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Extending radical space? A historical comparative analysis of sub-state violent contention in Quebec and Corsica

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A Thesis Submitted in Fulfillment of the PhD in Canadian Studies
The University of Edinburgh
2016
Declaration of original authorship

I declare that I have composed this thesis, and the work is my own. This work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification. Part of this research was considered for a recent publication: “‘Limité et primitif’ : une analyse du réseau social du Front de Libération du Québec”, Le Québec recto/verso, Publifarum, n. 21.

Megan Melanson
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FLQ

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FLNC

CHAPTER CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

SUBSTANTIVE FINDINGS

WHAT EXPLAINS THE OFTEN-CONTRASTING PATTERNS OF SUB-STATE VIOLENT CONTENTION IN QUEBEC AND CORSICA?

WHY DIDN’T THE FLQ RE-FORM AFTER THE OCTOBER CRISIS AS IT HAD SINCE THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FIRST CELL IN 1962?

WHY, IN CONTRAST TO THE FLQ, DID THE FLNC EXPERIENCE THE SCISSON DE 1990 AND MORPH INTO A COMPETITIVE ARMS RACE AND FRATRICIDAL WAR?

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Finally, a large ‘thank you’ to the respondents and individuals that shared their experiences, their histories, and their culture with me during fieldwork. The resolute love for one’s land and culture is inspiring.
Abstract

This thesis offers a comparative historical analysis of sub-state violent contention in Quebec and Corsica. It focuses specifically on the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) and the Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu (FLNC), in 1963 to 1971 and 1976 to 1990, respectively. The thesis argues that the FLQ and the FLNC sought to extend radical ideological space to promote independence in order to achieve revolutionary social and economic change through campaigns of violence and kidnappings.

Theoretically, the thesis draws on the contentious politics and social movements literatures, which it notably combines with Radical Flank Effect (RFE). RFEs are interactive processes that aim to map the beneficial and/or detrimental impact of radical group action on moderate groups. Whilst commonly used to understand the political outcomes of social movements, RFE is used in this thesis in conjunction with social movement literature to compare the relationship between these violent movements and their more moderate opponents. To understand the internal dynamics of these movements, I have identified four key elements of contrast: membership, ideology, network structure and strategy. I draw on, for example, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s (2001) mobilization method, which aids an understanding of membership and ideology by framing the interaction amongst challengers, their opponents and the media.

This thesis seeks to understand FLQ and FLNC mobilization in light of the aim to shape and develop radical ideological space in the sub-states of Quebec and Corsica. It draws on an extensive study of archival data that includes police reports that have only recently been made available in Canada, transcripts of court cases, newspapers, and an interview with a former member of the FLNC, as well as secondary sources. The central orienting question is: what explains the contrasting patterns of sub-state violent contention in Quebec and Corsica? More specifically, why did the FLQ dissolve in 1971, yet the FLNC continued its violent trajectory, albeit less political and nationalist, until 2014?
The FLQ and the FLNC differently subscribed to Marxism and post-colonialism. The FLQ was committed to a Marxist program of revolutionary change, and this commitment was shared by the FLNC until the collapse of communism in central and Eastern Europe in 1989. FLQ members considered themselves ‘urban revolutionaries’ and employed Marxism to understand the economic disparity in industrial Montreal. Early Corsican violent contention, in contrast, included Maoist influences, in particular, through their demand for agrarian reform. The two groups viewed the relationship between their sub-states (Quebec and Corsica) and central states (Canada and France) through a colonial lens, and understood their mobilization against these states and elite minorities (the Anglophone elite in Quebec and the pieds noirs in Corsica) in this light. Both violent movements targeted this colonial relationship. Both the FLQ and FLNC manifests were economically and politically focused, land and culture were additionally highlighted by the FLNC.

This thesis found that sub-state violent contention in the very different contexts of Quebec and Corsica shared an overall pattern, an arc of violent mobilization. The initial mobilization developed from a frustration with moderate political groups; radicalization grew and new tactics were embraced; until turning points that included the assassination of Pierre Laporte by the FLQ and the division of the FLNC into competitive factions, and then a decline of activity, mobilization and recruitment. Although the FLQ and the FLNC contrasted greatly in terms of membership, ideology, organization and strategy, both groups attempted to extend radical space through the use of violent contention in these two very different nations. Ultimately, however, while the FLQ and the FLNC were able to extend or maintain radical space at times, yet they failed to sustain the extension of ideological radical space on the basis on their revolutionary manifestos.
### Glossary of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>L’Associu di I Patrioti Corsu</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>L’Azzione pa a Rinascite di a Corsica (Corsican regionalist action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARQ</td>
<td>Armée Révolutionnaire du Quebec (Revolutionary army of Quebec)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Cunsulta di I Studienti Corsu (Corsican Student Consul)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSN</td>
<td>Confédération des syndicats nationaux (Confederation of National Trade Unions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONSEO</td>
<td>Conference of Nations without a State in Western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLF</td>
<td>Front de Libération des Femmes (Women’s Liberation Front)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLNC</td>
<td>Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu (The National Corsican Liberation Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLQ</td>
<td>Front de Libération du Quebec (The Quebec Liberation Front)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPCL</td>
<td>Fronte Paesanu di Liberazione di a Corsica (The National Front for the Liberation of Corsica)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>Ghjustizia Paolina</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Revolutionary Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLT</td>
<td>Mouvement de Libération du Taxi (Taxi Liberation Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWLM</td>
<td>Montreal Women’s Liberation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PQ</td>
<td>Parti Quebecois</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIN</td>
<td>Rassemblement Indépendence Nationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mountain Police</td>
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<td>WMA</td>
<td>War Measures Act</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“I have no more sympathy for Mrs. Cross\textsuperscript{1} than for the wives of thousands of men without jobs in Quebec at the present time” - Michel Chartrand

Still considered today as one of the most contentious moments in Canadian history, the October Crisis of 1970 threatened law, order and democracy in Canada. Two cells of the Front de Liberation du Quebec, the violent nationalist network that was active since 1963, publicly kidnapped two political figures: labour minister Pierre Laporte and British Trade Commissioner James Cross. Further, the Canadian government responded with the implementation of the War Measures Act (WMA) and the suspension of Habeas Corpus, for the first time during peacetime, in order to allow for the presence of the army in Montreal and Ottawa, a curfew, and the arrest of several hundred citizens without evidence.

Michel Chartrand, president of the Montreal central council of the Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), compared the grief of Mrs. Cross for her husband’s kidnapping to the grief of the thousands of wives of unemployed husbands, drawing light to the disparity between Quebecois and the economic and political elites, unemployment, and poverty in Quebec. While the provincial government put forward a series of social and economic reforms, and society secularized during the early 1960s, a new specifically Quebecois consciousness developed that critiqued the existing division of labour in Quebec in which capital was predominantly Anglophone and labour predominantly francophone, which was in turn inspired by international ideologies that included post-colonialism, nationalism, and in some cases- Marxism.

Similarly in Corsica, the local populace felt the pressures of poverty and unemployment as the traditional pastoral culture shifted to focus on tourism and agricultural export. Financially supported by the state through a series of programmes, the subsidies were perceived as being monopolized by

\textsuperscript{1} Wife of James Cross, who was kidnapped by the Liberation cell of the FLQ in
a clan system, the French, and the repatriated Algerians on the island. The donation of renewed farming land to the Algerians and a series of failed economic and social programmes by the state, and the return of university students from the mainland with international ideologies and a new-found interest in preserving Corsican culture, developed an already existent culture of violence to form a new type of radical space that was nationally-focused.

Born from these perceptions of inequality and sub-state frustrations, the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) and the Fronte de Liberazione Nazunale Corsu (FLNC) were active in the early 1960s and 1970s through the 1990s, respectively. This thesis offers a comparative historical analysis of the two networks in order to understand sub-state violent contention in Quebec and Corsica. This thesis looks at how the FLQ and the FLNC aimed to develop and extend radical ideological space through the use of violent contention, and uses Haines’ (1984) Radical Flank Effect to understand the effect of the violent groups on the moderate campaigns. In order to do so, the thesis is built around a central orienting question: what explains the contrasting patterns of sub-state violent contention in Quebec and Corsica? More specifically, why did the FLQ dissolve in 1971, yet the FLNC continued its violent trajectory, albeit less political and nationalist, until 2014? And finally, by comparing these patterns and causal mechanisms of violence, did the FLQ and the FLNC succeed in extending radical space?

