CONVENTION AND INTENTION: A DEFENCE OF INTENTIONALITY AGAINST MEANING-RELATIVISM

BY

R. G. MOUNT

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
2004
I hereby declare that this work is entirely my own, that none of it was carried out as part of a research group or committee, and that none of it has previously been made available in any format.
Throughout S and H stand for 'speaker' and 'hearer' (occasionally, 'utterer' and 'audience'), respectively. Their speech acts are to be regarded equally as utterances or marks, written, oral or gestural, for it is a tenet of the argument made, and explicitly in response to Derrida, that the supplementation of systems of writing adds nothing substantive to an argument for the necessary absence of meaning intentions in speech acts, a developed Gricean theory accounts for the presence of intentions and conventions in all such meaning acts.
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
1. Epitome i
2. Rorty’s Mirror Tinted v
3. Convention, Intention and Repetition xvii

I | INTENTIONALITY AND CONVENTION
1. The Principle of Charity and Intentionality 1
2. Demonstratives and Reference 20
3. Intentionality and Possible Worlds 40
4. States of Affairs, Denoting and Intending 61
5. Translation, Interpretation and Convention 78

II | MEANING
1. Meaning and Intentions 95
2. Occasion Meaning and Timeless Meaning 112
3. Timeless Meaning and Conventions 127
4. Strawson’s Distinction 141
5. Convention: A First Try 154

III | ILOCUTIONS AND PERLOCUTIONS
1. Conventions and Philosophical Analysis 166
2. Speech Acts and Reference 180
3. Rules and Conventions 187
4. Ilocutionary Point and Ilocutionary Force 209
5. How to do (a Few) Things with Words 221

IV | MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE
1. Analyticity and Convention 233
2. Convention and Coordination 247
3. Conventions and Language 263
4. Mutual Knowledge and Language 281
5. Conclusion: Conventions and Practice 298

Synoptic Conclusion 310

BIBLIOGRAPHY 320
INTRODUCTION

1. Epitome

The exchange between Derrida and Searle on speech acts, contrary to Searle's belief, perpetually engages with philosophical tradition\(^1\). Many issues, figuring debates of the metaphysics of presence and the possibility of repetition, are common currency, but equally many are not, and they connote the 'analytical' tradition. The main points of the exchange are summarised in the third section of the introduction, and in the first two the themes of the dissertation are presented. In the four chapters it is argued that the problems of indeterminable intentions and of non-saturable conventions can be resolved, and that the fount of Derrida's work, the failure of intentionality to mediate, or orientate, communication, self-consciousness and meaning is contested by the theory offered\(^2\). Rorty's rejection of theories of intentionality and of mimetic assumptions in semantics, epistemology and the philosophy of mind are explored in the second section of the introduction. (It is contended, in footnotes and asides, that the integration of the analytical and phenomenological traditions begins with theories of intentionality)\(^3\).

---


\(^2\) The matters precisely at issue in the exchange with Searle, and in the early work on Husserl. Taking on the task of comparing Derrida's work with that of certain luminaries of the analytical tradition is not perversity or bloody-mindedness, for Derrida's arguments are wont to seem less daring when it is seen that others have addressed the issue he raises and found sound reasons to move beyond the relativism in which he revels. It is not with a desire, all too often expressed, to trounce Derrida that this dissertation is written, but to indicate ways in which Derrida's work is of a part with lengthy and ongoing philosophical tradition, and thereby to engage with it, providing arguments against and suggesting weaknesses. It is disappointing, and to the shame of philosophers, that this still needs fully to be done and that Derrida is still treated so abominably. Of the many examples one could choose one shall suffice, from an author of whom one tires of saying that he should know better, namely Scruton, R.; Modern Philosophy: A Survey (London, Sinclair-Stevenson) 1994, p. 3

\(^3\) Certain remarks on the differences and convergence between these two traditions, which one might better call the semantical and the phenomenological traditions (stemming, as Dummett and Monk show, from shared sources: see Dummett, M.; Origins of Analytical Philosophy (London, Duckworth) 1993 and Monk, R.; 'What is Analytical Philosophy?’, pp1-22 in Monk, R and Palmer, A., (eds.); Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy (Bristol, Thoemmes) 1996), are made throughout the dissertation. It is contended that the argument to follow shows one way in which semantical analysis (apparently the preserve of analytical philosophy), may, to elucidate the notions of convention and intention for language, be supplemented by an
Davidson’s anomalous monism, described in 1.1, is both a rejoinder to dualist, or ‘representationalist’, theories of mind, and a powerful response to post-structuralist scepticism concerning meaning and truth. It is a theory of intentionality for language and mind grounded entirely in social coordination, cooperation and charity, unequivocally rejecting the thesis that there are conventions of language. A strength of the argument against Derrida and Rorty is that Davidson, Grice, Strawson and Lewis write this condition into their theories, crystallised (in II.4) as Strawson’s distinction, one eluding Derrida, and vitiating his work on Austin.

Derrida’s theory of speech acts finds limiting cases in indexical, or demonstrative, expressions, and they are examined in I.2. It is found that, in both Austin’s paradigmatic and Derrida’s parasitical cases,

essential pragmatic, syntactical, even hermeneutical, element. However, linguistic analysis has its place, and the arguments of Evans and Hintikka in I.2 and I.3 show how effectively it can overturn established views of the results of Fregean semantics (in I.3 the results are applied to Husserlian phenomenology), a result that shows that the arguments that meaning-scepticism offers in response to classical theories of meaning can comprehensively be challenged. In the light of the arguments given in the four chapters to follow, Derrida’s and (perhaps less so), Rorty’s meaning-scepticism is (and Derrida would abhor the change), seen to be based on arguments, and the reification of problems, to which ‘analytical’ philosophy has long since provided compelling and broadly applicable answers. One is tempted to venture further: the relativism of Derrida and Rorty, and its widespread acceptance, evinces too narrow an appreciation of the philosophical literature, and, regrettably, little understanding that this is a bad thing.

One should consider it an embarrassment to philosophy that many (some calling themselves pragmatists), still force an analytical/phenomenological distinction, so much so that one hesitates to draw it to attention. (Some points are raised in Introduction 2). The continued engagement between the traditions is invariably ignored (a randomly chosen example (repeated in context below): Kripke introduces to Kantian epistemology the notion of possibility, wishing to show that possibility is indistinguishable from necessity in the writing of a priori conditions, and states that a priority is an epistemological notion, but that the role of possibility introduces the further condition that ‘...it is supposed to be something which cannot be known independently of any experience’. (Kripke, S.A.; Naming and Necessity (Oxford, Blackwell) 1980, p34). This must be accounted for before the notion of the a priori can ‘...get off the ground’. ‘That means that in some sense it’s possible (whether we do or do not in fact know it independently of any experience), to know this independently of any experience: And possible for whom? For God? For the Martians? Or just for people with minds like ours?’ (pp34-35). As Kripke asks, what sort of possibility is in question here? Work explicitly bridging the divide is marginalised or unnoticed (because not written by authors in the canon), and more mainstream works are merely flirtations (perhaps, Wittgenstein and the hermeneutics; Heidegger on perception). Mulhall, S.; On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects (London, Routledge) 1990, for all its brilliance, brings little new to Wittgensteinian exegesis that could not be found in the major works published in the last thirty years: the comparison with Heidegger elicits little significant influence.

Listed here are a few ideas that one must consider before making any unthinking distinction. How analytical is Wittgenstein, or Austin, or Grice? Grice is as pragmatist a philosopher as one could find. Why do Russell and Strawson disagree on denoting phrases, and is their difference a symptom of two different approaches to philosophy? What underpins Tarski’s notion of satisfaction, and is it shared with Husserl (and Freud)? What is the motivation and end of possible worlds semantics but metaphysics? Putnam and Kripke are not unaware of this. Cavell is not a renegade from the camp of analytical philosophy, but truly a moderator, he defends the methods of the ‘Oxford’ philosophers and uses them in his own reflections. (Cavell, S.; ‘Must we Mean what We Say?’, ppl43-44 Must we Mean what We Say?: A Book of Essays (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons) 1969). What is Quine’s source for the irreducibility of intentional idioms? It is Brentano’s empirical psychology. Quine appeals to holism and to Dewey. Why does Crane object to Quine, and to the interpretation (by others following Quine), of Brentano? Why has Hare’s study of the analytic/synthetic distinction, in which he raises many notions vital for a theory of repetition, been ignored? (Hare, R.M.; ‘Philosophical Discoveries’, Mind, vol. LXIX, no. 274, ppl145-162, 1960). Why does McDowell think that Sellars’ lectures on Kant are the best source of arguments against theories of intentionality; indeed, how would one classify McDowell’s own work: analytical or hermeneutical? The work of Lewis on convention has come to exert (after some resistance), a significant influence in the social sciences, and it is, according to Rorty’s criteria, not analytical philosophy (it does not begin from reflection upon the structure of language). Why is Davidson missing from Bernstein’s survey of those theories negotiating a path between objectivism and relativism? (See Bernstein, R.J.; Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Pragmatism (Oxford, Blackwell) 1983).

Is ‘analytical’ philosophy hamstrung by its use of formal, or boring, or prosaic, arguments? Or notation? One suspects that it is simply not current, secy. The failure to see its relevance and importance is due to ignorance and a wholly unprofessional lack of rigour. An excellent essay considering the attempts to force an Anglo-Saxon (or what you will)/Continental divide is Glendinning, S.; ‘What is Continental Philosophy?’, ppl3-20 in Glendinning, S. (ed.); The Edinburgh Encyclopaedia of Continental Philosophy (Edinburgh University Press) 1999. Cf. especially pl3 on the rejection by Evans, McDowell and Peacocke of the thesis of intentionality without language.

Although Davidson rejects the very idea of conventions of language, anomalous monism and the principle of charity are predicated on the notion of what will be called in this dissertation, social, or institutional, convention, those conventions described human institutions or practices (such as those of politeness, marriage, dancing and so forth), those directing coordination in social exchange. These conventions may be tacit or explicit, and they are of such significance for Lewis shows how they can be used to write a theories of convention and intention for language.
speakers' meaning intentions can be fulfilled, and that Sinn and noema do indeed mediate reference. In I.3 it is argued that Sinn play the same rôle in a possible worlds theory of intentionality, which yet rejects all of the elements in Husserl to which Derrida objects: directedness upon an object, the distinction of meaning-conferring and meaning-fulfilling acts (also indicated and indicating meaning) and the properties of matter and quality. It is concluded that conditions as strict as Derrida demands of a theory of intentionality will most certainly make it unworkable, but that one need not hold such a theory. (In IV the same is argued for convention). In I.4 a template of a theory of intentionality ranging over possibilia is presented, namely Wittgenstein's picture theory; it is, so abhorrent to Rorty, a ‘representationalist’ theory, yet the representations for which it argues are carried by simple, Leibnizean monads, depending upon nothing for their truth, and, in their syntactical correlates, sharing (and showing) logical form with the structure of the world. The section broaches some suggestions to the end that the late Wittgenstein, now for Rorty an edifier, is equally in need of mental representations. 

In I.5 Quine’s stimulus and response theory of meaning is presented. It is argued that Quine cannot disregard intentionality, but must appeal to what Norris calls, ‘a priori structures of mind’, provided in Quine’s late acquiescence to anomalous monism. The cooperative function of the principle of charity leads Davidson to argue that a semantic theory must needs be supplemented by a syntactic, or pragmatic, constituent, for which he defers to Grice.

Grice writes theories of speaker meaning, utterance meaning, occasion meaning and timeless meaning for paradigmatic and parasitical utterances in conventional, cooperative situations, and his work is discussed in II. He argues that communication between speaker and hearer is the ‘transport’ of intended meaning, recognised as such by the hearer. Arising from it is Strawson’s distinction, clarifying what Austin means by convention, and sharply distinguishing it from what commentators (conspicuously Derrida), have taken Austin to mean.

McDowell’s work on convention, and its response to Strawson on the rôle for semantic analysis, begins III. A theory of convention in speech acts, of perlocution not illocution, introduces, as Derrida says, arguments analogous to those raised against intentions. It is shown that Searle’s theory of

---

5 Searle only intermittently displays understanding of the distinction.
6 Skinner supplies other reasons for why Derrida’s conditions need not be accepted.
7 Wittgenstein’s transitional work, between his ‘systematic’ and his ‘edifying’ period, contains his most sustained treatment of intentionality, and it is ventured here, without being argued, that the continuities found (in I.4) between Wittgenstein’s work at each of its stages, show that it can more profitably be seen as a whole. In I.4 Wittgenstein’s arguments are applied to a paradigm of analytical philosophy, namely Russell, B.A.W., ‘On Denoting’, Mind, vol. XIV, no. 56, pp479-493, 1905.
8 Fascinating similarities between Grice’s work and Husserl’s are noted.
constitutive, conventional rules for speech acts is internally inconsistent, demanding notions that it excludes, and that Searle's conspectus of indirect, parasitical speech acts suffers the same inconsistencies, and compels no distinction of literal and non-literal. Theories of intention and convention, and a compelling reason for their description by Gricean analysis, await the deliverance of Lewis in IV.

The kernel of Lewis' argument is that a theory of the conventional in language simply accounts for the intentional. His work is predicated purely on the notion of rational, social interaction, mutual knowledge and cooperation, and it solves the sceptical regress of intentions feared by Derrida and Quine, and brought fully to view by Grice. His presentation of possible languages, a unique application of possible worlds for intentionality, constitutes the final, eloquent reply to Derrida, and offers a theory of analyticity for language responding to Quine's objections. Mutual knowledge conditions, when applied by Schiffer to the rigorisation of Gricean speech act theory, gives the fullest such theory, one immune to pragmatist objections.

In the following two sections of the introduction is presented Rorty's and Derrida's meaning-scepticism, and attendant arguments against intentionality. The discussions initiate the debates taken up in I.1-5, which constitute a first response to the arguments of Rorty and Derrida, although Derrida's raise the issues in Austin which guide the rest of the dissertation. A second response, deriving from developments of Austin's work, is found in II, a response requiring a rigorised notion of convention, one, as argued in III, not supplied by Searle but, rather, in IV, by Lewis. Lewis' is a possible worlds theory of intentionality, one (as described in I.4), stating a good response to Rorty's rejection of 'representationalist' theories of mind. A description of its genesis is provided in the following section, in which suggestions are made to the end that Deleuze's notion of the fold and Plato's khora are elucidated by its conditions. In IV a possible worlds theory of intentionality constitutes a third response to meaning-scepticism.

9 See Introduction 3 for the presentation of the sceptical regress in Derrida. As said in footnote 4, owing to the fact that it reflects on the way in which social convention can arise in a population, and not on the structure of language, Lewis' work is not, by Rorty's criteria, analytical philosophy (and on Rorty's criteria, see Introduction 2).
2. Rorty’s Mirror Tinted

Rorty considers the old concept that philosophers discuss eternal and compelling problems, those perhaps, of the relation of the mind and the body, and of foundationalist claims in epistemology. It gives to itself the task of debunking claims to knowledge, and in so doing, tacitly or explicitly, implies claim to an understanding of the mind and, more perniciously, of rationality, predicated on a notion of ‘man-as-knower’ of his activity of self-reflection or representation. Such is, for Rorty, characteristic of the Lockean and Cartesian traditions, alternatives to which were offered by few dissenting voices.

Attempts to resist the estrangement of disciplines caused by the rise of natural science and philosophical schools, increased secularisation and specialisation were resisted by the men of letters, and latterly, the work of Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey continues this critical engagement with tradition. They are edifying thinkers, rejecting claims for method in philosophy, and, explicitly so in the cases of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, breaking with Kantian and Cartesian tradition. They ‘set aside’ the search for foundations of knowledge, and so the agonised attempts to refute sceptical arguments. With new means of doing philosophy, even a new vocabulary, such debates initiated are rendered otiose.

Fuelled by their example Rorty offers arguments to dismiss both the mind-body problem and semantic theories that (he thinks) fall within the Russelian and Fregean traditions (which he explicitly compares to Husserlian phenomenology), those which characterise a Kantian, ‘representationalist’ philosophy. Indeed, analytic philosophy is one more variant of Kantian philosophy, a variant marked principally by thinking of representation as linguistic rather than mental, and of

---


2 Rorty (1979) p4. Rorty offers James and Nietzsche as dissenters.

3 Accounting for Dewey is less simple, for he retained a Hegelian influence, and, as described in a footnote in 1.1, the influence of Leibniz, in the light of the theory of intentionality advocated here, is seen to be even more compelling.


5 It might be suggested that the arguments in 1.1 show that Kant’s ambition is achieved by Davidson (but without the ‘representationalist’ element), and that he offers a solution to Kant’s scandal of philosophy: namely, the failure to find secure foundations for empirical enquiry. (No arguments are offered in 1.1 for this conclusion, it remains a suggestion for further enquiry).
philosophy of language rather than "transcendental critique", or psychology, as the discipline which exhibits the "foundations of knowledge".6

The emphasis upon language changes neither the problems bequeathed by Kantianism, nor the 'self-image' of the discipline of philosophy, conveying still the presumption that all empirical enquiry is always framed by presuppositions, imposed by 'man-as-knowers', and is so limited. To this Rorty contrasts a 'Deweyan' conception of knowledge as justified belief, and counselling an openness to novelty and revision in the light of new, conflicting evidence.7 Pace Wittgenstein and Heidegger, language is not a mirror but a tool. Wittgenstein argues that there are no necessary conditions of linguistic representation, and Heidegger that the search for the source of necessary truth should be replaced by tolerance of newness, or 'strangeness'. This edifying philosophy is 'historicist', warning against the danger at the core of foundational thinking, namely the temptation to 'eternalise' language-games or self-images. Analytical philosophy is an attempt to find non-historical conditions for historical development, indeed, to 'escape' history; the historicist wants to extend the, for Rorty eminently pragmatist, holistic view of knowledge, propounded by Quine and Davidson.

[They] Quine, Sellars, Wittgenstein, James] show us that the notion of "accurate representation" is simply an automatic and empty compliment which we pay to those beliefs which are successful in helping us to do what we want to do.

---

6 Rorty (1979) p.10. This is worth quoting in full in light of the many questions under consideration (see especially I.2 and IV.1-3). Also of importance is Rorty's claim that the difference between analytic and other philosophy is "...relatively unimportant—a matter of style and tradition rather than a difference of 'method' or of first principles'.

7 Davidson makes the same point, as shown in I.1. Rorty (1979) p.8 argues that an emphasis upon language does not change the "Cartesian-Kantian problematic", because 'analytic philosophy is still committed to the construction of a permanent, neutral framework for enquiry, and thus for all culture'. Cf. Kaufmann, F.; 'Cassirer's Theory of Scientific Knowledge', ppl89-213 in Schilpp, P.A. (ed.); The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer (Northwestern University Press) 1949. Kaufmann argues that Cassirer belongs to the (phenomenologically inclined) school of Kantians begun by Natorp (p185), and cf. Derrida, J.; The Archaeology of the Fragile: Reading Condillac (Pittsburgh, Duquesne University) 1980, pp64-65 on scientific discovery and the prior necessity of a 'certain state of language', a medium for the conditions of discovery.

8 It is important to note that Rorty (1979) p.6 reads the Deweyan conception as disabusing one of the idea that there are constraints on what counts as knowledge; because justification becomes a 'social' phenomenon, there is no 'transaction' between the knowing subject and reality. Cf. Cerbone, D.R.; 'Proofs and Presuppositions: Heidegger, Searle and the 'Reality' of the "External" World', ppl259-278, in Wrathall, M.A. and Malpas, J. (eds.); Heidegger, Authenticity and Modernity: Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfus: Volume 1 (MIT) 2000. Cerbone considers Heidegger's response to the 'scandal' of philosophy stated by Kant: the absence of a proof of the external world, arguing that prior to his detailed response Heidegger attempts a proof along the lines of G.E. Moore, and in accordance with a notion of engaged agency. Cerbone wonders whether Heidegger's response is strictly speaking a proof or a rejection of the problem as a pseudo-problem. Engaged agency is compared to Searle's 'background', of which, Searle says, realism about the external world is a part; a proof thus becomes unnecessary. Cerbone is alive to the many differences between Searle and Heidegger; his essay is stimulating and fascinating. Additionally, Cerbone gives a full review of the consequences for representation of Derrida's arguments. Cf. Murphy, A.E.; 'Dewey's Epistemology and Metaphysics', ppl192-225 in Schilpp, P.A. (ed.); The Philosophy of John Dewey (New York, Tudor) 1951. Murphy suggests ways to smooth inconsistencies in Dewey's theories of knowledge. See also Reichenbach, H.; 'Dewey's Theory of Science', ppl57-192 in Schilpp (1951).

9 Rorty (1979) p.6. Wheeler, S.C.; 'The Extension of Deconstruction', The Monist, vol LIX, no. 1, pp.3-20, 1986, considers the results of similar arguments among philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, adumbrating some connections to the semantical tradition. Wheeler writes that Derrida shows that 'concern' for reaching conclusions from arguments is 'unjustifiably narrow'; indeed, a preference for inference in philosophy is a 'prejudice' (p5). Wheeler proceeds to give a 'rational' argument (p10) for the acceptance of his conclusion (this appears to entail that it delers to Quine and Davidson on indeterminacy and radical translation), in the spirit of Wittgenstein discarding the ladder up which he has climbed. Among other points raised by Wheeler, he writes that the logical flaws in the work of Husseri and Levi-Strauss detected in Derrida's early investigations are to be thought the child of the later work, and thus that Derrida's oeuvre displays a captivating consistency. Quine's arguments
In denying the existence of problems of mind-body interaction and of intentionality, Rorty states that, in the philosophy of mind, arguments against Cartesian interaction leave unsolved problems. Feigl's nomological gap between mental and physical remains, for a mental state is no more like a disposition or an attitude than it is like a neuron firing. Other problems derive from the work of the 'neo-dualists'. If, as they argue, 'mental' and 'physical' are simply aspects of a single composite organism, of which propositional attitudes are attributable (in the case of, 'event-like' mental states, such as pains or sensations, via a physiological description), then, Rorty argues, either mental and physical entities are identified in descriptions of events reporting two distinct ontological species (immaterial and material), or the neo-dualists is truly a dualism without 'ontological gap'. Rorty investigates these solutions, identifying, for argument's sake, the mental not with material, neural events, but with the 'intentional', or 'phenomenal'. He writes that identifying pains with a coming to believe that one's bodily tissue is damaged leaves unaccounted the fact of what it is to experience pain (the qualia, the raw feel), and raises a host of other questions. What is it that has pain? Where is it located? How does

against conventions are given as a paradigm deconstructive argument (p41f), and for the attack on essences, see Derrida, J.; "Genesics and Structure' and Phenomenology', pp154-168 in Writing and Difference (University of Chicago) 1978, p162. Scholes, R.; 'Deconstruction and Communication', Critical Inquiry, vol. XIV, no. 2, pp278-305, 1988, p280 demonstrates just how potent a tool for beginning a response to Derrida are the notions of radical translation and the indeterminacy of translation, for in this one looks back to a meaning existing prior to sounds heard; cf. also p288.

With his arguments Rorty can (on pre-eminently Wittgensteinian grounds), make the claim that the distinction between the 'objective knowledge' of traditional systematic philosophy and less privileged discourse (ediifying philosophy), is simply that between normal and abnormal discourse in Kukan's paradigm. Regarding the notion of criteria for enquiry (described above), Rorty parses Kuhn: normal discourse has publicly accessible criteria, and abnormal discourse lacks it, and Rorty's stated aim is to demonstrate that the attempt to exploit rationality in terms of the conditions of accurate representation is an effort to demonstrate accepted normal discourse, and that it is '...pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical convictions', and, without the Kantian picture, '...the notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation would not have suggested itself'. However, McDowell has a fascinating alternative view. McDowell, J.; 'Having the World in View. Sellars, Kant and Intentionality: I. Sellars on Perceptual Experience', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. XCV, no. 5, pp341-540, 1998, argues that, '...no one has come closer than Kant to showing us how to find intentionality unproblematic'. McDowell concours with Sellars study of Kant elucidates intentionality, but adds that Sellars cannot, owing to other commitments, accept the Kantian position. Getting Kant correct on this reveals, '...how we ourselves ought to think about intentionality' (p432). He finds a thesis in Sellars (p433), saying that certain mental episodes are characterised as 'knowings', and class humans as 'knowers', but that the 'conceptual apparatus' employed in making these characterisations, '...is irreducible to any conceptual apparatus that does not serve to place things in the logical space of reasons'. After finding difficulties with Sellars' reading of Kant, McDowell takes from Kant the point that intuitions are representations in which objects are immediately present, and that they represent 'logical togetherness' (p472) observed via conceptual capacities, and showing that seeing 'contains' claims about the objective environment. For Sellars representations are guided to an independent reality. McDowell replies, following Kant, that objects can be immediately present to consciousness in intuition, and that the due constraints are applied by perceived objects (p473). Cf. Merleau-Ponty, M.; 'Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence', pp36-80 in O'Neill, J. (ed.); Phenomenology, Language and Sociology: Selected Essays of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (London, Heinemann) (1974a) p86.

Rorty's remarks demonstrate the points at issue above: that the thoughtless distinction between schools of philosophy is hopelessly myopic and positively deleterious: there is little real difference between the methods of 'analytical' and 'phenomenological' philosophy, and his arguments are, by his own admission, derived from Sellars, Quine, even Ryle, and as Dolezel, L.; 'Heteronomics: Fiction and Possible Worlds (The Johns Hopkins University Press) 1998, ppx y writes: 'we live in the era of post-structuralism, but this stage of intellectual history is more complex than some of its speakers would have us believe. To be sure, in Anglo-Saxon post-structuralist academic criticism the French and German philosophical 'imports' are much more popular than the 'native' analytic philosophy. But who suffers from this puzzling paradox? Analytic philosophy has preserved the sober spirit of critical thinking at a time of bloated verbosity. This spirit, which requires controlled theory formation and testing, precise conceptual analysis, and fair assessment of the ideas of the past, has not died but has carried us into the computer age'. Cf. also pp1-2 and Rosen, R.; Possible Worlds in Literary Theory (Cambridge University Press) 1994, p6.

Rorty (1973) p17 begins his study of mind-body interaction from the confusion diagnosed by Davidson, namely that the grounding distinction of all previous, distinctly Cartesian, theories of mind (between the mental and the physical) is not easily made: cf. 1.1.

Much of the discussion in Perry, J.; Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness (MIT) 2001, is directed at neo-dualist theories.
one come to believe that one has a pain? Will not any such theory, Rorty asks, entail mental representations? The identification of a thought with a series of neural events is equally unacceptable for Rorty, for counter-examples could be given to argue that not all who have the thought have the series of neural events. An analogy between a neural event and a written inscription compels, for Rorty, the conclusion that there is no interesting problem of intentionality. The meaning of a written inscription is an immaterial property bound by conventions and a context of collocation; a mental state is experienced by a functioning physical body, and requires the working and complete correspondence of its parts. Rorty is explicit: the relationship between an inscription and its meaning is no more mysterious than that between a man's functional state and the parts of his body\(^{13}\). Functional states are immaterial, and the problem, such as it is, of the identity of the mental and the physical, is that of relating to this immateriality\(^{13}\). On Locke's mistaken account, the meaningfulness of an inscription is a result of its encoding an idea, but Rorty replies that reading the intentional as, on his terms, the functional is to hold that neither brain processes nor the marks of ink on paper represent anything suffused with an idea or thought. It is argued in I.1 that anomalous monism is a response to Rorty's arguments\(^{14}\), for it is a theory of intentionality explicitly in response to dualism and yet without any rôle for mental representations, but what must be described here are the ways in which a fully worked out possible worlds theory of intentionality challenges Rorty\(^{15}\).

Rorty's survey of systematic and edifying philosophy, and its appeal to dissenters, relies upon caricatures too broad to be useful. Missing, and muddying the waters, is Leibniz, the non-pareil of the man of letters, the most systematic of metaphysicians, and the progenitor of mathematical method in philosophy\(^{16}\). By way of showing the existence of counter-examples to Rorty's survey, some broad areas of Leibniz's response to Descartes and Locke shall be described\(^{17}\). This shows Leibniz to be

\(^{12}\) This is the Darwinian view Rorty later advocates, cf. I.1.


\(^{15}\) The description is, in keeping with this section, no more than suggestive, or speculative, but in defence one might appeal to Rorty's own method in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature which tolerates more generalisation and speculation.

\(^{16}\) One should not necessarily infer disreputable reasons for Leibniz's absence from Rorty's survey, but he simply does not fit. Here one can only refer the reader to the work of authors of excellent work on Leibniz's singular place in the history of philosophy, namely, Brown, S.; Leibniz (Sussex, Harvester) 1984. Indeed, on p207 Brown writes that Rorty might find in Leibniz an 'ally' for the criticism of foundationalist philosophy. See also Jolley, N.; 1984 p2. Hoffman 1974 argues that Leibniz came to mathematical method late, indeed, after the Paris years and the encounter with Descartes. Cf. Brown (1984) pp37-41.

\(^{17}\) Brown, S.; 'Leibniz's Break with Cartesian "Rationalism"', pp195-208 in Holland (1985). Brown argues, against accepted interpretations of Leibniz, that Leibniz neither followed Descartes nor was a rationalist, countenancing the possibility of '...adopting principles which are not intuitively known as a means of advancing a constructive metaphysics...'. Integral history
resolutely anti-Cartesian, and not by any means a foundationalist philosopher in Rorty's sense. His reflections are underpinned not by reflection on the actual structure of the world and its constituents but by reflection on possible worlds and the states of affairs that may be instantiated in each. Each possible world and each contained state of affairs is a monad, or a perspective, on each other world and state of affairs, and the development of such a theory of possibilia with reference to a theory of intentionality (by Hintikka and Lewis among many others), offers, it shall be suggested (especially in I.3 and IV.5), a response to theories such as Derrida’s emphasising the inevitable relativisation of utterances to conditions imposed by their contexts.

To Descartes’ denial of the possibility of a proof of the existence of the external world, Leibniz replies that, notwithstanding his belief in the goodness of God rendering him unable to deceive, Descartes’ arguments are unconvincing: consistent with his belief in the omniscience of God and that his creation of the world was a choice of one from an infinity of possible worlds, one might maintain, Leibniz argues, that it is to good purpose that the constitution of the external world be a delusion18. One might, from experience, convince oneself of its reality, but nothing constitutes conclusive proof19. Furthermore, Leibniz rejects distinctions between primary and secondary qualities, and the conception of matter as substantial and a continuum, with the capacity for infinite divisibility. (Deleuze considers this a characteristic of the fold). Leibniz also rejects Descartes’ arguments for the peculiar qualities of size, figure and motion as characteristic of matter in its extension, arguing that properties of dimension and spatial disposition are always relative to an observer20. (Again as Deleuze writes, matter is not, ‘...composed of substances, but in some sense “results from” them’. It is described in I.4 how this occurs).

The world chosen by God could not be better; any change would upset the perfect balance of compossibilities, indeed, this is why God chose it21. All exigencies and quiddities are worthy of

---

of philosophy may lionise Leibniz and Descartes, but, Brown argues, Leibniz would have one adopt a position far more congenial to Rorty, regarding, "...past philosophy as a series of errors brought about by one-sidedness...", and advocating that mediation between competing theories is the due method for choice between them.


21 Without this reason he would have chosen nothing. His conditions on choice are not always pellucid, cf. Mates, B.; The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language (Oxford University Press) 1986, p70; for instance, does he choose the world with most 'essence', achieving 'maximum effect with minimum outlay', or one simple in law and rich in phenomena?
In Hardt, M. and Negri, A.; *Empire* (Harvard University Press) 2000, the authors see a connection between the notion of teleology in Marxian materialism and the argument of Spinoza and Leibniz, that a leading consciousness, or prophet, produces its own people by the choice of a pre-determined possible world. This, Hardt and Negri argue, was Spinoza’s contribution to the dawn of modernity. Spinoza’s nature of the ‘desire’ of a prophet to create a world compelling and ‘irresistible’ to the multitude, and Hardt and Negri elaborate Marx’s materialist revolution in the work of Spinoza, by saying that there is a relationship between the people and the state. This Hardt and Negri place in opposition to the Machiavellian notion that revolution, the creation of a new society, needs violent upheaval. Both *The Prince* and the *Communist Manifesto*, the authors say, drawing upon the work of Althusser, share a common structure, negotiating a dialogue between subject and object. Both see this dialogue as constituting a working-out, resulting in a production, of a ‘self-constituting collective action’. *(2000) p53.* (Hardt and Negri’s link to the *res gestae* of Augustus is vital, for this was written to include nothing which could be in the context of the decision-making of the full Roman senate: the input of Augustus’ *auctoritas* is problematical). The significant differences between Machiavelli and Marx lie in the fact that the *Manifesto* argues for a teleology of subject and object and *The Prince* a utopia. Significantly, Althusser shows that both have consequences for practice: both view the ‘present as empty for the future’. However, the utopian vision of Machiavelli works to distance the subject and the object, and ‘postmodern liberation’ (a wrestling of the sources of repetition, or of production, from out of a handful of global sources that are ‘blind to the sense’ of the ‘apparatuses of the reproduction of life’), requires a new theory of political subjectivity, one that views the subject as prone to a ‘self-production’, for this Hardt and Negri refer to Spinoza and Leibniz, noting analogies for a full theory of self-production. Spinoza’s (and Leibniz’s) response to Machiavelli could run: one requires nothing for one’s self-production than what one has by virtue of being a human being: one’s individual creative powers, those shared with one’s fellows. We are, as Hardt and Negri say, the motors or repetition. The revolution is created in the space between the intentional subject and the object (in the field).


Popper marks the rise of relativism (a species, for Popper, of tyranny and fascism), and links it to a pervasive view that truth theories are incommensurable (as Popper understands the term, cf. Bernstein *(1983)*), and that choice between theories can be made on grounds no more secure than those of preference and likelihood. Popper, K.R.; *The Open Society and its Enemies: Volume II, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1945. See especially addendum I. Popper’s solution is to offer a ‘dose of Tarski’s theory of truth’ *(p369)*, and to refer the reader to his own ‘non-authoritarian knowledge theory’ (developed in *Conjectures and Refutations* and *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*). Against the approach of Popper, the core of the debate in question were clear, and of the choice between teleology and non-teleology. Cohen and Popper both reject the notion that the individual creative powers, those shared with one’s fellows, can be used to bring about an end to domination by capital. Cohen has been the most vocal critic of moralised coercion, see Cohen, G.A.; ‘Robert Nozick and Will Chamberlain: How Patterns Preserve Liberty’, in Arthur, J. and Shaw, W. (eds.); *Justice and Economic Distribution* (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall) 1978, and *Capitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat*, in Ryan, A. (ed.); *The Idea of Freedom* (Oxford University Press) 1979. Nozick seems to regard ‘capitalism’ as a purely market-based approach to ethics, and yet to face down all objections to it (that it is unfair, unjust, immoral), on the basis that those prejudices are held in the face of all logic and ‘facts or history or economics’: Nozick, R.; *Why do Intellectuals Oppose Capitalism?*, pp280-295 in *(1997d)* p282. Nozick is guilty of massive generalisation. It is interesting to note that Nozick remarks that intellectual’s desire for freedom from coercion contradicts their ‘general leftist tilt’ *(p280)*, and that Cohen, G.A.: ‘Why One Kind of Bullshit Flourishes in France’ *(typescript, Oxford)* (2002b) traces the flanmell of some French Marxist intellectuals to defects in French academia: the absence of peer review and the cultivation of the cult of the solitary intellectual. The view of Popper, and, in numerous senses, Russell (and recall his turning to Kant for his arguments for idealism), of Hegel as amoral, and as providing a foundation for fanaticism and Nazism is demolished in Kaufmann, W.; ‘The Hegel Myth and its Method’, pp21-60 in Maelintyre, A. (ed.); *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays* (New York, Anchor) 1972. The essay is particularly good, for Popper is accused of the lowest, most dishonest scholarship. Kaufmann states a principle vital for the theory of intentionality that must be written: having received the attention of numerous great philosophers, the work of the subject was to define its age in a way not captured in the arts and religion, and, “the philosopher’s task was to comprehend what the religious person and the poet feel” *(p21).* Kaufmann also has doubts about the pragmatist adoption of Hegel *(p22)* and Popper’s conviction that the pragmatist theory of truth derives from Hegel. See Popper, K.R.; *The Open Society and its Enemies: Volume I, The Spell of Plato* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1945, p274. The rejection of the pragmatist theory of truth leads to a rejection of ‘critica’ theories *(p371f).*

The theory of Popper advocates consists of the success of a statement in accounting for the corresponding facts, or state of affairs, and this, as he says, is derivative of a Tarskian truth theory. *(See Popper *(1945b)* p39).* Cf. Miller, R.W.; *Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation and Reality in the Natural and Social Sciences* (Princeton University Press) 1987. Miller argues that the relation of verification or falsification is not justified by the multiplicity of narratives that may be written (or read) for a text. One can relinquish the notion that fields such as literary interpretation and musical analysis have foundations as they describe them, and ‘no crisis’ follows. ‘For accepting a theory, approach, or explanation only requires belief in its adequacy to cope with the phenomena’ *(p501).* Miller’s is an excellent work of admirable breadth, and on the consequences for an approach to a theory of intentionality see pp117ff. One might find a connection in Dolezel, L.; *Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible Worlds* *(The Johns Hopkins University Press)* 1998, pp. Philosophical realism, even about possible worlds, is no
sufferance, for the actual world is the best of all possible worlds; in its balance and totality all that it contains is for the good. God's choice is not founded on his foreknowledge of the ways of actual things, for all of the ways of all things are known to him. His choice ranges over all of them. The world he chooses for actualisation is a vast network of interconnections, linking past, present and future, and knowable only to him in this world Jesus dies on the cross, is denied and is betrayed and so forth (for all the details of Jesus' life); that is, by the 'actual world' Leibniz means the, ... whole series and the whole collection of all existent things, lest one might say that several worlds exist at different times and different places. For the whole collection must needs be reckoned together as one world. In the actual world there may be found another sense of 'possible' governing repetition: all events linked to this world have occurred, are occurring or will occur, they are all ordained at the instantiation of the world; this, evidently, excludes from occurring in the actual world all of the possibilities excluded by the choice of this as the actual world. Leibniz writes of his theory of repetition,
about sensible things one can know nothing more, nor ought one to desire to know more, than that they are consistent with each other as well as with rational principles that cannot be doubted, and hence that future events can to some extent be foreseen from past. To seek any other truth or reality than what this contains is vain and sceptics ought not to demand any other, nor dogmatists pursue it.

Each thing is determined in all of its aspects: Adam is one and unique, there is no other with his properties: wife of Eve, father of Cain and so forth; such ‘complete individual concepts’ are not ‘indeterminate’, but are rather comprehensively described in their past, present and future. Each complete individual concept is ‘compossible’ with every other complete individual concept with which it may appear, and taken together as a set, they are ‘maximal’. Not every collection of complete individual concepts arbitrarily thrown together instantiates a possible world. Each and every object in a possible world, and their corresponding concepts, must allow no contradictions: the statements, ‘A exists’, ‘B exists’, ‘C ...’ (and so forth for all objects in the world), must all be consistent. There must be no indeterminacy between propositions and concepts, for in all worlds, each concept ‘mirrors’ every other in that world; there is a place in each for the rôle played by every other compossible object. ‘Each individual of the actual world is related to all the others, and every relation is “grounded” in accidents of the substances related; the same would be true of any other possible world’. If two concepts inhere in a possible world, then they are together present or absent in every possible world; it is, as Mates says, a transitive relation.

in all possible worlds, and synthetico contingent statements to report something thought true of this, but not all, worlds. (Mates writes, in line with other interpretations of Leibniz, that a theory of possibilities is often hard to square with positions upheld in Leibniz’s journal). See also Mates (1986) pp73-74.

Leibniz emphasises that being made actual does not change objects.

Mates makes clear that, as with much Leibniz exegesis, there are ambiguities. ‘Commentators have wondered how the existence of one individual could preclude that of another, especially since Leibniz denies the reality of relations. It is not surprising that they are puzzled, for Leibniz himself says “it is as yet unknown to men, whence arises the incompossibility of diverse things, or how it can happen that diverse essences are opposed to each other, seeing that all purely positive terms seem to be compatible inter se”.’ Mates continues (pp76-77) that the mirroring principle implies that concepts in different possible worlds are incompossible. Adam would have been different if he had not been the husband of Eve, and Eve different if she had not been the wife of Adam: they depend upon each other. The concept involves all of his progeny, including, of course, ourselves. This is also a reciprocal relationship, for if any of the members of the human race had not existed, Adam would not have existed. As Mates (pp78-80) writes, there are plainly difficulties, primarily those concerning the fact that everything appears to depend for its existence upon that of something else.

Thus there are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive equivalence classes. (Mates (1986) p77). The connection between the notions of compossibility and maximality are described in Mates, B.; ‘Leibniz on Possible Worlds’, pp335-364 in Frankfurt (1976) especially pp340-341. That the relationship is one of mirroring has been established. Complete individual concepts in worlds are compossible: they constitute a maximal set; each compatible with every other, and each relation grounded in the absolutely simple, monadic properties of each. For Leibniz, it is of the constitution of Adam that he is father of Cain; if he is not, he is not Adam. Furthermore, God only had choice as to whether Judas should exist, not whether he would betray: it was, plainly, for the best that Judas did sin. On this view of possible worlds, there are no two worlds in one of which Judas sins and in the
maximal. A world containing Adam necessarily contains Eve, Cain, Abel and so forth; it is not possible to create a world containing Adam without it containing Eve and so forth. Furthermore, every world containing Adam and Eve and so forth contains every other complete individual concept that is compossible with them. (Leibniz’s nominalism denies existence to abstract entities, or unactualised possibilia. Statements about possibilia and abstractions are, Mates argues, *compendia loquendi* for statements about actual individuals. Mates writes that references to possible objects can be replaced, so to display the inherent quantifications).

The best study of the way in which Leibniz’s work is a good response to dualism is Badiou’s review of Deleuze’s work on Leibniz. Badiou writes of Deleuze and Leibniz that both conceive of ‘discord’ or contradiction as holding not between the true and the false, the actual and the non-actual, but between ‘...possible and possible’. Like Leibniz’s monadology Deleuze’s book is, ‘...a vision and a conception of our world’. While Leibniz splices this with his theology and his predestinarianism, Deleuze does not, although both, for Badiou, conceive of the world as a continuum, an ‘enlarged chromatism’, encompassing all compossible states of affairs. Badiou writes that for both Leibniz and Deleuze ‘[a] discord is the “and” of the concord’, although again, one should add that Leibniz gives, in the choice of the best possible world, an at least partial resolution of the discordance.

second of which he does not. It is not the case that although no concept obtained in two possible worlds, attributes constituting concepts remain the same across possible worlds. Mates (1976) pp343-344 raises problems with this notion.

Nothing merely similar will suffice.

31 Mates (1986) p78. ‘There are infinitely many [possible] worlds, we are told, and each world contains infinitely many concepts; every individual concept belongs to exactly one world. Since Adam exists, there is no nonactual possible world W such that Adam would have existed if God had created W.

In view of certain controversies in the literature it is also worth pointing out that the possible worlds must clearly be restricted to collections of concepts of *created or to-be-created* individual substances. God himself stands outside the actual world, which he created, and also outside all of the other possible worlds he considered in so doing. I [Mates] believe further that not only does Leibniz deny reality, that is, existence in the actual world, to all abstract entities (such as numbers, geometric figures, Platonic ideas), but that he would not reckon any concepts of these as belonging to other possible worlds. It is not a contingent fact that these things do not exist; such questions as ‘[w]hat if, in addition to individuals, there had existed sets of individuals?’, would not, for him, even make sense.

33 Mates (1986) pp73. ‘This is not to say that it would make sense, in Leibnizian terms, to assert that a possible object is an individual concept; presumably the individual concept of Pegasus is not a possible horse: it is not by chance that concepts, like wishes, are not horses’. Mates gives the necessary refinements on pp73-74. Cf. Mates (1976) p338. Adam, Caesar and Nixon have complete individual concepts corresponding to existent individuals, Pegasus does not. The complete individual concepts of fictional individuals are studied in Kripke (1980) p. A full study is Thomasson, A.L.; Fiction and Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press) 1999.


36 Badiou (1994) p52.

37 Badiou (1994) p52. The analogy is to unresolved chords in music.

Badiou lists three points, found in Leibniz, characterising Deleuze’s notion of the fold. They go to show that the fold is simply a possible world. The first two points may seem contradictory, but they are, as should be clear from what has preceded, not so. Firstly, it is, like Derrida’s dissemination in its rôle as surplus an, ‘...antiextensional concept of the multiple’, irreducible to any simple ‘composition’, and, in its constitution and construction (like a possible world), irreducibly complex. Secondly, the fold is an ‘antdialectic’, thoroughly anti-Cartesian, concept of events, or, with Davidson, of ‘singularity’. Events, or states of affairs, are not individuated by thoughts, but by their potential for composibility, and it is this that permits the multiple. Thirdly, and following closely, the fold is categorically anti-Cartesian, (or anti-Lacanian), in its rejection of the idea that there is a peculiarly human genius, instantiating mental structures, characterising the representative powers of a subject, replacing it with the notion of the mirroring potential of ultimately simple, atomic monads. The notion of subjectivity, or of representation, that it permits is that by which effects may be registered in composibility with other monads; or, in familiar terms the monad is ‘...a communicating figure of absolute interiority, equivalent to the world, of which it is a point of view’. For Badiou, the fold, in forming a multiple from simple compositions, occupies precisely the point between the absolutely perspicuous and the irreducibly opaque occupied by a possible world and each of its instantiated states of affairs, and the notions of order out of chaos, of the choice of a possible world for actualisation, characterise the theory of intentionality offered in I.4. The choice of one from the multiple permitting this ‘chiarascuro’, this tint, Badiou says, allows for representation, revealing the

1984. Dolezel (1998) argues that possible worlds semantics gives the needed theory of *poesia* for literary narratology. He writes that this narrows the focus of narrative as fiction. ‘The universe of possible worlds is constantly expanding and diversifying thanks to the incessant world-constructing activity of human minds and hands. Literary fiction is probably the most active experimental laboratory of the world-constructing enterprise’. Dolezel’s view is that thinking about fictional worlds is rigorised by considering the arguments (of Russell, Meinong, Donnelan and so forth), concerning fictional, and non-existent, entities and objects.

Dolezel (1998) p23 says that possible worlds semantics for literary theory ‘respects the incompleteness’, of fictional worlds. Denying them incompleteness is to treat them as real. Cf. Ronen (1994) p9. On pp146-147 Dolezel considers performatives as world constructions, and he deals swiftly with Searle’s arguments for truth in fiction. Russell’s rejection of modality is broached in Dolezel (1998) pp2ff. All of Russell’s possible worlds is constantly and each of its instantiated states of affairs, and the notions of order out of chaos, of the choice of a possible world for actualisation, characterise the theory of intentionality offered in I.4. The choice of one from the multiple permitting this ‘chiarascuro’, this tint, Badiou says, allows for representation, revealing the

1984. Dolezel (1998) argues that possible worlds semantics gives the needed theory of *poesia* for literary narratology. He writes that this narrows the focus of narrative as fiction. ‘The universe of possible worlds is constantly expanding and diversifying thanks to the incessant world-constructing activity of human minds and hands. Literary fiction is probably the most active experimental laboratory of the world-constructing enterprise’. Dolezel’s view is that thinking about fictional worlds is rigorised by considering the arguments (of Russell, Meinong, Donnelan and so forth), concerning fictional, and non-existent, entities and objects.

Dolezel (1998) p23 says that possible worlds semantics for literary theory ‘respects the incompleteness’, of fictional worlds. Denying them incompleteness is to treat them as real. Cf. Ronen (1994) p9. On pp146-147 Dolezel considers performatives as world constructions, and he deals swiftly with Searle’s arguments for truth in fiction. Russell’s rejection of modality is broached in Dolezel (1998) pp2ff. All of Russell’s possible worlds is constantly and each of its instantiated states of affairs, and the notions of order out of chaos, of the choice of a possible world for actualisation, characterise the theory of intentionality offered in I.4. The choice of one from the multiple permitting this ‘chiarascuro’, this tint, Badiou says, allows for representation, revealing the

1984. Dolezel (1998) argues that possible worlds semantics gives the needed theory of *poesia* for literary narratology. He writes that this narrows the focus of narrative as fiction. ‘The universe of possible worlds is constantly expanding and diversifying thanks to the incessant world-constructing activity of human minds and hands. Literary fiction is probably the most active experimental laboratory of the world-constructing enterprise’. Dolezel’s view is that thinking about fictional worlds is rigorised by considering the arguments (of Russell, Meinong, Donnelan and so forth), concerning fictional, and non-existent, entities and objects.

Dolezel (1998) p23 says that possible worlds semantics for literary theory ‘respects the incompleteness’, of fictional worlds. Denying them incompleteness is to treat them as real. Cf. Ronen (1994) p9. On pp146-147 Dolezel considers performatives as world constructions, and he deals swiftly with Searle’s arguments for truth in fiction. Russell’s rejection of modality is broached in Dolezel (1998) pp2ff. All of Russell’s possible worlds is constantly and each of its instantiated states of affairs, and the notions of order out of chaos, of the choice of a possible world for actualisation, characterise the theory of intentionality offered in I.4. The choice of one from the multiple permitting this ‘chiarascuro’, this tint, Badiou says, allows for representation, revealing the
structure of ‘our world’; he adds that the multiple and the simple, and their composition, raise difficulties for Deleuze’s theory\textsuperscript{40}. the ultimate simple (or one), Deleuze says, invoking his classical heritage, is a point without matter (it is, in Leibniz’s terms, \textit{khora}), a vessel instantiating all of the conditions of all possible states of affairs, yet bearing none, able to represent all compossible monads. As Badiou says, this brings continual ambivalence concerning notions of ‘belonging’, and ‘inclusion’, of singular and composite states of affairs, but again with reference to I.4, he says that in description are concepts, objects and subjects, formed in states of affairs, instantiated\textsuperscript{41}.

You will then not find a case of the multiple, but a description of its figures, and, even more so, of the constant passage from one figure to another; you will not find a concept of the multiple, but the narration of its being-as-world, in the sense that Deleuze says very rightly that Leibniz’s philosophy is the “signature of the world” and not the “symbol of a cosmos”; and neither will you find a theory of the subject, but an attentiveness to, a registering of the point of view that every subject can be resolved into and which is itself the term of a series that is likely to be divergent or without reason\textsuperscript{42}.

That is, neither the relation of the one and the multiple, the one and the one, nor the multiple and the multiple, can be made by anything other than description, narration, or ‘enunciation’. For Badiou, this neatly avoids the problems raised by Plato and Descartes regarding the possibility of clear and distinct ideas, for Deleuze and Leibniz favour neither the clear nor the obscure, arguing that ideas must be worked and read off from the constitution of the world, for there is a, ‘\textit{tincture of the idea’}, obviating the stasis of dualism or dialectic. Dualism is, both Deleuze and Leibniz agree, ‘...foreign to the life of the world’\textsuperscript{43}.

In the following section is given a brief conspectus of Derrida’s response to Austin, framing the substantive issues for debate in the rest of the dissertation. This is not to say that what has gone is merely preliminary, for the case for an unashamedly ‘\textit{representationalist}’ theory returns in I.4, where it is argued that Wittgenstein’s picture theory supplies the means by which statements match the world,

\textsuperscript{40} Badiou (1994) pp52-53.
\textsuperscript{41} Badiou (1994) p53, and pp54-55 and 63-69.
\textsuperscript{42} Badiou (1994) p54.
\textsuperscript{43} Badiou (1994) pp58-61.
and in IV.5, where it is suggested that Lewis' theory of convention, derived from his work in possible worlds semantics, is acceptable in a pragmatist (Darwinian, cf. I.1), theory of meaning.
Derrida studies the concept of the transmittable, unique meaning or content described in and presupposed by the word ‘communication’. There is, he thinks, a presumption in asking after it, for if it were found to possess several meanings, irreducible to one another, there could be no a priori definition, and this is implied by its application across the fields of semantics, semiotics and linguistics, for communication also denotes non-semantic, gestural, or ‘real’ communication, and how might one account for this? Communication may have no connection to meaning whatsoever (Derrida suggests passage between places, and the transmission of earth tremors), yet the force of the analogy should not be overstated, because in acknowledging it, the ‘...value of the notion of literal meaning appears more problematical than ever...', and because metaphorical displacement to non-semantic cases (‘transport’) is, ‘...precisely constitutive of the concept of metaphor with which one claims to comprehend the semantic displacement that is brought about from communication as a non-semio-linguistic phenomenon to communication as a semio-linguistic phenomenon'. This abundance of meaning, this polysemy, exceeds even dissemination. A candidate for limiting the field is determinate context.

---

2 Both Strawson and Norris note the presumption. (Strawson, P.F.; ‘Meaning and Truth’, pp.170-189 in Logico-Linguistic Papers (London, Methuen & Co.) 1971, p.171 and Norris, C.; The Context of Faculties: Philosophy and Theory after Deconstruction (London, Methuen) 1985, p.195). It is a virtue of Grice’s (and Gricean) theory of meaning intentions that it theorises intentions in communication without reference to the fact of whether they are verbal or non-verbal. Plainly, this is a distinction which Derrida would not allow can be overridden, but it is the case that Grice’s voice is inexplicably missing from the Derrida/Searle exchange.
6 And because it postulates transport between meanings. The abundance is accounted for, it is argued below, by a principle of charity. Derrida (1977b) pp.178-179 asks of himself: what is he doing in the essays on Austin? Is the intention merely to provoke, or, perhaps more honourably, to offer, in writing, a text, signed and authorised, again in writing, in which a performance is presented and in which at all times the oppositions between concepts and values are questioned; this, as the conclusion to (1977a) shows, is a consistent motivation. Such rigorous oppositions are, Derrida maintains, upheld by speech act theory, and should be girt for Austin’s desire to play Old Harry. Derrida offers rather,
described in a linguistic convention, and, ‘...produced by a kind of consensus that is implicit but structurally vague...’; Derrida suggests communications, ‘...to engage or to pursue dialogues within the horizon of an intelligibility and truth that is meaningful, such that ultimately general agreement

...the performance of a text which by raising and passing the question of truth (beyond Austin’s intermittent impulses in this direction) does not simply succumb to its jurisdiction and remains, at this point, qua textual performance, irreducible to “verdictive” (as Austin might say) sentences of the type: this is true, this is false, “completely mistaken” or “irrational false”.

Derrida (p182) notes that it is in the “name of analogy”, that Searle justifies the idealising distinction of serious and non-serious in elucidating the nature of illocutionary acts. Speech act theory is limited from the beginning, however, by its being restricted to analysing speech acts said to be ordinary in languages said to be actual, and “[t]he language of theory always leaves a residue that is neither formalisable nor idealisable in terms of that theory of language’. (These points emerge in II.1). Derrida adds that all theoretical utterances are themselves speech acts, and that this can only ruin the ‘...analogical value (in the strict sense) between speech act theory and other theories’. The statements of theory in speech act theory are just as prone to incommensurability, indeterminacy and vagueness, and the illegitimacy of an analogy between heterogeneous theories is joined by the analogical status of the utterance suggesting that the analogy refers ultimately to an analogical utterance. (A Lewis convention responds to this point). This, Derrida argues, can hardly be thought to underpin the theory, purporting as it does to ‘found the entire methodology (abstraction, idealisation, systematisation, etc.) of the theory of speech acts’. Derrida writes that the essential iterability of all marks renders unworkable all of the philosophical oppositions governing the Searlean idealisation, and are, on these terms, the condition of the positive values for which Searle makes the case.

Derrida (pp183-186) moots in opposition to himself the idea that in the light of the irreducible and generality of iterability it may itself be susceptible to idealisation and purification, or, systematisation. Derrida replies that this is not the case, for the status of iterability as comprising identity and difference, repetition and alteration, renders idealisation possible without ever lending itself to any one idealisable conceptualisation. As before, there can be no idealisation without iterability, and yet iterability cannot be idealised, for any such process imposes a limit preventing the term idealisation from itself being subsumed within the idealisation, ‘...just as it excludes the reappropriation of that whose iteration it nonetheless broaches and breaches’. In this way is a limit imposed upon all theorising that seeks fully to account for its object of study, for the object incorporates the hierarchy of oppositional values which iterability is to unpick, and poses and reposes the values. The opposition of serious and non-serious cannot ‘become the object of an analysis in the classical sense of the term: strict, rigorous, “serious”, without one of the two terms, the serious or the literal, or even the strict, proceeding to determine the value of the theoretical discourse itself’. To avoid such presupposition speech act theory must make account of the non-serious, the metaphorical, the ironic and the cited; doing this derives idealisation on such an analogy of iterability as idealisation of serious and literal speech acts.

On these matters Searle (1977) p204ff is unequivocal in his assessment of Derrida: his depiction of Austin is ‘unrecognisable’. The exclusion of parasitic forms is not nearly as grave as Derrida says: as Austin indicates, he wishes to study standard cases to bring to light essential characteristics. There could not be promises made by actors if there were not the possibility of promises in standard communication. (This matter returns with fascinating consequences for the assessment of Derrida’s work in III.5). There is, Searle says, a logical dependency of parasite on parasited: Austin merely excludes them for the ‘present’. In developed speech act theory the problem of parasitism is of the least importance, and the very questioning of the status of parasitic discourse presupposes a ‘general’ theory of speech acts. Austin never wrote that parasitic discourse is not part of ordinary discourse, merely that the very questioning of the possibility of citation is not the same as the phenomenon of parasitic discourse. A writer is not in general quoting anyone, and an actor repeats lines without quoting them. Such cases are not instances of a general idealisability essential for successful performatives. Most instances of parasitic discourse are not citations, but cases in which the relevant expressions are used and not mentioned, and Austin works with a vastly different notion of iterability than that ascribed to him by Derrida: parasitic utterances are instances of iterability, not ‘...in any way a modification of iterability or citationality’. Austin’s setting aside of the cases of fictional discourse to deal with non-fictional performatives is an ‘investigative strategy’: both parasitic and non-parasitic are instances of iterability, but Austin draws no longer conclusion from the study of the former case.

Derrida (1977b) pp237ff rejoins that (1976a) was not primarily meant as a criticism of Austin but was to show that the ‘general theory’ which neither Austin nor Searle can state could only ever be given after ‘...a re-elaboration of the axiomatics or of the premises...’, of any such theory. In saying this, Derrida emphasises that he has not misunderstood the strategic intentions of Austin, and he notes a duty to responsibility, to ‘...responsible intentionality...’. He rejects Searle’s accusation that he states that Austin excludes the possibility that performative utterances can be quoted on the premise that Austin excludes fictional discourse. Derrida writes that both he and Austin would reject the charge. The question turns upon the analysis Austin gives of the possibility. Derrida turns again to the distinction he has marked between possibility and eventuality, a distinction inadequately marked by Austin in his deliberate exclusion of the possibility, and he cites again the second lecture (pp229-230). What Austin rules out by the temporary exclusion of the parasitical is the very fact that changes parasitism as possibility into an eventuality, and Derrida regards Searle’s arguments for the logical dependency of non-parasite, or literal, upon parasitical, as instrumental in allowing him to distinguish the temporary, methodological exclusion from a metaphysical exclusion. Derrida replies that the determination of positive values (serious, literal) is dogma, for all speech acts depend upon the structure of iterability; furthermore, he notes in Austin an intimation of the idea that one cannot have a methodological exclusion which is not also a metaphysical exclusion. His distinctions: normal/abnormal, literal/non-literal, are not simply value oppositions around an ‘unfindable’ centre, but imply a malicious, unhinging subordination, and his repeated returns to origins or structures of priority to elucidate the derivation and determination of specific speech acts, is ‘the metaphysical exigency’. An exclusion such as Austin postulates could not be temporary, and Derrida remarks, justifiably, upon the absence of the general theory from Searle, J.R.; Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press) 1969, and with incredulity upon Searle’s claim that one in possession of the general theory one can analyse the status of parasitical discourse. Derrida argues that Austin had the kernel of the general theory, but that it would not, even by extension on the terms in which it is stated, allow the integration of that which it begins by excluding. In this is Derrida’s major contribution to speech act theory. Derrida (p238) notes the developed philosophical tradition that would have rejected the Searlean analysis.
may, in principle, be attained\(^5\). Each act of consensus would direct a particular use of the word ‘communication’, ‘qua signification’, yet it could never be reached, for there is a, ‘theoretical inadequacy’, a ‘non-saturation’, in the constitution of determinate contexts, invalidating all attempts at definition and distinction, and confirming the status of writing as irredeemably metaphorical, as ‘inscribed and supplementary’, leashed to its source in oral and gestural communication\(^6\). For Derrida this demands the ‘extension’ (mootted above), of the ‘field’ of plausible means of communication, and shows limits to the reach of oral and gestural collocation, breached only by the accretion of writing\(^7\).

Derrida moves on to consider how this field is constituted, and how it may define a limit, given that it, ‘...remains fundamentally continuous and self-identical, a homogeneous element through which the unity and wholeness of meaning would not be affected in its essence’\(^8\), and the analogy is pursued in

\(^5\) Though Derrida rejects this, it is argued in this dissertation that a theory of meaning intentions in communication can be founded upon a theory of convention. Furthermore, the theory provides for a notion of analyticty in language, indeed, what Derrida rejects is precisely a coordination problem, as solved by Lewis. In III doubts about such a theory’s structural constitution are entertained, owing to the inconsistencies found in Searle’s theory. The relativisation that Searle fears to ‘each’ use of a word is obviated in Lewis’ conventions (cf. IV).

\(^6\) The notion of consensus directing uses of language approximates Searle’s theory of background conditions, or conventions, in speech acts, and Habermas, J., *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge, Polity) 1987, p197 says of these conditions that they can, if needed, be brought out in a ‘rationally motivated agreement’: (cf. III and Searle and Strawson on the essential arrogability of speech acts). In Habermas’ response to Derrida a principle passably similar to Searle’s theory of the background is used, yet Habermas’ response is founded more on those remarks of Derrida emphasising that the nod to convention in Austin justifies that the latter reproduces ‘... in a discourse said to be theoretical the founding categories of all ethical-political statements’. Derrida goes on (1977b p240):

I am convinced that speech act theory is fundamentally and in its most found, most rigorous, and most interesting aspects...a theory of right or law, of convention, of political ethics or of politics as ethics. It describes (in the best Kantian tradition, as Austin acknowledges at one point) the pure conditions of an ethical-political discourse insofar as this discourse involves the relation of intentionality to conventionality or to rules.


Although the point is not taken up in detail below, it is the conviction of the present author that Derrida’s arguments for the immanent relativisation to contexts can be challenged by the development of a theory of determination into oblique, indirect or propositional contexts. It is hoped that enough of an idea is provided in the discussion of demonstrative or indexical sentences (in I.2 and I.3). The ‘underdetermination’ of which Quine speaks in assessing the claims of founding conventions and contexts in the philosophy of language are of similar motivation to Derrida’s arguing for the impossibility of a means of reigning in iterability, and it is shown below (in IV.1) that Lewis’ possible worlds theory of intentionality is given explicitly as a response to Quine.

\(^7\) Because it seems to allow for iterability and repetition. The Gricean theory offered in this dissertation makes no use of a dichotomy between oral and gestural communication and that codified in writing; as seen in II, Grice’s theory accounts for all acts made with intention to communicate.

\(^8\) Derrida (1977b) p179 says that this picture, this representation, of interpretation ‘characterises the nature of philosophy: there is not...a single counter-example...’. However, Grice, as Searle and Derrida, argues that there is no intentionality without language, and, if it is added to his analysis, that the notion of convention needed to supplement it, makes no appeal to essences of either conventions or language. (See I.2) (It might be added that Derrida’s method in the essay following the establishing of his premises is a model of methodological philosophising). Derrida’s is a subtle questioning of truth, which by its formulation in a performance (‘at this point’) is an impossibility of classifying a performative with a simple verdictive sentence. Searle’s response, making such accusations, is so far from clear that his reply to Derrida is indeed a ‘misreading’, but rather of Searle’s own intention.

How is it possible to miss the point that Sec, from the one end to the other, is concerned with the question of truth, with the system of rules associated with it, reposing and altering that system, dividing and displacing it in accordance with the logical force of the iter, which ties repetition to alterity.

By ignoring many of the aspects of the essay Searle is able to articulate his criticisms, for his target is ‘...after all, nothing but [his] own autocratic representation’. Derrida (p181) can find humour in the ignorance: Searle misses only three things, namely signature, event and context. He claims that Searle’s adherence to a narrow definition of writing (one can substitute ‘all communication’), as the representation of speech, is only a further example of his faith in unworkable theories. In a connected point Derrida writes that the first premise of (1977a), the questioning of communication, applies to Searle’s arguments, for he works with a definition of language as communication, and with a definition of ‘text’ as the contents of an utterance, be they present or transcribed. Derrida’s first reply is to argue that that the role of context can never be separated from the analysis of a text; a context is always ‘transformative-transferable, exportative-exportable...’. With this in mind Derrida returns to the accusation of Searle that he trashes the use/mention distinction. The passage in (1977a) which Searle targets is set at an auspicious point, making his argument unworkable. The omitted word *encore* in its *signifie encore* does indeed signify that another, supplementary meaning can be grafted onto the first, ‘even onto a non-meaning’, but it also signifies that a supplementary graft has been added to another mark which itself did not originally signify an ‘example of agnomicality’, but
Condillac. Men write, Derrida argues, to communicate thoughts or ideas, and because they are disposed to communicate in progressively more adventitious ways, ways in which thoughts may be inscribed, or represented, for purposes of repetition and of instilling authority. Writing is a form of representation, analogous to gestures and sounds, which may undergo transformation into other systems of writing, but which never severs its connection to the first act of communication, '...the relation idea/sign...'.

Writing to communicate with an absent receiver ('The absence of the sender, of the receiver...'), leaves in its wake effects, '...independently of his [the writer's] presence and of the present actuality of his intentions...'; this absence marks the structure of all language, yet is dismissed by Condillac'.

Condillac argues that the analogy of the signs is 'chosen', in an order that one has 'instituted' among one's ideas. One retracts objects according to one's 'present needs', and finds the appropriate device. Condillac's contribution, Derrida argues, is the inclusion of an 'ideology' of presence, and a theory of

which in turn cannot constitute the original, authentic state of the mark existing before the graft. There is a circle of reference but no meaning. Derrida (1977b) p.222 notes a precaution he might have taken to avoid misunderstanding, derived from an example in Searle (1969). He could have mentioned 'the green is either' signifies nothing '...to the extent, at least, to which significations or meaning is bound to discursive grammaticality...', and added that a citation of a mentioning phrase '...the green is either...', as a 'citational reference' signifies in addition 'this is an example of grammaticality', and the example '...the green is either...', by dint of its functioning, that a graft is always possible, '...just as every phrase endowed with grammaticality that is cited in a certain context, for example in a grammar book, can also signify (encore): I am an example of grammar'. Derrida (p.223) moves to consideration of the distinction marked by Searle between normal and not-normal, and the claim that what does not have normal use, that is cases of citation and objects of discourse, are described by 'perfectly adequate use/mention conventions.'

Kripke (1980) makes a study of dubbing, or original naming. However, he argues that the relativisation to contexts (described by Derrida), in fact instantaneous relativisation to possible worlds. Cf. Manley, L.; Convention: 1590-1750 (Harvard University Press) 1980. It is Manley's ambition to study and remedy the breakdown in the view of '...readers, nature and precedents' which constituted classical linguistic theory. He sets as the main issue for study the opposition between nature and convention as a 'basis for collective order', and that between convention and a Romantic ideal of the individual (Cf. Eldridge, R.; Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality and Romanticism (University of Chicago) 1997). For the former Manley looks to Levi-Strauss' work on conventions and natural order, and its denial of the '...primacy of individual consciousness and intentionality', (p.6). Conventions, in line with the classic structuralist definition of Saussure (see Course in General Linguistics (London, Duckworth) 1972, Chapter II, especially pp.71-74), are to be understood intersubjectively. As an intersubjective phenomenon, structuring ways of thinking, conventions have a unity not evident at the 'empirical level' (p.7). In this convention and nature are not distinct, the former is not an interpretation of the latter; indeed, conventions 'determine and express' nature. Thus, on Levi-Strauss' terms, convention is pervasive and should be fundamental to philosophy, for any attempt to describe man in his intentionality, his self-consciousness and his intersubjectivity, must tangle with convention, and not, 'disguise it metaphysically'. As Manley says, this raises Derrida's concerns: see Derrida, J.; 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences', pp.278-293 in (1978).

Society is not preceded by a state of nature, in that there is no congress such as that envisaged by Quine for the settling of language (see IV). Levi-Strauss' work is thus wholly congruent with Lewis: as Manley and Levi-Strauss have it, '[w]hoever says "Man" says "Language", and whoever says "Language" says "Society"'. Intersubjective consciousness is thus a symptom of conventions, and so Levi-Strauss can make fundamental objections to Cartesianism. As Manley implies, there are radical implications for temporality, for the present is always constructed out of past regularities and future expectations.


See Condillac (Bonnot, E.); Philosophical Writings of Etienne Bonnot, Abbé de Condillac (New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum) 1982. Derrida (1977a) p.177 writes that in the Essai absence is the '...continuous modification and progressive extermination of presence'. The supplementation of ideography is, as with the relation of idea/sign, related always to the influence of oral and gestural communication. With regard to Condillac's notion of tracing and retracing one's thoughts, Derrida again takes up the idea/sign relation. Derrida writes, again parsing Condillac, that the sign '...comes into being at the same time as imagination and memory, the moment it is necessitated by the absence of the object from present perception', and in memory operates a process of analogy. Derrida's emphasis is on the passage of the analogy between references.
Derrida raises two problems. Firstly, the absence within writing would have to be of a more ‘original’ type than Condillac countenances if it were to be privileged, and secondly, if the absence were found to be applicable to all communication, writing would become merely a species of communication, and both concepts would fail. For a written communication to remain readable it must do so in cases of delayed presence, and indeed the absence of any receiver. It must, that is, be iterable. The only survival of a private language of two persons in the absence of one or both would be the result of iterability, and the effect of this in writing renders it a ‘rupture’ in presence: a writer’s marks remain for future reception, and yet are linked to, ‘. . .non-presence in general’. to, ‘. . .the non-presence of my [the writer’s]
intention of saying something meaningful...14. The rupture affects both context and intention ("...the wanting-to-say-what-he-means"), and allows the detachment of a written sign from the sentence in which it appears and its 'grafting' into others. The possibility of detachment intimates also the ever-present separation of written signs from all forms of present reference to past or future15. The effects of rupture go for all language, and ultimately all 'experience', deriving as it does from the, 'field of the mark', the network of effacement and of difference ensuring that the units of iterability constituting it are rendered never identical to themselves16. The status of each erleb is that of a grapheme, constituted

14 Derrida (1977b) p195. It shall be noted here for later reference that it is in this that Derrida makes first use of the phrase 'vouloir-dire', from which one approach to his arguments can be made. In an example he describes the functioning of a mark which, in the author's absence, will continue 'in principle', to undergo re-reading and rewriting, and this, in extremis, in "...the non-presence of [the author's] intention of saying something meaningful [non vouloir-dire, non intention, de-signification] of [his] wish to communicate, from the omission or production of the mark", a mark underwritten by the "...plenitude of his desire to say what he means, in order to sustain what seems to be written "in his name"'. This, for Derrida, is a drift both allowing and rendering impossible the repeated reception of writing, and the necessary absence of both responsibility for one's utterances and of a guiding consciousness: "...the break with the horizon of communication as communication of consciousness or of presences and as linguistic or semantic transport of the desire to mean what one says [vouloir-dire]...". Derrida emphasises that these points are generalisable for all systems of signs and of communication (gestures and so forth).

15 In Yourgrau, P.; 'The Path Back to Frege', pp97-132 in Yourgrau, P. (ed); Demonstratives (Oxford University Press) 1990, and in presenting his first thesis of reference (that the task of semantics is to describe the ways in which a subject is able to refer to the world), the author notes the difficulty of translating 'Bedeutung' and the intimacy between a theory of reference and one's epistemology and philosophy of mind. (Cf. Bennington, G.; 'For the Sake of Argument (Up to a Point)', pp332-354 in Glendingning, S. (ed.); 'Arguing with Derrida', Ratio, vol. XIII, no. 4, 2000, and Evans, G.; 'The Causal Theory of Names', pp1-24 in Collected Papers (Oxford, Clarendon) 1985. Yourgrau's essay is a model of the broad-based work done in the 'analytical' tradition. Without the connection one's theory of reference issues in a notion, unfaithful to Brentano's statement of the conditions on the intentional object of thought, tolerating what Yourgrau calls the "...'noumenalisation' of reference" (that is, the intentional objects become as elusive as Kant's noumena). In this are raised further matters for any work endeavouring to make the connection between semantical and phenomenological philosophy in contemporary responses to Kant, and Yourgrau (pp109-112) gives reasons for thinking that Kripke's Cartesianism is the purest response to intentionality. (Cf. McGinn, C.; 'Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions', Analysis, vol. XXXVII, no. 2, pp78-80, 1977. Yourgrau's revised Fregeanism is seen to share problems with Kripke's theory, especially time-sensitive (tensed) sentences: cf. pp128-132). Yourgrau says that semanticians face equally the problem faced by transcendental arguments, namely, the statement of the conditions on the possibility of reference to the world. Cf. Taylor, C.; 'The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology', pp151-187 in Macintyre, A. (ed.); Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York, Anchor) 1972. See Hacker, P.M.S.; 'Philosophy', pp322-347 in Glock, H-J. (ed.); Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader (Oxford, Blackwell) 2001, for the Kantian influence on Wittgenstein. As Yourgrau says, the shift in emphasis requires of future anti-Cartesian arguments that they work at the level of belief, thought and knowledge. What is the argument for the accessibility to oneself of one's thoughts?

Salmon, N.; Frege's Puzzle (Harvard University Press) 1986, p distinguishes Fregean sense from what a speaker's words are about (their semantic referents). Kant's argument is that reference to one's world is possible if it reports an identical yet numerically different twin. Yourgrau asks whether this is congruent with Kant's arguing for non-conceptualised, or non-mediated, reference to objects (or whether it is distinctly conceptual), and indeed, whether the action of reference to possible worlds problematises the whole notion of reference to reality, and so raises the matter of whether Fregean sense is itself made in intuition (non-conceptually): Salmon responds that Frege's semantics advocates a conceptual accessibility, and besides, that possible worlds semantics can allow reference to one's world (and that the Fregean theory of intentionality is superior to the Kantian). However, none of this, Yourgrau argues, rules out that in giving a Fregean sense one secures semantic reference.

Yourgrau gives a hearing to the competing ways in which identicals may be indiscernible (the ways Salmon denies to Frege in saying that, for Frege, all accessibility is conceptual), namely the denial that identicals are indiscernible by any means, and the view that indiscernibility depends upon the epistemology one advocates. In response to Salmon and Kripke, Yourgrau argues for the latter: that Fregean sense is semantic reference. This raises again the problems with Cartesian cognitive access, and is great for Evans' argument (described in 12).

15 Precisely what is replaced in the (possible worlds) theory offered in this dissertation. Searle (1977) pp200-201 writes, paraphrasing Derrida, that the permanence of the text makes possible the separation of the text from its origin, and the distinction of the written and spoken words. Derrida, however, Searle continues, conflates the two by a simple metonymy: the possibility of spacing and rupture is essential to the estrangement of the origin from its source of the utterance, and adds that this distance renders every mark "...a grapheme in general". The possibility of repeating an utterance through citation or quotation, Searle replies, is merely that of being able to use it outwith its role in a context of representation, and this is a feature of any system of representation. (Cf. 12 on Davidson on quotation and quantification and his use, in his work on creative use of language, of the Grecoan analysis of meaning intentions (1.5).)

16 Hence Derrida says that there can be no perception. In 1.3 Hintikka's arguments for possible worlds semantics as the kernel of a theory of perception are considered. With reference to the Saussurean notion of convention: that spoken elements of language find their places in relation to a code, Derrida writes that one must be able to identify signifying forms, an identity which carries with it the necessity of division. The very constitution of identity contains division. Derrida attacks Austin for the same reason, although as Strawson shows, Derrida's understanding of Austin is significantly wrong. Cf Derrida (1981a)).
by the possibility of its being repeated in the absence of a referent, of the ‘determinate signified’, and the intentions of signification and communication.

Derrida examines examples from Husserl17. An utterance referring to a possible object can be made with the referent present to speaker or hearer. This, for Derrida, is the possibility of iterability in general, the possibility of utterance, and the generative possibility of marks18. The possibility of the absence of the signified Husserl deems an ‘inferior’ meaning, one which is, indeed, (in part) responsible for the crisis in the European sciences. Husserl lists three forms of absence. Firstly, signs may function by being manipulated without animation, with merely the intention of signifying19. Secondly, utterances can have meaning without, ‘objective signification’, for example, in an utterance such as ‘the square circle’. It can be judged false or contradictory, yet the division signifier/signified/referent cannot, for Derrida, fit Husserl’s analysis, for there is in the example the absence of a referent and a signified, but not of a meaning, and the absence of the intention of actual signification, and of the referent, still constitute the possibility of writing, for it exhibits the internal structure of spoken language in the form of an outside20.

In the third category are cases of agrammaticality (‘the green is either’). There is here ‘...no cognitive language such as Husserl construes in a teleological manner, no language accorded the possibility of the intuition of objects given in person and signified in truth’21. Husserl’s focus is on the rules of a logical grammar as a set of conditions of possibility for significations in relation to possible objects, ‘...not with a pure grammar in general,...’22. In this notion of intention, in this ‘oriented contextual field’, ‘the green is either’ is unacceptable. However, Derrida writes, it signifies in other contexts, and he offers the example of translation (German into French), or, more provocatively, (and Searle is provoked), it signifies ‘...an example of agrammaticality’. This encapsulates the sense of possibility Derrida advocates, which is,

...the possibility of disengagement and citational graft which belongs to the structure of every mark, spoken or written, and which constitutes every mark in writing before and outside of every horizon of semio-linguistic communication; in writing, which is to say

19 Cf. the discussion of Fregean semantics in 1.2.  
20 Responses to these points are adumbrated in I.3 and responded to by the arguments offered in I.2.  
21 Derrida (1977a) pp184-185 notes that Husserl’s theory gives a putative differentiation of instances of communication from signs as signifying, and as seeking to say something.
in the possibility of its functioning being cut off, at a certain point, from its ‘original’
desire-to-say-what-one-means [vouloir-dire] and from its participation in a saturable and
constraining context22.

Every sign can be cited, and in so doing engender a proliferation of ‘illimitable’ contexts. There are
only contexts without centres, and this condition of iterability is, in a prelude to any discussion of
Austin, that without which a mark could not be thought to have a ‘normal’ function23. Austin’s theories
of perlocution and illocution emphasise the rôles of speech acts as acts of communication, replacing the
performative-constative distinction, and showing the use of the performative as produced in the
‘...total situation in which the interlocutors find themselves’. Illocution and perlocution, Derrida
writes, ‘...do not designate the transference or passage of a thought-content, but, in some way, the
communication of an original movement...’24. A performative communication is a communication of
‘...a force through the impetus...of a mark’. The performative does not have a referent; it describes

---

(Dordrecht, Reidel) 1982, pp289-300 detail the debt of Husserl to a possible worlds semantics and a metaphysics of possible worlds.
23 Derrida (1977b) pp184-185. Derrida says that he only appeals to this possibility, and makes no claim for the necessity of this
condition: absence pertains, and Derrida quotes himself ‘qua possibility’, to the structure of each mark as such and to its
possibility for iteration. The possibility of writing being able to convey communication in the absence of the speaker, receiver
and all context, is the only necessary element, being permanently inscribed in the structure of a mark and defining its function:
‘To object by citing is the possibility allowing it not to be observable is like objecting that a mark is not essentially
iterable because here and there it has not in fact been repeated’. The complexity of the structure of this possibility and the rôle of
the presence of speaker and receiver is greatly increased by the necessity for inscription of this possible functioning. This is the
logic for which (1977a) endeavours to account, for, contra Searle’s claims for Austin’s procedure, and indeed Austin’s own
justification of his method, when once one recognises the importance of this structure it cannot be treated as explicable, ‘...even
temporarily, on allegedly methodological grounds’, for it is always working its effects, ‘marking all the facts’.
24 Cf. Derrida (1977a) p185 and 196. In cases of anagrammaticity Husserl theorises the absence of language granting the grasp
of objects ‘...given in person and signified in truth’. Derrida notes with enthusiasm that his primary intention is upon Husserl’s
detaching communication from its ‘...context or its telological and metaphysical horizon...’. In this is the distinction affected of
communication from the analysis of the sign or expression ‘...as signifying the sign, the seeking to say something’. In the
accompanying footnote Derrida cites Husserl to the end that expressions in communicative situations function as indexes. There is,
in addition, a rôle for expressions ‘...in the life of the soul...’, as they function outwith such situations: the change of function
changes nothing pertinent to what makes them expressions. ‘They have, as before, their Bedeutungen and the same Bedeutungen
as in collocation.’

Iterability, which Derrida makes clear, is never confused with iteration, can be seen in a mark which seems to have occurred
only once, for the mark is always already divided by the structure of repeatability, and always undercuts, and allows the
contamination of, the oppositions of fact and principle, the factual and the possible, and the necessary and the possible. Searle’s
two putative counter-examples, the shopping list written for oneself and the scribbled note passed to a companion during the
course of a concert, cannot traduce this law. The shopping list is, indeed, neither utilisable nor producible, for it would not be
what it is were it not for the structure of possibility allowing it to function from the very beginning in the absence of the sender
and the receiver. The drawing up of the list for oneself is done in the light of the fact that it is only a list if it implies one’s
absence (if one is able to utilise its function upon one’s arrival at the shop). Even the most fleeting of absences, the simple
‘absence of memory’ for instance, is always already marked by absence. These conclusions move Derrida to argue that the writer
(or, in other examples, the sender), of the list is palpably not the same as the shopper (the sender at a later time), and if the
presence of the sender to the receiver is always assured, there would be no need for the writing itself. The sender and the receiver
always inevitably are related to a mark or marks they experience as always able to operate in their absence, and this is
experienced not as a limiting condition but as a positive, indeed the sole condition, of the possibility of communication. Derrida
remarks, but does not pursue the thought, that this requires analyses of the value of presence to oneself and to others, and of
difference and difference.

Derrida (pp188-189) calls Searle’s analysis ‘facile’, worried to the presence at the moment of sending the shopping list of
the receiver. If the list is to circulate, to perform its function, both the sender and the receiver, who cannot on Searle’s own terms be
the same, cannot be present at the moment of writing. In addition, Searle has no sensitivity to the difference of between being
present and being ‘present-to-one-self’. Derrida applies the same response to the example of communicating with short written
messages.
15 Derrida here fails to heed the conditions Strawson puts on the distinction between illocutions and perlocutions and their
production in a saturated context according to a specific intension. These conditions (presented in II and picked up in III), have
implications for a distinction between performative and constative utterances.
nothing ‘...that exists outside of language and prior to it’; rather it transfers a situation. Derrida argues that even if a constative utterance may achieve the same, this does not impair its function, as, he maintains, it does in the case of the performative26.

Derrida enjoys Austin’s liberation of the performative from conditions of true and false, and the shift of focus to study of their force. He writes that the performative is a communication which does not consist in the transport of ‘semantic content’, constituted by fidelity to truth, but that Austin encounters difficulties, each with a ‘common root’27. Austin does not account for the repetition immanent in the structure of location, and which introduces that obscured by the accretion of writing (the ‘graphematic in general’); recognition of this would destroy the distinctions between illocutionary forces that Austin so patiently establishes28. Derrida gives as an example Austin’s postulation of the ‘exhaustively

26 There is again a difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary force, although cf. following the discussion of II, the argument presented in III.5.
27 Searle (1977) p203 notes Derrida’s application of his conclusions to a discussion of Austin. Searle refers to the common root Derrida discerns as the source of Austin’s problems, namely that:

Aussin (does) not [take] account of what—in the structure of location (this before any illocutory or perlocutory determination)—already entails that system of predicates I call graphematic in general and consequently blurs...all the oppositions which follow, oppositions whose pertinence, purity and rigour Austin has unsuccessfully attempted to establish.

Derrida remarks upon Austin’s distinction of felicitous and infelicitous speech acts, but Searle adds, ‘...does not sufficiently ponder the consequences arising from the fact that the possibility of failure of the speech act is a necessary possibility’, on the face of it, one might add, an astonishing criticism. More depressing for Searle is Derrida’s charge that Austin excludes the possibility of quotation of utterances, made by the fact that Austin excludes fictional discourse and other parasitic forms. These forms are, for Derrida, in their emphasis of iterability, the condition of possibility without which there could be no successful performativistic utterances. For Derrida a performative can succeed only ‘...if its formulation reports a coded or iterable utterance, only if it is identifiable in some way as a citation’. With a reckoning of the forms of iteration one shall see that intention is essentially absent from an utterance (p204).

28 A defence of Austin on this point could surely be mounted to the end that he is operating not at the level of locations but at that of illocutions. Important cross-references are Cohen, L.J., ‘Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XIV, no. 55, pp18-137, 1964, and Skinner, Q. ‘Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts’, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XX, no. 79, pp118-138, 1970. Searle (1977) pp200-201 also attributes to Derrida (1977a) the argument that what distinguishes writing and speech is the ‘permanence’ of the text, and that the subsequent arguments confuse iterability and permanence: ‘...the type-token distinction is logically independent of the fact of the permanence of certain tokens...’. Derrida (1977b) pp187-188 says that (1977a) speaks rather of a ‘non-present remainder’, which cannot be assimilated to ‘...the substantial presence implied by the temporality of permanence...’. Derrida notes carefully Searle’s analysis of his words, and cites,

He [Derrida] writes, “This structural possibility of being woven from the referent or from the signified (hence from communication and its context) seems to me to make every mark, including those which are oral, a grapheme in general; which is to say, as we have seen, the non-present remainder of a differential mark cut off from its putative ‘production’ or ‘origin’”.

Derrida responds that it is imperative to avoid the incorrect translation of restance (the remains of the grapheme) into a ‘standard and trivial’ idiom, for it is categorically not to be allied with the permanence of written language, it includes oral marks, and indeed all graphemes. The remainder has nothing to do with the function of language, but is the condition of iterability of all marks, allowing the self same mark to be repeatable and identifiable after repetition. (1977a) articulates the work of the permanent non-present remainder of all marks extranged from their origins. The estrangement occurs not with the absence of the hearer from the speaker, but at once and always. Derrida is correct to say that Searle considers the theory of the objects described in speech act theory to be a psychology, describing an interior domain of psychic life, but his denunciation of the arguments for restance is a further example of Searle’s argument against his own autistc representation of Derrida’s argument. With regard to the distinction of serious and non-serious speech and the claim that in the first case there is no distinction between the illocutionary extension and its expression, there is no more significant target for (1977a), for no such idealisation can be made. Derrida (1977b) pp206-207 turns to Searle (1969), and to Searle’s recognition that idealisation is required for two reasons: to define the structure of illocutionary acts, and indeed for the justification of the whole enterprise of philosophical analysis. Derrida replies that neither point is satisfactorily made. In Searle’s rush to force the distinction Derrida finds confirmation of the fact that criteria of intention are required for the definition and distinction of serious and non-serious discourse and of the fact that the intention must (on Searle’s own arguments) be the motivation of the utterance. Derrida has three main objections, which he does not take up in detail: such an idealisation poses insuperable factual difficulties, opens up the of ‘labyrinths of empiricism’, and leads, inevitably, to an ‘interminability’ of the required analysis. (In II it is shown how a theory of meaning intentions can be derived from an analysis of speech acts making no such unacceptable conclusions, and in IV how such intentions can correspond to conventions without fear of ‘interminability’). Derrida says himself that empirical difficulties do not preclude the possibility of a process such as Searle’s leading to an essential definition, and that one need not appeal to cases of real promising for the
determined’ context in which a performative occurs, and in particular the place in it given to consciousness, or ‘...the conscious presence of the intention of the speaking subject in the totality of his speech act’. Austin conceives of performative communication as the communication of intentional meaning, ‘...even if that meaning has no referent in the form of a thing or of a prior or exterior state of things’. He allows no surplus in convention, in context, in grammatical form, or in the semantics of the constituent words, ‘...that is, no “dissemination” escaping the horizon of the unity of meaning’.

Austin’s six conditions for the success of a performative, by dint of the values of convention and completeness, emphasise the conditions of context, consciousness and of meaningful speech, ‘...[vouloir-dire]...’, as ‘... master of itself: the teleological jurisdiction of an active field whose organising centre remains intention’. Derrida writes that Austin’s procedure,

analysis of the conditions necessary for a promise. He does, however, that such unacceptable distinctions are precisely of the type that speech act theory is peculiarly suited to question and to overturn. Although Searle affects a lack of interest, owing to evaporation, in the exchange, he returns to the matter in Searle, J.; ‘The Word Turned Upside Down’, The New York Review of Books, vol. XXX, no. 16, pp74-79, 1983. Searle refers to an unnamed but esteemed friend who claims that Derrida gives bullshit a bad name. Although Searle’s caricatures are gross (primarily because he takes a review of Culler, J.; On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1982 as a review of Derrida), there are, as Rorty, R.; ‘Deconstruction and Circumvention’, Critical Inquiry, vol. XI, no. 1, pp1-23, 1984, says, real difficulties. Searle argues that Derrida sacrifices his arguments to the relentless pursuit of the tenor of an idea. Part of the negative response to Sokal and Bricmont would have been avoided had this been seen by the authors of the replies. Mackey picks up many of these points. Mackey, L.H. and Searle, J.R.; ‘An Exchange on Deconstruction’, The New York Review of Books, vol. XXXI, no. 1, pp47-48, 1984. Searle’s reply contains the beautiful irony of a pre-eminent speech act theorist denying a correspondent as to whether another (Culler) has or has not made an assertion. Perhaps despite himself, Searle raises the very idea that should have, from the light of careful reading. Cf. Lawlor, L. (ed.); ‘Derrida’s Interpretation of Husserl’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. XXXII, Supplement, 1994. One might take Searle’s remark that Derrida shares conditions with ‘classical’ metaphysics support for a view that the philosophers whose work is considered here is more radical, and that foundations for language and communication can be provided. (On bullshitting as an intentional state see Cohen, G.A.; ‘Why One Kind of Bullshit Flourishes in France’, (typescript, Oxford) 2002b, and ‘Deeper into Bullshit’, pp in Buss, S. and Overton, L. (eds.); Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Frankfurt (MIT) 2002a. Cohen responds to what appears to be the seminal essay in the field, Frankfurt, H.; ‘On Bullshit’, pp117-133 in The importance of what we Care About: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge University Press) 1988). Scholes (1988) writes that, for American literary theorists, Derrida offers ‘escape’ from rules and responsibilities. Part of his success is his style. This is, in its commentary on the Derrida-Searle exchange, a rich and suggestive essay. Another study argues that Derrida’s success is due precisely to processes of ‘legitimation’, from a congruence between his work and ‘highly structured cultural and institutional systems’, even a capitalisation on the intellectual fashions of an educated cultural public and not an academic elite. (Of course, the keep and dissemination of his work is now a preserve of the elite). The dissemination of his work by a hand number of critics in a few institutions secured both its appearance as a ‘status symbol’, and Derrida’s unique place in the intellectual ‘market’. See Lamont, M.; ‘How to Become a Dominant French Philosopher: The Case of Jacques Derrida’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. XCIII, no. 3, pp 584-622, 1987. Cohen (2002b) argues that one of the causes of bullshit in France is the absence of a system of truly critical peer review. He credits Sokal and Bricmont.

28 Such conventions are K-II acts in the vocabulary of Strawson and Millikan (cf. II.4-5).

29 Derrida (1977b) p195. Derrida (p198) moves next to the matter of context, and to Searle’s lack of attention. He writes that his exclusion of the matter is similarly motivated to Austin’s and able to be criticised on the same terms. Indeed, Derrida calls Searle’s remarks trivial and dubious. In speech, Searle writes, one can invoke features of context which could not be used in writing without those features appearing in or being repeated in the text, or ‘[i]n conversation a great deal can be communicated without being made explicit in the sentence uttered’ (Searle (1977) p203). Derrida is surprised that a theorist of speech acts can regard context as deferrable. He replies that context is either determinate, in that it determines the structure of an utterance from within, in which case it cannot be ‘bracketed’, or it applies to different separate contexts, ones which can always be separated from the context in which they are encountered and imported or grafted into another. Derrida writes that the new logic required to theorise iterability is not available on the terms given by Austin and Searle, and that contexts are never created from nothing: ‘...no mark can create or engender a context on its own, much less dominate it. This limit, this finitude is the condition under which contextual transformation remains an always open possibility’ (p203). Again, Derrida’s arguments would benefit from consideration of the wider work on speech act theory, that is, in some cases, other work of Searle (cf. III), but more importantly, the work of Grice and Strawson, McDowell and Schiffer, and the work of Lewis on convention.

xxvi
sidelight, for it is the mutual accusations of relativism that are here attended to, and which provoke their disagreements.

Rorty argues that Putnam, Cavell and Conant remain 'too kind', to modern philosophy. While Conant may caution against the allure of fruitless philosophical explanations (of mind, intentionality, free will, and so forth), reckoning the ways in which their acceptance entails complicity in the subtle form of imperialism which it is the mark of Rorty's pragmatism to dispel, Putnam declare that '...the illusions that philosophy spins are illusions that belong to "the nature of human life"'. Thus the problem affects Cavell's claim for the inevitability of tarrying with scepticism, (in Derrida, the hymeneal), for these, and Putnam's and Conant's, are tired themes, best given 'the slip'. Arguing against representationalist theories, Rorty recalls his early physicalism. The five-point plan of

Rorty (1993) p449, and one should try to set aside the 'shards' of the dichotomies between subject and object, scheme and content and appearance and reality. One's relation to the universe is 'causal' not 'representationalist', and Rorty argues that it is this purely causal picture which Putnam finds unpalatable.


Conant (1991) p622, the temptations of philosophy as diagnosed by Cavell. This excellent essay regards Cavell's essays on Shakespeare as continuing a tradition, from the later Wittgenstein and from Austin, of challenging sceptical arguments. Scepticism, for Cavell, characterises '...any view which takes the existence of the world to be a problem of knowledge', and the best source for his arguments is Cavell, S.; The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy (Oxford, Clarendon) 1979, and especially Part One, Chapter Two. The problems of scepticism are, Cavell says, shared by both sceptic and realist, and Wittgenstein, better than anyone, plays the role of mediator, as what Rorty calls a therapeutic philosopher. Conant places his discussion in the context of the institutional division and prejudice toward both 'Continental' and 'Anglo-Saxon' philosophy, for Wittgensteinian philosophy advocates, depending upon one's interpretation, either a return to the ancient motivations for reflection or the abdication of what many, in 'analytical' traditions, see as the due methods in the search for answers. (The hegemony of analytical philosophy, and its significance for the teaching and dissemination of philosophy in the "humanistic discourses" is taken up in Derrida, J.; Ethics, Institutions and the Right to Philosophy (Oxford, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 2002. One should see in particular pp23-32. In the roundtable discussion, Cavell is presented as an 'outsider' from the camp of analytical philosophy (p30). The debate is presented in the context of a discussion of cross-cultural influences. Again, Searle gets a rough ride (p32).

Cavell's position on the borderline of the two traditions is far more compelling and fecund than that of Derrida. The signatories of the letter to The Times would do well to understand the difficulty of their subject by reading Cavell on Austin and Wittgenstein, and indeed, Conant on Cavell (e.g. p623). They might consider, for instance, what Cavell does with the 'maddness', evidenced by Descartes (and by Othello). Conant also notes the discussions of scepticism, of mutual reading and of interpretation, of deception and of therapy, in Cavell and Gadamer (p630). The deception which scepticism can practice is, as Wittgenstein claimed to understand how Heidegger felt the frustration of this continual collision. Cf. Waismann, F.; Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (Oxford, Blackwell) 1979, pp68-69.
quotations are ‘abnormal, parasitic’, or ‘non-serious’ uses of language, and he ignores them: '[a]nd
[Derrida writes] the concept of the “ordinary”, thus of “ordinary language” to which he [Austin] has
recourse is clearly marked by this exclusion’34, an exclusion, Derrida argues, that carries with it the last
hope of the general theory, which, had it successfully been stated, ‘...would no longer be governed by
those oppositions’. Derrida refines his earlier question: does parasitism threaten speech, and place
around it unbreachable boundaries, limitations which speech can only exceed by ‘remaining “at home”,
by and in itself, in the shelter of its essence or telos...’, or does this risk the very possibility of speech?
What, Derrida asks, can be meant by ordinary language that excludes this law? What Austin describes
as ‘ordinary language’ in truth constitutes an ‘ethical and teleological determination’ of the utterance as
an ideal, carrying ‘...the presence to self of a total context, the transparency of intentions and the
presence of meaning [vouloir-dire] to the absolutely singular uniqueness of a speech act...’35. Derrida
responds that the non-serious, anomalistic performative is the exemplar of the condition of itetability,
and the condition, or the limiting case, of successful performatives36.

for the role of ‘I’ leaves it no less open to iteration and replacement; it offers no prospect of an adequation between saying and
meaning, for '[a] thousand possibilities will always remain open...'. Derrida lists as possibilities all the canonical examples of
parasitic utterance, again, however, itetability ‘...prohibits a priori (and in principle) the full and rigorous attainment of the ideal
plentitude such exclusions purport to isolate’ (p201).

34 Derrida (1977c) p190. However, Stanson (in ILA.5) shows how these uses can be accounted for in an Austinian theory. Cf.
Spivak, G.C.; ‘Revolutions that as Yet Have No Model: Derrida’s “Limited Inc.”’, in Landry, D. and MacLean, G. (eds.); The

35 Derrida (1977a) p191. Habermas (1985) pp194-195 is clear that the view of Austin as stating the view of convention and
repetition to which Derrida objects is accepted without demur by literary critics. Habermas’ response rejects the connection
between itetability, quotation, repetetability and the status of the quoted as fictonal. Why should the fact that a literal promise can
be repeated, conventionally, in a fictonal context have the consequence that the status of literal utterance is harmed? Only the
performatone utterance itself carries the force of, say, a promise, and that, ‘...mentioned or repeated in a quote depends
grammatically upon this’. Habermas is very close to Searle here. Stage promises depend equally on a basis of consequences for
action, understood background practices and actions: off stage, promises. (This is surely, as the arguments of II and III show, a
better interpretation of Austin). Why does Derrida not analyse this equally ‘ordinary’ mode of speech? Habermas extends the
argument to the proliferation of readings or interpretations of texts. Cf. Miller (1987) pp499ff, and indeed all of Chapter 10 in
which Miller defends realism. The argument for the continunity between Davidson and Gadamer, one good for forming part of a
response to Taylor, says that the proliferation (repetition) of readings (interpretations according to conventions) remains good if all
are focussed on achieving a, ‘...mutual understanding in which the same utterances are assigned the same meaning’ (p198).

All interpretations must be directed to achieving a consensus (cf. Lewis (1969) p21). As Habermas notes, one is here nearating the
notions of language games and criteria. Scholes (1985) pp279-283 writes that there is no coherent approach to text evident in
Derrida’s works, and that the response to Searle is an example. Scholes argues that Derrida helps himself to notions which
deconstruction categorically denies to others. Rorty writes of Derrida that he often likes to have it both ways: Rorty, R.; ‘Critical
1986. Cf. also Halion (1993) p163. Scholes’ examples are not always convincing (cf. pp218-229) for he does not give to law and
convention the role for which Derrida, though cf. p29.

There are further instances of coercesence in deconstruction, indicating that it may be as prone to the tendency to coercenesce in
philosophy diagnosed in Nozick (1957a), and other essays therein. The discussion in Philosophical Explanations (Oxford,
Clarendon) 1981 is broad and entertaining. That deconstruction is more coercive than negative dialectics is moooded by Habermas

36 Johnson utilises the taxonomy of illocutionary verbs given by Austin at the close of How to do Things with Words for the
analysis of performatives in poetry, the paradigm case of non-serious utterance. Cf. Johnson, B.; The Critical Difference: Essays
in the Contemporary Rhetoric of Reading (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins) 1980. It should be noted that Derrida makes no detailed
study of the taxonomy, and that this shall be seen to be a significant omission. The nesteed intensions in Mallarmé’s poem are ‘legion’ (p52), and Johnson raises as most pertinent that of the difference between the presentation of the beautiful lady and the
pained but always inadequate description. There is a congruence between the nats of naming and that of exhibiting (p53): the
poet gestures and struggles to describe, and both names and descriptions come together in a conlocution, with all of its
indeterminacies: namely, in an ‘act of speech’ (p53). Johnson lists the by criterion, the necessity of acting according to
conventional procedures with expected conventional effects, and the eventual rejection of the performative-constuitive distinction for
that of locations, illocutions and perlocutions. See Pratt, M.L.; Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse
(Bloomington, Indiana) 1977, pxvi. Both Valery and Mallarmé make the distinction between poetic and practical language (and poetic and practical experience).
Of successful performatics, the paradigm of events in speech act theory, Derrida questions the very status of event as it entails conditions of repetition in structure\(^3\). He asks whether a performative could succeed in the case that it does not conform to a context (for, say, launching a ship or laying a bet), by being an instance of citation\(^4\). This is not, for Derrida, simply the citation present in contexts of recitation, but is a condition opposed to Austin’s claim of a ‘relative purity’ of performatics, that which is offered not in opposition to the iterability in contexts of recitation, ‘...but in opposition to other kinds of iteration within a general iterability which constitutes a violation of the allegedly rigorous purity of every event of discourse or every speech act’. In Derrida’s notion of citation the ‘category of intention [does] not disappear’, but is no longer thought of as the basis of a theory of meaning and communicative acts\(^5\). Rather, the dichotomy between utterances conceived of as citations and their corresponding ‘event utterances’ is exchanged for another, namely that between marks and their constitution in sentences. The intention animating an utterance should never be thought ‘...through and through present to itself and its content’\(^6\), and the non-serious, or parasitical, cannot be excluded from ordinary language\(^7\).

\(^{37}\) Searle (1977) pp207-208 writes that the argument that iterability threatens the idea that intention is the fundament of meaning and communication cannot be accepted; the reverse is the case. Speech acts are indeed singular events, yet they have properties Derrida does not notice. There is no limit on new speech acts, no limit on what can be communicated by them: ‘...hearsers are able to understand this infinite number of possible communications simply by recognising the intentions of the speakers in the performances of the speech acts’, and both speaker and hearer are masters of the recursive rules of language. Iterability of types and of rules of syntax are required for intentionality.

\(^{38}\) Austin perhaps forgot that Brunei conceived, designed and built his great ship as the Great Eastern, but after disagreements, it was, without Brunel’s consent, christened the Leviathan: a bottle was broken and so forth. Cf. Brunel, I.; The Life of Isambard Kingdom Brunel. Civil Engineer (London, Longmans Greens and Co) 1870, p363. After the difficulties surrounding its launch (it was so heavy that it would not slip down the gangway), and when it was finally floated, the ship was unofficially and without ceremony named the Great Eastern. The name was in common use, and stuck.


\(^{40}\) Derrida (1977b) p202 turns to what he considers Searle’s second approach to his example of the reading of the statement of a dead author: that one think of it simply as a sentence of English ‘...weaned from all production or origin, putative or otherwise...’, and yet still exhibiting intentionality ‘...because a meaningful sentence is just a standing possibility of the corresponding (intentional) speech act’. One who made the utterance would be performing the speech act ‘...determined by the rules of the languages that give the sentence its meaning in the first place’. Firstly, Derrida replies, the consideration of utterances as having specific authors in particular situations is not as clearly rejected by his analysis, as Searle seems to think. In one of its main arguments (1977a) considers the break between author intentions and marks, and Derrida says that ‘up to a certain point’, this break retains its possibility without preventing the mark from functioning. He says that this implies that in the ideal cases postulated by Searle there is always an element of ‘...play, a certain remove, a certain degree of independence...’, in the origin, production and intention of the mark. The very idea of postulating a break from speaker utterance is dependent upon this element of play and remove, and if the break occurs it, of necessity, leaves its imprint on the mark. Derrida did not, in (1977b), argue that intentionality is absent, pure and simple, from the functioning of the mark, but instead that there can be no ‘...fulfilled and actualised intentionality, adequate to itself and to its contents’ (p203). Derrida expounds and takes the point into important new territory; he works on the ‘problematical’ relationship between understanding a mark in its ‘meaningfulness’ and the minimum required for the attainment of such understanding. (1977a) focuses on the constitution of this bare minimum of making sense, and argues that ‘...its conformity to the code, grammaticality, etc. is incommensurate with the adequate understanding of intended meaning’. What is more, the incommensurability is irreducible, it ‘inheres’ in intention itself and it is inven [create] with intentionality. The debate joined with Searle on this matter, as Derrida says, is that of the relation between iterability and conventionality and the latter’s possibility. Derrida notes with reference to (1977a) the ‘perhaps paradoxical’ nature of his appealing to convention for the writing of an argument for the necessary failure of convention, yet he returns to his arguments for the necessary contamination of iterability, saying that both convention and iterability can only be what they are ‘...in the impurity of [their] self identity (repetition altering and alteration identifying)’. As far as the internal semiotic context is concerned, the force of the rupture is no less important: by virtue of its essential iterability, a written syntagma can always be detached from the chain in which it is inserted or given
without causing it lose all possibility of functioning; if not all possibility of ‘communicating’ precisely. One can perhaps come to recognise other possibilities in it by inscribing it or grafting it onto other chains. No context can entirely disallow it. Nor any code, the code here being both the possibility and impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity) (pp203-204).

The permitted iterability allows the sign to break with all contexts, allowing an illimitable number of new contexts. ‘This does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any centre or absolute anchoring (ancrage)’ (p204).

d Derrida (1977a) p192 again ascribes to Austin arguments which are only dually his, firstly, the want of a general theory, one which, should it hold out successfully against rationality and iterability, would become a shelter for ‘...the teleological lure of consciousness...’. Secondly, the absence of intention in the utterance disallows the prospect of a complete, determinable context, ‘...in the sense required by Austin’, and renders it useless as a ‘determining centre’ of context. Derrida concludes that the concept of context is as walled as that of the ordinary to a basis of presuppositions in favour of a determinate consciousness.

The rejection of Searle’s accusation that the argument of ‘Signature Event Context’ requires a notion, implicit or explicit, of inner processes (‘intentions’) behind utterances does not, Derrida (1977b) p218 writes, constitute an endorsement of the thesis that there is a simple adequacy of the utterance to itself, or indeed between the intention and the expression in an ideal utterance which is the full realisation of the intention. Iterability, Derrida writes, works its effects in both intention and its expression. (1977a) argues that not all intentions are conscious, and that no intention can ever be fully conscious or present to itself; it makes the case (it would be incorrect to suggest that it does more), for a ‘structural unconscious’, the structure of parasitism in the ideal model of speech act theory. Additionally, and importantly, Derrida (p214) makes the case for the unconscious as subverting the concept of parasitism introduced strategically by Austin and Searle; this, he says, questions radically the nature of the bond between intention and consciousness, the bond neither Austin nor Searle questions. For qualification Derrida turns to Searle (1969), and to the conditions placed upon strict and literal speech acts (cf. III), namely, that in their analysis one considers an ideal speech situation (not a parasite), and that both speaker and hearer are taken to be conscious of what they are doing. (These points arise in Searle (1977) at the very points at which Searle nods to the unconscious, a recognition that Derrida (p214) denies is ‘...only a potential, ill intentions exist or have yet become thematically self-conscious...’). He notes also Searle’s claim that few intentions are ever ‘brought to consciousness’, and that speaking and writing are conscious intentional activities with this not implying that the intentions behind illocutions imply ‘a separate set of conscious states apart from simply writing and speaking’, and says (p215) that an illustrative example is found in Searle (1969), one in which promises are passed as threats or warnings. Searle writes that in such cases there is a distinction to be marked, seen in the fact that a promise is a promise to do something for the hearer, while a threat is a threat to do something to the hearer. A promise is defective if one promises to do something the hearer does not want done, and also if the promiser does not believe the hearer wants it done. He quotes Searle: ‘The promise wishes (needs, desires, etc) that something be done, and the promiser is aware of this wish (need, desire, etc)’. Derrida neglects to refer to the sources of which Searle’s work is a development and criticism, primarily the work of Grice, and especially in his remarking that Searle concludes that if a promise is to be non-defective, then that which is promised must be something the hearer wants done, considers in his interest, or prefers, and that the speaker must believe that these conditions obtain. Especially Derrida responds that this description excludes all but the ‘...distant, determining and determinable consciousness of the intentions, desires, or needs involved’. He moos (mischievously), the extension of his earlier example, and questions whether in promising to be critical of Searle’s thesis and thereby proving Searle’s unconscious with all of its desires would muddy the ascription to Derrida’s utterance of the status of promise, threat or warning: ‘Searle might respond that it would constitute a threat to Searle’s consciousness, and a promise for the unconscious. There would thus be two speech acts in a single utterance. How is this possible?’ (p215).

Derrida (p217) considers what he thinks would be a plausible Searlean response. None of this, Searle might write, contradicts the arguments; all that Derrida has done is to note certain interesting corruptions of promising. Searle would say that if a promise is to be made it must involve a ‘speaker who is conscious with regard to a hearer who is equally conscious and desirous of what is promised to him’, and for Derrida this is to conclude that the process of idealisation concerns speakers and hearers only as they are ‘conscious ego’s, and within the limited scope of the phenomena that this can describe the application and plausibility of this thesis is unquestionable. However, the phenomena never appear in this straightforward fashion, and the conscious ego can never be given a unitary identity precisely because of the effects of iterability. The second argument Searle gives, namely that both spoken and written discourse may become corrupt in identical ways is indeed ‘...the nerve of the demonstration in Sec...’ (p218), though in a more radical (more Davidsonian) fashion. The inadequation between meaning and saying, and the potential for corruption of a text, when raised to the status of a necessary possibility make up part of the structural ambivalence theorised by (1977a). This is the most significant parasite of them all, one which neither Austin nor Searle manage (or try) to incorporate into their discussions of corruption, infelicity and parasitism. What must be included in the description, i.e. in what is described, but also in the practical discourse, in the writing that describes, is not merely the factual reality of corruption and of alteration [de l’entame], but corruptability (to which it would be better henceforth not to give this name, which implies generally a pathological disfunction, a degeneration or an ethical-political defect) and dissociability, traits tied to iterability, which Sec proposes to account for. That can only be done if the ‘-ility’ (and not the liability) is recognised from the inception on [des l’entame as breached and breached [entamee] in its ‘origin’ by iterability (pp218-219).

speech and writing are thoughtlessly elided, and he turns for qualification to Austin’s treatment of

signatures. The context of the argument from Austin is a difficulty in the search for a criterion by

which to distinguish performatives and constatives, and Austin justifies his preference for first person,

present indicative active forms for performatives, owing to their proximity to the source or origin of the

utterance and its statement. In cases of the absence of an indexical, or a name, the utterer is ‘referred
to’, in one of two ways: verbally, by being the utterer, and, in writing, by the appending of a signature.

As before, the connection to source is made in the singularity of an event and its ‘pure’ repetition. Again,

however, the condition of possibility for the effect of the signature, the sine qua non of its

function, is the impossibility of its carrying present intention, and Derrida writes that his analysis of

non-verbal signatures applies equally to those ‘oral’ signatures constituted in spoken utterances. The

implication of non-presentation in the signature is potentially over-ridden by the retention of a ‘having-


\[\text{Derrida (1982a) p17 gives a suggestion for the consideration of Nietzsche and Freud as central in arguments in a work on intentionality. The notion of the eternal recurrence is paramount. Derrida makes it himself with his claim that difference is best considered a displacing movement between apparently opposed terms; indeed, that each term is always the difference of the other. Additionally, this would be include a ‘...reinterpretation of mimesis in its alleged opposition to physis’, and would indicate the ‘...sameness of difference and repetition in the eternal return’. Derrida (1980) p71 considers the consequences for repetition of a gap between native genius and the dissemination of language, and the view of history as bound by ‘gaps’ and irreducible novelty. A complete response to Derrida on the import of psychoanalysis in indirect, non-literal utterances would demand consideration of Sainsbury, R.M., ‘Saying and Conveying’, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. VII, no. 4, pp415-452, 1984, see esp. p423. Sainsbury develops a theory of speaker roles: speaking ironically, elliptically, sincerely and so forth. The confusions Derrida has identified obtain, he writes (Derrida (1977b) p1920), in Searle’s discussion of intentionality. Searle writes that intentionality plays the same role in written and spoken language, taking this as an argument against Derrida; Derrida, however, agrees. He, however, disagrees vehemently with the imputation to (1977a) of the argument that intentionality is absent from all writing (all graphemes). The what the questions is not intention or intentionality but their rels, which orient and organises the movement and the possibility of fulfilment, realisation, and actualisation in a plentitude that would be present to and identical with itself (p193). For a writing to being a writing it must continue to “act” and be readable even when what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has written, for what he seems to have signed, be it because of a temporary absence, because he is dead, or, more generally, because he has not employed his absolutely actual and present intention or attention, the plentence of his desire to say what he means, in order to sustain what seems to be written “in his name” (pp193-194).

The value of a law (any law) is not in its illustrative and particular examples but in its instantiation of a general condition, again defined by iterability, which says that intentionality applies only to things iterable. Intention will never “achieve the goal” of being present to the object and to itself, for the status of iterability is not an eventuality, present here and there, but unavoidable: “[I]ntention is a priori (at once) different: differing and deferring, in its inception” (p194). Austin accepts only that the source of an utterance in the present indicative active is present to the utterance and its statement, and that the authenticity of the relationship is assumed by (a case of non-verbal utterance) a signature. Derrida notes in addition Austin’s attention to the legal performatice ‘hereby’. Cf. Austin, J.L.: ‘Performative-Constative’, pp13-22, in Searle, J.R. (ed.), The Philosophy of Language (Oxford, Clarendon) 1984, pp124-125 makes a distinction between an assertion as reported in the first person present indicative active and the congeries of other intentions with which the assertion may be uttered, and writes that, in virtue of this, there can be no thought of there being a ‘central case’ in which the author’s intentions are made fully available for inspection and instantiate the conventions for each speech act. Blackburn says that Derrida’s work, and indeed its responses (especially Searle), has nothing essential to do with media of communication and the transtoriness of speech (Searle does not appreciate that this is a one-line version of Derrida), but that the debate concerns the authority, or responsibility, of an author over and for the signs he issues in a public and conventional nexus of communication. (The present author cannot help concurring with Searle that Derrida’s arguments are occasionally very poor, in Rorty (1984) p, they are described as ‘awful’). Blackburn argues that Derrida’s work is thought by Derrideans to be the ‘end of the road’ for a theory of convention in meaning, and it is to obviate this scepticism, or, at the very least to indicate alternatives, each radical in its own way, that this dissertation is written. It is the conviction of the present author that these alternatives, all it must be said, deriving from analytical work, illustrate a fact of great importance about this tradition, namely, that there are means by which to progress beyond poststructuralist meaning scepticism, and that far from being the end for theories of meaning and intentionality, enquiry in the analytical mode can meet Derrida’s work on the same ground. It might be ventured, in a work of greater scope than this, that by returning to the problems Derrida correctly puts at the heart of discussions of meaning, those once shared by the analytical and the continental traditions, the dialogue between the two shall be fruitful. Cf. Scholes (1988):}
been-present' in a 'past now', which remains a 'future now' in the transcendental form of presentness\(^4\), but again, for a relation to source to remain there obtains an 'absolute singularity of a signature-event and a signature-form: the pure reproducibility of a pure event', only with the simultaneous possibility and impossibility of the rigorous purity of a signature\(^6\).

It is to be argued that the guiding presence of speaker intention, in Austin's paradigmatic and Derrida's parasitical cases, can be accounted for without fears that the two types cannot clearly be discriminated, for they can, and the 'I' appearing in literal and fictional contexts registered in its status as literal or fictional. In I.2 the first element in the response to these arguments is presented in the context of Frege's discussion of statements containing demonstratives or other indexical expressions, and, more particularly, Evans' arguments establishing that they are comprehensible in a Fregean theory as the senses of statements mediated by reference. In I.3 it is suggested that, owing to the congruence between the notion of mediation in Fregean Sim and Husserlian noema, one might appeal to Evans in defence of Husserl against Derrida's criticism, and, furthermore, that the best theory of the mediation of senses by reference is of a piece with Hintikka's response to theories of intentionality as

\(^{45}\) Blackburn's suggested response to Derridean scepticism is identical to Scholes', and \textit{nota bene} that Blackburn raises the matter of the priority of intentionality over language (pp126-127 and pp134-140).

\(^{46}\) My theory that Derrida's concerns are answered by a consideration of demonstratives and indexicals (as presented in 1.2 and 3) seems preempted in Scholes (1988) p289.

\(^{66}\) Derrida (1977b) p192 stresses his annoyance that Searle ignores the section of (1977a) dealing with signatures, and yet 'the section on signatures concerns the putative "origin" of oral or written utterances, and thus, the content and indispensable recourse of all speech-act theory'; a signature is equally affected by the conditions of iterability outlined. The important matter of whether the features Derrida identifies as peculiar to writing render by extension the notion of intended meaning in all communication otose is treated separately by Searle (1977) pp200-201. The communication of intended meaning is not impelled by Derrida's arguments, for intentionality plays the very same role in written and spoken communication: '...a meaningful sentence is just a standing possibility of the corresponding (intentional) speech act' (p202). Understanding requires only that one know that one who said it '...and meant it...'; would be performing the speech act given its meaning by the rules of the language in which the sentence is given meaning, and Searle continues that the very idea of illocutionary intentions is prone to doubt; in response to Derrida he adds that if they existed or mattered they would subist 'behind' the utterance, and guide it. However, in '...serious literal speech...', the sentences are the realisations of the intentions; they are 'fungible intentions'. A second point is that intentions need not be conscious. Both speaking and writing may be conscious, intentional activities, but the intentionality of illocutionary acts does not require the postulation of conscious states underlying forms of communication. With regard to intentionality, the understanding of the utterance requires the recognition of S's illocutionary intentions, and this, in turn, requires the knowledge of what linguistic act S performs.

Derrida (1977b) pp213ff claims that he debates the status of 'structural possibilities', for once it is found to be possible for an utterance or mark to function in the absence of a guiding intention, there is missed the possibility of non-presence pertaining necessarily in this function. Firstly, one may consider cases of the functioning of a mark in cases in which S's intention is not present (that is, in which a present intention may be dispensed with), and secondly, the defined notion of 'possibility qua necessity'. There is cross-contamination between the two, both tending to the conclusion that by virtue of the iterability which forms the structure of all marks, and which cleaves intention, that the mark may never be 'fully present to itself in the actuality of its aim, or of its meaning (i.e. what it means to say [voulair-dire]). This limiting yet positive condition applies equally to intention as to the object aimed at in the intention, and to this end Derrida finds broad agreement with Searle on the fact that 'there is no getting away from intentionality', 'a meaningful sentence' being a 'standing possibility of the corresponding (intentional) speech act'. Derrida relates to this his doubts concerning the fullness of meaning and the presentness of the corresponding speech act. (1977a) questions precisely the presumption of the plenitude of intentional meaning (again, voulair-dire), and of consciousness and presence organising communicative situations. By arguing that all marks imply the possibility of functioning without the full presence of intention, Derrida does not, however, efface intentionality, for instance, the 'differential-deferring' structure of intentionality 'alone' can enable one to account for the difference between the locutionary, the illocutionary and the perlocutionary aspects of the self-same utterance. Writing has proliferated and continues to proliferate, leaving as its effects the play of logocentrism: 'the system of speech, consciousness, meaning, presence, truth...' (Derrida (1977a) p192). Derrida returns (provocationaly, and for strategic reasons), the name of writing: by placing metaphysical concepts in opposition one begins the process of undue subordination, and the therapy of deconstruction ('double writing') removes such oppositions for the purpose of formulating a means by which they may be overcome, it is not a metaphilosophy but a proto-philosophy.
directedness. The point to be made is that one need not entertain meaning scepticism after reading Derrida, for the criticisms he makes of intentionality need not be accepted. The relativism concerning meanings that such theories may engender is examined in I.1.

In II begins the main response to the problems Derrida discerns in Austin. A voice omitted from the Derrida-Searle debate, that of Grice, is heard. With specific relation to speech act analysis he, again, argues that speaker intentions, as it were, remain in the spoken utterance without losing its sense, and, one can add, that this is the case on both interpretations of his thesis (defined in II). Grice's thesis requires a workable notion of convention, and for this one must look to Lewis (in IV).
1. **The Principle of Charity and Intentionality**

Rorty considers where his agreements and disagreements with Putnam lie. There are (at least) five areas of agreement. Firstly, language, and mind, saturate ‘reality’, rendering any attempt independently to read it fatuous and its results irrelevant. Secondly, a description of the way the world is reflects beliefs and values, and some descriptions are better than others. Thirdly, and following this, the indeterminacy of translation is rather the ‘interest relativity’ of translation, and a correct translation may be provided, ‘...given the interests which are relevant in the context’. Fourthly, one’s relevant interests, or one’s conceptual scheme, make no claim upon, or reference to, ‘the way things are’. Fifthly, the idea that concepts and conceptual schemes can be bounded is ‘incoherent’, for they are given life only in a (Quinean) holistic web of belief, and are subject to review and continual change.

Some details of Putnam’s response are considered below, and it is to pre-empt discussion to add that Rorty finds cause to accuse Putnam of straying from the pragmatist path. This, however, must remain a

---


2 Putnam details his objections and misgivings. Putnam, H.; *Realism with a Human Face* (Harvard University Press) 1990, pp 20-21. Rorty finds the criticism of his scornful, Carnapian tone (particularly evident, he admits, in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*) well-founded, and ignores Putnam’s quip that this belies Rorty’s ‘analytic past’. Rorty makes no apology in ‘Non-Reductive Physicalism’, pp113-125 in *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume I* (Cambridge University Press) 1991, but, in the form of this physicalism, his shady background still works its influence, cf. I.1, but even in those dark days there were signs of the work to come. In Rorty, R.; ‘Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and Categories’, *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. XIX, no. 1, pp24-54, 1965, disagreements between proponents and critics of the identity theory are a ‘case study’ of methods of ‘linguistic philosophy’. Proponents argue that empirical enquiry reveals that sensations are brain processes, and that objections merely demonstrate conceptual confusions. Classifications of expressions as conceptual and as empirical are profitless, for they can only embody the present stage, and state, of enquiry, which, when described, shows that the mind-body identity theory is correct, and that ways of speaking must be changed. Classifications are always otiose. ‘There is simply no such thing as a method of classifying linguistic expressions that has results guaranteed to remain intact despite the results of future empirical enquiry. Thus in this area (and perhaps in all areas) there is no method which will have the sort of magisterial neutrality of which linguistic philosophers fondly dream’. (p25). Rorty defends his case in ‘In Defence of Eliminative Materialism’, *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. XXIV, no. 1, pp112-121, 1970. In Elder, C.; *Appropriating Hegel* (Aberdeen University Press) 1980 it is argued that Hegel has convincing arguments against eliminative materialism.
sidelight, for it is the mutual accusations of relativism that are here attended to, and which provoke their disagreements.

Rorty argues that Putnam, Cavell and Conant remain ‘too kind’, to modern philosophy. While Conant may caution against the allure of fruitless philosophical explanations (of mind, intentionality, free will, and so forth), reckoning the ways in which their acceptance entails complicity in the subtle form of imperialism which it is the mark of Rorty’s pragmatism to dispel, and Putnam declare that, ‘...the illusions that philosophy spins are illusions that belong to “the nature of human life itself”’, there remains a simple problem, giving Rorty pause at the statement ‘the nature of human life’\(^3\). The problem affects Cavell’s claim for the inevitability of tarrying with scepticism, (in Derrida, the hymeneal), for these, and Putnam’s and Conant’s, are tired themes, best given ‘the slip’\(^4\). Arguing again against representationalist theories, Rorty recalls his early physicalism. The five-point plan of

---

3 Rorty (1993) p449, and one should try to set aside the ‘shards’ of the dichotomies between subject and object, scheme and content and appearance and reality. One’s relation to the universe is ‘causal’ not ‘representationalist’, and Rorty argues that it is this purely causal picture which Putnam finds unpalatable.


Conant (1991) p622, considers the temptations of philosophy as diagnosed by Cavell. This excellent essay regards Cavell’s essays on Shakespeare as continuing a tradition, from the later Wittgenstein and from Austin, of challenging sceptical arguments. Scepticism, for Cavell, characterises, ‘...any view which takes the existence of the world to be a problem of knowledge’, and the best source for his arguments is Cavell, S.; The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy (Oxford, Claradon) 1979, and especially Part One, Chapter Two. The problems of scepticism are, Cavell says, shared by both sceptic and realist, and Wittgenstein, better than anyone, plays the role of mediator, as what Rorty calls a therapeutic philosopher. Conant places his discussion in the context of the institutional division and prejudice toward both ‘Continental’ and ‘Anglo-Saxon’ philosophy, for Wittgensteinian philosophy advocates, depending upon one’s interpretation, either a return to the ancient motivations for reflection or the abdication of what many, in ‘analytical’ traditions, see as the due methods in the search for answers. (The hegemony of analytical philosophy, and its significance for the teaching and dissemination of philosophy in the ‘humanistic discourses’ is taken up in Derrida, J.; Ethics, Institutions and the Right to Philosophy (Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield) 2002. One should see in particular pp28-32. In the roundtable discussion, Cavell is presented as an ‘outlaw’ from the camp of analytical philosophy (p30). The debate is presented in the context of a discussion of cross-cultural influences. Again, Searle gets a rough ride (p32).

Cavell’s position on the borderline of the two traditions is far more compelling and fecund than that of Derrida. The signatories of the letter to The Times would do well to understand the difficulty of their subject by reading Cavell on Austin and Wittgenstein, and indeed, Conant on Cavell (e.g. p623). They might consider, for instance, what Cavell does with the ‘madness’, evinced by Descartes (and by Othello). Conant also notes the discussions of scepticism, of mutual reading and of interpretation, of deception and of therapy, in Cavell and Gadamer (p630). The deception which scepticism can practice is, as Wittgenstein before him, a running up against self-imposed boundaries. Wittgenstein claimed to understand how Heidegger felt the frustration of this continual collision. Cf. Waismann, F.; Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (Oxford, Blackwell) 1979, pp68-69.
pragmatism articulates a vision of the way in which human constitution guides the development of social institutions, its moral concisely expressed in Dewey’s fable of the anteater and the bowernick, one headed, Rorty avers, by Davidson, but not Putnam. Human evolutionary features (digits, opposable thumbs, brains, and fraternity, solidarity and cooperation), allowed the growth of social institutions, for such features define humans in their wants and in their abilities to satisfy them, yet they compel the ascription of no ‘representational’ relationships, merely facilitating, ‘...bating increasingly complex noises back and forth’. The reluctance of philosophers to take the pragmatist turn, Rorty adds, should not blind one to the utility of the Darwinian vision in dissipating philosophical problems, and setting aside fruitless distinctions. One can see the world aright, not, following Wittgenstein, by

6 Under Sericusus Melinus, Chlamydoca Morton, Amblyocoris Sublaris and Ptilorhynchos Violaceus, Sharpe gives fine descriptions of bowers. Sharpe, R.B.; Monograph of the Paradisaeidae, or Birds of Paradise, and Ptilorhynchinae, or Bowernick (London, Henry Sotheran & Co. 1891-1898. A representative passage is Dewey, J.; Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, Henry Holt and Company) 1920, pp75-76. ‘It was said that it has now become extremely difficult to recover the view of the world which universally obtained in Europe till the seventeenth century. Yet after all we need only to recur to the science of plants and animals as it was before Darwin and to the ideas which even now are dominant in moral and political matters to find the elder order of conceptions in full possession of the popular mind. Until the dogma of fixed unchangeable types and species, of arrangement in classes of higher and lower, of subordination of the transitory individual to the universal or kind had been shaken in its hold upon the science of life, it was impossible that the new ideas and method should be made at home in social and moral life. Does it not seem to be the intellectual task of the twentieth century to take this last step? When this step is taken the circle of scientific development will be rounded out and the reconstruction of philosophy be made an accomplished fact’. On Dewey on life as a natural event, see Sathaye, S.G.; Instrumentalism: A Methodological Exposition of the Philosophy of John Dewey (Bombay, Popular Prakashan) 1972, pp111ff. See also Murphy, A.E.; ‘Dewey’s Theory of the Nature and Function of Philosophy’, pp33-55 in Ratner, S. (ed.); The Philosopher of the Common Man: Essays in Honour of John Dewey to Celebrate his Eightieth Birthday (New York, G.F. Putnam’s Sons) 1940, and pp43ff on the contextual definition of meaning.

