R.H. Tawney's Theory of Equality:

A Theological and Ethical Analysis

Simon John Robinson

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University of Edinburgh

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I, Simon John Robinson, declare that the following thesis was composed by me, and is my own work.

Signature:
Acknowledgements

Writing a part-time thesis involves ample amounts of joy and of pain. The joy is in discovering different parts in the 'kingdom of ideas' and in mapping out routes to them. The pain is borne of frustration and fatigue when reaching dead ends or having to juggle with pressing timetables.

I have to thank several people for enabling me to experience the joy, and get through the pain. Firstly, I must thank my supervisors, Duncan Forrester, Alex Robertson and Robin Gill, for their searching questions, constant encouragement, and good humour.

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Simon Robinson
August, 1989
Abstract

The first part of this thesis sets out the meaning and justification of equality in Tawney's writing (chapters one and two).

The complex view of equality which this uncovers is seen to withstand the majority of ethical and theological criticisms (chapter three), and to be distinctive in relation to Christian and Socialist views (chapter four).

Tawney's view is then set in a wider context. First, the influence of this view of equality is examined both in theological and socialist writers. In this, it is argued that whilst there is broad evidence of a Tawney tradition, there are important differences in terms of equality in the writers which followed Tawney. These involve both fundamental differences and modifications or developments.

Secondly, Tawney's view is compared to recent views of both marginal and global equality. It is argued that the meaning and justification of equality as seen from Tawney's writings is more compelling than such views.

The thesis concludes that despite some flaws in Tawney's view of equality, it has an important contribution to make both to the theology and philosophy of equality, and that the Christian concept of equality should be more rigorously developed and defended both at a theoretical and practical level.

Number of words in text: approximately 98,000
Introduction

The views of commentators on Tawney's writings about equality are many and varied.

Edwards suggests that 'Equality' 'simply sets out the disadvantages of the class system.' 1 By implication, there is no systematic statement or coherent theory of equality. 2 Others refer to his classic statement of the ideal of equality. 3 Edwards suggests that 'Equality' was very influential both with the Labour Party and post war New Conservatism. 4 Hobsbawm, on the other hand, suggests that the 'actual influence' of Tawney's ideas on equality 'is much less easy to pin down.' 5 For some, this is a comment on the lack of distinctiveness of Tawney's views. Hence, Tawney's position was 'claimed' by many different groups. 6 Against this, some argue that Tawney has a distinctive position in the development of liberal equality. 7 Finally, there are those who would argue that in some way or other, Tawney's view of equality is no longer relevant. 8 Against this are those who find 'Equality' still the finest account of the subject. 9

There are many possible reasons for such widely differing views of Tawney's equality:-

a) Tawney was not a systematic thinker. His college tutor referred to him as a brilliant but chaotic thinker. 10 He disavowed any skills in theology or philosophy and disliked the pursuit of abstract concepts or a theology not grounded in life or everyday meaning. 11
In particular, he was suspicious of any intellectual activity which compartmentalized life in general and morality in particular. Given this, it may be that it is easy to interpret Tawney in different ways and that his influence is not so much due to any sustained ideas or developed theory, and more to their style and moral vigour.

b) In some cases, the judgements on Tawney's equality may be due to straightforward misunderstandings of his overall position or what it implied. Thus, for example, Joseph and Sumption argue that equality, by definition, is a concept which will lead to uniformity, however well intentioned are writers such as Tawney. As shall be seen below (Chapter 3), this view ignores much of Tawney's writing, in particular the implication of equality for democracy.

c) Equality itself, it may be argued, is a concept, by nature, difficult to categorize, open to many different interpretations. Thus, J.F. Stephen could write that equality is 'a word so wide and so vague as to be, by itself, without meaning.'

Tawney himself acknowledges that 'equality possesses a variety of divergent meanings', it is 'an arithmetical metaphor for a relation between human beings, and the interpretation to be placed on it varies from age to age.'

Rae, in an analysis of the logical structure of equality argues that there are at least one hundred and eight different possible definitions of equality as a social principle. Given the risk of misunderstanding involved in the use of the term, Atherton questions its worth as a social principle at all. Thus, the
very openness of the concept may have contributed to commentators misunderstanding, or reading into Tawney's view, different meanings of the term equality.

This thesis aims to demonstrate that despite Tawney's lack of system, he was aware of the theological and philosophical difficulties surrounding the term equality, and that in his total writings, elements of a systematic view can be found, which he does attempt to justify (chapters 1 and 2). Chapter 2 will also examine whether Tawney's equality had a distinctively Christian character, i.e., whether it is dependent upon elements of its deontological justification for its meaning, or whether he used equality as a conscious bridge between faith and practice in society (similar to the middle axiom method). Chapters 3 and 4, acknowledging that Tawney's view spans Christian morality, Socialist policy and philosophy, will examine the validity and distinctiveness of Tawney's equality. They will include an examination of the major criticisms of his theory and areas where it may require development. Chapters 5 and 6 will examine the influence of Tawney's idea of equality in Christian and socialist circles. Chapters 7 and 8 will examine the relevance of Tawney's views to recent egalitarian debates, both about the justification of equality as a social principle, and its implications.

The conclusion of the thesis will be that Tawney's view of equality as such, is not as influential as many writers have assumed, but that it is very relevant to modern debates of an egalitarian nature. I argue that equality remains an important social principle, and that it requires a view and justification such as Tawney's to sustain it. I further argue for specific
developments in terms of participatory and distributional equality which are both implicit in Tawney's writings, but which also deal with the difficulties in his theory of equality.

My reasons for concentrating upon equality are two-fold. Firstly, there has been a paucity of writing since Tawney which concentrates on equality and relates it to theology. The last major work was 'Equality and Excellence' by David Jenkins. Any continuing debate has been largely in the field of philosophy and sociology. Secondly, with reference to equality, most writers make mention of Tawney, without a detailed examination of his views. Even the analysis of Gutmann, which places Tawney in the history of liberal equality, fails to appreciate either his views on participatory or distributional equality, or his strengths in relation to the modern debate and in particular, the egalitarianism of Rawls.

Other writers, of course, have examined Tawney in greater detail, but from the perspective of his total output, rather than the concept of equality. These writings include an examination of Tawney and socialism and Tawney as a Christian Social Moralist. During this thesis, it will be argued that such studies, whilst most valuable in their amassing of material, have tended to under-estimate the importance of equality in Tawney's thought.

This thesis will therefore attempt to cover the gap of the detailed study of Tawney's theory of equality, its origins and justification, its distinctiveness, influence and present-day relevance. It approaches the task in the knowledge that
Tawney's writings are not systematic and that therefore, what may be gleaned from them is, at best, the outline of a theory, which may require further developments. Nonetheless, in placing order on Tawney's writings, it is hoped to demonstrate how significant they are in the development of the idea of equality. In doing this, I hope to contribute to the rehabilitation of equality in social and theological terms.
Chapter 1  Tawney's Theory of Equality

For Tawney there is an intimate link between meaning and justification in equality. In order to fully understand his definition of equality, one has to examine his presuppositions about human nature, society, the state and the grounds for these. In the interests of clarity, however, this thesis will examine the two categories separately. Chapter one will discuss the definition of equality and chapter two the grounds for Tawney's view.

Given the different meanings that equality as a social principle can be invested with, Rae argues that the categories of equality of condition, outcome, means etc. are inadequate for an analysis of the logic of equality, and thus for any detailed examination of meaning.  

Rae suggests, therefore, five categories that may be used in examining any definition:-

The subject of equality
The value of equality
Equality of opportunity
The domain of equality
The degree of equality (absolute or relative).

It is these categories which will be used during the first chapter in attempting a detailed examination of Tawney's view of equality.

The Subject of Equality

Rae identifies three possible subjects of equality - the individual, the segment, and the 'bloc'. Simple individual regarding equality claims equality for one class of equals, each
to be the equal of every other within that class. Segmental equality requires equality within various sub-groups, for example, the equality which exists within but not between the various military ranks. 'Bloc-regarding' equality demands equality between classes, for example, between blacks and whites. Tawney's equality is of the first of these categories. Firstly, equality is demanded for all individuals i.e. Tawney's class is inclusive of all humanity. Thus, he refers to the 'supreme value of the individual.' Secondly, equality is seen primarily in terms of equality of respect, the recognition 'that all men, merely because they are men, are of equal value.' Thirdly, however, Tawney also argues for simple - individual regarding equality with respect to the conditions of civilization i.e. 'complete environmental equality in respect of the external conditions of health, education and economic security.' With the individual so important, Tawney was unable to fully accept utilitarianism as the basis of morality. This was certainly a 'good first approximation', but was ultimately unacceptable 'precisely because the convenience of the majority could involve injustice to the minority', and no amount of convenience to the majority could justify such treatment of the minority. From one perspective, Tawney was concerned about 'bloc-regarding equality', focusing on the poor and children. However, his concern was less to bring particular groups up to equality with other groups, and more to ensure that all received the necessary conditions of civilizations, including respect. Because of this, as shall be seen below, Tawney emphasized universal
distribution rather than selective, i.e. universal entitlement based upon need rather than upon membership of a particular group. With respect to 'blocs' or groups, Tawney was equally concerned about attitudes between groups and in particular, those which led to inadequate criteria for evaluating individuals such as wealth or status. Those were precisely not relevant grounds for evaluating individuals, because they ignored 'the common elements in human requirements.'

The Value of Equality

Rae's analysis contrasts two centres of value for equality, the lot or the person. The first sees the lot or good received as the focus of value, and argues that any individual should derive the same value from their lot as they would from any other person's lot. In effect, this defines equality as identity of lots, everyone receiving the same resources regardless of different claims. Lot regarding equality thus avoids all problems associated with the claims of individuals and tends to become an end in itself. Person-regarding equality, on the other hand, argues against identical treatment and defines equality in terms of the response to the different claims of individuals.

At times, Tawney appears to advocate a lot-regarding equality, especially in respect of health, education and economic security. However, he warns against seeing this as an end in itself, and especially against viewing increased material resources as 'the restoration of booty' and 'the great reform.' "What matters to a society' Tawney writes, 'is less what it
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'What matters to a society' Tawney writes, 'is less what it
owns than what it is and how it uses its possessions.' 41

Tawney also feared the effects of identical treatment, as reducing

'the variety of individual character and genius to a drab
and monotonous uniformity.' 42

Thus, equality of provision is not identity of provision, and

'is to be achieved not by treating different needs in the
same way, but by devoting equal care to ensuring that they are
met in the different ways most appropriate to them, as is
done by a doctor who prescribes different regimes for different
constitutions, or a teacher who develops different types of
intelligence by different curricula.' 43

Tawney's equality was thus person-regarding, accepting the many
and important natural differences between individuals 44 and
concerned to develop individual personality. 45 Such equality,
however, requires some 'basis for comparison', 46 which will
enable distribution to take account of relevant differences.
Rae's analysis points to three such bases:--

individual utility,

ends and

needs 47

The first of these bases comparison upon the needs of the
individual, with the individual himself as sole judge of the
utility of any good received.

Ends-based comparisons refers to publicly stated ends or aims
to which individuals commit themselves. This is concerned
less with the attainment of, or instrument for attaining such
ends, and more with the admissibility of ends. As such, it
involves the principle of neutrality ie.

'that no individual's conception of the good is better than
that asserted by his fellow citizens.' 48.
Thus, all ends are equally acceptable, unless they lead to the violation of another's autonomy. 49 In addition to this, it must be noted that some ends-based writers see equal respect for self-declared ends, and thus individual autonomy or privacy, as not simply an end itself, but also a means to an end i.e. to encourage individuals to develop self reliance and avoid dependence. 50

The third base of comparison returns to needs, with the difference from the first that individual requirements 'are determined by knowledgeable third parties.' 51 In this case, the specified needs become the criteria for distribution. This does not exclude some form of merit being used as criterion of distribution.

Tawney's equality is radically at odds with the first of these bases, but contains significant elements of the other two, especially the last.

1. For Tawney, subjective judgements are only acceptable within a moral framework. 52 He writes as a Christian social moralist, 53 and views equality of respect not as one amongst many principles, but as the fundamental moral principle:

'The essence of all morality is that every human being is of infinite importance'. 54

From this 'unashamedly ethical' base, Tawney can accept disagreements about the methods of applying principles, but not 'variety in standards as to fundamental standards of conduct'. 55 The latter involves the possession of 'a common moral ideal' which is essential for harmony. 56
Several points must be noted here:-

a) Tawney argued that this basic moral principle of equality of respect applied to all disciplines and situations.  

b) This leads Tawney often to take the stance of a teacher. Far from relying upon subjective judgements about needs, he looks to the acceptance of leadership and authority. Progress itself depends upon 'a willingness on the part of the mass of people to recognize genuine superiority, and to submit to its influence'  

For Tawney then, there was a proper subordination, necessary if order was to be maintained. This subordination was both functional and moral.  

c) Equality of respect as put forward by Tawney differs markedly from the formal principle of equality. The latter simply asserts that equal treatment should be presumed unless there is sufficient reason for not doing so. As such, the formal principle does not directly inform the practice of equality or the criteria of distribution. Not only does this leave the principle open to criticisms of being otiose, but as shall be seen below, leaves the principle of equality of respect open to a minimalist interpretation.  

Tawney's equality of respect however, is defined in terms of 'care' or 'consideration', and as such it is close in meaning to the concept of agape. Whilst Tawney does not use this concept specifically, he does quote with approval, Temple's words
'to love another person is to desire that they should be themselves.' 68

Whilst such a principle is too general to apply to particular action, it nonetheless does have both a commitment to the ultimate good of the individual and a concern for the relational dimension of equality referred to by Tawney as 'a spiritual relation' or 'a spirit of humanity and freedom in social relations.' 69

Thus, 'relations between human beings' which involved the right moral attitude towards others, were as important to equality as the distribution of commodities. 70

d) The principle of equality of respect (also referred to as the 'humanist spirit') actually generates and informs two major principles - liberty and fraternity, which form the two central ends or objectives of society. Thus, Tawney writes of the humanist spirit as aiming to liberate and cultivate the powers which make for energy and refinement. Liberty becomes the primary political good, 72 and the aim of social organization to liberate individuals to develop their capacities in 'growth towards the perfection of individual human beings.' 73

Perfection here does not refer to some ideal or moral standard, but to the individual achieving his or her potential. 74 Fellowship for Tawney is something 'ultimate and profound,' 75 which social organization and the attitudes behind it must not be allowed to obscure or discourage. As shall be seen below, these two principles are rarely if ever used by Tawney in isolation or as
individual ends. Both arise out of equality of respect and both are necessary. It will also be noted that equality in any form other than equality of respect, for example distributional or participatory equality is never seen as an end in itself. Such equality is rather an instrumental principle, for example, a means of achieving liberty or of guarding against division. Thus Tawney stands out against a simply calculative view of distributional equality. The twin aims of freedom and fellowship thus provide a 'regulative function' with regard to any social, and specifically egalitarian, policies. It must be noted, however, that whilst Tawney uses the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity in this way, he does on occasion simply lump the three together, without distinguishing their relationship to each other, which can lead to confusion.

2. Tawney stood out against ends-based comparison, arguing that examination of ends and their admissibility is inadequate without examining their consequences, and that not all ends are equally acceptable. Nonetheless, Tawney showed the concern of ends-based writers for the development of a critical humanism, the autonomy of the individual, the development of self-reliance and enterprise, and a fear of coercion both physical and ideological. Thus, he sought the cultivation of an 'independence of spirit' and 'free initiative and the power of self-direction, as against polite obedience.' At one point, Tawney explicitly defines freedom as 'the right of men to live their own lives and
express their own personalities.' 85 This included neither giving in to the 'dependence and subservience' 86 which were so often encouraged in, for example, industry, nor to the ideologically coercive power of 'infectious phrases' or 'insane ideologies masquerading as revelations.' 87

For Tawney however, freedom was not simply about the absence of disabilities, but the presence of abilities and 'freedom, to be complete, must carry with it not merely the absence of repression, but also the opportunity of self-organization.' 88

The following points must also be noted about Tawney's view of the concept of freedom:-

a) Freedom for Tawney was not an abstract concept 'divorced from the realities of specific time or place.' 89 Hence he writes of liberty as being made up of liberties, which in turn he divides into primary and secondary liberties. 90 The former, for example, freedom of worship, association etc. are counted as essential for all. Secondary liberties, for example, freedom to own the means of production 91 are not essential for all. Freedom for Tawney, is thus also never an absolute imperative, being always judged by its purpose, in particular how it contributes to the growth of the individual. 92

b) Freedom is a social concept in that any individual's freedom can affect another's. 'Freedom for the strong is oppression for the poor.' 93

In this, freedom is related to power and in particular, the power to control one's life in significant areas. 94
Such power is a function both of material resources and of the individual personality. Hence, material resources can either empower or enable individuals, or the lack of them deny power and thus freedom. Ultimately, however, the seat of power was, for Tawney, 'in the soul.' Here, Tawney's view of freedom begins to move to autonomy in the sense of maturity. Precisely because he sees such freedom as most important, he does not form a necessary link between poverty and lack of freedom. Thus, 'character can, no doubt, overcome circumstances.' However, experience suggests that the coercive effects of certain social organization will tend to diminish freedom. This is so in two ways. Firstly, certain economic relationships i.e. those which treated the individual as a means not an end tended to encourage 'subservience' and 'dependence' (the antithesis of the proper subordination above), which involved 'a complete loss of liberty.' In such relationships, the worker, for example, was often controlled by fear of loss of job. Such relationships do ultimately involve 'slavery' precisely because of the potential effects on the character and will of the individual. Thus certain economic relationships are 'in themselves preferable to others, irrespective of the wealth they confer.' Once again this stands out against a calculative or materialist view of equality of distribution.

The second coercive effect that Tawney feared was the denial of choice. Here, liberty was not identified simply
with increase in choice. For Tawney, freedom to choose involved the means of achieving the choice, and a choice which was meaningful and relevant. The latter is determined by duty - to the self, in terms of personal development, and to others, be it the basic obligation owed to all people or the duty involved in particular relationships, from family to community. Such relationships are not contractual but part of the social life of man and thus obligations cannot be simply ignored. Hence Tawney can refer to duties to the community which the individual 'does not choose and responsibilities created for him.'

The precise content of such duties is not prescribed by Tawney, indeed he argues that the individual should work out the implications of duties for themselves. It is precisely here that critical humanism has to be encouraged.

c) Given such a view of freedoms and coercion, Tawney argues that freedom cannot simply 'be willed' but requires planning. Such planning as shall be seen involves planning for responsible use of power, distribution of enabling material resources, and the encouragement and cultivation of critical humanism. The latter literally involved persuading 'men to be free.' Only such action could, for Tawney, begin to plan for freedom in terms of increased relevant choice.

d) Tawney sees negative freedom as a necessary but not sufficient condition for personal or moral freedom. His
concept of freedom, influenced by equality of respect, is far more complex, taking in the freedom to develop and the freedom to serve (duty to self and others). In all this, the agapaic understanding of equality of respect is strongly indicated. This is both in the balanced concern for the self and for others 112 and in the idea that freedom, in the sense of autonomy and subsequent fulfillment, is found precisely in service. 113 This further deepens the concept of subordination, from the recognition of superiority or functioning as the base of good order, to the moral concept of 'the essence of a good society.' 114 A 'good society' for Tawney is precisely that which allows individuals to fulfill duties to themselves and others. The conjunction of these two concepts of freedom and service also inextricably links the concepts of liberty and fellowship. 115 Given the link between equality of respect and liberty in Tawney, it is impossible to see the two as antithetical concepts. The same must be said of the relationship between liberty as an aim of equality of respect and equality of distribution and participation (equalizing measures) which are a means to that end. Thus Tawney can write of equality of distribution as being a 'condition' of liberty. 116 Indeed, liberty is 'equality in action, in the sense, not that all men perform identical functions or wield the same degree of power, but that all men are equally protected against the abuse of power, and equally entitled to insist that power should be used, not for personal ends, but for the general advantage.' 117
3. Tawney's most important base of comparison for person regarding equality is in terms of needs. Need can be divided into two categories:-

a) basic survival needs, 'such as light, fresh air, warmth, rest and food.' 118

b) emotional, spiritual and social needs. These were to do with relationships which held together family and local associations, the 'loyalties, affections, pious bonds between man and man which express a man's personality and become at once a sheltering place for his spirit and a kind of watch tower from which he may see visions of a more spacious and bountiful land.' 119

Neither of these areas of need were for Tawney determined by some 'knowledgeable third party.' 120 On the contrary, such a determination would tend to conflict with Tawney's view of the importance of freedom and the development of autonomy. In any case, such need is perceived by 'common experience', which involves rational reflection upon experience. 121

Both the levels of need are necessary conditions for the individual to develop his or her capacities and skills. Both are intimately linked to fellowship as well as freedom. Basic needs could only be supplied to all by co-operative, collective efforts, 122 whilst emotional and spiritual needs could only be fulfilled in community or fellowships. The means of fulfilling those needs, the strategy of equality, will be considered below. At this point several factors about the concept of fellowship in Tawney must be noted:-

a) As suggested above, fellowship and freedoms are intimately connected. The ignoring of social relationships in, for
example, economic matters is seen as a denial of freedom, and fellowship for Tawney is precisely the moral concept of right social relationships. The definition of right relationships involves once again a return to the concept of respect for self and others such as will develop 'self-respect, self-reliance, mutual confidence and enterprise.' 124 Such relationships discourage 'dependence and subservience' and avoid the 'ambulance work' of charity, which itself reinforces the old patterns of dependence. 125 Such fellowship was neither the romantic nor sentimental kind,126 nor that of a heaven on earth. 127 Moreover, given the importance of liberty to Tawney, fellowship could in no way be compulsory, only encouraged or facilitated. Fellowship for Tawney is an holistic concept which is both social and moral. It is the strong basis of agapic equality of respect which forms the link between freedom and fellowship, the two principles reflecting concern for the individual and concern for others. 128

b) Tawney's fellowship is inclusive, a necessary corollary of equality of respect. 129 Thus Tawney could not identify with sectional comradeship or sectional interests even of the Labour movement. He was apt to remind the Labour movement that the satisfaction of group or individual interests should not obscure the 'quality of life' in relationship. 130

c) Fellowship involves the idea of service. Terrill suggests that the concept in fact simply involves people
'being within reach of each other, with class status and wealth not dividing common humanity.' 131

This, however, is to confuse means and ends. In terms of strategy, Tawney advocated no more than a framework for fellowship i.e. egalitarian measures that would simply put individuals within reach precisely to avoid compulsory fellowship. Fellowship itself, however, is an ideal which involved service and which required development in local examples of 'community'. Thus Tawney argues for the 'substitution of service for the ideal of getting on.' 132

In both b) and c) something of the complexity of Tawney's view of fellowship can be discerned. The concept of fellowship as inclusive, whilst accepting the importance of 'belonging' and expressing and discovering identity in a group or community works against exclusive sectional views of fellowship. Such fellowship tends to emphasize bloc-regarding and lot-regarding equality. This has important moral consequences because such 'ends' tend to become predominant, excluding the higher moral principles of equality of respect, freedom and fellowship. 133 In that situation, equalizing measures become ends in themselves, no longer examples of an instrumental principle.

It is all the more important then to be clear about the meaning of fellowship for Tawney. His view, for instance, does not fit neatly into the Tonnies view of Gemeinschaft. He certainly accepts the importance of a society which shares benefits and misfortunes, encourages relationships and has a great sense of 'rootedness and order.' 134
However, even such a society can become exclusive, and Tawney wants to retain freedom within such a community, and service beyond it. This has particular reference to intermediate structures such as industry. 135 For Tawney, it is important for intermediate communities to be aware of their role and function vis-a-vis society, other groups, and social purpose in general. By implication therefore, Tawney has the same moral balance of self concern and other concern elevated to any discernible community (intermediate or not) - concern for community, but also concern for the community's role in society and its relationship with other groups. By further implication, the nature of fellowship itself, ie. whether it is inclusive or exclusive, will be affected by the balance given to moral considerations and in particular to equality of respect. 136

d) As noted above, fellowship is an end, or telos. However, it is not a straightforward end, with certain means or principles as purely instrumental to it. Thus, equalizing measures, do not, of themselves, produce fellowship. Emmett writes of two types of teleology. The first, A type refers to clearly achievable ends with particular means. Tawney often speaks of freedom in this light, in the sense of the provision of health, education, and economic welfare as providing basic freedoms. Fellowship, however, fits into Emmett's B type teleology, defined as
'a kind of activity where the manner of achieving it is a constituent part of the purpose.' 137

Such ends point to a style of life, so that one lives in
order to realize oneself, or express God's glory. In Emmett's words,

'One achieves such things...... in doing other things rather than by doing other things as means to achieving them.' 138

Fellowship falls into the B teleology for Tawney, precisely because it involves a way of life, with the development of relational virtues, and of commitment to and concern for others. 139 In one sense this also affects the concept of freedom, at least in so far as freedom is discerned or expressed in service. 140 So freedom does not always remain an A type telos. In another sense, it strongly affects the whole area of distributional equality. If fellowship is to be encouraged and developed, much will depend upon how resources are distributed, not simply that they are distributed in an equitable or just way.141

e) Alongside need as a straightforward criterion of distribution, 142 the idea of service and fellowship gives rise to a second criterion, that of function. This concept reveals Tawney as both moralist and realist. Firstly, reward for function refers to the service of a social purpose. 143 Once basic needs are met, this service should provide the basis for any differential rewards. This principle could be applied to property, industry and even rights. 144 It was as Terrill observed, a useful concept, for,

'since few people perform functions hundreds of times more socially valuable than other people, a system of rewards based upon social function is likely to be egalitarian.' 145
Moreover, whilst differences in renumeration might remain, these would not be heightened by 'the capricious inequalities of circumstances and opportunity.' 146

Secondly, the principle of function was also an acceptance of the need for incentive and reward for positions of greater responsibility. 147 Tawney was not thus demanding an entirely selfless society, and indeed accepted the fact that self interest had encouraged certain important values. 148 The major problem of self interest for Tawney, was when it became the major motivation, excluding other values, or actually perverting them. 149

Whilst needs were discerned in common experience, function was a criterion which depended upon accepted social purposes. Given the concerns for critical humanism, alongside acceptance of basic moral principles, the definition of social purposes became a process involving several strands:-

i) Tawney was concerned to trust the people and give them the responsibility for generating and expressing social purposes. 150 This was not the activity of discreet individuals but precisely a function of the community, because it involved developing commonly held attitudes and ideals. Thus the 'new culture' could be built of materials from the experiences and outlook on life, not of a leisured minority, but of the mass of the people.' 151

Hence Tawney was concerned for opportunities of participation and sharing of ideas in education and industry.
Democracy was thus a crucial element in Tawney's egalitarianism, not 'merely one of several alternative methods of establishing a socialist commonwealth', but 'an essential condition of such a commonwealth's existence.' 153

ii) Improving democracy would in itself allow the 'light of popular culture to shine through.' 154 Behind this common culture, Tawney argued for a moral consensus. Such a consensus had several elements to it. Certain fundamental principles were the 'common property of all Christian nations', in particular basic obligation to treat others as ends and not means. 155 Tawney details 'certain sorts of behaviour' which 'we know' to be right or wrong (the latter includes deception for profit, taking advantage of another's weakness) and which are all founded in the basic moral principle of equality of respect. 156 Such precepts are not only the product of tradition or conditioning but appraised 'as just by the conscience of mankind.' 157

Such a value consensus is, for Tawney, not a stable or static entity. It may suffer from the effects of a society which promotes interests above values. Moreover, it is a consensus as to basic moral values, not as to the precise means of applying them. 'New interpretations' of the principles in response to new circumstances are inevitable and to be encouraged. 160 It is precisely at this level within the context of the accepted broad
principles that critical humanism may operate and flourish. Notably, Tawney implies that the objective of equality of condition is included amongst the known principles. 161 It is the exact means of implementing that which could be open to discussion. 162 The consensus thus involves the basic moral principle of equality of respect, the twin ultimate objectives of liberty and fellowship, and the instrumental principle of equality of condition. Such 'equality of condition' includes both participatory equality and distributional equality. The former includes the development of democracy and opportunities to develop control of ones situation, the latter involves the re-distribution of life chances through education, health services and financial measures. 163

Nonetheless, there is a genuine ambivalence in Tawney about the consensus. At times he speaks of ordinary men as standing out against materialism, 164 as desiring proper respect for 'their' dignity as human beings 165 or of human nature demanding certain spiritual or relational ends. 166 At other times, he writes of a less optimistic view of man as 'all (having) a false philosophy of life.' 167 Thus, whilst wishing to respond to the ultimate intuition of the good in man, Tawney accepted that these were not always recognized by individuals themselves. 168

Even such a consensus is often limited to certain areas of application. Thus, just as slavery at one point was
seen to be outside the moral realm, industrial or economic fields, argues Tawney, are not judged from the standpoint of the basic moral principles. 169

iii) Given all this, Tawney argues for the need of a two pronged effort. Firstly, there is the need to articulate and maintain the basic principles which would sustain and develop consensus. Though Tawney was ambivalent about ideology, he argued that 'specific and distinctive aims' were necessary, providing both inspiration and a focus for unity, and a 'principle of limitation' i.e. clear criteria as to worth and success. 170

Central to all this, as shall be seen in chapter two is a concern for intelligibility and moral meaning, and a close connection between principles and praxis. 171

The second need was to provide the 'practical foundation of social organization' within which the 'ordinary decencies of human intercourse' could be nurtured. 172

Terrill argues that Tawney's writing shows a development away from 'philosophy to politics.' 173 In early writings, Tawney's concern was primarily with a social philosophy 'which would integrate man's knowledge of himself and society.' 174

Later, the argument goes, Tawney was concerned less with rightness of thinking and more with social cohesion and right structures for facilitating it. However, it would
be wrong to say that Tawney moved away from social philosophy to politics. He saw the disorders of modern society in organizational terms before the First World War, for example in his analysis of poverty as inequality, the product of social organization. 175

The need for reform of social organization was thus clear to Tawney from the beginning, and attempts at framing policies are evident before the Great War. 176 Equally, Tawney's later work is a strong appeal to principles as providing the necessary 'compelling motives for the sustained co-operative effort' which would appeal 'to the conscience and reason of all men of good will. 177

Tawney then, was always concerned for management by moral objectives, aware that success should not simply be judged by the effects of policy upon people but also in the light of stated aims - which themselves form the criteria of success. 178

In conclusion, Tawney's person-regarding equality is the focus of his theory of equality. Equality of respect (based upon equal value) forms the basis of his theory and acts as the fundamental moral principle. Understood in agapaic terms, this generates the twin aims of fellowship and freedom. It may be noted at this point that Terrill argues that fellowship is the ultimate end of all Tawney's writings. 179 This argument ignores the importance of freedom in Tawney's writings. As noted above, such freedom does have links with fellowship, and at one point there is the implication that freedom is to be found in service. 180
However, Tawney's emphasis on freedom remains conceptually distinct. Some writers also suggest that Tawney was happy with a plurality of middle level principles which he had distilled from his Christian position. I have argued above, that whilst Tawney writes sometimes in a loose way about the principles of freedom, equality and fellowship, that in fact, he has a clear idea of the relationship between these principles. His view means that any so called 'plurality' involves always seeing these principles in relation to each other, with fellowship and freedom growing out of equality of respect, and equality of condition (through participatory and distributional equality) being an instrumental principle. Participatory and distributional equality are linked by distribution of power. 131 This 'balancing' of principles, and clarity about their function works against any forms of essentialism i.e. pursuing any one principle at the expense of others. It also means, therefore, that such equality is more inclined towards appropriate responses to need i.e. ensuring that it remains person-centred. 182 In one sense then, the instrumental principle of equality, by aiming to enable the twin teleoi of equality of respect, is actually expressing equality of respect in society. In all of this, it has to be remembered that both fellowship and freedom have a high moral meaning, based upon the agapaic view of equality of respect. 183

This holistic view of equality is its strength, but, as shall be seen in chapter three is also a potential problem.
Equality of Opportunity

In Rae's third category, two forms of equality are distinguished:

i) **Prospect-regarding** which is exemplified by a lottery, where each person has the same prospect of achievement and nothing about the individual affects the result.

ii) **Means-regarding** where the same means of achievement is open to all, for example, the examination system. 184

Neither of these two concepts were acceptable to Tawney. Means regarding equality was made 'short work of by economic realities.' The existence of equality of opportunity, he argued, 'depends not merely upon the absence of disabilities, but on the presence of abilities....... In proportion, as the capacities of some are sterilized or stunted by their social environment, while others are favoured or pampered by it, equality of opportunity becomes a graceful but attenuated figure.' 185

For equality of opportunity to be even approximated, then it had to involve equalizing measures.

Prospect-regarding equality of opportunity had two problems for Tawney. Firstly, it set up scarce or limited goals as valuable with no moral justification for those goals. Indeed the motive for attaining such goals tends to be self advantage rather than for any social purpose. 186

Secondly, whilst Tawney was not against social mobility per se, 187 his concern was with the opportunity for the individual to develop as they are in the context of their capacities and moral relationships:

'Individual happiness does not only require that man should be free to rise to new positions of comfort and distinction; it also requires that they should be able to lead a life of dignity and culture, whether they rise or not, and that, whatever their position on the economic scale may be, it shall be such as if fit to be
This is precisely why Tawney argued for universal provision of education, and for methods of education which would enable all to develop the faculties which, because they are the attributes of man, are not the attributes of any particular class or profession of men. 189

Indeed, to restrict the goal of education to climbing 'from one position to another' would lead to a sterilization of talent. 190

Central to this is an idea of social solidarity which is based upon equal value. This idea 'which is the contribution of the working class to the social conscience of our age, has its educational as well as its economic applications. What it implies is not merely la carriere ouverte aux talents, indispensable though that is, but egalite de fait, not simply equality of opportunity but universality of provision.' 191

For Tawney, then, equality of opportunity was about equalizing measures and about the freedom for self-expression and development. The concept of equality of opportunity claiming an open road to individual advancement had been useful in the fight to remove political and legal inequalities, 192 but, with the individual as subject and person as value of equality in an era of different oppression and coercion, 193 equality had to be more far-reaching and positive. This meant a whole range of enabling provisions. 194

Degree and Domain of Equality

By degree of equality Rae distinguishes absolute or relative equality. Absolute equality means that every pair of subjects which is supposed to be equal is fully equal. Tawney could not accept absolute equality, largely because he did not perceive inequality per se to be wrong. He accepted natural inequalities of talent and capacity 195 and positively encouraged the
development of such differences. He also accepted inequalities of income based upon function. Tawney's concern was then with certain unacceptable inequalities:

a) extreme inequalities of property and income, with their functionless base. 196

b) inequalities of opportunity, based upon inequality of power. 197

c) inequality of power, often based upon extreme inequalities of wealth. 198 Though his major concern here was with the irresponsible use of such power. 199

d) inequality of status, based upon wealth or class. 200

All were unacceptable precisely because they either sustained social divisions and thus destroyed fellowship, or because they denied the individual freedom to develop or even to survive with dignity. 201 The latter points to a fifth unacceptable inequality that of e) the fulfillment of basic survival needs. Thus,

'even in childhood, different strata of the population are distinguished by sharp contrasts of environment, of health and of physical well being.' 202

Tawney sought to obtain greater equality in a) - d) (thus opting for relative equality) precisely to further his basic principles.

His approach to e) was in absolute egalitarian terms, arguing for 'complete environmental equality in respect of the external conditions of health, education and economic security.' 203

However, even this involved relative inequality in so much as 'equality of provision' did not entail 'identity of provision.' 204

Responding to the needs of the person, precisely demanded different treatment, or the provision of an environment in which different needs could be met, or the same broad needs met in ways appropriate
to different individuals. Thus, in one sense, person-centred equality, by definition, involved relative equality. Such relational relative equality differs from simply measures of relative equality, though as shall be seen, the two are not exclusive.

Rae's final category refers to the domain of equality, which is the classes of things allocated equally. Rae points to two ways of answering the question 'equal what?' Broad and narrow domains simply refer to the extent of equality, and Rae contrasts the narrow domain of Locke, Nozick etc., where equality is confined to certain limited goods, with the broad domain, as espoused by Socialism, which takes in economic and social rights as well.

A second distinction is both connected to the first, and more subtle. Marginal equality equalizes the domain of allocation ('the class of things that a given agent or agency controls for the purpose of allocation'), yet leaves the domain of account ('the class of things over which a given agent seeks equality') unequally divided, ignoring the residue between the domains. Global equality aims to promote equalization of a full domain of account - so that there is no residue between the domains. The means of achieving global equality are either compensatory (where the domain of allocation is divided unequally to offset inequalities in a larger domain of account) or redistributive (where domains of allocation are enlarged to cover domain of account, for example, the development of economic and social rights.)

In this category, Tawney is clearly advocating equality of broad and global domain. His domain of account involves equality of respect and its implications throughout society. The means of this were redistributive, with a distribution of basic rights.
and opportunities.

Tawney in fact seeks to extend political and legal rights to the economic and social sphere. However, such rights, whilst they must be an effective guarantee of freedom and apply to all, are neither simple nor absolute:

'The State has no absolute rights; they are limited by its commission. The individual has no absolute rights; they are relative to the function which he performs in the community of which he is a member.'

Tawney sums up by saying that all rights are

'conditional and derivative because all power should be conditional and derivative.'

The breakdown of society was precisely when rights were divorced from obligations which lead to defense of rights and thus private warfare. Rights must therefore ultimately be derived from the shared social purpose.

Significantly, however, fulfillment of obligations etc. was not a condition of receiving the right in the first place. The very moral foundation of equality of respect was by definition, unconditional. Rather were obligations part of the meaning of rights and the process of education in industry or the social services, 'the cradle of fellowship', aimed to encourage and foster this shared meaning. This contrasts sharply with the marginal equality of, for example, Nozick, where, beyond the limited notion of rights (which are absolute), all relationships are, by nature, contractual and thus conditional upon some reciprocal arrangements. Tawney's equality does not fit easily in this category of domain. As noted above, the ultimate domain of account (equality demanded) is equal regard for all men. The
very concept of a domain of allocation fulfilling that domain of account is difficult. Precisely because of the relational element, simple allocation is always inadequate, for the quality of relationships is of equal importance. This points to changes in attitude and a growth in community -

'A change in the house rather than simply re-organizing the furniture.' 215

As shall be seen, this also creates some problems in measuring the success of any equalizing measures. 216 Even if the domain of account is fulfilled in terms of equal resources, for example, for health and education, it is not simply the adequacy of the resources, but the quality and attitude of the services which have to be judged in Tawney's equality. 217

Tawney's person-regarding equality was thus concerned to equalize the domain of account, but this was not to be a matter of absolute equality. All of this points for Tawney, to a strategy for equality which would seek to pool the nation's

'resources by means of taxation, and (to) use the funds thus obtained to make accessible to all, irrespective of their income, occupation or social position, the conditions of civilization, which in the absence of such measures, can be enjoyed only by the rich.' 218

It is to this strategy that we must now turn to see Tawney's theory of equality 'in action.'

The Strategy of Equality

The redistribution of funds through taxation to the 'social income' of the social services, education and National Health Service forms an essential element in Tawney's approach to egalitarian measures. However, Tawney's strategy was ultimately neither so
His aims were:

i) To provide the basic conditions of civilization, such that the individual would no longer be in the power of another, subdued by fear.

ii) To re-distribute wealth, particularly with reference to functionless property.

iii) To re-distribute power, both in terms of providing opportunity for individuals to exercise appropriate power, and in providing safeguards against the irresponsible use of power.

iv) To remove divisions which lead to inequality of status.

As noted above, all of these are linked in some way so that, for example, equality of basic conditions would remove the privilege of status. Equalizing of power would also affect status. The use of the function as a criterion of distribution would also affect attitudes. Tawney's strategy attempts to take account of such links and thus extends social policy into education and industry. Aware of these links also it looks to philosophy and attitudes, as well as simple egalitarian measures. In this process, equality of participation and distributional equality are very much connected. Distributional equality becomes broadly defined, distributing 'life chances' and power which enabled the individual to gain control of their situation. Such control, however, also included participation, and for Tawney, this was spelled out in moral terms, i.e. with respect to the individuals duties to others as well as to themselves.
Details of the strategy must now be considered and below are some of Tawney's major plans for equality.

a) In terms of re-distribution through taxation, he did not advocate a severe progressive income tax, especially given his views on the importance of functional reward. \(^{222}\) However, he did attack functionless property and wealth through death duties. \(^{223}\) Equalization through taxation worked for Tawney in two ways. It re-distributed expenditure as well as income, creating the demand for different, more essential goods. \(^{224}\) Great inequalities in wealth had often led to 'the misdirection of production' with the production of luxuries taking precedence over necessities. Also, of course non-functional surplus was to be re-distributed in the form of welfare programmes.

b) In industry, Tawney sought to increase the opportunities for workers to control their own situation and re-distribution of power from the owners of production to the public (a combination once more of the two criteria, both increasing the basic freedom of the worker and decreasing the power of the owner). The first of these was to be achieved by an increase in worker participation with nationalized industries becoming 'experimental stations' for this. \(^{225}\) In itself, this was also an educational enterprise which involved persuading 'man to be free', and thus, far from prescribing particular methods, Tawney advocated the testing of 'different methods of making industrial democracy.' \(^{226}\) Such participation was thus not the assertion of some
'mystical self government', but the beginning of a relational process (which did not necessarily involve the layman overriding the technical expert). 227 The aim of this process was to increase the freedom/power of the worker, 228 to provide protection against economic oppression at work, 229 and to confirm that any industry 'belonged' to the worker as much as to any shareholder. 230 In order to achieve this equalization, Tawney advocated three things; increased public ownership, careful attention to administrative methods and the nurturing of an ideal of service. On the first of these, Tawney does not advocate wholesale nationalization, but rather, 'mastering' the key positions of the economic world such as banking, transport, energy. 231 He does not claim a right of state ownership derived from function, looking to industry to work responsibly for social purposes:

'The important question is not whether an undertaking is described as private or public; it is whether, if it is private, adequate guarantees can be established that it performs a public function, and whether if it is public, it performs it effectively.' 232

Nationalization was an important part of this process, precisely because it separated management from ownership, and because it made industry accountable to the public. 233 This, in itself, was a re-distribution of power. However, any re-organization of industry must not simply foster industrial freedom (industrial democracy), nor encourage more responsible use of power, it must also

'supply the machinery through which the public may secure efficient service.' 235
Two important principles would be the basis of such administration. Firstly, this administration would be 'vested in a joint board, composed of representatives of the community, and of all grades of workers in the industry.' Secondly, administration should be decentralized 'within the framework of a national system.' Local administrators would have a high degree of autonomy and be able to try methods of working best suited to the conditions whilst having to reach targets for production. This overall system would enable long term planning and investment to operate with a responsiveness to local situations and would inevitably lead to greater concern for worker's conditions and safety.

Tawney also advocated state involvement with private companies along such lines, both by investing in them and by legislating for hours of work, minimum safety standards etc. The third element, alongside the re-distribution of power was to work out a 'code of public honour and recognized obligations in industries as it has been in the professions.' Not only would such a code or ethos emphasize service and encourage high productivity and standards of work, it would also bring in a level of accountability involving the professions themselves. Whilst such 'professional spirit' should not be idealized, it equally should not be neglected. A second level of accountability is the public themselves. Public opinion has great force, and the state has a great part to play in the 'development of a professional spirit'
by insisting that industry be conducted on the basis of 'complete publicity.' Thus, certain types of economic organization
'are likely, by their constitution, to put efficient service before considerations of profit.' 247

In this respect, the very administration methods which Tawney proposed would tend to encourage the ideal of service. In industry therefore, the relative egalitarian measures proposed by Tawney, revealed an ultimate concern for the twin teloi of freedom and fellowship. Some nationalization was the necessary but not sufficient condition for these ends to be fulfilled. Only
'a simpleton supposes that a change of organization is a prophylactic against the imbecilities of human nature,' 248 and socialization of industry simply enables a process of reform to begin. However, for the process of relational equality to be effectively pursued, industrial democracy, efficient administration, openness and public accountability, and the propagation of an ideal of service were essential. In all this, industrial policy was, for Tawney, part of social policy.

c) Education was also in the sphere of social policy, 249 and Tawney's approach to it was remarkably similar to his approach to industry. In one respect, Tawney advocated total equality of provision with free schooling up to the age of sixteen, a free school meals service, and provision of adequate nursery schools. 250 However, such provision was, for Tawney, to be infused with his moral base of equality of respect. Education was, in itself,
'a spiritual activity, much of which is not commercially profitable.' 251

Though the needs of industry had to be born in mind, this meant that education should not be simply used for 'selfish advancement,' 252 or occupational utility, but to develop 'spiritual goods' which 'are worth any sacrifice of material goods.' 253

Indeed, such education was the respect due to the individual, with individual attention being given to students, whatever their situation. 254 In this light, equality in education was, by definition, relative, involving the development of what was unique in the individual. Because of the moral foundation to such equality, this demanded education in critical humanism and in community living, 'encouraging activity, free initiative and the power of self-direction', and preparing for 'life as a member of the community.' 255

Method and attitude were inevitably affected by this. Firstly, for individual attention and the development of individual attitudes and critical thinking, Tawney advocated smaller classes or tutorial groups which would enable individuals to learn by experience the skills of discussion and argument, leading to the discovery of ideas. 256 Simple lecturing involved often 'a system of mutual deception', with no real communication. 257 Smaller group work would also lead to toleration and respect for others' views.

In all this, the tutor or teacher remains important, but the emphasis shifts from 'what is done by the teacher' to 'what is done by the child' in practical activities. 258 The teacher
becomes enabler and guide with child or student a co-partner in the process of discovery. Many of these ideas were developed in the Workers Education Association, in itself an experiment in educational democracy. However, the same principles were advocated for primary and secondary education. As with the approach to industry, these involve both a redistribution of power, with the individual being encouraged to take responsibility for their own learning, and a commitment to experiments in educational methods which would be most appropriate to the local situation. Thus,

'the greater the variety of type among schools, the better, for the need of education is experiment, individuality and the enthusiasm of the pioneer.'

The second point about such a method was that it precisely encouraged the development of a common culture, the discovery of common moral values, and the development of community virtues. Thus, for Tawney, education was partly a

'process by which we transcend the barriers of our isolated personalities, and become partners in a universe of interests which we share with our fellow men.'

Such education would break down social barriers and become

'the symbol and cement of spiritual unity transcending differences of birth and wealth.'

In all this, Tawney's relative egalitarianism both infuses the methods of education, whilst education itself is also a means towards the process of social reform.

Tawney recognized that no institution could achieve total impartiality in its approach to education. Rather did he think of placing the partialities into the educational process, ensuring that they be openly discussed. Thus if anyone wished
to propagate a creed,
'they should do so by the frank exchange of open argument, not by subterranean intrigues.' 265

As with industry, the very conditions of openness, publicity and democracy, were, for Tawney, an important element in avoiding coercion and encouraging responsible control of power. A further element of control was shared power in administrative and planning bodies, for example in W.E.A. representation being sought from academic institutions, public authorities and actual and potential students. 266

However, whilst planning and control were of importance, Tawney did not advocate the socialization of public schools, which are often
'favourable to initiative, experiment and diversity of educational type.' 267

Instead, he recommends that private schools obtain a licence from a central authority, ensuring uniform excellence and accessibility to all children who might profit from such an education. 268

Thus, once again, Tawney seeks to balance control with individual or local initiative, and eschews equality of type between schools or equality of treatment within schools for equality which is both relative and relational. It must be noted that the equalizing measures in industry and education were not seen by Tawney as in isolation, but rather as part of total social reform. Thus,

'as long as many hundred thousand children are poisoned by slums and half starved by every depression, the most important of educational reforms is social reconstruction.' 269
d) Tawney's social equality sought, not simply increased resources or incomes, but a

'social income, received in the form, not of money, but of increased well being.' 270

Nonetheless, economic security was important. This was partly answered by Tawney's strategy for industrial equality (providing power against economic oppression) and partly by a state-sponsored insurance scheme for the unemployed and retired. The level of benefit should be sufficient 'not merely to keep them in physical existence, but for a self-respecting life.' 271

Such a 'self-respecting' life was precisely one in which duties to self and others could be fulfilled, 272 and this, at the same time would remove the oppression which controlled by fear. 273

In providing such benefit the state would be espousing a revised notion of social justice, where benefits were received as of right, acknowledging that, for example, unemployment was due to a collective breakdown. 274 The danger of this level of benefit encouraging social malingering and fraud was, argued Tawney, not severe. 275 He did not write directly on the danger of them creating dependence, partly because he saw the avenue of participatory equality as providing the means to encourage independence or interdependence. In any case, the notion of as of right benefits, precisely avoided the kind of 'charity dependence' which did not respect the dignity of the individual. However, as of right benefits could be abused by the state. This form of 'social malingering' involved using benefits as a

'lazy substitute for the attempt to prevent the contingency
from occurring.' 276

Thus, the priority of government had to be to deal directly with the causes of unemployment. Reisman 277 argues that Tawney does not in fact address himself directly to the means of curing unemployment. Questions of economic policy were not followed through by him. However, as Atherton points out, Tawney's industrial strategy was seen by him as the answer to questions of unemployment. 278 He rejected policies advocating purely increased productivity as a means to end unemployment, 279 and approaches which led to unemployment itself being a means of control. The answer for Tawney was therefore 'proportional' and 'relational', 280 involving government planning of industrial strategy, increased control of the work situation by workers 281 and the removal of gross inequalities.

Conclusion

Tawney is often referred to as a moralist, 282 and given his sometimes puritanical style, 283 and his battles for principles, this is no doubt appropriate.

However, in so far as this title implies a restriction in Tawney's perspective to 'the moral view point', it is perhaps unfortunate. Tawney, in fact, was a holist, aware of the complex relationship between the individual and society, between principles, and between principles and practice. Questions of value could not be restricted to certain areas, but were an integral element in the perception and organization of any situation. From such a base, is developed an holistic and complex view of equality, with equality of respect
as the fundamental principle, one which was defined in agapaic terms. This, in itself generates two principles or fundamental aims in terms of social organization, the high or moral view of freedom and fellowship. This produces

'a synthesis which may do justice both to the values of the Liberal era, and to equally important aspects of life, to which that era, for all its virtues, was too often blind.' 284

Such principles were to be achieved by equality in its instrumental sense i.e. equality of distribution and participation. Such equality would aim to re-distribute life chances and power in a global domain, and be relative, responding to need. Such equality would aim for universal provision of the basic conditions of civilization but would also be concerned with a broader view of distribution linked to the moral basis of this view of equality i.e. to function with respect to social purposes.

It is a broad vision of equality, demanding comprehensive thought, both in terms of principles and of policy, and which lies at the centre of a changed society developing right relationships. Tawney himself realized this when he commented that the complete attainment of the ends in question was not in itself important. What was important was that they

'should be sincerely sought.' 286

Tawney realized then that equality was about a process of development. It was also therefore the basis of a radical view of justice.

This gives rise to two questions:

a) What were the grounds for such an ambitious, and some would say utopian view? 287

b) How far could a vision which was so comprehensive be adequately sustained against criticisms from right and left?
The next two chapters will consider these in some detail.
Chapter 2  Tawney's Justification of Equality

Many different arguments have been used to justify equality. The arguments themselves tend to vary according to the kind of equality argued for, and, as noted above, tend to not only form the ground for equality, but the basis of the particular meaning.

The various kinds of argument may be briefly noted as follows:

a) Formal arguments, which appeal to considerations of logic rather than to empirical evidence. A bald version of this argument is that it is the unequal treatment of individuals which requires justification. Given that there are no reasons for unequal treatment forthcoming, it is therefore rational to treat people equally. As a formal argument, however, the 'presumption of equality' argument says nothing about what constitutes acceptable treatment or any criteria of distribution. It therefore has to be combined with empirical features such as an appeal to human characteristics, to demonstrate what is meant by equal treatment.

b) Consequential arguments, including utilitarian ones, urge that the consequences of equality, both for the self and for society, are the crucial justificatory evidence. Such arguments aim to demonstrate that egalitarian social arrangements are more likely to yield greater social benefits overall than alternative sets of social arrangements. The problem with this approach is determining what is an acceptable benefit.

c) A third line of argument may be termed deontological. In this approach, equality is seen to be founded upon ultimate values. Such arguments often have a metaphysical or theological base.
and tend to be perfectionist. The term perfectionist here refers to the belief that some forms of life are intrinsically superior to others. This approach, in stressing some overall good for the individual and society, always runs the danger of paternalism, i.e., coercing or persuading the individual to follow the greater good.

d) A fourth kind of argument may therefore be identified in contrast to this, that of the social contract. In this, an egalitarian position is argued from an 'original position' or 'state of nature'. From this it is argued that rational consideration of individual interests will lead to an egalitarian position. Such an 'original position' is said to achieve 'the same purpose as benevolence.' Notably similar arguments are used to defend both marginal and global equality.

Tawney's justification of equality contains elements of the first three arguments. He writes at times, of equality, and of the obligations consequent to it, as being self-evident. At other points he stresses the important consequences of egalitarian social policy, in terms of social well-being and increased efficiency. Having examined Tawney's consequence arguments, however, this chapter will conclude that they are ultimately dependent upon perfectionist assumptions. These assumptions are grounded in his Christian belief which in turn provides the basis of Tawney's deontological arguments for equality.

In examining the latter, note will be taken of the relationship between Tawney's Christian humanism and moral humanism. Note will also be taken of the difficulties this approach creates for adequately
evaluating the success of any egalitarian measures.

Finally, the implications of Chapters 1 and 2 on the position of equality in Tawney's thought will be considered. In particular, the view that Tawney used equality as a middle-axiom will be examined.

Consequence Arguments

Tawney's consequence arguments involve the consequences to the individual and to society, and refer to equality of respect, distributional equality and participatory equality.

One consequence of straightforward global re-distribution of domain would be individual self fulfillment. Such resources, opportunities and rights would allow the individual 'to make the best of such powers as they possess.'

Equality and self fulfillment do not have a necessary connection for, as Tawney remarks, no social organization of itself can change people. It does, however, provide the conditions for freedom which are crucial to self-development.

Terrill comments that self-fulfillment is not, of itself, an egalitarian principle. What made it so for Tawney, he argues, was the social and economic conditions of England in the 1920's which made it impossible for some to simply survive, still less achieve self-realization. Such individuals could hardly be said to have equal rights, since some of them will die before the rights can be exercised and others will be too enfeebled to exercise them effectively.

However, whilst it is true that Tawney was concerned about the effect of social conditions, Terrill's argument ignores the fundamental connection between self-fulfillment and equality of respect.
For Tawney, equality of respect is a positive concept which actively seeks the good of the individual. This good is seen precisely in terms of the individual developing and being allowed to develop what is unique to them, their personality. Creating conditions which allow the individual to fulfill themselves is thus a clear objective of equal respect for persons. Thus, for Tawney, self-fulfillment is intimately connected to person-regarding equality (equality of respect) and to equality of condition, which provides the freedom for self development. In all this, there is also the outline of a more down to earth argument ie. that more equal distribution will simply help individuals to live healthier, less painful lives ie. basic needs will be fulfilled.

Perhaps even more significant for Tawney were the social consequences of equality. Tawney saw order, social well being, social health, and efficiency in industry as in one way or another stemming from equality. It is precisely because Tawney envisaged such far reaching effects, even on industrial performance, that he did not spend time on economic policies. The working out of person-regarding equality in the organization of society was, for him, the essential first step in answering any economic problems, whatever the state of the economy.

Tawney's social consequence argument includes the following elements:

a) Straightforward distribution would decrease the gap between rich and poor, thus taking away a barrier existing to the development of community. Making the distribution of 'social health' universal and 'as of right' would also do away with the attitude of paternalistic charity to the poor, both
accepting the poor as equals and breaking down a further barrier to community.  

b) The provision of welfare and education would lead to less waste of individual talent. Thus, for example if children of twelve were kept in school and not 'given' to industry, then both individual potential and potential for society would be developed. Also, widening university entrance would develop more talent.  

c) Tawney argued that massive inequalities led to a misdirection of production effort, and thus, an inefficient use of limited resources. The free-market responds to demand, not need, thus giving priority to luxuries not necessities. Planning and co-ordination of industry in response to needs was thus necessary for a more efficient use of resources.  

d) Provision of resources, less wastage and improved planning were, however, only part of efficiency. For Tawney, efficiency was dependent upon the motivation of the total work force and ultimately on industrial peace. Thus, whilst economy and efficiency are important, they are 'not the last words in industry.'  

What is most important is that 'conditions of corporate freedom' should be involved in social and industrial organization. Such conditions would lead to both industrial peace and the emergence of a common culture. Such a common culture does not involve the lowest common denominator in humanity, but rather all the elements of social and moral relationships which are the essence of humanity. Such a development would, argues Tawney, also depend upon the acceptance of common purposes.
As noted above, the development of such a common culture would depend upon increasing participatory equality, equalizing of power, protection from irresponsible use of great power, and developing a common ethos and purpose. The power given by participation applies to education as well as industry.

Crucial to these consequence arguments, is an interactionist view of society, which sees ideas as affecting social organization, and social organization affecting the life of the individual; a moralist's view of society which sees it as a network of moral relationships; and an holistic view of the individual. At the base of this, as shall be seen below, Tawney sees self-respect as closely related to power and the structures of power, something which will depend both upon how the individual is treated and how the individual treats others.

**Tawney's Social and Moral Psychology**

Underpinning Tawney's view of equality was his Christian faith, and in particular the doctrine of the Incarnation. Tawney did not systematically develop a theology of equality. This was partially due to an antipathy not just towards theology, but also towards any academic discipline which was abstract or divorced from its moral context. Tawney was a Christian Social Moralist rather than a theologian. Like Gore, for whom faith had 'primarily a moral not an intellectual basis', Tawney saw Christianity as a way of life. This did not ignore the importance of doctrine. On the contrary, the relation between doctrine and conduct was analogous to prayer and conduct -
'prayer is all important and... conduct tests it.' 35

Conduct also makes doctrine and principles intelligible, a point exemplified by the Incarnation. This revealed that God relates not as a 'principle' or an 'absolute' but as a man. 36 Here, Tawney does not contrast particular states of God, for example, transcendence and immutability, but rather ways in which God is made intelligible, God as principle or God 'fully expressed...in a particular historical individual.' 37

By implication, the activity and nature of God only become fully intelligible through the Incarnation. This answers the 'down to earth' demand that might have been made by Henry Dubb, 38 'what we want to know is what kind of God He is, and what He is like in ordinary human intercourse.' 39

The Incarnation is also at the base of Tawney's thought on human nature and social organization. Firstly, God's assumption of humanity stands out against any dualist conception of man. He is rather an 'amphibious' being, 'both animal and spiritual', 40 sinner and heir to eternal life. Secondly, the Incarnation rules out any rigid divisions into sacred and secular, private and public morality. God was made man for all mankind, as mankind exists, in a framework of social relationships. Thus,

'the distinction between the life of the spirit and mechanisms of society is a false antithesis.' 41

He extends his moral psychology to include the effect of social organization upon the whole man, including the spirit. Social organization in one way or other, influences man's 'responsiveness and power of vision, his vitality and capacity
for growth in spiritual as well as physical stature.42 Moreover, institutions or social organizations rest ultimately upon a series of decisions taken by human beings 'as to the manner in which they and their fellowmen should live.'43 Ultimately then, such organizations are the 'real clue to the spiritual life of any age.'44

In all this, government is 'a servicable drudge', a neutral instrument which can be used according to the aims of whoever is in control.45 Its use will thus depend upon the principles of those in power. Hence, everyone has an interest in getting these basic principles and aims right.46 On the other hand, 'the only sound test in the first place, of a political system, is its practical effect on the lives of human beings.'47

Law, for Tawney, was the mother of liberty ie. had the capacity to affect peoples lives and put into effect basic principles.48 Thus, Tawney's view of the state, given his Incarnation base and moral and social psychology, was of a neutral instrument, but not unconcerned.

The notion then of Christianity as 'interfering' or 'intervening' in the mechanism of society made no sense to Tawney.49 "Humanity involved society and if Christianity left humanity to itself, the devil would certainly not limit his liabilities.50 Thus, whilst Christ seeks a personal response, and whilst God's Kingdom is more than any particular social institution, and to seek it only there would lead to disaster,51 the spiritual element of man, both in social relationships and as a physical/spiritual whole, provides a context for equality which demands a global rather than a marginal domain.
The Incarnation and the Christian view of man provide the basis for concern for humanity in society. However, the holistic view of man which Tawney has, is not confined to a spiritual/physical unity. Scattered amongst his writings are a number of elements which may be listed as follows:

a) He highlights the importance of personal qualities or virtues.

b) He stresses the importance of mental characteristics and the development of the critical faculty. This is closely related to the development of autonomy, in the case of maturity.

c) He views man as a moral being, both in terms of having attitudes and values, and in terms of being part of a network of social and moral relationships.

d) Man is also, as noted above, a spiritual being. Tawney does not define too closely what he means by spirituality, or the spirit. He is, however, clear that the spirit is an essential element of humanity and part of the holistic view of man, which links into social organization, and all those other elements of humanity.

e) Finally, of course, there is the sinful nature of man. Once again, Tawney does not define sin. However, he does give some hints as to his view. Firstly, sin is seen as a constant in human life, i.e. however hard the individual tries, he or she will always fall short. Secondly, sin is closely related to the idea of irresponsibility, especially the irresponsible use of power. The implications for a view of man's sinful nature of this approach are several. Sin moves out of a simple individual definition and becomes connected to social
injustice. Sin may refer to conscious irresponsibility ie.
irresponsible use of power actively commissioned, but it also
has the more subtle sense of lack of awareness of the totality
of man and of the effects which any decision may have upon
individuals or groups. Tawney does not explicitly state this,
but sin at this point comes close to being defined (though not
exclusively) as a narrowness of vision and relational awareness
which ignores man as a social and moral being, limits any
view of values and principles, and limits the responsibility
of the individual, and thus their development. It is precisely
such a broad view of sin which lies behind Tawney's moral
outrage at the capitalism of his age. 57 With respect to
those in power in that capitalist society, he sees this
limitation of vision as producing bad results, no matter how
well intentioned the statesman in charge. 58 Interestingly,
the principles underlying capitalism he lists as follows:—
- the denial of responsibility. A man is not responsible for
the results of a course of action pursued in the course
of business.
- the denial of personality. The mass of mankind may be
treated as tools.
- the denial of other than individual morality.
- the denial of freedom, such

'that as long as man are well fed and well housed, the nature
of social relations which they enter in order to earn food
and housing does not matter.' 59

Sin then is seen by Tawney in the context of the holistic
view of man, and recognition of such sin demands
a) the encouragement of the development of awareness, and
b) safeguards which will ensure that power is not used irresponsibly.

