BRITISH ATTITUDES
TO THE
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION, 1848-50

by

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British attitudes during the Schleswig-Holstein War of 1848-50 were predominantly pro-Danish. The invasion of Denmark and the Elbe Duchies by the Confederation of German States, led by Prussia, was looked upon as an attempt by a large and aggressive power to bully a smaller and inoffensive neighbour into surrendering a large part of her territory and excellent ports on the Baltic and North Seas. Besides the belief that Denmark had a legal right to the Duchies it was feared that should Germany gain control of this strategic area, she would in time build a merchant fleet and a navy which could offer Britain serious competition. In addition, should the Germans have their own way, the Duchies would probably become members of the Zollverein which already imposed high tariffs on British goods. Should the Duchies join this union, probably other north German areas would too, and perhaps even a good part of Scandinavia would be economically compelled to enter it. This danger helped to convince many Britons that the Helstat should remain intact.

Many in Britain objected to the interference of the Frankfurt Parliament in the Schleswig-Holstein Question and held that this body was using the issue merely to rally support for itself in Germany. Moreover, the general contempt for the vacillations of the Parliament increased the respect felt in Britain for the more stable Danish government. German professors advocating Schleswig-Holsteinism and German students who volunteered to fight there were severely censured by the British: the German professors for sponsoring what English writers considered inadequate and misleading historical arguments to prove that Schleswig was German, and the students for being adventure-
seeking, plundering youths rather than the freedom-loving emancipators which they claimed to be. British sources often praised the valour of the outnumbered Danes. They seldom condemned the Danish right to blockade German seaports, although it hurt many English industries, and Palmerston repeatedly stated in letters to memorialists and in addresses to Parliament that these blockades were legal.

Only at Court was there a strong pro-German sentiment; Queen Victoria, influenced by the German-born Prince Albert, wished the Duchies to be included in a unified Germany. But, Palmerston in his desire to maintain British neutrality and the balance of power in Europe, constantly discouraged the expression of the Court's attitude on this question. A few British men-of-letters also assumed pro-German stands, but far more of them condemned the Diet's intrusion into the Helstat and spoke up ardently for the Danes. Denmark was censured by the British press for renewing the war in the spring of 1849 after the termination of the Malmö Truce, but other than during this brief interval, nearly every major British newspaper and periodical hoped for a Danish victory.
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I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that the work is my own.
Chapter I

INTRODUCTION; BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT

The Elbe Duchies in 1848 constituted a relatively distinct geographical area at the base of the peninsula of Jutland. On the southwest, the River Elbe formed a natural boundary between Holstein and Hanover. To the west lay the North Sea and to the east, the Baltic. A small stream divided north Schleswig from Denmark - the Kongeaa. Holstein was separated from Schleswig by the River Eider and there were no natural obstacles to the southeast defining the frontier with Lauenburg.

Two large German cities situated on the southern border of Holstein, Hamburg and Lübeck, played a large part in the development of the trade and commerce of the region, although neither belonged to the Helstat. Altona in Holstein, located on the Elbe slightly downstream from Hamburg, was the largest North Sea port in the Duchies, while Flensburg and Kiel were the most important on the Baltic.

Besides Schleswig and Holstein, there was also Lauenburg - the smallest of the three Elbe Duchies. Located on the Elbe and southeast of Holstein, historians because of its size have often minimized its importance when carrying out research on the Schleswig-Holstein Question. Rather than Lauenburg and Holstein, it was the area from the Kongeaa to the Eider that significant numbers of both Danes and Germans settled. The situation which developed in this dual-ethnic region did much to

(1) Helstat (the entire State) was a term used to designate Denmark, the Elbe Duchies and the Danish overseas possessions.
bring about the struggle in the mid-Nineteenth Century between the
Eider-Danes\(^{(2)}\) and the Schleswig-Holsteiners.\(^{(3)}\)

Several British historians in the mid-Nineteenth Century when
commenting on the Danish-German conflict in 1848-50, reminded their
readers that historians believed that this area was the homeland of
the Angles, Saxons and Jutes.\(^{(4)}\) Samuel Laing wrote: "Here [the Elbe
Duchies] was the home of the three tribes, the Juti, Angli, and Frisi,
who according to the Venerable Bede, and all the traditional history of
the fifth century, invaded England ... Angeln may have been merely the
name of a very small district still called Angeln, which had served as
the rendezvous and the wharf of embarkation;"\(^{(5)}\) but later in the same
work he asserted more boldly that "they embarked on voyages from the
mouth of the Eyder to the mouth of the Thames."\(^{(6)}\) Edward Cayley
believed that the Duchies were of significant interest to the British
because they were the "original seat from whence sprung that great race
of Angles and Danes, which, combined with the Normans (originally another

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\(^{(2)}\) Danes who wished to incorporate Schleswig, "down to the Eider,"
into Denmark proper.

\(^{(3)}\) Germans who wished to establish a closer union between the Duchies
of Schleswig and Holstein.

\(^{(4)}\) See infra., Chapter VI, Men-of-Letters, passim.

\(^{(5)}\) Samuel Laing, Observations on the Social and Political State of
Denmark and the Duchies of Sleswick and Holstein in 1851 ...  

\(^{(6)}\) Ibid., p. 121. For additional opinions of Laing on these former
inhabitants of Jutland see ibid., pp. V-VII, 445-446.
Scandinavian sea-coast tribe), produced the Englishman and England as they now exist."(7) And according to Travers Twiss, many ethnographical traces of the early Saxons still remain in the Duchies, particularly in the area between the Elbe and the Schlei.(8)

German historians also pointed out these lineal connections. They hoped in this manner to win British sympathy for the Germans under Danish rule. The Prussian Ambassador in London, Christian von Bunsen, remarked on this relationship in the book which he wrote primarily to gain Palmerston's support. Bunsen included On the Succession in the Danish Monarchy, a separate treatise by another German, M. de Gruner, which supported his views on this.(9)

Besides the Danes and the Germans, there dwelt a third relatively large ethnic group within the Duchies - the Frisians. This people, whose motto was lever duad as slaav (death before slavery) lived mainly along the North Sea coast from The Netherlands to north Schleswig. They first came to the base of Jutland and its off shore islands before the year 1,000 and by 1848 numbered about 25,000. Their language was closer to Old English than German. The use of the Low German language soon began to spread in the area, two reasons being because Frisian contained so


(9) Chevalier Bunsen, Memoir on the Constitutional Rights of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, presented to Viscount Palmerston on 6th of April, 1848 ... (London, 1848), pp. 59, 75-78, 121. See infra., pp. 169-170.
many dialects and had no literary tongue to compete with Low German in the Middle Ages. This language assimilation continued well into the mid-Nineteenth Century, and beyond, so that by 1951, out of 60,000 Frisians living in the Duchies near the North Sea coast only about 20,000 spoke their national language at home. (10)

Another ethnic group, the Slavs, had settled principally in south-eastern Holstein. This race had invaded the Duchies from eastern Europe on numerous occasions from before the establishment of the Gorm dynasty in Denmark until well into the Eleventh Century. (11)

A fifth racial group to settle north of the Elbe were Huguenots, who migrated to Holstein and south Jutland after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV in 1685. Although not a large group, the Huguenots were a highly skilled people who did much to raise cultural as well as technical standards in the area. Because of the tolerance of the Danish government, these French protestants became particularly well-established in Fredericia, a Danish city near the north Schleswig border, (12) and also it seems at Altona, Holstein. (13)


(11) Twiss, Relations, p. 8.

(12) N.C. Lukman, Fredericia Kolonien, vort lille Frankrig, avec une Resume Frangais (Aarhus, 1939), pp. 7, 16-17; John Markus Dalgas, Historisk og Statistik Beskrivelse over de Reformeertes Establissement i Fredericia i Jylland (Copenhagen, 1797), pp. 7-8.

(13) Edmund Spencer, Germany from the Baltic to the Adriatic ... (London, 1867), p. 34.
In spite of the influence of Danes, Frisians, Slavs and Huguenots, the population of Holstein (almost 480,000 in 1844) remained preponderantly German, culturally and ethnically. German was the major language and this was fully recognized even by those in Denmark who wished to maintain the Duchy's ties to the Helstat. Lauenburg, with a population of about 50,000 was also German in character. It had only been a part of Denmark since 1815, being given to the King as compensation for the loss of the far more valuable Norway.

In contrast to Holstein and Lauenburg, Schleswig presented a far greater ethnic diversity. It is difficult to prove which language, Danish or German dominated in this Duchy. But it has been clearly established that in the mid-Nineteenth Century, while the people in north Schleswig spoke mostly Danish, the inhabitants of south Schleswig spoke primarily German.

A German cartographer, Johann Biernatzki, who had been born in Holstein, but who later moved to Friedrichstadt claimed that the

(14) Twiss, Relations, p. 5.
(17) E. Alberti, "Biernatzki, Johann Christoph," Allemeine deutsche Biographie, II (Leipzig, 1875), p. 630, hereafter cited as A.d.B.
number who spoke German in Schleswig was near to 133,000, and those who spoke Danish 123,000.\footnote{Carr, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 71.} But Travers Twiss reported that according to the Danish State Calendar for 1847, Schleswig had in 1844 a population of 362,900 people and that "[here] the German population formed the minority, there being upwards of 180,000 Danes ... About 125,000, whose language is exclusively Danish and who attend Danish schools and Danish religious services and amongst whom there is no German element. They occupy the entire northern part of the Duchy."\footnote{Twiss, \textit{Relations}, p. 5.} The Danish speaking population was about 145,000 and the German 120,000 to 128,000, and it was reasonable enough for the Danish members of the Schleswig estates to hold that at least fifty percent of the inhabitants of the Duchy used Danish.\footnote{Carr, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 71.}

Central Schleswig was the most ethnically diversified area within this Duchy. Not only did Danes and Germans approach numerical equality here, but in this region a large percentage of the Frisian population lived.\footnote{Ibid., p. 67.} The area also included Angeln, a province on the Baltic lying between two wide inlets of east Schleswig - the Flensburg Fjord and the Schlei. Here a form of Danish called Anglisch was widely used about 1800. The people of south Angeln after the turn of the century began to speak more German, while the speech in the area near Flensburg was influenced by Danes living in this city and on the north side of the

\footnote{Carr, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 71.}
Although the Duchies contained diverse ethnic groups, generally the residents were politically passive in the early 1840's. They were of an easy-going nature and left the affairs of government to the members of the estates, in whom they had confidence. (23) With the awakening of the Nineteenth Century feeling of national consciousness serious jealousies rose between them. (24) This feeling developed partly in Scandinavian universities (25) and folk high schools, (26) but probably to a greater extent, in German universities such as Kiel (27) and Heidelberg. (28)

One of the strongest movements in university circles which assisted

(22) Ibid., pp. 68-69.
(23) Ibid., p. 185.
(27) Cayley, Revolutions, II, pp. 45-47.
in the growth of "Schleswig-Holsteinism" was that of the Burschenschaften. These liberal student societies, after an unstable beginning in the 1790's, established a firmer base from which to expand after 1800. Friedrich Jahn, one of the early leaders of this movement also organized the Turnverein, a gymnastic organization which favoured the unification of the German speaking people. (29) One Englishman, Henry F. Chorley, travelling in north Germany in 1841 described members of the Burschenschaften, whom he met as "lawless" in manner, "unkempt" in dress, and disorderly. (30) Chorley also mentioned the Liedertafeln, German singing societies in which students enlivened public festivities in which they participated. (31) The historical importance of the Burschenschaften, the Turnvereine and the Liedertafeln for the Schleswig-Holstein Question proved to be not so much the immediate agitation they caused in their early years, but that they were training grounds for many of the German leaders in 1848-50.

Many of these German nationalists, such as Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, the noted Kiel historian known as "the father of Schleswig-Holsteinism," (32) looked to Britain with admiration and hopes of


establishing a friendly British-German entente. Dahlmann considered
the system of the constitutional monarchy of Britain ideal for a united
Germany. He and other Kiel intellectuals, such as F.H. Hegewisch,
approved of the British parliamentary system and the social harmony
it had produced.\(^3\) They desired a bicameral legislative system
for Germany which would, they believed, enable the middle class to live
in harmony with the Crown and with large landowners such as the members
of the Ritterschaft.\(^4\) They professed that both Schleswig and Holstein
were German in character as well as race, but at the same time hoped for
an even greater union embracing the Nordic lands and the German States.
Dahlmann maintained that a strong German-Scandinavian alliance would help
to preserve the balance of power, which major nations such as Britain
desired.\(^5\) He argued that the Duchies were inseparable and based his
arguments on a hitherto relatively obscure clause in the 1460 agreement,
dat se bliven ewich tosamende ungedelt (that they remain together always
undivided), between the noblemen of Schleswig and Holstein and Christain I,
King of Denmark, who became in that year also Duke of Schleswig and

\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 54-55.

\(^4\) The Ritterschaft, noted for their strict control over the people
living on their land was composed of 39 families in the Duchies.
They owned in 1600 approximately one-half of the estates of
Holstein and about one-fourth of those in Schleswig. Ibid.,
pp. 24-25, fn. 1.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 239.
Count of Holstein. (36)

Danes began to develop a more aloof attitude towards Germans in the early Nineteenth Century. More and more they distrusted the many Germans who served as the King's officials in the Duchies and in Copenhagen. In addition important Danish industries were German owned and many of the leading military and naval commanders had German names. While some of this resentment against Germans living in Denmark expressed itself prior to the 1840's, it was not until 1848 that a large scale purge of German officials in Copenhagen took place, (37) and these dismissals were largely carried out under the direction of the Eider-Danish political party. The leaders of this party were as equally determined that their ambitions should succeed as were the Germans who advocated a united Schleswig-Holstein up to the Kongeaa. What would happen to Holstein and Lauenburg, remained of secondary interest to the Eider-Dane nationalists. (38) Since these two Duchies had been members of the German Confederation from its inception, and their population was largely German speaking, they viewed the attachment of Holstein and Lauenburg to Denmark quite differently from that of Schleswig. (39)

(37) Danstrup, op. cit., p. 87.
(38) Ibid., pp. 100-101.
(39) Steefel, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
Orla Lehmann, leader of the group, asked in a speech in Copenhagen in May, 1842: "What is the Danish fatherland? Does it extend to the Eider, the Schlei or only to the Kongeaa?" All who heard the speech realized that Lehmann expected the answer - Denmark down to the Eider.(40)

The churches also played a large role in the development of nationalism in the Duchies. In centuries past German priests had carried German culture into the area north of the Elbe. The Reformation assisted this movement greatly; low German, as opposed to the more literary high German, became used in many churches throughout Lauenburg and Holstein and in much of Schleswig. In north Schleswig, however, the use of Danish unquestionably predominated in rural areas, but German was the most fashionable in town services.(41) In some places, such as Flensburg, there existed Danish and German churches;(42) while in other areas like Angeln and the west coast of Schleswig, instead of using local speech, priests preferred Low German as a groundwork for the future use of High German.(43)

By the 1840's most Danes and Germans in the Duchies viewed the language used in church services as one of the most important means of expressing their national status. During these years, as well as

(40) Quoted in La Cour, op. cit., I, p. 320.
(41) Holger Hjelholt, British Mediation in the Danish-German Conflict, 1848-1850, I (Copenhagen, 1965), pp. 15-16, hereafter cited as Hjelholt, Mediation.
(42) Carr, op. cit., p. 70.
(43) Ibid., p. 67.
previously, countless language petitions, proclamations, rescripts or resolutions, were issued. These often sought to increase the use of either the Danish or the German tongue in the area through its use in church services. The Danish King had issued an important language rescript in the year 1810. He called for the use of Danish in churches, and also in schools and courts, wherever the Danish language was widely spoken. This proposal was never fully implemented because Frederik VI's advisers believed it to be impractical.\(^{(44)}\) But in 1815 a Danish pastor, Knud Aagaard, published a pamphlet which explained that German was used in the churches, schools and courts in parts of Schleswig where this language was not the tongue of the inhabitants.\(^{(45)}\)

This advance of the German language created much ill feeling not only among Danes living in the Duchies, but also among those living in other parts of Denmark, especially since Germans used it as an argument to back their claim that the national allegiance of Schleswig should be determined by the number of its German speaking inhabitants. In like manner, any attempts by the Danish government to modify the established use of German languages in northern and central Schleswig churches caused much German resentment.\(^{(46)}\) Germans considered the

\(^{(44)}\) Ibid., p. 36.
\(^{(45)}\) Ibid., pp. 71-72.
\(^{(46)}\) Ibid., p. 72.
Danish spoken in north Schleswig as an uncultured dialect, but the same could with equal justification be said about Platt-Deutsch which was a local form of speech heard only in parts of Holstein and Schleswig.

When Frederik VI died on 3 December, 1839, still another issue arose — that of the succession to the throne. He had been greatly beloved by his peoples, and his death after a reign of 55 years, caused a mourning as deep among them as that of Queen Victoria's among her British subjects.

Christain VIII, Frederik VI's successor, could be crowned King of Denmark and Duke of the Duchies because he stemmed from a male line, that of Christian VII's brother, Frederik. However, it appeared that the male line of Oldenburg might soon become extinct (as it eventually did in

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(47) For example, Heinrich von Treitschke termed the north Schleswig speech as "Rabendänisch" (crow-Danish); see, Holger Hjelholt, Treitschke und Schleswig-Holstein (Berlin, 1929), p. 236, hereafter cited as Hjelholt, Treitschke.


(49) Carr, op. cit., p. 136.
1863). (50) Because of the rule of female succession established in the Lex Regia of 1665, this possible extinction caused no great succession problems in Denmark. (51) But Schleswig-Holsteiners argued that because of the right of succession in the Duchies followed the Salic Law - no female line would be acceptable to them. (52)

The succession question became even more acute in the Duchies in 1846 when on 11 July Christian VIII published a proclamation called the Aabene Brev (open letter). In this letter he advised his subjects that the question of succession to the throne of Denmark and the corresponding relationship of the successor to the Duchies had caused him to place this issue in the hands of a royal commission. These men had concluded that Schleswig, Lauenburg and parts of Holstein came under the law of the female succession. He advised the Holsteiners that he would strive to maintain the Helstat and assured the residents of Schleswig that it would remain an autonomous Duchy in an inseparable union with the Danish throne. (53)

The decree caused a furore not only in the Elbe Duchies, but in many other areas of Germany. While Charles Lorentzen pleaded before

(51) Hjelholt, Mediation, I, p. 13; Twiss, Relations, p. 62.
(52) Steefel, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
the Holstein estates on 21 July, 1846 for the Danish King to reconsider the view set out two weeks prior in the open letter, (54) a demand for Danish tolerance was also made in the same year by Ludwig Häuser, a professor at Heidelberg. (55) These uncertain conditions were not improved by a severe financial crisis in 1847 within the Duchies as well as at their main seaport, Hamburg. (56) When economic difficulties reenforced cultural, ethnic, religious and succession problems between Danes and Germans, an atmosphere existed in which almost any spark would start a fire. Palmerston received on 8 April, 1847 one report from Sir William Wynn, British ambassador in Denmark, which pictured such a situation. Wynn related that there appeared to be a lack of "any spirit of conciliation" on either side. (57)

By the beginning of 1848 both the German and the Danish positions could be clearly defined. The German argument consisted of three main points: that succession in the Duchies followed the Salic Law, the male line alone being acceptable; that Schleswig and Holstein being united in an inseparable union dating back to 1460, Denmark could neither bind Schleswig to her more than she could Holstein, nor could she legislate

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(55) See, Ludwig Häuser, Schleswig-Holstein, Dänemark und Deutschland (Heidelberg, 1846).


(57) Quoted in Carr, op. cit., p. 265.
for Holstein, since it was a member of the German Confederation; and that the Duchies were independent of the Danish monarch because the King of Denmark was not the King of Schleswig or Holstein, but only their Duke. (58) On the other hand, Eider-Danes claimed that Schleswig's succession law was identical to that of Denmark proper, being that of the Lex Regia since 1665. Secondly, they maintained that the "inseparable union" theory was never valid; Holstein had been associated with the Holy Roman Empire as well as with the German Confederation, but Schleswig had retained closer ties with Denmark. Thirdly, Denmark reminded the Germans that Schleswig had been incorporated into the Kingdom in 1721. (59) Finally, there became another view which is often quoted on the issue - Palmerston's famous remark. His analysis also consisted of three parts. It appears he said that there were only three men in Britain who had ever understood the Schleswig-Holstein Question: Prince Albert, who had died (1861); R.C. Mellis, a Foreign Office Clerk, who had gone mad;

(58) Twiss, Relations, pp. 65-83; Bunsen, op. cit., pp. 8-10, 49.
(59) Steefel, op. cit., p. 6.
and himself, who had forgotten it. \(60\)

In early 1848 a series of events rapidly changed the political situation in the Duchies. The death of Christian VIII on 20 January, 1848 \(61\) caused little grief among advocates of Schleswig-Holsteinism. Indeed many of them considered him as one of their worst enemies. They, as well as many Danes, thought Christian VIII's son Frederik VII to be weak and vacillating. They, however, hoped that he would be more sympathetic to their needs than his father had been and considered that he might well die without leaving a male heir to the throne, thus opening the way to an assertion of independence. \(62\)

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\(60\) Hjelholt, Mediation, I, p. 12; II, p. 246; Algernon Cecil, Queen Victoria and Her Prime Ministers (London, 1953), p. 182; Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815 (N.Y., 1962), p. 227, fn. 1. Other variations of this famous saying exist. Cecil hints that if Palmerston had never made the remark, the question might have been almost forgotten, Cecil, op. cit., p. 182. Von Bdlow's Memoirs reported Palmerston as saying that it was a German professor who found the answer, but unfortunately lost his sanity just prior to informing interested persons the results (omitting from the story Richard Charles Mellis), Bdlow, op. cit., I, p. 50. Steefel, op. cit., p. 3, fn. 1. and Ragnhild Hatton in "Palmerston and the Scandinavian Union," Studies in International History, ed. by A.K. Bourne and D.C. Watt (London, 1967), p. 119, fn. 2. refer to Ferrero della Marmora, Un po' più di luce sugli eventi politici e militari dell' anno 1866, 4th ed. (Florence, 1873), p. 30-31, who claimed Palmerston said that the first was Prince Albert who unfortunately was dead; the second, a Danish statesman who became insane; and the third, the Foreign Minister himself who had forgotten it.

\(61\) A. Fabricius, op. cit., II, p. 580.

proposed constitutional changes was an attempt to please both Danes
and Germans by attaching Schleswig to Denmark and allowing Holstein
to form its own Constitution and to remain within both the Helstat
and the German Confederation. But this plan satisfied neither the
Eider-Danes nor the Schleswig-Holsteiners. (63)

The estates of Schleswig-Holstein, in spite of their shock over
the King's actions, decided at Rendsburg on 18 March to send delegates
to meet Frederik VII. Also public meetings were held in Copenhagen in
March by the Danish National Liberals. (64) Further protests were made
in the German speaking parts of the Duchies and on 24 March at Rendsburg,
members of the Schleswig-Holstein estates formed a provisional government. (65)
They also appointed a deputation of five men to proceed to Copenhagen to
inform the King of five demands: that they be permitted to write a separate
constitution for the Duchies; that Schleswig be allowed to belong to the
German Confederation; that she be enabled to form a citizen's militia;
that freedom of public gatherings and the press be guaranteed; and that
Von Scheel, who was the head of the Gottorp government be replaced. (66)

(64) Ibid., p. 102.
(65) Hjelholt, Mediation, I, pp. 20-23.
(66) Carr, op. cit., p. 281; Twiss, Relations, pp. 170-171; p. 171 fn.*
In the meantime the Duke of Augustenburg, an owner of large
estates in Schleswig and a contender for the Danish throne, had scurried
to Berlin in order to request the King of Prussia to declare his
support for the Duchies. (67) Frederick William IV. obliged the Duke
and issued such a declaration, perhaps because serious rioting had
taken place in Berlin and the conservative King wished to pacify his
subjects by appearing to aid the causes of German liberalism and uni-
fication elsewhere without yielding many concessions to the revolutionists
at home. (68)

Furthermore the Frankfurt Parliament, after Prussian troops had entered
the Duchies, passed a resolution on 12 April approving of the conduct of
Frederick William IV. (69) The Parliament had no army of its own and
depended upon Prussia's armed strength to uphold many of its vocal demands.
One of these speeches in Frankfurt which did little to win British
sympathy to the cause of the Germans was made by Count Friedrich von
Deym, an author of several books on events of 1848-50, (70) who declared

(67) Laing, Sleswick, p. 227; A. Fabricius, op. cit., II, 589; Hjelholt,
Treitschke, p. 6.

(68) F. Darmstaedter, Bismarck and the Creation of the Second Reich

(69) "Schleswig-Holstein," The Annual Register or a View of the History
as Annual Register.

(70) Wilhelm Kosch, "Deym von Stritz, Friedrich Graf," Biographisches
Staatshandbuch ... I (Munich, 1963), p. 239.
on 26 October, 1848: "We the Germans shall wrest the rule of the seas from England to become the greatest and mightiest nation upon this globe." (71)

The importance of Schleswig-Holstein as a trading area began much earlier than the Nineteenth Century. The narrow base of the Jutland peninsula occupied by Schleswig offered a relatively convenient highway for the transport of goods from the Baltic Sea to western European markets and vice versa. The fjord known as the Schlei penetrated about half-way across the peninsula from the east coast. In Viking times the town of Hedeby, at the head of the Schlei near the present-day city of Schleswig, handled most of this east-west traffic. Danes usually carried these goods overland from Hedeby to the Eider, along which the goods were transported to the sea, often over to British commercial centers. (1) Frisians, who lived along the North Sea from The Netherlands to north Schleswig, and who established an early reputation as thrifty and perceptive businessmen, took part in this commerce too. But Hedeby ceased to be an important trading center before the end of the Viking period and by the time of its destruction had been completely overtaken by Schleswig.

With the introduction of faster and better ships, the dangers of navigating around the Skaw lessened. This fact coupled with the increased commercial power of the Hanseatic League, with its headquarters at Lübeck, diminished the importance of the Schleswig overland route. The Hansa

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(1) Danstrup, op. cit., pp. 7-8, 18.
dominated the trade of the Baltic for several centuries, but it had to all intents and purposes ceased to exist in 1669 when the last Hansatag was held. The Dutch increased their trading position in the Baltic at this time. But on land trade north into Denmark from Schleswig continued, as did the very important cattle trade between Holstein and north Germany. The cities of Hamburg and Lübeck also remained of much importance to the trade of the interior villages of Schleswig and Holstein. (2)

Up until the Napoleonic Wars Anglo-Danish trade was relatively slight. (3) The vast majority of the Helstat's population had been engaged in agriculture since neolithic times, and with the rise in wheat prices in the later Eighteenth Century and more modern agricultural techniques, Danish and German farmers in the Duchies increased food production. Some of this surplus found a ready market in rapidly industrialized Britain. (4) This trade dropped following the political break between the countries in 1807, but in spite of the war, connections were not completely severed; British goods continued to flow through into the Helstat via Heligoland and Holstein. (5)

Anglo-Danish trade rose after the Treaty of Kiel (1814). Industrial

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(3) Ibid., p. 268.
(5) Thomsen, op. cit., p. 280; see also Table, p. 75.
Britain needed Danish foodstuffs, and British manufactured goods were sought after by Danes. The comparatively low Danish customs duties during the early Nineteenth Century helped to encourage a favourable development of this trade.(6) Helped by the repeal of Britain's Corn Laws in 1846, Denmark's grain exports to this country trebled between 1840 and 1850 and the percentage of the total Danish grain exports which Britain purchased jumped from 32% to over 53%.(7) During the 1840's the augmentation of trade between Great Britain and Denmark helped to create a friendly commercial rapport which proved profitable to each country.

In the early Victorian age, the reputation of British political ideals rose in the eyes of most European countries, including Denmark and Germany. But the economic sphere of the Zollverein, a German customs union under the leadership of Prussia, became more and more a threat to British economic and political interests.(8)

When Prussia founded the Zollverein, she did so in order to prevent the formation of one under the German Confederation. She feared that such a union might result in too great an Austrian influence in Germany. As the Zollverein grew in strength, it became apparent that Berlin

(6) Ibid., p. 281.
(7) Ibid., p. 282; see also Tables, pp. 86, 89.
rather than Vienna would dominate German economic policy decisions.\(^{(9)}\)

In spite of the location of the centre of gravity of the customs union in north Germany, the Danish Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg continued to remain independent of it. So did the free cities of Lübeck and Hamburg, whose ports were important for other areas in north Germany such as Mecklenburg and Hanover, as well as for the Duchies. As a result the Zollverein had no North Sea base and no Baltic one further west than Pomerania. Especially galling was the fact that it was cut off from the mouth of one of Germany's most important rivers, the Elbe, whose northern banks at its outlet lay in Holstein.\(^{(10)}\)

The growth of the customs union from 1818 caused disquiet among Germany's neighbours and Britain. Metternich stated that within the German Confederation a smaller confederation existed which supported the objects of the greater confederation only if those objects were compatible with those of the smaller group; the Zollverein States, were to him, a status in statu.\(^{(11)}\)

France envied a rising Prussia; The Netherlands feared the creation of a more powerful and united German economic union which might seek to control the mouth of the Rhine; Britain objected to


\(^{(10)}\) Henderson, Zollverein, pp. 94, 122, 126.

\(^{(11)}\) Ibid., p. 96.
competition which could seriously threaten her export trade in manufactured products and colonial raw materials to the Continent;\(^{(12)}\) and Scandinavians resented German suggestions that she become a part of an enlarged Germany.\(^{(13)}\) The Danes also feared that the economic interests of the Schleswig-Holsteiners would lead them to demand a closer economic and political association with Germany and to break away from Denmark if this were not granted in Copenhagen.\(^{(14)}\) One Schleswig-Holstein historian, J.T. Droysen wrote: "In all the four centuries of personal union we have never learnt to look on Copenhagen as our capital city, as the focal point of our ... life."\(^{(15)}\)

The numerical strength of the Zollverein made impressive increases during the 1830's and 1840's. The German population also grew from about twenty-five millions in 1815 to about thirty-five and a half millions by 1850, even though there had been much emigration.\(^{(16)}\) Because of this population increase and because of Prussian desires to take in all of northern Germany, including the important sea ports in Schleswig and

\(^{(12)}\) Ibid., p. 97.


\(^{(15)}\) Quoted in Carr, op. cit., p. 276.

Holstein, the Zollverein stood to become even stronger. Small wonder many British subjects began to speculate as to where it would all end. Would the Zollverein come to include all of Denmark and Norway–Sweden, and even attempt to assimilate Switzerland, Luxemburg and the German parts of the Austrian Empire? Ardent supporters of the Zollverein thought that in order for the German nation to be complete, Denmark and The Netherlands must belong to the tariff alliance and that with the acquisition of their ports, Germany could increase its naval power and maritime commerce.(17)

One of the leading German economists who enthusiastically supported the establishment and the growth of the Zollverein under the leadership of Prussia was Friedrich List. Yet, List, a native of Württemberg, was often ridiculed by Prussian industrialists. It was not until after his death that this maligned figure received recognition as one of Germany's national heroes.(18)

List's main work, Das Nationale System der Politischen Ökonomie, contained a rejection of the theory laissez-faire as popularized by

(17) Snyder, op. cit., p. 165.
(18) Ibid., p. 163.
Adam Smith. List maintained that free-trade operated very well for Britain, but "if any nation whatever is qualified for the establishment of a national manufacturing power, it is Germany ... If any nation has the right to anticipate rich results from a protective system adopted to her circumstances ... it is Germany."(20) And when he spoke of a greater German union, he envisaged not only the Elbe Duchies, but also Denmark proper.(21) List further declared that "the German protective system only accomplishes its objective in a very imperfect manner so long as Germany does not spin for herself the cotton and linen yarn which she requires; so long as she does not directly import from tropical countries the colonial produce she requires, and pay for it with goods of her own manufacture; so long as she does not carry on this trade with her own ships; so long as she has no means of protecting her own flag; so long as she possesses no perfect system of transport by river, canal or railway; so long as the German Zollverein does not include all German maritime territories."(22) Such ambitious goals, British commercial interests realized not only were a menace to them,
but threatened even more directly Denmark and her Duchies with their excellent deep-water ports.

Lord Westmoreland, British Ambassador at Berlin described List as "a very able writer in the employ of the German manufacturers." List replied that this was hardly true since the manufacturers took insufficient interest in economic theory to pay an adviser. (23) In communication with Sir Robert Peel, List claimed that economic spheres would eventually divide the earth. Since these spheres would inevitably have conflicting interests, he advocated, shortly before the Schleswig-Holstein War, the economic and political unification of Britain and Germany in order to avert Russian and French threats. He pointed out the common Teutonic origins of Britain and Germany as opposed to Slavic Russia and Latin France. He not only envisaged such a union as encompassing all of northern Europe, with important bases in Britain and the Hansa cities, but believed that it should extend into the Near East and Africa. He advocated the construction of a railway from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, and pointed to the advantages of combining German military might with the strength of the British navy to protect such a joint economic venture. (24)

(23) Quoted in ibid., p. 109.
As the Zollverein grew stronger, German liberals hoped that the benefits from this closely knit economic union would help to unite Germany politically. (25) They also dreamed of extending such power beyond their frontiers. For example Jacob Grimm, one of the Göttingen Seven, but in 1848 a professor at the University of Berlin, predicted that Germany and Denmark would eventually unite. He asked: "... how could it be that the contentious peninsula [Jutland] should not be wholly joined to the mainland in accordance with the demands of history, nature and position?" (26)

On 14 July, 1839 Palmerston instructed a British economist, John Bowring, to report to him on the progress, present state and future outlook of the Zollverein. In this report he compared the formation of the customs association of the German States with the abolition of the customs barriers which separated Scotland, England and Ireland. "The Zollverein," he related, "brought the sentiment of German nationality out of the regions of hope and fancy into those of positive and material interests ... On every side beneficial changes are taking place." (27) A modern historian, L.L. Snyder, has described the Bowring


(26) Quoted in Butler, op. cit., pp. 83–84.

report "restrained and objective." (28) One of its probable results was a minor commercial treaty between Britain and the Zollverein in 1841. (29)

Certain Danish tolls, like those of the Zollverein, discouraged British trade in the Baltic. In 1429, Eric of Pomerania required vessels to pay dues when sailing through the Sound. (30) Two stations were also established at Nyborg and Fredericia on the Belts, but Elsinore on the Sound was by far the most important because most vessels passed into and out of the Baltic by this route. Tolls continued up until 1857 and those levied at Elsinore alone from 1842 to 1847 amounted to about £250,000 annually. In fact Denmark used the fees collected here as collateral for repayment of British loans. (31)

Partially to appease British commercial interests, tolls on British vessels were lowered in the 1840's. (32) But the charges remained high and Baltic trade was further hampered by the delay and inconvenience caused when paying them. From 1851-53 British ships and cargoes paid an estimated 29 percent of the total Sound dues collected by Denmark. (33)

(28) Snyder, op. cit., p. 163.
(30) Danstrup, op. cit., p. 50.
(31) Henderson, Zollverein, p. 256.
(32) Ibid., p. 258.
(33) Ibid., p. 257.
Still it is doubtful whether the Elsinore tolls were resented by British merchants nearly as much as were the custom duties imposed by the Zollverein, though it was here that so many ships owned by or carrying British cargoes were halted in 1848-49 and then dispatched to Copenhagen for detention. (34)

By 1848 the majority of the German States had entered into an economic union. The ancient free port of Hamburg, however, remained aloof. Its merchants and financiers feared membership of the Zollverein would lead to the loss of much of their British trade; (35) British merchants had used Hamburg as one of their most important gateways into Germany and also into Denmark since the days of the Hansa. (36) One Englishman, Sir Harry Verney, wrote in a letter of 1850: "Those who know Hamburg and that part of Germany will testify that there are no more trustworthy merchants and traders than the Schleswig-Holsteiners." He further described these men as being of "earnest calm character and a steady resolution," which he considered vastly different from the temperaments of the inhabitants of most areas of Germany. (37)

(35) Henderson, Zollverein, pp. 122-123.
claimed to be an international city as well as a German one, and it was this port; that Denmark and the Duchies during the first half of the Nineteenth Century greatly depended upon for credit as well as shipping facilities. (38) Denmark, even during the 1848-50 war, probably considered it a relatively friendly city which would remain so if left alone by Prussia and the more militant States of the Confederation. Its merchants were accustomed to maintaining "amicable relations" with Denmark and exhibited no enthusiasm for the Schleswig-Holstein cause. (39)

The port was often blockaded by the Danish navy during the war, (40) thus causing British merchants to establish stronger connections directly with Danish financial and commercial houses, and more often by-passing Hamburg as a port-of-entry into the Helstat. (41) The Hamburg Chamber of Commerce was very concerned by the Danish blockade and dispatched to London an envoy to ask the British government to protect the Hansa ships from Danish men-of-war. Although Great Britain stood to lose commercially from the Danish blockade, she was also a naval power, and so disinclined

(38) Thomsen, op. cit., pp. 283-284.
(39) The Morning Chronicle, 27 May, 1848.
(40) Hjelholt, Mediation, I, pp. 91, 111, 190; II, p. 125.
to seek to prohibit another nation from exercising a privilege which she might one day wish to use. In answer to the Hamburg request, Palmerston offered no protection to their ships and advised them to refrain from any provocative actions against Denmark.(42)

Hanover also played an important role in the British trade which was disrupted by the Danish blockade in the war. Only the river Elbe separated it from Holstein, and at the small port of Stade, near the mouth of the Elbe, Hanover levied tariffs on goods transported along the river.(43) Prussia and the other Zollverein States objected strongly to the Stade tolls, but their objections did little to change Hanover's independent attitude. One indication of this anti-Zollverein attitude was quoted by Heinrich von Treitschke in a poem sent to Metternich from Hanover in 1843:

Wir wollen ihn nichthaben  
Den preussischen Zollverein;  
Ob sie wie Gierge Raben  
Sich heisser danach schrien. (44)

(We will not accept the Prussian Customs Union; regardless of how eagerly the greedy ravens shriek).

