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Stalin’s Englishman: The Lives of Guy Burgess

Biography in Intelligence History

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This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Stalin’s Englishman: The Lives of Guy Burgess

*Stalin’s Englishman: the lives of Guy Burgess*, based on over thirty years of research in dozens of archives in Britain, America, Australia, Russia, France and Switzerland as well as over a hundred interviews – many with people who had never spoken before – was the first proper biography of the Cambridge spy. It produced a very different account of the dynamics of the Cambridge Spies, was critically acclaimed on both sides of the Atlantic and won the premier US and UK intelligence book prize in 2016.

Its importance lay not only in giving the first full account of the missing member of the Cambridge Spy Ring but showing Burgess was a far more important member – possibly the most important – than has hitherto been realised. It looked at the British cover up that continues to this day and attempted to assess the impact of Burgess’s spying on twentieth century history and the damage it did to Anglo-American relations and trust in the ‘British Establishment’. The book also revealed an unknown atomic spy Wilfrid Mann and raised wider questions about the use of biography to humanise intelligence history and the difficulties of researching intelligence history.

This thesis aims to expand on the book drawing on subsequent research. First, to assess how my biographical research into Guy Burgess has transformed our understanding of the Cambridge spy ring as a whole and of Burgess's relative importance within it. Secondly to consider the opportunities provided by a biographical approach when writing intelligence history. Third to look at the challenges of writing intelligence biography and what techniques and sources - oral testimony as much as archival research - can be used and fourth to assess the importance of Burgess and what damage he caused thereby setting him in the wider context of the Cold War and other historical disciplines such as international relations.
Preface

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Edinburgh or any other University or similar institution. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Edinburgh or any other University or similar institution.

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Professor Richard Aldrich at Warwick University kindly alerted me to the article on oral history and the CIA, Professor Gerry Hughes at Aberystwyth supplied several suggestions of articles to read and Professor David Stafford, formerly of Edinburgh University, alerted me to the story of the Wilkinson papers at Churchill College, Cambridge.

I am indebted to the Masters and Fellows of Churchill College, Cambridge for awarding me a visiting fellowship where I was able to do the extra research on the thesis.

Andrew Lownie,
London,
September 2018
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Bibliography
Introduction

The Cambridge Spy Ring – a group of Cambridge students recruited to spy for the Soviet Union in the 1930s – has excited public interest since its existence was revealed with the defection of two, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, in May 1951.¹ A huge literature has grown up around them with several general accounts.² The member who has perhaps generated most interest has been Kim Philby, hitherto regarded as the most important of the ‘Ring of Five’.³ The other members Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross have also had several books on them.⁴ The fifth member of the Ring, Guy Burgess, has been less well-covered, probably because he disappeared to Russia in 1951, was the first to die in 1963 and was assumed to have been unimportant. Stalin’s Englishman: The Lives of Guy Burgess⁵ was therefore the first authoritative life of Burgess.

¹ The first books, often based on newspaper reports, appeared almost immediately, most notably Cyril Connolly The Missing Diplomats (London: Queen Anne Press, 1952) and John Mather and Donald Seaman, The Great Spy Scandal (London: Daily Express, 1955).
Based on over thirty years of research in dozens of archives in Britain, America, Australia, Russia, France and Switzerland as well as over a hundred interviews – many with people who had never spoken before – *Stalin’s Englishman* produced a very different account of the dynamics of the Cambridge Spies and won the premier UK and US intelligence book prize in 2016. Its importance lay not only in giving the first full account of the missing member of the Cambridge Spy Ring but showing Burgess was a far more important member – possibly the most important – than has hitherto been realised. It looked at the British cover up that continues to this day and attempted to assess the impact of Burgess’s spying on twentieth century history and the damage it did to Anglo-American relations and trust in the ‘British Establishment’. The book also revealed an unknown atomic spy Wilfrid Mann and raised wider questions about the use of biography to humanise intelligence history and the difficulties of researching intelligence history.

This thesis, based on *Stalin’s Englishman*, aims to expand on the book drawing on subsequent research. First, to assess how my biographical research into Burgess has transformed our understanding of the Cambridge spy ring as a whole and of Burgess's relative importance within it. Secondly to consider the opportunities provided by a biographical approach when writing intelligence history. Third to look at the challenges of writing intelligence biography and what techniques and sources - oral testimony as much as archival research - can be used and fourthly to assess the importance of Burgess and what damage he caused thereby setting him in the wider context of the Cold War and other historical disciplines such as international relations.

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**The growth of intelligence history**

Intelligence biographies tend to be part of a subgenre of intelligence titles, many of them written by non-academics and once dismissed as from ‘the airport bookstall school of

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intelligence history’. There is however no reason why intelligence biographies should not combine scholarly archival research with readability, that they should make intelligence accessible to a more general reader and still make a contribution to intelligence studies.

It is worth tracing how the two distinct intelligence cultures of the ‘popular’ or ‘journalistic’ merged with the ‘academic’. There has always been an interest in spy books but the fascination was stimulated during the 1960s, Christopher Moran argues ‘following a string of high-profile fiascos (including the U-2 spy plane incident in May 1960, the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, the John Vassall spy case in 1962, and the Profumo Affair in 1963’.

Then during the 1970s there were a series of insider memoirs which included John Masterman’s account of the Double-Cross network and Fred Winterbotham’s book on Ultra. These books, which highlighted British successes at a time when the British intelligence services were being heavily criticized, showed the importance of intelligence in winning the Second World War and paved the way for intelligence scholars to draw on their revelations to present a fresh take on the conflict.

The real growth in serious books on intelligence, however, was due to ‘the appearance of a series of ground-breaking works on British intelligence over the space of little more than half a decade from 1979 through 1986’, notably the initial volume of the official history of British Intelligence in the Second World War co-written by a team of scholars led by Sir Harry Hinsley, a collection of essays on governments and intelligence communities The Missing Dimension edited by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks which showed serious work on intelligence history could be produced even when few documents had been released and the 1985 publication of Christopher Andrew’s Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community.

This was accompanied in the United States by congressional hearings and newspaper investigations into the American intelligence community linking the CIA with a string of illegal domestic operations. This greater public interest and demands for more openness encouraged the American government to make more intelligence records available. In America the CIA adopted a relatively liberal declassification policy and many FBI files have

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6 Christopher Andrew, “Historical Research on the British Intelligence Community,” in R Godson (ed), Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. and the Third World, (London: Brassey’s, 1988).
11 Harry Hinsley (ed), British Intelligence in the Second World War, (London: HMSO, 1979) The book was described by MI6 chief Maurice Oldfield as ‘a book written by a committee, about committees’.
increasingly become available or can be requested through FOIA. Len Scott makes the point that ‘the American approach to declassification remains the exemplar of glasnost, and has laid the foundation of a corpus of literature that provides for understanding and debate on intelligence far exceeding that of any other polity.’

In April 1995 President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 12958 which ruled that all classified documents older than twenty-five years would automatically be declassified unless there were important security grounds for retention. In the event, some 93 million pages of documents were exempted and many more await declassification. The joint declassification of the Venona project, giving details of Western decryption of Soviet cipher communications, also led to several new studies. By 2007, the CIA had declassified over ten million pages of material stored on an electoral search and retrieval system known as CREST.

British governments followed suit but with rather less enthusiasm. However there was a greater openness about the intelligence services after the end of the Cold War – partly because it was assumed that the role of the intelligence services would become less important - leading to the avowal of the intelligence services in 1992, the ‘Open Government Initiative’ of 1992, a systematic release of MI5 files from 1997 with SOE and GCHQ files following – over 200,000 files have now been released - and the authorised centenary histories of MI5 by Christopher Andrew in 2009 and of MI6 by Keith Jeffery in 2011.

Another influence was the 1986 Spycatcher trial in Australia, the British Government’s unsuccessful attempt to prevent Peter Wright publishing a memoir of his service in MI5. It ‘brought into ridicule British attitudes to disclosure. The fiasco was one element in changing attitudes toward unnecessary secrecy.

In the Soviet Union there was a brief moment during glasnost when Soviet archives were opened up to Western scholars, most notably with the publishing arrangement with Crown, which led to Deadly Illusions and The Crown Jewels a book by two former intelligence

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16 John Earl Haynes, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (London: Yale, 1999); Nigel West, Venona: The Greatest Secret of the Cold War (London: Collins,1999); Eric Breindel and Herbert Romerstein, The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America’s Traitors (Washington: Regnery, 2000). The release of the Venona decrypts by the British was driven not be openness but pressure from the NSA as much of the American Venona material was already on the NSA website.
20 Scott, “Sources”, p.188.
21 John Costello, John and Oleg Tsarev, Deadly Illusions; Oleg Tsarev and Nigel West The Crown Jewels.
officers on Berlin, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America* and *Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America*. In the early 1990s numerous retired KGB officers, some of them quite senior, sat down and began to write their memoirs with the result, Richard Aldrich notes, that there was ‘a growing danger that the history of British intelligence will be written by its enemies’.

The response in this propaganda war was British releases of material co-authored by Soviet defectors. As Richard Aldrich has also noted ‘The SIS decision to permit historical work based on cooperation with Oleg Gordievsky and on the Mitrokhin archive was probably the most adventurous example of official support for the writing of the history of secret service that was seen during the 1990s’. The result was two important books for intelligence scholars – both co-authored by Christopher Andrew - *KGB: Inside Story* and *The Mitrokhin Archive*.

Official and authorised histories of intelligence or histories where covert help has been given proved a way forward for governments balancing their need to control disclosure and the demands for greater transparency. As Richard Aldrich has written:

> Official history has played an intriguing role in the policing of Britain’s secret past. For the policy-makers, the official history has offered multiple advantages. Carrying the stamp of authority, official history permitted a sober account of events to be advanced that contrasted with the increasingly sensationalist nature of ‘outsider’ publications. Moreover, it provided some positive influence over that difficult terrain – the public understanding of the past – while at the same time appearing more reasonable than simply ‘stonewalling’ on the subject of intelligence.

He concluded ‘From the authorities’ point of view, official history remains by far the best way forward in the face of awkward declassification problems.’

Christopher Andrew has been one of the main beneficiaries of such co-operation but others who have been given access to SIS records include Gordon Brook-Shepherd with his study of

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28 Aldrich, “Policing the Past”, p. 922.
29 Ibid p.953.
30 His collaborations have included Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign from Lenin to Gorbachev*, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990 ) which confirmed John Cairncross as ‘The Fifth Man’. 
western intelligence and the Bolshevik revolution, Alan Judd’s biography of the first Chief of SIS, Sir Mansfield Cumming, Andrew Cook’s life of the SIS officer Sidney Reilly, the BBC correspondent Gordon Corera’s book on SIS and Times journalist Ben Mcintyre with his life of Oleg Gordievsky. All these authors have been given access to former members of the intelligence agencies but what they have written has been subject to control.

Such privileged access to favoured historians rather than making the records equally available to all historians has attracted some criticism with E.D.R Harrison writing to The Times that ‘official histories of this kind belongs to the era of deference to government and fits awkwardly with a modern intelligence service’. Yet a modern intelligence service is all about public image and these curated and controlled releases may well be an increasing occurrence and the only way intelligence scholars will be able to have access to certain subjects.

The UK Freedom of Information Act came into force on 1st January 2005, providing everyone with the right to ask for information from public sector bodies, including central government departments and this, to an extent, has facilitated access to official files though there are plenty of exemptions which can be utilised by governments. One of twenty three exemptions, section 23, deals with ‘Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters’ – the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Government Communications Headquarters, Special Forces and the National Intelligence Criminal Service. This is on top of the blanket exemptions in the Public Records Act of 1958 where section 3(4) allows documents to be retained by government departments for ‘administrative purposes’ and section 5(1) which provides for the extended closure of documents transferred to the National Archives.

The fact few files are released by the intelligence agencies has meant intelligence historians have had to revert to a long-standing practice of research in ‘adjacent’ files which may hold intelligence material, a practice, most notably utilised by Richard Aldrich whilst writing his history of GCHQ where his sources included documents from the Ministry of Agriculture and The Black Door which used files from the Public Works Department. Stalin’s Englishman for that reason drew on extensive requests, many under FOIA, to the Foreign Office (Security Department, News Department, PUS files), Joint Broadcasting Committee files at the British

36 EDR Harrison, Letter to The Times, 15 August 2002.
Council and Ministry of Information, the HS series of SOE files, Ministry of Defence files and the files of the Cabinet Office such as the PREM series.

Even the limited programme of releases, in particular of MI5 documents, has had a major impact on intelligence studies. This has led to a plethora of books based on archival research as well as a growth in the number of journals such as *Intelligence and National Security* founded by Christopher Andrew and Michael Handel in 1984, *Studies in Intelligence, the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* and the *Journal of Intelligence History* and from 1986 general historical journals, such as *The Journal of Contemporary History, The Journal of Cold War Studies* and *The English Historical Review*, beginning to publish articles on intelligence.