Whilst Tawney does not regard concentrations of power as necessarily leading to irresponsibility, he does argue that the aquisitive ethos will tend to be a focus for irresponsible self-centred behaviour, and even writes of privileges as producing 'wickedness'. Nonetheless, he does not accept that the sinful nature of man will be changed purely through social organization. Social organization can, however, take account of this nature.

Three brief points must now be made about Tawney's holistic view in general. Firstly, it implies a constant process or framework to develop awareness. Secondly, the fact of interconnections does not assume the development of an easy or largely peaceful process. At the very least Tawney's holistic view requires that individual freedom and control be balanced with the demands of moral relationships. For Tawney, both were essential. Thirdly, as shall be noted in more detail below, this holism makes it difficult to frame an objective view of society, at least in the sense of excluding moral values from that analysis. Moral values are part of the data.

As noted above, Tawney sees self respect both as affected by treatment of the individual but also by the individual's treatment of others. At this point, I will note some specific examples of how Tawney sees these connections working.

i) With respect to poverty, Tawney distinguishes two kinds.

The first refers to a group who had 'fallen over the precipice' - the group disqualified from employment by 'personal
defects.' The second was that of the low paid manual worker. Such poverty left the individual at the mercy of a power received quite 'haphazard', and which was caused by the power structures of that time. Hence, he could write of 'a unity underlying the individual cases of poverty.' The low paid worker was 'controlled' not only by fear of unemployment, but also by guilt which was created by the attitude of those in power, based upon the idea that poverty itself is a moral failing 'to be condemned.' In examining the power of attitudes, Tawney notes that certain virtues such as thrift, diligence and sobriety were encouraged as capitalism grew and that to applaud such virtues is 'by implication to condemn the habits and institutions which appear to conflict with them.' Such attitudes in turn reflect values and principles held explicitly or implicitly.

At the centre of poverty Tawney argued, was a loss of liberty. Indeed, this absence of liberty is the 'supreme evil of modern industrial society,' not poverty per se. It leads to 'hopelessness, irresponsibility, recklessness.' Tawney's argument here is compressed, but two elements are discernible. Firstly, lack of freedom affects the will of the individual. They have no hope for self-direction and thus lose 'the will not to be poor.' Secondly, lack of freedom in terms of resources given, can affect the moral behaviour of individuals. Thus, for example, it is 'extremely difficult'
for those on low pay to live virtuous lives. Such workers are 'tempted to neglect their duties to their families because it is so hopeless to discharge them.' Thus, Tawney offers some searching insights into the poverty trap. The lack of freedom caused by lack of reasonable resources leads to an erosion not just of the will, but of moral direction and of shared moral meaning. The only direction or moral purpose offered by an aquisitive ethos is material well being through self-reliant hard work, which, despite the examples of a few, in any case remains impossible for the majority trapped in poverty. As shall be seen shortly, Tawney does not in all this seek to deny the moral responsibility of the poor, but rather points to complex subtle relationships between resources and attitudes and principles, which can exert great influential pressure upon the individual both as social and moral beings. An important implication of this is that the individual who is a physical, emotional and spiritual being is always being influenced in one way or another, whatever the social organization or underlying principles. The choice facing society, therefore, is not between a society with a particular value base, or one which holds no value base with a morally neutral government whose aim is to simply balance a diversity of interests. Rather, must the state accept the inevitability of the influence of social organization upon the individual and search for the best way of using or fulfilling that relationship.
Alongside the negative effect of resources and attitudes upon freedom, Tawney emphasises the positive effect of attitudes. In particular, Tawney writes of the importance of trust in motivation.

'It is idle to expect that men will give their best to any system they do not trust, or that they will trust any system the control of which they do not share.'

This 'new psychology' of confidence or trust remains throughout Tawney's writings. Of itself, it is more effective as a motivator, than fear or competition. It is necessary, too, for general social well-being. This 'does not only depend upon intelligent leadership, it also depends upon cohesion and solidarity.'

This in turn, depends upon individuals being able

'to lead a life of dignity and culture, whether they rise (in society) or not.'

The foundation therefore of industrial efficiency and social health and well-being is equal respect for persons, involving conditions and attitudes which demonstrate that individuals are valued for themselves. The 'new psychology' involves trust at two levels. Trust of principles (and thus what motivates any organization) and trust demonstrated in a sharing of responsibility. Recognition of a shared moral purpose indeed, is precisely what establishes trust, providing a clear view of the justice of the treatment of individuals.

This does not lead to an ideal harmony, and disagreement and discussion over particular objectives and the means of achieving them is actively encouraged. However, such discussion can take place within a framework of trust, founded on shared basic principles. Sharing responsibility,
industry, or community, is also a mark of trust, which allows individuals to participate without usurping the particular responsibilities held by officials in industry or community. The ultimate result of this trust is a degree of 'harmony and peace' which leads in industry to increased efficiency.

In this context, trust also links closely with Tawney's view of freedom. It is an important element in allowing the individual freedom to develop and to serve. Equally, freedom and efficiency are very much complementary.

Indeed, it may be argued from Tawney's position that real efficiency is not achieved without industrial freedom.

iii) The self-respect of the individual can be affected in many ways by what happens to them with attitudes, mental characteristics, values and relationships being affected by attitudes, resources, or lack of them, and social arrangements. However, equally, Tawney implies that self-respect is dependent upon the individual fulfilling his or her duties.

'Finding ones work and doing it,' serving, and in this fulfilling ones role in relation to family, intermediate structures, or society as a whole is what 'spiritual well-being consists of.'

Hence, it is important, as noted in chapter one, to give the individual such opportunities to serve. In this, the control of one's situation involves also the response to the demands of moral relationships. Such a consideration lies at the base of Tawney's concern for participatory equality. However, this does not lead to any easy form of fellowship.
On the contrary, the individual is challenged to take responsibility for decisions. Hence, tied to service, has to be the development of virtues, and mental characteristics, from loyalty and sharpness of thought to self-reliance and enterprise. Taking on responsibility also involves risk, which Tawney finds 'bracing' if voluntarily undertaken, because

'a man balances probable gains and losses and stakes his character on success.'  

Such risk could be experienced at various levels in community and this kind of participation is contrasted with the authoritative style of management where the majority

'do not decide what risks they shall bear. It is decided for them by their masters. They gain nothing if the enterprise succeeds: they have neither the responsibility of effort, nor the pride of achievement; they merely have the sufferings of failure.'  

Tawney's holistic view then points to interaction in society at several levels. These are parallel to the Tawney view of the relationships between principles and practice. As noted above, the Incarnation made God intelligible in life. For Tawney, equally, any principle required to be made intelligible in practice, for

'principles, after all, are intelligible only in so far as their application is indicated.'  

With respect to equality, this means that any general principle of equality must be made substantive if it is to be understood. In turn, any society is to be judged not simply by consequences but by

'the institutions which it creates, the relations between human beings which those institutions establish, and the type
of character, individual and social, which is fostered by those relations.'

Underlying Tawney's consequence arguments, are thus perfectionist assumptions; i.e. that one form of life is superior to others and should be pursued. Hence, Tawney can advocate improved distribution of material resources as a particular objective, but notes, that this, of itself, is inadequate:

'...... the fact remains that certain economic relations are, in themselves preferable to others, irrespective of the wealth they confer.'

'If the way one earns one's living involves a complete loss of liberty, the living is not worth earning.'

Most tellingly, Tawney writes of the ethical foundations of his view of socialism as being superior whatever the outcome in terms of prosperity:

'...... even if the way of co-operation did not produce all the economic advantages expected from it, we should continue to use it.'

Thus, the justification of equality does not depend upon the achievement of any particular consequence. Tawney was a sufficient realist to know that creation of wealth and industrial performance were important. Hence, he argues for the practical superiority of a respect based approach, over against competition or fear.

Yet the achievement of that prosperity does not bear the full weight of the justification of equality.

Two things follow from this. Firstly, Tawney does not attempt to justify equality on any narrow view of self interest or even social interest. Equality and the view of justice that this espouses 'does pay'. However, to base a justification purely on that, is to 'sell the things of God for gold.' By implication, the concept of equality held by Tawney requires altruism and thus,
by definition, cannot be justified on, or motivated by purely self interest. On the one hand, this has the elements of an argument based upon the logic of Tawney's concept of equality, i.e., that a concept which is concerned with moral relationships cannot be justified purely on the grounds of self interest, however well understood. On the other hand, he is making a point about human nature and the tendency for self interest to ignore the claims of others and to actually subvert moral principles which take such claims into account. 100

The second point which flows from Tawney's perfectionist base, is that any policies founded on equal respect could never strictly provide empirical evidence against the principle of equality per se. If the consequences of any particular policy were neither 'peace and harmony' nor 'prosperity', this would demand examination of the methods used, not the basic principle and its key objectives. Tawney thus does not spend time gathering detailed evidence of how person regarding equality will eventually achieve the 'peace and harmony'. In this, he holds basically a natural law position, arguing that rational reflection upon human nature and relationships will lead to understanding of the process and its importance. Thus, the virtues of, for example, co-operation can be discerned by 'all men of good will.' 101 Such rational reflection would go hand in hand with analysis of society which would reveal the need for different methods to apply the basic principles in response to different situations in society. 102 However, Tawney did underpin rational reflection with evidence from history, especially to demonstrate the effects of attitudes or social activity, for example, the enclosures upon the poor.
Given all this, Tawney could not build any justification upon utilitarian grounds. He saw utilitarianism as a good 'first approximation', but attacked it on two grounds. Firstly, to rely solely on consequences for moral justification, leads to the end justifying the means. Secondly, the concept of happiness is a vague one which ignores all questions of 'right or wrong' regardless of the consequences for the majority. Hence, in Tawney, there is no question of justifying equality in terms of such arguments as the greatest good being achieved for the greatest number, by reducing the incidence of envy.

Tawney explicitly contrasts with the utilitarian approach, the criterion of moral judgement which he describes as a 'transcendental, religious or mystical one' that 'the personality of man is the most divine thing we know, and that to encroach upon it is to efface the very title deeds of humanity.'

Justification for Tawney then involves more than consideration of the consequences, it also involves examining the ground of equal value itself.

The Deontological Argument

Tawney's major argument was that the equal value of all men was based upon God's love. God's assumption of humanity precisely confirms His concern for all human beings - not in any weak sense of paternalism, but in the fullness of His self giving. Hence, Tawney links the Incarnation with the equal value of all, and the unique importance of the individual. Alongside this, Tawney has elements of the Imago Dei argument, referring to the personality as 'sacred' or 'the most divine thing we know.'
Several important points should be underlined in this view of equal value. Firstly, it is unconditional. No action on the part of man is seen to merit value. Thus, no particular action of man can be used to justify equal value. Secondly, the value is not read off from, or dependent upon any particular characteristics or view of humanity. As has been noted, Tawney has a clear view of man as a social and moral being. This, however, is not used as the basis of value. Tawney links value to the Incarnation or God's attitude to mankind, or an irreducible attitude to man in which, by implication, value is bestowed upon man by God. This does not mean that equal value becomes a matter of subjective judgement. Indeed, for Tawney, God's love is precisely objectified in the Incarnation. This has important consequences for the Christians view of man.

'It is this 'capital fact' which makes humanity per se unique and which gives 'dignity to man.' Thus the unique importance of the individual stems from the unique importance of humanity as a whole to God. Hence, when Tawney writes of the 'sacredness of the personality' or of the personality 'as the most divine thing we know', he is both expressing an attitude about humanity, but also pointing to the value which humanity has of itself, ultimately dependent upon God.

Thirdly, the equal value of each individual is the base of obligation of equal respect. This sets up the very Kantian view of respect owed to all, such that
'nothing can justify my using power which chance gives me ... to the full, that nothing can justify my using my neighbour as a tool, or treating him as something negligible (sic) which may be swept aside to realize my ends, however noble those ends may be.'

Of course, set out by itself, equal value and equality of respect cannot justify particular egalitarian measures. What it does do is to form the ground for equal care and concern, with, in Tawney's case, an implied basis of agape. Such a concern for the individual in Christian terms involves the desire for the individual to develop as a whole person. This development is seen in terms of the holistic view of man and implicitly by the second of the great commandments. Both stress the importance of voluntary, individual responsibility and responsibility for others, concern for self and concern for others, as central to spiritual, whole development. As noted above, the principles of freedom and fellowship pick up the essence of this development and are thus viewed by Tawney as end principles, the criteria of success in any social policy.

In a real sense therefore, there are two elements to Tawney's total justification, both of which are essential. The first, equality of respect arising from equal value (unconditional), provides the obligation to care equally for all. The second, an holistic view of man, grounded in agape, demonstrates how the desired development of the individual may be accommodated. 111

It is instructive to compare this with a more recent two tier argument, that of Richard Norman. 112 Norman argues that equality of respect is crucial for justification and the second level in his argument is that human beings need to associate with others 'and to link our efforts with their common projects.' 113
In fact, it is precisely such a need which has to be demonstrated, and it requires ultimately some form of holistic view of man. Tawney's justification, or at least the elements of it in his writings, is thus in its own way, holistic and complex. It implicitly accepts that at the base of any justification has to be an ultimate attitude, and that attitudes will affect the argument minimally in terms of providing a basis for commitment. It accepts equally the need for principles, but does not simply attempt to draw out the justification from a basic principle. It seeks confirmation from a view of mankind and from an interactionist view of society which is able to argue for consequences confirming the perfectionist stance. It thus seeks to demonstrate rather than 'prove' a particular view of equality. What links the two parts together most powerfully is the Incarnation itself. It is precisely this which provides the grounds for equal worth - bestowing value - but also this which demonstrates most clearly the holistic view of man as a spiritual, social, moral being. Thus, implicit in Tawney's view is a strong link between spiritual and social health, and social justice. Several points may be made before passing on to consider the importance of Christianity to Tawney's equality. Firstly, Tawney's justification differs markedly from the straightforward, formal justification of equality. This simply presumes equal treatment of individuals unless there is good reason for not doing this. Strictly speaking therefore, such an approach does not attempt to justify a positive view of equality, it simply demands that inequalities be justified. Tawney's justification of equality is quite different both in the positive concern at its base
and in the consequent concern for differential treatment appropriate to the individual. Thus, the very element which stands at the base of Tawney's justification, equal value, also sets the objectives in terms of the development of the individual in community.

Secondly, Tawney does not use rights as any part of the justification as such. He recognizes the importance of economic and social rights to sustain any social organization based upon equality, but reveals no argument from natural rights. This is largely because of his emphasis on duties and thus away from self-interest per se as the basis of an argument. Ultimately, of course, the grounds for equality may be viewed as prudential in the sense that the consequences outlined would provide the framework to enable the individual to develop as a whole person. However, even such prudence, argues Tawney, could not be fully appreciated by anyone who operates purely from self-interest:

'A man must be a little altruistic even in order to appreciate the full possibilities of selfishness.'

In this, Tawney is adding a basic psychological point to his foundation of unconditional value, and value in relation. Development of the individual is not really possible without altruism, an awareness of the value of the other, leading to respect of the other. Self-interest properly understood demands other interest and concern.

Even when Tawney argues for rights, then, he argues for a broad view of rights, not simply rights to a particular good, narrowly defined. Thus he can sound annoyed with the English Labour Movement as early as 1914:

'They have aimed at comfort, instead of aiming to get their rights,
including the right to do their duty.' 122

Thirdly, Tawney does not make explicit use of the doctrine of creation in establishing equal value. 123 Nonetheless, Tawney's view of freedom and his holistic view of man, does provide the basis for a theology of man as both created and partner in creation. This will be developed later, and in its own right adds to the justification of equality.

Tawney also does not use creation doctrine as an explicit justification for equitable distribution. Nonetheless, such a theology is implied in arguments for equitable distribution such as 'the resources of the community should be used to satisfy all, and not earmarked for the satisfaction of a few.' 124

Tawney of course, went beyond the Ambrose view of property, arguing that property and wealth should be judged in terms of social purpose and service. 125 The important distinction in Tawney's mind was therefore not between private or public property, but whether it was functional or not i.e. served the social purpose or not. However, this position is not based upon the doctrine of creation, but rather on all the elements of Tawney's holism and interactionism. 126

Fourthly, Tawney occasionally touches on what may be termed the Christian family argument i.e. that all persons are children of God. 127 In fact, this is less a developed argument and more simply an image, which supports the agapaic base of equality of respect.

Fifthly, it must be noted that the notion of a moral consensus does play some part in the justification of equality. This involves several elements:-

- the acceptance of duty related to roles. 128
- the acceptance of general principles on providing social purpose. 129
- the acceptance of certain virtues as necessary for community or fellowship. 130
- the acceptance of basic moral guidelines, such as promise keeping, for any relationship. 131

The consensus overall is seen as the consequence of Christian influence. 132 Consensus for Tawney is another element in the 'demonstration' of the importance of equality, at times much akin to Rawls's reliance upon 'considered convictions.' 133

The Importance of Christianity to Equality

Given the various strands in Tawney's justification, involving consequential and deontological elements, a crucial question at this point is how far Tawney thought his Christian base as being necessary in the justification of equality. At times, Tawney writes of our relationship with God as being the ultimate demonstrable justification of equality,

'It is only when we realize that each individual soul is related to a power above men, that we are able to regard each as an end in himself.' 134

This leads Tawney to argue for a Christian foundation of morality, in what seems to be a refutation of the autonomy of morality,

'The essence of all morality is this: to believe that every human being is of infinite importance.... But to believe that it is necessary to believe in God.' 135

This is further underlined in 'Christianity and Social Order',
where it is argued that the Christian view of man and what follows from it, is quite different from that of 'good pagans', unless the latter have been influenced by the Christian tradition. 136

As noted above, Tawney posits a 'necessary' connection between this distinctive anthropology and equality (clearly equality of respect). 137

Alongside this, however, Atherton detects a separate strand of moral humanism which seeks to justify equality purely in terms of 'common humanity.' 138 Atherton cites three examples:

i) Tawney emphasizes the value of the human being qua human.139

ii) The origin of human rights is located in the nature of man himself. 140

iii) Tawney gives support for the 'autonomy of the value of humanity in itself' ie. for the autonomy of moral humanism.

However, Atherton's examples are not entirely convincing as an attempt to point to a non-Christian base for equality in Tawney. His first example occurs in the context of an argument that begins with the statement, 'In order to believe in human equality, it is necessary to believe in God.' 142

The second example is historical comment, upon the developments in the French Revolution, and, as such, does not necessarily express Tawney's own arguments about the origin or foundation of human rights. The third example does not explicitly argue for the autonomy of moral humanism at all. In it, Tawney recognizes the existence of many 'admirable pagans', but sees them as a product ultimately of the Christian tradition and argues that the Christian moral tradition
is both distinctive and superior. 143

The most that can be taken from such examples is that Tawney does use the form of moral humanist arguments, for example in the formal justification noted above, but that even in these, the high value which he places on humanity is firmly rooted in his Christian position. The strand of moral humanism may also be noted in parts of the consequential arguments and also the moral and social psychology. However, as also was noted above, such elements are not per se the foundation of equality. All this evidence points firmly to a Christian humanist base for Tawney's equality and the implication that morality is not really autonomous.

However, one example not cited by Atherton points to a more interesting relationship between Christian humanism and moral humanism. In this, Tawney asserts that the 'humanist spirit', the equivalent of equality of respect, is not the exclusive possession of Christians or non believers. 144 The essence of this spirit is 'the attitude which judges the externals of life by their effects in assisting or hindering the life of the spirit.' 145

Having given some examples of moral humanists, Tawney asserts that such moral humanism and Christianity are:

'using different dialects of a common language.' 146

There may be several explanations for this stress on moral humanism. Firstly, that there was an element of moral humanism in Tawney's thinking which was unsystematically and inextricably linked with his Christian humanism. This, however, would not explain why 'Equality' as a whole is lacking in the explicit Christian underpinning of the concept. Secondly, the stress on moral humanism in 'Equality' may point to a development from the Commonplace Book to
Equality, away from Christian humanism to moral humanism. Support for this may be found in Tawney's increasing frustration with academic theology and the role of the Church in social affairs, and an increasing stress upon the role of social organization as against social philosophy. However, as noted in chapter one, Tawney's concern for social organization did not preclude his concern for philosophy and principles and the spiritual development of men. Also, Tawney does not dismiss Christian humanism in 'Equality', but rather points to a shared concern in moral and Christian humanism.

In any case, elements of moral humanism were already apparent before the Great War in the Commonplace Book. Furthermore, Tawney repeats his argument for equality from a Christian base after 'Equality' in 'Christianity and The Social Order.'

The third explanation of the greater stress on moral humanism in 'Equality' is simply that Tawney's emphasis changed, according to the audience he was addressing and the purpose of the address. In the case of 'Equality', Tawney was concerned not so much to simply justify the concept of equality, as to convince the general public of its importance and relevance to social organization, and so, the need for action based upon it. Such an exercise involved building bridges between Christian and moral humanism. The evidence for this more convincing view is cumulative:

a) In other publications, personal or addressed to Christian audiences, Tawney is clear that the ultimate justification of equality involves belief in God.

b) Tawney saw himself very much as a bridge-builder. Such pontifices he sees as the real priests in society.
c) Tawney makes use of one argument for equality which has common elements in Christian and moral humanism. This may be termed the argument from perspective ie. viewed from a particular perspective, or in relation to someone or something else, the differences between human beings become trivial. Significantly, in the Commonplace Book, Tawney gives this theistic form. Thus, having written of the importance of God to equality, he adds, 'It is only when one contemplates the infinitely great that human differences appear so infinitely small as to be negligible.' 152

In 'Equality', the same argument is used but now in relation to the universe. 153

In addition to this line of argument, Tawney reveals glimpses of an argument based upon ontological equality, what he refers to as 'identity of nature' or 'common humanity.' 154

Once again such an argument from sameness would pick up common themes with moral humanism. 155

d) With regard to equality, however, moral and Christian humanism not only share some similar justificatory arguments, they also share that attitude of commitment and concern which 'judges the externals of life by their efforts in assisting or hindering the life of the spirit.' 156

Such an ultimate attitude cannot be easily categorized or fit neatly into a philosophical or theological concept. Understanding of an attitude demands more than the understanding of a concept. Hence, Tawney can write in terms of 'belief in' equality, not simply comprehending equality. 157

The question of the link between Christian and moral humanism,
especially as regards equality, is then, more complex than Atherton seems to allow. Firstly, given that the idea of equality is holistic, taking in principle, attitude and practice, it is simply very difficult to neatly divide the two viewpoints. This is especially so given the fact that Tawney stresses the expression of theology not as doctrine but as a way of life. Secondly, in any case, it is probable that Tawney intentionally wanted to highlight overlaps and common elements in the views. Thirdly, however, it is clear that ultimately Christian humanism was an essential part of his justification of equality, and in particular the Incarnation. In a real sense, the Incarnation was the holistic demonstration of the love which bestows equal worth, i.e., it is not simply a theological doctrine, but was a demonstration of the attitude of God, of 'what God is like.' It is conceptual, but also experiential. The Incarnation indicates the kind of concern (unconditional) but also the strength of concern for all (each one unique). It provides therefore a high moral stance of person-centred equality, but also one that demands action. With the Incarnation at its basis, equality thus moves away from a simple philosophical concept and into a process or a way of life. This high view of equality then will be contributing towards and sustaining any view of equality, as well as searching for common elements in moral humanism.

All of this raises the question of how Tawney used the concept of equality, and in particular whether he saw it as a middle-axiom.
Tawney's Use Of The Concept Of Equality

According to R.H. Preston, Tawney uses the concept of equality as a middle-axiom.161 The latter is found in the ground between theology and social action. It is not, argues Preston, part of a logical syllogism, enabling thought to move unerringly from gospel to clearly defined social action. A middle-axiom is rather the central part of a reflective process. It is a general principle, acceptable to non Christians, derived from theology. Against this principle, society or some part of society is analysed and questions asked of it, leading eventually to clear guidelines for social action or challenges to society.162

At the stage of forming policy objectives and of planning measures, the theologian is joined by experts from other relevant disciplines. Middle-axioms thus are a means of seeking agreement on the general direction of social policies. They help to direct Christian attention to forming judgements in social policy, and also help to influence opinion generally. Middle-axioms, Oldham argues, tend to be 'provisional' and subject to re-examination as circumstances change.163

The term 'Middle-axiom' was coined originally by J.H.Oldham who in common with Temple, was concerned not to enter into the field of detailed policy making, subject as it was to so many empirical uncertainties.164 They were also concerned that the Church should not be associated with the policy of any particular party.165

Because the middle-axiom is part of a reflective process, it is impossible to say how detailed they should be, except to say that 'they do not go as far as policy formulation.' 166
Bennett provides two examples of middle-axioms in the economic field:

i) The government has the responsibility of maintaining full employment.

ii) Private centres of economic power should not be stronger than the government. 167

The search for middle-axioms, somewhere between general principles of theology and detailed policy, does not preclude the theologian from moving into the area of policy formulation. 'As citizens', writes Preston,

'we have to support detailed policies in the direction they indicate.' 168

On the face of it, Preston has some grounds for his description of Tawney's equality as a middle-axiom:

a) Tawney was very concerned about mediative principles, 'close to what I believe the logicians call axiomata-medii.' Terrill refers to Tawney's 'distillation' of several middle-level principles such as fellowship and equality. 170

b) Tawney accepts that 'experts' should be involved in working out the details of any particular policy. 171

c) Like Oldham, Tawney accepts that applications of any principles will vary according to different times, 'new interpretations will be added to the old.' 172

d) Tawney asserts that there is agreement on the necessary policy objectives to overcome, for instance, mass unemployment, or disparities in health and education. 173 By implication, this assumes general agreement on social policy objectives, and equalizing measures.
However, despite these similarities and given Preston's very broad definition of middle-axiom work, with engagement of the participants at several levels, it is difficult to see Tawney's equality as fitting into the middle-axiom method:

a) Tawney's stress is often not upon 'middle range' principles but upon basic social principles. In particular, Tawney sought agreement at the basic level of equal value. 174

The appeal to the humanist spirit in 'Equality' demonstrates the importance he placed upon agreement at the level of basic principle and attitude. 175 Moreover, whilst Tawney argued for a consensus at the level of basic principles, he was also realistic enough about man's sinful nature to accept that for many there was, 'a deeply rooted dislike of the principle involved.' Working for agreement at this level, was, crucial for Tawney precisely because agreement about attitude and relevance of such a fundamental principle would radically affect the content of any later policies. It is instructive in this context to note that even marginal egalitarians such as Friedman and Nozick argue for a form of equality of respect. 177 This is, of course, radically different from the 'humanist spirit' of Tawney. Thus, alongside the search for agreement with the basis of moral humanism, Tawney's task was to convince people about this ultimate attitude and its associated principles. 178

Tawney, of course, felt confident that given the right conditions and framework, men would come to agree on the fundamental
principles, however much they may disagree as to the means of implementing them. 179

In a very real sense, it was the contribution of the Church to ensure that these conditions were enabled and sustained. The high moral view of equality of respect has precisely this function, working against a limited or essentialist view of principles, and in particular, any exclusive view of fellowship or freedom. 180

Equality of respect, based upon equal worth, thus is used in several ways:-
- as a bridge between Christianity and moral humanism, highlighting 'shared attitudes.'
- as a means of deepening the very idea of equality, centering it upon care and relationships.
- as the basis for an holistic discussion of issues. Such a high moral foundation keeps the discussion on attitudes and values open, and guards against limiting principles.

Tawney, of course, was aware of the declining influence of the Church. At the same time, he saw no future for simple evangelism, which involved too much 'cajoling' and 'enthusiasm'. Equality of value and respect thus provide an excellent bridge for him, both avoiding any kind of moral coercion, yet through his holistic view, linking equality to altruism, and ultimately altruism to God. 182 Reisman suggests that acceptance of Tawney's position ultimately depends upon acceptance of the Christian basis. 183 Tawney's justification however, is not of that kind - demanding the acceptance of
basic principles and working from that. As was seen above, it involves a balanced demonstration, with all the elements of justification reinforcing each other. Equally he does not use the concept of equality in that way. Equality finds its ultimate expression in the Incarnation, in the person of Christ. This in turn will form the ultimate basis for a global view of person-centred equality. Such person-centred equality (based upon agape) is, in turn, essential if social policy is not to be fuelled by limited or limiting principles, and ultimately by interests. 184

b) Having said this, equality of respect is, for Tawney, part of a total process, which involves the interrelation of principles with each other and with an analysis of society, and the emphasis is precisely upon the process as such and not upon a particular element. This is necessarily so as meaning in terms of equality is a function of the interrelation of the process.

c) At one point, Tawney gives the impression of using substantive equality, in the sense of distributive or participatory measures, as a middle-axiom. This, however, is not clearly the case. The principles of distributive or participatory equality are not per se provisional. 185 They may be instrumental in relation to fellowship and freedom, but remain important principles to be enshrined in social organization. What is provisional for Tawney is the interpretation of equality, the policy objectives for any egalitarian measures in a particular context. An example of an egalitarian policy aim in education may be that:
'all children should have an equal opportunity to develop as persons.'

Such an aim, if accepted would not be provisional. What would be provisional would be the chosen method of achieving this aim with the specific educational objectives involved. This would depend upon examining the whole range of principles, needs, resources, constraints etc.

There is no doubt that there are general similarities in the egalitarian process of Tawney and the process in which several writers locate the middle-axiom. It is clear, however, that Tawney's approach to equality as such is not in terms of a middle-axiom, but is something far more complex. It may be added at this point that one of the difficulties in this debate is in discerning a system or common vocabulary in the whole field of principles, aims, objectives etc. It is also made difficult by differences between middle-axiom thinkers on what they are describing. Thus, for instance, Oldham and Preston both see the middle-axiom as provisional whereas Bennett provides examples of middle-axioms which though they may be logically provisional, i.e. some different middle-axiom could be developed given a change in circumstances, are hardly likely to be so. Indeed the middle-axiom that:

'private centres of economic power should not be stronger than the government,' 186

in the light of certain principles, not least about equalizing power, would seem to be absolute. 187
Conclusion

As befits a complex view of equality, Tawney provides a complex justification. Indeed, in his demonstration involving deontological and consequential elements, as well as several other arguments not fully developed, Tawney provides not simply a justification, but the grounds for commitment to equality. Tawney, in other words, is not concerned simply with an elegant argument in favour of a concept, but with an argument which will motivate action. His grounds for equality are intimately connected to his Christian faith and the theology of the Incarnation, but this does not exclude a non-Christian awareness of the argument and sharing in the commitment. Tawney's use of equality is in turn flexible and responsive. This is necessarily so for him, as he believed that on the one hand all social organization reflected the spiritual ethos of a society in some way, including the principles, yet on the other hand that all efforts at social policy or organization were provisional and developing. In this sense, equality could never be applied as an absolute concept i.e. it had to respond to developments. Yet equality of respect, remains, for Tawney, constant and fundamental. Just as changes in society affected any egalitarian objectives, so this high moral view of equality of respect is to ensure a development and a deepening of the egalitarian process.

There are those, however, who would argue that great though Tawney's influence has been, his work has been 'lost in the ocean of instinctive approval,' and that when examined carefully many flaws are revealed, some perhaps fatal. It is to those criticisms we must now turn.
Chapter 3 Criticisms Of Tawney's View Of Equality

Following the presentation of Tawney's view of equality and its justification in chapters one and two, chapter three aims to examine more closely the validity and coherence of his theory. In order to do this, various criticisms of Tawney's view will be examined. As shall be noted, some criticisms fall also into the category of general anti-egalitarian arguments in which the concept of equality and its relations with liberty are questioned.¹ Other arguments specifically examine the Tawney concepts of purpose, function and common culture, and how these relate to the concept of equality. ²

In addition, the theological and anthropological ideas behind Tawney's equality will be critically examined. ³ Finally, difficulties over the strategy of equality and its contemporary relevance will be discussed. ⁴

Several conclusions will be offered. Firstly, many of the criticisms of Tawney's equality are based upon misunderstandings and even caricatures of his work. Secondly, Tawney's view of equality is valid and coherent, whilst containing limitations and difficulties which require development. Thirdly, in discussing critical views of Tawney's equality, the argument tends to return to the fundamental question of how equality of respect is to be interpreted, and in particular, how it relates to the autonomy of the individual.

A. The Concept of Equality and its Moral Justification

In arguing against the concept of equality in general, though with specific reference to Tawney, Joseph and Sumption assert that
Tawney has not understood the nature of equality. Equality, it is said, is, by definition an absolute concept. By this, it is meant that equality is a mathematical concept referring to the sameness between a pair of subjects. The concept, thus, cannot logically admit of any gradation of equality.

'Two individuals are not more equal because they are less different; they are either equal or unequal.'

The logic of such a view, if espoused, demands equality of outcome or results. Tawney himself demands an equal start to life for every child which inevitably requires that every child should have the same standard of living. Tawney then, they argue, must be inconsistent in allowing relative equality to exist. The absolute nature of equality also makes it ultimately impossible to control argue Joseph and Sumption, so that any attempt to soften its nature will necessarily fail.

This argument involves two elements. On the one hand, the 'zealous egalitarian' will always discover further inequalities to be eradicated, thus forcing the concept through to its logical conclusion in society. On the other hand, such zealouslyness could not be controlled easily. Simply to rely upon 'good men' or 'soft-hearted egalitarians who would stop at freedom' would not be sufficient.

Equality then contains a logical and social force which would actually make it impossible to restrain. Of itself, this would not be unacceptable, providing the concept of equality could be justified as a political principle. Joseph and Sumption examine the justification of equality in terms of consequences and in terms of interests. In the first of these it is argued that:
'Political ideas are never intrinsically just. Their justice must be tested by their results.'

If the results are 'disagreeable', then, however fine the principle upon which they are founded, 'the principle ought to be discarded.'

Thus, the egalitarian has the formidable task of demonstrating that an equal society would be one in which people would choose to live. This would be unlikely for the following reasons:-

a) equality of result would necessarily preclude equality of opportunity.

b) equality, and by implication, planning for equality would destroy the 'competitive chaos' from which emerge significant ideas and progress.

c) such a situation, with motivation discouraged and differentiation ignored, would, argue Joseph and Sumption, lead to a sterile state, with no tolerance and no discernible culture.

At the core of such consequences, most exemplified in Communist societies, lies an argument which directly attacks Tawney's view of equality, liberty and fraternity. Equality, claim Joseph and Sumption, far from facilitating liberty and fraternity, actually destroys both. Fraternity depends upon tolerance, and tolerance requires difference, not sameness. The preservation of liberty demands that individual autonomy is not interfered with and the social application of any principle, however 'elevated' will necessarily do this. At the base of this are the same arguments as put forward by Hayek and Nozick, that any ideological domination of society amounts to coercion.
'autonomous individuals are prior to societies, and have rights independent of them.'

Thus, Hayek can write of the individual as having

'some assured private sphere... some set of circumstances in his environment with which others cannot interfere.'

Joseph and Sumption argue from this position that equality per se cannot enable liberty. On the one hand, this is because the absolute concept of equality will tend to be coercive, in any case. On the other hand, even if the range of choice were increased for individuals, this does not have a necessary connection to their fundamental liberty or independence. Hence, Joseph and Sumption can argue that,

'poverty is not unfreedom,'

that the individual can retain independence and dignity whatever their position, and should be encouraged to do so.

Thus, Joseph and Sumption argue that equality cannot be morally justified because the consequences of its implementation would lead to coercive policies which would destroy the important principles of liberty and fraternity.

A second criticism of equality and its justification is not aimed specifically at Tawney, but does have relevance to him. Joseph and Sumption argue that unless some natural right to equality can be proved, then equality in terms of re-distribution of wealth by the State,

'can only be justified by reference to criteria which both groups recognize as valid.'

It is argued that there is no basis for equality as a right.

There is no ontological equality and, in any case, human beings 'are so constituted that it is natural to them to pursue private
rather than public ends.'

This being so, it is the duty of governments to accommodate themselves to 'this immutable fact about human nature.'

Some measure of re-distribution then would be acceptable, providing it was in the interests of everybody. Joseph and Sumption offer the example of the rich recognizing that their interests are best served by political stability, and that this can only be had 'if the differences between rich and poor are kept within bounds.'

Ironically, this comes close to an alternative Socialist justification of equality as shall be seen below. Significantly, from such a base, Joseph and Sumption allow the possibility of some re-distribution for the relief of poverty, equality of opportunity and the fostering of a 'sense of brotherhood.'

A further criticism of Tawney's perception of equality and fraternity comes from quite a different background. David Donnison argues that Tawney's case for equality is based upon man's need for fellowship. Such fraternity or community depends in Tawney's words upon a common culture and this 'rests upon economic foundations.'

Donnison applauds the important moral capacity which underlies Tawney's view of fellowship, the 'capacity to perceive strangers as sentient, suffering human beings,' but differentiates this from the necessary 'common culture.' Against the latter, Donnison appears to have two arguments. Firstly, and implicitly, the notion of a common culture appears to
go against diversity. Secondly, the very attempt to find
fraternity in the sense of 'a common culture' will necessarily
be an activity of exclusion. Thus,
' a free world will be full of conflict: it cannot be a fellowship
of friends ruled by love, because the search for friends soon
degenerates into the exclusion of enemies, the suppression of
conflict and, ultimately, rule by hate.'  26

In short, to make fraternity the reason for equality in society
runs the danger of encouraging an exclusive nationalism and
falling into the coercive traps envisaged by Joseph and Sumption,
and Hayek.

A third criticism of Tawney's equality moves away from
consideration of equality as re-distribution and its relation to
liberty or fraternity, and explicitly accepts the importance of
equality of respect in Tawney's thought and of its relation to
equality as re-distribution. Henry Drucker offers one observation
on and one criticism of this concept of equality of regard.  27
Firstly, he comments that equality of regard is easier to describe
in action than to grasp as an abstract concept. Thus, equality of
regard is generally exemplified in descriptions of communities
such as the miners.  28

Tawney in this sense is
'legitimately abstracting from the experience of working people,'
when it comes to defining equality of regard. Secondly, Drucker
argues that Tawney's emphasis upon equality of regard and his
stance as a 'teacher' of society, puts him into an impossible
position, that of imposing equality of regard. In this, Drucker
refers to the words of Tawney on progress:
'Progress depends ...... on the willingness on the part of the mass
of mankind.... to recognize genuine superiority and submit to its influence.' 29

Underlying this argument are two strands. Firstly, Drucker stresses the simple impossibility of imposing equality of regard. Drucker does not develop this, but the wording implies similar objections to Joseph and Sumption i.e. that true equality of regard and related fraternity, requires a free response from individuals and therefore cannot be imposed.

The second strand is of a more particular nature. Drucker argues that the idea of giving equality is morally unjustifiable. The 'act of giving imposes obligations on the recipient', and 'repeated one-sided giving serves nicely to remind both giver and receiver who is boss.' 30

The very act of giving thus sets up a dominant or paternalistic relationship, with no real participation from the receiver. This process is wrong not simply because of the structure of the relationship, but also, because equality is not anyones to give. Hence, argues Drucker, equality must be taken and involves a constant class struggle for power.

Thus far we have seen consequential arguments against Tawney's view of equality and criticisms of his view of the concept of equality.

A final criticism in this section comes from John Charvet. Charvet has made several criticisms of equality, amongst which he argues that equality is self-contradictory and that it will lead to the destruction of roles in society. 31 However, as those do not argue against Tawney specifically, I will not address such arguments here. At one point, however, Charvet forms an explicit criticism of Tawney which questions his moral justification of
equality. In 'A Critique of Freedom and Equality', Charvet brackets Tawney with Williams, Rees and Vlastos, as building his justification of equality upon the central idea of individualist ethics, 'consisting in the individual giving his value to himself.' 32 At the base of this justification, is 'the requirement of authenticity' i.e. the requirement of self determination, and the exclusion of other determination in respect of a particular life. This, in itself is the corollary of the absolute value of the individual i.e. the 'axiom that individuals have value in themselves,' and not unmediated value for others. What value they have for others is a consequence of the value they have in themselves - hence the value is mediated. Charvet's criticism is, of course, a blanket one of several writers. However, it does strike at Tawney's view of equal value, seeing this as based upon individualism and 'the requirement that the individual has only himself as his end in his particular life.' 34 The point of his argument is that such a justification of equal value is morally inadequate i.e. it can never set up an adequate ground for shared morality. 35 Thus, Charvet argues that 'the affirmation of the individual's value in relation to other individuals is a necessary condition of the possibility of morality.' 36

Before examining the specific criticisms of Tawney's equality, two points are worthy of note. Firstly, the examples of criticism offered above, are not confined to any particular group. Tawney is criticised by both right and left wing.
Secondly, though the perspective of the criticism naturally differs, some arguments are common to all of the presentations, for example, the importance of freedom for fraternity. Further common elements in the criticisms are that they either begin from an inadequate understanding of Tawney's equality, or from an understanding of equality as such, which arbitrarily restricts the meaning. A good example of both of these is the work of Joseph and Sumption.

Firstly, they restrict the meaning of equality to that of an absolute concept. Their only attempt to justify this is to assert that equality must be understood as a literal mathematical concept. Thus, without any specific reason, they exclude the concept of equality of respect from consideration. This approach, much in the style of the logical positivists, then proceeds to deny any possibility of a deontological element in the justification of equality, again without exploration or justification, simply asserting that equality can have no intrinsic justification, only consequential. Finally, having characterized equality as necessarily involving equality of outcome, Joseph and Sumption assume that equality is being used as an end principle, i.e. a fundamental principle which is the basic aim of a social policy, rather than an instrumental principle i.e. a means of achieving other values.

Tawney, however, does refer to re-distribution as instrumental and spends time arguing for the importance of both deontological and consequential justifications of equality, in particular equality of respect which lies at the base of his thought. Not only do Joseph and Sumption not address the concept of person-centred
equality, they also fail to take account of the importance of liberty in Tawney's thought. The 'supreme good of public and civil liberty' is one of Tawney's aims which constantly works against the kind of sterile picture which Joseph and Sumption paint as the necessary end of equality. Tawney, as the authors rightly note, was concerned for individual growth and excellence, and this concern was precisely generated by his positive view of equality of respect. He would have accepted the assertion that 'poverty is not unfreedom' himself, noting that 'character can overcome circumstances.' Nonetheless, he argues that in fact, poverty does often contribute towards lack of freedom, diminishing power in many spheres and badly affecting motivation. However, the effect of distribution on freedom is seen by Tawney in the context of a wider view of equality, including distributional and participatory equality, a wider perspective which once again, Joseph and Sumption fail to address. In this context, to argue that Tawney equates freedom with simply widening of choice ignores his insistence that widening of choice should not be merely random, but relevant and meaningful, in the context of the duties of the individual to themselves and others.

It is precisely because of Tawney's emphasis upon duties as against rights, that the Joseph and Sumption argument against a right to equality, and for coincident self-interest, can have no relevance to his view of equality. For Tawney, rights were dependent upon function and thus tied to service. There is no attempt to establish a 'natural right' to equality, for equality is seen as part of relationships and the obligations involved in
Equality of distribution and participation facilitate these relationships, and give expression to equality of respect.

Joseph and Sumption's fundamental ideas about human nature and the state will be examined below. At this point, a final note on their argument against Tawney must take account of their use of consequential arguments. Having argued that equality is, by definition, an absolute concept, the range of their empirical evidence is inevitably restricted to nations who do aim for equality of outcome or uniformity. Not only does this ignore the evidence of non-Communist countries who have had some egalitarian policies, it also ignores the complex issue of interpreting equality sociologically and economically. Communist states, for instance, could equally supply evidence which suggests that equality has never really been achieved or that social stratification has been more influenced by the historical and social content of the nation than by any egalitarian measures. The issue of the status of sociological evidence in consequence arguments for or against equality will be examined in more detail in succeeding chapters.

In turning to Donnison's criticisms of Tawney, two points are worthy of note. Firstly, like Joseph and Sumption, he does not take account of the importance that freedom has for Tawney. Thus, like Terrill, he gives the impression that equality was only for fraternity. In that context, Donnison, secondly, provides too limiting a meaning for fraternity as common culture. More specific criticisms of common culture will be examined later in
this chapter alongside common purpose. However, it is important to note at this point, that Tawney was very aware of the dangers of an exclusive form of fellowship. It is not surprising then, that his references to fellowship should be cast frequently in the general moral terms of duties, or service, concepts which can apply to all communities or institutional relationships without being tied to any particular expression. As noted above, Tawney never seeks to impose fellowship through a change in social organization. He does, however, encourage mediation structures, such as industry or trades unions, to view their community in terms of their purposes and duties to society, and to work out how to fulfill them.

Behind many arguments against equality, especially in terms of consequences, lies a very real anxiety about the effects of equality in terms of allowing tyrannies to take power - either of the masses, or of nationalism, or of communist bureaucracies. In many respects, it is these elements which supply for Joseph and Sumption, the 'inevitability of uniformity' with respect to equality.

Along with this, there is used a subtle form of argument ad hominem, in which the forces of oppression, envy, and power seeking are ranged against 'a good man', a 'soft hearted egalitarian', a 'saintly' man, encouraging 'generous, gentle, gift giving.' By inference, a man such as Tawney could not really hope to stand against the immense powers waiting to fill any vacuum. Moreover, by implication, such a saintly man could not know how to ensure that social organizations could withstand such power. Once again, there is revealed genuine ignorance of Tawney's approach. As
noted in the first chapters, he was acutely aware of power and the tendency of man to misuse power, and was thus concerned to disperse power and make decision making far more open. 51 Tawney was thus, in many respects a realist. His altruistic nature or saintly character, in any case, have little relevance as to the validity of his view of equality.

Drucker's criticism of Tawney reveals a complete misunderstanding of the way in which Tawney sees the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity relating. Tawney certainly takes on the role of teacher and accepts the need for a hierarchical society (both points are mentioned in criticisms later in this chapter). However, Tawney nowhere suggests that the State 'distribute' equality of regard. In arguing that Tawney does, Drucker actually seems to confuse several concepts, equality of regard or respect, fellowship, and power. Tawney certainly does advocate the re-distribution of power both in terms of opportunities and resources, and does advocate education for the use of that power. 52 All of this is to increase freedom and to encourage fellowship. 53 However, none of this is imposed or 'given' in any sense which does not require the individual to take advantage of the distribution i.e. to use the resource or 'good' in fulfilling duties to self or to others. Drucker's observation that Tawney abstracted equality of regard from the examples of closed communities is only partially true. On the one hand he was deeply affected by the camaraderie of the 'common man', especially as experienced in the war. 54 On the other hand, fellowship being one of Tawney's twin aims, was precisely non-exclusive. 55
Turning to Charvet's view of Tawney's justification of equality, there are elements in his writings which seem to support this. Tawney's deontological justification, with its focus on equal value has the individual and his or her unique importance as the foundation of the moral attitude. However, in examining his justification in chapter two, it became clear that Tawney viewed the individual not in isolation, but in relation to others. He accepts that individuals are both determiners and determined, shaped by society as well as shaping the world, and part of a network of moral relationships. In such a context, it is impossible to say that the individual only has value for themselves. Charvet's own basis of morality, seeing the individual's value in relation to other individuals could itself be questioned. Indeed, it could be argued that Tawney provides a corrective that the value of the individual is both in relation to him or herself and to others. However, in the context of this thesis, it is sufficient to conclude that he misrepresents the basis of Tawney's view of equal value.

In conclusion, I would argue that none of these criticisms seriously disturbs Tawney's concept of equality of respect, and its relation to freedom, fellowship and distribution. They do, however raise serious questions about how it is possible to have dialogue on equality. Tawney and his critics share many important values which the critics seem unable to recognize. Perhaps, more interestingly, from right and from left (Joseph and Sumption, and Drucker), Tawney's critics share an insistence that social relationships with respect to equality should be interest and rights based. For Joseph and Sumption, it is the interest of the individual
which is paramount, and their right to retain goods unless it is in their interest not to. 60 For Drucker, it is the interest of the underprivileged classes which is paramount, and they must take equality. He does not say from whom, or how, but the implication is from the rich, and is to be taken by right. These criticisms rarely meet Tawney at his holistic and balanced view of equality. However, in turning to criticisms on concepts such as function, and the practical aspects of Tawney’s equality, arguments would seem to be better founded.

B. Equality and Other Principles

For Tawney’s equality, the most problems begin to emerge when viewed in relation to second level principles such as function and purpose. As noted above, the term function, is used as a criterion of distribution of resources, in particular salaries and wages. 61 Reward for Tawney, was to be based upon function in serving the common purpose, so that 'distribution should never fall out of relation to service rendered to the community.' 62

Whilst this criterion of distribution would tend to diminish great differences between rewards, precisely because most would have some claim to serving the common purpose, 63 nonetheless, it is a relative equality of distribution, which is, by definition, conditional. This conflicts with the express character of equality of respect, which is, by definition, unconditional. Equality of respect leads logically to distribution of resources based upon relevant reason, for example, illness is the relevant reason for health care, not ability to pay. 64 Behind the criterion of need, was, for Tawney, that of enabling the individual to fulfill their
duties to society, family etc. i.e. enabling them to contribute to the common purpose. Thus, it may be argued that for Tawney, to be consistent in terms of equality, function should be recast as an enabling criterion, rather than a criterion of reward. If reward were still deemed to be important in some way, then non-financial means of reward such as those advocated by Crick could be encouraged.

A second problem for function was its dependence upon purpose and the idea of the common good. The precise content of the common good was, for Tawney, open to question. Tawney wanted the common good to be collectively defined. This places Tawney upon the horns of a dilemma. Either the concept of the common good was still developing, in which case there could be no clear content to the criterion of function, or the concept of the common good was clear, and its meaning shared, in which case Tawney has to explain how a society can come to freely agree on common interests or goods, without being 'persuaded' or 'coerced' in some way. Indeed, it could be argued that concepts of purpose and function would necessarily require sufficient central control to enforce its egalitarian standards across a whole economy. Anything less, would leave the way open to 'local' perceptions of functional reward which might differ markedly from other perceptions, thus destroying the whole point of function.

However, even if problems of meaning were solved, the concept of function would still have difficulties. As it stands, it is still a general concept which requires interpretation, and which, of itself, cannot reveal how the differential distribution is to be made. It does not provide criteria for determining which functions
are more worthy of reward than others, nor what is an acceptable difference between rewards. It may be argued that reward led distribution will always tend to widen the gap between rewards in order to ensure that key positions are filled.

Gutmann takes some of these considerations further, arguing that distribution according to function 'invites the creation of a status hierarchy.' Status in this situation would depend upon the relative ability to contribute to the common good. Self-respect may then be based upon this relative ability, making 'fellowship psychologically untenable.' Thus Gutmann argues that even a status hierarchy based upon service to the common good, could lead to division and deference, precisely one of the reasons that made inequality in England undesirable to Tawney. Gutmann continues,

'But if social justice might also produce deference, would that be preferred? Even if so .... Tawney's discussion of equality, directed primarily at reducing established class privilege offers few clues as to why.'

Gutmann's discussion inevitably takes us back to the question of conditional and unconditional equality. Behind her hypothetical status hierarchy is the assumption that different rewards are an estimate of the value of the individual in their contribution to the common good. If this were taken further, it would be possible to envisage a newly defined form of poverty, the 'poor in service' ie. those who were unable to contribute to the common good, for example, the handicapped, the unemployed etc. It may be retorted that in fact all such individuals do have some contribution to make and are equally valued by society for them. If this is so,
then it would seem not only inconsistent, but morally wrong to tie contributions of service in with financial rewards at all. Either all should receive the same, to reflect equal value, or value should be rewarded by non-financial means, or financial distribution should not be tied to reward for function, but rather seen as enabling functions to be performed.

The consequences of these arguments for Tawney's overall view of equality are considerable. The need to provide different rewards in order to fill the key posts in society was a major ground for accepting any inequality in distribution. If this concept of function were no longer tenable then the idea of an acceptable relative equality might also fall. In the event of no support for relative equality in distribution, Tawney would be faced with radical or absolute equality. Thus the logic of the Joseph and Sumption argument would begin to re-emerge, i.e. that Tawney's equality would, in practice, inevitably lead to radical equality.

Closely connected to the question of the relationship between equality and function, is the broader issue of the relevance of the idea of a common purpose in a pluralist society. If it were found not to be applicable, then this would seriously affect the plausibility of Tawney's equality. Atherton argues that the idea of common purpose underlying function leads to a holistic approach to egalitarianism which simply cannot relate to the plurality of values in modern society. Thus, Tawney's 'continuing emphasis... on a strong social purpose suggests the persistence of an underlying belief in a form of Christendom no longer relevant to a modern society.'

In effect, Atherton is arguing that the concept of social purpose
is no longer the appropriate framework for any moral dialogue.

It limited Tawney's ability

'to recognize that the moral contribution of collective realities would have to be evaluated not only in relation to social purpose, but also in relation to their value in their own right as relatively autonomous bureaucracies, and political mechanisms or as means and expressions of procedural agreements.' 71

Atherton is thus arguing that Tawney's concept of social purpose tends to deny the autonomy of morality. Thus, if equality were inextricably connected to the concept of social purpose, it is hard to see how it could realistically be applied to a complex society. Behind the concept of common purpose, lie the ideas of a common culture and a moral consensus. Reisman notes several problems relating to these ideas, quite apart from the argument that a consensus simply doesn't exist in modern pluralist society.

Firstly, it depends upon a very optimistic view of individuals, as accepting the moral consensus and rejecting materialistic ends. (This will be further examined in section C of this chapter).

Secondly, Tawney's method of social change is not clear. Egalitarian views, given their moral base, would best be introduced from above, yet Tawney was determined to see change from below as the consensus emerges. 72 Thirdly, consensus can represent a threat to the 'creative deviance'. 73 In this, Reisman returns to the basic criticisms of Joseph and Sumption and Donnison, with coercion from above leading to lack of creativity.

This series of arguments provides serious difficulties for Tawney. Not only do they point to possible serious inconsistencies between equality and criteria of distribution, they also question the practicality of the application. Concerning the first criticism,
it could be argued that the contrast of conditional and unconditional equality is too simplistic. Though function does imply a relative equality based upon contribution, this is so only in the context of equality of respect, and, in particular, fraternity. If the spirit of fraternity prevails, then inequalities based upon service to a common end would be acceptable. Hence, Tawney was concerned to foster fraternity by breaking down barriers in education, wealth, etc., and by encouraging both a code of service and reflection upon duties. 74

The concept of function then cannot be starkly compared to equality of respect without taking into account the framework of fraternity which both enabled the inequalities to be accepted, provided a legitimate criteria for reward and was explicitly encouraged in the institutional organization advocated by Tawney. 75 However, all this tells us is that there is no necessary conceptual clash between equality of respect and function. Nonetheless, whilst it may be logically possible to contain both ideas, is it likely to work, given our knowledge of society? Tawney would argue in support of it that, precisely given our knowledge of humanity, some incentive to fill responsible posts was necessary. 76 Given the importance of fraternity, the idea of function would be the best possible. Certainly, a concept such as this was necessary, if Tawney was to have both morality and efficiency in a hierarchical society. 77

Gutmann, of course, also appeals to human nature in her hypothetical 'status hierarchy', 78 and it would be hard to deny the possibility of human nature always tending to create such structures.

However, her vision of an entirely new status hierarchy is perhaps
too grand for Tawney's writings to bear. It seems to assume a hierarchy quite different from the one of Tawney's time, with function according to the common good as the new ground for deference. However, it must be noted that for Tawney, function only directly applied to matters of resources in property and industry, and that whilst an equalizing of power was argued for in all these areas, from increased participation to selective control of industry, Tawney did not envisage a radical change in the hierarchical structure of industry or society. Thus,

a) the skill of the manager was the object of legitimate deference
b) proper subordination was not only acceptable in society, but actually necessary for progress.

Tawney therefore, looks to the same kind of hierarchical structure and simply to a modification of perception of the roles within that structure such that individuals are not treated as 'means' rather than ends. Increased participation and public control would support this shift in perception, ensuring that individuals are not abused.

At the core of this position, once again for Tawney, is equality of respect. This is directly relevant to the work place, because it precisely demands mutual respect within any given hierarchical structure. It neither demands the destruction of hierarchy as such, nor the rigid adherence to established power structures. Rather does equality of respect demand that respect in any social organization be based upon 'acceptable' grounds i.e. where the individual is valued for themselves and their contribution to the overall effort. In Tawney, these two elements of simple respect for the individual and respect based upon the contribution of the
individual are held together. His emphasis upon duties, both to industry and community, precisely reveal that respect for others and self-respect is tied in with our moral relationships and our fulfillment of duties to family, to work, to community. If the two elements were divided, then Gutmann's scenario might well be relevant. If unconditional equality were allowed free reign, then the logical result might be the rejection of hierarchy. If only respect based upon functional contribution were accepted, then indeed a new status hierarchy would be a danger. However, Tawney precisely holds the two together. Mutual respect in the context of a joint enterprise thus becomes more important than respect based upon contribution and ability to contribute. Once again then, function in Tawney has to be viewed in the context of Tawney's total egalitarian views. It is in this context that it becomes clear that function for Tawney cannot be seen simply in the light of an enabling concept i.e. distribution according to functional requirements. The concept of function does provide a framework for recognizing important contributions and thus, affirming them. In all this, however, Tawney talks far more in the language of realism, recognizing that individuals will still need incentives to serve in positions of responsibility. In this respect, Tawney remains a realist. On the one hand he accepts that human nature both requires incentives, and also that it will tend to abuse too much power in only a few hands. Thus, he suggests realistic measures for incentives and sharing of power. On the other hand, he is aware that only a long term development will provide the 'civilization' necessary for a recognition of 'common identity.' This goes some way to answering the criticism
that Tawney does not really address the question of how a society can come to agree freely on common goods or interests (the base of function) without having sufficient central control to enforce 'egalitarian standards' across a whole society. The only 'control' which Tawney argues for is precisely that which guards against the abuse of power and which gives more control to the individual. The basis of common purpose for Tawney would come through education, especially with its strong emphasis upon individual and social duties, and through the already existent consensus. Tawney never specifies this consensus too closely, noting a consensus over basic principles and basic moral rules which reflect those principles. Tawney's desire to generate debate about basic principles is very much one which aims to uncover this common bedrock of principles. These are the ones which precisely provide the moral meaning essential to any community. Thus, Tawney stresses the necessity for agreement at this level. This is very relevant to the whole debate about mutual respect. If this is to be encouraged and developed, then some acceptance of general meaning or purpose must be a basis for it. Indeed, Tawney has the makings of an argument that mutual respect (his view of a healthy social situation) cannot flourish where there is no agreement on basic principles. Without agreement as to the latter, there can be no real, shared understanding as to what mutual respect means, or involves in practice. This level of consensus then is to be discovered over basic principles, and really comes down to the idea of equality of respect for persons and the resultant aims of freedom and fellowship.
At this point, Tawney then falls open to Atherton's criticism that any social purpose based upon such a narrow set of principles cannot hope to engage a pluralist society. Alongside Atherton, McIntyre suggests that no moral consensus is possible in contemporary society. The argument from this point could take several routes. On the one hand, one might attempt to empirically test Tawney's position. It is, however, not clear how this might be achieved, for the notion of moral consensus in Tawney is not a static one. As an interactionist, he frankly admits that views on society are constantly developing in various ways. A second way may be to examine the cultural heritage of society and examine the assumptions on which it is built. Thus Tawney before the First World War, viewed a nation still under the influence of Christian moral views. Another possible approach would be to compare the different philosophies that are present in any society and look for the 'family resemblances.' Preston, for example, holds that there is a striking resemblance between various faiths and philosophies.

However, it is hard to see how any of these approaches of themselves, could conclusively defend Tawney's position, especially as he accepts that man is both aware of the important moral principles but is also prone to sin and thus the forgetting of them. At the very least, however, it can be argued that contemporary pluralism requires far more rigorous analysis before it is accepted that different philosophies are not compatible.

How far, for instance, do we simply assume that different interest groups, or different cultural groups, necessarily reflect different fundamental values or principles? Equally, where there are clear
differences, how far are these at the level of fundamental principles or at the secondary level of mechanisms and policies? Tawney does not follow such questions through in detail, but he does suggest that any discussion should take account of these different levels. If policy making followed such a process, either at national, local or industrial level, then consensus would be not a static thing, but something constantly being discovered or affirmed. It is perhaps sufficient to note at this point that the whole debate about consensus and pluralism is still very much open, and thus simply to argue that Tawney's equality cannot rely upon a consensus of opinion is not sufficient to endanger his egalitarian argument.

Reisman's criticism that the consensus either emerges or is placed from above, is answered once the idea of the process is accepted. In Tawney's eyes, the consensus is a function of movement from below and above. Government provides frameworks and institutions within which basic moral values and resultant aims can be clarified and given meaning in particular policies at all levels. A basic assumption here, underlined by Tawney's view of sin, is that consensus or even recognition of different and important values will not be achieved without some framework.