**Economic, political and demographic contexts in Quebec and Corsica**

As Tilly (2003) suggests, it is important to understand the historically-specific features in contentious politics and to place them within the appropriate time period. Comparing the changes and reforms in Quebec and Corsican society helps to identify the frustrations. By comparing the economic, political structures and demography, there will be overlap as the contextual processes affected each other.
‘The Sixties’, also known as the ‘cultural decade’ (Palmer 2008, 259), began to gain momentum in 1963 across westernized countries. The counterculture and revolution of the 1960s was certainly an influence on Quebecois; elements of culture and society were questioned and critiqued, and new social norms were developed. Just as rigid cultural boundaries were broken, new forms of politics and governance were considered and embraced. The civil rights and anti-war movements proved that there was power to change society, and the decolonization of Africa proved that political governance was not absolute and could be changed through physical force and revolution (Palmer 2008). There was a ‘certain dose of radicalism amongst the youth, a militancy and an activism’ (Rocher 2013, 30). While the world changed dramatically during the 1960s, a new and modern media of television was able to ensure that the rest of the modern world knew about it, and was influenced by it: “Une image à la télévision légitime toutes les causes. L’adoubement médiatique se substitue au sacre démocratique: démocratie directe, sondage grandeur nature, vote à main levée, à poing dressé”\(^2\) (Dominique de Villepin in Comeau 2013, 285).

**Economy**

During the 1960s, Quebec was focusing on the expansion and decentralization of industry through a series of economic reforms. While the Union Nationale promoted an economic policy in the 1950s that aimed at attracting foreign capital from outside of the province to invest in Quebec resources (Sara-Bournet 2009, 79), the Liberal Party, elected in 1962, took on an interventionist role and campaigned for the nationalization of the province’s private electrical companies (Bennett and Jaenen 1986, 503); thereby championing the slogan ‘Maitres chez nous’\(^3\). The Liberal party did not advocate a general policy of nationalism. The sole focus was to “build a broad and secure base for the expansion and decentralization of industry”

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2 Translated as: ‘an image on the television legitimizes all causes. Media dubbing substitutes for the democratic consecration: direct democracy, opinion polls, voting by a hand raised, a drawn fist’.

3 Masters at Home
(Manifeste du parti liberal du Quebec 1962, 9); however, the success of the Liberal Party in the 1962 election proved a changing mindset in Quebec that valued economic freedom and reform from English-speaking companies.

These economic reforms were made possible by sustainable economic growth between 1961 and 1967. According to Hébert (1989), this economic growth was due to the devaluation of the Canadian dollar (which fell to US$0.925 in 1962) and Canada’s reinstatement of a fixed exchange rate regime with OECD countries between 1962 and 1980, thereby allowing the provincial government to make contributions to a series of big projects such as: the Montreal metro, Expo 67, and the hydroelectric development on the Cote-Nord (53).

The economic reforms provided the sub-state with further control of its economy, and gave Quebeckers a confidence and assertiveness in its dealings nationally and internationally. Quebec’s Liberal government became more assertive in- and unhappy with- its place in Confederation and relationship with the federal government (Bothwell 1998). While parts of Quebec were experiencing modernization, secularization and economic expansion, East-Montreal, however, was going through a period of deindustrialization. While anglophone capitalist elites and Francophone political elites gained from these economic reforms and expansions, it widened the disparity between these groups and the working-class neighbourhoods4.

In Corsica, the economy was traditionally agriculture and sheep breeding; Corsican artists refer back to ‘the culture of shepherds’. During the 1970s, Corsica had yet to experience an industrial revolution or modernization. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Corsican society began to urbanize from the rural interior and small villages to the larger port cities of Ajaccio and Bastia (Poggioli 2012). As the state created a level of dependency through importing goods and a series of half-hearted economic

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4 The poverty in Montreal is discussed further in the Demography section
policies and programmes, many of these traditional employments would struggle to continue due to economic pressures.

La Société d’aménagement pour la mise en valeur de la Corse (SOMIVAC) was created in 1957 to create 30,000 hectares of viable agricultural land out of the Maquis; the objective was to create an agricultural economy of vineyards, kiwis and citrus fruits. The land was divided into lots and were mostly awarded to repatriated Algerians. While most agricultural properties in Corsica were unable to grow past 20 hectares due to the mountainous nature of the island, the new land also had new modern features such as a hydraulic pipe system, operational buildings, and the creation of an agromonic station (Poggioli 2004, 35). As the repatriated Algerians were given priority in this program, it created discontent amongst Corsicans who felt as though they had been cheated of their own lands, which had been modernized to boot. Tourism was also a focus of growth on the island, and the growth along the coastline of the island was through French investment; therefore, there created an economic divide between the Corsicans, the repatriated Algerians and the French.

In 1974, the government attempted to establish local opinion in order to fashion a more appropriate policy and/or programme. The state sent Libert Bou, a 65 year old experienced administrator and manager from Catalonia, to analyze the economic situation in Corsica (Ramsay 1986). After years of poor experiences with state-imposed programmes, the Corsican populace had no interest in the project. The disappointment with the report, the naming of the report as a Charter, and the denouncement of the Charter by the ARC only added fuel to the fire that was building against the state.

This feeling of unjust aid to the repatriated Algerians, combined with the economic dependency on the state (monopolized by the clans, as discussed in the next section on political structure) and the new agricultural competition, frustrations grew amongst the Corsican populace. While the Corsican sub-state was very economically reliant on France during this period, francophone Quebecers were becoming ‘masters of their own home’
economically. The decentralization of economy allowed Quebec further confidence politically, while Corsicans became more frustrated by the economical allowances provided to other ethnicities on the island, as well as the state’s inability to provide an appropriate solution that was suitable to Corsica’s distinct culture and need for a better economic deal, transport links and special regional structures. In both Quebec and Corsica, however, there was a frustration with the repatriated Algerians in Corsica and the English bourgeoisie in Quebec due to ‘rising expectations’ (Tocqueville 1955) from the Quiet Revolution and the attempts at new socioeconomic programmes by the French government. In Quebec, the elites gained from the Quiet Revolution, and in Corsica, the French and repatriated Algerians gained from economic programs and the budding tourism industry.

**Political structure**

As the largest populated province in Canada, Quebec held political clout against the other provinces in Canada during the 1960s. Situated geographically in central Canada, and surrounded by other provinces and territories, the preservation of identity, culture and political representation was important to the political class in the sub-state. As a province of Canada, the authority to make laws was divided between the federal parliament of Canada and the provincial legislature; however, the political reality is that ‘Quebec is not a province like the others’ (Gagnon 2004, 127) and began to assert its national status.

