear to depend on differences in personal characteristics. Perhaps it is worth emphasizing that, even when the coefficients are not significant, women in every employment status had a higher risk of having the first child than women in non-active statuses (only 11% of the sample).

With regard to the risk of having a second or third child, personal work and educational situations become relevant. Women with only one child certainly have a higher (precisely, 4.44 times higher) risk of becoming pregnant than those who have three or more children. Furthermore, the most favourable situation for a second or third pregnancy is that of unemployment, which currently constitutes 28% of this sample. Probably the most interesting finding is the influence of educational level when controlling for all other variables. Women with university degrees have a higher risk of having a second child, and therefore women with only basic secondary education have a 57% lower relative risk ($1-0.431$). In other words, housewives and those with a university-level education are those who have a higher risk of having these second and subsequent children, although this group is a great minority in terms of their percentage, as Table 9 in the Annexe shows. These results confirm some of the hypotheses already posed which, as one can see, are not mutually exclusive. For instance, we find that hypothesis H_2 about preferences and H_4 about incompatibility of paid work and care of babies are partly confirmed, since inactive women not in the workforce have more children. Probably they do not work because of the desire to be full-time mothers and wives. However, women who are part-time workers have less risk of having a second child (or subsequent children) than women not in the workforce, and almost the same risk as women who are full-time workers (as shown in the section on Part-time Work in Spain). It seems that these data are more related to job opportunities and workplace characteristics (safety, etc) than to a balance between household duties and paid work. On the other hand, changes in the trend of H_1 should also be considered, since women holding a university degree are

more likely to have a second and a third child, probably due to the improvement of living conditions and lower job risk (H_4 Stability Hypothesis).

When the couple's characteristics are introduced, the coefficients and the significance of the woman's educational level fall as a result of the educational homogeneity within the couple, as the educational level of the two members of a couple is correlated.

	1st child		2nd child and next	
	Model 1 Exp(B)	Model 2 Exp(B)	Model 3 Exp(B)	Model 4 Exp(B)
Married women (Ref. "de facto" partner)	1.491**		1.326	1.381
Number of children (Ref. 3 and more)			***	***
- She has ONE child			4.444***	4.424***
- She has TWO children			.377***	.379***
She doesn't have a child under 3 years old (Ref. Yes)			.845	.819
Economic activity in January (Ref. Inactivity)			**	**
- Working full-time	1.164		.707***	.697***
- Working part-time	1.073		.711**	.721*
- Unemployed	1.128		.859	.836
Level of education (Ref. Tertiary)			***	*
- Primary	.866		.431***	.666*
- Lower Secondary	1.205		.757**	.903
- Upper Secondary	1.130		.655***	.725**
HUSBAND/PARTNER				
Economic activity in January (Ref. Inactivity)				
- Working full-time				1.230
- Working part-time				.846
- Unemployed				1.613
Level of education (Ref. Tertiary)				***
- Primary				.430***
- Lower Secondary				.743**
- Upper Secondary				.884
	N (weighted)			
	Events	281	382	370
	Censored	929	3121	3018

Table 6. Results of Cox Regression. ACTIVE AND NON-ACTIVE WOMEN. Relative-hazards of having the first child and relative-hazards of having more children

Source: Longitudinal EU-SILC (microdata). Spain 2004-2007.

Significance levels: * $p < 0.1000$ ** $p < 0.0500$ *** $p < 0.0100$

When employed women are considered – 60% of childless women within the sample and 48% who were already mothers – we observed that when it comes to having the first child, educational level shows a very organized trend: the risk of pregnancy increases with the educational level. In the sample of women who already have had their first child, the trend is not as linear or clear and the significance of the coefficients drops. However, the risk of pregnancy for women with a university degree remains higher. In other words, once unemployed women are not taken into consideration – a significant proportion in the case of Spain – the Trend and Stability Hypotheses - H_1 and H_3 - are supported, since women with university level studies usually have higher-income jobs (care is bought in the market) and better working conditions, especially safety at work.