The response to Rorty’s arguments against ‘representationalist’ theories suggested in Introduction is, it seems, shared by Dewey, as may be seen in Dewey, J.; Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition (Chicago, S.C. Griggs and Company) 1888. He is concerned to disabuse the reader of the view (notoriously held by Russell, B.A.W.; A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz with an Appendix of Leading Passages (London, George Allen & Unwin) 1937), that Leibniz’s theory of monads is a useful theological fairy tale, one for which he prostituted his intellect in the service of his patrons. Dewey accepts all of the tenor of monads, especially pp291-298, and on p293 presents the theory of monads as ‘windowless mirrors of the world’. Dewey’s service is all the greater in that he finds the sources of the theory in Aristotle and Aquinas, and he writes: ‘[the monad is individual], for it represents reality in its own way, from its own point of view. It is universal, for its whole content is the order of the universe’. Cf. Deleuze (1993) p10. It is the ‘many in the one’, and the source of both perpetual change and of continuity, and is thus the ‘...answer to the inquiry [sic] of Greek philosophy’. It is khorik, cf. Anscombe and Geach (1973) p and Dewey (1888) pp340ff. The details of the atomists’ theories of the formation and constitution of possible worlds and khorik, see Guthrie, W.K.C.; A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume II: The Pre-socratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus (Cambridge University Press) 1965, pp404-413. Dewey (1888) p295 says that each monad expresses ‘precisely law’, and pre-established (meaning, following Russell, ‘existent’), harmony. The consequences for a theory of repetition are noted, and Kierkegaard’s credit to Leibniz is again invoked: ‘[all] things have an end because they from parts of one system; everything that occurs looks forward to something else and prepares the way for it, and yet it is itself mechanically conditioned by its antecedents’ (p296). In only man and God do monads, to different degrees, become self-reflective (cf pp318 and 347-348).

Following Wolff, with whom, for Dewey, misreadings of Leibniz begin, an Epicurean tenor was read into Leibniz’s theory. ‘The monad was...considered to be in space, or at least conditioned by space relations, as is a mathematical point, although not itself spatial in the sense of being extended’. However, Leibniz is more radical: monads are incorporeal and insensible: they have neither extension in space nor place in time. They are constituted by receptivity to changes, caused (mirrored, represented), internally by changes in relationships between other monads. Matee (1976) p335 argues that the Leibnizian theory of necessity as truth in all possible worlds is distinct enough from contemporary theories to justify the broaching of ‘...a more strictly Leibnizian approach...’. Deleuze (1993) pp3-13 describes this difficult relationship, and in a description of the fold as the intersection of many (infinitely many) monads (p26), he finds cause to question Heidegger’s theory of being-in-the-world.

working through prior ‘representationalist’ theories with a view to dismissing them, but simply by looking in the right direction.

Rorty defends himself, and Foucault and Derrida, Dewey and James, against Putnam’s charge of relativism. There is indeed a justification, a ‘sociological’ justification, to which statements are prone, any other is strictly inconsistent with the five points of pragmatism, but this counts nothing for the charge that the consequences that he, Foucault and Derrida read in the failures of (in Rorty’s catch-all term), foundationalism, constitute an incoherent, self-defeating, even repellent, relativism. The failures compel, Putnam says, the revision of ways of speaking, dictating ‘...whether and when we are allowed to use words like ‘know’, ‘objective’, ‘fact’ and ‘reason’, and leaves philosophy, once intellectual culture’s ‘pedestal’, unfit to bear a statue that has, besides (and by Rorty’s mentors), been toppled. Rorty replies that Putnam, as a pragmatist, should know that there needs be distinctions between useful and confused use of terms, and that, if philosophy, fully a century after Frege, is still talking to itself,

Davidson and Truth’, pp126-150 in (1991) pp129-152 is not troubled. Against Davidson’s animadversions (Davidson (2000) pxxiii), Rorty finds many continuities between his work and that of James, cf pp128-129 and pp132ff. Interestingly, regarding Rorty’s drafting of Quine for the pragmatist cause, Martin, E. and Smith, D.W.: ‘On the Nature and Relevance of Indeterminacy’, Foundations of Language, vol. XII, no. 1, pp49-71, 1974 consider three theses of Quine regarding translation: that when all evidence is in, no translation scheme is more likely than any other; that all translations are relative to a theory, and that there are no relations from language to language (meanings) making a translation correct or incorrect. The first is an epistemological thesis: indeterminacy affects all inference in theory construction; the second repeats Quine’s lesson that truth and ontology are relative to conceptual schemes. The third, regarding the example of posits in physics and linguistics (cf. L. 5) says that there are no relations for translation to establish. Martin and Smith venture that Quine is wrong to argue that the positing of meanings in linguistics is more objectionable than that of entities in physics; for their failure is due not to indeterminacy but to explanatory irrelevance. They do no work, for the evidence for translations is too weak, and allows no identification of sameness of meaning, but, Martin and Smith argue, the problem is not in language, or the theory of meaning, but in Quine’s epistemology, and that Peircean pragmatism includes what is missing in Quine’s Solution (p71) to defend linguistic theory against the indeterminacy of translation is to, ‘...marshalling behavioural evidence for one set of mental structures over others’. It might be investigated whether Quine’s acquiescence in anomalous monism (Quine, W.V.O.; Pursuit of Truth (Harvard University Press) 1990) offers a means to do this without abandoning key elements of his theory.

Peirce argues that repeated observation and revision of beliefs leads theory to converge on the ‘true conclusion’, and that the only restrictions on this must be procedural, dictating reluctance, or conservatism, with regard to altering entrenched beliefs. By following the correct procedure one will arrive at an explanation of reality, indeed, at the truth. (Martin and Smith suggest that the very idea of alternative conceptual schemes, and of their indeterminacy, holds inherent difficulties, for how may empirically distinct conceptual schemes, offering equally good explanations of all evidence, be individuated?) See Hartshorne, C and Weiss, P. (eds.), The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce: Volume V, Pragmatism and Pragmatism (Harvard University Press 1934), §5.407. Also Volume I, Principles of Philosophy (1931) §1.120, at which one learns that ‘a hypothesis is something which looks as if it might be true and were true, and which is capable of verification or refutation by comparison with facts’. (The issue of surplus and economy, or supererogation, is also raised, §1.122). Cf. also Volume IV, The Simplest Mathematics (1933) §4.1. The importance of the essays, ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, and the later ‘What Pragmatism Is’ (V §§5.411-5.437) is that they state and re-state the differences of Peircean pragmatism from that of James and Dewey. Cf. Weiss, P.; ‘Biography of Charles Sanders Peirce’, pp1-12 in Bernstein, R.J. (ed.), Perspectives on Peirce: Critical Essays on Charles Sanders Peirce (Yale University Press) 1965, pp6-7. Bernstein’s own essay, ‘Action, Conduct and Self-Control’, pp61-91 articulates a notion of praxis useful for elucidating the (Weiss says) opaque description of how Peirce says one achieves clarity, viz., ‘Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object (V, §5.402). Success in achieving this will plainly call upon capacities for intention and for action, and cf. Davidson, D.; ‘Intending’, pp41-60 in Yovel, Y. (ed.), Philosophy of History and Action (Dordrecht, Reidel) 1978, and Hampshire’s reply.

Rorty (1993) pp459-450 suggests as an example that one can make assertions unwarranted and unjustified by the practices obtaining in one’s language community, those the justification for which is, say, yet to be determined. Cf Norris, C.; The Contest of Faculties: Philosophy and Theory after Deconstruction (London, Methuen) 1985, p196 for an example of Norris recognising the problem in Putnam that he discusses in relation to Rorty and Foucault, that of applying relativist arguments so far as to remove all ground for one’s objections to relativism. See also Norris, C.; ‘Doubling Castle or the Slough of Despond: Davidson and Schiffer on the Limits of Analysis’, The Review of Metaphysics, vol. L, no. 2, pp351-382, 1996, pp355-356 on Putnam not following Rorty’s pragmatism. See Rorty (1993) pp449ff, and Howells, C.; Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics (Cambridge, Polity) 1999, pp118-119.

Putnam (1990) p4. Putnam writes: ‘Under the pretense that philosophy is no longer “serious” there lies hidden a gigantic seriousness’. This is the ‘covert ideological bias’ of which Norris (1985) writes.
and can still make nothing of Darwin, Freud, even Wittgenstein, then it must be gestured in a new direction. The desired reformation of thinking, which Putnam abjures, need be no more elusive than (Putnam’s ambition), secure foundations for ‘truth as idealised rational acceptability’, for what is this but acceptability to ‘... as we should like to be’, the very notion Rorty advocates in identifying pragmatism and ‘ethnocentrism’. For Putnam it follows from Rorty’s remarks that consensus to a systematic view of morals, interpretation, pragmatic liberalism, or translation remains always relative to the conventions of the interpreter’s or translator’s language, and that this conceals what Norris dubs a ‘subtle form of cultural imperialism’. Rorty replies that this, again, is to give too significant a rôle to the notion of critical analysis in philosophy; he prefers a mutual respect rather than a consensus, and says only this for the cultural rôle of philosophy, that ‘in the long run’ the abandonment of the view from nowhere may forge ‘some practical differences’ for the lives of non-philosophers. There is only a relationship of ‘rational persuasion’ between one, one’s forebears, and one’s followers, a relationship upheld in a network of mutually-enhancing, continually shifting, values and beliefs. As a better belief emerges the network is altered and significations shifted. In this the deference to Quine’s theories of language and epistemology is clear, yet Quine has doubts concerning his drafting for the pragmatist cause, and his doubts point one toward the utility of Davidson’s anomalous monism as part of a response to Rorty.

Quine writes that the claim that there is no first philosophy is not a naturalistic (Darwinian?), but a holistic claim. Moreover, there is justification in attributions of meaning to utterances and beliefs to people: ‘[h]ow words and sentences are used, in what circumstances and in what relationships to one another, is very much a matter of fact, and moreover I cheerfully call its study a study of meaning. Importantly, his arguments apply elsewhere: to the ascription of meaning to sentences and so to their translations. The factuality of beliefs is for decision in individual cases, and, ‘[s]ome beliefs can even be measured, in human subjects, by laying bets and offering odds’. ‘X believes that p’ is always grammatical and can be assessed for factuality, but for the ascription of terms for the description of the

10 Although, Rorty (1991) says, his view of the, ‘... cultural importance of philosophy’, is not that of Heidegger or Derrida, for whom the failures of theories of intentionality and reference and so forth, are cause for reflection on their failure and the salvage of guides for conduct.
13 Rorty (1993) pp452ff applies his arguments to study of truth as the ‘... reification of an approbative and indefinable adjective’.
15 Quine (1990) p118.
16 Quine (1990) p117. The means by which the ascription of beliefs to people is made is described in the discussion of Davidson in this section.
believer’s mental states, intentions and so forth, ‘...there is [and Rorty would agree] nothing factual about holding the belief: nothing but pious lip-service’\(^{17}\). In such cases, the idiom is not acceptable in a scientific, extensional language, yet for Quine this means that science must find more acceptable idioms for descriptions of mentality, not that there need be no descriptions offered. Quine adds that the indeterminacy of translation is not simply a result of the under-determination of science by observation, and denies a charge (brought by Putnam and Margolis), that he covertly imparts guidelines (conventions or analytical hypotheses), into his conditions for choosing between theories or conceptual schemes vital for interpretation which he denies to methods for choosing between translation manuals\(^{18}\), and he restates the kernel of the thesis of language as stimulus and response: that two complete manuals of translation may conflict without conflicting with any speaker’s behaviour or dispositions to behaviour.

Quine allows that terms describing mental entities might be postulated on the model of posits in physical science, for such theoretical terms have utility in framing useful theory in hard sciences and might be found to do so in describing mentality. The aim of knowledge, rather than being the coping with sensory input (unconceptualised sense data), in the field of force, is more properly the ‘...satisfaction of intellectual curiosity’, by establishing schemes for the prediction of sense-data. (Significant problems with this are discussed in I.5). However, as intimated, Quine states that the description of the world in truth-functional language may be accompanied, in part, by a description in intentional language, a point recognised (as discussed below), by Davidson and Strawson in arguing that at least part of a description of meaning must be given over to a communication, or use, theory, and it is anomalous monism that supplies the means of writing such a description by its containing a role for both semantical and syntactical theories. What is absent from Quine’s theory is a notion of how conceptual schemes, or conventions for referring, meaning and intending, can come to be established or assessed as pragmatically more useful than any other. It is argued in I.5 that he must, for his argument for holism to work, allow into the web analytic truths, or (in IV.1), truths established by conventions. While Quine emphasises his apostasy from Rorty’s pragmatism, and argues that the notions of the web of belief, of indeterminacy and of meaning as stimulus and response do not imply a meaning

\(^{17}\) Both quotations are from Quine (1990) p117.

There is a broader point to be made, namely, that notwithstanding Norris’ argument that Quine’s work entails a rejection of all ‘a priori structures of mind’, his tolerance of descriptions in intentional language and his late acquiescence in Davidson’s anomalous monism, both a compelling response to dualism, or ‘representationalism’, and itself a rich theory of intentionality, that Quine (as argued in I.5 and IV.1), must appeal to some, admittedly nebulous, such structures. The rest of this section describes how anomalous monism is such a good response to Rorty.

Davidson lists the states, described as mental, constituting Feigl’s nomological surplus. They have a causal, law-like rôle in the physical world, yet are not subject to scientific laws as are physical states and events. (He says that reconciling freedom with causal determinism is a ‘special case’ of the problem on the presumption that determinism entails capture in, and freedom escape from, the nomological net. Davidson argues that causal dependency and the anomalousness of the mental are undeniable and yet reconcilable.

Some mental states interact causally with physical events (perceptions are made and action taken consequently), and ‘perhaps’, Davidson suggests, reasons can be given to say that all mental events causally interact with physical events. One calls those verbs


Although they imply a great deal more than Quine countenances, as argued in I.5 and IV.1.


Davidson accounts for this seeming anomaly, which arises, he argues, in the mutual tension obtaining between three principles (p208). Firstly, that at least some (Davidson ventures, ultimately all), mental events interact causally with physical events (the act of sinking the Bismarck (firing torpedoes and so forth), was caused by prior mental events). Secondly, such causal relations instantiate laws, yet, thirdly, these laws can be neither predicted nor explained, for the mental is anomalous. Davidson holds all three principles, and so explains away the apparent contradiction.


Adams, F.; ‘Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View’, Mind and Language, vol. I, no. 4, pp281-301, 1986. Views such as those implicit in Derrida’s analogy, that meaning, or communication, is a broad class with instantiations in different categories, is the target in Adams’ essay on the explanation of cognitive behaviour (intelligent, intentional and goal-directed) in the cognitive sciences. At issue in all cases is the gathering and processing of information for the making of subsequent actions. Adams rejects the distinction between systems, “…instantiating mental states in full dress…” (those in possession of meaning), and those seen as possessing merely goal-directed behaviour (missile systems): he maintains that intentional behaviour is a ‘species’ of goal-directed behaviour, not its ‘genus’. Adams offers an analysis of part of his earlier stated theory, namely, that an intention to do A is a necessary condition of intentionally doing A. To this end he concurs with Davidson’s claim that bodily movements are not actions unless motivated at some stage by an intention: one may intentionally do A by carrying out B and intending B. Adams considers objections to his view stemming from this motivation, the most compelling of which allows that the content of an intention and the description of the corresponding action need not match. In Clark, A.; ‘A Biological Metaphor’, Mind and Language, vol. I, No. 1, pp43-63, 1986, the principle of charity is offered as the foundation for the ascription of intentional states to systems in non-static strong AI. Clark confronts the computational model of the mind with the biological as a model for progress. Cf. Oatley, K.; ‘Freud’s Cognitive Psychology of Intention: the Case of Dora’, Mind and Language, vol. V, no. 1, pp69-86, 1990. Oatley argues that Freud’s work ensures the understanding of ‘bases of intention’ in intentional mental states. He presents Freud, as in the case of Dora, as trying to read her actions not as mere outpourings of mental mechanisms, but as in their extent as ‘conscious’ mental states, and argues that the description of intentionality renders the language of psychology inappropriate. What is required is ‘narrative’ in the cognitive sciences (and Oatley sees other continuities), and a tolerance allowing content to emerge. Oatley also argues that Freud’s work on intention is immune to the substantive criticism of psychoanalysis.

Hence Davidson (1980) p207 says that reconciling the dependency of the physical upon the mental with the anomalism of the mental is a special case of Kant’s problem of accounting for the fact that human freedom and free will cannot be explained away. One must at least, Kant says, show that there is no contradiction, even if one cannot offer a theory of the freedom of the will. This raises the fascinating prospect of a Davidsonian theory of intentionality, in response to Rorty and Derrida, drawing on explicitly Kantian, ‘representationalist’, arguments, and this might be regarded as of a piece with the contemporary revival of Kantian themes in philosophy of mind.

And so prove that causal relationships instantiate lawful statements. Davidson’s examples may be taken from his work on Hempel, ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’, pp3-19 in (1980), and, best of all ‘Causal Relations’, pp149-162 in (1980). These essays
mental which express propositional attitudes, verbs which may sometimes appear as predicates in sentences with persons as subjects, and which are completed by embedded sentences in which rules of substitution do not apply owing to the problems of quantification. This criteria requires clarification, for Davidson wishes to exclude verbs expressing propositional attitudes when they appear in fully extensional contexts (because, due to the inherent quantification, definite reference cannot be achieved), and to include them even when they are not in embedded sentences.

Mental verbs can also be used as psychological verbs in the creation of non-extensional contexts, yet a description of the form 'the event that is M', or an open sentence of the form 'the event X is M' is a 'mental description' or a mental open sentence iff the expression that replaces M contains at least one mental verb essentially. In such a way can cases be excluded in which the description or open sentence is logically equivalent to one containing or not containing mental vocabulary. An event is mental iff it has a mental description, or if there is a mental open sentence true of that event alone; and physical events are identified by descriptions or open sentences that contain only physical vocabulary essentially. However, it is of secondary importance to characterise physical vocabulary, because when compared to the mental it is 'recessive' in determining whether an event is mental or physical, because by anomalous monism the distinguishing feature of the mental is not that it is private, subjective, immaterial or any of the properties philosophers suggest distinguish it from the mental (the only ones Rorty considers), but that it exhibits intentionality.

Davidson asks whether his analysis accounts for traditionally peripheral, less clear-cut cases of mental states. He gives the example of Smart: the seeing of an after-image, and, that of Wittgenstein, the feeling of pain. Sentences reporting after-images and pains '... seem free from taint of non-extensionality...', and the same holds for reports of raw feels and other sensations.

---

contain important developments of the notion of events as contained in 'Mental Events'. Emphasising the nomological nature of causation need bring no commitment to arguing that there are strict deterministic laws for the prediction and explanation of mental events, owing to the anomalous of the mental. Anomalous monism accounts for the dependency of the physical upon the mental and for the anomalousness of the mental. The three, apparently contradictory, principles are shown to be consistent, indeed, they are entailed by Davidson's identity theory of mental and physical events. In turn, this shows that events, by anomalous monism, are unrepeatable, individuated, 'dated' individuals (and Davidson emphasises the case of historical utterances). And on the use of Davidson's anomalous monism in clarifying the detail of the debate between Hirsch (and Schleirmancher) and Gadamer, see Warnke G.; Gadamer: Hermeneutics: Tradition and Reason (Cambridge, Polity) 1987, pp42ff. The prospect is raised of an aesthetics taking the best from theories of authorial intention and from hermeneutics.

Davidson (1980) p210. This perfectly in keeping with Fregean semantics (cf. 1.2).

Davidson (1980) p211 specifically references Brentano. All of the references for this paragraph are to this page.
Anomalous monism countenances no necessary laws connecting mental and physical events, and its import only waxes in comparison to other theories. The latter tolerate an ambiguity in the phrase 'a given mental event', saying that events cannot be dated or particularised, and that, without appeal to regularity or convention, it makes no sense to speak of a single (mental) event as invariably accompanied by another (physical) event, a position held to by Taylor. Davidson writes that if events are of a given kind, as the identity theory maintains, then the theory presupposes causal laws. Smart's identity theory is an '...honest ontology of individual events...', but one written without cognisance of the way in which mental events might be individuated without identity implying a correlative law.

The respective positions of these and other authors may be tabulated. Nomological monism (the position of, for instance, Smart and Kim), holds that there exist correlating laws, and that the events correlated are one; nomological dualism (Cormean, Putnam), covers parallelism, interactionism, and varieties of epiphenomenalism; anomalous dualism combines dualism in ontology with no allowance for correlations of the mental and the physical (Descartes); and Davidson's position, anomalous monism, the materialist thesis of the supervenience of the mental on the physical, with the rejection of the argument that the mental is 'explained' in terms of the physical. It allows, as Davidson has it, that not all events are mental, and insists that all are physical; and in its 'ontological bias', allowing for the best case to be made for the intentional.

Theories advocating the reduction, by law or definition, of the mental upon the physical (tacitly) accept, Davidson argues, the reduction of moral properties to descriptive properties, and this, he adds, there is good reason to 'believe' cannot be done; the example applies for another case, the reduction of truth in a formal system to syntactical properties, '...and this [Davidson says] we know cannot in

31 Cf. Smith, D.W.; 'Mind and Body', pp323-393, in Smith, B. and Smith, D.W. (eds); The Cambridge Companion to Husserl (Cambridge University Press) 1995. Smith argues that Husserl's monism is an 'ontologically more developed' form of anomalous monism (p362), and that Davidson's concession to materialism is one Husserl would reject. For Husserl events are neither mental nor physical, and yet they can be described in a theory of physical phenomena. A materialist theory is not enough to account for all of the relevant phenomena, most obviously, intentionality. Cf. esp. pp353-364. Smith also considers causality in Husserl (pp365-367). See also Fellesda, D.; 'Absorbed Coping, Husserl and Heidegger', pp251-257 in Wrathall and Malpas (2000a), p252. Kim, J.; 'Causation, Nomie Subsumption and the Concept of Event', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXX, no. 8, pp217-236, 1973. Kim argues that the components of a classic Humean causation are not joined in relations: he questions in particular the temporal and spatial contiguity of events: what, he asks, are the entities, and the categories of events, related in Humean causation conditions? The conditions are 'jointly incongruous ontologically', and so the causal relation itself 'ontologically incoherent'.
general be done'. His identity thesis describes a 'lawless monism'. If one thinks of the vocabulary of physical events (L) as possessing resources enough to express both an amount of mathematics and its own syntax, the addition of L' ((L) augmented with the mental predicate 'true-in-L'), allows the individuation, with a definite description or an open sentence, of each sentence in extension of the truth predicate, and if L is consistent there is no predicate of the syntax of L that applies to all of the true sentences of L. Consequently, there can be no psychophysical law instantiating an identity between a sentence true-in-L and a physical predicate of L. Davidson argues rather that mental events are individuated by physical vocabulary alone, but that physical and mental predicates have different extensions. It is, as the example shows, a 'matter of law' that no purely physical predicate could have the same extension as a mental predicate.  

\[34\]

Davidson (1980) pp214-215. This is, of course, Tarski's truth definition (and see below). In Tarski, A.; 'The Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages', pp152-278, in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938 (Oxford, Clarendon) 1956, Tarski endeavours to define truth, or better, to give a, '... materially adequate and formally correct definition of the term "true sentence"'. As Austin might say, this is a 'classical' problem of philosophy; Tarski's project proceeds in, as it were, the opposite direction, for though 'true sentence' seems clear in colloquial language, this is not the case in definitions with pretensions to precision. It is worth recalling that Tarski's considers the claims of both colloquial and formalised languages to give his semantic definition of truth. Tarski (1956a) especially p166. A fascinating examination of Derrida would be to append this to his analysis, for he tells Searle that the graft applies to both. Cf. on signs pp166-167.

Tarski's truth definition is the core of Davidson's theory of semantics, and is used throughout this section. Tarski allows 'no doubt' in the terms making up the definition (pp152-153). Cf. Sieroka, N.; 'Phenomenology Meets Logical Semantics: What Husserl's and Tarski's Theories of Truth Do Have in Common', Journal for the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. XXXIV, no. 2, pp16-131, 2003. Sieroka surveys the influence of Brentano on a number of the great Polish logicians. Tarski's notion of 'satisfaction' is compared to Husserl's 'fulfilment' (they also share a use for 'states of affairs'), and an attempt made to examine the shift, in thinking about truth, from metaphysical theories to formal scientific systems. Sieroka flags ideas that are key to a real dialogue of the analytical and the phenomenological traditions in intentionality (p127). One of the most fascinating connections is Tarski's knowledge of the work of the Gottingen school, and specifically Hilbert (Cf. 1956a, p199). See also p215, and the relation to 'type' in Principia Mathematica, and p219. Rorty (1991b) p137 remarks upon the pragmatist nature of Tarski's, and Davidson's, notion of satisfaction. He also embraces anomalous monism (cf. pp14 and 121).

Davidson, D.; 'In Defence of Convention T', pp65-75 in (2001), Davidson writes that the Ramsified truth-sentences presented in Lewis, D.K., 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain', pp216-222 in Block, N. (ed); Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I (Harvard University Press) 1980, do not account for truth in oblique or opaque contexts, say, for equivalents of 'Every sentence Aristotle spoke was false', and 'What you said last Tuesday was true' (p65). They do not show the indispensability of a truth predicate, but demonstrate '... what it would be like to have one'. There are T-sentences for each truth sentence of the language under analysis, and thus the corpus of T-sentences show the application (the extension) of the predicate '... is true', but how, Davidson asks, may a sentence fulfil the criteria defined by the T-sentence? A central point about Convention T and T-sentences, frequently missed by philosophers, is that they provide the 'sole link' between intuitive truths about truth and formal semantics; Convention T can guide one in negotiating use-mention distinctions, and the 'quotatio-lifting feature' of single-place truth predicate T-sentences governs the essential condition of recursion on truth or satisfaction. Most importantly, Convention T allows the framing of correct questions: in asking what it is for a sentence to be true, one need not require of an answer that it make a connection between the sentence and states of affairs, for semantic notions appearing in both subject and predicate in a Tarski definition are fully defined in syntactic terms. In determining that the meaning of a sentence depends upon the meaning of its parts, Convention T makes none of the mistakes of other semantic theories, namely of opposing meaning to reference, or of assuming that meanings are entities. Such theories analyse truth and inference in sentence structure, Tarskian truth theories, on the other hand, show that certain sentences are true according to the properties of their logical constants. Davidson (2001e) p71 writes: '[t]he logical constants may be identified as those iterative features of the language that require a recursive clause in the characterisation of truth or satisfaction. Logical form, in this account, will of course be relative to the choice of a metalanguage (with its logic) and a theory of truth'. On the proviso that one may limit the description of 'natural language' to 'systems of signs that are or have been in actual use', both interpreted and uninterpreted systems are by outgrowths of natural languages, and Davidson notes Tarski's recognition of the difficulties of deriving a theory of natural language in a natural language; for instance, there arise a raft of problems concerning the presence of words for which it cannot provide a translation; the universality of language requires also the admission into language of names of sentences and expressions, of sentences containing these names and of truth predicates. When considered in the light of Convention T, these problems are avoided, for one may describe the truth predicate using 'no conceptual resources' outwith the language in which the predicate appears. Only the truth predicate must be in the metalanguage, and all that is required for using it to elucidate the object language is a 'theory of truth' (p72). Both object and metalanguage retain the same ontology, with increase in 'ideology' limited to semantical concepts.
Anomalous monism synthesizes the best of the competing positions detailed. It holds that causality and identity are relations between individual events, regardless of the way in which they are described; the laws it postulates are linguistic, and so the events instantiate laws only as they are described; the causal interaction it allows for describes events in extension alone, and thus it is 'blind' to the mental-physical dichotomy. The nomological nature of the causal law, it must be emphasized, says that when events are related as cause and effect, their descriptions instantiate a law: it does not say that every true singular statement of a causal relation instantiates a law.35

Davidson insists that the analogy between the place of the mental and the physical and the place of the semantical and the syntactical is to be explained via Tarski's truth definition, the canonical version of which is applied to the calculus of classes, and shows that the metalanguage both names the sentences of the object language and provides each with a translation ('...a sentence having the same meaning'). Ascribing truth to a sentence of the object language utilizes the same recursive method as

---

35 Translatability between languages 'idealizes' the resources of a natural language, and this is justified with a transcendental argument (Davidson says, offered in 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', pp183-198 in (2001)), and this raises issues of how one may come to understand a metalanguage for the elucidation of an object language (2001)) pp72-73. An extensional metalanguage to illuminate the semantic features of an intensional object language assumes that the object language shows up typical features of a natural language: the metalanguage, as it were, '...exceeds the expressive power of the object language'. For each 'intensional' sentence of the object language there is a corresponding extensional sentence (about possible worlds, counterparts, etc.) with the same truth conditions in the metalanguage; but there must be metalinguistic sentences with intuitively the same subject matter that have no corresponding sentences in the object language. Intensionality is treated by such theories as a lack of expressive power—a lack we are taught how to make up for by the theory itself. But if we understand our metalanguage, we are using a system of concepts and a language which is the one for which we really want a theory, for it is this richer system that is our natural one. And fortunately the richer system does not raise any difficulties for a truth theory satisfying Convention T, for it is extensional. A theory of natural language, by Convention T, is, Davidson argues, open to empirical test, for the inheriting of the object language in the metalanguage does not render empirical content absent, '...rather this fact can qualify as the fact to be verified'. Davidson adds that one cannot use a criterion of translation without 'begging the question' of empirical application. The question, mooted earlier, of how T-sentences are taken as true can be answered, and the answer has wide ramifications (pp73-74). As before, T-sentences give the extension of the predicate '...is true'. If we consider any one T-sentence, this proposal requires only that if a true sentence is described as true, then its truth conditions are given by some true sentence. But when we consider the constraining need to match truth with truth throughout the language, we realize that any theory acceptable by this standard may yield, in effect, a usable translation manual running from object language to metalanguage... If we treat T-sentences as verifiable, then a theory of truth shows how we can go from truth to something like meaning—enough like meaning so that if someone had a theory for a language verified in the way I propose, he would be able to use that language in communication'. Problems arise in making a truth theory a theory of interpretation for relativisation to speaker and time; namely, problems of indexicals and demonstratives (discussed in 1.2). A solution to these problems shows more accurately the ways in which the sentences of a natural language are interpreted by speakers. The condition on the object language and the metalanguage, that they relate the sentence used and the sentence described, is challenged by cases of such relativised utterances, for a sentence giving the truth conditions of a sentence containing a demonstrative includes variables appearing in the statement of truth-conditions: as Davidson says, 'absolute truth...goes relative when applied to a natural language'. All the same, and vitally important, the verification of instances of T-sentences is still empirical, calling upon a notion of demonstration among 'speakers, times and objects', appealing to no notions of meaning or synonymy, and offering a theory of radical interpretation. Loar, B.; 'Two Theories of Meaning', pp158-161 in Evans, G. and McDowell, J. (eds); Truth and Meaning; Essays in Semantics (Oxford, Clarendon) 1976, p139 see that Davidson adds to Tarski consideration of indexicals. Sowa, J.F.; 'Laws, Facts and Contexts: Foundations for Multimodal Reasoning', pp, in Hendricks, V.F., Jørgensen, K.P. and Pedersen, S.A. (eds); Knowledge Contributors (Dordrecht, Reidel) 2003. Sowa argues that Kripke's possible worlds semantics can be simplified for application to some contexts of intentionality. Tarski's application of his work to a theory of linguistic intentionality is given at (1956a) p232. 36 Davidson (1980) p. Tarski (1956a) p187 gives an example, '...corresponding to the sentence "Tlx. Pk. AIXX.IX..." is the name "\(\Omega \Omega \Omega \Omega \) (I,24+I)"and the sentence "for any classes a and b we have a\(\in b\) or b\(\subseteq a\)". On the introduction of the metalanguage and the metatheory for the investigation of the language of a deductive science, see Tarski (1956a) p167. Segal gives a version of the Tarski truth definition for names. He writes, 'It is part of our semantic competence to know, in general, what it is for something to bear a name. And we know (partly consciously, partly unconsciously) how names can get attached to individuals by baptisms, cultural conventions and so on. We also know how they stick to individuals over time'. Segal, G.; 'Two Theories of Names', Mind and Language, vol. XVI, no. 5, pp547-563, 2001, especially pp549-550.
was used above: in the sentence schema ‘x is a true sentence if and only if p’, ‘x’ is replaced with the name of the sentence, and ‘p’ with its translation. When applied to Tarski’s sample sentence there follows a proof that there are no physical open sentences true of all and only all the events having the same mental property. This is an explanation, ‘...in a precise way, in accordance with linguistic usage...’, of truth-ascriptions to sentences, and the definition is formalised as Convention T37.

Davidson writes that in examining the irreducibility of the mental, ‘irreducibility’ must carefully be defined. He argues not only that mental events are picked out with physical vocabulary, but that in cases in which the number of events that fall under each mental predicate are finite, that there may exist a physical open sentence coextensive with each mental predicate38. However, even if finitude cannot be reached, there is no reason to rule out the possibility that there could be coextensive predicates, mental and physical, for none of this that the mental is nomologically irreducible. There may be true general statements relating mental and physical, but they are not laws, though they may have the logical form of laws39. They are ‘lawlike’, and following the earlier analogy, Davidson writes that the existence of lawlike statements in physical science depends upon the existence of constitutive synthetic a priori laws within the same conceptual domain.

Just as one cannot intelligibly assign a length to any object unless a comprehensive theory holds of objects of that sort, one cannot intelligibly attribute any propositional attitude to an agent except within the framework of a viable theory of his beliefs, desires, intentions, and decisions40.

The content of a propositional attitude derives only from its place in this framework, and there can be no ascription of beliefs to agents on the basis of verbal behaviour alone, for one makes sense of beliefs only as they cohere with others, with preferences, and with intentions, and because they approximate, to a greater or lesser degree, one’s own. Each case tests a theory and depends upon it, and the content of a propositional attitude derives from its place in this theory, and its relationships to others. There is

---

Tarski (1956a) p155 says the task of a semantical definition is to make precise the statement of a relation between a true sentence and the state of affairs it reports. Tarski (1956a) pp209-210 on the importance of ‘calligraphy’ in writing the symbols (constants, variables, notation) of a logical language.

37 Davidson (1980) p215. Cf. Tarski (1956a) pp187ff. ‘Not much more in principle is to be demanded of a general definition of true sentence than that it should satisfy the usual conditions of methodological correctness and include all partial definitions of this type as special cases: that it should be, so to speak, their logical product. At most we can also require that only sentences are to belong to the extension of the defined concept, so that, on the basis of the definition constructed, all sentences of the type ‘x is not a true sentence’, in which in the place of ‘x’ we have the name of an arbitrary expression (or of any other object) which is not a sentence, can be proved’. Tarski argues that the ‘establishing of semantics as a scientific basis’, as given in Convention T, fulfills Gödel’s conditions for making decidable propositions previously thought undecidable. Tarski, A.; 'The Establishment of Scientific Semantics', pp401-408 in (1956). Cf. Tarski (1956a) pp185-186, 247, 262ff, and especially pp274-277. Considerations of the correctness of Convention T are found in Tarski (1956a) pp195ff, pp236 and pp246-247.

no possibility of decoding or translating a man’s speech if one cannot access the attitudes guiding his sentences. Given access, one can begin working out a “passing” theory of meaning, one containing only “heteronomic”, lawlike statements linking mental and physical, indicating the rôle of (radical) translation in the description of the propositional attitudes, and so Davidson’s response to Quine⁴.

Davidson allows no strict psychophysical laws between mental and physical, because they perennially fulfil “disparate commitments”⁵. The irreducibility of the mental derives neither from the property of intentionality, for this interdependence is compatible with there being a correct way to interpret a speaker’s words without relativisation to conflicting translation manuals, nor from the possibility of there being many equally plausible manuals, for this is compatible with the arbitrary choice of a scheme; it is due rather to the utility in use of concepts of belief, desire and intention, showing that one must be prepared to adjust one’s theory “in the light of recalcitrant experience”, for reasons of overall cogency⁶. The nomological slack (not surplus), between mental and physical defines the property of intentionality, and allows one to conceive of man as rational. Arbitrary choice of translation manuals precludes this shifting of position, and ignores the fact that choice is to be made on the basis of all available evidence. The difficulties (and “oddness”) arising from cases of privacy and first-person reports of propositional attitudes dissipate with the investigation of the grounds for accepting a translation manual, for they are all investigated to further the principle of charity, not as private, first-person, literal, non-literal or parasitical, but as reporting the presence, in context, of a network of intentions, purposes and beliefs⁷. It is the very lawlessness of the mental which establishes

⁴ Davidson (1980) p221.
⁵ Davidson (1980) p222.
⁸ Davidson (1980) p223. Cf. Okrent, M.; ‘Intending the Intender (Or, Why Heidegger Isn’t Davidson)’, pp279-301 in Whitall and Malpas (2000a). Okrent considers similarities and differences between Heidegger and Davidson concerning first- and third-person directed intentions, showing that a significant difference between their respective traditions lies in the fact that Heidegger argues that all intentions are, at least partly, self-directed, or reflexive. Okrent also raises fascinating comparisons between Davidson’s and Heidegger’s responses to Descartes. The essay is an excellent study of Heidegger on intentionality, and is itself exemplary. Davidson admits to bemusement at his connections with Heidegger, Derrida, and post- and after- trends, wondering whether he misses something in his own work. Davidson, D.; ‘The Third Man’, Critical Inquiry, vol. XIX, no. 4, pp607-616, 1993. The essay contains Davidson’s reflections on objects linguistic and artistic, and their intentional creation.

the due identity of the mental and the physical, and the explanation of a man's free actions with reference to his decisions, habits, knowledge and perceptions offers an account of intentional behaviour, "...in a conceptual framework removed from the direct reach of physical law by describing both cause and effect, reason and action, as aspects of a portrait of a human agent."^{46}

Having rejected the idea of conventions linking mental and physical, Davidson asks whether the conventions applicable in language approximate more those of games or of etiquette; that is, are conventions of language necessary to communication, describing rules, or do they guide appropriateness and finesses? It shall be seen that the debates assessed in the chapters to follow raise repeated concerns as to the ambiguity of 'convention' (indeed, it compels Strawson's distinction), but Davidson's view is clear; the matter, "...concerns not the truth of the claim that speech is convention-bound, but the importance and rôle of convention in speech."^{47} A full and compelling theory of meaning needs more than the ascription of meaning to well-formed utterances and their parts. Clarification of what utterances mean demands reference to notions of intention and purpose^{48}.

Davidson considers Dummett's focuses on the form of conventions in declarative sentences, obtaining, "...except in special contexts..." (perhaps, fictional); assertions are theorised as having been uttered with the intention of producing a true sentence, in analogy to securing a victory^{49}. Davidson

---

^{46} Davidson (1980) p225.
^{48} Can there be, he asks, (2001k) p265, communication without convention? Lewis, D.K.; 'Languages and Language', pp3-35 in Gunderson, K. (ed.): Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume VII, Language, Mind and Knowledge (University of Minnesota) 1975, says that it is a platitude that there are conventions of language, and Davidson replies that while no-one could deny that conventions involve speech, this is not the convention upon which the existence of language depends. 'No doubt what Lewis has in mind is the idea that the connection between words and what they mean is conventional. And perhaps only a philosopher would deny this; but if so, the reason may be that only a philosopher would say it in the first place. What is obvious enough to be a platitude is that the use of a particular sound to refer to, or mean, what it does is arbitrary. But while what is conventional is in some sense arbitrary, what is arbitrary is not necessarily conventional'. (These points arise again in the discussions of Millikan (II.5) and Lewis (IV)).
^{49} Davidson (2001k) p266. That is, convention must supply the means of connecting linguistic meaning and human attitudes, and acts caused by dispositions.
^{51} Wright, C.; 'How Can the Theory of Meaning be a Philosophical Project?', Mind and Language, vol. I, no. 1, pp31-44, 1986. Wright discusses the prospects of theories of meaning of the Davidsonian/Dummettian kind, and their splicing of semantical and syntactical considerations. The appeal to recursivity, apparent in Davidson's application of Tarski's Convention T, raises questions which such a theory must answer: namely, how is it possible for the speakers of a natural language to understand an infinity of sentences, to learn said language, and to understand previously unheard sentences? Wright considers arguments, and an opposing view, from Evans for a dispositional account of meaning, stressing its connection (in terms of 'psychological bonds' between speakers and 'axioms' of knowledge-based reasoning), to notions of intention and convention.

Wright opposes Dummett's theory of implicit knowledge, and Evans' theory of dispositions to form beliefs about meanings; he suggests that this has implications for 'armchair' philosophy as vital to an approach taking cross-currents from neurophysiology and cognitive science.
asks whether attaining truth is a form of victory. A definition (in paradigmatically Wittgensteinian terms), of victory cannot be derived from definitions of instances of victory in particular games; likewise (again in Wittgensteinian terms), encountering a speaker of a foreign language, and given a truth definition, can one establish that the definition applies? If Dummett’s convention were to suffice, understanding truth in language as like winning a game would, ‘...make the crucial connection between meaning as described in a theory of truth and the use of language in contexts of communication’, but how would one recognise the speaker as aiming at truth50? Playing a game demands, at the very least, Dummett says, that one represents oneself as wanting to win. (This is not necessarily dissembling). It requires that one play by the rules, and that winning be an end in itself, but Davidson baulks at this. Dummett writes that to know a language is to be able to employ it, and thus that an account of the knowledge of a language is simply an account of how the language works. He adds that an account of the knowledge of a language (of all of its expressions), will solve all problems of meaning; ‘...once we are clear about what it is to know the meaning of an expression, then questions about whether, in such-and-such a case, the meaning of a word has been changed can be resolved by asking whether someone who understood the word previously has to acquire new knowledge in order to understand it now’. This is a notion of purely linguistic convention, defined as a commitment of speakers to make true (with appeal to specific conventions for each declarative sentence), one which Davidson rejects, but to which, it is argued, Derrida cleaves in interpretation of Austin, contrary to Austin’s own, far subtler theory. Strawson’s distinction brings out this subtlety (II.4-5). Davidson writes that speakers often do not want to speak true, declarative sentences; there is no requirement that speaker’s represent themselves as wanting to do so, nor that they do so intentionally. Speaking true sentences is, ‘...never an end in itself.’ One might, Davidson argues, substitute the search for a definition of speaker truth in declaratives with one emphasising the mutual exchange typical of assertion (in collocation), turning upon notions of coordination and rationality51. Assertions are made, in sincere cases, in the hope that they are taken as true (S wants H to recognise his intention in speaking). Assertions can be made without reference to agreed rules or conventions of language, but, Davidson adds, if there are to be connections between H’s recognition of S’s intention and a claim to

50 Davidson (2001k) p267. Dummett asks what can be said for a theory of truth conditions as the basis for a theory of meaning, in Dummett, M.; ‘What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)’, pp67-137 in Evans and McDowell (1976). He suggests as an alternative an intuitionistic theory with verification and falsification in place of truth and falsity. (Cf. Martin and Smith (1974) p53 on verification in Quine and Peirce). Dummett is critical of the Tarski truth theory, and writes of knowledge of how to use a language as practical, or propositional, knowledge, and represented as ‘...mastery of a procedure, of a conventional practice’. Though a theory of meaning for language must ascribe such ‘implicit’ procedures (it cannot demand that a speaker formulate in words his knowledge of language), it must also account for its manifestation.
truth, there must be conventions obtaining for situations in which assertions are made, justifying the attribution of truth conditions to illocutions, and this Davidson rejects. If a convention is to link intentions (Davidson’s ‘ulterior purposes’, explicitly compared to Austin’s perlocutionary effects), with meanings they must identify, for S and H, cases in which the intention yields the literal meaning, distinguishing them from those that do not. (This requiring understanding of the words spoken, and of their illocutionary force). Even if intentions may conventionally be related to illocutionary force, there can be no guarantee that S is sincere. Deciding an utterance’s literal meaning tells one nothing of whether S achieves his ulterior purpose, for his intentions remain hidden. Strawson’s ‘avowability conditions’ offer only a ‘partial’ analysis, neglecting the importance of, ‘...publicly recognised tests, criteria, or practices’, the matter of communication and convention in speech.

The analysis of linguistic conventions, as conceived by Dummett, says nothing for the importance and rôle of the notion of, and mutual awareness of, regularity or repetition in usage. Regularity (and Davidson stresses that this must be over time, and not of the moment), demands the repeated interpretation of sound patterns, and, ‘...unless they coincide in advance, the concepts of regularity and convention have no definite purchase’. Rather, interpretation occurs without agreed prior theories, for again, one applies charity, and radically interprets a congeries of general information that cannot be reduced to rules, ‘...much less conventions or practices’, guiding the assimilation of new information. While knowledge of broad tendencies in linguistic behaviour is a ‘crutch’ to interpretation, though utilised in practice, under ‘optimum conditions’ for communication, it is abandoned, offering nothing for theory. The details of Davidson’s arguments against conventions of language are surveyed in I.5.

---

51 This is a more sophisticated candidate for comparison to Strawson’s notion of convention in speech acts, see II.4.
53 Cf. Gruber, I.S.; ‘Performatif-Constitutive Transition in Child Language Development’, Foundations of Language, vol XII, no. 4, pp513-527, 1975. Gruber gives evidence for the fundamental rôle of the performatif in a child’s linguistic development, and speculates on the performatif as the, ‘sine qua non of human language’. It is a ‘representation of the power of reflection’ (and the reference to Chardin is made) upon oneself and one’s thoughts. Gruber writes that Jakobson makes the contrast (in an unnamed lecture) between predication and attribution, and ventures that the performatif can be thought an ‘essential part of predication’, cf. Searle (1969).
56 Davidson (2001k) p279. Stanley Fish adds another perspective, that of one who ‘redefines’, or interprets, events on a level at odds with that on which all (or most) others do. Fish gives an example of one who attributes his fortunes to ‘providential design’; one for whom the ‘everyday’ interpretation is conventional and no more essential than his own: the latter is as good an alternative. Fish, S.E.; ‘Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases’, Critical Inquiry, vol. IV, no. 4, pp 625-644, 1978. This makes a compelling question of the status of the ‘ordinary’, and a change in patterns of interpretation as drastic and as vivid as this is seen in Augustine’s conversion, and again cf. Cavell (1988) p132. (See also Cavell’s interpretation of Philosophical Investigations,
Like Quine, Davidson rejects all arguments to the end that a corpus of truths analytic for a language can found for it workable conventions, and, returning to earlier points, while Norris may write that radical empiricism rejects any distinction between matters of fact (syntheticity) and matters of \textit{a priori} logical truth (analyticity), because truths in the holistic web cannot be distinguished on these terms, the arguments of I.5 and IV.1 show that the case is far more complex. Accordingly, the interpretation of Quine and of pragmatist objections to the analytic/synthetic distinction goes on, the explanation of meaning and knowledge proceeds without appeal to \textit{a priori structures} of the mind, but neither of these claims is wholly correct, for Quine's distinction between the relative status of beliefs in the web is not pellucid as Norris argues, and, moreover, Quine had cause to 'acquiesce' in a theory of intentionality, namely, anomalous monism. Consensus on the interpretation of the rest of Quine's work is invariably achieved. Translation is indeterminate, and radical translation impossible, because an interpreter cannot know enough about the conventions of a native speaker even to start interpretation. Speaker and translator are ontologically relative, and the infinite, and most vicious regress, which Quine detects in theories of language conventions begins, owing to the incommensurability of conceptual schemes\textsuperscript{57}. However, it is the case that the regress may be avoided, and by a theory


Fish goes on to develop a thesis of the text as 'stable', as being as real as the 'ordinary world', yet subject to varying interpretations, the congeries of which bolsters its stability. The notion of 'evidence' for an interpretation is central, and Fish's case is made with reference to legal case histories. The Davidsonian ring to Fish's reflections is compelling, for example: 'How is it that a text... demonstrably unstable can be stabilised to such a degree that a large number of people know immediately what it means?' (p30). In Fish's theory of 'literal' meaning sentences are always under an interpretation: they all already have an illocutionary force. (As Searle makes abundantly clear (of III), the same statement may have different illocutionary forces). Fish argues that his take on the direct/indirect speech act distinction approximates that given by Searle. Again, this is described in Part III, and (other) reasons given, in III, for thinking Fish is right to see the connection. It is also the case that Fish's conclusions are overturned by Lewis' theory of convention, which as shall be seen, offers the deliverance Fish, and Derrida, seek; cf. Fish (1980) p239. In (1989) p53 Fish notes the regress of interpretations in Derrida's analysis of contextual conditions. In a Levinian convention there need be no contextual conditions. Lewis does not take a language and define its conventions, but define conventions that can be used in the used in all analysis of language. It should be recalled that Fish compares his theory to Wittgenstein's language games (p241). See Warnke (1987) pp110-111. Warnke adds Habermas' voice, and argues for the superiority of a Gadamerian/Davidsonian epistemology to a Wittgensteinian. Of course, as Warnke continues, Habermas raises concerns on the influence of ideology in the achievement of consensus. Cf. Habermas, J.; 'Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls' \textit{Political Liberalism}', \textit{The Journal of Philosophy}, vol. XCVII, no. 3, pp109-131 1995, on Rawls' original position.

\textsuperscript{57} Quine regards the simplicity of competing theories as a criterion for preference. Quine, W.V.O.; 'On Simple Theories of a Complex World', pp242-245 in \textit{The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays} (New York, Random House) 1966. They combine beauty and convenience, and carry a degree of probability. The latter is the 'maxim of the simplicity of nature', a mark ascribing in equal measure uniformity to nature. Simplicity is ... relative to the texture of a conceptual scheme'; if one conceives of the first as more elementary. However, if both contain propositions concerning the other, then neither can be deemed simpler, and simplicity has no intimate relation with truth. (The same applies for ascriptions of uniformity. Recall that Putnam suggests other dogmas of empiricism). The bias toward simplicity is, on experiment, found to preclude all possibility of disconfirming the belief in simplicity: it becomes self-fulfilling (pp243-244). It is akin to belief in the uniformity of nature, and this Quine ascribes to 'wishful thinking' and the tendency of perceptual capacities to filter out the complex. It works also for theory formation. If one devises a test of an agent's stimulus-response criteria, one's results need repetition in other agents before they can be forwarded as part of a workable theory. The theory describes the criteria of all whose conditioning and responses are described by it. Quine remarks: '... we cannot, by this method, get evidence of pre-experimental quality spaces unlike for the two [agents]'. Cf. White (1952) p. Quine writes that complex hypotheses are as simple an option, and as open to confirmation or rejection by experimental data (pp244-245). As Quine goes on to argue, one's conclusions turn upon the procedural conventions one adopts.

Quine considers the notion of sensations as immediate experiences, with particular reference to the 'process of language'. Quine, W.V.O.; 'On Mental Entities', pp208-214 in (1966). He rejects as 'unrealistic' the positivist thesis that says language has 'hidden' definitions, tracing terms back to their stimulus conditions. Quine returns to his theory of linguistic behaviour as a
predicated on the notion of a nascent, 'pre-individuative', (for McDowell 'primitive'), phase in the formation of conceptual schemes, at which the fundament, the principle of charity, is present but at which the vocabulary, experience and sensitivity remain as yet underdeveloped. Davidson goes further than Quine (and Derrida), and rejects the idea that truth is relative to the conventions of language. In their place Davidson offers, via the principle of charity, the basic attitude of holding true (described by Convention T), for ascriptions of truth to S's sentences. This allows interpretation (Hacking, it shall be seen, remarks on the equivocation between 'interpretation' and 'translation'), and the 'movement' between conceptual schemes, it shall be argued (in IV.3), allows the understanding of utterances issued in Derrida's parasitical contexts.

The conclusion of Davidson's theory is that conventions, if one wishes to call them that, proceed from language use, but that they are functionally irrelevant: they do no work, and, correlative, that meaning relativism is undercut, for the meanings of statements do not determine their truth. In the chapters that follow it shall be argued that the case against relativism may be made significantly stronger. The attitude, described in the principle of charity, of aiming to maximise rationality and coherence in familiar contexts shall be compared to a situation instantiating a coordination problem in Lewis' theory of convention. By exploiting premises analogous to those placed upon the principle of charity, Lewis describes the ways in which parties may, in his first examples, converge upon a course of action, and in his substantive examples, how such mutual, social, or institutional, conventions may, by identical means, apply to conventions of language. The work shows that conceiving of conventions

species of stimulus and response: language is an 'infinite totality' of sayable phrases and sense experience guided by a 'process of psychological association or conditioned response', and 'keyed in' to the totality at various places. The Duhem-Quine hypothesis is again referenced, and the rejection of theories of language conventions clear (pp208-209). The theory of stimulus and response describes the learning of words from one's elders in a formal learning situation. Phrases are associated with experiences, and contextual knowledge develops. Neurath's metaphor is again the model. The pressing question is how decisions are made as to acceptance and rejection. Quine suggests the presumption of simplicity, and a 'pragmatic guess'. One posits, say, electrons (of which one has direct experience) because they contribute to the richness and continuation of scientific theory; wavicles have, as yet, been seen to have no evident purpose (pp210-214). One's conceptual scheme is a 'function of present purposes and past conceptualisations'. The contribution of reason is not merely to conceptualize a 'presented pageant' of experience and to post objects behind it, for it always to respond, with selection and emphasis, to the pageant itself, which is always 'polluted' with the remnants of competing, past and fringe conceptualisations.


Cf. Davidson, D.; 'Radical Interpretation', pp125-139 in (2001b). Norris (1985) pp202-203 writes that Frege's semantics is undercut at its foundations by Quine's arguments, for the distinction between analytic and contingent statements cannot be made. Quine, as Davidson (and Derrida), goes on to reject the idea of conventions of language. Norris' discussion of Davidson on Convention T, a foil he says to deconstructive "rigour" and relativism, is weakened by incomplete consideration of its formal semantics aspect. Davidson insists that, as a basis for a meaning theory, this must always be supplemented by a Gricean communication-intention theory, and the relevant points are described in I.5 and II.

Norris (1985) p207 notes a move characteristic of Derrida's remarks on convention, namely, that of applying across the board arguments for a number of notions of incommensurability, and of generalising problems. The principle of charity makes the very opposite beginning, for one brings charity to all instances of communication.

Regarding Convention T, Norris (pp213-214) has doubts similar to Strawson's concerning its acceptance, and in his querying of Davidson's argument that the application of Convention T dissipates all problems of translation, Norris intimates the discussion of Hacking. He also echoes Searle's points on the incomplete reading of Saussure by Derrida and other meaning-relativists: they have focussed only the rôle of semantics in the construction of a language, and Davidson emphasises, in contrast, the rôle of syntax.
as relative to language, and of this resulting in a most vicious regress in which no conventions can be established, owing to the logical impossibility of settling a first meaning without an already developed, and considerably rich, language, is no cause for scepticism about meanings. One need not hold such a theory. Conventions for language may be founded in a theory having at its core the attitude described in the principle of charity, and Lewis argues that this allows even a theory of analyticity for language.

Davidson’s appeal to Grice is well-founded (he says that all formal semantics must be supplemented by a Gricean communication-intention theory), and Lewis’ work shows the way in which the appeal to convention made by Grice in his theory of meaning intentions may be set upon a firm basis. Reciprocally, Lewis’ theory of convention shows the way in which a theory of meaning intentions can be founded without the sceptical doubts expressed by Derrida. A Gricean theory of meaning intentions is essentially correct, allowing an argument to the conclusion that speakers’ motivating intentions in speaking remain present, even (after consideration of Lewis’ further arguments, and Schiffer’s), in the indirect, parasitical contexts for which, Derrida argues, theories of meaning intentions cannot account. A start is made in the following section with an argument for the meanings of statements containing demonstratives and indexicals, cases broached by Derrida in his presentation of Husserl and Austin, as not subject to the relativisation to literal and parasitical contexts. They can be assessed using identical criteria of sense and reference. A theory of communication makes this much appeal to rule-governed repetition as it is conceived: it is a presupposition that speakers will go on as before, yet this counts nothing for the necessity of an account of convention in a theory of language. Derrida’s rejection of convention is unworkable because no one need hold the theory he rejects. (It is debatable whether anyone could). The ‘trade-offs’ between attributed beliefs and the interpretations given to a speaker’s words constitute no concession to the disowned theory of convention, although they are needed in the move from artificial to natural languages. The conclusion is approached indirectly, by assessing the rôle of demonstratives in Frege’s semantics; this, as argued in I.3, the logical analogue of Husserlian phenomenology.
2. Demonstratives and Reference

Frege asks whether identity relations ascribe identity to objects or to their names (signs)\(^1\). In the 'Begriffsschrift' he argues that it concerns signs of objects: \(a=a\) and \(a=b\) are respectively an analytic statement and a synthetic statement (\emph{a posteriori}), giving 'valuable extensions' of knowledge, yet, if the equality relation is seen to hold between the objects identified by the names ('\(a\)' and '\(b\)'), then on the condition that \(a=b\) is true, statements '\(a=a\)' and '\(a=b\)' would not differ\(^2\). The names '\(a\)' and '\(b\)' would stand in a relation of identity, designating the same thing, the relation 'mediated' by the connection of the signs with the objects designated. However, '...this is arbitrary. Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something', and in such cases no proper knowledge is expressed by \(a=b\), only a 'mode of designation', or, a thought. In cases in which '\(a\)' is distinguished from '\(b\)' as an object and not as a sign (as designating something), the cognitive value of \(a=a\) and \(a=b\) is identical\(^3\). Designated objects differ if they receive a different mode of presentation, and Perry notes that Dummett argues that Fregean sense is linked to understanding and truth, yet Perry counsels that knowing an ideal procedure for determining reference is not necessarily to be able to carry it out, and in this section resolution is reached on this matter\(^4\).

Frege defines the notions of 'designation' and 'mode of presentation'.

It is natural...to think of there being connected with a sign (name, combination of words, written mark) besides that which the sign designates, which may be called the meaning of the sign, also what I should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained...The meaning of 'evening star' would be the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense'.

This is the theory of sense and reference. (Concepts and relations are argued for elsewhere)\(^5\). The notion of a sign as a designation means that it does the work of a proper name. A sign has a sense, and a meaning (or reference), yet again, '[t]he same sense has different expressions in different languages

---

\(^1\) Frege, G.; 'On Sense and Meaning', pp56-78 in Geach, P. and Black, M. (eds.); \emph{Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege} (Oxford, Blackwell) 1952, p56. Cf. also Quine, W.V.O.; \emph{Methods of Logic} (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1952, and Davidson, D.; \emph{Truth and Meaning}, pp17-36 in (2001b). Davidson begins his theory of meaning by noting the priority of the meanings of sentences upon the meanings of words. This compels the conclusion that one can learn a human language (and, as will be seen, Frege brings to the fore problems of translation), from a finite vocabulary and a set of rules (p19). Davidson considers the conditions upon any such theory, and his ideas are picked up throughout this section.

\(^2\) Frege (1952c) p57 suggests an example. Lines connecting the vertices of a triangle with the midpoints of the opposite sides share a point of intersection, which may be given two different descriptions: modes of designation and an identity statement, if given, import knowledge. Cf. Mill, J.S.; \emph{A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation} (London, Longmans, Green & Company) 1886.

\(^3\) Perry, J.; 'Frege on Demonstratives', \emph{The Philosophical Review}, vol. LXXXVI, no. 4, pp474-497, 1977, especially p475.

\(^4\) Frege (1952c) p57. 'In the example of lines meeting at a point of intersection, accordingly, the meaning of the expressions "the point of intersection of a and b" and "the point of intersection of b and c" would be the same, but not their sense'.

---

20
or even in the same language”. In an idiolect there should correspond to each expression a definite sense, ‘...but natural languages often do not satisfy this condition, and one must be content if the same word has the same sense in the same context’. This will come to raise the problems for Frege’s theory of sentences with demonstratives. Additionally, there may correspond to a proper name with sense nothing meant. Intricate cases arise when one uses words in other than the ‘ordinary way’, when one talks about words or their senses, or ‘...when the words of another are quoted”. One’s words designate those of another; they are signs of signs, requiring quotation marks. ‘Accordingly, a word standing between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary meaning.’ In quotational contexts one talks about the sense of another’s words; the quoted words do not have ‘customary’ meaning, and report their sense: that is, they have ‘indirect’ meaning. Given the ubiquity of such and correlative cases, ‘[I]The indirect meaning of a word is accordingly its customary sense”

Thus the core of Frege’s semantic theory is a theory of reference for meaningful expressions (reported in sentences), assigned to their parts. Understanding language requires knowledge of the reference of expressions, and a theory assigning to each meaningful expression a reference or ‘semantic value’. Evans says that such a theory discerns structure in compound expressions (sentences), and gives them references according to the references of their parts. Frege argues that the reference, or semantic values, of sentences and singular terms are truth values and objects respectively, but as seen below, and as Evans argues, this interpretation is unduly complex, requiring only that understanding of language all told requires knowledge of semantic values. Evans writes:

In the case of sentences this knowledge can be regarded as more or less explicit, but for sub-sentential expressions, knowledge of their semantic values will simply be a logical construction out of the knowledge of the semantic values of the sentences in which they

---

7 Frege (1952c) p58.
8 One thinks of Russell’s example of ‘the centre of mass of the solar system.’ Davidson (2001b) pp18ff gives an alternative theory for the sense and reference of singular terms and proper names.
9 Frege (1952c) p58.
10 Frege (1952c) p59. Such cases are imperative for the correct understanding of the relation of sign, sense and meaning. The sense, meaning and thought of a proper name gives access to a three-tier difference between expressions, words and sentences, inhering first at the level of the idea, secondly at the sense, and thirdly at the meaning. The stray and loose connection between thoughts and words may mean a difference holds for one person and for no others. ‘The difference between a translation and the original text should properly not overlap the first level’ (p61). Such difference may be accounted for as the ‘colouring and shading’ given by an author to his work to communicate his sense. These rhetorical elements are not ‘objective’, and need to be evoked each individually in the thoughts of each reader according to the author’s hints. All art requires this ‘affinity’, for, ‘...it can never be exactly determined how far the intentions of the poet are realised.’ In speaking of objects of disputed meaning or existence one ‘presuppose[s] a meaning’, guided in this by the author’s intentions in speaking or thinking. Mistakes in presupposition occur, but it is done all the same.
12 Evans (1990) p73.
13 In a footnote (Evans (1990) p73) wonders why he finds himself in disagreement with Dummett. The quotation to follow is from the same page.
Moments: Studies writes that whole word with p489). He Press) 1989. However, the thought is changed, and therefore cannot be what is meant by the sentence, but rather constitutes its sense. Additionally, Frege asks (and the points again arise below), whether it is conceivable that a sentence has sense but no meaning: some, for instance, contain proper names (and in subject-predicate form), those perhaps of mythical beings, that have no reference. Further problems arise with the ascription of truth or falsity to such a sentence. One regarding the sentence as true or false ascribes the contained proper name a meaning, for it is of what the name means that the sentence predicates something. One not allowing that the name has a meaning could not, in a non-fictional context, apply a predicate, and Frege concludes from this and the previous example, that,

[i]f it were a question only of the sense of the sentence, the thought, it would be needless to bother with what is meant by a part of the sentence; only the sense, not the meaning, of the part is relevant to the sense of the whole sentence14.

The thought remains the same whether the name, in a subject-predicate sentence, means something or not, and it loses its claim to truth value upon recognition that it fails of reference. The question arises again: in what is contained the meaning of a sentence? Frege consider the suggestion that it is the appeal to a truth value15.

Frege moots the idea that the relation of thought to truth approximates not that between sense and reference, but that between subject and predicate16. In each sentence, the truth claim arises from the

14 Frege (1952c) pp62-63. With predication, Davidson (2001) p17 writes, a problem arises concerning the ways in which the meaning of the sentence is dependent upon, or generated from, the meanings of the constituent parts. As shall be seen, to avoid these difficulties Frege assigns predicates to incomplete, ‘unsaturated’ entities, and names to saturated entities. The problems of predication and quantifying into oblique, indirect contexts still arise. Cf. on Frege and Husserl, Smith, B. (ed.); Paris and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology (Munich, Philosophia Verlag) 1982.

Kaplan, D.; ‘Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indecomposables’, pp481-563 in Almog, J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, I.K. (eds.); Themes from Kaplan (New York, Oxford University Press) 1989. Kaplan conceives of his theory as, firstly, about quantification into oblique contexts, and secondly about direct reference, and thus about the reference of singular terms, ‘...without the mediation of a Fregean Sinn as meaning’ (p483 and p489). He faces problems identical to those faced by Frege, those concerned with the troubling notion of mediation, those in which, ‘...the proposition expressed by a sentence containing such a term would involve, ‘individuals directly rather than by way of the “individual concepts” or “means of presentation”...’ (p483) Such ‘singular propositions’ are ‘directly referential’ (Cf. p484), and this solution is provided by Evans in the context of an assessment of Frege’s work.

15 Frege (1952c) p63 again makes the contrast to non-literal, or parasitical cases. In hearing a poem, for example, one is concerned with euphony and the images and feelings aroused (with thoughts); the question of truth arises in a different kind of investigation altogether, and by it one is led to the assessment of that which is meant. ‘We are therefore driven into accepting the truth-value of a sentence as constituting what it means.’ On these terms every assertoric sentence concerned with what its words mean is called a proper name, and it has either of the only two truth values, true or false. Cf. again Frege (1952c) ‘It would be desirable to have a special term for signs having only sense. If we name them, say, representations, the words of the actors on the stage would be representations; indeed, the actor himself would be a representation’.

16 All quotations in the paragraph are from Frege (1952c) pp64-65.
form of the assertoric sentence relating subject and predicate, and, in those instances in which the assertion ‘...lacks its usual force...’ (when spoken by an actor), the sentence contains only a thought, reporting a sense. From this Frege concludes that the relation of the thought to truth is not comparable to that of a subject to a predicate, for subject and predicate are elements of thought and may come apart in parasitical cases. On the supposition that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-value the sentence must bear the substitution of a part (word or expression), with another bearing the same extension, and if the meaning of a sentence is its truth-value, then true and false sentences will retain the same truth value and meaning, showing again that: ‘...in the meaning of the sentence all that is specific is obliterated’.

Frege writes that by judgement one may distinguish parts within truth-values, and this by attending to contained thoughts: every sense attaching to a truth-value contains a thought and has its own method of analysis. With this Frege indicates the importance in the analysis of a sentence’s meaning of the relation of part to whole, arguing that the meaning of a word is part of the meaning of the sentence, if the word is truly a singular term, elucidating the point with appeal to a case in which the expressions substituted in sentences (as the constituents of meaning; the parts of the sentence), are themselves sentences. The truth-value of the sentence remains the same in cases in which the replacement sentence has identical truth-value to that replaced. Exceptions arise in cases in which the whole sentence or the replacement part is, ‘...direct or indirect quotation...’, for in such cases the sentences designate another sentence and thought. Frege considers whether such subordinate clauses can have meaning according to an ascribed truth-value, for, ‘[o]f indirect speech we already know the opposite’. Frege ignores the grammarian’s categories of distinction in his analysis of subordinate clauses (see footnote 18), and begins with consideration of cases not conveying a full, independent thought, those introduced with ‘that’ clauses. Such cases include those of indirect quotation, in which words have indirect meaning, deriving their sense and reference by being analogues or paraphrases of another’s words, the latter derived from thoughts and not truth-values, and their senses not from thoughts but the sense of the words, or, the phrases embedding the noun clause. Frege gives as examples constructions with

17 Frege (1952e) pp65-66 for all quotations in this paragraph.
18 Frege (1952e) p66. Frege wonders whether subordinate sentences should be compared to meanings, and so share the same kind of meaning as nouns, adjectives or adverbs (that is, as parts of thoughts).
19 Davidson says that he has the key to an analysis of indirect (oblique), discourse, and thus to an analysis of sentences containing propositional attitudes. Davidson, D.; ‘On Saying That’, pp93-108 in (2001g). The change of context that occurs in the replacement of synonyms for singular terms changes the truth of the sentence. Davidson argues that the invalidity of this is only 'apparent', for the notion of replacement exploited is simply a part of the idea of a singular term. The problem affects the reference of quantifications into propositional attitude contexts and the truth or falsity of predications made of entities and their references. Hand, M.; 'On Saying That Again', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XIV, no. 4, pp349-365, 1991, brings out well the
'conclude', 'be convinced', 'be of the opinion', and notes the difficulties raised by words such as 'perceive', 'know', 'fancy' and so forth. It is of no moment to the truth of the whole sentence whether the embedded, subordinate clause is true or false, because the meanings of subordinate clauses are the thoughts contained. Frege gives two examples: 'Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are circles', and 'Copernicus believed that the apparent motion of the sun is produced by the real motion of the Earth', adding that the subordinate clauses can be substituted for each other without impairing the truth-value of the whole sentence. Both main and subordinate clauses, to repeat, have as their senses separate thoughts, and the truth of the whole sentence does not turn on that of the subordinate sentence.

As Frege has it, expressions in the subordinate clause may only be replaced by others with the same indirect meaning (as Frege calls it, 'customary sense'), and not those with the same customary meaning. In considering the idea that the belief reports state a relation between Copernicus and the reference of the clause, Perry writes that, on their own, the clauses refer to the False and the True respectively (stating respectively a false and a true statement), but that embedded in sentences they do not acquire, 'ordinary', customary reference; were they to, the replacement of a false sentence would preserve the truth of the full sentence. Perry's definition is apt; on this: '[t]he notion of the indirect reference...is just whatever it is, that this sentence has as reference here', and Frege concludes that the meaning of a sentence is not always its truth-value, for, say, 'morning star' does not always refer to the planet Venus, and paradigmatically so when the expression has indirect meaning, and when any


Segal and Speas reject Davidson's claims. Segal, G. and Speas, M.; 'On Saying 'it', Mind and Language, vol. I, no. 2, pp124-132, 1986. 'That' is not a demonstrative pronoun, and the structure of 'says that' postulated by Davidson is correspondingly weak. Segal and Speas give two uses of 'that', as a demonstrative pronoun and as a 'complementiser'; respectively 'That's him!' and 'She was so tired that she slept right through the third act' (p125). Davidson's examples, they argue, are all of complementisers, and Davidson's paradigm sentences may not divide into main and subordinate clauses and that 'that' in indirect discourse is not a demonstrative pronoun (p125). Segal and Speas adduce syntactical evidence against Davidson's claims and apply them to the arguments for opacity (pp126f). The most interesting in the present context is that regarding Davidson's account of the structure of indirect discourse, in the course of rejecting a quotational approach, rendering a translation between languages impossible even though the indirect sentences in both are structurally similar. Segal and Speas' question is whether translation is a test for 'that' in indirect discourse, and, as que and ca are found in different grammatical categories, that 'that' of 'says that' is different from a demonstrative 'that'. This ramifies in the consequences for opacity, for Davidson's account must extend to qualitatively similar languages in their indirect discourse. Different semantic structure and values for other languages would work equally for English. Segal and Speas give reasons for doubting that que is a semantic demonstrative; though its status as a syntactical demonstrative, Davidson might argue, is uncontroversial, this cannot give its role in semantics.


20 This constitutes the kernel of an unequivocal response to Derrida: it matters not in assessment of the truth and meaning of a sentence that it is, or contains, quotation.

contained subordinate clauses have thoughts as their meanings.\textsuperscript{22}

Frege considers sentences with subordinate clauses in which words have customary meanings, but no thought as sense or truth-value as meaning. He offers: 'whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in misery.\textsuperscript{23} If the subordinate clause expressed a thought it would be possible to express it in a separate sentence, and this is plainly not the case, for it describes Kepler and does not instantiate a truth-value. An objection says that the sense of the whole sentence contains a thought as part, yet Frege replies that this approximates only gives only the meaning of the dependent clause. He continues that it is wrong to presuppose that, in assertions, proper names have meanings, for (as described above), it does not follow that the sense of 'Kepler died in misery' presupposes that the name 'Kepler' designates something. It merely reports a 'fault' of natural languages that they contain expressions which do not designate objects, because the truth of a sentence must be assessed in its context, and this cannot tell one whether the subject of a sentence denotes objects, or '...only seems to do so...'. That is, a parsing of the sentence may not denote an object (as seen in the discussion of the means of establishing the truth of subordinate clauses). As Derrida notes, this imperfection affects even the symbolic languages of logical analysis, and Frege writes that therefore, '[a] logically perfect language (Begriffsschrift) should satisfy the conditions, that every expression grammatically well constructed as a proper name from signs already introduced shall in fact designate an object, and that no new sign shall be introduced as a proper name without being secured a meaning'. It must never depend upon the truth of a thought whether a proper name has meaning.\textsuperscript{24} Evans says that it need not,

\textsuperscript{22} Frege (1952c) p67. Concluding that the meaning of a sentence is not its truth-value might be taken to mean that '...in that case it could always be replaced by another sentence of the same truth-value. But this proves too much; one might just as well claim that the meaning of "morning star" is not Venus, since one may not always say "Venus" in place of "morning star". The relation to thoughts is again emphasised; in cases in which one says, 'It seems that...', one means, 'It seems to me that...', and the same goes for 'to be pleased', 'to hope' and so forth. Such beliefs or convictions can 'in addition', be the basis for inference. In inferences the meanings of the known and the inferred parts are two separate thoughts. All that is material to the truth of the sentence is that the individual is convinced of both thoughts and uses the first as a basis for drawing the second. Main clauses which do not exclusively pick out the object referred to in the subsidiary clause introduce further indirect meanings (cf. p68).

\textsuperscript{23} All quotations in this paragraph are from Frege (1952c) pp68-70.

\textsuperscript{24} Frege (1952c) p71. Expressions for concepts can be constructed such that marks of a concept are given by adjectival clauses. Such a clause cannot have a thought as a sense or a truth-value as a meaning; its sense is only part of a thought. As with noun clauses, there is no independent subject, and no possibility of reproducing the sense of the subordinate clause in an independent sentence. Similar considerations apply for places, instants, and so forth, taken as objects: '...the linguistic designation of a definite place, a definite instant, or a stretch of time is to be regarded as a proper name'. Expressions for concepts that apply to places can be constructed, yet again, the sense of the subordinate clauses cannot be reproduced in an independent sentence, for the determination of place or time is only indicated by a relative pronoun or a conjunction. Perry (1977) pp477-478 writes that not all sentences have complete sense. The subordinate clauses in Frege's examples refer to a time (or place) and are thus incomplete. The sense of the clause is thus not a thought, and only sentences, 'complete in every respect', express thoughts. Perry raises a vital point, one which can be lost sight of in Frege's presentation. The clause could be used, alone, to express on that occasion the sense of a thought. It might, for example, express the sense in response to a question. A distinction must, therefore, be made between the sense a sentence has on 'each occasion of use', and that which it 'expresses on various occasions of use'. For timeless sentences ('complete in every respect') the two will coincide, but for incomplete sentences, the occasion sense is given by completing the sense. (These points are raised in the context of Perry's response to Frege below). The thought is identified with the sense expressed in these latter sentences. Davidson (2001b) p18 gives a characterisation of one of Frege's complex singular terms, and the way in which they raise the problems of the meanings of whole and part. His example indicates the overcoming of a variety of use/mention distinction. He asks how the meaning of the terms depends upon the meaning of the parts. The response Davidson gives goes equally as well for Frege's example of sentences in which two thoughts are expressed.
but that Fregean sense can mediate references in literal and parasitical cases alike. Evans argues that the sense of a singular term in Frege’s semantics is, not as the above arguments have shown, ‘existence-independent’, or restricted to a literal or non-literal reference to a single referent (Evans shows that this may be elucidated through comparison with Russell’s definite descriptions), but is categorically ‘existence-dependent’25. More simply, Evans shows that Frege is more willing than most commentators allow to ascribe sense to empty (non-denoting, fictional, parasitical), singular terms, and that the arguments that subordinate clauses contained in sentences have as their senses not fully-formed thoughts, but parts of thoughts, reporting neither truth-value nor meaning (and because the words in the clause have indirect meaning, or because the presence of an indefinite indicator renders it incomplete, and able to express a fully-formed thought only when combined with a main clause), may be challenged28. Frege says that subordinate clauses cannot be replaced by others of equal truth-value without harm to the truth of the whole sentence structure, precisely because they do not have truth values as their meanings, because they express only parts of thoughts. However, Evans shows that it is wrong to regard the senses of expressions on a Fregean theory as, in some way ‘intermediary’ between sense and referent, making all reference, as it were, indirect, because guided by a contained thought, and thus allowing the difficulties of parasitical, indirect or oblique reference to arise27. There are, Evans says, no such problems, for sense never gets in the way, or renders ‘indirect what might be direct’29.

Frege continues that in cases in which the subordinate clause is such that it would express a truth-value if a whole sentence, the sense is still incomplete and the meaning indirect. Other cases arise when the subordinate clause does have such a value but is not restricted merely to doing so, for the reason that its sense includes one thought and part of another as a subsidiary clause, and when a part of the sentence is

26 Frege (1952c) pp74-75. The subordinate clause may be a complete thought, and in such cases, it can be replaced by another clause of the same truth-value without harming the truth of the whole, ‘...provided there are no grammatical obstacles’. Some subordinate clauses do not fit into these categories, and because they have no ‘simple sense’. One’s main thoughts have connected with them subsidiary, unexpressed, thoughts: they are associated by H with one’s words, ‘...in accordance with psychological laws...’. These thoughts may be expressed if necessary, and come to enrich the sense of the sentence, and ‘...it may well happen that we have more simple thoughts than clauses’. Some sentences require this elucidation, others may leave doubt as to whether the subsidiary thought belongs to the sense or only accompanies it. (Frege remarks that this will be vital in deciding whether an assertion is a lie, an oath, or perjury.) There is plainly here the notion of unconscious, implicit, unexpressed, thoughts, and in such cases one may doubt, ‘...whether this thought is just slightly suggested or really expressed’. The replacement of sentences with the same truth-value would ramify through all of one’s thoughts, and change their truth-value. For this reason, clauses of equal truth-value cannot always be substituted for one another in such cases, and so ‘[t]he clause expresses more through its connection with another than it does in isolation’. In some cases this regularly happens, and one might, for example, again consider a sentence in which two thoughts are expressed, neither by means of antecedent and consequent clauses. In the expression of the first thought the words of the subordinate clause have indirect meaning, and in the expression of the second thought their customary meaning. Thus, the subordinate clause in the original sentence has different meanings, once for a thought and once for a truth-value. The truth-value is not the total meaning of the subordinate clause, and another of equal truth-value cannot replace it. (See also pp76-77).

28 Evans (1990) p80. What is more, for Evans, ‘...we can appreciate how baseless it is to maintain that an extension of a Fregean theory to demonstrative singular terms must involve assigning to them the sense of, or anything like the sense of, some definite description'.

only an, ‘...indefinite indicator instead of a proper name’. Furthermore, the subsidiary clause may be a complement of another thought, which, taken with the thought ‘directly expressed’ by the subordinate clause, makes up the sense of the whole sentence29. More truculent cases arise with sentences containing demonstrative or indexical expressions, and it is to their importance that Perry and Evans turn.

Perry writes of the ‘severe’ difficulties raised by demonstratives in Frege’s semantics, that they introduce notions of private and uncommunicable senses wholly at odds with the theory of sense and reference. Evans replies that the interpretation of Frege’s notions of sense and reference upon which consideration of these difficulties turns is incomplete, and that a Fregean approach to demonstratives is, ‘essentially correct’30. Consideration of their respective arguments occupies the rest of this section31. Evans writes that although a theory of meaning ascribing sense and references must give the senses of expressions, a theory of sense is not independent of the theory of reference, and his alternative is avowedly Russellian in inspiration. A Fregean semantics of sense and reference has, as Evans argues, a consequence that one cannot give the sense of an expression without also giving its reference. Evans is admirably clear:

29 Quotations from Frege (1952e) p77. From this Frege concludes that cases of subordinate clauses not being replaceable by another of the same value cannot form counter-examples to the argument that a truth-value is the meaning of a sentence that has as its sense a thought. Perry (1977) pp475-477 emphasises that ‘sense’, ‘thought’ and ‘indirect reference’ are not synonyms in Frege: their references are the same but their senses differ. In ‘The Thought: A Logical Inquiry’, Mind, vol. LXV, no. 259, pp289-311, 1956, Frege remarks upon the use of syntax (and the ‘structure of language’), as an aid to P’s understanding: In (1952e) the structure of language is a, ‘... guide to the structure of senses and objects’, and the notion of sense completion is, for Perry, fundamental. As Perry writes, Frege sees the sense of ‘two plus two equals four’ as being determined by the sense of ‘two’ and of ‘( ) plus two equals four’. The blank could be filled by either an object or a concept, (say, ‘two’ and ‘something’ respectively).

Frege (1956) p289 writes that discovering truths is the task of all intellectual pursuits, but that logic must discern the laws of truth. ‘Laws of nature are the generalisation of natural occurrences with which the occurrences are always in accordance. It is rather in this sense that I speak of laws of truth’. From laws of truth follow rules for thinking, judging, inferring and so forth, and this may lead to the postulation of laws of thought, and Frege adds ‘[p]erhaps the expression “laws of thought” is interpreted by analogy with “law of nature” and the generalisation of thinking as a mental occurrence is meant by it’. A law of thought in this sense is a psychological law, and in this way one might come to believe that logic deals with mental processes and psychological laws, but this would be to misunderstand the notion of truth, for the assertion of what is false and what is true takes place in accordance with psychological laws, and a derivation and an explication of a mental process would never replace a proof of what is asserted. Frege argues that truth is not genuineness or verisimilitude, but nor is it a function giving a word its ‘...proper, unadulterated sense’. As an adjective, ‘true’ covers the affirmation of pictures, ideas, statements and thoughts, and Frege remarks that it ‘...striking that visible and audible things occur here alongside things which cannot be perceived with the senses’ (p290). He detects that this, ‘...hints that shifts of meaning have taken place’. Are pictures true and, say, leaves not; pictures must be animated by an intention, as must all ideas.

Frege considers truth as a correspondence between a representation and what it represents: ‘true’, however, carries no relation of correspondence between two items, and in a correspondence theory of truth it is essential that reality be distinct from the idea. However, in this there could be no complete correspondence, no complete truth. Frege abandons the attempt at a definition, for in a definition, ‘...certain characteristics would have to be stated. And in application to any particular case the question would always arise whether it were true that the characteristics were present’ (p291). The truth of pictures and ideas is reduced to the truth of sentences, and Frege says that one calls a sentence true when its sense (or corresponding thought) is true; it is here that the question of truth arises. Frege calls a thought something for which the question of truth arises, and continues that the thought is the sense of a sentence (with the proviso that not every sense of every sentence is a thought). A sentence comes to express a thought, and for the clarifying of the notion of thought Frege distinguishes various kinds of sentences: though one could not conceivably deny sense to an imperative sentence, the question of truth could not arise for it. Frege rules out desires and requests for the same reason. ‘Only those sentences in which we communicate or state something come into the question’. Interrogatives raise a difficulty: word questions are incomplete sentences obtaining ‘true’ sense through completion. Frege ignores word questions, and this is an early sign of the difficulties posed for his theory by demonstratives and incomplete sentences.

[r]ather than look for a theory quite independent of the theory of reference, we must take one formulation of the theory of reference—the formulation of the theory which identifies the references of expressions in the way in which one must identify them in order to understand the language—and make it serve as a theory of sense.

By way of example, Evans writes that the two clauses, one stating Leibniz's law:

The reference of ‘Hesperus’ = Hesperus

The reference of ‘Hesperus’ = Phosphorus

are equivalents, but that only the second can serve for a theory of reference, owing to the way in which it identifies, ‘shows’, or ‘displays’ a sense in identifying the reference of the name.

Perry emphasises that ‘thought’ is not, for Frege, a synonym for ‘sense of a sentence’, thought characterising the attitude of the one apprehending the sentence. The derivation of Frege’s notion of thought from the study of ‘judgement’ shows that ‘thought’ is typically, ‘...that for which the question of truth arises’ (This is also a ‘criterion of difference for thoughts’). The assertive force of a sentence lies not in the scope, application or presence of the word ‘true’ but by the sentence appearing in indicative form; the word cannot replace lost assertive force, and such a loss occurs (recalling Derrida), ‘...when we do not speak seriously’.

As stage thunder is only apparent thunder and a stage fight only an apparent fight, so stage assertion is only apparent assertion. It is only acting, only fancy. In his part the actor asserts nothing, nor does he lie, even if he says something of whose falsehood he is convinced. In poetry we have the case of thoughts being expressed without being actually put forward as true in spite of the form of the indicative sentence, although it may be suggested to the hearer to make an assenting judgement himself. Therefore it must still always be asked, about what is presented in the form of an indicative sentence, whether it really contains an assertion. And this question must be answered in the negative if the requisite seriousness is lacking. It is irrelevant whether the word ‘true’ is

---

31 The following references are from Evans (1990) p74. For Evans’ debt to Dummett cf. pp72-76.


33 More importantly, in response to a sentence-question one expects the response ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The former ‘means the same as’ an indicative sentence, for in it the thought contained in the interrogative sentence is proffered as true. (Such a sentence-question can be formed from every indicative sentence). Wiggins (1971a) pp16-17 and Searle (1969) pp31f. Frege distinguishes two elements in an indicative: content and assertion, the former containing the thought. In this way it is, ‘... possible to express the thought without laying it down as true’. Both elements may be conjoined in an indicative, but they are separable, and, consequently, there may be distinguished assertion, judgement (a suggestion of connection between content and assertion), and thinking. Thinking, or the apprehension of a thought, occurs when one forms a sentence-question (Frege (1956) p294. Frege comments that this is the stage at which scientific advance may occur (cf. p307)); when the thought is recognised to be true one may declare this with an alternative, indicative sentence (which need not contain the word ‘true’).
used here. This explains why it is that nothing seems to be added to a thought by
attributing to it the property of truth34.

Frege adds that an indicative contains a third component for which assertions categorically cannot
account: they might be called rhetorical elements. They are ubiquitous in poetry, but less so in the
'exact sciences', for the latter are directed at, '...truth and only the truth', and, Frege argues, demand
less of rhetoric35. He ventures more: '[those] constituents of sentences to which the assertive force does
not reach do not belong to scientific exposition, but they are sometimes hard to avoid, even for one
who sees the danger connected with them'. Their undoubted utility lies in the fact that they allow the
understanding of what cannot simply be grasped in judgement or apprehension, and by way of
example, Frege writes that the more scientific '...an exposition is the less will the nationality of its
author be discernible and the easier it will be to translate'. Rhetorical devices make difficult the
translation of poetry ('...even make a complete translation almost always impossible...'), for languages
differ mostly in those elements in which assertive force is inapplicable, those superadded and
extraneous to unadulterated thought.

Evans writes that on the theory that the referent of a singular term (say, the demonstrative 'today'), is
its semantic value, or a way of thinking about a particular object, the value could not obtain and the
way not exist if the object did not exist36. The fundament of Fregean theory, that sense presents
reference, shows one that one shall not receive specifications of sense without specifications of
reference, but this, Evans adds, should not obscure the fact of Frege's equation of the reference of
singular terms with their associated objects (their referents), an analysis of singular terms, Evans says,
more in the atomistic tradition of Russell or, more tentatively, Wittgenstein, and this is the point of
decession for Evans' theory. These cases show up singular results. He suggests that the semantic
difference between names in a description theory can be retained in a Fregean semantics of sense and
reference. References of 'a' and 'b' can be stated:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{The reference of 'a' } & = a \\
\text{The reference of 'b' } & = b,
\end{align*}
\]

with clauses showing the different senses of the two terms on condition that both terms have referents37.

---

35 Frege (1956) p295. The work of Davidson on the problems of translation, the application of a principle of charity and the
arguments for idiomatic uses as the growing points of a language are all relevant here.
36 Evans (1990) p75.
37 Evans (1990) pp78-79. Evans writes that all he tries to do is to show that there is a plausible interpretation of Frege that says
that he recognised in his semantics only Russellian singular terms: "... terms whose customary sense depends upon their having a
With regard to this, Evans wishes to remind the reader that, as before, empty singular terms, for Frege, have sense, and add that thus sentences containing them may have sense (constructed from the constituent parts), without reference. How can a Fregean theory, in which sense presents, or mediates, reference, possibly account for such cases? Evans continues that Frege’s notion of empty singular terms with sense is still acceptable in his semantics, for, with application to his work on demonstratives, it is seen that Frege’s rejection of empty singular terms as indefeasibly ‘defective’, ‘fictional’ or parasitical, is not the unequivocal rejection of their claim to reference as has been thought.

Atomic sentences in Frege’s semantics carry expressions of two kinds (as given above), those to signify objects and those signifying functions mapping objects to truth values, and,

[i]f any expression in an atomic sentence failed to refer to an entity of an appropriate kind, the possibility would be open that no further truth value would be determined for the sentence, and it is clear that Frege regarded this as a defect in a sentence of a quite fundamental kind—as he was quite right to do.

However, again, the postulated expression remains the bearer of a thought, and it should be said that Frege entertains no notion that vague concept-expressions have sense of a kind, or that vague sentences (and so without truth value), express thoughts of a kind. The same goes for empty singular terms.

Sentences with empty singular terms can have sense (they need not be nonsense), but it is not the sense of atomic sentences, because it only appears to function properly (in say, a fiction), and because the sense depends upon an associated thought referring to or communicating a fiction.

---

38 Evans (1990) pp75–76. Evans asks, rhetorically, how one can conceivably ascribe to Frege the view that sense is a mode of presentation of reference, this is plainly at odds with his semantics as it is traditionally understood. Evans argues that a very different interpretation emerges from a careful study of what Frege says about empty singular terms.

39 Evans (1990) p76.

40 Evans (1990) pp76–77. Evans expresses some of the confusion of Frege’s theory: he regards empty singular terms as fictional or mythical: “[j]instead of simply saying: ‘Proper names must have a reference’, he says: ‘Myth and fiction aside, proper names must have a reference’”. The serious use of a empty singular term is of a kind with the use of language in fiction or story-telling. Evans gives reference to Frege (1956) p300: ‘but if [in speaking] my intention is not realised, if I only think I see without really seeing, if on that account the designation “that lime-tree” is empty, then I have gone astray into the sphere of fiction without knowing it or wanting to’, and Evans notes, as any reading of Frege’s canonical works shows, that all of Frege’s remarks on empty singular terms exploit the notion of fiction. He finds the same to be true in Frege’s posthumous work: empty singular terms and sentences containing them have sense (for they need not be nonsense), but they do not have the sense of ordinary atomic sentences: they only appear to function properly. However, Evans writes, ‘Frege’s use of the notion of fiction wrongly directs our attention to just one case in which it is as if a singular terms refers to something, namely when we are engaged in a pretence that it does, but there are others, and if we think of them we will perhaps speak of apparent, rather than mock or pretend, thoughts, and turn upon an unjustified move from ‘mock assertions’ to ‘mock thoughts’.

41 Evans (1990) pp78–79. Evans adds that the idea of mock or apparent thoughts shows a way in which Russell’s work on singular terms must be extended if it is to be plausible.

Evans (pp76–77) shows that Frege thought of the serious use of empty (non-referring) singular terms, say, in drama, as fictional or mythical. In such instances, Frege writes, a speaker lapses into fiction. Evans notes Frege (1956) p306: ‘But if my intention is not realised, if I only think I see without really seeing, if on that account the designation “that lime-tree” is empty, then I have gone astray into the sphere of fiction without knowing it or wanting to’. Evans is explicit: for a full understanding of Frege’s account of empty singular terms one must refer to his account of fictional usage of language, which is found in a posthumous work on logic. Some representative passages are quoted: ‘[i]nules that fail to fulfill the usual role of a proper name, which is to name something, may be called mock proper names. Although the tale of William Tell is a legend and not history and the name
The problems of demonstratives, as Frege realises, are limiting cases of these problems. The contents of a sentence may, in fictional or deceptive cases, exceed the thoughts it expresses. The opposite may also happen, and cases arise in which the, ‘...wording, which can be grasped by writing or the gramophone does not suffice for the expression of the thought’. The exemplar in which instances can be described is the present tense, with which one may date one’s expressions, and indeed eliminate any temporal restriction, ‘...where timelessness or eternity is part of the thought’42. If a time indication is indicated by the present tense one must know when the sentence was uttered correctly to grasp the communicated thought, and in such cases, ‘...the time of utterance is part of the expression of the thought’; (for instance, one must replace ‘today’ with ‘yesterday’ when the thought is expressed on the second of two consecutive days). The thought is the same, yet its verbal utterance must be changed, adjusting its sense. (As Frege notes, the same is the case for ‘here’ and ‘there’). In all such cases the wording, as ‘...given in writing...’, is not the complete expression of the thought, the assessment of which requires ‘knowledge’ of ‘...conditions of utterance...’. ‘The same utterance containing the word ‘I’ will express different thoughts in the mouths of different men, of which some may be true, others false’. (One may, Frege adds, assess gestures and glances by the same criteria). Perry gives two examples, both of which appear to bear out Frege’s theory, but which upon closer examination, are found to raise difficulties for the notion of the ‘sense completion’ of demonstrative expressions43. A clause containing the sense completer ‘today’, will express a truth on the day of utterance and a falsehood on the following day, yet will have the same sense on both occasions, as will, indeed, the clause itself. Owing to the fact that the truth-value of the clause can change, its sense is incomplete: it is not a ‘timeless’ truth. In explicating what one knows when one understands the use and application of ‘today’, Perry utilises notions of ‘rules’ and ‘contexts’: rules to take one from an occasion of utterance to an object (‘today’ to the day, ‘I’ to the speaker and so forth, and for Perry these become crystallised as the rôles of the utterances), and contexts constituting a ‘...set of features of an actual utterance...’, in which utterances defined by respective rôles are singularly appropriate. (Perry has the

42 Frege (1956) p296 for the quotation and following references. Frege references the laws of mathematics.
same difficulty as Frege in describing the notion, although he returns to the matter). The object one is taken to by the demonstrative in a context is its ‘role’, but the machinery of sense and reference give no means of getting from an incomplete sense expressed in a sentence containing a demonstrative, and appearing in an (as yet unclear), context, to a thought⁴⁴.

Evans considers this case. The demonstrative ‘today’ is uttered on a particular day (in, say, the expression, ‘Today is fine’)⁴⁶. The concept expression ‘(£) is fine’, has a sense, the expression of a thought, on the occasion of utterance. However, if the sentence is to have sense on the occasion of utterance (the definition of Fregean sense), the demonstrative must have a sense and a referent, namely, the day itself, for one can refer neither to fictions nor to the day in the utterance, for it can be spoken on different days. The notion of an inviolable, timeless meaning for demonstratives, that which Perry dubs their ‘rôle’, and Kaplan their ‘character’, as Perry argues, does not supply a sense complete (or a convention for use of demonstratives), and neither can the referent⁴⁵. When used to refer to different days, the sense of a demonstrative expression (‘Today is fine’), takes different references, and a Fregean theory faces the problem of demonstrative expressions having differing references in different contexts. Perry’s argument that the completing sense requires a unique description, ‘...of the value of the demonstrative in the context of utterance’, is rejected by Evans, for there is no thought about the

⁴⁴ Perry (1977) pp479-480. Perry argues that the rôle of demonstratives is not explicable in a Fregean semantics: in demonstrative sentences '[n]othing do not carry us from context to references, but directly to references, the same on each occasion of use'. One might, he writes, suppose that ‘yesterday’ can have the sense of ‘the day before’, but gives two examples (i) ‘Russia and Canada quarrelled the day before’, and (ii) ‘Russia and Canada quarrelled yesterday’. The question ‘Did Russia and Canada quarrel on August 2nd’, asked on August 5, under (i) implies that they quarrelled on the 1st, and under (ii) that they quarrelled on 4th. ‘If (i) were uttered when no day had already been mentioned, it would not express anything complete, but simply give rise to the question “before what?”’ An utterance of (ii) would still be fully in order. Perry sees that Frege is sensitive to the rôle of demonstratives, or the fact that the context of utterance is vital to their understanding. ‘He does not talk about the sense of “today” or “I” so he also seems to have recognised that the rôle of a demonstrative is not a sense, as he has explained senses.

But Frege clearly thinks that, given knowledge of the accompanying conditions of utterance of a sentence like... (ii) to a thought. He has thought, then, that the demonstrative provides us not simply with an object—its value on the occasion of utterance—but with a completing sense. This is puzzling. Neither the unchanging rôle of “today” or its changing value, provides us with a completing sense. A day is not a sense, but a reference corresponding to indefinitely many sense. There is no route back from reference to sense. So how do we get from the incomplete sense of “Russia and Canada quarrelled”, the demonstrative “today”, and the context to a thought? This is the problem demonstratives pose for Frege’ (p480).


32
day, expressive by a definite description true of the day, that may express the thought contained in the demonstrative. (As Perry says, different speakers (on different occasions), will have differing cognitive attitudes). In response to these points (and correlatively, to those (above) concerning the reference of a sentence being its truth value), Evans notes Frege’s allowance for the fact that the references of an expression (‘Snow is white’), can be identified and described in different ways, say, as approaching the True, and as instantiating the value of the thought, say, that snow is white; he is, however, clear that understanding an expression requires understanding reference ‘in a particular way’, namely, via its sense, and Evans writes, replying to Perry, that:

[n]o substantial, or positive theory of the notion of a way of thinking of something is presupposed by this conception of sense. If the intuitive notion needs to be supplemented, one can appeal to the general idea of an accord of what makes it the case that a thought is about the object which it is about; two people will then be thinking of an object in the same way if and only if the account of what makes the one person’s thought about that object is the same as the account of what makes the other person’s thought about the object.


48 Evans (1990) p72 rejects Perry’s idea that the sense of a singular term must be the sense of a fully-worked out definite description, or ‘intimately related’. Cf. I.4 for a response in addition to that given by Evans.

49 Evans (1990) p74 gives also the example ‘(E) is bald’ as the function yielding truth given as inputs all, say, bald men, or as that which yields truth given any object iff that object is bald. On p74 he remarks upon the similarity of a Fregean to a Davidsonian theory.

50 The account that will be appealed to in this work is Wittgenstein’s, and this arises in I.4. Frege (1956) p297 gives as an example of the thought in two utterances of an identical sentence not being the same the case of Gustav Lauben, who says ‘I have been wounded’, followed days later by Leo Peter, who says ‘Gustav Lauben has been wounded’. Rudolph Lingens hears what Peter says, and was present at Lauben’s utterance. Frege says that if the same thought is uttered by Lauben and Peter, then Lingens, ‘…who is fully master of the language…must know at once from Leo Peter’s report that the same thing is under discussion’. Lingens acts as a translator of the language. However, ‘…knowledge of the language is a separate thing when it is a matter of proper names’, for if Peter and Lingens proffer identical descriptions of what ‘Gustav Lauben’ means, then they would understand a sentence in the same way. In the case that Lingens does not know that Lauben is the man who said ‘I have been wounded’, he cannot know that the same thought is expressed on both occasions. Conflicting means of understanding lead to opposed thoughts.

Then as far as the proper name “Gustav Lauben” is concerned, [two speakers] do not speak the same language, since, although they do in fact refer to the same man with this name, they do not know that they do so.

The same thoughts are not associated with one sentence. With proper names it depends upon how whatever it refers to is presented: every way corresponds with a sense of a sentence containing the proper name. The different resulting thoughts all correspond in their truth-value: if one is true then all are, and if one is false then all are; this notwithstanding, each is distinct, and account for this must be made. See also p298.

Evans goes on to argue that the senses carried by both subjects, in literal and parasitical instances, mediate references 5.

Perry gives an example of a sentence S(d) containing a demonstrative. Without the demonstrative one has S( ), an incomplete sense. (As Frege’s examples make clear, S( ) may still be a sentence). Perry suggests a schema for all such sentences S( ), postulating a means of describing the movement from context to truth value. He gives a rule for the role of S(d): ‘S(d) is true when uttered in context c, if and only if the value of d in c falls under the concept referred to by S( )’. For sentences, the object picked out by the role is a truth value. Perry states the situation succinctly, and notes a useful analogy: the role of a sentence with a demonstrative is said to share characteristics with sentences without demonstratives: ‘[...]the role is a procedure for determining truth value, just as is the sense. The difference is that the role is a procedure which starts from a context’. There is no need to find a completing sense, for there is no utterance of a complete sense in a demonstrative. This elucidation of the thought gives one a basis for arguing that the sentence, and its role, could not be found fully


Frege writes that each and everyone is presented to himself in a ‘particular’ and ‘primitive’ way, and wishing to communicate thoughts with others necessitates a procedure: one, ‘...must use the “I” in a sense which can be grasped by others, perhaps in the sense of “he who is speaking to you at this moment”, by doing which one makes the associated conditions of one’s utterance serve for the expression of one’s thought’. Frege (1956) pp299–301 considers further examples of thoughts as private and unique; he writes that each person stands within his own world of ideas. See Perry (1977) pp480 for the following example.

Kaplan (1989) p483 says that the problems of singular propositions that he diagnoses become acute in possible worlds semantics. ‘It was not that...any sentences of the languages being studied were themselves taken to express singular propositions, it was just that singular propositions seemed to be needed in the analysis of the non-singular propositions expressed by these sentences’. Kaplan argues that demonstratives, like proper names, are directly referential, and he distinguishes them from Kripke’s rigid designators. A study of Kaplan’s theory shows precisely how conventions apply in semantical theory, for they are the conventions found in direct reference theories. Kripke, S.A., Naming and Necessity (Oxford, Blackwell) 1980, pp24-26 quickly establishes the connection of the problems he describes with those of Russell. He asks whether the problem of supplying the referent of a name is best solved by definite descriptions or by Mill’s ‘denotations’. If a name does not have descriptive content, then, Kripke asks, how do names refer to things? One cannot fall back on ostension, for there are innumerable things to which one cannot refer in ostension: in such cases, ‘...our reference here seems to be determined by our knowledge of them’ (p28). He goes on to show that definite descriptions give the correct analysis of the way in which Hesperus comes to be identified with Phosphorus, and makes the point at issue here and in I.4: how does a description apply; how does one know that the properties ascribed do pertain of the subject in question? (In footnote 5, p29 Kripke says that Quine’s proposed ‘canonical notation’ shares none of the problems of definite descriptions, for it is not a theory of reference for names). Other holders of a description theory invoke the notion of a cluster concept, saying that each object identifiable by a proper name can be described by any of a number of ‘definite’ descriptions. Kripke (p31) regards Searle as the progenitor of the theory, though it is in fact a theory of reference for names. Other holders of a description theory invoke the notion of a cluster concept, saying that each object identifiable by a proper name can be described by any of a number of ‘definite’ descriptions. Kripke (p31) regards Searle as the progenitor of the theory, though it is in fact a theory of reference for names. Other holders of a description theory invoke the notion of a cluster concept, saying that each object identifiable by a proper name can be described by any of a number of ‘definite’ descriptions. Kripke (p31) regards Searle as the progenitor of the theory, though it is in fact a theory of reference for names. Other holders of a description theory invoke the notion of a cluster concept, saying that each object identifiable by a proper name can be described by any of a number of ‘definite’ descriptions. Kripke (p31) regards Searle as the progenitor of the theory, though it is in fact a theory of reference for names. Other holders of a description theory invoke the notion of a cluster concept, saying that each object identifiable by a proper name can be described by any of a number of ‘definite’ descriptions. Kripke (p31) regards Searle as the progenitor of the theory, though it is in fact a
congruent with the thought, in that a sentence could express the same rôle (carry the same sense), on
different occasions while having different truth values, and seems to account for Frege's contention
that a thought is expressed in a sentence with a demonstrative. The only analogy that can be discerned
between an incomplete sense and an object is their common sharing in an 'equivalence class of
thoughts', each being constituted together by its 'informational' equivalence. If this information
identifies the class, '...without identifying any one of its members...'; there will follow an explanation
of how one may get from the incomplete sense and the object to a thought without utilising a
completing sense. Perry offers a new definition:

...an utterance of S(d) in context c, and S'(d') in context c', will express the same
thought if the (incomplete) senses of S() and S'( ) are the same, and if the value of d in c
is the same as the value of d' in c'.

This, as Perry writes with the authority of Dummett, is a mainstay of Frege's theory, and a version of
Leibniz's law. Sentences expressing the same thought with different clauses ('today', 'yesterday'), do
so if their incomplete senses are the same. However, there are difficulties in the case of singular terms,
and, again, they appear as tensions in Frege's own theory. The thought of Lauben in saying 'I am
wounded' to Peter cannot be identified with that expressed in a non-demonstrative completion of the
incomplete sense in which the singular term refers to Lauben, for there is no thought that they both
express. That is, there is no correspondence between Lauben and '( )' for in 'different possible
circumstances' they correspond to different equivalence classes of Fregean thoughts. Frege's account
will not permit such utterances expressing thoughts to be expressible in eternal sentences, and these
conventions for demonstratives cannot be discerned or established.

---

mind-brain identity theory, see Feldman, F.; 'Kripke on the Identity Theory', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXXI, no. 18,
32 Perry (1977) p481. On Frege's criterion of difference for thoughts, rôles cannot be thoughts: they are not the senses expressed
by sentences.
33 This, Perry (1977) p483 remarks, makes the value of a demonstrative part of the thought, and Frege says that only senses can be
parts of senses. Perry's next example offers an instance, one Derrida might enjoy, of the supplementation, for the greater
clarity of a statement, of utterances by gestures. (On the first occasion of utterance S says of an item (x) the name of which is
carried on its side and clearly visible to himself and to H, that it is x, and the identification is easily accepted; on the second
occasion, on which the name is obscured, the identification, complete with gesture, is repeated but acceptance is not
forthcoming). For Frege, a different sense is expressed on both occasions, but on Perry's criterion of identity for thoughts, the
same thought is expressed, for the incomplete sense is the same in both cases and the value of the demonstrative is, in both cases,
x. 'To adopt this notion of a thought, Frege would have to give up the identification of sense expressed and thought expressed'.
Following on from Evans' recognition of Frege's treatment of the notion of fiction (Perry (1977) pp484-485), refers to the
example of Peter and Lingens expressing different thoughts with the utterance 'Gustav Lauben has been wounded'. Both know
the reference of the sentence by different means, and thus do not know that they both refer to the same individual. Frege (1956)
pp297-298 sees that the different thoughts are 'systematically equivalent' (they correspond in truth-value), but insists that they
are distinct, owing to counter-examples of a type in which one may take the sense of the sentence 'Dr Lauben has been wounded'
as true while taking 'Gustav Lauben has been wounded' (not knowing the identity of the Doctor to be that of the gentleman,
Gustav, known to one), to be false. Regarding his notion of informational equivalence, Perry writes that '[s]enses, considered to
be rôles, cannot be thoughts. Thoughts, considered as information, cannot be senses. If Frege is to keep his identification of sense
expressed by a sentence, with thought expressed by a sentence, he must find, somewhere, a completing sense'.

35
Frege considers the difficulty one might experience (as Perry does), in singling out an idea to go as bearer of the object called ‘I’.

To influence others through the communication of one’s thoughts, one induces others to apprehend one’s thought and to take it to be true and sincerely held. The process of communicating a thought is qualitatively different from that of handing over an object, which, in such a process, undergoes changes in, say (clumsily), the orientation of its parts in space and so forth; nothing of this occurs with the thought, which, ‘...does not leave the control of the communicator by being communicated, for after all a person has no control over it’. This, however, counts nothing for Perry’s hypothesis that a demonstrative supplies its own completing sense, for the appropriate sense for each and every demonstrative in each and every expression in which it can appear would be related to the sense of a definite description with the value of the demonstrative in the appropriate context. When two different descriptions attach, say, to the one proper name, Frege writes that one tests the identification by examining the beliefs of those giving the description, one, that is, imparting a sense, or determining, ‘...as reference the value the demonstrative has on that occasion’. However, while proper names can carry the same sense, once for all, demonstratives take different values on different occasions, and thus report different senses. They cannot abbreviate settled descriptions (conventions), for there will always be instances of expressions for which the description must account.

(The sense associated with a use of a demonstrative does not determine the thought expressed by a sentence containing ‘it’).

Additionally, there are difficulties in that a sentence with a demonstrative (‘...for which the question of truth arises...’), can express a thought whether or not the speaker associates a sense or a definite description with the demonstrative. One may be marking no identification; one may, indeed, be referring to nothing. Evans means of dealing with the references of sense reported in indexical, demonstrative or fictional utterances in a developed Fregean theory requires no undue notion of sense completion, indeed, he writes, ‘I want to stress that the idea of sense as a mode of presentation of reference is not by itself inconsistent with the quite unqualified ascription of sense to empty singular

---

55 Perry (1977) p486. Perry adds that one can still say that for each person, the sense of ‘today’ for a person on a specific day is the sense of one of the descriptions (or combination thereof). An objection says that this seems to explain the senses of sentences containing demonstratives in terms of beliefs the natural expressions of which contain demonstratives.
56 Perry (1977) p486. ‘Suppose I believe that today is the fourteenth of October 1976. From that it does not follow that when I utter ‘Today is sunny and bright.
I express the thought ‘The fourteenth of October is sunny and bright.
For suppose today is really the fifteenth, cloudy and dull. Then what I have said is wrong, whatever the weather was like on the fourteenth’.
57 Perry (1977) pp486-487. One can express a thought with an utterance ‘Today is sunny and bright’, and it may be assessed for truth or falsity independently of whether associates a correct sense with ‘today’. One may have no idea what the day is, and be
Freges canonical use of sense in ascription to singular terms is, as before, the source of problems with identity and the indiscernibility of identicals. The argument that two sentences referring to the same thing differ in cognitive value is the argument that one can hold different epistemic attitudes to them individually (one as true and the other as false, or as not simply instantiating a truth value). On the traditional understanding of Frege's semantics, the ascription of sense to a singular term is to say that there is a particular thought associated with the referent, a way in which it must be thought of if it is to be understood, and this, the interpretation goes, cannot arise via a reference for demonstrative expressions. Evans, for contrast, notes Russell's description theory, saying that if two singular terms referring to the same thing have different senses, then one must hold different ways of thinking of the referent. Evans is as yet cautious:

We [Evans, and Perry in his search for the sense completer] have linked the idea of a way of thinking of something to an account that may be offered of what makes a

unreliable '... without recourse to "today" or other demonstratives...'; to say anything about today that may not equally be true of other days. (See also Perry's further example on p437).

Evans (1970) p78. Frege (1956) pp298ff makes the case that various persons might associate various senses with one proper name if, following from the example, the person were presented in various ways. From this Frege makes the case for the incommunicability of self-directed 'I' thoughts. In communication 'I' thoughts can be expressed, owing to the replacement of the 'I' with other demonstratives in other contexts. These thoughts determine one as reference, yet are incommunicable. Frege continues that there seems to be no strict sense in which one could maintain that one is presented to oneself in a unique and primitive manner, but on the supposition that such a sense exists, it could not be the result of progressively more primitive senses; it must itself be primitive. Fregean sense is a model of the presentation of reference, and this taken as a unique method of presentation to oneself, shall still not suffice, for there is nothing to say that any such senses are definitional of oneself.

Perry (1977) pp92 turns to what he calls 'self-locating' beliefs as alternatives to Fregean thoughts; they are not simply the understanding of thoughts, but the '...grasping of them via the sense of certain sentences containing demonstratives'. The emphasis must be on the particularity of sense in particular contexts. Perry speaks instead of 'entertaining' sense and 'apprehending' thought. Different thoughts can be apprehended in different contexts by entertaining the same sense, and the same thought by different senses. These senses are not Fregean incomplete senses. The sense of a sentence with a demonstrative can be thought a rôle (not a complete sense), and thoughts reveal the type defined ('...individuated by object and incomplete sense...'). Senses and thoughts are not here identified, though they harmonise to a fault.

To have a thought we need an object and an incomplete sense. The demonstrative in context gives us the one, the rest of the sentence the other. The rôle of the entire sentence will lead us to Truth by leading us to a true thought, that is just in case the object falls under the concept determined as reference by the incomplete sense (p493).

Senses are used to characterise psychological states '... in explaining and predicting action...'; and it is the sense entertained and not the thought apprehended that makes the connection with human action.

Perry (1977) p495 applies the lessons of this to the revision of the notion of indirect reference, concentrating upon whether or not the reference of a sentence containing a demonstrative falls within the scope of a cognitive verb, a sense or a thought; this he does through an example of a sentence with a propositional attitude ('...S believes that...'). Knowing the sense entertained, and having been given the believer's context, it might be taken that the thought can be deciphered, but this is not the case. It is the thought apprehended that is the indirect reference of a sentence with a demonstrative and a propositional attitude. Moving from the sentence embedded in the utterance to the thought apprehended one takes '... the value of the demonstrative in the context of the belief reporter, not in the context of the believer'.

It has been suggested that we try to use the sense entertained by the believer in reporting his belief, wherever possible. What we have just said does not conflict with this. The point is simply that the function of thought identification dominates the function of sense identification, and when we use demonstratives, there is almost always a conflict.

There will be no conflict, when one is dealing with eternal sentences, or when one is reporting one's own current beliefs. The need for distinguishing sense from thought will not be forced to our attention, so long as we concentrate on such cases (p495).

Freges morning star/evening star example can be considered with reference to a notion of the context of utterance. If one announces a belief in the identity of Venus as the morning star in the morning, but rejects the belief in the evening, there is false belief but not belief in a contradiction. No 'thoughtful' person accepts a sense and its negation in the same context; one must not think of senses as thoughts; one may come to reject a thought once believed, yet this is not coming to reject a sense once
subject’s thought about its object, and certainly no argument can be based upon this idea alone to the conclusion that senses can be grasped in the absence of a referent. Therefore, how do the senses of different co-referring singular terms become established with differing cognitive values of complex, compound sentences? For this to occur the assignment of senses to singular terms t and t' in the sentences A(t) and A(t') must display their differing cognitive values, that is, it must ‘...be possible for anyone who understands the sentences to take different epistemic attitudes towards them’. For Evans this will be possible on the following principle:

If the account of what makes a subject’s thought T₁ (about x to the effect that it is F) about x is different from the account of what makes his thought T₂ (about x to the effect that it is F) about x, it is possible for the subject coherently to take, at one and the same time, different epistemic attitudes towards the thoughts he entertains in T₁ and T₂.

Furthermore, it does not behove to Frege to supply a theory describing the forms of the accounts, or to ‘...suppose that ways of thinking of objects can always be given by giving some definite description uniquely true of the object, or to make any other supposition which would lead to “existence-independent” senses’. This is not required because it is wrong to suggest that an account of what makes a subject’s thought about an object capable of making the principle true is one containing a condition saying that the subject provide or know a definite description of the object. With the strengthening of the ‘if’ of the principle to ‘if and only if`, Frege’s equation of the sense of a sentence containing singular terms and a thought may be made as the obtaining of a propositional attitude. This equation is not made if it is possible for one who understands two singular sentences with identical sense to take different attitudes to them, for this would require a difference in the ways the subject thought of the object to which reference is made, for this would not report an identity of sense.

Evans concludes his discussion of Frege’s notion of sense. The sense of singular terms is not restricted to the sense of definite descriptions, and thus of ‘existence-independent’ senses. Evans argues, with textual support from the canonical sources, that there are existence dependent Fregean senses, and what is more, that there is no justification for holding Frege to the view that singular terms must have existence-independent sense. Evans concludes that it is wrong to think Fregean sense intermediary between subject and referent, ‘...as something which must, from a certain point of view, get in the way, or anyway render indirect what might be direct’. Fregean senses simply do not play this

accepted. (p496) The negation of a thought consisting of an object and an incomplete sense is taken to be the thought consisting of the same object and the negation of the incomplete sense.
role and do not require that senses can only be understood in the context of a sentence with reference, fictional or otherwise. A way of thinking of an object (as appearing in fictional or non-fictional contexts), cannot obstruct the thinking of an object, or make such thinking indirect or make parasitical the thoughts contained in fictional contexts; singular terms, in a Fregean theory, can immanently carry their sense.

3. Intentionality and Possible Worlds

Husserl marks his own distinction between sense and reference1. As Frege before him, he distinguishes 'expression' and 'sign': all signs may go as signs for something, but only some are endowed with sense and reference, elicted by conventions of language or speech2. The simple relationship of 'standing for' does not convey a meaning3, for expressions must both signify and indicate4. Meaning in communication instantiates the conveyance of intended meaning, and, for Husserl, expressions used remain meaningful in 'isolated mental life'5. It is the continuities between Husserl's and Frege's theories, and this last one forget Evans' case for Fregean semantics, that constitute the core of the discussion in this section. (Noema and Sim should be taken as synonyms).

Føllesdal's, and more satisfactorily Hintikka's, theory of intentionality as intensionality relates all of the difficulties of intentional directness upon objects found in Husserl to consideration of the mediation of reference by sense; indeed, Føllesdal's 'main thesis' is that noema is a, '...generalisation of [Frege's] notion of meaning...'6. In response to Brentano's theory of directedness (that mental

---

1. Husserl, E.; Logical Investigations (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1970. His distinction bears comparison with Grice's distinction between natural and conventional meaning (and cf. II). Further points making the comparison are contained in this section. The affinity between Grice and some theorists of formal semantics has been described in I.1. Cf. Wiggins (1971a) p17, and Strawson (1971c) p172, at which Strawson regards the tussle between pragmatic and formal theories as a 'Homeristic struggle'.

2. Loar, B.; 'Two Theories of Meaning', pp138-161 in Evans and McDowell (1976) considers this, maintaining, contra Quine and Davidson, that semantics can be done with only intensions and propositional attitudes. It is interesting to note that his argument turns on the difficulties of translation into quantifiability contexts, cf. especially p144ff. On pp146-147 Loar finds Frege's, and so Davidson's, intensional semantics superior to Carnap's. In Mind and Meaning (Cambridge University Press) 1981, p3 Loar writes that his theory revives 'classical' ideas of truth as correspondence between thought (state of affairs represented), and world in response to Quine's scepticism. What is more, a theory of meaning containing propositional attitudes provides a necessary alternative to reference theories. On Quine on stimulus and response, cf. p4. (The points raised in these essays are considered in II).

3. Smith, D.W. and McIntyre, R.; Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning and Language (Dordrecht, Reidel) 1982, pp26ff stress the relationship of Husserl's semantics to pragmatic verificationism. On demonstratives, cf. ppl3,22-222. On p319 Woodruff Smith and McIntyre clearly bring out the major difference between Fregean and possible worlds semantics: in the latter, expressions in intensional contexts refer to entities in different possible worlds (and so, it is argued, avoid the problems, seen in I.2, of reference in demonstrative expressions and to fictional or non-existent entities). Derrida should not have considered the approach to intensions and intentionality taken by Husserl and Austin to typify all theories, for the possible worlds semantics approach is an alternative providing a strong argument for a theory of intentionality without the scepticism engendered by the difficulties Derrida (correctly) discerns in Husserl, Austin, Condillac and so forth. A possible worlds semantics response to Derrida is given in IV.3.

4. Apel, K-O.; 'Is Intentionality more Basic than Linguistic Meaning?', pp31-55 in Lepore, E. and van Gulik, B. (eds.); John Searle and his Critics (Oxford, Blackwell) 1991, p32 compares the reductionism of Grice's approach with that of Husserl's, yet sees a difference. Grice's reductionism is not of the 'total spectrum of the intentionality of mind', but of 'action-intentions' (of speech acts). Thus intended meaning is reduced to the production of effects in the consciousness of hearers. Apel writes: 'If one conceives these intended effects with Austin as "parloutatory effects", then this approach can best be compared with Max Weber's conception of social actions as reciprocal purposively rational actions; this means that it should here be possible to reduce linguistic communication to strategic interaction. More or less in the way that it is analysed in economic game theory'. (This is excellent for setting up further examination of the conclusions derived from Lewis' analysis of coordination problems in IV). References are Apel, K-O.; 'Intentions, Conventions and Reference to Things: Dimensions of Understanding Meaning in Humeanisms and in Analytic Philosophy of Language', pp79-111 in Parret, H. and Bouveresse, J. (eds.); Meaning and Understanding (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter) 1981, and 'Linguistic Meaning and Intentionality: The Compatibility of the "Linguistic Turn" and the "Pragmatic Turn" of Meaning Theory within the Framework of a Transcendental Semiotics', pp2-52 in Silverman, H. and Welton, D. (eds.); Critical and Dialectical Phenomenology (State University of New York) 1987. On pp35ff Apel places Searle in the pragmatic tradition of Peirce, and on Searle's theory of illocutionary force, cf. ppl7.


6. In the sense of pick out uniquely.

---
inexistence accompanies reference to a content, to which the intentional act is directed), Husserl replies that one might suffer hallucinations, or contemplate non-existent objects. If, say, one's intentional object is contained in one's thought, the content of the act could be real or unreal with no change in the act itself; more familiarly, one might think demonstrative thoughts, or reflect upon thought. For Husserl, each act has an accompanying noema to which it is directed, obviating the Brentanian appeal to intentional content, a theory which, Hintikka shows (see below), suffers inconsistencies, and compels the postulation of a possible worlds theory of intentionality.

Hintikka asks how 'abstract' noema determines objects. This abstractness is the subject of later discussion, and Mohanty adds that if the noema does not mediate sense and reference, what does a possible worlds interpretation give? Their disagreement aptly expresses the interpretative problem in possible worlds semantics, and an answer to the first question is given in I.2 (a noema need not

---

*Note: The document contains references to various authors and works, including Husserl, Frege, Hintikka, Derrida, among others, discussing topics such as intentionality, noema, and possible worlds theory. The text explores the relationship between Frege and Husserl, and critiques other philosophers like Scruton and Derrida.*
describe an object with a referent); an answer to the second shall be seen to turn on the answer to the first, and one must note that Hintikka’s theory of reference as providing arguments from a *Sim* to a world or sub-set of worlds, with objects in possible worlds as values of the arguments, is avowedly a response to a theory of *Sim* as abstract and complete. The argument to be made in this section says that if a function relates noema from a set of possible worlds to specific worlds (or objects in them), then a theory of intentionality, of sense determining reference, is given, and, deploying Evans’ arguments, without the difficulties of intentionality as directedness. Mohanty responds that one cannot know the constitution of possible worlds before one computes the functions to senses and so to objects, and thus one cannot argue that the functions express relationships from possible worlds to objects. For Mohanty a description of what is intended in thought or perception must be a precise identification, a locating, of the object in compatible possible worlds, and he fears that this cannot be done. It is argued

---

10 As Evans argues (1.2) one need not regard *Sim*, and by extension noema, as abstract and complete; one can discern the reference of expressions in contexts.
11 Mohanty (1982) pp239-240 considers a weaker interpretation. When S perceives p he, rather than perceiving that p in many possible worlds, or that there are many possible states of affairs compatible with p, there is a logical explication of what S perceives which locates p as a member of compatible possible worlds. Mohanty asks why such an explication (of what S perceives to be the case or of S’s perceiving what he takes to be the case), is necessary, and argues that it might be thought so only if the possible states of affairs are possible descriptions compatible with p and under which p can be perceived. (This restriction is necessary, for the possible states of affairs compatible with p may be anything whatsoever, so that if reference to such irrelevant states of affairs be required for semantical explication of what S perceives, the consequence would certainly be counterintuitive, if not absurd). This debate presages that in possible worlds semantics regarding whether the theory commits one to a belief in worlds (states of affairs) as qualitatively distinct from the actual world, or whether they are merely possible states of affairs obtaining in the actual world. The question can be more simply stated: is one committed to realism about possible worlds? Lewis, D.K.; *Counterfactuals* (Oxford, Blackwell) 1973, thinks so, and unashamedly so. He writes that there are possible worlds other than the one he, you and I inhabit: ‘‘If an argument is wanted, it is this’’: realism about possible worlds is like a belief in chairs and tables. Lewis allows that he is modalistically opinionated: some groups of possible worlds are classified according to his opinions (‘‘...there are worlds where physics is different from the physics of our world, but none where logic and arithmetic are different from the logic and arithmetic of our world’’), but adds that he makes place for these opinions when doing metaphysics. For arguments against abstract possible worlds, cf. Menzel, C.; ‘On an Unsound Proof of the Existence of Possible Worlds’, *Nous Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, vol. XXX, no. 4, pp598-603, 1989. Regardless of the interpretation one prefers, the tenor of Hintikka’s work is that an intentional relationship is a relationship to possible worlds, and Mohanty accepts only this. The intentional act, and its noema, include a, ‘‘...horizon of pre-delineated potentialities for further determinations’’, yet the question is, are possible worlds potential noemata or possible acts of perceiving? The rôle of meaning is played by *Sim*, the meaning relationship creating identity between noema. Mohanty asks how possible worlds fit the rôle of matching acts (noemata) to noema, and argues that acts of perception cannot fill this rôle: a description of the way in which an object is perceived is a further *Sim*, a further function. On a related point, Mohanty writes that different acts of perception, noema or *Sim* may refer to one object, and, ‘‘...if we construe two different *Sim* as two different possible worlds, the meaning function would be one which yields the same value for two or many different arguments’’, and this, without good reason, abandons the core of Frege’s semantics, that sense determines reference. The beginning of a possible-worlds theory of perception is contained on Mohanty (1982) p240 where he also considers the difficulties of making connections between semantical and phenomenological treatments of intentionality, and concludes that such a theory cannot truly be phenomenological, but a semanticist’s dream. The best sources for a study of the respective metaphysical and metaphilosophical positions with regard to possible worlds can be detailed. Stalnaker, R.; * Inquiry* (MIT) 1984, pp44ff examines Lewis’ realism about possible worlds. He argues that ‘‘possible world’ is not synonymous with ‘a way things might have been’, but that one may countenance ‘moderate’ realism about possible worlds. The questions Stalnaker asks are taken up in Adams, R.M.; ‘‘Theories of Actuality’’, pp190-209 in Loux, M. (ed.); *The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality* (Cornell University Press) 1979. Adams asks what it is that God confers in making a world actual. Adams assumes possible worlds are ‘determinate’, and that for every world and every pair of contrary propositions, one of the pair is true and the other false in each possible world; every possible world is a ‘complete world history’, and not a mere stage. Adams discusses the ‘actuality’ of the best of all possible worlds, and of things in possible worlds, noting some affinities with existential phenomenology, and regarding the matter of repetition. Plantenga, A.; ‘Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?’, pp146-165 in Loux (1979), questions the sense of ‘could have’, in the assessment of possible states of affairs: are they existent, or conjurable, worlds, or states of affairs in this actual world? Plantinga distinguishes natural possibility (the sense in which one speaks of one’s swimming the Atlantic as not impossible), and possibility in first-order logic. Necessary propositions include logical and mathematical truths, and a (probable) infinity of other propositions. The notion of an infinity of possible states of affairs raises issues which may help the elucidation of Lewis’ metaphysics. Plantinga describes senses of necessity and possibility which compel some conclusions: if S and S’ are states of affairs related
in this section that the ramifications of Hintikka’s argument, that *Sinne* determine possible worlds for compossibility, allows specification of references in specific worlds by the argument given by Evans (in the previous section). Evans’ argument also shows that the fears of Hintikka regarding the abstractness and completeness of *Sinne* are unfounded.