Before the Quiet Revolution, elections were dominated by two political parties: the Liberal Party and the Union Nationale. Urban and rural Quebecois were divided politically, which resulted in a focus on the interests of the Anglophone capitalist class (Cox 2009, 92). The rise of the nationalist movement in the 1960s allowed for the creation of the Parti Quebecois in 1968, and supported its momentum to instigate two referendums for independence in 1980 and 1995.
Corsican residents similarly questioned their sub-state relationship with France. France has three levels of territorial self-government: municipalities, departments/provinces and regions, and traditionally has had a very unified administrative system. During the 1970s, Corsica was a region of France\(^5\). Regions were created in 1972 and it was not until the 1980s that Paris elevated Corsica to a special status and began a “three-step process devolving authority to institutions on the isle well beyond the decentralization and regionalization process the Socialists inaugurated elsewhere in France during that decade” (Rudolph 2006, 51)\(^6\). Corsica was one of the French metropolitan regions with the lowest GDP per capita\(^7\), and had little real political power over its economy and society. (Directorate-general for internal policies European Parliament 2013, 29)

Corsica did, however, have a Corsican Regional Council, granted in 1970. The individuals running the Commission were not elected, but drawn from members elected to other posts, and was therefore viewed as symbolic until 1982 when a directly elected Assembly was given formal executive decision making authority on education, economic development, agriculture and housing. This assembly was elected through a proportional representation system based on an island-wide constituency instead of the electoral-districts in other regions. The aim of this was to give the Assembly island-wide legitimacy and to encourage the participation of both moderate and violent nationalists in elections. This system needed only 1.6 percent of the popular vote to win a seat, which encouraged nationalists to participate (Henders 2010, 100). The role of the Assembly, however, was advisory and could suggest legislative or regulatory changes in Corsica’s development, except when it came to organizing Corsican language and cultural classes,

\(^5\) Corsica would later become a collectivité territoriale in 1982, which would allow it greater political and economic powers.
\(^6\) In 1982, the directly elected Assembly was given formal executive decision-making authority, and a university was created. As the third step, Corsicans were officially recognized as a distinct ‘people’ within France in April 1991. In 1993, institutional reforms created a second Corsican executive that was elected by the island’s councilors.
\(^7\) In 2010, the GDP per capita in PPS reached the level of 90% of the EU27 average due to tourism, construction and industry.
which had to be optional so as not to breach the French state’s one-ness (Michalon 1985).

*TEST as a way to compare the limited political access as structural repression*

The obvious comparison of political structure between Quebec and Corsica looks at the access to political reform as sub-states. Quebec had the same electoral system and provincial institutions as the other provinces in Canada; however, due to a monopolization of an Anglo capitalist elite and a Francophone elite amongst the political parties, certain Quebecois actors felt economically and politically disadvantaged and many looked to radicalization through moderate and violent movements to achieve change.

Corsica, on the other hand, was given very little political autonomy through a Corsican Regional Council. Even when the French state gave formal executive authority to the Corsican Assembly in 1982, the role was advisory. The political structure in Corsica continued to pursue roots of a traditional clan system, which involved nepotism and patronage. As the island experienced modernization, it also endured high levels of poverty and half-hearted attempts by the government to impose economic programs that mostly benefitted the repatriated Algerians that became known as ‘les pieds noir’. This disparity on the island, a frustration with the neoclan system and an inability to achieve reform without backlash from the state and other agents (clan leaders, repatriated Algerians, and French) influenced a nationalist movement that was both moderate and violent, and much more intertwined.

Cox (2009) created a Theory of Ethnic Group Support for Terrorism (TEST) that posits that there is a “dynamic relationship between the state and an ethnic group that determines the conditions under which ethnic groups will support terrorism to change the status quo” (22). Experiencing structural repression and agent-driven repression, ethnonationalist groups turn to violence and threats as a way to strive for reform (53). TEST helps to
compare the political networks in Corsica and Quebec, and understand why actors chose violence over peaceful and moderate action.

Actors radicalized in Quebec (through violent and moderate means) in demand for reform and independence from a perceived colonial state. An economic disadvantage, particularly in Montreal, created disparity between Quebecois and the Anglo business elite in partnership with a Francophone elite. This economic disadvantage to the ethno-nationalist group in Quebec influenced individuals to participate in violent campaigns during the 1960s and early 1970s. In 1968, the Parti Quebecois (PQ) formed under the leadership of René Levesque. A merger of the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association and the Ralliement National provided the moderate nationalists in Quebec a political party within the federally-imposed political system to carry out their demands for independence and further autonomy. PQ leader, René Levesque, deliberately avoided a merger with the RIN, the political organization and party that the FLQ developed from. As the PQ gained in popularity\(^8\) and became the vessel for the nationalist movement and Quebecois interest, and the institutional structures became facilitative through the Quiet Revolution, violence became unnecessary. After the particularly violent October Crisis where James Cross and Pierre Laporte were kidnapped and Pierre Laporte was killed, many of the sympathetic individuals that once supported the FLQ turned against its violent campaign. As will be considered and supported with Radical Flank Effect in the following chapters, the violent tactics utilized during the October Crisis by the FLQ simply boosted the support for the moderate movement. Therefore, TEST proves that the political institutions initially seemed closed to the Quebecois, and forced some individuals to pursue violence as a way to rebel against the monopolization of the democratic electoral system by Anglo capitalist and French elites. Once the ability to change and reform Quebec society was possible through moderate means, the ethno-nationalist group as

\(^8\)The PQ had a strong and personable leader, a broad support for independence and embrace a ‘populist style’ that included demonstrations, house meetings and an egalitarianism (Linteau et al 1991, 524).
a majority ignored the opportunity for violence and ceased to mobilize and form other FLQ cells.

As discussed in the economic section, the French government provided financial support to Corsica after World War II, but did not address the issue of the ever-present clan system. Funds that were transferred to the island were seized and controlled by clan leaders (Kofman 1982, 303). The clans competed for control of the funds through elections for office (mayors and municipal councils), for the General Councils or for the position of deputy (Cox 2009, 97). Creating a pyramid structure of patronage, members of the villages were often clients to one of two local patrons—generally the mayor and the leader of the contrapartitu of the region—who were then clients to the leaders of the larger insular families that situated, respectively, south and north of the island and held considerable, and almost state-like power. Reciprocity generally included a vote for favours, and power for assistance (Lenclud 1986). Savigear (1983) argues that the Corsicans held the French government responsible for this corrupt governance (15). Just as the Anglo business elite and French elite dominated political parties in Quebec, clans also controlled political access through the domination of political parties, but with an extra emphasis on electoral manipulation (Cox 2009, 101). The French state, therefore, did not intentionally discriminate against Corsicans any more than other regions in France, but they instead “failed to ensure broad and fair representative government....[and] tolerate unfair and discriminatory practices against substantial portions of the Corsican population” (Cox 2009, 101)

The autonomists (demanded autonomy within the French state) and the Separatists (fought for independence) were two distinct factions of a larger movement for reform and change in Corsica, and the violent FLNC. Many actors subscribed to more than one group. TEST posits that the participation in violent campaigns within the FLNC was due to the limited political institutions and political power on the local level. The FLNC emerged as a response to the French government’s response to previous
strike action (as will be discussed in chapter 4) and a radicalization of the nationalist movement and demands for reform.

The Corsican case under TEST differs from the Quebec case. While Quebec had the framework for a democratic institution that should have allowed access to all ethnicities, it was monopolized by elites due to the dual party system that divided the province into urban and rural votes and, therefore, ignored the necessary representation of Quebecois and the disparity between classes. Corsica, comparatively, did not have similar institutions for local political power; and as they began to achieve them, the French government failed to challenge the clan system that evolved to the contemporary political system.

**Demography: a focus on language and violence**

Quebec went from one of the highest demographic growth rates in Canada during the 1950s to a nearly stationary growth rate that was less than 1 percent per year in 1970 (Langlois et al 1992, 13). In 1961, the average household in Quebec was 4.53 persons with a total population of 5,259,211, and by 1975 the number of persons per household was 3.5. This statistic represents a decrease in children and an increase in divorce as Quebec society experienced secularization (14).

There was a steady decline in the English-speaking population in Quebec from 15 percent in 1931 and 13 percent in 1976 (Cox 2009, 65); however, the economic elite continued to be massively represented by Anglophones. Linteau et al (1991) states that French Canadians represented approximately 6.7 percent in the early 1950s to 8.3 percent in 1972 (413). Although there was some growth in French-Canadian representation in the economic elite over 20 years, it still remained minimal and disproportionate to the distribution of French Canadians versus Anglophones in Quebec at the same time. As late as 1977, Milner stated: ‘there is little evidence to suggest that there is at present a French-Canadian group, of social stratum, which yields any amount of effective economic power on a scale comparable to
that of the Anglo-Canadian or American business interests’ (49). While this statement could be considered harsh, the economic, political and social changes and reforms occurring during the Quiet Revolution spurred a new consciousness of the division of labour in Quebec.

