GENERALITY AND SINGULAR TERMS IN THE PROPOSITION:
A COMPARISON BETWEEN BRADLEY AND
VARIOUS MODERN LOGICIANS

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

It is argued that propositions are general, which is taken to mean that there are no such things as 'singular terms' in the sense that certain parts of sentences are connected in a direct and simple one-to-one way with isolable bits of the world. Rather, it is suggested, the kinds of expressions usually called singular terms can be used to refer to individual things because of their respective meanings. An expression's possessing a meaning is understood univocally for both singular and general terms: it means that the expression implies certain characteristics which anything must have before the expression can properly be applied to it. The claim that the proposition is general is understood, therefore, as the claim that any part of a proposition which purports to pick out and individuate some item does so through devices common to the rest of the proposition, and thus cannot be thought of as non-general any more than the predicative component can be.

Bradley first articulated this view, and that he did is the chief burden of Part I. In Part II this view is supported through an examination of the three kinds of singular terms: proper names, demonstratives, and definite descriptions. In each case it is argued that the expressions involved are general, as a consequence of their possessing meaning.
PART I. BRADLEY

CHAPTER I. IDEAS

1. Terms and Distinctions; 
   Judgment as Assertion

Bradley's conception of logic was radically anti- 
psychologistic, i.e., it was directly counter to earlier 
theories of logic which attempted to depict logic as 
the 'working of the mind', or the 'nature of thought'. 
An appropriate example of the sort of thing Bradley was 
specifically against can be found in Mill's Logic, where 
he accepts a definition of

Logic to be the Science, as well as the Art, of 
reasoning; meaning by the former term, the analysis 
of the mental process which takes place whenever 
we reason, and by the latter, the rules, grounded 
on that analysis, for conducting the process cor¬
rectly. ... A right understanding of the mental 
process itself, of the conditions it depends on, 
and the steps of which it consists, is the only 
basis on which a system of rules, fitted for the 
direction of the process, can possibly be founded. ¹

Bradley rejected such psychologism for a variety 
of reasons, but most notably because of his rejection 
of the theory of the association of ideas which lay 
beneath it. The problems of logic could not be explained 
for Bradley by inspecting ideas in the mind and dis¬
covering the laws of their regular association.

Without pursuing Bradley any further into his 
specific criticisms of psychologism,² I shall turn to

¹J. S. Mill, A System of Logic, p. 3.
²On this topic see R. Wollheim, F. H. Bradley, ch. 1.
inquire about his own positive conception of logic. At the beginning of The Principles of Logic he starts straightaway on a discussion of the "judgement", which he acknowledges as the centre of logic.¹ He is not interested in its relation to "psychical states", but rather in its general character; he says

Judgement, in the strict sense, does not exist where there exists no knowledge of truth and falsehood; and, since truth and falsehood depend on the relation of our ideas to reality, you cannot have judgement proper without ideas.²

We can notice a number of points of importance in this passage; first of all, ideas seem somehow central to judgement, in spite of Bradley's aversion to psychologism and things mental in logic. But this is deceptive, as we shall see below, for Bradley's use of 'idea' is quite different from that found in associative theories. A further point is the dependency of judgement upon knowledge of truth and falsehood; this seems vague, for it tells us nothing of the exact relationships among judgement, truth, and knowledge. We get the impression, however, that of the great variety of kinds of sentences, those which can express judgements are the ones suitable for recording knowledge or conveying information, i.e., declarative sentences, as opposed to

¹PL, I, 1, p. 1 (I shall refer to Bradley's works throughout this thesis by using "PL" for Principles of Logic, "AR" for Appearance and Reality, and "ETR" for Essays on Truth and Reality.)

²PL, I, 1, p. 2.
commands, expressions of emotion, of persuasion, promises, etc. Of course, the knowledge involved in this particular argument is not the knowledge expressed in such judgements, but rather is knowledge of whether the putative judgement is either true or false, or neither; but it is only meaningful declarative sentences which can express something true or false. This impression, however, is not warranted. Bradley argues at some length that judgements can be expressed by incomplete sentences, incomplete at least from the grammarian’s point of view. He says that

The practical man would laugh at your distinction that, in exclaiming "Wolf," I cannot be a liar, because I use no subject or copula, but that, if I go so far as "This is a wolf." I am thereby committed. . . . In watching a sunset, it is enough for me to say the word "down" or "gone," and everyone knows I am judging and affirming. It might be said, no doubt, that the subject is elided, but this would be a mere linguistic prejudice.

So we cannot even say, as it might have appeared above, that what expresses judgements are declarative sentences. We might draw the weaker conclusion though, that declarative sentences can express judgements, while non-declarative ones cannot. (Incidentally, the passage just quoted rests ill with Wollheim’s claim that "Bradley’s view of language is, I think, peculiarly a logician’s view."² He says this in a different context, but with

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¹PL, I, 2, pp. 56, 57.
²Wollheim, op. cit., p. 70.
regard to this one, Bradley seems to be responsive to language itself, and not to the logician who, if he treats "wolf" as a proposition at all, says it must have the form $(\exists x)Fx$ or the like. I think Bradley's position here treats the problem of logical form much too lightly, and ignores entirely the logician's task of explicitly displaying the form of a proposition which can permit formal justification of the inferences to be derived from it. How, e.g., could Bradley formally represent "wolf" as one premise along with several others which altogether imply "We should leave this spot quickly"?

So far we have gleaned little; but at least it seems that whatever it is in language that is connected with judgement must be either true or false, but not neither. In fact this is correct, for Bradley says as much in numerous passages. One such, stripped of the rhetorical irony of its context, says, "... the essence of judgement lies[... in the production of truth and falsehood. ..."¹ Elsewhere he says that a judgement

either attributes the idea to reality, and so affirms that it is true, or pronounces it to be merely a bare idea, and that the facts exclude the meaning it suggests. The ideal content which is also fact, and the ideal content which is nothing beyond itself, are truth and falsehood as they appear in judgement.²

¹PL, I, 1, p. 17.
²Ibid., pp. 33-34.
But there is little else the original passage can tell us, which brings me to one last point concerning it: it does not even say just what judgements are. Are they the sentences we utter, the statements we make, are they propositions, affirmations, assertions, or what? All of these are connected in some important ways with truth and falsehood, and it would be of some help to understand how Bradley uses these associated terms before looking at his organic description of judgement.

We cannot expect that Bradley uses these terms with their more recent nuances, but we can look to see if he recognises any of the distinctions which require the modern usages. I take these distinctions to be roughly described by the following: a sentence token is spoken at a particular time by a particular person, or written in a particular place; a different token of the same sentence type may be uttered or written elsewhere. A sentence may be ambiguous as to what statement it (or the user of it) makes, but what is stated is not; for example, if I say "He caught the fly", the mere utterance may be taken as involving a baseball or an insect, the ambiguity of "fly" infecting the whole sentence. But I used this sentence to make one statement, not two, as the context would betray. A statement might be thought of as a contextually dis-ambiguated sentence. But the statement I make may
literally mean something contrary to what I had intended; an example given by Russell concerns a person who says, "I ain't never done no harm to no one", which was meant by the speaker to state something like what is stated by "I have never hurt anyone", but instead literally states what is stated in "There was at least one moment when I was injuring the whole human race."\(^1\) (In fact I think Russell's analysis is wrong: the literal sense seems closer to "I have at least once hurt someone", which is just the opposite of what was intended by the speaker.) Russell therefore distinguished what was meant ("the state of mind of those who utter sentences") from what was stated, by calling the former the "assertion". But interesting though the distinction may be, I shall reserve the term "assertion" for a different and more traditional use, letting the term "intended statement" suffice for the immediate difficulty.

With regard to statements, we must notice that they are language-specific in at least two ways: as unambiguous sentences, they are still in a specific language—no matter how unambiguous "the large book is on the table" is, it is not the same unambiguous sentence as "книга на столе"; more radically, nor is "that is a book" the same statement as "the object

\(^1\)Russell, "Mr. Strawson on Referring", *Mind*, v. 66, 1957, pp. 385-389; p. 388.
on the table is a book"). But in both cases we want to say that something is the same, and we call that a proposition.

These distinctions have all been introduced for the same underlying motive: to give a name to something felt to be the same in different cases, each occasion more abstract or remote from speech acts or occurrences than the last. But with propositions especially, some have converted this method into a criticism; they ask, how can we know when two propositions are really the same proposition? What is this stipulated criterion of identity?\(^1\) If this general objection is accepted, however, it has consequences more radical than usually supposed; for at the bottom, token sentences are collections of word tokens, which in turn consist of letter or sound tokens. But a token is always of a type (otherwise it would be a mere mark or noise), and how would we even know when a mark is a token, if to recognize the type we had to be able to specify an identity criterion, but could not? How, for example, would we know that a "t" is a "T"; or if those are of different types, how about "x" and "t", which are still visibly different? At the lowest level the type-token business tries to connect brute, unmeaning, different physical

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\(^1\)E.g., v. Quine, *Word and Object*, p. 201 ff., for detailed rejection of an identity criterion based on sameness of meaning, and hence a rejection of propositions.
objects via a common form, and if sameness is a problem anywhere, it is here also. We seem to be driven to confine our attention (if attention be any longer possible) to unique, irrevocably particular vibrations and inkspots if we cannot even find sound-types or letters.

Propositions have also been introduced as items relevant to language and logic from two independent considerations. They have been said to be the objects of "propositional attitudes"; they are what we believe or disbelieve, doubt, suppose, or sometimes even wish, know, etc. They have also been said to be the vehicles of truth and falsehood. Objections have been raised against both of these formulations, but I shall not pursue them; it is sufficient here to have simply recorded how 'proposition' has been used in recent writings. But one thing should be noted: only in connection with propositions have truth and falsity been mentioned so far. Even those who talk of propositions as objects of propositional attitudes usually construe


2E.g., Russell, Principles of Mathematics: "A proposition, we may say, is anything that is true or that is false." Pp. 12-13.

3E.g., v. Quine, op. cit.
them as being true or false. The way we introduced statements, however, was without regard for truth or falsity. The sentence token "Make way unruly woman" is unambiguous when used in a context which renders clear the woman referred to, and so could be used to make a statement. For most logicians this would be unacceptable, and they would restrict statements to disambiguated true or false sentences.

A further aspect of statements is sometimes emphasized by logicians: if a person makes a statement P, they say, he not only says that P, but also claims thereby that P is true. But this is what has more usually been called "asserting", and I shall use this term for such cases. Ramsey has argued that in saying "P is true" one says no more than when one says "P", and this has led logicians to think that, as "is true" is redundant, so also is a category of "assertions", distinct from statements or propositions, redundant. But this is a mistake; the difference can be brought out clearly if we remember that statements can be used hypothetically, can be entertained, considered, recalled, etc., with no decision or claim on our part as to whether they are true or not. But when we assert, we are affirming that what we say is true. Since when we

1E.g., Kneale, "Intentionality and Intensionality", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XLI, 1961, pp. 73-98; esp. p. 78.

say "P" we are usually asserting it, Ramsey is right to
point out the superfluity of adding "is true". For
example, if I ask "Where is my pillowcase?", it is
sufficient for you to say "It is on the pillow". You
need not have said, "It is on the pillow, and what I
just said is true". What you did say was sufficient,
because it was clear that you were claiming it to be
(intending that it be taken as, considering it to be)
true; you were asserting, and hence did not have to
add explicitly that you thought it to be true. Since
when we utter sentences that can be true or false we
are usually always asserting a statement, asserting
and making a statement tend to become confused. But
that is no reason to conclude that the typical super-
fluity of "is true" implies that assertions and state-
ments cannot be distinguished, and that a separate
category called assertion should be abolished.

Russell has also used the term "assertion" in
several other ways besides this one and his use men-
tioned above: an assertion is what he has elsewhere
called a proposition, i.e., what can be true or false,
and it is also (or better) what is now called a "predi-
cate" or "propositional function. But neither of
these meanings for "assertion" is any longer prevalent

or useful, since other terms are available, and I shall ignore them below.

I shall now turn from this digression to Bradley to see how he uses these related terms. Consider the following remarkable passage:

If we leave mere ideas and go on to judgements, it has been asked whether these make a statement in respect of the extension of their elements, or the intension, or both. . . . I will begin by the assertion that every proposition can be read in whichever of these ways we prefer. . . . Every judgment makes a double affirmation, or a single affirmation which has two sides. It asserts a connection of different attributes, or [etc.]. . . . If you take the proposition "Dogs are mammals", then this means that [etc.]. . . . And it is possible to interpret every judgement in this self-same way.1

Ignoring the specific topic (one could hardly do otherwise, the way I have condensed the passage), the main thing to notice is how many terms abound. Propositions are judgements, judgements make statements and affirmations, and they assert. A sentence is quoted, and called a proposition. Such terminological confusion need not indicate confusion itself, however. At most we can conclude that Bradley does not use these terms as we are inclined to. Because, for example, he calls "Dogs are mammals" a proposition, rather than using that term, as we might, for what is expressed by "that dogs are mammals", we cannot therefore take it that he does not think "Dogs are mammals" is a sentence (or sentence

1PL, I, 4, p. 174. Underlines added.
type, strictly). But that it is a sentence does not interest him particularly. Indeed Bradley nowhere to my knowledge discusses the relationship of sentences and propositions, nor even specifically demarks the distinction. That a particular expression is or is not a sentence is unimportant for him, compared to the proposition connected with the particular sentence. And to quote a sentence and talk of propositions means no more than that one wants to discuss propositions. But what does he take a proposition to be? I think it is clear enough from the passage that he uses this term synonymously with "judgement". He rarely uses the term "proposition" anyway, and surely never uses it as it is often used now. To the contrary, his use elsewhere also suggests that he takes a proposition to be a judgement.¹ But again, too much should not be inferred from this, because he does distinguish between something which can be true or false, and the affirmation of its truth, as we shall see below.

Judgements, it seems, make statements and affirmations, and also assert. In fact judgements are, for Bradley, assertions, as I have chosen to use that term. When he says that they make statements, he is using the sense of "statement" which I mentioned when introducing the term "assertion". At one point he even uses

¹E.g., v. PL, I, 2, p. 42.
"proposition", "judgement", and "statement" in three successive sentences on the same topic, showing quite clearly his assimilation of these terms.\(^1\) That for Bradley judgements are assertions is supported also by numerous passages. For example, in discussing the kinds of "analytic judgements of sense", he considers judgements expressed by one word, and says of them:

> When we hear the cry of "Wolf," or "Fire," or "Rain," it is impossible to say that we hear no assertion. He who raises the cry is always taken to affirm, to have uttered a sign and to have used it of the real.\(^2\)

Elsewhere he says,

> ... judgement, as we know, implies belief.\(^3\)

Of the terms I have distinguished, it is only assertions which could be said to imply belief. Again, discussing "analytic judgements" in general, he says,

> Let us turn at once to the judgements which assert within what is given in present perception.\(^4\)

Such examples abound which more or less explicitly identify judgements with assertions, but it would be tiresome to multiply them here; the ones I have quoted should suffice.

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\(^1\) PL, I, 4, pp. 169-170.

\(^2\) PL, I, 2, p. 56.

\(^3\) PL, I, 3, p. 115.

\(^4\) PL, I, 2, p. 93.
Bradley's use of "judgement", or at least what we have seen of it so far, is practically the same as Frege's, and it will be instructive to compare them.

Frege says,

A judgement is always to be expressed by means of the sign \( \rightarrow \ldots \). If we omit the little vertical stroke at the left of the horizontal stroke, then the judgement is to be transformed into a mere complex of ideas; the author [then] is not expressing his recognition or non-recognition of the truth of this. \ldots In this case, we qualify the expression with the words 'the circumstance that' or 'the proposition that'. \ldots As a constituent of the sign the horizontal stroke combines the symbols following it into a whole; assertion, which is expressed by the vertical stroke at the left end of the horizontal one, relates to the whole thus formed. The horizontal stroke I wish to call the content-stroke, and the vertical the judgement-stroke. \footnote{Frege, Begriffsschrift, in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, (ed. Geach and Black), pp. 1-2.}

With the publication of "Sense and Reference" Frege changed this somewhat, splitting the "content" into "thought" and "truth-value". But still, over and above these two aspects, there is in the judgement "the acknowledgment that the truth-value is the True." \footnote{Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Furth, pp. 6-7.} So for Frege, a judgement is an affirmation of the truth of a "content", an "assertion" of a "proposition."

This propositional content is characterised as a "complex of ideas". Likewise for Bradley, as we have seen, judgements are assertions; but what for Bradley corresponds to Frege's proposition? What is it that can be
true or false, and which a judgement affirms to be true?
It is not what Bradley calls propositions, for he uses
that term interchangeably with "judgement"; but he does,
as I suggested above, distinguish such an element in
judgements. His terminology for it is bewilderingly
prolix--an indication, I think, of its importance. In
the passage I quoted on page 4, for example, he calls
it both "ideal content" and simply "idea"--both of
which reflect a similarity to Frege. Elsewhere he
calls it "adjectival", a "floating adjective", a
"loosened adjective", and "adjective divorced", or even
a "predicate". Sometimes he gets especially literary
and talks of "a parasite cut loose, a spirit without a
body seeking rest in another, an abstraction from the
concrete, a mere possibility which by itself is nothing,
... paradoxical shadows and ghosts of fact. ..."¹
He is occasionally explicit enough, though, to let us
recognize a Fregean proposition: concerning one-word
judgements he says,

Such single words, it may perhaps be said, are
really interjections and never predicates. If
they were really interjections, we must stubbornly
maintain, they could not be the vehicle of truth
and falsehood.²

In short, predicates, i.e., ideal contents, are "vehicles
of truth and falsehood", a turn of phrase to gladden the

¹PL, I, 1, p. 8.
²PL, I, 2, p. 57.
heart of a modern logician. But here we must part company with Frege, for he goes on to analyse the content of a judgement in terms of what has since become an orthodoxy: function and argument. The expression "complex of ideas" is never emphasized, and even seems in the light of his subsequent work to be not much more than a metaphor. For Bradley, however, the notion of idea is central to his analysis of the judgement, and to get anywhere in understanding this analysis we shall have to be clear about what he thinks ideas are.

2. Ideas: Content and Existence;
   Signs and Meaning

Bradley introduces ideas in a very general and fundamental way by first noticing that there are two aspects or sides to everything that is: existence and content. Concerning anything, "we perceive both that it is and what it is."\(^1\) "For a fact to exist," he says, "it must be something."\(^2\) This distinction clearly applies to things in the world, to "facts" (which seem to be for him either things or complexes of things, parts of reality: facts are what exist). By pointing this out I mean to emphasize that what a thing is, its content, is an integral aspect of the thing itself. The content is not something in the mind's eye of the

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\(^1\) PL, I, 1, p. 3.
\(^2\) Ibid.
beholder, something stuck by the mind upon a bare 'that'. There are no bare etiolated 'thats' which possess no content, nor are there such 'thats' with content attached. These are just wrong ways of conceiving the matter. But what is a content, without which not? A fact, says Bradley,

is not real unless it has a character which is different or distinguishable from that of other facts. And this, which makes it what it is, we call its content. We may take as an instance any common perception. The complex of qualities and relations it contains, makes up its content, or that which it is. . . .

The content, then, consists of qualities and relations; but not just some of a thing's qualities and relations: the content of a particular dog is not just doginess, although that would be part of it. The content of that dog would be the complex of all its properties, its colour, weight, length of hair, etc., and relations, owned by so-and-so, born of so-and-so, etc.

This content, however, must be sufficient to make that dog different from all other dogs; but unless Bradley means that every thing or fact has an unique 'essential' property, possessed of and characteristic of it alone, he faces the notorious problem that any compound or complex of properties and relations is logically capable of multiple realization. The usual way out of this problem is to admit spatial and

1Ibid.
temporal relations as genuine relations of a thing on a par with all its other properties and relations. But Bradley seems to be of two minds on this issue. When he is explicitly discussing this topic, which he recognizes as the crux of the debate over the identity of indiscernables, he concedes that in some respects space and time are peculiar; however, he adds that, "all this is true, but it hardly shows that the character of space or time is not a character. . . ."¹ Things, it would seem, could genuinely differ merely spatially or temporally; and if they did not differ at least this way, then they must in some other way, if they really are things, and not one thing:

... So far as we know, there might be counterparts, one or more, of anything existing in space or time, and that, considered spatially or temporally, there would be between these different things absolutely no difference at all nor any possible distinction. They would differ, of course, . . . but that difference would not consist in space or time but merely in quality.²

Thus if the content of a fact or thing included spatial and temporal qualities and relations, it would be relatively simple to understand how that content differed from all others even though the non-spatio-temporal properties were indiscernable.

But elsewhere Bradley has different ideas. In discussing the nature of self-identity and things, he asks

¹AR, App. C, p. 528.
us to consider an atom which has moved from one place to another:

raise the doubt at the end of our atom's process, if the atom is the same. The question raised cannot be answered without an appeal to its character. It [i.e., the atom] is different in one respect—namely, the change of place; but in another respect—that of its own character—it remains the same. And this respect is obviously identical content.¹

A thing's content, its character, excludes spatial relations; it has the same character wherever it is. So what makes the content of one thing different from that of another thing cannot be sought in their respective places: change of place does not effect change of content, as one might have thought from the preceding quote. Another passage which suggests that a thing's character does not include spatial and temporal relations is the following:

For the identity in time of an existing thing ... you require both temporal continuity and again sameness in the thing's proper character. And mutatis mutandis what is true here about temporal continuity is true also about spatial. ... Now whether a wholly unbroken continuity in time or space is requisite for the singleness of a thing, is a question I here pass by; but some unbroken duration obviously is wanted if there is to be duration at all. And the maintainance of its character by the thing seems to me also to be essential. The character of course may change, but this change must fall outside of that which we take to be the thing's essential quality. For otherwise, ipso facto we have a breach in continuity.²

¹AR, I, 8, p. 62.
Bradley continues by saying that for a thing with content A to exist continually through some duration—even though a part of A, say b, might change—the rest of A, say c, must remain the same; this c contains the thing's essential quality, without which there cannot be duration. "The duration of a thing, unless the thing's quality is throughout identical, is really nonsense."¹ The point to notice here is that a thing's essential quality, a part of its character, remains the same while a thing endures through a change of time or space; hence temporal and spatial relations (which ex hypothesi do not remain the same) are not a part of the character, or at least not a part of the "essential" part of the thing's content.

The operative word here, as in the passages quoted above (pages 18 n. 1 and 19 n. 1) is "character," and it seems as though Bradley is in fact loading this word to act like "essence". Character is, or at least includes, an "essential" property of the thing in question; the uniqueness and distinctness of things is found reduplicated among their properties. This interpretation is greatly reinforced by a passage close to the one just quoted:

... Questions of identity turn always upon sameness in character, and the reason why you cannot reply [to such questions] generally, is that you do not know this general character which

¹Ibid.
is taken to make the thing's essence. It is not always material substance, for we might call an organism identical, though its particles were all different. It is not always shape, or size, or colour, or, again, always the purpose which the thing fulfills. The general nature, in fact, of a thing's identity seems to lie, first, in the avoidance of any absolute break in its existence, and, beyond that, to consist in some qualitative sameness which differs with different things. And with some things--because literally we do not know in what character their sameness lies--we are helpless when asked if identity has been preserved.1

We may sympathize with this helplessness Bradley has found, for it would seem to stem ultimately from his conception of character as an essence. If the character, or essence, of a thing is constituted by the complex of properties and relations internal to the thing, if they are what "make it up", Bradley appears to be holding a Lockean theory of real essences, and we and Bradley should naturally find the same difficulty Locke described concerning using real essences as a basis for distinguishing things: "Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate them, by their real essences, because we know them not."2 It is not all that clear that Bradley is advocating a doctrine of Lockean real essences, however, mainly because of an ambiguity in "character". Sometimes he does seem to mean by that

1AR, I, 8, p. 63.

2Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III, 6, 9, p. 246.
the content, the whole complex of properties and relations of a thing; at other times, as in the last passage cited, he writes as if "character" meant "property", albeit a special one. For if the general character of a thing is not always its shape, or size, etc., does this not suggest that in some cases it might be the shape, or size, etc? This certainly seems to be his meaning in the illustration he gives for the passage cited last, concerning whether a silk stocking, which is mended with other thread until no silk is left, is still the same stocking. The essence of a thing here seems to be some character with respect to which a changed thing is still the same thing. But how in the world this kind of sortal-essence of identification can furnish the principium individuationis for things is beyond me; this problem leaves me hopeless, not helpless. It does not improve matters much either if Bradley were taken to construe essence as a particular-property among the other general-properties of a thing, rather than a special one of its ordinary properties. For what is gained by saying that a thing has redness, roundness, smoothness, and "it-ness", even if we could make sense of that?

To sum up, Bradley sees two aspects to all that is: existence and content. The content of an existing thing or fact is the complex of properties and relations which characterize it. This content is supposed to be
sufficient to differentiate the thing or fact from all others, but Bradley is not clear as to how it is supposed to do this. He equivocates about space and time as properties or relations of a thing, and appears to advocate an essence as what individuates. But on either interpretation of what he means by essence, I cannot see how it will do what is required. My conclusion is that we should ignore the explanations in terms of essences, for neither are they particularly intelligible, nor will they play any more of a significant role in the subsequent exposition than they do in Bradley's general view. I think we should ignore also the claim that contents differentiate, because Bradley has not established it, nor do I see how he could short of counting spatial and temporal properties as genuine properties of a thing to which the identity of indiscernibles is applicable; but also, and worse, such a claim (that contents suffice for differentiation) is inconsistent with one of the most fundamental doctrines of his logic: that all judgements are general. For if a judgement is an idea which corresponds to the content of a fact, and which is referred (if true) to that fact in reality, then if this content were so constituted as to be the content of this and only this fact, the idea corresponding to this could be referred only to this fact; the idea itself would necessarily be a singular term, and
how then could the judgement be general? All of this should, I think, finally cause us to construe "content" as meaning for Bradley simply the complex of a thing's properties and relations, and to steer clear of the further implications he sometimes imputes to it.

The passages I have quoted above to show Bradley's equivocation on space and time as relations of a thing may not appear too convincing in the light of numerous places in which they are treated as such. But what is in question here is not whether space and time are relations or not (they clearly are for Bradley); the question is rather whether they are included in that "essential" part of a thing's character, so as to enable otherwise identical things to be differentiated on the basis of space or time alone. On this I think he is of two minds, at least on the present level of analysis. Compare, e.g., the passages discussed above on pages 18 and 19 with: "In the case of a single shed, where it remains throughout one and the same, it is still qualified by its temporal diversity, so as to be also so far different, and, so far again, not indiscernible." (PL, II, I, 6, p. 298 n. 5.) Also: "We must get rid of the erroneous notion (if we have it) that space and time are 'principles of individuation,' in the sense that a temporal or spatial exclusion will confer uniqueness upon any content." (PL, I, 2, p. 63.) I think these passages are plainly inconsistent, and that one cannot say that Bradley held one view and not the other. However, analysis is a falsification for Bradley, and when he moves in his dialectical fashion closer towards the 'real truth,' he becomes involved in further issues clearly incompatible with, e.g., the unchangingness of a moving atom. I am thinking in particular of the doctrine of internal relations. In discussing the suggestion that spatial relations are external to things, he says:

The question I am putting is whether relations can qualify terms A, B, and C, from outside merely and without in any way affecting and altering them internally. And this question I am compelled to answer negatively. At first sight obviously such external relations seem possible and even existing. They seem given to us, we saw, in change of spatial position and again also in comparison. That you do not alter what you compare or rearrange in space seems to Common Sense quite obvious. . . .

(AR, App. B, p. 314.) He continues with several arguments purporting to show
Ideas, as I noted at the outset, are not for Bradley something mental or psychical. To be sure, they are phenomena, as are "sensations and emotions", but for logic this is unimportant. What is important, logically that spatial relations also are internal. "The merely external," he concludes, "is, in short, our ignorance set up as reality...." (AR, App. B, p. 517.) To the objection that, in spite of his arguments, a billiard-ball or a man is the same even after moving about on or around the table, he replies:

A thing may remain unaltered if you identify it with a certain character, while taken otherwise the thing is suffering change. If, that is, you take a billiard-ball and a man in abstraction from place, they will of course--so far as this is maintained--be indifferent to change of place. But on the other hand neither of them, if regarded so, is a thing which actually exists; each is a more or less valid abstraction. But take them as existing things and take them without mutilation, and you must regard them as determined by their places and qualified by the whole material system into which they enter. And, if you demur to this, I ask you once more of what you are going to predicate the alterations and their results. The billiard-ball, to repeat, if taken apart from its place and its position in the whole, is not an existence but a character, and that character can remain unchanged, though the existing thing is altered with its changed existence. Everything other than this identical character may be called relatively external. It may, or it may not, be in comparison unimportant, but absolutely external it cannot be. And if you urge that in any case the relation of the thing's character to its spatial existence is unintelligible, and that how the nature of the thing which falls outside our abstraction contributes to the whole system, and how that nature is different as it contributes differently, is in the end unknown--I shall not gainsay you. But I prefer to be left with ignorance and with inconsistencies and with insoluble difficulties, difficulties essential to a lower and fragmentary point of view and soluble only by the transcendence of that appearance in a fuller whole, a transcendence which in detail seems for us impossible--I prefer, I say, to be left thus rather than to embrace a worse alternative. I cannot on any terms accept as absolute fact a mere abstraction and a fixed
speaking, is that ideas are symbols or signs for something else. (Bradley notes in passing that one might restrict the term symbol to natural signs, only to point out that he, to the contrary, uses the terms

standing inconsistency. (AR, App. B, pp. 517-518.)
A merely external qualification ... is but appearance and in the end is not rational or real. (AR, App. C, p. 528.)

In the end, presumably the Absolute, we transcend the appearance of external relations. But this is truly a Sisyphean ascension, for we have to push away not only space as external, but space itself, as well as time, and ultimately even relations and qualities. Moreover, into the maw of the Absolute we must finally heave the very distinction of fact and idea, and with it goes all thought as false. (Surely our labours must now be at an end!)

It may be thought that Bradley's doctrine of the concrete universal explains how judgement, while necessarily of one particular thing or fact, remains general. Unfortunately they are of no real help here, for they are simply (another name for) individuals, one thing containing or embracing a diversity. (PL, I, 6, p. 188.) Their generality is not the generality of an idea, but the generality of one thing containing a myriad of internal distinctions (qualities and relations). This may well be what all ideal complexes must in the end reduce to for Bradley—especially since he contrasts concrete universals with abstract ones, branding the latter unreal. In fact, he suggests, there is ultimately only one concrete universal, only one individual. (PL, I, 6, p. 190.) Not only do concrete universals not function as ideas, but really there is only one of them (AR, II, 13, pp. 124-126.) At this point I feel lost in agnosticism and silence; in the interests of continuing this discussion, therefore, I shall stick to the "subordinate view", and shall be content to remain with ignorance at such a "lower and fragmentary" level, or perhaps worse. Bradley himself occasionally thus rationalizes the particular direction of his thought when it suits him: I shall do likewise. This means, as far as I am concerned, that the concrete universal is unintelligible, that judgements employ abstract universals, that abstract universals, i.e., ideas, are different from facts and things, "... that for working purposes we treat, and do well to treat, some relations as external merely ..." (AR, App. B, p. 515.), and that ideas are not particular, i.e., they cannot
interchangeably.) In any idea there is both meaning and image, and the image is "nothing but a sensible reality".¹ It is the **symbolic** nature of an idea that is relevant.

As we have seen above, all facts have two aspects, existence and content. A symbol, however, has a third side, "its signification, or that which it means".² Are symbols or signs a special kind of fact? That this is so is clearly Bradley's intention, for he says,

But there is a class of facts which possess an other and additional third side. They have meaning; and by a sign we understand any sort of fact which is used as a meaning.³

One would therefore think that we have tables, rocks, houses, etc., on the one hand, and on the other, maces, foxes, doves, etc.; these later, like the former, exist and are something, but they also stand for monarchical authority, cunning, peace, etc. Bradley does think of symbols this way--indeed the fox example is his own. He also talks of flowers which we give to someone: it is not important that we give this or that flower, even though that is just what we do. We do give a particular

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¹PL, I, 1, p. 7.
²PL, I, 1, p. 3.
³Ibid.
flower, but only as a symbol, the meaning of which (friendship, etc.) will likely outlast the physical flower itself. The meaning we associate with a symbol may or may not be related to the content of the symbol as fact: Bradley says that the "meaning consists of a part of the content (original or acquired)". This is easy enough to understand for certain cases, i.e., those where the meaning is related to the content of the fact-symbol, where the symbol stands for a part of the original content of the symbol—for example, a rose standing for roseness, or more prosaically, for the genus Rosa, say, in a botanical museum. This is a simple matter of abstraction, in the sense of ignoring all the properties and relations of the sample except the desired ones; here "a part of the content" just means some one (or several) of the properties and/or relations which constitute the content of the thing or fact acting as a symbol. What is troublesome is the alternative case, where the meaning is not related to part of the (original) content of the fact-symbol, but relates instead to an acquired part. Obviously something along this line is required for the earlier examples: friendship is certainly not part of the content of any flower, hence it must be acquired. But how are we to understand this? How do we add to the content of a thing when the content

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1PL, I, 1, p. 4. Underline added.
is the complex of properties and relations it has? I can imagine giving a flower some new properties, such as painting the petals a different colour, or removing a petal, and the like. But how do we cause it to have friendship, as a property of its own, so that we can subsequently confine our attention to that part of its (acquired) content, and thus use it as a symbol? I suspect Bradley is here confusing together an idea with a thing's content, of which I shall have more to say below.

This problem of property acquisition infects words also; Bradley includes word-inscriptions (word-tokens) as facts: "The paper and ink are facts unique and with definite qualities." These qualities might be such things as black, boldface type, in English, five letters, etc. But as a symbol, none of these are operative: "In reading, we apprehend not paper or ink, but what they represent. . . ." Although he nowhere actually says so, words for him probably represent ideas; thus "horse" would represent an idea of a horse. (This is reinforced by a footnote in Appearance and Reality, where, having said that the mental existence of ideas is a matter for psychology, he remarks that invoking "Language" to account for abstract ideas is unsatisfactory, as that

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1PL, I, 1, p. 4.

2Ibid.
tells us nothing of what passes through the mind. He seems to be saying that while parts of language, i.e., words and expressions, represent or mean ideas, it does not help us discover the mental image--especially for abstract ideas--just to be told the word which represents the idea.\(^1\) How, then, has the idea of a horse become part of the content of "horse", which is supposedly a lot of qualities of ink and paper? Ignoring this difficulty, a word or expression is a sign for an idea. An idea is also a sign. Bradley also suggests, without elaboration, that all signs are ideas; this strikes me as false, but that does not affect his main point that all ideas are signs. As signs they are facts; they have mental existence in the form of images, and the characteristics of the images are their contents. This much he concedes to 'psychologism'; having conceded it, he relegates these aspects to psychology as unimportant for logic. It is only their meanings which are logically relevant. An idea only becomes an idea for logic "when it begins to exist for the sake of its meaning."\(^2\) But we now come upon the same difficulty observed above: "... its [i.e., an idea's] meaning, we may repeat, is a part of the content, used without

\(^1\)AR, II, 24, p. 352.

\(^2\)PL, I, 1, p. 5.
regard to the rest, or the existence." The content of an idea, as Bradley is well aware, includes properties and relations such as vivacity, fleetness—or perhaps it is an idée fixe—priority to some other idea, concurrency with a thirst, etc. In his own words,

I have the "idea" of a horse, and that is a fact in my mind, existing in relation with the congeries of sensations and emotions and feelings, which make my momentary state.

How then is anything remotely relevant to a horse got from all this? Or if horiness has been added as further content, which then serves as that part of the whole content which the idea means, whence this content (remembering, of course, that contents are complexes of instantiated properties, that they constitute the character of a thing, in this case a mental fact, an image)? Horiness is found in horses, not jostling in a man's mind with the congeries of emotion and what-not.

It may be a puzzle why Bradley did not appreciate this dilemma in such examples as the fox symbolizing cunning; but we can see why it did not bother him in the case of ideas as signs. In his account of the content of an idea he trades upon an ambiguity in "content":

A) the content of an idea on the one hand is its qualities and relations as an existing fact, a

1Ibid.
2Ibid.
fact in my mind jostling with other sensations and emotions for my attention,

B) on the other hand the content of an idea—_and this of course is a very natural way of speaking—_is the complex of properties and relations of whatever is in the image itself.

In this latter sense, if I have an idea of a horse, the content would include (say) bay, fifteen hands tall, shod, etc. But natural though this way of speaking may be, Bradley cannot justify it, given what he has told us an idea is. It evades the problem raised above rather neatly, however, by permitting the case of ideas to be assimilated to the type of meaning represented by the rose/Rosa example. Just abstract away from the various particulars of the horse in your image, and you are left with what is common to all horses, and this is what your idea of horse means.

Another difficulty arises about ideas: if their meanings are part of the content (in sense A), and the content concerns qualities of an actual mental fact, are not ideas themselves irredeemably mental? (Assuming that my acquired content would also have this mental character, for how to add something non-mental to something mental is an unsolved problem for Cartesians.) Again this is met, or rather avoided, by taking content in sense B; the meaning of the idea is a common property (or complex of them), a universal, something
general abstracted from what the image is an image of, not from the psychical fact itself. And although the image of a horse is mental, the horse which the mental event images is not. Thus the meaning is not mental. Or so it would seem; I shall remark further on this, and on the general implications of Bradley's employment of this ambiguity.

It may be thought that because of the emphasis we have noticed upon the "factuality" of ideas, on the equal status of things and ideas in respect of their being facts, that Wittgenstein's picture theory bears some considerable resemblance to Bradley's doctrine of ideas, especially when we remember that for Bradley ideas are not only of things, like horses, but also of facts, like horse-being-in-the-barn, and that judgement is a claim that an idea fits a fact. Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus,

The world divides into facts. A picture is a model of reality. A picture is a fact. Logical pictures can depict the world. A logical picture of facts is a thought. I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign. A propositional sign is a fact. Only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot.1

Here we have signs expressing a sense, or thought, which is a logical picture depicting facts, a model of reality. Signs with sense, which represent facts, are also

1Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1.2, 2.12, 2.141, 2.19, 3, 3.12, 2.14, 3.142.
themselves facts. For Bradley, ideas are signs expressing a "sense", which in turn is a "logical picture" of what the ideas mean or represent; they represent facts and are facts as well. But this similarity is superficial, as might already have been gathered from the preceding discussion. Facts for Wittgenstein are concatenations of objects, they are irreducibly pluralistic, while for Bradley they are not; rather they are artificially isolated bits of the one substance, reality. But even as such, they are unitary and cannot be analyzed into individuals in concatenation. Thus Wittgenstein calls propositional signs facts because they are composed of objects, i.e., names, in concatenation (not just in lists, a set); they picture the world because there is a one-to-one correspondence between these parts of the sign and parts of the world, and also between the structure amongst the names (logical form) and the structure of concatenation. All of this is quite alien to Bradley. Moreover, propositional signs are not mental, whatever else they are; ideas, as facts, certainly are. On the other hand, what a propositional sign expresses, a thought, would seem to be mental, and we saw that the meaning expressed by an idea is mental too, unless "content" is construed in sense B. But as I hope to make clear below, it is this second version of "content" that is most important for Bradley, rendering even this similarity illusory. A further complication,
however, finally makes the whole project of comparison otiose: Bradley ultimately rejects that ideas, for logic, are facts at all. An idea, he says, only becomes an idea for logic "when it begins to exist for the sake of its meaning".\(^1\) And as we saw earlier, its meaning "is a part of the content, used without regard to the rest, or the existence."\(^2\) Again he says, 

The "idea", if that is the psychical state, is in logic a symbol. But it is better to say, the idea is the meaning, for existence and unessential content are wholly discarded. . . . The mental event is unique and particular, but the meaning in its use is cut off from the existence. . . . An idea, if we use idea of the meaning, is neither given nor presented but taken. It cannot as such exist. It can not ever be an event, with a place in the series of time or space. It can be a fact no more inside our heads than it can outside them.\(^3\)

Thus because logical ideas do not exist, they are not facts; this removes the main point of comparing Bradley to Wittgenstein. But it introduces a problem for Bradley which I do not think he ever satisfactorily resolved; it is connected with the ambiguity of "content". He saw it as an ambiguity in "idea", and expressed it in a Hegelian fashion rather untypical of his Logic:

**Thesis.** On the one hand no possible idea can be that which it means.

\(^1\)PL, I, 1, p. 5.

\(^2\)Ibid. Underlines added.

\(^3\)PL, I, 1, pp. 6-7.
Antithesis. On the other hand no idea is anything but just what it means.  

He explains this, thinking that he thereby explains it away, by saying that in the first case the idea is the psychical image, but in the second it is the logical signification: "In the first it is the whole sign, but in the second it is nothing but the symbolized." He has not noticed the ambiguity in "the symbolized", which for him is the same as "the meaning". This term can be taken or construed in at least three distinct and important ways:

1) the content of my image as a fact itself  
(fleeting, vivid, etc.),

2) the content consisting of the abstract universal which the thing or fact shares with its image in my mind,

3) the thing or fact which is being symbolized.

The last of these can be (for the time being) ruled out, for immediately after the passage last quoted he goes on to emphasize the essential distinction between facts and ideas, in the sense of meaning; i.e., the meaning of an idea is not the fact to which it applies, if true (or any other fact, for that matter). We are left, however, with the other two.

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1PL, I, 1, p. 6.

2PL, I, 1, pp. 6-7.
Although Bradley never, I think, directly appreciated this ambiguity, it caused him to vacillate when he thought further about the connection of ideas and existence. When he seems to be thinking of the meaning of signs principally as parts of the contents of a psychical fact, he insists that in this respect they always do exist, although this is irrelevant for logic. He notes that for more abstract ideas there are certain psychological difficulties; presumably he has in mind the difficulty of conjuring up an image of justice or the like. But this does not seriously bother him; he says he follows Berkeley in this connection, that any idea as "mental fact contains always an irrelevant sensuous setting."¹ Later in an appended footnote, and also in Essays on Truth and Reality, he relents a bit and says that there need not always be an associated image, but still the idea, if it is an idea, must have some individual, particular mental existence.² Clearly, in these contexts he must have been thinking of the content of the idea as those qualities and relations it has as a fact itself, for how could the meaning be part of what is in the image if there is no image?

On the other hand, when he was thinking of the meanings of signs as part of the content, where content

¹PL, I, 1, p. 7, n.; on p. 38 n. 8 he suggests changing "sensuous" to "psychical".
²PL, I, 1, p. 38 n. 8; ETR, III, p. 29 n. 1.
is taken in the second way distinguished, he continually has recourse to the kind of metaphors we noticed earlier: "cut off", "floating", etc. Literally, these ways of speaking imply that there is something which is now no longer connected. It is as though he is suggesting that the idea, separated for logic from its existence as a mental fact, never-the-less has a kind of shadowy existence of its own; perhaps one could say it "subsists". There are better grounds for reading Bradley this way than construing his metaphors literally, however; in a note (in the original edition) to the claim that the meaning of a sign is part of the content, "cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign", he says,

It would not be correct to add "and referred away to another real subject"; for where we think without judging, and where we deny, that description would not be applicable. Nor is it the same thing to have an idea, and to judge it possible. To think of a chimera is to think of it as real, but not to judge it even possible.¹

Referring an idea to a real subject I take to mean asserting that the complex of properties that is the idea is somewhere instantiated. Thus he is saying that there are ideas that are not instantiated. I may truly assert that John is married, referring the idea of John's-being-married to the fact in reality of John's marriage; but I might have merely wondered

¹PL, I, 1, p. 4.
whether he was. Or I might have denied it, or asserted that he was single, i.e., asserted falsely, attempting here to refer an idea, John's-being-single, to a fact, but failing for lack of a fact. Or again, I might think of a round square without asserting the possibility of such an idea being anywhere realized. But if I have an idea of something that cannot, or does not, or even may or may not exist, still there must be the idea. To speak in Bradley's way, if there is an idea which I refer to a real subject when I assert, there must be the same idea still if I choose not to assert it, but merely to consider it. But we can consider many ideas which, were we to assert them, we would assert falsely, and some we would necessarily assert falsely. There thus must be some ideas which we might not, some we do not, and some we could not refer to reality. There must be some ideas which "continue to float", indeed some which needs be always "float", or continue to "subsist" in some other realm.

That such an interpretation of this passage is not over-drawn is evidenced by Bradley's own later repudiation of it in an added footnote, and by an extended discussion of the problem in the Essays. The same Berkeleyan scruple against the existence of abstract ideas which caused him originally--when thinking about meaning as part of the content of mental, existing facts--to deny that there could be ideas without some mental image (because he could not, at that time, see
how an idea could be a psychic reality, a mental fact, and hence have a proper existence, unless there were an associated "sensuous setting"), later caused him to say—when thinking about meaning as part of the content construed as certain properties of the thing imaged—that there are no ideas not referred to some reality. \(^1\) I shall pursue this later revision a bit, for it throws considerable light on how we should ultimately understand Bradley concerning the ambiguity of "content", and also because it puts into clear relief a major problem hinted at parenthetically on page 36 concerning the distinction of fact and idea.

The problem which seems to have bothered Bradley is that ideas seem to be able to have some sort of existence unconnected with either the mind or the world; unconnected with the mind, since the existence of an idea in the mind has nothing to do with ideas as logical symbols, and moreover he later admits that the aspect of a sign which is its individual existence may, in the case of ideas, be absent; unconnected with the world, since some ideas are obviously not found, some even cannot be found in the world, and of those which can be, they always might be used in what I earlier called statements, as opposed to assertions. But this is abstractionism and Platonism which Bradley finds

\[^1\text{PL, I, I, p. 38 N. 7.}\]
repugnant. What then to do with ideas not instantiated in reality, in the actual world?

This problem is similar to certain problems dealt with by Meinong, Russell, and Wittgenstein. When Meinong considered what the idea of the golden mountain meant, he suggested that it was not really cut off from reality because there are no golden mountains; rather, it names an object as do all singular terms. Objects, however, need not actually exist, i.e., subsist—whether they do or not is a matter of fact (or logic, presumably, in the case of self-contradictory objects). His solution might be viewed as a novel and somewhat radical analysis of our conception of "object", one necessitated by our doctrine of what and how singular terms mean. Or it has been construed as suggesting an ambiguity in "existence", used in one way of anything of which we talk, and in another way—properly called "subsistence"—when what is said to exist does so in the actual world. Russell read Meinong this way, and rejected this theory because such objects "are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent present King of France exists, and also does not exist..." Russell's own theory had been similar in that, on the basis of the requirement

1 Linsky, Referring, ch. II.
2 Russell, "On Denoting", in Logic and Knowledge, p. 45.
that all constituents of a sentence denote something, he also thought that there were objects denoted by such expressions as "the golden mountain", "the number 7", etc., laid up neatly in the "timeless realm of Being."¹ Unlike Meinong, Russell thought of these as existing objects, taking both these terms univocally. As is well known, he abandoned this way of thinking when he conceived his theory of descriptions; with that theory he skirted the problem of what to do with such names that name nothing by simply saying that there are no such names. These 'pseudo-names' are not expressions with denotations, for any sentence in which they occur can be analyzed into another complex sentence in which they do not have the appearance of denoting expressions. Wittgenstein, accepting Russell's theory of descriptions (and the associated apparatus of quantification), simply ruled: no objects, no names.

All of these theories, which ontologically might be called, respectively, the theories of "odd objects" or "split-level existence", of "objects bountiful", of "vanishing denoters", and finally of "unnamable non-objects", are alike in being designed to account for seemingly unrealized ideas (to revert to Bradley's way of speaking) for singular terms, ideas which, if appropriately realized, would be ideas of single things.

¹Russell, Principles of Mathematics, p. x.
For Bradley, however, the problem is more general, because although ideas when they are attached, are attached to one thing, namely, some portion of reality, the particular part is usually more complex than one individual. Ideas, in other words, as well as being of a golden mountain or 7, can also be of the-horse-being-in-the-barn. This means that Bradley considers this problem about "wandering" ideas to include those discussed by Russell concerning what corresponds to propositions or judgements as a whole. In particular, Russell asks: if there is one complex, object, a fact, which corresponds to a true proposition, what corresponds to negative propositions, or worse to false ones? The way Russell poses this question, and the answer he gives, would seem to indicate that he was aiming directly at a position like Bradley's; for Bradley's rejection of unrealized ideas in denials, false judgements, and the like suggests that there must be something in which they are realized. But Russell did not have Bradley in mind, even though Bradley's account appeared two years before Russell's, and Russell was certainly acquainted with it.¹

¹Russell's discussion is found in "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", first published as ch. VII of Philosophical Essays, 1910; it is an elaboration of the last part of an article reprinted in part as the preceding chapter, in which there is a footnote to Bradley's article of 1908, subsequently reprinted as ch. III of Essays on Truth and Reality, which contains his account of seemingly unrealized ideas.
The reason I bother to point this out is that Russell thought that the only way of answering the demand that some one thing correspond to a false proposition is the way of Meinong. That way would posit some objective fact, an objective falsehood, as though there were some event, a false event, actually in the world, such as for example, Humphrey's election to the Presidency, that corresponded to, or was the 'fleshing-out' of "Humphrey was elected President". Russell rejected the thesis that something corresponds to false propositions on the strength of his rejection of Meinong's "objectives", but he failed to realize that this argument requires (falsely) that Meinong's theory is the only one possible as an explanation of false propositions, assuming that there is something to which they correspond. Bradley assumed this, and suggested an alternative account to Meinong's, but it was never considered by Russell, who was content to express incredulity at the prospect of the existence of false facts, and then to state his own theory.

The account he did offer of false propositions was in terms of a theory of judgement which described judgement as a complex relation between some element of a self or mind and the various parts of an objective complex corresponding to the logical parts of the proposition judged. "Thus if I judge that A loves B, that is

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1Linsky, Referring, p. 13.
not a relation of me to 'A's love for B', but a relation between me and A and love and B.¹ As Geach would symbolize it: \( R(M,A,L,B) \). This does permit Russell to avoid postulating the falsehood of A's love for B if in fact A does not love B. If the judgement is false or true the relation \( R \) between me, A, B, and the relation of love \( L \) still obtains; but in the former case \( L \) does not relate A and B, in the latter it does. This account is not satisfactory, as Geach has pointed out:² firstly: there would be different judging relations \( R \) for each type and number of relations of the relation being judged. In Russell's example, if A and B are individuals, \( L \) is of type one and dyadic, and \( R \) is type two and tetradic. But if I judge that A gave B to C, my judgement is pentadic, or if I judge that "larger than" is converse to "smaller than", my judgement is expressed by a relation of (at least) type three. Secondly, it is not clear that a relation can be one thing alongside those things it relates, all of which are somehow otherwise related; it is not for nothing that relations are symbolized with gaps, \( L(\ , \ ) \), and not just \( L \). But what are the gaps to be filled with? Not surely those things it relates, for that would simply reintroduce the complex which Russell is trying to avoid. But if the

blanks are simply left blank (or what amounts to the same thing, if relation symbols were considered well-formed when standing alone with no gaps), we would seemingly have relations independent of what they relate, and the way would be open to Bradley's famous regress of relations relating relations relating relations . . . . ¹ Thirdly, if the relation L is before the mind, but not as relating A and B, or anything else in particular, how is the "sense" or direction of L perceived? If we are thinking of "loves" alone, how do we distinguish A loves B from the converse?²

These objections are directed at the technical adequacy of the formal analysis of things related in a judgement, and do not affect Russell's assumption that a proposition cannot be construed as one member in simple dyadic relation between the proposition and something else in the world. He supported this, as I remarked above, by rejecting Meinong's objective falsehoods. D. F. Pears has suggested that an alternative

¹This is not exactly Geach's second objection, but I cannot see the force in his way of putting it.

²Russell himself gave up this analysis because it required a self or subject; he returned to a Meinongian theory of objectives, or objective facts, which are referred to (not meant) by propositions; while all propositions (themselves facts too) are positive, objectives could be positive or negative, the latter if the corresponding proposition contained "not". There are no false facts, however; if "it is not raining" is false, its objective would be that it is raining. Generally, if a proposition is false, its objective is the actual fact which renders it so; but the constituents in the objective of a false proposition may well
to Meinong's theory was adopted by Wittgenstein; propositions correspond to possible states of affairs, true ones being actual states of affairs, false ones remaining merely possible.\footnote{D. F. Pears, \textit{Bertrand Russell and the British Tradition in Philosophy}, pp. 200-201.} He points out the similarity of Wittgenstein's atomic facts (\textit{Sachverhalte}) to Meinong's objectives, but says that Russell's objections do not apply to Wittgenstein. Meinong considered using "\textit{Sachverhalt}" instead of "\textit{Objective}", and Husserl and other phenomenologists actually did use "\textit{Sachverhalt}" to represent something which could possibly be the case.\footnote{Max Black, \textit{A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus}, p. 41.} But whether or not Wittgenstein did is a highly controversial matter, with persuasive arguments on both sides.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 39-45.} I personally agree with Anscombe and Black that for Wittgenstein \textit{Sachverhalte} are best understood as atomic facts. But my purpose here is not to get involved in interpreting the \textit{Tractatus}, so let us merely assume for the time being with Pears that elementary propositions represent possibilities which may or may not exist, that "a proposition has a sense that is not be the constituents meant by the various parts of the proposition itself. See "On Propositions", \textit{Logic and Knowledge}, pp. 314-320. He later even discarded negative facts by resorting to psychological criteria of belief and disbelief, and ultimately to feelings of "surprise" and "quite-so".}
independent of the facts . . .", that "the sense of a proposition is its agreement or disagreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs [Sachverhalte]."¹ Pears rightly points out that it would be absurd to expect to discover the meaning of a proposition by inspecting possibilities which, after all, are nowhere to be inspected. But if a proposition is already understood, yet false, it seems quite innocent to speak of it as representing a possibility, a possible fact.² It is not innocent if we construe possibilities as something just like actual facts, only unfortunately not yet summoned up by Fate from a nether place where they were ranked alongside the actual-facts-to-be. But we might construe possible facts simply as a way of speaking about what certain descriptions (false ones) would describe if they were true. This makes possibilities parasitic upon true propositions, which is as it should be; language, if it connects with the world, does so through those parts of it which are true. But we are now presented with true propositions representing facts, false ones possibilities, and possibilities are what would be facts were false propositions true: shades of Meinong again! But this is harmless enough if we think of possibilities as we do of

¹Wittgenstein, op. cit., 4.061, 4.2.
²Pears, op. cit., pp. 200-201.
descriptions in general—there no more needs be Humphrey’s election to the Presidency than there need be the round square.

Whether or not Wittgenstein thought of Sachverhalte as actual states of affairs or as possibilities may be moot; but a contemporary logician, Hintikka, speaks unequivocally of possible states of affairs, or possible worlds. He intends these phrases to be taken in a quite ordinary way: “Anyone who has ever considered, say, the probability of the different possibilities regarding tomorrow’s weather has considered several ‘possible states of affairs’.” It would be more natural to speak of different possibilities concerning our ‘actual’ world than to speak of several possible worlds. For the purpose of logical and semantical analysis, the second locution is more appropriate than the first, however.”

The notion of possible worlds is quite precise for Hintikka: it amounts to a certain

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2Hintikka, “A Program . . .”, op. cit., p. 73.