Husserl gives examples of natural and conventional meanings: brands for slaves, and flags for nations; Martian canals for signs of intelligent life, and fossils for signs of prediluvian species. There is in the latter cases, dubbed ‘indications’, a ‘common element’, allowing ‘transport’, or the capacity for certain states of affairs to indicate the ‘reality’ of others, a verity, Husserl says again, good for cases of collocation and for solitary utterance. There is “motivational” unity in such acts of judgement, matching them with corresponding states of affairs, and Husserl writes, ‘[p]lainly such a state of

such that they cannot both obtain (S precludes S’), and if S requires S’ to obtain, S includes S’. Further there is the case that S either includes or precludes S’, in which case S is ‘maximal’. Plantinga argues that a possible world is a maximal set of possible states of affairs, and continues, the world (W) contains a set of propositions of which p is one if W is actual. The set of W contains as subsets either p or not-p. All that is in the world is included, and all that is not is explicitly excluded. The network of propositions making up a possible world instantiates the same individual (x) in many different states of affairs (‘x is an athlete’, ‘x is a...’); as the world excludes non-obtaining possible states of affairs the descriptions will not obtain. Lewis (1973) p gives, in justifying his belief about possible worlds, a fascinating alternative to Rorty’s claims for the status of method in analytical philosophy. ‘One comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. It is not the business of philosophy either to undermine or to justify these pre-existing opinions, to any great extent, but only to try to discover ways of expanding them into an orderly system. A metaphysician’s analysis of mind is an attempt at systematizing our opinions about mind. It succeeds to the extent that (1) it is systematic, and (2) it respects those of our pre-philosophical opinions to which we are firmly attached. Insofar as it does both better than any alternative we have thought of, we give it credence. There is some give-and-take, but not too much; some of us sometimes change our minds on some points of common opinion, if they conflict irreducibly with a doctrine that commands our belief by its systematic beauty and its agreement with more important common opinions’. As shall be seen in I.4, Black, M.; *A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus* (Cambridge University Press) 1964, writes that Wittgenstein thinks of atomic propositions or situations as like coordinates in logical space, and complex propositions as a ‘volume’ in logical space. It might be added that the view of this as merely a metaphor depends upon which interpretation of possible worlds one holds. Black writes that, ‘[a]n important implication is the inseparability of a proposition from the “logical space” in which it is located. The proposition’s logical relations partially determine its sense and are not something superadded when the proposition combine with other propositions in truth-functions’.

Precisely those in Grice, H.P.; ‘Meaning’, pp213-223 in *Studies in the Way of Words* (Harvard University Press) 1989, for distinguishing natural and non-natural meaning. See especially p214. The theory is explained in I.1. The distinction as Husserl states it is plainly unsatisfactory. The Grecoan (and Schfferian) tenor is continued in Husserl’s ascription of conditions of indication. Indications may, of course, be brought about deliberately or artificially (signs may be called into use), and the relationship of standing for instantiated.

The matter presented in Note may be returned to. The notion of meaning with which Grice works shows him to be more radical than Husserl in a most significant way, and with consequences for any full assessment of Derrida’s work on Husserl. While both Grice and Husserl make a distinction between indicative and meaningful signs, bestowing only upon the latter the propery of ‘expression’ (‘utterance’ in Grice), and maintain that a speech act is an expression whether or not it is vocalised, Husserl, contrary to Grice and to the latter speech act tradition, excludes gestures (both as endowed with communicative intent, as in hand signals, and as inhering in (Austrian) contexts of utterance), as not ‘one with the experiences’ in which they are elicited. They are not intended as is speech and therefore have no meaning, though an interlocutor may, peradventure, interpret them as indicating something. As said, Grice makes no such distinctions and exclusions. Grice and Husserl are agreed that semantic theory must clarify these distinctions. Another Grecoan distinction arises below between signs (written marks, sounds), and associated acts giving them meaning, this distinction is, as is argued, vital to establishing conventional meanings.

Husserl (1970) p270. Cassirer studies the objectification of knowledge through the production of linguistic signs, and the ways in which this constructs a reality, instantiating the harmony and opposition of, ‘subject and object, ego and world...’. Kaufmann (1949) pp208-209 considers some consequences for ontology.

affairs amounts to just this: that certain things may or must exist, since other things have been given'.

States of affairs constitute the given in intentional acts, and are the core of a response to theories of intentionality as directedness, eluding the difficulties Derrida diagnoses. Reference, on a possible worlds theory of intentionality, is the mediation, carried in a Sinn, of a sense from a set of states of affairs to a reference in a single or sub-set of specific possible worlds. There is no unthinking metaphor of directedness against which Derrida justly argues: intentional acts are not directed but ‘informational’, they report on states of affairs.

Husserl demarcates cases of ‘demonstration’ and indication. Indications (brands for slaves, and so forth), as conventional established meanings, require no ‘insight’; however, an inference from fossils to their having been left by ancient species may turn out ‘false’, and only, ‘...a relation of consequence...be seen to hold’. That is, there are ‘objective relationships’ between states of affairs, inadequately approached in subjective judgements. However, with growing familiarity, judgements reveal a common property mediating communication (this brand means X is a slave); following repetition a rule becomes established, through reflection on judgements and contexts of inference and proof. For Husserl, indications exclude such knowledge of connections between contents of judgements. To say that a state of affairs indicates another implies no necessary correlation, for they are conventions, and are thus mutable. They presuppose cases of demonstration or explicit dubbings (‘this brand, which I now apply, means X is my slave); they are the conventions upon which all indications are based. An indication compels no necessary connection between mark, or statement, and meaning; belief in the indicated state of affairs can only approach the definitiveness of demonstrations. There is, Derrida is correct, a ‘jurisdiction’ allowing that the inferences may be called ‘justified’ or ‘unjustified’, ‘valid’ or ‘invalid’.

---


Pratt begins from a Derridean position. Wishing to overcome the distinction between literary and other uses of language, those discussed in the sources which are the targets of Derrida: ‘Russian Formalism through Prague School poetics and Anglo-American structuralism to present-day French literary semiotics’, (ppxi and xv) she rejects a distinction between poetic and non-poetic uses; Pratt, M.L.; _Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse_ (Bloomington, Indiana) 1977. Pratt discerns the origin of the distinction in Romanticism. Both Searle and Grice are marshalled for the case that literary use can be described by a theory accounting for non-literary discourse, see esp. Chapter Five. Husserl is classed as a structuralist in Derrida, J.; “'Genesis and Structure' and Phenomenology”, pp154-168, in _Writing and Difference_ (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1978. See also Habermas (1987) pp201-203.

14 This builds upon well-trodden objections to object theories of intentionality, cf. Woodruff Smith and McIntyre (1982) p262.
16 Husserl (1970) p272. ‘The contents of one’s judgements are not here related as premises are to a conclusion’. The latter state of affairs is parasitic upon the former.
17 This is what Derrida calls a parasitism, and as Husserl (1970) p274 writes, the associations made in indications are as much creative as they are generic.
18 The distinctions Derrida (1977b) p168 finds in Austin and Searle are thus found in Husserl. Husserl (1970) p277 says that all expressions in communicative speech function as indications. There is never an assured relation to probability conditions, and the
Sounds or marks allow communication when S intends a sharing of knowledge. Husserl’s affinities to Davidson have been intimated, and in describing the conditions necessary for mutual understanding, Husserl states that a principle of charity is applied. S matches his sounds with ‘sense-giving’ acts, revealed to H in communicative acts. Communication becomes the mutual correlation of thoughts, or, for Hintikka, the sharing of information. In speaking S intimates a sense (say, that he makes a wish), and in interpreting, H, following recognition, ascribes to S beliefs, desires, rationality and good faith, yet without ever accessing the private, incommunicable, unique (Fregean) thoughts, and so interpretations remain approximations in judgement. (Husserl again remarks that the meanings of expressions remain the same in uncommunicated, solitary utterance) As Frege before him, so Husserl: meaning does not reside in the mere intimation of senses. Additionally, one cannot, in soliloquy, use expressions as intimations to oneself; for in such cases one’s expression is given two aspects, (one means, and one intends the recognition of one’s meaning by oneself), that is, the sense in both the meaning and the intending act is that ‘aimed at’ in the one sign; and this logical embarrassment returns Husserl to his earlier point that mere signs do not give expressions meaning.

In intentionality as directedness a sentence good for use as an indication must describe ‘an existent’, and Husserl is as stubborn as Austin, rejecting out of hand the difficulties of non-existence or quantification into fictional contexts. Fellesdal examines this thesis. Noema contain two components, congruent with Fregean notions of sense and thought. The sense of one’s intentional act can be common to all acts with the same content, be they perceptions, imaginings, or hallucinations, or

jurisdiction is faced with appropriately ‘modest surmises’. Husserl distinguishes (as Schiffer does in response to Grice) the means of expression from the meaning of an expression, the latter notion, with its reference to ‘what these words ordinarily mean’, only comparable to Gricean natural meaning. It shall emerge (and in greater detail in II), that Grice himself makes no such presupposition about what words ordinarily mean; he makes no claim for meaning as predicated on a capacity for communication. Grice takes his lead from non-natural meaning, and the ways in which meanings arise in conventional contexts of communication (with ‘convention’ to be defined in the coming three chapters, and in a way in which Derrida’s doubts are neutralised). Grice makes no exclusion of parasitic cases, and as shall be seen his theory allows their assessment without the scepticism Derrida entertains.

Husserl himself sees that the distinction between the means of expression and the meaning of an expression is crude, and for clarification looks to paradigmatic cases (of names), and the (again Fregean) distinction between what the name means and what ‘mental state’ (Fregean ‘thought’) it engenders.

21 Husserl has the language of Grice but none of the subtlety in his theory, for he also argues that sharing (communication) takes place when H recognizes S’s intention in speaking.

22 The link to the theory of speech acts is clear. Husserl (1970) pp277-278. S intimates a sense with his speech act, and H’s judging it turns upon no ‘conceptual knowledge’; H perceives S to be saying ‘this or that’. H perceives S as a speaker, as recounting, demonstrating, doubting, wishing and so forth. He perceives the intimation as he perceives S, even though, in eminently Fregean language, ‘... the mental phenomena which make him a person cannot fall, for what they are, in the intuitive grasp of another’. The Davidsonian tone is continued when Husserl continues: ‘Common speech credits us with percepts even of other people’s inner experiences; we “see” their anger, their pain...’, and these are equally as much percepts as are those of ‘outward bodily things’. Again continuing the Fregean heritage, H can never have an ‘inner’ percept of S’s experience (‘thought’), but only ever an ‘outer’ percept, and this is the ...big difference between the real grasp of what is in adequate intuition, and the putative grasp of what is on a basis of inadequate, thought intuitive presentation’.

23 Husserl (1970) p278. ‘A word only ceases to be a word when our interest stops at its sensory contour, when it becomes a mere sound-pattern’. It is here in Husserl that the problem of demonstratives is seen to arise.


different according to their rôle as perceptions, imaginings or hallucinations, yet the thought contained in each act is unique. Against Husserl Føllesdal argues that it is noematic Sinn that allows consciousness to reach out to objects, for sense to mediate reference. A noema has only one object, while one object may be that of several noemata, or (to continue the connection), of several Fregean thoughts. As Føllesdal puts it: ‘[t]he object being identically the same is not sufficient to guarantee sameness of Sinn...’. Noemata may have many corresponding acts, each qualitatively distinct; indeed they are paradigm Fregean, non-spatial, thoughts. Husserl argues that knowledge of how noemata reach out to reality is found in reflection, this the, ‘...basis of the phenomenological judgement’, and which is learning meanings. It is categorically not the coming greater to understand thoughts or judgements themselves. The condition allowing the iteration of phenomenological reflection (with a Sinn becoming the object of judgements), does not permit, Husserl writes, that intentional acts are directed to meanings, or to thoughts of objects. Intentional acts remain (‘normally’ says Føllesdal), directed at intentional objects. In the description of phenomenological reflection de Mulder sees a neat statement of the problem of mediated reference to real and to imaginary objects owing to an analogy Husserl draws between perception and reference. Before the analogy is explored, Husserl’s distinction between meaning-conferring and meaning-fulfilling acts (and incidentally, matter and quality), must be presented. It shall be seen that the distinction is that Føllesdal marks between senses and thoughts. A ‘sound-complex’ (an utterance), is given meaning by meaning-conferring acts, and the sound-complex comes to refer (conventionally as Grice says); de Mulder adds, the sounds come always to evoke the

---

25 Husserl (1970) p682. Husserl writes: ‘[f]or perception never constitutes the full meaning of a statement grounded on perception, it seems nonetheless to make a contribution to this meaning...’, and suggests that in a perception instead of speaking, say, of ‘a’ blackbird, one speaks of ‘this’ blackbird: an occasional expression for an occasion of perception. He adds that the grammatical form contains a relation to time and to circumstances of utterance. The perceived object, described in perception, is what the word ‘this’ signifies. ‘The present tense in the grammatical form of a verb likewise expresses a relation to what is actually present, and so again to the same conditions apply to the example: to say ‘There flies a blackbird’ is not to say that some blackbird in general is flying, but that a blackbird is flying by here and now’. Cf. de Mulder, W., Demonstratives and Intentionality: Searle and Husserl on Meaning and Perception (Amsterdam Papers in Linguistics, no. 79) 1994, pp50ff.

26 That is, no act’s noema is not the object to which the act is directed (again, contra Brentano).

27 Føllesdal (1969) p683 says that each act has only one noema.

28 Føllesdal (1969) p683. The object must be imaged as the same.

29 Husserl (1970) p684 even uses the same analogy as Frege. He speaks of the ‘thisness’ of an identification under different specification, and as Føllesdal (1969) p684 says, although Husserl here speaks of noematic Sinn, since the other parts of noema are also parts of Sinn, the same conditions apply to the whole noema.


31 Frege’s conditions on the cases of oblique, propositional attitude contexts introduce (as seen in I.2), a distinction between reference in normal and in indirect contexts, in which terms refer to objects and to meanings respectively.

32 de Mulder (1994) p41. Husserl argues, says de Mulder, that perceptual acts are as much representations as are thoughts or senses; ‘...they aim at contents that are not given in consciousness through contents that are...’. The given in perception is the sensation, the hyle, they are not themselves perceived but are ‘transformed’ in acts of perception. Husserl (1970) pp597ff. Cf. Smith and McIntyre (1982) p246.

33 Hintikka (1973c) p205 calls the matter-quality distinction ‘ubiquitous’ in Husserl.
act of dubbing and thus can give meaning and fulfil reference in later instances\textsuperscript{35}. (Deliverance concerning the way in which a ‘sound-complex’ establishes a convention awaits the discussion of Grice in II and of Lewis in IV). Perception seems not to face the difficulties of mediation, for object and intentional content are related due to the immediacy of the sensation causing the intention. As before, sensations (\textit{reell}) are contained in acts and not objects, but a problem arises for the mediation of intentional acts to objects: the sensations in the act are themselves, as Follesdal says, imperceptible, they have no meaning; it is part of a debt to Brentano that sensations representing real objects are not the objects of intentional acts, and thus do not account for directedness\textsuperscript{36}.

I see a thing, e.g. this box, but I do not see my sensations. I always see one and the same box, however it may be turned and tilted. I have always the same “content of consciousness”—if I come to call the perceived object a content of consciousness. But each turn yields a new “content of consciousness”, if I call experienced contents “contents of consciousness”, in a much more appropriate use of words\textsuperscript{37}.

One ‘lives through’ one’s sensations, but they are not objects. They ‘show themselves’ in acts of perception, and accordingly limit the contents of intentional acts, as Follesdal says, and how does Husserl account for the directedness of intentional acts to their objects\textsuperscript{38}? Intentionality as directedness assays a solution in the distinction between matter and quality\textsuperscript{39}. The matter of an act relates it to ‘something objective’, and gives its manner of relation. Describing how one identifies an object reveals one’s sensations, the latter being, again, not contained in perceived objects, and endowed with (Fregean) sense. The quotation continues:

> Very different contents are therefore experienced, though the same object is perceived. The experienced content, generally speaking, is not the perceived object. We must note, further, that the object’s real being or non-being is irrelevant to the true essence of the perceptual experience, and to its essence as a perceiving of an object as thus and thus appearing, and as thus and thus thought of\textsuperscript{40}.

\textsuperscript{35} de Mulder (1994) p46 marks some differences between meaning and perception, referring to Husserl (1970) p455ff. A ‘sound complex’ and the meaning it is given in an intentional act bear no internal link; in perception there remains a link because of the perception bearing, for Husserl, an immediacy to the sensation itself.

\textsuperscript{36} Follesdal (1969) pp686-687.

\textsuperscript{37} Husserl (1970) p563.

\textsuperscript{38} de Mulder (1994) pp48-49 considers similarities and differences between Husserl’s and Searle’s theories of causation in perception. Searle’s causal theory is broached in Part III, though it should be noted that Husserl and Searle share a belief in the way intentional acts are directed to perceived objects: the causation is internal to the acts. Husserl does not speak of causation, de Mulder writes, because it might imply that the sensation and the act in a perception are separate, something he would not want to say. Cf. Searle (1983) pp454 and 49.

\textsuperscript{39} Husserl (1970) pp586ff.

\textsuperscript{40} Husserl (1970) p565.
Husserl continues the experience of the difference in content is itself a further sensation; their collation in judgement and reflection giving the ‘being of the object forms’. The ‘objective correlative’ of the act is found in the relationship to which it appeals in fulfilling its reference.

An act’s quality determines its status as an intentional act, represented in a speech act, of, say, asserting, questioning, and so forth. Matter conceived as sensation allows that sensation is a part (‘moment’), of the accompanying act, but as with different instances of particular speech acts, different acts, in time and in possessor, can share the same content. Content is a ‘species’, given a form in matter, and the relationship is one of tokens to types. Meanings are constituted by meaning-intentions, conceived in sensations or thoughts, and reported in acts which give meanings and so references to objects. Meanings are not inmutably related to the signs that express them but come to apply by usage and convention.

Soliloquy tolerates the existence of imagined indications, yet it is imperative that this is not elided with a corresponding belief in imagined objects. The imaginary mark or speech act does not exist, yet the words used do form an expression. Only in vocal utterance is intuition linked with meaning and the communication of Fregean thoughts. Expressions and their meanings break down into two categories: the ‘physical phenomenon’ of the expression, and the corresponding ‘acts’ giving them meaning (or their, ‘...intuitive fulness, in which [an act’s] relation to an expressed object is

---

42 See again Fräulein (1969) pp685-686. There are other conceivable links to Austin (cf. de Mulder (1994) p52), with Husserl considering the ways in which an act’s ‘liveliness’ or ‘intensity’ may affect its ‘essence’. See also Searle (1969) p52.
43 A further analogy between Husserl and Grice, and cf. de Mulder (1994) pp54-55ff. Cf. Ricouer (1970) pp383-385. Ricouer adds that this is a theory of repetition. Howells (1999) p110 writes, [the repetition compulsion does not seem to produce pleasure, on the contrary it tends to involve the relieving of displeasure, and Freud describes such compulsive and neurotic repetition as ‘devilish’]. Cf. also p120 and Bowie, M.; Lacan (London, Fontana) 1991, pp17ff and especially pp29-36. In ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’, pp196-231 in Writing and Difference (University of Chicago) 1978, Derrida considers the matter of representation in repetition and repetition. The writing interior to speech, ‘...has been contained outside speech’ (p197). A difference exists in that logocentrism retains the means of observing how repression occurs in fact and in history, and Derrida notes the caution with which Freud ‘manipulates conventions and conceptual hypotheses’ (p198). Cf. Merleau-Ponty (1974a) p80. On pp87ff Merleau-Ponty unequivocally states that intention and convention must always be discussed together, and offers a Lewisiian/Gadamerian/Deleuzian cooperative principle. Differences with Husserl’s theory of repetition are considered in Minkowski, E.; Lived Time: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Studies (Northwestern University Press) 1972. Husserl’s theory, displaying its scholastic bent, distinguishes a first, stimulus intentionality, and a second, unifying intentionality, reporting a dialectomy between subject and object, which one Minkowski rejects in favour of immediate experience of the natural world (pp44-78). In his philosophy of consciousness Husserl also, writes Welton (1999) p39, a phenomenology of the body and reflections on embodiment, all to a comparison with classical Cartesian conceptions of the body. There are shared problems of interaction and consciousness, and also concerning the nature of access to nature, or experience. Nature for Husserl, displaying both the influence of Leibniz and the reason his work is so amenable to Hintikka’s possible worlds theory of intentionality, is a ‘sphere of mere things’, of objects for perception, carried out by an engaged agent (an ego-subject), and not a Cartesian corpse (Welton (1999) pp39-41). Nature is always endowed with values. It is monadic in that it has no pure constitution or consciousness, no description free of values, but is rather always interested and characterised as ‘the correlate of a particular interest’ brought to it by the subject’. This acutely raises the problems found in Husserl’s theory by Hintikka, and does not resolve them.

44 Husserl (1970) pp279-280. One speaks in soliloquy, but ‘...in the genuine sense of communication...’, there is no speech, and one tells oneself nothing. ‘In a monologue words can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since each indication would there be quite purposeless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment’. 48
constituted'\(^6\). By the grant of meaning, and pending articulation, the expression relates to the 'objective', which may be present in intuition or in mental imagery; in this way, '...a relation to an object is realised'. Where the expression merely functions significantly, without meaning, there is no 'intuition' linking acts and objects, and the expression is merely a 'meaning-intention'. This clarifies the distinction between 'meaning-conferring' and 'meaning-fulfilling' acts, the former being speech acts, or expressions of sense, and the latter 'fulfilling' the relation to corresponding objects, revealing how the expression 'reaches right out'\(^8\). 'The sounded word is first made one with the meaning-intention, and this in its turn is made one (as intentions in general are made one with their fulfilments), with its corresponding meaning-fulfilment'. One should not say that an expression, '...expresses its meaning (its intention)...', but that the act of meaning-fulfilment completes the act accompanying the expression (a wish becomes a wish, a perception a perception and so forth)\(^7\).

Husserl asks how expressions relate intentions to objects, writing that, '[t]he function of a word (...an intuitive word-presentation), is to awaken a sense-conferring act in ourselves...', and repeats that the correlation of signs to signifieds does not make one the expression of the other, for again, the same signs may carry different thoughts; he adds that expressions are viable descriptions of such correlations only as experienced\(^4\). Husserl clarifies the cleavage between a sign and the intention making it an expression by arguing that signs are external experience open to the vagaries of perceptions (as described above), and in this one sees the vital notion, rarely seen for all its significance in Husserl, of intentionality as the coming greater to understand the logical relations of experienced correlations or states of affairs, and not, as a superficial reading of Husserlian intentionality as directedness would suggest, in the nature of the objects or states of affairs to which a subject relates\(^5\). An utterance, made with an intention to communicate, is modified when it constitutes an expression (as defined). Acts of meaning-fulfilment have objects coincident with the objects named or meant in the meaning. In the two aspects of an act of intentional meaning, conferring and fulfilling, there inhere expressions, senses and their objective correlates (their corresponding objects or states of affairs), and it is in this that the exclusion arises to which Derrida should have directed his attention, namely the condition requiring

\(^{45}\text{Husserl (1970) p280. The same reference goes for the next two quotations.}\n
\(^{46}\text{Husserl (1970) p281. 'The briefer expression 'meaning-fulfilment' can only be used in cases where there is no risk of the ready confusion with the whole experience in which a meaning-intention finds fulfilment in its correlated intuition.'}\n
\(^{47}\text{Husserl (1970) p281. In such a relation the expression (with sense) 'becomes one' with the act of meaning-fulfilment. The form of the expression (its utterance or inscription), and its meaning-intention or fulfilment are yet connected. Both are intrinsic to human experience, yet the provision of the expression does not contribute to the constitution of the life-world, but to the enactment of the sense and the corresponding intention.}\n
\(^{48}\text{Husserl (1970) p282. One might here ponder a Wittgensteinian connection.}\n
\(^{49}\text{Smith and McIntyre (1982) p276 argue that possible-worlds semantics is presaged in Husserl.}\n
49
that meaning expressions are, as a matter of course, issued with sincerity. H’s response assumes that S speaks sincerely: his understanding S’s assertion compels the notion that the latter judges the content of the assertion to be a reliable record of the state of affairs described. This leads Husserl to moot a question fundamental in assessments of Gricean analysis, namely whether the analysans in theories of communicated intention be S meaning or H understanding, and Husserl rejects the idea that S’s judgement or H’s understanding in any way constitute the meaning of S’s assertion, for the content of the assertion remains the same regardless of S’s identity and the occasion of its utterance. Utterances are the ‘uniquely adequate’ way of expressing meanings, yet they can reveal no individual judgement (Fregean thought). The state of affairs about which the assertion is made is reported or not regardless of whether S’s assertion is true of it or not, yet in judgement S assumes that it obtains, and thus judgements or intimations (defined above), bring in notions of inner, private experience; what is asserted brings in no such notions, and describes a single state of affairs. Intentions are communicated ‘only symbolically’ in false assertions; their want of ‘fullness’ entailing that they communicate no knowledge about states of affairs. The belief that a judgement is, ‘...the meaning of “the” declarative sentence’, confuses the intimation of an assertion with assertion itself, and in his categorical rejection of this belief Husserl again approaches the opaque doctrine of states of affairs.

If one falsely asserts something, he continues, one makes no assertion, for the state of affairs does not obtain. However, one says something, something more than a report of one’s judgement, and Husserl gives an example. One might hypothesise a possible state of affairs (say, that the sum of the angles of a triangle do not equal the sum of two right angles), a hypothesis the content of which can be intended in many judgements, at different times, by different people and so forth, but still states of affairs invoked by true judgements are, ‘...the objectively-ideal treatment characteristic of all thinking’; that is, Husserl maintains, and as Derrida says, that false cases do not achieve this ideal. The two aspects of intention, judgement and a mediating relation, can, Husserl writes, be explicated by considering a third sense of what is (tacitly) expressed by an expression in its invocation of a convention, namely, the reference to an ‘objective correlate’. An expression spoken with intention does not only say something, but refers to objects, one or many, over and above its meaning. For explication of this Husserl examines expressions

---

50 It is odd to see this distinction in Husserl, for elsewhere he seems to make no such dogmatic exclusions, but it is the case that all of the examples from Husserl to follow are predicated on the fact that they are spoken sincerely. The argument from Grice introduced in II, again, an intimation of conventional non-natural meaning, shows that such speech acts can be assessed for their status as literal or parasitical.
51 This obtains for false or absurd assertions. Husserl (1970) p285. ‘We continue to recognise its identity of intention in evident acts of reflection: we do not arbitrarily attribute it to our assertions, but discover it in them’.
52 This is Russelian failure to refer: the difference in Husserl of intending and fulfilling meaning.
with identical meaning but different objects, and those with different meaning but identical objects (differing extensions and intensions). Names are Husserl's paradigm cases. Proper names come to name different things by coming to mean different things, and so Husserl distinguishes names with many intensions from those with many extensions. A name names (refers) and means, the latter permitting the former, and the relationship established requires elucidation of the functions of expressions and guiding intentions. To compel the conclusion that the reference of an expression is contained in its meaning, Husserl repeats that one judgement can be carried by expressions with different extensions, adding that expressions and their intentions are not guided by an individual's intuition alone but by the, "...varying intellectual forms through which intuited objects first become intelligibly determined, mutually related objects"54.

53 He offers Frege's examples: 'the victor at Jena', 'the vanquished at Waterloo'. Husserl (1970) p287 writes 'Both, of course, only pertain to an expression in virtue of the mental acts which give it sense. And, if we distinguish between "content" and object in respect of such "presentations", one's distinction means the same as the distinction between what is meant or said, on the one hand, and what is spoken of, by means of the expression, on the other'. Husserl continues that expressions may have the same meaning but different objects, or different meanings but the same object. Expressions may agree in meaning and object, as with translated expressions.

There are problems concerning the objective reference of types of expression, owing to their 'manifoldness'. In 'S is P' the subject of the statement is the object about which the statement is made; another view says that the whole state of affairs corresponding to the statement is an analogue of the object a name names, and is thus distinguished from the objects meaning unequivocally; different expressions ('a is bigger than b', and 'b is smaller than a') express the same state of affairs.

There is, Husserl says, always an area for 'possible fulfilment'. In this, it might be suggested, Husserl draws some of Hintikka's criticism of intentionality as directedness. Cf. Husserl (1970) pp289-290.

There are, for Husserl, two things found in a realised relation to an object: the object itself and its ideal correlate, (its fulfilling sense), the latter instantiating the sense expressed by the expression used. In the case of a report of a perception there is a 'content' and an 'object', the former open and mutually available to S and H. Objects require fulfilment through correlation with an act of meaning, and in such cases the content of the latter coincides with the content of the former, and thus in one's experience they appear as one. (In the case of perception or of meaning, the notion is clear as to how an object may be the intended object of a totality of possible worlds or utterances, but fulfilled, perhaps, by one or few.) The potential ambiguity that may arise in the ascription of 'meaning' and 'sense' to both intentions and to their fulfilment (owing to their unity), raises matters taken up in the studies of both Derrida and Searle. (The use of 'sense' and 'meaning' as coterminous characterises the ambiguity Husserl finds in Frege). An expression has a meaning (a conventional, non-natural, Gricean meaning) and 'meaningless' expressions are, by this standard, not expressions: the sound patterns 'Abrazadabra' and 'Green is or' are Husserl's examples (p293). An expression carries a relation to an object, and, some say, '[i]t makes no difference whether the object exists or is fictitious, or even impossible'. Husserl will not accept this, for the 'genuine' concept of meaning includes the relation of an expression to an object: expressions denoting non-existent objects are thus meaningless. The meaning cannot be identified with the objective correlate of an expression, for then objectless expressions would become meaningless. Contradictory objectless expressions ('a red square') are 'senseless'.

Husserl (1970) pp295ff considers Mill's logic, and finds that Mill confuses the distinction between indication and expression. Husserl says that an arbitrarily chosen mark carrying a meaning is a mere indication and a proper name an expression. In this he appears to be arguing against a notion fundamental to the assessment of the Gricean theory: the communication of an understood conventional meaning. Husserl writes that names have expressiveness above and beyond that of the indication, for in the former one is not concerned with a mode of presentation but with the object presented, or named. It is the object to which one may have a propositional attitude: it is the fact of an assertion, and the object of a wish and so forth. The use in assertion is prior, for only in use as an assertion can the name become available for use in complex expressions (reports of wishes, statements and so forth). However, the name, for Husserl, is not an index of the subject, for an index serves to 'point to' an object, the object, ... need not be taken to exist at all. Mill's association of a name with the idea of the idea named (on the model of the marking of the house), is incorrect, for Husserl argues that this obscures the fact that one thinks of the object when the sign is encountered, and one must agree that the analogy is weak. With significance for a study of a Gricean analysis of meaning, Husserl marks the distinction between an expression and a noise or sound, in order to consider the notion of the attitude an expression may evoke. Husserl rejects the notion of attitudes. Understanding, on the view Husserl appears, is the garnering of meaning from the speaker's speech or actions. The mental contents of understanding given are, ... often said to be the meanings of words...", and the proponents of the view, ... claim to be getting at what ordinary speech means by the "meaning of an expression". (The objections Husserl treats will become familiar in II).

Utterances are often received by a hearer as communicating an intended image, but they are by no means necessary accompaniments (Husserl (1970) pp300-303). For instance, if one reads and understands an author's assertions: what more is there available for understanding? What images are conveyed or communicated? Husserl will not allow that a view saying that meaning is carried in corresponding imagery can appeal to a notion of confirmation of meaning as a private mental act. In this Husserl would seem to be challenging a tenet of Grice's theory, but as will be argued in II, Grice makes no appeal to private
The distinction between an act of meaning and achieving unambiguous reference, or conventional meaning, is threatened by expressions containing demonstratives and indexicals. In intimations made on an occasion, the meaning of a demonstrative changes according to context and to sense, and Husserl sees the threat they pose to his theory: they, '...shake our faith in the ideality and objectivity of meanings', and for a response he distinguishes 'subjective', demonstrative (or 'occasional') expressions from 'objective' expressions, adding again that, '...we shall deal only with expressions in their normal use'. Objective expressions are understood without attention to the circumstances of the utterance; and the exemplar of occasional meaning is the personal pronoun. Statements containing 'I', written by an absent author are not meaningless, but the meaning reports S's designation, and may instantiate many different extensions. This notwithstanding, demonstratives and indexicals are not, Husserl maintains, equivocal, and cannot be identified (as can personal pronouns) with proper names; Husserl prefers to say that they have two meanings: an 'indicating meaning', to present the things to which reference is made, and 'singular presentation', giving the meaning of the speech act in which reference appears. Meaning, full and actual, grows only from indicating meanings: they are necessarily prior, and they establish enduring meanings. It might very plausibly be said that Husserl, by making this Fregean distinction, ignores the problems of demonstratives, and one might, equally plausibly, see that he has good reason to do so: utterances containing demonstratives seem to carry their meanings in the corresponding judgements, or senses, used in speech contexts. Accounting for them and all of their respective contexts would render otiose any argument for the ideality of meanings and for

images in the presentation of the conventional 'transport' of intentional meaning. On the theory to be presented in this dissertation, conventional meanings require no familiarity for dissemination, communication or meaning, and thus Husserl's compelling example cannot apply.

Husserl also considers cases of sentences in grammatical moods, those relating to past experience and mathematical relationships. Among the former are included what are elsewhere called propositional attitudes. Cf. the previous footnote.

Of the role of demonstratives Husserl (1970) p314 writes '[o]bviously we are here dealing with a case of unavoidable rather than chance ambiguity, one that cannot be removed from our language by an artificial device or convention'. Husserl restricts himself to expressions with their normal use '...[for simplicity's sake...'. Smith, D.W.; 'Husserl on Demonstrative Reference and Perception', pp193-213 in Dreyfus and Hall (1982) notes the similarity of insight between Husserl's and Kaplan's theory of demonstratives, beginning with the understanding of occasional expressions (pp193-194). Smith identifies ten theses for Husserl on demonstratives.

'1' indicates to H how he is to understand the meaning of S's utterance, though it does not possess a power to convey this fact, for, as described, this power resides in the mediating qualities of speech acts. Husserl (1970) pp315-316. 'It is the universal semantic function of the word 'I' to designate whoever is speaking, but the notion through which we express this function is not the notion immediately constitutive of its meaning'.

Husserl (1970) p317 lists other occasional, 'subject-bound' expressions, and again, with say, 'here', the prior 'genuine' meaning is constituted in the presentation of the place denoted by 'here'. Hintikka (1975c) p193 compares the study of intentional concepts to developments in intentional logic. The solutions to the problems of intentionality as directedness given are as unsatisfactory to Hintikka as they are to Davidson. Hintikka (1974) writes of his approach: 'Conceived of in the way as [sic] we have done, there are few questions more important than this problem of characterising the nature of intentionality. For the question is then: what is characteristic of conscious, conceptualisable human mental life and mental experience? This question is intimately related to the salient philosophical questions: what is man? And what is thinking? He remarks that views of intentionality as directedness are typically '...represented by frequent assimilations of intentional, vernehende accounts of actions to the so-called teleological explanations'. It shall be argued that Hintikka's work, a development of the theory of possible-worlds semantics, provides the key to a better understanding of intentionality. It is to be argued that Derrida's criticisms are negated if one does not accept his interpretation of Husserl. On such an interpretation, intentionality obtains in directedness to.
intentionality as directedness. In response Hintikka dubs his thesis 'intentionality as intentionality', and, in applying the machinery of possible worlds, gives a description of the theory itself which serves admirably for present purposes. Intentionality need not be seen in terms of directedness or containment, but,

...in blunt terms...a concept is intentional if and only if it involves the simultaneous consideration of several possible states of affairs or courses of events...[possible worlds]... In other words, possible-worlds semantics is the logic of intentionality, and intentionality is what calls for possible-worlds semantics.

That Husserl does not carry out the phenomenological analysis of referring expressions to its logical extent is recognised by a number of critics (Derrida makes the charge in remarking that 'phonocentrism' is a founding assumption of Husserl's semantics), and is indeed, vital to the possible worlds interpretation. Derrida, in explication of his point, describes examples identical to those

...in blunt terms...a concept is intentional if and only if it involves the simultaneous consideration of several possible states of affairs or courses of events...[possible worlds]... In other words, possible-worlds semantics is the logic of intentionality, and intentionality is what calls for possible-worlds semantics.

That Husserl does not carry out the phenomenological analysis of referring expressions to its logical extent is recognised by a number of critics (Derrida makes the charge in remarking that 'phonocentrism' is a founding assumption of Husserl's semantics), and is indeed, vital to the possible worlds interpretation. Derrida, in explication of his point, describes examples identical to those

objects, and intentional acts, Derrida correctly says, are described by a metaphor of containment: an act has inexisting in it an object.

Hintikka (1975) p195. Hintikka wishes to define the senses of the terms he uses, and his remarks are worth quoting at length. 'The word "simultaneous" refers of course to logical parity rather than to contemporaneity in the literal sense of the word. By "involves" I refer to the semantic implication of a concept, not to the overt features of its use. The "possible worlds" contemplated here are not grand histories of the world but usually only what a theoretical statistician would call "small worlds", that is to say, alternative courses of events which are rather short in duration and which concern only a miniscule part of the universe, for instance alternative courses that a single experiment might take. What is crucial is only that several such alternative courses must needs be considered within the same 'logical specious present'. We shall also find that the word "possible" in my phrase "possible world" has to be taken with a grain of salt too, and that the possible-worlds semantics in question has to be of the right kind and even so will exhibit different degrees of intentionality'. His theory of intentionality says that it is found not in relations obtaining in the world, but in comparisons between several possible worlds.

For Hintikka the consequences of the incorrect interpretation of intentionality is amply demonstrated by approaches taken to perception, and he remarks the frequency with which Husserl offers, as examples of intentional acts, perceptual acts. Hintikka says that perception is not obviously intentional and directed: one might prefer to say that in perception one is passive, and responsive to physical stimuli, and that this obtains even for acts as described by Husserl. However, Hintikka defends the core of Husserl's theory of perception, noting merely that it appears incorrect because of the faith put in intentionality as directedness, and Hintikka's work provides the solution, for it is also the intentionality of perception. (He thanks Hazlitt and Kant for methodological inspiration).

Discussion of the problems of demonstratives as the limiting cases for both Husserl's and Frege's semantic theories are, it might be ventured, the forums in which Derrida's criticisms of Husserl must be considered, for as shall be seen at the end of this section, part of Hintikka's response to intentionality as directedness derives from Evans' arguments for the mediation of reference by sense. In other work on Husserl, Derrida describes the problems of the permanently absent intention and the non-sufficiency of operation, the matters characterising the exchange with Searle, which can perhaps be seen as defining deconstruction. (Cf. Norris, C.; Derrida (London, Fontana) 1987, p.177). The response of Husserl to the problems of indeterminacy and demonstratives acutely raises the main objection of Derrida, that self-consciousness and the prospect of defining contexts for utterances are both illusory. The presence and adaptation of the sign to context cannot represent that which eludes consciousness. Further congruence between Grice and Husserl at this point can be noted. Direct meaning ('natural' in Grice), Husserl calls 'expression', and indirect, 'non-natural' meaning he dubs 'indication'. The latter applies, conventionally, to things not open to awareness or perception, completely or in part, at the time of the utterance (vocal or otherwise). As with a demonstrative, such expressions, though they refer (and the connection with Frege is here strong), are always of indeterminate meaning. They possess 'intrinsic' value. (Mooney, T.; 'Deconstruction and Derrida: Philosophical Roots and Bibliographical History', pp441-473 in Keeney, R. (ed.); Routledge History of Philosophy, Volume VIII: Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy (London, Routledge) 1994, writes, pp455-456 'To be more than an empty bearer or carrier it must be given meaning by a specific intention, though it may not transmit this in its fullness'). Derrida writes that such indications cannot be given meaning, for the intention can never be found.

The notion of expression in Husserl postulates a meaning with an immediate relationship with that signified. Meanings are present, direct, non-metaphorical, non-mentonymical, unmediated and so forth. Again as in Grice's theory, expressions may be given a non-natural, conventional meaning; the signs come to be used for indication; and, for Derrida, the paradigmatic instance of this is representation in speech acts and writing. Speech and writing launch the expression into the world, exposing it to the play of intentions and parasitism, and estranging it from its motivating intention. Husserl's notion of the spoken word as vehicle of intention, one might say, classes him as a speech act theorist: speech reports, unmediated, the content of the speaker's intention, of his conscious life. (See Mooney (1994) p456).
(above) from Husserl: the writing desk, perceived as rectangular, wooden, and with, one assumes from one’s perspective, four identical legs at each corner; the tree, or the house, seen again from a single perspective, as a solitary case of reporting a state of affairs. Husserl argues that the full panoply, the manifold, is given with the possession of all possibilities, the horizon, of possible perceptions, but ignores the assumptions underlying the thesis. Further descriptions are used to fill out incomplete, or supply absent, states of affairs, and it is precisely here that the problem of demonstratives arises. Derrida argues that given the absence of motivating intention, and the proliferation of contexts in which an author’s statement may be uttered, how may the horizon of the utterance be supplied? Signs for objects in states of affairs may, Husserl writes, operate as effectively in the absence of the complete manifold for they retain the guidance of intentions and established conventions. Derrida rejects this, and raises problems of reflexive, or demonstrative, expressions. As described, Husserl argues that a demonstrative functions if one fills in the motivating intentions operative at the time of utterance, and Derrida replies that all of its functions can be fulfilled in S’s absence, adding that there is no cleavage between utterance and intention for which account must be made, for the utterance always operates in the absence of a guiding intention: the motivating ‘I’ is perennially absent. This is precisely the matter to which Hintikka and Evans offer a reply, for (as in I.2) senses can be discerned outwith the context of a determining reference. Of retention and protentio, the basis of human self-consciousness, Derrida writes that there is no self-contained, sustaining consciousness in which the reference of expressions is settled before they are debased by use in indication; there is no unique access one has to one’s own thoughts, expressed in signs motivated by activated knowledge of past meanings and theorised expectations of consistent, future meanings. Husserl’s arguments that self-consciousness is constituted by retention and protention show, for Derrida, a further example of phenomenology not following its arguments to their logical conclusion: self-consciousness is, on these terms, far from pure and self-

---

61 Regarding the ways in which possible perceptions are derived from intentions and conventions.
63 Mooney (1994) p457 writes, in relation to Derrida’s rooting of a private language in (1977a) that ‘if I express the personal intuition that my voice breathes into the signature [were] to give it its normal meaning, and if this were to stay with the sign, then everyone would have to use my own private language’. The argument of ‘Signature Event Context’, and ‘Limited Inc a b c’ is amply attested in Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs (Northwestern University Press) 1973: the meaning of signs is always independent of the intentions with which an utterance may provide them: contexts are never complete or clear to the speaker, utterances requiring clarification, restatement or redaction to suit.
contained; it requires developed consciousness of past and future contained in meanings which, for Derrida, cannot be established. Derrida argues that the network of relations to further signs in self-consciousness theorises expressions always by indications, the locus of non-natural, conventional (context-dependent) meaning, and that if meaning in the present always indicates meanings one may expect to arise in the future, and which are always anticipated from the past, in what Derrida conceives as a condition *ad infinitum*, there is nothing to motivate the sign, or to supply a meaning. There can be nothing to carry an intention into this regress, giving an enduring conventional meaning, and so stopping it. Hintikka argues that these failings in Husserl are of expression and not, as Derrida argues, of substance; intentionality can be argued for on a possible worlds theory. In presenting his thesis Hintikka considers the conditions attended to by Derrida, namely, the matter-quality distinction and that between indicated and indicating meaning. The mediating rôle given to quality and the notion of convention required by indications are elucidated, for Hintikka, by reference to Evans’ strong case for the mediation of sense by reference, with particular attention to indexical expressions.

Hintikka argues for the two notions in Husserl that Derrida rejects: there is a non-intentional, pure perception (of *hyle*), and an intentional noesis to mediate this raw material (sense-data). *Hyle* are not experienced in acts of perception, they are the constituents of all perceptions, and so play a fundamental rôle in connecting up stimulation and the senses. They are not, it must be emphasised, experiences of an object, and are thus not intentional by Husserl’s own criteria. The intentional framework is supplied by the noeses, performing their rôle by ordering *hyle* into a set of appearances of an object. *Hyle* occur in acts of perception containing noeses, allowing the repeated collation of the raw data; that is, sense-impressions become intentional when they are organised by,

...one’s expectations, memories, etc...These (and the like) are what the noesis relies on that makes perception intentional. The objects of our sense are reidentified from moment to moment largely by means of the continuity of the beliefs we attribute to them.

---

68. Hintikka (1975c) p198.
69. *This distinguishes Hintikka’s work in perception from that of, say, Austin.*
70. Hintikka (1975c) p198. Hintikka writes ‘[t]hus quite literally only an additional noesis or thought-element...makes the hyletic data intentional. Thus in a sense, which is problematic but not Piecean, raw sensation (unedited perception) is not intentional according to this reading of Husserl’. A corollary is that one may conclude that when one’s beliefs about what one perceives are correct, one perceives correctly. ‘In other words, illusions (incorrect perceptions) are false beliefs induced by the senses’. However, Hintikka writes that such examples show the insufficiency of phenomenological analysis, for they refer only to the distinction between correct and incorrect perception and not to that between knowingly having an incorrect perception (and being
Husserl’s phenomenology requires that mediating noesis be conscious, and not implicit or tacit. The expectations and memories associated with an object cannot, Hintikka suggests, be simply another way of speaking of the editing and ordering process of the central nervous system, for phenomenology requires that all noemata are open to the reflection, and therefore that the acts fulfilling the mediating relationship are available to consciousness; he ventures that Husserl believes that this goes also for hyletic data. Hintikka rejects the theses that intentionality need be theorised by noeses described in conventions, and that mediation be understood as instantiating a relationship of directedness. His account of intentional perception develops a Davidsonian theme, arguing that consciousness is always experience ‘of certain objects, their properties, their interrelations, etc.’ The rawest sense data are always already structured, and this is the result of past conditioning and expectations learned in experience. Hintikka is clear: ‘On this view, the most primitive layer of sensation we can reflectively behold is already directed, i.e. organised so as to be of definite objects’. This, Hintikka says, is a ‘direct corollary’ of a theory of intentionality as intentionality, adding:

Perception is intentional because it is informational, and all talk of information involves several different possible states of affairs or courses of events in that it involves a distinction between states of affairs compatible with this information and those incompatible with it. Since to specify what one perceives at a given moment in time is... to specify the information one’s senses then convey to one about the object of one’s perception, this specification involves several unrealised states of affairs, i.e. is intentional in my sense.

able to correct it in thought), and not having an illusion at all (an important phenomenological problem writes Hintikka, yet, as Hintikka writes, ‘[H]e able to correct a sensory illusion in thought just is not the same thing as to be able to correct it in perception’. Such distinctions are persuasive proofs that there is a kind of truth and falsity and therefore a kind of intentionality in a perfectly good sense even in spontaneous, unedited impressions largely independently of what current beliefs (memories, expectations etc.) we associate with them. They correspond or fail to correspond to facts independently of what we know or believe these facts to be’. Dummett (1976) pp126 and 136 notes the affinity of his work with Hintikka’s theory of semantics on the basis that it allows the incorporation ‘... into our theory of sense an account of the basis on which we judge the truth values of our sentences, since it does explain meanings in terms of actual human capacities for the recognition of truth’. Hintikka (1975c) pp203-205 does some speculating on the reasons for the ambiguities he finds in Husserl’s account of the relationship of hyle and noematic sense.

The references are from Hintikka (1975c) pp200-202. The view encapsulated in the long quotation is he says compatible with the results of numerous psychologists of perception who emphasise the object directedness of perception. He argues, perhaps somewhat, that experiments to prove their point actually prove his, for if ‘...we could always grasp the hyletic data directly, apart from their object-presenting function... such special setups [would be] redundant. We could always attend to the sense-data directly’. Cf. Hintikka, F.; ‘On the Logic of Perception’, pp151-183 in Models for Modalities: Selected Essays (Dordrecht, Reidel) 1969. Hintikka writes that the logic of perception is a modal logic, and that a modal logic of perception both answers classical problems in the philosophy of perception (sense data, the argument from illusion), and elucidates the semantics of modal logic. In possible worlds, modal context experience no failure of referentiality but rather a referential multiplicity of possible states of affairs or courses of events. In truly Leibnizean vein, Hintikka writes that, ‘[a] logician might say that we often succeed in saying something about the actual world [say, in predictions] only by locating it, as it were, on the map of all the different possible worlds.’

There is, be continues, an ‘intricate’ connection between propositional attitudes and possible worlds. He states a case in which a propositional attitude is ‘disclaimed’, in which it is said that S believes neither in q nor r; that is to say, ‘...that there is a possible world compatible with everything S believes in which q would be false and that there is also a similar possible world in
(With Hintikka’s earlier thesis, derived from Husserl, describing the structure of sense data, the contents of sensations are specified using the same concepts as apply to intentional objects; the conclusion is drawn that perception allows a commitment to realism, and that it is irredubly intensional, and needs clarification in a possible worlds theory)\textsuperscript{73}. Hintikka continues that the informational theory of perception elucidates the rôle of conceptualisation or mediation. Hintikka’s theory presupposes that sense-impressions are received as conveying information, and Husserl’s that sense-impressions are raw material for mediation; as Hintikka says, while the informational theory demands a degree of conceptualisation by the receiver, this is not something applied over sense-impressions and mediated by noema as Husserl and Derrida have it, but is immanent in the impressions themselves, and this is evident in the fact that describing sense impressions is describing states of affairs compatible with the impressions received. This requires a realist vocabulary, and a speaking of perceptible objects; a description offered of the state of affairs obtaining is framed in the vocabulary of the perceiver. It is in this way that concepts enter sense-impressions, and are ‘culture-dependent’\textsuperscript{74}.

Mediation raises other issues. Husserl’s argument that all noemata are always available to phenomenological reflection (even the hyletic raw data), contains equivocations and qualifications enough to lead Hintikka to reject it, for elsewhere Husserl palpably suggests that \textit{hyle} cannot be separated from the sense given by a noema, or sense from reference, or indeed, matter from quality. In elucidating these points Husserl shows some awareness of the difficulties of achieving mediation\textsuperscript{75}:

We cannot place side by side two components in intuition, sense and filling. We can only obtain the difference by contrasting the empty and the filled sense, that is, through a synthesis of intuition and empty consciousness. Perhaps we might put it thus: the abstract identical in several different acts of consciousness which is called sense is an essence (sense-essence) which particularises in its special way [in demonstrative thoughts],

which r would be false’. However, this is not to say that the worlds are identical, and it can be evident that they are not. Hintikka gives an example: it is possible that q=not r, and this means that S has neither opinion q nor not-r, and, in this case, the requirement that the two worlds be identical demands that there be a possible world containing everything S believes in which both q and not-q are true, this is contradictory. ‘Hence we often have to consider more than one possible world compatible with someone’s propositional attitudes. Only in the case of an omniscient S can one restrict one’s attention to one world only’. Hintikka (1969) pp157-162, proceeds to consider how worlds are related and weighted, and offers a short way of dealing with Chaine’s arguments against quantifying into belief contexts.

\textsuperscript{73} Hintikka (1975c) pp202-203 writes that this is a form of directedness, but that Husserl has the wrong sense. He adds that the intentional and informational character of perception is connected to the rôle of conceptualisation in perception, and on a theory of intentionality as intensionality, the intentionalty of perception ‘presupposes’ that sense impressions are received as conveying information, and are categorically not merely stimuli for eliciting responses.

\textsuperscript{74} Hintikka (1975c) p203. Hintikka argues that no noeses are required, and that ‘[a]ll these observations [that Hintikka makes] are consequences of the analysis of (spontaneous) perception in terms of the class of states of affairs it admits of...’.

\textsuperscript{75} Hintikka (1975c) p221 says that the remark is found in one of Husserl’s unpublished work. He adds that this doubt clearly shows a threat to all of the distinctions Husserl elsewhere seems so careful to establish (matter/quality, sense/reference and \textit{hyle}/\textit{sense}).
Husserl here describes the modes of intuition as irrevocably separate, with a meaning inhering in intuition, and another in non-intuition. Hintikka considers that the passage might be consistent with the core of Husserl’s arguments: that hyle are always connected with noesises, that sense data are only made intentional via a noema, and indeed, that Husserl remains consistent on the nature of the mediation between hyle and sense, but yet identifies, ‘...the limitations of our language and conceptual thought in speaking of it’. However, Hintikka concludes that Husserl’s requiring the mediating contrasts (hyle-form, matter-quality), leave him unable to accept a theory far more plausible, and closer to Hintikka’s (and indeed to that intimated in the passage), which sees the only necessary distinction as that between an intuited and a non-intuited mode of consciousness, reported in acts”. The unmediated data, Husserl argues, are the things that fill noematic acts, and Hintikka suggests that this filling rôles that Husserl gives them, ‘...implies [by Husserl’s own theory] their non-intentionality’, because to be unmediated data, they, by definition, are non-intentional. A possible worlds theory tolerates no such distinction. However, the ambiguities in Husserl’s presentation again prevent clear account, for though hyle and the filling are ever linked, their connection is opaque. Husserl makes, for Hintikka, a prima facie bewildering distinction in saying that the filling rôle of noema belongs to objects (or references), and not unconceptualised hyle; again, this conflicts with the notion that the data appropriate for filling are the most primitive, atomic givens”. These ambiguities apply equally to the matter-quality distinction. If

---

*Hintikka (1975c) p203.

6 Hintikka (1975c) p204 writes, in response to Husserl, that the passage quoted might be thought consistent with Husserl’s other remarks: ‘...Husserl is only saying that we cannot meaningfully speak of hyletic data in their virgin state, unsullied of any noesises. If this is what he means, what is involved is merely a consequence of the fact that hyletic data are according to Husserl only conceptualised (made intentional) through a superimposed noesises. Since language presupposes conceptualisation, we cannot speak of the hyletic data until they are subjected to the noesises. And even then we cannot really speak of them alone, only of the intentional experiences to which they belong as components’. This, it might be thought, does not alter the distinction between hyle and sense, but shows the limitations of language and of conceptual thought. ‘He is not saying that there are no unstructured hyletic data. He is only saying that we can speak of them only insofar as they have already been structured by the noesises (and even then only at the second remove, that is, only in so far as they are components of our experiences of those objects which are the only rightful subject matter of conceptualised discourse). So understood, Husserl’s second thoughts do not belie [Hintikka’s] criticism of him, they merely introduce a cautionary footnote as to how this criticism ought to be formulated’. Kaufmann (1949) p213 says that there is needed a comparison between Husserl’s and Cassirer’s arguments on form and matter.

the *hyle*-sense fulfilling relationship is workable, then are the acts filled (ones for which, Husserl says, one can have conventions and expectations), related more to *hyle* or to their objects? Are they 'meaning-conferring' or meaning-fulfilling'? Do they describe matter or quality, indicated or indicating meaning? If Husserl is to maintain the belief in the mediating rôle of noema, the data allowing fulfilling must be partly conceptualised, or partly intentional, and this Hintikka offers.

In rejecting the matter-quality distinction, Hintikka writes,

[w]hatever "form" there is in one's perception is present already in the most spontaneous sensuous "materials" that can surface in one's awareness. Speaking of "matter" and "form" in perception thus appears not only empty or problematical, but positively misleading?.

For all this, Hintikka draws no sceptical conclusions retaining a commitment to intentionality and to realism. He argues that the possible worlds theory of intentionality allows notions of conceptuality and mediation, and in conclusion, it is argued that Hintikka might appeal to that given by Evans in his analysis of demonstratives, and this constitutes the final tenet of the response to Derrida's criticism of Husserl on intentionality.

The mediating relationships established in a theory of intentionality as directedness are prone to the objections (as considered in I.2), to Fregean *Sinn*. The references, or concepts, of *Sinne* or noematic acts are their meanings or objects: they are, on traditional interpretations of Frege, directed.

Just as the meaning of a linguistic expression determines which object the expression refers to, so the noema determines what the object of an act is—if the act has an object, some acts have a noema for which there is no corresponding object.

Hintikka rejects the metaphor of directedness, and asks, after the rejection of the matter-quality distinction, how the relationship of sense to reference is instantiated without metaphor, and without loss of the guiding intention: he echoes Evans. Neither Frege nor Husserl argue that a *Sinn* 'functionally determines', by argument, a reference, or object, and this because, '...the two different

79 Hintikka (1975c) p205.
80 In the following section a possible worlds approach is used in formulating a response to Rorty's arguments against representation in semantics.
82 Hintikka (1975c) p206 rejects the notion with a pithy remark: '[a] noema, conceived of as the "vehicle of directedness", far too easily becomes like a concrete aid to a riflemen's aiming in that it becomes a single entity, however abstract', and provides for making a response to those, conspicuously Rorty, who believe that *Sinne* and noemata in Frege and Husserl are easily reified (and Hintikka reminds one that both regard them as single and complete), and are thus entities about which one may plausibly evince scepticism. Hintikka shows that the abstractness of noemata is not the pertinent point, for however difficult they are to, as it were, understand, they are immanent in experience.
noemata \textit{[Sinn and noema]} would only rarely be directed to the same object’. Rather, as Evans before him, Hintikka writes that \textit{Sinn} is a ‘function’, itself achieving definite reference to its object, for a \textit{Sinn}, besides its reference, contains also, ‘...the way in which this reference is given’. The notion of a ‘way of being given’, is not a metaphor, or a capacity giving only the remnants of always absent intentions, but is a function, described by Evans, of sense to reference, carrying the reference in literal and parasitical cases alike. Hintikka asks what are the functions of arguments replacing the ‘abstract’ entities in Husserl’s analysis, and going for sense and reference in the mediating relationship. His answer leads directly to the discussion of the following section: ‘[o]n the general semantical level on which we are here moving, the only plausible answer is the apparently trivial one: everything’. In specific, intentional relationships the functions depend upon features of the possible world in which the reference is made, and, as Hintikka says, they must always depend upon features of this world. ‘Concepts, meanings, are therefore functions from possible worlds to references (objects), for the whole idea of “possible world” is that it comprises everything (at least everything that is relevant to the particular question we are asking)’. This is, as Hintikka has argues, the response of possible worlds semantics with regard to the status of concepts and the Fregean notion of the movement of sense to reference: concepts are functions from possible worlds to extensions; concepts, as possible worlds, are, again by the above arguments, intrinsically intentional\textsuperscript{83}.

In the following section it is described how hyletic data can, on a possible worlds theory, be intrinsically intentional, and how utterances, or speech acts, reporting these data (in states of affairs), can carry intentionality, and thus provide a theory of intentionality for language. The theory to which appeal shall be made (Wittgenstein’s), is avowedly a response to a canonical theory of linguistic intentionality, namely Russell’s theory of descriptions, and it with this that the discussion of the next section begins.

\textsuperscript{83} Hintikka (1975c) p207. Meanings of expressions and meanings are functions determining their references or objects. Regarding Hintikka’s and Evan’s arguments, this is all that can be said for the logical status of noemata or \textit{Sinnen}. ‘No matter how interested one may... be in the specific recipes for determining the values of such functions or in other aspects of their concrete realisation, one must not forget their categorical status as functions’.

Regarding the intrinsic intentionality of concepts Hintikka writes that even if all uses of a concept do not have to involve, on one interpretation of possible worlds semantics, all possible worlds, any nontrivial use of concepts ‘... implicitly involves more than one possible world.’ He adds, ‘... a closer analysis of the very idea of intentionality or conceptuality as directedness (to an object) leads us back to my [Hintikka’s] thesis of conceptuality as intentionality in the sense of involving several possible worlds at one and the same time. Moreover, once we see this, all emphasis is shifted away from directedness as a special relation of an act to an object \textit{in this world}. The same function which in our world gives us one object will give us another object in another one. The relation of this function to its values is no more remarkable in one world than in another. This shows in further detail in what sense intentionality is an interworldly affair, not an intra-worldly one’. One may, says Hintikka, both at the same time criticise reifications of intentionals objects (in the case being considered here, sense data), into entities in the actual world (for they exist in identifications between worlds), and of intentionality into interworldly objects rather than relations.
Denoting phrases can, for Russell, have any object or subject as their referent; they denote solely in virtue of their form. However, there are three caveats to be noted. A denoting phrase might not signify any living thing or tangible object. Russell’s example is ‘the present King of France’. It may denote unambiguously a non-existent thing, say, ‘the present King of France’ (in 1905), and it may denote ambiguously over a class, say, ‘a man’. An important distinction accompanies this point, showing ways in which knowledge is acquired. Knowledge by description and by acquaintance are given by complete description and direct experience respectively. Russell’s example is of the ‘centre of mass of the solar system’. One can only be informed of this by means of description, for there is no immediate acquaintance with the centre of the solar system. As Anscombe writes, it is the premise of Russell’s theory that such designating, intentional descriptions require analysis, and that ontological commitments to non-existent entities can be avoided.

Russell defines both the universal and the existential quantifiers:

\[
C \text{ (everything) means } \forall x \text{ (x is always true)},
\]

\[
C \text{ (something) means } \exists x \text{ (x is false) is always true}. \]

---


2 Russell (1905) p479. The distinction is of the first importance, one found not to work in Anscombe, G.E.M.; An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (London, Hutchinson) 1959, p43 and Derrida, J.; Of Grammatology. Further arguments are made throughout the footnotes for the conclusion that the distinction does not work. Derrida cuts to the heart of the matter regarding the insufficiency of denotation as a theory of meaning, and his objections are the same as those made by Wittgenstein. Cf. Monk (1996) pp4-5. Indeed, responses to Russell must be seen for their use in further muddying distinctions between semantical and phenomenological traditions in philosophy. There are many interesting questions raised. The most sustained objections are those of Strawson, P.F.; ‘On Referring’, pp1-27 in (1971a), and the differences between Russell and Strawson are a microcosm of those between Cantabrigian and Oxonian philosophy, the former, crudely, after Russell’s example, emphasising semantical analysis in the pursuit of truth, and the latter, equally crudely, after Wittgenstein’s example, following the analysis of ordinary language, or of meaning as use. Monk and Derrida suggest Russell’s influences were far more phenomenological than has been realised, indeed, the latter’s objections place Russell in the same class as Husserl. Darnmesser is clearer still on the phenomenological bases of “analytical” philosophy. Is Wittgenstein really an analytical philosopher? He is categorically nothing like Russell. Atlas, J.D.; ‘What are Negative Existence Statements?’, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XI, no. 4, pp373-394, 1988, pp381-382 draws attention to an earlier remark in Russell, B.A.W.; The Principles of Mathematics (London, George Allen and Unwin) 1903. He wants an analysis of “A is which, ‘...holds of every term (A) without exception. The is here is quite different from the in “Socrates is human”; it may be regarded as complex, and as really predicating Being of it” (p49). It is this which Atlas’ work is set to criticise.

3 Anscombe (1959) p43.

4 Russell (1905) p480.
However, as Russell deals with definite descriptions, he adds, ‘C (nothing) means “C (x) is false” is always true’. The first two statements are Frege’s; the last is Russell’s application to definite descriptions, and accounts for variables which do not apply to the predicate. Denoting phrases, continues Russell, have no meaning in themselves; there is only meaning in the propositions in which denoting phrases occur. The constructions of the propositions in logical language are formed so as to give only a bald denotation with reference (to real or fictional entities). For example, ‘C (some men)’ is analysed as ‘It is false that “C (x) and X is human” is always false’, and so prevents ontological commitment to abstractions.

Russell rejects Meinong’s claim that a grammatically correct denotative phrase simply stands for the object denoted, for this permits breaches of the law of non-contradiction by allowing descriptions such as ‘a red square’ to refer. This notwithstanding, the target of the theory of descriptions is Frege, and his distinction of the two elements of a denotation: sense and reference. Russell says that the example of the centre of mass of the solar system is complex in meaning; there are, necessarily, many thoughts

6 Cf. Anscombe (1959) p44.
7 Cf. Anscombe (1959) p43 and Monk (1996) pp4-5. It is slightly to anticipate later arguments to say that Russell’s reasons for writing the theory of descriptions were to challenge the view that descriptions can have meaning by themselves, or, that they stand for something (an existing being), a theory he found in Meinong. Cf. footnote 14.
8 Russell (1905) pp41-81.


10 As has been seen, Frege’s distinction says that proper names and the predicates applied to the objects identified have sense, and that predicates have reference to an instantiated concept. A sentence with a judgement occurring in ‘secondary’ occurrence (cf. below on Wittgenstein’s objection to Russell’s final example), remains an expression containing a proper name, and if the name refers, the judgement is either true or false. However, the semantical philosophical tradition since Frege has asked how senses can be guaranteed references. Russell remarks that the problem is obviated for sentences analysed according to the theory of descriptions. In an analysed sentence the only words left are those unambiguous and identifying real things. As shown in footnote 20, meanings go for objects, relations and properties: all things for which the words stand. This, for Russell, is how language reaches out to reality.

Wittgenstein both retains and rejects parts of both Russell’s and Frege’s semantics, and the distinction between knowledge by description and by acquaintance is one part he rejects. All knowledge is knowledge by acquaintance. As seen in the ‘difference’ example, Russell remarks that the two judgements carry different relations of the mind to a set of objects and a relationship R (say aRb); if R gives the relationship between a and b, then the judgement is true, and if not it is not. Wittgenstein’s objections
required to understand it, yet there is ultimate simplicity in its denotation, for it 'has no constituents at all'. This broaches the notion of identity, yet leaves unaddressed a series of problems in Fregean theory, to which Russell turns. If a denotative phrase is explicitly to deal with identity there must be clarification offered by examples of the type given in Russell's unit class: 'If \( \nu \) is a unit class, then \( \nu \) is \( \nu \)'. This proposition ought always to be true, but as 'the \( \nu \)' is a denoting phrase, the proposition is rendered nonsense if 'the \( \nu \)' is not a unit class, for, by a Fregean theory, it fails of sense and reference.

Russell maintains that propositions do not become nonsense simply by virtue of their denotations being negligible. The second problem derives again from Meinong. Referring to a particular object, and predicating something of it, entails the difficulties of ontological commitment. For example, the present King of France is found in neither category when, say, all of the bald things and all of the hirsute things are enumerated. A third, related, difficulty with which denoting theories must contend is that of subsistent ideas or entities. There is an intuitive problem in saying 'A differs from B' in that 'difference' cannot be the subject of a proposition.

Russell rejects the Fregean theory that argues that a proposition has both a meaning and a denotation. He states an example which aims to show that the meaning of proposition \( y \), when analysed by the same method used for the centre of mass example, is, if it is anything, the meaning of the denotation. Denotation is given by 'The centre of mass of the solar system is a point, not a denoting complex', yet

and suggested corrections to this constitute the main reply to Russell (see below), and it is precisely the notions of states of affairs and of logical space (shared with Husserl and Hintikka), that revise this theory of linguistic intentionality.

As Anscombe (1959) p41 writes, readily assuming that descriptions hold of objects, and that the sentences in which they appear describe things true of objects, contains a tacit acceptance of the Fregean theory of descriptions with proper names.

For it is identical with itself.

Again as Anscombe (1959) p41 says, the core of Russell's theory is that the way in which descriptions stand for objects must be different from the way in which proper names do, and that the very idea of definite identity is challenged. She remarks that a proper name stands for an object because the object is called by that name, but that descriptions pick out objects, because the object identified satisfies the description: a different relation. Although see Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul) 1922, 5.542. Kaplan quips that the identifying function of Russellian definite descriptions is to identify a specific individual: 'That's right, John himself, right there, trapped in a proposition'.


Atlas (1988) essays the 'extravagant' semantics. He describes the Russell-Strawson debate: Russell's (and Meinong's) positioning of being for definitions for semantic versus Strawson's contextual (conventional) definitions of singular terms (pp382-383). Taking leads from linguistic theory, primarily that of a topic-designating Noun Phrase, Atlas argues that 'The King of France is not bald', is not about the King of France (it not being a topic-designing Noun Phrase). Atlas has great ambitions for his theory: it constitutes a response to Strawson on the presuppositions of existence statements, and an explanation of the appeal of the analysis in definite descriptions. Atlas criticises Quine's claim that Russell's mistake is to equate meaning with naming in the statement of a definite description, because the problem stands without appearing on those terms. The restatement brings up again the question at the heart of the Russell-Strawson debate: of the meaningfulness of statements as against their truth or falsity (cf. p376).

Russell (1903) states a different view, one to be contrasted with the theory presented in *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (London, George Allen and Unwin) 1919. In the former work Russell considers the idea that there are entities meant by descriptions (cf. especially §51). As Anscombe (1959) p43 says: '...not only definite descriptions, but such phrases as "any number" in "Any number is either odd or even", had denoting concepts as their "meanings"'. However, with reference to the 'difference' example, and to Anscombe's of 'any number', in 'Any number is either odd or even', one must reply that a proposition with a description is asserted of an entity not of a 'corresponding denoting concept'. Again, this is what the theory of descriptions is to overcome, and Wittgenstein gets to the heart of this problem.
the meaning may be expressed by referring to the subject directly, as in, "The centre of mass of the solar system" is a denoting complex, not a point". With a complex sentence y, for instance, its statement reports its sense; that is, to speak about meaning, one's given statement must identify something which denotes y. This description, Russell says, has among its problems that, in a proposition, only a denotation occurs, and not a meaning, for meaning is relegated to a sentence with a different structure, and can only be discerned with study of this sentence. Russell's suggested alternative begins from the intuitive objection that the meaning cannot be found only with reference to an ersatz descriptive statement, but should be given in what y itself means. Furthermore, in giving a definite description for the proposition 'George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley', meaning and denotation cannot be separated in this way, it describing a propositional attitude and not a factual statement. In providing its analysis, Russell shows if y denotes, then there is an entity for which it stands.

The distinction between primary and secondary occurrences is vital to the full analysis of denoting phrases. Denoting phrases ('the author of Waverley'), must be stipulated as uniquely identifying a single person to whom is given a definite description. 'One and only one man wrote Waverley, and George IV wished to know whether Scott was that man', and not 'George IV wished to know whether one and only one man wrote Waverley and Scott was that man' is the correct parsing of the phrase 'George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley'. If the property predicated of the term in question does not belong to the term, or, importantly, belongs to several, then the definite description has failed, for one is attempting to predicate something to one term, specifically the subject in y. The notion of primary and secondary occurrences becomes important when the sense of the

---

18 Anscombe (1959) p42 sees the attraction of Frege's theory. She gives examples of the ways in which the comparison of definite descriptions with proper names fails. The predicate in a definite description must be uniquely true of something if it is to stand for anything, and, analogously, a proper name, assigned a bearer, is said without guarantee that the bearer satisfies the name. In this way one '... can give truth-conditions for statements containing definite descriptions regardless of whether the descriptions are vacuous or not'. Anscombe adds examples to show that Frege's theory that an occurrence of a vacuous definite descriptions in a sentence renders the sentence unable to make a true or false statement; she suggests 'Either he has no children or his first child's name is Hilary'. This shows that the object (he) satisfying the description (there may be not such an object), is not designated by it in such a way that nothing true or false could be said by a sentence containing the description if the object did not exist, yet, say, if Walter Scott had never existed the use of his name to identify the author would never have occurred.
19 Cf. Russell (1905) pp487ff and Anscombe (1959) pp41-42. If a name picks out nothing in the use to which it is put, then no object is given to which properties may be ascribed, and nothing, true or false, is said. If it does have a use (if it applies to a bearer), then the accompanying sentence is false if it predicates of the bearer something which does not apply: A subject-predicate sentence 'Some man is...', if false, is so not necessarily because the predication is false of some man. However, if it is true, it is so because the predicate is true of some man. 'So, if we persist in thinking that the sentence would be made true by the fact that something holds of what the grammatical subject stands for, it turns out that its falsehood would not consist in the same thing's not holding of what the grammatical subject stands for'.
20 And on this cf. footnote 10.
21 The analysis of sentences with definite descriptions removes them from 'the class of signs that contribute to the meaning of sentences in which they occur by standing for their bearers'. (Anscombe (1959) p44). Anscombe continues: 'The denoting phrase
sentence would fundamentally be changed by the parts of the sentence referring differently, and Russell gives as an example. 'There is an entity which is now King of France and is not bald' fails to refer, and is, therefore, making a false statement; however, with the negative in the correct place, one can make a true statement: 'it is false that there is an entity which is now King of France and is now bald'. All propositions with 'the King of France' in a primary occurrence are found to be false.

The conclusion of the theory is described in terms of a resolution of the problem of ontological commitment. If a difference is to be found between two statements (a and b), then saying 'R is the difference between a and b' is a true statement, constituting a denoting phrase, if there is one and only one difference, R, to be considered. If the statement is false, then there is no difference, or relation, to be found between a and b, and there is no commitment to unreal individuals or subsisting entities, and it is to this example that Wittgenstein objects. The notion of identity as given in this final example disappear, and only the predicates (and proper names, if any), used in their construction play a part in the result of the analysis'. The relationship of intentionality that Wittgenstein offers is achieved by the simplest atomic signs.

Russell writes that for a sign to have a meaning it must stand for something: signs are proper names and also the relations said to hold between named individuals: both mean the things for which they are signs. Anscombe (1959) pp44-45 notes the deliverance, clarifying this view, offered by Wittgenstein, L.; *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford, Blackwell) 1958, in the distinction between the proper name as standing for its bearer, and the meaning of a name as its bearer.

Russell (1905) p488. Anscombe (1959) pp42-43 comments upon the primary distinction marked in Russell's theory, that forming part of the heritage from Frege. In a definite description there appears an identifying name and an appended description, for example 'Scott was the author of Waverley'. Anscombe finds a cleavage between Russell's logic and his theory of knowledge, that giving rise to the difficulties encountered in Russell's endeavours to avoid ontological commitments. As Anscombe has it, Russell argues that ordinary proper names are not genuine proper names (which require bearers), but require a parsing to avoid the intuition that what a genuine proper name stands for must exist. As Anscombe says, not taking this route leads to the idea that bearers of genuine proper names are not subject to Cartesian doubt (they are akin to raw sense data), or simply are Wittgenstein's objects. It is Anscombe's view that the ambiguity is never settled, and, again, this shall be pursued throughout the footnotes and in the discussion of Wittgenstein. Again, Wittgenstein's and Derrida's responses to Russell should be seen for their close similarity.

Another raft of the argument against Frege, and another to which Derrida attends, is considered here. As seen, Russell argues that a definite description has no meaning by itself but only in the proposition in which the denotation occurs. Anscombe argues that by this Russell holds that a definite description does not function like a name, and that this is a further symptom of his distinction between real proper names and genuine proper names. 'He puts the point in that obscure way because of his idea of what it is for a word or phrase to "have meaning", namely: a word has meaning if it has a word with which one means an object; to mean an object one must be acquainted with it; for a word or phrase to have meaning then, it is necessary for what we mean by it to exist'. It is to satisfy this difficulty that the theory of descriptions is written.

Topic designating noun phrases are described by Atlas (1988) pp376-378. Saying 'The King of France is bald' when there is no King of France is, for Strawson, a failure to make a true or false statement, for the presupposition is wrong. However, a 'cliff' sentence, 'It is the King of France who is bald', is a false statement, and thus is made without presupposition of there being a King of France. The presupposition is of someone as being bald, not of the existence of a King of France. In the latter, 'The King of France', is not topic-designating. Eliding the distinction between the two confuses the, '... use of a singular term to refer to something with a statement's presupposing that the singular term is used to refer to something' (p377). Fascinatingly, Atlas' work leads to discussion of the ways in which words and statements are 'about the entities named (pp378f). Atlas says that Russell was more aware of this fact than his critics allow, giving ample citation from Russell's work prior to 1900. In this way the understanding of 'aboutness' becomes another of the issues forgotten in the march of linguistic, analytical philosophy (p383 and see p381). Topic designating noun phrases are, according to Atlas, prefixed in Grice, H.P.; *Presupposition and Conversational Implicature*, pp269-282 in (1989), a fact recognised, according to Atlas, by Hintikka and Donnellan. Atlas (1988) p388 extends the arguments to Quine's arguments against quantifying into indirect, oblique belief contexts. Quine theories the 'aboutness' of statements describing beliefs incorrectly. His argument rests on the assumption that statements ascribing beliefs to Orttcutt are about Orttcutt (and hence he can establish that belief contexts apparently ascribing beliefs to Orttcutt cannot be thought to refer to Orttcutt when stated with an 'Orttcutt believes...' formulation). Atlas says this is an assumption fit for the language of quantified logic, but not for English.

Russell (1905) p490. Strawson's reply, rather than suggesting that there is a definite description applying to each and every name, argues for referring as being something one can do only in a specific case (1971a) p2. A meaning is a function of a sentence or expression, that is, a sentence or expression must have been assented to before one can give an analysis of its reference. In the case of the King of France, therefore, one must have assented to the fact that the present King of France exists, or at least, subsists, for the sentence 'the present King of France', is meaningful. Strawson wants a distinction to be made in terms of the ways in which a sentence is used in specific circumstance (pp7-8). The use of each utterance of a sentence is different from the sentence itself. There is both a distinction to be drawn and a similarity to be noted between Strawson's and Russell's accounts. Strawson's theory would accept that the denoting phrase 'the King of France' is significant, and that a
reference is made only if there is one and only one King of France answering to the description, but Strawson disagrees that one of Russell's 'uniquely-referring' phrases has any particular reference, even though it may be used to refer on specific occasions. The phrase 'The King of France is bald' is truth-valueless, for, he repeats, its use on specific occasions determines its reference.

Strawson takes a more circumspect approach to the matter of ontological commitment. He takes it that a cumulative outcome of his theory is that saying 'the King of France is bald' need not commit one to a belief in abstract entities. As a reference is determined by a use on a specific occasion there is no danger posed by ontological commitment, and, thus, one's use need not be circumstanced by any rules (p11). [Strawson also discusses the use of significant expressions to pretend to refer].

One fundamental distinction between the use of a sentence and precisely what the reference contained in the sentence denotes in the Russellian sense. Conventions, combined with the situation in which the utterance is made, secure a unique reference. The use of a proper name, or a pronoun, as what Strawson calls a 'singular logical' subject does, quite simply, make reference. The subject-predicate analysis of a sentence can be retained, and when an object is not present immediately to the senses, one can form a description. This description, however, is formed from terms derived from the grammar of a conventional singular sentence. Strawson dismisses definitional analyses as giving criteria suitable only for ascriptive uses. This, one can conclude, is due to the descriptions offered presupposing a degree of knowledge on the part of the conceiver (p12). That is, Strawson is suggesting that reference will already have been made before a definite description can even be formulated, and this is a solid criticism of Russell's theory.

A proper name for Strawson is the purest referring phrase, for it has no 'descriptive meaning', that is, it has the least dependence on context of the referring expressions (p20). Within certain bounds, a proper name can be used to refer without ambiguity in many contexts. This division within referring expressions is signalled further by two classes of statements to which references can be assigned (p21). The first gives general 'referring-oon-ascriptive' conventions, that is, say, for the use of indexical pronouns: I, he, and she, respectively in contexts. The second gives no conventions, but looks to 'ad hoc' decisions made for a particular use in a particular case, such as, for example, the use of proper names. Strawson wants to suggest that these ad hoc decisions are not relative to each individual occasion, but are governed by certain rules for each context in which their use is taken to be appropriate. One can best analyse the two opposing themes by noting some intuitive difficulties they contain, and, in some cases, show.

Referring, for Russell, can be achieved by a denoting phrase in three different ways: by referring to a wide class, referring ambiguously, or to nothing at all. To use Russell's first example, the centre of mass of the solar system cannot be referred to as an existent thing; this reference could only be given by a description of something not directly experienced. A number of problems are entailed. A first response would suggest that descriptions may leave one ontologically committed, for one may have to give faith in the knowledge one had ascertained an event or subject, without a suitable description. Secondly, the denoting phrase, 'a man', when given a definite description (in itself difficult enough), still seems not to refer. There is an air of contingency, or relativity, to this phrase; there seems to be needed a context of utterance. A series of sub-descriptions may have to be offered to achieve specificity. Russell's theory of descriptions does this, as per the Scott example. However, Strawson shows that there is another sense in which reference may be elucidated. There is a suspicion that Russell's definite descriptions will have to be made progressively more specific, and, in the process, render any benefit they may have nugatory. One would end up describing one's situation, or intended reference, in such detail, that one would end up with a theory with similarities to Strawson's when its details are filled out.

Avoiding breaches of the law of non-contradiction is central to Russell's intentions, and so the unique identity will single out one and only one with a description that signals whether or not the item exists. Russell extends this to the centre of mass example, a reference which can, of course, be made only by description. One can here see the problem of assigning descriptions, particularly in the light of the discussion of the specificity of Russellian descriptions. If one is forming one of Russell's 'wide class' descriptions, one is faced with the dilemma of having to form an accurate description of, say, a circle. One could plausibly describe a circle as, say, a square with equal portions removed at each corner so as to form a shape with two sides of the same length joined by a right angle, and with a third formed by constructing a line of uniform curvature from the end of one of the lines to the other. This description, however, is still vague, and the stages it describes could be broken down, and further described in a number of different ways. This brings the difficulty of requisite knowledge to the fore, one which causes difficulties for Russell's analysis, and which will be returned to. At the present, one can appreciate that the language Russell wishes to describe all denoting phrases in is not simple, or atomic, at all, but complex. At this juncture one might look to the Frege exposition for a more solid grounding of the distinction. Russell tells us that Frege's distinction between reference and denotation do seem comprehensive, yet there is a sense in which it may be applied. The meaning is achieved by the whole phrase identifying something: the fact that it does refer. The denotation, conversely, could be taken as the specific item referred to, that which is denoted.

Russell wants to distinguish knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Owing to the fact that one cannot be acquainted directly with many things, Russell laid stress upon descriptions, and, moreover, on full definite descriptions as avoiding ontological commitment. All descriptions, however, have been seen to offer only attributive knowledge, or knowledge by description, even for those things with which one is acquainted directly. One could still be committed to the existence of many entities. These points add up to a conclusion which imparts upon Russell's discussion of identity, continued in the example of the unit class. The conclusion says that one could take a as a unit class without denotation in the Russellian sense because meaning could plausibly be argued to be prior. The discussion Russell gives of primary and secondary occurrences of denoting phrases
contains an ambiguity affecting Russell's theory of intentionality, bringing into doubt the idea that meaning and denotation are carried in a single proposition with a denoting phrase. Wittgenstein argues that to judge a difference between a and b (a Rb) one stands in a specific relation to a, R and b, and he asks how the judging relation must change for, say, a judgement that not-aRb, that is, the converse of the same proposition. He considers cases for the other logical constants, and introduces notions vital for his analysis, those of states of affairs and of logical space.

A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given by it [in that it must be always sensitive to the combination of the expression with other logical constants].

(Otherwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc. would introduce more and more new elements—in coordination).

only goes to emphasise the preceding criticisms. To form a correct denoting description one must order the elements of the phrase correctly, thus one must say 'It is false that there is a King of France who is now bald', rather than 'There is a King of France who is now bald'. Again, one is defining, or elucidating, the already given meaning. This is the problem Strawson takes on by stating that meaning is decided in each case, that is, is a function of the sentence. The meaning, for Strawson, is not given by elaborating an exact identifying statement, but is inherent in the use of a denoting phrase in a context. The reference is always meaningful, for the use of a sentence is in a class apart from the plain statement of it, or its utterance. Strawson's point gives no problem with definite descriptions, and satisfactorily unites meaning with denotation.

Using a proper name on a particular occasion gives a reference, for, of course, the sentence is meaningful. Therefore, saying 'the King of France is bald' is a referring sentence for it is meaningful. The example of the non-existent entity, however, for instance Pegasus, points up ambiguities. To predicate things of Pegasus is to use meaningful sentences, but as to referring to things either true or false, how does Strawson avoid ontological commitments? Strawson might fall back on a translation such as Quine proposes. This necessitates providing a description, with all of the problems this entails. One need not think of ontological commitments when criticising Strawson, for one has, on his theory, to define the use of the denoting phrase in question in each instance of its use, or, at least, to know the terms applicable to the immediate context. One would be giving something like an extensive definition, and this would lead, inevitably, to the problem Russell's theory faced: that of giving only attributive, not referential, uses. The meaning would not be elucidated; it could still plausibly be assigned arbitrarily.

Strawson speaks of rules for his referring expressions, and they are not rules at, say, Wittgenstein has it. Strawson stresses that meaning cannot arbitrarily be assigned, and so he speaks of general 'referring-cum-ascriptive' conventions for directly referring expressions, and 'ad hoc' conventions for particular occasions. There is a general set of rules for each type of situation; one does not decide arbitrarily. For these rules to apply, however, there must be a prior decision as to how terms are to refer: there is a criterion. Once again, one is only talking of terms with attributive uses; the meaning, one might say, remains undefined.

Both Russell's and Strawson's theories have an absolutely unambiguous description of meaning as their goal. They are both unable to define meaning, merely relying on descriptions of an already assumed meaning. It was suggested that Strawson's theory may lack a Quinean descriptive element, as derived from the theory of descriptions. Mates, B.; 'Descriptions and Reference', Foundations of Language, vol. X, no. 5, pp409-418, 1973. Mates defends the theory of descriptions against the 'followers' of Strawson, and indicates a neglected feature of the theory, one which goes beyond the examination of the given example. The details are vital, and it is Mates' contention that the theory of descriptions has application not just to a formalised language, but to everyday speech. It is, the theory of descriptions applies to all propositions in the language of Principia Mathematica, and to all contexts in which they occur. In response to Quine's extension of the theory, it deals with so-called 'closed' descriptions, and with those 'open' to the binding of their variables outside the description. Thus, the reply of the followers of Strawson goes, the study of descriptions requires study of both types of cases, and thus that a unique reference for each description is an impossibility, for a referent, e.g., is not part of what the speaker asserts in an utterance in which... the description is used to perform the function of identifying reference, it is rather a presupposition of his asserting what he asserts' (cf. Strawson, P.F.; 'Identifying Reference and Truth-Values', pp75-95 in (1971)). Mates argues that this is mistaken, and the notion of presupposition inchoate (cf. p415). Mates' theory proceeds from a notion of asserting, and while it may not achieve what he claims for it, but as posing the semantics/pragmatics of language in a detailed and fascinating way (cf. p417). It is important to note that Mates works with a caricature of Strawson's position, making the, '...truth-value of what is said fluctuate with these differences of situation and purpose is only to lose the difficulties in a haze of confusion'.

Wittgenstein (1922) 3.1432 and 3.42; also 4.1252ff. Black (1964) p contains a remark that should be repeated. Black writes that Wittgenstein thinks of atomic propositions or situations as like coordinates in logical space, and complex propositions as a 'volume' in logical space. It might be added that the view of this as merely a metaphor depends upon which interpretation of possible worlds one holds. Black writes that, 'An important implication is the inseparability of a proposition from the "logical space" in which it is located. The proposition's logical relations partially determine its sense and are not something superadded when the proposition combines with other propositions in truth-functions'.

One must also see the applications of Wittgenstein's notion of states of affairs in Notebooks 1914-1916 (Oxford, Blackwell) 1961, especially 19.9.16, 7.10.16, 8.10.16, 21.11.16, 11.9.16, 5.8.16, 7.8.16, 11.8.16, and 2.9.16.
Thus it is, Wittgenstein argues, that the states of affairs described in propositions must mirror, or represent, all other states of affairs, to themselves and to all others, and he raises difficult matters for a theory of intentionality as directedness, firstly, how a belief is about something, and secondly, how it is that the content of the thoughts is correctly specified by the statement of the belief (‘I believe that p’). Can one misdescribe one’s intentional states, and if so, what is entailed for relationships to falsehoods or non-existent entities? Postulating the independence of the possibility of having the belief that p from the case that p is no solution, for this avoids the difficulty of how a directed intentional relationship is established when what one thinks to be the case is independent of, and so not caused by, the case the p. The question arises: how does the thought reach out to reality? For a response Wittgenstein introduces as central the idea of representation. He gives an example of formulating a wish, and stating it. What makes one’s wish the wish that p is a representation made to oneself of what one wishes to be the case. This, as shall be seen, avoids the difficulties concerning what one believes to be the case may neither existing nor coming to be, and permits the establishment of a relationship between the content of a thought and reality.

In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus the connection between an intentional representation and the representations of language as reports of states of affairs is intimately made. The analogy is clear in Wittgenstein’s example: one’s thought that p is a proposition that represents its sense iff one’s thought

25 Ammereller, E.; Wittgenstein on Intentionality, pp59-93 in Glock, H.-J. (ed.); Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader (Oxford, Blackwell) 2001, p62 notes Wittgenstein (1958) §518, in which Wittgenstein makes a clear application of his concerns to a theory of intentionality with a quotation from Theaetetus, a dialogue which occupies Wittgenstein in the arguments against ostensive definition. The Theaetetus passage (189a) has Socrates asking Theaetetus whether, when someone thinks, he thinks ‘something’, and that when he thinks something it is something ‘real’. Theaetetus replies in the affirmative on both occasions. This directedness of intentional states at their content requires elucidation (§95), for the content of the intentional representation obtains temporally, and (to put it crudely) in the head of one with the representation; it may refer to something one believed not to have happened, or to something which does not exist. How, to repeat (a question that will arise throughout the rest of this dissertation), is a picture ‘attached’ to reality, as Wittgenstein asks in (1922) 2.1511; his own answer is that it reaches ‘right out to it’. See also Wittgenstein, L.; The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford, Blackwell) 1958, §31. For a study of the representing relationships between words, propositions and things or states of affairs of Massumi, B.; ‘Deleuze’, pp59-573 in Critchley, S. and Schroeder, W.R. (eds.); A Companion to Continental Philosophy (Oxford, Blackwell) 1998. For the development of these ideas of Weleman, A.; ‘Into the Abyss: Deleuze’, pp615-627 in Glendinning (1999). Ammereller (2001) pp59-63 considers ideas and problems of intentionality, as propositional attitudes and as directed at literal objects. Cf. Davidson (2001g) especially p96.

26 For it is for future experience to decide whether what one now thinks is attested. Cf. Anscombe (1959) p46.

27 In Wittgenstein, L.; Philosophical Remarks (Oxford, Blackwell) 1975, in which the rejection of early ideas was, it should be emphasised, outweighed by their modification for the later work. See especially §20ff. The Philosophical Remarks is Wittgenstein’s response to Russell’s later theory of intentionality, given in Russell, B.A.W.; The Analysis of Mind (London, George Allen & Unwin) 1921.

28 Ammereller (2001) p63, notes Wittgenstein (1975) §26: ‘If I wish that p were the case, then of course p is not the case and there must be a surrogae for p in the state of wishing, just as, of course, in the expression of the wish’, and adds that one cannot say what one wishes to be the case without using some means of representing it: in this case by ‘p’. What makes one’s wish the wish that p is ‘somehow present in and constitutive of one’s wish’, and by this means can a mental state of wishing that p be individuated by what one wishes to be the case, ‘...given that this has not yet happened and may never happen’. This gives wishes their content as wishes; they reach up to reality by containing a representation of what one wishes. One takes the representation as true, and in cases in which it is, it accurately represents reality. One conceives of the thought one has in the representation as true. ‘Hence the constitutive problem of what makes a thought the thought that p [how a belief has a specific content if it is true] is identical with the problem of what makes a representation the representation of what I think to be the case when I think that p. And the epistemic problem [how what one thinks determines the content of the thought] is to explain the nature of the knowledge I have of what the representation in question represents’.

29 Wittgenstein (1922) 4.
is true, and he argues that what one represents to oneself, what is represented in the noun clause of the report 'A believes that p', is identical with the fact that p\textsuperscript{9}. Both the intentional representation and the representations of language are argued for through the picture theory of representation, central to the Tractatus, and developed and modified in the later work\textsuperscript{31}. The picture theory is instigated to rectify what Wittgenstein calls the 'misunderstanding' of the logic of language, a confusion engendered by the use in the same contexts of names and logical constants\textsuperscript{39}.

In the picture theory a proposition or thought is taken as a logical picture of a state of affairs. The most vital aspect to recall is the analogy (introduced earlier), between the pictorial representations and propositions. They have in common those features which make any possible representation of the situation represent truly what it represents\textsuperscript{33}. The sense in both cases, of the proposition and the representation, is made possible by the existence of atomic, simple objects, those which are a necessary precondition of representation, and the simple objects in combination, which the picture represents, are related to one another as represented by the picture\textsuperscript{34}. On a full linguistic analysis every proposition which can be represented, or can represent by mirroring, is a truth function of only the simple objects, (the elementary propositions), and Wittgenstein, taking his cue from Russell's definite descriptions (and from Leibniz), takes elementary propositions as ultimate, necessary metaphysical constituents of


\textsuperscript{32} Wittgenstein (1922) 3.323 and 4.0621, and cf. Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp46-47. Anscombe (1959) pp74-48. Ammereller (2001) p64 adds that Wittgenstein's theory advocates a close relationship between intentional representation and linguistic representation, for he argues that a thought is a significant proposition with sense. 'Like its linguistic expression, one's thought that p is a proposition token which represents its sense, i.e. what is the case, if one's thought is true. Hence, to show what must be the case for a thought to have content is to show what it is for a proposition to have sense. This...is the crucial point of Wittgenstein's obscure suggestion that "A thinks that p" is of the form "p" says p...viz. that it "explicitly reduces the question as to the analysis of judgement... to the question "What is it for a proposition token to have a certain sense?"". An answer to this question is, as said, the clarification of the way in which a proposition can have the capacity to be true or to be false as a measure of reality, and leads directly to the picture theory of representation. Ammereller gives a brief description of the derivation of the 'main pillars' of the picture theory from Wittgenstein's earliest philosophical work.

\textsuperscript{33} Wittgenstein (1922) 2.1 and 2.12.

\textsuperscript{34} Cf. Ammereller (2001) pp65-67. Ammereller writes that, for Wittgenstein, the way a proposition represents its sense is not the same as the way in which a name stands for an object. 'By the same token, Wittgenstein thought that the natural analysis of the sentential form "A thinks that p" or "A says that p" as that of a dual-relation must be wrong. For on this analysis, A's thinking (saying) that p consists in a two-term relationship between A and what A thinks (says), i.e. what is designated by the noun clause "that p". Accordingly, the content of A's thought is conceived as a kind of object. Furthermore, on this construal, the "object" of A's thinking or saying is identical with the sense of "p", i.e. with what "p" says or represents'. This seems to require, for true thought, that what A thinks (what 'p' represents), is identical with the fact that p, entailing the absurd conclusion that false thought is impossible. Therefore, Wittgenstein, as Ammereller shows, moves to examine what can go in the role of object of thought, and this raises the problems regarding how a thought may come to be endowed with truth, solutions to which are provided by the picture theory.

A picture and a proposition describing a situation have in common essential features '...in virtue of which any possible representation of the situation in question represents what it represents' (p66 and cf. Ammereller's description). Importantly, Ammereller adds, Wittgenstein does not say that pictures or propositions as wholes represent that which must correspond to them for them to have sense, merely that the elements of a picture, or of the proposition, are the representatives of objects (Wittgenstein (1922) 4.0312). The sense of a picture or proposition, and the possibility of its bearing truth or falsehood, turns upon the existence of simple, necessary objects to correspond to its elements, those which can go proxy for the elements of a picture.
the world, depending upon nothing for their truth\(^3\). Elementary propositions each stand directly for a simple object, and represent the possibility of a state of affairs obtaining, yet are independent of what is the case, being its foundation, and are the substance of the world\(^4\). The agreement in form of representation between a picture and what it represents is an agreement in logical form\(^5\). While the world is all that is the case, the case (in itself a fact) is the existence of states of affairs, and a state of affairs is a combination of simple objects\(^6\). The example of the cars in the model of the crash in the Paris court room is merely one example of a form of representation, for one could choose any such form for perspicuous presentation. Thoughts, and propositions expressing those thoughts in reports of intentional states, are, however, logical pictures in a stricter sense than other forms of representation, for their pictorial form is only logical form. It is essential for the simple objects that they be the constituents of states of affairs or of atomic facts, and Wittgenstein adds that each object exists only in logical space\(^7\). With this he contends that the matter of how propositions reach out to reality is solved, for what is given in the picture theory of representation is a definition of what makes a propositional sign produce on any occasion of its use the expression of the thought, or, the projection of a possible state of affairs. Speaker meaning in such cases must then be read off from the projection encapsulated in the verbal expression. (Wittgenstein postulates a process of interpretation, or translation, for the

\(^{39}\)”The Nature of all Being: A Study of Wittgenstein’s Modal Atomism” (New York: Oxford University Press) 1992. Bradley studies the mirroring properties of language, and the role played by human convention (especially pp164-165). Glock (1989) p649 says that Wittgenstein, in response to Platonist and empiricist theories of logic, questions the status of logical constants, and, a move known to Husserl, argues that the goal of philosophy is not to describe reality but to study the ways in which reality is represented. (Cf. on the development from Russell, Grayling (1996)).

\(^{38}\)”Hence, Wittgenstein is palpably more Fregean than Russellian. Ammereller (2001) pp67-68 notes some important points in respect, and regarding the way in which these considerations apply to study of propositions. What of problems concerning propositions containing empty names, or thoughts with non-existent objects? Do not these problems actually show up the difficulty confronting any theory of intentionalty, of the relation of words or thoughts to the constitution of reality? Wittgenstein’s reply is simple, ‘...he hold [that] every proposition must turn out to be a truth-function of elementary propositions to which the conditions of the picture theory apply, which entails that the sense of elementary propositions is object-dependent’. (How great a debt Wittgenstein owes to Russell and the theory of descriptions in this is considered by Ammereller and Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp70ff, roughly, Russell shows that the senses of propositions (say, a predication), can be independent of the existence of the object (S) of which something is predicated, and that such senses (of ordinary proper names), can be independent of the existence of objects referred to by expressions such as the name of the subject (S).

\(^{37}\)”The Nature of all Being: A Study of Wittgenstein’s Modal Atomism” (New York: Oxford University Press) 1992. Bradley studies the mirroring properties of language, and the role played by human convention (especially pp164-165). Glock (1989) p649 says that Wittgenstein, in response to Platonist and empiricist theories of logic, questions the status of logical constants, and, a move known to Husserl, argues that the goal of philosophy is not to describe reality but to study the ways in which reality is represented. (Cf. on the development from Russell, Grayling (1996)).

\(^{36}\)”The Nature of all Being: A Study of Wittgenstein’s Modal Atomism” (New York: Oxford University Press) 1992. Bradley studies the mirroring properties of language, and the role played by human convention (especially pp164-165). Glock (1989) p649 says that Wittgenstein, in response to Platonist and empiricist theories of logic, questions the status of logical constants, and, a move known to Husserl, argues that the goal of philosophy is not to describe reality but to study the ways in which reality is represented. (Cf. on the development from Russell, Grayling (1996)).

\(^{35}\)”The Nature of all Being: A Study of Wittgenstein’s Modal Atomism” (New York: Oxford University Press) 1992. Bradley studies the mirroring properties of language, and the role played by human convention (especially pp164-165). Glock (1989) p649 says that Wittgenstein, in response to Platonist and empiricist theories of logic, questions the status of logical constants, and, a move known to Husserl, argues that the goal of philosophy is not to describe reality but to study the ways in which reality is represented. (Cf. on the development from Russell, Grayling (1996)).

\(^{34}\)”The Nature of all Being: A Study of Wittgenstein’s Modal Atomism” (New York: Oxford University Press) 1992. Bradley studies the mirroring properties of language, and the role played by human convention (especially pp164-165). Glock (1989) p649 says that Wittgenstein, in response to Platonist and empiricist theories of logic, questions the status of logical constants, and, a move known to Husserl, argues that the goal of philosophy is not to describe reality but to study the ways in which reality is represented. (Cf. on the development from Russell, Grayling (1996)).

\(^{33}\)”The Nature of all Being: A Study of Wittgenstein’s Modal Atomism” (New York: Oxford University Press) 1992. Bradley studies the mirroring properties of language, and the role played by human convention (especially pp164-165). Glock (1989) p649 says that Wittgenstein, in response to Platonist and empiricist theories of logic, questions the status of logical constants, and, a move known to Husserl, argues that the goal of philosophy is not to describe reality but to study the ways in which reality is represented. (Cf. on the development from Russell, Grayling (1996)).

\(^{32}\)”The Nature of all Being: A Study of Wittgenstein’s Modal Atomism” (New York: Oxford University Press) 1992. Bradley studies the mirroring properties of language, and the role played by human convention (especially pp164-165). Glock (1989) p649 says that Wittgenstein, in response to Platonist and empiricist theories of logic, questions the status of logical constants, and, a move known to Husserl, argues that the goal of philosophy is not to describe reality but to study the ways in which reality is represented. (Cf. on the development from Russell, Grayling (1996)).

\(^{31}\)”The Nature of all Being: A Study of Wittgenstein’s Modal Atomism” (New York: Oxford University Press) 1992. Bradley studies the mirroring properties of language, and the role played by human convention (especially pp164-165). Glock (1989) p649 says that Wittgenstein, in response to Platonist and empiricist theories of logic, questions the status of logical constants, and, a move known to Husserl, argues that the goal of philosophy is not to describe reality but to study the ways in which reality is represented. (Cf. on the development from Russell, Grayling (1996)).

\(^{30}\)”The Nature of all Being: A Study of Wittgenstein’s Modal Atomism” (New York: Oxford University Press) 1992. Bradley studies the mirroring properties of language, and the role played by human convention (especially pp164-165). Glock (1989) p649 says that Wittgenstein, in response to Platonist and empiricist theories of logic, questions the status of logical constants, and, a move known to Husserl, argues that the goal of philosophy is not to describe reality but to study the ways in which reality is represented. (Cf. on the development from Russell, Grayling (1996)).

\(^{29}\)”The Nature of all Being: A Study of Wittgenstein’s Modal Atomism” (New York: Oxford University Press) 1992. Bradley studies the mirroring properties of language, and the role played by human convention (especially pp164-165). Glock (1989) p649 says that Wittgenstein, in response to Platonist and empiricist theories of logic, questions the status of logical constants, and, a move known to Husserl, argues that the goal of philosophy is not to describe reality but to study the ways in which reality is represented. (Cf. on the development from Russell, Grayling (1996)).
speaker to go through in order to give sense to the propositional sign; to determine fully and completely how and what the words signify. The completely translated proposition expresses the thought in such a way that the objects referred to correspond to the elements of the proposition and the syntactical relationships between the objects and the proposition are completely perspicuous. The fully interpreted sign stands in the projective relation to reality.

The analysis of the representing properties of propositions on the model of simple objects in combination requires clarification, for one must ask what precisely the objects are, and how they may appear in combination. In answer to the latter, it shall be argued that objects combine in possible states of affairs, but this must await a full answer to the first question, one which, one might immodestly say, elucidates Wittgenstein’s claim that the sense of a proposition can be shown but not said. For Wittgenstein, objects are the substance of the world, existing ‘independently’ of it (‘all that is the case’), irreducible and unalterable, and changed only in relation and configuration to other objects.

Their ultimate constitution cannot further be determined (they are, to repeat, unanalysable), and all that can be seen, and so shown, of their make-up is the logical relations they instantiate between type and type in combination. Wittgenstein writes of this ‘[s]o we cannot say in logic, “The world has this in it, and this, but not that”’, and so it is, as Hintikka and Hintikka say, that logic is prior to the question of how logical relations come into being, but not to the question of what it is that they bring into combination of the forms of different objects), gives the possibilities of certain objects of appearing in certain states of affairs, and it is in the context of these combinatorial possibilities that objects must be contemplated.


It is interesting to note that by the picture theory the expression of a thought is the translation of a proposition into a public language, and the means by which the relationship is made is studied by Ammereller (2001) pp71-73. He addresses one of the questions raised by Wittgenstein in his study of intentionality: what are the nature of the correlations between a picture’s elements and reality? (Wittgenstein (1922) 2.1515). Wittgenstein writes that it is for psychology to decide how a speaker’s meaning an object by a word can be described via physiological processes, and that discerning the logical function of a word requires a different (undeniably metaphysical), enquiry. The psychological question is irrelevant to philosophy. (The thoughts, one might add, would be constituted by the same logical form as the word in a proposition, and in this is the kernel of Wittgenstein’s theory of intentionality). However, as Ammereller notes, Wittgenstein’s explanation of what makes a sign an expression of thought utilises such a psychological conception of a correlation between word and object. Ammereller quotes Wittgenstein (1922) 3.11 and 3.12 (‘We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation. The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition. I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign. And a propositional sign is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.’), and writes that the expression of a thought, and the thought expressed, are both projections of states of affairs. Regarding the notion of thinking of a proposition Ammereller writes that ‘[s]ince what the proposition is a projection of is the sense of the proposition and since the sense of a proposition is what is said by it, what Wittgenstein refers to by “thinking the sense of the proposition”, presumably, is the speaker’s meaning or the hearer’s understanding something by a propositional sign “p”’. It is this that animates a sign on an occasion of use, for meaning and understanding, for Wittgenstein, are interpretative processes, giving for each expression a signification for the words used. ‘It is only the interpreted propositional sign which stands in a projective relation to reality: it is only the interpreted propositional sign which shows its sense, i.e. shows how things are if it is true’ (Ammereller (2001) p73). The process of interpretation itself requires knowledge of the logical form and those combinations of constituents that allow the corresponding thought fully to be expressed in a proposition sharing this form; indeed, the same processes that the speaker utilises in order to express his thought in a proposition. See for the most explicit presentation of the argument Wittgenstein (1922) 3.2. Ammereller (2001) p73 concludes that ‘[i]n the completely analysed proposition the thought is expressed in a way that the objects of the thought correspond to the elements of the propositional sign and its logical syntax is completely perspicuous’.

Wittgenstein (1922) 2.021, 2.024, 2.027 and 2.0271. Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp45-46 consider the plausible questions that arise in response to Wittgenstein’s theory: what are the simple objects, and how are they constituted? They venture that doubts are best allayed by consideration of the less prominent passages in (1922), and their remarks are considered throughout
combination". In reading off the configurations of states of affairs from combinations of simple objects, Wittgenstein writes, and the Deleuzian tenor should be heard,

...one cannot say, for example, "There are objects", as one might say, "There are books".

And it is just as impossible to say, "There are 100 objects", or "There are 80 objects".

And it is nonsensical to speak of the total number of objects*.

This picks up a thread left by the thesis outlined earlier in this section: that the existence of simple objects is shown in the use of their names in language. From this it follows, as seen in Wittgenstein’s response to Russell, that the constants of logical language are always ‘non-empty’*6. Furthermore, the thesis that simple objects are given, unanalyzable, and perspicuous in their configurations has consequences for the analysis of designating or denoting possible or non-existent entities. Wittgenstein’s ontology of objects avowedly includes possibilia, and he writes that it makes as little sense to say that a specific object exists or not as it does to maintain that an object could exist, for, again, one can only seek clarity concerning their instantiated combinations in complex, composite objects. This shows that ‘...we have to deal with the objects that actually are as if each of them existed necessarily and as if collectively they were exhaustive by necessity’*6. All states of affairs, actual and possible, are derived from the same simple objects in combination; their basic, unalterable form underpins all simple propositions in objects in states of affairs*6. Wittgenstein writes,

If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given.

Objects contain the possibility of all situations.

The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object*.

the rest of this section. They add that the confusion may be exacerbated by Wittgenstein’s apparent willingness to countenance phenomenological entities as simple objects (in this making reference to two early essays).

6 Wittgenstein (1922) p.5. Elsewhere (5.221) Wittgenstein says ‘Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I cannot speak about them. I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are’, and (5.552) ‘The “experience” that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is not an experience. Logic is prior to every experience—that something is so. It is prior to the question “How?”; not prior to the question “What?”’.

7 Wittgenstein (1922) 4.1272.

6 Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp.47–48 add that this is not in itself a foreign notion, for it ‘...reproduces a feature of Frege’s logical notation’. This revisits notions considered by Ammererler and raises both matters central to the Fregean semantics considered in 1.2 and to the metaphilosophical ideas adumbrated in Introduction and 1.1 regarding Kant’s relevance to the writing of a theory of intentionality. In Fregean semantics ‘...one could not express the existence or non-existence of an individual object. Existence is a higher-level predicate; it is expressed only by the existential quantifier. And this Fregean practice can be considered, according to several philosophers, merely as a technical realisation of the older [Kantian] idea that existence is not a predicate’. The shared assumption (one which Wittgenstein pushes much further than Frege) is, write Hintikka and Hintikka, a dubious notion in Fregean logic and its successors, not least because the inexpressibility of the existence of an individual introduces the idea ‘...that existence is expressed solely by the existential quantifier, for it means that existence assumptions are imported into one’s logical language by each and every individual constant admitted into it’.

6 Cf. Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) p.48

6 Wittgenstein (1922) 2.022 and 2.023.

The quotations are from Wittgenstein (1922) 2.0124, 2.014 and 2.0141 respectively. Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) p.49 write, following this, that the thesis of the inexpressibility of the existence and constitution of objects is accompanied by the thesis that
The last remark shows Wittgenstein's thesis to involve more than merely the claim that objects are the substance of the world: they are also its form, a form reported in propositions describing states of affairs, and showing that the description contained in the proposition can be given (that is, its logical form). The basic form of states of affairs and of propositions is immanent in simple objects.6

Hintikka and Hintikka describe the ways in which one may come to know simple objects, and to see and discern then from other simple objects. They suggest an analogy with Russell’s shifting notion of knowledge by acquaintance. (For Russell, sense-data are the matter of perceptions, yet they are also objects of perception, the contents of what is perceived). As has been seen, knowledge by acquaintance describes the direct experience of a state of affairs, and in later work Russell countenances the development of the theory for application to an account of logical form. Understanding aRb, and its difference from bRa and not-aRb, necessitates understanding the constitution of the logical form of each proposition and the relationship of acquaintance requires detailed knowledge of the corresponding existentially generalised proposition, and of its truth, as revealed in the theory of descriptions.7 such generalised propositions are necessarily true. As Wittgenstein’s objections show, there is a problem in relating acquaintance with completely general propositions, those Russell used to explicate logic and meaning in the theory of acquaintance. To what conventions can Russell appeal to claim that the one state of affairs is to be described in completely generalised propositions for analysis of its logical form? As Hintikka and Hintikka show, the work done by logical forms in Russell’s theory must, for Wittgenstein, be delegated to simple objects of acquaintance: they must account for (be the building blocks of), the logical form of complex propositions. Again, simple objects are the substance and form of the world; complex logical forms are given by the logical forms of atomic propositions, which are, in turn determined by the forms of objects.8 Simple objects are indefinable, ‘...everything that exists in

such objects constitute the substance of worlds, actual and possible. The same objects are the ultimately simple constituents of all worlds.

6 Wittgenstein (1922) 2.022 and 2.025. The thesis of the inexpressibility of objects is, however, confused as Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp49-50, show; it might, they say, go to show that objects are the substance of worlds, but he needs further arguments to show that they are also their form. It seems that the notion of the sharing of logical form between propositions and the structure of reality as a potential for the combination of states of affairs with others (presented above), is the source of a solution to Hintikka and Hintikka’s doubts. Simple objects, like monads, have no constituents giving them a pulposable form; they exist only in combination.

7 This goes for Russell, Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp52-53 show, for all propositions; all structures of propositions have a quantitatively separate logical form, which is, like the proposition, an object of acquaintance.

8 Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp53-55 argue that this gives a solution to the confusion noted in footnote 49: objects are, in addition to being the substance of worlds, their forms, that is, they do the work of complex logical forms in Russell. ‘To spell this out somewhat more fully, we can say that Wittgenstein thinks that the complex logical forms are all determined by the logical forms of elementary (atomic) propositions. Furthermore, the logical forms of atomic propositions are determined by the forms of objects. It is via this two-stage process that all logical forms can be reduced to the logical forms of simple objects. From them, all possible logical forms can be constructed. This view is so strange that it has demonstrably misled several competent commentators’. In coming to grasp this thesis it is well to recall that Wittgenstein rejects complex logical forms as independent entities: all such entities are constructed, owing to shared logical forms, from simple, necessary objects. ‘The very same objects have to constitute, by being combined with each other, the form of any conceivable fact because logical forms do not exist as
its own right can only be named, no other determination is possible, neither that it is nor that it is not’. Complex objects consist of compounded simple objects, and ‘...the names of the elements become descriptive language by being compounded together’; simple objects are not experienced as data for the understanding, as Russell says, but experience is, as it were, immanent in them.

The “experience” that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is; that, however, is not an experience.

Logic is prior to every experience—that something is so.

It is prior to the question “How?”; not prior to the question “What?”53

Understanding of logical forms comes not after acquaintance but with acquaintance53. In describing how acquaintance may arise one may return to two of Wittgenstein’s immortal lines, bearing conflicting interpretations:

*The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.*

I am my world. (The microcosm)54.

This is so, Wittgenstein writes, for the limits of one’s language defining the limits of one’s world mean that one is one’s world; one’s faculties and representing abilities are constituted by the relationships of simple objects55; the degree of sophistication of one’s abilities depending upon the way in which the objects are given, or how one has made their acquaintance. In a transitional work, Wittgenstein writes that a description of all of one’s sense impressions would give, ‘prima facie’, nothing of what is needed for a description of them (this being, as above, impossible), but rather ‘[t]his would be a biography’.

One’s world consists of the objects discerned in one’s experience, guiding one’s language and thought, a theory not, as might be thought, suggesting an existentialism or a solipsism, but rather that one, and one’s language and thought, depend upon the objects given in experience (the raw, unmediated sense-data)56. Given this the detail of the relationship of intentionality is elucidated: simple, atomic objects show their names to one in experience, performing again the task Russell set for knowledge by separate entities but have to be built up [from] the logical forms of simple objects. Thus Wittgenstein’s simple objects are in a poignant sense at the same time both the form of the world and its substance (content)57.

Hintikka and Hintikka go on to describe the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas from Russell’s (and Frege’s) and numerous interpretative difficulties.

Wittgenstein (1922) 5.552.

Cf. Wittgenstein (1922) 5.61 and 5.641.

Given this the detail of the relationship of intentionality is elucidated: simple, atomic objects show their names to one in experience, performing again the task Russell set for knowledge by separate entities but have to be built up [from] the logical forms of simple objects. Thus Wittgenstein’s simple objects are in a poignant sense at the same time both the form of the world and its substance (content)57.

Hintikka and Hintikka go on to describe the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas from Russell’s (and Frege’s) and numerous interpretative difficulties.

Wittgenstein (1922) 5.552.

Cf. Wittgenstein (1922) 5.61 and 5.641.

Given this the detail of the relationship of intentionality is elucidated: simple, atomic objects show their names to one in experience, performing again the task Russell set for knowledge by separate entities but have to be built up [from] the logical forms of simple objects. Thus Wittgenstein’s simple objects are in a poignant sense at the same time both the form of the world and its substance (content)57.

Cf. Wittgenstein (1922) 5.61 and 5.641.
acquaintance, namely, that of tracing back one's '...understanding of the meanings of phrases to its source in [one's] experience'. Their names and properties appear immanently in sense experience. The ways in which sense-data may come to make up the world turn upon their combination, which, '...produces [complex] states of affairs'. Even the constitution of an 'imagined world', Wittgenstein writes, must have a 'form' in common with the actual one, the unalterable form contained in simple objects. Their configuration to form the actual world betrays their status as each constituting a single, simple state of affairs, a possible world in miniature. (Their different configuration gives a different state of affairs, and so a different possible world). As Hintikka and Hintikka show, the combination of states of affairs does not include a temporal aspect: configurations and new possible worlds are altered and changed by the coming to be in description of new simple objects (or states of affairs), themselves unchanging and tolerating assimilation into new worlds. (It is in this property that they, it might be argued, constitute a sound basis for a theory of repetition, for they remain unaltered, and are thus not themselves subject to repetition, but form the structure of the world and the possibility of discursing about its contents). In this way can sense-data be more than merely phenomenal or existential objects, for simple objects, as seen, do not vary in time, but only in combination with other objects. They are unchanging because they are the meanings of the atomic expressions of a language, those which can no longer be spoken of or described, but only shown.

---


38 Wittgenstein (1922) 2.0272.

39 Cf. Wittgenstein (1922) 6.3611.

40 Simple objects stand outside the nexus of repetition, and see Wittgenstein (1922) 6.37.

41 Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp70-80 assess the arguments in Wittgenstein for the persistence and ultimate simplicity of objects (best conceived of, they say, as objects of acquaintance), seeking confirmation in the later works for their thesis that Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist and, in some ways, remained one, and again finding parallels with Russell's work. This nicely leads to the discussion, promised in Introduction, of representation in the later work. This is, it should be emphasized, merely a summary of some ideas.

One constant theme is the relationship of picturing, or representation. In (1958b) §429 the relationship between thought and reality remains internal to language, yet is presented as an agreement within language between thought and reality:

'The agreement, the harmony, of thought and reality consists in this: if I say falsely that something is red, then, for all that, it isn't red. And when I want to explain the word "red" to someone, in the sentence "That is not red", I do it by pointing to something red. The section also makes reference to the problem at the core of Wittgenstein's first approach to intentionality, that broached in Wittgenstein (1961), and central in the theories of logical form and logical space in (1922), and yet there are palpable differences. Firstly, the statement 'This is red' is instantiated not by the existence of a state of affairs which the proposition represents, but by the existence of the colour red. The propositions 'This is red' and its negation are about the colour red, and the senses of such elementary propositions are independent of the way things are, but are dependent on the existence of the objects about which the proposition gives information. Secondly, for an elementary proposition to have sense it must be possible for the object identified by 'this' to be red. (There is, therefore, an approximation to the early theory of logical form, and what one thinks, says or believes and so forth in the intentional relation must be something that is possibly the case). Thirdly, for the thought to reach out to reality its elements (in Fregean vocabulary, its sense and reference), must correlate with objects in the world. These correlations constitute the relation of representation, and make the representation a picture.

In presenting the doctrine of meaning as use, Wittgenstein points to the facts that one explains the meaning of some words by pointing to the objects identified, and that this generates the idea that what one indicates in an extensive definition is simply its
measuring is defined to reference thought or proposition is false depending upon whether the object pointed at fulfill its description or not. Wittgenstein gives a series of examples of the ways in which descriptions given on the model of ostensive definitions may or may not be observed in practice, and of how their use may incite imitation. They are, to all intents and purposes, conceived of as rules. While it is correct that ostensive definitions can be true or false in a way that definitions of such things as, say, units of measurement, cannot be, it is the words so defined, red and so forth, that are characterised either correctly or incorrectly, and this applies equally to words given straightforward lexical definitions. (In an example of a child being instructed by ostensive definition, the intention behind the teacher's explanation is to give meaning to the word, a meaning which will serve the child in future descriptions of the world, and in previously unencountered contexts. It becomes, in a way possibly identical to the definition of the unit of measurement, the status of a rule for continued application; that is, the ostensive definition may achieve the status of the explanation of an analytic truth).

At (1958b §60) it is claimed that what has to be in place prior to the use and understanding of ostensive definitions is a sense of the grammatically correct use of words. For the canonical illustration of this theory at work one must turn to the opening of (1958b), and the examples of the shopping lists and the builders (§§1 and 2). The two stories, particularly the first, show up the fact that just as units of measurement must exist before correct judgements can be made, so must defining samples be among the tools of language before such judgements can be made. Wittgenstein picks up the point (§38), and says that on the assumption that a name means, or stands for, an object, it is natural to go on to say that if the colour red did not exist, one could hold no intentional relationships to red things, and neither say nor think that something is red. This does not require that one posit red as a necessary existent, for saying that red exists may be merely a way of maintaining that the word 'red' has a meaning. Alternatively, saying that 'red exists' may be just to say that there are red things in the world. Here, however, in both cases, one says nothing to the end that the world contains red things as a necessary truth, nor that the meaning of the word 'red' as used in one's language is given meaning through the reference of an ostensive definition to samples in the world. A reconsideration of the picture theory may be made here. The possibility of an ostensive definition, and the sense of propositions as presupposing grammatically correct uses of the word 'red' have, following the postulation of a layer of presuppositions in one's use of language, uncovered again the question of how language reaches out to reality. As before, this demands analysis of the grammar of one's language.

In the later work Wittgenstein maintains that the relation between one's thought or proposition and what is the case if the thought/proposition is true, is not the sharing of a logical form, but one internal to grammar. It is legitimate to say that the thought that p is made true by the fact that p; this expresses a rule. The wish that p (to give a different intentional relation), and the wish fulfilled by the fact that p are two ways of referring to the same act of wishing. (These claims, arguably, ignore the real problems of intentionality, primarily, that one's thought that p is categorically distinct from the expression of the thought that p).

There is a second problem, namely, that by the utterance of a sentence one says something that can be verified only with reference to the intentionality, in thought or expression, of the speaker. Wittgenstein's interlocutor expresses this misgiving (1958b §50), in the comparison of a proposition to a ruler against which one can measure reality. (The analogy appears also in 1922, its precursor (1961) and scattered transitional reports. A reasonable response is to question the analogy: a ruler makes no statements of length by itself, it requires being placed alongside an object. Additionally, the objects themselves say nothing until they are placed against the measure. The objects do not represent how things are if they are true, for unlike the intentional properties of a thought the representational properties of the propositional sign are expressions of a thought; they are, one might say, extrinsic.

How, therefore, is the relation of representation to be revoiced? For the later Wittgenstein, signs are completely un rhetorical. There is no shared form between the speaker's meaning and the hearer's understanding. At (1958b §433) Wittgenstein presents a new idea. One's desire to communicate to X determines by its content what it is one desires to communicate, and the signs one uses to communicate one's desire cannot succeed in expressing an intention. Here one sees the continuity of (1958b): all of Wittgenstein's arguments are seen to be relevant to this conclusion. The addition of further signs will merely give further opportunities for misunderstanding. Misunderstandings are derived from the native belief that an ostensive definition correlates immediately a word or object and its meaning, a belief that may be challenged by the fact that the object gestured toward could not give meaning to its definition. Rather, the object gestured toward is, in keeping with the earlier discussion, a sample, and thus a part of a presupposed symbol into which speakers and hearers enter.

A worthy response is to question the use of this explanation for an elucidation of intentionality, for how precisely, on this account, do others come to an understanding of one's propositions, and the regress of signs halted, for as Wittgenstein (1958b §1) says, 'explanations come to an end somewhere'. (Arguments concerning these matters demonstrate again the internal coherence of (1958b), for they are of a piece with those concerning rule following). For Wittgenstein, the normative use of an explanation of the meaning of an expression is captured best by a comparison with a rule determining how the expression is used. For Wittgenstein, to reiterate, misunderstanding regarding this arises because of the assumption that what is meant by a sign is determined by an interpretation, but the regress of interpretations is halted by the use in actual instances of obeying or transgressing rules. Saying how a sign was meant is not manifested in explanations of how it should be used, but in applications of it constituting observances of the sign as a rule. As a further example of the way in which all of Wittgenstein's arguments are used for the same account, he argues that one cannot privately say a rule privately. There is no such thing as a sign which cannot be interpreted further.

One can take, as one of many examples of progression from the early work to the late, the tension between the idea that no sign cannot be interpreted further, and the view that thought and language share logical form. If the constituents of a thought stand in the relation to reality that words do to reality then the problem of intentionality is obviated, it being a matter of contingency that
the propositions in thought represent what they represent. This, in turn, can be put alongside the early view that the relation between a thought and its expression is analogous to that between a proposition and its translation by the hearer into a public, understandable language. There is here, however, in a problem that reoccurs throughout Wittgensteinian exegesis, a lack of criteria, in this case of correctness and incorrectness. A first suggestion as to how to resolve this difficulty is to say that the constituents of a language of thought represent intrinsically, and that the subject simply reads off meaning from them. This, however, makes the constituents of the language of thought have a different relation to objects as do words, as well as a power of intrinsic representation not shared by public language. The second suggestion, one made by Wittgenstein in transitional works, is that the constituents of the language of thought are extrinsically intentional, and have intentionality thrust upon them by acts of will. (In this Wittgenstein recalls his early debt to Schopenhauer). This, however, illustrates a difficulty, in that there is a presupposition that the acts of will carry with them ways of referring to the objects onto which the language of thought is projected, and this is possibly the same as arguing that the language of thought is intrinsically representational. Wittgenstein sees no need to explain this difficulty. To see it as a problem is to have misconstrued the grammar of intentional discourse. The source of difficulties concerning intentionality is thinking that the function of intentional statements is to articulate, or describe, associated mental processes.

Of the questions that arise two may be chosen. They reiterate, in different form, the classic questions of intentionality. How, on this interpretation, is the statement of a belief connected to what the speaker believes to be true, for what is believed may not itself be present to the speaker’s mind. Relatedly, how does the speaker know that the noun clause of an intentional statement is a correct interpretation of his state of mind. Will not an answer again appeal to internal representations?
5. Translation, Interpretation and Convention

Left over from Introduction and I.1 is Rorty’s claim that the advocation of a Quinean holism is the best response to theories of intentionality in philosophy of language and mind, those arguing for the presence of necessary conditions of linguistic and mental representation, and theories of analyticity. It is argued in this section that holistic theories must, however, appeal to structures of mind placing conditions upon representation and to analytic propositions for their strictures on language learning to work. Davidson’s holism is offered as a better alternative, and owing to the peculiar rôle it allows for conventions, categorically not conventions of language (following Quine), for, as Davidson says, they are at worst irrelevant, and at best unnecessary, but social, or institutional conventions, or better, practices. From this, it is argued in IV, a theory of conventions by which language learning can coherently be described, can emerge. (One might consider in the light of these arguments Quine’s belief that Rorty mistakes his holistic claim that there is no first philosophy for a naturalistic claim). No discussion of arguments against intentionality will be complete without a consideration of linguistic behaviour described in terms of stimulus and response. There are raised many issues regarding normativity in language, and, importantly in relation to other discussions undertaken in IV. 1, the status of analytic propositions.

Quine begins his discussion of language and truth by stating the empiricist premise upon which his verificationism is based: one’s subjective sense experiences are derivative, deriving from one’s knowledge of the ways of physical objects. A foundationalist approach, taking experience as having ‘protocol’ sentences, is unwarranted, for immediate experience does not, ‘...cohere as an autonomous domain’. Descriptions of sensation in protocol sentences cannot adequately describe experience, for there is no neutral means of accessing sensation; it is always experienced under the aegis of a conceptual scheme, and thus cannot be summarised in a general descriptive statement. A simple example says that reference to, discussion and analysis of physical objects occurs only in relation to a theory containing a prior acceptance of the existence of physical objects, and so man’s conceptual responses to the world are always intimately connected with the acceptance of certain things in the objective world. (Other examples are given below in this section).

---

1 It is vital to note that all of Quine’s work bears on the selective presentation made here.
2 Quine, W.V.O.; Word and Object (MIT) 1960, p1.
3 Quine (1960) p2. This prefaces Quine’s rejection of reductionism.
5 Quine (1960) pp3-5.
6 However, one may investigate man’s conceptual and linguistic responses to the world by subtracting them from the most appropriate conception of the absolute world, and so find his contribution.
Use of language is inculcated through education and practice in society; there are, Quine believes, ‘prior concomitances’ between a stimulus and corresponding appropriate behaviour. Margolis finds equivocations between the meanings of several of the central notions making up this thesis, and there follow consequences for the theory of translation according to stimulus meaning and guided by analytical hypotheses. Margolis argues that Quine’s central notions are, ‘...adjusted to what he alleges to be the problems of radical translation, and to what he is primarily interested in, namely, the analysis of a language of which the analysts are themselves users...’ Quine’s equivocations allow the running together of these two irrevocably separate notions, and an argument to this conclusion is offered in this section.

Quine’s example of one learning uses for the word ‘square’ takes account of the different perspectives pupil and teacher may have upon the square. An objective use may be found, he ventures, by collating the subjective points of view, and this is learning by induction. (The same process is carried out for sensations of, for example, ‘Red’). Quine applies his theory to whole single sentences: they may be described in terms of non-verbal stimuli (drawn from perceptions, surface irritations and so forth), and there may follow a series of substitutions to describe other sentences by analogy. Each sentence, simple or complex, has its corresponding set of inherent stimulus conditions, and depending upon the simplicity of the experience described in the sentence, some are learned more easily than others. However, Quine rejects this theory of language learning as giving too limited a rôle and too narrow an importance to sense-data; it allows no access to past sensations other than through indistinct memories of further unconceptualised stimulations, for how are ‘objective’ uses dubbed? What are the conventions? A fully rational conceptualisation of language associates one’s presently conceptualised sentences with those conceptualised in the past, allowing revision and redaction, and how are sense-data repeatedly identified as the same? Quine suggests that such a theory of learning requires a notion of ‘observationality’, which, Quine argues, is a graded notion with some ‘observation sentences’ high in observationality (‘Red’, ‘Rabbit’, ‘The tide is out’, instantiating a simple relation to

---

7 Quine (1960) p6.
10 Quine (1960) p7.
14 Quine (1960) p10.
sense-data), and others low\(^1\). For such sentences meaning can be explicated as stimulus meaning. Comparison with sentences low in observationality (‘Bachelor’) elicits the claim that, ‘...observationality is relative to the modulus of stimulation’, which, when increased, increases observationality\(^2\). Quine moves to consider the ways in which sense-data have stimulus effects. He argues that sensations, elicited by a simple stimulus, or a question requesting a description of one’s experience, require a prior language basis to which all experience is compared, and found either to correspond or to differ, a notion later crystallised in the web of belief\(^7\). When an action or sentence is elicited by a stimulus (Quine allows only for non-verbal stimuli, but his theory must apply also to verbal stimuli), a network of theory links, in every case, specific stimulus to appropriate response. Stimuli (in a neural response or in a sentence uttered) are connected in ‘logical’ and ‘causal’ ways to responses. There are, Quine says, ‘sensory supports’ for this holistic web, combining all of the sentences that are appropriate for a particular stimulation, and the association of all sentences is, for Quine, a ‘vast verbal structure’, linked to all non-verbal stimuli, and so to separate sentences for each person\(^6\). Logic exists in the web to bind all sentences and stimuli together, and these logical connections describing enduring constants are ‘eternal’, their path of connections in the web having acquired ‘transitivity’\(^9\).