The number of university courses also grew in departments of International Politics, International History, History, Politics and War Studies producing students looking to write on intelligence subjects. Marjorie Cline’s *Teaching Intelligence in the mid-1980s: A survey of college and university courses on the subject of intelligence* published in 1985 was one of the first guides to courses on intelligence with the most recent being *AFIO’s Guide to the Study of Intelligence* published in 2016.39

In Britain there are now major centres for the study of intelligence at the universities of Brunel, Buckingham and Aberystwyth while respected Masters courses have been taught at Edinburgh, Cambridge and Salford for over a quarter of a century.40 In addition ‘Academic papers on intelligence and intelligence-related subjects are an integral part of the annual conferences of the British International History Group, the British International Studies Association, and the British Political Studies Association which since 1993 has hosted its own Security and Intelligence Studies Group.’41

Writing in 2013 Christopher Murphy and Christopher Moran noted ‘In both the United States and the United Kingdom, the field of intelligence studies represents one of the fastest growing subsets of international history, political science and strategic studies. This dynamism is evidenced not only by the vast volume of publications that are generated, but by the existence of dedicated departments and centres, specialist degree programmes, conferences and professional associations….In short, the study of intelligence is booming’.42

**The challenge of intelligence history**

It is clear that intelligence studies have come of age but challenges and obstacles remain for the historian, both in terms of research and integrating that research into wider historical studies.

41 Scott, “Sources”, p.199.
The first is the comparative lack of archival material compared to other historical areas though as Donald Cameron Watt has pointed out ‘historians of twentieth-century developments in the West are spoiled in comparison to their colleagues in medieval or early modern fields, by the plethora of detailed source material at their disposal’.43

SIS never release their archives and the releases from MI5 and other parts of the Intelligence community have been inconsistent and slow. For example, rather than reveal all the files on a particular year or case, which would allow a full study to be conducted, MI5 have made public selective material often more with an eye to a newspaper headline than proper historical revelation, a policy of managed openness, where the splashy occasional release is used to persuade the public of a greater transparency that remains, in practice, quite limited. For example, though hundreds of Burgess and Maclean case files from the Foreign Office Security Department and MI5 were released in October 2015, they were far from complete and about 20% of the material was redacted. It is apparent from a close reading that many of the interviews with key players, such as Goronwy Rees, Harold Nicolson and Victor Rothschild, remain closed nor has there been release of any material relating to other members of the Ring such as Kim Philby, Anthony Blunt or John Cairncross.

Even then government files are not necessarily ‘the holy grail’. Even when made public they may only represent a partial picture and they may in Christopher Andrew’s phrase be ‘laundered’44 or as Richard Aldrich has claimed be ‘an analogue of reality’45. Though useful, intelligence historians have to be constantly aware that government records can be a highly manipulated source of evidence. Peter Jackson has pointed out ‘Not only do intelligence documents not speak for themselves, some may also dissemble and some may even lie.’46

They may lie through omission in terms of release or simply from the fact that the files only record what the government themselves knew. A good case is the collections of documents released during glasnost by the Russian Intelligence Services, in return for large advances, and edited by a member of the service.47 In each case, the Western co-author, who did not speak Russian, was presented with translated extracts from Russian files. The books certainly showed what documents the Cambridge Spies had given the Russians - and are often the only access scholars have to such documents which are closed in the West – but they are selective, provide little context and invariably portray Soviet Intelligence in a favourable light.48

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44 Christopher Andrew, “Secret Intelligence and British foreign policy 1900-1939”, in Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes (eds), Intelligence and International relations 1900-1945 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press,1987) , p.9.
48 An overview of access to Russian Intelligence archives can be found in Amy Knight, “Russian Archives: Opportunities and Obstacles,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 12:3 (1999), pp 325-37.
further problem for intelligence historians is that what Soviet officials reported is not necessarily true – many were keen to stay in the West and often exaggerated threats – and many Soviet documents have been shown to be fake either for propaganda purposes or because they might have a commercial value to researchers.

The intelligence historian, therefore, has to balance research in public collections, with material from private archives but even private archives have their problems. Those kept by large institutions are weeded on deposition or even many years later with sensitive material removed or redacted. Documents quoted in one book are often not there for the next researcher. Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor donated his papers to the RAF Museum at Hendon where they were open to scholars in the mid-1980s. When the MOD became aware of this they were transferred to the Air Historical Branch at the Ministry of Defence, weeded and then in the mid-1990s placed in the National Archives. The former SIS officer Gerald Wilkinson’s papers at Churchill College, Cambridge were used by David Stafford for his joint biography of Churchill and Roosevelt but subsequently censored at the request of the Cabinet Office.49

I know from my own experience as a visiting Fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge that members of the Intelligence Services and Cabinet Office regularly visit the archive to check on new depositions before public release. Lord Mountbatten’s papers, on which I am currently working, were weeded by a former member of MI6 before being loaned to Southampton University. The archivist at Southampton subsequently advised the Cabinet Office that further material should be closed and that was achieved by a Ministerial Directive in 2010.

Even archives kept by the family may have been partially destroyed by the subject or a family member or only parts of the archive shown to the researcher. This can be for all sorts of reasons, quite apart from national security, but they mean that private papers when they exist – and many are destroyed such as those of the spy chief Sir Joseph Ball - are not always as complete as one would wish. For example, only part of the correspondence between Lord Mountbatten and his close friend Sibilla O’Donnell was shown by her to Mountbatten’s official biographer Philip Ziegler in the early 1980s because her husband was still alive. With her husband’s death, I have been able to view the full correspondence.

So by its very nature intelligence history is difficult to research. Much of it remains secret and will never be made publicly available. In 1924 the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, solemnly told the House of Commons that, ‘It is of the essence of a Secret Service that it must be secret, and if you once begin disclosure it is perfectly obvious…that there is no longer any Secret Service and that you must do without it.’50 Those who serve in intelligence are bound by the Official Secrets Act and cannot talk about their work. Even when they do, there is no guarantee they are telling the truth nor that the files deposited in archives are accurate – they simply reflect the information gathered by the intelligence services. An intelligence historian has to rely on a variety of sources to tell their story,

49 The Government is not always successful. When the Cabinet Office attempted to remove SIS material from the Neville Chamberlain papers at Birmingham University the archivist Ben Benedicz sent them away with a flea in their ear. He is not an archivist who troubled the Honours list.

50 House of Commons, Official Record, 15 December 1924, col.674.
balancing like any historian, the credibility of the information and always seeking, where possible, to corroborate it.

Richard Aldrich has argued ‘Government files that are allowed into the public domain are placed there by authorities as a result of deliberate decision. The danger is that those who work only on this controlled material may become something close to official historians, albeit once removed’. He quotes the case of The Ultra secret where a select band of historians writing the Official History of the Second World War were told about Ultra but then could not reveal it providing other and totally wrong explanations for events.

‘Well-packaged programmes of document release have allowed governments to move beyond an old-fashioned “stonewalling” approach...into a new era in which the authorities set the agenda for archive based researchers.’ It is a real problem for intelligence historians where very few official records are kept - Aldrich estimates 2% - and who as a result ‘contest with government over secrecy, but mostly these are tactical skirmishes. Arguments usually take place over the closure of individual documents located within the thin slice of material selected for preservation. Meanwhile the bulk of contemporary history heads towards the incinerators unseen and largely unchallenged.’ He continues ‘Contemporary historians who explore the state are quite unique. Nowhere else is the researcher confronted with evidence precisely managed by their subject. From astronomy to agriculture, from botany to the built environment, no investigator confronts information so deliberately pre-selected.’

Yet is this really true? Of course, government files whether they come from the Intelligence Services or Department of Agriculture are selected by the departmental records officer and exemptions may liberally be applied but there are so many copies of files across Whitehall departments that it is difficult to have a consistent vetting procedure to ensure that everything sensitive is retained or destroyed. Peter Jackson reviewing Aldrich’s The Hidden Hand makes the point:

that very few professionally trained historians believe everything they read in the archives. Meanwhile, the assumption that the ‘real’ story behind policy making is usually either hidden or excised from the archival record attributes an unrealistic level of efficiency to government machinery engaging in the on-going struggle to maintain secrecy and shape popular perceptions (even the ‘Ultra Secret’ was eventually leaked). Moreover, it is highly unlikely that such a secret could be kept secret in the present era of increasingly intrusive mass media. The ‘inner stuff of secret history’ has a way of turning up somewhere, as official leaks to the press, in private papers, in memoirs, or in published diaries, and increasingly, in oral testimony.

Certainly I found Sir Patrick Reilly’s correspondence with the Foreign Office Head of Security George Carey-Foster in the Bodleian Library – the first researcher to do so even though the papers had been deposited in Oxford for many years - which sheds fresh light into the investigations of Burgess showing which official knew what and when. That is an

52 Ibid p.6.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
encouraging example of ‘adjacent’ files but what if the two men had not deposited their correspondence in a public archive or had even destroyed the correspondence. How do we know what we don’t know? Just because it hasn’t been discovered, doesn’t mean it hasn’t happened.

Jackson continues ‘It is difficult enough for governments to control the material contained in their own national archives, but they have little or no control over declassification and destruction procedures in other countries’\(^{56}\) but this is not true. Section 27(1) of the Freedom of Information Act provides exemptions ‘if its disclosure would, or would be likely to prejudice: relations between the United Kingdom and any other state; relations between the United Kingdom and any other international organisation or international court; the interests of the United Kingdom abroad; the promotion or protection by the United Kingdom of its interests abroad,’ \(^{57}\) It is true some material on Burgess was found in Russian archives but time after time in my Burgess research I found CIA and FBI material blocked under such an exemption.

Jackson argues:

> nor should we necessarily assume that there is always a ‘hidden history’ that will transform our understanding of past events. Our understanding of complex historical phenomena is too contingent on the temporal and ideological context in which we operate. Indeed, an excessive preoccupation of turning up new and hitherto secret information is a potential weakness of intelligence history…The special importance placed on turning up new information for its own sake can sometimes overshadow the scholar’s responsibility to provide a systematic analysis of what this new material tells us about the dynamics of policy-making and politics more generally…The historian must develop a feel for how papers moved within and across departments, as well as a sense of the institutional cultures of these organisations in general and prevailing attitudes towards intelligence information in particular’.\(^{58}\)

It is certainly true information needs to be interpreted and doesn’t exist in isolation but often there are few papers to follow across departments. For example, there are hardly any references to Burgess in the British Embassy papers in Washington 1950-1951. It is clear they have been weeded as references abound for those in the same role in the Embassy as his on either side of those dates. How then can one assess to what information he had access and could therefore betray? Fortunately, in this case, we again have the evidence of the documentation sent to Moscow and made available in some of the Russian books such as *The Crown Jewels*. Likewise, there is no trace of Burgess at the Information Research Department in government files but here secondary literature and interviews with Burgess’s Foreign Office colleagues reveal his role in the department.\(^{59}\)

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\(^{56}\) Jackson, p. 8.


\(^{58}\) Jackson, p. 9.

The importance of oral testimony

So the intelligence historian needs to conduct interviews and not rely just on government files and private archives, not least because much of what is of interest may never have been recorded on paper or, if so, has not been kept or will ever be released. Though nobody has written about the use of interviews when writing on British intelligence, Andrew Hammond has done so with regard to the history of the CIA.\(^{60}\) He argues ‘that while intelligence history

and oral history each harbour their own meta-theoretical perils and biases, pitfalls which may
in fact be exacerbated when they are conjoined, the relationship between them may in fact be
a productive, generative one.\textsuperscript{61} He is aware of objections by some academic historians that
‘it is inferior to the written word; interviewing is the business of social scientists rather than
historians; human memory is often faulty and unreliable, prone to the crustaceans of time;
oral history interviews are unrepresentative, the results un-generalizable; the questioning may
be biased; and so forth’.\textsuperscript{62}

He accepts intelligence history provides a further problem that ‘knowledge is
compartmentalized, there are silos of secrecy; information is often shared on a need-to-know
basis; many people do not want to share what they know’\textsuperscript{63}. And he continues:

\begin{quote}
how do you know you are not being misled or lied to?...These people are professional
liars, how can you trust what they say?...they are experts in psychological seduction,
trained to mislead, to deceive, to provide cover stories, to hide things; they are skilled
in subversion and covert operations; they are just as likely to subvert the historical
record as anything else.\textsuperscript{64}
\end{quote}

Furthermore ‘Are they merely score-settling, axe-grinding, legacy-building or attempting to
rewrite history? To what extent have we pulled our punches through not wanting to upset our
interviewees, to remain in their good graces or to keep that door open for future research?’\textsuperscript{65}

These are all elements any historian must bear in mind but it does not mean oral history does
not have a place in intelligence history which is being increasingly recognised also by
government records departments. The CIA, SIS and the Foreign Office have oral history
programmes but they rely on former members of the service being willing to speak, being
open and being properly questioned by knowledgeable interviewers. Only the latter is open –
it is at Churchill College, Cambridge and it is heavily censored – but reminiscences can be
useful for the revealing anecdote, character description, or personal insight especially to an
undocumented episode and how key players saw events unfolding.