3Hintikka, “Meaning as Multiple Reference”, op. cit., p. 341.
development of model theory for first-order logic.¹ He establishes six criteria which define what he calls model sets. He then can say that a sentence is true in some possible world "if and only if it occurs as a member of some model set. . . ."² These model sets describe kinds of possible worlds, rather than the possible worlds themselves as do the state-descriptions of Carnap, since the sentences comprising the sets contain no names (except for particular sentences under consideration) as in Carnapian state-descriptions, but only quantifiers and bound variables. Using this seminal idea of possible worlds, Hintikka is able to cut boldly across many problems, including false propositions, interpretation of modal systems, intensional (or "referentially opaque") contexts, clarification of the worth and limits of the "picture theory" as a description of the way language and reality are connected, and the nature of singular terms as individuating functions. Technical details will not be gone into here. For the issue at hand we need only consider false propositions. Any particular proposition can be false only relative to some possible world or worlds (or all of them if it is self-contradictory). With regard to those worlds, its negation is true, and hence its existentially generalized

¹Hintikka, "A Program . . .", op. cit., p. 75.
²Hintikka, "A Program . . .", op. cit., p. 79.
negation is a member of the model sets which describe the kinds of worlds it is false in. Those model sets which contain the existential generalization of the proposition itself (rather than its negation) describe the kinds of worlds in which it is true. Now what is generally called a false proposition simpliciter, what Russell was considering, for example, is one whose negation is in the model set describing the kind of possible world we consider "actual" or "real". A false proposition corresponds to a state of affairs in a possible world, but not the one kind of possible world we consider actual.

So far I have not mentioned Hintikka's treatment of judgement. Although I am not acquainted with anything by him in which judgements are specifically dealt with, I imagine he would include them under his general category of "personal modalities";¹ the logic of the 'judgement mode', as with logics in general, would be "a study of the properties and interrelations of different possible worlds."² Fortunately, there is no need to second-guess Hintikka on judging, nor to attempt giving sense to Wittgenstein's mysterious account of propositional attitudes,³ because it is not really the

¹Hintikka, "A Program . . .", op. cit., p. 73, where he equates this expression with "propositional attitude".
²Hintikka, "A Program . . .", op. cit., p. 72.
³Wittgenstein, op. cit., 5.542.
act of judging that I am interested in. Russell's theory of judgement was brought up because it was in that context that he discussed Meinong's objective correlates to false propositions—i.e., Russell himself had recourse to judging in his attempt to account for false propositions. We need not bring up judging when we interest our selves in alternative accounts, such as the one using possibilities as the correspondents of false propositions. After all, it is Bradley we are ultimately interested in here, and as we saw earlier, Bradley's judgements are what I have (following Frege among others) called "assertions". Assertions are propositions which are claimed to be true, or for Bradley, a "content" or "complex of ideas" which is claimed to be true, i.e., found in reality. Comparing Bradley to Hintikka, then, it is enough to consider the proposition, and how it relates, truly or falsely, to the world.

Bradley's answer to the problem of uninstantiated, or "floating" ideas (arising from false judgements, denials, negations, suppositions, etc.) is, like Hintikka's, to speak of a multiplicity of worlds.\(^1\)

Any idea which seems to "float" in one world, is actually anchored in another.

\(^1\)I am here and for the next few pages deliberately exaggerating the similarities between Bradley and Hintikka; see pp. 44-45, where the differences between their "multiplicities of worlds" is explicitly recognised.
In the end and taken absolutely (to repeat this) there can be no mere idea. Reality is always before us, and every idea in some sense qualifies the real. So far as excluded it is excluded only from some limited region, and beyond that region has its world. To float in the absolute sense is impossible. Flotation means attachment to another soil, a realm other than that sphere which for any purpose we take here as solid ground and fact.1

What are these worlds, and how does Bradley describe them? One of them, 'that sphere we take as fact', he describes as

the world which is continuous with my body. It is the construction which in my waking hours I build round this centre. My body, taken in one with my present feelings and with the context which in space and time I can connect with this basis, is regarded by me as actual fact while all else is unreal.2

But the claim that "all else is unreal" is false; the world continuous with "my felt waking body" is only one of many realities to be distinguished within the "whole Universe or the Absolute Reality". He says that "the subject in a judgement is never Reality in the fullest sense. It is reality taken, or meant to be taken, under certain conditions and limits."3 These limits determine various separate worlds, "worlds all more or less real but all, so far as it appears, more or less independent."4 He lists a great variety of such worlds:

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1 ETR, III, pp. 35-36.
3 ETR, III, p. 32.
4 ETR, III, p. 31.
the outer world of sensuous fact; the inner world of ideas, feelings, and moods; the present world; the world of "ambiguous existence" (past and future); the worlds of duty, religion, hope, desire, dream, madness, drunkenness, error, politics, commerce, invention, trade, and manufacture; the worlds of intellectual truth and science; the world of imagination (poetry, fiction, arts in general).¹ Reality in some measure is found in all of these, as are validity and truth. This is by no means a complete list, for "the diversity and even the division of our various worlds is indefinite and in a sense is endless."²

Bradley proceeds to argue in some detail against various specific ways in which it might be thought that ideas "float"; we need not pursue him into these, for generally speaking, his arguments are basically all of the same nature: they purport to show how an idea repelled here, is actually found to fall somewhere else, in some other world. His emphatic conclusion is that

Every possible idea therefore may be said to be used existentially, for every possible idea qualifies and is true of a real world. And the number of real worlds, in a word, is indefinite. Every idea therefore in a sense is true, and is true of reality.³

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
³ETR, III, p. 42.
It will be remembered that our interest in Bradley's treatment of "floating" ideas was motivated by a desire to decide in which sense the content of an idea is to be understood: is the content (part of which is the meaning) of an idea the complex of properties and relations of the idea as a fact, i.e., as an image occurring in my mind, or is it the complex of properties and relations of the thing in the image? Bradley's introduction and explanation of signs (although itself not without difficulties of a similar nature) seem to require the first; the way he occasionally speaks of ideas seems to require the second. Consider now the following passage on "floating" ideas:

If 'judgement' is used in its ordinary sense of explicit judgement, where we have a distinct predicate and subject taken as one applied to the other, then it certainly is true that apart from judgement we have ideas. And if the issue is raised thus, and if not to be so predicated means to float, then inevitably we shall be forced to believe in floating ideas. For in doubt and denial, to take obvious instances, we should find the evidence that they exist. But the issue, if so raised, I must go on to urge, is raised wrongly. We have not to choose everywhere between an idea which is predicated and an idea which simply floats. On the contrary, an ideal content can qualify and be attached to a subject apart from any predication in the proper sense or any explicit judgement. And by virtue of such an attachment the ideas which relatively float are everywhere from another point held captive. The idea comes before my mind as in suspension and as loose from a certain subject, and so far it floats. But none the less as an adjective it qualifies another subject. It is not predicated of this other subject, but it comes as attached to it or as inhering there.1

1EMR, III, pp. 32-33.
This is understandable only if ideal content is taken in the second sense, for how could vividness, for example, "qualify and be attached to a subject", say, a horse? The whole tenor of this discussion, indeed the whole problem of "floating" ideas itself and Bradley's proposed solution of it, suggest that the meaning of an idea is a part of the properties and relations of what is in the image. What purports to "float" is an idea of a golden mountain, but what (problematically) does not appear to be found in the world is the instantiation of the complex of properties "golden" and "mountain", not some properties and relations of the mental image of a golden mountain which (the image, that is) is found in the world (in my head in fact). Thus I think we should construe "content" and thus "meaning" (as a part of the content) in the second way, in sense 2) of page 36: the content consists of the abstract universal which the thing or fact shares with its image in my mind.

There is, however, a subtle but important difference between this formulation and the impression to be gained from the quoted passage. Whereas I have distinguished between the thing or fact and the image of it which is my idea, Bradley says that the idea, as an "adjective", "qualifies another subject". "It comes as attached to it or as inhering there."¹ What ideas qualify, or are

¹Ibid.
predicated of, is a subject--some fact or thing in some world or other; also the ideas come already "attached". In other words, the relevant complex of properties and relations are the properties and relations of some thing or fact, not just those properties and relations as they are found in my image. Bradley has merged these two, and thus has blurred what he earlier emphasized as a fundamental distinction between fact and idea. The meaning of an idea is a relevant part of the complex_1 of properties and relations of what is in the image, but this complex_2 is always found to "inhere", i.e., to be instantiated in some subject, some reality: that is why they do not "float". Bradley's answer to this problem of "floating" ideas therefore includes the identification of the two indexed complexes of the preceding sentence, that is, the identification of the properties and relations of actual things with the properties and relations of the thing as imaged. The result is that an idea of a thing is the same as a part of the thing's own content, a conclusion that Bradley perhaps would not ultimately reject in view of his metaphysics of the Absolute wherein all distinctions dissolve.

This situation can be seen from another aspect if we compare more closely Bradley's and Hintikka's multiplicities of worlds. What surely could not have
been missed earlier is the difference in the way these worlds are described: for Hintikka, worlds other than the actual, real, presented world are mere possibilities --they are nothing, really, but fictions described by a set of logically consistent sentences, at least one of which is false in the actual world. Bradley's worlds, on the other hand, are an extraordinary pot-pourri of disciplines, view-points, forms of discourse, careers, emotional states, and what-not. I have no idea what sort of criteria there are for anything to be a world in Bradley's sense, nor, hence, any idea of how to indefinitely extend his list of them as he says we might. (I suspect that his worlds may be vaguely akin to Wittgenstein's later "language games", but I could not support such a conjecture.)

In spite of all that, it is obvious that Bradley considers all these worlds real, not just possible; indeed, he puts it even more strongly: every possible idea is found somewhere in reality, in some real world.¹

This to my mind is Platonism with a vengeance! If for

¹ETR, III, p. 42. Does "every possible idea" include self-contradictory ones? He says that while they do in some sense exist, ultimately they are creatures of the intellect, and are not found in the one self-consistent reality; the sense in which they exist he describes by saying that, being repulsed from the 'real' world, they "fall into and coalesce with the residual mass of unspecified conjunction." What sense that makes I shall not venture to say. See ETR, III, p. 41n; AR, App. A, pp. 510-511.
any idea we may cook up, there is a world to be automatically found for it, we have arrived at the converse of the reduplication of the world in ideas (where for each thing, even hair, dirt, and dung, there is an idea): here we have for each idea a world. While the former renders thought needlessly prolix, the latter makes it silly— it removes the raison d'être of a distinction between facts and ideas. While perhaps reality and ideality do not coalesce, in such a circumstance they become coextensive, and the idea of a thing becomes simply part of the thing's properties and relations. The traditional distinction between a thing and its properties and relations survives (or as Bradley puts it, between existence and content), and it is to this that the distinction between fact and idea has shifted.

Ideas, if that term still be used, are subclasses of the complexes which constitute the contents of facts. This is not going quite as far as 1) on page 36, where the meaning of an idea is the thing, rather like the meaning of a Russellian name being what it denotes. It would be (or better, there would be no point in differentiating the idea from the thing) if the idea were the full content (all the properties and relations), and if the content were supposed to be or include the "essential character" of the thing; but we have seen reasons for rejecting both. Moreover, such ideas would be ideas of particulars, of single things or facts, and
would have no generality at all, even though their constituents—various properties and relations—would.

But what has happened to meaning? It has gotten squeezed out of the picture, and in this respect we have moved considerably towards 1). For where we originally read Bradley as saying that an idea means part of its content, we then took the content of an idea as being the content of the image-thing; but the content of the thing in the image became merged with the content of the thing itself in the rejection of "floating" ideas, and the meaning of an idea was thus part of the content of the thing which the idea is an image of. Ideas themselves, however, were also seen to coalesce with part of the contents of things in reality—these latter in fact were invented in abundance to be the instantiaters or bearers of seemingly "floating" ideas. Thus ideas are now seen as being what was earlier called their meaning.

This result calls into question the use and interest of Bradley's theory of signs, even within his own philosophy. (He himself appears to have become a bit uneasy about this: cf. Essays on Truth and Reality, III, p. 29n.) Ideas, as he ultimately chooses to use that term, do not operate in his logic as signs were supposed to do, and the "third side"—meaning—disappears. His ideas, as complexes of properties and relations which are part of the totality of properties
and relations which are part of the totality of properties and relations of facts, suffice for the purpose of analyzing propositions and judgements (to which I shall turn in the next chapter). The introduction of images, requiring all the talk about signs and meanings, can be seen as a vestige of psychologism, in spite of his insistence that for him ideas had nothing to do with the ideas of association theories. Not only that, there were serious difficulties in even understanding the theory of signs advanced, forcing us to make choices about interpretation in the face of impossibilities. These difficulties have come full circle, and led finally to an interpretation of ideas which, although quite different from what Bradley originally begins with, is more satisfactory, because it does suit what he wants to say in many places, and also because it avoids the earlier problems about the content of a sign (how does one add horseness to vivacity, etc., etc.), and avoids the psychologism of images. It leaves unexplained, however, a number of things: the relationship of images and ideas (as properties), how we think ideas, how we know them (directly? by abstraction?), and other worries. But my attitude is that such questions should be left unanswered in logic, and left to exercise the psychologist and epistemologist. This is, therefore, a merit of the revised notion of idea.
3. Summary

Judgements for Bradley are what Frege (and we) call assertions—they consist of two distinguishable aspects, a proposition and a claim that the proposition is true. Bradley's concept corresponding to the Fregean proposition is ideal content; a judgement is true when the ideal content is successfully referred to reality. The ideas which constitute this ideal content are introduced by Bradley via a very general discussion of facts. All facts (or things) have two aspects: content and existence. Content is the complex of properties and relations of the fact. (The content of a particular fact is claimed to characterize uniquely that fact, but this would require either accepting the identity of indiscernibles, together with spatial and temporal properties and relations as genuine properties of a thing—which Bradley does not unequivocally do—or accepting a doctrine of "real essences", a doctrine dubious at best, and useless anyway.)

Signs, or symbols, are facts also, but special ones because they possess also a third aspect: meaning. The meaning of a sign is part of its content considered apart from the rest, as cunning in a fox. With some signs the relevant part is "acquired", i.e., it is not part of the original content of the sign at all, but added to it; Bradley did not notice the oddity of adding friendship to the properties of a flower.
Ideas are signs, and as such have existence, content, and meaning. An idea is a fact existing as an image in the mind, its content is the complex of properties and relations it has as a mental fact (vividness, duration, co-occurrence with a toothache, etc.). Its meaning, as for all signs, is part of its content. But a similar problem arises here as arose for some signs: the meaning of the idea of a horse, e.g., is not part of the content of the image as a mental occurrence, but part of the complex of properties and relations of what is in the image. "Content" thus is seen to be ambiguous for Bradley: should we understand "content" as he describes it, and then try to conceive adding "horseness" to "vividness" and the like? Or should we construe "content" (in the context of ideas) as referring to part of the complex of properties and relations of what is imaged, rather than the image itself?

Bradley was sensitive to an ambiguity, which he located in "idea", and tried to resolve by saying that for logic the idea is not the whole sign (the existing image), but only "the symbolized", only the meaning. But "the symbolized" is itself ambiguous, not only because of the ambiguity of "content", but also because it can even refer to the thing or fact symbolized. The ambiguity from the two ways of taking "content" caused Bradley to equivocate about the existence of ideas:
when he thought of their meaning as part of the properties of the image, he insisted that if I have an idea, it must exist in reality as an image in my head, or at least there must be some sensuous setting, for there clearly cannot exist an idea by itself, unconnected with my thinking it. But when he was thinking of the meaning of ideas as parts of the properties of what is in the image, he argued that they could be unrealized: such ideas "float", are "cut off" from reality. Thus on the one hand ideas must exist in reality, on the other, they need not.

Bradley later revised his position on this issue: no ideas are unrealized. His way of handling seemingly unrealized ideas (e.g., false ideas, conjectures, denials, etc.) is different from both Meinong's objects and objectives, and Russell's theory of descriptions and his analysis of judgement as a relation between the judger and the various constituents falsely combined in the false proposition being judged. His method is to say that they are realized, if not in the world of actual fact, then in some other world. This is similar to (one interpretation of) Wittgenstein, and to Hintikka. In Bradley's account it becomes clear that he is using the term "content" in the second way, i.e., the meaning of an idea is an abstract universal shared by both a part of the content of the thing which the idea is an image of, and part of the content of what is
in the image. For if I have an idea of a unicorn, it only makes sense to speak of its meaning in the sense of the properties included in "unicornness" as being instantiated in some other, imaginary world; it makes no sense to speak of the meaning in the sense of some of the properties of the image itself, such as vividness, etc., as being realized in the world of mythology.

But if we understand the meaning of an idea this way, the relation of ideas to facts is rendered obscure; for Bradley is talking here of the idea itself being instantiated in a fact in some world. The idea has now come to be what was earlier thought of as its meaning, i.e., the idea is a part of the content of the fact. The distinction of fact and idea has collapsed back into that between existence and content, the only difference between content and idea being that a thing's content is all its properties and relations, while an idea of it includes only some of them—those, in particular, which it shares with others of like kind.

Since in this view ideas have become what earlier had been construed as their meanings, the theory of signs with their third aspect drops from importance in Bradley's analysis of ideas and judgement. This is welcomed as a way to avoid the difficulties associated with meaning (as Bradley used that term), and as a removal of a vestige of psychologism, the image from logic.
CHAPTER II. ALL JUDGEMENTS ARE GENERAL

1. Ideas in Judgement

We have seen that the best way to construe ideas is as a part of the content of things, i.e., as a sub-group or complex of the totality of the thing's properties. As such, ideas are no more mysterious than properties, and although this may not seem much of an advance in some quarters, it has at least rid us of the necessity of coping with Bradley's version of how ideas and symbols mean anything. But properties for Bradley are always the properties of something: they are always instantiated. This requirement led to his doctrine of a multiplicity of real worlds, so that ideas of unicorns, round squares, etc., could be accommodated. However, if we reject this explanation, as I think we should for various reasons (not least of which are that it is totally unclear just what such worlds are, and that the distinctions between actual, possible, and impossible are blotted out—everything becomes real), then we are left again with "floating adjectives". We seemingly must accept that properties can be found on their own, existing uninstantiated. But we should not overlook an aspect of his theory of meaning which I have so far neglected. There is of course a difference between the words or thoughts or whatever which occur in a judgement, and the actual properties of the thing being
judged about. I do not emit a patch of red when I judge "this is red", much less do I emit the very patch which is indicated by my judgement to be a property of this object. I think basically Bradley's theory of meaning was somehow trying to deal with the difference between properties in things and such properties as thought about or symbolized in an expression, and obviously it is necessary to do so. Bradley's account ran into trouble because of his desire to explain meaning in terms of the content of a psychological idea; as we saw, this led to the collapse of ideas into properties, to the ruin of the distinction between fact and idea, and to the ultimate glory of the Absolute. To avoid this, I shall use the term "property" for the various characteristics that a thing may be discerned to have; they constitute a thing's content and cannot be separated from the thing, i.e., they do not 'float'. They do not appear in judgements, and therefore the problems about falsity, negation, hypothesis, etc. are irrelevant.

By "ideas" I shall not mean properties as Bradley ends up doing, but something non-mental associated with words and expressions used in making judgements. They are, in short, what are often called universals. The connection between an idea and the expression it is associated with I do not plan to elucidate; it is a large and controversial issue, and not really central to this discussion. I also do not propose to develop
an adequate theory of meaning for universals; I do not think I could at present, nor for that matter has anyone to my knowledge been able to do it satisfactorily. Moreover, the attempt would probably occupy the rest of these pages, diverting us from the study at hand. I shall simply assume a primitive, unanalyzed sign-relationship between words and ideas, such that when properties corresponding to the ideas of a judgement are found to be in the thing or fact which the judgement is about, the judgement is true. By thus making explicit a distinction blurred over by Bradley (he used "idea" for both ideas and properties) we obtain an account not subject to the difficulties we found in the last chapter, yet one still within the spirit of his basic logical notions and still sympathetic towards his over-all purpose. Bradley himself occasionally appears to slip into thinking this way, when his earlier thoughts about images are temporarily out of mind.

A judgement, we have seen, is what I originally called an assertion: a claim that a (certain) proposition is true. Ideal content is what corresponds to the proposition for Bradley; he says, "Judgement proper is the act which refers an ideal content to a reality beyond the act."¹ In a later footnote he de-emphasized the "act" as unimportant for logic. But the act in

¹PL, p. 10. I have omitted a parenthetical expression which Bradley later rejected as wrong.
question corresponds to making the truth claim in an assertion. We might therefore understand this de-emphasis as a suggestion that it is what is asserted, i.e., the proposition or ideal content, which is important for logic. With regard to certain characteristics of the judgement, Frege held such a view; he says,

People distinguish universal and particular judgements; this is properly a distinction between contents, not between judgements. What one ought to say is: 'a judgement whose content is universal (particular).’ For the content has these properties even when it is presented, not as a judgement, but as a proposition. The same thing holds good for negation.1

I shall heed this suggestion of Bradley's then, and confine my attention to the proposition within the assertion, the ideal content within the judgement. This does not mean that the notion of asserting a proposition is of no use in logic; to the contrary—its analogue in formal deductive systems (an expression valid within the system as opposed to one assumed temporarily for the sake of a proof, say) is of considerable importance.2 But with regard to analyzing the judgement and its relation to the world, what can be said of it can be said of a proposition merely; the actual claim of truth

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1*Frege, Begriffsschrift*, in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (ed. Geach and Black), p. 4.

which is the assertion is extrinsic to and dependent upon the truth or falsity of the asserted proposition, and this is determined by the nature of the proposition and how the world is. However, I shall continue to use the term "judgement"--without causing too much confusion I hope--while what I shall be particularly interested in is the content within the judgement. This is only for ease of exposition, because Bradley continually uses the term "judgement" even when the points he is making are principally about contents, and it would be tiresome to rewrite the terminology on every occasion. It will be sufficient to remember that when we are considering judgements, we are considering the relation of its content to the world, and are ignoring the act which someone has made in thus referring it to the world.

We must now ask, how do ideas enter into judgements? Or better, how do ideas make up or constitute judgements, and how are judgements to be broken up or analyzed into their constituent ideas? In a previous quote we saw that in judging, an ideal content is referred to reality. Bradley immediately goes on to dispute both that in judgement there are two ideas, and that one is the subject. To the contrary--there is only one idea in every judgement, and the subject is the fact in reality of which the idea is predicated. If this is all there is to it, analysis is impossible, and the questions I posed come to a dead stop.
Fortunately, however, it is not as simple as that. When he insists that in any judgement there is only one idea, he is not thereby denying it any complexity. Rather, he is denying that two ideas are connected together in a judgement as if they were like two pieces of paper tied or stapled together, the relation between the ideas being some actual relation between mental facts.

We can readily concur with him here; "the relations between ideas are themselves ideal. . . . They do not exist between the symbols, but hold in the symbolised." ¹

What is curious is that he thinks that in rejecting this, we are bound to conclude that the ideal content is one idea, even though complex. He says,

We take an ideal content, a complex totality of qualities and relations, and we then introduce divisions and distinctions, and we call these products separate ideas with relations between them. And this is quite unobjectionable. But what is objectionable, is our then proceeding to deny that the whole before our mind is a single idea. . . .²

I fail to see the force of this; if we say that an ideal content is a complex of ideas, and are careful not to think that the relations between them are something like before and after, or more vivacious and less, etc., then why must we insist that the complex is really one, and not several (as we might expect from the word "complex"

¹PL, p. 11.
²PL, p. 11.
itself? Indeed, some pages later Bradley himself says, rather surprisingly,

it is true that the content asserted is always complex. It can never be quite simple, but must always involve relations of elements or distinguishable aspects. And hence, after all, in judgement there must be a plurality of ideas.¹

The other doctrine he disputes is the traditional division of the proposition into subject, predicate, and copula. His arguments against this are many and varied, one of them for example, being the one Russell was to make so much of later: that it cannot properly account for relations. Insisting that in "A is simultaneous with B", "A" is the subject and "simultaneous with B" the predicate, is just arbitrary. "B" could have been chosen, or better yet both "A" and "B" (more or less Russell's position²), or even "simultaneity". But if such "torture is admitted, the inquiry will become a mere struggle between torturers."³ After considering and rejecting a number of interpretations of the subject-predicate-copula theory, he broaches his own subject-predicate theory in which the ideal content, the complex of ideas asserted in a judgement, is the predicate, and the subject is the fact in reality to which the content is referred. It is perhaps unfortunate

¹PL, p. 27. Also, see below, pp. 98-100.  
²Russell, Principles of Mathematics, IX, 94, p. 95.  
³PL, p. 22.
that he used this terminology, for it has led to considerable misunderstanding and confusion; even Bradley sometimes finds it necessary to use "subject" in the earlier "grammatical" sense.

We can already see how the principle that all judgements are general has arisen—if in all judgements there is a plurality of ideas, and if the subject of a judgement, what the judgement is about, is not a part of the judgement itself, and if "the predicate must always be an universal, for every idea, without exception, is universal"¹, then judgements are every one universal, or general. This is the conclusion reached at the end of chapter two of the *Logic*:

Both in common life and in science alike, a judgement is at once applied to fresh cases. It is from the first an universal truth. If it were particular and wholly confined to the case it appears in, it might just as well have never existed, for it could not be used. A mere particular judgement does not really exist, and, if it did exist, would be utterly worthless.²

An examination in detail of what is meant by the claim that all judgements are general, and how it is supported, will occupy the remainder of this chapter.

2. Categorical and Hypothetical

To see what Bradley means by generality, or universality, or abstractness in judgements (these all

¹PL, p. 27.
²PL, p. 106.
being conflated\(^1\)), we must first understand his distinction between categorical and hypothetical judgments, and how he uses it. Fundamentally, judgement involves the relation of a synthesis of ideas to reality, not merely the prior act of synthesizing them. With regard explicitly to the content of judgements, this involves a shift of attention away from how the ideas are combined and towards the relation they have, once combined, to the world. To the suggestion that truth or falsity results simply from combining two ideas Bradley replies:

But reality is not a collection of adjectives, nor can it be so represented. Its essence is to be substantial and individual. But can we reach self-existence and individual character by manipulating adjectives and putting universals together? If not, the fact is not given directly in any truth whatsoever. It can never be stated categorically. And yet, because adjectives depend upon substantives, the substantive is implied. Truth will then refer to fact indirectly. The adjectives of truth presuppose a reality, and in this sense all judgement will rest on a supposal. It is all hypothetical; itself will confess that what directly it deals with, is unreal.\(^2\)

Thus categorical judgements are directly about some fact in the world, while hypothetical ones are indirectly about the world—indirect, because they involve an inference, a supposal. Other passages reinforce this account of the distinction:

\(^1\)Pace the "concrete universal", which is just another name for "individual"; see p. 24 n. 1 above.

\(^2\)PL, p. 46.
Judgments which assert within what is given in present perception . . . seem categorical because they content themselves with the analysis of the given, and predicate of the real nothing but a content that is directly presented.

A hypothetical judgement must deal with a supposal.

[The] process of taking up a statement without believing it, and of developing its consequences, is in fact nothing else than a supposition.

The proper terms by which to introduce them [i.e., hypothetical judgments] are "given," or "if," or "whenever," or "where," or "any," or "whatever."¹

From the last quote we might think that the occurrence of these words is sufficient for identifying a judgement as hypothetical, and that if the proper meaning of a judgement involves one of them, then it is hypothetical. Therefore we would expect Bradley to reject Mill's claim that the distinction between categorical and hypothetical judgments should be de-emphasized as not really very important, on the basis that any putative hypothetical judgement can be turned into a categorical one by analyzing away the "if". In Mill's own words (cited also by Bradley),

What is asserted is not the truth of either of the propositions but the inferribility of one from the other. . . . "If A is B, C is D" is found to be an abbreviation of the following: "The proposition C is D, is a legitimate inference from the proposition A is B."²

¹PL, p. 93; p. 85; p. 84; p. 82.

But if Bradley were merely to object that Mill's expansion of the abbreviation still contains a supposal, that its meaning—if it still reflects the original abbreviation—still involves "if", his position would be rather lame, and his polemic undeserved. It would seem to miss Mill's point that, if it is the form "if P then Q" which makes a judgement hypothetical, then the distinction of hypotheticals from categoricals is not so important, because the form can be eliminated in favor of a complicated categorical of the form R(Q,P), where R is the relation "... is a legitimate inference from ---".1

Bradley's position is more complicated, however; it does not rest merely on the form's containing "if" or one of its surrogates such as "whenever", etc. A hypothetical judgement contains or implies a supposal, i.e., an inference, and just rewriting the judgement to include a categorical assertion to the effect that an inference is involved does not render the judgement one whit less hypothetical. But what, we should ask, makes

1Actually Mill spoke of a property, not a relation; thus "if P then Q" would be F(Q), where F is the property "... is a legitimate inference from P"; this has the obvious disadvantage of requiring a new property of Q for each proposition from which Q can be inferred, and makes it impossible to talk, as Mill wanted to, of the property of "being an inference from something else": for "if P then Q" is obviously not rendered by "Q is an inference from something else"--the latter, G(Q), can be true when the former is false (since any proposition implies itself).
a judgement hypothetical, if not the form? What is it that a judgement must do or be to avoid containing a supposal, and thus be categorical, and why is it so important? The answer to these questions exposes one of the most fundamental underlying assumptions in Bradley's logic. It was already hinted at in the above quotation on categorical judgements. The assumption is that judgements, if true, are true of reality; the real is what exists, and it appears to us only through what is given to us in the present, via perception. Knowledge, and hence the true judgements in which it is expressed, can come only through what is given, since that is our only contact with reality. For a judgement to be directly true of reality, it must be about a fact presented to our awareness at the same time of the judgement; otherwise the judgement is mediate, it ex hypothesi involves reference to something other than that which is present. Such a mediating reference is a supposal or inference away from what we perceive immediately. This is the force of the ideas of directness and indirectness found in the first quote of this section. Categoricals are attributed to what is given at the time of their utterance, while hypotheticals are attributed to the present given reality only through a more or less complicated mediating inference. Therefore, it is not the form of a judgement which determines whether it is categorical or hypothetical (which case
would trivialize the distinction, as Mill pointed out, since the latter form is convertible to the former), but it is the nature of the judgement's relation to the presently perceived world which decides its category and dictates its proper form. The importance of the categorical judgement derives from the fact that we can understand in a simple and clear way how they are true or false: we just compare the fact we observe with the judgement asserted, and if they correspond, the judgement is true, and if not, false. We do not have to think about other facts past or future. Moreover, if we take seriously the claim that in judging the complex of ideas is referred to reality, and also that reality appears to me only in my "now", then non-categorical judgements will have to be taken to refer to reality through or with the aid of judgements which are true of the given present, i.e., categorical judgements. These then are the most basic kind of judgement, upon which the others depend, corresponding to the way all knowledge ultimately depends upon immediate experience.

That this rather astonishing view, some aspects of which are "characteristic of the crudest and most unre-generate empiricism or sensationalism," as Wollheim puts it,¹ is representative of Bradley's thought, may be seen in the following passages:

¹Wollheim, F. H. Bradley, p. 52.
The real is that which is known in presentation or intuitive knowledge. It is what we encounter in feeling or perception. Again it is that which appears in the series of events that occur in space and time. . . . It is briefly what acts and maintains itself in existence. . . . The real is self-existent. And we may put this otherwise by saying, The real is what is individual.1

Subsequently he asks whether "the real, which is the ultimate subject, and which, as we said, appears in perception, is identical with the merely momentary appearance."2 The answer is no, for momentary appearance is not individual. But it is natural to think that the real must be present:

Nothing in the end but what I feel can be real, and I can not feel anything unless it touches me. But nothing again can immediately encounter me save that which is present. . . . "The present is real"; this seems indubitable.3 . . . [However,] reality is not present in the sense of given in one atomic moment. What we mean, when we identify presence with reality, is something different. The real is that with which I come into immediate contact, and the content of any part of time, any section of the continuous flow of change, is present to me if I directly encounter it. . . . The present is the filling of that duration in which the reality appears to me directly.4

1PL, p. 45. The use of "intuition" in this context is very close to Kant's "Anschauung": "In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us." Critique of Pure Reason, A19, Kemp Smith (tr.), p. 65.

2PL, p. 51.

3PL, p. 51.

4PL, p. 53.
To give us a more concrete idea of how what we know is related to reality through the present, he gives (rather grudgingly) the following elaborate metaphor:

Let us fancy ourselves in total darkness hung over a stream and looking down on it. The stream has no banks, and its current is covered and filled continuously with floating things. Right under our faces is a bright illuminated spot on the water, which ceaselessly widens and narrows its area, and shows us what passes away on the current. And this spot that is light is our now, our present. . . . We have not only an illuminated place: . . . there is a paler light which, both up and down stream, is shed on what comes before and after our now. And this paler light is the offspring of the present. Behind our heads there is something perhaps which reflects the rays from the lit-up now, and throws them more dimly upon past and future. Outside this reflection is utter darkness; within it is gradual increase of brightness, until we reach the illumination immediately below us. . . .

We shall perceive hereafter that time and space beyond here and now are not strictly existent in the sense in which the present is. They are not given directly but are inferred from the present. And they are so inferred because the now and here, on which the light falls, are the appearance of a reality which for ever transcends them, and upon which resting we go beyond them.1

Much of the position I described above can be found in this epistemological model. The reflector behind (in?) our heads which dimly lights up the area beyond the little "hole" of our present is the analogue of inference away from what we can say about the here and now. Reflectors, obviously, depend for their operation on light—in this case from the brightly illuminated

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1PL, pp. 54-55.
Thus judgements not categorically and directly true of the immediately given present depend on such judgements, through inference, for their connection with reality.

This sets Bradley his task of trying to discover just what class of judgements are categorical. To this end he distinguishes various kinds of judgement and investigates them severally.

3. Kinds of Judgement

A. universal judgements
B. existential judgements
   a. subject is reality restricted to the present
   b. subject is reality not so restricted
C. singular judgements
   I. analytic judgements
      i. without grammatical subject or copula
         a. subject is all reality
         b. subject is part of reality
      ii. with a grammatical subject
         a. subject is all reality
         b. subject is part of reality
   II. synthetic judgements
   III. non-event judgements
      a. related to a temporal period
      b. not related to time

Bradley also distinguishes negative judgements and devotes a separate chapter to them; they would not be simply appended above, but would constitute a different, yet parallel, table. I shall not consider them here, for the upshot of that chapter is that "nothing in the
world can ever be denied except on the strength of positive knowledge."¹ "In 'A is not B' the real fact is a character \( x \) belonging to A, and which is incompatible with B. The basis of negation is really the assertion of a quality that excludes (\( x \))."² Thus, "the various kinds of negative judgement follow closely the varieties of affirmation."³ This being the case, I shall restrict myself to affirmative judgements and refer the reader to Bradley's chapter on negation for specific details of negative judgement.

A. Concerning universal judgements, Bradley considers first a judgement such as "Animals are mortal", which would appear to be categorical. It "seems at first to keep close to reality; the junction of facts seems quite the same as the junction of ideas."⁴ But this is a mistake, for although all the animals which exist are indeed real, we do not limit ourselves to presently existing animals when we say "Animals are mortal"; we are including future animals as well. Future animals, however (that is to say, animals which do not as yet exist), can hardly be part of a collection of real existing things. The animals which are mortal, therefore, cannot be just those which in fact do or did exist.

¹PL, p. 125.
²PL, pp. 116-117.
³PL, p. 120.
⁴PL, p. 47.
Also, it is not usually the case, as it would be with a judgement such as "All my sisters are blonde", that we are actually thinking of a complete collection, and this for at least two reasons: a) usually the number even of existing things, e.g., animals, is so great that we could not think of them all, even were we to know somehow about them all; b) perhaps more importantly, we do not usually intend to think about a complete collection even if we could, for we usually want our judgement to be about animals (or whatever) yet to come.

Again, suppose "Animals are mortal" is true in a categorical sense, i.e., of each real, existing animal, it is the case that it is also mortal. Then were there a time when there were no more animals, the judgement would be false, for if there are no animals, there are no mortal ones. But do we say that "Dodos are mortal" is false and would become true only if dodos once again evolved? Or do we say that "All persons found trespassing on this ground will be prosecuted"\(^1\) is false until someone trespasses and is prosecuted? Surely not. Only finding an immortal dodo would falsify the former example, and taking no action against a trespasser, the latter.

These arguments force the conclusion that universal judgements are not categorical; when we use them we do

\(^1\)PL, p. 48.
not mean that they are true directly of each and every (relevant) existing thing, let alone that they are true of only those things given in immediate perception. In judging "Animals are mortal" we mean not that our judgement refers to each actual mortal animal—"we mean, 'Whatever is an animal will die,' but that is the same as 'If anything is an animal then it is mortal'."¹ The "if . . . then . . ." form is appropriate because such judgements are one and all hypothetical—they contain an inference, a supposal.

The abstract universal, "A is B," means no more than "given A, in that case B," or "if A, then B." In short, such judgements are always hypothetical and can never be categorical.²

Bradley locates a problem concerning universal judgements containing "all", centering upon this word's ambiguity. In one sense it means "any", or "if . . . then . . .", and is treated exactly the same as above—-that is to say, "all A is B" is simply "If A, then B", and is clearly hypothetical. But it might be said that "all" can be understood collectively, in such a way as to mean a real collection of cases (not necessarily restricted to the present). This, says Bradley, "would be no more an universal judgement than 'A, B, and C are severally mortal'."³ More explicitly, such a judgement

¹PL, p. 47.
²PL, p. 82.
³PL, p. 47.
with "all" simply reduces to a collection of singular judgements: "'All A is B' will be an abbreviated method of setting forth that this A is B, and that A is B, and the other A is B, and so on until the lot is exhausted. Such judgements fall clearly under the head of singular."¹ The part I have underlined is important, for it indicates that Bradley is thinking of a finite collection; he would probably say that any actual collection, if it really is one, collects just so many things--there is no such thing as an indefinite or infinite collection. To say that a collection is infinite is only an extremely misleading and devious way of saying that the meaning of "All A is B" (understood collectively) cannot be exhausted by "This A is B", etc., for one will never reach an end; in that case the judgement must clearly be more than categorical, if it means more than can be said categorically.

Bradley has rejected the claim that universal judgements with "all" are categorical in the collective sense, for if they are categorical, they are singular, not universal. He sees this as an ambiguity only in the word "all", not in the other generality words "if", "whenever", etc. I think this is wrong, for the collective interpretation is a thesis about generality itself, not just the word "all"; it can be made against

¹PL, pp. 82-83.
any universal judgement. For example, "If anything is an animal, then it is mortal" could be said to mean of this object, either it is mortal or not an animal, and of that object, either etc., and so forth until the objects there are, are exhausted. Bradley should object to this attempt as well, and for the same reasons. Thus his position is an anticipation and rejection of the interpretation of quantifiers given by Wittgenstein.

Russell described it thus:

Wittgenstein's method of dealing with general propositions \[(x).fx \text{ and } (\exists x).fx\] differs from previous methods by the fact that the generality comes only in specifying the set of propositions concerned, and when this has been done the building up of truth-functions proceeds exactly as it would in the case of a finite number of enumerated arguments \(p, q, r, . . . . \).

Admittedly, it is difficult to tease this view out of the Tractatus itself, but part of it can be inferred from the following:

If \(\xi\) has only one value, then \(N(\xi) = \neg p\) (not \(p\)); if it has two values, then \(N(\xi) = \neg p \cdot \neg q\) (neither \(p\) nor \(q\)). If \(\xi\) has as its values all the values of a function \(fx\) for all values of \(x\), then \(N(\xi) = \neg (\exists x).fx\).


\[\text{Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.51, 5.52. The expression } "N(\xi)" \text{ could perhaps be a little more explicitly elucidated; take a set of propositions } p, q, x, . . . u, \text{ and } v, \text{ where these letters represent constants, i.e., symbols for specific propositions. Let } \xi \text{ be a variable over these constants (just as } x \text{ in } \exists x \text{ is a variable over the individuals named by the constants } a, b, c, \text{ etc.). Wittgenstein writes the column of a truth-table which defines a particular logical constant as a row in parentheses, followed by letters for the propositions.}\]
Thus if $\xi$ has as its values those of $fx$ for all $x$, its values will be $fa$, $fb$, $fc$, etc., for each name of an object. Then $N(\xi) = \neg(x).fx = \neg fa \cdot \neg fb \cdot \neg fc \ldots = (x).\neg fx$. That is,

(1) \hspace{1cm} (x)fx = fa \cdot fb \cdot fc \ldots, and

(2) \hspace{1cm} (x)fx = fa \lor fb \lor fc \lor \ldots.

Moore attributes this latter way of putting it to Wittgenstein explicitly, and this is also how Anscombe interprets him. But there seems to be no good evidence for Russell's claim that the arguments must be finite. Anscombe tries to slur over this point by saying that "Wittgenstein did not think there was any essential difference between the finite and infinite case." He nowhere says that there are only finitely many objects and names (indeed, to say so would be nonsense on his

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3Anscombe, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
view); he allows for the possibility of infinitely many states of affairs, says that there are infinitely many facts and propositions \((p, \sim p, \sim \sim p, \text{ etc.})\), and suggests that Russell's axiom of infinity would be unnecessary in a language with infinitely many names.\(^1\) However, Anscombe is surely correct in saying that "in the infinite case, Wittgenstein's theory can hardly be explained at all."\(^2\) For if "everything is f" means literally "a is f and b is f and c is f and . . . ." \emph{ad infinitum}, we would never, nay, \emph{could} never know the truth or falsity of it. "Everything is f" could only be meaningful (true or false) on this theory if we could eventually stop.\(^3\) That such a project of infinite enumeration must be frustrated, and yet we are still willing to say that "everything is f" may be true or false, indicates that the generalization is more than a series of truth-functionally related categorical singular propositions when infinitely many things are accepted.

Anscombe raises a technical difficulty for the case where there are only finitely many objects—which is the only alternative for someone who holds (1) and (2).

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2Anscombe, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 148.

3It might of course be shown to be true or false by deriving it or its negation, but then the remark would apply to the premises, and ultimately the axioms.
The difficulty depends upon the requirement that a complete description of a state of affairs needs a way to state exclusiveness or uniqueness. To do that, one needs more variables than names, and then, for $n$ names, while

$$(3) \ (\exists x_1, \ldots, x_n)[(fx_1 \lor \sim fx_1) \cdot \ldots \cdot (fx_n \lor \sim fx_n)]$$

is a tautology,

$$(4) \ (\exists x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1})[(fx_1 \lor \sim fx_1) \cdot \ldots \cdot (fx_n \lor \sim fx_n) \cdot (fx_{n+1} \lor \sim fx_{n+1})]$$

would have to be a contradiction on pains of admitting that a "complete description" would contain a part answering to no atomic proposition. But Wittgenstein might reply that uniqueness need not be stated: it would be shown. If only the first two of three toys, $a$, $b$, and $c$, are in the box, then it is not necessary to add to "$a$ is in the box" and "$b$ is in the box", that "$c$ is not in the box", for by inspecting all true atomic propositions and their "molecular" combinations, one just would not find "$c$ is in the box". Unfortunately for this hypothetical reply, Wittgenstein does permit statements of uniqueness of the form

$$(\exists x)fx \cdot \sim(\exists x,y)(fx \cdot fy),$$

which says that something is $f$, but it is not the case that it is $f$ and something else is $f$ as well. Why he

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1Anscombe, *op. cit.*, pp. 147, 148. But see immediately below. Also, see the next footnote for an explanation of the quantifier notation.

2Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 5.5321. "$(\exists x,y)$" is
would permit this while not allowing the need for uniqueness claims is unclear.

A more serious problem for Anscombe, however, is her claim that (4) can be a contradiction. Her argument is analogous to one by Ramsey: \((\exists x, y)(x \neq y)\) is a contradiction if there is only one (named) individual, and otherwise a tautology. That is, by the conventions for naming, \(a \neq b, a \neq c, b \neq c\), etc., are necessarily true, but on any convention \(a \neq a\) is necessarily false.

Extending this, for three names \((\exists x, y, z)(x \neq y \neq z)\) would expand to a logical sum including the contradictory expression \((a \neq b \neq a)\); but it would also include the tautology \((a \neq b \neq c)\), and any expression equivalent to an alternation containing a tautology as one disjunct, is itself a tautology. But for this expression with only two names available, every disjunct would contain one of the names at least twice, and therefore they all would be contradictory, rendering the original expression a contradiction. In general then, for \(n\) names, any such expression as

\[
(\exists x_1, \ldots, x_n)(x_1 \neq x_2 \neq \ldots \neq x_n)
\]

is necessarily true, while

\[
(\exists x_1, \ldots, x_{n+1})(x_1 \neq x_2 \neq \ldots \neq x_{n+1})
\]

simply an abbreviated form of the more usual "\((\exists x)(\exists y)\)" in which the scope of the symbol "\(\exists\)" for existential quantification includes all the variables in the parentheses; "\((\exists x, y)\)" should not be confused with "For some \(x, and for all \(y\) . . . ," which would be written "\((\exists x)(y)\)."
is necessarily false, since for each disjunct some name will have to be substituted for at least two variables, and so at least one expression of the form \( a \neq a \) will occur in each disjunct. Ramsey cheerfully accepted this result as a substitute for Russell's axiom of infinity, simply letting \( n \) be equal to the number of items in the universe of discourse, equal even to \( \aleph_0 \) or higher if need be, and assuming (5) as true.\(^1\)

But since Wittgenstein rejected any notation for identity, Anscombe tries to reconstruct the argument without it; the result is (4) which Anscombe says should become a contradiction for \( n \) names. But can it? Ramsey got a contradiction by substituting the \( n \) names available for the \( n+1 \) variables; this meant, as we saw, that for each disjunct of the expanded existential generalization, two distinct variables had to take the same name. But although \( x \) and \( y \) might both upon substitution become \( a \), if \( x \) anywhere became \( a \), it must elsewhere within the scope of its quantifier as well—this after all is the *raison d'être* of variables. How then is a contradiction got from (4)? Its complete expansion for \( n=2 \) is

\[
(7) \quad (x, y, z)[(fx \lor \neg fx) \land (fy \lor \neg fy) \land (fs \lor \neg fs)] =
\[
[(fa \lor \neg fa) \land (fa \lor \neg fa) \land (fa \lor \neg fa)] \lor
\[
[(fa \lor \neg fa) \land (fa \lor \neg fa) \land (fb \lor \neg fb)] \lor
\[
[(fa \lor \neg fa) \land (fa \lor \neg fa) \land (fa \lor \neg fa)] \lor
\[
[(fb \lor \neg fb) \land (fa \lor \neg fa) \land (fa \lor \neg fa)] \lor
\[
[(fb \lor \neg fb) \land (fa \lor \neg fa) \land (fa \lor \neg fa)] \lor
\[
[(fa \lor \neg fa) \land (fb \lor \neg fb) \land (fa \lor \neg fa)] \lor
\[
[(fa \lor \neg fa) \land (fb \lor \neg fb) \land (fa \lor \neg fa)] \lor
\]

\[(fb \vee \sim fb) \cdot (fa \vee \sim fa) \cdot (fb \vee \sim fb) \vspace{2mm}
[(fa \vee \sim fa) \cdot (fb \vee \sim fb) \cdot (fb \vee \sim fb)] \vspace{2mm}
[(fb \vee \sim fb) \cdot (fb \vee \sim fb) \cdot (fb \vee \sim fb)].

As is obvious, not only is it not the case that all the disjuncts are contradictory, but not even one is; moreover, they are all tautologies--even every conjunct within each disjunct is as well (it is this fact, of course, which makes each disjunct necessarily true). Just which parts will Anscombe look askance upon? The extra \(n+1\) clause at the end of (4) is the most likely candidate, for some part of each disjunct of (7) must be contradictory for the whole thing to be; also it is that clause alone that makes (4) differ from (3). But what is wrong with \((fx \vee \sim fz)\)? If we deny that different variables can take the same name when we substitute, we not only emasculate Ramsey's argument, but we fundamentally alter our own idea of what variables are. Even so, we still are left with the following:

(8) \((fa \vee \sim fa) \cdot (fb \vee \sim fb) \cdot (\exists z)(fx \vee \sim fz)\).

Now the last conjunct presents a problem of interpretation. If \((\exists x)fx\) simply means the disjunction of statements formed by attaching "f" to the names "a", "b", etc., of the things which \(f\), then if \(z\) in (8) cannot range over the things named "a" and "b", and if those are the only things, then \((\exists z)(fx \vee \sim fz)\) is meaningless. On the other hand we might, less heroically, say that it is false; on either account (8) is not contradictory.
Nor could it be construed as such without also saying that "there is a golden mountain" is a contradiction.

Of course, either approach would work—Anscombe does not really need (4) to be contradictory; either falsity or meaninglessness, deriving from the restriction 'substitute different names for different variables' together with the situation of having more variables than names, is enough for ridding Wittgenstein of general statements containing an element not obtainable from atomic propositions.

But the cost of obtaining this result is great; it not only ruins Ramsey's argument, but prevents us from arguing, say, from the arithmetic axiom \((x)(y)(x + y = y + x)\) to the instance \(6 + 6 = 6 + 6\). It may be countered that this can be got as a substitution instance of the identity axiom \((x)(x = x)\), but it seems odd to deny that it is an example also of the symmetry of addition. Allowing different variables to take the same name is also useful in constructing interpretations to show consistency. An example from Suppes is for the axioms \((\exists x)(y)(x = y)\), \((x)(y)(x = y \lor y = x)\), and \((x)(y)(z)\) \((x = y \land y = z \lor z = y)\). Interpreting \(=\) as \(=\), and the domain as one object named \(A\), the instances of these axioms are the following truths of identity theory: \(A = A\), \(A = A \lor A = A\), and \(A = A \land A = A\). Therefore the axioms are consistent.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Suppes, Introduction to Logic, p. 74.
But these are really Wittgenstein's problems, not ours. We can accept identity statements, substitution of the same name for distinct variables, and the consequence drawn by Ramsey, which finally only amounts to having at least as many names as variables. This being so, Anscombe's rather technical objection to Wittgenstein's interpretation of the quantifiers loses its force. The objection which to my mind is still good is the one Bradley makes, and which is advocated by Quine as well. Either a universal judgement is just a finite set of singular judgements—in which case it is not really universal, but only an abbreviation—or it is more than a finite set, i.e., an infinite set. Many ordinary things we generalize about require this: the set of all men, including all to come, is indefinite, and possibly (barring the Armageddon) infinite; atoms might be (less dubiously than men) infinite in number, and numbers themselves are clearly infinite. But if we understand '!' and 'v' as is customary, that is, as defined in a matrix while flanked by two propositions, e.g.:

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(a graphic way of saying "P v Q" by definition is true unless "P" is false and "Q" is false, in which case it is false.)

then an expression like "P v ..." is just undefined and ill-formed—it means nothing. It is the job of quantified statements to express explicitly the generality
covertly assumed by "etc." If dots or "etc." or "ad infinitum" is used, by that very fact the expression, if it can be said to make any sense at all, is no longer particular. As Quine says, "thus it is that quantification is here to stay." ¹

But here Bradley confronts a problem deriving from his basic epistemological assumption:

"Judgement, we saw, always meant to be true, and truth must mean to be true of fact. But here we encounter judgements which seen not to be about fact. For a hypothetical judgement must deal with a supposal. It appears to assert a necessary connection, which holds between ideas in my head but not outside it. But, if so, it can not be a judgement at all; while on the other hand it plainly does assert and can be true or false." ²

An assertion, if true, must be true of some fact; to discover this link with reality Bradley asks what a supposal is. He answers that "a supposition means thinking for a particular end,"³ in the respect of making an "ideal experiment":

"It is the application of a content to the real, with a view to see what the consequence is, and

¹Quine, Methods of Logic, p. 89. The tenor of Quine's position is actually somewhat different; he says the Wittgenstein interpretation can be used for finite universes, but since this is an intolerable limitation in many cases, it cannot be adopted generally. I take this as implying some such criticism like the one just spelled out against making sense of infinite strings of alternations or conjunctions.

²PL, p. 85.

³PL, p. 85.
with a tacit reservation that no actual judgement has taken place.¹

It is the connection of the consequence with its condition which is the fact asserted. This connection is the "ground" of the consequence, what causes B, if A.

The fact which existed before the experiment, and remains true after it, and in no way depends on it, is neither the elements, nor the relation between them, but it is a quality. It is the ground of the consequence that is true of the real, and it is this ground which exerts compulsion.²

But just what is this "latent quality"³ associated with hypotheticals? In one of the few examples Bradley gives, the ground asserted by "If the barometer were not destroyed, it would forewarn us," is said to be general laws of nature plus certain circumstances in reality. This is vague enough, but when we ask whether in general the qualities, which are the bases of our syntheses, are ever fully explicit or not, Bradley seems to vacillate, hinting that they are occult in the end, and to press the search for them amounts to asking for "the limits of explanation."

I cannot help but reflect that Bradley has done no more than simply claim that hypotheticals do have some connection with reality, because this is what they must do in order to be true or false, which they can be. The

¹PL, p. 86.
²PL, p. 88.
³The words are Bradley's own; PL, pp. 87,88.
talk of grounds and latent qualities is just a smoke-screen for a bald counter-assertion to the claim that hypotheticals are not true or false of facts in reality. Alternatively, if we take occult properties seriously, our powers of explanation are suddenly and dramatically enriched, to the extent that we could probably explain anything. Many, however, would not be happy over a victory won with such medieval ease.

B. An existential judgement for Bradley is one which is of the form "A exists" or "A is real"; in short, it is one marked by an explicit existence claim. The distinction between the two kinds of existentials depicted in the table at the beginning of this section is an idle one; Bradley draws the distinction, and then moves on as if he had said nothing about it at all. So exactly what its function is I cannot say.

Existential judgements buttress a claim we touched upon earlier; they show, says Bradley, that judging cannot consist in synthesizing ideas—for neither "is real" nor "exists" is a genuine predicate. If one thinks of the "idea" of reality or existence, one presumably has got hold of some element or character of "that actual reality and actual existence which we encounter directly."¹ But the peculiarity of such an "idea" is that it can only be predicated back from

¹PL, p. 81.
whence it came—it can be applied only to the particular given from which it was abstracted, quite unlike the predicate "is a horse" (say) which can be predicated all over the countryside. Thus the use of such an "idea" as "real" is either false or useless; thus it is not really an idea. Hence in "A exists" there is only one idea, and "A exists" cannot therefore consist of a synthesis of ideas.

This argument is a bit hasty, however. Why is an idea a pseudo-idea just because its use results in falsity or idleness? It may therefore be an odd idea, but there is nothing in the general logical conception of an idea which is affected by or which affects the use to which any idea is put or the consequences therefrom. If existence and reality do admit of pseudo-ideas, they admit of ideas—albeit odd ones. Then in "A exists" there are two ideas, a standard and an odd one. On his own account, Bradley cannot mean by "the idea of existence is never a true predicate,"¹ that existence is never a predicate, but only that it is an odd one.

