Thesis for the Degree of Ph.D.

KNOWLEDGE of the PARTICULAR
in St Thomas Aquinas

(including a discussion of the Principle of Individuation)

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Chapter 1: Sense and Intellect: the inadequacy of sense knowledge

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NOTE

The necessarily provisional nature of the findings in this essay will be obvious from the limited range of the reading on which it is based. It is hoped, however, that in the case of the writings of St. Thomas himself enough has been studied to justify the present statement of results. I have relied primarily, for my evidence, on the Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (Ed. Mandonnet) and the Summa contra Gentiles (the Leonine edition for Books I and II; for the rest, the edition published by Marietti in Turin, and by Burns and Oates in London); together with the passages collected in the three volumes of Nardi’s Opusculi et Testi Filosofici of St. Thomas, (Bari, Laterza, 1913-1917.) In addition, but chiefly after I had already outlined my conclusions, I examined, less minutely, the remaining relevant sections of the First Part of the Summa Theologica (Leonine edn.), certain others of the Opuscula (Ed. Mandonnet.), and the Quaestiones de Malo, de Potentia, de Spiritualibus Creaturis, de Anima, (Ed. Mandonnet).

What I especially regret is my failure hitherto to cope with the Commentators on St. Thomas and, in general, with the opponents and apologists of his doctrines. The absence of any definite statement of the relation of St. Thomas to Aristotle is not wholly due to a

1. Also a few passages elsewhere, and Alagona’s Compendium of the whole work.
2. Namely, De Substantiis Separatis, De Principio Individuationis, De Potentia Animae, De Natura Verbi Intellectus, De Deo Intellectu et Intelligibili, De Sensu respectu Singularium et Intellectu respectu Universalium, De Universalibus (two essays) of which all but the first are classed by Mandonnet as spurious.
like ignorance, but springs in part from the fact that my examination of the positions underlying Thomas' teaching is intended to be analytic and not historical. I should emphasise here that the consideration of that teaching itself is also analytic; and although I have often used the language of development, this refers properly only to the order of exposition, or, at most, of logical tendency. I am not concerned to affirm or to deny a conscious development in Thomas' own thought, although an acceptance of the current denial is involved in the use of texts irrespective of their chronological order.

It is hardly necessary to remark, finally, that my acquaintance with modern discussions is negligible: I can supply no bibliography of these which could have any worth. In the nature of the case I am unable to gauge the extent of my loss; but in any event I myself cannot be deprived of the benefit of an independent study.
INTRODUCTORY

Any student who, at the present day, elects to devote his attention to the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas is at least relieved from all necessity of apologising for his choice of subject. Apart altogether from the historical interest and importance of the representative mediaeval philosophers — an importance which ought at no time to have been denied — we must also take account of the fact that in the last half century the remarkable development of the neo-Thomist teaching has made of the interpretation and criticism of St Thomas himself what may be rather crudely termed a "living" issue.

This at least is true of all the fundamental aspects of the Thomist synthesis, and, among these none can be more vital for the purely philosophical investigator than such as constitute his theory of knowledge. For while it must be apparent that a theory of knowledge presupposes some or other elementary given fact, yet, clearly, unless in a real sense the conclusions of epistemology underly and condition the constructions of metaphysics there can be no place for epistemology in the philosophic discipline at all. The importance of the topic is certainly not underestimated by the apologists of the modern Thomist movement, as is sufficiently evidenced by their exaggerated hostility to Kant.
The first business of a theory of knowledge must always be the problem of our knowledge of the external, or, more explicitly, sensible world. There are two aspects of this problem. We may ask, how can we be sure, or can we be sure at all, that our minds do apprehend, and truly, the independently real? This is the true field of that which the Louvain school designate "Criteriology", and is naturally, the issue on which they oppose themselves to Kant with most enthusiasm. But there is also a subsidiary, though not unimportant question: what, assuming the fact, is the manner of our knowledge of the sensible world? in what way are its constituents the objects of our apprehensions, and what are the parts played, respectively, by sense and intellect, which, though they assuredly co-operate, must also be distinguished one from the other? It is this second question, or at least the most striking feature of Thomas' answer, which I propose to discuss. It has, for me, two advantages over the other: first, that it is more easily confined; and second, that, as the position of Thomas can be criticised adequately from the evidence which he himself supplies, the critic is not forced into a premature and superficial solution of the underlying problems. Primarily, in fact, we shall be accusing Thomas of holding a position which destroys itself.

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1 v. esp. for co-operation, DeVer. X. vi. For distinction, CG. II. 66. We accept here the distinction as made by Greek thought and accepted by Thomas. We can admit its propriety, even if we hold that the only ultimate distinction for knowledge is that between mediacy and immediacy.
Let us state our subject more exactly. Since Thomas, following Aristotle, is quite as explicit as one could desire that the sensible world is a world of individuals, that the individual, and not the species, is par excellence the real, our knowledge of that world must be somehow a "cognitio singularium", a knowledge of the individual members of the species. Further, on the subject side of the relation, it is clear that what distinguishes man from the brute animals is his intellect, that the properly human cognitive act is an intellectual act. Not only so, but, again as an Aristotelian opposing Platonists, Thomas re-iterates the truth that this intellectual act is directed towards the sensible world. It is therefore somewhat of a surprise, to those who know how little sceptical the Thomist epistemology is, when we are informed in those sections which deal explicitly with the "cognitio singularium" that the intellect does not know the particular after all. There is a knowledge of the particular, indeed: there must be. But it is knowledge by sense and not by intellect, except, to be strictly accurate, in a certain circuitous manner. It will be as well to give the situation which constitutes our problem in Thomas' own language. "Cognitio enim mentis humanae" he says2 "fertur ad res naturales primo secundum formam, et secundario ad materiam prout habet habitudinem ad formam. Sic autem omnis forma, quantum est de se, est universalis, ita habitudo ad formam non facit cognoscere materiam nisi cognitione universalis. Sic autem

1 esp. De Ver. X.v. II. vi.,
2 De Ver X.v. Resp. dic....
considerata materia non est individuationis principium

Unde patet quod mens nostra singulare directe cognoscere non
potest; sed directe cognoscitur a nobis singulare per virtutes
sensitivas——— Sed tamen mens per accidens singularibus se
immiscet, in quantum continuatur viribus sensitivis, quae circa
particularia versantur. Quae quidem continuatio est dupliciter.
Uno modo in quantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur ad mentem,
sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad animam; et sic mens
singulare cognoscit per qualiam reflexionem.... "1

There is sufficient of the unexpected and the obscure in this
state of affairs to warrant investigation. The force of the denial
of intellectual knowledge2 must of course depend on the nature and
intention of the distinction between sense and intellect, to a
consideration of which, so far as it is relevant, we shall therefore
first address ourselves. If we are satisfied that the denial has a
real significance, we may then proceed to enquire whether it can be
sustained.

1 The second form of the "continuatio" is that involved in practical
activity, and does not directly concern us.
2 I am venturing to assume, for the moment, that the "reflexio" does
not adequately relieve the situation. For a discussion of that
point, see Ch.V.
We must be clear, from the very beginning, upon one point in connection with this severance of sense and intellect: we ought never so to state Thomas’ view that the intellect, in knowing its proper objects, does not thereby in some way know also the external, sensible world. Consequently there should be that which is in some way in the external, sensible world and yet is not the proper object of sense; so that to say that sense does not know all that there is to be known in that world will not, in itself, involve an attack on the "knowingness" of sense, the reality of sense-knowledge. Yet, even should the "knowingness" of sense remain unshaken by other criticism, it is none the less true that some qualification is required of the view that particular things are the objects of the sensitive faculty, if the objects of intellect are to be located as we have demanded. Ought not a full knowledge of the sensible world of "singularia" to belong neither to sense nor to intellect, but to the synthesis of them both? Now we might well believe that at bottom Thomas intends this. The very fact that the synthesis is required would justify that belief, and its necessity is certainly made explicit in the regular distinction of intellect and sense as concerned respectively with the inner nature, ("intelligit"; "intus legit") and the external accidents of the object:

1No expositor, or critic, of St Thomas need hesitate to apply the qualification of a "quodammodo".
2 eg. De Ver. I xii Resp dic; cf III vii obj 5 (unchallenged) VIII vii nd add 40 dic X v. ad 50 dic vi. ad 20 dic.
3 disp. de An. a 13 (De Nat. De Hom 922).
In other passages, again, we have, in the insistence on the unity of the self, the cognitive subject, what seem almost direct statements of a synthesis. So nearly satisfactory are they that their tendency cannot be doubted; and we might be disposed to believe that our problem does not really exist, if we did not recall that our present subject is not what Thomas may have meant to say, except in so far as he succeeded in saying it.

The situation actually is that sense and intellect are somehow distinguished as being each cognitive. Is the distinction such as to admit of their synthesis? For this to be possible, either both must be but aspects of the one cognitive faculty or one (and it could only be intellect) must absorb the other. That the latter solution is not properly a synthesis at all amounts, merely verbal though it may seem, to a fatal objection; for in so far as it can be applied, no meaning whatever can be attached to sensitive knowledge. On the other hand, a purely aspect distinction is irreconcilable with any mutual impediment of sense and intellect such as is stated in the passage - "Per sequidem impediment se invicem intellectivae et sensitivae operationes, tum per hoc quod in utrisque operationibus oportet intentionem esse: tum etiam quia intellectus quodammodo sensibilibus operationibus admiscetur, cum a phantasmatisbus accipiat; et ita ex sensibilibus operationibus quodammodo intellectus puritas inquinatur." And the fact that this mutual impediment is actually used to show the union of its terms in the self proves

\[\text{Deg. De Ver. II \(\text{vi ad 30} \) dic. Sc. C II 58. of such a passage as S. Th. I\(34 \text{a 7} (=\text{Nardi 'De Hom' 659) De Ver. XIII iv Resp. dic.}\]
conclusively that the distinction is genuinely one of faculties. Each then has its proper object and must properly know it; and there seems no possibility, however Thomas may in fact desire it, of synthesising these objects and faculties in a single full apprehension of a sensible thing.

Such a full knowledge exists however, and must be located somewhere. It certainly cannot, by any interpretation of Thomas, belong to the intellect 'per se'; but it might be attributed to sense as being a natural meaning of the "cognition singularium" which he claims for that faculty. Yet obviously Thomas cannot rest in this position; he is faced immediately by the difficulty of finding a mode in which intellect may be said to consider the sensible world at all. A simple repudiation of such an object for intellect is unthinkable. There can be no doubt therefore that Thomas' intention is represented rather by the already-mentioned co-operation of sense and intellect in respect of the external world, -- a view which demands the interpretation of "cognition singularium" to mean not knowledge of the whole being of the particular, but knowledge of an object as a particular, of the particular as such. That interpretation is certainly the proper one, if there is to be any distinctive problem of "cognition singularium", but of course we are precluded from suggesting that Thomas has any notion of it. For the moment however, all that concerns us is the discovery of a conflict of tendencies.

1 See Chapt. VII.

2 Consequently the propriety of the interpretation will not be apparent until the errors of Thomas have been exposed.
in Thomas' attitude to sense, intellect, and the particular, as a result of which a clear distinction of the objects of the two faculties appears impossible. Such a failure inevitably rouses suspicion as to the independent cognitive capacity of one or other of the faculties, and, from this, sense rather than intellect must suffer. The worth of a purely sensitive "cognitio singularium", in any meaning of the term, is thereby prejudiced—a circumstance which would wreck the entire Thomist doctrine in regard to this knowledge. It is in order to satisfy ourselves whether that circumstance really exists, or whether, contrariwise, sense can satisfactorily be entrusted with our knowledge of the particular that I propose now more minutely to examine the relation of sense and intellect.

In its simplest form the question is just this: it being premised that the distinction is one of faculties, is sense to be regarded as constituting a peculiar level of cognition distinct from that of intellect, — the animal, in distinctions from the properly human, level — so that the one is more 'perfect' than, or the 'perfecting' of the other; or are sense and intellect here distinguished in terms of their direction, and not of their adequacy to their objects? In other words, does "sensible knowledge" signify simply knowledge of the sensible, and "intellectual knowledge" knowledge of the intelligible, according to a quite univocal use of knowledge?
This would be difference of direction, a difference in terms of the object. Or, contrariwise, is the distinction made in terms of the subject, as a difference of status in faculties as such, which is rather the condition than the result of any distinction of their objects? And, before we proceed to the more detailed examination of the evidence, let us remark that our problem is acute just in so far as the distinction is one of level, unimportant so far as it is one of direction.

We are, then, enquiring, we might say, whether the avenues named of "Sense" and "Inte!lect" lead severally and directly from object to subject, or whether they are each, as it were, bounded upon one side by the other faculty in such a way that, while sense alone "reaches" the independent natural world, through, or in, intellect alone does knowledge "reach" the self. The language of this latter suggestion is certainly not that in which a careful writer would describe the cognitive contact; and though it might be possible to illustrate it by certain of Thomas' expressions, it cannot be thought to cover the conceptions of that philosopher. For one thing, while it maintains the formal distinction of sense and intellect, it appears incapable of allowing distinct functions to both. That there could be no intellectual knowledge which did not in some way use the road of sense might not perturb us: but how can there be sensitive knowledge at all? It is easy for us to say that, the distinction being read in terms of level, there can
be no sense - knowledge for a creature which is in any degree intellectual: but in that event, to assign knowledge of the particular to sense is just absolutely to deny it. This is clearly not Thomas' intention, and, equally clear, it would be not only absurd but impossible. Could we have better evidence that Thomas' must have meant to distinguish sense and intellect in terms of direction merely?

Unfortunately, there is a grave obstacle in the way of this conclusion: it appears to be completely refuted by the overwhelming evidence that sense and intellect are regarded as forming a continuous cognitive channel such that intellect is dependent on sense for its material. It is hardly necessary to give references for this: it is fundamental in all Thomas' thinking, the whole abstractive theory of knowledge is based upon it; it is the central theme in the criticism of Plato: it is the mark of Aristotelian ancestry. Let us come to grips with this apparent contradiction. We may begin by taking the continuity of sense and intellect last referred to as a quite certain and fixed point. We have then two parts to our problem: first, how does Thomas combine this with the assertion of "sense* knowledge" at all? and second - the real question - is the knowledge asserted so properly 'knowledge' that the

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1 But see especially De Ver. X vi, & S. Th. Iq. 84 a6 ( = Nardi. 'DeHom' § 56) On the other hand we must call attention to a 'high' rationalist element (in 'DeVer' X vi, for instance, and cf. Id. xiii ) the relation of which with the predominant doctrine we must here leave undecided.
particular can satisfactorily be left to it?

By way of answering the former question we must simply say that the whole difficulty lies in the inadequacy of our spatial metaphor, whereby knowledge resides, as it were, at the upper end of the avenue of intellect: whereas in fact it is to be regarded as accompanying in its appropriate measure the apprehensive function at every level. The existence of sense-knowledge being thus allowed, we can pass straightway to our second question,—the consideration of its adequacy: and this we appear already to have answered by the very mention of 'levels'. Is not sense-knowledge clearly an inferior product? And is not our knowledge of the particular, as being purely sensitive, correspondingly unsatisfactory?

The problem is hardly so simple. It is true that Duns Scotus combined just this view of levels of apprehension with the demand for intellectual knowledge of the particular. He explicitly held the 'sensus communis' to be "a synthesis in consciousness of sense data which is on a lower level than that of the understanding, and is of itself incomplete and imperfect" and no one could have doubted the inadequacy of a sensitive 'cognitio singularium' in these circumstances. But there is a significant divergence between Thomas and Scotus in this connection. The position of Scotus is accompanied by a denial of the real distinction of the soul and its faculties.(2)

1. Harris 'Duns Scotus' IIp270.
a denial which at once limited him to but one manner and
standard of knowledge proper. Thomas, on the other hand,
repudiates their identification. (1) Whether or not - though
I do not see why not - this is compatible with the real unity
of the self may be left for the decision of those to whom the
formulae in question have more significance than I can
attribute to them. But at least it is clear that Thomas may
be able, as Scotus is not, to regard sense and intellect as
distinguished otherwise than as the lower from the higher level,
and consequently to attribute to the former some appropriate
cognitive adequacy in its own right. In short, it may be
possible for Thomas to combine in some sort the difference of
level, which the continuity of sense with intellect appeared to
involve, with the distinction of direction which would answer
our plea that the particular be satisfactorily known. This
solution of our problem would demand that the difference of
level carry with it some kind of distinction of object; and not
only so, but that this distinction of object be strictly the
concomitant and not the result of, even if revealed by, the
difference of faculty, - that in fact, the distinction be truly
objective, not the mere mirror of the strength or weakness of
the faculty.

Now it does seem that Thomas is taking up some such
position. For one thing, the whole question of levels is
raised in terms of the abstractive process, - of abstraction,
not of apprehension. This fact gives us at once an identity

(1) eg. Q. disp. de Anima xii (= Nardi 'De Hom' § 21.)
of object (= 'that from which abstraction is made') as the basis of status-distinction, and a diversity of objects (= 'the abstracted') which may secure a difference of 'direction', and so save the status-distinction from being taken in terms of adequacy or inadequacy to the object, (here once more equated with 'that from which abstraction is made'). The status will rather be determined by the object (= the abstracted), a view in harmony with Thomas' general position that faculties are distinguished in terms of their objects. (1) The admitted "greater perfection" of intellect than of sense (2) is thus but the measure of the greater perfection of its object, as being more abstract and immaterial; (3) there is no reflection upon the adequacy of sense for its own objects. (4) We have, then, all the appearance of a solution so satisfactory that the problem of knowledge of the particular loses its urgency. Yet I think it is an appearance only, and I shall endeavour to show as briefly as possible, first, that the distinction of objects, on which all depends, is not beyond cavil, and, second, that in any case Thomas' treatment of sense does imply an inadequacy in it which unfit it to be the sole proper faculty of knowledge of the particular.

(1) e.g. Q. disp. de Anima xiii (= Nardi 'De Hom' § 22)
(2) ib. ad 10 dic. (3) The justification of this standard of perfection is not our concern. (4) i.e. its own abstractions. The "non ita efficaciter" of De Ver Xyi ad 30 dic, which does suggest such a reflection, must obviously refer to the object as = that from which abstraction is made. This well illustrates the unsatisfactoriness of the situation which we are now going on to consider.
We ask then, how far can a distinction be drawn between the
objects of sense and of intellect? Wicksteed gives a fair
statement of one side of the problem. What Thomas meant by the
'intellectus agens', he says, is quite unambiguous. "It
signified the power of abstraction, the most distinctive faculty
of man."(1) "Thus abstractions or generalised conceptions
[= 'quidditates'] alone are the proper objects of the
intelligence"(2) and this implies the required position that
sense should know the concrete thing,(3) — required, because
it is sense that knows 'singularia'. So far we have that point
of view which, we supposed, Thomas must assume. The question is,
in what way are abstractions the objects of intellect, in what
way are they distinct from the concrete thing? Is not what is
abstracted the intelligible species? Is that species, then, the
object of the intellect? We touch here upon one of the crucial
problems of scholastic philosophy, — is the "intentional species"
whether sensible or intelligible, the 'quod' or the 'quod' of
knowledge? An adequate discussion of this question would be
out of place for us, and we must largely assume its conclusions.
We shall therefore take it as proved that the sensible species
at least is properly 'id quo', even if it be secondarily also
'quod'.(4)

1. Wicksteed 'Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy' p 381.
2. Wicksteed op. cit. p 302. The following references to St Thomas
himself may serve: — De Ver. VIII vii, Xvi, viii ad 2o dic,
XII, ad 12o dic XIV, ii XV iii ad 1o dic. S.contr.G.158
III 56, 108. (3) Though apprehending only its accidents: see
Wicksteed op cit p 404, quoted infra. (4) cf. Xavier
Rousselet: Etudes sur la philosophie dans le moyen âge;
ap. Ch xvi
Also Noel: Notes d'épistemologie thomiste, ch iii.
and the Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy: 'Psychology.'
I have no doubt personally that this was Thomas' conscious intention; and it is certainly demanded by the emphatic direct realism of his epistemology. It would be natural to suppose that the case of the intelligible species is a parallel; but clearly it is better that it should not be so, if our distinction of objects for sense and intellect is to be unquestionably maintained. Wicksteed, then, who denies the parallel, is taking up a position which is, a priori, reasonable. According to his view of the situation, "the species intelligibles which the human mind abstracts or distils out of the species sensibles (or rather their phantasmata preserved by the senses) are manufactured by the mind itself, and are recognised by it as mental facts to which no external or objective reality corresponds. They do not therefore direct the mind primarily to anything outside itself; and in this way they differ alike from the species sensibles in the human and the species intelligibles in the angelic consciousness; for both of these latter are media quibus (means, or instruments, "by which") of cognition; whereas the abstractions, or general conceptions, of which we are now speaking, are themselves the direct object of thought, out of which the mind must build up its conclusions and convictions; just as the sensations of colour, sound, taste, and so forth are the elements out of which the "common" sense constructs its representation of concrete external objects."(1) Accordingly the function of 'medium quo' is by Wicksteed attributed to the "phantasma,"(2) and this is in line with

(i) Wicksteed op. cit p 404.
(2) Wicksteed op. cit. pp 632-3.
the fact that it is of the phantasma that the intellect becomes conscious in its reflection. (3)

This seems a straightforward position, (2) and, it is highly important to observe, a demand for it springs inevitably from the view that the universal objects required for intellect do not exist "in rerum natura." (3) Its difficulties, however, may be quite simply stated. First, there is the feeling that the natural world is, after all, the object of the intellect's consideration, and here we are being cut off from that direct contact with it which necessitated the treatment of the sensible species as 'quod'. Again, our understanding is insulted when it is presented with a reversal for intellect - unexplained and I imagine inexplicable - of the relative status (4) of 'quo' and 'quod' as they function for sense. It will be replied that these objections amount to no more than our original desire that the cases of the two "intentional species" be parallel: the situation really is one of deadlock. The insuperable objection, however, to Wicksteed's view is surely that, so far as I have observed, wherever Thomas deals explicitly with the question at all it is as 'quo' and not 'quod' that the intelligible species is described! Thus we find that "intellectus cognoscit speciem intelligibilem non per essentiam suam, neque per aliquam speciem, sed cognoscendo"

(3) See, for instance, ap. De Ver II, vi, X v. (2) We must remark, however, that if the phantasma and species sensibilis are to be identified (as seems suggested in Wicksteed op cit p 371; also his 'Dante and Aquinas' Ch vi p 157; cf Gilson "The Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas", - Eng. tr. of 'Le Thomisme' - p 214 n 40) we are then reduced to but one medium quo for both sense and intellect. (4) In terms of "remoteness" from the concrete external particular.
objectum sujus est species, per quandam reflexionem." (1) The direct object of intellect is "aliqua natura universalis", distinguished from the species no less than from the phantasma, and constituting the objective quidditas. (2) Indeed in a way the phantasmata themselves are the objects of the mind, (3) - an extreme in which Wicksteed's arrangement is actually reversed: though it is more natural to conclude simply that the phantasmata are to intellect neither as "quo" nor "quod", but in some relation for which sense affords no parallel. Thus, "intellectus... roster in statu viae hoc modo comparatur ad phantasmata sicut visus ad colores... non quidem ut cognoscat ipsa phantasmata, ut visus cognoscit colores, sed ut cognoscat ea quorum sunt phantasmata." (4) However, the whole issue is debated at length and the attitude of Thomas, so far as concerns the intelligible species, expressed unmistakeably in a section of the 'Summa'; (5) and it is really very difficult to discover what positive grounds Wicksteed had for his interpretation. Wicksteed himself admits (6) in regard to the passage just quoted that, if we accept his view, "the phrase ea quorum sunt phantasmata is used more loosely than is at all customary with Aquinas," since it must then mean "the abstract conceptions generalised from the phantasmata," though he appeals for support to "the more careful phrase that immediately

(1) De Ver. X ix ad 10° dic. (2) De Ver X v Resp dic... X xi Resp dic. (3) De Ver X xi Resp dic... S.c G. IX 59. De Anima i ad 11° dic. (4) De Ver X ix Resp dic... It is worth noting the solution attempted in the (spurious) 'De Potentiis Animae': the species intelligibilis is "illud quo formaliter intellectus rem extra intelligit", while the phantasma is "illud quo quasi effective intelligit in acquirendo scientiam." (5) S. Th I 66 a 2 (= Nardi 'De Hom' 86) Minor references are De Ver II iii ad 1° dic VIII vi Resp dic. (ad fin) X viii ad 2° dic XVIII i ad 1° dic, and iv ad 10° dic. S.c G I 46 II 59, 75. (6) op cit. p 624.
follows, ea quae per phantasmata apprehenditur,"—(an appeal which
presupposes the identification of species intelligibilis with the
quod) and(2) to the relevant section of the Commentary on Aristotle,
De Anima III, which, I can only say, seems to me equally inconclusive.

To sum up, then, we find it necessary to distinguish the 'quidditas'
or 'natura rei' from the species intelligibilis and to regard the
former as the 'quod' of intellect, the latter as (primarily) quo
while dismissing the phantasm so far as possible, from our
consideration in this connection. This attitude is in harmony with
(2) Gilson's exposition of Thomas' view, and we shall find material in
that scholar's account for our new problem: how, in terms merely
of the objective 'quidditas' or natura rei and the concrete thing
itself are we to get that distinction of the objects of sense and
intellect respectively which is required as one condition of a
merely sensitive knowledge of the particular? How do the objective
'quidditas' and the concrete 'singulare' constitute two separate
objects at all?

If it were the fact that—as is at least suggested by
Wicksteed in a passage to which we have referred(3)—there is no
universal existent "in rerum natura" the problem for Thomas would
be impossible of solution. But the situation is really much less
definite. "We know," Wicksteed expounds "that there is nothing anywhere
in nature that corresponds to the general idea of 'a fish' in the

(1) p. 635. (2) Le Thomisme: Eng. tr as 'the Philosophy of St Thomas
Aquinas'. (3) op. cit pp 404 - 5. v. supra p. 16.
conceiving mind, without being any particular fish, or of any particular kind," and in this connection he quotes, (1) "Formae universales non sunt subsistentes in rerum natura." "There are, however," he continues "actual beings that answer to the definitions of 'fish' or 'man', though none that coincide with them." This second passage seems to me to leave room for all that we need; although a more adequate wording would be reached by a modification of the earlier statement; for that is simply a repudiation of Platonic realism; (2) and does not in the least compromise the moderate realism which the position of Thomas requires. We must deny that there are "subsistent universals" in the world, but need we assert "that there is nothing anywhere in nature that corresponds to the general idea of "a fish" in the conceiving mind" while at the same time being some particular fish, or, more, strictly, the essence of some particular fish? (3) Formally, this is Thomas' position and I question whether one can demonstrate the impossibility of distinguishing singulare and quidditas as two objects to any who take the view that the distinction exists. One might, of course argue a wholly different theory of universals, but that would not show any difficulty to be internal to the Thomist doctrine. One might

(1) As is clear from Wicksteed's refs. to pp 58, 66 of his own book. (3) Gilson op. cit.;
with more relevance suggest that the quidditas as existent in rerum natura is only potentially intelligible and therefore cannot as such be the object of the intellect. (1) But then what is the object? Is it the "actually intelligible", the "intelligible species"? Despite the suggestion of the phrase "actually intelligible", and despite Wicksteed, we were unable to accept that interpretation; and is there any formal inconsistency in holding that through the intellect's union with the actually intelligible we know the otherwise only potentially intelligible; the objective quidditas to which the intelligible species answers? (2)

The real difficulty is rather how to speak about the objective natura rei at all without suggesting its identity with the concrete particular, or about our intellectual knowledge of it without suggesting our intellectual knowledge of the particular also. How real a difficulty this is may be best seen, perhaps, not from Thomas himself, directly, but from an abbreviated account of his doctrine. Thus, for example, in Gilson's very accurate exposition we read,—"the forms united to matter..... are individual forms which.... cannot be apprehended as such by the intellect." (3) Now Gilson is using 'forms' as equivalent with 'natures', (4) and it would therefore seem that the quidditas in rerum natura is not properly even potentially

1. eg. De Ver. VIII ix, xiii obj 3° unchallenged, X vi.
2. Gilson op. cit. p 191 (eg.) is consistent with this. (3) Gilson op. cit. p 148. (4) op. cit. p 191. Strictly, of course, form and essence cannot be generally equated. The terminological vagueness is due, however, to Thomas himself.
intelligible, since it can never as such be actually intelligible. Yet very emphatically - if we are to avoid falling back on the intelligible species for our object - "the idea 'horse' is not an object offered to our knowledge, but we have to know rather the nature of the horse as realised in such and such a particular material horse."

But "this nature is the result of the combination of a form and its proper matter;" and what else, it may be asked, is the individual? Yet immediately afterwards we learn that the proper function of the human intellect is "to apprehend forms, undoubtedly existing individually in a corporeal matter, but also not to apprehend them in so far as they exist in this matter."(3) Thus we swing away again from an intellectual knowledge of the particular, but the cost appears to be that we must either apprehend the objective quidditas in so far as it is not as it is, or frankly accept the abstracted - that is to say the intelligible species - for our object. Either possibility seems allowed us by the vague language," to know what exists in an individual matter without taking into account the matter within which the object subsists means to abstract the form from the individual matter represented by the phantasm," and if it is the external object which is indicated (prudently) in the statement, "This abstraction consists ...... in the intellect considering in each material thing what constitutes it in its proper species, leaving aside all the principles of individuation belonging to the matter," - that is not a

(2) Gilson op. cit. p 306. My Italics. Cf S Th I q 85 al. esp. Resp. dic. and ad 1° dic. (Nardi De Homi § 61)
solution of the difficulty, but a reformulation of the requirements for a solution. We have admitted that the position is not so clear as to warrant the assertion that the discrimination of the objects of sense and intellect is impossible: but there is certainly ground for suspicion, which is if anything increased by those expressions which ascribe the palm, in cognition, to intellect, on the score of its knowing all that sense knows, only, more, or better.(1)

We turn now to the other main difficulty. If the possibility of securing for Thomas a "direction" distinction of sense and intellect is no worse than uncertain, it is beyond doubt that the distinction is at least not such as to remove the fatal discrimination in terms of 'knowingness'. Sense may know the particular, but its knowledge does not deserve the name. The clue for the interpretation of the evidence is as follows. If you once assert that sense has a knowledge which intellect does not possess, the more complete the knowledge which you claim for it, the less significant, the less harmful, will the distinction be. Conversely, positive proof that the distinction is a bad one will be given by indications that sense is defective in its very nature as a cognitive faculty, whether these indications are direct, or are given indirectly, by the attempt to secure also an intellectual knowledge of the objects assigned to sense. That evidence of this latter kind serves, further, to discredit the already-criticised distinction of objects itself, has been suggested at the close of the preceding paragraph.

(1) e.g. S. Th. Q. 86 a.1. obj. 4° and ad 4° dic: Q. disp De Anima a 13 (Nardi 'De Hom' § 22) De Ver X v.
What indications there are that sense may be an adequate independent faculty of knowledge are so invalid that we shall not trouble about them. For instance, the worth of the assertions of sensitive reflection(1) is impugned by other, limiting expressions in the context; and the same holds of the more clearly important claims for a *judicium sensus*:(2) while it is obvious that language which implies the attribution to sense at once of an adequate knowledge and of a *judicium*(3) must be declared illegitimate, if the *judicium* is not itself substantiated. The foregoing remarks, however, will at least have led us to connect the claim to knowledge properly so-called with the claim to judgement: and the necessity of this connection Thomas himself expressly grants, for, in his own words, "omnis cognitio perfecta duo [habet] scilicet acceptio et judicium de acceptis"(4) But if the universal, the concept, not only as object, but as 'medium quo', is limited to the intellect,(5) must we not at once grant that no *judicium* is possible for sense? Indeed I think so; but as Thomas insists on obscure the fact we must be more

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(1) eg. De Ver I ix, "quamvis enim sensus cognoscat se sentive..." Also X ix Resp dic... (2) eg. De Ver I xi: but some passages are non-committal, as De Ver XV iii ad 1 dic. De Ver I ix and xi are both passages discussed,below,as affording evidence of the incapacity of sense. (3) As does the "etiam apud sensum singulare magis communia sunt nota primo, ut hoc corpus quam hoc animal" of Boet. de Trin q. 1. a3(Nardi "De Hom" 479) (4) De Ver XII xii. (5) It is beyond question that the sensible species is not to be regarded as in any respect universal; although the manner of its materiality, and therefore its particularity, is one of our difficulties. We are not concerned here, of course, with that particularity which attaches to every intentionanl species as a constituent of an individual's psychical processes.
inquisitive. The admission (1) that sense is "quaedam deficiens participatio intellectus" does certainly suggest a distinction wholly in terms of "knowingness", and so appears to concede the crucial point. Still, it is annoyingly vague, and while there is any murmur of a judicium sensus it will be safest to see just to how much it amounts.

The question of judicium sensus naturally becomes most prominent where Thomas is concerned with the 'location' of truth and error, since every judgment by its very nature must possess one or other of these characters. The discussion in the first Quaestio of the De Veritate will serve our purpose. It is perhaps not to be stressed that in articles ii and x, where the issue is whether truth and error are to be located in the subject or in the object, the case for the subject, the whole anima, is stated in terms solely of intellect. The real argument is to be found in articles iii and ix (which consider veritas) and in xi and xii (where falsitas is the theme).