Due to Corsica’s geographical location in the Mediterranean basin, it was occupied by a succession of peoples including the Phoceceans, Romans, Vandals, Pisons, Genoans, British, and finally the French; and it had never been constitutionally absorbed into another state until France in 1768. While most countries invaded Corsica for the maritime advantage, they generally occupied the periphery of the island and allowed the Corsican populace to retain a large measure of their internal affairs and cultural identity. These invasions reinforced the defensive nature of the Corsicans; historically, they have had difficulty in forming satisfactory relations and alliances with outside people (Ramsay 1983, 2). Secondly, the mountainous terrain of the interior affected the ability for the sub-state to become materially or demographically strong enough to assert their independence militaristically.

The interior also shaped Corsican communities. Communications and travel across the island were difficult, which meant that small villages through the valleys and mountains were divided; thus, creating deep local loyalties that are apparent in the kin-based clan system. An agro-pastoral culture shaped active, but modest and even impoverished, lives (Sanguinetti 2012, 159).

Prior to the Regional Action Plan of 1957, in which repatriated Algerians settled in Corsica, the population of the island was 180,000, of whom 90 percent were Corsicans, 7 percent were Italian and less than 3 percent were from the French mainland. Between 1950 and 1970, Corsica experienced ‘an exodus of violence’, in which actors who once participated in violent action in Corsica moved to the mainland, and the traditional banditry adapted to the violence of the ‘milieu’. It was in 1950, at the end of WWII, that Sanguinetti (2012) suggests that a new form of violence with political claims formed due to the political, cultural and economic frustrations
discussed previously, combined with the exposure to new ideologies and the
global nationalist and decolonization movements from tourism and ‘les
éxilés’, students that had moved to the mainland for university (162). Later in
the 1980s, poverty and an increase in drug businesses and consumption also
influenced a change in violence. Between 1980 and 2000, Sanguinetti argues
that there was also an ‘explosion’ of homicides, suicides, transport accidents,
cancer and AIDS in Corsica. The amount of ‘perils’ increased more rapidly
than the governmental authorities could react (163).

Although French was the national language, and the language used in
schools and businesses, Corsican was very much used in the household. In
the 1970s, there was a reinvigorated interest in the Corsican dialect as an
instrument for Corsican culture, very much headed by Jacques Thiers who
was kind enough to meet with me during my fieldwork. A survey carried
out by l’Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE)
in 1977 showed that in Ajaccio and Bastia, 79 percent of ‘heads of households
claimed to speak Corsican, as did 69 percent of their spouses and 59 percent
of their children’ (Ramsay 67).

Notably, Quebec and Corsica were both experiencing socio-political
and economic awakenings. The Quiet Revolution in Quebec placed an
importance on becoming masters of their own homes, which included
protection of the sub-state language and culture. Similarly, many Corsicans
in the 1970s subscribed to a socio-political programme to protect culture and
language. There was a cultural movement to write the oral Corsican dialect
and to preserve the stories, poetry and theatre. The traditional shepherd
culture was romanticized within this literature.

When comparing the demography of Quebec and Corsica, it is most
important to note the contrasts of population size. While Quebec was a
considerable size in comparison to other Canadian provinces at 5,259,000 in
1961 (Stats Canada census 1961), and held considerable political weight,
Corsica was a much smaller population, at 180,000 in 1957 (Sanguinetti 2012,
62), with very little political and economic power.
What is ideological radical space?

In order to understand ideological radical space, I refer to Kohn’s (2003) work on radical space:

The social and symbolic properties of space can also be important resources for transformative political projects. Political spaces facilitate change by creating a distinctive place to develop new identities and practices. The political power of place comes from its ability to link the social, symbolic, and experiential dimensions of space. Transformative politics comes from separating, juxtaposing, and recombining these dimensions (4).

Whilst Kohn (2003), like others, focuses on physical space, she indicated the need to capture less tangible dimensions of space. She argues that it is necessary that a mediated position “acknowledges that space is a product of social practices but one that has particular properties precisely because of its embodiment in specific types of places…. [this] position neither reduces space to a purely physical category nor evacuates its material dimension” (15). It is to this end that I introduce ideological radical space in this thesis.

Tilly’s (1986) work on repertoires of contention demonstrates how social movements operates within the parameters of what each society perceives to be acceptable; these boundaries are shaped by cultural beliefs, values and attitudes. Radical ideological space is an extension of these parameters to conceive of a greater range of political possibilities. In agreement with Kohn, radical ideological space encompasses a material dimension of socio-political practices while also being rooted in the physical— in the case of this thesis, sub-states Quebec and Corsica.

This thesis examines how individual actors in Quebec and Corsica justified radical tactics in support of the movements for social and political change and attempted to manipulate or extend radical ideological space through campaigns of violence. When ideological radical space is extended,
one finds a great acceptance of radical means and goals. Conversely, a turn towards conservatism, might see an erosion of support for independence movements.

**Plan of Thesis and Research Scope**

The contentious politics paradigm has shifted from political to cultural approaches to utilize a combination of the two, and it has continued to place a focus on empirical research. This thesis analyzes new archival data, such as policing documentation, court transcripts, newspapers, primary accounts and secondary sources, within a social movement theoretical framework that is further explored in Chapter 2.

While the sub-state violent contention occurred in the very different contexts of Quebec and Corsica, the FLQ and the FLNC shared an overall pattern: an arc of violent mobilization. This pattern helped formulate the empirical chapters. Chapter 3 examines the initial mobilization of the FLQ between 1963 and 1965 and the FLNC between 1975-1979 that developed from a series of socio-economic and political frustrations; Chapter 4 looks at the radicalization of the FLQ in 1965-1968 and the FLNC between 1980 and 1989 in which new tactics were embraced; and Chapter 5 examines the peak of violence and then the decline of activity, mobilization and recruitment between 1969-1971 in Quebec and the early 1990s in Corsica.

While the Corsican violence continued on and off until 2014, the network changed after the ‘scission de 1990’; violence did not comprise symbolic episodes, but was used instead to further competition between the newly-divided factions. I introduce this change in the last chapter, and then choose to end the comparison for research scope and to limit the contrast to nationalist-focused violence. Finally, Chapter 7 acts as the thesis conclusion and compares and analyzes the two cases in order to answer the research questions and draw conclusions about sub-state contention, and the extension of radical space, in Quebec and Corsica.

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9 I am grateful to the examiners for their help in developing this concept.
Conclusion

This thesis compares and contrasts violent sub-state contention in the very different socio-political and economic contexts of Quebec and Corsica. The FLQ and the FLNC both groups sought to extend radical space. While both groups arguably were able to extend the space at moments by inspiring popular support, both ultimately failed at sustaining the extension of radical space on the basis of their revolutionary manifestoes. Both groups, however, acted as a ‘stepping stone’ for democratic moderate action. Many of the actors that once used violent means to achieve revolution, or members of the populace that once supported the violent contention, turned to moderate and democratic action through the forms of political referendums for independence.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Literature Review

This chapter is a review of social movement literature and contentious politics, highlighting key scholars such as McCarthy and Zald, Gurr, Tilly, Tarrow, McAdam, Snow and Benford and Haines. This literature provides a theoretical framework for the following empirical chapters. First, I introduce Social Movement Theory that frames the analysis of the FLQ and the FLNC; in doing so, I outline the evolution of Social Movement Theory, the distinctions between the theories and the approaches, and how they have come together to develop a strong contemporary theory that is both political and cultural. Second, I focus particularly on my comparative ‘tool kit’ of Radical Flank Effect, Tilly’s mobilization model and repertoires.