A more sustained defence of Tawney and his position on pluralism is to note that Tawney's equality precisely did encourage diversity, of individuals and of institutions. He is concerned that individuals work through duties in the way they feel most appropriate, both to themselves and to the various institutions or individuals that they relate to. Hence, Tawney sets out a view of complex equality which is similar to that of Michael Walzer, though again
not as systematically set out. Walzer argues that equality can
exist in a pluralist society providing that each distinctive
institution allocates goods in regard to its own appropriate
values, and the values of one institution should not be imposed
upon another. Thus are recognized different spheres of justice,
for example, health, where care should be allocated to those in
medical need. 102 Tawney thus sees health and education as
spheres of allocation based upon need. In industry he argues for
participatory equality alongside distributional relative equality
based upon function. Thus whilst all individuals are entitled to
respect, this would not require equal distribution of wages. In
the case of industry, the needs which determined equality were both
needs of the individual and the needs of the industry as a whole
(hence the desire for efficiency and order). 103 What Tawney sees
more clearly than Walzer is that despite the relative autonomy of
the different spheres of justice, there are connections which exist
between them. Thus the sphere of the family generates needs and
duties which may depend upon adequate distribution at the work
place, for fulfillment. Walzer's view also runs the danger of
falling into a relativism, such that injustice is defined exclusively
as the values of one sphere invading another. 104 Tawney avoids
such relativism precisely because equality of respect is at the
base of his complex equality and provides the consistency between
all spheres.

For Tawney then, with his emphasis upon diversity and upon the
different means that may be appropriate to fulfill the major
principles and aims, the idea that equality and pluralism should be
dichotomous is unfounded. Indeed, respect for persons properly carried through should lead to a flowering of diversity. This extended attempt to defend Tawney's equality and its relationship to moral purpose, cannot, however, disguise remaining difficulties:-

a) the concept of function still does not give clear or detailed guidance as regards distribution. For such a concept to be of use, either it would need to be developed in more detail, or social mechanisms will need to be developed with the role of interpreting the general idea of function in a local context. 105

b) there remains in Tawney, a tension between equality for self determination and adherence to moral purposes. I have suggested that the stronger strain in Tawney is precisely the one which seeks to enable the development of moral purposes through mechanisms which involve self-determination and the development of critical humanism. 106 However, firstly, Tawney tends to simply assert the holistic view of equality which balances self-determination and a moral framework and not always provide a clear understanding of how this can be achieved, or to assume that it has been achieved. Thus, for example, the democratic experiments in industry advocated in the 'Radical Tradition' do not achieve great detail. 107

Equally, his faith in British political democracy is boundless. He does not question whether its mechanisms really do enable any real degree of participation or self-determination. 108 Tawney seems to assume that once power has been equalized elsewhere, it will enable individuals to use their political
rights more effectively. 109

Secondly, there are places where Tawney does assert a strong moral regime, for example, where he demands that the Church oversee its members on the basis of a strong code of social ethics. 110 Wright also mentions the advice of Tawney to a socialist government, not to be deterred by the fact that industrial workers seemed to be reluctant to accept the responsibility of industrial freedom. The government should, 'take the initiative, force the pace, and - I won't say compel - but persuade men to be free.' 111 This example, however, is interestingly poised. It remains open as to whether this is paternalism or a legitimate challenge to the individual. In a later chapter, I will suggest that the challenge is legitimate and not coercive, precisely because it does not prescribe a particular course of action, and that it is an important part of a theology of equality.

Another area of potential tension, remarked upon by Gutmann, with regard to liberal egalitarians, is between participatory equality and distributional equality. The two tend to pull in opposite directions. Distributional equality demands centralism, to ensure that distribution is equitable across society. Participatory equality demands increasing decentralization with solutions appropriate to a local situation. As noted above, Tawney gives some important indications as to how they are linked both in terms of equality of respect and in distribution of power. However, his outline requires to be developed further.
The difficulties examined in this section have tended to move from discussion of concept to discussion of mechanism. They raise the interesting question that perhaps the so-called possible tension between equal respect (as moral base) and self-determination (freedom) can never be resolved at a general level, but only with respect to a particular situation or problem. Once again this will be examined in the final chapters.

c) Tawney's use of empirical evidence, with respect to equality is not convincing. As noted above, the whole issue of what constitutes empirical evidence of a consensus (an important part of evidence for accepted social purposes) is not clear. This is especially so if one accepts an interactionist sociology. Tawney can point to a broad view of consensus in terms of roles, general principles and procedural values. However, his assertion of a consensus based upon Christian tradition is not backed up by empirical evidence. In fact, on the contrary, there is some evidence against any form of ideology as dominating all society. However, as noted above, Tawney's view of equality does not depend upon a static view of consensus.

d) Tawney's tensions between centralism and participatory equality and moral purpose and self-determination, are also mirrored in his views on community and upon the importance of common purposes. A prominent example of common purpose providing a focus for community, given by Tawney, is the Second World War and its effects in Britain. The problem with such a
a model of community is that it is reactive and survivalist and precisely depends upon individuals sacrificing some degree of self-determination. Compared to this, the community which Tawney sees as developing in industry is quite clearly proactive with individuals contributing towards aims and plans in decision making. More precision is required for Tawney's position with respect to the role of common purposes, both in intermediate groups and in society as a whole, if participatory equality is to take greater shape.

To sum up this section, Tawney's views on function, consensus and a moral framework require development if his view of equality is to remain coherent and valid. There is no doubt that the broad view which Tawney sets, could exist without function. It could not exist, however, without the fundamental moral purposes and this area will be addressed in the last chapter. It must be noted that the difficulties raised in this section should not give the impression that Tawney's view of equality was not substantive. On the contrary, as noted above, he insisted upon taking equality into policy. The criticisms here, are rather in the perspective of Tawney's comprehensive view of equality i.e. that his view was so comprehensive that he did not always produce the detailed mechanisms to cope with potential tensions and difficulties.

C. The Fundamental Ideas Underlying Tawney's Equality

In criticising the egalitarian position of Tawney, the argument tends eventually to move either to the difficulties experienced in putting such a view into practice, and these will be examined more fully in the next section, or to the ideas underlying the theory
itself, the subject of this section.

Joseph and Sumption criticize both Tawney's view of human nature in general and of self-interest in particular. Firstly, they argue that competition and ambition are a part of human nature. Both are necessary if society is to develop, for progress is 'born from the unco-ordinated energies of countless individuals.'

At the base of this, the authors assert that the individual exists prior to or apart from society. The implication of this position is that the individual's identity, and thus, self-respect and esteem is established also apart from society and through the exercising of talents and pursuit of interests. The consequences of all this for society can be seen in technological progress and greatly increased wealth for all levels of society. Given this, Joseph and Sumption argue that planning and cooperation required by equality, are not only coercive, but also against genuine progress and ultimately, against nature.

Joseph and Sumption also argue that Tawney, along with Temple denies any possibility that the stimulus of self-interest can be good and that it must therefore be ignored or controlled. In fact, the case of equality is not only based upon a negative view of self-interest, but also the 'insulting untruth that men will always find it in their interest to be uncharitable to each other, so that self-interest must be stamped out if civilized behaviour is to be encouraged.'

R.H. Preston takes up a related point in his discussion of Tawney as a Christian moralist. Preston argues that Tawney's alternative of service or self-interest was too simplistic. Self-interest or the 'profit motive' is not of itself wrong. On the contrary, self-interest is a 'powerful' element in life which cannot be
repressed and thus 'has to be allowed for' alongside service. In developing this point, Preston argues that Tawney's perspective as a Christian moralist has actually obscured the possibility of an objective analysis of society and its institutions. In this, Preston focuses two major problems. Firstly, Tawney makes too direct a connection between faith and the empirical structures of life. Preston argues that there are no Christian principles of which a particular economic system can be said to be a simple expression. Secondly, Tawney's simplistic moral stance assumes that the basic principles behind any empirical structures must be either good or bad. Thus, any vacuum or principle must be filled by either a religion or a counter religion. This is exemplified for Preston, in Tawney's analysis of capitalism, which, by definition, becomes anti-Christian. However, as Preston argues, by Tawney's own admission, any economic or political system is but a 'serviceable drudge.' Thus, any system depends upon how it is used, and the basic principles or aims behind it. A mixed economy, with some element of market distribution does not, of itself, denote control by the 'profit motive' any more than socialist planning need demonstrate the control of Christian principles.

Alongside this simplistic moralism, which, if proven, would cause great difficulties for Tawney's view of the distribution of power and the application of equality in general, Preston argues that there exists a utopian strain in Tawney. Preston is not precise in his use of the term utopian, but he appears to use it in a negative sense to denote firstly, an unrealistic vision for society and secondly, the idea that the ultimate, in terms of Christian
ideals can be achieved in society. In this, Preston suggests that Tawney was misled by Gore. Gore argues that the Sermon on The Mount is the moral law of a new Kingdom, 'a law which recognized and accepted by the individual conscience, is to be applied in order to establish a new social order.' 130 Thus, Tawney can write in 'Aquisitive Society' of the aim 'to make a new kind, and a Christian kind, of civilization.' 131 This misses the crucial eschatological background to the Sermon on The Mount, which demands not only a radical critique of political and social institutions, but also emphasizes the provisionality of any social organization. Thus, 'the idea that there is a social order and some Christian law or principle which can be realized in it, is quite alien to the teaching of Jesus.' 132

With particular reference to the Aquisitive Society, Preston argues that the idea of such an order does exist in Tawney's thought. Furthermore, 'the abolition of functionless private property is the main item in establishing it. There are several empirical forms it could take; ... but the basic change required by Christian principles would have been made.' 133

Such an approach runs the danger of encouraging others to imagine that particular embodiments of justice are more than partial, making them an easy prey to fanaticism, and Preston traces the influential utopian strain in Tawney's egalitarianism to other socialist thinkers. 134

It must be noted at this point, that Preston's criticisms of Tawney are ambiguous. On the one hand he notes that Tawney qualifies most of the statements which Preston criticizes. 135 On the other hand, he clearly stands by his criticism of Tawney's
utopianism and lack of an eschatological perspective. Preston then develops this criticism by arguing that Tawney never developed a strategy for dealing with conflict and in particular, the legitimate conflict of interest that might develop between different groups in society, for example, producers, marketers, and consumers. Conspicuously lacking in Tawney is a theology of power which would recognize the reality of interest conflict without demanding the acceptance of one set of values. Thus, once again, the problems of individual or group autonomy versus a broad moral stance, emerge. In this, the theological critique of Tawney's egalitarianism tends to deal with the same issues as the more obviously philosophical critique above.

In the light of such criticisms, Tawney's equality thus has to face several difficulties:

a) the underlying assumptions about human nature are questioned.

b) the balance of the concept of equality and its usefulness or relevance in dealing with disputes is questioned. Here Atherton's later criticism of the concept as a whole are relevant i.e. that the concept is simply not clear enough to be fruitfully used in discussion of social policy.

Several commentators observe that because of Tawney's moralist stance, he thus does not actually address the major arguments of modern capitalism, especially that it provides a 'dynamic means of running a modern economy without political coercion.'

In discussing Tawney's view of human nature, it is important to distinguish groundless criticism, from that which may have some
evidence. Joseph and Sumption's blanket criticism of Tawney's view of human nature is simply wrong. Tawney held a balanced, realistic view of human nature, viewing man's capacity for good and awareness of moral principles along with man's sinful nature and his inclination to abuse power. Whilst this required control to ensure a responsible use of power, this did not deny power per se, nor the need for individual talent to be given full reign.

At the centre of Joseph and Sumption's criticism is not an argument against Tawney's underlying assumption, so much as simply a counter-assumption that the individual exists prior to society. In this, there is no attempt to examine the complexity of the relationship between the individual and society, of how the individual may be affected by social organization or affect society, nor of the possible moral obligations that are involved in relationships. Tawney examines such connections, and his conclusion that there are moral relationships which cannot be avoided nor entered into purely by contract or motivated by self-interest, is never really addressed by Joseph and Sumption.

Despite the assertions of Joseph and Sumption, it must also be noted that Tawney was aware of the importance of self-reliance and independence, and did note the good effects of capitalism and competition. Moreover, Tawney was well aware of the importance of the individual developing responsibility, and of the need for individuals to be involved in risk-taking. This was as much a part of progress and creativity as was the recognition of experience and expertise. His point was that such risks should be shared. Such risk, in terms of assessing options and making or helping to
make decisions, was one of the signs of equality of respect. 148

Concerning self-interest, neither Joseph and Sumption's assertion that Tawney has a biased view of it, nor Preston's that Tawney does not really address the subject, can stand. Much of the problem here comes from both critics being imprecise about the meaning of the concept. Tawney was perhaps more precise in his use of the idea without using the specific words 'self-interest.' Firstly, he implicitly recognized the importance of self-interest in his advocating differential rewards according to function. Secondly, he had a clear sense of self-interest in terms of the obligation of the individual to fulfill all that they are capable of. 149 As noted in the first chapters, Tawney did not see all of the individual's development as being fulfilled in service. His obligation to develop as an individual, however, was a broad one, which included the development of mental capacities as well as simply enjoyment. 150

Thirdly, Tawney points to a view of self-interest which actually does involve service. 151 This involves both the importance of service in self-development and spiritual fulfillment, but also involves co-operation and service as ultimately achieving better planning and greater efficiency. 152

Finally, Tawney does not argue against self-interest per se, only criticizing it where it is the sole motive and where it leads to policies which demean the individual i.e. ignore equality of respect. 153

With respect to the charge of simple moralism which makes it difficult for Tawney to analyse society objectively, there is clearly some truth. Tawney does roundly criticize capitalism.
He even goes so far as to list the underlying false assumptions or principles including denial of other than individual responsibility, denial of personality, denial of freedom. 155 Despite this, however, there are indications that Tawney's view was not so simplistic.

Firstly, Tawney recognizes that there are different forms of capitalism, and he states that his criticism is addressed to the particular manifestation of it in his time. 156 Secondly, he recognizes that the development of capitalism has involved the focus on and development of some important personal qualities. 157 Thirdly, though Tawney attacks the underlying principles of contemporary capitalism, he does not thereby assume that the statesmen' involved are necessarily evil i.e. they may be well intentioned. 158 Further analysis of the 'principles' underlying capitalism at this point reveals that they do not represent principles, at least in the sense of a normative concept, so much as a narrowness of mind and a lack of awareness which limits the response of those in power and thus limits options with regard to the development of capitalism. Tawney's emphasis upon 'principles' tends to obscure what is, in fact, a broader holistic perspective. In the light of such a perspective, the Tawney position looks far stronger, though it does require some development which will occur in later chapters. At this point, it is worth simply underlining that the capitalist process at Tawney's time did precisely re-inforce a limiting view of humanity and of its purpose. With power and decision making limited to a few, accountability limited to a small group of shareholders, the broader aspects of human personality and society noted in chapter two, were simply not part of the
decision making process. Such a limited perspective will, in turn, seek to legitimize itself, developing the virtues which re-inforce it. This at least, forms the basis of an 'alternative religion', if not quite the dramatic 'counter-religion' Tawney describes.

Tawney's analysis of society is, of course, very influenced by his interactionist view. Such a view inevitably includes reference to principles and in particular to the principles which explicitly or implicitly underlie any social policy. The underlying principles set the aims of any policy, with an understanding of society helping to devise appropriate methods. As noted above, in all this, Tawney does not see society as an overarching organism, but rather as the sum of a series of interactions at the levels of individual, groups, and intermediate structures. Given this, it is very difficult for Tawney to achieve an 'objective' overall view of society. Accepting that values have a part in the analysis will, inevitably raise questions of purpose and ultimately what is the most acceptable purpose or purposes for humanity. The question remains thus, as to whether any analysis of society can be undertaken apart from values and principles.

In the context of all this, the utopian strain in Tawney is not as clear as it appears to Preston. Tawney explicitly denies associating a future society with the Kingdom of Heaven. He is also very aware of the difficulties that exist for any attempt at social change. The concept of a functional society clearly was important to Tawney, and in 'Aquisitive Society' it does provide a challenging vision. However, from the perspective of 'Equality' and 'The Attack', such a society is not to be achieved at a stroke
and may well have very different empirical manifestations at
different times. 162 Function remained for Tawney, part of the
total aims based in equality of respect, and in itself, depended
heavily upon an understanding of fraternity and freedom. Equality
of participation and of distribution were of equal importance to
Tawney and thus, function could not be deemed to be the key
mechanism in changing society. 163

Turning to Preston's point about power, whilst there is little
explicit material in Tawney about the constructive use of power
conflicts in society, he nonetheless, had a great awareness of
power, and contributed several factors that would enrich a theology
of power. Power, for Tawney, was not static but relational or
dialectical. Thus, as Terrill comments

'It cannot be understood apart from the response it elicits or
seeks to elicit.' 164

As such, Tawney's view of power was closely linked to his holistic
view of man, and to his interactionist view of society. At one
level, the seat of power 'is in the soul' and rests upon attitudes
and response to attitudes. Therefore to destroy power ranged against
one,

'nothing more is required than to be indifferent to its threats,
and to prefer other goods to those which it promises.' 165

The power to do this, however, clearly required an integrated
personality able to withstand the various manifestations of power in
society. 166 Such power is not exclusively economic or political, 167
but manifests itself in many areas from military organizations, to
religions, to

'the strength of professional organization, in the exclusive control
of certain forms of knowledge and skill, such as the magician, the
medicine-man and the lawyer.' 168
Closely connected to great concentrations of power is man's sinful nature in the sense that man tends to exclude others either for self-protection or simple pursuit of profit. 169 Power, is thus able to move into many forms, each affecting the other. 170 Given this complex view of power, Tawney saw power dispersion not simply in terms of controlling great sources of power, but also in terms of increasingly sharing power. Sharing power involved not simply providing individuals with the opportunity, but also, the skills to control their situation, and this situation included moral relationships as well as individual development. All of this provides a basis not simply for a theology of power, but also, as shall be seen in chapter nine, an extension of the doctrine of creation. In all this, Tawney's view of power is more far reaching and realistic than he is given credit for.

In this context, there is no doubt that Tawney did not see that any institutions could, by definition, be a precise embodiment of social justice. Given his views on the Kingdom of Heaven, upon human nature, and upon the continuing process of interpretation involved in applying principles and aims, no one institution could ever fully embody the justice defined by those principles and aims. Indeed, the crucial point for Tawney was that 'in a changing world no programme can pretend to finality.' 172 Thus, whilst programmes could and did express principles there was no sense in which they could be said to totally embody them.

Tawney's position on this was not a reflection of any eschatological doctrine but rather a deep awareness of the provisionality of all policies, even actions, and also perceptions. Hence, he could
accept that even the definition of socialism was provisional. Implied in all this is very much a learning model of development which avoids methodological or conceptual essentialism. This will be further developed in the final chapters.

Nonetheless, there could be agreement as to the general direction in which the institution should be moving and all institutions could be judged as to how far they are fulfilling the major aims of freedom and fraternity. To this extent, however, there was, for Tawney, a minimum 'level' of justice in institutions i.e. one that involved participatory and distributional equality. However, participatory equality and democracy, by definition, involve a continual development in the definition and application of justice.

We may conclude in this section that criticisms underlying ideas of Tawney's equality, theological, sociological, or psychological do not affect the overall view of equality. Such ideas, and the perspective arising from them, do, however, demand a complex and far reaching view of equality, one which demands a much broader view of justice than distribution. The question then is raised as to how far such a view can be put into practice, whether the strategy of equality as such did, or could work.

D. The Strategy of Equality

Having noted the criticisms of Tawney's theory of equality and its underlying assumptions, it is necessary to turn now to criticisms of Tawney's application of equality. The criticisms can be divided broadly into two kinds:-
a) developing the criticisms of function and the problem of equality and a pluralist society, there is the argument that Tawney actually ignored important mechanisms for achieving equality or efficiency.

b) the argument that the strategy for equality simply did not work, precisely because re-distribution via the social services does not take account of the complexity of achieving equality.

McIntyre's review of Tawney's 'Radical Tradition' is an example of the first argument. In this, McIntyre argues that on the one hand, Tawney's socialist principles were too vague, whilst on the other he lacked 'political imagination' in terms of practical application. There are, in fact, several levels to McIntyre's criticism. Firstly, he criticizes Tawney's definition of socialism. He argues that this is too vague, based as it is upon the values of equality and fraternity. These are 'unhappily terms too vague and general for political guidance until they are embodied in specific social practices or institutions.' 175

Secondly, he argues that Tawney's socialism is defined by a limited concept of capitalism: 'the replacement of private ownership by public ownership or control, and the state's acceptance of the responsibility for social welfare.' 176 Because of this, Tawney was unable to see how the capitalism of the big corporation could, for its own purposes, accept the Trades Unions and the welfare state. Hence, the high ideals of Tawney could never really be effective as he was oblivious to the realities of modern capitalism. Indeed this led to his declared aim being curiously at odds with his chosen means. McIntyre is not precise in his definition of means here, but seems to refer to the pragmatic
policies of post war socialist governments which he sees as not truly socialist. 177 McIntyre's argument parallels both Atherton and Preston. 178 However, whilst Atherton sees the moralist Tawney as finding it hard to address a pluralist society, and Preston argues that the moralist perspective obscures an objective analysis of systems in society, McIntyre implicitly accepts that capitalism per se is not compatible with socialist aims, and that Tawney's vague moralism obscures a realistic assessment of a capitalism which might adapt to some of the challenges of equality. Thus, in Rae's terms, McIntyre is accusing Tawney of allowing equality to be 'tamed.' 179 Rae argues that it only requires a marginal egalitarian in power in any one of the five categories which he details, for the effect of equality in all the other categories to be tamed. To avoid such a danger, requires, according to McIntyre, 'practical skills' not used by Tawney. Thus, he concludes,

'The Socratic question of whether one would rather have ones shoes mended by a good cobbler or a good man has relevance in politics too. Goodness is not enough.' 180

The general point about Tawney's ignoring of important practical elements is examined in more detail by Reisman, with specific reference to 'Aquisitive Society.' 181 Reisman in effect argues that Tawney's preoccupation with equality of power and equality of participation, led him not simply to ignore the model of a mixed economy, 182 but also key areas in the total industrial process. Thus, the professional ethic of service commended by Tawney, which underpinned function, referred to technological rather than economic efficiency. The ethic thus refers to the activity of producing goods, and the activity of exchange falls short on two counts. Firstly, the trader is portrayed as not understanding the whole
creative side of industry, and being preoccupied with the profit motive. Secondly, concentration upon the production side of industry leaves the reader unclear as to how 'workmanship is to be translated into priced goods in the shops.' Reisman also notes how Tawney never really resolves the question of ownership in industry. It is neither seen in terms of a property owning democracy, nor a producers co-operative where workers and owners decide collectively on ends and means. Reisman sees this as being incongruous when the administration of the functional society is to be based in the industry.

Such administration was to aim at 'open dealing and honest work and mutual helpfulness' as a substitute to competition. However, if competition were removed from industry, it is not clear, argues Reisman, how costs and prices are to be determined. Moreover, simple emphasis upon altruism in the economic market would remove from industry the kinds of external discipline which would 'compel it to supply the consumer with what he wants, not what he needs.'

In placing administration in the hands of industry, Tawney incurs further problems. To leave industry to estimate the common good without guidance from central government places a heavy burden on industry itself. Reisman argues that administration would better have been in the hands of central government, thus giving operant meaning to 'common ends and social purposes.' and placing decision making in the hands of democratically elected representatives.

Reisman finally notes Tawney's disregard for the question of scale in industry;
'Once the issue of the character of ownership has been settled, the question of size of the economic unit can be left to settle itself.'

Such a statement, however, leaves open several questions about scale. Are the larger firms necessarily more efficient and if so, how can equality of participation be achieved in them? If smaller firms are necessary in order to achieve fellowship, how will this affect efficiency? Simply to do away with the capitalist class owning production does not begin to answer such detailed questions.

Thus, alongside McIntyre's accusation of lack of political skill, Reisman argues the lack of practical skills of industry or at least, the ignoring of these on Tawney's part in his haste to achieve a moral base for his thoughts. Such arguments would further support the argument that Tawney's equality is neither practical nor relevant.

Le Grand takes the focus of the argument a little further, and argues that Tawney's strategy for equality was unsuccessful. Tawney's method of re-distribution was to pool the nations resources by means of taxation and through this provide 'a social income...... available on equal terms', for all societies members. Le Grand concludes, however, that this approach has failed;

'public expenditure on the social services has not achieved equality in any of its interpretations.'

In health care, education, housing, and transport, public expenditure has systematically favoured the better off, leading to inequality of final income and inequality of outcome or access.

In some cases, the inequality appears to have changed over time.
Le Grand argues that the reason for this is because the forces which created inequalities in the first place, and which perpetuate them now, are simply too strong for indirect methods of distribution to resist. The implication for Tawney's view on equality is that he did not understand the mechanics of re-distribution which required:

a) direct methods of reducing income and wealth differentials, from reforms to the social security system, to proposals for a negative income tax or social dividend. 194

b) an attack upon the ideology of inequality

'the set of beliefs and values that underpins economic inequality and which is the major obstacle to any attempt to reduce it.' 195

Any such challenge to the ideology of inequality must challenge the many assumptions about equality and its effects.

In the light of the studies which Le Grand refers to then, Tawney's own assessment of the success of the strategy of equality would seem to be either misguided or begin to place him into a conservative understanding of equality and fellowship akin to Joseph and Sumption. 196

All of these criticisms in some way, comment upon Tawney's limited perspective and inadequate practical approach. It is not simply that his moral framework makes it difficult for him to see how, for example, the free market can be positively used, it is also that his chosen means of achieving equality are inadequate.

In addition to this, some see Tawney's perception of inequalities in society as too fixed, further reducing any relevance to contemporary society. He seemed unaware of any racial inequalities and 'did not mention inequality of gender except in passing - as
something safely abolished in the past. 197
At the base of this, it may be argued, was Tawney's acceptance of the pre-feminist view of women's role. McIntyre's criticisms of Tawney, are, in most respects, quite inadequate. Firstly, he reaches his judgements based upon the limited evidence of the 'Radical Tradition.' Secondly, even in that evidence, there is a great deal of space given over to policies and methods of achieving equality of power, such that the accusation of 'cliche-ridden high mindedness' is unfounded. 198 Thirdly, Tawney remained aware of the need to adapt to different empirical situations if his major principles were to truly engage society. 199 Fourthly, it is difficult to evaluate McIntyre's point about Tawney not grasping the adaptive qualities of modern capitalism. McIntyre assumes that all manifestations of capitalism are bad, and Tawney begins from a different viewpoint, noting that there are different kinds of capitalism, and that in some forms, it has had good effects. 200 What McIntyre may have inadvertently pointed to in fact, is the difficulty that Tawney would always have as a relative egalitarian. Given the acceptance of inequality as well as diversity, and given the role of function and ultimately of fraternity in defining acceptable inequality, Tawney's equality does at least bear a prima facie resemblance to conservative view of equality with a graded hierarchy in which everyone should know their place and where a form of fellowship can be created. 201
As shall be seen in chapter four, such a resemblance is only superficial. Nonetheless, if basic principles and aims are not made explicit, the two could easily be identified. To avoid such a confusion, however, it is precisely basic principles and how they
are expressed in any policy, which needs to be stressed. 'Political imagination' for Tawney involved precisely that.

Whilst McIntyre's criticisms point to possible dangers in the application of equality, these do not really affect Tawney's basic view of equality. Reisman's criticisms carry more weight. There is no doubt that Tawney does ignore many of the practical factors to which Reisman refers. However, like McIntyre, his evidence is limited, in this case to 'Aquisitive Society.' In other works, as noted above, Tawney is prepared to see the usefulness of some form of capitalism and thus of competition. Equally, Tawney increasingly saw the importance of planning at a national level, so that decision making, especially with regard to egalitarian measures should not be exclusively at the level of industry.

Tawney's view of scale and of traders does underline his concern with relationships above all. He argues that if the character of a particular initiative or institution is right, then problems of fine detail will take their place. The question of ownership did dominate his view of industry and the only guidelines with respect to scale in this context are in terms of his accepting worker ownership for small firms, and public ownership for large organizations. However, the fact that Tawney did not work through to the fine details of industrial planning or that he characterized the trader unfairly does not of itself, affect his view of equality. From the basis of equality of respect, distribution of power and participatory equality were necessary for industry, whatever their results in fact. In this, he looks to an overall framework which will involve some overall control or planning in terms of investments.
or setting targets, with accountability to the public effectively organized. At the same time, he looks to local centres of industry to take responsibility for decision-making at their level, and developing democracy. To this extent, fine details would always be left to local groups to work through. Where perhaps Tawney falls more seriously short, is not so much in the minutiae of industry, as in the guidelines of how central control and planning would relate to local experiments in democracy. There is no doubt that given his broad view, issues such as balancing of 'safety for miners and cheap food for pensioners' need not be left to local industry. To argue this, however, requires a more thoroughgoing examination of what decisions are appropriate to each level of industry or government. 206

Another good example of Tawney's inattention to detail is the question of review. Assuming the framework which enables broad aims to be pursued and appropriate policies to develop, some form of monitoring of effects and regular review would be necessary. Bodies such as consumer councils would be able to achieve this to some degree. However, effective reviews must be regular and take place at the level of decision making. 207

In these criticisms, three elements can be distinguished. Firstly, as noted, the relationship between central government, in industry, politics or social services, and local self-determination does need more detailed guidelines to demonstrate how this balance can be maintained. 208 Secondly, these are detailed arguments which question how Tawney's method will replace, for example, the price fixing mechanism of the market, or oversee that consumers receive
what they want and not simply what they need. These criticisms have less weight precisely because through equalizing power, industry would be accountable to consumers as well as producers. A third element in the criticisms is simply to the effect that Tawney's egalitarianism would not lead to greater efficiency. However, as Le Grand points out, there are no a priori arguments against the idea of equality leading to greater efficiency. Similarly, empirical evidence can be used to support either competition or co-operation as leading to greater efficiency.

Turning to Le Grand's criticism of the strategy of equality, we see that he makes use of statistics about inequalities in the social services, which, by themselves are impressive. In the context of his overall argument, however, they are less so.

a) Le Grand's argument assumes that equality was the major principle behind the development of the social services. The evidence for this, however, is not as conclusive as Le Grand suggests. Other commentators suggest that equality was only one of several important aims, which included the development of a rational and efficient form of provision.

In addition, Hindess suggests the negative argument that 'If the social services were indeed established primarily to reduce inequality, it is somewhat surprising that they do so little to monitor their effectiveness in this respect.'

It is thus difficult to ascribe failure to the social services if equality was not the major aim in the first place.

b) Even if equality was accepted as the major aim, there are important questions about the evidence adduced to test success. Firstly, such evidence is complex and is open to
several different interpretations. Le Grand suggests that the reason for lower uptake of the health service by lower socio-economic category groups depends upon their rational cost/benefit analysis of visits to the surgery, for example in terms of transport or wage cost, or, of lost time, if, due to lack of a phone, appointments are hard to make. This, however, assumes that 'health' is distributed within certain health service mechanisms, and takes no account of the responsibility of the individual in health, or the effect of life style upon health problems. Clearly, the indications of inequalities in health are disturbing, but such figures cannot, of themselves act as the basis for re-distribution, but rather open a debate into much broader areas. Secondly, even if egalitarian considerations are restricted to distributitional equality in terms of the social services, it must be noted that Le Grand does not include the effects of the personal social services and cash benefits. Davis and Piachaud argue that where these are taken into account, the broad effects of all social spending are generally pro-poor.

c) In turning specifically to Tawney's view of equality, it must be said that Le Grand fails to characterize this adequately. He includes Tawney amongst the 'dreamers' and refers to an aspect of his strategy. He then gives every indication that he views Tawney's equality as lot regarding. He argues that equality has not been achieved, in any sense, through social service re-distribution. He defines the senses of equality here in terms of:

- equality of public expenditure
135.

- equality of final income
- equality of use
- equality of cost, which is basically of access
- equality of outcome. 218

All of these are, in some sense, lot-regarding as distinct from person-regarding. This is confirmed by Le Grand's frequent use of distributional terms which quantify goods. Thus, for equality of use in education, Le Grand refers to 'similar amounts of education', whilst equality of outcome in education involves the 'bundle of skills learned.' 219

It is not clear what is the use of measuring the 'amount of education received' without consideration of the aims or quality of the education. Nor is it clear that the concept of skill can be quantified in the way that Le Grand suggests. It is, however, clear that Tawney emphasized person-regarding equality and that as a result, equality of distribution was not an end in itself, but rather a means to enabling freedom and fellowship. Inevitably, then, attempting to measure the success of Tawney's equality involves these two criteria and not just statistics on inequalities. This, in turn, provides real problems for assessment, and necessarily challenges the aims of any institution. Thus, for example, Tawney challenges the centres of education to move away from 'occupational utility', or even simple educational excellence and to aim for an education for the whole person. 220

As a consequence of this approach, Tawney does not restrict his strategy of equality to the social services, nor does he
restrict equality to distribution, but includes participatory equality. As noted above, a major element of this was the distribution of power in various ways. Le Grand, in focussing only on the social services, ignores this element in Tawney, and even the question of whether it was necessary. There is, in fact, a good argument to say that the equalizing of power is the crucial part of any strategy of equality, and that this would affect the statistics of inequality far more than Le Grand's advocacy of a sustained attack upon the ideology of inequality. 221

In all of this, Tawney himself agreed that much more was to be done. He could take some pride in the "advances towards the conversion of a class-ridden society into a community in fact, as well as in name." 222

Yet, he equally realized the importance of attacking inequalities in inheritance and education, and looked to developments in democracy that would guard against 'top-heavy bureaucracy and remote control,' 223

It must be accepted that Le Grand's criticism of Tawney's position is by no means aggressive. They both share a concern for ensuring that unjustified inequalities, and the ideology of inequality, are attacked. This requires developing new strategies to combat new inequalities. Le Grand's focus, however, is limited and, as a result, he does not grasp the definition or extent of Tawney's view of equality.

A final point must be made here, about those who see Tawney's own egalitarianism as limited, for example, with respect to feminism. There is no doubt that Tawney did not see all the
areas of injustice that abounded even in his own time. None of this, though, radically affects his theory of equality. On the contrary, his view depends upon analysis of areas of society precisely to bring unjustified inequalities to light. The fact that he was not aware of some inequalities, or that some inequalities have only since Tawney been highlighted, does not invalidate his position.

Conclusion

It is tempting to see Tawney's views of equality as simply a random collection of ideas, put down in response to the social injustices of the age, the writings of a prophet, not a philosopher with a clear theory of equality. As has been noted, his views on equality have to be extracted from several sources, and are not all systematically presented. Also, the different parts of his views are not systematically developed. Thus, Tawney does not develop the theological base of equality, nor does he, at the other end, work through some of the practical implications.

Much of this can be accounted for, as Atherton suggests, by Tawney's view of theology as a 'way of life' and his difficulty with theology as a discipline. However, despite all this, there remains in Tawney, clear outlines of a theory of equality which are held consistently. This involves a view of the foundations of equality and its importance, not just for theory, but for practice; a clear presentation of equality of respect and its relationship to other principles; a clear presentation of relative equality in terms of distribution and participation and how
this connects to freedom and fellowship; an understanding of the process of equality and how it might be applied in response to perceived needs in society; an underlying moral psychology to account for the effects of inequality and a criticism of inadequate criteria for inequality; and a justification of equality involving all these elements.

Tawney's view has been tested by many criticisms to see if it has any coherence and validity. After examination, the conclusion is that his theory remains coherent and valid. There are no internal contradictions, for example, between participatory equality and distributional equality, or person regarding and lot regarding. There are no major problems in his relation of equality to other principles. Tawney's justification remains coherent given his Christian foundation and his stated moral psychology. Many criticisms have simply not addressed any of this, making false assumptions about Tawney's work and the effect of equality. Other criticisms have centred upon the un-developed areas in Tawney's theory. However, such criticisms do not, in any way, affect the overall coherence and validity of the theory, though Tawney's theory would be improved if these areas were developed. The areas which require development and more detailed work are in the balance of central planning, purpose, and distribution with local self-determination; the question of consensus; and the details of mechanisms for social change. As befits an holistic approach, all of these are connected and take in individual areas of potential difficulty such as subordination, hierarchy and the development of democracy.
In many respects, central to all these issues and their resolution and development is the question of paternalism. If paternalism means taking away responsibility from the individual and creating dependence, then Tawney cannot be convicted of that. On the contrary, he is concerned to spread responsibility, along with power, and to encourage the growth of independent thought. His equalizing measures aim

a) to enable this, and

b) set this in a context of man as a whole being - psychological, social, moral and spiritual.

In all this, Tawney's morality enriches and adds to the framework within which man operates, it does not dictate to man precisely how he should operate. In this sense, Tawney's theory of equality is set in what he would have regarded as the most realistic framework, recognizing the broad nature of man, including his propensity to sin.

The very scope of such a view and the integration of so many elements is impressive. In defending it, however, two issues remain unresolved. Firstly, it is not clear what criteria could judge between the realism of Tawney and the realism which underlines the marginal view of equality - the realism of individualism and survival. Secondly, it is not clear that the issues noted above, can be resolved in the abstract. Any 'experiments' in democracy require the testing of particular methods and its modification based upon empirical evidence. This would demand a quite different attitude and approach towards problem solving in industry and government. Both of these issues will be taken up in the final chapters.
Chapter 4  The Distinctiveness of Tawney's Equality

It has already been noted that equality is a term with many different possible meanings. Thus, many different writers would claim that equality is a basic principle in their philosophy, each in fact having a distinctive view of equality. The task then for any writer who would seriously espouse equality is not simply to convince his or her readers of some general principle known to all, but rather to convince them of the validity and importance of their particular view of equality. In the first three chapters, I have attempted to demonstrate that Tawney's writings do contain a theory of equality which is coherent and which withstands most criticisms. In this chapter, I intend to examine the distinctiveness of Tawney's theory of equality. The first part of the chapter will consider how far Tawney's equality was distinctively Christian and in particular examine how Tawney related to the Christian Socialists. The second part of the chapter will compare Tawney's view of equality with that of contemporary Socialists, and in particular the Fabians, with whom Tawney is often associated. Mention will also be made of Tawney's equality in relation to Idealist philosophy. I will conclude that Tawney's equality is distinctively Christian and that whilst it shows the influence of humanist socialism and of Idealism, it remains distinctive in comparison to their view of equality. At points throughout the chapter, I will also contrast Tawney with other major views of equality.

A Christian View of Equality

In arguing that Tawney's view of equality is distinctively
Christian, I would not wish to argue that there is one distinctive Christian view. Doubtless, the Christian gospel is egalitarian in some sense. Lakoff asserts that 'the Christian message is a doctrine of equality' symbolized by the 'love feast', the injunction to love others as ourselves, and the 'promise of victory over mortal limitations.' Nonetheless, the Bible and Christian tradition reveal no developed theory or doctrine of equality. Indeed, several different substantive approaches to equality are evident. Lakoff refers to the two major ones as antipathetic and anticipatory. The first of these views all individuals as equal in the sight of God. This is a spiritual equality which has no relevance to social organization. The second view argued that equality did have some relevance to society, possibly even challenging the status quo. Any development towards equality was viewed as anticipating the Kingdom of God. Lakoff identifies a third Christian view of equality as the 'proto-prolétarian', a forerunner of liberation theology, which was 'virtually from the start, a doctrine of mass emancipation.' The fact that, as Lakoff argues, these different views form the basis of what was to become the Conservative, Liberal and Socialist views of equality, tends to suggest that there is as much diversity in Christian views of equality as there is in secular views. Moreover, like the different possible philosophical views of equality, Christian writers often combine elements of the different views. A good example of the latter is St. Ambrose. On the one hand, he stresses that all men are equal sharing a common nature, and that the earth belongs to all.
The outcome of this is that he urges the wealthy to return to the poor what is theirs by right. 11 On the other hand, Ambrose does not contend that the inequalities of his age were unjust as such, but rather, like Augustine, saw them as the consequences of the fall. 12 As a result, whilst he urges the rich to share, he does not demand a radical change in the status quo of social organization. The case of Ambrose adds a further complication to the attempt to find a distinctively Christian view of equality, in that his view relies heavily upon the Stoics. 13 Indeed, Lakoff argues that 'he merely offered a Christian gloss on the Stoic idea of a golden age.' 14

However, despite all this, it is possible to note certain elements which characterize a Christian view of equality.

The Justification and Type of Equality

It is here that the Christian view of equality is most distinctive. Yet even here, there are several different justifying doctrines. Two of these are shared with the Jewish faith - God's creation of man in His image, and His creation of the world for all humanity. 15 Two others are more specifically Christian, with the doctrine of sin, asserting man's common shortfall, and the doctrine of the Incarnation proclaiming Christ's reconciling work for all. 16 The creationist and Incarnational strands both see these great events as evidence of God's purpose for humanity and that He loves and values all.

Emerging from these doctrines are three strands which not only act as justification, but also radically affect the character of any view of equality. Equality is based upon
- God's activity
- The concept of agape
- The Christian view of human nature

As has been noted above, Tawney makes reference to all of these strands in some way. 17

The implications for the character of equality are several:-

a) Equality is necessarily inclusive, or in Rae's terms involving a 'global domain.' 18 This firmly distinguishes the Christian view from the Stoic conception of equality. Whilst the Stoics accepted a global equality, this was based upon a view of all persons sharing in the divine logos or reason. Their justification was therefore based upon the evidence of a specific attribute in man i.e. reason. Thus, given the absence of reason in such as the mentally handicapped, equality becomes an exclusive concept. Because Christian equality depends upon God's activity and not human attributes, it remains inclusive and global. 19

b) Christian equality is not based upon either an argument from self-interest or rights or merit. God's activity is not in response to any of these things, but totally unconditional. This provides an egalitarian perspective from outside humanity as such. From such a perspective, Tawney often notes how human differences appear trivial. The implication of this for the character of equality is that equality is not viewed in the light of the individual or group simply gaining what is due to them. This is underlined by the second commandment which from the perspective of the individual, seeks a balance of concern, and fulfillment of obligation, to
the self and others. Such a view of equality is very distinctive. It is not simply person-regarding, but about the person in moral relationships. In many respects, Tawney here is articulating and developing the Idealist view of equality with a strong emphasis upon self-realization through relationships. He echoes many Hegelian themes, not least the division of ethical life into family, civil society (work and economic life) and the state with their consequent duties. Underlying all this, is for Tawney, the basic morality necessary for such duties to be performed and for trust to develop in the relationships, such as promise keeping or avoiding deceit.

However, Tawney's position differs from the Idealists in two major ways. Firstly, for Tawney, equality does not depend for its justification upon the idea of self-realization alone. Self-realization is seen rather as part of the second element of Tawney's justification. First, comes equality of respect with its deontological foundation. Then the consequentialist arguments are brought into play. Secondly, whilst Tawney accepts that the task of the state is to further self-realization, and with the Idealists accepts the need for a common purpose, this does not require the emphasis upon serving the state that is found in Green or Bradley. For Green, citizenship is elevated to a form of civic religion. Bradley is aware of a variety of duties, but tends to concentrate eventually on obligations to the state to the extent that 'morality is virtually equated with patriotic duty to ones
country.'  

Tawney on the contrary maintains emphasis upon a wide range of duties, emphasizing the importance of the individual discovering for themselves the content of these duties.  

This respect for the autonomy of the individual and thus for the process whereby the individual can discover truth for themselves constantly weighs against any prescriptive view of right relationships. Tawney also had a far greater structural concern than Green. In order to gain the global equality he so desired, it was necessary that citizenship and service have a political framework which grasped the social system as a whole, and was able to balance central and local activity and relate them.  

The unconditional character of Tawney's equality also distinguishes it from the Aristotelian concept of proportional equality. Aristotle rejected the idea of natural equality, but argued for equality in social organization. Rights and privileges in the polis would be distributed according to individual merit, and those who are equal in terms of reason, birth or wealth would receive equal treatment. Aristotle accepted a form of democracy, and was against extreme inequalities in property and power. However, his equality was ultimately conditional.  

Tawney's concept of equal value also distinguishes it from any notion of mathematical equality or identical treatment. As noted in chapter one, his concern for the individual demanded rather diversity of treatment.
At this point it may also be noted how Tawney's relational equality differs from the view of equality as distributional fairness. A philosopher such as Rawls builds up such a view based upon a rational calculus of interest. Whilst this leads Rawls to attack the same inequalities as Tawney, it is ultimately quite distinct from his view. This is because distribution for Tawney is in effect a means of demonstrating respect, i.e. in its concern for liberty and fellowship, and thus is to be judged by its effects upon relationships and not in a calculation of interests.

c) The third distinctively Christian strand in Tawney's view of equality is his perception of human nature and in particular, sin. Here once more, Tawney differed from the Idealist school. Green, for instance, wrote that 'the sense of sin is very much an illusion,' holding a firm belief in rationality as a principle of progress. Tawney's awareness of man's sinful nature allowed him no such optimism. This led him to be realistic about progress and about the effect of great concentrations of power, not only upon the poor but on the wealthy. If the Incarnation meant that equality's application was to be global, human nature meant that such global application had to be realistic, not only giving more power to individuals, but providing the democratic framework for the responsible use of great concentrations of power.

The three strands in Tawney point to an unconditional equality of value which is person-centred and which requires a global domain, without demanding absolute equality. It remains to be
seen from this broad base, how Tawney relates to Christian egalitarian tradition with respect to fellowship, hierarchy and equality of participation, and distribution and property. These three aspects will now be considered.

a) **Equality and Fellowship**

Bowlby in his search for a theology of equality argues that equality by itself is 'an insufficient value.' 38 New Testament evidence certainly points to some radical demands for justice which might form the base of an extreme egalitarian position. 39 Nonetheless, as Mealand demonstrates, the evidence points to three phases in the early churches attitude towards distribution. The second and third phases in particular - the church of the resurrection and a time of routinization - see a softening of any extreme egalitarian demands and a view of equality from the context of the Christian community. 40 This is confirmed by the work of Theissen who points to the mutual equality of Pauline Christianity expressed within the context of the koinonia. 41 In this context everyone had a genuine sense of status without questioning the political or social status quo. Alongside this evidence Bowlby points to that of Jesus himself, his teaching and action, 'constantly emphasizing the dignity and value of those he met.' 42 In addition to this, the 'covenant community' tradition of the Old Testament must be noted with its respect for the community members and 'strangers', and the resultant distributional implications. 43
Bowlby concludes that equality in a Christian view must always be seen in the light of community or fellowship. Further, he notes that Tawney's stress on common humanity 'can be seen as a secular version of the New Testament emphasis on koinonia.' 44

Clearly, as noted above, Tawney points to important links between equality and fellowship. However, it is not clear how well he fits into a koinonia tradition of equality, especially one with the character of 'love patriarchalism.'

Certainly, he emphasizes the importance of subordination and order, and at times points to almost a sectarian view of the Christian community. 45 He also stresses the importance of intermediate associations either setting examples to society or being aware of duties beyond the fulfillment of the members' desires. 46 However, Tawney also stresses the importance of freedom and such freedom is not found exclusively either in the activity of service or in the context of fellowship. 47 He stresses the importance of self-determination and control, and of critical independent thought.

The result of this is that the status quo is always open to question and therefore the possibility of change. This differs greatly from Theissen's view of the conservative 'love patriarchalism' of the early church. 48

Such an ethos

'takes social differences for granted but ameliorates them through an obligation of respect and love, an obligation imposed on those who are socially stronger. From the weaker are required fidelity, subordination and esteem.' 49

Far from relating to such a model where equal value is a product of fellowship, 50 Tawney works from equal worth to
fellowship and is, in this sense, more at home with the Stoic categories used by the Early Church Fathers, pointing to a common humanity. Nonetheless, Tawney's concern for order requires that hierarchy and participation be examined.

b) **Hierarchy and Participatory Equality**

As Terrill notes, Tawney has a strong sense of order, which he attributes to his Christian background. Certainly, as seen above, there is a tradition which demands an acceptance of inequalities and order. Such a tradition has developed into the secular conservative view of equality which argues that inequality is necessary and that a form of fellowship is possible even with wide differences in distribution. Such a view can argue for equality of respect whilst arguing for a marginal application of equalizing measures.

Several strands need to be noted in these views. Firstly, the Christian conservative view of equality saw hierarchy either as a consequence of sin (ie. post fall), or as to do with God's positive ordering of creation. In addition, a strong view of the state gives this the responsibility for retaining order. For Tawney, the starting point of the Incarnation gave him a view not pointing to some Golden Age before the fall, but arguing for present relational equality. Thus, he had no need to explain inequalities, only to argue against unacceptable inequalities ie. those which obscured relational equality. Also, Tawney's view of the state was a primarily moral one. With the Idealists he saw the states function as not simply survival, but helping individuals achieve self-realization.
Secondly, with respect to the secular conservative view of equality, justification shifts to the necessity of inequalities for the creation of wealth, and dangers of coercion in any change of the status quo. 59

Tawney is aware of both of these arguments. He accepts the need for inequalities in distribution to provide incentives in fulfilling functions, and the moral requirement to respect the autonomy of the individual. 60 However, he stands out against the conservative view of equality on three points:—

- he argues that there can be efficient public enterprise based upon planning and co-operation around a common purpose.
- he argues for a redistribution of resources and opportunities to enable individuals to develop.
- he argues for greater control for the individual relevant to their situation. 61

In this, Tawney is not simply arguing that the status, income wealth etc. should not determine worth, but also that they should not determine the distribution of the resources necessary for the individual to develop. In addition, he demands that the individual's autonomy be respected.

Subordination for Tawney in this context was functional subordination ie. the recognition of another's function in relation to a common purpose. To avoid the danger of paternalism and subordination to a narrow definition of moral purpose, he looks to the individual or group working out their own purposes in context, and to a social structure that will enable this. Ultimately, this balance of self-
determination and a moral framework is what distinguishes Tawney's view of function from a straightforward functional theory of stratification. The latter simply argues that some form of hierarchy is necessary for the continuation of social life. For Tawney, it is not simply a matter of the administration of society, but rather the development and maintenance of a 'civilized' society, which was defined in terms of its moral relationships, and depended upon the acceptance and creativity of the citizens.

Tawney's idea of subordination bears some resemblance to the 'free subjection' of Nicholas of Cusa. Nicholas accepts the idea of subjection to leadership, but given the natural equality of all men, argues that such subjection requires consent. The idea of consent involves freedom and democracy. However, Nicholas of Cusa's position, however, does differ from Tawney's. Firstly, Tawney's argument for participatory equality has much broader application than to political democracy. Secondly, Tawney's argument is based ultimately upon equal worth and upon context. Thus he argues for unconditional equality and for participation in decision making in situations where the individual is affected or where he or she are involved in some way. In such a context will the individual gain relevant control and address duties.

In contrast, the argument from natural equality has two stages:

a) that every individual has the capacity to make political or moral choices, and
b) that this capacity is the basis for the right to its exercise. 66

Capacity to take part in decisions is, of course, important, but it cannot take the full weight of the justification of participatory equality, not least because capacity itself is not defined and, depending upon its definition, could form the basis of exclusion. 67 In any case, Tawney's emphasis is on the development of whatever capacity the individual has in relation to themselves and society. Moreover, Tawney sees the individual as being more involved in the shaping of group aims and fulfillment of objectives. 68

Terrill notes that Tawney's argument for the dispersion of power is similar to Niebuhr's for democracy. He paraphrases the argument as,

'Every man has enough quality to be given some responsibility, none so much that he should be given absolute dominion over his fellows.' 69

However, though Tawney certainly argues for safeguards in terms of the responsible use of power, acknowledging man's sinful nature, he also has far more positive arguments for participatory equality. These arguments centre around the other aim of equality of respect, freedom; freedom from economic oppression; freedom to control ones situation; freedom to develop, which requires responsibility and risk. 70

Participatory equality involves the development of such freedoms, and is a direct expression of equality of respect.

c) **Property and Distribution**

For Tawney, property played no crucial part in the argument
This is largely because he did not stress the creationist doctrine of man as steward of God's creation. Working with a view of person-centred equality, Tawney was far more concerned about the effect that property had upon the individual and upon community. In this respect, property was much like power, and indeed, can be seen as a form of power. It can be used to enable freedom and fellowship, or it can block these in various ways. Thus, for Tawney, the question of ownership, private or public, was not of itself important. The crucial question was the use or function of the property and how far it fulfilled the social purposes.

In this then, Tawney develops the position of such as Ambrose, but stops short of the proto-proletarian view of equality. He shared the latter's concern for equal liberty but could not accept the coercion involved, or the belief that the Kingdom of God could be established on earth.

Brief consideration of these areas demonstrates that Tawney is located in the anticipatory strain of Christian equality i.e. that he saw equality as having direct relevance to society. He does share some of the characteristics of the conservative or proto-proletarian views, but integrates them into his view of equality as an operative principle. The question then, is how Tawney's view of operative equality compares to other such views. To determine this, and thus Tawney's particular distinctiveness, the next section will compare his views with major Christian Socialists up to Temple.
The Christian Socialists

The early Christian Socialists such as Maurice and Kingsley saw equality as having moral and educative implications but not political. They were convinced of the equal value of all human beings, and saw equality as an operative value in the sense that outrages against individual dignity were to be attacked. All this, however, was in the context of rigid views of society and property, which saw the two major forms of operative equality, distributional and participatory, as destructive to the social fabric. It is therefore ironical that Tawney's views should be seen by some writers as in a direct line from these, as, for instance, Ruskin. There is little doubt that Ruskin was a passionate moralist who hit out at the evils of industry and political economy. A strong belief in respect for persons as ends in themselves underlines his concern with industry's 'degradation of the operative into a machine.'

He attacked the laissez-faire principle and the whole basis of the materialist society, arguing that a social system which ignored the 'will or spirit' of men, and the 'affections' which bound them together was evil. He also showed more concerns than some early Christian Socialists with distributional equality. Thus, he wrote that the work of 'Political Economy' was 'to determine what are in reality useful or life giving things and by what degrees and kinds of labour they are attainable and distributable.'

Despite this, Ruskin clung to the old order, with ranks clearly defined. Any change in this order would radically affect the whole balance and existence of society as such. Thus, social deference and a knowledge of one's place were essential to the
coherence of society. It was necessary in this social order that superior persons should be appointed to 'guide, to lead, or on occasion even to compel or subdue their inferiors.'

In all this, equality of participation had no part. Thus, whilst he accepted that the lower classes might be consulted democratically, he argued for plural franchises to protect the superior persons. Education for Ruskin, thus became a matter of social control with the idea of liberty reduced to finding the happiness in one's proper station. In all classes, 'it matters not the least how much or how little they know, provided they know just what will fit them to do their work and be happy in it.'

For Tawney, as noted above, social, family and individual relationships were not 'set down', but a matter of exploration, and democracy was a crucial part of the 'tissue of society.'

Turning to Maurice, Kingsley, Ludlow, Neale and Hughes, we see a further mixture of egalitarian strands. As with Ruskin, the mixture is not one of simply equality as ultimate and operative, but rather what is the acceptable or appropriate expression of equality as an operative principle. All were concerned about the value of the individual and the evils of competition.

However, none saw the necessity of giving expression to equality through political means. Thus, their energies were put into co-operative enterprises, education, moral education, and moral exhortation of the capitalists, not even evincing Ruskin's interest in distributional equality. There is a strong emphasis upon liberty and the emancipation of the 'white slaves.'

However, such liberation involves to a great extent negative liberty i.e., doing away with the economic oppression.
Tawney argued that a true respect for the individual demanded more, i.e. the creation of conditions for a positive liberty. 92

The result of this was a lack of moral interest in equality of participation and in particular, democracy. For Maurice, this was also partly due to a fear of organization and planning, a rigid view of rank in society and property, 93 and a belief that the Kingdom of God was a present reality and thus great social change was not required. The other Christian Socialists revealed a greater appetite for social change, and their view of small co-operative enterprises was as an educative preliminary to increased political power. 94 Nonetheless, their view of equality was still in fact removed from the political sphere. Thus, Kingsley stresses social equality as an ultimate value and one tied to a relationship with Christ:

'True socialism, true liberty, brotherhood, and true equality (not the carnel dead level equality of the Communist, but the spiritual equality of the Church idea, which gives every man an equal chance of developing and using God's gifts, and rewards every man according to his work, without respect of persons) is only found in loyalty and obedience to Christ.' 95

Such a spirit of relational equality might exist in a paternalistic way between classes and this ultimately was Kingsley's view of democracy, and equality of participation, stressing fellowship between classes and not the voice or the control of the voter. Even Ludlow who saw socialism in terms of making men partners, stressing the moral worth of the individual, envisaged severe limits to any political action. He, like Kingsley, saw the achievement of universal suffrage as being dependent upon the poorer classes being educated. Like Maurice, he was fearful of the tyranny of the masses. 96 Tawney's emphasis upon participatory and
distributional equality reflects a radical difference between his writings and the Christian Socialists. Not only did this involve their view of society, it also involved a much more vigorous working out of the relationships between equality of respect, liberty and fellowship, resulting in a very different view of social change, so that equality of participation and distribution were seen as essential for the development of the individual, a pre-requisite for the relational equality which the early Christian Socialist so firmly believed in.

With the later Christian Socialists, there is found a pronounced movement towards an operative view of equality and one not simply involving an operative egalitarian concern within the status quo. The influences behind this development include the late thought of Mill, the idealist philosophy of Green, and the proposals of George. These views led to a climate in which an operative view of equality was increasingly being accepted by groups both in and outside the church.

Two Christian writers epitomize this development, Headlam and Gore. Headlam in fact, saw his views as the development of Maurice's. Certainly, Maurice's vision of the Kingdom of God as already present echoes Headlam's view that 'the head of every man is Christ,' and, 'mankind is constituted in Christ.' Headlam's stress upon the Incarnation, however, took him into the realm of moralism, viewing Christ, 'the social and political Emancipator', and acknowledging that the Secularists have, in fact, absorbed some of the best Christian truths which the Churches have
been ignoring. Viewing human life as the most sacred and interesting thing possible, Headlam's equality was both person regarding and global in his application. A self-proclaimed Liberal as well as Socialist, he saw individual positive liberty as being the aim of 'some tremendous social re-organization.'

To this end, he broke away from Maurice and his horror of the collective or political and argued for support for 'any means by which a just distribution of the wealth of the country may be effected.'

The theme of individual liberation continued for Headlam, through to education, the purpose of which was to generate 'divine discontent.' This involved developing political awareness in the individual, and also eroding class deference.

Headlam, however, had several significant differences compared to Tawney. Firstly, he argued that the Kingdom of God on earth was the aim of Christian Socialism. Secondly, along with the Incarnational justification of equality, he relied upon an Old Testament view of land as created for all men. God had given man land on the basis of equality,

'and it is a blasphemy on their part if they allow that most important and valuable of all material gifts to be lightly filched away from them by the Duke of Westminster or the Duke of Northumberland.'

This emphasizes justice in terms of rights and just distribution rather than in the context of relational equality with its balance of rights and duties. This difference is seen especially in education, where Tawney does not simply seek to break down barriers of deference, but to help individuals discover the moral base of relationships and so enrich and develop relationships.
Thirdly, in addition to the emphasis on rights more than duties, Headlam tended not to emphasize fellowship in the same way as Tawney. He accepted the brotherhood of all mankind, but was wary of referring to this in any social re-organization. It was, he argued, the duty of the Church to persuade men to be brothers, and thus wrong 'to compel people by law to live as brothers.' 108

Fourthly, Headlam stressed distributional equality at the expense of participatory equality. He accepted the idea of democracy, and yet betrayed the influence of Maurice in believing that the working people were not ready for real democracy. 109

Finally, though Headlam was the first Christian Socialist to actually use real socialist ideas, he differed from Tawney, not only in his view of the general principles of operative equality, but also in terms of its application. Headlam supported the development of trades union rights, re-distribution of wealth by the state (including the Single Tax of George), and state education for all. Rarely, however, did he translate his egalitarian principles into policy objectives, or actual policy proposals. He was prepared to warn against the practices which prevented such principles being carried out. However, he saw his duty to advocate principles not to 'suggest any definite action on social and political problems.' 110

For Tawney, as was noted above, the very definition of equality as an operative principle demanded that clear egalitarian policies be set out. Without such policies the real meaning and implications of equality could never actually be discovered. 111
All commentators agree that Gore was a major influence upon Tawney. 112 For Gore, the Christian faith 'is not first a philosophy or system of ideas. It is first a life.' 113

Equality is central to this 'Way'. The principle of justice or equal consideration for all 'is the principle of all Christian social conduct.' 114

This leads Gore to advocate liberty and fraternity as the aims of social organization. 115 Indeed, the 'ideas associated with democracy - the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity - we must believe to be, at their best, of divine origin - real expressions of the divine purpose and the divine wisdom for today.' 116

It is not surprising that from this basis, many of the elements of Tawney's equality can be seen, from the idea of equal opportunity for self-realization, to the argument that the right to property should depend upon its use. What Gore does not do is to bring these elements of an operative view of equality together, and demonstrate their meaning in society. There are two major reasons for this. Firstly, as Ramsey suggests, Gore did not have a clear doctrine of the State. 117 As a result, Gore stressed the idea of the Church as exemplar of 'the brotherhood', denounced the evils of laissez-faire and put forward general principles. He did not demonstrate how the principle of equality might become operative in society. Hence, at the end of 'Christ and Society', the chapter on 'Practical Measures' has few references to equality in society. 118

The second reason for Gore's reluctance to spell out the elements of participatory and distributional equality was his fear of democracy:
'the vox populi can so easily lend itself to the purposes of the evil one.' 119

Thus, Gore, like Maurice, remained suspicious of the motives for social re-generation, and afraid of 'man's rule.' Tawney was equally aware of the dangers of putting 'the restoration of booty first.'

However, as noted above, he was confident to clearly demonstrate distributional and participatory democracy, and to project these in the context of what can only be termed 'moral democracy'. Equalizing measures were to take place not just for the common good as perceived by Tawney or Gore, but in the light of common purposes as perceived by society. Hence, we see Tawney's need for a social philosophy, something which Gore never really attempted. 120

Finally, Gore ultimately was concerned not with social reforms. In a sermon in 1928, he argued that whilst social reforms should not be undervalued, what was required was a change of character based upon Christian belief about God and man. He writes

'The possibility of a rational hope lies in what we believe about ultimate reality.' 121

For Tawney, with his interactionalist view of society, social reform was equally important in egalitarian development to belief or to social philosophy.