Article iii devotes itself to showing that truth belongs properly to the "intellectus componens et dividens", though secondarily through to the intellect when "formans definitiones." For while it is the fact that this"formatio quidditatum" is the first operation of the intellect, still if its activity proceeds no further "non habet nisi similitudinem rei existentis extra animam, sicut et sensus in quantum accipit speciem rei sensibilis": it has nothing "proprium" and therefore nothing between which and the "re" an adaequatio" in any significant sense can

(1) S.Th I q 77 a 7 (= Nardi 'DeHom' § 25)
be established. The "proprium" only comes at the level of judgment, and is indeed, "ipsam judicium". An exactly parallel position is taken up in xii, in respect of falsitas.

It is manifest, then, that unless sense also exercises some compositio et division, it can, even in Thomas' eyes, have a cognition only of a rather equivocal kind. We might add that if the "secondary" cognition with which sense is quite definitely credited is really analogous to the secondary cognition of the intellect, and if, as seems probable, the secondary intellectual cognition is nothing, if not the primary cognition in disguise, then sense if it cannot claim the latter, will be clearly devoid of cognition altogether. But it is unnecessary to insist upon this point: any, even partial, discrediting of sense-cognition will suffice here.

Now article ix holds that while some truth resides 'in sensu' it is 'non eodem modo' as in the intellect. The distinction is that while truth is in the intellect both as 'consequens actum intellectus' and as 'cognita per intellectum', only the former of these modes is paralleled in sense. The question, is, does this discrimination of truth as 'consequens actum . . .' and as 'cognita per . . .' match that of the secondary and primary meanings of cognition? The language of the passage is far from lucid: the distinction which is here made is stated in terms of the reflective powers of intellect and of sense, it is in these that sense is found defective; and it is not obvious that adequate knowledge of the external world demands this reflection, at least in that degree which distinguishes intellect from sense. The description of the 'judicium sensus' as "de re secundum quod est" might
appear to cover the primary force of cognition. None the less, even in itself the passage suggests the limitation of truth 'consequens actum' to the secondary cognition; and it is surely remarkable that, if this is not the real intention of the argument, then the basic distinction which underlies it does not answer to that of the three related discussions, which are all concerned with the issue of primary and secondary modes of knowledge.

Two of these discussions have already been mentioned. The last article xi, on the question whether falsitas resides 'in sensu', is peculiarly important. Here the initial distinction is that of sense when "intellectui comparatus quasi res" and when "rebus comparatus quasi intellectus". It is the latter situation that concerns us, and its very title may arouse dissatisfaction as at once suggesting a merely analogical cognition for sense. When we turn, however, to the distinction of the primary and secondary modes of cognition within this situation, sense appears at first sight to be receiving exceedingly good treatment: for both modes are claimed for it in a manner exactly parallel with the case of the intellect. The judicium sensus again, is itself distinguished into judicium naturale about "proper sensibles", and a judicium "per quamdam collationem quam facit in homine vis cognitiva quae est potentia sensitivae partis, loco cuius in alibus animalibus est existimatio naturalis", whereby the vis sensitiva can judge "de sensibilibus communibus et de sensibilibus per accidentes".

This second judicium sounds eminently satisfactory, (1) and if

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(1) We may safely disregard the judicium naturale; the limitation, if not rather denial, of its capacity for error - "semper est verum, nisi sit impedimentum in organo, vel in medio" - throws doubt upon its very status as a judgment.
its existence can be established it will silence all criticism of the 'knowingness' of sensae sense. There is but one suspicion: does not the mysterious vis cogitativa perhaps veil an intellectual importation? In that connection it is essential to know what is its relation to the brute existimatio naturalis: if it is other, then it must veil such an importation; if it is identical, then either it is not a faculty of real knowledge, or that knowledge must be supposed in animals also. Yet even if this supposition were made—and we can hardly imagine Thomas taking that step—still it would have no positive value, in view of the necessarily hypothetical nature of our theories of animal psychology. Actually, Thomas appears to aim at the advantages of both alternatives by means of a middle formula which, while seemingly renouncing identity in kind between the vis cogitativa and its brute counterpart, will not admit a distinction other than of degree, - a formula, therefore which for me can mean nothing at all. In discussing the sensitive powers of the soul he says(1) - after distinguishing the sensible forms from the intentiones, which are apprehended by the vis aestimativa and conserved by the vis memorativa — "Considerandum est autem quod, quantum ad formas sensibiles, non est differentia inter hominem et alia animalia: similiter, enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia est: nam alia

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(1) S.Th I q78 a 4 Resp. dic. (= Nardi. 'De Hom'.§ 27) I have ventured to quote at some length for the sake of clearness. Further, in I wished it to be observed how singularly empty, even an apparently detailed statement, Thomas' conception really is. Cf Q. disp De Anima, a13. (= Nardi 'De Hom' § 22)
animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam
instinctu, homo autem per quandam collationem. Et ideo quae in aliis
animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur
cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi intentiones
advenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis, cui medici
assignant determination organum, scilicet mediam partem capitis:
est enim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio
intellectiva intentionum universalium." And when challenged to
explain in what sense, then, the faculties are the same in man and
brute he replies merely(1) "quod illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et
memorativa(2) in homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis,
sed per aliquam affinitatem et proprinquitatem ad rationem
universalem, secundum quandam influentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliae
vires, sed saepeae perfectiores quam sint in aliis animalibus. "All
this is deplorably indefinite, but what we seem faced with is necessity
of conceiving a sensitive faculty with an intellectual character. This
I cannot do. And in any case, how can the principle of continuity
whether valid itself or not - secure such an "overlapping" as seems
involved in the term "influential"? Yet apart from this principle(3)
Thomas does not even attempt an explanation. I should be inclined
therefore to suppose that the idea of a, so to say, merely "accidental"

(1) S.Th I q78 a 4 ad 5ο dīc. (= Nardi 'De Hom' § 27)
(2) The passage quoted immediately above continues: "Ex parte autem
memorativae, non solum habet memoriam, sicut cetera animalia, in subita
recordatione praeteritorum; sed etiam reminiscerentiam, quasi syllogistic
inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam secundum individuales intentiones".
(3) See De Ver XIV i ad 9ο dīc for an example of this application of
the principle.
influence is wholly improper, that no faculty can exhibit an "influence from intellect" without being to that extent intellectual. Despite, then, the one quite unambiguous statement in Thomas' account—"cui medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem capitis"(4) — an assertion whose whole significance is that it would limit the *vis cogitativa* to the plane of sense, it is impossible to regard that faculty as strictly a sensitive one: and even if it be denied that it is therefore strictly intellectual either, still it is just in virtue of its intellectual nature, the specifically human modification, that *judicium* is ascribed to it. It is as intellect only, never as sense, that it judges; with what right, then, can we speak of sense-judgment?

We may remark at this point that just such an illegitimate importation of intellect into sense, or disguise of the intellectual as sensitive, as is here suspected seems involved in the passage, quoted earlier, as to the priority in knowledge of "singularia magis communia", — an expression which must strike us as ridiculous.(2) The *singulare*, the *hoc aliquid*, is identical as 'corpus' and as 'animal': and what distinction there is is in terms of the concepts under, or by, which the particular thing is apprehended. "Communia", then, may be admitted if taken to signify "communiter"; but even so the reference cannot be genuinely to sense-knowledge, since the *species sensibilis* is

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(1) Cf. De Ver xv i Resp dic, ad fin.
(2) In Boet de Trin q 1.a3(= Nardi 'De Hom' § 79) v. supra p. cf. S.Th. I q65 a3. (= Nardi 'De Hom'. § 63)
particular and not universal. It is pleasantly ingenuous in Thomas, therefore, to describe the situation as "quaedam imitatio intellectus in sensu."

But let us return to the vital problem of the vis cogitativa or ratio particularis. Whatever its status, it cannot be, as it is said to be, a counterpart to the "natural instinct" of the brute if it has not a purely "practical" cognitive function, if it is not confined to intentiones, the apprehension of "commoditates et utilitates, sive nocentura", and excluded from the apprehension of forms. It cannot be said that the language of Thomas invariably observes this limitation; but I believe that for the most part it does so, and in those passages to which the greatest weight must be attached. It must have been quite clear that the otherwise forfeited connection with "natural instinct" alone gave to the conception of a vis cogitativa any plausibility. But if the case be thus, then it is surely misleading to explain "judicium sensus by this vis cogitativa in a context where everything depends upon its being a judgment as disinterested as that of the intellect; and if the language there does not disclaim the analogy its fictitious propriety but aggravates the offence.

Accordingly we conclude that even were the vis cogitativa unequivocally sensitive, its judicium is not of the kind we desiderate. And if further proof be needed we may adduce the fact that

(1) Intellectus passivus is also sometimes used as an equivalent. See S. c G II 60. Q. disp de Anima a 13. (= Nardi 'De Hom' § 22)
(2) S. Th.Iq'78a4 (= Nardi 'De Hom' § 27), in Resp. dic.
(3) See, eg. De Ver xv i Resp dic; ad fin. (4) For instance, once again, S. Th.Iq'78a4 (=Nardi 'De Hom' § 27) and De Ver Xy.
(5) i.e. De Ver I xi.
though sense is "non cognoscitivus nisi singularium",(1) the singular proposition is actually a function of the intellect.(2) Finally, now that we have dealt with the real obscurities in the situation and cannot be accused of leaping to our conclusion, we may quote a few words from the Summa which, it can hardly be denied, dispose of sense-judgment: "Per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur. Nunc autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit: licet enim visus habeat similitudinem visibilis, non tamen cognoscit comparationem quae est inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea".(3)

In addition to the direct evidence of the incapacity of sense, which we have now examined, there were, we said, indirect indications offered by the fact that functions which should be sensitive are attributed to intellect. Something like this is implicit in the problem, just discussed, of the vis cogitativa, and exactly the same is true of reminiscencia, the human counterpart of brute memory.(4)

Such cases serve as a bridge between the two groups of evidence, by which we may now pass to more explicit instances of intellectual

(1) e.g. S.c G.II66. (2) De Ver Xv ad3° dic. S.Th.Iq66a1. Q.disp.de Anima a30: sed contr. 1° and ad 1° in contr. (3) S.Th.Iq16a2(= Nardi 'De Hom' § 83). Qq16 and 17 cover approximately the ground of the articles in De Ver I which we have been considering. Perhaps we may be allowed to quote from S.Th.Iq17 as this enlightening instance of the highest reach of sense-knowledge: "- in visu est similitudo hominis inquantum est homo, sed inquantum huic colorato accidit esse hominem." Another indication, almost a direct statement, of the non-cognitive nature of sense per se may possibly be found in De Ver XLI ad110 dic, if we are to understand from that passage that sense represents a mere psychological sequence of apprehension unaccompanied by any grasp of the apprehended as objective. That would be rather remarkable in Thomas, and I cannot be sure that his intentions there go beyond those of the passages already discussed. (4) See, eg, the passage quoted, supra p 391.
"poaching" upon sense.

This "poaching" will take the form of some equation of the objects of sense and intellect. Now we have seen that, though we cannot be certain that this equation takes place, it is extraordinarily difficult to deny it, if once it be asserted that intellect is directed towards the external world.\(^{(1)}\) In certain passages the difficulty becomes peculiarly apparent. Thus how can we deny an equation of object when an intellectual knowledge of the particular seems claimed on the ground that "universalem cognitionem singularibus applicamus quae in cognitione nostra sensitiva praestat"?\(^{(3)}\) Indeed is this not an \textit{identity} so manifest and straightforward as to give us just that synthesis of the intellectual and the sensitive needed to solve the problem of 'locating' knowledge of the particular? The answer to the second question is, - Very nearly but not quite; and the defect is fundamental. The whole of Thomas' problem arises from the duplication of 'knowledges' - the cognitio universalis and the cognitio sensitiva - which even this passage maintains. So long as the duplication continues an equation of objects can never collapse into an identity and no synthesis of sense and intellect is describable; and it is just this unresolved equation of objects which reflects on the status of sense.\(^{(2a)}\).

\(^{(1)}\) eg esp. De Ver X ix. as quoted earlier.

\(^{(2)}\) De Ver VIII xi Resp dic. "unde tertius...".

\(^{(2a)}\) on next page.
It can be urged that this formula of applicatio is descriptive of a "practical" rather than of a cognitive function(1). To this we may agree, admitting that our criticism is consequently wide of the mark. But since the passage from which we quoted(2) is itself vague upon this point, it seemed not unfair to call attention to the dubiety: the more so because the distinction between the application and the mind's undoubtedly cognitive reflexio is obscured in so far as the latter is treated as involving the ratio particularis which is the instrument of the former(3). However that may be, if we confine ourselves to the reflexio(4) whereby the mind quite definitely has some knowledge of the particular, our case is sufficiently conclusive. There can be no question whatever that there is an equation of objects here: it is explicitly the singulare in one and the same meaning of the term that is known directly by sense, indirectly by intellect. But a reflexio

(3a) See De Ver II vi X v. However, uses rather strange language, if the text be sound, which goes a long way towards admitting this resolution: "Nam quum sensus unde nostra cognitio incipit, circa exteriora accidentia versetur, quae sunt secundum se sensibilia, ut color et odor et huiusmodi, intellectus vix per huiusmodi exteriora potest ad interiorem notitiam pervenire, etiam illarum rerum quarum accidentia sensu perfecte comprehendit," unless, indeed, "nostra cognitio" be the subject of "Comprehendit". (1) De Ver X v, is clear upon this.

(2) De Ver VIII xi Resp. dic. "unde tertius . . ."

(3) I should deny that the reflexio essentially requires this ratio particularis, though we are confronted with such a sentence as "Haec reflexio compleari non potest nisi per adjunctionem virtutis cogitativa et imaginativa" (Q. disp. de Anima, a22 ad1 in contr.) Doubtless this would be justified were the cognitive claims of the vis cognitativa substantiated, and Harris (ap. Proc. Aristot. Soc. 1924/5, "Duns Scotus and his relation to Thomas Aquinas" § 3) seems to accept the position. But if our criticisms of those claims are sound, the function of that faculty in the reflexio must be limited to the apprehension by intellect of particular intentiones, or of intentiones as particularised.

(4) See De Ver II vi X v.
does have one advantage over an *application*: its very indirectness amounts to a disclaimer of an intention to take the place of sense. Accordingly, if it really just "happens" to exist, if it is, as Thomas says, a purely *per accidens* knowledge of the particular that the intellect thus acquires, then, however surprising this coincidence of function may be, however inconsistent with the Aristotelian hypothesis and the Thomist faith that Nature never works to no purpose, it must be admitted that the adequacy of sense to its objects is not impugned. But if, contrariwise, on this intellectual contact with the particular depends the very possibility of the singular judgment,(1) then the *reflexio* is party to that robbery of sense whereby the singular judgment was denied it; and the assertion that it is *per accidens* is not only disingenuous, but derogatory to the singular judgment itself: while if it is not *per accidens* its existence is a very proof that sense cannot be trusted with the objects which are supposed to be peculiarly its own.

This fact of the *reflexio* - whose *nature* will concern us later - concludes and epitomises the evidence that sense cannot be regarded as a cognitive faculty. Sadly diffuse and repetitive though our argument may have been, it cannot, I think, be dismissed as in principle unnecessary. Our conclusion is doubtless implicit in the avowal, both by apologists and external critics,(3) that *cognitio singularium* is a problem, and a crucial one, for Thomas; but that

(1) eg. De Ver X v. ad 30 dic. (2) v. infra Chapter V. (3) eg. Noël, in Ch vi of his "Notes d'epistémologie thomiste"; Harris, in § 3 of "Duns Scotus and his relation to Thomas Aquinas" (Proc. Arist. Soc. 1984/5.)
avowal must remain incomprehensible until we have observed the impotence of sense as an independent faculty no less than its refusal to surrender its independence.

We may say that the problem of knowledge of the particular in St Thomas has two sides to it: the attribution of that knowledge to sense; its denial - except, as we have just seen, indirectly - to intellect. We have now therefore dealt with the first of these aspects, in showing sense to be such that any attribution of knowledge to it is worthless; and we have further implied that Thomas himself is vaguely conscious of this fact, and that it would have been even clearer had the terms of the distinction of sense and intellect been consistently maintained, instead of blurred to conformity with his puzzled uneasiness. We turn now to the second, and even more confused, side of the question, - the denial of knowledge of the particular to intellect. We are contending primarily that Thomas' position contradicts itself, and our enquiry therefore will be how, or whether, the denial of this knowledge has grounds consistent with the kinds of knowledge which are admitted; first, with the alleged sensitive knowledge, and then with the ascriptions of intellectual knowledge of the particular to God, the angels, and (indirectly) ourselves also. It is this last point which will again bring the reflexio into the foreground.
CHAPTER II. The Principle of Individuation. (i) Its relevance to our problem; general consideration of materia as involved therein.

When we pass to this central topic of our investigation we find ourselves additionally entangled in the problem of the Principium Individuationis: for, we are told, "nullus potest scire singulare nisi scit illud per quod singulare completur." (1) This is but the relevant aspect here of that general correlation of being and knowing which cannot be questioned: whether or not in this connection it is correctly formulated by Thomas will be a later consideration, and meanwhile we shall content ourselves with setting forth the terms of his statement.

Before we do so, however, it may be worth while to remark on one difficulty which is bound to arise whenever knowledge is denied. Granted that what is and what is known are correlative in such wise that knowing presupposes the being of what it knows, there will be nothing self-contradictory in the idea of an unknown being. All the same, since our assertion of being presupposes our knowledge of it, will there not be a contradiction in the assertion of an unknown being? Now there is no significance in the assertion that intellect has no knowledge of the particular if the existence of the particular is not supposed. Does not Thomas' very denial of such a knowledge, then, contradict itself?

It will be replied that this criticism, if sound, would

(1) De Ver II v. obj 10 unchallenged.
forbid the affirmation that there is anything other than what we know and that philosophy cannot live on these terms. That some such affirmation is essential I would not deny, though what are its grounds and how it is related to knowledge proper we cannot discuss here. Accordingly our criticism must be modified. It is the assertion not of the unknown but of the unknowable that involves a contradiction; for while the grounds of "unknowability" may lie in the subject, in that which is certainly in some respect known, the grounds of unknowableness must lie in the object, in the ex hypothesi unknown. It will thus be impossible to know that "x" is unknowable unless "x" is in some sense known; or, in terms of our present question, it will be impossible to deny the knowableness of the particular unless we show that what distinguishes it from the universal or the specific is unknowable. This, of course, is what Thomas essays to do: but surely there can be nothing more patently absurd than his attempt to describe an element in such a way that its inapprehensibility becomes apparent.

In so far, then, as Thomas' position is a pure denial of our knowledge of, or, as he intends, of the knowableness of, the particular, it does seem to be hopelessly self-contradictory. But since his denial is not, in its terms, at least, so absolute as this, our criticism of his formulation of the problem must be correspondingly tentative. For, as we saw, Thomas allows a sense-knowledge of the particular, and that would give a basis for his intellectual denial of intellectual knowledge, if in the first place, the term "sense-knowledge" represents a fact, and secondly, the cognitive subject is a real unity of sense and intellect.
The first at least of these conditions, however, is, we have argued, not fulfilled. Thomas may then fall back on his assertion that even intellect knows the particular indirectly. The unknowableness of the particular is therefore not absolute but relative, though for direct human cognition it is, he would say, truly the unknowable and not merely the unknown. But in this connection we are entitled, I think, to rule out the Divine and angelic knowledges; for, apart altogether from the hypothetical nature of any account of them, they are Divine or angelic and therefore not possessed by Thomas himself, and accordingly they cannot free him from the contradictions of his human standpoint. So there is left simply the indirect human knowledge of the particular, and here is yet another side of its significance: If this indirect knowledge really exists, if it is compatible with what we may term our "direct ignorance," the situation is saved; if not, then I repeat the suggestion that Thomas' very statement of his problem involves a contradiction (1).

However this may be, Thomas does explicitly relate the principle of individuation to knowledge of the particular: and we are to indicate the meaning which he attaches to "individuation" in this relation. Here let us observe first of all that, in Thomas' opinion, it is not particularity as such but materiality that is the bar to knowledge, "non enim hoc quod est esse individuam repugnat ei quod est

(1) See infra. Chap. V.
esse intelligibile actu,... Sed id quod repugnat intelligibilitati est materialitas'(1). The importance of this distinction is that it limits the problem to the "material" world; how far that is in fact a limitation is uncertain, but at least it is regarded(2) as saving us from the contradiction otherwise involved in human self-knowledge. Further, the distinction supplies a basis for explanation of the difference between the human and super-human intellects.

In a way, then, it is only per accidens that the particular is unintelligible or the universal intelligible, however inseparable an accident it be for human knowledge(3). None the less, if the materiality of the sensible world does involve the unintelligibility of its particulars, we must suppose that there is some essential relation between materiality and particularity. Consequently, matter may be in some sense principium individuationis; and, in passages too common to require instancing, Thomas repeatedly assures us that this is the case. We cannot, however, rest content with so general a pronouncement. The initial distinction of particularity and materiality allows of there being, as certainly there are, immaterial individuals. God, for example, is emphatically such(4), and so are the angels(5). The species in the

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(1) S. C. G. II 75: cf Q disp. de Anima a 2 ad 5 dic (= Nardi "De Hom" § 8)
S. Th I q 76 a 2 ad 5 dic (= Nardi "De Hom" § 10) De Ver II 11 Resp. dic.
(2) See "De Unitate Intellectus" (ap. Nardi Vol. II p 66 ad init.)
(3) In its prime function, i.e. of apprehending the external world.
(4) eg. S. Th. I q 3 a 2 obj 3 and ad 5 dic (= Nardi "De Deo Uno" § 5)
(5) See esp. "De Unit. Intell." ap Nardi I I p 61: and cf. Q. d. de anima a 2, ad 5 dic. (Nardi "De Hom" § 8)

We are here simply giving Thomas' view: its difficulties will arise later.
latter case is the individual, not accidentally, as with sun or moon (1) but essentially. It is surprising that this equation did not induce Thomas to reconsider his whole use of species and its correlatives; but, accepting the situation, it is clear that matter cannot be the fundamental principle of individuality.

What, then, is meant when matter is termed the Principium Individuationis? The answer is immediate: it is intended to be the principle of multiplicity within the species (2): "Materia est principium distinctionis secundum numerum in eadem specie". (3) Moreover, this should be its sole function since even with material things form is the principle of their unity and so of their positive individuality: "nihil enim est simpliciter una nisi per formam unam per quam habet res esse". (4) But on this point there is some obscurity: "Non enim materia est principium individuationis in rebus materialibus nisi in quantum materia non est participabilis a pluribus, cum sit primum subjectum non existens in alio". (5) That is to say, matter is at once the ground of diversity within the species and of further indivisibility, and so of unity. Indeed, any distinction of forms into

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(1) eg. S.c.G. II 75. (2) So, too, Aristotle: see Ross "Metaphysics" Introd. p
(3) Q.d.de Spirit. creat. a. 1. ad 19 dic (Nardi "De Hom" § 5); cf ib. ad 9 dic, and S.c.G. II 49, 75; III 92 and S.Th I 47 a 3 obj 36 unchallenged (in Nardi "De Deo Creatore" § 11)
(4) S.Th. I q 76 a 3 Resp. dic. ad, "Primo quidem." (Nardi "De Hom" § 11)
participable and non-participable(1) seems bound to rule out the 
participable as such from being a unifying principle: and if we 
mean by form, in this connection, the form as participated in, we 
are begging the question, for then the whole work of individuation is 
already achieved. The language of the passages last referred to certainly 
does seem to indicate(2) that in the sensible world the work of 
individuation, positive individuality and sub-specific diversity alike, 
is attributed to matter.

Such a position would not only contradict the explicit account of 
the function of form, but would be in itself highly absurd: and in point 
of fact it is not held, the apparent antagonism can be resolved. We may 
best approach the solution by noting that even the multiplicity of which 
matter is the principle may be, according to Thomas, only potential, as in 
the case of sun and moon(3). It is therefore put beyond doubt that the 
difficulty of knowledge of the particular lies not in the discrimination 
of beings only numerically distinct, but in the apprehension of any one 
particular being(4). That is to say, attaching to the particular being in 
the sensible world and constituting it a particular (if any distinction 
from the separate substance is to be maintained) must be some non-specific 
element which is unintelligible. Thus the instance of the unique yet 

(1) As in the context of the passage last quoted: cf S. Th. I q3 a 2 ad 3 dic 
(Nardi "De Deo Uno" 65) 
(2) eg. the use of both "individuari" and "multiplicari" (Nardi II p 61. ad 
(3) S, c. C. II 75, 93 ad fin. 
(4) There is no inconsistency with the view (eg. De Ver II 9 Resp. dic..) 
that Sense's especial grasp of the particular comes just from its 
apprehension of "ea quibus ad invicem distinguuntur" so long as these 
elements are neither relations nor characters of whose occurrence a 
plurality of individuals within the species is a condition.
sub-specific individual shows that we not only may but must claim for matter that it is more than a principle of multiplicity. Multiplicity is, in fact only the (usual but not universal), expression of some direct particularising function, of a principle of unity in some sort. Now we have objected already to matter as a principle of positive unity: is there then any other kind? Is there not what we may designate "negative" unity, — unity, that is, in terms of limitation, not of expression, as a picture is one not merely in its proper nature as an artistic whole but as occupying a certain space which is not any other space? The distinction is made by Gilson (1) as that of the passive principle of individuation from the active principle of individuality, the first alone being matter, the second, form. The form received into the matter is limited by it and so as so limited is no longer participable. In this way matter gives to form the non-participable unity which characterises the particular while form as thus particularised gives to the compositum the positive unity of self-hood (2). This account not only satisfies the claims which we observed made on behalf of matter (3) but answers at the same time the question how a form in itself participable can be a unifying principle.

We might still urge that surely it is the form that sets the limits even in matter: but let us rather be thankful that we have reached what I believe to be a fair statement of Thomas' position. This limitation of form by matter he expressly and repeatedly maintains (4) and to query it is only to raise the whole question of the justification

(1) op.cit. p 175 n.6. (3) See S.Th.1 q7 a 1. (Nardi "De Deo Uno" § 23)
(3) De Unit. Intell. ap Nardi II p.61, as quoted supra.
(4) eg. De Ver II ix Resp dic... Q.d. de Spirit. Creat. al. Resp dic. and ad 2 dic (Nardi "De Hom §5").
for his distinction of participable and non-participable forms. That question, however, is of such importance that it demands a few words in passing. The difficulty with which we are faced is, that if on the one hand the distinction is not made, separate substance and natural object must be individuated alike, either by form, in which case the epistemological situation which constitutes our problem disappears, or by matter, which is absurd, or (as just set forth) by both matter and form in different respects, in which case the doctrine of separate substances must be recast: while if the distinction is made it would seem to demand that, the contribution of matter being a "negative" one, every true individual, every entity that has its own history, or at least (if this is really a restriction) every organic being should be a non-participable form, and so, for Thomas, a "separate substance". The case here is not to be solved by the analogy of sun and moon, (where we have what is unique of its species and yet sensible) since, if it does not itself subsume these analogues, there is the essential difference that the one form is not participated in, the other is by its nature non-participable. This astonishing and, for Thomas, unbearable situation by its urge towards an identification of individual and species in most, if not all, cases, suggests, even more vividly than their avowed identification in the separate substance, some confusion in Thomas' whole conception of the species.

Interesting though the topic is, we must not linger. Our immediate problem was, what Thomas understood by individuation taken as involved in knowledge of the particular. Our conclusions on this point we may sum up as follows. The problem of knowledge of the particular is the problem of the knowableness of that which is the basis of multiplicity
within the species, which adds itself, even if but in one instance, as a sub-specific element to the specific form and which being added, alone distinguishes the particular as such from the specific. It is therefore the principle not merely of multiplicity but of the particularity or negative unity, of the multiple particulars. Such is the individuating function of that which is in its least definite statement materia, and whose unintelligible nature we are now to observe through the eyes of St. Thomas.

It is natural that our first idea of this "matter" should be that it is an entity answering to that conception of the material with which we grow up, and which seems definite enough until we actually attempt to define it. We may dispense with that attempt here and content ourselves with a label. Is then, the "matter" which for Thomas is the principle of individuation, what we may by agreement term "physical matter"?

This question may be dealt with quite expeditiously; for although there are some passages which do suggest the view of matter as physical, there is, I believe, no passage which could be clearly charged

(1) For the problem of the disembodied soul which undercuts, if not solved, any material principle of individuation, see a few sentences in Ch.III. Meanwhile, in order that we may concentrate on the inherent weakness of a material principle, it is best to ignore it. The postponement of discussion of the full Thomist formula until the next chapter is similarly due simply to considerations of exposition. We may remark here that the remainder of this chapter, and chapter III, are not in general relevant to the strict epistemological subject, which is considered in Chapters IV & V. They do however, aim at compelling, as it were by a flanking movement, the main body of the Thomist doctrine, to fall back from the position which Chapters IV & V are attacking frontally. They are in any case necessary to the brief survey of the whole complex situation attempted in the concluding chapter.

(2) Such as the second and subsequent arguments of S.c.G II 50.
with taking this standpoint in any case in which matter is the principle of individuation. Nor need we wonder: for it is surely apparent that physical matter, that is, corpus, would be already individual, a substance compact of form and matter,—first matter and forma corporalis.

But not merely could such an individual being not itself provide an ultimate individuating principle; it cannot even, for Thomas, serve as such a principle relatively to any other thing(1). This position is necessitated by his assertion of the "unity of substantial form" the assertion that in each thing there is but one form which gives "substance," "thinghood," to the matter while at the same time placing it in its proper genus and species. "Oportet ... dicere," we are told, "quod eadem numero forma sit per quam res habet quod sit substantia, et quod sit in ultima specie specialissima, et in omnibus intermediis generibus"(2). Consequently there can be only one sense of "matter" as the term is used to indicate what, by reception, individuates the form. We are not to suppose, of course, that there can be no form whatever of the thing in question other than the substantial. There are or may be, "accidental" forms in addition. Thomas' point is that these forms merely supervene on an individual already existent. Certainly they affect the particular nature(3) of this or that particular thing but they have no significance for the constitution of the individual

(1) "Thing" is emphatic: for of course Thomas holds that every such thing is the ground of the particularity of its own characters; eg. De Pot. IX ii Resp. dic S. a. GIV62,65(with the exception, which we shall see to be important, of quantitas dimensiva).
(2) Q.d. de Anima a. q. Resp. dic (Nardis "De Homo" (14)
(3) But not, we must suppose, even the "most special" specific nature.
as such, and therefore none for us in the present issue. The opening section of the De Principiis Naturae describes the situation clearly, using the term materia prima, (which is pura potentia) to indicate this substance of substantial form, as against the already individual subjectum which underlies the accidental.

The merits or otherwise of this important doctrine do not concern us so far as we are questioning only the consistency of Thomas' thought: though for myself, I am inclined to follow him in this matter to the extent of regarding any other view as formally absurd. The undoubted difficulties would, if unsuperable, simply indicate to my mind the impossibility of treating the mental distinction of form and matter as real and constitutive at all. On the reality of the distinction, however, rests the whole situation with which we are dealing, and we must for our purposes remain within that situation. We shall simply emphasise, therefore that Thomas insisted on the unity of substantial form, even where, in the problem of body and soul, (2) there was every inducement to act otherwise.

(1) It is worth mentioning that the distinction of substantial and accidental form is in no way equivalent with that of substantival and adjectival (which latter concerns the formal being of characters as such) It is rather a distinction within the sphere of the substantival. Thus for instance, to quote the passage of the "De Princ. Nat" to which we referred when ex cupro fit idolum, "idolum" is not a substantial form, because "cuprum ante adventum figurae habet esse actu," and similarly "omnes...formae artificiales sunt accidentales" (ap. Nardi Vol II p. 7.) Wickssteed, "Dogma and Philosophy" pp 420-1 seems confused on this point.

(2) The difficulty of the doctrine in connection with the union of body and soul lies in this, that in so far as there are two real terms independently existent, the doctrine is violated, and, in so far as there are not, the formal aspect of body will flow into and contaminate the purity of the soul. In his endeavour to escape both consequences the Saint appears to lapse into the utterly meaningless. Thus he says -Q d.de Anima a9, ad7 dicit(Nardi "De Hom § 14") Corpus physicum organicum comparatur ad animam sicut non quod sit tale per aliquam aliam formam, sed quia hoc ipsum habet per animam".
and that this rules out as principle of individuation any matter which has independent existence of whatever grade.

