Carceral Territory: Experiences of Electronic Monitoring Practices in Scotland

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Abstract

Arguably we speak now of living in a ‘carceral age’ more so than ever before. Yet how does this carceral manifest directly into individual lives on the outside of carceral spaces? If the carceral should not be solely conceptualized in terms of its anchorage to the prison, then how do aspects of carceral subsume the private space of the offender’s home? What effect do these aspects have upon offenders and their routines and behaviours, family and friends? A critical appraisal of carceral demonstrates how diverse scholarly conversations have become when conceptualizing the notion of the ‘carceral’. The presence, proliferation and expansion of electronic monitoring (EM) is an appropriate example of the way in which the normative nature of the carceral age has taken shape in the West. EM manifests as an explicit symbol of punishment for the individual while they remain within their home and community, one node of the “great carceral network” which we are embedded within (Foucault, [1977]/1995: 298), and a notion which is already explicitly discussed in literature addressing community sanctions, penalties, and alternatives to confinement. However, there exists a greater exploration of how EM, as one tool of the carceral regime, literally and legitimately territorializes spaces in the community to monitor offender compliance and its violations. A fuller discussion must be had in terms of how EM takes place—not only through its protocols and procedures (whether they be directly controlled through government or contracted out to the private sector, the latter being the case of G4S Scotland), but also through its manifestation in the physical residence of the offender.

Drawing upon ethnographic observations and qualitative interviews with inmates, this study contends that EM should be geographically contextualized as a form of ‘carceral territory’. This apt frame of reference examines how the inscription of punishment upon the personal territories, routines and lifestyles of inmates and their loved ones takes place, and queries how carceral territory further spreads the carceral out into society, permeating the homes and residences of those it seeks to monitor and punish.

The capacity of research to provide understanding, give voice to unheard populations, and to even evoke positive social change demonstrates the need for continued ‘carceral work’. By inviting the respondents to speak of their struggles and movements between the prison and the community, this research attempts to give voice to unheard populations of society while attempting to comprehend experiences of the ‘carceral’ and the ‘territorial’ more effectively.
Taken together, this study crystallize a more capacious conception of how carceral territories are created, sustained, and perpetuated in the spaces and places of everyday life.
Lay Summary

The experiences and practices of electronic monitoring (EM) of offenders in Scotland are important to consider, requiring further research investigation. These experiences provide a greater understanding of how EM is operated by G4S Scotland, the private security company contracted by the Scottish Government, as well as how EM is experienced and made sense by both operators and offenders alike. When taken together, this study proposes that these experiences of EM practices can be appropriately referred to as ‘carceral territory,’ a notion which focuses on feelings of punishment the offender struggles with while out in the community. In addition, ‘carceral territory’ can be construed as another significant tool which the state has at its disposal, in particular as the long reach of the penal arm from the prison and extending outwards into society.

Research was conducted over a 12-month period (July 2017 – July 2018). Observations of monitoring practices were recorded at the National Electronic Monitoring Centre, located in Glasgow, Scotland from July to December 2017, while interviews with ten inmates at Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Edinburgh were contacted for discussion and interviewed from January until July 2017. Findings suggest that EM operators and offenders cope with the maintenance and compliance of EM and home curfews in diverse ways. When operators engage in communications with offenders on the telephone or visit offenders at their homes in the community, operators attempt to relate to offenders’ situations in order to manage the conversation on the phone or in person in a more appropriate way. Offenders attempt to comply with the time restrictions of the curfew by engaging in positive or negative activities that assists them to cope with the home confinement, to take their minds off of their current situation, or helps them pass the time while at home. Overall this research provides a unique and thought-provoking examination of the various individuals involved in and engaged with EM in Scotland. In doing so, this study demonstrates how Scotland, as one of many criminal justice systems in the West, attempts to manage impoverished or marginalized populations through the control and movement of people and their unfortunate circumstances.
Declaration

I, James Gacek, do hereby declare that I have composed this thesis, that the work contained in it is my own, and that it has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introducing the Thesis

Increasingly we now speak of living in a ‘carceral age’ more so than ever before (cf. Bosworth and Kaufman, 2011) especially with the extensive nature of surveillance, punishment and control permeating from beyond the traditional spaces of incarceration. Even now, citizens of Western, liberal democracies are consistently and routinely scrutinized and managed by various institutions in our society, their bodies profoundly exposed to surveillance, and their personal information “scanned, recorded, and registered multiple times in countless networked databases” (French and Smith, 2016: 4). Indeed, such thinking can cast light on a variety of actors, institutions, practices, and spaces, all of which intermesh and circulate within aspects of carcerality and various networks of surveillance (cf. Gill et al., 2016; Moran et al., 2017a, Haggerty and Ericson, 2000; see also Hier, 2003; Jones, 2005; Lippert, 2009; Klauser, 2013; Haggerty et al., 2011; Moran and Schliehe, 2017b).

Yet how does this carcerality manifest directly into individual lives on the outside of carceral spaces? If the carceral should not be solely conceptualized in terms of its anchorage to the prison (cf. Moran et al., 2017a), then how do aspects of carcerality subsume the private space of the offender’s home? A critical appraisal of carcerality demonstrates how diverse scholarly conversations have become when conceptualizing the notion of the ‘carceral’. In effect, the presence, proliferation and expansion of electronic monitoring (EM) is an appropriate example of the way in which the normative nature of the carceral age has taken shape in the West.

In this spirit, there is a need to examine the EM of offenders not merely as a technology implemented within offender/community supervision, but as one node within a series of pathways, modalities and networks of surveillance, entangling people and places within shifting strategies and measures of community sanctions and penalties. As a form of location monitoring, EM uses sensors “to secure compliance with a specified routine of temporal and spatial locations sustained over a period of time” (Nellis, 2009c: 43). Yet how do EM operators and offenders makes sense of EM, and how do they feel or experience EM in their own ways? And following on, how do EM operators and offenders manage EM in their everyday lives? If offenders are to be released back into their community, certainly their movement about the home and community has a significant impact. Yet we must reconsider whether the potential ejection or tentative ‘barring’ from spaces and places would be viewed
by offenders as a significant form of punishment (cf. Jones, 2000). While a wide range of literature has theorized the far-reaching consequences of surveillance and control at the national and international level, there exists a research lacuna wherein studies seek to examine how ‘surveillance from below’ is conceptualized within the micro-geographies of everyday life and between criminal justice actors and professionals. Such research could illustrate how offenders experience EM, the criminal justice system spaces of the sheriff’s station, the courtroom, the social service office; and how they perceive the exclusion (or arguably, ‘banishment’ cf. Beckett and Herbert, 2010a, 2010b; Herbert and Beckett, 2010, 2016) to and from particular spaces they routinely interact with in their communities.

While countries may differ in terms of implementing radio frequency (RF) or global system positioning (GPS) measures with their EM programmes, the common thread through such implementation is the advancements of technology, communication and monitoring made available to governments, market industries and criminal justice agencies. Coupled with the increased sense of ontological insecurity faced by Western liberal democracies is the enhanced surveillance systems in place to regulate, control and monitor diverse populations to various degrees and proximities. Today, almost all individuals can be traced and located via modes of communication and at several nodal points within the comprehensive human networks they interact with and forge over time. Indeed, those individuals who consent to be ‘tagged’ by criminal justice authorities become all too familiar with the sense of tracking, tracing and monitoring experienced within their daily routines, and the spaces and places they venture to throughout their lives generally and within the EM period specifically.

In light of this pressing need to reconsider EM differently, and drawing upon a litany of literature and empirical research from various disciplines, this interdisciplinary study proposes an insightful way in which to examine the EM programme in Scotland. In doing so, a unique appreciation for what I refer to as ‘carceral territory’ can form as an apt frame of reference to geographically contextualize EM as a form of punishment for the offender in the community. The concept of carceral territory can be reasonably extended to a focus of EM, as it not only considers the politics and dynamics of mobility in our postmodern era but it also allows for a more capacious conception of how carcerality and territoriality manifest in different ways and across a wide range of sites used in the Scottish EM programme. Furthermore, by capturing the observations and experiences of carceral territory in many ways, this concept supplements the extensive interrogation of carceral mobilities within and beyond the vast latitudes of carceral geography (cf. Turner and Peters, 2017). Therefore, this
project offers evidence of and critiques the normality of contemporary surveillance, and it is through carceral territory that we further extend considerations of carcerality beyond the conventional anchorage of the prison and state-sanctioned imprisonment to consider the people, objects, and practices which comes into contact with the operation and management of EM surveillance in Scotland.

Yet Scotland is but one nation in a vast array of many considering the expansion of their own carceral states, by which we can consider the ‘carceral state’ here as a collection of institutional configurations and actors all of whom prioritize punishment alongside containment, detention, and/or incarceration in order to manage poverty and marginalization, rather than to ameliorate these social issues outright (cf. Villanueva, 2017b; see also Beckett and Murakawa, 2012; Peck, 2003; Wacquant, 2009). To a certain extent, this exploratory project provides a way in which to reconsider sites of power and knowledge (cf. Youngblood Jackson, 2013) where EM as surveillant technology both operates and monitors those it has been informed to watch by the carceral state. By providing a cartography of sorts which illuminates forms of confinement and mobility under the shadowy auspices of the carceral state, the aim of this study is to trace out some of the forces at play in the reproduction of the ‘carceral’ beyond the anchorage to the prison. In effect, it is through EM that carceral territory is created, sustained and managed in the homes, physical residences, and personal territories of offenders and their loved ones. Furthermore, by demonstrating the how EM operates in form, function, and delivery, and coupling this with experiences by those whom are under surveillance by the carceral state, the everyday workings of criminal justice actors engaging with surveillant technologies hooks up with the extra-territoriality of carceral spaces, the reign of the carceral state and its increasing spread throughout society.

While Nellis (2018) contends that considering forms of mobility monitoring like EM as something carceral is a ‘semantic stretch,’ I respectfully diverge from this view. Macro-level research studying shifts in “vision[s] of ‘corporate futurism’ in contemporary criminal justice” (Nellis, 2018: 140) have their place; indeed, “the commercial exploitation of, and government receptiveness to, digital connectivity is far from played out —and…this is the milieu from which EM technologies derive their appeal” (Nellis, 2018: 140). Notwithstanding, this project is an attempt to examine EM within the minutiae of everyday life, and to focus upon the people, places, and practices which make EM possible. Geographically contextualizing EM as a form of carceral territory sheds light on the coerced
mobilities and power relations inherent in those surveying and those who are under EM surveillance. As a novel frame of reference, carceral territory can call attention to how carcerality makes us feel as social beings; it can be considered as a creative extension of the carceral state that engages throughout the successes and struggles in our daily lives; and at the macro-level, the acknowledgement of carceral territory in our lives allows us another way in which to query the current state of penal affairs in our society, and to question where the societal spread of the carceral is taking us.

While the next chapter devotes significant attention to the historical background and thematic debates encircling EM, it becomes pertinent to briefly highlight and draw upon aspects of the EM literature which frames the current study. Doing so provides the preliminary justifications and necessary foundation to which a carceral territorial framework of EM can be conceived, a focus to which I now turn.

**What is Electronic Monitoring?**

When considering the enhanced capabilities of surveillance and the effects such enhancements could have on its subjects, Nellis and colleagues (2013: 4-5) define electronic monitoring or EM as “technology [which] must be understood as nothing more or less than a form of remote surveillant control, a means of flexibly regulating the spatial and temporal schedules of an offender’s life.” The technology has a chameleon-like character of a multi-usable device, and can be presented as a solution to different types of penal problems. As Nellis and colleagues (2013: 5) argue, the intended effect of monitoring is to remind the offender that “he [sic] is being watched (continuously or haphazardly and regularly), and that his compliance or otherwise with the spatial and temporal regulations that the court or prison has imposed on him will be relayed to a judicial or penal authority.” Should the offender ‘breach’ the conditions imposed on them within the EM period, they will be subject to a more severe penalty (or recalled to prison) if a ‘violation’ has been deemed to occur. There are several uses of EM in criminal justice systems, such as during the pretrial phase, during parole, or in conjunction with other sanctions (e.g. imprisonment). In the latter case, the offender receives a prison sentence and is then placed on the EM system when released back into society (Payne and Gainey, 2004).

As a relatively new way of controlling (and punishing) offenders in the community, EM has been taken up in varying degrees (either as localized experiments or nationwide schemes) in approximately 25 countries over the last 25 years (Nellis, 2009b). In its original and
predominate form, EM is implemented alongside of curfews and home detention as forms of offender supervision in the community. Generally, the offender has a tag attached to their ankle (and in rare cases, the tag is worn on the wrist) (Nellis, 2009b; Nellis, 2013a). EM can exist as a generic term or several remote location-checking technologies which each make possible the micro-management of offenders’ (or in some cases, pre-trial detainees’) schedules and locations at various points in the criminal justice process (Nellis, 2013a).

Similar to the Anglo-Welsh approach of privatized EM service provision (cf. Lilly and Nellis, 2013), the systemic organization of EM in Scotland involves the installation and deinstallation of ‘tagging’ technology, coupled with monitoring and reporting to statutory authorities. The current contractual framework revolves around close oversight between the national private security provider (which is currently Guard 4 Securior, otherwise known as G4S) and the Scottish Government Justice Department (aptly named the Community Justice Department). Such close oversight is paired with ‘tight’ accountability “via real-time access to the contractor’s data on all tagged offenders, monthly performance audits and regular meetings with managers” (Nellis, 2016a: 184, cited in Graham and McIvor, 2017: 65).

**Why Study Electronic Monitoring?**

Described as one of the ‘successful areas’ in the development of non-custodial options, Bottoms and colleagues (2004) contend that the 1990s were defined as the ‘new generation’ of community penalities. This generation emphasized punishment in the community and the enforcement of orders to ensure that offenders receive and experience the intended liberty restrictions. The authors point out that this era was characterized by a ‘managerial revolution’ in the probation service where the contracting-out of some of probation services to the private sector was encouraged, coupled with a growing reliance on the use of technology to enforce the requirements of community orders (Bottoms et al., 2004; see also Nellis et al., 2013). This generation introduced the ‘creative mixing’ of different kinds of interventions, all of which aimed for a combination of more control and individualized sentences. A whole contractual and commercial infrastructure has grown around EM, and has created a new category of penal subjects—of whom are remotely surveilled—which are “required to comply with regulations that have had no real precedent in community supervision” (Nellis et al., 2013: 8).

More than ten years on from Bottoms and colleagues (2004), scholars are still extensively researching EM’s potential in having a transformative impact on the nature of offender supervision. However, as mentioned above, such technological advancements are not created
in a vacuum; there are deeper social, economical, and political reasons why different varieties of this technology are introduced and sustained (cf. Bülow, 2014). Many countries view the attractiveness of EM for policy-related reasons, in terms of it reducing prison population and recidivism rates. Yet the reduction of these burgeoning populations and rates are not always a result (Nellis et al., 2013). It may be more the case that EM technology satisfies political intentions in the penal field, whether we refer to ‘tough on crime’ political agendas, deterrence, and incapacitation, or respecting human rights and dignity by avoiding incarceration when- and wherever appropriate.

Nevertheless, a common thread throughout the various reasons countries differ in terms of their use of EM technology is that, to a greater or lesser degree, the emergence of this technology is challenging the traditional approaches to offender supervision. While it is not well understood yet as to the full nature of this challenge—and its likely outcomes and consequences—it is apparent that such a challenge has both theoretical and practical dimensions within and between disciplines, including but not limited to criminology, sociology, carceral geography, and criminal justice studies. Although the initial hostility and scepticism towards EM by critical observers has been and continues to be receding, the technological advances seen within the West, coupled with the (in)securities of globalization, is consistently assessed and examined throughout interdisciplinary academic communities. The trajectories of processes, practices and policies within and between criminal justice institutions and carceral regimes indicate an ongoing interest in surveillance and alternatives to incarceration—namely community sanctions and their subsequent and associated penalties. Indeed, the current study is not immune to the clarion calls by researchers to examine the increase of surveillant technologies and techniques of control generally and EM specifically in Western democracies (cf. Lyon, 2001, 2003). Such an expansion warrants further investigation, a discussion to which I now turn.

The Normality of Contemporary Surveillance and the Growth of the Private Sector

Most often, surveillance is thought of as undesirable. The fact that we continue to hear frequent cautions about ‘Big Brother’ or ‘1984’ speaks to the continued salience of Orwell’s ([1949]/2008) worrisome tale. Presenting us with a prescient and dystopic vision of how he believed surveillant technologies would intensify and advance, even he could not have envisioned the remarkable marriage of optics and computers which we see in contemporary
social orderings. When new surveillance technologies and practices are introduced, popular culture reflects disturbing scenarios all of which suggest that surveillance is something to be feared (Kohm and Gacek, 2016). Yet the rise of the Internet and other digital technologies has shifted Western society into the age of a new, highly mediated visibility (Brighenti, 2006, 2010). Surveillance has become an intriguing paradox, in which many people across the world have become fascinated by such emergent surveillant technologies and practices (especially in the context of social media production, consumption and popular culture—see for example, Nellis, 2003b). However, simultaneous these same people feel very threatened by the same apparatus and contend, for example, that privacy rights should be balanced with the use of closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance within public spaces (Norris and Armstrong, 1999; see also Lyon, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004; Smith, 2004, 2008, 2014).

In terms of EM, both Marx (2007) and Lilly and Nellis (2013) have adamantly encouraged the examination of EM in the context of “a broad swathe of techno-corrections,” as well as in relation to the widespread surveillance practices affecting law-abiding citizens as much—if not more than—as offenders (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 34; see also Graham and McIvor, 2015, 2017; Nellis et al., 2013 for further examinations). Specifically, Lilly and Nellis (2013) rightly contend that the ascendancy of the neoconservatives in the United States undoubtedly boosted the principle and practice of surveillance as a general strategy for securing political and social order. Indeed, the horrific events of 9/11 arguably provided a pretext for implementing widespread surveillance practices that neoconservatives might not otherwise would have had, but the foundations of “techno-utopianism” preceded the terrorist attack (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 34).

According to Lilly and Nellis, neoconservative developments affected the use of EM in three distinct ways. First, a “cultural mood” was created with the implementation of EM, in which the concept of surveillance generally became (even more) emotionally and intellectually appealing as “a means of dealing with threats to social order” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 35). In effect, the corollary of this mood, even within the local criminal justice context, was that if anyone argued against surveillance practices, they risked becoming perceived as ‘against the grain’ of society and all the morals and values ascribed to it (see Nellis, 2007a for the British equivalent). Related to the first tenet, the second neoconservative development demonstrates a discourse which arguably blurs (to an extent) the distinction between ‘ordinary citizen’ and ‘terrorist’ as threats to social order and the democratic status quo (see also Lyon, 2003, 2004). Such neoconservative discourses weakened still further “the already precarious claims of
humanistic (constructive and supportive) interventions with ordinary criminals, implicitly displacing or subordinating them in favour of ostensibly more controlling ones” like EM (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 35). Finally, the demand for increased surveillance capacity by both the political and military institutions boosted technological innovation within surveillance industries, and given the pre-existing connections between criminal justice and military institutions, and the commercial technological vendors who service these institutions, such linkages inevitably created “new surveillance options for correctional and law enforcement agencies” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 35; see also Nellis, 2009b, 2010; Nellis et al., 2013).

In sum, EM appears to have a vastly greater significance in a high-tech penal future, as no doubt EM does represent a new penal modality which is distinct from both incarceration and other intermediate sanctions. Customized from the “all-pervasive networks of information and communication technology” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 36), EM, whether in its RF or GPS forms, constitutes a surveillance-based intervention unlike other, alternative forms of offender supervision in the community (cf. Graham and McIvor, 2015, 2017; McIvor and Graham, 2016a, 2016b). Per Lilly and Nellis (2013), it can safely be said that EM is less relational than traditional loads of community supervision (thanks to the increasing probation/parole caseloads which can inhibit the formation of relationships), as well as introduces into this supervision a novel element of ‘the virtual’ not seen before within normative forms of supervision (cf. Nellis et al., 2013).

Criminological and criminal justice literature in particular have shown that EM is a qualitatively different experience of punishment from community service or probation, and “the experiences of the many thousands of offenders who have now experienced [EM] cannot be discounted or minimized” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 36; see also Bottomley et al., 2004; Nellis, 2003a, 2009c; Hucklesby, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013). While goals of retribution and deterrence may have been harnessed and repurposed within the use of EM technology, it has become a significant penal innovation, due in part to neoconservative discourses championing surveillant practices which ostensibly target and monitor citizens and terrorists, allies and enemies; the “affordances of a new global communication architecture” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 36; see also Nellis, 2010); and finally, the development of Western penal systems becoming predominantly more ‘panoptic’ or ‘telematic’ (cf. Foucault, [1977]/1995; Bogard, 1996; Castells, 1996).
Yet the growth, development and expansion of EM cannot be properly understood purely as a solely penal initiative. As Nellis (2009b: 104) argues, something approximating to EM had been imagined and desired by “electronic engineers, behavioural psychologists, and science fiction writers from the mid-20th century onward (and imagined and feared by liberal intellectuals who took their cues from George Orwell).” However, EM could have never been actualized or mainstreamed without “the prior availability of miniature electronic components and a cable and wireless communication infrastructure that had been developed for purposes quite independent of crime control” (Nellis, 2009b: 104). Indeed, the expansion of global capitalism—such as the processes which include, but not limited to, the compression of time and distance by digital technologies to facilitate vast flows of data, primarily to increase capital accumulation, extend and consolidate economic, social and political networks, and to enhance consumption overall—is invariably seen “as the driver of telematic society” (Nellis 2009b: 105). Just as commercial organizations can now gauge when face-to-face interactions and encounters are essential to business and when communication can now be ‘virtual,’ so too can cost-conscious crime controllers now consider the different grades of presence that are available, and weigh these against the costs when deciding how offenders should be supervised (cf. Mitchell, 1999). This ‘economy of presence’ has become a significant factor in the way that EM rivals normative probation (and prison) (Mitchell, 1999). Where supervision is deemed to require nothing more than an impersonal transaction—a gesture of acquiescence, the delivery (or exchange) of information, or proof of compliance with a particular rule—not only do social workers become unnecessary, “but telepresence, even automated telepresence, may be deemed sufficient” (Nellis, 2009b: 106). Arguably, we could say this is now the late modern life our telematic society leads and continues to advance. More than ever before, society is now permeated with location monitoring technologies, “a multiplicity of embedded tags and sensors that can rapidly identify what things are, where they are, and (in varying degrees) regulate their movement” (Nellis, 2009b: 106).

**Outline of the Thesis**

Chapter 2 begins by examining the development of EM technologies and modalities in the United States and then turning the attention towards the United Kingdom, in particular England & Wales and Scotland. It also explores the variable cultural perceptions of EM between the US and the UK, and reflects upon EM’s historical developments and debates advanced widely within EM scholarship at large.
Chapter 3 unpacks research on carcerality, examining the ways in which the ‘carceral’ has been advanced and discussed within academic scholarship. The recent spatial turn within criminology and prison sociology (cf. Campbell, 2012a, 2012b; Hayward, 2004, 2012, 2016a, 2016b; Kindynis, 2014) increasingly draws upon geographical understandings of space and spatiality as “multiplicitous and heterogeneous, lived and experienced” (Moran, 2015b: 7; see also Pickering, 2014). In effect, an increasingly interdisciplinary approach has emerged within the social sciences, opening a space for the coalescence of work under the banner of carceral geography (cf. Moran et al., 2011; Moran, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2015b). The purpose of this chapter “is to describe, rather than to prescribe, the nature of… carceral geography” in terms of its emergence within existing geographical scholarship, as well as some of the synergies already apparent within and between cognate disciplines utilizing the more ‘established’ themes of carceral geographical inquiry (Moran, 2015b: 8; italics in original).

By geographically contextualizing the people, places, and practices associated with the EM programme in Scotland, this chapter suggests that an exploration of EM through carceral geography benefits carceral territory as a notion for further investigation.

Building upon carceral geographical research in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 examines the significance of territory to the current study. By drawing upon Sack’s (1981, 1983) and Brighenti’s (2006, 2007, 2010) respective research on territoriality, I argue for a greater appreciation of territoriality for exploring the EM programme in Scotland. Following this, I then make a theoretical case for ‘carceral territory’ by connection Sack’s work on territorial tendencies with Moran and colleague’s (2017a) insightful examination of conditions of carcerality. Doing so highlights how EM, as a form of carceral territory is the inscription of punishment upon the personal territories, routines and lifestyles of inmates and their loved ones.

Chapter 5 discusses the methods and methodologies underpinning the study. I endeavour to engage in a discussion which proposes that both ‘institutional ethnography’ (Walby, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007, 2013; Taber, 2010) and ‘ethnographic commuting’ (Büscher and Urry, 2009; Murray, 2009; Jungnickel, 2014) are key methodologies to the present study, as the pair provide insight into both EM operators and offenders engage with surveillant technologies in their daily lives. Following this, data collection and analysis are then discussed for both (1) fieldnotes and ethnographic observations; and (2) conducting inmate interviews at Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Edinburgh, located in Edinburgh, Scotland.
Chapter 6 is the first of three analyses chapters. This chapter focuses on ethnographic observations of the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC), based in Glasgow, Scotland. Drawing upon institutional ethnographic and fieldnotes literature, respectively, I discuss and reflect upon how EM generally takes place at the NEMC, in terms of the protocols and procedures conducted by the G4S monitoring officers (MOs) behind the NEMC computer screens.

The second of three analyses chapters is Chapter 7. Supplementing ethnographic observations in NEMC, this chapter further explores how EM takes place by venturing out into Scotland. Partnered with a mobile G4S MO, I receive first-hand experience of how EM is installed, deinstalled and reinstalled in monitored persons (MPs) homes.

Chapter 8 is the final of three analyses chapters. Inviting those individuals whom are subjected to EM surveillance allows me a further opportunity to examine EM as a form of carceral territory. By conducting semi-structured interviews with ten inmates at HMP Edinburgh, I engage in a wider discussion of power, space, and mobility as they connect to carceral territory. Following this, I reflect upon themes which arose from the data collected. This includes further analysis of the commonsense and commonplace characteristics of EM as a carceral territory, coupled with a greater examination of how timepass and penal waiting ensure offender compliance through the EM curfew. I then highlight how the feelings of ‘sticking,’ or being ‘stuck’ run parallel to aspects of carcerality, in term of turn the respondents’ struggles with stigma or sticking to home or to ‘watch-time.’ I also discuss whether routines changed for both respondents and their loved ones, and couple this with an examination of respondents’ general freedom and mobility felt outside of curfew times and through transient living. Such a discussion must also take into consideration the ‘unruly’ mobilities experienced by respondents.

Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter of the study, which reviews the significance of carceral territory demonstrated in the project. Supplemented by existing criminological and carceral geographical scholarship, this project brings an understanding of spatial processes and flows between as well as within locales, as well as a desire to “broaden the conceptual and analytical contexts in which imprisonment is situated” (Mitchelson, 2012: 148). I also address the limitations of the study, and consider future considerations of this work. My aim is to highlight the importance of carceral territory in amongst the overwhelming and overarching societal spread of the ‘carceral.’ As an apt frame of reference, carceral territory supplements
brilliant and diverse scholarship continually reconsidering the expedience of the spread of carcerality throughout society. As a creative extension of the carceral state, a focus upon EM as a form of carceral territory also cautiously queries whether it is now the time to reconsider the reduction, reversal, or outright raze of the carceral state (cf. Gottschalk, 2015). By stressing the linkages between people, punishment and places, the originality of the project lies in the notion of carceral territory, and the wider yet intricate geographies of marginalization with which people, punishment, and places are both intimately and comprehensively connected.
Chapter 2: Historical Background and Literature Review

Introduction

Since the 1980s, the EM of offenders has been successfully introduced in over 30 countries worldwide, having originated in the United States, and with England and Wales being the first jurisdiction in Europe to introduce EM in 1989 (Nellis et al., 2013: 2). Historical and prominent debates about electronic monitoring (EM) have tended to foreground a focus on EM technologies and modalities. The most common questions have tended to revolve around “the effectiveness of a particular use of EM in seeking to reduce recidivism rates, and its utility as an ‘alternative’ to prison both to increase rates of diversion and decarceration and to decrease incarceration rates and costs” (Graham and McIvor, 2017: 63). Indeed, as Nellis and colleagues (2013: 3) argue, looking across different jurisdictions supports this view; EM has certainly been regarded as a “near-panacea” by governments seeking quick and cheap—but at the same time publicly credible—solutions to overburdened prison systems.

To this end, a further discussion of EM’s historical development and prominent debates are warranted, a discussion which this chapter provides. EM has been examined as an exemplary expression of managerialist tendencies in criminal justice (cf. Bottoms, 1995; Jones, 2000), and its rise is certainly coterminous with the emergence of the penal strategies that Feeley and Simon (1994) dubbed ‘actuarial justice’. In other words, such strategies were often presented to American and British publics as “merely pragmatic and depoliticized, concerned primarily with efficient risk management and cost-effectiveness, and detached from traditional penological aims” (Nellis et al., 2013: 4). However, aided and abetted by skeptical media, these publics became more inclined to view EM as a “mild and easily evaded form of control” and disinclined to see EM being sentenced to remain at home as a severe punishment (Nellis et al., 2013: 4). In effect, we must take account of the variable cultural perceptions of EM’s actual punitiveness, and reflect upon EM’s historical developments and debates advanced widely within EM scholarship at large.

This chapter begins by examining the development of EM technologies and modalities in the United States. The significance of the Schwitzgebel’s early research (cf. Schwitzgebel et al., 1964) advanced proto-forms of tracking subjects not yet witnessed within the realm of American crime control, setting the stage for additional scholars and authorities—most notably Judge Jack Love—to further stimulate the development of an operational version and the practical uses of EM in the United States. Following this, I venture across the Atlantic to
the United Kingdom, and focus upon the origins and development which took place in England & Wales and Scotland. While EM has expanded and progressed at a substantial rate within the UK, there is a distinction between the developments of the technology within the Anglo-Welsh model of criminal justice which differs from the Scottish context of EM. The variable cultural perceptions and development of EM provides a solid foundation in which I then turn to a further examination of the pressing issues arising from scholarly debates concerning EM. Reflections on the diverse landscape of EM across the US and the UK, and the intensified spread of EM going forward will conclude the chapter.

**Star-Spangled Tracking: EM in the United States**

While currently there is no country in which EM constitutes the dominant approach to offender supervision in the community, the national and global development of EM technology is by no means insignificant, nor does it show any signs of waning (Nellis et al., 2013). Such development can certainly be accredited to the political and commercial momentum this technology has gained within the last few decades (Nellis, 2009b: 102). Electronic monitoring has its origins in the United States, and it is Lilly and Nellis’ (2013) definitive account of its emergence and developmental trajectory which provides us with a comprehensive understanding the beginnings of ‘techno-corrections’ in the late modern world, and the greater recognition of the potential science and technology have to transform western, liberal democratic societies (cf. Moran, 2002). The now somewhat distant era in which the prototypes of EM first arose was infused by vigorous and confident public debate regarding such potential found within science and technology, and the extent to which this potential could transform human nature through technological ingenuity and prowess (cf. Harrington, 1965; Toffler, 1970; Crowe, 1972; Corn and Horrigan, 1984). As Lilly and Nellis (2013: 22) argue, the forerunners of what came to be called EM were born “in a moment when techno-utopian tropes were particularly powerful, and gained initial credence because of them.”

Scholarship generally agrees that the origins of EM began with the pioneering research of Harvard behavioural psychologist Ralph K. Schwitzgebel. Aided by his brother Robert, Schwitzgebel tested “portably but unwieldy (and short-range) tracking devices (which permitted bi-directional communication) on students, psychiatric patients and offenders” both in Cambridge and Boston, Massachusetts between 1964 and 1970 (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 22-23). Containing equipment adapted from a guided missile system, the devices enabled the
research to “unobtrusively” record the individual in question and ascertain where said individual spends their time (Schwitzgebel, 1963: 13). In effect, this technology was patented and the findings were subsequently published in authoritative scientific and legal journals (for example, see Schwitzgebel et al., 1964; Schwitzgebel, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971; Schwitzgebel and Bird, 1970; Schwitzgebel and Schwitzgebel, 1973).

Interestingly, the time in which this work took place was predominated by the behavioural psychology of B.F. Skinner (1948). It was widely thought during this time by many academic social scientists that Skinner’s research on ‘operant conditioning’ could have a significant and transformative impact in the arenas of education and crime control. Skinner was a great inventor of gadgets to aid his research, and coupled with the Schwitzgebels’ work on ‘psychotechnology,’ formed an “intellectual niche” which brought together both behavioural psychologists and scholars engaging in pioneering research on neuroscience (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 23). For instance, Delgado’s (1969) work sought to reduce the violent impulses men experience through experiments which engaged in ‘electrical stimulation of the brain’ (ESB). Indeed, the Schwitzgebels had themselves once entertained the notion of subjecting substance-using offenders to electronic stimulation technologies, which would resemble “small portable shock [apparati] with electrodes attached to the wrist” (Schwitzgebel, undated, quoted in Mitford, 1974: 226). However, such an idea was eventually discarded, as the Schwitzgebels maintained that their work should be implemented for rehabilitative purposes (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 24). The Schwitzgebels hoped that by monitoring the movements of offenders and praising the offenders for staying within agreed zones and schedules, they would be able to provide the ‘positive reinforcement’ that Skinnerians argued was essential to effecting behavioural change. The Schwitzgebels wanted their technology to have a more practical application than what was seen in the research of other scholars working within the psychotechnology movement (cf. Meyer, 1971; Ingraham and Smith, 1972); however, they were less convinced that ESB could be utilized and applied both outside of the laboratory and in the real world.

Notwithstanding, the Schwitzgebels’ work advanced proto-forms of tracking not previously witnessed within the realm of American crime control (Lilly and Nellis, 2013). The possibility to monitor mobile subjects and pinpointing individuals in a small town or crowded city seemed at the time like a significantly spectacular application of technology and science. However, criminal justice agencies did not adopt such technologies, and they were not subject to further development or research, and did not find commercial sponsors to progress
the psychotechnological momentum further (Lilly and Nellis 2013: 24). In respect of the Schwitzgebels’ technology, Mainprize’s (1996) contention was that the Schwitzgebels’ emphasis on their technology as a form of rehabilitation had conflicted and clashed with the punitive shift in penal responsibility and control. Arguably, what brought the ‘psychotechnology’ movement and the proto-forms of EM to a fall in support—and somewhat of an abrupt end—was the “burgeoning backlash against the illiberal implications of behaviouralism (as expressed by Skinner (1971)), the ascendancy of the personalist and libertarian values of the counterculture and the exposure and critique of military funding of university research” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 24). Indeed, the Schwitzgebels’ own work may have been relatively inoffensive in comparison to other scholars in the movement, but ultimately the Schwitzgebels’ ideas became unquestionably tainted because of the factors mentioned above. As Morris (1974) indicates, most community corrections and rehabilitation professionals could not reconcile the surveillance produced from such technologies with the social work practices they engaged with. In effect, more professionals agreed, becoming increasingly confident that parole and probation services could be improved, and incarceration reduced, without recourse to technology (cf. Morris, 1974).

While there was not governmental or professional attempt to revive interest in the Schwitzgebels’ research, a district judge in Albuquerque surreptitiously revived EM as we have come to know the technology. In 1977, Judge Jack Love became interested in ways of facilitating temporary release for young adult offenders from the local New Mexican penitentiary. Love randomly began collecting information on location monitoring, as he realized that public confidence required knowing where offenders were outside of the prison. Furthermore, it became clear that if there existed the potential to create specialized location monitoring programs, that such programs should be influenced and formed from broader social, political and technological changes within society (Payne and Gainey, 2000). Such collected information included “swipe-card systems in supermarkets, [and] animal and cargo tracking technologies” (Lilly and Nellis: 2013: 24). Interestingly, Love found a copy of a Spiderman comic strip which had been syndicated in a local newspaper. The comic strip depicted the superhero combating a villain who has fitted Spiderman with a (potentially explosive) tracking device to his wrist. This tracking device allowed the villain to offend with impunity and wreak havoc on the city as he could now stay one step ahead of Spiderman. Indeed, many punishment scholars agree that the origin of EM famously began with Love’s consideration of this comic book, and that the Spiderman comics of the sixties generally
provided the creative foundation of what was needed to think about creating an electronic monitoring sanction within the criminal justice system (Muncie, 1990; Lyon, 1994; Payne and Gainey, 2000; Nellis, 2006; Gable, 2007; Lilly and Nellis, 2013; Bülow, 2014).

Love deserves credit for both stimulating the development of an operational version of EM and making the first practical use of the technology. In effect Love became the originator of the modern form of EM in the United States, and stimulated international interest and development in EM technology (Lilly and Nellis, 2013; see also Burrell and Gable, 2008 for a further review). Within the United States, EM developed largely in the context of probation services (sometimes administered by police or sheriff’s departments), and used EM equipment bought or loaned from private vendors (Lilly and Nellis, 2013). EM became a predominant development in such services, as probation was mostly administered at the state level, with the remaining probation services split between state and county, or otherwise operated by the counties themselves. From the 1970s onwards, the primary emphasis of probation became intertwined with offering greater public protection and reducing prison use, of which operated under the rubric of ‘community corrections,’ such as the early community corrections innovation of ‘house arrest’ (and its variants, such as home detention, home confinement, and home incarceration) (Lilly and Nellis, 2013; for a further review see Nellis et al., 2013).

However, EM did not develop solely as a technical means of making house arrest possible or viable; in fact, the technology became a crucial part of the burgeoning and intensive probation and parole movement taking place during the 1980s (Morris and Tonry, 1990). Such a movement characterized a shift from ‘community corrections’ to ‘intermediate sanctions,’ which aimed to not only reduce overcrowding in prison, but also to address recidivism and prison operation costs. This shift required probation services to become part of a control system which openly supported punishment and surveillance (in other words, deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation). In effect, this shift marked the transition from therapeutic to more controlling forms of probation which allowed politicians—Democrats and Republicans alike—to get ‘tough on crime’ while simultaneously exert control, save money, and rhetorically exaggerate EM’s punitive characteristics (Lilly and Nellis, 2013).

However, the intermediate sanctions movement initiated a shift in the US which, largely for commercial organizations, gave an incentive to transgress boundaries typically occupied by
Electronic monitoring equipment has been developed by private entrepreneurs and aggressively marketed as a solution to prison and jail overcrowding. Vendors extolling the virtues of this equipment present a case that is very attractive; the systems are foolproof, safe, punitive, cheap and can reduce institutional overcrowding. Such a sales pitch presented to potential clients desperate for viable alternatives is almost certain to generate sales.

In essence, the constitution and continuation of commercial organizations (and arguably their profit motives) became significant in the advancement of EM in the US. Over time, emphasis was gradually increased to focus on the “impressive technical specifications of the equipment… [and] on the ways [EM] could actually help with the supervision of offenders” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 27). Such an expansion included both large commercial organizations and the small, local companies trying to offer competition within the EM US-based market, and as the technology increased in appeal to correctional system administrators what had resulted was the creation of the ‘corrections-commercial complex’ (cf. Lilly and Knepper, 1992, 1993; Lilly and Deflem, 1996). The corrections-commercial complex is an endlessly recomposing and amorphous ensemble of profit-driven organizations, all of whom are contracted to provide services at various levels of state administration. Indeed, information, resources (financial and otherwise) and influence flow between for-profit companies and organizations on the one hand and professional and federal agencies on the other. Such a complex typically operates without public scrutiny, and both lobbies for and exercises enormous influence over corrections policy (Lilly and Knepper, 1992, 1993). In effect, the commercial aspects of American continually emphasize the market-driven dimensions of criminal justice and the “political and power-related aspects of penalty” (Lilly and Deflem, 1996: 5).

Per Lilly and Nellis (2013: 28), “[a]s the political climate became more punitive, it became marginally easier to argue for the slightly earlier-than-otherwise release of those already imprisoned [onto a subsequent period of EM] than it was to argue against the use of a prison sentence in the first place.” It had also become easier for politicians to draw upon ‘technical fixes’ to corrections practices generally and probation services specifically and “could so easily be presented to electorates as more punitive than mere probation” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 29) and throughout the 1990s more probation and parole officers gradually conceded that EM would be a potentially beneficial tool so long as it was appropriately paired with
other forms of supervision (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 29). While EM has been discursively (re)presenting EM as a form of probation with a higher degree of control, scholars such as Enos and colleagues (1992) argued that EM should not be considered as something alien or extraneous to probation; rather, EM technologies can be assimilated into probation services, and have the potential to genuinely enhance the quality of offender supervision. They argued that there existed a “false dichotomy” between counselling and surveillance, and that such technology, “[freeing] the probation officer to concentrate his or her efforts… [on] counselling” could bridge and potentially reconcile these traditionally polarized notions (Enos et al., 1992: 159). For other probation academics, the overarching theme of dissent relayed that such a reconciliation by way of EM was a compromise gone too far. For instance, Clear (1994: 109) contended that the shift towards EM technology within probation services was a certain exemplification of punishment and control, and hardly enhanced the humanistic qualities of probation which traditionally formed such services. The “attractiveness of EM” and other new community programmes witnessed in the 1990s were ultimately “tied up in…[an] imagery of nastiness,” to the point that several community programmes harnessing EM technology had promoted themselves on their records that “some prisoners would rather be in prison than in [their] community alternative programme[s]” (Clear, 1994: 109).

Per Enos and colleagues (1999: iii), EM had “become a standard tool in the probation and parole officer’s arsenal of supervision technology. Yet by the end of the 1990s EM “was still not widespread” across the US (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 30). Lilly and Nellis (2013) attribute this opposition through two main factors which arose from the opposite end of the American political spectrum. To the political Right, EM was simply not a very punitive measure (Lilly and Nellis, 2013). Nationally and locally, the influential pressure group Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) never accepted EM house arrest as a penalty for driving under the influence, claiming that EM “was both inadequate as censure and that, compared to the fully segregative penalty of imprisonment, it still left neighbourhoods vulnerable to reoffending” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 30). Furthermore, many politicians also accepted that EM was a lenient sentence and queried whether it was an adequate penalty to impose to ensure general and specific deterrence of criminal activity (Lilly and Nellis, 2013). For example, in 1992 in New Jersey, state senator Louis Kosko sought to restrict EM use after two incidents in which monitored offenders were involved in violent crime, one with lethal results (Durham, 1994: 195). Nevertheless, as the 1990s progressed, “and the escalating costs of mass incarceration
began to affect state budgets, politicians and professionals alike were forced to becomes more positive about EM, whether they liked it or not” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 30). As Congressman James Traficant indicates:

Electronic monitoring could and should be a method that could make alternative sentencing programs feasible… While [it] does not represent a magical solution to America’s crime problems, it should and must be actively examined as an integral part of this nation’s long term strategy to deal with problems of crime and prison overcrowding. (quoted in Enos et al., 1999: ii)

Despite the small proportion of offenders subjected to EM, it became clear that once the technology was introduced into the American criminal justice system it would then be expected to expand, and the expansion “was frequently commented on as if [EM] represented the inexorable future of community corrections” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 31). Indeed, scholars such as Sullivan (1990) and Lilly and Ball (1990) warned that the evolution of such technology could pave the way for greater social trends in discipline and the reduction (if not total suppression) of individuality within offender supervision specifically and community corrections generally. As Sullivan (1990: 136) suggested, the development of EM would only be the beginning of a punitive shift within the future of community corrections, as the implementation and advancement of EM was “only the beginning of the use of new technologies for total surveillance and punishment.” Such a punitive shift “heavily emphasize[d] incarceration or technological surveillance” over the more normative methods of probation, parole, and fines generally (Sullivan, 1990: 136).

The 2000s saw the advent of GPS tracking for the US, and while GPS satellites had been available for non-military use since the late 1970s, “interestingly no-one seem[ed] to have imagined them in a correctional context” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 32). Several US electronics companies pursued the idea of personalized tracking at the time, such as Lucent Technologies, Westinghouse, and Motorola, plus the Canadian company Strategic Technologies Inc. (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 32). In addition, the New Mexico Corrections Department (which had once been skeptical of Jack Love’s initiative) had asked Sandia National Laboratories in California to explore real-time tracking technologies, and Sandia and Spectrum Industries came close to marketing a device (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 32). However, Protech, a company based in Florida, was the one which decisively tilted offender tracking technologies towards GPS-based systems and quickly became leaders in the field (Drake, n.d., cited in Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 32). Per Lilly and Nellis (2013: 33) by 2001 GPS-based EM was being used “in a number of states on small batches of offenders (often
fewer than 30), and the professionals were still testing the quality of the equipment” (for a further review, see also Johnson, 2002). For example, Florida began using it in conjunction with ‘CrimeTax’ software, which enabled corrections and law enforcement computer systems to coordinate offender movements to each day’s new crime scenes “either to incriminate or exonerate [offenders]” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 33). Currently all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government use EM to monitor the movements and activities of pretrial defendants or convicted offenders on probation or parole (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016: 1). Recent numbers indicate that since 2015 the number of accused and convicted offenders in the US who are monitored has risen nearly 140 percent over the last decade (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016: 1). More than 125,000 people were supervised with EM in 2015, up from 53,000 people in 2005 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016: 1). Although some research suggests that EM can help reduce reoffending rates (cf. Renzema and Mayo-Wilson, 2005), “the expanded use of these technologies has occurred largely in the absence of data demonstrating the effectiveness for various types of offenders at different stages of the criminal justice system” (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016: 3).

Since the new millennium onward, such scholars were correct to anticipate the turn towards technological surveillance within the American criminal justice system. The constant upgrading and increasing role of technology and surveillance within offender supervision and control speaks to a predominately neoconservative discourse, perpetuating the need to secure political and social order within the US. While it is clear that Western, liberal democracies have considered the move towards GPS monitoring of offenders over traditional RF forms of EM, it has yet to be seen whether such countries will execute these hyper-surveillant notions (Lilly and Nellis, 2013). Although the price of GPS tracking systems is falling, and old RF systems become obsolete to successfully track and locate offenders, the adoption of GPS nationally and internationally remains an ongoing discussion (Lilly and Nellis, 2013; see also The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). In the American context, such discussions will typically intertwine pervasive, “techno-utopian/dystopian discourses” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 34) with a symbolic need to secure order from ‘terrorists’ and ‘ordinary criminals’ alike. In effect, a “cultural mood” is formed in the post-9/11 age which emotionally appeals to the American population, harnesses technological surveillance above all else, and furthers neoconservative views of discipline and punishment (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 35).
The Great British Track-Off: EM in the United Kingdom

The private sector operates EM in the United Kingdom. At the time of writing, Capita holds the contract in England and Wales, while Guard 4 Securior (G4S) holds the contract for Scotland. These companies provide and fit the equipment, monitor offenders and investigate breaches. This situation arose because of the Probation Service’s original hostility towards the implementation of EM (Nellis and Lilly, 2000; Mair, 2001), and while the Probation Service’s concerns regarding EM have lessened (Bottomley et al., 2004), they have not yet fully embraced the technology (Hucklesby, 2013 citing Rogers, 2011). As a result, EM has a distinct identity and runs in parallel to the broader provision of community services available in the UK, resulting in limited information-sharing and integration between the private and public sector (CJJI, 2008; Hucklesby, 2013; Mair and Nellis, 2013).

By focusing on the origins and development of EM in Great Britain, we see how the UK led the way for Europe in piloting EM as an effective and alternative tool for criminal justice agencies (Mair and Nellis, 2013). The UK likes to see itself as a leader in penal policy and practice, and is proud to claim its importance “as the originator of probation”, despite the more accurate claims from other Western countries (Mair and Nellis, 2013: 63). While England and Wales led the way in Western Europe to pilot and develop EM, it went about this process in ways which had reflected the government of the day’s comprehension of penal crisis and their subsequent (and preferred) solutions to such a dilemma. However, this section will demonstrate that although EM progressed substantially within the UK, the development of the technology within the Anglo-Welsh model of criminal justice differed slightly from their Scottish counterparts, an examination to which I now turn.

England & Wales

EM had a shaky beginning in England and Wales (Hucklesby, 2013). First used in the mid-1980s, EM had its start in a pilot programme as a condition of bail (Mair and Nee, 1990). However, the pilot for EM produced negative results and any idea of EM lay dormant until the mid-1990s, when curfew orders were introduced on a pilot basis in the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (Mair and Mortimer, 1996; Mortimer and May, 1997; see also Mair and Nellis, 2013: 66). EM was pushed onto the policy agenda in England and Wales in two main ways. First, a journalist named Tom Stacey had independently thought up the idea of remote monitoring as an alternative to custody (he initially envisaged tracking more than house arrest) (Mair and Nellis, 2013). Stacey founded the Offenders Tag Association in 1981 to
promote the idea, and in effect he originated the word ‘tag’ and the process of ‘tagging’ to denote EM (Nellis, 1991, 2000; Mair and Nellis, 2013). Second, the organizations that made and sold electronic equipment in the US saw their next market in the UK. As Mair and Nellis (2013: 64) indicate, members of the Home Office Research and Planning Unit (RPU) attended criminological conferences in the US and were told so quite openly, as well as senior staff of EM organizations met with Home Office officials in London to push and persuade their products.

While official interest in EM was encouraged, the then Conservative government was under considerable pressure to deal with increasing size of the prison population. A great deal of effort had gone into the development of alternatives to custody over the previous 10-15 years; however, all the evidence suggested that community service, probation centres and other requirements which could be included in a probation order had not been successful in diverting offenders away from custody (Mair and Nellis, 2013). While the increasing government response was to criticize the Probation Service and its social work ethos, such a response was coupled with the implication that tougher ‘punishment in the community’ would finally reduce prison population numbers. In effect EM was claimed as the necessary tough punishment and should be substituted for the ‘soft on offenders’ social work ethos (Mair and Nellis, 2013).

Cutting the costs of public service was another ideological commitment on the government’s part (Mair and Nellis, 2013). Privatizing public sector jobs and processes wherever possible, the privatization of criminal justice was viewed with some apprehension by those who worked in the sector. Such a cause for concern was understandable, as the government engaged in considerable piecemeal cuts and privatization of some aspects of prison services and police work. It was during this time that EM was perceived as a way of introducing privatization—as well as technological and managerial rigour—into what would become known as ‘community penalties’ (cf. Bottoms et al., 2001). Such an introduction signalled to a cacophony of security, construction and telecommunications companies and firms—nationally and internationally—that a robust, unique market was about to emerge (Nathan, 2003; Mair and Nellis, 2013).

EM was introduced in England and Wales on the basis of what were assumed to be “vote-winning politics rather than a fully thought-out response to crime reduction” or to increasing prison populations (Mair and Nellis, 2013: 65). The lustre of EM as a new technology was
coupled with the privatization of the Probation Service, and government proponents saw EM as a tougher approach to dealing with offender populations. In fact, arguments that suggested greater caution of this technology were simply marginalized. As Mair (2005: 264) indicates, the research evidence in criminological terms was portrayed as “limited and unreliable,” the economics behind EM was ignored, and “the moral or ethical arguments were scarcely noted.”

Today, EM in England and Wales use radio-frequency identification (RFID or RF) technology. Offenders are required to stay at a specific address during a curfew period and wear an electronic tag, which is linked to the monitoring company through a home monitoring unit (HMU) placed at the address. Capita is then alerted when the offender attempts to go out of range of the equipment by leaving the address. Monitoring companies are generally aware when offenders are not at their specified addresses, when offenders have removed their tags, or when the HMU is unplugged or moved. These incidents could result in an EM condition breach, but depending on the seriousness of the incident the offender may not result in a return to court to be resentenced (Hucklesby, 2013). This system is widely used for the Anglo-Welsh criminal justice model, specifically for adult offenders sentenced by the court, bail defendants, released prisoners, and, in rare cases and circumstances, terrorist suspects (cf. Nellis, 1991, 2004, 2007a). The removal of the tag, as well as the offender being out for the whole of the curfew period (or a significant portion of the period), will lead to immediate breach action; however, less serious breaches such as being late for the start of a curfew period simply result in written or verbal warnings for the offender (Hucklesby, 2013 citing Ministry of Justice, 2011).