Comparisons thus far have served to illuminate the differences which exist in terms of equality, between Tawney and other Christians, even those deemed to be highly influential to his overall thought. They also serve to give notice that Lakoff's categories of antipathetic and anticipatory, viewing
equality as an ultimate or operative principle, are not entirely adequate. Few Christian writers would see equality as being exclusively 'ultimate'. There are, moreover, several different possible views of equality as 'operative':

- equality as operative within the Christian community;
- equality as operative in the koinonia, which exemplifies the principle to society;
- equality as attitudinally relevant to society ie. person centred equality which accepts the status quo;
- equality as operative in action, as the basis of social organization.

However, even this last view can conceal many areas of complexity. Is the principle of equality, even as the basis of social organization to be general or substantive? By this I mean a general principle such as equal consideration, or equal treatment for similar individuals. Such a principle is not open to contradiction, but tells us little of the meaning of equality. If the principle is to be substantive, does this require a greater concern by the Church for planning particular policies?

Indeed, it may be asked if detailed policies are necessary in order to make any view of equality substantive, or if derivative principles such as equality of participation are all that is required.

Any substantive Christian view of equality, will, as noted, in time, depend upon stated doctrines of state, society, human nature, and property. The combination of these and an analysis of society will then determine how the substantive definition is arrived at.
Such considerations come to a head in the final comparison of this section, between Tawney's and Temple's view of equality. In examining Temple's view of equality, it must be noted that Temple was not a theoretical egalitarian at all. He rarely uses the term, and most often when he does, it is to argue against particular forms of equality. Absolute or mathematical equality is seen as simply unattainable. Striving for equality, 'making Tom, Dick or Harry...equals of the kings' was an example of 'self-assertion' from which 'little good could come.' Finally, and most importantly, he saw the attempt to gain such equality as destroying fraternity and freedom.

However, whilst Temple's view of one kind of equality led him to avoid use of the concept, he nonetheless is clearly egalitarian. Firstly, he affirmed equality of respect as the basis of Christian morality; 'the primary principle of Christian Ethics and Christian Politics must be respect for every person simply as a person.' Such equal worth was quite independent of usefulness to society and attained its full meaning only in the context of the Christian faith. Secondly, Temple emphasizes the importance of freedom, in the extension of personal responsibility and control, and the importance of fellowship as the context of individual growth. Alongside the principles of freedom and fellowship, Temple has a separate principle of service to the community. In this, both refer to the concept of social purpose yet Tawney's reference in terms of duty or service is wider than Temple's. Both argue for equality of opportunity to realize the self, and see the state as having the purpose of enabling such development.
For Temple, like Tawney, this involved distributional and participatory equality. Thus he could write that 'political freedom is of little value without economic freedom,' 132 and,

'if liberty is to be obtained in industry, the worker must have his voice in determining the conditions under which he works.... as a permanent right.' 133

Both accept a degree of provisionality in any egalitarian programme - Temple because it may be changed by the detailed criticism of experts, Tawney because social conditions do change, demanding a modification of programmes. 134

Both stressed the crucial relationship between secondary principles and root principles. Thus Temple argued that democracy had to be viewed in the light of the root principle of 'respect for personality.' 135

Without this, the secondary principles were in danger of becoming ends in themselves with democracy realizing the fears of Maurice. Both saw egalitarian measures, properly carried out, as liberating individuals. Thus, Temple, like Tawney (and distinct from the Christian Socialists) saw the development of education not as instrumental, either for work or democracy, but to help 'men both to think for themselves and to appreciate the truth in any opinions from which they dissent.' 136

It is at this point, however, that a comparison becomes problematic. Even at the time of declaring what are at the least policy objectives, Temple was declaring that the Church could not commit itself to any particular programme nor align itself with a particular party. 137 He did not argue here against a concern with economics, but emphasised rather
'that the Church has a great concern with the spirit in men which shapes the economic system.' 138

The result was, that in this period Temple paid little attention to the detailed economic or political implications of Christian principles. 139 However, with the publication of 'Christianity and Social Order', (1942), a radical change occurred in Temple's approach. It is here that Temple first 'indicates the right of the Church to interfere in the social order.' 140

The radical element is found largely in the appendix, which sets down a proposed programme developing the implications of Christian principles for the social order. In this programme he sets down particular proposals for distributive equality, dealing with housing and environment, education, and income (largely through assured state employment opportunities), and for participatory equality, especially in industry. The evidence of this development does not point to a clear conclusion. One theory is that Temple was actually influenced by Tawney's approach to equality. The two were close friends and both shared a background of Oxford Idealism, so that cross fertilization of ideas must have been inevitable. Temple acknowledged the influence of Tawney's formulation of the idea of function. 141 Tawney acknowledges his debt to Temple in Tawney's 'Christianity and the Social Order.' 142 The precise nature of that influence is not clear, though it may be assumed to involve the theological underpinning of the article. 143 It must be noted, however, that Tawney's view of equality had not changed since the Commonplace Book. With respect to Temple's Christianity and the Social Order, Temple did in fact consult Tawney as to the advisability of
of including a practical programme. Tawney's advice was that it adds a note of realism. 144

As noted above, for Tawney, not to set out an example of how a principle might be applied in practice was irresponsible, 145 a point that Temple seems to address in writing, 'it seems fair to ask the proclaimer of principles if he has any proposals for bringing life into conformity with them.' 146

It would seem plausible to conclude that Tawney did influence Temple to make his principles more clearly operative i.e. to exemplify how such principles might be put into practice. However, a second view suggests that despite any influence from Tawney, Temple's 'change' in 'Christianity and Social Order' was not as dramatic as may be supposed, and that whilst the two may have very similar egalitarian views at a general level, they differ markedly over the extent to which such views should be operative in society. The following considerations lead to this conclusion:

The proposals for reform in Temple's appendix to 'Christianity and Social Order' add very little of substance to the broad outline and objectives set out in the final chapter. The two final objectives, concerning the provision of leisure and freedom of worship, speech and assembly, are, in any case clear enough not to require specific examples of how they might be put into practice. The first four involving participatory and distrib ional equality 147 pick up elements of Tawney's equality, including social function, 148 but there is no concerted development of these and certainly no attempt to see these 'suggestions' as part of an overall strategy of re-distribution of resources or of power. 149 On particular issues, it is instructive to
compare, for example, Temple's treatment of education. Firstly, he actually writes more of substance about equalizing measures in education in the final chapter of 'Christianity and Social Order', than he does in the so-called practical programme. Secondly, this set of suggestions pale into insignificance when placed against the writings on education of Tawney, which include research and an extensively set out policy proposal. As Suggate remarks,

'It is perhaps surprising that Temple did not acquire a stronger sense of the importance of patient research and analysis from his great friend R.H. Tawney.'

Such a lack of an empirical foundation to his social ethics resulted not only in a minimal setting out of policies, but also occasional mistakes, for example with respect to banking.

It may, of course, be that any apparent differences between the two writers reflect their personalities, positions and perception. Temple as an Archbishop would be concerned not only to propound a Christian concept of justice, but also to ensure that the Church was not divided on issues. Tawney, as an academic, socialist, and lay Christian, addressed a wider audience. Thus, it could be argued that each dealt with different views of the same equality.

The differences over the application of principles, however, are deeper than simply a difference of position or perspective. As noted above, Temple's major concern was with the enunciating of middle-level principles:

'The Church must announce Christian principles and point out where the existing social order at any time is in conflict with them.'

It is then the task of Christian citizens to re-shape
'the existing social order in closer conformity to those principles.'  

Also, in 'Christianity and Social Order' Temple refers to an argument for the Church's right to 'interfere' in politics, built upon the principle of equal worth. He does not, however, endorse this approach, indeed his description of it borders on the caricature. To go beyond middle-level principles for Temple runs the danger of obscuring roles, or being identified with political parties, or of producing policies which fail. Hence, such policies are best left to the experts. Behind this is perhaps the more profound fear that if the Church turns its attention to the details of social policy, "it may become infected with the prevailing diseases." By this, Temple means that the Church "may easily come to identify itself with palliatives of some gross evils, which are really based upon the denial of its own principles." The ultimate danger here is precisely that the Church becomes identified with policy objectives whose major or exclusive aim is in terms of materialism and lot-regarding equality. Hence, the Church must concentrate on the sphere of values - ensuring that the fundamental values of love and justice inform and regulate the secondary principles. It is these concerns which are at the base of his fear of the concept of equality, and explain why Temple would not in the appendix of 'Christianity and Social Order' produce an overall strategy of equality.

Trumpp shows all these concerns with Temple, and accepts the need for experts to be involved in policy making. However, for Trumpp, the operative concept of equality necessarily involved
detailing specific egalitarian policies. On one level, this is a necessary function of meaning i.e. the equality put forward by the Church can never be seen in its real distinctiveness without clear examples of how the ends can be achieved. On another level, it is also a matter of faith and responsibility:

'Christians have no right to demand complete certainty before they act. Men acquire light on issues which are still dark, not by waiting helplessly for light to be given them, but by acting fearlessly on such light as they already possess.'

Given this, the Church could not avoid dialogue with the experts on detail. Indeed, without that, the critical stance of Temple outlined in 'Christianity and Social Order' could never be achieved. Hence, for Tawney, empirical research and addressing policies was a necessary part of developing a substantive concept of equality. To detail egalitarian policies did not of necessity, mean that the high view of equality would be lost, so long as the foundation principles were constantly referred to. Moreover, Tawney's acceptance of the provisionality of all policies worked against the danger of accepting egalitarian measures as ends in themselves.

All of this points then to a clear difference between Tawney and Temple in their view of equality as an operative principle.

Two final points must be made with regard to this difference.

Firstly, Wright notes the difference between Tawney's view of equality and 'equality of consideration', which has no implications for policy. By implication, he sees this as the form of equality espoused by Temple before 'Christianity and Social Order.' Such would not have been the view of Temple. In advocating distribution and participation, he was advocating policy objectives
which necessarily do have implications for policy. The differences rather hang on whether a derivative principle such as distributional equality can really be substantive without a clear policy programme. The latter would seem to be necessary even in Temple's own logic. The only way of testing democracy, for example, against its root principle is to give an example of how such democracy would work in practice.

The second point concerns the nature of the difference. It may be argued that there is no substantive difference between Temple and Tawney in terms of meaning, only in terms of application, or the means of applying principles. In one sense this is true. However, Tawney's method is so open and dynamic that it does in one sense affect the meaning of equality. The relationship of the principle of equality of respect to the changing situations in society means that the operative definition of equality is continually developing. This in turn points to hints of another aspect of the difference between Tawney's and Temple's egalitarian stance. Both argue for the distinctive nature of a Christian view of equality. However, Temple emphasizes the importance of the spiritual in this conception whilst Tawney emphasizes the importance of the moral. This comes out in their views on education. Both emphasize the aim of education to help students to become 'zealous for individuality.'

For Temple, however, such an education would find 'its strength in spiritual power.' Hence, alongside the proposal that every child should have 'the opportunity of an education till years of maturity, so
planned as to allow for his peculiar aptitudes and make possible their full development,' Temple adds the following:
'this education should throughout, be inspired by faith in God and find its focus in worship.' 170

Here, Christianity not only provides a distinctive view of equality, as for democracy, 171 it actually provides the best possible focus within a school community for ensuring a corporate life which stressed both individuality and fellowship. 172

Tawney was equally aware of the spiritual dimension in humanity, but his concentration on the Christian faith in terms of morality led him to describe the educational exercise in moral terms, duties to the individual and to others. Moreover, an awareness of the diminishing influence of the Church, his emphasis upon respect for individual autonomy, and his concern about precise defining of ends and means would have led Tawney to be unsure of using Christianity for this purpose. 173 With education as a process of Socratic discovery, the Christian faith would more likely be involved in discussions rather than acting as a focus for the whole educational or community concern. By taking the agapaic view of equality of respect seriously, and pressing it to its conclusion, Tawney thus arrives at a view of equality which is Christian but not dependent upon an acceptance of any specific institutional expression of Christianity. It would be wrong to refer to this as a 'secularizing' of the Christian view of equality, for Tawney's view of human nature and moral psychology locates the spiritual in the world. 174 However, as equality for Tawney always transcends any particular expression of it, it is perfectly appropriate to see it as applying to all of
society and thus for the Church to support its implementation in society. From society's point of view, this is not an exclusive principle which a particular group wishes to force on society, but rather an inclusive principle which a particular group attempts, often badly, to live out. Tawney attempts to sustain such a view by reminding us of the pervasive influence of Christian principles on society, and of the general recognition that certain basic elements of moral behaviour are essential to the fulfillment of moral relationships and thus relational equality, and by attempting to work through a social philosophy which would emphasize transcendant ideals rather than sectional interests.

The difference that this points to is perhaps less one of spiritual against moral perspectives, as theological against holistic perspectives. Tawney's holistic and interactionist view of society demands that equality take in both matters of value and principle and details of social organization and development. Ensuring that the two are kept in balance demands a process which will enable this. This process must inevitably involve learning and development, and the flexibility to respond to changes in society. In this perspective the process becomes the focus of egalitarian development. For Temple, it is rather the Christian faith which becomes the focus of such development, the content not the process.

At the very least it must be concluded that questions of application do affect any Christian definition of equality and in this, Temple and Tawney do differ.
In conclusion of this section, three points may be made. Firstly, Tawney's equality is distinctively Christian. It is based upon Christian doctrine and differs from the major philosophical views of equality. It contains elements of all the Christian schools of thought, emphasizing both fellowship and order as well as liberty. The influence of philosophies such as Idealism are also evident. Secondly, in the end, Tawney's equality is distinctive from all these elements with a particular expression of operative equality which demands that equality of respect be expressed ultimately through framing policies as well as in developing social philosophies. Finally, the very inclusive nature of Tawney's view of equality is bound to lead to overlaps with humanist views of equality with a common concern for, for example, democracy. It is therefore necessary now to compare Tawney's equality with that of humanist Socialist thinkers who have been associated with him, to examine what, if any, are the substantive differences between them.

**Socialist Equality**

In this section, I intend to compare Tawney's equality with socialist views of equality. As the contemporary debate about Socialism and its values neatly underlines, there is, of course, no one socialist view of equality and its application. To fully appreciate Tawney's egalitarian contribution, examination of the political debate will be necessary, alongside a comparison with such socialist thinkers as Williams, Lukes or Crick. This, however, will be examined in later chapters. At this stage, it is necessary simply to note the distinctiveness
of Tawney's view compared to socialism as it existed in his time. In this respect, I will concentrate upon a comparison with Fabianist thought, considered by many to be the most influential socialist group in England at that time.  

Fabian Equality

Tawney has often been associated with Fabian thought. 182 Tawney in fact, joined the Fabian Society in 1906 and retained a lasting admiration for, and friendship with its outstanding figures, the Webbs. They were the dedicatees of 'Equality', and the subjects of Tawney's Webb Memorial Lecture in 1952, and Tawney had plans at one point to write their biography. 183 Equality was already a dominant principle in the 'basis' of the Fabian Society in 1887- (Webb joined in 1885). In the basis there was a concern for 'practical equality of opportunity', and for 'the establishment of equal citizenship for men and women.' 184 All the Fabians were united in their abhorrence of poverty and the effects of distributional inequalities on the dignity of the individual. From such an implicit basis of equal worth, Sidney Webb, in particular, began to outline an argument for equality. The roots of the Webb's view of equality were in classical utilitarianism. However, they modified and developed the latter's argument on distribution. 185 Thus, they argued that adequate shelter and sustainance are universal pre-requisites for happiness. Given that each person's happiness counts equally, then some re-distribution of wealth was necessary to provide the pre-requisites. 186 Webb defined such happiness in terms of the
possibility of a dignified existence. 187 Thus, Webb built into the idea of happiness one of equal worth and equal rights to the necessary pre-requisites of a dignified existence. This same argument has since been frequently used to justify a minimum welfare state. 188 In the light of this, Webb argued against Spencerian individualism and laissez-faire capitalism for a guaranteed national minimum. 189

In arguing for such a minimum, Webb was aware of the relationship of equality and freedom and of the need to re-distribute power. On the one hand, this would lead to a diminution of the landlord's and employer's power 'over the lives of others.' 190 On the other hand, such a 'National Minimum' would lead the wage earner to 'an enormous growth in practical freedom of action, a liberty positively encouraged by law, increased leisure, better health, greater amenity of life, further opportunities of advancement for his children.' 191

In addition to distributional equality, the Webbs were also aware of the need for participatory equality, especially in terms of democracy. Democracy was a crucial element in society, not least because it provided the training ground for a culture based upon service. 192 Thus, like Tawney, Webb saw distribution and participation as assisting freedom and fellowship. 193 Indications that Webb's collectivism was also influenced by Idealism give further substance to the argument that Tawney and Webb shared a view of equality that was very close. 194

However, several points militate against such a view:-
a) Tawney was fundamentally a moralist. This meant that he spent time in discussing principles, their justification and their application. For Webb, the importance of the concept of equal
worth or of instrumental equality was simply assumed.
Significantly in the 1920 edition of the Fabian Essays, Webb himself betrays unease at the lack of detailed thought about basic principles in the first edition -
'And whilst we were strong on liberty and fraternity, as essentials of democracy, we were apt to forget equality.' 195
For Tawney too, ideas and principles were crucial with respect to social change. A 'firm body of conviction' is necessary to guide and sustain social change. 196 This contrasts starkly with the Webbian view of change, not fixed by ideas, but as something which was gradual and inevitable. Tawney certainly saw signs of improvements in society, but did not interpret them as being determined. Thus he directly criticizes the Fabians:
'What we have to do first of all is to change these assumptions or principles. This is where the Fabians are inclined to go wrong.' 197

b) Though both writers showed a distaste for poverty and forms of inequality, Tawney's Christian view of man's sinful nature differed greatly from the optimistic view of Webb. 198 Such a view of human nature fits in well with the inevitability of gradualism. Man is so able to respond to democracy that this becomes
'one long training in enlightened altruism.' 199
Democracy, they continue,
'is always taking the mind of the individual off his own narrow interests.....forcing him to give his thought and leisure not to satisfying his own desires, but to considering the needs and desires of other people.' 200

Behind much of Webb's thinking was the Positivist view of Comte. Claiming to view society scientifically, he noted a
law of moral/social development which was inevitable and pointed to an organic view of society in which each individual had a part to play. 201 It is the last element which influences Webb's collectivism, for in arguing against individualism, he argued for subjection to the greater good of society:

'We must take even more care to improve the Social Organism of which we form a part than to improve our own individual developments .... For the perfect development of each individual (is)....in filling, in the best possible way, his humble function in the great social machine..... We must abandon the self conceit of imagining that we are independent units and bend our proud minds, absorbed in thir own cultivation to this subjection to the higher end, the Common Weal.' 202

For Tawney, whilst the state had the task of helping the individual touch 'perfection', this was not to be found in the collective, but through responding to the various moral relationships including that of the individual to his or her self. 203 Equally, society itself is defined by Tawney as 'a community of wills which are often discordant, but which are capable of being inspired by devotion to common ends.' 204 Tawney's interactionist view of society with the individual as part of a network of moral relationships and with ideas and structures capable of influencing and being influenced differed greatly from the Webbian organic view of society. Alongside this was Tawney's concern for individual freedom and development.

An example which vividly illustrates the differences of Webb and Tawney is that of education. Webb argued for equality of opportunity in education. Education, however, was ultimately instrumental. That is to say he wished to provide a 'ladder of opportunity' that would take the best talent and enable it
to be developed for its purpose in society. Webb went as far as to tell Wallas that he considered it an advantage for the ordinary man not to be educated above his station. 205

For Tawney, education was also instrumental but not in the sense of using or fitting an individual for a system. Equality of provision was, in one sense, an end in itself, a proper expression of equality of respect. In another sense equality of education was aimed at helping individuals both in relation to their talents and to their situation. Thus, he argues for

'not merely la carrière ouverte aux talents, indispensible though that is, but égalité de fait, not merely equality of opportunity but universality of provision.' 206

For Tawney, rather than education being used for sustaining the oppression of society, it was valuable to help the individual grow in spiritual independence. Only through the development of 'reasoned conviction' would any real social change occur, for

'no class is good enough to do its thinking for another; and, if the workers of the country are to be effective in action, they must first be independent in mind.' 207

c) In the same way, whilst Tawney agreed with Webb in seeing democracy as essential for the development of a common culture, his stress is not on democracy as conditioning men to altruism. 208 Rather does he see participatory equality in all its forms as liberating the individual, giving him power over his situation. The difference in emphasis is crucial, for Webb's view of freedom is ultimately not simply freedom from capitalist oppression, but freedom found in subjection to the greater good. 209 Hall suggests that another reason which
accounts for this difference is simply the backgrounds of the two writers. Webb may be seen as an 'isolated intellectual', one who never really related to the working classes and who, despite the initial emphasis on principles and values in the Fabian Movement, wished to view society dispassionately, and, as noted above, scientifically. Tawney, on the other hand was a 'political intellectual' who took the side of Henry Dubb, not only against superior persons, but against any statism, hence his emphasis upon the individual and the necessary control of their lives. Given such a difference, Tawney could only accept a 'satisfying social system' as one found upon a 'firm body of convictions' reached freely. Hence, he encouraged educational and industrial democracy experiments in which individuals could learn to develop their freedom. For the Webbs, such democracy was a means to social change which increased the 'subordination' of the person who cannot, to the person who can. As such, it was tactically necessary in the growth of the organic state. For Tawney, such a 'science of means' could never achieve the effect of real social change, which involved opening windows 'in the soul.'

In the light of all this, it becomes clear that much of the weight for Webb's justification of equality, rests not on the idea of equal worth, but on the part equalizing measures play, in the development of society. Also, just as Webb's idea of freedom differs from Tawney's, so does the view of fellowship. As noted above, Tawney's fellowship was a broad concept balancing the individual and social responsibilities. He stresses the need to
serve in the context of the individual's total situation, but
draws back from specifying how they should serve or recommending
an overall loyalty to the state. Hence, any social organization
was designed to put people 'within reach' of each other. 214

All of this inevitably affected the Webbian view of distributional
and participatory equality. As was seen above, distributional
equality involved re-distribution of resources through taxation
to social services. This would lead to an increase in government
authority over economic life: 215

'The best government is that which can safely and successfully administer most.' 216

However, whilst this bureaucracy would provide the material pre-
requisites for 'happiness', 217 it did not itself include everyone in the process. In Winter's words, the Webb's paternalistic
belief in

government from above, is demonstrated in their treatment of workers as spectators in the process of building the socialist state.' 218

The important work was to be done by

'a selfless, professional, intellectual elite, much akin to the Webbs themselves.' 219

Given this, there was little in Webb's view of equality to
encourage participatory equality, for example, in industrial
democracy. Any re-distribution of power was not to give individuals
greater control, but rather to increase the powers of government.
Such a view would tend to replace one form of 'instrumentalism'
with another. 220 Tawney himself, despite his positive evaluation
of the Webbs 221 was quick to see this, and wrote of the Fabians
'who appear to conceive the best life for most men as one in
which they are regimented by experts.' 222

Such paternalism would even border on the sinister when, in the stages of social transition, inevitable though they be, the Webbs suggest that censorship of certain newspapers may be necessary, at least those whose profit motive would make them 'dangerous to the community.' 223

In conclusion, Webb's view of equality bears a striking surface resemblance to Tawney's, but ultimately is very different. Webb's concern with freedom, fellowship and equality are ultimately within a particular conception of society and personal development which is quite distinct from Tawney's. Perhaps the ultimate proof of this is in their views of democracy, with Tawney seeking an extension of the individual's control, and hence suggesting far more ways of increasing participatory democracy. 224 At the root of these differences lies Tawney's Christian moralist position, emphasizing equal worth, respect for individual autonomy, a view of human nature and society which precluded any simple evolutionary or organic concept, and a far more rigorous analysis of the relationship between equality of respect and any derivative values. 225

Ultimately, this results in practical measures put forward by Tawney which demand not simply universal distribution of resources, but re-distribution of power.

Webb's view of equality was not the only Fabian view, though it was highly influential. Other Fabians emphasized aspects which Webb did not cover. Oliver, for instance, in arguing for the moral basis of socialism stressed the basic principle of respect
for persons and, having noted the effects of capitalism on the character, sought increased education and industrial co-operation. However, he rarely provided a detailed exposition of this, and still held a Webbian view of elitism. Thus, on education, he could write

'only when those schools are free and accessible to all, will the reproach of proletarian coarseness be done away with.' 226

Another writer who began as a Fabian, however, but who developed along the lines of Guild Socialism and emphasized the importance of participatory equality was G.D.H. Cole. Tawney at one point described himself as 'an unorthodox guild socialist' and welcomed the movement in general, in particular for its attack on the theory of functionless property.' 227

At the base of Cole's position was a revolt against the collectivism of the Webbs. 228 Echoing Tawney's thoughts on the ultimate value of the individual, Cole wrote,

'There is an individualism, as assertion that the individual...... is after all ultimate...... And there is a claim, on behalf of the individual, for a greater measure of effective self-government than can be given by the ballot-box and the local constituency.' 229

In stressing the freedom of the individual and the importance of self-development as an ideal, Cole, like Tawney, emphasized that in nationalizing industry, little could be achieved unless the workers had some control. 230 Thus, as Gutmann notes, over against the Webbs, he stressed that equality had to be 'two eyed', i.e. balancing both distributionary equality and participatory equality. 231 Alongside this, he argued for more power for the Trades Unions and a broadly democratic federated Trades Union movement, to give workers more control. 232

The democracy which Cole advocated, involved, as for Tawney, a
way of life which involved also the idea of function:

'Democracy is only real when it is conceived in terms of function and purpose.' 233

However, although Cole supported a strong view of person—regarding equality, one which was inclusive and valued fellowship along with freedom, the means of achieving this reveal a view of equality quite distinct from Tawney's.

To begin with, whilst both used the idea of function, it was in quite different ways. 234 For Cole, the idea of function was sectional ie. it referred to function within the guilds or associations advocated by him. Such guilds were the basis of a pluralist society in which the function and power of the state became greatly curtailed, all to give greater participatory equality to individuals in their local situation. 235 Ironically, in terms of democratic representation, this leads to what amounts to proportional equality. People, Cole argued, could not be represented merely as an aggregate of individuals, nor could their will be represented simply by the will of an elected representative. The only fair representation would be functional ie. reflecting the function or functions of individuals in the organization they belonged to. This would truly represent precisely what individuals had to contribute, and thus meant, in practice, plural voting. 236

Tawney's unconditional equal worth of the individual was quite distinct from such a view of equality. He accepted the need for local organizations to discover how to implement particular values in their situation. 237 However, he could not accept the pluralist conclusion of Cole and insisted that certain values be
the controlling ones within society. In consequence he saw the need for a much stronger state which was able to plan for the necessary equality and maintain a framework within which relational equality could develop. In this context Tawney's concept of function was deeply rooted in an overall society ethic. Cole then, attempted to balance participatory and distributional equality, but ultimately failed. The key to Tawney's balancing of the two was his holistic and interactionist view of man and society. This meant that the state not only was important in terms of distributing resources and power, but was also important as a focus for moral meaning. Without the state's clear adherence to the basic egalitarian principles, which involve a dialectical relationship between intermediary groups and the centre, there could be no shared moral meaning and thus local democratic groups could drift into exclusive pluralism. The state therefore had an important part to play in the matter of enabling social change, something which Cole could not accept.

In conclusion to this section then, it is argued that Tawney's view of equality stands out against the Fabians and Guild Socialists, especially in terms of his Christian view of man and society, and of his complex and balanced view of equality of respect and related principles. This in turn, affects the view of participatory equality and distributional equality, and the whole method of egalitarian social change.

Before concluding the chapter as a whole, it is necessary to briefly make two final comparisons, with Marx and with Mill.
Tawney felt some affinity with Marx. This is hardly surprising that this should be so given Marx's high moral tone and his desire for the liberation of man to develop his creative capacities, for 'the return of man to himself as social, i.e. human man, complete, conscious and matured within.' Tawney's social interactionism, however, differs profoundly from Marx's historical determinism. The latter assumes that values do not play an autonomous role in history, but are a reflection of different stages in the organization of production. With respect to the problem of equality, therefore, Marx does not see this in terms of an ethical ideal. He locates inequality in the existence of classes. Classes themselves are, in the last analysis, the result of the division of labour. When the division of labour is made obsolete, inequality will disappear. Hence, for Marx, the conception of equality is not a normative principle, but a theory which asserts that equality will characterize human relations at a certain period in the history of production. Such a view of equality stands against the element of self-determination and group determination which is at the centre of Tawney's equality of respect.

Turning to Mill, Gutmann associates his view of equality and freedom quite closely with Tawney's at points. Thus she claims that Tawney's argument for regulation or ownership by government is couched in terms consistent with the exceptions to laissez-faire policy that Mill recognized. Gutmann's analysis is partially true. Tawney was concerned with a positive view of freedom connected to individual development and with government
action which would enable this and not coerce the individual. Like Mill too, Tawney was concerned to balance the equal passion and equal rationality postulated i.e. allowing the individual to fulfill their desires and rational capacities. 247

However, several points require to be made to balance Gutmann's observations.

Firstly, Tawney himself argued against the utilitarian stance, arguing that the unique worth of the individual was the crucial moral starting point. 248 Secondly, Tawney was not simply concerned with the fulfillment of 'passions' or 'rational capacities.' He was also concerned for the individual to fulfill their moral capacities, which in turn was the basis for his view of fellowship. 249 Thirdly, it cannot be said that Tawney's equality fits at all into a laissez-faire approach. He argued for the necessity of positive planning on the part of the government. 250 Moreover, though he did not advocate nationalization for its own sake, his criteria for nationalization i.e. government interference, was not simply the Millean exception of improving efficiency, 251 but also about giving both consumer and producers more power and control, and about the responsible use of that power. Once again then, Tawney's equality involves an overall moral imperative which is concerned about relationships and the provision of conditions in which they might thrive.

A final point of note is that Mill's view of democracy though positive, involved a paternalistic attitude to the working classes, who, he argued, should be educated before they could use democracy. Tawney's perspective was quite different, not only trusting the individual but also viewing participatory equality
as itself a means of the individual developing and learning to use their power.

Tawney and Mill thus have different views of equality, with Tawney requiring a moral background which both gives meaning to the freedom of the individual and common purposes which the individual could work through both for themselves and in serving others.

Conclusion

As commentators have noted, Tawney shows the influence of many socialist and Christian thinkers from Arnold and Ruskin, to Morris, Webb and Gore. Raymond Williams can thus refer to him as, 'the last important voice in that tradition which has sought to humanize the modern system of society on its own terms.'

In this chapter, nonetheless, I have argued that with respect to equality, his view remains distinctive. It is distinctively Christian, containing elements of all the major Christian traditions yet it extends the concept of equality as operative to detailed political programmes including the distribution of power. It is distinctively socialist, and yet stands out against the socialism of his contemporaries, with a complex view of equality which includes an emphasis upon social and moral purpose, and a balancing of distributional and participatory equality.

In the next two chapters, I will attempt to examine what influence this view of equality has had in Christian and non Christian circles. This will be followed by an assessment of Tawney's distinctively Christian contribution to modern egalitarian debate.
This chapter and the following one will examine the influence of Tawney's equality both amongst writers on social policy and Christian writers. The first writers to be examined will be R.M. Titmuss and P. Townsend. Both are generally accepted as being heavily influenced by Tawney, and as in some way carrying on the Tawney tradition.  

Terrill writes of the work of Richard Titmuss that, 'it finely expresses Tawney's spirit today.'  

There is no doubt that the two men felt a significant bond. They were friends from the 1940s until Tawney's death. Both worked at the London School of Economics and had a strong commitment to socialism. Both espoused a deeply felt humanism which marked them out as 'secular saints.' Titmuss himself acknowledges his debt to Tawney in the introduction to the 1964 edition of 'Equality'. In that, he demonstrates a strong determination 'to search more intensively and more widely for greater equality in all spheres of our national life.'  

In turn, Tawney thought more highly of Titmuss 'than anyone else at the L.S.E. at the time that he left it.'  

However, whilst the closeness of Tawney and Titmuss is not in doubt, this does not of itself establish clear influence, especially in the area of a particular concept such as equality. This will require closer analysis noting both differences and developments. I will precede this with a brief examination of the ideas and pre-suppositions underlying their views of equality.  

To begin with, Titmuss, like Tawney, was a moralist. On the
one hand, social policy could not be value free, necessarily expressing underlying values in its aims and purposes. 'Social policy' therefore 'is all about social purposes and choices between them.' On the other hand, this placed any government in a position of moral leadership. In this respect, Titmuss can even talk in terms of 'moral progress' in society. Such language brings to mind the Tawney view of progress with government enabling the development of the individual, including moral development.

However, for Titmuss, 'moral progress' is measured in terms of social growth and does not involve teaching about obligation. This 'social growth' is defined specifically in terms of re-distribution through the social services:

'When our societies are spending proportionately more on the educationally deprived than on the educationally normal; when the re-housing of the poor is proceeding at a greater rate than the re-housing of the middle classes; when proportionately more medical care is being devoted to the needs of the long-term chronically sick than to those of the average sick.' Progress such as this would provide 'quantifiable indicators' of social growth. Alongside these, however, are indicators of social growth which 'cannot be quantified, but relate to the texture of relationships between human beings.' Here, social growth is seen very much in terms of Tawney's civilization with its stress on 'human loyalties, affections, pious bonds between man and man which express a man's personality.' However, for Titmuss, education had little part to play in the developing of such relationships in any moral sense. He could certainly advocate education for citizenship, informing individuals
of their rights, helping them to take up benefits. 13 Yet, education as such remained a matter of fulfilling personal differences 14 and did not involve helping students (of whatever age) to become aware of social responsibilities or duties. 15 Thus, whilst Tawney and Titmuss are both moralists who strive for the 'high moral ground' in social policy, a real difference emerges, one which may best be accounted for by Tawney's Christian humanism. Titmuss, according to his daughter, disliked religious ceremony and described himself as an agnostic. 16 At first sight, this does not point to great differences between the two. As Atherton argues, Tawney's own position was shot through with a straightforward moral humanism. 17 Significantly, when referring to important humanist principles, Titmuss quotes the Christian writer Daniel Jenkins about the discovery of the need to love our neighbours as ourselves. 18 Along with his writings on the gift relationship, this ties Titmuss's position firmly to the concept of agape. Furthermore, Reisman argues, both writers 'stressed the extent to which welfarism springs from altruistic attitudes which each was proud to share with his fellow citizens.' However, Tawney's Christian view of man as sinful, as well as capable of compassion, and of altruism having its springs ultimately in God, demands that altruism requires nurture and encouragement, not simply opportunities. 20 Hence, he stresses the need to develop ideology (in spite of its dangers) and to re-state the fundamental transcendent principles, and to re-distribute power. Titmuss's view of humanity is far more optimistic than Tawney. Hence, his moralism emphasizes the duties of the state to the individual and not the obligations of the individual. Given
this, Titmuss cannot accept the idea of individuals being educated in morality. This does not simply reflect a Fabian belief in the perfectability of man. For the Fabians, the means of social change would gradually condition the individual. For Titmuss, man had a natural or social base to altruism, which required expression. Hence, social organization would not so much condition as provide the opportunity for development.

Titmuss and Tawney did share a similar moral psychology in respect of self-realization. Both argued that 'giving' or 'serving' was necessary for the individual to grow and develop in the fullest sense. Also, both argued for some form of value consensus in society. Tawney saw the roots of this consensus as in the Christian tradition, and did not see it as a static phenomenon. Titmuss, however, with the aid of anthropology saw a broader provenance for consensus and more in terms of the need referred to above. Both accepted the importance of consensus in social change. Titmuss, in fact, sought justification for equality 'in the will of society to move towards a more equal society.' Consensus was necessary to both writers given their emphasis upon the necessary connection between values and policies. Examining blood donorship patterns as an index of social belief and values, Titmuss draws the unambiguous conclusion that the causes of different patterns in various countries are to be found precisely in the history, values and political ideas of society. Their shared moralism also led both men to the belief that wrong principles or bad motives could not lead to good results, that 'no amount of cleverness will get figs of thistles.'
Titmuss can thus quote Solzhenitsyn with approval:

'We have to show the world a society in which all relationships, fundamental principles and laws flow directly from moral ethics and from them alone.' 29

This perspective leads Titmuss, like Tawney at times to polarize the values of socialist humanism and free-market ideologies. Titmuss writes of a value free 'vacuum', over against the values of social humanism, likely to be filled with conflict and hostility. His attacks upon the free market system are remarkably similar to Tawney's:

   a) The market system emphasizes individualism and destroys community. 31
   b) It leads to a limitation or deprivation of freedom of choice. 32
   c) It results in inefficiency and shortage of provision and is costly. 33

Given the strong links between values and social policy, it is not surprising that as teachers, both Tawney and Titmuss advocated greater integration of academic disciplines and did not themselves remain in any neat category of academic discipline. 34 Tawney criticized economists and sociologists for an a-moral and limited approach to their disciplines, 35 whilst Titmuss encouraged the teaching of 'the imaginative excitements of unifying perspectives and principles.' 36

Alongside the importance of principles both stressed the importance of understanding society and framing policies in the light of 'the materials to be handled.' 37 Thus, both argued for the importance of reacting to the changing situations and perceived needs in society. 38 However, whilst Tawney was open to changes in the social situation and stressed the need for a systematic
collection of data, Titmuss more clearly identified the challenges of the technological process which would lead to major social 'dis-welfares' requiring compensation and calling for 'a major shift in values.'

Finally, in this brief initial discussion, note must be taken of the very different perspectives of the two writers. Titmuss wrote for the most part, about social policy, arguing, for instance, against the use of the free market in the social services. Tawney, on the other hand, saw all policy as social policy, and thus argued for action on a wider front. Some have criticized Titmuss for his narrower focus, arguing that he does not go far enough and that the social services of themselves, could not effect the necessary changes in society. However, Titmuss does not claim that the social services are the only instrument of change, only a very important one. They are a part of society, reflecting important values and as such, are also in danger from the atavistic market values. Furthermore, when writing from a broader perspective, Titmuss revealed that he was not unaware of the need to examine, for example, 'industrial citizenship' or the role of public schools.

Thus far, it is clear that Tawney and Titmuss were remarkably close in their approaches and views, though with major differences emerging over their view of humanity, and social change. At this point we must address Titmuss's view of equality and related principles.

a) Equality and Its Justification

The principles which Titmuss sees as being behind social growth
are 'equality, freedom and social integration.' The social change involved was to be expressed in the 'language of equality.' Such equality, is, for Titmuss, as with Tawney, person centred and rooted in the belief in the equal value and uniqueness of all persons. Thus, for instance, in talking of the caring professions, Titmuss warns of the dangers of scientism, 'which may diminish the value and uniqueness of the individual human being.'

Titmuss does not provide any deontological or ontological justification for this equality of respect, but does ground it in the concept of agape. Equality for Titmuss, then becomes a relational concept and is justified as being necessary for self-realization. Titmuss can thus write of discovering equality 'in our neighbours', and he quotes with approval, Daniel Jenkins:

'The discovery of equality might be defined as the discovery that we have indeed to love our neighbours as ourselves.'

Titmuss's justification of equality therefore emphasizes far more the consequential arguments, both for the individual and for society. Like Tawney, he argues that equalizing measures are instrumental in leading to greater individual freedom and social integration. Indeed,

'history suggests that human nature is not strong enough to maintain itself in true community where great disparities of income and wealth preside.'

Like Tawney, Titmuss does not see equality of condition as absolute. Indeed, because he argues for need as the relevant reason for receipt of services, he is necessarily a relative egalitarian. Precisely because of Titmuss's narrower
perspective his view of equality does not have to come to
terms with the problems of distribution of income, and thus, he
has no concept such as Tawney's function. However, like
Tawney, he recognizes that equalizing measures are, of
themselves necessary, but not sufficient for the social and
value change at which he aims.

In addition to these arguments, Titmuss has two justifications
which differ from Tawney. The first is the argument that the
provision of universal social services is necessary to avoid
stigma. For Tawney, universal provision was certainly part
of working through equality of respect, and like Titmuss, he
did not believe in 'ambulance work' or 'charity' in the social
services. However, Titmuss gave greater emphasis to the effect
that means testing would have on the dignity of the individual,
and lead to further perceived divisions. The second
argument might lead to the term compensatory equality. In
a rapidly changing society where individuals suffer dis-
welfares, such as unemployment, and where the train of cause
and effect is often so complex that the responsibility for
the dis-welfare is not clear, the state must compensate the
individual. This is the closest that Titmuss gets to
allowing a criterion of desert into his egalitarian distribution.
It is these arguments which take the place of the deontological
arguments in Tawney, as shall be noted below.

Having examined the background to Titmuss's egalitarian views
and how equality arises from that and is justified, I will now
examine in more detail the aims of Titmuss's equality, social
integration and freedom, and the strategy of distribution.

b) Social Integration

Titmuss specifically refers to the sense of community which an egalitarian social policy should facilitate as 'fellowship', which,

'Tawney.... conceived of as a matter of right relationships which are institutionally based.' 58

In effect, Titmuss argues that fellowship, in the sense of recognizing responsibilities within society, is necessary to real community. This shared recognition, arising from a shared morality and awareness of purpose, provides the necessary meaning for cohesiveness in society. In Tanganyika, he warned of the dangers of the breakdown of local communities, and the substitution of amorphous groups,

'where members admit responsibility to no one.' 59

In contrast to this, Britain in the Second World War, exhibited the kind of cohesion and integration which Titmuss searched for. 60 Tawney's own concern with conserving 'human associations' and his own use of the example of the Second World War, led him to write approvingly of Titmuss's work:

'The book of Dr. Titmuss on the social consequences of the war is not without lessons for peace.' 61

Behind this is a sociology very close to Tawney's which asserts that institutional arrangements and their guiding purposes do actually affect the development of individuals and their practice of altruism. 62 This causal relationship is central to Titmuss's book 'The Gift Relationship' where he argues that the use of market principles in blood donorship would lead to a diminution of altruism and thus of community:
'One of the functions of the atavistic private market system is to 'free' men from any sense of obligation to, or for, other men regardless of the consequences to others who cannot reciprocate, and to release some men (who are eligible to give) from a sense of inclusion in society at a cost of excluding other men (who are not eligible to give).’

Not only can community be affected in this way, but also the very basis of any moral relationship, truth. Thus, a donor in the market system could be strongly tempted not to reveal problematic details of his or her medical history, precisely because the first motive would be to gain money and not to affirm 'a sense of belonging.'

Tawney writes in a similar vein of personal morality being affected. However, Tawney's connection is more direct. On the one hand, it is poverty which can produce a moral breakdown, on the other, it is privileges which may lead to 'wickedness.' One aspect of this will be examined under Titmuss's concept of freedom. At this point it may be noted that the different focus that the two writers have, concerning moral breakdown, points to another important difference between them, one often seen more in terms of a development than a difference.

To see this clearly it is necessary to examine firstly, what Titmuss sees as the altruistic 'bonds' of community. These are 'ultra-obligations' (a term originally use by G.P. Grice) and the following must be noted about them:

a) Ultra-obligations cannot be viewed as purely altruistic. Titmuss accepts that giving to others or for others, is not devoid of community pressure of self-interest.

b) An ultra-obligation does not involve a strict duty. Thus, if the individual has not fulfilled the obligation, there is no question of censure. There is,
'no remorse, shame or guilt attached to the failure to give blood.' 69

c) Nonetheless, the individual who give blood does clearly see some obligation they wish to fulfill. This is supported by Titmuss's empirical evidence in the appendix where three times more people gave blood for altruistic or obligatory reasons than those who saw it as a reciprocal activity.

d) Given the above two points, the receipt of any gift can have not strict right to the fulfillment of such an ultra-obligation. To do so would assume some form of contract, legal or moral, whereas ultra-obligations 'derive from our own characters and are not contractual in nature.' 70

e) Ultra-obligations involve recognition of and response to need. 71

f) Titmuss specifically sets ultra-obligations outside the realm of

'reciprocal rights and obligations of family and kinship in modern society.' 72

Focusing on social policy, Titmuss is concerned 'with stranger relationships, with processes, institutions and structures which encourage or discourage the intensity and extensiveness of anonymous helpfulness in society.' 73

Anonymity is crucially important for Titmuss in the gift relationship because the care offered by the social services is precisely not dependent upon 'personal bonds' but upon need. 74 Thus, the individual, in giving anonymously can show no discrimination, and in so doing, identifies his or herself with the values of the service.
Against this view of ultra-obligations, Tawney is quite distinctive. Firstly, the concept of altruism is rarely mentioned in Tawney's writings. In the 'Commonplace Book', he connects altruism firmly to belief in God and also sees it as part of self-interest properly understood. However, Tawney's view of man's sinful nature precludes any simple appeal to, or reliance upon altruism. Indeed, Tawney's stress on the need to develop moral codes and the dispersion of power, demonstrates the need to develop accountability and curb exclusive self-interest.

Secondly, Tawney does not have any concept such as ultra-obligation. He certainly argues for the collective provision of the basic services. Also, he refers to the basic moral stance of equality of respect - the obligation owed to man qua man, and it may be thought that this basic Kantian respect is precisely what Titmuss develops into the concept of ultra-obligations. However, equality of respect sets up a framework of obligations which, in Tawney's view cannot be avoided. Equal value sets up an initial obligation to respect others, though, of course, the means of fulfilling this are not precisely stated. Nonetheless, such an obligation is not one that can be withdrawn from, like ultra-obligations. Moreover, this equality of respect is connected to, indeed informs, relationships which involve a clear sense of duty. Such relationships involve duties to family, community and fellow members of industry, and thus involve kinship and a implicit form of contract. For Tawney, universal provision of services was precisely to enable individuals to fulfill such
duties. Obligations then, for Tawney are tied to relationships in context, and it is precisely these that give shared moral meaning, along with equality of respect. Tittuss's 'ultra-obligations' however, are separated from relationships and derived 'from our own characters.' It is hard to see how these could form the 'bonds of community', without community context, and without clear expectations about duties and expectations of their fulfillment. For Tawney then, the basis of social integration or fellowship is far more complex and realistic, building upon a network of existant relationships. In his search to isolate altruism, Titmuss ironically turned it into an anaemic concept which in the end could not provide the basis for any welfare system. Ultra-obligations lack the necessary commitment and framework of rights which are necessary to any such system. Tawney, on the other hand, argues for specific rights which require fulfillment. Ultra-obligations as deriving from 'our characters' do, of course, reflect Titmuss's over-optimistic view of human nature, and this will be considered further below. His difficulties with the concept are also seen in the use of blood-donorship as the major example. Titmuss himself finds it hard to generalize from this, offering only fostering and the use of patients in teaching situations as other examples. Even these examples do not fit easily or necessarily into the gift relationship model. It is not, for instance, clear that the patient's participation in teaching situations can always be described as voluntary. Much again, depends upon the relationship between doctor and patient and how it is interpreted.
c) **Freedom**

Titmuss, like Tawney, had a strong sense of positive freedom. The individual required freedom in order to exercise crucial elements of the personality and so to grow. The essential elements in this freedom for Titmuss, were freedom to choose and freedom to give. Freedom to choose involved to some degree control of the individual's situation, though, as shall be seen below, in an examination of participatory equality, this was not stressed as much as Tawney did. Like Tawney, with his concept of freedom to serve, Titmuss's freedom to give directly linked freedom to fellowship. Being free to give, is being free to affirm the individual's sense of belonging and of 'identity, participation and community.'

The basis of this freedom is twofold. Firstly, as with Tawney, Titmuss argues that the self is only truly realized through giving, noting of the blood donors that to 'love themselves they recognized the need to love strangers.' Secondly, and arising from this, Titmuss argues for the human need to give, both biological and social, and thus for the importance of discovering means for expressing this need. However, whilst Tawney tied the freedom to serve explicitly in to the individual situation and his or her moral relationships, Titmuss sees the gift relationship primarily in terms of strangers. The fact that this is then viewed as a basic human right has important consequences, for Titmuss argues that any system which denies this right is necessarily coercive. This forms the second part of Titmuss's argument against market forces in the social services and his case
contains several elements:-

a) Having established in his own mind, the need to give and the importance of freedom to do so, Titmuss bluntly argues that 'compulsion, coercion, bribery and payment' will involve a denial of the freedom to give or not to give. Thus he argues that market conditions of themselves involve coercion. In contrast to this, Tawney sees coercion of market forces as that which denies the power of the individual in his or her situation.

b) Application of the market principle would also lead to a diminution of choice for those who had not sufficient resources to make a choice, 'the young, the old, the excluded.' Titmuss's evidence for this is taken from the United States where this is not simply a matter of the individual having to pay for health care, but of bearing the extra costs caused by a market system which is inherently inefficient and costly (as witnessed by the increase in defensive medicine).

c) The freedom of the professional to make judgements about the acceptability of available resources could also be curtailed by the use of the market system in the National Health Service. Such judgements could, for example, be challenged as restraint of trade.

Titmuss, then, whilst emphasizing the freedom of the donor, also emphasizes that of the recipient and the professional in this gift relationship. The effect of this coercion is not only to deny freedom, but also to risk the necessary bond of truth (as noted above) and even life itself. At its base, the
effect of the assertion of the individual right, is to separate the individual's 'freedom from other peoples' freedom.' 100

By ignoring others' rights, then the whole sense of community is destroyed. 101

As has been noted, Titmuss's concept of freedom to give is very similar to Tawney's freedom to serve. 102 However, Titmuss's freedom depends greatly upon the acceptance of the existence of a 'biological need to' give. 103 Once giving is accepted as a need, then, it is argued, the means of expression should be provided. The problem is that it is not clear what is meant by a biological or social need to give. Most of Titmuss's examples of giving are taken from writers such as Mauss, Levi-Strauss or Homans, 104 and refer to very different cultures. In any case, what Titmuss refers to is less a biological need to give and more the product of social conditioning. Thus he can refer to 'the immense pervasiveness of the social obligation', and 'the strength of the supporting sanctions; dishonour, shame and guilt.' 105

In addition, Titmuss does not provide convincing empirical evidence for the need to give. This is restricted to an analysis of blood donor motives, 106 which does not attempt even to specify what is meant by altruism. 107 It is, in fact, hard to determine what would constitute evidence for a need to give, or for that matter what would differentiate that from 'altruism' as the expression of community survival, a core of good sense.' 108
Tawney's justification of the freedom to serve is more convincing because he views service as a means to psychological and spiritual fulfillment on the one hand, and on the other, locates service in the total web of moral relationships and their demands upon the individual. 109

In all this, Titmus moves from a perceived basic need to an argument based upon natural rights. As noted above, the notion of a natural right is, in itself, difficult. 110 However, even if this could be overcome, Titmus then finds himself arguing for a position using the same method as his opponents - they asserting the right of the individual to sell, or to give. Tawney avoids the possibility of a simple counter-assertion of rights by basing his argument partially upon obligation. 112 He also leaves a greater room for choosing precisely how the individual might fulfill his or her obligations. 113 For Titmus, ironically, it may be argued that choice is actually diminished. One may give or not give, but the gift must be anonymous if the bonds of community are to be maintained. 114

From the above argument, it is not clear that Titmus's right to give is a real development of Tawney's freedom to serve. At first sight, it appears to be a development of Tawney's concept in the context of obligation to the community as expressed in the National Health Service. However, the idea has been seen to rest on quite different grounds in Tawney, and to have application on a far wider scale.
Participatory Equality

As noted above, participatory equality was an essential element in Tawney's views. In one sense, this was his version of equality of opportunity, for, along with other measures this was to give greater power to the individual in the organization and control of his or her life. His concern for this equality was seen in industry, education and political democracy itself.

One view of Titmuss, is that he was less concerned with participatory equality and democracy. Reisman, for example, writes that Titmuss thought the 'active component in democracy' less important than Tawney. 115 However, participatory equality did play an important part in Titmuss's thought. Firstly, the very concept of the gift relationship was aimed at allowing the individual to participate more fully in the work of the National Health Service. Thus, he refers to the importance of 'processes, transactions and institutions which promote an individual's sense of identity, participation and community.' 116

Secondly, Titmuss was very aware of the importance of the sense of control in individual or political situations. This related directly to the need for clearly set out ideologies which would enable real choice to take place. Without this, 'political democracy becomes a device for choosing between different leaders but not between different social objectives.' 117

Without that choice, the 'notion of purposive control over man's secular affairs' would be diminished. 118 Thirdly, Titmuss was concerned for the consumer's voice to be heard, for instance in the National Health Service. Indeed, he took the view that the articulate middle-class had been instrumental -
'in a general rise in standards of service particularly in hospital care. 119

Thus, in recommendations to Tanganyika, he is able to recommend that Area Hospital Advisory Committees provide, 'local democratic representatives with opportunities to participate in the responsibilities of hospital management.' 120

In some respects, Titmuss once more may be viewed as a developer of ideas or at least as applying ideas to different contexts. Thus Titmuss takes participation into the realm of the National Health Service at several levels, 121 something that Tawney never clearly did.

However, even here, differences emerge. Firstly, Titmuss stresses participation in decision making more in terms of maintaining standards than in respecting the autonomy of the consumer, 122 or providing opportunities for growth or control in the individual's life. 123 Tawney was not simply concerned with standards but the right of individuals, 'to be consulted in regard to their occupation', or situation. 124 Secondly, Titmuss did not share Tawney's belief in the ordinary man's need or desire to spend several hours per week participating in public or shared issues. 125 Titmuss wrote of Tawney, that his 'love for working-class commonsense has sometimes seemed to approach naïveté.' 126

In addition, Titmuss's civil-service background made him question the effectiveness of participation of individuals on consumer or planning groups.

'Most lay members,' Titmuss wrote, 'newly appointed are useless during the first year of office,' 127 hence the need for a prolonged period of learning. This is perhaps one reason why even when Titmuss does recommend participation in
decision making he does not enthusiastically espouse the idea of experimenting in participatory equality. 128 Thirdly, as was noted above, Titmuss does not extend his participatory ideas to the economic sphere, whereas Tawney was concerned to establish industrial democracy and consumer councils. 129 It was noted above, that Titmuss concentrated upon the narrower field of social policy, though he was aware of the broader relationship between the services and the values of society. 130 However, this does not entirely account for the lack of reference to participatory equality outside the social services. In fact, Titmuss did actually divide the realms of social policy and the economic world quite clearly. Thus he argues for the 'fundamental distinguishing marks of social policy' which, because it has to continually ask the question 'who is my stranger', must 'inevitably be concerned with the unquantifiable and unmethodical aspects of man as well as with those aspects which can be identified and counted.' 131 Implicit in this is the notion that the economic/industrial field is not a focus for participatory equality. For Tawney, quite the opposite was the case. The heart of economic matters involved moral relationships. 132 In turn this meant that 'either democracy..... will extend its authority from the political to the economic, and be established more firmly because on broader foundations; or it will cease to exist, save in form, as a political institution.' 133 Ironically, whilst Tawney did not advocate consumer groups and the like in the welfare services, this difference is very apparent in the approach of the two to education. For both, education was about making individuals 'more capable of freedom and more capable of fulfilling their personal differences.' 134
However, for Tawney, this very process involved not just equality of provision, but greater participation from the students in taking responsibility for the learning.\footnote{135} It was precisely in such a context that initiative and autonomy could develop alongside the awareness of social responsibilities.\footnote{136}

Tawney's holistic view of participatory equality rests firmly on his Christian foundations, and in particular, the Incarnation.\footnote{137}

Christ's concern was for all humanity and excluded no area of that world. Some Christians may limit their liabilities but, 'the devil does not. They may throw him the world of politics and business to devour at his leisure, in the hope that, while gnawing them, he will leave such minor morsals as private lives alone. He is not unfortunately, so easily appeased, nor can human affairs be thus departmentalized.'\footnote{138}

Tawney then, with his emphasis upon the global relevance of participatory equality and with a view of the individual as a partner in progress,\footnote{139} reveals a view of participatory equality quite distinct from that of Titmuss, who overall limits the application of this equality.

Two additional points may be noted here. Firstly, if Titmuss really did see the gift-relationship with its ultra-obligations as involving increased participation by insisting upon the anonymity of giving, he actually excludes many different ways in which individuals can voluntarily participate and contribute to the sense of community.\footnote{140} Secondly, having argued for the non-contractual right to give, Titmuss's view of participatory equality really takes on a form of equality of opportunity i.e. equality of opportunity to give.\footnote{141}
Equality of Distribution
Like Tawney, Titmuss was a relative egalitarian, setting himself against 'great disparities of income and wealth.'

Thus Titmuss did not argue against inequality as such, but rather inequality which led to a division in community and which denied freedom. Neither writer, argues Reisman, was very clear about 'precisely how much planned re-distribution of life chances and incomes is required to ensure social integration.'

While such a comment may be true, it is hardly justified as a criticism of the two thinkers. Neither of them saw re-distribution of life chances as sufficient of itself to ensure social integration. Both concentrated more on the distribution of life chances than on the re-distribution of income per se. In this situation, the provision of basic services has clear relevance to the freedom of the individual. In this respect both saw the welfare services as an important means of re-distribution.

However, even in respect of the distribution of life chances, both accepted the need to review the effects of any planned re-distribution in order to respond to the new challenges or any problems in application.

With Tawney's concern for the industrial world as much for the welfare services, his criteria for distribution were two; need and function. Titmuss had no references to function, relying on need as the major criterion. Nonetheless, as noted above, this was supplemented by the argument from dis-welfare ie, that the effects of technological progress were to produce dis-welfare such as unemployment. Such dis-welfares tended to occur to the least advantaged in society and responsibility was often very hard to
assess or even discover. Thus it was necessarily the 'handmaiden' role of the government to provide compensation. 148

However, far stronger than the idea of compensatory equality in Titmuss, is that of equality of access, which he emphasizes much more than Tawney. Whilst Tawney in general, accepted that the universal welfare services would provide an acceptable level of service for all, 149 Titmuss produced more detailed investigation of uptake to discover inequalities within welfare. 150 Titmuss divides the unequal distribution into three areas, fiscal welfare, social welfare and occupational welfare:

a) Fiscal welfare refers to the tax benefits gained by the rich such as tax allowances or covenants. 151

b) In the social welfare field, Titmuss notes for example, the dramatic higher take up of university places by children of higher income families. 152 This, in itself, affects inequality of income at a later stage. Equally in the National Health Service, figures revealed that it was middle and higher class families who were best able to take advantage of the services provided. 153

c) Occupational welfare refers to the benefits enjoyed by the higher income groups, related to occupation. These range from assistance with school fees to company cars. 154

Thus Titmuss argued that not only were the practices in these various areas preventing greater equality, they were in fact, 'simultaneously enlarging and consolidating the areas of social inequality.' 155

The social division of welfare was thus a complex phenomenon, one which involved many of the elements which Tawney had noted in his
interactionist analysis of society. Not only are there striking differences, both in quantity and quality, between, for example, occupational and social welfare, but such inequalities tend to be legitimized by those in power. This legitimization involves making judgements on the inadequacy of those who depend upon the social welfare, which will, in turn, affect the self-image of those who are in receipt of social welfare. Given this 'something akin to a stereotype or image of an all-pervasive Welfare State for the Working Classes... may, paradoxically, widen rather than narrow class relationships.'

In analysing the social division of welfare, Titmuss sees this as part of the 'irresponsible society' in which 'the play of powerful economic and political forces, the strength and tenacity of privilege' lay behind the 'new division of equity.'

Titmuss was thus very aware of the control which power structures had over the systems of welfare from large economic forces, to the professional in the Health Services. His work in the social division of welfare is far more detailed than Tawney's analysis of inequalities, and in Sinfield's view justifies his reputation as 'a seminal thinker in social policy.'

The result of highlighting such inequities is that Titmuss moves more into 'bloc' and even 'lot' regarding egalitarian measures. Thus, Titmuss, seeing the failure of straightforward universalist provision, argued for more targeting of groups as a means of achieving equality. Hence, his definition of social growth can have quantifiable social indicators i.e. the proportionately greater amount spent upon the socially disadvantaged.

In all this, Titmuss, like Tawney, urged that disadvantage be
attacked from several angles, noting how, for example, disadvantage in environment was connected to disadvantage in education. 166

Also, he was determined to achieve this without the stigma involved in means testing. Titmuss's recommendations may be noted in the following areas:-

a) In tax and contributions, he argued for a reduction in tax allowances for children and old people in order to prevent 'excessive benefits being paid to those who do not really need them.' 167

He also argued for higher contributions from the wealthy for health and education.

b) In education, Titmuss accepted the concept of educational priority areas and advocated social planning as part of university admissions. 168 He argued for the need to develop systems of quotas designed to widen higher educational opportunities. 169 A further proposal was to attract more working class children by offering more 'specialized, vocational career courses.' 170

c) Titmuss was aware of the importance of relationships in the re-distribution. The professions, in this context

'are increasingly becoming the arbiters of our welfare fate; 171 they are the key-holders to equality of outcome; they help to determine the pattern of re-distribution in social policy.'

Titmuss thus advocated education which would enable the professions not to be blinkered by class interest or specialization but to respond to the needs of their clients or patients. 172

d) In the field of social security, Titmuss advocated that full pensions be paid within twenty years rather than forty seven. This involved subsidising all workers over the age of forty,
and was particularly relevant to married women re-entering the labour market. Pensions were to be adequate enough to guarantee a reasonable standard of living to those not on occupational welfare, and contributions were to be earnings related.