(42) Hjelholt, Mediation, I, p. 39.
(43) Henderson, Zollverein, pp. 9, 155-156.
Although the personal union between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Hanover ceased in 1837 with the accession of Queen Victoria to the British throne, the commercial ties between this German State and Britain remained close. When the Danish blockade of the north German coasts began in the spring of 1848, Hanover estimated the value of her property at sea to be £600,000. Many Hanover merchants were opposed to a war in which they were likely to lose large investments, (45) and the blockade also meant losses to English insurance houses who had underwritten much of this Hanoverian property. (46) British underwriters hoped there would be no confiscation of German property by Danish warships, but there was. (47) As a reprisal the Germans confiscated Danish property in Jutland, (48) but the truce of Malmö in the summer of 1848 required both sides to reimburse the other for its respective losses. (49)

British technical skill, finance and equipment did much to assist

(45) Hjelholt, Mediation, I, p. 44.
(46) Ibid., I, p. 43.
(47) See infra., pp. 40-41.
(49) Hjelholt, Mediation, I, p. 170; "Schleswig-Holstein," Annual Register... 1848, p. 351.
the development of railways within the Germanies from 1835 up to the 1848-50 war.(50) The first German railway was built in 1835.(51) During the 1840's railway construction increased, and by 1849 the Germans had laid over three thousand kilometers of track.(52) Because of this construction the German states became economically much closer to one another.(53)

From 1835-50 Germany bought over £16,000,000 of iron from abroad for building railways,(54) but during the Schleswig-Holstein struggle such purchases and construction decreased considerably.(55) The tables furnished by C.F.W. Dieterici in his work Statistische Übersicht ... im preussischen Staate ... (1858) give the following figures for iron imported by the Zollverein, much of which came from Britain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pig Iron</th>
<th>Bar Iron</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>51 thousand zentners</td>
<td>129 thousand zentners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>2,284 &quot;</td>
<td>1,002 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>1,418 &quot;</td>
<td>596 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(50) For examples in the construction of and furnishing equipment for German railways by the British, see W.O. Henderson, Britain and Industrial Europe, 1750-1870 ... (Leicester, 1965), pp. 158-160, hereafter cited as Henderson, Britain.

(51) Henderson, Zollverein, p. 146.

(52) Carr, op. cit., p. 17.

(53) Henderson, Zollverein, p. 147.

(54) Henderson, Britain, p. 159.

(55) Danstrup, op. cit., p. 111.

While these figures indicate growth during the decade prior to the war, the year 1848 witnessed drops of almost fifty percent in the imports of both pig iron and bar iron. Much of this decrease was caused by the revolutions of 1848, but the Danish blockade of the most important German ports probably accounted for an even larger part.

In Schleswig there existed only one small railway in 1848, the Flensburg to Husum line. In Holstein the only important railway was from Altona to Kiel. These two lines, however, were important links between western and Baltic Sea traffic. The Duchies were ready for extensive rail development, and British steel and locomotive manufacturers wished to participate fully in it.

Because of the growth of woollen industries within Germany, her exports of raw wool to Britain decreased. In 1835 more than half the wool imported into Britain came from Germany, but by 1850 the proportion had dropped to about eight per cent. Australian exports caused part of this decrease, but the Germans were also using much more of the wool at home. There was also a decrease in exports of British woollen and

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(57) Carr, op. cit., p. 162; see map of German railways, 1835-65, Henderson, Zollverein, p. 144.

cotton finished products to Germany because of high tariffs and new home industries. Yet outside of the Zollverein States, German cotton products could not, during the 1840's, effectively compete with British finished goods.

On the other hand, Anglo-Danish trade grew. British trade with Denmark expanded from less than ten percent of Danish exports in 1847 to more than twenty-five percent by the mid 1850's. The reduction in trade between Britain and Germany, coupled with the increased trade of Britain with Denmark, could hardly fail to arouse British sympathies with the latter nation during the War of 1848-1850. To many British traders it appeared that the Danes were eager to improve Anglo-Danish relations while the Zollverein seemed anxious to prohibit as much British merchandise from entering their economic area as possible.

While in Germany, it appeared to many that the British wished to prevent

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(59) For a comprehensive report of official British government figures on the export-import trade during the Nineteenth Century refer to the tables within the appendix of Werner Schlote's British Overseas Trade from 1700 to the 1930's, trans., by W.O. Henderson and W.H. Chaloner (Oxford, 1952), pp. 120-178. Most of these tables denote a drop in trade in 1848 compared with that of 1847, and an increase in trade in 1851 over 1850, thus indicating the adverse effect of the continental wars, blockades and revolutions upon British commerce. See also Brown, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

(60) Henderson, Zollverein, p. 183.

(61) Carr, op. cit., p. 302. See Thompson, op. cit., pp. 281-282 and Tables on pp. 84-96 which indicate growth of Anglo-Danish trade.

the Germans in Schleswig and Holstein from being either economically or politically attached to the Germans of the Zollverein.\(^{(63)}\)

The conflict over Schleswig and Holstein because of the many uncertainties it created for Baltic trade worried many Britons concerned with north European commerce. Sir James Graham was certain in 1848 that the best way to have peace in Europe was to establish an England well-prepared for war.\(^{(64)}\) And in 1850 Harry Verney wrote: "Unless steps are taken to avert events which seem to be approaching, results may be anticipated injurious ... to the commercial interests of our mercantile men trading there."\(^{(65)}\) In the short run, British traders were losing business on the Continent because of the Danish blockade of north German and Duchy ports. And in the spring of 1848, German troops temporarily put into practice the expansionist theory of Friedrich List when Danish troops evacuated Jutland.\(^{(66)}\) But in the long run British interests feared that if the Elbe Duchies were wrenches away from the Helstat and absorbed by a greater Germany with its powerful economic union, Denmark would become too small to compete effectively against this larger power, and thus would eventually become submerged

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\(^{(65)}\) Verney, op. cit., p. 15.

into a German system.

The Danish blockade of German ports during the war caused much hardship in many areas of British trade and commerce, including such industries as fishing, banking, insurance, textiles and transportation. There is much evidence among letters and memorials written to the Foreign Minister in 1848-50 to indicate the attitudes of men engaged in foreign commerce. (67)

In the blockade of the spring-summer of 1848 several British ships trading with Germany were seized by the Danes. Among those who registered complaints about such captures was the Glasgow firm of Gavin and Thompson, owners of the detained vessel, Margaret Skelly. (68) Another petitioner was William Graves and Son of New Ross who complained that Russian property on board ships seized had been released by the Danes, but British goods had not. (69) The Foreign Office reported that it could not interfere in the case of the Margaret Skelly, (70) but did inform Graves that it had instructed Sir Henry Wynn in Copenhagen, to take steps to secure the release of British property in Prussian vessels.

(67) London, Public Record Office, Denmark, Domestic, Various, 1848 ... 1850, hereafter cited by Foreign Office dispatch numbers.

(68) F.O. 22, 168, No. 190, Gavin and Thompson to Palmerston, Glasgow, 19 June, 1848.

(69) F.O. 22, 168, William Graves and Son, Merchants and Shipowners to Palmerston, New Ross, 22 June, 1848.

(70) F.O. 22, 168, No. 177, Foreign Office to Gavin and Thompson, June 1848.
captured by Denmark.\(^{(71)}\) Later Graves wrote to Palmerston that he had received word that this property "would be restored on payment of certain freight and handling charges."\(^{(72)}\)

Lloyds of London, underwriters of property (German as well as British) detained by Denmark, informed Palmerston on 22 June that it was sending an agent named Daniel Magrath to Denmark, and requested a letter to the British Minister there to assist him in getting the goods released.\(^{(73)}\) The ships and goods insured by Lloyds remained under detention and on 3 August, the society wrote again asking Palmerston to help their agent in Denmark. Its memorial further declared:

> Being in the event of condemnation, liable to pay to the German parties such sums as may have been insured in this Country, we beg to call ... attention to the fact that in consequence of the great depreciation that has taken place in merchandise and shipping generally, especially in colonial produce, that the Germans instead of being punished by these seizures will be actually gainers where the property had been insured in this country, so that instead of Denmark punishing her enemies that she is actually conferring a benefit on them and inflicting the punishment on British underwriters. \(^{(74)}\)

At this time Palmerston was busy attempting to arrange a truce which would include compensation for those who lost property at sea during the

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\(^{(71)}\) F.O. 22, 168, No. 144, Foreign Office to William Graves and Son, 30 June, 1848.

\(^{(72)}\) F.O. 22, 168, William Graves and Son to Palmerston, New Ross, 3 July, 1848.


of these claims.\textsuperscript{(75)}

Members of the British fish curing industry were concerned about the blockade too. Denis Le Marchant, representing the fishcurers of Leith, dispatched on 30 June a memorial to Palmerston requesting him to use his influence to have the blockade removed and allow British vessels to transport fish to Stettin.\textsuperscript{(76)} On 8 July Marchant sent another resolution, this time from the Magistrates and Town Council of Wick. The memorialists claimed that Stettin and other Prussian ports imported annually from Scotland about £120,000 to £150,000 worth of herring in return for grain, wool and timber "which otherwise must be paid in Gold by taking that amount out of our circulation." They further remarked that 101,426 British subjects were wholly dependent on the Scottish fishing industry for their livelihood and that the blockade was causing much hardship.\textsuperscript{(77)} To both of these memorials Palmerston answered that Britain would not be justified in interfering with the blockade.\textsuperscript{(78)}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[(75)] See Hjelholt, Mediations, I, Chapters 7 and 8, passim.
\item[(76)] F.O. 22, 168, No. 199, Denis Le Marchant, "Memorial of the Fishcurers of Leith" to Palmerston, 30 June, 1848.
\item[(77)] F.O. 22, 168, No. 214, Denis Le Marchant, "Memorial of the Magistrates and Town Council of the Royal Burgh of Wick" to Palmerston, 27 June, 1848.
\item[(78)] F.O. 22, 168, No. 155, Foreign Office to Marchant and Fishcurers of Leith, 8 July, 1848; F.O. 22, 168, No. 158, Foreign Office to Josiah Smith, Provost of Wick, 12 July, 1848.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Some British traders also objected to what they considered preferential treatment by the Danes to vessels from other lands. Among these was Denis Le Marchant, who on this occasion enclosed a letter from the Gentlemen's Shipowners Society. (79) And Gee and Co., owners of the Queen of Scotland, sent a memorial from Hull merchants who desired that this ship be given the status of a mail carrier so that she could enter the Elbe as did vessels from The Netherlands. (80) Palmerston suggested that they write to the Postmaster General. (81) On 2 September, fishcurers in Scotland also requested mail carrying privileges for the Martello. (82) But by the time Palmerston answered, the blockade had been raised. (83) Thus during 1848, the British Government clearly acknowledged the Danish right of blockade even though the Foreign Office had received numbers of complaints from different areas and industries in Britain about these trade restrictions.

The year 1849 was the most serious one of the war as far as British men of trade and commerce were concerned. Many had been hurt by the blockades of 1848 and any further impairment of Baltic and North Sea trade.

(79) F.O. 22, 168, No. 246, Denis Le Marchant to Palmerston, 3 Aug., 1848.
(80) F.O. 22, 168, No. 289, Gee and Co. to Palmerston, Hull, 30 Aug., 1848.
(82) F.O. 22, 168, No. 296, James Methuen, "Memorial of Fishcurers of Scotland" to Palmerston, Leith, 2 Sept., 1848.
would be to some industries almost unbearable. The Foreign Office received scores of letters and memorials pertaining to this problem. A number of them had to do with ships which were already loaded or were already en route to Germany when the blockade was renewed. One of these was written by R. Anderson from Newcastle, who reported that many ships were confined at this city which otherwise would have sailed for Germany. He wrote that the Danes were inflicting "deep injury on the subjects of a Neutral and friendly power ... which I think they cannot intend."(84) Another came from William Hutt, M.P., who represented the merchants and shipowners of the Tyne. He characterized them as being in "consternation" because of the renewal of the blockade.(85) A certain Richard Watkins of Hartlepool inquired of Palmerston what could be done to help all the ships which the Danes were turning back,(86) and 24 merchants of London asked that all vessels which left England before the notification of the Danish blockade had been received, be permitted free passage to the German ports.(87) Another M.P., Alexander Hastie, inquired especially about trade with Hamburg. He wanted to know if a British ship sailing from the Virgin Islands could enter this port in safety, and if

(84) F.O. 22, 176, No. 126, R. Anderson to Palmerston, 10 Apr., 1849.
(85) F.O. 22, 176, William Hutt to Eddesbury, 11 Apr., 1849.
(86) F.O. 22, 176, Richard Watkins to Palmerston, Hartlepool, Durham, 16 Apr., 1849.
(87) F.O. 22, 176, No. 187, Memorial of Twenty Four Merchants of the City of London to Palmerston, 17 Apr., 1849.
British goods on a Danish ship would be subject to confiscation.\(^{(88)}\)

Palmerston advised Hastie that British ships could not proceed to Hamburg as long as the blockade was enforced and that British cargo on a Danish ship was liable to detention.\(^{(89)}\)

There were reports of actual confiscation also. Among these was one from R.T. Woodward of Liverpool whose cargo of wheat on the Theodore was apparently taken in April.\(^{(90)}\) Another came from Alexander Adam Leask, a bank agent and ship owner of Macduff, Banff, who claimed compensation from the Danish Government for losses on his vessel, the Deveron, which was captured near Kolberg and detained in Copenhagen from 24 June to 2 July.\(^{(91)}\) Palmerston told Woodward that he would have to prove ownership in the courts of Copenhagen,\(^{(92)}\) and Leask that the British Government could not support his claim for compensation.\(^{(93)}\)

Perhaps the largest group of protestors were those associated with the fishing industry. James Methuen wrote to the Foreign Office from Leith:

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\(^{(89)}\) F.O. 22, 176, No. 94, Foreign Office to Hastie, 3 Apr., 1849.

\(^{(90)}\) F.O. 22, 176, No. 134, R.T. Woodward to Palmerston, Liverpool, 16 Apr., 1849.

\(^{(91)}\) F.O. 22, 179, Alexander Adam Leask to Palmerston, Macduff, Banff, 20 July, 1849.

\(^{(92)}\) F.O. 22, 176, No. 190, Foreign Office to Woodward, 18 Apr., 1849.

\(^{(93)}\) F.O. 22, 179, No. 369, Foreign Office to Leask, 28 July, 1849.
I have two vessels laden with Herrings on their voyage to Stettin, which port, owing to the Blockade, they cannot enter, and I am unable to determine how and what to advise regarding them, they sailed from this country on the 16th and 18th March, but their passage must have been retarded by the late gales of easterly winds, and were three weeks at sea, previous to the declaration of the Blockade.

Other Fishcurers are similarlysituated and there are British vessels chartered and loading about 4,000 Barrels of Herring at Wick for Stettin.

The Early Herring Fishery commences first of May and continues till the middle of July, and on that fishing, do the inhabitants of the poorest districts of the Western Highlands depend, not only for subsistence during that period, but afterwards.

... unless the Blockade be raised, the Fishcurers will be unable to purchase these herrings, as they are a quality that only suits the Foreign Markets. (94)

Similar pleas on behalf of the fishing industry were made in April by the Wick Chamber of Commerce; (95) James Murdock, representative of the fisherman of Wick and Pulteney; (96) and James Stuart on behalf of the fishermen and seamen of Campbelltown, Argyllshire. (97) In May the fishcurers of Peterhead informed Palmerston that ships of other nations

(94) F.O. 22, 176, No. 131, James Methuen to Palmerston, Leith, 13 Apr., 1849.

(95) F.O. 22, 176, No. 170, Wick Chamber of Commerce to Palmerston, Wick, 25 Apr., 1849.

(96) F.O. 22, 177, No. 194, James Murdock and the Fishermen of Wick and Pulteney to Palmerston, April, 1849.

(97) F.O. 22, 176, James Stuart, "Memorial of the Fishermen of Campbelltown in Argyllshire" to Palmerston, 24 Apr., 1849.
were running the blockade and that since they had suffered so heavily the previous season, they would be "impelled by necessity for their own protection" to consider acting in the same fashion.\(^{(98)}\) Palmerston's replies to these petitions reflected the refusal of the Danish Government to make any exception in the blockade for the herring industry.\(^{(99)}\)

The preferential treatment given to foreign vessels proved even more irritating to many British men of commerce in 1849 than it did in 1848. On 28 April, Thomas Barclay for the Hull and Leith Steam Packet Company Traders to Hamburg dispatched a memorial to Palmerston complaining about special treatment of Dutch ships wishing to enter Hamburg;\(^{(100)}\) and on the 30 April, Palmerston received two letters, one from G. Sanders, M.P. which called attention to the "undue preference given to foreign vessels over those of Great Britain in the Blockade,"\(^{(101)}\) and the second from a Londoner who asked: "Why are French and American steamers allowed to pass?"\(^{(102)}\)

\(^{(98)}\) F.O. 22, 177, No. 208, "Memorial of the Fishcurers of Peterhead" to Palmerston, 15 May, 1849.


\(^{(100)}\) F.O. 22, 176, No. 172, Thomas Barclay "Memorial of the Hull and Leith Steam Packet Company, Traders to Hamburg and of Thomas Barclay of Buchannan Street, Glasgow, for himself and the other Partners of that Company" to Palmerston, 28 Apr., 1849.

\(^{(101)}\) F.O. 22, 176, No. 100, G. Sanders to Palmerston, 30 Apr., 1849.

\(^{(102)}\) F.O. 22, 176, No. 184, Husey to Palmerston, London, 30 Apr., 1849.
In May, 1849 the Foreign Office was besieged with numerous petitions urging Palmerston to attempt to have the blockade lifted and complaining that foreign ships were passing it while British ones were being refused. Eighty business firms from Bradford sent him one such message. (103)

Liverpool merchants declared that it was "notorious that numerous Dutch and other vessels arriving off the blockaded ports in ignorance of such blockade, have been suffered to proceed on their voyage" while British ships were refused entry. They accused Denmark of being more vigilant in guarding these ports whenever they saw the British flag. (104)

Hull merchants also complained of Danish unfairness to British ships and cited the Dutch and Americans as receiving special favours from Copenhagen. (105) Finally, two Members of Parliament registered similar protests - G. Sandars (106) and James Clay. Clay mentioned Spanish vessels, as well, as being given special blockade privileges. (107)

Certain British mail ships were allowed to pass the blockade, however. These ships sailed from London thus causing resentment in other areas of

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(103) F.O. 22, 177, No. 190, Eighty Firms, "A Memorial from the Bankers, Merchants and Others residing and carrying on Business in the Borough of Bradford in the West Riding County of York" to Palmerston, 7 May, 1849.

(104) F.O. 22, 177, No. 234, Liverpool Memorial to Palmerston, 15 May, 1849; a second letter requesting a reply from Palmerston was written by the same Liverpool sources on 28 May, 1849.

(105) F.O. 22, 177, No. 189, Memorial from Merchants of Hull to Palmerston, 5 May, 1849.

(106) F.O. 22, 178, No. 288, G. Sandars to Palmerston, 11 June, 1849.

(107) F.O. 22, 178, James Clay to Palmerston, 12 June, 1849.
Britain because they could not also have post carriers sailing from their ports. It was well-known that mail was usually not the only thing these postal ships transported.

J.R. Duncan wrote on 12 April to Palmerston on behalf of the shippers of Hull requesting that ships from this port be allowed the same mail privileges as London ships and that this be done for the benefit of exporters of goods from Manchester, Leeds and Bradford as well as Hull. (108) Thomas Barclay for the Hull and Leith Steam Packet Company and for the Thomas Barclay Company of Glasgow requested on 28 April that the ships *Mercator* and *Martello* be allowed to enter Hamburg as had the London carrier, *John Bull*; (109) and the Foreign Office received a second message complaining of the privileges enjoyed by London ships from the same source on 11 May via Alexander Hastie, M.P. (110) Hull merchants requested Palmerston in another memorial on 5 May for permission for some of their ships to carry mail to Hamburg for the duration of the blockade. (111) Also the Manchester Chamber of Commerce petitioned that Hull steamers as well as London ones be permitted to

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(108) F.O. 22, 176, J.R. Duncan and shippers of Hull to Palmerston, 12 Apr., 1849.


(110) F.O. 22, 177, No. 199, Alexander Hastie, "Second Memorial relative to the Danish Blockade from the Hull and Leith Steam Packet Company ..." to Palmerston, 11 May, 1849.

(111) F.O. 22, 177, No. 189, Memorial of the Merchants of Hull to Palmerston, 5 May, 1849.
carry mail to Hamburg. (112) Palmerston's general reply to these memorials and letters, both on foreign as well as London mail-ship concessions, was that if further postal carrying privileges were granted the Danish blockade would become ineffective. (113) On some occasions he forwarded the petitions to the Danish Government, (114) but whenever this occurred the requests were refused. (115)

Palmerston received memorials from British manufacturing centers which claimed undue hardships because of the Danish blockade. One written on 2 May, signed by 42 merchants, bankers, shipowners and manufacturers of Dundee, observed:

That in consequence of the blockade of the Rivers in the north of Germany against British vessels your Memorialists suffer great loss, as the importation of their manufactures into that country is totally prevented by the expense of sending them by another route and they are thereby unable to compete with other manufacturing countries.

That your Memorialists are not only engaged in a direct trade with Germany, but their usual business carried on with England is in consequence much diminished; and that they would therefore point out ... that the Blockades seriously interfere with the commerce in general of Great Britain ... therefore

(112) F. O. 22, 177, No. 205, Memorial of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Palmerston, 15 May, 1849.

(113) F. O. 22, 177, No. 175, Foreign Office to Baines and Merchants of Hull, 8 May, 1849; F. O. 22, 177, Foreign Office to Hastie and the Hull and Leith Steam Packet Company and Others, 12 May, 1849.

(114) F. O. 22, 177, No. 128, Foreign Office to Merchants of Liverpool, 30 May, 1849.

(115) F. O. 22, 177, Foreign Office to Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 16 May, 1849.
please ... take the necessary steps for the purpose of removing without delay the impediments to commerce which are equally injurious to all classes. (116)

Another memorial was sent by merchants, bankers and manufacturers from Manchester. (117) Palmerston did not attempt to argue with either of these groups. He simply replied to those from Dundee that His Majesty's Government was trying to bring about an end to hostilities, (118) and similarly to those from Manchester, adding that Britain would be unjustified in interfering with the blockade by force of arms. (119)

The lack of certain imports from Germany due to the blockade aroused the concern of some British traders as much as the halting of exports to the Continent. One of the main German imports to Britain was grain. Laing Brothers of Newcastle remonstrated on 9 March: "We ... have wheat laying for our account in the Baltic which we shall not get shipped, in fact, the grain laying for British accounts will also be retained." (120) And on 12 April, Peter Marrow of Liverpool repined that he had paid £2,304.17.0 for perishable grain which had been loaded

(116) F.O. 22, 177, No. 176, "Memorial from the Merchants, Bankers, Shipowners and Manufacturers of Dundee" to Palmerston, 2 May, 1849.

(117) F.O. 22, 178, "Memorial to ... Palmerston from Bankers, Merchants and Manufacturers of Manchester and vicinity," 14 June, 1849.

(118) F.O. 22, 177, No. 184, Foreign Office to the Memorialists of Dundee, 4 May, 1849.

(119) F.O. 22, 178, No. 193, Foreign Office to Mayor John Potter, Esq., Mayor, and Merchants of Manchester, 15 June, 1849.

(120) F.O. 22, 176, No. 113, Laing Brothers to Palmerston, Newcastle, 9 Mar., 1849.
onto the Mecklenburg ship, *Fünfster Blücher*; that the vessel sailed before the termination of the armistice, but had been detained by the Danes. (121) John Piggot and John Sampson Piggot of Essex voiced an almost identical protest on 7 June. They had chartered a ship to bring grain to Britain and paid £1,999.16.0 for the produce and cost of transportation. They had had no knowledge of a blockade when this transaction was made, but on the way to England, this ship was halted and taken to Copenhagen. They requested Palmerston's aid in obtaining the release of the ship and cargo. (122) Memorialists from Dundee also complained that they suffered from the loss of grain from Germany. (123)

Huddersfield petitioners expressed fears of the consequences of a wool shortage, a raw material, which they were accustomed to import from Germany. They pointed out to the Foreign Minister that the loss of this wool, which usually came from Hamburg to Hull, would, cause much unemployment unless the blockade was lifted. They argued that the time of year when the German fairs are held was near at hand, but that they dared not risk the purchase of their annual supplies because

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(121) F.O. 22, 176, No. 121, Peter Marrow to Palmerston, Liverpool, 12 April, 1849.

(122) F.O. 22, 178, No. 273, "The Humble Memorial of John Piggot and John Sampson Piggot of Langford near Maldon in the County of Essex, Merchants" to Palmerston, 7 June, 1849.

(123) F.O. 22, 177, No. 176, "Memorial from the Merchants, Bankers, Shipowners and Manufacturers of Dundee" to Palmerston, 2 May, 1849.
of the likelihood of their being seized by the Danes.\(^{(124)}\) But whether it was grain or wool the British might have no ration, Palmerston refused to demand that Denmark cease its blockade.\(^{(125)}\)

Another grievance against the blockade was that it was more of a "paper" blockade than an actual one. G. Sandars, M.P. mailed Palmerston a copy of a letter from British and Prussian subjects in Germany which had been originally directed to the British Consul at Stettin. They protested that there were not enough Danish frigates to constitute a true blockade and that a single ship would attempt to guard more than one port.\(^{(126)}\) Over a hundred signatures of merchants, shipowners, fishcurers and residents of Banff appeared on a memorial objecting to the blockade as not a "true" one;\(^{(127)}\) and traders of Kingston-upon-Hull dispatched a message showing a similar attitude on this point.\(^{(128)}\) Palmerston did at least give the later memorialists some ray of hope when he answered that the blockade would soon be over.\(^{(129)}\)

\(^{(124)}\) F.O. 22, 177, "Memorial of Importers of German Wools, resident in the Borough of Huddersfield" to Palmerston, 21 May, 1849.

\(^{(125)}\) F.O. 22, 176, No. 110, Foreign Office to Peter Marrow, 16 Apr., 1849; F.O. 22, 177, No. 184, Foreign Office to memorialists of Dundee, 4 May, 1849; F.O. 22, 178, No. 288, Foreign Office to John Piggot and John Sampson Piggot, 14 June, 1849.

\(^{(126)}\) F.O. 22, 176, No. 132, G. Sandars to Palmerston, 29 April, 1849.

\(^{(127)}\) F.O. 22, 177, No. 186, "Memorial of the Merchants, Ship-Owners, and Fishcurers, resident in Banff, Macduff and Neighbours" to Palmerston, 4 May, 1849.

\(^{(128)}\) F.O. 22, 179, "Memorial of Bankers, Merchants, Shipowners and others interested in the Trade of Kingston-upon-Hull" to Palmerston, 13 July, 1849.

Throughout 1849, as in 1848, he stuck consistently to the same position— that he could not interfere with the Danish blockade, but that he was willing to serve as a mediator between Denmark and Germany, and hoped by this means that these trade restrictions would be lifted. He even dispatched a British frigate, the *Hecate*, to the North and Baltic Seas to determine if the blockade was a true one. Reports from the ship's commander, H.C. Aldham indicated that it was indeed a valid blockade. (130)

A Danish blockade never actually developed in the spring of 1850, but the threat of one was enough to alarm some British men of commerce. Because of this, a number of memorials were addressed to Palmerston in March asking him to take the necessary steps to prevent any such occurrence. The first entreaty he received was from merchants of Kingston-upon-Hull on 2 March. (131) Another petition was mailed on 15 March by Thomas Bazeley, President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce. (132) On 22 March the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce prayed for a continuance of the armistice between Denmark and Germany and that the Baltic and North Sea ports would remain free from any blockade. (133)

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(130) For reports from the *Hecate* to Palmerston see, F.O. 22, 177, No. 233, 17 May, 1849; F.O. 22, 177, No. 239, 20 May, 1849; and F.O. 22, 178, 5 June, 1849.


(132) F.O. 22, 187, No. 71, Thomas Bazeley, President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Palmerston, 15 Mar., 1850.

(133) F.O. 22, 187, No. 76, Thomas Hossfalls, President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to Palmerston, 22 Mar., 1850.
And lastly, a Member of Parliament (Glynn) forwarded a letter from merchants having extensive trade connections with the Prussian ports who hoped that Her Majesty's Government could prevent the renewal of a blockade. Each of these petitions received assurances from the Foreign Office that it would do all it could to conclude the differences between Denmark and the German Confederation.

In conclusion, Palmerston received letters or memorials from men-of-commerce from nearly every part of Britain urging him to use his influence to terminate the blockade. The objections to this disruption of trade were varied. There were protests about the detention of ships or cargo, the allegedly different treatment accorded by the Danes to British and foreign vessels when seeking to enter German ports, requests from areas such as Hull and northern Scotland that ships from their localities should be given the same mail-carrying privileges as some from London in order that they might pass the blockade, and allegations that the Danish blockade was only a "paper" one because there were not always frigates guarding each port. Manufacturing areas, such as Manchester, and fishing localities, such as Wick, let it be known that

(134) F.O. 22, 187, No. 73, Glynn and memorialists to Palmerston, 25 Mar., 1850.

local industries had been severely damaged by the loss of the export trade to Germany of their products. Other areas like Huddersfield objected to the loss of imports, such as grain and wool, which had been usually obtainable from the German Baltic and North Sea ports. In nearly every instance Palmerston's reply was to the effect that he could not forcefully interfere with the blockade, but was working hard through mediation to bring about a peaceful solution to the hostilities between Denmark and Germany. It is significant that in none of these memorials or letters were the Danes referred to as irresponsible villains. The memorialists did not question the right of Denmark to impose a blockade. Generally, they requested special favours for their ships or cargoes, or manufacturing interests, or for their ports and areas of their localities. Thus it can be shown that while Palmerston encouraged Denmark by backing the legality of the blockade, the anxieties caused by these restrictions, which in some cases had dire results for certain British industries, were still not enough for those adversely affected to label the Danes as unlawful aggressors and deserving of a defeat by Germany or an attack by Great Britain.
While there could be only one official British attitude on the Schleswig-Holstein Question, that expressed by the Queen's government, there existed great differences of opinion between Queen Victoria and Prince Albert on one hand and Palmerston on the other. The Court supported the German side. Palmerston strove to keep Britain neutral, but at the end of the day favoured a return to the status quo ante bellum — in effect, the view of most Danes. This estrangement became actually so bitter that the Court accused him of using every trick, or bock, as Albert called it to frustrate them. (1)

Queen Victoria's blood ties with Germany were numerous. Through her father she belonged to the House of Brunswick, and was first cousin to King Frederick I of Württemberg. On her mother's side as well as through her marriage to Albert she was closely associated with the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. In addition she maintained wide connections among the mediatised German princes. (2)

These relationships naturally strengthened her loyalties to Germany. There was, however, at least one of her German relatives whom she disliked intensely — Ernest August, King of Hanover. Because of his extreme conservatism, the King of Hanover was very unpopular in Britain; he had

(2) Arthur Christopher Benson and Viscount Esher (eds.), *The Letters of Queen Victoria, a Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence between the years 1837 and 1861...* I (London, 1908), pp. 1-3, hereafter cited as Benson, *Letters.*
declared invalid the Constitution which William IV had authorized for this German State in 1833. The Queen's aloofness from Ernest August is significant because Hanover and Prussia were rivals for power in Germany; smaller States, like Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, wished German unification under Prussian leadership, while Hanover was less anxious to come under such domination.

Another of the Queen's links with Germany was her knowledge of the language. She had learned German when a child from her mother, and in later years corresponded frequently in it. She had little or no knowledge of Danish and when corresponding with King Frederik VII used French.

Louise Lehzen, the daughter of a Hanoverian clergyman, also had much influence on Victoria. Soon after the Princess's birth in 1819, Lehzen came to serve as governess. She remained with Victoria up until 1842 when she returned to Germany, one reason being because of an apparent

(3) Ibid., I, p. 6.
(4) Ibid., I, p. 4.
(5) See ibid., II, pp. 257-258.
personality conflict with Albert.\(^{(7)}\)

But the strongest German influence of all upon the Queen was that of the Prince Consort. Even before her marriage with Albert, she realized that the British public would not welcome additional German influence upon Britain's government. Because of this, she at first wanted to keep the Prince almost solely as her private companion,\(^{(8)}\) and during the first years of their marriage, he had little political responsibility. This situation gradually changed.\(^{(9)}\) Almost annually during these years, Victoria gave birth to a new Prince or Princess. Because of her increased domestic responsibilities, it seemed natural to her that Albert would assume more of her roles in government.\(^{(10)}\) As he gained more responsibility so his influence on the Queen's political views grew, and soon after the beginning of the war in Schleswig and Holstein, he convinced her of the legal and moral correctness of the German claims there. But it should not be thought that these family and educational influences blinded the Queen to the fears felt by many of her subjects. For example in a letter to the King of Prussia, she expressed approval of the principle of German unity,


\(^{(10)}\) Connell, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 32.
but added the following words of caution: "I am sure that the English public generally share this feeling, but I must not conceal from your Majesty that much would depend upon the manner in which this power was represented." (11) This letter was written only a few months before Prussian troops occupied much of the Helstat.

Victoria idolized Albert and any attack on him thoroughly aroused her protective feelings, and thus probably caused her pro-German attitudes over the Duchies to become even more firmly established. To her, Albert represented everything that was good and by 1848 she had come to consider almost any criticism of him to be morally reprehensible. But unfortunately Palmerston did worse than merely to criticize him, he consistently ignored him. On one occasion the Prince arranged for the Foreign Minister to visit him. The two had a long walk and discussed the Schleswig-Holstein conflict. Albert did most of the talking, but Palmerston failed to follow his advice in almost every respect. (12)

Palmerston adopted this attitude to Albert throughout the war. (13) In his behaviour towards the Queen, he generally followed the advice given to him in 1848 by Lady Palmerston who remarked: "I am afraid you contradict her notions too boldly ... I should treat what she says more lightly and

(11) Queen to King of Prussia, Osborne, 5 Dec., 1847, quoted in Benson, Letters, II, p. 139.