Viewing the FLQ and the FLNC as social movements

Social movements are a modern form of protest (Tilly 1995; Johnston 2011). Modernization and industrialization gave a rise to commerce and manufacturing, new classes, and status groups (Mann 1993). The 18th and 19th centuries witnessed a new politicization of social life that would develop into the 1960s and 1970s when political parties would form to pursue the interest of these new groups (Tilly 1978); however, not all groups felt adequately represented by the democratic electoral systems embraced by the French and Canadian states. The FLQ and the FLNC, in particular, offered particularly loaded critiques that turned from nationalism to Marxism. The FLQ and the FLNC can be understood by social movement theory, as they were both a ‘complex aggregation of peaceful and violent groups that encompassed a network against the state’ (Diani 1992). In this sense, the actors (or members of the FLQ and FLNC) were influenced by mobilizing processes and mechanisms, variables used to understand social movement dynamics, and participated in social movement repertoires, a set of various tools and actions available to a movement or organization. Both the FLQ and the FLNC were comprised of cells and canals, as discussed in detail in the empirical chapters, and can be considered as Social Movement Organizations (SMOs)
McCarthy and Zald (1977) define SMOs in a broad sense as “a complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or countermovement and attempts to implement those goals” (1218). Gaps in the social movement literature, as to the characteristics of SMOs, and their contributions to social movements, have been re-examined in recent years with a push to bridge social movement and organization theories (Davis, McAdam, Scott and Zald 2005; Lounsbury and Ventresca 2002; Minkoff and McCarthy 2005).

Currently, scholarship on SMOs focus on three critical areas: the organizational basis for mobilization; how resources are related to SMO strategy, and how these resources affect organizational mobilization; and a focus on SMO structure. A focus on the relationship between structure and internal SMO dynamics, similar to Balser (1997), Useem and Zald (1987), was influential to my empirical research. The three moments of the FLQ and the FLNC are analysed and investigated based on processes and mechanisms that are highlighted in social movement theoretical literature.

The following sections highlight the contemporary developments of Social Movement theory, and introduce and compare the distinctions between Resource Mobilization Theory, Political Process Theory and Cultural Constructivist Theories. All three theories are used to frame my analysis.

**Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT)**

Resource Mobilization Theory was developed in 1977 when McCarthy and Zald critiqued the early social psychological view of Gurr (1970) and Kornhauser (1959), and other deprivation theorists who suggested that protest was only used by marginalized members of society. Analysts criticized these theories by suggesting that the most marginalized people in society are less likely to engage in risky political actions as they are un-able to afford such risks, nor do they have the time or the political knowledge.
McCarthy and Zald (1977) argued that social movement theory ought to be integrated with structural theories of social processes; they focused on social movements that are composed of formal organizations, and that collective response is a rational response that can occur when adequate resources are available. RMT was groundbreaking scholarship as sociological variables replaced psychological predispositions to marginality and discontent (Klandermans 1984).

Resource Mobilization Theory critiqued the previous assumptions that SMOs relied on informal, contentious activity; the RMT perspective considered that organizations with paid leadership and paper membership as central to the ‘mobility, stability and maturation of the movement’ (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 24). Staggenborg (1988) focused on the formalization of SMOs, and found that the movement organizations that were less professionalized, had few policies and concrete procedures, no decision structures, and were influenced by individual leaders who often tended to have ‘autonomous chapters’. The FLQ reflect Staggenborg’s observation; as will be noted in the following empirical chapters, the cells of the FLQ were mainly independent cells under the umbrella term of the FLQ with limited to no interaction between cells and moments. In agreement with Gerlach and Hine (1970) and Piven and Cloward (1977), these less formal organizations, although less stable and influential to the maturity of the overall movement, are able to mobilize quickly. The cells in the FLQ were small, mobilized easily but were unable to last long after clandestine violence began. The FLNC held a more structured decision-making hierarchy, but allowed the regional networks to make their own decisions, thus allowing for a more stable movement that could survive long-term.

**Political Process Theory in Social Movements**

Political process theory (PPT) grew from original resource mobilization scholarship; while scholars from both groups agree that SMO’s are critical for mobilization, recruitment and collecting and distributing critical information
about the movement, political process theory includes a sociopolitical context and a study of the relationship between SMOs and the institutions within their environments. Political process scholarship looks further than the organizations themselves to focus on success and failure of the larger movement. For example, Tarrow (1998) argues the cycles of mobilization are influenced by the opening and closing of groups’ access to the political process. Political process theory was initially associated with institutions and conditions, but has become open to cultural and social contexts as way to inform the dynamics of the movements; Beth Schaefer Caniglia and JoAnn Carmin cite Gamson and Meyer (1996) and Rucht (1996) as early examples that applied a cultural context to political process theory. Certain scholars (see Bennett 2004, 2005; Kriesi 1996; McCarthy 1996; Rucht 1996 as examples) look at the links between individuals and organizations as a network. Bennett (2004) looks at how three properties of transnational protest, inclusive organization models, social technologies, and political capacities of members, ‘communicate their issues and form effective political relationships with targets of protest’, and I similarly focus on a contrast of organization, the use of technologies and media, and the political capacities of the members to inform membership and recruitment.

While much social movement literature focuses on interactions between social movements and authorities, certain academics (such as Diani 1995; Gerlach and Hine 1970; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988; McAdam 1988; Snow, Zurcher and Eckland-Olson 1980; Marwell and Oliver 1993; and Passy 2003) argue that associations and ties between actors act as an organizing and mobilizing mechanism by establishing means for communication and knowledge-sharing (Caniglia and Carmen 2005), but also provides the service of recruitment. Rucht (2004) argues that these links between actors “should become part and parcel of social movement studies. It is time to abandon the simplified image of a two-party struggle between a (unified) movement and its (unified) opponent acting in some kind of a social vacuum” (212-213). The empirical chapters of this thesis highlight the associations, ties and relationships between the members, the cells of the FLQ, and the canals and networks of the FLNC. In both cases, the
participation of the FLQ and the FLNC required affiliation with other members. Members, as noted in the empirical chapters, were recruited from other less-radical organizations or through relationships such as friends, family and/or neighbours. The FLNC published in their manifesto that all new members had to have relationships with at least one other member to avoid intelligence infiltration.

The political process and mobilization theories created a foundation for recent SMO research; it placed an importance on the study of the relationship between SMOs and their external environments, and focused on a broader economic and political context. PPT combined macro-organization theories with social movement methods to encourage research into ‘field-level dynamics’ (Edwards and Marullo 1995; Johnston and McCarthy 2005; Minkoff 1999, 1997, 1995). While critics found that PPT was originally overly structural, PPT theorists have turned to the processes and mechanisms of contentious politics. This thesis uses mechanisms as elements of contrast. The concept that SMOs are actors (Tilly 2003), or made up of actors, that respond to the sociopolitical environment is very much apparent in this thesis, and why a contextual element to my empirical chapters is so important.

Although PPT has been critiqued, it continues to dominate the field of social movement research. Goodwin and Jasper (1999) suggest that non-structural factors are often analysed as though they were structural factors, and are defined as factors that are relatively stable over time and outside the control of movement actors. Such factors include: agency, the active choice of movement actors, and cultural factors that deal with moral visions, cognitive understanding and emotions that exist prior to the movement. McCarthy, McAdam and Zald (1996) intended to establish these factors as frames rather than as ‘mobilizing structures, as suggested by political theorists’. While Goodwin and Jasper are quick to critique the conceptual consensus of this approach, they do not deliver a better solution; thus, the ideologies and strategy of the FLQ and FLNC, discussed in the empirical chapters, are introduced and analyzed as key elements, and as part of the context.
Cultural and Cognitive Theories

While social movement literature today has developed into a ‘synthesis’ of political and cultural approaches, it is important to highlight the two original approaches. Cultural theory developed as a critique of PPT and argued that movements develop and occur within social and cultural contexts. Participants are motivated to join movements because they hold the same values and beliefs as the movement due to primary frameworks (Goffman 1974); identity affiliation is prevalent. Framing, influenced by Goffman (1974), is often used as a tool to identify alternatives (Snow and Benford 2000), and develop a rationale for movement activity (Babb 1996; Snow and Benford 1988); it has been used by scholars such as Gamson et al (1982), Snow et al (1986), Snow and Benford (1988). Framing processes became popular during the mid 1980s when sociologists found that the mobilization of ideas and meanings were not discussed analytically, nor were they treated as relevant to the development of social movements (Snow and Benford 1992: 135-36). Movement actors are viewed as actors engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning, and are a part of the “politics of signification”, as discussed by Hall (1982).