Several points must be noted about Titmuss's measures. Firstly, in stressing access, Titmuss tends to concentrate more upon distributional equality. Secondly, as Reisman notes, Titmuss's egalitarian proposals do not go far compared to Tawney's. There are several possible reasons behind this. Reisman suggests that Titmuss was simply more cautious than Tawney. Aware of the need for broader reform, he only occasionally proposes elements of it such as the suppression of public schools. Alternatively, it may be argued that Titmuss himself was blinkered and given his division between economic and social policy, that he was unsure how to extend equality beyond the welfare services. Titmuss, of course, may simply have wanted to concentrate upon a different aspect of equality from Tawney's. Whatever the reason, there is a significant difference. The difference is not simply in the extent to which the two writers articulate egalitarian programmes, as Reisman would suggest, but in the absence in Titmuss of any real policy for the distribution of power. As noted above, this is central to Tawney's equality, ranging from the power of ideas, to the power of the individual to control his or her situation, to the power of the community, consumer, or producer to curb the irresponsible use of power. From Titmuss, then, there is no reference to details for nationalization, industrial democracy, planning etc., something all the more remarkable when
he identified the effect of powerful groups on the welfare services, highlighting irresponsible use of power.

This section then must come to some significant and perhaps surprising conclusions. There is little doubt that Titmuss was the 'spiritual heir' of Tawney. However, in terms of equality there are significant differences. Both acknowledge some basis of equal worth, though with Titmuss at times more explicit about the agapeic base to this. Both see the aims of fellowship and freedom as arising from this with equality of distribution as necessary but not sufficient means of achieving these aims. Their perception, however, of freedom and fellowship differs, with Tawney stressing both a moral framework in fellowship, one requiring that principles be stressed and duties addressed, and a broader view of liberty to serve, along with freedom to control ones situation. Despite a stress on agape, Titmuss's justification of equality is more consequential than Tawney's, and is also based upon a concept of rights which itself is based upon a social anthropology quite distinct from Tawney's moral psychology. Tawney's Christian deontological base and his view of sinful human nature leads him to stress responsibilities and duties rather than rights, and the need to help individuals develop in the light of these responsibilities. For Titmuss, a more optimistic view of human nature sees no need for such 'intervention'. The consequence of all this is that Tawney stresses participatory equality far more than Titmuss, and the need to disperse power both to give the individual control and to provide safeguards against irresponsible use of power. Tawney's perfectionism and his awareness of man's
sinful nature provide a far more compelling link between distribu-
tional and participatory equality.

Both writers acknowledge the importance of distributional equality, 
but Titmuss genuinely develops Tawney’s rather simple view of re-
distribution, based upon a more acute analysis of inequalities in 
society. In all this, it is clear that Tawney’s perfectionism 
and grounds for equality does lead to a very different approach 
to equality in practice, both in the extent of equalizing measures 
(i.e. beyond the social services) and in the kinds of equality, 
with a broad view of participatory equality as essential in the 
development of a welfare society.

A final note must be made of Reisman’s tentative criticism of 
Titmuss over against Tawney. Unlike Tawney, argues Reisman, 
Titmuss can be accused 
'of designing a welfare society which might possibly succeed in 
ensuring equality of opportunity but which could not adequately 
guarantee lifetime equality of relationship.' 181

This comment seems unfair since it is not at all clear that 
Titmuss intended to 'design' a welfare society as such. Moreover, 
he clearly was concerned with relational equality as his references 
to agape, his work on the gift relationship and the postscript to 
'Social Policy' demonstrate. 182 Moreover, the approach outlined 
in the 'Gift Relationship' was precisely to ensure that choices 
which confirmed a particular form of relational equality could be 
made. The crucial difference is rather in terms of the projected 
programmes, the underlying moral emphasis in Tawney upon relational 
obligations, and the broader perspective of Tawney which takes in 
participatory and distributional equality and dispersion of power.
Peter Townsend

A second writer thought to be influenced by Tawney's view of equality is Peter Townsend. However, as with Titmuss, whilst the writings of Townsend and Tawney are similar in many ways, their views about equality are distinctively different. Like Tawney and Titmuss, Townsend is unhappy with confining academic disciplines to a narrow focus and in particular argues against the concept of a value-free sociology. In this respect he views himself as something of a moralist. He criticizes the Labour government for not exerting moral authority and asserts that 'what counts in the end is the morality of government.' The sociologist is thus perceived as servant of society, 'but also...its judge.'

The sociologist's task with respect to social policy is seen as analysing political pronouncements and policies to discover the aims and objectives held explicitly or implicitly, and how they are carried through in actual decisions. He quotes Titmuss approvingly to the effect that social services should take their stand on aims not methods. He also refers to Tawney's comments on the failings of the English and their unwillingness 'to test the quality of that activity by reference to principle.' In the light of this, Townsend frequently attacks individualist philosophy, especially if applied to the welfare state. However, like Tawney his view of social policy is not restricted to the welfare state. Thus Townsend asserts that the aim of social democracy is to 'enlarge the individual's freedom of choice.'

He continues,
'In social policy it can be achieved only by devising principles which apply to all institutionalized methods of meeting need - to industrial, voluntary and private associations as well as central, regional and local government services - and therefore to all members of society.' 192

At the base of this is a view of equal worth which Townsend never really begins to articulate. He stresses the dignity of man, and an equality of respect which like Tawney, emphasizes relationships, where 'everything turns on the way people behave to each other.' 193

He does not attempt to justify this equal worth per se and certainly draws no Christian link, though nonetheless acknowledging that such attitudes 'are generally recognized as Christian virtues.' 194

Thus, much of Townsend's justification for equality relies either on a principle of distributive justice for all (where validity is simply assumed) or on consequential arguments stressing the effectiveness of equalizing measures in achieving social cohesion or productivity. 195

Thus, for Townsend the consistent emphasis is less on equal worth and more on distribution and the effects in terms of fellowship or freedom. Freedom in particular is seen as the major aim of social democracy. 196 Such freedom is defined by Townsend as freedom of choice, the individual's 'freedom to choose what kind of life he shall lead.' 197

It is thus, not simply a matter of enlarging the choice of available resources, but enabling the individual to pursue the aims they have in life. Thus, like Tawney, the emphasis is upon the individual's control over his or her life. 198 Also, like Tawney, Townsend sees equality as instrumental in achieving this major aim, so that
to pursue individual freedom is to pursue equality.' 199

Townsend, however, has nothing of the concept of freedom to serve or of the individual being enabled by equal distribution to do his or her duty as perceived, either to state or to smaller groups. 200

Also, like Titmuss, Townsend has an optimistic view of human nature, which does not take into account man's sinful nature. 201 Thus, for Townsend there is no hint of moralising or attempting to point to choice in moral relationships. 202 Equally, there is no sense in which Townsend feels obliged to 'persuade' people to be free. 203 Thus, Townsend tends to emphasize a rights-based philosophy. The social services aim, for instance, is 'to protect and substantiate individual rights' leading to an 'extension of rights.' 204 With the growth of rights would be a corresponding growth in responsibilities. These, however, are with reference to the local community and there is no consideration of what they might broadly involve or how they might be learned.

This same line moves into Townsend's view of fellowship. Like Titmuss, he is concerned that the social services should further social integration. 205 Indeed, services based upon rights and accessible to all would be more likely to lead to integration of minority groups. 206 Community integration is listed by Townsend as one of the four objectives of the 'New Social Services.' 207 Once again, however, this does not examine the duties or responsibilities of members of the community. This aim of integration involves three aspects:-

a) care for individuals in the community
b) improvement of the quality of family and community life. Here Townsend is not specific, merely noting that a
'deliberate reduction in inequalities of resources and of social isolation' would result in such improved quality.

c) the promotion of citizen's rights and 'of certain kinds of group activities.'

The latter certainly involves some sense, albeit implicit, in which individuals or groups can develop social responsibility by linking in to local democracy. However, unlike Tawney he gives no consideration of the common purpose necessary for community, or of the individual's obligation to the community, quite apart from obligations to self, family or industry.

Thus, unlike Tawney, Townsend spends no time on the question of moral consensus, shared moral meaning, or even an underlying moral psychology. He is certainly aware of the effects of poverty and of the interaction between the social organization of power and those in poverty. However, he sees none of this in terms of spiritual or moral effects. In all of this, Townsend has failed to work through the moral base of his egalitarian stance. This is demonstrated specifically in his definition of poverty as 'the lack of resources necessary to permit participation in the activities, customs and diets commonly approved by society.' Such a definition is open to the charge of moral relativism, with mores dependent upon general approval and none of the perfectionism of Tawney. From such an ambiguous moral base, the tendency is to move from person-regarding equality to lot-regarding equality, and from an emphasis upon service to one of rights. This necessarily affects distributional and participatory equality.
Townsend notes three possible principles underlying any approach to poverty; conditional welfare for the few, minimum rights for the many, and distributional justice for all. It is the last of these which he argues strongly for. About this principle, three things may be said:

a) Despite the references to relational equality above, distributional justice tends to dominate Townsend's approach.

b) The principle is global in domain and thus refers to universal service, individuals receiving benefits purely in terms of need. In all this he argues strongly against any form of selectivity with its resultant stigma.

c) Equal distribution does not simply involve distribution of resources but enlarging access to income and systems or structures of resources.

For Tawney, the criteria for distribution are need and function, the latter recognizing the centrality of common purpose. For Townsend the only acceptable criterion of distribution is need.

Two points may be noted here.

a) Townsend views inequality of treatment as morally wrong. Thus, he argues strongly against selectivity as both diminishing the poor, and strengthening the concept of a hierarchical society.

b) Townsend argues strongly against a national minimum. Such a minimum may well in fact lead to greater inequalities, as those above the minimum achieve greater wealth. In this respect, real distributional justice must take into account occupational and fiscal services as well as social services. Like Titmuss, Townsend goes beyond Tawney's distributional equality here. In any case, minimum income must not be estimated in isolation
or with simple reference to subsistence but rather in relation to the individual's context, and in comparison to the standards of need fulfillment through society. Thus, Townsend can write that individuals:

'have material, psychological and social needs which can only be measured or met by comparison with the full range of conditions found in society as a whole.'

In this, Townsend advocates a much broader re-distribution than Tawney, and one which stresses far more the 'eveness' of distribution. Thus he writes that

'wealth, including land, property and other assets can and must be distributed more widely as well as evenly.'

For Townsend this is not something simply to be achieved extending public ownership, but also

'by the enlargement of the direct rights of the individual.'

In housing he advocates, for instance, a common definition of the rights

'to succession and adaptation as well as space and amenities,'

In terms of income, Townsend looks to tackle, for example, equalities suffered by married women by having income paid

'from a common public source,...regulated by common principles.'

Thus the married woman would be paid for her work.

Townsend seems to be moving from the person-centred equality of Tawney to a more lot-centred approach. In fact, Townsend, along with a more detailed examination of existing inequalities, is proposing much broader lot-regarding equality in order, as he sees it, to properly fulfill person-regarding equality.

This is a real development upon the straightforward re-distribution suggested by Tawney via the convention of social services.
However, compared to this concern for and development of
distributional equality, Townsend shows little interest in parti-
cipatory equality. He sees this as important, but does not
advocate any particular ways of extending it. 228 Lack of
reference to industrial democracy or on educational democracy
demonstrates this both in and outside Townsend's major focus of
the social services. 229 Once again this seems to stem from an
emphasis upon consumer rights in terms of lots rather than upon
the responsibilities of the citizen. It may also reflect some-
thing of a Webbian bias towards the rights of the consumer and not
the producer. 230 Where Townsend does develop the theme of
participatory equality is in relation to the Seebohm Report's
recommendation that there be more involvement from individuals in
communities,
'in determining and meeting their own needs.' 231
Significantly, however, when Townsend does refer to equal
participation, it is with reference to lot-regarding equality,
 ie. equal participation in the resources of the social services.
Significantly, also, Townsend does not explicitly connect the
concept of freedom with participatory equality or systematically
work out the idea of the individual gaining control of their
situation through such participation. Changes in this area are
rather seen as instrumental in enabling distributional equality to
be extended:
'A transformation of work organization and social relations would
be required to legitimate such changes and secure public approval
for them.' 232

In conclusion then, there are many aspects of Tawney's equality
found in Townsend. In interview, Townsend himself admits to the
influence of Tawney, especially in 'Equality'. However, Townsend was not clear as to the specific influence as regards the concept of equality, considering it was more the spirit of Tawney's writing which affected him. Comparison of their views confirm that Townsend's view is very different. His justification of equality is based primarily on rights, and without a Christian moralist base, he tends to emphasize rights and lot-regarding equality rather than person-regarding equality, which balances rights and responsibilities. As a result, distributional equality receives far more emphasis than participatory equality, a distributional equality based upon an expanded concept of need and without reference to function. There is thus in Townsend none of Tawney's perfectionism or reference to duties or the need to educate for a balance of duties to the self and others, and as a result, there is a different view of equality in practice.

Socialist Writers

If the egalitarian links in the Tawney, Titmuss, Townsend chain are not as secure as some have imagined, the links which form any socialist chain of equality might seem even less secure. As some commentators suggest, socialism has never really determined how important equality is. In turn, of course, this is not helped by the many possible meanings of the term equality, and the assumption on some writers part that there is a common meaning. Plant, in an important Fabian pamphlet, for instance, spends twenty four pages working through egalitarian policies and viewpoints, before, in the final page providing a definition, which itself has space for only a sketchy justification.
In the midst of this uncertainty, there are socialist politicians and writers who have been associated with Tawney's equality such as Crosland, Hattersley and Crick. Writers such as Crosland and Hattersley have a clear view of equality as central to socialism. Crosland's view is similar to Tawney's in several respects. Firstly, he argued for equality as a central principle, 'the strongest ethical inspiration of virtually every socialist doctrine.' Secondly, Crosland emphasized the importance of democracy and participatory equality, and freedom to control the individual's situation. Thirdly, Crosland argued that extremes of inequality led to abuse of power, a waste of individual talent, social disharmony and a threat to the 'exceedingly important values' of democracy and freedom. Fourthly, Crosland did not argue for absolute equality in distribution and saw a definite limit to the degree of equality which was desirable. Finally, Crosland states that his ideal is a classless society, echoing Tawney's aim.

However, whilst Crosland shares with Tawney a concern for equality based upon its effects upon society and the individual, he does not share the same emphasis upon fraternity and ultimately upon equality of worth and of relationships. He acknowledges that brotherhood is an important socialist aspiration but does not see this as a test of any egalitarian measures. Indeed, Crosland argues that the concept of brotherhood applied to society is too simplistic. He suggests that a constant amount of frustration or discontent might be endemic in society, and that this will be impervious to social reform. Thus, any attempt to foster brotherhood must be utopian. Crosland's target here is the utopian
fellowship of such as Robert Owen. Tawney on the other hand, could argue for fraternity precisely as a realist, noting the importance of fraternity to efficiency and health, and encouraging the individual to work through the 'bonds of affection' which can be discovered in the moral understanding of man, whilst yet never defining fellowship too precisely and thus avoiding any idea of forced fellowship. 250

Crosland and his fellow Fabians recognised the importance of equality of respect, noting for instance, that equality of opportunity was not sufficient of itself. 251 However, as Drucker argues the connection was not followed through by Crosland, and equality of income and opportunity became ends in themselves.

'The virtue of equality of income can be seen only when the notion is tied to a further notion of the equal dignity of all men - and this the revisionists did not think out.' 252

Precisely because equal worth is not fully explored by Crosland, the actual grounds for Crosland's attack upon inequality, sometimes begin to resemble the position of the emotivists. 253 He accepts that the arguments against inequality are often based upon the envious feelings of the disadvantaged. However, such feelings are 'neither unnatural nor deplorable, but based upon a simple view of what is just and fair.' 254

However, as with the emotivists, Crosland fails to provide explicit criteria for what is just and fair. Thus, as Gutmann notes, Crosland's 'theory served as a solution not for inequality as socialists had previously understood it, but for class resentment.' 255

The search for criteria of fairness in Crosland is answered in the principle of equality of opportunity, which he viewed as widening
the competition for different positions. Thus, 'the essential thing is that every citizen should have an equal chance' and 'provided the start is fair, let there be maximum scope for individual self advancement.' 256

Crosland was concerned that individual merit should achieve the essential positions, yet was equally concerned that every individual should have the opportunity and resources to develop capacities. 257 However, whilst some achieve merit, others fail and some experience poverty. For Crosland, the latter, was often due to 'ignorant or imprudent spending of earnings,' 258 a phenomenon referred to as secondary poverty. To accept that poverty was not always caused by the organization of society raises acute problems for any argument for distributional equality based upon need.

Crosland along with Margaret Cole saw the solution in education. Education was not simply the key element in ensuring equality of opportunity, it was also necessary as a means of attaining a 'democratic quality of leadership', and in democratic values, including recognition of the individual's social debt. 259 However, even these democratic values did not fully involve participatory equality. In industry, for instance, Crosland totally dismissed the relevance and application of this principle.

Crosland's view of equality is therefore quite distinct from that of Tawney. His concern centres upon equality of opportunity supported by distributional equality. This has led some commentators to characterize his view of society as a meritocracy. 260 Despite Field's argument to the contrary, Crosland is concerned with freedom and sees equality as a means to this. 261 However, such freedom is not in the context of service or fulfillment of
duties, and equality of distribution takes on for Crosland, the major political aim. With no reference to service, there is no part for fellowship in Crosland's equality, and so no emphasis upon moral relationships. The overall result is that Crosland's major point of justification is found in the social effects of equality and has no reference to equal worth and its implications. Indeed, the three basic arguments for equality found in 'The Future of Socialism' are relief of primary poverty, reduction of class antagonisms and a more equitable distribution of 'rewards and privileges.' This leads to what Hattersley refers to, a 'minimalist argument for equality.'

Quite apart from these important differences, Crosland gives attention to the creation of wealth in a way not found in Tawney. Indeed, he argues that the achievement of greater equality 'depends heavily on economic growth.'

Not only would egalitarian measures require this growth, but also to propose such measures with zero growth, leading to necessary sacrifices would lead to electoral defeat. Once again, this contrasts with Tawney's concentration upon common purposes and the developing of an ethos of service. Moreover, despite Crosland's supposed greater realism he demonstrates an inadequate grasp of the policy instruments designed to increase growth.

If Crosland's is a markedly different view of equality to Tawney's, Hattersley would claim to be very much part of the Tawney tradition. Like Tawney, Hattersley emphasizes the importance of a clearly stated ideology and with that, a realistic approach to social
application. Like Tawrey, he cannot accept the doctrine of equality of opportunity without distributional equality. Also, Hattersley constantly returns to the theme that equality and liberty are inextricably linked, 'to choose equality is to choose freedom as well.' This focus on freedom leads Hattersley to criticize the neo-liberal view of freedom and in particular, the way in which interests affect an understanding of such a concept. Hattersley is also aware of the effect of greed from all interest groups on any attempt to re-distribute incomes and argues for more planning in terms of incomes.

In stressing freedom as the major outcome of re-distribution, Hattersley does not see this as confined to material choice, on the contrary, 'New opportunities would open up before (individuals) - material, aesthetic even spiritual.' However, such freedom to choose is ultimately that of the consumer, emphasizing the consumer's rights. He betrays none of Tawney's concern for the freedom to relate and to fulfill moral obligations. Nor does he give any time to the distribution of power necessary for some control in industry. Hence, the principle of fraternity has no place in Hattersley's view either. Hattersley's aim is to regain the ideological initiative from the neo-liberals with a coalition of principles ie. freedom and equality. The justification for this is largely utilitarian and he does not work from any explicit basis of unconditional human worth. These basic aims and justification are stated quite explicitly early in the book.
'A socialist society is judged by the extent it succeeds in providing for the largest possible number of its citizens, the power to exercise rights, which, under other forms of organization, are either denied or made available only in theory.' 274

'It is a commitment to organize society in a way which ensures the greatest sum of freedom, the highest total amount of real choice and, in consequence the most human happiness.' 275

Equality may well have consequences for society also in leading to more efficient performance not only in industry but also in schools. 276

However, the purpose and aims of the industry or education are never examined by Hattersley, perhaps because in his concern to respect the 'new individualism', he does not wish to give any impression of moral coercion. 277 Whatever the reason, it leads to an equality which is person-centred, but not relational - concerned for the individual but not for his or her moral context, and so duties and responsibilities.

Finally, note must be taken of a socialist writer whose view of equality seems clearly influenced by Tawney, Bernard Crick. Crick argues for equality as the only 'specifically socialist' value. Liberty and fraternity only 'take on a distinctively socialist form' when related to equality. 278 True equality involves a relative equality which removes all unjustifiable inequalities. 279 Relative equality will be acceptable and accepted if fraternity prevails. Fraternity is defined as 'right relationships', which develop through shared experiences and it involves 'support, care, practicality, grace, sensitivity and sympathy.' 280 Freedom is seen in the context of this fraternity, 281 and involves the development of equality of participation in particular. 282 Equality itself will
'lead to more co-operation than competition', and this will 'in turn enhance fraternity.'

Such fraternity involves people working together for common ends.

Clearly, Crick picks up several of the important Tawney themes in his attempt to place equality in socialism, from the balancing of the three major principles, to the need for common purposes and participatory equality and the need for gradual attitude change. However, as so stated, Crick's position lacks some crucial elements of Tawney's view. Firstly, he does not examine the concept of equality in any depth and in particular, the relationship between equality of respect and participatory equality. Secondly, there is no overtly moral base to his presentation, such that either acts as justification for equality, or informs or acts as the motivation for fraternity. Nor does he suggest a moral or social psychology that would provide the basis for change. Precisely because of this, he points to an almost automatic relationship between equality and fraternity i.e. that with increased equality, then fraternity will necessarily increase, without any real evidence for it. Thus, for Crick, the equalities of distribution and participation have little in terms of principles or empirical evidence to connect them.

This raises the important question as to whether to have a similar framework to Tawney's equality is sufficient. How far such a framework depends on the undergirding of equality of respect and ultimately of Christian doctrine, will be considered in greater detail in chapter seven.

Many Socialist writers or politicians have claimed to be following
or developing Tawney's view of equality, and some such as Crosland and Crick demonstrate important resemblances. However, this section has noted that ultimately the views of equality are very different, and indeed, are inadequate compared to Tawney's.

**Conclusion**

Much has been made of the general or spiritual influence of R.H. Tawney, as a man, as a member of committees, through the style of his writing. In this chapter, I have attempted to determine whether specifically his view of equality was influential. Taking five examples of writers who have been associated with Tawney in some way, I have used two criteria to determine influence: firstly, whether the writer concerned consciously used Tawney and his ideas, or explicitly admitted a debt to him; secondly, whether the writer in question had the same overall view of equality as Tawney, and in particular of the relationship of equality of respect to freedom and fraternity, and of distributional and participatory equality. As was seen in chapter four, one of the most significant aspects of Tawney's equality is precisely that equality of respect controls all secondary principles and this moral base provides the base necessary to give due weight to both distributional and participatory equality. It is this explicitly moral base founded upon both Christianity and Tawney's view of moral and social psychology which is missing from all the writers who might have been influenced by Tawney. This has led to distinctively different views of the secondary principles and, as a result quite different approaches to the whole application of equality in distribution or participation. This has held even in
the case of Titmuss. In the case of socialist writers, either politicians or academics, there are a great deal of surface resonances with Tawney's equality but ultimately, a reluctance to pursue the concept in its complexity, or to provide a significant moral base for it. Nonetheless, some writers have referred directly to Tawney's influence and in the case of Titmuss and Townsend in particular, this has also involved development - in particular of Tawney's view of distributional equality.

A further provisional hypothesis then which begins to emerge from this chapter is that any view of equality of treatment, condition or outcome, will depend upon how these are related to the principles of liberty and fellowship and ultimately equality of respect. With this in mind, the relevance of Tawney's Christian view to contemporary discussion will be examined in the final chapters.
In this chapter, I intend to examine the influence of Tawney's view of equality on Christian writers. Tawney's influence in this area might be thought to be more clear than in the secular sphere with respect to equality. The major theological writers which I have chosen to examine are Daniel Jenkins, Ronald Preston, and John Atherton. The last two form a personal link with Tawney. In addition, I shall note two lay Christians, Holman and Schumacher who demonstrate the extent of Tawney's influence. I will end with a consideration of Tawney's influence as exerted in other ways.

**Daniel Jenkins**

Perhaps the best example of the influence of Tawney's equality is to be found in Daniel Jenkins' 'Equality and Excellence.' Published in 1961, this was at a time Crosland's 'The Future of Socialism' was advocating one view of equality as the primary principle of socialism. ¹ Jenkins makes several references to Tawney and the general influence of 'Equality' and also to Titmuss and Townsend. ² Like Tawney, Jenkins does not set out to write a book of theology but he does see equality and the Christian faith as intimately connected. Indeed,

'the New Testament gives us more direct help in understanding (equality) than it does with many of the other issues of our day.' ³

The book in fact, is the product of study undertaken by staff members of the Christian Frontier Council, a body set up to contribute to the public discussion of major issues in Britain from a Christian standpoint. ⁴ It was to be of use to 'people engaged in practical affairs,' enabling them to see 'fresh aspects of the Christian interpretation of reality.' ⁵
The best way of doing that in the context of equality is 'through seeing more clearly what equality today should mean and how it illuminates our understanding of our duty in society.' In all this, Jenkins sees himself clearly as leading the second stage of the battle for equality, the first of which was led by Tawney. Tawney's writing helped awake Britain to the need for 'a measure of basic equality of social conditions and opportunity.' This stage, argues Jenkins, had largely been achieved by 1961. However, in a world where the forces of large scale industry and centralized communication dominate, the extent to which individuals can 'realize their equality is curtailed.' Here, Jenkins is referring both to the dehumanizing effects of technological progress and also to the particular distributional pattern which has accompanied it. This is the situation that Jenkins wrote for, the second stage of equality.

Jenkins begins his discussion of equality by distinguishing two levels. Firstly, there is 'a level of fundamental insight' where the equal status of human beings is intuitively understood - fundamental equality. This corresponds to Tawney's equal worth. The second level is that of 'day to day experience.' Here equality is defined in terms of specific inequalities between individuals or groups. It is not clear that the precise distinction drawn by Jenkins is all that helpful. In one sense, it corresponds to the two equalities detailed by Tawney, equality of respect and equalizing measures (distribution and participation). However, the second level is not as such defined in terms of inequalities. It is rather substantive equality, defined in terms of egalitarian policies.
Jenkins, like Tawney is concerned about the relationship between fundamental equality and the principles of liberty and fraternity. He does not spend as much time as Tawney examining the concept of liberty or how it might be nurtured in and through social organization. However, like Tawney, he views freedom in a positive sense, of allowing the development of the individual. 15 For Jenkins, the concept of fraternity is not adequate. More 'rich and more appropriate' is the concept of love. 16 Thus, Jenkins begins to make more explicit the agapaic elements of Tawney. 17 Equality, in relation to this deep view of fraternity 'does not come alive unless it realizes itself in the reciprocity of the communion of love, which is the mature human relationship.' 18 On the one hand, equality describes the external side of the relationship of love, which, from the inside is self-giving. 19 On the other hand:

'Following the way of love means that men recognize that the whole cannot be truly served unless each individual is respected in his uniqueness and encouraged to give to the whole the best that is in him.' 20

Two things are of note here. Firstly, Jenkins is concerned to give to the whole, (the paradigm of this being the community of the Body of Christ) whilst respecting the right of each part of the community. Secondly, Jenkins brings out more fully than Tawney, the way in which fundamental equality based upon agape has an attitude of concern which demands action, a commitment to seek the best for the other. This contrasts sharply with the formal principle of equality, which, without the agapaic base, is precisely in danger of becoming otiose. 21 Like Tawney, this concern centres upon
'the unique value of the individual',
and a concern for the
'true well being of the one who is loved.' 22
Equally, Jenkins emphasizes the obligation on the individual to
develop their capacities and the obligations involved in relation-
ships. 23
As noted above, though Jenkins does not see his role as a theolo-
gian, he is more explicit and thorough-going than Tawney in
ty ing in fundamental equality to love and the Christian faith.
Like Tawney, he sees the Incarnation as not simply justifying
fundamental human equality, 24 but as making it clear and coherent.
He takes this a stage further, by noting that Christians would
argue that
'this equality is experienced most vividly in the reception of
God's loving forgiveness.' 26
It is precisely this experience which forms the links
'between equality and liberty and equality and love.' 27
He argues that if the principles of liberty equality and fraternity
are not balanced by love, then the idea of equality can become
'corrupt and misleading.' 28 The ultimate danger is of equality
as becoming a weapon in ideological warfare, creating new patterns
of inequality and new outbursts of social unrest. 29
In effect, Jenkins is noting the danger of equality becoming an
aim in itself, excluding other principles, and encouraging resent-
fulness and envy. 30
Jenkins was writing at a time when he thought it necessary to
rehabilitate the concept of equality, 31 and given the oft expressed
fears about equality leading to uniformity, he sharpens Tawney's
argument that equality demands diversity. In fact, 'equality demands the pursuit of excellence for its full realization.' 32

Like Tawney then, Jenkins is actively concerned to promote certain inequalities, ones which would best be promoted and accepted in an environment of love. The inequalities which are not acceptable are those of 'social and economic environment.' 33

Jenkins can accept inequalities of income which take account of positions of responsibility and respond to self-interest. 34

However, again like Tawney, he is concerned that great extremes in income will lead to divisions in society:

'History in general, including that of the domestic history of the churches, proves that human nature is not strong enough to maintain itself in true community when there are too great disparities of income.' 35

Thus, Jenkins adds the further consequentialist argument to his initial deontological justification of equality. This is further re-inforced, when, again like Tawney, he argues that the 'co-operative spirit' is the condition of 'every kind of social success, including economic.' 36 Thus, 'Closely knit modern industrial society cannot function effectively without a large measure of economic, as of social, equality.' 37

Yet, despite those arguments, Jenkins accepts with Tawney, the intrinsic worth of fundamental equality and social institutions which are based on it, regardless of the results in terms of efficiency. 38 Jenkins does not stress as much as Tawney the idea of responsibilities and duties. 39 Nor does he emphasize the importance of codes of service or honour as Tawney does with the professional. 40 However, he is aware of the importance of duty and service, concentrating in particular upon the duty of the
individual to cultivate their excellence not only for their own sake but for the sake of the community. The gifted must, 'cultivate their gifts not for private satisfaction, gain or glory, but with a clear idea of their relation to the common good.'

In this, Jenkins once more sharpens Tawney's position, for the very excellence of the individual is what is to be at the service of society. Moreover, the Church has a crucial part to play in getting across this attitude, for,

'It is our conviction that it is only a revived Christian radicalism, born of a fresh vision of what a 'godly commonwealth' should be, that can give our nation the conviction and the energy to subdue and control our enormous technological and industrial power to worth-while human purposes.'

Such purposes include freeing social life from class consciousness, an imaginative response to the environment and the arts, preparing individuals for politics and public service, and above all, enabling 'us to fulfill our great responsibilities to the poorer peoples of the world.'

This radicalism is neither class nor culture based, but is relevant to all societies and all groups within society. Much of this, of course, could be said of Tawney. However, the means of this radicalism shows Jenkins moving away from Tawney's basic position. Jenkins does not specifically write that the Churches should be involved in forming policies, and certainly does not provide as detailed policy suggestions as Tawney. Rather does he stress the role of the Church, and the individual as examples to society. There is something in this of an egalitarian revolution from above, in which the educated, like the gifted, provide a clear example of witness, such as sacrificial giving, and of community in
This seems to compare well with some of Tawney's writings, not least where he argues for the recognition of superiority as essential to progress, but also where he focuses on the professional. The qualities and duties of the educated person which Jenkins refers to are quite daunting, and include cultivation of distinctive gifts, zeal in parenthood, thought in public service, and action in voluntary services. Ultimately however, in all this, Jenkins may be thought to be closer to Temple (with his emphasis upon influencing individuals who will influence society.), or to the Fabians (with their elitism). For Tawney, revolution, social change, had to come also from below, from the ordinary man, and was based upon desires and virtues common to all humanity. Though he accepts the need for examples to be given, and standards set, he nonetheless demands that individuals take responsibility for their own situation and are allowed self-determination. Thus he sees the need for decisions to be arrived at democratically including agreement on and development of social purposes. Thus, whilst Jenkins sticks closely to the Tawney view of equality with respect to excellence, he first of all develops Tawney's idea of diversity so that the individual's gifts are to be used in service, and secondly, he adds a dimension to this in arguing for the duty of the 'educated' to provide an example for society. It is this second level which begins to move away from Tawney. This movement and the lack of political substance in Jenkins may well be accounted for by his perception that he has entered the second stage of egalitarianism, the first stage having been completed by Tawney. This may be characterized as the end of
the political phase. However, for Tawney, the notion of a political phase as coming to an end was not thought of. His stress on the importance of social organization, and the need to respond to the changes in society, points to an element of 'semper reformanda.'

Given Jenkins's basic stance, it is not surprising that he argues for both distributional and participatory equality. The first of these, like Tawney, involves relative equality, without extremes of distribution. He has four criteria for distribution of income:

- enough income to enable the individual and dependants to survive and cope with contingencies.
- enough to enable the individual to 'take his place as a responsible and civilized member of the community.'
- enough resources for the individual to share in the same basic level of comfort as all citizens.
- reward for different degrees of responsibility.

In all this, a minimum income by itself is not sufficient for Jenkins. Not only is it hard to estimate minimum income, but if income above that line is left to itself, it tends to move to extremes, which, as noted above, adversely affects community and efficiency. These criteria are broadly the same as Tawney's, though with respect to reward for responsibility, Tawney stresses far more the role of function and thus responsibility for fulfilling social purposes.

In suggesting ways of applying distributional equality, Jenkins gives some policy objectives. These include:

- with reference to families, the priority of increasing family
allowances.
- with reference to wages, an attempt to equalize man and women.
- with respect to age, the increased rewards for younger professionals.
- with respect to young manual workers, a compulsory saving scheme comparable to the post-war credit scheme. 64

Jenkins is also aware of the problems of take up in the Welfare State and the inequalities generated by the 'expense account system,' and advocates a tightening up of regulations about taxation and exemption.

At this stage, two things may be noted. Firstly, Jenkins does not grasp the nettle of framing particular policy programmes, claiming that this is beyond the remit of the report. 66 Secondly, it is not clear how some of his aims could be achieved, at least without a very paternalistic approach. Thus, for example, he wants to limit the effects of a society which in fact, is becoming a gerontocracy, and to achieve this he advocates the paternalistic, if not coercive, compulsory saving scheme for young manual workers. 67

For Tawney, the attempts to value young workers or youth are clearly to be focused in education at school and work, and by enabling them to take more responsibility in their situation. 68

Significantly, Jenkins places a great emphasis upon the power of example, even in distribution:-
- the educated individual should aim to pay his debts. 69
- the individual high flyer can give an example of service by cutting down the reward received. 70
- the individual who receives a lower income can do his part by living with the resources given. 71
Here, Jenkins focuses upon

'the importance of a personal attitude of responsibility in relation to expenditure.' 72

This picks up the theme of personal stewardship which Tawney never examines explicitly, 73 and extends the application of Tawney's theme of responsibility which he tends to restrict to institutions or the wealthy. 74

In turning to participatory equality, Jenkins shows a similar concern to Tawney, in particular for industry. Fundamental equality is clearly at the base of this, and the aim is to give workers a

'sense of human dignity and fellowship in relation to their work.' 75

In the light of this Jenkins argues for greater shared responsibility. He does not suggest any particular means of achieving this and in this respect follows Tawney's line that a means such as nationalization is secondary to the aim of industry achieving responsibility both to workers and society. 76 The result is that Jenkins focuses very much on the attitudes and the development of equal consideration in industry. 77 He advocates a

'code of responsible conduct' with regard to staff relations and moves toward 'parity of esteem' in the work place. 78

Like Tawney, Jenkins is concerned with development of a worthwhile purpose for industry in relation to society. Like Tawney he recognized the importance of this in terms of work relationships. 79 Jenkins's 'worthwhile purpose' comes down to a sense of serving society, and of industry as a public trust. He argues that nationalization per se will not achieve this, 80 but that some form
of social control is necessary over industry, sufficient to plan for priorities and to prevent industry,
'from wasting its substance upon creating and meeting frivolous or otherwise unworthy demands.' 81
Any detailed policy suggestions are unfortunately beyond the scope of Jenkins's enquiry once again. 82 Thus he does not investigate particular ways of equalizing power in terms of consumers, owners, and producers. 83 Nonetheless, he is aware of the imbalances in power, and of the importance of facing this issue. Hence, for instance, he argues for devising,
'fresh means by which the long term public interest in industry could be more effectively represented.' 84
In education, distributional and participatory equality come together with the fundamental equality which holds that 'every child is a precious individual', as foundation. 85 In this context, like Tawney, Jenkins points to the limitations of the concept of equality of opportunity, quoting Young's Chelsea Manifesto with approval -
'Every human being would.... have equal opportunity, not to rise up in the world in the light of any mathematical measure, but to develop his own special capacities for leading a rich life.' 86
Equality of opportunity is demanded by 'justice and enlightened self-interest', but the fundamental equality of all men requires assertion, not only to help them develop their unique capacities and personalities, but also to
'give people humility, patience and courage to face and make the best of the (natural) inequalities' which will emerge. 87 Here Jenkins develops the implicit holism of Tawney's view of education. 88 The stress is upon individual development and mutual acceptance in community. The theological
foundation for this is the awareness that,

'we are all alike in sin and in having the promise of redemption set before us.' 89

Significantly, Jenkins reinforces his kinship to Tawney with a clear indication that the Christian attitude to education should involve less of an emphasis upon 'religious instruction' and more upon the style and way of life in the school,

'infusing a Christian 'spirit' or 'atmosphere' throughout the whole curriculum and common life of the school.' 90

The Christian view of equality is, for Jenkins, what provides the foundation for the emergence of a community such as this. 91

In stressing the development of such community, it must be said that Jenkins does move away from the liberal tendency in Tawney, i.e. the role of education as helping the individual develop as an independent critical thinker. 92 Equally, he does not stress the importance of developing the individual's sense of duty to the self and to others, and in particular, society. 93

It is perhaps not surprising, given this emphasis in Jenkins, that he views the problems of education not so much in terms of equality or inequality of opportunity or resources as in terms of relational equality and thus of unacceptable attitudes within educational institutions, between such institutions, and between them and society. Jenkins thus seeks to change attitudes rather than to recommend egalitarian policies such as the abolition of public schools. For universities, this means not emphasizing their difference from neighbouring institutions, but rather,

'the service which they render through performing their own distinctive function well.' 94

Of public schools he writes that they,
'should accept more frankly their status as public trusts,' and aim,
'to enrich the life of the whole community of which they are a part.' 95

What Jenkins once again does not do is to suggest how this kind of 'attitude change' is to be achieved and maintained, for example, working out mechanisms of accountability and sharing. 96 Jenkins, however, does examine various areas in which the educational institutions might form partnerships, in particular with industry and with the home. The key element once again is a shared view of fundamental equality, with the implied emphasis in the home on the duty of the parents to provide a responsible and cultivated environment for the child. Parents who do not provide this environment should be helped,
'to have a true understanding of fundamental equality and its relation to service', enabling them to co-operate with schools in 'cultivating the best gifts of the pupil.' 97

A final brief note should be made of Jenkins's concern for equality and the 'Rest of the World'. His inquiry specifically targets Britain. Nonetheless, awareness of fundamental equality demands that other nations be considered. 98 He proposes several possible options, from more direct aid to poorer nations, to export of skill and experience. 99 Significantly, he returns at the end of this chapter to the theme of example. Thus, he argues, that the wealthy nations of the West should not simply share their resources, but should also give the poorer nations an example which will demonstrate that,
'material benefits only come when certain spiritual qualities are cultivated.' 100

Jenkins's expression here is a little ambiguous but is really stressing that relationships with other countries should not be restricted to material deals and incentives. Tawney's position on international relations and equality was never fully worked out. His concern for service and unconditional worth would logically lead him to a position such as Jenkins, at least in recognizing that Britain is part of an international network, where the same principles apply. Thus Tawney can write of the principles which are more crucial than the simple ending of warfare, within or between nations, and note the application of principles especially to Empire. 101

To sum up this section on 'Equality and Excellence', the following points should be noted:-

a) Jenkins follows the broad outline and many of the details of Tawney's equality. He argues for an operative view of equality which involves not revolution but a continual development towards God's purpose for mankind. Such a vision is person-centred, of global domain and is relevant to all societies and times. 102

b) Jenkins is concerned with a way of life, and whilst he does not count his view as straightforward theology, he does in fact, make more explicit the agapaic and creationist/stewardship base of a Christian view of equality than Tawney. This leads to a deeper understanding of liberty and fraternity, with the experience of forgiveness as a key element.
c) Jenkins gives more emphasis to the concept of community than Tawney and less to the concept of liberty and associated ideas of the self-determination and equalizing power and control. Nonetheless, he develops Tawney's focus upon the uniqueness of the individual, stressing not only the duty of self and community to cultivate unique excellence, but also the communitarian context of excellence i.e. that any gift should be used to serve.

d) This moves Jenkins away from political or institutional change, to focus on attitudes and the important role of communities and individuals in providing examples to society. This develops one element in Tawney's thought, especially the idea of encouraging individuals to work through duties. However, it runs a great danger of shading into a paternalistic approach, which does not help the individual to make his own choice. It may well be that the report nature of 'Equality and Excellence', and the fact that many people contributed towards it, explains the lack of substantive policies and the occasional moralizing or paternalistic tone. However, the clear concentration upon attitudes rather than policy, without consideration of the mechanisms of attitude change, betrays an operative view of equality which is at times, close to Temple than Tawney. For Tawney, the development of equality demanded attitudes, principles and policies, policies which required articulation.

Jenkins then is clearly influenced by much of Tawney's view of equality, also developing parts, either in areas of application or
in theological perspective, but also not entirely meeting Tawney with respect to self-determination or the question of substantive policies. He also at times questions Tawney. How, for instance, could Tawney's view of equality cope with a modern situation with many different interest groups, including elements of the Church, where groups insist upon the perpetuation of division? 103

In this, Jenkins reveals himself to be aware of the transitions in society and the need to respond to new situations in society. 104

And in this, he precisely echoes Tawney's view that equality will remain radical whatever the situation. 105

'This radicalism is, therefore, no less relevant to a relatively just and prosperous society than it is to an unjust and impoverished one. Indeed, in the Christian view, the more we succeed in transforming our earthly cities into the image of the eternal City of God, which is our home, the clearer our vision becomes of what our true life together should be..........' 106

R.H. Preston

Perhaps the most direct and obvious influence of Tawney's view of equality is found in the work of R.H. Preston. Preston was a student of Tawney, keeping in touch with him until his death. 107 Despite some criticism of Tawney, noted above, 108 he frequently refers to Tawney, and reveals a concern for developing the stance of Tawney and Temple. 109 Perhaps the most explicit recognition of influence is found in the 'Christian Action Journal', 110 where in an article on Christian Ethics and the New Right, Preston writes of his personal standpoint.

'My main stance, very much influenced by R.H. Tawney, is in favour of a social order of greater equality - in material terms, but also equality of consideration.' 111

In spite of this declaration, Preston rarely offers an extended
analysis of equality per se. References to equality, do, however, pervade his writing in one form or another. As is to be expected for a theologian, the doctrinal foundation of Preston's view of equality is more explicit than Tawney's, arguing that it is not simply the Incarnation which provides the basis for interference in the political/economic realm. However, Preston's language has, at times, a very similar ring to Tawney's:

'Men and women as the crown of creation are given a supreme worth as being made in God's image, and this basic equality they have in common is far more significant than the differences between them in race, physique, intelligence, or skills.'

Such a 'common humanity' has to find expression in the structures of society, 'so that men will feel at home with one another.' Thus, like Tawney, he sees equalizing measures as being for the sake of fellowship. Supported in this by the Christian doctrine of the state, Preston thus argues that social institutions, structures and conventions which 'facilitate rather than hinder the living of the good life' should be created and encouraged. The good life in this context is the development of the individual to full maturity. This provides a clear perfectionist base for equality. Assuming such a base, then firstly, fundamental equality demands that everyone is enabled to grow to full maturity. Secondly, such equal respect demands concern for the poor and underprivileged. This requires distributive equality. Thirdly, a commitment to participatory equality, for the worker and citizen is required, alongside checks against the abuse of power. This Preston sees as the basis of a Christian critique of any social system, capitalist
or socialist. 125 It is explicitly agapaic, involving a balance of fellowship and freedom, and requiring a long term shift in attitudes alongside the distributional and participatory equality. This 'shift' involves in some way, 'the whole of social and economic life.' 126

Like Tawney then, Preston's view of equality is person-centred, and of global domain and to do with relationships and a way of life.

In examining the agapaic base of this equality, Preston notes its relationship with both equality and justice. Love is the principle of justice, which involves affirming 'persons in their otherness and not merely because of their function.' 127

Between love and justice is equality, a principle which embodies the creative righteousness of God, 'who is concerned with the good of each as well as the good of all.' 128

Justice also

'restrains egoism and provides stabilities in society for the common good.' 129

Justice therefore not only finds its base principle in love, it also prepares for it, 'and properly expresses it.' 130

Tawney does not examine justice and its relationship to equality and agape in this depth. Nonetheless, like Preston, he sees justice defined in terms of equal worth, and expressing equality of respect in society. 131

In Preston's analysis, the terms are not always precisely defined, which can lead to confusion. In the first place he is not always clear as to whether justice is the overall concept of justice or
the institution of justice. 132 Secondly, in placing equality between agape and justice, it is not always clear if he is referring to equality of respect/consideration or equalizing measures. 133 Perhaps the best interpretation is to see equality as equality of respect and to see justice in this context as the question of distribution. 134 This would fit in with Preston's most recent treatment. 135

One additional factor may be noted at this point. Preston argues for the use of discernment in the expression of love and justice by which he means

' an insight into institutions on a basis of thoughtful reflection arising out of the best knowledge of the facts which we have been able to acquire.' 136

This parallels Tawney's concern for a thorough analysis of society, and thus for social organizations to be able to respond to changes in society. 138

Preston also parallels Tawney in his view of the relationship of freedom and fellowship to equality. As noted above, equalizing measures are for the sake of fellowship. They are also necessary for the basic freedoms required for the individual to develop to maturity. 139 Freedom and fellowship are intimately connected for Preston, for individual freedom can only be realized in community and, in the Christian view, particularly,

'as we grow together in the community of Christians to our full maturity in Christ.' 140

Whilst Preston, like Tawney, accepted the balance between the principles, he notes that how they are balanced at any one time will vary. 141 Preston does not expand upon this and the best interpretation would seem to be that whichever principle is emphasized will
depend upon the situation in society at the time. However, as noted of Tawney's model, the principles of liberty, fraternity and equality are ultimately controlled by equality of respect which requires the concepts maintain a balance and thus gives them a specific meaning in relation to any situation. In this respect, none of the three principles can become an end in itself, indeed, none can find independent meaning apart from the others.

Preston's stress on man in community over against the individualist stance is underlined, like Tawney, with a moral psychology, which has an understanding not simply of the claims, but also the obligations involved in being human. Preston, however, anchors this more firmly in theology and in particular the Reformation doctrine of the Orders of Creation. The four Orders are:

- the Economic Order - be it feudal, market place or planned
- the Political Order
- the Community of Culture. Less defined than the other Orders, this deals with the all pervasive quality of culture in any society.

Preston draws out more explicitly than Tawney the lessons to be learned from the Orders and the individual's relationship to them. Firstly, they exist before the individual and in many ways profoundly influence the individual as he or she grows. Secondly, they involve responsibilities of the individual to the Orders which the individual has to work out for themselves. Importantly, these responsibilities exist prior to any decision to form a contract relationship. Finally, Preston makes quite explicit the idea of the individual as vice-gerent in creation.
as partner in change such that as the individual grows in maturity, he or she should use their influence to modify the structures so that they work in a more human way:

'Semper reformanda applies not only to the Church but to the Orders of Creation as well, just because they have such a profound influence on the person and on human flourishing.' 151

Alongside the vision of 'man in community' and of the constant refining of community structures lies the equally Tawney view of common purpose or a shared vision of the common good. 152 Preston argues the need for a basic social moral framework to maintain even a pluralist society. Such a perception of the common good is required even by the 'New Right', for the operation of the market depends upon such a framework. 153 In all this, Preston stands out against McIntyre, 154 positing a moral framework based upon the 'common moral tradition of promise-keeping, truth telling, benevolence.' 155

This coincides strikingly with Tawney's affirming of moral awareness and tradition in society. 156 Also, like Tawney, Preston sees the Christian faith as not simply affirming moral awareness, but also illuminating and extending it. 157 This is relevant even to a pluralist society, where 'family resemblances' can be discovered between the moral principles of different faiths. 158

As noted above, Preston's justification of equality is both deontological and consequential (enabling the individual to develop). He does not stress so much as Tawney the consequences in terms of efficiency in industry, but does stress the consequences in terms of a healthy society. This is particularly so with regard to rapid technological change, and the need for greater participatory equality to adapt to it. 159 Like Tawney, Preston
links participatory equality in with equality of respect. Without participation in decision making, 'the proper respect for each person as made in God's image and re-made in Christ is not expressed in the structures of human life.' 160

The importance of participatory equality as a means of respect is acknowledged by Preston, when he accepts that it can lead to great complications and does not necessarily entail greater efficiency. Nonetheless, efficiency must not be pursued at any price. 161 Such participatory equality, moreover, involves need for both large and small units of decision making, avoiding the dangers of guild socialism on the one hand, and of centralism on the other. 162

With regard to distributional equality, some differences begin to emerge between Tawney and Preston. Both accept the importance of the distributional criterion of need. Indeed, Preston argues that this criterion which, 'stresses altruistic and collaborative relationships between citizens' 163 is the best reflection of the ethics of the Kingdom of God. Nonetheless, he recognizes the existence of two other criteria, merit and existing rights - the most commonly held criteria in society. Preston argues that the Church must recognize the importance of all three criteria in the kingdoms of this world, but nonetheless attempt to foster the weakest of those, which reflects the altruistic stance of the church, need. 164 Tawney at this point is more 'involved' than Preston, and looks for a more holistic interpretation of these three criteria. Thus, for him, merit and rights come together in function. 165 In effect this means that reward is to be seen in terms of one's function for the
common purpose, and rights are linked to function. Preston, in his critique of Tawney, recognizes the difficulties involved in the concept of function and clearly wishes to avoid being drawn down that road. This may also reflect the differences between Preston the theologian and Tawney the Christian moralist. Preston is constantly aware of speaking from the Church's position, whilst Tawney is concerned less with what the Church has to contribute and more with framing a social philosophy and erecting social structures which will implement the basic Christian principles. Significantly, whilst Preston argues that policies which involve the basic principles put forward should be supported, he does not follow Tawney down the road of detailing policy proposals. The reasoning behind this seems to be twofold:-

a) Preston is very aware of the importance of experts in any decision making process and therefore in the formulation of any policy. The trained mind is better able, 'to perceive the secondary consequences of possible courses of action, and thus provide a better basis for decision making.' This does not avoid the democratic process but emphasizes the importance of a group approach, in which the expert would enable the group to make appropriate choices. Tawney did not dispute the importance of experts, but clearly argued for the importance of the Church stating policy content.

b) Preston is aware of the danger of the Church becoming identified with one particular political party or advocating a blue print for society in some way. Hence, he argues strongly that the Church should provide a critique of all forms of social organization based upon the four aspects of justice outlined
above. Preston is certainly aware of unjustified inequalities, but in this context he contents himself with policy objectives rather than detailed plans. Preston is therefore more concerned to provide the right base for a critique of social organization and a process whereby that critique can be taken account of in any decision-making about social organization. In this respect he argues that equality is rightly seen as a middle-axiom in the process of policy formulation.

Two points should be noted here. Firstly, Tawney was aware of middle-axioms but it is hard to see that his use of equality falls into this category. Secondly, Preston himself is aware of a specific Christian contribution to the debate about distributional criteria. He claims that this can contribute to a total view of distributional equality without actually producing a uniquely Christian view of distribution (ie. one separate from the basic three criteria). Nonetheless, against this, the Christian emphasis upon need and unconditional worth does radically affect any meaning of equality, making it difficult to use as a middle-axiom, ie. as a common concept around which decision making can be worked out.

Another factor which leads Preston to draw back from issuing 'blue-prints' for society is his stress both upon eschatology and sin. His eschatological emphasis provides a strong reminder of the provisionality of any social organization. Preston's strong emphasis upon man's sinful nature is perhaps more realistic than Tawney in that he concludes that not only will man never achieve perfection in social organization, but conflict of interests will
always remain, between producer and consumer, manager and worker. Hence, he argues strongly for the creation of institutions which would deal with conflict, as well as exploring the application of basic principles to institutions. As noted above, Tawney was aware of the continued presence of conflict in man's nature. However, for him, principles and the working through of these to practice were precisely the way to approach conflict. Thus it was important to establish at the beginning, a framework of shared values from which conflicts could be handled. However, he did not pursue any particular institutions whose prime purpose was to handle conflict of interest.

In all this, Preston is very aware of the importance of self-interest and its appropriate use. There is no doubt that whilst Tawney was aware of self-interest, he tends to move away from self-interest as narrowly defined and attempts to convince the individual of what is their best self-interest. Such an approach did not rely upon 'using self-interest' but rather developing an understanding of self-interest, either in terms of duty to self and others, or in terms of reward for service to others.

In concluding this section on Preston, several points require underlining. Firstly, Preston was clearly influenced by Tawney's view of equality, stressing the importance of it in relation to other principles and in relation to specific situations. In this, he recognizes that there can be no simple Christian view of equality which can be directly applied to society. Rather does the Christian view contribute to the wider view, always aiming to broaden it, and guard against essentialism of policy or principles. Preston, like
Tawney, holds a person-centred view of equality with stress on distributional and participatory equality as enabling power to be dispersed and freedom and fellowship to be developed. Secondly, Preston is very aware of the difficulties in relation to Tawney's equality and to equality in general. His response to this is conceptual and in terms of method. He distances himself from the concept of function, as a concept both too essentialist and too coercive, and he distances the Church from drawing up detailed policies for similar reasons.

In place of function and co-operation and shared principles, Preston looks for institutions which will handle the realities of conflict and self-interest. In place of direct policy formulation, Preston looks to the development of dialogue. With respect to the first of these, it is not clear how far Preston has solved the difficulties of the idea of function. In terms of handling conflict situations, the basis for any institution being given responsibility for this and what power they would have, would have to be examined closely. In any case, no matter how skilled any such group maybe in enabling trade-offs between groups to resolve issues, it remains to be argued convincingly that such a basis of self-interest is the most effective way of handling conflict. In the long run, Tawney looks to the development of participatory equality in decision-making which will both more effectively respect the individuals or groups involved and will aim to explore differences and common views before conflict arises. This would indicate that a development of Tawney's view would need to explore the methods of improving democracy in all situations. Preston, of course, is very aware of the need to extend democracy and make participatory
equality a reality. However, without more detailed plans or suggestions for democratic development, it is very difficult to see how the various elements of self-interest, common good, and democratic participation might be balanced and how the continual reformation may be achieved.

With respect to Preston's insistence upon the Church using equality as part of a critique of society, there are two possible explanations.

As noted above, this may be simply a different perspective of the same equality as Tawney, i.e. the theologian's view as distinct from the social moralist. It may, however, point to a more substantive difference between the two, with Preston viewing operative equality in a similar light to Temple. In so far as he advocates a middle-axiom method, and includes equality in this, there is no doubt that he does have a different view on the use of equality to Tawney. However, before being conclusive on this issue, finer distinctions would have to be made by Preston, for example, in his use of the term blue-print. He cannot accept the use of an egalitarian blue-print, preferring the Church's stance to be responsive or reactive to inequalities. However, a blue-print, with all aspects of policy detailed and not for discussion, is surely different from a more proactive stance which requires that the Church initiate not simply discussion, but activity, and be concerned not simply to react to injustice, but to proclaim justice. The result of this approach is an equality which demands policy formulations, whilst accepting that any policy is by nature, provisional. In this light, it is patently possible to have an operative view of equality which demands
policy formulation and not to see that as an inflexible blue-
print.

Finally, however, despite possible differences, and the lack of
systematic development of the Tawney view of equality, Preston
does develop and deepen the theological understanding of equality,
retaining the liberal element of Tawney, and avoiding any tem-
pitation to subvert the autonomy of morality in general. In this,
he retains the essential complexity of Tawney's equality.

John Atherton
The link between John Atherton and R.H. Tawney is very clear.
Firstly, Atherton has spent some time researching Tawney's work, and came to the conclusion that he made an important contribution to Christian Social Ethics. Secondly, Atherton was a post-

graduate student of Preston and sees himself very much in that

tradition of Christian Social thought.

Like Tawney, Atherton is concerned to take principles and praxis equally seriously, expressing this practical idealism variously as 'visionary pragmatism, realistic radicalism, and feasible alternatives.'

Alongside this, like Tawney, Atherton is not concerned to follow stereotyped party lines. Thus, whilst he favours social democracy he acknowledges that the important value in any political party should be to enable the individual to grow to his or her potential. He argues in this for a consensus of values which is based upon a careful consideration of what principles are involved. He contrasts this with the Butskellite "consensus" which was less a consensus of values and more a coincidence of interest.
Like Tawney and Preston he sees the great 'Christian moral presumptions and considerations' as pointing to a fundamental equality: 196

a) 'The unique significance of each particular person created in God's likeness and redeemed by his activity on the cross;
b) The fundamental unity of the whole human family in God which overrides all manufactured divisions;
c) The essential equality of each person in the eyes of God;
d) God's particular concern for the vulnerable.' 197

All this already has two important implications for Atherton. Firstly, it presumes that certain rights are universal, and integral to human flourishing, and secondly that these rights are not essentially dependent on a prior contribution. 198 This mirrors Tawney's stress upon the unconditional worth of the individual and the importance of enabling all individuals to receive the basic needs for individual fulfillment. 199 It must be noted that though Atherton begins to work a justification based on rights theory, such rights are in the context of communitarian justice, and are thus seen as 'a means to and conditions for the contribution of love.' 200

Despite these points and the apparent importance of the concepts of equal worth and equality of respect, 201 Atherton shows a deal of unease about the concept of equality. He is concerned, firstly, that the traditional term equality produces 'either or stances which fuel those divisions associated with the existence of poverty in an affluent society.' 202

It must be assumed that Atherton is here referring to equality as traditionally stated by the socialist movement, and he quotes
Gaitskill in this respect;

'In the goal of equality, the determination to uproot the conditions of economic injustice, lies the true characteristic of the socialist.' 203

This brings Atherton to his second reason, the growing conviction that the egalitarian bias of socialism would

'reinforce the tendency of the state towards authoritarian centralism.' 204

Several points may be noted about Atherton's stance on equality:

a) Atherton accepts that the concept of equality is useful, in the way that it concentrates upon relationships between individuals. 205

b) He uses the term equality in several senses himself. 206

c) His concern about the concept of equality has echoes both of Temple's concern and of the arguments of Crosland relating envy to equality. 207

d) The thrust of Atherton's position is unclear, and consequently his argument is ineffective. He uses consequential arguments about both the effect of the concept, that is, leading to centralist policies, and about the use of the concept in debate, that is leading to an exclusive or absolute position which would cause division. These consequence arguments in turn depend upon identifying a particular view of equality as both the fundamental and accepted view. However, this is simply not the case, for as noted above, even in socialism there are several different views of equality and its use. 208 Behind the argument lies the acceptable point that it would be wrong to make any principle exclusive or the instrumental principle of equality an aim. Of this, Tawney was perfectly aware, and thus concerned to clarify the relationships between principles.
Atherton's argument, however, is only valid against the misuse of equality and not against equality per se. The most it can be used to advocate is the clarification of the term in any context. Even the lesser thesis, that the term should be avoided in case it leads to misunderstandings or division, is inadequate, not least because the term is already in use and claimed by many different groups. It is therefore necessary at the very least to show the different Christian perspective of this concept. To take the argument further would lead away from the context of Atherton's point and on to the questioning of the nature of equality. This will be examined in chapter seven.

In an effort to avoid the concept of equality dominating the debate, Atherton argues for two fundamental principles from which 'middle level principles' would emerge such as the revolutionary triad of liberty, equality and fraternity, or the World Council of Churches emphasis upon justice, participation and sustainability. The first of these is the Body of Christ, the second is the Common Good. In fact, as Atherton rightly points out, these are not 'principles' at all, but corporate images. With this in mind, what seems at first to be a radical development of, or even departure from Tawney's position, begins to look like a simple reformulation. The concept of the Body of Christ supplies a more theological view of humanity and society than Tawney developed, but with much the same results. Central to the Body is the interdependence of the members with each able to contribute to the whole. Though some members may have more important functions, all contributions are equally important. The health of the whole
body is related to the
'proper recognition and valuing of each part.' 213
The proper functioning of such a community is, of course, marred by human sinfulness, and constrained 'by the limits imposed by finitude.' 214
Finally, a crucial part of the Body of Christ is its extension beyond itself in the world as the symbol of the Kingdom of God, transcending natural cultural or class barriers, holding the tension of the individualist and collectivist ideologies, and acting as,
'instrument of God's purpose of reconciliation in and of and through the world.' 215
The image of the Body of Christ expresses more clearly than Tawney the importance of community in which individuality is not lost. 216 It does not, however, stress the liberal element in Tawney which saw him focussing on the individual's development of critical thinking. 217 Moreover, the status of the corporate image of the Body of Christ must be questioned. Atherton gives the impression of this acting as the basis for secondary principles, giving rise to and informing them. 218 In fact, such an image is in itself the exemplification of a principle or attitude and is itself informed by that attitude. Thus, the image of the Body of Christ is an image of fellowship, and a particular view of fellowship i.e. based upon the fundamental attitude of equality of respect. 219

In turning to the second corporate image supplied by Atherton, we discover a concept often used by Tawney. More than Tawney, Atherton examines the history, justifications and problems of the image,
and is thus able to arrive at a more systematic re-development of it. 220 And yet, as with the koinonia image, the re-formulated Common Good is ultimately an image which depends upon the acceptance of certain basic factors, three of which are strongly advocated by Tawney and two of which he acknowledges but does not develop. These five 'elements' go to make up the re-formulated 'Common Good' which in effect is made up of a basic principle, a view of humanity, and a series of implications for shared purposes.