An objection independent of the status of existence is simply that "A" need not be one idea. Indeed, the reason Bradley gives so little space to existential judgements is that he does not consider them to be a

¹PL, p. 81.
unique kind. "We cannot say there is a class of existential judgements, for all singular judgements have by this time been shown to be existential." ¹ By this he means that a judgement, if true, is true of reality, or in short, its subject is real or exists. Thus "The horse is near the tree" can be rendered "The horse near the tree exists." "A" in this judgement is clearly a complex of ideas. Of course, for Bradley's argument to work, only one counterexample of unitary "A" need be produced, and it is not sufficient in reply to show that in some cases "A" is complex. So what kind of example could be produced? Clearly only one containing one idea, such as "Horses exist". But the idea of a horse can be analyzed into elements, such as quadruped, vertebrate, hooved, etc., and thus the judgement could be considered to contain a synthesis of ideas. The only kind of idea Bradley might have recourse to would be simple ideas, such as (one might think) colours: "There is yellow". But Bradley does not admit that there are unanalyzable ideas.

All judgement necessarily contains a relation; but every relation, besides its pair of related elements, presupposes an unity in which they subsist. Hence the judgement, in so far as it is the synthesis of the elements, is just so far the analysis of that whole to which they belong. And . . . we may say that all judgement, however near to sense, is essentially an act of analysis and synthesis.²

¹PL, p. 81.
²PL, p. 479.
Two pages prior to this passage he explicitly considers the possibility of simple predicates, of cases in which there is "no synthesis within the ideal content." I must say that I find his argument against such a possibility unintelligible, but his conclusion is clear enough:

We may therefore say that, if we go back far enough, all judgement does informally predicate a connection which is synthetical, and which is the analysis of that real of which it is predicated.\(^1\)

Therefore, no example can be given by Bradley to substantiate the argument given above based upon existential judgements, without running afoul of his own position on simple ideas.

To return more directly to existential judgements, we might wonder what Bradley says of "some" sentences, e.g., "some A is B". Contrary to what we might expect (with half a century's hindsight), he does not discuss these as existential judgements, but treats them piece-meal in his chapter on quantity. He is there disputing the claim that judgements which are particular, i.e., a judgement whose "ostensible subject is a particular phenomenon or collection of phenomena,"\(^2\) cannot be taken in intension (which means signifying the attributes, or content\(^3\)). In some cases, he says, it is easy to show

\(^1\)PL, p. 477.
\(^2\)PL, p. 182.
\(^3\)PL, p. 168.
how they can be taken in intension, or in other words, how they can be construed as about ideas, not individuals; these easy cases are "some" sentences. There seem to be two types:

(a) "In some diseases the patient should be secluded": we mean here that, given a . . . disease of a certain sort which we do not specify, then something else in that case would follow. The judgment couples mere attributes with attributes. It does not assert the existence of this or that . . . disease. It is hypothetical, and is naturally read at once in intension.¹

We might try to symbolize his example thus:

(1) \( (\exists x) [Dx \supset (y)((Py \land Hyx) \supset Gy)] \)

"something both is a disease and also is such that if anything is a patient and has it, he should be secluded." This would be true for diseases of one sort, while for other sorts

(2) \( (\exists x) [Dx \supset (y) \neg((Py \land Hyx) \supset Gy)] \)

might be true. But this does not reflect the analysis Bradley gives. To do this, unless we use second order logic,² we shall have to use a sortal logic--one whose variables are restricted to certain universes of discourse. Let \( d \) range over diseases, \( m \) over men; then

(3) \( (d)(m)[Fd \supset ((Pm \land Hmd) \supset Gm)] \)

says that if any disease is of the F-sort, then if anyone is a patient and has it, he should be secluded.

¹PL, p. 182.

²Quantifying over predicates we could say \( (x)[(\exists d) (Dx \land \Phi d) \supset (y)(Py \land Hyx) \supset Gy)] \), where "\( \Phi \)" represents the certain kind of disease; but this move has its own difficulties.
Here we do have a hypothetical statement (i.e., the dominant connector is "∨"), and the variable letters are most naturally read as "disease" and "man", both of which are universals, or ideas. Moreover "F" represents the unspecified sort of disease, and is contained within the judgment, rather than being left outside as in (1) and (2), where "F" is extensionally specified as just those cases such that (1) is true.

The other type of "some" sentences are those in which an unspecified number rather than kind is meant:

(b) "Some English citizens will be hung next year" may mean, not one sort, but one unspecified quantity of English citizens will suffer this fate. . . . When read in intension the judgment runs thus, "Given certain conditions, part unspecified, part specified as the attribute English citizen and the attribute of amounting to a certain number, then," etc.¹

This explanation is curious, because only individuals are English citizens, while only groups of individuals have a certain number; also what the unspecified conditions apply to is itself unspecified. Ignoring these conditions we might write

(4) \( (m)(g)[((m\sim g) \cdot \text{Em} \cdot \text{Ng}) \cdot \text{Hm}] \),

letting "m" range over men and "g" over groups of men. Then (4) says that any men, if they are English and members of any group numbering N, they will be hanged. This cannot be correct, for it says in effect that any Englishman will be hanged if he is in a group of N

¹PL, p. 182.
individuals; since every Englishman can be placed in such a group if \( N \) does not exceed the number of Englishmen, (4) says that every Englishman will be hanged. Obviously some "unspecified conditions" are needed. But to write these in a symbolic way would require something like

\[(5) \quad (Rm \lor Sq) \lor (Tm \cdot Ug)\]

conjoined to the expression on the left of the hook in (4). But because of "m\&g" the variables are of different type, and thus (5) requires the introduction of either second order logic, or set theory; the latter is needed anyway for "m\&g", since it is expressed with the primitive constant of set theory. But what, after all, is the rationale of (5)? It turns (4) into "any men, if they are English and belong to any group of \( N \) men, and either they have the property \( R \) or the group has the property \( S \), or they have the property \( T \) and the group has the property \( U \) (where \( T \) and \( U \) are not necessarily distinct from \( R \) and \( S \) respectively), then they will be hanged." Clearly, the function of (5) is simply to delimit in a certain unspecified way the group of to-be-hanged Englishmen from all Englishmen (its complexity owing merely to an indeterminacy as to what the restrictions apply to--the men, the group, or both). In other words, it permits a universally quantified statement to be given in analysis, by conditionally restricting the sort of Englishmen (using "\( R \)", "\( S \)"
"T", or "U") to just the group which will be hanged. Thus Bradley's "unspecified conditions" are not only necessary for (4), they are the very trick with which he can get a universal, and hence a hypothetical. This device is no different from saying that "some horses are white" is universal because what you are really asserting is "all horses which --- are white", where the blank is (perhaps) filled by "have chromosome M". All that is happening is that restrictions are placed on the undistributed term which are sufficient to reduce its extension to the same or less than that of the predicate term, thus enabling the subject term to become distributed.

Inclusion of these conditions into (4) almost reduces type (b) "some" sentences to type (a). But not quite; those of type (b) but not type (a) still contain the predicate letter "N". Now either this is a predicate schema for a specific number, as "E" is specific for English, or it is a variable. The former case, where "N" stands for 12, say, would not bother Bradley;

It is an elementary mistake to suppose that number confers particularity and destroys intension. 
... how can the addition of an universal quality force us to take a judgement merely in extension?\[^1\]

We can agree that numbers are properties, properties of groups for that matter, as indicated by "Ng" in (4). But just because 12 (or 56, or whatever) is a universal

\[^1\]PL, pp. 182-183.
quality, we cannot accept therefore that our original "some" sentence was somehow about 12 (or 56, etc.) men who will be hanged, as Bradley seems to think. It must be a variable, and therefore quantified. Universal quantification would render it false, so we are left with the following result:

(6) \((m)(g)[((m \cdot g) \cdot Em \cdot (\exists N) Ng \cdot ((Rm \cdot Sg) \cdot (Tm \cdot Ug))) \supset Hm]\).

This is an extraordinarily complicated and obscure alternative for

(7) \((\exists x)(Ex \cdot Hx),\)

merely to be able to make "some" sentences hypothetical; it requires either set theory, sortal variables, and second order logic, or third order logic. Worse still, one could run through an argument similar to the one for "N" for the "sort" of disease F in (3), and also for "R", "S", etc. in (6). Each would have to be quantified over, because they are "unspecified." And to ascertain whether or not (3) and (6) thus quantified were true or not in some interpretation, we would have to know which sorts \(F_i, F_j, \text{ etc.}, \) and \(R_i, R_j, \text{ etc.}, \) were true or false for the relevant diseases, men, and groups. In the same way, we would have to be able to specify the number named by "N_1" which would make "(\exists N) Ng" true or false for each group.

So much for Bradley's treatment of "some" sentences as hypothetical and not as existentials. I shall now
turn to the last and in some ways most interesting of his categories.

C. Singular judgements are the most likely candidates for being categorical; as will be seen, all three classes in some way or another "attribute an idea to the real which appears."\(^1\) The third class, which I have called for want of a better name "non-event" judgements, are simply judgements in which we "are speaking of a subject which is not an event."\(^2\) I understand this to mean that the reality referred to is not confined to any "now" or "here". There are two ways it may not be confined: one is the case where the subject extends through a number of the series of "nows" which constitute perception through time. In other words, that of which one judges is an individual which lasts longer than one's sense of the present—e.g., a person or a nation. The other case is where the subject is without time altogether—e.g., God or the soul.

With regard to the first case, it is rather curious that he should have not also included space; it would seem that an individual could extend far enough so as to be beyond any one "here"—it would consist of a number of contiguous "here's" in the spatial series. A huge tract of land might furnish an example. But he

\(^1\)PL, p. 80.
\(^2\)PL, p. 79.
considers just such an example as this in his discussion of synthetic judgements:

If we mean by phenomena the things we perceive, or the facts or appearances that are given to us, then the whole of England below our horizon (to say nothing at all of America and Asia), and every event that is past or future are not phenomena. They are not perceived facts. They exist in our minds as mere ideas, as the meaning of symbols. . . . Events past and future, and all things not perceived, exist for us only as ideal constructions connected, by an inference through identity of quality, with the real that appears in present perception.¹

This explanation as we shall see below, is typical of synthetic judgements. But what about persons and nations persevering through time then? Here Bradley admits outright that it is hard to distinguish such "non-event" judgements from synthetic ones.

Just as analytic judgements are always tending to become synthetic, so here it is impossible to separate sharply the first division of this class from the synthetic judgement.²

With regard to the question of whether or not they are categorical, I think he treats them as he does synthetic judgements; as a result I find it difficult to see just what the difference between them is. For although synthetic judgements are related to something that appears in present perception, almost everything which appears in the present endures as an individual before and after my "now".

¹PL, p. 75.
²PL, p. 80.
The other kind of "non-event" judgement is more deserving of that name, and is clearly different from analytic and synthetic judgements. Is it categorical? This is the very last thing he considers in the chapter we are dealing with: "Can truth categorical be finally discovered in some such judgement as 'The self is real' or 'Phenomena are nothing beyond the appearance of soul to soul'?" The answer is "either here or nowhere". A footnote added later says "in the end nowhere", but without any specific reasons. However, we shall see that the general argument Bradley mounts against analysis would apply here as well as to the other types of singular judgement, and would justify his dour conclusion.

a) The other two classes of singular judgements are the analytic and the synthetic (which has nothing whatsoever to do with Kant's distinction). Both kinds concern events or things, i.e., something existing in space and time, the difference being that an analytic judgement is about something given in perception simultaneous with the judgement, while a synthetic one is not so restricted: some part of it concerns something not perceived at the time of judging. It might seem that for this distinction we need that aspect of judging Bradley

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1PL, p. 107.

2See section c) below, pp. 147-161, esp. pp. 148-153.
has called the "act" of judging, and which I recommended at the start of this chapter that we ignore; for it is this act that is datable, whereas the propositional content is "eternal" or "timeless". But propositions are timeless in the relevant sense (are true or false for all time) only if a time reference is somehow contained within it. This means taking tenses seriously; but times indicated by tenses can be considered to be part of the propositional content. They can be indicated by "now", "before" and "after", or alternatively by naming specific times.\(^1\) Reichenbach has pointed out just how complicated our description of temporal relations must be to be adequate for English tenses; we need a basic 'now' of the proposition \((N)\), the time of the event judged about \((E)\), and a third often

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\(^1\)Quine argues not only that "tense, then, is to give way to such temporal qualifiers as 'now', 'then', 'before t', 'at t', 'after t'," but also that "to finish the job of eternalizing the sentence ... we have to supplant the 'now' by a date and clock reading or the like". Word and Object, pp. 172, 194. His reason for eliminating indicator words such as 'now', 'I', 'here', etc., is that they are indefinite in what they refer to, and a sentence containing them can vary in truth value, and is thus not eternal. The trouble with this is that dates and clock readings are names of particular times, and if names are treated as definite descriptions as Quine would have us do, then which particular time is meant is again problematic: it is no use just claiming by fiat that it is the one and only one which is so-and-so, for it may not be that there is only one so-and-so. (See the discussion below on uniqueness in descriptions, pp. 377-391.) A description may be given that would determine the time relatively within some series, but no more. And indicator words together with units of distance and duration suffice for that as well.
unspecified time of reference ($R$). For example, in "He will have paid you the money", the event of his paying you at $E$ is prior to some unspecified later time $R$, and both are subsequent to the propositional 'now' $N$. Letting left-to-right order between letters separated by a dash represent earlier-to-later temporal sequence, and (unordered) juxtaposition represent simultaneity, then the temporal relations in the example can be schematized as $N-E-R$. The propositions "He paid you", "He has paid you", and "He had paid you" will be, respectively, $R-E-N$, $E-N$, and $E-R-N$. Taking the last example, we could write it out (using the infinitive without "to" for the tenseless verb) as "He pay you before some then, which be before now." Barbaric English, maybe, but temporally explicit. The continuous aspect can be easily represented by drawing a dash over $E$ and anything justaposed with it. Thus "He was running" and "He will have been running" are schematized $ER-N$ and $N-E-R$.

Bradley's distinction, then, can be partially put in the following way: only singular judgements with the schema $NRE$ or $NER$ can be analytic, all others synthetic. This is not sufficient however, for some judgements with one of these schema are synthetic. The reason for this is that "present perception" means more than just being in the temporal present. It includes

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also spatial presence and 'perceptual' presence. "This road leads to London" and "This volume contains 3x10^8 oxygen molecules" are both MRE, but the former refers to something not here (London), and the latter refers to something not perceived, even though present (molecules). This indicates that the implicit "now" of a judgement content is not enough for Bradley's distinction; it requires an epistemological fleshing-out. In both of the counterexample MRE synthetic judgements, and for synthetic judgements generally, there is a time-lag between the time of E and the time at which the applicability or non-applicability of the idea to the event could be directly ascertained. Thus, although such a judgement may be true or false now, this cannot be verified immediately, but only through various investigations, inferentially connected, which take time. Analytic judgements, on the other hand, are judgements not only whose "now" is the same as the time of the event, but also whose verification or falsification can be made at that same time.

This epistemological aspect of the distinction is somewhat hidden in the account Bradley gives, when he says that "the essence of [analytic judgements] is to hold only of the now, and not to transcend the given perception." It might be thought that ascertaining

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^1PL, p. 56.
the applicability of an idea to reality is only an added complication, that Bradley had in mind that we merely inspect what is around us and abstract or analyse out of it an idea, e.g., "that tree is green". On such an account, the judgement would be true, for all we have done is to take the given and ignore some of it—what is left was certainly there to start with. This is inadequate however, because it cannot deal with false judgements: if in what is given me there is only a green tree, I cannot "abstract out" a red tree. All judgements got in this way would be true. Therefore, we do not get them this way, because some judgements are false. But then how do we know which are true and which are false, if this can not follow directly from the method of getting the judgements? The answer is that we must compare the content with the given to see if it is an analysis of it: if it is, it is true, if not, false. But this would render (if I am in Edinburgh) "Trafalgar Square is now foggy" false, for there is nothing in my present perception that can be abstracted from, so as to produce a foggy Trafalgar Square. Even so it might be true. Therefore the contents of some judgements must be compared with past or future givens (it would take some time to get to London to inspect Trafalgar Square, and the relevant given would be in the past). This business of comparing is
simply what I meant above in speaking of verifying an idea, or ascertaining its applicability to reality.

Bradley distinguishes two kinds of analytic judgements, those with and those without a grammatical subject, and within each of these categories he distinguishes those about the whole of the given and those about only a part of it. Here are some examples he gives to illustrate these classes:


ii. a. Now is the time. It's all so dreary. The present is dark.
    b. There is a wolf. This is a bird. Here is a fire. This bird is yellow. The cow, which is now being milked by the milk-maid, is standing to the right of the hawthorn tree yonder.¹

Although I do not particularly wish to argue that one or more words without a grammatical subject cannot express a judgement, some of these examples seem rather lame. The cries "Fire!" or "Wolf!", in the only plausible situation I could imagine their being used, would be referring to some part of the given, viz., a fire or a wolf. Unfortunate indeed would be the person the whole of whose given contained one of those. They seem to me to be cases of (i.b.), and better ones than the examples Bradley gives, for although one might cryptically say of a wolf "running", one would much more naturally say "It's running". Bradley claims that

¹PL, pp. 56-59.
to say the grammatical subject is elided is "mere linguistic prejudice". His point is apposite to "Wolf!", but my objection to saying "running" is not that one could not say it, but that one just would not. Moreover, why does "running" refer to only a part of the given, and "wolf" not?

Perhaps the most convincing example of reference to the whole of given reality is "Rain" and its counterpart with a subject "It's raining". The former expression is unusual (one would probably react to it as a warning) because of the tendency of English to add dummy subjects in the form of third person neuter pronouns—what Jespersen has called the unspecified, conceptual, or notional neuter.\(^1\) Some languages do not have this need for a dummy subject to carry the unspecified neuter—the verb alone does it; e.g., *Juppiter tonat* (Jupiter, let it thunder), ομη θεοποιη ηθιο (it killed father with a tree, or more idiomatically, father was killed by a tree). But many languages whether they require a subject or not, employ this unspecified reference to "the whole situation of the atmosphere"; it has been called "*das grosse neutrum der natur".*\(^2\) Jespersen gives an extraordinary passage from Hardy in which "the great neuter of nature" is


\[^2\]Jespersen, *op. cit.* The German quotation is attributed to Spitzer.
completely explicit: "Why doth It so and so, and ever so. This viewless, voiceless Turner of the Wheel?" The "It" is described as the de-anthropomorphized 'First or Fundamental Energy.' Bradley's use of the unspecified neuter is restricted to what is here and now, and of course none of the examples from Jespersen would be analytic judgements (the first is not even a judgement, the second speaks of the past, and to "viewless, voiceless" in the third, one might just as well add "timeless"). But in avowedly analytic judgements, such as "It's raining", "It's all so dreary", and "It's dark", the "it" is not just a cloud, some particular chore, or a scrap of cloth, but the whole of given nature or reality surrounding and perhaps including the user of the judgement. Admittedly, they could be used in the former way, even in some non-analytic way, but all I am concerned to do is to try to make sense of them when they are used to refer to the whole of the given present.

By far and away the most common kind of analytic judgement is the last type, with a grammatical subject and about only part of what is given. Each of Bradley's examples contains demonstratives, either as a subject or as modifying a noun. As may have been noticed from my discussion so far of the other kinds of analytic judgement, there is no proper grammatical form or

1Jespersen, op. cit., p. 242.
criterion which guarantees that a sentence is of one specific kind, or even that it is analytic. This is true again here. One might think that either a sentence has a subject or not, and this fact at least would exhaustively divide analytic judgements asunder; but is "here" a subject? Actually, we should be indifferent to either answer to that question, for the form of a judgement cannot determine its status as analytic, synthetic, or neither. Because of this, the presence of demonstratives in all of Bradley's examples for (ii.b.) is misleading, because one might think that words like "here", "now", "this", etc., are the sine qua non of this kind of analytic judgement. But neither are they necessary for this kind ("A cat is on the roof" might well be a case of (ii.b.)), nor are they sufficient ("This sort of weather is frequently shortlived" cannot be analytic at all). We cannot say from this, however, that demonstratives had best be ignored in connection with analytic judgements; this is a complicated matter, as might have already been surmised from the discussion above on the propositional "now". I shall return to them below.1

Synthetic judgements, as we have seen, are ones whose applicability to reality cannot be determined within their own "now"; they require an inference away

1See pp. 145-146 below.
from the given. Bradley might have given a little table of kinds of synthetic judgements analogous to the one for analytic judgements. That he did not buttresses the view that the distinctions into various kinds of analytic judgements are relatively superfluous, at best a rather clumsy and ad hoc way of dealing with some odd cases. Be that as it may, he does deal with synthetic judgements as a whole, rather than in several parcels.

One of the first questions to bother him is:

If the subject is the real that appears in perception, how can events in the past and future, or in a space outside the presentation, and how even can qualities not given to sense be referred to the object and considered as its adjectives?¹

The answer is that they are still true of reality, for although reality appears only in the present, reality is not confined to the present. However,

synthetic judgements are possible only by being connected with what is given at this very instant. The ideas of past and future events are projected from the base of present perception. It is only in that point that they encounter the reality of which they wish to be true.²

This is basically the answer we already met at the end of section two of this chapter, in the account of Bradley's distinction of categorical and hypothetical. Synthetic judgements, it seems, are hypothetical; they derive their truth or falsity from their indirect connection with the present. But what is the nature of

¹ PL, p. 62.
² PL, p. 62.
this connection? Bradley describes it as an "ideal construction", an inference which, like all inferences, "stands on the identity of indiscernibles."¹ The idea of a synthetic judgement, like that of an analytic one, "must be the idea of something in space or some event in time."² The content or idea in the former is of the same kind as in the latter, and therefore the content of the former could be a content of the given. But it is not. What then is the link between a content of the given and one which could be but is not?

That link is found by establishing a point which is the same in both, and is the same because its quality is the same. The "this" contains a complex of detail, either times or spaces (or both) in series, which we may call c.d.e.f. The idea, on its side, contains a series of particulars a.b.c.d. The identity of c.d. in each extends the perception c.d.e.f. by the ideal spaces or times a.b., and the whole is given by synthetical construction as a single fact a.b.c.d.e.f. The whole series now is referred to the real, and by connection with unique presentation, has become a series of events or spaces, itself unique and the same as no other series in the world. It is thus by inference that we transcend the given through synthetic judgements. . . .³

Well, that is how it works. But it is very difficult to understand what it means. Do the letters stand for qualities, for segments of space-time in a spatio-temporal series, or for facts in reality? If "c.d." is the same in both, from the first sentence we might

¹PL, p. 72.
²PL, p. 72.
³PL, p. 73.
expect the letters to represent qualities, i.e., parts of the complex of ideas which constitute the content of the synthetic judgement, and parts of the complex of ideas constituting the content of a judgement about the immediate present to which the synthetic judgement is linked. Thus the present might contain "sunny", "tree", "road", and various other details, and the point of identity between the present and the judgement "This road leads to London" would be the particular road. But this is totally unilluminating, and anyway, does the fact that there is truly a road here and now enable us to infer that it is the same road as a road which leads to London? And besides all that, why should these qualities be ordered in a series?

On the other hand, the letters seem to represent not qualities, but different times and/or places. But how could they be contained within the "this", which is what is given in the "now" of presentation? Therefore, "c.d.e.f." must be meant on this view to represent not various times and/or places within the "now", but a series of little "now's" or "here's" which we might write as ". . . (xyz)_{10},(xyz)_{11}, . . . " . But then mere identity of overlapping times and places cannot permit the inference of much of anything, except perhaps that there are times (or spaces) before or after (in front of, next to, above, etc.) the series of successive givens being considered. A further point is why
should spatial "here's" be ordered, as if in this respect they were like temporally successive "now's"?

Yet the letters seem not to be qualities, times, or spaces, but facts, for "a,b,c,d,e,f." is called a single fact, and presumably the parts of a complex fact are themselves facts.

Let us try a different approach. First of all, Bradley is considering descriptions (ideas) of what is in a series of successive times and/or places. Suppose we experience several successive moments and give an analytic judgement for each, symbolizing their contents as "c", "d", "e", and "f". Now suppose we have a judgement that refers to reality prior to the beginning of our series of givens, say "a". This idea a can be "grounded in reality" by showing that it is part of a series "a,b,c,d", where "c" and "d" are the same as "c" and "d" in the former series. Because "c,d,e,f" is a series of ideas referred to reality, then because the same "c" and "d" are found in "a,b,c,d", this may be joined to the first series, producing "a,b,c,d,e,f" as a new series referring to reality. Therefore a refers to reality. For example, I walk into a room at a certain time; at that moment I judge "John is reading". In successive moments I judge "John looks up", "John smiles", "John lays down the book", "John rises", "John says 'Hello'". Then an idea corresponding to the synthetic judgement "John sat down" would refer to
reality if I could make an "ideal construction", producing a series such as "John sat down", "John picks up the book", "John is reading", "John looks up", the last two being identical to the first two of the preceding series.

There is something awry in the last paragraph. The obvious objection is that there is no reason why I could not have proposed a different series ending in several events which were identical with those beginning the former series, and on that basis inferring something totally different from "John sat down", perhaps even something incompatible with it. One way of avoiding this would be to establish some sort of connection (perhaps causal) between the elements of the series which would block the inference of arbitrary series. But this would be a rather different account from Bradley's own. Another way would be to restrict the proposed extensions of the original series to only true judgements; but the method we are talking about is intended to permit us to ascertain the truth of synthetic judgements, using analytic ones directly about the present, plus a sure-fire inference procedure. And it is simply circular to buttress the inference procedure by restricting in advance the results it produces to just those which it was designed to produce on its own.

However, the above account does not for other reasons accurately reflect Bradley's view. He gives an
illustration of a synthetic judgement by asking us to consider a series of pictures such as Hogarth's The Rake's Progress, one of which is not a picture, but a momentary glimpse of a real man in a real room. By describing something we notice about the man which we see in that glimpse, we can utter an analytic judgement. But also,

by virtue of the sameness in the quality of the man, as he is in the room and is in the pictures, we, neglecting the appearance in the particular frames, arrange the whole series as his past and future. We transcend in this way the visible room and the presented scene, and view the real life of the person extending itself as a series in time.¹

Presumably, a synthetic judgement would be got by describing something about the man happening in one of the pictures, and its contact with the reality given in the glimpse would be via identity in "the quality of the man". Thus the letters Bradley uses should not be thought to represent successive ideas (complexes of qualities) used for successive judgements, as in the explanation above, but should be interpreted as representing the qualities themselves which are combined into complexes in a judgement. Then some particular group of letters represents a judgement, and any other group represents a different one. Let "c.d." represent this quality of the man; then an analytic judgement, say "The rake is seated" is represented by "c.d.e.f." It is

¹PL, pp. 78-79.
extended by "a.b.c.d.", say "The rake is speaking", to the synthetical construction "a.b.c.d.e.f." because the rake is identified as the same rake by means of his possession of identifying qualities. Is the result of this "The rake is seated and speaking"? I am not sure. If that is the result, there are problems, for the judgement may well be false: he might never have spoken while seated. Perhaps "The rake is seated and was speaking" is what Bradley had in mind; but if so, from where did the tense come? We are no longer thinking in terms of the earlier explanation, where the letters were contents of successive spatio-temporal bits: it just makes no sense to say that "speaking" is prior to "the rake" which is prior to "being seated". Maybe one of the letters, which represent qualities or groups of qualities discerned within some single given, somehow assigns a temporal quality, so that "a.b.c.d." can be seen to apply to a given prior to the given of "c.d.e.f." In other words, "a" could represent the quality of being at time $t_n$ and "f" of being at $t_{n+1}$. Something along this line seems to me necessary if Bradley is to avoid the difficulty noted above. There is no hint of it in his example, however, and his other one about schizophrenia is totally unilluminating.¹ Most of his discussion in his chapter called "Two Conditions of

¹PL, p. 73.
Inference" is equally so. But he does give there one example which is worth considering. He has been trying to show that the identity of indiscernibles is a condition of inference, and to explain how it works. An error some people make is to think that since Caesar is the same in two contexts, one can infer that Caesar is both twenty-nine and thirty years old. Bradley replies that

what is true of Caesar in a certain context is true of the same Caesar in any other context. But this does not mean that one context is the other or is to be confused with the other. It means that Caesar has two different contexts, and that the truth of one can be no reason whatever for the falsehood of the other.1

What he means by "context" I take to be "spatio-temporal context"; if it means anything else I do not see how it avoids the absurdity. He then proceeds to consider in more detail the related thesis: "That what is true of B here is true of B everywhere, means that, wherever B happens to be, you can say of it always what you have said of it once. This B you assert of is the self-same B that appears in the differences, but it is not the B \textit{just as it appears} in those differences."2

He seems to have in mind that although it was once truly said of Caesar (B) that he is in Italy (B-A), and at a different time that he is in Gaul (B-C), we cannot say

\begin{itemize}
\item[1]PL, p. 290.
\item[2]PL, pp. 290-291.
\end{itemize}
that the Caesar-in-Italy is in Gaul; it is not the Caesar as he appears in Italy or Gaul, but Caesar tout court, of whom being in Italy or Gaul is true.

The B, of which what has once been said holds good for ever, is not the B which is one thing with A or one thing with C. It is the abstraction, the idealized content B, which is different from its contexts and yet connected with them. . . .

Once again, the notion of "context" has entered; its role here is to embrace all the qualities (including spatial and temporal ones) of a thing which differ between any two judgements about that same thing. That is, if I judge that "The box near the chair is in the room", then later that "The box is in the next room", then "being near the chair" is part of the context, for clearly on the second I am not making an assertion about the box-near-the-chair, for the box is no longer near the chair, but is in the next room. What I asserted of is simply the box. The illustration Bradley himself gives is of a shed (B-A) to which something happens (D)--becomes tipped over, say. Then it burns down and another (B-C) is rebuilt "not distinguishable in itself from the first". Can we say of B-C that D happened to it? If not, and if the sheds are indistinguishable (i.e., are the same shed), how can we continue to claim that one can always say of something what one once said? Bradley

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1 PL, p. 291.

2 PL, p. 291.
restates this objection and then comments upon it, and
in doing so gives his most explicit explanation of how
inference is involved in synthetic judgements:

"The sheds and their environment are a certain
content, and that content is the same. If, on the
strength of their content, we said of the shed
B-A 'D happened here yesterday,' why can we not
also upon this ground now say of the shed B-C
'D happened here last year'? The content is what
we go from, and we have that in both cases." I
reply, By all means: the content is the same.
Let us try to carry out the process you recommend.
We cannot of course connect D with B-C unless we
establish a chain of relations through the identity
of their end-points. You cannot go direct from
the content B to the temporal event D, for that,
as we have seen, is not predicated categorically.
You must start from the content as given in one
time. Well, starting from B-A, you get a chain of
events which took you back to D. But, if you start
from B-C, you have a chain of events which takes
you back first to the origin of B-C, when B did
not exist, and then again through the destruction
of B-A, to the time when B once more existed
and was connected with D. Your process informs you
that D the event will not fall within the identity
of the ideal content B-C. That content has been
qualified by a limitation in time, and qualified
again by a definition of its component elements,
which excludes their identity with the elements
of B-A. If you deny that these qualifications are
objects of knowledge, then I admit D is true of
B-C, and why in the world should we not think it
true? But if you admit that these qualifications
are distinctions, then the content of the sheds is
not indiscernible, and therefore by your admission
is not identical.1

A certain curiosity will probably have been noticed:
why does Bradley use two distinguishable symbols, "B-A"
and "B-C", for the shed which, supposedly, is indis-
tinguishable from itself? That is the key to his
answer. The shed, which he sometimes calls simply "B",

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1PL, pp. 291-292.
is qualified by "time" and "a definition of its component elements". Some things about the shed, e.g., that it is green, seven feet tall, etc., are part of the context, related to the shed rather like being in Italy is related to Caesar. They are not part of "what is the same", about which what is said holds always. But certain other things about the shed are more intrinsically related, in particular, the temporal period of continuous existence, and its essential characteristics as the shed. These latter I take to be represented by "A" and "C". Admittedly, Bradley does not insist that we include these within the ideal content of the shed, but merely says that if you do, the sheds are discernible, and D cannot be said of B-C because B-C is not B-A; if you do not, D must be said of B-C as well. However, in a footnote added in the second edition he says:

And even in the case of a single shed, where it remains throughout one and the same, it is still qualified by its temporal diversity, so as to be also so far different, and, so far again, not indiscernible.1

This is no longer equivocal, and is quite radical--a thing is qualified not only by the duration of its continuous existence, but by each moment therein. A shed given now is discernible from an otherwise indiscernible shed then just a moment ago, and hence not the same shed. Instead of indicating this by double

1PL, p. 298 n. 8.
hyphenated letters, I shall just attach subscripts for successive moments.

To return finally to the account of synthetic inference quoted above on page 118, we can understand it in the light of this example of the shed as follows: we experience a number of givens in temporal succession. A judgement referred to the present given is analytic; one referred to a past (or future) given is synthetic, and it must be linked up with an analytic one in order to establish its connection with reality, i.e., its truth. To find this link, we proceed by inferences from the present successively to moments in the past (or future). It is all rather like reversing (or speeding up) a film projector. Let our analytic judgement be \( c_n \cdot d_n \cdot e_n \cdot f_n \), and the synthetic judgement for five moments (frames) earlier be \( c_{n-5} \cdot d_{n-5} \cdot e_{n-5} \cdot f_{n-5} \). Suppose we have been talking about the shed before it burnt, and "c.d." represents the shed. The link is established by the presence of the identical content of "c.d." in both, and we can say "The shed is tipped and was upright". The tense difference derives from the temporal indices. This view, I believe accurately represents Bradley's own.

However, there is a serious difficulty: we do not have the same symbols, but "c_n \cdot d_n" and "c_{n-5} \cdot d_{n-5}"; which are different, and might well have been written "X" and "Y". And this is not a mere quibble about symbolic
conventions either—without talking about symbols at all Bradley himself forces this conclusion in the last quotation above. We do not have the same symbols because each moment permits distinctions and hence discernibility. If this is the case, where can identity of content, upon which all inference depends, be found? Bradley is forced to include time as a property or relation of everything in order to cope with the timelessness of assertions, but the way he does it wrecks his account of the nature of inference for synthetic judgements. Identity of content of part of two judgements can only be found between two judgements made of the same one given, the same moment. As we saw earlier, the inclusion of time into judgements is necessary, but if we do it by counting time as a quality of a thing as Bradley does here (and as he rather ambiguously sometimes seemed to do when talking about the content of a thing or fact—see chapter I above), we court disaster; we end up with a wholly new set of objects each moment and no way to connect them, since each connection depends upon an identity which is not there.

An entirely separate difficulty, but one no less serious, is that his account, and both illustrations of it, require that the judgement of each preceding or succeeding link in the chain of events be—for that momentary given—an analytic judgement. From the central real room and man we look to the pictures and judge
that in this particular one, say, the rake is speaking. Or, starting from the present shed, we are taken back first to the origin of the shed, through its destruction, etc., where at any point the relation between what we judge and what we see is simply that of analysis of the given. The difficulty, then, is how do we understand this process for synthetic judgements about events I have not, shall not, can not, or even could not directly experience, such as "Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo", or "The Universe began with a gigantic explosion"? Some events are not observed by me, some not by anyone, and some are not observable, yet Bradley's description of the way synthetic judgements are connected with reality requires that they have been or will be given to me in a present experience. This leaves a great number of synthetic judgements hanging without explanation.

b) Analytic and synthetic judgements are singular judgements because they either directly or indirectly refer an idea to reality such that they are about single, unique things or facts given either in a particular present, past, or future experience, or in several. But the uniqueness of their subjects cannot be gotten into the judgements themselves. Bradley recognizes at this point that a special discussion is required on proper names and demonstratives, for both of these kinds
of expression have been thought to be somehow capable of bringing uniqueness into judgements.\(^1\)

In connection with proper names, it is Mill's doctrine of connotation and denotation which Bradley has in mind. Mill distinguishes these two types of terms:

A non-connotative term is one which signifies a subject only, or an attribute only. A connotative term is one which denotes a subject, and implies an attribute. By a subject is here meant anything which possesses attributes.\(^2\)

Thus "John" and "whiteness" denote, while "white" connotes, for it denotes all white things, and implies the attribute of whiteness as well. As regards proper names in general, "they are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals."\(^3\)

What is the nature of denotation? Mill says, "Proper names are attached to the objects themselves. . . ."\(^4\) And since the meanings of terms are found only in what they connote, i.e., in the attributes they imply, and proper names connote nothing, "these have, strictly speaking, no signification."\(^5\) They merely denote, and

\(^1\)I am using "demonstrative" loosely to refer to all expressions of an "egocentric" or "token-reflexive" type, including not only "this", "that", "those", etc., but also "me", "now", "there", etc.

\(^2\)Mill, A System of Logic, p. 19.

\(^3\)Mill, op. cit., p. 20.


\(^5\)Mill, op. cit., p. 21.
Mill takes the idea of their being "attached" quite seriously: he recounts the tale of the robber who puts a chalk mark on a house with booty, but is foiled when someone marks all the houses similarly, thus obliterating the difference.

When we impose a proper name, we perform an operation in some degree analogous to what the robber intended in chalking the house. We put a mark, not indeed upon the object itself, but, so to speak, upon the idea of the object. A proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object, in order that whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs to our thoughts, we may think of that individual object. Not being attached to the thing itself, it does not, like the chalk, enable us to distinguish the object when we see it; but it enables us to distinguish it when it is spoken of, either in the records of our own experience, or in the discourse of others; to know that what we find asserted in any proposition of which it is the subject, is asserted of the individual thing with which we were previously acquainted.¹

Although Mill earlier said that proper names are attached to objects, when he considered his analogy, he saw the absurdity of viewing names as chalk marks, and quietly slipped in the "idea" of the object. This did not escape Bradley, who replied: "If there is an idea conveyed by the name, whenever it is used, then it surely means something, or, in the language which pleases you, it must be 'connotative'."² For after all, a mark is a sign, and

a sign can not possibly be destitute of meaning.

Originally imposed as an arbitrary mark, that very

¹Mill, op. cit., p. 22.
²Pl., p. 59.
process, which makes it a sign and associates it firmly with the thing it signifies, must associate with it also some qualities and characters of that which it stands for. If it did not to some extent get to mean the thing, it never could get to stand for it at all.¹

Bradley's point rests upon his theory of signs which I examined in chapter I, and found superfluous. This, however, does not vitiate his objection to Mill. It could be restated as follows: if a word enables us to distinguish an object when it is spoken of, it does this by virtue of the idea it expresses, i.e., the idea we "connect in our minds" (as Mill puts it) with the mark, or word. An idea of an object, as we saw earlier, is a set of qualities and relations which is part of the qualities and relations that constitute the content of the object. It is these qualities and relations, which are the idea of the thing, that are connected with the word. But what is this connection, if not the "implication of attributes" with which Mill characterizes connotation? Such a word, which stands for some thing, is a proper name; it has meaning in the sense that it implies certain attributes of the thing (or, is connected with the idea of the thing), without which we could not know what it names. "What connection, I would ask, would be left between the bare name and the thing it stands for, if every one of these ideas were removed? ... You may

¹PL, p. 60
have no idea what 'William' connotes, but if so you can hardly know what it stands for."¹

In the first of these last two remarks Bradley puts his finger on the point at which Mill's analogy breaks down. We can understand the connection between a chalk mark and a house (particles of one adhere to particles of the other), but how is a name, a word--which is not identical with any of its occurrences--hooked up with an object? Are names actually labels? Surely not; neither are names concrete items, nor usually are their concrete instances physically attached to what they name, which is the point of labels. Any plausible account of the connection between a name and what it names will be an account similar in essentials to the connection of general, or connotative, terms with what they name. In particular, they will both involve meanings, in the sense of an attribute or a complex of attributes. I take the second remark above as partially making this point: if you do not know the meaning of "William", you no more know who or what is spoken of than if the expression "the quaigh" were used without your knowing what it meant. The converse is trickier: one might think that if I know the object spoken of, I know the meaning of its proper name, while knowing the objects which are quaighs does not guarantee that I know the meaning of

¹PL, p. 60.
"quaigh". For (suppose) all existing quaighs are wooden; then I might think that word means "a wooden cup", whereas it does not. But the difference is specious: in both cases the meaning is got by appreciating the sufficient characteristics, not just one or the other. Concerning William, I might have noticed particularly his dirty blond hair, his height of six feet, and his melancholy demeanor, and concluded, thus is William. But other people might be like that as well. We do, after all, have cases of mistaken identity. There are difficulties associated with "sufficient" characteristics, I am quite aware, and I shall return to this later. But for now, I only want to point out the similarity between singular and general terms regarding their meaning.

This similarity has also been stressed by Geach:

It has often been argued that it cannot be part of the meaning of a proper name that its bearer should be a man, because we cannot tell this just by hearing the name, and because there is nothing to stop us from giving the same name to a dog or a mountain. You might as well argue that it cannot be part of the meaning of "beetle" that what it is applied to must be an insect, because we cannot learn this meaning just from the sound of the word, and because "beetle" is used for a sort of mallet. In a given context, the sense of "beetle" does include: being an insect, and the sense of "Churchill" does include: being a man.1

Geach immediately goes on to argue that "for any proper name there is some interpretation of 'X' such that we

1Geach, Mental Acts, p. 70.
can truly say 'the continued application of this proper name requires, as part of the sense of the name, that it be always applied to the same X.'

This is a case of an even more general thesis Geach holds, to the effect that all identity statements are relative to some general term or other. That is, x is never simply the same as y, but rather is the same something as y (man, insect, stone, etc.). Bradley also assumes this thesis in connection with proper names, and uses it in an argument very similar to Geach's; this passage, incidentally, brings out quite explicitly the view I sketched above.

And, when we take the proper names of objects which last and reappear, then the given is transcended in a still higher sense. The meaning of such a name is universal, and its use implies a real universality, an identity which transcends particular moments. For, unless the person were recognized as distinct, he would hardly get a name of his own, and his recognition depends on his remaining the same throughout change of context. We could not recognize anything unless it possessed an attribute, or attributes, which from time to time we are able to identify. The individual remains the same amid that change of appearance which we predicate as its quality. And this implies that it has real identity. Its proper name is the sign of a universal, of an ideal content which actually is in the real world.

This passage also shows why Bradley considered judgments about individuals not to be "wholly analytic", but to pass into the synthetic judgement. But is not every

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1 Geach, op. cit., p. 71.
2 See below, Part II, ch. I, 2, B, iii, d.
3 PL, p. 61.
analytic judgement about some individual or other? Even unique momentary events such as flashes "involve a reference to a series from which [they are] excluded", rendering judgements about them synthetic. But then what has become of our distinctions? With the exception of judgements like "The soul is real", the so-called non-event singular judgements were seen to merge with synthetic ones; and now analytic judgements seem to do so as well. This seems to me to call into serious doubt the value of distinguishing singular judgements into various types to begin with.

As a final remark on proper names for this section, we can see that Bradley's rejection of Mill's theory of purely denoting terms, or what is now often called simply the denotative theory, had the effect of removing a putative source of particularity from within the judgement itself. Proper names for Mill are unique expressions, each one just as particular as the one particular thing it names, and attached to it by some mysterious, umbilical, and unexplained (except by faulty analogy) relation. Such terms, by their very nature, are supposed to guarantee in principle the exact and unique place in reality which is said to be so-and-so in any judgement containing one of them. But just what the nature of such terms is, that they can in advance carry this guarantee, is what puzzled Bradley and led him to reject them; he suggested instead that proper
names function by meaning (or implying) a set of universal properties which is sufficient for the identification and re-identification of what is named. And properties, of course, are general.

A similar motive is at work in Bradley's treatment of demonstratives—it is quite explicit in his first mention of them:

Ideas are universal, and, no matter what it is that we try to say and dimly mean, what we really express and succeed in asserting, is nothing individual. For take the analytic judgement of sense. The fact given us is singular, it is quite unique; but our terms are all general, and state a truth which may apply as well to many other cases. In "I have a toothache" both the I and the toothache are mere generalities. The actual toothache is not any other toothache, and the actual I is myself as having this very toothache. But the truth I assert has been and will be true of all other toothaches of my altering self. Nay "I have a toothache," is as true of another's toothache as of my own, and may be met by the assertion, "Not so, but I have one." It is in vain that we add to the original assertion "this," "here," and "now," for they are all universals. They are symbols whose meaning extends to and covers innumerable instances.²

This is so plain as to hardly need any comment. But somewhat later on his analysis of demonstratives takes an odd turn, when he asks himself what kind of ideas they are, what do they mean, and how are they different from ordinary ideas. He concentrates on "this" in particular, claiming afterwards that "what has been said of 'this' will hold in the main of 'I', 'me', and

²PL, p. 49.
Presumably he would include the other typical demonstratives as well.

He begins by disputing that space and time are principles of individuation; merely adding a date and location will not "confer uniqueness upon any event." Within a series (which I take to be a set of spatio-temporal "volumes" for what is experienced, ordered with respect to time), such a specification confers a relative uniqueness, but beyond the series, in another part of space-time not unified with it, a recurrence of the content could not be distinguished from the original by space and time. Even construing the series as an unbroken whole (extending uniformly to infinity in each direction perhaps), we cannot escape relativity, for nothing in such a series can guarantee that there are no other series fitting the contents associated in our series. The former situation envisaged here seems to be what Strawson once described as "massive reduplication in the universe". The latter might be called massive reduplication of the universe. However, Bradley has in mind an even more radical criticism than that: he is not suggesting that our whole common spatio-temporal universe might be somewhere replicated with another you, me, and everything else; rather he says that each of us

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1 PL, p. 69n.
2 PL, p. 63.
has our own series corresponding each to our own experience of the given. How can you, he asks,

determine or in any way characterize your series, so as to get its difference from every possible series within your description? It is idle to say "this," for "this" does not exclude except in this sphere, and it is idle to say "my", for it is only in my element that yours and mine collide. Outside if they are indifferent, and the expression "my" will not distinguish one world from the other. 1

Where then do we find uniqueness?

It is not by its quality as a temporal event or phenomenon of space, that the given is unique. It is unique, not because it has a certain character, but because it is given. It is by the reference of our series to the real, as it appears directly within the point of contact, or indirectly in the element continuous with this point, that these series become exclusive. We perhaps may be allowed to express this otherwise by saying, it is only the "this" which is real, and the expression "my" will not distinguish one world from the other. 2

What is unique is what is given to me, and that is "this"; when we judge of "this" we employ the idea of "this", for which Bradley has coined the term "thisness". If "thisness" is part of the content of a fact, how does "this" stand to its existence? He avoids an unambiguous answer to this, saying that he simply will not ask how far "this" holds of reality as opposed to appearance, how "far it is, or is only for me". 3 I suspect that he felt uneasy about conjoining "'this' is real", "the real

1PL, p. 64.
2PL, p. 64.
3PL, p. 65.
is unique", and "there are as many 'this's' as there are experienced series of the given", all of which seem to issue from the passage above. He later added that "this" falls neither within existence nor content, for these are ultimately abstractions from the unified Absolute; but that only renders its status more obscure.

"Thisness", however, falls within content, for it is an idea--it is "the general character of every appearance in space or time. Thisness, if we like, we may call particularity". Particularity is of course a universal; it applies equally to any particular object or fact. There is, however, a further meaning associated with "thisness": "the idea of my immediate sensible relation to reality." It is an idea of presence which we can abstract from direct presentation. But although it remains the same throughout the variety of content, Bradley regards the idea of presence as different from ordinary ideas. And this is where his analysis becomes curious indeed. He says that we call up the idea of "this", i.e., "thisness" by taking a given perception and "attending to the aspect of presence within it." So far so good. But then he says that if we try to attribute this idea to a different given, as we might

1^PL, p. 65.
2^PL, p. 67.
3^PL, p. 67.
the idea "horse", we are stopped, "for any judgement so
made we discover must be false." The reason for this
is that "thisness" does not mean merely particularity
and presence, but means on each occasion of its use the
particular particularity and uniqueness of that particu-
lar fact which is given.

The presented instance of reality is unique. By
discrimination we are able to fix that uniqueness
in the shape of an idea. We thereupon try to make
it the idea of something else. But, for the idea
to be true of something else, that something else
must be present and unique. We have then either
two unique presentations, or one must disappear.
If the first one goes, the idea goes with it. If
the last one goes, there is now no fact for the
idea to be referred to. In either case there can
be no judgement. The idea, we see, is not the
true idea of anything other than its own reality.
It is a sign which, if we judge, cannot signify
nothing except itself.

Bradley has argued himself into a peculiar corner:
judgements are made up of ideas, and ideas are general,
but the idea of "this" is particular. He seems to have
reintroduced a Mill-like doctrine for demonstratives,
and to have admitted that there are particular ideas,
i.e., ideas of one and only one thing or fact, and this
necessarily, not just coincidentally. He then extricates
himself with the rather lame device of claiming that the
idea of "this" is hardly an idea at all--so much so that
it cannot ever be used as an idea in judgements (this
evasion is rather like his side-stepping around the

1PL, p. 67.
2PL, p. 68.
'idea' of "existence" and "reality" we noticed earlier in this chapter). With one easy stroke generality is preserved. But although we cannot use "thisness" in judgements, we do use demonstratives, and we are left with two incompatible descriptions of them:

(A) The real is inaccessible by way of ideas. In attempting to become concrete and special, you only succeed in becoming more abstract and wholly indefinite. "This" "now" and "mine" are all universals. And your helpless iteration, "not this but this" will not get your expression any nearer your meaning. In using "this" we do use an idea, and that idea is and must be universal; but what we mean, and fail to express, is our reference to the object which is given as unique.

(B) The idea of "this" would be falsely used, unless what it marks were actually presented. What we mean by "this" is the exclusive focus of presentation which lights up its content, and it is of that singular content that we use the idea. And to treat that idea as a meaning which could be true elsewhere, would be to bring into our focus another content.

I think we can explain this incompatibility if we notice that there are two distinct notions of "meaning" involved here; 1) the meaning of an idea is one or more universals implied by the idea, which are instantiated together in certain things, and by virtue of that the idea applies to those things. 2) The other sense of meaning is what particular object or fact someone intends or has in mind when judging. For example, when

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1PL, p. 63.

2PL, p. 66.

3PL, p. 68.
I say "a horse is in the field" and there are innumerable horses in many fields, but I mean or have in mind only that particular horse which I see through the car window in the field. This second sense is clearly what is involved in the latter part of (A): you say "this cow" and mean a certain one, but fail to express that because your words are equally applicable to other cows. Meaning in the first sense is also involved, but kept distinct. The idea of "this" is universal; just as the idea of "cow", it implies some properties, namely, particularity and presence. But in (B) these senses of meaning become confused—the meaning (sense 1) of "thisness" is conflated with the very thing which is present and particular, which is meant (sense 2) when "this" is used. I think it is this confusion evident in (B) which led Bradley to say that the idea of "this" is itself particular, a unique sign for each unique given, and hence not really an idea, but a plethora of unrelated, exclusive marks, one for each given or even for parts therein. Had he paid sufficient attention to this ambiguity, he probably would have avoided its trap and its consequen-
tial absurdity of an idea which is both particular and not an idea.

By keeping in mind the two senses of meaning we can unravel this dilemma, and give an account of demonstra-
tives quite like that for proper names, and within the spirit of Bradley's analysis. In using either kind of
of term, we mean (2) to refer exclusively to some particular object or fact, yet we fail to do so with our judgement alone because the meanings (1) of these terms, like all meanings, are universal (see the conclusion of chapter I). The meaning (1) of a proper name is usually sufficiently rich, especially if we are acquainted with its bearer, to allow us to identify and reidentify and hence to mean (2) that which it names—the properties it implies are usually enough to exclude everything but one thing. The properties implied by demonstratives, to the contrary, are so general and abstract as to be applicable to almost anything—"this", for example, means (1) "some particular thing present to the senses", just that and nothing more. Terms so general in meaning (1) can apply indiscriminately, and hence can be used on various particular occasions to mean (2) various particular objects or facts. The main difference between proper names, general terms, and demonstratives is the degree of decreasing specificness in their meanings (1); on the other hand, all are or can be used to mean (2) particulars. (English requires articles for such a use of general terms, but some other languages do not, e.g., Russian.)

We can now see why consideration of tenses and the occurrence of "this" in analytic judgements are of some importance.¹ We saw that "this" in a judgement was

neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for it
to be analytic. But if a judgement is analytic, then
its content is predicated directly of a particular fact
or thing given in present perception. With these quali-
ties present, "this" could have been part of the judge-
ment even were it not. Thus if "A cat is on the roof"
is analytic, I could have said "That cat is on the roof
there". That is why all of Bradley's examples of
analytic judgements whose grammatical subject applies
to part of the given reality (type ii.b.) contain
demonstratives.

"This" implies particularity and presence; the
former is appearance in space and time. Present space
and present time are usually indicated by "here" and
"now", which together might be considered an analysis
of sorts of "this". Thus analytic judgements carry
either explicitly or, more usually, implicitly a refer-
ence to the propositional "now". Moreover, no part of
an analytic judgement can refer to anything outside the
same time reference of the propositional "now"--its
tense schema in Reichenbach's notation must be NRE or
MRE. Of course, some time afterwards, the presence of
that judgement is past, and the present time aspect of
"this" is no longer appropriate; "now" has changed to
"before now" or "then", and the tense schema to either
ER-N, E-R-N, or E-RN, or the respective continuous
aspects.
c) It remains now only to consider what Bradley says further of singular judgements. So far, singular judgements are found to be categorical, and abstract or universal judgements are hypothetical. Existential statements, as we understand that class of judgements, are mixed. Some of them are hypothetical, but others are categorical; indeed, Bradley says that all singular judgements are existential: they assert the existence of their subjects (in his special sense of that term). One thing Bradley seems to have temporarily overlooked when he says, "Singular judgements we have already discussed, and we found that, be they analytic or synthetic, they all at first sight seem categorical,"¹ is that synthetic judgement depends upon an inference. Ignoring the difficulties associated with understanding how such inferences work, we can see at least that since synthetic judgements are true of reality only through an inferential connection with the present, they are therefore only indirectly true, i.e., they are hypothetical. For categorical judgements, let us remember, "content themselves with the analysis of the given, and predicate of the real nothing but a content that is directly presented."² And synthetic judgements manifestly do not do that. True, reality is not identified

¹PL, p. 90.
²PL, p. 93.
by Bradley with the present, and synthetic judgements are predicated of reality, but they are so only mediately, via our sole epistemological "window", sensation of the present. They are therefore hypothetical. Remembering this himself, he tries to sidestep it by saying that a synthetic judgement "becomes categoric solely by relation to that which is given, and hence the whole weight of the assertion rests on the analytic judgement."¹ How being related to what is given makes it categorical, when these latter are directly of the given, is beyond me. However, this is not too important, for if the categoricity of synthetic judgments depends upon that of analytic ones, and the latter are shown to be not categorical, then whether or not synthetic judgements are categorical becomes otiose. And Bradley proceeds to try to show that analytic judgments are not categorical after all.

There are at least two ways a judgement can be false: it can go beyond the facts, or fall short of them. The first way is the one we have assumed from the beginning; for example, if I judge "That is a fox" when what is given contains not a fox, but a dog, I have judged falsely. But had I said "That is a dog", I still would have left out a vast amount of what was actually given.