The words a speaker learns first are supplemented by parts taken from other words to form sentences and propositions, a procedure carried out in different learners via different processes and by using different analogies. Speakers enter the web at different points, and discover the connections to other parts through experience, trial and error and so forth; there is no temporal order or linear sequence to the acquisition of language, and the gradation of observationality (between high and low) relative to the difficulties of interpretation is fixed (one should add to Margolis, ‘at least in part’), relative to ‘...non-verbal stimuli non-verbally discriminated...’, allowing the grasp of sentences high in observationality in a foreign tongue\(^6\). (‘Gavagai!’ is, whatever else it is, an ostension). However, the gradation of observationality relative to the language used, is, as before, marked in advance, by whatever is taken as the ‘modulus of stimulation’. (‘Gavagai!’ refers to a rabbit, a rabbit-part, a leg and so forth, and again as before, all sentences may increase in observationality). How does an interpreter grasp which

---

\(^{12}\) Margolis (1968) p129 objects to Quine’s definition.

\(^{13}\) Quine (1960) p11.

\(^{14}\) Quine (1960) p11. The quotations in the following paragraph are from pp11-12.

\(^{15}\) Recall Plantinga (1979) p148, and the discussion of competing theories of possible worlds and of the network of propositions making up a possible world as instantiating the same individual in many different states of affairs; as the world excludes non-attaining possible states of affairs the descriptions will not obtain.

\(^{16}\) Quine (1960) p12 gives as an example ‘Copper Oxide is green’. 
modulus is in use? A putative objection to Margolis' point, saying that Quine's theory is not so strict, allowing for invariable paths through the holistic web, and thus for different hypotheses and so different conventions, may not apply after Quine's remarks on behavioural non-verbal stimuli are described, and this is a plank of the argument made (below). Whatever the case may be, Margolis' point is a good one: Quine's equivocation on the modulus of stimulation in radical translation concerns uses of stimulus-response paths to fix meanings (his point being that interpreter and native are ontologically relative), and yet in the analysis of a speaker's own language, the modulus is to determine 'conventionally fixed references', determining, in turn, the 'ranges of observationality' and of 'collateral information'. Convergence between interpreter and native is qualitatively the same as that between speakers of the same language. In the first case the modulus of stimulation is undetermined relative to the languages of native and interpreter, and in the second case, determines a set of conventions (of indefinite status) within a shared language\textsuperscript{9}. This equivocation is a case in point of the problem with Quine's theory to be presented in this section: how to present an holistic theory of language learning, rich enough to provide for ontological relativity, without appeal to analytical hypotheses or conventions.

Quine writes that the process of understanding the objective world can be broken down into two phases. Firstly, understanding what the stimulations or objects presented to one are precisely, and secondly, understanding what one's prior body of theory, one's conceptual scheme, says about them. Quine says that there arise difficulties in the cases of objects for which there is no clear scheme or characteristic stimuli, and the example given is that of the activity of non-existent 'wavicles', opposed to that of explicable 'molecules'\textsuperscript{10}. For wavicles, one's necessary ignorance (caused by the fact that no stimuli report their presence), means that coming to understand what wavicles are is, in truth, a process of mastering what any putative theory says of them. While words may or may not refer, the distinction between referring and non-referring terms is made not on grammatical lines, but on the basis of whether a speaker has come to understand the theory corresponding to the term (that is, the parts of the web relevant to understanding the term). Quine continues: ways of learning cut across grammatical and referential boundaries; one learns through description, contextual explanation, or as a response to a one

\textsuperscript{9} Margolis (1968) p129.

\textsuperscript{10} Margolis (1968) p129. 'In the first, observationality and "the intrusion of collateral information" mark, in principle, exclusive domains, although particular sentences may exhibit degrees of both observationality and of responsiveness to collateral information'. As has been seen, Quine thus speaks of conveying stimulus meanings as 'observation sentences', and allows for degrees of observationality. Margolis continues, the first model allows Quine to argue that there is 'less scope' for collateral information in deciding whether a seen object is red than there is in deciding whether it is a rabbit, and to apply this argument to the study of language. How much scope is left for unconditioned variation in conceptual schemes?
word sentence. ‘Centaur’ fulfils the first two criteria; ‘sake’ can only be learned contextually; and ‘tile’ can be learnt in each of the three ways. For Quine, words mean only as they are used in sentences conditioned by explicable sensory stimuli; the psychology of stimulus and response is intimately connected to the sentences of language. In coming to understand the theory pertaining to a foreign term, an interpreter works on the assumption that he should, at all times, aspire to attain to the simplest possible theory for the explanation of phenomena. The question of truth in these theories is passed over by Quine, for one’s immediate experience can only ever provide indeterminate evidence, building into a potential explanation, in the light of current knowledge, for the nature of reality. A theory of the activity of molecules is always undetermined by the activity of ordinary things; a posited theory is necessary, and, while the question of what reality is like is in itself difficult to answer, asking the question, ‘what is real’ is, necessarily, logically prior, and demands far more of theory than an answer to the first. In the assessment of competing theories of the nature of reality, scientific method must be the arbiter. As a theory persists, and finds success in explaining phenomena in the simplest way, it is considered successful. Thus it is that the writing and revision of scientific method rests ultimately upon stimuli, and response to changes in stimuli observed under the aegis of a competing conceptual scheme.

When hardened into theory, the scheme offers a body of detailed suggested canons, all without necessary propositions22.

22 Quine (1960) p 15, and for the quotations in the following paragraph, pp 13-17.

23 Orianne (1976) p 199. As in the case of indeterminate translation of speech, so with the case of theory change in science: language and science face the tribunal of experience as a whole, and they are always underdetermined by further empirical evidence. Translations inevitably carry with them untenable analytical hypotheses. To garner evidence for the plausibility of a hypothetical translation, one questions native speakers, using demonstrations and indexicals and framing tests. In all cases, however, there is only evidence for translations in the light of other presupposed translations: the anthropologist asks, while pointing, ‘Is this a gavagai?’, and receives assent, assent, that is, to the word ‘gavagai’ and to the constant ‘same as’. Both together constitute a correct translation, but it is not by any lights the correct translation. The native’s replies, gestures and other behaviour are equally plausible under another translation schema; one might change the translation of ‘gavagai’ to ‘undetached rabbit part’, and the translation of ‘same as’ to ‘same as or attached’, and have the native still assent. Orianne (p 200) considers a fascinating ‘thought-experiment’ in assessment of Quine’s theory. His conclusions, and those of Margolis, are palpably the same as those offered in the arguments given below, yet the details are suggestive of intimate ties between philosophical traditions that are invariably set apart. The anthropologist, Orianne writes, might learn the native tongue as does a child, and become ‘perfectly bilingual’, using in his education in the language none of the resources or object lessons of his first language. Could these ‘unique credentials’ allow S correctly to translate between the languages, for ‘[i]t would seem at first obvious that the bilingual’s translation possesses unique credentials, superior to that arrived at by the ordinary linguist by means of analytical hypotheses’. Quine says no, for there are mutually exclusive translations, drawing upon the same dispositions, but Orianne responds that one might argue that two bilinguals with identical dispositions in both languages must agree in their translations; he assumes that either will use as the basis for a translation a readiness to use (in his first language), a given sentence in the same cases in which he uses a corresponding sentence in the second language. This readiness, one might add, evinces a ‘sufficient degree’ of intersubjectivity on the basis that this would constitute a linguistic community. (There are conceivable objections saying that the readiness to use two sentences under the same circumstances is not necessarily a condition of synonymy. That is, one cannot rely upon one’s speech dispositions to rule out the synonymy of two terms. ‘Notice... that the bilingual is not in this respect in a privileged position with respect to the ordinary linguist. The former can also consider his unwillingness to use rabbit part talk in circumstances in which a foreigner uses ‘gavagai’ and make it the basis of his translation... Yet in this case, the argument does not seem to carry as much weight because we recognise readily enough that the linguist and his informer are part of two different linguistic communities and hence that their respective usage may be at variance. But this is equally true of the bilingual. He is also a member of two different linguistic communities’ (p 201). This, Orianne says, is easily missed due to a general and unthinking acceptance of a theory of meaning as the mappings, according to conventions, of meanings onto sentences. If this were possible, it would, as Orianne says, be possible for a bilingual to find out whether two sentences express the same meaning, and this by assuming an ‘extra-linguistic’ point of view. The assumption that there are such conventions ‘...renders meaning insusceptible by assuming a contingent relationship between thought and

82
Quine’s first premise says that for any discussion of the ways and constitution of physical objects there is always required some prior theory: in the first example, describing knowledge of the existence of physical objects. One must postulate a theory, for experience will not cohere, and so a modulus must be supplied for purposes of classification. The argument to follow says that such a theory is inconceivable without appeal to analytic propositions. When Quine speaks of ‘past conceptualisations’ of experiences had (rejected conceptual schemes or theories), he leaves opaque the criteria with which such conceptualisations are formed, and the ways in which one may have faith in a particular conceptualisation of theory. Having faith in physical objects (as a result of a successful theory), and yet claiming that theories are continually to be revised through subsequent experience (as Quine does), makes a compelling question of how sound, enduring conceptualisations may be made from a stream of experience, and in their absence the ability to carry out the subtraction of man’s contribution from the objective world is made more difficult. An obvious response is to say that Quine thinks of conceptualisations relative to a theory, and the mere fact that he moots the idea leads one to consider the corpus of conceptualisations for that theory. Quine could refer to this point when faced with the objection that his reliance upon induction is unjustified: the induction is justified relative to a specific theory about the objective world. Regarding this, Margolis questions other of Quine’s points, and pertaining to the difficulties of demonstrative reference. Sentences not able to be distinguished in terms of stimulus and response will needs be supplemented by ostension and elucidation: (is this, the speaker asks while pointing, a rabbit?) Quine writes that the problem of the indeterminacy of translation is acute here, for the ability to ask such questions requires a knowledge of the language the questioner speaks; that is, he says, stimulus meaning suffices, and is, as Margolis says, ‘...altogether neutral to hypotheses about the terms of the native language’. However, Margolis replies that only a picture theory of language could achieve this, one not amenable to the indeterminacy of translation, for, as Quine writes, ‘...the native may achieve the same net effects through linguistic structures so different that any eventual construing of our devices in the native language and vice versa can prove unnatural and largely arbitrary’, and this problem is endemic in Quine’s work on translation. Quine does not provide sufficient explanation of how native or interpreter decide that the same effects

expression. In this connection [one] must note that Quine does not disprove the possibility of establishing a uniquely correct translation. The strong point of his argument is that this cannot be done under the assumption that a correct translation has to carry over from one language to another an invariant intentional meaning’ (p202). (For development of these points see pp206-209).


26 The importance of this for Quine on analyticity will be returned to below in this section.

27 Margolis (1968) p130.
obtained with use of one linguistic structure can be achieved with another (again, by native or interpreter), while the reconstruction of the language under analysis remains potentially 'unnatural and largely arbitrary', and itself always subject to revision.

Quine wants to reject a theory of language learning as response to sense-data precisely because of the fact that it offers no complete, rational conceptualisation of past and present sentences. One can see here that the plausible means of avoiding this putative objection by arguing that all conceptualisations are made relative to a theory is not open to Quine. If conceptualisations are relative to a theory, then all of the conceptualisations would be of sense-data observed under the aegis of that theory, a notion Quine rejects. Moreover, if all language is a comparison of present with past conceptualisations, then, almost by definition, a relative conceptualisation could hardly be compared with one made according to a different theory, for they would report different conceptual schemes. Sentences are being assessed on different criteria in the light of the different theories; different intentions inform each conceptualisation. One must suggest that there is only one stream of experience that language learners must try to conceptualise in one way or another, and this, on Quine's criteria, would give, not access to past conceptualisations, but to a stream of undifferentiated sense-data, which positively obstructs attempts to compare conceptualisations. The pressing question is what it is that permits language users to form conceptualisations, and does an answer entail a commitment to the existence of analytic propositions?

Quine argues that stimulations, those which lie at the periphery of the holistic web, are logically and causally connected with the responses appropriate to the associated experience. A second intuitive objection may be stated: there is a problem with a theory, which rejects analytic propositions, stating that there exists a logical movement from stimulus to response, for it is not unreasonable to say that this implies that there are steps to be followed. This impairs the picture Quine draws of the web of all of one's beliefs concerning language use coalescing in a vast network of interconnections, for he does speak of specific paths through the web. (Quine argues later that logic permeates the entire web, and this suggestion is considered in context). Quine's postulating 'occasion' and 'eternal' sentences is a related point. Sentences are dubbed eternal when they are seen to possess a high degree of stable meaning, with little experience suggesting their revision. (Margolis dubs them 'hypotheses'). One might add that one discovers them in the only way, given one's access to sensory experience, that one

---

77 Margolis (1968) p131 adds that 'stimulus meaning' presupposes 'rules of identification and reidentification'. He continues: Quine says that terms and reference are relative to one's conceptual schemes, but Margolis, agreeing in part, says that 'sentence' and 'term' are correlates, and that theorising the sentences of a native language presupposes the use and meaning of relevant terms in the language. This attacks the very foundation of the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation.
could possibly discover them, and that is, again, relative to one’s theory. Quine would object by saying that there is no conceptualisation possible, merely a stream of undifferentiated sense-data, but this merely motivates the charge of ambiguity in Quine’s theory. With reference to the discussion of this ambiguity one can see that Quine offers no independent standard, standing outside the stream of sense data, with which to form conceptualisations and ‘eternal’ propositions. Recourse to conceptualisations relative to a theory has been ruled out.

Similar objections can be made to Quine’s rejection of analytic propositions in the holistic web, and his preferred conceptualisations carried out in the one stream of undifferentiated sense-data. His allowance for individual language learning processes to differ from person to person is surely support for an holistic approach to knowledge, for one can have any one of the infinity of experiences available at the periphery of the web, and logic will ease the transmission of one’s thoughts to the appropriate response. Logic permeates the web in its entirety, for it is vital to all of one’s conceptual knowledge. It is the case that logic has been taken out of the web not by receiving an exalted position, but by being, as it were, spread throughout. Quine is surely not rejecting the status of logical principles as having a unique, special role in the web; they still have a status above that of ordinary propositions, and fulfil a rôle for which only logical constants can provide. The difference between a referring and a non-referring proposition or word is, for Quine, the difference between one grasping and not grasping the relevant theory shown to be appropriate by the web. While this strongly suggests the inclusion in the web of propositions resembling, to all intents and purposes, analytic propositions, accounting for movement between periphery and core, there is a palpable inconsistency. Firstly, if molecules are explicable to the understanding, and wavicles are not, this requires, by Quine’s theory, that molecules have a prior theory base, indeed, one prior even to one’s conceiving of them, and conceptualised in an alien conceptual scheme. Quine could not accept this. Additionally, he cannot, as arguments have shown, accept that the due conceptualisation is relative to the interpreter’s own theory; if understanding wavicles requires a recognition of the theoretical discussion concerning them (respective conjectures and so forth), and there is only one stream of experience (sense-data) to conceptualise, the theory will be of a kind that Quine repudiates. What one understands by ‘molecules’, and what one’s postulated

---

29 Nor does he reject this status in his work on convention, as described in IV.1. See also Stroud, B.; ‘Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation’, pp82-96 in Davidson and Hintikka (1969).

30 Namely, one containing analytic propositions. Lewis’ argument for a workable theory of analyticity for language (described in IV), must be thought a response to all advocating a holistic view of language and the abandonment of the analytic-synthetic distinction. It is thus a response to Rorty. Davidson, while advocating a holistic theory of language and mind, gives, in the principle of charity and the attitude of holding true, invaluable aids in the analysis of linguistic theories, namely notions of social
theory says about 'wavicles' are surely one and the same; any web of beliefs that is devised will be either unduly (in Quine's estimation), conceptualised, or will be imposed upon one with a substantial degree of theory already settled. The language will contain propositions expressing what are best regarded as normative principles, or conventions, for its use, and if this is so, then the notions of analyticity, and the way in which there may necessary propositions, are more satisfactorily explained.

The notion of a prior theory base which one accepts in coming to understand a word or proposition could only be predicated on a theory with an independent standard by which conceptualisations may be carried out. The analogy to the use of stimulus and response in scientific method is inappropriate for explication of linguistic learning. One cannot hypothesise, or 'conceptualise', in a stream of experience without an independent standard. There will, of necessity, be a basis of normative propositions around which to form one's conjectures of stimulus and response.

A more satisfying description of the way in which conceptualisations can be made is offered by Davidson, in the principle of charity guiding interpretation, and it is this that provides the kernel of the notion of convention to which reference will be made in describing the means by which convention and intention play roles in theories of meaning. The growing points of language, Davidson argues, are those to which philosophers neglect attention. He gives as examples malapropism, Spoonerism, jokes and puns, and the theory of radical interpretation with which account for such cases can be made provides a theory of meaning for language without appeal to linguistic convention, one which accounts for meaning and intentionality in the parasitical and fictional cases studied by Derrida. Davidson and Derrida would agree that such cases are 'ubiquitous', but a meaning-scepticism need not follow. The fact of understanding of S's speech acts on H's part (of speakers acceding to a 'standard' interpretation), does not evince error or mistake in interpretation, for homonyms serve equally as well in suggesting alternative, viable interpretations, and the want, in a theory of language, of a correct definition of words is no problem. What is needed is a notion of what words mean, '...spoken in context...', provided by application of the principle of charity, and for this, a distinction between what S means on an occasion and what his words mean, a distinction, Davidson writes, seemingly threatened by '[t]he widespread existence of malapropisms and their kin...since here the [decipherment of]
intended meaning seems to take over from the standard meaning\textsuperscript{33}. This entails a clear distinction between S meaning and ‘literal’ meaning, redefining what it is to know a language, or to define natural language\textsuperscript{34}.

Literal meaning is, for Davidson, ‘first meaning’, and, crudely, is reported in words and sentences uttered by S on occasions. In ‘standard’ cases first meaning can be found by consulting a dictionary, the first and most important resource in the ‘order of interpretation’\textsuperscript{35}. First meanings are the products of settled conventions, set by repeated S intentions, and, ‘[t]he intentions with which an act is performed are usually unambiguously ordered by the relation of means to ends (where this relation may or may not be causal)’. An utterance (p) spoken with an intention, \textit{pace} Grice, is spoken with the additional intention that H recognise S’s intention to communicate p (ignoring cases of deception, delusion and so forth); the appropriate recognition requires that S and H share mutual knowledge of the conventions of p, and ‘[i]n general, the first intention in the sequence to require this feature specifies the first meaning’. The enquiry can as easily emphasise H’s ability to ‘interpret’ S\textsuperscript{36}.

For the description of intersubjective (mutually-known), abilities allowing the interpretation of speakers, Davidson moots three principles of first meaning for which any theory of mutual knowledge must account\textsuperscript{37}. It requires ‘systematic relations’ between semantical properties of words (and parts of words), in utterances, and syntactical properties allowing the interpretation of utterances; these relations are shared, and ‘learned in advance’, of occasions of use. Davidson argues that the transport of intended meaning in communication requires only these conditions on mutual knowledge, encapsulated in the principle of charity, and constituting the basis of any theory of intentionality. They instantiate mutual, institutional, or better, social conventions, and can, it is argued (in IV, although necessary details are given in this section below), serve for conventions of language\textsuperscript{38}.

\textsuperscript{33}Davidson (1986) p434.

\textsuperscript{34}Cf. Yu (1979) p.

\textsuperscript{35}Davidson (1986) p435 notes the ambiguity of the notion. The same reference goes for the following quotation.

\textsuperscript{36}Davidson (1986) p435. ‘What the speaker knows must correspond to something the interpreter knows if the speaker is to be understood, since if the speaker is understood he has been interpreted as he intended to be interpreted’. Davidson makes a point vital to the understanding of the response to be made to Derrida, and to the case to be made in the coming chapters. Davidson does not limit first meaning to language, and indeed first meaning is Gricean, conventional meaning, that which, ‘...applies to any sign or signal with an intended interpretation’.

\textsuperscript{37}In the case, Davidson writes, the hearer and the speaker share a complex ‘system or theory’, making possible the discovery and statement of logical relations between utterances. In II, and in III and IV with application to Searle and Lewis, it is seen how successful Grice is in accounting for these relations. The decipherment of these relations is the burden of the work of Grice and Schiffer, of Strawson and McDowell, and Davidson emphasises that he wants to clarify in what sense this work is correct and able to inform semantic theory.

\textsuperscript{38}Cf. Hacking, I; ‘The Parody of Conversation’, pp447-458 in Lepore (1986). Davidson (1986) p437: The contrast in what is meant or implied by the use of ‘but’ instead of ‘and’ seems to me another matter, since no amount of common sense unaccompanied by linguistic lore would enable an interpreter to figure it out’. As Hacking notes, Davidson works with the first two principles, rejecting (Hacking is too dogmatic here), the last. Davidson broadens the difficulties encountered in deciphering the semantic roles of words, and thus of finding identities in semantic roles, and those of ascribing interpretative faculties to H allowing him to recognise as significant, or intelligible, certain words. However, this is not the core of specifically linguistic
Davidson argues that interpreters can understand sentences they have never heard before, that they can learn the semantic rôle of a finite number of words, and of a finite number of ‘modes of composition’. In analogy to conflicting conceptual schemes, interpretation can proliferate, for the modes of composition allow infinite iteration, and application to a vast number of sentences. The mechanism is a truth theory giving recursive definitions of the truth conditions of all of S’s possible utterances (Convention T). Interpretation (communication) does not require that S and H speak the same language; this is merely a convenience, for what is always shared, obviating the difficulties of mere translation, is S’s and H’s understanding of means of interpretation. H has a faculty, developed

competence, which requires distinctions to be drawn between literal (first) meaning, and the implications of uses of words, distinctions made, re-made, studied and shifted. As Davidson says, Grice studies the means by which such implicatures may be discerned and mutually-known. A definition of linguistic competence is not simply a study of such skills, for they are both things one could discern without, ‘training or exposure’, and things one, ‘...could get along without...’; both (types of) things one expects an interpreter to be able to do, and which enrich communication. Novel or fictional contexts create the difficulties of steering a course between these options, and so, again, malapropism and other creative uses of language threaten any ‘standard’ description of linguistic competence and behaviour.  

40 Davidson (1986) pp437-438. Here Davidson will only emphasise that the theory has a finite base and is recursive, and that ‘most philosophers and linguists’ agree. He adds that while a theory for interpreting S is a model of H’s linguistic competence, this is not to suggest that H knows any such theory, though they may be brought to the realisation, concerning, say, the logical constants they accept. Any claims for a satisfactory theory are not about propositional knowledge or about the ‘inner workings’ of part of the brain. ‘They are rather claims about what must be said to give a satisfactory description of the competence of the interpreter’, this requires a recursive theory, which, if it describes H’s linguistic competence, should not be thought also to describe ‘some mechanism’ in H corresponding to the theory. In Grice and Schiffer there is made a similar distinction between intending and believing that one intends, and this is seen to account for the difficulties of fictional contexts.  

Hacking considers Davidson’s conclusion that there is no such thing as a language, and argues that it can only force Davidson to revise other of his principles. The passage from which quotations have just been taken (pp437-438) is, Hacking says, a summary of Davidson’s work in the philosophy of language; it remains consistent because the passage, and so the work, speaks only of interpretation, and yet the problems raised in the essay are of conversation and communication. (Hence, Hacking says, the deference to Grice). Davidson’s thesis is plain: a shared language described in Convention T and the principle of charity requires no prior, systematic knowledge, for there can be nonic language is nothing like what philosophers think it to be. Hacking finds a slight of hand in Davidson’s talk of ‘interpretation’ rather than ‘translation’ in cases of colection, and many questions are raised. Does interpretation apply to the understanding of one’s own language as readily as to those in Quine’s translation situation? Do speakers interpret other members of their own speech community, and are malaprops an independent ease? Hacking also finds a tension between uses of ‘theory’ in Davidson: interpretation (or theory), requires recursion, and yet the passing theory is not able to be regularised or taught: it derives from luck, rules of thumb, seats of discerned knowledge and so forth. These problems are found elsewhere in Davidson. The modelling of speech, Hacking argues, does not need recursion, and neither does the systematicity of first, literal meaning, and thus Hacking (pp456-458) argues against Davidson’s holism. People, Hacking argues, are ‘non-total’, and mutual exchange in passing theories should not lead one to entertain holism about language. Exchanges might just be the playing of language games. Hacking (pp453-456) says that one of Davidson’s argument in favour of recursion says that speakers perceive logical connections between sentences, and he replies that ‘axiomatised formal theory’, requires all strings (not merely theorems and proofs), appearing in the theory to be themselves recursive. These facts, however, have nothing to do with passing theories of others’ speech. Human speakers make few, and then ‘only the shortest’, of deductive inferences in interpreting another’s speech; they frequently utter ungrammatical sentences, and even contradict themselves. As for the assumption that others are consistent, Hacking finds this implausible: ‘[it] is not charitable, but rather inhumane, to pretend that I am talking to a god’. (Cf. Norris (1996)). S’s skill in detection and correcting errors is evinced a certain systematic, consistent approach, but not a whole recursive system that ‘goes on forever spinning unintelligible deductions’. S has tricks, which the logician may order into formal systems, but which are a congeries of ‘not too closely connected’ methods. In IV no claim is made on recursion in a purely extensional language for the explanation of the ways in which passing theories are created and disseminated (and of analytic truth), and a longer study would consider the way in which Lewis’ arguments. This notion of a of is vital in the Lewisian response to Derrida on fictional contexts. Davidson’s arguments are considered here as a means of introducing the relevant notions of social, institutional conventions for use in the explanation of meaning in language, in opposition to theories, discredited by Davidson, of conventions of language.  

41 Davidson (1986) pp438-440 makes the connection with some issues of reference and denotation of non-existent and fictional objects raised in L. and Donnellan, K., ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’, The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXVII, no. 2, pp203-215, 1968. Donnellan’s distinction between referential and attributive definite descriptions includes a distinction between sentences uttered with an intended meaning and the meaning of sentences. Davidson says that S cannot change the meaning of words merely by intending to, but that he can change the meaning if he believes (justifiably), that H has sufficient aids to show him the new interpretation. Contra discussions of Donnellan, his distinction between referential and attributive has nothing to do with words changing their meaning or reference. In referenceal use, if S refers to X, incorrectly, for he is not guilty, by saying ‘H’s murderer is insane’, the reference is achieved, owing to the normal meanings of the words. The words have usual reference. Accepting this requires a ‘firm sense’ of the distinction between what words mean and what they
through education and practice, describing the ways in which words match the world, and telling him what S means on occasions of utterance. When S (or S’ or S"...), speaks with, say, Gricean intentions, he is understood, for H applies the principle of charity to reveal S’s intention. There is no ‘correct theory’ in advance, nothing to be wrong or sceptical about, merely a learned, mutual sensitivity to ways of speaking, a network of practices so rich as to account for new and novel utterances and contexts.

Davidson considers proper names in dubbing or christening. How does one match names with definite descriptions? As argued in I.4 (and, indirectly, I.2), the process clearly depends upon no rules. Theories arguing for a demonstrative element in proper names are more promising, giving ‘partial’ rules for dubbing. However, the element does not render names, and natural kind terms, pure demonstratives, for new words in these categories create, or provide tokens of, new meanings or contexts. Such creativity is carried farther, or rendered ubiquitous, by Mrs Malaprop, for she shows that all words can be given new uses in new or novel contexts. Although she adheres to a conceptual scheme difficult of access, she can be interpreted. Davidson has a ‘short line’ with theories arguing for the necessity of mutual failure of interpretation or translatability cases: on the premise that an activity that could not be interpreted in one’s language would plausibly be speech, one may conclude that an activity that cannot be interpreted in one’s language as language is not speech. As one may agree, an argument by fiat is surely unsatisfactory, for it makes ‘translatability into a familiar tongue a criterion of languagehood’, a premise Davidson rejects. Interpretation requires rather the issuing by S in his speech acts of intentions and sincerity conditions, and the recognition by H of these intentions, from which he ascribes to S propositional attitudes (explanation of these points is detailed and is given in II). S and H must both have access to S’s intentions (remaining respectively a first- and a third-person perspective). Davidson allows a non-transitivity of intentions, but by no means are they inefiable or inaccessible. It is this relationship, guiding the access of S and H to S’s intentions and

---

42 This defuses Black’s arguments against Grice, considered in II.
43 She and Reverend Spooner show up the problem which Davidson (1986) p441 wishes to examine, that of describing what is entailed by the possession of a language, and of ‘... being at home with the business of linguistic communication’.
44 Cf Davidson (2001j) p183.
45 Davidson (2001j) p186. One might here refer back to O Rianna’s objections to Quine’s arguments for failure of translatability.
allowing interpretation, that is described by Grice, and it is to Grice that Davidson defers. This move is accompanied by the relinquishing of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and a belief in the holistic view that there is no demarcation between theory and language. In the writing, through Convention T, of a purely extensional language, as following Quine (and contra Rorty), through learning and the testing of theory one enriches one’s vocabulary for explaining science and experience; this is a condition of discovery and progress, and, in the limiting case, sentences previously taken as false become true because provided with adequate scientific notation. Davidson counsels caution, for the introduction of new languages with ‘shiny new phrases’, may surreptitiously introduce terms for those found discredited in past theories. This is by way of emphasising that one accepts a vocabulary on the condition that it faces continual assessment with a view to revision.

As with Quine, all sentences have empirical content, and are open to revision. A theory of meaning for language is not the embodiment of a conceptual scheme, but a web of belief, or ‘field of force’, for categorising experience. Difficulty in categorising is difficulty in translating, and in some cases it may prove immensely difficult. One’s field of force serves to categorise, or translate, experience, and attention must shift to how this may be achieved. Again, it is by the application of Convention T, giving a theory of truth as a theory of translation, in a purely non-intensional vocabulary; it postulates no shared meanings, no rigorous distinctions, and no view from nowhere; rather, it directs the reading off of attitudes and the application of charity, as, ‘...all that can be done to ensure communication’,

46 The arguments of Lewis (1969) pertinent at this stage are taken up in Part IV. From similar premises Lewis, as said, writes a theory of analyticity and intentionality for language.
47 Davidson (2001) p189. The introduction of new vocabulary, describing physiological states, to avoid reference to intentions and thoughts, might still for a speaker play the roles of referring to the ‘messy old mental concepts’. One cannot tell, and the retention of old vocabulary or the acceptance of the new provides no basis for judging the two conceptual schemes to be the same or different. Davidson writes, that what seems like a ‘thrilling’ discovery, that ‘truth is relative to a conceptual scheme’, is, by these lights, nothing more than the truth of a sentence as relative to the language to which it belongs. Kuhn’s scientists may be only ‘words apart’.
48 Davidson (2001) p189. Giving up an analytic/synthetic distinction abandons the conception of meaning that goes with it: that some sentences have empirical content and meaning, and that others are true by meaning alone. Davidson argues that one can maintain that all sentences have empirical content, and that this is explained by reference to facts, experience or stimuli. ‘Meanings gave us a way to talk about categories, the organising structure of language, and so on; but it is possible, as we have seen, to give up meanings and analyticity while retaining the idea of language as embodying a conceptual scheme’. This issues in a dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, and an empiricism without the dogmas of analytic/synthetic distinctions or reductionism. It is an empiricism without the untenable idea that content can be allocated sentence by sentence.
49 Davidson avows the influence of Whorf, Kuhn and Feynman on his thinking regarding the connections of conceptual scheme and empirical content. Bernstein (1983) p1 says that the incommensurability that these authors advocate, when correctly understood, does not entail relativism.
against, ‘...a background of common beliefs’. There is no demarcation of relative conceptual schemes, for all can be translated; there is between oneself and one’s interlocutor only ever a ‘...difference of opinion’.

The revision of theory, in the light of, ‘recalcitrant experience’ is not simply the improving of methods of interpretation on the basis of more evidence (in particular of S’s intentions and of recognition of his intentions), for each theory used in interpreting an utterance is ‘geared to the occasion’; little or nothing is brought over to new interpretative situations from earlier for there is no settled body of theory (no conventions), with which to work. In making an utterance S exploits a mutual knowledge condition (one of a number of such conditions which must recognised): he wishes to be understood, and for H to recognise his intention, and so he utters words he believes will be interpreted in a specific way. He forms a theory of the ‘interpreter’s readiness to interpret’. Davidson adds a clarification: S does not necessarily speak in such a way as to prompt H to modify his ‘prior’

though of course they must face it together. In short, sensory experience provides all of the evidence that there is for the acceptance of sentences (or theories). The sentence describes, predicts or copes with and so forth, provided it fits the evidence.

The quotations are from Davidson (2001) pp197 and 196 respectively.

56 Cf Davidson (2001) pp193-198. Theories may be borne out by available evidence and still be false, for what is required is attention to the totality of ‘...possible sensory evidence past, present and future...for a theory to fit or face up to the totality of possible sensory evidence is for that theory to be true’. Furthermore, if the theory quantifies over objects, sets and so forth, ‘...what it says about these entities is true provided the theory as a whole fits the sensory evidence. One can see how, from this point of view, such entities might be called posits. It is reasonable to call something a posit if it can be contrasted with something that is not. Here the something that is not is sensory experience—at least that is the idea’. The notion of fitting the facts adds nothing to the concept of being true. Sensory experience, rather than mere evidence, expresses an idea about the source of evidence, but adds nothing against which to test rival conceptual schemes. ‘The totality of sensory evidence is what we want provided it is all the evidence there is; and all the evidence there is is just what it takes to make our sentences or theories true’; there is no fact, of experience, or of experience rubbing up against reality, making them true.

Rival conceptual schemes are more or less acceptable as they provide viable descriptions of experience; they are, as Davidson says, because genuine alternatives, ‘largely true [because offering a viable description of experience] but not translatable’. The matter of whether this is a workable criterion is simply that of whether one accepts Davidson’s conditions on Convention T as a theory of meaning and translation. Davidson repeats the derivation of Convention T, and that a satisfactory theory of truth for language L must entail, for every sentence s of L, a theorem of the form ‘s is true iff p’, in which s is replaced by a description and p by if L is English and by a translation if not. Davidson repeats, that a truth theory, ‘(our best intuition as to how the concept of truth is used)’, is irreducibly a translation theory. This he applies to elucidating the notion of partial incommensurability, or failure of translation, in opposition to that of total relativism, or, ‘the possibility of making changes and contrasts in conceptual schemes intelligibly by reference to the common part’, a theory of translation without assumptions of shared meanings, concepts or beliefs. Belief and meaning are, as the discussion of Donnellan shows, interdependent, and because the two relevant aspects in the interpretation of speech behaviour, attribution of beliefs and interpretation of sentences, are interdependent. Davidson continues, in a presentation of the principle of charity and of Gricean meaning theory: E cannot interpret S’s speech without knowing ‘a good deal’ about S’s beliefs, intents and desires, and distinctions between respective beliefs require more fine-grained distinctions reported in understood speech. Davidson asks how one is to interpret speech and to attribute beliefs and intentions. One adopts ‘certain very general attitudes’, toward sentences, and Davidson suggests as the core attitude, that of holding true. This begs no questions, for ‘...if we merely know that someone holds a certain sentence to be true, we know neither what he means by the sentence nor what belief his holding it true represents. His holding the sentence true is thus the vector of two forces: the problem of interpretation is to abstract from the evidence a workable theory of meaning and an acceptable theory of belief’. Davidson makes a response to arguments claiming the incommensurability or relativism of conceptual schemes and beliefs. ‘If we choose to translate some alien sentence rejected by its speakers by a sentence to which we are strongly attached on a community basis, we may be tempted to call this a difference in schemes; if we decide to accommodate the evidence in other ways, it may be more natural to speak of a difference of opinion. But when others think differently from us, no general principle, or appeal to evidence, can force us to decide that the difference lies in our beliefs rather than in our concepts.

We must conclude, I think, that the attempt to give a solid meaning to the idea of conceptual relativism, and hence to the idea of a conceptual scheme, fares no better when based on partial failure of translation than when based on total failure. Given the underlying methodology of interpretation, we could not be in a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different from our own’. There is no independent reality against which one can check conceptual schemes, but this does not jettison the notion of objective truth. Conceptual relativism turns upon the dogma of a dualism of scheme and reality, and without this, while yet truth remains relative to language (described in Convention T), ‘that is as objective as can be’, and the problems of incommensurability are avoided.
theory (his conceptual scheme in its most recent constitution, or his field of force), although he may. Prior theory is to be distinguished from ‘passing’ theory, describing the way in which H interprets S, and how S intends H to interpret his utterance. There obtain no shared semantic theories and no guiding conventions, for what is shared in successful communication is passing theory. ‘Only if these coincide is understanding complete’; according to the moment of the matter communicated, prior theory is changed a little, a lot, or not at all. As conversation continues prior theories come more into line, as do passing theories, and ‘[t]he asymptote of agreement and understanding is reached when passing theories coincide’. Passing theories cannot define S’s and H’s linguistic competence (better the reserve of prior theory), for they contain ever-changing catalogues of proper names and interpretations.

Every deviation from ordinary usage, as long as it is agreed on for the moment (knowingly deviant, or not, on one, or both, sides) is in the passing theory as a feature of what the words mean on that occasion.

These are literal, first meanings, and they account for deviant, non-literal usage. Only a recursive theory explains why when a word or phrase takes the rôle of another, or appears in a demonstrative construction, the implications for logical relations to other words and phrases are carried in the passing theory, for, owing to its derivation from Convention T, it is a purely extensional theory. If one considers prior theory as carrying sedimented uses of a natural language, and considers the case of a first conversation between S and H, the theory will be that which one expects one hearing one’s speech to use. However, one invariably tailor’s one’s speech to situations at hand, and, ‘...we cannot fail to have premonitions as to which of the proper names we know are apt to be correctly understood’.

This being so, prior theories are infrequently shared; novel, parasitical and fictional utterances, or their analogues, are ‘ubiquitous’, and nothing in a theory of communication depends upon prior theories. Prior theories could not be compared to languages; indeed, they have the features of speaker’s idiolects.

Another approach might emphasise the framework of ‘categories and rules’ codified in grammars. This may facilitate study and interpretation of syntax, yet it could never describe or tabulate S’s intentions in speaking. Moreover, with a Mrs Malaprop or a Reverend Spooner, or indeed any creative speaker, the provision of grammars would be futile, necessitating different axioms for different

---

52 Davidson (1986) p441.
53 Davidson (1986) p442 for both quotations and the intended quotation. As Davidson so rightly says, the matter of degree of success in communication is irrelevant in assessment of his argument.
54 Davidson (1986) p442-443. All meanings, all deviations, however transient, are literal, or first meanings. Passing theory is not what anyone would call a natural language. Besides, comprehensive knowledge of one would be ‘useless’, for each is pertinent only for a specific occasion. They cannot be said to have been learned, or to be guided by convention, and while things learned are useful in arriving at a passing theory, nothing that can be learnt is the passing theory.
speakers, and the, ‘...more general and abstract [the grammar] is, the more difference there can be [tolerated between grammars] without it mattering to communication’ 56. These problems indicate the difference between prior and passing theories: what S and H share, allowing transport, in successful communication, ‘...is not learned and so is not a language governed by rules or conventions known to [them] in advance’, it is a passing theory, changing in each instance the flux of prior theory. Interlocutors, if lucky, ‘converge’ on passing theories, so enriching their body of prior theory, and facilitating their operations with further passing theories for new situations; there is nothing else to a shared conventional language, were there to be, there would be a, ‘...new language for every unexpected turn in the conversation...’57. S’s ability to interpret H is an ability to form a passing theory for S; there is no such thing as knowing a language, for one understands ‘...knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally’ in palpably the same way, allowing only maxims and generalities for the construction of passing theories, derived, perhaps, by, ‘wit, luck and wisdom’ from a congeries of private vocabulary and grammar, knowledge of ways in which others have communicated and other rules of thumb58.

Davidson concludes that one should try to say how convention is involved in language, or, ‘...give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions’, and it is the concern of the following chapters to offer precisely such an explanation. It is argued in II that intended meaning can, again as it were, remain in S’s utterance: full explication of this awaits II.5 in which the ramifications of Strawson’s distinction are described, not the least important of which is that a distinction can be made between literal and parasitical in speech contexts, requiring only what is called in the following, first intention, and sensitive only to conventions of language as described in Austin’s work.

56 Davidson (1986) p444. Davidson argues that a framework complex enough to account for these difficulties, and divergences between speakers, will go to show that they are, indeed, actual.
57 Davidson (1986) p445. There is, Davidson adds, nothing to characterising the abilities of one in command of a language.
58 Davidson (1986) pp445-446. Arguing that the ability to communicate is the ability to make oneself understood, and to understand, is, for Davidson, fundamentally to revise ‘standard ideas of language mastery’. There is no shared grammar, body of rules or core of consistent behaviour. Language conceived of as the construction of passing theories abandons the ordinary notion of language competence, and the distinction between ‘knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally’.

Hacking (1986) pp433-454 offers arguments regarding the necessary revision of Davidson’s premises concerning Convention T, and of being true-in-L. (considering also ‘Semantics for Natural Languages’, pp55-64 and ‘Reply to Foster’, pp171-179 in (2001)), and draws attention to the ways in which senses and references may emerge in the light of contextual evidence; as Davidson writes, one can fit languages to speakers with ‘...various ways of matching words and objects’. One can then name the language, making it, as Davidson says, one for which reference and truth have been given roles. Hacking replies that this leaves outstanding the question of whether evidence allows one to attribute the dubbed language to the speaker, and this changes the picture presented in Davidson’s philosophy of language. Davidson here implies, for Hacking, that H does not simply apply a Tarskian truth theory, but works through a series of potential, and changing, Ls for the discovery of one fitting S. This, Hacking suggests, elides the two aspects of Davidson’s theory, for Ls need not be languages at all, and could remain a part of theory even if one denies there is such a thing as language. Davidson shifts his perspective with regard to Convention T in an illuminating way; he sees that while Tarski defines truth for a formal language in such a way that translation is assumed, but later, that for radical interpretation, this is what cannot be assumed: thus he attempts to illumine translation by applying a theory of truth. The Ls in Tarski are formal languages; the Ls in Davidson, at least for the Davidson for whom there is no such thing as a language, are merely formal constructs’, and Hacking argues that Davidson’s adoption of Tarskian truth theories is incorrect.
Additionally, Grice’s work itself gives a means of dealing with parasitical cases, the import of which is only fully apparent in IV.5. Suffice to say that for the non-literal cases, those in which, Derrida says, ‘transport’ is impossible, Grice examines in the closest detail the ways in which intended meaning may fail to be communicated. In deceptive or parasitical cases, one might think, H could only come to understand S by inferring to S’s real or disguised intentions, and as the complexity of the cases considered rises so does the complexity and number of the associated intentions, and so the reasoning required by H to understand them. In what follows, this is frequently referred to as a regress of nested intentions, or second intention. However, Grice teaches one to think of intentions intended to be recognised, in literal, sincere or parasitical, deceptive utterances, as sincerity conditions, from which H can infer to S’s intentions in speaking. In all such cases, S must appeal to types in his use of speech act tokens, types he knows H will recognise (or, to conventions), be it to communicate a sincere belief or a deception: his success in the latter depends upon this. Thus, Grice says, with application to cases of mounting complexity, S, for communication to be successful (with sincere or deceptive intent), must appeal to mutually-known conventions. In interpretation, H must appeal to the same conventions for explication of what S says. These conventions could never be written, Derrida argues, for there is no determinate context for each speech act type, and there are two points to be made in response. The first, awaiting presentation of Lewis‘ work in IV, saying that the relativisation to literal and non-literal contexts is obviated by the relativisation to acts in different possible worlds. Of immediate note is the second, giving the theory of convention from which this possible worlds semantics derives; it allows that conventions for language can be derived from simple, ‘primitive’ institutional, or social conventions, and that one can follow the Davidsonian thesis that there is nothing to be said for the idea of conventions of language, and that peculiarly Derridean meaning-scepticism would do well to consider the conclusions of Lewis’ work. Derrida’s analysis correctly rejects the notion of conventions of language for the reason that, on Austin’s theory, there could be established no fully applicable speech acts for each context of use. A theory of meaning intentions derived from Grice and Lewis shows how such a theory can be written.
1. Meaning and Intentions

Grice's theory of meaning distinguishes between semantic and syntactical theories. The basis of his analysis is S's intention in speaking: noises and marks have meanings as the products of intentions to communicate, and communication is achieved when H recognises S's intention. For some, Grice's argument has a false premise, and it is argued that meanings are independent of psychological states:

Chomsky makes this objection, and extends the criticism to Searle. Suppes remarks that criticisms of

---

1 Cf. Avramides, A.; Meaning and Mind: An Examination of a Gricean Account of Language (MIT) 1989, p.5. Avramides emphasises that this entails (unspoken) notions of sincerity and truthfulness, and on this cf. I.5 and especially III. The role of sincerity conditions is fundamental to the analysis offered in this dissertation of intentions in speech acts. There are (detailed in III.1) consequences for theories using both formal semantics and pragmatics, and particularly to elucidate notions of convention. As Loa, B.; Mind and Meaning (Cambridge University Press) 1981, p.244 says, the communication intentions relevant to a theory of S-meaning are those correlative with the sentences of a language as that of S and his population, though Millikan, R.G.; Proper Function and Convention in Speech Acts, pp.25-43 in Hahn, L.E. (ed); The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson (Illinois, Open Court) 1998, pp.28-29 disagrees.


Grice focus on the tenor of his work and not the detail, and while this practice shall not be followed, Suppes gives a classification of the main arguments with which a start shall be made.4

Firstly, the problematical concept of literal meaning, and whether it is required in a definition of S-meaning. Chomsky takes this objection as good against Grice, Searle and Strawson, arguing that they are not concerned to clarify the relevant distinction between theories of meaning and of communication, and so to derive a theory of meaning for utterances from analysis of their syntax.5

Suppes replies that Chomsky's theory itself gives no adequate answer, and that, besides, Grice's is merely a 'sketch'.6 (There is here a genuine issue, echoing points raised by Derrida, and taken up in III, for now some general points are made). Grice argues that meanings are reported in intentions to communicate, and Chomsky disagrees.7 Suppes grants Chomsky that the sentences of scientific treatises may support an argument for his case, but that they are 'non-standard', when considering the 'primary use' of language. (One might think that Derrida over-states the continuity between the two).

Context-dependency characterises the give-and-take of daily conversation, and analysis of literal meanings will not grant this. Secondly, the question of whether one can talk about 'the' rules of language (Suppes opposes this to 'some' rules of language). Deliverance on this matter awaits the discussion of Strawson in II.4 and 5, and, fully, III and IV. The discussion is held over).

Thirdly, and drawing on Chomsky's criticisms of Quine and B.F. Skinner, Grice is accused of behaviourism. While Chomsky asserts the primacy of literal meaning against Grice's support for the motley of communication, and while Avramides addresses none of her remarks to Chomsky's criticism

---


5 Chomsky (1975) pp36ff and 54ff. Chomsky criticises Searle's theory on the basis that there are uses of language that are not communicative, cases in which '...the speaker's intention with regard to an audience offers no particular insight into the literal meaning of what he says'. In such a theory, Chomsky adds, literal meaning is 'reintroduced as an unexplained meaning'. One may, for instance, be dissembling for whatever reason. Examples of the type Chomsky considers are amply represented in Strawson (1971). Chomsky's hard-headed objections, to his regret, bring him close to Derrida. Cf. Cowley, J. (ed.); 'Twelve Great Thinkers of our Time'; New Statesman, pp201-237, 14 July 2003, and p36, 21 July 2003 in which Chomsky is quoted on the 'postmodernist intellectual cretinism, Baudrillard, Derrida and Negri', describing their work as 'bullshit'.


7 Searle, J.R.; 'Literal Meaning', pp117-136 in Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge University Press) 1979, in presenting his theory of 'background', offers examples of apparently literal utterances having 'undetermined', literal meaning. Cf. especially pp126ff. For the response see Chomsky (1975) pp62-63f. On pp67ff sees no reason why the speaker should have the intentions described. 'In the case of honest self-expression, the speaker does not care. In the case of casual conversation, the speaker's intentions with regard to a hypothetical audience need not go beyond his intentions with regard to the actual audience, and plainly there need be no intention that the actual audience believe that the speaker's beliefs are such-and-such'. Suppose, he writes, that '...there are native English speakers who habitually misunderstand what they read or hear...Then even if this speaker happens to have the intention that Grice assumes to be necessary, it will be necessary to take p to be something like "is a speaker of English who will think that the utterer believes that q upon learning x", where q is the literal meaning of x'. The theory of speech acts, Chomsky (p73) writes, is a theory of communication and not of meaning


9 Suppes (1986) p113. One must say that Chomsky's questions about Grice's theory of linguistic rules are answered by Lewis' replacing the notion of rules with that of conventions. Chomsky's opposition to Wittgenstein is clear (pp76-77).
of Grice, she charges others (specifically Schiffer and Loar), with a mistaken, 'reductive' analysis, one leaving Grice's work open to the criticism it has received. Grice argues for a reduction, but on grounds common to Derrida and Searle, namely that intentions cannot be understood prior to understanding language. From this he forms theories of speaker meaning, occasion meaning, and timeless meaning, and in this lies his importance. Avramides writes that the question guiding Grice's enquiry is, '...whether there can be thought without language'; he, again in common with Derrida and Searle, says there cannot, yet commits to notions (of timeless meaning, of intentions, of the worth of philosophical analysis and of convention), vastly at odds with Derrida's scepticism. Derrida sees in Searle a necessary commitment to an unworkable theory of mind, namely, that the mind is 'objective', and able to be, '...comprehended from an external, detached, and impersonal perspective'. Grice has

---

10 Cf. Avramides (1989) pix and 6-7, and on the required 'asymmetry' between understanding and analysis, pp21-26. Also Chomsky (1975) especially pp56-57. Though he receives none of Avramides' attention, Chomsky (cf. pp73ff) views Grice as a reductionist. Chomsky, states in opposition to Grice, a theory of 'readiness'. Grice, remarks that Derrida (1977b) p193 remarks that he and Searle (unbeknown to Grice!) agree that there can be no intentionality without language; from this premise, shared with Grice, the latter may be cleared of Chomsky's charge. In place of the reductive analysis of Grice, Avramides (1989) p58ff argues that his theory gives account of how the semantic and the intentional (or propositional) match up, without reducing the one to the other. This is one of the lessons Derrida can learn from Grice.

11 Cf. Derrida (1977b) pp193ff. The most compelling argument for the way in which speakers come to learn operations with language takes its beginning from McDowell in response to Strawson (studied in III.1) the theory countenances no preference for formal semantics or use theories, but is sensitive to the benefits of both, and carries notions of guiding intentions and saturable convention with which one may reply to Derrida (cf. IV).


Bennett argues that language is coordinated communication, and emphasises the importance of practice, or 'behaveun' in writing a theory (g5), endeavouring to forge non-Wittgensteinian connections between meaning and use. This includes a rejection of Chomsky's arguments against behaviourism, and those to the end that there is no profit in considering human language as purissive, intentional communication, or gesturing, or as a network of 'iconic' relationships (p14). On p6 Bennett rejects Chomsky's arguments against there being a primary use of language. In addition to the work on Grice, cf. Chomsky, N.; Language and Mind (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich) 1972, especially, with regard to the issues raised in Derrida, J.; 'Form and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language', pp155-174 in (1982), 'Form and Meaning in Natural Languages', pp100-114.

no such commitment, holding only (a point clearer in Grice than in Searle), that meaning in communication, in paradigmatic and parasitical cases, in inscriptions written, gestural or oral, is understood by the application of a principle of charity, ascribing to S mental states and skills for the manipulation of language, a conception entailing, following Davidson, that a theory of meaning requires a prior theory of the anomalism of the mental. Much of this present section is devoted to establishing terms.

Grice considers two sets of examples, the first illustrative of what he terms ‘natural’ meaning, the second of ‘non-natural’ meaning. The first set runs:

Those spots mean (meant) measles

Those spots didn’t mean anything to me, but to the doctor they meant measles

The recent budget means that we shall have a hard year

Grice notes five points. Firstly, in such cases ‘x means that p’ entails p; one cannot, for instance, say ‘Those spots mean measles, but he hasn’t got measles’. Secondly, one cannot argue from ‘Those spots mean measles’ to a conclusion about what they mean: that is, one cannot argue that what was ‘meant by these spots was that he had measles’.

Thirdly, one cannot argue from ‘Those spots mean measles’ to a conclusion saying that a specific person meant something by these spots. The same goes for the budget example. None of the examples, to state the fourth condition, can be rephrased in such a way that the verb can be followed by a sentence or phrase in quotation marks, and thus there can be no formulation such as, “Those spots mean ‘measles’” or ‘Those spots mean “he has measles”’. Fifthly, the examples permit a restatement with the formulation, ‘The fact that...’: ‘The fact that he had those spots meant that he had measles’.

To these sample sentences Grice opposes the second set:

Those three rings on the bell mean that the bus is full

That remark, “Smith couldn’t get on without his trouble and strife”, meant that Smith found his wife indispensable

In these cases the conditions differ, as seen when the five points are restated. Firstly, in these instances ‘x means that p’ does not entail p: the driver, for instance, may be mistaken. Secondly, one


15 All from Grice (1989c) pp213-214.

16 He might have painted them.

17 Grice (1989c) p214.
can argue from them to statements about what is or was meant by the (non-verbal) rings on the bell, and the remark respectively. Thirdly, and following closely, one can argue from the given utterances to conclusions about what S meant, or, significantly, should have meant by the utterance9. Fourthly, both new examples can be restated in sentences in which the verb is followed by a further sentence, or phrase, in quotation marks: ‘Those rings on the bell mean “the bus is full”’. Fifthly, a sentence, for example, of the form, ‘The fact that the bell has been rung three times means that the bus is full’, is not, in contrast to the examples in the first set, a restatement of the sample sentence. Examination shows that the two are not approximate in meaning. The verb ‘means’, and its use in verb phrases, embodies, in the first set, use in the ‘natural’ sense, and in the second, the ‘non-natural’ sense. (Grice adopts the abbreviation ‘means_{SN}’ (or ‘meaning_{NN}’) for non-natural meaning)20. Black writes that Grice distinguishes the interpretation of mere signs from the possession of meaning by an intentional utterance, and, as must be recalled at all times in the discussion of Grice, the scope of, ‘utterance’ in his work covers gestures and all verbal and non-verbal communicative acts. Difficulties in the interpretation of terminology, pre-eminently in respective philosopher’s use of ‘convention’, will be a reoccurring theme in the three remaining chapters of this work, indeed it is to the point that a revised definition undercuts sceptical arguments. For Black the first intimation of the difficulty is in the definition of Grice’s terms ‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’, a difficulty studied by Ziff. Ziff objects to the distinction of meaning and meaning_{NN}. It is imperative, he writes, for semantics to make a workable distinction between the senses of ‘mean’ in two examples of Gricean meaning_{SN}, namely,

(1) The sentence ‘Snow is white’ means snow is white  
(2) The adjective ‘ungulate’ means having hoofs32  

If Grice is correct one should be able to rewrite the sentences replacing ‘means’ with ‘means_{SN}’, these both being mutable, conventional meanings. Ziff argues that this cannot be done, and that Grice’s work is ‘counterfeit’ coin. His arguments are considered below.

9 All from Grice (1989e) p214.
11 Grice (1989) pp214-215. In the first class are gathered sentences of the type, ‘A means (mean) to do so-and-so (by x)’, and in the second, of the type, ‘A means (mean) something by x’.
12 Black (1972) pp258-259. Cf. Note and the belief expressed therein that a distinction more productive than that Derrida makes between the spoken and the non-spoken, the literal and the parasitical is that given precedence in Grice, namely between the sincerely spoken and the insincerely spoken. It is argued here and in IV (and arguments from different premises are discussed in III), that both sincere and insincere utterances (or if one prefers the vocabulary of ‘Signature Event Context’ and ‘Limited Inc. abo…’), literal and parasitical: the terms will be used interchangeably throughout), can be accounted for in a Gricean theory of meaning. A summary of the argument to be made is introduced at the end of I.5.
Grice investigates the distinction set up by his examples, and the cases in which the terms ‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’ apply. He adds a proviso important for Ziff: the distinction does not rule out a definition of mean\textsubscript{NN} in terms of natural meaning, for the distinction, Grice continues, is what is elsewhere designated as that between ‘natural’ and ‘conventional’ signs, and, Black is correct, the terms have been variously interpreted\textsuperscript{23}. As shall be seen, Ziff and Avramides emphasise the dangers of taking the wrong interpretation; Searle, for instance, finds difficulty in following a consistent line on convention, and Strawson gives the means for a fuller interpretation of both Grice and Austin. Given the potential for ambiguity, a control definition is given, following Black: ‘meaning’ is the reserve of signification, the sense in which all signs mean; ‘meaning\textsubscript{NN}’ is the sense in which signs mean according to conventions\textsuperscript{24}. With this the burden is shifted from Grice’s definitions (his proviso, as shall be seen, draws part of Ziff’s criticism), to the need to define ‘convention’\textsuperscript{25}. Black describes the distinction between natural and conventional meaning as that between signification and S’s meaning, one showing an ‘essential’ difference according to the addition of S’s intention. It is from this that Grice develops his theories of S’s meaning on an occasion of utterance, and of S’s timeless (or established) meaning in the use of an utterance\textsuperscript{26}.

Grice wants more from his theory than a marker between ‘natural’ and ‘conventional’ signs: some things that mean\textsubscript{NN} are not signs, and others are not conventional. Grice adds that many things that mean naturally, referring to the budget example, are not signs of what they mean\textsuperscript{27}. Here it is worth considering Grice’s arguments on an issue fundamental to (peculiarly Derridean), speech act analysis, and the need for sincerity, or avowability, conditions in indirect or parasitical cases. Grice examines self-defeating assertions (‘p, but I do not believe that p’). Examples from Austin have been given, and Searle has others. Clark asks how such assertions are explained in Gricean theory, for self-defeating assertions seem to undermine one’s picture of S’s utterances as sincere expressions of belief\textsuperscript{28}. Grice appeals to Stevenson for clarification of mean\textsubscript{NN}, and his formulation is useful in clarifying Grice’s

\textsuperscript{23} Cf. Black (1972) p260. The problems in interpretation are at least partly due to the descent of the terms from Austin’s posthumous, edited text. As Strawson shows (III. 4 and 5) the distinction is not absolute.

\textsuperscript{24} Black (1972) pp261-262. This is a first response to the analogy Derrida (1977a) pp172-173 notes between forms of communication, natural and conventional; as one shall see when the detail of Grice’s argument is encountered, they are necessarily different, and subject to different analyses. Furthermore, the similarity between Grice’s and Husserl’s vocabulary is noted in III.1.

\textsuperscript{25} It should be emphasised that Ziff’s work is far wider-reaching.

\textsuperscript{26} Black (1972) pp272ff discusses problems with the notions and their relation.

\textsuperscript{27} Grice (1989c) p215.

own theory. Stevenson argues that for an utterance or sign to mean it must produce in H (or 'the audience'), propositional attitudes (cognitive or non-cognitive, as Grice and Schiffer note), and in S the attitude conducive to making the utterance. This is supplemented by a 'process of conditioning' on the use of the sign in communication (and which is taken up in McDowell's discussion of meaning and communication). There are two counter-examples: firstly, derived from cases in which an utterance engendered by a belief, a cognitive attitude, means something descriptive or informative. Black notes that in the early examples Grice considers (in the formulation of meaning), the intended effect of the utterance is the instilling of a belief, owing to the truth-value of the utterance, and that a feature of Grice's analysis is the,

...subsuming under a single analytical formula all uses of language, including the utterance of imperatives, interrogatives, optatives, and so on, whose different meanings would be manifested in the different kinds of "effect" intended to be produced in a suitable hearer.

This is a notion of illocutionary force which develops from Austin through Grice to Searle, with which Searle works in his reply to Derrida, and which can be given application to the grammatical moods

---


Loar, B.; *Mind and Meaning* (Cambridge University Press) 1981, is predicated on the idea that a theory of meaning requires a theory of propositional attitudes. Loar divides meaning theorists into groups: those who argue that meaning is read off from language used in speech, and those who argue that it is carried in language used to form thoughts (p1); this classification allows that both reductionists and anti-reductionists can appear in the former group. Loar is a reductionist, and, as above, in this he claims to follow Grice, yet he lessens the burden on communication in a theory of meaning: propositional attitudes can, he argues, reveal the underlying semantics of speakers' language. (He calls it, after Fodor, 'the language of thought'). This may suggest, Loar admits, '...a picture of thought without language, with language a more vehicle of communication' (p2), but he replies, '...even if belief were a linguistic state, those properties of beliefs which constitute their propositional content can be reconstructed independently of their linguistic aspects, especially connections with spoken language. The theory of propositional attitudes abstracts from overt language or its inner connections. This may be too analytical for some tastes, not enough about what beliefs and desires are—viz. perhaps linguistic states. But how better to pursue that than by setting how any state, linguistic or non-linguistic, must relate to behaviour and perception to be the belief that p or the desire that q'.
only after consideration of Lewis’ arguments\(^5\). (McDowell examines the transmission of belief in utterances; and on the debate between himself and Strawson concerning the correct parsing of the meaning conditions, Grice’s work has much to contribute. Grice wavers between saying that S must bring H to ‘think’ or to ‘believe’, but emphasises that the conditions remain the same, and his example introduces essential ideas of mutual knowledge\(^6\)). Many people ‘have a tendency’ to don a tailcoat to attend a dance; one seeing a wearer of a tailcoat will, very likely, conclude that the wearer is going to a dance. Grice asks: does this mean that putting on a tailcoat means\(_{NN}^{}\) that one is going to a dance, adding that there is nothing gained by referring to the idea of a convention in the qualification, ‘...dependent on an elaborate process of conditioning’\(^7\), for this leaves open the possibility that donning a tailcoat means\(_{NN}^{}\). (A more grave interpretation of Stevenson’s condition issues in a circular argument for meaning\(_{NN}^{}\)\(^8\)). The difficulties of describing intentions and their appeal to conventions lead Armstrong and Avramides to consider Grice in a tradition of semantic theory deriving from Locke. As noted, the characteristic of Gricean projects is the impossibility of thought without language, and in this links with Lockean themes can be forged. The pertinent question, asked by Avramides, is precisely the difficulty of deriving conventions from communicative use of signs: if the meaning of utterances derives from their associated ideas, the difficulty is shifted a stage farther back: how did the ideas derive their meanings? As Avramides writes, the burden of Grice’s work must be to give solutions to an analogous problem: how the contents of intentions and beliefs give meanings to utterances\(^9\).\(^{\text{\textsuperscript{31}}}

\(^5\) Described in IV.

\(^6\) Again, to be examined in IV.

\(^7\) Grice (1989e) p216. The process of conditioning might better be called teaching.

\(^8\) Because it would appeal to a convention of meaning in donning a tailcoat as engendering the specific associated propositional attitude, and how did this convention come to obtain? With this can be noted a vital aspect of the Gricean programme in absolving the use of signs in communication; the connection to Lewis’ arguments for coordination in meaning will arise in turn. One might decide that the wearer of the coat is going to a dance, but that the act does not itself mean anything, but it shall be contended (here and in IV) that Grice’s arguments provide a means for settling precisely how one may communicate with signs, given a convention embodied in a ‘process of conditioning’.

\(^9\) Avramides (1989) p23. It is argued (in IV) that solutions can be given only after consideration of Lewis’ arguments. Armstrong, D.; Meaning and Communication', The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXX, no. 10, pp427-447, 1971, notes the connection, approaching an identity, Locke sees between the signifying use of sounds and inscriptions and their meaning. Cf. Tiles (1988) p87. Armstrong says that this is accompanied in Locke by a clear distinction between mental states and their linguistic expression, reversing the due priority of language and intentionality described by Grice, Derrida and Searle; speech, ‘gives birth’ to progressively more complex thought in a ‘feedback process’, and, Armstrong argues, Locke’s errors in determining these premises can be discerned (p428). Cf. Bach, K. and Harnish, R.M.; Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (MIT) 1979, pp43ff. The thesis that the unit of meaning in communication is the sentence, contra Locke’s arguments for it being the word, raises a problem of distinctly Gricean, and Husserlian, flavour: how can utterances operate as signs, as may clouds or flags? Armstrong is unambiguous: ‘My hypothesis is that utterances of sentences in the communication situation are signs in exactly the same sense of the word “sign” that black clouds are a sign of rain’. (This can, he maintains, be made true to Locke’s analysis). Armstrong encounters problems that will become familiar from Grice’s discussion: how do signs work as signs; what permits, and what makes correct, a ‘true inductive generalisation’ from sign to meaning? What of signs that go unperceived, or that can never be deciphered? The defence of his hypothesis includes a significant correction to the forms of words used to describe signs, important given the theory of intentionality appealed to in this dissertation: ‘...like the sign, the thing signified is always a particular state of affairs. It is semantically wrong to say, “This phenomenon is a sign that the law of gravitation holds.” The correct thing to say is, “This phenomenon is evidence that the law of gravitation holds.”’ Armstrong
The second counter-example considers implications drawn from utterances. The utterance, ‘Blake performs regularly before an audience of thousands’, implies ‘Blake is talented’: one, very likely, believes the latter having heard the former37. Appeal to rules of grammar permitting one to speak of conditions in which Blake is wholly inept is not meaningless, or, as Grice has it, does not, ‘violate the rules of meaning for the expressions concerned’38. There is again the scent of circularity. Grice adds that appeal to rules for the distinction of what is meant from what is implied militates against appeal to processes of conditioning (the same applies for non-verbal utterances). What is more, the analysis offered by such a theory gives a definition only of what is called by Grice ‘the standard meaning’ of a sign, not of what S may mean by a sign on a particular occasion of its use39. The definition of the meaning of a sign requires explanation of what users mean by it on particular occasions, and to what settled convention they appeal in so doing. This is given in Grice’s theory of ‘timeless meaning’.

With this in mind Grice begins again with another set of examples40. The understanding of the first four assists in the understanding of the last two.

\[
x \text{ meant}_{NN} \text{ something (on a particular occasion)}
\]

\[
x \text{ meant}_{NN} \text{ that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)}
\]

\[
A \text{ meant}_{NN} \text{ something by } x \text{ (on a particular occasion)}
\]

\[
A \text{ meant}_{NN} \text{ by } x \text{ that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)}
\]

\[
x \text{ means}_{NN} \text{ (timeless) something (that so-and-so)}
\]

\[
A \text{ means}_{NN} \text{ (timeless) by } x \text{ something (that so-and-so)}
\]

Grice focuses on informative or descriptive utterances, and offers an example. It might be that to say ‘x meant_{NN} something’, is true if x is intended by S to induce in H a belief, saying what the belief is is to describe what x meant_{NN}. Grice’s counter-example recounts the leaving of an item at the scene of a crime with the intention of leading a detective to believe that the owner is the culprit, again, a case of non-verbal, insinuating communication. Grice contends that that one would surely not want to say that the item itself meant_{NN}, or that the act of leaving it meant_{NN} that the owner is the culprit. A necessary

---


39 Both points are raised at Grice (1989e) pp216-217.
additional condition is that for S’s act (itself and its performance), to have meant<sub>NN</sub> it must have been uttered with the intention of inducing a certain belief (or, with sincerity), and that H (the detective) must recognise the intention<sup>4</sup>. Again, and as Black implies in his comments on this example, there is evidently a link to the sincerity condition in Austin and Searle<sup>6</sup>. Grice contemplates further counterexamples<sup>6</sup>:

Herod presents Salome with the head of St. John the Baptist on a charger.

Feeling faint, a child lets its mother see how pale it is (hoping that she may draw her own conclusions and help).

I leave the china my daughter has broken lying around for my wife to see.

The conditions Grice specifies for meaning<sub>NN</sub> are stated: for instance, in each case, there is an intention to instil a belief, and an intention that H should in each example realise that S has an intention to make him so believe, yet Grice has qualms. The difficulty comes down to the distinction, studied by Strawson and McDowell, between letting someone know and getting them to think, and the distinction of both from telling or saying<sup>44</sup>. Grice illustrates by further examples<sup>45</sup>:

I show Mr X a photograph of Mr Y displaying undue familiarity to Mrs X

I draw a picture of Mr Y behaving in this manner and show it to Mr X

Grice gives an analysis similar to that for the previous examples: the photograph (and the act of showing it), do not mean<sub>NN</sub>, yet the drawing (and the showing of it), mean<sub>NN</sub>, namely, either that Mr Y was guilty or that S, in its showing, meant<sub>NN</sub> that Mr Y was guilty. There is here a palpable difference, the sense of which falls to the rôle of intention in the latter case. Recognition by Mr X of the intention to make him believe the worst about his wife and Mr Y is irrelevant to the instigation of this by the photograph (and even more so by its showing). The photograph may have been put into Mr X’s hands purely by accident, or have been fabricated, and he will believe the worst without any process of intentional belief-transmission. The difference is very grave in the case of the picture, however, for the understanding of its having been drawn to convey an intention truthfully, and to be recognised as such, makes all the difference to Mr X’s coming to have a belief<sup>46</sup>.

---

<sup>40</sup> From Grice (1989e) p217.

<sup>41</sup> All of the remarks in this paragraph are from Grice (1989e) p217.

<sup>42</sup> Black (1972) pp272ff, and cf. the discussion in III.

<sup>43</sup> Grice (1989e) p218.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. III. 1, and for discussion of Schwayder II.3.

<sup>45</sup> Grice (1989c) p218.

<sup>46</sup> In respect of this Black (1972) p259 says that Grice’s work illustrates a trend to, ‘...recover and refine the insights of continental idealism...’, to mark the distinction between intentional action and mere behaviour, and [so] to maintain that between
Grice adds a further example of non-verbal utterance, namely frowning. Frowning spontaneously might be taken as a sign of disgust, doing so deliberately, to show disgust, is still taken by one recognising one's intention as a sign of one's disgust. Non-verbal utterances, therefore, on this bald analysis do not mean. Grice meets the challenge with a counter-example: although the cases are potentially the same, deliberate frowning can be expected to have the same effect as spontaneous frowning only on condition that H takes the expression as intended to convey disgust. There is, as it were, a priority, and the rejection of the recognition of intention leads to the rejection of the expression as producing belief. Again, the conclusion is drawn that H's recognition of S's intention is essential for the transmission of belief or knowledge, and Grice arrives at the formulation of S-meaning, with modifications and counter-proposals to be considered: for S to mean something by an utterance he must intend to communicate a belief to H, and must intend his utterance to be recognised as uttered with this intention. On this analysis the case of self-defeating assertions is dealt with in short order. S intends to induce belief by the recognition of an intention to do so: belief in the truth of the sentence stated, and his authority and sincerity, and yet in his 'incredulity'. However, in uttering his incredulity S undermines his authority for categorically stating the assertion, and so his first intention, to communicate a belief, fails. As Austin, Grice, Searle and Schiffer repeat, one cannot, in general, have intentions that one could not conceivably fulfil. (Grice's doubts concerning his theory of meaning render the analysis unsatisfactory, and compel its rewriting, and the discussion is undertaken below). Clark examines this definition. Grice emphasises that the intentions are separate. The second intention, that S intend that his intention to communicate is recognised, can misfire, and thus disappoint S's intentions, a 'covariance' which, Wilson maintains, is inadequate for Grice's purposes, while the speech act itself can achieve S's desired effect in literal or parasitical cases. Additionally, there is here the tacit acceptance that S requires this condition, that he cannot rely on the relevant belief being transmitted in the first intention. Thus Grice arrives at a detailed statement of non-natural meaning: "S

---

50 Wilson, N.L.; 'Gricean Meaning: The Ultimate Counter Example', Nobs, vol. IV, no. 3, pp295-302, 1970. It is argued in this dissertation that the 'covariance' is indeed adequate. There are intimations here of Strawson's distinction.
meaning of something by x" is roughly equivalent to, "S uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention."

Grice, in his next examples, moves from consideration of assertions to imperatives. Suppose, Grice asks, that S is in the company of an avaricious man (H), and that S would like him to leave. S throws £1 out of the window with the intention of getting H to leave, and with, presumably, the intention to communicate this: is this an utterance with meaning? Grice says that it is not, and draws the parallel with his example of the incriminating photograph: there is no intention of H's recognising S's intention to effect his leaving: it is enough that he follow the £1 out of the window. Had S pointed to the door and even pushed H in its direction, the case would resemble more that of the drawing of the unfaithful wife, for the recognition of an intention to speed H's departure is more in evidence. Grice has a second example. If S, now an examiner, fails a candidate (H), S may upset H. In certain circumstances, S may intend this upset and intend that H recognise this intention. However, the act of failing H does not in itself mean. (Grice suggests one contemplate the difference between stopping a car by flagging it down and stopping it by standing in its path). Grice collates his results, giving a definition Black dubs 'The Formula'. Firstly, S means by an utterance to produce an effect in H through the recognition

---

81 Grice (1989e) p219. Grice remarks here that the statement of meaning is just the statement of the conditions of communication.

In Yu (1979) pp275-276, some observations are made regarding the logical priority, inherent in Gricean analysis, of sentence meaning on S-meaning, and of S-meaning on intention and its recognition. The defintion of S-meaning, Yu argues, conceals an equivocation "pernicious" for good understanding of Grice, one that has positively led astray followers and critics alike. He finds the consequent confusion in Black (1972) p271 and in Bennett, J.; Psychology and Semantics: Comments on Schiffer's "Intention-Based Semantics", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. XXIII, no. 3, pp258-262, 1982, and concerning whether a full analysis of meaning can be the consequence of explication of beliefs and desires. Yu charges Griceans (specifically Searle and Bennett) with equivocating between 'reportive' and 'sigulativé' explications of meaning and intention: the former clarifying pre-existing notions and the latter offering new notions, for which can be written their own conditions of adequacy (p276). The Schiffer essay is itself relevant to assaying arguments for the necessity and sufficiency of contextuality of analysis, for he moots the thesis that meaning is a construct from intentions and beliefs, and not merely derived by logical steps. (It might be noted that relevant terms are ill-defined in Schiffer, S.R.; 'Intention-Based Semantics', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. XXIII, no. 2, pp119-156, 1982). Bennett (1976) pp8f shows greater sensitivity to these matters, and yet (p9) maintains that the virtue of Grice's programme is its taking the 'instance' of meaning, 'by one speaker at one time', as basic, with all other statements derivative. See also p22 on the due method of analysis being to yield necessary and sufficient conditions for meaning.

Yu asks what are, and what should be, the targets and motivations of philosophical analysis, as typed by analytical philosophy, a tradition Yu thinks, 'not altogether honourable' (p276). It is slightly to anticipate later arguments to say that the necessity and sufficiency of analysis is precisely at issue in the work of Strawson on Grice and the subsequent exchange between Strawson and McDowell (LI.4 and 5 and 3 respectively), and cf. Avramides (1989) p23, and Strawson, P.F.; 'Reply to McDowell', pp282-287 in van Stratien, Z. (ed.); Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson (Oxford, Clarendon) 1980, pp285-285, and Lycan (1991) p83. Avramides (1989) pp19ff brings out well the fact that the work in the tradition of speech act analysis, and especially that of Grice, Strawson, McDowell and Searle, shows what philosophical analysis can and (should) do, namely, clarify concepts and rigorous thinking to the highest degree. This is not, she adds, antibetical to study of the phenomenology of language; indeed it is essential for the writing of the fullest theory, and is to be contrasted with the pure, descriptive philosophical analysis, as practised by Moore. Avramides (1989) p7 argues that Davidson's and Dummett's 'pessimism' concerning philosophical analysis as a basis for a theory of meaning is unfounded. She notes also the differences between Dummett's and Davidson's position, with specific reference to Grice. Bennett (1991) rejects the idea of necessary and sufficient conditions for meaning, and Avramides (p12) goes on to consider McDowell's rejection of analysis alongside Dummett's. McDowell asks (cf. III.1), why should one accept Grice's suggested foundation for a theory of meaning, and says that his (McDowell's) alternative accounts for the 'phenomenology' of language, he is, however, as Avramides says, committed to viewing Grice as a reductionist. (Cf. McDowell (1980) p136). Bennett (1976) argues that none of what McDowell says rules out a version of Grice's mechanism, and cf. Avramides (1989) pp17-18, and on the relation to Searle, cf. pp12 and 15. Apel, K.-O.; 'Is Intentionality more Basic than Linguistic Meaning?', pp31-55 in Lepere and van Gulick (1991), pp52-54 makes a connection with the notions of responsibility and sincerity in Habermas' theory of communicative action.
of intention is equivalent to the case in which S intended the utterance to produce an effect in H by means of the recognition of intention\(^a\). The effect intended must be able to be given a specific description, ideally introduced by a ‘that’ clause\(^b\). Secondly, the sentence ‘x [an utterance] meant something’ is equivalent to the sentence, ‘Somebody meant\(_{NN}\) something by x’ (Grice concedes the existence of vague cases)\(^c\). Thirdly, and vitally for later discussion, Grice returns to the notion of ‘timeless meaning’, (his ‘first stab’ at its definition): ‘x means\(_{NN}\) (timeless) that so-and-so’, is equivalent to a statement about what is intended by S to be the result of his uttering x. Ziff notes some ambiguities in the three characterisations, and, he argues, affecting any case for a congruence between (1), (2) and their ‘non-natural’ counterparts\(^d\). Firstly, concerning the replacement of ‘someone’ by a name, and ‘x’, but not necessarily, by a sentence, Ziff is unequivocal: that none of Grice’s ‘generalisations’ apply to words (parts of sentences), and consequently, focus should be only on (1).

However, only the third of the generalisations applies to (1), it being a statement of an homology between language and world with no reference to S intentions and their recognition, yet it is far from unambiguous. This notwithstanding, Ziff studies the first and second generalisations for the clarification of the third, and his remarks are considered with Grice’s additions to his analysis.

Grice considers a further case, in which an effect is intended, which could not but be one of meaning\(_{NN}\). There is a surfeit of examples to make the case, all of which suggest that for the utterance to mean\(_{NN}\) the intended effect is in some sense within H’s control, by dint of his knowledge being the condition on the recognition of intention\(^e\). It must, as Grice puts it, be for H a reason and not a cause, and the questions which may be asked about H’s reasons for believing are questions about the worth and veracity of evidence and not (necessarily) about reasons for action. Grice writes that it should be noted that the first intention is of importance in the meaning\(_{NN}\) of the utterance\(^f\). This bears

\(^{a}\) Grice (1989e) pp219-220. Meaning\(_{NN}\) is transported by an instance of S ‘cutting’ (ignoring) H; H could not be expected to feel offence unless he recognised an intention on S’s part to give offence.

\(^{b}\) And this may include the act of utterance, in appropriate circumstances.

\(^{c}\) This condition re-emerges in McDowell’s criticism of Strawson.

\(^{d}\) Grice (1989e) p220 says he feels inclined to say that, as regards the changing of traffic lights, a change to red means\(_{NN}\) that the traffic is to stop, but that saying that ‘somebody meaning\(_{NN}\) by the red light that the traffic is to stop’ is eccentric. Grice thinks that there is nevertheless some type of reference to somebody’s intentions.

\(^{e}\) Ziff (1967) pp1-2.

\(^{f}\) Grice (1989e) p221. By telling H that by making a certain noise he is signalling to H and that he is to respond in a certain way, S is plausibly settling with H a means by which he may recognise his intention, but is this mean\(_{NN}\)? Surely, Grice writes, the effect of recognition must be ‘in some sense’ within H’s control.

\(^{g}\) Grice considers the thought that the recognition of S’s intention in an utterance gives H reasons for believing the intention by which it is motivated, and hence is akin to H’s ‘having a motive’ for so believing. On this, recognition ‘that...’ is better parsed as recognition ‘to...’, and again the conclusion is stated that the recognition of the intended effect is in the control not of S but of H. This draws some of the force of Searle’s objections to Grice (cf. III), namely that his theory is, in truth, one of perlocution not illocution, for if Grice notes the application of his work to assessment of perlocutionary utterance, it seems eternally to argue that his theory is (Searle seems to think, unbeknownst to Grice), a theory of perlocutions. It is a raft of the thesis offered in this dissertation that Grice’s theory is, in its appeal to first and second intention, equally a theory of illocution and perlocution. The remark concerning first intention neatly sets up Schiffer’s extension of the Greenean analysis (IV.3).
implications for the correct definition of convention, for if S makes his utterance with the intention of affecting H in a specific way, then the fact that he intends this recognition to bring about a further effect (say, of understanding or successful deception), notwithstanding the dependence of the one upon the other, means that the second cannot be thought dependent upon the recognition of the intention to bring about the first: if S intends to get H to do something by giving him information, the definition of what S intends H to do has no bearing on the meaning of the utterance. Ziff's examples resonate with all of those discussed. On being ordered to identify himself, S in Ziff's example, thinking the order demeaning, mumbles incoherent nonsense, and by the first condition of 'The Formula' he means to give offence (by recognition of intention). Ziff writes that the case described accords with the conditions Grice adds to first and second intention (H, Ziff says, could refuse to be offended, and thus prove that the success of S's effect is in some way within H's control, but that it shows up a confusion of S-meaning an utterance, and his meaning the corollary effect (understanding or to deceive); his charge is that this is an endemic problem in Grice's theory. What is more, there is an effect of contamination on the second generalisation: S may have mean that his answer to the order to identify himself surely did not. Patt and Stampe argue that Ziff's example is wide of the mark. It does not meet the conditions Ziff caricatures as Grice's first generalisation, for, as Grice writes, not any kind of intended effect (in this case communicated in incoherent nonsense) will do, and Ziff pays little heed to the essential qualifications of the first generalisation, saying that the sense is not any noise S may issue (for this has no conventions governing the ways in which it is to be understood), but

59 Ziff objects, and the continuity with Searle's example of the German-speaking soldier (described in III.3) should be noted. The examples described in the following paragraphs are from Ziff (1967) pp2-3.
60 That is, S means something by his incoherent nonsense, and he intended to produce his desired effect by the recognition of intention.
61 Black (1972) pp272-274 considers the fact that on the Gricean analysis what H is intended to think is identical with S's meaning, and after offering cases of S meaning in which Gricean conditions on H-recognition are not met (those derived from Ziff), writes (p273): 'this sounds suspiciously circular, since it amounts to saying that S will count as intending to mean what the words he uses would normally mean, a move that is clearly out of order in a theory that ultimately hopes to explicate standard or "timeless" meaning by reference to speakers' meaning in particular speech acts'. However, this is unduly pessimistic. It has been intimated that Grice's work needs amendment, and this is provided by Lewis in showing how conventions for language use (normal, or timeless, use) can be established in exchange between S and H, and without tacit appeal to standards to which, without inconsistency, the simple Gricean theory cannot appeal; such standards are simply not required. In his arguments against meaning relativism Norris (1985) pp1-16 might have made good use of Lewis. There is, in the distinction between S's meaning and its utterance meaning, an intimation of Strawson's distinction, and of Millikan's adaptation, that between K-I and K-II sets (explication must await II.4-5). In questioning whether S's utterance can itself mean, Ziff makes apparent the need for a mutual knowledge between S and H regarding what it is S means by the utterance. The case in which S mumbles ungrammatical nonsense allows, Ziff writes, a variation. In reply to the same question S says 'pi.hi.y pi.hi.y', meaning what he means by the nonsense, and meaning something both by the utterance and by its utterance. He thinks his sentence will be taken, again, as nonsense, but 'pi.hi.y pi.hi.y', is Hopi for 'I do not know'. (One can fill in one's own reasons for why S chose to reply in Hopi). S may not have known an answer to the question, but he surely meant something by his utterance. Ziff feels justified in writing, 'that S means something by the Hopi is wholly irrelevant to the question whether S meant something by [the Hopi]', and this because S can mean the same by all manner of different sentences, even, in this case, ungrammatical nonsense. What the Hopi means has nothing to do with what S intends to effect by an utterance in Hopi.
something yet to be specified according to a conventional (timeless) meaning, within H’s control, and for them a reason and not a cause. In more familiar vocabulary, the argument turns on a notion of illocutionary force (not given), and as Patten and Stampe have it, the sense of intended effect (that S wishes to engender in H), with which Grice works is one for a reason for H to do or to believe something in light of S’s utterance, and for which H decides to reciprocate with appropriate action or belief. Patten and Stampe, as Austin and Grice before them, note that one cannot, for example, decide to be offended by an utterance in this way (the engendered belief or reason for action coming with ‘uptake’, or the illocutionary force of the utterance): it may be a corollary (perlocutionary), effect that one feels offended, and it may be due to the recognition of an intention, but the understanding of the utterance (in the relevant sense), cannot be a reason for one’s taking offence.

Ziff’s second example, in which S utters a meaningful reply to the examiner’s question but in a language, say, Hopi, the examiner does not understand (that is, S does indeed mean something by his utterance, but thinking H will take it as babbling), is similarly weak. Ziff allows that one must be careful not to confuse ‘S did not mean what he said’ (for he did, his utterance was a perfectly reasonable answer to the question), and ‘S did not mean anything’, for, again, he plainly did. Patten and Stampe write that Ziff’s belief that S meant something by the utterance is argued for, ‘...in the belief that for someone to mean something by an utterance it is necessary and sufficient for this to be the utterance of a sentence in some language.’ As was brought out above, and as will be returned to, this is not an objection to Grice. Ziff’s example requires that S know what the Hopi sentence means, for otherwise there is no motivation to argue that S can intend the meaning of his utterance. However, there are many cases in which S may utter a sentence, knowing its meaning, but without intending to communicate its meaning, and, Patten and Stampe add, the utterance of a sentence is not enough for Ziff’s purposes, for had S not known what the Hopi meant, there would be no stimulus to say that S meant by its utterance ‘I do not know’.

(Patten and Stampe make a stronger argument. S cannot truly be said to have meant and said ‘I do not know’, for he is not trying to enlighten or inform by his act of communication, but to frustrate or inconvenience: he is trying not to communicate). Cases in which S

---

65 schiffer (1972) pp95ff gives a detailed discussion of this point (cf. IV).

66 Patten and Stampe (1969) p5 note that Grice is aware of the fact that cases of ‘cutting’, might resist assimilation under the analysis of the recognition of intention, and because one is hard pushed to say that, in such cases, the intended effect is, in some sense, in H’s control, or for them a reason and not a cause. Patten and Stampe argue that, ‘[i]f the cutting is intended to offend or distress, as opposed, say, to informing the person that he is out of favour, then the case is substantially like Ziff’s and could legitimately, we think, be similarly excluded’. Other cases arise in reminders: S intends that his intention to bring H to recall y be recognised, but this recognition cannot function as a reason for remembering specifically y. Patten and Stampe write (pp5-6) that ‘...perhaps in such cases we may construe the effect wanted to be that of considering or attending to the matter of which the audience is reminded, or which is pointed out or brought up’.

109
means something by his utterance, but in which the utterance is itself nonsense, point up Ziff's difficulties with the notion of convention. If S says '#sf'jl' meaning, by the recognition of intention, to offend H, he uses '#sf'jl' as, he thinks, an appropriate means by which this may be done. H has no recognition of the sentence itself ('#sf'jl'). S goes away from this exchange thinking he has achieved his intention, one recognised by H, owing to a shared, conventional understanding of what S intends by such an utterance in such circumstances with such intonation and so forth. Ziff allows this much of convention, but denies that the sentence itself can have any mutual conventions obtaining, describing its meaning, appropriate utterance and so forth, and yet the latter notion is precisely what is to be established by Gricean meaningNN. It theorises the ways in which any sentence or expression can come to have meaning in a convention, and how in use its constituents might uphold or deviate from standards established by the examples of natural meanings. The three rings on the bell may have come to mean that the bus is full; the driver may issue them incorrectly, or for another reason. The spots, however, mean (according, say, to the best medical opinion), measles; they are (or are a symptom of), measles; one cannot reason from them to a separate conclusion, or use them as signs of something else. Natural meanings are those established without conventional dubbing, but obtaining as natural, hard facts (recall that one cannot say, of S, that his spots mean measles but that S does not have measles).

However, the sense of 'meaning' in both cases is the same; they both explain how it is that a sign or mark or utterance can have a meaning after it has received a sense through natural fact or dubbing. Arguments for the absence of 'meaning' in intended nonsense sentences are irrelevant to assessment of Grice's work. Ziff argues that the nonsense sentence means nothing, yet the difficulties regarding definitions of convention noted at the beginning of the discussion of Ziff on Grice apply, for the identity Ziff claims between meaningsNN and meaning is incorrect. Patten and Stampe make the same point and raise a deeper argument. They suggest an example: suppose two auditors wonder what S means in a nonsense sentence by which S appears to think he means something clear and unambiguous; it may be that they cannot imagine what was meant or what S meant, or that they decide the utterance and S most likely meant nothing; the differences between the responses are small, and this, for Patten and Stampe, counts against Ziff's claim that the nonsense plainly meant nothing, for the nonsense is, Ziff says, 'compatible' with S's having meant by its utterance that he, say, felt fine. However, S and H could not know of this convention, and thus it is, 'qua non-sentence', that the nonsense meant

---

nothing. That the utterance means nothing is 'no more obvious' than that the responses to the sentence are misguided, and Patten and Stampe aver that none of the responses are misguided in the case that a context of utterance is apparent in which S is convincingly described as having the intentions he indicates.

66 Patten and Stampe (1969) pp11 add that in a case in which S says ungrammatical nonsense he intends to produce in H, by means of the recognition of intention, a certain belief, it is not correct to assume, as they argue Ziff does, that the cry necessarily means nothing. He assumes that Grice's statement that 'x means something' is roughly equivalent to 'Somebody means something by x', is rendered by the fact that, in such ungrammatical cases, S could not possibly have meant anything by his statement.

67 If Grice's statement applies in the case of S speaking ungrammatical nonsense, then, as Patten and Stampe (1969) pp11-12, concede, it is 'misleading' to say that what x meant can be described as meaning something specific, for such descriptions are most frequently used to report natural meaning, and this is plainly not appropriate in this case. Patten and Stampe suggest that there be made a switch to passive constructions: what S means by x is, say, that it is snowing in Tibet. Saying in response to S's ungrammatical nonsense that one cannot imagine what the utterance means is, Patten and Stampe suggest, not strictly speaking the correct response: this response does not in truth carry the implication that the utterance means nothing at all. "That "is supposed (verb) such and such" in its idiomatic use does not generally imply "is not such and such" can easily be seen from such examples as these: "Why ask me what we've got in the treasury? You're supposed to be the treasurer!" (which implies not that you are not treasurer but that you're a pretty poor one); "What's that supposed to be a picture of?"—a question which may be answered either "It's a bear" (with no sense of having contradicted and implication of the question), or "It's supposed to be a bear" or "...a picture of a bear". (These come nearer implying that it is a bear, or a picture of a bear, than that it is not). What "supposed to (verb)" adds is the implication that the performance, picture or utterance is irregular, defective, somehow not up to standard. But that S's utterance is irregular, and that the standard from which it deviates is that of the language we speak, are facts fully consistent with Grice's equivalence (ii). Black (1972) p273 considers the fact that, on the Gricean analysis, what H is intended to think is identical with S's meaning, and gives examples of cases of S meaning in which Gricean conditions are not met.
2. Occasion Meaning and Timeless Meaning

In justifying his terminology and usage Grice broaches the question of whether he is a behaviourist. He rejects the accusation of, ‘...peopling all our talking life with armies of complicated psychological occurrences...’, and denies that there are difficulties in his use of intention as a basis for a theory of meaning1. Some utterances are (pace Austin), preceded by a ‘plan’ formulated with an express intention, they are explicit performatives2; yet Grice notes that the gap between familiar and unfamiliar uses of utterances may be bridged, and the importance of intentions as a coherent body of guided behaviour over time emphasised. There are, in passing, still more difficult cases for Austin’s theory, instances of confused intention, and of latent, ‘coming to’ after having conceived an intention to act differently. Links to conventional explanations of intentional behaviour arise again in Grice’s statement that such explicitly avowed intentions are rare, and that in most cases one relies upon the criteria used in identifying intentions in non-linguistic behaviour, namely, appeal to generalised, common and time-honoured usage. S is thought to intend to convey by his utterance what is ‘normally’ intended by it; there must be, ‘good reason’ for suggesting divergence. ‘Similarly in non-linguistic cases: we are presumed to intend the normal consequences of our actions’. In cases of doubt about the intention to convey in particular utterances, in either linguistic or non-linguistic instances, one refers to the context in which the utterance is made and asks how a plausible alternative is fitted into a schema of S’s other behaviour and guided purposes. Grice states the situation pithily: ‘...relevance to an obvious end is a criterion in settling why a man is running away from a bull’. Black considers such a case in arguing for the insufficiency of the Gricean analysis, and his examples are of handshakes or gifts given3. S intends that H think one well-disposed toward him, on the basis that such an intention is difficult to conceal. S is happy to let his intention be taken as a reason for H’s response. Need S mean in this case that he is well-disposed? The conventions of handshaking allow only a ‘precarious’ inference to a friendly disposition. In neither case is one communicating a message. In some ‘linguistic’ cases H can ask S about his intentions, and in some such cases S will reply not with a report of a now exhausted intention, but with a description, arrived at after reflection. (Grice admits that he, ‘cannot find a nonlinguistic parallel here’, but adds that the existence of the case is an insignificant addition). Therefore, Grice states the conclusion to which his argument has led: the criteria for judging linguistic and non-linguistic

1Grice (1989e) pp221-222.
2Grice’s appeal to Austin here is unacknowledged.
3Cf. Grice (1989e) p222 for all of the examples on this page. The work of Avramides is important here, and raises the notion of mutual cooperation for the success of communication, and cf. Black (1972) p271.
intensions is the same, and so, ‘...linguistic intentions are very like the non-linguistic intentions’. Once again, Grice appeals to a notion of conventions for the expression of intentions, not of pre-linguistic intention.

Ziff suggests other difficulties with the characterisation of ‘x meant<sub>NN</sub> something’, by ‘Somebody meant<sub>NN</sub> something by x’. He offers the utterance, ‘Claudius murdered my father’, and three contexts: (a) in a soliloquy (on or off stage); (b) in a discussion; and (c) while ‘delirious with fever’. Ziff asks whether the sentences mean the same, and, on the model of the analysis of his (1) and (2), whether they mean<sub>NN</sub> the same. Again, as above, the analysis is taken as applying only to statements. Ziff writes that, ‘evidently’ no-one meant anything by (c) for it was uttered in a fever, with no audience present: the utterance was not intended to produce a response. Ziff is again muddling the two notions he finds in Grice, for, he repeats that, ‘...one need not confuse “What S said meant nothing”, which may be true in one sense of “what S said”, with “The expression which S uttered meant nothing”, which is untrue.’

Utterance (b) Ziff says, confirming concerns of Derrida and Quentin Skinner, is paradigmatically a case of meaning<sub>NN</sub>: it is issued, after all, in a dialogue. Ziff argues that though the sentences may mean (and for Ziff, astonishingly, they mean the same), they do not (all) mean<sub>NN</sub>, and his response to (a) is clearer still,

…it could hardly have been intended to produce an effect in an audience. (But perhaps Grice would wish to maintain that, in so far as S was speaking to himself, he was his own audience. But then could he intend to produce an effect in himself by means of a recognition on his own part of his own intention? These are mysteries one may cheerfully bequeath to Mr Grice)’.

---

1 Grice (1989a) p223.
2 Grice’s examples are all, at this stage, of collocation, and the criticism of this tenet of speech act theory in Skinner, Q.; ‘Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts’, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XX, no. 79, pp118-138, 1970, shall be discussed (ILS). Skinner argues for the ‘essential conventionality’, of speech acts, and that the dialogue situation is, following Strawson’s distinction, in truth a singular case, which, ‘...misleadingly oversimplifies the role of conventions’ (p135). Speech act analysis, Skinner says echoing Derrida (1977a) p196 fn. 3, cannot be predicated on a study of such synchrony. Once again, these points are discussed in IL 5.
3 Ziff (1967) pp.34 argues that the sentences in their contexts all mean the same; and for the purpose of stating further arguments against Gricean analysis (on the model of the case of S being asked to identify himself), he reintroduces the notion of sentences meaning something if somebody meant<sub>NN</sub> something by them.
4 Ziff (1967) p4. Ziff writes that in case (o), although S means nothing by the utterance, the utterance itself is indeed meaningful; and Ziff suggests that one can add cases in which S means something, but in which the utterance is meaningless. (His example might be compared to Schiffer’s of a neuroscientist communicating with H without any process of intentional belief transmission). ‘[S] has had his head tampered with: electrodes have been added, plates mounted...’; and when, again, asked to identify himself, he replies with more nonsense; later; however, when questioned, he says that what he meant by his utterance was that he felt fine, and that he, when making the utterance, thought all would know this. For Ziff, by the collation of Grice’s results (Black’s Formula), S meant<sub>NN</sub> something by his nonsense and the nonsense itself must have meant<sub>NN</sub> something, but, Ziff replies, the utterance is perfectly meaningless. ‘On Grice’s account, good intentions suffice to convert nonsense to sense: the road to Babble is paved with such intentions’ (p5). Avramides (1989) p66 gives a good hearing to the notion that S soliloquising or writing notes to himself is indeed intending himself as his own H.
The idea that the sentence means the same in the three contexts is examined by Patten and Stampe, and the matter of the restriction placed by Ziff on his analysis considering only sentences is raised. With their comments in mind, it shall be argued that Ziff uses notions of convention to argue against Grice that he denies to Grice, and in this it is seen how this is of a part with Ziff’s confusion of S-meaning and perlocutionary effect.

Ziff pays little regard to conditions of utterance in his arguments for the identity in meaning of (a), (b) and (c); though utilised in making the distinction, they are, write Patten and Stampe, for Ziff ‘...never relevant to the question of what was meant by what was uttered, or what an utterance meant.’ Ziff’s objections have purchase on timeless utterance, in that conditions of utterance (context, and an enduring, mutual convention), are thought irrelevant to timeless meaning, but this is categorically not Grice’s point in the generalisation Ziff discusses, which concerns the statement that ‘x meant something’ is equivalent to ‘Somebody meant something by x’. (It may be argued that Ziff’s criticism does not apply when timeless meaning is correctly understood. This is broached in II.3). Grice writes that an utterance remains tied to a time, a place and an author, and that the distinction between utterances (one’s and others, and outside of contexts), allows a theory of timeless meaning, but again, Ziff’s examples are all predicated on the condition that all elements to be meant in Gricean theory are sentences in some language. There is, as Patten and Stampe say, a ‘dogmatism’ in Ziff, a refusal even

\[\text{References}\]

8Patten and Stampe (1969) p7 say that the argument that the sentence in the three contexts means the same is less misleadingly expressed by the following formulations: ‘Claudius murdered my father’ as uttered by S in soliloquy means the same as ‘Claudius murdered my father’ as uttered by S when delirious which means the same as ‘Claudius murdered my father’ as uttered by S in soliloquy’, which means, ‘What S meant by ‘Claudius murdered my father’ in his soliloquy was the same as what he meant by ‘Claudius murdered my father’ in his delirium which was the same as what he meant by ‘Claudius murdered my father’ in his soliloquy’. Ziff would not accept this, for precisely this is rejected in his argument against The Formula. That is, he would have to reject both paraphrases. Cf. Cohen, L.J.; ‘Do Illusory Forces Exist?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XIV, no. 55, pp118-137, 1964, p120.

9Patten and Stampe (1969) pp8f bring out the consequences of Ziff’s restriction to sentences as his paradigm utterances.

*The self-perpetuating regularities of timeless meaning that Grice countenances are conventional (meaningless) meanings. Full discussion of how these are disseminated awaits IV.1-2. Unlike Grice’s, Lewis’ theory faces no problems of how one accepts procedural rules for ones linguistic practice.

Patten and Stampe (1969) p8 write, with textual support from Grice, that it is seldom to sentences that meanings are ascribed. ‘Utterance’, has what Grice (1989e) p216 calls ‘convenient act-object ambiguity’: utterances remain, as the discussion of indexicals shows, tied to a place, a time and an author. In cases of their repetition or quotation, one does not without oddity, say that the sentence S uttered, repeating one of H’s, in any way belongs to S or H. Sentences acquire timeless meaning by use in contexts, but timeless meanings depend upon no particular contexts: to repeat there is, on the theory offered here (and as established by the method advocated for the treatment of demonstratives and indexicals in 1.2), no claim for the centrality of any specific speech acts; indeed, it is maintained, in II.5 and III.5 that the distinction between literal and para-linguistic can, with a theory of what Skinner (1970) p133 calls ‘socially conventional intention’, be disregarded, as of little or no importance in speech act analysis.

By the analysis Ziff (1967) p3 proposes, (a), (b) and (c) are sentence ‘tokens’, but Patten and Stampe (1969) p8 argue that he treats them as sentence types, as ‘...conceived in abstraction from their utterance or inscription’. The argument that the sentence means the same in the three contexts is ‘trivially true’, if they are conceived as types, and, Patten and Stampe note carringly, this means that the use of the word ‘meant’ in Ziff’s argument is ‘incoherent’. They suggest a viable alternative: can not (a), (b) and (c) have meant the same by virtue of being utterances of the same sentence? S might, with (a), be referring to a defeat at tennis, and with (b), to a heinous crime. They may be thought to mean the same, but not in the sense in which one might be ascribing intentions to S, and, as Patten and Stampe say, for Ziff’s arguments to be subject to such a simple refutation is a symptom of his lack of clarity in distinguishing types and tokens. What can serve as a disambiguating element between sumness and difference of meaning in ‘historical’ utterances? There is, Patten and Stampe suggest, the need for a set of distinctions such as those Austin (and Cohen and, most profitably, Skinner, cf. III.5) makes between phonetic, plastic and rhetoric acts. What sense can be made of
to allow that the utterance may be more fundamental than the recursion of sentences in semantics; with this one is taken to the third condition of Grice's analysis. Ziff gives more examples (I, II, and II\textsubscript{NN}):

(I) He is the son of a stickleback fish

(II) Sentence (I) means the male referred to is a son of a small scaleless fish (family Gasterosteidae)...

\[(\text{II}_{\text{NN}}) \text{ is formed as before, as with (1) and (I}_{\text{NN}})\].

Ziff has no sensitivity to the examples as uses of metaphor, and yet he says that the use of 'means' is here the same as in (1): they are both, "...simply of the form: sentence X means m.' (The question of what intentions motivate the utterer of such a sentence is of minimal importance for Ziff; he does some speculating (see below)). However, for Patten and Stampe, the case is oversimplified; the matter of what a novel utterance means is no less simple and no more difficult than that of what S intends by its utterance and one should heed the Gricean analysis of the belief S intends the utterance to elicit\textsuperscript{11}. The semantical structure of the sentence is itself deviant, because unusual or metaphorical, and speculation as to what it means would hardly be more than guesswork, yet from this Ziff draws invalid conclusions\textsuperscript{12}. Ziff continues, if 'means' in (II) has the same sense as in (1), as he is satisfied they do, (1) and (I\textsubscript{NN}) are not equivalent, for (1) and (I\textsubscript{NN}) differ as do (II) and (II\textsubscript{NN}); by Grice's theory (II) and (II\textsubscript{NN}) are different. Ziff declares that (II) is a correct statement of the meaning of (I), and that since (II) and (II\textsubscript{NN}) are equivalents, (II) must be a 'disjunction' of statements about what people intend in uttering (I). The oddness of (I) leads Ziff to state that one could only ever profitlessly speculate about what S intends by uttering it. The likelihood is that it is not described in (II), but that the intent is derogatory. (II) restates the meaning of (I) but not the intention motivating its utterance; thus (1) and (I\textsubscript{NN}) are not equivalents.

\textsuperscript{11}Patten and Stampe (1969) pp9ff.

\textsuperscript{12} The invalidity affecting equally Ziff's alternative: the form with 'acoustic similarity' (Ziff (1967) p6). That is, the form in which S explicitly says what he intends by 'He is the son of a stickleback fish', which, Ziff says, is a 'familiar form of expression, given that sticklebacks are known to be tough fish, and] given that the sex of a fish is not readily determined by the uninstructed...'; there could only be intent to... denigrate a contextually indicated male person'.

The problems in Ziff's work should not, Patten and Stampe add, obscure the fact that he has, inadvertently perhaps, directed attention to the notion that must be elucidated in a study of meanings, namely recursion. In studying recursion in meanings it is, Patten and Stampe say, natural to abstract from utterances to their contained sentences (or the types they report), and the problems with Ziff's theory (raised in fn. 73) are encountered. However, such reduction is carried out, and is useful, not least for the analysis of ambiguous sentences in generative grammar. Cf. Chomsky, N.; Syntactic Structures (The Hague, Mouton) 1957. A typical means of testing for different or ambiguous meanings is to ask subjects whether they can understand a sentence in which the meanings are borne, but, as Patten and Stampe say, "...methodological soundness here presupposes that there be distinct utterances of some sentences that differ in meaning in non-imaginary cases", and these meanings cannot be identified with any putative 'timeless' meaning of an ambiguous sentence, for, by definition, there can be none. For Patten and Stampe, linguists must have recourse to what authors mean for the identification of what utterances mean, and this, it might be suggested, is part of a deeper response to Chomsky's work on Grice.
Patten and Stampe argue that Ziff's arguments against Grice are unconvincing. The search for an appropriate disjunction of statements may be fruitless, and no equivalents found for intentions, but the truth of equivalence relations need not depend upon the discovery of an indubitable method of equivalence in the analysis of sentences. Patten and Stampe add that knowing what a sentence means is distinct from 'knowing how to tell' whether what the sentence says is true: the problem can be stated as easily in Gricean terms: how can one know what is intended by a 'novel utterance'. For Patten and Stampe, Ziff oversimplifies what (I) may mean, for, by his own standards, (I) is 'semantically deviant', having no clear criteria of application '. . . at best one could guess at what it might mean'. By Gricean theory, and a condition to which Ziff holds Grice, this would constitute a guess as to what might be meant by someone on an occasion of their uttering (I), and by the first condition of 'The Formula', what might be meant is a matter of what people might intend in its utterance. Patten and Stampe wonder how Ziff can betray such certainty concerning what (I) can mean, for even if one could find a canonical, etymologically correct meaning for (I), it would still, potentially, be used in novel (non-literal or non-straightforward), utterances, and, in such circumstances, could it be said to keep the same meaning? Taking it that the meaning of (I) could never be natural, but only ever conventional (or non-natural), in Grice's sense, ...what would S probably have in mind as being the meaning of (I)? This is hard to say, although our "tough or stickling scoundrel" was a try, since (I) is deviant and its predicate, were it used, would be idiomatic, and this is so for other uses of the utterance.

It is clear (and will become clearer) that Ziff's objections may be written into Grice's analysis with no change in the substance of the theory, while he indicates the distinction between sentences and utterances (the latter tied to occasions, and their meanings determined for occasions), sentences themselves have an enduring ambiguity, and hence Ziff's search, ultimately unsuccessful, for a disjunction of meanings for types.

The problem of novel utterances in Grice's theory is not, Ziff argues, solved by a theory of what S 'would intend', for what would S intend by a novel utterance: not likely anything to do with the meaning of the sentence spoken. Once again, this is not an objection to Grice. Patten and Stampe

---

13 Patten and Stampe (1969) pp1-2: they are simply not sensitive to the details of the theory.
14 Patten and Stampe (1969) p16 moot the idea that the constructs, the most basic parts, of a theory such as Ziff proposes are entities amenable to unambiguous semantic characterisation, namely utterances. Some means of carrying out this unambiguous characterisation are described in I.2, II.5, III.5 and IV.3-5.
15 This, it should be emphasised, is what S would intend as opposed to what he does intend. Ziff (1967) pp6-8. There can, he says, be no such method.
argue that Grice’s condition on timeless meaning would have to utilise such a theory for application to novel utterances (as indeed it does), but bizarre utterances such as Ziff describes fail to meet Grice’s conditions on the recognition of intention, for no such utterance would be made with the intention to elicit a response on a Gricean model, for S would not utter it thinking he could achieve recognition16. Ziff’s misunderstanding of Grice’s theory is so grave that he can accuse him of (because he, Ziff thinks, allows the meanings of identical sentences to apply in different circumstances), a lack of concord with the use of an expression17, and also of a lack of attention to the ‘projective devices’, (the recursiveness), between the sentences of a language. However, as has been seen, this would affect nothing in a Gricean theory. Ziff writes that ‘[w]hat any given sentence means depends on what (various) other sentences in the language mean’, and, in so doing, appeals to the types of convention (although between sentences and not utterances), that he denies to Grice, and his most significant addition is that of a ‘regularity’: his remarks show that these are both linguistic and non-linguistic18.

Patten and Stampe object to Ziff’s claim. A set of projective devices is not the basis of a theory of meaning, and Grice can with justification ignore it. Ziff’s arguments for the recursive structures of semantics and syntactics tell one only about the structures, not about meaning, and Patten and Stampe note Grice’s condition on the meaning of non-verbal, non-linguistic, and one may add, metaphorical, utterances, (the rings on the bell; Smith’s remarks about his ‘trouble and strife’). The rings on the bell are not ‘expressions in a natural language’, and can be described in no recursive semantic system, yet they can in Gricean meaning theory. ‘There is no set of projective devices that is relevant in the

16 What S means by an utterance can be ‘irrelevant’ to the meaning of the utterance. If Grice’s statement applies in the case of S speaking ungrammatical nonsense, then, as Patten and Stampe (1969) pp.11-12 concede, it is ‘misleading’ to say that what x mean can be described as meaning something specific, for such descriptions are most frequently used to report natural meaning, and this is plainly not appropriate in this case. Patten and Stampe suggest there be made a switch to passive constructions: what S means by x is, say, that it is snowing in Tibet. Saying in response to S’s ungrammatical nonsense, that one cannot imagine what the utterance means is, Patten and Stampe suggest, not strictly speaking the correct response: this response does not in truth carry the implication that the utterance means nothing at all.

That is supposed to (verb) such and such in its idiomatic use does not generally imply ‘is not such and such’ can easily be seen from such examples as these: ‘Why ask me what we’ve got in the Treasury? You’re supposed to be the Treasurer!’ (which implies not that you are not Treasurer but that you’re a pretty poor one); ‘What’s that supposed to be a picture of?’—a question which may be answered either ‘it’s a bear’ (with no sense of having contradicted any implication of the question), or ‘it’s supposed to be a bear’ or ‘...a picture of a bear’. (These come nearer implying that it is a bear, or a picture of a bear, than that it is not.) What ‘supposed to (verb) adds is the implication that the performance, picture or utterance is irregular, defective, somehow not up to standard. But that S’s utterance is irregular, and that the standard it deviates from is that of the language we speak, are facts fully consistent with Grice’s equivalence [the second condition of The Formula].

Patten and Stampe (1969) pp.12-13 suggest an instance in which S says ‘snow is white’. Of course a person uttering the sentence in question might just have the relevant sort of communicative intention—say, to induce by means of the recognition of that intention, the belief that snow is (perhaps monotonously) white. If, as is unlikely, anyone were to mean anything by this peculiar utterance, that would be a fair guess as to what he and hence the utterance would mean. This taken together with [Grice’s] condition on timeless meaning: ‘x means not (timeless) that so-and-so’ might as a first shot be equated with some statement or disjunction of statements about what ‘people’ (vague intend (with qualifications about ‘recognition’) to effect by x) nicely explains one’s inclination to say that Ziff’s deviant sentence [‘Snow is white and snow is white and snow is white...’] ‘could only mean ‘snow is white’.

17 That is, in relation to other expressions.
relevant way to the truth or meaning of...[the rings on the bell].' Patten and Stampe reject the idea that the rings on the bell mean in an ‘extended’ sense of ‘mean’, and that there is any distinction to be marked between Ziff’s (2) and Grice’s example of Smith (a sentence), concluding that Ziff’s analysis identifies a feature of language, not a feature of meaning: Grice’s theory is more fundamental, asking what it is for a mark to mean something. Having settled these points a return to the details of Grice’s shall be made.

Grice introduces notions of ‘conversational’ and ‘nonconventional’ implicature in describing the full requirements for a theory of what H assumes S intends in speaking. He goes on to analyse the notions of saying, of conventional meaning and of implicature by convention, and of the relation between conventional implicature and saying respectively. Grice begins by considering the characterisation which says that ‘S said that p’, entails ‘S did something x by which he meant that p’. He finds that the latter formulation includes cases which could not be gathered under the rubric ‘cases of saying’, and makes a substitution and an elaboration: ‘S did something x by which he meant that p, and which is of a type which means that “p”’, a sentence expressing the conventional meaning of the utterance. Grice likes the ‘laxity’ which means the variable ‘p’ will remain in speech, and thus could not be a quotation of a clause following the phrase, ‘S meant that...’. Again, however, the notion of saying is no clearer, and Grice tries again, emphasising the significance of linguistic rules or conventions:

S did something x

(1) by which S meant that p;

(2) which is an occurrence of an utterance type u...such that

(3) u means ‘p’

(4) u consists of a sequence of elements (such as words) ordered in a way licensed by a system of rules (syntactical rules)

18 Ziff (1987) p7. However, regularities, or conventions are, pace Lewis, Wittgenstein, and most significantly Davidson, conveniences for exposition, they are not needed in a theory of meaning or of conventions in language, and can account, as Lewis argues, for the regularities in S intentions.

19 Grice, H.P.; ‘Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions’, pp86-116 in (1989). The notions are introduced in order to preserve the assumption of the ‘Cooperative Principle’, (saying that S and H must at all times make their contributions to dialogue, ‘...such as is required, at the stage at which [they] occur, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which [they] are engaged’), if not at the level of the utterance, at that of what it implicates, and at that of what S may be taken to imply by the utterance. For the quotation see Grice, H.P.; ‘Logic and Conversation’, pp22-40 in (1989), p26, and cf. pp28-31.


21 Grice (1989b) p87. One might communicate with a simple gesture.

22 Again, because of the use of gestural communication.
(5) u means that ‘p’ in virtue of the particular meanings of the elements of u, their order, and their syntactical character.

The statement is abbreviated: ‘S did something x (1) by which S meant that p; (2) which is an occurrence of a type u which means “p” in some linguistic system’. Grice finds counter-examples in utterances of the type, ‘She was poor but she was honest’, in which what S means and what the sentence means are each contributed to by the word ‘but’. This is not part of the analysis of what S says, but part of, ‘conventional implicature’. To the notion of first intention Grice introduces a second, viz. ‘central meaning’, by which it can be elucidated what precisely S (centrally) meant. Therefore, ‘S said that p’ can be read as ‘S did something x (1) by which S centrally meant that p; (2) which is an occurrence of a type u part of the meaning of which is “p”’. Four questions remain: firstly, how is ‘S meant that p’ explicated; how is ‘W (word or phrase) means “…” explicated and related to ‘S meant that p’; how is ‘u means “p”’ (and ‘u meant that “p” here, on this occasion’, and ‘S meant by u “p”’) explicated and related to the first two examples; and how is ‘S centrally meant that p’ explicated? The analysis follows examination of the notions of meaning and saying.

Grice examines meaning and its rôle in convention and communication. He gives an example: ‘If I shall then be helping the grass to grow, I shall have no time for reading’. In one or other of two meanings the reference of the noun is to a lawn or to marijuana. Both are specifications of timeless meaning for ‘a “complete” utterance type’. The same specification can be made for ‘incomplete’ utterance types, that is, words or phrases or their non-linguistic counterparts. One must attach one of the potential timeless meanings to the utterance to the exclusion of others, and this Grice calls the specification of applied timeless meaning of an utterance on an occasion. A further specification to be made is the ‘occasion-meaning of an utterance-type’: drawn from the use of ‘recognised’ idioms or implications in an utterance and their specified timeless meaning. Writing the last specification demands consideration of indirect speech, and of ‘utterer’s occasion meaning’: the definition of what S intends, on this occasion, by this utterance. Grice studies the two categories, and their distinction, and

---

23 Grice (1989b) p87. The abbreviation to follow is from p88. It is vital to note here the nature of the relationship between sentences and constituent parts, namely, words. This will reoccur in later discussion, of both Schiffer and Lewis (IV). The relationship to rules and their conventional character is no less important.

24 As seen in Grice (1989b), especially pp216-217.

25 Grice (1989b) pp88ff. The utterance type is ‘complete’ because its tokens may be linguistic or non-linguistic; that is, the type expresses the thought of a sentence, be it expressed in a vocalisation, gesture or inscription.

26 Again, the same must apply to the constituents of utterances.


28 This, as shall be recalled, is a Davidsonian distinction.
Yu and Wilson note ambiguities. Grice offers a definition of utterer’s occasion meaning in terms of utterer’s intention, and he returns to the definition of meaningNN, for, that ‘S meant something by an utterance x’ is true iff for H, S uttered x with the intention that H give a specific response, that H recognise that S intends that H give the response, and H give the response on the basis of his recognition of S’s intention. Wilson sees a confusion between what S intended to say and what S intended to effect by his utterance. This is a point exploited in Grice’s analysis, but incorrectly, and Wilson thinks that on this, Grice’s theory can be rectified. (He does not specify whether the effect is illocutionary or perlocutionary, and in Searle’s criticism of Grice, this becomes an objection of some force). The two intentions may ‘vary independently’, and so Grice’s work is open to a plethora of counterexamples. Wilson gives an example: S says, ‘x is y’ meaning that x is y: he means something by the utterance. On Grice’s analysis, S intends (I), (II) and (III). Wilson writes that while S may intend to communicate to H that he has (I), his secondary intention may just as easily be not to have (II) and (III), and no emendation of Grice can avoid this. The problem is more acute in relation to Grice’s earlier definition.

For Wilson the premise of Grice’s theory is wrong. One deciphers S’s meaning with dictionaries, lexicons and grammars; this precedes the ascription to him of intentions. One applies a principle of charity, interpreting sentences as a body, on the basis of as much relevant information as is obtainable, garnering the best possible approximation. Wilson explains Grice’s condition in terms of this principle: the utterance has meaning if it can be interpreted according to other utterances ascribed to S. If x means y in this corpus of interpretation, then ‘x means y’ is defined. This allows the diagnosis of the main confusion in Grice: Wilson’s definition says that the utterance x means something, Grice’s that utterance x meansNN (is conventional) and is sincere, neither covert nor quasi. However, there are, discerned by Wilson and Ziff, speech acts which are not signalings, and signalings which are not locutions.

Yu (1979) pp273-274 distinguishes the underlying thesis on broadly Chomskyan grounds (as Patten and Stampe (1969) p15 indicate), from those about the genesis of language. Grice (1989b) p91 gives ‘σ (σx)’, with σ a complete utterance-type, and x (complete or incomplete). He then gives ‘σ’ as a further utterance type, and ‘σ (σx)’ as the result of substitution of σ for x in σ. How the sentences come to have the same meanings is a different question, one which it is argued (here and in IV), can be answered in a Gricean theory.


Wilson (1970) p297. Wilson (1970) p300. Wilson suggests that for a definition of how this method must proceed one should, ‘Ask Ventrilo’. The convention is a ‘signalling’ in Wilson’s terminology. It is part of the defence of broadly Gricean theories made in this dissertation that the apparently dire consequences following from cases of speech acts in covert and quasi contexts can be avoided.
Grice considers such alleged counter-examples. He credits Urson with the observation that $S$ might elicit an intended effect by duress. $H$ has information that $S$ wants; $H$ knows $S$ wants the information; $S$ tortures $H$ into giving the information, and with the intention of so doing. Grice questions whether $H$ was to recognise, from the application of torture, $S$'s intention that he speak. One should say only that what $S$ meant was that $H$ speak. Nevertheless, an amendment is in order, due to two analogous examples, in one of which recognition is taken from an utterance, and in the second of which it is not. $S$ goes to $H$ (a friendly shopkeeper), and, saying nothing, proffers the cost of the item usually purchased: $H$ gives $S$ the item. Alternatively, $S$ goes to $H$ (now unknown), and asks for an item; $H$ waits to see $S$ can pay before giving the item. Nothing has been meant in the latter case, but in the first something has been meant, and an 'inducement' given. The second premise is amended, reading, $S$ intended $H$ to recognise, at least in part from the utterance given, that $S$ intended to produce the response. Vlach dubs the inference of (III) the 'Gricean mechanism'. His first example is Bennett's, and emphasises that the inference is based only on $H$'s belief in $S$'s sincerity. He gives, in addition, developments of the case in vocal, linguistic utterance. Case A3 requires that $H$ reason on the basis of $S$'s utterance, 'beyond' its conventional meaning, to its implication. There are cases (accusations, insults), in which there is no attempt by $S$ to convince $H$, merely to instil the recognition that $S$ believes $p$. The Gricean mechanism fails here, for the inference made is to that which $H$ believes, not to the fact that $S$ means $p$. Analogous cases include reminding, in which $S$ has no intention to get $H$ to believe anything, and $H$ does not reason on the basis of $S$'s intentions, the latter point being known to $H$. Again, the mechanism

34. Thus the definition reads: (I) $S$ intended, by uttering $x$, to induce a certain response in $H$; (II) $S$ intended $H$ to recognise, at least in part from the utterance of $x$, that $S$ intended to produce that response; (III) $S$ intended the fulfilment of the intention mentioned in (II) to be at least in part $H$'s reason for fulfilling the condition mentioned in (I). Grice (1989b) p92. Recanati focuses on this definition, and considers variants of 'neo-Gricean', claims that communication requires (as necessary or necessary and sufficient), recognition by $H$ of $S$ intention. Recanati, F.; 'On Defining Communicative Intentions', Mind and Language, vol. I, no. 3, pp213-242, 1986. (A 'neo-Gricean' who might fit this definition is Bennett). On the given definition, as Recanati says, this condition is a 'sub- perlocutionary intention', and will probably, in the course of events, occur. Recanati considers whether the definition can and should be amended, and whether the 'neo-Griceans' (Searle, Bach and Harnish, McDowell, Sperber and Wilson), have a better claim to have analysed communication. Bach, K.; 'On Communicative Intentions: A Reply to Recanati', Mind and Language, vol. II, no. 2, pp141-154, 1987.

35. Vlach, F.; 'Speaker's Meaning', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. IV, no. 3, pp359-391, 1981. The reference is to Bennett, J.; 'The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy', Foundations of Language, vol. X, no. 2, pp141-168, 1973. Cf Bennett (1976) pp125ff. Bennett presents the Gricean conditions for meaning, and stresses the unspoken requirement (unspoken by Strawson and Schiffer), for there to be a reliance by $S$ on the mediation of a trusted mechanism of meaning to achieve his intended effect (communication with $H$). It is the difference intending using $U$ to produce an effect in $H$ and relying upon $U$ to produce it in $H$. Evidently this introduces notions of choice and of rationality, for $S$ would not rely on the mechanism if he thought he could not with it achieve his intentions. This, as Bennett says, leads to Strawson's sceptical responses, in which $S$ speaks intending $H$ to believe as per the mechanism, but yet giving $H$ to believe he relies on a different mechanism entirely. As Schiffer says (below), Strawson's additional condition shall not suffice to obviate the difficulty, and the regress of further, and more otiose, stipulations begins. Bennett paraphrases Strawson: further stipulations become contrived and both defeat 'any humanly possible state of belief (p126), and ignore the fact that true (ideal) communication is 'open and above board', without 'contrived cross-purposes'. Bennett's own response to the regress is described on pp126-128; for further discussion of the same points, cf Loar (1981) pp243ff.


fails. A further case is reasoning from a body of shared propositions. For instance, cases of ‘direct evidence’, epitomised in Grice’s example of the bandaged leg\textsuperscript{38}. Stampe offers a counter-example\textsuperscript{39}. S wants, as skilfully as he can, to communicate to H (his bridge opponent, and, in the example, his manager), that he wants him to win. S feigns to smile in a certain way ‘very like’ but not ‘quite like’ a spontaneous smile when dealt a good hand, and in producing it intends that H thinks he has a good hand, that H should think this on the basis (partly), of the smile, and that at least part of the reason for thinking S has a good hand is that S intends him to think so. Strawson suggests a further condition: that S smile also with the intention that H recognise that S has this first intention\textsuperscript{40}, in what he is to take as a ‘spontaneous giveaway’. Black offers counter-examples of this type, arguing that Grice’s fear that there may result a regress of intentions in the move to prevent the case becoming one of real communication is, ‘well-founded’, for such a theory is ‘suspect’\textsuperscript{41}. A third case derives from Schiffer: S’s intended response is a practical one, namely, the effecting of the departure from the room of an avaricious yet proud man (H): H leaves not in pursuit of the £1, but because he is evidently not wanted. This notwithstanding, Grice contends, the utterance (tossing the money), does not mean\textsuperscript{42}. A further feature for note is that though H’s leaving was intended by S to be elicited by H’s thought that S wanted him to leave, S did not intend that his (own) intention was so motivated. A condition is added: that S intends that H recognise that S intended that in leaving the room, at least part of H’s reason should be that H recognised that S intended that he leave. Grice adds, again with reference to Strawson, that the new analysis has the feature that S’s further intentions are all intentions such that H should think that S has them.

Grice questions Strawson’s belief that the regress of intentions is virtuous, and attacks the idea that workable examples can be constructed with iterations of ‘S intended H to think that…’. Grice considers

\textsuperscript{38} Vlach (1981) p says that the mechanism remains good for cases of indirect evidence, perhaps Strawson’s rat setter. Less amenable are those cases, suggested by Searle, of utterances made out of a sense of duty. Vlach goes on to argue that the condition in Grice’s analysis, shared by Armstrong, Bennett and Schiffer, stating that H must come to believe by recognising S’s intention, should be replaced with a notion deriving from Searle: that of ‘understanding’, ‘undertaking’, or ‘commitment’. This is defined as a commitment, given by S in his utterance, to the truth of his utterance as depicting accurately, or asserting, an existing state of affairs: this is, in Searle, an ‘essential condition’. This is of a part with Searle’s response to Grice that meaning something by an utterance is an illocutionary and not a perlocutionary act. S stands guarantee for his assertion, not merely presents it for survey by H. The Austenian influence on Searle is evident. Full discussion of this awaits III. This is evidently a notion of responsibility for S’s intended notions and utterances, it is a condition of utter internal consistency. Cf. de Mulder, W.; Demonstratives and Intentionality: Searle and Husserl on Meaning and Perception (Antwerp Papers in Linguistics, no. 79) 1994, p6-9.

\textsuperscript{39} Grice (1989b) pp94ff.

\textsuperscript{40} Of letting H think he has a good hand.