Our considerations have so far indicated a meaning for "matter" which makes it not merely not "physical" but something dangerously like a bare potency. We turn now to a fact which, though equally ruling out matter as "physical" does not give any clear clue to what it positively may be: yet it has this special significance,—that here we have an actual modification of the problem by a cognitive demand. The fact referred to is that intellect does apprehend the material(1). There is absolutely no question of this: the necessity for it is undeniable, the arguments against it rest on a confusion. As regards the former point: the proper object of the intellect, we hardly need repeat, is the quidditas(2); but as natural objects differ from spiritual in that they are material, so the quiddities of those objects, if they are to be distinctively the quiddities of natural objects, must also "contain" matter(3). The principle is perhaps best seen from the first chapter of the De Ente et Essentia(4)

"Essentia rei est illud quod per definitionem rei significatur. Definitionem autem substantiarum materialium non tantum continet formam, sed etiam materiam; aliter enim definitiones naturales et mathematicae non different..." and so on. Turning to the second point, we notice that the arguments against knowledge of the material(5) seem generally to amount to the queer position that mind as immaterial cannot have that contact

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(1) V. esp. De Ver X iv and S. Th. I q 84 a i (Nardi "De Hom" §52)
(2) E. G. S. Th. I q 65 a 5 ad 3 dic(Nardi "De Hom" §65)
(3) E. G. S. c. G III 41, IV 35: S. Th. I q 75 a 4 Resp. ad init(Nardi "De Hom" §4)
(5) For these and for Thomas' answer as here given see De Ver. X iv.
(assimilatio or the like) with the material which is necessary to knowledge of it; the queer idea, in fact, as Thomas suggests, that "knowledge of the material" would involve the absurd conception of "material knowledge". We must, he urges, distinguish the form which is the principium cognoscendi "secundum esse quod habet in cognoscente" from the same form "secundum respectum quem habet ad rem cujus est similitudo". That distinction being clear "nihil prohibet, per formas quae in mente immaterialiter existunt, res materiales cognosci". And this is the position which he takes up repeatedly (1).

Now if we were working with only one sense of matter this position would contradict the emphatic assertion, to which our whole problem owes its particular nature, that materiality is just what is unintelligible. Thomas is forced immediately, therefore, to a distinction of known from unknown matter, and the principle of individuation will of course be the latter. For the moment we shall not discuss Thomas' account of the matter in which the known matter is known, nor shall we yet too ardently enquire into the relation of these two "matters". But one thing at least is clear - the natural equation is of the known res materiales with physical objects (2); it should therefore be matter as physical that is known. This is indeed, though perhaps not too clearly, involved in the very passage of the De Ente et Essentia (3) which urges that the bar to intelligibility must be matter as such.

(1) As in De Ver VIII xi. Cf also De Ver II ii ad 11 dic.
(2) The exact force of this and its consequent depends, of course, on the necessity or otherwise of giving to "physical matter" its "commonsense" meaning.
(3) Cap iii, ap Nardi Vol I pp47-8 quoted infra p5; We may note also that it is implied in the earlier quoted passage from this work (supra p47.) that not simply matter but physical matter falls within the quiddity, since intelligible matter is involved even in "diffinitiones mathematicae".
not just corporeal matter. And from this it follows that it is not physical, or corporeal, matter that is the principle of individuation.

The two "matters" are distinguished formally as materia universalis (or communis) - the matter that falls within the quiddity -, and materia individualis which is the principle of individuation (1). We shall now for a time ignore the first of these and shall attempt once and for all to understand what is meant by the materia individualis. Only when that is done can we again introduce the question of cognition and ask with what right this matter is regarded as inaccessible for intellect. We shall expect from the investigations just concluded that it will be matter of a kind, or, to be more cautious, in a state most certainly not physical, and very intimately akin to bare potency, even if not actually identical with it (2).

Let us enquire then whether materia individualis can for Thomas, be equated simply with potency? It would be easy brusquely to answer, No, on the ground that pure potency cannot supply any differentiating features whatever, and we must, if we speak of a principle, mean something capable of functioning. But it might be said that in this we were confusing potency "pure" as not being, in another respect "act", with potency "pure" as not being relative even to its own act. It is the

(1) See De Ver VIII vi ad 5 dic, S.c.3 II02, De Ente et Ess. ap Nardi I D 34 sq S.Th.I q3a3 (Nardi "De Deo Uno" §6) ib q75a4 (Nardi De Hom" §4): ib q86a1 (Nardi "De Hom" §61)
(2) With regard to the attitude here taken up towards the distinction of these two "matters", it must be made clear that it is put forward as a purely prima facie one, and as such it is, I think, fair. Its difficulties, which I have not succeeded in disguising, are considered in Chapter IV.
latter which could have no function and would be self-contradictory; the
former is at least not patently absurd. The distinction is a fair one (1).
The real problem of "pure potency" is wider than our immediate question: 
it is not, whether a potency can differentiate, but whether a potency not
itself differentiated can be at all. This we need not now discuss.

For our present purpose the nature of the "separate substances"
appears conclusive. The argument for the existence of these substances (2)
does not concern us: what is significant is the manner in which Thomas
supposed them to exist. They are he said, immaterial, and that in the sense
of matter which we are considering; since from this immateriality it is
inferred that there can be but one to each species (3). But though they are
immaterial they do consist in both act and potency - for only God is actus
purus - and does it not therefore follow that matter and potency are not
the same? Such, at least, is the explicit teaching of the De Ente et
Essentia (4) to identify with matter the potency of a separate substance
would be mere equivocation. The fact is that "materia et forma dividunt
substantiam naturalem; potentia autem et actus dividunt ens commune" (5);
and the manner of this division in the case of a separate substance is
the distinction of substantia and esse, of quod est and esse, or of
quod est and quo est (6).

The point of view seems quite definite, and, we may remark, ought to
reduce argument with those who maintained the materiality of separate
substances (in the manner of St. Bonaventure (7), at least) to a merely

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(1) Even if it should prove to be a distinction only for thought.
(2) S. c. G II 92.
(3) S. c. G II 93.
(4) S. c. G II 94.
(5) S. c. G II 95.
(6) S. c. G II 96.
(7) S. c. G II 97.
verbal debate: for Bonaventura's distinction of physical and metaphysical matter(1) would cover the situation met by Thomas' distinction of matter and immaterial potency; while Thomas in one argument for the immateriality of the substances in question(2), presupposes a definition of matter which confines it to the bodily.

But Thomas urges the issue as real, not simply one of terms; and in so doing he reveals a weakness in his own position. For what, in the De Ente et Essentia is the main argument to show that the separate substances are immaterial? It springs "ex virtute intelligendi, quae in eis est(3). We have already noticed Thomas' assumption that the material bars intelligence and intelligibility:(4) but why should that principle (suppose it to be sound) exclude from the purely intelligent and intelligible separate substances all that goes by the name of "matter", whatever be the nature assigned to it? Is Thomas merely in bondage to language here? No: apparently with reference to the position of Bonaventura we find him arguing(5) - "non potest autem aliquis dicere, quod intelligibilitatem non impedit quaelibet materia, sed materia corporalis tantum. Si enim hoc esset ratione materiae corporalis tantum, cum materia non dicatur corporalis nisi secundum quod est sub corporali forma, tunc oporteret quod hoc haberet materia, sicilicet impedire intelligibilitatem, a forma corporali". But this is, from his standpoint, clearly

(1) See ap. Nardi I p47 n2; cf Assenmacher "Die Geschichte des Individuationsprinzips in der Scholastik" p35 B. is anticipated by Avicebron in the basic identification of matter with potency. (Gilson: La Philosophie au Moyen Age: I iv §2) (2) S.c.G. II 50: "unumquodque...ex materia et forma compositum est corpus" For the argument that intellectual substance is not body - a point of general agreement - see S. c. G. II 49. On the whole question, Gilson. "Phil. of St. Thomas Aquinas" pp147 sqq. from which it may be seen how far the problem is one of language. (3) Nardi I p47. (4) The qualification of this which we recently mentioned but have not yet elucidated does not in any case affect the argument here. (5) Nardi I pp 47-8.
absurd. Consequently unless he is to make an admission (namely, that matter is not after all unintelligible) which would wreck his whole statement of the problem of cognitio singularium, Thomas is obliged to exclude some non-corporeal matter, in addition to body, from the separate substances, (if only in order that he may have it to include in the composite creatures); and this although the matter so excluded seems to be only nominally other than the potentia which he must retain. We are intended, it would appear, to treat "matter" as neither potency nor corporeal but as something between: yet whatever names we employ, until we succeed in giving definite meaning to this ambiguous existent, we must confess that the early lucidity of Thomas' position has suffered eclipse.

We may mention here another topic which would be very significant in this connection, if one could only be more certain of Thomas' position in regard to it. I mean the question of determination of species by genus and differentia. What, in an immaterial substance, can take the place of the determination by matter and form in the case of the composite beings? This question is raised in the contra Gentiles, (1) for instance, and it seems to involve Thomas in a direct contradiction. For, clearly unless matter (the generic) is taken as something positive and not as existing (so far as it is matter) only "respectu speciei" no difficulty ought to arise, since a relative matter, or potency, attaches even to the separate substance. Now it is as relative that it must be taken: "Natura enim sensitiva ex qua sumitur ratio animalis, est materiale

(1) II 95: cf S. Th. I q 50 a 2. ad 1 dic.
in homine, respectu naturae intellectivae(1) ex qua sumitur differentia specifica hominis, scilicet rationale;" and elsewhere we read that unity of the genus proceeds "ex unitate materiae sive potentiae, secundum Philosophum"(2). It does seem then that Thomas, in finding a problem here at all, must be quite definitely excluding from the separate substance a matter identical with the potency left behind. In point of fact, since the form (which of itself secures specification of the separate substance is of course not the specific difference in the composite substance, but the specific "content" ("ex qua sumitur differentia specifica") the situation for composite substances appears to me indistinguishable from that described by Thomas for the supposedly unlike case of the separate substance.

Our hesitation as to whether the self-contradiction here suspected in Thomas really exists, springs from the fact that in a parallel passage, he does discriminate the "matter" in question from materia prima in such a way that a merely analogical use of "matter" here is implied(4): indeed(5) he positively deprecates the use of the term "matter" at all. In so far, of course, as he takes up such a position the dispute becomes verbal and insignificant for us. Yet it will surely be granted that his treatment of the subject in the Contra Gentiles and elsewhere(6) does not suggest this solution, and in its absence Thomas' argument will have

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(1) My italics.  (2) De Ver. VIII xiv.
(3) De Spirit creat: a i. ad 24 dic (= Nardi "De Hom" §5)
(4) As in Aristotle's view: see Ross op cit. p civ. But it becomes even more incomprehensible why the distinction made on this score between the two kinds of substances should be maintained.
(6) eg. S. Th. I q 85a5 ad 3 dic (= Nardi "De Hom" §65): "genus a materia communis, differentia vero completiva speciei a forma, particolare vero a materia individuali". cf De Ente et Ess. ap Nardi I p 62.
the significance indicated. This would then constitute a third stage in the answering of the question "Is matter mere potency?"

We passed from an initial hearty "No" to a negative more hesitant because we began to feel a difficulty as to what that matter positively was; and if we now pass from doubt to certainty again, it is only to exclaim oracularly, "Yes and No together".

But whether or not there be a contradiction implicit in Thomas' actual statements, there is indisputably some confusion; and we may now go on to note that there is even an explicit contradiction between different statements of his views. An intention to distinguish matter from potency was, we remarked, clearly manifested in the De Ente et Essentia. An intention to identify potency and matter appears equally clearly in the De Principiis Naturae: "sicut... omne quod est in potentia potest dici materia ita omne a quo habet aliquid esse... potest dici forma". Surely this is a frank equation of the distinction of quod est and a quo est with that of matter and form, and of both of these with the relation of potency and act? And when we turn to consider more especially the equation of matter with potency we find it further specified thus: "Tam autem illud quod est in potentia ad esse substantiale quam illud quod in potentia ad

(1) ap Nardi I p5. (2) This is the text of Nardi I pp4-5. In place of the first sentence here quoted Mandonnet reads only "-tamen illud quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale potest dici materia". A glance at the context will show that the meaning is not affected; but Mandonnet's version gives, I think, a rather more natural expression of it.
esse accidentale, potest dici materia", but "proprie loquendo, illud quod est in potentia ad esse substantiale dicitur materia prima; quod autem est in potentia ad esse accidentale, dicitur subjectum." Now only the former is unambiguously potency and matter: the other has an admixture of form, of actus; it is only material and potential "respectu alicujus generis." But (in the terminology of this passage) it is precisely materia prima (as "potentia ad esse substantiale"), it is precisely that which is potency pure and par excellence which concerns us in connection with individuation. So far as regards this passage the answer to the question we have asked is therefore, Yes, and not No; and does not that expressly contradict the answer which we reached earlier, and therewith also the terms of the argument for the immateriality of separate substances on which that answer was based? We are then, confronted with a direct contradiction between the two accounts, in addition to the inherent obscurity in one of them.

Thomas does not shirk the difficulty. He attempts a solution, for instance, in that section of the De Spiritualibus Creaturis (1) which discusses whether a spiritual substance is a composite of matter and form. We have already dealt with two arguments on this subject (2) and the present one is much after the same fashion. It is, however, worth taking separately at this stage; since even if it does not really add anything to what the former passages may be interpreted as saying, it is at least more explicit in regard to the problem which we are here facing.

The definition of materia prima in the body of this article as

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(1) a.1. (=Nardi "De Hom" 95)
(2) Those of "De Ente et Ess." and S.c.G; see supra p. 50.
a potency "in genere substantiae", a potency "intellecta praeter omnum
speciem et formam et etiam praeter privationem"(1) is identifiable with
the position of the De Principiis Naturae. How then in this sense can
matter be excluded from spiritual substances? Thomas, as elsewhere, admits
that, if we choose to identify the correlative act and potency with form
and matter, the exclusion is impossible: but such language, he says, is
improper. So here we have also the position of the De Ente et Essentia
and the direct contradiction already mentioned. But at this point we get
a further distinction - present, we may grant, in the other discussions(2)
but most emphatic here: an ambiguity in the term potentia itself(3). In
one sense of potentia it exists in all created things, "separate" and
"composite" alike: it is then the quod est. In another sense it is equiv­
alent with matter, and in that sense it is confined to the composite.

How in the first place, will this distinction affect the apparent
conflict of the De Principiis Naturae with the other treatments of the
question? If it can be maintained we must, I think, allow that it will
achieve a harmony to the extent that matter may be equivalent to potency:
but in so far as the De Principiis Naturae asserts an absolute congruency
of the two conceptions, maintaining that all potency is matter, it goes
without saying that no agreement is possible. It will be best, then to
admit the contradiction frankly, and to rule out, for the moment, the

(1) For a possible significance of the last qualification see Chap. III p. 74.
(2) At least in S.c G. II 54.
(3) It must be borne in mind in what follows that the distinction here
made is not that of potentia as opposed to actus from potentia as =vis,
facultas (for which see Nardi, Indice Lessicale s.v. "Potentia": this
distinction goes back to Aristotle: see Ross op. cit. p. xxiv) It is a sub­
division under the former of these heads.
simpler position. This is not to suggest that it may not prove to be the best to which Thomas is in fact entitled: but the more elaborate view with its discrimination of potency and matter does give hope of solving the initial problem of the nature of matter consistently with the doctrine of the separate substance: and it is therefore only fair to treat it as the more adequate expression of Thomas' opinion.

Let us recall the exact situation. The problem is that while the matter excluded from the spiritual substances does seem to be more than bare potency it is also not corporeal matter: yet, as formless it should be only a potency for form, and the question of the determination of species may possibly swing us back to its identification with potency. How, then, is potency both included and excluded? Obviously there is no answer if there is but one kind of potency; but if we can establish a distinction of kinds of potency then no difficulty arises. Such is the importance of the distinction attempted.

Now it must be made quite clear that, whether or not successful the very fact of the attempt may be treated as evidence that Thomas intended matter to be regarded as potency simply: and, we may add, even if we conclude that the distinction cannot be made, that will not of itself prove that this potency cannot be the principle of individuation, but only that it cannot be so within the limits of the Thomistic position respecting separate substances and so forth. That however would for Thomas himself be equivalent to a rejection of the principle absolutely. We must therefore relinquish the idea that individuating matter is, for him, simply potency, unless we can say either that his
distinction of potencies holds, or that, at least, he was quite unconscious of its failure.

The difficulty which faces such a distinction is this: how can a potency as such, that is, without reference to its "act", be qualified or limited to one particular sphere? We are surely justified in demanding this discrimination irrespective of the act, in view of Thomas' treatment of the potency as a constitutive factor. His denial that it exists by itself is not a denial that it is an entity distinguishable from its act; and except as such an entity it can have no significance whatever. While therefore we certainly have no right to invite Thomas to produce a potency which has no act, we have no right to suppose that potencies whose acts are different are themselves the different, and that the difference of their acts is but the expression of this prior distinction. I do not suppose that Thomas would repudiate this statement: he would reply simply that, though that is certainly the order of fact, still, the recognition of the distinct potencies can be achieved only by the discrimination of their acts. As, then, to come to our particular issue, existence, the "act" of the essence differs from form, so their potencies, essence and matter, must differ, and it will be possible to ascribe to substances an immaterial potency without denying the merely potential character of matter. Now, whether or not recognition of potencies is only possible in this way, the particular conclusion at least is undeniable. But it is, so far, inadequate. For, again, as statue differs from marble so their potencies must differ; yet Thomas would certainly not claim that we are dealing with two kinds of potency in the latter case: on the contrary, both potencies here belong to the matter-form
series, at the foot of which is the pure potency of bare matter. How is Thomas to show that essence is not a point on the same series, while still maintaining that it is a potency?

If we suppose that essence is, like first matter, simply potency and nothing else, we shall readily grant that only through their acts can the two be discerned: but will not this discrimination by appeal to the act necessarily destroy the hypothesis that both are pure potencies? For it is surely absurd to argue from a difference of acts to a functional difference of potency, and then to assign to these potencies an existential identity as being each undifferentiated - for such they must be if they are not themselves acts. Now as a matter of fact the arguments in the corpus of the article which we are discussing do seem to be either mere assertions or appeals to the act: and in the latter case we seem even to have an appeal to the act as form in order to show that matter is excluded from the separate substance, although form as actus must surely imply matter as its potentia!

It will of course be properly objected that Thomas does not assert the existential identity, as undifferentiated, of his two potencies.

(1) It is irrelevant that they are prior to the explicit distinction of the kinds of potentia.
(2) Q.d.de Spirit.Creat a.1 (Nardi "De Hom" § 5)
(3) ap Nardi II p97 ad fin.
(4) ap Nardi II p98 ad finit.
(5) At least, a "perfectio intellectualis substantiae" which is "intelligibile prout est in intellectu" seems to me to be form and not existence: and immediately below we find Thomas obliged to fall back on question-begging assertion in order to proceed at all.

There can be no question, of course, of the propriety of speaking of the "form" of the separate substance when it is equated with the essence, and therefore with the potency in the act-potency relation. (See "De Ente et Ess."")
"Corporalium... materia est potentia pura... Relinquitur igitur quod materia(1) substantiarum spiritualium non sit potentia pura, sed sit aliquid ens actu potentia existente."(2) Only in the case of matter and form is there a pure potency: the essence which is in potency relative to existence has already a positive nature. This is the sole escape from the previous difficulty; and we may urge against it that it in fact repudiates a distinction of kinds of potency as potency altogether, seeing that there is but one potency which, existentially regarded, is nothing but potency. To such a charge there can be only one effective rejoinder: it may be claimed that there are indeed two kinds of potency (although, strangely, only one pure potency) if it can be shown that the relation of essence to existence is "discontinuous" with the matter-form series(3). Thomas must maintain in fact, that, while there are not two kinds of pure potency, there are substances which, though not excluding potency, do exclude that which is potency merely.

This problem is before Thomas' mind in a perfectly explicit form. "Ia quod est primum in quolibet genere", runs the hostile argument,(4) "est causa eorum quae sunt post; sicut primus actus est causa omnis entis in actu. Ergo, eadem ratione, omne illud quod est in potentia quocumque modo, habet hoc a potentia prima, scilicet a prima materia"

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(1) This use of the term "materia" is not that of Thomas himself naturally. (2) "De Sep. Subst." ap Mandonnet. "Opuscula" I p91. (3) It is not certain that even so we should be entitled to speak of "two kinds": but we give St. Thomas the benefit of the doubt. (4) Q.d.de Spirit Creat a.1. obj 25 (Nardi "De Hom" §5)
Therefore, it concludes, the spiritual substance has its potency from matter and so must include matter. To this Thomas retorts with a vigorous negative: for, he explains (1) "imperfecta...a perfectis sumunt originem et non e converso". On this answer we make two comments. First, that here, if ever, a distinction of potencies as such, as the ground of discontinuity, would have been effective; and that the absence of any hint of one is sufficient evidence that apart from such discontinuity it cannot satisfactorily be achieved. But, second, we must note the ineffectiveness even of the attempt here made to reach the distinction by inference from direct evidence of that discontinuity. Of course nothing can follow as effect from a pure potency as cause: the latter has indeed no separate existence. Existentially, it is but an aspect of the composite of act and potency, and, as "pure potency", is only separable in thought. Still, this "pure potency", this aspect of "potency as such" is involved in, though not related as cause to, every such composite being, and every "relative" potency thereof. How can it be shown that it is not so involved also in the supposed separate substance? This is a problem which the argument of Thomas does not touch; if it did, it would prove equally the "discontinuity" of all the sections of the matter-form series.

There is however, yet another endeavour to secure the particular discontinuity which is required. We quoted from the De Substantiis Separatis a passage which proved that the potency in "separate substances" was not pure but aliquid ens actu (2). In that context Thomas

(1) Loc. cit. ad 25 dic.
(2) ap. Mandonnet "Opuscula" I p. 91. see supra. p. 60.
continues to the effect that this *ens actu* is not to be regarded as itself "composed" of act and potency: for he clearly realises, what we have just urged, that then we must eventually admit the pure potency which is first matter. The potency of the "separate substance" is therefore an act which is nevertheless not the act of, nor compounded with, a potency. But we may remark, the essence-existence relation applies to all created beings, composite as well as separate. Now in the composite being the essence is surely the act of the matter-form series; and matter in this connection is of course not what we have termed physical matter; it is the "individual matter", which does involve a pure potency. But is there anything, except a confusion of "individual" with physical matter, which gives even a likelihood to the view that the essence of the incorporeal being will be an act which has no reference to potency? And no advantage can accrue from emphasising the idea that the essence does not actually contain potency: for may not that purity be claimed equally for the essence of the composite substance, or for any form seeing that as such it necessarily excludes matter in that sense in which it is antithetic to form? Or suppose again that Thomas is equating the freedom of an act from any included potency with its freedom from any combination with potency, the equation is inconsistent with his refusal to conclude that all substances are "separate". Our verdict therefore can only be that his position is a blank assertion against the probabilities. That, if made, it may not be capable of refutation will hardly be claimed as a proof of its success.

My own opinion is, then, that the distinction of kinds of potency is not satisfactorily achieved by Thomas. It is a natural
consequence of this failure that, if the doctrine of the separate substance is not to be surrendered, the principle of individuation should be found in something more than the matter which is bare potency; and such is actually the line that Thomas takes. It cannot however, on that account be securely inferred that he was himself conscious of the collapse of his distinction: other reasons may have moved him to adopt this more elaborate position (1). Indeed that he was unaware of his failure seems shown by the fact that that change is not accompanied by any repudiation of his potencies-distinction; although it is probably a needless one in the new circumstances, for here at last surely the discussion concerning the immateriality of the separate substances could be safely treated as verbal (2). But whether Thomas was conscious of it or not, at least the change of ground is now demanded if the discrimination of separate and composite substance is to be still possible; so that we may proceed to an examination of the expanded principle with the assurance that we are pursuing a logical, if not historical, order of criticism.

(1) See the criticism of pure potency as individuating principle, in Chap. III.

(2) In fact, of course, this position is satisfactorily attained only so far as the new materia does not tend to fall back into pure potency. See Chap. III.
Chapter III. The Principle of Individuation (ii)

The "signate matter" formula.

There is more than one statement of the new principle, but in all it is emphasised that it is matter in some relation with quantity or dimension with which we have to do. Materia signata, being non-committal, is the best term which to indicate this formulation; but typical of the more explicit expressions are such phrases as "materia signata sub determinatis dimensionibus existens " or "materia quantitati subjecta". (1)

Here, then we have a complex formula claiming to be, as the principle of individuation what, substantially, is matter, but claiming also, by the adjectival phrase, that it is matter in some special condition. It cannot fail to occur to us that this is the solution of the "potency yet not mere potency" difficulty with which we have been engaged: for materia prima is certainly pure potency, (2) and the materia of our formula is, as certainly, materia prima; (3) while in quantitative signation we have the required mean between potency and body, attached as we should expect, most closely to potency. (4)

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(1) De Ver X v. and S.Th.I q 115a 1 (= Nardi 'De Deo Creatore '§ 31) respectively cf. De Ver. II vi ad 10 dic. S.c.G.IV 81. De Ente et Ess. ap Nardi I p 84. (2) cg. S.c.G.III 69. S.Th. I q 115 a 1 (= Nardi 'De Deo Creatore '§ 31) Q.d. de spirit.creat a 1. (= Nardi 'De Hom' § 5): and, of course, De Princ. Naturae. (3) This is both natural and 'orthodox'. As illustrative we may notice (to quote a sentence very significant in another connection) "Materia...prima recipit formas individuales: immo per hoc individuantur quod sunt in materia" (S.c.G.II 59); or again, it is "materia prima" that "perficitur per formas naturales" (II. 76.). Especially enlightening is S.c.G.III. 97, where the 'materiæ' in question is avowedly "quae per se non est ens actu", though (in the same context) as functioning to constitute the individual it has qualifications. (4) A mean equidistant so to say, from both body and potency is in any case impossible; for it would have to be an entity substantially different from both extremes; but body and potency are second and first matter 'respectively and therefore 'contiguous', substances.
The meaning of materia being quite clear, we should at once enquire what the quantitative signification may be. This half of the formula has itself two parts,—that which refers to the "sign", (quantity, namely, or dimension), and the verb which connects this with the matter. Let us for the moment assume that we understand what is meant by quantity and dimension, giving them whatever "commonsense" meaning we like, and concentrate our attention upon the relation between the qualification and that which it qualifies. For whether or not the common-sense meaning of quantity be in this connection the proper one, it would be absurd to make a gratuitous assumption of the extraordinary, and only a discussion of the relation will give us any evidence on the point. It is, in fact, over the relation that the differences in the exposition of this individuation formula have arisen.

We cannot, consistently with the scale of our undertaking, make our own survey of the various reputable expositions. (1) We

(4) contd. See, eg the glossary in the 'Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy' s.v. 'Matter'.  
(2) A general reference may here be made to the good and brief account in Assenmacher, "Die Geschichte des Indivuationsprinzips in der Scholastik". In addition to the statement of the position held by Thomas and the Commentators, and the criticisms made by Scotus (for which see also Harris, 'Duns Scotus' II p92) attention may be especially called to Durandus of St Pourcain (pp72-3) and Suarez (p86 n 1.)
shall therefore assume the adequacy for our purpose of the summary
in Suarez(3) which supplies us with four different views, though
only two of them are of real significance. According to one of
these opinions *materia signata* means "matter as the basis of
quantity": it holds that "materiam signatam quantitate non includere
quantitatem ipsam intrinsice, sed ut terminus habitudinis materiae
ad ipsam. Est enim materia natura sua capax quantitatis, sed ut sic
non potest esse completum principium individuationis quia est
indifferens ad quanouque quantitatem, sicut ad quamvis formam;
per actionem autem agentis praeviam ad generationem determinatur ut
sit capax hujus quantitatis et non alterius, et illa ut sic dicitur
esse individuationis principium." So runs the account in Suarez(2)
of the view held by Cajetanus, Javellus, and Aegidius. It adds also a
remark that by quantity in this context we are to understand not
mere "mathematical" quantity, but, so to say, "physical" quantity,
that is, quantity "physicis qualitatibus et dispositionibus (affecta)."
The warning seems only to indicate, in somewhat unusual language,
that the matter as qualified, will be not "intelligible" but
"sensible" matter:(3) and since the former does not as such exist
in the world of natural objects, the remark does not affect our
problem.

The interpretation here described of the principle of
individuation is peculiarly important: for it is that which has
the authoritative support of the Louvain school. "The principle of

(3) Disp. Metaph. V Sect. 3. v. ap Nardi I p34 n 1. (2) It is the
'Secunda Expositio' in Suarez; here taken first as being the
orthodox view. (3) For which see S. Th. I q 85 a 1. (= Nardi 'DeHom'
§ 61: - II p429); also De Ver II vi ad 10 dic.
individualisation "says their manual "is primary matter as the foundation of quantity". (1) This manual we may best remark here, goes on to discriminate the functions of the various parts of the formula, quoting, (2) "cum duo sint, de ratione individui, scilicet incommunicabilitas et distinctio materialis ab aliis, unius horum principium est materia, alterius vero quantitas, et sic totale individualisationis principium est materia signata, id est materia sub quantitate, quae signum ejus dicitur, eo quod per ipsum sensibilis fiat et determinata ad hic et nunc." There are thus, it explains, two aspects of the individualisation problem; first, what individualises the essence? and the answer is materia prima; second, what accounts for numerical multiplicity within the species?, and the answer is quantity.

Let us first of all consider how seriously we should take this complication of the problem. To begin with it would seem that first matter, and quantity as inhering in that matter, are (if we are to speak of both terms as together constituting "totale individualisationis principium") separable only in thought. It is the total principle that functions, not the parts severally. First matter of itself cannot function, and quantity does not exist except as inhering in first matter. The distinction of function here made, therefore, - a difficult one even to conceive - is in reality quite ineffective. Indeed, if it were not so the principle of individualisation for sun or moon would presumably have to be first matter simply and without signation! The evidence accordingly does

(1) Manual of Mod. Schol Phil. Thesis VIII: v. sub "General Metaph" 66 28-9. (2) override the quotation
not go beyond our own earlier conclusion, - namely that you can formally separate (negative) individuation and numerical distinction, but that there is only one principle, which accounts for both (where both occur) in accounting for the former; while, conversely the non-occurrence of numerical distinction leaves that principle itself and the individuation which results from it, unaffected.

We are still left then, with an unitary formula and we return to the question, whether "matter as the foundation of quantity" is a fair interpretation of it. To myself it appears to be open to two serious, if not actually fatal, objections. In the first place, (if we take materia quantitate signata as fairly describing the entity under discussion) (1) this interpretation

(2) CONTINUED. Loc. cit. 622. The quotation is from "in IV Sent. dist. xii q l.a.i of "De Principiis Individuationis", ap Mandonnet 'Opuscula' Vol. V. pp. 35-6 (This work is given as spurious in Mandonnet. Assenmacher, however, op. cit p.) refers to as Erbach's as having recently argued its authenticity.) (1) "If...." but it is very remarkable that the actual phrase "materia quantitate signata" is not to be found in St Thomas; at least I have never found it myself nor is there any mention of it in Schütz (Thomas-Lexikon Edn. 2. s.v. 'Materiav') This fact is the very strongest evidence though it is not conclusive, that the orthodox view correctly interprets the mind of St Thomas; but it is astonishing that in stating this interpretation both Suarez and the modern Louvain School use a formula which is irreconcilable with it. As we intend to criticise adversely all expositions alike it becomes of secondary importance to us which is the "true Thomas", but it is only fair to emphasise that, if, as we suppose, St Thomas does not speak of "materia quantitate signata" the inconsistency with the interpretation here under examination cannot be charged to the philosopher himself but only to his less clear-headed champions. Our other objections, of course, will apply also to Thomas himself.
seems to give a really impossible rendering of the Latin. In the Latin we have the quantity in an achieved relation to the matter through a past participle, and to this achieved relation the translator gives a prospective force. The version is not of course inconsistent with all uses of the past participle (1) nor, more obviously, with such a description of materia individualis as "materia determinatis dimensionibus substantis" (1a) but it is absolutely incompatible with the combined past participle and ablative of the original, while even those other phrases may express an actual quantification. But further, the very passage from the Commentary on the Sentences which we have just discussed (2) arises up in judgment against Louvain. (3) For how can your formula be even divided in thought into "first matter" and "quantity", - as that passage demands - unless their union has already been completed in fact? It is true that the exposition in

(1) eg. with the dative, as "quantitati subjecta" of S.Th. I q115 a 1 (= Nardi 'De Deo Creator' §51.).
(1a) De Ver VIII vi ad 5° dic. (2) in IV Sent dist xii q1 al. v. supra p. 67. (3) Louvain, however, appears here as in the already remarked acceptance of the phrase "quantitate signata" to have attempted a conflation of the view of Cajetan with that of Ferrariensis (to be discussed shortly) without any consideration of adjustments.
the Manual makes the division one of materia prima from this same materia prima "as the foundation of quantity". But, once again, this is not what the Latin says; and the mental distinction in this case has no counterpart in the fact and cannot, therefore, justify a discrimination of function even for thought.

But let us suppose that the translation be a fair one, can we be satisfied to leave individuation to "matter as the foundation of quantity"? We turn here to the second objection, can we not urge that in so far as the modification by quantity is only prospective, the actual and effective part of the formula is limited to materia prima simply? This reduction is not self-evident and would be highly discreditable to the advocates of the exposition which we are considering. We shall not therefore decide immediately whether it is involved, but consider, first, why, if involved, it renders the situation absurd.