¹PL, p. 93.
And it is evident at once that the idea we use can not possibly exhaust the full particulars of what we have before us. A description, we all know, can not ever reach to a complete account of the manifold shades, and the sensuous wealth of one entire moment of direct presentation. As soon as we judge, we are forced to analyse, and forced to distinguish.¹

The dog by itself was not given, "it was in the fact and we have taken it out." In doing so "we have separated, divided, abridged, dissected, we have mutilated the given." But if the analytic judgement thus arbitrarily selects from and thus alters the facts, "how can it any longer lay claim to truth?"²

The thesis is clear: analysis is falsification.³ Bradley has no real answer to the objection: So what if all is not said? What was said was there. A judgement need not say everything to say something true. On such a reply he merely heaps abuse and accusations of prejudice, and petulantly threatens to end the discussion if the thesis is not recognized. His one attempt to argue the thesis involves his famous rejection of relations on pains of infinite regress: if you analyse, you

¹PL, p. 94.
²PL, p. 94.
³Inasmuch as the non-event singular judgement does not exhaust the full particulars of reality, it is subject to this criticism also; those non-event singular judgements limited by some duration of time, which we found difficult to distinguish from synthetic judgements, are subject to the next criticism as well, for although the things they are about extend through time, they do not extend through all time.
must relate the parts you have distinguished; but then what relates the relation to the parts—another relation, and so on ad infinitum. The flaw in this argument—that relations themselves are on all fours with what they relate, and therefore require further relating to them—is so well known that it need not be laboured over here.

The way out of this dilemma, assuming that it is one, is to render the analytic judgement dependent upon all that has been left out, in other words, to include what was omitted as a condition of the truth of the judgement. Then "S is P" becomes

\[(1) \quad (x)(Sx \cdot Fx \supset Px),\]

where "Fx" represents everything else about the thing judged of. Unfortunately, this is no real way out, for "P" is actually an infinite conjunction of properties, so that (1) properly is

\[(2) \quad (x)(Sx \cdot Tx \cdot Ux \cdot Vx \ldots \supset Px),\]

which is ill-formed, and that is just another way of saying that one cannot put an infinite number of conditions into the antecedent of a conditional—it will not make sense.

Worse yet, Bradley says that you can not assume (or I, at least, do not know your right to assume) that the present exists independent of the past, and that, taking up one fragment of the whole extension, you may treat this part as self-subsistent, as something that owes nothing to its connection with the rest.\(^1\)

\(^1\)PL, p. 99.
He not only does not acknowledge your right, but holds the assumption false. We saw earlier that reality is not to be identified with the present;¹ but how do we know that? How do we know merely from inspecting our little "hole" of the given, from perceiving the light which falls only upon a limited area of the stream, that there is something like a stream? Earlier I quoted Bradley as saying that space and time beyond the here and now are inferred because they "are the appearance of a reality which for ever transcends them . . . ."

But how do we know that? His answer to this in the context of his attack on analysis, is rather cryptic:

The continuity of the element, the integrity of the content, forbids us to say that this illuminated section by itself is real. The reference of the content to something other than itself lies deep within its internal nature.²

Continuity, integrity, and deep internal natures give me, for one, little solace. I suspect that he has in mind that everything is hooked together in a vast nexus of causal connections,³ and that we can, nay, are

¹ See above, pp. 79-80.
² PL, p. 96.
³ I should stress the tentative nature of the suggestion that these are causal connections. The following considerations led me to this: a) the difficulty of understanding how criteria which are observational in character (deriving from our inspection of the "illuminated section") could give rise to a priori connections of a metaphysical character; b) the fact that Bradley describes the underlying grounds of hypotheticals as scientific laws, if they are not that already; c) the fact that he sometimes uses metaphors such as "... all in the end hang together . . . " (ETR, p. 326),
compelled to recognize this merely on the basis of our successive givens. This being the case, each fact is conditional upon not only everything else given simultaneously, but upon everything else past and future. Our expansion of "F" must be doubly infinite, which is even more impossible than before. For the expansion of "F" to be possible, the series of space and time must have come to an end, which is itself impossible. So there is no satisfactory way to construe the analytical judgement by the method of including the conditions for its truth within it.

"Nothing can really be quite loose from anything else in the Universe" (ETR, p. 329), each fact "depends" on a prior fact that "begots" it (PL, p. 100—I have added all the underlines); and finally, d) the passage itself from which the last metaphors are taken describes a "chain" of facts, a word commonly and naturally associated with causality. Against these considerations are the following: a) Bradley frequently describes these connections in very abstract terms, such as unity amidst diversity, one and many, sameness and difference, and he often associates the issue that something always refers to something other than itself with the dispute between Pluralism, with its independent, isolated facts and things, and Monism, with its defense of the internality of all relations—and if this external reference is merely a consequence of the necessary internality of relations, it is hard to see how they must be causal; b) the object of science is held to be not "the ascertainment of ultimate truth, . . . [and its ideas] are not intended to set out the true character of reality." (AR, pp. 250-251). " . . . science keeps merely to the sphere of phenomena and the laws of their occurrence . . . " (AR, p. 252); c) causes themselves cannot be real, but only appearances, because they give rise to a contradiction: causation must be and cannot be continuous (AR, pp. 46-52); and finally, d) he attempts at one point to give a straightforward phenomenalistic account of why, in immediate experience, we want to go beyond it. The description is entirely in terms of feelings of agreement and unison, and the felt absence
Bradley considers two objections to this conclusion. The first is that even though the truth of A depends upon that of B, when B is true, A is also; both are true simply, or categorically. This argument depends upon the following: although the fact which makes A true could not have existed without the existence of the fact which makes B true, if the former fact does exist, it is still fact and A is true of it categorically, even if the fact of B, upon which it depends, is unknown or itself dependent upon some further fact. Bradley's answer is rather extraordinary—he denies that there are facts. He does this by turning Aristotle's argument for a first cause on its head, concluding not that there must be a first fact, but that since a first fact is something "which could not possibly be real", our chain of facts, conditioned (causally?) by what goes before, cannot have any support, or fastening at the end.

And when the end is unsupported, all the rest is unsupported. . . . [Our judgement] avowedly depends upon what is not fact, and it is not categorically true. Not standing by itself, it hangs from a supposition. 1

Bradley's answer is inconclusive, as Wollheim has pointed out in his excellent exposition and criticism of sensations of disturbance, etc., with no mention of causal relations—in fact, relations in general produce only "failure and a sense of defect". (ETR, p. 186) Therefore, I consider my claim that these connections are really causal as tentative, though plausible.

1PL, p. 100.
of it. ¹ He confuses connection of facts together in a series, with connection of the bits of knowledge about them. Regarding the former, just why is a first fact not possible? And if there is no first fact, is not the series infinite? If so, we shall never come to a fact dependent on something outside the series which is not there. We simply have no end, and so the question of its support is irrelevant.

If the argument is about our knowledge of facts rather than the facts themselves, it is more plausible, for of all the facts we know, some will depend upon facts about which we do not know. But for the conclusion that 'no facts are known' to follow because eventually in the series we must come to facts whose conditions are unknown, an assumption is required: "in order to know a fact, it is necessary to know its prior condition."²

The other objection Bradley considers is that the analytic judgement, while hypothetical, is so only in the sense of being "subject to the condition of the rest of the series"; subject to this condition, the judgement still is an assertion of its content to be fact, to exist. This, says Bradley, is tantamount to "Given something else, then a-b exists" (where "a-b" is

¹Wollheim, F. H. Bradley, pp. 94-104.
²Wollheim, op. cit., p. 102.
the analytic judgement in question). That is, it is a suggestion to translate an existential judgement "P exists" (all analytic judgements being existential) into "If anything exists anywhere, then P exists." He attributes this view to Drobisch and Herbert, and criticizes it for covertly assuming that something exists, and hence remaining categorical. His corrected translation runs "If everything else exists, then P exists."

We might write these two versions thus:

(3) \((\exists x)(x = A) \supset (\exists y)(y = P)\), "if something, say A, exists, P exists"; and

(4) \((\exists y)(x = y) \supset (\exists z)(z = P)\), "if everything exists, P exists" (I have omitted the "else" from the antecedent, for it plays no role in Bradley's argument). Bradley then objects that "(x) (\exists y)(x = y)" must be false, for there is no such fact as everything. That presupposes that "the infinite process [of space and time] must have come to an end, and be realized in a finite result. And this cannot be. . . . it is metaphysically impossible." He recognizes that falsity of the antecedent does not require that the consequent be false; it does, however, if the antecedent is the sole condition of the consequent. This situation is equivalent to the impossibility of

\[ 1 \text{PL}, \text{p. 104}. \]

\[ 2 \text{PL}, \text{p. 99}. \]
the truth of the consequent and falsity of the antecedent, or 
\((P \supset Q) \land \neg(Q \land \neg P)\); but that is equivalent to
\(P \equiv Q\), and thus Bradley is suggesting that (4) is really the biconditional
(5) \((\exists x)(\exists y)(x = y) \equiv (\exists z)(z = P)\).

He concludes from all this that an analytic judgement
"P exists" is false if categorical, and if hypothetical
in the way suggested here, is equivalent to an expres-
sion that is false, namely, that everything exists.

The holes in this argument are so numerous as to be almost painful. First of all, (3) neither asserts
nor assumes the existence of anything, anymore than (one
of his own examples) "If God is just the wicked will be
punished" says that "a just God exists." Secondly,
assuming that (3) is not an adequate translation of
"P exists", what compels us to change it to (4)? Third,
what compels us to change (4) to (5) other than the
fact that (4) will not give Bradley the conclusion he
wants? Fourth, why does \((\exists x)(\exists y)(x = y)\) require space
and time to have come to an end? To advocate this is
to imply that the expressions of universality "all",
"every", "whenever", etc., can apply only to finite
groups. But Bradley has explicitly (and rightly)
rejected the "collective" or finitistic sense of "all"
as not expressing genuine universality. Fifth, if we
accept (5), instead of concluding that since

\[^1\text{PL, p. 89.}\]
"(x)(y)(x = y)" is false, "P exists" is false, why could we not infer that since "P" is obviously true (just look there before you!), clearly everything must exist? Sixth, there is something odd about a procedure which offers a more perspicuous translation of an expression, but which includes the expression itself. Not only is it odd, but confusing. For example, could I not say that since a categorical analytic judgement is false, and since "everything exists" is false then both sides of (4) and (5) are false, and therefore both (4) and (5)—take your pick—are true, while what they are translations of, or definitions of, are false? Even for (3), if nothing exists, P does not; but then (3) is true while "P exists" is not. Seventh, if someone seriously suggests (4) as a translation of "P exists", intending this suggestion to be an objection to Bradley's thesis that you cannot get all past and future conditions into the judgement, Bradley cannot in reply merely trot out his thesis again, for that is a petitio principii.

We need not pursue this any further. What is clear enough is that Bradley thinks that analytical judgements are false, because anything less than the whole truth in a categorical judgement is not truth at all. The whole truth in a categorical judgement is not truth at all. The whole truth, moreover, cannot be expressed in a categorical judgement merely by the expedient of plugging into it more content, for such content can
never be rich enough to correspond to the variety of all
givens, past and future, nor even to the infinite detail
of the present, which is only one of the elements in
the series of givens. What does Bradley then say about
analytic judgements? Should we stop using them? His
recommendation is almost as drastic: the singular
judgement

must cease to predicate its elements of the real,
and must confine itself to asserting their connec-
tion as adjectives generally, and apart from par-
ticular existence. Instead of meaning by "Here is
a wolf," or "This tree is green," that "wolf" and
"green tree" are real facts, it must affirm the
general connection of wolf with elements of the
environment, and of "green" with "tree." And it
must do this in an abstract sense, without any
reference to the particular fact. In a low and
rudimentary form it thus tends to become a scienc-
tific law. . . .1

Singular judgements are hypothetical in the same
way scientific laws are, and science, he says, "desires
to get a connection of content, to be able to say, Given
this or that element, and something else universally
holds good."2 Thus singular judgements have the same
form as universal judgements. Is there any difference?
Suppose I have a "general connection" between "tree" and
"green"; how do I know that I have the judgement "this
tree is green" rather than "every tree is green"? In
both cases presumably I would have "Given the element
'tree', then 'green' holds good universally". I find

1PL, p. 104.
2PL, p. 105.
it difficult to extract a clear answer from Bradley on this question. In one respect the difference between them is a matter of degree: singular judgements are more "rudimentary" than abstract generalizations, for they are "immersed in matter".\(^1\) Which means, I think, that the "latent quality" of which I was so suspicious in the discussion of universal judgements--the ground of the consequence said to exert the compulsion connecting the elements of the judgement--is, in the singular judgement, much more obscured by irrelevancies. For example, whereas the ground (I would guess) is explicit in "the force necessary to accelerate a body is proportional to its mass and the achieved acceleration," in "this body putrefies" the fact in reality which compels it to be true must be ferreted out. It involves not only not some of this body's properties (that it is organic), but also external properties (the action of bacteria), neither of which are indicated by the judgement itself.

But Bradley also says that a judgement of perception involves a connection of adjectives which is true without respect to "this" "here" and "now". If you take it as asserting a synthesis inside that ideal content, it transcends perception...\(^2\)

\(^1\)PL, p. 105.
\(^2\)PL, pp. 104-105.
We are reminded by this that "this tree is green" contains not just the adjectives "green" and "tree", but also a demonstrative. But having reached the present stage in his analysis of singular judgements, Bradley says no more about demonstratives and their role in singular judgements than what I have just quoted, and it is difficult to figure out just what he means. Is he rejecting the possibility of ascribing an ideal content to this reality, i.e., to a particular given, or is he saying that this is how one uses a universal synthesis to talk about particular things and facts, i.e., by using a content together with a demonstrative? Although his handling of "this tree is green" seems to point to the former, I think it is absurd to suggest that we have no way of judging about immediately given particular things, that we cannot ascribe a content, even though universal, to this reality. Perhaps omission of the demonstrative in his explanation of that example was just an oversight; in the other one, "wolf" is said to be connected with "elements of the environment", and where would those come from if not from "here"? Analogously, "this tree is green" should connect not just "green" and "tree", but also "thisness", and would therefore be different from the corresponding "all trees are green"—its content would not be expressed by "if anything is a tree, it is green", but by something like "if any present particular is a tree, then it is
green". It is still hypothetical in the sense of: suppose one thing, another follows, but what is supposed is severely restricted to only one particular present thing at a time; it is (in one sense) more "immersed in matter".

Only one further point remains to complete the presentation of Bradley's claim that all judgements are general. So far Bradley has attempted explicitly to argue that all judgements are hypothetical, not that they are general; the reader cannot but have noticed, especially in these recent pages, that there has been a tendency to slip from calling judgements hypothetical to calling them universal, or general. What justifies that? Clearly, only the thesis that all hypothetical judgements are universal. Bradley of course holds this thesis, but his only argument for it is of a rather weak, inductive character; to this he adds a diagnosis of the error which cause some to deny it. He lists several examples of hypotheticals which seem not to be universal, but about particular things:

"If God is just the wicked will be punished," "Had I a toothache I should be wretched," ... "If it is now six o'clock we shall have dinner in an hour," "If this man has taken that dose, he will be dead in twenty minutes."

We do not assert in these that God is just, or even exists, that I have a toothache, etc., but only suppose

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\[1\text{PL, p. 39.}\]
then. We are asserting hypothetical connections between propositions, or ideal contents. In none of these cases do I, or this or that individual thing "pass into the supposition". You, instead of me could have said "Had I a toothache," etc.; so could have anyone else. It is applicable to a wide variety of situations, and therefore it is universal. Likewise for the other examples, and likewise upon reflection for all hypotheticals.

The reason why this is sometimes doubted, Bradley says, is because the true connections of ideas underlying many judgements are not explicit--the judgements are ambiguous. The last assertion quoted above, for example, is completely vague as to whether it follows because the dose is poison and would kill anyone, or it would kill only the sort of man he is (perhaps he is allergic), or because some special circumstances obtain (perhaps he just previously had a maximal dose).

But, because we are not clear what that content is, and because we know it is to be found in the individual as supposed, we fire, so to speak, a charge of shot instead of a bullet, and take the individual as the point of reality to which our supposition is to be confined. In this way we give rise to the erroneous idea that the reality itself passes into the supposal.¹

If we rid ourselves of this error, we see at once that

the real judgement is concerned with nothing but the individual's qualities, and asserts no more than

¹PL, p. 90.
a connection of adjectives. In every case it is strictly universal as well as hypothetical.¹

Thus we can now see the way to Bradley's conclusion:

All judgements, universal, existential, and singular, are hypothetical, for they assert of reality only through a mediating inference. Such inferences are connections of properties of the form "if A, then B", and these properties are all universal. All hypothetical judgements are thus universal, and therefore all judgement is general.²

²Admittedly, the patness of this conclusion is somewhat marred by Bradley's summary at the end of chapter II (PL, p. 106). He says there not only that all judgements are universal, but concrete, categorical, hypothetical, individual, and abstract as well. That they are hypothetical is all right, for that is why they are universal. They are all categorical, however, "for they all do assert about the reality, and assert the existence of a quality in that." But this is not the meaning of categorical he began with: we saw that it meant being predicated directly of the given, and he argued that reality cannot be identified with the given. So if they are categorical, they are so in a sense we have not been concerned with. Also, what in this sense is categorical is not the content of the judgement, but an occult ground which is quite different from the content, yet which is supposed to be what is "really" asserted. All judgements are concrete because they are only true of the "individual reality which appears in the sensuous wealth of presentation." Just what is being claimed here beyond the observation that true judgements are true of reality, and reality appears in the given, I do not know. The latter has nothing to do with judgement per se, but is a thesis of Bradley's epistemology, and the former would be correct no matter how you construed judgement; so the claim that all judgements are concrete seems to me vacuous. All judgements are individual because the reality of which they assert is individual. This follows trivially from the metaphysics of the Absolute; but unless we grant that everything is one, it is false to suggest that each judgement is
4. Comments and Criticisms

The thesis that all judgement is general is, I think, an interesting one. The main objective of this chapter has been to show what Bradley meant by it, and how he arrived at it. Of the criticisms I offered at various points, some are perhaps not so serious. If, for example, the distinctions between the types of singular judgements breaks down, and they all merge into synthetic judgements (pp. 136-137), then his conclusion is only more quickly reached, for synthetic judgements are already hypothetical. Just how they are hypothetical is another matter, and the inadequacy of his account of the inference involved in such judgements cannot be overlooked (pp. 128-130). The inclusion of time as a property of things prevents their being identical, regardless of any other or even otherwise complete similarity, and hence the only basis for the inference does not exist. But also, the analogy of Hogarth's pictures or a film projector tends to obscure the fact that most past events were not ever experienced by me, and of course no future ones have been either. So where

individual in the sense of being about one and only one particular thing or fact, let alone that they are all about the same thing. Are all judgements abstract? That merely means that they do not say everything, "for they disregard context, they leave out the environment of the sensible complex". That, I should think, beyond being compatible with their all being universal, is a necessary corollary of it. Therefore universality still remains after the weeding-out as the principal character of judgement.
do the pictures or individual frames come from? The only thing in experience which corresponds to my being able to rummage through a set of pictures is my own memory of past perception, and if some event is beyond my ken, how can I infer about it as Bradley describes? Supposing the pictures to the left represent successive memories of the past (ignoring how I came about those on the right), and I am interested in some assertion about a lady in the picture which is next to the centre "real" one; I follow her "regress" back through the pictures until I come to one into which she is just entering. But the event asserted of preceded that. Now what do I do? The whole metaphor collapses. The difficulty lies I think at the very heart of the notion of synthetic judgements. In trying to make more clear the difference between them and analytic judgements, I found it necessary to emphasize the time-lag between the "now" of the judgement and when its application to reality could be ascertained (pp. 111-113). But if I set out from Edinburgh to London to check someone's assertion "It is now foggy in Trafalgar Square", I cannot possibly get there fast enough; for when I arrive, the "now" will have disappeared, and the relevant fact can never be part of my series--I cannot just peer more intently to inspect the past. And what sort of series of givens would it be which would get me from "now" to the perception of a molecule? The trouble is that Bradley wants it several
ways: synthetic judgements are about datable events past, present, and future, yet they are about individuals which persist through time; they are about things not now perceived, yet must be connected with such things through my series of experiences, and hence must have been or will have been experienced—-but past and future events cannot be perceived; however, individuals with a past and future can be perceived, yet there are no such individuals—each moment brings a fresh distinction, and with it, loss of identity. It could hardly be expected that a coherent idea of the synthetic judgement could be extracted from all that.

Another serious matter is the objection against treating "some" judgements as really hypothetical. He does not make the elementary mistake of saying that "some tree is green" is simply "there is something, which, if it is a tree, then it is green", or

\[(1) \quad (\exists x)(T_x \land G_x).\]

That is true if anything is not a tree, or if anything is green, or in other words, it is true only unless everything is a tree and nothing is green. And since this page is not a tree, there is a green tree, which is absurd.

Bradley erred in a subtler way—he converted (1) into a universal generalization, and then tried to retain the force of the original by adding "certain unspecified conditions" to the antecedent. We saw earlier the
technical difficulties of this (pp. 100-6), but what I wish to question here is the very move itself, which consists in telling us that we do not actually mean what we say, but rather we mean something we had not even suspected—we meant (confusedly) to assert some general scientific principle which expresses the natural regularity (or necessary connection, to be more strictly faithful to Bradley) of which the present item being judged about is a case, complicated also with irrelevancies. This is the same maneuver which we found in his attempt to describe the connection with reality of universal judgements themselves. What we really were asserting was some other judgement or judgements which described principles working in nature and which had as one of their consequences the judgement we mistakenly thought we were uttering. Who then knows what he says? Only scientists, and they only part of the time, and no one before, say, Galileo? Bradley's answer is even harsher: there is always an unknown element at the basis of our universal syntheses. To some extent then, no one ever knows what he is saying. Any argument with this conclusion constitutes its own refutation, in my opinion, as a reductio ad absurdum.

If we do not accept that the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements cannot be made out, then certain other criticisms are relevant; the

1PL, p. 112n45.
preceding absurd conclusion, for example, holds for analytic judgements as well (pp. 162-163)—they are so "immersed in matter" that they are ambiguous: we cannot tell what are the correct underlying causes which make what we say be the case or not, and so we do not really know what we are asserting.

More trivial, perhaps, is the doubt I cast on Bradley's classification of the kinds of analytic judgement (pp. 113-116); it is not very intrinsic to his overall argument for the generality of the judgement. But what is of major consequence for this argument is the doctrine of the falsification of analysis. And this, as we saw, was given meagre defense (pp. 149-150). The inadequacy of Bradley's objections to the two replies he considers (which attempt (1) to maintain that a judgement about a fact is still about it even if the fact is dependent upon another, and (2) to insert the conditions for an analytic judgement's truth into the antecedent of a conditional having the judgement as a consequence—pp. 150-157) pales into insignificance next to the inadequacy of his support for rejecting analysis itself.¹ The scope of the thesis that analysis is

¹I do not regard this as a special case of Bradley's attack on Pluralism, as does Wollheim, op. cit., ch. 3, esp. pp. 93-94. The principal argument against Pluralism which Wollheim cites is Bradley's theory of internal relations; but one might accept that and still argue that "There is a wolf" can be true even though its myriad properties and relations were not mentioned. The issues are independent.
falsification is much broader than analytic judgements alone, a fact which even Bradley did not seem to notice; it would apply to all judgements, including universal ones. "If anything is a man, then it is mortal" would be false for neglecting that it also was born, that it inhabits Earth, that it has a heart, etc. Even the "occult ground" which is really asserted, would cut, divide, and mutilate. Science, after all, as Bradley himself emphasizes, abstracts the most; it invariably selects only a few of the properties and relations of things as being relevant for the explanation of those forms of behavior of things in the world which interest it. And this seems to me to be the strongest argument against the falsity of analysis. It was one of the major achievements of intellectual progress when men discovered that knowledge of nature advanced not in the attempt to record everything, creating a cluttered replica of reality, but in the drawing of distinctions and discovering which of these is most relevant. It was not, for example, particularly interesting to know that a feather and a stone were dropped, and they fell; but it was of the utmost moment to learn that their rate of descent depended only upon their mass (after correcting for the friction of air), and not upon their shape, size, who dropped them, their material, or what have you. It was difficult and laborious even to realize the importance of looking for relevant distinc-
tions, let alone to set about finding them, as is well attested by the amount of inconsequential curios and worthless freaks amassed in a museum of the early Royal Society.\footnote{Feyerabend, "Problems of Empiricism", Beyond the Edge of Certainty, v. 2, (ed. Colodny), pp. 156-157.} To say that any judgement leaves out something is one thing, and a commonplace; but it is quite another to say that it is thereby false, implying that the activity which characteristically produces the soundest empirical truths is from top to bottom methodologically wrong and creates nothing but lies. If this be so, then the requirements for truth are so stringent as to be never fulfilled, and then I am afraid I have no idea what is meant by the word, used in this way. Not that I am so confident that I know what it ordinarily means in any precise way, but I can at least apply it with confidence to some judgements, and hence I have some understanding of it.

Bradley is of course aware that his position requires that he cannot say that any judgement is true, but when this conclusion is finally made explicit, it is tempered with the claim that no judgement is false either--"it will be a question of amount, and will be a matter of more or less."\footnote{AR, p. 321.} However, accepting a doctrine of degrees of truth presents Bradley with a dilemma: if it is true, then judgements cannot be false
by analysis and omission, but only less true than others. But if analytic judgements are not false, they need not be construed as non-categorical, and the conclusion that all judgements are general is thwarted. In my opinion this results anyway, for the falsification of analysis is no more plausible than degrees of truth is understandable.

A further serious and fundamental problem for Bradley is one barely hinted at above (pp. 78-79). It concerns the basic epistemology which he introduces at the beginning. The main thrust of his second chapter was to discover which judgements are categorical and which hypothetical—-with what results we are now familiar; the reason he was so concerned with this is that he thought that we can only know directly those things which we experience in some "now", as it were, right before our eyes. There are at least two kinds of objection to this, one being that we know intuitively, i.e., directly, quite a few things which are not ever, or not now being experienced, such as various items from our memory, or that, for example, $2 + 2 = 4$, that artifacts are made, and that $\sim(P \cdot \sim P)$. The a priori examples may be said to depend upon inferences deriving from conventions, and these are learned only through contacts with reality via immediate experience. That no doubt is true, but as an objection it confuses the source of our first
acquaintance with examples of the truths—no one knows
that \( \sim(P \land \sim P) \) because of several cases he has observed.

The other example—memory—Bradley duly insists is
dependent upon inference; "we are aware of and think of
the past as past always by an ideal construction from
the present, and the immediate presentation of the past
as such would be a gratuitous miracle."\(^1\) What I can
understand of his argument for this seems to require an
inference procedure similar to that used in synthetic
judgements—in fact it seems that he is simply reducing
memory judgements to synthetic ones. If so, his account
is subject to all of their difficulties. Regardless of
that, remembering is something which I do in some
present, just as much as perceiving; but this does not
make plausible the claim that my past experience I am
now remembering must be connected inferentially with my
present perceptual experience. The paradigm Bradley uses
at one point is my present perception of a stone at my
feet, and my memory of it having just been thrown there;
the inference moves in the series starting with the
stone in someone's hand, through the various positions
in its flight, and finally ending at my feet.\(^2\) But most
memories are not even remotely like that, and have
nothing whatsoever to do with my present experience.

\(^1\text{ETR, p. 362.}\)
\(^2\text{ETR, p. 358.}\)
We simply remember earlier experiences directly and independently of what we are now experiencing. It would indeed be miraculous if by this were meant that we directly experience again the past experience itself; but no one who advocates the immediacy of memory means that.

If these objections are allowed any force, then the distinction between categorical and hypothetical— at least as Bradley draws it, between direct and indirect application of a content to reality—breaks down. For first of all there is no independent reality of which we can be directly aware, and secondly, all present awareness is in some sense affected by "inferences". This, then, casts doubt both upon the whole project of trying to find categorical judgements, and upon the notion of truth that underlay and impelled it.

This notion of truth is independently dubious anyway: even if we grant that all knowledge ultimately must depend on or be derived from contact with reality through present perception, why should we so canalize truth? Why, that is, should we think that the truth of a judgement must depend on some immediate, direct contact with reality through present perception? This question is meant to suggest that the truth or falsity of a judgement can be for certain purposes detached from the issue of how that truth or falsity is attained or verified. With regard to universal judgements in
particular this distinction is necessary for even getting
logic off the ground, for logic—whatever else it may be—is the examination of possible truth combinations, and
the truth of empirical universal judgements is always
indeterminate if we require that each of their infinitely
many cases be verified through having been experienced.
If their truth is indeterminate, how can we discover
their consequences? The point is that truth can be
ascribed to a judgement, and the consequences of com-
bining it with other judgements studied, without any
consideration of how that judgement is connected with
this or any other "now". This point is ignored by
Bradley because of an ambiguity in his use of "cate-
gorical assertion of the real". In the main sense,
which I have used in this chapter, it means a direct
connection with reality through the present; it is
particularly the element of "now" which is one of the
principal things distinguishing the categorical from
the hypothetical judgements. But Bradley also says that
the "latent quality" which is the ground of a hypotheti-
cal judgement asserts of the real, and is therefore
categorical (p. 163 n. 2). But what this means is
left unsaid. These latent qualities are, after all,
highly abstract and hypothetical (they are scientific
laws), and I simply cannot imagine what possible analogy
there might be between their relationship to the world
and the relationship "That is a dog" has to the world,
which would justify describing both as categorical, i.e., true directly of the present given. Therefore I do not know what it means to say that universal judgements are finally categorical, nor how saying that explains how they are true in the sense of "true" required by Bradley. But we have to be able to talk of their truth and falsity, and so we must dissociate the notion of truth from the epistemology of immediate given experience.

There are further matters which could be taken up—e.g., the artificiality of trying to show all judgements to be hypothetical in order to conclude that they are all general, the weakness of Bradley's argument that all hypothetical judgements are general, etc.—but what has already been said in this section should be sufficient to make us deeply suspicious of this main conclusion, that all judgements are general. However, I think that would be a mistake, for the claim is an interesting one independently of all the errors leading up to it. If we disregard the categorical/hypothetical distinction, and all the blind alleys and pitfalls issuing from it,¹

¹That is not to say that the distinction cannot be made at all. We can say that simple propositions (those containing no truth-functional connectives) are categorical, and complex ones whose dominant connector (the one with the largest scope) is "D" are hypothetical. What about the other connectives: "\(\neg\)", ",", "\(\vee\)", and "\(\equiv\)? Since "D" and "\(\neg\)" are sufficient for defining the other fifteen two-place connectives, we might be tempted to say that any connective, when converted into an expression with only "D" and "\(\neg\)", is categorical if "\(\neg\)" dominates, and hypothetical if "D" does. But this will not work, for "\(\neg\neg P\)" is equivalent to "\(P \neg\neg\neg\)", and "\(P \neg\neg Q\)" is equivalent to "\(\neg\neg(P \neg\neg\neg\)". Thus any expression, say
we can extract from Bradley an implicit, but more persuasive and simple picture. It is, in fact, the picture given at the end of the first section of this chapter: a judgement consists of a complex of ideas; ideas are universal—they express properties and relations found in and amongst things. Since they can apply to a variety

"P : Q", can be expressed categorically, "(P \lor \neg Q)", or hypothetically, "(P \lor \neg Q) \lor (P \lor \neg Q)\), at will. Apart from simple propositions, whether a proposition is hypothetical or categorical cannot be stated absolutely, for it can always be expressed both with "\lor" dominating, or with it not. The notion of hypothetical must therefore apply to propositional forms, not to propositions, and must be restricted to those particular forms of a proposition which contain a dominate "\lor". Thus propositions cannot be called hypothetical, but only certain ways of analysing them, and not other ways. But what use such a distinction might be is far from obvious. One might use it to say that all universal judgements are hypothetical, as Bradley did, and as Russell—who acknowledged that he was following Bradley's lead (Wollheim, op. cit., p. 50n; Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", Logic and Knowledge, p. 237)—also did. This claim is supposedly enshrined in the analysis of "All F is G" as "(x)(Fx \lor Gx)"; but this is equivalent to the non-hypotheticals "(x)\neg(Fx \lor Gx)" and "(x)\neg(Fx \lor Gx)\", which are equally analyses of the universal judgement. So what is the point in calling it hypothetical? This argument might be weakened somewhat by saying that a propositional form is hypothetical only (1) if it is the form "P \lor Q", or (2) if it is that form dominated only by any number of iterated double negations. But to deal with the last counterexample, one would have to add: or (3) if it can be converted truth-functionally so that (1) or (2) applies. And this third condition makes all forms hypothetical in view of the fact that any form can be translated into another which contains no connectives other than "\lor" and "\neg", which is dominated by one or the other, and which, if dominated by "\neg", can be translated into one dominated by "\lor" from the equivalence of "\neg P" and "P \lor \neg P". So I still do not see the utility of the distinction, and concur with the general tendency to abandon it in modern logic.
of cases, they are general. There is nothing in words, or the ideas they are connected with, which can cause them to fasten on to one particular unique thing in the world. We do, of course, talk about particular things, and use words and their ideas to do so. But no combination of ideas can on its own succeed in doing this absolutely, i.e., can necessarily be applied only once or to only one object.

The immediate rejoinder to this is that there is one class of terms whose function is just what Bradley denies of any term: they are singular terms, so called because they pick out one and only one thing in the world. Ryle affords a convenient illustration of this position (although in this context he is arguing not that some words denote one thing, which he accepts, but that not all words do that):

First, it is obvious that the vast majority of words are unlike the words 'Fido' and 'London' in this respect, that they are general. 'Fido' stands for a particular dog, but the noun 'dog' covers this dog Fido, and all other dogs past, present and future, dogs in novels, dogs in breeders' plans for the future, and so on indefinitely.\(^1\)

A few pages later he says,

There is not one basic mould, such as the 'Fido'-Fido mould, into which all significant expressions are to be forced . . . The notion of denotation, so far from providing the final explanation of the notion of meaning, turns out itself to be just one special branch or twig on the tree of signification.\(^2\)

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2Ryle, ibid., p. 145.
But denotation is still included, as explaining proper names; its diminished stature derives from its pretensions among some followers of Mill (who ignored his "connotation") to account first for the meanings of all words, then merely for singular terms, and finally, after Russell's theory of descriptions, to be demoted to only proper names. Bradley was never misled about Mill as Ryle argues some philosophers were; but he did recognize that the doctrine of pure denotation for proper names was a threat to the full generality of judgements, and attacked it correspondingly. He also, interestingly enough, anticipated the similar account of demonstratives which Russell was later to advocate for a while, and rejected it as well, although not without the curious and uncharacteristic twist we noticed above (pp. 141-145).

Bradley's attack on purely denotative proper names and demonstratives furnishes evidence that he was at least sometimes thinking of the generality of judgements along the lines I have just sketched--for if he was not, it is difficult to understand why he bothered himself particularly about them. A hypothetical containing a word which picks out some one thing in the world is none the less hypothetical for all that. Suppose, for example, that "Ernest" denotes one and only one thing; then my saying "If Ernest has a moustache, his kisses must tickle the ladies" does not commit me to the
categoricals "Ernest has a moustache", "Ernest kisses the ladies", etc. He may well, for anything I have said, be clean shaven. However, it might be said that if "Ernest" does denote, the existence of Ernest is categorically presupposed (unlike unicorns in "If anything is a unicorn, it has a horn"), and this threatens the pure hypothetical nature of my judgement. I shall take up these matters connected with existence later, but for the moment I can see no grounds for supposing that such an argument had ever occurred to Bradley. Therefore, if the generality of judgements results merely from their being hypothetical, and not also from the basic fact that, as complexes of ideas, they are already general, then I cannot see why he was worried about proper names and demonstratives at all.

But, of course, he did concern himself about them, and the account he gives of them (once we straighten out the ambiguity over the meaning of a demonstrative, and the thing intended) is I think substantially correct. In Part II I shall look at them more closely, along with unique descriptions (those with the definite article, or some other device implying uniqueness), and shall examine what various logicians since Bradley have said and what their notational conventions embody with regard to singular terms. For as Bradley correctly realized, what we say about singular terms is finally the crux for the claim that judgements are general. This can easily
be seen by considering what has become the fairly standard representation of propositional form in modern predicate logic: "Fa". The upper case letter is a predicate, and the lower case letter is an individual or singular term. The predicate is general—it can be considered to be an expression for a more or less complex property, depending upon the needs of the context; but however complex or simple it is, it is a general term because the property it expresses is or can be found in many things. The lower case letter is supposed to name one thing. The form "Fa" embodies, among other things, the fact that these two types are mutually exclusive categories, which together exhaust the proposition. If we locate the singular term in a proposition and remove it, what is left is the predicate, a general term. Hence the singular term is the only non-general element, the only obstacle to full generality.

Immediate difficulties arise for such a simple account, however: what if there are more than one singular term, what if there is a connective such as "or", and what if there are no singular terms, but instead words like "some", "any", etc.? This last situation brings in the theory of quantification, with attendant problems about variables, existence, reference, and others. I shall now turn to the treatment of these topics by certain modern logicians, keeping in view all the while Bradley's thesis that all judgement is general.
PART II. GENERALITY AND SINGULAR TERMS

CHAPTER I. PROPER NAMES

1. Russell's Logically Proper Names

Given the fact that we often use words to pick out particular things in the world, there are two questions I wish to ask about the expressions whose function it is to do this: how do they (i.e., singular terms) work, or in other words, what is the nature of the relationship of reference which they have to things, and does the relationship of reference itself require the existence of what is purportedly being referred to? That a singular term picks out a unique particular thing, and the same thing on each occasion of its use, and also that the referring relation it has to the thing is such that it requires that the thing actually exist, are necessary and together sufficient conditions for a term being non-general. Thus the question of the generality of propositions revolves around the question as to whether there are such terms.

Historically, an unambiguous, if not exactly clear answer was given by Mill as to the existence and nature of singular terms. I shall, however, concern myself mainly with Russell, since I have already had some occasion to discuss Mill, and Russell's early views represent to some extent a refinement of Mill's. Also, Russell was quite directly connected with the revolt against
Bradley's idealism, and I think that this perspective is instructive with regard to the emergent doctrine of logically proper names. This revolt took many forms, but what is of most interest for singular terms is the conception of the propositions in which they are used. Russell wanted to get as much reality as he could into philosophy, and in his haste to cast ideas out of the proposition, he brought in reality literally—among the constituents of a proposition are things themselves. Consequently, he is unable to distinguish facts from propositions, except under extreme duress. The confusion occurs in many places; a very early example can be seen in the following passage from Principles of Mathematics:

A proper name, when it occurs in a proposition, is always, at least according to one of the possible ways of analysis (where there are several), the subject that the proposition or some subordinate constituent proposition is about, and not what is said about the subject... Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term... Every term, to begin with, is a logical subject... Among terms, it is possible to distinguish two kinds, which I shall call respectively things and concepts. The former are the terms indicated by proper names, the latter those indicated by all other words.¹

Thus proper names occur in propositions as their subjects, but on the other hand, things—which are "indicated" by proper names—are the subjects of propositions and occur in them. That this desire to get things

¹Russell, Principles of Mathematics, pp. 43-44.
into propositions is a reaction to Bradley is a point Russell himself explicitly makes only a few pages later, where he rejects a view he attributes to Bradley, which says that words stand for ideas having meaning. "Words", he says,

all have meaning, in the simple sense that they are symbols which stand for something other than themselves. But a proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, does not itself contain words: it contains the entities indicated by the words.¹

Unfortunately, he nowhere says what the difference between a proposition and a linguistic proposition is, nor how they are related. It is therefore doubtful that this qualification was meant to imply a distinction of any importance, and we are still left wondering how both words (e.g., proper names) and things can be parts or constituents of propositions.

Although Russell was later to abandon the terminology of thing and concept,² he did not give up the distinction itself, nor the tendency to conflate words and objects in the proposition. Five years after the passages above he wrote in "On Denoting",

The [denoting] phrase per se has no meaning, because in any proposition in which it occurs the proposition, fully expressed, does not contain the phrase, which has been broken up.³

¹Ibid., p. 47.


One interesting result of the above theory of denoting is this: when there is anything with which we do not have immediate acquaintance, but only definition by denoting phrases, then the propositions in which this thing is introduced by means of a denoting phrase do not really contain this thing as a constituent, but contain instead the constituents expressed by the several words of the denoting phrase.1

There is here an uneasy distinction between words and the things they express, but both are contained in or occur as constituents in propositions. Again, from *Principia Mathematica*,

we will use such letters as a, b, c, x, y, z, w, to denote objects which are neither propositions nor functions. Such objects we shall call individuals. Such objects will be constituents of propositions or functions, and will be genuine constituents, in the sense that they do not disappear on analysis, as (for example) classes do, or phrases of the form "the so-and-so".2

Perhaps phrases of the form "the so-and-so" are not genuine constituents of propositions; but that would not be because they are phrases, but for other reasons (the possibility that such phrases might not denote anything). Phrases of any kind are not analysed away into objects, but only into other phrases, and if analysis leads from pseudo-constituents to genuine constituents, the phrases got by analysis from definite descriptions will be genuine constituents. So practically in one breath we again have both words and objects in propositions.

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I hope that these passages (which could be multiplied) suffice to show that this confusion of facts and propositions was endemic to Russell's way of thinking, and not just a minor slip. When he began to be influenced by Wittgenstein, whose apparatus of objects, facts, names, and propositions forced a sharp distinction, Russell did separate facts and propositions. In the first lecture of "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", called "Facts and Propositions", he says,

When I speak of a fact . . . I mean the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false.¹

"Facts", he says a few paragraphs later,

which are the sort of things that you express by a sentence, . . . just as much as particular chairs and tables, are part of the real world.²

He has shifted from "propositions" to "sentences", and he uses "statements" just as readily in the same pages. The reason for this is that he makes no important distinction between them:

A proposition, one may say, is a sentence in the indicative, a sentence asserting something, not questioning, or commanding, or wishing.³

A sentence or proposition "expresses" a fact because it is a symbol, and its parts, i.e., words, are symbols too (although not all in the same way).

¹Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", Logic and Knowledge, p. 182.
²Ibid., p. 183.
³Ibid., p. 185.
When I speak of a symbol I simply mean something that 'means' something else. . . . As to what one means by 'meaning' I will give a few illustrations. For instance, the word 'Socrates', you will say, means a certain man; the word 'mortal' means a certain quality; and the sentence 'Socrates is mortal' means a certain fact.  

But later on even in these lectures his earlier tendency to run propositions and facts together reasserts itself, and he forgets the distinctions I have just quoted. By the fifth lecture, for example, he can say,  

If you want a different definition of the form of a proposition, you might be inclined to define it as a class of all those propositions that you can obtain from a given one by substituting other constituents for one or more of the constituents the proposition contains. E.g., in 'Socrates loves Plato', you can substitute somebody else for Socrates, somebody else for Plato, and some other verb for 'loves'.

Thus the constituents of that particular proposition are two people and a verb. On the next page 'Socrates', not Socrates, has returned as a constituent of the proposition, but somewhat later he says,

You cannot have a constituent of a proposition which is nothing at all. Every constituent has got to be there as one of the things in the world, and therefore if Romulus himself entered into the propositions that he existed or that he did not exist, both these propositions could not only not be true, but could not be even significant, unless he existed.  

In yet a different context we meet something familiar:

So if I say 'Scott is Sir Walter', using these two names as names, neither 'Scott' nor 'Sir Walter'  

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1Ibid., p. 186.  
2Ibid., p. 238.  
3Ibid., p. 242.
occurs in what I am asserting, but only the person who has these names, and thus what I am asserting is a pure tautology.\(^1\)

The point he is making in this last passage is the now familiar one about the need to distinguish use and mention; but the way he puts it requires that the objects our propositions are about occur in the proposition. And the cat is really out of the bag when he says that unicorns cannot be constituents of propositions,

because the constituents of propositions, of course, are the same as the constituents of the corresponding facts. . . . \(^2\)

True, he still makes a show of propositions being different from but corresponding to facts, but if they have exactly the same elements, wherein lies the difference? I shall not draw out the absurdity of my uttering a proposition which contains (is made up of) people, relations, and what-not, for the falsity of such a view seems to me patent.

But it is this view, seldom quite so explicit as in the last quotation, which caused Russell to identify the meaning of a name with what it stands for. He even accepted for a while the account he attributes to Meinong, which would have all expressions meaning what they name, even such expressions as '3', 'the golden mountain', and 'the round square'. As is well known, he

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 246.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 248.
was able to free himself of this with his theory of
definite descriptions; but the effect of this theory was
not the abandonment of the idea of words meaning what
they stand for. Rather it eliminated awkward cases which
seemed to contradict it by substituting new, less naive
propositions in which the offending expressions do not
occur. Those which do remain however, still do mean
what they stand for (mostly properties, in fact). I
shall defer discussion of descriptions until later, and
confine myself to names here. I shall also ignore com-
pletely the contention that words other than names also
mean what they stand for, that a common noun, say, means
a property or a concept. For what I am interested in
is particularity, and however we understand naming,
properties are general.

Russell was aware that most ordinary names cannot
be treated as simply "standing for" an object, and his
account of them requires his theory of definite descrip-
tions; so that too will be postponed. But what lead
Russell to this conclusion was a particular epistemo-
logical assumption, rather like Bradley's emphasis on
immediate experience, which stipulated that we could
only know the meaning of a proper name if we were
directly acquainted with what it names.¹ Proper names
which satisfy this requirement he called logically proper

¹Ibid., pp. 56, 130, 194, 200-202; Problems of
Philosophy, p. 58.
names. It is on this category of names that I wish to concentrate, for on Russell's account, it is only through such names that any proposition, once it has been analysed, can be about a particular item in the world.

Now if a fact, say that Socrates is mortal, consists of the person Socrates and a property of being mortal which belongs to him, and if the proposition 'Socrates is mortal' has Socrates the person as a constituent, and if I am now directly acquainted with the said Socrates, what could be more natural than to identify that very person Socrates standing in front of me, with the element in my proposition which is a thing (i.e., which is not a property)? In other words, 'Socrates' is Socrates. Of course, Russell never made such an extreme claim, even though he did say both that 'Socrates' and that Socrates is one of the two constituents of that proposition. For when he was thinking about names—which clearly are words—as opposed to propositions, he was usually quite conscious of the distinction between words and things. So he said the next best thing: 'Socrates' means Socrates. It means Socrates by simply standing for Socrates. I am suggesting that this account arose out of a combination of confusing words in a proposition with things in the fact which makes it true or false, together with the epistemological requirement of the compresence of the name used and one's experience (or memory of that experience) of
the thing named. The final result is got by retreating from full identification ('is') to a fully determinate relation ('is a word for'), probably conceived of as somewhat analogous to 'stands on', in the sense that a determinate fixed (in this case spatial) relationship is implied as holding between two existing things. The way is clear for the metaphor 'label' which sometimes crops up in explanations of proper names similar to Russell's. In his own words,

The only kind of word that is theoretically capable of standing for a particular is a proper name. . . . Proper names = words for particulars. Df.1

When you are given a logically proper name, you are given, as it were, the very object itself, in your proposition and right before your eyes (or in your mind if you are remembering): that is what your name means and stands for. I shall not dispute this account of proper names for the moment, but rather try to determine more exactly what is meant by it. Russell never tried to do this, perhaps because he thought that the idea of naming was obvious, or that it was primitive. He did not, for example, say like Mill that a name is a mark; to see that logically proper names are like Mill's purely denoting names requires a bit of looking.

First of all, we have seen enough to suggest that a logically proper name and a thing are connected by a

relation, and that Russell refers to this relation by "stands for" and "is a word for". In some of the earlier passages I quoted he used "indicates" and "denotes". Elsewhere he says that a name "designates", \(^1\) "applies to", \(^2\) "expresses", \(^3\) and "signifies"\(^4\) an object. We might call this relation the 'naming relation'; but if we are in the dark about this naming relation to begin with, being given a number of alternative terms for it is no help. And just being told that it is a relation is not to be told much either. Mill was more helpful--he said that the relation a name had to what it names is like a chalk-mark on a house. Regardless of the difficulties in that, already pointed out by Bradley, such a comparison does at least enable us to infer some properties of the name relation. In particular, chalk-marks are always on something, they mark something which exists; also, each mark is on one thing only (let us not worry about parts, atoms, and such)--it cannot be on two houses, for that would be two marks. These are the criteria for non-general terms with which I opened this section. Can we discover such properties in Russell's naming relation? We cannot, of course, merely from

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 244.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 244.
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 200.
\(^4\)Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica, p. 15; this appears to be quite rare.
thinking hard about the various terms he uses: stands for, designates, etc. What we need are passages in which such properties of the name relation are explicitly mentioned.

To begin with, we can notice how he uses the notion of meaning. Meaning is not for Russell something involving universals which are implied by a word, and which constitute necessary conditions for identifying some object as something to which the word can be applied; to the contrary, the meaning of a word or expression, as we saw a few pages back, is simply whatever the word or expression stands for, i.e., whatever it names. The theory of meaning is reduced neatly and exactly to the theory of naming. 'Socrates' means (or names, take your pick) a particular individual person--Socrates; 'white' means (names) a particular individual property--whiteness. The general thesis can be found in the following:

the components of the fact which makes a proposition true or false, as the case may be, are the meanings of the symbols which we must understand in order to understand the proposition.1

Also,

the only thing you can really understand (in the strict sense of the word) is a symbol, and to understand a symbol is to know what it stands for.2

1 Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", op. cit., p. 196.
2 ibid., p. 205.
But since we are not particularly interested here in the application of this thesis to general terms, let us look at what he says directly of proper names in connection.

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In fact, just after the passage last quoted Russell goes on to say that we understand a predicate (which is a "word that is used to designate a quality such as red, white, square, round," etc.) in a way different from the way we understand a name. But that does not imply that Russell is giving for predicates a different account of meaning; 'red' still designates red. Apparently, understanding a symbol involves not only knowing the meaning of it, but also knowing that it functions as a symbol for a thing of some particular logical type: an individual, a property, a property of a property, etc. Hence, understanding a name differs from understanding a predicate. But ignoring these epistemological differences, both kinds of symbol mean in the same way—they designate, or stand for something. Some years later, however, Russell gave what he thought to be an illustration of "how meaning is a different relation for different types [:] The way to mean a fact is to assert it; the way to mean a simple is to name it." ("Logical Atomism", Logic and Knowledge, p. 336.) Ignoring the absurdity of literally asserting a fact rather than a proposition (that old confusion still lingering on), we must acknowledge that propositions cannot for Russell have significance in the same way names do; however, this follows not from the type difference between a name and a proposition, but from the consideration that to a fact there does not correspond just one proposition. (See further below in the text; this can also be seen quite clearly where Russell made the same point in a discussion after one of the lectures on "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", op. cit., pp. 268-269.)

A more serious difficulty for my claim is that nearby Russell explicitly and emphatically states that "when two words have meanings of different types, the relations of the words to what they mean are of different types; that is to say, there is not one relation of meaning between words and what they stand for, but as many relations of meaning, each of different logical type, as there are logical types among the objects for which there are words" (Ibid., pp. 332-333.) Here he is clearly talking about objects and names, properties and predicates, etc., and his position seems to flatly contradict what I said above. But his emphasis upon the differences is an exaggeration to the point of distortion: the various relations differ only in the types of their relata, and consequently in their own type, but in nothing else. They differ from one another no more than
with meaning. As we would expect (and indeed, have already anticipated),

'Scott' taken as a name has a meaning all by itself. It stands for a certain person, and there it is.  

So far we have not gotten much further than that the meaning of a name is what it names, and a reiteration

"is a member of", for example, differs when it connects individuals and classes from when it connects classes and classes of classes. This very fact enables Russell in general to use the same letter with only different subscripts to represent "systematically ambiguous" relations; they may be ambiguous, but they are not said to be systematically so for no reason at all. Along this line, I might point out that the Polish logician Lesniewski further emphasizes the sameness amidst diversity (i.e., the analogical character) of a relation at different type levels (or "semantic categories" as he calls them) by not using subscripts at all, but only differently shaped parentheses: "Words of any semantical category can be equiform with one another, even within the scope of any one thesis belonging to the system". ("Grundzüge eines neuen Systems der Grundlagen der Mathematik". p. 76. The parenthesis conventions for types is in T. E. XXIII, ibid., p. 66; see also Luschei, The Logical Systems of Lesniewski, pp. 175-176, 194.) Also, Quine goes so far as to eliminate all distinguishing marks, and with them, type differences as well, by stipulating a procedure for effectively deciding when an expression is "stratified": although stratification levels can be made to correspond to type levels, the correspondence is not exact, for unstratified expressions are not meaningless as are Russellian type violations, and notational regimentation is superfluous. (Quine, Mathematical Logic, sections 28 and 29.) The possibility of using a completely univocal expression in situations where Russell demands that such expressions be equivocal, casts doubt not only on his extreme claim that the meaning relationships are totally different for different types, but even on the milder claim—which is more in conformity with his own practice—that they are only ambiguous (i.e., much the same, yet obscurely different).

that what it names is what it stands for. Let us ask, then, how on Russell's account might an expression be meaningless? One way is for it to be of the form "a so-and-so", or "the so-and-so". The former does not designate a certain thing, and so it is analyzed into "something which so-and-so's," which does not purport to designate; the original form, as a unit, has no meaning, and its analysis shows how the proposition in which it occurs can be significant in spite of that. The latter form purports to designate something specific, but might not for lack of either uniqueness or the existence of the thing supposedly named. Thus the move Russell makes is to say that expressions of such a form do not designate at all, they have no meaning on their own and as a unit, but like the former type of expression, must be analyzed away. Now it might appear that names also can be meaningless for the same reasons which led Russell to argue that definite descriptions cannot have meanings. But rather than saying that therefore no name has meaning and all such expressions must be analyzed away, he says that any name without a meaning is not a name at all:¹

¹Had Russell taken a similar course with definite descriptions, saying that they all have to have a meaning, he would have obtained—had he arbitrarily provided a meaning for those descriptions which fail to describe exactly one thing—a theory of definite descriptions tantamount to Frege's, whose method was to say that descriptions of one and only one object designate those objects (respectively), and any other designates a certain class of pairs specifiable for any given
If "a" is a name, it must name something: what does not name anything is not a name, and therefore, if intended to be a name, is a symbol devoid of meaning. . . .

Thus names cannot be meaningless; in particular, they cannot fail to designate through the non-existence of what they are supposed to name:

Supposing he [Socrates] had never lived, the sound 'Socrates' would not be a name at all.2

The fact that you can discuss the proposition 'God exists' is a proof that 'God', as used in that proposition, is a description and not a name. If 'God' were a name, no question as to existence could arise.3

Speaking generally, Russell says that

a name cannot occur significantly in a proposition unless there is something that it names. . . .4

Names are such, then, as to require the existence of what they purport to name. What about the requirement of uniqueness, what Carnap has called "the principle of description (and that in effect is how Frege defines them in general)." (Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, tr. Furth, pp. 49-51. See also below, p. 371 n. 1. Frege's treatment of descriptions suggests for proper names an alternative to Russell's striking-off of non-designating names as meaningless marks: why not assign them a designation? I am, however, personally unsympathetic to such an approach, as will be seen below.

1Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, p. 179.
3Ibid., p. 250.
4Russell, My Philosophical Development, p. 84.
univocality" ("every expression used as a name ... is a name of exactly one entity")? Descriptions are said to have no meaning because of the possibility of their not describing at most one thing; are names likewise meaningless in such a case? Again the answer is, as we would expect, even stronger—such symbols are not merely meaningless, they are not even names:

A name can just name a particular, or, if it does not, it is not a name at all, it is a noise. It cannot be a name without having just that one particular relation of naming a certain thing.