The most noteworthy aspect of proportional-hazards risk models developed with the sample of employed women is the lack of significance of female work variables. The exception is that women who work less than 34 hours have a greater risk of having the first child, although the significance of this effect disappears when the couple's work characteristics enter into the model. Another exception is that, regarding the lower risk of non-skilled women of the tasks resulting from having the second child, only the woman's education is particularly relevant. Similar to that revealed by the models for the total sample, amongst employed women, those with university education always have a higher risk of getting pregnant, whether it is the first child or subsequent births. These results can be interpreted in the light of a strong segmentation of the female labour market according to educational level. In other words, temporary work – very related to income and other work conditions – is higher in occupational categories demanding a lower education level.

Finally, the husband's characteristics were indeed significant in understanding the risks for occupied women of getting pregnant. Its effect is embodied in different trends. First, when introducing the male variables, the significance of the characteristics of female employment increase; in particular, women with permanent contracts are at lower risk of having a second child than those with short term contracts. In terms of occupational category, two different groups are emerging: clerks and unskilled occupations in non-service, with greater risk of pregnancy, and the rest. Furthermore, regarding the nature of male employment, it is surprising, for instance, that when the couple has a temporary contract, the risk of having the second child increases. This result may counteract the higher risk of university graduates of having a second child. Taken together, these trends seem contradictory. In women, the trend is to be a graduate, have temporary contracts, and be working in "Shop and market sale", while in men, the trend is to be a professional with a university degree and have short term contracts. But a possible explanation is labour market segmentation in Spain. In other words, we can see two scenarios involved in the higher risk of having children: one is couples in which each member has a university degree and good work conditions, and the other is couples in which the woman is a housewife, has a low educational level, and the husband has worse work conditions.

	1st child		2nd child and next	
	Model 5 Exp(B)	Model 6 Exp(B)	Model 7 Exp(B)	Model 8 Exp(B)
Married women (Ref. "de facto" partner)	1.658*	2.226***	1.262	1.444
Number of children (Ref. 3 and more)			***	***
- She has ONE child			4.421***	5.560***
- She has TWO children			.369**	.445
No child under 3 years old (Ref. Yes)			.723	.610*
Level of education (Ref. Tertiary)	**	***	**	*
- Primary	.096**	.204**	.544	.746
- Lower Secondary	.369**	.318***	.680	.538*
- Upper Secondary	.572**	.469***	.510***	.507**
Labour relationship (Ref. Employee- temporary contract)				*
- Self-employed	1.362	1.289	.960	.893
- Employee- permanent contract	1.502	1.453	.780	.589**
Working week hours (Ref. less than 30)				
- More than 30 hours a week	.899	1.775	.866	.836
Occupational category (Ref. Elementary occupations-Non services)	***	***	***	***
- Managers	.000	1.514	.374	.213**
- Professionals	.442	1.189	.436*	.210***
- Technicians & Clerks	.583	1.495	.569	.372**
- Skilled workers - Services	.448	.997	.382*	.269**
- Shop & market sales	2.039	6.211	1.006	.993
- Skilled workers - Non Services	.597	3.071	.432	.200**
- Elementary occupations- Services	.909	2.964	.215	.118***
HUSBAND/PARTNER				
Labour relationship (Ref. Employee- temporary contract)				
- Self-employed		.679		.650
- Employee- permanent contract		.688		.610*
Working week hours (Ref. More than 40)				***
- Less than 35 hours a week		1.817		.193**
- From 35 to 40 hours a week		1.512*		.529***
Occupational category (Ref. Elementary occupations-Non services)				
- Managers		.300		2.444*
- Professionals		.546		2.834**
- Technicians & Clerks		.683		1.922
- Skilled workers - Services		.416		1.211
- Shop & market sales		1.148		.957
- Skilled workers - Non Services		.529		1.350
- Elementary occupations- Services		.113**		2.039
N (weighted)	599		1611	1441
Events	123	111	150	135
Censored	476	571	1461	1306

Table 7: Results of Cox Regression. WORKING WOMEN (*). Relative-hazards of having the first child and Relative-hazards of having second and subsequent

Source: Longitudinal EU-SILC (microdata). Spain 2004-2007. (*) Occupied in January of the last year and who do not change status regarding activity. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1000$ ** $p < 0.0500$ *** $p < 0.0100$.