\textsuperscript{41} Black (1972) p274-279 presents his response to this logical embarrassment. It is argued in IV that there is no regress. That all of Grice’s work is directed to getting round the regress, and to emphasise the problem of speaker’s speaking with deceitful intent, is considered by Avramides (1989) pp51 and 38ff. She brings to attention that Grice writes elsewhere that the regress of intentions is a mark in favour of his analysis. Communication has a value, and successful communication is its optimal condition; communication is an ideal, one never fully attained in particular speech acts. This is grist for Schiffer’s mutual-knowledge conditions. Cf. Grice, H.P.; ‘Meaning Revisited’, pp283-303 in (1989g).
Schiffer’s example of S singing in order to get H to leave. S intends that H recognise his intention to get him to leave. H should think that the singing is a result of S’s intention to get rid of him, but S just wants rid of him. In Grice’s words: ‘S’s scheme is that H should (wrongly) think that S intends H to think that S intends to get rid of H by means of the recognition of S’s intention that H should go’. One making this argument holds that one cannot argue that S meant by his utterance that H should leave, for Grice’s iterated intentions confuse the dual aspect of the intention, for how does H recognise that S communicates also a first intention: that S wants rid of H by his singing. Does S have to sing beautifully, in a way he knows is a pleasure for H to hear, but a pain for all other people? Grice continues: if H is aware of this reasoning on S’s part (as the example requires), he will likely conclude that S’s singing is intended to drive him out; he will not reason to a further intention. The beginning regress presages confusion in the communication of iterated intentions, and there are greater difficulties. Not only is the multiplying of clauses implausible, but it suggests that the ‘definitional expansion’, of a statement reporting the meaning of an utterance might be given differently from case to case, and include matter extraneous to the analysis of a meaning utterance: ‘...the nature of the intended response, the circumstances in which the attempt to elicit the response is made, and the intelligence of the utterer and the audience’4. Grice sees no objection to adding a clause to his analysis, halting the regress: meaning may be negatively described as requiring that S not have a certain sort of intention, namely, the complex intention described in the singing example:

“S meant something by uttering x” is true iff (for some H and for some r): (a) S uttered x intending (1) H to produce r; (2) H to think S to intend (1); (3) H’s fulfilment of (1) to be based on H’s fulfilment of (2) (b) there is no inference-element E such that S uttered x intending both (1’) that H’s determination of r should rely on E and (2’) that H should think S to intend that (1’) be false.

The regress of nested intentions initiated (though not infinite), demands justification, for it is yet a regress. It requires that S reason with reference to pre-established conventions, and, Grice adds, shows that one must use caution when assessing Searle’s example of the German-speaking soldier (described below).

4 For the same reasons as given above.
4 Grice’s examples are unconvincing, but his point is made. Parikh, P.: ‘Communication and Strategic Inference’, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XIV, no. 5, pp473-514, 1991, theorises Gricean communication using the machinery of Barwise and Perry’s situation and semantics and game theory. The latter is derived from Lewis, and shall be presented in IV. The former offers, in Parikh’s words, a theory of language as able to communicate different propositions ‘...in different circumstances with the same sentences’. It is a theory of contexts, and answers the very same questions Grice asks. Parikh studies directedness in greater detail.
Grice writes that in cases in which a sentence is uttered S’s intentions are to be recognised through H’s knowledge of the conventional use of the sentence (he notes also the rôle for non-conventional implicature). However, Grice’s account takes conventional links between utterances and elicited responses to be only one way in which they may be correlated, for it is a tenet of Gricean theory that utterance meaning precedes, and guides, sentence meaning. Searle’s example contains ambiguities. Does S intend that his captors (non-German speaking), having no idea what he says, conclude that his speaking German compels the conclusion that he is a German officer? As Grice says, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that S intends his captors to carry out this reasoning. There is, however, a difficulty encountered, as before, of intending a result without the likelihood of its occurring. In this case S would not mean that he is a German officer, for though he intends his captors to believe this, he does not intend this on the basis of their recognition, for they do not understand the sentence. (On the reading that S’s words were intended to be taken by the captors as the sentence ‘I am a German officer’, Grice is adamant that this may be what S meant, though in an aside says that in this case it is difficult to elicit a conventional context).

This raises a broader point: whether S intends H to think his sentence has a given meaning, and whether this intention is to be recognised by H. Grice rejects the German-speaker case as one of meaning, writing that there is ‘characteristically’ a correlation between an utterance and an intended response. It is not pertinent whether the utterance is really so correlated, or indeed whether S thinks so, ‘...though of course in the normal course S will think [the utterance] to be so correlated’; there remains, that is, a distinction between what an utterance means and what S takes it or wants it to mean. Grice accommodates this into a revised analysis.

Ranges of variables: H: hearers; f: features of utterance; r: responses; c: modes of correlation (such as iconic, associative, conventional); (E) (Ef) (Er) (Eo) S uttered x intending:

(1) H to think x possesses f
(2) H to think S intends (1)
(3) H to think of f as correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs
(4) H to think S intends (3)
(5) H to think on the basis of the fulfilment of (1) and (3) that S intends H to produce r
(6) H, on the basis of fulfilment of (5), to produce r

One may as Grice states, fulfil all of the first few intentions with an utterance which is not conventionally correlated with intended responses, and yet regard the utterance as one by which S means something. This is due to the presence of f (say, being an utterance of a particular French sentence). In Searle’s example there is no such unambiguous feature, for the captors are intended to recognise S’s utterance as being a token of German, but to think that they are intended to recognise the utterance as having been a particular German sentence. (Black likens Searle’s example to the case of an incorrigible liar whose ‘Yes’ is always taken for ‘No’ and his ‘No’ for ‘Yes’: the effect elicited is the reverse of that intended, or the liar means ‘No’ by ‘Yes’). With some exclusions and revisions Grice gives the second revision of the third redefinition:

\[(\exists A) (\exists f) (\exists r) (\exists c): (a) \text{S uttered } x \text{ intending}
\]

\[(1) \text{H to think } x \text{ possesses } f
\]

\[(2) \text{H to think } f \text{ correlated in way } c \text{ with the type to which } r \text{ belongs}
\]

\[(3) \text{H to think, on the basis of the fulfilment of (1) and (3) that S intends } A \text{ to produce } r
\]

\[(4) \text{H, on the basis of the fulfilment of (3) to produce } r, \text{ and (b) there is no inference-element } E \text{ such that S intends both (1') H in his determination of } r \text{ to rely on } E \text{ (2') H to think S to intend (1') to be false}
\]

Grice returns to the beliefs or actions engendered by indicative and imperative sentences, those S intends as the outcome of his utterance through H’s recognition. Black has intuitive objections to the point: a ‘good Gricean’ could never intend to get another to think what they already believe. He could not reply to ‘demonstrate’, his knowledge, for he would still ‘need to mean’ his answer. Grice likes the fact that in both indicatives and imperatives here both S and H have propositional attitudes, and that agreement to the utterances ‘The engine has stopped’, and ‘Stop the engine’, signifies respectively belief and intention and he suggests further cases. Grice offers a counter-example to the analysis of ‘[b]y uttering x, S meant that so-and-so is the case’, with ‘S uttered x M-intending to produce in H the belief that so-and-so’. The activating sense is too strong. What is needed is a theory of what S meant by an utterance on an occasion, not of the proposition S intended to produce a belief. (Grice considers the cases of questioning, confessing, reminding, reviewing mutually-known facts, drawing conclusions and

---

44 Grice (1969b) p101. The example is discussed further in III and IV, and is from Searle (1969) p44.

45 That is, on the most charitable interpretation of the example. It can be seen that the case of the communicating bridge player is to be treated in an identical manner: H is intended by S to recognise S’s knowing smile as meaning that he has a good hand. For the reference in the following sentence, cf. Black (1972) pp274-276.
telling a counter-suggestible man. The first example is described). S asks H ‘When was Waterloo?’, and H replies ‘1815’. Grice writes that H hardly intended to engender the belief in S that Waterloo was fought in 1815, though he meant that it was. S’s beliefs are irrelevant to the eliciting of H’s answer. Grice considers that the intended effect is that S knows or thinks that H thinks Waterloo was fought in 1815, or that S knows whether H knows the correct answer to the question. These examples raise two difficulties, one described here and one in the following section. The first concerns the tie of convention between an utterance and the intimation that S intends by it the engendering of a specific belief. There are cases (paradigmatically, reminding), in which the indicative mood is not given by S’s intention to induce a belief, and one could not consistently say that the intention of the indicative is to engender belief. A conventional tie seems clearer for imperatives, but Grice demurs at the question of whether the indicative can analogously be treated, and the points are taken up in the following section.
3. Timeless Meaning and Conventions

Grice makes a distinction between the meaning of an indicative sentence and of what S means by an indicative sentence\(^1\). Sentence meaning ever entails reference to the fact that an indicative conventionally indicates S’s intention to communicate belief; there are, however, cases in which sentence meaning does not coincide with S’s meaning\(^2\). The second difficulty follows. If one accepts the idea that the indicative is connected by convention to the indication of the intention to engender a belief, one must allow that S meaning differs for different occurrences of the same indicative. Grice considers the example again: ‘Waterloo was fought in 1815’, spoken by S in a class, by H in response to S’s question, and by S in a ‘revision class’. Each use embodies a different meaning. Grice argues that even if H intends to engender the belief that he thinks Waterloo was fought in 1815, it does not seem correct to say that when he said this he meant that he thought Waterloo was fought in 1815. (This, Grice adds, distinguishes him from S lecturing to H). The examples may be revised by considering the intention communicated an ‘activated belief’\(^3\); H, ‘...should be in a state of believing that p and having it in mind that p’. (Reminding and inferring may receive the same response, but with an intent to ‘remedy a different deficiency’). There is, however, a counter-example. If S reminds by saying ‘Waterloo was fought in 1815’, he can be said to intend to induce activated belief in H and to intend that this be recognised by H. In cases in which H believes but has temporarily forgotten the fact (it might be, as Grice says, on the tip of his tongue), the activated belief will be instilled, but despite S’s intention. However, the relinquishing of the condition is not acceptable: Herod, showing Salome the head of St John the Baptist, cannot be said to have meant that John was dead; S showing a bandaged leg in response to an invitation to dance can be said to mean that he cannot take up the invitation or that he has an injured leg, but not that his leg is bandaged\(^4\).

Grice considers that a third condition applies only when S intends to engender activated belief by eliminating ‘assurance-deficiency’, and not ‘attention-deficiency’. The idea can be extended to imperatives also. Grice offers a redefinition, in which \(\psi\) is a ‘mood marker’ reporting a propositional attitude:

\[
\text{"S means by uttering } x \text{ that } \psi \ p = \text{ S utters } x \text{ intending } (1) \text{ that } H \text{ should actively } \psi \text{ that } p
\]

\(^1\) Grice (1989b) p102. Here is a vital Gricean distinction, and he reapplies it to previous examples: the German soldier and the communicating bridge player.

\(^2\) And consider the example of S asking H the date of the battle of Waterloo.

\(^3\) A notion considered by Strawson, McDowell and Schiffer, and discussed below.
(2) that H should recognise that S intends (1) and (unless S intends the utterance of x merely to remedy attention-deficiency)

(3) that the fulfilment of (1) should be based on the fulfilment of (2).’

This, however, will not serve in cases in which S intends by his utterance to give H the belief that p, for it is required that H should think that S thinks that p; to this location one might add the need for a direct intended effect, that H should think that S thinks that p. (The indirect effect is H’s coming to think that p). This permits the retention of (3), and extension to cases of reminding, questioning, counter-suggestion and fact review. A problem arises with the application to non-indicative cases, described in two contrasting examples: (a) ‘You shall not cross the barrier’, and (b) ‘Do not cross the barrier’. The explanation of intended meaning for (a) is clear, but for (b) would need to include the statement that S intends that H shall not cross, and that H must himself form the intention not to cross. Grice dubs the cases ‘exhibitive’ and ‘protreptic’ respectively, and gives the fourth redefinition:

“By uttering x S meant that *ψ ρ* is true iff (3A) (3f) (3c): S uttered x intending (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) [as in the third redefinition, version A, with ‘ψ-ing that p’ substituted for ‘r’] and (for some cases) (8) H, on the basis of the fulfilment of (6), himself to ψ that p.

(The fourth redefinition, version B, is obtained by adding (8) to the definiens of the third redefinition, version B, as subclause (a) (5) together with a modification of clause (b) to account for the fact that the intended response is now specified by ψ-ing that p).’

In this, Clark writes, S saying, ‘p, but I do not believe that p’, invokes both his belief that p, and that he does not believe that p; a case, Clark says, requiring Grice to account for the roles of unconscious beliefs and deception (of oneself or by others).

Clark adds that this self-evidently compromises the condition on recognition of intention. Cases of self-deception are the most intriguing, precisely because they raise the issue of private colloquy, for which Grice accounts in his final version of S meaning.8

---

5 Grice (1989b) p110. As remarked at the beginning of II, Suppes argues that it is upon this that the major criticisms of Grice should be focused.
6 Given at the end of II.2.
7 Grice (1989b) pp104-105. The definition runs: ‘(3A) (3f) (3r) (3c): (a) S uttered x intending (1) H to think x possesses f, (2) H to think f correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs; (3) H to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of (1) and (3) that S intends H to produce r, (4) H, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3) to produce r, and (b) there is no inference-element E such that S intends both (1) H in his determination of r to rely on E and (2) H to think S to intend (1) to be false’. For the references in the following paragraph cf. Clark (1975) p.
8 Chomsky (1975) pp64-68. Chomsky considers cases in which S, before a hypothetical H, has intentions as in Gricean analysis. He argues that ineluctably ‘suspect’, notions of linguistic and literal meaning intrude, and that the Gricean nested intentions are unnecessary in ‘normal’ language use. Significantly, in light of the rumbling on of Derrida’s analogy between forms of communication, Chomsky marks distinctions between linguistic and other forms of communication and the literal meaning of S’s expression and what S meant by producing the expression. (He makes no distinction between the latter notion and saying,
Grice considers whether S means something by an utterance addressed to no-one. Such cases seem to undercut his analysis, and Black offers this response. Black deals perfunctorily with the notion that such a case may be explained as one of S communicating with his future self, as not serving in cases of 'pure soliloquy', for S cannot, in uttering, 'I must...', intend to give himself a reason for doing as he demands. Black repeats Chomsky's point that there is an indefinite number of uses of language and of utterance contexts, and of innumerable language tokens, that will never be uttered. He asks, carpingly, that if all Gricean examples are to be modelled on collocation, must cases of soliloquy be 'derivative' of discussion with a potential audience? Black allows only that this applies to cases of prior rehearsal or, less convincingly, notes for the development of ideas. The additions Grice makes can deal with exceptions, but at cost of mounting complexity. He draws attention to difficult cases: the posting of notices ('Keep out'), diary entries, notes to self, soliloquies, rehearsals for conversations and silent cogitations. These require a fifth and final redefinition. Grice postulates ϕ and ϕ' as ranging over properties of possible audiences.

"S meant by uttering x that ψ p" is true iff (∃ϕ) (∃f) (∃c):

I: S uttered x intending x to be such that anyone who has ϕ would think that,

(1) x has f,

(2) f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p,

(3) (∃ϕ'): S intends x to be such that anyone who has ϕ' would think, via thinking (1) and (2), that S ψ's that p;

(4) in view of (3), S ψ's that p;

II: (operative only for certain substituends for ""ψ") S uttered x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has ϕ, he would via thinking (4), himself ψ that p;

'whatever expressions S used'). For Chomsky, a theory of linguistic meaning is 'unilluminated' by an analogy to the sense of 'meaning' carried in an act of slamming a door, though a theory of communication may be, ('perhaps'). That is, Chomsky argues that the two elements of Derrida's analogy are inherently separate. He cites difficult cases for Grice: S without an audience, or in private collocation. (Cf Yu (1979) p278). Derrida would demur at Chomsky's exposition; the cases Chomsky cites say nothing of intention and its recognition, but are cases in which what is said has 'strict' meaning, and S means what he says. (S could, on this, say something to himself with strict meaning and mean what he says). While Derrida says the analogy results in all forms of communication being subject to the same arguments against satable conventions and indeterminable intentions, Chomsky would reply that there must needs be a distinction between communication and meaning. It should be said that it is a virtue of Gricean analysis that it makes no distinction between forms of communication, beginning from a premise passably similar to Derrida's, and aiming to account for the ways in which all marks can come to have conventional meanings.

Suppes (1986) p11 thinks the problem of soliloquy to be of no importance. He dwells longer on the concept of intention, and Chomsky's 'superficial' notion. Suppes emphasizes the primacy of communication over meaning, contrary to Chomsky in his rejection of Derrida's analogy. Suppes writes that if S writes a diary entry or notes to self, it is not acceptable to say that S writes something with a strict meaning but without intention to communicate. Suppes himself makes the point raised above: that Chomsky attributes to Grice, by implying an undue reductionism, a theory not obviously his. Cf. Bennett (1991) p7.

III: It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, S intends x to be such that
anyone who has φ will both (1') rely on E in coming to ψ' that p (2') think that (3φ'): S
intends x to be such that anyone who has φ' will come to ψ'' that p without relying on E10

There is plainly an ambiguity in the formulation, centreing on the 'such that' condition (and skewing
the interpretation of Schiffer)11. As Hyslop says, S utters his sentence intending that it have the feature
that it would inform H, and this, Hyslop argues, deals with Schiffer's objections, in both the soliloquy
case and that of the order made without H12. Hyslop is not so sure that the argument works for Grice's
example (as given in Grice's descriptions), for it may still be said that the requisite Gricean intentions
(given in the analysis), are present, but that the intention relevant to and needed on this occasion, is
wanting13. As Hyslop writes, the utterance in this case is to serve as a token of a type used to inform,
but it might be said that this leaves behind the lesson of Grice's core analysis of meaning intentions:
that the utterance itself is to have certain effects: namely, to communicate with H were one present.
(This, as should be clear, aptly describes the interpretative problem found in II.1 and raised by
Wilson)14. Black rejects the fifth definition, owing to what he thinks an incomplete notion of intention.
Every speech act, and indeed all 'social intervention', has consequences which '...can always be
brought under the rubric of a certain desired state-of-affairs, p'. One can, he suggests, read off the
intention in all speech acts, even, with the series of nested, regressive intentions, in deceptive cases; to
avoid objections such as those Clark makes, one should dissect the notions of context and
communication on which the ascription of intention depends, for, on Grice's theory, securing the
recognition of intention is wont to seem 'automatic', or 'ritual'. The ascription of intentions should

criticism is equally effective here (owing to his scepticism concerning the primacy of intention to S meaning and sentence
meaning), and the analysis can be reapplied.
13 As will be seen in III, this is the tenor of Searle's criticisms of Grice, which awaits full explication in IV. Schiffer (1972) pp.73-
Green concentrates on the addition to the condition of the recognition of intention, by Searle and Alston, of S's utterance as a
conventionally recognised sentence, using the example Lewis (1969) p.177 finds in Wittgenstein.
notions of context and convention: φ and φ' may be replaced by 'certain substituends', and Grice's definitions are doubted. (Cf.
Boer and Pappas (1975) p.213). In the case of silent cogitation, for instance: '[w]e could perfectly well... replace... every process
of speaking to oneself by speaking aloud or writing'. (Cf. Wittgenstein, L.; The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford, Blackwell)
1958, p.6). More pertinently, an utterance might be made without intention that anyone hear it; indeed, there are some utterances
for which no possible H is allowed, and while this is not pertinent to Clark's analysis, his point about Grice's definition is good.
Grice's commitment is to a view of language (verbal and non-verbal) as a means of public communication, and it is this that is
used in private communication. (Clark is surprisingly blunt in this straightforward transference; he is positively Searlean). Non-
communicative ('private') uses are 'parasitic' (Clark's word) on communicative uses, and it is enough if 'standard' cases are
defined and the results applied across the board. Clark is of the belief that Grice's definition achieves this, and that no more need
be asked of it.
rather be thought impossible without reference to rules and contextual conventions, and Black considers how such notions may be included in a Gricean theory of S-meaning.\footnote{In giving a theory of S meaning one must separate the relevant intended effect from the array of other effects (illocutionary, perlocutionary, rhetoric) achieved in a speech act. In utterance in the absence of an H one or more of these attendant effects simply is frustrated. Black (1972) p.273-274 sees in Grice's response to Searle's example of the German soldier a tendentious shift from meaningfulness to meaningful content, and this pertains (as discussed above) to the interpretation of the case of the German soldier. Black adds that the tenacity with which Grice pursues the purification of his analysis is like that of the logical positivists in shoehorning the verification principle; the principle eventually 'faded away', and the conditions of the recognition of intention will follow.}

Black theorises the application of these notions in a theory of communication as per Gricean analysis. By 'The Formula' for establishing conventions it is necessary that H come not just to recognise that S has a specific propositional attitude to some state of affairs, but to share it, to have it himself. This situation, Black urges, cannot arise in Gricean (and Austinian), analysis, for, firstly, a theory of propositional attitudes requires a theory of perlocutions and not illocutions, H's coming to believe something from S's utterance being a perlocutionary effect. Secondly, Grice wants for a theory of convention. (It is argued in IV that the requisite additions are made by Schiffer). Black asks whether, in cases in which S's illocutionary effect is unambiguous and achieved, H can come to have an attitude to the proposition expressed without understanding S to be asserting the fact contained in the proposition. He writes that S has still, surely, communicated his meaning, as he has in, say, cases in which he is understood but not believed. In this there are broad agreements with Searle's response to Grice, both regarding a theory of perlocution as immaterial to the notion of communication or of S-meaning, and arguing that the notion requiring clarity is that of the 'understanding' of H elicited by S's communicated intention.\footnote{Cf. Skinner (1970) p.120.} Any attempt to shore up Gricean theory not heeding this must meet three demands. Firstly, echoing Clark, that the postulated intentions occur in the situations in which they are invoked (Black says elsewhere that this occurs in 'standard cases' of illocutionary utterance, in which S's intention is, '...constituted by the meaning of what he says'; that is, in cases neither ironic nor protreptic, and categorically not perlocutionary); secondly, and quite simply, that the bald notion of 'intention' be clarified; and thirdly, that the clarification not be dependent on the notion of meaning.

Black quips that there are few, if any, explicitly formulated intentions, and Grice's condition that S intends to communicate what is 'normally conveyed' by his utterance brings a charge of circularity.\footnote{Black (1972) pp.270ff argues that there is no distinctive 'criterion' of understanding communications (as opposed, one must suppose, to acts of communication); they are not 'specifiable events', and he takes this as good against all Gricean theories. McDowell (1980) offers an eminently hermeneutical solution to the problems Grice raises (cf. III.1.).}

\textit{When S utters U [a sentence], he knows, or has a good reason to think, that H will be led, on the
Furthermore, this will not serve for novel uses of language, and Black suggests an alternative, similar in many respects, as shall be seen, to McDowell’s in response to Strawson, eliminating reference to psychological events ‘preceding or accompanying the actual utterance’, and contending that conventions of language are read off from overt linguistic behaviour. Black says that the circularity remains in the condition requiring H’s recognition of S’s intention, and hence his argument that Grice’s analysis is unworkable.

Grice shows sensitivity to these concerns. He writes that the relation between meaning and meaning NN might provide the key to showing that, ‘... any human institution, the function of which is to provide artificial substitutes for natural signs’ must encapsulate the features of S’s occasion-meaning, and to this he adds a further complexity 19. In saying of S that by doing (uttering) something he means NN something specific, and of a word or sentence that it means something specific, there is a further, vital distinction to be noted, between what S says and what he implies by what he says, compelling an explication of the notion of ‘saying’ and its relation to that of convention 20. There are six stages to the analysis. Firstly, a distinction between locutions of the form ‘S meant that ...’, and those of the form ‘[a]n utterance-type means “...”’. Secondly, the provision of a definiens for statements of occasion-meaning, with, again, the proviso that an utterance may be linguistic or non-linguistic, conventional or non-conventional. Thirdly, and most importantly, a means of clarifying the notion of the conventional meaning of an utterance type: of sentences which make use of the form ‘[a]n utterance-type means “*p”’, or ‘X means “…”’. This is the explication of timeless meaning in sentential and non-sentential expressions, and the classification may be sub-divided, firstly into statements of, ‘idiolect-meaning’ and ‘language meaning’, and secondly with recognition of the fact that an utterance-type ‘may have more than one conventional meaning’. Fourthly, with respect to the last point, one must provide an explication of the applied timeless meaning of an utterance type; that is, an analysis of ‘[a]n utterance-type meant here “...”’, making a distinction between the applied timeless meaning of an utterance type and the occasion-meaning of the utterance. (Schwayder pursues Grice’s discussion from this stage,

---

19 Grice (1989b) p116. Black (1972) p272 thinks that the reformulation allows that S knowing the consequences of an act (utterance) accepts responsibility for the act, and that, ‘...such acceptance of responsibility will be the visible content of the attribution to him of a corresponding intention’. Correlatively, H’s understanding requires that he, guided by previous experience and knowledge of the relevant context, see that S assumes this responsibility. The appropriate conventions are established before S can intelligibly invoke them in utterances, and thus the faculties used in H’s understanding precede the ascription of intention. Black gives formal expression to his argument that Grice’s analysis is unworkable (pp278-279).

20 The distinction between S’s meaning something by an utterance, and an utterance meaning something begins the analysis of Schiffer (1972) p 1, and cf. IV.3. Grice writes that implication can be carried conventionally (by the meaning of a word or phrase), or non-conventionally (by a use of words outside the specification of their conventional meaning). Cf. Grice, H.P.; ‘Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning’, pp117-137 in (1989), p118.
defining saying as meaning.\(^{21}\) Schwayder thinks Grice too modest: words such as 'therefore' and 'however' are conditions of politeness or deference; in their use they conventionally affect the ways in which S may say what he means to say, but not what he means to say). Fifthly, the distinction between what is said and what is conventionally meant compels the task of describing the conditions in which what S conventionally meant is also part of what was said. Grice does this by specifying, '...conditions which will be satisfied only by a limited range of speech-acts, the members of which will thereby be stamped as specially central or fundamental', and by specifying that in making the utterance S will have said \(\ast p\) if he has done so with a 'central speech-act' in an utterance embodying, 'some conventional device', the meaning of which, by its appearance in the utterance, shows that the speech act means that \(\ast p\). A central speech act constitutes a conventional illocutionary act in Austin's sense (one that means\(_{NN}\)), and carries with it Grice's substitute for the explicit performative, namely an indication, carried in the act itself, that S performs this very act.\(^{22}\)

Schwayder's alternative definition of meaning and saying states that meaning is communicated in acts of meaning\(_{NN}\), and makes radical appeal to convention. Schwayder removes all reference to intended effects, for they are correctly assigned to, '...the perlocutionary intent of the illocutionary act', and his account has no rôle for illocutionary force.\(^{23}\) He argues that the events (speech acts), described in his theory as conventional are prone to success or failure, with consequences to follow for misfires or infelicities: a bet is laid in a locutionary act iff the act contains the indication that it is performed. (Schwayder puts it succinctly: '...an act would have succeeded if the answer to the question “What was he meaning to do?” itself also conveys an answer to the question “What did he actually do?”'). Schwayder considers his work to reckon the ways in which one, '...performs an act of conventional meaning', his own taxonomy of illocutionary acts (‘action sorts’) would proceed by a listing of the conditions, ‘...under which acts of that action sort logically could not succeed’, and sincere, or, using Strawson’s term, avowable, acts are performed in the belief that no contrary


\(^{22}\) Additionally, Grice (1989c) pp121-122 defines a formula for all members of the group of 'central speech acts' in terms of occasion-meaning.

\(^{23}\) Schwayder (1972) pp82-83. Certain rhetorical devices conventionally affect what S says, namely, those conditions considered as oblique statements or implications. Some speech acts are, Schwayder writes, traditionally identified as answers to the question 'what was he meaning to do?' and are also answers or implied answers to the question 'what was he doing?'. Schwayder responds '[a] possible answer to such a question is 'Apologise', where I assume that apologising would pass muster as a kind of non-natural or conventional meaning. Also, if you ask me what to do, I might reply 'Apologise'. He adds, apropos this and what follows, that a central notion in this conception of action is the possibility of failure, described as the tendency to, when identifying a piece of behaviour as a type of action, imagine that it could be successful or a failure, but '[i]t might be wondered whether acts of conventional meaning can be said to fail'. However, Schwayder offers an example. 'Suppose I bet that UCLA will beat Kentucky in the finals, and then it turns out that Jacksonville is one of the teams that gets there. The bet is off. Although I certainly meant to make a bet, no bet got made, and the bet failed. Again, my act of apologising to Thalberg might fail because the person to whom I address myself is not Thalberg, as I thought'.
conditions obtain. An action meant is defined by a list of its ‘conditions of success’, and all such conditions constitute also a definition of conventional meaning. Schwayder is unequivocal: S means everything identified in a wide categorisation of things indicated in the act, things that, in normal, sincere cases, constitute an analysis of saying. For cases of insincere utterance, what S says is what ‘would be’ identified in ‘standard conventions’. In challenging Grice’s definition Schwayder opposes two senses of ‘convention’, approximating those in Strawson’s distinction governing K-I and K-II acts (described in II.5). He argues that everything S includes in his speech act: its intonation, its rhetorical turns, its use of implicature and so forth, indeed, all of the extra-linguistic conventions appealed to (including those considered by Austin), are pertinent to their analysis; again, a speech act cannot fully be analysed with cognisance only of its appeal to linguistic convention, crystallised in the explicit performative. (Millikan’s means of dealing by this method with parasitical speech acts is detailed in II.5). In emphasising this rôle for extra-linguistic conventions Schwayder considers himself to be filling in the details of Austin’s nebulous theory of rhetoric conditions, and, recalling that in the interpretation of Grice it was argued that a notion of convention can be supplied for first intention, Schwayder writes that the determination of, ‘...what is said is made in relation to specifiable standard conventions’, those defined, ‘...relative to the language...’, but adds that, ‘[o]ne can know what a coded message says only if one knows the code or is given a translation from the code...[and this]...may leave the question of what the transmitter meant still unsettled’. As species of conventional action, meaning and saying are,

24 Schwayder (1972) pp83ff considers what is added by what Austin called ‘rhetic’ acts, namely, the way in which acts are performed allowing the introduction of conditions good for politeness and deference. Schwayder considers how these conditions affect the ways in which one performs an act of conventional meaning (how one indicates what one means to do in doing what one does), and he says that the answer is given by his ‘general theory of action’. ‘My theory maintains that an action-sort can be defined by listing conditions under which acts of that sort logically could not succeed. An agent does such an act only if he believes that no such condition obtains. I prefer to put this by saying that he believes that every “condition of success” is satisfied’. An act an agent means to do is defined by listing the conditions of success for the act, such a definition implies nothing as to whether the act was successful or not. ‘There are to be sure other classifications of action which may be laid across this central one to provide for such further implications. So, for example, to identify an act as murder would imply it was a case of culpable killing. Again, to identify an act as sawing would imply that it was a case of cutting with a saw. Still again, an identification may carry implications bearing on manner of performance: so, stalking is deliberate pursuit and chasing is quick pursuit.

Every such kind of action is also, inter alia, a kind of action of one of our preferred sorts, defined in terms of “conditions of success”.

25 Schwayder (1972) pp84-85. Schwayder adds that S means what he means to say if the conditions of success for his act are indicated by the conventional occurrence of the expressions he uses. However, he may mean more than what he says if, firstly, in his use of the expressions he chooses, he indicates conditions conventionally affecting the style of utterance, and secondly, if he indicates conditions of ‘success or manner’, that are not indicated in the standard occurrence of the expressions used. Schwayder is bold:

[a] speaker says what he does not mean if the standard occurrence of the expressions he employs would indicate conditions which are not conditions of success of his act.

It now appears that neither meaning nor saying are, within my taxonomy of action, preferred classifications of behaviour. The identification of what a speaker said always carries implications about the means he employed. The identification of what a speaker meant may carry implications about performance style. Saying is something like sawing, and meaning is something like stalking, although a still closer analogy could be drawn between meaning and certain conventionalised dance routines.
for Schwayder, typical, convention-guided behaviour: saying is done with tools united by convention to the action, and meaning simply introduces to the same analysis further conventions.

The sixth stage of the analysis appeals to Grice's recognition of the necessity of an account of the elements in the conventional meaning of an utterance which are not part of what has been said. This is given in the following way: the elements not part of what has been said are 'linked with certain speech-acts', posterior to, and dependent upon, some member or disjunction of members of the central group. For instance, the meaning of 'moreover' is linked with the speech act of adding, 'the performance of which would require the performance of one or another of the central speech-acts', each of which must be distinct from, yet indefeasibly linked to, other non-central speech acts. (It might now be suggested that Chomsky's arguments for the primacy of literal meaning, and his appeal for support to Grice's invocation of rules and conventions, are challenged28. Suppes rejects Chomsky's arguments for the rules of language and the autonomy of syntax, and suggests in its place a bare minimum of agreement, (some rules of grammar, words, and acoustical properties), between S and H. 'The rules they use are similar enough for them to understand each other and communicate with each other, but they are not using the same rules [those of a language].' The way in which S and H differ, writes Suppes, is brought out by the rhythm or 'prosody' of their speech, '...surely anyone not committed to the written word as the final embodiment of language will want to argue that [they]...effect the meaning of speech and therefore, utterer's meaning?')29.

Grice returns to the analysis given for meaningsNN, now abbreviated to 'U M-intends to produce in H effect E', and he pursues the analysis of the intended effects of imperative and indicative utterances. He states two conditions for the cases: that for imperatives the M-intended effect must be that H come to intend to do something, and for indicatives that H should think that S believes something. With this the account of meaning must be reformulated. ('H' ranges over hearers, and '+'p' is a variable standing for a 'mood-indicator' corresponding to the propositional attitude ψ-ing. Grice gives a first definition29:

---

28 Part of a case against a too literal interpretation of conventions of language has been intimated in the discussion of Davidson at the close of I; detail must await IV, and as Chomsky (1980) pp81-85 applies his arguments to Lewis, this discussion is a preface of IV. The discussion raises issues of the development of identical and similar meanings in language communities, of the logical priority of some utterances upon others (explicit performatives or 'central speech acts'), and of the development of communication from primitive instincts. This last matter takes McDowell's attention, and is discussed on in III.1.

29 Suppes (1986) p113. 'These matters are unexceptionable and easily stipulated by all parties'.

28 Suppes (1986) pp114-116. This raises the issues at the heart of the debate between formal and use theories. The Davidsonian tenor of Suppes' remarks becomes clearer on pp124-128.

29 Grice (1989c) p123. The following quotation is from p124.
"By uttering x S meant that *ψ p" = df. "(ΣH) (S uttered x M-intending [i] that H should think S to ψ that p) and (in some cases only, depending on the identification of *ψ p) [ii] that H should, via the fulfilment of [i], himself ψ that p)."

Grice gives "ψ+" in 'that H should ψ+ that p' as an indicator which may be interpreted in two different ways, as 'that H should think S to ψ that p', and as 'that H should ψ that p (via thinking S to ψ that p)'. The earlier definition may be reformulated: ""By uttering x S meant that *ψ p" = df. "(ΣA) (S uttered x M-intending that H should ψ+ that p).""

With this he considers the relation between timeless meaning and occasion-meaning, and between sentences as utterance types and their 'incomplete structured and unstructured elements' (words and phrases), beginning by considering unstructured utterance types, and the example of a simple gesture, directed in the first example to an individual, and in the second, to a group, elucidating respectively the notions of 'established' and 'conventional' meaning. A full analysis must relate how conventional timeless meaning can come to guide S’s occasion meaning, and Grice offers, '[i]t is S’s policy (practice, habit) to utter HW if S is making an utterance by which S means that [say] S knows the route.' Significantly, Grice adds that when read correctly, the definition in the formula reintroduces the notion of M-intention, which is now, for Grice, 'otiose', the analysis requiring only first intention, for if S’s policy in the use of the gesture is an intention to effect H, it follows that when doing the gesture he does so M-intending to effect H in this way.

If S is to have the intentions good for all implementations of his policy, he must be confident that his intentions will be realised: H, as before, must be aware of S’s policy and know that it applies to the gesture. The definition 'For S, HW means “I know the route”'= df. "It is S’s policy (practice, habit) to utter HW if, for some H, S intends (wants) H to think that S thinks S knows the route’’, is rejected for two reasons. Firstly, S may give the one gesture two uses, so giving it two meanings, and secondly, the effect of the gesture may be achieved by other means (S could even use an explicit performat ive: ‘I know the route’). For elucidation Grice turns to a notion of ‘having a certain procedure in one’s repertoire’, a notion with application outside ‘linguistic or otherwise communicative’ utterances. The definition must further be refined: ""For S utterance-type x means (has as one of its meanings) *ψ p”= df. “S has in his repertoire the following procedure: to utter a token of x if S intends (wants) H to ψ+ that p”. This allows the study of timeless meaning among a group or class of individuals. To access the communicated meaning of the gesture, each H of a group G must want his response to the gesture

---

\textsuperscript{30} Grice (1989c) p126. The reasons bear comparison with those given by Chomsky (1975) pp36ff and 54ff.
harmonised with that of G, and this can be factored into the analysis. For Grice, a redefinition accounting for this carries the idea of an utterance’s correct and incorrect use, and not merely of normal and novel use, and thus rigorises the definition of convention, which Grice gives, tentatively, as a readiness to utter a ‘…member of the same family…as an intention to do that thing’. (He remarks that this must be distinguished from S’s ‘being equipped’ to utter the expression). The gesture can similarly be defined for timeless meaning, covering cases in which S indicates one thing by his gesture and by the same gesture on another occasion, another thing entirely. In both cases, however, S expects that H’s understanding of the gesture will be based on his knowledge that S has a procedure good for a context. A similar analysis can be applied to structured utterance-types and their parts, after the introduction of certain ‘apparatus’, firstly, ‘s1(s2)’ to denote a sentence of which s2 is a sub-sentence (with the proviso that sentences may be sub-sentences of themselves), and secondly, ‘v [s1(s2)]’, to be a complete utterance token of s1(s2). Thirdly, and owing to the property of sentences by which they have meaning as a consequence of the meanings of their parts, Grice adds a ‘resultant procedure’, describing both an utterance-type determined by the understanding of procedures for particular utterance-types featuring as elements in the utterance, and a sequence of utterance-types featuring an ordering of syntactical categories. Grice ventures a definition of applied timeless meaning31:

“S in v [s1(s2)] meant *ψ p”= df. “(∃Η) (∃q) (S meant by v [s1(s2)] that *q, and S intended H to recognise that S meant by v [s1(s2)] that *q at least partly on the basis of H’s thought that S has a resultant procedure for s2, namely (for suitable H’) to utter s2 if S wants H’ to ψ+ that p)”’.

Chomsky regards these arguments as Grice’s ‘most careful’ work, demurring that a standing readiness to do something is a notion of similar compass to an intention to do it32. He rejects the extension to group situations, even when the analysis for the connection of timeless and occasion meaning is accepted, for there are no ‘contours of preparedness’ permitting account for ‘normal creative’ use of language, but the outgrowth of innateness and generative grammar. However, Grice makes no grave use of the terms ‘practice’ or ‘custom’; it is only, as Suppes writes, ‘...ordinary talk about behaviour’. While the notion of the ‘resultant procedure’ is unclear, and the elucidation of ‘word meaning’ in its connection to ‘meaning that’ demands the elucidation of notions more fundamental than resultant procedure, Grice is not a behaviourist, for he does not make concepts of ‘practice’,

---

31 Grice (1989c) p129.
'habit', and 'procedure'\textsuperscript{35}. There is nothing behaviourist about this usage, again, "...it is just ordinary talk about behaviour", compelling no account of the creative use of language but merely generalised descriptions of practices or procedures. While Grice admits that there is an attractiveness in the idea of a 'general schema' giving the roles of word meanings as determining sentence meanings, he warns that the most that could be achieved in such a theory is an assessment for a 'very restricted (but central)', group of types and forms: 'a fragment of what might be the kind of theory we need', and to this he turns.

Grice takes as his range the 'affirmative categorical (not necessarily indicative) sentences including a noun (or definite description) and an adjective (or adjectival phrase)', and adds that an explication of such procedures requires that $\sigma$, a sentence, be taken as an indicative, with provision available for imperative versions, and so on for other grammatical moods. It requires also that there be added an idea of the predication of an adjectival clause on a nominal base, and that there may occur extension to referential and denotational correlates, of particular objects as referential correlates of nominals, and of all members of groups of objects as denotational correlates of adjectivals. Grice postulates as basic the procedures of uttering the indicative version of $\sigma$ if $S$ intends $H$ to think that $S$ thinks "..." (the infinitive of $\sigma$, with obvious changes for imperatives), and as uttering an $\psi+$-correlated predication of the adjectival on the nominal if $S$ wants $H$ to $\psi+$ a particular referential correlate of the nominal to be among the set of denotational correlates of the adjectival. Grice adds that for $S$ the following two correlations hold: 'x's dog is an R [referential]-correlate of "Fido"' and 'Any hairy-coated thing is a D [denotational]-correlate of "shaggy"'. The following inferences can be made concerning $S$'s resultant procedures: determined by $P_1$ and $P_2$ is $RP$ [resultant procedure]: to utter the indicative version of a predication of the adjectival on the nominal if $S$ wants $H$ to think $S$ thinks a particular referential correlate of the nominal is one of a particular set of denotational correlates of the adjectival. From $RP_1$ and $C_1$ one can infer that $S$ has $RP_2$: '[t]o utter the indicative version of a predication of $B$ [the adjectival] on "Fido" if $S$ wants $H$ to think $S$ thinks x's dog to be one of a particular set of D-correlates of $B'$. From $RP_2$ and $C_2$ one can infer that $S$ has $RP_3$: to utter the indicative version of a predication of 'shaggy' on 'Fido' if $S$ wants $H$ to think x's dog is of the set of hairy-coated things. One can also infer that $S$ utters 'Fido is shaggy' if he wants $H$ to think that $S$ thinks x's dog is hairy. The definition of a complete utterance-type follows: "'q is complete'=df. "A fully expanded definiens for 'q means'...""
contains no explicit reference to correlation, other than that involved in speaking of an R-correlate of some referring expression occurring within q''. Grice explicates the notion of correlation with reference to the model given by linguistic and non-linguistic items in speech acts or gestures, asking how such expressions match the world. Over and above his intention in making this act of correlation, S has by his utterance established a relation of the expression uttered by him on a particular occasion in 'juxtaposition' to the name of a class to which each such expression belongs. He has also set up an analogous relation (by excluding all that does not belong), naming the 'complement' of the class to which it belongs. However, he intends only to set up the first relation. This may be expressed formally. Grice asks one to suppose that an utterance-token of a type, when uttered, correlates the utterance with each thing in the set: '(∃R)((S effected by V that [Hx] [R "shaggy" x=x E y (y is a hairy-coated thing)]) and (S uttered V in order that S effect by V that [Hx]...)).' The correlation holds if there is 'an identifiable R' for which the condition in the definiens holds. Grice suggests 'R xy = x' as a word type such that the corresponding utterance may be included in a sequence made up of a token of x followed by a colon and an expression, 'the R-correlate of which is a set of which y is a member'. The regress begins again. Saying of y that it instantiates a correlation by being a member of a class that usually fulfils such correlations, makes prior, indefinite reference to the relationship S invokes in his utterance, and how is this established? How may the circumstances of application be stipulated, and how do correlations grow? Are they created? What of tacit correlations, in situations never articulated, or 'non-explicit'? S may think that in stating his condition for correlating word and object he has a 'free hand', but Grice asks, must S be able to give a 'non-arbitrary condition'; and, he adds, 'it is tempting to suggest that [S] is to make his explicit correlation such as to match or fit existing procedures'. Grice asks whether the circularity is tolerable, and, a more palatable suggestion, whether it is an outgrowth of apparent 'linguistic rules' which determine one's linguistic behaviour, 'as if one accepted these rules.


Grice (1965) pp134-135, although aware that this seems not to be the most dangerous regress (he says in defence that 'correlation' is not used in definition of correlation, but rather in specification of an indefinite reference occurring in the definition of correlation), considers an alternative: namely, 'ostensive' correlation, but questions again the nature of the relationship between word and object. He considers a case in which a word, a token of a part-utterance type, is ostensively correlated with a property of being such-and-such. S performs a number of acts in which properties are ascribed to an object; in each predication the token in question is uttered with the intention of ostending the word. For successful predication, it 'seems' necessary (and sufficient) that there be a relation holding between word and an object, and how is this to be specified? Grice replies that the relation between the token and the property is constituted by the fact that the two are related, and would be, by S rather than not. In other words in a limited universe consisting of things which in S's view are either plainly x or not x, the relation R holds only between the word... and each object which is for S plainly x'.

and consciously followed them.\textsuperscript{36} Such rules do not detail facts about linguistic practice but explain it, and lead one to believe that 'in some sense', 'implicitly', the rules are accepted. Why the rules are accepted, and how this acceptance is distinguished from the existence of practices governed by the rules is a question Grice does not consider, but an answer is provided in IV\textsuperscript{37}. What must here be discerned in Grice is the postulation of claim and counter-claim regarding the matter of S-meaning something by an utterance by the recognition of intention, and how far an answer seems to take one from analysis of the spoken utterance itself. It is not unreasonable to assume that a theory of linguistic meaning, while, as Grice has surely shown, needing a theory of intentions in communication, must remain sensitive to the matter of what S's utterance can mean, as established by conventions. The means by which such conventions may be established without pre-established standards (a circularity feared by Grice and Derrida), is presented in IV. The utterance of a sentence in a parasitical context, and its difference from a literal utterance, is explained by Lewis in a possible worlds semantics, and shows that if one interprets Grice as saying that an utterance, for it to be understood as communication, requires more than the meaning immanent in the (explicit) performative, then S's intentions, and the conventions to which he appeals, can be established without circularity or regress. While the argument that there can be no contexts supplied for performatives in speech acts determining them as literal or parasitical is subject to the same response from Lewis, another argument can be made to the end that these (explicit) performatives performed in accordance with conventions of language (in which S intention is carried in the utterance itself), can definitively be classed as literal or parasitical, and owing to the distinction Grice draws between S's meaning in an utterance and his intending, by H, the recognition of intention. The thread is picked up by Strawson, because Grice, as seen, does not consider how conventions are accepted.

\textsuperscript{36} Grice (1989c) pp136-137. One is left to consider a non-explicit correlation determining that S would explicitly correlate the word and the object in order to generate 'relevant existing procedures'.

\textsuperscript{37} Chomsky (1980) p44 asks one to consider the act of meaning as 'primitive and isolable'. There is an original stipulation and the association is conveyed to others.
4. Strawson’s Distinction

Strawson, as Grice and Husserl before him, asks what it is to have sense as words, sentences and signals do. He is chary of the complex of timeless meaning, and alive to the dangers of too facile connections between ‘meaning in general’, and ‘what it is for particular expressions to have particular meanings’, for, the question arises again, how can conventions for the latter be established? In discussions of the matter, there is joined, he argues, a ‘Homeric’ struggle, between formal semantics and use (pragmatic, intention-based) theories, yet, Strawson says, intercession is possible, and the referral of the analysis in terms of, ‘...rules and conventions, semantic and syntactic’, to the explication of linguistic meaning. The need for mediation is shown not least by reflection on the fact that the capacity for conventions to generate and inculcate an infinity of further sentences (as has been seen, a necessity for Gricean analysis), takes one far from the type of ‘primitive’ situation in which Grice envisages the explication of bald S meaning must take place. Conventions ‘govern human practices and purposive human activities’, yet Strawson, and Lewis (in IV), take up the task of rigorising the definition of convention.

Complex, compound thoughts and their analysis tell against Austin’s theory of conventions as immanent in paradigm performative utterances. If language is a system of rules for facilitating communication, and its analysis is ‘not to be circular’, must one not, Strawson quips, postulate complicated intentions, and these independent of the means of their successful communication, and in so doing, commit to a notion of pre-linguistic intentionality? Strawson replies that use theory requires merely that the working of convention in communication be explained at Davidson’s preindividuated, ‘primitive’ level, and in this section and the following it is argued that this is the kernel of a response to Derrida’s interpretation of Austin. Strawson’s analysis is devoted to filling out the details for a case in

---

2 Strawson (1971e) p172. Use theories argue that the meanings of speech acts (utterances) are ‘largely a matter of rule and convention’, instantiated and disseminated in S’s intentions. Formal semantics argues that the rules of language are discerned in analysis of, and describe, the structure of thought, the study of which is to be distinguished from the study of processes of thinking, cf. Wettstein, H.K.; ‘Cognitive Significance without Cognitive Content’, pp132-158 in Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?: And Other Essays (Stanford University Press) 1991 and Dummett (1978) p458. They are not rules for communication, indeed communication is merely a useful correlate of language. One could conceive, Strawson writes, of an instance in which one has complete understanding of a workable language, '...without having even the implicit thought of the function of communication.'

Use theory makes the explanation of linguistic meaning dependent upon a prior theory of intention in communication. What is meant by an utterance is given by identifying the intention with which it was uttered. The Gricean notion of timeless meaning is Strawson’s first target in his assessment of use theory, for it is a theory potentially fraught with difficulty to establish language conventions upon S intentions. The irreducible, indefeasible unit of communication-intention is S’s act of utterance, in which he means something in an utterance directed at H (the condition that this must be a particular H has been considered, and will recur) on a particular occasion. The utterance, Strawson emphasises, need not be vocal, and Grice, it will be recalled, makes particular cases of non-verbal utterances.

3 McDowell (1980) p122 finds this to be a problem in Strawson.
4 Strawson (1971) p173. They are, for the use theorist, rules the observance of which will assist S in the achievement of his purpose, namely, of communicating successfully.
which S achieves with H, by means of a specific utterance, a pre-conventional communication of a primitive cast (by grunts, smoke signals and so forth). If the same recourse later recommends itself in similar or identical situations, S and H have reason to repeat their behaviour. Over time, 'because it has worked, it becomes established, and then it works because it is established'. That is, a movement occurs from S meaning p in a pre-conventional communication situation to the utterance type coming conventionally to mean that p, 'now in accordance with the conventions.' (Developed and clarified, this thesis constitutes a powerful response to meaning-scepticism concerning intentions and conventions).

Strawson considers objections to the apparent restriction of this suggested analysis to utterance types, and finds them unfounded. Cases in which meaning is not derived from the meanings of constituent parts seem to point up the relevant difficulty, namely, that characteristics of linguistic utterance types are complexity and structure, or, that the ‘...meaning of a sentence is a syntactic function of the meanings of its parts and their arrangement’, and in such ultimately simple cases there are, it might be argued, no other meanings established. There is, however, Strawson says, no reason why in the analysis he gives pre-conventional utterances should not have analogous ‘complexity’, allowing tolerance of repetition as part of an utterance, and the application to new and varied cases. An idiolect of utterance types becomes established, and, in time, meets needs unknown at the first communication. More sophisticated language allows the formation of more complex thoughts and so a richer language.

Parties to formal semantics and use theories agree that sentence meanings are (mostly) guided by rules and conventions of language such as those promulgated by Austin. Possession of a mutual language offers a means of communication, and ‘...thereby of modifying each other’s beliefs or attitudes or influencing each other’s actions’. Furthermore, a broader notion of convention, again due to Austin, is shared between formal and use theories: the means of communication are used in conventional ways, giving relations between intentions and sentence meanings. Mutual differences centre on the function and importance of communication, and the sensitivity of truth-conditions to spoken sentences. Avramides adds that a further congruity between formal and use theories is a commitment to treating sentences, written or spoken, as the bearers of meaning, and while the analysis of the structure of entailment in formal languages takes this as a principle, along with the view that the constituents of a sentence determine its sense in a way congenial to analysis, Austin (and Wittgenstein)

6Strawson (1971c) p175. Strawson calls this 'alternating' development an incremental, augmenting growth.
7Strawson (1971c) p176.
stress that use of language operates, and more productively, beyond the imperative mood. Regarding these mutual similarities and differences, and in a discussion of the means of giving sense to a sentence, Wiggins raises many of the points discussed in I. He writes that clarifying the central tenets of Fregean semantics cannot be achieved, owing to the arrested development of philosophical linguistics; work continues because of the reappearance in philosophy of perennial problems: demonstratives, writing definite descriptions and so forth, demanding the ascription of sense to words such as ‘good’, ‘right’ and ‘true’. With quantification into the oblique and opaque contexts, he asks, do words come to have more than one sense? Wiggins argues that an answer requires prior consideration of three other questions: (1) whether the word has one or more lexical contents; (2) whether the shift in contexts makes the word express a different proposition; and (3) whether a change in lexical content means the substituted word remains a homonym of the first. (1) is answered by consulting a dictionary, and a study of the changes in lexical content gives, Wiggins argues, the most workable interpretation of Fregean Sinn. Answers to (2) and (3) are answers to the problem of ascribing properties to lexical contents, and await an answer to (1).

A reason for the arrested development, Wiggins says, is mistaken interpretation of Frege. Sinn and noema have been found useful for addressing the problems of demonstratives and of definite descriptions (I.2-I.4), and Wiggins emphasises that the ascription by Frege of sense and reference to proper names and definite descriptions must not obscure the fact that he ascribed them also to sentences and predicates. Addressing Frege’s notion of sentence meaning as constituted by the meanings of their parts, Wiggins writes that it is proper to say that Frege explains sentence sense via a prior notion of dubbing (of parts or constituents), and that, by this, sentence meaning is just the reference of a proposition to its truth value (on a model of dubbing). Wiggins, as Evans, notes Frege’s understanding of the sensitivity to context, or speech conditions, of demonstratives and other

---

4 Avramides (1989) p21. It is worth remarking that both formal and use theories treat what goes, in primitive cases, for sentences as bearers of meaning. Searle (1971) p writes of the influence of Austin that he shifts, ‘...discussion of many of the problems in the philosophy of language into the larger context of the discussion of human activity and behaviour generally’.


6 Cf. Frege (1952c) p57.

7 Cf. Husserl (1970) p271. This is dubbing in Husserl’s first sense, that of demonstration (cf. I.3). Husserl (1970) p272 is, in his state of affairs, more attuned to the sensitivities of the notion of sentence meaning as simply the reference of a proposition to its truth value. Wiggins (1971) p16 rehearses some objections to a Fregean theory of names and indexicals. In sincere, literal expressions, in which as Frege has it, the target is the True, why should S not, ‘...choose the easiest way of hitting the target and always say snow is white, or the cat is on the mat, or anything at all that is as a matter of fact true? Is there one message always and an indefinite number of media? Or if there is more than one message, is the message the medium itself?’ As has been seen, one interpretation of Frege reveals there to be no way in which these points can be accounted for in his semantics. What is more, in insincere, non-literal cases, in which perhaps, as Wiggins says, one refers to the False while aiming at the True, there will, ‘...never apparently be room for anything but a rigidly extensional theory of designation and reference. What then of sense without reference?’
indexicals, evident, Wiggins ventures, in all of Frege’s work: signs (names) express senses, references and thoughts, the sense of which thoughts reveal that certain truth-conditions are fulfilled. Each sentence asserting a reference expresses a thought.

The simple or composite names of which the name of a truth-value consists contribute to the expression of the thought. This contribution of each is its sense. If a name is a part of the name of a truth-value, then the sense of the former name is a part of the thought which the latter expresses.

This is a theory of conditions under which a sentence is true. A strictly formal semantics theory, Strawson argues, accounts for far too little of significance in collocation, even in the emphasis on the indicative case. In distinguishing the meaning and the force of an utterance, Austin’s theory of locutions, Wiggins argues, utilises a Fregean distinction between sense and reference, which in Frege and Austin limits the meaning of indicative sentences to considerations bearing on their truth-conditions. Grice makes an analogous distinction, under Austin’s influence, but works on both sides of it, between sentence implication and conversational implicature, and these differences between formal and use theories still do not (as above), for Wiggins, shift the focus in a theory of meaning from study of what is said, or disprove that the meaning of what is said matters fundamentally to the conditions under which what is said is true. (An argument to the end that there remain vast numbers of utterances which are not indicative in form requires, says Wiggins, a thorough analysis of performatives, and an argument for the right of the indicative to be considered first among moods. The arguments are considered in III, and in IV Lewis’ conditions on convention are seen to obviate concerns about the priority of moods). As Davidson argues, both use theories and formal semantics must be harnessed for a theory of meaning, and the fact (called a virtue), that Grice offers a theory of

---

12 Cf. Wiggins (1971) p16. Wiggins contends that Fregean theory is best viewed not as predicated on a theory of the mode of presentation of sense, and because of the insistence elsewhere (especially (1956)) that reference is ‘...unintelligible outside the context of a complete sentence or thought’. The theory of the sense and reference of proper names occurs rather in a general theory of language, with a foundation in sentence-sense and not reference. For Wiggins, this explains the ‘...production of familiar and unfamiliar utterances by an account of how the constituents of sentences can systematically contribute to the meaning of the complete sentences within whose structure they figure’. This being so, there follow no difficulties of mediation, for there is no ‘analogy...to bear the weight of explaining the meaning of sentences’, and so no passage, in the explanation of an utterance, from the designation of specific objects to truth values. A theory of sense sense has as its core a theory of saying, and with account of the way in which words contribute to sentence sense, Wiggins suggests, there is possible an analogy between the way in which a function (3) determines value 4 for argument 2, and the way in which predicate ‘...() is wise’ determines truth value True for argument Socrates. The meanings of predicates, their roles in complete sentences with meaning, are explained as truth functions of those sentences. The senses of referring expressions are ‘special’ cases of senses in general.

13 Wiggins (1971) p17, and is to be contrasted with a theory of meaning as use (Wittgenstein), or as recognition of S intention (Grice), for it requires no means by which semantic terms be explained before they can be talked about. However, it faces some familiar difficulties (pp17-18), concerning the intensionality of meaning, the constitution on the indicative mood, the potential for confusion between sentences and statements, and the absence of a rigorous connection between truth-conditional definitions for sentences and meaning-definitions for their constituent words.

14 Frege (1952c) p63.

meaning good for all meaningful marks or utterances may proffer nothing due to the absence of a workable notion of convention\textsuperscript{14}. However, as shall be seen in IV, Grice's sins are of omission not of substance, and the pertinence of both formal semantics and use theories has and shall be seen to assist the writing of a theory of meaning offering conditions for both intention and convention\textsuperscript{17}.

Strawson writes that some sentences exist for which the application of a truth conditions theory seems unclear, namely, ‘...imperatives, optatives, and interrogatives...’. Others, particularly those containing demonstratives, though congenial to a truth-conditions analysis, contain parts making a difference to their conventional meaning that cannot simply be explained in terms of truth-conditions\textsuperscript{18}. Although both formal semantics and use theories must exhibit sensitivity to such issues, Strawson describes a notion which he discerns in Austin, Grice and Searle. They implicitly acknowledge that in,...almost all the things we should count as sentences there is a substantial central core of meaning which is explicable either in terms of truth-conditions or in terms of some related notion quite simply derivable from that of a truth-condition, for example the notion, as we might call it, of a compliance-condition in the case of an imperative sentence or a fulfilment-condition in the case of an optative\textsuperscript{19}.

(One should add that Grice is hardly of the belief that this is implicit, and that Davidson's suggested means for the distinction of illocutionary and perlocutionary effects can be challenged, and by a Searlean analysis\textsuperscript{20}. For Strawson, if good account can be given of the notion of truth-conditions, then a theory of meaning may be written without reference to communication-intention, and this Davidson offers, although, of course, Strawson thinks Davidson's theory unsuccessful). For the completion of 'general' and 'particular' theories additions are necessary. To a particular account must be appended a notion of the required 'transformations' of truth-conditions to, as in the above description, yield compliance-conditions and fulfilment conditions; the general theory must describe the derivation of sentences, and Strawson asks, what does this demand of the function of communication? For completeness sake, he clarifies his use of the phrase 'the truth-conditions of sentences'. Strawson has

\textsuperscript{14}See also Note.

\textsuperscript{17}As Searle (1969) pp18-19 says they are complementing not competing. Harnessing the best of formal semantics and use theory (as desired by Davidson) turns, according to Avramides (1989) p8, on two prior questions, namely, the interpretation made of Grice (reductionist or not), and the worth and methods of linguistic analysis and ordinary language philosophy. The latter point emerges in the debate between McDowell and Strawson, and is mooted by Derrida (1977b) p211.

\textsuperscript{18}With regard to convention, Bennett (1976) pp148ff considers icons as bearers of intended and demonstrative meaning. It is seen that words are the paradigms of non-iconic meanings. Bennett references Schiffer's point that intentions require that S (again in accordance with the means presented in this dissertation of getting around the regress), believe that his utterance has a feature (mutually-known) that leads H to fill in the intentional relationship, to connect the utterance with the thing identified.

\textsuperscript{19}Both quotations are from Strawson (1971c) pp177-178.

\textsuperscript{20}See the discussions of Searle in III.
spoken of them as determined by the rules (semantic and syntactical), of the language in which the sentences are uttered, and he now adds that 'sentence' should be read 'type sentence', one that may be uttered on a host of different occasions by many people. Ascription to them of truth or falsity is redundant, for it is rather the propositions expressed by the sentences, on occasions of their utterances that may be assessed for truth and falsity, and Strawson considers how a statement of truth-conditions for a particular sentence may be relativised to relevant contextual conditions of utterance.

Strawson argues that a general statement of truth-conditions for a sentence is not a statement of conditions in which the sentence is a truth, but a description of types of conditions in which different particular utterances of the sentence issue in different particular truths. He says that the bald statement of a formal semantics theory (that the notion of truth-conditions underpins a general, and all particular, semantic theories of meaning), leaves unanswered the question of how truth is defined. Strawson rejects Davidson's faith in a definition of truth-conditions given through Tarski's analysis of truth in $L$, and precisely because of its unwarranted appeal to recursion; for Strawson this avoids the vital philosophical difficulty of applying one's notion to difficult cases, those, say, of indirect or demonstrative utterances. One might think, Strawson writes, that there is something 'uncontroversial' or 'general' about truth, that one might define a statement as true iff things are as S states them to be, and that the same might be gainsaid for supposition, questioning and so forth. Adding the consideration that the meaning of a statement is determined by the rules which determine how things are stated to be by S making a true statement, with the (Gricean) condition that rules are bound by context and convention, Strawson argues that one is returned '...to the notion of the content of such speech acts as stating, expressly supposing and so on', and that the communication-intention theorist may here intercede and say that any elucidation of the content of speech acts requires study of the speech acts themselves, and even that for speech acts, '...in which something true or false may, in one mode or another, be put forward, it is reasonable to regard that of statement or assertion as having an especially central position'. Here, as in the discussion of McDowell in III.1, the singular rôle given to assertion carries no metaphysical ramifications, for, *contra* Derrida, it is not taken to exclude any other cases.

The due study can only be made *via* a theory of H-directed intention.

---

21 Strawson (1971b), his work on convention in speech acts, is discussed below and in the following section.

22 This might be considered a generic statement of the relationship between meaning and truth conditions. As Strawson says, it, at first, seems 'general' and 'uncontroversial'. Strawson (1971c) p180 and see pp176-179. Cf. Wiggins (1971a) pp16-17 and McDowell (1980) p127.
The central case of stating or asserting, ‘...in terms of which all variants must be understood...’, is the case of a sentence uttered with a specific intention, and one, as Strawson has it, wholly overt in the sense given in the analysis of S meaning. The paradigm case is, as before, ‘...letting H know, or getting him to think...’ (and the correct description will be seen to be most vital), that S has a certain belief. ‘The rules determining the conventional meaning of the sentence join with the contextual conditions of its utterance to determine what the belief in question is in such a primary and fundamental case’, and in this latter determination the rules also determine what statement is made. They occur simultaneously. Strawson sees an indecent haste with which the use theorist reaches this conclusion. Having begun with the premise (itself unsatisfactory Strawson says), that the rules which determine truth-conditions of sentences determine also their meaning, one faces an argument that the same rules determine what statement is made (or what speech act is performed), by one who utters the sentence. This again belies Strawson's dissatisfaction with the Tarskian recursive definition. He suggests an alternative: to describe truth-conditions without reference to the notion of communicative speech acts, giving instead a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for the correlation of the utterance with the meaning of the description, ‘...under whatever contextual conditions are envisaged’, that is, a theory of truth conditions emphasising their sensitivity to use in specific circumstances.

Communication-intention might, the formal semantics theorist may argue, be allowed this much: that the notion of truth-conditions has been seen to issue in a description of what is said, to the ‘...question of what is being done when utterances are made’, and thus to have important lessons fundamental to a study of ‘belief-expression’, lessons which must be learned in tandem with those describing a truth-conditional analysis of statements. A putative theory need say only this: there are meaning-determining rules for the sentences of a language, those which determine the beliefs articulated by one who utters the sentence in the appropriate circumstances. As in the above case, the process of determining these beliefs is identical to that of identifying what assertions are made: a belief is expressed in accordance with the conventions governing the making of assertions. This development of the formal semantics theory argues that the communication of an H-directed intention is a mere corollary to the prior notion of belief expression: it is this that requires elucidation, for Strawson rejects the (distinctly Searlean),
addendum to Gricean theory stressing H recognition, in favour of one solely concerning S meaning, and he goes on to consider some difficulties with this position.

In discussions of the respective positions of formal and use theories Strawson finds ‘...a mixture of truth and falsity, of platitude and illusion...', and a persisting delusion (again, Searlean), that one can, from the notion of S meaning, extract an element corresponding to the expression of a belief which does not itself include S’s intention. The expression of a belief is equally the expression of an attitude, and one intended to be communicated and recognised as such, and Strawson raises two intuitive difficulties for an explanation of belief-expression. Firstly, in analogy with the ascription of a man’s actions expressing beliefs when they are seen to be directed to a goal or end, Strawson writes that this forbids reference to the goal of communication as coming under this ascription, for communication is immanent in the speech act, not the reading off from an associated belief. Secondly, the strictness of the theory being outlined must be emphasised: it aims to group under conventions the meaning-determining rules of a language to aid the regulation of linguistic behaviour in its rôle as belief-expression. On the assumption that a concept of belief expression is given which satisfactorily accounts for linguistic meaning, it follows that there will be an appearance of contingency in the statement of conventions determining meanings as public and mutually-knowable. One would not, on this, be able further to analyse the obtaining of conventions as a fact about language, and there is nothing to prevent one settling the foundations of a theory of meaning on the premise that each language user uses a language which he alone understands, and in this there would be left no rôle for mutual convention whatsoever. Strawson suggests a response for the formal semantics theorist, one which again invokes the notion of communication-intention. In this speech situation S might be thought of as recording, for his own use, a description of his relevant beliefs and their contextual appearance in utterances for the convenience and accuracy of communicating in identical or similar contexts at later times, yet for Strawson one need not regard this as strictly speaking a formal semantics position, for one might say that ‘...the earlier man communicates with his later self'.

Strawson suggests that one might, in an effort to keep apart formal and use theories, state that language is public (‘socially common’), and argue that the connection of public rules with the

---

36 Strawson (1971c) p185. That is they are immanent in the self same speech act. One might describe a case in which the expression of a belief is qualitatively separate from S’s expression of his intention, but there remains a logical dependency of the imagined case on that in which S has such an intention. Furthermore, as seen in the discussion of Searle’s (1972) p72 one cannot simply stop short at appeal to notions of belief-expression, for as the discussion of the propositional attitudes has shown, the term itself needs explanation.


phenomenon of communication is a corollary of their guides for belief-expression, and a mere contingency. Teaching language is a model of getting pupils to do the right thing; with emerging self-consciousness pupils come to realise that the skills they have learned can be used to express belief; this latter is an 'unconnected benefit', unconnected to what it is to know the rules of a language. In cases of communication, in which S directs his utterances to H (on the model of Gricean analysis), H is to take it that S holds the belief in question, and that he intends H to think that he holds the belief. This reveals the possibility of varieties of linguistic communication other than those based on the transference of belief-expression (again, belief-expression is a corollary of consummated communication), typified in the cases studied by Grice as meaningNN, and the concession of some 'outlying' areas of semantic theory to communication-intention. 'As far as the central case is concerned, the function of communication remains secondary, derivative, conceptually inessential'29.

A further point is directed against both formal semantics and use theory:

Of course, there are many ways in which one can say something which is in fact true, give expression, if you like, to a true proposition, without thereby expressing belief in it, without asserting that proposition: for example when the words in question form certain sorts of subordinate or co-ordinate clauses, and when one is quoting or play-acting and so on.

Strawson argues, in response to both, that the saying of something true requires reference to an accompanying, sincere belief; S says something true if things are as he says; and following this, Strawson suggests the replacement of 'says' with 'propounds' (owing to the conditions on communication described above), and states that S propounds something on the basis of his belief that things are as he says30. Again, the reference to belief and to the communication of intention emerges, and Strawson concludes by noting a fault typifying the work of philosophers regarding 'true' as a predicate of type-sentences; this is to forget '...what sentences are for', adding, '...as theorists, we know nothing of human language unless we understand human speech.'

The study of true expression bearing its truth in an accompanying belief brings Strawson to an analysis of Austin's notion of the illocutionary force of an utterance and of respective speech acts.

29 Strawson (1971c) pp188. (The following quotation is from p189). Strawson draws together some conclusions of this 'perverse' debate, remarking that the means have been promulgated of providing an acceptable answer to the question which started his reflections, stressing the need for assessment of both formal semantics and use theories and forcing one to recognise the importance in any theory of meaning of conditions of utterance, (of the means by which one '...says something true').

A means by which this hypothesis can issue in a theory of intentionality, writing the connection between word and object, is described in I.4. For the quotation at the end of the paragraph see Strawson (1971c) p189.
performed\(^{31}\). Strawson notes the distinction that Austin marks between ‘normal’, ‘serious’ uses of speech and the ‘parasitical’ uses that he excludes for want of a general theory. Strawson thinks the distinction unclear, and remarks that the notion of illocutionary force, by virtue of Austin’s exclusion, is worked out only in appropriate detail for literal use\(^{32}\). Strawson asks what it is about ‘meanings’ and ‘locutions’ that classes them as deviations from the ideal, total speech situation justifying their position as ‘...the second term...’, of the distinctions between the illocutionary force of an utterance and its meaning, and the illocutionary and locutionary acts performed in an utterance. Strawson writes that they must be distinguished mutually and in relation to illocutionary force, but argues that Austin does not do this. Strawson ventures some difficult cases, those showing the meaning of ‘serious’ utterances as marking limits to the possible force they may wield; and showing that for explicit performatives, the meaning of the utterance comes to exhaust its force\(^{33}\). He notes, additionally, instances in which there is a surplus of illocutionary force in a speech act. Furthermore, the notions of the force of an utterance and of the illocutionary act performed cannot be invoked in the same relationship, for there are cases in which, say, a warning is not understood as such, in which there is a lack of ‘uptake’. Strawson makes a hypothesis, consonant with his earlier analysis: to know the force of an utterance is a species of the securing of uptake: it requires the same knowledge as that required to know what illocutionary act is performed in the issuing of the act.

Strawson groups together the points of Austin’s theory on which he wishes to focus. Firstly, on the premise that the meaning of an utterance is known, there may still arise additional questions concerning how what was said was meant, in what way the words were used, or, how S intended the utterance to be taken. Secondly, although the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts as that between acts of saying something and acts performed in saying something is given as basic, there must be considered Austin’s reservations concerning the distinction\(^{34}\). Thirdly, it is sufficient but not necessary that a verb being the name of an illocutionary act means that it can appear in the first person indicative as an explicit performative. Fourthly, that illocutionary acts are ‘conventional’ means that they are to

---

31 Strawson (1971b) p149.
33 In that the meaning of the utterance in the explicit performative is the canonical means of performing the act reported. It could not be performed in a more effective or explicit way. This, of course, raises all of the problems with intention and convention in speech acts which Derrida describes in such detail. The arguments of II.5, III.5 and IV. 4-5 show a way in which explicit performatives can be accounted for in a theory of meaning intentions.
34 Austin (1962) p99. Austin countenances that the distinction does not correctly delimit the class of illocutions, for it admits acts which he wishes to exclude.
be contrasted with the production of effects by means of an utterance (their perlocutionary effects)

Regarding the fourth, the most important, Strawson writes that Austin is usually seen to affirm the
conventional nature of illocutionary acts in 'unqualified' ways (substantially the view of Austin by his
interpreters), but that on the very first statement of conventionality in illocations, he is more guarded.
Austin says of illocutionary force that it may '...be said to be conventional in the sense that at least it
could be made explicit by the performative formula'36. Austin's point is familiar: the determining of the
meaning of locutionary acts requires reference to linguistic conventions for the making of utterances.
All speech acts are conventional in that there must at least be a link to conventions of grammar, syntax
and so forth, and yet Austin's point is more subtle: the force not exhausted by meaning, that is, by the
linguistic convention, and indeed the fact that meaning is exhausted or not, is itself determined by
conventions, those of collocation, mutual interaction and social coordination. It is imperative to
distinguish the types37.

Strawson dismisses the prospect of describing every act as conventional according to a certain type or
description. Austin gives ample evidence for the conventional nature of illocutionary force, yet there
are cases in which an illocutionary act is performed with force not exhausted by meaning, and without
it conforming to any accepted social convention, (in what Strawson calls Austin's second sense)38.
Paradigm cases are warnings, and the cases Derrida considers are all pertinent. The utterance of the
words 'The bull is dangerous', is the issuing of a statement with the force of a warning, according to its
locutionary conventions, but cases could be multiplied in which it is made without reference to any
stable convention for illocutionary acts. One might append bona fides, entreaties, confirmation from
an independent source, and a host of other locutions, none of which need conform to any conventions.
What makes a naming is an additional something, a deference or obedience to social convention,
'...relating to S's situation, attitude to Y [the object named], manner, and current intention'39. Strawson
asks why Austin does not remark the fact that some illocutionary acts are conventional and others not;
what does he discern as the '...further, and fundamental, feature...’, making the link? For an answer
Strawson looks to the original statement of the force contained in illocutionary acts: that they can be
given as conventional when put in the explicit performative form. Strawson notes an ambiguity

35 Again, as Grice makes abundantly clear, this conventionality covers also non-verbal utterances.
37 By this distinction Austin emphasizes, following Grice, that verbal and non-verbal acts are conventional in the very same ways.
36 Strawson (1971b) p152. John Jones may say to H 'The bull is dangerous' and by so doing issue a warning (a statement with
the force of a warning), yet without there being any '...stable convention at all (other than those which bear on the nature of the
locutionary act) such that [S's] act can be said to be an act done as conforming to that convention' (p153).
38 Cf. on naming in Kripke, Chomsky (1975) pp44ff.
pertinent to the two types of convention that have been discerned, and eluding the standard interpretations of Austin: the force of an illocution is not indefeasibly conventional, but is "...capable of being conventional"\textsuperscript{10}; illocutions may be vocalised explicitly and conventionally by the use of the correct, corresponding first person performative form (given, say, in the authentication by John Jones), yet Strawson argues that the potential for conventional status of illocutions describes not simple linguistic convention, for the catalogue of illocutionary acts include many that can be performed without their possessing a first-person performative alternative, but requires elucidation via meaning\textsuperscript{NN}. By now familiar, the analysis runs\textsuperscript{41}: "...the securing of the response \( r \) is intended to be mediated by the securing of another (always cognitive) effect in \( H \); viz. recognition of \( S \)'s intention to secure response \( r' \), and this, as has been seen, demands understanding of the ways in which two parties to a convention may come to settle on and coordinate their behaviour according to the convention. This is provided in IV, but in the following and final section of this chapter it shall be described how the consequences of Strawson's distinction affect Derrida's analysis of Austin on performatives. Millikan marks the distinction between the two types of convention as K-I and K-II speech acts. The distinction is of the greatest importance, and will reoccur; it marks a fundamental difficulty with the Derridean criticism of Austin on convention, and is a tenet of the argument to be made. Strawson's argument is that there are illocutionary acts (K-I type) which are not characterised according to their conventional roles (in the explicit performative), but by \( S \)'s purposes or intentions, and it is these can be described in their literal and parasitical status\textsuperscript{42}.

\textsuperscript{10} Strawson (1971b) p155.
\textsuperscript{41} Strawson (1971b) pp155-156. Strawson's remark is apt for seeing how vital the securing of Austinian uptake is in the Gricean definition.
\textsuperscript{42} It should be remarked here for reference that Searle, J.; 'How Performatives Work', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XII, no. 5, pp535-558, 1989, marks the distinction between linguistic conventions and social conventions. Millikan (1998) p26 emphasises the 'aspects' under which Austinian speech acts may appear: as animated by speaker intention; as vocalised by an expression having a conventional function in a context; and as an action with a conventional outcome. She speaks of the array of speech acts appearing as if on a continuum, for while they 'tend to coincide' in an illocutionary act, they can 'come apart', and
appear in illocutionary acts not obviously classifiable emphasising either end of the spectrum. Millikan argues for the continuum, and thus against Strawson’s distinction.
5. Convention: A First Try

Strawson gives a counter-example to the Gricean analysis of communication. S fulfils Grice's conditions, yet does not give a sense of 'communicate' along Gricean lines. H takes S as '...trying to bring it about...' that he become aware of something, but he will not think S is trying '...in the colloquial sense, to “let him know” something (or to “tell” him something).' Unless S brings it about that H takes him ‘...to be trying to let him know something, he has not succeeded in communicating with H'. The example gives a case in which S does not even try to elicit communication, stressing the fact that there exists a further condition, namely, that S should not only intend H to recognise the intention to get him to think something, but that S should also intend H to recognise his intention to get H to recognise his intention to get him to think something: thus the regress begins. Grice's way of dealing with this example has been discussed, but Strawson emphasises the need for explanation of the ways in which S and H may exhibit their attitudes to S's utterance, or, to demonstrate their mutual knowledge. Strawson suggests that for H to understand something by the utterance issued by S it is '...necessary (and perhaps sufficient)...', that there be a complex intention...which H takes S to have, and that it is necessary for H to take S to have. It is in this that Strawson sees the connection with uptake, and, by extension, with the notions of illocutionary force and illocutionary act. Securing uptake is simply the understanding of meaning and illocutionary force, and, Austin argues, securing understanding of illocutionary force is essential to the success of bringing off the act itself. The importance of uptake, for Strawson, is as a '...standard, if not an invariable...', element in the performance of an illocutionary act, and its identification with a notion of H-understanding invokes Grice's meanings, now, Strawson says, to be thought equivalent to an analysis of illocutionary act and illocutionary force. If the identification can be made good, then, '...to say something with a certain illocutionary force is at least (in the standard case), to have a certain complex intention of the...form described in setting out and modifying Grice's doctrine', and this Strawson applies to other features of Austin's theory of illocutionary acts. Firstly, Austin's saying that, '...the production of an utterance

---

1 Strawson (1971b) pp156-157. The first tenet of the example (and so of Grice's conditions) is taken up in McDowell (1980) p125. Skinner (1970) p120 remarks, of Strawson's treatment of illocutionary force, that he gives conditions, '...sufficient or at least necessary...' for uptake and for workable distinctions from cases of perlocutions and of utterances in non-serious contexts. This derives from an adoption and adaptation of Grice's conditions on meanings, and is vital to the analysis of intentions and conventions in speech acts offered at the end of this section.

2 This invokes (or perhaps, evokes), Austrian 'uptake'.

3 Skinner (1970) p120 adopts Ziff's criticism: Grice fails to distinguish 'what S meant by the utterance', and 'what S meant by his utterance of the utterance'. Strawson's adoption and adaptation allows the writing into a meaning theory of this vital condition; and Skinner substantiates the point to be made, namely, that it is of use in distinguishing serious and non-serious illocutions. Furthermore, with it Cohen's doubts regarding illocutionary forces may be eased, and by taking the kernel of an idea from Ziff. Ziff, as has been seen, shows (no matter how successfully), that there are cases in which S means something by his uttering the utterance, but in which the utterance itself means nothing. (This may be thought especially so in the non-verbal,
with a certain illocutionary force is a conventional act in that unconventional sense of "conventional" which he glosses in terms of general suitability for being made explicit with...an explicitly performative formula', and secondly, the point at which he "...considers the possibility of a general characterisation of the illocutionary act as what we do, in saying what we say". Austin, of course, considers how insufficient the latter distinction is, and Strawson ventures that the analysis he presents explains "...the exclusion from the class of illocutionary acts of those acts falling under this characterisation which Austin wishes to exclude [parasitical cases]." The class of K-I acts are those deemed successful (uptake is secured), according to the laws of the Gricean (or Austinian) analysis: H recognises S's intention to get him to form a belief or take an action. A naming is recognised as intended as a naming, a reminder as a reminder, and so forth. S may add entreaties or bona fides and so forth, and there are applicable Austinian conventions: that S be in an appropriate position of power, and so forth.

The explanation of the first point requires reference to two matters Austin distinguishes in his account of illocutionary acts: the 'general' and the 'special' point about intention. The general point says that one may speak of one's intention in performing a certain utterance with an authority one may not apply to the production of the outcome, for it may not come about. S wishes to produce a response in H specifically by means of the recognition of his intention to produce that response. The recognition is part of the reason H has for making his response, and part of the complex intention on S's part is that this recognition should occur. (It is important to indicate here that, if Grice's theory is successful, he has theorised communication). Essential to S's desire is a means of making his intention perspicuous, and he may utilise an available, conventional linguistic means. One such example, close, as Strawson notes, to the use of the explicit performative, is to append to the utterance 'a force-elucidating comment', such as 'That bull is dangerous...let this be a warning to you'. As Strawson has it, these comments should be thought part of the unitary speech act, showing that the first-person performative "manifestly has that logical character of which Austin rightly made so much...", namely, that of making explicit the communication-intention with which S makes the utterance, or the force with

gestural cases). However, in such cases, as Skinner argues, meaningful is still communicated; that is, the utterances are uttered with a (potentially peculiar) force. His arguments arise at the end of III.5.

Millikan (1998) pp26fE Skinner (1970) p118 notes Austin's concerns regarding the incompleteness of the theory of illocutionary force, firstly focusing on the nebulous theory of 'uptake' (it lacks, as Derrida shows, applicable notions of convention and guiding intention), and secondly (important for Searle's arguments against Grice), the possibility of a workable distinction between perlocutionary acts and illocutionary acts. Skinner adds the difficulty of distinguishing sincere illocutions and the 'non-literal' and 'non-serious' things done with words (cf. Skinner's apt examples on p119). In the face of a raft of criticism (most potently, Derrida's), Skinner writes, Strawson has done more than anyone to fill the gaps in Austin's theory.
which he speaks. (Strawson remarks on two points before looking to the second feature: it is plausible to argue that Austin describes merely a ‘utility’ of explicit performative formulae for cases of illocutionary acts not essentially conventional, and that the intentions intimated may not be of the complex form described in the Gricean analysis. Both of these points are answered by Strawson, the first in his distinction, and the second saying that the regress of intentions can be halted. This arises in IV, where doubt is cast on the argument that complex intentions underlie all illocutionary acts. Millikan remarks on these explicit avowals, in which the conventional meaning of the expression exhausts the illocutionary force of the utterance).

Regarding Austin’s exclusions from the class of illocutionary acts Strawson considers two cases, those of ‘showing off’ and of ‘insinuating’. In the first case, though speaking with animation and effect, it is not part of S’s intention to secure the recognition of his intention by H. This is positively antithetical to S’s success. A subtle point arises. In making an utterance directed to H, motivated by an intention, S often intends to produce additional effects by means of the primary recognition by H. For instance, S may wish H to change his behaviour. The question this raises is whether such additional effects, and their being secured, change in any way the illocutionary speech act performed. Austin’s analysis makes no provision for ulterior motives or additional effects: uptake, or successfully performed communication, occurs if H understands S to be, say, informing him of something. The further effects are not in the illocutionary act. If one takes an example of S aiming at a complex primary response in the making of an utterance the case is quantitatively more complex. (Strawson considers the case in which S both warns and informs H of something). Among the intentions S intends H to recognise (as intended to be recognised), are not only those to confirm H in the belief, but also those to confirm to H that he should, ‘...guard against [say] p-perils.’ From this follows a distinction between the showing off case and that of warning and informing: in the latter H’s recognition of S’s intention to warn should contribute to H’s behaving in a guarded fashion; in the former the recognition of intention militates against S achieving his goal. Insinuating fails as an illocutionary act, and because

---

5 For further examples of cases which do not fit Austin’s criteria for illocutions one might consider Skinner (1970) p119. It might seem that S can warn, express surprise, evoke terror, inform and so forth, in saying ‘There is a bull in that field’; that is, that S can perform all of those illocutionary acts and more. However, genuine illocutions must be distinguished from a range of other linguistic acts. The explicit performative will not work for making this distinction, as Skinner shows. In cases such as expressing anger, terror or surprise, prefixing ‘I am angry that...’; to ‘...there is a bull in that field’, explicates no sense of what S did by saying ‘There is a bull in that field’.

Another suggestion, deriving from Alston W., ‘Meaning and Use’, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XIII, no. 51, pp107-124, 1963, is no more successful. Alston postulates a test for deciding what linguistic act is performed: to see which rejoinders, cavils and other responses H could make to S which the latter would deem relevant. How, Skinner replies, can this elucidate specifically illocutionary acts, for H might reply with, say, ‘What do mean by that?’; or, in oblique cases, ‘Are you telling me, or


156
the intentions making up a complex illocution are potentially overt; they have ‘essential avowability.’ Strawson calls this ‘logically embarrassing’ for Gricean analysis, for to give account of convention it must be amended with the addition of further nested intentions. The nesting gives rise to the regress discussed by Grice, and analysed by Schiffer and his critics, and Strawson writes, ‘[w]hile I do not think there is anything necessarily objectionable in this, it does suggest that the complete and rounded-off set of conditions aimed at in a conventional analysis is not easily and certainly attainable in those terms.’ This analysis allows the inclusion of insinuation in the class of illocutionary acts, for insinuation is getting H to suspect that S has an intention to communicate a belief; but, as Strawson says, insinuation could only ever be non-avowable.

Strawson criticises the Gricean analysis for not having even general application in a partial analysis of the force of an illocutionary act. S’s utterance ‘Don’t go’, may have the force of a request or an entreaty; in either case the primary intention of the utterance is to command H to remain where he is. The other intentions present in the analysis relate to the recognition of this primary intention, and the question of greatest significance is how one accounts for the illocutionary force of requests as against entreaties. Strawson writes that an explanation arises from supplementation of Gricean analysis. S’s entreaty may be read as an attempt to secure the desired primary response not merely by getting H to recognise his intention, but by getting H to recognise the larger complex attitude of which the primary intention is a vital part. S’s desire that H stay may be held in varied ways and with varying degrees of intensity, and part of S’s intention in this case may be to communicate this intensity. That is, the case of ordering H to stay is, Strawson writes, not simply accounted for as a case of illocutionary force, for in it the role of social convention and context are of the utmost importance. S’s order is given with the intention that it will elicit a response, and that its recognition as an order be a reason for the response. Its being recognised as an order can occur only in an understood social context in which certain rules and conventions apply. Analysing conventions and mutually-known procedures raises difficulties too great, Strawson thinks, for Gricean analysis to bear. He writes that one cannot plausibly say that an umpire’s primary intention in giving a batsman out is to secure a response, and nor can one isolate, in

merely insinuating or showing off?’, neither of which reply indicates the utterance by S of an illocutionary act, but rather, a non-literal and an expressive non-illocutionary act respectively).

Strawson (1971c) p163. Skinner (1970) p121 writes that the act of communication as theorised by Strawson is of ‘the greatest value’ in dissolving the confusions deriving from Austin. H’s understanding of the intention (‘essentially avowable’) on S’s part, in a sense, defines all illocutionary acts; all acts of communication which are not essentially avowable are not illocutionary. Skinner works on the two points of ambiguity Strawson finds in his own theory, namely, the matter of whether genuine illocutionary verbs demand that the essential avowal be made in the form of an explicit performative, and the existence of intermediate and stubborn cases between the conventional and rule-governed utterances (both problems solved by Millikan), and
another case, among all the participants in the situation to which the utterance belongs, ‘...a particular audience to whom the utterance can be said to be addressed’. Strawson remarks that this type of case can be made amenable to a description of illocutionary force.

What Grice gives is a 'partially analytical account' of an act of communication, one which may be performed non-verbally and yet possess all of the characteristics of an illocutionary act. These acts obey linguistic conventions, applicable up to the point at which the utterance's illocutionary force is exhausted by meaning (and, as Strawson says, in this the notion of an 'essentially avowable' intention is vital). In such cases, of illocutionary acts as conventional according to linguistic rules, the act is conventional in that, ‘...the means to perform it are conventional’; it is the case that the conformity of the act to conventions is a factor determined only by the extent to which conventional linguistic meaning exhausts the illocutionary force of the utterance. K-II acts (laying a bet, launching a ship), bear no intention to secure a response, but are performed according to rules of conventional procedures. (They may come to report intentions). There is no dependence on H's recognition or 'cooperation' in discerning the force of the utterance. However, S's intention in speaking or acting is overt (or avowable) in both cases. Austin's primary focus is on illocutionary acts which are essentially conventional, those which have no existence outside rule-governed practice, and there is, for Strawson, a 'standard' case, one in which S and H know the roles they should play and the rules and conventions governing the situation, and participate in good faith. Between this instance and the illocutionary act in a non-conventional case there is both a likeness and a difference. The likeness is seen in the case of an utterance, in a practice governed by convention, showing S's utterance as intended to further the practice in a way governed by the convention: the point is simple: such practices could be performed unintentionally, or without meaning.

Forms can take charge, in the absence of appropriate intention; but when they do, the case is essentially deviant or non-standard. There is present in the standard case, that is to say, the same element of wholly overt and avowable intention as in the case of the act not essentially conventional.

The difference concerns the conventional nature of the standard and non-standard cases. There are two points. The first says that if things go in accordance with the rules of the procedure, an act done in

---

10 Strawson (1971b) p166.
furtherance of the practice is an act permitted by the rules, and the second that an act in such a situation is identified "...because it is performed by the utterance of a form of words conventional for the performance of that act." In the absence of breaches in the conventional conditions for furthering the procedure in a conventional way, S's utterance will further the procedure in a conventional way, and the two types of case may be contrasted in the light of these considerations. In the case of non-conventional illocutionary acts, the act of communication succeeds in the cases in which uptake is secured and the utterance is taken as issued with the intention with which it was issued. However, even though the act of communication is in this case performed, the overt intention at the heart of S's complex intention may, "...without any breach of rules or conventions, be frustrated" by the obtaining of extra-linguistic circumstances. For an utterance made as a part of a wholly convention-governed procedure, in those cases in which uptake is secured, any frustration of S's communicative intentions can be ascribed to a transgression of a pertinent rule or convention; S, abiding by conventions, intends to further procedure if he takes it that conventional conditions are satisfied, and hence that his utterance will put into effect his intentions; there is nothing comparable in the case of illocutionary acts in practices not wholly conventional. In both cases "...speakers assume the responsibility for making their intentions overt", but in the conventionally-guided procedure, S using a performative form also assumes responsibility for making his overt intention effective. In the non-conventionally guided procedure S cannot assume this responsibility in a speech act, for there are no conditions which conventionally can guarantee the transmission of his overt intention.

Acts belonging to procedures constituted by convention are by no means the whole or the fundamental part of a theory of human communication. They are not, "...the model for understanding the notion of illocutionary force in general", as Austin is wont to imply when he gives illocutionary acts as essentially conventional, and "...connects this claim with the possibility of making the act explicit by the use of the performative formula". This is a mistaken analysis of Austin. It is equally mistaken to generalise an account of illocutionary force from Grice's analysis, for such a theory involves S accepting that the complex overt intention in an illocutionary act always includes an intention to derive a definite response from H, in addition to that which is secured if the illocutionary force of an utterance is understood. This is where Strawson loses momentum, and should turn to Lewis, for account can be made for the complex intention. Strawson can, however, generalise something for all types of case, including the intermediate. The illocutionary force of an utterance is essentially something to be
understood, and the understanding of illocutionary force ‘in all cases’ involves the recognition of an overt H-directed intention (intended to be recognised as such). ‘It is perhaps this fact which lies at the base of the general possibility of the explicit performative formula; though, as we have seen, extra features come importantly into play in the case of convention-constituted procedures.’ Having discerned the common element in illocutionary acts, it is simpler to acknowledge that there exist varied types of H-directed intention, and that different types may be instantiated in the same utterance. Strawson contrasts cases in which S’s overt intention is to forward a convention-guided practice, and those in which the overt intention includes in addition securing a response in H over and above that of securing uptake. The contrast, however, is not definitive. S may offer information, yet be indifferent as to whether the information is accepted or acted upon. S’s overt intention may be simply to invoke information available; he may exhibit only ‘general’ intentions, being merely the ‘mouthpiece’ of a desire. These ‘complications’, however, are not difficulties, for one cannot expect a general account of communication to give more than ‘schematic outlines’, and all of the benefits garnered may be lost when qualifications, ‘...which fidelity to the facts requires’, are added.

Millikan finds an ambiguity in Strawson’s distinction and returns to its statement for clarity concerning terms11. Austin’s argument that all illocutionary acts are distinguished according to the (conventional) rôles they may play, or ‘fit’ in appropriate utterances is, Strawson replies, subject to a fundamental misunderstanding concerning the ways in which conventions obtain in speech acts. Millikan develops the point. Strawson’s distinction distinguishes linguistic and ‘wider’ social, or institutional, convention12. The first tenet, following Gricean theory, says that all that is required for meaning (communication) is that H recognise S’s intention in speaking; it describes the conventions governing explicit performatives (in which S makes his intention paradigmatically clear). As Millikan has it, these (K-I) acts are differentiated ‘...by reference to the purpose of [S] in speaking’, captured in the relevant grammatical mood: imperative, indicative and so forth; she regards purposes as kinds of intention, and adds, so importantly, regarding S intention, that a conventional expression used in an appropriate context, and conventional moves made as classified by conventional outcome, are elements that may come apart in some acts, a point to which Austin never shows sufficient awareness13. Strawson’s distinction (of K-I and K-II acts), Millikan is correct, suitably corresponds to that between S intention and conventional outcome, and she remarks that Austin’s examples frequently confuse the

two, now emphasising the role of the explicit performative (and with Grice’s addition the recognition of intention), now the need for conventional, social conditions (“I name this ship”). (Millikan wishes to argue that the distinction between the two types allows some overlap, even that it might be regarded as expressing the two ends of a continuum with shades between. This, however, does not threaten Strawson’s distinction, but it merely illustrates how important a dichotomy he discerns) 14.

K-I acts, Millikan argues, are not ‘essentially conventional’, and Strawson’s point is clear: why should one want to say that S can only perform acts of warning, promising, entreating and so forth with acts conforming to conventions (love affairs need not attain the heights of the *Roman de la Rose*). There is, categorically, nothing to distinguish or constitute S’s act of warning as a warning, though S may explicitly perform the act he intends by invoking the appropriate linguistic convention in the formulation with the explicit performative. K-II acts, those capable of being essentially conventional, apply, say, in cases of umpires giving batsmen out, dignitaries naming ships and so forth. These cases may, of course, be frustrated (by the bottle not breaking and so forth), and the convention not furthered, but this not due to S’s failure to secure the recognition of intention; K-I acts may indeed be frustrated in this way, but, reciprocally, without any breach of the conventions of conventional procedures 15.

Millikan considers K-I acts (explicit performatives) which are described by conventions exhausted by their illocutionary force. How do they come to constitute warnings, promises and so forth? She states a vital point, that it cannot be that, say, a warning is conventionally regarded as a warning by being dubbed a warning, remarking that the fact that “…S has a given intention cannot be a mere matter of convention”. Regarding certain acts as warnings, as embodying specific intentions, cannot make the acts constitute warnings. Millikan adds that equally one cannot say that having an intention to warn in performing a speech act can count as performing an act conventional for warning, for intentions to warn or promise cannot be thought mutable like conventions, and able to be changed for another if it is so wished. (Millikan surely betrays in this her acceptance of the thesis that there can be intentionality without language, and it is a fascinating question to ask whether all intentions can bear her analysis:

does, for example, promising report an intention, or reveal and repeat a vestige of an utterance structure, of a very primitive cast, from pre-linguistic communication? Millikan offers another solution, connected to the way in which, it shall be argued, Strawson’s distinction deals with parasitical or non-literal cases. Suppose, she suggests, that one denies that use of the explicit performative turns a K-I act into a conventional act. By this, explicit performatives are natural acts of expressing intentions, and their being performed in ways described by conventions is merely happenstance: that is, they report events that can be described in natural vocabulary (or better, an explicit performative reports an intention which makes the utterance into the associated act), and which could be accomplished in a world without conventions. (Again, it is immaterial that a specific intention, say to warn, has come conventionally to express what is to be taken as a warning). For cases of S uttering a performative without ‘normal and serious’ intentions, but intending only to trick, or to be indifferent as to whether his information is recognised, accepted and so forth, Millikan suggests a solution: K-I acts are defined by their ‘purposes’, and conventional acts directly, ‘as such’, have purposes7.

Regarding these cases, Millikan writes that it is not a matter of convention that S communicates his intention, and nor is it a matter of convention that H should respond as intended by S. H follows convention when he believes that what S says is true. Millikan writes:

In each such case H completes the reproduction of a conventional pattern of movement from S words into H reactions. Correlatively, in each of these cases S makes a conventional move having a conventional outcome. He lays down the beginning of a

procedure. Millikan notes that Strawson advises due caution in thinking that all acts may easily fall into one or other of the categories, and suggests an example of S giving information yet being indifferent to whether it is accepted.

8 Millikan (1998) pp28-29. It is not reasonable, Millikan writes, to assume that having a specific intention in performing a speech act is to perform a specific conventional act. Conventions are, Millikan says by definition, arbitrary, ’...something for which another thing might have been conventionally substituted. One’s intentions in speaking cannot be supposed to play that sort of pawnlike rôle’. Additionally, it is not the case that having a certain type of intention inevitably has certain social consequences. One might intend to deceive, and this has appropriate consequences derived from rules of ethics and good conduct, but the intention does not count as anything in accordance with conventions.

9 Millikan’s definition of convention deserves close study (Millikan (1998) pp30-34). She studies the conventionality of acts, defined as reproduced tokens of types of established behaviour. Had the types been established differently, appropriate tokens would have differed accordingly; when defining functions they are seen to have the essential arbitrariness that characterises conventions. ‘Thus patterns of skill, though they may be handed down by copying and instruction, are not as such conventional patterns. The shape of a conventional act or pattern is not dictated by function alone. A reproduced act or pattern that has a function is conventional only if it might have differed or been replaced by differently shaped acts or patterns which, assuming similar proliferation in the culture, would then have served the same function. This does not give as a sharp boundary for the conventional. A borderline case might be, for example, certain “conventional” techniques handed down in different schools of violin playing. These techniques are not totally interchangeable. They have subtly different musical effects. But the conventions of each school taken in toto accomplish pretty much the same’.

Conventional act tokens are such, in part, because they are reproduced instances of a type. However, Millikan adds, they must needs be performed intentionally and as explicitly following a specific convention. (Some conventional act types are able to be performed in more than one convention). Millikan describes how some patterns of conventional acts are very complex: Millikan offers the procedures of institutions or of formal meetings, and others requiring the reproduction of relationships between patterns (cf. for conditions pp32-33).

Some tokens in complex procedures put constraints on what may follow, and ‘...if the conventional pattern is to continue to unfold, the rest must be conformed to this piece, so as to bear the right relation to it’. (Millikan suggests the examples of chess and marriage ceremonies).
conventional pattern in a way that constrains what can follow in accord with the
convention19.

She adds that following a convention is not mandatory ('as such'), and that, importantly, ‘...following conventions is not always following conscious rules’19. S’s act of utterance and H’s response or recognition respects, in each act, a repeated pattern (owing to its prior success), the effect of which might, in other circumstances or different traditions, be achieved with different means. A case is described: in directing H to do something, S utters a token of a conventional pattern, completed when H acts according to S’s intention, in accordance with conventional rules, from signs given by S. The completion of the pattern as according to convention demands the due response of H, for, as Millikan says, S would not be moved to issue conventional signals reporting intentions unless he knew that there is, very likely, a specific response to be expected from H: indeed, this explains why his signal can be thought conventional, with a due response to follow20. Millikan considers a case of S’s issuing an utterance with intention to instigate a specific response in H, one described by convention (in a K-I act). This says that in this case a (potentially explicit performative) K-I act is performed with a specific outcome in mind, and Millikan’s response is illuminating. She states the thesis for which she shall argue, that K-I acts can be performed by the issuing of utterances or actions conventional according to the context in which S and H find themselves, yet merely aping the act of S conventional for the situation, and ‘[i]n the absence of a conventional device for performing the designated K-I act, having made the conventional response of believing that S is indeed performing this act, H must conclude that S’s intention accords with the act’21. There can, for both cases, be made a distinction between literal and parasitical utterances. When H responds or understands, a pattern, or convention, emerges, one which, Millikan says, begins with S intentions to elicit appropriate responses from H in repeated conventional situations, exploits explicit performatives, or their ersatz, and ends with H recognising S’s intention, or acting appropriately as the case may be. In this way, the conventions of speech situations arise, but, as above, how can the obtaining of convention reveal the possession, or expression, of an intention? In respect of cases of explicit performatives made without ‘normal and serious’ intentions, Strawson remarks that in such cases, S is the, ‘...mouthpiece, merely, of another agency [that which

20 It is, Millikan (1998) pp34-35 writes, conventional both for S to tell H in an appropriate way and for H to respond in a conventional way. The full conventional pattern is incomplete unless H has been, through recognition of intention and by conventional rules, ‘guided’ to belief; S would not issue further initiations of the pattern unless he thought, from past experience, that he could expect a likely response. Patterns do not result from voluntarily following rules, they are produced in processes of reproduction resulting from learning.
established the conventions for the utterance in sincere cases] to which may be attributed at least general intentions of the kind that can scarcely be attributed, in the particular case, to him', and Millikan adds that such cases are warnings, entreaties and so forth, by 'analogy'. However, she argues that all cases are, for Millikan, literal, for all K-I acts may be grouped according to 'purposes', or 'cooperative proper functions' (as defined above). The latter Millikan defines as the function fulfilled by items connected in repeated or causal situations, those in which, following repetition, the function served is revealed. (Her best example concerns learning by trial and error), and the use of specific speech acts and moods in natural languages are paradigm reproduced figures, those, say, from speakers to children, and sustained because they work, and replaced or modified as required, in what Millikan says is an evolutionary mechanism. The function of explicit performatives is to elicit associated H responses: the conventional outcome expected of the speech act accords with its proper function.

Millikan replies that all associated, passably similar, means of, say, warning (shouting and waving, reporting 'I warn...'), setting off flares, raising flags and so forth), have common purpose (as defined), and, in sincere cases, are cooperative proper functions, fulfilled by H's completing the act issued by S. For Millikan, K-I acts are defined by cooperative proper functions, and the grammatical moods (given in acts of ordering, indicating, questioning and so forth), are such functions (as defined), and are speech acts of broad kinds. The behaviour reported in speech acts is further differentiated by '...more fine grained speaker (rather than expression) purposes...', with which S intends to elicit the specific intended response in each instance. In the case of explicit performatives, the acts name themselves, or are 'self-verifying'. S warning in a play or to joke, or, in more Davidsonian fashion, misunderstanding

---

28 Milikan (1998) pp36-37 elaborates. A proper function is the product of a device designed to change or elaborate its products (or tropisms) in changed circumstances. These products are 'derived' proper functions, and one might refer to the dances of bees or the more complex behaviour in humans. These functions '...coincide with what we would usually identify as the purposes of these behaviours or of the individuals exhibiting them. Human intentions, understood as goal representations harboured within, have as derived proper functions to help effect their own fulfilment. And human artifacts have as proper functions the purposes for which they were designed'.
29 A mechanism, Millikan (1998) p37 says, identical to that which tutors a song to a species of bird, but '...with learning standing in for natural selection'. Speakers (collectively) learn how to speak and hearers learn how to respond in ways that serve purposes for both, each learning on the settled dispositions of the other. This kind of co-tutoring requires there to be functions served at least some of the time by cooperation some of the time between the paired cooperating devices—(just enough of the time to keep them tuned to one another. So there must be purposes that are sometimes served for hearers as well as speakers, served at least often enough, by hearers' responding in the right way to speakers' utterances of the various language forms. For example, often enough there are rewards to motivate hearers who satisfy imperatives. Indeed, simply pleasing the speaker is usually enough reward. And speakers often enough speak the truth, so that there are often rewards for hearers who believe indicatives. A proper function of the imperative mood is to induce the action designated, and a proper function of the indicative mood is to induce belief in the proposition expressed'.
30 Milikan (1998) pp38-39. '(In the sorts of cases that account for the survival and proliferation of the English imperative mood, of course, these two kinds of purposes do not conflict)'.
32 Millikan (1998) p38. Millikan's description is worth quoting in full: '...instances of the original informative conventional pattern from which they were derived... and which they also exemplify (they still are ultimately reproductions of it), their more recent conventional purposes automatically accord with what they say is the purpose of the saying'.
the public language function of the words he uses...", has two proper functions, one from the language forms he reproduces (mood and 'fine grained' purposes reporting the proper function of the expression used), and the second from his intention in speaking, derived, as Millikan says, from neural mechanisms created by learning, trial and error, experience and so forth28. This latter is not a cooperative proper function, for S is insincere and has no ambition to further the practice embodied in the associated procedure, and so is, by the argument, irrelevant in assessment of the K-I act S performs; S is merely mouthing a performative. Millikan writes that one might say that the cooperative functions are in such cases 'conflicting', but that whatever the case may be, the acts of warning performed are assuredly not paradigm K-I acts, and that the cooperative proper functions of the expressions used are not accompanied by intentions to further appropriate practices; the question of whether the act is performed can be answered affirmatively or negatively according to whether or not one thinks that S having, in a play, an intention to warn does in fact have the intention. Once again, this matters nothing for assessment of the literalness of the speech act performed, for it is not with reference to the intention with which it is uttered that a speech act is described as literal or parasitical, but to a far broader notion of social, or institutional, convention which requires qualitatively different treatment in a syntactical, pragmatic theory, one for which Searle attempts to account (as described in the following chapter)29. It is the case that a theory such as Searle's, and more successfully Lewis', can describe the way in which the conventions applying to repeated language forms can come to obtain. Millikan quips:

[i]s jokingly asking you to leave really asking you to leave? Perhaps it is really asking you to leave but not seriously—as I might really slap you in the face in a skit but not seriously. In cases in which cooperative proper functions do not match S's intentions, then in answer to the question of whether the reported act is performed, one can answer as one wishes, ...[as] long as you don't mislead in the context.

29 Millikan describes K-II acts as those not conventional according to the reproduction of tokens of act types but given by law or explicit regulation described by institutions (1998) pp39-41. They have 'regulated outcomes', and require 'regulated moves', which, Millikan adds, may have a proper function, derived from the intentions of those responsible for the definition of the move and its outcome. 'Conventional and regulated moves are classed, as such, by their conventional outcomes. K-I illocutionary verbs classify by purposes that accord with the conventional outcomes of the moves made when these expressions are used performatively. At the opposite of a continuum are performative verbs and other descriptions which apparently classify by conventional outcome alone. These appear to designate conventional moves as such: Strawson's K-II illocutionary acts. These are moves whose outcomes, for a number of good reasons, could not reasonably be intended by speakers in the absence of conventions to determine them. Also, these outcomes may routinely fail to be strongly intended by speakers'. Paradigm K-II acts (say, performing a marriage ceremony), have outcomes that require the coordination of many persons (some possibly absent and cf. p41), in a complex pattern, with appropriate sanctions attending the connected convention, and the obtaining of Austinian 'felicity conditions'.

165
1. Conventions and Philosophical Analysis

McDowell, like Grice and Strawson before him, argues that any viable theory of linguistic meaning must consider the claims of both semantical and syntactical traditions. His work is a response to Strawson’s on truth, meaning, intention and convention, and its importance to the discussion undertaken here is that McDowell begins the process of describing how acts (linguistic and, in Strawson’s terms, non-essentially conventional (or K-I and K-II)), may be discerned as conventional, and as good for successfully carrying out specific associated intentions. There are four important points to be taken from the discussion: firstly, and again following Grice, Derrida, Searle and (presumably) Strawson, language precedes intentionality, but secondly, McDowell’s argument is far stronger against Derrida’s advocating that such a reduction of operations with language to prior to intentional states is a pre-requisite of speech act theory. There need be no such reduction. McDowell begins the description of the ways in which conventions for K-I and K-II acts can emerge in the most primitive of exchanges, their complexity and utility hardening into speech act conventions in sophisticated languages. The reduction, and the claim of the meaning relativists, that intentions and conventions to perform certain speech acts must derive from a pre-linguistic capacity to formulate intentions to act in ways that will be successful and recognised as such by others (and are thus subject to a vicious regress), is, in the third point, soundly challenged in McDowell’s practice-based theory. The fourth point must be cross-referenced with I.4, and the potential fears regarding first intention (K-I acts) in Grice (found in II.5 and III.5), and Davidson’s application of Tarski’s truth condition. It shows how, with a strong Wittgensteinian influence, sentences describing a state of affairs or reporting a speech act (and so
forth), can be the linguistic correlates of the logical forms of the structure of the world, and thus can be, in their utterance, performances of the acts of describing, reporting and so forth. The point is again made that Derrida’s scepticism regarding the establishing of conventions for meaning is fuelled by insufficient attention to syntactical theories.

McDowell credits Strawson with raising the matter of the relation of formal and use theories. Strawson mediates between the two, arguing that a theory of meanings described by truth-conditions needs appeal to a use theory, for, ‘...the theorist of communication-intention can claim to be closer to the philosophical foundations’1. He suggests ways in which the competing theories need each other, allowing that communication-intention concedes (in some cases), that in sentences there is a core of meaning, ‘...explicable either in terms of truth-conditions or in terms of some related notion quite simply derivable from that of a truth-condition’2, and that notions of truth ‘in general’ appear platitudinous3, and in supplying truth-conditions, assert that, ‘...to specify the meaning of an indicative sentence is to specify how things are stated to be by someone who makes a statement by uttering it’4. Strawson sees in this an opportunity for a use theory.

There is no hope, he says [the use theorist], of elucidating the notion of the content of such speech acts without paying some attention to the notions of those speech acts themselves...[O]ne cannot...elucidate the notion of stating or asserting except in terms of H-directed intentions. For the fundamental case of stating or asserting, in terms of which all variants must be understood, is that of uttering a sentence with a certain intention...which can be incompletely described as that of letting H know, or getting H to think, that S has a certain belief...4.

Determining the meaning of an indicative sentence is determining what statement is made in uttering it, and, this, in turn, is determining the belief the sentence may lead H to think S has’. Strawson writes that this, ‘...so far from being an alternative to a communication theory of meaning, leads us straight in to such a theory of meaning’5; theories of meaning may be promulgated in formal semantics, but the

---

4 And hence Strawson’s objections to Davidson’s use of the Tarski truth definition: cf. Strawson (1971c) pp176ff.
6 Strawson (1971c) p181. Derrida would, of course, object.
8 Strawson (1971c) p182.
explanation of the concept of meaning used in such theories is given not by appeal to the ‘notion of truth’, but to S intention’.

McDowell agrees that formal semantics can make this appeal to communication for a notion of truth, and he states some premises. In collocation, there is ‘transport’ between S and H. H understands S’s utterances not as noises but as speech acts spoken with meaning and intent: he secures something approaching Austinian ‘uptake’: H is able to understand and to work with S’s utterances, and how does this understanding arise? H garners knowledge as to the content of the speech acts, knowledge inaccessible to those not sharing the language shared by S and H. H is distinguished from non-speakers by a theory, containing no interpreting conditions, offering descriptions of possible utterances in a language: a theory describing the language in which the utterance is made (perhaps a grammar) as alloting a recognisable content to individual speech acts performed. Such a theory explains the competence of H in understanding and altering his cognitive capacity, and in the light of his understanding speech acts in use; this reveals the network of relationships of signification between noise and meaning, which, ‘...in a sense, constitute the language. It is hard to see what could have a better claim to count as a theory of meaning for a language’. As in Grice and Schiffer, the discussion is focused on examination of the indicative mood, reported in sayings. Explaining H’s cognitive competence requires a description which,

...for each object-language sentence...entails a theorem whose form we can represent schematically as “s...p”, where “s” is replaced by a suitable designation of the object-language sentence and “p” by a sentence, in the language in which the theory is stated, suitable for expressing what can be said by uttering “s”.

A condition is added. The description must express the relevant content, demonstrated in the utterance of sentences of the language with understanding, as the result of the, ‘...contribution from repeatable

---

10 Although, McDowell emphasises (and the point is described below), the unmediated information reported is equally available to those who do not share the language. It may for them have a pragmatic value; they may learn to behave in ways similar to those with the language having seen the benefits they may accrue.
11 McDowell (1980) p120. This remark should be read with Dummett’s claims, as expressed in (1976). Contra Wittgensteinian theories of meaning as use, Dummett responds (with Frege), that sense/reference, meaning/force distinction gives, in addition to a truth-conditions theory, a hint of a significant addition, for one ‘...who knows, of a given sentence, what conditions must obtain for it to be true does yet know all that he needs to know in order to grasp the significance of an utterance of that sentence’. Supposing that he does, attributes ‘...an understanding of the way in which the truth-condition of a sentence determines the conventional significance of an utterance of it...’. Cf. pp73 and 75.
12 Cf ‘content-specification’.
13 McDowell (1980) p120.
parts or aspects of it". It is 'inconceivable', McDowell says, but that this be considered a *sine qua non* for a theory of meaning for any natural language; and it must allow that the, ...theorems would need to be deducible on the basis of the structure of the object-language sentences, in such a way that the premises which register the contribution of, say, a word to a given sentence figures also in derivatives which reveal its contribution to other sentences in which it occurs. Replacements for 'p' offer necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of predicates to the sentences of the object-language. They show what can be said by the utterance of its relevant sentences. McDowell adds that the description may be applied to moods other than the indicative without change in terms, and the rôle of generating sentences for the specification of content remain with the core of a theory of meaning written for indicatives. If the object-language has more than one mood, a theory giving interpretative descriptions of all of its possible utterances must classify them as of respective kinds, and thus, following the point just made, a requirement can be placed on the theory: it must be written in such a way that cases of non-assertoric utterances come with an indicative sentence able, via the argument given above, to express the content of the original non-assertoric utterance. This central rôle in McDowell's theory for assertives (or indicatives), suffers none of the problems Derrida finds in Austin, as is seen below.

McDowell's theory of language as offering sentences for the ascription of cognitive content (or interpretative descriptions), does not entail that it be thought, in light of the quotation on the previous page, a 'characterisation' of a theory of predication; however, this is a useful way in which it may be understood. It may also, again in keeping with formal semantics, McDowell argues, make appeal to notions of communication, and this may be illustrated by comparison with Strawson's theory, which, for McDowell, is incomplete. In describing the ways in which formal semantics may utilise communication-intention, Strawson gauges the Gricean notion of 'sentence-meaning' according to the content of the associated assertion, and McDowell asks why philosophers pause at the introduction of this 'overtly linguistic notion', when any analysis with pretence to fullness should break down the

---

169 McDowell (1980) p120. Thus it is that McDowell's may be considered a theory of the repetition of utterances established by conventions for the performance of specific, particular intentions.

17 Both quotations are from McDowell (1980) pp120-121.

18 With reference back to Strawson (1971c) p180, McDowell (1980) p122 adds that this demonstrates the utility of considering the component of a language that yields sentences suitable for specifying the contents of utterances as a characterisation of a truth predicate, and he notes Tarski's influence.

19 McDowell (1980) p121. References at the end of this paragraph are all to this page.

20 McDowell (1980) p122. The theory accounts also for changes in cognitive content. McDowell cites Chomsky and Tarski, and refers back to the conditions imposed on his putative theory by the quotation above.
matter into progressively prior elements. The notion of assertion 'seems to be on a level' with that of sentence-meaning, yet McDowell writes that a deeper analysis can be made, and an assessment of assertion made in non-linguistic terms, namely those of belief, intention and convention. McDowell argues that formal semantics can make sense of the notion of the intentional content of an assertion, and that one need not appeal to Strawson's analysis of sentence-meaning through the provision of the truth conditions of the associated assertion. Indeed, McDowell's model is a Davidsonian predication theory, giving transformations of the object language via the provision of truth predicates in a Tarskian meta-language. This is not a product of sentence-meaning, but a consequence, from Convention T, of what gives sentences their meanings. McDowell asks why any other theory could suggest itself, for why should meaning as a philosophical problem demand reductive analysis; an ability to understand language, '...is an ability to know what people are doing, in the way of performing significant speech acts, when they speak in it...'. The significant problems lie not with speech act analysis, but with how the ability to understand may be seen to be instantiated over time and be given systematic description. This is achieved not by '...conceptual analysis, but [by] a perspicuous mapping of interrelations between concepts which ...can be taken to be already perfectly well understood'. Indeed, '[s]o far from analysing the notion of meaning, [entertain] the radical thought that in describing the understanding of a language we can get along without it'. Speech act analysis emphasises the role of communication and human interaction in language, and McDowell remarks that this need not be rejected by formal semantics. However, there is wanting precision in the definition of communication.

Strawson makes the connection between assertoric communication and the satisfaction of an intention of, in part, '...getting an audience to believe that S has a certain belief'. His analysis says that an at least partial description of what it is to communicate is that S fulfils his intention in the

---

19 All of the remarks regarding Strawson's theory are from McDowell (1980) pp122-123, and they anticipate Searle's and Searle/Schiffrer's queries concerning the logical priority of elements in an assessment of a theory of meaning. (See III.2 and IV.3).
20 McDowell (1980) p123. McDowell remarks in a footnote that the full import of the notion of intention would of necessity introduce the notion of convention and its rôle in the execution of intentions, and McDowell is (following Davidson), '...sceptical about the idea that linguistic behaviour is conventional...'.
21 There need be no aiming at the truth in a speech act, merely a Davidsonian endeavour to make oneself understood. The deleterious effects of the search for truth in speech act analysis noted by Derrida, are one might say, never encountered.
22 McDowell (1980) p124. The connection of this to Davidson's theory is deep.
23 McDowell (1980) p125. McDowell expresses the hope that a rigorous definition will give an answer to the question of when transformative descriptions and interpretations of speech acts may be given (those, respectively, in which an account of the way in which language affects and changes lives is given, and those in which it is determined of what type is a particular speech act).
24 McDowell (1980) p125. McDowell notes in a footnote the ambiguity between the two notions introduced in Strawson's given definition, namely, getting the audience to think and 'letting an audience know'; much of this has emerged in the discussion of Grice. Strawson's theory, it should be remarked, is an outgrowth of his theory of saying or asserting. McDowell's theorist may, as the example indicates, make a further commitment to communication-intention (for Strawson's account of saying or asserting says that assertoric communication is to be equated with the fulfilment of an intention (to get H to believe that S has a certain belief), and thus does not merely countenance 'innocuous concession' to use theories. This notwithstanding, McDowell finds much to criticise in Strawson's theory.
communicative act: H ‘...should come to believe that S believes that p’\textsuperscript{25}. McDowell asks how S might communicate that p without it being the case that p, for Strawson's partial description is not sensitive to the truth of ‘p’. McDowell adds his own example to the problems raised by deceptive, parasitical cases, suggesting a means, already considered, by which intentions can remain sensitive to the truth of the speech acts reported\textsuperscript{26}. (His Tarskian formal semantics, as the picture theory in I.4, turns upon the homology of statements to states of affairs reported). The verb 'communicate', McDowell writes, belongs to a class (other members 'disclose', 'reveal'), whose characteristic is that their appearance in sentences of the form 's v's that p' gives the truth of the 'embedded sentence', or, ‘“a decision as to the presence or absence of knowledge”'; or, to put it another way, with 'communicate' it is the presence of knowledge, and not belief, which is determined by 'the applicability of the verb'\textsuperscript{27}. With reference to Gricean examples, McDowell rejects the thesis that S's fundamental (first) intention in making his utterance is to make H believe what S believes, for, say, if one examines the communicative intentions behind questions, for example, it is not the case, as Grice says, that they are asked with the intention of getting H to induce in S a belief about H's belief\textsuperscript{28}. As for assertions, they are made to inform, not necessarily to foment beliefs: in many of the examples given, S's assertions may not be S's beliefs\textsuperscript{29}.

McDowell asks why communication is thought the instilling or alteration of beliefs, noting that this could not possibly be in H's interests in all cases\textsuperscript{30}. H must, for instance, have faith in S's honesty. A sharing of knowledge or belief must, one might think, be predicated on the idea that each such sharing is beneficial (and Searle studies this, below), but McDowell considers the opportunities for deception or coercion. There are, additionally, instances in which S is mistaken, though his intention to communicate is honest and truthful\textsuperscript{31}. Theories regarding communication as the fundamental characteristic of linguistic behaviour must account for such cases, and, for the kernel of a response,
McDowell bruits an analogy to perceptual capacities gathering knowledge about the external world; knowledge is not gathered in every use of perceptual capacities but they are ceaselessly in use, and imperative to the development of human faculties\textsuperscript{32}. (One may of course be deceived, and the analogy is furthered in the potential for misperceptions)\textsuperscript{33}. Likewise, assertoric speech acts (accepting for the sake of argument that they are the fundamental speech acts), are essential for communication, yet there may still occur communication in S's honest mistakes. McDowell argues that to deny that communication occurs in cases of deception or error is implausible, for holding this view would seem to deny that the fount of communication-intention, the sharing of knowledge, can occur in cases of non-assertoric uses of language. The core of communication-intention, McDowell writes, theory is the claim that all speech acts are communicative by virtue of being intended and directed at a specific H or end to be achieved. For clarity regarding the way in which this is achieved, the theories of perlocutions and illocutions must be given precedence, and the claims of all utterances, assertoric and non-assertoric, considered in light of them. This, McDowell writes, can be done while retaining the notion that communication is the passing on not of belief but of knowledge.

For elucidation of the concept of knowledge-transmission McDowell precedes again by analogy. He asks how one ascribes knowledge to creatures (non-human and children), that are not recognised as forming or fulfilling intentions. McDowell suggests a situation in which a speech act is performed: the knowledge disseminated is, as it were, equally available to one understanding the language in which the speech act is made and to a non-speaker (or one who is yet to achieve facility with the language); a difference obtains in that the former has the ability fully to receive and to process the information. However, McDowell writes that the non-speaker may still acquire information about the world, information to affect and alter his behaviour, for he can come to realise the pragmatic benefits of acting in the same or qualitatively similar ways to the speaker (indeed, this is learning). The connection between the stimulus condition and the engendered response will be more or less obvious, more or less direct, and the difference, McDowell argues, between this and the conditions described in communication between fluent subjects is the ascription of intentional behaviour, and this causes him to consider the conventions underlying the ways in which S may influence H (fluent or non-speaker), by his behaviour, and to the notions of mutual knowledge and mutual awareness\textsuperscript{34}. In the canonical

\textsuperscript{32} They must account, McDowell says, because of the obtaining in each case of a Tarskian truth condition.
\textsuperscript{33} Searle (1983) pp37ff argues that perceptions are as intentional as the propositional attitudes: they have the same sincerity conditions as beliefs, desires and so forth, and the 'mind-to-world direction of fit'.
\textsuperscript{34} McDowell (1980) pp127-130.
statement of Gricean theory S communicates the intention that H should ascribe to him knowledge by having H recognise an intention to communicate. This condition of mutual awareness (and, importantly, of overtness), could be present in cases in which S’s intention is not recognised: H, say, might ‘fail, or refuse’ to oblige. McDowell aims to rigourise this condition. It is better to postulate, he argues, that the condition of mutual awareness is aimed at in S’s ‘primary communicative intention’, and that communication is dependent upon this successful transmission. As with second intention, it is the condition requiring mutual understanding that brings ambiguities, and McDowell’s Tarskian theory, like Searle’s in III.5, makes the case that intentions are simply stated in utterances appropriate for articulating such intentions.

Speech acts, McDowell says, are ‘publications of intentions’; they are uttered to make public a report (allowing its mutual consideration), and the intentions are those, in each sincere case, always accompanying specific acts. In this McDowell makes a vital distinction, ambivalent in the discussions of Grice and Strawson, between the notion of an intentional performance and the notion of the intention to make the performance, the former being, in McDowell’s words, more ‘fundamental’. It is more fundamental because while H can ‘sometimes’ discern an intention behind a misfire or a deceptive utterance, correctly executed speech acts ‘carry their intentions on their surface’. (A ‘normal’ understanding of ‘correct’ speech is not, in McDowell’s phrase, ‘...a matter of elimination...and an account of the understanding of language must start with the understanding of correct speech’).

Intentions in correctly executed speech acts, whose publication is their statement, require the same analysis as those intentions guiding the transmission of knowledge or the imparting of reasons for action, for in the latter case S’s intention to make public his intention to transmit knowledge or impart belief is realised by uttering an appropriate speech act, and so by letting H know what act he performs. For McDowell this shows communication to have a two-fold aspect, firstly as the promulgating of information (understood by native speakers and potential stimuli for non-speakers), and secondly, as the transmission of sincerity and veracity conditions concerning S’s intentions, and thus an appeal to H’s mutual knowledge. In cases of ‘properly executed’ speech acts recognised as such, these conditions are transmitted, ‘...not only in informative assertions but also in assertions by which information is not transmitted and in speech acts which are not assertoric at all’.

For McDowell there is no distinction,
such as that found in Grice, between first and second intention, for knowledge is derived from all speech acts in the same way, and the correctly-executed bear in their statement a report of the logical structure of the world. McDowell is clear about the import of these aspects: if the premise that the content of an intention is made public in the utterance of speech acts includes, as both the Gricean and the Derridean analysis do, an immanent relationship to the types of speech act that may be made, then the prospects for analysis are indeed, as Derrida says, bleak, for one cannot, following from the arguments made in II, give account of speech acts purely in terms of the intentions of those performing them. There is, again, needed an attention to conventions observed in their performance. The need for substantial emendation of Gricean analysis is not feared by McDowell for, ‘...once we have burned our books on analysis of the concept of meaning, we have no obvious reason to regret this renunciation’.

For McDowell, Strawson puts too great an emphasis on the primacy of assertoric speech acts, his motivation being to explain the content in these ‘central’ speech acts, and apply the results to all other types. For a response, McDowell refers to the dual aspect of communication: ‘first-level’ communication (the promulgation of information), is, it is true, typified by assertion, but there are inadequate negative reasons for singling out their case (namely, that assertions need not transmit information), but what constitutes a positive reason? As Strawson himself says, mining the content of speech acts requires elucidation of the speech acts themselves and their appeal to conventions. His own theory for determining the meaning of indicative sentences specifies conditions in which the sentence could be used to assert something true, and Dummett replies that such a theory runs the risk of superficiality: it should not be taken to imply that truth and falsity are simply alternative properties which an indicative sentence may have, for there must needs be a reckoning of the rôle of the truth or falsity of a sentence (its success in reporting a state of affairs), as affecting any account of its content and of the conventions attending its utterance. Strawson takes for granted not only that the content in

forth. This raises the prospect that an act is successful without fully securing Austinian uptake (cf. Warnock (1989) p127). Kearns distinguishes between an intention for an act and an intention of an act: the meaning of an utterance is given in the former; however, words are conventionally related to certain acts, and can, owing to ‘slips’, fail to inform H of the act performed. (Kearns adds a fascinating element to the analysis of expressions (or utterances), thought by Derrida to be as speech: to vocables and inscriptions he adds ‘neural episodes’). Correspondingly, Kearns gives a theory of semantic and syntactic structure for ‘linguistic acts’ and not expressions. ‘Semantic structure is constituted by meaningful component acts being combined in characteristic ways’ (p51). He goes on to argue that this has significance for a theory of ‘where meaning resides’, for his theory is contrary to ‘conventional understandings of syntax and semantical’. A similar distinction is made in Schwytzer’s ‘conditions of success’, and ‘conditions for doing’; see Schwytzer, D.S.; ‘A Semantics of Utterance, Formalised’, pp90-98 in Tsohatzidis (1994).


39 Strawson (1971c) p181. Strawson raises a similar point in his examination of the formal semantics theory, and McDowell concedes that his characterisation of the theory might be thought to take for granted the notion of the content of the assertion, or
a saying carries the meaning of the speech act, but also that the content of S’s belief, which S intends to communicate, is carried in the speech act, and McDowell warns against the temptation to think of representations of the truth and content of states of affairs as inhering in mental states. Dummett’s suggestion that the classification of sentences as true or false be sensitive to the fact that S aims at making true statements allows that statements intended deceptively are still articulated as standing representations of the way things are; subsequently, it can be reckoned whether the statement attains to truth or not, and McDowell wishes to include this condition in his theory, approximating again a statement of Convention T⁴⁶. He writes that content and truth-conditions seem independently of intentions to be connected, adding that, ‘[i]t is natural to suspect that facts about the normal or proper aims of statement-makers are not themselves what we are looking for’⁴¹.