Of course interviews have to be treated with caution. The interviewee may want to please but
have forgotten or simply conflated what they’ve read elsewhere and thought happened. They
may not be telling the truth deliberately or never knew in the first place. An interviewee may
be prosecuted or lose their pension if they speak too freely and may therefore be evasive.
They may wish to protect their reputation and not tell the truth or want to undermine someone
else’s reputation. Given the ‘need-to-know’ principle, have they the full picture? Malcolm
Muggeridge, who himself served in British Intelligence, later wrote ‘Diplomats and
intelligence agents, in my experience, are even bigger liars than journalists, and the historians
who try to construct the past out of their records are, for the most part, dealing in fantasy.’\textsuperscript{66}

\begin{footnotes}
\item 61 Ibid, p. 312.
\item 62 Ibid, p. 322.
\item 63 Ibid, p. 323.
\item 64 Ibid, p. 323.
\item 65 Ibid, p.324.
\item 66 Malcolm Muggeridge, \textit{Chronicles of Wasted Time, The Infernal Grove} (London: Collins,
\end{footnotes}
I encountered examples of all in the course of my research, not least Muggeridge himself who gives a vivid description of Burgess and Bentinck Street during World War Two in his memoirs, written in the 1970s, but judging from his own diary entry for 7 February 1948, he only met Burgess after the war. ‘Present: character called Burgess (Foreign Office). Burgess lamentable character, very left-wing, obviously seeking to climb on the Socialist bandwagon. Long, tedious, rather acrimonious argument.’ One of my interviewees, who claimed to know Burgess, I subsequently discovered only came to Britain after Burgess had fled to Moscow. It was clear one of Burgess’s contemporaries at Dartmouth had confused Burgess with someone else so his interview wasn’t used. Another claimed he had reported Burgess for stealing at Dartmouth and that was the reason – not his poor eyesight - he left but put the date as ‘late in 1925’. Given Burgess left Dartmouth in July 1927 I relegated that account to a footnote especially as Burgess’s wartime medical records showed he had poor eyesight. Similarly an account of a Burgess visit to Churchill at Chartwell given by a Burgess colleague at the BBC, John Green, to the writer Andrew Boyle was left to a footnote because I could not corroborate it.

Colleagues of Burgess, such as Bernard Burrows, refused to corroborate whilst others simply did not respond to my approaches. A former MI6 officer Nigel Clive agreed to meet at an expensive restaurant and managed to extract far more from me than I ever managed from him. Three former Burgess lovers Clarissa Churchill, Charles Fletcher-Cooke and Sir Steven Runciman denied the love affairs yet the affairs can be corroborated from interviews with others, MI5 reports and Burgess’s own letters. Edward Playfair, one of Burgess’s closest friends as a young man and later interviewed by MI5, wrote to me ‘I never sought his company because I rather disliked him…’ whilst Gladwyn Jebb, one of Burgess’s greatest mentors, claimed in his memoirs he had secured Burgess’s sacking in 1940. Fred Warner, a Foreign Office colleague of Burgess and probable lover, told Andrew Boyle that he had found an injured Burgess at a gay nightclub, only by chance, but Burgess’s boyfriend Jack Hewitt and Robin Maugham both give accounts of Warner being with Burgess at the nightclub all evening.

The self-confessed spy Michael Straight gave different versions of his encounters with Burgess in his testimony to the FBI in the 1960s, in his memoir, in interviews with other spy writers and myself. Which to believe if any? Brian Sewell has given several different versions of his encounter with Burgess. Sergei Kondrashev, one of Burgess’s handlers in Moscow, had never spoken before about Burgess and had important insights but he claimed the Soviets did not mind exposing Philby with the flight of Burgess because they had others. Disinformation or covering up a mistake? Donald Maclean’s brother, Alan, claimed when interviewed that he hardly knew Burgess though I discovered only after his death that they had been close friends and shared a flat.

Timing is indeed key. Goronwy Rees’s sister-in-law, Mary Hardy, remembered little when I spoke to her in the 1980s but had much better recall when I saw her in 2015. Had she held

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69 Robin Maugham papers, Indiana University, Robin Maugham to Harold Nicolson, 14 February 1949 and Leitch, p. 164.
something back and now in her nineties couldn’t care less what was said or had I simply got her on a better day? Sometimes an interviewee has a different relationship than the one expected. I contact Martin Young as a former member of the Apostles. He had not met Burgess there but gave me a story about meeting him in Cuba when Burgess was acting as a King’s Messenger.

According to an unpublished and un-translated section of The Mitrokhin archive, now in Churchill College, Cambridge, Burgess had tried to recruit one of his wartime MI5 colleagues and, though he was rebuffed the approach, was not reported. I had my suspicions of who the man might be but as the man’s daughter had been very helpful, let me reproduce a photograph and I did not have concrete proof, I did not name the man. The music critic Philip Hope Wallace claimed he had been on holiday in Italy with Burgess just before he fled in 1951.\(^\text{72}\) Since Burgess had not been on holiday in Italy or anywhere else for at least a year and there is no evidence he knew Hope Wallace well, I only included the story in a footnote. A dozen people in memoirs or interviews said they dined with Burgess the night before he fled in 1951. If so, he must have been very full. For his movements in his final week I preferred to trust the reports of the MI5 surveillance team above anyone else.

For all the caveats, oral testimony can be crucial especially when governments attempt to manipulate history. The Whitehall version that the flight was only discovered on Monday 28\(^\text{th}\) May 1951 continues to be accepted even though Stalin’s Englishman gives several accounts of the flight being noticed and reported on over the weekend including testimony from MI5 officer Russell Lee on the Friday and Jane Portal on the Saturday.\(^\text{73}\) Without these interviews the only evidence would be that in the archives which supports the official version.

A document produced for the 30\(^\text{th}\) anniversary of the disappearance of the two diplomats in 1982, and which I recently discovered, lists 200 files which need to be reviewed.\(^\text{74}\) Many still remained closed including: Milo Talbot’s interview revealing he had suspected Burgess of being a Communist; the interview between Burgess’s step-father Jack Bassett and George Carey-Foster; a letter from Gladwyn Jebb to the PUS; details of the talks between the head of the FBI J. Edgar Hoover and head of MI5 Sir Percy Sillitoe; Gladwyn Jebb’s interview with George Carey-Foster and Security Office Robert Mackenzie on Burgess. Without the ‘adjacent’ document found in the Foreign Office library department and dated some thirty years after the disappearance, the existence of those interviews might never have been known.

**Sources for Stalin’s Englishman**

The research for Stalin’s Englishman began in 1984 and concluded in 2015. It consisted of interviews with almost a hundred people, most of whom had never spoken before, who knew

\(^{72}\) Guardian archives, OHP/69/1.

\(^{73}\) E mail Nigel West to Andrew Lownie 4 January 2016 and interview Lady Williams 27 January 2015. Lownie pp 239-240.

\(^{74}\) TNA, FCO 12/352.
Burgess at Eton, Dartmouth, Cambridge, in the BBC and Foreign Office and socially as well as interviews with members of his family and his Russian handlers.\textsuperscript{75}

This was supplemented by secondary reading of books and scholarly articles which referred to him, newspaper accounts, school and university records, his BBC and Foreign Office personnel files, private diaries and correspondence, the research papers of spy writers such as Andrew Boyle\textsuperscript{76}, declassified MI5, Foreign Office, Cabinet Office and Home Office files at the National Archives and from the FBI and Russian archives and oral history collections at the Imperial War Museum\textsuperscript{77} and Guardian.\textsuperscript{78}

As far as possible, primary sources were used over secondary so, for example, I traced the original manuscript of Goronwy Rees’s \textit{A Chapter of Accidents} in the National Library of Wales.\textsuperscript{79} This had not been looked at since it was deposited in the 1960s. It differed from the published edition revealing, for example, that Burgess and Maclean had had an affair at Cambridge\textsuperscript{80} and that Blunt was aware of Burgess’s espionage activities.\textsuperscript{81} The papers also showed that Rees may well have been a Russian spy.\textsuperscript{82}

Several unpublished memoirs and biographies added to the picture, most notably the memoirs of Jack Hewitt\textsuperscript{83}, Kenneth Sinclair-Loutit\textsuperscript{84}, Dilkusha Rohan\textsuperscript{85}, the journalists Stephen Harper and John Mossman\textsuperscript{86} and Anthony Blunt\textsuperscript{87} and David Leitch’s biography of Guy Burgess\textsuperscript{88}. Steven Runciman’s diaries, still held by the family, provided evidence of the close relationship – one denied by Runciman - between the two men whilst MI5 officer Guy Liddell’s diary, now in the National Archives, proved invaluable for an insider’s account of MI5 between 1939 and 1953.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{75} See Richard Aldrich, “Grow your own: cold war Intelligence and history supermarkets,” Intelligence and National Security, 17:1 (2002), pp135-152 for the importance of oral testimony as well as archival research.

\textsuperscript{76} Cambridge University Library, Boyle Papers, 9429/1G/143.

\textsuperscript{77} Margot Heinemann, Imperial War Museum, 9239/5/1-2 and Richard Leven, Imperial War Museum, 05/59/1.

\textsuperscript{78} Richard Scott OHP/79/1.

\textsuperscript{79} Goronwy Rees Inquiry Papers, GB 0210 GOREES, UCW, Aberystwyth, \textit{A Chapter of Accidents} original typescript. It can now also be found at TNA FCO 158/184.

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{A Chapter of Accidents} original manuscript p.2. This is confirmed in Steven Runciman’s January 1958 interview with MI5. TNA, KV2/4123.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{A Chapter of Accidents} original manuscript p.222.

\textsuperscript{82} An interview with Oleg Tsarev by Rees’s daughter Jenny 3 November 1993 does not clear Rees of spying, as she later claimed, but shows that Tsarev did not know either way. National Library of Wales, Goronwy Rees Papers, GB 0210 GOREES 2/2.

\textsuperscript{83} Jack Hewitt, unpublished manuscript.

\textsuperscript{84} Kenneth Sinclair-Loutit, ‘Very Little Luggage’, Marx Memorial Library.

\textsuperscript{85} Dil Rohan, ‘How Do You Do’.

\textsuperscript{86} Stephen Harper unpublished chapter, ‘The Burgess I Knew in Moscow’ and John Mossman untitled memoir.

\textsuperscript{87} British Library, Blunt Manuscript, ADD Ms 88902/1.


\textsuperscript{89} TNA, KV4, 185-196.
I also had the benefit of Burgess’s letters to the great love of his life Peter Pollock, lent by the latter before his death, which are revealing about Burgess’s inner life, his dreams for the future and the difficulties in his love life and Goronyw Rees’s highly autobiographical screenplay Influence, an account of Burgess which was never made but was full of fascinating nuggets about Burgess’s private life.\textsuperscript{90}

Burgess’s school record at Lockers Park showed him to have been a brilliant and conventional student from an early age whilst research at Eton showed his developing interest in politics.\textsuperscript{91} Study of the Trinity College archives and Cambridge University archives confirmed his academic success at Cambridge where he was awarded several scholarships. An examination of the minute books of the Apostles showed the Apostles were not politicised until much later than hitherto thought\textsuperscript{92} whilst the Cambridge University Socialist Society minute books for the period, recently released by MI5, revealed the most active overt Communists in the university at the time.\textsuperscript{93}

The National Archives proved a fruitful source, most notably the files of the Foreign Office Security Department - FO series 158 - whilst the Far East Department memos and briefing papers showed how trusted and respected Burgess was by his more senior colleagues, the depth of his knowledge, his excellent drafting skills and how he was able to both interpret and shape policy even given his comparatively junior status.\textsuperscript{94}

The FBI kept copious files on Burgess and proved a useful source on the American side of the story and Anglo-American liaison. Triangulating various copies of the same document showed how redactions had not always been consistent.

Other collections which provided useful material included: the British Library (Roy Harrod papers); Bodleian Library (Patrick Reilly papers especially MS England c6920 and Joseph Ball papers MS England c6656); Christ Church, Oxford (Tom Driberg papers); Churchill College, Cambridge (Mitrokhin archive); King’s College, Cambridge (Noel Annan, Dadie Ryland, Rosamond Lehmann’s papers); London School of Economics (Herbert Morrison papers); Public Record Office, Northern Ireland (Derek Hill papers); Indiana University (Robin Maugham papers); Princeton (Harold Nicolson papers including unpublished parts of his diary); Georgetown University (Anthony Cave Brown papers); and National Library of Australia (Richard Hall papers).

The BBC maintain extensive files on staff and contributors to programmes allowing one to chart Burgess’s career at the Corporation between 1936 and 1944, his skills as a talks producer and how he leveraged his job to network and act as an agent of influence.