A factor that does have an easy interpretation is the duration of the workday, because men who work more than 40 hours and live in dual income households are more likely to have their partners decide to get pregnant. This is a trend that does not seem to match easily with the second paternity introduced by the theory of the second modernity.

Conclusions

The pace of social change appears to be accelerating. After the first demographic transition, we are already in the second one with all characteristics involved: postponement of marriage and pregnancy with the first child, lower fertility and increases in cohabitation, divorce, and 'reconstructed families'. The second transition is the demographic aspect of a broader change in modern western societies, which different authors have called second modernity societies, risk societies, liquid or reflexive societies. In this new society, old securities have disappeared and not even careers promise to be organized and thriving, nor is marriage life-lasting. Moreover, female identity is not exclusively built around motherhood; the ideal family is egalitarian without gender role specialization; and a new definition of motherhood/parenthood casts these as a gratifying experience in which parents must ensure the access of certain consumption standards to their children. And finally, life expectancy has risen, which creates changes in the biographic strategy especially through the delay of entry into adulthood (extension of the educational period, delayed emancipation and fertility) and it provides legal status to multi-generational families, postponing the transfer of assets and access to housing.

The rise in uncertainty resulting from the second modernity societies, gender equality, greater life expectancy and the new parent-child relationship, were explanations used in the analysis of low fertility rates in developed countries. However, they do not explain differences between countries, especially when it comes to understanding why Spain has a fertility rate lower than that of France, Denmark or Sweden, whose change of values occurred earlier and more strongly than in Spain.

The increase in uncertainty and, therefore, the delay in fertility, is also related to an imbalance amongst social institutions involved in this process, resulting from different paces of change that have occurred in Spain since the democratic transition. As seen in the text, the more rapidly these changes occurred, the stronger was the likelihood of a greater imbalance. In Spain, changes have been particularly rapid. Since the 1980's the educational institution has focused on equal opportunities for both genders, such that nowadays there are more women than men earning college degrees. Female labour force participation rates continue to grow in a steady and sustainable way. Furthermore, these women are mostly full-time workers and the egalitarian partnership model dominates. However, in spite of the increase in school places for 3 and 6 year-old children, there are poor care resources, both public and private, for children under 3 years of age outside the family, and the existing ones are generally expensive. At the same time, companies do not adapt themselves (in general) to the demands of new female workers and new reconciliation policies do

not cover working mothers' needs. Finally, this new cultural understanding of fatherhood more oriented towards care seems to be statistically rare. In summary, although equality values have taken over homes, there is still a clear dissociation between expectations and actual behaviour.

Changes in institutions involved in the decision of having children are analysed through three key dimensions: domestic culture (especially its family values, gender roles and care responsibilities); labour market (especially the kinds of jobs to which women have access and employers' awareness regarding reconciliation); and public policies on reconciliation support.

In connection with the role of the cultural context, Spain is characterized by what is called a '*familistic* culture', which refers to a strong inter-generational support involving the prolonging of children's life with their parents (with hardly any pressure to become independent) and grandparents' supporting of parents in the care of babies. This culture also entails female responsibility in family care tasks. Specifically, when it comes to norms and gender roles, we see a duality in the conservative values and behaviours exposed by surveys. Despite the fact that most families claim the symmetric family is ideal, most women carry a dual burden. This imbalance in the female role may create a conflicting position that discourages women from having children. In addition to this conflicting and uncertain position women find themselves in, we must consider the particular effect of the increase of living standards in Spain in recent years. First, the risk of losing status relative to the family of origin (high price of housing, uncertainty in professional career) and secondly, the idea that bringing up a child needs not only specific standards of living but also some assurance that these standards can be maintained.

A second institutional dimension is the organization of the female labour market and the response given by employers to challenges of reconciliation. It must be taken into account that during the last period of economic prosperity, prior to the crisis of 2008, the Spanish labour market created many jobs when generations born after 1980 began to work – the smallest generations in the recent history of Spain. As mentioned earlier, most young women in Spain work, although very long hours with less options for flexible working hours, a characteristic that has its positive side, as we have seen, if we take into account that time flexibility is more prone to generating extra hours than to organizing timetables personally.