(12) Benson, Queen, p. 161.

(13) Ibid., pp. 163-164.
courteously, and not enter into arguments with her, but lead her on gently, by letting her believe you have both the same opinions ... but take sometimes different ways of carrying them out."

On 17 April, 1848 Victoria complained to Palmerston about the slowness with which reports from the Foreign Office reached her. She declared: "The acceptance of the mediation between Denmark and Holstein is too important an event not to have been first submitted to the Queen." The following day Palmerston expressed his regrets at the delays and outlined some of his views on the Duchies: "Although events of the greatest importance have been passing in rapid succession in almost every part of Europe, the position of your Majesty's Government has been one rather of observation than of action, it being desirable that England should keep herself as free as possible from unnecessary engagements ... in order that your Majesty may be at liberty to take such decisions as the state of things may from time to time appear ... most advisable."

Following Albert's advice, the Queen wrote to Palmerston on 1 July, 1848. This time she complained about the inconsistencies between the Foreign Office's approach to the revolutions in Italy and to the one in the Elbe Duchies.

(14) Quoted in Longford, op. cit., p. 208.
(15) Queen to Palmerston, 17 Apr., 1848, quoted in Benson, Letters, II, p. 17.
(16) Palmerston to Queen, 18 Apr., 1848, quoted in ibid., loc. cit.
(17) Queen to Palmerston, 1 July, 1848, ibid., II, p. 182.
Pilgerstein(18) answered: "In the case of Schleswig the British Government has been accepted by both parties as mediator, which is not the case in regard to the Italian war; and a government engaged in mediation may justly urge the contending parties to suspend the progress of the war." He reminded Her Majesty once again of the British Guarantee of 1720, and added: "... if the Danish construction of it were admitted, it might compel Great Britain to become a party in the war, if your Majesty's Government did not succeed in its efforts at mediation."(19)

The following month, Victoria again attacked the Foreign Minister. She wrote to Russell expressing disapproval with Palmerston personally, as well as with his unsatisfactory handling of the crisis in Schleswig.(20) But in a letter in September concerning the Frankfurt Parliament and its policy towards the Duchies, she commented: "The Schleswig affair at Frankfurt is very unfortunate, and there seems a lamentable want of all practical common sense, foresight, or even common prudence."(21) This letter was addressed to the King of the Belgians. It is noteworthy that many of the Queen's sharpest criticisms of Germany seem to have been written to people outside of Britain rather than to Palmerston, but there was a deep contrast between her sympathy for the Germans in the Duchies and her lack of sympathy for the

(18) A nickname by which the Queen and Albert referred to Palmerston.
(19) Palmerston to Queen, 2 July, 1848, quoted in Connell, op. cit., p. 87.
(21) Queen to the King of the Belgians, 13 Sept., 1848, quoted in ibid., II, p. 194. Author's italics.
Frankfurt Parliament.

The battle of letters continued into 1849. In June of that year, the Queen once again complained to Palmerston and gave him her version of some of Schleswig's and Holstein's history: "The union of Schleswig and Holstein is not an ideal one, but complete as to Constitution, Finance, Customs, Jurisdiction, Church, Universities, Poor Law, Settlements, Debts, etc., etc., etc. It is not established by the Kings - Dukes, but has existed for centuries. To defend Holstein against the attack made by Denmark upon this union, Germany joined the war." She told him that Germany was obliged to see that Schleswig's independence should be guaranteed before signing a peace treaty; accused him of not familiarising himself properly with this issue; and concluded that peace could not be enduring unless it contained ample assurances that Schleswig would not be incorporated into Denmark. (22) Palmerston in his reply gave his "entire concurrence in the justice of the principles" of the Queen's views. (23) Evidently, this is one occasion when he chose to follow the advice of Lady Palmerston in expressing a basic agreement with Her Majesty's attitudes, while doing little to follow her advice.

The Foreign Minister's superficial politeness in his dealing with the Queen did not stand up under her every attack. Another disagreement

(22) Queen to Palmerston, 21 June, 1849, quoted in ibid., II, pp. 222-223. Author's italics.

(23) Ibid., II, p. 223, fn. 1.
occurred over the London Protocol of 1850. The Queen objected to
Palmerston's delay in inviting the German Confederation to the conference.
She wrote that since Holstein belonged to the Confederation and "is only
accidentally connected with Denmark through its Sovereign, a Protocol to
ensure the integrity of the Danish Monarchy is a direct attack upon Germany,
if carried out without her knowledge and consent." She believed that third
parties had no right to dispose of other people's belongings and complained
that the agreement to call the Protocol had been decided upon by Sweden,
Russia, Denmark and France before Prussia or Austria had received even a
notification of the meeting. (24)

Palmerston replied curtly and emphatically, but he did so through a
third party - Lord John Russell. Palmerston wrote: "The Queen has
entirely misconceived the object and effect of the proposed Protocol. It
does not 'decide upon the fate of Holstein,' nor is it 'an attack upon
Germany.'" In fact it was to "decide nothing;" it would merely record
the wishes and attitudes of those who took part. "Is not the Queen," he
asked, "requiring that I should be Minister, not indeed for Austria, Russia,
or France, but for the Germanic Confederation? Why should we take up the
cudgels for Germany when we are inviting Austria and Prussia?" These he
pointed out, were the two greatest German powers and it was their respons-
ability, rather than Britain's, as implied by the Queen, to speak up for

(24) Queen to Palmerston, 22 June, 1850, quoted in ibid., p. 249.
the German Confederation when necessary. (25)

Apparently it did not take long for the Queen to receive this message from Russell, as she replied to him two days after Palmerston's response. She explained that she did not wish Palmerston to be a "Minister for Germany, but merely to treat that country with the same consideration which is due to every country on whose interests we mean to decide." She also wrote: "Whether this will be an attack upon Germany or not will be easily deduced from the fact that the attempt on the part of Denmark to incorporate into her polity the Duchy of Schleswig was declared by the Diet in 1846 to be a declaration of war against Germany merely on account of its intimate connection with the Duchy of Holstein." (26)

A few weeks later she wrote Russell that the "whole war - Revolution, mediation, etc., etc. - rested upon the question whether Schleswig was part of Holstein (though not of the German Confederation), or part of Denmark and not of Holstein." (27) She saw no sense in drawing up a Protocol which would facilitate the annexation of a German-speaking State, Holstein, by a non-German-speaking country - Denmark. The Queen even accused Palmerston of secretly masterminding a Russian-backed revolution in Schleswig, which she

(27) Queen to Russell, 31 July, 1850, quoted in ibid., II, p. 258.
believed could only lead to a general European War.\(^{(28)}\)

Another cause of the Queen's dissatisfaction was the proposal by Palmerston to appoint Colonel George Lloyd Hodges as the British member of the administrative commission for Schleswig set up in accordance with the terms of the Berlin Armistice. She believed that Hodges was too partial to Denmark to serve on this body, but Palmerston had his way once again and the Colonel was named to serve.\(^{(29)}\) Afterwards the Queen advised the Foreign Minister that she did not expect her objections to this appointment would change his views on the subject, "but she mentioned them as she has the satisfaction to recollect that she always has done, whenever she saw that a mistake was going to be made, as she thinks Colonel Hodges' appointment will be."\(^{(30)}\)

A speech from the throne, delivered by Victoria on 4 February, 1851 contained the reference which seems to reflect her sympathy for some of the aspirations for the Germans in the Duchies. She urged the German States to abide by the terms of the Berlin Treaty of 1850 with Denmark, but added: "I trust that the affairs of Germany may be arranged by mutual agreement in such a manner as to preserve the strength of the Confederation and to

\(^{(28)}\) Queen to Russell, 28 July, 1850, \textit{ibid.}, II, p. 257.

\(^{(29)}\) Connell, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 109.

\(^{(30)}\) Quoted in \textit{ibid.}, p. 110.
maintain the freedom of its separate States." (31) Doubtless, to her, the 'freedom of its separate States' included the freedom of Holstein and Lauenburg from incorporation with Denmark.

Correspondence between Palmerston and Russell during 1848-50 indicates that many times they discussed the question of the Duchies. Russell often informed the Queen of Foreign Office decisions; (32) in addition, Palmerston himself briefed the Court about many important issues of the day. Because so many dispatches passed through the Foreign Office, the Queen surely would have complained had she been expected to comment upon all of them. Also the necessity for Palmerston to make quick decisions often prevented him from having the time to wait for her to state the Court's view. But she did feel that he was not keeping her well informed on the Schleswig-Holstein question. (33) Because the Court's attitude to the war was so different from his, perhaps due to Albert's influence the Queen was unusually sensitive on the Danish-German quarrel and used the Foreign Minister's apparent oversight in this matter as an opportunity to reprimand him.

Prince Albert had lived most of his life before coming to Britain within

(33) Hjelholt, Mediation, I, pp. 26, 37. Palmerston maintained that the Foreign Office sent and received 28,000 dispatches in 1848 alone. See Russell to Albert, 19 June, 1849, Benson, Letters, II, p. 221.
German Court circles. For a foreigner he was well acquainted with British politics, but this did not mean that Britons always appreciated this experience.\(^{(34)}\) The British public was extremely jealous of any foreign influence upon its Court or political leaders and was often suspicious and at times expressly critical of his views.\(^{(35)}\) Some believed that Albert lacked a sense of humour or the \textit{savoir faire} either to think or behave as an Englishman.\(^{(36)}\)

Another German, Baron von Stockmar of Coburg, had for years exerted a great influence on the Prince.\(^{(37)}\) He had been instrumental in encouraging the marriage of Victoria and Albert and had served as the young Queen's secretary in 1837–38.\(^{(38)}\) He wished to draw Britain and Germany closer together and saw in Albert one means of bringing this about.\(^{(39)}\) And although Albert had become an Englishman first and a German second, he and his children still retained hereditary rights in Germany. He vowed to remain a loyal German when leaving Saxe-Coburg-Gotha\(^{(40)}\) and because of his links with his

\(^{(34)}\) Eyck, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 41.
\(^{(40)}\) Jagow, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 119.
fatherland, he felt especially entitled to speak up for the rights of the German population living under the rule of the Danish King in Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg.

Another German whose relationship with the Prince was both friendly and influential was Bunsen. According to the Duke of Argyll, Bunsen's and Palmerston's temperaments "were pretty nearly at the poles of human character." Argyll remarked that Palmerston hated Prussia and had a low opinion of the motives of Prussian statesmen. (41) Since the Queen and Albert held the Foreign Minister in contempt, it is not surprising that one with such a different disposition, like the religious minded Bunsen, was in good standing with the Court. (42)

Albert in a letter to Prince William of Prussia in 1850 praised Bunsen, commenting that the Baron possessed "a certain distinction and influence in England, which any other Prussian Minister would find difficulty in acquiring so quickly." (43) But Bunsen, like the Prince, apparently could not understand why so many Britons objected to the principle of a united Germany that would also include the Elbe Duchies, an area which he considered to be predominantly German.


(43) Albert to Prince William of Prussia, 7 Sept., 1850, quoted in Jagow, op. cit., pp. 165-166.
When the war began, Albert attempted to indoctrinate the Queen thoroughly with his viewpoint on the Schleswig-Holstein Question. He believed that the two Duchies should remain united and was in sympathy with the idea of a Prussian hegemony over a politically unified German people. The Prince had protested to Russell as early as 1 May, 1848 about the unfairness of anti-German articles in the press, mainly The Times, as well as about the fierceness of Disraeli's attacks on Prussia in Parliament. Russell's reply gave him little comfort. He wrote that he had not the power to suppress the voices of the press or Members of Parliament, but suggested to him that The Times did not speak for all of Britain. Stockmar also cautioned Germans like Albert that they should not believe that all public opinion in Britain was against them. He remarked that some British papers, such as The Morning Chronicle, were influenced by Palmerston and others were "the willing servants of this, or that, individual" and so could not be expected to adopt a pro-German attitude, but believed that in England the authors of these anti-German articles were not important nor respected enough for Germans to allow their emotions to be aroused by them.

(45) Albert to Russell, 1 May, 1848, Eyck, op. cit., p. 105.
(46) Russell to Albert, 2 May, 1848, ibid., loc. cit.
(47) F. Max Müller (ed.), Memoirs of Baron Stockmar ... II (London, 1872), pp. 348-349.
Prince, however, continued to believe that much of the British press was biased against Germany and wrote to Frederick William IV that he doubted whether the British public would become properly informed about the conflict as long as its press behaved as it did. (49)

Lord Aberdeen complained in 1849 of Albert's "excessive Germanism, and his being such a vehement and uncompromising partisan of the German Imperial Unity scheme, and abettor of the Prussian dangers;" a scheme in which Albert was "morbidly anxious that Prussia should have Schleswig." (50) One example of this is in a letter from Albert to Ernest II of Saxe-Coburg who had led a German brigade at the battle of Eckernförde on 5 April, 1849. Excited over this German triumph, he complimented his kinsman upon the "great victory," and remarked further: "It [the battle] could not have turned out better, and the loss of her ships may make Denmark more ready to listen to reason and to agree to a peace of which both she and Germany stand in need." (51)

The Prince also objected to Britain's signing the London Protocol of 1850, (52) and after the Battle of Istedt expressed the fear that the

(49) Albert to Frederick William IV, 1 Dec., 1850, Jagow, op. cit., p. 169.
(51) Albert to Duke Ernest II of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, 10 Apr., 1849, quoted in Jagow, op. cit., p. 149. After the Danish warship, King Christian VIII exploded, according to The Times, 11 Apr., 1849, Ernest II displayed heroism in efforts to rescue Danish seamen.
victorious Danish armies might invade Holstein as well as Schleswig. He and Palmerston had a long conversation about the Danish question after this battle which ended without the Foreign Minister giving him any positive answer. (53)

Still Albert urged Prussia to show moderation in letters written in 1849-1850 to Prince William. After the Berlin Armistice in 1849 he advised William to abide by the Armistice and "maintain her [Prussia's] good name" even though the peace preliminaries did little to satisfy German ambitions. (54) In August, 1850 he wrote to William: "The poor Schleswig-Holsteiners must be bearing a great deal for their isolation; and yet it is a good thing that their justified resistance is not spoiled by appearing as the result of Prussian ambition." (55) And in the same month, the Prince in a letter to Stockmar commented: "The idée fixe here is, that Germany's only object in separating Holstein with Schleswig from Denmark is to incorporate them with herself, and then to draw them from the English into the Prussian commercial system. Denmark will then become a State too small to maintain a separate independence, and so the division of European territory and the balance of power will be disturbed." (56)

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(55) Albert to Prince William, 20 Aug., 1850, quoted in ibid., p. 164.
(56) Albert to Stockmar, 25 Aug., 1850, quoted in ibid., p. 165.
Not all of Albert's statements on the Duchies were wholly partial to Germany. He put some of the blame on Germany for the threatened extension of the war, for example in a letter to Russell he admitted: "The Schleswig-Holstein question causes me much anxiety as I am afraid that we may be dragged by the Danish and Russian, perhaps even by French insinuation and diplomatic efforts, into an open opposition to Germany. I assure you that I try to divest myself of every particle of German feeling in considering this question and am looking solely to the interests of this country [Britain] which may be most seriously endangered." (57) But the Prince Consort remained throughout the war an ardent supporter of the unification of German speaking areas. If his influence over Palmerston and Russell was negligible on this question, his influence over the Queen was great. And it must have been a source of encouragement to the Schleswig-Holstein forces to have known that the British Royal Family supported their cause.

Palmerston claimed to have understood the Schleswig-Holstein question once and then to have forgotten it, (58) but the fact that so vast a number of dispatches passed through the Foreign Office on this subject indicates that the issue was unusually complex and difficult for anyone to grasp completely; Count Reventlow, Danish Ambassador in London, once described

(57) Albert to Russell, 1 May, 1848, quoted in Eyck, op. cit., pp. 104-105.
(58) See supra., p.17, fn. 60.
Palmerston's remarks as "characteristic by being made as obscure as possible;" (59) and The Times commenting upon a speech by him on a resume of the politics of Europe wrote: "We must cordially recommend it as a model for all future Ministerial explanations, of which the essence and excellence are to leave as much as possible unexplained." (60) Yet, he was outspoken when he believed a situation demanded it.

If Palmerston unnecessarily irritated the Court and worried Russell, the British public continued to look upon him as the leading upholder of the British name abroad. (61) Indeed, the more the Queen and Albert complained about him, the more the man on the street seemed to admire him, (62) and one historian recently wrote that in 1850 Palmerston "basked in popular favour." (63) Often Palmerston alienated public opinion abroad, and especially within the German Confederation, but the vast majority of his fellow-countrymen approved of his support of the "weak against the strong." (64) Also it was not always easy for Palmerston to forget that he had served in high positions of trust

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(59) Quoted in Hjelholt, Mediation, I, p. 85.
(60) The Times, 6 Feb., 1849.
(62) Benson, Queen, p. 163.
within the British government before the Royal Pair were born and was in fact older than Victoria's Uncle Leopold, King of the Belgians. (65) This age difference could well be another reason for the differences in outlook between the Court and the Foreign Minister.

Great Britain had for years recognized the strategic importance of Denmark and the Duchies. It is thus not surprising that Palmerston should be sensitive about any issue which could cause a change within the Helstat and disrupt the balance of power in Europe. As a result, he wished to retain the Danish kingdom intact although he had in 1848 considered a partition of Schleswig along ethnic lines. (66) Prussia's desire to extend its coastline on the Baltic and to acquire one on the North Sea disturbed him, but he was equally afraid of Russian ambitions in the same direction. This attitude was shared by much of the British newspaper and periodical press. (67) The problem was thus not purely a Danish-German one, but one which involved much of Europe. (68)

Nearly all of Palmerston's letters to Russell on the conflict centre on the theme of how to avoid using British military or naval forces in the war and how to arrange a peaceful settlement before the war should spread. (69)

(65) Southgate, op. cit., p. 250-251; Benson, Queen, pp. 163-164.
(67) See infra., pp. 116-120, 159.
He took issue with the Queen in a letter written to Russell on 23 September, 1850. In an earlier letter she had referred to the "State as Sleswig-Holstein." Palmerston corrected this statement: "I return you the Queen's letter, which contains two mistakes ... There is a Duchy of Sleswig and a Duchy of Holstein, separate in their origin, history and political condition, the one being a member of the German Confederation, the other not, the one entirely German as to its population, the other chiefly Danish, the former (Sleswig) being guaranteed to the Crown of Denmark by Foreign Powers, the other (Holstein) not being so." He also tried to correct the impression the Queen had gained from some of his remarks on the Holstein insurrection since the Berlin Treaty of 1850. The Queen had gathered that Palmerston believed that the Holsteiners were not insurgents. He informed Russell, however, that he considered the Holsteiners' insurrection had developed the "character of war," and that they were in violation of the recent peace agreement. (70)

The triangular affair between the Court, Palmerston and Russell was one in which the latter was often called upon to act as intermediary, (71) and on at least one occasion Russell warned the Foreign Minister about his apparent failure to keep the Queen well enough informed. On 1 October, 1848, he wrote: "That the Queen is constantly suffering under uneasiness is too true, but I own I cannot say it is always groundless. It is surely

(70) Palmerston to Russell, 23 Sept., 1850, quoted in ibid., II, p. 28.
(71) Southgate, op. cit., p. 251.
right that a person speaking in the name of Her Majesty's Government should in important affairs submit his dispatches to the Queen and obtain the opinion of her Prime Minister before he commits the Queen and her Government. This necessary preliminary you too often forget; and the Queen, naturally ... dreads that upon some occasion you may give her name to sanction proceedings which afterwards she may be compelled to disavow."

(72) Russell requested Palmerston to inform the Queen and himself prior and not after an important dispatch had been forwarded. But added that although he had felt uneasy at times about this neglect of the Queen, he had agreed with most of the foreign policy decisions Palmerston had made in 1848. (73)

Russell was also called upon to answer criticisms of British attitudes on the Duchies from Stockmar. The German mentor complained that the "unfortunate Sleswig-Holstein affair has prejudiced the English mind to such a degree that it has become totally incapable of seeing anything German or Prussian but through that medium." (74) Russell replied: "It is not for forty millions of people to complain that they could not obtain good government because England has looked coldly on them." He informed Stockmar that "neither justice nor England could tolerate" Schleswig being taken from the


(73) Ibid., loc. cit.

(74) Stockmar to Russell, 8 Nov., 1850, quoted in Gooch, op. cit., II, p. 31.
In spite of the general agreement of Russell and Palmerston over the war, their rivalry for power within the Whig Party made it increasingly difficult for Lord John to retain his Foreign Minister regardless of the latter's immense popularity with the British people. Gradually, Russell came to the conclusion that Palmerston must be removed, but this event did not actually occur until about a year after the end of the hostilities in the Duchies.

Besides attacks on him by the Queen and the Prince Consort, Palmerston was frequently subjected to critical comments and questions on the war by Members of Parliament. Most of these expressed pro-Danish sentiments, and foremost among them was Benjamin Disraeli. On 19 April, 1848 he delivered a long speech which covered a variety of aspects about the war.

On Prussia's invasion of the Helstat, he declared:

> there is probably no event in modern history more unjustifiable than the conduct of Prussia under these circumstances. Since these occurrences, it has been pretended that Holstein being a German State, and Schleswig, through not a German State, having chosen to be united to Holstein, and the King of Denmark, as Duke of Holstein, being a German Prince and a member of the German Diet, the King of Prussia, as a member of the same body, had not only a right, but felt it also a duty, to march his troops into the territory of another member of that Diet, in consequence of the disturbances there existing. But, in the first place, the King of Prussia ordered his troops to march, and his troops entered Holstein, and occupied Holstein, without the German Diet having given any order whatsoever. In the second place, if any application had been made to the Diet for interference, it ought to have been made, not by a member of the Diet, who was King of

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(75) Russell to Stockmar, 22 Nov., 1850, quoted in *ibid.*, II, p. 34.
Prussia, but by him who was King of Denmark. And, in the third place, even if the Diet had authorised Prussia to occupy Holstein, it would have been impossible for the King of Prussia to show that he had any right whatever to invade Schleswig and occupy a considerable portion of that duchy. (76)

He considered Bunsen’s Memoir to be worthy of note only for its length and interesting title; its contents, he considered “less remarkable.” (77) It was, he contended, “a somewhat extraordinary thing for the ... Minister Plenipotentiary of the King of Prussia, to draw up a memoir and present it to our Minister only a few days back, and then publish it as a pamphlet, in order to influence the opinions of the House of Commons.” (78) He deeply regretted that “a man so distinguished [Bunsen] ... should have been so carried away by that dreamy and dangerous nonsense called ‘German nationality’, as to draw up a memoir ... characterised by so much indiscretion and passion as that now before us.” (79) He reminded his listeners that Britain had in 1720 guaranteed to the King of Denmark the possession of Schleswig; (80) called Prussia’s invasion an act of “cruel injustice, and such flagrant wrong;” (81) and prayed that if Prussia continued on such a course against Denmark, “may the peace of Europe be maintained by the justice and the


(77) Ibid., p. 518.

(78) Ibid., pp. 518-519.

(79) Ibid., p. 521. Author's italics.

(80) Ibid., pp. 520-523.

(81) Ibid., p. 523.
power of England."(82)

Palmerston was careful in answering Disraeli to avoid any arguments which could be interpreted as either pro-Danish or pro-German, but he observed:

The question of right has arisen between the German Confederation on one hand, and the Government of Denmark on the other, and that the question of right confines itself simply to the Duchy of Schleswig. With regard to Holstein no difference exists; that duchy has long been a member of the Germanic Confederation; the King of Denmark has been a party to that Confederation in virtue of his capacity as Grand Duke of Holstein; and it is consequently with respect to Schleswig alone that any dispute has arisen. The German Confederation, on the one hand, contend that, by ancient acts and recorded transactions, Schleswig is united to Holstein, and must, by treaty follow Holstein, according to whatever succession may take place in that duchy. The Danish Government ... pretends that it has a right to require that Schleswig shall follow the line of succession in Denmark ... Her Majesty's Government have signified to the two parties ... willingness to undertake the task of endeavouring by their good offices to settle the dispute amicably. (83)

He also offered to show the original treaty of 1720 to those Members of Parliament who might wish to scrutinize it further, but believed that it would be unfitting for him to give an opinion as to the side on which "the right preponderates."(84)

Disraeli made two more speeches in Parliament later in 1848 on the Schleswig Holstein issue. On 4 August, he expressed a fear of further German aggressions.

(82) Ibid., pp. 523-524.
(83) Palmerston, 19 Apr., 1848, Hansard, XC VIII, pp. 524-525.
(84) Ibid., p. 525.
sion in Europe, not only in Denmark and the Duchies, but also against Luxembourg;\(^{(85)}\) and three weeks later repeated the obligations he believed Britain to have under the 1720 Guarantee, cited France's acknowledgment of the Guarantee, and expressed concern over the damage the Danish blockade was doing to British commercial interests.\(^{(86)}\) Disraeli laid the ultimate blame for the war on the Germans. Palmerston's answers must have given him little satisfaction, for they amounted to little more than a promise that he would continue to mediate and the repetition of his claim that the Guarantee of 1720 still did not apply to the present state of affairs in Schleswig.\(^{(87)}\)

Disraeli continued in 1849 to express in Parliament his concern over the Danish-German conflict. On 1 February he referred particularly sneeringly to Germany's conduct in the war;\(^{(88)}\) and on 14 May, he questioned Palmerston about the progress of British mediation,\(^{(89)}\) but received no direct reply. The Foreign Minister claimed that anything he said was likely to be

\(^{(85)}\) Disraeli, 4 Aug., 1848, Hansard, C, pp. 1151-1152.

\(^{(86)}\) Disraeli, 25 Aug., 1848, Hansard, CI, pp. 562-564.

\(^{(87)}\) Palmerston, 4 Aug., 1848, Hansard, C, p. 1153; Palmerston, 25 Aug., 1848, Hansard, CI, p. 564-566.

\(^{(88)}\) Disraeli, 1 Feb., 1849, Hansard, CII, p. 103.

\(^{(89)}\) Disraeli, 14 May, 1849, Hansard, CV, p. 388.
"misunderstood" of "misrepresented" by people concerned with British commercial interests. (90)

Another M.P., David Urquhart from Stafford, expressed pro-Danish views on several occasions. On 19 April, 1848 he called Prussia's invasion an act of "violent oppression;" (91) on 4 May, 1848 claimed that Denmark's rights under the 1720 Guarantee had been "openly infringed;" (92) and on 11 May, 1848 characterized as "pirates" the Germans who had invaded the Duchies. (93) Urquhart received replies from Palmerston, or in his absence from Russell, to the extent that Her Majesty's Government would continue to mediate and did not yet consider the Guarantee of 1720 applicable. (94)

George Sandars, M.P. for Yorkshire, on 13 March, 1849 inquired of Palmerston about the possibility of the confiscation of British ships and goods in the event of a more stringent Danish blockade. (95) Palmerston attempted to satisfy him by remarking that he hoped to bring the conflicting parties to a "mutual good understanding" and that he believed "the spirit of conciliation ... will induce them to come to a reasonable understanding with the view to a final arrangement for permanent peace." (96)

(91) Urquhart, 19 Apr., 1848, Hansard, XC VIII, p. 526.
(92) Urquhart, 4 May, 1848, Hansard, XC VIII, p. 605.
(95) Sandars, 13 March, 1849, Hansard, CIII, p. 635.
(96) Palmerston, 13 Mar., 1849, Hansard, CIII, p. 637.
received another reply from Palmerston three days later, but the Foreign Minister only added vaguely that these matters were under discussion and that he hoped Danish intentions to blockade German coasts would soon be abandoned. (97)

Other Parliamentary speeches on the war occurred during 1848-50, but they usually consisted of questions or brief comments by Members on the blockade, the agreement of 1720 or mediation, answered by short general statements by Palmerston. (98) Sometimes the Foreign Minister would correct misinterpretations by speakers, but his basic thesis remained a very simple one – it was better for Britain to mediate than go to war over Schleswig. While some of the more outspoken Members of Parliament, like Disraeli, appeared to wish Britain to become actively involved on the side of Denmark, it is probable that the majority of the Members agreed with Palmerston, and preferred that Great Britain should mediate rather than dispatch British subjects to Jutland and the Baltic to challenge the Prussians.

To conclude, the Queen and the Prince Consort favoured the German side in the Schleswig-Holstein conflict. Much of this support doubtless stemmed from their German background, Albert's especially. He had been raised in

(97) Palmerston, 16 Mar., 1849, Hansard, CIII, p. 870.
a very small German State and it was one of his strongest desires to see the German speaking people become politically united rather than continue to be divided into so many weak units. He was backed by Stockmar and Bunsen and his influence on the Queen was considerable. On the other hand, Members of Parliament who voiced their attitudes on the war spoke up for Denmark. Disraeli was foremost in this group. Palmerston incurred the wrath of both the Court and some Members of Parliament by often not taking sides in the dispute, and choosing the role of a mediator. He assisted the Germans by refusing to admit the applicability of the Guarantee of 1720, but probably aided the Danes by helping to conclude the Armistice of 1849, the Peace Treaty of 1850, and the London Protocol of 1850 and by his refusal to interfere in the Danish blockade of German ports. Russell tried to pacify relations between the Queen and Palmerston, but generally supported the Foreign Minister's policies on the war.
A complete coverage of the attitudes of British newspapers to the Schleswig-Holstein Question in 1848-50 would fill many volumes. I have therefore made a selection from a great many comments and believe that the sample is a representative one. The most influential British newspapers were those published in London, but I have tried to include every affected area, from the docks of Cardiff to the fishing stations in the north of Scotland. I have paid particular attention to the towns along the east coast of Britain, some of which were seriously disturbed by the Danish blockade of German ports and have given due consideration to the inland manufacturing centers whose exports, especially to the German States but also to Denmark and other Baltic countries, were affected by the war.

The Times was not only the most influential newspaper in Britain at this time, but also the most prosperous journal in the world. (1) It claimed a circulation of 40,000 copies in 1847; no other paper in Britain could claim one-fifth of this. (2) Its influence could, according to Henry Reeve

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(author of nearly every major article on foreign politics for the paper from 1840-55), "hardly be exaggerated." The Times did not express the views of any one group, but reflected the personal attitude of John Thadeus Delane, who became its editor in 1841. He had the respect of "men of all parties and a position which no editor of a newspaper had before enjoyed."(5)

Reeve, who had come to despise Germany while living there as a young man, condemned nearly all revolutions including the uprising in the Elbe Duchies. He exercised an influence on editorials on foreign affairs in The Times during the war which was almost as great as that of Delane's. Reeve complained in 1849 that The Times lacked sufficient reliable information from north Germany. One possible result of this complaint was the appointment of William Howard Russell by The Times as a war correspondent. In 1850 the paper dispatched Russell to the

(3) Frederic Boase, "Reeve, Henry," Modern English Biography ... III (Truro, 1901), p. 89.
(6) See infra., p. 206.
(8) Ibid., p. 218.
(9) Ibid., p. 135.
(10) Ibid., p. 170.
Duchies where he covered the Idstedt campaign and was slightly wounded. (11)

Next in importance came The Morning Chronicle. It had often supported Whig foreign policy, but on 21 February, 1848 was bought by Sidney Herbert and other moderate Tories, (12) and thereafter supported many of the views of Peel. (13) It was noted for its broad coverage of foreign events. (14) Even Reeve admitted that he relied upon it for his north German news. (15) But compared with The Times, it had only a small daily circulation of about 3,000 copies in 1850. (16) It was edited by John Douglas Cook, a former staff-member of The Times, and managed by William Delane, father of the editor of The Times. (17)

The Morning Post was one of the leading organs of the aristocracy. (18) C. Eastland Michell became its editor in 1833 and bought control of the paper in 1842 because he wished to use it to campaign in favour of protection. (19) On 5 October, 1849 he sold out to T.B. Crompton, a Lancashire papermaker who

(14) Ibid., loc. cit.
(18) Mitchell, op. cit., p. 76.
(19) Hindle, op. cit., p. 177.
appointed Peter Borthwick as editor. (20) Under him it changed its attitude to foreign policy so radically that it became known as "Palmerston's paper." (21) Because of this and because of Palmerston's dislike for The Times, he on occasions gave The Morning Post official information, (22) but its circulation at the close of 1851 was still under 3,000. (23) The Standard was regarded as an organ of the Conservatives. (24) Published by Charles Baldwin, it supported the interests of protectionists and land owners. (25) The paper was so conservative it even accused The Times of allowing Palmerston to write its editorials in 1846 on foreign policy, (26) but The Morning Herald with a moderate Tory bias, usually supported him. (27)

The Globe was perhaps the most important evening newspaper at this time. It was credited with being the official organ of the Whig party. (28) It gave reliable support to Palmerston's policies abroad and in return it was

(20) Ibid., p. 178.
(21) Ibid., p. 187.
(23) Hindle, op. cit., p. 186.
(24) Young, op. cit., II, p. 32.
(26) Morison, op. cit., p. 102.
(27) Bourne, op. cit., II, p. 96.
believed that he gave it numerous news items prior to announcing them to other papers. (29) The Observer, a highly respected Whig Sunday paper, (30) usually summarized the most important news of the week while adding much original comment. (31)

A good many of the newspapers along the east coast of Britain paid considerable attention to the Schleswig-Holstein Question, but these were often more interested in the way the war affected their local economies than in its repercussions on the balance of power in Europe or in the claims of the ethnic groups within the Duchies. Two Hull newspapers are good examples of this. Both the Hull Advertiser (Liberal) (32) and the Hull Packet (Conservative) (33) often protested against the Danish blockade and its effect on the port. Other newspapers in this category were the Newcastle Chronicle (Liberal), (34) the Newcastle Journal (Conservative), (35) the Perthshire Advertiser (Liberal), (36) the Dundee Courier (Conservative), (37)


(30) Young op. cit., II, pp. 37, 63; Aspinall, op. cit., p. 331; J.L. Garvin, The Observer, 1791-1921, a Short Record of One Hundred and Thirty Years (London, 1921), passim.


(32) Ibid., p. 201.


(34) Ibid., p. 224.

(35) Ibid., p. 225.

(36) Ibid., p. 321.

(37) Ibid., pp. 297-298.
the *Aberdeen Banner* (Liberal),(38) and *The Northern Ensign* (Non-Party) of Wick.(39)

Special mention should be made of *The John O'Groat Journal* (Liberal) of Wick. This paper carried the most up-to-date fishing intelligence of any paper in northern Scotland and was widely read by people in that area with maritime interests, but was also followed by businessmen throughout the British Kingdom; (40) *The Times* frequently reprinted its articles. During the war its editorials often called upon Palmerston, in vain, to use his influence to lift the Danish blockade and encouraged the sending to him of numerous petitions on the subject.(41)

The leading newspapers of Edinburgh and Glasgow, like those of London, assumed a more international outlook on the war. *The Scotsman*, under Alexander Russel, who became editor in 1849, reached a circulation of 7,000 in the 1850's and was recognized as the leader of the Scottish liberal press.(42) Usually it accepted Palmerston's arguments to the Danish–German conflict. *The Caledonian Mercury*, published in Edinburgh, shared Palmerston's European outlook and was considered as a Liberal paper of the "Whig complexion."(43)

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(41) See supra., pp. 41, 44-46; infra., pp. 97, 102-103.
Another Edinburgh paper, The Witness, was a proponent of the principles of the Free Church of Scotland. (44) In 1848-50, its editor was Hugh Miller, an independent Whig Liberal whose editorials did not usually pertain to foreign policy, but when they did, often supported Palmerston. (45) Among leading Conservative papers deeply concerned about the commercial affairs of the country were the Edinburgh Advertiser (46) and the Glasgow Constitutional. (47) The Scottish Guardian of Glasgow and the Edinburgh Evening Courant also claimed to be free from any political affiliation, (48) but the latter's clientele were principally of the nobility, gentry, and upper financial classes in Scotland. It was a strong advocate of the "principles of law and order," (49) and doubtless feared revolutionary Germany. The Welsh newspapers like The Cambrian (Liberal) of Swansea (50) and the Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian (Conservative) (51) generally paid closer attention to the effect of the war upon local developments than to the broader issues at stake.