Per Hucklesby and Holdsworth (2016: 20), there is limited publication details on EM data as data published prior to 2013 “is also likely to be inaccurate, [and] overestimat[es] the use of EM”. These data recording issues are linked to an overcharging scandal in which G4S and Serco was under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office for over-charging the government for EM services (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2013). They are accused, *inter alia*, of claiming fees for monitoring offenders who were not actually monitored. This investigation links to broader concerns about the price charged by G4S and Serco (Geoghegan, 2012; Comptroller and Auditor General, 2013) which utilized evidence provided by the right-wing think-tank Policy Exchange that the price was significantly higher than that charged by these and other contractors in the US (Hucklesby and Holdsworth, 2016: 7). The accusation is that these private contractors have been reaping large profits at the expense of taxpayers, and as of
yet this scandal has not been resolved (Hucklesby and Holdsworth, 2016). Short-term data provided by Hucklesby and Holdsworth indicate that the use of EM decreased by 11 percent in an 18 month period, from 14,762 people monitored in June 2013 to 13,210 in October 2013 (2016: 20). Nevertheless, Hucklesby and Holdsworth (2016: 20) contend that despite this decrease, England & Wales remain a “high user of EM” when compared to Scotland, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands—the four other jurisdictions compared in the study—suggesting that EM supplements imprisonment “rather than provides an alternative to imprisonment”.

Scotland

It is apparent that EM within Scotland is the focus of the current study, and so to introduce and undertake a comprehensive overview of this technology in this section would not provide the theoretical nuances necessary to appreciate EM as a form of carceral territory. Nevertheless, while later chapters are dedicated to and delve into a more robust understanding of this jurisdiction’s EM programme, a succinct discussion of EM’s development in Scotland can be briefly outlined here.

While similar and basic “parallel tracks” pattern of policy development emerged in Scotland, such policy development diverged from the normative Anglo-Welsh model (Mair and Nellis, 2013: 75). EM was first introduced under a Labour government in 1998, and then reintroduced under a Scottish National Party government, and the EM schemes were first trialled in 1998-2000 and subsequently evaluated shortly after (Lobley and Smith, 2000; Smith, 2001). Organizing a public consultation with relevant stakeholders, the Scottish Executive (2000) sought perspectives on the use, benefits and consequences of EM from the judiciary, local authorities and voluntary organizations. The consultation reported results which were largely positive and in favour of the technology, and in 2002 the government legislated EM as a Restriction of Liberty Order (RLO, or the equivalent of an EM curfew in Anglo-Welsh model). EM was also legislated as a condition of both a Probation Order (PO) and a Drug Treatment and Testing Order (DTTO). Unlike the Anglo-Welsh model, Scotland’s orders permitted both ‘restrictions from a place’—the equivalent of an exclusion zone created by placing tag-sensitive equipment around its perimeter—and ‘restrictions to a place’ (the equivalent of a curfew) (Nellis, 2009b; McIvor and Graham, 2016a, 2016b; Scottish Government, 2016). Subsequent legislation in 2003 (the Criminal Justice (Scotland)
Act 2003, as discussed below) specified that RLOs could be used as a direct alternative to custody, and also introduced EM as a parole condition (Mair and Nellis, 2013: 76).

EM was initially introduced in Scotland on a pilot basis in 1998 as a means of monitoring compliance with RLOs. RLOs were established through Section 245A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (as introduced by Section 245A of the Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997) and enabled the courts to require that offenders stay in a specified place for up to 12 hours a day, for a period of up to 12 months, or stay away from a specified place for up to 24 hours a day for up to 12 months (Graham and McIvor, 2016). RLOs can be enforced as a standalone measure, or in conjunction with a supervisory order, and failures to comply with an RLO—otherwise known as ‘violations’—can include “being absent from the address to which [the offender] had been restricted; being present at the address away from which [the offender] had been restricted; withdrawal of consent; and tampering with or damaging the monitoring equipment” (Graham and McIvor, 2016: 21). In the event of non-compliance, G4S could initiate proceedings by reporting them back to the court to decide. In the case of a proven breach, the court could impose a fine on the offender, vary the conditions of the order, or revoke the order and re-sentence the offender for the original offence, taking account of the time during which the order was in operation (Graham and McIvor, 2017).

Following an evaluation of the EM pilot scheme (Lobley and Smith, 2000) RLOs were subsequently rolled out nationally in Scotland in April 2002. The use of EM was further extended by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, which introduced provisions for EM curfews as a condition of parole (s. 40), as a probation order (s. 46), or as a condition of a drug treatment and testing order (DTTO) (s. 47). Furthermore, the same legislation also specified that the RLO should be deemed an alternative to custody (s. 50(3)) by stipulating the orders should only be imposed for offences punishable by imprisonment where the alternative would be a period of detention or imprisonment. In 2005 EM was introduced as a condition of bail (or EM bail) on a pilot basis in order to improve bail decision-making and encourage compliance with bail. However, following the evaluation research by Barry and colleagues (2007) the decision to not roll out EM bail nationally was made. The findings of this evaluation indicated that applications for EM bailed representation a very small population of potentially eligible cases, and that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that confidence in public safety attributable to EM improved as opposed to the standard bail process already in place (Barry et al., 2007). In effect, the remand population in the pilot areas was reduced by less than two percent (Barry et al., 2007). In 2011, the Community
Payback Order (CPO) was introduced in Scotland through the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, following the recommendation of the Scottish Prisons Commission (2008), to replace existing community sentences (probation, community service, and supervised attendance orders). Specifically, RLOs and DTTOs were not ‘rolled up’ into the new order. RLOs were retained for those offenders “where the safety of the public in general or of particular individuals… [are] at risk” (Scottish Government, 2008: 11). While EM cannot be imposed as a condition of CPO, it is possible for an RLO and a CPO to be imposed concurrently, providing offenders with access to other services and supervision as warranted.

At present, Guard 4 Securior (G4S) is the national private security provider which holds the five-year contract in Scotland, and operates EM at various points in the Scottish criminal justice system. G4S provide its services to the Scottish Government in the installation and deinstallation of ‘tagging’ technology. Additionally, G4S couples this service with the monitoring of offenders and the reporting of EM breaches and violations to statutory authorities such as courts and the Scottish Government Justice Department (more recently renamed as the Community Justice Department) (cf. Graham and McIvor, 2017).

**Thematic Debates in EM**

Several themes are brought to light when one engages in a critical discussion of EM. Such themes are not unique to one country or nation, but span internationally and have been discussed to varying degrees. Indeed, discussions of EM have become so topical and controversial in nature that research across disciplines overstate some issues while underplaying others. At times there is overlap between the themes, and as EM technology expands and advances by no means will this be a comprehensive nor exhaustive list. Nonetheless, what is apparent in these discussions are notions pertaining to evaluation, privatization, the perspectives from offenders, operators, victims, media, and the public about EM; and the ethics of EM which ultimately progress the debate forward (cf. Nellis et al., 2013; Graham and McIvor, 2015).

**Evaluative Research on EM**

Per Renzema (2013), there is only a limited amount of evaluative research on EM. Much of this research was and continues to be published and disseminated by official government researchers, with a strong focus on cost-effectiveness and a primary concern with reducing offending. Such evaluation studies include Mair and Nee (1990), Church and Dunstan (1997), Bourn (2006), and Robert and Stassart (2009). Furthermore, this research contends that
punishment and leniency can only be fully understood if the experience of those who underwent the sanction is also considered (cf. Spelman, 1995; Robert et al., 2003; Payne and Gainey, 2004).

There has been relatively limited empirical research into the operation of EM in Scotland, with the main studies having been commissioned by the Scottish Government to evaluate the piloting of EM at different stages of the criminal justice process (cf. Lobley and Smith, 2000; Barry et al., 2007; McIvor and Graham, 2015; Graham and McIvor, 2016).

Furthermore, there have been attempts to estimate the unit costs of EM orders and curfews in the evaluations of pilot schemes in Scotland. However, the yielding estimates of unit costs have a greater probability of being artificially high as a result of start-up costs, coupled with relatively slow take up and progression (Graham and McIvor, 2015). For instance, as a result of the lower than anticipated number of orders made in the pilot RLO scheme fifteen years ago—which had been operating at under-capacity—the unit costs of EM orders was relatively high (Lobley and Smith, 2000). In effect, Smith (2001) had subsequently suggested then that there was little substantial evidence from their evaluation (Lobley and Smith, 2000) that RLOs could reduce the prison population or the overall costs of the criminal justice system in Scotland.

The Scottish Government annually publishes the costs of EM, and the most recent numbers indicate that the average unit cost for EM in Scotland in 2013-2014 was £743, a significant reduction from £1,940 in 2011-2012 (Scottish Government, 2013b, 2015).1 In 2013, the average cost per EM order per day in Scotland was an estimate of £10.17 (Scottish Government, 2013a: 7). Annual costs of EM can be problematic to estimate, as typically most EM orders are not imposed for such a long period of time. Contrarywise, while per diem costs are difficult to calculate for prison sentences, the average cost per prisoner place during 2013-2014 was £37,059 (Scottish Government, 2015).

Finally, in an evaluation conducted by Armstrong and colleagues (2011), two weeks of Home Detention Curfew (HDC) was estimated to produce a cost saving of £266, and six months of HDC produced a saving of £10,914. In 2013-2014, findings suggested that the average unit cost of writing a HDC report was estimated at £142, which is different and additional to the

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1 As McIvor and Graham (2016) indicate, figures represented here are comprised of total expenditure across all forms of EM, including as part of a DTTO as well as Movement Restriction Conditions (MRCs) imposed upon children and young people by the Children’s Hearing System in Scotland (for further review see also Graham and McIvor, 2015).
average unit cost of the EM element of HDCs (Scottish Government, 2015; see also Graham and McIvor, 2015; McIvor and Graham, 2016).

**EM and the Private Sector**

The question of whether the daily monitoring of offenders should be contracted out to the private sector was and still is a highly contentious and political debate (Paterson, 2013). While such contracts can be different across countries and jurisdictions, in the United States and the United Kingdom we see the private sector involved in the contracted provision of EM in two ways—technology manufacture and service provision (of which the provision of monitoring offenders is separate from existing probation services) (Nellis et al., 2013). However, some organizations combine both functions. For example, England & Wales and Scotland have fully fledged private sector providers, contracted for five-year periods (Nellis et al., 2013; McIvor and Graham, 2016). State agencies within the United States have even tended to buy or loan equipment, and do the monitoring themselves. Many of the business areas where EM and commercial criminal justice now flourish are based upon original developments in the United States, and have inspired the development of new commercial crime control markets across the globe (cf. Newburn, 2002).

Paterson’s (2013: 213) research on the development of EM in the context of international developments in private security and penal provision highlights the growth of the “corrections-commercial complex.” Indeed, by drawing on the growth of commercial markets in the United States, Canada, and England & Wales, Paterson argues that the commercial markets in incarceration and social control have been driven by “the dual forces of neoliberal globalization and insecurity” which have dominated the Western world in our late modern era (2013: 224). Despite a lack of conclusive evidence that EM ‘works’ in protecting the public and reducing offending, Paterson indicates that such growth is driven by a fascination with “the potential of new technologies to deliver managerialist solutions to complex social problems” (2013: 223). In effect, he suggests that by sub-contracting service delivery to the commercial sector, “central government is able to expand the crime control system, and…meet the political demand for enhancing security, while also deviating around fiscal restraints” (Paterson, 2013: 224). Arguably, this creates new problems for transparency and accountability within a fluid structure where relations between different agencies are both perpetually negotiated and are part of an ongoing political contest.
Offender and Operators’ Perspectives of EM

New categories of penal subjects and monitoring agents have entered the field of crime control with the introduction of EM. Research like that of Payne and Gainey (1998, 2000, 2004), Roberts (2004) Jones (2005), Hucklesby (2008, 2009, 2011, 2013), Gibbs and King (2003), King and Gibbs (2003), Martin and colleagues (2009), and Vanhaelemeesch and colleagues (2014) thoroughly examines the extent to which such surveillant technology impacts offenders, the family members of the offenders being put under EM, the work experiences of monitoring agents operating and enforcing the conditions of EM sentences, and additional vulnerable populations within the community.

In the study conducted by Payne and Gainey (2000a), the authors found that punishment is experienced differently by different groups and individuals, which has led to the suggestion that EM causes some individuals to be unfairly punished, while other are not necessarily affected by the sanction (Payne and Gainey, 2000a: 96). Tracing the development of EM programs in the United States, the authors contend that research on EM must continue to explore the viability of these programs, and ensure that lines of communication and transparency between researchers, program officials, politicians and citizens are and remain open (Payne and Gainey, 2000a: 106). Furthermore, as institutions change, so should the standards and the role EM plays in the criminal justice system; in doing so we must be mindful that evaluations of EM programs (regardless of their successfulness) must continue (Payne and Gainey, 2000a: 106). Finally, such evaluations have the potential to better fit offenders with supportive technologies and ensures a criminal justice system that operates as efficiently, effectively and as humanely as possible (Payne and Gainey, 2000a: 107).

Jones (2005) examined EM in several areas within England & Wales, indicating that while the rollout of EM was nationwide, there were slight differences in the implementation of EM geographically which influenced the experiences of monitoring officers as they went about their work. Such differences included the densities of populations within the urban areas, the busyness of traffic congestion, the distance for travel to remote or rural communities, the weather conditions and the number of officers assigned to monitor a particular offender (Jones, 2005). With a similar focus upon England & Wales, Hucklesby (2008) examined the impact of standalone curfew orders imposed upon 78 offenders between April and August of 2005, and how EM factored into offenders’ desistance from crime. Hucklesby’s (2008) findings suggest that for some offenders, curfew orders reduce offending and contribute to
desistance by (1) reducing offenders’ links with situations, people, places and networks correlated with their offending; and (2) by encouraging offenders to (re)connect with influences linked with desistance such as employment and family. Following this, Hucklesby (2009) then analyzed the same data collected to investigate offenders’ experiences and attitudes about compliance to EM curfew orders. These findings indicated that the surveillance-based nature of the curfew orders influenced offenders’ decisions to comply, and that subjective perceptions of offenders about EM equipment efficiency played a role in their compliant behaviour. Such findings also take into consideration the consistent use of the (sub-)contracted monitoring company (Hucklesby, 2009; see also Hucklesby, 2013).

To provide a more nuanced and complex understanding of EM curfew orders, Hucklesby included participant observations and interviews with 20 monitoring officers by one security company contracted in England & Wales to monitor offenders (Hucklesby, 2011). In terms of the working life of monitoring officers, Hucklesby (2011) argued that feeling unsafe or vulnerable impacted upon how the officers went about their work. Such feelings occurred when monitoring officers were reluctant to visit the homes of offenders’, and when officers engaged in particular interactions to either avoid conflict with the offender undergoing EM (Hucklesby, 2011). Furthermore, situational/environmental factors played into how officers were influenced by the practices their occupation was required to carry out, such as working late evenings and at night, largely on their own, within certain marginalized neighbourhoods, and without immediate backup. Taken together, Hucklesby contends that monitoring officers’ practices and concerns impact how EM is operated, and can have a significant impact on whether the offender complies with the conditions of EM, depending on the encounters between monitoring officers and offenders (Hucklesby, 2011; see also Hucklesby, 2013).

In a parallel vein, Smith’s (2004, 2008, 2014, 2016) work on closed circuit television (CCTV) monitoring agents reflects similar experiences of empowerment and disempowerment within the work spaces of agents as they scrutinize the CCTV images taken within the U.K. Specifically in his research on the CCTV workplace culture, Smith (2004) found that, contrary to political and academic assumptions about surveillance operations, the control rooms he observed were “soaked in playfulness, time wasting and at times, comedy, as the operators attempted to cope with socio-structural disparities, and the monotony of a routinized and largely unrewarding job” (p. 392). Those who monitor the CCTV cameras were not robotic individuals with ‘super-human’ tendencies, capable of watching screens objectively and effectively for hours on end. Instead, these operatives considered themselves
as subjective human beings, “open to natural and emotional factors such as tiredness, boredom, frustration, apathy and discrimination” (Smith, 2004: 393). Similar experiences were found in his later work (Smith, 2008: 133), which indicated that the CCTV workspaces were not “voyeuristic paradises”. Rather, these work cultures were subjected to “unrealistic organizational goals and demands” and coupled with various responsibilities and tasks associated to the shifting and blurring roles of employee/worker/‘watcher’ (Smith, 2008: 133). Through his interviews and observations, Smith contended that his sample of operatives produced a collective narrative of the ‘disempowered worker,’ continually frustrated with and alienated from their labour. Such powerlessness was demonstrated through the operatives’ wider understanding of CCTV surveillance (and how this ontology of control operationally restricted their freedoms to work); the operators’ position at the bottom of a social control hierarchy; the operators’ inability to physically take part and intervene in the action being televised on their screens; and the extent to which escalating court appearances erode operators’ anonymity and integrity (Smith, 2008). Such studies demonstrate the degree to which surveillant technologies are not only experienced by the offenders for whom they were made for, but ultimately draws upon how auxiliary criminal justice actors work within the predominant assemblage of surveillance and crime control (cf. Haggerty and Ericson, 2000).

Returning to offenders’ perceptions of EM, one study of 27 offenders subjected to EM in Belgium found that EM was not simply a ‘soft’ alternative to imprisonment for those who experience it (Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014). The majority of respondents found EM to be both a penalty and a favour, in comparison to the physical confinement and restricted mobility inmates experience while incarcerated. However, there were mixed results in terms of the social life of respondents, as some felt slight changes in their routines and habit with friends and family members, while others experienced significant strain (Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014). While the EM technology allowed respondents a greater allowance of flexibility to find and hold employment as they abided to their EM conditions, respondents overwhelmingly felt variations of restricted freedom. Such ‘false’ or illusory freedom has been noted in Martin and colleagues’ (2009) research as well, as offenders perceive and expect more freedom with EM than they get in actuality, which leads them to think of themselves as prisoners in their own home (cf. Mair and Nee, 1990; Church and Dunstan, 1997; Bourn, 2006). The respondents in Vanhaelemeesch and colleagues’ (2014: 281) research had reported that they felt limited in the use they could make of local space (such as within and the immediate space outside of and surrounding the home), and those respondents
who needed to rely on public transportation were “mainly tied to a particular geographical area”. Other respondents had resented the limitations on their own home by the boundaries of EM, as some could not even go into their own garden or into the hallway of their building without triggering the EM receiver alarm installed in their residence. Such limits on freedom, even at the minute level of movement through and around the home or residential property, was one element of EM that made the experience more difficult for the respondents, increasing their temptations to violate EM compliance and transgress the EM boundaries placed on them (Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014: 281).

Victims’ Perspectives and Involvement with EM

Victim involvement in the use of EM can take on many forms. However, there remains a dearth of research about victims’ experiences and perceptions of EM (Graham and McIvor, 2015, 2017). The existing and paucity of empirical knowledge pertaining to EM is mostly derived from small qualitative studies conducted in the U.S. and in Sweden, and while informative and useful, the ability to generalize from these studies’ findings are limited at best. One must be mindful that, in terms of such small studies, there is the influence of bias in who chooses to respond and why. In effect, it becomes difficult for researchers studying victims’ perspectives to obtain a representative understanding of victims’ experiences with EM.

According to Wennerberg and Holmberg (2007; see also Wennerberg, 2013), in Sweden the perspectives of both victims and their advocates seem to have shifted over time, as originally victims’ groups expressed opposition to EM reforms due to what they perceived as a lack of understanding of its impact on victims. However, victims’ perspectives of EM in Sweden since that time have been shown to be more mixed if not positive (Wennerberg and Holmberg, 2007; Wennerberg, 2013). In Wennerberg and Holmberg’s study (2007), the authors conducted interviewed with 39 victims (22 females, 17 males) where the offenders had been placed on EM release. They attempted to obtain victims of violent crimes (ranging from sexual assault to grievous bodily harm and attempted murder) and sexual crimes for the study, in order to reflect the significant proportions of these types of offenders in EM release (Wennerberg and Holmberg, 2007). In one of the first studies of its kind, and given the proportion of participants in the study who had been a victim to a violent and/or sexual crime, a particularly interesting finding was that most victims expressed the view that they did not feel unsafe during the period wherein which the offender underwent EM. In fact, the authors’
findings indicated that feelings of safety were increased with the knowledge that the offender was being monitored, and that protocols and alerts would be followed if the offender breached their EM conditions (Wennerberg and Holmberg, 2007). Furthermore, some respondents had believed that EM release was less harmful than prison. Overall, the majority of the crime victims interviewed for the study showed positive perceptions “[of] the offender serving a sentence at home with electronic tagging” (Wennerberg and Holmberg, 2007: 20).

The notion of alerting victims has become increasingly significant with the development of EM technology. Although it is not currently used extensively, increasing numbers of European jurisdictions like Albania, the Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands, and Norway are piloting or incorporating victim notification into their EM schemes, as well as victim involvement into bilateral electronic monitoring (BEM) (cf. Nellis, 2013c). Empirical literature on BEM remains limited, but this can be accomplished using RF or GPS technology, or hybridized RF/GPS tags. According to Graham and McIvor (2015), there is currently in Scotland the capacity for victim involvement through imposing ‘away from’ restrictions and exclusion zones which seek to prevent and reduce a monitored person from approaching a specified place, such as a victim’s home or a small or local business. This type of victim involvement is voluntary and requires the victim’s consent, and it is currently used only in a relatively small number of cases (Graham and McIvor, 2015: 81). It is important to note that who is notified will depend on the jurisdiction and when, for instance, an alert may first be received by the victim themselves, by probation, by police, or by the EM service provider, or combinations of these people. Describing how this technology works with a standard RF-based arrangement, Nellis and Lilly (2010: 362) state that the victim’s home is “equipped with a receiver sensitive to the signal from the offender’s ankle bracelet [personal identification (PID) tag]; if the offender goes near the home, both the victim and the police are alerted.” There are limitations to the RF-based arrangement, as this type of monitoring is limited to knowledge of whether the offender approaches the exclusion zone they are restricted away from. Additionally, such arrangements cannot account for the fact that victims are more likely to spend significant portions of time away from and outside the monitored exclusion zone.

Where GPS EM technology is used, BEM can involve victims carrying or wearing a device on their person, such as a device in their bag or pocket or being tagged themselves (Graham and McIvor, 2015). In effect, the monitoring is not simply that of a specific place or property, “but tracking the location of the victim themselves in real time” (Graham and McIvor, 2015:
81). Indeed, Paterson and Clamp (2014) argue that the advent of BEM is a major shift from EM as an offender-focused approach to surveillance and punishment, to BEM as a victim-centred approach, prioritizing surveillance towards victim monitoring in the interests of their safety and protection. The notification of victims, as well as of authorities (usually police) when alerts are generated, expands crime control into realms of surveillance never proceeded before (cf. Paterson and Clamp, 2014). However, Ibarra and Erez (2007) found mixed results which conveyed the tensions and opportunities of BEM, whereas later research conducted by Erez (2009) indicated more positive perspectives about benefits from victim involvement. Erez and Ibarra (2007) conducted interviews with criminal justice professionals (n = 22) who worked with victims, and female victims (n = 30) of domestic abuse involved in BEM. Their findings suggest that numerous victims cumulatively developed a sense of safety over time with the advent of BEM, and described the transformation of their homes from sites of conflict to spaces of refuge and shelter (Erez and Ibarra, 2007). Furthermore, victims stated they were better able to relax and experienced reductions in fear and stress (Erez and Ibarra, 2007: 108). Some victims had even reported that they (and their children, if they were parents) felt that they could return to and resume an ordinary lifestyle again (Erez and Ibarra, 2007: 110).

In effect, Hoffman (2014) has argued that there is promise in both BEM and victim notification programmes, so long as we understand the limitations and constraints of the EM technology. When investigating the appropriateness and availability of the technology, it is important to remember that there are uncertainties about the technological functions and application of BEM “which may hinder effective operation at any given time” (Hoffman, 2014: 2). Some questions we must ask ourselves include: “[Is] the monitoring device receiving a GPS and cellular signal; is the device charged and working properly; is the victim carrying the device; did the offender approach the victim intentionally or unintentionally; does the victim know the quickest route to safety; [and] can law enforcement arrive in time?” (Hoffman, 2014: 2). As Hoffman contends, all functions with the BEM system “must operate flawlessly” and must be seamlessly coordinated with the victim’s notification programme and law enforcement’s response “to enhance the victim’s safety” (2014: 2).

**Media and Public Opinion on EM**

Internationally, there is limited research on public attitudes toward and media representations of EM (cf. Graham and McIvor, 2015). In his study which documented and analyzed media
coverage of EM bail pilots, Nellis (2007b) argued that media discourses on EM in Scotland have been negative and skeptical. Such discourses have focused on the leniency of tagging offenders and the risk posed to the public through individuals charged with serious offences subjected to EM, while the ‘success stories’ of EM have been avoided (Nellis, 2007b). Media representations in England and Wales appears to have mixed findings, though overall still more negative media representations than positive in their orientation (Graham and McIvor, 2015). Such a mixture of results could be partly attributed to the introduction and expansion of EM in England and Wales, which was originally characterized by limited media attention and debate (cf. Nellis, 2003b).

In one study, three U.K. newspapers were analyzed for their respective coverage over one decade of media representations of people as the subjects of different types of surveillance (Finn and McCahill, 2010). The authors’ findings suggested that targets of surveillance where overwhelmingly labelled and described in terms of their offending behaviour, and were negatively constructed as ‘Others’ through the consistent use of terms such as ‘tagged offenders’ and ‘criminals.’ Finn and McCahill (2010) indicated that media discourses (re)produce notions of ‘bad’ surveillance and the EM technologies used to target ‘them’ to protect ‘us.’ In effect, the authors showed how such discourses enable their readership to differentiate between the tagging and monitoring of offenders versus the use of CCTV on a public road—the latter being a ‘good’ technology to target and protect ‘us’ (Finn and McCahill, 2010: 27).

In contrast to the generally negative media representations of EM mentioned above, Scandinavian countries such as Sweden and Norway have had significant different experiences with media discourses vis-à-vis EM. For instance, Wennerberg (2013) argues that Swedish media tend to be relatively positive towards EM, despite some initial concerns by some media commentators that EM was not sufficiently punitive, would result in a mechanistic approach to offender supervision in the community, and was only suitable for people in relatively stable social circumstances. Per Wennerberg (2013), positive media depictions of EM were facilitated in part by a proactive and clearly defined media strategy by the Swedish probation service, by the gradual introduction and evaluation of EM with different target groups prior to a national EM rollout and implementation, and by the absence of serious and high-profile incidents involving monitored people. Similarly, in Norway the majority media representation of EM has been described as positive, following close liaison between media broadcasters and the Norwegian government both before and during the
implementation of Norway’s EM pilot (Kylstad Øster and Rokkan, 2012). In light of the initial opposition by political parties in Norway, the positive reception of EM by the media and the public has been viewed as remarkable, despite the original decision to initiate the EM pilot in Norway was described as “controversial” (Kylstad Øster and Rokkan, 2012: 90).

European and American research has attempted to explore public attitudes towards EM; however, these studies have tended to use samples of students (usually from discipline(s) of, or related to, criminal justice), which means that the studies’ wider generalizability is unclear (Graham and McIvor, 2015). Research from the United States has indicated that public attitudes regarding EM may vary per demographic characteristics of respondents like gender or ethnicity. For example, Payne and colleagues’ (2009) study suggests that respondents from non-white minorities held more negative than positive views of EM. Such variances in demography, they argued, could reflect perceived inequalities in the use of EM with different ethnic and/or racial groups (Payne et al., 2009). Furthermore, a study conducted by Gainey and Payne (2003) asked criminal justice students their attitudes regarding EM before and after a guest lecture on EM. Their findings indicate that students held more positive attitudes towards EM following the educational input and, more specifically, students viewed EM “as a rehabilitative tool, as cost-effective, and as effective for family- and work-related reasons” while simultaneously considering the technology as “more punitive, [and] as an effective deterrent or method of control” (Gainey and Payne, 2003: 203). In effect, Graham and McIvor (2015) argue that there is some (albeit limited) evidence which suggest that public opinions about EM can develop and change in association with the provision of educational information. However, it remains unclear “how much and what types of information the public in Scotland (and elsewhere in the UK) would require in light of negative media depictions of EM” for meaningful changes in attitudes towards EM to be achieved (Graham and McIvor, 2015: 85).

Ethics of EM

Surprisingly little is explicitly written about the ethics of EM and community supervision (for exceptions, see Nellis, 2013a; Bülow, 2014). As mentioned above, it is important to recognize that EM technology is not value-neutral, neither in its technological design nor as a practice (Bülow, 2014). Even the technological design of EM bracelets, both in terms of its appearance as well as its potential technological functions and intentions, has ethical implications. As Nellis (2013a) and Bülow (2014) argue, there are many ethical issues to
consider that should be addressed in the ongoing development and design of EM both as a technology and as a punishment. Such issues include public risks and risks to the offender, the profit-driven industry of EM, offenders’ privacy, the stigmatization caused by the technology, using the home as a place of confinement, and the enforcement of spatial constraint and mobility monitoring to ensure rehabilitation, crime reduction, and deterrence.

As a sentence of the court, or as a measure of penal administration, EM and RLO (through curfews and home detentions) places a degree of trust in the offender and requires their active participation to comply with the conditions imposed upon them (for example, to be home at a specified time, to take care of the equipment, to forgo certain spaces in the community either before or after certain times), as well as seeking, to some degree, prompt, responsible and law-abiding behaviour. Such behaviour is over and above mere obedience to schedules, and must be maintained at least for the duration of the order (cf. Nellis, 2009c, 2013). However, as Nellis (2009c) argues, it is a moot point to consider how comprehensively the offender’s mind is being targeted through this technology, and the ethics behind such thought alternation. In other words, attentiveness towards rules is required by the offender, “but compared to the aspirations of specific attitude and behaviour change programmes relatively little by way of cognitive change is (or can) be expected of [EM]” (Nellis, 2009c: 43). He asserts that it is “the presence or absence of the offender’s tagged body from specific premises at specific times” which is more significant to determine whether compliance has occurred (remotely registered as a trace on a computer screen at a national EM centre), rather than considering how the offender’s thinking has changed (Nellis, 2009c: 43; italics in original).

Another ethical issue to consider is whether EM is a cause or modality of unfairness. As Bülow (2014) indicates, our basic intuitions about fairness and justice suggest that there must be proportionality between the level of crime committed and the punishment imposed (see also Nellis, 2015). Such reasoning dictates that if an offender commits a more severe crime then they should be given a more severe punishment (Duff, 2001: 133). Arguably, a proportionate punishment would be something that the offender undertakes without succumbing to humiliation, and that his fellow citizens, ideally, can respect the offender for undertaking.² If punishment of the same severity is given to individuals each of whom have committed different crimes, intuition would inform us that such punishment would then be

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² For further discussion of the relationship between the offender, their civic roles, and punishment within the democratic republic, see Duff and Marshall (2016).
unfair. In effect, this constitutes a potentially worrisome aspect for EM as the punishment may be experienced differently by different groups and individuals (Bülow, 2014; see also Payne and Gainey, 2000a, 2000b). Therefore, the type of EM technology implemented and the duration of surveillance and punishment should ultimately be proportional to the seriousness of the offence and the level of risk posed by the offender, with continuous GPS tracking reserved for examples such as “a high risk sex offender…upon their release from prison” (Nellis, 2015: 13).

Additionally, Nellis (2015) argues for reflexivity and the need to unsettle taken-for-granted assumptions about the differential impact of different types of EM technologies on offenders. The presupposition that because GPS tracking is more ‘intrusive’ than RF EM technologies it should always be used on high risk offenders may be misleading; rather, “notwithstanding the greater amount of data that GPS generates, and the behavioural inferences that may be drawn from this, some offenders may experience this as less ‘intrusive,’ because it permits movement rather than requires confinement at home” (Nellis, 2015: 27-28, italics in original). Therefore, proportionate punishments should be assessed in the context of EM. In order to ascertain offenders’ perspectives and experiences of the different EM technologies, further research is required to investigate how such perceptions question proportionality, as well as help or hinder compliance, desistance and reintegration.

Finally, the data collected by EM technology, coupled with personal privacy of the offender and the practice of inter-agency information sharing are additional ethical issues to consider. According to Graham and McIvor (2015), in some jurisdictions such as several regions in England & Wales and some US states, police either have ease of access to data about, or oversee the operation of, the electronic monitoring of offenders, including GPS-based EM. Where an EM initiative is not police-led, “the existence of surveillance data generated by GPS tracking may attract increased requests by police for access to that data” (Graham and McIvor, 2015: 94). Indeed, swift access to information regarding the whereabouts of offenders can be significantly appealing for the data’s potential to save police resources (in other words, time and money), resources that would otherwise be required for routine investigative procedures to find and obtain the same information. However, Nellis (2015) warns that some police may come to value the savings and benefits for police under the rubric of public protection and helping the public purse—put differently, “to value the intelligence-gathering, investigative capabilities which GPS enables” (p. 11)—more than the technology’s capacity to assist offenders in compliance and their reductions in re-offending once back into
their community. Therefore, per Graham and McIvor (2015), a balance should be struck between stakeholders interested in EM, in which rights, responsibilities, protections and restrictions should be adequately and appropriate discussed and negotiated if EM is to be legislated and enforced.

It is important to note that in the event the police do obtain the location of an offender for the purposes of a criminal investigation, GPS-based monitoring can neither directly prove nor disprove where said offender has committed a new crime, and this technology does not have the capacity to confirm whether others are present, unless they too are tagged (Graham and McIvor, 2015). The GPS technology can only locate the offender at any given point in time, which may or may not coincide with the timing and the location of a crime. Specifically, in the US, GPS monitoring technologies and systems, and the data generated from them, can be used in the court process and can be admitted as evidence (cf. Geoghegan, 2012). As Geoghegan (2012) contends, GPS-based monitoring can be beneficial in terms of ‘fighting crime’ and providing evidence to enable arrests and (re)convictions. Furthermore, the mapping practice of “crime scene correlation—in which locations of reported crime are overlaid on a daily basis against offenders’ movements—should be a key feature of new [EM] programmes” (Geoghegan, 2012: 65). While both Geoghegan (2012) and Nellis (2013a) recognize that some (but not all) offenders may exert legal pressure to use this data collection for exoneration—rather than used for incrimination—there is a dearth of literature which deals with the ethical implications of such practices generally, and within the Scottish context specifically.

However, as it currently stands in Scotland, the police do not routinely have ease of access to this level and type of data for individuals serving other penal sanctions (for example, fines, unpaid work/community service, and/or Community Payback Orders (CPOs)). Additionally, such access to data is not provided to police regarding people monitored using radio frequency (RF)-based EM or curfew orders (Graham and McIvor, 2015). Similarly connected to the discussion above, there needs to be a more detailed consideration concerning the potential ethical and legal challenges to privacy, data protection and human rights. Scholars have issued greater warnings such as Nellis (2014) and Graham and McIvor (2015; see also McIvor and Graham, 2016), however more research is required to fully address the issues and impact of GPS tracking on personal privacy, and the potential illegality of continuous ‘real time’ mapping of the movements of convicted offenders and crime scene correlations.
Conclusion

There are apparent variable perceptions of EM’s punitiveness that must be accounted for, and as the scholarly debates have indicated, such punitiveness will vary across individuals, social groups, time, jurisdiction and culture (cf. Payne and Gainey, 2000a, 2000b; Graham and McIvor, 2017). This chapter has demonstrated an interest in better understanding the origins and developments of EM cross-culturally to contextualize the current project and provide the project with an analytical advantage. Put differently, the adoption of EM in a particular place may have more to do “with the internal dynamics of the commercial-corrections complex operating at a local level” than one had expected (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 37). To see how EM has sustained over time requires us to examine what technological infrastructures have been put in place to make this monitoring possible; whose interests in EM were championed and whose were opposed; and the role and influence of the private sector organization in promoting and maintaining EM. As Lilly and Nellis (2013: 37-38) indicate, whether “the contemporary forms of EM survive” matters not; the “geolocation of offenders is unlikely to be a ‘fad’” if EM remains a “cheap and [an] accessible means” of accomplishing punitiveness for offenders in the community.

By critically examining the origins, developments, and prevailing forms, norms and patterns of EM use in both the US and the UK, it is clear that there are structural and cultural factors underpinning EM’s influence in the US and the UK “which are not likely to be ironed out anytime soon[,]” the force of which, “and the tension between which, may even intensify” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 38; italics emphasized). There is no reason to think in either the US or the UK, EM will have no future. EM has earned a niche for itself in both the American and British criminal justice systems, created new occupation of private sector monitoring officers (Hucklesby, 2011) and given new penal/surveillant experiences to a large number of offenders (Mair and Nellis, 2013: 78-79). However, the spread of EM worldwide and acceptance by these systems does not mean that we relinquish our ability to critique the technology and its place within the lives of the marginalized who come into contact with it. The capacity to question EM’s “future penal trajectory” still exists (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 37), and it is through this project that such reconsiderations of the presence and promulgation of this carceral tool can be further discussed.
Chapter 3: Carceral Conversations

Introduction

The aim of the chapter is to address the ongoing conversations within and between core and cognate disciplines examining carcerality. Exploring these carceral conversations is a warranted discussion, given the use of electronic monitoring (EM) programmes in over 25 nations for over more than two decades (cf. Nellis et al., 2013). The history and thematic debates surrounding EM lay a solid foundation for its theorization, yet an attendance towards brilliant and diverse carceral scholarship in this chapter will place the current study in a strong position to analyze the EM programme in Scotland and its associated experiences in a more critical fashion.

This chapter begins by first describing and examining the spatial turn in the criminology and carceral studies. A greater appreciation between space and crime has become rightly recognized within criminology and between cognate disciplines, and I set out to revisit the space/crime nexus and focus upon these connections in greater detail. I then discuss the importance of conceiving the notion of the ‘carceral’ and couple this discussion by outlining the developments made within the core discipline of geography. A geographical focus has been shown in the literature to possess great potential towards exploring the carceral, especially in terms of the conditions which acknowledge both the contingency of a carceral designation and the importance of the circumstantial and subjective experiences found within and throughout the ‘carceral’ (cf. Moran et al., 2017a, 2017b). I then pair this critical appraisal of carcerality with the significant subdisciplines of carceral geography and carceral mobilities. The emergence of these subdisciplines is indicative of their connections to the wider body of work in geography and criminology, and of these subdisciplines’ “synergies with the praxis of social change aimed at challenging and transforming prevalent relations, systems and structures of inequality and oppression” (Moran, 2015b: 7). Arguably, there is more to the carceral than a mere anchorage to the prison; it is in the mundane, banal and normative spaces and places of everyday life where we must conceive beyond the current latitudes of the carceral, and where I argue a greater carceral geographical appreciation of EM and its territorial tendencies can be further conceptualized.
The ‘Spatial Turn’ in Criminology and Carceral Studies

Spatial analysis is fundamental to criminological inquiry, and when criminologists engage with human lived experience and the complexities of life we must also consider how such research benefits new ways of thinking about space and crime, a thought which may help “extend the boundaries of current spatial/geographic criminology” (Hayward, 2012: 442; see also Hayward, 2004, 2016a, 2016b). Such a challenge provides criminologists an exemplary opportunity to “think differently about the role and nature of space in our discipline” and those with keen interests in spatiality (Hayward, 2012: 459). Spatial analysis within criminology has significantly grown into leading areas of ecological interest, such as environmental criminology, the ‘journey to crime’ literature, and the criminology of place (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981, 1984, 1991, 2008; see also Andresen, 2006; Andresen et al., 2013; Bernasco, 2007; Bernasco and Block, 2009; Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Eck and Weisburd, 2015; Rengert, 1996, 2004; Rengert and Lockwood, 2008; Rengert and Wasilchik, 1985, 2000; Rengert et al., 1999; Rengert et al., 2005; Weisburd et al., 2008). As the history of criminology is told, and when it comes to criminology’s relationship with ‘criminogenic’ space, Hayward (2012: 443) contends that the work of the Chicago School is “one moment [which] stands out above all others.” When Park and colleagues published The City (1925) it was through their respective essays that they (and in particular, Burgess’ (1925) essay) solidified Chicago-style (urban) sociology. By linking ‘human ecology’ and competition for space to Park and Burgess’ concentric zone model and applying it to the city of Chicago, the School’s interpretation of ‘space’ highlighted the significance of the geography of crime within the criminological discipline, becoming one of the earliest influencers on criminology’s relation to space (Hayward, 2012; Bookman and Gacek, 2017).

Brantingham and Brantinghams’s (1981, 1984, 1991, 2008) research has also made great strides in developing ecological understandings to the space/crime nexus, specifically focusing on the criminology of place and crime pattern modelling. Crime pattern theory (CPT), conceptualized by Brantingham and Brantingham (2008), centres on the notion that offenders, like everybody else, learn about their environment in going about their legitimate and everyday activities. As the pair assert, an ‘activity node’ becomes a place where one normally stops and performs activities for more than a trivial amount of time (for example, a

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3 However, Hayward (2004) asserts the Chicago School’s legacy within criminology is certainly not immune from problems of its own, nor is it the only early influence on criminology’s relationship to space. For further discussion, see Hayward (2004).
home, a workplace, a shopping centre, etc.). ‘Paths’ become the routes that one takes from one node to another. Taken together, paths and nodes form an individual’s ‘activity space’, and an ‘awareness space’ is the area normally within visual range of the activity space (Brantingham and Brantingham, 2008). In effect, CPT argues that offenders commit offences at places where their awareness space overlaps with an attractive target, and while critics point to environmental criminology’s overemphasis upon rational choice approaches which “too readily distil[s] lived human experience and the complex fabric of life to leave only the discourse of demographics, statistics and multi-factorialism” (Hayward, 2012: 442), proponents argue that this particular focus within the space/crime nexus “provides an excellent starting point for testing the role of awareness space in crime location choices” and the meaningful, ‘sentimental’ journeys offenders make to commit crimes in their social worlds (Bernasco, 2010: 394; see also Bernasco, 2007; Bernasco and Block, 2009; Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005).

Indeed, we have also seen growing academic interest in terms of the offender’s journey itself. As Rengert (2004: 169) contends, there are three elements of the journey to crime: (1) the ‘starting point’ or reference point we measure the journey from; (2) the direction the criminal moves; and (3) the distance of the crime scene to the reference point. As the journey to crime literature suggests, one must understand the components of the many journeys of which crime patterns are composed in order to comprehend crime patterns in toto (Rengert, 2004; see also Rengert, 1996; Rengert and Lockwood, 2008; Rengert and Wasilchik, 1985, 2000; Rengert et al., 1999; Rengert et al., 2005).

It is clear then that understanding crime, criminals and crime patterns warrants greater attention to spatial inquiry and place-based meanings. However, notions of space and place also implicate a variety of fields, including but not limited to sociology, philosophy, cultural studies, political science, and criminal justice, to name a few (cf. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2011; Jarzombek, 2010; Ogelsby and Ross, 2009; Marcuse, 2009; Escobar, 2001; Desfor and Keil, 1999; Bookman and Gacek, 2017). Extending this focus of space and place beyond criminology illustrates the importance of related disciplines to the spatial turn in academia. For example, social and legal geography investigate the spatialization of law (Mitchell, 1997; Ford, 1999; Blomley and Sommers, 1999; Blomley, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005; Valverde, 2011), which have examined the divided practice of conceptualizing space in public and private realms. Geographers themselves have also shown how space and place are not simply ‘things’ or geometric zones, remaining open to the idea about what ‘space’ and
‘place’ constitute within empirical research (cf. Peck and Tickell, 2002; Jessop et al., 2008). Urban sociology continues to critique the normative understandings of the city, questioning how cities have become new places of advanced systemic, structural and interpersonal forms of social control. Cities are places where structures and practices of state and economic power are most dramatically affirmed, sustained, and perpetuated (cf. Desfor and Keil, 2000; Escobar, 2001; Joyce, 2003; Keil and Boudreau, 2006; Hubber and Currie, 2007; Sanscartier and Gacek, 2016; Bookman and Gacek, 2017). Overlapping social processes and practices found within the city certainly contribute to its vitality and value, but also its ability to regulate punishment, social and crime control.

Space and place have become significant resources and variables to the operations of policing (cf. Eick, 2006; Herbert & Beckett, 2006, 2010; Bennett, 2009; Walby & Lippert, 2012; Walby & Hurl, 2014), to studies of courts and legal proceedings (Merry, 2001; Mawani, 2007; Auty, 2009; Valverde, 2009; Layard, 2010; Moran, 2016), and to examinations of prisons and jails (cf. Crewe et al., 2014; Gacek, 2015, 2017, 2018; Moran, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; 2015b). Indeed, a growing contribution from prison ethnography has examined space as an embodied practice and performance within such spaces of confinement (cf. De Viggiani, 2012; Drake and Earl, 2013; Crewe et al., 2014; Moran, 2013a, 2013b; Moran and Disney, 2017). Particularly relevant to criminal justice studies, the study of spaces and places provide key resources to the criminal justice process, ranging from experiences of crime to its subsequent reactions. For instance, people typically refer and reflect on certain places when they talk about crime and justice, and vice versa (cf. Warr, 1992; Andresen, 2006; Fornango, 2010; Vilalta, 2013). For some, place could mean a home, a neighbourhood or a community; for others, it could mean a larger area like a city, some area where people exist in or move through, or even a sense of place created by temporary social practices (Lehman-Frisch, 2011). As Kohm (2009) contends, spatial studies of neighbourhood-level perceptions of crime reveal that even in areas statistically associated with high levels of property and violent crime. Per Kohm (2009), residents may be more fearful of encounters with other forms of socially marginal behaviour within the everyday micro-level contexts of daily routines and lifestyles. Moreover, when some people speak of crime and justice they experience emotions about place and proximity, and through their understandings and variations of race, crime, and gender (cf. Koskela, 1997; Pain, 2001). Even Girling and colleagues (2000: 12) have commented on the need within the social sciences to develop a “place-sensitive sociology of public sensitivities towards crime.” In effect, to study space and place is to examine, critique
and assess the spaces and places where justice and injustice unfold (Kohm, 2017). By linking spaces and places to questions of justice and injustice, we push the boundary of discipline demarcations and open up new frontiers and conceptualizations of justice in theory and praxis (cf. Crank, 2004).

The recent development of carceral geography is significantly influenced by and directly akin to the ‘spatial turn’ in criminology and the spatialization of carceral studies (Moran and Schliehe, 2017b: 3). Per Frank (2009: 66) the spatial turn has been “one of the most recently proclaimed turns within the human and social sciences”, and far from being a unified movement, the thematic and methodological reorientation consists of a variety of often diverse approaches to understand and conceive space (see also Gacek, 2017: 75; Warf and Arias, 2009). By drawing upon intellectual developments provoked by the spatial turn in social theory (cf. Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 2005), the impact of the spatial turn has been substantive and far-reaching, especially for certain forms of socio-spatial criminology (cf. Hayward, 2012: 442). Notable scholars who have begun to theorize space in this regard include Hayward (2004, 2012, 2016a, 2016b), Campbell (2012a, 2012b) and Kindynis (2014). Indeed, these scholars offer alternative, prospective ways to potentially interpret relationships between space and crime.

As Kindynis argues, theoretical developments in the spatial turn of social theory “have begun to offer a more sophisticated rendering of the lived experience and socio-cultural complexities” of the space/crime nexus (2014: 232; see also Moran and Schliehe, 2017b: 3). Such research, like that of Hayward (2004, 2012, 2016a, 2016b) and Campbell (2012a, 2012b) have engaged directly with theorizations of space from cultural geography and cultural criminology, examining the potential resonances between the pair. Rather than viewing the environment simply as a geographic site, they aptly reconsider conventional understandings of space and encourage inquiry in criminology and carceral studies to examine space as part in parcel of “power relations, cultural and social dynamics,” and “everyday values and meanings” (Hayward, 2012: 441). In particular, Hayward (2016a, 2016b) has recently reflected on the relationship between space and crime and its emergence in the past decade, focusing on spatial models and theoretical concepts on the one hand (using notions such as ‘container space,’ ‘soundscape,’ ‘parafunctional space,’ etc.) and examining specific types of spaces on the other (such as borders, rural spaces, and mega-security zones). Hayward (2016a, 2016b) actively encourages both the proliferation of cultural criminological spaces and alternative ways of interpreting relationships between space and crime, as doing
so strengthens criminology’s position for developing real world applications in policy and praxis in a more nuanced and comprehensive fashion. As a result, approaching space through criminology should view space “not as an undialectical void, but as a complex constellation of social and power relations” through its nexus with crime and must be understood in greater detail (Hayward, 2012: 459).

In addition, spatial criminologists have attended to geographical research with a criminological lens (and vice versa), developing “innovative and explicitly spatial(izing) methodologies with which to generate further empirical insights” into the space/crime relationship (Kindynis, 2014: 232). Such research has included or drawn upon different cartographic or map methods, including (but not limited to) geo-tagging, global positioning satellite (GPS) systems, photo-mapping, and spatial transcript projects to obtain diverse insights. In effect, we are witnessing a new wave of socio-spatial criminology which blends together participant observation and other qualitative methods with quantitative geographic information systems (QGIS) to, for example, help develop new, politically nuanced ‘alternative crime maps’ (Hayward, 2016a: 213; see also Schuurman, 2009 regarding the use of QGIS to store qualitative information to aid map interpretation and geographic profiling).

In sum, there are conversations occurring across core and cognate disciplines, all of which recognizing the significance of the spatial turn to academic scholarship generally and to criminological and carceral studies specifically. With every new conversation comes a greater appreciation for space and place, and it is clear that criminology and carceral studies are important to this cause. However, as indicated in the introductory chapter, what has eluded scholastic attention until recently has been the conditions to which an entity could define itself as ‘carceral,’ be it a place, a practice, an experience, or something else (cf. Moran et al., 2017a). As Moran and colleagues (2017a: 15) contend, the significance and scale of this word demands critical attention: “Forty years since Foucault deployed the term ‘carceral’, and two decades since geographers adopted it, for carceral geography to meaningfully engage…with interdisciplinary scholarship of confinement we must consider the possibilities presented by interpretations of the term that has become central to both our academic inquiry and the functioning of the societies within which we live.” I supplement their clarion call for continued interrogation of the ‘carceral,’ and in the following sections I attend to this term and discuss its impact within diverse carceral scholarship.
Thinking about the ‘Carceral’

As Moran and colleagues suggest, the definition of the ‘carceral’ should be broadly conceived to enable a critical appraisal of carcerality “without eliciting an introspective definitional debate” (Moran et al., 2017a: 15). The authors provide a robust and thorough exegesis of the term, and by tracing the etymology of ‘carceral’ they argue that the term should be disentangled from the prison, as framing the ‘carceral’ solely in terms of the prison delineates a limited analytical field in which scholars can examine and critique carcerality. Simultaneously, they acknowledge that incarceration extends beyond the prison into a range of spaces, including but not limited to the factory, the school, the workplace, and the neighbourhood (for further discussions and examples see also Comack, 2008; Gill et al., 2016; Woolford and Gacek, 2016). They also turn to Foucault’s ([1977]/1995) notion of ‘compact’ versus ‘diffuse’ carceral models—the former being factory-convicts, almshouses, institutions for abandoned children, and so forth, while the latter include charitable organizations, housing associations, and moral improvement societies—in an attempt to reconcile visions of the carceral, wherein the prison represents the “touchstone” around which less severe sites of incarceration are modeled (Moran et al., 2017a: 7; see also Hamlin and Speer (2017) for a critical response to Moran et. al (2017) and Moran et al. (2017b) for a response to Hamlin and Speer’s commentary).