Firstly, the Common Good is explicitly based upon 'equality in our relationships with each other in the ever-abiding context of God's presence.' 221 This relational basis to equality leads to a strong presumption in favour of equality of treatment and the need to distinguish between 'legitimate or relative inequalities and illegitimate or absolute inequalities' 222 This leads Atherton to assert a Christian view of anthropology which, like Tawney, focuses on and always holds 'together the commitment to the person as individual and the person in community.' 223

In this view, human beings are interdependent and,
'to be a human being in the fullest sense(and it is to this that God always calls us), it is necessary to belong properly to and in society.' 224

Secondly, the Common Good requires political action. This emerges directly from equality of respect which sets up a presumption for equality of treatment in 'the covenant relationships and structures of the world.' 225 Given the view of the person in community noted above, the importance of the individual holding power over his or her life and
sharing in power over society becomes important. Equally important is power which will safeguard

' the great orders of creation and institutions of life because they have such an influence for good and bad in society.' 226

The third element of the common good shared with Tawney is the insistence that a statement of it can only be provisional. The Kingdom of God, as both radical present and future eschatology 'challenges any social order because it transcends them.' 227

Fourthly, Atherton notes the importance of not arguing for a Common Good which excludes plurality and which can so easily lead to 'corporatism, paternalism and authoritarianism.' 228

Central to this view of the Common Good is the acceptance of ambiguities and a move away from any prescriptive methods of communicating the image. Thus, the Common Good is about acknowledging

'the general unity of common basic human needs,' recognizing

'what belongs to our shared humanity', and also acknowledging

'a diversity of understandings and practices which related to those needs and how we meet them.' 229

In this, whilst the approaches are broadly the same, Tawney emphasises more the idea of shared common purposes, and thus some form of moral consensus underlying the differences in society. Atherton has written elsewhere of the rather narrow nature of such purposes in relation to a pluralist society. However, as noted above, the idea of narrowness depends upon how general any such purposes are, and upon how such general purposes may relate to other principles. 230 In addition Tawney does not simply rely upon the abstract idea of common purposes but sees roles and relationships as involved in the defining of purposes. 231
The final element of the Common Good is perhaps more problematic. In this, Atherton argues for the need to recognize that conflict of interests will always exist in society. He contrasts this specifically with the spirit of co-operation and fraternity advocated by Medhurst, which he sees as avoiding issues of conflict or being proffered as an unrealistic solution to such issues. Ironically, Medhurst explicitly refers to Tawney in his advocacy of this fraternity. In fact, as noted above, Tawney himself does not discount conflict and accepts that at one level it is actually healthy. In addition, Atherton himself acknowledges that even conciliatory bodies may have to be coercive. The basis of this would be a commitment to the Common Good, which, 'will always involve some restraints on the pursuit of some individual and groups' ends, including legitimate ones.' Medhurst in fact does not rely upon a romantic view of 'co-operation', but is very aware of the need to handle interests properly;

'The challenge is to fashion an over-arching framework of democratic values, practices and institutions which may, to some extent, harness the self-interest of sectional groups for communal purposes and set limits to the more destructive of sectional ambitions.'

In the same way, Tawney was concerned to set limits to individual or group power, to avoid division or irresponsible behaviour. It must also be noted that the basis of the restraints would be commitment to the Common Good, according to Atherton. However, it is not clear that such commitment would be possible without agreement on the principles which actually give meaning to the Common Good, including

'commitment to the person as an individual and the person in community,'
and an understanding of shared needs. This is very close to the general social purposes of Tawney. Once again therefore, it is clear that Atherton's image, whilst a rich and useful one is neither radically different from, nor a development of Tawney's equality. Instead there is a change in presentation with certain elements more systematically worked through. 240

To test this conclusion out fully, Atherton's view of freedom and participatory and distributional equality must be examined. 241 Atherton uses the language of rights more than Tawney. However, the rights are to do with human flourishing in community. Central to this view is the importance of participatory equality i.e. enabling the individual to partake fully in his or her work, or community. This involves the acceptance of democracy and its extension to all levels, in economic life, intermediate associations, regional government. Significantly, Atherton's argument for participation in national government leads him to argue for the specific policy of proportional representation. 243 The effect of all this participation would be the erosion of the exclusive society. The value of participation, which Atherton argues, arises from the corporate images, is also important because it focuses upon human solidarity, taking in the cause of the poor, without making theirs an exclusive cause i.e. identifying totally with their interests. Atherton argues that this is an important alternative to liberation theology. 244 Once again it must be noted that in fact, the value of participation is linked directly to the realization that 'we are all one family of God', and thus, fundamentally equal. 245

Given this context, Atherton proposes,
'two equal, interdependant and interacting realities necessary for fulfilled human living in our kind of society.' 246

Firstly, the basic and necessary
'rights for participation in our society',
and secondly, the basic and necessary responsibilities for responding to that society. 247 Atherton's vision, then is of 'a participatory and reciprocal society', and what is necessary to achieve this. 248 The basic rights which affirm the individual's belonging to community, and which are necessary to participation are as follows:-

a) Civil and political liberties. 249

b) Social rights ie. the right to live
'according to self-chosen purposes.'
Such rights include health care, housing and education. 250

c) Economic rights. These pick up the Titmuss point about economic dis-welfares which occur from technological transition. In order to insure against these effects, income and employment would be necessary. 251 This much Tawney would have accepted. However, significant differences do begin to emerge. Firstly, Tawney does not specifically move into the realm of work as a right. He simply assumes a full employment situation. 252 In any case, to argue that paid employment is necessary for participation in society raises many problems. 253 Secondly, as presented, his argument for economic rights moves away from Tawney's position. He argues for communitarian justice, but in fact argues for rights on the basis of their enabling the individual 'to realize their own ends.' 254

In this, Atherton begins to shift from an argument based upon a normative society to one based upon a 'normal society.'
Thus he argues that the income necessary for participation in society is that which allows the individual to play a normal part in society. The context of 'normal' however, is not clear and could be defined in terms of an average, or acceptability in material terms. For Tawney, however, distribution was intimately tied to the normative i.e. duties owed to individuals, groups and society.

However, Atherton does not ultimately rely upon this rights or normalcy approach. When he moves to the question of responsibility he returns to a Tawneyesque position. Like Preston, he does not see rights as tied to function, but does see contributions as 'an indispensible compliment to rights; they are integral to a properly functioning person and community.' These important elements are then noted by Atherton. Firstly, he details the kinds of contribution that individuals can make. This list is very close to Tawney's obligation list, but draws out more explicitly participation in cultural and leisure activities, in employment and in the informal economy.

Secondly, this appeal encourages a view of work as vocation. The theology of vocation does two things. It 'provides a disciplined purpose for work in all its legitimate forms by encouraging all to contribute in ways ultimately more beneficial to people and societies.' Thirdly, he argues that a Christian view of incentive is about more than self-interest. If the great importance 'of the breadth of what people contribute to society, to human life and fulfillment' is accepted, then the motivation of altruism cannot be excluded from public activity and must have an effect on the
question of rewards. If incentives are restricted only to an appeal to selfishness, this would ultimately radically affect the common good. 262 Atherton quotes Wogaman with approval on this:

'the fact that wrong incentives can exert such power often means that large numbers of people are given insufficient opportunity to experience human fulfillment. Use of external incentives should be limited, where possible, to those things which lead people toward, not away from human fulfillment.' 263

Thus, Atherton argues for the use of internal incentives (i.e. non financial) and for external incentives to be tied to service in some way. 264 Without specifying it, this brings Atherton very close to Tawney's concept of function. 265 All incentives, including self-interest ones, should be, 'sublimated to the primary commitment, the participating and reciprocal society.' 266

Once again then, the conclusion must be that Atherton does not radically develop Tawney's view of equality. He accepts both distributional and participatory equality as being essential and this in a framework of moral relationships where the state provides the individual with the opportunity to contribute and learn to contribute and this can expect the individual to do so. 267

Thus, in all of this, Atherton like Tawney, is concerned with both principles and practice and is content that the Church should advocate policy programmes. 268 Thus, if the Church is to be visionary, practical, and responsive to a complex and changing world, it must 'learn to think harder, and in more detail and more comprehensively than ever before.' 269

His attempt to move beyond equality is, in effect, a deepening of equality such as Tawney attempted, which Atherton presents with
greater theological depth and more systematically. The only substantive differences are threefold. Firstly, in stressing the rights of participation he gives more time to work its meaning and proposals for means of full employment than Tawney. Secondly, he continues the Preston theme of accepting the market as 'serviceable drudge' and not something inherently evil. Thirdly, with Atherton's concentration upon corporate images and the ultimate allegiance to a participatory and reciprocal society, he does not give evidence of the same liberal emphasis as Tawney betrays at various points.

With respect to the first of these differences, Tawney's emphasis is far more upon work as community i.e. relationships and decision-making at work. With respect to the final of the differences, Atherton runs the danger of coercive government. He refers, on occasions, to the 'commitment' or 'primary commitment' that should be held to the Common Good. This commitment would involve restraints to individual interests, and incentives should be sublimated to the Common Good. Of course, the primacy of this commitment would not in itself involve coercion, providing that individuals had an opportunity to define the Common Good or social purposes in their situation. Atherton however, does not propose this or offer mechanisms whereby it might be possible. Tawney, of course, does not provide detailed mechanisms either, but is clear that social purpose is a dynamic thing involving the participation of individuals in defining and developing. For Atherton, even his proposals for the reform of democracy only begin to alter the basis of representation, they do not address the questions of active participation.
I would conclude then that despite an important attempt to restate a Tawney view of equality and develop it, Atherton does not satisfactorily deal with the difficulties or shortfalls in Tawney, or always maintain the balance of Tawney's position.

Other Writers

There are several other writers who have clearly been influenced by Tawney's view of equality. However, in this section, I will confine myself to mentioning two writers in particular, who demonstrate how wide was the influence of Tawney's Christian view of equality.

The first example is Robert Holman, a writer who clearly spans the divide between social policy and the Church. He was at one time a professor of Social Administration at Bath, and at the time of writing is a community worker at Easterhouse, Glasgow. He is also a Christian, a fact which he openly refers to in his writings. In that context, he expresses his debt to R.H. Tawney and argues for the principle of social equality. Concern for this principle arises directly out of an examination of poverty. Holman is not concerned with equality of treatment, but rather in promoting 'each individual's uniqueness "without regard to the vulgar irrelevancies of class and income."'

He accepts relative equality, arguing against vast differences in income, wealth, environmental condition and power. In all of this he follows Tawney and especially in his concern for those who have not, 'control over the constraints which shape their responses and behaviour.' Holman's justification of equality is consequential, in the sense...
of giving more freedom for the individual to develop. It also accepts some of Rawls's view of egalitarianism as advocated by self-interest. However, ultimately, Holman is not satisfied by the Rawls approach. He disputes that individuals behave in a consistently rational way. Moreover, he argues that it is not clear how Rawls's criteria of distribution are to be assessed, that is, 'need, merit and contribution to the common good.' A sounder basis for a caring society would rather be the unconditional recognition of humanity. At this point, Holman introduces his deontological justification for equality, with particular reference to the Imago Dei argument. From that basis of the belief that 'God created man in the image of Himself, and that He created the earth for man's benefit,' Holman argues that three things follow. Firstly, all people are of equal worth. Social deprivation, which by definition leads to distress and disadvantage for valued people, should not be tolerated. Secondly, the common sense of all people points to the basic fellowship - 'the commitment, concern and solidarity which could exist between people,' which should be pursued. Great differences in income and resources serve to break down fellowship. Thirdly, Holman adds an element of the creationist doctrine not developed by Tawney, i.e. the argument that as the earth is created for all, there can be no reason for restricting its abundance to only some. This is central to Holman's argument for attacking inequality and deprivation.
Alongside the positive arguments for equality, Holman also stresses the dark side of the Christian concept of human nature and the implication of this for social organization.

'It follows, as Tawney again argued that power should be dispersed, should not be concentrated in the hands of what could be an evil minority. Power as well as material resources should be more evenly distributed throughout society.'

Holman does not fully work out the relationship between equality and other values, or for that matter between fundamental equality and distributional equality. Indeed, at one point he defines equality very narrowly as 'the drive to end social deprivations.'

Nonetheless, like Tawney he accepts that there can be a plurality of values and cites democracy and freedom of expression as being important, alongside equality. Unlike Tawney he does not see those values as essentially related and writes of possible conflicts and complications. However, empirical evidence demonstrates that the pursuit of one value against the others is unsatisfactory. Thus, whatever the difficulties, the various values must all be held in balance. Holman accepts then, the need for re-distribution of resources and with Tawney, the need to deal with underlying causes such as the private inheritance of wealth and the 'stranglehold which public schools and older universities hold on the membership of elite occupations.'

However, he argues that Tawney along with other writers on social issues do not really tackle how their proposals are to be put into action - the means of change. He argues that the means of change have to be political, personal influence and middle-class altruism being inadequate. However, he continues, political
means are rarely used to further social equality, precisely because the poor have no real political power and are thus unable to set the agenda for reform. Thus, 'the poor play little part in politics, in negotiating wage levels, or influencing the distribution of goods,' and participatory democracy becomes an 'illusion'.

Holman then contributes an important development to Tawney's egalitarianism by arguing that community action would be an important means of helping the poor to develop a political voice for themselves. Holman recognises that this is only one method, that there is not a great deal of empirical evidence to undergird it yet, and that there are dangers involved in this method, as with any other. However, properly run community action would involve greater control by the deprived over their environment and patterns of living, and a greater voice in defining their aims, needs, problems and solutions. It would involve the individual in activity, and specifically, collective activity. By definition, one tenant refusing to be re-housed into slum property would have little impact, whereas a hundred such tenants would begin to exert power. For Holman this is a process then of discovering power in collective action and learning to use it responsibly and effectively.

By this approach, not only is Holman developing the theme of participatory equality, he is actually using this as a means to change mal-distribution (and possibly also larger issues of democracy). Thus, community action can bring 'harsh and unfair treatment' into the open, and persuade authorities to change their attitudes and practices.
In this, Holman plainly declares that the task of community action is not simply to further individuals and community interest, but to generate a debate on values and practice which the broader community can become involved in and thus take responsibility for espousing and declaring the aims and purposes of local government. As noted above, Terrill points to hints in Tawney's work of the desire for a 'dialectical relationship' between an active community and a responsive government. The concept of community action as put forward by Holman begins to put real flesh on these bones. Such action, also, when replicated throughout the nation could begin to set the agenda at national level.

The effect of such community action would not only be in terms of change of practice following a public examination of values, it would also involve a relational or attitudinal change between groups. Middle class assumptions of the poor as inadequate or inferior would be challenged and gradually the poor's membership of society affirmed. In one area then, Holman pays more attention than Tawney to the means of change and the way that equality of participation can become not simply a liberator of individuals, but also a liberator of whole communities, affecting both poor and non-poor. He recognizes that there is a thin line between simply asserting rights, and declaring common moral values. However, in advocating the discovery and use of collective power guided by such moral insights, he provides a very real alternative to some liberation theologians.

Holman's centralist position is reaffirmed at the end of his book where he reminds us of his Christian and in particular Tawneyesque position. In this he argues that it is not possible for the
material and spiritual to be separated anymore than one can view an individual apart from community or the effects of social organization or attitudes. Hence, like Tawney, he sees gross inequalities as leading to a breakdown of individuals and above all, fellowship;

'when great disparities occur, then not only are distress and disadvantage created, but so are behaviour patterns which lead to apathy, extreme aggression and the inability to survive in modern society. In short, grossly unequal conditions are likely to promote those factors which inhibit the growth of happy relationships.'

His final sentence is tantalizingly unclear. He declares his belief in seeking

'those structural changes which will lead to a society in which the distribution of resources will facilitate concern for others, tolerance and sharing.'

This would seem to indicate a mechanistic model whereby a change in patterns of distribution would lead to a change in attitude. However, his writing up to this point gives the impression of a much more gradual process with, for example, social workers helping individuals to develop and promoting 'a concern for individuals', and communities articulating those views and finding power. Nonetheless a change in structures remains important, to facilitate the continued growth of such attitudes and of fellowship as such.

A second writer who reveals the influence of Tawney is E.F. Schumacher. Some would see his writings in economic and social change as utopian, whilst others categorize Schumacher as a Distributist. However, Schumacher makes frequent references to Tawney including the judgement that he is 'one of the greatest ethical thinkers of our time.'
Schumacher does not spend a great deal of his time on equality per se. Nonetheless, his basic premise is that God's purpose in creation is for all people to develop to their full capacity, which demands respect for the dignity and freedom of all men. Like Tawney, however, he sees that equality of freedom carries with it responsibilities. Thus Schumacher emphasizes the importance of structures that will enable individuals to develop as autonomous, critical beings ('persons not puppets') and also which would enable individuals to develop their sense of responsibility. Thus education must enable individuals:

'to act as neighbours, to render service to his fellows - man as a social being. To act as persons as autonomous centres of power and responsibility, that is, to be creatively engaged, using and developing the gifts we have been blessed with - man himself and herself.'

At the base of this is, like Tawney, the moralist who sees moral awareness as common to all and this requires individuals:

'to act as spiritual beings, that is to say, to act in accordance with their moral impulses - man as a divine being.'

The major focus of Schumacher's writing though, is both narrower and broader than Tawney's. He focuses on work and how equality of respect can be implemented in the work situation, but also attempts to demonstrate its applicability to Third World as well as developed nations. Central to the work place has to be equality of participation enabling the individual to take control of their situation in work. Such industrial democracy would tend to become the most efficient form of work. However,

'it is not of decisive importance whether these arrangements work better or worse than undemocratic enterprise; they are better because they are more in line with the meaning of life than the wealth-producing machine........ which is based upon and motivated by the aquisitive instinct.'
Like Tawney, Schumacher is concerned with principles, motivation and action. Also like Tawney he does not accept functionless property as helping to motivate service or as respecting the dignity of man. Through the private property of the passive owner, reward is achieved parasitically, 'on the work of others.' Schumacher does not, however, draw from this that nationalization is the only answer, and where it is the answer, like Tawney, this is not on dogmatic grounds. Thus retention of ownership of production will depend upon the performance of service. This will most often pertain to small scale enterprises. Producers 'should also stand in a direct relation to the community,' so that their primary responsibilities be made clear and not forgotten in subsidiary responsibilities to shareholders. Nationalization of large industries thus made sense in that it clearly underlined the responsibilities of the industry and who they were accountable to. Schumacher therefore, was less concerned with distributive equality and more with democratic arrangements both within industry and between industry and the consumer. In all this he draws heavily on Tawney, especially with respect to ownership. However, differences and developments do exist. Firstly, between small enterprise and large business, Schumacher argues for a range of medium scale enterprise to change to worker ownership, as in the case of Scott Bader. Secondly, Schumacher moves most directly away from Tawney's position when he argues that along with any change in the superstructure - including expansion of nationalization, welfare or re-distributive taxation -
there had to come a change in the technological base. Indeed, Schumacher argues that

'If there is no change in the base - which is technology - there is unlikely to be any real change in the superstructure.' 330

Schumacher's guidelines for appropriate technology are the subject for another debate. 331 It may, however, be noted in this debate that even these are connected by Schumacher to equality. Firstly, by looking for 'human-scale technology', he is aiming to increase participation. 332 Secondly, he argues that

'immense capital requirements are a principle of exclusion, are totally incompatible with any ideas of justice or equality.' 333

Thus, great capital investments in for example the development of the motor car make the product a viable option for only some of society.

Both Schumacher and Holman then are good examples of Christian writers outside theology who have been influenced by Tawney's equality and who have taken important elements of it and developed it in strategies for action.

Other Influences of Tawney's Equality

The examples above reveal the extent of Tawney's influence upon some Christian thinkers at a theoretical and planning level. However, Tawney's influence is seen not simply in the writers who 'claim' him, or develop his point of view. It is also seen in the many committees and reports that he was involved in.

Atherton notes this of many secular committees. 334 Two important Church reports also reveal his influence. The first worthy of note is the report of the Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State. Tawney was a member of the committee dealing with
Section III of the report on 'Church, Community and State in Relation to the Economic Order.'

Tawney's paper, 'Christianity and the Social Order' was in fact written for the conference and clear echoes of this can be found in the report itself. The report emphasizes the equal worth of all humans and notes that differences of class or race 'though important on their own plane, are external and trivial.'

Any institution which obscures the common humanity of all by 'emphasizing the external accidents of birth or wealth, or social position, is ipso facto anti-Christian.'

The aim of any distribution is to reinforce the common humanity and enable fellowship to grow. The report also shows concern for freedom in terms of the individual's control of their situation and for a responsible use of power. Also the report stresses the importance of social function in any view of property. Thus,

'it should further be affirmed that individual property rights must never be maintained or exercised without regard to their social consequences or without regard to the contribution which the community makes in the contribution of all wealth.'

The report, however, was light, compared to Tawney, on participatory equality and in particular on suggested plans for implementing equality. Like Tawney, it urges that the existing situation in society be thoroughly examined revealing 'the human consequences of present forms of behaviour.'

However, the report states that

'Christian teaching should deal with ends, in the sense of long-range goals, standards, and principles in the light of which every concrete situation and every proposal for improving it must be tested.'

In terms of changing the economic order, the report provides only
one paragraph (p. 129) which stresses the role of the individual Christian, and their contribution to the economic order. This contrasts sharply with Tawney's Oxford paper, which emphasizes the importance of giving substance to principles in order to make the principles intelligible. 344

The second Christian conference which is worthy of note is the 1924 C.O.P.E.C. 345 In this conference, Tawney sat on the commission for industry and property. Like the Oxford Conference report in which Tawney was involved, the report of the C.O.P.E.C. commission on industry and property is light on specific policy plans, and whilst it takes some time to consider the problems of industry and property as they then stood, it tends towards the generalizations which are often the mark of corporate productions. Nonetheless, some of the influence of Tawney may be seen in the emphasis upon equality as the first Christian social principle. The real meaning of the concept of human equality

'is the immeasurable value of the individual personality to God and therefore to honest men.' 346

This basic principle also demands,

'the recognition of the freedom of the individual' 347

in order to develop the personality. Crucially a 'reasonable' social order,

'will furnish the foundation on which individual freedom may be built.' 348

Alongside this was a concern for fellowship based upon the view of members of society as 'mutually dependent beings.' 349 These basic principles form the first test of any social conditions. 350 Though the report does not move forward to specific suggestions as to how these principles may positively be applied, it does list a
series of objectives. Several of these reveal a Tawneyesque stance:
- an increase in participatory equality in industry
- more equal distribution of income and wealth
- the substitution of the motive of service for that of gain
- the tying of property rights to contributions to
  'the good of the whole community.' 351

Conclusion
Tawney's view of equality has clearly influenced many Christian writers in Britain. The extent of that influence and the extent to which equality has been seen by church writers as a major principle in Christian social ethics has, however, varied. The reports mentioned above have tended either to avoid equality as a central principle or emphasize the importance of equality and attitudes, and attitude change, rather than outline specific egalitarian policies. 352 Theologians such as Preston and Atherton have considerably deepened and developed the theological view of equality without developing specific aspects of egalitarian policy. Though they reveal sympathy with particular policies and recommend some, they either avoid the dangers of detailed policy work or, in some cases suggest policies which do not develop important aspects of Tawney's approach. 353 They do, however, recognize, with Tawney, the need for a comprehensive approach taking in equality in relation to principle and practice.

Perhaps the most striking examples of Tawney's influence and of development of his equality are found not in the writers of academic theology but amongst the lay Christian writers considered.
Schumacher develops Tawney's views of equality in industry, whilst Holman explores ways in which Tawney's complex view of equality can be developed in local communities. The former has been judged by many to be utopian, the latter, however, places Tawney's equality firmly in contemporary situations and examines mechanisms for distributing and developing the use of power. No doubt this reflects a different perception from the theologians, and it could be argued that the lay writers do not do justice to the theology. However, they clearly do more justice to the intent of Tawney vis-a-vis equality, i.e. that it must be exemplified to be intelligible.

The influence of Tawney's equality on Christian writers then is clear. What is perhaps equally striking, however, is the comparative lack of interest in Christian writers since Tawney, in either developing Tawney's equality, for example, in industry or education, or in new areas, or even in addressing the subject of equality in depth at all. The last major work was 'Equality and Excellence'. The paucity of research is striking when compared to philosophy and sociology. The reasons for this, as touched upon at various points above seems to range from fear of using the concept to concern that the church's identity be lost if it enters the arena of operative equality with policy programmes. Ranged against this is Tawney's positive advocacy of equality, with a deep interpretation of equality of respect as the central or ultimate principle with dynamic relationships with other important ones. In the next chapter, I intend to relate Tawney's equality to recent debate about equality and demonstrate its contemporary relevance. This will lead to some general conclusions about equality.
Chapter 7 Tawney's Equality and The Modern Debate

Despite Lakoff's assertion that equality is no longer a major topic for debate, it is still central to any discussion of policy and values. Recent discussion has centred upon refining an acceptable definition of equality and finding uncontroversial grounds for this.

In this chapter, I will examine attempts to do this in terms of person-centred equality, of a global domain. In particular, I will focus upon the work of John Rawls and of socialist writers who have built upon his work.

The conclusion will be in two parts. Firstly, I argue that Tawney's position is more convincing than Rawls and related views. Secondly, and more generally, I argue that person-centred equality of a global domain is not possible without a strong view of equality of respect and a perfectionist base, and that the Christian view provides these most compellingly. In all this, I do not argue simply that Tawney's view of equality remains relevant. Despite limited awareness of some modern issues, Tawney's equality remains relevant precisely because by definition it is open to development. Rather does the chapter argue that Tawney's view is relevant to the present debate. In pursuit of this I will first examine the justification, and then the meaning and practice of equality.

The Justification of Equality

A major element in the recent debates on equality has been the nature of any justification. Rawls, for instance, argues that to justify egalitarian justice, one is not required to work from first
principles or assumptions. For him, the justification of an egalitarian position 'rests upon the entire conception' of a theory, 'and how it fits in with and organizes our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium.'

Justification is thus, 'a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view.'

In more detail this involves three elements. Firstly, the principles of justice are argued for 'on the basis of reasonable stipulation concerning the choice of such conceptions.'

Secondly, Rawls aims to demonstrate that the theory proposed 'matches the fixed point of our considered convictions better than the other familiar doctrines.'

This is achieved by examining the kinds of institutions demanded by justice and the duties and obligations imposed by it. Thirdly, the feasibility of the theory of justice is tested. Importantly, the stability and congruence of the theory and any underlying concept of right and good do not determine acceptance of the first principles but rather confirm this.

In all this, Rawls is concerned to chart a course between utilitarianism and perfectionism. His concern with not justifying egalitarian justice from first principles focuses precisely on equality of respect. On the one hand respect is essential to the effective functioning of the principles of justice, for without it there can be no sense of justice, argues Rawls. However, 'the notion of respect, or the inherent worth of persons' cannot be the basis of justice, precisely because 'these ideas call for interpretation.'
Such provision of meaning is provided by the principles of right and justice, principles, 'which are already independently derived.' Hence, argues Rawls, the so called first principles depend upon justice for meaning and the important level of justification concerns the concept of justice.

There are two immediate problems with Rawls's view of justification. The first is that to place the burden of justification upon coherence does not provide adequate criteria for determining between different theories. As noted above, Tawney's view of equality can claim coherence. He too points to 'considered convictions' common to all which confirm the basic principle of equality. The problem is that his convictions and basic principles differ from Rawls at significant points, and Rawls does not provide criteria to judge between them.

The second problem with Rawls's view of justification is that by relying heavily upon the confirmatory force of 'considered convictions' he seriously diminishes the applicability of his theory. As Gutmann puts it, 'the claims to justification end where..... non-egalitarian institutions begin.'

Thus, Rawls's theory would find little acceptance in different societies or times where individualist or non-egalitarian conviction prevailed. In contrast to this, Tawney's view of equality, because of its deontological element of justification, claims to be applicable to all times and societies. This claim can be sustained precisely because Tawney appeals to a basic ideal which transcends particular social expression.
Neither of these two points are intended as knock down arguments of Rawls's position. Their aim is simply to point to limitations and inadequacies of Rawls's view of the justification process. Perhaps more serious, and lying at the base of Rawls's chosen method of justification, are the reasons why he argues that it is not possible to begin from the first principle of equality of respect, in terms of justification. As noted above, Rawls accepts the importance of equal worth. His theory of justice provides a rendering of the ideal, i.e.

'to respect persons is to recognize that they possess an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.' 19

However, the ideal depends upon right and justice to find meaning. In this, Rawls, is arguing two things, firstly that equality of respect as such has no substantive meaning, and secondly that the only way of finding such meaning is with reference to the principles of justice, arrived at independently. Such a view of equality of respect is at best controversial, and at worst untenable, and that for the following reasons: Firstly, the term justice itself demands interpretation. Rawls spends much of his book not simply justifying his theory of justice, but interpreting the theory in terms of fairness, a term which in turn he interprets as the product of rational choice in reflective equilibrium. The meaning of this in turn depends upon a particular view of rationality which in turn is exemplified and confirmed in a particular anthropology. Clearly here there is the danger of circular reasoning. 20 Such a process, where one general principle finds meaning from other general principles, serves to warn against relying purely upon a concept of justice to interpret equality of
respect. The grounds of Rawls's method of justification become therefore no longer clear.

The second and more important point, however, concerns the status of equality of respect and other possible sources of meaning. Purely as a formal/general principle, equality by definition, will always lack clear meaning. Hence, as noted above, it is necessary to develop a substantive or operative view of equality in order to find meaning.

This does not, however, mean that the formal concept of equality of respect must of itself, become vacuous or otiose. On the contrary, even a minimal interpretation of the term respect points to a meaning of some care or concern for all persons. The meaning of the concept in this case is that of an attitude, and such an attitude contains elements both of the formal, in that it applies to all, and of the substantive, in that it is expressed in any substantive view of equality and affects how such a view may be put into practice. As noted above, such respect demands a commitment to the individual and his or her self-realization. 

Rawls rightly argues that equality of respect could not be the sole basis for equality, at least in the sense of all justification flowing from the concept. However, this does not mean that equality of respect can be excised from the justification altogether. It is therefore, at the least, questionable whether the meaning of equality of respect must rely solely upon distributive justice, or even whether the meaning can be purely confined to philosophical categories. 

Two points must be made finally in this section. Firstly, in the Tawney approach, the primary value of equality of respect actually
helps to define justice per se, and to target the aims of justice, freedom and fellowship. As shall be seen in the debate on substantive equality, this has important consequences in terms of participatory as well as distributive equality. Secondly, the Christian view of equality of respect is clearly the strongest version of this particular approach. As noted above, it derives its interpretation from agape, and in Tawney's argument in particular, from the Incarnation. This is a most remarkable combination for not only does this express most profoundly the 'ultimate attitude', it also gives a substantive example of this in the person of Jesus Christ and the activity of God. Given such a meaning there can be no question of a conceptual regress, i.e. of always moving to another general concept for meaning. It may of course, be argued, that such a meaning would be very hard to justify, i.e. that it would depend upon many controversial metaphysical or religious ideas. However, against that, it may be argued that, like Rawls, Tawney is not out to frame a proof based upon Christian doctrine. Rather does Christian doctrine provide the supreme exemplar of the ultimate equality of respect i.e. God's love in Christ. As such, belief in and an awareness of God provides the supreme experience of the attitude of equality of respect, with, as Jenkins emphasized, the central experience of being valued i.e. forgiveness.

We may conclude then that Rawls does not give adequate grounds for his method of justification. At the very least he supplies no criteria for determining between his and another coherent justification. More importantly, Rawls provides no adequate grounds for ignoring the role of equality of respect in any justification,
or for confining the meaning of such equality to that of distributional justice.  28

Examining the elements of Rawls's justification in more detail, we must first note that it gives rise to two egalitarian principles of justice. The first defines the fundamental equality which applies to the 'respect owed to persons irrespective of their social position,'  29 and is stated as follows:

'Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.'  30

The second principle is about distributional justice and is stated as follows:

'Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principles, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.'  31

The first principle takes priority over the second.

As already noted, the meaning of equality of respect is supplied for Rawls by the theory of justice which underlines these principles. As to how that differs in concept and practice from Tawney's equality will be considered in the following sections. Here, it must be noted that Rawls relies heavily for justification upon firstly, the hypothetical description of a state of reflective equilibrium known as the 'original position', and secondly, upon a particular view of anthropology.  32

The first of these justificatory appeals refers to a hypothetical congress of people each representing a social class. They are situated behind a 'veil of ignorance',  33 which means that they do not know which social class they belong to or at what stage
of development their society is at, and that they have only general information about human psychology and the laws of science. From such a situation, Rawls argues, the congress will choose unanimously the principles which will regulate whatever society they turn out to belong to, this guided by rational self-interest. Each knows that he will have a plan of life (his own conception of the good) but does not know what this will be. The individuals will therefore agree to social principles which will give them the best chance of achieving their life plans, whatever this may be. By definition these decisions would not take into account special interests and so would be objectively just.

The first point to note about this mechanism of justification is that it does in fact force the individual into deciding for these principles of egalitarian justice. Some philosophers have suggested that in fact members of the original position could have chosen differently. However, it is clear that, if one accepts the scene of the original position, that the members would be obliged to choose some similar result. It is not simply that the members are said to be equally ignorant of society and their own life plans, or that they all equally operate according to rational self interest. We are also told that all accept that there are certain 'primary goods', headed by liberty and self respect, goods which are necessary for any individual to achieve life plans. Rawls does not specify the primary goods in detail when working out the original position. This comes later in his sections which confirm the insights of the original position. However, he clearly fixes primary goods as a sine qua non for the development of any life plan. The self-interested person would therefore in the
original position necessarily choose a situation where he or she would ensure an acceptable level of primary goods as this is deemed necessary even if the life plan of the individual will be to maximize material goods. However, this builds into the original position a logical inevitability such that there is little difference from the method Rawls himself wishes to avoid i.e. drawing out the logic of a particular concept or first principle. The second problem with this approach then moves to any confirmation of the original position. If the original position has an almost logical force, then the real weight of any justification will in fact be placed on the so called confirmation. Granted that this would not constitute proof, there would nonetheless need to be convincing evidence about human nature and moral psychology that would lead one to accept the picture arrived at by the 'original position'.

A crucial first question in this respect hangs over the so called 'primary goods', the desire for which is part of the definition of a rational individual. Rawls infers that self-respect is the most important primary good. This primary good is necessary because it provides the sense of worth and confidence which is essential for any intentions to be valued and action to be carried through. However, whilst this may be an element of the role of self-respect, Rawls provides no empirical evidence to show that this is exclusively how self-respect is used. In fact, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which self-respect, far from preceding action, could depend upon the fulfillment of a particular action. This might be self-respect measured narrowly in terms of achievement in a chosen task, or profession, or more
broadly self-respect which arises from fulfilling ones duty either to self (in terms of developing personality and talents) or to others. For Tawney, reflection confirms that, 'spiritual well-being' does involve, 'finding ones work and doing it,' and 'performing certain primary duties, care of home, wife and family, direction of industry by which (one) lives, a share in public life.'

In all this, Tawney would not deny the importance of self-respect as a primary good, and he specifically notes the effect of distributional inequality on the estimation of the individual's own worth. Rather, does he see self-respect as a more complex phenomenon, the achievement of which cannot depend solely upon distributional equality. Given this, a crucial element in Rawls's argument is taken away. On the one hand, this view of self-respect does not confirm the original position. On the other hand, it demands the original position be broadened to take account of this greater complexity. Either way, the crucial justificatory weight which Rawls places on self-respect as a primary good becomes too much for the concept to bear.

Significantly, Rawls's view of self-respect depends heavily upon his conception of goodness as rationality. This is the 'thin theory' of the good which Rawls uses purely as justificatory device. However, in terms of self-respect it becomes a deceptive concept, which actually ends up defining the conditions of self and mutual respect. These conditions would 'seem to require that..... common plans be both rational and complementary.'

Such plans,
'call upon their educated endowment and arouse in each a sense of mastery, and they fit together in one scheme of activity that all can appreciate and enjoy.' 47

In his search for a non-controversial basis to justice, Rawls has here moved into further difficulties. Firstly, the fact that self-respect is characterized in terms of the conception of goodness as rationality confirms the view that his thinking is circular. If considerations of self-respect are to confirm 48 the original position, then an objective description of self-respect would be necessary in order to match the two. Rawls, however, draws upon his justificatory mechanism for the original position precisely to describe the basic 'primary good' which should be confirming the original position. Secondly, in framing conditions for self and mutual respect, Rawls ignores a whole range of empirical evidence which argues that as individuals develop, they require respect which is not conditional. It is the giving of this love as the individual grows which helps them acquire the confidence and assurance of which Rawls speaks. 49 This is not to deny that respect for rational life plans etc. is important for the continued development of self-respect. It is to argue that there are no grounds for confining an understanding of self-respect to that. Rawls's position here underlines the difficulties in any contract theory, which are bound to exclude duties outside the basis for the contract, or similarly awareness of respect not seen in those terms, for example in the relationship of the family.

Rawls's attempt to view good in terms of rationality causes further problems for justification. Firstly, if good is defined as rationality, then it would be interesting to speculate how Rawls could
accommodate either the concept of sin or evil. Presumably they would be described in terms of the non-rational or irrational. There must needs therefore be some judgement of value to distinguish that which was intentionally non-rational or perversely so and that which is acceptable. Of course, Rawls may wish to be without either of the two concepts. In that case he would fall into the second problem of how to explain so much patently evil behaviour in the world, even in terms of simply going against the principles of justice which he espouses. These points have great relevance to the justification of equality. It is precisely sin and the propensity of human beings to act irresponsibly in relation to great concentrations of power which demands that power be dispersed and that accountability be improved. Rawls' original position provides a quite different picture with individuals ruled by reason. Of course, Rawls would not want to see this as reality but as a hypothetical mechanism for reaching a definition of justice. However, even if we accept the 'original position' as such a mechanism, there would be no reason for the individuals to abide by the rules established behind the veil of ignorance, once they had returned to the society which would eventually emerge from this exercise. It is precisely the conditions of the 'original position' which provide 'self-interested reasons' for continuing. Once out of these conditions, self-interest and rationality would be determined in relation to different conditions. Thus, either account has to be taken of man's sinful nature, or consistency demands a perfectionist stance which is more than self-interest i.e. which balances concern for self and others. Alongside the 'original position' and confirmatory evidence,
Rawls' justification relies heavily upon the concept of the moral person. The idea of man as a moral agent being owed respect is not, of course, new. It, however, and the broader argument that equality of respect is grounded in certain features of humanity still holds currency in some circles. Rawls, quite apart from his original position, sees this as the basis of equality. Moral persons, 'are entitled to equal justice' and moral persons are distinguished by two features:

'First, they are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life) and second, they are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree.'

The upshot of this position is that 'those who can give justice are owed justice.'

A writer such as Lukes broadens the argument considerably, searching for the basic features of human beings which 'command equal consideration or respect.' The features number three:

a) the capacity of human beings to form intentions and purposes
b) the capacity to 'think' thoughts and perform actions
c) the capacity for self-development

Lukes, in fact, sees himself as part of the Rawlsian tradition and also calls upon Tawney for his characterization of self-respect. He sees the three above features as 'at least part of the ground on which we accord (humans) respect.' Rawls is more specific, noting that there are many problems with the concept of moral personality or moral agent, and writes that
an argument from this basis is confirmatory rather than a direct justification. 61 There are, however, many problems with this whole line of justification. Firstly, as noted above, Rawls's use of the justification by confirmation is very questionable. Even with respect to moral personality, definition is entirely dependent upon a concept of justice as fairness which requires confirmation in any description of the moral personality. In fact, the statement 'those who can give justice are owed justice' 62 belies any assertion that the argument is purely confirmatory. The capacity to give egalitarian justice is a direct ground for the receipt of such justice. Secondly, to rely on such grounds leads, as Rawls recognized, to potential problems of exclusion. 63 If the features detailed by Rawls and Lukes are adhered to rigidly, then they would exclude the mentally handicapped, some forms of mental illness, and quite possibly some members of different cultures. 64 Rawls's response is then to argue that in the first two cases, it is necessary to assume that individuals have a life plan etc., or treat them as if they had. 65 However, this entirely begs the question as to why we should treat such individuals 'as if' they are humans. If the grounds for equal respect are the features referred to, then the grounds for equal respect for those who do not have those features must logically be different. Those grounds could only be found in either a broader view of what constitutes humanity 66 or an unconditional version of equality of respect. This latter is precisely the stance of Tawney's justification, which sees everyone born into the human species as being unique,
and, by implication as having something to offer i.e. a unique and important role or capacity or talent. As noted above, this leads to a view of equality which looks for pertinent differences in individuals. When applied to the mentally handicapped, this moves from the bland assumption of humanity to the very positive search for uniqueness in each individual.

None of this is to deny that the features of humanity are relevant to the justification of equality of respect. At the least they give general pointers as to the conditions, resources and relationships necessary for self-development. Such features, however, cannot be the total ground for global, person-centred equality. The ground must necessarily be some form of the ultimate attitude of respect or concern for all. Indeed, such an attitude is assumed in Rawls's inclusion of the mentally handicapped etc. in his definition of humanity. He does not, however, draw this out or recognize the importance of it. Once again then, Tawney demonstrates a keener understanding of the necessary elements in any justification of equality.

Rawls's view and justification of equality has been very influential and one Rawlsian argument for equality and for minimally, the provision of a welfare state has been put forward by Raymond Plant. His argument is important to note not least because he is a Christian. Plant's argument begins by accepting the basic liberal view that,

'as purposive creatures, liberty to pursue our own good in our own way is central to us.'

However, in order to pursue the 'good life', the individual requires two goods, survival and autonomy. These generate certain basic needs, including income and wealth, education and health care.
In this, Plant wishes to refute the New Right's insistence that equality of respect should involve simply non-interference. In so doing, he aims to demonstrate the connection between liberty and equality and argues that in addition to negative rights, there should be positive rights which secure the full value of liberty. The latter is a Rawlsian concept which refers to the liberty which genuinely enables an individual to pursue his or her life plan.

As stated, however, the argument for distributional equality is limited. Firstly, it begs too many questions, such as what autonomy is, and how needs associated with it may be satisfied. Secondly, by seeing equality as primarily instrumental, i.e. to achieving freedom, Plant does not answer the question of whose responsibility it is to fulfill such needs in the first place. The important point here is that Plant's initial grounds for commitment to equality are individualist and libertarian. He is concerned that each individual should be able to pursue his or her own good in their own way. However laudable this aim is, it does not as such provide the grounds for the fulfillment of the needs by the state. It could still be argued that such needs are best fulfilled by the individual themselves. At the same time, the pluralist vision of individuals pursuing their own good in their own way is also inadequate because it provides no moral context for those 'goods'. Without such a context this egalitarian position will gravitate to the negative morality of the marginal egalitarians in which liberty becomes indefeasible. In short Plant's argument lacks precisely the emphasis upon unconditional equality of respect and perfectionism which Tawney demonstrates.
these, he has no ground for commitment and relies exclusively upon liberty as his ground for morality.

Plant, like Rawls, wishes to avoid perfectionism. However, it is not clear that their view of perfectionism is reasonable or that perfectionism per se should be avoided. Rawls sees perfectionism as prescriptive i.e. prescribing specific ways of life as superior to others. However, as noted above, Tawney provides a perfectionism which is not prescriptive. It certainly argues for a series of principles, and for particular means of implementing those. However, the principles themselves are too general to be prescriptive and the means of implementing them include a strong emphasis upon participatory equality which precisely gives individuals opportunity to work out their own good in relation to the network of relationships and demands in which they find themselves. Significantly, Plant recognizes the importance of participatory equality, but his chosen argument precisely presents no grounds for it.

Rawls, whilst protesting against perfectionism, consistently assumes some form of it, minimally that an autonomous life is essential to human well-being. Without an appeal to such a standard, writes Haksar,

'Rawls cannot demonstrate why the doctrine of equal respect commits us to a belief in a liberal and open society.'

Once again therefore, there is the need for grounds for commitment to the self-realization of individuals (equality of respect), and also a framework of moral meaning which broadly defines self-realization and the means to it, and explains why such a standard is important. Without such perfectionism of this second element, there can be no standard and without a standard there can be no
ultimate justification.

Another approach to the justification of equality has been that of Bernard Williams, in an influential paper 'The Idea of Equality.' Faced with questions about the transcendent basis for equality, and about the actual moral content of the concept of equality, Williams attempts to circumvent the level of moral discourse and find the ground for equality either in conceptual truth, or everyday language. This appeal also provides the criterion for distribution. Using the example of medical care, Williams rests his argument on the logic of relevant reasons. For Williams, the relevant reason for the distribution of health care is ill health. This relevant reason is basically found in the concept of medical care per se, or by an elucidation of the common moral assumptions which are the base of correct practice in our medical institutions. This same logic is applied to all the basic needs for the human being. William's method of justification then has echoes of Rawls in that he turns to moral practice for confirmation. However, unlike Rawls he looks to the internal logic of the relevant concept or practice.

Unfortunately, William's method of justification is no more convincing than Rawls. The concept of relevant reasons is relative to the good social practices of an institution or society. What is precisely at issue is what practices are good, i.e. institutional practices themselves require to be interpreted according to some broader view of justice. Any attempt to rely solely upon concepts or practice would of course, lead to a serious limiting of the application of this method - for not all institutions or societies see need as exclusively the criteria of distribution.
Similar points could be made about the so-called citizenship school. Harris, for example, argues citizenship can be seen as the basis of entitlement to equal distribution. The distribution is of rights, which pertain to the recognition of an individual's status as a member of society. However, whilst the concept of membership is useful in articulating relationships and responsibilities, not least of society or community to individuals, it is not a sufficient ground, of itself, for entitlement to equal distribution. Membership remains both a conditional ground, with difficulties arising as to individuals not counted as members, and a concept which ultimately rests upon a definition of society or community for meaning. It is thus possible to argue for a hierarchical society in which individuals are accorded different worth and in which citizenship requires unequal distribution. Harris's own view of citizenship remains morally neutral requiring equal access 'to valued forms of life.' As a result, like Williams, his view of equality becomes relative. Thus, even the concept of citizenship requires both a ground of unconditional worth and a perfectionist element which indicates roles and responsibilities which citizens are enabled to fulfill through distribution.

The evidence examined above indicates that Tawney's justification of equality is more convincing than recent major attempts. These attempts provide no adequate reason for excluding equality of respect from any justification. The exclusion appears to be largely through a fear of perfectionism, and yet most of the attempts assume some form of perfectionism. In searching for an
alternative, non-controversial basis to equality, their arguments rely either upon some element of humanity, for example, rationality, the logic of institutions, or individualist objectives, all of which are limiting or excluding in some way. Additional support, defining morality as rationality, or descriptions of psychology or of human nature prove to be equally limiting, and insufficient grounds on which to base equality.

Tawney, clearly shows that any justification of equality has to be complex, involving unconditional equality of respect, some form of perfectionism and a morality which is not confined to rationality as self-interest. Hence, as noted above, Tawney's view requires a two level justification balancing both deontological and consequential elements. The question of the basis of morality and the importance of the Christian view of equality in all this will be examined in the conclusion of this chapter.

In the meantime, the above work on justification has further suggested that justification and meaning are intimately related with respect to equality, and that in fact the Rawlsian view, whilst bearing surface resemblances to Tawney's, is in fact, quite different. Firstly, as noted above, Rawls's view of equality of respect is quite different, taking its meaning from equal liberty. Secondly, such liberty centres on distributive equality, and the principles for calculating such equality. Thirdly, Rawls has no place for fellowship in his view of equality or for its development in institutions. Inevitably, this affects his view of participatory equality.

He defines 'the principle of (equal) participation' as 'the principle of equal liberty, when applied to the political
procedure defined by the constitution." 91

What this means in practice is two things:

a) As Gutmann observes,

'Rawls is not concerned with the value of participation other than as a form of defense against subversion of constitutional rights of individuals and of constitutional government as a whole.' 92

This would then involve the preservation of the basic political rights of

'freedom of speech and assembly, and liberty of thoughts and conscience.' 93

b) Besides advocating steps to preserve the

'fair value for all of the political liberties', Rawls includes in his principle of participation his principle of fair equality of opportunity. Thus it demands that all

'citizens are to have an equal access, at least in the formal sense, to public office.' 94

There is, then, no sense in Rawls of participation as an expression of fellowship or co-operation, or of participation as an expression of control of the individual's life, or as the expression of a need to serve. As a result there is no concern for equal participation beyond the political sphere. 95 This contrasts starkly with Tawney's emphasis upon participation as being an essential element in all institutions. 96

Fourthly, Rawls does not produce the substantive policy detail of equality that Tawney has. This is to be expected, as without any view of sin, Rawls is not concerned about detailed plans to equalize power. Also, Rawls's view of distributional equality does not take into account the effect that this will have upon society in terms of building community. Substantive policy
details are important for Rawls only in terms of how they can achieve the best distribution of resources. Whichever system, free market or socialist, achieved this would be judged to fulfill justice. 97

Finally, many of these differences and consequent difficulties can be seen in a comparison of the two writer's views of equality of opportunity. As noted above, equality of opportunity can be seen in two broad ways, involving equal prospects or equal means. 98 Like Tawney, Rawls is unhappy with the doctrine of 'careers open to talent' 99 and proposes instead the concept of 'fair equality of opportunity', by which

'positions are not only open in a formal sense, but.... all should have a fair chance to attain them.' 100

This would seem to involve some combination of both means regarding and prospect regarding equality of opportunity. As Rae notes, it is very difficult to combine the two. 101 Rawls, however, attempts to find a compromise and defines his doctrine as

'those with similar abilities and skills should have the same life chances. More specifically..... those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the income class into which they are born.' 102

For Rawls, this is also in the context of the 'difference principle' which aims to maximize the prospects of those least favoured in the natural distribution of talent, or in any initial social position or status. Thus, in place of social or economic strata dictating opportunities, Rawls proposes talent strata. This means that equality of opportunity will be defined within what amounts to exclusionary strata. This causes several problems:

a) It requires a phenomenology of talent to be worked out with
great care. Not only does Rawls not offer this, but it is not clear if a consensus about levels of talents and ability could be arrived at. 103 Notably, Rawls only defines the talent strata in terms of the equalities with which they are associated. As Rae notes,'if they are not conceived and constructed independently, the whole requirement is circular.' 104

b) Even if the conception of talent strata were acceptable, this would simply lead to prospect and means equality within strata. Technically it could lead to both unequal means and unequal prospects among persons in different strata. 105 The Rawlsian compromise is thus not successful. Tawney criticised the concept of equality of opportunity on two grounds. Firstly, that without a redistribution of resources, it was a fiction. 106 In this, Tawney and Rawls would agree. Secondly, however, whilst accepting some degree of social mobility, Tawney set questions about the whole concept of equality of opportunity for scarce positions or rewards. A greater stress was laid upon equality of opportunity to fulfill that which was appropriate to the individual, rather than achieve that which was deemed to be the prized status or reward in society. 107 This view of equality of opportunity then begins to set the concept more alongside equality of freedom and equality of power, as having relevance to all, not simply the few who achieved the 'highest positions.' Moreover, such a view then puts far greater weight upon the liberal concept of the uniqueness of the individual, 108 and really looks to value and liberate that individual in their uniqueness. This is at least as compelling a view of equality of opportunity as Rawls's and has none of
his contradictions. The problems for this, as shall be seen in the final chapter, are how to put this kind of equality of opportunity into action. Once one values the opportunities for individuals, then the worth of scarce opportunities begins to diminish. In that context it soon becomes apparent that such a shift in valuation will depend upon a framework of fraternity, or service, in which all parts would be viewed as both opportunities to serve society and to develop the self in one form or another. 109

Thus far, major differences have been noted in the equality of Rawls and Tawney. Difficulties with Rawls's view, quite apart from questions of justification, have involved contradictions in his view of equality of opportunity; lack of substantive egalitarian policies to exemplify his theory; and, despite lip service paid to democracy, an emphasis upon distributional equality at the expense of participatory equality. In each case, Tawney provides a more convincing view, with a richer concept of freedom, and a more balanced and integrated view of participation and distribution.

As noted in chapter five, a further Rawlsian approach to equality does attempt to balance liberty and fellowship and so give greater emphasis to participatory equality. 110 In this, Bernard Crick argues that fraternity in terms of 'right relationships' is important if relative equality is to be accepted. Thus freedom is seen in the context of fraternity and this is developed through participation.

However, it is not clear that liberty and fraternity can be held together without inconsistency unless equality of respect is involved in some way such as in Tawney's approach. In fact, Crick
reveals two senses of equality. On the one hand, he argues for legitimate inequality, where equality is a distributional principle. On the other hand, he sees equality as a participatory principle. The first necessarily involves centralizing, because it is allocating goods across society. The second involves decentralized decision making. How to balance the two equalities is very difficult, hence, for example, Rawls and Plant tend to come down on the side of distribution. Gutmann suggests that there is a clear relationship between the two i.e. that distributional equality enables the individual to participate. Norman suggests that the important link is that both involve some distribution of power enabling the individual or group to take control. Crick sees a similar relationship. However, these approaches are ultimately unsatisfactory. Firstly, the link advocated by Gutmann or Crick is not absolute, by which I mean that not all participatory equality depends on receipt of any one distributed resource. Thus, for example, in order for one individual to participate in family life, they may require human resources to help them develop skills and awareness, as much as material resources.

As noted above, so much depends upon what is meant by participatory equality. If it involves participation in decision making then besides human or material resources, then opportunity, information, education and an appropriate process will be necessary. None of this precludes the need for basic distribution of resources as an important element in enabling participation. It rather underlines that the relationship between distributional equality and participatory equality is more complex than simple
instrumentality and depends upon which definition of participation is determined upon.

A second and connected, difficulty revolves around the definition of participation. Even with Crick's emphasis upon fraternity, the encouragement of participation at local level would not prevent the growth of inter-communal conflicts resulting from subjective group identification. Participation in this sense would be instrumental to group achievements and thus could lead to precisely the kind of individualism or materialism writ-large which Tawney feared. In turn, such a situation would tend to become inegalitarian in that it would challenge central distributional equality.

In order to answer the first problem, a strong conceptual link is required between the two equalities. In order to answer the second problem, some form of perfectionism is required that will prevent participation from being used as instrumental to sectional interests and so lead to a major contradiction. It is precisely these which are supplied by Tawney's Christian view of equality of respect with its attendant perfectionism based upon agape, seeing participation as both a means to self-determination and service, both for the individual and the group. Perfectionism thus is seen to be essential to the meaning and practice of equality as well as to its justification. Without this Christian perfectionism it is clear that the very meaning and significance of participation will be limited and diminished. This, of course, is so for those who would espouse democratic equality. For marginal egalitarians the issues are quite different.
It must be noted that in addition to this high view of equality of respect, a process will be required which enables such participation to take place, without it being morally coercive. This will be outlined in the final chapter.

Conclusion

In examining the Rawlsian and related socialist views which argue for equality in a global domain, I have concluded that Tawney provides a more compelling view and justification. Tawney's two-tier justification demonstrated the need for an unconditional equality of respect, and a perfectionism based upon agape and confirmed by an holistic psychology and interactive sociology. The justifications examined above proved to be circular, relative, exclusive, and relying upon unsatisfactory views of psychology and human nature. The desire to avoid perfectionism led to a reliance on libertarian values and rational self-interest which in turn led to a limited view of freedom and of equality. The problem over the substantive meaning of equality in all of this is not helped in Rawls's case by the lack of policy suggestions. Participation was paid lip service by the above writers but was not integrated with distributional equality. Indeed, integration of the two equalities was seen to demand attention to the complexity of possible relations and to require a perfectionist stance which emphasized the balance of self-interest and altruism. Without this, the participatory and distributional equality run the danger of becoming contradictory, with in turn, freedom and fellowship becoming negative or exclusive.

Two connected general conclusions may be drawn from this analysis
of the debate. Firstly, unconditional equality of respect and a perfectionism based upon agape are necessary for the justification of global domain equality. These elements are most clearly seen in the Christian view of equality set down by Tawney. Secondly, the Christian view of equality of respect i.e. where respect involves enabling the individual to fulfill duties to the self and others, is the only adequate basis for ensuring that participatory equality and distributional equality do not become either arbitrarily limited or contradictory.

One final observation should be made at this point. This conclusion has echoes of Charvet's thesis, briefly mentioned above, that given an individualist and self-interest starting point, it is not possible to arrive at or justify a coherent conception of the individual's relationship to other individuals in the community. Indeed,

'(T)here always exists a potential conflict within the individual between the right of the particular self to its authentic self-realization and the objective requirement to respect the rights of others.' Charvet thus argues that the individualist stance can never be the basis of a coherent morality.

The fundamental error highlighted here is, 'the idea that objective value lies in a self-determining being', and this assumption should be replace by the 'fundamental moral attitude', namely,

'the mutual valuation of concrete persons as valuers of each others lives.' Only this can be the basis for negative freedom and a right to welfare.

Like the conclusion that has been developed from Tawney's view,
Charvet finds the individualist base for global domain equality unsatisfactory. Charvet's answer is to devise a perfectionist, altruistic base to morality. However, ultimately he lacks precisely the two major elements of the Christian perspective. Firstly, the moral attitude he propounds lacks the force of agape and this provides no ground for commitment to welfare rights. Secondly, his concern for others and value of them does not include the concern for their opportunity to serve, and thus misses the high form of altruism which frames individual or group goals in the light of self and other concern. In addition, Charvet does not begin to resolve how this objective 'moral attitude' can be applied to community without diminishing community or self-determination.
Chapter 8  The Modern Debate and Marginal Egalitarianism

The relevance of Tawney's equality to modern marginal egalitarians, i.e. those who oppose the broadening of equality beyond formal property rights and certain civil and political rights, may not seem immediately obvious. Indeed, some would argue that even the arguments used by Tawney against libertarians such as Hayek are inadequate and simplistic. Reisman, for instance, points out that in arguing against Hayek for the importance of planning, Tawney simply retorts that planning per se cannot be wrong, losing an opportunity to address Hayek's points more fully. Despite this in this chapter I will argue that Tawney's views on equality, taken as a whole, provide a very real and important challenge to modern marginal egalitarianism. I will then indicate ways in which his position must be developed and strengthened.

Many of Tawney's points which address marginal egalitarianism have already been referred to, either in answering direct criticisms of Tawney, or in parallel arguments used with global domain egalitarians. Equally, because there is a significant body of literature which addresses marginal egalitarianism, I am concerned not simply to duplicate their arguments. In consequence, I will firstly sum up the relevant elements of Tawney's argument thus far, developing them where necessary. Secondly, I will examine in more detail three prominent arguments which underlie much of marginal egalitarianism - the principle of neutrality; the Gellner/Turner thesis, with its reliance upon empirical evidence to point to increased equality; the work of Lucas and Raz in questioning the philosophical status of equality. As with the previous chapter, I will not suggest that Tawney's work directly
answers these points, but rather that the elements of his argument for equality provide, as a cumulative case, the most convincing answer to them.

The arguments already noted are as follows:

a) Marginal egalitarians base their case on the primacy of the principle of liberty. However, their view of liberty is arbitrarily restricted to negative liberty. Furthermore, liberty per se is not indefeasible and therefore by definition, cannot by itself, be a primary principle. Tawney not only argues for a moral context to liberty, but also broadens possible views of liberty. For him there is not simply negative and positive freedom, but also the freedom to serve. It is worthy of note that both Rawlsian and marginal egalitarians have their own conception of negative and positive freedom. Moreover, at the level of justification, both are very close, basing it upon self-interest and self-determination, with no fundamental part for service or fellowship in relation to equality.

b) The marginal egalitarians' view of human nature and society is inadequate. Man is viewed as an individual existing prior to and apart from society. Responsibility is seen to apply to individuals only and self-respect is gained as a result of individual effort. In all this, human nature requires competition and risk to flourish, with the necessity for associated virtues to flourish.

As noted above, Tawney presents a far more convincing picture. Self-respect is dependant upon treatment and service as well as 'achievement' in any narrow sense.
Given his view of the interdependence of individuals, it is not possible to confine responsibility purely to individuals. Risk is accepted as important along with the virtues of self-sufficiency and responsibility. However, Tawney argues that risk and responsibility can, and should be shared. Central to this is an argument that equality of respect demands such sharing. Given the holistic view of man as a mental, emotional, physical, spiritual whole, to deny the individual opportunities to exercise and develop this nature in an interactive society, is, itself, a denial of respect. This can be developed into an important argument for equality of participation. In practice it is argued that marginal egalitarianism actually leads to increased freedom of choice and greater distribution of power and resources, with the market as an essential means to this, along with sustained decentralization and giving greater power to the individual. However, firstly, as noted above, increased freedom of choice by itself is a contentious objective. As Tawney noted, such freedom of choice requires to be meaningful and relevant. Secondly, the equality of opportunity, based upon ability, argued for by such as Friedman, is, as Tawney argued, useless without economic power to fulfill important choices. In this, the market does not enlarge equality of opportunity or freedom for distribution, these still remaining inequitable with wealthy individuals able to register a much wider range of preferences. Thirdly, it is clear that some forms of decentralization or dispersion of power actually deny freedom, especially with respect to decision making. Thus, for instance, to offer a
council-house tenant the choice between two possible landlords simply asks for a limited decision about pre-determined options. There is no opportunity for involvement in information gathering, discussion of values or ethos, setting of objectives, or in carrying out plans. In the context of exercising and developing their whole person, individuals are once again powerless.  

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c) Just as the marginal egalitarian view of human nature is arbitrarily limited, so is their view of society and history. Nozick, for instance, bases his view of property rights on an argument that any process by which material goods are produced is one which, by its very nature, attaches those goods to particular owners. To this extent the goods are already distributed and the individuals are entitled to them and thus any proposal for distribution in fact involves re-distribution and this overrides the property rights of existing owners.  