\textsuperscript{91} Eton College Archives, SCH/SOC/Pol/1.
\textsuperscript{92} King’s College Cambridge, minute books of the Apostles, KCAS/39/1/17, vol XV11.
\textsuperscript{93} TNA, KV3/422 and KV4, 466-475.
\textsuperscript{94} TNA, FO 371/75747; TNA FO371/75749; TNA, FO371/75766.
News reports are not always accurate, and some wartime national papers seem to have been censored, but regional accounts revealed Burgess’s appearances in court for drunken driving in London in 1940 and Dublin in 1949.95

Secondary sources often had revealing anecdotes about him. Nigel Tangye remembered him at Dartmouth96, Alan Hodgkin had an anecdote about a Cambridge march97 whilst a member of his BBC cohort in 1936 leaves a pictures of him in a book published in 1941.98

In October 2015, just after the first publication of Stalin’s Englishman, some four hundred Foreign Office and MI5 files on Burgess and Maclean were released. They provided extra detail but nothing substantial and many were incorporated into the June 2016 paperback and October 2016 American editions. They included surveillance reports showing the movements of Burgess and Maclean in the week before they fled and chapter and verse on Burgess’s engagements to Clarissa Churchill - niece of Winston Churchill and wife of Anthony Eden - and Esther Whitfield, the secretary and mistress of Kim Philby.99

They confirmed Burgess’s ‘roaring affair’ at Cambridge with Maclean100, that he had unsuccessfully tried to stay in MI5 after World War Two,101 how he came close to being sacked several times from the Foreign Office for poor work and that at his death he was writing a memoir which named Blunt ‘as having been the man who warned him that the security net was closing around him’ – a memoir which vanished on his death.102 There is also a copy of a memoir by Philby written some fifteen years before his autobiography My Silent War published in 1968.103

The files also contain an MI5 interview with Goronwy Rees, interviewed ten days after the disappearance, in which he named Robin Zaehner, Edward Playfair, Andre Revai and John Cairncross as Soviet agents.104 Victor Rothschild in a similar interview named Adam Watson and Judith Hart as possible spies.105 The jury remains out on Zaehner and Playfair whilst Watson was cleared, Revai is suspected of being agent ‘Toffee’ and Hart confessed.

The new releases raised more questions than they answered. The official story is Burgess only joined British Intelligence when he was seconded to the Joint Broadcasting Committee, a secret propaganda organisation, in January 1939 yet there are references in the new files, that ‘from about 1936 onwards (ie before the time of the GRAND organisation) Footman and Burgess were collaborating in the running of an Agent network for MI6’.106 Certainly an

95 Nottingham Evening Post, 10 September 1940; Dublin Evening Mail, 4 March 1949 and Dublin Evening Herald, 4 March 1949.
99 TNA, KV2/4113.
100 TNA, KV2/4123, interview with Sir Steven Runciman.
101 TNA, KV6/145.
102 TNA, KV2/4139.
103 TNA, FCO 158/29.
104 TNA, KV2/4114.
105 TNA, KV2/4115.
106 TNA, KV2/4103.
analysis of the stamps in his passport suggests his travels to the Continent in the late thirties were more extensive than realised nor can be accounted for by holidays.

Though extensive investigations were carried out, some obvious contacts were not interviewed. According to Tim Marten, a colleague of Burgess in the Washington Embassy, neither he, Jellicoe and Greenhill were ever interviewed. ‘It struck both Jellicoe and myself as very odd that, so far as we knew, no attempt was made to obtain information about Burgess from his colleagues in Chancery and in the Embassy who might be expected to know something about him’.  

The new documents confirm the British were reluctant to admit the breach of security to the Americans. ‘In Patrick Reilly’s absence on leave I would strongly urge that we should, at any rate for the time being, not tell the Ministry of Defence or the JIC, anything about the main security enquiry underlying the disappearance of Maclean and Burgess’.

They also provide evidence that the British could have arrested Burgess if he had returned to Britain. George Carey-Foster noted ‘that as regards Burgess, there is no legal evidence at present available which would justify a prosecution against him for espionage. There is, however, legal evidence that Burgess retained in his possession, when he had no right to retain them, various documents which had been issued to him or to which he had access during the course of his employment, and that therefore should he return, evidence exists upon which, in the opinion of MI5, a successful prosecution could be launched against him under Section 2(b) of the Official; Secrets Act, 1911, as amended by the Official Secrets Act, 1920’.

The new files reveal that suspicions were immediately raised about Kim Philby, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross but Cairncross was absolved because embarrassingly his brother Alec, who himself had had Communist sympathies, was the Chief Economic Advisor to Treasury. It was argued Cairncross in 1951 was no longer a security threat because he had left government service and Russia was a wartime ally conveniently forgetting this was not true when he was recruited in 1936.

The new releases only deal with Burgess and Maclean. The files on Blunt, Philby, Cairncross and the lesser-known spies, such as Leo Long and Michael Straight, have still to be made public. It’s clear the full story of The Cambridge Spies has not yet emerged.

The contribution of Stalin’s Englishman to intelligence history

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108 Carey Foster 11th June 1951 in response to concerns from British Joint Services Mission in Washington that the Americans were seeking information. TNA, FCO 158/24.
109 TNA, FCO 158/28, 22nd February 1952, This was confirmed by MI5’s lawyer BA Hill, TNA, FCO 158/178, 20th October 1960.
110 TNA, FCO/158/129.
The Academy has traditionally been suspicious of both biography and intelligence studies – perhaps because they are so popular – even though there are innumerable distinguished practitioners of both from Professors Richard Holmes and Hermione Lee in biography to Professors Christopher Andrew and Richard Aldrich in Intelligence.

Richard Holmes has written:

For some three hundred years, from John Aubrey via Lytton Strachey to Peter Ackroyd, its most exciting and innovative work has been done outside the established institutes of learning, and beyond the groves of academe…. Academia, in its turn, has not been very keen to recognize biography, especially of a literary kind. It has regularly assaulted the form as trivial, revisionist, exploitative, fictive, a corrupter of pure texts and probably also of scholarly morals. Most fatal objection of all, biography has no serious poetics, no set of post-Aristotelian regulations, and is therefore irredeemably subjective.111

In their chapter on ‘Intelligence Studies Now and Then’, Christopher Moran and Christopher Murphy note that ‘While intelligence history has proved incredibly popular with the public at large, it has been relatively marginalised within the academic profession, often criticised for being prone to sensationalism and uncritical scholarship.’112

One reason is that there is less documentation for intelligence than other academic areas which has meant some historians have been reluctant to become involved. As Richard Immerman has written ‘To an extent greater than journalists, historians are constitutionally wary of undertaking projects in which the unknown unknowns may well prove more vital to the story than the knowns and even the known unknowns.’113

One of the criticisms of the first wave of academic intelligence books was that they were dry. Reviewing Harry Hinsley’s official history of British Intelligence Ralph Erskine noted “Hinsley makes too few judgements, and his book is definitely not bedside reading. Order of battle appreciations loom all too large’.114 Subsequently serious intelligence writers, such as Christopher Andrew and Richard Aldrich, have realised the importance of bringing the subject alive and I hope Stalin’s Englishman continues this new tradition.

Biography in intelligence history can be very useful for various reasons. Not only does it humanise the subject but it allows, in the case of a traitor, a psychological examination to try and understand why the person became a spy. This is not only intrinsically interesting but has wider implications for espionage and counter-espionage services in identifying people who might be vulnerable to recruitment. Given the evidential problems with intelligence history, the techniques and insights of a biographer – sometimes akin to a novelist – can be valuable.

Ben Pimlott has argued that the aim of biography ‘should be to understand an individual life, the forces that shape it and the motives that drive it, in the context in which it is placed.’\(^{115}\) He continues ‘If the quest is for understanding, then public and private facts clearly cannot be put in separate boxes.’\(^{116}\)

In the case of Burgess, a biography allows one to trace the factors that made him a spy and a traitor from his childhood to recruitment in his early twenties, his growing political engagement with Marxism and personal disillusionment with the ‘British Establishment’ because in his case it is a mixture of both the political and personal. His treachery cannot be understood without examining his life.

An analysis of his childhood shows him to have been a spoilt child with no father figure and no boundaries set for his behaviour. At Dartmouth, he learnt to hide his feelings and develop his multiple personalities – outwardly a successful, conventional student but with mixed emotions towards authority and his background and a growing sense of being an outsider. A close study of revealing episodes and influences in his youth help to build the picture of the budding traitor.

At Eton he appeared outwardly conformist – he was a corporal in the school’s Officer Training Corps, a house prefect and represented the school at football but as one contemporary noted ‘a bit of a loner and a bit of a rebel. He was looked on as a bit left-wing and an outsider in his social and political views’.\(^{117}\) An important influence was his history teacher, Robert Birley, sometimes known as ‘Red Robert’ who writing to Burgess’s housemaster Frank Dobbs noted ‘The great thing is that he really thinks for himself’.\(^{118}\)

Burgess had always read widely, but at Eton his reading became increasingly politicised, with Arthur Morrison’s *The Hole in the Wall* and *Tales of Mean Streets* and Alexander Paterson’s *Across the Bridge*, with its exposure of conditions in London’s East End, being particularly influential. Burgess’s own political views were also being shaped by his history teacher Robert Birley’s concern for social justice. A visit by a trade union organiser to the school, where he talked about inequalities between rich and poor, only helped to reinforce a growing interest in radical politics.\(^{119}\)

He was also active in the school debating society discussing whether the English public school system was a good idea or not, and ‘Russia – Country of the Future?’ For example, on 25 October 1929, with police riot squads forced to deal with crowds on Wall Street, he was in a minority supporting ‘radical changes are needed at Eton in view of the rise of Socialism’.

Burgess continued to win all the prizes at Eton but one distinction eluded him – membership of Pop, a self-elected elite of between twenty-four and twenty-eight boys, which conferred special privileges such as wearing coloured waistcoats, carrying umbrellas, and caning other

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116 Ibid, p. 158.
117 David Philips telephone conversation with the author, 28 October 1998.
118 Robert Birley to Frank Dobbs, 14 December 1928, quoted Driberg, p.11.
119 Driberg, p.12.
non-Pop boys. Between September 1929 and May 1930, Burgess’s name was put forward unsuccessfully several times. It didn’t surprise another Eton contemporary, Peter Calvocoressi: ‘I don’t think it was very strange that he never got into Pop. There were three kinds of Pop members: ex officio, good at games, an exceptionally “good chap”. He was none of those things!’\(^{120}\) But to Burgess it was another example of his will being thwarted.

In his second year at Cambridge, 1931-1932, Burgess found the university increasingly politicised by the world situation. Unemployment had reached nearly three million, there had been a naval mutiny at Invergordon, Britain had been forced off the gold standard, and Ramsay MacDonald had been required to form an all-party coalition National Government. At the same time there was increasing political instability on the Continent, particularly in Germany. Cambridge was not isolated from these developments and its response was reflected in both overt and covert activities.

During the summer of 1931, the Cambridge University Socialist Society had been formed by Harry Dawes, an ex-miner, and it became the focal point for left-wing radicalism in the university and was increasingly infiltrated and used by the communists. Burgess became active in CUSS alongside two other students - Kim Philby and Donald Maclean – and returning to Cambridge as a research student in autumn 1933 he became part of the Trinity College communist cell.

He joined campaigns to support striking city bus drivers and sewage workers, and against high rents for council house tenants and helped organise a strike on behalf of Trinity waiters against the casual labour system which laid-off most of them during vacations. And he played a prominent role in the Armistice Day demonstration of November 1933 and in February 1934 supported a contingent of hunger marchers passing through Cambridge en route to London.

Until this point Burgess’s life had been predicated on his academic success and political activism but in March 1934 he was shattered to discover that his doctoral research had already been covered in Basil Willey’s *The Seventeenth Century Background*. Though he explored other topics, he had lost interest in academia. It was at this point that the Russians made their first approaches to recruit him. Now it was politics which was to give him a sense of self-worth and purpose. In December 1934 Burgess was asked if he would serve the Party. He readily agreed.

Traditionally the factors in agent recruitment are MICE – Money, Ideology, Compromise and Ego. It is worth looking which of them played a role in Burgess’s recruitment

Money played little part. Though he occasionally accepted money from the Russians, it was not his motivation – he had independent means as well as being constantly in well-paid employment - and he often refused sums.

Ideology was certainly a factor. As an historian at Cambridge, Burgess became enamoured by the Marxist interpretation of history. He would later claim his interest in communism had ‘an intellectual and theoretical rather than an emotional basis’.\(^ {121}\) Already at Dartmouth, he had

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\(^{120}\) Peter Calvocoressi to the author, 4 December 1998.

\(^{121}\) Driberg, p. 18.
been drawn to the determinist view of history propounded by Alfred Mahan’s *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, a book incidentally which strengthened his anti-American views and which were to be another factor in his political sympathies.

One of his subjects for the Cambridge History Tripos was ‘the theory of the Modern State – what the state is – the point at which the general study of history touches real life most closely’. Dissatisfied with what he was being taught he ‘tried to work out a theory of his own…the State, he decided, had always been the instrument by which the economically dominant group in society exercised power’. He had discovered the arguments of Lenin’s *The State and Revolution* independently. His belief that Communism held the answers was shaped by current events, not least a belief that the only bulwark against the rise of the Dictators was Communism.