Despite the term’s archaic origins, Moran and colleagues (2017a: 3) indicate that ‘carceral’ has become a significant word for our times, as arguably we now speak of living within a “carceral age” more so than ever before (for a further discussion see also Bosworth and Kaufman, 2011). Indeed, there continues to be ongoing debates surrounding the legitimacy of incarceration in all its manifestations, and how incarceration transcends and differentiates between local and national cultural norms and practices. Such a carceral age is unequivocally characterized by unprecedented fluidity between forms of confinement “be they state-sanctioned, quasi-legal, ad-hoc, illicit, spatially fixed, mobile, embodied or imagined” (Moran et al., 2017a: 3; see also Moran and Schliehe, 2017a). This characterization includes the visibility and scales of deployment of carceral techniques and technologies, all of which must be granted further attention generally and within the context of EM specifically.

Beyond Foucault ([1977]/1995), Moran and colleagues suggest there are three conditions “that bear on the nature and quality of carcerality” (2017a: 12). The three ‘carceral conditions’ do not qualify carcerality; it would be a fraught pursuit, according to the authors,
to delineate qualifications as it could potentially produce an overly simplistic binary categorization of “carceral-or-not” (Moran et al., 2017a: 12). Instead, these conditions acknowledge the contingent nature of a carceral designation while highlighting the significant subjective experiences found within and throughout the carceral. Per Jefferson (2014: 49), to understand the experience of confinement “we must look not only at institutions or sites but at practices and meanings, or more crucially at the relations between sites, practices, social relations and subjectivity.” Moran and colleagues (2017a) suggest that a move towards an enriched discussion of the carceral could consider three conditions of carcerality: (1) detriment; (2) intention; and (3) spatiality. Combined, these three conditions suggest that there exist gradations of carcerality, that incarceration involves the intentional imposition of harm through space, and that space itself is key to the enactment of incarceration both through mechanisms of confinement and restricted mobility, relatively speaking.

First, detriment refers to the “lived experience of harm, as perceived by those suffering it” (Moran et al., 2017a: 12). This condition focuses on the way in which detriment is experienced rather than whether detriment was intended. While they acknowledge that detriment may be unintended or intentionally aligned with punishment, the authors afford primacy to those individuals whose loss is experienced as detrimental, as such detriment can encompass physical, emotional and psychological pain and suffering as well as comparatively mild inconveniences.

Intention is the second carceral condition and refers to the state agent(s) intending detriment through their operations of carceral spaces, practices, policies and technologies. However, Moran and colleagues readily acknowledge the condition of intent as problematic, particularly due to “the decision-making of calculative governance” (2017a: 13). Indeed, many state policies, for example, are justified as beneficial to the public and/or pragmatic and are punitive in their effects (Hamlin and Speer, 2017). Temporal distance is another issue to consider, as carceral geographers have identified the detriment felt by those individuals originates within an intention to harm, and exists as a lasting effect that persists long after actual incarceration has ceased. Nevertheless, Moran and colleagues assert that both formal and informal structures or organizations that intend or administers punishment are essential for carcerality. While the formal confinement of one person or group by another is a clear example (such as the administration of punishment upon inmates of a prison by state agents), we must also become attuned to the informal structures behind intention—namely, the motivations, norms, and informal expectations of behaviour manifesting within intent. An
example of the latter would be a family structure and/or dynamic which restricts the
movement and agency of certain members.

Finally, the carceral is achieved through spatiality, which is the third and final carceral
condition. If the first two condition exist, then there will be space(s) to which both detriment
and intention will relate “but both the nature of the space(s) and the ways in which the
carceral is enabled and determined by its spatiality may radically differ” (Moran et al., 2017a:
14). However manifested, carceral spatiality seems characterized by a “technology of
confinement: (intentionally) keeping-in, (detrimentally) containing, those ‘within’” and
where it purposefully keeps people and things out it does so primarily to protect its ability to
delineate and keep those inside in (Moran et al., 2017a: 14). Therefore, while carceral
spatiality is related to but distinct from the first two carceral conditions, there is more to it
than simply observing that the carceral is spatial. Carceral spatiality refers to diverse
(im)material technologies and the spatial relationships between and through them; the former
delivers intent, while the latter is through which detriment is experienced, contested and
resisted.

Taken together, the three carceral conditions “enable the achievement of carcerality”,
illustrating the spatial phenomena which delineate and literally enclose, the processes through
which diverse mobilities are restricted and/or regulated, and the ways in which detriment and
intention take on effects of incarceration long after periods of actual incarceration have ended
(Moran et al., 2017a: 14; italics in original). These carceral conditions benefit the current
study, as what can be included here are the arguably elusive and (in)tangible techniques
through which the carceral “adheres” to particular spaces encountered post-custody and
assume a certain carcerality about them (Moran et al., 2017a: 14). The territorial processes of
EM rely in part on such carceral adherence and to the (in)formal practices and expectations of
behaviour by which state actors and the surveilled abide by throughout the EM period. The
EM period is simultaneously state-sanctioned, mobile, and imagined; while state agents and
the surveilled make meaning through its carcerality, simultaneously these same actors
produce and/or embody territoriality to which it is proscribed. Moran and colleague’s (2017a,
2017b) attempt to delineate the ‘carceral’ advances a strong position for further interrogation
of the term, which ultimately provides us with an opportunity to further explore strategies and
technologies of control and confinement within our current carceral age. To understand such
processes requires us to reconsider the carceral techniques and technologies pervading a
range of spaces and attitudes in modern society. A geographical focus is well suited for such an examination, and is taken up in the following sections.

**The ‘Carceral Turn’ in Geography**

Per Moran and colleagues (2017a: 1), the so-called punitive turns by governments in both welfare and justice policy can be aptly described as the ‘carceral turn,’ characterized not only by the growth in legal, state-sanctioned incarceration sentenced to ever-longer prison terms in punitive conditions, but by “the extra-penal mass supervision of increasing numbers of people whose lives are penetrated by the criminal justice system” (see also Moran and Schliehe, 2017b). Engaging with such developments from a geographical perspective, the carceral turn illustrates the deployment of a range of strategies of social control and coercion that operate beyond the prison. Technologies of surveillance and control to track offenders are a prime example of this carceral turn, as such EM technologies “enable a carceral ‘fix’ to operate beyond conventional carceral spaces,” permitting people to remain mobile in their communities relative to the curfews imposed upon them at sentencing (Moran et al., 2017a: 1; see also Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017).

As indicated above, the popular impression of prison as an enclosed and impervious space, cut-off from the wider world is being challenged by rising prison populations and technological innovations that have precipitated all manner of circulation and mobilities both within prison walls and across them. Such challenges have also received scholarly attention, as the examination of strategies and spaces of confinement become significant to the future development of geographical scholarship and other cognate disciplines. Academia has become increasingly mindful of how the ‘carceral’ is conceptualized within any research project undertaken, and the trajectories through which the ‘carceral turn’ will lead future research (Armstrong and Jefferson, 2017; see also Moran et al., 2017a; Schliehe and Moran, 2017). Indeed, many scholars have critically discussed Goffman’s (1961) notion of the ‘total institution’ in order to call attention to the interconnectedness of prisons and other carceral spaces (cf. Moran, 2015b; Gill et al., 2016; however, see Foster, 2017; Schliehe, 2016, 2017; Gacek, 2018 for a recovery of Goffman’s work in this respect). The intention of this attention has been to counter the imagination of the cloistered carceral institution, discussing instead the liminal, carceral spaces “betwixt and between” the inside and outside of prison (Moran, 2015b: 90; see also Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017; Turner, 2016; Turner and Peters 2015, 2016, 2017). The EM of offenders provides us a way in which to attend to the multi-scalar
contexts witnessed within carceral spaces, as these technologies and techniques of confinement and restricted mobility “leach into everyday domestic, street and institutional spaces with which both former inmates and their loved ones...come into contact” (Moran et al., 2017a: 5).

Geography is a strong discipline to engage in questions of what a meta-institutional geography of the carceral would look like, asking not simply what a geography (from) ‘above’ carceral institutions entails, but rather questioning what lies beyond the carceral sites and examining such spaces through a combination of “supra-, sub-, inter-, intra-, and extra-institutional imaginaries and perspectives” (Gill et al., 2016: 2; see also Moran and Schliehe, 2017b; Peters and Turner, 2015, 2016, 2017; Turner, 2014, 2016). Unlike prison studies, geographers approach the subject of carcerality with an emphasis on the continuities that stretch across institutional boundaries (cf. Allspach, 2010; Moran, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Moran and Disney, 2017; Moran et al., 2015; 2017; Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017; Turner, 2013; Turner and Peters, 2015, 2016, 2017; Villanueva, 2017a, 2017b) and do not restrict the scope of analysis to the bounds of inquiry at the institutional-level.

In sum, carceral geography attends closely to these issues through work which is both diverse and multi-scalar. This subfield is well suited to focusing on a range of carceral spaces and places, from institutional, political and structural contexts at the macro level to the minute experiences, practices and agency of everyday life. Yet if carceral geography is to be a significant focus within the current study, what objects of study have been instrumental to its development? What, if anything, lies beyond the latitude of a carceral geographical perspective going forward? We must reconsider what elements of carceral geography have been essential to the “exponentially mounting possibilities of the carceral,” the increasingly diverse application of the ‘carceral’ and its subsequently expansive analytical field (Moran et al., 2017a: 4; 2017b; see also Moran and Schliehe, 2017a, 2017b; Schliehe and Moran, 2017).

**Developments in Carceral Geography**

Carceral geography “is not just a fancier name for the geography of prisons” (Routley, 2016: 1); rather, it is a perspective which examines what lies above, beneath, betwixt, between and beyond carceral sites, practices, regimes, technologies and schemes. Even the term ‘carceral geography’ (Moran, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015b; Moran et al., 2012) was coined to describe the relatively new and vibrant field of geography and geographical research into practices of incarceration, viewing such carceral spaces broadly “as a type of institution... whose
distributional geographies, and geographies of internal and external social and spatial relations, could be explored” (Moran, 2012: 306). As previously stated, it is a relatively new terrain for exploration; yet, carceral geography has been able to account for and critique the so-called ‘punitive turn’ in the West (cf. Wacquant, 2002), which has brought about new ways of thinking about geography, the state, and spaces of incarceration, detention, and captivity (cf. Gacek, 2015, 2017, 2018; Woolford and Gacek, 2016).

Carceral geography’s emergence as a sub-discipline of human geography was originally heavily influenced by mobilities researchers issuing a clarion call for greater examination into the experiences and forms of movement and mobility within the social sciences (cf. Sheller and Urry, 2006). Characterized by the tensions between “apparent fixity and forced mobility” (Martin and Mitchelson, 2009: 461), carceral geography and its subsequent scholarship take seriously regimes of imprisonment, detention, temporary-holding and captivity (cf. Conlon, 2011; Gacek, 2015, 2017, 2018; Martin and Mitchelson, 2009; Moran, 2015b; Moran and Disney, 2017; Moran et al., 2012; Moran et al., 2013; Moran et al., 2017; Moran and Schliehe, 2017a, 2017b; Morin, 2013, 2016; Morin and Moran, 2015; Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017; Turner, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2016; Turner and Peters, 2015, 2016, 2017; Schliehe and Moran, 2017; Woolford and Gacek, 2016; Villanueva, 2017a, 2017b). Indeed, a major contribution of carceral geography has been its suggestion that how we define ‘carceral’ should be something more than merely the spaces in which people are enclosed (Moran, 2013b: 176; see also Gacek, 2017, 2018). Such carceral spaces typically maintain “a selective and imperfect degree of separation” between what lies beyond and what exists inside the ‘carceral’ (Moran, 2015b: 90), existing “outside of and different from other spaces, but still inside the general social order” of societies within late modernity (Baer and Ravneberg, 2008: 214). This body of work suggests that the carceral can be delineated by and through psychological and social constructions, of which can leave lasting impacts upon incarcerated, (im)mobilized people (Moran, 2015b). As Turner (2014) contends, carceral geography has the potential to both highlight, deepen, and enrich understandings of the cultural manifestations that permeate carceral spaces and their complex relationships to the world around them (see also Morin, 2013, 2018; Woolford and Gacek, 2016).

As illustrated above, carceral geography research is heavily influenced by Foucault ([1977]/1995), but it also draws upon Agamben (1998, 2005). The former has been included to consider the development of the prison, surveillance, the regulation of space and the docility of bodies (Foucault, [1977]/1995), while the latter has been tapped by carceral
geography to flesh out and further comprehend spaces of exception; spaces where sovereign power suspends the law and produces a zone of abandonment (Agamben, 1998, 2005). This ontology carves up the imagined geography of discrete institutions which men and women enter from all walks of life and from whence they are ‘released’ in favour of emphasizing continuity across institutional and (typically) urban settings (Wacquant, 2001, 2009; Allspach, 2010; Gill et al., 2016). For example, Allspach (2010) introduced the notion of ‘transcarceral spaces’ to help appraise the complex geographies of carcerality. Allspach studied prison experiences of federally sentenced women (pre-, during, and post-prison) in Canada, and drawing upon in-depth interviews, her research highlights the everyday geographies of women subjected to racialized, gendered, classed and criminalized practices along the long trajectories of institutional and/or structural social control. Allspach concluded that even after women were released from federal prisons in Canada “the practices of social control…produce continuities of confinement beyond prison walls on multiple levels” (Allspach, 2010: 721). Community policing, therapeutic courts, residential placements for post-release prisoners exist as some of the ‘transcarceral spaces,’ coupled with the programs and institutional arrangements that have worked to extend the reach and scope of social control in the West (cf. Villanueva, 2017a, 2017b). In a similar vein, Moran (2014: 37) examined the embodiment of incarceration by former prisoners in Russia, noting that “transcarceral spaces exist alongside and perhaps also in combination with an embodied sense of the ‘carceral‘”. Such an embodied sense of the carceral, she argued, was “similarly mobile beyond the prison wall through the corporeality of released prisoners” (Moran, 2014: 37).

Other developments within carceral geography are worth mentioning as well, for they are indicative of the breadth of empiricism this discipline has reached thus far. For example, Crewe and colleagues (2014) have examined the emotional geographies of carceral spaces; Woolford and Gacek (2016) drew on carceral geography to theorize ‘genocidal carcerality’ in Indian residential schools in Canada; Baer and Ravneberg (2008), Gill (2013), Schliehe (2016), and my own work explored the complex notions of inside and outside in carceral spaces (Gacek, 2017), and I have further drawn upon carceral geography to examine former inmates’ experiences of solitary confinement within Canada (Gacek, 2018). Moran and Disney (2017) centre upon the prison visiting room, and through carceral geography they examine the space as an embodied geography of both presence and absence in which certain types of multiple and overlapping experiences are keenly felt (for further exploration of the
prison visiting room and impact upon family dynamic, parenting and experiences see Moran et al., 2017). Villanueva (2017a, 2017b) drew upon legal and carceral geography to not only focus on how carceral spaces are legally constituted within France’s social housing estates, but to also demonstrate how ‘prosecutorial spaces’ (such as district, community, and youth courts, alongside judges’ and prosecutors’ offices) become “key sites for the practices of surveillance, disciplining, detention and confinement” (Villanueva, 2017b: 149). Peters and Turner (2016) examined carceral geography in terms of the (im)mobilities aboard convict ships sailing between the British Empire and Australian colonies (see also Turner and Peters, 2016), while Turner (2013b) focused upon carceral geography through geographical considerations of the ‘home’ to attend to the struggles prisoners face as they attempt to reintegrate into British society; Moran (2015a) discussed animal geographies of carceral space with reference to animals as contraband that penetrates the prison; and Morin (2016) has examined similarities between human and nonhuman carceral geographies, looking at close linkages and ‘carceral comparisons’ between prison and animal carceralities (see also Morin, 2018). By no means is this an exhaustive list as such scholarship is many, expansive, overlapping, entangling, and synergizing. Nevertheless, we can see how the “multiplicity of carceral spaces” as Brown (2014: 386) contends, “ultimately work together to create the carceral society” that has become common in late modernity (see also Gill et al., 2016; Moran et al., 2017a).

It is clear that carceral geography has become increasingly recognized beyond the geography discipline (Schantz, 2017; see also Gacek, 2017, 2018; Maddrell, 2017; Mincke, 2017; Moran and Schliehe, 2017a, 2017b; Schliehe and Moran, 2017; Turner and Peters, 2016, 2017; Villanueva, 2017a, 2017b), and although its development has been rapid, it still attempts to gain on the strategies and spaces of confinement which have vastly expanded, diversified and proliferated which have outpaced it. A striking characteristic of carceral space is the movement of people. Carceral geographers have begun to recognize the enrolment of (im)mobility to view and interrogate how punishment is transferred between carceral establishments, problematize their relocations from prison post-release, and can act as the initiation into a “disorientating and subjectifying system” of carcerality (Gill et al., 2016: 5; see also Feldman, 1991; Stoller, 2003; Svensson and Svensson, 2006; Gill, 2009, 2013; Moran et al., 2012; Hiemstra, 2013; Michalon, 2013). Furthermore, transfers of arrested or detained individuals, offenders, inmates, police, lawyers, criminal justice social workers and
so forth can be justified on a wide array of administrative procedures, cost, severity of sentence, informal punishment and/or improvements to system efficiency (cf. Follis, 2015).

Regardless of the justification, we see how the spatial churning of criminal justice actors serves as an important function in shoring up and performing the symbolic power of carceral spaces. Incarceration is far from mere immobilization; on the contrary, physical confinement is but one aspect of a much more fluid, mutable, and complicated series of movements across time and space (cf. Gill, 2009, 2013; Moran et al., 2012; Michalon, 2013; Mincke, 2017; Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017; Turner and Peters, 2015, 2016, 2017). As the next section indicates, carceral geography has begun to explore such movement in greater detail. When carceral spaces are understood as relatively mobile, such a notion destabilizes the spatial separateness between prison and society (cf. Peters and Turner, 2017; Schliehe and Moran, 2017). Arguably, the EM of offenders is an example of this continual blur between carceral regimes, technologies, practices and the wider communities’ tagged offenders and monitoring officers inhabit and experience in everyday life. To conceive carceral mobility and questions of agency is to allow us a better sense of the symbolic, social and material relations across and between spaces and places.

**Carceral Mobilities**

To confine attention to the movement of people within and between carceral spaces is to narrowly sharpen the scope of a much wider phenomena of circuitry involving people, objects and practices (cf. Gill, 2009, 2013; Schliehe, 2017). On the one hand, to require bailed, tagged and otherwise monitored individuals to move with greater sense of relative freedom, even when they are ostensibly not incarcerated, creates and reinforces comparably unfree conditions and experiences (cf. Peters and Turner, 2017). On the other hand, inmates are not the only subjects within spaces of incarceration to experience this carceral churn. For instance, correctional officers experience a significantly different carceral churn and spatial transfer than their elite counterparts (i.e. the judiciary and/or institutional directors or wardens). These groups of criminal justice actors orbit within a different, transcarceral space (Allspach, 2010; Gill et al., 2016). Therefore, the circulation of people, objects, practices and experiences can supplement a larger discussion concerning how spaces of incarceration and practices and processes (im)mobility—in other words, the study of carceral mobilities—intersect, coalesce, and conflict simultaneously.
As Peters and Turner (2017) indicate, at first glance, the words ‘carceral’ and ‘mobilities’ appear to sit uneasily together. “Consider the brute physicality of a prison wall[,]” the authors suggest; whether the wall is “stone, brick, edged with barbed wire, or flanked with surveillance, the boundary between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of this particular space...marks an assumed boundary between movement and stasis” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 1). Outside, there is a presumed freedom of movement, a liberty to move freely at one’s own will; inside, however, there is an assumed prohibition of movement, an imposed stasis and immobility. Yet the authors contend that scholarship is now reconsidering the boundary, turning towards how “the key tenets of mobilities thinking might be reanalyzed in the context of the carceral[,] and how the carceral can be better understood through an attention to mobilities” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 4; see also Altin and Minca, 2017; Brown, 2017; Fishwick and Wearing, 2017; Gacek, 2017; Gutiérrez Rivera, 2017; Turner, 2016; Turner and Peters, 2015, 2016). Carceral mobility is another sub-discipline best suited to examining the “coerced, disciplined, and also emancipatory, minute, temporal, partial and laborious motions that are part and parcel of what it is to be incarcerated” (Turner and Peters, 2016: 99; see also Peters and Turner, 2015). Such literature unhinges carceral spaces from sedentarist ontologies that conceptualise spaces of detention, imprisonment and captivity as ones of stability and fixity, and allow us to explore “mobile lives…and...make sense of both historical events and the formation of mobility norms in the present” (Turner and Peters, 2016: 97).

Indeed, mobilities research is now an established field of academic enquiry (cf. Faulconbridge and Hui, 2016). A proliferation of wide-ranging work on the politics underscoring the movements of people, objects, and information has emerged because of two significant papers that argued for a repositioning of mobilities scholarship within social science agendas (Hannam et al., 2006; Sheller and Urry, 2006). What this ‘mobility thinking’ has accomplished is a re-examination of how one might consider and study a world that is always ‘on the move’ in late modernity (Cresswell, 2006). The notion of mobility has generally been linked to autonomy, movement, freedom and transgression, but it did not always have these meanings (Cresswell, 2006). Current representations of mobility are connected to Western modernity, the expansion of global capitalism, and the rise of technologies (Gutiérrez Rivera, 2017). Aside from such representational meanings, mobility is also physical—put simply, mobility is “practiced, experienced, [and] embodied” (Cresswell, 2006: 2). Furthermore, mobilities is not value-neutral; it can be an instrument of power, of which not all people have equal access to its operation or implementation (Murray,
Similarily, EM is not value-neutral; as Bülow (2014) reminds us, EM’s technological design as well as its potential technological functions, as indicated in the prior chapter, can have ethical implications for both monitoring officers and the tagged offenders. Certain individuals under an EM period may have restricted movement or limited access to a place or area, while others may be forced to move (as is the case with EM programmes; see for example Nellis et al., 2013). In any case, we must be mindful that both punishment and mobility is experienced differently between individuals and groups (Payne and Gainey, 2000a, 2000b), and while some may not be affected by the sanction, others may be unfairly punished through EM and the burden it places upon an offender’s mobility.

As is well documented elsewhere (cf. Cresswell and Merriman, 2011; Adey et al., 2014; Jungnickel, 2014), mobilities research has ranged from a study of technologies of motion (bicycles, cars, buses, trains, airplanes), to the infrastructure that either enable or disable mobility (data centres, airports, rails, roads, sidewalks). This area includes the subjects made (im)mobile by regimes of control and regulation (tourists, migrants, commuters, and so forth), as well as the materialities which shape and are shaped by mobilities (passports, currency, fossil fuels, etc.) (cf. Jungnickel, 2014). Mobility can also draw attention to the psychosocial dimensions of spatiality. For instance, my own study with ten men who have experienced incarceration in Manitoba, Canada have focused in part upon the role of inner, mental spaces to disconnect from their physical existence ‘inside’ the prison to ephemerally ‘escape’ their carceral lives (Gacek, 2017). Through the power of the mind, imaginative mobility became “a bridge towards phantasmagorical spaces” (Gacek, 2017: 81). Movement and place became essential components for existential travel between the real and the imaginary, and forging a strong connexion to the sacred inner sanctums of the mind as a sort of personal liberation (Gacek, 2017: 81-82).

In effect, the “maturity” (Faulconbridge and Hui, 2016: 8) of the “mobilities paradigm” (Sheller and Urry, 2006: 207; see also Adey, 2006) relies upon the recognition that (carceral) mobilities research is moving forwards; drawing upon new spaces, subjects, occurrences, events and temporalities in order to generate fresh discussion for scholars investigating carceral environments (cf. Peters and Turner, 2017). In contemporary carceral studies, to move is to journey from one point to point, charting a geometric and horizontal trajectory across space. Yet as Turner and Peters (2016: 97) argue, rethinking mobility within
criminology and carceral studies is more than this trajectory; mobility is also the politics of motion in the process of moving:

Accordingly, mobility is not the abstract macro-movement along a path or line: it is the minute, intimate, embodied, power-filled ways and methods of moving within the path or along the line. If we are to move (literally) beyond thinking carceral movements as ‘travels’ between fixed nodes to a more probing understanding of how, why, whom, by what means, and under what conditions subjects, objects, ideas and elements move—then the literature still has some way to go. With mobility studies exploring the ways in which motion is never straightforward—occurring forwards and backwards; horizontally and vertically; as well as under and over.

Therefore, studies of mobility urge us to pay attention to what occurs during and in-between movement. These features of mobility require our attention as they have the potential “to fundamentally shape what it is, means and feels to move and not move and it is these that carceral scholars have yet to fully reveal” (Turner and Peters, 2016: 110; italics emphasized).

New comprehensions of space, through a mobility lens, might be called what Thrift (2005: 592) refers to as ‘movement-space’: “folded and animate because everything can be framed in perpetual movement.” This allows us to critically question how “mobility is part and parcel of carcerality” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 3), as “[m]obility is… a constant practical concern in the management of penal systems” (Moran et al., 2012: 339). No regime of incarceration is without movement, as movement dictates and predicates what is to be detained, imprisoned or held captive (Mountz et al., 2013; see also Altin and Minca, 2017; Comack, 2008; Fishwick and Wearing, 2017; Gill, 2009; Gutiérrez Rivera, 2017; Moran et al., 2012; Moran et al., 2013; Mountz and Lloyd, 2014; Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017; Turner and Peters, 2015, 2016, 2017; Woolford and Gacek, 2016). While mobilities research expresses an explicit focus on how the dimensions of power are embedded in mobile (as well as how immobility is produced through power), it can also offer a framework for better understanding the operation of power that works to confine, detain, contain, immobilize, and “also make mobile incarcerated peoples” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 3; italics in original, see also Peters and Turner, 2015 and Turner and Peters, 2016). Likewise, carceral settings and environments provide fertile ground to generate fresh understandings into queries of “how, why, [and] in what ways are people and objects able, unable, and restricted in their movement” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 3; see also Schliehe, 2017 regarding complex micro-scale mobilities of objects, people and locomotion).
Of course, one must be cautious of exploring mobility within and between sites and spaces of incarceration; the possibility exists that “if we explore mobility in everything” as Adey asserts, “and fail to examine the differences and relations between them, it becomes not meaningless, but, there is a danger in mobilizing the world into a transient, yet featureless, homogeneity” (2006: 91). Undoubtedly, this is a caution which I recognize. Nevertheless, carceral mobilities, in line with carceral geography, is in a strong position to assess the gradations of carcerality betwixt and between spaces and sites of EM, and provides an opportunity to assess the ways in which “movements are (re)made and (re)produced in sites that have established, concretized, and enduring appearances as ones of relative stasis” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 9; see also Peters and Turner, 2015). Its distinction of the relations between inside/outside and (im)mobility is evidenced in sites of detention, captivity and holding, such as the prison, the migrant camp, the detention facility, and the quarantine island, to name a few. Carceral spaces, moving beyond normative frameworks and knowledges which cements rigid dichotomies between inside/outside and (im)mobility, should be conceptualized as spaces which reach into, beyond, spill over, muddy, and “blur any socially and materially constructed boundaries” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 2; see also Turner, 2016). To borrow from actor-network theory, the carceral landscape could be conceived as “fibrous, thread-like, wiry, [and] ropy’ (Latour, 1997: 3). In this landscape, routes, courses and pathways that constitute carceral spaces are addressed in their own right through (im)mobility, rather than as interstices (Gill et al., 2016). To maintain fixed attributes and aspects of carceral spaces is to uphold an illusory image of immobility; a “visual trickery” of sorts (Peters and Turner, 2017: 2; Turner and Peters, 2016), which limits the possibilities of engagement to unlock new knowledges of (im)mobilization, as well as the degree to which (im)mobilizing carceral regimes (such as EM and other likeminded surveillant technologies) have extended into and proliferated within everyday spaces and places.

Furthermore, the circulation of people around the carceral space is occasionally substituted for, and complimented by the material circulation of objects (Schliehe, 2017; see also Turner and Peters, 2015). Within spaces of incarceration, detention, long-term captivity or relative mobility, these material objects link incarcerated individuals to their families, previous lives and legal supports, and positions these individuals within broader circuits of global forces which center on supply and demand, labour and exchange, and production and consumption (cf. Conlon and Hiemstra, 2014, 2016; Schiller, 2014). Such circuity of objects includes, but
is not limited to, “possessions, memos, letters, stamps, books and magazines, photographs, food items, toiletries, as well as packages and gifts that express emotional attachments and needs” (Gill et al., 2016: 5). As Michalon (2013: 50) notes, “[t]he spatial dimensions of confinement is not only a matter of fences” and this is exemplified in the case of EM. The surveillant technologies of the EM bracelet, the home monitoring unit (HMU) installed in the offender’s residence, the electronic ID badge worn by Guard 4 Securior (G4S) agents and the unmarked vehicles which they drive to such residences are examples of objects which circulate within the wider ‘surveillant assemblage’ (as discussed in subsequent chapters) and should be considered within the carceral circuitry of objects (cf. Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). EM regimes are predicated on complicit self-monitoring and self-management, simultaneously permitting and sentencing the monitored person “to take up their social responsibility and continue to fulfill their work-related and familial obligations” (should they have any) (Gill, 2013: 22), and exacerbating the dynamic and “often contradictory state of betweenness” that comes with experiencing community penalties (Baer and Ravneberg, 2008: 205). Therefore, the control and regulation of mobility between G4S agents and monitored persons works with other institutional processes to constitute the criminalizable ‘other’ as someone locatable, knowable, and pathological (for an example of how mobility is regulated and controlled within the juvenile court system, see Brown, 2017). By tracing the circuity of material objects through carceral spaces, not only can we gain insight into the social and cultural significance of ‘things,’ but we further interrogate the tightness with which carceral and surveillant authorities spatially restrictive various materials, populations, and territories (cf. Gill et al., 2017; Brown, 2017).

Finally, both carceral geography and carceral mobilities also require an attention to scale and reflection, two geographic tropes for understanding the operation and dissemination of power. The scales in which carceral mobilities operate—from national level-regimes that function to constrain and immobilize (such as the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC) based in Glasgow, Scotland and the NEMC’s strategies, policies and technologies to monitor offenders) to the local scale of movements within everyday spaces and places which feel carceral (such as the shifts in offender’s routines while undergoing EM, which (re)shape their lifestyles into pseudo-punishments). Although not intrinsically punitive, the ‘surveillant control’ of offenders is not an ethically or politically neutral capacity. Focusing on the carceral geographies and mobilities beyond the prison highlights the ways in which EM can be seen as fulfilling a ‘shadow’ state function of surveillance and governance, thereby
potentially being experienced as an extension of the ‘Panoptic’ functions of the prison, and relying upon compliance through “ethical self-steering mechanisms” (Rose, 2000: 321; see also Maddrell, 2017: 223). In its essence, the current forms of EM help to check that required restrictions are adhered to (cf. Nellis, 2006), and this can be done either through Radio Frequency (RF) or Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) systems. In either case, these technologies constitute a distinct form of surveillance, one that has enabled restriction in public and private spaces to become a meaningful punishment in ways that were not possible before (Nellis, 2006).

Conclusion

This chapter illustrates the interdisciplinary conversations surrounding the conceptualization of the ‘carceral.’ New comprehensions of space can be witnessed when we examine the possibilities the carceral can create for criminology, carceral studies, geography, and mobility research. While the debate ensues, it is clear that the experiences, practices and agency associated with carceral spatiality continues to increase, resulting in expansion, diversification and proliferation of strategies of control and coercion to which carceral conversations are attuned.

Thinking about the carceral has demonstrated that carceral geography is well suited to further interrogate EM and its associated surveillant technologies. Per Moran (2015b: 149), carceral geography “has already made substantial progress, has already established useful and fruitful dialogues with cognate disciplines [like] criminology and prison sociology, and is attuned to issues of contemporary import such as hyperincarceration and the advance of the punitive state.” Nevertheless, while the latitudes of carceral geography are vast, going forward there is still much more to examine beyond conventional associations of the carceral to the prison; the everyday spaces and places—and degrees of mobility between them—must be where we focus upon EM in greater detail. Arguably, to feel the carceral, yet not critique the nature of its presence, demonstrates the normative nature of the carceral age in which we find ourselves. Indeed, the societal spread of the carceral becomes a “great carceral network” which “reaches all the disciplinary mechanisms which function throughout society” (Foucault, [1977]/1995: 298). Such spread needs to be recognized as an embodied, imaginative experience, “with the capacity to co-produce the mundane and the symbolic” (Maddrell, 2017: 222; see also Maddrell, 2011, 2013). The carceral conditions to which allows EM its mundanity, banality and normativity needs to be redressed, and it is through
the current study that I shed light on the territoriality of EM’s carcerality. EM is part in parcel to this carceral system; reaching far beyond the prison, it both draws upon and exudes disciplinary control, and supplements the most “coercive technologies of behaviour” the carceral system can produce (Foucault, [1977]/1995: 293). Only by examining the mobilisation of the practices and performances of EM can we then become attuned to potential new ways of seeing and thinking about EM, and the interdigitations between EM, the carceral system, and society at large (cf. Gale et al., 2015: 7).

It is clear that academic scholarship has explored in great detail, but not likely exhausted, “the range and multiplicity of material, virtual and imagined spaces with which the carceral has been articulated” (Moran et al., 2017a: 14; italics emphasized). However, the carceral conversations witnessed in this chapter recognizes that my current study stands on scholarship that has come to form the bedrock of insightful carceral analyses. The carceral conditions of detriment, intention, and spatiality are not enough to fully appreciate the complexities of EM; we must also examine the territoriality at play within this technology. My study brings together the notions of the carceral and the territorial in order to analyze EM. As the next chapter articulates, EM, as a form of carceral territory, contributes to these carceral conversations, and it is through the societal spread of the carceral that we can continue to explore the material, virtual and imaginative aspects of territoriality imbued within this surveillant technology.
Chapter 4: Electronic Monitoring – A Case for Carceral Territory

Introduction

A critical appraisal of carcerality demonstrates how diverse scholarly conversations have become when conceptualizing the notion of the ‘carceral’. As I have indicated in prior chapters, electronic monitoring (EM) manifests as an explicit symbol of punishment for the individual while they remain within their home and community and a notion which is already explicitly discussed in literature addressing community sanctions, penalties, and alternatives to confinement (cf. Bottoms, 1995, 2001; Bottoms et al., 2004, Nellis, 2004, 2010, 2013a). However, what has eluded attention until now has been a scholastic exploration which interweaves together a critical appraisal of carcerality with the practices and experiences of EM.

Indeed, such an exploration further begs the question of how aspects of carcerality directly hook up with and connect to individual lives on the outside of traditional spaces of incarceration. If the carceral is more than a mere anchorage to the prison, as Moran and colleagues (2017a) suggest, then is it possible to explore aspects of carcerality within the private space of the offender’s home? What effect do these aspects have upon offenders and their routines and behaviours, family and friends? There exists a greater exploration of how EM, as one tool of the carceral regime, literally and legitimately territorializes spaces in the community to monitor offender compliance and its violations. EM is but one technological advancement of the government’s arsenal among many, which spreads the carceral beyond the anchorage of the prison and into the community spaces and places of everyday life. In doing so, a fuller discussion must be had in terms of how EM takes place—not only through its protocols and procedures (whether they be directly controlled through government or contracted out to the private sector, the latter being the case of G4S Scotland), but also through its manifestation in the physical residence of the offender.

This chapter makes a theoretical case for ‘carceral territory’ which I refer to here as the inscription and/or imposition of punishment upon the personal territories, routines and lifestyles of inmates and their loved ones. As a form of carceral territory, EM geographically spreads the carceral out into society, permeating the homes and residences of those it seeks to monitor and punish. In order to explore this notion, the chapter is structured as follows. First, the chapter will outline the significance of territory to the current study, drawing upon Sack’s (1981, 1983) and Brighenti’s (2006, 2007, 2010) respective research on territoriality. A
greater attention to territoriality may be the best strategy for exploring EM practices in Scotland, as it provides a fuller examination of how territory sutures the criminal justice system, the private sector, the offenders and those associated to offenders (i.e. family and friends) together, configuring a continuum of contact and control amongst a variety of actors through a particular space and place (i.e. a physical residence). Drawing upon Sack’s (1983) three primary territorial tendencies—classification, communication, and the enforcement of access—I endeavour to parse out a richer discussion of how these tendencies are essential to consider in order to conceptualize territory within and across the particular spaces and places of an offender’s everyday life. Next, I define and draw upon important aspects of space, place, and time, and reconsider their significance in relation to territory. Following this I make significant connections between territory and temporality, visibility, and surveillance, addressing how each interdigitates with territory. A common thread between visibility and surveillance is the recognition of the boundaries which delineate what can and cannot be made visible and/or surveilled, a topic of which I further discuss and analyze in greater detail. I then return to the question of time and space, examining the extent to which time and space—with further attention accorded to scale and jurisdiction—are necessary elements of territory, especially in terms of the ‘timespaces’ socially constructed within the carceral territory and the ‘timepass’ experienced by those subjected to EM conditions. In effect, I view carceral territory as an apt frame of reference to geographically contextualize EM alongside the embodied experiences of those whom are tasked with installation and maintenance of the EM system and those subjected to monitoring upon release from carceral spaces. A more capacious conception of how carceral territories are created, sustained, and perpetuated in the spaces and places of everyday life. In conclusion, I argue a focus on carceral territory is not limited to the geographical contexts and embodied, emplaced experiences of EM subjects; as a significant frame of reference, the originality of the notion has the potential to critically query the societal spread of the carceral, to make a meaningful contribution to existing carceral scholarship, and to provide a more robust understanding of alternative measures to confinement and community sanctions going forward.

‘Taking Place’: Talking about Territory

As Brighenti (2006: 65) contends, one of the main difficulties in talking about territory is that this concept is transversal to many different disciplines—geography, sociology, ecology, anthropology, and law, to name a few—all of which “assume to have a clear understanding of their own object. Consequently, the wide interest in territorial phenomena, territorial
dynamics, and territorial features paradoxically [fail] to generate an open debate on the topic.” Focusing on territory in a non-conventional way has the potential to problematize unstated assumptions about the realities of everyday life, while allowing us to remain open to different discourses and epistemic frameworks. A mainstream view of territory, commonsensical in the social, legal and political sciences, conceives the concept as “a portion of land under the authority and within the jurisdiction of a local or central agency” (Brighenti, 2006: 66). While Brighenti indicates that various disciplines have made important contributions to demystifying the traditional image of territory and reshaping our understanding of the nature of the relationship between territory and society, “the concept of territory underpinning numerous analyses, even by critical scholars, remains surprisingly naïve” (2006: 66).

Elden makes a similar assertion to Brighenti, insofar as Elden argues that although it is a central term within political theory, geography, and international relations, “the concept of territory has been underexamined” (2013a: 3; italics in original; see also Elden, 2013b). Rather than undertake a definitional task in attempting to bring all perspectives on territory into one coherent form—a fraught task which leads toward an impossible synthesis (cf. Brighenti, 2006, 2010)—territory should be explored here as a working concept, whose starting point “is not the question of what is territory in the first place” (Brighenti, 2006: 66; italics in original). Instead, we should begin to question what can be grasped by describing a series of relational phenomena rather than a series of objects as a territory, and what one can learn through relationships as a territorial endeavour. Therefore, to explore a constellation of attributes which can be predicated upon territory allows us to further address possible analytical traits of the territory concept. This shift from treating territories as “a priori givens” (Murphy, 2012: 159) to focusing on how territorial structures, practices and relationships coming into being and are maintained allow us to further question “what…territorial arrangements mean or represent, and how they function in relation to other geographical processes and practices” (Murphy, 2012: 159). Indeed, rather than accept the concept of territory as a hard fact which provides the visible support or backup of invisible social ties and relationships, understanding territory as a working and relative concept explores how every type of social tie and relationship “can be imagined and constructed as territorial” (Brighenti, 2006: 66-67; italics emphasized).

Of course, one remains mindful that not all territories are identical, and that territories differ dramatically in terms of degrees of their visibility. Nevertheless, if the most visible ones are
recognized as proper territories, then such visibility effects depend in part upon specific relational arrangements: “Only once relations among subjects, rather than space, are put at the conceptual core of territory, it becomes possible to capture the ways in which spatial and non-spatial territories are superimposed one onto the other and endowed with multiple reciprocal connections” (Brighenti, 2006: 67; see also Brighenti, 2010). In doing so, this relational conception strives to avoid reducing territory to mere space imbued with power, and highlights the dimension of power involved in and crucial to human interaction and relations.

Drawing upon this conception allows us to attend to two important points about territory: (1) the function of territory; and (2) territory as an imagined entity. The first point is that territory has fundamentally to do with functions, insofar as for both animals and humans, these functions are usually understood as control, defense, reproduction, and access to resources (cf. Brighenti, 2006, 2010). Second, territory as an imagined entity indicates a space which is “carved out, excerpted and circumscribed in view of a set of tasks to carry out” (Brighenti, 2006: 68), a point which has similarly been raised within geographical literature focusing on carceral spatiality (cf. Gill et al., 2016; Moran et al., 2015, 2017; Moran and Schliehe, 2017a, 2017b; Woolford and Gacek, 2016). Territory is not solely a physical setting whereby someone is recognized as an intruder or insider (or other equivalent qualification) to one’s territory; rather, such recognition and subsequent separation become what Brighenti (2006: 68) refers to as “two basic types of cospecifics”. In other words, this is what territory is all about; to be territorial(ized) is part and parcel to processes of inclusion and exclusion—as well as processes of (im)mobility and (in)visibility—in both the constitution and order of social groups (cf. Brighenti, 2007). Therefore, territory becomes relational, a type of intraspecific communication which recognizes dimensions of power and captures the superimposition of multiple relationships and interactions within its parameters. While such relationships and interactions are the product of how territories are imagined and constructed, we must further consider the strategic dimensions of power embedded within territory and particular tendencies associated with its functioning, a discussion of which I turn to next.

**Primary Tendencies of Territory**

Sack’s (1981, 1983) research on territorality has been considered one of the most fruitful theoretical reflections on territory as a crucial and strategic dimension of power (cf. Brighenti, 2006, 2007, 2010). Indeed, to conceive of EM within a carceral territorial
framework is to rightly draw upon such theoretical reflections. As will be discussed below, Sack’s (1983) ‘territorial tendencies’ or primary conditions of territory are significant to this study, as such tendencies enable us to comprehend the processes of both MOs and MPs all the while supplementing a further theorizing of the parallels between the ‘carceral’ and the ‘territorial.’

Rejecting naturalist determinism and reframing the question of territory as inherently political, Sack defines territoriality as “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (Sack, 1981: 19; see also Sack, 1983: 55). By making strategy a central concern, this point of view has the advantage of identifying crucial—yet often neglected—features, such as highlighting how territories may exist in degrees, and that they can be switched on and off according to strategic aims (Sack, 1981, 1983). In effect, such research foregrounds the potentially flexible and selective quality of territoriality. Of course, control of space is just one—albeit an important one—function among many territorial functions, and while different people live together within shared social patterns and institutions, they are territorialized on them. However, as Brighenti (2006: 69) indicates, these groups of people often interpret strategies and territories “in contradictory, controversial and even conflicting ways.” While a territorial framework may work towards full control within a territory’s parameters, such an ideal can never fully be accomplished, and no presumptions should be made regarding “one-to-one correspondence between as single territory and a single strategy” (Brighenti, 2006: 69).

Indeed, Sack argues that such correspondence will be along a continuum “from direct contact, which means touching, to degrees of indirect contact, from speaking face to face to transmitting information via electromagnetic waves” (1983: 56). He asserts that these forms of correspondence and contact remain predominantly contingent upon technological advancements, and while not explicitly referring to EM, it becomes clear that aspects of this continuum can be witnessed within the surveillant technology. EM involves a continuum of correspondence, from the radio frequency (RF) emitted from the tag and the home monitoring unit (HMU) installed in the home, which is then received by the EM systems located in the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC); the phone conversations between monitored persons (MPs)⁴ and monitoring officers (MOs); and the direct interactions between MPs and MOs.

⁴ Discussions with staff at the NEMC indicated that ‘MOs’ and ‘MPs’ are the terms they use to carry out monitoring services at G4S Scotland.
mobile MOs in the field when MOs engage in select visits with MPs whose statuses have changed in the EM system (for example, through an EM strap tamper or a breach in curfew, etc.). Therefore, we can see how the continuum of correspondence is significant to the configuration of the territorial process inside the MO’s physical residence; throughout the EM period, the interactions between MPs, MOs, and associated objects, spaces and places of restricted mobility are configured to ensure appropriate relationships and territoriality are established and maintained. In effect, territoriality becomes a means by which one can affect, influence, or control another, and gradations of territorializing (i.e. how one space or places exists as more territorial than others), much like gradations of carcerality, will rely upon the extension of action through a continuum of contact and its configuration within a particular spatial carrier. Per Sack (1983), regardless of the innumerable kinds of territoriality which exist in society, territoriality is always socially or humanly constructed and should be defined within a social context. While territoriality may exist in various forms, and will be contingent upon society’s “levels of hierarchies, forms of technology[,]… historical conditions and reasons for control,” the relationship between x and y will not exist within a territory unless specified by the definition to which we ascribe it (Sack, 1983: 57).

Given certain conditions, Sack argues that there are three predominant tendencies of territoriality which come to the fore: (1) classification; (2) communication; and (3) enforcing control. These three tendencies are not mutually dependent of each other, and have the ability to overlap and synergize in many ways. Nevertheless, Sack asserts that classification, communication, and enforcement of control “are by definition essential attributes of any territory. That is, all examples of territoriality would contain them. They are necessary and sufficient attributes of territoriality” (Sack, 1983: 58). The first territorial tendency is classification, in which territoriality classifies at least in part by area, rather than by type. For example, when we say that anything in this room (i.e. area) is ours, or is off-limits to you, we are classifying such as ‘ours’ or ‘not yours’ according to their location in space. As a result, it is not necessary to stipulate the kinds of things in place that are ours or not yours. To varying degrees, territoriality avoids the need for classification and enumeration by kind yet still allows one to assert control if one cannot enumerate all of the significant factors and relationships to which we have access.

The second territorial tendency is communication, which can be easily formed because it requires only one kind of marker or sign—the boundary. As discussed below, the boundary is an important aspect of territoriality, and in terms of communication, in most cases the
territorial boundary may be the only symbolic form that combines direction in space and a statement about exclusion or possession (Sack, 1983: 58). For example, the walls and door to my academic office physically demarcate the private space of my office from the more public spaces of the academic department corridor, communicating that which is my area for students to find me.

Finally, territoriality can be the most efficient strategy for enforcing control. In terms of the third tendency, enforcing control provides a means by which resources or things to be controlled are required to be distributed in a particular fashion through time and space and such distribution “falls somewhere between ubiquity and unpredictability” (Sack, 1983: 58). As Sack asserts, models of animal foraging demonstrate that territoriality is more efficient for animals “when food is sufficiently abundant and predictable in space and time whereas nonterritorial actions are more suitable for the converse situation” (1983: 58-59).

Taken together, these three tendencies are significant aspects to territory, as they provide a means of reifying power and potentiality. In other words, classification, communication, and enforcing order provide a structure to which actions, interactions and relationships between individuals, objects and space can develop and take place. In other words, by pointing out that territories may exist in degrees, and that they can be switched on and off according to strategic aims, Sack reimagines territory through not only one’s agency within a territory but their relations to others and the territory which surrounds and operates within and through them. Through the three territorial tendencies it becomes possible to witness polymorphic power relationships (re)shape within a formed territory, making the potential of power “explicit and real by making them ‘visible’” through the strategic, flexible and selective qualities of territoriality (Sack, 1983: 59).

However, Brighenti (2006) indicates that three critical observations can be made of Sack’s (1983) perspective of territoriality. The first observation is that while agency may be a significant factor in the establishment and maintenance of territory and the territorialisation process, no one-to-one correspondence between a single territory and a single strategy should be assumed. Rather, “a plurality of strategies, which may reinforce as well as conflict with each other, may characterize a single territory” (Brighenti, 2006: 69). Different people live together within shared institutions and social patterns, and while they all may be territorialized through the same process, they may all interpret territorialization in controversial, contradictory and even conflicting ways. Sack remains too preoccupied with
the correspondence between the individual and the territory and fails to recognize that there is power there is also resistance to power, and that even if it were possible to identify a hegemonic territorial strategy, the habituation of social groups in society is neither immune nor comes without resistance. As Brighenti (2006: 69) asserts, “[s]eldom, if ever, can control from a single agency upon patterns of social relationships be absolute. Consequently, the existence and proliferation of conflicting strategies need to be accounted for.” While a territorial framework may tend towards a strategy which is a harmonious ideal of homogeneity, it can never be fully accomplished through this ideal. As a result, Brighenti argues that perhaps it would be more preferable to say that control, not territory, happens in degrees, in order to begin to account for the plurality of strategies required to characterize territoriality.

Second, Sack appears too concerned with differentiating his own approach to territoriality from an ethological understanding, which according to his view is prone to biological determinism and reductionism (cf. Sack, 1983). However, Brighenti indicates that such a rejection of ethological insights or influences “entails the opposite risk of hyperrationalist anthropocentric exceptionalism” (2006: 70). Put differently, associating territory exclusively to the strategic dimension of human interaction suggests an “over-cognitivization” of the territorial experience to the detriment of human affectivity (Brigenti, 2006: 70). While significant to territory, strategy cannot account for the whole import of the territorial phenomenon; there is something to be said about the affective dimensions of territory—in other words, how it feels for territory to happen, occur, or take place. Territory breeds attachment and identification which, according to Brighenti, “humans happen to share with animals” (2006: 70). In effect, further exploration and territorial processes should be mindful of territory’s affectivity and to avoid both biological and sociological reductionism as an explanation for how a territory is formed and maintained.

Third and final, Brighenti argues that control “cannot be taken as the territorial redux” (2006: 70; italics in original). Put differently, the control of space is just one among the many functions of territory. While Sack (1983) rightly asserts that one can control a territory one does not occupy, his conclusion is ultimately still consistent with the thesis of the selective nature of territory, a notion advanced through biological and ethological perspectives which Sack argued to eschew (Sack, 1983: 55; Brighenti, 2006: 70). Examining territoriality then requires us to reconsider the intentions and power relationships behind territorial activations.
as control *per se* does neither fully account nor explain why, when and how select territories are activated.

Notwithstanding, Sack’s comprehensive approach to territoriality is important in terms of viewing territory as a product of human behaviour that needs to be further examined and explained. His territorial tendencies aptly demonstrate how a critical understanding of territoriality has “the advantage of…reifying power; of streamlining understandings, of depersonalizing certain relationships; of diverting attention away from power relations; of promoting spatial compartmentalization; of altering the relationship between people and things; and of promoting other forms of territoriality” (Murphy, 2012: 161). For Sack, territoriality is a phenomenon worthy of attention and analysis, as it is an important shaper of the social world in which we live and not solely a vehicle for recasting how human interaction is conceived and practised. Indeed, his approach is well suited to analyses of the human differentiated spaces of everyday life, as Sack’s territoriality “provides insight into how a particular system works—one with extraordinary implications for patterns of conflict, identity, and…exchange. As such, it [Sack’s approach] serves as a powerful tool for analysing structures and actions that are part of that system” (Murphy, 2012: 168).