In considering the idea that communication is the transmission of information McDowell revisits the cases of actions performed by creatures to which one would not ascribe intentional behaviour. Communicative behaviour between such creatures promulgates information about a shared environment, and when what is communicated is ‘misinformation’, there occurs a ‘malfunction’ of a natural process, constituting ‘as such a defect’ (although, as Dummett says, the act of communication, and its matter, have pragmatic uses). Utilising this McDowell splices the problems of the distinction between true and false statements and that of the distinction between the proper function of a statement and its misfiring. In explicating the meaning of a statement, there is no condition requiring S’s sincere intention and its recognition by H. In its place is the notion of a ‘repertoire’ of behavioural functions, a corpus of conventions, fulfilling the rôle of content, and requiring nothing of intention. This function, writes McDowell, instantiates the use or effect (even the content), of an assertion, a rôle previously, and incorrectly, assigned to an aiming at truth⁴⁹. In a case of full and proper communication, H’s understanding of S’s utterance is a proxy for H’s direct ‘confrontation’ with the state of affairs S represents: the former is surrogate for the latter, for they share logical form.

⁴⁶ Austin’s arguments for the conclusion that performatives are not statements, and are thus are neither true nor false, are precisely at issue in Searle (1989) especially p557. The theme is continued, with objections to Searle’s other contentions, in Bach, K. and Harnish, R.M.; ‘How Performatives Really Work: A Reply to Searle’, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XV, no. 1, pp99-110, 1992. The debate is continued in Reimer, M.; ‘Performatives and the Logical Form of Declaratives’, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XVIII, no. 6, pp655-675, 1995. Bach and Harnish are fundamentally Gricean in their approach: declarations do not carry intentions, intentions are communicated by speakers and inferred by hearers (pp94-97). This goes for ‘ordinary’ performatives. For Bach and Harnish, ‘... communicating is the act of expressing an attitude...’ (p96). Cf. Austin (1971) p16. The explicit performative is a more sophisticated, precise method of achieving illocutionary effect than, say, intonation or gesture. It is of a part with the evolution of, ‘... more complex forms of society and science’.

⁴⁹ McDowell (1980) pp133-134. Again, in an assertion one is not aiming at truth.
McDowell considers that the apparent 'core' of linguistic behaviour, namely assertion, is a descendent of such instinctive communication. He suggests that assertions can serve purposes other than transmitting information, particularly so with the nested addition of conditions for mutual knowledge, or in cases of secondary illocutions. From assertions knowledge can be gained ‘second-hand (as in the case of the non-speaker)’, and this is not explicable by an argument that such knowledge obtains because H can argue for its cogency from S’s reliability and the communication of his intention. McDowell suggests a ‘more attractive’ proposal: that the repertoire of linguistic behaviour retains, in the changing of H’s cognitive situation by the transmission of knowledge, a vestige of an instinctive, ‘pre-linguistic’ ancestor; and that, in ‘suitable’ circumstances, uses of the faculty constitute proxies for the state of affairs spoken about, and this occurs only in cases in which H sees that S’s utterance fits the rôle for which he offers it.

But all standard assertions—not including, that is, special cases like irony [until competences become very sophisticated]—purport to it [the due epistemological role]. Thus their possession of content—their capacity for representing states of affairs—is intelligible in terms of a suitable modification of the simple idea which seemed appropriate in the case of instinctive communication.

As representations of states of affairs, assertions perform the task of revealing S’s states of mind, without requiring the reading off of intentions and without traducing the thesis of there being no intentionality without language. In the formal semantics sketched by McDowell, one regarding the transmission of guides for interpretation, promulgated in teaching, as making linguistic behaviour intelligible as communication between S and H, the rudiments upon which meanings depend are the relevant propositional attitudes ascribed by H to S. In the light of S’s behaviour and collated dispositions and attitudes, his assertions are regarded, when assessed by standards of accepted practice, as expressive of beliefs. The virtue of significance in indicative or assertoric sentences owes not to their potential for expressing beliefs, but language use develops over time from primitive instinctive communication supplemented by the learning of new potentialities created by the presence of more complex desires and wants, and significances change and develop in relation to other potentialities, and

43 Strawson (1980) p283 agrees with the broad outlines of the theory.
44 In Searle (1979) p30 he suggests an example in which one might request that another pass the salt by asking the question ‘Can you reach the salt?’
45 The paradigm of the communication of information.
46 These points and the quotation are from McDowell (1980) p135.
as a speaker develops facility in this the operations of the linguistic capacity develop from instinctiveness to self-consciousness, growing as assertions are found to be suited to, and widely accepted as, expressive of beliefs. The practice of ascribing content to assertions in these operations, and its dependence upon sensitivity to, and knowledge of, previous like and correlative instances, lead S to reflective, self-conscious linguistic competence, yet, following Davidson, and his rejection of language conventions, the display of instinctive communicative capacities reports no states of mind, for ‘...there are no states of mind, in the relevant sense, to be expressed’, merely operations with competences. Progressively, as a speaker develops, the repertoire becomes less instinctive, and moves through ‘conditioned reflex’, to issue in communicative behaviour under rational control. As Strawson has it, for McDowell, the condition of mutual awareness of intention is achieved when successful communication occurs, and Strawson captures McDowell’s sense well: the intention in communication is ‘to say what is said’, to,

...perform linguistically in a way which would be appropriate to transmitting such-and-such a piece of information. No further analysis of the intention of which mutual awareness is secured in successful communication, hence no analysis, in such terms as suggested in ‘Meaning and Truth’, is either required or appropriate.

Regarded as conditioned reflex, an instance of communicative behaviour simply represents or misrepresents reality as it is true to the facts, or as it ‘goes wrong’. Once communicative behaviour is under S’s intentional control, ‘...so that deliberate misrepresentation of reality is possible’, the second aspect of the dual nature of communication is introduced, and in this, McDowell writes, S becomes, along with the contextual circumstances, himself an object of representation. S misleading H about the cast of his thought reports both incorrect information and false intentions, and, ‘...in a sense which seems to apply only when questions arise in this way about the sincerity or insincerity of [his] expressions’. H, McDowell adds, might see through S’s deception owing to a greater sensitivity to such contexts, and an audience made up of those still carrying the conditioned reflex will not be deceived about the second aspect, owing to their simple grasp of the primitive, brute meaning of the information promulgated.

---

48 This evolutionary theory should put one in mind of Rorty’s Darwinian epistemology (described in 1.1).
McDowell argues that indicatives allow the representation of the very constitution of reality, and that thus their analysis may be used to assess S’s beliefs as to this constitution, precisely because S’s manipulations of the linguistic repertoire are wilful and self-conscious. It does not follow from this that the use of utterances to represent reality ‘breathes life’ into them, giving speakers representing ability by virtue of instantiating prior conventions; rather the primitive capacity enabling speakers to acquire and manipulate knowledge renders them capable of expressing beliefs. Those in the primitive situation imbibe knowledge from utterances before they develop the faculties to doubt S’s honesty and veracity: content is imparted, and stimuli issued and received, before the utterances are recognised as expressions of certain beliefs. If S’s sentences include terms which can only occur in the context of a body of theory, then a comprehension of their content without proper knowledge of the context is imperfect and incomplete. (McDowell allows that there may be a form of acceptance yet no understanding). The gap cannot be bridged by a statement of the thoughts or intentions motivating S, but by H’s coming to the understanding and acceptance of further sentences stating the conditions of the theoretical context in which the utterance is made. H must develop an ‘appreciable’ amount of such belief before he is able to engage in and be sensitive to acts of assertion and expressions of belief, and McDowell argues that this defines the way in which conventions are present in language, deriving not from a developed understanding of S’s use of utterances to communicate belief, but, ‘...because...operations with sentences have fitted into his life [even at the earliest stages] in such a way as to permit us to suppose that the sentences have been serving as vehicles for the transmission of knowledge’.

Strawson, in response, finds McDowell’s an (incomplete) analysis of saying, referring to cases of communication with full overt intention, with mutual knowledge obtaining; while these cases have been seen to require a theory of convention, there follows a distinction vital to elucidating the distinctions Derrida sets up and their assessment by Gricean analysis, saying that the clause in McDowell requiring that S’s act be ‘apposite to transmitting information that p’, is subject to an ambiguity centring on whether it requires that H recognise nuances attached to S’s utterance. Strawson (and Grice), say H must, at least in cases of communication, ‘between mature language-users’, and that consequences follow for the ‘nature’ of ‘genuine’ intention in the communicative acts McDowell studies (H-directed assertions). Few if any Hs, Strawson suggests, would not know of the chances of

---

error, and of intention to mislead: S’s act might be thought governed by assumptions concerning his sincerity, and this is part of S’s intention in a genuine communication, a position Strawson finds continuous with his own⁵³. This is surely provided for by the analysis of Grice offered in this dissertation, accounting both for first and second intention, but this notwithstanding, McDowell writes, the Gricean-Strawsonian description is, due to its wanting a theory of convention, an ‘unrealistic’ analysis of the ‘normal’ case. McDowell’s work begins this, and recalls formal semantics to the priority of the realities of speech and ‘speech-like behaviour’, arguing that all semantics is ‘secondary’ to the theory of communication⁵⁴. The reduction of operations with language to corresponding S-intentions is unnecessary, and indeed, misleading, for a theory of illocutionary force requires at least some account of the ways in which utterances can fulfil specific conventional rôles written in the (admittedly rather nebulous), theory of perlocutionary force, and this is attempted by Searle, whose work is considered in the rest of this chapter.

2. Speech Acts and Reference

Searle discusses together formal and use theories: they are not ‘competing’ but ‘complementary’, for any theory of language and mind requires consideration of the rôle played by conventions1. He offers two principles, firstly the principle of expressibility, or, ‘...whatever can be meant can be said’. In Searle’s words,

...for any meaning X and any speaker S whenever S means (intends to convey, wishes to communicate in an utterance, etc) X then it is possible that there is some expression E such that E is an exact expression of or formulation of X.

This, and the second, that, ‘...speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behaviour’, establishes what Richards calls Searle’s ‘corollary’, that rules for language use are rules for uttering linguistic elements, or, Searle again:

...for any possible speech act there is a possible linguistic element the meaning of which (given the context of the utterance) is sufficient to determine that its literal utterance is a performance of precisely that speech act. To study the speech acts of promising or apologising one need only study sentences whose literal and correct utterance would constitute making a promise or issuing an apology4.

Thus it is that speech acts determined by the meaning of elements in a language (by applying their constitutive rules, see III.3), are determined also in their linguistic or semantic content and rôle5.

Richards argues that the difficulties of establishing whether the speech act rules match the semantic elements of the language in which the utterance occurs cannot be overcome without abandoning one or both of Searle’s principles6. The speech act of promising reports the semantic features of English relevant to making a promise, yet Searle’s point, is as Richards’ says, opaque, and too easily delegated

---

1 Searle (1969) p18-19. Fraser, B.; ‘Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language by John R. Searle’, Foundations of Language, vol. XI, no. 3, pp433-446, 1974, makes the point with interesting cross-reference. The work of the structuralists points up the need for theories of syntax. It is argued by some, Fraser writes, that the development of this work falls within the domain of morphology, and is to be studied there, but Fraser says ‘...syntax was often the convenient rug under which to sweep problems in syntactic description, at least as long as syntax and semantics were held separable and distinct’. Semantics has been found to be unable to account for the problems arising in the linguistic disciplines, and speech act theory should be thought part of the newest solution: pragmatics.

Fraser states a number of theses, of which the ninth makes Searle’s point, following upon his utilisation of Fregean senses, (points which will reoccur), that the study of the meanings of sentences and the study of speech acts are not independent, but the same practice beginning from different sources.


2 Richards (1971) p520 says correctly that this prefaces Searle’s discussion of demonstrative reference, and continues that one might find numerous counter-examples to this analysis, but that the that speech acts are performed in utterances using elements of the language, for context may, ‘...supply what the meaning of the elements leaves unspecified’.

to the linguist. Searle’s premise that semantic structure is the conventional structure of sets of constitutive rules, rules described in linguistics, leads him to postulate rules without reference to natural languages, stating conventions but unusable in practice as conventions for natural languages.

Searle gives some of the rules used in the speaking of a language, and the conditions necessary and sufficient for the performance of different kinds of speech act. From this he extracts ‘sets of semantic rules’ for the use of utterances, and by which they can be marked as speech acts of specific types. Richards’ arguments apply equally against Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary force (later dubbed illocutionary ‘point’), for the inconsistency in Searle’s premises regarding convention allows no distinction between types to be made. Searle imagines a speech situation containing S, H and a context, in which ‘...in appropriate circumstances S utters one of the following sentences’:

1) X smokes habitually
2) Does X smoke habitually?
3) X, smoke habitually!
4) Would that X smoked habitually,

reporting respectively an assertion, a question, an order and a wish. Each act is, additionally, an act of referring to, or of designating, an object (X) and something predicated of him. The examples show that the same reference and predication can occur in the performance of different complete speech

---

8 He explicitly says so: Searle (1969) p41. A solution is given by Lewis (described in IV). (It is pertinent to recall that both Searle and Derrida reject the thesis of intentionality without language, and to add that both fail to mark Strawson’s distinction).

Habermas, J.; ‘Comments on John Searle: “Meaning, Communication and Representation”’, pp17-29 in Lepore and van Gulick (1991) pp21ff argues that the framework of Speech Acts is not fruitful enough to account for Searle’s intersubjectivist view of conventions in language. (The debt of Searle’s work to the Gricean mechanism is described in Alston, W.P.; “Searle on Illocutionary Acts”, pp57-80 in Lepore and van Gulick (1991). Alston is less sanguine than Bennett that Searle’s conditions on understanding as a replacement for the Gricean recognition of intention are successfully met). Habermas compares the Gricean ‘intentionalist’ view with the Searlean ‘intersubjectivist’ view. The latter is characterised thus: ‘In producing the utterance x S allows [H] the option of responding with “yes” or “no”. It is the achievement of a mutual consensus with respect to a (potentially questionable) matter, and not the transfer of ideas, that serves here as a model of communication’ (p17). Habermas says later that with the intersubjectivist view (foregrounding “the representation of states of affairs”), “...a relation to the world of events and objects and a dimension of validity come into play which essentially provide the criteria for a successful performance of a communicative intention” (p19). This plainly has implications for the arguments for the priority of language over intentionality, codified in Habermas’ two theses, for “[m]ental representation of states of affairs in terms of an analysis in terms of satisfaction conditions is more basic than linguistic representation”, and, “[i]llocutionary types can be distinguished like representations of states of affairs and corresponding propositional attitudes of the speaker’. See also Apel (1991). The view of Searle (1991) p90 in response to Habermas (1991) is one that must be echoed here. The ‘intentionalist’ and ‘intersubjectivist’ views are perfectly compatible, the first elucidating the structure of meaning and communication, and the second requiring the foundation of the first, viewing successful speech acts as achieving consensus and agreement between S and H on a subject in the world.

In Searle’s theory of the understanding of H, rather than the (following Grice), intention of S, there is a notion of the way in which meaning is a ‘matter of rules or conventions’. (Searle (1969) p43). As de Mulder (1994) pp11 says this makes an illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction illocutions being conventional meanings of speech acts and perlocutions being conventional outcomes of speech acts performances.

7 The extraction of sets of semantic rules allows a taxonomy. Richards follows out the consequences of Searle’s argument that speech acts ‘presuppose’ conventional sentence meanings. (Richards writes that this argument is given in an unpublished essay, ‘Meaning and Speech Acts’ (typescript, Cambridge University) 1969). Richards, it should be noted, thinks of Searle as trying to forge a ‘general theory’ from Austin’s insights.

Searle (1969) pp22-23. Searle says elsewhere that intentional acts ("states") represent objects or states of affairs in the same way as do speech acts, the latter being derived from the former. Cf. Searle (1983) pp4-5. Chapter one is devoted to making the connections between the work on intentional meaning and speech acts and the philosophy of mind. Searle has a notion of mediation in his theory, pp13ff.
acts. In uttering any of the four statements S performs at least three types of act: he utters words, sentences or morphemes, and therefore performs utterance acts; he refers to objects or predicates something of objects, and therefore performs propositional acts; and he makes statements, promises, warnings and any number of other speech acts, and so performs illocutionary acts. From this Searle draws further distinctions: that different illocutionary acts can be performed by the same propositional acts, and that S can thus perform utterance acts without performing any propositional or illocutionary act. A further example,

5) Mr X is a regular smoker of tobacco,

shows that in the performance of the same propositional act as in 1)-4), and the performance of the same illocutionary act as in 1), a different utterance act is performed: none of the same words is used, and only some shared morphemes, whence, in the performance of the one utterance act S may perform the same propositional and illocutionary acts. Furthermore, S may use the same utterance on different occasions to perform different propositional and illocutionary acts: that is ‘...the same sentence may...be used to make two different statements’. Searle finds that the only unequivocal distinction that can be made is that, ‘[u]utterance acts consist simply in uttering strings of words. Illocutionary and propositional acts consist characteristically in uttering words in sentences in certain contexts, under certain conditions and with certain intentions...’14. The latter term of the distinction leads Cohen to object, and since his theory bears affinities with that offered in this chapter in reply to Searle, his arguments shall be presented.

Close textual study leads Cohen to reject the theory of illocutionary force: the concept is ‘empty’, and witness, he suggests, exclamations with only locutionary aspects and no illocutionary aspect

---

1 These point up the importance of Austin’s theory of illocutionary acts.
4 The distinctions and the two quotations are from Searle (1969) pp24-25. The detail of the distinctions, and their soundness, (the ‘spirit’ of which derives from Austin), is Fraser’s sixth thesis, and Searle’s remark that it is possible for every speech act to be determined by a sentence on the assumption that the speaker speaks literally and the context is appropriately constituted (e.g. one has the right to launch the ship, etc.) his eighth. Cf. Searle (1979b) p130. Contexts in literal meanings are like the background of intentional states. The notion of literal meaning is, ‘...the notion of conventional and hence fungible intelligibility’. Searle (1983) p143 argues that 'The Background' is a set of 'pre-intentional' mental capacities allowing representation to take place. It is not itself intentional. 'The Background' constitutes a means of knowing-how without knowing-what (Searle gives as examples, walking, eating and perceiving among others) (p144). On p154 Searle writes that the belief that 'The Background' is a product of social interaction, '...[o]n that it consists of cultural objects in the world such as chairs and tables, hammers and nails...in a Heideggerian vein', is only partly true. The foundation of 'The Background' are 'practices', or 'capacities', and not representations (p156). Part of Searle’s reason for coming to the hypothesis of 'The Background' was to refine a view of literal utterance. Searle (1983) pp145-148. Literal meaning is context relative: 'it only has application relative to a set of pre-intentional background assumptions and practices' (p145). On the importance to intentionality of seeing-as, cf. Searle (1979b) p156.
whatsoever, perhaps obscenity or solecism\textsuperscript{15}. ‘Damn’ is at once a phonetic, a phatic and a rhetic act\textsuperscript{16}, its rhetic aspect carrying its sense and reference, and its phatic aspect its intonation, pronunciation, grammatical construction and use of vocabulary\textsuperscript{17}. The force of ‘damn’ is, as it were, carried without nuance in each instance of its utterance, which conceals nothing illocutionary, and furthermore, analysis of such speech acts must be made with nothing as simple as Austin’s means of distinguishing illocutions (namely, the construction in explicit performative form), for phatic acts are reported immanently in direct speech, rhetic only indirectly, with connotation to independent conventions for sense and reference, as described by Frege\textsuperscript{18}. (As Derrida notes, it is essentially to distinguish force from meaning, and sense from reference ‘within meaning’). Cohen continues: the cognition of Austin’s distinction of illocution and perlocution and Grice’s, and of Austin’s speaking boldly of the ‘use of language’, obscure both the distinction of locutions and illocutions, and the true distinction of illocutions and perlocutions\textsuperscript{19}. Use of language for illocutions is for Austin conventional, and not so for perlocutions, and the difference is marked by the use, in the former cases, of explicit performatives. Further indeterminate cases are supplied by Strawson: ‘[w]e may speak of the use of language in poetry or for joking, and we can also use language to make insinuations or to express our feelings, as [following the first example] in swearing\textsuperscript{20}. For Austin, the types of illocutionary act that may be performed accord with the conventions of illocutionary force; following the act’s performance, ‘uptake’ is required, and H’s response is assessed against the appropriate conventions. In all of these ways do illocutions differ from perlocutions. Cohen replies that the difficulties he prefaces (described

\textsuperscript{15}Cohen (1964) p. As intimated in Part II, the details of Cohen’s criticism, his method of deriving his arguments, make points similar to Skinner’s.

\textsuperscript{16}Cohen (1964) p. Skinner (1970) p argues that illocutionary force is rhetic force. (The arguments are considered in III.5.) As Austin writes, the performance of a rhetic act is, ‘... generally to perform the act of using that rheme or its constituents with a more or less definite “sense” and more or less definite “reference” (which together are equivalent to “meanings”). Austin (1962) pp92-96. Austin views the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts as clearer than that between illocutions and perlocutions, and, as Cooper (1972) p72 says, Austin does not elucidate the theories of sense and reference with which he works. The provision of such a theory is the main concern of Vanderwegen, D.; Meaning and Speech Acts: Volume I, Principles of Language Use (Cambridge University Press) 1950, and with formal notation, Meaning and Speech Acts: Volume II, Formal Semantics of Success and Satisfaction (Cambridge University Press) 1991. Cf. Searle (1968) pp410ff. Searle finds an inconsistency in Austin’s characterisation of the elements of the locution (phonetic, phatic and rhetic), and argues that the locutionary-illocutionary distinction is unworkable. He presents a different analysis: what is stated in an act of stating can be true or false; propositions stated are ‘neutral’ as to the illocutionary force with which they are expressed, but statements are not. Statements are ‘constructed’ in a context of intonation, stress, punctuation, and so forth (cf p419).

\textsuperscript{17}The sense and reference of a locution being, as Austin says, equivalent to meaning. Austin (1962) p148.


\textsuperscript{19}In this there are major consequences for Searle’s charge against Grice, namely, that he gives a theory of perlocution not of illocution. He gives a theory of both, and the argument given here shows Searle to be far wrong, and the thrust of Cohen’s argument plainly has a similar motivation. See also Cohen, T., ‘Illocutions and Perlocutions’, Foundations of Language, vol. IX, no. 4, pp492-503, 1973. Cohen argues that, when cleared up, the notion of perlocution is much closer to that of illocution than Austin and subsequent authors have argued. A relation of convention (p499ff), Cohen continues, might be stated which would clarify the distinction Austin makes between illocutions and perlocutions (pp493-494). Austin’s distinction is not clear-cut. Cohen rejects the ‘formul relic’ utterances of legal contexts, for they are not ‘parts of live speech situations’ (p502). Cf. Kuroda (1989) pp658ff and pp668ff, and in particular for the latter, Searle’s criticism of Grice. Kuroda argues that Gricean meanings are an intention to produce an illocutionary effect (p680).

183
above), arising in the discussion of locutionary meaning, perlocutionary effect and illocutionary force, are shared, and thus that there is no such thing as illocutionary force, its work being done by conventions of sense and reference and of syntax, intonation, pronunciation and so forth. He assesses the notion that led Austin to formulate the theory, and to abandon the performative-constative distinction\(^\text{21}\), finding that problems of demonstrative reference are, as Derrida realises, more directly an influence on Austin, and Cohen's points are fully detailed below\(^\text{22}\).

Searle is well-disposed toward Austin's notions of illocution and perlocution. He writes that for propositional and illocutionary acts there are characteristic kinds of expression uttered in their performance: for unambiguous illocutionary acts they are complete sentences, and for propositional acts, parts of complete sentences, the latter comprising, ‘...grammatical predicates for the act of predication, and proper names, pronouns, and certain other sorts of noun phrases for reference’\(^\text{23}\). However, propositional acts do not occur alone, for S cannot simply refer and predicate in a speech act without performing an illocution: Searle gives as the linguistic correlate of this point that sentences and not words are used to say things\(^\text{24}\). This remark draws an apt response from Fraser: it would be justified if language were used only to communicate, and if communicating linguistically were necessarily to perform illocutionary acts. ‘But since language is used for self-expression, thinking and problem-solving as well as inter-personal communication in the ordinary sense, it is easy to imagine cases where one performs propositional acts without having any intention to create an illocutionary effect’\(^\text{25}\). This recalls Strawson's counter-examples to Gricean analysis, and informs Searle's work on indirect speech acts\(^\text{26}\). (Fraser notes elsewhere (as his seventh thesis) Searle's repetition of his first principle: that whatever can be meant can be said; one might venture that this is part of the reason for the ambiguity Fraser notes in Searle, and why parasitical, indirect instances constitute obstacles for any Fregean theory\(^\text{27}\).

\(^{20}\)Cohen (1964) p119.
\(^{21}\)Cf. Cohen (1964) pp120-125 for an excellent discussion.
\(^{22}\)In Ill. 3.
\(^{23}\)Searle (1969) p25. This is Fraser’s third thesis.
\(^{24}\)Although one might recall Evans’ case for the sense and reference of singular terms in a Fregean theory (II.2). Cf. Wiggins (1971) p16.
\(^{25}\)Fraser (1974) p434 fn. 3.
\(^{26}\)Presented in III.5.
\(^{27}\)Because by the principle, and the thesis of there being no intentionality without language, one must, it seems, mean the statement contained in the act before one performs it. It would be a profitable avenue of enquiry to examine the exchange between Perry and Evans on demonstratives, and the possibility of establishing conventions for the situations in which they may appear, for its relevance to this debate. For criticisms of Searle, see Bertolet, R.; 'Are There Indirect Speech Acts?', pp335-349, Holdcroft, D.; 'Indirect Speech Acts and Propositional Content', pp350-364 and Tsohatzidis, S.L.; 'Speaker Meaning, Sentence Meaning and Metaphor', pp365-373 in Tsohatzidis (1994).
Searle describes the way in which his use of the verb 'predicate' differs from that of traditional philosophical usage, wishing to bring out the connection between the notions of predication and of truth. For Searle the same predication occurs in 1)-5) (above), and conceding this gives a third principle: that the same predicate expression is used, with different inflections, in different illocutionary acts; this, he says, goes for other illocutions, and further emphasises the distinction between illocutionary acts and propositions. Referring expressions such as 'you', 'Caesar', 'the battle of Waterloo', in their utterance, pick out, point to, or identify one object or entity apart from all others. Such expressions answer questions, 'Who?', 'What?' or 'Which?' They are known by their function, not by their grammatical form or the manner in which the function is performed. They are to be contrasted with other kinds of expressions, encapsulated for Searle in those beginning with indefinite articles, ('A man...'), which, '...might be said to refer to a particular man, but [could not] come to identify or...indicate S's intention to identify an object in the manner of some uses of expressions with the definite article, such as “the man”', and thus a distinction must be marked between definite and indefinite referring expressions in the singular and the plural, and another between referring and non-referring uses of expressions formed with the definite article, for example, 'a man' in the utterances, 'A man came', and, 'John is a man', respectively.

The notions of definite reference and of a definite referring expression are as yet imprecise. Searle's examples elucidate 'paradigm' cases of reference, but fail to account for doubtful cases. Does signifying one's name constitute a reference to oneself; what of fictional reference; and does the use of a tensed verb refer to its time of utterance? For clarity Searle states his method in assessing speech acts: he looks to those cases, '...which constitute the centre of variation of the concept of referring...', and extrapolates the conclusions to 'borderline' cases, '...in light of their similarities and differences from the paradigms'. The concept of referring should not be abandoned, he says, for want of an unequivocal answer to the question of the worth and status of paradigm cases, and Searle explains the function of the paradigms in utterances given as complete illocutionary speech acts, and the means of contrast with parasites. The class of paradigmatic referring expressions good for surface structure comprises '...proper names, noun phrases beginning with the definite article or a possessive pronoun or

---

29 Cf. Searle (1989) p537 for constructions with the present continuous, a plural subject, and the passive mood.  
30 Searle makes these restrictions in (1971) p40. He says he sacrifices 'thoroughness' for the sake of 'scope'.  
noun and followed by a singular noun, and pronouns. In cases in which two illocutionary acts contain the same reference and predication, and in which the meaning of the two expressions is the same, the same proposition is expressed, and Searle adds to 1)-5),

6) If Sam smokes habitually he will not live long

7) The proposition that Sam smokes habitually is uninteresting, illustrating (in light of 1)-5)) that propositions must be distinguished from their assertion or statement, both of which, unlike propositions, constitute acts. Propositions are asserted in acts of asserting, and stated in acts of stating. The expression of a proposition is a propositional act, and not an illocutionary act, and propositional acts (as above) cannot occur alone: one cannot express a proposition, and do nothing else, in performing a complete speech act. The characteristic incomplete sentence form for propositions is ‘that...’, and by this locution can they be isolated.

Searle distinguishes two elements in the syntactic structure of a sentence, dubbed the 'propositional content indicator' and the 'illocutionary force indicator'. The latter shows what illocutionary act is performed. The general form of ('very many kinds of') illocutionary acts is F(p) in which F takes illocutionary force indicators, and p propositions, accounting. Searle says, for questions other than those requiring a yes-no answer, and clearly indicating the difference between propositional and illocutionary negation. From this account can, Searle argues, be derived an account of the refusal to perform an illocutionary act as a statement of an autobiographical kind.

---

32 Searle (1969) p28. The confinement of Searle’s theory to cases of literal and correct utterance constitutes Fraser’s tenth thesis. The hypothesis that the speech act is the basic unit of communication, and the network of connections between speech acts, speaker meaning, sentence meaning, utterance meaning, speaker intention, hearer recognition and rules, his eleventh.

33 Searle (1969) p29. The point is simply expressed, Searle distinguishes between the illocutionary act and its propositional content, with a proviso that not all illocutionary acts have propositional content. Cf. Cohen (1964) p121.

34 Searle (1969) pp30-31 writes with reference to examples that the elements corresponding to the illocutionary force indicator can be identified separately from those corresponding to the propositional content indicator. 'I promise to come' and 'I promise that I will come'. the deep structure of both sentences reveals the phrase marker: 'I promise + I will come'. This Searle gives as the syntactic 'analogue' of his semantic distinction between the context of the utterance showing illocutional force and the explicit invocation (explicit performative) of illocutionary force. On the saturation of phrase markers, cf. Miller, J.; 'The Parasitic Growth of Deep Structures', Foundations of Language, vol. XIII, no. 3, pp361-389, 1975.

35 Searle (1969) pp30-33. Again, in this context, Searle notes the (apparently) necessary restrictions on his procedure: having listed the types of illocutionary acts, separate studies can be made of each of illocutionary force, referring and predicing. He deals with '...simple illocutionary acts of the sort that involve reference to a single object (usually in the utterance of a singular noun phrase) and the predication of simple expressions.' Again, he focuses on the simple cases for clarity concerning the complex cases, and to this end he ignores '...subject expressions, relational predicate expressions, and molecular propositions.'
3. Rules and Conventions

Searle has a fourth principle, a distinction between 'regulative' and 'constitutive' rules. Regulative rules govern antecedently or independently existing forms of behaviour. Constitutive rules create or define new forms of behaviour. Richards rejects the distinction, and so argues that Searle's theory of convention is unworkable. The uses of expression in the erasat language Searle presents are exhausted by the two types of rules given, which Richards formalises: the regulative, (a) 'x is to be uttered only if...', and the constitutive, (b) 'The utterance of x counts as...', adding that, as Searle specifies none of the elements for which the rules obtain (those which might fill the blanks in the formalisations) he relies on an unspoken formulation of the most general type: (c) 'The device (whatever it is) for...', in which the blank is filled with the name of a speech act, and the denotation of an expression (in a chosen language). Following Richards, one might emphasise that marking rules has consequences: one obeys or disobeys their conditions, and one's behaviour is assessed against them; there is, as it were, success and failure.

Searle's second principle says that speaking a language is participating in a procedure performed according to rules, and writes,

The form this hypothesis will take is that the semantic structure of a language may be regarded as a conventional realisation of a series of sets of underlying constitutive rules, and that speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules.

---


2 Searle says that they appear tautological, for they exist to define what the element of the game they govern is to do: the rule for the move of checkmated in chess seems to (in part) define 'checkmate'. Searle notes the importance of such rules in philosophy, and for an examle he turns to the question 'how can making a promise give one an obligation?' Constitutive rules may be characterised according to two formalisms, which Searle examines, the first governing their status as creating new forms of behaviour. In cases of pure regulative behaviour (rules) strictures in accordance with them could be given the identical description regardless of whether or not the rule existed. However, in cases of constitutive rules, behaviour made in accordance with them can be given specifications not available in the absence of the rule. Of the statement of the form of constitutive rules Searle admits that this may not be offered as a formal criterion for their distinction, for any regulative rule could be moulded to fit the characterisation. Holborow, L.; 'Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind by John R. Searle', Mind, vol. LXXXI, no. 323, pp458-468, 1972, p465 insists that any account of games must give reasons for their roles in the lives of men, and comments on the difficulty Searle encounters in incorporating facts of this latter sort into an account of constitutive rules. There are, however, adjustments easily made to the standards of appraisal and judgement and not simply those of specification or bald statement. Where the rule naturally can be phrased in this form and where the Y term is a specification, the rule is likely to be constitutive. However, Searle has two caveats. Firstly, that since constitutive rules appear in broader, more sophisticated, systems, it may plausibly be the case that the rule is instantiated in fact by the system in which exemplifies the form and not the individual rules found in the system. Secondly, within these broad systems the phrase which picks out the act which is subsumed under a rule will not in general be simply a label.


4 Searle (1969) p37. This is Fraser's fifth thesis, and the first premise Richards discerns. These rules are those for the successful performance of speech acts, and are not all imperative. The sense in which constitutive rules impact upon the speaking of a language is elucidated for Searle through an example. The difference between promising and fishing which compels one to say that the first is possible only due to the existence of constitutive rules describing operations with the elements of a language, and that the latter does not require such a set of rules due to the fact that there are no given conventions for the catching of a fish.
It is a matter of convention that the utterances of certain expressions in certain conditions or contexts qualify as specific speech acts, and Searle distinguishes convention from, ‘...strategy, technique, procedure, or natural fact’. This normative status of constitutive rules leads Holborow to argue that Searle’s analogy to achieving checkmate in chess fails, for such rules define terms, or give ‘ends-and-constraints’ conditions, determining how, in this case, one successfully achieves checkmate, yet they are silent on their broader, practical significance, to which any theory of rules for language, Holborow argues, must attend. Chess, as languages, instantiates a series of rules, observance of which allows one to perform permitted moves, exploit strategies and so forth. In language one must accede to similar rules, of, say, grammar or logic, but one must, additionally, observe rules and conventions defining the ways in which speech acts ‘fit’ into the contexts Austin describes, how their significance and performance may change in time and be observed in different traditions. (These are K-II acts, and it shall be noted throughout the following discussion that Searle is only fitfully aware of Strawson’s distinction). Because Searle does not make this distinction his rules can appear, as he claims, analytic, and as binding for practice.

Holborow argues that there is ‘room for cultural variation’ within Searle’s, ‘vaguely drawn limits’, and it is this vagueness that Richards seizes upon in his objections. Richards argues that in Searle’s conditions on rules there is a series of unspoken premises. Determining the use of expressions according to rules requires four features in a Searlean theory: firstly, that each rule be either of type (a) or (b) (as given above); secondly, that the set contain one or more type (a) rule, and thirdly, at least one of type (b); fourthly, the set is ordered such that (b) rules apply only if some (a) rules are satisfied. The significance of these conditions shall be seen when consideration is made of Searle’s analysis of the conventions of illocutions, and, in preparation, some of Searle’s further remarks on conventions shall be noted. Searle asks whether languages, specifically as opposed to language, are conventional, whether illocutionary acts are conventional, and whether language is rule-governed. Searle says that the answer to the first question is obvious, for in speaking or writing one observes the conventions of one language and not another. The second, in general, is answered affirmatively, though,

---

6There will be many rules for each expression not one.
Fraser is of 'convention', another does distinctions, and Fraser can one conventional act illocutionary acts performed unless language permitted. Fraser does not work sufficiently to establish the differences between language, languages and the rôle of both as conventional. The simple hypothesis of constitutive rules is insufficient to mark these necessary distinctions, and to establish a notion of convention rich enough to give a full analysis of standard cases for application to non-standard cases, a particular problem, as Strawson shows, for theories of language. Fraser articulates the dissatisfaction with Austin which led to Strawson's distinction: how can one invoke rules for conventions when the device by which one does this must itself be a part of a conventional system, or one conventionally interpreted as indicating the intention to perform a particular act according to a convention?

In answer to the third question (whether language is rule-governed) Searle writes that, in general, illocutionary acts can be performed in language in virtue of certain rules, and could not be so performed unless language permitted them. In explication Searle weaves a second fiction, one in

---

7 For this and the above points see Searle (1969) p38. Fraser (1974) finds great difficulty in following Searle's use of the terms convention and conventional, difficulties which one might respectfully suggest would be dissipated by study of Strawson's distinction.

8 Fraser (1974). The central thesis of this dissertation regarding convention is that Derrida's animadversions regarding Austin on convention are dissipated by a full development of the ramifications of Strawson's distinction.

9. The sadist example (Searle (1969) p39), makes the same point differently: Searle writes that anyone could experience the pain they enjoy without being aware of a convention. Searle appeals also to conventions in translation (again, incidentally, confusing the case with regard to the conventions for utterances), and goes on to say that illocutionary acts are performed only in accordance with the rules, and that there must be a way in which rules may be invoked. Holborow (1972) is concerned at Searle's slighted distinction and the use to which it is put, and he notes Alston's concerns. Having conflated language and languages, and intimated observance of the conventions of one language rather than those of another, Searle proceeds as if he theorised a set of rules for language (as Searle puts it, '...the underlying rules which the conventions manifest or realise...'). This, Holborow writes, muddies the connection (elsewhere foregrounded by Searle), between rules and one's practices. Were they independent, they would play a rôle different from that envisaged in the broader theory of speech acts. Holborow suggests that one might theorise certain changes in the details of the conventions governing one's practices without affecting the practice, and that one might identify dispositions to perform the rules of one's practices, but that neither give the existence of rules independent of the practices. They are rather processes of clarification. As has been seen, however, Strawson's distinction is still not overcome, and this is of greater importance. In this context Searle notes the weakness of the analogy with games.

Searle writes that 'mean' translates comfortably into neither French nor German. Searle, J.; 'Meaning, Communication and Representation', pp209-226 in Grandy and Warner (1986), p209 and of p213. Searle asks how a wave, shout and so forth, comes to mean, wishing principally to elucidate the rôle of intentions in his earlier work. He revisits examples of H not understanding S's utterance, even though S means what he says by his utterance (say in which uptake is not secured), or in which S speaks out of duty, knowing that H is paying no attention. (Searle adds, as an analogous case, that of a diary writer writing entries to himself). Searle now maintains that, in communicating, S reports his intentions in order to produce effects on H, and adds, supplementary to Speech Acts, that this succeeds by representing the world (a state of affairs), in, '...one or more of the possible illocutionary modes....' (p212). Distinguishing meaning from communication in this manner leads Searle to declare the Homeric struggle a draw, and to suggest again that the best must be used of both formal and use theories (pp223-226).

10 Searle also wants to make it a tenet of study that there is a system of rule-governed elements required for the obtaining of certain types of speech act.
which the relationships between rules, acts and conventions may be indicated. One is to imagine the playing of chess according to different conventions in different communities. In such cases the rules must be realised, or codified, in some forms for the game to be playable at all, that is, they must be regulative. A second example describes a group of sadists who enjoy terrifying each other. Unlike the chess players, there are no conventions regarding the ways in which the sadists derive this pleasure: any convention they may establish is "...not a realisation of any underlying constitutive rules. Unlike the chess case, the conventional device is a device to achieve a natural effect." From this and his earlier remarks Searle draws conclusions: languages involve conventions, and speaking a language and performing illocutionary acts are, "...like the chess case in ways that they are crucially unlike the [sadist] case." 'Different human languages, to the extent that they are inter-translatable, can be regarded as different conventional realisations of the same underlying rules." For many kinds of illocutionary act there must be a conventional device within the scope of which the act must be performed (additionally, there is a means by which the accompanying rules can be, if necessary, invoked or made avowable). Specified in the rules are not natural effects (described in regulative rules), those which can be caused without the invocation of rules, but the holding of conventions, governing speech acts and expressing commitment to the existence of the state of affairs reported.

Holborow investigates an analogy (drawn by Searle) between games and speech acts sincerely and literally made: that a provision be made in any definition of games that both sides play to win, making no exceptions, and giving no quarter. Holborow replies that in games one can play to the rules without playing to win, and that the analogy does not work, and because of an opacity in the definitions of regulative and constitutive rules for speech acts. The latter, Holborow suggests, be restricted to the definition of 'ends-and-constraints' conditions, adding that Searle's remark that the distinction between regulative and constitutive tolerates a distinction between 'specifications' of behaviour and 'appraisals' of behaviour, holds further difficulties. Many rules are introduced to regulate existing forms of behaviour, not to specify the behaviour appropriate to newly-inaugurated forms, and they continue to exist by defining subsequent behaviour as correct by these rules, and thus specify conditions essential to constitutive rules. The distinction is not clear cut, and, on Holborow's

14 Searle (1971b) p42. Searle says that scepticism about rules (conventions) of language arises because of an incorrect understanding of what the rules must be like. Illocutionary acts are performed according to constitutive rules. He again uses the case of promising (cf. pp46-53).
conception, the introduction of rules introduces a scheme of permissions and proscriptions to order practices, with penalties for infringement, and this questions Searle’s distinctions, for a class of rules defining technique for existing forms will also broach ‘convention’ and ‘natural fact’.

Searle emphasises that he does not argue that illocutionary acts always occur (and alone) according to rules described in conventions. While the appeal to the recognition of intention must be held over for discussion of Searle’s criticism of Grice’s analysis, he does say, in a similar vein to Grice, and again in ignorance of Strawson’s distinction, that ‘in general’ illocutionary acts are performed, ‘...within language in virtue of certain rules, and indeed could not be performed unless language allowed the possibility of their performance’. This raises two problems in light of the analogy with games. Can there be, as Holborow asks, as it were, penalties for violations of languages (insincerity, lies, and perhaps fictional utterances); and can one follow a rule without knowing that one does so? Searle answers no to the first question (because if one performs the speech act, observing the due conventions of language, one has successfully performed the act (once again, Searle pays no heed to Strawson’s distinction), and to the second, that there are cases in which rules of language are discovered or found to obtain, even though the rules instantiated by the practice have been unknowingly followed in prior practice. Furthermore:

[t]wo of the marks of rule-governed as opposed to merely regular behaviour are that one generally recognises deviations from the pattern as somehow wrong or defective and that the rule unlike the past regularity automatically covers new cases. Confronted with a case he has never seen before, the agent knows what to do.

With this Searle turns to the matter explicitly raised in the ascription of meaning to illocutionary acts, and concerning the difference between merely uttering sounds and performing acts. In the latter cases S is said to intend to mean something. Gricean meaning makes a connection between meaning and intention, but Searle suggests a caveat: the analysis does not account for the extent to which meaning is a matter of rules and conventions. Searle writes that Grice does not elucidate the way in which what S says comes to mean in the common, shared language in which he speaks (the points were raised at the

\[^{15}\] Fraser (1974).
\[^{16}\] Searle (1969) p38. Is this within a language (languages) or within language? Holborow gives two reasons why Searle requires an appeal to 'language'. Some illocutionary acts are of such a type as to demand constitutive rules, while others, though not requiring convention, are complex enough to require formulation in language. Searle's paradigm illocutionary act, in a move to which Derrida seems acutely aware, is that of promising, an act requiring, on Searle's theory, issue in a conventional act. It is here that Searle appeals to Grice's meaning and meanings. de Mulder (1994) pp10-11 brings out how conventional, non-natural meaning in Grice derives from repeated instances.
\[^{17}\] Searle (1969) p42.
\[^{18}\] And the act itself said to mean something.
end of II.3); in defining meaning in terms of intended effects, Grice confuses illocutions and perlocutions, and Searle rejoins: ‘...Grice in effect defines meaning in terms of intending to perform a perlocutionary act, but saying something and meaning it is a matter of intending to perform an illocutionary, not necessarily a perlocutionary, act’20. In response Searle asks: can it follow that what the captured soldier means by his utterance is that he is a German soldier, (or better, ‘I am a German soldier’), for, Searle says, what can be meant is a function of what speakers say, can say, or are saying: ‘[m]eaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also at least sometimes a matter of convention’, and Searle suggests amendments to Gricean analysis21. It should make clear that meaning something in uttering a sentence requires more than merely relating by force of will noises or marks to what they mean in the language S speaks; that is, a full analysis of illocutionary acts requires full understanding of both their intentional and their conventional aspects, and of the relationships between the two. Following Grice, Searle says that acts performed according to conventions are acts with meaning22. (The amendments, for Searle, make the connection he needs to the conditions of the recognition of intention). It should be recalled that Grice’s meaning2NN invokes, without adequate substantiation, conventions, for if Searle is to communicate with H, his act must draw upon mutually-understood conventions, and for Searle this may be remedied by a condition saying that the performance of such illocutionary acts (in ‘utterances’ he writes), count as obligations, owing to S’s sincerity, ‘...to the existence of some state of affairs’23. As the discussion of Strawson’s distinction shows, there are difficulties regarding whether an illocutionary act is successfully performed with this simple appeal to linguistic convention, and it should be recalled that Searle repeats that this is the sense in which he argues that languages are conventional24. (However, as Holborow says, Searle later writes that in cases in which, ‘...illocutionary acts all can be performed standing outside any system of constitutive rules, it still would not follow that performing them in a language is not engaging in a rule-governed form of behaviour’, and this implies at least some understanding of Strawson’s distinction)25.

20 Given in IV.
21 Searle (1969) p44. Hornsby considers the difficulties of clearly distinguishing between illocutions, locutions and perlocutions. Her own theory resembles Alston’s and Searle’s. Hornsb, J.; ‘Illocution and its Significance’, pp187-207 in Toulouzadis (1994) makes illocution an act which is successfully performed when H recognises, not an intention, but an attempt to perform this very act. There is ‘reciprocity’ (p192), and for Hornsby this raises important issues of participation and inclusion (and exclusion) in and from social groups in which one’s illocutionary acts could be recognised. Reciprocity, and its denial, is, she avers, written into language, and she cites cases of the denial of free speech and the proliferation of pornography as ‘silencing’ ideas. She references Dworkin, R.; ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, pp100-109 in Margalit, A. and Margalit, E. (eds.); Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration (London, Hogarth) 1991.
23 Cf. an act of promising.
24 Searle (1969) p47.
25 This, Searle says, is how illocutionary acts are rule-governed.
26 Holborow (1972) and Searle (1969) p47.
Searle considers how constitutive rules apply to illocutionary acts performed in non-conventional contexts (that is, as subject to infelicity as defined by Austin), and to non-verbal utterances; he also contrasts conventional, ‘standard’ cases of collocution, and those in which the complexity of the propositions demands that they can be expressed only in fully-fledged, rule-governed language. With this distinction (and those above), Searle makes a vital addition to his hypothesis of language as rule-governed; as Holborow writes:

[i]t...seems that the important contribution made by the constitutive rule is not that the effect achieved by the performance of an illocutionary act in language is one which could only be brought off by invoking rules, but rather that it is brought off in this way when the illocutionary act is expressed in [rule-governed] language26.

A second point, made contra Grice, concerns the account his meaning analysis makes for perlocutionary utterances. S’s success in getting H to recognise his intention turns upon the instilling of a perlocutionary effect (recognition of intention, understanding or what you will). The analysis is correct, says Searle, save for the designation, which should read ‘illocutionary’ act, for there are many kinds of sentences used to perform illocutionary acts which have no perlocutionary effect whatsoever. Searle offers the examples of greeting, and, paradigmatically, that of promising. Gricean theory studies only S-meaning for an analysis of how S may communicate an intention to H, and, as said, it lacks a theory of convention. Even in cases in which there is a correlative perlocutionary effect, S might in many instances, say something and mean it without intending the perlocution. Additionally, the reasons H may have for believing what S says (taking him as truthful, reliable and so forth) are not, in the main, those S supplies in communicating an intention. The end to which Grice has recourse, namely the reflexive, or nested, intention, will not work for perlocutionary effects without a notion of pre-established, mutual convention, and Searle finds in this justification for his argument that communication between humans has properties not shared by other kinds of human behaviour, among which is that if S is trying to tell H something, and H recognises this and the content of what S says, S will have succeeded. Applied to illocutionary effects, S succeeds in getting H to recognise what he is trying to do in the illocutionary act by making clear the intention with which it was done by drawing upon appropriate conventions. The effect need not be described as a belief or a volitional response, but can simply be constituted by H coming to understand the utterance, by securing uptake of the

26 Holborow (1972).
illocutionary effect, and so the definition of the way in which the reflexive intention works may be stated: ‘...S intends to produce an illocutionary effect IE in H by means of getting H to recognise S’s intention to produce IE’.

Cohen replies to these points. He remarks the fact that one sentence may be said with types of intended illocutionary force (as command, request, order, recommendation and so forth); however, determining the force of the utterance in the absence of an explicit performative, one refers to the context of utterance, to, ‘...what else is said both before and after the utterance...’, and to the situation in which the utterance is made. His argument is offered in rejection of Austin’s distinction between meanings and illocutions: Cohen argues that there is both a ‘general’ meaning of a ‘sentence-type’ and an irreducible pragmatic effect in all tokens (Austin’s illocutionary force), but that they share the means of determination. As Searle, Cohen betrays a Fregean influence in arguing that the meaning of a simple subject-predicate sentence is given by its sense and reference. Sentences containing indexicals and demonstratives hold no difficulties, ‘...[i]f we do not suppose in these cases that the context-dependent element in the commonly accepted meaning of the utterance is not stricto sensu meaning at all, then we should treat any utterance of “Go to London to-morrow!” analogously’. What Austin calls illocutionary force is an irreducible characteristic of the meaning of sentences; once again, and with reference to 1.2, they all exhibit a context-dependency, and their meanings must be discerned in context. Searle adds, commenting on Grice, that successfully communicated meaning between S and H requires only the understanding, and mutual recognition, of conventions of language appealed to in a speech act, and that bald Gricean analysis will not account for the irreducible perlocutionary, or pragmatic, effect the analysis of which, Searle and Cohen agree, should be the basis of a theory of

27 Searle (1969) p47. 28 Cohen (1964) p126. With all of the Austinian conditions on utterance in place: S must be in appropriate position of authority and so forth. 29 The difficulties that pragmatics may cause for speech act theories are studied in Dascal, M.; ‘Speech Act Theory and Gricean Pragmatics: Some Differences of Detail that Make a Difference’, pp323-334. More current proposals, notably Sperber and Wilson’s, are assessed in Bird, G.H.; ‘Relevance Theory and Speech Acts’, pp292-311, and Kasher, A.; ‘Modular Speech Act Theory: Programme and Results’, pp312-322 in Tsohatzidis (1994). 30 Cohen (1979c) pp118-119 briefly addresses indexicals (‘token-reflexives’), and distinguishes them from other elements of context outlined (‘background assumptions’). The relation of context to practices governed by constitutive rules is made on p127. 31 Cohen (1964) pp127-128. Cohen writes that certain patterns of English sentences are commonly uttered with one specific meaning that when they are given a different meaning this appears an addition and not an alternative. (Cohen offers ‘I wish you good afternoon’: a wish but also a dismissal, the latter property being the sentence’s illocutionary force). Cohen allows that there are surely cases in which the two properties are present together, but that if the wish is only a dismissal ‘...there is no need to suppose that it retains any of the sentence’s original, common meaning’. One could not sensibly reply ‘That’s a lie’, and thus, Cohen asks, how can one distinguish illocutionary force from the meaning of the utterance? Cohen considers cases in which speakers do not produce utterances that are as clear in meaning as they might intend. ‘Go to London tomorrow!’ might be offered, depending on context, as a request, an order, a recommendation and so forth. (The speaker might be called upon to clarify his intention). One might plausibly say, Cohen adds, that the force of the utterance is distinguishable from its meaning, for the latter was understood prior to the force being elucidated, but that it might be better practice to clarify how much of the intended meaning was understood in the utterance and how much needed elucidation. For Cohen, the distinction between intended illocutionary act and illocutionary act performed is simply that between meaning intended and meaning expressed.
meaning. The Gricean mechanism for explicating meaning cannot provide an analysis of understanding (this perlocutionary effect), for the reason that meaning and understanding are too closely connected for the latter to be used in any analysis of the former, and Searle examines what it is that constitutes understanding ‘a literal utterance’, studying the rules governing the elements of the uttered sentence and of H’s recognition that the sentence is subject to those rules. For S, saying something and meaning it is closely connected with intending to produce in H certain effects; and for H, understanding S’s utterance is closely connected with recognising S’s intentions. ‘In the case of literal utterances...’ the gulf between S and H is bridged by the possession of a common language, described in the following way. Understanding a sentence requires knowing its meaning, the conditions of its production and what the utterance counts as in the common language. Uttering a sentence and meaning it is a case of intending to get H to know that a certain state of affairs specified in the rules obtains, and to achieve this by means of getting H to recognise S’s intention to do this, and on the basis of H’s knowledge of the rules for the appropriate utterance of the sentence. Thence the uttered sentence exploits the conventional means of achieving the intention to produce the illocutionary effect, and thus, if S utters a sentence and means it, he has the nested intentions given in Gricean analysis, and if H understands the utterance this consists in the achieving of these intentions on S’s part. Reciprocally, this turns on the fact that H knows the meaning of the sentence and the rules governing its elements32. Searle endeavours to supply the notion of convention seen to be necessary for Grice’s theory. He gives his analysis formal expression:

S utters T and means it (i.e., means literally what he says) = S utters T and,

(a) S intends (i-1) the utterance U of T to produce in H the knowledge (recognition, awareness) that the states of affairs specified by (certain of) the rules of T obtain.

(Call this effect the illocutionary effect, IE)

(b) S intends U to produce IE by means of the recognition of i-1

(c) S intends that i-1 will be recognised in virtue of (by means of) H’s knowledge of (certain of) the rules governing (the elements of) T33.

This marks the addition to Gricean analysis of a condition regarding what S literally means in accordance with certain conventions, and Cohen notes the effects of infelicitous cases on this analysis34.

32 Searle (1969) pp47-50. In the description of the illocutionary act of greeting, Searle uses the word ‘greeting’, and he notes that the example would be circular if it were presented as an analysis of meaning, for greeting involves the notion of meaning. (The Strawson-McDowell dialogue on these points is discussed in III.1).

There is a difference he says between successful and unsuccessful speech acts: those in which a name is announced, a bottle broken and a ship floated, and those in which one or all of the acts fail. The bald utterance remains meaningful in both cases, yet, in the second, the performance is ‘unhappy’. Cohen says that no more can be said of performatives than that they are happy or unhappy in this sense. One can say that S tried to name a ship, but that the ceremony was invalid, or that he tried to name it, but that there occurred a ‘misfire’ or a mistake. Cohen describes the senses that may characterise any performative, labelling them ‘happy-or-unhappy’ and ‘happy’ respectively. The latter apply in cases in which the sentence spoken remains coherent and meaningful. ‘In the former we either leave it open whether the attempt was successful or imply that it was not: in the latter we imply that it was’. Cohen notes an equivocation in Austin as to how these designations apply to performatives, explicit or not. Austin says that performatives can potentially always be unhappy (not possible in Cohen’s second sense), and yet also suggests cases (say, the naming of a ship), in which if the circumstances are inappropriate for the making of the performative, then the act is simply not performed. This views performatives not as happy or unhappy but as happy (in accordance with conventions of language), or not performed at all, and allows only the application of Cohen’s second sense. With the happy or unhappy sense describing the class of performatives, the concept of illocutionary force cannot simply be distinguished by noting its difference from misfires and infelicities, for all cases, happy or not, share identical force, and consequently, the condition requiring that successfully performed illocutionary acts must secure uptake is challenged. The ‘happy-or-unhappy’ sense renders nugatory the notion of uptake in illocutionary acts, for it can only result in, ‘...illocutionary acts that are happy in the appropriate respects’, namely, according to linguistic conventions describing illocutionary force. Austin is right to say that naming ceremonies must be valid and appropriate, but it is also the case that, say, a warning is only effective if H hears and understands S, S is sincere and so forth34.

In his theory of convention Searle distinguishes between ‘brute’ and ‘institutional’ facts, the former describing what exists and is incontrovertible, and the latter the realm of values and judgements; the

34 Cohen (1964) pp128-129. All of the references in this paragraph are from these pages.
35 Cohen (1964) pp129-130. ‘In the happy-or-unhappy sense of “warn” I can say, without contradicting myself, “I warned him by shouting in his ear though he was too deaf to hear”, but in the happy sense I can only say “I tried to warn him by shouting in his ear though I failed because he was too deaf”. For a speaker’s utterance to be a warning in the happy-or-unhappy sense what is required is that it should be of a kind that he could reasonably expect to secure uptake. I cannot warn a man fifty yards away by whispering. But a warning, in this sense, does not actually have to achieve uptake. Thus it is quite possible to preserve the general principle that the meaning of an utterance does not include any of its effects even if we regard naming, warning, concluding etc., as aspects of meaning, provided that we concern ourselves here only with the happy-or-unhappy senses of these verbs or with the corresponding “try”, “seek”, “attempt”, “endeavour”, etc. expressions as with “I am trying to warn you”. These are the only usages in which these verbs may occur in an exclusively performative phrase. When used in their happy sense they must normally be supposed instead, if in the first person present indicative active, both to perform an act of the appropriate happy-or-
statements, say, of ethics or aesthetics. The latter group, Searle argues, presupposes the existence of human institutions or conventions, or, in now familiar terms, they describe, or report, systems of constitutive rules. Every institutional fact is founded on a system of rules as described in the above criterion for constitutive rules, namely, that ‘X counts as Y in context C’, and this invokes Searle’s second principle: that the fact that one performs a certain speech act means that one subscribes to an institution or convention (a ‘rule-governed form of behaviour’), for the speech act is an institutional fact, founded on constitutive rules, and Searle writes that the application of this to language reveals the semantic rules underlying the brute regularities of communication. Searle’s paradigm illocutionary act is making a promise: for a promise to successfully and non-defectively have been made in an utterance there is entailed a condition such that there is a set of propositions of the conjunction of the members of the set which, in turn, entail the proposition that S indeed made a successful and non-defective promise. (The proposition that S made such a promise entails this conjunction). Each condition is, on this assessment, necessary, and taken together sufficient, and while, ‘[t]here are various kinds of possible defects of illocutionary acts...not all of these defects are sufficient to vitiate the act in its entirety’. As seen in Cohen’s discussion, in some cases a condition intrinsic to the notion of the act is not performed in a given utterance, yet the act is itself performed; Cohen says that such cases are ‘defective’, or infelicitous. Some conditions are, while stated as separate, in truth, entailments from others, and from the set of said conditions one can extract rules for the use of the illocutionary force indicator. Cohen concludes from this that nothing more is needed for a definition of force than a description of the speech act, ‘...in virtue of the meaning of what was said’, and with due attention to the context of utterance and of conversation. In this way is both an act declared happy or unhappy

[unhappy variety and also to imply the occurrence of circumstances, consequential or otherwise, that render this performance a happy one].

Searle (1969) pp50-53. In this they must be distinguished both from theories of linguistic behaviour as a species of stimulus and response, and as the discerning of correlations between utterances and states of affairs. The class of rules Holborow (1972) discusses (those with regulative and constitutive aspects) may also fall under the ‘X counts as Y in context C’ formula while yet remaining good in Searle’s definition of speech acts. Such cases are creative in that the behaviour described is afforded new significance, but not in all cases will the newly-sanctioned behaviour facilitate one’s action, and he studies Searle’s paradigm case of promising. In a promise one is obligated to others regarding the performance of future action, yet there are, for example, cases in which one gives one’s word reluctantly. Does this then show that Searle’s governing hypothesis, that speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed practice, contains situations allowing the introduction of cases that it should, to remain general, exclude. This raises again, the matter of the definition of ‘convention’ being worked with.
Searle (1969) p55. The lessons learned in the discussion of the case are of ‘general application’.


The later work of Searle on illocutionary verbs can be prefaced with a consideration of the exchange of Hare and Warnock on speech acts and meaning. (Cf. Hare, R.M.: ‘Meaning and Speech Acts’, The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXIX, no. 1, pp3-24, 1970, and ‘Hare on Meaning and Speech Acts’, The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXIX, no. 1, pp80-84, 1971). Hare, like Cohen and Fraser, argues that an account of the meaning of words (those counting as illocutionary verbs), requires account of the force they may have in utterances. He adds that the account is then applicable to accounting for the force of words such as ‘good’,
(though Searle would not accept Cohen's distinction), and the questions raised that need to be settled before a definitive verdict as to the act's status is given. These conclusions, Searle says, should not lead to the wholesale rejection of the project of philosophical analysis as practised by Griceans; all that must be cautioned is that certain forms of analysis are likely to lead to the idealisation of the concept analysed, in this case intention, or illocution.

Searle repeatedly emphasises that his analysis of the conventions of speech is, '...directed at the centre of the concept of [for example] promising. I am ignoring marginal, fringe, and partially defective promises'. For Searle, such counter-examples would not refute his analysis; they would, rather, point up the need for further clarification of the 'central' cases for application to the difficult. To this end he ignores promises made by hints, metaphors and allusions, and deals with simple and idealised (control) cases, for the purpose of systematisation. (Searle considers peripheral cases in later work, cases in which, he says, 'notoriously' cases of meaning are not as 'simple' as the central cases. 'In hints, insinuations, irony and metaphor—to mention a few examples—S's utterance meaning and the sentence meaning come apart in various ways').

Until then, Searle ignores promises made in sentences containing elements strictly speaking irrelevant to the making of the promise; and declares that the study of categorical promises can 'easily' be applied to a study of hypothetical promises. There is, Searle believes, a non-vicious circularity in the appearance of institutional concepts such as 'obligation' in both the analysans and the analysandum of a statement of the conventions of promising; this makes no claim on reductionism or of the idealisation of concepts, but rather, Searle says, shows that '...certain statements of institutional facts, statements of the form, “S made a promise”, [may be analysed] into statements containing such notions as intentions, rules, and states of affairs specified by

---

42 Cohen (1964) p130. Cohen adds that Austin is rightly concerned regarding the distinction between what is said and the act of saying it, [indeed Austin himself, by speaking of locutionary acts (that have meaning) as well as of illocutionary ones (that have force), makes it quite clear that this is not how he himself would seek to define his theory'.
43 It should be recalled that this is precisely what Derrida finds most objectionable in the theory of speech acts given in Searle, and (one must add, with less justification) in Austin.
44 The importance in the theory of the Background of attempts of literary grammar (and thus of metaphor and indirectness) is referenced by Cerbone (2000) p263. de Mulder (1994) p4 notes that the Background plays a significant role in Husserl's theory of demonstratives, and is hard to bring in to line with Searle's methodological solipsism. It is Husserl's move from the theory of meaning as species to the theory of the lebenswelt that affirms the link with Searle (lebenswelt being, de Mulder says, in many ways similar to the Background). However, one must recall that the lebenswelt is an intersubjectivist theory of mind. Cf. Fodor (1982).
45 Alston develops a theory of sentence meaning as the 'potential' for it to be used for the performing of specific illocutionary acts. Alston, W.P.; 'Illocutionary Acts and Linguistic Meaning', pp29-49 in Tsohatzidis (1994). He refers to 'Meaning and Use', The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XIII, no. 51, pp107-124, 1963, and Philosophy of Language (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall) 1964. Alston studies the relation between speaker and utterance for an illocutionary act to successfully be performed; he develops a theory of 'responsibility' or 'liability' of a speaker in accurately reporting a 'normative' state of affairs. That the speaker made an illocutionary act means he is open to questioning and criticism about his act in context. An illocutionary act, as in Searle, is constituted not by the intention with which it is performed but by conventional relations existing between speaker and audience.
the rules. Sometimes these states of affairs will themselves involve institutional facts\textsuperscript{44}. It is argued in this section and following that Searle cannot claim for his theory of convention this non-vicious circularity; the conditions that he uses to write conventions for meaning and illocutions derive from careless assumptions derived from analysis of an ersatz language, and that cannot be applied to natural languages.

With this Searle states the following conditions for a promise to have been made\textsuperscript{45}. There must be in operation ‘normal’ input and output conditions, no cases of deafness or aphasia, and categorically no, ‘...parasitic forms of communication, such as telling jokes or acting in a play’. Secondly, S must express the proposition that p in the utterance of T. In this way can the proposition be ‘isolated’ from the rest of the speech act, and focus be made on the peculiarities of promising as an illocutionary act. Thirdly, in expressing that p, S predicates a future act of his, it is a promise to do something. It is, as Richards writes, an utterance giving an obligation to do something, and in promising, this is, as Searle says, the only (b) rule applicable\textsuperscript{46}. (These two conditions are the ‘propositional content’ conditions). Fourthly, H would prefer S’s doing action A to his not doing A, and S must believe that H would prefer that he does A than not. S’s promise is defective if that promised is something H does not want, and if S does not believe that H wants it done. (A (b) rule is applicable if two (a) rules are satisfied, and this is, says Richards, the first, that is (a1))\textsuperscript{47}. By Searle’s analysis a non-defective promise is, at least in part, one intended as a promise: a promise can be defective because it was not so intended. The fifth condition says that it must not be obvious to both S and H that S would do A ‘in the general course of events’; acts must ‘have a point’, and when they do not, they are again defective. This defines the second (a) rule Richards identifies in Searle, namely (a2). Richards assesses the analysis so far: it is a tenet of Searle’s theory that no speech acts are specified entirely by (b) rules; there are regulative, conventional, contextual (a) rules as part of each and every speech act. (B) rules require the application of conventional conditions (more than one (a) rule), before they can be satisfied\textsuperscript{48}. Knowledge and

\textsuperscript{44}Searle (1969) pp55-56. Searle’s analysis considers the case of ‘sincere’ promises, and the conditions are modified for ‘insincere’ promises. Such idealised cases are in analogy to those constructed for control purposes in economic theory or the natural sciences, and in Derrida (1977a), the possibility of drawing such an analogy is itself questioned. Searle gives his revised analysis as an improvement on Grice’s. The best source for Searle’s later approach to parasitical cases is ‘Indirect Speech Acts’, pp30-57 in (1979b).

\textsuperscript{45}Searle (1969) pp57ff.

\textsuperscript{46}Richards (1971) p522.

\textsuperscript{47}Richards (1971) p524. One is at this point close to the Gricean analysis. Already the relation to the Derridean analysis is clear, but the example Searle gives should be followed out.

\textsuperscript{48}Richards (1971) p523 uses due caution here. That there must be rules satisfied before a (b) rule can be said to have been utilised in an utterance does not justify the conclusion that they are (a) rules. There are no alternatives offered, ‘...unless we are willing to accept a certain incompleteness in the analysis of the constitutive rules for speech acts, we must agree at least that the rules whose satisfaction is presupposed for the application of the b-rules must themselves not be b-rules’. Richards lets this pass, for his objections to Searle’s theory go much deeper.
understanding of the appropriate rules guide the performance of illocutionary acts; as ‘preparatory’ conditions, they are the ‘sine quibus non of happy promising’.

The sixth condition says that S must intend to do A, and that this marks the distinction between sincere and insincere promises, giving again a link to the actual knowledge and understanding of rules and conventions. A related condition is that S must intend that the utterance of T will put him under the obligation to do A, and this distinguishes the illocutionary act of promising from those in which an obligation is not entailed. (Presumably Searle would say that the condition can simply be removed in analysis of these other speech acts). The seventh and final condition states that S intends (i-1) to produce in H the knowledge (K) that the utterance of T is to count as placing him under an obligation to do A. S intends to produce K by means of the recognition of i-1, and he intends i-1 to be recognised in virtue of H’s knowledge of the meaning of T. (This allows the intention stated in the sixth condition to be achieved in the making of the utterance). The semantical rules of the language spoken by S and H are such that T is correctly and sincerely (non-defectively), uttered iff the preceding conditions obtain.

Although Richards grants, with demur, that Searle shows the need for (a) and (b) rules for the specification of speech acts, he does not accept that they are together able to determine their semantical features, asking again, what makes the device, ‘I promise...’, mean that S promises? Why, for example, should one accept that rules (a1) and (a2) are basic to the promising function in language? Richards studies Searle’s account to hold him to every word: given that the rules determining every speech act must include at least one (a) rule, then, by Searle’s second principle, the semantic constitution of every speech act device includes at least one (a) rule (as defined by Searle’s fourth and fifth conditions), and thus (a) rules are fundamental to the meaning of speech act devices. Richards challenges this argument, saying that for most speech acts, rules of type (a) required for their specification cannot be among the semantic features used in their performance. Illocutionary acts, particularly those reported in explicit performatives, have meaning which fulfils, exhausts or ‘saturates’ the force of the utterance, yet, like Strawson, Richards wishes to analyse the conventions accompanying illocutionary acts. He writes:

---

8 Searle (1969) pp60-61. That is, the utterance is a promise according to the semantical rules of language in which the promise is made.
9 Richards (1971) p523. ‘In fact, intuitively speaking, we might reasonably feel quite disinclined to include rules (a1) and (a2) as part of the meaning of the device while nonetheless favourably disposed to include (b1); but, of course, this proves nothing except perhaps about our intuition. However, it is just such an intuition that Searle’s hypothesis is supposed to over-rule’.
10 Searle allows only that performatives are Austin’s explicit performatives. Searle, J.R., ‘How Performatives Work’, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XII, no. 5, pp535-558, 1989, p536. One might perform an illocutionary act by one of many means, but only very few utterances are performatives. Searle’s distinctions are again in place, namely, a... performative sentence is a sentence whose literal utterance in appropriate circumstances constitutes the performance of an illocutionary act named by an expression
Furthermore, it follows from the principle of expressibility that all sentences are categorised in one or other of two classes: (A) those whose semantical rules fully determine and thereby exhaust the force of their utterance, and (B) those that do not. Richards studies the subset of (A) containing sentences with one illocutionary act device, its force determined by the rules of the language, adding that thus the same rules apply to the subset (the naked illocution) as to the sentences themselves, and so any distinction between speech act device and embedding sentence is muddled. (Richards quips that he can find few sentences which unequivocally contain only one illocutionary act device, allowing Austin's 'Out' in cricket, and for the sake of his argument, 'I promise...', 'I apologise...', 'I assert...' and so forth).

In that very sentence in virtue of the occurrence of that expression (p537). In response to Searle, Bach and Harnish (1989) p99 say that, "...though conventions involve precedent, precedents do not always involve conventions' Ginet, C.; 'Performativity', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. III, no. 2, pp245-265, 1979. Ginet considers the distinction between the explicit performative ('I hereby...') and the class of verb phrases which can act as performatives. Having done this he considers that between verb phrases uttered with intended meaning (meaningum) and those that cannot be given explicit form: why, he asks, can the former be performatives and the latter not? Ginet's answer appeals to convention: a verb phrase is performative 'in certain circumstances' (p246) if a description of the act (promising, etc.) makes it possible in the circumstances to promise by saying 'I hereby promise...'. Ginet is more radical still: the 'brute convention', saying that an explicit performative is one way to perform an illocutionary act is 'useless', for performatives can operate in the latter sense Ginet presents.

In novel utterances, in which the utterance has never been made, saying 'I hereby promise...', will be taken as a promise if one's audience knows the meaning of 'promise', if one utters a performative that cannot be given an explicit form, then no stipulation of a convention of an explicit performative of a circumstance to promise is workable. In this Ginet sees himself as clarifying a notion in Austin, and again, the interpretation stemming from Strawson's work on Austin is brought up. Austin says of performatives that are not descriptions of one's acts but their instantiations, and Ginet agrees that uttering a performative utterance in appropriate circumstances and with the correct intentions is to promise and so forth. He disagrees with the view that one, in the performative, states that one performs the act. Ginet's essay is complex and fascinating, and may undercut the conditions of Derrida on the obtaining of the conventions in the explicit performative formulations. It requires for greater treatment than is here given.

52 Richards (1971) p524. He adds that Searle takes it that all sentences contain an illocutionary act device, or illocutionary force potential.
53 Richards (1971) p525. There may appear in (A) sentences that contain more than one illocutionary act device, and thus which have multiple, simultaneously occurring, forces (potentially unrelated).
54 And, additionally, Richards (1971) p525, that conditions (1)-(4) specify essential characteristics of all sentences in (A1). This is both convenient for the argument and ...it may well happen that at least for some cases the linguist will be able to isolate the device into some part of the sentence. Whether or not this is actually possible, however, is really irrelevant to the point we shall argue. What is relevant is that whatever we argue regarding the subset (A1) applies equally over the whole class (A). In effect, whatever holds for sentences containing one illocutionary act device, we shall argue, holds as well for sentences containing more than one illocutionary act device'.
55 Identifying members of (B) is equally difficult (Richards (1971) pp525-526). Some (unnamed) argue that all sentences belong to (A), that is, that there are no sentences the force of whose utterance is not fully determined by its semantical rules. 'Of course, to argue thus is virtually to argue that the force of uttering a particular sentence is never distinguishable from its meaning', an argument Searle challenges with no counter-arguments.
Searle adds to his first condition on promising that it is broad enough to allow that, with the other conditions, it guarantees that H understands the utterance; that is, the illocutionary effect produced in H by means of the recognition of S's intention turns upon H's knowledge of the meaning of T. For fear of misunderstanding he adds that the condition does not alone turn on the fact that H understands the utterance (again, a purely perlocutionary effect). Cohen broaches some difficulties in this, and concerning the obligation to sincerity undertaken in the speech acts Searle describes56. If one takes the case of a warning, given say in the utterance, 'Beware the Ides of March', it is, Cohen says, surely wrong to think that there is, as part of the meaning of the utterance, and carrying all of the force, a further (unspoken) utterance, perhaps, '[I]n warning you I commit myself to your cause' (by speaking truthfully and with your interests at heart), or some such. The difficulty is intuitive: this parsing of the first sentence uses, or explicates, the force of the (unspoken) utterance, and the complexity of the parsings will only grow, and potentially to absurd lengths, when applied to utterances with more complex intentions. Furthermore, the forces applicable to these utterances cannot, Cohen shows, be made vocal in an explicit performative. S might say, 'I warn you to beware the Ides of March', by prefixing the performative to the bald utterance, but he can only take on a responsibility, commit himself, by prefixing 'I commit myself' to a sentence different from the bald utterance. In Austin's theory such 'higher-order' forces utilise other, unuttered, or inexplicit speech acts, even those, '...that require a different mood of the verb...', and in complex and oblique cases speech acts reporting higher-order forces can come to subsume or contain forces of lower order. Cohen takes from this that an analysis of the effects of speech acts requires not a theory of conventional illocutionary force given by reflection on the rôle of the explicit performative, but by reflection on the types of effects created in a perlocutionary utterance. Indeed, none of the acts defined by Austin as illocutionary acts fulfil his criteria for illocutionary force. They are rather, as Cohen says,

...the implications of speech acts, where a speech act is said to imply that p if and only if the speech act gives its audience sufficient reason to take it that p but it is not part of the utterance's meaning that p.

Cohen adds that the implications of senses by speech acts are categorically not illocutionary forces, and that although Austin and his followers correctly believe illocutionary force to be a part of an

56 Cohen (1964) p131. The difficulties affect Searle's analysis in a more fundamental way, over and above that raised for the specifics of the analysis by Richards' arguments.
utterance's meaning, they miss the fact it concerns only an utterance's implication. Cohen's example gives S asking a question in saying, 'I would like to know the time': the question, implicit though it is, is implied, and still the utterance accurately describes what S wants to know. The point indicates the role in any account of S meaning of implicature and implication.

Searle modifies his analysis to account for such oblique cases and for insincere promises (although in truth he explains them away). In such cases S does not have the intentions a sincere promiser has, but feigns having them: in short, S has no intention to perform the act promised. The new (amended Gricean), analysis runs: the conditions must state that S takes responsibility for having the intention, and not just that he claims to have it. The acceptance of such responsibility is seen in the fact that a sincere S may not say 'without absurdity', that he promises to do A, but does not intend to. A promise is a bond of responsibility for one's actions, captured in the sixth condition (above), and stating that, by the utterance of T, S is made responsible for intending to do A. By discerning whether or not S has the intention, the condition analyses the giving of promises, sincere or insincere. Essential for deciding whether S is sincere or not is a set of rules for '...the use of the indicator of illocutionary force' (Pr), and in stating this, Searle again countenances that there may be necessary alterations of the rules for application to cases of illocutions other than promising. (These matters will be outlined when the conditions have been introduced). Pr is to be uttered in contexts of sentences the utterances of which predicates of S the future act A. Firstly, Pr is to be uttered only if H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A. Secondly, Pr is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A (in the normal course of events). Thirdly, Pr is uttered only in cases in which S intends to do A, and finally, the utterance of Pr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A. Searle now, he believes, has the tools for a taxonomy of illocutionary acts, and he formulates some general hypotheses. Firstly, whenever a psychological state is specified in the sincerity condition, the performance of the act is an expression of the psychological state, regardless of whether the expression is sincere or insincere. Secondly, only in cases in which the act can be read as the expression of a psychological state can insincerity be possible. One cannot, he writes, greet or christen insincerely. Thirdly, preparatory

57 Cohen (1964) p133. Cohen calls implication the 'consequential element'. This might intimate to one the connections between Searle (an avowed Fregean), and Cohen.
59 Searle asks where in a language these rules apply, given that a Chomskyan account of syntax and semantics is accepted. The answer turns on the reduction of illocutionary acts to a taxonomy of basic types, which if possible strongly would suggest that deep structure represents illocutionary type. (Searle (1969) p64). An excellent review of the main parties to the debate entailed by the question is Katz, J.J.; 'Interpreative Semantics vs Generative Semantics', Foundations of Language, vol. VI, no. 2, pp220-259, 1970. On generative rules of syntax (and another case of parasitism), cf. Miller (1975).
60 This might be applied to the accusations of presupposition in the Derrida/Searle exchange.
conditions tell one, in part, what S implies in the performance of the illocutionary act, characteristically that the preparatory conditions for the relevant act are satisfied, and Searle uses this condition for an analysis of the notion of sayings in terms of their ‘essential’ rules. (He adds that one might be tempted to argue that S should say, when wanting successfully to communicate, whatever is correctly specified by the relevant essential condition; however, this is an incomplete analysis, for there is an as yet unexplored connection between the illocutionary act performed in saying and Austin’s constative class. Analysis of saying accounts for statements but not for constatements)\(^6\).

Searle’s fourth hypothesis notes the possibility of performing an illocutionary act without invoking any illocutionary force indicating device whatsoever: a saying in which the context and the utterance show that the essential condition is satisfied. Searle offers as an example a case in which an utterance taken by H as a promise is uttered in a context in which it is obvious that S accepts the associated obligation. A similar case can be made for requests (that is, in which S plainly makes a request), for instance, ‘Could you do this for me?’ Fifthly, the condition obtains that whenever the illocutionary force of an utterance is not explicit it can be made so; this condition accompanies an addition saying that whatever can be implied can be said, and furthermore, said with the intention of implying things other than are explicitly said. In a related point, Searle adds that certain kinds of illocutionary acts are special cases of other kinds of illocutionary acts, and Searle asks whether there exists a basic type, ‘...to which all or most of the others are reducible...’. In the statement of the relevant conditions for the performance of an illocutionary act, the essential condition, in general, determines the others; the latter are its functions. If the relevant latter conditions reoccur in consistent ways in other illocutionary acts, then the acts ought to be thought reducible to control types (and in this Searle refers to the lessons of the preparatory condition stating non-obviousness). Searle believes that all sentences contain at least one illocutionary act device, and Richards asks how this applies to (B) sentences, those, that is, in which illocutionary force is not fully exhausted, or determined, by semantical rules. Richards writes, 

\[\ldots\text{if every class-B sentence contains an illocutionary act device, i.e. at least one illocutionary act device [by Searle’s criterion it does], then clearly by definition the semantical rules of every such sentence fully determine the illocutionary act(s) which can be performed in uttering the contained device [because it can successfully be used, by}\]

\(^6\)Perhaps, say, greetings. Searle (1969) p68. Austin’s insight into the class of performatives is that utterances are not to be seen as sayings but as doings as another kind. Searle writes that, this notwithstanding, there is a connection between saying and constatives, for example, ‘I (hereby) promise’, a case in which one promises, and says that one does; this shall be seen to have importance for Searle’s class of declaratives (see III.5).
Searle’s argument, to perform that illocutionary act. In effect, every class-B sentence is such that for any occasion of its utterance (which is appropriate) it can be used not only to perform the illocutionary act(s) determined by the semantical rules of its contained device(s) but also to perform illocutionary act(s) for which it has no device(s) [because illocutionary force is not fully exhausted by the rules governing the sentence]. Consequently, every class-B sentence can be used to perform multiple illocutionary acts simultaneously; this is a necessary feature of every sentence in the class, given the definition of illocutionary act device above.

Richards also notes other of Searle’s ambitions, those attendant on his search for a basic type of speech act, one excluding, as parasites, non-standard illocutions. As Richards says, Searle envisages a ‘hierarchy’ of illocutionary acts, in which the ‘semantically non-determined illocutionary act(s) performed on a particular utterance occasion is some more specific type of the semantically determined illocutionary act(s)’, and this, as intimated in the above quotation, is at the core of Searle’s theory of convention, to which Richards turns.

The forces of (B) sentences are determined by two factors, their semantical meaning and their context of utterance. Richards asks a simple question: how does context determine illocutionary acts? An answer, and the correct description of illocutionary force, demand the statement of several different principles of distinction: namely, the point or purpose of the act; the relative positions of S and H; the degree of commitment made to the act undertaken; a statement of the illocutionary act’s difference from propositional content; a statement of the difference in the ways in which the proposition relates to the interests of S and H, of the different expressible psychological states, and of the different ways in which the utterance relates to the rest of the conversation. (With this, Richards adds, Searle identifies several criteria of illocutionary force, yet without sufficiently clarifying their mutual distinctions). Each of these principles, Richards argues, implies that the same utterance may perform an act with a variety of intentions, or, that one utterance may be the performance of several different illocutionary acts (that is, there may be several different non-synonymous illocutionary verbs that may characterise the utterance). Holborow reckons the difficulties with this and with Searle’s analysis and taxonomy of illocutionary acts, connected particularly with the elucidation of constitutive rules. He notes that Searle

---

64 Richards (1971) pp526-527: if context determines illocutionary force, then can one perform an act by saying nothing?
gives his analysis of ‘standard’ cases of promising, leaving other (insincere) cases to follow by ‘analogy’, yet wonders mischievously why a special case is made of sincere promises when insincere promises are still promises, made in coherent and mutually-understood speech acts. He invokes Strawson’s distinction in questioning why Searle gives as a rule for the expression of a promise that S intends to do as he has said: this is not a matter of ‘linguistic propriety’, but a moral imperative, parsable only in Searle’s terms if one takes the rule to read that S does not promise unless he, if required, expressed the intention to do all he could to fulfil his vow. (Schiffer adds this to his analysis of Grice’s conditions). Holborow adds that this muddies the analogy with games. Distinguishing throwing a game (on the terms given above) from cheating, Holborow writes of the rules of a game that they proscribe cheating, and of the rules of illocutionary acts (the linguistic rules), that they do ‘not [themselves] require sincerity’. The distinction Holborow makes, as it is stated, is unworkable, for the rules of a game do not explicitly proscribe cheating, but his point is clear. Searle’s statement of sincerity conditions is a mistaken attempt to insert conditions on the ‘point and functioning’ of the practice in to the ‘...meaning rules of the words which can both denote, and be utilised in, a particular reference under the auspices of the practice’.

With consequences for an assessment of Gricean analysis, Searle writes that some illocutionary verbs may be defined in terms of the intended perlocutionary effect made in their utterance, and others not so. If one could make rigorous such an analysis, then the prospects for deriving a theory of illocutions making no reference to extra-linguistic rules and conventions are ‘increased’, and language may be regarded as a conventional means for securing natural responses or effects. The illocutionary act would itself involve no invocation of rules whatsoever, and ‘[o]ne could in theory perform the act in or out of a language, and to do it in a language would be to do with a conventional device what could be done without any conventional devices [that is by gestures, semaphore, signal flares and so forth]’. On this illocutionary acts would be ‘optionally’ conventional, but never normative. Richards writes that achieving this outwith language requires a definite determining relation between the meaning of the sentence, the context of its utterance, and the semantically non-determined illocutionary act performed, and he suggests an analysis:

---

65 Holborow (1972). It is worth emphasising in relation to Searle (1971b) p51 that defective, insincere promises are accounted for by adding a responsibility condition to the analysis of sincere promising.
66 The very same argument should be applied to Searle’s statement of ‘sincerity conditions’. Cf. Holborow (1972) p466.
67 One should perhaps say that they give positive rules: they are not stated as things one does not do. Cf. Holborow (1972) pp465-467.
Premises: (I) There is a class-B sentence σ such that an illocutionary act A performed in its utterance under conditions c is not determined by its meaning; (II) There is at least one other sentence x such that its utterance on some occasion under conditions c is a performance of A; (III) The meaning of x does not determine A; (IV) σ does not entail x nor is entailed by it; 

Argument: (V) The conditions for the appropriate utterance of the illocutionary act device(s) in σ are semantically determined and thus cannot determine A; (VI) Since A cannot be determined by the meaning of σ and thus by all the conditions c, it must be determined by some subset of these conditions, c'; (VII) If A is determined by c', then it is performed solely in virtue of the fact that these conditions obtain; (VIII) c' have no relation to σ that they do not have to x; (IX) It is not a condition of c' that either σ or x is used to perform A; (X) If there were such a condition, then by hypothesis, c' would be at least partly constitutive of the meaning of σ or x or both; 

Conclusions: (XI) Therefore, there is no relation members of c' have to σ or x which they do not have to any sentence; (XII) Given that the conditions c' obtain, A can be performed by uttering any sentence whatsoever. 

Richards writes that one should not be inclined to accept an argument saying that, for every illocutionary act, there are conditions in which the utterance of any sentence counts as a performance of the act, and thus that Searle’s argument for the necessity of the reduction of the illocutionary to the perlocutionary is unconvincing, and that what must be attended to is the way in which the semantically non-determined elements of acts can come to be determined70. It is argued in the following chapter this requires a notion of social or institutional convention.

In closing his discussion of illocutionary acts, Searle repeats that illocutionary verbs differ as classes, some classifiable in terms of the corresponding act’s intended perlocution and some not71. (This, for instance, marks a distinction between promising and requesting). The difficulties found in the reduction of the illocutionary to the perlocutionary lead commentators (Richards, Holborow and Fraser), to abandon altogether the idea of illocution as governed by linguistic convention, and Holborow writes that this is strongly to suggest that the ‘effect’ of rule-governed illocutionary acts is irrelevant to

70 Searle (1969) p71. Searle claims that it is ‘...at this point that what might be called institutional theories of communication, like Austin’s, mine, and I think Wittgenstein’s, part company with what might be called naturalistic theories of meaning, such as, e.g. those which rely on a stimulus-response account of meaning’.
whether they are guided by constitutive rules (for one may achieve the effect with a different act). He adds that Searle would be on safer ground with the hypothesis that speaking a language can be rule-governed even if all illocutionary acts could be performed without use of any linguistic rules (because there are rules invoked in speech situations, governing conventions of rhetoric, euphony, intention, emphasis and so forth), adding that in this there is the kernel of a Gricean reply to stimulus-response theories of meaning\(^7\). In later work Searle examines how conventions apply to speech situations, and considers the indirect and parasitical cases. He investigates 'insinuations', described as, '...the problem of how it is possible for S to say one thing and mean that but also to mean something else'\(^7\). In such cases illocutionary force indicators for the performance of one kind of illocutionary act perform 'in addition' another kind of illocutionary act, or, in another instance, S, by his utterance, may mean what he says yet mean another illocution with a different propositional content: ('Can you reach the salt?'). There is here the intention, on S's part, to impart the knowledge that he makes a request, by means of getting H to recognise his intention, yet meaning cannot simply be read off, as per Gricean analysis. It is to this later work on indirect cases that attention is now turned.

---

\(^{72}\) *Apropos* the discussion in II, Chomsky's response to Grice, and plausibly to Quine and B.F. Skinner, might be challenged on the basis that he has overstated the manner in which Grice needs appeal to 'rules' and 'literal meaning'.

\(^{73}\) Searle (1979b) p31.
4. **Illocutionary Point and Illocutionary Force**

Searle admits that his early presentation is 'incomplete', and the improved analysis, accounting for the felicitous performance of acts in indirect cases (strengthening the specification of the 'essential condition' by means of, '...asserting or questioning one of the other conditions'), is made with a variant of Grice's cooperative principle\(^1\). Searle states a new hypothesis, that in indirect speech acts, 

...S communicates to H more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of H\(^2\).

He stresses that there need be no addition of conversational postulates to his theory of illocutions, but adds, '[w]e will see, however, that in some cases, convention plays a most peculiar rôle'\(^3\). In IV it is argued that Lewis supplies the mutual knowledge condition on convention that Searle requires\(^4\).

The illocutionary acts discerned in an indirect case are dubbed primary and secondary; S performs a secondary illocutionary act in virtue of uttering a sentence with a literal meaning, '...such that its literal utterance constitutes a performance of that illocutionary act’, but for which the sentence uttered has a direct, literal meaning such that S achieves his desired effect. Searle asks: how does H distinguish the two? The question goes deeper:

How is it possible for S to mean the primary illocution when he only utters a sentence that means the secondary illocution, since to mean the primary illocution is (in large part) to intend to produce in H the relevant understanding\(^5\)?

Searle's method is again stated: he will study cases of 'singular definite reference...to get clear about other kinds of reference', and he gives some examples. The most obvious case of definite reference is found with proper names, though they are, evidently, not all referential. Definite descriptions raise further problems, for some can be read as referring expressions, some not, and others are indefinite cases. (Searle refers to Quine's example of indefinite reference, contrasting, 'I did it for his sake', with 'I did it for his brother'. The former identifies no object or entity, the latter does. (A generative syntax might say that 'sake' is here not a noun)). It is also the case that not all referential occurrences of

---

\(^1\) Or another deep syntactic structure Searle (1979b) p31. See also Grice (1989a) pp26 and 28-31.
\(^2\) Searle (1979b) pp31-32.
\(^4\) The response of Lewis to Searle is even more telling with relation to (1971b) p46.
\(^5\) Searle (1979b) pp33-34.
\(^6\) Searle (1979b) p34. Searle's analysis gives conditions of cooperation, conversation, politeness, relevance and of preparatory status to perform the act. These conditions suffice to explain the cases of indirect illocutions. Holborow (1972) is confused by the comparison, in the passage quoted above, of institutional and naturalistic and of its ability to carry the distinction of institutional and constitutive.
singular referring expressions are categorical; some are hypothetical, and similar cases are derivable for proper names. Searle's analysis of definite reference proceeds along the lines of that offered for illocutionary acts. He states two axioms of referring and referring expressions, firstly, that whatever is referred to must exist, and that if a predicate is true of an object it is true of anything identical with that object; that is, in cases in which it is described with different intensions. Richards adds a third, a variant of the principle of expressibility. He chooses a sentence (Sb) from the subset (B) to which belong sentences containing one and only one illocutionary act device, and able to be used to perform one semantically non-determined illocutionary act on any occasion of its utterance. He replies that in an appropriate context what is meant by an utterance of Sb, according to Searle's principle of expressibility, is either specified by a sentence belonging to (A), or, when there is no such sentence, by a sentence written for the occasion, and so for inclusion in (A). Searle's two axioms of referring can be regarded as tautologies, and both give rise to paradoxes. Russell removed some of the paradoxes in denying reference to definite descriptions, and more arise with reference to fictional characters or events in fictional worlds, and Searle reiterates that these are, for him, parasitical forms. Searle's own

---

1 Searle (1969) pp77-78. Searle says that not every occurrence of a referring expression is a referring occurrence, and that on some occasions, expressions are talked about in discourse whether they refer or not. This matter causes the problems of use and mention, illustrated in the examples, 'Socrates was a philosopher,' and 'Socrates' has eight letters.' In a note that Searle here, and elsewhere, ascribes to Tarski, the condition of the latter is thought not to be an occurrence of the word 'Socrates', but the 'proper name of the word,' a word with radically different conditions. The new word is formed by placing quotation marks around what would be the expression of it were a use of the expression. Therefore, the word beginning the second sentence is not 'Socrates' but 'Socrates', and the word written is 'Socrates'. A regress begins. Searle rejects this analysis, and argues that it is based on a misconception of how proper names, quotation marks, and other elements of language work. It has caused a consequent infection of semantic philosophy, leading some to say that clauses beginning with 'that' are proper names of propositions, '...on analogy with the orthodox account of 'use and mention', the latter which Searle rejects. The 'institution' (and mark the use of this word following from Searle's earlier arguments), of proper names was established, for Searle, partly because 'we need a convenient device for making identifying references to commonly referred to objects when the objects are not always themselves present.' (There is no need to carry out this procedure when the object to be talked about is a stretch of discourse, and therefore, '...is easily producible and does not require a separate linguistic device to refer to it'. Exceptional cases are those of obscurities of sacred words, in which a speaker may simply give a token, without naming or referring to it). The conventions of written discourse, and in particular in this case, those governing the use of quotation marks, are there to mark the fact that the word indicated is the topic of discussion, or, to talk about things which are not themselves words, and which need not be present on the occasions on which reference to them is made. 'The whole institution gets its point from the fact that we use words to refer to other objects', and requires also that there be a difference between the name and the thing named. Searle offers an example of referring to a word: 'The word which is the name of Plato's most famous teacher has eight letters', giving the use of a definite description. There are cases in which a proper name can be given to a word; in the example 'John' is replaced by 'Socrates', and the earlier sentence rewritten as 'John has eight letters'. However, it is the case that when one wants to talk about a word it is, in most cases, possible to produce the word itself; the competing theories Searle dismisses as redundant or false. Characterising the utterance of the first word in 'Socrates' has eight letters', one can say that the word is uttered, but not with its 'normal' use. The word is presented and talked about, '...and that it is to be taken as presented and talked about rather than used conventionally to refer is indicated by the quotes'. The word is not referred to, and neither does it refer to itself.

2 Searle (1969) pp77-78 is explicit about the influence of Frege and Strawson. de Mulder (1994) p3 studies the way in which linguistic meaning is '...combined with the meaning of the perceptual act that gives the object designated by the demonstrative'. Searle is, for de Mulder, making a workable response to Kaplan and Perry, and making it on Fregean lines: meaning has a set of conditions determining how the world must be for the speech act to successfully have been uttered (p16). On pp3-4 de Mulder argues that Husserl's and Searle's theories of intentionalities suggest that the meaning of demonstratives is always dependent upon other features of a theory of mind ('other cognitive structures').

3 Richards (1971) p529.

4 One might recall again the Kantian influence on Russell in his denial of existence as a property, and the remnants of the Kantian influence (over the Hegelian), which characterised his early work.

5 Searle (1969) pp78-79 argues that one can refer to fictional characters because they exist in fiction: in contexts, institutions and conventions, identical in all relevant ways to those of the real world. A speaker fails to refer to Sherlock Holmes in the real world because there is no such person; in fiction one can refer to Holmes as a fictional character, in a world in which '...what I say...is true'. Searle could not be more explicit, '...in real world talk one can refer only to what exists; in fictional talk one can refer to
third axiom says that if S refers to an object, then he is able to identify that object for H apart from all other objects. This is also a tautology, '...since it only serves to articulate my exposition of the notion of (singular, definite) reference'. Richards says that, by the argument given, for a sentence of (B₁) (described above) the semantically non-determined illocutionary act performed in uttering the sentence on an appropriate occasion must be of the type of semantically determined acts, and concludes that the relevant sentence from (A) will belong to a subset (A₁). Thus, Richards allows a sentence (Sa), belonging to (A₁), the illocutionary rules of which determine the two illocutionary acts, determined and non-determined, performed in uttering (Sb) in appropriate conditions c. Richards studies Searle's terminology: the meaning of (Sa) exhausts the illocutionary force of (Sb) under conditions c, and the notion may explicitly be formulated:

A necessary condition for the successful performance of a definite reference in the utterance of an expression is that either the utterance of that expression must communicate ['appeal to', 'invoke'] to H a description true of, or a fact about, one and only one object, or if the utterance does not communicate such a fact S must be able to substitute an expression, the utterance of which does.

Searle lists three ways in which S can guarantee that this fact 'be communicated': firstly, that the expression uttered must contain predicates true of only one object; secondly, that the utterance together with its context gives an ostensive or indexical presentation of only one object; and thirdly, that the utterance gives a mixture of indexical indicators and descriptive terms sufficient to identify one object. If the expression uttered does not contain one of these referring terms, communication will only be successful in conditions that S offers one of these referring expressions when requested: this Searle sees as a generalisation of Frege's theory that all referring expressions have sense.

---

Footnotes:
13 Richards adds that if one grant the existence of a hierarchy of illocutionary acts and accept that language '...tends in the direction of efficiency', one cannot plausibly object to a conclusion that only one illocutionary act device is necessary for the job. Richards (1971) p529.


16 Mulder (1994) p argues that visual experiences are intentional on the very same terms as beliefs, desires and so forth, because they are directed at states of affairs in the world. As the theory of speech acts distinguishes the statement or proposition made from the illocutionary force with which it was made, Searle's theory of intentionality distinguishes the content of the state.
Types of referring expressions may be divided into four categories. Firstly, proper names, and secondly, complex noun phrases in the singular: that is, paradigmatically, Russellian definite descriptions. (A definite description may contain another definite referring expression, given perhaps by an embedded definite description or by a proper name, and this allows one to speak of primary and secondary referents). Thirdly, pronouns: 'this', 'that', 'I', 'he', 'she', 'it', and fourthly, titles, with close affinities with definite descriptions and proper names. Searle considers the conditions necessary for the utterance of one such expression to constitute successful reference, along with the question of the function served by the propositional act of reference in illocutionary acts. As seen, Searle argues that, in referring, S identifies a specific, particular object about which he goes on to say something. An immediate difficulty is how the identification is communicated to H, and, for an answer, Searle distinguishes (and Cohen's arguments should be recalled), between a fully consummated reference and a successful reference: in the first case an identification is communicated, and in the latter S could, if requested, give an unambiguous identification, and thus a consummated reference. In studying this Richards again follows out the implications under his analysis of the principle of expressibility. What (Sb) in c means is determined by the semantical rules of (Sa), and the conclusion follows that the meaning of (Sa) and of (Sb) in c is identical, or described by the same semantical rules, a conclusion

of affairs represented from the mode in which one represents the content. (In addition, they have identical conditions on word-to-world and world-to-word direction of fit, cf. Searle (1985) pp10-11. The hypothesis of the Background implies that there are intentions prior to language, and particularly with reference to Grice, prior to intentions to communicate, and is supported by Searle's examples of the ways in which one intend to represent without intending to communicate, but not intend to communicate, but not intend to communicate without intending to represent. This is then of a part with Searle's theory of meaning in communication (as criticised by Derrida): the primacy of representation is fundamental to the way in which all acts have intentionality. 'I make a noise through my mouth or I make some marks on paper. What is the nature of the complex intention in action that makes the production of these marks or sounds something more than just the production of marks or sounds?' (Searle (1983) p163). Searle replies that intentions, along with their corresponding speech acts, have identical conditions of satisfaction: in this case Searle adds that '...in the performance of the speech act the mind intentionally imposes the same conditions of satisfaction on the physical expression of the mental state, as the mental state has itself'. In communicating one represents a state of affairs as existing and with sincerity; the intention that is communicated is that H should recognise that the act was sincerely performed with the intention to represent. (It is worth remarking on the fact, in light of Derrida's remarks, that Searle's theory of meaning makes use of the notion of communication, although of course, he adds that many intentional states require the deliverance of language). H's response (in accordance with the contextual conditions of perlocutions), is defined by conventions: H must respond in the appropriate or correct way. (Searle neatly avoids the responsibility of explaining where the pre-intentional, non-representational practices of the Background come from, and how they are derived by an agent. Are they derived by communication? For doubts, cf. Leilich, J., 'Intentionality, Speech Acts and Communicative Action: A Defence of J. Habermas' and K-O Apel's Criticism of Searle', Pragmatics, vol. III, no. 2, pp155-170, 1993 and de Mulder, W., 'Intentionality and Meaning: A Reaction to Leilich's 'Intentionality, Speech Acts and Communicative Action', in the same volume and number).

The question in relation to demonstratives is easily answered: by what conditions of satisfaction do they uniquely refer? de Mulder (1994) p writes that the problem of indexicality would not be pressing for Fregean semantics if all it meant was that indexicals refer differentially than do definite descriptions, but the problem goes deeper, as Perry and Kaplan show: an individual and his double in another twin earth both think that they are Hume (giving the same Fregean sense to I), but only one is correct. Kaplan's (and by extension Perry's), remedy, the distinction of indexicals according to sense on each occasion and the sense that changes with each use (namely, the 'character' and the 'content' or intension), points up the distinction of, as de Mulder says, indexicals as 'directly referential' and of the propositions used as 'singular propositions', for a part of the proposition containing an indexical is the subject to which reference is made. As Perry and Kaplan argue, Frege cannot accept this theory of propositions, for in his semantics propositions contain sense and no reference.

11 Richards (1971) p530.
Searle could not accept\(^{16}\). Pursuing this, Richards makes the reasonable assumption that two sentences have the same meaning, ‘...only if the propositions expressed by the sentences mutually entail each other...mutual entailment is a necessary condition for sameness of meaning’, and adds, as a consequence, that almost every sentence expresses a proposition, and that, therefore, almost every sentence expresses something that can be true or false\(^{17}\). He argues that, by Searle’s theory, every sentence contains at least one illocutionary act device, and adds that for all sentences with illocutionary act devices, the proposition expressed is (partly), determined by the semantical rules for the device, those which govern one or more illocutionary acts; that for any occasion on which the sentence is uttered it is true or false that the act is performed; and, therefore, that in such cases the proposition expressed (the state of affairs described), by the sentence is true or false.

Searle asks how this ideal scenario may be fulfilled: how words can come to identify things. He states two conditions, firstly, that there must exist one and only one object to which the utterance refers, and secondly, that H must be given sufficient means to identify the object from S’s utterance. For an example Searle turns to the utterance of a definite description: ‘the man’ in ‘the man...’, needs two things for reference to be successful: there must be at least one object to which the utterance applies, and there must be no more than one. The first condition is satisfied by a definite description, for the expression contains a descriptor, and this is (or contains), a descriptive general term. This being so, it describes the one object of which the descriptor could truly be predicated. Of the second condition, one might say, if one considers definite reference a kind of disguised assertion of a true, unique existential proposition, that if there exists at least one object of which the descriptor can be predicated, it follows that there is at most one object of which it is true. Richards offers examples, of an explicit speech act (semantically non-determined), and a predication\(^{18}\). ‘I promise...’, expresses a proposition which is either true or false on occasions of utterance. ‘The cat is on the mat’ also expresses a proposition, one which is true or false on, ‘every appropriate occasion’ of utterance, namely, in the correct context. As Richards writes, the qualification ‘appropriate’ is unnecessary in the first case, because, as a speech act, the proposition expressed by the sentence determines the conditions of appropriate utterance. As said, the semantical rules determining the meaning of (Sa) and those determining the meaning of (Sb) are

---

\(^{16}\) The proposition is represented (Richards (1971) p530): ‘(1) m(Sa) is equivalent to m(Sb) C. In addition, it follows from (1) together with the fact that (Sa) is a member of the subset (A1) that the meaning of (Sa) is also equivalent to the meaning of the utterance of (Sa) under conditions C, or simply (2) m(Sa) is equivalent to mU(Sa)C’.

\(^{17}\) Neither consequence implies, Richards (1971) p530 says, that almost every sentence can be true or false or that every sentence asserts something that can be true or false.

\(^{18}\) Richards (1971) p531.
non-equivalent. The different sentences express propositions, and, again as established, although the proposition expressed by (Sa) entails that expressed by (Sb), the identity does not hold from (Sb) to (Sa), for Searle’s analysis concerns only the semantically non-determined components. Richards argues that this follows from the fact that the semantically determined illocutionary act in (Sa) is not the same as that in (Sb). If (Sb) were a type of (Sa), as Richards’ reductio shows, (Sa) would not be a member of (A), or both (Sa) and (Sb) would be, and this traduces Searle’s theory, for his account of semantically determined illocutionary acts will not tolerate the presence of semantically non-determined elements. Richards writes that, by the argument given, neither of the conditions Searle places on rules obtains; more formally, and for later reference, \( p(Sb) \) does not entail \( p(Sa) \).19

Searle’s second condition on definite reference requires that H be able to identify the object referred to from S’s utterance, and here the lessons of the Gricean analysis are pertinent. While an identification may, Searle writes, contain demonstrative or descriptive identifications, most identifications are a mixture of both, or of another form of secondary reference from which H can derive an identification.20

Furthermore S must be able to supplement the pure demonstrative, “this” and “that”, with some descriptive general term, for when S points in the direction of a physical object and says “this”, it may not be unambiguously clear whether he is pointing to the colour, the shape, the object and its immediate surroundings, the centre of the object, etc. But these kinds of identifying expressions—demonstrative presentation, unique description, mixed demonstrative and descriptive identification—exhaust the field.

The second condition is satisfied by S’s ability to supply an expression of one of these latter kinds, an expression uniquely to refer to the object to which he intends to refer, and in this Searle sees the connection of the two conditions. Intending a specific object raises problems concerning whether S can intend an object independently of the seemingly necessary condition of his intending a reference to it in an utterance. Searle argues that S’s ability to take the object as an intentional object is identical to his ability to give it an identifying description, and part of his motivation is to overcome the problems of referring to non-existent entities, or to those for which one cannot supply a description. Searle says that the condition governing the giving of an identifying description is the ‘vehicle for saying what is meant in the reference’; this supplants the avowability condition expressed by Strawson, and furthers his analysis of central cases for application to the indirect instances.

On Richards' argument for the semantical rules determining the meaning of (Sa) and of (Sb) being the same ((1) in Richards and expressed m(Sa) is equivalent to mU(Sb)C), there are propositions expressed by (Sa) and (Sb), and by the utterance of (Sb) in conventional conditions C, for in the cases of (Sa) and (Sb) the relevant conditions are invoked by the same rules, those constituting the illocutionary acts specified by the semantical rules of (Sa) and by the utterance of (Sb) in conditions C²⁰. Additionally, when (Sb) is uttered in C, the proposition expressed by (Sa) is true, and thus, as (Sa) expresses a proposition, the utterance of (Sb) in C does also, as per the corollary and the principle of expressibility. Searle argues that his axiom of identification for referring expressions follows from the axiom of existence, adding that once considerations as to the means of identification are given, the principle of identifying definite reference follows from either. When he repeats that the principle of identification is a special case of the principle of expressibility, and that a 'limiting case' in this instance is 'saying which involves showing': '...that is, a limiting case of satisfying the principle of identification and hence the principle of expressibility is indexical presentation of the object referred to', Richards holds him again to the corollary and to the principle of expressibility, arguing that one is justified in accepting that for almost any sentence, its utterance under definite conditions expresses a proposition, and that the proposition expressed by the utterance need not be the same as that expressed by the sentence, owing to its illocutionary force²². Richards' earlier deference to Leibniz's law is now extended from the meanings of sentences to the meanings of the utterances of sentences, and this compels the conclusion that (1) is true in case the proposition of (Sa) entails and is entailed by the proposition expressed by (Sb) in C. What is more, the same applies to (2), forcing the conclusion that the meaning of (Sa) is equivalent to the meaning of the utterance (Sa) in C (that is, m(Sa) is equivalent to mU(Sa)C)²³.

Searle considers other cases affecting the principle of identification. In a case of 'ordinary' discourse, H may demand no identifying description and be content with the expression offered. H proceeds with the assumption that S could give an identifying description if requested; the expression giving reference used is (because non-identifying), 'parasitic' on the correct, identifying description. Whether or not his expression identifies depends on whether or not S has to hand an independent, unambiguous, identifying description, and communication, Searle says, is not imperilled by this 'partially

²² Richards (1971) p532.
²³ In Richards (1971) p532 this is presented:
consummated reference'. In other cases a descriptor may not even be true of the object referred to, yet H takes the reference, and the act of communication as successful. Some examples, Searle writes, might 'fool' one into thinking that there must be more to referring than giving an identification in a recognisable act of communication, that is, that there is a corresponding mental act, or that all existential statements presuppose identity statements. However, context is sufficient to provide for identifying descriptions, and Searle adds, '...the demonstrative “that” in “that...” indicates that the object either is present or has already been referred to by some other referring expression and that the present reference is parasitic on the earlier'. In the 'limiting case' of reference with ostension, the only description S can give is to indicate their recognition of the object when it is re-presented to them. However, not all identifying descriptions are of equal utility in achieving identifying reference: part of the strength of the principle of identification is that the reference performed in the utterance of the definite description succeeds in virtue of the fact that the expression indicates characteristics of the object referred to; however, recognising that the point of definite reference is to identify and not to describe the object referred to, the expression used best serves its purpose if the characteristics indicated are important to the identity of the object and to the context of discussion. However, Richards' arguments apply here also. On Searle's terms, every sentence contains at least one illocutionary act device, showing that for any sentence the meaning of the utterance in appropriate conventional conditions is partially determined by the semantical rules governing the illocutionary act devices in the sentence, and Richards writes: '...however, a much stronger thesis follows from Searle's general theory, one which it seems is independent of this assumption', saying that while S can, in an illocutionary act, mean more than he says, S must mean at least as much as he says, assuming that is, that S means something by what he says. S can mean more by uttering (Sb) in C than what (Sb) means, because, again, it is a semantically non-determined element, but he must mean at least as much as (Sb) means if he is to mean anything, and there is nothing in the meaning of (Sb) which does not also characterise the meaning of the utterance of (Sb) in C. Applying Leibniz's law, and the arguments established, Richards draws the conclusions pU(Sb)C entails p(Sb), from which, because proposition (Sa) entails pU(Sb)C, follows p(Sa) entails p(Sb), and pU(Sa)C entails p(Sb). All of the propositions follow from Searle's theory, and all apply to subset (B1); therefore, they all apply to (B), and thus

1 only if p(Sa) entails pU (Sb)C [and] pU (Sb)C entails p(Sa) are both true. Moreover, the same requirement applies equally to (2), thus (2) is true only if p(Sa) entails pU (Sb)C [and] pU (Sa)C entails p(Sa).

2 That is, an identifying description could fail to be a useful referring expression.

3 Richards (1971) p532.
Searle is unable to accommodate, in his own theory, semantically non-determined, parasitical cases, and, a corollary, the question of the size and constitution of \((B_1)\) is obviated: it simply is \((A)\)\(^{26}\).

Searle’s ‘idealised’ model of the propositional act of referring has it that given that S utters the expression R in the presence of H in context C, then in ‘literal’ utterance S successfully and ‘non-defectively’ performs the speech act of singular identifying reference iff the following conditions are present. Firstly, there obtain normal input and output conditions (defined); the utterance of R occurs as part of the utterance of some sentence T; the utterance of T is the purported performance of an illocutionary act; there exists an object x to which reference is made; and R either contains an identifying description of x, or (as before) S is able to supply one. Additionally, S must intend that the utterance of R will pick out or identify x to H, S intends that the utterance of R will identify x to H by means of the recognition of intention, and that this recognition also be achieved by means both of H’s knowledge of the rules governing R and his awareness of C. (The semantical rules governing R are such that it is correctly uttered in T in C iff the conditions obtain). Searle notes the ‘abstract’ character of this analysis, and adds that the associated rules solve this problem\(^{27}\). Firstly, R is to be uttered only in the context of a sentence the utterance of which could be the performance of an illocutionary act; secondly, R is to be uttered only if there exists an object x such that either R contains an identifying description of x, or S can supply such a description, and such that in the utterance of R, S intends to identify x to H. This rule states, as above, that the axiom of existence and the principle of identification

\(^{26}\) Searle (1969) p89 draws together the principles of identification. Firstly, if S refers to an object then he identifies the object apart from all others for H; from this is entailed the further consequence that if S refers to an object in the utterance of an expression then the expression either contains a description true of the object, presents the object demonstratively, or identifies it through a combination of demonstrative presentation and descriptive definition. The premise is again added that, failing this, S must be in a position to substitute such a description on demand. Reference is made in virtue of the facts about the object that are known to S; the utterance of a referring expression communicates the reference because it ‘communicates’ these facts to H. In this Searle returns to Frege’s ascription of sense to referring expressions. In some sense a referring expression must have ‘meaning’, or ‘descriptive content’, for S to succeed in reference when he utters the expression: ‘[f]or unless its utterance succeeds in communicating a fact, a true proposition, from S to H, the reference is not fully consummated’ (p92). In this sense, Searle writes, meaning is prior to reference. Searle distinguishes the sense of a referring expression from the proposition communicated by its utterance. The sense of a referring expression is given by the descriptive general terms in or implied by the expression. In many cases the sense is insufficient to communicate a proposition, and rather the utterance of an expression in a context communicates the proposition. This distinction allows one to see how two different utterances of the same expression with the same sense can refer to two different objects.

It is false to claim that there is a class of logically proper names, those whose meaning is the object to which they refer, for if an utterance of an expression communicates a descriptive content, then there is no way of establishing a connection between an expression and an object (p93). It is misleading to say that the facts one must possess in order to refer are in every case facts about the object referred to, doing so would suggest that the facts are about an independently identified object. In satisfying the principles of identification, existential properties play a crucial role, for the possibility of satisfying the principle by supplying an identification of a non-existent proposition depends upon the truth of a existential proposition. Here one might say is another form of parasitism, for ‘...underlying our conception of any particular object is a true, uniquely existential proposition’ (p93). In contrast to the view, as Searle explicitly notes, of the early Wittgenstein, objects cannot be named independently of facts. Quantification here is potentially misleading, for it is tempting to regard the bound variable in the proposition \((\exists x)(Fx)\) as ranging over objects already identified, and to suppose that what it states is that one or more objects within the range of the objects identified have a certain character. They will therefore be read: ‘there is at least one instance...’, to avoid ‘misleading metaphysical suggestions’ (p94). For the reasons adduced, reference is of no logical interest: for such propositions containing a reference one can substitute an existential proposition which has the truth conditions of the original, and, therefore, in circumstances in which one is true the other will be so.

\(^{27}\) Cf. Searle (1968) pp412-413.
apply to all referring expressions, and shows that reference is an intentional act. Thirdly, the utterance of R acts as the identification of x to H. Regarding this Fraser argues that Searle gives no clear distinction of illocutionary from perlocutionary acts, from intimations carried in aspects of the utterance, from S’s ambition in trying, say, to persuade or to request, and from the conventional act of H’s recognising S’s intention in an appropriate context, and his argument develops Richards28.

Fraser states an ‘Intent Condition’, predicated upon S’s fidelity to Austin’s conditions upon the performance of respective illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts, and, it might be noted, approaching Strawson’s distinction. It is defined:

**Intent Condition:** S in performing the act has the intention of creating in H an understanding of S’s position toward a particular proposition (usually the proposition expressed in the utterance but not necessarily so); **Success Conditions:** There are objective criteria for determining (at least in principle) if S has been successful in satisfying the Intent Condition in the process of uttering the sentence.

It is said, with reference to Gricean implication, that the proposition need not explicitly be expressed because both S and H have mutual knowledge both of the propositional content and of each other’s capacity for mutual knowledge (allowing both to know that the other knows the content of the act), or, less exaltedly, because S believes H can work it out. Fraser elucidates the point, bringing the notion into close contact with Millikan’s ‘illocutionary purpose’. Illocutionary effect is an understanding of, ‘...the speaker’s position toward the proposition he expresses in uttering the sentence’ (if H indicates that his utterance is a response, one can say that H intended to perform the act of answering), and Fraser suggests that the point of illocutionary acts be divided into two classes: those describing states of affairs, and those changing, or bringing into being, states of affairs29. Success Conditions give restrictions on the proposition and its utterance necessary and sufficient for illocutionary acts to have successfully been performed. Searle’s distinction between defective and non-defective illocutionary acts illustrates that not all defects are able to ‘vitiate’ the acts, and, in cases of insincere promises, the act is successful, yet defective: S indicating that he assumes an obligation to do something has promised, irrespective of an intention to fulfil the obligation. Fraser agrees that Searle’s conditions on speech acts are successful, but remarks that some non-defective acts are assessed independently of the

28 Fraser (1974) says he ‘goes beyond’ Searle.
criteria of Success Conditions, those for which there must occur mutual recognition for their success. Mere observance of a conventional formula will not achieve this. Fraser notes Searle’s acknowledgement that the essential condition is likely to command the others, and adds that each of the conditions may be seen to be inferred from the standard, ordinary case, and hence Searle can call the acts successful, yet defective. However, this in itself is a derivation from a standard, paradigm case, according to predicates of rational behaviour, and how may H realise this on Searle’s theory? The conventional relationship Austin makes so much of, that in which S is in an appropriate position to launch ships, pass judgement and so forth, depends for part of its success on H’s recognising this in S, and this is, for Fraser, part of the Intent Condition through the Success Condition. H recognises S’s desire to get H to bring about the state of affairs expressed in the proposition, again, by virtue of S’s ‘position’. This covers all the cases for which Searle notes ambiguities in the derivation of the conditions on speech acts, ambiguities which are removed with a theory of mutual knowledge.

The third element of Searle’s discussion which Fraser wishes to revise concerns the relationship between sentence-meaning (the conditions of utterance of a sentence), and illocutionary force. It picks up the point in the previous paragraph regarding the need for a theory of mutual knowledge and is considered in IV. In the following section it is considered how Searle’s theory, although missing (as has been seen), the essential notion of mutual knowledge, can provide a fascinating response to Derrida’s notion of the parasitical as vitiating speech acts in literal and non-literal contexts alike. Searle’s distinction between the proposition and the illocutionary force indicating device, saddles the latter with a raft of grammatical devices which properly belong to the proposition. Again, Searle wants to establish, through analysis of ‘standard’ cases, conditions for successful, non-defective illocutionary acts, and, from this, to discern constitutive rules for the use of illocutionary force indicating devices. Among the grammatical devices considered are the traditional cases, particularly the explicit performative verbs (‘I promise...’), and such cases (and the use of non-standard locutions, verbal or not, as requests, promises and so forth), raise Searle’s difficulties with indirect speech acts, and the development of applicable rules; these are taken up in the following section.

are listed eight attitudes one may take in an illocutionary act. He gives acts of declaring, of evaluating, of expressing an attitude, of stipulating (a naming convention), of requesting, of suggesting, of exercising authority and of committing.

Fraser (1974)

Fraser (1974) writes that Searle might object to the dependence of preparatory conditions on the essential condition in cases of ordering, in which appropriate context and conventions provide positions for S and H. Requesting differs, in that no such structure exists.

Fraser (1974) p441. Fraser finds the most plausible response to the difficulties of the indirect cases is a Gricean theory of conversational implication, one emphasising the roles in successful communication of rationality and mutual cooperation. While the Gricean conditions do not elucidate the principles by which S makes the implications described, and do not clarify the
construction of illocutionary acts (because it relates sentence-meaning to utterance-meaning). There are similar problems, though for different reasons, in Searle's theory. (Fraser (1974) p444 raises the matter of the necessity of a condition of responsibility upon S). Fraser describes a case ('...one of the many regularities of an indirect nature we find between classes of sentences and associated illocutionary force'), of sentences with the form of performatives including the modal 'must'. In their analysis one must again attend to Searle's later work on indirect speech acts and literal meaning. Fraser says that each such case features an utterance attempting to wield the illocutionary act contained in the respective act; however, because of sentence meaning, the examples have different meaning: in each the proposition gives the obligation that S is bound to perform the act denoted by the verb.

Each example may be used as a request, but need not be. The sentence is thus not literally a request, unlike the associated performatives. Fraser gives two further example sentences:

Tomorrow, John must request that you leave at 4pm
John must request that you leave at 4pm

and gives a, '...general rule of conversational interpretation...', namely, the 'Vagueness Principle'. 'Whenever the time of an action predicated of a subject is left unspecified, it is generally assumed that the subject is expected to carry out the action at his earliest chance'. The example, 'I must request that you leave at 4pm', carries no specification of time, but H can, by the principle, expect S to perform his obligation at the earliest opportunity, that is, now, in the sentence itself.
Searle gives a classification of illocutionary acts, developing upon Austin's taxonomy of verdictives, expositives, exercitives, behabitives and commisives, aiming to show how these types are realised in the syntax of natural languages. He replaces the notion of illocutionary force, for "it suggests that different illocutionary forces occupy different positions on a single continuum of force". The illocutionary force of separate illocutionary acts is, rather, a network of, "...criss-crossing continua", divisible into twelve distinct 'dimensions'. (The distinction between illocutionary verbs and illocutionary acts is also marked).

The first dimension builds upon the notion of illocutionary point. The point of an order is to get H to do something; of a description, to represent the way something is; and of a promise to undertake to do something; they differ due to the presence of different 'essential conditions'. Essential conditions are, following Austin, the basis for a taxonomy, and the presence of 'illocutionary point' should not be taken to mean that, "...every illocutionary act has a definitely associated perlocutionary intent".

Illocutionary point might be considered part of illocutionary force; the illocutionary point of requests, in Searle's example, is the same as that for commands, namely, to get someone to do something; '[b]ut the illocutionary forces are clearly different'. It is considered, taking the arguments above, whether Searle can achieve this (at least partial), conflation of perlocutions and illocutions; he goes on to say, "...that the notion of illocutionary force is the resultant of several elements of which illocutionary point is only one, though, I believe, the most important one". The second dimension examines 'direction of fit' between words and world: for example, the illocutionary point of assertions is to get words to match the world, of promises and requests to get the world to match words. An utterance gives, "...the propositional content of the illocution and the illocutionary force determines how that content is supposed to relate to the world". 'Direction of fit is always a consequence of illocutionary point'.

The third dimension identifies differences, articulated in utterances, between expressed psychological states, differences between assertions and claims, threats or pledges, and orders, commands and requests. The state expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act is just the sincerity condition of

---

1 Searle, J.R.; 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts', pp1-29 in (1979a) p1. The classification is offered as supplementary to that presented (1969) and, it is argued in this section, obviates Derrida's criticisms of Searle. The dimensions are introduced on p2.
3 Both themes from the early work.
4 Searle (1979a) p3.
5 An in-depth study of perlocutions and their relation to illocutions is Schiffer (1972) p.
Searle's early work, and the conditions are repeated, with the reminder that the utterance of a promise stated as insincere ('I promise that \( p \) but I do not intend that \( p \)'), can only explicitly be seen for all of its incoherence in the first person performative. On most interpretations (Derrida's is no exception), Austin gets only this far, and Searle credits the achievement; however, other dimensions are required, and they are stated. The fourth says that illocutionary point can be reported with '...varying degrees of strength or commitment'; the fifth that there is a difference in the status of S and H bearing on the illocutionary force and thus the illocutionary point of the utterance'. Sixthly, there is a difference in the way in which an utterance relates to the 'interests' of S and H, captured, say, in the difference between celebrations and laments, or congratulations and condolences. Discernible differences are marked by the fact of one or other being in the interests or not of S and H. In his taxonomy of illocutionary acts Searle dubs a new category 'expressives', and says of their illocutionary point that they express the psychological state, '...specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content'\(^8\). In expressives there is no 'direction of fit', for S tries neither to match words to world nor world to words; '...the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed'. (In apologies, one makes neither a predication nor a report)\(^9\). Seventhly, there are instantiated different relations to the 'surrounding context' of the discourse.

A connected point forms the eighth dimension: there is a difference in propositional content as determined by the illocutionary force indicating devices: self-evidently, a prediction is about the future, a report about the past\(^10\). The ninth dimension marks a distinction between acts which must always be

\(^{10}\) The utterance can again be non-verbal. Searle's example is of a man using a shopping list to select items from a shop who is followed by another man recording in writing the man's purchases. The lists will be identical but will fulfil different purposes; the first list is written to get the world to match the words, the second to get words to fit the world (the actions of the first man).

\(^{11}\) Recall the revolutionary grabbing the bottle and naming the ship Mr Stalin. The Searle of (1969) regards such matters as part of the theory of preparatory conditions.

\(^{12}\) Searle (1979a) p15

\(^{13}\) This Searle (1979a) pp22-23 sees reflected in the '...paradigm expressive verbs', in the corresponding performatrice utterances: they will not form expressions with that-clauses, but demand a 'gerundive nominalisation transformation'. These are syntactical facts, and the importance of syntactical arguments, pressed above, and to be utilised further in discussion of Schiffer, must be considered in unison with a powerful argument to the conclusion that Schiffer's arguments are hamstrung from the start by their use of gerundive constructions. For example, one says 'I apologise for stepping on your toe', and the expressive may be analysed for its deep syntactic structure: 'I verb you + Iyou VP --> gerundive nom'. This is required in the absence of direction of fit. This is not to say that all of the permissible transformations are gerundive, only that, '...they must not produce that clauses or infinitive phrases'. The 'paradigm' assertives have the syntactical form 'I verb (that) + S', but certain assertives verbs do not fit the pattern, those which may be given the syntactical form, 'I verb NP=NPP be pred'. Searle notes the idea that this might justify the conclusion that these verbs are wrongly called assertives, and that this suggestion might take support from Austin's claim that veridical and expositives require separate classes. Searle writes that such a distinction is necessary, for in assertive discourse one focuses attention on a topic for discussion (a propositional content is asserted), and one says things about the objects referred to in the propositional content. 'But this very genuine syntactical difference does not mark a semantic difference big enough to justify the formation of a separate category' (p25). Searle notes that the sentences in which the describing is done are 'seldom' explicit performatives, and that they are 'equally' in the 'standard' indicative forms so 'characteristic' of the assertive class. Utterances are characteristic statements, in the making of which one describes, judges, identifies and characterises. Searle concludes, following from his earlier statement, that there are two syntactical forms for assertive illocutionary verbs: one to focus on propositional content and the second to focus on the objects referred to in the propositional context. Once again, the connection to preparatory conditions is noted.

\(^{10}\) In Searle (1969) this appears in the conditions of 'propositional content'. Cf. Schiffer (1972) p.
speech acts, and those which can, but need not, be performed as speech acts, and in such cases, ‘...no speech act, not even an internal speech act, is necessary’\textsuperscript{11}. In the tenth dimension are distinctions linked to the institutional conventions Searle describes in his early work, some requiring ‘extra-linguistic’ institutions for their performance and some not. S and H hold positions in extra-linguistic institutions, but, Searle remarks, Austin was not always sensitive to differences between illocutionary acts on this matter: one need only obey conventions of language to state that it is raining, not conventions of practice\textsuperscript{12}. The eleventh dimension states a distinction between acts for which the corresponding illocutionary verb has a performative use, and those for which they do not. The relevance of the distinction to a response to Derrida is important, for while most illocutionary verbs have performative uses, one cannot (indeed as Austin says), perform acts of threatening by stating ‘I hereby threaten you’. (The rôle and understanding of illocutions in Derrida may again be brought into question). Lastly, the twelfth dimension, considers the style in which an illocutionary act is performed. A difference can be marked between, say, insinuating and confiding, not necessarily according to illocutionary point or propositional content, but according to the style in performance of the act.