Although culture is considered a defining and shaping factor for protest, it was originally considered in the form of a ‘frame’ or ‘identity’ within the political process literature, rather than a cultural approach (Goodwin and Jasper 2004, Viili). Collective action frames simply highlight aspects of society in ways that are “intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner the bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (Snow and Benford 1988: 198); in other words, Snow and Benford suggest that collective action frames are “sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (Snow and Benford 2000: 614). Collective action frames are distinguishable from schemas (as discussed in psychology) and cognitive constructs in that collective action frames are not “individual attitudes and perceptions, but also the outcome of negotiating shared
meaning” (Gamson. 1992b: 111). Building on Wilson’s (1973) three part ideology, Snow and Benford (1988) designate three core framing tasks: diagnostic framing includes problem identification and attributions; prognostic framing that articulates a solution, or plan of attack, and the strategies to the problem; and motivational framing, the agency component (Gamson 1992a), that provides rationale for engaging in collective action. SMOs use these ‘tasks’ to ‘diagnose situations, generate solutions and communicate views and positions’ (Snow and Benford 1988). Many sociologists including Cable and Shriver (1995), Capek (1993), Gamson (1992a, 1992b), Gamson et al (1982), Kubal (1998), Neuman (1998), Triandafyllidou and Fotiou (1998), White (1999), and Zdravomyslova (1996) have looked at the processes of frame development and innovation. Klandermans and Goslinga (1996) differ from the scholarship that focused on the functional aspect of frames with research that focuses on how frames shape the production and construction of meaning. As suggested by Caniglia and Carmen (2005), cognitive and normative attributions shape the choices of the SMOs just as culture shapes the structures and practices of the movement; social movements and SMOs have shared understandings, values and beliefs. As noted in the following empirical chapters, FLQ and FLNC members mobilize around shared values and beliefs.

The constructivist approach not only provided insight into framing processes, but also placed an importance on the inclusion of culture when studying social movements and SMOs. Highlighting cultural theories in this literature review identifies trends in the emerging research on social movements; SMOs are no longer considered components of the movement, but active instruments. The internal dynamics of the SMOs, the movements, the ‘mechanisms’ and relationship with the state are all important factors to explore in order to answer the thesis question. While this thesis certainly affords culture quite a bit of emphasis, the focus on membership and mobilization/recruitment mechanisms follows a contemporary theory of social movements that combines both political and cultural approaches. As Tarrow rightly states, the political process approach deals with more than politics; “it helps us understand processes, such as mobilization and
demobilization, the framing of contentious political action, and how social movements mobilize resources on behalf of their claims” (Tarrow 2012: 8).

Similar to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), my empirical research attempts to avoid ‘fitting’ my research into ‘invariable models’, but to analyze the FLQ and the FLNC amongst processes, mechanisms, actors and culture outside of the “boxes and arrows of the classic social movement agenda” (McAdam et al 2001: 84). My research also places an importance on Tilly’s challenge of idea-based explanations of violence by insisting on the importance of social interaction (Tilly 2003). Strong emotions arise from social interaction and respond to changes in the social setting (Tilly 2003), thus placing an importance on the interactions and changes that occur in the social setting.

**Studying Social Interactions: Repertoires and Radical Flank Effect**

This second section explores contentious politics including Radical Flank Effect, Tilly’s mobilization model, Gurr’s study of political violence and repertoires. Leitner et al (2008) critique Tarrow’s definition of contentious politics by suggesting that it is overly state-centric and interest-oriented; it is ‘insufficient in acknowledging the differences within all collective action’. I, therefore, turn to the definition that I feel best represents my own research: ‘contentious politics refers to concerted, counter-hegemonic social and political action, in which differently positioned participants come together to challenge dominant systems of authority, in order to promote and enact alternative imaginaries’ (158).

Charles Tilly (2003) outlines four characteristics of productive social movements: social movements must demonstrate (1) a worthiness of the

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10 Tarrow’s definition is: ‘public, collective and episodic interactions between makers of claims when a) at least some of the interaction adopts non-institutional forms, b) at least one government is a claimant, and object, or a party to the claims, and c) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants’ (Tarrow 2001, 7)
cause and claim-making (2) a unity of purpose; to demonstrate that the claimants will not disappear over time (3) large numbers of supporters and (4) a strong commitment amongst the members to urge a response from the state. Johnston (2011) critiques Tilly by arguing that when the committed groups are unable to show or gain numbers, they sometimes choose violent acts to prove a dedication to the cause. In the case of the FLQ and the FLNC, both groups had limited numbers when they initially mobilized, and chose violence as a means to draw attention to their demands and motives. There was, however, less need for the violent networks as peaceful political movements gained strength. Violence also attracts the attention of the media, the populace and the policy makers; a phenomenon called the radical flank effect (RFE) shows that extremists can draw the attention of the populace and policy makers when moderate groups may not, but will also ‘bear the brunt’ of state repression (Haines 1984). RFE acts as an explanatory mechanism for my thesis argument that the FLQ and the FLNC shaped radical spaces. When social movements are comprised of radical and moderate SMOs that are aligned differently on the spectrum, radical flank effect may occur; the more extreme factions frame and shape the social movement demands and have either a positive or negative effect on the movement as a whole.

Haines (1984, 1988, 1996) led scholarship on Radical Flank Effect by first studying it systematically in reference to the black power movements and civil rights movements in the United States. Gupta defines the RFE as a ‘mechanism triggered by the bifurcation of a social movement into radical and moderate factions’. In other words, RFE is not a tactic or strategy; it is a variable that ‘enters into the likelihood of success’ (Lofland 1996: 295) when studying the success of a movement. Lofland (1996) states that SMOs can often be arranged on a spectrum of moderate to radical “running from the more conservative SMOs who are closer to the mainstream, to the more militant and radical SMOs who are further to the extreme ‘left’, ‘right’, or merely ‘out’” (294). When a movement contains both a radical and moderate group, the radical group’s actions are perceived by external actors (the state, populace, opposing radical groups) to be threatening because they advocate extreme and politically unpalatable goals and/or they pursue transgressive
(often violent) tactics. In other words, the level of ‘radicalism’, or ‘moderation’, of the actors is defined by ‘the degree of legitimacy that is imputed to their objective, rhetoric, and tactics by relevant external audiences’ (Haines 1984, 1). The state will either bolster the position of the moderates to make them more desirable and to isolate or undermine the extreme groups, or, they will provide concessions to the moderates in the form of policy changes or resource transfers to stave off costly radicalism (see Haines 1984; Marger 1984; Haines 1984; Gupta 2002). The violence by clandestine actors can normalize and redefine moderate strategies and demands from peaceful groups, and can make them seem ‘reasonable’ (Haines 1984, 32). Or, the radicals can also ‘create crises which are resolved to the moderate’s advantage; (Haines 1984, 32). This dynamic, called the positive radical flank effect (RFE+) occurred during the final moment of the FLNC in chapter 6. The Corsican government found that repression of the violent network was not working; despite arrests, violence continued to occur. Authorities began to look at the region of Corsica as a distinct region in France that required its own attention, and therefore met with moderate, peaceful actors to attempt political negotiation towards policy change.

In some instances, the presence of radicals in the same movement can have ‘deleterious effects on moderates’ ability to gain access to decision makers and achieve some measure of success’ (Gupta 2002: 6). The Negative Radical Flank Effect (RFE-) then affects the moderate program and discourages benefits from external actors (see Wall 1999; Shellengberger and Nordhaus 2004). The intense fear, provoked by the militants, creates a reactive repression of the entire movement, thus, setting back if not destroying the cause (Loftland 1996). As will be noted during the final empirical chapter, the Parti Quebecois, already distinct from the FLQ, made sure to publicly announce during the October Crisis that they worked separately from the FLQ; leader René Levesque and the PQ were worried that the violence would hurt the nationalist movement. The Marxist focus of the FLQ, however, made it unlikely that the FLQ would ‘destroy’ the cause of the moderate nationalists.
Gupta (2002) argues that RFE is problematic by suggesting that one gains while the other loses; however, both groups can benefit or lose power at the same time. Rather than two outcomes, RFE theorists should consider four different possibilities: RFE+, RFE-, INCR (increase, when all groups advance) and DECR (decrease, when all groups retreat) (6). The radical flank effect is only appropriate when there is competition between two or more groups for the resources and attention. Relative and absolute gains that are studied under the RFE are not conducive to a single, monolithic movement organization that holds all of the influence.