**Boundaries and the Territorial**

Yet to talk about territory is to also analyze how boundaries become a constitutive prerequisite for territory. Territory cannot but be delimited, and as the current geographic literature articulates, the activity of drawing boundaries is significant for territory and its associated relationships (cf. Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017). Whether we are demarcating the shore from the ocean, the property parameter of a residence from the city street, or a separation line between two nation-states or between two children sharing the same bedroom, the activity of boundary-making demonstrates how territory is made through interactive imaginings. At times, boundaries may be implicit or explicit, visible or invisible, static or dynamic. While territory serves as an imaginary—but no less effective—prop for social relations, it is more than simply the *setting* for social interactions; the crucial dimension of power must be recognized to understand the processes of boundary-making. We must ask ourselves: who is drawing the boundaries, and what gives this entity the authority to draw? How are the boundaries delineated? What kinds of boundaries are being delineated? And finally, what is the purpose of delineating these boundaries (Brighenti, 2006: 70-72; see also Brighenti, 2010, Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017)? In effect, boundaries, imbued with
meaning, become the object of an ongoing work of enactment, reinforcement and negotiation, all of which can be “more or less effective, impressive, memorable, and affectively powerful according to specific circumstances” (Brighenti, 2006: 72).

Whenever a territory appears, the creation of a territory generates a basic discontinuity between the inside and the outside. New functions are created, pre-existed functions are reorganized, and each boundary delineation determines effects of deterritorialization and subsequent reterritorialization. These basic territorial operations generate and maintain an ongoing process and dialectical relationship of separation and fusion, with the two movements embedded into one another. Contemporary surveillance processes can serve as an example of de/re-territorialization, especially in terms of nation-state boundaries (Lyon, 2004). In a post-9/11 world, we have witnessed a deterritorialization of national boundaries of Western countries not because these countries are disappearing, but because of their multiplication across the globe (Lyon, 2004). The displacement of boundaries by way of de/re-territorialization is affected through a series of surveillant technologies which aim to control people preventatively and limit the mobility of people profiled as ‘posing a threat.’ In effect, ‘social sorting’ and profiling could be construed as forms of territorial reshaping (Lyon, 2001, 2003, 2004; see also Brighenti, 2006, 2010).

It is clear that territory can be imagined and drawn upon different aspects to serve several different functions in the pursuit of different ends. While functions may range widely, a common thread throughout is that in most cases, co-presence defines territory. Indeed, territories may vary in terms of the degrees to which tolerance, negotiation and spatial sharing occur, but it is not the complete denial of interaction. Territory exists as a “positive framework for interaction which requires interaction itself” (Brighenti, 2006: 75). Within a territory, exclusion and co-presence are two sides of the same coin; two opposing forces which come together to define the relational range of territory. In effect, the focus of territory is not exclusion from a particular area, but the creation of ordered social relations and co-presence, which are, in many cases, relations of dominance. It becomes an explicit display of superiority and submission which facilitates the making of hierarchies. By ‘anchoring’ the ownership of territory upon the co-presence and social relations within the territorial bounds, one entity will dominate and ‘possess’ the relationship over another, stabilizing patterns of relationships between the two (cf. Brighenti, 2006, 2010; see also Sack, 1981, 1983).
Such a focus can be witnessed in the practices and procedures of EM, insofar as the installation of the surveillant technology in a physical residence requires ordered social relations between those subjected to the monitoring (i.e. the offender) and those whom consent to its installation (i.e. family member, friend, or person of significance to the offender). Certain patterns are then stabilized within the territory between the pair as they regulate their movement according to the EM conditions outlined by G4S Scotland, and sanctions are imposed upon the offender when the conditions are contravened or breached. Co-presence exists within this physical residence until the consenter no longer authorizes the offender to remain within the physical residence, and as such relations of dominance and hierarchies are formed between the pair: should the offender no longer wish to remain at the residence or abide by the territorial conditions of the consenter, the consenter has the power to punish the offender by withdrawing their consent which ultimately recalls the offender back to court, prison, or both.

Therefore, while a demand for consensus surrounds the maintenance of territory, territorial relationships are not solely established and maintained through displays of dominance and aggression. The demand for respect “constitutes the consensual side of territorial relationships, a consensus which makes order-through-territory much more attainable” (Brighenti, 2006: 76). As a pivotal regulator social device, respect sets up “a visible stage for the taking place of the relationships” which are played out through interaction (Brighenti, 2006: 76; italics emphasized). In doing so, territory exists as a reminder of some form of past command, decree or proclamation which has gained both temporal stability and acceptance.

Recognizing and respecting boundaries are significant to the maintenance of territory, yet to make the case for carceral territory we must briefly consider how notions of space, place, and time connect the intimate realities and microcosms of offenders’ everyday lives to aspects of carcerality at large, as I demonstrate below. Doing so highlights the importance of the human experience of being within the social world, and the sociality inherent in within the practices associated with carceral territory.

Space, Place, and Time

As indicated in the prior chapter, the ‘spatial turn’ in academia provides thought-provoking empirical accounts of space and place and has generated insightful understandings of how social beings engage with the spaces and places of everyday life. However, notions like space, place, and time are multifaceted and nuanced concepts which can be defined in many
ways. As such, it is important at this point to clarify these terms to usefully apply them properly and appropriately to carceral territory going forward. *Space* and spatiality is the world around (an actor) in its pertinence to and involvement in human activity and understanding. Put differently, our world is involved in and pertinent to human activity—and the hermeneutics associated with such activity—in providing a platform for, and comprising entities that have places in, human activities. A *place* denotes the socio-spatial bounding of ideology and context to space, resulting in particular regularities and orders (cf. Cresswell, 1996; Sanscartier and Gacek, 2016). As Cresswell (1996) contends, places are static, insofar as relations and contexts are naturalized within them; things ‘are the way they are’ for individuals in all sorts of categories (wealthy, poor, men, women, elderly, youth, etc.) because places themselves do not physically change, at least not abruptly. A place is a place to perform a particular activity, and connecting one place to another in a set number of directions would be what are constituted as *paths*. As a person goes about their day, they proceed via an array of places and paths that both, in various degrees, reflect and determine their and others’ activities within the same day. Furthermore, places and paths are anchored to objects, and the physical entity at which a place or a path is anchored also yields the location in objective space where the path or place exists (cf. Schatzki, 2009). Finally, places and paths which converge, overlap, and/or intersect with one another form *settings*, which interlock with other settings and form *locales* or regions. As Schatzki (2009: 37) indicates, which settings, locales and regions that exist in a particular geographical area “depends on the physical arrangements that exist [in the area] and what practices are carried on amid or in relation to those arrangements.”

Time is an essential dimension of territories, and understanding territory as a socially constructed and imagined relationship implies appreciating its processual and temporal dimension. Territories are created, reproduced and terminated according to temporal periods, rhythms and cycles (Brighenti, 2006; see also Lefebvre, 1992). Arguably, one point in history which initiated the turn from pre-modernity to the modern era was the establishment of ‘clock’ time (i.e. time which is both homogenous and desacralized). To understand the temporal experience of routine, one must be mindful of the various temporalities which exist alongside of modernity’s clock time. In a sense, everyday life is a “polyrhythmic ensemble” of competing and overlapping rhythms, and that the most central conflict and imbrication is between “the linear rhythms of rationalized modernization and the cyclical rhythms of nature” (Highmore, 2004: 322). As Lefebvre and Régulier contend, the victory that clock
time possessed over cyclical temporal experiences changed how modern societies viewed
their organization and pace of life:

[Once clock time] became the time of the everyday, [it] subordinat[ed] other
aspects of daily life to the spatial organization of work: times for sleeping and
waking, times for meals and private life, relationships between adults and
children, entertainment and leisure, relationships in the home. However, everyday
life is shot through and cut across by the larger rhythms of life and the cosmos:
days and nights, months and seasons, and more specifically still, biological
rhythms. In everyday life, this results in constant interaction between these
rhythms and repetitive processes[. ] (1985: 190)

Furthermore, the body can and should be seen in terms of its relations to biological and social
arenas, and as the locus and seat of these interactions, the body becomes subjected to various
spatio-temporal experiences and rhythms (Lefebvre and Régulier, 1985: 196). In effect,
disturbances such as stress, frustration and involuntary memory have the ability to “poke
holes in the smooth surface of the present[,]” reminding us that time remains a series of
consistent and continuous instantaneous moments of which our body attempts to attune to
such rhythms and routines (Highmore, 2004: 325).

Finally, in terms of time and territory, territories are rhythmic, insofar as they can be
observed through the lens of their specific rhythmic constitution. For example, public spaces
such as desks in classrooms or libraries or tables at restaurants are only temporally
appropriated by some people according to an implicit norm (cf. Goffman, 1963, 1972). The
effects of territory through time is similar to the temporal dimensions of the ‘carceral’
inasmuch as the detriment and pains perceived through territorial effects can persist long after
actual territory has been terminated (Moran et al., 2017a). Therefore, the duration of these
types of territorialization become intimately linked to the type of activity that is considered
legitimate within the given context, such as the activities one is expected to perform while
seated on a bus versus in a theatre, at a restaurant table, in a classroom, and so forth.

Per Schatzki (2009), when social theorists and laypeople alike refer notions like to ‘time’ and
‘space’ they typically mean objective time and objective space. Objective time and space are
notions conceived of as features of reality that persist independently from human activity and
understanding. While human activity and understanding can comprehend or affect objective
times and spaces, however, what they can comprehend or affect exists independently of the
activity or understanding. Furthermore, a key feature of objective reality is succession: that is,
whenever instants or events occur one after another, there is succession which can be
established in a chronological fashion. Taken together, Schatzki argues that most social
theorists who consider time and space examine either time or space—in other words, time and space are taken to be separable matters, between which only contingencies exist in their relations: “Social theory is replete with accounts of either… time or…space that mostly ignore or elide the other phenomenon” (Schatzki, 2009: 36).

However, the last several decades have witnessed a variety of theorists analyzing space-time, such as Hägerstrand (1975), Parkes and Thrift (1980), Giddens (1984), Ingold (2002), Castells (1996), Harvey (1996), and Lefebvre (2004). While a full reconsideration of these scholars’ respective accounts of space-time is beyond the scope of the project, Schatzki (2009) is quite right to contend that when such theorists are taken into consideration together there are two particular features which characterize these accounts of space-time. First, these social theorists typically, though not always, consider and treat space-time as an objective phenomenon; and second, they always treat space-time as “a conjunction of space and time conceived of as separable phenomena;” that is, as phenomena that is not intrinsically related to one another (Schatzki, 2009: 36). In so doing, these social theorists consider space-time as an entity which is not unified, as this conception of space-time solely embraces contingent connections between spatial and temporal phenomena, or between the spatial or temporal properties of social phenomena (Schatzki, 2009).

In a similar vein to Schatzki (2009), I have no qualm with such considerations of space-time as an objective phenomenon or as a phenomenon which generally connects space and time into an inseparable entity. However, it is the exclusivity of the contingent connections which bind phenomena where I raise concern, much like how Schatzki (2009) has similarly problematized. Such a configuration of space-time may not fully grasp, or significantly reduces, the tentative, interwoven instants and moments required to imbue meaning into human activity and understanding. Social life, and the meaning we attach or associate our experiences within it, relies upon both contingently related and objective spatial and temporal properties and phenomena. Arguably, there exists a duality between objectivity and subjectivity within our understanding of the space-time connection; a need to theorize both time and space from either an objective or a subjective lens of scrutiny that can be upheld through empirical validation. Yet what must be further grasped, as Schatzki (2009) contends, is how our comprehension of space-time not only centers on temporal and spatial properties of phenomena, but the contexts and meanings which flow in, out, alongside and interweave together.
To grasp the spatial and temporal properties of social life is to both embrace and emphasize the sociality of the space-time connection. As Schatzki (2009: 36) argues, social life possesses significant attributes of social space-time, of which he refers to as “timespace.” While the objective time-space connection may be more noticeable than timespace, timespace is, arguably, at least as essential to understanding human activity and the hermeneutics of meanings imbued within society as the former, if not more so. Indeed, “interwoven timespaces are fundamental to human society” (Schatzki, 2009: 36). Human activity institutes and thus bears a timespace “whose temporal and spatial dimensions are connected inherently—and not contingently as with objective space-times[,]” and as a result, social life then amalgamates timespace with objective space-time and forms “a temporalspatial spatial-temporal phenomenon” (Schatzki, 2009: 38).

Carceral institutions have also been associated with such fundamental and interwoven timespaces in terms of two figurative senses of time, space, and place: (1) the deaths among incarcerated and detained individuals (euphemistically, the ‘passing on’ of prisoners, offenders and detainees) (cf. Glamser and Cabana, 2003; Hooper, 2009; Erfani-Ghettani, 2015); and (2) the slow passage of time in prison (cf. Jeffrey, 2010; Conlon, 2011; Mountz, 2011). The second figurative sense of timespace is of greater interest here, as prison scholars have long recognized the pains associated with the passing of time in prison. However, what characterizes contemporary carceral systems is a new type of relationship between carceral institutions and time. Carceral time, or the impact of ‘doing time’ (Jewkes, 2005, 2013; Moran, 2012a; Moran et al., 2013) suggests that those incarcerated or detained lack the ability to control their time in terms of their ‘biological clock’—indicating their lack of control over the aging process—and the length of sentences offenders will receive post-conviction, which slowly passes by as these individuals endure the carceral space (Moran, 2012a; see also Cope, 2003). Such endurance can be also understood as ‘timepass,’ which refers to the institutionalized disposal of time (cf. Jeffrey, 2010). Timepass is the organized warehousing of sections of the global population which have been forced to wait purposefully on the margins of developed economies in prisons, detention centres, camps, and slums in response to global political-economic conditions. As Gill and colleagues (2016: 8) contend, the calibration of carceral space to accommodate the institutionalized disposal and/or wastage of time, over and above aspirations to reform, rehabilitate or even punish the incarcerated, has become “a hallmark of the neoliberal carceral landscape.” In effect, the continuation of timepass, coupled with the wastage of human life within carceral institutions, demands
further attention from carceral and surveillance scholarship alike. There exists an urgent need to address how “surplus populations” are treated as “disposable,” considered “expendable,” and are ultimately rendered “stagnant” within postmodern society (Tyner, 2013: 701-708).

In sum, notions of space, place, and time are essential to theoretical case for carceral territory. Taken together, they supplement a more nuanced understanding of how social beings generally and offenders specifically are caught within and part in parcel to the spatial and temporal properties of social life. Emphasizing such timespaces also attunes to how carceral regimes embrace aspects of timepass, and the extent to which timespaces and timepass are, much like the carceral, carried out beyond the anchorage to the prison. However, to reconsider carceral territory and make a case for it further requires us to reconsider the significance of visibility for surveillance, a notion which is key to EM as a first and foremost surveillant technology. Such a discussion is one which I turn to next.

**The Significance of Visibility for Surveillance: Seeing and Searching Territory**

As Brigenti (2007) asserts, visibility is a complex phenomenon which lies “at the intersection of the two domains of aesthetics (relations of perception) and politics (relations of power)” (Brighenti, 2007: 324; italics in original). Indisputably, vision has become a sense of power, or perhaps, a sense which confers a sense of power (Brighenti, 2007: 328). The theoretical stake for social scientists in interpreting visibility is not finding one way to meaningfully talk about paintings, landscapes, films, figurative images and so forth; visibility is both a metaphor for knowledge and “a real social process in itself” which must be examined in greater detail (Brighenti, 2007: 325). In an ideal natural setting, the general rule is that if I can see you, then you can see me, and vice versa. However, as Brighenti (2007: 325) argues, things are never that simple:

The relation of visibility is often asymmetric; the concept of intervisibility, of reciprocity of vision, is always imperfect and limited. In military strategy, it is well known that when I am on the peaks of the mountain and you are down in the valley, I can easily track your movements for hundreds of miles around, but you can track my movements only in a much more limited way. Complex and less complex technological devices, from curtains to stone walls, from video cameras to satellites, enhance visible asymmetries according to planned arrangements, liberating it from the spatial-temporal properties of the here and now…The relational aspect of visibility points precisely to the fact that asymmetries and distortions of visibility are the norm, vis-à-vis the exception of perfect intervisibility.
In effect, asymmetries transform visibility into a site for strategy. Similarly, Goffman (1971) explored this notion with a central concern towards relations of visibility as they intersect and overlap with perceptions of danger. He demonstrated that normalcy represents a state of invisibility of the environment; put simply, in the lack of cautionary or alarm messages, the environment exists in a ‘transparent’ state to the observer it surrounds (cf. Goffman, 1971). Building on this difference between an observer being at ease versus being alarmed, it then becomes possible to understand the characteristics of normal as those of the invisible: “the normal is unmarked, unnoticed, unthematized, untheorized” (Brighenti, 2007: 326). As we will see in subsequent chapters, the commonsense and commonplace characteristics of EM attests to the normalcy (and arguably, legitimacy) of the practice by both EM operators and offenders, transforming (in)visibility into a site for control and maintenance of carceral territory.

However, while Goffman explored visibility from the origin of the individual, Brighenti (2007) argues that there exist other flows of power at work within the relations, asymmetries and distortions of visibility. When a transformation in reciprocal visibilities occurs, it becomes imperative to question who is acting on and reacting to the properties of the field of visibility, and which specific relationships are being shaped and managed. In other words, to question when something or someone becomes more or less visible than before is to examine the work of shaping and managing visibility, and to critique “what is worth being seen at which price—along with the normative question of what should and what should not be seen” (Brighenti, 2007: 327). Such questions are inherently practical and political, and not simply a matter of technique.

Visibility is closely tied to recognition, but it is not linked to recognition in a linear, straightforward way. Thresholds of visibility come into play here; a minimum and a maximum of what Brighenti (2007: 330) refers to as “fair visibility”. Below the threshold, one becomes socially excluded; such invisible subjects could be discursively constructed, for example, as the populations who inhabit ghettos and slums around the world. Advanced neoliberalism has lead to the rise of new and invisible forms of poverty, constructing these people into categories of unseen, excluded populations (cf. Brighenti, 2007). Conversely, above the threshold, one enters into a zone of “supra-visibility, or super-visibility, where everything you do becomes gigantic to the point that it paralyzes you” (Brighenti, 2007: 330). Media representations of criminals is an example of supra-visibility, in which these forms of moral panic are selectively focused onto actors deemed to be representative of immoral or
deviant populations. In effect, one’s positioning behind or beyond the thresholds of fair visibility raises concerns for the management of one’s social image in one’s own terms. Seeing and being seen simultaneously affects the observed and the beholder, and once we understand how recognition is embedded within visibility, new ways of framing old problems open up.

The mixing of visible and invisible human relations is a significant dimension of assessing sites, subjects and effects. As Brighenti contends, some sites and subjects are more visible than others: “Because sites and subjects interact relationally, social effects of visibility depend on who is more visible in which site. Effects of one’s visibility feed back from and to effects in one’s visibility” (2007: 331; italics in original). To an extent, visibility “curdles” into representations, insofar as representations, in the absence of dissonant messages, tend to settle down and stabilize themselves; those who have a voice in the production of representations, in effect, have access to these sites and places of invisibility (Brighenti, 2007: 333). More precisely, the styles and modes of access become significant to consider as well; it is not simply true or enough to say that if I am disempowered or an outsider in society, then I am invisible. Rather, it becomes necessary to question when and how I access such sites and places of visibility, and in ways they have become areas largely or completely outside of my control; the extent to which my access is broadened or limited within these areas, and to which others are accorded access to these areas as well.

The issue of access to the sites, places and territories of visibility arise issues of identification (cf. Brighenti, 2006). Visibility breeds identification and makes seen and being seen possible. Of course, surveillance is an activity that goes through a procedure of individual identification and is also aimed at social classification of people. Surveillance operates to individually identify the subject(s) to which we have been instructed to watch. At the same time, however, the procedures of surveillance function to construct and classify categories which delineate ‘safe’ subjects from the ‘dangerous’ while we watch (Brighenti, 2007: 333). If we accept that deviance is a relational moral quality (cf. Durkheim, 1982), then under surveillance a deviant action exists only if it is framed on a visible threshold of moral difference. Therefore, visible and invisible social acts depend upon how and which subjects act in which places. Through surveillance, visibility can be a double-edged sword: it can be empowering as well as disempowering (Brighenti, 2007; see also Smith, 2004, 2008, 2014, 2016). Researchers of surveillance and the technologies of control have explored this kind of effect (cf. Ball, 2005; French and Smith, 2016; Haggarty and Ericson, 2000, 2006; Haggarty

Per Brighenti, such a means of control is a reason why “surveyed people, insofar as they cannot look back and they cannot establish any eye-to-eye contact, always look suspect to a certain extent, if not culpable, for the very fact of being looked at one-way in a mode of surveillance” (2007: 337). Inherent in the one-way gaze is a kind of dehumanization of the observed, which illustrates another pervasive issue with surveillance, insofar as its non-reciprocal gaze leads to a qualitatively different way of seeing. This is evidenced within EM practices, insofar as installation of the EM within a physical residence only requires one instance of eye-to-eye contact (i.e. the G4S Scotland MO and the MP). Throughout the period of EM, the only contact made between MOs and MPs are between the home monitoring unit (HMU) and its attached telephone. This kind of dehumanization can influence how one interacts with the other on the phone, especially in terms of how the offender makes sense of G4S Scotland surveillance as they undergo the monitoring themselves.

Furthermore, the pervasiveness of contemporary surveillance reveals more than subjects being seen or watched; it operates complex activities focused upon the tracking of information. By relying upon advanced technologies, surveillance has become more abstract then ever before, tracking flows of information as the crux of contemporary surveillant technologies (cf. Lyon, 2001, 2004). Surveillance is no longer interested in solely watching people; instead, surveillance has focused upon tracking movements and information (including but not limited to people, choices, money, customs, and so forth). Deleuze (1990) first spoke of a transition from a disciplinary society to a ‘society of control,’ in which enclosed institutions and their logic are superseded by new formations. A new scenario was established: the corporation replaced the factory, a new being called the ‘dividual’ replaces the individual, and the concept of the ‘password’ becomes the central tool of control and access, which enables surveillance agencies to differentially regulate access (and its denial) for specific subjects into specific sites and places (cf. Deleuze, 1990). In effect, the whole process shifts from a focus on people to a focus on codes, texts, and surveillant system statuses and updates. This is further evidenced in EM practices by MOs, insofar as the
telephone call made to MPs is a minimal amount of communication which humanizes the surveillant technological process; often times, shift changes between MOs, and the associated paperwork of the MP they are watching, means that an MO could be more readily knowledgeable of the ‘dividual’ than the individual they may have to speak to on the telephone.

Drawing from the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), Haggarty and Ericson (2000) move beyond Foucault’s disciplinary society to describe an assemblage which consists of a “multiplicity of heterogeneous objects, whose unity comes solely from the fact that these items function together, that they ‘work’ together as a functional entity” (Haggarty and Ericson, 2000: 607). This type of mixed network-like control—referred to as a ‘surveillant assemblage’—has a composite central-and-polycentric character, functioning from above as well as from below. According to Haggerty and Ericson (2000: 607) the surveillant assemblage is “part of the state form” but that one should not confuse this form with those “traditional apparatuses of governmental rule studied by political scientists.” Rather, the state form seeks to create “bounded physical and cognitive spaces and introduces processes designed to capture flows to ‘striate the space over which it reigns’” (Haggarty and Ericson, 2000: 608; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 385). At the same time, an ‘actuarial gaze’ emerges, a “structural visual regime of threat perception” which crosscuts politics, public safety concerns, geographical planning, media, and so forth (Brighenti, 2007: 337).

The view from above remains, however, the dominant image of control, yet the concept of assemblage allows us to conceive how diverse surveillance practices, institutions and knowledge systems enter into relationships and interact to make visible and knowable many aspects of social life, while simultaneously installing mechanisms of governance and identity (cf. Hier, 2003; Brighenti, 2007; Murphy and Anderson, 2016). The assemblage is characterized by relations of exteriority, by which independent components join and interact, but also exist independently, separate and destabilize over time (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Therefore, power “can be conceived as a form of external visibility (visibility of effects) associated with internal invisibility (invisibility of identification)” (Brighenti, 2007: 338). In other words, the effects of power are visible to everyone, but what power is in its essence, where it is really located, will not be disclosed. Indeed, the installations of EM equipment occurs all across Scotland in hundreds of different flats, houses, and physical residences, and while these individual territories are constructed and maintained by individual offenders, where the power is really located is not so readily disclosed; while some MPs may believe it
is G4S Scotland monitoring them, others could believe it is the government watching them in their homes. While some MPs may believe that the MO on the phone with them has the power to recall the MP back to court or prison for breaching EM conditions, others could believe that the staff are just ‘doing the job,’ working within a hierarchy where their superiors are those with such power. In effect, asymmetries of visibility exist as asymmetries of power in a further meaning besides that of surveillance: “it is the style in which seeing and being seen take place that carries the most important consequences” (Brighenti, 2007: 339; italics emphasized). The exercise of power is always an exercise in activating selective (in)visibilities, and while secrecy “lies at the heart of power,” it also lies at the core of the possibility of escaping and opposing power (Canetti, 1973: 253).

**Territory: A Question of Space?**

According to Brighenti (2006: 79), there is an inherent value in examining territory as more than space itself, as “to describe territory as a piece of land is, so to speak, one misses the whole picture”; while the carrier is hardly irrelevant, the carrier is not the sole mechanism which gives the territory ascribed within it meaning. While it is important to note that not all physical spaces are territories, and not all territories are spaces, territory is more than a simple region of land which demarcates the geopolitical location of nation-states and countries, nor is it merely space with a function. As similarly indicated in Chapter 3, the carceral can be more than mere spatiality; the practice of space’s division and administration is one of the most powerful ways of creating and maintaining social order, and while space can be described “as a capacity to host and to become the recipients of objects and relations, territory can be best understood as a relationship in itself, which may subsist even without any spatial dimension” (Brighenti, 2006: 79; italics in original).

This is not to deny the existence of fundamental spatial constraints to human inaction; indeed, space remains the most visible territorial carrier, and while notions like the ‘carceral’ and the ‘territorial’ have the potential to be aspatial, we cannot presume that aspatiality is the most appropriate for one individual or group’s maintenance of authority or power over another (cf. Brighenti, 2006, 2010). Indeed, there exists ways of living non-spatial experiences and relations that are territorial just as there are ways of living spaces that are not territorial: “The persistent difference between territory, on the one hand, and the space it occupies and the places in which it manifests, on the other hand… entails the recognition that there can be more than one territory in the same place” (Brighenti, 2006: 79-80; italics in original). For
example, while G4S Scotland may install an HMU into the physical residence of an offender, the offender may have personal territories within the residence itself which establish their domain or co-presence with those that share the space. Understanding territories as mutually exclusive is an oversimplification of the reality in which territories find themselves; in practice, territories are constantly coexistent, merged, and stratified one onto another within (more than) one spatial carrier. And while the possibility exists for both the carceral and the territorial to be aspatial, it is clear that in terms of EM, regardless of how they manifest, the carceral and territorial require a visible spatial carrier to take place; put differently, an anchorage point within which one may imbue meanings, experiences and relationships with spatiality. This anchorage point, coupled with spatiality, can be then recognized through visibility and surveillance. In effect, to talk of carcerality and territoriality in the case of EM is to render it legible through a spatial context, and it is through diverse measures of visibility and surveillance that such anchorage points, especially within the intimate geographies of the home, can be established.

Like visibility, scale is also a pivotal variable which appreciates the relational features of territory (cf. Marston, 2000; Brighenti, 2006, 2007, 2010). Scale matters in both practical security enterprises and in our analyses of these activities (Valverde, 2014: 385). While the rule of thumb associates larger scale with higher visibility, Brighenti argues that this correlation is not always valid: “Rather than simply large-scale ones, the most visible territories are the institutionalized ones” such as the nation-state, the city, and public spaces for civilians (2006: 80; italics in original). In addition to these institutionalized territories, EM and its associated surveillance complex provides a strong example of such territorialization. Similar to the above territories, which lie along a clear continuum ranging from micro- to macro-level organization and social ordering, more challenging, less intuitive territories—which incorporate objects, rituals and culture worlds—can also be considered. While they may vary in visibility, surveillance systems and technologies are certainly institutionalized (and non-intuitive) examples of territorialization, insofar as tracking and identifying people through relational databases gives shape to strategies for territorializing (i.e. including, differentiating, and providing access to) and de/re-territorializing (i.e. excluding, isolating, and denying access to) people (Brighenti, 2006: 81-82; see also Lyon, 2001, 2003; Haggerty and Ericson, 2000, 2006).

However, scale is more than the amount of space that is included in either the actual security project at hand or in our analysis. Temporality is also scalar, as a particular temporality (i.e.
the retrospective reconstruction of a crime that took place in the past) may have a particular spatialization (Valverde, 2014) and as such we should be mindful of the multi-scalar analyses of territory. G4S Scotland currently uses an RF-based EM system, which requires the MOs to retroactively reconstruct breaches or technical violations of curfews. Simultaneously, the EM system is part and parcel to the crime prevention work which G4S undertakes; while crime prevention work typically looks to the future rather than the past, it also encompasses an indefinite series of possible future events which takes on broader temporalities and spatialities in scope (Valverde, 2014: 386). While the space to be secured in crime prevention may be relatively small (i.e. the physical residence of the tagged offender under an EM curfew), the project to monitor the whole of the space alongside a series of other spaces across a series of communities in Scotland suggests a larger multi-scalar organization of EM at the institutional, national and local levels. Scalar effects shade into jurisdiction, and as Valverde (2014: 386-87) contends, there are “important jurisdictional divides in non-state or informal systems of governance, which means that those interested in informal social control and extra-state security should therefore include jurisdiction into their analyses.” However, as Valverde (2014) reminds us, jurisdiction should not be conflated with spatial scale; while the latter encapsulates many spaces, persons and issues to consider, the former designates the ‘who’ and ‘how’ of governance—namely, who is the authority over the jurisdiction and how they will govern within the bounds of the jurisdiction.

Similar to carceral regimes, territories can become instruments of social sorting, and coupled with surveillance the territorial imaginary reveals complex connections between territory, populations, government, and sovereignty over, within, and through space (cf. Foucault, 2007). For example, at the core of ‘governmentality,’ the practice of “[the] disposition of men and things towards the realization of specific aims,” Foucault examined how the governmental state is not so much focused upon territory per se, but on populations, security apparatuses and the discursive knowledge used to govern populations (Foucault, 2007: 87). While Elden (2007) argues that most of what Foucault says about territory specifically is at best misleading, Brighenti (2006) interprets Foucault as taking territory in its intuitive understanding, insofar as Foucault examined and criticized the centrality of territory within the definition of sovereignty (cf. Foucault, 2007). Per Brighenti, once we progress towards a more radically relational concept of territory and its functions and features, it becomes clear that what keeps sovereignty and government together is territory: “The link between sovereignty and government is indeed the territorial relationship par excellence. In order to
work properly, government needs to territorialize a given population on its own framework of sovereignty” (Brighenti, 2006: 78; italics in original).

Conversely in Foucault’s account, the link between sovereignty and government is precisely the aim that disciplines help to achieve, and that in any case, what counts is not the place *per se*, but the relationship amongst people built throughout and even beyond it (cf. Foucault, 2007). Nevertheless, it is clear that territory “needs to *take place*” insofar as that in order to be, territory needs to be somewhere (Brighenti, 2006: 83; italics in original). We must recognize that this dimension of *taking place* not only exists within the constitutive tension between scale, visibility and space, but through surveillant technologies, systems, law, and the responses and responsiveness between individual and groups. Such movements and processes of territorialization and de/re-territorialization are embedded into one another in the form of differences and repetitions (cf. Fitzpatrick, 2001). While differences are the variations in how territory takes place (and how one responds to it), repetitions are the extensions or reoccurrence of territory taking place. Taken together, differences and repetitions determine the territorialization of people, populations, and spaces.

**Electronic Monitoring: A Form of ‘Carceral Territory’?**

So far this chapter has outlined the relational aspects of territory, centring on significant attributes which shape territory such as space, place, time, visibility, and surveillance. Drawing upon the influences of cognate disciplines, it is clear that to theorize EM is to look beyond the geographic conventions of space as physical carrier and territory as demarcated landscapes, and to consider whether a case can be made to examine EM territorially. Analyzing the ‘compliance work’ of both monitored persons (MPs) and monitoring officers (MOs) through a geographic lens reveals a potential to look beyond the carceral spaces typically associated with the criminal justice system (i.e. police detention, the jail cell, the prison, etc.); there exists a territoriality of monitoring compliance for both MPs and MOs, a focus which must be brought to the forefront of discussions, debates and disciplines which centre upon how the carceral is defined and produced in everyday life.

Human territoriality is a vast, yet often neglected, facet of human behaviour. Instead of simply reducing it to biological drive or instinct, I draw upon aspects of Sack’s (1981, 1983) research to theorize how EM, through processes of creating and maintaining a territory, are significant to strategies for influence and control, particularly exerted from carceral systems. While I realize that not all territories exude aspects of carcerality, there is an inherent worth...
in examining EM as a ‘carceral’ territory, considering and drawing upon Moran and colleagues’ (2017a) conditions of carcerality. Taken together, the territorial tendencies and carceral conditions of EM provides a robustly theoretical perspective for future carceral conversations.

EM is a unique form of territorially, one which is gaining momentum in tandem with and alongside other techniques and technologies of confinement within the “new carceral project” witnessed in the West (Mincke, 2017: 237). While the conventional carceral project “is to detain and immobilise people behind walls as a form of retaliation for the crimes they committed[,]” the new carceral project, which has expanded in the last several decades to include community sanctions, is based upon “mobility as a value in itself” (Mincke, 2017: 237; italics emphasized). While territory typically establishes differential access to things, places and people through mobility, time and space, a carceral territory includes the added enforcement of a temporal and pseudo-spatial zone of carcerality which permeates the MP’s private residence, indicating both the proximity (i.e. how far I can move away from the HMU) and duration (i.e. when the curfew is enforced, and how many weeks/months I must wear the EM ankle tag) of confinement.

However, what makes the territoriality created by EM ‘carceral’? As a unique form of territoriality, EM requires the active participation of humans in order for the territory it imposes to be imagined, constructed, and sustained. It is through an MP’s fixed personal space and private property that a carceral territory is established, one which superimposes the intentions of a carceral system upon the MP’s domain (i.e. house, flat, or permanent residence in the community). In this sense, punishment is not the physical confinement of prison walls or absolute immobilization per se, but the regulation of the MP through legitimated participatory confinement. The ends are more significant than the means, so to speak; the reasons behind an offender’s compliance matter less so long as the curfew and territorial bounds of the EM technology are enforced, maintain and co-produced between MP and MO.

It is the creative carceral extension by the state into the community and into the lives of offenders and their families where the measures of EM programmes creates self-monitoring subjects in concert with long distance social control, self-discipline, and punishment over a broad geography (cf. Garland, 1996, 1997, 2001; Rose, 2000). Indeed, such measures can coerce, restrain, and potentially “immobilise the lived time and spatial freedoms” of the offender’s everyday (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 44; see also Brown, 2014; Gutiérrez
Rivera, 2017; Maddrell, 2017; Moran et al., 2012). The movement encompassed within EM should also be construed as forms of ‘carceral mobilities’; as we will see in subsequent chapters, the rational and technical means of governmental (or private security) control over offenders’ spaces in the community generally and the personal territories of the home specifically speaks to forms of mobility inherent in the process of carceral territory-making.

Finally, the continuation of timepass in the personal territories of offenders’ lives reifies carceral territory. The calibration of the home (now a pseudo-carceral space under EM conditions) legitimizes the disposal or wastage of time, ultimately renders these marginalized populations further stagnant in a world that is forever ‘on the move’ (cf. Cresswell, 2006). Carceral territory is taking place by putting punishment and offenders in place; rendering these individuals stagnant is a punishment with which they must endure, a punishment one can readily view from conventional carceral spaces (Jeffrey, 2010; Moran, 2012a). In doing so carceral territory becomes another promise of the “neoliberal carceral landscape” (Gill et al., 2016), a promise which ensures that calibrating the residence in this way will ensure the state can extend its penal arm and impose a punishment upon the offender, even while they remain in their community. This promise also imposes further pains on the offenders associated with the passage of time beyond their control. The passage of time in the home becomes an endurance test, one which the offender must fill their time with activities to cope with the pains of being rendered and feeling stagnant or ‘stuck’ (see Chapter 8) in a world which is passing them by.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the possibilities opened by the shift in our understanding of territory “from object to relationship” (Brighenti, 2006: 84; italics emphasized). Indeed, as Elden (2013a: 18) makes clear, territory contains a mixture of elements that are constantly under construction and negotiation: “Territory is not simply an object: the outcome of actions conducted toward it or some previously neutral area. Territory is itself a process, made and remade, shaped and shaping, active and reactive.” In doing so Sack’s (1981, 1983) approach to territoriality provides a framework of considerable usefulness and importance, “as long as we are cognizant of the conditions under which the framework can be expected to provide explanatory insight” (Murphy, 2012: 170; italics emphasized). Viewing territory as a process reminds us to query the extent to which the reach of the carceral state can grasp or touch the lives of the marginalized, incarcerate, or both, and whether this reach coalesces or conflicts
with the personal territories of their lives. A case for carceral territory suggests that we can view carcerality manifesting directly into individual’s lives on the outside of carceral spaces.

In varying degrees, carceral regimes hinge on mobilities—that is, the perceived need to govern mobilities through the processes and control of how, where and when offenders can and cannot move through spaces and places. The geographical turn to carceral mobilities has enabled “a deeper socio-spatial understanding of how everyday spaces are governed, creating…spaces of semi-confinement” through acts, practices and mechanisms of self-monitoring (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 54). As this chapter has demonstrated, the inscription of punishment upon the personal territories, routines and lifestyles of inmates and their loved ones indicates how EM, as a form of carceral territory, spreads the carceral out into society. By inscribing and/or imposing punishment within the personal territories of offenders’ lives and impeding their routines and lifestyles, the presence, proliferation and expansion of EM is an appropriate example of the way in which we can view and recognize the spread of the carceral beyond the mere anchorage of the prison, undoubtedly (re)shaping the carceral age we currently find ourselves.

Given the increasing number of (quasi-)state actors in the West assuming tasks and responsibilities of safety and security, a further examination of EM generally and carceral territory specifically is especially warranted. No longer does the government have the sole monopoly on resolving challenges facing their populations; contracting out and/or transferring such tasks to other parties in the private sector can slightly reduce or redistribute the government’s exclusive right to punish (for example, see Johnston, 2006; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wood and Kempa, 2005). Yet as a community penalty, EM is an appropriate tool for investigating how this punishment is enacted, processed and experienced by those of whom work with the surveillant technology and those of whom are subjected to its monitoring. In effect, carceral territory is an apt frame of reference to further interrogate the intimate realities and microcosms of everyday life, pushing the territorial and scholastic bounds on how we view the carceral beyond the anchorage of the prison, and redefining territory and punishment for offenders in the process.
Chapter 5: Methodology and Methods

Introduction

The methodology and methods discussed in this chapter attempt to make sense of (im)mobilities, surveillance and punishment in a host of settings. Considering the methods used to conduct the current study allows us to focus upon and question how actors engage with surveillant technologies and the ways in which the qualities of carcerality and territoriality are filled with restrictions and limitations, curtailments and exceptions. In effect, an ontology, influenced by a hybrid of mobile and institutional ethnographies can enhance researchers’ examinations of electronic monitoring (EM) of offenders in Scotland specifically and speak to the structural processes and practices of surveillance and punishment generally.

This project attempts to provide a novel frame of reference for EM, shedding light on the disciplined and coerced mobilities of those doing the surveying and of those who are under surveillance. Doing so provides further thought to EM as a form of carceral territory, and the subjects, objects, practices and experiences bound up with carceral and surveillant regimes. Furthermore, my study provides a greater attention to the movements of objects and subjects through specific sites and places, as such investigations highlight “the tensions in such allowances for those who have had everyday liberties legally curtailed” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 11) which can assist in understanding regimes of surveillance, security, and offender supervision in the community.

Although carceral environments like prisons and detention centres present only an illusion of stasis, carceral spaces are in fact filled with a plethora of regulations and restrictions which govern this illusion (Peters and Turner, 2017). Not only do these same constraints impact the access of actors doing and undergoing surveillance, but also the researchers gaining access to carceral spaces in the first instance and its continuous examination (cf. Comack, 2008; Altin and Minca, 2017). Such an issue is typically associated with studies of carceral spaces like jails, prisons, detention centres, migrant camps, and mobility tracking centres established within the federal and private sectors. Whilst there are spatial differences in access (for example, access to such spaces of incarceration and surveillance in the Global North rely upon different requirements and permissions from those in the Global South), and cross-cultural differences in access (i.e. the unequal mobilities which pervade societies, or inequalities to access which run across racialized, classed, and/or gendered axes), it is important to note that researchers themselves must abide to rules and regimes that govern
their own movement once within and between such sites. In many cases, the researchers permit such limits as they are necessary to protect themselves and vulnerable people, research participants or otherwise. Yet the capacity of research to provide understanding, give voice to unheard populations, and to even evoke positive social change demonstrates the need for continued ‘carceral work’ (Peters and Turner, 2017; see also Armstrong and Jefferson, 2017; Gacek, 2017, 2018; Moran and Schliehe 2017a, 2017b; Schliehe, 2016; Schliehe and Moran, 2017; Woolford and Gacek, 2016).

Therefore, we might ask ourselves how one should methodologically research the subjects, objects, practices and experiences of the ‘carceral’ and the ‘territorial’ more effectively. Alongside the invaluable and diverse methods of ethnography, might there be a place for mobile methods in researching the ‘carceral’ (cf. Büscher and Urry, 2009), and can the ‘territorial’ be included in this discussion? What can the (im)mobilities of populations and places inform us about the intersections between the carceral, surveillance, and punishment? And following on, how can this method, coupled with a nuanced understanding of carceral territory, be employed to make sense of criminal justice actors’ movements and routines as they engage with surveillant technologies in Scotland? The ensuing chapter is directed towards answering these questions.

First, this chapter will discuss the methodology and methods which underpin the study. I argue that both ‘institutional ethnography’ (Walby, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007, 2013; Taber, 2010) and ‘ethnographic commuting’ (Büscher and Urry, 2009; Murray, 2009; Jungnickel, 2014) are key methodologies to the study. These ethnographic practices provide insight into how criminal justice actors engage with surveillant technologies both within the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC) and in travelling to and from tagged offenders’ residences. Understanding how the work involved in monitoring both offenders (monitored persons, or MPs) and fellow agents (monitoring officers, or MOs) is socially organized supplements the ways in which we make sense of surveillance and punishments. Furthermore, the mobile interviewing methods implemented (i.e. ‘go-along’ or ‘ride-along’ interviews) illustrates how the surveillance work of the MOs in the field or ‘on the ground’ is experienced and managed as they visit the homes and residences of those they are charged to survey. Following this, data collection and analysis are then discussed for both (1) fieldnotes.

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5‘MOs’ and ‘MPs’ are the actual terms used by G4S staff to carry out monitoring services at G4S Scotland.
and ethnographic observations; and (2) conducting inmate interviews. Reflections on the methodology and the methods implemented in this study will conclude the chapter.

**Methodological Foundations to the Thesis**

A qualitative research paradigm was used in this study, as I situate my epistemological position within social constructionism (cf. Berger and Luckman, 1966; Bogdan and Taylor, 1998). In this type of approach, data are grounded in the perspectives of the participants as well as the researcher himself. As Bogdan and Bilken (2003: 2) argue, this approach of data collection is “rich in description of people, places and conversations.” In terms of research questions, this approach formulates such questions “to investigate topics in all their complexity” (Bogdan and Bilken, 2003: 2). Finally, they suggest that the qualitative researcher becomes “bent on understanding, in considerable detail, how people think…and how they came to develop the perspectives they hold” (Bogdan and Bilken, 2003: 3; see also Schwartz and Lutfiyya, 2016).

This chapter does important work in bringing diverse and/or disparate groups to the forefront of discussion. While some studies may speak inadvertently for such groups from the top-down perspective of the researcher, my methodological aim is to give voice to the range of persons caught within regimes that survey, curtail and limit movement. The ethnographic observations I undertake illustrate the complex and multifaceted system monitoring officers (MOs) engage with on a day-to-day basis. In sharing their experiences, monitored persons (MPs) reveal the everyday, mundane realities of mobility, surveillance and punishment. As EM maintains a carceral territorial hold upon the spaces they inhabit. However, this carceral territorial picture is not complete without incorporating the experiences and perspectives of those whom are drawn into such marginalized circumstances. Inviting my respondents to describe their own subjections brings to light various and memorable experiences of and struggles with EM practices. In essence, the stories shared by these Scottish criminal justice actors capture the quotidian atmosphere of surveillance as it is lived and understood by the people doing the surveying and those undergoing the surveillance. How these actors make sense of and work with surveillant technologies illuminates the impact of EM within the daily routines, rituals and lifestyles of all of those involved.

**Institutional Ethnography**

Institutional ethnography (IE) seeks to preserve the presence of subjects and the experiential features of subject’s every-day and -night lived realities (cf. Walby, 2005a, 2006). In part IE
is a method of inquiry which allows the researcher to question and reflect upon their own experiences with the organization and organizational cultural practices. At the same time, IE treats text—namely the documentary materials used by MOs to monitor MPs, and the verbal scripts and observations compiled by the researcher—as active in shaping and (re)producing social relations. Social interaction is increasingly mediated textually, by paper, electronic, and televisual media. Institutional ethnography problematizes these relations at the local site of lived experience, while examining how series of texts contribute to the perpetual structuring and coordination of actions, consciousness, and forms of social organization in extra-local settings (Smith, 1987; 1999). Participants within the relation are not necessarily known to one another, yet they are connected through the text and the work that texts organize. Examining these documentary materials as well as the researcher’s own fieldnotes have the potential to focus on the people working within the organization, the occupational culture and rituals, the origins, history, and developments of the institution over time, and so forth. Indeed, seeing individuals as real and relationally producing their own conditions of existence, Smith (1999: 75) contends that discursive, managerial and professional forms of governance and knowledge are socially constructed, and that whatever is brought into being is done so by people “at work.”

Research conducted by Walby (2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007, 2013) has made significant strides in promoting institutional ethnography as a critique and a method of sociological inquiry, as well as centring institutional ethnography within the comprehensive debates encircling the surveillance studies literature. As Hier (2003) contends, one should not easily assume that surveillance has become, primarily, horizontal instead of hierarchical. While there has been growing evidence in the literature to witness the rhizomatic characteristics of contemporary surveillance, we should not so easily presume that surveillance has radically altered hierarchies of organization, as asymmetries of organizational power still exist (see also Lyon, 2003). Research attention must be accorded to further examining the continued existence of centralized institutions which serve as sites for the unification of regulatory surveillance projects (Walby, 2005b). The connection between surveillance agents and subjects is mediated through various technologies, most notably through commonplace forms of texts, of which refer here to “words, images, sounds that are set into a durable material form of some kind that can then be read, seen, heard, or watched” Walby, 2005b: 160, citing Goody, 1986). In the case of EM, such texts are compiled into electronic dossiers which become constitutive
of the NEMC’s bureaucratizing process and are the constituents of rational knowledge systems through which bodies are administered and organizational power flows.

Texts hold and generate power in our society (Smith, 1992: 93) and whether they be in paper or digital formats, texts are instrumental to institutional organization (Smith, 1984). Differing from traditional sociological methods of investigation, institutional ethnography views texts as the ‘material relations of surveillance,’ in which the actual and material object of a text is recorded, written or read in one place and time as the recorder, writer or reader engaged with them, and then sent to various other recorders, writers and readers who process and work with the textual information provided. In effect, the material relations of surveillance matter to institutional ethnographers as we seek to redress “how human relations are mediated by texts that coordinate social monitoring practices” which enhance, transform, and/or govern surveillance subjects and agents (Walby, 2005b: 161). Such material relations are actual conveyances of texts which have sustained the distanciated surveillance relationships between people.

This method of inquiry explores how everyday life is caught up and coordinated through organisational processes. Interested in local knowledges, institutional ethnography treats people not as the object under analysis but as an entry point into understanding the conditions placed upon people’s lives. In terms of methodological practice, institutional ethnography involves what Walby (2013: 141, citing Smith, 2005: 135-39) refers to as ‘data dialogues.’ The primary data dialogue in institutional ethnography is between the interviewer or participant observer and one or more persons that the researchers talks with or observes. A secondary data dialogue occurs between the researcher and the interview transcript and/or the fieldnotes. In effect, data analysis in institutional ethnography cannot simply focus on one individual standpoint; instead, the trick of analysis is to find a way to do it that “locates individuals and their experiences within a complex institutional field” (McCoy, 2006: 113, cited in Walby, 2013: 142). By starting from this standpoint, “lines of fault between peoples’ own embodied knowledge and the ways of knowing ‘written out’ of conceptual practices of power become revealed” (Walby, 2013: 143). Conceptual practices of power, which as Smith (1990: 31) argues, “subsume people’s actual speech and what they have to tell about themselves” are tied to organisational forms of ruling.

Therefore, institutional ethnography examines the linkages between experience, sociality and work. Put differently, we see how this method is interested in what people do, how they
work, and how this process of doing and working links together with other people’s doings
and workings in a web of ruling which has becoming increasingly mediated through
surveillance texts. The interpretive work that people do to activate and/or add to the text
coordinates organisation “of what happens in the setting in which the reading takes place and
the multiple sites in which the same text is read, as well as the local settings of work
connected in the ongoing process” (Turner, 2002: 309). To further explicate the relations
between people and extra-local institutions, institutional ethnographic studies explore the
everyday work-text-work activities done by people in their local settings.

**Mobile Methods and the Ethnographic Commute**

Mobile methods and the ‘ethnographic commute’ are increasingly used for research which
examines mobile practices and/or techniques (Büscher and Urry, 2009; Murray, 2009;
Jungnickel, 2014). Predicated on research in context, mobile methods encompass the
exploration of movement and situate it within physical and social spaces under investigation
(Murray, 2009). Multisensory techniques which examine aspects of everyday life
acknowledge the importance of the bodily experience of space, place, time and routine, as
well as the perceptual memory of humans (Degen and Rose, 2012). The last decade has seen
a surge in the innovation and use of mobile methods to study mobilities—the journeys
themselves—in place-making practices (Sheller and Urry, 2006). The growth of mobile
methods has seen a renewed focus on the study of human experience, as these methods focus
on the reciprocal relationship between people and place (Wolifson, 2016).

This exploration involved the use of adapted version of the “go-along” interview (cf.
Kusenbach, 2003). “Go-alongs,” and more specifically “walk-alongs” (Lynch, 1960) are a
micro-ethnographic method (Smith, 1967) of the mobilities turn (Sheller and Urry, 2006).
The technique involves combining participant observation and interviewing while
accompanying subjects on their familiar outings and routines to understand their “authentic
practices and interpretations” (Kusenbach, 2003: 464). This combination has the effect of
grounding the research in situ and prompts access to participants’ experiences in and
perceptions of the surrounding environment. For instance, the use of mobile methods in the
day- and nighttime spaces garner a more nuanced understanding of how expeditions to visit,
check in and monitor tagged offenders are perceived and experienced by field agents using
those spaces. In this way, mobile methodologies supplement the excavation and access to the
meanings of human construction of the social world, a world which has become increasingly shaped by mobility (Anderson, 2004; Murray, 2009).

‘Go-alongs’ are emplaced, mobile methods significant for examining how agents and offenders, in practice, make sense of surveillance and punishment through EM technologies. It is important to note that I use the term ‘emplaced’ here to describe the setting of methods within the physical spaces, locales, routes and routines being examined: the day- and nightscapes of Scotland, and particular spaces within it, including the NEMC, the vehicles of field agents, and the residences of offenders.

The second mobile method employed in this study is the ethnographic commute. A key feature of the ethnographic commute is an openness to engage with sites as they emerge; in other words, to follow and move with the research participants and to go where they go, rather than solely rely on a predetermined spatial nature of the stationary field-site prior to the start of research. This openness of engagement pushes the ethnographer to go outside “the citadel of expert knowledge to the viewpoints of lay groups” and their practices and routines (Hess, 2007: 236).