His conversion was also influenced by his personal friendship with an ex-miner from Nottingham, Jimmy Lees, and a leading student Communist, David Haden-Guest. He joined the Cambridge University Socialist Society which had been infiltrated by the Communists. It was from CUSS that his friend Kim Philby would recruit Russia’s long-term penetration agents.

Compromise was also a factor in the recruitment. Burgess made no secret of his homosexuality – then a criminal offence – but it was paradoxically his sexuality which made him attractive to the Russian recruiters. The Soviet intelligence service had discovered that the penalties for homosexuality in Britain meant that homosexuals had to live part of their lives in secret and formed a tight and loyal network, which if penetrated, could be very fruitful. It was felt that Burgess’s knowledge of, and contacts within, the homosexual world could prove very useful and this assessment was proved to be correct.

In a psychological profile, written in 1939, his recruiter Arnold Deutsch concluded

Many features of his character can be explained by the fact that he is a homosexual. He became one at Eton, where he grew up in an atmosphere of cynicism, opulence, hypocrisy and superficiality. As he is very clever and well-educated, the Party was for him a saviour. It gave him above all an opportunity to satisfy his intellectual needs. Therefore he took up Party work with great enthusiasm. Part of his private life is led in a circle of homosexual friends whom he recruited among a wide variety of people, ranging from the famous liberal economist Keynes and extending to the very trash of society down to male prostitutes. His personal degradation, drunkenness, irregular way of life, and the feeling of being outside society, was connected with this kind of life, but on the other hand his abhorrence of bourgeois morality came from this. This kind of life did not satisfy him.

Finally Ego was also a factor. Burgess felt himself to be intellectually superior to his contemporaries. This found expression in his membership of a secret society, The Apostles, a university discussion group founded in 1820, which drew in some of the cleverest of Cambridge students. The Apostles, like many such societies, had its own rituals and

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122 Ibid. p. 18.
123 Ibid. p.19.
language, which helped sustain a sense of being special. Potential recruits – called ‘embryos’ – were spotted first by an Apostle and then if considered ‘Apostolic’ were sponsored by a member called his ‘father’. The first meeting for a new member was his ‘birth’, where he would take an oath, and after being elected he would address his fellow Apostles as ‘brother’.

The Apostles created a strong sense of being special and separate, with a different set of allegiances to those who were not members. Apostolic virtues included the importance of sexual and emotional honesty, truth, beauty and friendship, which were placed above conventional sexual morality and orthodoxy. Many of the Apostles were also part of the Bloomsbury Group, a collection of writers, philosophers, economists and artists, who were generally left-wing, atheists, pacifists, lovers of the arts and each other. The group was influenced by the philosopher and Apostle G.E. Moore, who believed that ‘affectionate personal relations and the contemplation of beauty were the only supremely good states of mind’. It is perhaps not surprising that the Apostles should prove to be so open to communist infiltration.

Burgess was a product of his generation. Born a few years earlier or later, his life would have taken a very different course, but he came from a generation politicised during the early 1930s that felt it needed to stop theorising and do something, even if this call to action took many forms and led few to beat a path to Moscow. His fellow Communists at Cambridge, David Haden Guest, went to work with the young Communist League in Battersea, and John Cornford to serve the party among the Birmingham working-class, before both died in the Spanish Civil War. Maurice Cornforth gave up philosophy to become an agricultural organiser in East Anglia, whilst many, such as Eric Hobsbawm, became communist intellectuals.

For Burgess, serving the Communist Party in Battersea or Birmingham was less attractive than trying to shape political events at the highest level. It played back to his school-day fascination with Alfred Maher’s theories of great power blocs and Marxist teachings. Burgess needed a moral purpose, to do something positive in the struggle against fascism, and, at a vulnerable point in his life, the Russians provided the opportunity.

Writing to Harold Nicolson in 1962, he quoted Stendhal’s ‘The Pistol Shot in the Theatre’ on the importance of timing in shaping political and personal decisions:

You were born too early to be hit by this at the age at which one acts, & the intelligentsia of the 40s and 50s were both too late. I was of the generation of the pistol shot in the 30s. I notice the intellectuals of the 60s, the young at Aldermaston, have again been hit by the continuing fusillade. I notice this with pleasure, one greets others getting into the same boat; and with sorrow that they don’t know how rough the crossing is.125

He refused to believe that his God had failed him, as it had Koestler, Spender and the other fellow travellers. Like Catholics in the reign of Elizabeth working for the victory of Spain, or indeed the sleepers of ISIS now, there was a certainty in the correctness of the choice. It was, as Graham Greene would write of Philby, ‘the logical fanaticism of a man who, having once found a faith, is not going to lose it because of the injustices or cruelties inflicted by erring human instruments’.126

126 Philby, My Silent War, foreword.
Burgess was guided by a strong sense of history, which he then misread. Goronwy Rees would write, ‘The truth is that Guy, in his sober moments, had a power of historical generalisation which is one of the rarest intellectual faculties, and which gave conversation with him on political subjects a unique charm and fascination. It was a power which was, I think, completely native and instinctive to him. It might have made him a great historian; instead it made him a communist’.127

Just as the nineteenth century had belonged to the British Empire, Burgess felt the twentieth century would belong to Russia. George Weidenfeld, at one of Baroness Budberg’s drinks parties, remembered how Burgess accused him of ‘sitting on the fence’ by supporting a pro-European policy for Britain. ‘There is no such thing as a European policy,’ he pontificated. ‘You’ve either got to choose America or Russia. People may have their own view which to choose, but Europe is something wishy-washy that simply does not exist.’128

In Graham Greene’s The Confidential Agent a character says, ‘You choose your side once and for all – of course, it may be the wrong side. Only history can tell that’.129 The same can be said of Burgess.

No account of Burgess’s life can be written without an understanding of the intellectual maelstrom of the 1930s, especially amongst the young and impressionable. In An Englishman Abroad, Burgess is asked why he became a spy. ‘At the time it seemed the right thing to do,’ he replied. For Burgess and others, their conversion had strong political roots, but most fellow members of the Cambridge cells did not spy for the Russians and indeed lost their communist fervour in 1939 with the Nazi-Soviet Pact, in 1956 with the invasion of Hungary, or simply because they had to get on with the business of earning a living.

So why did Burgess stay the course? Partly because, having picked his football team, he loyally stuck with them through thick and thin, capable of all sorts of intellectual somersaults to keep in step with the changing situation. He stayed because he was flattered to feel he did have a real chance to affect events and from a perverted form of imperialism, that having witnessed the death of one empire, he decided to attach himself to another which he felt less materialistic. He also stayed because the Russians wouldn’t let him stop and because he actually enjoyed his clandestine role, hunting with both the hare and the hounds.

Burgess was a spoilt child, indulged by his mother and with an absent father – a characteristic of several of the Cambridge Ring – and he had never been given boundaries. His mother, who refused to set them, seemed to be grateful to first Dartmouth and eventually the Soviet Union for so doing. Without a strong moral compass, he was

127 Rees, p.121.
129 Ibid. Michael Straight said much the same to Noel Annan when explaining his treachery, reminding him of ‘the response of the historian who was asked to assess the French Revolution and who answered “It’s too soon to tell”’. King’s College, Cambridge archives, NGA 5/1/950, Straight to Annan, 24 April 1989.
vulnerable to the blandishments of the highly sophisticated Soviet recruitment techniques, which offered excitement and a sense of worth. The Soviets recognised his desire for clandestine danger in his private life, but also his guilt and desire for some sort of redemption, and simply utilised it for their own ends.

The Apostles proved to be fertile recruitment ground, because the society drew men attracted by secrecy, by apparent higher loyalties, and a feeling of superiority. Burgess was perhaps a classic example of his acquaintance Cyril Connolly’s theory of arrested development, a Peter Pan figure who never grew up. Cyril Connolly noted that ‘the child whose craving for love is unsatisfied, whose desire for power is thwarted or whose innate sense of justice is warped . . . eventually may try to become a revolutionary or a dictator’.130 Service to the Soviet Union gave Burgess a cause after he had failed with many of his other ambitions. A sense of purpose, a new beginning after rejection, the opportunity to create a heroic role for himself.

Guy Burgess wanted to be someone and shape events. Knowing he would not make it as a Cambridge don or high-flying mandarin, the role offered by the Russians seemed attractive. Malcom Muggeridge, a shrewd judge of character, reviewing the Tom Driberg biography noted ‘the vanity, snobbishness, romanticism, weakness masquerading as defiance, retreat from reality somehow made to seem an advance upon it, which constitute him. One senses the influences which played upon him, the perky, half-baked longing somehow to be someone’.131

Part of the fascination with Burgess is his complexity and paradoxes. No figure could have been more British and Establishment with his Eton and Cambridge education, membership of London clubs, expensive clothes, love of British literature, hunting scenes on the walls of his flat, and final wish to be buried in Britain. But this was only one part of him and any analysis of his character and motivation needs to be aware of his second world – with the romance of Russian music and literature and his respect for the ruthlessness of its history and political system.

Spies live double lives, sometimes out of necessity, but generally from choice. Burgess wasn’t torn between his various lives; they existed in parallel and even together. Marching with the hunger marchers he wore his Pitt Club scarf and Old Etonian tie, just in case such protective clothing was required. The order of Britain and the wild danger of Russia were simply the yin and yang of his personality.

Burgess was not unaware of the purges in the 1930s, the failure of Collectivisation, the labour camps, and so on. After all, he lectured on the evils of communism at the Foreign Office summer schools and made his reputation as a British propagandist against the Soviet Union, notably in the Information Research Department. But though an intelligent man, he was also politically naïve – a not uncommon combination – and he simply chose to ignore what did not suit him. Any change, such as the Nazi-Soviet Pact, could instantly be explained away in view of the bigger picture.

He had learnt to compartmentalise his life and feelings as a child and he carried this

130 Connolly, pp 15-16.
131 Malcolm Muggeridge, ‘St Guy and Merry Russia’, *Encounter*, (January 1957), p. 75.
through into adulthood. Like an actor, he played each part as required, but he was a Janus. To his close friends, and in particular women, he was kind, loyal, stimulating company, a good conversationalist, thoughtful and charming. Miriam Rothschild remembered, ‘He had slightly protruding top teeth (like a baby thumb-sucker) which made him youthful-looking and appealing. And he was always in sort of high spirits – like a school girl’. Whilst Rosamond Lehmann felt he ‘was not only brilliant, but very affectionate and warm-hearted . . . I was very fond of him’.

Yet from Stanley Christopherson at Lockers Park – ‘He wasn’t the kind of boy I wanted as a friend. He wasn’t quite right’ – to over thirty years later, there were those who were repelled by him. Margaret Anstee, a young female colleague in the Foreign Office, thought him ‘extremely repulsive. He was rather greasy and dirty. He was always telling awful dirty jokes’.134

Brian Sewell, who was eighteen when he met Burgess, remembered ‘he had egg on his tie, tobacco on his breath, and wandering hands; I might have been glad of such hands of a boy of my own age, but not his and the accompanying odours – not even the strawberry milk shakes that he was inclined to buy me could compensate for those’.135 John Waterlow put it simply, ‘I don’t think Burgess had any real warmth of character’.136

Harold Nicolson could see both sides of Burgess’s character and his conflicted personality. ‘He publicly announced his sympathies with communism and yet he heartily disliked the Russians . . . When Burgess was sober he was charming, jolly, and a magnificent talker. When he was drunk, he drooled foolish nonsense. He was a kind man, and despite his weaknesses, I don’t think he could do anything dishonourable or mean. But he was so terribly impetuous’.137

You don’t want to betray if you belong. It is all relative, but Burgess never felt he belonged. He was the outsider. At Lockers Park the fathers seemed more distinguished, at Eton he resented his failure to make Pop, at Cambridge the Etonians didn’t want anything to do with him, in the Foreign Office he wasn’t taken as seriously as he would have liked. Small slights grew into larger resentments and betrayal was an easy revenge. Espionage was simply another instrument in his social revolt, another gesture of self-assertion.