This RFE is useful as a comparison between the FLQ and the FLNC, and as a tool to understand the shaping of radical spaces in Corsica and Quebec. Gupta (2002) creates a list of assumptions of the mechanism that can point to environmental and strategic factors that are likely to influence power among movements and SMOs. First, the radical flank effect requires rival movement organizations, rather than a monolithic movement organization, that compete for the minimal resources and attention. If we look at the nationalist movements in Quebec and Corsica with a wider lens, the FLQ and the FLNC can certainly be studied using the RFE. Second, the RFE requires that the groups are distinct and differentiated in the eyes of the external actors: the populace, state and provincial governments. While the FLQ had different cells and groups that were not differentiated by the media or the state, the FLQ (violent faction) and PQ (moderate faction) distinguished themselves from one another very clearly.

Harrison and March (1984), Schelling (1963) and Jervis (2002) argue that the RFE lacks an element of explanation, which can be rectified with insight into influential environmental and strategic factors, such as: distinct rival organizations, factors that distinguish a differentiation of actors, and the response of external actors. A final difficulty, Gupta argues, is that the RFE mechanism does not explicitly consider the levels of strategic interaction within the movement (Alimi et al. 2012). Internal dynamics and factors external to the movement also need to be studied and articulated. McCarthy and Zald equally suggest that groups can lose or gain power. While the RFE
lacks certain explanatory powers, it is useful when studying spaces in Quebec and Corsica. The spaces were partially shaped by the relevancy given to the FLQ and the FLNC by external audiences, their relationships with moderate factions, and the networks’ interactions with the authorities; therefore, a comparison of the RFE, supplemented with environmental and strategic factors, helps to answer the question of how radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica were shaped by the FLQ and the FLNC.

While Gurr’s study of political violence is important to mention, his scale is rudimentary and less helpful to this study than RFE. Gurr’s study of political violence combined violence by both governmental actors and dissident groups; he looked at “nonstate communal groups that were politically salient” (Gurr in Tilly 1986, 64). In doing so, he used case reports to grade the activity over five-year periods with a scale of 1 through 5. The scale includes: (0) none reported; (1) political banditry, sporadic terrorism; (2) campaigns of terrorism, successful coups by or on behalf of the group; (3) small-scale guerrilla activity or other forms of conflict; (4) guerrilla activity involving more than 1,000 armed fighters carrying out frequent armed attacks over a substantial area, or group involvement in civil, revolutionary, or international warfare that is not specifically or mainly concerned with group issues; (5) civil war fought by military units with base areas (Gurr 2000 in Tilly, 64). The scale is basic and can lead to error, however Tilly suggests that critics have encountered difficulty in creating their own. While it could be simple to place the FLQ and the FLNC on a numerical scale similar to Gurr’s, this thesis has the luxury of comparing and exploring the two cases in depth with the aid of mechanisms, repertoires, and RFE.

Scholars such as Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982), Jenkins and Eckert (1986), Tarrow (1988), Olzak (1989), Kriesi et al (1995), McCarthy et al (1996) have studied strikes, riots, violent incidents and other contentious gatherings that have emerged as a way to assess the tactics of mobilization within social movements. Similarly to RFE, McAdam et al’s (2001) mobilization model expands on framing to involve the interaction amongst challengers (or actors), their opponents and the media. Unlike Gurr’s scale, this model adds
the elements of contrast in this thesis by calling attention to ‘active appropriation of sites for mobilization’ (44); the model looks at the mobilization process rather than the origins of an episode that affect mobilization. As will be noted in the empirical chapters, the mobilization of the FLQ and FLNC was dynamic and interactive. The FLQ and FLNC were ‘continual and recursive’ (45) throughout their trajectories, and were both created from preexisting groups that worked as mobilization structures; thus, supporting the dynamic mobilization model that suggests that mobilization structures can be preexisting (McAdam et al. 2001, 45).

RFE outlines the relationship between the extremists and their moderate factions, and the mobilization model looks at the interaction between extremists, opponents and the media. The next section of the literature review looks at repertoires, and how the actors interact with audiences, public authority and one another.

‘Trangressive Repertoires’ as Strategic Framing

Similar to RFE, Tilly and others suggest that actors interact strategically with significant audiences and representatives of public authorities. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) compare the interactions, that proceed from prior encounters and experiences, to performances and scripted interactions ‘in an improvisatory manner of jazz or street theatre rather than the more repetitious routines of art songs or religious rituals’ (49). These performances are obvious during the empirical contrast of the FLQ and the FLNC, especially in the third moment when the networks attempted to manipulate the press to portray strength and patriotism by relying on acts and imagery.

In this sense, members of the FLQ and FLNC, as challengers of the status quo, are considered actors. These actors used ritual and symbolism when committing violent acts as a performance; the performances innovated around inherited repertoires (McAdam et al. 2001, 49). Tarrow (2012) suggests that repertoires represent the culturally-encoded ways in which
people interact in contentious politics, and they evolve as a result of improvisation and struggle (16). Rarely was the ‘innovation’ within repertoires or the innovative acts completely new. All activity by the FLQ and the FLNC subscribed to a history or a movement of performance; some acts were simply creative forms of previous performances and routines. Bombings, hijackings and assassinations were part of the protest culture of the 1960s and 1970s, a culture in which the FLQ and the FLNC subscribed, yet resonated when used in Quebec as they were unprecedented in Canada.

Actor constitution

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) argue that actor constitution interacts with the mobilization process, and affects its course and outcomes. The actors, as in theatre, manipulate, modify and reinterpret their identity of contention (See Andrews and Biggs 2006; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McCammon 2003; Myers 2000; Soule 1997). In both the cases of the FLQ and the FLNC, membership was open to many different social profiles; although identity was important, appropriation of identity was acceptable. As long as one considered themselves ‘Corsican’ or ‘Quebecois’ and made the same claims, he or she could be considered a member or actor. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly also claim that the crucial arena for causal mechanisms lies in social interaction rather than in individual minds. Again, the importance of social interaction between movements and relevant audiences link contentious repertoires, actor manipulation, and the analysis of space using RFE.

My focus on identity and actor formation throughout the three empirical chapters takes further inspiration from McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) who assess that actors are ‘socially embedded and constituted beings who interact incessantly with other such beings and undergo modifications of their boundaries and attributes as they interact” (57); contentious politics attract actors to participate in a series of interactive performances that are partly improvisation within the constraints of a general script. The relational approach of theatricality is excellent for the analysis of the FLQ and the FLNC; the interpretation of members as actors and activity as performances
within a larger script of contentious episodes provides a mechanism for analysis of social interaction. This focus of interaction between actors and relevant audiences, further supported by RFE, informs the development of radical spaces by the FLQ and the FLNC within the fluid boundaries of contentious politics.

Tactical Repertoires

While the above section introduced and focused on the symbolism of repertoires as theatre and members as actors, this section conceptualizes literature of protest forms as tactical repertoires. Social, political and economic processes constrain the tactical options available to social movements and SMOs. The literature in this section places an importance on both internal dynamics and external sociopolitical factors to understand repertoires and the effective use of tactics as a way of shaping space, which supports my decision to place the comparison of the FLQ and the FLNC into a detailed historical context.