On its surface, the researcher’s routine journey from one site to another and back can be considered a mundane and boring practice. However, exploring and implementing the ethnographic commute has potentially valuable interventions in the craft of qualitative research (cf. Jungnickel, 2014). Typically, when the researcher identifies a site to investigate, a central and indubitably practical aspect of any ethnographic study entails a form (or forms) of ethnographer mobility. This mobility involves a variety of items to consider: looking up the location on a map or through online searches; planning routes; choosing appropriate means of mobility; negotiating a constellation of factors, including weather, people, devices and materials to bring or leave behind; and then getting to and from identified places. Distances might be minutes or months between events or sites, and may require the assistance of cars, bicycles, trains, plans, trams, or boats to reach them. For example, qualitative methods literature has examined the selection of research sites (Fetterman, 2010), methods for gaining entry into the sites (Hine, 2000), how to negotiate relationship upon entry (Silverman, 2006), the ethical issues and implications researchers should consider within these sites and throughout data collection (Murphy and Dingwall, 2007; Skeggs, 2007; Ferguson, 2016), managing multiple site visitations (Falzon, 2009; Coleman and Von Hellerman, 2011), and advice on when and how to leave the field (Hammersley and
Atkinson, 2007). In sum, ethnographers do not simply turn up at a research site as if by magic; rather, it is a complex interplay between body, landscape, time, and routine, all of which are connected and understood intimately. Although ordinary, trivial, and often overlooked, these activities, choices, and practices are imperative to the doing of ethnographic research (Jungnickel, 2014).

Utilizing a multi-sited approach, the current study fits into Marcus’ (1998) argument that ethnographers who engage in this approach should “follow the people”; “follow the thing”; “follow the metaphor”; “follow the story, plot or allegory”; “follow the life or biography” or “follow the conflict” across a range of locations. Marcus insists that multi-sited studies are useful for “suturing locations of cultural production that have not been previously connected and consequently, for creating empirically argued new envisionings of social landscapes” (1998: 93). It might involve moving between field-sites or the selection of two or more contrasting (or similar) field-sites to study one theme, and then having to move back and forth because the comparison is analytically useful. In doing so ethnographers are constantly adapting to accommodate shifts and changes in the configurations of field sites, and the act of movement then is revealed as both practical and necessary to the nature of the research.

Indeed, as Jungnickel (2014: 652) contends, there are advantages to encompassing mobility into both ethnographic process and analysis:

> Recognising how we plan routes, get lost, ask directions, find our way, meet people, see unexpected things, get hot, cold, attacked by birds, buffeted by wind and caught in the rain and do it regularly on a daily basis can add… another layer of texture to the study of ‘ordinary, small troubles’ in everyday life that we attempt to understand.

While it might not make sense at the time, the deliberate choices of how ethnographers enter and leave a field, coupled with the practicalities of moving between sites in the field, suggests that ethnographic mobility has a significant role in research. The ‘ordinary, small trouble’ of how the ethnographer gets there and back becomes quintessential to the subtleties and complexities of experiencing, researching, and participating in everyday life.

**Data Collection for Fieldnotes and Observations**

Participant observation for institutional ethnography (IE) was employed, the purpose of which was is to generate descriptions of what people do in their everyday lives (Taber, 2010) particularly while they engage in electronic monitoring (EM) work at the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC). Observations at NEMC were conducted for six months (June -
December 2017) and ranged from 3-5 hours in length per shift, with most shifts beginning at 7pm until 7am the following day. As I further discuss in Chapter 6, data collection with IE was significant to the study as it allowed me to engage in my own experiences with the organization, organizational cultural practices, and organizational official and unofficial texts (Taber 2010). Doing so provided the necessary bedrock to stand upon to assist me in understanding the procedures and processes of EM under the operation of G4S Scotland, as well as the foundation necessary to consider a more capacious conception of carceral territory.

The “go-along” method was conducted within the same six month period of observation at the NEMC (June – December 2017), and was employed to reveal individual experiences of EM field work and to interrogate how multiple and multilayered discourses, memories and worldviews of participants framed these experiences. While a fuller understanding of how this project utilized the ‘go-along’ method is discussed in Chapter 7, its significance can be briefly mentioned here. By using this method in place, and moving through place, I sought to reveal how valuable and meaningful encounters unveil complex narratives of those places first hand. More generally, I sought to interrogate how the routines of both surveyors and the surveilled shape experience, an interest which would lead me to further understand how these criminal justice actors engage make sense, engage in, comply with or resist ‘carceral work’ to co-produce and maintain a carceral territory through EM.

‘Go-alongs’ were selected in part because of their capacity to engender a collaborative approach between the research and the researched (Anderson, 2004). This power relation in the ‘go-along’ allows for a more free-flowing and dynamic interview or observation, all of which is accompanied by the surrounding environments (Ross et al., 2009). Go-alongs were not filmed, but extensive field and research notes were taken immediately after and in the days following the go-alongs, when memories were freshest. This approach enabled me to remain cognizant of the various sensory levels of complex conscious and unconscious relationships between self, routine, time and landscape (Bingley, 2003; Wolifson, 2016; Finlay and Bowman, 2017). Furthermore, the go-along method facilitates access to memories in place and routine “whilst staying connected to the present experience” (Bingley, 2003: 330). This method’s flexibility can put participants more at ease than the seated interview, as it is more conducive to frank conversations with natural breakpoints involving stories and personal experiences (Finlay and Bowman, 2017). Through this method, participants are less
concerned with trying to give the ‘right’ answers (Evans and Jones, 2011) and can be more engaged in fluid, open dialogue.

The informal settings and the ample timeframes of the go-along allows for comfortable expeditions for the researcher and the respondent that may not be obtained in a traditional interview setting. Go-alongs with MOs in the field usually lasted approximately 7 hours in length per shift (i.e. a field MO shift always began at 5pm and they can visit an MP’s residence at midnight at the latest). In effect, the informality of such settings can reveal insights on behaviours, attitudes, and efforts exerted to engage in EM work on a day-to-day basis.

Finally, I recognize the ethical aspects inherent within qualitative research, such as obtaining consent from interviewees, interview confidentiality, risks and benefits of the research project to the sample of respondents interviewed, ethnographic observations recorded, and dissemination of project findings. To ensure the progression of the study, I sought ethics approval prior to the commencement of the research project. This study received ethics approval from the Research Ethics and Integrity Committee based in Edinburgh Law School at the University of Edinburgh. Separate attention is accorded to the ethics’ approval process of ethnographic observations and ‘go-alongs’ in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively, while the approval process of inmate interviews is examined later in this chapter.

**Data Analysis for Fieldnotes and Observations**

By coupling institutional with mobile ethnographies, this study relies on interview transcripts, participant observation (i.e. respondent ‘shadowing’) and field notes as data. Triangulating this method of inquiry best serves the study as it treats such sources of data not as the object of interest but as conceptual entry points into human experience and sociality (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983; 2007). Furthermore, this triangulation illustrates the respondent as a contact point through which a number of experiential dialogues and networks meet and intersect, making evident to the researcher the organizational arrangement of the institution, the impact of EM as a form of carceral territory, and the efforts required to maintain routine EM compliance.

By observing and/or asking a respondent how they work with texts or how they are subjects of surveillance we can explicate the way surveillance reaches down into people’s lives and connects up with extra-local, institutional processes (Walby, 2005b, 2013). The talk of surveillance agents (i.e. G4S monitoring and field agents) in their work settings demonstrates
they perform and facilitate extra-local organization as well as coordinate lived social realities. As the constituents of social relations, surveillance texts—such as the documentary materials required by MOs—expose the subjective aspects of recording/writing/reading involved in EM text production and the extra-local institutions the surveillance text joins and connects into the surveillance circuit (Walby, 2005b). It becomes important to ask about and listen for texts or sequences of texts while interviewing and observing, of which allows for “a kind of listening and probing oriented toward institutional connections” (Devault and McCoy, 2002: 765). Human experience and text are produced within specific interpretive and institutional frames, and because the ethnographer is located within a range of workplaces throughout the research process (in the current study, this can include the NEMC, the unmarked G4S monitoring vehicle, the offender’s address to install the HMU, and the roads and routes taken between these sites in the community, etc.), it is possible to examine how different interpretations of the same surveillance text could be made. Indeed, in the cases where both the surveillance agent and the ethnographer can view the same surveillance text, different interpretations can occur.

Once collected, the content from the fieldnotes and interviews were coded to facilitate the analysis process. The type of coding implemented is what Coffey and Atkinson (1996: 29) refer to as “coding as an analytic strategy” in which each piece of data was (re)read to examine broader assumptions, themes and meanings underpinning what was articulated within the text. Rather than focusing on specific quantities of words or phrases, this strategy emphasizes the presence and absence of information within the data. In effect, this coding process made the data more manageable, while simultaneously allowed for a more complex and in-depth analysis (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 30).

The primary data supplements research and evidence on EM in the Scottish context from other secondary sources (for example, see Graham and McIvor, 2015, 2017; McIvor and Graham, 2016a, 2016b). It is acknowledged that the sample size is relatively small—albeit one that is, arguably, appropriate in the context in the smaller European jurisdiction of Scotland, in combination with other sources of evidence. Nevertheless, there is inherent value in the qualitative research conducted in this study. The significance of this qualitative method suggests that hypothetically, even a sample size of one—whether it be, for example, one visit to the NEMC, one ride-along, or one interview with an MO or MP—can provide a significant amount of knowledge, information and perspective that enriches criminological and geographical inquiry, an argument which I have made elsewhere (cf. Gacek, 2017, 2018).
Data Collection for Inmate Interviews

To further this capacious conception and affirm carceral territory as an appropriate frame of reference to consider EM, semi-structured interviews were employed over a six-month period (January – June 2017) with inmates at Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Edinburgh. In total, ten interviews were conducted with inmates. These interviews were audio-recorded and then later transcribed. These inmates were serving a sentence within the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) and had been either available for early release into the community with a period of electronic monitoring (EM), or had a period of EM coupled with their period of incarceration at sentencing. These inmates were offenders who had breached their Home Detention Curfew (HDC); in other words, these individuals were released to a period of EM but had breached the conditions imposed on them within the EM period and were sent back into SPS.

Inmates were identified and recruited for interviews using snowball sampling. Central to accounts of snowballing is a ‘referral’ model of “using one contact to help you recruit another contact, who in turn can put you in touch with someone else” (Valentine, 2005: 117). This method of sampling can be beneficial to qualitative research, generating a unique type of social knowledge that is emergent, interactional, and potentially political (Noy, 2008: 327). These inmates were serving a sentence within the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) and were either available for early release into the community with a period of electronic monitoring (EM), or had a period of EM coupled with their period of incarceration at sentencing. These inmates are Home Detention Curfew (HDC) offenders, and as indicated earlier in the project, these individuals were released to a period of EM but had breached the conditions imposed on them within the EM period and were sent back into SPS. The sample of inmates reported that the majority of the four prisons which they have been incarcerated include HMP Edinburgh, HMP Polmont, HMP Addiewell, and HMP Corton Vale. HMP Edinburgh is a large community facing prison receiving offenders predominantly from courts in Edinburgh, the Lothians and Borders, but also offenders from the Fife area. This prison manages male and female offenders for those on remand, short term offenders (serving less than 4 years), long term offenders (serving more than 4 years), and offenders with life sentences (Scottish Prison Service, n.d.). HMP Polmont is Scotland’s national holding facility for young, male offenders aged between 16 and 21 years old. Sentences range from 6 months to life, and the average sentence length at HMP Polmont is 2-4 years (Scottish Prison Service, n.d.). HMP Addiewell is situated in the village of Addiewell, which is in the central belt of Scotland. This village is between Scotland’s two largest cities, Edinburgh and Glasgow. This prison houses
all offender types the exclusion of female offenders and convicted young offenders (Scottish Prison Service, n.d.). Finally, HMP Corton Vale is the national facility for only female offenders for both remand and convicted prisoners, while HMP Edinburgh and HMP Polmont have the capacity to hold both male and female offenders. It is important to note that there are additional prisons within Scotland which house inmates, however, the inmates interviewed at HMP Edinburgh did not mention these additional prisons when they recalled their experiences in the interviews, and as such are not included in my discussion.

HMP Edinburgh provided a small room inside the prison where these meetings between the men and myself could take place. Given the personal nature of the inmates’ experiences, and coupled with the highly controlled prison environment, interviews were carried out off-wing (i.e. away from inmates’ accommodations) in private interview rooms within the ‘Agent’s Visit’ area of the prison (i.e. in spaces reserved for private consultation with legal representatives, social workers, psychologists, and this gracious researcher himself). Although for security reasons HMP Edinburgh staff were present in the corridor outside the interview rooms, interviews could not be overheard. HMP Edinburgh provides one 45 minute per visit per inmate, and depending on the participants’ talkativeness, the length of interviews ranged from 15 to 30 minutes. The interviews with inmates were audio recorded and later transcribed. Any information that could identify the participants personally was kept confidential. The audio-recordings of the interviews were downloaded to a computer file that was password protected, and the audio-recording device was wiped following download to computer. No names or names of agencies or businesses (besides G4S Scotland) were included in the transcripts. Pseudonyms were assigned to each respondent to further ensure confidentiality in the research encounter and anonymity from the public. In a similar vein to Ricciardelli (2014: 417), included quotations from participants have been slightly edited “to remove any non-prison slang, non-word utterances, speech fillers… and to assist with comprehensibility and flow. To stay true to the voice of a participant, grammar was less frequently modified.”

Participation in the study was voluntary, and the participants were initially recruited via assistance from SPS operations management. Prior to each interview, consent was obtained from each respondent and each respondent was always thanked for their time and contribution. Although the face-to-face interviews were semi-structured, a 30-item interview guide was used when needed to draw participants into conversation (see Appendix B). The
intention for the interview guide was to not strictly direct how each interview would progress; rather, the guide offered extensive leeway for the interviewer to probe conversational paths as they surfaced while touching on topics related to the inmates’ backgrounds, observations regarding incarceration, perceptions of community re-entry with the monitoring ‘tag,’ their return to SPS once they have breached their conditions of EM, and perceptions of their residence and neighbourhood. Questions posed to participants focused on several aspects of the project, including how the inmates constructed their experiences in carceral spaces in relation to community release, the struggles of abiding by the conditions of being monitored through G4S Scotland, and in what ways was living post-release similar to the experiences of being incarcerated. In posing these questions, probes were kept to a minimum, and used only to seek further elaboration of the inmates’ responses.

In terms of potential risk from participating in this research, participants were informed that they may feel emotional or psychological stress from recounting their experiences of incarceration. It is important to note that SPS offered to assist participants if they required further counselling from recounting such experiences or sharing their stories.

Recollections of time served in SPS were approximations at best. The inmates found it difficult to exactly remember the range of time spent for each prison sentence they had received, or the total number of months or years spent within a particular prison. Nevertheless, the incorporation of the inmates’ narratives into the study, coupled with an understanding of what the narratives are trying to say about carceral experiences, highlights the significance of acknowledging the very real human aspects that exist within qualitative data collection and analysis (Gacek, 2017, 2018).

Additionally, I am aware of the possibility that there may be a bias in snowball sampling, insofar as inmates interviewed could have similar ideas and experiences and give each other’s references to SPS operations management or to the researcher himself (Flick, 2009: 110). Furthermore, I recognize this type of sampling strategy “as convenience (based on contacts available), non-random and non-probability (not necessarily reflective of a broader population, making wider inferences difficult) and often purposive (targeting certain groups or types)[,]” so of course the usual caveats will apply (Geddes et al., 2018: 347-348). Notwithstanding, the study generates “context-dependent knowledge” pertaining to the impact of incarceration through the experiences chosen by the inmates to be shared
As indicated in the methodology chapter, I incorporated aspects of Bourdieu and Wacquant’s (1992) self-reflexive sociology to understand how to position myself in relation to the respondents at HMP Edinburgh, the research encounter, and the analytical themes that arose from the data. This allowed me to engage in a critical and reflexive analysis of my own social location in amongst my observations, interactions, and conversations with those interviewed in the prison (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

Indeed, while the information obtained by the sample of inmates is in no way generalizable to the inmate populations in Scotland generally, nevertheless I see the inherent value in recognizing and examining the small sample’s experiences. I also recognize that limiting the sample size to ten may impact the other knowledges and perspectives that could be construed and shared to the public. However, similar to my arguments above, the inherent importance of qualitative research suggests that even a sample size of one interview or one narrative shared can assist the ongoing knowledge mobilization inherent within criminological and carceral geographical inquiry and the minute yet complex intricacies of everyday life.

**Data Analysis for Inmate Interviews**

The data collected from these interviews were coded in order to facilitate the analysis process. The type of coding indicated aligns with the coding practice discussed above (cf. Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). This coding process is significant for inmate interviews as it can make the data more manageable, while at the same time it allowed for a more comprehensive analysis of my sample’s experiences (see also Gacek, 2015, 2017). The general themes were developed based on the research questions; specifically, how the inmates at HMP Edinburgh constructed their experiences of carceral and community spaces, their perceptions or their own engagements with being ‘tagged’ upon release from prison, and how they struggled with returning to SPS once they breached their conditions of EM. Interviews were coded individually and without the use of coding software. Individually coding interviews allowed for themes to be drawn out of the existing literature, and others were identified as they emerged (Kotova, 2018). These themes are important to consider as such knowledge produces an enriched understanding of carceral spaces, in terms of forging connections between experiences of incarceration, being released onto a period of EM, and returning back into custody at HMP Edinburgh.
It is noteworthy that the participants’ choice of stories impacts the analysis. Choosing narratives to discuss in the research encounter, according to Somers (1994: 630), becomes a deliberate way of rejecting “the neutrality and appearance of objectivity typically embedded in master narratives.” Such rejection further promotes the expression of “multiple subjectivities” that permeates the self when participants choose a narrative to represent themselves (Somers, 1994: 630). In effect, the struggles over narrative choice and narrations “are thus struggles over identity” (Somers, 1994: 631) to ascertain and reify authorship, and to invite my participants to talk ‘territorially’ is to recognize how EM coalesces and/or conflicts with their own personal territories of everyday living.

Furthermore, by situating the narratives within the context of spatiality and mobility, it became useful to examine, along Foucauldian axes, the ways in which a spatial methodology assists us in ‘mapping out’ how power is exercised in unequal and unstable relations that produce knowledge (Youngblood Jackson, 2013). As Youngblood Jackson (2013: 841) contends, a spatial reading then involves “disentangling the complex production of subjectivity as an effect of power/knowledge relations and practices.” Understanding the multiple effects of social, cultural, and material practices within such relations of power/knowledge illustrates how these inmates-as-social subjects are in a continual process of “constructing and transforming their selves and their worlds” through their interactions with others (Youngblood Jackson, 2013: 841), while concomitantly highlighting how spaces form chains of relations that advance, multiply, and branch out deeply into social networks. Practices of power/knowledge are spatial, insofar as they spread out and connect to/with other forms of power/knowledge as inmates move through various and diverse spaces. As authentic vehicles of power/knowledge practices, these inmates and their subjectivities shift in response to the contextual demands of the spaces they encounter, both behind and beyond the prison walls. Indeed, while power is acted upon them, “they also acted on power” (Youngblood Jackson, 2013: 844), such as when these inmates respond to the contextual demands of EM upon release. Therefore, situating power relations in terms of spatiality and mobility then allows us further analysis of “how things change, transform themselves, migrate,” disconnect and reconnect, in order to (temporarily) produce different desires, different affects, and different practices, all within a wider space of ontological becoming (Foucault 2000: 294, cited in Youngblood Jackson 2013: 844-45).
Respondent Representation and Researcher Reflexivity

As Rapley (2001) contends, qualitative interviews are inherently sites of social interaction. Indeed, what the self experiences is not only in relation to another, but to time, place, and power, all of which shifts how experiences of an actor will become embedded within and constituted through narratives, action, social processes, practices and interactions (cf. Somers, 1994: 621).

Ethnographers are aware that their own subjectivity has effectivity in research situations, and so are reflexively monitoring at all times their position in relation to the presence of an interviewee and the local setting (Smith, 2005). As indicated above, while the primary dialogue is between researcher and their respondents, a secondary dialogue occurs between the researcher and the transcript, audio recorded interview, or written field and research notes. It is often in the secondary dialogue where the ethnographer’s experience as subject of the research process and the traces of both the institutional organization and the social organization of the local setting in the ethnographer’s experience become apparent (Smith, 2005).

It is through our experiences that we come to know, understand and make sense of the world and our place within it (Somers and Gibson, 1994). However, it is important to remember that although researchers intend to encounter the knowing, experiencing subject of our investigations, researchers cannot know that subject or field site to the fullest extent (Doucet and Mauthner, 2008). There may well be something ‘beneath’ or ‘behind’ what the subject tells the researcher and what the researcher can infer from the sites visited, yet all we can come to know is what the subject narrates, as well as our interpretations from their experiences “within the wider web of social and structural relations from which narrated subjects speak” (Doucet and Mauthner, 2008: 404). In terms of the subject, the lived life is more than just what is comprised within a story of set of experiences; how subjects are embedded within their lives speaks “all around the life: [a story] provides routes into a life… [and] lays down maps for [other] lives to follow” (Plummer, 1995: 168; italics emphasized). Yet the fragment of experience the subject chooses to share to the researcher from the subject’s larger knowledge prism—while incomplete and unknowable in principle—is not fruitless. In fact, the experience the subject provides to the researcher may be one of the most important tools researchers have for understanding lives and the wider cultures, social and structuring processes and practices the subject is part of at large (Plummer, 1995).
Self-reflexivity is quintessential to understand how to position oneself in relation to the respondents, the researcher encounters at and along the way to sites under investigation, and the analytical themes which arise from the data collected. Such researcher reflexivity allowed me to engage in a critical analysis of my own social location while I attempted to make sense of in my observations, interactions, and conversations with the criminal justice actors I travelled with and interviewed (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). My interactions with all three elements relay how unspoken power relations and surveillance govern each point of interest, the extent to which all three elements interdependently operate, and the potential for each to influence and further develop notions like the ‘carceral’ and the ‘territorial’.

I readily accept that I am an outsider to the criminal justice system of Scotland specifically and to the United Kingdom generally. I am also foreign to the conviction, sentencing and EM processes and practices underpinning the Scottish criminal justice system, and to the experiences and impact of such practices that infuse the lives of the criminal justice actors I encounter. I sought to use a self-reflexive approach in conjunction with my own set of cultural assumptions, and methodological and analytical frameworks. Put simply, my experiences as a White, straight, working class, young Canadian male influence my epistemological standpoint (cf. Gacek, 2015, 2017; see also Mao et al., 2016). There is no synchronicity between my own life-course trajectories and those MOs or MPs I sought to observe and/or interview. This leads me to believe that full comprehension of the experiences these actors have with surveillant technologies and the locales of carceral territory they navigate cannot be achieved in toto. At best, this study enriches the fragments and pieces of knowledge and experience these respondents decide to share with me. While the experiences and standpoints between the respondents and myself are not on equal footing, at the very least I can report on, examine and discuss my own ethnographic observations, what my respondents have to say, and provide a venue for our collective insights to be voiced and heard to greater, diverse audiences (for a further review and examples of researcher reflexivity, see Berger, 2013; Mallozzi, 2009; Mao et al., 2016; Walby, 2010).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has demonstrated the methodological underpinnings of the current study, considering first the significance of both institutional ethnography and mobile methods for a further examination of the carceral territory of EM. Institutional ethnography is a method of inquiry that explores organisations and textually-mediated relations whilst attempting to
preserve the presence of the self in the account. It problematizes social relations as the local site of lived experience, while examining how series of texts coordinate actions, consciousness, and forms of organization in extra-local settings (cf. Walby, 2005a, 2005b, 2013). Smith (2005: 219) suggests that institutional ethnographies carried out by different researchers contribute to a diverse, ‘collective work’ as they share the same focus on how texts influence and organise human relations.

Emplaced, mobile methods shape our encounters in a way that valorises their significance, revealing a multitude of individual experience and unveiling complex narratives of place, routine, surveillance, and punishment (cf. Wolifson, 2016). Indeed, as Jungnickel (2014: 652) contends, “mobile positioning matters.” Despite ethnographic training, it becomes easy to overlook the mobility of ourselves and the people and practices to which we observe; yet much of following the person, thing, idea, and so forth is actively about making choices and connections, and it is the mundane and boring aspects of mobility “that offer unique insights into everyday practice” (Jungnickel, 2014: 652). Ethnographic mobility observes and charts different ways of making coherence (and incoherence) across different sites, all of which serve to tie people, places, decisions, and experiences together in a complicated yet comprehensive manner.

Yet the capacity of this research to continue understanding ‘carceral work’ also relies upon semi-structured interviews with inmates. By inviting the respondents to speak of their struggles and movements between the prison and the community, methodologically this research attempts to give voice to unheard populations of society while attempting to comprehend experiences of the ‘carceral’ and the ‘territorial’ more effectively. The inscription of punishment upon the personal territories, routines and lifestyles of inmates and their loved ones indicates how carceral territory spreads the carceral out into society, permeating the homes and residences of those it seeks to monitor and punish. Taken together, the triangulation of the methods used in the study crystallize a more capacious conception of how carceral territories are created, sustained, and perpetuated in the spaces and places of everyday life, both in terms of those tasked with installation and maintenance of the EM system and those subjected to monitoring upon release from prison.
Chapter 6: Observing the National Electronic Monitoring Centre

Introduction

This chapter examines the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC) of G4S Scotland through ethnographic observations. As the service provider contracted by the Scottish Government, G4S Scotland provides electronic monitoring (EM) services for the monitoring of both court-ordered offenders and offenders post-release from prison. To explore how everyday life is caught up and coordinated through organisational processes of what work people do in the NEMC, how they work, and how these doings and workings connect to each other in a constellate web of ruling relations, institutional ethnography (IE) is a useful way to pursue these procedures, practices, and experiences in greater detail.

As indicated in Chapter 5, IE attempts to understand the institutional conditions placed upon people’s lives, rendering the structure of the institution and its ruling relations knowable, and examining how text coordinates organization in such a way as to reveal individuals and their experiences from within a complex institutional field and its ongoing practices (Walby, 2013). Starting from this standpoint, IE allows the researcher to examine the linkages between experience, sociality and work engaged within the organization itself, and in terms of my study, provides a solid bedrock for me to stand on to crystallize and promote a more capacious conception and broader understanding of carceral territory.

First, this chapter discusses the importance of placing IE within the context of NEMC. In particular, notetaking and field notes provided an insightful way to examine more than simply the work G4S monitoring officers (MOs) engage in on a daily basis, presenting the organizational structure, culture, practices, ruling relations. I then segue to a discussion which highlights the institutional barriers faced in data collection and the access negotiated to observe G4S staff at the NEMC. Researchers are constantly faced with issues gaining entry into sites they wish to observe (Hine, 2000; Silverman, 2006), not only in the first instance but its continuous examination. There is also a plethora of regulations and restrictions which govern how certain institutions, especially ones working under the banner of criminal justice (or those working alongside it, as is the case of G4S Scotland), would like to be observed (cf. Peters and Turner, 2017). These same constraints to access for the researcher are important to consider, and are further examined. Following this, I discuss how EM generally operates

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6 The institutional lingo used in this chapter will be similar in Chapters 7 and 8. In effect, certain terms like MOs, monitored persons (MPs), the home monitoring unit (HMU), etc. will be used as warranted.
within the NEMC and couple this understanding with a more specific focus upon the work MOs engage in to sense and manage disruption produced by monitored persons (MPs) under EM surveillance. I then turn the attention to the operational constraints of freedom witnessed through my observations of the MOs engaging in this type of surveillance work, and the ways in which responsibilization strategies and participatory surveillance were used to co-produce EM compliance. Reflections on significance of the analytical themes in relation to carceral territory as an appropriate frame of reference to consider EM will close the chapter.

Placing Institutional Ethnography: Notetaking at the NEMC

My observational role within the NEMC was as “background ‘sociological voyeur’” (Smith, 2007: 288), insofar as I was centered within three detached yet technologically interconnected realities: (1) the embodied, perceptual action and behaviours occurring between MOs within the NEMC monitoring centre; (2) the distanciated, mediated action taking place between individual MOs and their the NEMC monitoring screens; and (3) the disembodied, verbal action over the communicational telephone networks between MOs and MPs. The NEMC is a complex environment for ethnographic observation, and it took some time to satisfactorily settle in and get to grips with the multiple layers of reality undermining the EM of offenders. Moreover, I recognize that “the sheer volume of visual, aural, sensory, semiotic and symbolic information circulating” in the NEMC makes this “a particularly difficult meaning world to realistically capture, interpret and understand” (Smith, 2007: 289).

Notetaking and field notes produced entry-level data for this phase of the project. As Walford (2009: 119-120) indicates, one of the clear things to come from notetaking and field notes is that “there are similarities as well as differences in the ways…ethnographers actually construct field notes and in the terminology that they use to describe what they do.” While there are always subjective perception about what is constructed in the written record or what ethnographers have seen or wish to record in a field note—especially with memory erosion and the limitations of what ethnographers see and hear in the field—the important point underscored here is that so long as ethnographers arm themselves with some sort of notebook or pad to write in, and couple this material with an enthusiasm to record and understand, then the role of field notes in ethnography can be a viable resource for qualitative research (cf. Walford, 2009).

By conducting ethnographic observations, the purpose of which was to generate descriptions of what people do in their everyday lives, I was able to question and reflect upon my own
experiences with the organization (cf. Taber, 2010). MO wariness of my presence and what I was doing in ‘their’ domain is certainly understandable, and because of this observations were recorded in situ in the form of scribbled notes and quotes, which were then typed up more fully after observation at the first available opportunity. Furthermore, none of the observations or interpretations drawn upon in the chapter have been ‘checked’ for accuracy or validity by MOs. In a parallel vein to Smith’s (2007: 289) ethnographic observation of CCTV operators, such a course of action to have operators ‘check’ for accuracy and validity “would only reaffirm my identity to them as ‘outside’ researcher/investigator rather than passive, empathetic observer.” Adopting such an approach might have alienated, angered or affected MOs in such a way that would place them on the defensive and thus jeopardize my access to future ethnographic observations at the NEMC. From the outset my aim within this period of ethnographic observation at the NEMC was to limit unnecessary disturbance of the socially constructed nature and interaction order of the NEMC setting. Rather than to ‘check’ or glean information in an inauthentic or ‘staged’ setting where both memory and self have had time to reflect upon what was said and done between fellow MOs, and between MOs and MPs, a position of limiting unnecessary disturbance felt to be more scientifically accurate in collecting and recording data in context as natural and free flowing as possible, where “the minute to minute pressures and workplace cultural practices and rituals” are present (Smith, 2007: 289).

Research conducted in this phase of the study followed an open-ended process; it was not random and unfocused, but was without a predetermined outcome (Taber, 2010). I began with a very specific research idea and a research plan: I wanted to know how EM practices and procedures operated within Scotland, and I wanted to examine how G4S Scotland staff, as EM operators, experienced this work as work. My original plan was to observe this staff operating EM at the NEMC and conduct interviews to invite them to share their thoughts and experiences of doing this type of surveillance work. By engaging in an active inquiry, I was then able to adapt my research as applicable as I progressed. It was through the initial ethnographic observations at the NEMC that the focus and format of my research changed, my theoretical framework was modified, the texts I had intended to analyze changed, and my analytical focus shifted, all of which has made my research much more solid, relevant, and

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7 As Smith (2007: 289) acknowledges, it is clear that, due to memory erosion, this method of recording has some implications for the authenticity, accuracy and validity of the research findings presented in this chapter. Similarly, I recognize and openly acknowledge this limitation.
rugged. In doing so, I let my research analysis take me to unintended and significant places, which brought me to considering carceral territory as a geographically contextual frame of reference for EM. As Taber (2010: 17) contends, “[i]n the spirit of IE, what was previously invisible to me became visible, enabling me to make unanticipated connections between everyday practices, texts, and institutional ruling relations.” By adopting IE, the themes and following discussions emerged purely from spending time in the field as opposed to being formulated by any predefined hypothesis or deductively framed research question. Over this period of time, what started as mere intrigue into how EM operates in Scotland became a larger investigation into an attempt to further understand how EM, as a form of carceral territory, supplements the spread of the carceral throughout society, and how NEMC and G4S Scotland practices and procedures imagine, create and sustain such carceral territories across Scotland.

**Organizational Constraints to Access: Getting a ‘peek’ inside the EM Black Box**

The NEMC is a part of G4S Scotland, located in the Tannochside area of Glasgow, Scotland. My original study was directed towards a more comprehensive engagement in the subjective experiences of MOs. My intention was to interview MOs as well as management as they cogitate their roles in the NEMC, in order to “reveal the negotiated, contested, messy and affective character of supervisory labour” (Smith, 2014: 22). I wanted to reveal the role of watching and monitoring through EM, from managing the conversations and disruptions external from the NEMC to managing selfhoods of MOs within the NEMC. In effect, my initial aim was along a similar vein to Smith’s (2014) ethnographic work of CCTV operators and operations in the UK. While Smith demonstrates how the CCTV gaze “borne from camera work is mediated by social factors that define its daily orientation and that construe its retrojected reflection” (2014: 162), my original focus was to examine how EM as a surveillant technology could be mediated by social factors as well, not only redefining its daily orientation but how ‘compliance work’ made sense to the MOs whom operated it, and how MOs construed EM as a form of punishment to be meted out to offenders in the community.

Unfortunately, efforts to begin the original aim of the project were quashed. I had met with the research director of G4S Scotland in February 2017 to discuss potential ideas for ethnographic work inside the NEMC. While communications went smoothly, the difficulty
lay in the contingency of obtaining approval from the Scottish Government—in order to
obtain access to interview MOs and management I would need the Scottish Government to
confirm the project I was willing to progress. However, after many attempts to contact and
liaise with the research director of the Scottish Government (with many numerous emails left
unanswered), it became clear that full access of the NEMC would not be obtained. As a
Canadian researcher foreign to Scotland’s governmental authorities, and the limited
assistance I could obtain from criminal justice networks (academic and otherwise), I realized
that this venture may not be successfully accomplished. Once I informed the NEMC
researcher director of the lack of communication between the Scottish Government and
myself, the director informed me in another informal conversation that my project could still
be allowed to proceed at the NEMC; however, I was not allowed to interview staff, and could
only draw and make observations of my own inferences. Furthermore, I was only allowed in
the main monitoring room (see below) and would not have access to institutional paperwork
in full—in order to better familiarize myself with the NEMC operations, I was allowed
instead to email the research director for further questions about any observations I had made
during my visits at the NEMC and she would provide her own thoughts on the operations and
on the information NEMC staff would typically input into paperwork.

Taken together I decided to slightly amend my project, and discussed with the NEMC
research director that field notes would be taken in place of interviews with NEMC staff.
While I recognize that interviews and full access into the EM ‘black box’ of supervisory
labour (cf. Smith, 2014) would be more comprehensive methods, the ‘peek’ into the workings
of NEMC, I argue, can still illustrate insight into how EM as a form of punishment is
currently operated within Scotland. Furthermore, by reconfiguring my project in this way, the
limited access my research may have had does not devalue the project’s undertaking of how
compliance work at the NEMC operated and made sense to those workers whom engaged in
it on a daily basis.

Accounts presented in this chapter are reflexive extracts taken from my field notes. In total,
26 hours were conducted in observation MO work at the NEMC. While I recognize that a
greater amount of time spent observing the NEMC could construe a larger range of
observations, for several reasons I found it necessary to end collection at this point. First, due
to G4S Scotland being a private sector company, with its own mandate and schedules, it
became difficult for the NEMC research director and myself to schedule dates and times for
my research visits. In effect, I was able to visit once per month and to observe and note as
much as I could during those visits. Second, time and financial limitations played a major factor in my ability to schedule more research visits. Put differently, a foreign international PhD student with severely limited funds and time to complete the doctoral degree meant that my data collection period would be considerably shorter than desired. Thirdly, institutional barriers from the NEMC prohibited me from observing for longer amounts of time within each visit. In other words, I did not have institutional clearance to remain on the 12-hour evening shift, and so more research visits would have to be arranged with the NEMC research director. Fourth and final, after several visits to the NEMC I felt that data saturation through my observations and notetaking had been accomplished, and as Snow (1980: 102) reminds us, “the researcher leaves the field when enough data has been collected to sufficiently answer…emergent propositions, or to render an accurate description of the world under study.” After 26 hours of observations and notetaking I felt I could generate a sufficient description and more accurate understanding of what NEMC staff do in their everyday work environment, their ruling relations and the organizational culture at play. Furthermore, I was then able to ruminate and reflect upon not only my experiences and observations of the NEMC, but how these descriptions, understandings, and experiences connect back up to EM as a form of punishment and to the bigger picture of carceral territory.

Although the fact that I was denied formal interviews with staff and management of NEMC forced me to alter my research approach, nevertheless it was through ethnographic observations and field notes I found that I had rich data as opposed to a shortage. Access, time and funding dilemmas certainly plague qualitative research projects, and it became clear that my student project would not be immune to such unfortunate circumstances (for further examples see Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011; see also Morrison et al., 2012 regarding why qualitative research terminates, and Russell, 2005 regarding the difficulties of timelines). However, the lack of interview and institutional access pushed me to explore an exciting methodological landscape, challenging me to become more observant of what I could note while visiting the NEMC, especially in terms of how the EM system operates at the NEMC and the ways in which MOs engage in compliance work as everyday work. The notes I produced became the text of which I could coordinate the organization of the NEMC, and coupling this data with the surveillant text I observed (i.e. the computer screens of the MOs operating the EM system), my project persisted in revealing experiences from within a complex institutional field and the practices it operates.
How the EM System Works: Carceral Territory Within and Beyond the NEMC

From the outset of the project my intention was to obtain a better understanding for and a more nuanced appreciation of the operations of the EM programme in Scotland. In a sense, I felt it necessary to begin to capture such appreciation at its source; namely, the headquarters of EM in Scotland. It was here that I wanted to not only witness how surveillance of offenders in the community took place, but also see how this compliance work is made sense through the practices and mobilities of the NEMC staff as surveillant technology workers. Described below is my initial impression of G4S Scotland where I began my IE journey:

G4S Scotland is located in Glasgow, Scotland in what appears to be as unmarked building. I say this because the signage for G4S Scotland is quite minimal at best upon entering their parking lot from the road. An identification (ID) badge is required for entrance into the building. From the train station a G4S monitoring officer (MO) picked me up in their car to take me to the G4S Scotland building. To physically enter the building requires a member of G4S Scotland to be with you at all times. The MO scanned their badge across the entry door sensor and we walked inside. Upon entering, staff and visitors alike must identify themselves in a sign-in binder in the foyer to keep track of all arrivals to and departures from the building. Interesting, the windows marking the front of the building were all one-way (so those on the inside of the building were able to look out, yet outsiders would not be able to look inside). It appeared to me that such windows were installed for security purposes, and was one of my first instances of observing the physical securitization of G4S Scotland.

Every door I walked through within G4S Scotland required an ID badge. It seemed like bathrooms were placed in the foyer to reduce intrusion of persons to a minimum and slow the flow of traffic walking through the building. From the foyer I was taken through several sets of doors, each requiring a scan of the ID badge by the MO. The MO and I finally arrived into the main monitoring room—arguably the heart of the operations for electronic monitoring (EM) in Scotland. This room monitors all EM tags in Scotland, and all of the monitored persons (MPs) with it. The room itself was quite rectangular, and almost imperceptibly bland. Minimal furnishings were in the room; however, it was sectioned off into various spaces: a conference room; a small kitchen; an office spaces for inventory and EM equipment; the main monitoring area (which comprised 3-4 pods of 5-6 computers in a circle); and an area called the ‘back office’ where administrative tasks like the filling out, storing and filing of paperwork could be conducted. (field notes: 07/17)

As evidenced above, the physical securitization of G4S Scotland was a theme which arose from my observations. Yet, I realize this is hardly a revolutionary theme to suggest; as a private sector company specializing in security and monitoring services, the physical and material source of these services could parallel their workings and operations. Nevertheless, the authorization procedures for entry into these private company spaces are significant to consider. While I recognize my status as an outsider to the company (which could lend itself
to the assumption that an MO worker should be paired with me for the duration of the visit), the security features of the building suggest a more securitized space than what I anticipated. With every door requiring an ID badge scan to slow the mobility between rooms and floors, there was a greater sense of information protection that G4S Scotland wanted to maintain; an arguable superior power relation they wanted to institutionally impose and enforce throughout one’s stay on their premises.

However, the physical securitization of the building could be construed as akin to the physical securitization of carceral spaces, inasmuch as the features installed in G4S Scotland (i.e., ID badges, door authorizations, one-way windows, etc.) are similarly witnessed in the practices and procedures implemented in prison and detention facilities in order to control the flow of bodies (Moran et al., 2012) and information (Piché, 2011) from leaving the premises. As indicated in Chapter 4, territorializing spaces, bodies and information remain part and parcel to processes of inclusion and exclusion, communicating various dimensions of power and recognizing the superimposition of multiple relationships and interactions within its bounds. Arguably, the “ergonomically imprisoning confines” of the NEMC control room (Smith, 2007: 295) can also be seen in the CCTV control rooms that Smith (2008, 2014) ethnographically observed. It comes as no surprise that sectioning off different spaces within G4S Scotland can serve a variety of purposes similarly witnessed in typical organizational settings. Yet the fact that this specific company engages in EM for Scotland and G4S Scotland holds the contract from the Scottish Government to provide EM for Scotland suggests that the securitization of this institutional space goes beyond the mere architecture of the building, but also includes the design and layout of the inner workings of the building. Regulating and restricting access to various rooms and locations in the building ensures that both individual and material text alike are not easily between rooms on each floor, about or beyond the building itself.

In effect, my observations suggest that the NEMC becomes a carceral territory of sorts. I say this not to conflate the experiences of MOs with MPs, but as a way in which to understand the presence of carceral particularities within the community at large, and present it in a manner that queries experiences, practices or procedures of carcerality beyond the conventional anchorage to the prison. While the NEMC engages in territorial tendencies like classification (ex. ID badges and scans), communication (i.e. security features communicating the boundaries between inside/outside the building, and between rooms), and
enforcement of access (i.e. the procedures to heavily restrict movement of people and text) once again this is not to suggest that the NEMC is a space of carceral territory similarly experienced like MPs (see Chapter 8). Indeed, carceral territory is the imposition and/or inscription of punishment into and upon the personal territories of offenders, their homes, and their loved ones. However, as a space which intends to impose this punishment upon particular groups in the community, the NEMC is a physical space which brings about specific intentions (either their own or bestowed upon them via the state) that may have (or will lead to) detrimental effects for this population. Taking these carceral conditions and territorial tendencies together, it is not a far cry to suggest that the carceral territories imposed in the community derive from an origin point; conceiving the NEMC as a “single node in larger practices of social control” (Brown, 2014: 385), it becomes a main carceral node which connects together all other carceral territories within the larger EM circuitous system, ensuring that the state’s reach into the community persists and perpetuates the self-monitoring and governing of subjects (for a similar discussion, see Chapter 7). In effect, the NEMC does form a carceral territory, one which maintains and regulates the movements of people, objects, and practices within and throughout Scotland. In its contract to the government, G4S Scotland ultimately becomes a proxy for the carceral state (also discussed in Chapter 7), which (1) allows the carceral state to extend its penal arm out into the community (cf. Garland, 1997, 2001; Rose, 2000); and (2) guarantees that punishment imposed upon the offender by the carceral state is meted out through EM.

The inner workings and operations of the main monitoring room itself is also significant to consider, insofar as it also demonstrates the comprehensive monitoring that one MO is responsible for while on shift. As my field note indicates:

Per one monitoring officer (MO) workspace in the monitoring room, each MO space has one computer system with two screens. One computer screen is for the collective records of monitoring persons (MPs) which allows MOs to see what each other is working on; this screen shows the total list or ‘task sheet’ of calls the MOs in the NEMC must deal with on their shift, and this list is constantly updated in real time to show the progress made for all MOs on shift. The second computer screen shows the history of communication between MOs and a particular MP, and indicates all the details the MP has provided over the phone as well as the positive and negative reflections of the MOs in their conversations with this individual. The task sheet will also list the various reasons why calls to particular MPs must be made, such to regularly ‘check in’ with the MO; MPs with a ‘late start’ to their curfew or ‘left early’ from their curfew; indications of why there was ‘no answer’ from a MP, or for MOs to call MPs which may have tampered with the electronic monitoring (EM) bracelet (otherwise known as a ‘strap tamper’). (field notes: 07/17)
As demonstrated above, there is a great detail of information provided to the MO when they are tasked to monitor on shift. Through my observations, it became clear to me that once seated at a computer within a pod, the responsibilities associated with working as an MO means that there is little room to move about while upon shift. The MO worker is stationed in front of two computer screens, facing other MOs within the pod in a circular formation, while the scheduling manager and shift supervisor oversee MO monitoring from outside the pod.

The circulations of knowledges produced within the cluster of MOs working one shift, coupled with the circulations of responsibilities amongst MOs themselves to monitor particular MPs at particular times of the evening (field notes: 07/17), suggests that within the particular geography of the pod what forms is an organized process of continual monitoring for MPs beyond the NEMC and MOs within the confines of the NEMC. To a certain extent, we can see how the workings of the institution, set up and organized in this way, sheds light upon “spatial analysis and associated insights into power relations” (Billo and Mountz, 2016: 203). Indeed, a geographical appreciation of IE, especially in terms of spatial differentiation within the inner workings of an institution (cf. Billo and Mountz, 2016), has the ability to enhance and “enrich geographical research not only about a multitude of kinds of institutions, but about the structures, effects, and identities working through institutions as territorial forces” (Billo and Mountz, 2016: 200; italics emphasized). For example, how different workers are located within the building, offices, and cubicles speaks to “patterns of behavior and interaction, categories of identification, modes of management, exercises in power and interpretation in everyday life” (Billo and Mounts, 2016: 203). Such patterns, categories, modes and exercises reify the territorial force the G4S Scotland maintains both the explicit monitoring of individuals within their own communities as well as the implicit monitoring of those tasked to monitor said individuals.

Taken in aggregate, it becomes possible to see an architecture of security and surveillance imposed upon the G4S building and throughout the main monitoring room of the NEMC. Engaging in IE at the NEMC provided an insightful interrogation of how EM operated throughout Scotland, opening up discussion of how the composition and design of the building feeds into the work MOs engage in on a daily basis. Yet these descriptions merely scratched the surface of what exists beneath; through IE it became possible to witness first-hand the NEMC as a main carceral node of the circuitous EM system imposed and operated within and throughout Scotland. While the original intention of the project was to further understand the operations and workings of the EM programme in Scotland at the NEMC,
further investigation reveals how the maintenance of carceral territories in homes across Scotland derive from the NEMC as a securitized and surveillant space which powers and circulates the carcerality needed to perpetuate its EM regime.

**Behind the NEMC Screens: The MO Work of Sensing Disruption**

The work of a MO is an interesting job to observe. Similar to a closed circuit television (CCTV) operator (Smith, 2008, 2014), the work of a MO often involves the control of monitoring hundreds of offenders in Scotland; a large network which attempts to compress time and space (cf. Giddens, 1990) to make the work more manageable. While recognizing that the relationship between surveillance and society “is a ‘two-way’ exchange or interaction” (Smith, 2007: 290) the “micro communicative process taking place” between both MO and screen, MP and home monitoring unit (HMU) is significant to how disruption to the EM regime is managed and resolved (Smith, 2007: 290; italics emphasized). In various degrees, MOs watching the NEMC screens are caught within a complex dynamic of both interaction and socialization. Whereas interactions “take place recurrently with the surveillance technologies and the ever changing realities displayed on the monitoring screens” (Smith, 2007: 290), a corollary form of socialization emerges from the simultaneous meaning and significance the MOs adhere to such realities which impacts the course of action decided upon by the MOs (i.e. whether to communicate with a particular MP at the first instance of alert, delay communicating with a particular MP and order the calls a MO must undergo within their work shift, or alert an external agency to a MP’s violation of EM conditions and/or breach of curfew).

Similar to the introduction of CCTV to city-centre streets, to a large extent the introduction of EM to criminal justice and corrections has fundamentally altered, in various ways, the nature of micro relations between state and citizenry: “from an authoritarian gaze which was historically embodied and face-to-face to one which is now ‘distanciated’[,] disembodied, anonymous and technologically mediated” (Smith, 2008: 128; see also Giddens, 1990). It is through this monitoring that these operators have the ability to accumulate vast knowledge and intelligence from the HMU placed in an MP’s residence and the telephone communications between the MP and MO. Through this textual, audio-recorded and surveillant information MOs are able to monitor multiple realities at once, and arguably finding themselves “locked within a continual interpretive figuration of risk assessment and
management” (Smith, 2008: 127; see also Beck, 1992). The collection of this information is evidenced in one of my field notes:

Collective records on the first computer screen assisted MOs, as the list of records for one particular MP, including call history (especially when other MOs attempt to transcribe their conversations into the records), EM status of the MP and/or breach reports filed by G4S Scotland could be used by the MO to make sense of the situation before them and establish a relation with the MP that could be more easily received. (field notes: 07/17)

In a real sense, this is a privileged perspective held by MOs; while every MP can become visible, at the same time every MP can become a potential risk. It is not only the privilege of monitoring which could empower MOs at the NEMC, but their capacity “to collect, analyse, store and know intimate details” about the MP populations they observe (Smith, 2008: 128; italics emphasized; see also Foucault, [1977]/1995). Another field note supplements this observation:

While observing MOs at the NEMC what I found interesting is the amount of information collected by MOs while conversing with MPs on the phone. This amount of compliance work conducted by MOs involved continuous compiling, detailing, recording, and storing information about all communications with the MPs, as well as any changes in their EM status (including the status of the personal identification device (PID) or home monitoring unit (HMU)) in the MP residence. Should MPs discuss their loved ones (family members, friends, etc.) on the phone in relation to any changes in their status, the MOs will jot down these details as well. This is done to ensure that communications between MOs and MPs are as detailed as possible so that if a particular MP’s file needs to be passed to or shared with the authorities (criminal justice or otherwise) all information concerning the MP is comprehensively noted in the NEMC’s file and in those files of other authorities. (field notes: 07/17)

Therefore, it is clear that flows of information eventually manifest themselves in actual and multiple locations—what Walby (2005b) in his IE research refers to as ‘contact points’ (see also Ball, 2005)—where information about a surveillance subject becomes accessible whether in paper or digital format and in the form of a text, dossier, file, etc. Often MOs have reasonable access to large amounts of physical and surveillant texts containing sensitive and detailed information of the MP they are tasked to monitor throughout their work shifts. This allows MOs to both locate the MP within the residence (ensuring they are abiding by their EM conditions and curfew) while concomitantly gathering information about their prior whereabouts, routines and lifestyles when MOs engage in telephone conversations with MPs. Collecting this information not only renders the MP ‘locatable’ (cf. Nellis, 2018) but knowable; the collection of this knowledge is not merely contained to the MP in their residence, but to information about the loved ones whom come into contact with the MP and
the carceral territory established within the residence. Emanating from the HMU outward, EM extends its surveillant (and arguably carceral) reach and captures information about those that come into contact with it, which allows MOs to bring together “a seemingly limitless range of information to formulate categorical images of risk data profiles which render opaque flows of information comprehensible” (Hier, 2003: 4000). As suggested in Chapter 4, the perpetual process of capturing, deconstructing and reassembling this system of surveillance upon the MP and their personal contacts can be what Haggarty and Erison (2000) refers to as the ‘surveillant assemblage’ (p. 606); with its rhizomatic sequence of processes, this assemblage thinking perpetuates an ongoing and ever-prevailing “rhizomatic levelling” of surveillance, rendering groups which had been previously exempted from routine surveillance becoming subjects of interest and/or to increased monitoring.