This is no lengthy task. Even if we ignore the confusion in the thought of St Thomas from which only a real distinction of "signate" and "first" matter seemed able to save us, even if we leave unchallenged the dogmatic distinction of participable and non-participable forms, there still remain several objections which, if they have any meaning at all, are unanswerable. Firstly, since we are dealing with a potency which is only relative to its act and is not itself the act of another potency there will be no positive element in the resultant which does not come from the 'form'. In so far therefore as the individuals of a species are
differentiated only by their matter a bare numerical differentiation is all that can be allowed. (1) That is not in itself an impossible position, but, apart altogether from the fact that it is discrepant with the epistemological problem as Thomas saw it, it is certainly not maintainable on any view which finds its infima species in 'horse' or 'man' or so forth. (2) Moreover we may well suspect in this case the attribution to 'matter' of any part in the result at all. (3) It is in this connection that we discover an indiscretion in the phrase "materia ....prima recipit formas individuales: idem per hoc individuantur quod sunt in materia" (4); and another aspect of the same doubt is illustrated by the problem, how can a pure potency be the differentiating element in particulars if "illud quod est principium individuationis in unoquoque impossible est inesse alteri quod supposito distinguatur ab eo?" (5) And have we not the

(1) It will be understood that there is here no contradiction with our admission, supra, Ch. II. p. (2) The "animae enim humanae non differunt species ab invicem, sed numerò solo" of S. c. G. II 83, or any other such passage, does not of course intend bare numerical difference, as the "diversitas et pluralitas animarum "of the context shows. (My italics). (3) Here we do question the admission above referred to. (4) S. c. G. II 59. (5) S. c. G. IV 10.
explicit assurance, "Dicitur materia prima unum numero, quia intelligitur sine omnibus dispositionibus quae faciunt differe numero, vel a quibus est differentia in numero?" (1) Again, if we press the description of first matter as being not merely "praeter omnem speciem et formam" but "etiam prater privationem" (2) (3) we not have an entity of self-contradictory nature,—a potency namely, in which is no reference to any definite act? And further if this is so, if the being of the potency is not after all in its relation to its act, it must somehow be per se: but, if there is one doctrine about first matter more certain than another, it is just that "per se.... nunquam potest esse." (3) This could only mean that it is nothing at all, and a nothing can have no function. Even if we returned to the position that it is relative to its form, it would still be true that, as per se nothing, it would per se have no function, and the reduction of our formula to such a matter would thus be as fatal as before. In conclusion we may remind ourselves that the incompetence of first matter is

admitted in Suarez' very account of the interpretation we are discussing. Matter in itself "non potest esse completum principium individuationis, quia est indifferens ad quamunque quantitatem, sicut ad quamvis formam".

If the reduction of the formula to mere unqualified matter is absurd, how consistently with the prospective nature of the relevant qualification, (that is, of the quantification) can that reduction be avoided? There is but one way. We must maintain a "tendency" to the quantification, something below the level of an actual quantification, but which is itself already actual as a modification of matter. The account in Suarez allows for this, and there is evidence in Thomas that could support the attempt.(1) The evidence takes the shape of an insistence that there must be a proportio between matter and its form; but we should observe that in regard to the present issue the form in question will not be, as we should expect, substantial form; but (however difficult the supposition) some infrasubstantial "quantitative" form: unless it be clearly granted that quantity involves, and is not strictly a prius of, substantial form. Perhaps it will be simpler here to give Thomas the benefit of this admission: we shall thus be saved the necessity of discussing which of the assertions of a proportio are revelant at this point.

We find then, that "oporēt... materiam proportionatam esse formae", (2) that "omnis... forma habet determinatam materiam:

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(1) This seems to be the line taken by Wicksteed. "Dogma and Phil." p.423 sq: q.v. for an excellent discussion.
(2) S.c.G.IV.33.
oportet enim esse proportionem actus et potentiae" (1): and again, (2) "non...possent materia et forma ad aliquid unum constitutendum convenire nisi esset aliqua proportio inter ea", and this means that diverse forms must have correspondingly diverse matters: and so on (3). But it will be readily admitted that all these passages can afford at best a nominal solution. They are absolutely devoid of positive information as to the nature of this sub-quantitative or, since we are equating them, infra-substantial diversity in matter. In fact the seeming answer they suggest for the problem is no more than a statement of the desideratum itself. The source of the modification is still undiscovered.

I cannot see that the position is in any way affected by the point that what, in the order of generation, determines the matter to this or that particular "capacity" is not the form, or act, of that matter itself but, as Suarez puts it, (2) the "actio agentis praeivia ad generationem" Our problem is not the genesis but the constitution of the individual, its object is static rather than dynamic,(5) a distinction which is recognised not only by Suarez in

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(1) S.c.G.IV.84. (2) S.c.G.III.97. (3) Esp.Q.d.de Anima a 9 add. (loc. cit). (4) Assenmacher (op cit pp4-5) properly distinguishes three aspects, (which he terms the epistemological, physical, and metaphysical,) of the problem of individuation. What we here call the dynamic is the physical as distinguished from the others. The problem of the place held in Thomas' theory by the two static principles we raise explicitly in Chapter VI.
his own thinking(1) but by Thomas himself(2). But the assertion that the modification of matter for which we seek is due to a generative agent is not only irrelevant but unjustified, if the matter as so modified cannot be observed in the constitution of the individual generated. There is, however an even more fundamental objection than that which we have put forward. Let us suppose the differentiation of matter, here claimed, to be effected. The proportio, as it is the key to individuation, must be understood as relative to the yet unindividualised form. But unless we are going to suppose that such a form is already the form for (let us say) this fire and not that(3) - and this surely would anticipate the alleged function of matter - the form in question must be a specific form.(4) But on the other hand the proportio of matter to a specific form will leave that matter identical throughout the species, and so incapable of explaining real sub-specific difference. A proportio, in fact, is by its nature useless for our purpose; and the significance of the view of "specific matters" involved is of quite opposite tendency, in

(1) See ap. Assemacher op. cit. p85n5. (2) S.c.G III65.Q.d. De Anima a 5 ob13°and ad13° dic.Q.d.de Pot.q 5 a 10(- Nardi 'De Hom' § 17)
(3) As is the case according to certain passages. See Wickawsteed "Dogma & Philosophy " pp472 sq.
(4) A proportio between such a form and its appropriate matter is certainly what Thomas usually has in mind. An example is,'De Princ.Nat.ap.Nardi I p25.
that it indicates the futility of the general opposition of form and matter as specifying and particularising respectively. What is required for real individual differences is rather an inequality or variety within the specific matter itself, which variety will as such have no 'proportion' to the (unchanging) specific form. But this so far from being expounded, seems not even to be claimed; although it may be that it is assumed. (1)

To crown all our reasons against sub-quantitative determinations of matter, we have Thomas' own word for it that such do not exist. "Quantitas enim dimensiva est quae primo inhaeret materiae." (2) and "qualitas non inhaeret substantiae nisi mediate quantitate." (3). Further argument is really superfluous. Yet it will be as well, in concluding our examination of the orthodox view of materia signata, to mention two additional grounds for suspecting it, two reasons less internal to, the view, so to say, but condemning it by implication. First, there are passages in Thomas, to be discussed at a later stage, which tend to place the function of individuation wholly in quantity, without reference to matter. Now such a development is understandable if the original formula included an actual quantification: but is it conceivable that it could have arisen (more or less unconsciously, as we must suppose) from a principle

(1) See Wicksteed op cit pp468-470. (2) S.Th.q 3 a 2 (= Nardi 'De Deo Uno '§ 5): cf S.c.G. IV 63 "Nam inter omnia accidentia propinquius inhaeret substantiae quantitas dimensiva" also (spurious) 'De Pot. Anima' Mandonnet 'Opusc' V p359. (3) De Ver II i obj 12° "for "qualitas corporalis," which is sufficient for our purpose. (Accepted in ad 12° sic.
which referred to quantity in purely prospective terms?
Secondly, there is some significance in the fact that Cajetan himself, one of the principal champions of this interpretation, was dissatisfied with it: "et ideo alium invenit dicendi modum, si tamen est alius(1); ait enim, non materiam ut est in potentia ad hanc quantitatem, sed ut virtute praebens hanc quantitatem, seu ut est radix et fundamentum hujus quantitatis esse principium individuationis". (2) I shall not discuss this restatement, since the parenthetic scepticism of Suarez, (which I have italicised) seems to me wholly justified: the significance of it lies, I think, simply in this; that, by doubting, it discredits the exposition it is intended to replace. (3)

Before we go on to consider the second important interpretation of the signate matter formula it may be as well to

(1) My italics. (2) Suarez: loc. cit.

(3) The Cajetan school of interpretation found itself (not unnaturally) driven to take refuge in subtleties which I am venturing here to ignore. I instance those given by Assenmacher (op. cit): an argument (pp55-6) to me incomprehensible, to explain how quantity may be both prius and consequent of the individual, (the difficulty here seems to me even more clearly against Ferranensis' interpretation; v. infra.) also a distinction, directed to the same end, between actual and potential quantity, - 'quantitas terminata' and 'quantitas interminata'. What does this multiplication of entities effect? One is reminded of Jeremy Taylor's phrase about "a doctrine of philosophy made intricate by explications and difficult by the aperture and dissolution of distinctions."
remove from our path the remaining minor suggestion. This I propose to do without ceremony. As given by Suarez(1) it is entirely useless. How far, even, it differs from the exposition about to be discussed may be reasonably doubted. I content myself with quoting its terms, which are that, "materiam signatam nihil aliud esse, quam materiam ultima dispositive ad hanc formam, quia non disponitur nisi quantitatem talibus qualitatibus affecta". Possibly our cursory dismissal does this view an injustice, but the risk is worth taking, in the absence of any aggressive advocacy.

We pass now to the other main interpretation, that which takes 'signate matter' to mean "matter as already quantified", we need not search for special evidence in favour of this interpretation, since it gives not only a natural meaning to the words of Thomas himself but the only natural meaning to the ablative, quantitate, admitted by his disciples. It maintains, according to the account of Suarez(2), that "materiam signatam quantitate nihil aliud esse, quam materiam cum quantitate, sed quantitate affectam: ex his enim duobus censent, hoc principium individuationis quasi integrari, ut materia det incommunicabilitatem, quantitas distinctionem": "Such was the view of Capreolus, Soncinas, and Ferrariensis.

(1) Loc. cit.
(2) Loc. cit. "Prima expositio...."
As with the Cajetan exposition, we shall ignore the discrimination of function between the two parts of the formula, since at least they act together; though we may remark in passing that once again, if pressed, the distinction might result in leaving to sun and moon, for instance, mere 'unsigned' matter as individuating principle, and that the power of a pure potency to confer incommunicability on an otherwise participable form is not easily conceived. But let us turn to the difficulties which beset the formula taken properly as an unit.

The first problem is, how to conceive the relation of qualification and qualified. The qualified, matter, should be materia prima and could in fact be nothing else unless it were the infra-quantitatively modified matter to which we have just objected. But no real conception can be formed of a relation one of whose terms is a pure potency, (1), a 'matter' which, as the 'orthodox' interpretation assured us, (2), is "indifferens ad quamcunque quantitatem." And in any case, the whole situation, since 'matter' adds nothing positive, must be under the control of the determinant, that is of 'quantity'. This, indeed is what we find. There are as we remarked earlier, passages in Thomas where the function of individuation is transferred, virtually or explicitly, from matter, to quantity simple and without

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(1) It is easy therefore to appreciate the intention of statements such as that in Q.d. de Anima a 9.ad5° dic (= Nardi 'De Hom.' 6 14)
(2) v. supra p. 66.
reference to matter. But not merely is this a rejection of the
official individuation formula altogether, a rejection which would
seem to involve admission of forms individual even without matter,
(1) unless we accept the alternative of purely numerical distinct-
ion within the species: it is at the same time an admission of the
knowableness of the particular; for matter is the ground of un-
telligibility, and here we are dealing with purely immaterial (2)
elements.

Thomas can hardly be credited with having intended this
result. In order fairly to consider his case let us therefore
assume that somehow the union of terms of the formula has been
achieved in such a way that a genuinely material element is
involved. Again the result does not satisfy: for will not this
quantified matter be identical with body? If so, we have already
suggested that it must be knowable, if materialia, which are surely
corporeal objects, are known (3); though we do not urge this,
since the distinction of known and unknown matter is a confused
one, and not to be prejudged (4). But in any case corpus, we
agreed, could not serve as a principle of individuation on
account of the unity of substantial form and the fact that it
is already individual.

There is one line of defence available here, parallel with

(1) cf S.c.G.II 52. (2) We may even say 'formal', if we suppose
for the moment that the individuating 'quantity' would be (like
the individuating 'matter', and as the words 'quantity',
'dimension', etc. suggest) a character of the particular, not a
relation between one particular and another. (cf. the 'Sed contra'
of S.Th.Iq 3 a.2 = Nardi De Deo Uno '6,5) Later we shall see
that Thomas' position is not so unambiguous as this. (3)v.supra
Ch II p 15 (4) v.infra Ch.IV. (F)
that employed in the former exposition of the formula. (1) We might urge that quantitative determination is infra-substantial. It is of no avail, of course, in view of our previous criticisms, to aduce the evidence of "proportions", or "proprieties", since the disposition of matter which we require is something fluctuating within the matter as "proper" or "proportionate". Thomas we have said, makes no claim for this; but if we are to be fair to him we must voluntarily concede such a disposition if one is at all possible. Now in the former case we could make no concession, since we were faced with a quite empty postulate: but here we have 'quantity' as a clue. Is 'quantity' a conceivable non-specific modification of matter? Surely we must say, Yes. It is at least thinkable that, while Plato and Socrates are specifically of the same matter, they differ from one another in virtue of their 'quantity'; though of course, not simply in respect of 'quantity', since all other accidents, so far as mediated by quantity, (2) will vary correspondingly. This is our last chance of saving the signate matter formula, and to myself it seems clear that such "quantified" matter "regarded as a basis for substantial form affords the nearest approach to a successful exposition that Thomas can make.

Still, it is not successful. We do not require to appeal to commonsense to decide whether anything not a body can be 'quantified'. Thomas' own language supplies our need. For instance, when we read, (3) "omne compositum ex materia et forma..."
est corpus; quantitas enim dimensiva est quae primo inhaeret materiae", is not the conclusion simply an a fortiori from the proposition that materia plus quantitas dimensiva equals corpus? It might be said, not very convincingly, that this example, occurring as it does merely in a 'Sed contra.. ' is not conclusive for Thomas' own opinion. Let us turn, then, to the topic where the need of infra-substantial modification is most urgent, where the demand for real difference within the species is loudest, where, consequently, the desire to find in signate matter a distinctive and efficient principle will be especially operative. It is from the discussion of the human compositum, centreing round the problem of the union of body and soul, that our most significant and conclusive evidence is drawn.

It is not proposed to discuss that problem here on its own merits. We acknowledge of course, as Thomas must grant, that strictly the question is not, consistently with the unity of substantial form, one of the union of body and soul at all, but concerns the union of a unique kind of form, a "soul-and body" form, with its individual matter. The peculiar difficulties, however, which this position involves, the many expressions which virtually contradict it, (1) are not in themselves our concern. What is significant is the relation which signate matter bears to body, on the one side, and to first matter, on the other, throughout the to-and-fro of conflicting phrases. Now where body is spoken of as individuating, quantitative signation is doubtless present, but
not in freedom from substance. Our interest is accordingly confined to the stricter statements of the situation. Where we have the 'total' human 'form' imposed on matter that is not body, does quantity fall on the side of the form or of the matter? There is every incentive to the maintenance of the second opinion, and yet the first is upheld by Thomas.

There is, so far as I have observed, only a little evidence, and unemphatic at that, for regarding signate matter as individuating the human 'form' and for attaching signation to the as yet(or, should we say? otherwise) uninformed matter. We find, it is true, this special case treated as exactly similar to all others,(1), with the conclusion, "in signatione enim Socratis includitur haec materia, non autem in ratione humanae naturae. Omnis igitur hypostasis(2) in natura humana subsistens est constiuta per materiam signatam": or again,(3) the materia individualis which is 'subject' to the human 'form' is explicitly matter "sub dimensionibus"; and doubtless other passages in the same vein might be cited. But on the opposite side are arrayed all the contexts where the question of body and soul is directly under discussion.

Those sections, we may remark in passing, while regarding both today body and soul as constituting the form assign the pre-eminence to soul very completely: virtually, "soul is form and doth the body make", "though the body so made is also form, the 'appearance' as it were of soul. Thomas is not content with the Aristotelian position that some body may exist apart from the soul, though it will

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(1)in S.c.G.IV 40. (2)"Individuum in genere substantiae dicitur hypostasis, in substantiis autem rationalibus dicitur etiam persona" (S.c.G.IV 41) (3) S.c.G. IV 81.
be only equivocally a human body(1): he holds that "anima illud esse in quo subsistit communicat materiae corporali ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum"; (2); the "anima intellectiva" is "materiae (which is not 'body') immediata". (3) This exaltation of the function of soul in man may be wholly admirable, but attention must be drawn to two points: first, that it will remain unsatisfying, however emphatically it is maintained, so long as matter is what distinguishes one individual from another; and second, that the immediacy of soul upon matter is surely inconsistent with the limitation of matter to be "in potentia ad omnes formas sensibiles", which occasioned such trouble to us at an earlier stage. (4)

For the moment, however, our interest is focussed not on the relation of matter as such to our human 'form' but on the question, to which of these, the matter or the form, does 'quantity' attach? The

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(1) A transitional stage may be discerned in S.c.G.IV 37. "Non omne corpus pertinet ad humanam naturam, sed solum corpus humanum. Non autem est corpus humanum nisi quod est per unionem animae rationalis vivificatum..."and Thomas never seems to consider the special difficulties which a complete dependence of body upon soul would involve. (2) S.Th.I q 76 a 1.ad5dic (=Nardi 'De Hom' § 9) (3) S.Th. I q 76 a 4.ad3dici; also ad1dic.(ap.Nardi 'De Hom' § 12) (4) See Chapter II. pp 56 sq. The phrase here quoted is from Q.d.de Anima a 2 obj 170 and passed in ad17d dic. (= Nardi 'De Hom' § 8) It is an extreme extreme expression, and in considering the limitation of matter we confined ourselves to those statements of it which were not gratuitously provocative. It will not be denied however that the restriction of matter to be a potency for form was intended to exclude it from relations with non-sensible forms: a main difficulty of the theory lay of course, just in this advance from the general to the explicit limitation.
answer comes with no uncertain voice. "Dimensiones non possunt intelligi in materia nisi secundum quod materia intelligitur constituta per formam substantialem in esse substantiali corporeo; quod quidem non fit per aliam formam in homine quam per animam, ut dictum est. Unde huiusmodi dimensiones non praetelliguntur ante animam in materia totaliter, sed quantum ad ultimos gradus perfectionis, ut supra(1)expositum est"(2) And if the (so to say) "post-individual" standing of the "dimensions" can be even more strongly asserted, Thomas does it: "Ex hoc quod materia constituitur in esse corporeo per formas, statim consequitur ut (3) sint in ea dimensiones, per quas intelligitur materia divisibilis per diversas partes ut sic secundum diversas sui partes possit esse susceptiva diversarum formarum."(4). We will not stay to urge that this "reciprocal causation" of the individual and its alleged principle of individuation is intolerable.(5). It is surely manifest that "quantified matter" as a medium between first matter and body has been repudiated. We cannot even claim for it an unstable and unsatisfactory existence, for

(1) i.e. in the body of the article. (2) Q.d.de Anima a 9 ad170dic (- Nardi 'De Hom' §14) of 'De Ente et Ess'.ap.Nardi I pp36-7. (3) My italics. (4) Q.d.de Anima a.9. Resp dic.(- Nardi 'De Hom' §14).For the general principle v. De Spirit Creat a 5.Resp dic S.Th.I q 76 a 6. (5) But(see supra p. 77 n.3.) attempts were made to meet the difficulty.
really it does not exist at all. As a medium it is entirely fictitious and can be regarded in relation to each of the extremes only as the other in disguise. Whether it be reduced to first matter or to body is unimportant, since we have already discussed and rejected both of these alternatives. It is only fair to Thomas, however to observe that the evidence of the passages just discussed points to a reduction to first matter, the less obviously futile choice. But from first to last there is a most regrettable absence of explicitness in the statement of the position, and the consequent movement away from matter altogether is equally unadvertised.

The vagueness in the first of these regards is very well shown by the use of the term *materia corporalis*, which is regarded as identical with the 'individual matter' of *res naturales* (1). For it is hard to say whether it is more fairly to be taken as "bodied matter" or the "matter of body". In support of the latter view may be adduced such expressions as *materia prima corporalis* (2) or others that occur elsewhere in the *Summa* (3). On the opposite side we should probably set a statement like, "Non autem minus est aliquid unum ex

1. eg. S.Th.I q 85 a 1. (= Nardi 'De Hom' § 61)
2. S.Th.I q 84 a 3 obj 2. (ap. Nardi 'De Hom' § 54)
3. S.Th.Iq. 66 aal. and 2 (= Nardi 'De Deo Creatore' §§ 20, 21.)
substantia intellectualis et materia corporalis quam ex forma ignis et ejus materia (1); and the suggestion of the equation of materia corporalis with matter already "sub forma corporali" (2) is to the same effect.

We turn now from the breakdown itself to the retreat which it inevitably involved. The interest of the unavowed and therefore, we must suppose, unconscious reformulation of the principle of individuation is twofold. First, it removes any lingering doubts as to whether the signate matter formula really has collapsed; and second, it helps us to understand what is the real problem (3) which has clearly eluded us, and what is the relation of Thomas' views to it.

The reformulation has, also, two aspects, - the introduction of determination by an individual form (4), and the correlative decomposition of the material element in the individual. The first of these aspects shows the positive attempt to state a substitute view, the latter shows how it may be quietly arrived at from the original formula. Now as it

(1) S.c.G.II 68.
(2) De Ente et Ess, ap Nardi I pp. 47-8.
(3) See Chap. VI ad init.
(4) The lack of explicitness in this connection may be seen in the continual uncertainty as to the relation of individual and specific forms, - the problem, which of them is the substantial form. It would be superfluous to give references to Thomas himself, and impossible to explain them in a note. But it is worth drawing attention to "Manual of Mod. Schol. Phil" Ontology §§ 29, 32. For the same difficulty in Aristotle see Ross, Edn. of "Metaphysics", Introd. p. cxv. sqq.
was in connection with "real" sub-specific difference, as illustrated in
the treatment of the human being, that matter most signally failed, so it is
in this connection and in the treatment of this same species of being that
formal individuation is most apparent. Now, we ask, if signate matter is a
fiction, does Thomas contrive in that context to speak of sub-specific
difference at all? What attitude does he assume towards barely numerical
and real difference in that crucial case?

Of course if Thomas were content - inconceivable though it be -
with a purely numerical distinction of human souls, he would not, perhaps,
feel the temptation to revise his view at all: I find, however, no passage
is which fairly interpretable in this way. (1). As we should expect, there are
places where a combination of material individuation and real difference
is attempted: but inasmuch as the attempt presupposes the reality of signate
matter it has been already refuted. Under this condemnation comes the
whole theory of debitae dispositiones in matter; the fact that these are
interpreted as "calor" and "humiditas" and "alia huiusmodi", instead of in
terms of "quantity" (2) may indeed surprise us, but cannot save them from
the fate which attended quantitative signation, in view of Thomas' doctrine
of the relation of quantity to other accidents (3).

(1) The most hopeful passage which I have observed is that in S.c.G.II.83
for which v. supra p. 71 n.

(2) Q.d.de Anima a 9 ad16 d.i.c. (Nardi "De Hom" 114) For an exposition
of the theory see Wicksteed "Dogma and Philosophy" pp 423-9. (Also his note,
pp.465-475 on the principia individuationis generally) "But", he concludes,
the question that troubles us now is how the dispositions of matter, in-
volved in the balance of the active and passive qualities, which constituted
the lower forms survive the loss of those forms and yet outside the
final form, and constitute the principia individuationis or the temperament of,
man" a "Yet, vital as the question is, it seems never to be directly treat-
ed by Aquinas. "This accusation of silence is almost generous, what impor-
tance has silence as to the how of the media between form & matter, when
as we saw, Thomas has denied I5c cit ad 5 d.i.c. - that, at the lowest & only
relevant level, these media exist at all? It almost seems that Wicksteed
(contd)
But here we must go on to remark that, if with signate matter disappears all hope of real difference between the individual embodied souls, the individuation of disembodied souls cannot be accounted for by any matter whatever, signate or otherwise. This is a difficulty which arises irrespective of the discrediting of signate matter, and in fact contributes incidentally thereto. To meet this situation Thomas borrows, but without ever, so far as I have observed, fully expounding it, or examining its implications, a doctrine of Avicenna to the effect that "individuation animarum et multiplicantio dependet a corpore quantum ad sui principium, sed non quantum ad sui finem" (1) If this means anything it means that matter is effective only in terms of generation, but that so far as concerns the constitution of the individual (which is our subject) matter does not individuate at all. (2a). Now even if we concede that the human soul is a unique case, as being, on the one hand, capable of existing "in suo esse", while yet on the other, it is not properly subsistent, since it has necessarily all the time that strange "aptitude and natural inclination to union with the body", - even if we grant this, we should claim that at least in one sphere particularisation depended upon formal elements. But

(contd from previous page) (2)(op. cit p. 421) is accepting the dull suggestion of "Nisi forte per materiam primam primum elementa corporea intelligantur" (S.c.G.IV 63)
(3) v. Supra p 76.

(1) "De Ente et Ess." ap Nardi I p. 56. cf. S. Th. I q 76 aa 1 and 2. (Nardi "De Hom" §§ 9, 10), Q. d. De Pot. III a 10 (Nardi "De Hom" § 17) S. c. G. II 79-81

(2a) So also, God as "efficient cause" of the diversity, solves nothing. (Q. d. De Pot. III a 10. ap Nardi "De Hom" § 17, p. 225)
how can we allow that the human soul is an exception? For in accounting for the "real" difference of individuals in this very connection we find Thomas urging: "non enim quaelibet formarum diversitas facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed solum illa quae est secundum principia formalia vel secundum diversam rationem formae; constat enim quod alia est essentia formae ignis et illius, nec tamen est alius ignis, neque alia forma secundum speciem" (1). Thus a real difference of particulars of all kinds is asserted, parallel with that of human souls: and the vague phrase with which Thomas then describes the differentiation of souls, as being, not "secundum principia formalia", but "secundum diversam commensurationem animarum ad corpora" (2), appears to me a meaningless compromise between formal and material individuation, which should, in the light of our previous results, be reduced to individuation by form. We have, then, every reason to suppose that objects such as "fire" must be similarly individuated, while the signate matter formula remains uninterpretable, and while Thomas does not claim, far less argue, uniqueness for the human soul in respect of the manner of its individuation.

We are strengthened in our view of the situation if we may take seriously that passage which says of the possession of a sixth finger by a human being, "ad naturam speciei non pertinet: et tamen ex parte materiae competit huic individuo" (3). Here we have an individual bodily difference which, according to the doctrine of the unity of substantial form, must be due to the same element which causes every other difference from the specific form in that individual; and Thomas, inasmuch as he wishes to repudiate a doctrine of forms individual apart from matter, fully admits this. But we find that in the case of the human compositum we seem

(1) S.c.G.II 81. (2) cf Wicksteed op cit pp 472 sq. (3) S.c.G.IV 41.
driven to individuation by the form, and therefore to the assertion of an individual form, and not matter, as the cause of the sixth finger, will it not be natural to suppose (apart from any difficulty of conceiving the opposite) that form and not matter is responsible for similar variations in other bodies also?

But we are robbed of the power to say definitely that Thomas comes over to a view of forms individual per se. When he has no further answer to make he can always fall back on the unfailing resource in such extremities,—the employment of language so vague that it reveals nothing. Thus we find our basic instance itself— the human creature— dealt with in cavalier fashion. "Personarum enim distinctio etiam in rebus humanis non attenditur secundum essentiam speciei, sed secundum ea quae sunt naturae speciei adjuncta; (1) in omnibus enim personis hominum est una speciei natura, sunt tamen plures personae, propter hoc quod distinguuntur homines in quae sunt adjuncta naturae." (2) Reticence, however, is useless where it is so complete: if Thomas cannot be more informative, must not his case go by default?

Necessity, then, compels, and the language even of Thomas suggests, in the case of the human being, a movement from the position that the individual is a unity of specific form and signate matter to the view that it is a per se individual form, with matter as the doubtful claimant for the function of bare numerical distinction. We added the suggestion that this conclusion, so desirable in the case of the human hypostasis applies also to

(1) My italics.  (2) S.c.G.IV 14.
other, and inanimate, individuals. The onus of argument lies on those who would deny this extension. The one thing now required to complete the change from the original theory is the discarding of matter even in its limited function. Now matter, to be effective for numerical distinction but no further, will be pure potency, - if indeed we suppose a pure potency to be effective at all: but we remember that, in the attempted discrimination of functions within the signate matter formula, mere matter, which is pure potency, conferred not "distinction" but "incommunicability". In any case, is not matter here superfluous? If the form is already individual and unlike every other form within the same species, the purpose for which matter is designed is already accomplished. There can be no use in bringing it into the question at all, unless on account of the dogmatic distinction of participable and non-participable forms: and that distinction is here impossible, if we really are speaking, as we have claimed, of forms already individual.

We have endeavoured to maintain the application of the above-described development to all "composite" beings alike: but, generally, where animate beings are not in question and the need for real difference within the species is therefore less urgent, it is the negative aspect of the desertion of matter rather than the positive assertion of form that is emphasised. The minimum change appears to be that from matter to materiales conditiones, a difficult formula which seems intended to be both the same as, and other than, signate matter(1). The connection, however

(1) eg. De Ver II vi Q.d.de Anima aa 1,2,4,5. (=Nardi "De Hom" §§2,8,30,31 respectively).
S.Th.I.q 84 a 2 (=Nardi "De Hom" §53)
between a large proportion of the passages expressive of this change and the special epistemological problem which is our subject is very marked; and it might therefore be a mistake to urge that we have here the beginning of that break with matter which is involved in the failure to secure individuation by it. Epistemological reasons can account for the change: why assume ontological also? Still as a matter of fact, Thomas cannot mean anything else by the phrase than the "principia individuantia, quae sunt ex parte materiae"; (1); and are not these in turn, the "accidentia individuantia" or "accidentia individualia quae materiam...determinant"? (2) This expression again would seem necessarily to refer to quantitas, - primarily at least, inasmuch as it is the "first accident" (3); and quantitas is spoken of as being in and for itself a principle of individuation, - "Habet...hoco proprium quantitas dimensiva inter accidentia reliqua, quod ipsa secundum se individuat" (4). So once again we have come to a purely immaterial principle: the qualification has taken the place of that which it was introduced to qualify; and we would, further, naturally suppose that this qualification was a constituent of the formal aspect of the compositum, - its "dimensions" being a character of the individual just as colour would be. It does not appear possible to interpret certain passages otherwise (5), and whenever there is any doubt it is only proper to assume this position.

(1) S. Th. I q 76 a 3 ad 3 dic (=Nardi "De Hom" §10)
(2) S. c. G. I 65 Q. d. de Pot. IX i ap Nardi, note on "De Hom" §4: cf also S. Th. I q 3a 3 (=Nardi "De Deo Uno" §6)
(3) S. c. G. IV 63 S. Th. I q 3 a 2 (=Nardi "De Deo Uno" §5)
cf the spurious "De Potentiis Animae", ap. Mandonnet "Opuscula" V p. 359.
(4) S. Th. I 115 a 1 (=Nardi "De Deo Creatore" §31) S. c. G. IV 65.
(5) eg. S. c. G. IV 81 Q. d. de Anima a 9. (=Nardi "De Hom" §14)
There is, however, another group of passages which puts forward an alternative theory. Again and again the principle of individuation appears to be reduced to mere hic et nunc, (1) and though the casual nature of many of these statements forbids us to regard them as conclusive, a different complexion is given to the situation when we find that the more explicit discussions of "quantity" support that view. For "quantity" turns out to be an individuating principle not in its nature as a formular character of the individual, but as a character of the world in general whereby the individuals have unique "position". Thus a passage already quoted to the effect that quantity is individuated "secundum se" goes on to explain, "quod ideo est quia positio, quae est ordo partium in toto, in ejus ratione includitur; est enim quantitas positionem habens" and much more to the same purpose. (2). The function of "dimensions" is that by them as medium a particular is "in loco" (3) and obviously the dimensions in question cannot be those of the particular itself, irrespective of its location,—they must be those of the whole spatial continuum, unless we are to suppose that no two particulars can have an identical shape. (4)

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(1) De Ver X i ad 2, dic: cf. ap. De Ver VIII xi, xii, xiv, De Malo XVI vii ad. 5 dic S. c. G. III 84, IV 57. S. Th. I q 57 a 2 ("Manual of Mod. Schol. Phil." Psychology 64, 68, Logic 98 will appear, to the attentive, illuminating in this regard.)

(2) S. c. G. IV 65 cf II 49, 50. (3) S. c. G. IV 67.

(4) I am not prepared, to say, however, that Thomas' language may not at times imply this supposition. It is indeed hardly to be avoided when the term "dimensions" is used as of something distinct from space itself; for since dimensions cannot be thought away altogether they must, in so far as they are separated from extension as such, be attached by the conceiving mind to particular extended objects. If, then, the supposition is made, it can only mean that location is not itself the principle of individuation but is the result of a form individuated by itself. How closely Thomas would thus, by what is, in its context, an obviously unjustified assumption, approximate to what I regard as the real truth of the matter, may be seen from Chapter VI.
We need not labour the difference between this and the orthodox theory: it is enough to say that in that sense (if any) in which matter may still be supposed to be involved, it is not the matter of our earlier consideration, it falls outside the particular and does not enter into it as a constitutive factor. The situation is, like that of forms individual per se, one which forbids any assertion that the particular is unintelligible, so long as it is maintained that the ground of unintelligibility is the matter which the particular includes.
CHAPTER IV. The Unintelligibility of the Material Particular.