(44) Grant, op. cit., III, p. 431.
(48) Ibid., pp. 301, 314.
(49) Ibid., p. 301.
(50) Ibid., p. 274.
(51) Ibid., pp. 273-274.
Leading newspapers in the north of England, such as the Manchester Guardian and the Leeds Mercury, both organs of advanced liberalism,\(^{(52)}\) stressed the effects the war had on home industries and the wider influence it had upon Britain and the Continent. Since these papers served very similar interests it is not surprising that their editorial policies varied little. The Manchester Guardian's editor, Jeremiah Garnett, and Edward and Frederick Baines of the Leeds Mercury usually supported the policies of Palmerston abroad.\(^{(53)}\)

Of three leading Midlands papers, the Birmingham Mercury (Liberal), published by W.B. Smith, often took a radical line and went into much detail in the coverage of foreign news;\(^{(54)}\) Aris's Birmingham Gazette (Neutral), published by John Caldicutt, Jr., an independent newspaper which enjoyed the confidence of "numerous and influential" people from every party, gave a weekly digest of the foreign news with comments;\(^{(55)}\) and the Birmingham Journal (Liberal), operated by J.F. Feeney, discussed foreign events with moderation and remained independent of Palmerston.\(^{(56)}\)

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\(^{(52)}\) See Aspinal, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 368, fn. 2; Young, \textit{op. cit.}, II, pp. 37, 39; Bourne, \textit{op. cit.}, II, pp. 44-45, 258.


\(^{(54)}\) Mitchell, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 160.

\(^{(55)}\) Ibid., pp. 159-160.

\(^{(56)}\) Ibid., p. 160; Grant, \textit{op. cit.}, III, p. 315.
Shortly after the first outbreaks by the German population in the Duchies in March 1848 and in face of the apparent intention of the King of Prussia to support them in their rebellion against the Danish King, the British press began to pay closer attention to developments in Schleswig and Holstein. Most papers claimed that the King of Prussia and the German Diet had no right to interfere in the Duchies because this area was the domain solely of the King of Denmark. In an editorial on 1 April, The Times asserted that other European countries should not enter this conflict and remarked that the King of Prussia had not "a shadow of legal authority" in Schleswig.\(^{(57)}\) Furthermore, in a probable reference to his ambitions to acquire new dominions for Prussia, The Times characterized his diplomacy over the Duchies as being "disguises ... of hypocrisy more often than political wisdom."\(^{(58)}\) The Morning Chronicle described Frederick William IV's aggression as demonstrating his "utter unfitness" to become head of the German Confederation\(^{(59)}\) and that he had used the Schleswig-Holstein issue as an "escape value" to ease tensions in Berlin by sending troops into the Helstat.\(^{(60)}\) The Morning Post regretted the Prussian support for the revolt in Holstein. It commented:

\(^{(57)}\) The Times, 1 Apr., 1848. Newspaper references are to editorials unless otherwise stated.

\(^{(58)}\) Ibid., loc. cit.

\(^{(59)}\) The Morning Chronicle, 4 Apr., 1848.

\(^{(60)}\) Ibid., 10 July, 1848.
Until the late revolution of everything that appeared to be politically established in Prussia, no continental state was viewed with more friendly feeling in England; but the part taken against Denmark has altered that feeling... considering all the circumstances of Germany at the present moment, we can scarcely imagine greater folly than that of the Germanies taking part in the revolt of Schleswig-Holstein against Denmark. We certainly have no wish that our country should become a party to any of the continental wars which seem likely to arise, but the sympathy of such a country as Great Britain cannot be regarded as unimportant, and we rejoice that it is unequivocably on the side of the Danish monarchy. (61)

The Standard wrote sharply: "The unprovoked and most unjust war upon Denmark, by which the new German empire preludes its formidable consolidation, is certainly no pledge for its moderation or respect for right."(62) The Globe accused Prussian leaders of attempting to divert attention from their troubles at home by taking up the cause of Germans living in Schleswig and Holstein. (63) It considered Prussian intrusions into the Duchies as an "unfortunate diversion" from its efforts to unify the German States. (64) The Observer feared that the King of Prussia would not recall his troops from the Duchies. It felt that although the people of Holstein were German in language and sentiment as well as belonging to the German Confederation, the King of Denmark had already offered them generous concessions and would probably submit to every demand "short of seeing the sovereignty pass into

(61) The Morning Post, 17 Apr., 1848.
(62) The Standard, 4 May, 1848.
(64) Ibid., 18 Apr., 1848.
other [German] hands." It believed that most of the people of Schleswig preferred being under the Danish King. (65)

British newspapers outside London also showed little sympathy with the King of Prussia. The Hull Advertiser wrote: "It is certainly very greatly to be regretted that an old and inoffensive Monarchy like that of Denmark should have her territory invaded, and her peace disturbed, merely to divert the waves of popular commotion from Berlin;" (66) and the Hull Packet remarked: "History scarcely furnishes a more unjustifiable interference than that of Prussia just now in the affairs of Holstein." (67) The Newcastle Chronicle hoped that Prussia "will be yet made to suffer for her unjustifiable attack upon an unoffending neighbour." (68) The Manchester Guardian called the invasion a "grand error" and believed that Berlin had not discriminated "between what was due to the duchy of Holstein, as a portion of the German Confederation ... and what was due to it, only on the pretext that another province [Schleswig], in whose political position Holstein had some indirect interest, and with which it was connected, felt some of its privileges at stake." It thought the invasion's primary purpose was to add Schleswig, a "third party, not connected with the Germanic Confederation," to the German States and that the presence of German troops in Holstein would "overawe the

(65) The Observer, 16 Apr., 1848.
(66) Hull Advertiser, 12 May, 1848.
(67) Hull Packet, 21 Apr., 1848.
(68) Newcastle Chronicle, 16 June, 1848.
King of Denmark and compel him either to make concessions ... or, at least, refer the question in dispute to a third party." When Prussian troops invaded Schleswig, it continued, their character changed immediately from that of a "defensive force in Holstein, to that of an aggressive and invading army in Schleswig."(69)

The attitudes of British newspapers at the outbreak of the war were generally anti-German, but were more specifically anti-Prussian. Political allegiance caused difference of stress, but the resultant attitude was the same. Whig papers, like The Globe and Hull Advertiser, condemned Frederick William IV's invasion as being one designed to aid conservative Prussia and his conservative allies in the Duchies, rather than to help the causes of liberalism; independent papers, such as The Times felt that Prussia had no legal authority to assist the Schleswig-Holsteiners in their struggle; and Tory organs, like The Morning Post, opposed the revolt by Germans in the Duchies as being one against the well-established authority of the Danish King.

As has been suggested in a previous chapter, one of the first concerns of many Britons in face of the conflict was the possible loss of trade which would result from it. Newspapers along the east coast of Britain were very sensitive to the disruption of commerce caused by the war. One of the cities

(69) Manchester Guardian, 19 Apr., 1848. Author's italics.
most affected was Hull. The Hull Advertiser reflected this feeling:

"So long as the law of nations was not invoked to obstruct the free passage of our commercial flag, it mattered little to us what systems of government were most in vogue with the Nations of the Continent. But the effective blockade of the German Baltic Ports of Stettin, Stralsund, Rostock, Wismar, Pillau and Dantzic, and the closing of the commercial navigation of the Elbe, by the King of Denmark, is painfully impressing our merchants;"(70) and the Hull Packet proclaimed: "The blockade of the Elbe by the Danes, if long persisted in, will add much to the commercial embarrassment and manufacturing distress of this country, and will be especially injurious to our own port."(71) The Edinburgh Advertiser feared that much British trade would suffer;(72) the Perthshire Advertiser, conscious of Danish naval superiority, worried about a blockade of the Elbe;(73) the Aberdeen Banner and the Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian expressed concern over the closure of the Schleswig-Holstein canal which was an important passageway for British ships trading in the Baltic;(74) and the Newcastle Journal described the blockade as an "act which will seriously derange the trade of the Baltic."(75) While inland, the Manchester Guardian

(70) Hull Advertiser, 12 May, 1848.
(71) Hull Packet, 12 May, 1848.
(72) Edinburgh Advertiser, 12 May, 1848.
(73) Perthshire Advertiser, 27 Apr., 1848.
(74) Aberdeen Banner, 5 May, 1848; Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian, 5 May, 1848.
(75) Newcastle Journal, 29 Apr., 1848.
predicted that if the Prussians persisted in their aggression:

it will amount to a declaration of war against Denmark; and it is much to be feared that, in that case, the Danish government will make reprisals upon the commercial marine of Prussia, if not of the Hanseatic cities also, all of which are entirely without the means of defense. Should this unfortunately occur, it will have a decidedly unfavourable influence upon English commerce with Germany, at a time when there seemed to be some prospect of its speedy revival. (76)

In London, The Times warned: "Our interests are touched ... in the Baltic where our commerce is so largely engaged and where it may suffer from the operations of a belligerent fleet." (77) And Aris's Birmingham Gazette feared the blockade of a port like Hamburg would cause hardships, "the ultimate consequences of which by any means cannot be guessed." (78)

One section of the British economy which carried on an extensive trade with Prussia and other north German states and free-cities was the fishing industry of northern Scotland. The John O'Groat Journal of Wick, especially interested in the export of herring to Germany, complained: "The effect of the present state of matters of the commerce of the continent has already been most injurious; and unless peaceful relations are speedily established, there is no portion of her Britannic Majesty's dominions that will more seriously suffer than will the North Eastern Counties of Scotland, which will be prevented from supplying the Continental markets, especially those of

(76) Manchester Guardian, 15 Apr., 1848.
(77) The Times, 5 Apr., 1848.
(78) Aris's Birmingham Gazette, 15 May, 1848.
Prussia, with their staple commodity."

In spite of the damage which might be caused to British trade by an extended Danish blockade of German ports, Denmark's right to enforce such a restriction was generally recognized. The Times hoped that Danish naval power would soon cause Germany to withdraw from the Duchies; and in support of the blockade, it declared that regardless of the inconvenience caused to mercantile interests, "there never was a case in which all maritime belligerent rights could more properly be employed than by Denmark in her self-defence against a league of all the states of Germany." The Edinburgh Evening Courant considered Prussia's invasion of Denmark as "unprovoked," and observed that because the Danish army had been unable to halt German land forces, Frederik VII was compelled to resort to a blockade. It reasoned that Britain could not complain against such an act in spite of the harm it might do her trade because she had often invoked the same principles on previous occasions when at war. The Edinburgh Advertiser also blamed the "iniquitous" Prussian invasion for the blockade and The Observer sympathised with Denmark's fears for the possible loss of her Holstein and Schleswig ports.

(80) The Times, 1 May, 1848.
(81) Edinburgh Evening Courant, 13 May, 1848.
(82) Edinburgh Advertiser, 12 May, 1848.
(83) The Observer, 10 Apr., 1848.
Some newspapers suggested that British warships be dispatched to strategic points in the Baltic. These vessels were not to be sent there to intimidate the Danes, but merely to warn British merchant ships of probable interference with their activities in these waters. The Times advocated this procedure and believed that it might avert collisions between other parties too. (84) The Observer encouraged the Foreign Office to provide ships to assist British trade in the Baltic and help prevent further disturbance of commerce, and complained that Palmerston did not seem to be too worried by these inconveniences. (85) The Morning Herald published a list of at least 17 ships detained by the Danes which were either bound for or sailing from British ports. (86) It also reported: "A very serious complaint is made by our merchants that there is not a single [British] ship of war on the coast of Denmark, whether at the entrance to the Sound or the Belt." It believed that had there been a warship to warn merchants many of the confiscated vessels would still be free. (87)

Some comment concerned the possible effect on Great Britain of any extension of the Zollverein into the Duchies and other areas of northern Europe. For example, The Morning Chronicle warned of the union's aim to extend its seaboard along the Baltic and to establish one on the North Sea thus enabling it to compete more effectively in trade with existing maritime

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(84) The Times, 5 Apr., 1848.
(85) The Observer, 10 Apr., 1848.
(86) The Morning Herald, 29 Apr., 1848; cf. Glasgow Constitutional, 3 May, 1848.
(87) "Money Market and City Intelligence," ibid., 1 May, 1848.
powers. (88) But The Standard, a Tory organ, ridiculed what it considered Whig fears of antagonising the Zollverein, and described Germany as a country which doesn't have a "cock-boat on the ocean." (89)

The British press became particularly concerned by the Danish blockade of German ports in the spring and summer of 1849. Especially anxious were many of the cities on Britain's North Sea coast. The Hull Advertiser of 13 April predicted that the trade of the port would be severely hurt and suggested that its merchants should address Palmerston in the "strongest terms" in favour of a settlement. It believed that the "remonstrances of commercial men seldom fail to make strong impressions even upon the most absolute Governments." (90) On 1 June it used stronger language: "If the Blockade of the German Ports continues to be enforced much longer, we fear that it is the people of this country and not the Germans who will be the great sufferers from such a lamentable state of things." The paper felt that Palmerston was not as "resolute" as he should be in insisting to the warring countries that peace should be restored. It thought that probably "the most annoying circumstance in connection with this foolish and absurd War - apart from its wickedness - is, that without the interference of mediators, it threatens to be interminable. If the belligerents were left to themselves it might continue for seven years as well as seven months ..."

(88) The Morning Chronicle, 30 Mar.; ibid., 27 May, 1848.
(90) Hull Advertiser, 13 Apr., 1849.
Meanwhile we are the real sufferers. It is the good people of Hull, and not the hostile Germans, that the King of Denmark is injuring by his Blockade of German Ports."(91) It dismally forecast on 8 June that peace would not come "before ruin has overtaken many of the trading communities of this Port." It expressed sympathy for the Danes and branded Prussia as the guilty party but thought that the blockade of the German ports was "not inflicting a tenth of the injury upon the King of Prussia which it is upon the Merchants and Shipkeepers of Hull."(92) After the Berlin Armistice, this newspaper asked: "What has been gained by either party in exchange for the blood that has been shed, and all the property that has been destroyed? Hull has suffered; but has the Danish Treasury been thereby enriched, or the Prussian Exchequer filled to overflowing?"(93) The Hull Packet remarked: "... when we bear in mind how greatly and especially the prosperity of this port depends upon the free and unimpeded navigation of the Baltic, and how seriously our commerce was crippled by the blockade of last year, we cannot regard the alarm with which our townsmen regard the prospect of a renewal of the Danish war as otherwise than very natural."(94) The Newcastle Chronicle predicted that a blockade would be a serious blow to British commerce and called for Palmerston to use his offices to bring an end to the conflict.(95) It blamed rumours that the blockade was being more strictly

(91) Ibid., 1 June, 1849.
(92) Ibid., 8 June, 1849.
(93) Ibid., 20 July, 1849.
(94) Hull Packet, 16 Mar., 1849.
(95) Newcastle Chronicle, 23 Mar., 1849.
enforced against the British than other countries on Germans who wished to
excite Britain against Denmark. (96) The Edinburgh Evening Courant
and
The Witness also believed uncertainties due to the blockade were causing much
harm to British merchants, (97) but perhaps the British newspaper most con-
cerned over the blockade was The John O'Groat Journal. On 30 March it
wrote: "Should hostilities be resumed none will suffer more therefrom than we
of the North of Scotland, the more so as we are on the eve of the season when
our extensive commercial intercourse with Prussia is about to be resumed." (98)
On 4 May it reported: "... the interests of the Northeast Coast of Scotland
threaten to be seriously compromised by the Danish war, and when herrings
to the value of not a few thousand pounds are on the way to Stettin - a
blockaded port." (99) The paper also complained of huge quantities of herring
accumulating at Wick, which lacked a market because of the blockade. It
remarked that Hamburg was one of the more heavily blockaded ports and that
it would be "a difficult matter to get a few hundred barrels smuggled into
it." (100) On 15 June it reported that the expectation of peace had lifted
some of the depression felt by the herring traders of northern Scotland, (101)
but on 22 June stated: "The Baltic is still hermetically sealed against us." (102)

(96) Ibid., 4 May, 1849.
(97) Edinburgh Evening Courant, 15 Mar., 1849; The Witness (Edinburgh),
18 July, 1849.
(99) Ibid., 4 May, 1849.
(100) Ibid., 17 May, 1849.
(101) Ibid., 15 June, 1849.
(102) Ibid., 22 June, 1849.
After the July armistice, The John O'Groat Journal hoped that "due caution will be exercised in not glutting the continental markets at such an early period of the season. Notwithstanding the close of the war with Denmark it will take sometime ere Prussia will be able to recover itself."(103) It declared when the blockade was officially removed in August: "This announcement will create but one feeling of satisfaction over the northeast counties of Scotland, whose pecuniary and commercial interests are inseparably interwoven with the blockade question."(104)

Newspapers in London and elsewhere in Britain likewise expressed concern over the Danish blockade. The Morning Chronicle felt that had Palmerston been more forthright in dealing with Prussia when the war first began "it would not now have been our disagreeable duty to announce, for the second time, the exclusion of the shipping of all nations from the waters of the Baltic."(105) It pointed out that because of Frederick William IV's rashness, the German seaports were suffering from a blockade which "impoverishes the wealth, paralizes the traffic, and cripples the industry of the whole northern coast."(106) The Morning Herald described business in London as being "flat and inactive" due to the delays and uncertainties of the blockade.(107) The Leeds Mercury wrote of the harm

(103) Ibid., 27 July, 1849.
(104) Ibid., 17 Aug., 1849.
(105) The Morning Chronicle, 16, Apr., 1849.
(106) Ibid., 17 July, 1849.
that the blockade did to British trade and warned of "deplorable consequences to shipping houses" if it continued.(108) In Swansea, The Cambrian sympathised with the plight of the east coast: "The Danish dispute is productive of very considerable distress in the ports whose trade lie at the Elbe; and at Hull the condition of seafaring men has become so bad, that a public subscription is now a fact to alleviate their distress."(109) Finally, The Standard adopted a radically different attitude from most British newspapers. This protectionist organ believed that the operation of the Danish blockade "has been beneficial - beneficial to British agriculturists by keeping Baltic grain out of the market - beneficial to British manufacturers by silencing the looms and spinning mills of Germany."(110) When the blockade was finally lifted, The Standard pessimistically, but correctly, predicted a glut on the market.(111)

In 1848 and 1849 British papers adopted a very lenient attitude towards Denmark over the harm her blockades had caused British commerce, but in 1850, at least one newspaper, The Times, began to speak more sharply on this inconvenience. It wrote on 14 February that the "patience and long-suffering of this country have been stretched to their utmost limit, even at the expense of its lawful obligations to support the rights of Denmark; and it would be intolerable that a fresh campaign and a fresh blockade

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(108) Leeds Mercury, 23 June, 1849.
(109) The Cambrian (Swansea), 13 July, 1849.
(110) The Standard, 4 May, 1849.
(111) Ibid., 17 July, 1849.
should commence on the opening of the Baltic ... we trust that the British Government would think it had the authority to terminate a dispute which has too long been the disgrace and annoyance of Europe."(112)

It can be concluded that British newspapers in 1848 did not adopt a hostile attitude towards Denmark in spite of her invocation of a blockade of German ports. Regardless of this inconvenience most papers recognized that it was an act of self-defense in face of the German invasion of Schleswig and Holstein. Some complained to Palmerston, but none denied that the Danes had the right to impose such a sanction. There was doubtless a genuine concern among British papers over the effect the Danish blockade was having upon the economic interests of Great Britain, a concern which grew as the war lengthened. Especially grieved were those representing the fishing interests of northern Scotland but those of Hull were equally disturbed. It appears that party differences did not play a large role in their attitudes over this interruption of trade. Only one paper, the high Tory Standard, saw any benefits to be gained for Britain from such a blockade.

The guarantee of Schleswig to the King of Denmark in 1720 and the extent to which it obliged Britain to come to Denmark's defense was the subject of much editorial discussion in British newspapers. The Times and The Morning Post were among those who believed that Britain was honour bound to enter the war on the side of Denmark. The Times referred its readers to the recently published book of Grimur Thomsen, an Icelander connected with

(112) The Times, 14 Feb., 1850.
the Danish Foreign Office at Copenhagen: "This authentic correspondence of the time demonstrates beyond all doubt that ... for various considerations of sufficient weight, this country guaranteed the Danish title to it [Schleswig]; (113) while The Morning Post expressed disagreement with the view of the Foreign Office that no occasion had yet arisen which would cause the Guarantee to be applied against Prussia and reminded its readers that France, who had also signed the 1720 agreement, was willing to abide by her promises if Britain would also. (114) The Observer was more sympathetic to the Foreign Office. It argued that no cause had arisen for British interference: "It is not at all probable that any case will hereafter arise where that arrangement shall be called into question. The Danes have no sovereignty in the disputed Duchies, nor ever had. The present King of Denmark is Duke of Schleswig and Duke of Holstein, but the sovereignty of the Duchies is limited to himself and his uncle, who are both childless, and the rule is limited to the male line only." (115) The Manchester Guardian put forward an interesting but untenable argument on the subject. It doubted whether Britain still remained bound by the 1720 agreement because its provisions concerned the King of England as elector of Hanover; and in 1837 with the accession of a female to the British throne, Hanover, under the rule of the Salic law, had become separated from England and her Queen.

(113) The Times, 24 July, 1848. See Grimur Thomsen, Om de franske-engelske Garantie for Slesvig af 1720 (Copenhagen, 1848).
(114) The Morning Post, 31 Aug., 1848.
(115) The Observer, 14 May, 1848. It repeated these arguments on 24 Sept., 1848.
This newspaper felt therefore that the responsibility for observing the terms of the guarantee belonged to Hanover and not to Great Britain.\footnote{Manchester Guardian, 19 Apr., 1848.}
The Edinburgh Evening Courant deemed it unwise "to rake those old and originally ill considered treaties from the dust of oblivion in which they have happily slept for centuries, into a mischievous activity that could have no other effect than to aggravate the unhappy ferment."\footnote{Edinburgh Evening Courant, 27 July, 1848.} Some papers took a neutral stand on the application of the guarantee. The Hull Packet observed that "we are not qualified to express an opinion. We may, however, express a hope, which is that she [Britain] will remain at peace until the very last moment consistent with national honour and national safety."\footnote{Hull Packet, 21 Apr., 1848.} Finally, The Morning Chronicle adopted an attitude somewhat different from any other newspaper. It remarked that it had "never insisted upon the guarantees by which it is asserted that Great Britain is bound to assure to the Danish Crown the perpetual possession of one or both of the rebel duchies. Fully admitting the binding nature of such engagements, when intelligibly expressed, we must plead guilty to a strong aversion to guarantees in general, especially when given under such circumstances as the often quoted guarantee of 1720."\footnote{The Morning Chronicle, 27 May, 1848.}

The attitudes of British newspapers on the desirability of Britain's
adherence to the 1720 Guarantee or not were thus mixed. The Times and a Conservative organ, The Morning Post, disagreed with the Whig Foreign Minister, but Conservative papers such as the Edinburgh Evening Courant and the Hull Packet believed, as did Palmerston, that Britain had no compelling duty to intervene. So did a main voice of the Radicals, the Manchester Guardian. Whig papers, like The Morning Chronicle and The Observer also leaned more towards Palmerston's policy of mediation in preference to Britain's engagement in a shooting war.

Actually much of the editorial comment centered on Palmerston himself and the tactics he adopted to end the war. There were editorials both for and against him, but nearly all of them urged him to find a speedy solution to the conflict. The Times was one of his severest critics. It complained that he had no clear idea of how he intended to bring about peace; (120) believed that he should have used more "energetic measures" at the beginning of the conflict to discourage Prussia; and thought that the conduct of the mediation would in the end be guided by "the firm attitude of Russia and Sweden, rather than by the lukewarm advice of the English Minister." (121)

The Morning Post wrote:

[Palmerston's diplomacy] has neither supported Germany in her shameless aggression, nor aided Denmark in her righteous resistance, it has given that sort of countenance to the pretention of both as has rendered both determined in the assertion of their claims. It has suffered

(120) The Times, 22 May, 1848.
(121) Ibid., 24 July, 1848.
the disputed Duchies to continue to be the theatre of a petty, harassing, and desolating warfare, which, but for its intermeddling would long before this have been brought to a termination one way or the other. It has not the honesty to speak out for the right, or the courage boldly to declare for the wrong ... It has shown itself timorous, vacillating, impotent, ill-informed. It has busied itself in many matters without effecting good. (122)

The Edinburgh Evening Courant also doubted the effectiveness or the expediency of British mediation. It hoped that this might terminate the conflict, but went on that "it appears that the war originated in the revolutionary tendencies of Germany, over which the mediation of Britain could exercise no effective control. It seems very doubtful how far our interference, even as mediators in the dispute, would be either safe for ourselves or expedient in any view ... if we were to meddle, we might soon be partakers of the mischief, without mending it."(123)

Other papers were friendlier to the Foreign Minister. The Globe had kind words for his attempts to halt the war and did not blame him for the lack of peace in the Duchies; (124) the Manchester Guardian interpreted his acts as meant to maintain British Neutrality; (125) and The Morning Chronicle felt that British mediation was the proper way to prevent further war. (126)

For a few months in early 1849 The Times adopted a more favourable

(125) Manchester Guardian, 22 Apr., 1848.
(126) The Morning Chronicle, 19 Apr., 1848.
editorial policy towards Palmerston. On 6 February, it credited his negotiations with helping to prevent a general European war; (127) and on 22 March commented: "The real value of those diplomatic achievements of our agents abroad and at home may now be fairly appreciated." (128) But this benevolent attitude was of brief duration. On 21 April, it reminded its readers that Palmerston had "greatly underrated" the disappointment felt by the British public after the failure of his attempts to mediate between Denmark and Germany. It wrote: "By a firm and judicious conduct last year on the part of England and France, it is more than probable that hostilities might have been prevented altogether." It believed that the British government had "not only a right, but the duty to prevent Denmark from an unprovoked resumption of hostilities." If the Schleswig-Holstein Question had been settled by Palmerston, The Times would have been the first to congratulate him, but as things stood, it could only condemn him. (129) Even after the Berlin Armistice in July, it lambasted the Foreign Minister, blaming him for the huge losses suffered by British mercantile interests because of his lack of firm support for Denmark at the outset of the war. (130) And early in 1850 it wrote that when the war had broken out two policies were open to Palmerston: either to support the King of Denmark in Schleswig under the 1720 Guarantee with the aid of France, and possibly Russia - or to

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(127) The Times, 6 Feb., 1849.
(128) Ibid., 22 Mar., 1849.
(129) Ibid., 21 Apr., 1849.
(130) Ibid., 14 July, 1849.
assume the role of mediator in the quarrel. The paper complained that he "unluckily" chose the latter alternative: "It is needless to recapitulate the continual disappointments and deceptions practiced on the Mediator during the course of the last two years. We have had two long blockades, seriously injurious to British trade; we have witnessed two campaigns memorable for the spirit with which one of the smallest maritime States of Europe defied the armies of Imperial Germany; we have had two truces ... and after all the question is now just where it stood at the outbreak of the contest."(131)

Another paper very critical of Palmerston was the Hull Packet. It declared: "... we base our hopes of peace far more upon the firm front shown by Denmark, from the known sympathy of Russia, and from the divided and disorganised state of Germany, than upon the success of any diplomatic movement in which Lord Palmerston is concerned ... He has already shown so much sympathy with insurgents and rebels of all kinds and countries, that we can scarcely expect from him a due recognition of the rights of the King of Denmark."(132) It had more confidence in the Czar of Russia's ability to end the war than Palmerston's and wrote that if peace came through Russian intervention on the side of Denmark, "Hull of all places in the world must rejoice; for Hull of all places suffers most by the Danish war."(133)

(131) Ibid., 22 Jan., 1850.
(133) Ibid., 27 Apr., 1849.
When mediation resulted in a successful armistice at Berlin in July, 1849, the *Leeds Mercury* ignored him and awarded most of the credit to Westmoreland; however, at least two papers, both Whig, had friendly words for him. Firstly, *The Globe* was confident in early 1850 that his mediations would produce peace. It claimed to be impartial in the war: "Alone of, we believe, the whole English Press, we have uniformly refused to identify ourselves with the extreme view of either one or the other party ... In spite of our persuasion that the King of Denmark was unfairly pressed, we clearly recognize the national character of the internal opposition to his government." It had written also in January, 1849: "We can only applaud an English Minister for his Constitutional forebearance to take an active part in the dispute;" and soon thereafter declared: "There can be but one opinion on the wisdom and duty of endeavouring to pacify the parties to this quarrel. Has peace been preserved, or not? If it has, to whom ... is its preservation owing, but to Lord Palmerston?" Secondly, the *Aberdeen Banner* believed Palmerston to be deserving of praise and thought that his part in obtaining an agreement for peace would have "a good influence on the various markets both at home and abroad."

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(138) *Aberdeen Banner*, 20 July, 1849.
Although the attitudes of British newspapers to Palmerston's activities on the Schleswig-Holstein Question were very varied, and the editorial policies of a few of them changed during the course of the war, some conclusions can be made for the first two years. Whig papers, such as *The Globe*, stood by him during the entire period, whereas Tory ones, like *The Morning Post*, reprimanded him at times. The Hull papers, Liberal and Conservative, were usually very critical of him, but this was to be expected because of the severe damage done to trade and commerce in this port by the blockades. On the other hand the war also hurt Manchester and Leeds, yet neither of the cities' leading newspapers were particularly critical of his Schleswig-Holstein policy. *The Times* was the unkindest of all. One reason for its being anti-Palmerstonian in policy was doubtless its ardent belief that Denmark was in the right — as well as the fact that Henry Reeve had a deep dislike for Germany and for a revolution of any kind against established authority. *The Times* especially resented Palmerston's refusal to fulfill what it regarded as British obligations under the 1720 Guarantee. Another reason could well be that it took much pride in enjoying complete independence from political leaders. Palmerston, it is said, approached it with the idea of obtaining its editorial support in exchange for advance news releases. The self-assurance of *The Times* apparently contributed to its conviction that such a bargain was unnecessary.

The British subject after Palmerston who evoked most editorial comment on his attitudes to the Schleswig-Holstein question was Travers Twiss.\(^{139}\)

\(^{139}\) See infra.,
The Globe produced a series of articles in January, 1849 which went in
great detail into the arguments as set forth by him in his book, *On the*
Relations of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to the Kingdom of
Denmark and the German Confederation, in the hope that some of its conclusions
might persuade Denmark and Germany to renew the armistice. It observed:
"... we believe that no one, after studying Dr. Twiss's book, can fail to
be convinced that the German party is utterly defeated on that historical
field which it so ostentatiously selected." It repeated Twiss's arguments
on the merits of the Danish and German constitutional claims and on the
German Confederation's justification for interfering, (140) and concluded
that he seemed to have proved that the "perpetual connection," of the two
Duchies mentioned in the agreement of 1460, was "absolutely incapable of
bearing the sense attached to it by the German party." It admitted that
such an agreement had existed, but its force, it was claimed, was not so
strong as "to impose upon the alleged protectors of one Duchy [Holstein] the
duty of the superintending of the other [Schleswig]." (141) The Morning
Chronicle commented that it had read "with much interest the erudite and
ingenious argument published by Dr. Twiss." It thought that his book threw
a great deal of light upon the subject, and was pleased to learn that many
of his attitudes closely resembled those it had itself earlier adopted.
It considered that the main question dealt with in the book was whether or
not Schleswig was the "absolute property" of the Danish King and if Prussia

(140) The Globe, 8 Jan., 1849.
(141) Ibid., 10 Jan., 1849.
had a right to interfere in defense of the rights of the Germans living there. Like Twiss, it held that the Prussian invasion was "unjustifiable." (142) The Morning Post expressed deep sympathy for the Danish cause and rejoiced that its convictions had been strengthened by the conclusions of "a learned advocate in Doctor's Commons, Dr. Travers Twiss, in his very able and impartial work." It maintained that Twiss had proved the "utter absence of truth" in the principal German arguments. (143)

On one point in the Guarantee of 1720, some of the British newspapers disagreed with Twiss. He believed that there was a case under the guarantee for Britain's aiding Denmark in its defense of Schleswig. The Globe reported:

It is with extreme diffidence that we venture to differ from Dr. Twiss, without whose help we could have written scarcely a line of these articles. But it appears to us that our recognition, in 1727, of the guarantee, tells against the present demand of Denmark rather than in favour of it ... there is no more certain truth in the law of nations that no guarantee whatever is good against a people. The Foreign Powers who guarantee the succession to a kingdom, engage that they will not themselves attack, nor suffer other Powers to attack the rule prescribed. But most assuredly they never pledge themselves to debar the inhabitants of the country in question from asserting their own right to choose their ruler and modify their institutions. (144)

The Globe believed that on this ground Denmark had failed to establish the right to invoke the 1720 Guarantee, although it extended its sympathies to the Danish Government which it considered "attempting to fuse into one

(143) The Morning Post, 7 Aug., 1848.
homogenous nationality the separate elements of the Danish monarchy."(145) The Edinburgh Evening Courant was also unconvinced by Twiss's arguments about the applicability of the Guarantee; it remarked that a "hint has been ... thrown out, by some stickler for the old policy of British interference in every petty quarrel among the Continental Powers, that Great Britain is bound by a treaty ... to guarantee to Denmark the possession of Schleswig." This paper felt very strongly that Britain had no business involved in this quarrel.(146) Still, in spite of the difference in opinion over the Guarantee of 1720, the favourable remarks on Twiss's treatise far outweighed the negative ones. It is significant that his conclusions, regarded as pro-Danish, were generally accepted by Whig, moderate-Tory and Conservative newspapers.

Another concern of British newspapers was the possibility of an enlargement of the war. This fear lasted throughout 1848-50, but was especially strong during the spring and summer of 1848.