Indeed, one could construe MOs as empowered agents of control; through the medium of largely wired technological networks closed off from public view, the MOs, housed in the G4S building are safely distanced from the action, and “are presented with the unique opportunity to freely, discreetly and subjectively target and scrutinize all that crosses their gaze” (Smith, 2008: 127). So while MOs have an greater freedom to choose to monitor in closer detail who they like, MOs themselves cannot be seen, remain relatively disembodied and anonymous should they choose to communicate with MPs, and are, in a corporeal sense, inviable to MPs.

Furthermore, the MOs’ placement behind the screens enables these individuals to ‘virtually’ follow, track (through physical or surveillant texts if warranted), and facilitate the exclusion of bodies (i.e. MPs) from the monitored Scottish population “perceived to be ‘out of place or out of time’” (Smith, 2008: 128; italics emphasized). This observation was noted in one field note:

This evening there were a lot of ‘out past curfew’ events displaying in the system. When I asked the MO about these events, they remarked, “we get this a lot—most times it’s MPs who don’t make it home in time before the curfew is in place”. (field notes: 09/17) Being ‘out of place’ (i.e., not at home) or ‘out of time’ (i.e., those individuals of whom depart early from or arrive late to home while the curfew is taking place) provides further insight into how tagged bodies are rendered knowable and locatable through MO work. It becomes clear that is a wider ontology of control at play, insofar as the surveillant technology is linked to notions of power, governance, and risk management; in effect, by knowing where a tagged body is not (i.e. at home on curfew) the EM system then initiates procedures for MOs to
contact and follow up with these missing individuals, in an attempt to manage and resolve the disruption of these individuals’ curfews that said individuals have caused to the EM system.

As evidenced in Chapter 2, EM’s development in the West is also tied to offenders’ spatial and temporal management and political-economic policies primarily concerned with securing and controlling offenders and their movements. While EM is but one node within a wider ontology and culture of control (cf. Garland, 2001), the controlling dynamics underpinning EM do not start and end with the technology and its ability to monitor individuals from the NEMC. Perhaps ironically, MOs, like CCTV operators, are themselves increasingly subject to a range of internal regulations and forms of monitoring within the NEMC. As Smith (2008: 134) suggests:

Such measures include having to adhere to a raft of ambiguous yet legally stringent rules and procedures regarding what is and is not permitted, an expectation of continuous intelligence-gathering productivity and the requirement to meet targets and provide documentary evidence that sufficient intelligence…of certain populations has been achieved, and being physically constrained at a ‘control’ desk…for long periods of time and for relatively low psychological, financial, and organizational reward.

Through IE, it became apparent from listening to and speaking with the MOs, while closely observing their interactions with each other, their screens, and MPs on the phone, that there were different ways MOs would approach the work and regulate their conversations they had to engage in with MPs:

It became clear to me that most, if not all, of the job of monitoring compliance at the NEMC involves conversations between MOs and MPs (and to a lesser extent, between MOs themselves). Indeed, I noticed that different MOs had particular ‘creeds’ or ways in which they would converse with MPs over the phone: while some MOs were firm (arguably, even hostile) to MPs, others were more talkative, receptive and somewhat empathetic with the circumstances of the particular MP case the MO was dealing with at the time. I saw how some MOs were more progressive or conservative with their speech, tone, and general language use to better converse and/or connect with the MPs on the phone. (field notes: 07/17)

To a certain extent, watching the NEMC screens intently for hours on end in a bid to document MP breaches of curfew, paired with telephoning MPs in the late hours of the night, is a job where the degree of ease of MO work waxes and wanes. Such MO work is certainly a monotonous, repetitive, and onerous task. Yet we must be mindful that MOs, much like CCTV operators, are not “unthinking organizational robots/dupes” (Smith, 2008: 141). In terms of conversations between MOs and MPs on the phone, MOs can be reflexive, emotive and creative social agents. Smith (2008, 2014) has brought attention to the discretionary powers which CCTV operators possess, in terms of defining the situation which they see
before them on their screens. Smith suggests that CCTV operators “are not simply passive conduits of information” but rather “are active agents of social construction who, like television audiences, partake in extensive practices of phenomenological hermeneutics” (2008: 130; italics in original). In effect, CCTV operators interpretatively created biographies or narratives for those they watched, “enabling anonymous bodies in space [on screen] to become…individualized and subjects of interaction” (Smith, 2008: 130). On the one hand, doing this enables meaning and entertainment to be gleaned from the work of the CCTV operators, bringing “colour to the greyness” these operators watch on their screen and interest to what is essentially an alienating job (Smith, 2007: 295); on the other hand, in their official role as watchers from distanced rooms of control, such operators had the ability to “subjectively construct suspicion and narratives for the realities watched” (Smith, 2008: 130).

Indeed, in terms of the conversations between MOs, these conversations would briefly involve two or three MOs within the vicinity to discuss and construct the scenario indicated by a particular MP. Such discussions and the collection construction could then assist the main MO engaging with the MP on the phone to inform them of how they (i.e. MO) would proceed with an MP’s particular disruption, whether it be in the form of warning or technical violation of the MP’s curfew. A similar experience was observed at the NEMC in one field note:

Another call between the MO I was shadowing this evening and an MP was regarding an MP who breached their curfew (i.e. left the premises while the curfew was in place). The MO called the residence to inquire about the breach, and the MP indicated that he had seen a ‘fire in the street’ in front of his house; that something had caught fire in the street and the MP had stood in his front doorway to get a better view of the fire. When the MO asked if he moved past the doorway, the MP changed his story, indicating that he was actually in his front garden, but that his curfew order allowed him to be there. Upon hearing this, the MO pulled up the MP’s personal information in the EM system, and checked the MP’s curfew order. The MO indicated to the MO that the order does not specify that he can be in his garden, to which the MO changed the story back, indicating he saw the alleged ‘fire’ from his doorway but did not cross the doorframe threshold. The MP then indicated that they would make a note of this in the system, but that the MP technically violated his curfew as he moved too far from the premises while the curfew was in place. The MP hung up the phone and the MO indicated in the system the information the MP provided, but was certain that the MP was trying to talk his way out of the violation. After this conversation, the MO chatted briefly with their fellow MOs on the evening shift for further clarification about what they had heard on the phone, and through her interpretation of what the MO told her, the MOs discussed and recreated the MP’s story, ultimately coming to a collective agreement that the MP had violated the curfew. (field notes: 09/17)
As evidenced above, the MO dealing with the MP’s particular situation attempted to reconstruct the MP’s scenario, discussing the MP’s story with her fellow MOs. Not only was this recreation beneficial by providing clarity on the information the MP gave over the phone, but also provided the MO assurance that the information she intended to record in the MP’s file was correct, as such information was ultimately legitimized through other MO’s subjective opinions of the matter. Taken together, the MOs become active agents of social construction, drawing upon the discretion of other MOs to construct, manage, and resolve the MP’s disruption. By participating in such phenomenological hermeneutics, this co-construction of knowledge through the MO collective not only secures the necessary information for the MP’s EM record, but the information for any and all associated surveillant texts that additional authorities may require when reacting to the violation of the curfew.

Workplace conversations between MOs have the potential to create a more intimate connection with what is being monitored or documented, “facilitating the formation of a shared workplace culture (thus reality) and worker productivity” (Smith, 2007: 295). Such informal tactics (de Certeau, 1984), utilized mainly for understanding and ordering information for the MO while they monitor their screen (and arguably for general amusement) are also one of the unintended consequences of, and a response to, “a system which has, at its core, an ontology of rational control and, on its surface, strategies of management designed to induce conformity” in both MOs and MPs (Smith, 2007: 295). Furthermore, the informal tactics of MO conversations with MPs does not necessarily undermine the extension of EM’s rational power. In fact, the MOs generally employ such tactics to counter monitor and information overload and provide relief to what could be construed as a mundane yet exhaustive job. As a result, it becomes clear that the management of this information is to ensure that all disruptions are brought back into a state of order and predictability which allows the EM regime and carceral territory in the homes of MPs to proceed as planned.

**Responsibilization Strategies and Participatory Surveillance in Practice**

Within criminal justice institutions, various subjects are transformed and reconstructed into prudential and self-governing individuals who are charged to “take full responsibility for their lives and actions and align themselves with the neoliberal project of governing” (Gradin Franzén, 2015: 253; see also Phoenix and Kelly, 2013). Involving his or her own responsibility through self-governing (Garland, 1997; Rose, 2000) responsibilization ensures
that such institutions are designed to produce not compliant subjects \textit{per se}, but rather \textit{self-monitoring subjects} who willingly engage in introspection” (Gradin Franzén, 2015: 252, italics emphasized; see also Garland, 1997). Therefore, strategies of responsibilization are productive in the sense that they produce particular subjectivities aiming to transform offenders into “active, law-abiding, responsible citizens by partly changing the offenders’ thought patterns” (Gradin Franzén, 2015: 253; see also Cox, 2011). For Rose (2000), self-responsibilization becomes an iteration of governing at a distance in which ‘advanced liberal democracies,’ as he terms, centres on governance through notions of inclusion and exclusion. The excluded are “the criminalized, the underclass, the pathological and any additional ‘others’ who do not conform to the ideal of the prudent, self-actualized, neoliberal self. The included are, of course, all the rest” (Moore and Hirai, 2014: 7). Thinking through responsibilization, Rose (2000: 334) suggests that responsibilization works

\begin{quote}
[t]o reconstruct self-reliance in those who are excluded…within [the] new politics of conduct, the problems of problematic persons are reformulated as moral or ethical problems, that is to say, problems in the ways in which such persons understand and conduct themselves and their existence. This ethical reformulation opens the possibility for a whole range of psychological techniques to be recycled in programs for governing ‘the excluded.’ The imperative of activity and the presumption of an ethic of choice, is central not only to the rationale of policy but also to the reformatory technology to which it is linked.
\end{quote}

As indicated earlier in the chapter, the main approach to interactions between MOs and MPs occur over the phone. Therefore, language as a social action is significant to how it becomes a responsibilization strategy to shift the weight and the efforts of EM compliance onto the MP. An example of this can be witnessed in the field note below:

The first call I listened in on with the MO I was shadowing this evening involved an MP whose home monitoring unit (HMU) reported that their electricity in their flat had been cut off. When the MO called the MP, the MO informed the MP that the electricity had been shut off by the council because the MP could not pay his rent, forgetting that the HMU would run on a back up battery (which only would hold a charge for up to 24 hours, and ensuring that the EM curfew would remain stable and secure for an MO to re-visit the home and check the HMU connection to the NEMC). The MP asked the MO on the phone if the MP could get authorization to leave his flat to run to the shop and pay his electricity bill, but the MO refused, indicating to the MP that he would have to send a family member to run errands in his stead; relying on the back-up battery did not change the status of his court order to remain in his residence during curfew. The MP retorted, saying he always runs to the shop to do errands for the family, justifying that his shop was only on the corner and wouldn’t take long to run there and back. The MO firmly indicated that if the MP left the premises he would be breaching his court order; the MO told him that MOs had no authority to provide MPs this authorization, that G4S Scotland only monitors, and that if the MP was to leave his premises it would be \textit{his choice to}
leave but that he would be in violation of the enforced curfew. The MP took a few seconds, indicated that he would send a family member to the shop, and hung up the phone. After the conversation, the MO informed me that “they” (MPs) always try to do this, and that the NEMC gets a lot of MPs asking for authorization to leave but time and again MOs cannot give it to them. The MP’s sentence outlines what they can and cannot do, “we just monitor” indicated the MO. (field notes: 09/17; italics emphasized).

Therefore, we can see a significant linkage between language and power (Foucault, 1982). As a responsibilization strategy, MO language encourages MPs to reconsider choices and actions, reminding MPs that with their increased agency of living in the community there will be further punishments and/or consequences should the MP not take introspection and their own self-governance seriously. By repeating ‘we just monitor’ and reiterating language around choice and responsibility, such MO practices endeavour to shift the burden of compliance onto the shoulders of MPs. Such practices also remind MPs of how their personal spaces have become territorialized by and through the carceral state, and it is because of these responsibilization strategy that processes of inclusion and exclusion—as well as processes of mobility (i.e. staying within the bounds of the curfew) and visibility (i.e. rendered locatable and knowable to the state)—are reaffirmed and reified (cf. Brighenti, 2007). Once again, carceral territory becomes relational, a type of intraspecific communication (as indicated in Chapter 4) which acknowledges the power relations inherent in the making and sustaining of carceral territory. As a result, self-monitoring becomes a warranted action to ensure curfews are enforced; the MP’s conformity with other prudent, self-actualized, neoliberal and responsibilized citizens in their community becomes the target in the main.

Besides language, those subjected to surveillance might also engage in other responsibilization strategies themselves to comply with EM surveillance. As Ball indicates in her analysis of the subjects of surveillance, “surveillance may be tolerated or even sought after because the giving of data satisfies individual anxieties, or may represent patriotic or participative values to the individual” (Ball, 2009: 641; italics emphasized). Complementary to this tolerance of surveillance is the notion of participatory surveillance. While this concept is typically defined as a mutual monitoring situation in which participants knowingly watch each other in the pursuit of some goal or state (Collister, 2014: 337), and is akin to reciprocal surveillance (Regan and Steeves, 2010) and lateral surveillance (Andrejevic, 2005) I respectfully diverge from this definition. I alter the notion of participatory surveillance to suggest that the subjects of surveillance (i.e., the MPs) tolerate or seek surveillance in order to satisfy the NEMC’s concerns for the disruptions in the EM system by MPs, and MPs participating in this surveillance renders these surveilled subjects visible, knowable, and
locatable for the carceral state. The co-production of EM compliance and carceral territory not only requires the participation of MOs to do their jobs (i.e. to engage in compliance work), but also requires the active participation of MPs to make themselves known to the NEMC. Such participation, whether invoked willingly or unwillingly by the MP, is necessary to ensure the continuance of EM surveillance. In doing so, it is through MPs’ own responsibilization strategies used within their homes that confirms that should the NEMC come calling, MPs will be responsible (or become responsibilized) and answer. To not answer these calls (and in some respects, to ‘disappear,’ as one respondent eludes to in Chapter 8) is unforgivable in the eyes of the carceral state, and may hinder further privileges of MPs remaining in their communities. Further efforts of responsibilization strategies and participatory surveillance on the part of the MP are indicated in the field note below:

The MO I was shadowing this evening informed me that when calls are made or taken by MOs, protocol dictates that all calls must be logged, and there always must be a ‘reason for calling’ description inserted into the monitoring history. A common lie this MO told me is that what he hears when he is monitoring is the “I was in the bath” excuse, which for MPs is a justification of why they could not answer the NEMC call sooner, or why the MP missed the call altogether.

While listening in on phone calls between the MO and MPs, I noticed that even the activities of the MPs are limited even when the curfew is in place; while there may be other conditions imposed in the curfew at sentencing (to keep the peace and be of good behaviour; to stay off drugs or alcohol), even mundane activities are now further scrutinized. For example, even if we are to accept at face-value that this remark is truthful (that indeed, an MP on one call indicated he ‘was taking a bath’ and missed the MO’s call), while on curfew the MP is responsibilized to answer the call—the MP should be able to reach the phone in time, he should be able to hear the phone, and others should not impede him in order to answer the call. The conditions of the EM technology indirectly regulates the actions and activities of the MP more so than a virtual radius imposed upon the physical residence of the MP. MPs may have to turn down noisy appliances and technology to listen more intently during this period of time; they may not be able to take showers, baths, use restroom facilities as they will be ‘on guard’ for fear of missing the call; the MP may stay away from upper and lower levels of the home (if they have the luxury of a multi-storied residence) for fear of not reaching the phone in time. It could also be the case that childcare and relationships with friends and family may differ during this time, as their needs are then not a priority compared to the MP forced to answer the MO call. (field notes: 07/17)

As the field note suggests, MPs are potentially caught within a continual negotiation of self-governance. Responsibilization strategies, like those indicated above, recruit neoliberal notions of choice and empowerment to charge the excluded “to take control of their own lives (and thus join the majority in the society of the included)” (Moore and Hirai, 2014: 8).

However, the rhetoric used in practice (i.e., ‘we just monitor,’ as indicated above) to guide
the excluded towards individual choice and responsibility has the power to guide the excluded towards “a particular, state-defined subjugation in which the individual who takes responsibility for herself ends up paradoxically following the directions given by others” (Moore and Hirai, 2014: 8).

Furthermore, the efforts MPs enact to live in the community and to take responsibility for themselves through a range of techniques has the potential to change their routines and/or behaviour because of the carceral territory imposed upon them. In their critical analysis of responsibilization strategies, Moore and Hannah-Moffat (2005: 93) observe “the wedding of individual choice and responsibility”. Under the carceral state and its neoliberal penal practices, “subjects of…programmes are empowered as rational and responsible choice-makers. Responsibility and empowerment become interchangeable” (Moore and Hirai, 2014: 8). It is through participatory surveillance that we can also see how being part of surveillance can give a feeling of increased agency for the surveilled subjects; while MPs are afforded the privilege of living out in their communities to reengage in their lifestyles post-release, MPs are no longer tied to the schedules and routines of the prison; EM provides a sense of increased agency for offenders (for example, see Hucklesby, 2009, 2011, 2013). In theory, to do so will assist the MPs in casting of their excluded status and be included (and made visible) in the eyes of the majority of society, of whom are responsibilized citizens just like them. Yet in effect, what we also witness is the ability for MPs to self-monitor themselves through responsibilization strategies to ensure they conduct themselves in a manner which abides by the rules of the EM curfew. Granted a creative community penalty, MPs are able to remain in their communities and continue to traverse and inhabit the personal territories they hold dear; however, such a privilege comes with a price, as this penalty requires active participation on the end of the MP to ensure they are not only rendered knowable and locatable to the NEMC, but that the carceral territory installed in their home persists as intended.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of my research, indeed all IEs, is not solely to analyze everyday practices and texts; rather, it is to connect them to institutional ruling relations, assisting us in explicating why and how we experience our social world (Taber, 2010). This chapter was an endeavour to stimulate further attention towards notetaking and field notes, highlighting the significance of IE and discussing emergent themes which arose from this particular method. My method
involved an encounter between personal reflection and the organizational culture and practices witnessed at the NEMC. It is clear that researchers who pursue IE in organizations can be met with barriers in their research (cf. Taber, 2010). IE can pose a threat to powerful authorities who may rather not have their organizational policies and practices questioned in open-ended qualitative research. However, methodological approaches like IE can nonetheless still critique organizations such as the NEMC in Scotland without gaining full access on the condition that the methods and focus of research is changed to suit such authorities. By incorporating IE into the project, I was able to construct my research methodology according to my own ontological and theoretical grounding, avoiding restrictions and obstructions that may have occurred had my research been co-opted by the Scottish Government or G4S Scotland.

I allowed my IE analysis and expectations to be contested by new considerations that altered my research process and conclusions. In doing so, my questions concerning how carcerality takes place and spreads throughout society is framed by this research, moving outside and beyond what I had thought I knew about the practices and procedures of EM. By letting my research guide me, I was able to search for the invisible relations between MOs working at the NEMC, the organizational structures with the NEMC, the MO work of sensing disruption, and the responsibilization strategies and participatory surveillance used not only render MPs visible, knowable, and locatable, but to ensure that the carceral territories in their communities are maintained.

Even with only the limited access available to me for ethnographic observation, my IE analysis provided me the opportunity to ‘peek’ into the black box of EM supervision for offenders in Scotland. As Campbell and Gregor contend, IE is distinct from “conventional research” in its requirement that the researcher be “a knower located in the everyday world and find meaning there, in contrast to [sole] reliance on library research and the application of theories” (2004: 11; italics emphasized). Therefore, IE assisted the study by establishing a solid bedrock which with I could find a footing to move into mobile methods of ‘ride-alongs’ with one mobile MO (see Chapter 7), to engage in semi-structured interviews with inmates (see Chapter 8), and to consider the notion of carceral territory as an apt frame of reference for geographically contextualizing EM as a form of punishment. Indeed, the exploration of supervisory labour through IE (still) matters, as it offers “a more nuanced understanding of how power is actually operationalized and flows in a multiplicity of ways[,]” providing
further credence of why lived experience through ethnography (institutional or otherwise) is a valuable resource for academic inquiry (Smith, 2014: 151). As Taber (2010: 20) contends, IE is central to how one begins to query the ways in which an organization operates itself: “IE tends to show us the trees that were hidden in the forest; once we can see the trees (ruling relations), they can never again recede. And once we can see the ruling relations, we can begin to interrogate and challenge them.” Speaking to these themes does not allow them to recede back into obscurity, and begins to shed a critical light on the practices and procedures associated with EM as carceral territory in Scotland.
Chapter 7: On the Move with G4S Scotland

Introduction

Mobile methodologies generate rich spatial observations and theories grounded in lived experiences (Finlay and Bowman, 2017) and guided by the notion that place matters (Massey, 1984) researchers can experience places that matter to participants in situ (Kusenbach, 2003). According to Spinney (2015: 231), there has been “a recent upsurge in mobilities research related to embodied movement, and a corresponding interest in adapting methods to acquire data while on the move.” Increasingly attention is also being paid to “the complex interrelation between travel and dwelling, home and not-home” for researching such mobile experiences (Sheller and Urry, 2006: 211). In a similar vein, go-alongs and ride-alongs, as forms of mobile participant observation, are significant then to understanding how G4S monitoring officers (MOs) travel around Scotland to install and maintain the electronic monitoring (EM) of offenders or monitored persons (MPs).8

As I have indicated in Chapter 5, the go-along/ride-along method is important to the project as this mobile method of inquiry examines place specificity insofar as respondents articulate their own subjectivity in real time (Finlay and Bowman, 2017). Their ideas and emotions are articulated differently firsthand, as opposed to by recall (Evans and Jones, 2011). Indeed, the self-place relationship is not just one of reciprocal influence; it is “more radically, [one] of constitutive co-ingredient: each is essential to the being of the other. In effect, there is no place without self and no self without place” (Casey, 2001: 684; see also Wölfison, 2016). Given the advent of increased speed in global transit and social media influences, such influences can be said to have a significant impact upon us, altering our experience of place and movement more so than ever before (cf. Finlay and Bowman, 2017). With spatiotemporal compressions (Harvey, 1990) our sense of place is not limited to immediate surroundings; in the software universe of lightspeed travel, “space may literally be traversed in ‘no-time’; the difference between far away and down here is cancelled. Space no more sets limits to action and its effects, and counts for little, or does not count at all” (Bauman, 2000: 17).

As Sheller and Urry (2006: 210) contend, the passages of ourselves and communications central to a sense of place spurred a new mobilities paradigm:

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8 G4S Scotland opted for this particular lingo, and depending upon the discussions in this chapter these terms will be used as well.
A set of questions, theories and methodologies that seek to transcend the dichotomy between transport research and social research, putting social relations into travel and connecting different forms of transport with complex patterns of social experience conducted through communications at-a-distance.

Indeed, mobility is more than just the simple movement between two or more localities, and to dwell is more than to be immobile within a locality (Sheller and Urry, 2006). Movements and dwellings are shaped and challenged by structures and power. Mobilities are attributed with meanings and are therefore context-related (Cresswell, 2006). Accordingly, Bauman has exemplified that “immobility is not a realistic option in a world of permanent change” (Bauman, 1998: 2). But he demonstrated that the conditions are unequal. On the one hand, he recognized those whose reach became global, such as ‘tourists’ (Bauman, 1993), the ‘transnational capitalist class’ (Sklair, 2001) or as the ‘global elite’ (Elliot and Urry, 2010). Conversely, those who are located and to be local (or localized) is considered as “a sign of social deprivation and degradation” (Bauman, 1998: 2) as not having the possibility to being nor becoming mobile.

In the spirit of utilizing mobile methodologies to generate such rich observations and to recognize the lived experiences of those ‘on the ground,’ this chapter examines the go-along/ride-along method in terms of shadowing a mobile MO from G4S Scotland. I endeavour to engage in a discussion which highlights the importance of mobility, connecting the significant themes of data collection and analysis back to a carceral territorial framework for EM. Observing how monitoring and place matters while ‘on the move’ (cf. Cresswell, 2006) to the maintenance of EM operations in Scotland provides an insightful connection to the significance of carceral territory. First, the chapter will discuss the issues faced with negotiating access to mobile MO ride-alongs, and the information which I was able to collect from my observations with Angus,9 one mobile MO I arranged to follow. I then turn the attention to how EM is operated ‘on the ground’ by way of the work mobile MOs engage in on a daily basis. Doing so highlights the significance of the mobile MOs work, in relation to the operational freedom they can obtain from the mobility in their position as mobile MO. However, such operational freedoms are also met with particular constraints, of which I turn to next. Following this, I then discuss the significance of the G4S Scotland car, the main vehicle used by mobile MOs to move around Scotland. I argue that this car that while the freedom of driving may alleviate the struggles of the mobile MO work, the car also serves as

9 Pseudonyms are used here to ensure confidentiality of the respondent.
an object of carceral mobility and as a proxy for the carceral state. Reflections on the importance of mobile methods to the academic project will conclude the chapter.

**The ‘go-along’/’ride-along’: Notetaking on the Move with the Mobile MO**

The go-along offers intimate views of landscape, life history, and layered meanings of place. Through this mobile method, participants can be empowered by becoming the role of ‘tour guide’ and expert (cf. Garcia et al., 2012), which reduces situational disparities (such as age, education, etc.) and allows participants to “interact on a deeper level through a more egalitarian connection” (Finlay and Bowman, 2017: 269). In addition, this method helped me convey respect, interest and enthusiasm (cf. Carpiano, 2009). As Spinney (2015: 232) suggests, while all researchers will have “a different take on why they felt it important to ‘go-along’ in some way, they all have in common the ethnographic desire to understand in detail what constitutes a mobile practice, particularly the fleeting, relational and felt aspects of mobility.” Indeed, Spinney goes on to state that “many mobile researchers have sought to adapt methods to become ‘mobile’ so that they can ‘bear witness’ to the presences and absences that occur in response to moving through different environments as they happen” (2015: 235; italics emphasized).

Negotiating access to go-alongs faced similar issues as outlined in Chapter 6. In total, 14 hours were spent riding along with one mobile MO. Go-alongs with Angus in the field lasted approximately 7 hours in length per shift (i.e. a mobile MO shift always began at 5pm and they can visit an MP’s residence at midnight, at the latest). I wrote comprehensive field notes within twenty-four hours to describe the sites visited, the participant and researcher mobility, observed features, social interactions and discussions. In effect, the informality of such settings can reveal insights on behaviours, attitudes, and efforts exerted to engage in EM work on a day-to-day basis. Given the institutional schedule and the convenience for both Angus and I to meet in one place for a go-along, coupled with the limited financial resources and time on the part of the researcher, two car journeys were conducted over the course of a six-month period of data collection. Angus and I visited eleven residences in total to examine

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10 ‘Go-alongs’ and ‘ride-alongs’ have similar meanings under the umbrella of mobile methods (cf. Kusenbach, 2003; Evans and Jones, 2011; Finlay and Bowman, 2017). In the context of this chapter, both refer to shadowing Angus and following his work across Scotland. I use these terms as dependent on particular contexts in this chapter.

11 Similar to the previous chapter, the limitations of this method of recording notes are readily acknowledged. I recognize that, much like ethnographic observations in the NEMC, the authenticity, accuracy and validity of the research findings presented in this chapter are influenced in part of memory erosion since the original mobile MO visits.
how Angus conducted his work as a mobile MO in the field. Routes were not set by the researcher, as I felt it necessary to limit my unnecessary disturbance of the socially constructed nature and routines while Angus worked, allowing my observations, our conversations, and the go-along in general to be as natural and free flowing as possible. In a similar vein to the limitations I recognize in Chapter 6, my ethnographic observations have not been ‘checked’ by Angus for accuracy or validity. Furthermore, Angus consented to take part in the research only after he made it clear to me that I do not quote him directly on any observations or interpretations of his work with G4S Scotland. To safeguard Angus’ confidentiality, excerpts from my field notes are provided throughout this chapter and his thoughts are inferences at best. I respect his wishes, as to not adopt such an approach could have alienated, angered or affected Angus, insofar as he would be so defensive it would hinder my observations while on our car journeys and further jeopardize my access with him and G4S Scotland mobile MOs.

In contrast to the seated interview, the go-alongs offered rich insights into self and place as it attends to participants’ rich realities and places in the world (cf. Finlay and Bowman, 2017). The unstructured nature of the go-along with only paper and pen enabled Angus to guide the conversation with minimal intrusion or interruption on my end. Indeed, it can also offer many of the advantages of participant observation and “hanging out” with participants without the intensity or time commitments of traditional ethnographical research (DeLyser and Sui 2013). I was also able to engage with my senses and comprehend places myself (Evans and Jones, 2011). I witnessed poverty and marginalization firsthand, such as seeing the decrepit council estates offenders were living in during their periods of EM, or looking at the shabby and unkempt rooms in flats where offenders kept their home monitoring units (HMUs).

Furthermore, this mobile method’s flexibility put Angus at ease. Indeed, by connecting participants and researchers to the “materialities of doing” (Spinney, 2015: 236), “the ‘effervescence,’ [or] the ‘over-flowing’ nature of lived experience” as it happens in real time could be retained, enriching data collection and conversations between Angus and myself along the way (Spinney, 2015: 236). It was conducive to frank conversation with natural breakpoints involving stories and personal experience (Carpiano, 2009; Finlay and Bowman, 2017). Angus was less concerned with attempting to give the ‘right’ answers to me as may be the case in seated interviews (Evans and Jones, 2011). In doing so the conversations between Angus and myself seemed more fluid and relaxed with open dialogue.
In effect, these observations of Angus’ MO work adds rich details to the understanding of how EM and ‘compliance work’ at large takes place. I grasped his embodied struggles, and car journeys with Angus overtime became more personal. Angus also expressed gratitude to have an opportunity to share his thoughts, opinions, and experiences with me. Similar to Spinney (2015: 237), the point I want to make here is that “‘movement with’ becomes a way of ‘attuning’ a researcher to the mobile practice and in so doing, of facilitating cultural and social empathy.” As indicated in the prior chapter, MOs are placed within a hierarchical structure of surveillance and organizational culture of accountability and control. As Smith (2008, 2014, 2016) contends, these workers tend to experience further disenfranchisement and alienation from these power structures, disempowering their spirit as a result. My hope is that, through the mobile method implemented, inviting Angus to speak about his experiences in my study encourages participants to feel more important and valued, and with any luck contributes to a reinvigoration of their spirit in the process.

**Carceral Territory as ‘Circuitous’: Calibrating Carcerality by ‘Ranging’ a Home**

The main job of a G4S mobile MO is to install EM into the home of an offender. On my go-alongs it became clear that there are a variety of steps required to ensure that the EM technology—most notably, the home monitoring unit (HMU)\(^\text{12}\) and the ankle tag or personal identification device (PID)—is properly set up and operating for G4S Scotland to monitor offenders. As my observations indicate:

When G4S Scotland installs EM into an offender’s home they refer to this process as an ‘induction.’ Shadowing Angus this evening I was able to witness two inductions. For both inductions, Angus had gone through the paper work with the offender, informing them of what they are and are not allowed to do during the curfew period, to not tamper with the ankle tag strap or HMU, and potential situations involving the police or A&E (accident and emergency services). If the police require tag information, they need to have a warrant and a reasonable cause to collect the data; they cannot take the info arbitrarily. However, if a crime occurs near the residence and the description of the offender matches the tagged offender, the police may visit the residence to question the tagged offender of their whereabouts. Additionally, should an emergency trip to the hospital (i.e., A&E) happen, the offender should call the NEMC before they leave to inform them they need to go, and upon arrival to/departure from the hospital, the offender must inform a nurse to call NEMC to validate the times the offender was in the hospital’s care—this information will be compiled and provided to the court so that a violation of the curfew does not constitute an actual breach. However, if this trip happens too often, G4S will contact the court to inform them of this regular pattern so that the court can determine whether the offender should be brought back to the court for

\(^{12}\) As indicated in Chapter 8, the HMU was also referred to by respondents as ‘the box’; I will use these terms as dependent upon the context of my discussion.
further investigation. Once this was made clear to the offender, they sign the consent form and Angus fits the offender with a tag. We then call the NEMC to begin the test (to verify a test can begin). The range test begins in the residence, and once it is completed Angus makes another call to NEMC to verify the test’s completion, and Angus asks who is the gas/electricity supplier so that it can be recorded in case of a power outage in the residence or the battery dies in the HMU. The offender must then wait for a call from the NEMC and answer the call to verify their contact information. In total, an induction can take approximately 40-45 minutes within one home. (field notes: 10/11)

As demonstrated above, there are several procedures both the mobile MO and the offender must undergo in order to begin the initial setting up of the EM technology in the home. A ‘range test’ is the main procedure to create the territorial boundaries of EM within the home itself (as discussed below) and its function is to maintain and monitor the offender under curfew. The range test also creates a secure connection to the offender in the community, maintaining the ability for G4S Scotland to survey the offender from the NEMC. Terms and conditions of operating EM in the home must be discussed with the offender and in turn the offender must consent to all of these implemented procedures. Similar to Chapter 6, material text is used to compile information on the individual to be monitored in the home, as well as to gain the tagged individual’s consent that all terms and conditions have been properly understood and made sense. This discussion produces a particular power relation between the mobile MO and offender, insofar as the interaction is not only between two individuals, but in reality, what we can witness is an interaction between (1) an individual who will be punished within their own residence; and (2) the mobile MO as both a representative of G4S Scotland, as well as a proxy for the carceral state at large.

It is interesting to note that for the offender, particular services such as police and hospital visits are still allowed while the offender undertakes EM; however, the offender must still inform the NEMC of any changes in their status should they feel the need to leave their residence during curfew to access these services. Should these services be utilized more than necessary or what G4S Scotland deems reasonable, further investigation of the monitored offender will then take place, and may warrant a return to court to alter the offender’s curfew order. In effect, my observations suggest a larger ontology of surveillance and control; drawing upon Garland (1996, 2001), the EM technology exists as both a symbolic and physical punishment imposed by the state, and through the technology’s symbolic enforcement (i.e. the standard terms and conditions for each offender to be monitored through the EM period, and the maintenance of the EM curfew) the offender becomes responsibilized to inform the NEMC of any changes to the monitoring; should the offender require any
authorities (i.e. police, hospital, gas/electricity supplier, etc.) they are again responsibilized to ensure those authorities are informed of the offender’s tagged status and then must inform the NEMC of any status changes as well. Therefore, multi-agency collaboration and public-private organizational relationships are forged to ensure the maintenance of offender monitoring proceeds as planned. In so doing, each individual and group becomes one node or component of a larger circuit, and like electrical circuits, forms part of a broader system of surveillance and control that are not intended to be visible at first glance (cf. Gill et al., 2016: 8). This facet of circuitry captures the way certain carceral systems are configured with a broader purpose in mind: namely, the management and containment of risks (social, economic, or otherwise) (cf. Rose, 2000; Garland, 1996, 2001).

Indeed, the calibration of space into carceral territory provides an appropriate exemplar of one of the ways offenders are managed and contained within the confines of their own homes. ‘Ranging’ a home, in the institutional lingo used by mobile MOs, is the more intricate process of ‘securing’ offenders’ mobilities in order to contain those within the carceral territory by delineating the boundaries of EM. As my field notes indicate:

In order to range a home for EM, the mobile MO calls the NEMC on the mobile MO’s G4S cellphone to ensure that the mobile MO has the clearance to begin testing the home monitoring unit (HMU) in the monitored person’s (MP’s) residence. Once the mobile MO is given clearance by the NEMC, the MO reads the serial numbers of the specific HMU to the MO on the other end of the line. The mobile MO also reads the serial numbers of the specific ankle tag (or as referred to by G4S Scotland, the personal identification device or PID) the MP will be wearing of the duration of the MP’s EM curfew. Once the MO on the other end of the line receives these numbers, the test of the HMU inside the MP’s residence begins. The HMU emits a series of repetitive, loud beeps to indicate to everyone in the residence that the test is occurring. The MP, while wearing the PID, must stick their leg wearing the EM tag in every corner of the room where the HMU is situated. Per G4S Scotland protocols, the HMU is to be set up in the most geographic centre of the residence as possible, or else the room in which the people living within the residence will mostly use, like the MP’s bedroom or living room. Once the MP has put their leg with the EM tag in every corner of this room, they are instructed by the mobile MO to slowly walk through each room of each floor of the residence, and in each room they must again put the leg with the EM tag on it in every corner. Doing this ensures that the radius of the HMU can be established within the entire premises of the residence. When all rooms have been slowly walked through to establish the range of the HMU, the MP and mobile MO walk back into the room where the HMU is stationed. The mobile MO shuts off the test from by pressing a button the HMU, and a series of numbers are listed on the HMU screen. The mobile MO must then call another MO at the NEMC, indicate that the test has been completed, and reads off these numbers to the MO on the other end of the line. This series of numbers is to verify that a test has been conducted, a residence has been successfully ranged for the HMU, and the test can be completed. The MO on the other end of the line then hangs up the phone and calls the
MP on the phone set up with the MP’s HMU. The MO and MP then briefly discuss that what the MP can and cannot do with the HMU phone, and the MO hangs up the phone. (field notes: 10/11)

As evidenced above, the multitude of sensorial experiences (for example, telephoning the NEMC; reading and stating various serial numbers to the NEMC operator; hearing the EM technology ‘range’ the home; walking through the home to establish the carceral territory, and so forth) demonstrate the productive benefit of witnessing carceral mobilities in everyday contexts and engagements. Indeed, such mobile and embodied research interactions from the range test, immersed “in the ordinary commotion of everyday” (Ross et al., 2009: 615) were effective in aiding Angus to manage the pacing of the EM tests (i.e. the slow walk throughout an offender’s home) and to range the homes correctly (i.e. sticking the tagged foot in each corner of each room) in order to calibrate carceral territories successfully. These interactions also aided the researcher in gaining meaningful understandings of how EM is installed in the home of the offender, and the overall process by which the surveillant technology is set up to produce the EM penalty.

The practice and performance of transforming a home space into a carceral territory suggests that such mobility of objects, people, and practices are “entwined with a complex array of carceral particularities” (Schliehe, 2017: 118). Put differently, whereas geographies of mobility are often concerned with different forms of human movement (for example, see Cresswell and Merriman, 2011), these micro-scale mobilities play out in an environment where life and mobility at home becomes restricted and now rests in part upon imaginative yet carceral mobilities (i.e. putting your tagged foot into each corner of each room of your home to imagine where boundaries of EM will exist), coupled with practices of identification and classification (i.e. syncing personal with numerical information together to identify the offender on the HMU phone). As Urry (2007: 9) points out, movement, regardless of the scale of movement under consideration, “can be a source of status and power” whereas the restriction of movement is linked to social deprivation or exclusion. The diverse carceral practices witnessed in the ranging of the home reify the power of G4S Scotland and the carceral state and the exclusion offenders will feel as punishment through EM. To a certain extent, such carceral practices parallel prison environments, inasmuch as such practices augment broader questions of the connection between inhibition of movement, boundaries, and boundary-making processes (Schliehe, 2017: 118).
Furthermore, Urry (2007: 290) indicates how ‘securing’ mobilities means ‘securing’ people within “multiple panoptic environments,” which seems to suggest, along Foucauldian axes, the spreading of disciplinary power into society overall (cf. Foucault ([1977]/1995). In a similar vein, to secure the mobility of the offender in their home is to regulate their self-discipline of acknowledge the boundaries formed through EM. Securing offender mobilities also secures these individuals under the watchful gaze of the NEMC, and to a larger degree, the carceral state governing-at-a-distance (cf. Rose, 2000; Garland, 1997, 2001). We can see how mobilities at the small scale of the carceral (i.e. within the home of the offender) reveal a complex picture where “mobile and inertial practices can both stand for the display of status and power as well as being a diagnostic of deprivation and disempowerment” (Schliehe, 2017: 118). Once again, these smaller instances of the carceral are the components that, when taken together, form a larger circuitous carceral territory system that is perpetuated by the carceral state and pervades the community spaces and places of everyday life. In effect, the practice and performance of ranging a home for EM and its installation transform the home environment into a carceral territory, reifying the status and power of the carceral state and the deprived and disempowered nature of the offender.

**Operational freedom through mobility**

A significant theme which arose from my observations was the relative freedom Angus had in his daily work as a mobile MO. Besides his main task of installing EM in offenders’ homes, Angus’ work schedule was very flexible. While the NEMC would create his work schedule for one work shift, of which certain homes on his schedule had to be visited, Angus was able to move this schedule about to ensure reasonable driving distances and times to visit these homes.

Furthermore, Angus’ job also provided the freedom of moving about different communities in his car. Inherent in the go-along method are multisensory techniques which also acknowledge the importance of the perceptual memory of humans (cf. Degen and Rose, 2012). These everyday experiences were some aspects Angus reflected upon in our go-alongs. Driving gave Angus the chance to see different neighbourhoods and communities, and upon reflection, he informed me that he remembered the development of communities, seeing how they change as he engaged in his mobile MO work over the years:

When Angus received calls in his car, he spoke using hands-free technology to NEMC MO, and often while they conversed Angus could hear an address and know it; he was able to recall the person, place, and feelings and experiences associated with the address.
So while the NEMC may only recite the physical residence address, Angus was able to reflect on his experiences of prior interactions with the offenders who lived there. Furthermore, should the MP had relocated to a different residence, Angus was able to recall the reason for the relocation without needing to consult the log history or MP details. (field notes: 08/17)

To certain extent, motion and emplaced knowledge “served to mediate normative generational power relations” (Ross et al., 2009: 615) insofar as Angus also opened up to me about his experiences with particular spaces in the community. As we passed particular communities worked in by Angus, our conversations opened up into talk about places past (both in terms of direction and time) and associations with events that took place there. It was through some of these conversations that I gained insight into his everyday life at home, his locality and issues of importance to him: namely his strong ties to his wife and daughter, his sense of community, and his perspectives on redeveloping neighbourhoods while being cognizant of how lower socioeconomic status populations could experience these community changes. Arguably, these insights could not have been gleaned from more structured interviews. This free-flowing conversation encouraged Angus to share past memories, associations, and future imaginings that the journey brought to mind, placing his everyday locale at the centre of the research encounter (Ross et al., 2009).

The freedom of moving between field sites certainly reveals both the practical and necessary nature of the work of the mobile MO, yet it also highlights the access these workers can have in entering the personal territories of the lives of offenders and their loved ones. The movements within the micro-scale geographies of the home was another theme I observed in my field notes:

The third visit this evening involved an MP (white man in his late teens or early 20s) who had asked the court to be moved to his grandparent’s residence for the remainder of his EM period to ensure compliance. Originally, Angus was only meant to ensure the MP signed the appropriate paperwork for the transfer. However once Angus and I arrived at the MP’s home and discussed the visit with the MP, we learned that the prior MO had not ranged the MP’s home properly in their last visit, which meant that the MP was more likely to have a technical breach. As a result, Angus and I spent more time re-ranging the home for the MP, which added more time into the job/visit than necessary.

In order to range a home for EM, the MO calls NEMC to ensure that they have the clearance to begin a test, and indicate the HMU and PID numbers. Once the test begins, the HMU emits loud beeps to indicate to everyone in the residence that a test is occurring. The MP, while wearing the tag, must stick their EM leg in every corner of the room where the HMU is situated (HMU is set up in the most centre of the residence, or else the room in which most people use). From there, they walk through each room of each floor of the residence, ensuring that the radius can be established on the entire
premises. The MP must stick their EM foot in each corner of each room for several seconds, and slowly walk throughout the home.

I did notice that this noise for the test can be quite loud and bothersome, especially if the radius test is ranged incorrectly and must be redone. While walking through the home with the MP and Angus we came across the grandparents of the MP, who were visibly unhappy to see us perform this test (especially the grandfather, who glared at me even after I gave him a small smile and said hello, with my university ID clearly visible). He continued to glare, unhappy and frowning in the sunroom of the residence. While we had legal permission by the MP’s court order to be here, and it became clear for Angus and I, in the eyes of the grandparents, we were interfering with their family life, and as such Angus and I kept our conversations with family members to a minimum. (field notes: 08/17)

As indicated in the prior section, the range test requires the MO and offender to move about the physical residence and ensure the boundaries of EM are in place. In doing so we moved throughout different personal territories within the home itself, like bedrooms, bathrooms, kitchens, living rooms, hallways, stairwells, and closets. Typically one does not open up their homes and lives to strangers and in doing so have their personal lives out in the open for members of the public to examine. Yet the access G4S Scotland obtained by the Scottish Government to move about the offender’s home is a particular freedom for mobile MOs (especially as EM requires the offender to consent to this sort of access). MOs working within the NEMC may be able to communicate with offenders on the phone, which gives the former a sense of the latter’s lifestyle out in the community. However, mobile MO work provides more operational freedom to witness and engage in the monitoring of offenders ‘on the ground’. Interestingly one could argue that such mobile MO access provides a freedom for the carceral state, represented through the work of the mobile MO, to see the lives of the monitored as they live and the conditions of their living. In effect, both the meso-scale movements between different homes and the movements between the micro-scale geographies of each home itself proved to be analytically useful, inasmuch as such movements render a more nuanced understanding of how the carceral state was taking place within the personal lives of offenders (marginalized and/or formerly incarcerated) out in the community.

As indicated in previous chapters, carceral geographical scholarship has recognized the enrolment of mobility in order to punish through the use of transfers between carceral establishments in both immigration detention and prison (Gill, 2009; Moran et al., 2012; Hiemstra, 2013; Conlon and Hiemstra, 2014) and these transfers typically involve the movements of detainees and prisoners. Yet the movement of MPs between different homes to
ensure EM compliance is relatively insightful. As the situation with the MP in the above field note suggests, the transfer of these offenders from one site to another (where the former carceral territory would not ensure compliance, while the ‘transfer’ to the latter carceral territory based at the MP’s grandparents’ home would ensure compliance) demonstrates how mobility is used to punish offenders. In some cases, the case could be made that by uprooting an offender’s lives and personal territories at one home and planting them in another place, this act could be construed as a potential burden on the offender in the community. The possible tension, conflict and reorganization of works schedules of offenders and family members, coupled with the movement of necessary and personal items of the offender from one home to another can be difficult to manage as an offender attempts to comply with their EM conditions in the community. Furthermore, the movement of mobile MOs between different sites is also significant to consider. Indeed, the operational freedom bestowed upon the mobile MO to transfer themselves between homes may appear as Angus just doing his job at first glance; however, the mobile MO’s mobility highlights how Angus’ daily work as ‘compliance work’ can be rendered carceral, interweaving homes together to form a grand mosaic of carcerality in the community. In effect, the transferring of people (Angus, myself), objects (Angus’ personal items, EM equipment) and practices (procedures to install EM in offenders’ homes) once again configures and constellates a larger field site from an array of homes-as-carceral territories across a plethora of communities.

**Constraints on operational freedom**

While mobile MOs have some operational freedom in their schedules and mobility, this is not to suggest that these workers wield unyielding powers upon those they monitor in their daily work. In fact, it was through the go-alongs with Angus that I was able to observe constraints on his ability to complete his mobile MO work efficiently.

Angus relayed the difficulties of driving to scheduled points on his shift, as he felt that sometimes, half the job is just finding the place to visit (field notes: 08/17). Angus felt that typically, it was access to the buildings he was to visit, coupled with finding the location on his maps and parking the car were added stressors to his job. Furthermore, while Angus informed me that the NEMC scheduling manager does their best to group scheduled points in a more coherent sectors of Scotland (i.e. jobs within the vicinity of the city of Edinburgh and surrounding villages and towns, etc.) there were times where Angus felt the scheduler should
consider how they manage to schedule visits within a mobile MO’s work shift. I observed the latter difficulty in one field note:

Angus and I were coming to the last scheduled visit of the evening. This visit was a court-ordered restriction of liberty (RLO) order, and the MP would have the home monitoring unit (HMU) installed in their flat within the city of Edinburgh. This evening we had been visiting residences to check in on MPs who were living in towns in the Scottish Borders, areas in the southern parts of Scotland. Once we pulled up to the front of the MP’s council estate, Angus chuckled, indicating to me that after all the driving we had endured over the last several hours driving all the way out to the south of Scotland and back into the city, it would be nice to finish off a visit in the city as it would be more convenient for the both of us (who live in the city) to make it home at the end of Angus’ shift. As Angus began filling out the “EM Scotland – Operational Record” (a form which documents the personal details of the MP, the time, date, and mileage taken of the car, and other information), he suggested that for him, the greatest concerns to do a shift in the field was generally the distance it took to reach visits, and the scheduling of visits themselves. Angus recalled that sometimes it would take him hours to reach the visits he was scheduled for, only to simply turn up and check why some MP was tampering with the strap of their tag. Angus would always wonder why the NEMC could not send a closer mobile MO to this visit, rather than him. Angus indicated that some visits are just so far from the areas he needs to be for the majority of his shift, and it would take hours to drive back. Angus liked it when the schedulers would actually take a second to organize his shift with more common sense. It became clear to me that if the scheduler on duty does not consider the geographical proximities of all the distances between visits, Angus would have spent hours reaching remote areas with not enough time within the actual visit to truly engage in the work he needed to accomplish. (field notes: 08/17)

As we can see above, Angus’ frustrations with the scheduling of visits can certainly influence his impression of the NEMC schedulers on his shift. To a certain extent, mobility for the mobile MO can be freedom and a burden; while the mobile MO can alter their work schedule to visit homes in a way that can be travelled to in a more reasonable manner, the act of moving themselves there by way of driving has the ability to hinder the work mobile MOs are tasked with by the NEMC. With some distances taking ‘hours’ to reach by car, according to Angus, and factoring in weather conditions and driving in darker hours, Angus attempts to manage his work shift schedule to the best of his ability. However, as demonstrated above, there are times where Angus hopes the NEMC would reconsider the actual distance Angus would need to cover to reach these homes for visits, and whether the schedule they provide Angus should be reorganized accordingly. To not reconsider this could create conflict between the NEMC and mobile MOs in the field, as each could blame the other for not prioritizing the mobile MO’s work shift more appropriately for the tasks at hand.

Another constraint that came up in the go-alongs was the re-ranging of homes for EM. On several occasions in our go-alongs, Angus had to re-range a home, due in part to other mobile
MOs’ mistakes, or other mobile MO’s lack of care or attention to detail for a proper EM induction. This constraint was observed in one of my field notes:

The fourth visit we had this evening was to another decrepit flat in a council estate. Angus informed me that we were making a visit to this home because the EM system indicated that the MP was absent from the radius between 3:39-3:48am. Once we arrived and stepped inside the home, the flat was small, cramped and cluttered; the MP was a white man in his late 20s or early 30s (wife (similar) and two children (two young girls) were present). After discussing with the parents as to why the system would indicate an absence in the system, everyone came to the conclusion that the MO who originally ranged the residence did not have the MP stand in the shower/bathtub area—typically, the MO asks the MP to fill a bathtub with approximately a foot (i.e. twelve inches) of water and submerges their EM foot and ankle into the bath for a few minutes. This procedure ensures that the HMU can calibrate the depth of the submerged foot. However, as we realized in this procedure, antique or old cast iron bathtubs will interfere with the connection between the PID and the HMU, which would explain why the signal was lost with the HMU and why an absence was recorded. In effect, Angus had to re-range the residence, once again adding additional time into the visit, as he had to correct the mistakes of whomever ranged the residence originally. (field notes: 08/17)

Re-ranging a home adds time to a mobile MO’s schedule that they do not readily have; these workers are only provided approximately 40-45 minutes to range a home, and it is hoped that each mobile MO ranges a home appropriately, whether or not they are the MO returning to the home for another visit as required. Especially as it may take time to find the home in question, Angus informed me that he gets frustrated that other mobile MOs may not properly conduct EM inductions, as the MOs that are conducting EM inductions to the best of their ability are left to pick up the slack and are forced to resolve mistakes created by others’ lack of attention to detail or care for the work involved.