It will be of advantage at this point to take stock of our position. We raised the question, in our second chapter, Why is it that intellect does not know the particular?, and at once the reply came, Because of the unintelligible nature of the principle of individuation. Since then, we have devoted our attention to that principle with results somewhat disconcerting for St. Thomas. Why is the individuating factor unintelligible? Because it is, or involves, matter. Matter and nothing else is what hinders our knowledge (1). It is impossible, therefore, to know the material? Not at all. We must distinguish common from individual (that is 'signate') matter: only the latter is unintelligible, and we can know the material in terms of the former, while yet the nature of the latter prevents knowledge of the particular. But what is this latter?

We found it was reducible either to pure potency or to body, neither of which could be the principle of individuation. But if we cannot discover that principle in any interpretation of individual matter, what relevance has the unintelligibility of such a matter to knowledge of the particular? The replacement of this matter either by individual forms or by the formal 'signant' elements of matter, whether or not adequate to the problem of individuation, should offer no hindrance to knowledge.

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(1) Here and elsewhere if 'knowledge' is not further specified, it may be taken as meaning intellectual knowledge.
The conclusion therefore seems justified, that the denial of intellectual knowledge of the particular is unfounded, and that our original question is consequently solved.

But let us be thorough. Thomas' epistemological position collapses, I certainly hold, with the failure of its ontological basis. But he obviously had no clear idea that that basis had failed. Suppose, therefore, that matter of some sort is the principle of individuation, can he even then maintain the unintelligibility of the particular? I believe not; and I propose now to give reasons for that belief. These reasons are of so radical a nature that it is not even necessary for us to decide whether individual matter is to be taken as potency or as body; but in point of fact I think we shall be able to observe a confusion of both standpoints underlying Thomas' arguments for the unintelligibility of matter, now one position, now the other being effective(1).

There is, however, a prior question which requires discussion. What, for Thomas, is the difference between common and individual matter(2) ?. Can they be distinguished as the intelligible from the unintelligible at all? What is the account which Thomas gives of common matter and our knowledge of it? It is immediately obvious that any distinction of individual from common matter as a part of matter from its context, as 'this' matter from a not otherwise distinguishable 'matter in general' will not serve his turn. If

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(1) See Chapter VI.
(2) See supra Chapter II ad.fin.
"matter in general" be known, the problem for knowledge presented by 'this' matter will spring not from the matter that it is, but from its mere 'thisness'. There may certainly be such a problem, and there is much in Thomas to suggest that the difference between common and individual matter amounts to no more than is here involved.

But clearly such a situation presupposes the rejection of matter as principle of individuation altogether: it is in open conflict with Thomas' fundamental assertion that materiality and not particularity is the bar to knowledge.

Common and individual matter must therefore be of different natures: we must be able to point to some kind of matter quite distinct from any matter that is known (directly) by intellect, if we are to have the required individual matter at all: and with a view to this we may first rule out the kind of matter admitted to be known. We are told(2)that since "omnis ... actio est per formam" and our human intellects have to wait upon the action of their objects, therefore "formae quae sunt in mente nostra primo et principaliter respiciunt res extra animam existentem quantum ad formam earum", whether these be forms "quae nullam sibi materiam(3) determinant, ut linea superficies, et huiusmodi", or forms which "determinant sibi speciâlem materiam: sicut omnes formae naturales"; though only the latter, of course, concern us in connection with knowledge of the material. It will be obvious that matter as so

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(1) eg. De Ver VIII, ap. distinction of "Singulare singularitatis cognoscere" and "Singulare universaliter cognoscere", cf X IV ad 6 dicit. STh 6 IV 40, STh I q 3 a 3 (=Nardi De Deo Uno 66).
(2) De Ver X 44v.
(3) The reference is presumably limited to sensible matter.
known is known only "secundum habitudinem quam habet ad formam"(1)
It is natural to retort that since this very principle of "omnis actio per formam" is used to deny knowledge of the material, of individual matter, that is, on the score of its falling outside the form,(2) and since even the common matter falls likewise outside the form — for, otherwise, knowledge of it would be identical in status with knowledge of the form — it will be impossible to distinguish the one matter from the other. But Thomas is ready for this emergency. "Sicut autem omnis forma", he says "quantum est de se, est universalis, ita habitudo ad formam non facit cognoscere materiam nisi cognitione universalis".(3) The distinction of the two matters is read, not in terms of the object which exists for apprehension, but of the object which exists in apprehension. Ontologically regarded, the two matters are, it is true, one and the same; or rather, only individual matter is at all. But that does not alter the fact that knowledge grasps only common matter, that is, (individual) matter in so far as it is not individual.
This being admitted, in what sense of matter can it be adequately known "secundum habitudinem ad formam"? First matter is certainly only so known, (4) and the briefest reflection must convince us that, further, it is only first matter, as pure potency, which can be satisfactorily known on these terms. The case for the identification of materia communis

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(1) In a sense this is not direct knowledge at all, and we might urge that in any genuine knowledge of materialia matter and form should be on the same level. In the situation here described matter is rather postulated than known; or at best it is inferred. Let that pass, however; the knowledge here is direct as opposed to "reflective".
c(3) De Ver X v. (which, however, needs care)
(4) E.g. De Princ. Nat. a6. Nardi I p 31, & 8. Th. I q 67 a1 ("Nardi: De Horn,
3a), in the present connection, ap. De Ver X iv, citing Aristotle.
with materia prima or pure potency, is unanswerable. (1)

But at an earlier stage in our discussion (2) we remarked that Thomas, in saying that materia are known by intellect must surely mean that the intellect knows actual bodily objects, corpora. Indeed this is only a re-wording of his statement, and the real problem is, how to distinguish these materia from material particulars. (3). Now it was in view of this admission of the knowledge of materia that we found the distinction of common and individual matter formulated as that of the known from the unknown. But obviously this cannot mean that body itself is common matter, not only because we have just identified common matter with first matter but because body, irrespective of any individual body, is a complete quiddity, and not simply the material constituent thereof. But, on the other hand, in so far as body is known none of its constituents can be individual matter; and body cannot be known, even as quiddity, except as quantified (first) matter. Such quantified matter must therefore be known, at least "secundum habitudinem ad formam", in order to account for our knowledge of bodies. This, if sound, would mean that quantified matter, likewise, could not be materia individualis: but it may be fairly urged that we are here confusing knowledge that the matter in question is quantified - which would take us no further than materia prima corporalis - with knowledge of its particular quantification in any given case. Let

(1) Consequently individual matter must be sought elsewhere.
(2) Chapter II p.48.
(3) This is the difficulty of Chapter I as to the discrimination of the objects of Sense and Intellect.
this be admitted: we may still put the old difficulty, what is there in any given quantification to debar knowledge, what is there in it as such that is either individual or material? The situation then seems to be, that if quantified matter is materia individualis, it is so as a result of its being in an individual and not as the ground of its individuation. We cannot observe that it differs from first or common matter except in so far as first matter is thought as independent of quantity, or rather (since materia prima corporalis is our concern) as independent of any particular quantification: unless, alternatively, we confine ourselves to its being matter, and then it will be distinguished from first matter only as a part from the sum total of matter, as being barely "this". The latter situation we have dealt with at the beginning of the present section: (1) with regard to the former we must say, either that quantified matter is individual matter, but that the individual can be intellectually known; or that since, as Thomas maintains, the individual cannot be intellectually known, quantified matter is not individual matter.

But if neither first matter nor body (to which quantified matter necessarily reduces) is materia individualis, and if, as we agreed (2) there is no other kind of matter available, it does not seem possible...

(1) Supra p. 97-8.

(2) Chapters II & III. Of course Thomas must say materia individualis is "something between"; but we cannot make any allowance for that, since we found that that "something" not merely could not account for individuation, but - which is the point here - did not exist. In taking leave of this problem reference may be made to Ross, Edn. of Aristotle's "Metaphysics", Intro esp pp cv, cvi for Aristotle's views on the "materialis universal"
for Thomas to make that distinction of common and individual matter on which depends his claim to knowledge of the 'natural quiddities' without knowledge of the particular. All matter must be in the same situation as regards knowledge: and the identification of common matter with first matter, which is matter in its one and only quite uninformed aspect, suggests that all matter alike is known.

The same conclusion is indicated by the difficulty which we experience when we try to assure to intellect more than a 'permissive' abstraction from the particular. For clearly, unless the intellect is such that it cannot avoid abstracting from the particularising elements, Thomas' problem does not exist. And for the same reason we may note as significant the class of passages which attribute to sense a mode of knowledge (in terms of form) which would not, ex hypothesi, exclude knowledge by the intellect.

Let us deal with this latter point first. Intellectual knowledge of form, we have learnt, does not permit of knowledge of the individual matter; for all form, "quantum est de se", is universal. The common matter which is known is known only "per habitudinem ad formam", and therefore presumably falls 'outside' that form. Now if sensitive knowledge, in so far as it is knowledge of the particular, has nothing to do with forms, there is at least no inconsistency. But that Thomas frequently, perhaps necessarily, deals with it in terms of individual or singular forms is obvious to the most
casual inspection. (1) Above all, we have the authority of the very context(2) in which intellectual knowledge is limited to common matter. The account of sensitive knowledge there given tells us that the sensitive faculties "recipient formas a rebus in organo corporali: et sic recipiunt eam sub determinatis dimensionibus, et secundum quod ducunt in cognitionem materiae singularis". Let us pass over the problem of the nature of this "reception", and ignore the question whether 'et sic ...' is not simply the unexplained assertion of the required conclusion. Mere obscurity may be pardoned, seeing that we are dealing with a sub-intellectual situation. But how can we admit the exact parallelism of sensitive and intellectual cognition? "Sicut enim forma universalis ducit in cognitionem materiae universalis, ita forma individualis ducit in cognitionem materiae signatae, quae est individuationis principium." How is this reconcilable with the principle that "omnis forma, quantum est de se, est universalis"?

If the individual form is really form, I do not think any reconciliation is possible, and Thomas' account contradicts itself. There is just one defence: 'individual form' we may say includes matter; "quia omnis forma corporea" (that is, 'forma rei naturalis') "est materialis et individuata". (3). Does this save the situation? If "material form" is not simply "form of a material thing" or "form united to matter", but, quite strictly, a form which is itself material, I can only say, that I do not know what that means. It will, at all events, break down that antithesis of form and matter.

(1) e.g. De Ver VIII xi ad 18 dic: ScG III 84; De Malo 66 (ap Nardi)
(2) De Ver X v.
(3) Sc G III 84.
on which quite clearly Thomas' whole case for the unintelligibility of the particular depends. But I think it more probable that "material form" means only "a (specific) form united with matter": for not only could we find passages directly suggestive of this(1), but in the very article which we are discussing, the parallel with intellectual knowledge of common matter demands that the individual matter be also outside its form(3). But then the form is in its nature identical with the specific form; it can differ only as being "placed". It should therefore lead to the knowledge of a matter one and the same in nature with common matter, differing at most as being 'this' and 'here': and such a difference, we decided(3), is not sufficient to constitute individual matter, within the limits of Thomas' position. Since 'universal' and 'individual' form, then, will give knowledge of the same kind of matter, whether common or individual, it follows that intellect and sense must alike know, or be unable to know, the particular. It is needless to argue that the former alternative must be chosen(4).

We pass now to the cognate argument that, intellectual abstraction being no more than 'permissive', nothing can prohibit an intellectual knowledge of all that is apprehended in sense. So far as words go, Thomas himself seems sometimes to urge this. "Intellectus cognoscere potest ea quae cognoscit sensus, aliam tamen modo quam sensus..."(5) But the

(1) Q.d. de Potentia IX i. "Hoc autem quod est in substantia partic-
ulari praeter naturam communem, est materia individualis..."
(2) The 'secondary' nature of the knowledge of this matter is clear from the language, - "ducunt in cognitionem". The passage is De Ver X v.
(3) Supra p. 97-8. (4) It is not easy to see how Thomas could give any account of sensitive cognition not involving forms. This lays rather in a confusion of the ontological & the epistemological. Even if all forms are in their nature universal why may they not be either universal or individual in their reference? For this question, see infra. p. 120 sq.
(5) De Ver X v. ad 5. die. And consider also the language of 'Manual of Modern Schol. Phil. Logic 69.
qualification of this statement is soon apparent. Intellect knows the same things that sense knows, but not in their particularity; although it is only as particulars that they exist. This qualification, however, does not rob the passage of its relevance here. We have already dealt with the difficulty of giving its full value to Thomas' intention while yet distinguishing as he demands, the objects of sense and of intellect(1), and it is proper to insist that, the more real this difficulty, the more are we compelled to regard what abstraction intellect performs as purely voluntary. We have now to bring forward some more definite evidence in support of this conclusion.

Let us then consider that section of the De Ente et Essentia where is discussed the sense in which matter is included in, or excluded from, the quiddity(2). Signate matter is not included, we learn, in the definition of homo, "in quantum homo est", but it would be included in the definition of Socrates, if there were such a definition. But(3) it is stated that the terms 'homo and humanitas are distinguished in that while humanitas signifies the specific essence "cum praecisione materiae signatae", homo signifies, in some that essence as including "designatio materiae", albeit 'implicitis' and 'indistincte'. For "sicut illud, quod est genus, prout praedicabatur de specie, implicat in sua significacione, quamvis indistincte, totum illud quod determinate est in specie; ita etiam illud, quod est species secundum quod praedicatur de individuo, oportet quod

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(1) Chapter I.
(2) Cap I. ap Nardi I pp 34 sq. Cf. S.c.G IV 81. S.Th I q 3a 3 (Nardi
(3) ap. Nardi I pp 40 sq. De Deo Uno § 6)
significet totum illud quod essentialiter est in individuo sed indistincte". It will surely be agreed that the conception answering to homo, equally with that answering to humanitas, belongs to intellect. They are but two ways of regarding the one human quiddity, now as constitutive of individuals, now as separate. Further, if we are compelled to decide which is more naturally the intellect's object we must say the former, that is, the quiddity as constitutive of individuals: "intellectus...humani...proprium objectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens". (1) Now the praecisio which gives the quiddity its 'separateness' must obviously, if the quiddity in both aspects is the object of the intellect, be a voluntary act. What, then, we go on to enquire, is the relation of the quiddity as "implicitly and indistinctly" containing signate matter, with the sensibly apprehended particular? Is there anything in this case which compels the confinement of the intellect to the former object?

It was implied, if not actually stated, earlier, that the inclusion of signate matter would make the essence particular. But here that matter is included, and therefore, except for the defence put up by the phrase "implicitly and indistinctly", the essence should be particular. Now the "implicitly and indistinctly" cannot be merely ignored; it is not hard to understand, for instance, the sense in which 'red' is none, and yet, "implicitly and indistinctly" all of the shades of red, determinand whose whole significance lies in its being determinable in one or other of them; and so here with 'man'. The question.

(1) S. Th I q 84 a7 (ap Nardi 'De Hom' §59 II p 421 ad init.)
however, is rather this: does the intellect apprehend the determinand in and through the apprehension of its various determinations, in such a way that the prime object of the intellect is some determination or other, from which the determinand is attained by "permissive" abstraction? or is the prime object of the intellect a bare determinand, knowledge of the determination being secondary, the result of a "reflection"? Thomas ought to maintain the latter of these alternatives; but the former is, I think, suggested by the passage under discussion. For one thing, it is only so that we have a fair parallel with the relation of species to genus. The abstraction involved in that case is emphatically voluntary, and the "indistinct presence" of the species in the genus means only that the genus is not determined to one species rather than another; all alike are potentially distinct and direct objects of intellect. But if that is also the relation of individual to species what difficulty is there in intellectual knowledge of the particular? Whether the intellect's object shall be species or individual will be a matter for its own decision. (1).

It is, I suppose, in order to block this solution that Thomas was careful to say, not that the specific name indistinctly signified the individual, but that it signified "totum illud quod essentialiter est in individuo". What is the force of this "essentialiter?" It cannot refer to specific essence, for that would be evident tautology.

(1) On this point cf also the(Spurious) "De Sensu respectu singularium et Intellectu respectu universalium"(Mandônnet Opuscula Vol V No.LXIV.)

(2) My italics.
The allusion must be to a distinct individual essence which, if there is any point in the qualification, is less than the total complexity of the individual thing. Now whether or not such an essence can be even supposed, consistently with the problem of knowledge of the particular as Thomas has formulated it, is perhaps arguable. But, we may ask in the light of our discussion of common and individual matter, what, in any case, could lie outside the individual essence? Matter in some sense it surely must be: but not individual, signate matter, the principle of individuation, — for how could the principle of individuation lie outside an essence which it has already individuated?(1), nor common matter, for that admittedly falls within even the specific essence. And there is no other matter. "Essentialiter", then, is absolutely ineffective; so that our conclusion stands, that the intellectual consideration of the nature of a species, rather than of a given individual of that species, is the result of a voluntary, a permissive abstraction; an abstraction which, however conditioned by the nature of intellect, is certainly not compelled in any given case. The individual, as an alternative object, is of equal, if not prior, status.((2).

We have dealt, in the course of the last paragraphs, with

(1) And see De Ver II viii,-"De essentia singularis est materia signata". Cf Infra Ch V p 33, for the individual essence.
(2) We might borrow the language of S.c 0 I 53, and say that the consideration of the intentio is the terminus of an act of apprehending (in our opinion) the individual. Such consideration will presuppose the apprehension of at least one individual of the kind in question; but thereafter we may please ourselves as to whether we direct our attention "inwards" or "outwards" - the unambiguous "difference of direction" which Thomas failed to secure; but harmless, because not made in terms of a distinction of faculties.
various considerations antagonistic to Thomas' limitation of
the scope of intellect. We are now to reverse the point of view,
and to investigate his explicit reasons for that limitation.
We are to investigate the grounds upon which he denies knowledge
of the particular to intellect - grounds, that is, of the
unintelligibility of matter - and we shall notice that they are
such as would exclude a sense - knowledge. This in itself will
amount to a demonstration of their invalidity.

There are, so far as I have observed, two such grounds
asserted: one is, that since only form is active, only form can
be known by a mind which is not (so to say) "self-starting"; the
other, that in knowledge the known and the knower must be assim-
ilated, and that any assimilation of the immaterial intellect
with a material object is impossible. I suggest, but without
attempting to enlarge on the suggestion (1), that the former of
these grounds treats matter as potency, while the latter more
naturally refers to physical matter as common speech understands it.
If this is so, it is only one more proof of Thomas' confusion that
he uses both arguments, apparently as interchangeable; and more
particularly it is startling that matter in the sense of potency
should be unknown, since it is identical with 'common matter' (2).
We should notice that the choice of argument does not vary merely
from passage to passage: sometimes (3) we change our principle within

(1) But see ap Chapter VI.
(2) See the discussion earlier in this chapter.
(3) E.g. De Ver VIII xi, and, in the reverse direction, De Ver II v.
a single context presumably as the deficiencies of the original choice become too apparent. But no steady movement from one to the other standpoint can be observed; although it is impossible consistently to maintain both, since the "assimilation" argument contradicts its partner in making no allowance for any exception. The order of treatment here followed is, therefore, simply a matter of convenience: it enables us to remove the slighter problem first, and so to face without distraction an issue sufficiently confused in itself.

First, then, the principle - "omnis actio per formam".

"Materia... propter debilitatem sui esse, quia est in potentia ens tantum non potest esse principium agendi; et ideo res quae agit in animam nostram, agit solum per formam"; (1) "quantum est ex virtute agentis; non fit aliqua forma a rebus in nobis nisi quae sit similitudo formae". (2)

There are several incentives to the maintenance of this principle by St. Thomas, but for the moment it will be sufficient to recall that it was in terms of it that the attempt was made to limit knowledge of the material to materia communis. (3) It seems, indeed, a strange application: it is not obvious how a similitudo formae can secure knowledge of any kind of matter, (the principle being supposed that "all knowledge is by a similitude" (4)); postulation rather than knowledge is perhaps the limit of our attainment, though how to justify

(1) De Ver II v. (2) De Ver VIII xi; and of XIX ii.
(3) De Ver X iv and v. See earlier in this chapter.
(4) E.g. De Ver I v. II i ad 6 Dic iii ad 1 dic, ad 3 dic, vi: ScG II 98.
the postulate remains obscure. But grant Thomas what he claims and the significance of 'omnis actio per formam' is undeniable.

But will not the formula apply to sense equally with intellect? Will not matter in so far as it is impotent to act upon intellect be equally impotent to act upon the sense-organs? So we might interpret Thomas' own words, "unde similitudo rei quae imprimitur in sensum, et per quosdam gradus depurata"(delightful reticence!) "usque ad intellectum pertingit, est tantum similitudo formae"(1). In this highly ambiguous statement, the answer to the question as to whether Thomas openly concedes our point or not, thereby admitting the inability of the senses to know the particular, depends on whether the similitudo rei is "tantum similitudo formae" in its impression on sense, or only as purified and attaining to the intellect. For his theory's sake Thomas must choose the latter, for truth's sake, the former: the language, I think, cleverly covers both alternatives. In any event, there is nothing to support the plea of "not guilty", (the plea that the formula can function as the theory demands), even suppose it to be made: though perhaps yet another uncertainty is intended for this purpose(2). This is the doubt as to whether the principle of individuation is 'matter' or 'material conditions' which are apparently not themselves matter(3). What they are is very far from clear, but it could be urged that as immaterial they can act upon sense and so afford knowledge of

(1) De Ver II v. (2) De Ver II v. obj 2 and ad 2 dic. (3) Eq De Ver II v X i.
then
the particular. But why should they not operate upon intellect
to a like effect? Because apparently they are material as well
as immaterial. This happy ambiguity allows them to supply sense
with knowledge in virtue of being that, not being which they
can supply no knowledge to intellect. Such a position needs
only be stated to be refuted: "similitudines rerum recipiuntur
in organis corporalibus] materialiter, id est cum materialibus
conditionibus quamis absque materia, ratione cujus singularia
cognoscunt," (that is, the faculties affixed to the organs know).
"Materialiter... quamis absque materia" is surely a poor subtlety.

But in any case "materialiter", and therefore the explanatory
"cum materialibus conditionibus", is claimed only on account of
the difference in nature between intellect and sense, inasmuch as
the latter apprehends by the instrumentality of material organs. So
another passage (2) in speaking of sense-knowledge says, "sed per
accidens contingit ut sit similitudo etiam materialium dispositionum,
in quantum recipit in organo materiali, quia materialiter recipit,
et sic retinentur aliqueae conditiones materiae. Ex quo contingit quod sensus et imaginatio singularia cognoscunt". Now however much
may be said in favour of that distinction of sense from intellect,
it is totally irrelevant in the present argument, which is based
not on the nature of the knowing subject, but entirely on the
'operation' of the object. Indeed one is amazed, on reflection, that
Thomas ever attempted to support himself in this regard on the

(1) It is worth remarking that De Ver XIX ii qualifies this
(2) De Ver VIII xi. with a quodammodo!
principle of the impotence of matter. One would have thought it obvious that only a principle which utilised the difference on the subject side could hope for success (1); and for this reason the formula of 'assimilation' or 'union' is much more important (2).

(1) Especially if we accept Cajetan, Comm. on S. Th I q 14 a 1 ap Nardi I p 160, - Cognoscens autem recipiens cognitum..." etc.

(2) There is therefore nothing surprising in the silent transition from the one argument to the other which sometimes occurs, except the rapidity with which it may be achieved. That may be taken as showing that Thomas was not himself aware of his change of ground. We may quote, - it would be held hard to find a more compact instance - "species autem quae sunt acceptae a sensibus, sunt similes rebus secundum hoc tantum quod res agere possunt, et hoc est secundum formam. Et ideo per eas non possunt singulare cognosci, nisi forte in quantum recipiuntur in alia potentia utente organo corporali, in qua quodammodo sunt materialiter... In intellectu vero, qui est omnino a materia immutis, non potest esse nisi principium universalis cognitionis, nisi forte per quandam reflexionem..."

We may remark here that this 'actio per formam' theory is only the most prominent instance of an argument based on the nature of agency in the present connection; note also the dogmas of "agens honorabilius est patiente et acto" and of the necessity that agent and patient should be "unius sed..." But these are used quite casually, and contain nothing not better considered in the argument just discussed, or in that of "assimilation". They do suggest, however, that mediaeval doctrines concerning agency might supply an interesting topic in themselves. Cf. also the radical dogma that "Like causes like".
The argument based on the assimilation theory of knowledge must of course presuppose the immateriality of intellect, and we shall assume this to be proved(1). It is an argument which could be regarded as but an exemplification of the general principle that agent and patient must be "unius generis"(2): but that principle is itself one which facts will not easily be found to justify. It is better therefore to consider the assimilation theory as standing in its own right, and we shall treat it as so standing, without enquiring into the grounds for supposing it at all(3).

There is nothing casual about Thomas' acceptance of this theory. The commendably non-committal account of knowledge as "quidam contactus cognoscentis et cognoscibilis"(4) he expressly rejects. "Non sufficit ad cognitionem contactus inter cognoscens et cognoscibile; sed oportet quod cognoscibile cognoscenti uniatur ut forma, vel per essentiam suam, vel per similitudinem suam"(5). And we should note that that assertion is here bound up with a deliberate refusal to see in the cognitive relation one of agent and patient at all(6): a refusal which, unless important reservations are made, will rule out immediately any ground of the unknowableness of matter hitherto remarked. This result, while it would show a lamentable inconsistency in Thomas, would also certainly justify us in laying every emphasis upon his present argument. The emphasis justified likewise by sheer quantity of evidence, but a few typical passages must suffice us here.

(1) See for instance S.Th I q 14a 1 ("Nardi De Deo Uno" q 37, with which is printed Cajetan's commentary).
(2) De Ver VIII ix. (3) But see Chapter VI.
(6) A reference is given, ap. loc. cit., to De Ver VIII vi.
Thus we find; "omnis...cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognita"(1). "Intellectum est perfectio intelligentis: secundum enim hoc intellectus perfectus est, quod actu intelligit, quod quidem est per hoc, quod est unum cum eo quod intelligitur"(2). "Intellectus in actu et intelligible in actu sunt unum sicut sensus in actu et sensibile in actu"(3). "Omne...intellectum, inquantum intellectum, oportet esse in intelligent"(4): and of course the famous Aristotelian principle, - "est enim anima quodammodo omnia, secundum quod est sentiens et intelligens"(5). We must be quite clear, however, that Thomas does not intend an actual union of the external object with the knowing faculty: the absurdity of this would be especially patent in the case of sense-knowledge. The "principium cognitionis" is a "similitudo cogniti" which 'informs' the "potentia cognoscitiva"(6). So "res exterior intellecta a nobis in intellectu nostro non existit secundum propriam naturam, sed oportet quod species ejus sit in intellectu nostro per quam fit intellectus in actu"(7).

It is possible that this qualification, which must certainly be included in any statement of Thomas' position, removes all that is distinctive in the idea of assimilation. But whether or not that be the case, it does not seem possible to dispense with it; and we should remark further that it has one positive virtue, it provides

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(1) De Ver I i. cf S. c G I 53. (2) S. c G I 48. cf De Ver VIII. i.
(3) S. c G II 59. (4) S. c G IV 11. (5) Q. d. de Anima a 13 Resp dic (=Nardi De Hom. § 32): S. Th I q 14 a1 (=Nardi 'De Deo Uno' § 37) where is given the reference to Aristotle 'De Anima' III. As a further indication of the pre-eminence of the 'assimilation' formula may be cited the treatment in the spurious "De Sensori Respectu Singularium et Intellectu respectu Universalium", Mandronnet 'Opuscula' Vol V NoLXIV.
(6) De Ver II vi. (7) S. c G I 53.
Thomas with a possible escape from an immediate embarrassment. For while the nature of the cognitive species may be debateable, the external particular at least is unambiguously material. The direct union, then, which would be necessary, (were the qualification not made) in order to give sense a knowledge of the particular, must be impossible if sense itself is not unambiguously material. But apart from the natural obscurity of that conception, there would still be nothing gained even were it realised: for Thomas bases himself upon the doctrine of Aristotle, that "quae non recipiunt formas nisi materialiter, nullo modo sunt cognoscitiva" (1). To repudiate that doctrine would be to go back to Empedocles and the Naturales. Besides, if we wished to be consistent we should then have to admit that "nulla ratio esset quae res quae materialiter extra animam subsistunt, cognitio carerent: puta, si anima igne cognoscit ignem, et ignis etiam qui est extra animam, ignem cognosceret" (2).

It is, then, quite clear that a mere union of material things does not establish a cognitive relation. And even if it could do so, there is another reason why, the intellect being immaterial, sense should not be straightforwardly material nor endowed with unambiguous "material receptivity". This reason is the maintenance by Thomas of the "ladder of abstraction" view of knowledge, itself an exemplification, if a mistaken one, of that insistence on 'continuity' which pervades the whole of his thought. For on the "ladder of abstraction"

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(1) S. Th. I q 84 a 2 (ap. Nardi 'De Hom' § 53)
(2) Loc cit.
sense is required as a mediator between immaterial intellect and material object. We have to account for a gradual dematerialisation of the sensible object, we need a doctrine of "degrees of materiality", and apart from sense(1) we have no medium with which to work. "Species...in ipsa re sensibilis habet esse maxime materiale, in intellectu autem summe spiritucale; unde oportet quod in hanc spiritualitatem transeat mediantibus quibusdam gradibus, utpote quia in sensu habet spiritualius esse quam in re sensibilis, in imaginatione autem adhuc spiritualius quam in sensu, et sic deinceps ascendendo"(2).

This is in perfect harmony with Thomas' original qualification, that not the object itself but a species is united with the cognitive faculty. But we can no longer postpone the question, - what is the nature of that species ? So far as the qualification itself went, there was nothing to preclude the species sensibilis from being material as really as the species intelligibilis must be immaterial. But for the sake of the 'ladder' we find that that possibility must now definitely be given up. "Similitudo corporalis, quae requiritur ad operationem imaginationis et sensus" is "immaterialior quam

(1) and imagination: but the point is that the process must begin with sense, and sense is our present concern. It must be said also that it is not always clear whether imagination constitutes a distinct rung in the ladder (as in the passage immediately quoted) or whether it may be covered by a wide use of 'sense'.

(2) De Ver. XIX i. For the "degrees of materiality" within the range of sensitive functions see Q.d. de Anima a 13 (=Nardi 'De Hom' §22.)
ipsum corpus"(1). Now if knowledge involves 'assimilation' or union of knower and known, and if the party to the union on the side of the known is not material even in the case of sense, and if, lastly, matter is the principle of individuation, - how can even sense possess knowledge of the particular? Does not the assimilation theory exclude such knowledge from sense as effectively as from intellect, and therefore, deny it to us altogether?

It is at this point that the already-noted(2) attribution of individuation to certain "material conditions", rather than to matter, becomes of the greatest importance. Thomas is entitled here, - as, strictly, he was not entitled in the case of the "omnis actio per formam" theory - to the use of this distinction as a means of avoiding the fatal conclusion which we have just drawn. But if the attempt is legitimate, is it also successful?

The intention is very easily understood: if "material conditions" rather than matter be the principle of individuation, then it will be possible to secure knowledge of the particular to sense if there be reception of these conditions, despite the exclusion of matter itself. This is exactly the line taken. "Sensus autem recipit species sine materia, sed tamen cum conditionibus materialibus: intellectus autem etiam a conditionibus materialibus species depuratas recipit"(3); or, more fully, "Unus enim gradus est secundum quod in anima sunt res sine propriis materiis, sed tamen secundum singularitatem et conditiones individuales, quae consequuntur materiam; et iste est gradus sensus, qui est susceptivus specierum individuialium sine materia, sed tamen in

(1) De Ver XIII iv ad 6 dic (2) Supra, Chap III ad Fin. (3) De Ver II ii.
organo corporali. Altior autem et perfectissimus immaterialitatis gradus est intellectus, qui recipit species omnis a materia et conditionibus materiae abstractas, et absque organo corporali"(1).

The short answer to this evasion, however, wholly irrespective of any enquiry as to the exact nature of these "material conditions" has been given already(2). The conception of degrees of materiality or immateriality is simply inadmissible: it is an idea as primitive as the notion that the paler a colour is, the less it is a colour. But obviously a colour however pale is still a colour, and however tenuous be a matter it is still material; in or any other entity. A middle is excluded, and conversely, the Thomist position is nothing else than a violation of the law of excluded middle.(3) These "material conditions" then are themselves either material or immaterial. If the former, we are back to the old position; if the latter, what will prevent an intellectual knowledge of the particular? The truth is, we noted, that they are treated as being either, according as reception into sense or exclusion from intellect is under consideration. The reception itself, though bluntly stated in one passage, quoted earlier, to be "materialiter"(4), is, according to another passage, only "quodammodo materialiter"(5). A third passage has the modest phrase "non omnino immaterialiter"(6): and elsewhere it is laid down that though, in the case of the most primitive sense, (touch), there is a "materialis immutatio" in the sentient creature, even there the species is received in

(1) Q. d. de Anima ais(Nardi de Hom. §32): cf also De Ver II v. XXIII i, supra p. 11-2. VIII ix etc.
(2) This of course applies equally to any doctrine of "degrees of reality" if that means exactly what it says. (4). Supra p. De ver II v. (5) De Ver XIX ii. (6) De Ver XXIII i.
sense "immaterialiter". (1). Further investigation might reveal even subtler variations, but this will surely be sufficient to show how marked is the Janus-nature of these "material conditions". And to be a Janus is, in the present case, to be nothing at all.