Russell even goes further by claiming that the uniqueness requirement also works in the other direction; he argues that propositions cannot be thought of as names for facts. This is perfectly evident "from the mere circumstance that there are two propositions corresponding to each fact." The required assumption, of course, is that there cannot be two, but only one name corresponding to each object. Thus a name can designate only one object, and any object can have only one name. The name relation for Russell requires both the existence of what is supposed to be named (a necessary condition anyway for naming to be a relation), and

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1Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p. 98.
2Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", op. cit., p. 137.
3Ibid., p. 187.
a one-to-one correspondence between things and their names. All this, plus the fact that Russell is stipulating conventions for proper names, is rather neatly expressed in the following:

In a logically perfect language the words in a proposition would correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact, with the exception of such words as 'or', 'not', 'if', 'then', which have a different function. In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every simple object. . . .

It has now become abundantly clear that Russell has adopted a straightforward Millian doctrine of proper names, with minor differences (for example, they are not meaningless, as for Mill, but their meaning is simply what they name; but since they do nothing but designate, or denote an object, this change is trivial). One major departure from Mill, which I have not yet sufficiently emphasized, is that whereas Mill considered his account of proper names to apply to what we normally consider to be proper names, e.g., 'Dartmouth', 'London', 'John', 'Socrates', etc., Russell severely restricted the class of proper names to which the above Millian theory would apply, and he gave a totally different account of names such as those just listed. He was led to do this because he thought for epistemological reasons that the one-to-one relation between a name and an object had to be somehow channeled through a person who, when using the

\[1\text{Ibid., p. 197.}\]
name, was or had been directly acquainted with what is named. This requirement by itself rules out many names as being logically proper names, and if it is combined with the further thesis that one cannot be acquainted with a person unless one is that person, very little remains—nothing, in fact, but my own name, place names of places I have been to, and a few other odds and ends. When Russell rejected mental substances, and advanced sense-data as the only objects of acquaintance, even names of those few remnants dissolved into descriptions of classes or series. What then is left to be a logically proper name? To answer this Russell turns to demonstratives; with the air of pulling a rabbit out of a hat he announces:

The only words one uses as names in the logical sense are words like 'this' or 'that'. . . . It is only when you use 'this' quite strictly, to stand for an actual object of sense, that it is really a proper name. And in that it has a very odd property for a proper name, namely that it seldom means the same thing two moments running and does not mean the same thing to the speaker and to the hearer. It is an ambiguous proper name, but it is really a proper name all the same, and it is almost the only thing I can think of that is used properly and logically in the sense that I was talking of for a proper name.  

1 Russell, "On Denoting", op. cit., p. 56; "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", Problems of Philosophy, pp. 54-55.


He seems not to have noticed the incompatibility between his requirements for proper names— in particular the requirement of univocality— and the "very odd property" he correctly notices demonstratives to possess: ambiguity. (Correct, that is, in the sense that they apply to different things at different times and places; but I shall argue later that they do each have an unambiguous meaning in a different sense of "meaning".) The only way to resolve this conflict while holding on to both the univocality of names and the namehood of demonstratives, is to say that we really have within such a word as 'this' a myriad of separate names, each like nothing so much as numerals, which fact suggests that we might symbolize these differences by 'this_1', 'this_2', 'this_3', etc. This ploy is of course no analysis, but merely drawing out the consequences of a dogma (univocality). Since demonstratives change their meaning rather quickly ("you can keep 'this' going for about a minute or two. . . . If you argue quickly, you can get some little way before it is finished."\(^1\) Do minds not so nimble, by the way, unavoidably commit fallacies of equivocation?), we are presented with the spectacle of Russell subsequently doing exactly what he sternly warns us against: "attributing to the thing properties which only belong to the symbol."\(^2\)

\(^{1}\text{ibid.}, p. 203.\)

\(^{2}\text{ibid.}, p. 185.\)
For if the meaning of a proper name varies quickly, that
must be (he seems to have thought) because the thing
varies, or becomes something else, in a very short time.
Why else would he say that a particular

is completely self-subsistent. It has that sort
of self-subsistence that used to belong to sub-
stance, except that it usually only persists
through a very short time, so far as our experi-
ence goes... I think things last for a finite
time, a matter of some seconds or minutes or what-
ever it may happen to be.1

It is interesting to speculate about the extent to
which Russell's advocacy of sense-data as the only
objects of acquaintance was motivated by his analysis
of proper names, and the brevity of their possession of
a univocal meaning. But regardless of that issue, it
is clear that the notions of sense-data and logically
proper names were closely connected and interdependent
for Russell, for not only does he usually give sense-
datum statements (e.g., 'this is red') as paradigms for
atomic propositions, but also he says implicitly that a
change in the meaning of a name need not accompany any
change in the properties or relations of the particular
it names, but only such changes as bring about an
altered sense-datum. This view has far-reaching conse-
quences, one of which Russell immediately draws, to the
effect that monism, which depends upon the doctrine of
internal relations, is false. For those properties and

1Ibid., pp. 201-202, 203.
relations of a particular which do not affect its appearance can be distinguished as external to it, and inessential for "knowing" it in the sense of being acquainted with it, and this latter state of affairs is all that is necessary for understanding its name and any proposition in which it occurs (assuming the rest of the proposition to be understood, of course).

The doctrine of logically proper names is also important for Russell independently of its connection with the epistemology of sense-data; for although he counts practically nothing as an example of such a name, and although the examples he does give are very peculiar indeed, logically proper names are a fundamental category in his logical analysis. If we are given a Russellian language, like that of Principia Mathematica, and interpret it by assigning a vocabulary so that it can be used to speak of the world, the language will contain apart from its elements of syntax, nothing beyond this vocabulary which will consist only of words corresponding one-for-one with simple things. In short, it will contain only the syntax plus a supply of logically proper names.¹ With regard to pure logic itself (what I have called the 'syntax' just above), Russell held a very Bradlian view: "It is part of the definition of logic (but not the whole definition) that all its

¹Ibid., pp. 197-198.
propositions are completely general, i.e., they all consist of the assertion that some propositional function containing no constant terms is always true. But in an interpreted logic, i.e., a language about the world, constant terms are used, and these are going to be logically proper names. Thus logically proper names (in particular, for Russell, demonstratives) are the vehicle of reference to the world. They constitute the element through which particularity is got into propositions, and they enable Russell to draw back from the full Bradlian thesis of generality in propositions. They represent an emasculated version of the Millian theory of pure denotation attacked by Bradley, and rest ultimately upon a theory of demonstratives which we saw Bradley himself veering towards, but which we were able to eliminate by straightening out a confusion between two senses of meaning.

Russell does not fall prey to the same ambiguity, but simply says that the meaning of demonstratives, like that of all words (except the syncatégorimatic 'logical' words) left after analysis, is what they designate. There is for him no such thing as meaning in sense (1), to revert to terminology of Part I. Thus the category


2 See p. 143 above. From what little I understand of it, this seems to be the main point of his attack upon Frege in "On Denoting", op. cit., pp. 46-51.
of logically proper names, though sparsely populated, occupies a basic and crucial, if somewhat devious, place in Russell's view of language.

I shall now argue that there are no words which satisfy the conditions mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, and which are therefore necessarily non-general. I shall, in this respect, be supporting Bradley's rejection of Mill, and rejecting Russell's logically proper names as a fiction. I shall use among other things considerations deriving from ordinary proper names, even though these are not logically proper names for Russell, because I want to show that they cannot be thought of as purely denoting terms for reasons independent of Russell's epistemology. Also, besides criticising the theory of logically proper names, I am interested in coming closer to an adequate account of ordinary proper names, and in showing in what sense they have meaning as Bradley claims they do.

2. Proper Names

A. Referring

To start with we can notice some obvious cases which do not fit the description of naming as a one-to-one relation between a word and a thing: a look in the telephone directory of probably any city in England will produce at least two entries of "John Smith". Here, then, is a double-word expression which is as good a name as
any, and which is correlated with more than one thing. Only a bit less obvious is the consideration that an individual, named "John" say, changes from time to time, and we find perfectly ordinary sentences such as "John is not the same irascible John I knew years ago". This led Bradley to say that judgements with proper names are synthetic. Although I am inclined to say that the same thing is named by each occurrence of the name, someone who holds with Russell that the identity of an object is determined by the identity of its appearances, must admit that there are distinct objects denoted by 'John', or else must avail himself of some subterfuge (as Russell does) to the effect that there are as many names as changes. The first alternative would give us further examples of names not restricted to one object.

It is a bit more difficult to come up with a name that has not named anything; this is not because names have not been thus used, but because most names used for non-existent things have at one point or another been used also for things less ontologically exotic. American rocketeers, for example, seem to have a penchant for Greek mythological names. 'Santa Claus' will perhaps do, or 'Dylp', which is a name I have just invented for Santa Claus's next-door-neighbor. I doubt whether this latter name has ever been the name of an existing thing.

Although the claim that a thing can have only one name does not affect the issue over the generality or
non-generality of names, it does seem usually to be a part of the theory of naming we are considering. So we might point out the commonplace that such cases as "Cicero" and "Tully", "Mark Twain" and "Samuel Clemens", and aliases, nick-names, pet names, honorary names, etc., plainly do exist.

If we symbolize the name relation, called variously 'denoting', 'designating', etc., by a line connecting the name with what it names as in figure (1) below, the three kinds of exceptions just given can be shown as (2)-(4):

\[
\begin{array}{c}
(1) \quad (2) \quad (3) \quad (4) \\
\quad 0 \quad \quad \quad 0 \quad 0 \\
\quad 0 \quad \quad \quad 0 \quad 0 \\
\end{array}
\]

Why, it might be asked, are there no cases of (5)—why is the breakdown of (1) not symmetrical for (3) as it is in (2) and (4)? The reason is that the relation symbolized is the name relation; names are presupposed by the relation. One could easily give examples of things without names, e.g., the pen with which I am writing these words. There are, after all, many more things without names than with. But such examples are irrelevant when we are trying to understand names, for where there is no name there is no name relation. This reply might invite the rejoinder that (3) is not relevant either, for the name relation, as do all
relations, presupposes the existence of both its relata—there are no "unattached" or "floating" relations. The cases are not parallel however; all those examples, including those of type (3), were produced as examples of perfectly good names in order to discredit the picture of names as being one member of a simple two-place relation. It is no good to patch up such cases as (3) by saying that existence is analogical, or different from subsistence, or many layered, or that some apparent names are not names at all; any such move starkly reveals the stipulative, rather than descriptive, character of this approach to proper names. If names (as relations) do presuppose the existence of what they purport to name, then naming cannot be a relation.

The idea of presuppositions is not so easily put down, however, and for good reason: there is something important which underlies it. To see just what it is, we shall have to make a distinction between denoting and referring.¹ Denoting, as I have been using that term, is something a word is said to do by virtue of a relation between the word and an object—the word is a name, and the thing it names is its denotation.² As I believe


²This use of "denote" is not the same as Russell's in "On Denoting"; I could have used "designate" instead, but confusion is hardly likely to arise.
I have just shown, denotation is not an adequate explanation for ordinary proper names.

Referring, on the other hand, is something that people do, it is an act we can perform. In performing such an act we can use words. They are not a necessary part of referring, however—various non-linguistic conventions can be used as well. The most important of these conventions is perhaps pointing; others are glancing at, holding, thrusting, etc., which can be construed as minor variations on pointing. They are commonly all lumped together as acts of ostention (when they are, in fact, being used referringly) because their function is to pick out and display some one particular object. Using words and ostensive conventions exhaust the ways we can refer to something; what I want to find out is how we can use words to refer.

Referring, like many things we do, is an act of achievement. It suggests that some sort of successful result has come about. Winning a race, for example, is something one can successfully do by crossing the finish-line first; it presupposes that there was an end to the race, a finish-line to cross. Spotting an airplane is also an achievement: it is the successful result of having looked for it, and the very success presupposes the existence of an airplane.¹ Achievements are not

¹These two examples of "achievement terms" are due to Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, pp. 103-107.
like ordinary actions such as writing, or hammering a nail, but are the consequences of such actions, and they happen at a time, not during a time. Referring is the consequence or result of using certain words in certain ways, but of course such uses need not guarantee successful reference, any more than running a race guarantees winning it. But if one does succeed in referring, i.e., if one does refer, then certain things are presupposed in the achievement of this act which correspond to the conditions imposed upon a name for it to denote. These presuppositions of referring explain why, when naming is conceived as a simple relation, names are described as terms which must satisfy these conditions. The corresponding presuppositions for singular reference are that (1) what one has referred to must exist (much as there must be a finish-line to win), and (2) there must have been one and only one thing to which one has referred (if there were two finish-lines, what would constitute winning?). These are not, let me repeat, conditions on words, but what must be the case if one has achieved an act of singular reference.

B. Meanings

We saw that there were two ways to refer, using either words, or non-linguistic conventions. What is it

1Vendler attributes to Ryle an example which illustrates a grammatical feature of achievement terms; (substituting "refer" for "see") we can say "I have
that we must be able to do in order to use these to refer? (I am speaking henceforth about singular reference.) In both cases, to satisfy the requirements of referring it is sufficient to be able to pick out and identify some particular object—the one to which we refer. The answer I wish to suggest is, briefly, that one can refer to something only if one could identify it. Let me hasten to add that I do not mean that one has to be able to physically pin-point the object on the spot, or even that he could do that with no further information, given only enough time. By "one could identify it" I intend to include 'borrowed reference', in the sense that if pressed about the intended referent of a name one used, one could ultimately come up with either a direct physical 'laying on of hands', or (if the thing is historical) enough information to satisfy those people most knowledgeable about the thing, that had you been there then, you could have picked out and actually isolated the thing from all other things plausibly confused with it. In both cases one is referring in good faith upon the belief that one could strictly identify the referent if pressed. If that belief is well founded, I would say that one has made a 'borrowed reference', and therefore that one could identify that to which he refers.

referred" as soon as we can say "I refer"—in general, achievement terms have unorthodox interpretations of both their ordinary and progressive present tenses. Ibid., pp. 103-104.
In ostention we simply employ the most obvious method for drawing attention to the particular object itself. In the case of words we can use a description of the object, a demonstrative, or a name. Concentrating on the latter, what we need to know is how a name can be used to pick out and identify a particular object, especially in view of the conclusion for which I argued above that it is false to think of a proper name as a word necessarily hooked onto one particular object. The answer I wish to suggest is that proper names enable us to refer because they have meanings, just as general terms apply to (are true of) those things to which they do apply by virtue of their meanings. In fact, a name can only be used to refer to something if it gives us some information about what it is used to refer to, and we get this information from the meaning of the name. The only alternative is that the name has no meaning, but just stands for some object (or equivalently, its meaning is the object), and this has been shown to be inadequate in many cases. But the claim I wish to make here is stronger than the mere production of counterexamples will allow: a theory of purely denotative terms, or logically proper names, is not just false for some names--it cannot be true for any. It cannot even be intelligibly stated. Our suspicions ought to be

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1See below, p. 267 n. 1.
aroused by the lack of attempts to give a precise account of what it is to denote by those who hold such a theory. We are usually given just a variety of alternate terms. Sometimes an analogy is attempted, such as Mill's chalk-mark on the house. But we have seen that almost as soon as he broached this analogy he fundamentally altered it, as Bradley was quick to point out, by saying not that a name marks an object, but the "idea" of the object. This alteration, incidently, brought Mill closer to a correct account than he was aware.

Another analogy sometimes used is that names are like ostention, they point to what they name. Thus Russell: "the name itself is merely a means of pointing to the thing". The trouble is that it is basically people who point, not words; but perhaps he meant that people can point 'by means of' names, rather like they can point by means of special signs with arrows on them, and indeed, that is the special merit of names over actual pointing—they can point when neither the object nor the one who points is present. There are difficulties with this analogy too; the presumed merit is no advantage, but rather its Achilles heel: what is being actually pointed at is always present to the person pointing. It just makes no sense to talk of pointing when that is not the case, and of course we do use

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1 Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", op. cit., p. 245.
names in the absence of what is named, and we come across names when there is no one to do the pointing (in print, on the radio, etc.).

Again, we should suspect that something has gone wrong when Russell is reduced to giving a few minutes worth of "this" as the only names which satisfy a theory of purely denoting terms. With regard to the properties which names are supposed to have by virtue of the naming relation, which we found implied by Mill's analogy, and which we extracted piecemeal from Russell, we saw that they were not properties of names (how can a word guarantee that something exists in the world, or that it cannot name more than one thing?), but rather necessary conditions for successfully bringing off an act of referring. There just is no way of coherently formulating a theory of names which on the one hand is dominated by the naive view of two objects (a thing and a name) tied to opposite ends of a rope, and which on the other hand will account for certain simple facts about how we use names. The reason for this is that it omits the very element of proper names which enables us

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2 The idea is seldom so crudely put as that, but consider, e.g., the following illuminating metaphor used by Pears: is "a complex singular symbol . . . like a name with a single filament reaching out for a denotation?" D. F. Pears, Bertrand Russell & The British Tradition in Philosophy, p. 204.
to identify what they name: their meanings. Before proceeding to consider in what sense proper names have meaning, and what arguments there are to show that they have meaning, I would like to consider some further arguments recently advanced against the denotation theory which are of a more internal character than the charges I have made of inadequacy and incoherence.

i. Arguments against the Denotation Theory, Including the Rejection of a Proposed 'Syntactical' Criterion for Proper Names

Sidney Zink has argued that the denotation theory holds that the meaning of a proper name is the thing that it names. . . . But a thing which is held to be the meaning of a proper name, say Mt. Everest, existed before the name existed. In the beginning was the thing. If, then, the thing named is the meaning of the name, the meaning of the name existed before the name existed, and this meaning would have existed.

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1 The view that names have a meaning enables me to deal with a possible objection to the first sort of example in the previous section. "Surely," it might go, "there are not two or more people denoted by the one name 'John Smith', rather there are two or more different names." I admit that there is something odd about one and the same name designating different things, because when we use a name to refer, we are referring to one thing. But since I take isomorphism (graphic or phonetic) as a criterion of the identity of a name, and do not accept the identity criteria of things as the identity criteria of their names, I reject the alternative suggested in the objection. My answer is that there are different meanings of the name "John Smith", just as there are different meanings of "beetle", "fair", "to lap", etc. The meanings of names are, however, connected with the criteria of identity of the things they name.
even if the name had never existed. But this contradicts the notion that only the symbol has meaning.¹

Therefore it follows that "no part of the meaning of . . . proper . . . names could be the things named."²

Much as I sympathise with this conclusion, the argument is clearly fallacious. First of all, the mountain is the meaning, it does not have the meaning (a point Zink himself makes, in spite of the last line of the above passage); so it has not been shown that something other than the symbol has a meaning. For that to follow, a premise is required to the effect that if a meaning exists, there must be something which possesses it. Then, if there is no symbol for the mountain, something other than a symbol must have a meaning, which is counter to the hypothesis, etc. Although this premise is neither stated nor supported, it is plausible enough not to cause the argument serious difficulty. A second problem is not so easily met, however. The advocate of a denotation theory does not have to hold that because Mt. Everest is the meaning of "Mt. Everest", the meaning of "Mt. Everest" existed before "Mt. Everest" did. The mountain of course existed before that name for it did, but it was not the meaning of the name until there was the name. Zink is trying to use the absurdity of case

²Zink, ibid.
(5) diagrammed above on page 207 to disprove the possibility of a denotation theory; we there rejected case (5) on the grounds that the name relation presupposes names. Another way of putting it is to say that a thing is not a meaning merely because sometime hence it will be named; for the denotation theorist it only need become a meaning when it is given a name. To argue as Zink does is no better than claiming that since I admire Mt. Everest, Mt. Everest is what I admire, and since what I admire existed before I did, Mt. Everest was once the object of the admiration of someone who did not yet exist. Obviously, it did not become the object of my admiration until I admired it; nor did it become the meaning of "Mt. Everest" until it was called by that name. The denotation theory cannot fall prey so easily; it is necessary to show what is fundamentally wrong with it. And that is, I think, that it tries to ignore how we use names to refer, it substitutes a short circuit straight from the word to the name. The consequences of this course are that a kind of relation is assumed of which an adequate account cannot be given, and that the meanings of names, which enable us to use the names to refer to things, are completely forgotten, if not outright rejected.

John Searle has given two further arguments which are both more serious for the denotation theorist. The first one concerns identity statements: we are inclined
to say that statements of the form "a = a" are analytic, while those of the form "a = b" are synthetic. But if the meaning of names are simply the things which they name, "Tully = Cicero" is just as true as "Tully = Tully", and for the same reasons. There is in fact no difference, for in both cases the names involved name the same object, and that is why both are true. Thus "a = b" cannot convey information (be synthetic) any more than "a = a" can.\(^1\) (Searle also points out that "a = a" can be synthetic if we change our rules for using symbols, and he describes such a change;\(^2\) but then "a = b" would be analytic--they could not both be the same, at least for the change he suggests. Thus the present argument would still work, but in reverse, i.e., we would say that the denotation theory counter-intuitively makes "a = a" analytic after all.)

Wittgenstein handled this problem by proscribing identity statements altogether, for "a = a" is so absurdly trivial that it means nothing, while "a = b" is just plain absurd, since no object has two names, and two objects cannot be the same.\(^3\) Those of us unfortunate enough not to have been on hand when our


\(^3\)Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.5303.
language was constructed, however, have to come to grips with the fact that statements of the form \( a = b \) can be informative, and within the conventions of our language, quite different from \( a = a \). There is some point after all, about arguing over whether Shakespeare was Bacon or not.

This argument of Searle's derives from Frege, who concluded from it that proper names must have a sense, and that \( a = b \) is informative because it tells us in particular cases that names with different senses can be used to refer to the same object. (Actually Frege says that names themselves refer, not that they can be used by people to refer; but due to the relation between sense and reference for Frege, this is of little consequence. I introduced the notion of referring partly to indicate and emphasize how the use of a name depends upon its meaning: you cannot use a name to refer if it does not have a meaning. The parallel point about Frege's view is put rather neatly by Searle: "According to the classical [denotation] theory, names, if they are really names, necessarily have a reference and no sense at all. According to the Fregean theory, they essentially have a sense and only contingently have a reference. They refer if and only if there is an object which satisfies their sense."\(^1\)

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\(^1\)Searle, "Proper Names and Descriptions", \textit{op. cit.}, p. 488.
Searle's other argument concerns existence statements: on the denotation theory such statements must be either true or else be some kind of contradiction. "Cerberus does not exist", for example, we would like to think is true, but if the meaning of "Cerberus" is some existing object—Cerberus in fact—then it has to be the case that "Cerberus does not exist" is false. Thus "exists" attached to a name must be true, and "does not exist" false; but "Cerberus exists" is false, and "Cerberus does not exist" is true. The truth or falsity of such statements depends entirely upon whether or not the name names anything, and so we cannot assume at the outset that the name does denote. Rather, we must say that an existential statement "expresses a concept and states that that concept is instantiated." Therefore proper names in such statements do not denote, but "must have some conceptual or descriptive content." Therefore proper names in such statements do not denote, but "must have some conceptual or descriptive content."

Modern defenders of denotative theories of proper names are not unaware of this problem, and they employ one method or another to avoid predicating existence onto proper names. Wittgenstein held that names denote the substance of the world, of which it makes no sense to assert or deny existence. Russell, drawing out the

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1 Iibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
consequences of this view (substituting in his own exposition the term "particulars" for "substance"—at one point explicitly likening particulars to substances except in respect of their duration\(^1\)), rejected ordinary proper names as not being proper names at all, logically speaking. For he recognized that we could say truthfully that "Pegasus exists" is false, and for factual, not grammatical reasons, and that in doing so we were in some sense making claims about the instantiation of concepts or properties.

Anscombe avoids this rejection of all proper names as not being genuine proper names, as Searle points out, by using the existence of a bearer for the name in question as a criterion for whether it really is a proper name.\(^2\) Thus "Caesar exists" and "Pegasus exists" are true and false respectively, but for different reasons: the first because "Caesar" is a genuine proper name, i.e., it actually names something which exists, and the second because (presumably) the properties associated with the pseudo-name "Pegasus" are nowhere found together. Searle's objection to this is quite direct: on Miss Anscombe's view a name is not necessarily a name just because we think it is—whether or not it is must be decided. But, Searle says, any such decision is arbitrary: "membership in a syntactical category

becomes contingent on the nonsyntactical relation of name-bearing". ¹

Although I agree with Searle that the relation of naming should not be used as a criterion for a word's being a genuine name—my reason being that I do not know what such a relation is—I do not know how he would go about giving a syntactical criterion such as he implies ought to be given. He nowhere gives such a criterion; to the contrary, he says that "we have the institution of proper names to perform the speech act of reference. The existence of these expressions derives from our need to separate the referring from the describing functions of language."² This suggests that the criterion for proper names is to be sought in their function, not their membership in syntactical categories, and I think this is quite correct. It is difference of function which underlies difference of syntax, and not vice versa. The fundamental difference between the referring and describing functions of language is the rationale for parsing statements into subjects and predicates. But it is a mistake to go from there, establishing radically different and exclusive categories of syntax into which, Procrustean-like, an expression must fit or be tailored to fit, or else be rejected as not really what we thought it to be.

¹Searle, "Proper Names and Descriptions", op. cit., p. 489.
²Ibid., p. 491.
Taking as a basis function, rather than purely syntactical considerations, we can formulate a criterion for proper names as follows: an expression is a proper name if its function in some statement is to refer, or in other words, if it can be used in an attempt to refer. This would include definite descriptions and demonstratives as well; they may be distinguished, if you wish, thus: the given criterion is for names; definite descriptions are names beginning with the word "the"; demonstratives are the following names—"this", "that", "I", "now", (etc., through an exhaustive list); the rest are proper names. I shall urge below that although these distinctions can be made, there is no deep importance in them.

Such words are the subject(s) of a statement, and the rest, which says something about the purported referent(s), is the predicate (ignoring the obvious complications introduced with logically compound statements). Notice that this criterion includes "Pegasus" as a proper name in the statement "Pegasus causes poetic inspiration", for the function of an expression is independent of whether or not it manages to achieve its purpose. And I submit that this is just what we want: surely "Pegasus" is as much a name as is "Caesar".

To some who worry overmuch, the most obvious next question is, what about statements whose subjects are names which cannot be used in a successful act of
reference because the pre-conditions for referring are not met? For example, "Pegasus", since Pegasus does not exist. Are they true, or false, or what? To answer this one way or the other is, I think, genuinely arbitrary, and makes little difference.¹ Let us say they are false (à la Russell), or neither true nor false (à la Strawson), or sometimes true and sometimes false, letting "exist" apply more loosely than only to material bodies (à la Linsky), or let us await decision until a statistical survey of preferences among plain men has been conducted. None of these alternatives will cause us to believe in ghosts, gods, and golden mountains unless we have independent reasons to do so. The immense controversy over this point has obscured what is interesting in Strawson's discussion of Russell, and it is a red herring.

A Bad Suggestion

It might be thought that one way to give a criterion for proper names is to start out with the syntactical distinction between subject and predicate (ignoring how that is to be obtained), and then to say that proper names are words which occur as subjects (with certain specifiable qualifications), but not as (or in) predicates (except in certain specifiable circumstances). This is no caricature, but a point of view recently

¹See the discussion of descriptions below, pp. 369f, especially pp. 373-376.
advocated by Richard Campbell. Let us look more closely at just how his method goes wrong.

The circumstance in which a proper name can occur in a predicate, he says, is when it has some descriptive content or import; thus two cases arise—one for those words which can form a predicatable by prefixing some form of "to be", and the other for those which cannot. In the first case, a sufficient condition for an expression's being a proper name is given by:

I. For any n, if (a) [is an n] or [are n] is a predicatable expression,

then (b) [n] is a proper name

if and only if (c) [n is not an n] or [n are not n] is not self-contradictory.¹

This is supposed to count words such as "Napoleon" as proper names. The second case is dealt with by another sufficient condition, which together with (I) forms a necessary condition for an expression's being a proper name. In this second condition, a number of qualifications are included to eliminate certain expressions which also do not form a predicatable with "to be".

II. For any n, if (a) [is an n] or [are n] is not a predicatable expression,

but (b) it makes sense to attach a predicatable expression to [n],

and if (c) [n] is not a quantifying expression,

and if (d) it is not impossible that a sentence of the form \([n \text{ is } \emptyset]\) should always be used to make the same statement,

then (e) \([n]\) is a proper name.\(^1\)

Looking at II first, condition (a) is satisfied by "Cynthia", "seven plus a tree", "all men", and "this"—i.e., none of these examples forms a predicatable as required. The successive qualifications are designed to eliminate each term but "Cynthia". But suppose the predicatable in the 'meaningfulness' qualification (condition (b)) were "is divisible by two"; then all names but numerals would be eliminated. The problem here is whether to interpret the qualification as

\[(\exists P)(n)("Pn" \text{ makes sense}),\]

or as

\[(n)(\exists P)("Pn" \text{ makes sense}).\]

My objection rests upon the former interpretation, which has the effect of eliminating proper names of anything not of one kind, since there are no genuine predicables sensibly applicable across all categories. So Campbell must have meant this qualification to have the latter interpretation. But then it can easily be subverted by using the predicatable "makes no sense", for "seven plus a tree makes no sense" makes sense; it is even true.

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\(^1\)Ibid., p. 339. In both this and the previous passage I have split Campbell's text and added the letters in parentheses as labels to ease my subsequent discussion; removing these labels and running the rest together restores the quotation verbatim.
Worse yet, "seven plus a tree makes sense" must also make sense, for it is false. Thus Campbell must strengthen this qualification by ruling out the use of the predicables "makes no sense" and "makes sense"—but the latter one is needed to state the qualification itself!

Condition (c) eliminates expressions like "all men" and "some men"; but what about other members in the general class in which these are included, which Geach (following Johnson) calls "applicatives"? Some examples which Geach gives are "a", "the", "some", "any", "no", "every", "only", "just one", "all but two", and "most". Campbell "assumes that quantifying expressions are individually definable in rules parallel to those governing the use of quantifiers in predicate logic. . . ." This, with some careful attention to scope, takes care of "all", "a", "some", "every", "no" and "any". The numerical ones "only", "just one", "just two", etc., can also be handled this way, and thus can be eliminated by this qualification.

Among the applicatives which remain is "the". "The men" forms the predicable "are the men", as in "they are the men", so it would fit into I, only to be there eliminated because contrary to I(c), "the men are not the men" is self-contradictory. There are other

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1Geach, Reference and Generality, p. 47.
2Campbell, op. cit., p. 338.
examples, however. An expression will fit case II, and therefore be a proper name, if either [are n] or [is an n] is not a predicable—it need not be the case that both are not predicables. "Is a the man" is not a predicable, and thus "the men", while failing under I, passes muster under II. Equally non-predicable are "is a the man" and "are the man". None make sense, yet predicables can sensibly be attached to both "the man" and "the men". Thus if expressions beginning with "the" are to be eliminated as proper names, this must be done under condition (c), and not by anything prior.

Campbell could try to eliminate these examples under the next condition, by arguing that it is possible that expressions such as "the man" could be always used to make the same statement. This in effect would be an objection to the uniqueness clause of the Russelian analysis of definite descriptions (a move I think ought to be made), and would amount on Cambell's part to saying of sentences of the form [n is $\emptyset$]—and presumably also of the form [n are $\emptyset$]—where n is of the form [the m] and m is a general term, that they cannot be construed as always being about the same objects. To a simple idea of statement I reply with simple examples: definite descriptions which carry on their face an explicit claim to uniqueness—"the father of John", "the tallest man who has ever or will ever live", "the only natural satellite of Earth", etc. These expressions will pass
condition (d) and be counted as proper names, a consequence I think Campbell would not welcome.

On the other hand, this move by Campbell would eliminate certain names as well, such as "The Royal Bank of Scotland", for it is of the form [the m], yet it carries no explicit uniqueness claim. If Campbell were to say that it does carry one implicitly, that is, if he were to reject Russell's analysis not for all expressions of the form [the m], but only for some of them, then the natural question to ask is how do you distinguish one from the other--how do you know, e.g., that "The Royal Bank of Scotland" is meant to be unique? The only non-arbitrary answer I can imagine would be that proper names, but not necessarily definite descriptions, are meant to be unique. But within a criterion which is designed specifically to distinguish proper names from other expressions, including descriptions, that would be flatly circular, for it presupposes that distinction already.

To continue with applicatives, what about "most", "almost all", "two-thirds of all", and other such expressions which involve an explicit or covert reference to a totality ("most" meaning "more than half of all")? If they are thought to fit case I, then they form proper names, for "most men are not most men" is not contradictory, but true: in the only way that sentence makes sense, all men, and hence most men, are each just one man, not most men. But if they are thought to come under
II, then to be eliminated they must be explained, if not as quantifying expressions, at least in the same general way as quantifying expressions are explained, and it is incumbent upon Campbell to show us how this is to be done. I know of no such account which is satisfactory. The only attempt of which I am aware is given by Geach, in which "most A's are F" is explained as, for three A's ($a_1$, $a_2$, and $a_3$):

$$(Fa_1 \cdot Fa_2) \lor (Fa_1 \cdot Fa_3) \lor (Fa_2 \cdot Fa_3).$$

The general idea is that you simply disjoin all possible conjunctions of $F$-statements about the individual A's in which the number of the conjoined statements in each disjunct is at least one more than half the total number of A's there are.¹ A very natural solution one might think; unfortunately it assumes a complete and finite list of all the A's.² This is the requirement we had to force upon Wittgenstein in order to understand his interpretation of the quantifiers, and which had the consequence of making universal statements not general after all, but just a logical product of singular propositions. Geach avoids this by suggesting an alternative interpretation of the quantifiers; it works for "some" and "all", but not for "most" or any other applicative expression which refers to a totality.³

¹Geach, op. cit., pp. 82-83, 172, 177-178.
²Ibid., pp. 71, 82-83, 168, 178.
³Geach, Reference and Generality, pp. 185-186. On
Of course Campbell need not try to define "most" so as to exclude it under qualification (c) in II; he could simply add another qualification excluding it and others like it. But this is not so simple as it sounds, for he cannot merely list them if the totalities involved are infinite, as is assumed in the notion of the matter of the alternative interpretation of the quantifiers, see Geach, ibid., p. 185, and also "Quantification Theory and the Problem of Identifying Objects of Reference", Acta Philosophica Fennica, 1963, p. 45. This interpretation is now usually called "substitutional quantification", as opposed to classical, or "objectual quantification", due to Quine, who succinctly describes it thus: "An existential substitutional quantification is counted true if and only if there is an expression which, when substituted for the variable, makes the open sentence after the quantifier come out true. A universal quantification is counted as true if no substitution makes the open sentence come out false." ("Existence and Quantification", Ontological Relativity, p. 104; also in Fact and Existence, (ed.) J. Margolis, p. 11.) On this view we worry about linguistic items only, names, open sentences, and the truth-predicate, instead of—as on the ordinary view—a mixed bag of non-linguistic objects, open sentences, and a cross-category relation "is true of". Quine advances two arguments against substitutional quantification. One is that "whereas the expressions, simple and complex, available to us in any given language are denumerable", any universe containing the real numbers, for example, is nondenumerable, and therefore "an existential quantification can come out true when construed in the ordinary sense, and yet be false when construed [in the substitutional sense]." ("Reply to Professor Marcus", Synthese, v. 13, 1961, p. 328.) The assumption is that "given" languages must have a denumerable number of names. The magic of "being given" presumably involves that it is an actually used language, and of course no such language uses a nondenumerable quantity of names. But neither does such a language ever use a denumerably infinite number of names—used expressions are always finite. But if used languages can be theoretically extended to contain a denumerable number of names, why cannot we consider a language extended to contain nondenumerable names? The procedures we use to talk about real numbers could be employed in our talk about the language too. Quine has asserted in a variety
generality involved in general terms, because there will be an infinite number of such applicatives. (Let the first be "most"; let the second be "at least two more than half", and the third be "at least three more than half"; etc., *ad infinitum.*) Therefore his new qualification will have to include a recursive specification of places his belief that the elements of a language must be denumerable, but always without any reasons given.

In one passage he argues that "if we succeed in showing that every result of substituting a name for the variable in a certain open sentence is true in the theory, but at the same time we disprove the universal quantification of the sentence, then certainly we have shown that the universe of the theory contained some nameless objects." (Ontological Relativity, p. 64.) In a footnote to this he points out that the relevant state of affairs is typical in any "numerically insegregative system", i.e., in the 'interestingly' ω-inconsistent ones, which he discusses in "ω-inconsistency and Infinity", Selected Logical Papers, pp. 114-120. But nothing he says there indicates that the devices available for showing that every instantiation of the certain open sentence is true in the theory, can be extended to a nonenumerable set of names. The devices in question must be recursive for theories with an infinity of names, but no recursive methods could be so extended, for it would allow a recursive specification of the nonenumerable. Therefore the strongest conclusion Quine ought to draw is that the existence of interestingly ω-inconsistent systems implies that not all systems have as many names as objects in their universe; one could never prove that more than a denumerable number of a system's names always rendered a certain open sentence true in that system. Proving that the substitution of all names (specified in some recursive fashion) into an open sentence are true, yet its universal quantification false, establishes only that either there are more things than names, or that the names are not all reached by the recursive devices, i.e., they are nonenumerable. Thus ω-inconsistency does not furnish an argument against substitutional quantification: a system with that property could always have it because one of the names not captured recursively renders the open sentence false upon substitution. Thus ω-inconsistency can be viewed as a property a system might have which proceeds purely as a consequence of denying that everything can have a name.
of the applicatives; it would be easy enough to generate the series of applicatives I just now gave as an example. But I have no idea whether all applicatives which refer to a totality are denumerable. Campbell would have to show that this were the case before we could be sure that his new qualification excluded everything that it should.

What about Campbell's last qualification, condition (d)? This is designed to eliminate demonstratives, for it is impossible that "this is red" or "he is ill", etc., can be used to make only one statement, because it is possible to use them to make different statements. But it is possible to use "John is ill" to make different statements (as the notion "statement" is used by Campbell).

It remains for Quine to show why such a simple assumption cannot be held.

Quine's second argument, and the reply to it are more direct: substitutional quantification, he says, "abstracts from reference altogether." ("Reply to Professor Marcus", op. cit., p. 329.) To one who suggests that the criterion for existence commitments is to be found in what one is prepared to quantify over, this objection is to be expected. But to one who wants to separate the existential and quantifying roles of the idiom "some", this feature of substitutional quantification, with its attendant demand for a special treatment of "exists", is no objection, but something quite welcome. We sometimes refer to things, and we sometimes use language. The fact that we sometimes do the latter in order to do the former is no reason to conflate these activities in our formal analysis of the structure of language. Keeping reference distinct from syntax serves, among other things, to render understandable, if not actually desirable, not only recent attempts to construct "free logics", which make their existence assumptions plain, but also earlier and recent suggestions related to "sortal logic", which appear to accord much more satisfactorily with the way we use language in making inferences, and with the overly abused traditional analysis of terms. But to deal with these matters thoroughly would be to go well beyond the scope of this thesis. Let it suffice to say that Quine's second charge is accepted with enthusiasm.
and therefore it is impossible that "John is ill" can be always used to make only one statement. Therefore "John" is not a proper name. Condition (d) is, however, more subtle than this argument suggests. Demonstratives are eliminated because

(1) For any demonstrative \( n \), it is impossible that sentences of the form \([n \text{ is } \varphi]\) are always used to make the same statement.

This follows because there is no demonstrative which cannot be used to refer to more than one thing. That is part of what it means to be a demonstrative: suppose there were a demonstrative "thas" which was always used to refer to the same thing. We would not call it a demonstrative for that very reason, but probably would think of it as a name, as indeed Campbell's criterion would have us do. But consider a claim parallel to (1) for proper names:

(2) For any proper name \( n \), it is impossible that sentences of the form \([n \text{ is } \varphi]\) always be used to make the same statement.

For a unique name (2) is false and its negation true; thus we write:

(3) For some proper name \( n \), it is not impossible that sentences of the form \([n \text{ is } \varphi]\) always be used to make the same statement.

The question now is, how can Campbell justify converting the quantifier in (3) into a universal generalisation,
since that is needed in order to capture all proper names, and not just those few which happen to be unique? Each name not captured by (3) as it stands (i.e., every name, if there are any, which renders the instantiation of (3) false), will not be captured as a proper name in Campbell's criterion. The only way I can see for him to do it is by arguing that names which happen not to be unique, such as "John", might have been unique—they might have been such that "John is $\phi$" always makes the same statement. How do we know this? Well, the answer could run, there are a few names which are unique, and there is nothing special about them—the same might have happened to any name. This argument can be dispatched straightaway: every proper name, unbeknownst to Campbell, names not only those things he thinks it names, but also names two numbers. Therefore there can be no unique names, for every name must name at least two things, if not more. This objection is highly artificial, and rather silly, but Campbell cannot reject it on the most obvious grounds that it is part of what it means for a word to be a proper name, that it might always be used to refer to only one thing; for his whole project is to give criteria for proper names independent of meaning and referring. Basically, my point is that if condition (d) is really going to be able to distinguish proper names from demonstratives, it must assume a non-linguistic characterization of proper names which Campbell's criteria I and II
are designed to avoid: it must require that proper names are such that some of them are able to be used to refer to one and only one thing, and therefore all of them are such that they might have been so used--this being part of what being a proper name means. Demonstratives, on the other hand, could never be so used--this being part of what being a demonstrative means. I think these characterizations are correct, but Campbell cannot avail himself of them and still pretend to be giving purely linguistic criteria.

So much for II; does I fare any better? I think not. Let n be "book"; then "book is not a book" is not, as it stands, self-contradictory, but ungrammatical and meaningless. There seem to be three courses open to Campbell: he could (1) deny that "book is not a book" is ungrammatical and meaningless, (2) change [n is not an n] to [an n is not an n], or (3) add "or ungrammatical and meaningless" to the end of I(c).

(1). The only way for "book is not a book" to be grammatical and meaningful is to understand the first occurrence of "book" as mentioning the word, not using it, or else to take it as being used to refer to the concept of book; in either case the statement is then not self-contradictory, but true. Thus "book" is a proper name.

(2). This change would rule out "book", for "a book is not a book" is self-contradictory; but if "is a
Napoleon" is a predicable, as Campbell wants to allow, then "a Napoleon is not a Napoleon" is just as contradictory, and "Napoleon" is not a proper name. This emendation would eliminate all those proper names the criterion was designed to pass (i.e., those with "descriptive import").

(3). This seems to be the most plausible way. But it works only by depending upon an accidental feature of English: singular common nouns cannot ordinarily occur as subjects without an article (barring other words they might occur with, such as quantifiers and 'quasi-quantifiers', i.e., "most", etc., since they do not form predicables in the required way). What about languages without articles? Actually, there is no real problem here, for while the Russian "ни́ма не́ ни́ма" ("book [is] not book"), e.g., is not meaningless, it is self-contradictory. Moreover, Campbell might say that he is only concerned with English. Actually we do not need to go outside English to turn up a problematic example, for plural common nouns do not need an article to be a subject: "books are not books". Occurrences of this kind are provided for by Campbell—they are eliminated because they are self-contradictory. But are all such grammatical and meaningful sentences contradictory? I might, for example, wish to say that "losers are not losers", so far from being contradictory, expresses a deep truth: losing causes suffering, and I
believe (along with Dostoevski, say) that suffering is the only way to salvation. Those who are saved are not losers, but the receivers of what is most important—redemption from evil. Campbell of course would reply that if what I say is not self-contradictory, it is only because I equivocated on "loser": it has a different meaning on each occurrence in my sentence.

My reply is that that is precisely what he does in saying that if "Aristotle" is a proper name, then "Aristotle is not an Aristotle" is not a self-contradiction. So any objection to my move is equally an objection to the namehood of words which I is supposed to isolate. To see this, we must first notice that there are two ways sentences of the form he is interested in might or might not be self-contradictory: by virtue of their form alone, or by virtue of the meanings of the words involved.

Considering the former alternative, if the form of "Aristotle is not an Aristotle" is analysed as simply "Fa", no conclusion about its being a contradiction or not could follow. It must, therefore, have a different form, perhaps that of a negated identity statement: "a ≠ a". This is patently a contradiction, so "Aristotle" is not a proper name. Barring some radically new analysis on Campbell's part, there seems to be no way to show that names with descriptive import can avoid formal self-contradiction when they enter into
sentences of the form \([n \text{ is not an } n]\). (Claiming that the form of our example is "Fa" is no consolation, because while not a formal contradiction, it admits also the analysis of "an elephant is not an elephant" as "Fa"; thus "an elephant" would be a name.) Therefore the decision as to whether \([n \text{ is not an } n]\) or \([n \text{ are not } n]\) is contradictory for some \(n\) must depend not upon form, but upon the meanings of the words. This introduces an element Campbell would rather his criterion did without, but for the moment we might waive the fact that this is a serious complication for him, and see whether any view about the meaning of proper names can provide an out.

Let us then consider how "Aristotle is not an Aristotle" (which I shall subsequently refer to as "\(A\)") could escape self-contradiction (if it can) on the three versions of proper names we have looked at: Mill's, Russell's, and Bradley's. For Mill, "not A" is not necessarily true, and nor, then, is "A" self-contradictory. It cannot be, because the first occurrence of "Aristotle" has no meaning. "According to . . . [my] view of essential propositions, no proposition can be reckoned such which relates to an individual by name, that is, in which the subject is a proper name."\(^1\) But the second occurrence does have meaning,

\(^1\)Mill, A System of Logic, p. 73.
for "all concrete general terms are connotative."¹ Therefore since only one occurrence of "Aristotle" has meaning, they cannot both have the same meaning, and "A" is not self-contradictory, because it is a (degenerate kind of) equivocation. If Campbell were to adopt Mill's view, and yet try to avoid this charge of equivocation by saying that the second occurrence of "Aristotle" also has no meaning, then "A" becomes some strange kind of identity statement (if anything at all) which is contradictory, and hence "Aristotle" is not a name.

For Russell, either (a) "Aristotle" is treated as a logically proper name, and its meaning is some particular thing, or (b) it has no meaning (it is analysed into a definite description, and they have no meanings on their own). If (b), then an argument like the one for Mill applies. If (a), then the two occurrences of "Aristotle" have different meanings: the first is a thing, and the second is a (likely complex) property. If the second occurrence is a name and not a general term, then either it means a different thing from the first, and "A" is not self-contradictory, but is equivocal, or it means the same thing, and "A" is self-contradictory. Thus "Aristotle" is not a name, or it is equivocal.

So far the result is that on either denotative theory of proper names, a name used as in "A" is used

¹Ibid., p. 19.
equivocally, or else Campbell's criterion will reject the statement as contradictory, with the consequence that the word thought to be a name is not a name.

The alternative to yet consider is the connotative theory of proper names, such as I have adapted from Bradley. The result is exactly the same. On this view, either (1) "Aristotle" is the name of the man who was a pupil of Plato, was born in Stagira, wrote some philosophical treatises, etc., or (2) "Aristotle" is the name of some other man with a different assortment of properties. The name has a different meaning in each case. When "Aristotle" is used predicatively it also has a meaning, and let us assume that it is used univocally in both versions of "A" corresponding to the use of "Aristotle" as subject according to case (1), or to case (2). Let us further assume that its predicative meaning indicates something characteristic of the man named "Aristotle" in case (1). Now if the two occurrences of "Aristotle" in "A" are not equivocal, "A" is self-contradictory, since the meaning of the second occurrence of "Aristotle" is part of the meaning of the first. Hence "Aristotle" is not a proper name. On the other hand, when the subject of "A" is construed as in (2), "A" will not be self-contradictory, but only because it is equivocal: "Aristotle" means something different on each use in "A".
Campbell's criterion I thus works only if he allows sentences of the form [n is not an n] or [n are not n] to be equivocal. But then any general term for which I can cook up a suitable equivocation (such as in my example with "loser") will be a proper name.

The difficulties we have found in Campbell's two (together necessary and sufficient) criteria for testing whether or not a word is a proper name all stem ultimately from the underlying misconception of a functional category as a syntactical one, and the consequent attempt to specify proper names as what can be a subject, rather than specifying them by their function (which is that they can be used to refer). The syntactical distinction of subject and predicate is a result of the basic duality of function in language: referring and describing.

ii. What Meanings Are, Including a Discussion of Presupposition

Returning more directly to the function of proper names in acts of referring, I might briefly sum up my position: referring, like winning, is an achievement—if we do not succeed in our attempt to refer, we have not referred. If we do refer, then it must have been the case that there was something, and only one thing, to which we referred. An act of reference can be achieved through ostention, or words. In both cases the object must be picked out and identified (or else, in the case of verbal reference, one must at least have
a reasonable belief that one could, through the knowledge one has of the knowledge of others, satisfactorily isolate the object referred to.) To communicate the identification of something by means of words, some information must be conveyed about the object of reference, and this information is obtained from the meanings of the words with which we communicate. What, we may now ask, are meanings?

To answer this we should begin by sharpening the notion of "information about". When we have information about something, we know some things which can be said to be true or false of it, i.e., we are enabled to give a partial description of it, which is the same as knowing some of its properties and/or relations. It seems to me obvious that we could never have complete information about something in this sense, even without assuming an infinite number of objects related to it, about which we know nothing beyond their existence. But complete information of relations to remote and exotic objects is not necessarily needed to identify ordinary garden variety objects. All I wish to claim is that the non-extensive identification of medium-size dry goods can be effected by describing some of their properties and/or relations.

Proper names, of course, do not explicitly describe the objects they name--they do not overtly specify properties as, say, "is six-sided, oblong, and blue"
does. But we can and do refer with names; we must therefore be able to identify (at least in the qualified sense specified above) what is named if we refer with a name--this means being able to describe the named object by giving a list of properties and/or relations the object has, since verbal (i.e., non-ostensive) identification relies solely upon such descriptions. (For the sake of convenience I shall drop the inclusive disjunction "properties and/or relations" in favor of just "properties", which can be construed as something possessed by one, or two, or three, etc. things.) Often the descriptions we could provide are frustratingly specific, and exploit our confidence both that someone we know or have heard of could make the identification, and that we, if pressed, could do so also to anyone's satisfaction. But we should not let this circumstance obscure the facts that we are still using descriptions of the object, and that there is a cluster of properties for any given object which is prone to repetitive employment in identifications regardless of what other useful descriptions circumstantially come along. Contextually obtained information (except when ostention is possible, which is not usually) is parasitic upon this cluster of properties; in the last analysis it is these properties we have to rely upon when we have to no avail exhausted our supply of accidental and specific properties in an attempt to communicate to someone what we are talking
about. To the extent that a person can draw upon this cluster of properties in order to specify which thing it was whose name he was using in an attempt to refer, to that extent he knows the meaning of the name. In general, we can identify things with names because they do have meanings, i.e., there is, for any name, a set (or 'cluster') of properties implied by that name. A sufficient condition for any purported property of a thing belonging to the set which constitutes the meaning of its name is that if the object named does not actually have that property, there would be no non-arbitrary way of deciding what the name names. I suspect that weaker conditions also operate: for "is blind" and "spoke Greek" seem to be as much a part of the meaning of "Homer" as does "wrote the Illiad", yet unlike for the latter, disconfirming discoveries about the former properties would not cause serious difficulties for us.

Nonetheless, names do imply some properties. If there were no properties necessarily connected with the name, we could not, in using the name, be taken to have identified anything, or, therefore, to have referred to anything. I may have wanted to refer to something, but I could not have done so anymore than I could refer by uttering a noise which ex hypothesi has no meaning.1

1It might be thought that this is exactly what we do when we give a name. A new name, if it implies any properties at all, surely cannot imply properties of something it has never been a name of; it could, in fact, imply no properties whatsoever if it is a
their names,\(^1\) therefore to say that the essence of Thompson includes rationality is to say nothing more than that since he is a man he must be rational, because "man" means, in part, being rational. These are the innocuous "nominal essences" of Locke's. His "real essences", however, are another matter; Mill suggests that physics takes the real essences of ordinary objects to be their "corpuscular structure", but he declines to offer a definition of what the real essences of corpuscles and other basic entities might be.\(^2\) This studied impartiality is not an evasion, but is actually meant to be a rhetorical device indicating his rejection of real essences; for on the previous page he emphatically says: "Individuals have no essences."\(^3\) Thus the idea of an object cannot include any properties which are special, unique, and essential to it--it must include only ordinary properties, properties which the object in fact has, but ones other objects might have as well.

It appears, therefore, that the account of proper names which Mill slips into under pressure from the absurdity of his chalk-mark analogy--that proper names are connected with the ideas of the objects they name--is basically the same as Bradley's and my own. It is

\(^{1}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 72.\)
\(^{2}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 74.\)
\(^{3}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 73.\)
quite distinct from and incompatible with the account he gives in more guarded moments, and it is, as I am arguing, substantially correct. However, it is the theory of proper names as meaningless, as purely denoting terms, which is quite justifiably remembered as Mill's; it is this theory which he explicitly advocates, seemingly mindless of the complications introduced by ideas of objects.

Campbell has suggested, in the article discussed above, that the view of proper names I have been recommending—that they have meanings which consist of some of the properties of the thing named—does not represent a view opposed to Mill's. He says,

If Mill's definition is to lead to any workable account of proper names, his notion of connotation needs to be freed from any suggestion of meaning the associations to which a normal use of the name might give rise, associations which might vary from person to person. For these same reasons, the current Searle-Strawson account of the descriptions 'presupposed' by the use of proper names should give no encouragement to those who are still tempted to say that proper names do have connotation, thinking that thereby they are at variance with a Millian treatment.\(^1\)

It is not exactly clear what he means by a "suggestion of meaning the associations to which a normal use of the name might give rise", but whatever he does mean by it, he thinks that it represents a wrong idea of Mill's "connotation", and that Searle (I shall consider

\(^1\)Campbell, "Proper Names", Mind, 1968, p. 333. My account of proper names is heavily indebted to Searle, as will be even more apparent below.
his view mainly) advocates it, and that therefore Searle's theory, when it attributes connotation to proper names, does not attribute to them what Mill denied of them. Campbell mentions two misconceptions about Mill's "connotation", one of which he appears to explicitly impute to Searle in the context of the passage I quoted, and another which, were it correct (i.e., were it a misconception), would also apply to Searle.

The first derives from a muddle about "imply": when a word connotes a property, it is said to imply the property. Implication might be taken as a relation between ideas which psychologically are necessarily associated together (i.e., always are associated together in thought), or it might be taken as a purely logical relation, as Campbell suggests Mill might have taken it. He implies just before the passage I quoted that we must understand Mill's "connotation" in the latter way, because of the poverty of associationist explanations of implication. Searle, he seems to suggest, is still bedeviled by this relic from the past--he puts scare-quotes around Searle's "presupposed" as if to emphasize that this is different from "implied" as explained in logic, and reminiscent of associationist accounts in which ideas bring one another to mind. This of course is absurd; Searle no more holds an association psychology than Campbell does. But we might wonder what
"presupposition" does mean for Searle, if it does mean anything else than logical implication. I shall pursue this matter a bit, for it will throw some light upon my own use of that notion. Searle uses "presupposition, plus various other expressions ("backing", "condition", "precondition") often enough in both of his articles on proper names, but almost always it is with regard either to the use of a name, or to the object named, and not to the name itself. That is, as with many things we do, certain other things are required in order for us to be able to do what it is we wish to do. Reading, e.g., presupposes certain abilities and skills. Successfully using a name to refer presupposes the ability to identify what is referred to. It presupposes also, if the name is used more than once, that the object referred to is in some respect the same object each time. These presuppositions are not independent: "to presuppose that the object is the same in turn presupposes a criterion of identity, that is, it presupposes an ability on the part of the speaker to answer the question 'In virtue of what is the object at time \( t_1 \) referred to by name \( N \), identical with the object at time \( t_2 \), referred to by the same name?'".