The Dundee Courier feared that Frederick William IV's aggressiveness in the Elbe Duchies would antagonize Russia.(147) The Times warned Prussia in mid-April of Russia's possible entry into the war,(148) and on 14 June

(145) Ibid., loc. cit.
(147) Dundee Courier, 19 Apr., 1848.
(148) The Times, 15 Apr., 1848.
exclaimed: "A more imprudent step could not have been taken by Germany than to throw down such a casus belli to Russia as the occupation of Schleswig and the attack on Jutland ... To run the risk of a contest with Russia at this moment is, on the part of Germany, an act of madness ... until Schleswig is evacuated, Prussia stands in a false and perilous position." (149) The Edinburgh Evening Courant wrote that Russia had 100,000 men at Riga to aid Denmark, "ready to embark, if not already embarked." (150) The Manchester Guardian declared: "Every day which passes over without a settlement of this untoward and bootless quarrel adds to the danger of a general embroilment ... If Russia should interfere actively in the contest, the King of Prussia will have ample time to regret the rashness and folly which induced him to commence it, — at the risk, as he must have well known, of plunging all of northern Europe into an obstinate and bloody war." (151) The Morning Chronicle feared Russian entry into the quarrel because she had a large interest in the Baltic and saw "herself threatened by Germany." (152) The Aberdeen Banner believed that the Tsar was merely waiting for a favourable opportunity to attack Prussia. (153) The Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian pessimistically assumed: "The great probability of the future, in the north and east of Europe, is a war between Russia and Germany. In that war, Denmark, will no doubt, be joined with Russia ... In such a contingency and

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(149) Ibid., 14 June, 1848.
(150) Edinburgh Evening Courant, 1 May, 1848; cf., The Observer, 25 June, 1848.
(151) Manchester Guardian, 13 May, 1848.
(152) The Morning Chronicle, 30 Mar., 1848.
(153) Aberdeen Banner, 11 Aug., 1848.
collision, our first and greatest interest is to preserve a neutral attitude and position." (154)

The press was also very interested in the role of Sweden in the conflict and in the probability of her eventual entry. Because Sweden was the leading Scandinavian power it seemed almost inevitable that she would render Denmark every moral assistance and probably some active military aid. The pan-Scandinavian movement was another important factor which affected Sweden's attitude at this time. The Times declared that the loss by Sweden of Finland to Russia in the Napoleonic Wars had been to her what the loss of Schleswig would be to Denmark; (155) and commented further: "From the North Cape to the Sound there is but one feeling for the cause of Scandinavia which has been attacked in Schleswig." (156) The Observer declared: "... Sweden has so far joined in the fray as to announce her intentions of aiding in the defense of Denmark proper against all assailants - a course which she clearly has as much right to pursue as certain of the German States have to interfere in a territory in which they have no clearly defined connections, and upon grounds which rest upon the construction of very ambiguous claims." (157) The Aberdeen Banner believed that Denmark counted upon the "active assistance of Sweden," (158)

(154) Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian, 5 May, 1848.
(156) Ibid., 14 July, 1849.
(157) The Observer, 14 May, 1848.
(158) Aberdeen Banner, 11 Aug., 1848.
and the **Birmingham Journal** wrote that all of Scandinavia protested "with one voice" because of the "perfidious" King of Prussia's attack upon the Danish Duchies.\(^{(159)}\)

A number of editorials showed concern over possibilities of both Sweden and Russia entering the war on the Danish side. Among these was **The Morning Chronicle**. It forecast that Denmark would not long be fighting single-handedly should the war be prolonged, because the sympathies and interests of Sweden and Russia were enlisted with her.\(^{(160)}\) It later wrote that "contested by Russia and actively supported by Sweden, Denmark might yet hold her own against any force which Prussia and the neighbouring states could, with safety to themselves, send into the field."\(^{(161)}\) The **Newcastle Chronicle** likewise predicted that Russia and Sweden would come to the aid of Denmark if Prussia persisted in its "unjust" invasion,\(^{(162)}\) and the **Edinburgh Advertiser** suggested that the possible assistance to the Danes of Russian and Swedish forces should be enough to discourage the "warlike ardour" of the Prussians.\(^{(163)}\)

The possible entry into the war not only of Russia and Sweden but also of France received some comment. **The Times** warned the Diet that France might enter the war if fighting continued;\(^{(164)}\) **the Newcastle Chronicle** admonished

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\(^{(159)}\) **Birmingham Journal**, 10 June, 1848.

\(^{(160)}\) **The Morning Chronicle**, 2 May, 1848.


\(^{(162)}\) **Newcastle Chronicle**, 26 May, 1848.

\(^{(163)}\) **Edinburgh Advertiser**, 26 May, 1848.

\(^{(164)}\) **The Times**, 15 Apr., 1848.
Frederick William IV that it was doubtful if France or England would stand aside and allow Prussia's "wanton and uncalled for outrage to be perpetuated;"(165) while the Manchester Guardian remarked that should Russia enter the war, France probably would also.(166)

British newspapers on occasions commented on the dangers of an enlargement of the war without specifically mentioning any lands other than those already engaged. The Morning Post, for example, pessimistically thought that the "general war that we have tried to ward off must at length burst forth;"(167) and the Perthshire Advertiser forecast: "It seems almost certain, that, if the war continues, nearly all the northern powers will become involved."(168) Finally, on the temporary cessation of hostilities agreed to in July, The John O'Groat Journal remarked: "Had the war continued, there is too much reason to fear that other continental nations would have ultimately been mixed up with the quarrel, and that even Britain may have been embroiled in it."(169)

British newspapers were thus very concerned that the war in Schleswig and Holstein should soon cease, lest Sweden, Russia, France and maybe even Great Britain become actively involved. They hoped that Prussia would withdraw from the Duchies before any such enlargement occurred, and used the

(165) Newcastle Chronicle, 15 Sept., 1848.
(166) Manchester Guardian, 29 Apr., 1848.
(168) Perthshire Advertiser, 29 June, 1848.
threat of it to convince Prussia to give up.

The Schleswig-Holstein policy of the Frankfurt Parliament evoked considerable editorial comment, nearly all of it unfavourable to Germany. Prior to the signing of the Malmö Truce by Denmark and Prussia, a number of newspapers criticised the Parliament for varied reasons. For example, The Times ridiculed its members as sturdy singers of Schleswig-Holstein stammverwandt, but lacking in essential "manly prudence and self-controlling energy;" (170) and The Morning Chronicle felt the German Baltic merchants who had suffered so severly from the Danish blockade would hardly turn their affairs over to such an irresponsible body. (171)

The Times and The Morning Chronicle also commented on the relation between Frederik VII and the Parliament. The former paper remarked that it was useless to expect from this body any political responsibility after it had decreed that the King of Denmark should withdraw his troops from Schleswig on the grounds that they menaced the rights of Holstein. (172) While the latter, called the body "shadowy" and believed that the King of Denmark could well be excused for his reluctance to send an accredited ambassador to Frankfurt in his capacity as Duke of Holstein. (173) It later added: "We know of no reason why the King of Denmark should lose anything, or why Frankfurt ..."

(170) The Times, 22 May, 1848.
(171) The Morning Chronicle, 20 July, 1848.
(172) The Times, 18 Apr., 1848.
(173) The Morning Chronicle, 13 June, 1848.
should gain anything, by a war in which the latter are entirely the aggressors." (174)

To the dismay of several British papers the Frankfurt Parliament in early September rejected the Malmö Truce. The Morning Chronicle exclaimed: "The course pursued by the Frankfurt Parliament, with reference to the Danish quarrel, sufficiently proves that so long as that body retains its present power of thwarting and misdirecting the policy of the German States, the tranquility of Europe must rest on a very insecure foundation." (175) The Scotsman remarked: "This unfortunate and threatening event is one of the fruits of the present complicated and unsettled conditions of German affairs." (176) The Glasgow Constitutional concluded that it threw "the relations of Northern Europe back into that critical position from which it was thought they had at length been extricated." It felt that Frankfurt was jealous of Prussia's power to make an armistice before she registered her approval and that the rejection was therefore an act of spite. (177) The Hull Advertiser declared: "The Mercantile Community of Hull have much reason to feel deeply aggrieved at the conduct of the German Parliament at Frankfurt ... Of all the wars ever undertaken between civilized nations, that which arose out of the Schleswig-Holstein controversy was, on the part of Prussia, the most pretextless and most unjust." It condemned the King of Prussia for

(174) Ibid., 28 Aug., 1848.
(175) Ibid., 21 Sept., 1848.
(176) The Scotsman, 9 Sept., 1848.
(177) Glasgow Constitutional, 13 Sept., 1848.
using the Duchies as an escape-valve to save his own throne, but when he adopted a more conciliatory view at Malmö which was rejected at Frankfurt it thought that the Parliament would be well advised to "recede from pretensions which cannot be sustained without perilling the unity of the German Confederation." (178) Other newspapers censured the Parliament for its rejection of the Malmö Truce, (179) but The Observer took a calmer view. It did not attach great significance to the rejection because the Parliament had no army to back up their decision. It regretted that Germany's energies were being dissipated in aggression against Denmark instead of being used to build a stronger inner union (180) and thought that Frankfurt's rejection had been more injurious to the confederation than to any other body. (181)

Friedrich Dahlmann led the members of the Parliament who voted against the truce. On Dahlmann The Times wrote: "A Government such as M. Dahlmann might be expected to form, with the rejection of the Danish armistice for its only basis, is simply a Government pledged to carry on an unjust war in defiance of all the Great Powers of Europe, and without the concurrence of the German States themselves which are principally engaged in it." (182) The Morning Post remarked: "The wild inspiration of [Dahlmann]...may contribute

(178) Hull Advertiser, 15 Sept., 1848.
(179) The Caledonian Mercury (Edinburgh), 14 Sept., 1848; Dundee Courier, 27 Sept., 1848; Hull Packet, 15 Sept., 1848; Perthshire Advertiser, 21 Sept., 1848; The Standard, 9 Sept., 1848.
(180) The Observer, 10 Sept., 1848.
(181) Ibid., 17 Sept., 1848.
(182) The Times, 13 Sept., 1848.
much to stir the passions of his unruly hearers, and plunge his country into greater confusion; but this man, in spite of all his learning and his undoubted talents, has never yet been successful in any one of his public undertakings in political life, and no better fortune is likely to follow him in his endeavours for the honour of Germany. "(183) To The Morning Post, he was a "renegade Danish subject" and the leader of a treaty-breaking party. (184)

A few days after Frankfurt's decline of the armistice it reversed its decision. This act won widespread approval in the British press, but it was hardly enough to win any great measure of confidence in the Parliament. The Morning Chronicle tempered its joy over the Assembly's change of heart as follows:

While, however, we must deem it a happy circumstance that an insane and revolutionary faction have not consummated their triumph, and that the question of peace or war with Denmark, and with the Powers which have identified their interest and honour with Danish rights, is still open for consideration - and while we willingly refrain from too closely inquiring whether the recent pacific vote of the Assembly can, under all the circumstances, be regarded as having imposed more than a temporary check on the bellicose spirit of German democracy; we cannot but point attention to the inherent incompatibility of the present Frankfurt regime, with a safe and satisfactory management of international affairs. (185)

The Scotsman deemed the retraction of its "rash and warlike" rejection as improving the chances of stability but found that war was still "threatening;" (186) and the Newcastle Chronicle, while terming the reversal of the decision as

(183) The Morning Post, 9 Sept., 1848.
(184) Ibid., 12 Sept., 1848.
(185) The Morning Chronicle, 21 Sept., 1848.
(186) The Scotsman, 23 Sept., 1848.
"gratifying," thought that the Assembly's many inconsistencies placed it in a "ridiculous position." (187) The Hull Advertiser did not give the Parliament much credit for benevolence either. It felt that Frankfurt had changed its position in order to avoid a contest with Prussia, rather than out of a real desire for peace with Denmark. (188) The Edinburgh Evening Courant and the Glasgow Constitutional were a little more charitable. The former stated: "The threatened renewal of war in Denmark has been happily averted by the good sense and firmness of the Diet at Frankfurt;" (189) and the latter remarked: "This decision will give pleasure to every friend to the maintenance of peace in the north of Europe." (190)

The Assembly stumbled along for the remainder of 1848 and up until May, 1849, before it finally dissolved itself. When it did so The Times rejoiced, because it felt that the event would do much to speed the return to peace. (191)

The Morning Chronicle in its epitaph on the Parliament called its members the creators of a "gross and unjustifiable act of aggression against Denmark perpetrated with the declared object of annexing to the dominions of an Empire ... two extensive and fertile provinces." (192) The Morning Herald

(188) Hull Advertiser, 22 Sept., 1848.
(189) Edinburgh Evening Courant, 23 Sept., 1848.
(190) Glasgow Constitutional, 23 Sept., 1848.
also accused the now defunct body of providing the main impulse for the German invasion of Denmark and the Duchies,\(^{(193)}\) and The Standard blamed its members for "preaching the virtue of rebellion and the propriety of violating international rights."\(^{(194)}\)

The vast amount of unfavourable comment by the British press on the Frankfurt Assembly's actions on Schleswig and Holstein stemmed primarily from this body's active promotion of the invasion of the Helstat. Its vacillations over the Malmö Armistice also made it particularly vulnerable to attack. It is significant that newspapers of all political shades from the Radical Manchester Guardian to the high Tory, The Standard, and from those with as wide circulation as The Times and The Scotsman, down to the smaller provincial ones mentioned, placed much of the blame for the war and its continuation on the Frankfurt Parliament. When the Parliament was finally abandoned, the British newspaper press expressed little regret; they rather seemed to breathe a sigh of relief.

German professors and students drew much adverse comment from the British press in the early part of the war. The professors were censured for their prominent advocacy of the doctrine of Schleswig-Holsteinism, and the students, who formed a considerable part of the German free-corps, were thought to be foolish, glory-seeking nationalists. The Morning Chronicle believed that the

\(^{(193)}\) The Morning Herald, 28 Aug., 1849.

\(^{(194)}\) The Standard, 17 July, 1849.
dissatisfaction thought to exist among so many of the inhabitants of Schleswig was grossly exaggerated, and attributed the revolutionary movement in favour of a closer union with Germany primarily to the instigation of the upper gentry and literary men of the Duchies. It characterized the movement as a "headstrong, unreasoning outburst of national sympathy."(195) The Standard believed German ambitions towards the Duchies were guided by a few "wrong headed German professors, and rash, giddy and ignorant schoolboys."(196) The Manchester Guardian also argued that the war originated in the "idle dreams of a few German professors."(197) The Morning Chronicle described the free-corps as "amateurs who nurse their martial enthusiasm on metaphysics and beer" and declared that the natives of the Duchies showed themselves cold and indifferent to these student soldiers.(198) Some sympathy was shown for them by The Witness, a religious organ of the Free Church of Scotland, after many had been killed or wounded in battle. It declared: "The volunteer troops, consisting mainly of students, were assigned the more dangerous positions, and were nearly all cut down. In this way the flower of the youth of the best families in Schleswig and Holstein have fallen,"(199) but later added that their "military ardour is greater than their skill."(200)

(195) The Morning Chronicle, 28 Apr., 1848.
(198) The Morning Chronicle, 10 July, 1848.
(199) The Witness (Edinburgh), 19 Apr., 1848.
(200) Ibid., 29 Apr., 1848.
The press's attitude towards the German professors and students changed little as the war neared its close. After the battle of Idstedt, The Times wrote: "It is hard to lay aside a cherished illusion ... but this decisive event must bring home the conviction of every professor ... throughout Germany, that the rights of an independent, though a small nation, are not to be disposed of by academic casuistry or by popular songs." (201) The Morning Herald called the free-corps, many of whom were students from other areas of Germany, a group of "turbulent discontented, muddy-headed, and beer-bibing democrats." (202) The Newcastle Journal forecast that the severe defeat of the free-corps at Idstedt in July, 1850 would do much to dampen the enthusiasm of the volunteers; (203) and the Edinburgh Evening Courant described them as - "marauders." (204) To conclude, British newspapers had few good words to write about German professors and students involved in the war. Only The Witness showed any charity at all to them. In general they were regarded as poor soldiers and troublemaking intruders.

Editorial sympathy for the Danes lessened in the spring of 1849. This was largely because they had refused to renew the armistice in March on the same conditions which had been agreed upon in August, 1848 at Malmö, had renewed the blockade, and had bombarded with men-of-war a relatively peaceful German inhabited town in south Schleswig-Eckernförde.

(201) The Times, 30 July, 1850.
(204) Edinburgh Evening Courant, 26 Oct., 1850.
The Times argued: "... we do not perceive that Denmark has at this moment any sufficient reason to retire from the negotiation and to renew the war. If this be the final and serious determination of the Government of Copenhagen, it must have other reasons for incurring so weighty a responsibility; for the renewal of war, when equitable terms of peace are offered on the basis originally adopted by Denmark itself, is calculated to damage her cause, to endanger her territory, and to subject her to the occult policy of another Power." (205) It further commented that the conduct of the Danish Cabinet in Copenhagen since the re-opening of the war showed "more pugnacity than discretion" and considered it impossible for the Danish army to halt the invasion of one three times its size. (206) The Hull Advertiser agreed with most British papers that Denmark was in the right when the war began and the "real aggressor" was Frederick William IV but regretted that she had "exhibited such precipitancy in renewing the contest." (207) The Newcastle Chronicle considered Denmark's action "altogether uncalled for." (208) The Manchester Guardian spoke very plainly: "How long this mischievous and perfectly bootless war is to be permitted to disturb the repose and interrupt the commerce of a large portion of Europe, it is impossible to say ... we cannot help thinking that the resumption of hostilities without any apparent necessity, and without the slightest explanation of motives which prompted

(205) The Times, 3 Apr., 1849.
(206) Ibid., 21 Apr., 1849.
(207) Hull Advertiser, 13 Apr., 1849.
(208) Newcastle Chronicle, 13 Apr., 1849.
the measure, was an unwise and improper course of proceedings, and one which will certainly diminish the sympathy that would otherwise be felt for the Danish cause by the people, not only of this country, but of all Europe, with the exception of those who are engaged in committing the aggression on the Danish territory."(209) Even the Dundee Courier, who showed some sympathy for the Danish defeat at Eckernförde, labelled them as the new "aggressors."(210)

The Battle of Eckernförde on 5 April between Danish warships and German shore artillery attracted more attention in British newspapers than any other naval engagement during the war. The Danish lineship, Christian VIII, ran aground while in the Bay of Eckernförde. Germans destroyed it with shore artillery and also captured a smaller vessel, the Gefion.(211) The Times criticized the Danes for attacking this port at all. It judged the naval operation to have been ill conceived and unskillfully carried out. It felt that there was no military purpose in the bombardment and that the battle would stir up old hatreds all the more. It predicted that the engagement would be hailed throughout Germany as a great victory, but remarked that it had "no more resemblance to a naval victory ... than the slaughter of a stranded whale on the coast of Suffolk has to harpooning a leviathan in Arctic Seas."(212) The Morning Chronicle, in a similar vein, called it an "unseamanlike blunder" on the part of the Danes, and a "cheap and inglorious

(210) Dundee Courier, 11 Apr., 1849.
(211) See infra., p.
(212) The Times, 11 Apr., 1849.
triumph" on the part of the Germans. (213) The Hull Advertiser reproached the Danes: "There was none [glory] to be gained by bombarding a peaceful town whose simple inhabitants were quietly engaged in their pursuits by which they labouriously acquire their daily bread. King and ministers of State incur a fearful responsibility when they send forth thousands of their fellow creatures to slaughter or be slaughtered after the above horrible fashion." It believed that this "untoward event" at Eckernförde would create new bitterness and that the "fatal effects" would be long remembered after other hostilities had ceased. (214) The Newcastle Chronicle judged that this action by Denmark "had the effect of greatly weakening the sympathy [in Britain] which was before felt for her." (215) Lastly, the Hull Packet's attitude to Eckernförde was one of concern at the possibility of a stronger blockade of German ports by the Danes in order to avenge this loss. (216)

For the first time since the beginning of the war, British newspapers severely censured Denmark. This did not mean that most of the British press had become pro-German, but they did feel that the Eckernförde disaster had brought little honour to the Danes.

The Danish land victory over the invading Schleswig-Holstein forces at Fredericia in June wiped away much of the stigma of her naval defeat at Eckernförde. British newspapers had much to say about this battle, the most

(214) Hull Advertiser, 13 Apr., 1849.
(216) Hull Packet, 13 Apr., 1849.
important one in 1849. Many of them were particularly impressed by the Danish military skill, especially since it was thought that the Germans had superior land forces. The Times wrote: "In a military point of view, the exploit performed by the Danish army in its sally from Fredericia on the morning of the 6th instant deserves the highest commendation;" (217) The Morning Chronicle called Fredericia a "brilliant affair ... by which the Danes have amply retrieved the honour which they lost at Eckernförde;" (218) The Morning Post rejoiced in the "chastisement" inflicted by Denmark upon "injustice and violence" and called the country, a "stout little nation ... that has crowned its persevering energy in defense of right against overwhelming might;" (219) The Standard described the victory as a "triumph of legitimate authority over rebellion;" (220) and The John O'Groat Journal considered the battle as sanguinary revenge for Denmark's losses at Eckernförde. (221)

The German forces at Fredericia were composed mostly of native Schleswig-Holstein troops. The Times regretted that the heavy casualties had been sustained by Danes and Germans living in the Helstat rather than by intruders from other areas of Germany and feared that the defeat of the Schleswig-Holstein army would make them more dependent than ever upon Prussia. (222)

(217) The Times, 14 July, 1849.
(222) The Times, 14 July, 1849.
The Morning Post combined its sorrow over the large loss of life with its happiness over the Danish victory.\(^{(223)}\) The Standard, however, was not so regretful over the German casualties. It declared: "That the Schleswig-Holsteiners should have escaped all the disagreeable consequences of their own perverse misconduct would have set a precedent which might have proved injurious to the tranquility of Denmark at a future period."\(^{(224)}\)

Some newspapers were disturbed that this battle would upset the armistice agreement concluded in Berlin just prior to its occurrence. The Leeds Mercury feared that the news of this battle would reactivation the hostility of Germans living outside the Duchies.\(^{(225)}\) But The Observer hoped that the Danish victory, having occurred before the combatants realized that an armistice had been declared, would not harm the results of the negotiations. It believed that the Danes would be very wise to accept some compromises, in spite of their recent victory, in order to save themselves probable future casualties in a war in which they purported to be acting upon the defensive.\(^{(226)}\)

The Manchester Guardian recognized the possibility that the news of this battle might disturb the armistice, but thought that it would more probably have the opposite effect; it should be enough to vindicate the honour of Denmark and wipe out the loss at Eckernförde.\(^{(227)}\)

\(^{(223)}\) The Morning Post, 16 July, 1849.
\(^{(224)}\) The Standard, 17 July, 1849.
\(^{(225)}\) Leeds Mercury, 14 July, 1849.
\(^{(226)}\) The Observer, 15 July, 1849.
\(^{(227)}\) Manchester Guardian, 14 July, 1849.
It can be safely concluded that none of the above British newspapers regretted the defeat imposed upon Schleswig-Holstein troops by the Danes in Denmark proper. To be certain they regretted the length of the casualty list, but they considered the Danish victory as a triumph of right over wrong. By crossing the Kongeaa into Denmark, the Germans had reassumed the role of an aggressor, and by so doing lost what good will they had gained in the eyes of the British press, when the Danes renewed the conflict earlier in the year.

The next important land battle, the fiercest of the struggle, was fought at Idstedt on 25-26 July, 1850. In spite of the agreements between Denmark and Germany which were embodied in the Berlin Treaty and heedless of the negotiations proceeding in London under British mediation at the time, the rebelling army reassembled near this small Schleswig township. As a result the Danes engaged and defeated it, but only after severe casualties had been suffered on both sides. British newspapers lauded the Danes upon their success. The Times rejoiced: "... never was the just cause of authority more triumphantly defended, never did a people rally with more gallantry round their Sovereign and their standards."(228) The Morning Herald mourned the loss of life and destruction of property, but said: "... victory has crowned the arms of the Danes, who all through have had right and reason on their side."(229) The Hull Packet exclaimed: "Although every humane man

(228) The Times, 30 July, 1850.
(229) The Morning Herald, 30 July, 1850.
will regret that the long and vexatious dispute between Denmark and her dependencies has been brought to the bloody arbitrement of the sword, no one who has impartially investigated the cause of the quarrel will regret the immediate result of this recourse to arms has been the decisive victory of the Danes.\(^{(230)}\) Other newspapers who were pleased with the Danish victory were the Manchester Guardian, which credited the triumph to the "superior steadiness and discipline of the Danish troops;\(^{(231)}\) the Edinburgh Evening Courant, which believed that this engagement decided the outcome of the war;\(^{(232)}\) The Caledonian Mercury, which complimented the Danish General, Krogh, for his "superiority in tactics" against the Schleswig-Holsteiners;\(^{(233)}\) and The John O'Groat Journal which wrote that "victory is on the side of order and legal right.\(^{(234)}\) But the Leeds Mercury, called for moderation on the part of the Danes after their triumph. Otherwise they might arouse a fresh wave of German patriotism south of the Duchies which would bring new recruits to aid those rebelling against Frederik VII.\(^{(235)}\)

The abuse British newspapers heaped upon the Schleswig-Holstein forces and their supporters from other areas of Germany approximated the amount of praise they bestowed upon Denmark. The Times remarked: "... never were

\(^{(230)}\) Hull Packet, 2 Aug., 1850.
\(^{(231)}\) Manchester Guardian, 31 July, 1850.
\(^{(232)}\) Edinburgh Evening Courant, 1 Aug., 1850.
\(^{(233)}\) The Caledonian Mercury (Edinburgh), 1 Aug., 1850.
\(^{(234)}\) The John O'Groat Journal (Wick), 9 Aug., 1850.
\(^{(235)}\) Leeds Mercury, 3 Aug., 1850.
the intrigues of a foreign faction, which had fomented civil war in the dominions of a neighbouring and inoffensive State, more signally defeated and punished. (236) The Morning Chronicle hoped that the results of this battle would convince the Schleswig-Holsteiners that their strength was insufficient to defeat the King of Denmark and that "nothing but useless bloodshed and wanton destruction of life and property can result from prolonging a struggle in which the substantial interests of the people of Schleswig and Holstein have throughout been sacrificed to the ambitions of a few schemers." (237) While The Northern Ensign feared that other powers, probably Prussia, would now once again become officially involved militarily in the war. (238)

Some papers blamed the failure of diplomacy for the battle and the apparent continuance of hostilities. The Scotsman, just prior to Idstedt, correctly predicted: "If the parties are left to fight it out, there can be little doubt that Denmark would soon gain the mastery;" (239) and after the battle expressed the hope that its results would achieve what the diplomacy of Europe had failed to gain - "a final settlement of the question." (240) The Times continued to needle Palmerston and said that if the German States had been prevented from interfering in the affairs of the Helstat, Denmark would

(236) The Times, 30 July, 1850.
(238) The Northern Ensign (Wick). 1 Aug., 1850.
(239) The Scotsman, 24 July, 1850.
(240) Ibid., 31 July, 1850.
have settled the uprising long ago. (241) But in spite of the criticisms directed at the Foreign Minister for not having ended the war two summers before, the British press expressed ample satisfaction that Denmark had won such an important victory and had been able to do it almost entirely with her own resources. Every segment of political opinion, from the high Tory Hull Packet to the Radical Manchester Guardian and from the London press to the papers in the north of Scotland, expressed satisfaction at the outcome of this battle.

The last major battle was fought at Friedrichstadt, a small town on the Schleswig side of the Eider, inhabited mainly by Frisians and Germans, but held by Danish troops. It was bombarded by forces from the Duchies during an almost week-long engagement in late September and early October. This siege ended in another military failure for the Germans. The Cardiff and Merthyr Guardian questioned the sense of such an attack because most of the residents of Friedrichstadt were sympathetic to the Schleswig-Holstein cause and described the results of the battle for the Germans as "unprofitable carnage." (242) The Edinburgh Advertiser called the resumption of hostilities "a disgrace to Europe, and even to civilisation itself;" (243) the Manchester Guardian chastised the Germans for publishing undependable casualty lists and accused them of trying to deceive the German people by exaggerating their

(241) The Times, 30 July, 1850.
successes against the enemy and underrating their own losses; (244) and
The Caledonian Mercury suspected that Prussia was the motivating influence
behind the siege in spite of having signed the Berlin treaty. (245) The Observer pointed out that one of the leading Schleswig-Holstein commanders
was a former Prussian Officer, General Von der Tann. When Von der Tann
resigned from the rebel forces after this unsuccessful siege, it hoped that
his example would be followed by many of the volunteers in the Duchies who
came from other areas of Germany. (246) Finally, The Times described the
attack as "the crowning incident of this miserable warfare" and considered
that the Prussian soldiers there were "at variance with the first principles
of humanity and good faith." (247)

Throughout 1850, Schleswig-Holstein remained a subject of comment in the
British press, nearly all of it anti-German. The Times continued to show its
resentment towards Germany by pointing out that should the Diet renew
hostilities against Denmark, it would certainly receive no support from
Britain; it characterized the German government as being "in a maze of
inextricable perplexity and complicated intrigue." (248) The Morning Chronicle

(244) Manchester Guardian, 12 Oct., 1850.
(245) The Caledonian Mercury (Edinburgh), 7 Oct., 1850.
(246) The Observer, 10 Nov., 1850.
(248) Ibid., 19 Mar., 1850.
also reasserted its anti-Prussian stand; it commented that "her soldiers have really no more right to set foot [in Schleswig than to] Saint James's park,"(249) and that Denmark had fought "single-handed a gallant but most unequal contest against the total strength of the German Confederation."(250) The Manchester Guardian forecast that if Prussia and the other larger powers within the German Confederation would abstain from participation in the war that peace would soon come in Schleswig and Holstein;"(251) whereas, The John O'Groat Journal blamed the Schleswig-Holstein forces and believed that their "highly exasperating mood ... seems to render war probable, perhaps inevitable."(252) Several papers also expressed fear of Russia's entry into the war in 1850 should Prussia persist against Denmark.(253)

Even after the conclusion of the Berlin Treaty on 2 July, 1850, many British newspapers did not cease to pour ridicule upon the German States for their policy towards Denmark. The Times was particularly outspoken:

We have no desire to dwell upon the darker side of these transactions, but as nearly four years have now elapsed since we first had occasion to advert to this Schleswig-Holstein controversy, we may now repeat our sincere regret that the German people allowed themselves to be imposed upon and led away to so extraordinary an extent by the misrepresentations, enthusiasm and the democratic intrigues of the faction which made Schleswig-Holstein its rallying cry ... The Peace now concluded at Berlin appears to be an unconditional abandonment of every principle which Germany had professed to care and to contend. (254)

(249) The Morning Chronicle, 4 Mar., 1850.
(250) Ibid., 1 Apr., 1850.
(251) Manchester Guardian, 15 June, 1850.
(254) The Times, 8 July, 1850.
The article went on to mention the "abortive enterprise and the crooked policy of the German States in this war." (255) The Morning Chronicle was also outspoken in its condemnation of Germans. It wrote that in Germany the war had been "the stalking-horse of every noisy demagogue ... and the ready material for the manufacture of political capital at the expense of prudence, justice, integrity, and honour." (256) The Morning Herald condemned the Schleswig-Holstein policy of the Prussian Court as "mischievous and Machiavellian;" (257) the Leeds Mercury hoped that other German States would not, through jealousy of Prussia, refuse to ratify the Peace Treaty as they had at first done to the Malmö Convention at Frankfurt in September 1848; (258) while The Globe, as to be expected, heaped praise upon Palmerston. It gave most of the credit for the conclusion of the Berlin Peace Treaty to his "energy;" he had "at all events done his best." (259)

For a number of weeks during the negotiations which led up to the Berlin Peace Treaty another group of diplomats from major European powers as well as from some of the smaller northern European countries assembled in London to deliberate on the Danish succession question. All of the powers except Prussia preferred to see the Helstat remain under the rule of the Danish

(255) Ibid., loc. cit.
(256) The Morning Chronicle, 8 July, 1850.
(257) The Morning Herald, 30 July, 1850.
(258) Leeds Mercury, 13 July, 1850.
(259) The Globe, 8 July, 1850.
King rather than have the southern parts of it transferred to German control. Their efforts culminated on 4 July, 1850 in the signing of the London Protocol. British newspapers favoured this agreement. Among them was the Aberdeen Banner, who considered the protocol significant because "it sets at rest the question of the preservation of the integrity of the Danish monarchy." It felt that even though Prussia had alone among the major powers withheld her signature, the document should be thought of as another move towards the establishment of peace in Schleswig and Holstein. (260) Similarly, the Newcastle Chronicle and The Globe believed that the course which the great powers were following in London was one best designed to avert a major war. (261) Even The Times, which so seldom praised Palmerston's Schleswig-Holstein policy, thought that the protocol promised "to increase the stability of the peace about to be concluded at Berlin." (262) The Morning Chronicle, however, predicted "with tolerable confidence" that unless the discordant parties made peace between themselves soon, peace would be made by intervention on behalf of Denmark by the powers who signed the London Protocol (263) - Great Britain, Sweden-Norway, Austria, Russia and France. (264)

British newspapers in the spring and summer of 1850 were almost entirely

(260) Aberdeen Banner, 30 Aug., 1850.
(262) The Times, 15 July, 1850.
(264) The Times, 15 July, 1850.
on the side of Denmark. Some considered themselves neutral, but no major journal hoped for a German victory under the leadership of Prussia. They were tired of the three years of war which had caused so much damage to British trade, considered Prussia an aggressive and covetous neighbour of a much smaller country, and had little sympathy for either the irresponsible supporters of Schleswig-Holsteinism living within the Duchies or the leaders of the German Confederation who encouraged perpetuation of the war.

The siege of Friedrichstadt was the last major military contest of the war. After this failure it became apparent to most of even the staunchest Schleswig-Holstein patriots that without Prussian help, the war was for all practical purposes over. Prussia had enough worries of her own in view of the attitude of her neighbours Russia, Austria and France at the close of 1850 without adding to them by becoming further involved with Denmark over the Duchies. But British newspapers continued in October and November to censure the German States, especially Prussia. The Morning Chronicle declared: "The countenance afforded to the rebellious subjects of the Danish Crown, the assistance which is believed to have been given to the army of the Duchies, and the evasive manner in which all proposals for an equitable peace have been received, indicate that ... the policy pursued at Berlin has been one of delay and tergiversation - with a view, we must believe, rather to the extension of Prussian influence than to the consolidation of the German nation." (265)

The Morning Post called Prussia's role in the war "a scandal and a blot on

(265) The Morning Chronicle, 5 Nov., 1850.
the page of our daily history;(266) the Newcastle Journal thought her conduct "utterly indefensible;"(267) while The Times rejoiced that the "Prussian game is now almost played out."(268)

The Observer attempted to show some understanding of the Schleswig-Holstein case. It said that it was not an admirer of the King of Prussia, but that the Germans in the Duchies had just complaints in so far as the present King of Denmark, who was their Duke, was actually under the control of a Cabinet very partial to the Danish inhabitants living north of the Eider.(269)

Some concern was shown for the native population of the Duchies by the Dundee Courier, who believed them to have been the main victims of the quarrel even though many of them had no interest in it.(270) The Scotsman expressed some sympathy for the Germans too when it observed that Russia and France were using the Schleswig-Holstein question as an excuse to gain bits of territory for themselves; Russia wanted Silesia and France desired additional parts of the Rhineland.(271) But praise for the Danes continued. The Times commended Denmark's moral condition(272) and The Morning Post called her a noble country "trusting in the truth, which is on her side" and as one who had stood alone against her enemies.(273)

(266) The Morning Post, 16 Oct., 1850.
(268) The Times, 8 Nov., 1850.
(270) Dundee Courier, 16 Oct., 1850.
(272) The Times, 13 Nov., 1850.
The attitudes of the majority of British newspapers continued to be just as strong for Denmark at the end of the war as they had been when German troops first crossed the Eider in the spring of 1848. Throughout the three years, with the brief exception of the spring of 1849, newspapers looked upon the Germans as aggressors against a smaller, weaker but determined Denmark. They greatly feared that if the struggle continued it might develop into a general European conflict which would involve such major powers as Russia and France; Sweden and Austria might also become actively engaged. Many newspapers criticized Palmerston for failing to lend Denmark enough active assistance at the outbreak of the war to discourage the Confederation's invasion of the Duchies. He was also censured for his disinclination to recognize the applicability of the Guarantee of 1720. While Travers Twiss's treatise which concluded that the German States had no historical grounds of proof to its claims of Schleswig was well received. Palmerston also drew some praise, notably from The Globe, for his mediation between the warring powers and for his role in the promotion of the London Protocol. Much attention was also devoted to the Danish blockades and the effect they had upon British trade and commerce, but the blame for them was laid principally on Prussia. British papers criticized Denmark for her naval attack upon the relatively insignificant town of Eckernförde, but lauded her later land victories. Finally, more evidence of anti-German attitudes in the press was shown by its strong criticism of the Frankfurt Parliament, German professors and young German students; while at the same time it often praised Danes and their achievements during the war.
A number of British periodicals published articles in 1848-50 on the Danish-German conflict. Their coverage of the subject was not as extensive as that of the newspapers, but it was wide enough for a selection to be made representing various shades of opinion at the time including organs of the Tory, moderate Tory, Whig and Radical groups as well as a number which were politically independent.

Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine probably published more on the dispute than any other British periodical. The magazine was begun in 1817 as a Tory organ and at mid-century continued to represent conservative interests. It has been described as advocating a "semi-feudal society, supporting a privileged, usually landowning class with certain self-imposed duties and responsibilities to the lower orders, and steadily supported all rural, as opposed to all urban, interests." One particular service which it performed for British readers was its broad coverage of foreign literature, especially translations of German publications. Among those contributing to Blackwood's on the Danish-German question were Archibald Alison, William Edmondstoune Aytoun, George Croly, William Gregory, Frederick Hardman and John Palgrave Simpson. Alison visited the Continent on many occasions.