Once again, then, the theory which is to explain why sense can know, while intellect is ignorant of, the particular breaks down. The knowledge or the ignorance belongs to both equally. But now we must comment upon a very strange fact: namely, that the principle just discussed, though so often avowed by St. Thomas, is no less often repudiated in the only sense in which it has any significance. The contradiction is absolute.

In stating the principle we drew attention to the qualification that not the external object but a similitude of it was united with and 'informed' the cognitive faculty; and we wondered whether this qualification might not involve the supersession of the principle itself.

Our doubt was justified. It will be remembered how, when faced with the intellectual knowledge of "common matter" Thomas maintained that we must distinguish the similitude 'secundum esse quod habet in cognoscendo' and 'secundum respectum quern habet ad rem cujus est similitudo'. This distinction he insists upon, over and over again. The 'likeness' involved is not that of 'convenientia in ipsa natura', or 'conformitas'; but one of repraesentatio. "Hoc modo aliquid cognoscitur secundum

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(1) Q.d. de Anima a13. (=Nardi De Hom 532); and cf. the "non materialiter sed magnis immaterialiter" of the general statement in S. Th Iq84a2 Resp. dic (ap. Nardi De Hom 53). (2) Supra p. 47-8. (3) De Ver X iv. (4) De Ver II iii, v. cf. III, obj 2° and ad 2° dic, obj 3° and ad 3° dic, v. De Ver II v adds "sicut per statuum aurream duceur in memoriam aliquid hominis", - an inadequate enough illustration, as will be discovered if we attempt to apply it to the principle involved in Thomas' position & stated in De Ver III i ad 3 dic, "quanto est similius.... Cognoscere facit..."
This is the plea which defends the supra-human knowledge of the material, involving, in this case, knowledge of the particular, - "Constat enim quod forma lapidis in fomine anima est longe alterius natura quam forma lapidis in materia": so the immateriality of the forms in the intellect does not prevent their "assimilation" to things in respect of matter as well as of form.(2). Surely it will be admitted that, whether or not there is any justification for the term 'assimilation' in such a context, the theory is one which can never perform the function to which we recently saw Thomas applying it. It is true of course that in so far as the 'representation' standpoint is admitted our enquiries as to the nature of the similitudo in itself, whereby we wrecked the previous position, become irrelevant: representation would seem to supply a very satisfactory escape. But Thomas cannot use the advantage of two mutually exclusive theories to support each the other. Left to itself the crude assimilation theory collapsed; left to itself this latter position is also ineffective. For why, if 'representation' be all that is needed, and if (as is suggested) the ability to 'represent' is unaffected by the immateriality, (or for Thomas, degree of immateriality) of the similitude - why can the intellect not know the particular? Why does it stop short at "common matter"? The only

(1) De Ver II v. (2) De Ver VIII xi ad 3 dic(for the angels) and (for God's knowledge) all the passages cited supra, in the general statement of the "representation" position.

Additional references for the new theory are ScG I 36, II 25(for which cf. De Malo XVI vi ans to arg 1° for the negative). Th I q 84 ai (=Nardi 'De Hom' §53), S. Th I q 86 ai ad 2 dic (=Nardi De Hom §77).
answer attempted, in the articles expressly dealing with this problem(1), is in terms of the principle, "omnis actio est per-
formam", the futility of which for its purpose we have already expounded.

It will be appropriate here(2) to make a few general remarks upon this contradiction in the thought of St. Thomas, which is so
direct and fundamental and yet so unconfessed. It is, we must
suppose rather the cause than the effect of the particular epistem-
ological difficulties which we are discussing. It is otherwise
incomprehensible how Thomas failed to see its nature clearly and to
remedy it. What we have is, in fact, something that may be termed
a confusion of the mind’s 'content' with its 'intent'. From this
confusion Thomas has verbally shaken himself free, in his emphasis
on 'representation' as against 'identity of nature', but really
he is still subject to it, seeing that he takes the species in its
aspect of 'intent'(that is, as 'representative') to be an image of
the represented. It is very eloquent of this confusion that though
Thomas opposes representation to conformitas of nature in a passage
already cited(3), he elsewhere (4) opposes the idea of 'conformity'
equated with 'representation') to that of 'conjunction'(involving
identity of nature). This hopeless laxity of vocabulary surely
mirrors the state of his mind. Only by a complete break with the

(1) De Ver X iv and v.
(2) Rather than in Chapter VI. There we are concerned to explain the
the confusions underlying our problem as a whole, and on the side of
epistemology the culprit, in that connection, is the 'assimilation'
theory as such, not the chaos consequent upon Thomas' implicit repud-
iation of it. (3) De Ver II v ad 5 dic.
(4) S. c 3 I 47.
whole conception of 'images', a conception which is simply the
legacy of the crude assimilation theory already formally surrendered,
do we get the distinction of 'content' and 'intent' quite clear, as
something akin to the distinction of idea as 'psychical
and idea as 'meaning'. Thomas "anti-assimilation" statements are
the outriders of an advance to a position still barely discerned.

We have suggested that the confusion is focussed in the
treatment of the species intentionalis, which, though primarily a quo,
an instrument of apprehension(1), is also, in a secondary sense quod,
a potential object(2). The difficulty is to prevent the secondary aspect
from usurping the place of the primary one, as in a quite unqualified
assimilation theory it must do. This difficulty is not felt in the case
of sense, indeed: but in the case of intellect it is very marked; for
except by replacing the quo aspect by the quod it is, as we found,(3)
virtually impossible to make the required limitation of intellectual know-
ledge to the specific. We were, then able to appreciate, while compelled
to reject, Wicksteed's equation of the species intelligibilis with
the quod cognoscitor of intellect. In theory, of course, the limitation
of intellectual knowledge here in question does not demand this: but
even in theory it demands an identity in nature between the intentional
species and the object; and this is only a less palpable form of the
same confusion, and no less really contradictory of the claims made on

(1) De Ver II iii ob 3 and ad 3 dic X ix ad 10 dic. S. c 6 I 46, II 75.
(2) The above cited passages, L 3 Th I q 65 a 2 (Nardi De Hom 962)
with the exception of the first, will serve again.
(3) Chapter I.
behalf of the species as 'representative'. When he is on this level of thought Thomas in fact treats "cognitio per modum formae quae est in cognoscente" as equivalent to "cognitio formae"(1), and, a target for the criticisms of his better self, takes the necessary "immateriality" of intellectual apprehension to signify knowledge of the immaterial.(2). The whole of his conflict may perhaps be epitomised in words whose melancholy significance will be appreciated in the light of our previous criticisms: "si dicam: si ego intelligo aliquid, illud est immateriale; non... oportet ut, quod intelligiter, sit immateriale nisi secundum quod est in intellectu"(3).

From this conflict we can satisfactorily free ourselves only by insisting that the species quo of knowledge is in no sense a quod. I do not think it is possible to do this without the annihilation of the sensible species altogether; but there is nothing whatever in the cognitive situation to hinder our taking that step. For ex hypothesi the species is never observed in its capacity as quo, and as quod it is observed only subsequently to the original act of cognition. But as so observed it is not distinguishable from the phantasma: why, then, should we not identify it therewith, as a bye-product and not an instrument of the cognitive process? The intelligible species, again, would be the schematised concept, which, Thomas himself might admit(4), is only observable as determined to some more or less arbitrary particularity. It therefore is, or rather,

(1) De Ver II vi, VIII xi (contradicted in the same article) XIX ii. Contrast VIII x ad 1. dic.
(2) Eq. Q.d. de Anima a1. (=Nardi 'De Hom' 82)
(3) De Ver II xii ad 7 dic. (4) Cf his denial that our intellect can apprehend through the intelligible species "non convertendo se ad phantasmata". (Eq. S. Th. I q 84 a7=Nardi De Hom 859)
helps to constitute, a quod only when deprived of that freedom of
reference which enables it to function as a quod. In itself it has
a being as observable as sound in the absence of atmosphere(1).

We have now concluded our criticism of the only reasons which
are, to my knowledge, adduced by Thomas to explain why matter is
unintelligible and why, therefore, intellect is ignorant of the
particular that sense knows. Whether or not it is possible to find
other grounds of unintelligibility in the particular, grounds
unconnected with matter, at least these do not concern us here:
they belong not to what may be fairly termed the Thomist position
but to that substitute for it to which we saw Thomas being uncompre-
hendingly driven. They must necessarily contradict the fundamental
assertion that not particularity but materiality hinders knowledge,
and raise again such problems, supposed settled, as that of knowledge
of the individual self, (2) of the separate substance (3), of the
very species intelligibilis in its nature as quod (4). And, we may
add, even if the difficulty lie in particularity itself will it be
such as to discriminate between sense and intellect? For that
primarily is our problem. What reason is there to suppose that the
intellect which can apprehend the simple by the complex, the material
by the immaterial, may not also apprehend the particular by the univ-
versal? If such be the real issue, Thomas at least does not suggest

(1) Among medieval critics of the species intentionalis may be especi-
ally mentioned Durand of St. Pourcain and Occam. It is worth
noting that the "Manual of Mod Scpl. Phil" (Psychology §§38-9) accepting
the view of the sensible species, which it terms the "cognition determinant", as primarily id quo, says: "The qualitative character
of our sensations must be immediately referred to the subjective
modification which we have called the cognition determinant": It
surely cannot be intended that this qualitative character, like the
(2) De Unit Intell (ap. Nardi II p 66 ad init)

(3) Ib: also Q.d. de Anima a2 (= Nardi De Hom §8)

(4) Q.d de Anima a2 (= Nardi De Hom §8): §.Th I q 76 a3 ad 3 dic (= Nardi De Hom §10) S. qIII 75 etc.

(5) See Chapter VI.

Before we proceed to the direct treatment of particularity and knowledge of the particular, suggested at the close of the last chapter, we have one final group of problems to discuss which will still further show the confusion of Thomas' thought. We turn from the grounds asserted for the unintelligibility of matter to consider the ways in which intellect, despite that unintelligibility, is said to know the particular. And first - to begin with the supremely important human level - we must examine that knowledge of the particular by reflection(1), which is claimed for our own minds.

It is possible that we may be accused of having too lightly esteemed this qualification of Thomas' denial that we know the particular. It might be urged that in fact it obviates all objections; that if this reflective knowledge be granted it is sufficient, nothing else matters: consequently all our discussion of the situation hitherto must be beside the point. That would indeed be a serious indictment; and though I think we have really answered it already(2), it will be advisable to make an explicit reply here, even at the risk of repetition.

The problem is, to account for knowledge of the particular. Now, whatever else be true, Thomas certainly attributes such a knowledge to sense. Is that sense-knowledge adequate? If it is, then the question

(1) See Chapter II ad init.
(2) See Chapter I.
of the "reflection" does not even rise into significance; it will not deserve more than an incidental treatment. But we decided that sense was not adequate, and one ground of our decision was this very assertion of the intellect's "reflection", since it seemed to cast an aspersion upon the status of the sensitive faculty. If sense, then, is inadequate, where can we find an adequate knowledge of the particular? It must belong either to intellect or to a synthesis of intellect and sense. The former may be excluded, both because of the psychological dependence of the operations of intellect upon the stimulus of sense, and because, (even if that were not convincing), we should otherwise be credited with two "independent" knowledges of the particular, - one, adequate by the intellect, the other, inadequate by sense. It remains therefore to find in the synthesis of sense and intellect the one adequate knowledge of the particular, on the possibility of that depends the success of the criticism which we are rebutting. But it is not possible, apart from the removal of all meaning from sense's (inadequate) knowledge; we should once again have the two "independent" knowledges of the particular, only "intellect" would be replaced by the new synthesis. Moreover, the synthesis, if admitted, would be of sense with the secondary act of intellect; and though "secondary" does not imply any inadequacy, it is perhaps inconsistent with the claim of the individual, as the prime constituent of reality, to be the proper object of knowledge. Even suppose that claim disallowed, as much in Thomas would seem to disallow it, still the actual account of this reflection, its unemphatic
per accidens nature, on which we remarked, is not, I think, to be reconciled with the view that it is the essential condition of the only genuine knowledge of the particular.

I maintain, therefore, that our procedure in relegating the "reflection" to a secondary place is justified, and that our emphasis on the problem of purely sensitive knowledge was correspondingly appropriate. But though it is thus denied that the intellect's "reflection" obviates our problem, it does not follow that that "reflection" has no significance. It is important just in so far as sense is inadequate; and sense, in our view, having broken down completely, it remains as the only, though still insufficient, manner of knowledge of the particular. We noted also that Thomas expressly made it responsible for the singular proposition. In these circumstances the examination of the "reflective knowledge" must be accounted of some importance.

No very elaborate discussion, however is required. The conclusion is reached very rapidly that the indirect knowledge of the particular by intellect is open to the same difficulties which, it is asserted, prevent a direct knowledge(3). Everything depends, Thomas clearly holds, on the intellect's relation to phantasmata: it is in terms of them that the intellect must know the particular if it is to know it at all. Now phantasmata, says Thomas, are to the intellect as

(1) In Chap I.

(2) The account which follows is based almost exclusively on the discussion in De Veritate II vi. No references are given except for the few additional passages.
sensibilia to sense. But, we at once object, sensibilia are the
direct objects of sense; therefore, if the parallel holds, phantasmata
are the direct objects of intellect. Either, then, the intellect’s
knowledge of the particular is direct, or knowledge of the particular
is not to be got by knowledge of the phantasmata. We must deny the
latter alternative, for we have nothing, apart from phantasmata, which
might serve as the suitable intermediary between intellect and the
external and sensible particulars; while the former alternative
contradicts the whole nature of the reflexio. We can only conclude
that the parallel between the relation of phantasmata to intellect
and that of sensibilia to sense does not hold in all strictness. Thomas
it would seem, admits the conclusion. By the species abstracted from
the phantasma the intellect’s cognition "quodammodo ad phantasmata
continuatur", but the correspondence with sense may be no closer than
that. Through the sensible species sense directly knows the sensible
object, through the intelligible species intellect directly knows not
phantasm but the intelligible object esse or natural quiddity. But
in reflection the intellect can observe - the phantasma? Not even
then immediately: it observes first the intelligible species(1), and then
the phantasma only thereafter.

This is the actual account of the position. The question now is,
can apprehension of the phantasma give knowledge of the particular?
Or, if it does, will the phantasma be such as to be apprehensible by

(1) see also De Ver X v.
intellect, consistently with intellect's inability to apprehend the external particulars directly? Take the first of these questions: what reason does Thomas put forward for his necessarily affirmative answer? The only one hinted at in the main treatment of the topic seems to be that the phantasma is a *similudo particularis*. This expression is ambiguous: it may mean either that the similitude is itself a particular or that it is the similitude of a particular. That it is itself a particular is true in any case, but inadequate for our purpose, because we are not concerned ultimately with that particular which is a phantasma. The particularity of the phantasma is, we may for the moment suppose, particularity of the same kind and irrelevance as that which characterises the intelligible species. Such particularity being admittedly no bar to knowledge, we may then allow that the phantasma actually is apprehended by intellect. But how do we know the "real" particular thereby?

This involves taking *similudo particularis* as meaning "similitude of a particular", a view which all the evidence demands(1) But, we repeat, how by knowing the similitude of a particular do you know the particular of which it is the similitude? If the similitude is identical in nature with its counterpart it will be as hard to know as that counterpart and therefore it will not help us in the least. But if its likeness is simply "representative", - as it must

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(1) Ex. S. Th I, q. 85 a. 1 (=Nardi "De Hom" § 61), Z. obj. 1 unchallenged, ad 3 dic.
S. Th I, q. 64 a. 7 ad 2 dic (=Nardi "De Hom" § 59)
Q. d. de Anima a. 6 ad 6 dic (=Nardi "De Hom" § 31)
be since we are conceding that the similitude is known — is it not when such a similitude is a mere quo that you know its real counterpart by it? Now the phantasm is here (1) explicitly not quo but quod. The intellect’s passing to the external object is therefore at least unexplained. But even if Thomas’ language allowed us to take the phantasm as quo, the difficulty would then be to explain why knowledge of the external particular is not gained by the intellect’s “first act”? since it would be in that "first act" that the phantasm, like the intelligible species is medium quo.

We may possibly allow that Thomas’ difficulty is one of expression. That he is conscious of the obscurity in the situation of the phantasm is obvious, although he does not succeed in illuminating it. As he states the position it would seem that the intellect has two media, "intelligible species" and "phantasm", as against the single "sensible species" of sense; and the phantasm is not only the non-parallel medium, but it also appears to be ineffective. Perhaps the fairest thing is to suppose that in the "first act" of the intellect the phantasm is neither object nor medium quo. Is it inconceivable that the intellect should encounter the phantasm only in reflection; first, becoming conscious of it as object, and proceeding therefrom to use it as medium?

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(1) i.e. in the passage referred to as our main source. Cf. S. Th I q 84 a? (=Nardi "De Hom" § 59), S. Th I q 85 a1 ad 5 dic (=Nardi "De Hom" § 61), which, I think, exhibits the conflict, — and also "De Unit. Intell. ap. Nardi II p 28.

(2) Here, and elsewhere in this connection, we mean by "first act", the direct as opposed to the reflective, cognitive act, not the "formatio quidditatum" as against "judgment proper".
ceivable, (is the reply) it may not be, but it is certainly unexplained.
The movement from phantasm as quod to phantasm as quo is the reverse
both of the general direction in respect of those two functions, and
of every suggestion in the language of Thomas about the present special
case. Nor is it clear how or why the intellect would move not merely
from but in virtue of apprehension of the intelligible species to
apprehension of the phantasm; has been properly performed. The relation
of the phantasma to intellect is to me beyond comprehension; the
Shakespearian coupling of the term with “a hideous dream” appears as a
poignant truth.

But suppose this problem satisfactorily settled one way or the
other. Whether the particular is to be known in terms of the phantasm
as quod, following the suggestion of Thomas’ language, or, according
to what seems the more natural method, through it ds quo, is the
phantasm such in its own nature as to allow of this, within the limits
of the conditions of unintelligibility prescribed by Thomas? This is
to ask, — what is the relation of the phantasm to the material principle
of individuation?

Now for the phantasm to be itself unintelligible, as quod, or
incapable of “informing” the intellect, as quo, it is not necessary that
it should be actually and unambiguously material, — for we found that even
sense-knowledge could not be explained on such terms: it is enough for
it to be characterised by the supposed conditiones materiales. But the
phantasm as quod, in order that it may, in any significant manner, give

* if the abstraction of that species from the phantasm
a knowledge of the particular, must differ in its nature from the intelligible species; and the minimum difference discoverable, which is relevant, at least, to the present issue, is that it should be characterised by "material conditions". We may securely challenge a Thomist to make any other suggestion. Being, then, characterised by these conditions it is unintelligible and so cannot account for the reflective knowledge in question, unless on terms which would also make the external particular directly intelligible.

It is not necessary, however, that a _quo_ should be characterised in the manner stated. "Quamvis singulare, inquantum huiusmodi, non possit a materia separari; tamen potest cognoscì per similitudinem a materia separatam, quae est materiae similitudo"(1). Here, therefore, we must call in direct evidence. We then learn that "phantasmata, cum sint similitudines indivorum, et existant in organis corporis, non habent eundem modum existendi quern habet intellectus humanus"(2). The passage here quoted goes on to state that the agent intellect can elicit a similitudo able to "inform" the intellect; but unfortunately, we must observe, that similitudo is of course the intelligible species and no longer the phantasm. This is exactly the position more obscurely

(1) De Ver. II v ad 14 dic
(2) S. Th I q 85 ai ad 3 dic (=Nardí "De Hom" §61.)
stated elsewhere(1) as the distinction between the phantasmata in
their state of "potency" relative to the intellect and in their state
of "act" relative to the intellect. Once again the latter can be
discerned to be not strictly phantasmata at all, but intelligible
species; and, in this context, the former are definitely described as
phantasmata "inquantum non sunt ab individuantibus conditionibus abstract
abstrahibilis tamen". Doubtless it would be possible to multiply such
evidence(2), but if it is not clear from these passages that the
phantasm as such is incapable of being so united with the intellect
as to be the medium quo of knowledge, we may conclude by quoting the
direct assertion, "ipsum phantasma non est forma intellectus possibilis,
sed species intelligibilis quae a phantasmatibus abstrahitur"(3). And
indeed if it were not so, why would the abstractive operation of the
agent intellect ever be necessary at all?

In concluding this examination of the reflexio I repeat that I
think Thomas himself intended the phantasm to be for the intellect quod
rather than quo in this connection. But we have now asserted that it is
incapable of either function consistently with the denial of direct
intellectual knowledge of the particular. The choice of interpretation
is therefore of secondary importance. Finally we may remark that if
our criticism has been sound and the appeal to the reflexio is

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(1) Q.d.de Anima a 5 (=Nardi "De Hom" §31)
(2) E.g. S.Th I q 85a 1. sed contra (=Nardi "De Hom" §61): phantasmata
as similitudines materiales.
(3) S.Th I q 76 a 2 (=Nardi "De Hom" §10)
consequently negative, we have incidentally shown that Thomas' very statement of his problem in regard to knowledge of the particular involves a self contradiction(1).

It is just worth noting at this point that the other mode of continuity between sense and intellect, that, namely which holds in practical activity, does not involve the contradictions which characterise its fellow. Here the connecting link is the ratio particularis which enables us so to apply the universal rule as to make choice of a particular act(2); we are dealing, in short, with the psychological aspect of the practical syllogism. It is true of course, as we have discovered(3), that the status of the ratio particularis and so its capacity to fulfil the mediating function are extremely obscure. But if we suppose that difficulty removed Thomas' statement may stand.)

The functions(4) of intellect and of the ratio particularis will not overlap, however hard to conceive be their continuity(5); there is no obligation upon intellect to know the particular directly or otherwise. The knowledge of the particular which is unquestionably

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(1) see Chapter II. We do not deny by the foregoing criticism that the general doctrine of a Reflexio may be(as I believe it is)very valuable in other connections. (2) De Ver M v: and cf S.c GII 60, III 75. (3) in Chapter I. (4) "Functions",not "natures"; as we pointed out in Chapter I the ratio particularis does appear to have an intellectual element in its constitution. But that is the problem which we have just dismissed from consideration here. (5)As evidence that this difficulty was felt note,for instance,De Ver II vi objj 2 and 3 and ad 2 and 3 dice: we have to take refuge in homo to hold together sense and intellect.
implied in the fact of controlled activity can thus be accounted for by Thomas, not satisfactorily indeed but at least in such a manner as will avoid any peculiar embarrassment for his theory of intellectual cognition.

A prominent feature in the writings of St. Thomas is provided by his hypothetical psychologies, - his account of the spiritual and, more especially, intellectual operation of beings other than the human. For our present purpose these have, it may be thought, little or no importance; but as a pendant to our criticism of the consistency of Thomas’ doctrine concerning human knowledge it is at least appropriate to observe briefly the manner in which he accounts for knowledge of the particular in such dissimilar beings.

Naturally the supreme instances are God and the Angels, and it is of course in the case of God that Thomas has the better opportunity of avoiding any contradiction with his human psychology. God, we may say, has all the peculiar advantages of the angelic situation, with others in addition. How does Thomas account for God’s necessarily intellectual, knowledge of the particular? For that He must possess this knowledge is clear; first, simply because it is inconceivable that our knowledge should in any way outstrip His(1), and also because the providential ordering of the world presupposes it(2). But how does He know? If the materiality of the particular coupled with the immateriality of the intellect prevented intellectual knowledge in

(1) E.g. De Ver II v. Sc G I 65. S. Th I q 14 a 11.
(2) De Ver II iv (and see also Ib. xii)
our case, will not the same result befall God, and the angels, also? (1) We cannot rest satisfied with appeals not to judge by the human intellect of the workings of the divine mind (2). These appeals do not bind us to refrain from criticism where they leave to Thomas freedom of exposition.

Let it be supposed that "qui cognoscit definitionem, cognoscit emunctabilia in potentia, quae per definitionem demonstrantur; in intellectu autem divino non differt esse in actu et posse, unde ex quo cognoscit essentiam verum, statim comprehendit omnia accidentia quae consequuntur" (3). Now, sicut essentia universalis alicuius speciei se habet ad omnia per se accidentia illius speciei, ita se habet essentia singularis ad omnia accidentia propria illius singularis, cuiusmodi sunt omnia accidentia in eo inventa; quia per hoc quod in ipso individuantur, efficiuntur ei propria" (4).

Thus the problem would seem to be how to secure for God knowledge of the individual essence. In fact, however, this is no simplification. What is this individual essence, which clearly we do not know? "De essentia singularis est materia signata" (5); that alone can explain our ignorance of it.

But since the only element added to the specific essence in order to constitute the particular thing is this materia signata (6), we have only restated the initial question "How can intellect know the particular?" in the special form "How can intellect know materia signata?" We are of course ignoring here the real point of this insistence on essence, which is, that it will admit of knowledge independent of any "here and now" apprehension.

that knowledge has a "here and now" reference, so that the "whole truth" about any particular, though that particular is a fact enduring and changing in time, will itself be a timeless body of mutually-cohering entia. We are concerned here only to point out that this rationalist doctrine, whether sound or not, in no way lessens our immediate difficulty. How should one kind of intellect know a matter which to another kind is unintelligible?

The solution suggested for angels and for God alike seems to be a cognition "per formas quae respicient immediate materiam sicut et formam", as the one means of apprehending matter not only "in universali directa inspectione", but also "in singulari(1)". It should be noticed that in this statement of the case there is clearly repudiated the "crude assimilation" difficulty of the human level(2). And that is not strange: for certainly matter is no liker in nature to the divine or angelic intellect than to the human. We discover here, in fact, a reason which obliges Thomas absolutely to disown the assimilation theory, and in the circumstances it is surprising that his repudiation of it was not more explicit. For the plain truth is, that, in so far as the need for assimilation is maintained, he cannot secure the necessary distinction between God(or the angels) and man in respect of knowledge of the particular. That the "representation" emphasis should be so marked in

1) De Ver X v.
2) S.Th I q57 a 3, however, - where obj 3 pleads the difficulty raised by the "assimilation" theory of knowledge, - does not repudiate that theory explicitly but slides vaguely over into the causal theory which we discuss below.
discussion of the Divine knowledge is thus easily explained(1).

But assimilation being discredited, and no new difficulties for the human intellect having been invented, the distinction between God and man must be drawn in terms of the principle, "omnis actio est per formam". This is in fact impossible, if our earlier criticism of the principle in its application to human knowledge was a valid one; but that will not affect the question of Thomas' consistency here. Assuming, then, the truth of the principle and its adequacy to account for intellectual ignorance of the particular on our human level, how is any intellect to be immune from that result? The answer is easy: the principle will condition only that knowledge which waits upon the impact of its objects, that knowledge whose cognitive "forms" are impressed by the known. A knowledge not thus controlled may well be "per formas quae respicientiunt immediate materiam sicut et formam".

Such a knowledge God not only may but must possess, in virtue of His nature as Creator. The artist's conception of his work precedes the work and is not drawn from it; and the analogy becomes cogent when it is realised that the divine skill is flawless, and that God is not merely artist but creator, that He does not merely fashion matter into form but produces the matter with the form(2). Luckily it does not fall to us here to examine the sense in which

(1) Supra, Chapter IV p.121 n.2.

(2) See esp. De Ver II v. Cf II viii, X iv XIX i.
the "scientia Dei" is "causa rerum"(1), the doctrine of the creative ideas. It is, I suppose, a theory incapable alike of demonstration and of disproof; and though grave difficulties might easily be found, more especially in connection with the contingent character of the particular, here we have only to admit that it is at least consistent with the position taken up in regard to human knowledge.

There remain, however, one or two further comments to be made. In the first place, this "creator's knowledge" is surely confined to the Deity Himself: the angelic knowledge of the particular is still unexplained. The sine qua non of such an explanation is of course that the Angelic ideas should not wait upon things, and Thomas is quite definite in making this claim. The Angels, he says, know "per similitudines...a creatione divinitus impressas"(2).

"Sicut enim ex rationibus aeternis in mente divina existentibus procedunt formae materiales ad rerum substantiam, ita procedunt a Deo formae rerum omnium in mentes angelicas ad rerum cognitionem"(3).

Thus while our intellect is like the "tabula in qua nihil est scriptum" (4) the angelic intellect is a "tabula depicta" or, better, a mirror "in quo rerum rationes resplendent"(5).

(1)Ep De Ver II xiv, III i, ii, v, vii, viii.
(2)De Ver, VIII vii; cf. ibid. viii and xv, and, above all, ix. (3)De Ver VIII ix. (4) But not in Locke's sense: see(e.g.) De Ver VIII xv, - "Oportet quod in intellectu nostro sint quaedam quae intellectus noster cognoscit, scilicet prima principia, quamvis etiam ipsa cognition in nobis non determinetur nisi per acceptionem a sensibus".
(5) De Ver VIII ix,
This theory of the "impressed ideas" is still, however, an empty postulate (1). If beyond criticism it is also below consideration, until Thomas links it with the theory of the Creator's knowledge by the principle that knowledge of the cause involves knowledge of the effect. That principle can be, and is, applied as an explanation in the case of God Himself (2), who, "cum ipse sit causa omnium causarum propriarum et communium, ipse per essentiam suam cognoscit omnes causas proprias et communes" (3); although perhaps it is no advantage to the divine knowledge that it should be regarded as merely one instance of this rule. In the case of the Angels, however, there is no other way of "giving body" to the conception of their cognitive ideas. Accordingly we find it implied in the parallel operation of the creative influence of God and the "pouring" of these cognitive ideas into the angelic intellects (4); and we observe it more explicitly in the teaching that in apprehending things in the divine essence a being must be thought of as apprehending the effect in its cause rather than an image in a mirror. We note also the significant suggestion that only on that view can we account for the fact that, in knowing through the divine essence, the angels are not, like God, omniscient: for "non est... necesarrium quod quicumque cognoscit causam, cognoscit omnes effectus qui possunt ex ipsa produci nisi comprehendat ipsam; quod non contingit alicui intellectui creato, respectu divinae essentiae" (5).

(1) Q.d.de Anima a30 ad 8 dic is certainly not convincing here. 
(2) E.g. S.c G I 50 (speaking of "cognitio propria" for which see infra ) and 65. In 50, the argument from creation and the argument from knowledge of the cause are both given, as distinct.
(3) De Ver II iv. (4) De Ver VIII ix, quoted supra: also II xiv, VIII xi, and esp. XIX ii. (5) De Ver VIII iv.
Although, as I have suggested, it is not necessary nor, perhaps, advantageous to interpret God's knowledge in terms of the principle of angelic knowledge, it is natural to assimilate the two cases, as is done in the context of the passage last quoted, and elsewhere. Everything will then depend for God and the Angels alike on the validity of that principle. Unfortunately, it seems to be a principle either untrue or uninformative. We have no space here for a discussion of it; but, briefly and roughly, we may say that the proposition that knowledge of the cause involves knowledge of the effect is uninformative, if in "cause" we include all four Aristotelian causes, or, more especially, the formal and the material, while it is untrue if by "cause" we do not mean this, and, above all, if we only intend the popular modern acceptance of the term as identical with efficient cause. That Thomas himself should prefer the former alternative is natural, but if he thus avoids positive error it is without achieving positive truth. His position is significant just in so far as he interprets that alternative so that the "cause" known is some unique "exemplary" cause - the artist's "pattern" conception - which is rather final than efficient, and not properly either formal or material but an immaterial form of the concrete thing both in its formal and its material nature. Such, of course, the creative ideas are considered to be(1), and we do not rule out the conception. We simply deny Thomas' right to combine this unique situation, whether in the case of God or in the modified instances of subordinate artists, with the general rule concerning knowledge of cause and

(1) De Ver III passim.
of effect. The exemplary idea is not a cause within the meaning of that rule; if it were, it would be impossible to draw any real distinction, as Thomas does(1), between the knowledge of the effect in the cause and the apprehension of the mirrored image. The cause-effect rule, then, is ineffective; and, though the theory of divine knowledge may still stand on its own merits, the explanation of the angelic knowledge becomes once more an empty postulate.

Thomas was not aware of this result; he holds to the cause-effect rule and states it in a further series of passages which seem at first to be introducing a new principle altogether, - the principle, namely, of a concrete universal. Thus, the divine essence appears to be regarded as such an universal, wherein is contained every particular in a manner other and more intimate than the relation of cause and effect(2). The same position is implied in the unchallenged application of the formula, "quanto aliqua formarum est simplicior, tanto est plurium formarum comprehensiva"(3), and in many more passages(4). This presence of the particular in the universal is impossible for the human intellect, whose forma universalis is abstracted, so that although "ductiva in plura", the "plura" exist in it only potentially, and in knowing it we know only potentially its particulars(5). The human intellect, in fact, is in the unfortunate position that, while unable to have knowledge of the particular by a form which is individual, since that form belongs to sense, it cannot possess it by the form which belongs to the

(1) De Ver VIII iv See Supra. (2) De Ver II iv ad 4 dic. (3) De Ver II iii. (4) e.g. S.c G I 50,61. (5) De Ver II ix.
intellect, for that is an abstract not a concrete universal. The more general our cognitive forms the more imperfect our knowledge: the "similitudo animalis" gives us less adequate knowledge of the external object than the "similitudo hominis". "Similitudo autem intelligibilis quae est in substantia separata est universalioris virtutis ad plura repraesentanda sufficiens...Per similitudinem...unam cognoscit et animal et differentias animalis"(1) "Per unam similitudinem possunt a substantia separata omnia individua illius speciei cognoscì, in quantum illa similitudo speciei efficitur uniuscujusque singularium propria similitudo secundum proprium respectum ad hoc vel illud individuum"(2)

But though Thomas may at times have tended to this line of argument, it is in contradiction of his real view of the universal as that which exists only in the particular: nor does it appear possible to limit it to the sphere of the non-human intelligence and achieve a harmony so, since the distinction involved is not merely a psychological one, but demands that the apprehended be constituted in a certain manner. In any case, when the ability to have "proper knowledge" of man by the knowledge of "animal" is directly challenged, Thomas counters(3) with the reply that God's essence is not the medium of his knowledge "quasi universalis forma" but "quasi universalis causa" thus explicitly reducing the present position to that already discussed.