As Jungnickel (2014: 642) contends, it becomes clear that regardless of the nature of distance (physical, virtual, or symbolic) “movement and travel are deemed vital to the development of an authentic ethnographic presence and authoritative voice.” Indeed, my presence in the movement and travel with the mobile MO is a clear attempt to develop a more authentic ethnographic presence in the ‘on the ground’ work associated with EM. My presence also highlighted constraints Angus experiences as he engages in his mobile ‘compliance work.’ Similarly we can witness that, regardless of the distance the mobile MO must take, or the amount of time mobile MOs must use to range (or unfortunately re-range) a home, these constraints on operational freedom are needed to ensure that carceral territory continues to takes place; in other words, that carceral territory is maintained in the homes of offenders and proceeds as usual. Constraints such as distance travelled or time used for re-ranging homes, while mild annoyances for mobile MOs, are necessary, in the eyes of the NEMC, to re-
establish an authentic presence of G4S Scotland and the carceral state in the lives of offenders. Regardless of where the homes may be placed in Scotland, these practices performed by G4S Scotland re-presents (and continues to represent) an authoritative voice which pacifies and resolves the issues taking place in these carceral territories.

The Car and its Carceral Mobility: Extension of Self and the State

Car journey interactions were generated as Angus and I drove together in Angus’ car, travelling together to and from designated visits on his work shift. These journeys formed part of the regular routines set up to maintain the EM curfew of offenders in the community. In fact, car journeys were not originally envisaged as part of the data collection process, as I considered them more so as a necessary means of shadowing mobile MOs in the field in order to reach different residences in Scotland under EM curfews. However, these journeys slowly became an intriguing aspect of the processes by which EM as work is conducted and how it maintains carceral territory for offenders in the community. As the project progressed, it became clear that the conversations and ethnographic observations that took place in the car were potentially interesting data in themselves.

Attention to the car journeys themselves are important as place-making practices (Sheller and Urry, 2006; Pink, 2008; Ross et al., 2009) insofar as we can come to know and potentially understand everyday experiences through embodied, multi-sensory research experiences. Practices and everyday experiences like driving or ‘passengering’ (cf. Thrift, 2004) can become subject to scrutiny, turning our attention to the embodied experiences of different travels and distances between sites and focusing upon the multitudes of activities they comprise (Ross et al., 2009: 606). There has been increasing interest in the mobilities literature regarding the embodied experiences of driving and ‘passengering’ and the emotional, multi-sensory experiences of car dwelling (Sheller, 2004; Thrift, 2004; Ferguson, 2008). Before, en route to, and after visits at residences with offenders on EM curfews I was provided opportunities to ask Angus clarification on the work he engages in, the struggles he faced while working, and his insights on EM as a practice used within Scottish criminal justice. Car journeys also gave Angus time to reflect on questions I posed him, and allowed him time to offer up and share thoughts of his own accord. The car journeys themselves, as dynamic and place-making practices of installing and maintaining the carceral territory of offenders in their geographic residences, foreground movement, interactivity, and the multi-sensory, allowing the ethnographer to focus upon not only the research relationships but the
contexts and engagements within and throughout such relationships (Kusenbach, 2003; Pink, 2008; Ross et al., 2009).

Indeed, the “immediacy andnowness” of place-making practices were significant to consider within the go-alongs (Ross et al., 2009: 606). The meaning of places and significance for those people either doing the surveying or those being surveyed through EM were transformed over time through a continued practice of co-construction. As Angus and I drove from site to site, from home to home, and from carceral territory to carceral territory, it became clear that how Angus, the offender (and their loved ones), and myself each viewed the places which brought us together brings to light “a world that is not only perceived or conceived but also actively lived and receptively experienced” (Casey, 2001: 687; italics in original).

Finding ways to reinvigorate the work Angus conducted was another significant theme. Angus’ car assisted him in ameliorating stress while driving between MP visits, as well as preparing him for conducting home visits:

Angus’ car was spacious, and it was clear that the more time I spent in the car the more I realized he had taken the time and effort to make this space his own. In most respects, his car became his office: it allowed him a space where he could fill out records and log times, mileages and details of each visit he was scheduled for on one shift. While we drove around, Angus would play the radio, and the radio stations he liked were all preset for him so that when he wanted to hear news, music, or weather forecasts he could switch to whichever he preferred at just the click of a button on the car dashboard. Sometimes we would talk about the homes we were to visit that evening, our experiences of what we saw, heard, smelled and otherwise felt in the homes, and the conversations we had with offenders and their relatives we interacted with on several occasions. Besides conversations about the different homes we were to visit, Angus and I would also get into conversations about my personal interests as a Canadian student foreign to Scotland, my research interests, and why I chose Scotland for my PhD degree; other times, we chatted about our collective interests like sports teams and recent matches, and places we each have travelled to in Scotland and the rest of the world. When conversations grew stagnant between Angus and myself, he would generally hum to the music that was playing on the radio. I certainly did not mind this, as it gave me additional time to collect my thoughts and jot down in my notes my observations of the shift thus far.

Besides his radio, Angus had a satellite navigation system (‘Satnav’) installed in his car, and to assist him in finding an MP’s residence, he would input the postcodes of each MP residence into the Satnav to find the quickest way to each destination. However, if Angus’ Satnav provided him confusing directions, he would often look to Google Maps on his personal cellphone to either confirm the directions given on the Satnav or to find a more appropriate journey to the destination.
This was not the only technology in Angus’ car-as-workspace; beside Angus’ personal phone in the glove compartment, as a mobile MO he is also provided a G4S cellphone to allow him to call into the NEMC to begin each job, as well as the time he arrived to each site and the residence address.

In Angus’ car, his car-as-workspace contained a variety of items, such as a spare jacket, sunglasses, pens, extra pads of paper, used and spare file folders, gum, phone installation equipment for his car to enable hands-free conversation and for Google Maps on his personal cellphone, and hand wipes for visits where Angus felt the need to wipe his hands and jacket off from touching items in an MP’s residence. (field notes: 08/17)

Therefore, the embodied practices of driving and ‘passengering’ can “can create a place of communication” between Angus and myself; a place where the car journey itself gives us “a valuable time to talk” about and reflect upon the homes we just visited, the things we had seen, heard, and smelled, and the people we spoke to while Angus made his home visit (Ross et al., 2009: 610). Indeed, shared journeys led the researcher in an open, fluid, and evolving format. In other words, conversation gaps were less noticeable, as conversations with Angus was only one contribution to the mass of other elements that comprised our car journeys, such as the people, places, and things passed, and coupled with the sights, sounds, smells and feelings associated with the journeys, to name a few. To a certain extent, the “commotion of the journey” (Ross et al., 2009: 614)—namely what was passed en route, mingling with in-car activities like Angus negotiating routes, his attention focused on driving, our combined attention on finding offenders’ residences and parking, turning the radio on and switching radio stations, and the lapses between listening, talking, and distractions—provided “stimulus for, and interruptions and disruptions to, interactions” in our shared car journeys (Ross et al. 2009: 615).

In a similar vein, Bull’s (2003, 2004) research on ‘car habitation’ (mainly from the perspectives of solo drivers) has suggested that the soundscapes of the journey and the personal touches of the car owner to the car has the potential to transform the driving experience into a more liberating one. The association of car space to motion and freedom has been examined elsewhere (cf. Ross et al., 2009), despite the different context of sharing the car space between researcher and participant(s). However, while mobility is by now an established area of interest in carceral geography (for example, see Gill, 2013; Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017; Turner and Peters, 2016, 2017) objects in particular have been previously mentioned in passing in carceral context (cf. Philo, 2001; however for a notable exception see Schliehe, 2017) while there has been no attention focused upon car space in relation to carceral contexts.
Interestingly, one could argue that the G4S Scotland car itself exists as an object of carceral mobility. While some mobile MOs opt to use their own cars for various reasons (especially given the geography of Scotland and how mobile MOs are dispersed into the Scottish rural countryside to monitor, making trips to the NEMC impossible), other mobile MOs can use unmarked G4S cars to monitor offenders on their work shifts. As “objects and their movements tell tales of inner social worlds and complex interplays of care and control” (Schliehe, 2017: 115), the G4S car itself could be construed as a space of confinement which moves between carceral territories throughout Scotland. Due to its high level of mobility, the car (with Angus as its driver) constantly crosses boundaries of various scales, from different community and neighbourhood boundaries to the inside/outside of offenders’ homes. G4S Scotland is tasked with installing EM in and at a range of sites in Scotland, and in doing so the movements of these cars, as objects of carceral mobility, and the underlying power influencing these actions produce both imaginary and material boundaries imposed by the carceral state. Moving between different personal territories and a diverse array of living accommodations in Scotland, the car’s presence in the community evokes the presence of the carceral state in the community, of which continues to evoke “atmospheres and symbolic perceptions of closed space” within these offenders’ homes (Schliehe, 2017: 115).

To a certain extent, the actual and imagined object mobility of the car literally and figuratively “holds keys to control and self-assertion, as well as symbolizing powerlessness and inertia” (Schliehe, 2017: 125). As evidenced above, Angus, as one mobile MO amongst the G4S Scotland MO workforce, carves out personal space by imbuing materials spaces (like the G4S Scotland car) with meanings that express their identity or respective status within a particular space. For example, de Certeau’s (1984) concept of ‘tactics’ is significant to understanding the importance of objects to make sense of how they are used in particular spaces. De Certeau uses the example of a radio to underline his argument that it is only an object in the corner of the room until it is used/turned on, when suddenly it transforms the space and embodied experiences within—therefore, objects do have an effect (de Certeau, 1984: 211). The “visual, audible and haptic imprint” on the interior of Angus’ car is reflected in objects that are, in turn, “intimately connected to people’s tactics and their social worlds” (Schliehe, 2017: 117). As indicated above, personal touches Angus had in the car included several packs of gum, stationary, his personal technological devices, and preset radio stations on the radio (field notes: 08/17) Therefore, the alteration of the car-as-workspace through a tactical use of objects means that MOs can transform their spaces to assist them in coping
with and working through the work of creating and maintaining carceral territories in the community. Mobile objects, specifically the EM equipment of G4S Scotland, similarly express such statuses to the offenders whom are restricted to their homes for periods of time through EM.

Furthermore, much of the movement of the car occurs in line with the movement of people tagged to particular locations out in their communities and within the wider EM regime of the carceral state. Put differently, just as offenders move between courts, prisons and their homes, Angus and I travelled along various routes and paths to reach these offenders, ‘following’ their paths as they were documented in Angus’ records, and ensuring that the carceral territories we established in different community spaces in Scotland would be maintained and complied by the offenders we visited. In effect, the movement of the car as an object of carceral mobility becomes one of many objects, people, and practices concurrently working together to (re)produce carceral territory with multi-scalar effects. It becomes clear that, as a proxy of the carceral state, the car carries meanings with it, and while the car itself may be unmarked for security reasons (so that G4S MOs working in the field are not concerned about their safety in certain neighbourhoods) the car carries objects, people, and practices all of whom comprise the conditions needed to create carceral territory. In doing so, we can see how the movements of G4S Scotland cars into and out of diverse sets of territories (personal and/or carceral) occur at the micro- and meso-levels (within offenders’ and between offenders’ homes, respectively), and maintain the wider scheme of carceral territory-making at the macro-level, witnessed across the macro-scale geography of Scotland. Therefore, by taking up space in the homes of offenders and through various practices (for example, by driving and ‘passengering,’ and moving within these homes for an EM induction) it becomes possible to witness EM taking place in diverse set of ways and at various scales of mobility and geography, all of which reproduce carceral territory in the process.

**Conclusion**

The mobile method highlights the significance of the shared real time fieldwork, making visible some of the filters that shape participants’ social worlds (Kusenbach, 2003). By grounding this analytical stage of the project in the go-along/ride-along method, mobility “highlights the fundamental reflexivity of human engagement with sociospatial surroundings” (Finlay and Bowman, 2017: 272), invites participants’ lived experiences to supplement the research, and offers innovative ways to better understand how place and
space matter (Carpiano, 2009). This method accesses more mundane and less easily storied spaces that can be overlooked in traditional ethnography or seated interviews, and further investigation of mobile methods can not only broaden the fields of criminology and geography but critically query how carceral territory takes place within and between the homes of MPs and how such practices are routinized, maintained and perpetuated.

The above observations and findings underscore the significance of diverse scales of processes for understanding the objects, practices, people, and experiences of carceral territory while physically ‘on the move’ (cf. Cresswell, 2006). While many movements of objects and people are inherently embedded in the EM regime—from the routes planned and taken in the G4S car, to the distribution and installation of EM within offenders’ homes—it becomes pivotal to uncover the realities of carceral mobilities by following them beyond the NEMC and betwixt and between the community spaces of everyday life. It is through mobility and mobile methods that we can productively unpack the role particular people, objects, and practices of EM have in constituting and reproducing punishment as it extends from the carceral state.

Ultimately, ethnographers must remain mindful that the mobile methods we adopt or adapt raise particular questions of what kinds of abstractions we aim to produce, for whom, and the temporal and spatial contexts we study. As Spinney (2015: 241-242) states:

> It is certainly clear that one researcher’s ‘loss’ will be another’s ‘gain’ because they will be asking different questions for different audiences. We should not lose sight of this in attempting to produce some kind of new methodological orthodoxy; rather, we should always think carefully about…how we mobilize method to apprehend traces of movement in any quest to provide convincing and relevant interpretations.

Indeed, whatever our mode of enquiry, mobilizing methods so that we have the ability to be ‘on the move’ with our participants “is at its heart a call to be transformed by our research: to get involved, to feel and care and be moved by what we are studying” in the hopes that our abstractions will become less abstract as a result (Spinney, 2015: 242). In a parallel vein to Ross and colleagues (2009: 619), I found that interactions with Angus were dynamic, “characterized by a more free flowing dialogue, moving from topic to topic, returning to previous topics, [and] allowing unrestrained gaps and pauses” when Angus or myself felt necessary. Focusing upon the ‘materialities of doing’ alleviated the pressure to converse and allowing the researcher a richer experience of the car journey in motion and in between sites for EM installation. As a result, go-alongs/ride alongs, as one aspect of mobile methods, have
the ability to generate insightful understandings of everyday life as a mobile MO in a more nuanced fashion.
Chapter 8: Talking Territorially – Inmates’ Experiences of Electronic Monitoring

Introduction

This chapter provides an analysis of the experiences of formerly tagged offenders. In carceral settings, mobility is a key facet of the power geometries of tagged offenders’ everyday lives. Autonomous mobility is restricted along temporal and spatially sensitive lines; offenders are subjected to flow control and regimes of movement. As indicated in Chapter 3, a mobile ontology provides a way of thinking about the circuitry of people, objects, practices and experiences (Gill et al., 2016). Such a lens of circuitry benefits the theoretical approach of this project as it to make sense of the rhythm, periodicity, frequency, and the pace of carceral cycles as experienced by those routinely caught within this detrimental loop (cf. Edensor, 2010; Gill et al., 2016). Not solely understood as a way to describe carceral systems, the ‘carceral continuum’ comprises these sequences and loops of bodies, communities, and global flows of capital, resources and information (cf. Wacquant, 2002, 2009). The extent to which electronic monitoring (EM) influences the spatial and temporal rhythms of mobility within settings and locales suggests that, as a form of carceral territory, such technology can be vehicles of punishment which accelerate, decelerate, interrupt or distort the recurrence of routines in the personal territories of offenders’ lives.

Inherent to an understanding of carceral mobilities is the recognition that circuits return to their own starting or anchor point (Gill et al., 2016; see also Peters and Turner, 2017). Yet for various stakeholders, ‘return’ captures and denotes different meanings and interests for diverse participants. For instance, a return for investors refers to the efficiency and collection of profits made on investments. For those ‘released’ from custody or incarceration, a return to communities with prospects equal to or worse than when and where they left can be a disparaging experience, fraught with strife and struggle. A return for professionals and practitioners within the criminal justice system could capture the cyclical patterns of offender behaviour, coupled with the ‘revolving door’ of North American prisons, in which the circulation of poor, racialized men between city blocks and prisons is so common that everyday life gets fundamentally (re)figured (cf. Wacquant, 2009; Massaro, 2015). Finally, a return could also indicate the practitioners’ goal to reduce offender recidivism and rehabilitation while mediating a balance between cost-effective criminal justice initiatives and programmes (Gill et al., 2016).
Regardless of its usage, what remains clear is that the circulation of people, objects, practices and experiences, coupled with the proliferation of carceral environments can become embedded in everyday life. EM has become an increasingly complex entity within the expanding carceral state, a notion which I described in Chapter 1 and similarly refer to here as “a set of institutional configurations and actors that prioritize punishment, containment, detention, and/or incarceration for treating poverty and marginalization” (Villanueva, 2017b: 150; see also Beckett and Murakawa, 2012; Peck, 2003; Wacquant, 2009). The extra-territoriality of carceral spaces, as evidenced in Chapters 6 and 7, is the linkage which connects this study to the everyday life of criminal justice actors engaging with surveillant technologies. Thus far we have seen this extra-territoriality witnessed in both the monitoring of location and status of both offenders and monitoring agents, as well as the physical distances and routes taken and navigated by both groups as they engage in the social world surrounding them. EM and other technology-driven surveillance and management innovations (such as identity cards worn by monitoring agents and home monitoring units installed in the offender’s residence, workplace(s) and public space) effectively extends carceral space into everyday life, rendering carcerality and surveillance commonplace (cf. Patterson, 2007; Gill, 2013).

Now is the time to invite and speak to those on the other side of this surveillant technology; namely, those individuals whom are subjected to EM surveillance. Doing so allows them to talk ‘territorially,’ by which they are encouraged to share their experiences and struggles as authentic knowers of their own stories, narratives, paths and life trajectories, all the while recognizing their perspective and insight as I endeavor to examine EM as a form of carceral territory. In this spirit, the chapter is structured as follows. First, I describe the demographic characteristics of my inmate sample group. Data analysis follows this discussion, insofar as I reflect on themes which arose from the data collected and position them in relation to wider reflections of power, space, and mobility. In particular, I discuss the normalcy of EM in terms of the commonsense and commonplace characteristics associated with carceral territory. In addition, I examine how timepass and penal waiting ensure offender compliance of the EM curfew. Following this, I turn the attention towards the struggles of stigma or sticking to home or ‘watch-time,’ highlight how the feelings of ‘sticking,’ or being ‘stuck’ run parallel to aspects of carcerality. I then examine how the extent to which routines changed for both respondents and their loved ones, as well as the general freedom and mobility felt outside of curfew times and through transient living, taking into consideration the ‘unruly’ mobilities
experienced by respondents as they continually venture between the prison and their communities. Taking these findings together, the chapter will conclude by reflecting upon how carceral territory is an apt frame of reference to examine EM, especially as a particular and creative form of punishment imposed by the carceral state which extends carcerali

Demographic Characteristics

Of the ten interviews conducted with inmates at HMP Edinburgh, the sample comprised of two women and eight men. Eight inmates identified as White Scottish while two inmates identified as White English. The average age of the sample was 33 years old (the youngest was 22 while the oldest was 43 years old). The level of schooling varied across the sample, as eight inmates indicates they had completed secondary education, one inmate had a college degree, and one inmate had left school when they were 15 years old to get a job to support their family. When asked if they were presently in a relationship, seven of the ten inmates reported that they were not in one at that time, while the remaining three were involved in a relationship. When asked if they had children, eight inmates reported that they did while the other two inmates reported that they had no children. Of the eight men that reported that they had children, the number of children ranged from one to three.

When asked where they each had grown up, eight inmates reported that they had grown up in various communities in Scotland, one inmate had grown up in England, and the remaining one inmate reported that they had grown up in both Scotland and England, moving between different communities for all of their childhood and teenage years.

While the length of their incarceration and period of EM may be relatively brief in some cases, for these respondents their experiences of moving between the prison and the community is no less significant. In sharing their experiences, my respondents reveal the everyday realities of their lives beyond prison walls. Inviting these incarcerated people to describe their own carceral situations brings to light various and memorable experiences of themselves and their interactions with their loved ones. In essence, the stories my sample shares capture the quotidian atmosphere of ‘the carceral’ as it is lived and understood by the people confined within it, whether it be a prison or a home undergoing a period of EM.
Calibrating Carceral Territory: Commonsense and Commonplace
Characteristics

When asked about their interactions with G4S Scotland, in terms of phoning the company, being called by the company, or visited by them (to install or de-install the home monitoring unit (HMU)), respondents felt that their experiences with G4S Scotland was quite simple and straightforward:

It was simple and basic to set up the box [home monitoring unit], and they told me the standard terms and conditions—basically being in your house for 7pm and don't commit any offences, and if there's any issue just phone us [G4S Scotland]. Also don't touch the box unless we phone you, and make sure you don't turn it off. So there was nothing really complicated about it—it was a simple, simple procedure to have done. (Aaron)

It was alright, and the guy doing it was nice. He was just doing his job, and we didn't have much conversation, because he came there to do a job. Like I said, it was the Friday before Christmas when he came to my place to tag me, so you could tell he wanted to just finish the job and go. It was quite simple really, put the tag on my ankle, told me what to do, and then left. (Billy)

The women who come set up the box was alright… And it terms of experience, they go through basically, just, the repetitive things of what you can and can't do while on the tag. (Danika)

G4S was alright, and I think they are quite a good security firm. The boy that fitted my tag was alright, and the set up of my tag was pretty simple. (George)

Yeah they were alright, aye. I didn't have any problems. They came into the house and fitted the tag. It all seemed pretty simple to get tagged to my mum's house. (Isaac)

To a certain extent, one could argue that such experiences were expected to occur in this way. Viewing the interactions with G4S Scotland as ‘basic,’ ‘simple’ and ‘alright’ highlights the lack of concern the respondents had with EM as a practice and punishment. To these respondents, it appeared as a standard procedure that mobile monitoring officers (MOs) would instruct them of what the respondents can and cannot do while the curfew was in effect. Yet what becomes clear is that such commonsense and commonplace perceptions of EM procedures becomes a creative extension of carcerality, inasmuch as the timespaces of the home—which compounds human activity, the diverse hermeneutics of meanings, and social life together (cf. Schatzki, 2009)—are then reconfigured to ensure that punishment is imposed upon and sustained within the personal territories of offenders’ lives, however minute and banal the punishment may actually appear.

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13 Similar to Chapter 7, pseudonyms were used to ensure confidentiality of respondents.
Indeed, calibrating the space of the home into a carceral territory also speaks to classification of the territory to be imposed upon the home as well as the acceptance of the EM as a legitimate punishment. This punishment was seen as legitimate when it ‘made sense’ in its application (Danika); the ease of communicating the punishment of EM (i.e. of getting ‘tagged’ to your or someone’s home), the physical and symbolic bounds of the punishment, and the ‘simple’ conditions required by the offender to ensure that they do not interfere with the carceral territory’s continued calibration (i.e. ‘don’t touch the box unless we call you’; make sure to not turn the HMU off, etc.) are all significant attributes to ensuring that this particular type of penal measure imposed by the state is legitimate. Taken together, the commonsensical and commonplace-like conditions of the carceral territory for both MOs and inmates suggested that the carceral territory, as a legitimate punishment, would hopefully be sustained and monitored more effectively.

In effect, this form of punishment need not be a grand spectacle for the offender, nor should the form of punishment be so complex that the offender does not understand the terms and conditions of their confinement. To keep the punishment as simple and straightforward as possible was the carceral state’s attempt to communicate the territorial bounds of the punishment as effectively as possible, and to ensure that the inmates would have a higher chance of completing the EM period in the community. Therefore, while the visibility of the punishment remained minimal, insofar as the respondents suggested an almost lack of experience with G4S Scotland MOs, it is clear that the commonplace characteristic and mundanity (and indeed, the normalcy) experienced by my respondents indicates the presence of punishment was taking place, regardless of the severity of the punishment imposed or the proportionality of the interaction.

**EM Offenders as ‘Waiters’: Carceral Territory as Timepass and Penal Waiting**

Spatialized through the home, the punishment of time imposed by carceral territory gives us a view of imprisonment in which we ‘see’ offenders coping with timepass, allowing both them and ourselves to understand penal time and penal waiting as sitting around. Carceral territory encourages us to see EM offenders, not as physically trapped in their homes, but in fact as penal ‘waiters’ immersed in their own dysfunctional, marginalized and ‘suspended’ lives (cf. Medlicott, 1999). In terms of the struggles offenders and their loved ones faced while the EM period happens, focusing upon this waiting provides a crucial insight into how EM as a penalty and carceral territory as a state penal power subsumes the personal territories and
lifestyles of those in comes into contact. Indeed, “the analytical power of waiting…derives from its capacity to highlight certain features of social process that might have been hitherto been foreshadowed by others or entirely hidden” (Hage, 2009: 4).

When asked about what activities they engaged in while the EM curfew was in place, respondents shared how they attempt to pass the time:

It was mostly play Xbox, or watch tv, but you get bored of watching tv after being in here [prison] for so long, because that's all you can really do to pass the time. Outside, I'd go on social media and talk to people. But otherwise it's playing Xbox and that's pretty much it. (Billy; italics emphasized)

Sit and watch telly, watch football probably. Play on the computer, and muck about on my phone, checking social media. Just things like that to help pass the time. These activities helped me comply, aye. (Ernest; italics emphasized)

Just watch tv, play on the computer, and watch DVDs. Maybe I'd read books too. These activities helped yeah, light reading would help me take my mind off of stuff. Finding a room in the hostel and getting into a book helped time pass. (Fred; italics emphasized)

Honestly, I would just sit at home and drink. Drink and get wasted. Have parties too. Wait for the boys to come around, and we'd party and drink. Sometimes the kids would come around in visit, but besides that it was just drinking. (George)

When I was off curfew, I would like to play football, go swim, go to the gym. Yeah I like to stay active. But when the curfew was happening, I would just be watching DVDs, telly, listen to music, go on the computer, aye. (Hank)

I never really had many activities, to be honest with you. I was staying at my mum's place, and there's not much to do there in the evening. So when I was on curfew, I would just go to sleep, basically. I know I would hate to be awake and missing out on being out with pals, so I figured I should just go to sleep. Other times, I would sit in my room and watch tv, but sleeping was it most of the time. (Isaac; italics emphasized)

Female respondents slightly differed from their male counterparts in terms of passing time, as Danika and Jackie indicate:

I would just tend to be out and about doing what I had to do during the day, and deal with my housework, cooking, and things like that when I was in at night. Also getting my child organized, like with homework and for bed, and things like that. (Danika)

Just cooking and drinking (laughs). I liked to cook, but I also liked to drink. (Jackie)

As demonstrated by several of the respondents above, it becomes clear that imprisonment, regardless of whether it takes place in the prison or the home, “is the exemplary symbol of waiting, of being stuck in a space and for a time not of our choosing” (Armstrong, 2015: 1). It is not a far cry to suggest that the home may be a space where we choose to be ‘stuck,’ especially when passing the time with loved ones; it can also be a place where we engage in diverse range of activities which might have productive value (i.e. housework and cooking
versus checking social media, watching television and DVDs, etc.). To this end, I remain mindful that the inside/outside dichotomy of the home has been analyzed and critiqued, “with feminist scholars pointing out the patriarchal character of the association between masculinity and the public, and femininity and the private/domestic, in the light of the fact that the domestic can be the locus of oppression rather than freedom” (Moran, 2015b: 31; see also Rezeanu, 2015 for a further review). Nevertheless, the point underscoring this form of confinement is that for a particular timespace (7pm – 7am within a physical residence) what we may actually experience are feelings of being trapped or ‘locked up’ within a particular area all the while preferring the freedom of just ‘being out’ (Isaac). Typically the prison conveys this metaphor of waiting, “evoked when we feel stuck, caged, forced by others to endure a period of…time” (Armstrong, 2015: 1). While prison waiting may be experienced as particularly burdensome because it stops time (for the inmate) while the rest of the world remains ‘on the move’ (Cresswell, 2006), this type of waiting as rendered stagnant through EM produces the particular pain of “time standing still but passing away” (Armstrong, 2015: 2, citing Wahidin, 2006: para. 6.4). In effect, by being forced to wait on the margins in carceral territories can be considered a pain of which is witnessed from my respondents’ experiences.

Conventionally the temporality of imprisonment finds its spatial translation in the prison cell (an arguably crucial space of imprisonment), in which “time itself [is] compartmentalised through space” (Matthews, 2009: 37). Yet to understand penal waiting, as Armstrong (2015: 2) rightly contends, we should not solely consider it as “a form of stopped time and stilled movement” which focuses on particular moments and populations and constructs their needs in particular ways. We must also acknowledge the mobility embedded within experiences of imprisonment, examining how “waiting can be a mobile experience” (Armstrong: 2015: 3) which makes visible the inmate as ‘waiter’ (or in the context of EM, the offender released to their home and/or physical residence in the community) and other ‘waiters’ feeling such similar pains (the loved ones of the tagged offenders). My earlier work suggests that inmates will attempt to lessen the impact of carceral regimes by engaging in activities which takes their minds off or helps them forget their carceral environments for short periods of time (cf. Gacek, 2017). Indeed, the mobility of inmates “to psychologically enter the inner spaces of their minds to avoid and distance themselves from…prison life” (Gacek, 2017: 73) existing outside their anatomical control can be similarly compared to the activities engaged in by
these respondents (i.e. watching television, playing video games, going on social media, drinking, etc.).

Furthermore, while the prison cell “produces a particular visibility of punishment that furnishes our social imagination of penal possibility” (Armstrong, 2015: 5), I argue that such possibility should be extended to the geography of the home within the EM curfew. This adherence to a space renders a particular visibility to the offender and/or former inmate, making them visible to G4S Scotland specifically and criminal justice authorities generally (further discussed below).

Notwithstanding, it is clear that such resemblances of carceral spaces through timepass and penal waiting can be witnessed through the carceral territory of EM. Once the EM curfew begins for the offender “the swirling flow of life is broken up…into boxes of time” in which particular activities and movements are authorized or not, much like what is seen in the prison (Armstrong, 2015: 5). By slicing up life into spatiotemporal boxes, this logic of control through EM reveals a Foucauldian penal power in which “[w]e…become disciplined through the waiting process” (Kohn, 2009: 225). As indicated above, the calibration of the home into a carceral territory initiates the feeling carceral experiences and it is further sustained by the offender, their loved ones, and G4S Scotland through monitoring compliance. Therefore, when all of these actors come into the fore to ensure that, through monitoring compliance, the calibration of the carceral territory constellates together and crystallizes, carceral territory continues as a result, and the penal power of the state can be felt and further sustained through the waiting and passage of time.

The Monitoring Tag and Monitoring ‘watch-time’: Struggles with Stigma and Sticking to Time

As I have indicated in prior chapters, there is more to the carceral than a mere anchorage to the prison. Indeed, Gill (2013: 26) has explored the use of EM as a natural extension of or an alternative to mainstream carceral environments, suggesting that confinement can be independent of physical restriction. By drawing upon Carnochan (1998), Gill observed that forms of punishment that are not explicitly prison-based can be just as constraining, in a different sense, as traditional incarceration.

The risk of stigmatization was a theme which emerged from my respondents’ experiences. As Bülow (2014: 511) indicates, “the EM device is not only a technological artifact, but also has social and cultural content that may lead to stigmatization of the individual wearing it.” As
EM can lead to stigmatization, people who meet individuals undergoing EM “may ascribe normative expectations to that person, which may result in both social disadvantages and social exclusion” (Bülow, 2014: 512) especially if one considers how the stigmatization can relate to future employability (cf. Nellis, 2009a). Perceptions of whether respondents would hide the fact that they were tagged were similar in this regard:

Yes, eh, there was one time, my friend wanted to go swimming and I had to deny I could go because I had the tag on, but that was it. It was just the one time I had to say no (chuckles). (Aaron)

I used to get kind of anxious for people seeing me wearing a tag. Because dealing with, or out in the community anyway, it's easy for people to be judgmental or that had a brush with the law. So it was just another, you get to sort of deal with once tagged. And it wasn't easy to wear, as I was tagged in the summer, and that wasn't easy--I ended up walking around with long trousers on, and even that would be suspicious, you know? I do get quite anxious about being seen with the tag. But now being back in the prison it's just something I just want to put it in my past. Now that I'm back, would I hide it? No. But would I willingly disclose it? No. (Danika)

No, but obviously I don't want people knowing. If I wear skinny jeans, then it's hard with my body being pumped, and people are gonna notice. But if they notice, they notice. (Carl)

I mean I wouldn't walk around in shorts with it on. I would be embarrassed. So aye, I would hide it, aye, even if I was roasting in the summer months, I would hide it. (Isaac)

Indeed, these respondents would hide the fact that they were tagged, but only in particular contexts and certain situations. Getting tagged in the summer months for respondents was particularly difficult as it would indicate to others in the community that they had ‘a brush with the law’ and did not want people in their communities ‘to be judgmental’ of them (Danika). In addition, Danika reframed her thoughts to indicate that rather than hiding the tag she would not disclose this knowledge to others, potentially for further anxiety of judgment. And hopefully, with the passage of time, the stickiness of the stigma would rub off and be less noticeable in the community. While Carl suggested that he would not hide the tag, his suggested a similar sentiment like Danika towards disclosure: that ‘obviously’ he would not want people to know, and that if the community notices him wearing a tag, then so be it, but not because he has disclosed this information from the outset.

However, Hank, thought oppositely from the majority of respondents, indicating that he felt no reason to hide the tag:

Why would I want to hide the fact that I've been tagged? There's nothing wrong with being tagged, it's a good thing and better than being in the prison. It's a good thing, and it's just up to you to stick with rules and the times of the curfew. It's better than being in
a cell, and why would you want to be back in here when you could be out there on the tag? (Hank)

Certainly, past studies have regularly found that while most offenders consider EM to be punitive (and sometimes shameful and embarrassing at times, as indicated in the prior section) they prefer it to conventional imprisonment (Gainey and Payne, 2000, 2003; Payne and Gainey, 1998, 2000a, 2004; Wiloughby and Nellis, 2016).

Besides the focus of stigma sticking to them, respondents also indicated the hardest thing to deal with once released was ‘sticking’ to the time, or monitoring the time they had before their curfews began:

The time was the hardest to deal with, yeah. There was sometimes I was late getting in, but sometimes it was just the initial looking at the watch, sometimes from like, half six, quarter to seven, constantly looking at the watch and asking yourself "Am I going to make it? Am I going to make it? Am I going to be ten minutes late?" So it was really 'watch-time' that was the only issue. (Aaron; italics emphasized)

When you get tagged, you've got to figure out how much time you could do things before the curfew, and that put a strain on my relationship with my girlfriend. And when I was in here it was hard for her to see me, as there's not many buses that will take her from Dunbar to here, so that also added to the strain. (Billy)

Sticking to the time. Aye, sticking to the 7pm to 7am time. I'm a nighthawk, and I like being out of the house and if I can. Especially if I'm taking my dogs for a walk and it's hard to collect them. You can lose track of time without even realizing it. (George; italics emphasized)

Indeed, the theme of sticking to or being/feeling stuck is a significant theme which spans the experiences of my respondents. Along parallel lines, I concur with Gill (2013) that while imprisonment does cast a long shadow, one which may start from the prison and extent outward into society, carceral territory as a form of punishment becomes an apt frame of reference to consider the pains of waiting as a “state of ‘stuckedness’” (Hage, 2009: 7).

Unlike traditional incarceration, carceral territory is a distinctive geographical context which adheres to the personal territories of offenders and their loved ones, manifesting within and/or supplementing the fraught realities these individuals face on a day-to-day basis.

Like glue, the adherence leaves behind residue which exacerbates the detriment these marginalized individuals are already experiencing in their lives in the community. One could argue that such residue is the product of experiencing the pains associated to the EM penalty; in other words, the feelings and experiences of being in a ‘state of stuckedness’ parallels the feelings associated with aspects of carcerality, notably the detriment of social exclusion, the aggravation and frustration of isolation from the community, the shame and embarrassment
of being incarcerated or electronically monitored, and in terms of EM, the annoyances attributed to micro-managing times and schedules before and after curfews. Taken together, the stickiness of stigma and time and being or feeling stuck indoors during the curfew demonstrates how carceral territory, as a punishment, does its part to enforce offender compliance and to ensure that, in varying degrees, the offender feels punished, even within the comfort of their community.

**The Freedom of ‘just being out’**

When asked about their typical day in prison, respondents indicated how routines were assigned by prison staff to inmates to organize respondents’ typical days and schedules in HMP Edinburgh. A typical day for inmates in HMP Edinburgh can be summarized by Ernest:

Before you get sentenced, a typical day starts with 8 o’clock wake up, then breakfast ‘til around 9. Then it’s exercise from 9am ‘til 10am. Then locked up from 10am ‘til half 11am. Lunch at half 11, then locked back up from noon ‘til 2 o’clock, then you get recreation from 2 ‘til half past 3, then locked back up from half past 3 ‘til half past 5. Then after you have dinner ‘til half 6, then locked up again ‘til 7 o’clock. Then from 7pm ‘til half past 8 you have recreation again, then locked up from half past 8 ‘til the next morning. But when you get sentenced, it's pretty much the same routine, except that you get exercise from half past 12 to half past 1, and then recreation is half past 6 ‘til half past 8, and half past 8 ‘til half past 12 you have a work shift. Then 2 o’clock ‘til 5 o’clock you have another work shift. Being in here, and in that regime…it's like, you’re locked up then closed, and then locked up then closed--I think it's just done to break people, you know? (Ernest; italics emphasized)

Indeed, Ernest’s understanding of a routine day in HMP Edinburgh provides an apt summary of how routines shape the movements and behaviours of inmates. Linked to order, predictability, and control, routines can be seen by some as helpful tools for organizing the flow of time. Routines “create rhythms and patterns by squeezing and synchronizing time[,]” and become the manuals for what has been tasked or to be completed in the course of a single day (Ehn and Löfgren, 2010: 81). Routines are the maps of life at home and work, where many activities are charted in detail, and as “economizing devices[,]” routines, to a certain extent, may help one avoid making a myriad of choices, or having to reflect about various alternatives in recurring situations (Ehn and Löfgren, 2010: 81).

However, the lack of routine, or disorder and unpredictable nature of respondents on the outside of prison was a theme which emerged from my participants’ responses. When asked about what a typical day looks like for them out in the community, respondents had varied experiences, and most of my sample did not abide by a particular routine:
I had the day to myself, and it would just be driving about with my friend, either doing other stupid things or things that I shouldn't be doing and just, like, somedays I would be out with my girlfriend and others it would be out driving with my friend. (Aaron)

It would be wake up, find a way to get alcohol, get drunk and then just drink all day... everywhere I was, everywhere I went, there was alcohol. If I was on my own, I was staying at a bed and breakfast, and I'd be moving between those spaces. If I was on my own, it was pretty much drinking. It's not what twenty years old think of their lives, and I got into a lot of trouble and I had and still have a hard life. But that's it, I would go to anyplace that had alcohol. (Billy)

I'd always go to the gym... [and] I would definitely be out having a drink... I'd like to have a good night with the boys. At home I'd probably get hammered up, have a drink (chuckles)... or else just on Facebook chatting to birds... [and] maybe on the weekend go for a drink [with them], do a couple of lines [together], and then... bang them (chuckles). (Carl)

Crime and drugs, really, that's all I can explain it as. Just get up in the morning, and I needed drugs, and I would go wherever I could find them. And if I needed money for drugs, I'd go and shoplift. Go anywhere I could to buy drugs. (Fred)

Wake up around 9 o'clock, and take the dogs out and go for a ten mile hike with them. Come back, and then start drinking and taking drugs. That was basically my day, and I've done it for years. I was also a heroine user and that was my typical day, just drinking and taking drugs. (George)

Sometimes I would get up and take the bus to go see my daughter at her place, and sit with her for a wee while -- like a few hours just being with her. And then I'd leave and walk about, you know, just being out. Sometimes I would bump into my pals and we'd go drink. I'd go into the pubs for a while, just back and forth between the pubs. When I was able to keep a job I'd be working, but that didn't happen often. (Isaac)

As the respondents demonstrate, their typical days manifested as an array of choices in which they were free to seek out any pursuit they desired. It was not routine per se to head to particular spaces in the community; rather, for several of respondents, it was more so of an adherence to general places (i.e shops, pubs, etc.), faces (family, friends, and pets), and what I refer to as ‘chases,’ such as searching for drugs (Carl, Fred, George), alcohol (Billy, Carl, George, Isaac), the opposite sex (Carl), and the thrill of adventure (like ‘having the day to myself’ and doing ‘stupid things’, as Aaron suggests). Contrary to the male inmates’ responses, female responses indicated a more routine approach to a typical day on the outside of prison:

Typical day's just getting up in the morning, and getting my daughter organized and prepared and make breakfast for me and for her; then getting her off to school. Then, I would get myself ready and go deal with my education and things. Then perhaps go into town, and visit family, like my dad, and make sure they are alright. Sometimes I would maybe be doing a computer course, so I would be visiting the library and things like that for the afternoon. I was out of the house most of the day, you know. And then I would
return as my daughter would be due back from school, and I’d get the tea and things organized. (Danika).

I was just working at my job most of the day. Life was good, but I definitely made a mistake and ended up incarcerated. (Jackie)

Once again we see another example of how the female respondents engaged in more productive activities (home-based domestic work, and paid work outside of the home), only here we see activities engaged in a typical day in the community. Gendered experiences about the meaning of home has certainly been discussed by Rezeanu (2015: 16), especially when we consider the larger implications of conventionally placing women in spaces associated with care and emotional tasks, while men with “mind-related work, leisure, and prestige.” Even now women continue to be responsible for both organizing and engaging in domestic tasks both while within the home and when away from this space, more so than their male counterparts (Rezeanu, 2015; see also Kan et al., 2011). Therefore, the fact that female respondents would be making greater efforts to organize their homes and their lives more than the male respondents runs parallel to what the extant literature suggests.

Notwithstanding, “routines hold onto us just as much as we hold onto them, sometimes unwillingly and oftentimes unwittingly” (Highmore, 2004: 311; italics emphasized). As simultaneously comforting and frustrating, routines can be hard to acquire and even harder to break. Yet, what routine feels like, and how it is experienced, is by no means clear; it certainly can produce mixed feelings of both autonomy over life and adaptation to imposed restricted time, as Danika and Ernest indicate:

Yeah, my routine did change a bit, but not as much as what it would normally be like without the tag. It would be, not really, the same routine that I would have had before, you know? I would deal with everything later on at night, because I was on the tag. (Danika)

My routine did change a bit, yeah. Because when I got off the tag, I was finding myself getting back in the house earlier than what I used to do. Because I used to be out at my partner's ‘till half 10 or 11 o’clock at night, and then make my way back home. But once off the tag I was leaving earlier than I thought, so actually it did change my time schedule, yeah. (Ernest)

For Danika and Ernest, their routines slightly changed; while EM did not forcefully impose a new schedule onto them, it certainly impacted how they went about completing tasks they set out for the day and the management of their everyday lives in general. While the pair still retained a certain degree of autonomy while during the period of EM supervision, the imposition of EM into their lives had an effect upon how they organized their times and schedules, and especially for Ernest, continued to have a presence in how he managed his
times once the period of EM had finished. However, as Carl and Isaac suggest, their typical routines (or arguably lack thereof) were not impacted by EM:

I don't think it changed my routine. I just figured it was better than being in the jail, so that's it. (Carl)

No it didn’t change because I wasn't on the tag for long enough, and really the only rule was to be back to your home by 7pm. It was just better than sitting in a jail, so it didn't really have a big change or effect on my life. (Isaac)

As indicated earlier in the chapter, examining EM in relation to traditional incarceration has the ability for offenders to view EM in a better light, incentivizing them to comply with the curfew conditions (cf. Paine and Gainey, 1998, 2003; Wiloughby and Nellis, 2018).

Certainly, Carl and Isaac’s responses compliment such findings from these past studies. Notwithstanding, the point running through these experiences is that EM, as a form of punishment, can be experienced differently by different individuals and groups (cf. Payne and Gainey, 2000a; Bülow, 2014). EM may coalesce, conflict, or contravene with the offender’s routine and how they attempt to organize their life out in the community. While EM for these respondents had minimal impact upon how they structured their times in the home and out in the community, a greater consideration of routine warrants a concern of how carceral territory is legitimated and sustained as an appropriate penalty to impose upon an offender at sentencing.

In addition, such a consideration of routine can be evidenced through penal waiting within both the prison and carceral territory. All prisoners can be moved throughout their sentences, and over the course of their sentences, for many reasons, including ‘population management,’ a term of art referring to the movement of prisoners around correctional facilities to ensure building capacity limits (cf. Armstrong et al., 2011); for disciplinary reasons or sometimes specifically as a punitive measure for particular inmates (Gill, 2013); as well as “medical reasons; court appeals; revised risk assessments; new offending; for their own protection; to be closer to family” (Armstrong, 2015: 9). Similarly, EM offenders, once released into the community, can move or be moved if they (or the person they are living with who owns the residence) withdraw their consent to live in the home where the EM is established, wants to move to another residence to ensure they properly comply with the conditions of the EM period, or they fail to have authorization to move from their home while the EM curfew is in place and breach. While my sample was able to adapt their routines to EM supervision and the curfews imposed, we must remain cognizant of the fact that moving back and forth between prison and community, and between residences for EM, has the ability of creating
pains of punishment; put differently, it is not solely about sitting still in prison or the home, but the monotony of routine in the prison and/or the unpredictable circulations of life on the outside that could cause these pains to occur.

**Being anywhere but home: Transient lives and ‘unruly mobilities’**

When asked about respondents’ lives in the community, another theme which emerged from the interviews was the transitory living most respondents engaged in throughout their lives. Specifically, Aaron, Billy, Fred, and George mentioned their consistent mobility in a variety of ways:

Me and my girlfriend, when she felt pregnant, we went into the homeless wait program to try to get a house a wee bit quicker. We went into a hostel ‘til she was about 5 months pregnant, then they gave us a short term council tenancy down Leith Walk in Edinburgh. We were there for a year and a half, and our son—he was about or coming up to one years old at the time—they [the landlords] said that it was getting overcrowded at the one bedroom house, and they offered us the two bedroom council tenancy house in Edinburgh. (Aaron)

When I was tagged, I was living in Dunbar. I grew up there and then I was staying in Musselborough before I went to jail. Then I would move between homeless shelters and bnbs when I’d get out of jail. (Billy)

I've never owned or rented anything, I'm homeless. I just keep moving around. (Fred; italics emphasized)

In Glasgow I lived in a neighbourhood called Pollock, and I've lived there since I was 10. Back then it was all drugs, gangs, stabbings; that was the place for all of the crime. Then we moved to get away from it to the Scottish Borders, to a place called Selkirk, but there I also got picked on a lot… And one day I got fed up, I just wanted to get back at them so I started robbing their houses, and it just got worse from there. Now I'm homeless, and I’ve been homeless for some time. (George)

As we see above, respondents like Aaron continued to move about Edinburgh to find a stable accommodation to raise his family, whereas other respondents (Billy, Fred, George) were forced to move about upon release, whether they wanted to move or not. While it is clear that the duration of mobility for respondents was varied—occurring over days, months, or even years—the continual upheaval from one home or residence to another made it difficult for respondents to improve their transient lives. Interestingly, Billy expressed his need to be on the move:

Well, before I got the tag, I would be trying to get drunk--Ya might say, I don't know what you'd call it or how to describe it, but I liked to disappear. I was always somewhere else, I would have decided to go out with friends or travel around Scotland, even leaving my place for a half hour and come back. I would go visit my son in Dunbar, and when I
could and when I had the money, I was always out. I was always with my girlfriend too, even going for walks, like stupid things like that. (Billy; italics emphasized)

JG: Was it difficult for you to comply with the conditions of being monitored?

No, it just, I'd like to go on adventures-- how do I say this; you had freedom but you didn't. Kinda like you weren't in a prison, but you're still pretty much locked up in your house for twelve hours. (Billy; italics emphasized)

As the excerpts above suggest, the day-to-day coping, adjusting to or managing with carceral territory can make respondents visually assess their daily routines of life on the outside of prison. Per Billy, rather than feeling ‘locked up in your house’ one could ‘go on adventures,’ and through movement, find a greater sense and experience of freedom. In a similar vein to van Hoven and Sibley (2008: 1001-2), vision is of central importance for an individual’s ability to (re)make space within carceral environments, as the ways in which they look, are seen, or stay out of sight are in turn affected by the materiality of the carceral environment. To obtain more freedom while off curfew is to make yourself ‘disappear’ from the purview of those tasked to monitoring your offender compliance in the community. Indeed, Billy’s responses reflect Foucault’s ([1977]/1995: 200) assertion that in a disciplinary society “[v]isibility is a trap” as visibility means disempowerment, and the awareness of one’s own visibility status can potentially influence one’s behaviour, rather than being under actual or physical control. In a very real sense, disappearing could also be construed as a way to impede the carceral state’s focus upon you, and through mobility (i.e. travelling, as indicated by Billy) you can feel as if you render yourself invisible to the state surveillance upon you and the personal territories of your life. In effect, to be ‘always out’ and ‘somewhere else’ is to reconfigure your agency and, to a certain extent, be out of reach of the penal arm of the carceral state. Carl and Fred had similar perceptions of needing to be (willingly or unwillingly) on the move upon release:

When I got out I would go anywhere, try to go anywhere. When I got out I tried to get an accommodation, like a ‘bnb’ [bed and breakfast]. But the bnbs in Edinburgh are nae good, you can't even stay in one for more than a night before getting kicked out. (Carl; italics emphasized)

It’s hard to describe, like I can't really describe the spaces I would go. It’s more I would be seeing friends, acquaintances, and family. Travelling to see them or just go around the community with friends and stay with them for most of the day. Didn't like sticking to one place, so I was always moving around. (Fred; italics emphasized)

As indicated in Chapter 4, visibility breeds identification, inasmuch as it makes possible the ability to see and been seen by others. As Fred tries to visit and communicate with friends, acquaintances, and family, he is seen just as much as they see him out in the community. The
feelings of trying ‘to go anywhere’ (Carl) were coupled with the personal freedom of being out of prison, and relishing in the ability to have freer access of mobility. Yet Carl and Fred’s respective responses indicate the transience of their lives and the turbulence they may be facing. To an extent, the experience of ‘sticking to one place’ (Fred) could parallel the sticking Fred may feel from being ‘stuck’ in prison or at home on curfew. Therefore, ‘moving around’ may be a more enjoyable activity to retain some agency from the state surveillance imposed upon you.

Similarly, Fishwick and Wearing (2017: 44) have explored the extension of the carceral state into the community and into the lives of young offenders where “the legal-administrative measures of diversionary programmes create long distance control and discipline (including self-discipline), and punishment” over broad yet diverse geographies. The authors defined the movement encompassed within diversionary measures as ‘carceral mobilities’ insofar as such measures had the capacity to “coerce, constrain, and potentially immobilize the lived time and spatial freedoms of…youth” creating ‘liminal’ or pseudo-carceral spaces in homes, streets, or shopping malls (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 44). As a result, the need to govern the behaviours of these offenders are driven by what Fishwick and Wearing refer to as ‘unruly mobilities,’ inasmuch as these offenders are “often seen to be unpredictable[,] ungovernable, [and] ill-disciplined” (2017: 44). Conventionally these individuals are categorized as “vulnerable, marginalized, and usually highly disadvantaged” (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 45) and patterns of mobility and movement are then orchestrated and mapped by specific mobile technologies and practices—such as through curfews, behaviour management programmes, and probationary regimes—in an attempt for authorities (police, prison, welfare, health, and education) to manage and monitor these offenders’ ‘unruliness’ based on their whereabouts in geographic domains.