His homosexuality could have been a factor in feeling an outsider, but it strangely wasn’t, because on that score he felt no sense of shame. Robert Cecil, who knew him, noticed, ‘He

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135 Brian Sewell letter to author, 25 October 1998. He gives a slightly different account dating the meeting two years later to May 1951. ‘A day or two later he waylaid me and invited me to dinner, after which he inflicted the traumatic experience of taking me to his “club”, which was not in Pall Mall, but in some cellar haunt where I was more or less compelled to dance with him – more food stains and foul breath and an overwhelming discomfort at the very idea of doing such a thing. I fled’. Brian Sewell, Outsider: Always, Almost Never Quite, (London: Quartet, 2011), p. 69.
137 Mather, pp 35-36.
had no particular wish to change the law on homosexuality; so long as he succeeded in
defying it, the risk involved gave an added frisson to his exploits’.138 And frisson was part of
the attraction of first communism and then his spying, which, as one newspaper put it, provided
‘a gesture of rebellion, an intellectual excitement; an outlet for his sense of adventure and
love of mischief’.139

Spies have to be good liars and even fantasists, not least for self-protection, but for Burgess
decit was integral to his life, from his sexual activities to his political allegiances. As
Andrew Boyle noted, ‘Truth for Guy would always be a moving target, but the ability to
dazzle friends and casual acquaintances with the lurid glare of his fantasies consistently
prevented them from finding him out’.140

Guy Burgess sought power and realising he was unable to achieve that overtly, he chose to do
so covertly. He enjoyed intrigue and secrets for they were his currency in exerting power and
controlling people. Goronwy Rees recalled, ‘He liked to know, or pretend to know, what no
one else knew, he liked to surprise one with information about matters that were no concern
of his, derived from sources which he could not, or would not, reveal; the trouble was that
one could never be sure whether the ultimate source was not his own imagination’.141

There was, too, a moral vacuum. His BBC colleague John Green re membered, ‘He had
literally no principles at all. None at all . . .’142 For Steven Runciman, ‘It was a wasted life.
There was a solid core missing . . . épater le bourgeois. That’s what really started him off’.143

Burgess would, of course, not have seen his life as one of failure, hypocrisy and deceit. Just as his
Huguenot ancestors had chosen to start a new life abroad, he too had put his political principles
ahead of his personal wishes. He did not see himself as having betrayed his country, but as a
Soviet agent who had nobly served his adopted country. And yet, at the final reckoning, it was
to his childhood home that Stalin’s Englishman wanted to be taken.

Len Scott has written ‘The professional and public responsibility of academics who study
intelligence is to foster greater understanding of the nature and role of intelligence, including
not only its value but its limitations. These include understanding the limitations of our
knowledge of what is done in secrecy by our governments’.144

I hope I have achieved this with Stalin’s Englishman which broke new ground by
demonstrating that rather than being the tragic-comic, drunken clown in the group Burgess
was regarded by his colleagues and the Russians as the leader of the group and the most
important of the ring.

It showed that whilst Philby was the first to be recruited and Burgess only the third, it was
Burgess who acted as the chief talent spotter bringing in Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross and
the recruits from Oxford such as Goronwy Rees. Burgess was the first to be recruited to

138 Cecil, pp 131-132.
139 Daily Herald, 7 November 1955.
140 Boyle, p.118.
141 Rees, pp 140-141.
142 Penrose, p.195-196.
143 Steven Runciman interview, 2 August 1998.
144 Scott, p. 201.
British Intelligence in 1936/37 and the only one to work for both MI6 and M15. It was he who helped engineer the entry of Philby into MI6 in the summer of 1940 and it was Burgess who sustained the Ring during the 1930s when the recruits were separated from their controllers.

One of his Russian controllers Yuri Modin was later to write that ‘the real leader was Burgess. He held the group together, infused it with his energy and led it into battle, so to speak. In the 1930s, at the very start, it was he who took the initiatives and the risks, dragging the others along in his wake. He was the moral leader of the group’, adding, ‘He was the most outstanding and educated among all the five.’

Sergei Kondrashev, a KGB general who worked with Burgess on disinformation measures in Moscow, agreed. Asked who was the most important of the Cambridge Spies, he immediately replied, ‘Burgess. Definitely.’

It’s been assumed that Burgess’s most damaging period was the four years he spent in the inner sanctum of the Foreign Office, as private secretary to the deputy Foreign Secretary, Hector McNeil, but Kondrashev revealed that in Russian eyes, ‘One of the most important periods of his service was just before the German War’ when Burgess was acting as middleman between the British and French in the crucial days immediately preceding the Second World War’.

Reporting to MI6 officer David Footman, Burgess used his friendship with Edward Pfeifer, secretary to Edward Daladier, to obtain details of French Cabinet discussions. It’s a view shared by respected spy writer, Nigel West. ‘Anthony told me that Guy Burgess was the genius in the network, the key man. He was the person everybody had to go to for instruction, help and advice. Guy was always in touch with the Russians and could make decisions and could counsel other people’.

*Stalin’s Englishman* also confirmed the escape route of the two men in May 1951, one of the mysteries of the story. Over the years, numerous suggestions had been put forward ranging from using the same route as Melinda a few years later through the Soviet zone of Austria to their exfiltration by Russian ship from Bordeaux via Copenhagen to Leningrad. Burgess had told Driberg in 1956 the two men had caught the Paris express from Rennes and taken an overnight train to Berne, where they collected visas at the Czech embassy. There they waited a week for a flight to take them from Zurich to Prague and then Moscow. An analysis of cypher traffic in Guy Liddell’s diary shows an increase in traffic from Berne about 28th May and from Prague about 4th June suggesting Burgess’s account was broadly accurate.

*Stalin’s Englishman* also confirmed the existence of another atomic energy spy Wilfrid Mann. Mann, a scientist responsible for atomic energy intelligence, worked next door to Maclean, Burgess and Philby in the British Embassy in the period 1943-1951. In his memoirs he writes of his friendship with all three men and gives a particularly vivid account of the famous 1951 dinner party at the Philby house where Burgess managed to insult the guests - all top American intelligence officials.

146 Sergei Kondrashev interview 24 November 2003.
147 Ibid.
148 Cecil, p. 144.
150 TNA, KV4/473, Guy Liddell, Diary, 12 June 1951.
Mann had been named before. Andrew Boyle, whose *The Climate of Treason* led to the exposure of Antony Blunt in 1979, called Mann ‘Basil’ in his book and named him as having worked for the Russians. Citing confidential information from a CIA source, Boyle claimed the Israelis ‘passed on to Angleton the name of the British nuclear scientist whom they had unearthed as an important Soviet agent’ just after the Second World War as ‘the price for uninterrupted but informal cooperation with US intelligence’.151

Angleton decided to ‘run the operation out of his hip pocket for at least a couple of years…Whether Hoover himself was fully informed is questionable. What can be said is that the FBI did learn eventually that ‘Basil’ was working under CIA control as a double agent. It is impossible to be more precise than this because no complete chronological record of the operation was kept; next to nothing was committed to paper – or to the supposed hierarchical order of the US Intelligence community’.152 In the book, Boyle argued Mann was used to help Maclean interpret for the Soviets information on the latest developments in nuclear physics, which without Basil’s help would have been Greek to Maclean.

According to Boyle, quite separately in late 1948 American crypto-analysis revealed a Russian source inside the British Embassy who had passed classified information during the final stages of the Second World War. ‘Basil’ was identified and ‘broke down quickly and easily, confessing that he had become a covert Communist in his student days and a secret agent for the Soviets not long afterwards’.153 He was given the choice of continuing to work for the Russians under CIA direction, or ‘take whatever penalties were visited on him by American law’.154 In return for protection and the promise of American citizenship, ‘Basil’ agreed to be played back against the Russians providing Maclean only with useless or wrong information for passing on to the Soviets.

Though Boyle did not name Mann, he was easily identified – his second name was Basil - and questions were asked in the House of Commons. Mann denied the accusations, publishing a book in 1982 *Was There A Fifth Man?* challenging some of the evidence that Boyle had produced.155 However, there were inconsistencies in his statements at the time, not least claiming not to know Maclean and to having joined the British Embassy in 1949 after Maclean had left when in fact he had joined in 1948. Boyle refused to apologise for the alleged libel and Angleton to provide testimony when Mann wanted to sue. The matter was dropped.

Boyle’s account is supported by former US intelligence officer William Corson in his history of the Washington intelligence community *The Armies of Ignorance*. He wrote that Israeli intelligence had provided ‘some remarkable results and intelligence coups’ and that Burgess, Maclean and Philby were identified earlier than 1951 and manipulated giving them ‘intelligence disinformation to mislead the Soviets’ – something not commonly accepted by intelligence historians.156

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152 Ibid, p.309.
154 Ibid.
I uncovered confirmation of Mann’s spying in the private papers of Sir Patrick Reilly, Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee and then the Foreign Office Under-Secretary in charge of intelligence at the time of Burgess’s defection in 1951. Reilly wrote in his unpublished memoirs ‘That ‘Basil’ who can easily be identified, was in fact a Soviet spy is true: and also that he was turned round without difficulty’.157

Wilfrid Mann was born in London in 1908 and educated at St Paul’s school before going on to receive a degree in maths and physics from Imperial College in 1929 and a physics doctorate in 1934. He went on to do graduate work during the 1930s in Denmark under Niels Bohr and to work on cyclotrons at the radiation laboratory at Berkeley, California and in 1941 he invented the ‘Jitterbug’, the prototype uranium separation machine.

At Imperial he had come under the influence of GP Thompson, the British physicist in charge of the Tube Alloys project - the British nuclear programme, later incorporated into the joint British and American Manhattan Project - and went to work for it first at Shell Mex House in the Strand and then from 1942 at the British Commonwealth Scientific Office in Washington as the supervisor in British and Russian scientific co-operation.

After a short period with the British nuclear programme at Chalk River in Canada, he returned to Washington as a member of MI6 reporting to Commander Eric Welsh, the chief of MI6’s scientific intelligence service, where both he and Donald Maclean attended the Combined Policy Committee on Atomic Energy. As the British scientific intelligence liaison officer, he maintained close relations with the CIA’s James Angleton. Mann’s office was in the ‘Rogues Gallery’, the secure area of the Embassy, and next door to those of Philby and Burgess. Here he held the British decrypts of Soviet signals traffic relating to atomic bomb experiments, decrypts he shared with the CIA – and it appears the KGB.

Confirmation of Donald Maclean’s treachery came from intercepted Soviet communications in April 1951 and coincidentally on the 25th of that month Mann was replaced by Dr Robert Press as the MI6 scientific intelligence officer. He was never employed by the British again, subsequently working from 1951 to 1980 as head of the radioactivity section at the National Bureau of Standards in Washington. Mann, who became an American citizen in 1959, declined all interview requests and died in a Baptist retirement home in Baltimore in March 2001. In spite of his wartime scientific contributions in both the UK and the US, he received no obituaries.

My discovery backs up Ultimate Deception: How Stalin Stole the Bomb, by Jerry Dan (real name Nigel Bance), a book based on interviews with a KGB officer Vladimir Barkovsky, formerly deputy director of the department within the KGB which handled all scientific and technical intelligence and KGB documents, which revealed Mann to have been recruited – possibly through homosexual blackmail - in the late 1930s and given the codename MALONE because of his Irish connections.158 Interviewed for the book, Mann confirmed to Dan that he had been a Russian spy.159

According to Ultimate Deception, Mann was in regular contact during and immediately after the Second World War with Russian intelligence officers and KGB officers confirm he was a

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157 Bodleian Library, Sir Patrick Reilly papers, MS, Eng, c 6932, folio 57.
158 Dan, p. 323.
159 Ibid, p. 331.
Soviet agent of great influence – ‘rated in Moscow as equal to Philby in importance’.\(^{160}\) He supposedly passed to his Russian case officer the precise details of British cooperation with the United States on atomic matters, revealed that Britain had given up the right of veto on the dropping of an atomic bomb and accepted that two-thirds of all uranium oxide mined in the Belgian Congo and South Africa should go through American ports.\(^{161}\)

Other documents he supplied – reproduced in the book - included a transmission dated 23rd August 1945 ‘Report of NKGB resident in London on the intensification of activities of British Intelligence against the USSR’ telling Moscow that the British and French were about to establish the ‘Anglo-French Liaison Bureau’, a secret MI6 bureau in Paris to monitor Soviet atomic developments. On a trip to London in February 1948 he gave the rezidentura the technical details of a fleet of adapted long-range US bombers on constant alert in the north Pacific to check the fallout from any Russian nuclear explosion.

According to *Ultimate Deception*, the Russians never entirely trusted Mann and suspected - rightly so - that he was being ‘played back’ to them. The discovery of Reilly’s account of ‘Basil’ appears to confirm that the Mann accusations were correct though how Mann was used is not clear.

Those who defend Mann say his name does not appear in Guy Liddell's diary, the Venona decrypts nor the Mitrokhin Archive, that he was several times security cleared and his FBI file is not designated R for Russian espionage. They believe Angleton misled Boyle to protect his own reputation over Philby. However, the fact Mann’s name has not cropped up in Liddell, Venona and Mitrokhin does not necessarily mean he did not spy for the Russians but simply there is no record. He could, for example, have been run by Russian military intelligence, the GRU, or outside the rezidentura. The spy writer Nigel West claims that in 2003 documents were retrieved from the KGB archive suggesting 'that Mann may have been a Soviet spy codenamed MALLONE'.\(^{162}\)

MI5, when I approached them, claimed they ‘hold no files relating to Wilfrid Mann that fall within this category’ i.e. ‘files that are still in existence and at least 50 years old, if to do so would not damage national security’.\(^{163}\) The CIA, in response to a Freedom of Information request, wrote they could ‘neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records response to your request’ and it was being denied under various national security FOIA exemptions.