He goes on to point out(4) that the presence of the particular in the

(1) S.c G II 96, and see the whole passage: also II 100.
(2) De Ver XIX ii. (3) De Ver II iv ad 7 dic (4) Ibid.
universal form is "in potentia quasi materiali" whereas the effect is in the cause "in potentia quasi activa". "Et quia unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est in actu, et non secundum quod est in potentia; ideo hoc quod differentiae specificantes genus sunt in genere in potentia non sufficit ad hoc quod per formam generis habeatur propria cognitio de specie". So we have a view of the universal which makes it identical for God and man, - not a bare abstraction indeed, but certainly not concrete. We must suppose, therefore, that no separate theory of knowledge in terms of a concrete universal was intended by Thomas either for God or for any creature. The apparent concreteness of the universals on the supra-human level is merely the reflection of their causal nature, - directly, in the case of God, "Ex assimilatione... ad primam intelligibilem speciem intellectus divini"(1) in the case of the angels. The difference between the universals of the human and those of the non-human levels of cognition lies not, as at first it seemed, in their constitution, but simply in their efficacy(2).

It is fair to say, then, that the theory of divine and angelic knowledge of the particular is based(perhaps unnecessarily so far as regards the former) on the one, ineffective, supposition that knowledge of the cause involves knowledge of the effect, while the

(1) S. c 6 II 100. (2) We should perhaps take as expressive of this, if not also as eloquent of its difficulties, the statement that it is only "cointellectis diversis proportionibus rerum ad eam" that the divine essence is "idea unusquisque rei" unde cum sit diversae rerum proportiones, necesse est esse plures ideas; et est quidem una omnium ex parte essentiae; sed pluralitas inventur ex parte diversarum proportionum creaturarum ad ipsam"(De Ver III iii). The relation of God to His creatures, it should also be remembered, is, unlike that of the creatures to God, one of reason only(eg.De Ver II ix, III ii ad 6 dic IVv.
consistency of this divine or angelic knowledge with our human ignorance has to depend upon the supposition that form is the only principle of activity. But there is, besides, one would-be argument; which in fact, however, does not advance beyond the bare postulate (presupposed in it) that God and the Angels must know the particular since we lesser creatures have that knowledge. How, it asks, is that knowledge to be allowed for? By the principle most modestly expressed in the form, "quanto aliquis intellectus est efficacior et limpidior in cognoscendo, tanto ex uno potest plura cognoscere" (1) Thus God knows all things through the single medium of His own essence, and "superiores Angeli cognoscunt res per formas magis universales quam inferiores" (2). This is sheer assertion of a position suggestive of the concrete universal and unredeemed by any reference to the "knowledge of cause and effect" principle: but even so, it is still useless for the purpose in hand. It is only when the statement adds to its negative, a positive defect that it becomes relevant. This step is taken when (3) the principle goes beyond the limits of merely intellectual (or merely sensitive) knowledge, and bestrides the boundary of these faculties with a general formula, "Quod potest inferior virtus potest et superior, sed eminentius; unde virtus inferior operatur per multa, virtus superior operatur per unum tantum". Thus the sensus communis can (so Thomas) by itself apprehend what the five exterior senses perceive. "Anima autem humana est inferior ordine naturae quam substantia separata; ipsa autem cognoscitiva est universalium et singulatum per duo principia, scilicet per sensum et

(1) S. c G I 69: cf De Ver VIII x.  (2) De Ver VIII x.  
(3) S. c G II 100.
intellectum. Substantia igitur separata, quae est altior, cognoscit utrumque altiori modo per unum principium, scilicet intellectum”. But if the replacement of sense and intellect by one faculty is on the same plane as the replacement of any two or more senses or any two or more modes of intellection by another sense or intelligent faculty(1), how is the radical distinction of sense and intellect to be maintained? And if the situations are not on the same plane, the argument – even supposing the truth of the subsidiary illustrations – breaks down. We are still left postulating; and the postulate itself labours under the disadvantage of being compelled, in the transition from human (sensitive) knowledge of the particular to supra-human(intellectual) knowledge to ignore the distinction of sense and intellect.

We have hitherto taken no notice of a matter which has relevance to the whole question of knowledge of the particular, but which may most suitably be discussed here, since it is only by a statement in connection with the divine knowledge that the element of contradiction is introduced. It is, of course, an additional advantage not to have allowed it to complicate our main theme; and that this has been possible without injustice will be apparent from our conclusion. The problem is that of the nature of cognitio propria and its relation with cognitio singularium.

(1) It will be observed that we have quoted indifferently from passages which speak of knowing through more or less media or more or less faculties. Both are arguing from the same principle of the correlation, in activity, of economy of means with dignity of status. If we must distinguish, however, it is strictly the faculties which are in question here; but it should be noted that though a plurality of media quo does not imply a plurality of faculties, a plurality of faculties does imply a corresponding plurality of media.
The contexts in which the former phrase occurs show clearly that the adjective *propria* cannot refer to the knower; indeed the sections discussing whether one or another kind of knower has this knowledge would otherwise be meaningless. The natural assumption is, then, that it refers to the object of knowledge and the force of *propria* should therefore be identical in the cases of God, Angels and men.

The term *propria* is, in this connection, coupled with such words as *determinate* or *distincta*, as opposed to *universalis*.(1) In view of this opposition the determinateness of the knowledge should be in respect of an individual, not of any more general, object. On the other hand, it is the clear suggestion of certain passages(2) that knowledge of the specific character is all that is involved in *propria cognitio*; and the distinction between this knowledge and *cognitio singularium* is accordingly made explicit in the form, - "intellectus noster singularia non cognoscens, propriam habet cognitionem de rebus, cognoscens eas secundum proprias rationes speciei"(3). What then can be the meaning of *propria cognitio*? *Propria* cannot in any case refer to the knower; it cannot, if we are to believe the passages just cited, refer to an individual object; it cannot, in view of the opposition of the term to *universalis* or *communis* refer to any object not individual. The solution must be that it refers to the manner of the knowledge, yet of the knowledge not as function of the knower but as apprehensive of the known. Thus "Deus cognoscit res in propria natura, si ista determinatio referatur ad cognitionem ex parte cognitii"(4)

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(1) E.q. De Ver II iv. (2) Eq. De Ver II iv obj 6 unchallenged in (3) De Ver II iv ad 1 dic. the reply: Ib. sed contra 2 (4) De Ver II iv ad 6 dic.
"Proper knowledge" is in fact opposed as the "clear and distinct" to the confused, the explicit to the implicit. It will not merely be other than cognitio singularium: it will/even imply it. But explicit knowledge, however it be absent in any given instance, raises no theoretical difficulty for a knowing determined by the impact of its objects: for the intellect in this case is, by its abstractive nature, incapable of apprehending through intentional species "wider" than its objects. A problem exists only in a circumstance parallel with Avicenna’s distinction of knowledge of the particular universaliter from that knowledge singulariter, the former being a knowledge of the determinate object in question as contained in a wider knowledge "secundum principia et causas universalès"(1): for the explicitness which constitutes the "propriety" of knowledge demands the coincidence, detail for detail, of medium and object. On this view, then, the issue of propria cognitio would never be raised for the human intellect, and this is precisely what we find. It is in the case of God that it attains the dignity of treatment as a distinct question; and that treatment turns upon the problem of the power of a general medium quo to represent a determinate quod(2).

This conclusion would make propria cognitio irrelevant to our discussion of cognitio singularium. Why then should we suggest that it has importance at this juncture? Simply because there are further

(1) De Ver VIII xi: note also S.c 6 III 75, S.Th I q 14 a.a.5 and 6 (=Nardi "De Deo Uno" §39)
(2) De Ver II iv.
passages which indicate a violation of the solution reached, - which do appear to understand propria purely in terms of the object and therefore to press for an identification of cognitio singularium with, or its implication by, propria cognitio. A good instance of the first stage in this movement is the assertion, "Deus cognoscit quidquid est in re, hoc autem est habere propriaet completam cognitionem de re, cognoscere scilicet omnia quae in re sunt, communia et propria"(1). The second position is given at its clearest in the words, left at least unchallenged by Thomas, - "Deus habet cognitionem de rebus propriaet distinctam. Sed hoc non esset, nisi sciret ea quibus res ab invicem distinct. Ergo cognoscit singulares conditions cuiuslibet rei secundum quas una res ab alia distinguuntur; ergo cognoscit singularia in sua singularitate"(2). The inconsistency of this with the statement that man has propria cognitio without cognitio singularium, - a statement followed by the comment, "unde etsi etiam intellectus divinus singularia non cognosceret, nihilominus posset de rebus propriam cognitionem habere"(3) - needs no emphasis: and in face of such a contradiction it will not be denied that we do right in giving the question some attention.

Now if the interpretation of propria cognitio last mentioned be accepted, it will appear that in this connection there is no distinction between the divine and human intellects. God and men either have or have not cognitio singularium and propria cognitio alike: and this conclusion fatally traverses Thomas' whole case. Only at the cost of

(1) SecI.50 (which see, passim): and cf. De Ver II iv obj 4 unchallenged which seems to have a foot in each camp. (2) De Ver II v. "Sed contra." ad fin. (3) De Ver II iv ad 1 dic.
denying the human *propria cognitio* can he still achieve the position which he desires to hold; and it is of course impossible for him to acquiesce in such a denial. Neither an identification(i) nor yet a mutual implication of "proper" and "particular" knowledge can therefore have been intended. How then, we must ask, is Thomas come to such a pass?

Accepting the interpretation of *propria cognitio* which referred *propria* to the manner of knowing, as knowing is apprehensive of the known, it may be admitted that in the case of an intellect which, like that of God, knows the particular, "proper" and "particular" knowledge can in fact coincide, as they cannot do with us. But the coincidence depends on the supposition that the intellect in question does know the particular; it will not itself be a basis for the argument to such knowledge, and the formal distinction of "particular" and "proper" will remain as absolute as before.

The root trouble is to be found, as might be expected, on the human plane, where "proper" knowledge should not in fact go "below" the *infra species*. The tendency to equate "proper" and "particular" knowledge in this case is, I suggest, nothing but the reflection of the difficulty, already discussed(2) of how to secure location in the external world for the quidditas which is the object of the intellect, while at the same time, distinguishing it from the particular. We must suppose, then, that the intended distinction of quidditas *re* from *res* is paralleled, in the case of man, by the real, and therefore, in all cases, by the formal, distinction of proper and particular knowledge; but that when with the collapse of the ontological distinction——

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(i) The absurdity of identification is in any case obvious.

(2) Chapter I.
distinction(1) we get the actual coincidence of the objects of "proper" and of "particular" knowledge for all knowers, the material identity of the two knowings is treated as also a formal one. On this view it will be as the result rather than as the cause(2) of the identification of "proper" and "particular" knowledge that the "propriety" of knowledge is understood in terms of the object. Now only as so understood has propria cognitio any significance for the subject on which we are engaged, and accordingly we may dismiss it from our minds. For we have, I hope, satisfactorily explained this way of regarding it as a mere confusion of Thomas' real conception, a confusion moreover (that our dismissal of it may be fully justified) which is parasitic upon a more radical problem faced by us elsewhere.

Indeed it may be said of the whole of our discussion of non-human knowledge that it assists our main investigation only by this throwing of doubt once more upon Thomas' conception of the relation of individual to species, and by the additional discrediting, remarked on earlier, of the "assimilation" theory of knowledge in its function as a barrier to human knowledge of the particular. Nor do subsidiary cases advance us any further. The states of rapture and the like offer us nothing to our purpose; and if man in the state of innocence among his many superiorities and in virtue of the knowledge revealed by Grace(3) differed from ourselves in the one relevant respect, this is not made clear. It is otherwise with the disembodied soul, which deprived of the senses, must make some fresh provision for knowledge of the particular; but this is achieved simply by conforming the case to that of the

(1) Chapter I: but we may call attention here to the fact that S. Chls quoted by us in the present connection, is evidence for this collapse; for the language there used while suggestive of the particular is not inapplicable to the quiddity. (2) Which was our suggestion earlier in the discussion. (3) De Ver. XVIII. 1. c. 5. St. Th. 1 q. 94 a. 3.
angelic intellect\(^{(1)}\). Differences between the two cases there certainly are; but here we need only say that they are not such as to involve any new principle of cognition. And, we may remark in conclusion, despite the obscurities, if not the insuperable difficulties, attending the exposition of the knowledge possessed by Christ, it seems certain that the same applies also to his unique situation\(^{(2)}\).

\(^{(1)}\) De Ver \(XX\) ii Q.d.De Anima \(XX\).15,30. S.Th I q 89(esp.a.4). The case of the disembodied soul really deserves more than the passing reference which we here accord it.

\(^{(2)}\) De Ver \(XX\) esp iii and iv: of VIII iv Also S.Th III qq 9-12.
We have now concluded our criticism of the Thomist theory of knowledge of the particular; and what, in the main, have we achieved? If our arguments are sound we have shown first, that the assertion of sense as independently cognitive compels us to seek in sense alone for an adequate knowledge of the particular, and secondly, that Thomas' own language betrays the incapacity of sense for its office. Passing thence to a consideration of intellect, we accepted Thomas' suggestion that the intellect's ignorance of the particular is conditioned by the principium individuationis; but we proceeded to urge that that principle could not be satisfactorily formulated in terms of the element — matter — which was supposed to confer unintelligibility upon it. Going still further we maintained that in any case the doctrine of the unintelligibility of matter rested upon one or other of two principles neither of which, we found, is consistent with the required distinction between sense and intellect; and later we discovered that the problem of divine and angelic knowledge definitely excluded one of these principles. Lastly, we have also satisfied ourselves that our intellectual "reflective" knowledge of the particular, so far from obviating our problem is not itself possible upon Thomas' statement of the situation.

Our result, then, is markedly a negative one, and has been secured without the need of raising the underlying issues; and while I should insist that, apart from incidental points of
value and the interest that attaches to any historical investiga-
tion, our treatment of St. Thomas, a representative philosopher of his age and one
whose doctrines are the basis of a school contemporary with
ourselves, a philosopher, moreover, who has been especially
praised for the lucidity and consistency of his thought,(1) -
while I should insist upon this, I must yet admit that from a
historical point of view our topic may appear excessively
narrow, and that for the benefit of philosophy a more thorough
examination into the question here considered would be advisable.

Both the defects indicated can be remedied, but the remedies
must be largely independent of one another: for the only conclusion
possible in regard to Thomas' treatment of our subject is that he
does not touch the real question at all. But I would suggest that
both for the historical and for the properly philosophical study a
criticism of Thomas provides a valuable preliminary. On the one
hand, further historical reading, but little more, is required to
transform it into a survey of the problem of knowledge of the
particular as it must appear in any hylomorphic conception of things.
On the other hand, the contradictions of that position, necessitat-
ing in my opinion the sacrifice of hylomorphism, carry within them-
selves the seeds of a reformulation, the nature of which cannot but

(1) As - to cite a restrained example - by Gilson, (Phil. of St.
Thomas Aquinas Ch XV,) who speaks of his "ideas so exactly defined,
and his "formulas of such perfect precision". For myself, I subscribe
rather to Xavier Rousselot's verdict, which has the advantage of
being prior to the establishment of Thomism as the official philos-
ophy of the Church, and which ascribes to the Saint "une clarté bien
plus apparente que réelle". (op cit Ch XV p 236) Worth note also
is his comment (Th. Part III p. 43) "Saint Thomas manquait de
profondeur, il était moins porté à la réflexion qu'à la contemplation.
be significant for philosophy. And lastly, if in the light of our own convictions we turn back to understand the real nature of the confusions in the other theory, it will not be denied that our own thought and our grasp of the history of philosophy will alike benefit.

Unfortunately, it is impossible for us here to enlarge upon these wider and doubtless more interesting topics. With our preliminary study we must for the moment be content. Yet in conclusion I should like to suggest, still by way of prolegomena, and in a spirit, if we may so term expansion of tentative dogmatism, the lines upon which the expression of the two latter topics might proceed. The general standpoint of the proposed historical survey must be sufficiently obvious from what has already been said.

We spoke of the hylomorphic theory as carrying within its own corruption the seeds of a new position. It is not hard to show the truth of this. The point of fresh growth must lie in the basic realm of ontology, and in our present study that realm was represented for us by the problem of individuation. Now it will be remembered that in examining that problem we not only found a situation of inconsistency and collapse, but we noticed certain substitute formulae which, because of their elimination of the element of matter, could not be treated as Thomist. These formulae, then, certainly represent a movement to a non-Thomist position, and if it is an exaggeration to say that they show also a repudiation of the matter and form antithesis, at least they regard it as in this connection irrelevant. We propose now in a brief discussion to consider the new aspect which they give to the problem of our knowledge of the particular.
The withdrawal from the position that matter was the principle of individuation took, we pointed out(1), two lines. First, there was a positive assertion that forms were individual per se; and secondly, there was the position reached simply by the cancelling of matter from the "signate matter" principle, the assertion, namely, that the signant element - quantity - constituted the whole principle. There appeared, further, to be two ways of regarding this 'quantity'. On the one hand - and it seems thus more naturally related to the original formula - it may be taken as a character of the particular itself, the "dimensions" of a thing giving it its particularity. On the other hand the signant quantity may be regarded as a character of the sensible world in general, as that in terms of which the thing can be "located", particularity being conferred by that location. This latter alternative is, beyond question, that which has the support from Thomas' language; and small wonder, since the other is nothing if not a weakened version of the theory of individual forms.

The result, then, seems to be that instead of the old 'material' formulae we have a choice between the views that particularity is conferred by an individual form and that it is conferred by location in the spatio-temporal order. I suggest, however,(2) that we shall

(1) Chap.III. ad fin.
(2) And it may be worth considering whether, or how far, the suggestion amounts to a "return to Plato".
find a significance and a partial truth in each. Let us begin
with the theory of individual forms. It is maintained that the
individual has not merely the nature which it has, but is further,
unique and distinct from all other things in terms of its positive
formal elements. There is nothing evidently absurd in that view;
it may well be the fact. But from the standpoint of knowledge the
situation is less satisfactory. It is true that an individual, so
regarded, offers no positive bar to knowledge, even on Thomas'
principles; while the negative hindrance of the inexhaustibility of
its detail may conceivably be countered by the theory of "essences".
But suppose an individual form completely apprehended, do we not still
know it as a 'such', as potentially not unique and individual?(2)
Knowledge, in short, will give us no warrant for the treatment of it
as a particular. Its constituent characters are in themselves
universals: "ex formis autem universalibus congregatis, quotidique
fuerint, non constituitur aliquid singulare; quia adhuc collectio
illarum formarum potest intelligi in pluribus esse" (3) To take a
suggestion from the context of our quotation; we know the singulare
(suppose it to be such) as yet not singulariter but universaliter
only(4). Be it ever so indubitable that the particular is constituted

(1) Thomas, in treating form as principle of individuality, could not
accept so much.
(2) It must not be supposed that, in our opinion, apprehension of this,
or any 'such' can in fact be disjoined from apprehension of it as
(3) De Ver II v. Cf Quaest. Quodlib. VII i 3. Mandonnet's Edn. p. 355, where as instances of the universals are given
"album, bicubitum, et crispum et huiusmodi" (My italics)
(4) And Cf De Ver VIII xi.
in its particularity by an individual form its particularity cannot be recognised in terms of that form; and from this point of view the conclusion seems justified that a theory of the principle of individuation has no direct relevance for our present problem of cognitio singularium.

We turn now to the alternative reading of particularity in terms of location, and it must be granted that location, - a factor not fairly describable either as material or as formal - does characterise the particular unambiguously. 'Here and now' provides an infallible reference, - not, of course, in its empty verbal form, but in its various ostensive applications. Where we secure such a deictic reference as 'here and now' can supply we may fairly claim that, whether or not there be exhaustive apprehension of the form, we know a 'such' as also a 'this' and so have knowledge of the particular singulariter. But, in contradistinction from the previous case, location, - or in general, bare 'thisness' - though it be the necessary and sufficient principle of the recognition of the particular(1) will surely not be supposed to constitute it in any sense whatever. For to do that it would need to be the positive ground of the appearance which 'fills' it, something positive, that is, irrespective of its filling; but empty location, or bare 'thisness' is nothing at all. Location is not itself a constitutive principle whether of individuality or, as Thomas might suggest, of individuation;

(1) 'Manual of Mod. Schol. Phil.' Ontology §25 intends this. But, not discriminating the conflicting uses of 'quantity' it speaks of dimensions, shape, and position in space and time, all together. Only the last is relevant here: shape and dimensions are important only for the purpose mentioned infra p. 165-6.
it is but the reflection of some such principle, although for knowledge of the particular it, and not the principle, which it reflects, is the significant factor. And we may remark that on this plane the reciprocity noticeable between the particular and its "principle"(1) is not involved in the contradiction which besets it on the constitutive level.

Our result may be summarised as follows. First, the true problem of cognitio singularium is that of apprehending a 'this', irrespective of its composition by form or matter or otherwise, as 'this'. Accordingly particularity itself, and nothing else, presents whatever obstacle there be. It is unnecessary to emphasise how completely Thomas' position is undermined hereby, the problem being extended to every existent, self, separate substance, and the like, impartially: and we may suggest that the original limitation owed its speciousness simply to the fact that, apart from the self, none of the 'exceptions' come within the field of natural knowledge at all, and so their existence could not be effectively denied. The significance of the unique case of the self, if once it be isolated, must of course be determined by and not determine the general theory. Such, then, is the true problem of knowledge of the particular; and our second result is the realisation that for that knowledge we do not require a knowledge of the principle of individuation. So far as the question is one of psychological possibility - and Thomas has treated it as such - the ability, as above described, to use

(1) E.g. Q. d. de Anima a. 4. (=Nordi 'De Hom' § 14: p 180); see supra Chapter III p. 85.
demonstrative words significantly is all that matters. The fact of
the singular proposition is thereby adequately safeguarded.

We cannot, however, rest content with the establishment of a
psychological possibility. We are discussing a problem of knowledge,
and we must therefore go on, unhelped by Thomas, to consider the
conditions of significant assertion. We have to ask not merely 'Can I
in general make an assertion of a certain type?' but 'What gives me the
right to make it in one or another particular case?' Is a deictic
reference to the 'here and now' sufficient, even if it be necessary, to
justify this? Surely we must answer, No. 'Here and now'(1) will give an
unambiguous reference for any total perceptum as such, since that is
completely and uniquely indicated in terms of a psychological moment of
apprehension; and for some singular propositions that may be enough,
may
"This is appalling", for instance. But even in such cases there, or will, be
a more or less implicit discrimination of aspects of the perceptum, and
in the great majority of singular propositions the discrimination is
quite clear, - Socrates, this tree, this stone, and so forth. That a
'here and now' reference is not an adequate basis for propositions of
this type we shall surely admit, when we go on to consider the twofold
nature of this discrimination(2): but first we may advantageously dis-
tinguish substantial and non-substantial subjects.

(1) Again we must emphasise that we do not refer to the verbal form.
(2) Namely, 'Description' and 'Circumscription': infra p.165-7.
Where we are dealing with non-substantial subjects - characters or relations such as 'this red' 'this superiority'(1) - we have to remember both that these characterise, or relate, substances, and that their initial distinction from substance can only be made in terms of change, as the transient from the, at least relatively, constant.(2)

But any character or relation may be, or may be regarded as, itself relatively constant; or on the other hand the substance may be taken as changing continuously in respect of its characters or relations(3). In the latter case, the characters and relations of the substance at any moment are the unique 'possession' of that moment, and, conversely, 'now' will locate them unambiguously in time. But this temporal 'location' being granted, location in space by 'pointing' becomes possible; and in the case of the non-substantial, - which, unlike substance, is matter of direct observation, - pointing presents no difficulty, where, as here, reference to a substance is purely general and implicit(4). Statements about characters and relations looked at thus are in the same situation with statements about a total perceptum.

But if we are taking any character or relation as relatively constant it will be the possession of more than one 'now': and though it will still be possible to make propositions about it as existing at

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(1) I omit 'events' to avoid complexity; the difficulties attaching to that conception, however solved, do not, I think, raise any fresh problem of principle for knowledge of the particular. (2) It may be remarked also that this distinction presupposes what we later discuss as 'circumscription' of the substance. Cf Stout 'Manual of Psychology' p 456. (3) We are not concerned with the distinction of sensible appearance from 'real character' here; for our purpose we can conveniently speak of both in terms of the latter. (4) In effect, the total perceptum is treated as the substance.
any one point of the spatio-temporal order, exactly as in the preceding case, a new factor is involved when we wish to speak of it in its nature as constant, as belonging to a succession of 'nows'. We find ourselves forced to an explicit recognition of the substantial; we have definitely to refer the character or relation to its substance, which must therefore be distinguished from and, I imagine we may also say, within the perceptum as such. Perhaps we may symbolise the difference between the present and the earlier situation as follows: where before we were considering 'this red; 'this superiority; now we are concerned with 'the red of this' 'the superiority of this'. The character or relation remains, indeed, still a particular but the emphasis is transferred from its particularity in itself to the particularity of the substance which ontologically is, in any case, its principle of individuation.

Given a knowledge of the particular substance we encounter no hindrance to knowledge of its particular characters, however constant or momentary these be.

We have here in fact the one instance in which it appears to be true that knowledge of the particular involves knowledge of the ground of its particularity; but of course it is not in the sense in which Thom-as understood the correlation. In the first place the necessity is again not a psychological one, - the mind is not so constituted that it cannot apprehend a character without a knowledge of the substance characterised;

(1) Cf S. c O IV 63 "Accidentia autem quum sint formae..." It has been remarked that Thomas' holds a view of the particularity of characters akin to that of Stout. (Aveling, on "The Thomistic Outlook in Philosophy" ap Proc. Arist. Soc 1923/4) This is suggestive as a hint, even if it be superficial as a verdict.
and, secondly, it is, as we see, only under one aspect of characters that a reference to substance is even a logical necessity. It is consistent however with Thomas' general outlook, his conviction as to the relevance of the principle of individuation, to treat the situation last considered, where at least that logical necessity exists, as if it were the only one; and from that point of view the virtual limitation of the problem of cognitio singularium to substantial particulars, with the failure to distinguish the cases of the substantial and the non-substantial, is easily understood.

At the problem of the substantial particular we are now arrived: and, assuming our ability psychologically to use the terms 'this' and or 'that', the problem is one of how to discriminate and indicate the subject without ambiguity. We have argued that for the particular perceptum as a whole, or for any non-substantial element of it taken simply as an element of it, as momentary, that is, and unenduring, no difficulty arises; and the difficulty in the case of the non-substantial particular regarded as enduring is simply the difficulty of the substantial particular at one remove. The problem of our new case lies in the fact that we wish both to secure for our subject a recognition of its uniqueness, which appears to be only possible in terms of its location in time and place, - 'this' being insignificant except as indicative of a 'here and now' - , and yet to speak of it without reference to any particular time or place, since its nature is such that it can be at various times and also (in principle) at various places. There is, so far as I can see, no theoretically satisfactory solution; the best that can be done is, by means of a more or less elaborate description
in terms of qualities themselves universal, to reach a conception
of the thing which will be for practical purposes unique, - no one
description, of course, being guaranteed as adequate for every occa-
sion. Doubtless if there be an individual 'essence' it will serve
as the theoretical terminus of our description; but even so, in
our admitted actual ignorance of that essence, the situation must
in fact remain unaltered.

But there is another aspect of this discrimination of the
particular substance. The process of description presupposes what
we may perhaps distinguish as the "circumscription" of the thing:
we must, so to say, secure our text before we can expound it, we
must assert a 'this' prior to any (or at least any deliberate)
explication of its content. How do we come to achieve this circum-
scription in the first instance? It must be in terms of a 'here'
at some 'now', the 'this' must, as always, signify 'pointing'; but
how do we come to delimit the locality at which we point, to
distinguish the place occupied by 'this' from the 'not-this'? With
characters as such, we said, there is no difficulty; their limits
are directly observed, - with sounds, smells and the like no less

(1) There is a concise discussion of this question in Stout "Manual
of Psychology" III ii 2. §3. The function of interest, there emphas­
is, is of course irrelevant to our consideration. Our concern is
"disinterested" cognition, which demands 'true', not 'useful'
circumscription; and though the 'true' will certainly condition
the 'useful', only the Pragmatists, or Bergson, would suggest that
the 'useful' is the prins. of the 'true'.

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than with colours, if it be remembered that we are accepting them as being just themselves and not as belonging to this or the other substance. But a substance is not directly observed: what, then, gives us the right to ascribe this group of characters to one substance, that to another? I suppose we do not act upon any one principle exclusively: but at least a main ground of our decision is observation of movement independent of the environment. It is a further question, into which we need not enter, why we should regard movement as having this significance. We must note, however, that the application of the rule may not be easy. To cite but one difficulty 'independence' of the environment does not mean that the behaviour of the environment and of the thing are in no way related, but only that their behaviours are not 'proportionate'. The question becomes therefore one of degrees, with all the perplexity attaching to marginal cases; though of course when explained is introduced the situation is improved, as also by the growing store of 'anticipations of perception' in this as in other regards. In concluding our sketch of the conditions required for 'locating' a substantial particular we may add that 'commonsense' seems to demand that, in our spatial world, 'things' should invariably be of a three-dimensional nature. However difficult the application, that would seem to be the rule for distinguishing things from characters.

(1) In a wide, 'Aristotelian' sense; but the evidence from local movement holds chief place. (2) Stout(loc.cit) shows the unique position of our body, among 'circumscribed' substances, or, properly, of the embodied self. Now, since 'circumscription' of the body presupposes and cannot account for the significance of its criteria, does it not seem likely that those criteria are significant because they are the expression of a self? If the clue is not in our unique case, where is it?
We have now discussed the real psychological requirements for knowledge of the particular, as indicated at times by Thomas himself; and further, going beyond anything which Thomas suggests, we have given as background to that problem of apprehension the other problem which the new form of the original question inevitably raises - how do I distinguish one particular from another, what right have I in any instance to single out this or that element of my experience as 'this' or 'that'? I think it is fair to say that the distinction of these two problems was not realised by Thomas: the difficulty, as it seemed to him, was wholly a psychological one, - how is the particular as such apprehensible? For myself, I think the emphasis should be inverted: the difficulties of the derivative question have been already hinted, and we propose here briefly to show how, on the other hand, Thomas' problem in its now correct statement may be safely dismissed.

Clearly the difficulty, if it exists at all, must lie in the use of 'this', implying, as it does, apprehension of the 'here and now'. The question, in Thomas' view, could not be of course whether they are the function of sense or of intellect; and our first chapter has shown that unless they are attributed to intellect the situation is unsatisfactory. The onus of proof therefore lies on any who would deny the capacity of intellect for these functions. But let us ask for ourselves, is intellect incapable of using 'this'? I can discover no reason for the supposition: the concept of 'thisness' must be granted to exist, and by it we can speak of, or think, 'this' as properly as by 'redness' we think red. It may be urged that 'thisness' differs from other concepts such as 'redness', and we admit the charge. But if we
proceed to examine the nature of this difference we shall see that it is in fact such that even if 'sense-knowledge' could account for 'red' and the like, 'thisness' must remain invincibly non-sensitive. For is not the difference simply that 'thisness' is an 'intent' without 'content'? Now the 'content' of apprehension is received from the apprehended, while the 'intent' or reference or assertion is a function of the apprehender; but that sense is a receptive faculty is admitted universally, so that, even if it were capable of 'intent' at all, at least an 'intent' without 'content' is impossible for it. And in this connection we may recall that Aristotle himself has declared the inability of sense to know the particular as such(1).

It will be asked, can even the intellect cope with an intent which has no content? Now we do not suggest that intellect operates in isolation from sense; for the human creature we should claim that knowledge depends on their co-operation, so that in point of fact we shall not have to suppose the possibility of judgments devoid of content. But that one element in the judgment should be thus purely formal (in the modern usage of the term) is not ridiculous, and the fact that intellect, as distinguished from sense, is not receptive will make it possible for it to possess a concept of the kind required. It cannot be maintained that such a concept is

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(1) Anal. Post II xix, 100 a. ad fin. — καί μὴ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἔκκλασιν, ἢ σκπόθεσις τοῦ καθόλου ἑστίν, διὸν ἅπασθαν τοῦ καλλοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
inconceivable, any more than are the categories; like them it is conceivable in its schematised nature, as the 'here and now'. If our opponent persists that he still feels a difficulty in the use of 'this' by the intellect he is perhaps not unreasonable: but we can now urge that he can only deny that use if he is prepared to deny the singular proposition altogether. And here we must distinguish the denial that the singular proposition is an ultimate logical form, or that it can mean exactly what it says, from the denial that it says, however distortedly, anything at all, that it is a logical form even provisionally. The second denial alone concerns us at the moment, and the short answer to it is that it is contrary to fact. Whatever the validity of our singular judgments we do, as a matter of psychological fact, use the form of them.