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Unfortunately this view relies upon firstly an amoral view of history, i.e. one which ignores the fact that a good deal of wealth was first accumulated precisely by violating the rights which Nozick argues for. Secondly, modern society does not constantly relate ownership, production and wealth. The dominant form of ownership is corporate not individual. Nozick's argument only begins to make some sense, for example, in the society of the early American West, with small farmers achieving their own living, cultivating land they had claimed. Against all this, Tawney argues for a relational view of property as power,  

22 with workers as part of the process of production.  

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Allied to this view of society in Nozick, is a view of relationships as contractual i.e. that no individual can enter another's 'space' without the consent of the other. Tawney's argument against this view is twofold. Firstly, it is simply not true that all relationships are contractual in nature. He points to family and community loyalties which involve obligations and commitments prior to any contract. Secondly, Tawney's interactionist view of society demonstrates the way in which the rights of individuals are often infringed by those in power. Such a view also effectively argues against any simple view of individuals as existing apart from society.

In all the above, it is clear that principles, values and empirical data are inextricably linked leading to different views of rights, virtues and concepts such as autonomy or coercion. Given this, three issues become essential to modern egalitarian debate: the status and relevance of morality; the use of empirical data; and the definition of equality. I will now examine important arguments supporting marginal egalitarians' conclusions in all three areas.

The Principle of Neutrality

In arguing for marginal equality there is no appeal to moral psychology, moral consensus or to any base principle other than freedom as relevant to all human beings. It is understandable that no weight is given to such evidence for the very status of moral knowledge is questionable in their eyes. This is so at least in the sense that no moral philosophy can be seen to have
necessary application to all humanity. To assert that would be, by implication, to assert that one moral view is better than that asserted by others. The basis of this position is what Ackermann terms the principle of neutrality:

'No reason is a good reason if it requires the powerholder to assert (a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens or (b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow citizens.' 28

Such a view of neutrality effectively destroys any conception of a common good that can be used as an overall purpose in social organization, for by definition, any moral purpose which is chosen as the aim of society is going to be perceived as superior to some individual's conception of the good. Hence, the assertion of one purpose as superior to any other, and the requirement that it be accepted becomes a form of coercion. Closely linked to this is the argument that any form of political activity, and thus distribution is coercive. 29

Several points must be made against this principle:

a) Just as the concept of liberty cannot be indefeasible, so it is not possible to have a morally neutral basis to social organization. Tawney clearly sees this in his argument for a moral context to liberty and in particular in his argument that principles, implicit or explicit underlie all social organization. 30 The implication of this argument is important, in that the principle of neutrality cannot thus be used as a blanket argument against egalitarian arguments. Once moral neutrality is denied, the argument shifts from a morally neutral position against a perfectionist to two opposing perfectionist arguments. The ultimate problem for
the marginal egalitarians is that moral neutrality and non-coercion are, in themselves, a moral position which form the basis of a social organization. Minimally, this principle requires that the state ensure that individuals are not coerced. However, it would require only one individual to demand that he or she retain responsibility for protection of their autonomy to make even a minimal state coercive. The logical end of this is to move to a purely evolutionary state. 31

b) All of this radically affects any view of morality or sin. A principle of neutrality radically questions the possibility of any moral dialogue, and of the development of moral meaning. Such a dialogue is possible under Ackermann's principle with individuals freely accepting other moral positions. However, the principle does not suggest what the basis of such a dialogue could be and suggests that a moral position could be rejected simply because it is claimed to be superior and not on the basis of any reasoning or failure of reasoning behind it. Such a principle then runs the danger of actually limiting moral dialogue and thus the development of moral meaning. As noted above, Tawney looks to the development of a society in which individuals could explore and develop moral meaning, developing bonds of trust sufficiently to question and test the principles behind social organization. Under this principle morality in the public realm becomes minimal and negative with sin confined to the concept of invading others negative rights. Tawney presents against this a far broader view of coercion in his interactive sociology.
and a clear view of how sin applies to the public realm and affects both individuals and the health of society. 33

Ironically, marginal egalitarians do advocate a positive morality in the private realm. 34 Such a morality, however, much like Rawls's equality of respect is seen as instrumental, in this case important for sustaining society and the market. 35

The problem for any marginal egalitarian is that under the principle of neutrality, it is hard to see how such values can actually be commended. Indeed, it is hard to see how any form of public health education or policy which implies a perfectionist stance can be justified.

c) In the light of the principle of neutrality and the absolute view of liberty, Tawney's criticisms of capitalism take on a more precise focus. As noted above, Tawney's condemnation of the profit motive and of capitalism in general ran the danger of being too simplistic, ignoring the potential of the market as a tool. 36

In fact, in looking to pin down the principles underlying capitalism he notes several elements which are implicit in the principle of neutrality, in particular the denial of other than individual morality, the denial of responsibility, and the denial of freedom: in the sense that social relations in industry, however coercive, do not matter. 37 Such elements described by Tawney as principles, do not make capitalists evil individuals. 38 Nor do they necessarily lead to evil results. 39 However, such principles will tend to limit awareness of others, and limit the focus and breadth of any decision making. In this, absence of positive consideration
of principles, quite apart from the claims of individuals involved in any decision will tend in turn to restrict options to those which fulfill strictly contractual obligations. Tawney's attacks could thus be re-formulated along lines such as these:

The absence of explicit consideration of major principles in institutional relationships or social organizations will tend to produce results which do not give equal respect to the members of such groups.

At first sight this might seem to lack the bite of Tawney's initial attacks, until that is, the flowers of such non-principle thistles that it targets, be examined, for example, excluding individuals from decision-making, from the development of fellowship in groups, or from service.

Such reformulated argument requires a high view of man, which will be considered below. In addition to this softer restatement of Tawney, it must also be noted that such exclusion of principles and claims has a stronger side to it in that it is precisely in such situations, where power is also concentrated, that sin does tend to flourish.

The theme of neutrality is important in marginal egalitarianism, and is partially an attempt, like Rawls's view of goodness as rationality, to find a non-controversial basis of morality. However, as Tawney clearly notes, such neutrality is neutral only to the status quo and excludes all broader considerations of balance or concern. From this, it becomes clear that the only acceptable basis of a 'neutral position' is a Christian view of equality of respect. The
problem, as shall be seen below, is how to develop a viable social organization from that.

**Empirical Data**

Alongside the principle of neutrality and an absolute concept of liberty, marginal egalitarians place great emphasis upon empirical data which demonstrates the bad consequences of equal distribution. 45

The use of such empirical data is in fact highly questionable. Firstly, it is often selective, ignoring 'hard cases.' 46 Secondly, as Tawney argued, there is simply no necessary connection between egalitarian methods and measures and, for example, the evils of totalitarianism. 47 Thirdly, as noted above, in a different context, the interpretation of any data takes place in some value context. 48 It is thus impossible to exclude principles and their perception from the interpretation. Moreover, such principles and perceptions may radically affect any general conclusion drawn from particular data.

Once these points are allowed, then the second great plank of marginal egalitarianism is taken away. For writers such as Friedman, Griffiths and Hayek, the use of empirical evidence depends upon it being viewed as objective, and upon the generalizable connection of certain data to particular forms of egalitarianism as being assumed.

Much of this argument is implied in Tawney's attack on Hayek's view of planning, which thus has far more force than Reisman will allow. 49
However, a far more demanding thesis has emerged from Gellner and Turner which from empirical data claims:

a) that inequality is inevitable, and that participatory democracy is not achievable, and

b) that a form of equality has already been achieved vitiating any need for egalitarian policies.

Here, empirical data is used to address egalitarian claims more directly, and without recourse to assumed causal connections. 50

Turner examines the evidence of small scale attempts at democracy, from utopian communities such as Owen's world village, to the kibbutz and finally to the attempt to create mass equality in Russia and China. The evidence for their success is not good. The smaller groups tend to either collapse following the death of a charismatic leader, or to revert over time to an authoritarian style of government. National attempts at equality do not in fact eradicate inequality in terms of income, prestige, or reward, now based upon bureaucratic power. 51 The sociological evidence, Turner argues, indicates therefore that inequality is inevitable. Some would argue that this is necessary for the functioning of society. Turner's thesis is slightly less forceful than this, arguing that inequality constantly reasserts itself over time and that this is contained by

'a natural sense of fairness and justice' in society. Thus, 'opposition, conflict and resistance to inequality seems as inevitable as inequality itself.' 52

In addition to this, Turner extends the thesis of Gellner, to the effect that modern industrial society has tended to bring about the realization of the egalitarian ideal, partly as a result of
the decline of old hierarchical structures and a weakening of the culture which in the past legitimated inequality. Contributing to this effect has been:

- increased social mobility
- a levelling of human experience and attitude through technology
- a greater division between home life and work, which has encouraged the development of the individual and a positive view of privacy
- the development of the mass media and the emergence of modern consumerism which has led to a decline in the traditional forms of cultural inequality
- the standardization of mass education, leading to uniformity in training, leading to uniformity in behaviour and socializing.

Turner extends the argument. Firstly, he suggests that modern consumerism has been liberating, both in making more goods accessible and in eroding the traditional hierarchies. Secondly, he argues strongly against the suggestions that modern consumerism has had a negative effect, either on attitudes or on culture. In fact, it is precisely the positive effects of modernism which lead to equalizing and which assisted the development of democracy.

This thesis is imposing. However, it ultimately fails, for the following reasons:

a) In the first part, Turner does not distinguish the various levels of inequality, lumping together the evidence of small groups which aimed at participatory equality and nations which aimed at equality of condition. More importantly, he does not consider the possibility of democratic organization which takes in both national and local organizations and thus cannot claim
from the available evidence that inequality is inevitable. In this is a more general point about the status of sociological evidence, ie. that whilst sociological data can demonstrate that some experiments in social organization have failed, and note the reasons, it cannot serve to generalize for all attempts at social organization - in this case participatory equality. Tawney's view precisely demands a link between all levels of society, so that no one power perspective dominates, and also demands a frequent review to evaluate developments. None of these elements are present in the experiments referred to by Turner. Significantly, building up a democratic process which includes the setting of objectives and reviews would actually provide mechanisms for the kind of development process which Turner describes. The process he describes however, is clearly haphazard and one which provides no opportunity for real development or learning.

b) On the second part of the thesis, there are again questions about the sociological evidence, its interpretation and about the meaning that Gellner and Turner place on equality or democracy. In a weak version of the thesis all it has to say is that old hierarchies are breaking down, and that this could facilitate the development of equality. However, both Gellner and Turner admit that in certain areas 'modernism' has led to the development and firming of some hierarchies. Equally, in considering evidence, they do not examine the present distribution of power. As a result, they are not in a position to say if there has actually been significant
broadening of areas in which individuals are able to participate in terms of decision making. Indeed, their own evidence would seem to militate against the development of such opportunities, and the whole concept of mass culture received by mass media would seem to go against the concept of a process involving participation in decision making. There is no doubt that the increased sharing of information by the mass media could lead to assisting the development of participatory equality. However, this depends upon how it is used and whether it aims to be part of an education or decision making process. What is clear, is that there is no firm evidence for a strong thesis that modernism has led to any meaningful relational equality.

Though this thesis is well argued it ultimately falls into the same difficulties as those outlined above. It does not examine different particular concepts of equality, and inquire how they have been or might be put into practice. It does not therefore give full weight to equality as a principle. Instead, it concentrates upon equality and inequality as social phenomenon. In doing this, two things occur. Firstly, the particular principle of equality espoused by Tawney is not addressed and therefore cannot be said to be affected - even if all the evidence were accepted. Secondly, the use of such sociological evidence runs the danger of once more limiting discussion, and in particular of making discussion of principles secondary. Tawney argued that sociology could not simply be about the accumulation of evidence but needed to articulate and discuss underlying principles.
Indeed, sociological evidence was of little use without a clear understanding of principles. The danger in using empirical data in the egalitarian debate is precisely that it will take precedence over discussion of principles, and judgements on feasibility of options be deemed to be judgements on the principle itself. Hence, Tawney argued for the primacy of principles and in his argument for equality balanced both deontological and consequential arguments.

The Concept of Equality

In support of empirical evidence and the principle of neutrality some marginal egalitarians question the very meaning and status of the concept of equality. Such arguments are basically stated by J.R. Lucas and J. Raz. Lucas argues that equality involves two major principles - the principle of formal equality or universalizability, and the principle of equality of respect or universal humanity. The first of these is distinguished from the argument for sameness and establishes little except that if two people are to be treated differently, there should be relevant differences between them.

The principle of equality of respect is perhaps more significant. However, argues Lucas, in this principle 'it is the word 'Respect' - respect for each man's humanity, respect for him as a human being - which is doing the logical work, while the word 'Equality' adds nothing to the argument and is altogether otiose.'

The rest of Lucas's paper argues that whilst both of these principles have an important part to play in politics, neither lead to the conclusion of full egalitarianism i.e. equality of
'Legality, Justice, Fairness, Equity, Humanity, all will on occasion produce a measure of Equality, but this measure is never exact, and they are none of them essentially egalitarian.' 61 Lucas concludes with an examination of the relationship between equality, fraternity and liberty. Whilst fraternity has important elements which overlap with equality of respect, Lucas argues that the two are contradictory. 62 Real fraternity demands that individuals be given freedom and are not forced into particular action. Liberty, he argues is about real choice: 'Equality lays down how we are to treat people; but liberty entitles us to act as we choose not as some rule lays down.' 63 Thus Lucas, having begun with what seemed to be a logical analysis of equality moves across to the basic libertarian argument that freedom is inherently unfair (ie. leads to inequalities) and if any value is to be placed upon the concept of freedom, then, 'we must to that extent compromise the principle of Equality.' 64 Raz frames a similar argument to Lucas, noting that, 'Principles of equality always depend on other principles determining the value of the benefits which the egalitarian principles regulate.' 65 Thus he distinguishes the concern for the hungry, needy and so on, as the relevant underlying principle, there being no 'independent evil of inequality.' 66 Raz then develops the argument by distinguishing between diminishing satiable principles and non-diminishing insatiable ones. The former require that the demands of the principles can be completely met. Once they are met, for example, in the case of reducing hunger, then the reason for distribution diminishes. Such principles are precisely independent of, and do not require equality. The second kind of principle can, by definition, never
be satisfied and is identified by Raz with the utilitarian principle of maximizing the net amount of pleasure for all. Such a principle could never act as the basis of equality precisely because it provides grounds for resolving conflicting demands. The maximizing of pleasure principle provides equal reason for all demands to be met and thus would tolerate extreme inequalities. 67 Equality can therefore not exist with either kind of principle being based upon pre-suppositions which are either irrelevant to it or contradictory.

A good deal of Lucas's argument hangs upon two elements, a) his characterization of real egalitarianism and b) his analysis of the principle of equality. In the first of these, Lucas views egalitarianism as a position which demands identity of treatment and which therefore leads to uniformity. However, as noted above, this is an arbitrary perception of egalitarianism and cannot be used fairly in an argument against all forms of egalitarian theory. 68 Tawney explicitly accepts relative equality in terms of income, and equal provision in terms of welfare services which in itself demands a relevant and thus unequal response to individuals and their needs.

Lucas's analysis of the principles of equality is more subtle, but in the end equally unsatisfactory. Formal equality certainly is problematic. By definition it does not say a great deal about justice or questions of distribution. Hence Rawls argued for the real meaning of equality as coming from a separately held principle of distributive justice. Equality of respect, however, is a far more difficult concept to analyse. Firstly, whilst Lucas is right that the concept cannot rest upon the argument from
sameness, i.e. that all men are equal, it does involve some recognition of equal worth. Equality of respect is not then simply a principle of humanity i.e. expressing an attitude of concern to all persons, it also recognizes that all human beings have equal worth regardless of their status, position, wealth etc. In this concept of equal worth, central to Tawney's equality, the term equality directly informs the concept as a whole for it excludes the possibility of treating individuals as though they were not equally worthy and so points both to a sense in which all human beings are or should be treated as equals, and yet as also quite uniquely important. 69

The term equality by itself, has no clear meaning, as Tawney himself admits, 70 but this does not make the term otiose. The term is given relevance and meaning in context i.e. in the light of what equality is referred to. 71 In Tawney's case this is a relational equality which cannot be contained simply in either the concept of formal equality or the principle of humanity, but rather, as noted above, involving aspects of both. 72 In its Christian form this attitude of commitment is far stronger than, for example, simply equal consideration of interests, being the development of the individual. 73

Secondly, just as Lucas's first argument finds it hard to cope with concepts or principles which do not fit neatly into formal or attitudinal logic, his second involves a categorical slight of hand, turning equality into an absolute principle. He begins by viewing liberty as an absolute, not formal principle. The difference between the two is clear. Liberty as a formal principle would simply lay down that all men should be free. As a
formal principle this is unexceptionable. Liberty as an absolute principle is expressed by Lucas as entitling human beings to act as they choose. This principle is far more precise, no longer formal and yet still it seems applies to all and in all situations - hence I refer to it as absolute. As an absolute principle, liberty is then put up against equality. Significantly, however, the form of equality which Lucas chooses to put up against liberty is another absolute principle. Hence, he argues that if we are to place any value on freedom, the principle of equality must be 'compromised.' To use this argument as a blanket argument 'Against Equality' is therefore quite unsatisfactory, once again arbitrarily restricting the concept of equality.

Raz's argument, despite its developments has similar problems to Lucas. Firstly, the distinction between diminishing satiable principles and non-diminishing and insatiable principles is at best contentious. His prime example to distinguish the two is, 'Everyone should have as much pleasure as they can enjoy' (non diminishing, insatiable) compared to 'Everyone's needs should be met,' (diminishing and satiable). However, the validity of the distinction depends entirely upon how one defines the terms in each principle, and what status one accords to the principle. Thus, for example, seen in a formal sense, the second of these principles is certainly diminishing and satiable. However, the term 'needs' is open to many meanings and could logically refer to needs which whilst felt, could never be fully met, for example, psychological needs.
Secondly, and connected with the first point, any such principle depends in itself upon both the context i.e. in this case defining needs and which are acceptable ones and which should be met by the state, and upon some other reason to explain why the needs should be met. We are then forced to return to the concept of equal worth and respect. Thus, as with the discussion of Rawls in the previous chapter, there is need for perfectionism and equality of respect such as Tawney's.

For all these arguments self-determination becomes the basic moral principle. On the one hand, this acts as a perfectionist base. On the other hand it is an insufficient perfectionist base, precisely because it is both defeasible and has insufficient data.

Two final points may be noted here. Firstly, Raz's argument depends upon the distinction between diminishing and satiable and non-diminishing and insatiable principles. The latter is basically a utilitarian principle. Tawney, however, clearly argues against utilitarianism as being the foundation for equality. Primary to such considerations is equality of concern for all individuals. 75 It is precisely such an attitude and any sense of relational equality, that Raz's argument fails to recognize.

Secondly, and connected to the previous point, it must be noted that the characterization of equality as an absolute principle is vitally necessary to the libertarian arguments. It is not simply a case of mistaking or ignoring egalitarian arguments which do not refer to absolute equality. 76 Only if equality is seen in that light is it possible to maintain an absolute view of liberty. All that is required to undermine the marginal
egalitarian position then, is to demonstrate that such a view is arbitrary.

**Conclusion**

Taken as a whole, Tawney's view of equality has an important contribution to make to modern egalitarian debate. It stands out against Rawlsian and marginal egalitarians, posing serious questions about their view of morality or neutrality, their definition of principles, their view of psychology and sociology and their use of empirical data. Working from his view, it has become clear that self-interest is not an adequate basis for a moral position, and that an adequate view of equality requires some form of unconditional equal worth and of perfectionism.

Tawney's approach to equality in fact begins to break through what had become a sterile debate. It questions the claims of both groups in finding 'objective' criteria to judge between views of equality. The very term 'objective' assumes shared meaning as the basis of significant criteria. However, with respect to equality, the meanings offered by, for example, Rawls and Nozick are so different, with justification tied closely to the meaning, that no such shared meaning is possible. The term 'objective' also assumes some rational point of reference which can be arrived at independently of individual or group interpretation. However, as noted in Tawney's view of human nature, personal qualities, mental characteristics, sinfulness, group identity, relative positions of power and so on, all influence the interpretation of any data, rational argument, or view of principles.

All of this rules out any essentialism with respect to equality,
restricting it to simply a philosophical concept, or restricting data or options. It also demands developments in methods of justification. As we have seen, Tawney's Christian view of equality provides the basis and framework for such developments, with a cumulative case which involves more convincing views of society, the individual, moral principles and empirical data. However, as noted above, this position requires further developments both in theory and practice and these will be considered in the final chapter.
Chapter 9 Conclusions

The analysis of Tawney's equality, brought together into a systematic presentation from his writings, has revealed a concept which is complex and rich. As such, despite difficulties which require modification or developments, Tawney's equality has a great deal to contribute, both to the theology of equality and to any secular views.

In the final chapter, I will attempt to sum up this contribution and indicate the important areas of future research and development.

Tawney, of course, was not a theologian, and was uneasy with theology as a discipline. As noted above, he can be criticised for the lack of any eschatological element, running the danger of seeing policies as not provisional. He also lacks an explicit creationist theology to support distributional equality.

There are, too, within Tawney's view great tensions between order and self-determination, and fellowship and freedom, which are not totally resolved. A more systematically worked out, explicit theology of equality is therefore a necessary development of Tawney's position, both to answer these criticisms and to sustain the debate with the marginal egalitarians noted above.

Tawney's equality provides the framework for such a development. Central to this, is the way in which Tawney details the relationship between equality of respect, fellowship, freedom and participatory and distributional equality. This demonstrates both that any theology of equality involves more than simply juxtaposing the principles of equality and fraternity and that
any so called middle level principles have very precise, often complex relationships. This provides a framework for synthesizing the various doctrines underlying any theology of equality. Such doctrines were detailed by Macquarrie as the Incarnation, through which God bestows equal value on all; the doctrine of sin, often used as the basis for participatory equality; the doctrine of creation pointing to ontological equality; and the doctrine of the Church which focuses on relational equality in fellowship. Initial analysis of these doctrines reveals possible conflict, for the doctrines point to different kinds of equality which could be contradictory.

Much depends upon the statement of particular doctrines which themselves contain possible tensions, for example, between order and self-determination in the doctrine of the Church. All this underlines the need for synthesis, but also notes that some of the tensions referred to in Tawney's equality are inherent in the doctrines underlying the theology of equality itself.

The following is a brief indication of how a more systematic theology might develop.

Tawney's balance of principles would indicate a theology of equality with the Incarnation as the basic doctrine. Alongside this, the doctrines of creation and man come together to offer a Christian view of freedom, whilst the doctrine of the Church provides the foundation of fellowship. These last three doctrines provide the important link to participatory, distribu-
tional, and relational equality, all viewed as an expression of equality of respect.
The Incarnation

The doctrine of the Incarnation functions in several ways for equality:

a) As the ultimate example of love, it provides the basis for an agapaic view of equality of respect. As such, equality of respect becomes the basic moral principle, not one amongst many.

b) Such a view of equality of respect takes equality out of any simple philosophical categories, not least because it involves an ultimate attitude of concern for the individual.

c) The inclusiveness of this concern makes it relevant to individuals in all situations, alone or in groups, throughout society, and involves a concern for the individual to realize their full potential. Such potential would ultimately only be fully realized in relation to God.

This provides the ground, firstly, for theology and the Church to be concerned with society and social organization. In this view, the development of a 'common culture' involves spiritual and social development. Secondly, equal respect generates the twin principles of freedom and fellowship. These provide the necessary conditions for self-realization, self-determination and service, involving obligations to self and others, recognizing man as a social and moral being. Equality, in the sense of equalizing measures, then becomes an instrumental principle, its aim to enable freedom and fellowship. Hence, distributional and participatory equality are not seen as ends in themselves but as expressions of equality of respect, and as such, once again, involve relational equality and the development of relationships.
Equality of respect thus serves to generate various other principles, and remains a necessary base for holding together the potentially contradictory principles thus generated. All this militates against any principle being viewed in isolation or as an absolute, and looks to participatory and distributional equality as operative principles. One of Tawney’s important contributions to the theology of equality is precisely his argument for seeing equality as an operative principle applying to all society, and as involving substantive policy proposals. Moreover, even at this stage there is a demand for a process whereby the various principles and objectives can all be explicitly handled in social organization, and monitored.

Creation

Whilst Tawney has no explicit creationist theology, he does have an implicit doctrine of man as co-creator. This is strongly seen in the high view of Man’s nature and potential. The doctrine of creation in this light moves away from its static use of justification for distribution, and takes on a dynamic form, involving man’s role and therefore participation in creation. As co-creator, man requires freedom to create. Such freedom involves self-determination, and the acceptance of responsibility and risk. Responsibility includes responsibility to God, and for the created order including other human beings, as well as for one’s own actions and development. As Hull writes, Christ deepens this view, challenging individuals to, 'become creative participants in their own development and in the task of understanding and changing the world.'

The activity of creation involves the whole person, and the
material of creation is spiritual, social and physical. The whole person involves man as a spiritual, social, moral being, bearer of attitudes and values, focus of relationships and obligations.  

To respect the individual as co-creator is therefore to enable him or her to exercise their creativity from principles, consciously determined, to practice. This specifically involves:-

a) providing opportunities for involvement in decisions and activities in communities and situations of which an individual is a part.  

b) enabling the individual to discuss and determine underlying principles and purposes which may be involved in such decision making, as well as allowing consultation on options and policies.  

c) enabling the individual to develop the virtues, personal qualities, mental characteristics and all such skills necessary for the activity of creation, both in making decisions and in putting them into practice.

Implicit in all this is the social nature of decision-making, and the need to broaden democracy into all parts of life.  

Indeed, it could be argued that creativity is assisted by group consultation and discussions, precisely because it ensures that a broad range of principles is discussed, and helps to develop awareness and tolerance of co-creators.  

As co-creators, individuals or groups take on the creative activity of God, in healing and challenging, in building and rebuilding communities, and in enabling individuals to grow and become whole. Besides this social and spiritual dimension,
property and material resources are seen as part of the material for creation. As noted, Tawney saw property as power for service, emphasizing its functional nature. However, the concept of co-creation is superior to function. Firstly, it maintains a balance between self-determination and concern for others, whereas function's emphasis upon service to an overriding purpose runs the danger of denying self-determination. Secondly, co-creation looks to enabling the individual to fulfill a particular task of creation and thus avoids the possible clash between unconditional worth and conditional worth i.e. where function becomes the sole basis for distribution. 29

The concept of man as co-creator provides strong basis for participatory and distributional equality, viewing both as enabling the group or individual to create. This also gives greater meaning to the concept of equality of respect outlined above, for respect for man as co-creator demands an empowering of individuals and groups for co-action. In terms of participatory equality, the consequential arguments used in its support by Mill and others, have much less force. 30 It also has greater force than Niebuhr's argument for democracy, which, noting the element of good and evil in all men, argues that each individual was good enough to be given some responsibility, but not of sufficient quality as to have dominion over his fellows. 31

None of this could be said to encourage dependence but rather responsibility and acceptance of risk. Equally, it broadens any concept of self-determination, for without full consideration of principles and some responsibility in the practice of decision making, it is difficult to see how the concept 'determination'
can have any meaning. Such a concept of self-determination clearly involves some challenge to the individual, in terms of taking responsibility and considering all the principles and interests involved. However, a challenge per se is no more coercive or paternalistic than measures which empower individuals or groups to achieve self-determination.

The concept of co-creator picks up so much of Tawney's contribution to a theology of equality, especially his interpretation of equality of respect and participatory and distributional equality. At the same time, it modifies the difficult concept of function. It stresses equality of freedom to create, denial of this equality being a denial of real freedom. Furthermore, it sharpens Tawney's case for equality as an operative principle, for an equality such as that outlined above, has to be clearly set down in practice in order to differentiate it from egalitarian policies which are either ends in themselves or are not related in the same way to other principles.

None of this requires that a statement of policy should be seen as the denial of its provisional nature. Also any application of such equality will demand sensitivity, with awareness of the need to clarify questions of roles, relationships and efficiency, especially with regard to participatory equality.

As noted above, the dark side of man provides a further negative reason why power should be dispersed. This parallels Niebuhr's argument for democracy, and arguments for participatory equality based upon equal ignorance.
Apart from providing grounds for dispersion of power and shared and improved accountability and responsibility, the doctrine of sin is a further ground for a process of comprehensive decision making in participatory equality, in which principles are discussed and where there is opportunity to reflect upon and modify practice. Central to such a process would be the acceptance of different points of view, as openness to development, the acceptance of failure, and the experience of forgiveness. It is precisely this forgiveness which is lacking in a pluralist society and which is central to the Christian view of equality. There are, of course, many questions as to how forgiveness could be part of an operative principle of equality. However, minimally, it points to the development of an environment in which trust can be encouraged and developed, and this leads to a consideration of the doctrine of the Church.

The Church

Tawney has no clear doctrine of the Church and his view of community does betray ambiguities. However, the strongest view of community in his writings is one which is inclusive, with members holding mutual respect and aiming to serve society as a whole, as well as their own interests.

In one sense, a clear mark of respect is the practice of distributional and participatory equality. This in itself, enables freedom in the sense of the development of the individual as co-creator, and involves the development of trust. This underlines the important point that ethos and attitude are a crucial element of the enabling process. Thus just as the Christian view of equality of respect brought the concept equality out of
philosophical confines, participatory and distributional
equality must involve more than simply plans for efficient
distribution and reasonable participation. Drucker was quite
right that one cannot distribute an attitude i.e., equality of
respect. However, any equalizing measure is ultimately the
expression of an attitude and as such, the manner of distribution
should reflect the attitude. Thus, no distributional equality
should imply any exclusion or judgement of unequal worth.
Where selective distribution is necessary, it should be speci-
fically enabling, supporting and affirming individuals and groups.
Community or fellowship, would also provide the context of trust
within which individuals can safely be challenged to examine and
explore moral meaning in terms of their roles and responsibilities.
Discovery of such moral meaning is important in itself, in the
development of self-respect and is thus a further element in
the development of freedom. The very concept of discovery and
the background of man's sinful nature pre-supposes a community
which involves a continuous process of discovery, one which in
a sense is provisional. Once again, if such relational equality
in community is to be realized, it requires to be operative, in
the sense of clear proposals, and to have adequate monitoring.
In his view of community then, Tawney points up several of the
central themes of Christian community; community as inclusive;
community as pilgrim; community serving; and community as the
centre of empowering and as the basis for relational equality.
Thus, rather than simply using the doctrine of the Church as the
focus of relational equality, Tawney extends these marks of
koinonia into an operative view of equality, and this may be
developed to demonstrate how such relational equality ties in with participatory and distributional equality.

The above is only a brief indication of how Tawney's work provided a framework for a theology of equality, and how it might be developed. It may be said that Tawney's ultimate contribution was precisely in his comprehensiveness. His work provides the grounds for establishing equality of respect as the basic moral principle, whose Christian understanding pervades any egalitarian measures. This principle generates and informs fellowship and freedom, and participatory and distributional equality. All of these principles are seen to be integrated, with the last two as instrumental, operative and relative. This provides a framework for integrating the various doctrines underlying any theology of equality. In all this, Tawney is both idealist and realist, recognizing both the spiritual and sinful nature of man. Given such a complex view of equality, it also guards against any absolute view of the concept.

Tawney's contribution was, as noted, wider than this, taking in the philosophy of equality in general. Tawney's Christian view of equality was seen to be quite distinctive from major secular views and to rest upon a far more convincing cumulative case, balancing both deontological and consequential arguments. This case, which involved equality of respect, perfectionism, and a more convincing view of humanity, demonstrated the inadequacy of attempts to base a view of equality on moral neutrality or upon rational self-interest. Such grounds were equally inadequate in providing a link between participatory and distri-
butional equality.

Tawney's contribution was also important in trying to form links with humanist views of equality, though given his complex and distinctive view of equality, it is clear that his use of equality cannot be confined to the middle-axiom method. The moral base of Tawney's Christian view of equality and development of it demands a particular view of equality of respect and distinctive models of participatory and distributional equality. Thus, a major thrust of any outreach work involves convincing others of that particular view of equality. This involves accepting the total framework and not simply broad egalitarian objectives. 48

There have been, of course, many criticisms of Tawney's equality. Some of these have been answered above, 49 others require developments or modifications such as suggested in the theological outline above. 50 Other criticisms centre on the practical development of Tawney's view of equality. These difficulties may be detailed as follows:-

a) attempting to balance participatory, distributional, and relational equality, whilst at the same time accepting the provisional nature of any policies is, in practice, too difficult to achieve. It could lead, for example, to conflict between central distribution, necessary for essential goods and for a sense of equity, and local autonomy which may lead to wide differences of income in different areas.

b) problems may arise between the development of social unity and common ends, and a participatory equality which demands
an element of self-determination. Central to such a problem would be how to define and sustain social purpose.

c) a further practical problem is whether distributional equality would lead to dependency, having the opposite effect intended by Tawney. 51

Such criticisms do not, as such, damage Tawney's view of equality, for practical difficulties cannot as such, invalidate a principle. Nonetheless, they do point to basic tensions existing in the view of equality, both at conceptual and practical levels. The presence of such tensions, however, is not in itself a criticism, for the moral base of the Christian view of equality precisely demands that several potentially contradictory factors, freedom and fellowship, distributional and participatory equality are held together. Herein lies the core of Tawney's view of provisionality. It is moral and social, not eschatological, for the different elements, self and other, self-determination and subordination, can never be balanced with complete satisfaction. By definition, there could be no conceptual or practical resolution of the tensions which could apply to all situations or at all times. What is required, apart from a conceptual framework such as outlined above, is the development of detailed models which would demonstrate how the elements can be held together. Despite the comprehensiveness of Tawney's view of equality, it is in such detail that he falls short. He does not, for example, provide the details of the democratic experiments he urges on industry, confining himself to elements of constitution-making. Nor does he demonstrate in detail how distributional equality
and fellowship might be integrated more closely. In the development of a theology of equality, it also becomes necessary to give detailed models of how participatory equality can provide a challenge which avoids dependence upon distributional equality.

Such models as these would be an important development of the argument against the marginal egalitarians, used as demonstrations against the accusation of paternalism. They would also involve an important development of Tawney's own stress on operative equality and provisionality. They would also be necessary if theology is to address society clearly on equality. Hence, a great deal of further research is required in developing models of equality which show how the various elements can be balanced in practice.

I will confine myself at this point to simply suggesting a few areas in which such models could be developed. The first area is industry. The above theology would suggest that work is not simply a vocation, providing the basis for improved distribution of such opportunities, but also a community. Meaning, in the work situation, would therefore be as much a function of fellowship and service, within and beyond the industry, as one of fulfilling particular work tasks. Research would need to indicate both how work might feasibly and better be distributed, but also how participatory and relational equality might be achieved, without losing efficiency, and fully enabling individuals to create. Several points are worth noting about the development of such models. Firstly, methods would have to be researched which ensured that the full range of principles
and interests were discussed in decision making. Secondly, a national framework within which such models could be developed would have to be worked out ensuring a balanced relationship between central government and local groups. However well the industries may relate to society an overall framework would be necessary to plan for freedom, ensuring, for instance, that industry did enable participation. Thirdly, there are already many empirical examples or models of participatory equality such as pyramid democracy, annual participatory reviews (fixing ethos and major aims), worker directors, consumer representation, which demonstrate that participatory equality can work, and which can be refined to enable individuals to participate fully in co-creation. Fourthly, there are no a priori reasons why greater involvement in the decision-making process should clash with the roles and responsibilities of individual executives, providing expectations and accountability was clear. Fithly, there are important additional consequential arguments which would support such models. The operation of such models would both increase commitment to the industry and its purposes, and involve the development of stated purposes and the forming of a consensus. Thus, the difficulty of imposing purposes would be avoided. Such methods would help individuals and groups to explore moral meaning both within an industry and in relation to the community in general, facilitating the development of fellowship and trust and education in participation. Finally, such participation could have a direct effect upon distribution, narrowing the range. Properly set up, they would
lead to the affirmation of individual members in their roles, with emphasis upon distribution as enabling. In this context, it would be difficult to achieve wide differences in pay, and non-financial rewards could be developed.

A second area which would require development would be political equality. Tawney simply accepted that parliamentary democracy had achieved political equality. However, in the light of Tawney's own view of equality, it is not clear that it has been achieved. With few political parties dominating politics, and providing a limited range of policy options, little systematic opportunity to discuss issues, for example, in elections, and accountability of elected representatives more to parties than to people, there is a case for describing this as a 'pseudo-democracy.'

Several ways of improving this situation should be examined, from referenda to proportional representation. However, perhaps more importantly, given the view of community above, the role of intermediary associations should be examined to see how they can facilitate greater discussion and communication of ideas, and how they could relate to the community in general. Intermediate associations are often recommended to be strengthened, yet few detailed models are actually suggested. Intermediate associations, can, of course, have several functions, from developing a separation of powers from central government to supporting the meaningful structure of the status quo. It is all the more important then that detailed models of how intermediate associations can enable co-creation in and with society should be developed.

As with industrial democracy, this is not an exhaustive consideration of areas of research, but a brief view
of areas in political democracy and methods which might be considered in researching possible models.

Another area of important research would be in examining how distribution of benefits, health care, and social services should take place. This refers to the humanizing of distribution, referred to above, such that individuals and groups are affirmed in their self-esteem both as an individual and in their roles and relationships. Besides minimizing means-testing and targeting the roles of carers, this could involve measures from humanizing the point of distribution, to providing human resources to assist individuals in working through the meaning of their roles and relationships, and helping them to develop the related skills. Such support helps individuals to explore and develop moral meaning and empowers them to develop and sustain their roles.

These are simply some ways of moving away from a consumer model of distribution to a community model which would be concerned to enable the individual and groups to develop as co-creators. Again, more empirical work should be pursued to monitor the effect of such 'humanizing.'

These have been only three areas in which models of a complex equality could be developed, stressing the development of community and the enabling of co-creators. Such models themselves would require testing and any necessary modification.

Thus far, developments have been noted in two levels of justification, in the theology at the base of deontological arguments, and in the development of models to strengthen the consequentialist
arguments. However, in any confirmatory justification, there was also the element of 'considered convictions' which, it was argued, were supporters of particular views. As noted above, the idea of 'considered convictions' has many problems, and its status and possible function is not always clear even in justificatory terms. However, the development of egalitarian community building, outlined above, does provide the framework within which convictions can be reflected upon, developed, and communicated. We could, of course, not presume to know precisely the content of such convictions, especially if a dynamic process is enabling them to develop. Thus, they could not be used in a simplistic way as confirmation of a particular view of equality. However, it is safe to say that given the development of such an environment, it is unlikely that convictions would involve an absolute view of any principles, and that such convictions would tend to stress the need to develop the common 'bonds of civilization.'

In all this, Tawney does not demonstrate any intermediate strategies for social change, such as Holman's use of intermediary associations as both liberating and prophetic. Such models would also need to be examined and empirical evidence collected. For Tawney, social change was perhaps seen in grander perspectives, involving political planning, with the fundamental principles of equality at its base. As such, he saw the importance of both planning for freedom, but also convincing society that freedom was based in equality, equality of respect, and related, distributional and participatory equality.

There are, of course, parallels with liberation theology, with its
stress on liberation, conscientization, and the importance of social analysis and of developing and deepening traditional theological views. The theology of equality, however, ultimately has a broader perspective. It is not confined to a Marxist analysis of society or history, and does not run the danger of association with particular group interest, precisely because of its balance of freedom and fellowship, of responsibilities with rights. Tawney's equality ultimately looks to planning a framework within which learning and development can take place as part of the 'tissue' of life, whereas liberation theology views learning and development as necessary for social change. Whatever their differences, however, both see an important part for the Church in bringing about change, both in developing awareness of principles and of social conditions.

In writing about equality, Tawney was concerned not simply to re-establish equality as a major principle and policy objective, but to establish a particular view of equality. Such a view was seen to be distinct from his contemporaries and from major modern views of equality. The influence of Tawney's view was seen to be considerable, both in the Church and in social policy. However, even in writers closely associated with Tawney, such as Townsend and Titmuss, the richness and complexity of Tawney's view is not fully taken up. There are no doubt many reasons for this which will vary from writer to writer, ranging from differences in basic views of morality, to simple selectivity or ignorance of Tawney's total view of equality. None of this is helped by Tawney's lack of systematic treatment of the concept, or by the many claims upon different meanings of the term, which has led
some commentators to argue that the concept of equality no longer has a meaningful use in theology or politics. This in turn, may account for the lack of any substantial treatment of equality in theological circles over the last quarter of a century. It is my hope that this thesis will contribute to a clear view of the full complexity of the concept of equality in Tawney's writing. In so doing, I further hope to have established the importance of the concept of equality both to theology and to social policy. Finally, I would hope that this thesis might go somewhere towards filling the gap in the theological treatment of equality, establishing the need to maintain and develop the concept at the level of theory and practice.
Abbreviations Of Titles Used In The Notes

R.H. Tawney

A.O.P. 'The Attack and Other Papers'
A.S. 'The Aquisitive Society'
C.B. 'The Commonplace Book'
C.C.S. 'Church, Community and State In Relation To The Economic Order'
C.W.O. 'Christianity and World Order'
E. 'Equality'
E.S.P. 'Education, The Socialist Policy'
R.T. 'Radical Tradition'

R.M. Titmuss

C.W. 'Commitment To Welfare'
E.W.S. 'Essays on The "Welfare State"
G.R. 'The Gift Relationship'
H.S.T. 'The Health Service in Tanganyika'
P.W. 'Philosophy of Welfare'
S.P. 'Social Policy'

R. Preston

C.S.L.T.C. 'Church and Society In The Late Twentieth Century'
F.C.E. 'The Future of Christian Ethics'
R.P.C. 'Religion And The Persistence of Capitalism'
P. Townsend
P.U.K. 'Poverty In The United Kingdom'
S.S.P. 'Sociology and Social Policy'

W. Temple
C.S.O. 'Christianity And Social Order'
E.C.P. 'Essays In Christian Politics'

J. Atherton
F.N. 'Faith In The Nation'
R.H.T.C.S.M. 'R.H. Tawney As A Christian Social Moralist'

E.F. Schumacher
G.W. 'Good Work'
S.B. 'Small Is Beautiful'

Others
F.S. 'The Future of Socialism' - A. Crosland
G.S.R. 'Guild Socialism Restated' - G.H.D. Cole
Notes

Chapter 1  
Tawney's Theory of Equality

1. 'Equality and Excellence' p. 208  D. Jenkins
2. Ibid. cf. also S. Lakoff, 'Equality in Political Philosophy' p. 4
5. 'Whatever Happened to Equality?' p. 39
9. Ryan p. 200
11. Commonplace Book p. 66, 78; cf. also Terrill p. 31ff.
12. Commonplace Book p. 32
13. Preston, R.P.C. p. 87
14. D. Riesman, 'State and Welfare' p. 130
17. 'Equality' p. 92
18. 'Equalities' p. 150
20. There have been some important small studies eg. F. Cope and M. Davies 'An Exploration into Equality' Crucible, July-September, 1931, or R. Bowlby 'Is There a Theology of Equality?' The Modern Churchman, New Series, Vol. XXVI, No.


24. R. Terrill, 'R.H.Tawney and his Times, Socialism as Fellowship'; A. Wright, R.H.Tawney


27. ibid. p. 133
28. ibid p. 20ff
29. ibid p. 30
31. 'The Attack' p. 183
32. 'Equality' p. 122
33. ibid p. 52
34. C.B. p. 65
35. 'Attack' p. 170, C.B. p. 37; Poverty as an Industrial Problem; Equality p. 50
36. 'Equality' p. 71, 72
37. Rae p. 83
38. ibid p. 85ff.
39. 'Equality' p. 52; 'Education, A Socialist Policy' p. 6
41. 'Equality' p. 81
42. ibid p. 86
43. ibid p. 50; cf. p. 113
44. 'Attack' and Other Papers' p. 183; 'Equality' p. 48,9.
45. E.T.S.P. p. 5. The development of the individual personality included a concern for excellence in education.
46. Rae p. 92
47. ibid
48. B. Ackermann, 'Social Justice in the Liberal State'; p. 11
49. R. Nozick, 'Anarchy, State and Utopia' p. 28-35 on side-constraints against intrusion.
50. M. Friedman, 'Capitalism and Freedom', p. 201
51. Rae p. 53
52. C.B. p. 70
cf. J. Atherton, 'R.H. Tawney as a Christian Social Moralist.' Atherton argues that the basis of Tawney's faith was 'moral' not 'intellectual' and that he saw Christianity not in theological terms, but as a way of life. For further consideration of this theme, see chapter two.

C.B. p. 67; cf. 'Radical Tradition' p. 168

C.B. p. 25

ibid p. 17

C.B. pp. 30, 56, 66; 'Religion and The Rise of Capitalism' p. 275; 'We Mean Freedom' from A.O.P. p. 91

'Equality' p. 49, 50; cf. H.M. Drucker 'Doctrines and Ethos In the Labour Party' p. 53

'Equality' p. 87

C.B. p. 41, 54, 56, 57

e.g. accepting the skill of the industrial expert, 'Equality' p. 180; cf. also p. 108

Accepting the overall moral purpose of society, 'The Aquisitive Society' p. 163


See chapter seven

'Equality' p. 49, 50

cf. Feinberg p. 89, 90

C.B. p. 68; cf 'Equality' p. 87

'Equality' pp 49, 39 respectively

'Equality' p. 46, 81; cf. C.B. p. 18 where Tawney refers to the social problem as not one 'of the amount of wealth, but of the moral justice of your social system.'

'Equality' p. 85; cf. C.B. p. 85

'Equality' p. 164

'Equality' p. 85

This potential involved the whole of ones being, spiritual, intellectual, as a social and moral person. See chapter two for further details.

'Equality' p. 113; cf. 'The Attack' p. 191, R.T. p. 176

'Equality' p. 164ff.

A.O.P. p. 186

C.B. p. 41

cf. W. Temple, 'Christianity and Social Order' p. 79
80. A.O.P. p. 91-, Chicago Lectures, L.S.E. 16/1
81. cf. A.O.P. p. 189 , A.S. p. 32
82. C.B. p. 40, 41
83. R.T. p. 84
84. E.T.S.P. p.22; cf. p.4
85. C.B. p. 47
86. A.O.P. p. 184; cf. C.B. p. 41
87. cf. Reisman p. 41
88. R.T. p. 103; cf. p. 159. In the latter, freedom is referred to not as a possession to be defended but 'a goal to be achieved.'
89. A.O.P. p. 83; cf. R.T. p. 176
90. E. p. 227
91. cf. Beveridge's 'devices' in 'Full Employment in a Free Society' p. 23
92. E. p. 85
93. E. p. 228
94. C.B. p. 22, 34
95. E. p. 228, C.B. p. 34
96. E. p. 159; A.O.P. p. 174
97. A.O.P. p. 174
98. C.B. p. 34
99. C.B. p. 41
100. A.S. p. 140
101. C.B. pp. 34, 51, 55
102. C.B. p. 41
103. E. p. 228, cf. p. 106
104. C.B. p. 54, 55
105. C.B. p. 56ff
106. E.T.S.P. p. 22; cf. C.B. p. 56; A.S. p. 34
107. E. p. 235; cf. A.O.P. p. 54
108. A.O.P. p. 97; E. p. 55, 56
110. R.T. p. 177
111. Negative freedom is often characterized as 'freedom from'; cf. I. Berlin 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in Political Philosophy ed. A. Quinton pp 141-153
112. Matthew chapter 22 v. 39
113. C.B. p. 56, 57
114. C.B. p. 57
115. See below
116. E. p. 164. See below, however, on relative equality
117. E. p. 168
118. E. p. 136
119. C.B. p. 14
120. cf. Rae p. 99 ff.
121. C.B. p. 31, 32, 56
122. E. p. 55
123. C.B. p. 47
124. C.B. p. 40, 41
125. A.O.P. p. 184
126. cf. Terrill p. 214
127. cf. Morris, 'A Dream of John Ball' p. 51
128. In fact for Tawney, both principles have the moral balance of concern - freedom as control, and to serve; fellowship as necessary for development, and involving service beyond identified communities.
129. See above on individual regarding equality
130. Fabian Society Dinner, 15th May 1954, Speeches on Various Occasions; cf. also R.T. p. 185; A.O.P. p. 190
131. Terrill p. 216
132. C.B. p. 24; cf. A.S. and the emphasis upon serving a social purpose and the professional ethic with reference to service.
133. C.B. p. 41, 61
134. cf. the article on Community by R. Preston - 'Dictionary of Pastoral Studies' ed. A. Campbell
135. Though the church may also be included in this cf. A.O.P. p. 168. cf. also 'Democracy and Mediating Structures' ed. M. Novak.
136. This will be further examined in the last chapters.
137. D. Emmett, 'The Moral Prism' p. 6
138. ibid
139. cf. C.B. p. 56, 57
140. ibid
141. See the final chapters for a development of this point.
145. Terrill p. 67
146. E. p. 150
147. C.B. p. 54; E. p. 113
149. A.O.P. p. 85 where Tawney cites the example of the concept of freedom being used by self-interest simply to defend the status quo.
150. Gutmann, p. 83; Terrill p. 161, 162
152. R.T. p. 83, 4, refers to education as a process 'by which we...become partners in a universe of interests which we share with our fellow men.'
154. cf. Reisman p. 38
155. C.B. p. 31
156. ibid
157. C.B. p. 18
158. A.S. p. 32; C.B. p. 46, 47
159. C.B. p. 25
160. A.O.P. p. 189
161. A.O.P. p. 189
162. C.B. p. 25
163. See below on the strategy of equality
164. C.B. p. 59
165. A.O.P. p. 91
166. A.O.P. p. 191; cf. E. p. 81
167. C.B. p. 60
168. cf. C.B. p. 15 on sin. See also chapter 2
169. C.B. p. 14, 59, 60
170. R.T. p. 83; A.S. p. 179
171. A.S. p. 189; A.O.P. p. 55
174. ibid
175. C.B. p. 45; cf. Ratatan Foundation Lecture, 1913
176. C.B. p. 37, 52, 74; cf. E. p. 120ff; J. Winter 'Socialism and The Challenge of War' p. 78


178. cf. R.T. p. 140; R.R.C. p. 279; A.S. p. 189, where Tawney refers to society 'relating its activities to the spiritual purpose from which they derive their significance.'

179. Terrill p. 197ff.

180. See above

181. See below on the strategy for equality

182. A.O.P. p. 183

183. See above

184. Rae p. 67

185. E. p. 103, 4; cf. p. 110

186. A.S. p. 31, 32; cf. R.T. p. 80 where Tawney comments that the goals of education are often limited to personal or industrial utility.

187. E. p. 107, 108

188. E. p. 108; cf. C.B. pp 15, 56

189. R.T. p. 73

190. E.T.S.P. p. 50; E, p. 235

191. R.T. p. 74

192. E. p. 80; cf. Terrill p. 123

193. Much of the oppression was economic either in simply the provision of wages so low that the individual was unable to fulfill duties to themselves or others, or in terms of the owner's power to dismiss the worker thus creating fear.

194. See below for details

195. E. p. 49

196. R.T. p. 185

197. E. p. 110


199. E. p. 112

200. E. p. 71; A.S. p. 37

201. E. p. 74

202. ibid

203. E. p. 52

204. E. p. 50

205. See below on the strategy for equality

206. Rae p. 45
207. p. 47, 48. Rae thus argues that the ideological conflicts of equality versus freedom are wrongly stated. Rather is the conflict between 'equal liberty' and 'equal life in society.' (p. 48) A division on those lines is confirmed by stress in Friedman and Joseph and Sumption upon equality and equality of respect.

208. Rae p. 48ff
209. C.B. p. 54
211. R.T. p. 160
212. A.S. p. 48
213. ibid
216. See chapter 3
217. cf. A.O.P. p. 87
218. E. p. 122
219. This must be compared with Le Grand's more limited view of Tawney's approach - discussed in chapter 3 below.
220. C.B. p. 34
221. C.B. p. 56, 57
222. E. p. 113
223. E. p. 28, 150
224. A.S. p. 38
226. R.T. p. 177
227. E. p. 181; R.T. p. 155; See also above on subordination
228. C.B. p. 22
229. E. p. 180
230. ibid 179
231. ibid 186
232. ibid 183
233. It thus avoided the irresponsible use of power often linked by Tawney with capitalism and in particular ownership. See also chapter two; cf. A.O.P. p. 186
234. R.T. p. 127
235. R.T. p. 111; cf. p. 110
236. R.T. p. 111; cf. R.T. p. 129 on the nationalization of the coal industry
237. R.T. p. 128
238. R.T. p. 129
239. A.O.P. p. 97
240. E. p. 157
241. ibid. This would also facilitate overall co-ordination and planning.
242. ibid
243. R.T. p. 113
244. R.T. p. 112. This internal accountability with reference to medicine would rid their professions of 'quacks' and 'squeers'.
245. A.S. p. 148
246. ibid
247. R.T. p. 115
248. R.T. p. 155
249. R.T. p. 58, p. 70
250. E. p. 146
251. A.O.P. p. 30
252. R.T. p. 84, 86
253. A.O.P. p. 30; cf. R.T. p. 74
254. E.T.S.P. p. 5
255. E.T.S.P. p. 22; cf. R.T. p. 84
256. R.T. p. 78; cf. p. 85
257. ibid
258. E.T.S.P. p. 20
259. R.T. p. 70ff.
260. E.T.S.P. p. 20
261. E.T.S.P. p. 15
262. R.T. p. 84
263. R.T. p. 87, 88
264. R.T. p. 58ff; C.B. p. 42, 43
265. R.T. p. 90
266. R.T. p. 85
267. R.T. p. 63
268. R.T. p. 72
269. E.T.S.P. pp 3, 16
270. E. p. 127. It must be added that Tawney did see sense in the implementation of a minimum wage as providing a standard of fairness independent of the impersonal dealings of the market (The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century, p.
Such a benefit would have to be secured by law. Tawney, however, is not clear how to cope with industries who claim that they could not pay the minimum. (The Establishment of the Minimum Rates in the Tailoring Industry p. 105).

271. E. p. 148
272. C.B. p. 56
273. C.B. p. 47, 48
274. C.B. p. 37; 'Poverty as an Industrial Problem' p. 17
275. E. p. 148
276. ibid
277. Reisman p. 66
278. Atherton, 'R.H. Tawney as a Christian Social Moralist' p. 426
279. Tawney did, though, recognize the benefits of industrialization, C.B. p. 37, 26
280. cf. A.S. p. 45
281. Involving both protection from economic oppression and greater control of the work situation.
282. cf. Atherton, Preston.
283. cf. H. Gaitskill in the foreword to E. Durbin, 'The Politics of Democratic Socialism' p. 9
284. R.T. p. 140; cf. C.B. p. 79
285. Available to all on the basis of need and not of wealth, status, or group membership. Civilization for Tawney involved an appreciation of 'spiritual ends' E. p. 81
286. E. p. 56; cf. R.R.C. p. 277, 279
287. The term utopian used here in its prejorative sense of being unattainable or unrealistic.
Chapter 2  Tawney's Justification of Equality

2. cf. S. Lukes 'Socialism and Equality' in 'Inequalities, Conflict and Change' pp 64-85
3. In terms of self-realization
5. cf. Turner, 'Equality' p. 35
8. In both Rawls 'A Theory of Justice' and Nozick 'Anarchy, State and Utopia'.
9. See chapter 1
10. 'Equality' p. 24
11. R.T. p. 155
12. 'Equality' p. 85
13. Terrill, R.H.T. p. 129; cf Bedau
14. ibid
15. cf. Tawney's quotation of Temple C.B. p. 48
16. See chapter 1 on the objectives of freedom and fellowship
17. It minimally requires such a distribution in order for freedom to be a reality. See below in chapter 7 for a comparison with Rawl’s concept of the full worth of liberty. To make sense, of course, liberty in this context has to be more specific. Hence, Tawney speaks of the liberty for self-direction or the freedom to serve or do one’s duty.
18. Tawney did not attempt detailed economic solutions to any of the issues he highlighted, for example unemployment, and gives no detailed policy for economic growth.
20. A.O.P. p. 186
21. cf. Terrill p. 179
22. cf. Terrill p. 134
23. E.S.P. p. 49, 50
24. E. p. 27
25. A.O.P. p. 92; R.T. p. 115
26. R.T. p. 115
27. A.S. p. 101
28. R.T. p. 115
29. ibid
30. E. p. 209
31. cf. Terrill p. 61
32. C.B. p. 30
33. See chapter 1
34. cf. Gore, 'Christianity Applied to the Life of Men and of Nations' p. 50
36. C.B. p. 78
37. ibid
38. Tawney's civilian equivalent of the 'poor bloody infantry man.'
39. C.B. p. 79
40. A.O.P. p. 184; C.W.O. p. 6
41. C.W.O. p. 7
42. ibid p. 6
43. A.O.P. p. 176
44. C.W.O. p. 2, 13
45. A.O.P. p. 97
46. E. p. 54
47. R.T. p. 140
48. Though such law in turn depends upon the acceptance of the ideas behind it, C.B. p. 76
49. cf. Atherton p. 204 for the use of the term 'interfering.'
50. A.O.P. p. 176
51. C.W.O. p. 176
52. cf. C.B. 40, 41, 50, 56.
53. E.S.P. p. 5
54. See chapter one on education
55. A.O.P. p. 173ff; E. p. 81
56. C.B. p. 15
57. A.O.P. p. 186
58. C.B. p. 46
59. ibid
60. C.B. p. 61
61. R.T. p. 155
62. cf. C.B. p. 41; R.T. p. 103
63. cf. Atherton p. 420
64. C.B. p. 34, 35
65. C.B. p. 45
66. R.R.C. p. 110
67. R.R.C. p. 253
68. C.B. p. 34
69. ibid
70. C.B. p. 32
71. ibid
72. 'Christianity and the Social Order' L.S.E. p. 5
cf. A.O.P. p. 174
73. E. pp 84, 85; E.T.S.P. p. 22; C.B. p. 71;
A.O.P. p. 178
74. See above, chapter one
75. A.S. p. 149, 150
76. A.S. p. 143; C.B. p. 50; R.T. p. 113
77. A.S. p. 138 ff.
78. E. p. 108
79. C.B. p. 41
80. C.B. p. 50
81. C.B. p. 25
82. ibid
84. C.B. p. 17
85. This view lies close to the philosopher Minogue who argues
for freedom as a 'relational skill' which demands 'the risk
of relying upon one another.' 'Of Liberty' ed. Griffiths,
86. R.T. p. 116
87. ibid
88. C.B. p. 56
89. C.B. p. 57
90. Though control is not seen exclusively in this way.
91. C.B. p. 33-34
92. ibid; cf. also R.T. p. 108
93. A.O.P. p. 177
94. A.O.P. p. 169
96. C.B. p. 41
97. L.S.E. Papers 16/1
98. R.T. p. 97 - 117
99. C.B. p. 50
100. See chapter one above
101. cf. C.B. pp 30, 31
102. A.O.P. p. 189; R.R.C. p. 279
103. C.B. p. 64ff.
104. For a comparison with Crosland, see chapter 5 below
105. C.B. p. 64/65
106. ibid
107. E. p. 85
108. cf. G. Outka 'Agape' pp 82, 157 - 159
109. A.O.P. p. 181
110. C.B. p. 54
111. ie. provides the groundwork to enable the development of self respect in social organization.
112. 'Freedom and Equality' 1987
113. 'Freedom and Equality' p. 92
114. Simply to argue for co-operation on the basis of this as the most efficient way of producing equal lots is inadequate. This limits the focus of justification to one form of empirical evidence, which does not take into account holistic needs, or the effects of social interaction.
115. The basis here being concern, care or love.
116. See below chapter 7 on Rawls
117. A.O.P. p. 182
120. C.B. p. 50
121. ibid
122. C.B. p. 80
123. For the creation and equality see E. Rackman, 'Judaism and Equality' Nomos IX pp 154-160
124. C.B. p. 36
125. See chapter 1 above. cf. also Terrill p. 165
126. The doctrine of creation by itself, as the basis of equal
distribution, would tend to emphasize lot regarding equality,
rather than person regarding.

127. A.O.P. p. 182
128. C.B. p. 56, 57
129. C.B. p. 25; cf. p. 13
130. C.B. p. 55
131. C.B. p. 31
132. C.B. p. 31
133. See below chapter 7 for further consideration of this
134. C.B. p. 67
135. ibid
136. A.O.P. p. 182
137. ibid; C.B. p. 53 ff.
138. Atherton p. 205
139. C.B. p. 54
140. A.S. p. 20
141. A.O.P. p. 168
142. C.B. p. 53
143. A.O.P. p. 168; cf. C.B. p. 77, 78
144. E. p. 84, 85
145. ibid
146. ibid
147. cf. Terrill p. 60
148. cf. also R.T. p. 113
149. Notes for Christianity and the Social Order were written in
1937. These were published in 1953 in A.O.P.
150. C.B. p. 53, 54; A.O.P. p. 182
151. C.B. p. 43
152. C.B. p. 53
153. E. p. 48
154. C.B. p. 55; E. p. 86
155. E. p. 85
156. ibid
157. C.B. p. 67
158. See above
159. C.B. p. 78
160. See chapters 7 and 8 below
161. R. Preston, 'Church and Society in the Late Twentieth Century' 148
162. Preston p. 153
164. cf. W. Temple, 'Christianity and Social Order'
166. R. Preston, 'Explorations in Theology' 9 p. 41
167. Quoted in E.T. p. 39
168. E.T. p. 41
169. Notes for Speeches Made on Various Occasions, Section 7, L.S.E. Papers
170. Terrill p. 267
171. E. p. 136
172. A.O.P. p. 189
173. A.O.P. p. 182
174. A.O.P. p. 183
175. E. p. 84, 85
176. A.O.P. p. 185
177. See chapter 7, and also on the domain of equality in chapter 1.
178. This accounts for much of Tawney's rhetorical style
179. C.B. p. 25
180. See chapter one on the principles of freedom and fellowship
181. cf. Terrill p. 34
182. C.B. p. 67
183. cf. Reisman p. 95
184. Hence Tawney's concentration upon principles as an essential part of any political agenda.
185. See above on Oldham
186. See above on Bennett.
187. If the principle of power sharing is accepted, then Bennett's 'axiom' cannot be described as provisional, for there would be no circumstances conceivable in which private centres of economic power would be acceptably greater than the governments. There is no space in this thesis for a prolonged discussion of the topic of middle axioms. However, I would suggest that the method runs a great risk of category confusion, reflecting not so much difference over moral concepts (cf. R. Gill, 'Prophecy and Praxis' p. 126) as over the technical description of the elements of the process itself, for
example, principles, aims, objectives, policy formulations etc. and how these relate.