The weight of part-time work could be noted as a possible measure to provide reconciliation and therefore lead to motherhood, but the results are far from unequivocal. In general, the fertility rate is higher in countries with high rates of female part-time workers, but we also see countries like Finland, in which the rate of part-time work among women is low while their fertility rate is above the European average. Meanwhile, in Spain more than one half of women living with a child under five years of age and working part-time do so specifically to support the child. Yet, more than a quarter of these women wish to work more hours.

Finally, the temporary-employment rate has been analysed, very closely associated with age, experience in the labour market, and experience in the job position itself. It seems logical to assume that some women will wait for an open-ended contract to have children to avoid potential contract-renewal problems should they become pregnant.

Decisions taken in order to build any kind of Welfare State and, especially, the interaction between social policy and the labour market, may encourage or discourage to a greater or lesser extent, the combination of household/care work with paid work. That is, these decisions may facilitate either the persistence of traditional family roles or the introduction of new possible solutions. We have seen in recent years that public authorities have made a definite programmatic effort to include the problem of reconciliation in the political agenda although it has not resulted in a major budget allocation. This is a phenomenon shared by countries in southern Europe, which, since their entry into the European Union, have suffered a deep conversion in their human resources and have invested in their educational systems. Parental leave is still enjoyed mostly by women, so it is false to affirm that employers take the same risk when hiring women or men. However, childhood care services for children between 3 and 6 years old, while nearly universal, are limited and quite expensive in case of younger children, plus people commonly assume babies are badly cared for in these centers.

Also, behaviour regarding fertility is not homogeneous. Different factors delay the decision to have children. The use of proportional-hazard models to test the hypothesis of the fertility positive-turn is not conclusive, especially because having the second and following children is clearly related to being a housewife, a status that still represents a large proportion of women in Spain (28% of the sample of women who are already mothers). When analysing only the working women, educational level stands out as a better explanatory factor, as those holding a university degree have a higher risk of having the first and subsequent children. In order to understand the implications of this relationship, the strong segmentation of the labour market depending on educational level must be taken into consideration, especially in the female population. Bearing this in mind, it is understandable that women with college degrees are more likely to have children than other women, because they have the highest employment stability and, in general, better working conditions. There is only one exception: the decision to have the first child in the survey of all the women, in which educational level was not significant, probably because the strong presence of housewives counteract the other situations.

Future Analysis

The aim of this working document is to show where research on the relation between fertility, female participation in employment, and reconciliation policies in Spain, currently stands. During the course of this research it has been possible to note some aspects of the complex context in which the decision to enter into parenthood is made, on which there is little knowledge, due to a shortage of data (sometimes a lack of institutional transparency) or because of inadequate research, or relevant aspects that deserve to be studied in greater depth. Specifically, this last section arranges this information into three categories: the decision to enter into parenthood, the reorganization of time after the first child's birth, and maternity/paternity leave. The general conclusion is that the large databases, including both registry and survey databases, are not designed to analyse these issues, so that when one works with a target population, such as pregnant women or

women with children under three years old, the subsamples are reduced, which is the main problem with the multivariable analysis carried out in this paper. Furthermore, there is never one single source that contains all the dimensions needed to test the most current hypotheses, therefore it is not easy to carry out research more focused on microdata.

The decision to have children

The size of the samples

To analyse the influence of the woman's employment status – and that of her partner – on the decision to have children, it seems convenient to turn to the time when she gets pregnant, that is, nine months before the baby's birth. Annual samples both from EU-SILC and EPA are limited, so in order to increase the size of the sample it is suitable to turn to longitudinal databases. The problem with longitudinal databases is that, in standard files, the number of variables available for research is reduced, making it necessary to compare these variables separately. For example, longitudinal databases of the EU-SILC do not include nationality or country of birth. The longitudinal EPA does include the mother's nationality but not the date of birth of all the family members which, again, makes it necessary to compare data *ad hoc*.