(2) Ibid., p. 8.
(3) See infra., pp. 208-209.
and was particularly interested in German military history. (4) Aytoun, a lawyer and an Edinburgh professor who had been raised in Whig tradition but by 1848 had become a Tory, (5) lived for a number of years in Germany, acquired a thorough command of the German language, and was an enthusiastic student of its literature. (6) Croly, author and theologian, became especially interested in the history of Prussia. (7) Gregory, an Edinburgh professor who studied at Giessen, was skilled in the German language and translated many German writings into English. (8) And both Hardman and Simpson, who were professional writers, spent much time in Europe, including Germany. (9) Another Tory periodical, The Quarterly Review, included several articles on the conflict. This journal was begun in 1808, one of the original founders being Sir Walter Scott. (10) Its aim under publisher John Murray was to counteract the influence of Whig periodicals, notably The Edinburgh Review. (11)


(11) Ibid., loc. cit.
Seldom did advocates of liberalism receive good reviews in these pages. (12) In 1848–50 John Wilson Croker, Henry Reeve and Travers Twiss contributed articles to it on Denmark and Germany. Croker, a high Tory author of many publications, knew four or five European languages. (13) Reeve and Twiss were also good linguists. (14)

Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country was a third important Tory periodical. (15) Founded in 1830 by William Maginn and James Fraser, (16) it was according to Dodds, "the most politically and critically provocative" (17) monthly magazine. While it generally followed a conservative line, it was independent enough not to hesitate to attack Tories. Indeed there was not a single Tory leader whom Maginn failed to expose to ridicule—from the moderate Peel to the conservative Wellington. (18) It was acquired in 1847 by John William Parker who continued to edit it in 1848–50. (19) On its political policies, Parker wrote in 1849 that Fraser's "undertook to bolster up no faction; to pin our faith to no man, nor any set of men; to support to the best of our ability the established institutions of the country; and to

(12) Young, op. cit., II., pp. 78–79.
(17) Dodds, op. cit., p. 113.
(18) Thrall, op. cit., p. 147.
deal with every public measure, as it came before us, strictly according to its merits." (20)

The Edinburgh Review or Critical Journal was the leading Whig periodical at this time, and was dedicated to "political enlightenment and social reform." (21) It was founded by Francis Jeffrey, Sidney Smith and Francis Horner in 1802. (22) Throughout most of the Nineteenth Century its literary supremacy was seriously challenged only by the Tory Quarterly Review. (23) In 1848-50 it published several articles on the war by Henry Annesley Woodham, Nassau William Senior and Richard Monckton Milnes. Its editor from 1847 through the war was William Empson, (24) son-in-law of Francis Jeffrey. (25) Woodham, a fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge in 1848, (26) contributed articles on the German Empire and on the state of Europe; Senior frequently visited the Continent and was actually an eyewitness to some of the events of the revolutions of 1848; (27) and Milnes, (28) who had studied at Bonn and had visited Germany


(22) Graham, op. cit., p. 233.

(23) Ibid., p. 236.

(24) Ibid., p. 237.


(26) J.A. Venn, Alumni Cantabrigienses, a Biographical List of all Known Students, Graduates and Holders of Office at the University of Cambridge from the Earliest Times to 1900, Part II, VI (Cambridge, 1954), p. 568.


(28) See infra., pp. 222-223.
several times thereafter, was very sympathetic to liberal movements on the Continent. (29)

The radical Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review had been founded in 1824 as The Westminster Review by the utilitarian James Mill, a follower of Jeremy Bentham (30) and the father of the more famous John Stuart Mill. (31) It was first edited by John Bowring, (32) who became particularly interested in the operation of the Zollverein, (33) and in 1847 was taken over by John Chapman. (34) In 1848-50 it included a number of articles on Denmark and the Duchies and on Germany.

Four other British periodicals, although they did not express forceful opinions on the Schleswig-Holstein Question deserve brief mention. The Gentleman's Magazine had as its leading editors in 1848-50 John Bowyer Nichols and his son John Gaugh Nichols. (35) Graham valued it for its "special antiquarian, biographical, and historical features which make it ... a storehouse of information." (36) True enough! In 1848-50 it carried almost every month interesting accounts of events in the Duchies, but

(30) Graham, op. cit., p. 251.
(33) See supra., pp. 29-30.
(34) Graham, op. cit., p. 252.
(35) Ibid., p. 158.
(36) Ibid., pp. 158-159.
unfortunately seldom expressed an opinion on them. The Annual Register also published much on the war, but only on rare occasions took sides. The Literary Gazette carried some letters on the issue, but they were written by either Danish or German citizens.

Finally there was Punch, begun in 1841. This journal had as its editor in 1848-50, Mark Lemon, a playwright and professional writer. It dealt with the war on several occasions, usually in making fun of people and events associated with it.

Most of the leading British periodicals were hostile to the German invasion of the Duchies in the spring of 1848. Conservative writers were particularly critical, among them being several writers for Blackwood's. Alison called the invasion by Prussia a completely unwarranted act, aimed at seizing Schleswig and devastating Jutland. In another article, he said that Prussia was carrying on a "doubtful and aggressive war with Denmark." Aytoun described it as "an act of the most flagrant aggression" and hoped that the Confederation would soon withdraw from the war.

(37) Young, op. cit., II, p. 86.
said that it was useless to expect any explanation from the Germans because they were "like men who, in attempting to cross a ford, have been carried off their feet by the swollen waters."(43) And Simpson wondered what were the real objectives behind Germany's declared aims.(44)

Blackwood's also illustrated its partiality to Denmark by publishing the following sonnet:

To Denmark

Again the trumpet-blast of war is blown:
Again the cannon booms along the sea,
Now, may the God of Battles stand by thee,
True-hearted Denmark! struggling for thine own,
For right, and loyalty, and King and throne,
Against the weight of frantic Germany!
Old honour is not dead whilst thou art free-
Oh be thou faithful to thy past renown!
May the great spirit of thy heroes dead
Be as a bulwark to thine ancient shore:
And, midst the surge of battle rolling red,
Still be thy banner foremost as of yore;
Prouder than when it waved, to winds outspread,
On the broad bastion-keep of Elsinore! (45)

Similarly, Fraser's observed that the "German nation being taken with

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(44) John Palgrave Simpson, "What Would Revolutionising Germany be at?" Blackwood's, LXIC (Sept., 1848), p. 386. A year later Simpson wrote an article "What Has Revolutionary Germany Attained?," in which he remarked that in "actual progress the sum-total appears to be a zero." See Blackwood's, LXVI (Oct., 1849), p. 436.

(45) n.n., "Sonnet - To Denmark," Blackwood's, LXIV (Sept., 1848), p. 292. Blackwood's also published a number of old German folklore prophecies, some of them pertaining to the war in the Duchies. See William Gregory, "German Popular Prophecies," Blackwood's, LXVII (May, 1850), pp. 563, 570.
a strong desire to erect itself into a single state, had devised plans for calling in its lost tribes; and finding that of these a considerable portion were living under the immediate sway of the Danish crown, that it cast about to discover good and sufficient reasons for absorbing, not the people only, but the districts they inhabited."(46) It accused the King of Prussia of attempting to enlarge Germany at the expense of Denmark "at whatever cost of principle."(47) It felt that the Holsteiners had some valid reasons to prefer to be a part of a new and united Germany rather than of Denmark which had fared so poorly in the Napoleonic Wars,(48) but termed their uprising as "treasonable"(49) and their claims as "absurd."(50) In the same article Fraser's mentioned the attempts of Germans to impose the German language on Danes in Schleswig. On this, it observed: "The greater proportion [of Danes] ... still clung with affection to the language, the customs, and the manner of their fathers, and strenuously resisted the systematic endeavours of the dukes to eradicate their language by forcing German pastors, German schoolmasters, a German judicature, and a German administration upon them."(51)

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(46) "Denmark and the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig," Fraser's, XXXVIII (July, 1848), p. 49, hereafter cited as "Denmark," Fraser's.

(47) "Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein," Fraser's, XXXVII (May, 1848), p. 614.

(48) "Denmark," Fraser's, XXXVIII (July, 1848), p. 53.

(49) Ibid., p. 55.

(50) Ibid., pp. 53-54.

(51) Ibid., p. 52. Travers Twiss also discussed the power of the German educated classes associated with the University of Kiel over the Danish population in Schleswig. See Twiss, "Austria and Germany," The Quarterly Review, LXXXIV, (Dec., 1848), p. 222, hereafter cited as Twiss, "Austria," Quarterly.
Lastly, Woodham of *The Edinburgh Review* pointed out that the Diet was attempting to include within their domain areas which had never been a part of the Empire. He reminded readers that Schleswig had been for nearly a thousand years free from German rule and accused the Germans of having "laid resolute hands" upon this Danish province.

Besides expressing strong anti-German attitudes when writing of the invasion of Denmark and the Duchies, British periodicals voiced much praise for the Danes. Early in 1848 in an article called "Denmark," *The Gentleman's Magazine* mentioned the fairness shown to the inhabitants of the Duchies by the King of Denmark when he awarded them the same number of delegates to participate in the formation of a new Helstat constitution as he had allotted to Denmark proper. The magazine concluded that this fact alone should convince Schleswig-Holstein supporters that "no unfair advantage will be taken by him [Frederik VII] as regards his German subjects." An article in *Fraser's* praised the fairness of the Eider-Danes, of which it said: "... in justice to this party ... notwithstanding their extreme indignation of the illegal proceedings of the Separatists, they never, in their turn, sought to trample on the just claims of their opponents, but steadily desired for the German subjects of the Crown of Denmark the same rights

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which they were endeavouring to secure to the Danes of Schleswig." (55) This article predicted that "if success go with the right, Denmark will surely prevail." It accused the inhabitants of Holstein of having grossly abused their privileges within the Monarchy and offered the Danes full moral support. (56) In conclusion, Alison of Blackwood's praised the "patriotism and valour" of the Danes, (57) while the politically independent Annual Register declared: "The Danish Government throughout the struggle [in 1848] seems to have been sincerely desirous of peace." (58) British periodicals left little room for doubt that they objected to the bullying of a small state by a larger one.

The effect the war had on economic conditions further aroused the interest of British periodicals. The Westminster Review commented on a book by the German Theodore Mugge called Rambles in Schleswig-Holstein and North of the Elbe. The review paid particular attention to the parts of Mugge's work which concerned the important trade between the Duchies and England in beef and dairy products, most of which were shipped through Hamburg. (59) It offered little sympathy to the Duchies in their battle

(55) "Denmark," Fraser's, XXXVIII (July, 1848), p. 55.
(56) Ibid., p. 58.
(58) "Schleswig-Holstein," Annual Register ... 1848, p. 349.
against Denmark. Indeed, the reviewer stated that the article had almost not been published because Mügge's book was about Schleswig and Holstein and there had lately been so much feeling in Britain against the Germans there. (60)

A number of articles expressed concern of the blockade. Among them was one in Fraser's called "Germany" which wrote: "We are much interested in having the matter [war] speedily settled, because the Danes have been compelled to make use of their naval power to blockade all the harbours, ports, and coasts of the enemy [Germany]." (61) Alison of Blackwood's pointed out that trade in Germany had been "paralysed" due to hostilities; (62) and Punch published a verse on the interruption of business which could be sung to the tune of a German lyric:

'Du, du, du, du.' - German Ariette

See, see Commerce suspended,
See, see Credit destroyed,
See, see Confidence ended,
See, see hands unemployed;
See, see, see, see all Britain's foes overjoyed! (63)

The Annual Register, however, in a more neutral vein, argued that the Danes had imposed a blockade principally to impede the commerce of neutral countries

(60) Ibid., p. 504.
(61) "Germany," Fraser's, XXXVII (June, 1848), p. 734.
in order to create for them "a direct interest in putting an end to the quarrel."(64)

The effect of the growth of the Zollverein on Britain and also on the Duchies received attention. The reviewer of Mugge's book in Westminster admitted that membership of the Zollverein offered tempting advantages to the people of the Duchies (65) and that the Schleswig-Holsteiners had undoubtedly some grievances, but said that these "fat flourishing provinces" would have to become a lot worse off than they now were before he "could hope to get up the smallest emotion in their favour."(66) And Croker in an article for The Quarterly Review, expressed concern about the custom union's trade barriers. He believed that it was only wishful thinking to suppose that German tariffs on British goods would be lowered.(67)

Closely linked to concern over the interruption of British commerce caused by the war and the fear of the Zollverein's being extended in northern Europe were the fears of German ambition to extend her sea-coast along the Baltic and North Seas and her desire for a strong navy to protect merchant ships which would in all probability be competing against British ones.

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(64) "Schleswig-Holstein," The Annual Register ... 1848, p. 350.


(66) Ibid., p. 504.

Hardman in Blackwood's reproved the Germans for their ambitions to have a fleet. Referring to the spring of 1848, he wrote: "Those were the insane days when Germany dreamed of a fleet, coveted a seaboard, and vowed that her limits should extend, in the words of Arndt's rhapsodical ditty — So weit die deutsche Zunge klingt (wherever the German tongue is spoken)."

He reminded his readers that if they were to do so, many other states besides Schleswig might be included within the German empire; and specifically mentioned Alsace and Lorraine. Fraser's called upon England to support Denmark, and pointed out the importance Germany attached to the coasts of Schleswig and Holstein by quoting the Augsburger allgemeine Zeitung: "Schleswig-Holstein is the handle of the sword which Germany is to throw into the scales of fate on the northern seas." The Westminster Review stressed the importance of such Duche ports as Kiel and Flensburg on the Baltic and Altona on the Elbe. Woodham in an article in the Edinburgh Review condemned Germans as overambitious in their plans to form a united empire from the Baltic to the Adriatic, and doubted whether they could achieve


(69) "Denmark," Fraser's, XXXVIII (July, 1848), p. 57.

(70) Quoted in ibid., p. 56.

this goal. (72) Finally Punch made light of Germany's dreams of a great navy, referring to the idea as "a storm in a teacup." It listed the German fleet as consisting of: "3 Steam Tugs; 4 ... steamers on the doctor's list; 1 Mud-dredging machine, mounted with a cannon; 24 Wherries with 24 gun barrels." It concluded that the "German Fleet had never been in sich [sic] an efficient state before." (73)

Tory periodicals were doubtless critical of Palmerston on party grounds, but they also feared that his failure to offer more positive aid to Denmark might enable either Russia or Prussia to gain control of the entrances into the Baltic. Aytoun of Blackwood's suggested that the Foreign Minister should use his influence to discourage any further German intrusion into the Duchies. (74) About the same time a writer for Fraser's, was willing for Palmerston to mediate, but with the wisdom of hindsight, complained: "The appearance of a British fleet at the mouth of the Elbe three months ago would have prevented it all; but we can have no right to protest now against results which our own supineness has hurried forward." (75) In August, 1849, however, after the signing of the Berlin Treaty, it observed: "Prussia ... has concluded an armistice with Denmark, and professes herself ready to enter into a treaty of permanent peace. This is how it ought to be; and

(73) "A Storm in a Tea-Cup," Punch, XVII (1849), p. 149.
(75) "Denmark," Fraser's, XXXVIII (July, 1848), p. 58.
let us do justice to Lord Palmerston, the result seems to be in some measure owing to his exertions.⁷⁶ Alison of Blackwood's in September, 1850 commented with some satisfaction on the agreement by the signers of the London Protocol that the integrity of the Danish monarchy should be maintained. He believed, however, that Palmerston had acted on Denmark's behalf, rather from fear that Russia would gain too much influence in the Baltic if Britain withheld her signature, than from a desire to protect a small country against an ambitious neighbour.⁷⁷ Henry Reeve, writing for The Quarterly Review, was also concerned about Russian intervention. He feared that the Tsar would send a "Russian corps d'armeé to the Eider."⁷⁸ This danger, he believed, had arisen partly because Palmerston's policy of mediation had "totally failed to accomplish any purpose whatever."⁷⁹ This seems to be too harsh a criticism. Reeve's article appeared in December, 1850. By this time the war was over, it had not spread to include powers other than Denmark and Germany, and thanks in large measure to the Foreign Minister, Britain's


⁷⁷ Alison, "Foreign Affairs," Blackwood's, LXVIII (Sept., 1850), pp. 326-329. This source used the word - "guarantee" of the integrity of the Danish monarchy, when in fact the London Protocol was, according to Palmerston: "... only a record of opinions and wishes." Palmerston to Russell, 23 June, 1850, Benson, Letters, II, p. 250.


⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 194.
neutrality had been maintained.

Independent Punch enjoyed harassing him. It ridiculed him for mislaying by "accident" a Danish peace offer. Palmerston admitted this error, but alleged that the result would have been the same even if the "accident" had not taken place, as Prussia would have refused the offer. On this neglect Punch commented:

Possibly! But suppose the proposal had been accepted? LORD PALMERSTON knew nothing of the contents of the Dispatch. The Danish note, like ROBERT-HOUDIN'S Portfolio, might have had a dove inside of it, with an olive branch in its beak: and the poor bird would have been smothered and the Elbe blockaded, and the Gefion taken, and the noble Christian the Eighth blown up, which is lamentable, and LORD PALMERSTON himself blown up, which is less serious - all along of those three days' mislaying. (81)

Great Britain's periodicals, whether Tory, Whig or Radical published much unfavourable comment on the Frankfurt Parliament because of its actions against Denmark and the Duchies and its failure to secure stability at home. (82) Woodham of the Edinburgh Review warned of the assembly's lust to include eventually, not just Schleswig, but all of Scandinavia within the Confederation of German States, in which case, the Baltic would


become a German lake. He, however, regarded such a development to be very unlikely; the Scandinavians did not wish it and the Germans were not well enough organized to annex this region. (83) An article in Fraser's called "Northern and Central Europe" described the 1848 condition of Germany as "incomprehensible," one reason being because of the Frankfurt Parliament's involvement in Schleswig and Holstein. (84) Another one of its articles stated that its members had shocked the English public with their "audacity" (85) and judged them to be "of a very Radical complexion - the restoration of German nationality their chief dream, and the war with Denmark the rash consequence." (86) In at least two articles, the magazine reprimanded the Parliament for almost causing the war in Schleswig and Holstein to broaden into a general European conflict. (87) The Westminster Review wrote in 1850: "The good which the Frankfurt parliament hoped and intended to have done may remain as a cordial to the private conscience of its members; but for what it has actually effected neither the world nor the 'fatherland' is greatly its debtor." (88)

The manner in which German students participated in the war also aroused disgust in Britain. Frederick Hardman of Blackwood's reviewed Sketches and

(84) "Northern and Central Europe," Fraser's, XXXVIII (Aug., 1848), p. 243.
(85) "Modern Frankfurt," Fraser's, XXXVIII (Sept., 1848), p. 344.
(86) Ibid., p. 335.
(87) "German Unity and Disunion," Fraser's, XXXVIII (Oct., 1848) p. 479; "What is the Utility of the Central German Power?" Fraser's, XXXVIII (Dec., 1848), pp. 720.
Episodes of a Campaign in Schleswig-Holstein by William Hamm, a student of the University of Leipzig who had volunteered to fight with the German free-corps in the Duchies. Hardman described such students as "irregularly armed, totally undisciplined, bedecked with the tricolor, and yelling for the Fatherland." He felt that they were a group of adventure seekers anxious to plunder the property of innocent farmers. Hamm was labelled as a "weak brain," and a "Radical propagandist."(89) He was furthermore "a glorious fellow at a flourish, and a very fit historian of the band of deboshed students(90) who... speaks more frequently of what he heard, than of what he saw."(91) Hardman translated parts of the student's account, emphasizing the illegal confiscations made by the free-corps of private property belonging to German as well as Danish residents of the Duchies.(92) The review was filled with disdain of both Hamm's literary style and the motives behind the adventures of these soldiers. The confiscation and destruction of private property by these volunteers must have done much to strengthen further Hardman's and doubtless other Tories' anti-German attitude.(93)

(90) Ibid., p. 310.
(91) Ibid., p. 312.
(92) Ibid., pp. 311-317.
(93) The Literary Gazette and Journal of Belles Lettres ... for the Year 1848 (London, 1848) published a letter on p. 298 by Hans Andersen written on 15 April, 1848 in praise of Scandinavian volunteer soldiers. The editor favourably described Andersen's letter as "characteristic of the high patriotic and poetic feelings of the distinguished [Dane]."
In the final year of the war British periodicals praised Denmark and condemned Germany, especially Prussia, with as much vigour as they had done earlier in the conflict. Several of Blackwood's writers were especially outspoken. In January, Alison declared that the "fumes of revolutionary aggression in Schleswig had been dissipated by the firmness of Denmark." (94) After the Battle of Idstedt he praised the Danes and criticized German policy in the Duchies, but just as clearly rebuked the British government for failing to provide greater assistance to Denmark. He wrote:

in regard to Holstein, and the iniquitous revolutionary aggression commenced by the German democratic states on Schleswig, did we, when Denmark in the first instance was overwhelmed for a time by the revolutionary tempest, interpose to restrain the invasion of the Prussian force, and secure, by mediation and intervention, Denmark from being partitioned and destroyed by the German revolutionists? Quite the reverse — we did none of these things. We let Denmark stand alone and unaided the whole burst of the revolutionary tempest. She withstood it indeed, and saved the north of Germany from being involved in a desperate conflagration; but no thanks to us that she did so. She owed her preservation entirely to the patriotic and courageous spirit of her inhabitants, the noble stand they made in defence of their country, and the known countenance, and perhaps covert support of Russia. (95)

Croly also criticized Prussia's interference in the war as being an excuse to gain naval bases rather than to liberate the Schleswig-Holsteiners from the Danish King. (96) And Hardman declared that Germany had committed "an ill-advised and unjust aggression ... upon the territory of a unoffending

(94) Alison, "The Year of Reaction," Blackwood's, LXVII (Jan., 1850), p. 3.
(95) Alison, "Foreign Affairs," Blackwood's, LXVIII (Sept., 1850), pp. 328-329.
and comparatively feeble neighbour."(97)

In another Tory periodical, Reeve of The Quarterly Review spoke out plainly on behalf of Denmark. He lauded the heroic determination of Frederik VII, and condemned the recent German intrusions into Danish lands across the Elbe and Eider(98) and "her whole conduct in the Danish war."(99) Senior of the Edinburgh Review disapproved of the Schleswig-Holstein demand for separation on ethnic or linguistic grounds. He pointed out that such nations as Britain, France, Austria and Turkey were not homogeneous and that it was a "barbarous feeling which leads men to quarrel because they differ in language or in race."(100) And an article in The Gentleman's Magazine remarked that the "affair of Schleswig-Holstein has been throughout an illustration of the selfish policy of Prussia."(101)

Often articles indicated pro-Danish sympathies through the use of adjectives when reporting battles; generally, complimentary ones were used to designate Danish forces and non-flattering ones for Germans. For example the Danish sortie from the fortress at Fredericia was described as "gallant," "skillfully planned," and executed with "overwhelming ardour." Her seapower was described as "omnipotent," her defense at Friedrichstadt as "brave and skillful," and her men at Idstedt as "patriotic" and "courageous." On the

(99) Ibid., p. 188.
(101) "Germany," Gentleman's, XXXIV (Dec., 1850), p. 644.
other hand, the Holsteiners were "pestilent" and the German free-corps members were "malcontents," "undisciplined," "desultry individuals ... thirsty for plunder, abnoxious to the police," "freebooters," "sickening," "shallow-pated liberty mongers," "wolfish," "scamps, outcasts and criminals, with a sprinkling of hair-brained boys and wrong-headed politicians," and "deboshed students, bankrupt barbers, seedy patriots, and escaped galley slaves." (102) All of which was not entirely fair to the German soldiers, many of whom had volunteered solely for the purpose of helping to unify their people.

It can be concluded that the writers and publishers of British periodicals were concerned with several factors which caused them to be both pro-Danish and anti-German in their feelings over the Question of the Duchies. Tory writers of Blackwood's, The Quarterly Review and Fraser's were especially appalled by the policy of the liberal-minded Frankfurt Parliament towards Schleswig and Holstein. But the Radical Westminster Review, and the Whig Edinburgh Review were hardly less so. Every major periodical I have mentioned looked upon the King of Prussia's actions as being uncalled for aggression against a weaker neighbour. They preferred the Duchies to remain in the hands of a country which they considered small and unoffending, to being absorbed into an enlarged central European power; feared or dis- approved of Germany's acquiring additional seaports and a strong navy

which might become a threat to British seapower; resented the restrictions placed upon British trade by the Zollverein; and had no desire to see this economic system imposed upon either the Duchies or other northern European free trading areas. The Gentleman's Magazine and Edinburgh Review failed to censure Palmerston for withholding British support to Denmark, but the Tory periodicals criticized him severely. Finally, it should be remembered that British periodicals looked upon with great respect the manner in which the Danes had bravely fought, almost single-handedly, against numerically superior forces.
Chapter VI

MEN-OF-LETTERS

Sir Travers Twiss

The most scholarly book produced by a contemporary British author on The Schleswig-Holstein Question was Travers Twiss's, On the Relations of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to the Crown of Denmark and the German Confederation ... (1) Twiss, born in 1819, was the eldest son of Robert Twiss, a London clergyman. He graduated from Oxford in 1830; became Dean of University College, Oxford in 1837; and in 1849 was appointed Commissary-General of the city and diocese of Canterbury. (2) Twiss was one of the very limited number of Oxford scholars of his time who had acquired a competent knowledge of German, (3) which undoubtedly helped him to acquire a broader understanding of the highly complex Schleswig-Holstein Question. He never seems to have studied at a German university, so it

(1) See supra., pp. 113-116


(3) "Twiss," D.N.B., XIX, p. 1320.
must be assumed that he learned the language in Britain. (4) His knowledge of Danish was scant, but he could call on Danish diplomats residing in Britain to provide him with material and to help him translate it to English. (5)

Immediately prior to the war, Twiss had published a book entitled, View of the Progress of the Political Economy in Europe since the Sixteenth Century ... which consisted of a course of lectures he had delivered at Oxford. In this Twiss criticized List's economic theories and claimed that they were "dictated by the narrowest most shortsighted selfishness" and that List had "palmed them off upon the German nation, as the conclusions of an enlightened comprehensive philosophy." He dismissed them as "too extravagant to require any serious discussion." (6) The fact that they would be more easily applied should the Zollverein come to include Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg may have been one of the reasons he tended to favour the Danish arguments on the Duchies rather than those presented by Prussians, such as Bunsen and Gruner. (7)

Twiss wrote his book on Schleswig and Holstein soon after the beginning of the war. Two of the reasons he gave for the study were because he believed that the armed intervention by the German Confederation in the

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(4) His writings on the Duchies were also translated into German, being included within a work known as Beiträge zur schleswig-holsteinischen Frage (Leipzig, 1849), ibid., XIX, p. 1321.

(5) Twiss, Relations, p. IV.

(6) Travers Twiss, View of the Progress of Political Economy in Europe since the Sixteenth Century, A Course of Lectures ... delivered at Oxford (London, 1847), pp. 247-248.

(7) See supra., p. 3.
conflict between Denmark and the Duchies "invested the question with all the gravity of an international dispute" and because he thought that the Treaty of 1720, of which Britain was a guarantor, should be carefully re-examined. He admitted that it would be difficult for a foreign writer to sympathise with both Danes and Germans, but thought that a stranger would be able to view the question more dispassionately. (8)

Twiss was helped in writing the book by the loan of valuable Danish documents from H.F.R. Bielke, the Secretary to the Danish Legation in London. (9) Among them were many original state papers and international treaties, some of which were unpublished (10) before he included them in extract in his Appendix. (11) His most important German source was Bunsen's Memoir on the Constitutional Rights of the Duchies ... (12) which had been published to present the German side of the Schleswig-Holstein Question to the British. (13) It contained a pamphlet, De la succession dans la monarchie danoise considérée principalement sous le point de vue du droit public (1847), by a Prussian diplomat in Paris, M. de Gruner (Justus von Gruner), (14) which Bunsen had

(8) Twiss, Relations, pp. III-IV.

(9) On Bielke see, A. Thorsøe, "Bielke, Holger Frederick Rudolph," Dansk Biographisk Leksikon, II (Copenhagen, 1933), pp. 594-595, hereafter cited as D.B.L.

(10) Twiss, Relations, p. IV.

(11) Ibid., pp. 175-204.

(12) Ibid., p. IV.

(13) See supra., p. 78.

(14) Hjelholt, Mediation, I, p. 83, fn. 2.
apparently translated into English. The Memoir also included a large appendix of official documents related to the question. (15) Finally, Edward B. Banks of Hamburg, special envoy to Britain from the Federal Diet, (16) provided him with material on recent proceedings of the German Diet. (17)

Twiss's treatise was far more than an outline of the history of the Duchies, but to provide his readers with a background to the subject, he began with a survey from the Ninth Century up through 1815. (18) Of most importance to Britain were, in Twiss's opinion, the British Act of Guaranty of the possession of the Duchy of Schleswig to the King of Denmark of 26 July, 1720 (19) and the Treaty of Copenhagen between France, Great Britain and Denmark of 16 April, 1727. (20) He provided a summary of the text of the Treaty of 1720, (21) in which the King of Great Britain and Ireland guaranteed to the King of Denmark and Duke of Schleswig and Holstein the possession of the Duchy of Schleswig, "as long as the suspension of arms between the two Crowns of Denmark and Sweden should last, with the express condition that in case, with the Divine blessing, peace should again be

(15) See Bunsen, op. cit., pp. 131-165.
(17) Twiss, Relations, p. IV.
(18) Ibid., pp. 7-43.
(19) Ibid., pp. 175-177.
(20) Ibid., pp. 183-185.
(21) For Bunsen's attitude on the "often alleged pretended" British Guarantee of 1720 see, Bunsen, op. cit., pp. 53-56.
concluded between the said Crowns, before the expiration of the armistice, the guaranty should remain firm forever."(22)

Twiss argued that the Guarantee did not entitle Britain to intervene in the event of political changes within the Helstat any more than the King of Denmark would have been entitled to intervene in Britain should he have given a similar guarantee to Princess Anne and she had been faced by civil disturbances. But if Louis XIV or Philip V had dispatched foreign troops to assist the insurgents, then he believed there would have been immediately "an undeniable casus foederis."(23)

He pointed out that because of this guarantee, the King of Denmark surrendered to Hanover the territory of Bremen and Verden, which Sweden had lost to her in 1712 and that Hanover had earlier allied her forces with those of Denmark to help obtain a favourable treaty for both powers at Stockholm in 1720. (24) "But Denmark," Twiss remarked, "felt unwilling to give up her acquisitions jure belli in deference to the mediating powers, unless she obtained from them a guaranty in conformity to the provisions of the VIIth Article of the Treaty of Stockholm, of her peaceful enjoyment of the Duchy of Schleswig." (25)

The grounds for Holstein's claim to independence from Denmark were very different. It had been a part of the German Empire down to 1806,

(22) Twiss, Relations, p. 128.
(23) Ibid., pp. 124-125.
(24) Ibid., p. 126.
(25) Ibid., p. 127.
but claimed that after that date the Duchy became independent because of the abdication of the Emperor. After the Napoleonic Wars it had become a member of the German Confederation of States. Schleswig, on the other hand, was a fief of the Crown of Denmark and had not been associated with either the Holy Roman Empire or the Confederation. (26) To a second Schleswig-Holstein argument that the Salic Law prevails in the Duchies, Twiss wrote:

"... 'that the contention that the male line alone can succeed in either Duchy', cannot be admitted." (27) To support this opinion he went back to 1460 when Christian I gained the titles of Duke of Schleswig and Count of Holstein through the female as well as male line. (28) On a third German point, that "the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein are firmly united states," he reasoned: "This idea of a perpetual union between the Duchies, as States, is founded upon an interpretation of the Act of Security of 1460; (29) wherein it is recited 'that we promise by every means in our power to maintain peace between the aforesaid lands, and that they shall remain ever together undivided.' " (30) Twiss however, thought that the German word ungetheilt, in this instance, did not mean "'undivided' in the sense of 'not separated from each other' or 'always united with each other';!' expressions which in his opinion could better be expressed by the German

(26) Ibid., pp. 65-70.
(27) Ibid., p. 71.
(28) Ibid., pp. 70-79.
(30) Twiss, Relations, pp. 79-80. Author's italics.
Finally, he contended: "... although Schleswig may be politically connected with Holstein, this political connection, however close and intimate it may be, in no respects affects its international relations, any more than the political connection of Denmark itself with Holstein affects the international relations of Iceland or Jutland to the German Confederation." (32)

Twiss also commented on some of the Danish arguments, such as the female succession law adopted in 1665 in the Lex Regia and the previously discussed Guarantee of 1720, but he devoted far more space to refuting the German claims. (33) Often he used German sources, such as Bunsen, Falck and Gruner, to make a favourable point for Denmark. He described, for example, one of Gruner's conclusions about conditions in the Duchies prior to 1326, as a "misapprehension of the relations between the Duchy of Southern Jutland and the Crown of Denmark." (34)

On Bunsen generally, Twiss wrote: "It is with considerable diffidence that an English writer would venture to differ from the Chevalier Bunsen on a point upon which his intimate knowledge should entitle his remarks to great weight, but it is difficult to acquiesce in the view which he has adopted in his Memoir." (35) Twiss quoted him as claiming that the British

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(31) Ibid., pp. 80-81.
(32) Ibid., p. 115.
(33) On the Danish arguments see supra., p. 16.
(34) Twiss, Relations, p. 88.
(35) Ibid., pp. 113-114. See Bunsen, op. cit., p. 48.
Guarantee of 1720 lost its raison-d'etre in 1773, when Russia renounced her claim to the territories of the House of Gottorp. Twiss replied: "But the express object of the Guaranty was the maintenance of the King of Denmark in the perpetual and peaceable possession of the ducal part of the Duchy of Schleswig against all and every power that should seek either directly or indirectly to disturb it; and it is difficult to see how such a guaranty can ever lose its object." (36) Twiss also believed that the Prussian Ambassador's failure to examine the situation before 1448 may have accounted for some of its inaccuracies. (37) Also with reference to the Bunsen Memoir, he observed that, "No power short of the sovereign power [the King of Denmark] could unite the internal constitution of two separate states [Schleswig and Holstein], in the manner in which it is maintained in the Prussian Memoir, and the Duchies were now explicitly acknowledged to be united; and it has seemingly been overlooked by the Chevalier Bunsen, that this acknowledgement ... was made by Christian I in his subordinate character of Lord of the Duchies." (38) Twiss disagreed with Bunsen's interpretation of the letters-patent issued after the Peace of Stockholm in 1720 which called upon the inhabitants of Schleswig to take an oath of loyalty and to pay homage to King Frederik IV. The Prussian reasoned that the "patent is not addressed to the whole of Schleswig, but only to the States of the hitherto divided Ducal Schleswig." (39) Twiss replied that as far as "the language of the

(36) Ibid., p. 146. Author's italics.
(37) Ibid., p. 66.
(38) Ibid., p. 80.
(39) Quoted in ibid., pp. 93-94.
letters-patent is concerned, it does not support this statement." (40)  

A third German author to whom Twiss referred in his book was Nikolaus F. Falck, Professor of Law at Kiel who published in 1847, *Sammlung der wichtigsten Urkunden welche auf das Staatsrecht der Herzogthümer Schleswig-Holstein Bezug haben.* (41) Unlike Bunsen and Gruner, Falck was born in Schleswig; he was the son of a Danish-speaking north Schleswig farmer. He studied at Haderslev Latin School, lived for three years in Copenhagen, and later became a professor at Kiel. Carr writes of him: "Falck's affection for Schleswig-Holstein was not ... an exclusive loyalty; in common with most people in Schleswig-Holstein he had a very real affection for the Helstat." (42) Unlike Dahlmann, Falck believed: "The expression fatherland, should never be so narrowly construed that it excludes other parts of the Danish monarchy." (43)  

Twiss's purpose in using Falck was to strengthen Danish arguments in favour of the retention of Schleswig by their King. He learned from Falck about the letters-patent to the inhabitants of Schleswig issued in 1684 by the King of Denmark in which the monarch called upon the various estates and subjects within the Duchy to consider him as their only sovereign and to be loyal to him and to his rightful successors, (44) after he had confiscated

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(40) Ibid., loc. cit.
(41) Ibid., p. 81.
(42) Carr, op. cit., p. 74.
(43) Quoted in ibid., loc. cit.
(44) Twiss, Relations, p. 90.
the ducal part of the Duchy and united it with Denmark. The Schleswigers, Twiss noted, accepted the letters-patent on 9 July, 1684 at Gottorp and swore their allegiance to him. (45)

Twiss also gained knowledge from Falck about the oaths of fealty taken by the nobles of Schleswig to the King of Denmark in 1721. These, Twiss pointed out, defined Danish, as opposed to German, rights in this Duchy in 1848. He wrote: "If now the language of the oath of homage may reasonably be called in to assist us in interpreting the proceedings of this occasion, it seems to lead to the conclusion that the King of Denmark declared the Dukal part not merely to be united with the Royal part of the Duchy of Schleswig, but to be incorporated again into the Crown of Denmark." (46) He showed that the estates of Schleswig had promised at this time for themselves and their heirs to recognize the Danish monarch as "their exclusive sovereign, lord paramount, and to be faithful, loyal, and obedient to him and his royal hereditary successors in the government, secundum tenorem Legis Regiae." (47)

It seems possible that the British Foreign Office encouraged Twiss to record his opinions on the legal status of the Duchies. In 1846 he had helped Sir Robert Peel by writing a treatise entitled The Oregon Question Examined in Respect to Facts and the Law of Nations. (48) A letter from

(45) Ibid., pp. 90-91.
(46) Ibid., p. 96.
(47) Ibid., p. 97.
Twiss to Peel is evidence of the author's contact with British Government leaders at this time. Peel was furnished with a list of publication errors made in his book.\(^{(49)}\) As Twiss had helped Peel on the Oregon Question, Palmerston may have asked for his views on the Schleswig issue.