2 Searle, "Proper Names and Descriptions", op. cit., p. 489.
is more or less the same as I was using above in section 2.A. of this chapter.

On the other hand, Searle says:

Now what I am arguing is that the descriptive force of "This is Aristotle" is to assert that a sufficient but so far unspecified number of these statements [from "a set of uniquely referring descriptive statements"] are true of this object. . . .

To use a proper name referringly is to presuppose the truth of certain uniquely referring statements, but it is not ordinarily to assert these statements or even to indicate which exactly are presupposed. 1

Here presupposing is connected with assertions and statements—they, not abilities, are what are presupposed.

But they are presupposed by an act of referring, a use of a name, so we still have not got a logical connection in the sense of a relation between expressions. However, in talking about the descriptive force of a name, Searle considers himself to be elucidating the claim that names have a sense, and in this connection he says,

We might rephrase the question "Do proper names have sense?" as "Do proper names entail any descriptive predicates?" or simply as "Are any propositions that contain a proper name as a subject and a descriptive expression as a predicate analytic?" 2

From this passage it is clear that "presupposition" is meant to have logical force, if, that is, the question posed is answered affirmatively. Is it?

If it asks whether or not proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the

1 Searle, "Proper Names", op. cit., p. 159.
2 Searle, "Proper Names and Descriptions", op. cit., p. 489.
Two questions thus arise: how are these two senses of presupposition related (acts presupposing abilities, and names presupposing descriptions), and how is the second, the "loosely" logical one, related to implication (i.e., entailment)? Looking at the latter question first, we can immediately observe that what is meant by "loose" has nothing to do with the logic involved (how could a logical relationship be loose?), but rather refers to Searle's view that the descriptive statements presupposed are not specific. For anyone at any particular time, some, but not necessarily any actually designated subset, of the true descriptive statements about some thing are presupposed by the name of that thing. The looseness consists in that subset not being delineated once and for all.

Strictly speaking, implication is something which obtains between statements (or propositions, or sentences, etc., whichever are you choose to grind), not between terms or expressions which are not statements, such as names and descriptions. Both Mill and Searle do use "imply" in the latter way (actually Searle uses "entail", both for his own view and when speaking of Mill's). But we can easily translate such usage into the stricter usage: if an expression is said to entail (imply) some

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1Ibid., p. 490.
property (or better, an expression for some property),
we can take that to mean that any statement containing
the former expression as the subject entails (implies)
some other statement which contains it as the subject,
and which contains the expression for that property as
the predicate. An analogous translation can be made for
presupposing. Then letting 'S' and 'P' be statements,
our question can be phrased: what is the difference
between 'S presupposes P' and 'S entails P'?

Searle does not discuss this, but he does say that
in using "presuppose" he is following Strawson:¹ so let
us look at what Strawson says:

It is self-contradictory to conjoin S with the
denial of P if P is a necessary condition of the
truth, simply, of S. It is a different kind of
logical absurdity to conjoin S with the denial of
P if P is a necessary condition of the truth or
falsity of S. The relation between S and P in
the first case is that S entails P. We need a
different name for the relation between S and P
in the second case; let us say, as above, that S
presupposes P.²

When Strawson says that P is a necessary condition
of the truth, simply, of S, he is taking the symbol "P"
to represent a statement about a fact, not the fact
itself (as is obvious from the context of the quoted
passage, if not already from his use of it in the expres-
sion "S entails P"). But statements are either true or
false or neither. Since nothing entails a statement

¹Searle, "Proper Names", op. cit., p. 158.

²Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, p. 175. I
have changed Strawson's symbol "S" everywhere into "P".
which is neither true nor false, he cannot mean to include that possibility for P when he talks of it as being a necessary condition. Could the truth of S have as a necessary condition the falsity of P? Since this case is parallel to the other, we can ask: could the truth or falsity of S have as a necessary condition the falsity of P? If so, we could say that the truth or falsity of "the king of France is bald" has as a necessary condition that "there exists one and only one king of France" is false. This of course is just the opposite of what Strawson wants to claim. So what the truth of S, or the truth or falsity of S have as a necessary condition is the truth of P. We can represent the two cases as follows:

(1) S entails P iff; the truth of P is a necessary condition of the truth of S, together with the assumption that S . ~P, results in a contradiction.

(2) S presupposes P iff; the truth of P is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of S, together with the assumption that S . ~P, results in a different kind of logical absurdity from that of contradiction.

If we are to discover the difference between entailment and presupposition, we must find out how the logical absurdity of case (2) differs from contradiction. But if the assumptions in case (2) can also be shown to be contradictory in the same sense as for case (1), the
distinction will disappear. So let us first see how (1) is contradictory. If the contradiction is straightforwardly logical, the expression "is a necessary condition of" must be understood as a logical one. Typically this is done with the material conditional; it, however, forms a statement from statements, not from facts such as, e.g., the truth of some statement, or the truth or falsity of some statement. It must be construed as combining the statements which express such facts: "'P' is true", "'S' is true", "'S' is true or false", etc. Since disjunction also combines statements, and not--logically speaking--predicates, we can understand "'S' is true or false" only as "'S' is true or 'S' is false". But "'S' is false" if and only if "'¬S' is true" (the negation of something neither true nor false is still neither true nor false). Finally, "'S' is true or '¬S' is true" is equivalent to "'S' or '¬S' is true". Now we can rewrite (1) and (2) as:

(3) $S$ entails $P$ iff:

\[ (\text{"}S\text{"} \text{is true } \lor \text{"}P\text{"} \text{is true}) \land (\text{"}S\text{"} \land \text{"}¬P\text{"} \text{is true}) \]

is contradictory.

(4) $S$ presumes $P$ iff:

\[ (\text{"}S \lor \text{"}¬S\text{"} \text{is true } \lor \text{"}P\text{"} \text{is true}) \land (\text{"}S\text{"} \lor \text{"}¬P\text{"} \text{is true}) \]

is logically absurd, but not contradictory.

The metatheoretical devices can now be dropped, for the truth conditions of "'A' is true $\lor$ 'B' is true" are the same as for "$A \lor B$": the former is false only (and
otherwise true) when "'A' is true" is true, and "'B' is true" is false, i.e., when "A" is true, and "B" is false. Likewise, mutatis mutandis, for "'A . ~B' is true". (3) and (4) thus simplified become:

(5) S entails P iff \((S \supset P) \land (S \cdot \neg P)\) is contradictory.

(6) S presupposes P iff \(\left[\left(\neg S \lor S \supset P\right) \land \left(S \cdot \neg P\right)\right]\) is absurd.

We can now see how the assumptions of (1) result in contradiction: assume an S and P such that S \supset P and S . \neg P; from the latter we get S by separation, and with that and the former we get P by detachment; we can also get \neg P from the same place we got S, so by conjunction we have P . \neg P. However, we can now just as easily show that the assumptions of (2) result in a garden-variety contradiction as well: if we have an S and P such that \((S \lor \neg S) \supset P\) and also S . \neg P, then we have \((S \supset P) . \neg S \supset P\) also, since it is equivalent to the former; by separation we can obtain S \supset P, and together with S separated from the second initial assumption, we get P by detachment; but \neg P also comes from that second assumption, so by conjunction we have P . \neg P. Since the assumptions of both (5) and (6) result in the same kind of absurdity, namely, contradiction, I fail to see the difference Strawson was trying to capture. There is some difference between (5) and (6), because from the first assumption of (6), but not from that of (5), we can also derive a contradiction if we further assume
\( \neg S \wedge \neg P \). This does not help to establish a distinction between two relations any two statements might possess, a distinction characterized by a difference in kind of logical absurdity resulting from conjoining one with the negation of the other. What it does suggest is that presupposition is, quite simply, entailment by both some statement and its negation. Presupposition is not something radically different from entailment, but just a tag for a certain arrangement of entailments: S presupposes P if and only if S entails P and \( \neg S \) entails P.

Let us now see how this result accords with Searle's account of names presupposing the truth of certain descriptive statements. Instead of talking about "Aristotle", for example, presupposing something, I shall in accordance with the translation proposed above take a statement in which "Aristotle" is used to refer to Aristotle, say, "Aristotle is in Greece", and consider that it presupposes "Aristotle is a person".\(^1\) Thus if Searle is following Strawson, he means that "Aristotle is in Greece" entails "Aristotle is a person", and "Aristotle is not in Greece" also entails "Aristotle is a person". But this cannot be right; it seems to suggest that his being a person follows from his being in Greece, and also follows from his not being in Greece, whereas clearly it follows from neither (Athens is in

\[^1\text{Assuming for simplicity that "is" is timeless, and Aristotle lived all his life in one country.} \]
Greece, but is not a person). What whether or not he is a person does depend on is Aristotle himself. The problem is that anything capable of attribution to a subject seems to figure as a sufficient condition of its being what it is. Perhaps Searle could avoid this problem by restricting the set of statements which do any presupposing to those which are used only to refer (i.e., which does not also attribute some property to what is referred to). A paradigm example of such a statement would be thought by many to be "This is Aristotle", and it is interesting that Searle uses this very example at one point. Thus "This is Aristotle" presupposes "Aristotle is a person"; we can say that the former entails the latter, and also that "This is not Aristotle" entails the latter. But the second case is absurd; it might not seem so absurd if we say that we could not ordinarily deny that something is Aristotle, unless it might have been, and it could have been Aristotle only if, like Aristotle, it is a person. It is plausible, however, that I might deny of something that it is Aristotle, not because it is not a person, which it would have to be to be Aristotle, but because I am blissfully ignorant of whatever "Aristotle" might mean, yet I am quite certain that this thing's name is (say) "London", and not "Aristotle". So why in this case should my saying "This is not Aristotle" entail something about any particular thing named "Aristotle" rather than
some other thing named "Aristotle"? It would seem, then, that in this restricted set of statements we do not have presupposition after all, but at best only entailment. And that is not even to mention the violence such a restriction would do to the basic thesis that the use of names in general is such as to presuppose that what is named has certain properties.

Worse yet, Searle says that statements like "Aristotle is a person" are analytic, and since a necessary statement is implied by any statement, such statements are presupposed by every statement. At this point, I think a fresh start is indicated.

Searle wants to say that "Aristotle" has a meaning which consists of certain properties of that which "Aristotle" names. Another way of putting the matter is to say that "Aristotle" implies or presupposes some other words, the words, in fact, for those properties. And all that means is that statements in which we use "Aristotle" to refer to Aristotle, and then go on to predicate of Aristotle one of those properties, are analytic. That is all that is meant by "implies" or "presupposes" in this context, and no importance should be attached to the terminological difference. In particular, we should not construe Searle as following Strawson's distinction between entailment and presupposition (at least as I have argued it must be interpreted). For if "Aristotle" implies "is a person" is
roughly analogous to "S implies P", how could "Aristotle" presupposes "is a person" be even roughly analogous to "S implies P, and ~S implies P"? What, in other words, would the truth of "~S" correspond to, if the truth of "S" corresponded to using "Aristotle" to refer? Any answers I can think of (e.g., not using "Aristotle" to refer, but not to Aristotle, etc.) just do not make sense, either on their own right, or in connection with the claim that they would imply that Aristotle is a person.

Therefore, what is logical in Searle's use of "presuppose" (and, I might add, in Mill's use of "imply") is contained in the assertion that statements such as "Aristotle is a person" are analytic (for Mill, that statements like "Any man is rational" are analytic). With this interpretation, the complications just noted arising from recasting the relata of "presupposes" from terms to statements are avoided. The result is simpler, and it achieves a naturalness intended, I think, by both Searle and Mill. Thus when I say that S presupposes P, or that S implies P, I intend to follow Searle and Mill: I mean that S is P is analytic.

What about the other sense of "presuppose" mentioned earlier, in which an act of referring by using a name is said to presuppose the ability to identify what is referred to? Is this totally unconnected with the logical sense, the analysis of which I have been
concerned with up till now? If so, we might as well—indeed we probably should—simply change our terminology and stop worrying. But they are not unconnected. I said earlier that achieving an act of referring presupposes that the referent exists, and is only one thing, and that these conditions are satisfied if the object can be identified.¹ Now there is something logical about that claim; we are even inclined to say that it must be true, that being the result of a conceptual elucidation, it is a kind of analytic truth. That is precisely what I wish to suggest. "Presupposes" only appears to be relating acts and abilities; in fact it is functioning just as it does in the claim that "Aristotle" presupposes (implies) "being a person". In the latter case "presupposes" serves to elucidate that a certain property is part of the meaning of a certain name. In the former claim it is the meaning of "referring" itself which is being elucidated: to refer is, in part, to perform an act, the success of which requires the existence of just one thing, a thing which the performer is able to identify. I would add, of course, that linguistic reference also involves using words which serve as

¹This cannot be strengthened to "... if the object is identified" because some types of singular reference, e.g., definite descriptions, do not by themselves contain enough information for the identification of the thing to which reference is being made. I shall argue below that proper names cannot be thought to do so either, without involving the dubious principle of the identity of indiscernibles.
devices for identification; it is only via the properties of thing that it can be isolated and picked-out verbally. Whether or not Searle would put the matter this way I cannot say; in any case, it is how I wish my use of "presuppose" in this sense to be understood.

The second misconception about "imply" which Campbell mentions is not explicitly attributed to Searle, but he does say: "That Mill's usage of 'connotation' is not uniform is important in view of the muddles into which later writers have got." Campbell says that by "connote" Mill meant that a word implied a property, as "white" implies the property whiteness; he is then puzzled why Mill does not say that "man" connotes manhood, instead of what he actually said, that it connotes "corporiety, animal life, rationality, and a certain external form". These, Campbell scolds, are not what "man" should connote, but rather are properties "which provide the criterion for the correct application of the name 'man!'" Quite so; and it is just because they do provide it, that they constitute the meaning of the word, that they are connoted by it. As Searle puts it: "For Mill a common noun like 'horse' . . . connotes those properties which would be specified in a definition of the word


\[2\] Mill, A System of Logic, p. 19.

\[3\] Campbell, op. cit., p. 330.
'horse'...".¹ Campbell has stumbled over an accidental feature of one of Mill's examples--"snow is white", in which "white" is said to denote white things and connote the property whiteness, i.e., the property of having a white colour. That only one property is connoted, the name of which, "whiteness", is parasitic upon the word which connotes it, is due not, as Campbell would have us believe, to the view that defining properties are not connoted, but to the fact that colours happen to be simple--they have no defining characteristics. With regard to "man" Mill did not have to resort to some stop-gap like "manhood"; but he was forced to do so with "white", since that word cannot connote the properties which provide criteria for its correct use--there are none. So we should not take Mill's analysis of "snow is white" as the key to his theory of connotation, but merely as an example of how he handles the seemingly non-connotative common names for simple properties of sensation.

This all together, then, puts paid to both of Campbell's arguments that the connotative theory of proper names I have been advocating does not represent a view directly opposed to Mill's. I can now collect together a number of threads running through this section.

¹Searle, "Proper Names and Descriptions", op. cit., p. 487.
Referring is an achievement-act performed by people; it is performed with or without words, the latter kind of act being called ostention. Proper names are one of the various kinds of words and expressions which can be used to refer. A successful act of reference presupposes the existence of one and only one thing to which one is referring; this is part of what "referring" means. That part of a statement which is used to refer is called the subject; the rest is called the predicate, and it has the function of describing or giving further information about the thing referred to by the use of the expression which serves as the subject. An act of reference is accomplished by identifying some object by one means or another. If the purpose of identifying the object is to draw attention to the object by virtue of its features, so that it can thereby be picked-out and distinguished from other objects, but not to say of some antecedently picked-out object that it has such-and-such features, then one has done what is termed a linguistic act of reference. In using a proper name to refer, the object is picked-out and identified by virtue of the meaning of the name. The meaning of a name is a number of properties of the thing which are implied by the name, i.e., those properties which, when used individually in predications, form an analytic statement when joined to a subject which is the proper name in question.
iii. Arguments for the Connotative Theory

We have already seen some negative arguments against the denotation theory; what arguments are there which are specifically for the alternative, the connotative theory?

a) Searle's Arguments

There are, first of all, the two arguments of Searle's turned around: we do make informative identity statements and false existential statements, and both can be satisfactorily explained by the connotative theory. In an informative identity statement, such as "Tully is Cicero" we successfully refer twice, but do so with names whose meanings are not fully or accurately known to whomever the statement informs. These statements are exactly on a par with statements like "marble is crystallized limestone", which can be either informative or tautologous, depending upon what one knows. In both kinds of statements the informative aspect is due to an original ignorance of the proper meanings of the words. An identity statement is true or false insofar as the properties meant by the names describe the same or different objects, respectively. There is, however, a further sense of "informative" which is not connected with ignorance. Even if we know that Tully is Cicero, the truth of "Tully is Cicero" seems different from that of "Cicero is Cicero", and we try to convey that by calling the former, but not the latter, informative.
The difference between these two cases can be represented in a connotative theory as follows: the latter case is one in which there is no possibility of the identity statement having on one side a name which implies a different set of properties from that implied by the name on the other side—the name is the same on either side. In the former case, however, there is such a possibility—in fact it often happens. It can, because nothing requires that the two or more names of a thing (if it has more than one) all imply the exact same set of properties. "Tully is Cicero" is thus contingent, for the fact that the two sets of properties describe the same individual is contingent. By the same sort of reasoning, "Cicero is Cicero" is analytic.

Existential statements, true or false, can be viewed on a connotative theory not as attempts to refer, but rather as statements about whether or not the properties which the name means are anywhere found together. If they are not, as in the case "Pegasus exists", the statement is false and meaningful—they say in effect that the name cannot successfully be used to refer. That follows because of the world, not because of the meaning of the name. Thus Anscombe's dual explanation for the truth of "Caesar exists" and "Pegasus does not exist", with its stipulated distinction between genuine and pseudoproper names, need not arise. Membership in the category of proper names does not depend upon things in the
world, but the ability to successfully refer with a proper name does.

It might be objected that these arguments are not adequate for showing that proper names have sense, for there might be an alternative account which could also satisfactorily deal with such statements. But I have no idea what such an alternative would be; for me it is quite plain that either proper names have sense, or they do not. What could the middle view be which I am unjustifiably excluding? Perhaps it might be suggested that just as numbers are neither red nor not red, it is a category mistake to say that proper names can have or not have meanings. But if anything has meaning, words do, so proper names on this view could not be words, which is fatal, I think, to any reasonable theory of proper names. Since the denotative and connotative type theories exhaust the possibilities,¹ showing that one cannot while the other can account for certain facts constitutes an argument in favor of the latter.

¹It might be suggested that contextual considerations afford a via media between connotative and denotative theories. As I conceive these theories, however, there is little room left between. A denotative theory denies that a name implies any of the named thing's properties, while a connotative theory claims that all or some of them are implied. It is within this framework that I discuss below which properties are those that constitute meanings. (See below, pp. 341f.) Since any view which holds that any of a thing's properties are implied by its name is a connotative theory, any alternative to a connotative theory must, like denotation theories, deny the implication of properties by names. While conceding the theoretical possibility of a non-denotative theory of proper names which does not involve
b) Linguistic Arguments

A rather different kind of argument consists in looking at a variety of actual names and a number of different uses to which they can be put, apart from explicitly referring uses.¹ For example, they can be

names implying properties (to which the qualification 'type' in the text above is a concession), I am at a loss to understand the difference between it and an unabashed denotative view. If we consider the relation between names and their objects presumed by the denotation theory, how are we to distinguish it from the relation presumed by someone who says that nothing we know or could ever know about any particular object is relevant with regard to our use of the name? I do not mean to attribute this view to one who advances the importance of contextual considerations for proper names; I mean only to draw the consequences of the connotative/denotative distinction far enough to show that the claims of context are a burden greater than the denotative theory can bear. Contextual considerations are quite important in our actual determination of just which thing is being referred to, and these considerations are invariably such as to provide clues as to where a thing was when, or as to how it looked, or who is acquainted with it, etc. I attempt below to discuss the relation of a thing's contextually understood properties to the properties which are taken to constitute the meaning of its name (see below, pp. 358-361). The point worth emphasizing here, however, is simply that our context provides information about things, and that, were it to be explicitly formulated, it would appear as properties predicated of things. The difficult question about context is not whether it provides an alternative to connotative theories (it cannot, since it is one), but which, if any, of the contextually associated properties contribute to the meaning of the name? Most of them are far too specific to be considered part of the name's meaning, since meanings must to some extent be "inter-subjective".

¹Some of the following examples were suggested by Gardiner in various parts of his The Theory of Proper Names, though not in support of the argument for which they are here adduced.
used with articles: "a Ford", "a Napoleon", "the new Jerusalem"; with plurals: "He saw a dozen Jane's in the mirrors"; with both: "the Andes", "the Pleiades". They can be used as noun-modifiers: "the Rhodesia blockade", "a Winston Churchill accent". All of these grammatical constructions are such that the place occupied by the proper name could be filled by a common noun, and most of them would be much more often used with common nouns than proper names. (It might be said that in "the export blockade", e.g., the name "Rhodesia" has been replaced by an adjective, not a noun. If this were generalized into an objection against all my examples, it would amount to a rejection of the commonly recognized category of noun-modifiers: all words used to modify a noun would have to be adjectives. "Export", of course, has a recognized use as an adjective, as a glance in any dictionary will show. But my dictionary, at least, does not recognize as having an adjectival use seven of the eight modifying words in the following plausible, even if improbable, signpost inscription: "Mohawk Squadron Emergency Airplane Radar Parts Replacement Supply Depot". But even were the objection allowed, it would be of no importance against the point I wish to make, for adjectives as well as common nouns are general and have meaning.) If, then, our understanding of such constructions is dependent in part upon the meanings of the common nouns involved, if, e.g., we know
the meaning of the expression "the older rug" only if we know the meaning of "rug"—then it is difficult to see how we could understand those constructions when the general term is replaced by a word which is supposedly without any meaning. Or to put it another way, if it is conceded that names in such constructions have meanings—that "the Rhodesian blockade", e.g., means a blockade against the former African colony of Britain in which there is presently a suppressive minority government whose independence and legitimacy are not recognised by Britain—then how can a word such as "Rhodesia" have no meaning one moment, and just 'pick up' a meaning the next, even within the space of a single sentence: "Winston Churchill seldom spoke with the now familiar Winston Churchill accent"?

Proper names can be modified by adjectives and possessive pronouns. When a common noun is thus modified, it is often explained as a restriction of the applicability of the noun; this achievement is tantamount to the creation of a new general term, the meaning of which consists of the properties implied by the noun plus the properties added by the adjective or pronoun. Thus "small man" is a general term which means being corporeal, rational, possessing animal life, a certain external form, and moreover, being small. Examples of modified proper names are: "young Billy Jones", "my little Mary", "pseudo-Dionysus". The denotation
theorist would probably say that it is not necessary to give an explanation such as the one above which requires the modified word to have a meaning, and if he does I would agree, for the cases are not strictly analogous. But if he proceeds to explain them by saying that they amount to assertions that the object denoted possesses the specified properties, I must object: that does not give the whole picture. To say that "My little Mary is taking piano lessons" is represented by "Fa . Ga . Ha", where "a" denotes Mary, "T" is "taking piano lessons", "F" is "little", and "G" is "belongs to me" or "is related (in some literal or metaphorical sense of that word) to me"--to say that is to miss the point of what has been said. "My little Mary" is an expression which is being used to refer, and only "T" is being predicated of what is referred to. Taking this into account, the denotation theorist might say that "F" and "G" are superfluous in the analysis after all; just write "Ha". But then part of the expression the user of the sentence felt it necessary to include to insure that his reference was understood will have been omitted. He did not originally say only "Mary is taking piano lessons", because he thought it might not have been clear which Mary--the point being that often more than one thing have the same name, as the other examples I gave perhaps indicate more clearly. It is even more explicit in "I have three Sam Goldwin's in my class". What I wish to
maintain is that these names have multiple meanings, and that the qualifiers sometimes conjoined to them serve to indicate which meaning is intended in some particular use of the name. Such qualifiers might (but need not) be redundant, for they might add nothing to the meaning already given by the name; even so, they are still useful for indicating the relevant meaning, for disambiguating. That, incidently, is why I think that these examples are different from the typical case of a modified common noun—the adjectives in "small man" and "big man" do not indicate different meanings of "man". (There is, however, an exactly analogous situation with homonymous common nouns, such as "pipe", "beetle", "jack", and "rut". Sometimes they are disambiguated by the use of a superfluous modifier, as in "a smoking pipe", "a crawly beetle", "a lifting jack", etc. Notice on the other hand that the modifier in "a leather jack" disambiguates, but is not superfluous; in "a water pipe" it is not superfluous, but does not disambiguate either; and in "a hollow pipe" it does not disambiguate, but is superfluous.)

Faced with two Mary's, the denotation theorist need not throw in the towel and admit that the name has two meanings, and hence that names in general have meaning. He might say that the name is equivocal, and mean by that merely that it designates more than one thing. But then most names would be equivocal, and practically all
sentences containing a proper name would be ambiguous--"John is sick and John is not sick" could not prima facie be held to be self-contradictory. Alternatively, he might say either that such names are not genuine names, or that they really are several names. Russell held the first, and Mill probably held the second (although it is difficult to be sure); both options are totally arbitrary, and border on fiddling the facts to fit the theory. The first has the absurd consequence that virtually all proper names recognised as such, are not proper names after all; the second is almost vacuous without some criterion for distinguishing the name "John" from the different name "John". Labeling them with subscripts is technically possible in artificial languages, but it is silly to say that we do this in practice or to recommend that we do it. The simplest and most natural criterion for a name's being the same name is phonetic or graphic isomorphism, and if that is accepted, then we must hold that proper names have meanings to account for the different John's and Mary's.

Some proper names are overtly descriptive, and they clearly originated as descriptions true of the things they name. Some examples are "The Royal Bank of Scotland", "University of Edinburgh", "Commercial United Assurance Limited", "Choral Symphony", "Dartmouth"; such a list could be extended almost indefinitely. These names identify the things they are used to refer
to not only by implying properties of the things, but by actually specifying some of them outright. Mill, as would be expected, objected to this way of viewing such names, and he gave a well-known argument against it:

A town may have been named Dartmouth, because it is situated on the mouth of the Dart. But it is no part of the signification of the word ... Dartmouth, to be situated at the mouth of the Dart. If sand should choke up the mouth of the river, or an earthquake change its course, and remove it to a distance from the town, the name of the town would not necessarily be changed. That fact, therefore, can form no part of the signification of the word; for otherwise, when the fact confessedly ceased to be true, no one would any longer think of applying the name.1

Gardiner cites a linguist who, pursuing the logic of this argument to an extreme, concluded that no expression with a descriptive import could be a name until the description became false; Spittal, in Corinthia, e.g., did not have a name until there were no hospitals there, and "Dartmouth" will not be a name until the sand or earthquakes comes.2 Gardiner rightly rejects this without much ado, but his reaction to Mill's argument itself is curiously ambivalent. He says that such names are names "because they are accepted as the designations of the [things] in question, and because they are known to be the right linguistic instrument for identifying them"; but still they do have a meaning, and "for listeners ignorant of the objects to which they refer the

1 Mill, A System of Logic, p. 20.
meaning thus afforded might provide some identificatory help." He concludes, therefore, that "proper names that have a clear etymology or recall some similarly constructed proper name are slightly less pure examples of the category than completely arbitrary and unintelligible names".¹ Strictly speaking, then, proper names designate and have no meaning, but some are unfortunately sullied by having an origin not exactly arbitrary, while others are degraded from their pristine innocence by unwanted analogies and associations. Gardiner wants to say, against Mill, that many names have meaning, but with Mill, that they do not. He manages to do this by stressing that "the term proper name has reference to the mode of functioning which certain words possess within the mechanism of speech".² Thus even though a proper name might have a meaning, it is irrelevant to the function of the name: "Ultimately, York will prove much more informative than cathedral-town, but in itself it does no more than establish the identity of the town spoken about".³ The notion of the function of a name being to identify what it names is not a casual aside for Gardiner, but is rather the basic principle upon which proper names work.

¹Ibid., pp. 42, 43.
²Ibid., p. 41.
³Ibid., p. 34.
I would agree that the category of proper names should be characterized functionally, and that their function of being able to be used to refer involves, in an essential way, the process of identifying things. Unfortunately, Gardiner nowhere explains how things are identified by words, and he does not seem to realize that it can be accomplished only by means of informative descriptions. "York", he allows, is richly informative, much more so than the suggested meaning "cathedral-town", but this, he says, has nothing to do with its capacity for identification. What does though, is a mystery.

It is curious that, without realizing it, he was close enough to the correct connection between identifying and informing (i.e., describing) as to remark upon them both in the same breath, only to arrive at a conclusion diametrically opposed to the (I think) obvious one. Why, that is, did Gardiner feel it necessary to point out the informative nature of proper names, only to deny of this aspect any importance with regard to their use in the identification of objects, without equally denying the importance of, say, their capitalization? Could it have been that he dimly realized that these unimportances are unequal? Perhaps it was simply because as a linguist he was more sensitive to the actual functioning of proper names, yet like Mill, he was completely unaware of the difficulties involved in
the idea of a simple, meaningless, one-to-one designating relation between words and things.

However this minor puzzle is resolved, it remains that his objection to Mill's argument is somewhat beside the point (although intentionally so); he is only quibbling over whether we do or do not ever think of the meanings of the words which make up some proper names, and Mill's own argument about "Dartmouth" (which Gardiner cites) should have settled that, since it presumes the activity in question. The main point that "Dartmouth" identifies Dartmouth without the aid of any kind of meaning is completely accepted.

Mill's argument does not work, however, and for reasons that Bradley could easily have advanced and should have. The mistaken assumption is that the meanings of proper names must be derived exclusively from the meanings of their parts. The meaning of "Dartmouth" is thus assumed to be "that on the mouth of the Dart". (It is no mere accident that "Dart" was given no analogous explication, for it is not composed of words which are not proper names; but the ease with which he switched from "Dart" to "the river" is instructive.) On this assumption, "Dartmouth" should be discarded as the name for Dartmouth were the Dart to change course above its mouth. But the assumption is wrong—"Dartmouth" means much more than being situated on the mouth of the Dart. It includes a whole host of
properties, of which the one suggested by Mill is only a little part. If one of Mill's catastrophes were to occur, the meaning of "Dartmouth" would shift, but no differently from the way the meaning of "music" has shifted since the discoveries of Schoenberg, or that of "star" since the invention of telescopes. The meaning of any word is subject to changes from many sources, but whatever the source, the effect is always an alteration of the set of properties of the thing or things to which the word applies which are considered "essential". This is not to suggest that substances have certain properties without which not, but only that things without these properties cannot be called by that name. The necessities involved are those of symbolic conventions, not metaphysics. After Mill's earthquake "Dartmouth" need mean "on the Dart" no more than "England" now means "land of the Angles". So Mill's argument does not show that proper names do not have meanings, but only that the meanings of ostensibly descriptive proper names cannot be identified with, or even be held to necessarily include the description which the name overtly specifies.

This same phenomenon occurs also in complex common nouns, and does not cause any doubts there that the words have meaning; e.g., the meaning of "egghead" has nothing to do with eggs or heads, nor does "oldwife" (a kind of fish) have anything to do with wives or being old, any more than "goosefoot" (a kind of herb) has to do with
geese or feet. However, in spite of Mill's argument, some proper names are overtly descriptive of the thing they name, and some of these names, unlike "Dartmouth", describe characteristics which are quite central to the meaning of the name. While no one would worry much if the Dart changed its course, we would think it a bad joke at least, if not even an outright deception, were The Royal Bank of Scotland to lose its royal charter, move all its places of business to Leeds, cease its commercial activities, and become a charitable institution for the preservation of decrepit castles, and yet were to retain its present name. This shows, if anything, that some names do have a descriptive import which is part of their meaning.

Another fact about proper names which indicates that they have meanings concerns our learning of them. When we first hear a name, we might say that it is a "mere name", and after all, what's in a name? If these expressions are taken to suggest that names have no meanings, they only repeat an old error; but if they are interpreted--especially the first--as a reflection upon the fact that when we first become acquainted with a name, we do not know what it means, then they express what is deservedly thought of as a truism. It is often the case when we first come upon a name in a newspaper, and always the case in a novel, that the name tells us nothing--i.e., we have no idea how to use it properly,
because we know nothing about that which it can be used to refer to. If we are discussing harmony, and I am ignorant of modern Viennese developments, and you say "Now consider Anton Webern", I shall draw a blank, for I know nothing of Webern. If I interrupt, and ask about him, the replies will furnish descriptions which will enable me to use the name with a rudimentary understanding of whom I am talking about. The difference between my inability to use the name correctly at first, and my subsequent ability to use it can be explained in terms of my partially learning the meaning of the name; and all I learned was that some otherwise unspecifiable object has certain properties.

Basically the same phenomenon occurs with common nouns as well. On first hearing "murrain", e.g., I might not have a clue as to what you are talking about, and the quickest way to learn is to be told that it means a plague affecting domestic animals. To be able to use the word it is necessary to learn the salient properties a thing must have in order that it might have the word applied to it, and these are no more apparent from just inspecting the word, than are the properties constituting the meaning of a proper name apparent from a simple-minded inspection of the name.

"But", a denotation theorist might complain, "you have ignored the paradigm example of learning a name: when what is named confronts you, and you are directly
acquainted with it as you receive the name. There is no problem about meanings here, and what you call meanings in the other situations—with regard to proper names anyway—are no more than a few facts about what is named which serve only as a substitute for direct acquaintance. And even in these cases acquaintance is paramount, because someone, we trust, has been acquainted with the object. That is, after all, why it has a name. Our use of the name is parasitic on the acquaintance someone has."

Disregarding the obvious difficulties about fictional names, and the fact that many names would be saprophytic, not parasitic, this account of names renders our use of them dependent upon a belief, which often is unverifiable, that someone was once acquainted with what is named. A more fundamental objection, however, is that acquaintance is not the simple affair denotation theorists often tend to assume it is. When we perceive an object, we notice various properties, and it is from these that we glean the criteria for reusing the name. If we did not recognize certain features of a thing, we could not tell whether it were the same thing, and whether we would be justified in using the name, on some future occasion. So the denotation theorist was correct to point out that being told the properties associated with a name is not the only way to learn it, but in suggesting acquaintance as the alternative way he overlooked the fact that his alternative is an
alternative way of learning the relevant properties: we just directly observe them instead of having them given via descriptions.

The following example affords a good illustration: suppose I introduce you to Joe Harrison; three days later we are walking along together, and I gesture towards someone in the distance and say, "Say, isn't that Joe Harrison?" Suppose further that it is not, and you realize it; you might say "No, Joe had black hair, didn't he?" or "No, it doesn't look like him," or some such reply in which the name would be denied of that person in the distance because of some properties this man has and you remember Joe not to have, or vice versa. You are able to reply this way because in learning the name through being introduced to the person, you associated with the name various properties. And by "associate" I do not mean merely the vague "bringing together in the mind" of associationist psychology; rather, I mean at least that you use the name in a way which indicates that you would assent to the analytic truth or falsity of certain statements in which the name was the subject, were you ever directly asked.

Jespersen has given arguments similar to the four I have here advocated on mainly linguistic grounds,¹ although he does not emphasize quite the same things I

¹(1) proper names can take articles and plurals, and can act as noun-modifiers; (2) they can be qualified by adjectives and possessive pronouns; (3) some are
have.\textsuperscript{1} He has other arguments as well; two are closely related to my second argument and depend upon separating the issues of plurals and modifiers which I combined. But there is danger in separating the issues this way: the mere fact alone that proper names can sometimes take plurals does not by itself force the conclusion that they have meanings. Nor does it follow that names have meanings simply because they can be modified by adjectives, as Campbell supposes Jespersen to be arguing.\textsuperscript{2} Jespersen's point is the somewhat more subtle one that the things we name are constantly changing, and some sentences indicate this overtly by qualifying a proper name in such a way as to show that the thing named has changed; \textit{e.g.}, "there were days when Sophia was the old Sophia--the forbidding, difficult Sophia".

This kind of example, he suggests, is very hard to account for if we assume that names are non-connotative. The denotation theorist could say that ordinary proper names are really a succession of independent proper names, each naming one unchanging bit, or he might relent and say that some changes are irrelevant. The first alternative is exceedingly bizarre, and has the overtly descriptive, and the content of some of these are essential characteristics of the thing named; (4) learning the proper use of some names can be gradual, involving learning more about the thing named.

\textsuperscript{1}Jespersen, \textit{The Philosophy of Grammar}, pp. 65-71.

\textsuperscript{2}Campbell, "Proper Names", \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 331-332.
consequence that names are dependent upon properties any¬
way, for if a single property of something changes, the
name ceases to designate it and a new name is needed. 1

1 Lesniewski appears to have taken this first alterna¬
tive: since "Warsaw of 1831 is smaller than Warsaw of
1931" is true, "Warsaw" cannot name one object only,
unless it is taken to name the four-dimensional object
Warsaw from its beginning to its end, and "Warsaw of
1831", "Warsaw of 1931", etc., are taken to name only
Arist. Soc. Supp. Vol. XXXI, p. 253.) But each and
every change in Warsaw, no matter how fleeting, would
by the same reasoning require a name of its own, and we
have for each proper name of ordinary usage a whole
plethora of proper names, one, in fact, for each dis¬
tinguishable proper part of the thing named.

In a similar vein, Woodger has argued that since
things truly attributable to Winston Spencer Churchill
with respect to some particular time are not attributable
to him with respect to some other time, "Churchill", and
in general all ordinary proper names, are terms not
restricted to one thing only—i.e., they are not proper
names after all. They are, quite simply, general terms.
(Woodger, "Science without Properties", The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, pp. 203¬
204.) If we want to find a proper name, therefore, we
must find an expression which can be used only of a locus
of a constant set of properties. Such loci are as
ephemeral as states of the world, and consequently, as
equimumerous. Names, when we look, are found to breed
like the May-fly.

In due respect, it must be pointed out that neither
Woodger nor Lesniewski recognize a fundamental and cate¬
gorical distinction between singular and general terms.
For both of them names are basic, and that a name might
be a name for only one thing, is an eccentricity which
we note in passing with the tag "proper", or more tech¬
nically for Woodger, the tag "has cardinality 1". There
is no distinction for them between subject and predicate,
insofar as that distinction requires, as in Principia,
that the respective terms be of two different kinds:
singular and general. The formal feasibility of such
a view has its vindication even from within Principia¬
style systems in Quine's elimination of the singular
variable, following Schönfinkel, and in the exploitation
of many-sorted logics by Smiley. (See Schönfinkel, "On
the Building Blocks of Mathematical Logic", a translation
with an introduction by Quine, in Source Book in Mathe¬
matical Logic, 1879-1931, (ed.) van Heijenoort, pp. 355¬
366; Quine, "Variables Explained Away", Proc. of the
The second alternative is less arbitrary, but it amounts to saying that some changes are relevant, i.e., some properties are essential if the name is to continue to be applicable, and this is about as close as one could


Inasmuch as I have been arguing that the expressions usually given as examples of singular terms function in propositions just as do general terms, it might be asked whether any of these formal developments might be recommended over the traditional Principia formalism, as more closely capturing the actual use of language. Woodger's system is a curious algebra of terms, the formulae of which are statements of equality or inequality with respect to the "cardinality" of their terms (the numerical size of their extensions), and which even include arithmetical operations of addition, subtraction, and multiplication. It is explicitly extensional (case (i) of theorem 16, op. cit., p. 199), and although I have no proof, I suspect that it is isomorphic to some ordinary set theory. Consequently, proper names are essentially unit classes, and as such suffer from the same difficulties which afflict the denotation theorist--e.g., in "Sophia is not the same old Sophia", two different unit classes must be involved.

The system Lesniewski called "Ontology" is somewhat of an improvement, in that its more highly developed state renders its evaluation more definite. It consists of one of a variety of equivalent axioms joined to another system which serves basically the same function as an ordinary propositional logic. The earliest axiom Lesniewski used for his system of ontology is perhaps the most intuitively clear; it introduces an undefined constant "ε" which connects two terms (capitalization is formally meaningless--Lesniewski used it where the term would be most naturally thought of as applying to only one thing). The axiom is:

\[(A, a) : : \varepsilon[Ba] \cdot \varepsilon[CA] \cdot \varepsilon[BC] : (B) : \varepsilon[BA] \cdot \varepsilon[BA]\]

(Leśniewski, "Über die Grundlagen der Ontologie", Comptes Rendus des séances de la Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie, Classe III, v. 23, p. 114.) It says that for any two terms A and a, the A is an a iff: something is an A, only one thing is an A, and any A is
come to saying that the name has a meaning without actually saying it. This reply is quite similar to a point made by Bradley in the course of his argument against purely denotative names:

an a. (Cf. Slupecki, "S. Lesniewski's Calculus of Names", Studia Logica, vol. III, pp. 20-21.) In a footnote to this axiom Lesniewski invites comparison of it to Russell's analysis of definite descriptions, and the suggestion is apt: were one to use singular variables, this axiom could be directly correlated with Russell's definition of \( \forall x \left( \neg \exists y (y \neq x) \right) \). Thus while Lesniewski does not distinguish between singular and general terms, and consequently appears to conform to the view that "the only way we can linguistically get at individuals is by speaking of them as what certain common nouns apply to," Lesniewski's special constant \( \epsilon \) can be interpreted, as Prior points out (due to Los), as unit class inclusion. Then if "Sophia is not the same old Sophia" is represented as \( \neg (\exists A) (A = A) \) (where \( A = B \) by definition is \( A \in B \cdot B \in A \): Slupecki, op. cit., p. 40.), it can be true only because there exists no A, or because there are more than one A. But neither, by hypothesis, is the case. Therefore that case will have to be represented by "the one A is not the one B", i.e., \( \neg (\exists A) (A = B) \), and we are again driven to conjuring names at the drop of a distinguishing feature. While I approve of Lesniewski's return to a 'neo-Aristotelian' analysis of the structure of predication, his choice for the predicative constant is an unfortunate resurrection of the uniqueness requirement of the denotation theorist's singular term.

I am inclined to think that the most fruitful line for further development of a calculus which reflects the basic views I have been advocating is to be found in sortal logic. Smiley, extending the work of Church and Wang, has moved in this direction, but there has not yet been enough done in connection with the problems of existence assumptions and the so-called "free logics", identity, interpretation of the quantifiers, and requisite metatheory, to permit my suggestion to be anything but very tentative. I do not, of course, wish to suggest that there would be no profit in pursuing ideas initiated by Lesniewski--his work has continuing interest for a multiplicity of reasons, not least of
The meaning of a sign need of course not be fixed. But is the thing it stands for quite invariable? If the "connotation" is unsteady, does the "denotation" never change? But where the latter is fixed there the former on its side (within limits) is stationary.1

Jespersen's remaining argument is somewhat dubious. European surnames are transmitted through descent, and he says "it would be rash to assert that Tymperleys, for instance, have nothing in common but their name".2 Wittgenstein's remarks on family resemblance suggest just the opposite, and I think correctly. At best all the Timberleys might be said to have in common the properties of being a person, and being descended from the same ancestor. Given names of people furnish better examples, although Jespersen does not think so. They are better because they are often restricted in such a way as to imply a few properties regardless of who they name, unlike surnames, whose conventions of bestowal preclude this. "Mary" usually implies being female; "Heinrich", being male and German; "Xavier", being male and Roman Catholic; etc.

All of these considerations lead Jespersen to conclude that

no sharp line can be drawn between proper and common names, the difference being one of degree

which, for me, is his constant effort to make his symbolism reflect the deepest traits of language, from which it springs.

1 Bradley, Principles of Logic, p. 60.
2 Jespersen, op. cit., p. 67.
rather than of kind. A name always connotes the quality or qualities by which the bearer or bearers of the name are known, i.e., distinguished from other beings or things. In Mill's terminology, but in absolute contrast to his view, I should venture to say that proper names (as actually used) "connote" the greatest number of attributes.

This is substantially the view we found in Bradley, and the one I have been advocating here. Campbell cites the arguments Jespersen uses, only to try to side-step his conclusion by imputing to Jespersen, as he also did to Searle, an associationist interpretation of "connote". Jespersen does in fact say that "the main point in my argument ... is that whenever the name Maud is naturally used it makes the hearer think of a whole complex of distinctive qualities or characters", and Campbell duly pounces upon this statement as conclusive evidence that Jespersen considered "connotation" to be "what the use of a word brings to mind". But Jespersen's remark need not be understood so uncharitably. If the connotation or meaning of a word is a complex of properties, it is only natural to say that if one is thinking of the word one thinks of these properties, or at least some of them. Be that modest claim true or false, the important point remains: Jespersen's facts, which Campbell admits are indisputable, can easily be given

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1Ibid., pp. 70-71.
2Ibid., p. 66.
3Ibid., p. 68.
a strictly non-associationist interpretation, and then at best Campbell's objection is an irrelevant ad hominem argument.

Apart from charging Jespersen with a confusion over what Mill meant by "connote", Campbell says that the view that the meaning of a name is what it makes someone think of, is faced with "insuperable difficulties", for most probably any name makes different people think of different things, so how could they be thinking of the same thing? It is no help to say that it is enough if they each happen to be thinking of some set of descriptions (not necessarily the same set), each of which is true of only one thing, as Russell has suggested,\(^1\) for they may not be true of the same thing. One person might be thinking of certain characteristics not true of the thing whose characteristics the other person is thinking of.

Jespersen has more or less anticipated this criticism, and he answered in effect that if this is a problem for proper names, it is as well for other words. If, e.g., "it is hard to see how both speaker and hearer can be thinking of the same thing when they talk about Maud",\(^2\) it is just as hard if they are talking about sugar, and the speaker is a chemist thinking of \(\text{C}_{12}\text{H}_{22}\text{O}_{11}\), while the hearer is a housewife thinking of

\(^1\)Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 57.

\(^2\)Campbell, "Proper Names", *op. cit.*, p. 332.
a grainy white sweetener, or if the discussion is about flint, the speaker knowing only that it is a material used in muskets to ignite the powder, the hearer all the while knowing only that it is a material used in some societies for making arrowheads.¹

But this way of meeting a problem—pointing out that it is a bigger problem than suspected—is not very satisfactory. If we reformulate Campbell's objection by excising the associationist overtones, it then amounts to the question of how is it possible to claim even that a word has an unequivocal meaning, in the sense of implying a certain specific set of properties, if the word implies different properties for different users of the word? We certainly cannot deny that some words imply different things for different people; that much is obvious fact. Moreover, consider the gradual increase in our own knowledge of the meanings of many words, which shows that a word implies a different set of properties even to the same person at different times. The consequence for proper names which Campbell wants to draw from that fact can be answered only in a discussion of what properties, if any, are necessary and sufficient for identifying the thing named. It is these properties which would constitute the meaning of the name. I shall postpone this issue; meanwhile, however,

¹Cf. Jespersen, op. cit., p. 68.
it should be remembered that the function of a name is to be used in an act of reference, and that the conditions upon being able to use it to refer are satisfied if the user is able to identify that to which he refers. This is emphatically not a condition on our ability to communicate; one might manage a reference without knowing an adequate, accurate, or even correct set of identifying characteristics.

c. A Metaphysical Argument

A further argument for the meaningfulness of proper names is based on what might be called metaphysical considerations. It runs as follows: there are no such things as "bare particulars", i.e., things with no properties. Plato says specifically that at least two properties, being and number, are necessarily found in anything.

It is also plain, that in speaking of something we speak of being, for to speak of an abstract something naked and isolated from all being is impossible.

But how can a man either express in words or even conceive in thought things which are not, or a thing which is not, without number?¹

It was argued above that this much (properly interpreted) is necessary for a successful reference to something; however, I think an even stronger claim is warranted whether or not a thing is ever referred to. From

¹Plato, *Sophist*, 237, 238 (Jowett's translation).
our conception of the distinction between substance and attribute it follows that \((\exists x)(f) \sim (fx)\) is necessarily false, even excluding "being" and "number" from the values of "f". This is equivalent to the necessary truth of \((x)(\exists f)(fx)\), or "everything is such that it has some property". That is a different claim, of course, from the assertion that "everything is such that it has some property necessarily". This latter claim is that everything has some essential attribute, without which it could not be. The properties concerned in the claim I am interested in making might be said to be "essential", but not in this way. They are essential only in respect of the thing's being called by a certain name. If the thing is a man, say, then necessarily it is rational—but the thing may well not have been rational, in which case it would not have been a man. I mentioned earlier that the essences involved in this kind of example are what Locke called "nominal essences", and that Mill accepted them as quite innocuous. Mill applied this view, however, only to common nouns, not to proper names; he emphatically denies that individuals have essences.

But if we accept that \((x)(\exists f)(fx)\) must be true, then for some particular proper name "a", \((\exists f)(fa)\) must also be true. We have already explained that if "a is F" must be true, we can say that "a" implies "F", and if a name implies a property, we can say that the property is part of its meaning: that is what "meaning" means.
From "(f)(fa)" we cannot infer "Fa", for "F" may not be the particular property. That would be the same mistake as inferring from "Someone is bald" that "Jones is bald". But if "a is some f or other" must be true, then we can at least say that "a" implies some f or other, and that therefore some f or other is part of its meaning. Which is merely to say that "a" has a meaning, although we have not shown what its meaning is.

d. Identity

The last argument for the meaning of proper names I shall consider is one we have already run across in the discussion of Bradley's treatment of proper names. It depends upon the thesis that all identity statements are relative to some general term. This being the case, "the continued application of [a] proper name requires, as part of the sense of the name, that it always be applied to the same X".¹ Or as Bradley might have put it, the use of a proper name for some individual requires, for "real identity", that the proper name have a meaning, that it imply a universal which can be used to identify and reidentify that individual. Extrapolating a bit upon Bradley's qualification of "identity" with "real", we might think that there is another kind of identity--

¹Geach, Mental Acts, p. 71. See above, pp. 135-136, where the relevant passage in Bradley is also quoted from Principles of Logic, p. 61. See also Geach, "Identity", Review of Metaphysics, vol. XXI, pp. 3-12, together with a criticism by Feldman, a rebuttal, and a reply, all in the same journal, vol. XXII, pp. 547-561.
perhaps "apparent identity". The difference would be that for real identity, any statement of the form "a is the same as b" could only be true if some predicate F is true of both a and b. Another way of putting it is to say that there is an incompleteness in an identity statement unless it is of the form "a is the same F as b". On the other hand, for apparent identity, the first form is sufficient—there need be no relativization of "... is the same as ..." to "... is the same F as ..."). Let us call these alternative views of identity the absolute, or A-theory ("=" means "is the same as"), and the relative, or R-theory ("=" means "is the same F as ").

The argument for proper names having meaning can be stated as follows: one can refer to something when one can identify it. Identification, in the sense of distinguishing that something from everything else, can be accomplished by extensive conventions, descriptions, demonstratives, or names. It is the latter we are concerned with here. Consider a situation in which two names, say "a" and "b", are used to refer to the same thing. Either "a" and "b" are words of different types, or they are two words differing only as two different tokens of the same type (e.g., either "Tully" and "Cicero", or "Tully" on one occasion and "Tully" on another). Since an identity statement relating these two names must be of the form "a is the same F as b, for some F", it must be the case that "Fa" and "Fb" are
both true for some $F$. In general, if $(\exists x)(\exists y)(\exists F)(x \text{ is the same } F \text{ as } y)$ is true—or more conveniently, if

$$(1) \quad (\exists x)(\exists y)(\exists F)(x \neq y)$$

is true--then for those things which the object-variables in $(1)$ range over which render it true, some predicate or other, say $F$, is truly predicated of them. If two names which satisfy $(1)$ are "reidentifications", i.e., if they are different tokens of the same type being used to refer to the same thing on different occasions, then there must be some $F$ true of the thing on both occasions. If they are not being used to make a reidentification, but to make a genuinely informative identification, then again there must be some $F$ true of the thing no matter how denominated. Thus identity statements, whether they are reidentificatory or informative in intent, are all alike in implying that each name involved has some (at least one) one-place predicate $F$ such that when $F$ is predicated of what is named, a true statement results. Thus

$$(2) \quad (\exists x)(\exists F)(a \neq x) \supset (\exists F)(Fa).$$

Since anything is identical to itself,

$$\quad (3) \quad (\exists F)(a \neq a),$$

and therefore from $(2)$ we can obtain

$$\quad (4) \quad (\exists F)(Fa).$$

Any name, therefore, which can be used to refer to something on the basis of our being able to identify that to which we refer, can be said to "imply" some
predicate, and that is a basic part of saying that it has meaning, in the sense of "having meaning" which I wish to argue names have. (It is only a part, since proper names imply more than some one property. But it is a refutation, pending the discussion which follows, of the view that proper names have no meaning, when "a proper name 'n' has no meaning" means "'n' does not imply any properties".)

To relate this argument to the extrapolation of Bradley's remark which preceded it, we simply observe that the argument assumes what I have called the R-theory of identity. Whether or not Bradley would have sanctioned the distinction of two views of identity, the argument just given for the meaning of proper names is squarely in accord with the spirit of his remarks, and it does require the R-theory. Since this is incompatible with the A-theory, one can easily see that Bradley would have to support his view of identity to anyone who tried to stop him by objecting that his view is wrong, that identity is not relative to a general term, but pure, plain, simple, and absolute.

A confrontation as I just imagined between an A-theorist and an R-theorist has recently occurred between Quine and Geach (although it seems not to have been motivated by its role in an argument about proper names). The most recent argument Geach has given for the R-theory is complicated and ingenious, and I shall attempt
a re-statement of what I think to be its central thesis, divested of the *ad hominem* and polemical character of the original.\(^1\) I think this worthwhile for two reasons: I regard the argument as persuasive, and I do not think that just what *is* the argument is at all obvious in Geach's own presentation. If I misrepresent Geach (as I concede is quite possible), then so be it; I am mainly interested in the argument which I do present.

The argument is conducted within the context of a formalized language, or theory, in the Tarski set-theoretic sense. Thus we shall begin with a universe containing some objects, and our theory \(T^n\) will contain, besides the usual apparatus for propositional and quantificational logic, some predicates, some of which are true of some of the objects. Let \(T^n\) also contain an I-predicate, which is a two-place predicate satisfying

\[(x)[Fx \equiv (\exists y)(Fy \cdot xIy)]\]

for any \(m\)-place predicate \(F\) constructible in \(T^n\). An \(m\)-place predicate is constructible in \(T\) if \(m-1\) of its places can be filled up by names in \(T\). This schema says that given any \(F\), and for any \(x\), \(x\) is \(F\) iff something is \(F\) which is also I-related to \(x\). A consequence of (5) is

(6) \[(x)(y)(Fx \cdot xly. \equiv Fy)\],
for any F. This implies

(7) \[(x)(y)[xly \vdash (Fx \equiv Fy)]\],
for any F, which is one form of what is sometimes called the "indiscernibility of identicals". Thus "I" may be viewed as an "indiscernibility-predicate"; i.e., whatever are named by two names which can flank "I" to make a true statement are indiscernible.