The influence of nationality

It is expected that being an immigrant increases the likelihood of having more children. This hypothesis results from the second modernity theory. Immigration of young women into Spain has occurred primarily because of work. These women come from less industrialized countries (more than one half come from South America). Holding the other variables constant, a high and significant coefficient in this variable may test the second modernity in the sense that those women who are not socialized in these values have not internalized the need for motherhood to be a gratifying activity or the need for their children to access high consumption standards. In this sense, foreign women do not believe that motherhood does not stand in conflict with paid work in as high of a proportion as Spanish women do. As mentioned before, the nationality variable is not available in longitudinal files; an *ad hoc* request must be made to the Spanish Statistical Institute.

Gender relationships: the new paternal role

The dual female work burden refers to the saturation of activity that a working woman may suffer when she is the sole or the main person responsible for the baby's care. It may be a reason to postpone the arrival of the second child or not to have it. In the 'new paternal role', it is expected that men will share the care with women such that the dual burden phenomenon would not be relevant anymore. The new paternal role can be analysed through different *proxies*. For instance, Livia Oláh (2003) analysed whether parents took the maternity/paternity leave with their previous child birth in Sweden, and the extent to which the couple arranged household work equally in Hungary. The influence of the paternal role cannot be analysed in Spain because Spain lacks databases in which the decision to have

children is listed together with employment status at the time of becoming pregnant and in which there is also any kind of *proxy* to infer male participation in childcare.

The availability of playschool services

Continuing with the female dual burden phenomenon, the decision to have a child, especially after having had the first one, may be related to availability of quality cares. Baizán and González (2007) analysed data collected from the EPA (from 2001 to 2006), introducing characteristics in the models such as socio-demographic ones including employment, family history, and type of partnership. The authors showed that as the number of playschools for children under three increased, fertility increased. However, the authors themselves recognized that the territorial unit of the schooling rates of children under three that they analysed (the province) may be too large. Moreover, they indicated that the information source is not always the same (Ministry or Autonomous Community) so the authors used this variable carefully. The study of the kind of care given to babies is provided by the present EU-SILC because it is one of the analysis dimensions collected. The main problem is the lack of distinction between the mother and the father regarding their childcare participation.

Finally, if our beliefs concerning the future affect our present decisions, our beliefs concerning the possibility of reorganizing time after having the first child will affect the decision to have it. In other words, until now the dual burden thesis has been tested after the first child. However, one could also analyse whether a self-fulfilling prophecy occurs: perhaps women believing themselves to be the main carers of their children prefer to delay or avoid the decision to become pregnant.

Re-organization of time after the first child

When a baby is born, housework at home increases exponentially. How do couples manage this housework, and how much time is spent on each activity? Are there any changes in income? What factors are related to the mother leaving the labour market or reducing her work schedule? And, which ones are related to the type of care enjoyed by babies? Three especially relevant aspects of time reorganization are the mother's (or the father's) dedication to paid work after the child's birth, the type of baby care, and the possible reorganization of the work schedule.

Also, the EPA monographic module of 2005 focused on the problems of reconciliation between household and paid work. Information collected for all countries within the European Union participating in the "*Community Labour Force Survey*".

Changes in dedication within paid work

Cañada (2007) analysed personal and partner's characteristics of women having professional experience but not employed at the time of the survey. The EPA, specifically the module of 2005 – which included questions about reconciliation problems – studied the group of women active at any time between 16 and 34 years old and it constructed a dichotomous dependent variable with value '1' for 'non-

active women who have been active in the past' and '0' for 'active'. Through a series of logit models that function by accumulating variables, one can see whether the inclusion of certain variables interacts with the previous ones.

Cañada's results show two associations that are widely acknowledged. The likelihood of leaving paid work reduces with the increase of children's age and educational level. When introducing variables measuring the perception these women have about their reconciliation problems, Cañada observed a significant interaction between these last variables and having children, which lost a big part of its significance, such that it only remained in the 'having children under three years' model. As we can see, the most problematic time for reconciliation between paid work and care occurs during the children's first few years. However, his study was not focused on changes in dedication to paid work after having children.

Sebastián Sarasa's team (Sarasa, 2007), using the European Community Household Panel, showed that gestation period implies relative-hazards of interruption of work 9.7 times higher than that of childless women. Furthermore, the coefficients of leaving the labour market were also remarkably high and significant for women with children up to 6 years old.