Further evidence hinting at the semi-official nature of Twiss's book on the Duchies are the publication dates of Bunsen's \textit{Memoir} and Twiss's apparent rebuttal. Bunsen's \textit{Memoir} appeared on 17 April, 1848 and was dedicated especially to Palmerston;\(^{(50)}\) Twiss's work followed on 1 July, 1848.\(^{(51)}\) Samuel Laing mentioned that Bunsen had made claims about Schleswig which Twiss had disproven.\(^{(52)}\)

The Relations remained Twiss's greatest contribution to Danish-German history, though he continued to take a keen interest in jurisprudence of northern Europe.\(^{(53)}\) British periodicals and newspapers in 1848-50 considered his book a reliable enough source to use as a basis for their arguments on the Question of the Duchies and many editorials were written.

\(^{(49)}\) British Museum, Add. MS. 40586, Fol. 229, Twiss to Peel, 8 Mar., 1846.

\(^{(50)}\) Bunsen, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. XVII, 1. Like Twiss, Palmerston "did not adopt Bunsen's opinion;" see Hjelholt, \textit{Mediation}, I, pp. 86-87.

\(^{(51)}\) Twiss, \textit{Relations}, p. IV.


\(^{(53)}\) Later in life Twiss published further works concerned with Scandinavian and German countries. Some dealt with the laws of the Swedish island of Gotland and the Codes of the Teutonic Order; others were studies of the Baltic seaports of Livonia, Lübeck and Danzig; and he wrote briefly on the Schleswig-Holstein War of 1863-1864. \"Twiss,\" \textit{D.N.B.}, XIX, pp. 1321-1322.
in its praise. The Morning Chronicle reported in July, 1848 that the "researches of the learned civilian appear to us to throw upon the subject much additional light" and agreed with Twiss's view that the Prussian invasion of Schleswig was legally "unjustifiable." (54) In January, 1849 it again reminded its readers of Twiss's "careful and luminous disquisition." (55) The Morning Post judged his treatise "very able and impartial," and added that he had completely disproved the three main legal arguments advanced by the Germans. (56) The Globe devoted three editorials to his work, terming it "most learned and impartial." It believed that anyone who read it "can not fail to be convinced that the German party is utterly defeated on that historical field which it so ostentatiously selected." (57) Even a provincial paper, like The Cambrian, alluded to Twiss near the close of the war as an "able" jurist who thought "that the cause of Denmark is a just one." (58) His sentences were usually long, possibly because he was often paraphrasing, if not directly translating German sources, and his juridical reasoning and repeated use of legal terminology make parts of his work, although usually comprehensible, difficult for those not trained in jurisprudence to follow. But he did know much about the legal status of the Duchies. Perhaps Lord Palmerston's famous statement that only three

(54) The Morning Chronicle, 27 July, 1848.
(55) Ibid., 15 Jan., 1849.
(56) The Morning Post, 7 Aug., 1848.
(57) The Globe, 8 Jan., 1849. See also 10 and 15 Jan., 1849.
(58) The Cambrian (Swansea), 2 Aug., 1850.
Englishmen had ever understood the Schleswig-Holstein Question, should have included a fourth – Sir Travers Twiss.

Samuel Laing

Samuel Laing of Orkney became deeply interested in the Schleswig-Holstein Question during 1848-50. He was indeed one of the most outspoken British men-of-letters on the Danish-German conflict in the mid-Nineteenth Century.

He was born at Papdale House near Kirkwall in 1780 into a family long resident on the islands. (59) He received part of his higher education at the University of Edinburgh; and later spent eighteen months at Kiel studying German. (60) His translation to English of the Heimskringla (61) indicates that he knew Old Norse and presumably to some extent at least of modern Scandinavian.

He travelled in Scandinavia and began to write about it long before the War of 1848-50. In 1836 he published Journal of a Residence in Norway

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during the years 1834, 1835 and 1836, where he described the Norwegian landscape, family life and government. Most of his recorded impressions on Norway were favourable. (62) He followed this in 1839 with A Tour in Sweden in 1838 ... (63) Laing had gained an early reputation for his "spirited" directness, (64) but the Swedish Ambassador in London considered his work on Sweden so disparaging that he published a rejoinder, On the Moral State and Political Union of Sweden and Norway. (65) Laing had denounced the union of Sweden and Norway, claiming that Norway was justified in seeking separation from her larger neighbour (66) and judged Sweden to be "in a more demoralised state than any nation in Europe." (67) Not content with these denunciations, he published a reply to the Swedish Ambassador's book in The Monthly Chronicle (68) and had it reprinted as an introduction to his

(62) Samuel Laing, Journal of a Residence in Norway, during the years 1834, 1835 and 1836 ... (London, 1836), passim.


(64) "Shetland Fisheries (pt. II)," Blackwood's, X. (Dec., 1821), p. 728.


(67) Ibid., p. 108.

next book, *Notes of a Traveller ...* (1842), a work which also severely criticized Prussia.\(^{(69)}\)

Charles Neaves\(^{(70)}\) in a review of *The Heimskringla* in the *Edinburgh Review* accused Laing of glorifying Scandinavia "by denying or depreciating the virtues of all their neighbours"\(^{(71)}\) and for falling into "errors and exaggerations of a marked and serious kind."\(^{(72)}\) He felt that he could have shown more "charity" to Anglo-Saxons while granting full "justice" to Orcadians and that Scandinavian greatness was not best shown by "indiscriminate disparagement" of the other Teutonic peoples.\(^{(73)}\)

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(70) Neaves was a Scottish judge, who had served as sheriff of Orkney and Shetland from 1845-52. See A.H. Millar, "Neaves, Charles," *D.N.B.*, XIV, p. 152.


(72) Ibid., p. 291.

(73) Another indication of Laing's efforts to link the Orkney and Shetland Islands with their Scandinavian past is shown in a letter written by him from Papdale on 22 October, 1831 to Charles Christian Rafn, Secretary of the *Nordiske Ældskrifter-Selskab*, Copenhagen. In this letter, Laing questioned Rafn about some of the early and medieval historical connections between the Orkneys and Shetland and Scandinavia. Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Copenhagen, *Nye Kongelige Samling*, Vol. 1599, I, 2, Fol., 248, hereafter cited as *K.E., Ny. Kgl. Saml.*
Laing's deductions Neaves considered as "erroneous" and his statements as "fanciful exaggerations." (74) Still the journalist recommended his "racy delineations" for perusal by students interested in the relationship between the British and Scandinavian past. (75)

The two most important sources for Laing's attitudes on the war are:

Observations on the Social and Political State of the European People in 1848 and 1849 ... and Observations on the Social and Political State of Denmark and the Duchies of Sleswick and Holstein in 1851 ... . These proved beyond any shadow of doubt his strong sympathy for Denmark during her conflict with the German States. In his introduction to the latter book, he wrote: "I propose on this tour to write such observations as may occur to me from time to time on this subject, without studying to connect them into formal dissertations. They may be sometimes contradictory or incorrect, and often trivial; but they will be real impressions and reflections, given as they arise or suggest themselves, in a country which was the seat of a bloody and remarkable war, and in which a weak power, with a total population of only a million and a half of souls, appears to have withstood, and at last to have signally defeated, the army of a power with forty millions." (76)

(75) Ibid., p. 318. For further attitudes of Laing on German customs, see Edinburgh, LXXXIII (Jan., 1846), pp. 100-128.
(76) Laing, Sleswick, p. 21.
Laing devoted much space to condemnation of the German invasion of Denmark and the Duchies. He called the invasion of 1848 "a hasty and bloody exertion of brute military force, which would have disgraced the darkest period of the middle ages" (77) and claimed that the King of Prussia fought the war, not on behalf of the German inhabitants of the Duchies, but in order to add this territory to his own dominions. (78) He believed that Prussia had no "legitimate authority" to send troops into the Duchies (79) and that Germany had recklessly abandoned its "principles, treaties, guarantees and all the acknowledged ties which hold together the European family of nations in civilised and generally peaceful relations with each other." (80) Indeed the new Germany claimed on grounds of race and linguistic affinity not only Denmark and the Duchies, but also other areas of Europe. He wrote that the "same convenient principle might have been extended to the Isle of Thanet and the Thames." (81) Germany had neglected the "plainest dictates of humanity and prudence" (82) and its "visionary schemes ... should be understood, exposed and repudiated." (83) Furthermore, he felt that Britain should have sent an expeditionary force to Denmark in 1848 by reason

(77) Laing, 1848 and 1849, p. 438.
(78) Ibid., p. 437.
(79) Ibid., p. 438.
(80) Ibid., p. 445.
(81) Ibid., loc. cit.
(82) Ibid., p. 443.
(83) Ibid., p. 449.
of the 1720 Guarantee, and because she did not, he accused the British cabinet of also being "guilty of the bloodshed of these three years in Sleswick."(84)

Laing commented often on the use made of the Schleswig-Holstein Question by the Frankfurt Parliament, especially its literary delegates, as a rallying cry to unite all of Germany. He denounced the ambitions of this body to conquer the Duchies as "insane,"(85) but about the majority of Germans, he wrote: "The common sense of the many, of the great mass of the forty millions, could not be brought to believe that a common race and tongue a thousand years ago - blue eyes, fair skin, and Platt Deutsch - are good and sufficient reasons now for overturning all their existing social and political arrangements, and bringing under one common government, at Frankfort, the inhabitants of countries so little connected by their wants or interests, as the coasts of the Baltic and the Adriatic."(86) He pointed out that the industrialists, farmers, merchants and seamen of Schleswig and Holstein were unrepresented at the Frankfurt Parliament, which, he claimed, was controlled by "self-conceited men, drunk with power, insensible to, or ignorant of, the wants and rights of the people."(87) He called the German legislators at Frankfurt "crows and magpies, not eagles."(88)

(84) Laing, Sleswick, p. 78.
(85) Laing, 1848 and 1849, p. 447.
(86) Laing, Sleswick, p. 84.
(87) Ibid., pp. 114-115.
(88) Ibid., p. 444.
Laing gave special recognition to one of these "insensible" men at Frankfurt - Friedrich Dahlmann. On his activity to promote the Danish-German War, he wrote: "Professor Dahlmann ... is another instance of the different moral sense of literary men abroad from that which regulates social action in England. On the 4th September, 1848, the convention for an armistice and peace between Prussia, on the part of Germany, and Denmark, was laid before the Frankfort Parliament. It raised a storm of indignation in that sage and sedate assembly. Peace was repudiated, the proposal was cried down as an insult to the patriotism of the citizens of the German 'Vaterland.' Professor Dahlmann was the head and orator of the party in the parliament who rejected, by an immense majority, the proposal of peace with Denmark, and decided for war and bloodshed."(89) Laing gave a brief history of Dahlmann's life, stressing the debts he owed to Denmark. He described in scornful language Dahlmann's loyalty to Germany, and ended his comments on the "inventor" of the Schleswig-Holstein Question, by remarking: "... we find this German patriot as declaiming against a peace with Denmark, and urging the Frankfort Parliament, with a fatal success, to carry fire and sword into the provinces of Holstein and Sleswick, which had been his home for the better part of forty years, and to wage a furious war against that State which had bestowed on him his education, his subsistence, and his position in life."(90)

(89) Ibid., pp. 109-110.
(90) Ibid., p. 111.
Jacob Venedy, a former member of the Frankfurt Parliament and the author of a diary, *Schleswig-Holstein im Jahre 1850*, (91) also came under adverse criticism from Laing, who had read his publication. Venedy had offered his services to the German army in the Elbe Duchies after the dissolution of the Frankfurt Parliament. Apparently, the German officers in Schleswig considered his experience as a legislator and professor of insufficient military value to them, and the rejected parliamentarian retired to Altona where, according to Laing, he invented a "deliberate lie" to arouse public support for the Schleswig-Holstein cause; he described the hardships suffered by a non-existent family of Friedrichstadt on account of the siege of this city in September and October, 1850, and requested financial contributions for its assistance. The story was inserted in a leading north German newspaper and as a result much money was mailed to its editor. Finally, Venedy admitted that the story was a fabrication, and the funds were given to a ladies society in Kiel. Laing exclaimed: "We have surely in England a different moral standard, a different moral sense from that of literary men in Germany;" and used this example to illustrate the manner in which he considered many German intellectuals through the press and the debates at Frankfurt had aroused and misled German public opinion. (92)

Laing expressed his attitudes to German professors and their students on other occasions too. He was convinced that the dreams of many German

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university men, especially those associated with the University of Kiel, of forming a united Fatherland, were "wild speculations and dreams of crazy professors, authors and enthusiastic students."(93) In another fiery outburst, the former student of Kiel asserted: "By following the insane projects of a few professors and students at Kiel, men either strangers or with no stake in the country, the provisional government plunged itself into an unjust and ruinous war."(94) He regarded as "fanatical" the demand of some professors that Schleswig and Holstein be jointly governed and of those Germans who wished to "preach a crusade against the Danish language."(95) He was very much disturbed by the behaviour of the German "literary power" during the three year struggle. Believing that the press had purposely distorted news in order to arouse discontent within the Duchies, he lamented: "But it appears to be a kind of moral disease among literary men in Germany to write for effect, not for truth, to excite by statements and reasonings, without regard to reality, and to invent and publish as facts the poorest falsehoods which they imagine may serve their cause."(96) He believed the members of the Burschenschaften to have behaved with "demoralized frenzy." They were aiding a "bloody and disgraceful" war in the Duchies which was fought "for an unjust and unprincipled object, at the bidding of a clique of professors, functionaries,

(93) Laing, 1848 and 1849, p. 445.
(94) Ibid., p. 444.
(95) Ibid., p. 227.
(96) Laing, Sleswick, p. 85.
newspaper writers, and students." He concluded that the influence of the professors in Germany was greater than that of the governments, and that this influence had caused them to attack Denmark. (97)

Laing's two books contained descriptions of and comparisons between the Danish and the German soldiers. The German free corps, which was composed mainly of student volunteers, came under particularly strong criticism. They were referred to as "bands of undisciplined students, journeymen, and ragamuffins." (98) He remarked that the rural population of the Duchies was often subjected to acts of thievery by the free corps and described these soldiers as of a "very unaccomodating character, and were always craving more and better food, lodgings, and attendance . . . and would not help at all at any farm work." The Danish soldiers on the other hand were said to be often popular with their hosts. Many of them were landsmen by profession, were happy to assist the Schleswig farmers with the everyday chores, (100) and were considered "under excellent discipline." (101) The difference in discipline between soldiers of the opposing armies seemed great to Laing and the misbehaviour of some of the German free corps probably further strengthened his pro-Danish convictions in the conflict.

Laing devoted a great deal of space to several important land and naval engagements during the war. A full chapter was written about the

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(97) Laing, 1848 and 1849, p. 227.
(98) Ibid., p. 472.
(99) Laing, Sleswick, p. 165.
(100) Ibid., pp. 190-192.
(101) Ibid., p. 165.
Danish victory at Idstedt and several pages about the Danish defense of Friedrichstadt. These two military successes by the Danish army further strengthened Laing's belief in the righteousness of their cause. He glorified the astuteness of the Danish General Krogh at Idstedt and ridiculed the blunders of the Prussian General Williston.\(^{(102)}\) He lamented the manner in which Friedrichstadt had been bombarded by the Germans;\(^{(103)}\) and considered that the Schleswig-Holstein movement had been "morally dissolved" by these two engagements.\(^{(104)}\) His sympathy for the Danes was strengthened by their victories but was not weakened by their defeats, such as at Eckernförde.\(^{(105)}\)

One of the strongest reasons for Laing's conviction that right was on the side of Denmark in this struggle was the apparent attempt by Prussia to exploit the Holsteiners' grievances to enlarge her seacoast at the expense of the smaller Nordic power. He stressed the economic and strategic importance of Schleswig and Holstein and predicted that should the Germans acquire the Duchies they would soon build a merchant fleet and a navy to protect it.\(^{(106)}\) But he cited the effectiveness of the Danish naval blockade in helping to prevent such German acquisition.\(^{(107)}\)

\(^{(102)}\) Ibid., pp. 240-262.
\(^{(103)}\) Ibid., pp. 264-268.
\(^{(104)}\) Ibid., p. 268.
\(^{(105)}\) Ibid., pp. 163-164.
\(^{(106)}\) Laing, 1848 and 1849, p. 444.
\(^{(107)}\) Ibid., p. 447.
Laing dedicated almost an entire chapter to the importance of Kiel as a naval base because he was convinced that Prussia wanted it for its fine harbour and strategic location. He observed: "In this bay of Kiel lies the key to the dark and unprincipled intrigues and manoeuvres of the Prussian government in 1848-49-50, and in the war under the mask of peace carried on to the last against Denmark." (108) The following quotation further indicates the international importance he attached to the harbour of Kiel and the dangers of it following into Prussian hands:

In this beautiful inlet ... the largest ships of war may anchor close to the town, and the bay could contain, and shelter in safety, the largest naval force ... This bay of Kiel is the only military haven or port for a great naval station, on the south side of the Baltic ... The command of this port would give Prussia, or Germany, if an united Germany should ever become a political power, the command of the Baltic. (109)

On the importance of the Duchies to Denmark, he believed that Schleswig was the "key to the Danish Islands. It is so situated with respect to Alsen, Fyen, and Zealand, that the Danish Kingdom could no more exist as an independent power with the Duchy of Schleswig separated from the Danish crown, than England, if Kent or Essex, or the Isle of Wight or the Isle of Thanet, were in the hands of France or Germany." (110)

(108) Laing, Sleswick, p. 25.
(109) Ibid., p. 23.
(110) Laing, 1848 and 1849, p. 448.
On some points Laing made factual errors such as referring to the Guarantee of 1730 instead of 1720, and in writing that Prussian troops invaded the Duchies in response to the "call" of the Frankfurt Parliament, when in fact, the Parliament passed a resolution on 12 April approving of this conduct only after Frederick William IV's soldiers on 6 April had crossed into the Helstat. Still the Orcadian's works do indicate that he was well acquainted with the Schleswig-Holstein Question.

His style had been described earlier by Neaves of the Edinburgh Review as one of "extreme partiality." When he wrote his book on the Duchies, fifty years after his student days in Holstein, his manner of writing was still outspoken. He was doubtless a very controversial character. Thomas Seccomb in The Dictionary of National Biography commented that some of his writings "exhibited less judgement than enthusiasm," and on at least one occasion Laing's pen caused him to be involved in a libel suit. But he had also a gentle side, as indicated for example in a

(111) Ibid., loc. cit.
(112) Ibid., pp. 438-439.
(113) For text of resolution, see "Schleswig-Holstein," Annual Register ... 1848, pp. 346-347.
(115) Laing, Sleswick, p. 33.
a letter in which he recommended the repair and preservation of the Cathedral of Saint Magnus in Kirkwall, (118) and another to him which showed the responsibility he felt to the other members of his family. (119) He died in 1868 at the age of 87. (120) The forthrightness of his pen certainly left no doubt that he was one of Britain's most loyal supporters of Denmark during the Three Years War.

Edward Stillingfleet Cayley, the Younger

An English landowner who was particularly interested in the events in Schleswig and Holstein in 1848-50 was Edward Cayley. He was born on 30 July, 1824 and lived most of his life at Wydale and Low Hall in Yorkshire. (121) Cayley's father was a wealthy landlord who represented this area in parliament over forty years. (122) Young Cayley received his early schooling at Eton, (123) and continued his education at Trinity College, Cambridge,

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(118) Scottish Record Office, Inventory of Orkney and Shetland Papers, RH 9/15, 206, p. 49, "Memoir relative to Cathedral of Saint Magnus in Kirkwall, and towards a Grant from the Government for its Repair and Preservation, with Copy letter from Samuel Laing" to W.A. Fetheringham, 1 Moray Place, Edinburgh, 27 Mar., 1845.


(121) Boase, op. cit., I, p. 577.


having matriculated there in 1843.\(^{(124)}\) His view on the Question of the Duchies was strongly pro-Danish and is found expressed principally in the second volume of his work, *The European Revolutions of 1848*\(^{(125)}\) and in brief comments on the War of 1848–50 in his book, *The War of 1870 and the Peace of 1871.*\(^{(126)}\)

Although Cayley's *The European Revolutions of 1848* was not published until 1856, he began collecting material for it some years earlier. He wrote in the preface: "The extraordinary events which convulsed nearly every European state, during the years of Revolutions, 1848, induced the author to investigate the political phenomena connected with them. For this purpose, he collected most of the historical works bearing on the subject, as well as all the printed political articles and pamphlets that could be procured both foreign and English." He also acknowledged his debt to private interviews. He had, he claimed, "extracted from this mass of material the main facts ... [and afterwards] threw his notes into the form of a narrative."\(^{(127)}\) His work, he informed his readers, had been compiled chiefly "to arrive at facts for his own satisfaction, and not to

\(^{(124)}\) Venn, *op. cit.*, Pt. II, I, p. 545.


\(^{(127)}\) Cayley, *Revolutions*, I, p. V.
make out a case to suit preconceived views."(128)

Cayley devoted about one-tenth of volume II of The European Revolutions in 1848 to the Danish-German war. One of the subjects he discussed here was the Duke of Augustenburg. He blamed, to a large degree, the rebellion on the "intrigues" of the Duke in the years immediately prior to 1848 and at the outset of hostilities.(129) He criticized the Duke for writing falsehoods about Schleswig which created the impression that this Duchy was primarily German in population and for having them published, often through bribery, in German newspapers. The Duke had held, Cayley claimed, that in the Duchies the German language was "universal;" in any case he had undertaken "the insane attempt to make it so." Cayley also accused the Duke of unsuccessfully trying to bribe The Times to support his "absurd crusade."(130) He named as one of the most prominent Augustenburg ruses, that of the Duke's brother, the Prince of Noer. It was purported that the Prince used a forged Stettin newspaper to persuade the inhabitants of the Duchies to revolt. This paper reported that the King of Denmark was held by insurgents in Copenhagen and that an insurrection had taken place there. Thus, according to Cayley, many natives of the Duchies were tricked into rebelling against the King when, actually, they thought they were rising to assist him. Cayley's reaction to the Augustenburg ruse was " - so much

(128) Ibid., loc. cit.
(129) Ibid., II, p. 45.
(130) Ibid., II, p. 47, fn.
for honesty and patriotism. Such was the cause for which the German
sovereigns violated the territory of a king with whom they had no
quarrel."(131)

Nor did Cayley neglect to chastise the Frankfurt Parliament and what
he called the "rabble of the Frankfort streets"(132) for meddling in the
affairs of the Danish King. He remarked: "But, not content with doing
nothing, they [the members of the Parliament] did much wrong; they gave
way to the most selfish ambition for national aggrandizement; they aided
and abetted the under-graduate rebels in Holstein and Schleswig(133) in
their treason; they hurled on Denmark an army of 80,000 men, with a
vaunted population of 40,000,000 to back them, - not from the justice of
their cause, but because they had looked on their neighbour's vineyard, and
coveted it."(134) He described the Danish government as "despotic ... but
the people were really free" and declared that in Holstein under the
Danish King "public duties were much less burdensome than in the rest of
Germany."(135)

(131) Ibid., II, pp. 48-49.
(132) Ibid., II, p. 55.
(133) British writers spelled Schleswig in a number of different ways.
Cayley used a mixed German-Danish version - "Schlesvig" in his
book about 1848. In later writings he adopted a more Anglo-Danish
version - "Sleswick."
(134) Cayley, Revolutions, II, pp. 52-53.
(135) Ibid., II, p. 45.
Many of the actions of German intellectuals caused Cayley to assume an anti-German attitude. He felt that professors and students of various German universities, especially Kiel, shared with the Duke of Augustenburg, the blame for the war. (136) He claimed that the outbreak at Kiel in March, 1848 was effected by "idle students," (137) but that when the real battles began these students "were remarkably useless soldiers." Furthermore, the cause of a united Germany was one of "literary volunteers" instead of one urged by the small farmers of Schleswig and Holstein, who cared little about the matter. (138)

Cayley was especially concerned that Kiel should remain under Danish control and not fall into Prussian hands. On this, he wrote: "One of the chief objects of longing of Young Germany was a navy. In possession of the duchies, they would have the best harbour on the Baltic south of Cronstadt. The King of Prussia, therefore, who had taken on himself to lead that party, was tempted by this; and, coveting his neighbour's havens, regardless of the laws of nations, without any declaration of war, on the 6th of April sent an army of 20,000 men to assist the rebels." (139)

On the other hand, he commended Denmark for delaying her naval attacks on Prussian coasts and ships until Schleswig had actually been invaded. (140)

In view of the events of 1863–65 it is hardly surprising to discover

(136) Ibid., loc. cit.
(137) Ibid., II, p. 47.
(138) Ibid., II, p. 62.
(139) Ibid., II, p. 49.
(140) Ibid., II, p. 53.
that Cayley's attitude to Prussian ambitions for Schleswig and Holstein changed little. As late as 1871, he declared: "The story of Prussia and Denmark is the story of Naboth's vineyard. Prussia wanted Sleswic, and Holstein with the port of Kiel, very much, and having attempted to take them on the sly, about the year 1850, disguised as somebody else, and having got a drubbing at Idstedt for her pains, she wanted them all the more ... This the Germans called Geist. The ardent wish for other folks' goods." (141)

Cayley commented on several of the more important battles of the war. He described the Danish attack at Fredericia as "overwhelming," the Schleswig-Holstein army having been "routed and destroyed." (142) On the Danish success at Idstedt, he said: "... the resolute dauntless cool courage of the Dane ... was entirely victorious over [German] boastful enthusiasm and vapouring rhapsodies." (143) He believed the Schleswig-Holstein bombardment of Friederichstadt was undertaken for the "sole object" of enabling the German press: "to rouse the people into enthusiasm, which they did not succeed in doing." (144) But he thought the "most remarkable circumstance in the war" occurred at Eckernförde, when the Germans captured the Gefion and sank the Christian VIII. (145)

Because Cayley was a strong supporter of the Danish side it is difficult

(141) Cayley, War, p. 4.
(142) Cayley, Revolutions, II, p. 59.
(143) Ibid., II, p. 67.
(144) Ibid., II, p. 72.
(145) Ibid., II, p. 59.
to believe that he used the term "remarkable" in the sense of the Germans having achieved an extraordinary victory, but more in the sense of an unexpected or strange event. In any case the Germans were unable to put the captured Gefion, renamed the Eckernförde, to any immediate use and the Danes still maintained their naval superiority. (146)  

Cayley's anti-German attitude seems to have stemmed partially from his abhorrence at the disorderly manner in which the Frankfurt Parliament behaved, but it is apparent that he disapproved also of the attempted revolution by forces in Schleswig-Holstein. He objected to the Frankfurt-Rendsburg alliance, backed up by the military might of Berlin, which aimed at the conquest of three small but strategically located Duchies that belonged by right to the King of Denmark. It is also apparent that Cayley, although from a landed background, recognized the importance of a strong fleet and good seaports. He proposed that the harbours of the Duchies should remain a part of the Halstat rather than to be annexed by a power which through an enlargement of the Zollverein and of her merchant marine and navy, might come to be a serious competitor of Britain. He was a man of strong and independent principles and he left no doubt that his sympathies were entirely with Denmark in this conflict. He died in 1884, (147) twenty years after the Prussian annexation, but apparently remained in later life as staunch  


(147) Boase, op. cit., I, p. 577.
a foe of German "tyrannical confiscation" as he was in 1848. *(148)*

**Lieutenant-General Sir William Napier**

William Napier, an artillery officer and historian who had been stationed in Denmark for a time during the Napoleonic Wars, *(149)* was particularly anxious that the Schleswig-Holstein War in 1848-50 should not broaden into a larger one such as those which had engulfed Europe during the early part of the century. Napier, born in 1785 and commissioned as an ensign at the age of 14, *(150)* developed a strong liking for Denmark during his stay there. His book, *The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier*, indicates that Britain acted too hastily in attacking this small country in 1807. *(151)* Perhaps some of this feeling of guilt lingered on through the years of the Danish struggle against the German States, and helped to strengthen his sympathy for the smaller protagonist. Undoubtedly Napier still in 1848-50 appreciated the experience he had gained on Zealand.


*(150)* Boase, op. cit., II, p. 1080.

and valued his contacts with the Danish people during the Napoleonic Wars.\footnote{152}

In a survey of the major European nations written by the General dated 26 June, 1848, entitled, \textit{Notes in anticipation of the State of Europe, A.D.,} 1848, he warned: "Russia has a good cause in the aid of Denmark; she can involve Sweden, Denmark, and herself in war with Prussia and Germany, certain that France by interfering will only render the matter more perplexing and inextricable."\footnote{153} He linked the Eastern Question with the Schleswig-Holstein one: "[Russia could] use," he wrote, "the 50,000 men she must keep in Poland as her aid to Sweden and Denmark: it will give her a force of 100,000 allies to fight distracted Germany; and Russia can support that force without trenching upon her main army ... which she can, and will I think, suddenly move upon Constantinople."\footnote{154} Because he believed that neither England nor Austria could stop the Tsar, Napier wanted the Schleswig-Holstein conflict, which he described as "a small cloud menacing the interest of England, which ... might become very formidable," to be solved at the

\footnote{152} An extract from a letter written by a Major Hopkins while serving as a member of the Copenhagen Expedition provides one example of Napier's attitude towards the Danish population and the German troops in Denmark at this time. Hopkins wrote: "He [Napier] broke out in great indignation on witnessing the conduct of the officers of a German regiment, who were helping themselves most freely to the property in a house which they had entered during a halt in our march. His humanity was continually exerted, not only in favour of our wounded, but also for those of the Danes." See H.A. Bruce (ed.), \textit{Life of General William Napier, author of the History of the Peninsular War} ... I, (London, 1864), p. 37.

\footnote{153} \textit{Ibid.}, II, p. 260.

\footnote{154} \textit{Ibid.}, II, pp. 260-261.
earliest possible moment. (155) He could not understand why Palmerston allowed the war to continue, and in an apparent reference to the Guarantee of 1720, accused Palmerston of causing Britain to be "false to her engagements with Denmark," and reminded his readers that Russia and Sweden had "seized the opportunity of appearing, and being in reality, the saviours of that country." He wondered if Palmerston acted so cautiously as a "result of conscious weakness or the secret feeling that England cannot go to war," or if that was not the reason for his attitude to Denmark, "it must be that, fearing a quadruple alliance, he wishes to give Germany a sea-coast, knowing that she cannot be for many years a formidable maritime power; and that meanwhile she will weaken the maritime power of Sweden, Denmark, and Russia." (156) This speculation of Napier's appears to be very much *sui generis*. Palmerston seems to have given such a theory little or no consideration.

Napier wrote in an essay called *Continuation of Notes in anticipation*, dated 27 October, 1850: "The cloud mentioned in my former notes as arising over Denmark seems now ready to burst in a storm over Europe." (157) It was his opinion that Napoleon III and the Tsar of Russia were forcing Prussia to make peace with Denmark and he thought that they had invited England to join them, but: "England," he remarked, "cannot do so without

(155) Ibid., II, p. 262.
(156) Ibid., loc. cit.
(157) Ibid., II, p. 263.
great danger; she would thus lend herself to the aggrandizement of those powers, when it is in her interest to prevent such aggrandizement at the expense of Prussia." (158) Napier estimated that Russia, France, Denmark, Sweden and Holland would have over one million men to fight against only a half million Prussians. He believed that Britain could not afford the expense of helping Prussia financially, and thus hoped that Frederick William IV would withdraw his support of the Schleswig-Holstein forces. He felt that "if Prussia is governed by reason that she will avoid this danger and submit; but I believe her ambition and extreme military arrogance and vanity, will not let her submit." (159) He went on to say that Russia wanted Constantinople and that the time seemed to him to be a good one, because she could offer France, "about whose desire to go to war there can be little doubt," the Prussian Rhineland. Russia would then take the Polish territories of Frederick William IV and then "safely move on Constantinople, offering France ... Egypt." (160)

Napier declared in his same notes of 1850 that Britain could not honourably abandon Denmark. "It remains," he wrote, "to be seen if her interference singly can effect a peaceable termination to the great difficulty under consideration." (161)

(158) Ibid., loc. cit.
(159) Ibid., II, pp. 263-264.
(160) Ibid., II, p. 263.
(161) Ibid., loc. cit.
Napier's sentiments were obviously on the side of Denmark as opposed to the Schleswig-Holsteiners during the 1848-50 war. He did not wish a partition of Prussia at the hands of such powers as Russia, France or Austria, who, he feared, might use the Question of the Duchies as an excuse to enlarge their own territories, but he regretted that Palmerston had exercised such caution and neglected to come to Denmark's assistance early in the war. To conclude, Napier wished to return to the status quo ante bellum for both the Helstat and for Prussia, and believed this to be the best means of preserving peace and the balance of power in Europe.

George Stephens

George Stephens was a strong supporter of Denmark during the war, one reason apparently being because it was his firm conviction that the English language evolved from the Scandinavian tongue instead of the German. (162) He also encouraged British support for the Danes by stressing Anglo-Danish kinship. (163)

Stephens expressed deep regret over the Danish losses at Eckernförde in a letter to Hermann Henrik Lynge, a book publisher in Copenhagen. He offered his sympathy and hoped that the Danes would take new courage. He closed with the exclamation: "Levæ Danmark med Slesvig!" (164) He also


expressed his sorrow over Eckernförde in a 14 verse poem about the battle. This poem was published in Stockholm's Ur Aftenposten, No. 90, of 17 April, 1849. Stephens had copies of it printed and sent one of these to his friend Professor Neils Lawritz Höyen of the University of Copenhagen. (165) The first and last verses are as follows:

I.
Weep, Dana, weep! Weep hot tears silently, 
Weep for thy children and thy tarnish'd Name. 
Yes! bow thy queenly head, and mournfully 
Rend'rer past Glories veil'd by present shame. 
Danskers! forget ye never
'Christian den Ottende' and 'Gefion!'