Austin’s ‘paradigm’ cases of performatives must also be revised in the light of Searle’s taxonomy. The problem is raised by those instances in which a state of affairs represented in the proposition is realised, or brought into existence, by the illocutionary force indicating device (‘I name this ship’)\textsuperscript{13}. Though they are ostensibly identical to Austin’s paradigms, they are, ‘...not adequately described in the literature...’, and their status as illocutionary acts is, ‘...usually misunderstood...’. They have a vital rôle in a theory of illocutions, for their importance attacks the very basis of the paradigm/parasite distinction: an argument can be made to the conclusion that the cases Austin (and Searle) push to the periphery for want of a general theory are not so easily distinguished from the central cases, and that Searle shows a sensitivity to the distinction not evident in his early work and the reply to Derrida, and the means by which it can be overcome. Furthermore, the means of overcoming the distinction invoke notions of surface and deep syntactical structure, and stress their importance in truth-conditional semantics. The apparently paradigmatic cases are dubbed ‘declarations’ by Searle, and their ‘defining characteristic’ given as the fact that their successful performance gives a guaranteed correspondence between propositional content, declarative force and reality: if one successfully performs the act of naming the ship, the ship is named. In surface syntactical structure this is concealed due to there being

\textsuperscript{11} Searle (1979a) p7.
\textsuperscript{12} This is Strawson’s distinction.
no adequate distinction marked between propositional content and illocutionary force (again, one does not threaten by uttering ‘I threaten you’), and herein lies the difficulty\textsuperscript{14}. Declarations show a congruence of content and force in a unitary illocutionary act; the case for Searle’s new type of illocution demonstrates, with lessons taken from Millikan, that the relativisation to contexts promulgated by Derrida plays no rôle in the assessment of illocutions, for it can be maintained that contexts for speech acts are established by interlocutors in practice. If \( S \), to take a familiar example, as the appropriate dignitary, launches a ship, uttering the correct form of words (in (a potentially) explicit performative), and breaking the bottle, the ship is launched. (Searle, in typically hard-headed fashion, says that this occurs in identical ways, and without exception, in fictional cases). The act may be frustrated (the bottle remains unbroken and so forth), but in these cases all appropriate conventions of language are observed, an act with specific illocutionary force uttered, and, with the recognition of intention, uptake secured. An act of promising, naming, wishing, indeed, of any act described as illocutionary, in a performative utterance, carries, for Searle, both the utterance’s content (as a promise and so forth), and its force (as a speech act with the conventional force of a promise); there is set up an unbreakable bond between the conventions of language observed in making an utterance with a recognised illocutionary force and those appealed to, or utilised, in order to make it fully successful. Searle, like Millikan, argues that the content and force of an utterance with an illocutionary intent are contained in the one act, and that a relativisation to contexts of utterance bears no threat to this structure (as is suggested in IV.5 the forcing of a distinction between content and force is positively to invite parasites). Contexts, or conventions, for utterances are, again as Millikan says, discerned in social or institutional practices, in a theory of illocutions containing a distinction between K-I and K-II acts, or making recognition of Searle’s new illocutionary type, and as Lewis shows (described in IV), such conventions may be established and discerned for literal and parasitical cases alike. For Searle, declarations bring about alteration in the states of the objects referred to, ‘…solely in virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed’, and in this they are distinguished from the other categories in Austin’s taxonomy. ‘In the history of the discussion of these topics since Austin’s…introduction of his distinction between performatives and constatives, this feature of declarations has not been properly understood’. The original distinction between performatives and constatives put declarations in the former group, and, Searle argues, when, in the development of the

\textsuperscript{12} The rôle of ‘hereby’ is here of the utmost importance.

\textsuperscript{14} Searle (1979a) p17.
theory of illocutionary force, the distinction is seen to collapse, or to have fluid boundaries, the oddness of the relationship between propositional content and reality should have been clear.

With regard to the importance of conventions, rules and extra-linguistic institutions, ‘...in addition to the constitutive rules of language...’, the latter (as said), are not themselves sufficient for the successful performance of a declaration. The former give S and H their places in institutions, and it is only given such institutions that such acts may be performed\textsuperscript{15}. (There are two classes suggesting exceptions: ‘supernatural’ declarations (‘Let there be light’) and, most importantly, those, ‘...that concern language itself...’ (‘I define’, ‘I name’ and so forth). This is not to say that all declarations require an extra-linguistic institution, for they are, ‘...a very special category of speech acts’, reporting the founding of speech act conventions. In their utterance they obey no sincerity condition, and do not require the authority of established attempts to get language to match the world, for they describe no existing state of affairs, and do not attempt to bring about a future state of affairs. Rather they establish conventions for contexts, guides for future use.

Some declarations overlap with assertions. In many institutional situations (say, Austin’s repeated examples of judges and umpires), one not only garners from speech acts facts about one’s situation, but requires an authoritative decision given, or verdict passed, upon the situation. Such examples show that institutions often take on, with the force of declarations, the authorities of various kinds held in illocutionary acts. (Assertive declarations have a sincerity condition, and Searle repeats the syntactical form given above for the cases of peripheral assertions (those with a declarative element) to reject the argument that they form a separate category). There are several forms for institutional explicit performatives of declaration, and Searle lists the ‘most important’: ‘I find you guilty as charged’, ‘War is (hereby) declared’ and so forth. This, for Searle, is the ‘purest’ form of declaration: S says, in effect, that the state of affairs exists, and this ‘bemusingly’ simple structure is explained by the fact that some verbs in their performative occurrence encapsulate both the proposition’s declarative force and its content\textsuperscript{16}.

Skeenendeavours to find difficult cases, and refers back to Ziff’s example of an illocutionary act performed in an utterance, but in which communication is performed in another ‘oblique’ act\textsuperscript{17}. S

\textsuperscript{15} Searle (1979a) p18. Searle’s remarks on the exceptional case of language might be rejected if one accepts Lewis’ theory of the development of language (cf. IV).

\textsuperscript{16} Searle (1979b) p29 rejects the Wittgensteinian idea of a limitless number of language games, for with illocutionary point as the basis for a theory of language use there are, in fact, very few things that one does with words.

\textsuperscript{17} Skeen (1970) p119 notes the hedging and finessing of polite communication, cases in which S might use, alternatively or in addition, the explicit performative, but in which his interests are best served by not doing so. Such cases, he writes, acutely raise the difficulties of the distinguish of ‘genuine’ illocutions and non-serious illocutions.
enquires in, say, a question, although the intention with which he speaks is that of requesting (or demanding): S's intention is intended to be understood, yet is not explicitly avowed. Thau calls such cases, in which illocutionary force is not clear, or is open to interpretation, 'illocutionary breakdowns'\textsuperscript{18}, regarding them as failures to make clear the illocutionary force with which an act is performed. He notes appositely Austin's rejection of the performative-constative distinction, owing to the propensity of utterances to infelicity, and its replacement by notions of phatic, rhetoric and phonetic acts, and the 'different types of nonsense' which may be created in an act's performance, the most important of which involve the performance of an intended illocution\textsuperscript{9}. In such cases the addition of an explicit performative seems positively to impair S's intentions, and Skinner offers, rather, cases in which there is no possibility of making an explicit avowal, drafting the argument to elucidate the difficulties of distinguishing illocutions and perlocutions\textsuperscript{9}. He asks one to consider pairs of cases: conciliating and coaxing, and luring and beguiling. One might say of S that he conciliated or beguiled by an utterance, or better, that he achieved an effect with his utterance. In such cases, however (and more so with coaxing and luring), one may decide whether S performed the act, as Searle shows, without reference to any perlocutionary effect, for they may be considered on the model of paradigm illocutionary acts, one which Thau examines\textsuperscript{19}. The transference of the notion of infelicity or breakdown (from the study of performatives to the study of illocutions), is not, Thau says, clear-cut, for examples of 'unhappy' or unsuccessful speech acts may display no phatic, rhetoric or phonetic failure (again, 'I name this ship'). The sense and the reference of the utterances can be clear and unobjectionable, and S mean (and intend) his utterance, say, as a naming, and in this they are unlike the failures of illocutionary force as they are described by Austin.

\textsuperscript{18} Thau, S.; 'Illocutionary Breakdowns', Mind, vol. LXXX, no. 318, pp270-275, 1971. He borrows the term 'breakdown' from Austin's classification of human actions according to their potential for infelicities.

\textsuperscript{19} Thau (1971) p has an important addition to make to the distinctions Skinner proposes (see below).

\textsuperscript{20} Skinner (1970) p122 has numerous examples and p123 considers his argument that there are some illocutionary acts with no explicit avowals. He remarks on those that, one might say, cannot be performed verbally at all, say, 'ignoring' (or 'cutting'), adding that Austin seemed to believe that 'cooking a snack' could be both a non-verbal illocutionary act and the name of a genuinely illocutionary act. He adds that Austin '....may only have intended to point out that a non-verbal warning, for example, is still the name of an illocutionary act, in the sense that there is a standard case in which to warn is to speak with a certain illocutionary force. If I intended the further claim, however, that there can be genuine illocutionary acts which never involve the use of words, it is not clear how this squares with the stated intention...of concentrating on the relations between "saying something" and the illocutionary force of such utterances'.

\textsuperscript{21} Thau (1971) p124. Skinner (1970) p124 writes that it may still be the case that S (as he intends) coaxes in what he says, even in cases in which H is not coaxed by what S says. While doubt might be entertained about the status of such cases, Skinner offers others which can be more easily assimilated (indeed, those given), which for contrast, might be considered alongside a case of insulting. Insulting might seem similar to, say, cases of gloating, snubbing (or rebuffing), taunting (teasing), sneering, gloating and so forth, but a palpable difference obtains in that insulting seems to be placed in '....an almost wholly perlocutionary light....'. 'The question, in the first place, of whether I am snubbing or rebuffing you in saying what I say is obviously a question essentially for the speaker to answer, in a way that hardly seems to hold with the more perlocutionary question of whether I am causing you to feel insulted'. S might endeavour to insult H and yet only succeed in amusing him, yet if he snubs H he has snubbed him. To repeat a point made above on numerous occasions, there must always be a distinction between effects of speaking and speaking for effect. '....the former is obviously a perlocutionary matter, but the latter (even if not illocutionary) is not'.

226
Skinner raises a similar point. His argument against the distinction of illocutions and their non-serious, failed *ersatz* counterparts says that there is none to be marked, for all are ‘...fully-intended acts of communication, and of genuine illocutionary acts’. If one considers a list of (apparently) paradigm illocutionary verbs, he remarks, one might contrast the paradigm of, say, insulting, with the difficult cases (noted by Austin), of snubbing or rebuffing, expressing a distinction between effects of speaking and speaking for effect, coterminous with Austin’s distinction between acts performed in saying things and acts performed by saying things22. Problems with the class of performatives, in Strawson’s gloss, concern whether each included names an act of ‘full and intended’ communication in the sense required by the theory of uptake of Austin’s standard, conventional cases. As has been seen (in II.4-5), they do not. Arguing that their mutual distinction is good, Skinner countenances that Austin’s ‘behabitives’ and ‘expositives’ are consequently closer to the ‘non-literal’ uses, ‘...intuitively marked off [for want of a general theory] from illocutions by Austin, and which Strawson’s model can be used to distinguish from illocutionary acts’. As established, illocutionary verbs, on Strawson’s model, *via* Millikan, all have the status of fully-intended communication, and are all equally genuine23.

Difficult cases for illocutionary status (coaxing, luring and so forth), are not straightforwardly applicable to Strawson’s theory, for one can conceive cases in which the success of the act (the fulfilment of S’s intention), turns on the non-avowability of the utterance, and the potential for this to be exploited. Other cases are more amenable, and capture Strawson’s response to Grice’s canonical analysis, yet Skinner wants a simpler theory24. He suggests an example case of a remark intended as an insult. There is in such cases no intention that the means to evoke the response intended by S be kept hidden: as Skinner writes, such partial communication is more likely to impair intentions to, say, cajole or flatter and so forth25. Thus it is that the illocutionary verbs Skinner calls markers of this first class (class A) occur in situations in which Gricean nested intentions are present. Infelicitous instances, say, in which S intended to insult H, without caring whether the intended effect is understood, are accounted for by a condition which says that the acts in question are indeed intended by S, but in which recognition or ‘uptake’ is not secured. (Skinner is of the belief that there is a ‘standard’, or control, case of such acts in which S intends his act of, say, insulting to be fully understood; in which there is an,

---

23 Skinner (1970) p125. ‘None of them seems to fail in any of the ways that “expressive” usages (here the example Austin gave, and to which Strawson applies his model, is “showing off”), or “non-literal” usages (here the example which has been considered to “insinuating”), have been shown to fail as genuine illocutionary acts’.
‘...overall intention to be understood of exactly the character required by Strawson’s model for a full act of communication’ and described by Grice’s analysis\textsuperscript{26}. Thau raises a question: whether the two kinds of act he describes (unhappy in illocution or in sense and reference), might simply be considered illocutionary breakdowns\textsuperscript{27}. He argues that Austin’s definition of the types of error or misfiring that may occur in an illocutionary act are not paradigms for ‘...any illocutionary breakdown’, for while it may be unclear in elucidating illocutionary force, say, whether what S says is meant as a statement or as a warning, Thau asks whether this should not be considered a species of rhetoric breakdown, an instance of speaking ‘ambiguously’ or ‘too elliptically’. In the cases of ambiguous, or ‘inexplicit’ sentences (Skinner’s and Strawson’s), breakdowns may be prevented, firstly, by an appeal to the context of the utterance aiding the communication of sense; and secondly, ‘...by using alternative, more explicit sentences’ (paradigmatically, the explicit performative). Thau echoes the point at the heart of Searle’s argument, that the taxonomy provided by Austin shows that rhetoric breakdown and illocutionary breakdown are qualitatively the same, and subject to the same ambiguities and infelicities.

Other less obvious candidates for illocutionary status (Skinner’s class B), are classed by Austin as innuendo, and Skinner suggests as examples, alluding or adumbrating, best analysed, Skinner says, by a theory describing the ‘non-literal’ things done with words. He argues that both Austin and Strawson note the difficulty (given by Searle), that an explicit avowal in such cases would be merely an added description of the act performed, yet again acts of utterance are still acts of communication, for in uttering to H, S might still intend to invoke, allude, adumbrate or indicate and so forth\textsuperscript{28}. Such cases show the existence of large numbers of illocutionary verbs (genuine and full acts of communication), for which there can be no explicit avowal through the explicit performative and ‘hereby’. Many such verbs, Skinner avers, may not have a truly explicit performative formula, in that supplying it is not to explicate the basic utterance, but to add something the need for which implies rather that the act of communication itself has failed and needs supplementation by explications known to S and H, regarding locutions and mutually-known, institutional, or social, convention\textsuperscript{29}. Skinner writes: ‘The difficulty and the paradox lie...in the fact that the process of making the intention explicit, in the case

\textsuperscript{26}Skinner (1970) pp125-126. Additionally, there is no intention, as in the case of insinuating, that an intention to evoke an intended response be suspected, for this is a different response entirely, although ‘...one which it is of course perfectly possible to intend to evoke’.

\textsuperscript{27}One wonders why Skinner felt the need to state this, for it is surely not required by either his or Strawson’s theory.

\textsuperscript{28}Skinner (1970) pp126-127. Here one sees the importance of the case Strawson considers of S setting a rat, and the pertinence of McDowell’s insistence on the interpretation of ‘getting one to know’, or ‘letting one think’. Skinner shows how an identical analysis can be provided for his class A illocutionary verbs.
of the verbs in lists (A) and (B), actually seems to defeat the intention itself", and again, that, "[t]he act of avowal, in all these cases, seems not (as in the standard case) to underpin, but actually to undermine, the intended act of communication"30.

Skinner argues that cases of oblique illocutionary acts (paradigmatically, in hints, metaphors and allusions), show that the distinction between the serious ('standard') illocutionary acts and the non-serious ('non-conventional') illocutionary acts, is not one that can successfully be made, and that the potential need Strawson sees for avowability in acts of communication is not served by putting illocutionary verbs in explicit performative formulae31. Skinner lists two points, the first directed at Cohen's dichotomy between illocutionary force and propositional content (although as argued, the dichotomy is more widely applicable), and the second, threatening the basis of Strawson's distinction. Skinner argues that Cohen is committed to two things: firstly, in his faith in Austin's transference of the notion of infelicity from performatives to illocutions, that it is part of the meaning of a performative utterance that it can be used for advising, warning, gloating and so forth. However, Skinner argues, the oblique illocutions are only tentatively part of the meaning of the basic utterance, and accounted for only by the presence of social conventions. (Cohen's commitment to the forms of the illocutions as the meanings of the performative utterances gives this argument its strength; it is not an argument against Austin, for Strawson shows how faulty interpretation commits Austin to this notion). It is positively not an argument against intentional analysis, the case for which is only stronger owing to the fact that, on this, interpretation, understanding or meaning require that H be supplied with a means of interpreting S in a context; as Skinner writes, echoing Derrida, it is '...odd to suggest that it is in virtue of its meaning that it ['the basic utterance'] can equally have the oblique but no less intended (and intended to be understood) force of, say, taunting or gloating32. Skinner's use of 'basic' must here be understood (and, in the light of Derrida's arguments): it gives no commitment to a metaphysical or reductionist distinction between serious and non-serious, literal and non-literal; as the arguments presented show (in II and IV), these distinctions may be overcome. Thau adds a consideration33. Cohen (and, one might

---

30 Skinner (1970) p127 writes that Cohen does not see the implication of this fact of Austin's taxonomy, and one must add that neither does Derrida. Searle's replacement for Austin's taxonomy is considered above in this section.

31 Skinner (1970) pp127-128 writes that the terms in list B (allude, indicate, adumbrate and so forth), bring out the point particularly well. '[f]or there simply is something irreducibly odd about avowing that "I hereby flatter you, patronise you", and so on. It seems indispensable to the nature of the intended act of communication in all such cases that it should be achieved without having in this way to be avowed. To avow, in fact, that I do intend in what I say to flatter, patronise and so on, may well be to make explicit what I am doing, but it equally suggests that I have already in some way failed to do it'.

32 One must note again (as Grice before) that there is no distinction between spoken and non-verbal utterance being worked with here. His conclusions have 'implications' for analyses of uptake and illocutionary force, and these points are of importance when taken up in relation to Searle.

33 Skinner (1970) p128. This constitutes no metaphysical distinction.

add, Derrida) fail to draw the distinction between the clarity in meaning of an utterance, and the possibility of making the illocution clear (removing infelicities), with the explicit performative, and reciprocally, it is on this distinction (as seen in IV) that any distinction between illocutions and locutions should be founded. (Cohen is, secondly, committed also to the belief that oblique communication has all of its specific forces, yet, Skinner replies, noting the case of innuendo, that it can, say, be made in innocence, or with intent as a joke, even ‘... about the fact that it is not usually uttered with complete innocence’. The classes of illocutionary acts are thus further contaminated. Innocent expression is a different illocutionary act from intentional innuendo, and joking not an illocutionary act at all).

Skinner’s analysis raises some questions regarding Strawson’s avowability condition. While Strawson argues that the avowability of one’s intentions in making utterances is ‘essential’ in illocutionary acts (a condition read through the Gricean nested intentions), the cases Skinner notes (in classes A and B) fulfil the conditions on recognition of intention, and yet are non-avowable or not illocutionary. There follow consequences for Strawson’s clarification of Austin’s notion of convention, and its replacement by Strawson’s distinction. Austin argues that illocutionary acts are performed according to conventions, and Strawson replies that this does not ‘hold generally’, for S may, say, issue a warning without conventions (other than those of his language, in which his locutions are mutually related by conventions). Thus, treating illocutions as conventional is myopic, identifying acts as conventional because ‘...performed by the utterance of a form of words conventional for the performance of that act’. The distinction is offered, Skinner writes, parsing Strawson, between acts guided by ‘convention-constituted procedures’, and those ‘...in which it is not as conforming to an accepted convention of any kind [other than those linguistic conventions which help to fix the meaning

---

34 Cohen (1964) pp.124-125. Restricting the discussion of Cohen to just those points relevant to the discussion undertaken here does scant justice to Cohen, whose essay is wide-ranging and highly detailed. It is particularly good for exegesis of Austin, cf. especially pp.120-125 on deep ambiguities in the notion of illocutions and perlocutions and of translations. The emphasis on indirect discourse sets up some details of the discussion of Searle. Cohen foregrounds the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts as that between conventional acts (those given in the explicit performative) and non-conventional acts. In this he bases the securing of ‘uptake’.

Cooper, D.E., ‘Meaning and Illocutions’, American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. IX, no. 1, pp.69-77, 1972, considers Cohen’s theory along with three others, those of Alston, Holdcroft and Austin respectively. He aims to reconcile the four positions, which appear opposed. He takes first Alston’s and Holdcroft’s positions, namely that illocutionary acts are actual, and meanings are explained by reference to them, and that illocutionary acts are actual, and that yet meanings cannot be explained in terms of speech acts. The latter is given a proviso: unless, ‘... there is a way of telling what speech act has been performed which does not involve making use of semantic information about the language in which the speech acts are uttered’ (p.70). Holdcroft argues that this ‘criterion of adequacy’ cannot be met, and his doubts centre on the elucidation of an act’s illocutionary force.

Cooper finds two reasons for doubting the relevance of Holdcroft’s arguments to Alston’s analysis. Firstly, Alston works with Austin’s definition of illocutions, and so ‘... can hardly be unaware of the fact that most of the acts in Austin’s list are essentially verbal. Austin, indeed, makes that clear’. Secondly, Alston holds that a speech act cannot be identified from the locution used to perform it: acts cannot be identified without ‘semantic knowledge about the sentence’ (p.71). Cooper next takes Austin’s and Cohen’s theories: that there are illocutionary acts distinct from meanings, the former playing no role in explaining the latter, and that there are no illocutionary acts, and thus they can play no role in explaining meanings.
of the utterance] that an illocutionary act is performed’. This, palpably, is Strawson’s distinction. Skinner considers cases in which one enquires, yet validly intends (with Gricean nested intentions), an order, and suggests that the success of communicative acts must ‘to a considerable extent’ be based on the conventions of what counts as ordering. From class B examples Skinner derives the case of S intending, and intending H to understand that he intends, to, say, patronise, without there being any explicit avowal of this on S’s part from the speech act made. Again, the conclusion is compelled that the success of such acts depends on the satisfying of mutually-understood conventions of what counts as a speech act of a certain type.

Skinner has two points to add to the difficulties raised for Strawson’s distinction by non-standard cases. The first (obvious for some time), says that such cases confirm the Strawsonian (and Austinian) view that there is always a vast, shifting group of intermediate, difficult cases between explicitly performable and non-conventional illocutionary acts. Skinner argues indeed that the non-standard cases threaten the status of Strawson’s non-conventional illocutionary acts, and thus the distinction itself, and not least because Strawson (and Millikan) establish no means of how a non-conventional illocutionary act can achieve successful communication in a context. Take the case of a warning issued, and understood as such, in a standard or an oblique utterance. If a convention is to ease the act of communication, there must be, over and above the shared linguistic conventions and appropriate circumstances, ‘mutually-recognised’ conditions, such that S’s utterance (again, verbal or non-verbal), is able to be understood as a warning. Skinner writes, ‘...this seems to be a question essentially about the nature and the extent of the social conventions which S may expect H to regard as appropriate for the regulation of their social (and so verbal) relationships’. Skinner considers what follows from an apposite case, one in which S is motivated not to carry out the intention to warn H in a situation in which a warning seems proper. H might reason that an intended illocution might have an unintended perlocutionary effect (say, of alarming or irritating) even if uptake is secured; there may be doubt whether H will achieve uptake on the intended effect of S’s utterance (S may abstain from warning for fear that he be taken to be pleading or entreating); finally, S may wonder whether his intention may not be taken as of a different type. In the most significant case, Skinner posits a situation in which S could not ‘...gain uptake of the act as an act of warning simply because there was no convention at all that S in uttering such an utterance could be understood as intending to perform that illocutionary act’. For the

35 Skinner (1970) pp130-131 shows some applications of Strawson’s distinction, to disabuse certain philosophers of mistaken views of conventions in speech acts. He sees the distinction as ‘genuine and important’, and as one which ‘Austin (and his
solution of such cases Skinner writes that there must be (undefined) prior and mutually accepted social conventions, which are ‘clear and strong’, allowing, say, a warning to be understood as a warning, rather than as advice or admonishment and so forth. Skinner says correctly that this is neither an issue of perlocutionary effects or of intended tone. ‘It is firmly an issue about the part played by social convention in the performance of any successful communication between S and H’, and it is to Lewis’ work that one must look for the detailed analysis of the way in which such conventions (allowing the establishing of standards for K-II acts, declarations and non-conventional illocutions), may arise36. Lewis’ work is a response to Quine’s rejection of conventions for formal and natural languages, and the details of Quine’s arguments are examined at the beginning of the next chapter.

It is vital to emphasise that Skinner (and Strawson) share some important notions with Derrida and meaning-relativists, namely those concerning that fact that conventions in speech acts cannot be understood in any simplistic manner as reporting illocutionary effects that can be read for their accompanying intentions; however, countering peculiarly Derridean scepticism, Skinner argues that conventions obtain in the broader social convention that he describes. Skinner (1970) pp133-138 goes on to describe some more complicated types of communication situation.
IV | MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE

1. Analyticity and Convention

For Stroud, Quine’s work is characterised by the thorough rejection of conventionalism, a case in point being his analysis of the status of logic and mathematics. Quine writes that it seems platitudinous to say that increasing advances in the exact sciences link assumptions to definitions, which, in turn, become analytic truths, or, that ‘...what was once regarded as a theory about the world becomes reconstrued as a convention of language’: this seems a corollary of progress. However, Quine repeats the lessons of the indeterminacy of translation and the stimulus-response theory of meaning, saying that there can be no conventions for theory formation, and that an argument that the logic binding the web is through-and-through conventional is comprehensively challenged. Quine questions the sense of forcing a fruitless dichotomy between the rival theories, and his later criticism of analyticity has a similar motivation, offering a general theory, one crystallised in the claim that all and every statement

---

3 Quine gives the example of Einstein exploiting, to establish a convention, the possibility of simultaneity at a distance.
4 Putnam rejects the idea that the impossibility of radical translation follows from the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Putnam, H.; ‘The Refutation of Conventionalism’, pp153-191 in Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume II (Cambridge University Press) 1975. He finds the common interpretation of Quine to be a misunderstanding, and refutes the interpretation with the help of Quine, the real Quine. Putnam argues that both Quine and Grünbaum use a similar notion of convention, the ‘conventionalist play’, and that it is the benefit of axiomatic method in mathematics that the weaknesses in this can be indicated. Putnam shows that arguments for conventions are fallacious, and conceal forms of essentialism (pp162-163). The impossibility of achieving radical translation occurs, Putnam writes paraphrasing the conventionalists, because all possible translations are always, ‘...part of the meaning of the notion of a metric [in Grünbaum] or of the notion of an analytical hypothesis’, and, moreover, that ‘... any further condition that one might suggest would definitely not be part of the meaning of the notion in question, and also would not be a “substitute law” about the notion in question (since a “substitute law” would presuppose that the extension of the notion in question had somehow been fixed...’ (p163), a condition the conventionalist would not accept.

Putnam (1975b) pp164-165 distinguishes a trivial conventionality (the sound ‘dog’ means ‘dog’ and not ‘telephone’) and says that given use and a meaning for terms, there is, following Quine, no fact of the matter as to how they are rendered true. Putnam argues that Quine’s conventionalism is thus trivial or false, and because all reference, again following Quine, is a function of theory, and so is subject to the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Putnam develops a theory of reference as maximal coherence of terms, not as conventional, and Quine would acquiesce. Quine’s conditions on translation do not differ from ‘meaning postulates’, and of ‘The Analytic and the Synthetic’, pp33-69 in (1975b).
in language or theory can be revised in the light of 'recalcitrant experience'. In the image of the web of belief any statement close to the periphery may be retained for pragmatic or utilitarian purposes, potentially with the revision of relevant ('deeper') logical laws, and belief so conceived cannot tolerate an analytic/synthetic distinction. In this Quine dismisses not merely a theory of necessary truths giving \textit{a priori} knowledge, but the possibility of such a theory, for there is an under-determination of knowledge by experience, and it is a matter for decision as to which statements remain in the web, and which are rejected\textsuperscript{4}.

In his later work on analyticity Quine considers arguments for the making sense of language possession and acquisition in terms of stimulus and response. Indeterminacy obtains here also, for a mapping onto itself of the sentences of S's language leaves unchanged his 'dispositions to verbal behaviour', but gives no definite, consistent equivalences of sentences and dispositions\textsuperscript{5}. (The 'overall pattern' of sentence associations and of non-verbal stimuli in the web remains the same). Many manuals may be devised for the translation of S's native language into another, all apparently accounting for S's stimulus conditions, but none of which are compatible, owing to their irreducible underdetermination. Indeterminacy does not, for Quine, extend to observation sentences and truth-functions, for each instance of a truth function must contain variables used in the language\textsuperscript{7}. There is no equivalent for a truth function in the language that would map onto itself leaving a disposition to respond unchanged, and, Stroud continues: 'If T\textsubscript{1} and T\textsubscript{2} are not equivalent, and yet can be translated on objective behavioural grounds, then the speaker's dispositions with respect to them must differ'; they must be different truth functions\textsuperscript{8}. The translations of such statements is determinate, and in this Stroud finds the kernel of Quine's later arguments against conventions and analyticity. For statements to which there are 'no non-equivalent alternatives', Quine writes, convention or decision plays no part in their acceptance or rejection because there can be written no appropriate conventions. Quine grants, for the sake of argument, that if mathematics is constructible from logic, on the model of the truth

\textsuperscript{4} The beginning of Quine's study is made with an examination of conventional logical notation. Cf. Putnam, H.; 'An Examination of Grünbaum's Philosophy of Geometry', pp93-129 in \textit{Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers, Volume I} (Cambridge University Press) 1975. Putnam examines Grünbaum's work on convention in geometry and classical mechanics. The discussion is extended in 'Memo on Conventionalism', pp206-214. Davidson (2001) p313 writes that Quine 'saved' philosophy of language by categorically rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction, and White (1952) p317 notes the irony in the fact that it is formal logicians who have carried out this work. Recall that Rorty (1979) p7 says that his criticisms of 'analytic' philosophy are 'borrowed' from 'Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Ryle, Malcolm, Kuhn and Putnam'.

\textsuperscript{5} Rorty might say that here is evidenced Quine's thorough going pragmatism.

\textsuperscript{6} Quine (1960) and cf. 1.5.

\textsuperscript{7} Quine sees no discontinuity between 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' and \textit{Word and Object}. In the former he is 'concerned to stress general revisability', and in the latter 'sensory evidence'. Statements close to the periphery can be held true, and there are none immune to revision. 'The sustaining force is observation'. The state of insusceptibility to revision is never reached, for, \textit{in extremis}, the '...tail...comes...to wag the dog', and predictions are doubted.

\textsuperscript{8} Stroud (1969) pp85-86.
functions, then it is true by convention ‘in a relative sense9’, and Quine adds that this may be all that is meant by saying that mathematics is true by convention, ‘... at least, an analytic statement is commonly explained merely as one which proceeds from logic and definitions, or as one which, on replacement of definienda by definientia, becomes a truth of logic’. However, the difficulty again concerns the account given of the logical principles themselves, for they must, in turn, be true by convention for the argument to work. The argument might be filled in: one wishing to argue for logic as non-conventional, and diminish the number of principles to be held true by convention, must add to the corpus of analytic truths, but do so without standards to which one may appeal for one’s decisions10, and this is to base logic on a convention ‘other than definition’, for definitions (allowing the ‘movement’ defined above), transform truths, but cannot, for fear of regress, found them. The connection to the arguments for the indeterminacy of translation is clear11.

While arguments have (in I.5) been given against Quine, those from Stroud should be discussed. Stroud asks whether the condition requiring that a statement’s being revisable compels its indeterminacy is a necessary one, and he remarks that the indeterminacy present in the case of the logical truths is that relative to a given set of dispositions to verbal behaviour (the tribe (S) is disposed to accept certain logical truths, revealed by scientists’ observation), and that dispositions remain unchanged even under indeterminacy. Quine shows that there are no equivalents to truth functions if there are no alternatives to the tribe’s verbal dispositions, but the conventionalist affirms precisely this: that there are indeed relevant alternatives to verbal dispositions, for it is a convention that one speaks as one does. Different dispositions would determine the acceptance of different truth-functions, or ‘tautologies’, and if the arguments of I.5 are accepted and supplemented, the ontological relativity of native and interpreter engendered by their differing dispositions can be overcome and relative dispositions discovered and interpreted12. That scientists can discern S’s truth functions does not mean that they are those the scientists accept: indeed, in his argument that S’s and the scientists’ dispositions could not conceivably be the same, Quine might be said tacitly to accept that there are alternatives to the scientists’ truth-functions for there are alternatives to their dispositions. Stroud conjures the image that haunts Quine, of a board of syndics convened for the settlement of a social contract to ratify the dispositions to speech of a language community, and finds no reason for fear; Stroud argues (and the

---

10 This problem is solved by Lewis. Cf. Hookway, C.; Quine: Language, Experience and Reality (Cambridge, Polity) 188, pp110-111.
same conclusion shall be offered with reference to Lewis), that it is only because a speech community accepts standards (conventions) that it accepts truth functions15.

Stroud, echoing Lewis, writes that there is utility in the fiction of a contract setting down conventions of language. One may examine cases in which dispositions differ: 'Lo, a rabbit!' might, in a foreign tongue, report a stimulus provided by what one is personally disposed to call a tortoise. This, however, unless it immediately overturns one’s accepted convention, would have no consequences for one’s faith in what one accepts as truth-functions. The utterances report stimuli consonant with different dispositions, but, as Stroud says,

[a]s long as there is only a class of stimulations prompting assent to “Rabbit”, another prompting dissent, and perhaps a third which inhibits a verdict, then whatever these stimulations happen to be, the sentence “Rabbit and not-Rabbit” would command assent under all stimulations that would elicit a verdict to “Rabbit” at all14.

Stroud’s argument says that is, one can share with the native stimuli to different dispositions without harm to one’s truth functions. All three responses (assent, dissent, no verdict) have associated stimuli, and stimuli provoking the third would show the existence of compound sentences, describing truth functions, to which S would not respond, formed by the components of the sentences to which he expresses assent or dissent, even though they are translations of sentences to which the scientists assent after stimulations which elicit responses to the components. By Quine’s argument, if S has different dispositions than those of the scientists, his remarks instantiate different logical truths, but if the scientists discern the appropriate dispositions, reported in assent or dissent to the components of the shared compound sentences, they may, it seems, provide a translation. However this may be, rôles in the web of belief for analytic truths, or their analogues, have been demonstrated, and if the scientists’ language contains resources to articulate S’s alien disposition, then the capacity exists for them to make the alien response, and in the language web there exist connections of stimulus and response to the same logical truths, none of which are different from their own15.

As argued in 1.5 it seems that there must be presuppositions, approximating analytic truths, in S’s and H’s language, allowing the translation of alien dispositions: but what might their status be? As seen, for

---

Quine, a mapping of the sentences of a language onto itself, the possibility of the rejection of logical truths, and of different stimulus-response conditions, are ruled out by the fact that all putative alternatives are only conceivable in the language used. He argues not only that all alternatives are viable, but that all are already in use, spread throughout the entire web, and that mutual dispositions to language behaviour are incommensurable and untranslatable. To repeat, he argues that observation sentences and tautologies are peripheral to the web, and are not subject to revision, but with Stroud’s response, and that of I.5, in mind, one may leave this matter and attend to Quine’s application of his arguments to a rejection of alternative possible conceptual schemes. He proceeds from the premise that the acceptance or revision of sentences occurs within the one and only language web; again, in the mapping of a single language there is no possibility of conflicting conceptual schemes with differing stimulus-response criteria.

To the same degree that the radical translation of sentences is underdetermined by the totality of dispositions to verbal behaviour, our own theories and beliefs in general are underdetermined by the totality of possible sensory evidence time without end.\(^{16}\)

The one conceptual scheme, as and when it requires repair, is revised as a ‘going concern’,\(^ {17}\), (and with this image, of a ship being repaired while under sail, Quine makes clear his commitment to the Carnapian project of parsimony in theory construction). The image of the web of belief shows that the only way in which theories may explain experience, and the degree of parsimony invoked, is articulated in the condition requiring that any alternatives are always already conceivable ways of speaking open to one in one’s language. He adds:

[w]hat is a possibility for us is always a function of our actual ways of thought and speech and the state of our knowledge at the time, and so the notion of a possibility or a possible world sub specie aeternitatis, without connection with any set of verbal dispositions and beliefs, makes no sense.\(^ {18}\)

Adaptation or novelty is provided for piecemeal, and the ‘bulk’ (the ‘going concern’) of the language remains unchanged. In time, as a cumulative effect, great conceptual change may result. One might ask where the change will end, perhaps, given the arguments of I.5 and to follow, after revision of logical truths, and of different stimulus-response conditions, are ruled out by the fact that all putative alternatives are only conceivable in the language used. He argues not only that all alternatives are viable, but that all are already in use, spread throughout the entire web, and that mutual dispositions to language behaviour are incommensurable and untranslatable. To repeat, he argues that observation sentences and tautologies are peripheral to the web, and are not subject to revision, but with Stroud’s response, and that of I.5, in mind, one may leave this matter and attend to Quine’s application of his arguments to a rejection of alternative possible conceptual schemes. He proceeds from the premise that the acceptance or revision of sentences occurs within the one and only language web; again, in the mapping of a single language there is no possibility of conflicting conceptual schemes with differing stimulus-response criteria.

To the same degree that the radical translation of sentences is underdetermined by the totality of dispositions to verbal behaviour, our own theories and beliefs in general are underdetermined by the totality of possible sensory evidence time without end.\(^ {16}\)

The one conceptual scheme, as and when it requires repair, is revised as a ‘going concern’,\(^ {17}\), (and with this image, of a ship being repaired while under sail, Quine makes clear his commitment to the Carnapian project of parsimony in theory construction). The image of the web of belief shows that the only way in which theories may explain experience, and the degree of parsimony invoked, is articulated in the condition requiring that any alternatives are always already conceivable ways of speaking open to one in one’s language. He adds:

[w]hat is a possibility for us is always a function of our actual ways of thought and speech and the state of our knowledge at the time, and so the notion of a possibility or a possible world sub specie aeternitatis, without connection with any set of verbal dispositions and beliefs, makes no sense.\(^ {18}\)

Adaptation or novelty is provided for piecemeal, and the ‘bulk’ (the ‘going concern’) of the language remains unchanged. In time, as a cumulative effect, great conceptual change may result. One might ask where the change will end, perhaps, given the arguments of I.5 and to follow, after revision of logical

---

\(^{16}\) Quine (1960) p78.

\(^{17}\) Quine (1960) p4. Quine introduces the metaphor of Neurath’s ship.

\(^{18}\) Quine (1966) p. It shall be seen that this argument does not apply to Lewis’ possible worlds, for they are predicated on the idea that they retain connections with verbal dispositions and beliefs. Indeed, Quine’s remark might be thought compatible with moderate realism about possible worlds, and, incidentally, demonstrates Rorty’s point that Quine denies that epistemology can appeal to any direct check with reality.
truths, in an alien conceptual scheme. Quine’s argument that the translation of truth-functional logical truths is determinate, and that thus they are not revisable, again raises the question of their status. As has been argued, if the indeterminacy of translation is taken as a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the revisability of statements, Quine’s arguments against conventions are less potent, for the logical truths are indeed, by these standards, revisable in different conceptual schemes or possible worlds. The arguments of I.5 show that there must be present in the web, to allow the revision of beliefs for which Quine argues, statements approximating conventions, or more tentatively, truths analytic for that language.

Quine rejects the relativisation of truth and analyticity to possible worlds, arguing that there is no position sub specie aeternitatis. The revision of one’s corpus of accepted truths occurs piecemeal and only in a language; the best is constantly reconstructed and always against a background of linguistic usage; in extremis the only guide in the evolution of a new conceptualisation is its promise. This, Quine argues, demands nothing either of convention or of identities between conceptual schemes. He offers an example of the identity, or individuation, of an object over time and according to different conceptual schemes. Objects are individuated by inhering in a prior notion of ‘body’, with dimensions, orientation in space and so forth, for they may receive conflicting definitions in different conceptual schemes offering different means of filling variables in quantification over objects. Quine argues that this goes for quantification over individuals in possible worlds. Quantification may be made over all objects defined in a language, but in a predication the means by which objects are identified is pertinent to the truth value of a sentence, and the means by which the subordinates of ‘body’ may be defined do not obtain in differing possible worlds, and thus another predication, like a sentence, applies only in a context; in this is the heart of Quine’s arguments against essentialism. If one assumes that a single property can be predicated of an object ((∃x) NFx), and the quantification extended to the identity of objects in other possible worlds, a further predicate is given (G) fulfilled by

---

20 In IV.3 Lewis’ means of doing this is presented.
23 In this following Hintikka (1975). Hintikka also discusses the view of modal logic as (as Marcus said) conceived in the confusion of use and mention. Cf. Quine, W.V.O.; ‘Worlds Away’, pp124-128 in Theories and Things (Harvard University Press) 1982.
24 Cf. especially Quine (1982) p126. The Fregean heritage is acknowledged elsewhere in a discussion of the indiscernibility of identicals, and Quine writes that failure of substitutivity shows that, ‘... the statement depends not only on the object but on the form of the name.’ The difficulties raised by opacity, and of contexts of quotation, are again detailed for their significance for reference, and their ramifications extended to the modal contexts. Cf. ‘Reference and Modality’, pp139-159 in Quine (1980).
25 Cf. White (1952) p327 for a similar example, pointing up the incommensurability of conventions. There is a palpable connection with the indeterminacy of translation, and cf. Quine (1956) and (1951). Kazmi distinguishes Quine’s notion of referential opacity from his other theories of essentialism (following upon the analytic-synthetic distinction) and the of
an x which instantiates NFx. The problem then is to give conditions for cross-world identity for x to affirm its status as Gx. The same problems are seen to arise\(^\text{25}\). These arguments are of a piece with Quine’s rejection of the notion of quantifying into propositional attitudes, and he states that identities between objects in different worlds cannot be ascribed according to any view of intentionality predicated on the modalities and propositional attitudes\(^\text{26}\). Quine writes that, ‘...[e]ach belief world will involve countless beliefs that are not seperately recognisable objects of the believer’s beliefs at all, for the believer does believe still that there are countless such beliefs.’ Reciprocally, quantifying into propositional attitude contexts will not account for all of these many beliefs, and Quine rejects such idioms as any part of a canonical, scientific, extensional notation\(^\text{27}\).

There are two arguments still to be made, the first revisiting the remarks of I.5 and of Stroud, and fully making the case that the holistic web must include, to establish Quine’s own arguments, statements approximating, to all intents and purposes, analytic truths. Secondly, and extending into IV.2-3, it is argued that Lewis’ conceptions of possible worlds, of conceptual scheme and of conceptualisation (the latter as in the stream of experience in the web of belief), are all immune to Quine’s arguments against conventions, analyticity and essentialism. Indeed, Lewis’ theory of

---


\(^\text{25}\) Those obviated, Quine (1982) p127 says, unsuccessfully by Kripke’s rigid designators. Smith and McIntyre (1982) discuss the difficulties of identity with reference to Quine’s example in ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, pp183-194 in Quine (1966) and the problems for the indiscernibility of identity, pp227-228 and pp232 and 244ff. The point is clear: an intentional act intending more than what is prescribed in its Sinn reveals that each act is related to a horizon of other possible acts, ‘...whose Sinn (the possible manifolds of perception), would tend to complete what is left open or indeterminate about the object in a given intention of it’. (p229). See also on Husserl’s notion of how a possible world may be completely determined, pp260-261ff and Ideas §44, and on the development of Husserl’s notion of horizon pp233-240. Woodruff Smith and McIntyre (1982) pp289-300 detail Husserl’s use of a possible worlds semantics and a metaphysics of possible worlds. They note a remark at Cartesian Meditations §60, speaking of a range of infinitely many possible worlds. The locas clausalis of the metaphysics of possible worlds is Lewis, D.K.; On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford, Blackwell) 1986. Woodruff Smith and McIntyre (p304) find that possible worlds are not essential to Husserl’s theory of intentionality, but that a possible worlds theory carries with it an assumption of meanings comparable to that in the semantic theory traditionally ascribed to Frege and Husserl (pp309ff). This is expressed best of all on p316: ‘In a sense, then, there is no “pure” possible-worlds theory of intentionality, if “pure” means ultimately free from a life of Sinn’. Husserl writes that without horizon analysis intentionality remains ‘anonymous’, and on his relation to Descartes, cf. Cartesian Meditations §20. He goes on to emphasise the Kantian influence, and cf. Woodruff Smith and McIntyre (1982) pp233-236, 274-275, 277 and 288. The temporal aspect of the perceptions constituting the horizon is discussed in Woodruff Smith and McIntyre (1982) pp258-261. The best study is Miller, I.; Husserl, Perception and Temporal Awareness (MIT) 1984.

Woodruff Smith and McIntyre (1982) pp246ff discusses the pre-determination of an act’s horizon, with reference to Husserl’s nascent notion of ‘habitus’, in comparison to Searle’s The Background.

\(^\text{26}\) Cf. in development of the arguments given earlier, Hintikka, J.; ‘Quine on Quantifying In: A Dialogue’, pp102-136 in (1975).

\(^\text{27}\) See Hookway (1988) pp122-123. Modality has a tortured relationship within modern quantificalional logic, best characterised by both Russell’s and Quine’s omitting its terms from their ontologies; indeed, the paradigmatic example of what there are not in Quine’s ‘On What There Is’, pp1-19 in (1980), are modalities, intensions and intensions. The indeterminacy of translation is, by Quine’s own admission, nothing but Brentano’s irreducibility of intentional idioms, and for all Carnap’s influence, Quine remained sceptical of his Aufbau, that is, the writing of a thorough ontology of modality. A longer work would make the case that Derrida’s difference is rightly considered as nothing but the apotheosis of the conditions of possibility for reference, for what is difference but the necessary failure of intentional reference? On this cf. Harvey, I.; Derrida and the Economy of Difference (Indiana University Press) 1986, p37.
convention is expressly a response to Quine and White; before it is presented, Quine’s substantive arguments against analyticity must be detailed\textsuperscript{28}.

Quine’s arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction are premised (as in the early work) upon a puzzle regarding the way in which knowledge is acquired, and form a challenge to reductionism\textsuperscript{29}. He asks what concept of meaning is presupposed in the distinction, a question Kant did not ask. Meaning is given not by checking the names of the constituent terms of, say, a statement ‘x means y’, for, as Quine shows, names can agree in extension yet differ in intension\textsuperscript{30}. The same goes for predicates, (‘general’ terms in Quine), as they are true of named entities rather than used to dub as yet unnamed entities. The meaning of a general term cannot be identified with its extension, (its referents in all possible cases), for, like names, they can apply to precisely the same things yet differ in intension. Kant’s presupposition is not easily seen when the cases under examination are names or extensions, two fundamental concepts in the analysis of the constituent terms of a sentence, and paradigmatically so in a subject-predicate sentence.

Quine rejects the theory of specific concepts belonging to individual essences. Essences can plausibly be parsed in a number of ways, as Quine’s examples of rationality and two-leggedness show, and as the example (above) of defining an object has shown. He concludes from such cases that: ‘[m]eaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word’\textsuperscript{31}. Having established that meanings cannot be identified with names, extensions, or essences, Quine states that one may accept that a theory of meaning can postulate nothing in the way of abstract entities, but that analyticity may be defined in another way. Quine identifies two classes of potentially analytic statements. The first gives statements true in all possible worlds: reinterpretations of constituent terms (perhaps, translations), will still yield truths \textit{salva veritate}. The second gives a truth with differing constituent terms but which is still analytic, that is, terms with the same extension but different intensions. (Better still: they could be given different intensions). Quine’s examples are variants on one another. ‘No unmarried man is married’, and ‘No bachelor is married’ respectively. Using synonymy to

\textsuperscript{28} Lewis’ definition of analyticity is considered in Szorenyi, N.; ‘Review of D.K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study’, \textit{Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, vol. LIII, no. 1, pp75-82, 1975, especially p76.

\textsuperscript{29} Quine, W.V.O.; ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, pp20-46 in (1980b).

\textsuperscript{30} Here, and throughout, he quotes Frege’s example of the astronomer dubbing the Morning and the Evening stars. For ‘general’ terms see p21. Elsewhere Quine considers Kant’s question of the possibility of synthetic \textit{a priori} judgements (Quine, W.V.O.; Carnap and Logical Truth’, pp100-125 in (1966b).

\textsuperscript{31} Quine (1980) p22. The rest of the quotations in this paragraph are from pp22-23.
change the latter into the former is unacceptable to Quine, for the notion of synonymy is not logically restricted, as the notion of meaning as essence is required to be32.

Of Quine's two stated versions of analyticity he considers the first to raise no significant difficulties, for the statements in this class are true in all possible worlds. The statements of the second class require more detailed treatment. Having discussed how definitions may generate synonymy in identical contexts, Quine offers an alternative: abbreviate via notations. In a simple definition the definiendum is unique, created specifically for the relevant purpose: there is, thus, no reliance on pre-existing synonymies. There is here an intimation of Quine's holism, stated more clearly in a specific example. Knowledge, paradigmatically mathematical knowledge, requires two things, firstly, an economy in the number of terms used and a preference for simplicity, and secondly, a procedure by which the basic terms can be applied to novel situations, in this case, a grammar. Quine marks a tension between these two requirements: economy in the number of terms of the language will make more difficult the transformations and combinations that the grammar specifies; combining the two in an 'inclusive language', gives requisite economy in 'message lengths' but a potentially unworkable, primitive, grammar and vocabulary33. Excepting the cases of newly-created notations, Quine concludes, definitions depend upon a prior synonymy; the only plausible correlations between the primitive vocabulary and the stated grammar are meant to mirror all that an earlier language can while showing analyticity, and these conditions all depend upon synonymy.

By imparting this arbitrariness in the assigning of meaning to a term in the inclusive language Quine makes the point that synonymy of terms is the vital notion in determining analyticity. The example of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' shows again that intension is the relevant consideration in interchanging terms, although Quine countenances a way out through taking each of the occurrences of 'bachelor' as a 'single indivisible word', regarding interchangeability as applying to each separate occurrence34. Turning analytic statements into logical truths simply by substituting synonyms for synonyms will, it is claimed, show the real nature of analytic statements: that they are true by virtue of meaning. However, Quine faces this with an example (i): 'All and only bachelors are unmarried', which, considering cognitive synonymy, is analytic. One may derive from this (ii): 'Necessarily all and

32 Carnap's description of analyticity in terms of the assignment of truth values to non-compound statements of a language is rejected (pp24-27). The truth value of a complex statement is, for Carnap, constructed by the combination of each of its non-compound statements in accordance with logical laws, and Quine replies that to give a truth value to all specifiable non-compound sentences would be to make them all mutually independent. In the case of 'John is married' and 'John is a bachelor' this would render 'No bachelors are married' synthetic.
only bachelors are bachelors’, and, in turn, (iii) ‘Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men’, without alteration in truth value. This is to say that (iii) is true, and hence that (i) is analytic, and ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ cognitively synonymous.

Quine objects primarily to the use of the adverb ‘necessarily’; there could be no room for it in an extensional language; it is an undefined term in a language constructed from first principles, and, more specifically, from combinations of predicates and variables as atomic sentences, and complex sentences formed by the inclusion of truth functions according to logic. There are no undefined terms, and any two predicates which apply to the same things (have the same extension), are interchangeable. Quine continues, however, that this could apply across a broad range of terms, and so cognitive synonymy is not assured. Quine’s suggested way around this difficulty builds upon a suggestion that analyticity can correctly be brought out in an artificial language, obviating the difficulties of ordinary language. Language \( L_0 \) will, it is assumed, include a specification of all of the analytic statements of the language; at least, Quine thinks it had better, for one is dealing only with ‘analytic for \( L_0 \)’. It could, to take another tack, arbitrarily be defined, and the attribution rules be peculiar to the language itself. Quine expresses a second problem, concerning the semantical rules of artificial languages being always relative to other semantical rules. Artificial and hypothetical languages would need to incorporate factors for the determination of analyticity. This, Quine says, is not defining analyticity, merely making it an irreducible characteristic. Truths of statements must be looked for outside the domain of pure linguistics: quite simply, a statement would have been false if events occurred differently from the way reported in the statement, and sentence meanings are changed by the different interpretation of one of the terms in the sentence. There is a ‘factual component’ to each statement, but Quine repeats that this does not create a ‘boundary’ between the analytic and the synthetic. A more sophisticated analysis considers a verificationalist theory of meaning: the meaning of a statement is its method of being empirically confirmed. By this definition an analytic statement should be true in all cases, and synonymous statements will be confirmed by dint of synonymy. However, Quine rejects this reductionism, and because it claims that all statements are translatable into new statements describing the situation given in terms of sensory experience, that which the first statement described purely as events in the world. There is an immediate ambiguity: the new language does not distinguish sense-

---


data considered as qualities or as events. More pressing is the difficulty of the required term-by-term reduction, necessary given the number of statements to be reduced. Quine suggests in reply that statements about the external world are confirmed or refuted by sense-experience only as parts of a 'corporate body' (the Duhem-Quine hypothesis), and this disallows any distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, for one's readjustments and shiftings in the web of beliefs proceed upon rational, 'pragmatic' lines\textsuperscript{37}.

A preliminary objection to Quine focuses on his use of the identity statement. Quine wishes to establish by it the conclusion that meaning cannot be given by examining the names of the constituent terms. That the Morning Star is the Evening Star is an \emph{a posteriori} discovery made after checking observations and astronomical data; it does not have, one might say, the same \emph{a priori} status, and hence, claim to analyticity, as does, say, $2+2=4$. Difficulties in this approach concern the fact that there is, potentially, no difference between discovering that the Morning Star is the Evening Star, and 'discovering' that $2+2=4$, and the intuition behind the objection is that mathematical propositions have a stronger claim to \emph{a priori} status, or analyticity. The slack in Quine's theory allowing this objection to arise, stems perhaps from the fact that his radical empiricism is taken to the extent of postulating the web of beliefs, in which all propositions have no empirical content as individual propositions, and are thus open to revision and rejection, and is largely unsupported by positive arguments; rather Quine relies on attacking possible definitions of analyticity\textsuperscript{38}.

Quine rejects intensions because they, as do proper names, have no specific set of referents; or, if they do, the extensions cannot properly determine all that have the same intension. An illuminating way into Quine's discussion of intensions and extensions is to apply an argument derived from Kripke and Putnam, and aimed specifically at Russell's Theory of Descriptions. One significant criticism of Russellian theory is that all potential descriptions of a particular 'natural kind' term could turn out to be false\textsuperscript{39}. With a lead from Putnam's twin-earth thought-experiment the objection says that meanings can be described as the potential uses, or scope, of a term, (its extension), because in all senses that one, in this world, knows that tigers are cats, one knows it necessarily to be so\textsuperscript{40}. For something to count as being a tiger it must fulfil a series of stated criteria defining the concept of being a tiger. Extension can be determined by intension. Self-evidently, Quine would reject this suggestion, giving as it does, a

\textsuperscript{37} Cf. Quine (1980) p44-46
\textsuperscript{38} As argued in Grice, H.P. and Strawson, P.F.; 'In Defence of a Dogma', pp196-212 in Grice (1989).
\textsuperscript{39} As described in Strawson's objections to the theory of descriptions (footnotes to 1.4), it can be argued that one can never know enough about the referent of a term to give it full description.
possible criterion for analyticity. Some things are necessarily tigers; there are a series of logical truths one could state about them. Here is an illuminating angle from which to examine Quine's rejection of extensions as giving meanings, for he accepts the notion of logical truths, true under all reinterpretations of constituent terms. The second class of cases raises the difficulty of analyticity, for changing 'No bachelor is married' to 'No unmarried man is married' requires the notion of synonymy, which is a further intensional concept left undefined. The concept of synonymy needs strict criteria; without it analyticity cannot be elucidated. (Names and extensions have been considered and rejected).

There is a difficulty in seeing what Quine will permit if he will rule out as much as he does. His attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction is wholly negative. Having ruled out intensions and extensions as defining analyticity, one assumes that Quine wants alternatives to give a more adequate explanation. The rejection of names and extensions force a conclusion which tends toward holism. (Quine’s ersatz of intensional notions in Word and Object is considered in context). Carnap’s suggestion of postulating an artificial language is rejected, not just because of the considerations outlined, but because analyticity in this language will remain peculiar to it. The response might better utilise arguments he gives against intensions and extensions, for if he is prepared to consider analyticity in this language, then it could be given by any language, real or artificial. For a more formal response, Quine offers his own ‘extensional’ language, one given wholly in logical notation: predicates and variables in combination through logical constants. There are no undefined terms, and synonymy is present in interchangeable predicates applying to the same things. This, however, only explains the logical truths which Quine, correctly one must admit, says do not pose the real difficulties of analyticity, and, besides, arguments against Quine’s theory of logical truths are given above. On one interpretation Quine has himself presupposed the notions of synonymy in claiming that his ideal language is fully reflective of all an earlier language (or a now discredited conceptual scheme) can do. In stating that logical truths are the fundamental building blocks of this extensional language the construction of complex statements is said to proceed through combination of the basic logical truths. Another interpretation says that the ideal language is to serve the purpose only of explication and not analysis, but either way the problem of synonymy has not been overcome, just ignored. The expressions holding in place of the variables may still arbitrarily be combined; their meanings need never be the same, and so analyticity, statements synonymous with logical truths, is lacking. Quine’s

theory seems to import the intension and extension of the laws of logic. He speaks of building complex sentences through the application of logic. The building derives from the most simple elements: the construction of this language must still take regard of validity and soundness, necessitating tight restrictions on the terms which can be applied. Quine certainly presupposes the extension of his logical language. Quine could reply that logic has a clear extension, that is, all statements in a language. He could say that logical laws are perfectly clear extensional terms. Of course, there must be a set of restrictions as to which terms under this extension may be combined; it cannot be simply an arbitrary process. However, Quine lets his notion of extensionality rest upon that of intensionality, for he claims that any predicates that apply to the same things (have the same extension), are those which are 'interchangeable'. This process of interchangeability can only depend upon synonymy. The charge is only made stronger when Quine goes beyond considering language in purely formal, logical terms, and turns to its 'factual components', arguing that sentence meanings are changed by the different interpretation of the terms in the sentence.

Quine's final argument against the analytic/synthetic distinction is embodied in his holism. Quine's holism is a plausible intuition about the formation of knowledge, but to do what Quine intends it to do it would have considerably to be strengthened. The image of the web of belief says that in principle all beliefs are relevant to a particular question or experience, and are, subsequently, all equally revisable. The mere fact that Quine singles out the logical laws for mention suggests their case is singular. One's more simple, less sophisticated beliefs form the periphery: they are changed by sense-experience. That is, the change is not voluntary, it is imposed upon one by experience conflicting with that which one earlier accepted: 'recalcitrant experience'. This suggests that they are distinct, but Quine may reply that any experience has a direct evidential link to the logical laws relevant in this situation, as it may suggest an immediate change in an accepted constant. This description, however, suggests equally that logical laws are at the periphery, something Quine is unwilling to say. Quine's argument that all statements have both a 'factual' and a 'linguistic' component allows a second objection to his holism. The periphery, that which confronts experience, can be said to have both components, but Quine says that analytic statements are those without factual components, ones true by virtue of their logical constituents; indeed, this is the only sort of analyticity Quine allows. Unless all have a linguistic component, the beliefs in the web are being distinguished upon some criteria: an analytic/synthetic distinction is being made.
There is no reason to say that logical rules are closer to the centre if all rules share the same status. If sense-experience and belief are changed by one’s experiences, then the effect this has upon the logical laws one accepts is unclear. This constitutes a further problem. Quine objects to the verification principle on the grounds that there are no criteria for the translation of the terms of sensory experience into those describing events in the world. One might suggest, however, that Quine’s holism lacks, and needs, criteria of translation for the periphery of sense-experience to the normative laws of logic. If they are to be revised, then it must clearly be stated just how far the former bears on the latter. Quine would say that his extensional, logical language is not in need of translation, for one constructs sentences according to the laws of logic. This tends to the conclusion that the laws of logic are all-pervasive throughout the web of belief. In turn, this suggests that, as logic is found both at the centre and at the periphery, one revises logic on the basis of sense-experience. One should prefer to say, it can confidently be claimed, that recalcitrant experience would be rejected long before one rejected the logical law. The web of belief, postulated in the Duhem-Quine hypothesis, is a plausible theory, but only on the condition that the web is adapted to contain a core of fundamental laws, analytic statements, which one abandons only when faced with a mass of recalcitrant experience. Logical principles may well apply throughout the web, but only in the sense that experiences are seen in the light of a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Necessarily ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are cognitively synonymous, for one cannot define synonymy, an intensional and an extensional term, without appeal to other intensional terms. Some definite meanings must be taken as analytic⁴, and Lewis shows how synonymies may be established without fear of regress.

---

⁴ This, in turn, lends support to the Kripke/Putnam theory of reference. Putnam (1975b) gives a foil to Frege’s theory of sense and reference. (See Yourgrau, P.; ‘The Path Back to Frege’, pp97-132 in Yourgrau (1990) p100 and also Salmon, N.; Frege’s Puzzle (Harvard University Press) 1986, p. One’s of the reference of one’s words, it is argued, is not the specification of what is truly the referent (the semantic referent). In Yourgrau (1990) p101 the claim is made that Putnam’s twin-earth is a possible world, explicitly in opposition to Leibniz’s and to the between Leibniz and Kant on the constitution of space. See Hanna, R.; Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford, Clarendon) 2001, p. and Mates, B.; ‘Leibniz on Possible Worlds’, pp315-364 in Loux (1979). Kant’s categories, for Yourgrau, give a commitment to the ideality of space (for he argues that distinct, yet symmetrical, cross-world counterparts exist in a distinct yet symmetrical universe). The problem of identifying across possible worlds is simply that of the absolute versus the relational theory of space. (See Kemp Smith, N.; A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (London, Macmillan & Company) 1923, ppxxv-xxxiii. (One might consider the question of which is conventional). The necessity of both intuitions and concepts for knowledge and the existence of a distinct yet world allows space to be only an intuition (it is the form of an intuition and thus prior to conceptualisation). Corollaries of this are that there is no one thing of which one could say that it is the correspondent of one’s world or description of space, and that one, in using such words and descriptions is speaking of a possible world and of nothing resembling an actual world. As Lewis argues, one always refers to possible worlds. On the of a theory of intentionality for any theory of space, cf. Wittgenstein, L.; Philosophical Remarks (University of Chicago) 1975, his response to Russell, B.; The Analysis of Mind (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd) 1921. This should be read with Husserl’s work on geometry and Merleau-Ponty’s response.

246
Lewis describes *Convention* as his ‘effort to rehabilitate analyticity’, and Quine states his reservations, writing that appeal to an analytic/synthetic distinction, ‘...is a characteristic and crucial case of appealing to convention where there can have been no thought of convening’. Quine says that contractualist theories of government, settled by avowed convention, present fewer fears of regress than the case of language does; while both raise problems of ‘latent content’, the problem is acute in the case of language, for the founding of language by overt convention is ‘unthinkable’, and ‘[w]hat is convention when there can be no thought of convening’. Philosophers exploiting an analytic-synthetic distinction place logical truth paradigmatically in the former group, and the regress begins, for conventions for logical truth need logic to derive individual instances, and this circularity is for Quine unacceptable. Lewis, however, shows that convention does not require convening, and that no regress of conditions begins.

Lewis considers the seeming platitude of language conventions. Words in a language have come to mean what they do and not another thing, and ‘[w]e might change our conventions if we like’. Convention obtains, yet Quine and White argue against it in theories for both formal and natural languages. Lewis ventures that it ‘must’ at least be that which elicits a response of recognition in those

---

1 Lewis (1969). Quine’s comments are contained in a Foreword, ppxi-xii.
2 Lewis (1969) pxi.
4 Lewis (1969) pxi.
5 Quine (1966a) pp81ff postulates a notation derived from as much definition (‘movement’) as possible, and from which all idioms may be derived with the addition of truth-functions. He proceeds to consider the arguments for the conclusion that logic is true by convention. He lists the derivations, of ‘not’, of ‘if-then’, and so of ‘or’, and so forth; additionally, with reference to the Carnapian project of simplicity in theory construction, Quine says that definitions may be framed in many different ways, depending upon one’s choice of primitive devices. For example, primitive ‘or’ joins statements to form new statements, and may be given definition by ‘not’ and ‘if’. Quine goes on to argue that a suggested set of recalcitrant mathematical expressions, or those in empirical science, resisting explanation by the logical primitives, can also be rendered true by convention. All of Quine’s many examples proceed along the lines of first or overt convening for a notion of convention. He gives contextual definitions of each of his primitives, allowing the definition of all logical devices from the primitives and the truth functions. Determining contexts in which said constants are true and in which they are false can, Quine shows, be thought to render logic true by convention. On pp96-99 he gives an explanation of the regress set up by the accounts to which Lewis responds.
8 White’s work is less well-known than Quine’s. In ‘The Analytic and Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism’, pp272-286 in Linsky (1952) he shows himself to be as chary as Quine of the definition of ‘logical truth’ as applied to paradigmatic analytic propositions (p is p), and of ‘syntonymy’ between the substituted terms. As in Quine’s criticism of the distinction, and taken up in Grice and Strawson (1980), White remarks that those appealing to the distinction do not themselves understand ‘synonymy’ (pp320-322, and cf. White, M.; *Toward Reunion in Philosophy* (Harvard University Press) 1956, especially pp133-135 on the ‘jargon’ taught by teachers of philosophy). White says that the distinction between ‘analytic’ in a logician’s formalised language, and ‘analytic’ in a natural language entails the impossibility of attributing analyticity to any statement which is not codified in the
sharing a common language, and from this premise he begins. On Hume's account (credited by Lewis), convention is:

...a general sense of common interest, which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules.

I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly enough be call'd a convention or agreement betwixt us, tho' without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are perform'd upon the supposition, that something is to be perform'd on the other part.

Use of language is a 'coordination problem'. Lewis offers eleven illustrative examples, and one is chosen for description. S and H talk on the telephone until they are cut off. Both wish to resume conversation, and one must call back and the other wait. Both are indifferent as to who calls back, but

formalised language, and so the application to ordinary languages is rendered difficult. Philosophers appealing to the distinction might fall back on arguing, '...that people using natural languages behave as if they had made rules for their language just like those of...[formalised languages]...', but White asks, '...how do we establish when people behave as if they had done something which they haven't done?' This raises, White says, the difficulties of counterfactuals (p328). In (1956) p135 White contrasts the use of a child taught the terms 'analytic' and 'a priori', and a philosopher 'corrupted' into thinking that they are synonymous. On p137, White says that the former need fear no 'guilt by association'.

White (1952) does not fear the regress Quine states, but is adamant that before the terms 'analytic' and 'synthetic' can be applied to natural languages, the ways in which convention can be found in a language community must be explained (pp323-324 and cf. Lewis, C.I.; Mind and the World Order (New York, Dover) 1926 and Quine (1960) p). White (1952) p324 sees a 'dodge' in appealing to a notion of synonymy 'in the sense'; cf. White (1956) pp133-134, p157 and Quine (1980). White (1956) pp158-163 asks whether there is a property of sentences making them statutes, and requiring prior discovery before they are accepted as legislation. He answers, surely not, and asks why one should think the case is different for sentences deemed analytic. White adds that different conventions give different statutes. White (1952) is keen to show that his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction is in the spirit, and not necessarily to the letter, of Dewey's. He gives examples of logical truths (p or not p) and of predications (all bachelors are unmarried), and argues that the distinction between analytic propositions, in logical truths, and definitively synthetic, contingent propositions is not easily made (pp326-330). Again, the difficulties of defining what a language community is ('...who are we...'), and of conventions defined for specific communities, are raised. He finds an analogous case in determining relevant criteria for the writing of substitute predicates; how does one describe the way in which predicates are assigned or withheld? Cf. White's example: 'All men are featherless bipeds', (p326). Fascinatingly, he makes the connection between 'modern' dualists, and the scholastic distinction between essence and accident.


11 The term, and the motivation, are derived from the theory of games and rational decision. However, Lewis (1969) p3 adds that the theory is 'scaffolding', and that a theory of convention can be written without it. The canonical source is von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O.; Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (Princeton University Press) 1944. Lewis' greatest acknowledged debt is to Schelling, T.C.; The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press) 1960, and especially chapter four. Schelling (p91) writes, 'the coordination game probably lies behind the stability of institutions and traditions and perhaps the phenomenon of leadership itself'. On p260 conventions are not analogies for limiting cases but themselves limiting cases. Von Neumann and Morgenstern developed game theory for modelling in economies after finding unsatisfactory abstract models in the hard sciences. Bach (1994) p155 notes the need for a theory of salience in such theories (Lewis' difficulties with the notion shall be detailed below). Bach describes the introduction of the notion by Schelling, and offers Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory as a workable alternative (pp155-156). The similarity between Lewis' theory of convention and mutual knowledge and Sperber and Wilson's is implied in Hirst (1989) p140.

each chooses whether to call or wait on their assessment of what the other will do. Cases of coordination, in which parties achieve their desired outcome, are 'equilibria'; no result could be more satisfactory. (Lewis offers further examples of coordination problems in which S and H are indifferent to the equilibria, are not indifferent to the same equilibria, and those in which no outcome can be unqualifiedly best for both.) He writes that the apparent difference between equilibria in which agents do the same and those in which they act differently is spurious, for one says that agents' actions are the same if they are 'of the same kind', that is, instances of a common description, none with claim to primacy (they are conventions, they can be changed), and this will come to be a vital distinction.

For any combination of actions, and a fortiori for any equilibrium combination of actions, there is some way of describing the agents' alternative actions so that exactly those alternative actions in the given combination fall under a common description.

A description of a combination as one in which each performs the same action 'depends merely on the naturalness of that classification', and consequences follow for the definition of coordination problems as situations in which agents aim for equilibrium, for equilibria may be achieved by luck or

\[
\begin{align*}
R_1, C_1 & : 1, \text{ meet, 1} \\
R_1, C_2 & : 0, 0 \\
R_1, C_3 & : 0, 0 \\
R_2, C_1 & : 0, 0 \\
R_2, C_2 & : 1, \text{ meet, 1} \\
R_2, C_3 & : 0, 0 \\
R_3, C_1 & : 0, 0 \\
R_3, C_2 & : 0, 0 \\
R_3, C_3 & : 1, \text{ meet, 1}
\end{align*}
\]

R3, C2 is an equilibrium by Lewis' definition for S prefers it to R1, C1 or R3, C1, and H prefers it to R2, C1 or R2, C3.

Lewis (p10) changes, in his next example, the preference ranking regarding the places to which S and H go, although, as he emphasises, not so as to affect the their mutual preference for meeting.

For illustration Lewis (1969) pp11-12 returns to a simple payoff matrix. There are two action descriptions to be considered, firstly in which S and H, in actions R1 and C1, choose to call back and to wait respectively, and secondly in which they choose not to do the appropriate actions. A payoff matrix may be drawn for them:

\[
\begin{align*}
R_1, C_1 & : 0, 0 \\
R_1, C_2 & : 1, 1 \\
R_2, C_1 & : 1, 1 \\
R_2, C_2 & : 0, 0
\end{align*}
\]

Lewis adds that if one has in mind the actions descriptions, R1' or C1': calling back iff one is the original caller and R2' or C2': calling back iff one is not the original caller, one can draw the matrix:

\[
\begin{align*}
R_1', C_1' & : 1, 1 \\
R_1', C_2' & : 0, 0 \\
R_2', C_1' & : 0, 0 \\
R_2', C_2' & : 1, 1
\end{align*}
\]
with no knowledge of what others will do. Success is more likely, Lewis argues, through, ‘...a system of suitably concordant mutual expectations’, or, ‘precedent’: on the balance of past evidence of similar or identical situations, assessment of typical behaviour, and the nesting of higher-order expectations of S’s and H’s intentions, they call back or wait as appropriate. (Sincerity conditions are one case of mutually known dispositions, and Lewis takes up a discussion below).

Conventions arising from cooperative social practices, and the utility of theories of rationality in their execution, preoccupy Heal. The complex, Gricean intentions describing mutual knowledge that require account from II are rejected, and a distinction made between ‘dispositional’ and ‘occurent’ knowledge. Dispositional knowledge is, as Lewis says, a vast network of capabilities and practices, and it is man’s limited capacity for developing it that suggest to Heal the weakness of Lewis’ arguments. Dispositional and occurent knowledge, and Heal’s arguments, are considered below. Some of Lewis’ points are summarised: once established, disseminated and learnt, a convention can indefinitely persist or be replaced. No convention defines behaviour in its entirety: in language one may remain silent, yet still conform to the conventions of a language. For Lewis, a working language is a convention between users to use it, and the conventions of language are regularities restricting one’s operations with its, ‘...verbal utterances and inscriptions’. One conforming without reason, or by luck, is not party to the convention. For Gilbert, these tenets of Lewis’ theory belie an, ‘underlying abstract argument’, and she lists the premises. Lewis writes that conventions are, by definition, arbitrary; they are regularities in behaviour, in the interests of all party to them, obtaining between rational agents (as defined), sharing mutual knowledge. Gilbert remarks that Lewis never defines the sense of ‘arbitrary’ with which he works. The platitude definition of convention as arbitrary because another equally

The equilibria in this case are no more natural explanations of S’s and H’s actions than are those in the first matrix, and, Lewis, asks, what difference would be marked by the fact in the case that they were? This goes to show that the important notion regarding the study of coordination is not the uniformity or familiarity of action but their resulting in equilibria.

Lewis (1969) pp12-27 considers situations of conflict between agents and the ways in which they may be represented so as to make the payoffs to S and H add up to zero in each case (in which S’s losses are H’s gains and vice versa). He examines coordination equilibria in games of pure conflict, the presence of non-coordination equilibria (pp15-16), the presence of dominant choices determining (not necessarily coordination equilibrium, p17), and, most importantly, the requirement, to avoid cases of coordination by chance, for S’s and H’s choices to be, as it were, based upon expectations about the ways the other will act (pp22-22 and 27). It is worth repeating, again apropos the quotation from Hume, that the ‘...theory of games is scaffolding’, the theory of convention can be stated without it.

Lewis (1969) pp279ff describes the way in which one may develop, and reason from, (mutual) expectations about others’ behaviour, cases in which one replicates others’ reasoning; he introduces the notion (so vital below), of salience.

Lewis (1969) pp36-42 considers the force of precedent (‘...one important kind of salience...’), as a motor of coordination. The depth and sensitivity of Lewis’ analysis is impressive (cf. p40).


Heal (1978) p117. Heal also states a theory of intention for a theory of reasons for action, surveying the tradition from Aristotle. On p118 it is suggested that a theory of rational action may help elucidate the ‘phenomenology’ of common knowledge, and the link to prisoner’s dilemma situations is made (p123). Cf. Evans and McDowell (1976), and Weissman, D.; Dispositional Properties (Southern Illinois University Press) 1965.

Lewis (1969) pp49-51. That is, it is not, say, a convention that Welshman use Welsh, but that they have, and continue to, coordinate in the use of a language that the world calls Welsh.
suitable might have been chosen counsels indifference, and conventions are not matters for indifference, but of "...judgement, decision or will". However, this is an unworthy objection. The sense of 'indifference' with which Lewis works allows merely that situations for which conventions arise are not chosen or, necessarily, willed. They arise in all manner of everyday situations, and compel those party to them to discover, or to create, a means with which to deal with them, and this indeed requires judgment, decision and will. It is not a convention, in Lewis' sense, that Welshmen use Welsh, for the rules of a well-developed, natural language are instantiations of the ways in which signs may come to mean, and it is at this prior stage that Lewis' theory of convention works. The rules of Welsh were settled, for the most part, without agreement, but by the convergence, over time, of a language community on a series of practices, which through dissemination and codification, became settled. The language continues to tolerate some change, but is, now, substantially stable; the Welsh might have alighted on a different language, or still yet decide to change the one they use, but if they were to this would demand that the previously Welsh speaking community settle some conventions for future communication. In the use of all languages there arise situations for which new conventions are required, and these are accommodated without any threat to the going concern that is the stable language. The process of settling conventions is the same as that required for all languages or systems of communication.

Mutual knowledge of others' behaviour consists of first- and higher-order expectations (communicated in 'indications', described in Grice's meaning), and Lewis asks how the regress is stopped; that is, how indications are curtailed to issue in belief or action. A higher-order expectation (say that H recognises that S intends him to recognise his intention), is formed according to assumptions

---

26 It is replied in what follows that Lewis' errors are, at best, of infelicity and surely not of substance. None of Gilbert's points evade Lewis' analysis (of Lewis (1969) pp40-42). Gilbert (1986) pp340-341 writes that one can find numerous examples of social conventions that are not obviously conventional in the sense that there can be equally good alternatives, and she suggests conventions of, say, replying to the host with thanks after a party; this is not a saliently arbitrary course of action and can be considered a convention without contemplating whether there are alternatives equally acceptable from another reasonable point of view. She goes on to consider other poor objections to Lewis' definition of convention.
27 Armstrong (1971) pp436-437 utilises Lewis for his argument that conventions are not agreements, tacit or explicit, but regularities promulgated and disseminated. Notions of the privacy of practice (Wittgenstein's, Bourdieu's, Dreyfus' and Heidegger's), are discussed in Stem, D.; 'Practices, Practical Holism and Background Practices', pp53-69 in Wrathall and Malpas (2000b). Stem raises issues pertinent for a theory of dwelling (in Heidegger's sense) and intentionalities, see especially p60.
28 Lewis, D.K.; 'Languages and Language', pp3-35 in Gunderson, K. (ed); Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume VII, Language, Mind and Knowledge (University of Minnesota) 1975, p makes the connection between languages, as per the functions described, and language, as a "...rational, convention-governed human social activity". As in (1969), Lewis discusses what it is for a language to become the functional system used in a specific community, and the conditions of truthfulness and trust are again described. Cf. Warnke (1997) pp112 and the Gadamerian/Davidsonian reply to these points on pp113ff. Habermas considers the ways in which consensus can be skewed by power, ideologies and the lack of trust or sincerity, and a fuller study would reveal the ways in which Lewis' conventions can allay Habermas' concerns. Rawls and Habermas debate the original position and the rules in it that individuals may play, in Habermas, J.; 'Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls' Political Liberalism', pp109-131, and Rawls, J.; 'Reply to Habermas', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. XCI, no. 3, pp121-180, 1995.
of rationality, and issues in belief or action when there are no further, deeper expectations or intentions
to which S and H may infer; the force of precedent, or ‘regularity’, brings common assent to
coordination. Extrapolation to future instances of like or identical coordinations allows conventions.
Each convention is self-perpetuating as conformity is seen to maximise benefits and satisfy desires.30

Lewis’ first ‘rough’ definition is as follows:

A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are agents in a
recurrent situation s is a convention if and only if, in any instance of s among members of
P, (1) everyone conforms to R; (2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; (3)
everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since s is a coordination
problem and uniform conformity to R is a coordination equilibrium in s.31

The nesting of higher-order expectations, and the need for coordinated intentions to issue in actions
demands the addition of a common knowledge condition, and thus Lewis gives an ‘amended’
definition:

A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are agents in a
recurrent situation s is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common
knowledge in P that, in any instance of s among members of P, (1) everyone conforms to
R; (2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; (3) everyone prefers to conform
to R on condition that the others do, since s is a coordination problem and uniform
conformity to R is a coordination equilibrium in s.32

It should be emphasised that coordination on this analysis covers cases of coordination over time, and
even in the absence of H. The situation, say, might be one in which a new member (x) of a P meets the
practices of P, or of a certain (S) of P (whom, say, x never meets), settled long before. The neophyte
learns the appropriate behaviour regarding S in experience, trial and error and so forth. In this also is
the solution to the situation in which S chooses to call or to wait.33 (After further refinements a third
definition is given)34. The consideration of ‘abnormal instances of S’ compels a further analysis for the
exclusion of inapplicable cases, and with this Lewis arrives at his final definition:

---

30 As Grice before him, Lewis finds no viciousness in the infinite regress. It is chain of implications, not of one’s reasoning.
31 Lewis (1969) p40. This is, of course, in a world without freeriders. Additionally, actions conforming to conventions are
‘unrestricted as to time...’.
32 Lewis (1969) p42.
33 Lewis (1969) p58.
34 Lewis’ theory deals with the cases of absent S by dint of being a theory of convention. The context is supplied by H owing to
his shared knowledge of identical and similar situations.
35 Lewis (1969) p56. The definition runs: ‘A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are agents in
a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in any instance of S
A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are agents in a recurrent situation s is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in almost any instance of s among members of P, (1) almost everyone conforms to R; (2) almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to R; (3) almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible combinations of actions; (4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R, on condition that almost everyone conform to R; (5) almost everyone would prefer that any one more conform to R', on condition that almost everyone conform to R', where R' is some possible regularity in the behaviour of members of P in s, such that almost no one in almost any instance of s among members of P could conform both to R' and to R.\footnote{35}

Gilbert questions the faith Lewis, and Grandy, have in the role of precedent, or example, as a guide for assumptions of rationality and the course of future action.\footnote{36} This concerns precisely the importance of repeated, nested reasoning: what Gilbert calls 'reason-replication'. Why should S call back, as he has done before, in this instance? The force of precedent must be explained. S, to attempt coordination, must ask whether he should observe precedent, on condition that H does, and thus replicate H's reasoning. However, H must carry out a similar replication of S's reasoning, with similar failure.\footnote{37} By Lewis' theory, if two rational agents act similarly in an equilibrium (as defined), then neither could have improved the outcome, yet there is no compelling reason why they should so act, and the complications of this for Lewis' main concern, the conventions governing communication, must be considered. To repeat, it is the core of his study to reveal how signs come to have meaning, and it is not good enough to say that actions become signals when one arbitrarily assigns them meanings (this is as Lewis repeats, an impoverished view of convention), for communication is a coordination problem, with S and H finding success, and communication, if equilibria is secured; in time equilibria become conventions, invoked and used without further explicit convening.\footnote{38}

among members of P, (1) everyone conforms to R; (2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; (3) everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible combinations of actions; (4) everyone prefers that everyone conform to R, on condition that at least all but one conform to R; (5) everyone prefers that everyone conform R, on condition that at least everyone prefers that at least all but one conform to R', where R' is some possible regularity in the behaviour of members of P in s, such that no one in any instance of S among members of P could conform both to R' and to R.

\footnote{36}{Lewis (1969) p78. The definition appears in Lewis' addendum to (1969), namely (1975). Lewis writes that R allows for the condition of arbitrariness in conventions, and this, contra Gilbert's objections, is still a matter of judgement, decision and will.}


\footnote{38}{Gilbert (1989) pp347-348.}

\footnote{35}{The one described by Lewis happens to be begun by an explicit agreement.

\footnote{36}{In this, as Lewis (1969) p122 says, meaning can be left to 'look after itself'. Lewis describes a coordination problem between S and H according to a set of contingency plans. Whichever contingency plan is chosen, they achieve coordination (R1, C1; R2, C2;
Lewis describes a signalling problem. It involves S, H and a series of alternative states of affairs \((s, ..., n)\), with S aware of which holds. H can respond in one of several ways \((r, ..., n)\). Both S and H want the latter to follow from the former. There is a certain one-to-one function \(F\) from \(s_i\) onto \(r_j\) such that everyone prefers that each member of \(H\) do \(F(s_i)\) on condition that \(s_i\) holds, for each \(s_i\). S can do one of a number of actions (signals), \(s, ..., n\), and neither he nor \(H\) has preferences skewing the dependency of responses upon states of affairs. S has a 'contingency plan' (items to be arranged for conventional communication in innumerable ways: flags, sticks, lanterns, scorches marks, reporting any possible way in which a signal depends upon a state of affairs), with a function \(F_c\) from \(s_i\) to \(\sigma_k\). H's contingency plan is any possible way in which a response depends on S's signal: a function \(F_a\) from part of \(\sigma_k\) to \(r_j\). In the case that S acts according to \(F_c\) and H acts according to \(F_a\), the latter's response depends on the state of affairs holding according to function \(F_a \mid F_c\). When \(F_a \mid F_c = F\) over the class of signals, H's response is performed in the state of affairs in \(\{s_i\}\) obtaining, and so both parties act for the best given each others' contingencies and all possible states of affairs. This is a 'signalling system'.

\(R_0, C_0\) if the message intended to be communicated is sent and received, according to mutual expectations about the other's choices.

\[
\begin{align*}
R_0, C_0 & : 1, 1 \\
R_1, C_0 & : 0, 0 \\
R_1, C_1 & : 0, 0 \\
R_2, C_1 & : 0, 0 \\
R_3, C_1 & : 1, 1 \\
R_3, C_2 & : 0, 0 \\
R_4, C_2 & : 0, 0 \\
R_5, C_3 & : 0, 0 \\
R_6, C_3 & : 1, 1 \\
\ldots
\end{align*}
\]

In such cases there may occur conditionally successful communication \((R_i, C_i)\), in which S may or may not give the correct signal depending upon what information he is fed, and also failures in which, invariably, the wrong signal is given \((R_i, C_j)\). Lewis argues that he has described a case of signalling without reference to the meanings of the signals and adds that such two-sided coordination problems are directly applicable to one-sided problems (in which there is only one agent, S or H, choosing a contingency plan), and for those in which one- and two-sided problems are mixed.

\(H\) might be a collective, or an audience, but for simplicity Lewis (1969) p130 considers two-sided problems. Cf. Miller, H.J.; 'Negotiation Principles', pp211-229 in O'Hare, G.M.P. and Jennings, N.R. (eds.), Foundations of Distributed Artificial Intelligence (New York, John Wiley and Sons) 1996. Miller discusses notions of coordination and collective decision and the tacit ideas of negotiation needed to arrive at them. Numerous other essays in the volume are vital for developing a possible world theory of intentionality for distributed systems.

4\ Lewis (1969) p131.

5\ Lewis (1969) p131. The preferred response, Lewis says, is to be the same for all members of H. This may seem restrictive, but it is not. If the preferred action of a member of the audience depends on his circumstances, his role in the situation, or anything else beside the state of affairs \(\{s_i\}\), that dependence should be built into the specifications of the responses \(r_j\). If a warship is in distress, another warship's preferred response may be this: to take her place in battle if it is possible to do so effectually; otherwise to come to her aid. We count this as one response, specified by a pair of conditionals.

6\ Lewis (1969) p131-132 gives a treatment identical to that given for Fe (described in the previous footnote), for Fa, H's contingency plan.

7\ Lewis (1969) p131. Lewis adds that for any two functions \(f\) and \(g\) and any argument \(x\) such that \(g(x)\) is in the domain of \(f\), \(f|g(x)\) is defined as \(f(g(x))\), and that \(f|g\) is undefined for other arguments. He offers (pp132-133) two formal proofs for admissible contingency plans as signalling systems.

8\ Lewis (1969) p132.
choosing which signal to send and which response to make, a coordination problem is established, with payoffs for combinations dependent upon payoffs for each state of affairs and their probabilities. Hea. Heal objects to the definition; it presumes conditions of common knowledge between S and H: of similar background knowledge, of powers of observation and inference, and of the state of affairs in which they find themselves as, "...good evidence that both...have good evidence that the set-up exists". (Heal gives the implicit reasoning: "Because things are arranged in this way, it follows that each...can see that they are arranged in this way"; this is central to a theory of mutual knowledge. Shared abilities to reason and infer allow S and H, from this base, to carry out an, "...indefinately extended chain of reasonings". What is more, the knowledge that both can do this, is shared; they can 'replicate', reasoning. For Heal, this raises the problem of the way in which dispositional knowledge may issue in occurrent knowledge, and the difficulties are discussed later in this section. Suffice to say that in the theory as presently described, occurrent knowledge of the situation is possible (that S means that p) without H realising so), that is, without reference to a disposition.

Lewis defines a signalling convention as one in which S and H participate in a signalling system by acting according to their contingency plans, chosen as the best rational solution to a coordination problem. He raises two difficult cases: the first of S not blindly following his contingency plan for a

4 Lewis (1969) pp133-135 writes that, for some combinations, S must consider what he expects members of H to do in response to signals not in the domains of the functions given by their chosen contingency plans. He also shows that some 'inadmissible' contingency plans (those for which there are workable, equally useful, alternatives), may be coordination equilibria. He adds that ...if the audience has just one member, then no combination of one admissible plan and one inadmissible plan can be an equilibrium; for another combination on the same row or column would be a signalling system and would be preferred to the given combination'.

Lewis defines a signalling convention as a convention in which members of P in a coordination problem do their parts of a signalling system by acting according to their contingency plans, and remarks that if some coordination problems have an equilibrium that is not a signalling system, then one must conclude that there are conventions that are not signalling conventions ...even though they govern the choice of contingency plans in a signalling problem'.


Relevant notions of the 'background', and Searle's and Dreyfus' conflicting notions, are discussed in Wrathall, M.A.; 'Background Practices, Capacities and Heideggerian Disclosure', pp93-114 in Wrathall and Malpas (2000b).

4 Heal (1978) p126.
4 Heal (1978) p126.
specific coordination problem, but deliberating on the outcomes of many possible actions and doing that which is best: is this a choice of a whole contingency plan or merely of a part dealing with the present contingency? The second features $S$ following his procedure absent-mindedly, knowing that it gets the job done, for $H$ accordingly follows a pattern. Such justifications, or motivations, explain choices, regardless of whether the justification is ever explicitly given. In a passage which must be read with his later comments on intention and convention (in a discussion of meanings), Lewis writes that,

...it is a fact of human nature that we tend to act in ways justified by our beliefs and desires, even when we do not think through the justification. I may put it negatively: whatever may be the habitual processes that actually do control our choices, if they started tending to go against our beliefs and desires they soon would be overridden, corrected, and retrieved by explicit practical reasoning.

Lewis writes that exemplary signals are speech acts and writings, used for verbal expression and signalling. Communication between two agents may use such a conventional system, and in cases in which $H$ sends, ‘...a piece of paper on which marks are inscribed’, without use of code or cipher, the verbal signal is indistinguishable from ordinary use of language. Natural language, though more sophisticated, has such verbal signals, and when they are used, they are conventional. The objection, mooted by Heal, that occurrent knowledge of conventional use in a situation may arise, on Lewis’ analysis, without either $S$ or $H$ realising, may be returned to. The problem is acute in cases of meaning, in which $S$ means $p$ in a situation in which $H$ has occurrent knowledge without $H$ realising, and Heal objects that Lewis cannot conceivably claim that mutual knowledge obtains in such situations. A further remark of Heal’s has a Strawsonian air. If $S$ proceeds, mistakenly, as if $H$ remains ignorant of his actions in, say, setting a rat in his house, $S$ does not (or fails to), draw the inference that the

---


3 Lewis (1969) p141. One might consider the case raised in Grice (1989a) p222 of a man who acts as per an original intention, having conceived a later intention to act differently. Here the notions of intention and convention arise, returned to in Lewis’ discussion of meaning. An excellent discussion of this is in Heal (1978) pp118-122.

31 Lewis (1969) p114. He adds, Lewis (1969) p142, that ‘[o]fficially, the signal is the action. But we usually need not be careful to distinguish the action, the string of sounds or marks produced by the action, and the verbal expression uttered or inscribed; all three can be called the signal. We can also allow “uttering” to cover inscribing as well as vocal uttering.’

3 Lewis (1969) pp142-143 considers a hypothetical verbal community with verbal signalling conventions for various uses and a number of ad hoc expressions. An interpreter or translator will discover the significant deficiencies in the language, namely, that every verbal expression used was conventionally linked with ‘...some readily observable state of affairs, or with some definite responsive action, or with both’. They can use only finitely many verbal expressions, and the conventions governing their signalling can be described ‘...by mentioning each expression they used’. We human speakers, Lewis adds, are similar in the use of signalling conventions, but we do so much more with language.

36 Heal (1978) p125.
situation is one of common knowledge, even though it is one. H might infer (again, mistakenly), that S does not share similar abilities and background knowledge: there is here, as before, nothing to get S or H from dispositional to occurrent knowledge. Both may continue working out that the other can carry out this reasoning *ad infinitum*, but nothing says that they arrive at common knowledge or communicated meaning.

Lewis turns to the meanings of signals, a stage on the way to his theories of truth and convention in a language, given *via* a theory of moods. σ is a signal which, when used in accordance with a convention, is a conventional signal that the corresponding state of affairs (s) holds: more simply, σ is a conventional signal to give a response (r). What then does σ mean? When is it, say, indicative or imperative? The distinction between them (and of the ‘natural’ signal: one which might be a directive – to or –that), is in the intentions motivating S and H (plans Fc and Fa), and the ‘deliberation’ required of S in choosing the appropriate course of action to compel H’s correct response. (Lewis dubs this the degree to which they are ‘discretionary’). When Fa is discretionary and Fc not, σ is indicative; when Fc is discretionary and Fa not, σ is imperative; when neither, σ is neutral. Meaning$_{SN}$ occurs if S intends his action to produce in H an effect by means of the recognition of intention. (Lewis adds only that, as above, cases of natural meaning elicit H’s response according to an established signalling convention).

With σ as a signal of a conventional signalling system (Fc, Fa), s a state of affairs, and r a response such that σ is Fc (s) and r is Fa (σ), in a classic signalling problem with σ given according to a convention with s holding, S means$_{SN}$ in uttering σ. As noted in II, one may mean$_{NN}$ but deceptively (that is, a signal accepted as conventional in the language common to S and H is not in conformity to the appropriate convention of signalling): S might issue his signal in the mistaken belief that it adheres to a convention, and so fail to produce an intended response. With reference to Searle’s example of the captured soldier, Lewis writes that the difficulty of H’s interpreting S’s utterance is obviated, and to Strawson, that S (and H) may think they are not conforming to a convention in the rat case, a description of their behaviour requiring only a theory of ‘salience’ and not ‘precedent’, for, as Lewis says, an analysis of mutual knowledge need make no appeal to reason replication. Furthermore, Searle’s desire to capture the intentional and the conventional in communication is satisfied by Lewis’

---

37 Heal (1978) p127.
39 Lewis (1969) p155. Lewis applies the very same reasoning as he does in the explications of mutual knowledge and of the discerning of relative contingency plans.
40 Lewis (1969) p159. Lewis thinks the regress of mutual, nested reasoning ends.
theory, for the conventional accounts for the intentional in that it is a theory of what S may plausibly (intend to) mean by an utterance, and what H may take S to (intend to) mean60.

Heal rejects Lewis’ argument that the condition starting the regress (for both Lewis and Schiffer, virtuous), can be delegated to mere ‘salience’62. Her argument is predicated on the assumption that all that is required for study of the mutual knowledge conditions, and to demonstrate the circularity of any attempt to isolate a singularly salient condition, is a short initial segment of the regress of duplicated reasoning. Heal asks how an instance of successful coordination can result in mutual knowledge, for neither interlocutor can ascertain whether the other acts entirely at random or not, and, moreover, whether this justifies persevering with the choice in the hope of achieving equilibrium in future qualitatively similar cases63. If S thinks H has no means of deriving laws from their successful (random) correlation, he will conclude that H chose without reason: in the circumstances this is surely rational. S’s only reason for his choice is that he thinks H will respond to it in an appropriate way, and thus (as described above) his reason is never made in confidence64. Augmentation of the segment raises the same problems. Gilbert concurs, arguing that Lewis writes as if conformity to successful precedent is, simply, a mark of rationality65. Lewis’ earlier remarks, she says, sound an equivocal note, for elsewhere he writes that precedent is the source of mutual knowledge (of salience), and of, ‘conspicuous uniqueness’, a concession, perhaps, that rationality is not enough. All the same, Lewis argues that mutual knowledge of reasons for action give expectations that others will act in similar ways; he speaks also of tendencies to act set by precedent, and it is Gilbert’s contention that with this Lewis introduces further caveats to his theory of rationality, for neither tendencies nor expectations are characteristic of the reasoning faculty. Gilbert paraphrases Lewis’ argument: ‘...if a certain strategy has been successful in the past in a given coordination problem, CP, then failing any reason to do otherwise, a rational agent will use it in future occurrences of CP’, and Gilbert replies that this traduces a basic tenet of game theory, namely, that demanding a condition of rationality, for agents now have an, ‘a-rational

60 Cf. Dasenbrook, R.W.; Truth and Consequences: Intentions, Conventions and the New Thematics (Pennsylvania State University) 2001. Dasenbrook argues against the conventionalism of Fish, Rorty and Foucault, and for the reasons adumbrated by Davidson and Putnam (described in 1.1). Dasenbrook suggests in its place (explicitly contra Derrida), a new approach to intentionality for literary criticism. As will be argued, Lewis’ theory of convention is rigorous, bearing none of the difficulties Derrida describes, and Dasenbrook notes this, cf. p267, fn. 4. It is precisely to avoid objections to an intention and convention theory, as voiced by Fish (1980) pp203-204, that the theories of attitudes and of Lewisian conventions are developed in this dissertation.
61 Heal (1978) pp121-122.
62 Heal (1978) pp122-123.
63 Heal (1978) p126.
tendency' to follow the successful procedure. What works, or proves successful, Gilbert writes, is not necessarily rational.

Heal considers a scenario: having achieved a random success, S and H choose the same again, notwithstanding that there is no compelling reason. Even with the addition of nested conditions, there is still no justified choice: the point from which the justification grows remains an 'irrational impulse'.

She writes:

[but] either the existence of this impulse is necessary to justify coordination even in undoubted situations of common knowledge, which implies the strange conclusion that those lacking this impulse could not rationally cooperate in such situations, or the justification provided...by the line of argument sketched above is not the same as that provided by common knowledge and so we lose reason to say that ...[the irrational situation]...is one of common knowledge.

What is more, the knowledge in irrational impulse situations cannot guarantee the justification of coordination, for the irrational impulse can be removed altogether: if S or H makes the same choice on a second occasion, but fails to achieve coordination, there is no justification, and because of the doubt in the interlocutors' minds, no impulse. (Heal remarks on the fact of Lewis apparently tolerating an irrational impulse to govern salience conditions). She argues that although the impulse may be suppressed or frustrated, this need not prevent coordination, for salience may be accounted for without it. The notions Heal considers for a theory of common knowledge prove too demanding (of an omniscience, requiring knowledge of an infinity of conditionals), or too weak (simply not establishing mutual knowledge), and Heal suggests a middle way, demanding that parties to a coordination know that, '...reasons for believing a certain class of propositions are available and will be utilised if need be'. This demands neither that the parties believe in the propositions nor that they have reasons for believing them, but only that each, knowing that minds are transparent, can 'replicate' the other's reasoning. This is the basis of cooperative action. Lewis' account is correct, yet incomplete; it requires

---

66 Gilbert (1986) p337. Gilbert (p338) writes that Lewis' references to tendencies seem to make no distinction between actual, motivating tendencies that S might have to repeat successful behaviour and, say, '...possibly false expectations that people have such tendencies', and she adds that surely even rational agents (on Lewis' terms), can be fed false information. 'However, if the agents are allowed to be wrong about the springs of one another's actions, we have moved quite far from the original game-theoretical picture in which the workings of each agent's mind are available to the others'. See also Gilbert's example (pp338-339 making a stronger case against the possibility of reason-replication).

68 Heal (1978) p124.
70 Heal (1978) p128.
the addition of a clause establishing that S and H are both aware that certain, mutual knowledge is attainable. The full analysis runs:

It is common knowledge between S and H that p iff:

(i) S and H share reasoning standards;

(ii) S and H know that (a) a certain set-up exists (b) its existence is for them good evidence that p (c) its existence is for them good evidence that both know that the set-up exists;

(iii) on the basis of his knowledge of the set-up and of the shared standards of reasoning, S and H each knows that:

(I) p;

(II) what he can infer from the existence of the set-up using (i), (ii) (b) and (ii) (c) the other can infer also;

(III) each thus has available the same class of beliefs about the existence of the set-up, the fact that p and their mutual knowledge on these matters;

(IV) hence for any belief in this class, it is not possible that some shared purpose makes it important for one person to have the belief and the other to know he has it, while there is also uncertainty or error about whether this desired state of affairs obtains71.

An instance of coordination results in common knowledge and repeated action because both S and H know that coordination requires that they pick out, by focusing on a prominent or salient feature, as Lewis says, one course of action above all others. Each course of action is uniquely identified in that is the course of action it is and not another; it is identified by both S and H according to its `prima facie salience’72. (Indeed, on this, a previous, chance, coordination counts as an instantiation of a prima facie salience). Heal emphasises the way in which any course of action (A) tending to coordination must be tested for relative significance to S and H: if H is ignorant of A’s salience to S, then salience to S will produce nothing. This ramifies through all of the conditions of prima facie salience, for, as above, no finite sample of the common knowledge conditions can result in certainty that salience to S is not rendered useless by H’s ignorance. (Prima facie salience to S being based on knowledge that A is prima facie salient to H, and H’s confidence on his knowledge that A is prima facie salient to S, in a

71 Heal (1978) pp128-129. Heal adds that in this analysis infinite, potential knowledge appears but only as the object of ‘finite’, ‘actual’ thought.
72 Heal (1978) p129.
regress ad infinitum). The virtue of Heal’s addition to Lewis is that it rules out the difficulties of ignorance, because it is not founded upon reason replication.

Gilbert’s arguments against the force of precedence lead her to consider, following Heal, the rôle of salience, and her fears are, as seen in the following section, allayed in similar fashion. The idea that a successful combination is uniquely salient turns, in Lewis’s work, on an unuttered assumption. If H calls back according to successful precedent, then ‘from a purely logical point of view’, not calling back in identical circumstances is the unprecedented case, and the distinction is important for psychology not for analysis, for there is no greater reason to choose the preceded over the unprecedented case. Choosing the salient as the only way of coordinating satisfies neither Lewis’ conditions on equilibria, for they tolerate ‘a-rational’ tendencies, nor gives reasons for acting. Acting to achieve a non-salient combination in a coordination situation, having no mind for, or ignoring, one’s interlocutor’s actions, is equally rational; what is asked for is a reason for both agents (independently, in the limiting case), to choose the only correct course of action. As Gilbert says, mere conspicuousness is no guide. Gilbert looks to cases of non-trivial decision situations (ones requiring nested intentions), in which the structure of preferences written to give a coordination problem as defined is absent, giving an example of the difficulty of coordinating one’s decisions to reasoning of what others will do: with the introduction to the example of preference rankings, one encounters a coordination problem containing S and H (two invitees to a party). S may regard as the ideal situation, S’s wearing a dinner-jacket with black tie and H’s wearing a dinner-jacket with white tie, or their both wearing clown suits. Other, less favoured preferences follow, down to a least favoured. H has a similar ranking, though with no two preferences congruent with S’s. However, there is in the example no case in which there is two competing, typical coordination equilibria, and the desired convention, it may reasonably be concluded,

74 Gilbert (1989) p332 asks two simple questions: does a previously successful combination of actions make them salient, and if so, why, again, should rational agents care?
75 Gilbert (1989) pp332-333 considers the prospects for a salience condition in a society of ‘... highly nonconformist... or determinedly creative people...’; the fact that something has been done in the past would not recommend it to such people. What, Gilbert asks, could be expected of a rational Martian? She goes on to argue that it is generally not the case that salience of precedent combinations is engendered by common knowledge of successful precedent, even given common knowledge of rationality.
76 Gilbert (1989) pp333-334 says that arguments for the necessity of a condition of salience are often presented as fait accompli.
Owing to the fact that rationality will not provide a reason for action in ‘one-off’ cases, what clues can be given to direct coordination? Concluding that there are such clues to be found is to say ‘... maybe instincts or psychological propensities which have nothing to do with rationality could operate in a situation with this preference structure, so that beings of the relevant psychological type, at least, could cope with it. In itself this kind of move seems permissible... What I [Gilbert] am arguing is that within the framework of game theory the assumption that some point is salient gets us nowhere. That is, it does not move the agents’ reasoning on to the conclusion: act this way’. On p337 Gilbert rejects the idea that agents may simply carry out inductions from S’s act to an appropriate response.
77 Gilbert (1989) pp334-335 adds that there are cases to make her point. Firstly, in one-off cases, reasoning that does not appeal to salience dictates a course of action to S and to H. Secondly,
arises by chance. (It is also to be added that, again, there is here more than one equilibrium in which S and H would, each individually, be better off).²

Heal’s and Gilbert’s work makes the substantive points against Lewis’ arguments made in critical assessments. It is argued in the following section that the rejection of the notions of salience and precedence, and of arguments doubting the abilities of S and H to reason to others’ intentions and conventions in acting or understanding are of no threat to Lewis’ theory. Heal’s replacement, the theory of unique salience without reason replication, is unnecessary, for Lewis’ conventions are, as required by the absence in Gricean theory, descriptive of mutual knowledge and of S intention. More importantly, the theory is applicable to elucidating conventions of language. As Heal says, the problems of nested intentions, or reason replication, obtain for even the shortest section of reasoning regarding S’s intentions, and in the following section there are two main points to be made, each with a common root. Firstly, Lewis shows how a possible worlds theory of intentionality makes no claim for the necessity of H’s settling upon one certain course of action or interpretation in response to S’s utterance. Lewis does not require that a course of action be uniquely salient in the sense advocated by Heal and Gilbert, but that S’s act be interpreted as a type of action (as above), performed in different equilibria, the congeries of which constitute successful coordination. Equilibrium conditions in different coordination equilibria describing the same coordination problem, are each describable as actions with a common description, namely, as successful coordinations given the intentions of S and H in the state of affairs instantiating the coordination problem. (This, it should be recalled, is of the definition of convention, for all coordination equilibria in a coordination problem are conventional under a certain description). That is, there is no fundamental meaning, or unitary connection to reality, in a speech act (one that can easily be frustrated in parasitical or non-denoting utterances), but a host of plausible contexts for accommodating utterances in different, near and far, possible worlds or states of affairs. This, the second point, shall be seen to show that H can reason to S’s likely meaning in a speech act without fear of Heal’s and Gilbert’s objections to the notion that conventions can arise without reference to explicit conventions.

3. Conventions and Language

The core of Lewis’ work is his theory of possible languages, with which he offers an eloquent reply to the problems of demonstratives and a workable theory of analyticity for language. Both Quine’s arguments against conventions and Derrida’s for the relativisation of language to an illimitable number of contexts are challenged; indeed, in response to the latter, Lewis’ theory says that language assigns interpretations not to its sentences, but to the possible occasions of utterance of its sentences, conceived not as contexts but as instantiations in possible worlds: in this the condition that conventions for uses of language be applicable to specific utterances in specific situations is obviated. As said, the signalling language Lewis describes (presented in IV.2), is limited in its application to contingent states of affairs (ones that do not draw upon enduring conventions), and Lewis begins his theory of possible languages by moving to solve this problem.

Lewis describes language \( \mathcal{L} \) as a replacement for the signalling language. The latter fails for it contains no way to create new, true sentences, and introduces truth-conditions as applying only to specific sentences reporting corresponding states of affairs. It allows no idle conversation: all sentences are spoken to a specific purpose of coordination, and the governing conventions in these cases are defined relative to an interest in the ‘short run’. It offers no provision for opinions or hypotheses, argument and speculation. Most importantly, \( \mathcal{L} \) requires moods other than the indicative, and provision for indexicals and demonstratives, and Lewis argues that he accounts for these additions. Such additional required moods and revised truth-conditions allow for the fact that truth is not, as in the signalling language, a correspondence of gestures or acts to conventions to which the particular use of language applies, for there is no longer ‘...any special situation to which the language applies’, but rather conventions established and disseminated, modified and changed, mutually-known between \( S \) and \( H \), and applicable to novel and varied contexts and situations: Lewis defers to his analysis of the

---

1 Fish (1980) p199 rejects the arguments for a babel of interpretations as promulgating a ‘standard story’. In Fish (1989) he speaks of all communication as mediated.

2 Lewis (1969) p163. Possible occasions being a pair of a possible world and a spatio-temporal location in the world.

3 Lewis (1969) p160. No standard or language convention can develop, for a non-conformist will elicit a confused response given the corresponding state of affairs.

4 Lewis (1969) pp163-164 considers possible languages, at first without reference to their form in use. The signalling language derived from Grice (seen as a function giving all expressions in a language a mood and a truth condition), is described as per the definition outlined above. Kirk (1970) p14 makes abundantly clear the distinctions for which Lewis argues. He does not specify truth and analyticity for a language, but gives a means by which a language may be used in a population, and defines truth and analyticity relative to those using the language. The relation to the two types of convention defined by Strawson and Millikan is clear. Kirk marks Lewis’ distinction between mood and truth-conditions but is, however, surely wrong to say that, owing to convention requiring mutual knowledge of alternatives, \( S \) could only use a language if he knew there were other speakers. Kirk also argues that the notions Lewis uses to underpin his theory of analyticity in possible languages: conformity to a convention of truthfulness, reasoned expectation and rational preference, are all subject to Quine’s arguments against analyticity.

ways in which conventions may be established for a description of how statements in possible worlds come to have conventional meanings, writing that one can,

...take a truth-condition to be a set of possible worlds: the set of those worlds in which,

as we say, the truth-condition holds. If \( L \) assigns an interpretation \( \langle \mu, \tau \rangle \) to a sentence \( \sigma \),

then \( \tau \) is the set of worlds in which \( \sigma \) is true in the sense appropriate to \( \mu \).

Considerations of indexicality require that \( L \) assign interpretations to sentences when relativised to individuals or locations, and this is defined by Lewis as a unity of a possible world and a location within it at which \( \sigma \) is uttered. (From this may follow definitions of the type of \( S \) speaking, the \( H \) aimed at in his intention, and the context in which the utterance occurs). In the signalling language the meaning of a sentence is given by an interpretation without reference to the occasion of utterance, but as seen in the presentation of Gricean analysis, no such interpretation assigns meanings ('...or even a meaning...'). In the function assigning possible worlds to interpretations, all ascriptions of meanings to sentences proceed from the study of the features of the occasion of utterance. The description of some linguistic properties, such as communication and \( S \) meaning, can it may be argued, be given in terms of the signalling language described by Grice, but indexicality and ambiguity need separate treatment.

The semantic properties of sentences of possible languages are described by a function obtaining between four elements: the sentence \( \sigma \), the language \( L \), an occasion utterance \( (o) \) of \( \sigma \), and the interpretation \( \langle \mu, \tau \rangle \) assigned. Lewis defines eternity, ambiguity, indicativeness, and truth and falsity in the language.

\( \Sigma \) is true in \( L \) on \( o \) under \( \langle \mu, \tau \rangle \) iff \( L \) assigns to \( \langle \sigma, o \rangle \) a set of interpretations containing \( \langle \mu, \tau \rangle \) and the truth condition \( \tau \) holds in—that is, contains—the possible world \( w \) in which the possible occasion \( o \) of utterance of \( \sigma \) is located... \( \sigma \) is false in \( L \) on \( o \) under \( \langle \mu, \tau \rangle \) iff \( L \) assigns to \( \langle \sigma, o \rangle \) a set of interpretations containing \( \langle \mu, \tau \rangle \) and the truth condition \( \tau \) does not hold in the possible world \( w \) in which \( o \) is located.

---

5 Lewis (1969) p164 is not ignoring the difficulties caused by potential ambiguities. In such cases \( L \) must assign not a single interpretation but a set of interpretations: when the sentence is unambiguous on an occasion, the set contains one interpretation, and when it is ambiguous, the set contains finitely many interpretations. There are cases in which a set contains no interpretations, and this Lewis says, provides one means of dealing with difficult, ungrammatical cases ('quadruplicity drinks procrastination'), on all occasions of their utterance. Treating such cases as non-sentences would, as Lewis says, make sentencehood relative to occasions of utterance, and he adds, one might pursue another option and treat such cases as one would self-contradictory sentences, and assign interpretations with empty truth conditions. Lewis adds that all of the interpretations given to a sentence on occasions of use cannot be thought to have the same mood.
6 It is also the case (Lewis (1969) pp165-173), that one cannot stipulate that the set of sentences of \( L \) is finite. This is central to the theory of possible world semantics. Cf. p171 and p172.
7 The definitions are on Lewis (1969) p173.
Truth conditions given by the function may apply in all, some (one or many) or no, possible worlds, and there follows a definition of occasion analyticity, syntheticity, and contradiction\textsuperscript{11}. The final, fullest definition is, ‘\( \sigma \) is analytic in \( \mathcal{L} \) iff \( \mathcal{L} \) assigns to \( \sigma \) on every possible occasion of its utterance a single fixed interpretation \(<\mu, \tau>\) and the truth condition \( \tau \) holds in every possible world’\textsuperscript{12}. Lewis’ most urgent question is how a population comes to use and accept the conventions of a language, and, relatedly, to accept and to know that others use them. They must, argues Lewis, be used, ‘in a certain way’, the clarification of which way shows how sentences are given interpretations\textsuperscript{13}. In his developed Gricean signalling language Lewis sees a convention of truthfulness found also in \( \mathcal{L} \). Taking first the sentences of \( \mathcal{L} \) as indicatives, and temporarily ignoring the problems raised by indexicality and ambiguity, the function gives each sentence an interpretation. (In discussion of this, and indeed throughout, it shall be seen that the core of Lewis’ theory is the holding of mutually-known sincerity conditions)\textsuperscript{14}. Being truthful is to speak true sentences in \( \mathcal{L} \); it is also to engage in collocation, knowing

\textsuperscript{11} Lewis (1969) p174. The analysis gives an essential notion of partial analyticity, describing truth conditions holding in some worlds but not others. He describes syntheticity for \( \mathcal{L} \) on occasions and under interpretations: \( \tau \) is synthetic in \( \mathcal{L} \) on \( \sigma \) under \( <\mu, \tau> \), iff \( \mathcal{L} \) assigns to \( <\sigma, \tau> \) a set of interpretations containing \( <\mu, \tau> \) and the truth condition \( \tau \) holds in some possible worlds but not in others'.

\textsuperscript{12} Lewis (1969) pp175. On pp175-176 Lewis considers some conditions on his definition. Unambiguous indexical sentences may be true in \( \mathcal{L} \) on every occasion of its utterance but not be analytic on any occasion (Lewis suggests ‘I am here now’). He adds that such sentences are assigned truth conditions that hold in the world in which the occasion of the utterance is located, but not in others. This is the kernel of the theory of analyticity that Lewis advocates.

\textsuperscript{13} A further difficulty arises in the case of an unambiguous indexical sentence analytic on one possible occasion of its utterance but false on another. (In this case he suggests ‘It is a perfect square’). ‘Take an occasion of its utterance on which the only entity under discussion... was the number 49, referred to by the numeral ‘49’. Then I take it that the truth condition assigned to our sentence on that occasion will hold in every possible world in which 49 is a perfect square—that is, in every possible world. So it is the universal truth condition. The sentence is analytic in English on that occasion. But take another occasion of its utterance in which the entity under discussion was the number 48, referred to by the numeral ‘48’. On that occasion, our sentence is not analytic in English; it is false, and indeed contradictory, in English’. This is not a problem for Lewis’ theory of analyticity; although the sentence is analytic in English on certain occasions, it is not analytic simpliciter by the definition. Others (‘Yesterday is past’), are not only analytic in English on occasions of use but analytic in English simpliciter. ‘Any possible occasion of utterance of the sentence ‘Yesterday is past’ is located on some day \( d \). The truth condition assigned to the sentence on that occasion holds in every possible world in which \( d-1 \) precedes day \( d \); this is the universal truth condition, no matter what \( d \) is. So our sentence is assigned a single fixed interpretation on every possible occasion of its utterance, and this interpretation contains the universal truth condition’. Further quotation can be provided to demonstrate Lewis’ method in deriving his theory; one can only be struck by the sheer brilliance and, one must say, brio, with which he works. ‘Customarily, a sentence of any mood may be called contradictory; but only an indicative sentence may be called analytic. I have ignored this pointless restriction: analyticity—like contradiction, truth and falsehood—depends on the truth condition assigned by \( \mathcal{L} \), without regard to the accompanying mood. An analytic imperative is “Wear a hat or else don’t!” An analytic permissive is “I promise to remain unmarried as long as I am a bachelor”. An analytic conditional is “You may respire whenever you breathe”’.

\textsuperscript{14} One cannot assign interpretations simply by putting one’s mind to the task; there is, as Wittgenstein says, a deep need for the convention. Lewis (1969) p177 refers to Wittgenstein (1958) §31, and his challenge to say that ‘it is cold here’ and mean ‘it is warm’.
that silence renders one a non-user of the convention. There is, as there was not in the signalling language, what Lewis calls a 'positive' and a 'negative' truthfulness. In an actual language silence is not outlawed, but the continuation of the language as a going concern requires the utterance (the vocalisation) of true sentences. Speakers pursue a conventional regularity of trying to achieve truthfulness in L, a regularity given by mutual-knowledge, and upheld by all members of the language community on the condition that it is upheld by all others. Communication is thus facilitated, for there has, in such cases, been prior coordination and observance of conformity to a convention.

Lewis reviews the arguments of Austin and Grice for indicatives as the direct (face-to-face, or ideal) communication of a situation. He adds that language L allows the writing of more (and more real), situations in which one communicates with an absent receiver, and with, in many cases, no knowledge of those who will receive one's truthful communications. It is not necessary that there be a specific belief or intention formed by S in speaking, or action taken (as on Grice's and Schiffer's accounts).

While all conventions have alternatives, other regularities of truthfulness in alternative possible languages, alternatives in adjacent possible worlds must never be too close approximations, for they must never allow shifting at will between a convention and an alternative. For indexicals, Lewis restates the convention for truthfulness in L, yet with provision for the dependence of words and truth conditions upon occasions of utterance. P is a population, and x a member:

---

He details some benefits of the change in the definition, again suggested by Bennett. What if a language has one speaker, yet several who understand? Is this a population? Is there a difference between one who does not speak a particular language because he is never in the appropriate population, and one who does not speak because he has nothing to say? 'Both are alike, so far as action in conformity to a convention of truthfulness goes'. In the later work Lewis thinks the condition on the predominant coincidence of interest too restrictive; it is now enough that S and H agree in the preferences of general conformity to R rather than 'slightly-less-than general' conformity. (Of course, Lewis does not deny that widespread non-conformity to R may be preferred more). All who believe that at least almost everyone else conforms to R will want the others to conform.

Lewis (1975) states the Gricean mechanism. The motivation behind Lewis' follow-up to his book is to meet criticisms of Bennett (1973). He gives a potted version of his theory of convention: one complies because there is widespread conformity, or, '...has been... or will be', and reasons for conformity are reasons for belief; they are promises 'tending to confirm the truth of the belief in question'.

They are qualitatively different to the cases considered in the signalling language as so far considered. On Lewis' theory the 'face-to-face' permits that this process can proceed by metonymy: that is, the passage of intentions from S to H can persist over time.

Lewis (1969) p180. Lewis, echoing Davis, writes that forming beliefs is normally involuntary, and not in conformity to any convention. Even in cases in which H should perform an act in response to S's utterance, the act may not serve purposes common to S and H, may not be the one S intended H to perform and so forth. In such cases the act may not be described as bound by convention. 'No doubt there is a continuous spectrum from verbal signalling to idle chat, and two-sided and one-sided coordination may be mixed in various proportions. But generality is served by concentrating on the one-sided coordination among communicators which is present in all conventional indicative communication, not on the occasional two-sided coordination between a communicator and his audience'.

Lewis (1969) pp180-181 adds that not every other possible language is a suitable alternative. Lewis has not (yet) ruled out of consideration as languages many 'bizarre entities'. Indeed, as things stand, one cannot define truth in any possible language, but only in one restricted to one with indicative, imperative and commissive moods and little ambiguity. This allows that there will be, for example, languages without grammars, trivial languages, languages that cannot be pronounced, or learned, languages without any discernible use, and even those with sentences so long that the effort required to speak it is such that decides not to bother. On pp181-191 Lewis describes some objections that might be made to the theory of conventions of truthfulness in a language.
If \( \sigma \) is a sentence of \( L \) which would be indicative in \( L \) on an occasion \( o \) of its utterance by \( x \) to an audience in \( P \), then \( x \) tries to make sure that he utters \( \sigma \) on \( o \) only if \( \sigma \) would be true in \( L \) on \( o \).

(The definitions are amended for imperatives and commissives). In respect of ambiguity Lewis considers two options: that \( L \) may be a language of \( P \) iff there exists a convention saying that in \( L \) unambiguous sentences are true, and that this inheres in a more general convention of truthfulness. Secondly, one might write a standard of truthfulness for sentences to which are given multiple interpretations (say, those containing demonstratives): minimal truthfulness may result from taking any one of the given interpretations ‘...and doing whatever one would have to do to be truthful in \( L \) if that interpretation were the only one assigned to \( \sigma \) on \( o \) by \( L' \). Thirdly, and a ‘higher standard’, \( S \)'s in \( L \) might give conditions showing the ways in which ambiguity is resolved in conversation, a principle making reference to \( S \)'s purposes. As Davidson before him, Lewis maintains that in a population \( P \) there is a convention of truthfulness in their language, sustained by the need for mutual coordination and communication, and, he conjectures, this goes for actual languages.

Given this, Lewis offers relations of expressions in actual languages to populations offering interpretations sustainable by the languages, predicated on the model of the relations of expressions to possible languages. He again offers definitions of eternal, ambiguous, mood-relative, true (and false), and most importantly, analytic, sentences.\n
\[ \sigma \] is analytic in \( P \) on \( o \) under \( <\mu, \tau> \) iff there exists a possible language \( L \) such that \( L \) is an actual language of the population \( P \), and that \( L \) assigns to \( <\sigma, o> \) a set of interpretations containing \( <\mu, \tau> \), and the truth condition \( \tau \) holds in every possible world.

(Likewise for contradiction and syntheticity).

---

20 Lewis (1969) p193, and these depend upon \( S \)'s and \( H \)'s mutual, and mutually-known, opinions about conversational purposes. One can, for example, Lewis writes, ignore interpretations that are conversationally pointless (in more Gricean terms, it serves none of \( S \)'s conversational intentions). One can also ignore those that are blatantly false, or those that both \( S \) and \( H \) fail to notice has a specific interpretation. All methods of resolving ambiguity, Lewis adds, are crude, and they are not ‘...part of the content of our convention of truthfulness in a language'. They result not from such conventions but from the 'common sense' that accompanies their use.
21 Lewis (1969) p195. The conventions of a population of inveterate liars are peculiar, and palpably unclear, but in that case they can be settled ‘...in whatever way we find convenient’. ‘We can happily admit, of course, that they are cases in which a language is, in an extended sense, an actual language of a population; this is simply to say that they bear important resemblances to cases in which the condition given in the definition is satisfied’.
Simplicity is gained by writing the definition in Gricean terms, adding the condition that one might see in the occasion o that S wishes to communicate with H, and find a language population in which this may occur. The simplification runs,

\[ \Sigma \] is analytic on o iff there exists a possible language L and a population P such that the communicator and intended audience on o belong to P, L is an actual language of P, and L assigns to \(<\sigma, o>\) a single interpretation \(<\mu, r>\) whose truth condition r holds in every possible world.

In analysing the words of a language, and the ways in which they may be interpreted by a population, Lewis defines a function linking L with a grammar \(\Gamma\), and with the population P and the assignment r to \(\xi\), and finds it ambiguous, for there will be more than one viable grammar. However, he replies that conventions of truthfulness link speakers with their utterances, and not with the constituents of their utterances: given this, the problem is solved. He writes, 'conventions are regularities in action, and there is no such action as adopting a grammar or bestowing an interpretation (or if there is, it does not occur in normal use of language)'. While a best grammar may emerge (on Chomskyan lines), as a vital element in the explanation of S's truth-observing and truth-expecting operations with language, the practice of coordination over time elicits a 'method of evaluation', determining the grammar which, Chomsky argues, is immanent in S's internal representation.

Lewis offers his theory of convention as a response to Quine's arguments for the incommensurability of conceptual schemes, the inscrutability of reference, and the indeterminacy of translation, for all of which, Quine argues, no conventions can be described. Lewis postulated conventions of truthfulness (or sincerity) in communicative acts are 'limiting case[s]' of conventions in the language chosen of a

---

23 Lewis (1969) p197: one can, if necessary, provide for ambiguity and interpretation by examining o, and so identify S and H, and look for an actual language of a population to which they belong. This gives semantical relations between a verbal expression \(\sigma\) and an occasion o.


25 Lewis (1969) p198. Different grammars for L interpret and assign constituents differently. They may even analyse sentences differently into constituents, but, Lewis remarks, such differences cancel themselves out, for the grammars give the same sentences with the same interpretations. The question is how one selects a convention of truthfulness for a language of a population.

26 Lewis (1969) pp200-201. Lewis summarises the importance of his conclusions for a theory of analyticity. Lewis has, he believes, shown the way in which a verbal expression can be analytic or conventional in a population, and yet '[i]t remains open whether any verbal expression ever is analytic in any population. Analyticity as described so far might be a perfectly intelligible status which happens not to be occupied. Similarly, we may know what it would be for a possible language L to be the actual language of a population; but we do not know that this ever occurs. And I strongly suspect that it does not'. Saying analyticity is not 'sharp' is not to say that it is unintelligible (Lewis writes that in any language population there are mostly synthetic sentences, some clearly analytic and a vast number, all of the interesting ones, that are somewhere between), but how may one accept the possibility of partial analyticity? Finally, because the conventions of language are conventions 'to less than the highest degree', and fewer cases of untruthfulness, firmer confidence in the truth of others and a smaller class of indefinite cases would not make the analyticity allowed for in a language any sharper. Secondly, although the number and variety of possible worlds is unfathomable, the property of analyticity as truth in every possible world, and that of uncertainty about the possibility of worlds potentially reflecting a greater uncertainty about the analyticity of sentences, shows that there is more to 'unsharp' analyticity. 'Sometimes we cannot tell whether a sentence is analytic—say, one of the principles of dynamics—because we cannot tell whether it is true in our language in some hypothetical world that clearly is possible'.
interpretations, yet the utterances, 'tight' cluster: two tokens of an utterance type (one sincere, one insincere), may share the same interpretations, yet correspond to different truth conditions, owing to their occurring in different (but adjacent) possible worlds on the criteria given by Wittgenstein and described in I.4. The two tokens of the utterances, given by S and S', may report on the same state of affairs (S sincerely and S' insincerely), and they may, additionally, share the representation of a combination, in a state of affairs, of atomic simples. However, in speaking insincerely, S' is speaking in a different possible world to that in which S speaks and in which the state of affairs of which he speaks obtains. By the conventions for the language of S, established on Lewis' terms, and the congruence of an utterance with a state of affairs represented (established by Wittgenstein), S' is using different conventions to S and is speaking a different language: there exist in the respective languages different truth conditions. Thus it is that the condition of salience to which Heal holds Lewis may be found to be unnecessary, for in endeavouring to achieve coordination with H, S chooses not merely the course of action he thinks is most likely to succeed, but an entire possible world in which he thinks H participates and in which his action is coherently interpretable. The possible world contains many states of affairs pertinent to interpreting the action, say (in the case of a speech act, and in the example Wittgenstein considers), those that obtain when the utterance is part of a negation, equivalence or inference and so forth, each of which, by virtue of appearing in 'logical space' is indefeasibly carried in S's act. (H will equally, if in the same world as S, know of these indefeasible connections). In the same way, S, in issuing his speech act, instantiates each of the worlds in which the state of affairs of which he speaks obtains and all of the forms in which it may appear. The act he chooses to issue, if sincere, must appeal to one such world and one such form, and thus S must appeal to a mutually-known convention to achieve coordination with H. However, the utterance itself carries no inherent conventions of usage, it merely, and inevitably, appears in a possible world (or a logical space), instantiating conventions appropriate for, in this case, negating, drawing equivalencies and so forth. It is argued in IV.5 that possible worlds are, as Lewis says, established by conventions as he conceives of them. The analogy of distance between possible worlds may usefully be continued. Less accessible possible worlds interpret the sentences of S's and H's language in a single possible world as true and false, and so are more resistant to change, and thus Lewis allows the status of some statements as 'partially' analytic. (Lewis' modal realism says that analyticity is absolute in one of the infinity of possible languages; that is, each statement has a world in which it is analytic).
Furthermore the acceptance of the existence of many possible languages allows that a theory of communication is preserved. Truth of S (given as correspondence to the existing state of affairs), is secured in some languages, but not those, say, in which S acts or dissembles, yet divergences in such cases are between closely-allied languages, and are overcome by the institution of conventions, *ad hoc* and temporary if necessary. Thus language is flexible, with room for change in the light of progress, and even to suit, when the convention is required, S’s, ‘...opinions, tastes, and conversational purposes’, all of which can be accommodated. It is incorrect to view convention as relative to occasions of utterance and their contexts; with a theory of language as a cluster of shifting, augmenting possible languages, each constituted by myriad states of affairs, there is indeed little or nothing to be said for the idea of a permanent convention conceived of as requiring anything of the resources or construction of a natural language. The less exacting each Lewis convention is, the greater scope it leaves its fuller acceptance. A child coming to a language has only what he hears to develop his own competence as a speaker: it may be some time before he is able to identify and distinguish the language he uses from others in (remote) possible worlds. The conventions he is inured to will be resilient, and thus identifying other candidates for truth, analyticity, indicativeness and so forth, will be difficult, but this is as it should be, for it is the condition of progress. A convention of truthfulness in a single language, premised in Derrida’s response to Austin, is inconceivable, preventing the progress of learning and of self-sustainability; because of its incompleteness it is open to the very tensions (owing to the conditions on demonstrative uses and insincerity and parasitism) that Derrida diagnoses in any such theory. The theory of communication with appeal to mutual knowledge is examined by Schiffer for its application to Gricean arguments, and it is with this that one can begin to see the way in which Lewis’ conventions fill the gap in Grice’s theory of meaning-intentions, concerning how conventions for speech acts can arise without circularity. Schiffer begins by examining some difficulties in Grice’s work, and primarily the sense of ‘meaning’ relevant for the explication of communication?7. The utterance ‘x means something’ may be true in at least two different ways; Schiffer gives as examples S meaning something, and a sign meaning something?8. He contends that S did something (performed an act), by which meaning is communicated, and that the sign did not. (The sign has meaning, be it

---

7 Cf. Kemmerling, A.; ‘Utterer’s Meaning Revisited’, pp130-155 in Grandy and Warner (1986). Kemmerling begins his analysis of utterer’s meaning on the premise that the Schifferian mutual-knowledge conditions, derived from Lewis, are accepted and common currency (pp130-131). The ‘legalistic’ view of Austin on convention is rejected (p133). Taxonomies of speech acts should be ‘vertical’ as well as ‘horizontal’, ordering them according to their importance for communication and ‘basicness’.