The analysis of possible change in dedication to paid work after having children is not easy when using the databases currently available in Spain. Longitudinal information is needed, specifically concerning labour status before pregnancy and status when returning to work after maternity/paternity leave (9+4 months at least). This information is only available in longitudinal databases (such as EU-SILC or EPA), but the sample decreases and many relevant questions are not answered in standard databases. Therefore, an *ad hoc* request to the statistical service is necessary as well as a budget for these databases.

Formal and Informal Care

During the 1990's informal care – especially the support of the extended family – was a tool for young Spanish mothers to combine work and family. This reality reflected the lack of any other choices. Specifically, in Spain, some started to use the term 'modified extended family', with the extended family living apart, because the norm of relocation for new couples is observed, but they relocate near enough to offer help of very distinct nature. Here, the role of grandmothers (and grandfathers) allows parents (especially, mothers) to combine their professional careers with having children. According to a 1998 study (Tobío, 2002), what helps working mothers to balance their job with childcare is the help given by the grandmother (26.7%) followed by partner's help (24.7%), followed by living near the workplace (13.9%), and lastly, help by other family members (10.2%).

As indicated in the section 'The decision to have children', the EU-SILC has information on the number of formal and informal care hours (although it does not distinguish between father's or mother's care). With the help of this database, how care is provided in households having children under three years old could be analysed. For instance, we could examine whether this kind of care is used differently according to the characteristics of the household, especially the household's financial resources, or whether a public offer of formal care affects the mother's decision to keep a paid job.

Organization of the workday. Roles of companies in reconciliation

In the same way that care must be arranged for a child's birth, the fact that changes will be made in the organization and duration of the working day must also be assumed. The 2004 EPA module, 'Organization and duration of the working day', allows us to observe if couples with babies organize their workdays differently from childless couples. Furthermore, this survey, as a part of 'The Community Labour Force Survey', allows us to compare different EU countries.

Maternity/paternity leave

Despite the focus of researchers on parental leave, in Spain, there is a problem of visibility and therefore of assessment (Castro & Pazos, 2007).

- The percentage of men that enjoy a portion of the 12-week maternity leave is known but the duration of the leave is unknown.
- We also do not know the consequences maternity leave may have on dismissals or any other form of moving away from the labour market; these consequences are almost exclusively faced by women and are not taken into consideration.

Social-labour characteristics of those who enjoy parental leave and unpaid leave have been available in Spain since 2005 through the Labour Force Survey (EPA), because leave was included as a 'reason not to work' [values 2 (leave) and 3 (unpaid leave) in variable RZNOTB]. As had already occurred with other research questions, in order to analyse the socio-demographic profile of those who enjoy paid and unpaid leave, this profile must be recorded, because the sample size of those who do not work due to maternity or paternity leave is very limited (174 cases of paid leave and 108 of unpaid leave out of 160,000 individuals in the sample). The decrease in the number of working hours can also be taken from the EPA, value 2 (<hr Paternity Leave) in variable RZDIFH - Main Reason for the difference between effective and common hours.

It is a pity that the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (MCVL) only includes unpaid leave – Value 68 in variable 'Reason for leave' in the file 'Labour Status of Members Social Security Contributors'. However, paid maternity leave is not included in this database.

¹ A quality analysis of Spanish reconciliation policies and their negative consequences on gender equality or the State's redistribution principle is found in Fernández Cordón and Tobío (2006).

² A good summary of paternity leave is found in Ray, 2008 pp. 25-27.

³ Paternity leave will be extended four weeks from the year 2011.

⁴ Del Boca, et al. 2003: 9 shows six studies where this relation can be observed.

⁵ Apart from the reconciliation goal, childcare services may also contribute to the reduction of poverty, as high participation in the labour market may 'reduce the risk of poverty during the working life and especially, into old age'. (Plantenga et al. 2009: 7). Thus, baby care added as provision of

quality care may contribute to the baby's cognitive development and to a higher socio-economic integration.

⁶ In September 2009, the Spanish Government announced significant reductions in this type of aid for the next tax year due to the economic crisis.

⁷ Cohort born between 1956 and 1960 is found between these two behaviours; although they mostly leave work at 25-29 years of age, more than a half of the generation is working at the age of 30.