Let us assume further that apart from each object in our universe being I-related to itself, there are some objects indiscernible from each other; i.e., let

(8) \[(\exists x)(\exists y)(xly)\]
be true in $T^N$.

Now we can either construe "I" as an indiscernibility-predicate, or as absolute identity, depending upon how we interpret our quantifiers--upon what our variables range over. Consider the two possibilities, respectively, of

(i) the objects ranged over include some which have just the same properties,
(ii) the objects ranged over are each distinct from one another (each has at least one property not possessed by another).

On interpretation (ii), for (8) to be true in $T^N$ there will have to be at least one object with two names. There will be more objects on (i) than on (ii), but the objects of $T^N$ on (ii) will be more "abstract" than on
(i). So far there is nothing in particular which recommends one interpretation over the other. The "abstractness" of (ii)'s objects is nothing to worry about; it merely means that the objects will have a certain substructure from a different perspective which is ignored on the perspective adopted as just generating so many idle wheels. A current dispute in microphysics might afford us an example. One can range one's variables over the standard sub-atomic particles and view quarks as metaphysics, or one can range over quarks, reducing one's stock of objects, and explaining other particles as constructions (quarks in certain structures). Until there is good observational evidence, one choice over the other is rather arbitrary.

With regard to the $I$-predicates of $T^R$, they may be thought of as expressing identity. Indeed, just replacing "I" with "=" in (5) results in a schema which can suffice as the sole axiom for deriving classical identity theory in a predicate calculus.\(^1\) On (ii) the $I$-predicates will express absolute identity, a relation each object has to itself, and to nothing else. The thesis Geach explicitly attributes to the A-theorist is:

(9) $x$ is identical with $y$ iff whatever is true of $x$ is true of $y$, and conversely.\(^2\)

\(^{1}\)Geach, "Identity", op. cit., p. 3, where he cites Quine.

\(^{2}\)Geach, "A Reply", op. cit., pp. 556-557. It is not clear to me why Geach has expressed this going both
On (i) the I-predicates will express a relativized identity, where identicals are identical only relative to the theory in which "I" is a predicate. Since it is the predicates of the theory to which "I" is relative, we might say that if "aIb" is true, then a is the same X as b, where X is a complex predicate composed of all the predicates in T^N which are true of a and also true of b. X might be more naturally construed as a simple predicate, namely, one of those true of the I-related objects individually. Further restrictions on the construal of X may be motivated for various reasons, but this broad way of putting it (i.e.: "X" attached to any name forms a statement equivalent to the conjunction of all the true statements formed by attaching predicates of T^N to that name) is sufficient for us to capture the relevant predicate if and when it is deemed appropriate.

To take a concrete (though trivial) example, consider the universe of letters in the next line:

inn

Let our predicates be:

ways—with an "iff" instead of an "only if"—since the half of it going the "if" direction is the "identity of indiscernibles", a principle some A-theorists may not wish to accept, and which nowhere explicitly enters Geach's argument. However, there is a complicating factor in this direction, which I discuss below.

1Geach, e.g., wants to restrict X to the most general substantival term available in one's theory true of that 'kind' of object, which he calls the name's "nominal essence". Reference and Generality, pp. 43-46.
G is discontinuous
H is curved\(^1\)
J has a form

Let \( T^* \) consist of "G", "H", and "J", the usual logic, and some I-predicate, say "K". On interpretation (i),

\[(\exists x)(\exists y)(\exists z)(xKy)\]

is true, because it is a generalization of "\( n_2K_n_3 \)" which is true. (\( n_1, n_2, \) and \( n_3 \) are the names for the first, second, and third objects respectively.) On (ii), (10) is true also, but for a different reason. It is not true because the object \( n_2 \) and the object \( n_3 \) have exactly the same predicates true of them, namely "H" and "J", but because "\( n_2 \)" and "\( n_3 \)" are different names for exactly one and the same object. The variables of \( T^* \) range alternatively over (i) letter tokens, or (ii) letter types, and for (ii) the I-predicate "K" can be construed as "is the same as". For (i), "K" can be construed as "is the same \( X \) as", or "is the same with respect to form and being curved as"; more briefly, "is equiform to".

An advocate of (ii) might try to argue that (i) is untenable because (9), in which there is no mention of the relevant theory whose predicates are at stake for

\(^1\)This property could, of course, be so defined as to exclude anomalous points of infinite curvature, and typographically extraneous curves in the little lefthand flag at the top of the stem in the first letter. Deviously ingenious typesetters could be given a wholly different example.
the R-theorist. That is, he might try to argue that reference to the (or some of the) predicates of a theory is unnecessary, for no matter what two names stand for, if they can be used to form a true identity statement, then any predicate whatsoever which is true of that named by one name, is true of that named by the other. If this is so, then merely restricting the predicates available to some specifiable set will not suddenly weaken the sense of identity so that two things identical in one set might not be identical in another. They will be identical in every possible set if they are identical at all.

To an A-theorist who chooses to argue this way, Geach points out that the semantic paradoxes involving the predicate "is true of" are a consequence of this objection to the R-theorist, and that the usual way of avoiding them is to define "is true of" upon a specific set of predicates and objects, thus placing "is true of" not in that theory, but in a metatheory. Therefore, on this solution of the paradoxes, (9) is unintelligible as it is stated, without reference to a specific theory.

This is not to force (i) over (ii), for (ii) might still be opted for within the confines of some theory. It is only to rule out the claim that (i) is untenable, when that claim is based upon (9), at least until the A-theorist can come up with an acceptable solution to the semantic paradoxes which does not need recourse to the specification of some theory.
So far we have found no good reason to adopt one
view of identity over the other. But now consider the
addition of some predicates to $T^n$ sufficient to render
(8) false. Call this new theory $T^{n+1}$; our previous
type $T^n$ is a proper subset of it. The effect of this
change is either to render distinguishable some objects
previously indistinguishable, or to eliminate all cases
of objects having more than one name. The first
alternative is the one which will be taken by the $R$-
theorist, and it presents him with no special diffi-
culties.

The $A$-theorist, on the other hand, must take the
second alternative, since he countenances no indistin-
guishable objects. But how is this 'elimination of
cases' to be accomplished? He cannot simply eliminate
some extra names, for that would be to abandon $T^{n+1}$
for some other theory; for the same reason he cannot simply
eliminate many-named objects together with their names.
No change in names was involved in going from $T^n$ to
$T^{n+1}$. He cannot leave the offending names and excise
the offending objects, for then some true statements
in a subset of $T^{n+1}$ (namely, $T^n$) would be uninterpreta-
ble in $T^{n+1}$ ("$\bar{m}_n^2$", e.g., in $T^a$). His only remaining
recourse is to admit that what he previously thought had
more than one name, actually is more than one object,
that there is one object for each of the names he previ-
ously considered to be names of the same thing. But
this is simply a move from the objects assumed on interpretation (ii) to those assumed on (i), which in \( T^{n+1} \), of course, are all distinguishable. This consequence means that whereas the R-theorist can retain the variable range (his ontology) which he adopted for \( T^n \) when he moves to consider \( T^{n+1} \), the A-theorist is forced, if he is to retain his interpretation of "I", to range his variables over the same objects as does the R-theorist.

If increasing the number of one's objects were the only consequence forced upon the A-theorist, it would not be so bad. After all, a few revisions in one's ontology are sometimes both necessary and desirable, especially when one has good reasons for admitting new predicates to one's theory which cannot be admitted without changing the number and kinds of things one considers to exist and be real. But the rub comes not when we consider the ascension to theories ever richer in predicates, but rather when we consider the descent from a predicatively rich theory to poorer subsets of it. Let \( T^m \) be a theory with many predicates and many true statements of the form

\[
(11) \quad (\exists x)(\phi x),
\]

where "\( \phi \)" is a schema for the predicates of the theory. The A-theorist will construe any two names which can be used to make instances of (11) which correspond in truth-value for every \( \phi \), and also used to make a true
instance of (8), as names of the same object. Any two names which make a true instance of
(12)  \((\exists x)(\exists y)(Fx \land \lnot Fy),\)
no matter what \(F\) is, cannot name the same thing. Now consider a subset of \(T^m\), call it \(T^{m-1}\), which is the same as \(T^m\) except that those predicates which render
(12) true for some names are omitted. There will then be some objects ranged over by the variables which will be indistinguishable, and which will be I-related. For the R-theorist this will be no problem, for identity to him is not restricted to a relation which only obtains between an object and itself. On his view, it can relate any two distinct objects which have only the same predicates true of each. But for the A-theorist, for whom identity cannot relate distinct (even though indistinguishable) objects, this situation is unacceptable. To retain identity as only a self-relation, he must re-read his quantifiers for this subset as ranging over objects more "abstract".

Let us look again at our previous example \(T^a\), and the theory \(T^a+1\) of which it is a subset. \(T^a+1\) is simply the theory \(T^a\) plus the predicate "\(L\)" which is such that
(13)  \(Ln_2 \land \lnot Ln_3\)
is true in \(T^a+1\). The A-theorist will construe the objects of \(T^a+1\) as letter tokens; but in the subset \(T^a\), he will find his variables ranging over two distinct objects of the same form (because they have only the
same form predicates, and no other predicates), which are therefore indistinguishable. To retain his absolute interpretation of "K" he will have to range his variables over letter types. And since this is a subset of $T^{n+1}$, the variables of $T^{n+1}$ will also have to be interpreted as ranging over types as well as tokens, because the variables of part of a theory cannot have a range different from the range of the theory it is a part of.

From this example it can be seen that in general, for any theory $T^n$, each subset $T^{n-k}$ which is formed by omitting at least one predicate such that for each $\phi$ remaining,

$$\sim(\exists x)(\exists y)(\phi x \land \sim\phi y)$$

is true in $T^{n-k}$ when it was false in $T^n$ (where $\phi$ included the deleted predicate(s))—each such subset will require the addition of a further whole type of objects, i.e., further objects of a wholly different kind, to the ontology of $T^n$. Assuming, as is likely, that any interesting theory will be rich enough to contain a plethora of such subsets, the A-theorist is faced with the prospect of maintaining an ontology full of many objects of a wide degree of "abstractness", all types of which—most curiously—must be in the range of the 'master' theory. (Appropriate, if peculiar, formation rules or effectively similar restrictions could avoid the Russell paradox.)
In these circumstances, it is the R-theorist who views a desert landscape. He need recognize only those objects which are of the lowest level of "abstraction" needed to render all the statements of the theory appropriately true or false. With regard to subsets in which distinguishing features of several objects have lost their representation, these several objects can be said to be I-related with respect to the predicates of the subset, without the assumption of types, types of types, etc., forced upon the enthusiast of absolute identity. Such identity statements, properly relativized, are true not only in the subsets of a theory, but in the theory itself. Both the kinds and (usually) the absolute number of objects will be fewer for the R-theorist.

This argument depends, of course, upon a preference for an ontology containing the fewest kinds of things thought necessary for an adequate description of the world. Anyone who is willing to embrace an over-ripe metaphysics, who finds in the study of Being a veritable cornucopia, will not feel its force. But no matter how important complication is in aesthetics or even real life (which I do not merely admit, but positively advocate in both), I am yet to be convinced by those who would ignore Occam in matters of natural philosophy.

The most sustained criticism of the R-thesis which I know of is given by Wiggins.\footnote{Wiggins, Identity and Satio-Temporal Continuity.} He views the R-thesis
as tantamount to a rejection of Leibniz's Law, which he gives as

(15) \((a \neq_F b) \lor (\forall a \equiv \forall b)\).

He gives the R-thesis as

(16) \((a \neq_F b) \land (a \neq_G b) \land (Ga \lor Gb),\)

and it is easily shown to be inconsistent with the assumption of Leibniz's Law.\(^2\) (15) is Wiggins' way of

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 3; the predicate letter "F" appears to be construed as a particular predicate, and "a" and "b" as specific, yet arbitrary names.

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 3-4; his proof is marred by the fact that he represents \(R\) as different from (16) in the proof—there it is given as \((a \neq_F b) \land (a \neq_G b) \land (Ga).\) The difference makes no difference, however; for the record here is an amended proof (I adopt certain familiar parenthesis and dot conventions for grouping, and indent procedures for the deduction theorem). Let Leibniz's Law, as in (15), be abbreviated "LL". To prove: \(LL \lor (a \neq_F b \land a \neq_G b \lor Ga \lor Gb).\)

Proof:

1. \(LL\)
2. \((\forall)(a \neq_F b \lor \exists a \equiv \exists b)\)
3. \(a \neq_F b \lor \exists a \equiv \exists b\)
4. \(a \neq_F b \lor \exists a \equiv \exists b\)
5. \(a \neq_F b\)
6. \(a \equiv_G a \equiv a \equiv_G b\)
7. \(a \equiv_G b \equiv b \equiv_G b\)
8. \(Ga \lor a \equiv b \equiv b\)
9. \(Gb \lor a \equiv_G a\)
10. \(Gb \lor a \equiv_G a\)
11. \(Ga \lor a \equiv_G a \lor Ga \equiv_G b \lor Gb \lor a \equiv_G b\)
12. \(Ga \lor Gb \lor a \equiv_G a \lor Gb \lor a \equiv_G b\)
13. \(Ga \lor Gb\)
14. \(a \equiv_G a \lor b \equiv_G b\)
15. \(a \equiv_G a\)

Note: The proof is structured to show the logical implications of the given assumptions and the derived conclusions, adhering to the principles of logical deduction as outlined by Leibniz's Law and the predicates given in the context.
of stating what I earlier represented in (7); since the "I" in (7) ultimately becomes interpreted by the R-theorist as "is the same F as", or simply "F", that difference comes to nought. But the universal quantifier over predicates which appears in the consequent of (15) is a different matter, as we shall shortly see.

Besides the formal demonstration of the incompatibility of (15) and (16), Wiggins' strategy includes showing to be useless several likely emendations of Leibniz's Law, and also providing accounts compatible with (15) for various examples intended to cast doubt upon it. I do not plan to discuss these examples; rather I shall turn to some considerations which seem to me to undermine his whole position, from the formal proof onwards. In particular, his claim that the R-theorist cannot in some sense accept Leibniz's Law is incorrect, and his various attempts at restating this principle, if intended to represent the R-theorist

16. \( a \equiv a \supset a \equiv b \)
17. \( a \equiv b \)
18. \( Ga \lor Gb \supset a \equiv b \)
19. \( a \equiv b \supset : Ga \lor Gb \supset a \equiv b \)
20. \( \ll \supset : a \equiv b \supset : Ga \lor Gb \)
21. \( \ll \supset (a \equiv b \supset a \equiv b \supset Ga \lor Gb) \)

\[ 6, (P \equiv Q) \supset (P \lor Q) \]
\[ (Q \lor P), MP, sep. \]
\[ 15, 16, MP \]

13-17, theorem of deduction (TD)
5-18, TD
1-19, TD
20, \( (P \lor Q \supset R) \supset S \equiv (P \lor \sim Q \supset \sim S \lor R) \).
under pressure, are misguided. Both (15) and (16) are acceptable—when properly understood—to the R-theorist.

Turning first to (16) as a representation of the R-thesis, I have already remarked that statements I-relating objects in some subset of a theory are true—when construed as properly relativised to that subset—in the theory of which it is a subset. To return again to our previous example of the theory $T^{*+1}$ and its subset $T^*$, "$n_2K_n^3$" is true in $T^*$, and when read as "$n_2$ is equiform with $n_3$", is true also in $T^{*+1}$, even though $L_{n_2} \equiv L_{n_3}$ (perhaps "L" might be "occupies the second position"). As long as any statement of I-relatedness is construed as identity with respect to a specific set of predicates (or some 'master' predicate coextensive with the set), such a statement will not be falsified by its inclusion into a theory formed from the one in which it was defined by adding more predicates. Thinking that such a true statement must remain true in such an extended set, for all of the added predicates also, might well be called the Fallacy of Identity-Extension. It is this fallacy which bedevils Wiggins' arguments. In $T^{*+1}$ it would license an inference from "$n_2$ and $n_3$ are equiform" to "$n_2$ occupies the second position iff $n_3$ does" (interpreting "L" as recently suggested). Refusal to permit this inference can be represented as a statement of the same form as (16):

(17) \[(n_2 \equiv n_3) \cdot (n_2 \not\equiv n_3) \cdot (\neg n_2 \vee n_3),\]
where "M" is some predicate coextensive with "G", "H",
and "J" (the predicates of T*), and "N" is one coexten-
sive with "G", "H", "J", and "L" (the predicates of
T*+1). Thus (16), taken as a principle forbidding
countenance of the fallacy of identity-extension, does
reflect the R-thesis.

But then how is (16) compatible with (15), especial-
ly in light of Wiggins' proof to the contrary (as
emended in footnote 2, p. 308 above)? The problem lies
in the quantifier in (15), carefully omitted in (7)
in favor of a predicate schema for one from a there
unspecified set of appropriate predicates. Leibniz's
Law, as stated by Wiggins, involves the material equiva-
lence of two statements each containing a name and the
same predicate, no matter what that predicate is, if only
the object(s) named are related by identity. This kind
of latitude is, of course, an open invitation to the
semantic paradoxes. The "\(\exists\)" in (15) must be restricted
to some specified set of predicates which constitutes
part of the extra-logical component of some theory.

If the range of "\(\exists\)" were restricted merely to the
predicates of a theory in some subset of which an I-
statement could be truly asserted, then (15) would still
permit fallacious inferences of identity extension, as
in the example above with T*+1 and its subset T*. The
appropriate set of predicates for the range of "\(\exists\)" must
be specified before Leibniz's Law can be accepted in
its generalized form as in (15). A perhaps more intuitive way of putting this is to say that if two objects are the same with respect to certain predicates, we cannot say that they are the same with regard to any predicates—this is only another way of stating the rejection of identity-extension fallacies. The revision of Leibniz's Law, as given by (15), which this requires is not any rejuggling of its expression in normal first- and second-order logic—various possibilities of which Wiggins examines and rejects—but a metatheoretical identification of the range of "$s$" with the set of predicates coextensive with the predicate "$X$" for which the objects are the same $X$ as one another.\footnote{For any version of LL in $n$-adic logic, a restriction formally equivalent to the metatheoretical one envisioned could be formulated in $n+1$-adic logic, but this is already beyond the moves Wiggins anticipates.}

The range of "$s$" cannot be extended beyond the predicates which justify "$(\exists x)(\exists y)(x\equiv y)$" without justifying false as well as true statements. Thus (7) and (15) might both be appropriately and properly represented as:

for some $F$ coextensive with the predicates of theory $T^{n-k}$, if the predicate variable "$s$" has a range including only the predicates in $T^{n-k}$, then

\[
(18) \quad a \not= b \supset (\exists)(\forall a \equiv \forall b)
\]

is a true statement in $T^{n-k}$ and any theory $T^n$ containing $T^{n-k}$ as a subset.

This way of qualifying the "indiscernibility of identicals" blocks a crucial step in Wiggins' proof of...
the incompatibility of (15) and (16)—namely, the steps from 2 to 3 and from 2 to 4 in the version above.¹ He thinks it necessary to apologize for this step, but his worries are over "a=G" being considered a legitimate predicate, and not over the fundamental error of allowing "a" to range over "G"—a predicate not found within the set relative to the truth of "a ≠ b". It is this which vitiates his demonstration.

What I believe I have shown is that given proper interpretations, Leibniz's Law and the R-thesis are acceptable together. Wiggins raises several other points connected with this view of identity in a long footnote to his claim that

the principle [Leibniz's Law] marks off what is peculiar to identity and differentiates it in a way in which transitivity, symmetry and reflexivity (all shared by congruence, consanguinity, etc.) do not.²

In the footnote he acknowledges in effect that (5) is sufficient for deriving the indiscernibility, transivity, symmetry, and reflexivity of identity, yet he goes on to deny that a relation's satisfying (5) "completely ties that relation down within a first order formal system to what we normally intend by identity."³ He does this for reasons he does not specify, but does attribute to

¹Footnote 2, p. 303; in Wiggins' version, the step from 3 to 4, op. cit., p. 3.
²Wiggins, op. cit., p. 5.
³Ibid., p. 66 n. 9.
Quine and Geach. Moreover, he does not tell us what are his intuitions about "what we normally intend by identity", which would make (5) necessary but not sufficient as an axiom for capturing identity in a formal system. I myself would say that (5) is incomplete until the set of predicates schematised by "T" is specified in the manner done for (7) in (18), and Wiggins seems to hint that this is what he had in mind when he later in the same footnote says

Any complete vindication of my use of it [Leibniz's Law] would involve e.g. discussion of the specification of relevant predicables and discussion of whether these could be specified absolutely without danger of paradox.

But the appropriate specification is the one I have already given, and it opens the way for the R-theorist. He probably had, therefore, something else in mind. Might it have been that (5) should go both ways before it is sufficient? In other words, could Wiggins be hinting that in addition to Leibniz's Law, we need also the identity of indiscernibles? I suggest this because of the role played by the identity of indiscernibles in the passages of Quine's to which Wiggins refers.

It is clear that this cannot be the case for Wiggins, however, since he explicitly denies it.

Leibniz's Law and its contraposition gives a sufficient criterion of difference, but none of identity. The Identity of Indiscernibles yields no sufficient condition. For the strong or classical Identity of Indiscernibles phrased in terms of pure predicates is not a logically true principle. The weak principle of Identity of Indiscernibles,
with predicate variable unrestricted and open to predicables with embedded proper names, is a true principle but does not give us any effective sufficient condition of identity. It is not effective (i) because, for any identity \( a = b \), there will be many predicates whose application to one or other of \( a \) and \( b \) can only be settled by first settling whether \( a = b \), and (ii) because the weak Identity of Indiscernibles presupposes a prior understanding of the identities of times and places, or of the identities of the particulars whose names turn up inside such predicates as 'five miles S. W. of Big Ben'. In either case we are thrown back onto a prior understanding of the individuation of persisting things.¹

The last sentence in particular, and the text following it, indicate that for Wiggins fixing the sense of identity statements involves principles for tracing spatio-temporal objects, and it is this which is left out of (5), and which renders it deficient as tying down "what we normally intend by identity". But Wiggins does not give a single good reason as far as I can tell for thinking that identity statements are normally, or ought to be understood within his style of an Aristotelian substance metaphysics, and hence why (5) cannot suffice for identity theory.

Regardless of this problem, it is clear that Wiggins does not think that the identity of indiscernibles is what is needed to capture the notion of identity. However, he refers specifically to Quine's discussion of "relative discernibility"; the consequences Quine draws, which presumably are the ones Wiggins accepts as showing

¹Ibid., p. 34.
the inadequacy of (5), depend upon what Quine calls the "maxim" of the identity of indiscernibles,¹ to which Quine elsewhere says he is committed in a "mild way". Insofar as Wiggins accepts Quine's consequences (if only to use them for a contrary inference), he appears also to accept this mild maxim of the identity of indiscernibles, in spite of what he says in the passage just quoted.

But leaving Wiggins' difficulties aside, I would like to look further at the connection between the R-thesis and the identity of indiscernibles. Quine's discussions are particularly helpful in this matter.² He gives in Word and Object a general method for constructing a complex formula in any specific theory which is coextensive with, and which can therefore be taken as defining, identity in that theory. He instructs us to write 'if Fx then Fy' and vice versa with each of the absolute general terms of the vocabulary in place of 'F'; also '(s)(if Fxs then Fys)' and '(s) (if Fxs then Fys)', and vice versa, with each of the dyadic relative terms in place of 'F'; and so on to '(s)(w)(if Fxsw then Fysw)' etc. The conjunction of all these formulas is coextensive with

¹Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 71.

²Incidently, I think it should be acknowledged that what Quine has to say in Set Theory and Its Logic, pp. 12-15, From a Logical Point of View, pp. 70-72, and in Word and Object, pp. 130-131, has been seminal in Geach's argument for the R-thesis, and my adaption of it. Without his insights I doubt that such an argument would have been readily apparent.
'x = y' if any formula constructible from the given vocabulary is; and otherwise we can without conflict adopt that conjunction as our version of identity. In so doing we impose a certain identification of indiscernibles, but only in a mild way.  

This method will generate a series of conjoined material equivalences of the form

\[(S) \quad (\varphi_m^{1}x_1 = \varphi_m^{2}x_2),\]
\[(x_3)(\varphi_m^{2}x_3 = \varphi_m^{2}x_3),\]
\[(x_3)(\varphi_m^{2}x_3 = \varphi_m^{2}x_2),\]
\[(x_3)(x_4)(\varphi_m^{2}x_3x_4 = \varphi_m^{2}x_2x_3x_4),\]
\[(x_3)(x_4)(\varphi_m^{3}x_1x_4 = \varphi_m^{3}x_2x_3x_4),\]
\[(x_3)(x_4)(\varphi_m^{3}x_1x_4 = \varphi_m^{3}x_1x_2x_4),\]
\[(x_3)(x_4)(\varphi_m^{3}x_1x_4 = \varphi_m^{3}x_3x_4x_2),\]
\[(x_3)(x_4)(\varphi_m^{3}x_1x_4 = \varphi_m^{3}x_2x_4x_3),\]
\[\vdots\]
\[(x_3)...(x_{k+1})(\varphi_m^{k}(x_1,x_3,...,x_{k+1}) = \varphi_m^{k}(x_2,x_3,...,x_{k+1})),\]

where \(x_1, x_2, \ldots, \) and \(x_{k+1}\) are variables, \(\varphi_m^{k}\) is the \(m\)-th \(k\)-adic predicate (there will be \(n\) formulae for each line, where \(n\) represents the number of \(i\)-adic predicates; for each class of \(i\)-adic predicates their number \(n\) is possibly different, \(0 \leq m \leq n\), and the parentheses around and commas between the variables in the last line represent a generalization that each possible permutation of the \(k\) number of variables inside is to be represented with its own line, on the sole condition that any combination on the right side of the equivalence must be the same as that on the left, except for the substitution of "\(x_2\)" for "\(x_1\)."

\(^1\)Quine, *Word and Object*, p. 230.
If we instantiate all these expressions, we will be left with a lot of predicates which have only one place, marked by either \( x_1 \) or \( x_2 \), and then we can simply write the series \( (S) \) using monadic predicates—different ones, of course, for each number and order of original variable places. We shall have a new set of notationally equivalent "constructed" predicates in just the sense used by Geach, and which I intended in describing \( (S) \) above. If \( F \) in \( (S) \) schematizes these constructible predicates, then \( (S) \) represents for \( (S) \) an explication of indiscernibility, or I-relatedness.

For Quine, however, \( (S) \) represents an explication, or, stronger still, a definition of identity. But if indiscernibility in the sense of \( (S) \) defines identity, Quine thinks it is only a "mild" case of the contraposition of Leibniz's Law. He elaborates this claim by drawing a distinction between \( x \) being absolutely discernible from \( y \) (which I shall abbreviate \( "x_D^A y" \)), and its being relatively discernible from \( y \) (abbreviated: \( "x_D^R y" \)). ¹ Let \( \phi \) schematise the monadic predicates of a theory, and \( \psi \) the dyadic; then for some \( \phi \) and \( \psi \),

\[
x_D^A y = \text{df} (\phi x \cdot \sim \psi y) \lor (\psi y \cdot \sim \phi x),
\]

¹ Relative discernibility or indiscernibility has nothing directly to do with the relativity of identity itself, which Quine will not brook. The term "relative" as it figures in Quine's distinction here will not be used elsewhere, and an R-theorist will continue to be one who advocates the relativity of identity, not the relativity of indiscernibility (although for him identity is relative just because it is the same as indiscernibility).
\[ xDRy = \text{df } (\exists x)[(\forall x \neq y) v (\forall y \neq x) v \\
(\neg \forall x \neq y) v (\forall y \neq x)]. \]

More briefly, for some \( \phi \) and \( \psi \),
\[(19) \quad xDA\psi = \text{df } \neg(\phi x \equiv \phi y), \]
\[(20) \quad xDRy = \text{df } \neg(\exists \psi)[(\forall x \equiv \forall y) v (\forall y \equiv \forall x)]. \]

Quine claims that construing (3) as coextensive with identity involves only identity of relative indiscernibles (analogously abbreviated: "\( xIRy \)", where by definition \( xIRy = \neg xDRy \)), but not identity of absolute indiscernibles (abbreviated: "\( xIRy \)", where by definition \( xIRy = \neg xIRy \)). That is, it requires the truth of
\[(21) \quad (z)(\forall x \equiv \forall y) v (\forall y \equiv \forall x) \supset x = y, \]
but not the truth of
\[(22) \quad (\phi x \equiv \phi y) \supset x = y, \]
for any \( \phi \) and \( \psi \). (3) does not involve (22) because there can be some \( x \) and \( y \), and some \( \psi \), say \( R \), such that
\[(23) \quad Rxy \cdot \neg Rxx \cdot \neg Ryy. \]
If (23) is the case, then \( x \) and \( y \) need not be absolutely discernible, i.e., it could be true that for any \( \phi \)

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1It might be thought that a more accurate representation of Quine's definition would be \( xDRy = \text{df } \neg(\forall xy \equiv \forall yx) \), for some \( \forall \); but this would be a mistake, since this formula expresses symmetry, but not reflexivity. Thus two objects could be relatively indiscernible under all predicates including some nonreflexive ones, and because of that latter fact they would not be identical by (3). Therefore (3) would not declare identical just those objects that are not relatively discernible, as Quine says it would. Compare my extension of relative discernibility in (30) below with the quote from Quine concerning the predicate "C" below.
(24) \( \phi x \equiv \phi y, \)
while at the same time \( x \neq y, \) because to be identical, among other things

(25) \((s) (Rxs D Rys)\)

must be true for \( x \) and \( y. \) But it is not; for presumably \( y \) is in the range of the quantifier, and from (25) we can get

(26) \( Rxy D Ryy. \)

From (23) this, and thus (25) must be false. Not only is (25) false, but

(27) \((s) (Rxs \equiv Rys)\)

is too, since (25) going the other way is falsified by instantiating \( x \) for the quantifier. Thus for any two objects to be identical under (S), they have to be not only absolutely indiscernible, but also relatively indiscernible. This is "milder" than the plain identity of indiscernibles because beyond two things having all and only the same monadic predicates, for them to be identical they must also be subject to the further restriction that, if they are related to anything by any dyadic predicate, they must be related to it by that predicate regardless of ordering.

The important question at this point is just how far does this qualification go in mitigating--in making genuinely "milder"--Quine's embrace of the identity of indiscernibles?
First of all, I think it ignores altogether the troubling aspects of that principle, and I shall return to that later. But secondly, it depends upon refusing to admit the formulation of monadic predicates "constructed" from n-adic ones. For if this were permitted, cases like (23) would simply not be cases of absolute indiscernibility (let R and its first place be U, then Uy . ~Ux; and let R and its second place be V, then Vx . ~Vy), and in general, relative discernibility collapses into absolute indiscernibility. Quine has in other contexts exploited the collapsing of n-adic to monadic predicates, by the use of what he calls a "derelativization operator" to eliminate the formal need for variables of quantification.¹ But if for that purpose predicates can be "derelativized", why not in matters concerning identity? Even in Word and Object Quine talks of forming absolute predicates from relative ones:

Relative terms also combine with singular terms by application, to give absolute general terms of a composite kind. Thus the relative term 'brother of' gives not only the absolute general term 'brother', but also the absolute general term 'brother of Abel'.²

Apart from all this, why should Quine stop relativizing discernibility at the level of dyadic predicates? Consider a case where x and y are neither


²Quine, Word and Object, p. 106.
absolutely nor relatively discernible, as defined in (19) and (20), yet it is the case that for some three-place predicate, say $T$, that

$$(28) \quad T_{xy} \neq T_{yy}.$$ 

In these circumstances, $x$ is not identical with $y$ because (S) is not satisfied: the fourth conjunct is false. Thus following Quine's lead (taking absolute discernibility as relative (0) discernibility, and relative discernibility as relative (1) discernibility, with corresponding changes in the subscripts of "D" and "I") we can define relative (2) discernibility as follows: $x$ and $y$ are relatively (2) discernible if some open three-place sentence is satisfied by them in all except at least one of the orderings. Symbolically, for some $\theta$,

$$(29) \quad xD_2y \equiv (\exists z)(\exists w)[(\theta xzw \cdot \neg \theta yzw) \lor (\theta yzw \cdot \neg \theta xzw) \lor (\theta xzw \cdot \neg \theta zyw) \lor (\theta zyw \cdot \neg \theta xzw) \lor (\theta xzw \cdot \neg \theta yzw) \lor (\theta yzw \cdot \neg \theta xzw)].$$

More succinctly, for some $\theta$,

$$(30) \quad xD_2y \equiv (\exists z)(\exists w)(\theta xzw \equiv \theta yzw \cdot \theta xzw \equiv \theta zyw \cdot \theta zyw \equiv \theta xzw).$$

Relative (2) indiscernibility is just the definiens of (30) without the negation, for any $\theta$. We can now see that just $xI_0y$ and $xI_1y$ alone are not sufficient to make $x = y$: $xI_2y$ is needed also. Thus (S) declares identical only those objects which are relatively (0), (1), and (2) indiscernible. However, this same line of
reasoning could be carried on until we would say that \( x \) and \( y \) are identical by (S) only when they are relatively (i-1) indiscernible, with \( i \) always bigger than you please. Quine does not consider such a radical relativization of the principle. As we have seen, he stops at relative (1) indiscernibility. And as I earlier asked, why should he?

I suspect the reason is that he thinks (30) can be reduced into (20), perhaps by something like the following definitions: let \( \forall \) be a predicate constructed from \( \emptyset \) and the variable \( w \); then (30) becomes, for some \( \forall \),

\[ (31) \quad xD_2y =df \sim(z)(\forall xz \equiv \forall yz \cdot \forall xz \equiv \forall yz). \]

Since the last conjunct is redundant, we have for some \( \forall \),

\[ (32) \quad xD_2y =df \sim(z)(\forall xz \equiv \forall yz). \]

which by (20) makes "D_2" the same as "D_1". But if we can go this far, surely we can go the last step and reduce (32) to (19)—after all, the process would be exactly the same. All that is necessary is the construction of a predicate \( \emptyset \) from \( \forall \) and the variable \( s \); then from (32), after removing redundant equivalences, we get, for some \( \emptyset \),

\[ (33) \quad xD_2y =df \sim(\exists x \equiv \exists y). \]

Therefore, for this reason and those mentioned earlier, I do not believe that Quine's device of distinguishing levels of indiscernibility helps at all in rendering his acceptance of the identity of indiscernibles
more agreeable. (He might, of course, reject this reduc-
tion—on what grounds I shall not speculate—in favor
of the radical extension mentioned above, where for i-
adic predicates in the theory, objects are identical
only if they are relatively \((i-1)\) indiscernible. In
this event, my objection against the arbitrariness of
stopping the relativization at relative \((1)\) indiscerni-
bility is beside the point. But the whole business still
depends upon not allowing reductions in the \(i\)-adicity'
of the predicates of a theory, and my objections here
still stand.)

Returning finally to the connection between the R-
thesis and the identity of indiscernibles with which the
discussion of Quine's attempted mitigation began, what
I wish to point out now is that, as Quine acknowledges,
the A-theorist does have to accept it, yet the R-
theorist does not, except as an initial and informal
guide for the selection of an optimal ontology. Even
in this role, the principle is no more than a conveni-
ence for the R-theorist, which could be done without.
Concerning the A-theorist, however, the reader may
already have noticed the covert entry of the identity
of indiscernibles into the argument in the three para-
graphs above which contain \((11)\) through \((14)\). It was

\footnote{Although the passage in Word and Object I have
been discussing does not indicate anything like this,
he does there refer (in a footnote) to the last of the
three passages I quote just below, in which an instance
of the negation of \((30)\) occurs.}
maintained there that in descending from a theory $T^m$ to a subset of it $T^{m-1}$ which is formed from $T^m$ by dropping all predicates which for some two objects are true of only one, the A-theorist will have to recognize a new breed of objects, more abstract than those needed to satisfy $T^m$ alone, on pains of having some indistinguishable, yet non-identical objects on his hands. But if he rids himself of such objects, he is in effect identifying indiscernibles. Quine is fully aware that this is what he is doing, as the following examples show:

concerning the interpretation of $(S)$, he says that

> if the universe is taken as that of persons, and the predicates are interpreted in ways depending on nothing but people's incomes, then the proposed way of defining '$x = y$' will equate any persons who have equal incomes .... In cases of this kind we could protest that the interpretation of the universe and predicates is ill-chosen, and that it might better be so rectified as to construe the members of the universe as whole income groups.\[1\]

Where what we want to say about certain broad surfaces does not concern distinctions between their parts, we simplify our discourse by making its objects as few and as large as we can—taking the various broad surfaces as single objects. Analogous remarks hold, and very conspicuously, for conceptual integration—the integrating of particulars into a universal. Suppose a discourse about person stages, and suppose that whatever is said about any person stage, in this particular discourse, applies equally to all person stages which make the same amount of money. Our discourse is simplified, then, by shifting its subject matter from person stages to income groups. Distinctions immaterial to the discourse at hand are thus extruded from the subject matter. In general we might propound this maxim of the

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1Quine, *Set Theory and Its Logic*, p. 15.
Identification of indiscernibles: Objects indistinguishable from one another within the terms of a given discourse should be construed as identical for that discourse. More accurately: the references to the original objects should be reconstrued for purposes of the discourse as referring to other and fewer objects, in such a way that indistinguishable originals give way each to the same new object.¹

A passage particularly relevant to the example of types vs. tokens I used above in the argument for the R-thesis is the following:

It may happen that a theory dealing with nothing but concrete individuals can be conveniently reconstrued as treating of universals, by the method of identifying indiscernibles... [An] example of such identification of indiscernibles is obtainable in the theory of inscriptions, a formal syntax in which the values of the bound variables are concrete inscriptions. The important predicate here is 'C', where 'Cxyz' means that x consists of a part notationally like y followed by a part notationally like z. The condition of interchangeability or indiscernibility in this theory proves to be notational likeness, expressible thus:

\[(s)(v)(Czsw = Czvw \cdot Czvw = Czvy \cdot Czvw = Czwy)\]

By treating this condition as 'x = y' we convert our theory of inscriptions into a theory of notational forms, where the values of the variables are no longer individual inscriptions, but the abstract notational shapes of inscriptions.²

In this passage Quine moves from distinct (non-identical), yet indiscernible inscriptions, or tokens, to indiscernible, hence identical shapes, i.e., types. The point is, though, that if x and y are not indiscernible in some theory, yet the condition he gives does

¹Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis", From A Logical Point of View, pp. 70-71.
²Quine, "Reification of Universals", From a Logical Point of View, p. 117.
hold in some subset of it for that \( x \) and \( y \), then there are two alternatives. One is to hold that in the subset \( x \) and \( y \) are tokens of the same form; the other is to say that in the subset we are now talking about types, and \( x \) and \( y \) are the same simpliciter. On the second alternative, new objects are in the range of the variables, and this might appear to be an economy. However, the original theory is still there containing the subset, and since it must still as a whole range over tokens (otherwise some counterexamples to Leibniz’s Law could be produced), its ontology must include both types and tokens, if identity is to remain absolute. Economy has gone out the window with the refusal to relativize identity and opt for the first alternative.

It is interesting, and not a little curious, that in a recent publication Quine more or less admits as much. Speaking very generally about the reduction of ontologies and how this makes sense only relative to some background theory, he says:

Our dependence upon a background theory becomes especially evident when we reduce our universe \( U \) to another \( V \) by appeal to a proxy function.¹ For

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¹With regard to reducing a theory \( \Theta \) to a theory \( \Theta' \), a proxy function is specified as "a function, not necessarily in the notation of \( \Theta \) or \( \Theta' \), which admits as arguments all objects in the universe of \( \Theta \) and takes values in the universe of \( \Theta' \). . . . Then to each \( n \)-place primitive predicate of \( \Theta \), for each \( n \), we effectively associate an open sentence of \( \Theta' \) in \( n \) free variables, in such a way that the predicate is fulfilled by an \( n \)-tuple of arguments of the proxy function always and only when the open sentence is fulfilled by the
it is only in a theory with an inconclusive universe, embracing \( U \) and \( V \), that we can make sense of the proxy function. The function maps \( U \) into \( V \) and, hence, needs all the old objects of \( U \) as well as their new proxies in \( V \). If the new objects happen to be among the old, so that \( V \) is a subclass of \( U \), then the old theory with universe \( U \) can itself sometimes qualify as the background theory in which to describe its own ontological reduction. But we cannot do better than that; we cannot declare our new ontological economies without having recourse to the uneconomical old ontology.¹

With this I rest the argument that the A-theorist is ontologically extravagant and that his argument invokes the plain, old-fashioned identity of indiscernibles. Two issues I have raised as yet remain corresponding \( n \)-tuple of values." Quine, *The Ways of Paradox*, p. 205.

¹Quine, "Ontological Relativity", *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. LXV, pp. 205, 206. That these remarks are directly applicable to the discussion of the relativity of identity is made obvious by Quine himself, for in the reprinting of this essay in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, he inserted ahead of the paragraph (which itself got expanded into six) preceding the part quoted, the example of people being reduced to income categories. And the way he presents it there is quite remarkable, for he seems to employ not only the idea of relative indiscernibility, but also the relativity of identity itself to the background theory. See *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, p. 55.

A further remark might be appropriate concerning the last sentence of the passage to which this note is appended; Quine rather neatly turns it from a predication into a *reductio ad absurdum* proof that the universe of \( U \) is excessive. But this can only work when there can be a proxy function, i.e., when the surplus universe is bloated by "hidden inflation", to use another of Quine's expressions (see "Implicit Definition Sustained", *The Ways of Paradox*, pp. 196-197), or more simply, when for any \( x \) and \( y \) made identical in the reduced theory, it is not the case that they were discernible in the old theory. This situation, of course, is precluded in the arguments used on behalf of the R-theorist.
undiscussed: how does the identity of indiscernibles figure in the R-theorist's position, and what is wrong with the principle anyway?

It might be suggested that the R-theorist is complicit in accepting the identity of indiscernibles, since he uses it in his argument against the A-theorist. But this would be mistaken; that aspect of the argument employs the fact that the A-theorist must accept it (why else would he reject two things being in all respects the same?), and then proceeds to show the unacceptable consequences for anyone who does accept it. The R-theorist need not accept it to do that. For him the crucial question is, given a theory with some true statements of the form "(x)(y)(x\#y \land Fx = Fy)", for any F in the theory, why does he take "x\#y" to express identity? As was argued at the beginning of this section, an I-predicate expresses only indiscernibility within the theory; then how does the R-theorist get from x and y both having all and only the same predicates of the theory true of them, to saying that they are the same? This question has only to be clearly formulated in order to see its answer, which is that the R-theorist does not say they are the same, but that they are the same, with respect to all of some set of predicates (or some predicate coextensive with them). Relativized identity is nothing else but an indiscernibility
predicate with reference to that with respect to which the indiscernibles are indiscernible.

What if, however, the R-theorist starts out with his theory, consisting of a standard logic, some primitive predicates and names, and some true statements, but not including any of the form "alb", and then proceeds to discover that whereas \((\exists x)(\exists y)(\exists t)\) has not been included amongst the true statements, nonetheless for some \(x\) and \(y\) it is the case upon inspection that for any predicate of the theory, \(\exists x \equiv \exists y\) (where "\(\equiv\)" schematizes the said predicates)? Should he go on to say that they are two indistinguishable objects, or should he, at this initial stage (i.e., this is not a case of examining a subset of some theory for which all of this has been settled), decide that "hidden inflation", from whatever source, should be exposed and exorcised? We might amplify this choice: he can (a) admit some statements like "alb" as being true, thus allowing there to be in the theory itself, not just in subsets of it, distinct indiscernible objects, or he can (b) recognize as distinct objects in the full theory only those objects which are discernible. The latter course need not oblige him to do the same for subsets: that would be tantamount to becoming an A-theorist. Yet it does involve him in an outright identification of indiscernibles, at least initially in the process of deciding what there is for the theory as a whole. Still,
the principle is only being used as a guide of sorts, and remains extra-theoretical. The other option, (a), could have been adopted anyway, and the principle not invoked in any sort of way.

Taking the second alternative, however, is probably more natural. After all, what is the point of having a needlessly prolix basic theory? Eliminating indiscernible duplicate objects at the beginning is a common-sense reduction of otiosity. In this exercise of identifying indiscernibles the R-theorist would appear to be in the same boat as the A-theorist—even though the latter makes such identifications at the least drop of a set of differentiating predicates within his theory. For the A-theorist as well, the principle is used as an extra-theoretical guide, a "maxim" as Quine calls it. We are brought, then, to face directly the principle of the identity of indiscernibles.

The difficulty with it, as is well known, is that it appears to be—-even if true—-merely contingent. It could be the case that there be different objects which have all their properties in common, even if in fact there are none. How then can the identity of indiscernibles be a logical principle, if it is not necessarily true? And if it is not a logical principle, why even use it as a maxim when building theories about how the world is?
As I mentioned in connection with Bradley on the identity of indiscernibles,¹ a common way to avoid this is to include spatial and temporal properties (or relations) as genuine, admissible properties (or relations) which designate some specific place or time (or some relation to such). This is just what we saw Wiggins doing in a passage I quoted above.² But pace Wiggins, Ayer, Bradley (perhaps), and others, I do not think that it works. Since the addition of spatio-temporal properties is supposed to individuate by containing designations of particular places and times, and since, as Wiggins indicates, much the same effect can be got by using predicates containing names of non-spatio-temporally defined individuals as well, this attempt to save the identity of indiscernibles can more generally be viewed as a lifting of the restrictions upon the predicates schematized by "&" in the "classical" version,

(34) \( \forall x \equiv \forall y : \exists x = y \),

so that dyadic predicates or higher which have at least one place filled by a name are included. For ease of reference, I shall schematize this enlarged set of predicates by "\( \forall \)", and state the principle as

(35) \( \forall x \equiv \forall y : \exists x = y \).

¹See above, Part I, Ch. I, 2, pp. 17ff.
²See above, this section, pp. 314-315.
It is this latter principle Wiggins claims to be true, while the former is at best only contingently true. As I have already argued, there is nothing amiss in allowing "constructed" predicates to be included in the set schematized by the predicate schema in the identity of indiscernibles; the trouble with (35) lies elsewhere.

A J. Ayer gets closer to the problem when he observes that if (35) is true, it is so trivially, because "=A", where "A" is a name for something, is in the range of "y", and is true only of A; likewise for every other object. Thus antecedent is false, and the whole conditional true. This kind of trivialisation, Ayer claims, is a consequence of admitting elements into the predicate expressions which are not "essentially general". When all such elements are replaced by general terms, the principle is no longer trivial. "Consequently," Ayer says,

an expression is, for our present purposes, to be accounted fully predicative only if all the demonstratives or individuating elements that it may contain are replaced by indefinite descriptions. And when it is claimed that objects can be differentiated only through their properties, or rather, that to speak of different objects can only be a way of speaking of different sets of properties, the only expressions that are to be regarded as designating properties are those that are fully predicative in this sense. When it is interpreted in this way, the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is still necessarily true, if it is true at all. . . .

1Ayer, "The Identity of Indiscernibles", Philosophical Essays, p. 29.
2Ibid., p. 30.
Ayer is claiming that the non-trivial cases of (35) are to be changed by substituting descriptions for their names, thus converting them into cases of (34), and it is (34) which he believes to be logically true. In this latter respect I think he is wrong and Wiggins correct. I shall come to that shortly. But in vitiating Wiggins' distinction by reducing (35) to (34), Ayer is on the right track. Only he does not go far enough. Wiggins' distinction, and the consequent possibility of spatial and temporal relations sufficing for individuation, at bottom amounts to fully general predicates on the one hand, and predicates with non-general elements on the other. But as I have contended that Bradley argued, and as I have been arguing ever since, there are no non-general terms. Proper names are general in the quite specific sense that they, like all words, have a function for which they can be used which depends upon their having meaning. The meaning of a proper name is a number of properties and relations the name implies which enables the identification of the object which the name is used to refer to.

But serving the purposes of an identification sufficient for communication is different from and falls short of total "in principle" isolation and individuation. No relation, property, or description can do that. As Ayer puts it, "... descriptions are essentially general; to describe anything is to attribute
to it a property of a certain sort, a property which is
capable, in theory, of being manifested in any number of
different contexts, whether or not it is so manifested
in fact. "\(^{1}\) Proper names, through their meanings,
'describe' things, and are in this sense essentially
general; it remains to be seen whether or not there is
any non-general sort of property which is not capable
of multiple manifestation.

The main point is that names (and as I shall argue,
demonstratives and definite descriptions as well), while
they permit reference to individual things, they do so
through a mechanism which by its nature is capable of
including more than the one object intended. They are
therefore general. Because of this, we do not have to
make substitutions to collapse (35) into (34)—it col¬
apses by itself. The distinction between them is actually
specious.

In a more recent work Ayer has moved closer to this
view, but still he talks in terms of an "abstract"
language from which all singular terms have been
"eliminated", and contrasts this with what he considers
a plausible, albeit not better warranted, "contextual"
or "referential" language. \(^{2}\) Much of his discussion
involves weighing the relative merits of each with

\(^{1}\)Ibid.

\(^{2}\)Ayer, "Names and Descriptions", The Concept of a
Person, ch. 5.
respect to various problems, and the upshot is that an "abstract" language, devoid of singular terms, is not only feasible, but also

the statements which are expressible in any contextual language can be adequately paraphrased in an abstract language, the mark of an abstract language being that nothing more is needed for the understanding of it than a knowledge of its semantic rules. . . . [Such a language will have an "anchor in reality"] if our language is such that its rules allow us to correlate its predicates with types of empirical situations. 1

I think this talk of relative merits and alternative possibilities is still too much of a concession to the intelligibility of viewing singular terms as non-general. Either such terms somehow internally guarantee that there is one and only one thing to which they can be used to refer, or they do not. How they could is beyond me; on the other hand, uniqueness of the referent is a precondition of being able to successfully refer to it. The meaning of the word we use in a successful act of reference must be sufficient to enable the speaker to identify that to which he refers (and sufficient also for the audience to do likewise, if communication is achieved). But how, it might be asked, can anyone "identify" something using purely general terms, short of claiming that a certain complex of properties—namely, all that a thing has—is sufficient for individuation? The underlying issue here is the difference between "identification" which is sufficient for

1 Ibid., p. 158.
communication (including, in a degenerate sense, to oneself), and identification as it figures in the identity of indiscernibles.

The former requires only enough knowledge of the thing to render ambiguity unlikely. If someone uses a name to refer to something, and realizes that his knowledge of the meaning of the name is slim enough not to settle to his own satisfaction just what he was talking about, or perhaps is asked by his audience whom he was referring to: this Smith (say), or that one, all he needs to do in such circumstances is to disambiguate who or what he meant; he can do this by (respectively) learning or specifying more about who or what he meant. This process would amplify his (or the audience's, as the case may be) understanding of the meaning of the word. In practice, of course, ambiguity is never so pernicious as to require a specification of all a thing's properties and relations, even were that possible. The difference between the two senses of identification lies mainly in the functions served; the former serves a practical function, and the latter a theoretical one.

The objection above appears to assume that it is possible to list all of a thing's properties and relations, that this will identify a unique individual, and that no other method will suffice. It rejects the practical possibility of communicating about individuals short of full theoretical individuation. Since we
obviously do sometimes communicate without ambiguity, the objection will be laid to rest if it can be shown that even theoretically individuation cannot be achieved by specifying the complete set of an individual's properties and relations. This is the same as denying the necessity of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles.

The most direct way to do this is to produce examples of what has been called mere "numerical" difference, since what denying the identity of indiscernibles really amounts to is saying that there could in fact be numerically distinct individuals whose properties are all the same. It is not supposed that different numerals correspond to each indiscernible object, for then they would be discernible. Numerical difference, as opposed to qualitative difference, is so called simply because two or more objects, whether discernible or not, together still comprise two or more objects, as the case may be.

Consider these examples: a universe consisting of two identical objects;¹ a larger universe which is radically symmetrical about some center; a cycle of

¹This example and the following one are suggested by Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles", Mind, vol. LXI; (page references are to its reprinting in Balis, Metaphysics, pp. 66-77; see pp. 69ff, and 74ff.). The next example and the last one are suggested by Ayer, Philosophical Essays, pp. 34, 32. The other three might be construed as cases of Strawson's "massive reduplication" of the universe; see Individuals, pp. 8ff.
universes which always has and always will continue endlessly to repeat itself exactly; a universe with one or more exact simultaneous counterparts somewhere totally apart from it (i.e., such that they are not spatially comparable--there being no possibility of a comprehensive "overview"); two or more universes like those in the last example, except that they have totally distinct and unrelatable times; two or more universes exactly alike even with respect to time and place; a universe consisting of an infinitely repeating series, which might be represented as \ldots BCDABCDAB \ldots . Each of these examples are such as to contain at least two indiscernible objects, and there seems to be no reason for identifying them other than the dogma of the identity of indiscernibles. Ayer tries to eliminate the examples by discrediting their intelligibility. He says that "such examples seem intelligible to us only because we tacitly introduce into them some further feature by reference to which we do in fact discern between the objects which we are supposing to be indiscernible."\textsuperscript{1}

But this just is not so. And he even admits as much for the example of the cyclical universe (the last example above):

\begin{quote}
There would, of course, be no way of describing any one term of the cycle so as to distinguish it from any other, but this, it may well be said, is no objection to their actually being, or even to their being thought to be, distinct.\textsuperscript{2}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1}Ayer, \textit{Philosophical Essays}, p. 32
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 34.
Indeed, it may well be said. I do not myself understand why Ayer thinks this example so unique. In none of the examples could there be any way of describing the relevant objects so as to distinguish them. When he suggests that we actually sneak in some distinguishing feature, he seems to be saying that we could not even imagine, let alone describe a universe without doing so. This is tantamount to saying that asserting there are distinct indiscernible objects is nonsense, and this because it is unverifiable. For either, he appears to be implying, there is some covert way of giving some empirical content to the claim that there are two, not one, objects, or else the claim makes no sense.¹ I have never been persuaded by this invasion of epistemology into ontology: why should we think that what is or might be, is limited to what is observably discernible? To put it another way, why should there not be some distinct yet indiscernible objects, even though ex hypothesi there is no observable nor even imaginable way of telling one from another? Ayer himself is more tolerant of this in his later work, where, having described a procedure for avoiding explicit uniqueness claims in identifying descriptions, he points out that it commits him only to Leibniz's Law, and not to its contraposition. He quotes

¹Reliance upon the verification criterion of meaningfulness is explicitly attributed to Ayer in Black's article, op. cit., p. 70.
with apparent approval Wittgenstein's remark from the *Tractatus* to the effect that claims of mere numerical difference at least make sense, even if they are never true, and says that on this view "we have to treat merely numerical differences as a primitive notion."^1

He then declines to discuss whether or not this is preferable to the identity of indiscernibles. But if he is prepared to admit that numerical difference can be a primitive notion, even though there may be arguments against accepting it as such, he seems to be committed to the logical possibility, at least, of objects distinct merely numerically, and that is enough to render the identity of indiscernibles contingent.

iv. Which Properties Constitute Meanings

The possibility of mere numerical difference renders the need to specify criteria for just what information is necessary and sufficient for identifying a particular object somewhat of a hopeless cause: none ever could be. But we still might ask what are the minimal conditions needed to explain the success we undoubtedly do have in communicating to others which things we are talking about. What, in other words, need a name mean in order to function as names do in our verbal activity? The possible answers are: a name must imply all of the

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properties of the thing named, some of them, or none of them. The latter possibility I have all along been arguing against, and I shall say nothing more about it. The other extreme can, I think, be more easily dispatched: if the universe is infinite, the meaning of every name would be infinite, and consequently no name could ever be fully understood. Even if the universe is not infinite, it is known to be immense, and each object in it will have more relations than we could ever hope to know. Again, therefore, names have meanings which 'passeth all understanding'. Of course, it could be held that this by itself is no problem, for if it is admitted that partial understandings of the meanings of names can sometimes still be sufficient for communication (as I am prepared to accept), why not all the time? Why not admit, that is, that we never better than partially understand the names we use?