**How much damage did Guy Burgess inflict**

One of the important debates in intelligence studies is contextualising intelligence, the need not just to give details of intelligence operations but to assess their impact and broader importance. A critique is that much of intelligence history is ‘military buffism’. As John Lewis Gaddis has written:

\(^{160}\) Ibid, p.8.
\(^{161}\) Ibid, pp 321-322.
\(^{163}\) Letter to Andrew Lownie from MI5, 16 March 2015.
As great stacks of books that have been written about the history of espionage amply demonstrate, it is easy to get so caught up in the fascination of esoteric minutiae that one loses sight of what, if anything, it all meant. What difference did it make that the Russians spied on their Anglo-American allies throughout the war, that they knew much of what went on within the British and American governments during the early post-war years and that London and Washington failed to discover this until 1951? Is the world today – was the world then – discernibly different as a result? He has argued that intelligence is always filtered so ‘someone must decide what information to obtain or intercept, what to transmit or decipher, and finally what to incorporate within the necessary laconic analyses that go to those few on the receiving end who have the authority to act. For these reasons alone, an intelligence breakthrough is likely to provide less accurate information than one might expect: one need only cite the ineffectiveness of MAGIC in anticipating Pearl Harbour, or of ULTRA in warning of Hitler’s 1944 attack in the Ardennes, to make the point. The difficulty is likely to be compounded when decision makers distrust the source of such information. We know, for example, that Stalin dismissed American and British warnings of a German attack in June 1941 because he was convinced the West was trying to use disinformation to undermine Soviet-German relations’. He goes on:

Any comprehensive assessment of the impact of Soviet espionage on post-war diplomacy will have to give attention to the particular characteristics of its primary consumer, and to the question – fundamental to an understanding of Stalin – of whether he ever overcame the fear of being fooled sufficiently to be able to act on the basis of information being conveyed to through sources he could not completely control.

And even if Stalin trusted his sources, he says, did any of the information provided by the spies change history?

The British spies would have been in a position, as well, to convey information about American efforts in 1949-50 to bring about a break with the Chinese Communists and the Russians, and about plans – or the lack of them – for the defence of Korea. And once the Korean War began, of course, there would have been ample opportunities to inform the Russians of evolving Anglo-American strategy for countering North Korean and Chinese military operations. But so what? What difference did this all make?

He concludes in a call for greater rigour in intelligence studies that ‘good intelligence history will have to be more than an accumulation of “spy stories”: it will have to try and answer

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165 Gaddis, p.201.
Robin Winks’s “So what?” question; it will have to try to distinguish between “necessary” and “sufficient” causation.; and it will have to show how what governments actually did relates to what they did, or did not, actually know.  

Sir Rodric Braithwaite, former head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, reviewing Christopher Andrew’s *The Secret World: A History of Intelligence*, whilst admitting ‘Intelligence studies have at last become a respectable academic discipline’, felt that Andrew ‘does not quite engage with the broader questions he himself raises. How much influence did intelligence really have on the course of history? How much do you distort the historical record if you omit the secret world?’ If a Cambridge Professor of History struggles with such links, what hope for a doctoral student at Edinburgh?

It is a view shared by John Ferris who has argued ‘Students of intelligence should aim not just to astonish their audience, but to bore them, and always to answer the key questions - why and how did intelligence really matter?’ This is easier said than done. Intelligence is like advertising. Only a small part is effective but it is sometimes difficult to establish which part. It is, however, possible. One thinks of Ralph Bennett’s books on Ultra which specifically showed how Ultra shaped certain events and why during World War Two, Calder Walton’s *Empires of Secrets* on British intelligence and de-colonisation or James Barr’s *Lords of the Desert* on British intelligence in the Middle East.

Writing about Burgess’s fellow spy Donald Maclean in 2002, Sheila Kerr admitted some of the challenges in determining the importance of some agents:

> While we know that Maclean was a Soviet agent, some 50 years after his defection to Moscow we still do not know the true cost of his betrayal. Incomplete, ambiguous and misleading evidence prevents a full and accurate assessment. Speculations, hypotheses and conspiracies turn the evidence into a tangle. The intellectual challenge begins by distinguishing between these different strands of evidence and opinion, trying to find the origin of particular stories, and then separating fact from fiction, information from disinformation….we remain some distance from being able to make accurate, comprehensive judgements about the significance of intelligence in international history.

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173 Sheila Kerr, “Investigating Soviet Espionage and Subversion: the case of Donald Maclean,” *Intelligence and National Security*, 17(1) (2002), p.101. The release of hundreds of MI5 and Foreign Office files to the National Archives in October 2015 relating to the investigations into Maclean’s spying has helped but we still lack access to NKVD and GRU.
She argued that ‘intelligence history’s key contribution lies in its power to alter previous causal explanations…If intelligence history alters our explanations about causation then it has the power to alter our understanding of the relationship between cause and effect as well as altering the ultimate significance of events and their consequences’. This is clearly what happened with the books on Ultra which completely changed scholars’ view of the Second World War.

With regard to Maclean, she also makes the point of perspective in assessing the success of a spy:

For the Soviets, Maclean was a hero of the revolution. British and American opinion is mixed. Some left wing idealists admire Maclean for his ideological commitment to communism regardless of the cost. Others regard the whole business as inconsequential, taking the view that the intelligence Cold War was an amoral and meaningless struggle without heroes or villains. Most people see Maclean as a damaging traitor who caused deep distress in the Anglo-American relationship.

Establishing how much damage Burgess inflicted is not easy. We know some of the material that Burgess passed to the Russians, and that it was so extensive that much of it was never even translated – the Russian agent Kislytsin talked about Burgess bringing out suitcases of documents and at one point Burgess requested he be supplied with an extra suitcase. But we know only what the Russians have chosen to share in authorised books such as Deadly Illusions and The Crown Jewels, fascinating accounts but ones which have to be treated carefully as the Russian authorities often had another agenda. There are certainly still shelves of material on the Cambridge Spy Ring in both Russian and British archives that have not been released and which might well provide a new narrative.

What we do know, according to The Crown Jewels, is that from 1941 to 1945 Burgess passed 4,604 documents to Moscow Centre. These documents included, amongst much else, telegraphic communications between the Foreign Office and its posts abroad, position papers and minutes of the Cabinet and Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff. However, even when we know what documentation was taken, we don’t know who saw it, when, and what they did with the material. Donald Cameron Watt agrees that:

To arrive at an assessment of the impact of clandestinely obtained information on Soviet policy is more difficult. Even where one can assume accuracy of frequency of reports, the circulation and evaluation of such reports within the Soviet military and political hierarchy is difficult to reconstruct. We simply do not know how the reports of the GRU and the NKVD were circulated or evaluated.

The irony with Burgess is that the more explosive the material, the less likely it was to be trusted, as Stalin and his cohorts couldn’t believe that it wasn’t a plant. Also if it didn’t fit in records and to the personal files of Stalin and Molotov to understand what he actually did and how his information was acted on. The problem remains with Burgess too.

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175 Ibid, p.104.
176 Cameron Watt, p.201.
with Soviet assumptions, then it was ignored. Much of the material Burgess supplied, out of practical necessity for security reasons, was oral briefing, which could easily be misinterpreted as it was passed on. The extraordinary amount of intelligence supplied by the Cambridge Five rather than pleasing the Centre only fed into their paranoia.

A young intelligence officer, Elena Modrzhinskaya, was asked to evaluate the information provided and determine its reliability. She knew through Blunt of the Double Cross system, whereby Britain had played back agents against Germany, and concluded by November 1942 that a similar deception was being undertaken against the Soviet Union by the Five acting as double agents. How possibly, given their communist past, could the Cambridge Spy Ring have been allowed to work for British Intelligence? The only conclusion she could come to was ‘that SÖNCHEN and MADCHEN, even before their contact with us, were sent by the British Intelligence Services to work among students with left-wing sympathies in Cambridge’.177

The Centre couldn’t believe the Five’s access and how much secret material was being supplied, nor could they believe that British intelligence were not targeting the Soviet Union. ‘Not a single valuable British agent in the USSR or in the Soviet embassy in Britain has been exposed with the help of this group, in spite of the fact that if they had been sincere in their co-operation they could easily have done’, one report noted.178 The explanation was much simpler. The Foreign Office had banned covert activity against Britain’s new ally, and all intelligence energies were being focused against Nazi Germany and winning the war. There were no secret agents to report.

So suspicious was Moscow Centre about their star agents that the London residency was ordered to create a separate independent agent network. An eight-man surveillance team, none of whom spoke English and all dressed in conspicuously Russian clothes, was sent to try and catch the Cambridge Spies meeting their non-existent MI5 case officers. Failing to discover any such contact, the surveillance team simply reported various innocent visitors to the Soviet embassy in London as suspected MI5 agents provocateurs.179

What could Burgess have passed to the Russians? Clearly anything he drafted himself, but also anything that came across his desk or he asked to see. In particular, as Hector McNeil’s private secretary and as a Far East expert, he would have seen very important and secret documents, especially crucial during the Four Powers conferences, when the British negotiating position would have been known to the Soviets during the conferences themselves. He was known to work late and at weekends and had access to secret safes, but even plain texts of enciphered cables were useful for code-breaking efforts. We can certainly surmise that he passed across information about the post-war peace conferences and founding meetings of the United Nations, NATO and OECD, plans for the reconstruction of post-war Germany and the immediate negotiating positions at conferences such as that creating the Brussels Treaty.

An indication of the quality of intelligence Burgess supplied can be seen in Harold Nicolson’s diary entries. In February 1945 he wrote, ‘I dine with Guy Burgess, who shows

179 Christopher Andrew, _Defence of the Realm_, p.837.
me the telegrams exchanged with Moscow. It is clear that the Ambassadors’ Commission is not to be a farce in the least”. The Commission, which consisted of the Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and the British and American ambassadors in Moscow, was to settle the composition of the new Polish Provisional government. It’s clear from the fact that Nicolson saw them that Burgess had access to Foreign Office cables between London and the Moscow embassy, and was able to remove them and pass them to Moscow, allowing Molotov to be well-briefed in negotiations. On 4 March, Burgess’s Soviet handler Boris Kreshin, ‘Bob’, reported he had brought several Foreign Office telegrams and ‘had also written an agent’s report on the procedural conduct of debates in parliament on the Polish question’.181

The material he was supplying was dynamite. The report of the meeting of 4 March listed amongst much else: telegrams on the San Francisco Conference the following month that set up the United Nations, and the British position on the division of Germany, which went against what the American delegation had proposed at the Yalta Conference a few months before. A May 1945 Chiefs of Staff report for General Ismay, which set out plans for war between the British Empire and Soviet Union – Operation Unthinkable – was passed to Moscow, probably by Burgess. The report accepted a three-to-one superiority of Soviet land forces in Europe and the Middle East, where the conflict was projected to take place, but did nothing to allay Russian suspicions that the wartime alliance was clearly over.182

Appointment as personal assistant to the Minister of State at the Foreign Office had brought Burgess to the heart of the British government at a crucial juncture in twentieth-century history, giving him access to almost all papers that came to the Foreign Office ministers, including the minutes of meetings of the Cabinet, the Defence Committee and the Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff, and the positions of Western countries on the post-war settlement in Europe and Britain’s military strategy. He also took advantage of the daily afternoon tea party in the ambassadors’ waiting room, fifty yards from McNeil’s office, to pick up all the latest gossip and expand his network of contacts.

Within days of taking up his post, Burgess had supplied two documents from the Russia Committee, a Foreign Office committee that dealt with all aspects of policy towards Russia. It reported that Bevin and the Cabinet were about to decide ‘whether to extend Great Britain’s present hostile relations with the governments of the countries which he calls Soviet satellites (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania), and whether Great Britain should maintain its present policy of support for the opposition, or whether the time has come to recognise Soviet influence and cease the fight against it’. Further documents followed, including various ministerial minutes on German post-war political and economic reconstruction, notably from the Overseas Reconstruction Committee, chaired by Ernest Bevin.

In December 1947 Burgess attended with McNeil the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in

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181 Lownie, p.148.
182 11 August 1945, TNA, CAB 120/691/109040/002. Authentication of the document was confirmed by Oleg Tsarev in a lecture in Moscow on 26 May 2003, which the author attended.
183 Lownie, pp159-160.
London with delegates from the United States, Soviet Union and France, where again the future of Germany was discussed. During the period from 6 November to 11 December, he passed across more than three hundred documents to his Russian contacts.

In November 1948 Burgess started in the Far East Department. The diplomat and writer Robert Cecil has suggested it’s possible ‘that Burgess’s arguments contributed in some degree to the recommendation made by Ernest Bevin, and accepted by Attlee’s Cabinet in December 1948, in favour of de facto relations with the PRC’.\(^{184}\) This is an exaggeration, as Burgess had only just joined the department as its most junior member a month before, but his position did allow him to keep Moscow informed on the formulation of British policy on the People’s Republic of China, founded in October 1949, and towards Korea, right through until the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950.