8 This, it should be recalled, being precisely the point at which Ziff begins his analysis of Grice.
correctly understood or not; S performs or reports an act with meaning)". The two cases are designated means, and means, respectively. Schiffer asks: how does someone mean, and something mean,? In the first case, there is a condition that there is something someone did (not necessarily intentional), the articulation of which meant something. The uses report the message, or information, conveyed by an utterance in the first case, and its sense or intended meaning on an occasion of its appearance in the second. Substituted for the ‘…” in the following analysanda (in the first case) are grammatically complete sentences (complete thoughts or actions), and in the second, ‘…a word, a phrase, or a sentence”. Schiffer offers two analysanda:

S meant something by (or in) producing (or doing) x.

(S meant [that]…by (or in) producing (or doing) x), and S meant something by x (S meant “…” by x)32.

He adds: ‘[t]he part in parentheses is to remind us that we do not want an account of what it is to mean something which does not enable us to specify what was meant.’ There are difficulties immediately. Wertheimer suggests a case in which S says what he means: on Schiffer’s theory, ‘S meant that x by saying “x”’ is true, and ‘S meant that x by “x”’, is false or ungrammatical, yet, Wertheimer argues, the converse is true, and Schiffer’s mistake is a ‘handicap’. He is again mistaken to think that Grice’s work bears on the first sentence, for it bears only on the second, and Wertheimer writes: while S says what he means by saying what he says, he does not mean what he means by the act of saying it. Schiffer’s work, ventures Wertheimer, impacts only on the first sentence. Wertheimer looks to Schiffer’s two formulations. In the first a gerund is given to follow ‘by’, but no means suggested as to how it is to be read, or, when supplied, how x is specified. Any such gerund will be ambiguous, meaning either, ‘performing an act of (GP) [gerund phrase]’ or, ‘the act of (GP) S performed’. Only the latter identifies an event produced by S, and yet gerunds in Schiffer are (paradigmatically, considering the desire to write a theory of S-meaning), ‘uttering “…”, and this is not a gerund of the second type.

31 Schiffer (1972) p1. He also considers a possible counter-example: ‘If [the first sentence] is true, then it is most likely that S did something. But if [the second] is true, it is unlikely that the mark did something. If [the second] is true, then it will be true that the mark has meaning. But if S means something it is unlikely that he has meaning. (Unlike but not impossible. S may mean something in the same way that, say, a signal flag means something. Thus, a lighthouse keeper might communicate to ships at sea that there is a hurricane coming by putting his son S on the top of the lighthouse, in which case any sailor worth his salt would know that S meant “there is a hurricane coming”’). Cf. Loar (1981) p245.
32 These may have been metaphorical or analogical uses: Schiffer’s example is ‘S means “his male parent is inexperienced” by “his father is green”’. (p2).
33 Schiffer (1972) p3. There are, in addition, cases in which S means something by the production of x without meaning something by x, and in which S means something by x without meaning something by the production of x. It is, ‘in general’ the case that in an utterance made meaning p, S means p by the utterance (this covers cases of ironical utterances, and of metaphors understood and misunderstood).
34 Schiffer (1972) p3.
'At any rate, in normal speech S usually does not mean anything by his act of uttering "..."; acts of uttering words are not usually signals, gestures or the like...\textsuperscript{32}. It is shown in what follows that Schiffer (and Lewis), owing to the amenability of their analyses to a pragmatist interpretation, can overcome this objection.

Schiffer turns to consideration of meaning \(x\) by an utterance. He gives four paradigm cases, and a condition of timeless meaning. Firstly, the class of 'whole-utterance types' (sentences and signals); secondly, whole-utterance tokens; thirdly, part-utterance types (words and phrases); and, fourthly, part-utterance tokens. Criteria for inclusion in each class are defined: \(x\) is a whole-utterance type iff \(x\) means (timeless), "..." and the only substitutes for "..." are grammatically complete sentences; a token of this type is a whole-utterance token iff \(x\) is a token of a whole-utterance type. A type \(x\) is a part utterance token iff \(x\) means (timeless), "..." and the only substitutes for "..." are words or phrases; a token of a type is a part-utterance token iff \(x\) is a token of a part utterance type. Schiffer countenances other senses of 'meaning' not directly relevant to the explication of language and communication; he deals with them as either reducible to analyses and offered, or as at least connected with the senses of 'mean' to be discussed. As Schiffer ignores them they will be merely referenced, as not pertinent to the argument to be made here\textsuperscript{36}. Schiffer asks which is prior, the whole utterance type or the part utterance type. He writes that a first consideration is that the meaning of a sentence is at least in part a 'function'

\textsuperscript{32} Wertheimer, R.; 'Meaning by Stephen R. Schiffer', The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXIV, no. 2, pp267-270, 1975, p. Such cases are, Wertheimer says, 'perforce the normal case'.

\textsuperscript{36} Wertheimer (1975) p. Wertheimer suggests alternatives: firstly, to presuppose that in the act of utterance \(S\) means something (something, by something...). The question: what did \(S\) mean has two meanings, one giving an identifying description of \(x\), the other of \(\omega\); the answer to what did \(S\) mean by "...?" correlates with the description of \(x\). 'S means \(\omega\) only if \(S\) intentionally produced \(W\); \(S\) meant \(\omega\) only if \(S\) intended to produce \(V\), in the case that \(S\) meant something, by a gerund of the first type (one that does not refer but identifies \(\omega\)). If \(S\) means something, by a gerund of the first type then \(S\) produced intentionally the event allowing the description of \(\omega\). (Recall that the second type of gerund is the description referring to \(\omega\).) \(S\) produced the event with the intention of producing it for the description of \(\omega\). 'But \(S\) may fail and then \(V\) will not exist! From this it follows that answers one might give to: what did \(S\) mean by a gerund of the first type?' are varied, none give a referring expression but all identify. They have 'correlative transfers' that refer, and by an application of Leibniz's law (most commonly, 'to VP (verb phrase) with \(V\) referring (if it exists) to the same event as 'W'—therefore \(V=W\)). Other 'ordinary' answers must be transferable into a VP construction.

The second alternative is that \(S\) means something by \(x\), and this appears in the second formulation of Schiffer's premise. In this case the expression following 'by' is a noun phrase referring to \(\omega\), usually an 'ellipsis' of the description of the event. 'W [the event] may be anything \(S\) can intentionally produce that can have a meaning'. The '... in \(S\) mean "..."' is a referring expression, an ellipsis of 'V. W may or may not have a meaning: it may be a 'sentence-token or a yawn'; regardless, in virtue of \(S\)'s meaning something, by \(W, W\) means what \(S\) means by \(W\), but 'W' is independent of \(S\)'s intention of producing \(W\). For a description 'W' a description 'V' can be given describing \(\omega\) in terms of \(S\)'s intention in producing \(W\). (Wertheimer notes Austin's distinction between phemes and rhemes). Therefore, while \(W\) (the event) may or may not have meaning, \(V\) means what \(S\) means by \(W\). Wertheimer offers the example in which \(S\) means something, by \(x\); \(S\) means '...\' by \(W\) (it was produced intentionally), and with the intention of producing \(V\), and considers its significance as a translation argument: the argument '..." is not confined to particular utterances of a particular speaker. 'W' means \(V=W=S\) means \(V=W\), and \(V=W\) are always true, and context determines how \(S\), \(V\) and \(W\) are to be read, and in this there is appeal to standard, conventional meaning. Giving the meaning of a word is identifying the word (this includes signals, gestures and so forth). Understanding the meaning of a word is understanding the word. Proper names have no meaning and cannot be understood.

\textsuperscript{36} Schiffer (1972) p5 offers, for example 'I meant what I said when I said that I hate you', 'Your love means more to me than all the tea in China', and 'I meant to scare you by throwing the knife'. One might suspect that Schiffer is, in this, covertly disposing of difficult cases of metaphorical or metonymical utterances.
of the meaning of its words. However, he adds, there are cases of ‘non-composite’ whole-utterance types without the structure of sentences, showing a real independence in a significant number of instances. Furthermore, this is not a two-way dependency, for something is a part-utterance type iff its combination with other grammatical parts gives a whole utterance type, and yet the constitution of whole utterance types need not require a combination of part utterance types (say, in cases such as ‘Stop!’, ‘Observe!’).

The case of S meaning something by x cannot, for Schiffer, be prior to the case considered as meaning: S can mean ‘...’ by x iff he believes that x means ‘...’, and study of this must precede any analysis of meaning. This is, it has been argued, not achieved by Grice, and, once again, because of the missing theory of convention. (One might reply: meaning, may seem prior to meaning, for the simple reason that an utterance type means only if S is able to mean what is communicated by it in its utterance). Additionally, one might look to cases in which it is possible to communicate with H (to mean something by an utterance), even when the utterance itself has no meaning, and Schiffer notes that Grice does not make a necessary distinction, namely, between an account of what it is for S to mean something by an utterance, and the senses in which S can be said to have meant something (palpably Strawson’s distinction). Schiffer writes this into his theory, and so extends the application of mutual knowledge and of the way in which meanings can come to be conventions on Lewis’ terms.

Schiffer shows that clarity concerning Grice’s theory requires some distinctions. The condition that S meant something by an utterance iff he intended it to produce a specific effect in H can be understood in three ways, owing to an ambiguity affecting accounts of S-meaning and of H-understanding. It might refer to an effect produced in H such that S meant something by the utterance iff he intended it to produce the effect; to S meaning something iff he intended there to be an effect that his utterance will produce, or, more plausibly, to S’s meaning being conditional on there being an effect in H which S intended to bring about by the utterance. All one can maintain, Schiffer says, is that meaning is carried (communicated) in instances in which the effect S intended to produce is discovered in some way: H must recognise S’s intention to produce a specific response, and the ambiguities described show that this needs more than simply a study of S’s utterance. Further ambiguity is found in the condition that

---

\(^{273}\) A distinctly Gricean comment.

\(^{p6}\) Schiffer (1972) p6 writes: ‘A whole utterance type x, we may say, is non-composite just in case there is no “proper part” of x, y, such that both y means something and the meaning of x is determined in part by the meaning of y’.

\(^{p7}\) Schiffer (1972) p7 is here alive to the priority of an account of S meaning, and he turns to consideration of Grice. Schiffer adds the Gricean condition to his analysis (above) that ‘utterance’ will include non-linguistic behaviour, and this is in accord with Grice’s analysis.
the response is necessarily to be made ‘...in a certain audience’; that ‘...S means something by uttering x only if there is an audience H and a response r such that S intends his utterance of x to produce r in H’. (Schiffer’s responses have arisen elsewhere: the H for whom the utterance is intended may not exist, and it is not a condition for S meaning something by his utterance that he intends a response in a particular H)\textsuperscript{39}.

Schiffer raises other counter-examples to Grice’s analysis. With reference to Strawson’s example of S setting a rat (described in II.4). Schiffer states that S satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for meaning something by his (non-verbal) utterance, but that there is no process of intentional belief-transmission. S intends H to think his house is infested, and indeed, H (unbeknownst to S), seeing S setting the rat, infers, even though S thinks he has issued no intentionally-guided utterance, that it was issued with the intention of making him think that the house is infested (by the recognition of intention). (Schiffer echoes Strawson in saying that this is not ‘attempted communication’ in the sense Grice studies). Schiffer calls Strawson’s \textit{ad infinitum} condition a requirement that H should recognise S’s intention that he infer (at least in part), from the fact that x is f that S uttered x with the intention that H respond (by recognising that x is f), and adds that this requires a notion of how H may, and S may expect H to, reason regarding nested intentions. Schiffer notes further difficulties, seen by examining Grice’s, and Gricean, examples. S intends (in the case of the avaricious man), that H believe that S plans to get rid of him by throwing the money, but in truth S intends that H’s reason for leaving is his recognition of the intention. Notwithstanding the fact that H does not recognise the intention and pursues the money, H is intended to take as his reason for leaving the fact that S wants him to leave\textsuperscript{40}. Strawson writes, echoing Schiffer, that here there must be, for satisfaction of the thesis that S-meaning requires the communication of intentions, recognition by H of a further intention of S, namely, that his intention that H’s recognition of the utterance to produce a response should be (in part) H’s reason for his response (cognitive or otherwise), and again one may see the rôle being given to mutual knowledge. Schiffer gathers his points into a formal analysis of meaning which runs\textsuperscript{41}:

\begin{itemize}
  \item S meant something by (or in) uttering x iff S uttered x intending:
  \begin{enumerate}
    \item that x have a certain feature f;
    \item that a certain audience H recognise that x is f;
    \item that H infer at least in part from the fact that x is f that S uttered x intending
  \end{enumerate}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{39} Schiffer (1972) p9 says that S, while drowning, may shout ‘help!’ to any one is listening.

\textsuperscript{40} A Gricean would, in such cases, defer to the notion of conventional implicature.
(4) that S’s utterance of a produce a certain response r in H;
(5) that H’s recognition of S’s intention (4) shall function as at least part of H’s reason for his response r;
(6) that H recognise S’s intention (3);
(7) that H recognise S’s intention (5).

The conclusion drawn is that for S to mean not only must he utter x with the dual-aspect intention seen to be necessary for Grice’s theory, but intend H to recognise that he does so, and this requires mutual knowledge. This can only occur, Schiffer says, if S expects H to recognise that S intends to produce the desired effect r in him by means of recognition of intention; in cases in which S intends to deceive H, S must frustrate or confuse H’s inferences ‘...as to the means by which S intends to produce r...’. On condition that S is not intending to deceive, it is necessary that he, to satisfy the primary intention to produce r in H, must expect H to think that he intends H’s reason for r to be S’s intention to produce r in H. Schiffer gives an example. If S intends H to think that he uttered x intending H to think that p, S must think that H thinks that S thinks his utterance will be sufficient to this end, ‘in the circumstances’. This requires the appending of a reason (owing to a sincerity condition), and, Schiffer adds, H will not think that S uttered x unless he thought the utterance was one such reason. (Grice’s example of Herod presenting Salome with St John the Baptist’s head is a case in point. Schiffer adds, the connection is here to the recognition of primary and secondary intentions (counselling sincerity), on the basis of mutual knowledge). ‘[I]n general...’, S thinks that H thinks that the utterance is a reason for thinking p only if S thinks that H has beliefs which cause him to think p having understood S’s utterance. It is also the case that ‘ordinarily’ S is justified in thinking H has such beliefs only if S thinks H has a ‘certain’ belief that will compel the conclusion. Consequently, H thinks S uttered x with the intention of giving a reason for r iff H thinks there is a certain belief (shared in a context), that S thinks H has, and that H thinks the utterance warrants drawing conclusion p. Schiffer argues that this compels two possibilities in the case that S utters x intending to get H to believe p through recognition of intention. Firstly, that S expects H to think that S intends H’s reason for thinking p to be the fact that S uttered x intending to get H to think this; and, secondly, that S expects H to think that S thinks that H will have reason(s) other than the recognition of the intention as his reason for thinking p on the basis of the utterance, namely, those given by mutual knowledge conditions. The second case points up a discrepancy

41 Schiffer (1972) p19.
allowing for cases of deceptive meaning between the reason H is intended to have for thinking p on the basis of S’s utterance, and the reason he is intended to think S intends him to have⁴².

A further type of ‘deception’ may obtain. S again sings with the intention of getting H to leave, and with the intention that H recognise S’s intention by inference from the fact that S is singing (woefully). An intention is added, requiring that H’s reason for leaving is truly his recognition of S’s intention, but the case is more complex. S intends that H should think S intends him to leave because of his appalling singing, but S also (really) intends H to leave by recognition of S’s intention to get him to leave. (In the previous examples there was an intentional discrepancy between the reason S intended H to have for leaving, and the reason he was intended to think he was intended to have; yet in this case, H is intended to think that there is an intentional discrepancy, though there is none). In such cases Grice questions the mounting complexity of the analysis: ‘For how could S reasonably expect such a complicated inference to be made from the fact that he is singing “Tipperary”? ’ Schiffer has no doubts that Grice’s suggested ‘special circumstances’ (for ending the regress of intentions), can be gerrymandered, and he (facetiously?) offers a case in which, having sung his first song, S has another person tell H his plan, apparently in strictest confidence, with S knowing nothing. Thus when S sings again, H sees the intention, communicated and recognised, that S sings with the intentions animating the first song. (It is plainly unsatisfactory for the meaning of all utterances to be revealed only by reference to other utterances. This merely begins a further regress, and Schiffer sees that this analysis may issue, in cases in which S is taken to (following the above analysis) intend (7) that H recognise S’s intention (5), and which do not appear to be cases of meaning, in infinite regresses of nested intentions of mutual knowledge (to the nᵗʰ order))⁴³. Schiffer uses Lewis’ conditions on conventions to halt this regress.

Schiffer repeats that Grice argues that a regress of intentions is avoided, for there is a stage at which S knows H could not infer his complex intention, and ‘...since one cannot, in general, intend to bring about a result one knows one cannot bring about...’, there will appear an nᵗʰ order intention saying that H could not possibly understand one more complex. Schiffer is dubious about the chances of reaching this ‘cut-off’ point in all cases, and one must concur that it is decidedly ad hoc. (He notes Grice’s remark that the difficulty posed by the regress is that it nullifies all potential counter-examples, and that this merely goes ‘... to show that there will come such a point in all cases of communication’, for logically it must always arise). Schiffer grants that there will arise such difficulties in ‘cases of

⁴² Schiffer (1972) p21.
⁴³ One might recall Strawson (1971c) p157 (and II.4).
deception', in which S could always fall back on a later intention, but that it is 'false' to conclude that a 'corresponding intention' in the 'standard case of communication', shows the same conditions, for here 'there is no deception': 'everything is out in the open', and Schiffer argues again that, by Grice's own theory, mutual knowledge is unattainable, for, as Davidson would ask, how are the conventions established for the standard cases, those allowing H to infer to S's intentions? There will have occurred, Schiffer says, in any successful standard case of communication, reasoning to S's intended meaning, and the reasoning required, as Schiffer says, is palpably the same as that for deceptive cases. It is argued (in IV 4-5) that Schiffer's argument, with its inspiration from Lewis, can account for both.

For qualification, Schiffer refers to the difficulty H must find in inferring a complex, nested intention (as in one of the above counter-examples), by contrasting it with the inference in 'straightforward' cases, say, in which S utters 'Leave the room'; the number of inferences required might differ but there is no difference in the complexity of the nested inferences that must be carried out for second intentions, ones Grice accepts must occur for the recognition of first intention. To Grice's examples of 'apparent' intention two objections follow: firstly, that no such intention could be provided with logically sufficient conditions, because of a greater 'ingenuity' and 'subtlety' in one's interlocutor; that is, there may be a stopping point, but it could, quite plausibly, never be fixed upon. This being so, if one takes as a necessary condition of S meaning something by X that he have an (n+1) intention that H recognise his nth order intention that H recognise his (n-1) intention, then it follows that a necessary condition of S meaning something by X is that H recognise an intention that he could not possibly recognise. If one demand only that S intend H to recognise S's intention as per Grice's analysis (his (n-1) intention, and regarding only first intention), one of Schiffer's counter-examples is untouched, and the consequence drawn that, '...only the two most subtle and intelligent beings alive could mean anything, and they could only communicate with one another.'

Grice's suggested addition, that the analysans 'vary' with the nature of the intended response and the circumstances in which the attempt to derive the response is made, still, Schiffer says, results in S demanding of H both more than H could give, and more than '...is necessary for [S's] meaning...'. Schiffer gives examples, their force lying in the fact that S intends to deceive. Schiffer attends to the Gricean condition: that a requirement be made that S not have certain, devious intentions, or, as Grice has it, '...there is no inference-element E such that S uttered x intending both (1') that H's

\[44\] For all of the quotations in this paragraph see Schiffer (1972) p24.
\[45\] Schiffer (1972) pp24-25.
determination of \( r \) should rely on E and (2') that H should think S to intend that (1') be false', and Schiffer argues that this will not diffuse all counter-examples. In the first of the singing examples S intends H’s belief that he wants H to leave to be an inference-element speeding his departure, and it is true that S in addition intends H to think that S does not intend H’s belief that S wants H to leave to be an inference-element, disguised more or less successfully by his singing. However, it could still be remarked that H thinks (correctly, but contrary to S’s plan), that S intends him not to have the belief that S wants him to leave as his inference-element. In such a case meaning will be communicated, but without mediation of S’s intentions.

Schiffer states a theory in response to these cases, making no requirement on S that he not have certain intentions; before giving his analysis he considers Searle’s example of the captured soldier\(^{46}\). He makes the intuitive objection (considered above), that ‘...it would be wrong, or at least not quite right, to say that S meant that he was a German officer (or anything else) by uttering “Kennst...”’, but to make his case as strong as can be, moots that S does indeed intend H to take the utterance as meaning that S is a German officer\(^{47}\). On both interpretations (this, and that saying that S intends to imply by speaking German that he is German), S utters his sentence intending H falsely to think that it has a certain feature; however, only the interpretation Schiffer considers has it that S intends H to have a false belief as part of his reasoning in concluding that S uttered the sentence intending to produce a definite response in H, namely, for H to think that S is a German officer. Schiffer writes that this is not a sufficient condition for meaning, and asks that one consider H’s interpretation of S’s utterance when it is a malapropism: in such cases S means something, and what he means (on Gricean analysis), is that described in the utterance of the malapropism, ‘...and this despite the fact that H was intended [owing to the malaprop] to have the false belief about the meaning of “...” as his basis for inferring what S meant from what S uttered’. (It should be clear that Schiffer can read this back over the analysis of inference elements contained in the singing example). S’s utterance in Searle’s example is (owing to

\(^{46}\) Schiffer (1972) p27 adds merely that since there is no reason why S should not want these intentions recognised (and intended to be so), the self-reflexive intentions in his developed Gricean analysis may be thought acceptable.

\(^{47}\) Schiffer (1972) pp27-28 finds that Searle’s reasons for the conclusion that the utterance should not count as an example of S-meaning are unconvincing, for numerous simple counter-examples may be found. Searle (1971) p44 gives the reason: ‘we have here a case where I am trying to produce a certain effect by means of the recognition of my intention to produce that effect, but the device I use to produce this effect is one which is conventionally, by the rules governing the use of that device, used as a means of producing quite different illocutionary effects’. Schiffer replies: ‘This explanation will not do. At a boring party Miss S might say to her escort, Mr A, "Don’t you have to inspect the lemon trees early in the morning?", and mean thereby that she wants to leave’.

Schiffer offers another example, derived from Grice: an Arabic-speaking prostitute utters, as seductively as she can, and with the intention of picking up an English-speaking sailor, words that, translated into English, mean ‘You filthy pig of a sailor’. She means something by her utterance (though something she either did not want translated into English or that she hoped would be taken as a sweet nothing); the soldier in Searle’s example speaks, using the only sentence of German that he knows, with the intention that the utterance evince a belief that he is a German, owing to the captors’ knowledge.
the ambiguity in its interpretation), issued with an intended discrepancy between the basis that H is intended to have for thinking S uttered it intending to produce a specific response in H, and the basis that H is intended to think he is intended to have. (No discrepancy obtains with the malapropism, for the belief that, say, ‘flamingo’ means ‘flamenco’ is both the basis H is intended to have and the basis he is intended to think he is intended to have. One might say that one does not consciously ask another to dance a flamingo). Grice’s postulated recognition condition will not stop the regress of intentions given by his analysis (and stated in II.3), for as Schiffer shows, many counter-examples obtain making reference to further required intentions. The regress obtaining in literal and deceptive cases (the singing example and Searle’s soldier), can be stopped, but only by a version of Lewis’ mutual knowledge theory, giving necessary conditions for the performance of an act of communication. Mutual knowledge may be shared by any number of people greater than two, and is defined thus for S and H.

\[ K^*_SHP \iff \]

\[ \]

Schiffer declares that such a case, described in an example, is one of mutual knowledge, depending on the ascription to both parties of ‘normal’ faculties, of rationality, and of associated ‘laws’ of reasoning.

The phenomenon described is a ‘general’ one, obtaining whenever and wherever ‘...S and H know that p, know that each other knows that p, and all of the relevant facts are “out in the open”’. Schiffer’s claims are greater still: ‘in general’, for a person x and a proposition y, if x knows that y, then there is a property A ‘...such that being A is sufficient for knowing that p, being A is sufficient for knowing that being A is sufficient for knowing that p, and so on’: for example, we ‘normal’ people know, and mutually know, that snow is white, and this procedure of analysis and confirmation can be applied to all of one’s stock of ‘common, general’ knowledge. The possession of such mutual knowledge, as Lewis shows, can be accounted for in conventions established without explicit convening and manifesting a conventional procedure by means of which S can articulate his intentions in such a way that he knows H will, in sincere cases, respond (owing to the structures Millikan describes), with the

---

48 Schiffer’s analysis is palpably the same as Lewis’. (See (1972) pp30-31).
49 That is, S and H mutually know....
action (or belief) directed by the convention. Schiffer takes on this argument from Lewis and shows how, when applied to speech act theory, it can provide an argument to the conclusion that in describing and assessing the contexts of speech act as correct or meaningful by convention the emphasis on S' intention and the situation in which S's utterance appears need not be regarded as unavoidable contingencies. It can be shown that conventions for speech acts can be established (on Lewis' terms), without fear of the relativisation of all contexts to those containing parasitical, quotational or otherwise 'insincere' utterances; all that is needed is a willingness to participate in a conventional coordination situation, those which can, as suggested in IV.5, be thought of simply as Deweyan stimulus conditions.
4. Mutual Knowledge and Language

Schiffer has a yet bigger claim to make, namely, that ‘in general’, ‘...if one knows that p, one will know how one knows that p...’; ‘...in most cases in which one knows how one knows that p, one would not know that p unless one knew how one knew that p...’. Schiffer says that he interprets knowing how one knows that p as knowing that having ‘...a certain property is sufficient for anyone’s knowing that p’, and this he applies to the knowing of a putative proposition X, adding that for propositions such as X, if they are sufficient for knowing that p, then they are sufficient for knowing that being X is sufficient for knowing that p. In turn he considers the elucidation of mutual knowledge, and, having given further examples to emphasise its dependence on conventions, states some general conditions. Again, the possession of the knowledge that X gives knowledge that p, and in cases in which S knows that H knows that X, S knows that H knows that p. The general conditions are given through an example, in which it is suggested that the X-property of both S and H (that they know X), entails that they share the same general properties, and if in both cases the X-properties are both sufficient for knowing that p, then they are both sufficient for (S and H mutually) knowing that it is sufficient for knowing that p, and, furthermore, that each is individually sufficient for knowing that the other is sufficient for knowing that p. The ‘...two properties do not differ relevantly, since S and H share all of the purely general properties entailed by either V or W [the X-properties]’.

To this Schiffer makes two objections. One might say that S and H do not possess mutual knowledge; they know only that by following analogous procedures each may acquire knowledge of the kind described; additionally, there is nothing in the example to say that mutual knowledge obtained before S’s and H’s coordination was identified, or described, as evincing mutual knowledge. (These objections, as the connection drawn (in IV.5) between Lewis and Dewey shows, raise no difficulties). Schiffer indicates two facts for a putative reply, and which begin the improvement of the Gricean analysis. Firstly, one may not argue against the mutual knowledge condition in ‘S knows that p’ by stating a case in which S states p but has never had the thought that p: that is, in which he must be brought to the realisation that he knows that p. To see the difficulty one need only study the recognition conditions in the Gricean analysis of communication. The conditions on mutual knowledge vary from the examples of Schiffer, Strawson and Searle, but the ‘paradigm’ case of communication in Grice contains a mutual knowledge condition: S and H know that the utterance has a certain feature, and that the possession of the feature is evidence that the utterance was made with the intention of producing a
definite response by means of the recognition of intention, and that the utterance was made with the intention of its being mutual knowledge that S uttered the sentence with this intention. In ‘making sure everything is out in the open’, S increases the chances of his achieving his first intention, and since, in standard cases, the utterance is made in good faith, the recognition of the intention can only be achieved if it is mutually known by S and H that the utterance was made with this intention. On the Gricean analysis, a regress (harmless Schiffer would repeat), of mutual knowledge conditions is established. The Gricean analysis, however, cannot easily be amended as Schiffer wishes, for counterexamples hold: most simply the case in which S utters x intending it to be mutual knowledge for himself and H that the fact that he uttered x is evidence that he uttered x intending to produce a certain response through the recognition of intention, but in which he intended H to think that it was not intended to be mutual knowledge. Additionally, Grice’s analysis cannot tolerate a requirement that S intend it to be mutual knowledge that the fact that he uttered x in the circumstances is evidence that he intended the fact that he uttered x to be mutually known as evidence that he uttered x intending to produce a certain response in H through the recognition of intention; that is, S might utter x with these intentions, but with the additional intention that H think S intended the obtaining of mutual knowledge itself to be evidence. Schiffer’s arguments are succinctly stated:

So long as a proposed account of S-meaning requires S to have some intention i such that the analysans does not secure that it is impossible for S to intend H to think that S did not utter x with intention i, then the analysans will not be sufficient. In other words, if S is to mean something by uttering x, then all of the intentions necessary for his meaning something must be out in the open; there must be no possibility of “hidden” intentions which are constitutive of an act of meaning something.

Schiffer reconstructs Grice’s account: it should read that S meant something by uttering x iff he uttered it intending to report a state of affairs intended to be sufficient for S and H mutually to know that it obtains; or, that it is conclusive evidence that S uttered x with the intention of eliciting a certain response in H, and of intending that recognition of this intention is ‘at least part’ of H’s reason for his response, and to realise state of affairs E. Concerning this Boër and Pappas argue that from a counter-example Schiffer moots and rejects follows a fundamental revision of the ‘epistemic’ principles on which his argument is based. Schiffer wonders whether the conditions on his analysis allow S to utter x

---

1 Schiffer (1972) p38 refers back to Strawson’s example of S setting a rat in H’s house.
without intending to produce r in H. The principle writing ‘good evidence’ into the final version of the analysis says that S intends its conditions, and Boër and Pappas write that unless one accepts the reasoning behind the ‘good evidence’ condition, one can state counter-examples: they offer one in which S has the intentions Schiffer lists but does not fulfil Schiffer’s own conditions on meaning. (Once again, the holding of sincerity conditions is paramount). S has a reputation for lying: it is mutual knowledge between S and H. For self-interest he, on this occasion, tells H the truth on a matter he invariably lies about. However, H, knowing S’s reputation, proceeds on the basis that S is lying, ignoring the apparently good evidence (in the case S invariably lies about), that S has a first intention of speaking truthfully. However, S does not have the first intention of so speaking, for he surely did not mean that H should believe his utterance, for he was capitalising on his mutually-known reputation as a liar. Boër and Pappas require that Schiffer prove the strength of the ‘good evidence’ conditions through those on mutual knowledge, and write that S cannot think the realising of E is good evidence if it is not intended. Mutual knowledge still eludes cases of deception. Their objection, Boër and Pappas add, is to a general principle, which Schiffer appears to accept, namely, that ‘if S knows that it is not the case that q, then S cannot think that E is good evidence that q’. (One might here consider an analogy with one of Grice’s examples: that of S posting a letter, and only subsequently realising that he had formed a further intention not to send it. S has at the time he posts the letter, and for some time prior to posting it, no thought of his further intention, due to distraction or absent-mindedness, and Boër and Pappas appeal to the ubiquity of such cases). Schiffer has a good reply, arguing that a theory emphasising mutual knowledge and convention can, as Lewis says, account for the intentional, and it shall be shown that the nesting of reasoning in second intentions can be accounted for in a Gricean theory containing a mutual knowledge condition.

The foundation of Gricean analysis, H’s recognition of S’s intention to produce a response, is subject to doubt, Schiffer writes, due to ‘standard instances of S-meaning’, in which S utters x intending to produce the response, but in which it is not part of his intention that any part of H’s reason for his response be that S intended its production. Thus, while the condition of the recognition of intention may be necessary ‘for performing an act of “telling”’, it is not for S meaning something (by an

---

3 Schiffer (1972) p57: mark the additions of ‘p’ for a variable marking reasons, and of ‘p(t)’ for a variable giving p as a truth-supporting reason. There is, additionally, a description for ‘causes in H the activated belief that p’ (p38), and for, ‘causes H to ψp’ (p59). Holdercroft (1978) p133 writes of the definition that it is necessary but not sufficient, and precisely because of Strawson’s counter-examples. He also writes that in its bare form it is vulnerable to counterexamples in which S wants to deceive, to disguise his intention. He adds that, as Schiffer notes, the difficulty arises if S intends H to realise that S intends to give H reason to think that S intends H to believe p.

4 That is, S might, while distracted, entertain thoughts at odds with his intention.
utterance); it is incorrect, Schiffer writes, to argue that Grice’s analysis derives from cases of telling (‘that...’, and ‘to do...’). Furthermore, on Gricean analysis, there lies unspoken the fact that S intends H to take the fact that S intends H to think that p as evidence that S thinks that p, and to take this as evidence that p is the case, yet Schiffer rejects this, adding that, since one cannot intend to bring about that which one knows impossible, it follows that if p is such a proposition, no one can mean p. However, as Boër and Pappas show, such arguments are made and meant, and in their analysis one sees the kernel of Schiffer’s treatment of indirect, parasitical cases. If S utters x with the first intention of eliciting a certain response (r₁) through the recognition of intention, and with the intention that the production in x of r₁ be sufficient for the production in H of a further response r₂, then the intention to produce r₂ in H is not part of a description of what S meant in uttering x. Again, a mutual knowledge condition is required. Boër and Pappas add a third case for assessment of Gricean analysis, and state a counter-example. One never exposed to, say, an aspect of higher mathematics would have none of the concepts relevant to the field; he would lack the ability to formulate intentions and explanations concerning the subject; Boër and Pappas doubt that one could say that the subject, in speaking, never intends to explain the aspect of higher mathematics: he simply does not know the mathematics. Additional counter-examples to Gricean analysis are found in cases of ‘reminding’ and ‘pointing out’, in utterances. In these cases it need be no part of S’s intention that the response be elicited by means of H’s recognition of S’s intention to produce a specific response, thus allowing for metaphors, hints, allusions and pretence in speech. The importance of such cases may be seen in those for which the rôle of getting H to see could not be played by recognition of intention, but in which S still meant something. In some cases the belief p is produced, and in some it is activated, and of all the cases of S-meaning considered, Schiffer chooses for study, following Austin and Grice, that in which S utters x intending to bring it about that H has in mind the belief that p, adding that it should be noted that ‘...although only in some [specific] cases does S actually intend to provide H with the belief that p’.

Schiffer considers two ideas from which objections to his analysis may proceed. One might argue that in the cases Schiffer offers there is a further response saying that the utterance is indeed ‘derived’

---

5 Schiffer (1972) p42.
6 Schiffer (1972) p says that there is a class of propositions for which no amount of empirical evidence gives the truth, because what is needed for the statement of their truth is not such evidence. If, therefore, Grice’s analysis of meaning intentions and their appeal to conventions is correct, no one could mean that p in cases in which p is such a proposition.
7 Boër and Pappas (1975) pp210-212 provide an elaborate example for the making of their case and to protect it against objections.
8 Schiffer (1972) p44 offers: ‘H: “A necessary condition of someone’s meaning that p is that he utter a sentence which means ‘p’.
S: “But then one could never mean that p by uttering a sentence metaphorically”. Here S utters x with the intention of getting H
from the Gricean cases, and that S intends to produce in H some recognition of intention, and that consequently S means something by uttering x with appeal to mutual knowledge. Schiffer makes two responses, noting the case in which S means that p on certain known premises; firstly, that S intends H to think that S thinks p and intends that part of H's reason for thinking this is S's intention, and secondly, and pending the addition of _bona fides_ given by S to convince H that p, that S does not intend H to accept the _bona fides_ owing to S's acceptance, but rather for H's reason for accepting them to be that S intends him to do so. Schiffer responds that even if the suggestions were true, they could not apply in Gricean theory, for accounts of what it is for S to mean something by an utterance must be correlated with an account of what is meant by uttering x, one for which the condition of the recognition of intention does not, on its own, allow. Both suggestions, Schiffer adds, are also false, for it is not decided by an intention and its recognition, in most instances, that mutual knowledge obtains between S and H as to S's belief that p. If required, S could articulate his intention, and, if x is not understood, one might say that he would have to, and this demands that there are mutually-known conventions of language. The second suggestion claims for an intention conditions which make it practically untenable: such an intention (distinctly non-Gricean), would apply only to a limited range of cases, and application to all "...would commit one to saying that the conditions necessary for S meaning that such-and-such is the case vary from one type of case to the other". 

A better response, Schiffer ventures, is to argue that his counter-examples are themselves 'parasitic' upon the canonical Gricean cases of _telling_, and are thus 'departures' from 'primary' cases of S-meaning (although passably similar), those perhaps in which, though S does not intend to elicit a response by recognition of intention, he means (something). One such case is a _'pretending to tell'_, but Schiffer asks, "...what kind of explanation could be given to show that the above examples are dependent upon cases of "telling" for their status as instances of S-meaning?" Furthermore, the requirement for the addition of mutual knowledge has taken the analysis of Gricean meaning theory far from simple cases of _telling_, and has shown the need for a workable theory of nested, second intention. Boer and Pappas make another suggestion. Grice's letter writer (in the example considered above), may be at pains to say something to H; he writes at the peril of being misunderstood, thinking he

---

1 to see, or of pointing out to H, that p (that such-and-such is a consequence of H's statement), but S does not, and indeed could not, intend to bring about this effect by means of recognition of intention. Still, we should want to say that S meant something'.

2 Schiffer (1972) p47.
knows his intentions, but is simply mistaken. (What is more, they suggest, S may know of such suppressed intentions without being ‘explicitly aware’). As Schiffer says when describing the
sufficiency of his theory, S need not have or be aware of any of the complex, Gricean intentions in the
analysis; it is the task of mutual knowledge to account for them.

Schiffer wants to retain the Gricean condition that S meant something by an utterance only if S
uttered it intending to produce a response in H. With this and the argument established for the necessity
of mutual knowledge conditions, there are two problems for which Schiffer must account before
writing his alternative theory of S-meaning. The first concerns Grice’s implication that what S means
be determined by the value of H’s response ‘r’; Schiffer argues that this is not an adequate criterion,
determining at best that which must be determined if one is to determine what S meant, and not what S
meant. The second condition, given in the counter-examples above, concerns the fact that the restraint
on the way in which S must intend to produce the response in H allows only one type of instance of S-
meaning, that requiring the creation of a perlocutionary effect (the recognition of intention) in H.
Schiffer accepts, following his earlier point, the Gricean condition that S meant that p by his utterance
iff it was made with the intention of causing in H activated belief that p (though this is not, he repeats, a
sufficient condition for S meaning that p, as the counter-examples show), and this raises again the
question of whether the mutual knowledge conditions are required merely for S to be telling H that p,
or whether they are required for all cases of S meaning that p. For illustration, he suggests a case in
which, it might be claimed, a sufficient condition for S meaning that p by his utterance is that he
uttered x intending to remind H that p. Schiffer offers counter-examples, in which S reminds H that p,
but does not mean that p, and similar cases are summarised (to make the case for mutual knowledge),
in which S intends to point out that p or to convince H that p on the basis of prior premises, or in which
S utters x intending to produce the activated belief that p, but in which S does not mean that p. In
response, Schiffer states necessary conditions. S meant that p by uttering x iff he uttered x intending to
realise a certain state of affairs E which is (intended) such that E’s obtaining is sufficient for S and H
mutually knowing that E obtains and that it is conclusive evidence that S uttered x intending (1) to
cause in H the activated belief that p; (2) to realise E. These conditions, however, are not sufficient for

---

10 Indeed, Boër and Pappas (1975) p213 writes that it is ‘...not infrequently the case that people are mistaken about their intentions in doing and saying various things’. (This is precisely one of Derrida’s objections to Searle)
12 The most complex of which is on Schiffer (1972) p52. S intends that a bowl of roses he places in H’s room remind H that x’s name is Rose, only ‘...S intends H to reason: “S intends me to think that he intends me to think that he put the roses in my room purely for decorative reasons, but I recognise that he really intends me to recognise that his intention in putting the roses in my room was to remind me that x’s name is Rose”’.

286
S meaning that p, as given in the example of S (a neuroscientist) and H his assistant. S doctors H in such a way that by striking a certain chord on a piano, causing a sound of a certain frequency in H, H comes to recall the first word he learned. S knows this, that H is of the appropriate type, and (independently) what word H first learned (all of this constitutes their mutual knowledge). S strikes the chord intending H to recall his first word (say, ‘stichomythia’), and with mutual knowledge conditions obtaining, but he surely does not mean, by striking the chord, that ‘stichomythia’ was H’s first word. Schiffer goes on to contrast two sets of (distinctly Gricean), cases, showing S meaning that p in a verbal and a non-verbal utterance, and in which the necessary conditions are fulfilled. In the examples of non-verbal utterances (S again strikes a chord), intending to cause H to recall that p, in only one is the chord intended to cause H to recall that there is a relation between the chord struck and the belief that p. In those of verbal utterances, it is contended that S intends the utterance to cause H to recall the fact by virtue of H’s recognition of the utterance as ‘...a conventional means for making known one’s intention to produce in an audience the belief...’13. (Holdcroft writes, in response to these examples, that Schiffer’s mutual knowledge conditions are not applicable in the counter-examples given by Strawson, and in those cases in which S deceives about his intention. Additionally, he counters Schiffer’s application of mutual knowledge conditions to cases of S meaning, questioning the analysis saying that in cases in which S intends his utterance to produce a state of affairs, S and H mutually know both that it obtains, and that the fact that it obtains is evidence (good or very good), that S intends H to believe that p. Holdcroft argues that there is no distinction between the problems with which the first and the second points are to deal, and that the possibility of mutual knowledge is not proven14. This is discussed in context, and the reply made that, on the contrary, the fact that there is no distinction between the problems is to the benefit of Schiffer’s analysis).

Schiffer writes that a case of S uttering x with the intention of, say, thereby reminding H that p is a case of S meaning that p by uttering x iff S makes the utterance intending to cause in H the activated belief that p, and the utterance is a cause of H’s having the activated belief at least partly by virtue of H’s recognition that x is related to the belief that p. From this, he continues, one may conclude that S meant p by x iff he uttered it intending to cause the activated belief that p and intending that his utterance be a cause of H’s having the activated belief at least partly in virtue of H’s recognition that x is related in a certain way to the belief p, and Schiffer adds this to the reconstructed analysis. (The same

---

13 Schiffer (1972) p53.
considerations apply to cases of 'reminding' as to 'pointing out', 'calling up' and 'argument'; this shows that, following Grice, in cases of 'telling' there is at least one additional (perlocutionary?) relation between x and p that S must intend H to recognise if S is to produce the belief that p, namely, that x was uttered with the intention of producing the belief. It is vital to note that Schiffer believes that the intention and convention conditions of the Gricean analysis are not 'erased' by the development of the mutual knowledge conditions. Indeed, one can see that they remain at the core of his arguments, making the case that, explicitly in response to Derrida's scepticism, intentions and conventions can be founded for simple speech acts. Schiffer continues, firstly, the fact that x is f is not a means to make known to H the response S intends to produce in H unless the fact that x is f relates '...x in a certain way to the type of response to which r belongs'. (Schiffer says that this goes for cases in which H thinks that there is a relation). Secondly, if this additional condition is necessary for S-meaning, then H will not take the fact that S uttered x as evidence that he meant that p unless H thinks that x is related in a specific way to p. This additional condition has a fascinating 'double life': if S meant that p by x, and if he succeeded in satisfying the Gricean intentions with which the utterance was made, then x will have been related in a certain way to p, and in virtue of this will S's utterance have caused H's having the activated belief that p, and been evidence that S uttered x with the intention of producing the belief.

There are difficulties for Schiffer's reconstructed analysis, raised by cases of admirably Derridean nature, such as those in which S means something and intends to cause belief that p, but does not mean that p. One might refer back to the case of Herod presenting Salome with the head of St John the Baptist, and Schiffer adds, with respect to the cases of nested, mutual knowledge, the case in which H holds up a bandaged leg in response to S's request that he dance\(^{15}\). In neither case is there a difficult inference, and Schiffer is confident he can exclude examples of this type by specifying that the relation H is intended to recognise must not be such that the utterance gives H evidence that p without '...the mediation of an intention on the part of S to produce in H, by uttering x, the belief that p', but that Gricean analysis needs emendation to account for the ways in which Lewis' conventions can become settled in speech. If S sincerely means that p by uttering x then he intends to produce the belief that p and that H have reasons for the belief that p. (This does not say that S supply H with reasons for p). It

\(^{14}\) Holdcroft (1978) pp134-135 writes that cases of the neuroscientist type, while ambiguous as to the permissible ways in which x can be related to beliefs, reveal important conditions.

\(^{15}\) Cf. Holdcroft (1978) p132. Schiffer does not find it 'wildly implausible' to say that in presenting the head Herod meant that John was dead. (It might be noted that Schiffer's examples are invariably instances of non-verbal utterances).
is, Schiffer ventures following this, ‘almost always’ the case that if one holds \( p \) as a reason for \( p \), one will think \( p \) in some way grounds for \( p \): \( p \) is, for Schiffer, ‘truth-supporting’\(^1\). Schiffer introduces notation: ‘“\( S \) intends to produce in \( H \) the response \( r/p \)” = df. “\( S \) intends to produce in \( H \) the response \( r \) for which he intends \( H \) to have the reason(s) \( p \)”'. If the reasons are intended to be truth-supporting for \( H \)’s belief, then this is notated \( \rho(t) \). Therefore, \( S \) means that \( p \) by \( x \) in cases in which ‘\( S \) intends that there be some \( p \) such that his utterance of \( x \) causes \( H \) to have the activated belief that \( p/p(t) \). This, ‘...captures the demand that meaning and communication be rational in a certain way...’, and that, ‘...communication, in general, aims at the production of knowledge and not merely belief’\(^7\).

Holdcroft (as broached above) sees a difference between the \( p \)-identifiable, Gricean class and the \( \rho(t) \)-identifiable class. Analysis of the latter, by applicable conditions for mutual knowledge, leaves behind the analysis of \( S \)-meaning, for it says that \( S \) has an additional intention that it be mutual knowledge that \( S \) intended \( H \)’s reason for believing that \( p \) to be of a specific sort, and this is, he argues, supplied by the context of utterance contained in the \( p \)-identifiable class on terms derived from Austin and the theory of illocutionary force\(^8\). Holdcroft asks which features of an utterance, ‘in a particular case’, indicate to \( H \) the belief \( S \) wants him to adopt: how is the utterance related to the belief? What are the relationships that can be instantiated by \( x \), and on what conventions do they depend? \(^9\) Holdcroft considers the example of utterances spoken with a literal meaning and an intention to communicate meaning, but in which \( S \) intends an implied, oblique meaning. This raises, for Schiffer, further difficult cases. \( S \) says and means that Morris has one leg, and his utterance offers no evidence that \( S \)’s first intention be that \( H \) take from the utterance that Morris should not be prop-forward. The oblique intentions, Holdcroft notes, can only be carried by the context of the utterance, and are superadded to its meaning: \textit{pace} Austin, they give (in the Morris example), the utterance the force of an objection. Holdcroft finds many difficulties with Schiffer’s argument that the intentions requiring elucidation in a study of illocutionary force, in addition to those for \( S \)-meaning, are those descriptive of the intention with which \( S \) performs a \( \rho(t) \)-identifiable act, and a case in point is Schiffer’s inclusion of the

\(^{14}\) There may, for instance, be moral or prudential reasons for holding that \( p \). Cf. Gilbert (1989) p. One might find reasons to criticise Schiffer for his too frequent use of the ‘almost always’ construction.

\(^{17}\) Schiffer (1972) p38. A congruent formulation is seen for the case in which \( S \) meant that \( H \) was to do something, and in the elucidation of illocutionary force. The definition can be revised once again, to take the case in which there is to be a \( p \) such that \( S \)’s utterance of \( x \) causes in \( H \) the activated belief that \( p/p(t) \). (It is unlikely that \( S \) intended \( H \) to believe that they are in retreat because \( S \) himself believes this having seen them). There must be some ‘easily noticeable feature’ of the context which \( S \) intends that will bring \( H \) to realise that there exist reasons for believing the utterance. Indeed, if some feature of an utterance of “They are in retreat” indicated to \( H \) what reason he was meant to have for believing that they are, then, on Schiffer’s account, \( S \) will come perilously close to meaning that they are in retreat, and I intend you to believe that this is so because...” (p119-140).

\(^{18}\) Holdcroft (1978) p139 adds that the necessity of the additional intention is highly plausible, ‘...since it seems unlikely that there is any feature of an actual utterance of, for example, “They are in retreat”, when it is used to make a report, which indicates that \( S \) intends \( H \) to believe that they are in retreat because \( S \) himself believes this having seen them’. There must be some ‘easily noticeable feature’ of the context which \( S \) intends will bring \( H \) to realise that there exist reasons for believing the utterance.
illocutionary act of affirming in the p-identifiable class. From this it follows, Holdcroft argues, that affirming something requires that there be a p such that one means that p, and that p be of a specific form for inclusion in the Gricean analysis, but Holdcroft returns to his example (of Morris), and allows that one may be affirming, or expressing a belief that p, but that following the counter-examples, one cannot possibly mean that one expresses a belief p\textsuperscript{19}. Holdcroft writes that Schiffer takes features of the context of utterance indicating implicature as guides as to what the sentence means, thoughtlessly eliding the two; Holdcroft finds that the mutual knowledge condition cannot fully account for the difficulties he describes\textsuperscript{20}. He argues (correctly), that mutual knowledge was added to deal with the regress of intentions left by Grice’s theory of S-meaning, seen particularly in cases of deception (say, in which S has intentions he does not want recognised), and to combat Strawson’s counter-examples.

To exclude others, and to give a more intuitive theory, Grice adds (as seen in II), that S should not intend that any of his relevant intentions go unrecognised, a point to which Schiffer objects. In response Holdcroft also appeals (in counter-examples), to cases in which there is a discrepancy between the reason H thinks S has for getting him to leave, and the reason S wants him to have for leaving\textsuperscript{21}. Furthermore, Holdcroft argues that the first of the two pertinent conditions in Grice’s analysis writing in the condition that S’s relevant intentions not go unrecognised, and saying that S’s utterance (x) has a feature, taken as evidence that x was uttered with intention to produce a definite response, may hold, and yet it not follow that S intends H to think that S intends the first condition to be false, say, in cases in which (studied by Schiffer), H thinks and S does not intend H to think that S intends to be rid of H by singing for it is the most likely method, but to think that S sang not caring whether H would leave. The case seems utterly intractable, for Grice’s analysis fails to cater for those cases in

\textsuperscript{19}One might examine Holdcroft’s own example (Holdcroft (1978) p140).

\textsuperscript{20}There is in Holdcroft a refusal even to consider that S’s utterance ‘Morris has only one leg’, might best be analysed as an example of a metaphorical utterance. S may utter the sentence knowing that it is not a conventional means of expressing any belief; on this occasion it has the force of an objection, but it may be used in other ways if necessary (Holdcroft (1978) pp140-141). No feature of the sentence correlates it with the illocutionary force of objecting, and so with the relevant S belief. By saying ‘Morris has only one leg’, S means that the fact that Morris has only one leg is a reason why he should not be prop-forward because of the tenets of Schiffer’s own theory, namely that the utterance must be related to the belief that S is trying to communicate to H. Cf. Burkhardt, A., ‘Searle on Metaphor’, pp303-335 in Burkhardt, A., (ed.); Speech Acts, Meanings and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of John R. Searle (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter) 1990. Bach and Harnish (1979) are as confident as their analysis applies to literal, non-literal and indirect utterances. There is, however, no significant role for convention in their theory.

One might utter the sentence literally, and, if S means anything (and means H to recognise that he means anything), he means that Morris has one leg. In such a case, S’s primary intention cannot be said to be that H come to believe that Morris should not be prop-forward. On pp141-142 Holdcroft raises similar problems for cases of commissives.

\textsuperscript{21}Holdcroft (1978) pp142-143 suggests further difficulties with the theory that if an act is illocutionary, then in performing it S must mean that p or that H is to q. S may beg, pray or shout out ‘Leave me alone!’, without in truth wanting H to leave. With regard to the distinction set up by Strawson, Holdcroft writes of Schiffer’s assigning acts performed in literal utterances of imperatives to the p-identifiable class is questionable in light of considerations that the function of the imperative is to indicate that, for S, there is a reason, promulgated by utterances in a context, why H should perform an act. For Holdcroft, this requires that intentions other than those required to mean something in a location and those bearing on the type of reason S intends H to have adopting a certain belief, are determinants of illocutionary force.

\textsuperscript{22}He gives a version of Grice’s second definition, version B. Cf. Grice (1989b) pp99-100.
which S wants H to reason in a certain way, but to think that he is not to reason this way, and
(Schiffer’s addition), those in which S does not intend H to think he is to reason in a way he is meant
to, and Holdcroft asks whether mutual knowledge can possibly account in such cases. With an
application of his notion of the truth-supporting condition Schiffer introduces his means of dealing with
these cases.

Schiffer gives a formulation similar to that for ‘S means that p’ for cases in which S meant that H was
to do something, or to have a belief, wishing further to elucidate the connection with illocutionary
force. The definition for ‘S means that p’, must be revised, to take the case in which there is to be a p
such that S’s utterance of x causes in H the activated belief that p/p(t), and Holdcroft objects to the
latter as he does the former, arguing that the meaning of the proposition stating the first mutual
knowledge condition for S-meaning, taken from Grice, is that there is a truth-supporting reason
accompanying S’s utterance of x affecting H, allowing it to produce an activated belief that p. For
Holdcroft, it follows that S intends the state of affairs produced or indicated to be evidence that there is
such a reason, and that this renders otiose Schiffer’s neuroscientist counter-example (described above)
and similar. What is more, even if S makes the utterance intending that mutual knowledge be invoked,
and that H’s recognition of the fact that the utterance reaches out to the belief described in the state of
affairs is imperative for H coming to believe this, still S may not mean anything by the utterance23. The
examples that the second mutual knowledge condition are to exclude are those, in Grice, in which S’s
utterance directly causes a belief without an intentional correlation (that is whether or not H recognises
any of S’s intentions). Those that the first is to exclude always include this correlation: H is to see that
S’s utterance is correlated with the belief p, and come to believe p, and in this case, whether or not H
recognises the intentions with which S makes the utterance. Holdcroft asks how the cases differ, how
the second depends for its meaning on anything other than analysis of Gricean S-meaning, given that,
Schiffer writes in explicating the second condition, Gricean analysis always includes a condition of
mutual knowledge on relation R that it cannot hold directly between the utterance and H’s belief24.

23 Holdcroft (1978) p137.
24 The cases that show the need for truth-supporting reasons such that S’s utterance causes H to have activated belief, and that S
intends his utterance to be good evidence that it is correct to have activated belief that there exists such reasons are described by
Holdcroft (1978) pp136-137. One such shows a man S, supposing H to be in all respects normal, who utters ‘Turn right!’ with
the intention of getting H to turn right, and that ‘Turn right!’ being conventionally related to the action plays some part in getting
H to perform it. ‘The trouble is that if H is so constituted that he cannot help turning right once he realises that an “utterance” is
correlated by R [the conventional relation] with that action, no matter what S’s intentions are’. S does not know this, and so it is
difficult to say precisely why this does not describe a case of S-meaning. ‘For since S assumes that H is normal, he cannot be
relying on this particular fact about H’s psychology to play any part in getting H to turn right’.
In cases in which S knows this peculiar fact about H, the case is confused. If he cannot then mean that H is to turn right, this is
because he cannot be seen to intend that H recognise his intention to make him turn right as the satisfaction of a mutual
knowledge condition.
Holdercroft concludes (a point with which one must concur), that Schiffer’s conditions on mutual knowledge must account for the way in which utterance and reported belief are related. The effects of deceptive, parasitical cases still remain.

Schiffer’s analysis for S means that H is to \( \varphi \) (to do something) runs: \(^{25}\)

\[
S \text{ meant that } H \text{ was to } \varphi \text{ by (or in) uttering } x \text{ only if } S \text{ uttered } x \text{ intending thereby to realise a certain state of affairs } E \text{ which is (intended by } S \text{ to be) such that } E \text{’s obtaining is sufficient for } S \text{ and } H \text{ mutually knowing (or believing) that } E \text{ obtains and that } E \text{ is conclusive (very good or good) evidence that } S \text{ uttered } x \text{ intending: (1) there to be some } \rho \text{ such that } S \text{’s utterance of } x \text{ causes } H \text{ to } \varphi/\rho; (2) satisfaction of (1) to be achieved, at least in part, by virtue of } H \text{’s belief that } x \text{ is related in a certain way } R \text{ to (the act-type) } \varphi-\text{ing; (3) to realise } E.
\]

It is imperative to note that here, and so in the conditions for S meaning that \( \rho \), that still S meaning that H is to \( \varphi \) allows that S may mean this by his utterance even though S intends his utterance to provide H with a reason for \( \varphi \)-ing, ‘…without the mediation of S’s intentions’ as they are given in Gricean analysis. \(^{26}\) It is equally important to note that, referring again to Herod-like cases, Schiffer observes that the relation between the utterance and the act-type \( \varphi \)-ing which H is to recognise, ‘must not be such that the utterance will provide H with a reason for \( \varphi \)-ing without the mediation of an intention of S to cause H to \( \varphi \). (As shall be remembered, Grice writes that in the Herod example, and similar oblique cases, no ‘mediation’ of intentions occurs. Herod’s intended meaning cannot be communicated). Schiffer suggests a different analysis. Once again, if S utters x with the intentions Schiffer specifies, then S means that \( \rho \), and by uttering x, that he intends to cause in H the activated belief that \( \rho \), H to have reasons for the belief, and this (partly) in virtue of H’s recognition that x is related to \( \rho \) in a certain way. \(^{27}\) However, following Herod-like cases, if S means that \( \rho \) by uttering x with the intention of causing H to \( \varphi \) by Schiffer’s conditions, it will not be the case that he also meant that he uttered x intending to produce the belief that \( \rho \), for as numerous objections have shown, the conditions are not jointly sufficient, and the intention guiding the utterance reaches beyond mediation of the mere

---

The need for truth-supporting reasons regarding S’s utterance is challenged by such cases. Scepticism regarding whether the case described could possibly exist is made more difficult by the fact that it is not a certain sound that causes H to turn, but that he recognises that the sound is correlated in some way with the action of turning. Thus, it seems that whenever H recognises the correlation he will turn.

\(^{25}\) Schiffer (1972) p59.
\(^{26}\) Schiffer (1972) p59.
\(^{27}\) Schiffer (1972) p60. This may continue for the other beliefs, in addition to \( \rho \), that S must intend to produce in H.
utterance to appeal to H's mutual knowledge. The same objections are good for Grice's analysis of S-meaning, and Schiffer gives an alternative: that whenever S utters x intending to produce response r in H by means of recognition of intention, there are always beliefs other than the intended primary response: that '...it follows from Grice's account [as described in II] that whenever S means something he will mean a lot more than he bargained for'. These beliefs, Schiffer says, must be theorised as what they are, necessary parts of S's act of meaning that p, and not corollaries. They accompany primary and secondary intentions, and they are identified as follows. When a person acts a distinction may be drawn between the intention with which he acted, say, in issuing the utterance, and other intentions he had in performing the act. The first describes his reasons for doing the action, and the latter those containing its successful performance; the relation between the two types of reasons is asymmetrical (as Millikan says, the former depend upon the latter but the latter do not depend upon the former), a fact that, for Schiffer, applies equally to S's intention to produce in H the belief that p, and explains why, in uttering x, S means that p and not that he uttered x intending to produce in H the belief that p. (Schiffer allows that S, in certain cases, may have more than one primary intention in acting, and that S's primary intention may not easily be identified). In considering the consequences of his analysis Schiffer offers an example (Searlean though unacknowledged), regarding the indirect, non-literal cases for which, it shall be argued, mutual knowledge can account. There are cases in which S makes an utterance knowing that he will not cause H to ψ. In such cases, Schiffer asks, does S intend that his utterance cause H to ψ? (Boer and Pappas add, as above, the condition that S's knowledge in such cases must be 'occurent' or 'active'). In response Boer and Pappas consider sudden outbursts: 'Stop, thief!', and so forth. It is argued that S does not intend that his utterance will halt the thief, and exclamations and curses are not publications of intention, for S could hardly be said to have wanted to communicate the intention that he wants H to stop, for, on Schiffer’s conditions, he must have wanted to produce the belief in H that he wants him to stop, and it is plausibly the case that this is known: H is, after all, taking flight. Orders are prone to the same arguments: if S did not intend the utterance to cause H to stop it did not function as an order.

---

29 The same objection can be made, as Schiffer (1972) p61 says, for the analysis of 'S meant that A is to φ'.
30 Schiffer (1972) p61.
31 Schiffer (1972) pp69-70. A parent might issue a warning to a child, warning them against doing that which they in truth want them to do, and so exploiting a rebellious streak in their offspring.
32 Boer and Pappas (1975) p216 write that, however, it is not necessarily true that S ordering H to ψ must intend so. 'Suppose S is a general who is seriously concerned with the welfare of his troops. S's superiors command him to order an attack which he privately regards as suicidally stupid. But since he has an ailing wife to support and is only a month away from retirement and a fat pension, he does not dare to disobey. So he orders the troops to attack, hoping—indeed, intending—that his men should see the gross stupidity of the order and refuse to obey, thereby bringing his superiors to their sense and saving him from moral and
A consequence of this example is that if $S$ utters $x$ with the intentions in either condition of the definition of mutual knowledge, then he cannot mean by uttering $x$ that his primary intention in uttering $x$ is to produce the belief that $p$, for if he says ‘Stop, thief!’, as Boër and Pappas show, this articulates an already apparent belief, and this being the case the utterance appeals to no mutual knowledge condition. Schiffer suggests a further case in which $S$ uttered $x$ with the due intentions, and that what he uttered was $'\sigma_1$: My primary intention in uttering this sentence is to produce in you—by means of recognition of intention—the belief that $p'$, one in which $S$'s chances of producing belief are more likely than in, say, ‘I believe $p$’, to jeopardise the communication of meaning and intention. This circumvents both Gricean conditions of mutual knowledge, for it gives no truth-supporting reason, and displays no intentional correlation as they are conceived by Grice. Objections might still proceed from considerations concerning the fact that $S$'s may be a parasitical utterance, and attention to this must be left to IV.5, and the introduction of a further feature of $S$-meaning for which account must be made, and owing to the Gricean rejection of the possibility of pre-linguistic intentionality, namely, that what $S$ means is not determined by what is uttered. This allows no licence for $S$ to mean what he wants by what he says, for $x$ must be uttered with intentions ‘...relevant...’, to making the utterance. Whatever the nature of $x$ be, it is ‘essential’ for Schiffer’s account of meaning that if $S$ can ‘reasonably expect’ to utter $x$ with the intentions said to be necessary and sufficient for meaning that $p$ (with conventions established on Lewis’ theory, without regress), then he will truly mean that $p$, and this can be achieved by a unitary speech act appealing to first intention alone. Furthermore, truth-supporting reasons for $x$ arise not in additional or supplementary reasons between $S$ and $H$ for believing $x$, and describing or explaining the nested reasoning through which $S$ and $H$ must work to arrive at coordination on communication, but in speech act conventions established by Lewis conventions, which, again, can account for first intentions. Such speech acts carry with them their truth-supporting reasons. Schiffer writes:

The importance of this condition is that if it were the case that what $S$ meant by uttering $x$ were determined, even in part, by the meaning of $x$, then this would, on the face of it, render circular an account of what $x$ means in terms of what is or would be meant by uttering $x$. And the serious problem with the objection raised is that, if true, it would

---

31 Schiffer (1972) p65.
show that what is meant by uttering x at least sometimes is determined by the meaning of x.\[33

One might consider the case in which S utters simply ‘p’ (\(\sigma_2\) in Schiffer’s example). It does not seem correct, again following Herod-like cases, to say that what S meant by uttering \(\sigma_1\) was what he meant by uttering \(\sigma_2\); the relevant intentions are not present.\[34 However, one might deny that S can utter \(\sigma_1\) with the intentions specified in the definition, firstly, by stressing the intimate connection between \(\sigma_1\) and \(\sigma_2\), emphasising the fact that were S to utter \(\sigma_1\) his intention would be to produce by recognition of intention the belief that he uttered \(\sigma_1\) intending to produce in H the belief that p. In the case of \(\sigma_2\) S’s intention is to produce in H by means of recognition of intention, the belief that p, and Schiffer writes that this is impossible without a prior convention, but this, he shows, could never be provided by the explicit performative. With reference to a further (like) example Schiffer denies that in uttering \(\sigma_1\) S means that his primary intention is to produce in H the belief that p, and following this it is seen that Boër and Pappas’ concerns, regarding the estrangement of intentions from S’s utterance, are obviated.\[35 Schiffer offers \(\sigma_3\), meaning the same as \(\sigma_1\), but which cannot be used to mean that S’s first intention is to produce in H the belief that p. If examples of such sentences could be found they would give grounds for denying that by \(\sigma_1\) S meant that his primary intention was to do as he said, ‘... for it seems highly reasonable to assume that if two sentences have the same meaning, then what would be meant by “subscriptively” uttering the one would also be meant by “subscriptively” uttering the other’. The model for \(\sigma_3\) is Austin’s explicit performative, ‘I (hereby) tell you that p’. In uttering \(\sigma_3\) S does not mean that he tells H that p, S means p, spoken in the utterance; S is not saying that he performs the speech act of telling H that p, rather, he is performing the act of telling H that p (he is meaning that p); such utterances are not descriptions, reports or contentions, and they are neither true nor false. As Schiffer says, one might contend that an utterance of \(\sigma_3\) is not a constatement of p, but still that S means that he tells H that p. Schiffer responds by saying that this is unacceptable, for ‘...surely our inclination to say that by uttering \(\sigma_1\) S meant that his primary intention was [as stated] is inextricably bound up

\[33 As Frege says, these cases give rise to the problems of sense and reference.

\[34 Schiffer (1972) p65. The example excludes at least one case of S meaning that p, and offers up at least one case in which what is meant is determined by the meaning of the sentence uttered. If in uttering \(\sigma_1\) S meant that his primary intention in uttering his sentence was to produce in H, by means of the recognition of intention, the belief that p, and if S uttered \(\sigma_1\) with the intentions thought by Griceans to be necessary and sufficient for meaning that p, then not all of the conditions are necessary, for ‘...the analyses will then exclude at least one case of S meaning that p’. Furthermore, if in uttering \(\sigma_1\) S meant that his primary intention was to produce in H, by recognition of intention, the belief that p, and if in uttering \(\sigma_1\) S did not mean that his primary intention was to do this (and the only difference between the cases is in the means used to make explicit the intentions, then ‘...we have at least one case where what is meant is determined by the meaning of the sentence S uttered, and this would seem to call into question the whole enterprise we [followers of Grice] are engaged in’.

\[35 Schiffer (1972) p66. This does not prevent one from saying that by ‘My primary intention...’, S meant ‘My primary intention...’.
with our inclination to say that when he uttered $\sigma_1$ S said that his primary intention was [as stated]"\(^36\). Ignoring irrelevant changes of syntax, the explicit performative ($\sigma_1$) has the same meaning as $\sigma_1$; what is meant by an utterance of $\sigma_1$ is identical with what would be meant by an utterance of $\sigma_1$ \(^37\). This being so, what is meant by uttering $\sigma_1$ is identical with what is meant by uttering $\sigma_3$, and, correspondingly, if it is the case that in uttering $\sigma_3$ S does not mean that he tells H that $p$, then it follows that in uttering $\sigma_1$ S does not mean that his intention in speaking is to produce in H the belief that $p$. This notwithstanding, problematical cases arise when the response S intends to produce is neither activated belief that $p$ nor H's $q$-ing, and in which an utterance is made in the absence of any H. Firstly, one might cite cases in which S means that $p$ by his utterance, but not care whether he is believed; it does not follow that x was not uttered with the intention of causing H to believe that $p$. There are also (Gricean) "momentary" intentions: cases in which S forgets his 'standing' intentions; cases of S performing an act, with intention, knowing or believing that he cannot bring about the result; cases of counter-suggestion, of telling and of confession, and of S letting H know (surreptitiously) that he knows. (All such cases, Schiffer writes, following Austin, are cases of S meaning that $p$, "...derived from and dependent upon the primary case captured in the definitions". For instance, counter-suggestive utterances are "...directly parasitic upon primary and standard acts of meaning"; the deception is itself, "...dependent upon its being at least generally the case that one who means that H is to $q$ intends H to $q$". S could not pretend unless "...the imperative mood were conventionally correlated with an intention to produce action..."\(^38\). Schiffer describes a way in which the definitions may be altered to accommodate parasitic cases, but adds that, "...since such degenerate cases have been noticed and accounted for it is probably best to leave the formal definitions unaltered so that they will provide a schema more directly for the standard and primary cases". The same applies to cases of 'telling', and thus to analogous cases of confession, for, "[c]ommunicating that $p$ is a paradigm of bringing the fact that $p$ "out in the open", and by acting as though he were communicating that he did such-and-such the confessor purports to show that he is willing to have it out in the open that he did such-and-such'). In the following section there are presented reasons for rejecting Schiffer's conditions on the explicit performative, and the argument made that, in a theory of speech acts containing a mutual knowledge condition, the failure of Austinian

\(^{36}\) Schiffer (1972) p67.

\(^{37}\) Another application of Leibniz's law.

\(^{38}\) Schiffer (1972) pp71-72. One might, Schiffer adds, speak of pretended X-ing as X-ing, especially in those cases "...where what one does is exactly the same as what one would do were one actually X-ing (in our case, meaning such-and-such)". One might, for example, say that in the primary sense of 'applying artificial respiration', one does so only if one intends to restore a patient to normal breathing, but in the context of a first-aid class S might 'quite naturally' request H to apply artificial respiration to another student. See also Schiffer's two further conditions (the third and the fourth) on pp71-72.
and Searlean theories to account for distinctions between literal and parasitical contexts of utterance is not repeated, and that it is not the case that such distinctions constitute fatal flaws at the heart of any attempt to write conventions for language.
5. Conclusion: Conventions and Practice

Cases of S-meaning in the absence of an H, Schiffer writes, divide into two types: those in which S utters x because of the possibility of producing a response in a (type of) person and a (type of) situation, and those in which S utters x with no H-directed intention at all. The first type is (as seen below) exactly equivalent to that appealed to by Derrida in the examples of the shopping list and concert note, and Schiffer adds a further example, of a diary writer recording an event for the reference of his future self. With consideration of further cases, of utterances made with the belief that S will very likely not inform H of his belief and of the mutual knowledge conditions obtaining, Schiffer arrives at redefinitions …which should accommodate all of the cases considered so far; they differ only in the addition of provisos to the definitions of mutual knowledge: they are spoken as ‘parasitic’ on the ‘standard and primary’ cases. In cases in which there is no H-directed intention, what we want to find are examples of S meaning that p or examples of S meaning that H is to φ where S has no intention to produce a response in some actual or possible audience (including himself on some later occasion).1

Schiffer notes further truculent cases, adding the case of S thinking through a problem, occasionally noting ideas for clarification, to which he will never return. Schiffer asks whether this be a case of S meaning that p by utterance (or inscription) x, and adds, suppose there was no act of writing, and that S only ran the thoughts through his mind, concluding, ‘[b]ut then why should the fact that he did not actually write or utter aloud the sentence constitute a relevant difference?’2 In line with his analysis of S-meaning, Schiffer writes that such cases, and those above, are qualitatively the same as the standard, adding that denying that the cases are the same ‘…would not win many converts, and for at least this reason I shall henceforth assume that we do want to say of these cases that in uttering x S meant that p’.3 Schiffer finds an analogy in joking, utterances with an additional (perlocutionary) intent to amuse. The model of the previous examples is followed: S (now a dour man) alone in his room writes down a joke; it amuses neither himself nor anyone else, for it shall be shown to no one.4 The utterance is a joke ‘…in virtue of S’s uttering x with the intention of uttering something which would amuse a certain type of audience (if uttered in certain (types of) circumstances)’. However, Schiffer adds that this analysis is incomplete, for there exist cases in which S utters x intending that the utterance fulfil this criterion, that

1 Schiffer (1972) pp76-77.
2 Schiffer (1972) p77.
3 Schiffer (1972) p77.
4 (This is another case of non-verbal utterance).
it would produce the desired response if it were uttered in a non-parasitic context, but in which it is false to say that S meant something by the utterance. (Schiffer suggests: a lieutenant, aware of the joy he gets from brutalising an anxious private (X), mutters to himself, in the privacy of his home, ‘X, run your bayonet through yourself’, enjoying the thought that if he were to do this in the presence of X he would do as he was ordered. He surely does not mean by his utterance that X is to do this). What is more, private utterances directed at specific individuals, which in non-parasitic contexts would issue in the specific desired response, may still not be cases of meaning. (Schiffer offers another example: a purist, determined never to produce a false sentence, practices utterances with an exemplar (say, ‘Snow is white’), with an intention to produce a true sentence, one that could be used to tell someone else that snow is white. However, as in the first case, he does not mean that snow is white). In the case of S reflecting on a problem, Schiffer finds no reason to doubt that S means that p by his utterances. S formulates an argument which could, at some future time, be produced to convince H (conceivably himself) that p: it is essential to the example only that S’s intention is to convince H that p. In cases in which S means that p by his utterance and in which he has no H-directed intentions, ‘...S’s utterance x will be part of some activity directed towards securing some cognitive response in himself, and...it is in virtue of this significant resemblance to the standard case that we class these cases as instances of S-meaning’. (As before, Schiffer extends the arguments to cases in which S meant that H was to φ, and gives the example of notes to self to direct one’s future actions: ‘...my intention in writing what I wrote was to secure that I would have in mind a network of intentions’). This intention may be secured

3 Both examples are from Schiffer (1972) p78.
4 Schiffer (1972) p80. Cases in which ‘S means something by (or in) uttering x’ are derivative of the analysis of ‘S means that p’ (or ‘S means that H was to φ’). Schiffer notes the ‘cutting’ example in Grice. If the ill-feeling communicated in the example is a key to a relevant response of distress in an account of S-meaning, it would be the case that S means something, and that what he means is necessary or sufficient for S meaning that p. If what is meant in the example is that S wants nothing to do with H, then on the definition of ‘S means that p’, the only relevant response is H thinking that S wants nothing to do with him, and this is surely S’s intention in wanting to cause H distress (p82). Regarding this, Schiffer writes that the eliciting of responses, described in propositional attitudes, are all, ‘...definable in terms of belief or intention...’, and that ‘...we seem, as intended, to be left with only belief and action (intention) as the relevant types of response’ (p83). Schiffer concludes from this that S can mean something only by virtue of an intention to produce (activated) belief or action, distinguishing this from Grice’s arguing that the difference activated beliefs and propositional attitudes is written in the distinction between having reasons to believe (or motives), and deciding to believe. Schiffer allows no element of deliberation or decision in the affective attitudes, for one does not decide to be offended. Kemmerling (1986) p132 gives a study of propositional attitudes in Grice. He argues that an analysis such as Schiffer gives effectively reduces the number of mutually-known intentions that must be known, and emphasises the problems Davidson finds in Grice, those of trust, rationality and cooperation and convention. He argues that Schiffer’s nesting of intentions cannot easily be done, for they are possessed only by ‘rational agents’ and are far too complex (p137).

Schiffer turns next to utterances making explicit appeal to convention, taking ‘o’ as any well-formed English sentence: I [Schiffer] want to say that if S utters o with its full conventional force, then, for some p, H, and φ, what S will mean by (or in) uttering o is either that p or else that H is to φ (Schiffer (1972) pp83-84).

To establish this Schiffer requires two contentious distinctions, the first, marked by, ‘...pauses, intonation, linguistic context, etc.’, between sentences and non-sentences. A sentence is ‘...the cat is on the mat...’ (it has full conventional force); a non-sentence is ‘...the cat is on the mat’, and is a conventional utterance. A sentence has full conventional force iff the utterance is ‘The cat is on the mat’; and it means that the cat is on the mat, an utterance of o with full conventional force is to utter o and to mean what one says. Schiffer can here return to the formulations of ‘S means that p’, or ‘S means that H is to φ’. Schiffer, ‘[f]or convenience’ ignores problems of ‘ambiguity’ (p84). If o is well-formed, then it will be in the indicative, subjunctive, optative, imperative, or interrogative mood, and Schiffer gives instances in each of the moods, each with the rider that S means what he says. An indicative with full conventional force may give difficulties in the case of explicit performatives, and Schiffer reminds
owing to the possibility of writing enduring conventions for certain speech acts (those, that is, that the hermetic philosopher and the sadistic lieutenant may use in their solitary musings or the typist in his practice sentences).

Lewis' conditions on conventions show that taking as the model for coordination situations that of two agents (S and H) in explicit collocation is otiose, for S can inaugurate a convention on his own,

the reader that, ‘...meaning being what it is...’, S cannot mean, in uttering a request, that he is requesting H to do something (p85).

The conclusion of S-meaning as the condition in which S uttered x iff for some p, H and φ by (or in) uttering x S meant that p or that H was to φ follows with the addition of this final premise to the definitions of mutual knowledge. Boehr and Pappas (1975) p218 object to Schiffer's argument that if S utters a well-formed sentence, in one of the grammatical moods, and with 'full conventional force', S's meaning something by the sentence, but that, in truth, Schiffer exploits a feature of the language in which he writes (English) to draw conclusions with, he must be prepared to argue, application to all languages. (Boehr and Pappas speculate that Schiffer works with a thesis saying that there exist irreducible moods, ones from which others may be derived. However, this is an unstated, and they add, one could hardly discern the irreducible moods without substantial argument. For this Boehr and Pappas must turn to Lewis). Schiffer (1972) pp83-84 writes, '[[let φ be a "dummy" for any expression which can complete the sentence form "S meant that... by (or in) uttering x", and Boehr and Pappas (1975) p217 reply that, if by uttering x S meant that φ, then there is something (English sentence) such that if S utters it with its full conventional force, it will only mean φφ by uttering φ'. Boehr and Pappas ask whether Schiffer appeals to a translation thesis, again unstated; they state a plausible version: We English speakers are justified in believing that M is a modal construction of L only if M is explicable in terms of the modal constructions exemplified in English, i.e. only if sentences of L containing M are adequately translatable into English. They suggest that if Schiffer can make this stand his argument works. If a language is postulated that fulfils the conditions on S-meaning, but in which S can utter a sentence without meaning that p or that H is to φ, one may ask in what way M is a modal construction of L, for if one translates the sentence into English, then S can mean the point of the first sentence only in its English paraphrase, that is, in a language different to that in which S spoke. If there is no translation, then there is no compelling reason to think that M is a modal construction of L. (Boehr and Pappas (1975) p218 describe examples of the tendentiousness of Schiffer's translation thesis).

Holdecroft states the main objection to Schiffer's mutual knowledge condition, that one could not carry out the complex reasoning required, but, ‘...at best...a piece of reasoning which will have this as its conclusion’, and (pp146-147) states clear, well-reasoned counter-examples. Lewis' theory avoids this difficulty. The existence of property H in Schiffer's analysis, telling how one knows that one knows, is more problematical than he thinks: if being H is sufficient for knowing that p, then being H is sufficient for knowing that being H is sufficient for knowing that p, a raft in the theory of mutual knowledge. Holdecroft rejects the thesis and its context: one might, say, know x but not know the property one possesses that is sufficient for the possession of knowledge x (Holdecroft (1978) pp147-148 gives examples). What is more, knowing H leads to a regress; if, in Schiffer's example, Kφ implies (Ωφ) (KφH & (y) (Ky—>Kyp & Ky—>Kyp & Ky...), then to know φ requires that one know H, and knowing this requires that one know (Kφ) (KφG & (y) (Ky—>Kyp & Ky...). Holdecroft (1978) pp148ff turns to a revival of a Gricean definition of meaning to resolve the situation, namely, Grice (1986b) pp99-100. The definition is presented in II.

Schiffer (1972) pp90ff attacks Austin's notion of the conventionality of illocutionary acts for the same reasons as Strawson. The examples Austin gives are "special" and "peripheral" cases. What more, the account of S-meaning gives acts of meaning not as conventional acts; they, are, again in line with Strawson's example, ‘...non-conventional acts usually performed by the use of a conventional means’. On the cases of illocutionary acts thought by Austin to be conventional Schiffer emphasises Strawson's doubts, and writes that such speech acts are, ‘...from the point of view of the theory of language and communication, of marginal interest only’. Part of the Strawsonian analysis gives necessary and sufficient conditions for,...performing a standard non-conventional illocutionary act'. Schiffer gives his own analysis of illocutionary acts, retaining the idea from Strawson that they are not essentially conventional. He divides the class of illocutionary acts into two subclasses, the assertive and the imperative respectively: they correspond to 'S meant that p' and 'S meant that H was to p'. (The analysis of the meanings of speakers in performing illocutionary acts given by Schiffer (1972) pp95-104 might be thought to constitute a further and different response to Derrida's treatment of speech acts). Cf. Loar (1981) pp245-247.

In an assessment of non-composite whole utterance types, those 'historically' prior to composite whole utterance types (see above), Schiffer develops the idea that x means something in G as a matter of convention. He asks first what it is for x to be a noncomposite (nc) whole utterance type which means (timeless) 'p' in G. (x (nc) means "p" in G). With affinities to Quine, Schiffer says (roughly speaking) that suppose that in a certain community a type of sound (nc) means something specific. In another community it may mean something different. It seems there is a connection between what x means in G and how the members of G do, could potentially do, or mean, by an utterance of x. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for x (nc) meaning 'p' in G. What precludes a noise from meaning p is, aside from its facility for successful communication, that the feature in virtue of which an utterance of the noise is evidence that S meant p is a natural feature, and therefore a non-conventional means for communicating. There is, of course, and following Grice, a difference between a conventional and a non-conventional means for communicating p, and for elucidation Schiffer looks to the mutual knowledge condition, and the possession of a relevant feature f of x as being of a certain type, specifically not one which is true of x independently of '...people meaning something by uttering x'. The relevant feature might be taken to be the fact that members of G have meant or do mean that p in uttering x, and this looks to the mutual knowledge conditions obtaining between S and H, and to a rational action condition borrowed from Lewis. The augmenting, self-perpetuating nature of mutual knowledge conditions makes them identical to Lewis' conventions on convention. Schiffer claims that if x meets the conditions described for (nc) meaning "p" in G then x will be in G a conventional means of communicating that p. His theory of convention in a group applies equally to composite whole utterance types, and not just to the non-composite cases described. One must consider Lewis' analysis of coordination problems as the means to solve these recurrent dilemmas.
without (even tacit or implicit) convening with H. If the convention is successful in its rôle, if it does useful work in a way more amenable to H than a prior convention (for what might be a variety of reasons), H will, very likely, fall into the practice of following S’s convention. (It might be added that such a convention can remain private between S and H or become that of a larger community). To illustrate what can be achieved with Lewis’ thesis one may return to Schiffer’s example and take the case of a convention directing the use of an explicit performative (say, $\sigma_3$, ‘I (hereby) tell you that p’).

As Schiffer shows, $\sigma_3$ does not mean that p, that S means that p, that he constates p or any number of other illocutions: $S$, in uttering a token of $\sigma_3$, thereby performs the act of telling. One could, Schiffer adds, reasonably say that in uttering $\sigma_1$ S means that he tells H that p, for when one says of S that in uttering $\sigma_1$ he meant that his ‘primary intention in uttering this sentence is to produce in [H]—by means of recognition of intention—the belief that p’, one’s motivation to say that he meant what he said is driven significantly by the fact that he said so, in apparently as unambiguous a way as he possibly could. However, the telling difference between the two statements, Schiffer argues, may be discerned in examination of their respective syntax. That of $\sigma_1$, he argues, adds nothing to the illocutionary force of the act of telling (immanent in $\sigma_3$), it merely tolerates irrelevant changes: $\sigma_1$ means the same as $\sigma_3$, for what is meant by the utterance of either (what is intended to be communicated), is palpably the same (they, Schiffer says, ‘subscriptively’ mean the same), and yet, he continues, this being the case, if in $\sigma_3$ S does not mean that he tells H that p, but performs the act in the utterance, an utterance of $\sigma_1$ (with none of the immediacy of $\sigma_3$), can hardly be said to carry an intention to produce the belief that p, for the reason that, for Schiffer, one cannot mean by it that p, the form of words in which it is couched being merely a contingency. This is not a compelling example, and a criticism is offered below.

Schiffer’s conclusions offer a sop to Derrida and a response. Derrida might be thought correct to say that performative utterances (and particularly so, explicit performatives), cannot carry S intentions, for the ‘subscriptive’ identity between $\sigma_3$ and $\sigma_1$, meaning that by an utterance of the former (and because one cannot mean by it that one says that p), one cannot mean by $\sigma_1$ that what one says is that one means to instil p by means of recognition of intention, assuredly gives no good reason to assume that $\sigma_3$ is the more appropriate utterance for performing the act. One might reply to Schiffer that while one may not be able, by $\sigma_1$, to mean p immanently, as in $\sigma_3$, that it seems perverse to argue that an utterance of $\sigma_1$ will inevitably fail to mean that p, and a theory of speech act conventions established on Lewis’ terms is offered (below) in support of this view. Only a theory of meaning committed to taking the explicit
performative as the exemplar of a meaning utterance could be offered to support Schiffer’s view, and
Derrida’s objections to such theories have been described; in what follows it is suggested that this
assumption regarding the explicit performative is unnecessary, and, reciprocally, that defining a
meaning-relativism in response to theories containing such an assumption is correspondingly
superfluous. An alternative theory can draw upon what has been argued for a means of supplying the
missing theory of mutual knowledge in Grice.

One might suggest that the difference between $\sigma_1$ and $\sigma_3$ is that between a meaning statement
couched in the explicit performative and one explicit enough to function as a performative (utterances
of either could, of course, fail of uptake), and that Schiffer’s conclusion saying that because S does not,
by an utterance of $\sigma_3$, mean that he tells H that $p$, he equally does not mean by $\sigma_1$ that he says that $p$,
derives from a false and unnecessary premise. The differences between $\sigma_3$ and $\sigma_1$ are, as Schiffer says,
irrelevant changes of syntax (although they ‘subscriptively’ mean the same), and this, rather than
compelling one to draw the conclusion that the convention of the explicit performative ($\sigma_3$) is uniquely
applicable to, in this case, an act of telling, can as simply show that the communication of the meaning
that $p$ in speech acts requires nothing of the structure or context of the corresponding respective
utterances. If $\sigma_3$ means that $p$, and $\sigma_1$ cannot, for Schiffer, attain to this because the syntax of the
utterance cannot mimic the force of $\sigma_3$ (again, notwithstanding that they ‘subscriptively’ mean the same),
then rather than making an unargued, unwarranted and unnecessary case for the convention of the
explicit performative as basic, one might demand of Schiffer that he, in the light of Lewis’ remarks
on convention and mutual knowledge, heed the ramifications of his argument that the differences
between $\sigma_1$ and $\sigma_3$ lie in irrelevancies of syntax, and allow that Lewis’ conditions on the ways in which
conventions arise be considered. Lewis shows that conventions for illocutionary acts may be
established without presupposition of any basis, or basic type, from which the writing of such standards
begins. The knowledge to which S appeals in issuing an act with which he wishes to achieve
coordination with H is, as Lewis says, that which he knows H will, or come to, recognise as
characterising and compelling the convention for the associated response; this, as Schiffer (like
Millikan and Strawson before him) sees, requires nothing of a theory of convention for language, but
rather one describing the ways in which conventions arise in cases Grice regards as typical of
meaningNN. The knowledge to which S appeals may derive from a convention inaugurated, say, after S
and H see that they have typically behaved in certain ways in certain situations in the past and wish
formally to dub their practices, or, say, one in which S, wanting to establish a convention by a
particular utterance or inscription, appeals to typical likely forms or shared procedures; in both cases,
and even in instances of the most primitive exchange, there is no contingency requiring that the
meanings of the utterances or inscriptions issued in the acts be supplied by a prior dubbing or
convention. Typical coordinations grow, as Lewis shows, from the use, in practice, of repeated
procedures, and a broader consideration of this thesis shows further ramifications, shown admirably by
returning to the problem, derived from Grice, of supplying conventions for speech acts.

A Deweyan would object to Grice that meaning-intention theories obscure the nature of human
interaction in the case of language, and that the uses of words (for Dewey, tools), cannot be described
by conventions. Such a pragmatist argument would continue that the meaning, of a voice or inscription,
cannot be found in a contingent relationship to an arbitrarily assigned standard, guiding transport
between S and H, and add that Grice conspicuously holds to the thesis that there can be intentionality
without language, seemingly advocating, in the theory that S means in a speech act according to the
recognition by H of the intention with which he speaks, that the ideas communicated in speech acts all
have prior, independent existence described by conventions7, or, that some expressions come
conventionally to be linked with specific intentions, assigning meanings, and thus constitute ‘frozen
signs’8. For Grice, in a Deweyan gloss, one is able to read conventions in speech acts because words or
gestures are outgrowths of prior mental states, and Tiles writes that a Deweyan response to Grice (and
Bennett) may be extended to Lewis. The project of meaning-nominalism, such as practised by Grice,
Bennett and Lewis, endeavours to account for the ways in which communication and language arise in
a community, yet Tiles argues (following James), that this demands notions of prelinguistic
intentionality, asking how, in an ‘initial’ scenario, S could possibly know what act to issue to
communicate a specific meaning, and, indeed, how H could recognise an act as carrying a specific
intention. Neither S nor H could account for the appropriateness to convention of an act issued, not
having respectively, in an ‘initial’ scenario, the language to express and to recognise a conventional

---

7 In response Dewey offers his theory of language as stimulus and response (cf. Tiles (1988) p86). Notwithstanding his
Darwinian influence (see below) Dewey was keen to emphasise his distance from Darwin on the matter of explaining emotional
expression as the outlet of a prior mental state; for Tiles Dewey would say that Darwin here forgets ‘...the requirements of the
explanatory principle which had been introduced by his own theory of natural selection’. The countenancing of prior mental
states causing emotional expressions, when consistently adhered to, becomes, Tiles writes paraphrasing James, the
countenancing of subjective, or immediately present, aspects to experience. Dewey would charge Grice with holding such a
theory, for ‘...the intention on a given occasion [of speaking] constitutes the individual mental state corresponding to a
Darwinian emotional state, and which finds its expression in a linguistic utterance corresponding to an emotional expression’

meaning utterance. What, Dewey would ask, could possibly serve to guide meaning between S and H, and allow one consistently to say that S intends and H recognises? Tiles says that, for a response, Dewey would ask the eminently Darwinian question of how emotional expressions have evolutionary, adaptive value, for in reply to the notion that language, with all of its conventions, carries intentions from S to H, he argues that language itself makes thought possible, and, as an intersubjective phenomenon, demonstrates its utility by facilitating group coordination and the gaining of strategic, selective advantage. For Tiles, Dewey shows that,

neither intention nor the recognition of intention is necessary to sustain a coordinated pattern of (social) behaviour. All that is necessary is that the members of a group of animals should stimulate one another to appropriate behaviour at the appropriate time.

In illustration of his thesis he suggests the example of a flock of birds alighting from a pond after the movement of one offering a stimulus to move (in the form of a sign), and expressing, say, fright or pending danger and so forth. The sign, for Dewey, is mute between the birds, for it does not itself communicate that one has taken fright and so alighted, and that the others are wise to follow; alighting is a mere stimulus to which the flock responds with, again, stimuli to action. Dewey argues that this will serve for the explanation of the human interaction in language, for one could not possibly respond to another’s often complex, nuanced and even disguised intentions in speaking if one is not already able to respond to instances of their behaviour as stimuli to action or belief, unless, that is, there is a prior stimulus condition guiding appropriate behaviour in specific situations; without this any signal issued with intention to communicate will remain mute or utterly ambiguous, and the consequences for a theory of language that Dewey and his followers draw from this thesis are that meanings never come into being without language, and that meanings require the deliverance of a mutual coordination between the users of a language.

It is difficult to see what Lewis could find objectionable in the pragmatist thesis, for the conditions on mutual exchange in a language community for which Dewey argues are precisely those that Lewis puts on convening in a coordination situation. It is the case that Lewis’ conventions are as amenable to a pragmatist analysis of meaning as they are useful to completing the Gricean project of describing

---

6 Tiles (1988) p87 raises a number of these problems.
6 Tiles (1988) p88 writes that Grice, Bennett and Lewis commit, in ascribing to agents antecedent mental states, intentions and beliefs, the psychologist’s fallacy of assuming that language expresses thought, rather than making thought, reflection, prediction and recollection possible. It might be suggested the some of the force of Dewey’s argument stems from his retaining a vestige of his early Hegelian influence.
7 The question is one, as Tiles (1988) pp88-89 shows, that Darwin himself did not ask, and for the reasons Dewey describes.
8 Tiles (1988) p89.
meaning intentions, for again Lewis, contrary to Tiles' insubstantial arguments against his work, requires no notion of a prior intention or guiding standard in the establishing of conventions. He requires only that S and H mutually settle on practices for achieving the most acceptable, useful, efficient, or beautiful (and so forth) means of facilitating coordination and exchange. One might look to Lewis' paradigm example of the inauguration of a convention: if S and H wish to be reconnected when cut off when speaking on the telephone, one must initiate the process of calling back and the other wait for the reconnected call. In a case without precedent (an 'initial' scenario) there must be choice by each, in isolation, of the rôle they wish to play; over time, after repeated instances and the repetition of the rôles played from the beginning, as Lewis says, a convention emerges. The act of calling back is as mutable a sign as that of the bird alighting from the pond, and it does not in itself mean that S has called back, rather it is the act of calling back, or, a stimulus to which H will respond with his part of a mutually-known practice (waiting to receive a call), having seen its utility in facilitating coordination. Such practices are established in use, as the solutions to coordination problems, and the development of conventions for language occurs in palpably the same way. S and H (for convenience sake, a whole language community), can alight on conventions for the meanings of words in mutual exchange: over time, as, say, an object comes to fulfil a rôle or purpose it is established as an object for that purpose, and named, classified and so forth. The conventions for naming and describing draw upon no prior, or literal, meanings for naming or describing (the object); a convention emerges from practice, and the adventitiousness of language changes nothing of the structure of assigning conventions. A convention of naming is no different, by virtue of being a convention, from a convention derived from a mutually-understood stimuli and describing the response of birds alighting after the movement of one. The matter of the ways in which conventions in language utilise the evolutionary human capacities for speech and writing is purely a matter for physiology, anatomy and ethology.

This adventitiousness of language, for Derrida, shows up in stark relief the problems with Austin's presumption of the explicit performative as the model, for each illocutionary act, of congruence between an utterance and its conventional meaning. It allows that the notion of determinate context, for Condillac and Austin, is one that may be applied to uses of language in illocutionary acts, bearing witness to enduring conventions, deviations from which are abnormalities or parasites, and Derrida replies (as described in Introduction), that the fact of such abnormalities is the condition on the

---

possibility of meaning or communication in primitive (oral and gestural) collocation and writing alike (thereby illustrating the problems raised in cases, say, of communication with absent receivers), and yet that Austin allows no ‘surplus’ in his theory of convention, nothing outside the scope of the explicit performative allowing it to evince a sensitivity to its use in non-serious, non-literal contexts, and consequently rendering the model it instantiates inapplicable to many communicative uses of ordinary language. It is, as Derrida says, more profitable to conceive of the uses of speech acts as able to be cited without harm to their ‘...allegedly rigorous purity...’, as permanently estranged from the contexts that could supply their conventions. However, one might make a case, drawing upon Lewis’ conventions and possible worlds semantics, to say that the notion of defining a meaning-relativism in opposition to the explicit performative, and by emphasising the prevalence of cases for which it cannot account, is simply unnecessary, for as Lewis’ theory of mutual knowledge shows, the explicit performative need not be the model of a convention for a speech act. Using a (Lewis) convention in a non-literal or figurative way is (as seen in IV.3) an insincere report of a genuine state of affairs; for it to appear to function as a genuine representation, one might say, with Millikan (in II.5), it must ape or mimic the structure of reality immanent, as Wittgenstein says, in genuine reports; more straightforwardly, there is a simple homology between the fact reported in a true representation (in a ‘logical picture’) and the corresponding state of affairs. Again as Wittgenstein says, all of the elements in a picture that have representing properties are direct correlates of atomic objects; when the elements are pictured in combination in a report of a state of affairs, this is, if true, an accurate representation. (Recall that the atomic objects are independent of states of affairs, being the ultimate simples from which they are constituted). Wishing that p, or promising, or, indeed, performing any other illocutionary act over p, shows the combination in logical form of the atomic simples directing the conventions for wishing, promising and so forth, but again, insincere or non-literal utterances are not, as has (admittedly crudely) been said, genuine. A condition on the success of insincerity or deception is, in the Wittgensteinian terminology of I.4 and IV.3, that the contents of a logical language are always non-empty (a true report of a state of affairs in a world bearing an honest representation, and a false or insincere report instantiating the conventions of another world: logic is, as Wittgenstein says, prior to all experience), and consequently that all reports, genuine or insincere, are derived from the same simple objects in combination (or again with Wittgenstein, an ‘imagined’ world has a form in common with the actual world). Acts of wishing, promising, negating and so forth each instantiate different
intentional relationships over the same ultimately simple objects, drawing upon conventions established for the correct combination for each relationship in a possible world; insincere or fictional utterances report upon no genuine states of affairs in this world; they instantiate none of its conventional logical structures. One might take a familiar example: aRb and not-aRb report a state of affairs and its negation in a world; bRa, in the same world, states a falsehood, or, following Lewis, a convention for a different world. One might, as per Lewis’ definition of convention as arbitrary (and not Heal’s and Gilbert’s misunderstandings), settle upon bRa as one’s convention, or adopt it upon seeing it to be a better alternative; but this is to choose to occupy a different world, and, again as Lewis shows, such conventions need not be chosen as relative to any prior scheme determining the appropriate means of articulating specific intentions, but they may emerge in practice. In this there is a first response to arguments claiming that the effects of insincere or fictional reports negate or render parasitical the apparently conventional structures of a language, for giving an insincere or fictional report in a world is neither to negate nor render parasitical any of the conventional structures of a language of a possible world (such structures being rendered by Lewis’ conventions), but to speak of a different possible world and its constituents14. Each such world allows, as argued in 1.3, that the shared structure of ultimate simples is intrinsically intentional, being able to underpin all logical relations described by conventions in different worlds; as Hintikka has it, such conventions convey information compatible only with the particular world in which the states of affairs on which it reports appear. In his contribution to possible worlds semantics Hintikka wants to prove that the phenomenological reduction in Husserl, and his own theory of informational intentionality, require that noemata and \textit{hyle} be always available to consciousness in noeses. He ventures that one conceive of \textit{hyle} in eminently Wittgensteinian terms, as sense data, not simply as the unmediated given in intentional acts, but as always structured according to the constitution of each possible world, and as thus conveying information regarding the structures (the states of affairs) of that world, and that, indeed, for Husserl \textit{hyle} are the bases for senses and conventions to mediate references, they being unperceived and unmediated, and the basis of all sound, enduring meanings, and so immune to frustration by infelicity or the vagaries of perception. It follows from Husserl’s thesis that the perceived in acts are objects in states of affairs constituted by conventions, those, as Derrida shows, which fail of establishing timeless meanings; for Husserl, in each intentional act (one, that is, in which one has an intentional object: say,

14 A truthful fiction, one that is a report of actual events true in every particular, could be discerned as true or false according to Millikan’s criteria (II.5), as, say, the solutions to two different coordination problems (one of genuine engagement, truth and
as in the example above, a perception), each experienced content 'yields a new "content of consciousness"...', one that, when collated with all others and the appropriate conventions to form the manifold, gives the objective correlate, or, the being of the object forms. The theory of informational intentionality presupposes no such basis of timeless conventions for the establishing of meanings for a language, the acceptance of the facts both of a distinction between states of affairs compatible with a world and those incompatible, and of worlds or mediated contexts as always structured by the knowledge of the properties of objects and their interrelations learned in past conditioning and experience, being enough to show that its meanings may be founded on Lewis’ model. (What is more, sense data are, by being always structured, subject to phenomenological reduction, for they themselves, as Wittgenstein argues, exist only in the combination in states of affairs (or, the fulfilling of truth functions) of one datum with another).

As Hintikka and Lewis argue, the writing of conventions for a language is not hindered by the prospects of insincere or fictional contexts rendering parasitical any of its conventional structures, these, again, being established by Lewis conventions; however, one can now make a stronger point, drawing upon the connections established between the informational theory and the possible worlds theory of intentionality. They both speak of the mediation of reference by sense according to conventions established for a language, and exclude as ‘incompatible’ or delegated to another (near) possible language, reports of states of affairs without reference in the language. One might be tempted to ask how such references can be spoken of as different or separable, and the argument (so bemusing to Derrida) upheld that a parasited utterance is not a contrariety to the conventions that it misuses. For an answer one might accept that talk of possible worlds and possible languages is not always appreciated and recast the debate in familiar terms. The descriptions that constitute the conventions for a language for Lewis, or a mediated context for Hintikka, are, as has been said, combinations (or states of affairs) made over an unchanging basis of ultimate atomic simples (monads), each of which possesses the capacity to represent, or to combine with, all compatible (or compossible) others, and so to instantiate the relationships of states of affairs in a world or logical space. The incompatible states of affairs are relative to worlds for, as Wittgenstein says in demonstrating that in speaking or, indeed, performing any intentional act, one invokes, in an utterance, a range of possible worlds or states of affairs compatible with that reported in one’s speech act. In the example given, one may perform a falsity and binding consequences, and one in which none of these properties obtain).
great number of acts over the simples aRb (wishing, promising, negating and so forth), and in the performance of an act one circumscribes the logical space that may be occupied by acts containing aRb. This is, as Hintikka says, equally to exclude from this logical space those states of affairs that are incompatible (incompossible) with those in it, those, that is, that report no genuine states of affairs (in this world), or combine simples in incoherent or unrecognised, novel ways. By the conventions for speaking in this world, established, again, on Lewis’ terms, fictional or insincere contexts obtain in a language or a context other than that of the world of genuine reports, their status as literal or parasitical established, as the debt of Hintikka to Evans (described in 1.3) evinces, by a function of sense determining the way in which the reference of terms is given. Singular terms, as Evans shows, may have reference without the mediation of a guided intention or a context of utterance (a theory making equally compelling criticisms of Fregean semantics and Husserlian phenomenology); they rather manifest in their use the conventions that Hintikka (Wittgenstein and Lewis) regard as functions of senses in contexts (or that derive from practices), and that guide the combinations of states of affairs in a world.
Synoptic Conclusion

In the dissertation are considered a number of ways in which one may discern, write and analyse conventions and intentions for the illocutionary forces of speech acts, and meanings, senses and references for statements and utterances, with the objective of suggesting alternatives to what is dubbed meaning-relativism. It is argued that the paradigm of the explicit performative is inexpedient, for it need not be considered the model of the congruence between content and force in an illocution, and the scepticism evinced by Derrida regarding the possibility and purpose of writing such conventions is correlative challenged. (Discussion of respective arguments for the writing of senses and references for statements and utterances in truth-conditional semantics occupies most of chapter I, and develops themes shared with the discussion of speech acts contained in the introduction, and picked up in chapters II-IV. Derrida sets up qualitatively similar arguments in his study of the use of indexical or demonstrative expressions, considered in relation to Fregean semantics and Husserlian phenomenology in chapter I sections 2 and 3). The central thesis presented makes both a substantive argument and a related metaphilosophical point: firstly, the problems of indeterminable intentions and of non-saturable conventions can be resolved, and the fount of Derrida’s (and Rorty’s) work, viz. the failure of intentionality to mediate, or orientate, communication, self-consciousness and meaning, is contested by the theory offered, a theory, in the second point, rendering profitless Rorty’s distinction between the ‘objective knowledge’ of traditional systematic (semantical) philosophy and less privileged discourse (‘edifying’ or ‘historicism’ philosophy).

Derrida denies that the meanings given to the word ‘communication’, and vouchsafing the metaphorical application to definitions in semantics, semiotics and ‘real’ or ‘gestural’ collocution, can be settled by a priori definitions, or conventions. The consensus required to direct each such convention of communication, he argues, could never be found, or would remain irredeemably metaphorical, as the incomplete and illegitimate extension of a paradigm of rule or law to which it could never attain. This may be seen in the reshaping of speech acts in indexical, demonstrative and quantificational constructions, in the estrangement from speakers’ intention brought by appearance in quotational contexts, and in the tolerance of insincerity, conditions rendered ubiquitous, Derrida continues, by the extensions of ‘ideal’ speech situations tolerated by writing. Derrida asks how writing and communication may confront these problems, and, a related point, how intentions in writing and communication can be read off from their reports in conventional (paradigmatically explicit
performative) formulae. The effect of the relativisation to non-literal, fictional, or quotational contexts for Derrida, is to render incomplete all conventions and motivating intentions for locutions and illocutions, for they are perennially spliced to constructions for which they cannot account, and to the vocalisation of intentions indefeasibly more complex than those for which they were written. The arguments of chapters II-IV consider the ways in which Grice, Strawson, McDowell, Searle and Lewis address these problems, and the conclusion is drawn that conventions and intentions for locutions and illocutions can be written, via Lewis’ conventions, without presupposition of any standard to which they must conform, and without the inevitable relativisation to literal and non-literal, fictional, or quotational contexts. (There is, it should be said, insufficient attention given to Derrida’s reasons for holding that the explicit performative is the exemplar of a statement with illocutionary force).

Rorty’s arguments against theories of intentionality exhibit a similar motivation and tenor. Rorty denies that mentality, in its functioning and in its description, carries processes apt to be described by intentions and conventions, and his work is considered in the second section of the introduction. There is no problem of intentionality for Rorty, because man’s faculties and operations with knowledge and language are, in their complexity, irreducible to cognitive or ‘representationalist’ models; there is, he argues, nothing gained by imposing such structures. An epistemology and a philosophy of mind can be written for man without any call upon ‘representationalist’ theories, and Rorty makes the case for a Deweyan, pragmatist conception of knowledge as justified belief in conjectures, best guesses, surmises and opinions that help ‘…us to do what we want to do’. (In chapter IV this is compared to the derivation and enduring of a convention as conceived by Lewis). To suggest difficult cases for Rorty’s survey of systematic and edifying philosophy appeal is made to Leibniz as both a systematic metaphysician and yet as a critic of the Cartesian and Lockean traditions to which Rorty objects. Analogues of the details of Leibniz’s response to dualism are found in Deleuze, and the rôle and importance, in any theory of intentionality countenancing possiblia, of notions of compatibility, incompatibility, composibility and incomposibility, are presented. The applications of a possible worlds theory of intentionality are explored in chapter I sections 3 and 4, and the discussions raise an incidental matter of some importance: the desire throughout equally to consider the lessons of the semantical and the phenomenological traditions, with the ambition of, at the very least, intimating that Rorty’s caricatures do no useful work. One example must suffice for illustration: in section 2 Evans’ arguments concerning the notion of the mediation of sense by reference in Frege’s semantics are
considered, and, in section 3, an application of his conclusions made to matters derived from a discussion of Husserlian noema. It is shown that one can, by the selfsame reasoning, derive a case, contra Derrida, for conventions of meaning in a truth-conditional semantics.

In chapter I section 1 the case is made for an extensional semantics as conceived by Davidson, by way of intimating a means of defining conventions for language without the presupposition of standard, constituent or enduring meanings. Anomalous monism is presented as a theory of intentionality holding none of the concerns that, Rorty argues, such theories inevitably raise; it is palpably not a ‘representationalist’ or dualist theory, and is a powerful response to typically Rortyan post-structuralist scepticism concerning meaning and truth. The debts of anomalous monism to Tarski’s truth definition, and of the informational theory advocated in chapter I section 3 to principles of charity, are defined, and the prospect mooted of describing a possible worlds theory of intentionality for distributed systems as a development of models provided by Tarski semantics. (Reasons for advocating an informational theory are explored also in relation to Lewis’ description of the structures of convention and of possible worlds). In recommending anomalous monism as a theory of intentionality Davidson allows no strict psychophysical laws between mental and physical; the mental and the physical perennially fulfil ‘disparate commitments’; the irreducibility of the mental derives neither from the property of intentionality, for such interdependence is compatible with there being a correct way to interpret speakers without relativisation to conflicting translation manuals, nor from the existence of many equally plausible manuals, for this is compatible with their arbitrary selection: the contrast aptly sets up the choice between Kripke or situation semantics and Tarski semantics.

In section 2 Evans’ arguments for the rôle of singular terms in Fregean semantics are presented, the better to make a case, in section 3, against Derrida’s objections to the possibility of achieving the mediation of sense by reference or context in Husserlian phenomenology. The notion, central to Fregean semantics, of the context of a sentence as the modulus of meaning, is soundly challenged by Evans, for, he shows, the sense of singular terms in Fregean semantics need not be given in the determination by a reference: singular terms (empty or not) can carry sense without the mediation of a reference, in literal and fictional contexts alike. In section 3 the correspondence between Fregean Sinn and Husserlian noema is presented, specifically to make the case that intentional acts do not require the mediation to which Derrida objects. Conditions as strict as Derrida demands of Sinn and noema do indeed make Fregean semantics and Husserlian phenomenology unworkable as theories of
intentionality, but one need not countenance such strictness. It is argued that Hintikka shows a way in which Husserl’s difficulties with a foundational phenomenological notion, namely that reduction reveal all mediating noematic acts as open to consciousness and reflection, can be resolved, and consequently that Husserl’s equivocations regarding the presence and importance of *hyle* in connecting up sensation and sense can be eliminated. Arguing against a conception of intentionality as mediated or directed there is suggested, as a sound and fruitful alternative, an informational (or intensional) theory, one, it is noted, allaying the fears of Sartre and Ricoeur regarding *hyle* and the presentness to consciousness and cognition of perceptual acts. A connection to Merleau-Ponty and his work on intentionality and the situated body is ventured, aiming to compel the abandonment of Husserl’s form-matter distinction; for Merleau-Ponty matter always contains and precedes form; the perceived world constitutes the basis of rationality, value and existence, even a ‘nascent logos’. (There is missing a compelling argument to say that the intrinsic intentionality or mediation of *hyle* allows that senses may arise without the mediation of a *noema* as do singular terms in Fregean semantics, as *per* the discussion of section 2).

The description of possible states of affairs in worlds as instantiating, with greater or lesser success, the constitution of the actual world (*viz.* that of the speaker), requires a means of discerning the ways in which reports of states of affairs can be declared true of the world or incorrect or false, and it is the burden of section 4 to suggest a way in which this may be provided. Developing Hintikka’s possible worlds theory in which descriptions of sense are descriptions of possible states of affairs, the picture theory of the early Wittgenstein is considered for its contention that statements reporting possible states of affairs can be proxies for the state of affairs themselves, or substitutes for their direct experience, sharing as they do, the logical form of the atomic structure of the world in which the statements are made. If accurate, a report both mirrors, with all due Leibnizean conditions on compossibility, the state of affairs described, and, it is argued, limns the forms in which sense-data may cognitively be received: in Wittgensteinian terms, as always under the aspect of states of affairs or ways of seeing. (This is, again in response to Rorty, an avowedly ‘representationalist’ theory. There are, it should be said, a number of equivocations, in both sections 3 and 4, on ‘sense-data’, ‘sensation’ and ‘sense’). The argument of Hintikka and Hintikka, that the lessons of Husserlian phenomenology are evident in the work of the early Wittgenstein is broached, and some of the themes of the theory of intentionality as developed in his middle period works considered.
Another source of arguments against Rorty is examined in chapter I section 5, arising from his advocating Quine's holism as the best response to theories of intentionality countenancing necessary conditions of linguistic and mental representation and analyticity, and from Quine's reply that his claim that there is no first philosophy is not a naturalistic but a holistic claim. Quine's stimulus and response theory of meaning is presented, and the argument made that he cannot disregard intentionality, but must appeal to what Christopher Norris calls 'a priori structures of mind', provided in Quine's late acquiescence to anomalous monism. Quine is, on Rorty's terms, an historicist, offering, in his holistic theory of meaning and knowledge, an eminently pragmatist position, and it is argued that while this should be well taken, it need not engender scepticism about meanings and intentions or repudiation of the semantical tradition. The voices of the excluded for which Rorty makes the case are surely to be heard, but not at the price of an unthinking relativism or anti-realism. The debt of Davidsonian holism to semantical and pragmatic theories for the writing of the cooperative function of the principle of charity (in which there is equally no first philosophy but in which there are conventions of practice), reveals Davidson's debt to Grice, and the details of Grice's work are considered in chapter II.

A number of ways in which the content and force of a speech act may be written, divined and analysed are surveyed in chapter II. The discussion is focused by examination and criticism of Grice's theory of meaning intentions and of critical work on Grice and Gricean theory, and the need is established for enduring (or, as per Grice, 'timeless') conventions for meanings in communication. There are a number of matters which would be recast in a differently formulated argument, but the important matter to be taken from the discussion arises in Strawson's response to Grice in his work on truth theories and speech act conventions and intentions. Strawson writes that Austin's notion of the form of the explicit performative is not the unequivocal, unambivalent formulation to which Derrida cleaves in interpretation, and that there are two pertinent facts to be noted regarding Austin's theory of illocutions. Firstly, it is sufficient but not necessary that a verb being the name of an illocutionary act permits it to appear in the first person indicative as an explicit performative: Strawson illustrates his point with reference to a plethora of counter-examples to make the case that there are prototypical illocutionary acts that can have no performative formula. (Skinner gives a taxonomy of central cases). Secondly, Strawson considers that Austin was fully aware of this, for he sees that, in the affirmation of the conventional nature of illocutions, explicitly in contrast to the production of perlocutionary effects, Austin is never unequivocal. Indeed, on the first statement of the conventionality of illocutions,
Austin’s profound insights regarding the performative and its functions are importantly qualified: he writes that illocutionary force is conventional in the sense that it can in some singular cases be made explicit by the performative formula, and, with regard to prototypical illocutions without performative constructions, Strawson examines the verity that there exists an insufficiently understood supererogation in the potential force of an illocution, a surplus of what is called, in an awkward portmanteau, extra-linguistic convention.

Strawson draws a distinction in light of these remarks between the semantically-determined conventions of a locution, those, say, determining a single, unitary illocutionary force, and their non-semantically-determined conventions (being those that permit the designation of an illocution when no performative is appropriate, or compel its capacity to articulate other illocutionary forces when used in different contexts, or in quantificational, demonstrative constructions). As Strawson writes, the forces not exhausted by semantically-determined meaning (the non-semantically determined conventions) may themselves be determined by conventions (those of mutual, social coordination, collocation and, following Davidson, of charity), and it is discussions arising from matters relating to this thesis that occupy the rest of the dissertation. Chapter IV describes Lewis’ account of the emergence of conventions for communication and for tensed and mood-relative language from such elemental notions of mutual, social coordination, but to complete chapter II an argument is considered to the end that in cases in which expression in no abiding conventional, performative formula is applicable or possible, a speaker can make clear his intended meaning. Millikan writes that speakers may be thought of as fulfilling not intentions but ‘purposes’, the latter being reproduced functions or figures good for communication, and completed by further repeated acts of mutual recognition by hearers; by virtue of being repeated and disseminated such figures become established as means of achieving relevant purposes, while requiring nothing of a paradigm or archetype of literal or semantically-determined illocutionary force. New means of achieving communication may emerge or become attached to established means, but this is only by grant of mutual agreement on terms, and not to the discerning of a priori standards; non-literal illocutions are, for Millikan, divined in context or found to do no enduring, useful work and classified accordingly. The Millikan arguments are given too much space, their points being better made by Strawson and Lewis, to the discussion of whose work they still serve as a prelude. The argument of the chapter, and indeed the deeper exploration of themes from Derrida, might better have examined the debt of McDowell’s work on meaning and intentions to Tarskian truth
theories, a debt that significantly tempers Strawson’s doubts regarding Davidson’s anomalous monism; nevertheless, the strength of the argument made against Derrida and Rorty is that Davidson, Grice and Lewis write an analogue of Strawson’s distinction into their theories, while it yet eludes Derrida, and vitiates his work on convention and intention.

Chapter III is an examination both of the detail of Searle’s theory of illocutionary force, and, with greater focus, of the rôle of conventions of semantically and non-semantically determined illocutions. It is shown that Searle’s theory contains a core, fundamental ambiguity. One is asked to consider again illocutions articulated in locutions, both those whose force is fully denoted in a description of their semantically-determined content (that is, paradigmatically, in explicit performative formulae), and those locutions that may instantiate more than one illocutionary force in discrepant contexts (or the illocutionary forces of which may fulfil more than one non-semantically-determined rôle). A summary of the argument made against Searle follows: a sentence (Sa), the semantical rules of which fully determine or exhaust the force of the utterance (U), may also determine the force of an utterance (Sb) in a context (C), one which may, in another context, articulate another illocutionary, non-semantically determined force. This is so by Searle’s principle of expressibility, to every detail of which the argument holds Searle; the principle says that for any meaning and for any speaker, whenever the speaker intends the meaning in a speech act, it is the case that there may be given an exact expression or formulation of the meaning (one might suppose that this is, again, the explicit performative). On this the meaning of (Sb) in C is fully determined by the sentence of (Sa), or the ‘exact expression’ of the force of the utterance (Sb) in C. By an application of a Leibniz’s law type equation, that (Sa) is an utterance which fully determines the illocutionary force of (Sb) in C entails that the meaning of the utterance (Sa) is equivalent to the meaning of the utterance of (Sa) in C. From Searle’s addition, viz. that all sentences contain at least one illocutionary act device, and the argument that the proposition of (Sa) entails that of (Sb) in C, a similar determination of illocutionary force (from (Sb) to (Sa)) does not follow, (Sb) bearing the force of potentially many locutions. In the idioms of critical work on Searle, a speaker may mean more than he says in a speech act, owing to the articulation of illocutionary force in discrepant contexts, but he must always mean as much as he says: as Searle has it, he must report at least the force of one illocutionary act device. By the argument, the meaning of (Sb) in C is exactly expressed by an utterance of (Sa), and if the proposition (p) expressed by (Sa) entails the proposition expressed by (Sb) in C, then pU(Sa) is equivalent to pU(Sb). The thesis motivating the argument
questions whether Searle could accept that the utterance of a sentence (fully semantically-determined) can determine the forces of utterances in non-semantically determined contexts.

The chapter concludes with an uneven consideration of Searle's later work on speech act conventions. Searle argues that a type of speech acts, dubbed declarations, and in which semantically-determined content fully determines the act's illocutionary force, function as models of the way in which conventions arise for locutions and illocutions. Again, the fullest treatment of the ways in which illocutions may be conventional is taken up in chapter IV; in III the structure of declarations is examined for its consequences for study of the conventionality of locutions. Declarations may, Searle continues, require the Austinian (extra-linguistic) conditions on appropriate utterance, viz. that speakers be in suitable positions of authority, have sanction to order, pass judgement and so on, but, in the condition that recommends their significance, it is, Searle maintains, difficult to discern sincerity conditions for declarations: their content and force are carried in their grammatical form or syntactical shape. They obey the authority of no prior, established attempts to match language to the world, and the questions raised by the cases Searle considers are indicated as of importance in stimulating responses to Derrida's arguments, although, as presented, the connection may be opaque. The discussion would benefit from a clearer exposition of the way in which such locutions might come, as per Lewis conventions, to have illocutionary force, or to be settled upon as conventions, without the regress of intentions or perennial ambiguity discerned by Derrida. Some of the discussion of Skinner is redundant; the compelling theme that arises is the argument, following Searle's, that any theory regarding the explicit performative as the model of the way in which illocutionary force is articulated is incomplete, there being a palpable distinction between the clarity in meaning, sense and reference of a proposition and the means of making the sense of the locution, and its author's intention, clear with a paradigm (explicit performative) speech act. Far more of the elemental structure of illocutions, and of the machinery pertinent to the understanding of speech acts arises, as Skinner aptly shows, in the patterns of mutual exchange in contexts of utterance.

The discussion of chapter IV revisits Quine's arguments against analyticity and the possibility of writing meanings or intensions for cognitive synonymy, and offers Lewis' theory of convention as a means of establishing appropriate equivalences. Lewis' theory is avowedly a means of rehabilitating a theory of analyticity and replaces the relativisation of utterances to a standard of illocutionary meaning with a relativisation to possible occasions of utterance in mutually accessible and perpetually available,
compossible possible worlds. Theories of intention and convention, and a compelling reason for their description by Gricean analysis, await the deliverance of Lewis' work. Lewis argues that a theory of the conventional in language simply accounts for the intentional, and his work is predicated purely on the notions of rational, social interaction, mutual knowledge and cooperation, and, it is argued, solves the sceptical regress of intentions feared by Derrida and Quine, and brought fully to view by Grice. The study of practical reasoning to compelling conclusions in the application of singular, appropriate intentions and guiding conventions, underpins research into the philosophical foundations of heuristic models in distributed or multiagent systems, and Lewis describes the structures of convention good for modelling social interaction in coordination situations in both persisting or long-term coordination games and for ad hoc measures for present needs: structures that equally describe agents' modalities in computational or information processing hypotheses. The constitution of conventions for information states and their enrichment or contravention in communicative acts (couched in symbols or utterances under interpretation), demands the convergence of agents on strategies, meanings or intentions (properly, strategic information, or control states), and drives the evolution of pragmatic or illocutionary and perlocutionary meaning. Lewis' presentation of possible languages, a unique application of possible worlds for intentionality, constitutes the final, eloquent reply to Derrida, and offers a theory of analyticity for language responding to Quine's objections. The mutual knowledge conditions described by Lewis, when applied by Schiffer to the rigorisation of Gricean speech act theory, gives the fullest such theory, one, it is argued in conclusion, immune to pragmatist objections to theories of meaning-intentions. In the discussion of the nature and application of mutual knowledge conditions arise further compelling problems. If, as is maintained, Lewis' theory describes a way in which conventions can come to direct unforced, mutual agreement on reasons for action without reference to any predetermined, definitive standard (in Lewis' specific case for the dissemination of communicative meaning), then an application to matters of social interaction (partly undertaken by Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman and motivated by the appeal of Lewis' work to sociologists and jurists), raises many issues regarding the ways in which parties to agreements or contracts can attain equitable consensus without coercion or duress. (In a footnote Lewis' coordination situations are compared to those obtaining in Rawls' original position, and the solutions they offer recommended to those following Nozick's desire for an epistemology without coercion). Such a theory of convention might also begin a compelling reply to the pragmatic liberalism advocated by Rorty, or better still to
the relativism in social policy and philosophy of science evinced by some post-structuralists; more specifically deriving from the work undertaken, a deeper study then has been made by speech act theory of the binding power of the speech acts instantiating the force of legal instruments may be begun.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


— 'How does One tell Whether a Word has One, Several or Many Senses?', pp35-47 in Steinberg and Jackobovits (1971).


Bennington, G.; 'For the Sake of Argument (Up to a Point)', pp332-354 in Glendinning (2000).


Brunel, I.; The Life of Isambard Kingdom Brunel: Civil Engineer (London, Longmans Green & Company) 1870.


——‘Wherein is Language Social?’, pp175-191 in George (1989).


Cavell, S.; 'Must we Mean what We Say?', pp1-43 in Must we Mean what We Say?: A Book of Essays (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons) 1969.


—— In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (University of Chicago) 1994.


Chomsky, N.; Syntactic Structures (The Hague, Mouton) 1957.


—— ‘Semantics for Natural Languages’, pp55-64 in (2001d).


—— ‘Radical Interpretation’, pp125-139 in (2001h).


—— Conventions and Communication, pp265-280 in (2001k).


Writing and Difference (University of Chicago) 1978.
Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles (University of Chicago) 1978.
The Archaeology of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac (Pittsburgh, Duquesne University) 1980.
Positions (University of Chicago) 1981a.
Dissemination (University of Chicago) 1981b.
Margins of Philosophy (Sussex, Harvester) 1982.
"Whom to Give to: Knowing not to Know", pp 151-174 in Rée and Chamberlain (1995a).
The Gift of Death (University of Chicago) 1995b.


— 'What is a Theory of Meaning II?', pp 67-137 in Evans and McDowell (1976).


Eliot, T.S.; Notes towards the Definition of Culture (London, Faber and Faber) 1948.


—The “Mental” and the “Physical”: The Essay and a Postscript (University of Minnesota) 1967.


—The Language of Thought (New York, Crowell) 1975.


Frege, G.; ‘Begriffschrift’, pp1-20 in Geach and Black (1952a).
—‘On Concept and Object’, pp42-55 in Geach and Black (1952b).
—‘On Sense and Reference’, pp56-78 in Geach and Black (1952c).
—*Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, pp117-224 in Geach and Black (1952d).


Girle, R.; Possible Worlds (Buckinghamshire, Acumen) 2003.


Goldingay, J.; Models for Interpretation of Scripture (Michigan, Paternoster) 1995.


Howells, C.; Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics (Cambridge, Polity) 1999.


Kemp Smith, N.; A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (London, Macmillan) 1923.


Kuhn, T.; *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (University of Chicago) 1962.


Lewis, C.I.; *Mind and the World Order* (New York, Dover) 1926.

— Languages and Language*, pp3-35 in Gunderson (1975).


Linsky, L. (ed.); *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language* (University of Illinois) 1952.


Michailescu, C-A. and Hamarnah, W. (eds.); Fiction Updated: Theories of Fictionality, Narratology and Poetics (University of Toronto) 1996.


——The Concept of Intentionality (St Louis, Warren H. Green inc.) 1972.


Muller, H.J.; ‘Negotiation Principles’, pp211-229 in O’Hare and Jennings (1996).


Okrent, M.; ‘Intending the Intender (Or, Why Heidegger Isn’t Davidson)’, pp279-301 in Wrathall and Malpas (2000a).


———‘Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals’, pp146-165 in Loux (1979).


———Realism with a Human Face (Harvard University Press) 1990.


———*Word and Object* (MIT) 1960.


--- 'Reference and Modality', pp139-159 in (1980).


--- Russell and Modal Logic', pp139-149 in Roberts (1979).


—— 'Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth', pp126-150 in (1991)


Sellars, W.; 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', pp253-329 in Feigl and Scriven (1956).

—-'Intentionality and the Mental', pp507-539 in Feigl, Scriven and Maxwell (1958).


Sharpe, R.B.; Monograph of the Paradiseidae, or Birds of Paradise, and Ptilonorhynchidae, or Bower-Birds (London, Henry Sotheran & Co.) 1891-1898.


Spivak, G.C.; 'Revolutions that as Yet Have No Model: Derrida's "Limited Inc"', pp75-106 in Landry and MacLean (1996).


Stevenson, C.L.; *Ethics and Language* (Yale University Press) 1945.

—- ‘Error’, pp258-301 in (1930).


Whorf, B.L.; *Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf* (MIT) 1956.


— 'Strawson on Anti-Realism', pp70-84 in (1993b).


Yovel, Y. (ed.); Philosophy of History and Action (Dordrecht, Reidel) 1978