⁸ 87.4% think that health is very important and 79.1% consider family very important. At a distance there is partner and work (61.7% and 58.3% respectively think these are very important) (CIS, 2008 question 8).

⁹ There is an interesting thinking in modern demography about revolutionary changes entailed in the increase of life expectancy. At present, almost the whole of population could be able to help in raising grand-children.

¹⁰ It is specifically described as 'A family where one of the members of the partnership has paid work with lesser dedication to it and takes care of most household tasks and childcare if there are any'.

¹¹ The European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions is a successor of the European Community Household Panel. This survey, which started in 2004, belongs to the set of statistics operations that were agreed upon and brought into consonance by EU countries, in order to have at their disposal comparable statistics on income distribution and social exclusion at a European level (INE – Spanish Statistical Institute, 2004). The sample is made up of 15,000 households distributed among 2,000 census sections all over Spain's national territory.

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Appendix

AGE GROUPS	1987	1990	1995	2000	2001	2005	2006	2007	2008
TOTAL									
16-19	94.7	95.0	94.9	94.0	93.9	91.7	92.2	91.6	92.3
20-24	82.9	84.3	88.4	88.0	86.3	80.3	78.5	77.2	77.1
25-29	43.5	48.7	58.0	60.8	60.1	53.0	50.9	48.3	46.5
30-34	17.8	19.9	24.8	26.0	26.5	23.5	22.3	21.7	21.0
MALES									
16-19	95.4	95.5	95.7	94.8	94.7	92.5	92.9	92.7	93.4
20-24	89.3	89.2	91.3	89.6	88.2	84.4	82.4	81.8	81.8
25-29	52.4	57.6	66.9	68.7	66.7	59.2	57.8	54.6	53.4
30-34	21.0	23.3	29.8	31.2	31.8	27.8	26.1	25.6	24.8
FEMALES									
16-19	93.9	94.4	94.2	93.2	93.1	90.9	91.5	90.4	91.0
20-24	76.3	79.2	85.3	86.3	84.2	76.0	74.4	72.5	72.3
25-29	34.4	39.6	48.8	52.6	53.2	46.4	43.5	41.5	39.2
30-34	14.5	16.6	19.6	20.6	21.0	18.8	18.3	17.5	16.8

Table 8: Percentage of young people living with their parents

Source EPA. Years 1987-2000, 4th quarter. Years 2001-2008, Annual median

	Working full time	Working part time	Unemployed	No active	TOTAL
Primary	25.5	13.9	17.0	43.6	100.0 (N=459)
Lower Secondary	31.1	14.9	16.6	37.4	100.0 (N=878)
Upper Secondary	42.5	17.6	12.1	27.8	100.0 (N=738)
Tertiary	62.9	14.3	7.8	15.0	100.0 (N=841)

Table 9: Economic activity by level of education (Women with one child)

Source: Longitudinal EU-SILC (microdata). Spain 2004-2007.