We maintain, then, that, psychologically speaking, there is no hindrance to the intellect's functioning in singular judgments, and that to the intellect alone can they belong; and, since it is fair to ascribe knowledge according as there is ability to formulate propositions, this amounts to the assertion that knowledge of the particular can belong to intellect and to intellect only. But we must repeat that 'only' does not mean 'in isolation'; and here we modify what is otherwise a complete reversal of Thomas' position by reference to the one truth which underlies it. Sense does bear a part in knowledge of the particular as such; not simply in its general function of providing the stimulus and, (indirectly, as the matrix of phantasms), the supporting imagery for thought, but directly and precisely. The exact
moment of apprehension which, in our other knowledge of the external world, is irrelevant, is here essential; for knowledge of the particular, we have urged, involves a deictic reference, and in the case of the particulars of the external world such a reference is only possible through our point of contact with that world. At the point of contact is, on the one hand, a particular constituent of the world, on the other, a particular moment in the life of the self; and while the former provides the content of our judgment the latter secures it from ambiguity of reference. Now for our human knowledge the point of contact is certainly in sense, and accordingly location particulars of the external world is only possible in terms of our sense-experience. That is all the reality which can underly a theory of sense-knowledge of the particular, and it was already implied in the fact that we can have no conception of 'thisness' except as it is manifested in space and time, the "pure forms" of the perceptual world.

But, again, there is no reason for supposing that 'thisness' is actually so confined in its application: there is a danger of falsely narrowing the question, just as it was necessarily narrowed by Thomas when he asserted unintelligibility to be due to matter. Sense is only one very important type of contact; some particulars are not known through it even on our human level. Knowledge of the self, for instance, neither can, nor needs to, be explained by an "inner sense". And as on our human level there are exceptions, so there is nothing obviously absurd in the idea that, on another level
even that which we now know by sense may be known without it. The idea is admittedly empty, but it may stand for the assertion that the real opposition is not one of sensitive and non-sensitive, but of immediate and mediate. Knowledge of the particular does not of its nature require sense, but it will always involve an immediate contact with the reality known.

This concludes our statement of what we consider to be the real problem and its solution. We have lastly to suggest grounds from which the mistaken formulation of it by Thomas may have sprung: and as a preliminary let us recapitulate the errors of that formulation. They are three in number: first, a false (as we already knew it to be a futile) manner of distinguishing sense and intellect, namely as two independent faculties of cognition with somehow different objects; second, the view that knowledge of the particular as such must be materially not merely formally different from knowledge of the infima species, that the problem of such knowledge lies not simply in the apprehension of ‘thisness’ but in the apprehension of a certain real element in things; lastly, the incorrect correlation of our problem with that of the principle of individuation.

It is not easy to decide how far these errors are of independent origin, and how far or in what order they condition one another: but in any case the second and third are more closely related than is the first with either of them. Let us suppose, for a start, then, that our three errors form two independent ‘groups’: what grounds for the first error can be suggested which fall outside the second group?
A distinction of some kind between sense and intellect may be premised, as necessary to account for the admitted fact of abstraction and abstract thinking: the peculiar contribution of intellect may then readily be regarded as this abstract thinking. This is a natural, though dangerous, way of expressing the truth that the abstract is confined to the intellect. The danger lies in the fact that it too easily passes into the supposition that the intellect, in turn, is confined to the abstract; if once there is any reason for supposing that a non-intellectual cognition exists at all: and such a cognition seems supplied by brute animals. Of course this theory of animal cognition, regarding it as differing not in degree but in kind from our own, is somewhat dogmatic; and we are naturally debarred from forming any conception of the manner in which the cognition takes place. All that we do is to make positive the, for us, merely limiting concept of pure sensation: but, however our justification, the step is taken and the effect secured.

The idea of a purely sensitive cognition, then, allows for the distinction in man, who is both intellectual and sensitive, of intellect and sense as two independent faculties, and from that follows the limitation of intellect to the abstract. But still such a distinction was not really compelled: it results necessarily only on the supposition that sense, independent where, as in the brutes, isolated, retains its independence, remains unaltered, where, in man, it must somehow be yoked with intellect. Now that is a supposition which might well accompany Aristotle's account of the various levels of psychical existence in terms of various grades of soul, - nutritive, sensitive, intellective,
development being matter of addition: and perhaps that method of treatment is partly responsible. It is impossible, however, to claim this without at the same time bringing a charge of inconsistency. For in Aristotle's opinion the lower souls do not so much exist with the higher, in man, as in it: their separate substantiality must therefore be forfeited. So also Thomas denies that a sensitive soul persists in intellectual beings (1), and he certainly held, as we have seen (2), that the sensitive faculties are modified by continuity with intellect.

No convincing explanation of Thomas' distinction of sense and intellect can then be formed along this line; though of course there is nothing extraordinary in his being guilty of a natural error, even where no element in his thought necessitates it. How it is natural we have already indicated, and many factors not now discernible may have assisted the tendency to it. Here it will suffice to point out that influences from the 'second group' of confusions, which we shall shortly discuss, cannot be discounted. The investigation of any such influences may however be left to others (3).

(1) S. c G II 58 S. Th I q76 a 3 (=Nardi 'De Hom'. §11.)
(2) Chap. I.
(3) What I have in mind is, of course, the falsification of the cognitio singularium problem by rationalism and scientific pre-occupation with the universal, whereby the object of intellect is limited to a selection from the concrete thing. Note, however, that even granting that falsification, the demand for a second faculty presupposes the equation of the 'scientific intellect' with intellect in general, and this in turn seems explicable only by the ambiguity of 'matter' (which we shall discuss later) in collaboration with the assimilation theory of knowledge. Again, the limitation of object which rationalism demanded ought not to have been admitted as a limitation at all, so that, once more, no second faculty of cognition would be necessary. Actually, of course, the admission could not be avoided. The conflict of wish with fact in this connection is reflected in the problem of individual, species, and the substantial form; which goes back to Aristotle (v Ross. 'Metaph'. Introd. pp cxv Sq.)
Thomas’ distinction of sense and intellect being once established, knowledge of the particular has, of course, been limited to sense; but this limitation can only be explained if there is something in the object as apprehended by sense which intellect cannot grasp. Now all human knowledge "waits upon" its objects, and in the case of sense at least this waiting can only be conceived in the purely passive form of "reception" of an impression - the union of knowledge known. The theory of union is extended quite naturally to intellect also, and the activity of intellect is made subsidiary thereto. What, then, can be united with sense but not with intellect? Does not sense alone receive in physically material organs? The unintelligible, which must also be the principle of individuation, will therefore be the (physically) material; and so we find the second and third errors likewise explained, as the necessary consequences of the first.

The application of the principle of cognition here set forth we have already discussed; now we are merely suggesting an origin. We have tried to show that it would follow naturally on the severance of sense and intellect; but we must add that it may more probably have been accepted on its own merits into Aristotle’s thought, and so have been rather a concurrent ground of that severance. It is a pre-Socratic theory, formulated before ever the distinction of sense and intellect became explicit, formulated in terms of sense-perception only and concerned with the physiological basis of perception. To physiological considerations it owes its nature, and indeed it is not absurd to suggest that its origin is best understood from the obvious case of the "species in pupilla", - the sense of sight being the one predominantly, and
therefore also dangerously, used for illustration by philosophers. Such is the original doctrine, and there is nothing in Aristotle's interests, or in his attitude to his predecessors, to make it other than likely that he would be attracted by the theory for its own sake, and attempt the re-statement of it in terms of the distinction of sense and intellect achieved in the meantime. But heredity, we may say, triumphed over environment: the effect of the original formulation in terms of sense alone is apparent in the undue deference shown to sense in the new situation. Here, as we have suggested, the theory of "reception" believed necessary for sense is simply, without more ado, assumed to hold for intellect also; and, the limitation of the intellect's knowledge being thereby established, our problem emerges once more.

For purposes of exposition it has been necessary to treat the two aspects of the situation above discussed with a self-containedness which cannot be supposed to have characterised their actual history: and this is true also of the relation between our two groups of error. We have shown how the second is involved in the consequences of the first; we wish now to show how the second group may have originated independently; but we do not suggest that it developed in fact either as a mere consequence, or in complete independence, of the severance of sense and intellect. There is, however, this positive motive to the separate account of the non-psychological errors, that there are elements in the final confusion, as we shall see, which are natural also to views not involving an Aristotelian psychology.
Within our second group of errors the first question must be, are the two errors of independent origin, or if not, which causes which? Now the mistaken statement of the problem of **cognitio singularium** is anything but natural; I cannot see how it could have arisen of itself. On the other hand, the introduction of the **principium individuationis**, the assertion that knowledge of the particular involves knowledge of the principle, may be readily accounted for as the unexamined, dogmatic expression of the correlation of being and knowing; and, the principle being necessarily some real element constitutive of the particular as such, the mistaken statement of the problem at once follows. It will, however, not be effective here unless the principle of individuation be some unintelligible element: but this, as we have seen, means that it must be matter, and it does not seem obvious that a consideration of the problem of individuation in itself will lead necessarily to the view that matter is the individuating principle. We have, nevertheless, no choice: we must try to explain the situation from this starting point. But first we will spare a few words for comment on the introduction of the principle of individuation into our problem in the first instance.

It is not our intention to attempt any detailed explanation of this error; we desire simply, at the risk of repetition, to make clear its nature. The error consists in the supposition that in order to know anything we must know what makes it the thing it is. The falsity of this as a general position is apparent unless we are prepared to make every cause "internal" to its effect; but in the case of the principle of individuation the mistake is not quite so obvious.
As we have said earlier, the situation involved is static and constitutive, not genetic, and the principle therefore must be regarded as internal to that which it individuates. Does not knowledge of the particular, then, involve knowledge of this principle?

"Knowledge of the particular" is, however, ambiguous; it may mean knowledge of the full nature of a particular, or simply knowledge of an object that it is particular. It is, as we have said, beyond doubt that the latter is our concern; for certainly sense does not know the particular in the former manner. Yet it is not impossible that the ambiguity, and the ignorance of the full nature of the particular by which intellect is unquestionably characterised, should have led to the statement of the relevant problem in terms only suitable to the irrelevant one. For, to a certain philosophic outlook, failure to achieve exhaustive knowledge of the object is in itself a problem, and that is an outlook that belongs to the philosophy which engages us here. Now only in the irrelevant problem does cognitio singularium involve what Thomas terms "cognitio illius per quod singulare completur"; for us, "cognitio illius per quod aliquid ut singulare apparit" would be enough, and that, we have decided, is knowledge of the "thisness" of the object, schematised as the "here and now". No distinction of the principles of individuality and of individuation is to the

(1) How this outlook assists the confusion of issues we shall see presently.
principles of constitution from those of recognition, which we have spoken of as the reflection of the former. Indeed, the two constitutive principles become one, or individuation drops out altogether (as we can see from Thomas himself) if ever space is not a character of the world: and as we have been unable to give a meaning to the principle of individuation even in a world so characterised, (since it collapsed into a non-constitutive bare location) we may be allowed to reduce the two principles to one for every case (1). If we go on to say that we cannot distinguish the one principle now remaining from the thing itself we again have support in Thomas, in so far as he identifies the principle of individuality with the form; since form ("matter" as a constitutive element having evaporated) does cover the whole being of the thing.

The position thus reached is, in effect, identical with Bonaventura's placing of the principle in the composite of form and matter; but of course it is unenlightening. It amounts to the statement that everything is a particular in and through its being a thing. It empties the word "principle" of all significance; there

(1) We may even remark that this distinction on the constitutive level is never clearly made by Thomas himself: it is, I think, more an arguable inference by apologists. The principle of individuation cannot be found to be other than a compromise between the principles of constitution and of recognition, and as such it is typical of Thomas' whole position, hopeless itself just because it is merely on the way to a new standpoint.
is no attempt to conceive what may be the "inner side", so to say, of that which appears as a "thisness" over and above all formal (or material) elements. Perhaps the haecceitas of Scotus comes nearest to making that attempt, although in fact it does not get beyond the indication of what must be attempted. The haecceitas simply expresses a postulate which remains a surd, though because a surd it demands that we essay an interpretation. No interpretation, however, was possible within the confines of crude realism. Had Scotus understood the "phenomenal" nature of the world of the senses, and so recognised also that there may be an interpretation of the nature of things otherwise than as they are apprehended in sense, he might have succeeded in giving a meaning to his formula, - a meaning of a Leibnizian nature. The question would be, can we attribute any positive significance to the conception of substance, except in terms of the self? - though we must not of course, ignore the difficulties involved, for this restriction of substance to that which lives, in our inability to apply the restriction to our actual, if provisional, discriminations of one substance from another.

It is just worth noting that, in contradistinction from Scotus, Occamist nominalism - freed from the necessity of "explaining" the individual - was enabled to concentrate upon the epistemological aspect of the situation and satisfactorily reduced it to a question of numerical otherness. The degree of success achieved by Scotus and Occam will serve to emphasise the havoc wrought in Thomas' thinking by a
confusion of the two problems (i).

We turn at length to consider how the introduction of the individuation question into the cognitive situation may in fact have led to Thomas' misunderstanding of the point at issue, and to various attendant confusions. It must be understood that here, as earlier, our procedure is analytic, not historical; we do not profess to recount the actual development of the error, nor do we attempt to assign their various degrees of responsibility to Aristotle, Thomas, and the intervening Peripatetics.

Broadly, we have to explain why the principle of individuation should be taken to be matter. The effect of that principle has two aspects, - multiplicity (at least potential) within the species, and numerical otherness of the particulars. Now if by matter we mean the world extended in space, it is only in virtue of its spatial extension, - which is not sensible matter at all, - that it secures bare numerical difference; accounting simultaneously for multiplicity, since a plurality of identical forms can be observed only as they occupy different positions. But that is just the view to which Thomas seems finally moving, the view involved in our own statement of the problem: it is not a confusion at all. Can we not discover some other sense in which matter may be said to be the principle of multiplicity, or of numerical otherness, or both?

(i) The comments, in the foregoing section, on thinkers other than Thomas are not based upon first-hand knowledge. At the same time they are so general as to preclude specific acknowledgment to any secondary source. Harris oppcit. for Scotus, Delisle Burns (ap. Proc. Arist. Soc. 1913/4) for Occam, Asennacher oppcit and Gilson "Philosophie au Moyen Age", are together my justification.
I think it is to be found as an element in the situation secured by abstraction. When we select any being and fix our attention upon certain main characters of it to the exclusion of the others, these characters are for us, at that time, the form of the thing, and the disregarded detail is, by antithesis, matter (1). Matter is the ad hoc irrelevant. Now any selected element is (at least potentially) common to beings other than that from which it is selected: and conversely, the thing from which abstraction is made being a particular, if we replace the "matter" (2) we may be said to particularise the universal form. We have thus a new sense in which matter may be termed the principle of individuation; and it is the sense required, for it is a matter really in part constitutive of the particular, as the other was not. It can be called a principle of the distinction of particulars, since it is in virtue of the matter added to the common form that the possessors of that form are distinguished: but the distinction would not, apparently, be barely numerical, for matter in this sense is not "empty" or undifferentiated; it simply consists in certain characters excluded from the common form. We see here, in the confusion of this with the true situation, the root of the uncertainty as to whether the sub-specific is distinguished by a "real" or only by a numerical difference, and correspondingly, whether the substantial form is to be treated as specific or as individual,

(1) But see infra p. 191 and note 1, ther.

(2) Which, however, then ceases to be matter!
- however the line is drawn between the two. These are
difficulties which reveal the Thomist position at its weakest.
But to continue: it is not, we must admit, so clear that matter
in the sense here discussed can be termed a principle of plurality.
Perhaps, however, it is enough that potential plurality and matter
are certainly parallel results of the one abstractive process; so that
matter would be a sign of plurality, as plurality reciprocally of
matter.

It is this matter, then, we suggest, which, taken as principle
of individuation effected the distortion of the issue. No alternative
presents itself, and by way of answer to the doubter we can only
proceed to a more careful examination of it, and discussion of the
manner of its effectiveness. The obvious charge is that it does not
meet our needs, since, in any case, it is not matter in the sense in
which matter was said to be unintelligible: it is, unlike that
"physical" matter, the result and not the cause of abstraction. We
admit this freely; but is not the solution obvious? Will it not
lie simply in the supposition that the two "matters" were confused?
And as evidence that that confusion did in fact occur we may recall
that one of our difficulties was to decide whether matter, for Thomas,
was potency or body, his intermediate formula being apparently a
merely nominal solution of that conflict. So also the distinction of
these two senses of matter would at once have solved the difficulties
inherent in the conception of separate substances. Their separateness
is, obviously, in terms of ordinary "physical" matter, or body; but
their immateriality in this respect leaves them no less subject than the composite beings to the "matter" of abstraction. They will therefore present no difficulty of their own for the theory of individuation and particularity; and we shall not be driven to that distressing distinction of participable and non-participable forms which, in turn, I believe, cannot be stated so as to be applicable to the situation for which it is intended except by the confusion of abstract universal with essence, and which, as applied, is, we saw, but the foundation of chaos(1). Thomas' difficulties concerning the relation of genus to species, again, show the same compresence of both uses of "matter". That relation is irrelevant if physical matter alone is in question, and easily dealt with as simply analogous to the species - individual relation, if matter as the ad hoc negligible is our only concern.

Let us pass now to our hypothetical construction of the development, beginning with a consideration of the significance of the matter-form antithesis, irrespective of the confusion just mentioned. We have implied above(2) that "matter" as here antithetic to form amounts to mere potency: a little earlier we suggested that it was just in terms of this matter that real difference within the species was possible, and that the opposed theory of a merely numerical difference springs from a glimpse of the true problem.

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(1) The problem of the separate substance, regarded as devoid of matter in both senses, is that it must then be at once properly specific and properly individual: which is impossible, - where(as by Thomas)specific is opposed to particular. (The reason for the qualification will soon be apparent.)

(2) In our reference in the preceding paragraph, to the potency-body ambiguity of signate matter.
There is no contradiction in this: it is certainly true that only in the terms of the true problem can any account be given of this purely numerical difference; but the views of matter as something positive and as something quite empty are none the less both covered by the abstractive situation. The differentiation of form and matter is not absolute: though whatever we regard as form in any particular instance will be determined by that instance, there are various levels at which we may "specify". "Matter", therefore, will be not merely a correlative term, but fluctuating in its significance, according to the level of specification. It has, in fact, two aspects, - a negative (and so, naturally, constant) significance as the correlate of form, and in this aspect it figures as a bare potency of determination; and also a positive (fluctuating) significance in respect of its own nature, the ("formal") elements which constitute it, but which are at the moment irrelevant.

Thus the double view of the relation of the individual to the specific form is made possible: but so far it may be said that everything is in favour of treating matter in the positive sense; and further, since in that positive sense it is capable of being regarded as formal, no less than its "form", where can a cognitive problem arise at all? Perhaps it arises thus. "Matter" is composed of irrelevant formal elements; but clearly knowledge as such does not treat anything as irrelevant. Knowledge would aim, then, at grasping a form from which nothing is excluded, - a lowest form or infima species: and the correlative matter in this case would have no positive side to it at all, - it would be a pura potentia or
prima materia. Might not such a matter, absolutely formless, present an obstacle to knowledge?

No, it will be replied. There is nothing in this account to necessitate treating the total state of affairs—infima species and prima materia—as other than a limiting case; and a badly stated one at that, since "potency", being like "appearance" a relative term, and the negative aspect of "matter" always presupposing therefore its positive existence, "pure potency" is as meaningless an expression as "mere appearance" would be. If the conception of infima species here intended is to be taken seriously, it should be regarded as a species sine materia; and therefore, presumably, as an individual, since the absence of matter would indicate that no abstraction had been made. Infima species and individual would be one; nor could they be distinguished except as the "such" and "this" aspects, respectively, of the particular being. But if this attitude had been taken up, we should once more have been faced with the true problem of cognitio singularium(1).

What, we have to enquire, hindered this result? Wicksteed very properly maintains that the trouble arises from the scholastic hardening of the Aristotelian matter and form antithesis(2); and though it must not be supposed that Aristotle himself was free from

(1) As Thomas himself states it for the supposedly different case of separate substances, - "De Spirit Creat," a5, ad 9. dic; "in formis abstractis non addit individuwm supra naturam speciei aliquid secundum rem...Addit tamen aliquid secundum rationem; scilicet hoc quod est non posse existere in pluribus".

(2) "Dogma and Philosophy" p 424.
guilt, we may accept the principle. But what in fact is involved? The hardening is inconceivable except in terms of *infima species* and *prima materia*, where alone we have matter unambiguously. But it is perfectly right, indeed necessary, that the antithesis here should be hard, since we are dealing with the limiting uses of the terms in question. The fundamental error is, therefore, not the hardening of the terms as such, but the alleged discovery of the *infima species*, of which discovery that hardness is the expression. I say "alleged" because the discovery of an *infima species* which was itself the individual would have had no evil effect. The trouble for knowledge came with the assertion of that as *infima species* which from the point of view of knowledge was not *infima* at all. Once this assertion was made you had masquerading as "first matter", or, more vaguely, as matter which in no sense was also form, a "matter" which did in fact possess a positive and therefore "formal" character. Thus on the one hand the limitation of knowledge to the "form" became serious while, on the other side, *matter* was both, in fact, a principle of real differentiation and, nominally, a principle of purely numerical distinction. Further, the confusion allowed "first matter" to be treated as a real entity; and this may explain both how it was not seen to be absurd to "limit", as Thomas does, a potency as such – a folly doubtless originating in the fact that the "reference to the act", which expresses this limitation, is natural to a potency reached by abstraction – ; and also how, when "first matter" was found (as "common matter") to be known by its relation to the form, this knowledge did not, apparently, embrace all that was contained in the material side of the relation.
How did the "discovery" of the infima species come to be made? I suggest two grounds. First, a demand by a two intellectualistic philosophy that the infima species should be a real fact: there was no other way of securing a "limit" to the nature of the thing known and, thereby, the possibility of complete knowledge. This possibility to such an outlook -- and it need not be said that here is the point at which the roots of our trouble go far beyond Aristotle! particular school of opinion -- this possibility would seem necessary if scepticism was to be avoided(1). Hence the doctrine of forms or essences, transcendent or immanent. It is needless to seek any more elaborate origin for the conception; the philosophers were working, as has been remarked, with a prima facie notion(2), which, however mistaken, was the natural one at the period when, we may say, philosophy first became self-conscious. The "discovery" of intellect seemed to require a discovery also of the purely intelligible object, "out of the wash of days and temporal tide" or at least rock-steady therein. But if it was necessary, in order to avoid scepticism, to suppose the reality of the infima species, it was natural, with the same motive, to suppose that we could in fact apprehend such. Now if the infima species were actually the individual, knowledge of it (in the sense of "knowledge" here required) would mean exhaustive knowledge of the "what" -- not simply the "that" of an individual. For men this is certainly no more than an ideal; consequently the infima species, to

(1) Cf the rationalist, anti-sceptical ground for limiting knowledge to universals (for "singularia sunt infinita") ap. the spurious "De Universalibus" Tract I (Mandamenti Opusc. Vol V p386).
(2) Ross, on Aristotle: "Metaphysics", Introd. p xciv. And cf in general in this connection Hamelin pp 74 sq. of his "Système d'Aristote."
to be known, has to be limited to something not individual, some
definite body of characters common (at least potentially) to more than
one individual, - a specific form, as we commonly understand "species".

It may be acknowledged that the force of this suggestion seems
diminished by Thomas' admission of the failure of the intellect to know
its "proper object" satisfactorily (1); knowledge of the intellect to
with a medley of inessential characters seems at times to be approximately
what he allows us. But we may perhaps regard this modesty, where it occurs,
as indicative simply of the direction in which Thomas was tending, -
away from reckless rationalism - though he himself did not see its
significance for that theory of species and individual which he had
inherited from the less empirical doctrines of his predecessors (2).

A second ground of the discovery of the infima species may be more
briefly stated. "Species", in ordinary speech to-day, is an ontological
not an epistemological term. In this sense we oppose species to individ­
ual deliberately and without any self-deception; and the fact and present
relevance of that opposition are not affected whether we believe the
species to be metaphysical or methodological only. We are urged by
practical considerations: for the purposes of science we must consider our

(1) Of "Manual of Mod Schol Phil", Psychology "De Hom" §65 ap.444) See also
S. G. III 56. Of "Manual of Mod Schol Phil" Psychology §106; also Logic §79.
(2) The conflict of rationalism and empiricism in St. Thomas is worth study,
as even the passages cited in our last note may indicate.

It may be said that, as regards Thomas' predecessors, however rationalist
the intervening thinkers may have been, Aristotle himself at least was no
foe to empiricism. But even if that be true of Aristotle's bias and inten­tion
the fact remains that only by dogmatism at some point, by some fore­
closing of the search for forms or essences, could his Organon be set in
operation. For he had, we may say, while elaborating his Xροτηθέν, left his
Οπτυθέν to take care of itself. It was of course to remedy this
defect that the inductive method of the "Novum Organon" was propounded,
with what success is another question.
object in terms of a nature which it shares with other objects, and
the scientific species has significance only so far as it is not
individual(1). In itself this outlook would not demand that intellect
be by its nature limited to the specific so understood; but a confusion
of intellect as the faculty of science with intellect in its wider
meaning as opposed to sense would account for the limiting of the latter
to the proper object of the former. And just this confusion is involved
in that manner of distinguishing and separating sense and intellect which
we examined earlier in this chapter(2).

Thus we reach the second stage of the development of our confusion.
We have shown how knowledge of the particular might come to be denied in
the manner of Thomas' position: it remains to see how that denial could
be supported in any treatment of the subject. As it stands, the error might
be apparent enough to suggest its own cure by a mere alteration of terms.
This happy issue was hindered, we have suggested, by the confusion of
"matter" as above opposed to form with "matter" as we ordinarily under-
stand it in such phrases as "the material world", and we gave instances
of the operation of this confusion. But how could it have occurred? For
between the one meaning and the other there seems just nothing in common.

We can suppose only that it was permitted by the fact that the
objects, the particulars, with which our knowledge is at least primarily

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(1) This is to emphasise the classificatory aspect of science. In so far
as the object desired for science is not the universal as such but the
necessary(cf Hamelin "Système Aristoté" p 399) the case coincides with our "first
(2) See supra p 174 n.3. for the situation if this confusion be taken to be a ground
rather than a consequent of the severance of sense and intellect. It is by this influence of the scientific interest that
we must correspondingly explain Aristotle's lack of regard for the singular proposition, which, however fully revenged itself on Thomas for
instance, as we saw, by obtruding when no satisfactory account of it could
any longer be given. Thomas can only attempt to mitigate his chagrin


concerned, are the constituents of the natural, or material, world. Thus, the proper, or primary, sphere for the employment of the terms is co-extensive for both significations of matter, and what, in the more technical sense, was "matter" opposed to "form" would appear(1) to be also "material" (as the residue in rerum natura) opposed to that (immaterial, abstraction: although, of course, this material residue was no more existent in rerum natura apart from the form than the form apart from its matter. Then, while it is only as opposed to form that matter should enter into the question of the principle of individuation, it was primarily in terms of the non-technical significance that plausibility was given to the denial of knowledge of the non-formal and sub-specific, by the principle of the unintelligibility of a matter incapable of union with the intellect. But, illegitimately, the popular sense of "matter" further gave solidity and positive being to the individuating principle, while the "matter" of that principle repaid the debt by supplying, in ἄτομο the pure potency which is its limiting case, an opportunity for denying knowledge of the material, by the doctrine of "omnis actio per formam".

Among the marks and effects of this complex perversion, additional to those mentioned earlier, it is easy to understand, though too-far-reaching for us here to unravel, the various contaminations of the straightforward matter and form antithesis, which are present to a degree

(2a) by the principle, itself the false reflection of a scientific bias and one peculiarly unsuitable for a Christian philosopher, that "singularia" are not as such "de perfectione naturae": so, "cognoscere species rerum pertinet ad perfectionem intelligibilem; non autem cognitio individuum nisi forte per accidentem". (d. de Anima al.8.)

(1) Apart from this appearance I do not see why the term "matter" should have been used of the non-formal at all; though for convenience we have spoken throughout as if it were an obvious term to select and not itself a mark of the confusion.
that makes it hard to distinguish its terms at all. On the one hand, matter, under the influence of the popular conception, is found characterised by formal elements; while form, in its crucial equation with the infima species, must necessarily include physical materiality. Many minor difficulties might engage us indefinitely; but we shall conclude by calling attention to one of the first importance, which will be sufficient to illustrate the interest attaching to such investigations.

There is an ambiguity as to the meaning of "form" itself, which certainly goes back to Aristotle (1), and which is strikingly exemplified throughout Thomas' writings (3). "Form" may intend either the "inner structure" or the "outer shape" (5) or contour of an object; and these alternatives are of course reflected in the account of the are known. There is "intentional species" whereby the forms in-the-account-of-the no reason except that of convenience, why "form" should not have this double signification, but there is every reason why the meanings should be kept distinct; and that is not achieved. I think it is legitimate to hold that the cause of their confusion lies in the see prior confusion of the meanings of "matter" to which they are respectively opposed. As

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(1) See Ross. "Metaph". Introd xciii-iv
(2) There is no need of references. We have simply to observe in any case how far form is being treated as equivalent with essence, how far two are distinguished. The corresponding ambiguity in the nature of the "intentional species" is that which we observed in Chapter IV, in connection with the assimilation theory of knowledge and Cf. infra. For Aristotle see(e.g) Ross "Aristotle", chapter on Psychology.

(3) These terms are borrowed from Ross, loc.cit. in not()}
"contour" form is opposed to "physical" matter; it is the insubstantial surface of a substantial thing; while as structure form can only be opposed to that matter which is the "irrelevant" rejected in abstraction.

We can, however, go a little deeper. Only the second represents an antithesis of form and matter which we have found significant and have therefore discussed at length. We have not mentioned any sense in which form was opposed to physical matter. But a confusion of the meanings of matter could not produce a confusion of the meanings of form if one of the latter is not before the mind at all. Where, then, are we compelled to consider form as it is opposed to physical matter? It is in the "assimilation" theory of knowledge, according to which what is united with the knower is that superficial form, or rather the intentional species representing that form(1), of the physical object. Here indeed is a tragedy: the confusion of the meanings of "form" is due ultimately to a theory of knowledge which, none the less, could not be maintained; while conversely no one could have failed to secure a true theory of knowledge through concepts as media who had confined himself to the opposition of structural form with matter, since it is clear that only a concept can "represent" such a structure. Thus at the end of our story we are fittingly made to realise afresh the fatal influence of that primitive psychological outlook whose importance was impressed upon us at the beginning of this explanatory analysis.

(1) It is true that even this "form" becomes adequate only so far as it absorbs the whole observable nature of its "matter"; but this process hard to conceive in itself, brings us in any case no nearer to the concept. At the finish, we are still left with a content devoid of intent, from which only a break with "images" as media can free us. For such a tendency in Thomas, see Chap IV.
Here we must leave our examination of the confusions underlying the Thomist position. They are certainly worth a fuller and more systematic discussion; but even this brief survey may suffice to show their general nature, — a mistaken view of our psychological constitution, a primitive theory of cognition, the blind acceptance of a correlation between a principle of being and a principle of knowing, the intellectualist demand for an exhaustible object, supported by the scientist’s invention of one and the conflation of two quite unrelated meanings of "matter". Further, our conclusions have been confirmed by what is, I trust, a sufficiency of illustration of how these unobserved radical errors bore their manifest fruit in the express detail of Thomist thought.

If in this final chapter we have come at all near the truth, we may hope also to have mitigated the suggestion of hostility and sheer destructiveness which our previous treatment of Thomas can hardly have avoided. Believing the position of Thomas there criticised to be fundamentally mistaken we had no choice but to recite its faults with the greatest possible emphasis. The subject selected was not unimportant in itself, and the errors revealed may well be supposed to affect the Thomist position at points which we have no opportunity to consider now. That must be our justification for what is here written. But there was not necessarily any implication that Thomas was a foolish and negligible thinker; and indeed we must positively repudiate so suicidal a judgment. If he can be accused of uncritical bondage to the past, so in some measure can all philosophers, — Kant certainly not excepted.
But great philosophers may also be in some measure what Shelley has claimed for the poets, "the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration"; and we must remember that we observed in Thomas, along with this bondage, point to a tentative attitudes of mind which are more the new outlook in the problem here discussed, and which are more than matched by discussions of other themes in a vein which frequently leaps the Cartesian tradition altogether. Again, we must record that we have been obliged to ignore many excellent details and suggestions even in the teachings which we have submitted to examination; that was incidental to our purpose and scope, not indicative of our ingratitude.

But when all is said and the accuser returns once more to mock the mind entangled in the thicket of terms and formulae, many of them in hopelessly conflict with one another, and some, it even appears, meaningless in themselves, the facts of the situation must be frankly admitted and defence confined to the method just employed, of exhibiting the extent and the astonishing root-depth of the embarrassments which the thinker had to elude or destroy. When these difficulties are sufficiently realised, we shall be grateful to any philosopher in whose work they are so clearly exemplified that not only is dissatisfaction created, but the data for elucidation supplied. And if we observe that philosopher himself stumbling half-blindly though it be, toward the solution, it is impossible not to add to our gratitude a very sincere admiration.