Among the documents he saw in April 1949 was a CIA report, ‘Prospects for Soviet Control of a Communist China’, arguing that any pledge that Chinese communists would like foreigners to continue business as usual was only a feint to secure recognition of the regime change and minimise foreign opposition. Burgess was inclined to agree and duly added the briefing to his suitcase.

On 29 April 1949 he saw the Joint Intelligence Committee’s views on the nature of Russian air assistance to China. The secret reports listed:

> by name, in some cases, Soviet military personnel drafted into China after the revolution, the weapons they brought with them … the airfields they were constructing, and the training they were providing to Mao’s forces. Such intimate knowledge of how much Western intelligence knew on the military side would have been prized in Moscow in the months before the outbreak of the Korean War.\(^{185}\)

However the October 2015 release of Burgess files suggests that some of the accusations levelled against Burgess with regard to the Korean War are exaggerated. It was openly discussed that Western Forces would not counter attack beyond the Yalu River and MI5 officer Graham Mitchell told his American intelligence counterpart ‘There is no evidence whatsoever to show that Burgess or Maclean passed on any information about the Korean War to the Russians or the Chinese or to anyone else’.\(^{186}\)

In August 1949, the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee produced two long papers assessing the prospects for regional collaboration in the Far East. It concluded that the modest British military resources made direct intervention in an anti-communist struggle impossible and that the defence of Southeast Asia was down to the region itself. The PUSC papers were passed to Burgess to send on to Nanking, but went missing. The admission of British reluctance to intervene must have been valuable to the Russians.\(^{187}\)

\(^{184}\) Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, p.189.
\(^{186}\) TNA, FCO 158/9, G.R. Mitchell to J. Cimperman, 26th Jan 1956.
Burgess’s effectiveness should not just be measured in the quality and quantity of documents passed over. Sheila Kerr makes the point in her case study of Maclean that:

significantly there is only one other reference to Maclean being an agent of influence when he was at the British Embassy in Cairo. All other works focus on Maclean’s espionage, ignoring the importance of subversion, influence operations and diversion in Soviet intelligence doctrine. This is a sharp reminder of how a key question went unanswered and was then forgotten - an important and regrettable omission because Soviet intelligence doctrine regards influence operations as the most powerful tool of intelligence. Ideological agents were first and foremost agents of influence and they could also engage in espionage depending upon their circumstances.188

Burgess was certainly an agent of influence, most notably in the BBC and during his time on Far East affairs, where he helped shape British policy to recognise Communist China when America refused to, but also later in Moscow working on Soviet disinformation.

In assessing the damage he caused it’s also worth considering Burgess’s role as a recruiter, something that academics such as John Lewis Gaddis forget. What about all the agents he was responsible for recruiting – Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross, Michael Straight – and the agents they in turn recruited and all the information they supplied to the Russians? And these are just the agents we know about.

Burgess was also a magnificent manipulator of people and trader in gossip. He was highly social and almost always out at dinners and night clubs – usually paid for on expenses or by others. In the Foreign Office, he is remembered for always popping in and out of other people’s offices. He knew how to extract material through charm, provocation, his own powers of argument and knowledge and, when required, blackmail. Here was a man who supposedly kept every love letter in case it could be useful and who was happy to lend his flat for assignations. People liked him and confided in him and Burgess took every advantage.

As Goronwy Rees noted:

Guy possessed an appalling fund of information to the discredit of numerous persons in this country. Collecting it was one of his private hobbies; it was a native instinct in him and it was done primarily, I think, for purposes of gossip and private amusement; but I believe ...it constitutes a formidable weapon of pressure and blackmail.189

Tom Wylie, Dennis Proctor and Fred Warner may not have been Soviet agents, but they might as well have been as they showed Burgess the interesting papers that crossed their desk. One can only speculate at the information he may have gleaned from his friends in intelligence, Guy Liddell and David Footman, on their weekly visits to the music hall. And there was always the excuse at various moments that Burgess was working in the cause of anti-fascism, that Russia were our allies, or it was for some hush-hush British organisation.

Apart from actual documents, he could provide lists of agents when he worked for MI6 and

188 Kerr, p.105.
189 Goronwy Rees, *A Chapter of Accidents*, original typescript University of Aberystwyth, p.82.
MI5, he could interpret policy and human nature, and he could provide insights into character that might allow others to exert pressure on a particular individual. Rees later wrote:

The very existence of a secret service was for Guy a challenge to curiosity and certainly he showed a persistent determination to penetrate its secrets which had nothing to do with his official duties. It is quite certain that during the period after the war, both in London and in Washington, he acquired a remarkable knowledge for one in his position, both of the personalities and of the working of the security services . . . What is difficult to exaggerate is the amount of information which he had acquired about the machinery and methods of our security services, their organisation, and the names and positions of those who worked in them.  

Indeed the very word ‘secret’ was like a call to battle for Burgess, a challenge that he never failed to accept; he hunted out secrets like a hound after truffles. These elements, ignored in the Gaddis debate, need to be taken into account.

One of the most damaging legacies was the defection itself, which undermined Anglo-American intelligence co-operation at least until 1955. Tim Marten, a First Secretary dealing with Atomic Energy in the Embassy in Washington, set out the situation for his boss Roger Makins on 20 June 1951, saying that while the Atomic Energy Commission and State Department were still open to co-operation, the CIA and Defence were not. ‘The one gleam of hope is that Bedell Smith and the Department of Defence may be prepared to reverse their present attitude of opposition, if some solution of the Maclean-Burgess affair is found which is not damaging to the reputation of British security’. In fact, as a senior MI6 officer at the time, with close ties to the Americans, later admitted, ‘The B&M defection caused a terrible rift between us and American intelligence, and at the time they simply clamped down and stopped giving us anything’.

The suspicion that Burgess and Maclean had been protected before their defection and the subsequent cover up – the White Paper on the case was called ‘The Whitewash Paper’ - shook public respect for the institutions of government, including Parliament and the Foreign Office. The Burgess and Maclean case also bequeathed a culture of suspicion and mistrust within the Security Services that was still being played out half a century after the 1951 flight and may have proved more debilitating to British Intelligence than the original acts of espionage. What it did not lead to, as is sometimes claimed, was a witch hunt against homosexuals as with the Lavender Scare in America. In fact, proceedings for ‘queer incidents’ at the Metropolitan Magistrates Courts between 1947 and 1952 fell from 637 to 583 incidents.

An immediate consequence of the Burgess and Maclean case was the setting up of a Committee under Sir Alexander Cadogan to look at how similar scandals might be prevented in future. Set up on 7th July 1951, it met first on 3rd November 1951. Dominated by members

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190 Ibid, p.49 and p. 52.
191 TNA, FO 115/4524, Tim Marten to Roger Makins, 20 June 1951.
193 Though Richard Davenport overstates his case in Enemies Within that it led to the vote to leave the European Union in June 2016.
of the Foreign Office, it took no submissions from the Civil Service Commission which did the recruitment, nor any psychologists, nor anyone connected with personnel in industry or the armed forces.

It further strengthened positive vetting, which had begun already in early 1951. Previously, candidates had been checked to establish if there was anything negative against them in the files. Now it required all civil servants who had ‘regular and constant access to the most highly classified defence information’ and those who had ‘access to the more highly classified categories of atomic energy information’ to submit to positive vetting. About one hundred and twenty-five Foreign Office posts were so designated and had been checked by November. The loophole was that it didn’t cover people who didn’t have ‘regular and constant’ access. It was an improvement and required all the relevant departments to set up their own security departments to carry out the vetting – though the Admiralty didn’t do so until 1961 – but there were still no background checks.\(^{196}\)

It suggested that if a person brought discredit on the Foreign Office, whether homosexual or heterosexual, then they would have to resign. Even if there was no scandal, the person should be watched and any appointments taken into account, because of the risk of blackmail. The system of confidential reporting by heads of mission on their staff was improved, though the committee understood the reluctance of colleagues to ‘blab’ about each other. It was a start, but it required huge resources to administer. Guy Liddell of MI5 noted in December, ‘We are now vetting something like 5,000 cases a week.’\(^{197}\)

These are all elements of the intelligence story worth studying but which are often forgotten by placing too much consequence on the repercussions in terms of international relations. We may not be able to totally assess the damage Burgess caused in terms of power politics but we can, through media coverage, look at the impact of his case in terms of public opinion, diminishing faith in institutions, changing recruitment and vetting systems for government jobs and even attitudes to homosexuality. Gaddis argues that history only matters if we know what the impact of what certain events were, how history was changed by events. That may be what interests him but it may not be important to others. Why a person became a traitor and why they were not suspected for many years is as legitimate a study for the intelligence historian as the impact of that spy’s treachery. Indeed, history doesn’t even need to reach a conclusion. Going for a historical walk observing things on the way can be of sufficient pleasure and interest in itself.

### Conclusions

Intelligence biography is now an important element within intelligence studies allowing a more focussed study of treachery and its consequences. There has recently been a flurry of biographies of SOE figures with the opening of the SOE files and as more documents, especially personal case files, are released, in particular, to the National Archives the number

\(^{196}\) TNA, CAB, 134/1325.  
\(^{197}\) TNA, KV 4/473, Guy Liddell, Diary, 19 December 1951.
of intelligence biographies will grow. But even with a programme of document releases, the challenges for intelligence historians remain. Intelligence personnel are still reluctant to talk because of the legal penalties. Stronger privacy laws make disclosure in books more difficult and many files remain closed. We live in an era of ‘fake news’ where no information can be fully trusted and where governments manipulate and curate our history. The Freedom of Information has not brought the transparency and anticipated release of documents as was hoped. Archives going back over a hundred years remain closed and blanket exemptions are still the norm.

It is important governments realise their responsibility to the past and ensure all but the most sensitive files are released. Until a Public Interest test can be brought to bear on all historical documents, greater power, independence (it is under the control of the Cabinet Office the worst offender for FOIA breaches) and resources given to the Information Commissioner and Advisory Council on National Records and Archives and more resources devoted to the release rather than suppression of historical documents then it is going to be difficult to fill the gap of this missing dimension in our recent history.

The balance between accountability, transparency and open government and protecting national security is a difficult one to strike. Once records are released the genie is out of the bottle but it is hard to argue that records, which in many cases are over 60 years old and where the officials involved are dead, should not be released. If our history is to be written accurately, we will have to have all the records made available – not just those a government department believes we should have.

What conclusions can be drawn from Stalin’s Englishman? First that Guy Burgess was a much more damaging spy than hitherto realised, not just in his access to intelligence and documents with the intelligence services and government but also in his role as an agent of influence and recruiter.

Second Burgess’s role in various departments should provide new leads for scholars in other academic areas of study. His work as a propagandist for the British in the Ministry of Information, News Department and Information Research Department and for the Soviet Union especially during his exile in the Soviet Union establishes new information for scholars of the black arts. His role as a courier immediately before World War Two should produce a new element for diplomatic historians studying the origins of the Second World War and especially the Nazi-Soviet Pact whilst his time in the Far East Department should be of interest to those studying the Korean War.

New light has been shed in Stalin’s Englishman on some of the controversies surrounding his life, such as his escape route to the Soviet Union in 1951, the ramifications of the defection to Anglo-American intelligence cooperation and the role played by other members of the Cambridge Ring, by other spies, such as Michael Straight and Alister Watson, or fellow travellers such as Dennis Proctor. The baton is there to be picked up by scholars, for example, to discover more about Wilfrid Mann, one of the new spies revealed by Stalin’s Englishman and how far the Burgess and Maclean case changed government and public attitudes to homosexuality and the pace of homosexual de-criminalisation.

A study of Burgess not only gives new insights into the dynamics and importance of The Cambridge Spy Ring but it has revelations about British institutions of the period and the way they first failed to uncover Burgess clandestine activities and then, concerned not to create a
British McCarthyite witch hunt and jeopardise Anglo-American intelligence and atomic cooperation, they attempted to downplay the extent of the treachery.

Thirdly, Stalin’s Englishman is a case study in how biography is a useful way of studying intelligence, especially traitors, showing the influences which shaped them becoming spies and specifically how they operated. Telling the story of intelligence operations or events through the prism of a life humanises and makes intelligence much more accessible and it is hoped more intelligence historians will embrace the opportunities presented by the biographical form.

Intelligence biography should also be helpful for scholars studying the psychology of treason and for intelligence agencies on targeting potential agents susceptible to recruitment and for counter-espionage officers determining those who may have been suborned.

Guy Burgess has inspired dozens of dramas and novels most notably Julian Mitchell’s Another Country, Alan Bennett’s An Englishman Abroad, Robin Chapman’s One of Us, Rodney Garland’s The Troubled Midnight, Nicholas Monsarrat’s Smith and Jones, John Banville’s The Untouchable and Michael Dobbs’s Winston’s War. This is becoming a rich source of study for not only literary and film scholars but also those writing about popular culture and in LGBT studies. This research will be helped by the new information in Stalin’s Englishman.

It is clear not all the files on Guy Burgess have yet been opened so there should be fresh discoveries to be made in the archives. The opportunities are there for the diligent intelligence biographer.

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