	N= N weighted*	1st. child		2nd. child and/or next	
		No (809) (4,015,842)	Yes (249) (1208,888)	No (2652) (9,909,655)	Yes (304) (1,295,140)
- Married		71.9	86.5	92.3	93.6
- <i>De facto</i> partner		28.1	13.5	7.7	6.4
<i>Number of children</i>					
- One				42.1	82.0
- Two				49.4	10.7
- Three or more				8.5	7.2
<i>Child(ren) under three years old</i>					
				10.6	12.1
Woman	<i>Age groups</i>				
- Under 25 years old		9.7	7.7	1.6	2.8
- From 25 to 30 years old		36.3	45.4	9.0	22.4
- From 31 to 35 years old		29.1	40.4	21.3	45.2
- 36 years old or more		24.9	6.5	68.1	29.6
<i>Economic activity in January</i>					
- Working full time		68.7	69.6	43.4	44.3
- Working part time		9.5	7.3	15.6	12.8
- Unemployed		11.1	10.3	13.1	14.6
- No active		10.7	12.7	27.8	28.4
<i>Level of studies</i>					
- Primary		8.2	5.8	15.9	8.4
- Lower Secondary		18.4	18.4	29.5	27.0
- Upper Secondary		25.9	26.4	25.7	22.3
- Tertiary		47.6	49.3	28.9	42.4
<i>Economic activity changes last year</i>					
- It doesn't change		85.5	68.5	85.1	80.1
- From working to non-working		7.8	24.0	7.4	11.9
- From non-working to working		6.8	4.2	6.7	6.2
- From non-working to non-working			3.3	.8	1.8
Man	<i>Age groups</i>				
- Under 25 years old		3.7	4.0	.6	.5
- From 25 to 30 years old		29.6	32.9	5.3	15.4
- From 31 to 35 years old		34.0	44.2	15.2	34.5
- 36 years old or more		32.6	19.0	78.9	49.6
<i>Economic activity in January</i>					
- Working full time		91.7	93.9	90.7	92.3
- Working part time		3.2	2.5	2.5	1.6
- Unemployed		2.1	3.6	4.0	4.4
- Not active		3.0		2.8	1.6
<i>Level of studies</i>					
- Primary		9.9	14.7	20.1	10.6
- Lower Secondary		24.6	22.9	28.7	22.1
- Upper Secondary		28.8	27.5	24.7	26.5
- Tertiary		36.7	34.9	26.4	40.8
<i>Economic activity changes last year</i>					
- It doesn't change		90.0	91.0	91.6	92.4
- From working to non-working		4.5	3.8	3.2	2.5
- From non-working to working		5.2	5.2	5.1	5.1
- From non-working to non-working		.3		.1	

Table 10. Percentage distribution of dependent variables of the models with all women between 19 and 45 years living in partnership

Source: Longitudinal EU-SILC (microdata). Spain 2004-2007.

	WOMEN N=	1st. child		2nd. child and/or next	
		No (549)	Yes (123)	No (1.470)	Yes (150)
<i>Labour relationship</i>					
- Self-employed		8.2	5.7	15.5	14.7
- Employee- permanent contract		69.6	84.6	70.4	72.0
- Employee- temporary contract		22.2	9.8	14.1	13.3
<i>Working weeks hours</i>					
- Less than 30 hours a week		90.0	89.5	74.7	78.7
- More than 31 hours a week		10.0	10.5	25.3	21.3
<i>Occupational category</i>					
- Managers		2.0		5.3	3.3
- Professionals		20.8	24.2	17.2	22.7
- Technicians & Clerks		39.1	44.4	32.6	39.3
- Skilled workers – Services		9.1	4.8	12.2	8.7
- Shop & market sales		10.8	15.3	8.5	12.0
- Skilled workers - Non Services		6.8	3.2	7.1	4.7
- Elementary occupations- Services		9.5	6.5	15.0	5.3
- Elementary occupations-Non services		2.0	1.6	2.1	4.0
MEN					
	N=	(470)	(104)	(1.350)	(137)
<i>Labour relationship</i>					
- Self-employed		11.8	11.4	20.4	23.4
- Employee- permanent contract		72.8	80.7	67.6	59.9
- Employee- temporary contract		15.4	7.9	12.1	16.8
<i>Working weeks hours</i>					
- Less than 35 hours a week		2.2	5.7	4.2	1.5
- From 35 to 40 hours a week		57.6	68.6	57.4	48.9
- More than 40 hours a week		40.2	25.7	38.4	49.6
<i>Occupational category</i>					
- Managers		4.3	3.0	9.1	12.4
- Professionals		11.5	18.2	11.7	20.4
- Technicians & Clerks		25.9	29.8	20.0	26.3
- Skilled workers – Services		6.5	4.5	7.4	4.4
- Shop & market sales		1.9	5.7	4.2	2.9
- Skilled workers - Non Services		37.5	30.4	35.6	23.4
- Elementary occupations- Services		5.3	3.3	5.8	5.1
- Elementary occupations-Non services		7.3	5.1	6.2	5.1

Table 11: Percentage distribution of dependent variables of the model with only occupied women(*) depending on pregnancy or not

Source: Longitudinal EU-SILC (microdata). Spain 2004-2007

(*)The occupational variables refer to the current job (or the last one if the woman is not active in the year of the survey).

Women who have changed jobs since last year (moving between jobs, not due to inactivity) were removed from the sample.

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