188. K. Joseph and J. Sumption, 'Equality' p. 2
Chapter 3  Criticisms of Tawney's View of Equality


5. Joseph and Sumption (hereafter J and S) p. 45


7. J. and S. pp 45, 46

8. ibid

9. J. and S. p. 43

10. J. and S. p. 20

11. J. and S. p. 124


13. J. and S. p. 122


15. cf. Hayek, 'The Constitution of Liberty' p. 87; R Nozick 'Anarchy, State and Utopia' p. 32

16. J. and S. p. 100

17. Hayek p. 13. This points to the negative liberty, i.e. 'freedom from' which accompanies the individualist stance.


19. cf. Hayek p. 12, 'Whether a person is free or not does not depend on the range of choice.'

20. J. and S. p. 102

21. J. and S. p. 100

22. J. and S. p. 102

23. See chapter 5 below on Crosland


25. 'Equality' p. 41

26. Donnison p. 195
28. ibid
29. 'Equality' p. 87
30. Drucker p. 53
32. J. Charvet, 'A Critique of Freedom and Equality' p. 35
33. Charvet p. 157
34. ibid
35. The ground is inadequate precisely because it has no interpersonal base.
36. ibid
37. cf. 'Logical Positivism' ed. A.J. Ayer. The logical positivists attempted to restrict knowledge to that which was verifiable, logically or empirically.
38. J. and S. p. 43
39. See chapter 2 above
40. A.O.P. p. 165
41. Undated note quoted in Terrill p. 178
42. See above, chapter 2
43. See above, chapter 1
44. cf. Norman 'Free and Equal' where the author argues that the idea of natural rights is itself redundant. Also note Bentham's famous reference to natural rights as 'nonsense on stilts' from 'Anarchical Fallacies' in Human Rights ed. A. Melden p. 31.
45. Prime examples are Marxist states pp 54ff.
47. See above, chapter 1 and 2
48. Thus the decision making process for these groups always involves concern for service and moves beyond the immediate interest of the group.
49. cf. J. and S. pp 54ff; cf. also A.O.P. p. 170
50. cf. J. and S. p. 50
51. See below on the strategy of equality
52. See above, chapter 1
53. ibid
54. cf. 'The Attack' in A.O.P. pp 11 - 28
55. See chapter one
56. C.B. p. 65
57. See chapter 2 on Tawney's moral and social psychology
58. Charvet p. 157
59. Charvet in his stress upon value in relation avoids the possibility of the individual relating to him or herself.
60. J. and S. p. 102
61. See chapter 1
62. 'Equality' p. 114
63. cf. Terrill pp 166, 167
64. See chapter seven on Bernard Williams
65. cf. 'Equality' in B. Pimlott (ed) 'Fabian Essays in Socialist Thought.'
66. cf. 'Liberal Equality' Gutmann p. 87
67. Gutmann p. 82
68. ibid p. 82
69. ibid p. 83
70. 'R.H. Tawney as a Christian Social Moralist' p. 468, 69.
71. ibid
72. 'State and Welfare' D. Reisman p. 40
73. Reisman p. 42
74. cf. R.T. p. 113
75. ibid
76. See chapter 2
77. cf. R.T. p. 111
78. Gutmann p. 87
79. R.T. p. 97 - 117
80. R.T. 110; 'Equality' p. 180
81. 'Equality' p. 180
82. cf. 'Equality' p. 87
83. C.B. p. 54
84. cf. the anti-hierarchical arguments of S. Lukes 'Socialism and Equality' in 'Inequalities, Conflict and Change' p. 79 ff.
85. cf. Lakoff, 'Equality in Political Philosophy' p. 157
86. C.B. p. 56; E.S.P. p. 22
87. See chapter 1
88. cf. 'Equality' pp 55 - 56
89. E.S.P. p. 22
90. Contrasting an acceptable disagreement over methods C.B. p. 25
91. C.B. p. 30

92. C.B. p. 31. Also note Chicago Lectures L.S.E. 17/7 with Tawney's four point democratic process. These include the importance of settling affairs 'not by entrusting decisions to an individual, but by group decisions' and a 'passion for compromise' of a positive form.

93. ibid

94. C.B. p. 25

95. ibid

96. C.B. p. 41; cf. A.O.P. p. 191

97. C.B. p. 31; though Tawney did accept the decline of religious influence, cf. Terrill, p. 33

98. 'Church and Society in the Late Twentieth Century' p. 132

99. C.B. p. 15


101. E.S.P. p. 22; 'Equality' p. 235


103. cf. R.T. p. 111

104. cf. Rustin 'For a Pluralist Socialism' p. 88

105. See below, the final chapter.

106. See chapter 2

107. cf. R.T. p. 129 and frequent references to 'democratic experiments' which are not detailed

108. Though he does demand that any law has to harness the creative forces of accepted ideas, C.B. 76. This however, is without demonstrating how the voice of the people might be heard.

109. See the final chapter below


111. R.T. p. 185

112. Gutmann p. 173

113. See chapter 2

114. cf. C.B. pp 31, 32, 56


116. cf. A.O.P. p. 156

117. cf. the martial imagery in R.T. p. 108, when Tawney refers to the condition of economic liberty.

118. R.T. p. 116

119. J. and S. p. 124
120. J. and S. p. 100
121. J. and S. p. 124, 102
122. J. and S. p. 100ff
123. J. and S. p. 120
124. J. and S. p. 120
125. Preston, R.T.C.M. p. 264
126. cf. also Atherton p. 469
127. Preston p. 267
128. 'Attack' p. 191
130. Gore, 'The Sermon on The Mount' p. 3
131. A.S. p. 239; cf. A.O.P. p. 177
132. Preston p. 209
133. ibid
134. pp 267, 268
135. p. 269
136. R.P.C. p. 95
137. See sections A and B above
138. cf. J. Atherton, 'The Scandal of Poverty' This criticism will be addressed in chapter seven below.
139. cf. Wright p. 144
140. cf. J. and S. p. 11 ff.
141. See chapter 2
142. J and S. p. 100
143. J. and S. p. 100
144. E.S.P. p. 22
145. See chapter 2
146. C.B. p. 34; cf. R.T. p. 108
147. cf. 'Equality' p. 180
149. See chapter 2
150. E.S.P. pp. 5, 22
151. See chapter 2
152. See chapter 2 for consequentialist arguments
153. C.B. p. 32
155. C.B. pp 46, 47
158. C.B. p. 46
159. See chapter 2 above
160. cf. C.B. p. 31ff.
161. A.O.P. p. 175
162. A.O.P. p. 189
163. See chapter 2
164. Terrill p. 144
165. Quoted in Terrill p. 144
166. E. pp 159 - 160
167. cf. A.S. p. 77; E. p. 161
168. E. p. 160
169. C.B. pp 46, 47, 61
170. See chapter 2 on interactionism
171. 'Equality' p. 56
172. R.T. p. 144
173. cf. Speeches, L.S.E. Papers 1915, 1950's
174. See chapter seven below, and the importance of participatory equality.
175. McIntyre p. 40
176. ibid
177. McIntyre p. 41
178. See above
179. Rae p. 148
180. McIntyre p. 41
182. cf. Preston above
183. Reisman p. 108
185. ibid
186. Reisman p. 112
187. Reisman p. 113
188. Reisman p. 114
190. Le Grand p. 8
(often viewed as access) and outcome.

192. For example, the 'good' of health, as measured, for example in mortality rates.
193. cf. Le Grand p. 39
194. Le Grand p. 141
195. Le Grand p. 142
196. J. and S. p. 211-227
197. Wright p. 147
198. R.T. pp 110 ff on industrial organization, pp 118 ff on nationalization, p. 138 on social democracy; cf. A.O.P. p. 177
199. A.O.P. p. 189
200. See chapter 2
201. cf. S. Lakoff p. 238. cf. also J. and S. p. 35 on the importance of brotherhood.
202. cf. A.O.P. p. 169
204. ibid
206. See chapter 8 below
207. See chapter 8 below
208. P. Green in 'Retrieving Democracy' suggests that in fact many guidelines cannot easily be settled constitutionally, but need to be tested in practice, p. 183
209. See above
211. ibid
212. cf. Le Grand p. 132
213. ibid
214. cf. R. Klein, 'The Politics of The National Health Service' p. 18-19
217. Le Grand p. 8
218. Le Grand pp 14, 15
219. ibid. It is informative to compare Le Grand's view of education as 'not really an effective tool for promoting equality' (p. 79) with Tawney's view of education as a
centre for relational equality. See chapter 1 on the Strategy of Equality.

220. E.S.P. p. 22

221. In a real sense the distributional equality which Le Grand concentrates on is only part of the whole dispersion of power.

222. E. p. 222

223. R.T. pp 182 - 3

224. cf. Reisman, 'State and Welfare'; p. 82

225. E.S.P. p. 5
Chapter 4  The Distinctiveness of Tawney's Equality

1. See chapter 1  
2. cf. marginal egalitarians such as Nozick and Friedman in chapter 2  
4. Nomos p. 119  
5. ibid  
6. ibid p. 122  
7. 'Equality in Political Philosophy' chapter 3  
8. See chapter 1 on Rae's definitions of equality  
9. See also Augustine 'City of God' Book 19, ch. 15, p. 693  
10. De Nabuthe 11 PL 14:47  
11. ibid  
12. C.G. Book 19, chapter 15, p. 693  
13. Ambrose uses many basic Stoic categories, for example the concept of 'common nature' - with all of us 'consortes' in this and 'conformes' with one another (cf. Avila p. 79), and cites the Stoics (cf. Lakoff, 'Equality in Political Philosophy') p. 21). Ambrose also shares the concept of a natural equality existing before the fall comparable to the Stoic Golden Age.  
14. S. Lakoff, 'Christianity and Equality' in Nomos IX p. 127  
17. See chapters 1 and 2 above  
18. Rae p. 48ff.  
19. Applying to everyone, and in all important areas of life.  
20. See chapter 2  
21. cf. Rae p. 82ff  
22. R. Norman, 'The Moral Philosophers' p. 151  
23. ibid. p. 152, 153  
24. See chapter two above  
25. ibid  
27. quotation Norman, p. 151  
28. See above, chapter 2  
29. Green was less concerned with balancing individual freedom
57. cf. C.B. p. 41
58. cf. 'Equality' pp 55, 56, 81
59. cf. B. Griffiths, 'The Creation of Wealth' p. 79; cf. also Joseph and Sumption in chapter 3 above.
60. See chapter one above
61. cf. C.B. p. 34
62. cf. B. Turner 'Equality' p. 39, 40
63. cf. 'Equality' p. 81
64. De Concordantia Catholica Book II chapter XIV, ed. G. Kallen. cf. R. Hooker Laws of Ecclesiastical Policy 1, X, 4 pp 190 - 191 (see the edition)
65. cf. R.T. p. 111
66. cf. J. Locke, 'Second Treatise on Civil Government' chapter vi, para. 63
67. See above on the Stoics
68. See chapter two above
69. Terrill p. 145
70. cf. C.B. p. 34
71. See chapter 2 above
72. Unlike, for example, Ambrose
73. See chapter two above, on power
74. See chapter one on function
75. Moving from stewardship of what is common to all (De Nabuthe ed. Maguire p. 47) to a dynamic view of how property is used.
76. Not advocating lot-regarding equality
77. See chapter three, section three, above, on the provisionality of policy.
78. The term ultimate denotes ultimate equality, at the end of time. The term operative denotes equality which has relevance to contemporary social organization; cf. Nomos IX p. 124
79. cf. Terrill p. 30
80. 'The Stones of Venice' II p. 163
81. cf. 'Unto This Last' p. 170
82. 'Munera Pulveris', xviii, p. 10
83. 'The Seven Camps of Architecture' p. 194
84. 'Unto This Last' p. 202
85. 'Munera Pulveris' pp 161 - 2
86. 'The Stones Of Venice' III p. 216
and the common good. For him, self-realization became equated with the concept of the common good. cf. Richter p. 259


31. ibid. Rights and privileges were available to all, but distributed according to individual contribution to the welfare of the community.

32. See chapter seven below
33. ibid
34. quoted in Terrill p. 178
35. C.B. p. 15
36. cf. C.B. p. 61
37. See chapter one above
40. Mealand p. 92ff.
41. G. Theissen, 'The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity' 137 - 140
42. Bowlby p. 6
43. cf. 'Just Sharing' ed. D. Forrester and D. Skene p. 70
44. Bowlby p. 7
45. A.S. p. 186ff
46. cf. R.T. p. 113; A.O.P. p. 168
47. cf. 'Equality' p. 235; C.B. p. 47
48. Theissen pp 15, 137 - 140
49. Bowlby p. 5
50. All equal in Christ - Galatians, Chapter 3, v. 28.
51. Where value depends upon fellowship or an example of fellowship there is the danger of conditional value, or exclusive fellowship.
52. Terrill pp 213, 214
53. See above on Augustine
54. J. and S. p. 40
55. ibid
87. 'The Highway', January 1945 p. 47
88. cf. Nomos p. 124
89. cf. Kingsley's 'Alton Locke' p. 290; Maurice, 'The Reformation of Society' p. 32
90. See above
91. 'Alton Locke' p. 290
92. 'Equality' pp 158ff.
93. Maurice, 'The Lords Prayer' p. 122 (Sermon IX)
95. C. Kingsley: His Letters and Memories of His Life, edited by his wife, p. 248
96. Fraser's Magazine, XLI, 13
97. Including hierarchy
98. cf. J. Carpenter, 'Gore: A Study in Liberal Catholic Thought' p. 28
99. Carpenter p. 35
100. S. Headlam, 'The Service of Humanity' p. 68
101. S. Headlam, 'The Sure Foundation' p. 6
102. Headlam's speech in the Sunday Observance Debate, The official Report of the Church Congress held at Reading 1883, p. 428
103. 'The Service of Humanity' p. 72
104. S. Headlam, 'Christian Socialism' p. 5
105. ibid p. 9
106. O.R.C.C. held at Wolverhampton, 1887, p. 175
107. See chapter two above
108. 'The Service of Humanity' p. 72
111. See especially on the comparison between Temple and Tawney above.
112. Terrill, pp 24, 30
113. C. Gore, 'Christian Moral Principles' p. 47
114. C. Gore, 'The Sermon On The Mount' p. 171
115. C. Gore, 'Christ and Society' p. 173
116. quoted in Carpenter, p. 247
117. M. Ramsey, 'From Gore to Temple' p. 106. Whereas Tawney
saw the state's responsibility as assisting the development of the individual and civilization ('Equality' pp 51, 52, 81).

118. See especially pp 172, 173
119. quoted in Carpenter p. 247
120. See chapter one above
121. 'The Return of Christendom' p. 11
122. Such principles in context would then act as policy objectives. See chapter two on the middle-axiom view.
124. W. Temple, 'Essays in Christian Politics' p. 73
125. ibid
126. 'Christianity and Social Order' p. 64. cf. chapter three above on the view of the marginal egalitarians.
127. E.C.P. p. 44; cf. p. 66
128. ibid
130. E.C.P. p. 14
131. This reflects their common background of Idealism. cf. Ramsey p. 154
132. cf. also E.C.P. p. 73
133. ibid p. 10
134. C.S.O. p. 114
135. E.C.P. p. 77, 79
136. ibid p. 76
137. ibid pp 6, 27
138. ibid p. 29
139. cf. J. Oliver, 'The Church and Social Order' p. 107
141. cf. R. Craig, 'Social Concerns in the Thought of William Temple' p. 16. See also C.S.O. p. 112 on social function.
143. cf. also C.B. p. 68
144. A. Iremonger, 'William Temple' p. 439
145. A.O.P. p. 177
146. C.S.O. p. 28
147. ibid pp 100 - 102
148. ibid p. 112
149. See chapter one above on the strategy of equality.
150. C.S.O. pp 88 - 90
151. E.S.P., R.T. pp 47 - 97; A.O.P. p. 29 - 36. In addition see Terrill pp 293 - 301, for a list of articles on education.
152. Suggest, p. 161
153. chapter two
154. C.S.O. p. 58
155. ibid
156. ibid p. 37
157. ibid - with reference to 'the infidel' being able to ignore the challenge of equality. Only in the light of the Christian Faith it is said can equality make sense.
158. ibid pp 40, 41
159. E.C.P. p. 30
160. C.S.O. pp 30, 31
161. It is not always clear whether he doesn't like the use of the concept, i.e. a fear of misuse, or whether he dislikes the concept per se.
162. See chapter two, on the use of equality
163. cf. A.O.P. p. 177
164. ibid pp 178, 179
165. See chapter two above on the use of equality.
166. Wright p. 74
167. See chapter two above
168. E.C.P. p. 76
169. ibid
170. C.S.O. p. 102
171. E.C.P. p. 77
172. C.S.O. p. 92
173. See chapter two above
174. A.O.P. p. 176
175. C.B. p. 31
176. See chapter 8 below
177. A process which ensures that principles and policies can respond to societies needs. See above chapter three on the use of equality.
178. cf. C.S.O. p. 192, where the Christian Gospel is seen as the focus of community.
179. The question is raised as to how far making content the focus of development will lead to exclusiveness.
181. cf. H. Laidler, 'History of Socialism' pp 184 - 223
182. for example, V. George and P. Wilding include Tawney in chapter on 'The Fabian Socialists', 'Ideology and Social Welfare' p. 62
183. cf. Terrill p. 77
184. The Fabian Society Basis, quoted in H. Laidler 'History of Socialism' p. 189
185. cf. Gutmann p. 70
187. ibid
190. ibid
191. ibid
193. See chapter one above
194. W. Wolfe, 'Radicalism to Socialism', p. 275
196. 'Education of The Citizen' 1932 Speeches on Various Occasions, L.S.E. Papers
197. ibid
198. Industrial Democracy p. 849
199. ibid
200. ibid
201. cf. Wolfe p. 276
202. 'Our Corner' lecture, August 1888 p. 87 - 88, quoted in Wolfe p. 277
203. See chapter one above
204. A.S. p. 180
205. cited in M. Weiner, 'Between Two Worlds', p. 139
206. R.T. p. 78
207. Education of the Citizen
208. 'Industrial Democracy' p. 849
209. cf. note 29 above on Green.
211. C.B. p. 34
212. New Statesman, 3 - 5 - 1913, p. 107
213. C.B. p. 51
214. See chapter one on fellowship.
215. S. Webb, 'The Difficulties of Individualism' p. 6
216. ibid.
217. ibid
218. Winter p. 52
219. ibid
220. cf. Webb, 'The Difficulties of Individualism' p. 6, where Webb seeks to find the means of persuading individuals to make 'sensible use' of their time.
221. cf. 'The Webbs in Perspective'
222. R.T. p. 178
223. The contrast with Tawney's emphasis upon publicity is great, cf. R.T. p. 113
224. See chapter one above
225. ibid
226. Fabian Essays, p. 115
227. Speeches on Various Occasions 1920, L.S.E. Papers
228. See above
229. 'The World of Labour' p. 4
230. ibid
231. Gutmann p. 78
232. 'The World of Labour' p. 9
233. 'Guild Socialism Restated' p. 31
234. cf. Laidler p. 321
235. In fact, the state's functions are pruned down to only five, 'Guild Socialism Restated' p. 140
236. ibid p. 31
238. See chapter one above
239. It was tied to perfectionism and service, which applied to all society.
240. See chapters one and two above, and chapter nine below.
241. G.S.R. pp 160, 161
242. See chapter one above
243. Terrill pp 234, 235
244. Lakoff p. 232
245. See chapter one and chapter two above.
246. Gutmann p. 86
247. ibid p. 48
249. See chapter one on fellowship
250. A.O.F. p. 93
251. Gutmann pp 63, 64
252. for example, Wright, p. 2
253. 'Culture and Society' 1780 - 1950, p. 223
Chapter 5. The Influence of Tawney's Equality

1. Atherton p. 395; 'Whatever Happened to Equality?' ed. Vaizey p. 34, where Titmuss is described as the spiritual heir of Tawney.

2. Terrill p. 7; cf. also Reisman p. 74ff

3. 'Philosophy of Welfare' ed. B. Abel-Smith and R. Titmuss p. xi

4. Reisman p. 89

5. 'Equality' p. 347; cf. 'Philosophy of Welfare' p. xi

6. Terrill p. 67

7. 'Social Policy' p. 131; cf. also p. 13, 136.

8. 'Philosophy of Welfare' p. 67

9. 'Equality' p. 87; E.S.M. p. 27

10. 'Commitment To Welfare' p. 164

11. 'Philosophy of Welfare' p. 274

12. C.B. p. 14


15. cf. E.S.P. p. 22

16. quoted in 'State and Welfare' p. 184

17. Atherton p. 81

18. 'Social Humanism' ed. E. Fromm p. 362

19. 'State and Welfare' p. 82

20. C.B. p. 67; E.S.M. p. 22


22. G.R. p. 239

23. See below for the nearest Titmuss gets to sin, in his view of irresponsibility.

24. See above chapter two.

25. G.R. p. 223

26. 'Social Policy' p. 131

27. G.R. p. 196

28. C.B. p. 46

29. G.R. p. 335

30. G.R. p. 224

31. cf. G.R. pp 253, 276

32. For insurance see 'Irresponsible Society'. For medicine see 'Essays on The Welfare State p. 28ff.; G.R. especially103f.
33. C.W. p. 252
34. S.W. p. 75
35. C.B. p. 19, 30 - 2, 68 - 9
36. C.W. p. 18
37. 'History and Society' p. 45 - 'The Study of Economic History'
39. S.H. p. 363
40. G.R. p. 253
41. See chapter 1 on industry
42. S.W. p. 86, 7
44. 'Introduction to Equality' pp 23, 4
45. C.W. p. 116, 151
46. S.H. p. 364
47. C.W. p. 41; P.W. p. 113
48. S.H. p. 362
49. C.W. p. 116
50. P.W. p. 121
51. See below on positive discrimination
52. See below however, on diswelfare and compensation.
54. S.P. p. 44
56. See chapter one above on Tawney's use of function as a means of accepting merit.
57. See below on equality of distribution.
58. G.R. p. 273
59. H.S.T. p. 171
60. See 'The Problems of Social Policy'.
61. S.W. p. 87
62. G.R. p. 82ff.
63. G.R. p. 269
64. G.R. p. 270
65. C.B. p. 32
66. C.B. p. 32, 61
67. G.R. p. 240 n. 9
69. G.R. p. 84
70. G.R. p. 240
71. G.R. p. 260
72. G.R. p. 240
73. ibid
74. cf. G.R. 80ff., 85, 86
75. G.R. p. 268
76. C.B. p. 67
77. ibid p. 50
78. cf. Terrill p. 275
79. cf. R.T. p. 113
80. See chapter one on distribution
81. C.B. p. 55
82. C.B. pp 24, 32, 56
83. cf. C.B. p. 56; E.S.M. p. 22 where Tawney sees the individual as having to respond to 'duties which he did not choose and responsibilities created for him.'
84. ibid
85. This may be contrasted with J. Benson's 'The concept of community' in 'Talking about Welfare' ed. Timms and Watson pp 237 - 251. In this Benson sees moral meaning as tied to the fulfillment of roles in a community. However, to rely upon roles alone without equality of respect or perfectionism is to introduce cultural and moral relativism.
86. Indeed, without the expectation of fulfillment in some way, it is hard to see how moral meaning, so important for Titmuss' view of community, could be achieved.
88. These social and economic rights are, as noted in chapter one, tied to responsibilities. Hence, Tawney's view is far more complex, interlinking several levels of relationship.
89. G.R. p. 243
90. G.R. p. 253
91. cf. G.R. p. 239
92. G.R. p. 268, 239
93. G.R. 236ff.
94. G.R. p. 270
95. See above chapter 2 on the effect of capitalism, and self-interest.
395.

76. G.R. p. 270
78. G.R. chapter 9
79. G.R. p. 270
80. G.R. p. 270
81. See above
82. G.R. p. 223, 253
83. G.R. p. 82, 83
84. ibid
85. ibid. p. 256, 333
86. ibid. Notably even under the heading of altruism as motive, the total is only 26.4% of total answers. Moreover, there is no attempt to consider the concept of motivation for altruism.
87. cf, H.L.A. Hart 'Are There Any Natural Rights' in 'Political Philosophy' ed. A. Quinton pp 53 - 66
88. cf. C.B. pp 56, 57
89. See chapter two, part one
90. G.R. p. 54ff.
91. cf. C.B. pp 56, 57
92. 'Equality' p. 235; cf. C.B. p. 32
93. Thus the whole question of donation of time and energy in voluntary work, especially person to person, is queried.
94. S.W. p. 84
95. G.R. p. 253
96. Introduction to Tawney's Equality p. 14
97. ibid. Like Tawney, Titmuss saw the need to have control over ones situation.
98. C.W. p. 196
100. This is both providing opportunity to give, as in the Gift Relationship, and in increasing access which leads to integration. cf. Reisman 'Richard Titmuss' pp 70ff.
101. C.W. p. 196
102. cf. R.T. p. 103
103. ibid.
104. Tawney Papers 18/9 (Box 19) Speech to the W.E.A.
105. 'R.H. Tawney A Portrait of Several Hands', Titmusset al. p. 29 - 30
127. E.W.S. 119, 120
129. cf. R.T. p. 110
130. cf. S.P. p. 131
131. G.R. p. 253
132. C.B. p. 56
133. Introduction to, Mayer, 'Political Thought' pp xxi - xxii
134. S.H. p. 359
135. E.S.M. p. 20
136. ibid p. 22
137. A.O.P. p. 174
138. A.O.P. p. 176
139. See above on the theology of co-creators, chapter 4
140. Notably activities which involve voluntary work with individuals, and building up relationships.
141. cf. chapter one above on Tawney's view of equality of opportunity, which required not only the means of fulfilling an opportunity, but also a perfectionist framework.
143. Reisman 'Richard Titmuss' p. 166
144. See chapter one above on Tawney's distribution.
145. ibid
146. A.O.P. p. 189; I.D.S.C. p. 198
147. See above chapter 1
148. S.P. p. 89. The danger of this argument is that the responsibility of those who caused the dis-welfare might too easily be ignored. Difficulty in finding a culprit is not a necessary argument for state activity.
149. 'Equality' p. 235. See chapter one above on distribution.
150. cf. 'The Social Division of Welfare', in P.W. pp 39 - 60
151. I.D.S.C. p. 89
152. C.W. p. 32 - 33
153. C.W. p. 67
154. C.W. p. 192
155. E.W.S. p. 55
156. See chapter two above.
157. E.W.S. p. 37
158. ibid
159. ibid pp 54 - 55
160. ibid
161. ibid
163. See chapter one above on Rae's distinctions between bloc- and individual equality, and lot and person-regarding equality.
164. Introduction to 'Equality' p. 9; C.W. p. 135 (Titmuss)
165. C.W. p. 164
166. cf. C.W. p. 33; cf. E.S.P.
167. C.W. p. 122
168. C.W. p. 33
169. C.W. p. 34
170. ibid
171. C.W. p. 196
172. E.W.S. p. 130
173. C.W. p. 33, 34
175. Reisman, 'State and Welfare' p. 84
176. ibid p. 86
177. Introduction to Tawney's 'Equality' p. 24
178. Vaizey p. 34.
179. S.H. p. 362
180. G.R. p. 81 ff where Titmuss stresses the sociological importance of gift exchange (Mauss, Levi-Strauss etc.)
181. S.W. p. 87
182. Social Policy p. 145
183. Atherton p. 81
184. 'Sociology and Social Policy' p. 1
185. S.S.P. p. 290
187. S.S.P. p. 9
188. S.S.P. p. 261
189. S.S.P. p. 251
190. S.S.P. p. 259
191. S.S.P. p. 266
192. ibid
193. 'Conviction' ed. McKenzie p. 118
194. ibid
195. S.S.P. p. 260
196. S.S.P. p. 266
197. S.S.P. p. 256, 266
198. See chapter one above on participation.
199. S.S.P. p. 266
201. 'Conviction' p. 118
202. cf. C.B. p. 6
204. S.S.P. p. 40
205. 'The Fifth Social Service' p. 17
206. S.S.P. p. 40
207. S.S.P. p. 219
208. S.S.P. p. 218
209. ibid
210. P.U.K. p. 915
211. ibid p. 88
212. ibid p. 915. Townsend writes of individuals being deprived of 'the conditions of life which ordinarily determine membership of society.'
213. P.U.K. 923 - referred to as the Webbs position, see chapter 4.
214. S.S.P. p. 124
215. See above on Titmuss and selectivity
216. P.U.K. p. 925
217. ibid pp 914, 915. Again the idea of a consensus on conditions and needs is not proven. Equally, it is not clear that such a consensus could be arrived at apart from a perfectionist framework.
218. S.S.P. p. 126
219. ibid p. 265; cf. R. Plant, Crucible January / March 1983
220. See above on Titmuss and distributional equality.
221. C.B. p. 56
222. S.S.P. p. 265
223. P.U.K. p. 925
224. ibid
225. ibid
226. ibid
227. See chapter one above
228. S.S.P. p. 206
229. ibid p. 33
230. See chapter four on Webb.
231. S.S.P. p. 219
232. P.U.K. p. 925
234. New College Interview. In the same interview he argued for increased lot-regarding equality.
235. S.S.P. p. 290 makes some reference to common purpose, but not to function.
236. cf. Drucker p. 59
238. ibid p. 11
239. 'The Future of Socialism' p. 113
240. ibid p. 341
241. ibid p. 210
242. ibid p. 215
243. ibid p. 207
244. F.S. p. 217
245. F.S. p. 67, 76 - 77; cf. 'Equality' p. 57 - 8
246. F.S. p. 90
247. F.S. p. 207
248. F.S. p. 193
249. cf. Laidler 'History of Socialism' p. 88
250. See chapter one above
252. Drucker p. 52. Also see above on Temple and Tawney's work on the relation of principles.
253. ie. ethical judgements based upon feelings; cf. Warnock 'Ethics Since 1900' p. 79ff.
254. F.S. p. 193
255. Gutmann p. 89
256. F.S. p. 150 - 1
257. F.S. p. 227ff.
258. F.S. p. 46
259. F.S. p. 267 - 70
260. With an inadequate view of poverty as absolute, for example MacGregor 'The Politics of Poverty' p. 91
261. Field p. 14; cf. also Hattersley p. 254 where he quotes Crosland's concern for freedom.
262. F.S. pp 190ff.
263. cf. Fabian Tract no. 438 1975
264. ibid
265. ibid
266. cf. B. Hindess, 'Freedom, Equality and the Market' p. 26ff. Hindess suggests that Crosland was too simplistic in his view of government imposing its will on policy and that policy instruments impose limitations.
267. cf. 'Choose Freedom' pp 250, 251
268. ibid
269. ibid p. 26
270. ibid pp 26, 147
271. ibid pp 79ff.
272. ibid pp 241ff.
273. ibid p. 135
274. ibid p. 22
275. ibid
276. ibid p. 124
277. ibid pp 73ff.
278. B. Crick 'Socialist Values and Time', Fabian Tract 495, p. 13.
279. ibid p. 21
280. ibid p. 25
281. cf. Minogue
282. Crick p. 32
283. ibid p. 7
284. ibid p. 22
285. ibid p. 7
Chapter 6  The Influence of Tawney's Equality

1. 'Equality and Excellence'  p. 11
2. ibid  p. 12, 208
3. ibid  p. 18
4. As such the work is in the nature of a report. However, I shall refer to Jenkins in the discussion following.
5. ibid  p. 18
6. ibid. cf. Tawney E.S.M.  p. 22
7. ibid  p. 32
9. p. 32, 33. cf. the Rawls concept of the fair value of liberty in chapter seven below.
10. p. 91 cf. Titmuss and Townsend above, chapter five.
11. p. 19
12. See chapter one above
13. p. 19
14. See chapter one
15. pp 31, 33
16. p. 22
17. See above chapter one.
18. p. 22
20. p. 31
21. See the discussion Lucas's argument of equality as otiose in chapter eight below.
22. p. 22 cf. C.B. p. 68
23. p. 33
24. p. 22
25. p. 34
27. ibid
28. p. 23
29. p. 25
30. cf. C.B. p. 61
31. pp 9 - 18
32. p. 37
33. Tawney quoted in Jenkins p. 29
34. p. 83
35. p. 84 cf. Titmuss in 'Social Humanism' where the same words without reference to the churches are used.
36. p. 84
37. ibid
38. p. 21, 22
40. cf. R.T. p. 113
41. p. 33
42. For Tawney, development of the individual is not totally identified with development in community. Hence, he emphasizes liberty, control and balances duty and fellowship with these. cf. E. p. 235
43. p. 163
44. ibid
45. p. 162
47. See chapter one above on the strategy of equality.
48. p. 171
49. p. 102, 171
50. cf. Tawney 'Equality' p. 87
52. p. 173 - 178
53. See chapter 5 above.
54. See chapter 5 above.
55. cf. C.B. pp 76, 31
56. cf. R.T. p. 108
57. p. 12
58. p. 32, 33 cf. A.O.P. p. 189; C.B. p. 66
59. pp 77ff.
60. p. 82
61. p. 82. Tawney does not argue this explicitly, and it is not an important element in his justification.
62. p. 83. Like Tawney, however, he also stresses the importance of the responsibility of the professional.
63. p. 100
64. p. 88ff.
65. p. 93
66. p. 71 Jenkins notes this in respect of participatory equality.
67. p. 88ff.
68. See chapter one above on education and industry.
69. p. 101
70. p. 96
71. p. 101
72. p. 101
73. See chapter 2 above
74. for example, the irresponsible behaviour of industry owners.
75. p. 65, cf. 64
76. p. 71. There is not the same emphasis in Jenkins, however, on what means might be used.
77. p. 66
78. p. 67, 68
79. p. 70
80. p. 71
81. ibid
82. ibid
83. See above chapter 2
84. p. 74
85. pp. 113, 114
86. p. 111 my emphasis; cf. Tawney’s emphasis upon the unique development of the individual, chapter one above.
87. p. 113
88. The term holism here is used in the sense of education which affects the whole person, involving personal as well as intellectual development.
89. p. 113 cf. A.C.P. p. 182
91. Thus, like Tawney, Jenkins uses equality as less a middle-axiom and more the foundation of social philosophy.
92. cf. E.S.P. p. 22
93. ibid. In fairness, however, the theme of service is present in Jenkins’s concept of an educational community. He does not make it explicit.
94. p. 120
95. p. 125 cf. 127
96. See above chapter one on Tawney’s idea of school licences.
97. p. 133
98. p. 137
99. p. 139ff.
100. p. 148
101. cf. A.O.P. pp 71 - 81, 'Speeches on Various Occasions'
18/10 L.S.E. Papers.
102. p. 162
103. p. 29
104. cf. A.O.P. p. 189
105. It may be added here that this is partly because neither
man identifies himself totally with any group or interest.
106. p. 162
107. p. 11 'Church and Society In The Late Twentieth Century'
108. See above chapter three
109. C.S. L.T.C. p. 138
110. Spring 1988
111. ibid p. 12
112. 'Religion And The Persistence of Capitalism' p. 51, 52, 57, p. 97; 'The Future of Christian Ethics' p. 62
113. F.C.E. p. 68ff. In particular Preston notes the importance
of the doctrine of creation.
115. R.P.C. p. 51
116. R.P.C. p. 48
117. cf. R.P.C. p. 52; F.C.E. p. 141
118. R.P.C. p. 49
119. This in fellowship, participation and care ibid p. 48
120. By perfectionism I mean the premise that one form of life
is superior to others. This in some way points to a moral
ideal. See below chapter 7 for Rawls's attempt to avoid a
perfectionist stance. See also V. Haksar 'Equality, Liberty and Perfectionism'.
121. R.P.C. p. 52
122. R.P.C. p. 48 and 52; C.S.L.T.C. p. 125
123. R.P.C. p. 48
124. R.P.C. p. 49. Also see chapter one and two above on Tawney's view on the dispersion of power.
125. R.P.C. p. 48
126. R.P.C. p. 59, 60
127. F.C.E. p. 59. See also chapter three, section two above.
128. F.C.E. p. 59
129. ibid. cf. p. 100
131. See above chapter one.
132. R.P.C. p. 100
133. ibid
134. Involving the criterion and means of distribution in its broadest sense of resources and opportunities.
135. F.C.E. p. 60 Here Preston examines the criteria of distributonal justice.
136. F.C.E. p. 59
137. In respect of poverty, for instance, see 'Poverty As An Industrial Problem' 1913
138. cf. A.O.P. p. 189
139. cf. R.P.C. p. 52
140. R.P.C. p. 70; see also p. 52
141. C.A.J. p. 12
142. ibid
143. See above chapter one
144. cf. R.P.C. p. 48
145. ibid p. 72ff.
146. R.P.C. p. 75ff.
147. ibid
148. ibid
149. ibid
150. C.S.L.T.C. p. 125
151. R.P.C. p. 76
152. C.S.L.T.C. p. 131
153. C.A.J. '88
154. C.S.L.T.C. p. 132
155. ibid
156. cf. C.B. pp 13, 31
157. C.S.L.T.C. p. 137
158. ibid p. 132. Tawney does not go so far in his view on consensus - indeed he explicitly sees the Christian tradition as the base.
159. In this, like Titmuss, Preston shows a greater awareness of the effect of technological change - not least its diswelfares.
160. F.C.E. p. 62; cf. also R.P.C. p. 48
161. F.C.E. p. 64, 65
162. See chapter five above on Cole.
163. F.C.E. p. 60
164. ibid
165. See above chapter one.
166. See also chapter four above. In Tawney there is a distinction between functional rights (especially to property) and basic rights, economic and social.
167. See chapter three above.
168. F.C.E. p. 60
169. F.C.E. p. 64
170. ibid
171. 'E' p. 180
173. R.P.C. pp 48, 49
175. See above chapter two on equality as a middle-axiom.
176. C.S.L.T.C. p. 148
177. See chapter 2
178. F.C.E. pp 60ff.
179. R.P.C. p. 109
180. R.P.C. p. 79
181. See above chapter 2 on Tawney's social and moral psychology.
182. R.P.C. p. 104
183. cf. C.B. p. 50
184. ibid
185. F.C.E. p. 62
186. See below on Atherton and the solution of conflict.
187. See above chapter 2.
188. cf. 'Explorations in Theology' 9 p. 42
189. Atherton - unpublished theses M.A. 'Tawney's Concept of Function' PhD 'R.H. Tawney As A Christian Social Moralist'
190. R.H.T.C.S.M. p. 431
191. 'Faith In The Nation' p. vii
192. F.N. p. 101
193. F.N. p. 38
194. F.N. p. 40
195. ibid
196. F.N. p. 14
197. ibid - also see above for Preston's basic values.
198. F.N. p. 85
199. See above chapter one.
200. F.N. p. 85
201. F.N. p. 14, 37 - 38, 59
202. 'The Scandal of Poverty' p. 95
203. F.N. p. 124 quoted from Durbin 'The Politics of Democratic Socialism' p. 128
204. F.N. p. 124
205. F.N. p. 37
206. ibid pp 124, 125, 37, 59 - involves fundamental equality, equality of opportunity, participatory equality.
207. F.N. p. 124. Atherton argues that equality cannot bear the full weight of social policy. Presumably he refers here to equal conditions and opportunities being the major aim.
208. F.N. p. 124. See above chapter 5. Atherton has no grounds for reducing the view of socialist equality to one definition.
209. See above, chapter one. It is therefore perhaps misplaced to thank the New Right for reminding us of the importance of liberty. cf. F.N. p. 124
210. Atherton's argument of course, could be used with respect to freedom or fellowship.
211. See chapter eight on Lucas's argument about equality as otiose.
212. cf. 1 Cor 12 v. 22
213. F.N. p. 28
214. ibid p. 29
215. ibid p. 30
216. ibid p. 40
217. See chapter one above.
218. Or in some way providing the context.
219. With agape at its centre, this stresses concern for the self or group and others, in or beyond the group.
220. F.N. p. 32 - 36
221. ibid p. 38
222. ibid
223. ibid
224. ibid p. 39
225. ibid p. 38
226. ibid p. 42
227. ibid
228. ibid p. 41
229. ibid p. 40
230. See chapter one above
231. cf. C.B. p. 56. Note however, that relationships or roles as such do not exclusively define duties for Tawney. This may be contrasted with J. Benson 'The Concept of Community' in 'Talking About Welfare' ed. Timms and Watson pp 237 - 252. In this, Benson discusses the moral meaning of community in roles.
232. F.N. p. 41
234. ibid p. 119
235. cf. C.B. p. 25
236. F.N. p. 42
237. Medhurst p. 122
238. See chapter one above.
239. F.N. p. 38
240. It may well be argued that the corporate image of the Common Good, as distinct from the Body of Christ, is in any case not substantive without the middle-level principles referred to by Atherton. As such it is not clear what it has to offer as an important foundation principle.
241. cf. F.N. p. 77
242. ibid p. 75
243. ibid p. 78
244. ibid 77, 80
245. ibid p. 72
246. ibid p. 81
247. ibid
248. p. 71ff
249. ibid p. 86
250. ibid p. 87
251. ibid p. 87, 88
252. See above chapter three.
254. F.N. p. 85
255. ibid p. 88
256. cf. C.B. p. 56, 'E' p. 235
257. F.N. p. 93
258. cf. C.B. p. 56
259. F.N. p. 94
260. F.N. p. 96 cf. Tawney's emphasis upon the importance of professional codes of practice, emphasizing service, for example R.T. p. 113
261. ibid
262. ibid p. 98
263. F.N. p. 98
264. ibid
265. Though Atherton's use of internal incentives broadens the concept compared with Tawney.
266. p. 98
267. ibid
268. See chapter one on the strategy of equality.
269. F.N. p. 143
270. p. 90, 95
271. See above
272. p. 71ff.
273. See above chapter 1 on freedom.
274. cf. p. 42
275. As Tawney argues for, see chapter one above.
276. cf. Gutmann p. 83
277. for example, proportional representation.
278. for example, 'Poverty, Explanations of Social Deprivation'
279. Significantly, in 'Poverty' an examination of equality does not emerge until the last chapter.
280. p. 250
281. ibid
282. ibid
283. p. 250, 251
284. p. 251
285. ibid
286. p. 252
287. ibid
288. ibid
289. See above on Titmuss, Jenkins as well as Tawney in chapter two.
290. p. 252
291. p. 257
292. p. 252
293. p. 253
294. ibid
295. p. 255
296. p. 260
297. p. 261
298. p. 264
299. p. 267
300. p. 261
301. p. 262
302. p. 255
303. p. 268
304. cf. Terrill pp 174, 181
305. p. 268, 269
306. p. 271, 272
307. cf. Tawney's concern with the balance between rights and duties, for example, C.B. p. 57
308. See the final chapters below.
309. p. 293
310. Webb's position in chapter five above.
311. What Holman lacks in his discussion is an articulation of the moral psychology underlying altruism, with attention to duties and the concept of service.
312. Here used in the prejorative sense.
313. Charlton et al. p. 209
314. 'Good Works' p. 27
315. G.W. p. 32, 33
316. G.W. p. 32, 33, 23
317. G.W. p. 32
318. G.W. p. 23
319. G.W. p. 116
320. ibid cf. 'Small Is Beautiful' chapter 6
322. G.W. p. 34
323. G.W. p. 60, 66
324. S.B. p. 220
325. cf. S.B. p. 224
326. cf. Schumacher's quote from 'The Aquisitive Society'; S.B. p. 227
328. See above chapter one. Nationalization also made sense in that it got rid of tyranny and parasitic wealth, and was able to facilitate more industrial and consumer democracy. cf. S.B. p. 227
329. S.B. p. 223
330. G.W. p. 43
331. C.W. p. 51ff.
332. In this sense Schumacher can be compared to the Distributists and Penty.
333. G.W. p. 55
334. R.H.T.A.C.S.M. p. 409
335. published 1937
337. C.C.S. p. 106
338. ibid cf. 'Attack' p. 172
339. C.C.S. p. 116; cf. A.O.P. p. 175
340. C.C.S. p. 125
341. C.C.S. p. 118
342. C.C.S. p. 119
343. C.C.S. p. 115
344. A.O.P. p. 179
345. Conference on Christian Politics, Economics and Citizenship, Birmingham, April 5 - 12, 1924
346. 'Industry and Property' p. 181
347. ibid p. 183
348. ibid
349. ibid
350. ibid p. 181
351. ibid p. 194
352. cf. Jenkins, chapter five above.
353. for example, Atherton's concentration upon proportional representation. This does not address the crucial aspect
of control in Tawney's thought.

354. All this balanced in a moral context of rights and duties.

355. A.O.P. p. 177


The first of these provides useful indications of policy objectives, but does not address the theological basis of equality at any length. The second, referred to in chapter four above, does not move far beyond suggestions of a theological basis, in particular relating equality to the koinonia.

357. The extent of this work is best gauged by referring to the Bibliography below, in particular:

Chapter 7  Tawney's Equality And The Modern Debate

1. Lakoff p. 234ff.
2. See chapter three above.
3. In chapter 8, marginal domain and narrow equality will be considered.
4. cf. A.O.P. p. 189
5. 'A Theory of Justice' p. 578
6. ibid
7. ibid
8. ibid p. 580
9. ibid p. 572
10. ibid p. 414
11. ibid p. 586
12. ibid
13. chapter three
14. With regard to equality and liberty see below.
15. cf. Gutmann p. 168
16. ibid
17. Chapter two, part one.
18. ibid
19. 'A Theory of Justice' p. 586
20. Rawls is in fact aware of this danger, cf. 'A Theory of Justice' p. 583ff.
21. This is in contrast to Benn's concept of equal consideration of interests, Bedau p. 152 - 167. The problem with such a concept of equality is that the term interests is itself open to many possible interpretations.
22. cf. Wright p. 75
23. See chapter one.
24. See below
25. cf. Haksar p. 44
27. See chapter six on Jenkins. As noted above, Tawney's justification involves many elements and does not involve a simplistic reliance upon doctrine.
28. See also below on the meaning and practice of equality.
30. ibid pp 440ff.
31. ibid
32. ibid
33. ibid
34. cf. D. Lyons 'Nature and Soundness of Contract and Coherence Arguments' in 'Reading Rawls' ed. N. Daniels pp 141 - 168
35. cf. 'A Theory of Justice' p. 21
36. ibid pp 62, 90 - 95
37. ibid p. 440
38. ibid pp 178ff, 397ff.
39. ibid p. 441
40. Not even in his sense of confirming 'considered convictions'
41. C.B. p. 57
42. ibid p. 56
43. See chapter two above
44. See chapter three above, especially Drucker's criticisms of 'the distribution' of respect.
45. 'A Theory of Justice' p. 440
46. Significantly, Rawls's broader theory of the good only follows the justification.
47. 'A Theory of Justice' p. 441
48. See above on Rawls's confirmatory style of justification.
49. cf. for example, J. Bowlby, 'Child Care and The Growth of Love'.
50. Dispersion of power was also required to increase freedom, both to control and to serve.
52. See above chapter two.
53. See chapters three and seven on Charvet's thesis.
55. 'A Theory of Justice' p. 505
56. ibid p. 510
57. 'Socialism and Equality' in 'Inequality, Conflict and Change' ed. Blowers and Thompson, pp 64 - 84
58. ibid p. 67
59. ibid p. 66, 68
60. ibid
61. 'A Theory of Justice' pp 505, 506
62. ibid. p. 510
63. ibid

64. Much depends upon the description of the moral personality.

65. 'A Theory of Justice'

66. One which concentrates upon developing the idea of measuring relationships and what handicapped people have to offer. cf. S. Hauerwas, 'Suffering Presence'.

67. cf. J. Feinberg, 'Social Philosophy' p. 94

68. Writers who note some debt to him include Titmuss, Runcimann, Crick.

69. His broad argument is found both in Fabian Tract no. 494 'Equality, Markets and The State' (E.M.S.) and in the Christian journal Crucible, Jan - March 1983, 'Neo-Liberalism and the Welfare State'.

70. E.M.S. p. 26

71. ibid p. 7

72. See chapter eight below for the principle of neutrality.

73. 'A Theory of Justice' pp 224 - 227; cf. Tawney, 'Equality' pp 73, 103ff.

74. E.M.S. p. 6

75. problems with the indefeasibility of liberty will be noted below and in chapter eight.

76. Hence, he wishes to encourage pluralism.

77. 'A Theory of Justice' pp 325 - 332

78. All the emphasis is upon distributional equality.

79. Haksar p. 170

80. Williams, p. 116 - 137

81. ibid p. 128

82. ibid. cf. also M. Walzer, 'Spheres of Justice', referred to in chapter three above. (Section B.)

83. ibid

84. See above also on Rawls's concept of 'considered convictions'.

85. cf. also Walzer. As noted above, Walzer also limits relevance to particular spheres, thus lacking continuity of moral meaning across the spheres.

86. D. Harris, 'Justifying The Welfare State' p. 104

87. ibid

88. In all this Harris is wrong to place Tawney too firmly in the 'citizenship school'.

89. See chapter two.

90. 'A Theory of Justice' p. 221 - the brackets are Rawls's.

91. ibid
92. Gutmann p. 141
93. 'A Theory of Justice' p. 225
94. ibid p. 223
95. ibid pp 221-234
96. cf. R.T. pp 78, 103
97. Justice being purely distributional.
98. chapter one.
99. Tawney 'Equality' pp 100-112
100. 'A Theory of Justice' p. 73
101. Rae p. 73
102. 'A Theory of Justice' p. 73
103. Rae p. 73
104. ibid
105. ibid
106. See chapter one above.
107. ibid
108. ibid
109. See the final conclusion below for suggestions of how this might be developed.
110. See chapter 5 above, on B. Crick.
111. Significantly, Plant uses the same term as Crick, legitimate inequality, to define democratic equality, E.M.S. p. 24.
112. Gutmann pp 173-217
113. Crick p. 7
114. See chapter two above.
115. cf. C.B. p. 61
116. See chapter one on community.
117. See chapter eight.
118. This being largely distributive.
119. This also applies to any broad view of equality of distribution.
120. This applies to individuals and groups.
121. This also applies to the concepts of freedom and fellowship.
122. Charvet p. 82
123. ibid p. 22
124. ibid p. 172
125. Participatory equality is thus not emphasized by Charvet.
126. See below.
Chapter 8  The Modern Debate and Marginal Egalitarianism

1. Rae  p. 96
2. Reisman  p. 129
3. See chapters three and seven.
5. See chapter seven above.
6. See chapter one.
7. Thus, for example, marginal egalitarians see freedom not simply as freedom from coercion, but as freedom to achieve. See M. Friedman 'Capitalism and Freedom' pp 7 - 21. Friedman also accepts the need for economic freedom, just as Tawney, but sees this as best supplied by the market.
8. Hence, no emphasis upon participatory equality.
9. See chapter three above.
10. ibid
11. See chapter two above.
12. C.B. p. 33 - 34
13. ibid
14. See chapter two above
15. See below
17. cf. Scotsman February 4th 1989, " 'Thatcher Revolution' is already giving more power to the people."
18. See chapter one on freedom.
19. See chapter one above. cf. Friedman M and Friedman R 'Free to Choose' pp 119 - 126
20. Many other examples of limiting power can be given. British Trades Union legislation, for example, purports to improve democracy by the diminishing of Trades Union officials' power. This in no way, however, increases the power of the individual providing no basis for active participation in industrial democracy. On decentralization of government power to states, Friedman argues that this increases power through greater choice ie. if an individual does not like the government of one state he may choose to move to another. (Capitalism p. 2 - 3). Once again, however, options are limited, and the individual has little opportunity to participate or to question or alter values or ethos. This also raises major questions about community obligations and the basis of social morality.
21. Nozick pp 149 - 182
22. See above, chapters two and three.
23. C.B. pp 33 - 34
25. C.B. pp 56 - 57
26. See above chapter two. cf. C.B. pp 47, 54
27. See chapter two and three.
28. B. Ackermann 'Social Justice in The Liberal State' p. 11
29. cf. Nozick pp 167 - 173
30. See chapter one and two above.
31. To avoid this the individualist would have to demonstrate how the individual's survival depended on the state in some way. Such a view would, however, question their view of society and the individual.
32. C.B. p. 14
33. See chapter two above.
34. cf. B. Griffiths, 'Morality and The Market Place' p. 36. Marginal egalitarians do differ as to what the essential principles are. Hayek argues for individual responsibility and equal worth, in the sense of the worth of individuals not corresponding to market rewards. Without these principles the market system would not survive. Griffiths (in 'Morality and The Market Place' and 'The Creation of Wealth') argues that these principles are not sufficient, and that Christian values are necessary. However, even the Christian principles advocated by Griffiths are instrumental, and the justification of the market in his argument differs little from Friedman or Hayek. Thus the Christian position is not central to any market justification for Griffiths.
35. ibid
36. See Preston's criticisms of Tawney in chapter three section C.
37. C.B. p. 46, 47
38. ibid
39. Nozick implies that, despite his view of rights in industrial relations that the self-interest of the producer/manager can lead to consultation and participation. cf. Nozick p. 270
40. Such obligations include those to shareholders to maximise profits.
41. See chapter two.
42. C.B. p. 61
43. Nozick's 'State of Nature' aims to provide a neutral, non-controversial basis for his theory, much as Rawls's
hypothetical original position does. cf. 'Anarchy, State and Utopia' pp 10 - 25, 271 - 274.

44. 'Equality' pp 71 - 78
46. cf. R. Preston, 'The Future of Christian Ethics' p. 151; E. Rayack, 'Not So Free To Choose' p. 131
47. A.O.P. pp 93 - 100
48. Chapter three, section D.
49. Reisman p. 129
Much of this argument is implied in Joseph and Sumption, for example, pp 35ff.
51. Turner pp 100 - 115
52. ibid p. 115
53. ibid p. 126
54. ibid p. 128
56. See chapter one and two above.
58. Lucas p. 139
59. ibid
60. ibid p. 141
61. ibid p. 147
62. ibid p. 150
63. ibid p. 151
64. ibid
65. Raz p. 240
66. ibid
68. See chapter three
69. See chapter one.
70. 'Equality' p. 46
71. See chapter one
72. See chapter seven
73. cf. S. Bean 'Egalitarianism and The Equal Consideration of Interests', in Bedau pp 152 - 167.
74. Bedau p. 151
75. C.B. p. 65
76. See chapter three above, Section A., especially Joseph and Sumption's argument that equality is by definition absolute.
77. cf. A. MacIntyre, 'After Virtue' p. 246
78. See chapter two and three above, cf. also P. Hamilton 'Knowledge and Social Structure'.
79. See chapters one and two.
80. See chapter three above and the final chapter.
Chapter 9

Conclusions

1. See chapter three, section C
2. See chapter four
3. See chapter three, section B.
4. See chapter eight
5. See chapter one
6. See chapter four
7. Unlike the loose association of middle-level principles suggested for example by Terrill. See chapter one.
11. In addition the creationist argument sees material resources created for man, providing grounds for entitlement to distributional equality; cf. Ambrose's Commentary on Corinthians II, 9,9, quoted in C. Avila 'Ownership' p. 77.
12. for example participatory equality, emphasizing personal involvement could be contradicted by distributional equality which is simply concerned to supply material resources.
13. See also below
14. See chapter one for Tawney's concept of theology as a way of life.
15. See chapter one on the aim of perfection
16. Tawney does not state this explicitly. It is, however, implicit in the way he ties in the moral basis of self-realization with God. cf. C.B. p. 67, 68
17. This is underpinned by an interactionist view of society and holistic view of man. The breadth of both these views owes much to the doctrine of the Incarnation.
18. See chapter four above
19. ibid
20. cf. A.O.F. p. 182
21. cf. Avila p. 77
22. cf. C.B. pp 33 - 34
25. See chapter two on Tawney's moral psychology and chapter seven on a comparison with Rawls's view of the moral person.

26. This assumes involvement in a decision making process, without necessarily meaning that all decisions must be made by all participants.

27. cf. R.T. p. 141

28. This may be compared to D. Cupitt's 'New Christian Ethics' pp 127ff, 135ff, who sees the importance of creativity and taking responsibility in ethical decisions but who does not see this as a possibly corporate activity.

29. See chapter three, section B.

30. These including the arguments that equality of participation leads to better opportunity for self-development, better protection against power blocs of any kind, and the argument that any individual will know the situation in which they are in the best, and should therefore be included in decision making about that situation. (cf. Gutmann pp 178 - 181). All are useful supporting arguments for both theology and philosophy. None, however, provide clear grounds for a right to participation, partially because it could be argued that self-development could be better achieved by some other method, partially because it may be argued that any situation is more objectively and clearly viewed by those who are outside it.

31. Niebuhr pp 126ff. This argument certainly supports equality of participation, but says little about the quality of that participation. Tawney parallels some of Niebuhr's argument in his treatment of sin, for which see below.

32. See chapter eight above for the limiting of self-determination caused by marginal egalitarian approaches.

33. cf. R.T. p. 108. The idea that some form of challenge (not seen in adversarial terms) is necessary to enable self-determination, applicable to institutional education or to education related to roles in society, is one which itself requires further research.

34. See below

35. See below on industrial democracy.


37. cf. J. Habgood 'Church and Nation' p. 48

38. See chapter six above for David Jenkins's development of the theme of forgiveness.

39. Not least of these would be how it might operate with respect to failure in work roles.

40. cf. H. Willmer, 'Forgiveness and Politics' in Crucible (1979) pp 100 - 105

41. See chapter four on equality and fellowship
42. ibid
43. cf. Minogue
44. See chapter three, section A.
45. See chapter five on Titmuss
46. cf. C.B. p. 56, 57
47. For the concept of pilgrim community, stressing the provisionality of community from Old Testament models, see 'Just Sharing' ed. Forrester and Skene, pp 68 - 70. Relational equality does not assume a maintenance of the status quo.
48. Hence Tawney's emphasis upon the importance of principles and upon practical planning.
49. See chapter three
50. See on function above
52. Nor, as noted, does Tawney give consistent attention to economic planning. Where he does, as in the recommendation that the government should extend wartime economic controls (194) this does show clear evidence of planning for freedom. Reisman (State and Welfare p. 129) refers to an 'elaborate and extensive web of State directives' which if pursued might limit freedom.
53. See chapter three, section C.
54. In addition to models of egalitarian management, models of economic planning would be necessary.
55. P. Ballard, 'Towards a Contemporary Theology of Work' p. 36
56. cf. J. Atherton, 'Faith In The Nation' pp 104 - 106
57. It could of course be argued that vocation per se involves the idea of service.
58. Such would range from the development of professional codes to the development of methods of group decision making which would ensure consideration of principles, to including all parties involved, both producers and consumers in annual review exercises.
59. Research here is of paramount importance firstly to ensure some framework of overall planning and secondly to establish clear relationships between central and local bodies. This may well link in with the whole area of discovering moral meaning both in relation to the work community and the community as a whole. Writers such as Cole and Pateman (Pateman 'Participation and Democratic Theory' p. 35) tend to diminish the role of central government and thus neglect the means of maintaining relative equality amongst industrial groups. A further tentative conclusion that should be
explored here is how far the moral base of Tawney's equality is necessary to maintain the relationship between local autonomous groups and central government. (cf. chapter four on Cole).

60. cf. chapter four on Cole
61. cf. R. Norman 'Free and Equal' pp 156 - 172; P. Green 'Retrieving Democracy' pp 241 - 266.
63. cf. A.S. p. 100ff.
64. In this situation a total process would take over from the simple application of function as a criteria of distribution.
65. Green p. 13 - 24
66. cf. Norman pp 156 - 172; Atherton 'Faith in The Nation' pp 73 - 76
Intermediate associations or mediating structures are groups or organizations which exist somewhere between the State and the individual. The community groups of which Holman writes are a good example of such a group.
68. cf. 'Democracy and Mediating Structures' ed. M. Novak pp 198 - 200
69. for example through Child Benefit and care allowances.
70. This may be in terms of environment or procedures
71. This would range from work in secondary education to that of social workers or health visitors. See Holman on social workers p. 278.
72. See chapter seven on Rawls's justification.
73. Such a process would necessarily involve a consideration of fundamental principles.
74. This could be argued more from the basis of self-interest in that it would give the individual more control of their situation and more recognition.
75. See chapter six on Holman.
76. However, D. Sheppard in 'Bias To The Poor' rightly notes that some liberation theologians, such as Bonino, see involvement with the oppressed classes as essential if a Christian critique is to be offered of their aims and objectives.
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Section 19 (10 subsections) 'Speeches on Various Occasions' - to Fabian Society, Labour Party meetings; on Socialism, Foreign Affairs, etc.

Section 20 (7 subsections) 'Notes for Speeches made on various occasions' - on Cranfield, the Webbs, Hammond, Christianity, etc.

Section 21 (7 subsections) 'Notes and Papers re Reform of Oxford and Cambridge' - including the Barnett papers, Labour Party Advisory Committee on Education, W.E.A., Memo, etc.

Section 22 (11 subsections) 'Papers and Memoranda on Education' - produced by Tawney as a member of the Board of Education's Consultative Committee; on young people and employment.

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Further details of the L.S.E. Tawney Papers can be obtained from the 'Handlist Of The Papers Of R.H. Tawney At The B.L.P.E.S.'

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