As indicated in Chapter 2, there are many points of compliance involved in EM in Scotland which govern offenders’ movements and their ability to abide by curfews or see their loved ones in the community. Failures to comply with Restriction of Liberty Orders (RLOs) or Home Detention Curfews (HDCs) can include being absent from an address to your presence is required, or being present at an address to which you are restricted from entering; the withdrawal of consent to use EM, either by the offender him- or herself or by the loved one of whom owns the residence the offender is restricted to within the hours of the curfew, and the tampering or damaging of the EM equipment itself (cf. Graham and McIvor, 2016). In the event of non-compliance for an RLO, G4S Scotland could initiate proceedings by reporting
the offender back to the court to decide, or in the case of HDC, the offender must report back to the prison from which they were released. Where a breach in the EM curfew has been proven, a court could impose a fine on the offender or vary their conditions of the order. Indeed, courts hold the power to impose an order restricting whom offenders can meet with and where they can go. If an offender breaches the order they may be liable for a sentence of imprisonment, or the court could rescind the order and re-sentence the offender (Graham and McIvor, 2017). Even technical breaches of curfews have meant that offenders have been arrested and placed in detention as a result of minor breaches of the conditions of EM (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017; Graham and McIvor, 2016). In turn, as the carceral state extends in the spaces of everyday life, it becomes clear that EM conditions and curfews have the potential to create unruly mobilities for offenders, and/or supplement and exacerbate the unruliness already existing in the offenders’ lives.

**Back and Forth: Breaching the EM Curfew and Returning to HMP Edinburgh**

It would be a truism to say that inmates are caught up in the “ongoing circulation between the two poles of a continuum of forced confinement” formed by the prison and the neighborhoods they return to upon release (Wacquant 2010: 611). Per Wacquant, prisons today have shifted their operations from rehabilitative to primarily warehousing “the rejects of the labour market” (Wacquant 2012a: 5; see also Jeffrey, 2010). A strong representation of punishment, the prison has come to serve three missions that have little to do about crime control: to “bend the fractions of the postindustrial working class to precarious wage work, to warehouse their most disruptive or superfluous elements,” and to monitor and police the boundaries of the ‘deserving’ citizenry while (re)asserting state authority within the restricted domain it now assigns itself (Wacquant 2012b: 240).

While respondents opened up about how they felt returning to HMP Edinburgh, there experiences were mixed. For some respondents, like Fred, George, and Jackie, it was not difficult to return to prison:

No it wasn’t difficult for me, because I’ve been to so much prison for so many years, it just feels like a ‘home’ to me. That’s the only way I can really explain it. It's like a second home to me. Actually, the prison has been more like a first home, to tell you the truth. I’ve been here in prison for longer than I’ve been out. And it’s not difficult for my family and friends because they're just used to it. They're just used to me going back and forth. (Fred; italics emphasized).

It was difficult to come back. But honestly I've been back and forth so much and seen this prison change so much in the last twenty years that it would shock you. I've seen this
jail change from when it was a Victorian building to what it is now, all renovated and things like that. But every time I come back in, there's been no changes. Nothing changes really for how a prison works for us. Every time you go through that door, and every time I come back, it all comes back to you, you know? You see the same faces, and a lot of the same boys that have been in here for years. Was it difficult for family and friends? Probably for my mum, but again she's a drinker so I don't know for sure. (George; italics emphasized)

No it wasn’t hard for me to come back. At the time it was quite easy to be in prison, compared to what it was like for me outside. Just difficult, all I can say. But it was hard for my family, aye. Just coz, obviously they knew that I messed up again, even after I promised I would change. (Jackie)

However, Aaron felt that it was difficult to return to HMP Edinburgh, and the emotional heartbreak they felt before they returned, as he indicated:

Yes. Leaving my son and girlfriend…was very heartbreaking. There was tears that night, so it was hard. It was especially difficult for my family. Friends, they come up and see me here [HMP Edinburgh] but it isn't long enough, so it's hard, it's hard saying goodbye to them as well. (Aaron)

Other respondents, like Carl, Danika, and Ernest, could especially feel their loved ones’ displeasure of them for not trying harder to remain on the outside:

Difficult to be back in prison, yeah. Probably difficult for my family, because seeing me back in here again... “I'm just not learning,” that's what they're probably thinking--"same old Carl". (Carl)

Yeah, because I felt like I had really let myself and my daughter down. I battled hard, you know. But I regretted shoplifting once I did it, because it was just more hassle of the consequences than I expected. Because if I didn't shoplift I wouldn't be back in prison…I do feel like because I breached [my curfew] I lost confidence and trust in myself, and I definitely lost trust and confidence in my daughter. Definitely difficult for my family and friends, because they hope that on your release from prison that that is you, and that is it, and that you won't create more problems back in the community. And they want you to succeed--but you don't. And when you don't it hurts; it hurts them, it hurts you. (Danika)

It was difficult to come back, and probably for my friends and family as well. Because they probably were thinking "this fucking guy, he's not changing his ways" and things like that. And that's gutting, aye. (Ernest)

Billy and Isaac found it hard to return to prison knowing what special events and moments they would be missing on the outside, and the pressures it could cause the ones they loved:

Yes… it was hard, because when I told my girlfriend I was coming back in here ‘til April she wasn’t happy. She told me I was missing my birthday, and my son's birthday, and stuff like that. I missed New Years too, and it’s just, it’s just hard being back in the prison. (Billy)

Yeah it was hard for me to leave, because my kids mean so much to me. They and my girlfriend, and my mum -- it was just hard for me to leave. It was hard on my girlfriend
mostly, because of my kids. My oldest keeps asking 'where is dad' and it's getting hard for her to answer that question, and it's hard for me too. (Isaac)

In their examination of the prison visiting room as a site of multiple and overlapping experiences of embodied presence and absence, Moran and Disney (2017) found that prisoners experience “multiple forms of absence, not least their own from the world they have left behind, as a form of presence. Similarly, prisoners’ loved ones negotiate as a presence the painful absence of the prisoner as a loved one, from everyday routines and experiences. Prisoners and their loved ones are therefore both present in and absent from each other’s lives” (Moran and Disney, 2017: 2; italics emphasized). In a related vein, my findings present similar experiences felt by the respondents interviewed. My respondents’ experiences suggest an oscillation or circulation between presence and absence, insofar as this presence/absence dialectic speaks to the continued disruption of their lives and the lives of their loved ones. Indeed, one could argue that a hallmark of neoliberal capitalism and the carceral age we find ourselves has decidedly become characterized by and experienced as “left-behind-ness, and a simultaneous fear of missing out” when we are forced to wait as a punishment or to waste time in a society which prizes the ability to be both productive and ‘on the move’ (Wafer, 2017: 406; italics emphasized). In effect, the constant appearance and disappearance of offenders from their loved ones and their communities can reconfigure and recirculate the personal territories of those missed by loved ones when the offenders are sent back to prison. In other words, the collateral effects of prison (i.e. the feelings of loss, neglect, displeasure, and resentment towards the offender) may reshape how loved ones classify, communicate, and enforce the boundaries of their lives. This may lead to loved ones’ reimagining their personal territories to such an extent that the offenders may not have the ability to access these territories any longer. As Billy indicates:

I'm still close to the people I'm still with before and after I was out. Though the only relationship that has changed was between me and my son and me and my ex-partner. It's made a lot harder on our relationship between us because she thinks that I was being selfish to come back here--which I mean, I think now I kinda was--but now when I get out I have to take her to court because I never get to see my son anymore. (Billy)

Indeed, collateral effects of imprisonment have certainly been discussed in the prison literature (Mauer and Chesney-Lind, 2002; Travis and Waul, 2003; Breen, 2010 Comfort et al., 2018). Such effects range from the more direct emotional and financial effects on inmates’ individual families (Comfort, 2008; Breen, 2010; Comfort et al., 2018), to wider social outcomes related to labour market opportunities (Western, 2002), civic engagement
(Uggen and Manza, 2002), and community health (Thomas and Sampson, 2005).

Respondents opened up of how both the EM curfew and the return to prison changed relationships they had with loved ones in diverse ways:

My relationship with my girlfriend, yeah. Me being on a tag did rock us a wee bit, just because I was tagged to my mum's house. And when I cut it off she [my girlfriend] told me that I was being stupid, and that going back to the jail meant I wouldn't be seeing my kids as often. I know I was stupid; it was my choice to cut it off and I regret it. (Hank)

My daughter would have her dancing classes or swimming classes or things like that in the evening, so usually we would leave after tea time to go and do all these sorts of things. Yeah, that was a bit of an issue for me when I was tagged, actually. Definitely more of an issue. Because, like, she'd start to, how do I say this, it [EM] would start to affect her, because she would start… skiving dance or swimming, or she'd just cut classes altogether. Because she knew that I couldn't say “right, let's physically take you there” or be there to pick her up after classes because I would be stuck at home. So she knew I couldn't do it, so she would just use it as an excuse to get out of going to these things because she knew we wouldn't be back in time for the curfew, and wanted to make sure I wouldn't breach. So yeah, that was hard for her, and that was hard for me to deal with, yeah. (Danika; italics emphasized)

As these responses indicate, there were emotional effects on Hank’s family when Hank returned to prison, seen in the loss of a father from the family. For Danika, she could also see the collateral effects of imprisonment in terms of EM, insofar as her daughter began to feel ‘stuck’ in certain situations. Indeed, once the period of EM began, her daughter knew Danika would not be able to take her daughter out to evening activities or events, or would not be able to pick up her daughter in the evening altogether. As a result, the daughter begins to shirk outings she might enjoy out of concern for Danika’s punishment to be ‘stuck at home.’

Once again we see the penal arm of the carceral state stretch into the personal territories of loved ones, either through the return of an offender to prison and the removal of the offender from the lives of their loved ones, or through the collateral effects and carceral feelings imposed upon loved ones through the punishment of electronically monitoring offenders in the community.

Finally, when asked if he would like to add any final thoughts to our discussion before our interviewed was over, Carl opened up about how he felt that the prison system should refocus its efforts to assisting inmates post-release:

I think that people are put in here [prison] for crimes for being drunk, and I think if people can't fight the drink, and it's just part of their system, then they [the prison] need to focus on that. They should help these people look for work, and things like that, instead of being chucked back out, where you only get to have a small amount of money when you're out, and you just end up going back into crime. Trying find a job is hard,
and with only 57 quid in your pocket it's impossible. You might as well just live in the jail. (Carl; italics emphasized)

Rather than solely relying on incarceration to handle deviancy, Carl reportedly felt that SPS should encourage open discussions about the needs and issues of their inmate population. Further assistance for inmates in obtaining legitimate work opportunities would be beneficial in guiding inmates out of the prison system rather than inmates be ‘chucked back out’ into society and ‘back into crime’ (Carl). Such movements between the prison and the community reflect Wacquant’s (2009) work on the ‘carceral continuum,’ and highlights the fact that without proper programmes and supports in place post-release, these marginalized individuals are forced back into carceral environments and situations where they feel disheartened by their families’ perceptions of them, trapped in a vicious and endless carceral cycle, and desperate to escape the continuum. Especially for the fraught and detrimental situations some inmates may experience upon return to their communities (as Jackie indicates above), Carl is correct to say that you might as well ‘just live in the jail,’ as opportunities for personal growth and prosocial development appear as empty pursuits. Therefore, even through the use of EM we can view a creative extension of the carceral as it reaches out into communities, and much like the prison, it recreates similar feelings of incarceration while the offender serves their punishment beyond the prison.

**Conclusion**

This chapter was an attempt to galvanize further attention towards the experiences of formerly tagged offenders, now inmates at HMP Edinburgh. It is clear that the distinctive geographies and personal territories which comprise offenders’ experiences of EM, as authentic knowers, need to be recognized in attempts to understand socio-spatial relations (Moran, 2015b). The point here is that the nature of carceral territory within the home and its purposes do matter to existing criminological and carceral geographical scholarship, and they matter intensely.

As this chapter demonstrates, there are insightful ways carceral territory is created, sustained, and legitimated by both offenders and their loved ones. Whether this be through the commonsense and commonplace characteristics of carceral territory, by drawing upon different examples of mobility and waiting in prison and the home, the struggles of stigma or sticking to home or ‘watch-time,’ this chapter reveals wider connections of power and space, coupled with “temporal flows which are multiple, nested, distorted and disciplining” (Armstrong, 2015: 9). In addition, we can see how EM can be vehicles of punishment which
alter in significant ways the recurrence of routines in the personal territories of offenders’ lives, from the freedom felt outside of curfew times, within transient living, or through the general ‘unruliness’ of mobilities experienced by respondents as they go back and forth between the prison and their communities.

Furthermore, this chapter has attenuated towards the ‘return’ of offenders and their loved ones, and the ‘return’ of the offender from prison to the home, arguably from one carceral setting to another. As a creative extension of the carceral state, EM as carceral territory allows the carceral continuum to persist and pervade society, and just as circuits return to their own starting or anchor point, inmates upon release return to their marginalized lives and unfortunate circumstances. In effect, the nature, form and delivery of carceral territory produces further insight into how EM has been experienced, as the significant themes addressed here connect back the bigger picture of carceral territory as a form of punishment imposed by the carceral state. Offenders and inmates alike are caught up in carceral territories beyond the anchorage to the prison; hopefully by recognizing this reality we can begin to modestly discuss and resist the reach of the carceral state’s penal arm any further.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

Introduction

This project was an attempt to galvanize further attention towards aspects of carcerality in our everyday lives. Supplemented by existing criminological and carceral geographical scholarship, this project was as a desire to “broaden the conceptual and analytical contexts in which imprisonment is situated” (Mitchelson, 2012: 148). In the last chapters, I have begun to explore conceptions of carceral territory, highlighting its importance within academic examinations of carcerality, and imagining how carceral territory fits in and amongst the overwhelming and overarching societal spread of the ‘carceral.’ Carceral territory has become an appropriate frame of reference to reconsider carcerality within empirical research of criminology, carceral geography, and mobility studies; within methodologies and methods of carceral work, like institutional and mobile ethnography and inmate interviews; and across various research sites, like the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC), the prison, and the home. Each are apprised of a comprehensive level of depth and nuance, yet the importance of the project lies in the overarching notion of carceral territory and where this notion, through its recognition, can take us.

The concluding chapter begins by briefly revisiting carceral territory in terms of the spread of the carceral throughout society. By stressing the linkages between people, punishment and places, this project has come to bear upon the wider yet intricate geographies of marginalisation within which people, punishment, and places are intimately connected, and how carcerality manifests within, throughout, and beyond these linkages. I also address the limitations of the study, and consider future considerations of this carceral work. By recognizing the carceral territories created and maintained in the homes of offenders allows us to see another example of how carceral states have been established in the West. Perhaps it is now time for future research and policy to critically reconsider whether the reduction, reversal, or outright razing of these carceral states is a warranted venture (for a further discussion of razing the carceral state, see Gottschalk, 2015). Connecting carceral territory to these reflections will be reconsidered and will conclude the chapter.
Recognizing Carceral Territory: A Step Towards Resisting the Spread of the Carceral State?

As Mincke contends, immobilization “makes sense in the context of a society that prizes anchorages: family, nation, culture, class, country, or even the company, with every individual asked to stabilize in different spaces” (2017: 238; italics emphasized). To a certain extent, laying roots is part of the human experience: “to be human is to have and to know your place” (Cresswell, 2006: 31). Disciplining and social functioning could then be gained from “the assignment of a geographical, social, professional, and familial position” (Mincke, 2017: 238). Compulsory rooting, such as that experienced by electronic monitoring (EM), could be seen as a way to prevent disorders inevitably arising from uncontrolled mobility; that is, from the uncontrolled mobility of those deemed incapable of moving responsibly, insofar a self-governing manner exists and is maintained within society (cf. Rose et al., 2006; Valverde, 2010). In effect, a carceral anchorage to the home would become necessary in order to ensure that those formerly incapable would become responsibilized and could be trusted to know how to move without additional supervision.

Upon further inspection, however, we can see how the legitimation of the carceral anchorage to the home requires a comprehensive level of empirical scrutiny which this project has offered. As evidenced from this project, carceral territory constitutes the imposition of a particular punishment upon the offender, namely the targeting of the personal territories of the offender’s home or physical residence. While in theory the punishment is imposed only on the offender by the carceral state, my findings have suggested otherwise; in practice, the effects of carceral territory stretch out farther than merely the offender, coming into contact with and entrapping their loved ones in particular ways.

Carceral scholarship in the realms of criminology, geography, and so forth are pushing at the boundary of the ‘carceral’ definition (Moran, 2017: 9). Although “incarceration” has conventionally come to refer to “the legal confinement of sentenced offenders under the jurisdiction of the state” (Moran, 2017: 8), carceral scholarship continues to examine and interrogate the myriad ways in which persons could be, and indeed are, confined by other means (such as unlawful imprisonment, kidnap, abduction, curfew, grounding), or even the means by which people could confine themselves (phobias, cultural practices, competing gang territories, and so on) (Moran, 2017: 8-9). Certainly, as this project has pointed out, a vast array of brilliant yet diverse carceral scholarship continues to reconsider the vast
latitudes of the ‘carceral.’ Through synthesizing and synergizing more sophisticated comprehensions of how these carceral geographies form, take place, and sustain themselves in our society, we are opening the bounds and taking a more lateral approach to interpreting the ‘carceral’ as not necessarily limited to state-sanctioned legal imprisonment (cf. Moran, 2017). While such interpretations can include the conventional, state-sanctioned spaces of incarceration which hold sentenced prisoners, this is not an exhaustive approach to the carceral; interpretations also encompass “spaces of detention of refugees, noncitizens, asylum seekers, the trafficked, and the renditioned,” (Moran, 2017: 9) as well as “forms of confinement that burst internment structures and deliver carceral effects without physical immobilization” (Moran et al., 2013: 240) like EM, surveillance, and carceral territory. Therefore, carceral territory, as one form of confinement within the broad scope of carceral geography, is an apposite frame of reference to geographically contextualize the punishment of EM, inasmuch as it has the ability to manifest itself “in mobile notions of the carceral” (Moran, 2017: 9) and adhere to the much more personal and nuanced territories of individuals’ lives.

Indeed, a more lateral approach to interpreting carcerality and mobility can be evidenced from each analysis chapter this project has undertaken. In a literal sense, moving between the analyses chapters of the project demonstrates how the use of movement takes carceral scholarship generally and carceral territory specifically into new directions of inquiry. In Chapter 6 ethnographic observations were conducted at the NEMC as a way in which to initiate a further examination of how the EM programme operated in Scotland. My observations allowed me to examine the relations between monitoring officers (MOs) working at the NEMC, as well as the organizational structures within the NEMC itself. It became clear that the MO work of sensing disruption, coupled with the responsibilization strategies and participatory surveillance witnessed in my field notes, were used to not only render monitored persons (MPs) visible, knowable, and locatable, but to ensure the order and maintenance of carceral territories out in the homes of MPs. Following on, Chapter 7 examined the work of EM surveillance ‘on the ground,’ riding along with Angus in his car as he conducted his EM work. Calibrating carcerality through ‘ranging’ a home, as well as the carceral mobility of the G4S Scotland car itself, indicates how the physical movement to reach homes and install EM surveillance constitutes the material manifestation of the carceral state within the homes of MPs and their loved ones. Moving to Chapter 8 the project situates itself within HMP Edinburgh where I conducted semi-structured interviews with ten inmates.
Demonstrating wider reflections of power, space, and mobility, the commonsense and commonplace characteristics of EM as a carceral territory arose from conversations with inmates, as well as how aspects of timepass and penal waiting ensure compliance of the EM curfew. Inmates also experienced struggles of stigma, of sticking to home or to ‘watch-time.’ Taken in aggregate, these findings highlight how feelings of ‘sticking,’ or being ‘stuck’ in carceral territory run in a similar vein to aspects of carcerality experienced in the prison. In a real sense, the excluded became the stuck; stuck within lives which required assistance and support from social services they could not reach (both literally and figuratively speaking) on their own. Their experiences also shed light upon how routines changed for themselves and their loved ones; such a general freedom and mobility felt outside of curfew times and through transient living was especially felt in regards to the ‘unruly’ mobilities experienced by inmates moving back and forth betwixt and between the prison and their communities, caught within a carceral continuum with multi-scalar effects (cf. Wacquant, 2009, 2010, 2012a, 2012b).

In effect, the concept of carceral territory is further examined in various sites (the NEMC, the home, within inmates’ experiences), all of which suggests that carceral territory can be reasonably extended to EM as an apt frame of reference. Each chapter considers carceral territory amongst the politics and dynamics of mobility; by capturing the observations and experiences of carceral territory in a variety of ways, this concept supplements greater considerations of carceral mobilities within and beyond the larger discipline of carceral geography (cf. Turner and Peters, 2017). In addition, by moving across chapters this project offers evidence of and critiques the ways in which the normality of contemporary surveillance has developed and is experienced by and through the people, objects, and practices associated with the operation and management of EM surveillance in Scotland.

Furthermore, this project provides a way in which to map out sites of power and knowledge (cf. Youngblood Jackson, 2013) where EM, as a surveillant technology, operates and monitors those it has been instructed to survey at the command of the state. Drawing upon carceral geography, criminology, and other cognate disciplines as this project as done reconsiders “how the multiplicity of carceral spaces ultimately work together to create the carceral society that is so common to modern day descriptions” (Brown, 2014: 386). Indeed, this project makes available a sort of cartography which highlights multiple forms of confinement and mobility (especially for those marginalized and/or incarcerated populations)
in the shadows of the carceral state (cf. Beckett and Murakawa, 2012), a process of tracing out some of the forces at play in the reproduction of the ‘carceral’ beyond the anchorage to the prison. The use of the private security firm G4S Scotland by the Scottish Government to monitor offenders in the community could be rightly argued as one tool of the carceral state’s arsenal; put differently, the penal arm of the state which is charged with the task of “containing the surplus populations constantly (re)produced by the neoliberal paradigm of capitalist development” (De Giorgi and Fleury-Steiner, 2017: 3). By recognizing the carceral territory created, sustained, and perpetuated in the homes of offenders in their communities, I seek to extend the critique of the carceral state in a direction which supplements the academic clarion call for greater attention towards the extension of carceral logics outside of prison walls and the larger, “punitive governance of social marginality through carceral expansion” (De Giorgi and Fleury-Steiner, 2017: 2). Indeed, the carceral state now includes not only a country’s “vast archipelago of jails and prisons but also the far-reaching and growing range of penal punishments and controls that lie in the never-never land between the gate of the prison and full citizenship” for the excluded of society (Gottschalk, 2014: 289). Notable scholars anticipated these penal developments (cf. Cohen, 1979, 1985; Feeley and Simon, 1992; Simon, 2007), and fortunately there continues to be great interest in and concern for the dynamics and politics of carceral expansion (Lynch, 2001; see also Dolovich, 2011; Archer Alvaré, 2017; Coddington, 2017; Guenther, 2017; Headworth and Ossei-Owusu, 2017; Whetstone and Gowan, 2017).

As De Giorgi and Fleury-Steiner (2017: 7) contend, current mainstream penal reform efforts have been aimed at reducing prison populations in the West, and coupled “with the support of corporate actors eager to capitalize on the resulting human surplus in poor and segregated…areas” and communities, such efforts are no more than “simply technocratic plans to rationalize the carceral apparatus—initiatives dictated by fiscal concerns over rising correctional expenditures rather than by any serious concern for the welfare of prisoners and of the dispossessed communities they come from” (De Giorgi and Fleury-Steiner, 2017: 7; see also Aviram, 2015; De Giorgi, 2015; 2017; Gottschalk, 2015). In this spirit, distinguishing carceral territory as an appropriate frame of reference for geographically contextualizing the monitoring practices and experiences of EM is to add to these discussions, as well as to further query the carceral state crisis as it exists. In a parallel vein to De Giorgi and Fleury-Steiner’s (2017) assertion, it becomes clear that only “a massive reinvestment in social welfare, public education, free health care, affordable housing, and a
guaranteed basic income—that is, a renewed struggle for the social wage—can begin to address the structural violence produced by a [carceral] system of neoliberal governance [now] rooted in the normalization of human disposability” (2017: 7). Certainly, we could do more to engage with civil society and rouse public interest in resisting the spread of the carceral throughout society. By considering carceral territory in the way the project has outlined, hopefully we can spark the flames of further public concern towards how we punish, who benefits by this punishment, and whether the punishment espoused by EM and the expanding carceral state is warranted, proportionate and appropriate in its delivery and application.

**Limitations of the Study**

While much has been examined from the present study, no research is immune from limitations. Indicating the limitations of this thesis project below can hopefully contribute to future directions in investigating the monitoring practices and experiences of EM offenders, as well as the continued spread of the carceral throughout society.

First, while I have made significant attempts to acknowledge and be reflexively open-minded to the experiences the inmates at Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Edinburgh have shared, I do realize the epistemological ground I stand on while engaging in such research. As I indicated in Chapter 5, my standpoint impacts my perceptions of these inmates’ experiences, and while I have gained some understanding of their struggles—moving between the prison and their communities—my experiences are not relatable to theirs. This study only provides pieces and fragments of knowledge that my sample of respondents have chosen to share. Sharing the social-constructivist understanding of subjective ‘truths,’ I cannot make the claim that the study illustrates these inmates’ ontological experiences as a whole (Rapley, 2001) nor can I generalize the findings presented here to inmate populations across Scotland, let alone further afield. Furthermore, while it is true that my standpoint barricades my efforts to ‘truly’ understand the small sample’s experiences, I am not suggesting this research is all for naught. Instead, this research project highlights the importance of subjective experiences from various standpoints, and the attempts made by academic inquiry to bridge a relationship between researchers and the individuals we ask to engage in our research (Berger, 2013; Mallozzi, 2009). Doing so speaks to the significance of personal experiences that individuals can share when they move through similar life-course events (i.e. the incarceration period,
followed by release) and the need for researchers to examine how individuals understand themselves alongside their own experiences of carcerality (cf. Gacek, 2017, 2018).

Second, the decision to have a purposive, snowball sample impacts the type of experiences mentioned in the interviews. In other words, while purposively seeking out individuals that have experienced EM was a main objective of the thesis project, it is noteworthy that in terms of such experiences, there is a potential that respondents with similar experiences will choose to participate in the study (cf. Flick, 2009), a caution to which I raised in Chapter 5. Indeed, similar experiences could alter the findings of the study in general. Similarly, I recognize the limitations of a sample recruited through snowballing techniques, insofar as inmates of HMP Edinburgh were encouraged to recruit others within the prison to participate in the study, and those willing to sit down for an interview were to notify Scottish Prison Service (SPS) Operations’ management of their interest. At the same time, SPS Operations’ management were encouraged by the researcher to compile a list of potential respondents for the study. As I relied on SPS Operations’ management to recruit respondents for the study, there is the chance that they would compile a list of respondents who may have similar experiences of EM. Therefore, while the benefits of purposive, snowball samples are simultaneously their own weaknesses (cf. Geddes et al., 2018; see also Yin, 2009, 2011), it is significant for researchers to acknowledge the benefits and costs of implementing such samples, and be cautiously aware of the experiences their participants share within the research encounters (Gacek, 2018). Doing so illustrates the need for future research to incorporate additional methods (i.e. surveys, questionnaires, diaries, journals, prison poetry and writings, etc.) to triangulate various sources of knowledge that illuminates experiences of incarceration and EM within inmate populations.

Third, observations at both the NEMC (Chapter 6) and riding along with Angus (Chapter 7) can also become constrained by particular limitations. For example, seasonal weather conditions are conventionally largely beyond researcher control (cf. Finlay and Bowman, 2017) and may limit access to EM operators and their locations. In particular, I did not have access to a car to make my own way to these research sites, and had to rely primarily on public transportation. Especially during the winter, sessions can be cold and difficult to access with snow and ice on roads and tracks, and sessions were timed with the NEMC research director to ensure travel modes that are more sheltered (i.e. buses and trains). In addition, when the days grow shorter in the winter months, observations may be limited in
terms of what I could see from Angus’ car. In effect, time of day is another important methodological consideration, as mobile ethnographies “generally capture a brief snapshot of local daily rhythm” (Finlay and Bowman, 2017: 271). Observations at the NEMC and riding along with Angus occurred during evening times where I was told by the NEMC research director more ‘activity’ takes place. Going forward researchers could repeat mobile ethnographies across a wider range of times to account for diverse rhythms in the field.

Fourth, the sample of inmates interviewed in Chapter 8 was capped at ten, due to the time restraints of both the thesis project and degree completion. Furthermore, I began to reach data saturation towards the tenth interview, and while data saturation is generally a subjective limit imposed by the researcher (cf. Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Corbin and Strauss, 2015; Gentles et al., 2015) I recognize that there is a chance that a larger sample of inmates could alter the themes that had emerged from the interviews. While such a limitation may impact the other knowledges and experiences that could be shared, the significance of qualitative super quantitative research suggests that even a sample size of one person is still one person; a pebble dropped into a pond still has the potential to make waves, regardless of the size of waves the pebble produces. Human experience is crucial to such empirical work, as it can provide a significant amount of knowledge, information, and experience that enriches academic inquiry. Rather than assessing numbers and data trends, I sought to promote the humanness of the sample, the intricacies of experience, and the complexities embedded of being within our complicated, social world.

Fifth, my own subjectivity, in terms of theoretical preferences and convictions in analyzing the emergent themes that arose from the inmate interviews is a potential limitation. In other words, contributions to criminological and geographical literature have outlined themes which could arise when observing surveillant technologies through institutional ethnography (cf. Smith, 2008, 2014) as well as speaking to offenders about EM experiences (cf. Hucklesby, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013). While at the same time, however, I felt it necessary that within data analysis I remain open to the experiences my respondents share. The themes that theory determines and what themes emerge in practice can be a difficult balancing act for researchers, and while this academic project attempted this balancing act, the themes that arose are not an exhaustive list. There is the potential for existing themes that this academic project has not recognized. Therefore, it is important for researchers to balance theory and practice the best they can, as doing so opens up fascinating observations within making sense
of carceral and compliance work, respectively, which inevitably enhances academic inquiry going forward.

Sixth, it is significant that the respondents interviewed had been recruited from HMP Edinburgh. Therefore, recruiting a sample of inmates from a particular prison may impact the findings that arose from the experiences inmates shared, as the requirements for admission to the prison may have produced more of a homogeneity in the sample than might otherwise have been the case.

Seventh and final, the choice of venue to conduct inmate interviews may impact the experiences shared by the respondents. As mentioned above, while researchers must be aware of sampling techniques to recruit participants, the location for the interview must be acknowledged when examining the respondents’ experiences (cf. Moran et al., 2017). As indicated in Chapter 5, HMP Edinburgh provided me with a small office in their building so that I could interview my sample of respondents. Ideally, the office was to be convenient for both the participants and myself as it located within the prison itself. However, the fact that the location of the interviews took place within the same building could impact their experiences of returning to their communities upon release and returning to the prison once respondents breached their EM curfews. While I had made it clear to my sample that I did not represent the HMP Edinburgh, Scottish Prison Service (SPS) or G4S Scotland, some respondents indicated before our conversations that they thought if they answered all of my questions they would be available for EM again. I made it clear before the interviews began that my work bears no affiliation to such organizations or such ideas. Therefore, it is important for researchers to acknowledge the spaces they use to conduct their interviews, especially when it appears that particular criminal justice institutions have connections with the respondents-as-inmates or respondents-as-clients. Such decisions may impact the findings that arise from the interviewing process.

**Implications of the Study**

Reconsidering EM as a form of carceral territory is a fascinating empirical endeavour. Much like the carceral state, this reconsideration merits further examination in where the current trajectory of EM surveillance is taking us. In this spirit, I address several implications and directions of my research below.
From the outset it is no mystery that the situation of the carceral states in the USA and the UK have become “a frightening colossus of confinement” (Aviram, 2014: 413), and to resolve this situation one could argue that EM has been legitimated as a viable alternative to increase diversion and decarceration and to decrease incarceration rates and costs (cf. Nellis, 2013c, 2015; Nellis et al., 2013; Graham and McIvor, 2016). While I recognize this argument as a fruitful endeavour to deal with mass incarceration in the West, I query whether a focus upon population rates and costs of prison on the one end and EM on the other merely obscures the underlying culture of control pervading our understanding of punishment (cf. Garland, 2001). As Kato (2017: 198) contends, even though demands in the West to dismantle mass incarceration “are increasingly gaining traction, it will not necessarily lead to a reduction of the carceral state.” Emerging trends which centre on surveillance and security, coupled with how policy-making is negotiated and social upheavals are managed, puts more of the onus upon the controlling aspects associated with the carceral state and less upon the enclosing characteristics of traditional incarceration. Therefore, declines in incarceration and increases in EM “should be seen as more of a realignment than an end to the carceral state” (Kato, 2017: 198; see also Simon, 2007) and while people may elude incarceration it is through EM that “they are nevertheless enmeshed within a carceral web that is more widening and diffuse” (Kato, 2017: 217; italics emphasized). Cognitive assumptions, normative commitments, and emotional sensibilities continues to coordinate crime and social control of our society in such a way that reshapes how we feel about marginalized groups and how they are made to feel punished, excluded, isolated, mobile, immobile, or stuck within the carceral web in numerous ways. Whether we are debating the use of prison versus the use of EM, such penalties merely represent two sides of the same coin; that is, the legitimation of the carceral state’s continued management of impoverished and marginalized groups with little to no consideration of ameliorating these social issues outright. At the end of the day, EM is no horse of a different colour; it represents a form of confinement similar to the prison while simultaneously widens the carceral web across a diverse range of geographic scales, and does nothing to assist or support the excluded in a meaningful way that could lead to their actual inclusion in our society.

Indeed, the USA and the UK have become archetypes of carcerality, and I contend that we are now faced with current carceral circumstances so dire that it seems we have no choice but to reconsider where EM, as a creative extension and penal arm of the carceral state, seems to be taking us. Such a consideration begs questions about the path of punishment we are
venturing down at the behest of the carceral state and whether we continue to trek the path any further. In other words, what are the ethical ramifications of continuing the EM programme in Scotland? It is crucial that in answering this question everything is done to assure that offenders, in prison or upon release, are no longer a threat to themselves or to society. In effect, policies and programmes which emphasize therapeutic integrity and the principles of effective intervention should be intended to not only assist offenders, but also their loved ones, ranging from parents and children to neighbours and their communities as a whole (Sparks and Gacek, forthcoming; see also Lipsey, 2003; Petersilia, 2003). EM as a standalone punitive measure does nothing to assist the needs of the offender—simply returning the offender to their community without proper supports in place merely band aids a wound that requires greater attention. Should we decide that EM be allowed to expand further (both in technological prowess and punitive means) it must be paired with appropriate social policies and programmes which directly redress the actual needs of the offender.

In addition, EM as it exists does nothing to redress the collateral effects of imprisonment imposed upon the loved ones of the offender. While I remain mindful that such redress may neither be within the nature of the technology nor the parameters of its use (cf. Bülow, 2014), greater attention must be accorded towards public involvement, both at the initial stages of expanding EM as well as its rescission. A very real task becomes how to create “a more receptive political environment” (Gottschalk, 2015: 44) for all citizens within modern, liberal democracies, for law-abiding and offenders alike. Greater public involvement would allow citizenry to reconsider both penal reforms and policies as well as the “the far-reaching consequences of the carceral state[,]” making both EM and the current situation of their carceral state “leading political and public policy issues” (Gottschalk, 2015: 44).

Direct human vulnerability maintained by the carceral state mandates more comprehensive forms of public participation to resist it. In other words, the impact further expansion of EM will have upon the dignity and integrity of offenders requires greater consideration by the general public than those more impersonal domains of governmental contracts and control concerning, for example, the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, or predictable service contracts where revenues and expenses may be more definitive in nature. In Scotland this has taken the form of a proposed legislative Bill made available for comment by the Scottish Government. The Management of Offenders (Scotland) Bill was introduced in Scottish Parliament in early 2018 and is currently under consultation by various stakeholders, experts, and the public. The proposed Bill is separated into two parts, the first part referring
to EM and the second to the disclosure of convictions (Management of Offenders (Scotland) Bill, 2018). It is expected that Part 1 of the Bill, if passed, will enable EM to be play a greater role in the Scottish criminal justice system, especially with the introduction of Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) technology to work in tandem with Scotland’s current use of Radio Frequency (RF)-based EM (cf. Weaver and Graham, 2018). However, there exists some concern for the potential for ‘net-widening’ (arguably, even carceral ‘web-widening’) especially as GPS technology would further allow authorities to prevent tagged individuals from entering specific locations and where the GPS exclusion zones can be tailored in size, “from a house, to a specific street pattern, to a neighbourhood, to a whole city” (Green, 2018: n.p.). In effect, there is an enduring need to observe the principle of proportionality and adhere to European ethical standards (cf. Nellis, 2013c, 2015) in future uses of EM in Scotland, as punitive and disproportionate uses of EM in some other jurisdictions “have proven counter-productive” (Weaver and Graham, 2018: 2; see also Graham and McIvor, 2015).

Unfortunately, mounting fiscal pressures alone will not be enough to spur communities and governments to make significant shifts in how they perceive punishment in nature, form, and function. The ‘carceral clawback’ has become so tenacious (cf. Carlen, 2002) that as the carceral state has grown “so has the political clout and political acumen of groups, institutions, and organizations with vested economic interests in maintaining [it]” (Gottschalk, 2015: 35). Indeed, the further privatization of corrections is another issue worth considering, especially as it has been a longstanding focus of scholars and policymakers alike (cf. Lindsey et al., 2016). While the bulk of privatization has predominantly focused on private prisons, privatization is slowly permeating all of corrections (Lindsey et al., 2016; Sparks and Gacek, forthcoming). Drawing attention to significant philosophical and ethical concerns of expanding the privatization of corrections generally and the privatization of EM specifically also paints a worrisome picture of its potential effects on the marginalized in society (cf. Nellis, 2006; Bülow, 2014; Sparks and Gacek, forthcoming). Besides prison guards’ unions, correctional departments at federal or state level(s), law enforcement groups, and financial firms, the private corrections industry is another entity which devises bonds and other mechanisms to fund and/or ensure the persistence of the carceral state and particular forms of punishment (Gottschalk, 2015). While each may have their own vested interests in the carceral state, it is certain that the predominant correctional philosophy of incapacitation (either through conventional incarceration or EM) omnipotently looms overhead. One could
argue that our entire penal system based on rational choice and issues of cost (Cullen et al., 2002) and that privatization adheres to this dominant correctional philosophy to survive. And while such vested interests were not the main catalysts for the origins of the carceral state, they have certainly become major impediments to reducing prison populations significantly, to reining in the carceral state, and to the public’s involvement in reconsidering why certain forms of punishment in our society are allowed to persist, regardless of whether this be through the private or public sector (Gottschalk, 2015; Sparks and Gacek, forthcoming). The construction of the carceral state resulted from a complex set of developments: “No single factor explains its rise, and no single factor will bring about its demise” (Gottschalk, 2015b: 34). Indeed, the resiliency of the carceral state is attributed mainly to its elasticity, insofar as “the various permutations of the carceral state suggests that it is informed by and contours itself around the ways in which the economic, political, and social structures interrelate to each other at different moments in time” (Kato, 2017: 217).

However, while the carceral state may be exceptional in its size and tenacity, “many of the political, economic, and social forces that sustain it and stand in the way of genuine penal reform are not” (Gottschalk, 2015b: 39). Going forward, research and policy need to continue to critically query and examine how particular forms of punishment are legitimated through society’s “deep attachment to [punishment] and its centrality within our culture, vocabulary, and sensibilities” (Sparks, 1994:19). Only then can we reconsider EM’s place within the carceral state’s arsenal of penalties to impose upon offenders.

Finally, it is through carceral territory that we witness how EM practices and measures of the carceral state move beyond traditional spaces of detention and confinement and work their way into everyday space of the offender (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 49). It becomes clear that such hyperincarceration not only enables constraint within the penal and remand institutions but also governs socio-spatial movements outside of such places of confinement. In this light, techniques of incarceration that manifest in the local community and in wider society “are now possible in unprecedented ways that were not feasible in earlier periods due to lack of infrastructure and technology for security” (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 49). Such techniques could expand and include technologies which reify aspects of carcerality in a multitude of ways, like “DNA analysis; high-powered satellite surveillance cameras; Taser guns; electronic tracking devices; Internet surveillance; and new security forces…introduced to police migration and ‘terrorism’” (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 49). As Brown (2014:
386) argues, “a geographically expansive understanding of the carceral opens up incarceration as a multi-institutional, fluid, and indeterminate practice.”

Arguably such creative carceral extensions could also be described in part as ‘pre-emptive’; that is, EM, whether it be through the private or public sector, is but one measure among many within the shift from prevention of crime to pre-emption of crime and future risk (Zedner, 2007; see also McCullouch and Pickering, 2009; Jochelson et al., 2017 for other examples of the precrime shift). This shift is indicative of a new set of social ordering practices and, arguably, creates and maintains carceral territories alongside “liminal carceral spaces and new forms of mobilities that engage communities…and individuals” (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 51). An example of this shift is found in the work of Mincke and Lemonne (2014). The authors examined the Prison Act of 2005 enacted in Belgium to observe what the effects have been on offenders since the passing of the Act, and how the Act’s passing has developed and legitimized ‘punitive procedures’ in the community.

“Traceability” was indicated in their study (Mincke and Lemonne, 2014: 545), in which the potentiality of the panoptic gaze—that is, highlighting a ‘potential gaze’ over an actual, constant gaze—had become developed and legitimized through various surveillance mechanisms, such as GPS tracking, changes in parole conditions, and required attendance to counselling and social service resource centres. Moreover, the exponential increase of ‘surveillance archives’ has been a significant punitive procedure, insofar as the potentially infinite accumulation of data—through the resources offenders either seek out on their own or are parole-mandated to attend, and the places and spaces they habituate (or avoid) in the community—renders these individuals traceable and, arguably, knowable through preemptive or potential monitoring (Mincke and Lemonne 2014). Indeed, traceability affirms the continuity of carceral space, all the while maintaining the mastery of the situation. In essence, the power gained through traceability opens up new types of knowledges, from forecasting possibilities of recidivism by tracking various indicators to criminal career analyses and constructing models that predict situations of violence (Mincke and Lemonne, 2014). It is no longer the question of understanding, as the authors suggest, but rather the possibility of anticipating offenders’ actions slightly ahead of time in order to maintain continuity, both in control and in a permanent state of monitoring. Therefore, further carceral scholarship needs to continue to engage with these extensions of the carceral state as they come into contact with the lives and territories of offenders, beyond traditional spaces of incarceration.
Concluding Remarks

By exploring the novel application of carceral territory within the EM programme of Scotland, this project presents a pertinent frame of reference to reconsider both the micro-scale complexities of daily life for EM operators and offenders, as well as the macro shifts in carceral spreading across society. To query the spread of the carceral throughout society also asks us whether such spread can be reduced, resisted, or halted altogether. Recognizing the carceral as it persists in the everyday spaces of life seams together embodied experiences across various sites and scales of carcerality (for example, the NEMC, the prison, and the home). Such a recognition also calls into question the politics of mobility, the geographies betwixt and between the carceral state, and the normality of surveillance (EM or otherwise) that extends its pervasive and insidious reach into the lives of the marginalized. Indeed, taken together my ethnographic observations and the experiences of inmates attest to such carcerality through a closer exploration of EM.

Furthermore, while my own research attempts to investigate the meanings, interpretations and representations of carcerality in its various forms (Woolford and Gacek, 2016; Gacek, 2017, 2018), it cannot be accomplished without the experiences my respondents have chosen to share. While sharing certain commonalities in terms of demographic information, these inmate experiences are intricately complex, with separate life-course events that make their narratives and perspectives unique. My ethnographic observations shed light on other significant realms of EM in Scotland. However such observations should not overshadow respondents’ experiences, but rather work in concert with them. The experiences presented here are the respondent’s stories, and they deserve to be shared and discussed, rather than discredited, neglected, or silenced. Inviting these respondents to speak does not merely voice their concerns to a broader audience. Rather, their words in concert with this study are more than a mere contribution to carceral scholarship and wider discussions of EM, but to the growing concern for ameliorating the unfortunate circumstances of the marginalized, monitored, and/or incarcerated in our society.

Coalescing my findings together produces a more nuanced appreciation and concern for carceral territory and our current carceral age. If we are to accept that “the very purpose of producing knowledge about the social world is to change it” (Garland and Young, 1983: 32) then we must continue to query the carceral state as it exists. Bigger questions must be now asked of the direction the carceral state is taking us, and hopefully with the aid of my
observations and these voices we can begin to answer and act on them in a more effective manner.
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Appendix A: Informed Consent for Scottish Prison Service Participants

Project Title: Emplacing Compliance: Experiences of Electronic Monitoring Practices in Scotland

Researcher: James Gacek, Postgraduate Student, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Law School

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This consent form, a copy of which will be left with you for your records and reference, is only part of the process of informed consent. It should give you the basic idea of what the research is about and what your participation will involve. If you would like more detail about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask. Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand any accompanying information.

Project Description:
James Gacek is from the University of Edinburgh and is interested in learning about your experiences of being electronically monitored with a G4S Scotland ‘tag,’ especially in terms of the impact compliance has had on your relationships with family, friends, community and G4S Scotland, the struggles you face(d) before, during, and after curfews; and whether you feel attached to your neighborhood and community.

Participation in this study will involve either an in-person or phone interview conducted by the researcher of the study. The interview will take approximately 60 minutes. If the interview takes place over the phone, the interview will be recorded through handwritten notes. If the interview takes place in-person, the interview will be audio-recorded on a digital recorder and transcribed. In the case of the latter, the interviewer will request that you permit him to digitally record your conversation, but if you object the interviewer will
transcribe it by hand. The interviewer will ask you questions about your background/demographics and what you see as your physical, mental and emotional needs and challenges throughout your experiences of electronic monitoring. Your participation in the interview is voluntary and you do not have to participate in an interview if you don’t want to. You can stop the interview at any time and you are free to not answer any question you don’t want to. Your decision to participate or not participate will in no way affect your relationship with the Scottish Prison Service, other institutions or agencies, or any services that you receive.

Please initial here if you would like to receive a report produced based upon this research:

______

**Confidentiality:**

*Any information that could identify you personally will be kept confidential.* The audio-recordings of the interviews will be downloaded to a computer file that is password protected. The audio-recording device will be wiped following download to computer. No names or names of agencies (aside from G4S Scotland) or businesses will be included in the transcript. Geographical setting such as names of cities, towns, villages and communities may be named, but any identifying information which ties the participant to their specific neighbourhood will not be included. The transcripts and consent forms will be number coded and stored separately in locked cabinets at the researcher’s university office. These consent forms and the transcripts will be stored separately so no one can link your name to your interview information. Only the researcher himself will ever be able to see your interview. All of the transcripts, recordings and consent forms will be destroyed after the completion of the data collection. This will at the completion of the project, with the latest completion date of November 2019. Please note that the researcher is required by law to report current criminal offenses, illegal behaviours/activities, and current and past unreported child abuse or situations dangerous to children to the proper Authorities. These are the same laws followed by all service providers.
Dissemination:
The information you give will be combined with information collected from other participants. A summary of the results from the interviews will be prepared for a thesis project concerning Scottish Prison Service participant and G4S Scotland service provider perceptions on compliance and electronic monitoring practices, and a more detailed summary will be supplied to the Scottish Prison Service and G4S Scotland for distribution. In addition, electronic copies will be provided to the agencies for posting on their websites to download. These summaries will be available in November 2019.

The findings of this study will be disseminated in aggregate (group) form only through reports prepared by the researcher, journal articles, conference presentations and presentations to community organizations and institutions. No names or identifying information will be included in the findings.

Risks and Benefits:
There is the potential of risk from participating in this research. Participants may feel emotional or psychological stress from recounting their experiences of electronic monitoring. The Scottish Prison Service has offered to assist you if you require further counselling.

There may be a short-term benefit to you in terms of having an opportunity to tell a concerned listener about the challenges and needs of compliance and electronic monitoring practices. In the long term, you may benefit if the findings of the research help persuade government officials and other policy-makers to change in a positive direction policies that directly affect you.

Consent:
Your signature on this form indicates that you have understood to your satisfaction the information regarding participation in the research project and agree to participate as a subject. In no way does this waive your legal rights nor release the researcher or involved
institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to withdraw from the interview at any time, even after it begins, and /or refrain from answering any questions you prefer to omit, without prejudice or consequence. Your continued participation should be as informed as your initial consent, so you should feel free to ask for clarification or new information throughout your participation.

A copy of this consent form has been given to you to keep for your records and reference. If you agree to participate in this interview, please place your name and signature in the appropriate spaces below.

I _________________________________ (print name) understand what the study is about and what participation involves and the signature below means that I agree to participate.

_________________________________________   _______________________
(signature)                                   (date)

_________________________________________   _______________________
(signature of interviewer)                    (date)

Email or surface email address to which a summary of findings and written reports (at your option) should be sent:

________________________________________________
________________________________________________
Appendix B: Interview Guide for Scottish Prison Service Participants

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. In this project, I am interested in learning about your experiences of being electronically monitored with a G4S Scotland ‘tag,’ especially in terms of the impact your family, friends, community and G4S Scotland has in assisting your compliance, the struggles you face(d) before, during, and after curfew; and whether you feel attached to your neighborhood and community.

The first set of questions deal with your background.

How old are you?

Do you identify with a specific race or ethnicity?

What level of schooling did you complete?

Are you presently in a relationship? For how long?

Do you have any children? How many and what are their ages?

Where did you grow up?

The next set of questions deal with your perception of community re-entry and reintegration with the monitoring ‘tag.’

Can you tell me what a typical day looked like for you before the ‘tag’ was attached to you? (i.e. your routine or schedule)

What were the hardest things you had to deal with once the ‘tag’ was attached to you? How did you manage to cope?

Did you have a lot of supports in the community when you were released? What did that involve?

Was it difficult for you to comply with the conditions of being monitored? Why or why not?

What activities would you do when the curfew was in place? Did these activities help you comply with the curfew? Why or why not?

Did the change in curfew times change your activities, routines and schedule? In what ways?
When the curfew was not in place, where would you spend most of your time? Describe these spaces/areas for me.

Do you think that being monitored with the ‘tag’ has changed you as a person? In what ways?
Do you feel the need to hide the fact that you have been ‘tagged’? Why or why not?

We will now move on to questions about the neighbourhood and (city, town, village) where you presently live.

Which city, town, village or community do you live in? Have you always lived there? Why or why not?

(If not always lived there) What was it like when you first moved here?

What impression do you think people outside your area have of it?

a) When have you encountered this?

How has it changed?

How would you describe your neighbourhood? Has the area gotten better/worse?

Do you think it would be easy to move into your area (now and in the past)?

The next set of questions discuss your perceptions of problems and safety in your area.

Do you think there are problems living in your area? If so, what are they?

Who deals with these problems in your area? Who do you think should be dealing with these problems?

Have you or your neighbours ever tried to intervene?

What do you think of the work of the police in your area?

What do you think of government agencies (e.g. housing, social services) in your area?

Do you feel safe in your area? Why?
a) walking at night, in the day time, when talking to people who are not from your area, when talking to others living in your area?

b) compared to other areas of (your city, town, village), centre of (your city, town, village), neighbouring areas?

c) compared to other estates where you have lived, or when visiting estates by other community members?

We'll now move onto our final set of questions which deal with your perception of the future of your area.

What do you think your area will be like in five years’ time? Will you stay? Why or why not?

Do you feel attached to your area?

Do you feel like you belong in your area?

Do you feel like the residents of your area share the same values as you?

If you ran or oversaw your area, what would you do to sort out or deal with its problems?

Is there anything you would like to add that you think I have not asked you about or think that I don’t understand?

Thank you very much for your time and contribution to my research.