First of all, I think such a move does injustice to what we normally take meanings to be. Quite generally, meanings of words are whatever enables us to use them in the regular ways we do. (This captures what is interesting in the slogan "meaning is use"; its misleading implication of identity, however, ignores the fact that theories of meaning are attempts to provide an explanation for the observation that our use of words betrays highly significant regularities.) It is peculiar, to say the least, that a concept employed in
explanations of how we use language eventually involves our having to admit that our use of that language is subject to regularity restrictions we can never know of. We normally, and more properly, think of meanings as being whatever in fact is needed to explain the linguistic behavior competence of language users. Claims that words have meanings which extend beyond the generalizations we need to describe the actual use of these words begin to look like the historically inveterate tendency towards ghosts, gods, and abstract ideas. Semantics has problems enough without all its elements being described as unknowable.

Secondly, this view would render all statements with a proper name as the subject expression analytic, since everything which could be said about an object is already implied by the name. Perhaps the conflict of this claim with the more modest view that many such statements are synthetic and a posteriori could be mitigated by distinguishing between "analytic" and "a priori", and saying that they are analytic a posteriori statements. Analytic, because the meaning of the predicate is part of (or excluded from) the meaning of the name, and a posteriori because the meanings of words are not innate—they must be learned through some sort of experience. The truth or falsity of any given statement about an individual must be somehow ascertained empirically, and this allows us to say that while any
statement of the type we are considering is analytically true or false, that it is one or the other must first be discovered—i.e., it is an a posteriori statement.

This defense of the analyticity of all proper name statements may appear to be workable, even if somewhat strange. But appearances can deceive. What is being learned on this view when we discover a posteriori that a proper name statement is true or false, is part of the meaning of the proper name. It was no slip when it was said above quite generally that the meanings of words are not innate; if proper name statements are called a posteriori because however much of the meanings of proper names we know has to be learned from experience, the same can be said for all statements, and not just those whose subject expressions are proper names. Obviously we learn the use of all our words from our experience of the world around us—which includes, of course, other language users—and therefore there are no a priori statements at all. This seems to be a worse situation than the original admission that all proper name statements are analytic. It all follows from the objectionable literalistic interpretation of "a posteriori" as "knowable as true or false only if there is anything at all from experience required for that knowledge". The sense in which typical examples of non-empirical statements are said not to be a posteriori is more restricted than that. It has never, to my knowledge,
been claimed that no experience of any kind is necessary for someone to be in a position to know or affirm that some a priori statement is true or false.

If the argument being examined does seriously suggest and insist upon such an interpretation of the a priori/a posteriori distinction, in spite of its historical eccentricity, it can have the words. But this new terminology will not remove the substance of the original objection, which was that some proper name statements actually do enrich what we know about the things named, often, in fact, far beyond what we know about them as a result of achieving the ability to communicate by employing expressions to refer to them. Thus we have, roughly, two kinds of proper name statements (beyond the epistemologically preliminary ones from which we in part learn the names): those which repeat what we already must know in order to use the names, and those which inform beyond that. Using old words or new ones, we still have a distinction.

Perhaps a different interpretation of "a posteriori" could be given to capture the second kind of proper name statement without capturing all statements; the onus is on the advocate of the analyticity of all proper name statements. In the absence of any such proposal, I shall maintain the Kantian claim that a posteriori statements are synthetic. Apart from finding no motivation for taking all proper name statements to be analytic--beyond
a metaphysical fondness for grand simplicities—there is still the objection I made earlier, that it is rather mystical and in any case mystifying to be told that certain perfectly ordinary, much used, and basic words have meanings, the analysis and understanding of which are a practical impossibility.

If we are to discover what has to be attributed to names in the way of meanings in order to explain their function in communication, we can rule out already the extreme proposals: that any statement in which a proper name occurs as a subject entails none, or all of the statements which have been or ever could be made with the name so occurring. The sole option is that some, but not all, such statements are entailed, and the obvious question is: can we restrict, in a fully general way, this set of 'some' statements which for a given name is constitutive of its meaning?

Let us consider briefly a proposal made by Geach. It arises in connection with his argument for the meaningfulness of proper names, which I compared to one from Bradley at the beginning of the section above on identity. Geach says that

for any proper name there is some interpretation of "X" such that we can truly say "the continued application of this proper name requires, as part of the meaning of the name, that it be always applied to the same X".¹

This "X", he says, expresses the nominal essence, but it is not clear to me why he says that it is only part of the meaning of the name, since he adds in the next paragraph that

I hold that the sense of a proper name never includes anything about the individual peculiarities of its bearers.1

If "river" expresses a nominal essence of the Thames, this would eliminate such general terms as "flows past London", or "is polluted" from expressing part of the sense of "Thames". It would seem that only those general terms truly applicable to all rivers could express part of the meaning. But would not all general terms applicable to all rivers ("flows downhill", "has a mouth", etc.) express nominal essences of the Thames--and of all other rivers as well? And since the general terms applicable to all rivers, together with those applicable to some (individual peculiarities) or none (irrelevancies) exhaust the supply of general terms, the nominal essences of the Thames would have to be its name's whole meaning--there are no other general terms which could be a further part.

I suspect Geach would reply that a thing has only one nominal essence, and that is why a nominal essence furnishes only part of the meaning of its name. I say this because he uses the phrase "the nominal essence"

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1Ibid. See also his Reference and Generality, p. 44.
on several occasions, suggesting that he does think each
name to convey only one, even though he nowhere says
so outright. But I do not see how he could limit the
number of nominal essences a name conveys to just one,
for nominal essences are defined functionally as that
expressed by general terms which can be used to identify
the same something-or-other on different occasions, and
they have nothing to do with "real essences". Thus any
general term which affords a criterion for the reiden-
tification of an object as the same object as before
will express a nominal essence conveyed by the name of
that object. Clearly many general terms can serve that
function for any given object. Moreover, many general
terms which express individual peculiarities can also
serve the purposes of reidentification—indeed, often
the more peculiar they are the better they serve those
purposes. But this means that we no longer have any
very useful way of deciding which of a thing's properties
are, and which are not, conveyed as part of the meaning
of its name.

I do think that if nominal essences are to be par-
celed out one to each object, Geach is right in holding
them to be only a part of the meaning of their respective
names. For the meaning of a proper name is rather inti-
mately connected with the typically numerous identifying
descriptions used to figure out, remember, and communi-
cate just which thing a name ordinarily names. The
whole meaning of a name, in other words, is not to be found in only one of the named thing's properties. On the other hand, we perhaps ought to be more charitable to Geach's stricture against including "anything about the individual peculiarities" of a thing into the meaning of its name than I appeared to be above, for certainly some of any thing's properties will not be relevant to its name's meaning. We would not, for example, wish generally to include as part of the meaning of a name properties known only to an extremely small fraction of the users of the name (through contextual acquaintance perhaps). Meanings of all words, including proper names, must be objective, at least in the important sense that they are potentially accessible to any would-be user of the word. There are, however, many notorious difficulties surrounding the whole idea of "objectivity". I shall forego the more metaphysical ones, and look instead at those likely to cause the meticulous lexicographer some trouble.

Suppose we wanted to give an account of the word "mass" as it is used in classical physics; the idea of "potential" accessibility used above is crucial here, for the meaning of "mass" is not available to anyone who has not learned Newtonian mechanics, although anyone could learn it (subject to certain trivial qualifications). So if we were to try to discover what "mass" means, we would have to restrict our inquiry to those
who know Newtonian mechanics, i.e., to those who are the "typical" users of the term. But how shall we decide who is to be included in this typical group: Newton only, famous physicists since Newton (who have sometimes disagreed about something so basic as mass), any student in first-year mechanics, or who? Even the most technically employed term is subject to dispute and alteration.

Were this question settled we would still have to restrict our inquiry in some way to the "normal" usage of these typical users, for any of them might on some occasion use the term in a quite different (perhaps colloquial, or ironic) way. Although we may well want to exclude such occurrences from our survey of what "mass" primarily means, how to formulate the general procedure is not so clear. (I suspect that the operating lexicographical method is sheer intuition.)

Further, of the typical users we need an "average" assortment, i.e., one indifferent to any significant way of classifying them, for bias towards some special subgroup of the typical users could introduce distortions into our assessment of what the term means. For the highly technical term I have been using as an example, this appears to be a minimal problem. (Perhaps we should worry about 'philosophical' issues which might divide physicists, such as the discernibility of mass and inertia, or the intelligibility of "virtual", or non-detectable, masses.) But for many other words
(e.g., "poor", "God", "freedom", "fair", "national interest", "tasty"), avoiding economic, theological, political, moral, or gastronomic bias is exceedingly difficult.

Finally, it is important that the normal usage of the average typical user of the word be one found within "standard" contexts, for non-standard and unusual contexts may permit the attachment of an idiosyncratic meaning for the purposes at hand. Two physicists, e.g., might in the course of a discussion of particle theory constantly talk about the "mass" of an electron, meaning by that its rest mass. But we would be misled if we were to include what they said about rest mass into our general account of "mass" itself.

I do not pretend that this is a complete list of the problems that would face anyone who attempted to determine what a word means from the way people use it. But they are problems we are all, as language users, involved in, and each of us decides them or accepts others' decisions on authority (be it from our parents, peers, dictionaries, or whatnot). The main point I wish to press, however, is that the situation is no better and no worse for the meanings of proper names.

If we set out to discover the meaning of a name by looking at its uses, we are at the very least limited to the uses made by those who have used the
name at least once. But that is too generous. We need somehow to limit our survey to those who have not just repeated the name or mentioned it spontaneously, for neither of the latter could be a source of genuine knowledge about what the name names. We need to restrict ourselves to "typical" users of the name. But how do we exclude some users as "atypical", especially with regard to names used by many who have practically no knowledge or only meagre second-hand knowledge of the thing named? That I have no answer is why I am driven to talk of "typical" users of names.

But any typical user of some name might upon one occasion or another use the name in an abnormal way—he might sarcastically refer to a local poet as "Byron", or flatteringly refer to the town beauty as "Venus". Characteristics garnered from such uses can in general play no role in our determination of the meanings of names; we can consider only "normal" uses. But at best I could only provide an ad hoc list of abnormal uses to be excluded with no illusion that it would be complete.

The typical users of a name, from whom we are to figure out what the name means, must be not any sample of them, but an "average" one. It should not reflect any bias due to views held by an inordinately large proportion of the members of the sample, such as might be found concerning "Marx", e.g., from a survey done
mostly in Arizona, or "God" from a survey in Sicily. How one is to ascertain a proper balance of views, and of what views, I am not sure. We all do, however, make judgements about what is an average sample of typical users of a name, just as we do for any word. How we ought to go about it is the problem.

Even if we were to figure out who the average typical users of names were and what their normal uses were, we would still have to worry about special situations where an unusual use of a name is temporarily employed by virtue of extra, added meaning. The situations I have in mind are those in which mutual understanding of which thing is being referred to by the name is achieved through some local contextual characteristics the thing has being adopted as sufficiently identifier. But these characteristics can be (and often are) extremely local, and cannot, therefore, be part of the name's meaning; meanings must derive from "usual" (i.e., non-contextually dependent) uses.

Putting all these qualifications together, we might say that the meaning of a proper name must be found among those properties of the named thing which reflect the normal use of that name by an average assortment of its typical users for purposes of identification and reidentification, within usual contexts. As much can also be said for words in general. I do not at present know how to be more specific than that.
It might be suggested that we could employ statistical methods to determine in advance what we mean by "normal", "typical", "average", and "usual". Speaking generally about all words, we might say that a minimal (i.e., a not necessarily complete) set of properties implied by any given word would be those which at least \( X\% \) (where \( X \) is determined by bell curves and the like) of the users of the word do deem to be necessary if the use of the word is not to become incomprehensible. At least two factors in this formulation, however, are genuine sources of trouble: how should we sharpen "incomprehensible" into an adequate criterion, and who (yet again) are "the users of the word"? (Although there are problems for meanings of words in general, my remarks below will be confined to proper names, since they are what I am principally interested in here.)

All of us are constantly learning more about many individuals. How do we decide when what we learn is definitory of the thing, and hence part of what its name should mean, or rather that it is and should remain simply further information about it, information which were it to prove inaccurate would not affect our understanding of which thing it is, but would affect only what we thought about that thing? Consider an example—suppose we knew a little about Homer, the blind poet, and then found out that he did not write both the *Iliad*
and the *Odyssey*. Prior to our believing that to be true would have to be our tacit agreement that the use of "Homer" in such a statement is comprehensible. But whether we thought it comprehensible or not would depend upon whether we thought that the meaning of "Homer" involved "wrote both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey". Of course if we did think it incomprehensible, yet had independent evidence that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were not written by the same man (such as word frequency and distribution studies), we could revise what we took "Homer" to mean, and count our discovery as true. The meanings we attach to words need not be impervious to facts. But we must recognize that it would be incomprehensible to use the name "Homer" in the two incompatible ways suggested. The only trouble is that comprehensibility and incomprehensibility depend upon the meanings we attach to names, and so cannot furnish an independent criterion. Moreover, the example exploits incompatibility as the basis of the incomprehensibility, and clearly that is not sufficient for establishing the minimal set of properties necessary for a comprehensible use of the name. For on the basis of compatibility alone we know that no given property and its negation can be without incomprehensibility implied by a word, and this applies to all properties (at least, with regard to any specific word, all properties within certain specific "categories"). Incompatibility, then, over-
determines the set: it would include all properties the thing has, not just those somehow 'essential' to it with regard to how it is usually identified by those who have occasion to refer to it by name. Some stronger restriction is necessary, and what that might be I do not know. I suspect that the most simple procedure for actually operating the method suggested above would be to try to discover sets of statements, with the name in question as subject, which as a whole are rejected as incomprehensible, and then to try to isolate more specifically which are the offending juxtapositions. This, presumably, would reveal what a sample of the users of a name considered the meaning of the name to be, using an observationally simple acceptance/rejection indication of comprehensibility.

As to the problem of who are the users of the name, I do not have even a plausible answer. Clearly the sample cannot be random, for the responses of anyone totally ignorant of what the name means would be irrelevant, and too many names are not known to too many people. But while subjects totally ignorant of the name (i.e., of what the name is used to refer to) could easily be eliminated from the sample, those who know the meaning of the name only partially could not be so easily dealt with. In fact, for many names there are vast numbers of people who fall into this group, and how could we separate those with an inadequate, from those with an
adequate (if partial) grasp of the name (the so-called 'users of the name'), without appealing to some previously established meaning of the name? (Imagine the situation: "We cannot use him in our example—he thinks 'Kant' implies 'wrote the Tractatus'. We can use him however, because he thinks it implies 'wrote the Critique of Impractical Ideas'!")

Perhaps if a large enough sample were used, the properties arising due to ignorance of the name would be random enough to be sufficiently infrequent so as not to be found among X% of the sample. That is, however, as much a hope as a guess.

Regardless of the adequacy of my tentative proposals for the solutions to these problems, it remains that they are not special to one who holds that proper names have meanings. They are, rather, problems for the theory of meaning generally. As such, they can cast no doubt on the view that proper names do have meanings, and that as a consequence, statements with proper names as their subject are general.
CHAPTER II. DEMONSTRATIVES AND DESCRIPTIONS

This chapter will be considerably briefer than the preceding one, for I think that the chief burden upon one who advocates the generality of the proposition is in establishing that proper names have meaning. Also, the main framework and the requisite distinctions for elucidating and supporting that claim do not need to be repeated here, only presupposed. Consequently, my central concern will be to specify in what sense statements with demonstratives or descriptions as subjects are general, and to discuss certain issues which naturally arise, including several which have been raised by others.

1. Demonstratives

In the last chapter I argued that so-called singular statements containing proper names as subjects are general because proper names are not singular terms, singular terms being such as to require that they are somehow connected to one and only one existing thing. That proper names are singular terms I called the denotation theory, and I opposed to it the connotative theory, which says that proper names presuppose certain properties, and that these properties are what enable us to refer to things by using their names. More strictly, they are what enable us to be assured that we can isolate from amongst all the things in the world that
to which we or someone else refers by name. For purposes of communication we frequently depend upon tangential and circumstantial—'contextual'—properties, and even upon the simple faith that it must be some one particular thing, even if we cannot figure out which, because his speech behavior, which we trust, indicates that he has some special thing in mind.

This kind of communicatory trust is quite common, and I would be the last to object to its common use in our talk (my intent has never been revisionary). It is parasitic, however, on better methods of identification. And contextual considerations represent no real advance towards a satisfactory explanation for our success in understanding one another either. Talk about context is useful only insofar as it is construed as talk about the nonlinguistic recognition of certain states verbally representable as complex general terms. (I call them 'complex' because they typically contain components which are traditionally thought of as singular terms—proper names, demonstratives, and descriptions. But if the over-all argument I am making is correct, these components do not involve non-generality at all, so the qualification 'complex' could be dropped.)

For names of things we are acquainted with, or things not too remotely related to what we are acquainted with, and which moreover are not so well known as to be famous (i.e., whose names are fairly restricted with regard to
their typical users)---for these names (which, incidently, includes for most if not all people most of the names they know) it is most often the case that their meanings will include contextual properties corresponding to these "complex" general terms. Of course communication can succeed when either the speaker or hearer or both have only a minimal grasp of the meaning of the name used, or even if both only knew of some (not necessarily the same) contextual property which, for all they know, has only one instance. But one is inclined to regard such cases as consequences of luck more than anything else. For if we ask the speaker or hearer: just which thing was referred to?, and get no better answer than some general term we know to be severally applicable, our reaction is likely to be: but which one?

So long as this kind of question is reasonable, it is reasonable to doubt that the attempted reference has been successful. Just having mentally intended or wished to refer to something, and having exploited the usual linguistic formula for referring, is no guarantee. If figuring out which thing was intended is as much a problem for the speaker as it might be for any potential hearer, we ought properly to be reluctant to admit that anything more than an attempt to refer was accomplished. To the extent that the question "which one?" is allayed, the respondent can identify that to which he wants to refer. Having communicated does not entail
that the communicants could, in any situation, successfully refer to what they are communicating about. They could do that only if they could identify the referent, i.e., could always isolate it from everything else plausibly confused with it. But being able to do that is to know the meaning of its name.

However, while a connotative account of proper names shows us how we can in practice communicate to each other regarding specific individuals, it shows us how in principle (ultimately via the contingency of the identity of indiscernibles) proper names remain incapable of guaranteeing the uniqueness and existence of what we ever use any specific proper name to talk about. We can use proper names to refer because they have meanings, and because of the general nature of their meanings communication may falter; in practice it never need do so irreparably, but theoretically it must always, for the simple reason that no set of characterizations can claim unique instantiation (or, for that matter, instantiation itself, i.e., existence; this aspect is rather trivial for proper names, but not so for descriptions).

In the same way, demonstratives are general too. That is, they each have a meaning, and by that fact are not singular terms. As a consequence of the extraordinary lack of specificity in the meanings of all demonstratives, a secondary argument as to their
generality can be mounted. They are at opposite poles from proper names in this respect; the meaning of a proper name is such as to hopefully (albeit vainly) capture one thing, while the meanings of demonstratives are such as to capture almost anything, although not all at once. This last qualification reveals something essential about all demonstratives, but if we temporarily ignore it, we can focus upon the former fact, and argue that since "me" can be used by different people, on a variety of occasions, that "this" is used then for one, now another thing, that "these" become "those", that one person's "here" is another's "there"—that because of all this and more the words concerned could not ever be thought of as words designating some one, and not any other, object. They are multiply applicable, hence general.

Bradley uses such an argument, and I think it is an appropriate one.\(^1\) It is secondary, however, because while it is true that we can all use "me", it ignores that aspect of demonstratives mentioned above, their 'onleness'. Nonetheless, it is a sufficient reply to Russell's early view that demonstratives are the paradigm, if not the only (logically proper) names.\(^2\) For demonstratives, but no proper name, can be (univocally) used to refer to different things.

\(^1\) See above, p. 138.
\(^2\) See above, p. 199.
It is interesting that Russell eventually felt the force of this argument, and even adopted it against his earlier view:

The word "this" is one word, which has, in some sense, a constant meaning. But if we treat it as a mere name, it cannot have in any sense a constant meaning, for a name means merely what it designates, and the designation of "this" is continually changing.¹

Bradley, of course, was very alive to the peculiarities of "this"; he recognised that in any one particular use of "this" we intentionally mean to exclude all those other situations in which "this" is ever used. But he tried to render the 'lonliness' of the demonstrative a semantical matter. He tried, that is, to force into the meanings of demonstratives a notion of "presence" which--while remaining an idea, and hence universal--was essentially particular, and as such could not "be true elsewhere".² When discussing this view of Bradley's I argued that it was a consequence of confusing meaning as implied universals, with meaning as object intended, or 'that had in mind'. In using a demonstrative to refer, one has in mind a particular object to which one wants to refer, but the language has limitations as a vehicle of reference through meanings in the former and (linguistically) only proper sense. Demonstratives, at

¹Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. 109. There remains in this passage, however, the objectionable view that names mean what they are used to refer to.
²See above, pp. 140-145.
the opposite pole of specificity from proper names, capture so much that a proper understanding of their role in communication is impossible without some account of the contexts of their specific uses, which is just a simple way of saying that in any situation of communication involving demonstrative reference, more of the individuating characteristics of the thing being referred to (beyond those connoted by the demonstrative itself) are assumed to be understood as being obvious, than would be so assumed were a name to be employed instead. Understanding a particular demonstrative reference ought, then, to be capable of being represented as an explicit account of those assumed characteristics which implicitly figure in our identification of the referent.

Having become aware of the general nature of demonstratives, Russell did not lose his earlier appreciation of their particularity. In fact he still retained it as a criticism of considering them as purely general.

The passage above quoted continues:

If, on the other hand, we treat "this" as a concealed description, e.g., "the object of attention" it will then always apply to everything that is ever a "this", whereas in fact it never applies to more than one thing at a time.¹

It is curious that such a persistent and ardent critic of Bradley's should have succumbed to the very same temptation: describing demonstratives as meaning

(for Russell, "applying to") only one thing. Russell, admittedly, did not try to talk of particular ideas. His move was vaguely in the right direction, which is away from the constant meanings of the words. I do not propose to discuss his view, because it is unclear just what it is; most of his discussion at the relevant place is preoccupied with giving a causal account of the differences between "this" and "that", and he merely asserts that the meaning of "this" has to be found in some causal process directly connected with a perception. Which perception (this one, or that one maybe?) is left unexplored.

Bradley was far more aware of the difficulties connected with the 'oneness' of demonstratives, for his proposal was overtly desperate. There is simply no way to avoid the fact that our use of demonstratives is such as to allow many this's, that's, here's, and now's, no matter how specific our thoughts might be, no matter how 'present' the things be nor whatever their physical connections with us might be.

It is true, as Russell emphasizes from a different perspective, that we intend to refer to one thing (or group of things) at a time when we use demonstratives,

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1 Russell, ibid., p. 111. His words are: "What is true is that "this" depends upon the relation of a user of a word to the object with which the word is connected", and from the ensuing discussion it is clear that the relation is taken to be a causal one.
and how we manage to communicate our intentions is a matter of genuine interest. But it cannot be a matter solely of the meanings of the demonstratives themselves. The most we can attribute to the meaning of any demonstrative (in this respect of singularity) is the idea of "thisness", as Bradley called it. "Thisness, if we like, we may call particularity."\(^1\) It is the idea itself of singularity, or uniqueness as I should like to put it for reasons which will emerge in the next section; and while the thing which is unique is not the word or its meaning, but the thing to which we wish to refer, uniqueness is an idea: it belongs "to the content, and is the general character of every appearance in space or time."\(^2\) Russell came very close to this formulation, and to that extent he was right:

There is obviously a general concept involved, namely "object of attention", but something more than this general concept is required in order to secure the temporary uniqueness of "this".\(^3\)

Both Russell and Bradley recognized that including the idea of uniqueness, or particularity, in the meaning of "this" is insufficient to explain the communication of which particular, unique thing we intend to refer to, and Russell's course is more plausible than Bradley's, since almost any would be. (More charitably, Russell

\(^1\) Bradley, PL, p. 65.

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Russell, op. cit., p. 111.
seems to be saying something roughly true, even if it gets us nowhere nearer to an explanation of how we communicate.) But both of them fail to recognize that any adequate account of what demonstratives mean, as opposed to what we mean (i.e., intend) when we use demonstratives to refer to something, must include the idea of uniqueness, but cannot provide for the actual particularity of the thing itself. Meanings, after all, are essentially general, even when their purpose is to claim outright that they are uniquely instantiated. This is an implicit purpose of demonstratives, and an explicit one for some descriptions (for all of them according to Russell), and I shall postpone my comments on this latter consideration until I come to descriptions themselves. For the time being, I would only point out that to seek any source of particularity within the meaning of any demonstrative would be to look for limits of applicability for the demonstrative in question beyond the limits imposed by that aspect of its meaning which does not involve uniqueness, such as "within some (spatially or figuratively) near context" for "this", "belonging or pertaining to the speaker" for "my", or "within the time-stretch (or a reasonable extension of it) of this utterance" for "now", etc. Any such limits could be readily falsified with examples.

In summary, demonstratives are used to refer to specific things, just as proper names are. For the
same reasons that account for the occasional failure to get across just which thing we are referring to with a name, we cannot expect to isolate some component within the meanings of demonstratives which captures just that thing we want, on any occasion, to refer to. The best we can do is to count as part of the meaning of any demonstrative that it be used, on each occasion of its use, to refer to some particular thing or other. "Particularity" is part of its meaning, but nothing in particular is. Names are quite otherwise, for their meanings do make a fair stab at isolating that to which they are used to refer. And while a uniform account of the general nature of their meanings might plausibly be sought, no such uniform account could be given of the nonlinguistic, or contextual (which is not to say non-general), requisites of communication. The contextual demands of names are often minimal, of demonstratives usually maximal, and therein lies their important differences. These differences should not obscure the salient fact that from the point of view of their meanings, demonstratives are, like proper names, general. The confusion over the ambiguity in "meaning" which put Bradley's analysis askew (and which, as an early doctrine of Russell's, returned to haunt his in other respects superior later view), ought to be considered secondary to the main thrust of his argument that the proposition is general, because no component of it is not.
2. Descriptions

The only element yet to be considered in making good the claim at the end of the section above is the definite description. Bradley had nothing to say about it—apparently he never considered it a recognizable and problematic category. However, in his principle work—roughly contemporary with Bradley's Principles of Logic—Frege recognized it as a type of expression which could be the logical subject of a proposition, and he was aware of the complications descriptions pose when nothing or more than one thing fit the description.

No matter how prone we are to use it, being in the wrong tradition is ultimately a rather lame excuse for an inadequate analysis. But that matter is minor; what is important is that no discussion of singular terms and generality can ignore descriptions, and particularly, Russell's claims about them.

In the midst of these claims is a criticism of Frege which has generated some considerable controversy,† and I do not propose to enter the lists. It remains beyond doubt that Frege thought of definite descriptions as singular terms with an analysable structure, the important part of which is a specific general characteristic of which it is supposed to be true that only one thing has that characteristic. If this is the case, 

†For further reference, see the reviews by Kaplan, Journal of Symbolic Logic, v. 34, 1969, pp. 142-145.
the description refers to that thing; if not, it refers to a specific (and rather complex) set.\(^1\) The interesting difference between Russell and Frege is their methods for handling the failure of the indiscernibility of identicals (i.e., the substitutivity of identicals) in intensional contexts. Linskoy has explored this aspect of their divergence quite fully, and has satisfactorily established, in my opinion, both that the scope devices proposed in "On Denoting" and employed in *Principia Mathematica* were designed to meet the truth-functional problems of intensional contexts, and that they are inadequate for this purpose.\(^2\)

I mention all of this only for the negative purpose of removing these issues from our present consideration. Neither Russell's comprehension of Frege, nor the adequacy of his handling of the principle of substitutivity has any direct bearing upon the question of generality. On both Frege's and Russell's view, indeed, the definite description is understood, roughly, as a general term with one, but only one thing satisfying it. Frege's move is to construe descriptions as by definition being singular terms, and by some rather ad hoc definitions in the *Grundgesetze* he achieves

\(^1\) Frege, *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic* (tr. Furth), 11. For more on this interpretation, see the next footnote but one.

\(^2\) Linskoy, Referring, ch. V: "Extensionality and Description", pp. 67-84 (with the appendix).
something more or less to this effect. Russell's move is to analyse statements in which definite descriptions are the subjects as only ostensibly containing them as subjects: really, they are a conjunction of statements

1The ad hoc character of Frege's choice for the referent of an empty description has been the source of a variety of proposals for a better referent. (See, e.g., Scott, "Existence and Description in Formal Logic", Bertrand Russell, Philosopher of the Century (ed. Schoenman), pp. 181-200. I might add that Scott's motivation, at least with respect to Frege, is based upon the misinterpretation of Frege's "Wertverlauf" as meaning the set of objects which fall under a concept—those objects which as arguments to the concept yield as value the True. Only thus could Scott say that for Frege, "the £" denotes the null class when there are no £. All such proposals, however, labor under the illusion that our inability to refer using certain descriptions ought to be remedied by gifting us with unexpected things to refer to. Furthermore, the positively eccentric nature of Frege's proposal becomes apparent upon considering that "the golden mountain is a range" and "the set which is not a set, is a set" are both true. "Range" in the first statement translates "Wertverlauf", following Russell (Principles of Mathematics, section 484) and Wells ("Frege's Ontology", The Review of Metaphysics, IV, 1951, pp. 537-573, section II); Furth translates it "course-of-values" ("Introduction", Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic (tr. Furth), p. liiv). The second statement exploits Well's and Furth's explanation of what Frege's range (or course-of-values) is: it is, for some function £©, the set of ordered pairs, each consisting of first an argument for £©, and secondly the value of £© for that argument. (Wells, ibid.; Furth, op. cit., pp. xxxvi-xxxvii.) Definite descriptions are thought of by Frege as expressions consisting of "the" followed by an expression for a concept, concepts being functions whose values are truth-values for any object as argument. Definite descriptions can therefore be understood as themselves being functions with values defined in accordance with certain restrictions on their arguments, the value in any specific case being what the description denotes. Frege defines this function so that if one and only one object £ falls under the concept of £©, the expression "the £" shall denote £; if no object or more than one falls under £©, "the £" shall denote the range which
to the effect that there does exist a thing so described, that there is only one, and that it moreover has the property ascribed to it by the rest of the statement.¹

Both Frege and Russell think of the definite description is, respectively, either the set of ordered pairs obtained by pairing every object with the False, or the set obtained by pairing every object with the False except those objects which fall under $\exists x$ and pairing those with the True. The function $\neg \exists x$ Frege actually defines as a substitute for the definite description cannot be directly compared to expressions of the form "the $\exists x$", because while its values are defined to correspond to the objects denoted by such expressions, its arguments in no direct way correspond to anything which might follow (or might be thought to be expressed by what might follow) the "the". In other words, $\neg \exists x$ is not a symbolic substitute for "the". The ersatz description $\neg \exists x$ is a function, whose value is either the object which falls under $\exists x$, or else, when no or no single object falls under $\exists x$, it is the argument itself, which is a range as previously described. Presumably, then, since there is no object which falls under the concept what is a set only if it is not a set, the value of $\neg \exists x$ for that concept is the range of that concept, which is the set of all ordered pairs whose second member is the False. Thus "the set which is not a set" denotes a set, making "the set which is not a set, is a set"--our second example above--denote the True.

¹ Some important qualifications might be observed by saying that *14.01* in *Principia Mathematica*, "\$y(x)(\exists x)\$" is defined as "$(\exists x)(y)(\exists x \equiv x = y \cdot \forall x)". (The quotation marks represent mention conventions, not quotation ones; I have adopted the implicit convention for description scopes which Russell and Whitehead suggest immediately below *14.01*, and the now common use of variable letters from the end of the alphabet.) The defining expression can easily be shown to entail $(\exists x)(\exists x \cdot (y)(x \neq y \cdot \exists y) \cdot \forall x)\$, whose meaning in English could hardly be better expressed than in the statement to which this note is appended.
as a kind of expression which by its nature involves a unique existing thing in the world. The idea that any linguistic expression could demand this I labeled as pernicious at the outset of Part II, and have been arguing against ever since. There are no linguistic forms which can legitimately stipulate their own unique instantiation either covertly or (as I shall come to below) explicitly.

The pressure of this fact drove Frege and Russell into stratagems of avoidance. They both reasoned that since a statement with a definite description which failed somehow in one or the other of these respects could not be true, all that is needed is some account of why they are false. Frege said in effect that "the King of France is bald" is false because it is false that a certain (or, for that matter, any) class is bald. Russell thought it false because he thought that "there exists a King of France" is false. But while it is true that no class is bald, and that there is no King of France, it does not follow that "the King of France is bald" is false. An attempt to use a certain combination of words to state a fact may fail for a variety of reasons, only one of which is that there is no such fact. To represent all such cases as attempts to assert that some specific state of affairs which does not obtain, does obtain, is to put an arbitrary straight-jacket upon explanations of statement failure. It is
close, if not tantamount, to the imposition of a fact/false-fact dichotomy, a metaphysical extravagance to which Russell, at least, has declared himself sensitive.

Another way statements might fail in their purpose has been well understood since Strawson's discussion of "On Denoting". He points out that if an expression cannot be successfully used to refer, because the conditions for successfully achieving a reference are not satisfied, then any statement using that expression as a subject fails.¹ Strawson says that any such failed statement is neither true nor false (actually, that it is not a statement, since statements are made only by uttering a true or false sentence—sentences cannot be used to make a statement otherwise), and it has sometimes been thought that the issue between Russell and Strawson could be reduced to and resolved by deciding on an intuitive, or perhaps an empirical basis whether utterances such as "the King of France is bald" are false or in some limbo between truth and falsity. This is silly. It ignores entirely the substantive matter of Strawson's criticism, namely that assertion and entailment are confused in Russell's analysis with the conditions for successfully referring. If we say that "the King of France is bald", it is not the case that

we have in part said that "there now exists a King of France", nor that a purely logical deduction can produce it (page #14.21 in *Principia Mathematica*). What we can say is that if we utter the former set of words, we can hope to have said something true (or even false) only if we managed to refer to some one existing thing by using the expression "the King of France" when we used it as the subject. No general term can require its own unique actual instantiation. That they might, motivated both the idea that descriptions are not general, and that being not general they must contain within themselves their own denial of plurality and vacuity. To show in detail just how they contain these denials was, then, all Russell needed to do in order to complete his theory of descriptions. But surely we do not need such drastic measures as the elimination of all definite descriptions from the category of expressions which can be used to refer, only to allow them to sneak back into subject positions through the back door of "theoretically superfluous" definitions; nor such improbable fishing about for objects to be denoted by nonconformist descriptions. As a class, descriptions are expressions which can be used to refer, but not all are such as to be capable of being used successfully to refer. To be able to use one to do that, it must be possible to identify that which is being referred to, and that cannot be done unless the thing being referred to is a
thing, i.e., it exists, and is in some sense uniquely isolable from other things.

Does this mean that any statement fails which has as a subject a definite description that, as a general term, applies to no or more than one thing? We must, in general, answer no on both counts. If statement failure is contrasted with a statement's being either true or false, it should be admitted that general statements which are analytically true (such as \((x)(x = x)^1\)), are true even in the possible worlds where any non-selfcontradictory, yet empty, description could furnish a substitution instance. Suppose, for example, that actually there were no swimmers; it would nonetheless not be a statement failure, but true to say that the fastest swimmer is the fastest swimmer. It is true because there could be no fastest swimmer who was not the fastest swimmer, not merely because there is a fastest swimmer (which ex hypothesi, there is not). Statements can be made whose function is not to pick out some part of the world and then to declare that some characteristic, beyond those the knowledge of which is needed to identify which part of the world had been intended, is true of it. Statements can be made whose function is to describe linguistic or conceptual connections, and their truth or falsity is independent of

\[1\text{Theorem 182 in Quine, Mathematical Logic.}\]
the existence of things, and of there existing one and only one such described thing. Our example above can easily and naturally be understood as a claim to the effect that if something were to be described by the expression "the fastest swimmer" when it occurs on the left of the identity sign, then it must be described by that same expression when it occurs on the right. If anything is true that should be, yet no assertion of an existential character has been made. So at least some statements with empty descriptions as subjects are not examples of statement failure.

The question remains concerning statements whose definite description subjects are not uniquely applicable—are they all failures? Reading "On Denoting" tends to cause myopia in this direction, for the examples are almost all descriptions pertaining to one or no thing. But much more common are expressions of the form "the Ψ" where "Ψ" is never meant by the user of the expression to represent a general term applicable to one at least, but just one thing. Conversations are dotted with

1 Thus the theorem #14.22 in Principia Mathematica is false—it holds only if the biconditional is replaced with a conditional, but not with a conditional 'going the other way'. "The swimmer is a swimmer" is necessarily true, and is implied by "there is a swimmer", since tautologies are implied by any statement. It does not, however, imply that there is a swimmer for the same reason that "the golden mountain is a mountain" and "the round square is square" do not imply the existence of golden mountains and round squares. The half of #14.22 which does hold, does so because "Ψ(∀x)(∃x)" is always true.
"the α"'s in positions which would have to be rendered as logical subject positions, yet to attribute to the users of some of these statements the thought that they had actually given a unique identificatory description, on pains of failure of communication, or at best of falsity, is to distort both intentions and accomplishments.

Strawson was the first to point out this inadequacy of Russell's analysis. In a later work he isolated a special class of descriptions which demands special attention in connection with the uniqueness question we are considering. These are descriptions which explicitly "proclaim, as it were, the uniqueness of their application". He calls them "logically individuating descriptions", and he distinguishes two subsets. I list these below, together with an explanation and some examples for each:

I. logically individuating descriptions--those descriptions which carry an explicit claim to uniqueness.

E.g., the first king, the only house he owned, the largest stone within one mile of Stonehenge, the woman John is married to;

but not, the table, the book on the desk, the car.

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I. a. **pure individuating descriptions**—those descriptions in (I) which contain no proper names of any kind, nor any form of demonstrative.

E.g., the first king, the only material useful in heating-pad covers, the theoretically maximal magnetizibility of ferric compounds;

**but not**, the woman John loves, the oldest human bone yet found, the present state of the economy.

I. b. **quasi-pure individuating descriptions**—those descriptions as in (I.a.), except that they contain a demonstrative element restricting the objects described to the past and present.

E.g., the one epileptic king so far, the only virgin birth 'till now, the oldest human bone yet found, the only house he has owned;

**but not**, the woman John is married to, the only house that will ever be owned, the house he owns.

Just why Strawson should provide only these subclasses of (I) and not others is not clear. Why should there not be a whole plethora of quasi-pure individuating descriptions, distinguished from one another by any number of *ad hoc* restrictions upon their demonstrative component? We could have individuating descriptions limited entirely to things in the present (the current state of the economy, the only railroad still privately
owned), or limited to the future (the only person who will ever learn to read minds, the fastest short-distance sprinter excepting the current title-holder), or limited to some demonstratively indicated place (why is time so favored?), or limited to things in the possession of the speaker (the only son of mine, the first inkling I had of the general duplicity of governments regarding policies of social welfare). The list could go on. But the point should already be obvious: Strawson's classification of individuating descriptions is not merely not exhaustive, but arbitrary. Less arbitrary is his distinction between individuating and purely individuating descriptions, but even here I would argue that the distinction collapses, and for the same reasons I used above against Wiggins.\(^1\) Proper names, demonstratives, and definite descriptions are general (temporarily excepting, for the sake of the current argument, the individuating descriptions being here discussed); consequently their presence in the predicative component of a description cannot suddenly convert the description into a term which bespeaks its own uniqueness. Within the predicative component (the "\(s\)" in "the \(s\)") they function as elements contributory to its whole meaning, which is just how they function when they occur elsewhere in a statement.\(^2\) Therefore

\(^1\)See above, pp. 334-335.

\(^2\)Thus we can appreciate the completely misguided
all individuating descriptions are "pure" within the spirit of Strawson's use of that term. Since there is, then, no point in the distinguishing qualification "pure", I shall simply omit it when talking about this class of descriptions.

I argued above that the non-existence of anything corresponding to a description need not cause statement failure, that in particular it does not in analytic statements involving such descriptions. Since individuating descriptions are a subclass of descriptions, this holds for them as well (indeed, the example used above employs an individuating description: "the fastest swimmer"). Is a similar argument available for uniqueness? To see why a negative answer is demanded we must notice that statement failure is avoided in those cases because the descriptions are not being used to refer to

nature of Margolis' attack on Quine, based on the puzzle that "if "Socrates" as a name has a reference but not a sense (in the sense specified) and if "Socrates" in the phrase "is Socrates" (reparsed) is a general term that has a sense, the connection between these seemingly identical, but in fact quite different, terms is not at all clear." (Margolis, "On Names: Sense and Reference", American Philosophical Quarterly, v. 5, 1968, p. 206.) The sense, for Margolis, in which a name has no sense is that one cannot state its meaning, or give a definition or synonym for it. The problems connected with stating the meaning of a proper name I have acknowledged above; but once we admit that being able to state the exact meaning (if there be an exact one) of a name is not a necessary condition of the name's having a meaning, and that every name does have a meaning, then Margolis' identity crisis evaporates.
some specific thing. Existence is connected with
definite descriptions the same way it is with proper
names: if the thing one purports to refer to by using
the expression in question does not exist (i.e., is not
a thing at all), one cannot succeed in referring to it.
Under the conditions imagined for the example above,
"the fastest swimmer is an Australian" would be a
failure because there is nothing the subject expression
could be used to refer to. But uniqueness is connected
descriptions as it is with demonstratives. To "the
fastest swimmer is the fastest swimmer" being true
when there are no swimmers, there is no parallel for
the lack of uniqueness, because part of the meaning of
any expression of the form "the φ" is that there is
only one φ. That is, such expressions--like demonstra-
tives--contain the idea of particularity, of "oneness",
or as I prefer to call it, the idea of uniqueness.¹
Even "the golden mountain is a mountain" would fail as
a statement if there were two such mountains. Since
part of the meaning of the expression is its own unique
applicability, it cannot (except when used in circum-
stances I shall shortly describe) be successfully
employed in an act of reference when the rest of its
meaning is severally applicable. All this, however,
gets us no closer to knowing which thing, even though

¹This may appear to conflict with what I said a few
pages back, but it does not, as will emerge below.
we know from the meaning of the expression that it is a single thing, is the thing being referred to by the user of the description. "The first dog born at sea, you say? This dog? Or that one? Or some other perhaps?"

Strawson has made the point quite nicely, that (so-called) individuating descriptions cannot be thought of as singular terms\(^1\) telling us in some direct manner just which solitary thing is being referred to by the user of the description. Knowing that the user had some unique, particular thing in mind (and thus felt justified in using an expression of the form "the $\circ$") is no help in figuring out which thing it is. And piling on further descriptions has the interesting disadvantage that while drastically limiting the theoretical possibilities, it also increases the possibility of the total description becoming vacuous.\(^2\) I might add that no matter how drastically limited the possibilities are (i.e., no matter how rich the description becomes), they cannot become limited to one unique thing,\(^3\) even if the idea of uniqueness is stipulated in the teeth of its theoretical impossibility.

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\(^1\)My term, not Strawson's--I have been using it for an expression which is somehow intrinsically connected with a single, existing real thing. The metaphors sometimes found for this connection are such as "chalk-mark" and "filament"; "umbilical cord" has always seemed to me particularly apt and appropriately silly.

\(^2\)Strawson, *Individuals*, pp. 15-16.

\(^3\)See above on the identity of indiscernibles.
But if individuating descriptions cannot actually individuate—i.e., pick out and isolate some unique individual—even though they explicitly proclaim to do so, how in general do they differ from other definite descriptions, all of which contain the idea of uniqueness implicitly? I believe this question to be an interesting one, for its answer affords a clue to a more appropriate (though perhaps necessarily fragmentary) understanding of descriptions. Very often we want to and do use definite descriptions whose descriptive content is by no means thought to be uniquely instantiated; but feeling the force of particularity in "the", and noticing the multiplicity of things described, we overtly include the idea of uniqueness as a (redundant) reinforcement. More often than simple reinforcement, however, (which usually only makes the situation worse: being conscious of the fact that "the king" cannot be used to refer to the single king because there are many, we would hardly remedy the matter by using "the only king") what we do is to reinforce together with adding further locutions which try to establish uniqueness by specifying a single position within some spatial, temporal, qualitative, or other ordering. E.g., "the first king", "the kindest king", "the only king so far", "the present king". Individuating descriptions, in other words, are attempts to remind us of the idea of uniqueness in "the $\exists!$" expressions, and to furnish some
further descriptions with respect to which the unenlarged description is to be more plausibly thought of as uniquely applicable. But such further descriptive content has to be formally construed as part of the descriptive content as a whole, and thus as being in "s" of "the s". "The first king", e.g., amounts to "the only non-preceded king", and "s" will be "non-preceded king", with the juxtaposition of "the" and "only" showing the latter clearly to be redundant. Viewed this way, individuating descriptions are simply idioms used to make explicit the typically implicit uniqueness of "the" and to add further circumscribing detail.

This idiomatic tendency is a symptom of inadequacy in typical uses of "the s" expressions. They seem to claim uniqueness, yet nobody considers that someone who uses them is trying to uniquely specify some object via "s" alone. What we want to do is to tell others something about some object; but what we say inadequately isolates that object about which we want to talk. The techniques of individuating descriptions amount at bottom to an emphasis of the fact that definite descriptions include the idea of definiteness itself, and that they often do little else beyond providing a rather commonly found characteristic.

What, we are not only entitled but obliged to ask, enables us to communicate with descriptions as referring terms, whether or not they overtly claim uniqueness?
The important aspect of definite descriptions with regard to this kind of question is, I think, their possession of the very idea of definiteness which led Russell to call them that. But from that fact it certainly does not follow that we should expect to be told that when we use an expression such as "the table" to refer, our statement entails that there is only one table in the world. Russell's recourse of admonishment—suggesting that we should have used the expression "a table"—and the ensuing distinction between strict and non-strict employments of "the ø" expressions, \(^1\) is at best a technical device for excusing us from uttering outright falsehoods, but at worst it expects us to reform our intention of referring to something into stating something else quite general ranging over everything. Strictly speaking, so the account runs, when we say of a particular table that "the table is on fire", we ought (charitably) to be taken to have actually meant that "at least one object somewhere or other of all objects there are, is both a table and is on fire". Such a proposal ought, in my view, to be tabled on that particular table! Not only is it revisionary, but it reflects, quite simply, a misunderstanding of how definite descriptions are employed in the ordinary communication of facts about

\(^1\)Russell, "On Denoting", Logic and Knowledge (ed. Marsh), p. 44: "Now the, when it is strictly used, involves uniqueness; we do, it is true, speak of 'the son of So-and-so' even when So-and-so has several sons, but it would be more correct to say 'a son of So-and-so.'"
things. If we construe Russell's remark not as an attempt to scold us into behaving according to his theory of descriptions, but as a suggestion for an empirically justifiable (and theoretically useful) distinction, we need to know what the empirical basis of the classification is to be. Can Russell—or anyone for that matter—give us a method for determining whether a specific definite description is an expression which if employed as the subject expression in an attempt to state a fact will result in a true or false statement, instead of a non-statement, without circularly stipulating that the "strict" use of descriptions requires that there be one and only one thing satisfying the description? Unless "strictness" can be defined independently of the unique applicability of a description, it is of no use in determining when a description does describe only one thing, and consequently when we ought to apply Russell's analysis (were we ever to want to do so).

In fact, there is nothing wrong with using descriptions such as "the table"; we do so instead of saying "a table" precisely because we wish to exploit the idea of uniqueness in the definite article in order to communicate our intention to refer to a single particular thing. If by conveying some dominant characteristic (though usually a by no means uniquely applicable one) together with the idea that we intend to refer to some particular object having that characteristic, we succeed
in causing our listener (or reader) to realize just which object it is we are talking about, then we have communicated. But beyond the characteristic (e.g., "table"), and the idea that we intend only one of the things having that characteristic, and moreover, a certain one of them, what gives our hearer the all-important clue as to which one? What, in other words, forestalls the query "The table, yes, but which table"?

The correct answer can only be given in the most general terms—it is that some principle of restriction is, for one or more of a great variety of reasons, mutually understood. Using a bit of jargon, this might be put as a mutual understanding of some class of objects, only one member of which has the property conveyed by the description (theoretical doubts due to the contingency of the identity of indiscernibles do not, of course, represent a hurdle for communication—they do only for attempts to construe expressions as singular terms, i.e., expressions which are by themselves and independently of the uses to which they might be put, symbolically connected to one and only one actual thing.)

For any description "the $\exists$", how do we depict the class $\mathcal{Y}$ which contains only one thing having the property $\exists$? I would suggest that there is no answer in general, beyond a vague and not very fruitful reference to 'context', and that the class $\mathcal{Y}$ for any particular use of
some expression "the $\mathfrak{g}$" can no more be pinned down than can the different kinds of referential uses of "the $\mathfrak{g}$" themselves. Consider some examples: in a long conversation about a confrontation between a policeman and several demonstrators, someone says "But the cop had an obligation to interrupt their actions"; having watched a television programme exposing the construction of a pier in violation of coastal regulations protecting wildlife, someone says "the pier ought to be dismantled"; out of the blue and a propos of nothing prior, someone says "the Prime Minister today suggested a policy which is clearly beyond the mandate from last year's referendum". Plausible candidates for the class $\mathfrak{7}$, respectively, are: people about whom we have just been talking, marine constructions which were subjects of a recent television programme, and officials of our government.

Vendler has recently indicated how we ought to proceed in discovering the restrictions which produce $\mathfrak{7}$ for any given case: we should consider pieces of discourse larger than single statements, large enough to be found to contain some explicit delineation of $\mathfrak{7}$.\footnote{Vendler, "Singular Terms", Linguistics in Philosophy, pp. 33-69.}

His analysis represents a genuine advance in our understanding of some uses of "the $\mathfrak{g}$" expressions whose "$\mathfrak{g}$" is not uniquely applicable; it is restricted, however, to the uses of such expressions within a group of state-
ments, some of which when taken together do positively identify the thing intended to be referred to through the use of "the a". His account, in other words, is workable (i.e., it shows where to look for the information needed to explain why the question "The table, yes, but which table?" often does not arise), but it cannot be applied to situations where there is no relevant surrounding conversation, as is the case in the second and third examples above. His recourse in these cases is to refer to superfluity, familiarity, circumstances, or presuppositions, but it is precisely here that the impediment to a fully general account is to be found, regardless of how close Vendler's account has come, or how slight his argument makes the impediment appear.

We seem to be capable of and even positively eager to use definite descriptions, when intending some particular thing, which have only the most remote and nebulous chance of being correctly understood outside some narrow circle as having been used to refer to that thing had in mind. We might, e.g., be referring to someone mentioned in an esoteric journal left unsaid, or to something well-known only within some relatively limited profession (medicine, archeology, electronics, etc.), or to someone locally famous, and so forth—all the while, however, using such descriptions as would let

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1Vendler, ibid.; pp. 52, 54, 55-56; p. 56; pp. 61 (iii, viii), 62; and p. 66—respectively.
only the initiated know whom we were talking about. Being in on a conversation is only one of the many ways to be an 'initiate', to be privy to the 'class of restriction'. Beyond the very general stipulation that in order for communication to succeed where descriptions which describe many things are used to refer, there must be a mutual understanding of some form of further restriction--beyond that I am very skeptical towards the possibility of an adequate account in any detail of our communicatory successes which embraces these hard cases.

To summarize briefly the results of this final chapter, I would like to emphasize that while demonstratives and descriptions both contain the idea of particularity as a part of the meaning of each such expression (overtly so—to no special consequence—in some descriptions), it does not follow from that, that the very real particularity of the object referred to transfers back to the expression itself, thereby disabling it from ever being used elsewhere to refer to another thing. That there is something, and only one thing, are both prerequisites of success in any attempt to refer; that this particular thing is tied through a one-to-one relationship to the expression used on some occasion to refer to it is false.

From the results of the preceding chapter just as much is true of proper names also. I have argued that
the phenomena which led to the classification of names, demonstratives, and descriptions as singular terms are properly accounted for only in a theory which describes linguistic reference to objects as an achievement act that exploits expressions which have, as essential to their referential employment, some general descriptive meaning. (It has not been pretended, however, that there are no important problems with respect to accomplishing an adequate account of the meanings of these expressions, where such accounts are possible.) I know of no other coherent doctrine of singular terms; in particular I do not know of one which can make sense of the "mark" or "umbilical" metaphor seldom acknowledged but universally employed in systems which allow non-general propositions. My conclusion is Bradley's, and for the same basic reasons: the proposition is general.
Included are only those works referred to above. The dates given for books are not always their first printing, but the dates of those editions actually consulted and to which page references have been made.


———, "The Identity of Indiscernibles" (see Ayer, Philosophical Essays).

———, "Names and Descriptions" (see Ayer, The Concept of a Person).


———, "The Identity of Indiscernibles" (see Baylis, Metaphysics).


Frege, G., Begriffsschrift (see Frege, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege).


Quine, W. V., "Existence and Quantification" (see Margolis, Fact and Existence).

Quine, "Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis" (see Quine, From a Logical Point of View).

Quine, "Implicit Definition Sustained" (see Quine, The Ways of Paradox).


Quine, "Ontological Relativity", Journal of Philosophy, v. 65, 1968, pp. 186-212. (See also Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, which contains a revision of this article.)


Quine, "Reification of Universals" (see Quine, From a Logical Point of View).


----------, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" (see Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*).


----------, "On Denoting" (see Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*).

----------, "On the Nature of Acquaintance" (see Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*).

----------, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood" (see Russell, *Philosophical Essays*).

----------, "On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean" (see Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*).

----------, "On the Relations of Particulars and Universals" (see Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*).


----------, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" (see Russell, *Logic and Knowledge*).


Ryle, G., "The Theory of Meaning" (see Caton, *Philosophy and Ordinary Language*).


Scott, D., "Existence and Description in Formal Logic" (see Schoenman, Bertrand Russell, Philosopher of the Century).

Searle, J., "Proper Names" (see Caton, Philosophy and Ordinary Language).


———, "On Referring" (see Caton, Philosophy and Ordinary Language).