XIV.
Trust thou in God! - With Glory fall, at least 
If fall thou must in such unequal fight:
And aye, in sad days, nerve thy sorrowing breast 
With: REMEMBER ECKERNFÖRDE! GOD HELP THE RIGHT!
Danskers! forget ye never
'Christian den Ottende' and 'Gefion!' (166)

Stephens stands apart from the other writers we have been and shall be dealing with in so far as he lived during the war neither in Britain nor in either of the belligerent states, but Sweden. He was born in Liverpool in 1813, the son of a Wesleyan minister, and was educated at University College, London. In 1834 he travelled to Stockholm, where his brother was already living, to teach English to Swedes and became adept in Swedish. (167)

(166) Ur Aftenposten (Stockholm), Nr. 90, 17 Apr., 1849. Author's italics.
In 1851 Stephens left Sweden for Denmark, where he lectured on English language and literature at the University of Copenhagen, and became a naturalized Danish Citizen in 1855. His disappointment that Britain had withheld military and naval support from Denmark in defense of the Duchies may have influenced this decision. It is more likely, however, that when he was offered a Professorship in English and Anglo-Saxon at Copenhagen in the same year, he decided to become a Dane. Indeed, the Professorship may have been proposed to him on the suggestion that he become Danish.

**Henry Reeve**

Henry Reeve was another British man-of-letters who wrote in favour of Denmark. He considered Germany's attack on Denmark in 1848 as "iniquitous," and felt that her defeat in 1850 "was a thing to rejoice over." He was born in 1813 in Norwich and received his early schooling there. Later he attended the Universities of Geneva and Munich. He learned

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(170) Ibid., loc. cit.
(171) See supra., pp. 84-85.
(173) Agnes Mary Clerk, "Reeve, Henry," D.N.B. XVI, p. 849, hereafter cited as "Reeve," D.N.B.
(174) Laughton, op. cit., I, pp. 9-12.
(175) Ibid., I, pp. 25-26. Years later (1869), he received a D.C.L. from Oxford. See Foster, Men at the Bar, p. 388.
German so well that by the age of 21 he had already published many articles in it, but in spite of this, he developed an intense dislike for the country. He described German professors as "over-dogmatical" and the land as the "most uninteresting nation in the world" and the one with "perhaps the least truth in all Europe."(178)

During the years between his student days at Munich and 1848, Reeve made several trips abroad and at least one return visit to Germany, which included Prussia and Hamburg. In 1840 he joined the staff of The Times, and is said by one authority to have written nearly every one of its editorials on foreign affairs during 1848-50. Prior to the war he enjoyed an intimate association with Bunsen, but because of The Times's strong pro-Danish stand, this friendship cooled. On 19 April, 1848 Reeve wrote the Prussian that it was a great honour to have the personal friendship of one of the "most eminent statesmen of this time," and as a consequence, it was "hard fate" for him to dispute Bunsen's authority on the Baltic conflict. He had read the Ambassador's Memoir on the Duchies with much interest and

(176) "Reeve," D.N.B., XVI, p. 850.
(177) Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 28.
(178) Ibid., I, p. 29.
(179) Ibid., I, p. 68.
(180) Boase, op. cit., III, p. 89.
(181) Laughton, op. cit., I, pp. 152, 183-184, 195-197.
(182) Ibid., I, p. 199.
(183) Ibid., I, p. 197.
felt that it contained the "cream" of the German arguments, (184) but went on:

What am I to say when the catapult which threatens Denmark bears no ram's head, but the honoured features of Bunsen? ... But what a misfortune to Europe is this event! Instead of plunging into it, one would have expected that Prussia would have used every effort to avert it, for it has a strong tendency to leave Germany wholly unsupported in Europe ... This unhappy agitation has laid the basis of an Anglo-Russian alliance; and it is the triumph in Germany of the party who have for years been labouring to traduce the name of England and to destroy the independence of Denmark ... Schleswig-Holstein has very materially contributed to the present political position of the sovereigns, ministers, professors and people of Germany ... For my own part, all revolutions have the effect of throwing my sympathies into the opposite scale. (185)

Reeve, who lived for almost 45 years after the Berlin Peace Treaty, (186) greatly feared that if the war in Schleswig and Holstein broadened into a general European conflict, the result could be "disastrous for England;" and he concluded in a review of Radowitz's book, Deutschland und Friedrich Wilhelm IV, (187) that Germany's actions in the Duchies from 1848-50 "were no more ... than external symptoms of a deeply-seated disorder." (188) Although Reeve was a competent German scholar and had been intimate with

(184) Ibid., I, p. 198.
(185) Ibid., I, pp. 198-199.
(186) Boase, op. cit., III, p. 90.
(187) General Joseph von Radowitz, Deutschland und Friedrich Wilhelm IV (Hamburg, 1848).
German leaders, (189) his sympathies in the war were strongly on the side of the Danes. (190)

Sir Archibald Alison

Archibald Alison, born in 1792 at Kenlëy in Shropshire, was educated at the University of Edinburgh. (191) During 1848-50 he wrote several articles for the Tory periodical, Blackwood's, on the European wars and revolutions of these years. (192) Some of these articles were very critical of the German State.

The Frankfurt Parliament and the King of Prussia were principal targets of Alison's criticism. He objected to the invasion of Schleswig by Prussia and also to the encouragement given to this invasion by the legislators at Frankfurt. His articles also showed a complete lack of sympathy for the "revolutionary tempest" of the Schleswig-Holsteiners; he had no desire to

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(190) Letters to Reeve from Comte Adolphe de Circourt, Director of Foreign Policy of The Times, may have strengthened his pro-Danish convictions. De Circourt expressed the belief that the Schleswig-Holstein forces would be defeated and forced to recognize the King of Denmark as their rightful ruler. See British Museum, Add. MS. 37422, Fols., 47, 124, 126, 130, 149.


(192) See supra., pp. 145-146.
see the Elbe Duchies governed by men engaged in what he phrased as "iniquitous revolutionary aggression." (193) On the other hand, Alison found words of praise for Frederik VII and Count Reventlow, the Danish Ambassador to Britain. He met both men in 1845 when Frederik VII, then still Crown Prince, and Reventlow visited Glasgow. He described the Prince as "affable and agreeable in the highest degree." On Reventlow, he said: "We were charmed by the graceful manner and agreeable conversation of Count Reventlow, one of the most favourable specimens of the diplomatic body that could be imagined." (194) He commented also: "We were far at this period from anticipating the glorious stand which in perilous times the Prince Royal, when he came to the throne, afterwards made against the assault of the revolutionary forces of Germany." (195) Alison died in 1867, (196) perhaps "most devoted" to German literature, (197) but not to German politics.

Andrew Hamilton

Andrew Hamilton, a sympathizer with the Danes, is probably the only

(193) Archibald Alison, "Foreign Affairs," Blackwood's, LXVIII (Sept., 1850), p. 328; see also Alison, "Revolutions," Blackwood's, LXIII (May, 1848), pp. 639, 645.

(194) Archibald Alison, Some Account of My Life and Writings, An Autobiography... ed. by Lady Alison, I (Edinburgh, 1883), pp. 530-531.

(195) Ibid., I, p. 531.

(196) Boase, op. cit., I, p. 47.

British men-of-letters who lived nearly the entire period of the Three
Years War in Denmark and Germany. He arrived in Denmark from Wismar on
29 March, 1849, (198) and remained in that country, with the exception of
a brief visit to Gothenburg, until the summer of 1850, when he travelled
to Berlin in order to study at the university there. (199)

Hamilton was born in Stirling on 15 December, 1826. His father,
William Hamilton, was a clergyman at Strathblane, (200) and his mother,
Jane King, was the daughter of William King, who it seems owned the first
cotton-spinning factory in Scotland. (201) In the manse at Strathblane,
Andrew had access to a large private library. (202) The financial success
of his maternal grandfather probably assisted the young scholar to study
and travel abroad comparatively free from financial cares. (203)

(198) Andrew Hamilton, Sixteen Months in the Danish Isles, I (London, 1852),

(199) Ibid., II, pp. 346-347; K.B., Copenhagen, Collinske Brevsamling,
VIII, 2, Fol. 21, Hamilton to Andersen, n.p. [Copenhagen], n.d.
[1850], hereafter cited as Collin. Brev.

(200) Lieutenant-Colonel George Hamilton, A History of the House of Hamilton
(Edinburgh, 1933), p. 610; Hew Scott, Fasti Ecclesiae Scotticae,
The Succession of Ministers in the Church of Scotland from the Reforma-

Robert Naismith, Stonehouse, Historical and Traditional (Glasgow, 1885),
p. 164.

(202) James Hamilton, Life in Earnest, with a Biographical Sketch of the

(203) On the property left Andrew Hamilton upon the death of his father,
see Scottish Record Office, Sheriff Court of Stirlingshire, Record
of Inventories, 1809-1900, Vol. 16, Fols. 288-294, will of Dr. William
Hamilton, Minister, Strathblane, 14 Nov., 1835; for the will of William
King, see ibid., Sheriff Court of Renfrewshire, Record of Inventories,
The most important sources for Hamilton's attitudes to the war over the Duchies are his book, *Sixteen Months in the Danish Isles*, and several letters written by him to Danish friends. The book was dedicated to the Bishop of Copenhagen, Jacob Peter Mynster (204) evidently one of his oldest and most respected friends in Denmark; (205) in a letter to him which alluded to the Schleswig-Holstein revolutionaries and their supporters in Germany, he remarked how little he sympathized "with those parties who would change everything now existing, without having any thing better to put in its place." He expressed "no love for the mere spirit of innovation" and felt assured that the Bishop would uphold him in this respect. (206)

Hamilton was well received by members of the literary society of Copenhagen. After Mynster, he perhaps admired Hans Andersen more than any other Dane. From a series of his letters to Andersen it seems that these two men had one another's esteem. (207) In one letter written shortly before he sailed for Wismar in 1850, he reminded Andersen of his promise to write letters of introduction on his behalf to professors at the University of Berlin. (208)

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(207) K.B., Collin, Brev., Vol. VIII, Fol. 18-22, Hamilton to Andersen, written at Copenhagen and Berlin, 1850 and n.d.

(208) K.B., Collin, Brev., Vol. VIII, 2, Fol. 21, Hamilton to Andersen, n.p. [Copenhagen], n.d. [1850].
There was no mention, however, of the war in his letters to Andersen. (209)

While in Denmark, Hamilton became particularly interested in the Kongelige Nordiske Oldskrift-Selskab. (210) This society, founded in 1825, was presided over by Professor Carl Christian Rafn and its purpose was to promote a greater interest in Nordic antiquities. (211) The Rafn Collection of Letters located in its library contains at least five letters written by Hamilton to the professor. (212) Hamilton had made a donation of 50 Rigsdaler to the organization during the war, and it was Rafn who proposed the young student's name for membership. (213) This donation was unusually generous, (214) and gives an indication of Hamilton's strong respect for Denmark. He does not appear to have made such a sizeable donation to any German organization, and in one letter to Rafn, written in 1850 from Berlin, he described the condition of Prussia as "lamentable in every res-

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(210) Hamilton, Danish Isles, I, pp. 29-34.

(211) Minutes of the Annual Meeting, 31 May 1850, Det Kongelige Nordiske Oldskrift-Selskab Forhandlings-Protocol, Copenhagen, III, pp. 1, 170, hereafter cited as Minutes, K.N.O.S.


(214) Interview with the Secretary of the Kongelige Nordiske Oldskrift Selskab, Thorkild Ramskov, Copenhagen, 29 Mar. 1967.
pect ... the mind of every body is completely taken up with political matters; so that for one who is desirous to pursue his studies, the residence in Germany at present is not very favourable."(215)

In spite of Hamilton's feeling that right was on the side of Denmark during the war, he regretted many examples of what he considered to be the excessive Danish nationalism which flourished throughout the country at that time. In 1849 German was the second most widely spoken tongue in Denmark and since Hamilton knew almost no Danish when he arrived in Copenhagen but spoke German, it was often necessary for him to converse in German. He wrote that the worst offence a foreigner could commit in the eyes of a Dane seemed to be to speak German unnecessarily.(216) He also cited an incident which occurred at a party given by Danes at which articles were auctioned to raise funds for the Schleswig cause. One article received no Danish bids because it was a room deodorant made in Prussia which the Danes called "Berlin smoking powder." Finally, Hamilton bought it and presented it to a Danish lady; she responded by buying a small purse with a Danish flag stitched on it and gave it to him.(217) On another occasion, a pasteboard Prussian soldier had been erected in Tivoli to be shot at. If he were hit properly, he would fall over. Hamilton remarked that "everybody seemed desirious to avail themselves of ... [this game]
and every time a successful hit was made, the assembled crowd raised a shout of laughter. The Prussian, indeed, had a hard time of it." He judged this sport to be "an ignoble way of taking revenge on a warlike enemy, however vexatious to that enemy it might have been." (218) He also criticized Danish paintings of that time as "revelling in blood" and more suited "to call forth admiration by awakening national enthusiasm, than by virtue of any artistic value they possessed." He felt that Danish artists often stirred up the "never very slumbering abhorrence of the Germans." (219) He revealed further evidence of intense Danish nationalism as displayed at musical festivals. He attended some of those which celebrated the victory at Fredericia, (220) and commented that he believed that the hatred of the Germans was "too essentially bound-up in the idea of Danish love for Denmark." (221) Nevertheless, he rejoiced also in this victory, (222) sympathized with the Danes over the naval loss at Eckernförde, (223) felt the Berlin Armistice in

(218) Ibid., I, pp. 184-185.
(219) Ibid., I, pp. 79-80.
(220) Ibid., II, p. 115.
(221) Ibid., II, p. 124.
(222) Ibid., II, pp. 111-112.
(223) Ibid., I, p. 80-82; II, pp. 112-113. The memoirs of another Scotsman, Ebenezer Henderson who had visited Denmark and the Duchies on several missions for the British and Foreign Bible Society and who had helped to found the Schleswig-Holstein Bible Society, also commented on the tumult of this battle. See Thulia Susannah Henderson (ed.), Memoir of the Rev. E. Henderson, D.D. Ph.D., including his Labours in Denmark ... (London, 1859), p. 400.
1849 could have been more advantageous to Denmark, (224) and did not allow their strong nationalist traits to alter his basic pro-Danish attitude.

But Hamilton also showed a fondness for Germans, having made friends at a number of German cities and universities. He had enjoyed being at the University of Rostock just prior to coming to Copenhagen (225) and commented upon the number of Englishmen who liked to study at Göttingen. (226) Upon leaving Copenhagen in 1850 he visited a Dr. Dammann in Hammeln in Hanover, (227) and from there journeyed to Berlin to pursue his interest in German language and literature. In Berlin he became acquainted, with the help of an introduction from Rafn, with the brothers Grimm and with Friedrich Hagen. In a letter to his Danish friend, Hamilton wrote: "They [Professors Hagen and Jacob Grimm] are both pretty strong friends of the Slesvig-Holstein affairs but never speak about that matter." (228) Finally, years after the war, Hamilton wrote a book favourable to Prussia and Frederick the Great, *Rheinsburg: Memorials of Frederick the Great and Prince Henry of Prussia.* (229)

Thus Andrew Hamilton, with certain reservations sympathized with the

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(224) Ibid., I, p. 182.
(225) Ibid., I, p. 1.
(226) Ibid., II, p. 235.
(228) Rafn Saml., Hamilton to Rafn, Berlin, 9 Dec., 1850.
Danes in their struggle against Germany to retain possession of the Elbe Duchies. He considered that the war "with all its attendent good, must be regarded as a most lamentable and unfortunate event, for its evils in the eyes of a by-stander entirely overshadow the good,"(230) but declared that his convictions were largely with the Danes "and without bias, for I have lived as long in Germany as in Denmark." He claimed that his fondness for the German people was equal to his fondness for the Danes, but believed the German governments "worthy of blame ... in the Duchies." While he disapproved of the Danish hatred of "every person or thing of or belonging to Germany,"(231) he also expressed great admiration for their courage. He represented Danes as being "intelligent, patriotic, active and if sometimes unreasonable [towards Germany] not unnaturally so."(232)

Richard Cobden

Richard Cobden, described by John Morley as being, in 1848, better qualified to advise on British foreign policy than any other man,(233) was also interested in the Schleswig-Holstein conflict. He called it "that

(231) Ibid., I, p. 48.
(232) Ibid., I, p. 231.
most complicated of all questions.\(^{(234)}\) This well-known advocate of free trade had visited several cities in north Germany in 1847, including Berlin, Stettin and Danzig.\(^{(235)}\) While there he made friends with a number of Germany's leading economists who were citizens of Zollverein states who supported Cobden's ideas on free trade. Conversations with men such as Johann Eichhorn, Prussian Minister of Public Instruction, and Gustav Kühne, one of the founders of the Zollverein,\(^{(236)}\) possibly helped him to think that Prussia would be willing to agree to more liberal trade agreements with Great Britain.

When war did break out and Members of Parliament, such as Disraeli,\(^{(237)}\) were urging Palmerston to come to the aid of the Danes because of the Guarantee of 1720 and because the war had interrupted much British commerce with Germany, Cobden urged the Foreign Minister to mediate rather than fight. He realized the great importance of the trade of Hamburg and the German Baltic ports to Britain, but felt that Palmerston "would best meet the wishes of the manufacturing community if he could with honour maintain his present pacific posture of mediator." Cobden had urged this approach to him with a delegation of businessmen from Manchester.\(^{(238)}\) He reasoned that

\(^{(234)}\) Ibid., II, p. 440.

\(^{(235)}\) Ibid., I, pp. 446-450.

\(^{(236)}\) Ibid., I, pp. 446-447.

\(^{(237)}\) See supra., pp. 77-80.

\(^{(238)}\) Palmerston, 25 Aug., 1848, Hansard, CI, p. 566.
England at war would be worse for free trade than England at peace in spite of the harm the blockade was causing.

Cobden was interested in the return of peace for economic reasons and in 1850 attended the Frankfurt Peace Congress held in St. Paul's Church, the same building in which the Frankfurt Parliament had sat earlier in the war.\(^{(239)}\) He recognized the sinister role that money played in the prolongation of wars. It was to a large measure through his leadership that the Peace Congress was induced to try to halt hostilities, like the one in the Duchies, by the prevention of financial loans to warring powers,\(^{(240)}\) and through the appointment of three members from the Congress to serve as peace mediators between the Danish and Schleswig-Holstein forces.\(^{(241)}\)

In three letters, all written in the first week of September, 1850, to John Cassell, who was the editor of *The Working Man's Friend*, a periodical which appeared in 1850,\(^{(242)}\) Cobden set out his attitudes to the settlement of the war. He was particularly disturbed by Palmerston's role in

\(^{(239)}\) Morley, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 82-83.

\(^{(240)}\) William Harbutt Dawson, *Richard Cobden and Foreign Policy, a Critical Exposition, with Special Reference to our Day and Its Problems* (London, 1926), p. 126. On Cobden and the resolutions of the Peace Conference pertaining to the Danish-German War, see British Museum, Add. MS. 43668, Fol. 102, Cobden to Cassell, Sussex, 6 Sept., 1850.


adding Britain's name to the countries who signed the London Protocol of 1850, and declared to Cassell:

We have alienated the best part of Germany by joining Russia and France in this intervention, and for no other useful purpose that I can see so far as we are concerned. Excuse me for saying it— but your foreign policy articles are sadly inconsistent. On the one hand you agree with the Peace Congress in condemning intervention, and on the other you excuse Palmerston for outraging the principle of non-intervention, and the only argument I can find in your article to justify it is that to prevent Russia doing wrong alone— we must join in the wrong doing! There is no iniquity which might be justified on such a principle. (243)

In addition to criticising the British Government's intervention in the affairs of the Duchies through the signing of the London Protocol, Cobden's second letter expressed outright sympathy for the German side. He reasoned that "if there can be a nation on the Continent with which we might fairly expect to maintain an amicable feeling it is Germany— especially liberal protestant Germany and it is precisely the latter portion of that empire which we have alienated from us by our intervention in the Schleswick-Holstein affair. What end have we to gain by our protocols to compensate for this loss of German heart which is the heart of Europe?" (244) In his third letter, he was especially critical of Palmerston and the form of mediation which had led to Britain becoming a signer of the London Protocol. (245)

Cobden also criticised British intervention via the London Protocol in a letter to Bunsen. He wrote: "We are a pugnacious, arrogant, dictatorial,
intermeddling people, always ready to take up any body's quarrel and inclined even to take offence if other people venture to go to loggerheads without asking us to take a part in the fray." (246) In reply, Bunsen expressed his gratitude to Cobden for his sympathetic efforts on behalf of Germany at Frankfurt, and assured him that his remarks "gave satisfaction and unmixed pleasure to all with whom I was to converse on those subjects so dear to every German patriot." Bunsen was also optimistic that because of Cobden's work at the peace conference "some way will be found out of this bloody labyrinth." (247)

In this letter Bunsen also mentioned Gervinus, (248) a professor at Heidelberg when the war began who became a member of the Frankfurt Parliament. (249) At the suggestion of the Prussian diplomat, these two men corresponded in October, 1850. Gervinus, on a trip to London at this time, tried to win Cobden's aid in securing a loan for the Schleswig-Holstein government, but Cobden remained consistent in his principle of British non-intervention in the conflict, and refused the German professor his support by answering:

I beg to assure you that it is with regret that I cannot in any way be a party to your suggestion for raising a loan for the Schleswig-Holstein government. I am opposed to the principle of raising war loans in neutral countries for the purpose of

(248) Ibid., loc. cit.
(249) Georg Gottfried Gervinus, Introduction to the History of the Nineteenth Century, with a Brief Notice of the Author ... (London, 1853), p. X.
assisting belligerents to protract hostilities which might otherwise cease from the exhaustion of the contending parties. It is intervention in the very worst shape. I am sorry that the Danes were allowed to borrow £800,000, chiefly I believe in this market [Britain] last year, during the suspension of hostilities. Had the loan been raised during time of active war, I should certainly have made a public protest against it, and I am bound however much my sympathies may be on the side of the Schleswig-Holsteiners to apply the same principle to both parties. (250)

It may be concluded that Cobden throughout the war supported as little British involvement as possible. He demonstrated this by refusing to support the call for intervention under the terms of the Guarantee of 1720, preferring to suffer a Danish blockade of German coasts rather than enter the conflict to halt this obstruction to British trade, objecting to the loaning of funds to Denmark by England in 1849, refusing to support Gervinus's request for British financial aid to Germany the following year, and opposing Britain's agreement to the London Protocol in 1850. I have not found evidence that Cobden wished German annexation of the Duchies, but he did favour the Schleswig-Holsteiners in their war against Denmark. Probably he believed their economic interests lay more with those of the German States than with those of the Helstat.

Richard Monckton Milnes

A second British man-of-letters who expressed sympathy for the Germans in the Duchies was Richard Monckton Milnes. Milnes was born in 1809 at London. He graduated from Trinity College, Cambridge, and later attended the University of Bonn and travelled widely throughout Germany and other countries of Europe. His father was a well-to-do country gentleman whose family had been actively engaged in the cloth trade, (251) and this source probably provided him with funds to study abroad. He became a Member of Parliament in 1837 and belonged to the liberal wing of the conservative party. He was very interested in Continental politics (252) and sympathized with the liberal movements there in 1848. (253)

Milnes acquired a love for Germany while a student at Bonn in 1830. This feeling was renourished on visits to Berlin in 1845 (254) and 1850. (255) In addition he had formed a very close friendship with the Bunsen family. From 1831, the Bunsens had been a "constant Prussian element" in his life and the Baron enjoyed his deep respect. (256) It can be assumed that these


(253) "Milnes," D.N.B., XIII, p. 467; see Milnes, op. cit., passim.


(256) Ibid., p. 176.
attachments helped to influence his pro-German sympathies in 1848-50.

On the assistance given by the German States to the inhabitants of the Duchies, Milnes observed: "The interference of Germany, in Denmark, arose from the presumed incompatibility of the characters of the King of Denmark and a German Prince [Augustenburg], and the supposed necessity of either closely incorporating those provinces in the new Confederation of Germany, or separating them altogether from it, against their will." (257) He justified the military intervention of Prussia as having been made in response to a request by the natives of Schleswig and Holstein, and insisted that such an intervention should not be confused with a war of "conquest or oppression." (258) Milnes warned Germany that the commercial interests of Britain were vitally concerned in the establishment and maintenance of peace on the Continent, (259) but the results of the war which the German people had to accept, were to him in 1851, "not encouraging." (260)

(257) Milnes, op. cit., p. 59.

(258) Ibid., loc. cit.


(260) Hennessy, Milnes (1851-1885), p. 13. Another British historian with a strong love for Germany was Thomas Carlyle. Carlyle, with whom Milnes frequently corresponded, described in 1849 the "Sleswicker" as being "dreadfully hunted" and as becoming "ever more desperate." See Thomas Carlyle's, Collected Works, Latter-Day-Pamphlets (London, 1850), p. 125. In spite of his own disappointment over Prussia after the war, Milnes wrote to Carlyle that the Prince Consort, well known for his ardent feelings for the unification of the German peoples, was taking the defeat very well. See National Library of Scotland, Carlyle Collection, 1851-1881, MS. 666, Fol. 70, Milnes to Carlyle, 9 July, 1851.
It is very clear that nearly all of the British men-of-letters who commented at any length on the Schleswig-Holstein conflict were pro-Danish. Twiss disproved the main German arguments, including the "inseparability" theory. Laing and Cayley expressed contempt for the Frankfort Parliament's attempt to annex the Duchies and believed that the area was far too valuable to be allowed to fall permanently into the hands of a united Germany. Stephens favoured Denmark because of English ethnic and linguistic ties to that country. Napier wished to maintain the Helstat in tact because he feared that the balance of power might be disturbed. Reeve and Alison favoured the Danes principally because they were against revolutions, and Hamilton felt right was on the side of Denmark, but tried to show some sympathy for the Germans as well.

Cobden and Milnes adopted a more favourable attitude to the Germans. They insisted that the Schleswig-Holsteiners had requested Prussian aid; the war was therefore not one of aggression or expansion on Germany's part, but one of assistance to fellow Germans living in the Duchies who had called for help against Danish oppression. Cobden's efforts for peace appear to have been made, however, to a large degree because the war interrupted free trade.

Finally, many men-of-letters with significant German friendships and
interest, such as Sir David Brewster (261) and George Grote (262) unfortunately failed to record their attitudes to the question. The attitudes of the British men-of-letters can thus be concluded as predominantly on the side of Denmark in her efforts to retain the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.

(261) Brewster won at least four German honoury distinctions: one of these, the Chevalier of the Order of Merit, he received from Frederick William IV of Prussia in 1847, only one year prior to the outbreak of war with Denmark. See Mrs. Margaret Brewster Gordon, The Home Life of Sir David Brewster (Edinburgh: 1869), p. 190.

(262) Some of Grote's ancestors came from Bremen to Britain about 1750. He mastered the German language, and showed great interest in early German history and in German literary figures, such as Goethe, Lessing and Schiller. See, M.L. Clarke, George Grote, A Biography (London: 1962), pp. 8-9, 17; George Grote, The Personal Life of George Grote, Compiled from the Family Documents ..., ed. by Mrs. Harriette Grote (London: 1873), p. 1.
British attitudes to the Danish-German conflict as recorded in newspapers, periodicals, speeches by Members of Parliament, letters and memorials to the Foreign Office, and statements by men-of-letters were overwhelmingly pro-Danish.

Many editorials were devoted to the subject, not only in large circulating newspapers like The Times, but also in provincial papers of all political sympathies, like the conservative Hull Packet, the liberal John O'Groat Journal, the radical Manchester Guardian and the non-partisan Edinburgh Evening Courant, and few showed any sympathy for the German cause. (1) Less was written in periodicals, but what was, was equally critical of the Schleswig-Holsteiner. Writers for the moderate Tory Fraser's, the high Tory Blackwood's and the Whig Edinburgh Review all condemned their uprising against Frederik VII as well as the assistance given to them by Prussia. (2) At the same time, they praised the gallantry of Denmark's defenders. (3) Benjamin Disraeli and David Urquhart were the leading speakers on the war in Parliament, and each opposed the German arguments. (4) Richard Cobden and Monckton Milnes expressed sympathy for the Schleswig-Holstein cause. (5)

(1) See supra., Chapter IV, passim.
(2) See supra., pp. 150-153, 163-164.
(3) See supra., pp. 153-154, 163-165.
(4) See supra., pp. 77-81.
(5) See supra., pp. 219-221, 223.
but most men-of-letters, such as Travers Twiss, Samuel Laing, Andrew Hamilton, George Stephens and Henry Reeve sided with Denmark. (6) Besides condemning Frederick William IV as having no legal right to the Duchies and seeking merely to avert attention from the Berlin riots in March, many of these writers feared that the real reason for Prussia's crossing of the Elbe and the Eider was her desire to gain a long North Sea coast including the mouth of the Elbe, and valuable seaports on the Baltic, especially Kiel. (7)

The threat that this conflict could broaden into a general European war worried many British observers. The press for example often condemned Prussia for her disregard of the possible consequence for Europe of her invasion; The Times believed that Prussia's invasion might lead Russia to intervene, (8) while The Observer declared that Sweden had as much right to enter on the side of Denmark as Prussia had to enter on behalf of Germans living in the Duchies. (9) Some also feared that if Russia entered the war against Germany, so would France. Even if things went no further than Prussia's seizure of the Duchies, the balance of power in northern Europe it was pointed out would be disturbed. And if Russia and France joined in and defeated Prussia, the balance of power on the continent would be even

(7) See supra., pp. 92, 157, 163, 189-190, 196.
(8) See supra., pp. 116-117.
(9) See supra., p. 118.
more seriously threatened. Thus Palmerston was often urged to try to halt German aggression against the Helst immediately the war enlarged any further.

The Foreign Minister came into conflict with Queen Victoria and Prince Albert almost as soon as the war had broken out. While the first loyalties of the couple were to Britain, Victoria's close relationships to many of the German Royal Houses and the Prince's background made them sympathetic to the German aspiration. Albert wished for a unification of the Germanies under the leadership of Prussia. He hoped that such a unification could include all German-speaking areas, and since most of the people living in the Elbe Duchies spoke German, they he thought should likewise be involved. Palmerston resisted the numerous attempts made by the Court to win him to this point-of-view.

The British Guarantee of Schleswig to the King of Denmark in 1720 evoked considerable comment in Britain in 1848-50. Newspapers, such as The Times and The Morning Post, thought Britain honour bound to assist Denmark in maintaining possession of Schleswig against the invaders. Disraeli on at least two occasions in Parliament declared that Britain

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(10) See supra., pp. 119-120.
(12) See supra., pp. 68-69.
(13) See supra., pp. 59, 61, 63-65, 71.
(14) See supra., pp. 105-106.
owed to Denmark the protection of the Duchy from foreign intruders.\(^{(15)}\)

Even Palmerston reminded the Queen that if the 1720 Guarantee were admitted to be in force, according to the Danish interpretation, Great Britain would be compelled to enter the war against Germany.\(^{(16)}\) Cobden urged Palmerston to mediate rather than fight.\(^{(17)}\) But other men-of-letters such as Napier, described his policy as "causing Britain to be false to her engagements with Denmark;"\(^{(16)}\) Laing thought a British expeditionary force should have been sent to Denmark;\(^{(19)}\) and Twiss drew special attention to the obligations of Britain to assist Frederik VII after the invasion of Schleswig.\(^{(20)}\) Palmerston’s organ, The Globe, published three editorials which commented favourably on Twiss’s conclusions;\(^{(21)}\) still, the Foreign Minister preferred to act in the role of a peacemaker rather than commit Britain to involvement in a continental war.

The Danish blockades of the north German ports during the conflict drew much comment from the British press and were of great concern to traders in the Baltic and North Seas, many of whom petitioned Palmerston.\(^{(22)}\) Most

\(^{(15)}\) See supra., pp. 78, 80.
\(^{(16)}\) See supra., p. 61.
\(^{(17)}\) See supra., p. 217.
\(^{(18)}\) See supra., p. 201.
\(^{(19)}\) See supra., pp. 183–184.
\(^{(22)}\) See supra., pp. 39–54.
British subjects realized that because Denmark relied more on her navy than her army, she had been forced into this course of action to counter-balance the superiority of Germans on land. They realized also that the disruption of their trade to northern Europe caused by the blockade was the result of the German invasion of the Duchies. While the blockade in 1848 injured many British merchants and seamen financially, the one in 1849 hurt even more. It was at this point that Danish sympathy in Britain reached its lowest ebb during the war. (23) Still, it is significant that petitions to the Foreign Office did not contain much criticism of the Danes. The blockade was lifted in the late summer of 1849, but Palmerston continued to receive memorials well into 1850, calling for him to use his full powers to see that no such further impairments would occur. (24)

Besides the blockades, the Zollverein with its high tariff barriers against foreign goods, also irritated many Britons. Should the Elbe Duchies fall into Prussian hands, this area would undoubtedly become part of the economic union. (25) The same fate would probably it was feared befall the important Hansa city of Hamburg, through which so much British trade passed. (26)

Indeed, some thought that if the Duchies fell under the economic control of

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(23) See supra., pp. 42-53, 100-104.
(24) See supra., pp. 53-54.
(26) See supra., pp. 31-32.
Germany much of Scandinavia might follow. (27) Thus it was, in the minds of many British merchants, clearly in Britain's interest that Denmark should retain the Duchies. The remarkable increase in Anglo-Danish trade in the 1840's also probably strengthened this attitude. (28)

The Frankfurt Parliament's involvement in the Schleswig-Holstein Question was also strongly criticized in Britain. Newspapers, periodicals and men-of-letters condemned it for urging German troops from outside the Duchies, particularly from Prussia, to attack the Helstat. They also ridiculed the vacillations of this body when it first rejected the Malmö Truce, and then, only a few days later, accepted it. (29) Even the Queen described its members as lacking in common sense. (30) And some British sources, like The Observer, judged the Parliament to be guilty of aggression in the Danish Duchies when they should have been more occupied with the difficult task of trying to unify the various German States. (31)

Professors and students of German universities were severely censured by the British press and by men-of-letters. The professors, many of whom took part in the proceedings at Frankfurt, were blamed for their promotion of the doctrine of Schleswig-Holsteinism; (32) while the student-soldiers,

(28) See supra., p. 37.
(30) See supra., p. 61.
(31) See supra., p. 123.
most of whom were members of the German free-corps, were thought of as glory-seeking adventurers who plundered the property of innocent civilians, but who made poor soldiers on the battlefield.\(^{33}\) On the other hand, the bravery of the usually outnumbered Danish land forces received much praise in Britain.\(^{34}\)

The recorded reactions to the battles of the war further emphasize the strong pro-Danish sympathies of most Britons. For example, much sorrow was expressed over the heavy losses in men and ships suffered by the Danes during their naval attack on Eckernförde.\(^{35}\) But when Denmark won important land battles, such as at Fredericia\(^{36}\) and Idstedt,\(^{37}\) and withstood the Schleswig-Holsteiner's siege at Friedrichstadt those commenting on these events appeared well-pleased.\(^{38}\) There was the feeling that Denmark was the underdog struggling against a much larger adversary.\(^{39}\)

In spite of the disbanding of most of the Schleswig-Holstein army after its failure at Friedrichstadt, much of the British press and several men-of-letters continued to censure the Germans.\(^{40}\) One reason was that a number of Prussian officers remained in the Duchies and could be used to lead new revolts even though Prussia and Denmark had signed a

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\(^{34}\) See supra., pp. 134-135, 164, 188, 197.

\(^{35}\) See supra., pp. 189, 197-198, 204, 214.

\(^{36}\) See supra., pp. 131-134, 164, 197, 214.

\(^{37}\) See supra., pp. 134-137, 164, 189, 197.

\(^{38}\) See supra., pp. 137-138, 164, 189, 197.

\(^{39}\) See supra., pp. 73, 132, 139, 163-164, 182, 195.

\(^{40}\) See supra., pp. 142-143, 163-164, 186, 189.
peace treaty. (41) Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort, however, continued to sympathize with the German side, and the Queen even pleaded on behalf of the Schleswig-Holsteiners in her speech at the opening of Parliament in 1851. (42)

Although British sentiment was undoubtedly partial to Denmark, with the cessation of hostilities people began to forget the misfortunes of the war. They were generally content with the results.

(41) See supra., pp. 138, 142, 189.
(42) See supra., pp. 65–66.
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