Authors such as Tilly (1978, 1995), Traugott (1995) and Tarrow (1998) write about ‘tactical repertoires’ to discuss the predictable, limited and bounded tactics of protest that develop over time. Tarrow (1993) builds on Tilly’s (1986) idea that tactics are historically specific by suggesting that protest repertoires are also modular; tactics are borrowed by different groups and movements pursuing different targets. Activists take inspiration from other groups and movements so that they “do not have to reinvent the wheel at each place and in each conflict” (McAdam and Rucht 1993, 58 in Van Dyke et al. 2001, 266); however, because of this, “tactic innovations occur slowly” (Van Dyke et al 2001: 266). Social movements also appropriate cultural symbols and modify them to allow them to take on new meaning; this is another way that groups create new forms of protest. Taylor and Van Dyke convincingly state that cultural repertoires are central to movements across the political spectrum, and new technologies are always being incorporated into tactical repertoires.
The theme of tactical repertoires is discussed further in the empirical chapters, and especially during Chapter 6 when I place the FLQ’s tactics and actions in context of other nationalist movements. Hostage-taking and plane hijacking were popular tactics during the late 60s and early 1970s. The Montreal Gazette published an article by the United Press International on the 6 October 1970 declaring 1970 as ‘the year of the terrorist kidnap’ and listed 12 political victims kidnapped by leftist guerilla groups in Latin American countries since 4 September 1969. Plane hijackings peaked during 1968 to 1973, in which 326 hijackings were attempted worldwide, or one every 5.6 days; 137 hijacking attempts occurred in the US alone (Holden 1986). The FLQ was not only influenced by other groups using these tactics, but also specifically used them to become a part of the larger international movement, and to be known outside of Canada.

Turner and Killian (1987) identify four basic tactics that are based on the types of interaction with the target (persuasion, facilitation, bargaining, and coercion) while recent academics such as Soule et al (1999) and Van Dyke et al (2001) focus on a differentiation between two modes of action: non-confrontational or insider action and confrontational or outsider action. While insider action includes boycotts, lawsuits, lobbying, petitions and press conferences, outsider action uses demonstrations, vigils, strikes, symbolic actions, bombings and other illegal activity. Tarrow (1998) argues that violence incorporates a third category, and acknowledges that contentious politics often use tactics from all three elements. As will be noted in the empirical chapters, the FLQ and the FLNC did in fact use tactics that were both non-confrontational and confrontational; press conferences and newsletters were used as tactics throughout all three moments and chapters. Symbolic actions and bombings were the main tactics used to draw attention to the demands of both the FLQ and FLNC.

Forms of collective action are determined by the degree of political opportunity, the form of organization adopted by the subordinate groups, and the cultural framing of the group’s grievances. My own research aligns with Taylor and Van Dyke’s (2004) exploratory research in how these macro
and micro factors influenced the FLQ and the FLNC’s tactics. The macro factors that are applied in this thesis include transnational tactical repertoires (including international influences), and a larger increase of radicalization and institutionalization, as described by Tarrow 1989, Koopmans 1993 and Kriesi et al 1995. InternalMovement processes involve three internal features: level of organization among actors, cultural frames of meaning used to justify collective action and the structural power of the participants. According to Darnovsky et al (1995), tactical repertoires are influenced by social movement culture. Not only are tactics adopted due to their efficiency, but also because they resonate with the beliefs, ideas and cultural frames of meaning (Snow and Benford, 1988) the actors use to legitimate their collective action (Van Dyke et al. 2001, 226). Gender specific ideology also serves as a basis for the choice of tactics by nationalist movements; Nagel (1998) found that this was the case when studying the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Brown (1992) when he researched the Black Panthers. Gender-influences, specifically within the context of nationalism, influenced the choice of tactics by FLQ and FLNC. The first empirical chapter discusses the gendering of nationalism, not only as an influencing factor on tactics, but also in recruitment. Taylor and Van Dyke (2004) conclude that actors choose among tactical repertoires for those that best conform to their ideologies and collective identities, and embody the cultural frames that best highlight the group’s motives for action (277).

Scholars such as Schwartz (1976), Tilly (1978, 1986), Gamson (1989) and Taylor (1996) all argue that the structural power of protestors influences a group’s choice of tactical repertoires. Several studies of social movements have found that actors who lack access to institutionalized political and economic power are most likely to engage in protest (Scott 1985; Van Dyke et al. 2001). This theme is crucial to my own comparison where members of both the FLQ and FLNC felt as though they were not represented politically, but the movements would cease action when they felt as though they were or could be represented politically and return to violence when it became clear that their demands were not being considered. As will be noted in the empirical chapters, many members of both organizations were students;
scholars agree that students have ‘fewer countervailing ties to the constraints of adulthood, and have limited access to politics through other means’ (Van Dyke, 277; McCarthy and Zald 1973; Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 1988; White 1999; Soule 1997; Zhao 1998; Van Dyke et al. 2001)

Studies (see Tilly et al 1975; Piven and Cloward 1979; McAdam 1983) found that groups using disruptive tactics were more successful at policy change than those who were quieter and focused on institutional changes; however, this has been challenged by several authors who argue that there is no blueprint: Soule et al (1999) found that insider tactics were much more successful than disruptive tactics when studying women’s groups in the US, and McAdam and Yang (2002) argued that movements needed a combination of disruptive tactics and peaceful politics of persuasion. The October Crisis in 1970, in which the FLQ took two hostages, particularly proves that disruptive tactics were in no way successful in Canada in the 1960s and 1970s. There was a worry by the moderate movement that the violent activity of the FLQ negatively impacted the completely separate and distinct democratic nationalist party, the Parti Quebecois. René Levesque, leader of the PQ, made many attempts to distance the PQ from the FLQ; as early as 1964 when he was Natural Resources Minister, Levesque denounced violence. (Peters 1964).

As Mueller (1999) argues, repertoires and tactics are building blocks of all of the major social movement theories from the past three decades; therefore, it is important to highlight literature on repertoires in both this literature review and how it applies to the FLQ and the FLNC within the empirical chapters. Ferree et al (2002) suggest that identity and discourse take on an important role in repertoires by groups challenging cultural codes; this is linked to the nature of political authority in modern societies. A ‘recognition struggle’ (Fraser 1993) developed a modern tactical repertoire in response to the lack of recognition for identities in law, politics, government politics and professional and social practices. Thus, it is important to understand the democratic relationships between Quebec and Canada, and Corsica and France; the next few paragraphs looks at modern democracy in
countries Canada and France within a larger scope of social movement literature.

Both France and Canada were modern democracies during the moments of sub-state violent contention studied in this thesis. Both systems had, and still do have, a clear division of political labour between elected politicians who govern and the populace who elect them (Allen and Mirwaltd 2010: 871). Political parties acted as ‘expressive instruments’ (Sartori 1976: 28) that performed vital democratic functions by connecting the voting citizens to the political and governmental process (Klingemann et al. 1994:5), and shaping democracy and the division of labour. Alongside the checks and balances of democracy, there are also procedures that guarantee the freedom of expression, debate, and the liberty to form and join political groups and express views through lawful protests and campaigning (Giddens 2002, Heywood 2002); however, individuals have at times felt in Quebec and Corsica as though the electoral and legal processes were conceived in colonial terms. The assumption that violent ritual need not occur in democratic regimes due to the wide range of opportunity for claim-making is certainly a reason in which democracies experience less violence (Tilly 2003), however both the FLQ and the FLNC felt as though they were not represented by the government and chose illegal actions as a form of claim-making. The contextual chapter will give further examples of the differences between the democratic governments in Canada and France, and the amount of claim-making allowed by both systems.

According to Kischelt (1993) and Della Porta and Diani (2006), social movements can articulate a need for direct democracy, and more authority over politics than by simply electing representatives, to support the interests of the people further than a liberal democracy. The citizens involved in social movements assume direct responsibility for intervening in the decision-making process and seek to switch the current decision-making process to include ‘more transparent and controllable sites’ (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 240). While representative democracy is based on the creation of a specialized body of representatives, direct democracy is more participatory
by advocating a continuous turnover. Direct democracy views the process of political delegation, through the electoral process, as an instrument of oligarchic power and asserts that the actors be subject to recall at all times. Issues with advanced democracy include: ‘the oligarchic functioning of political parties, the exclusionary implications of majority rule, the monopolization of public spheres of communication, and the exclusion of marginal groups and issues from their practice of democracy’ (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 241). While public decision-making has a low degree of transparency, movement organizations propose alternative and open public spheres. The following empirical chapters will show how the FLQ and the FLNC perceived the democratic electoral system as an institution that perpetuated colonialism, and chose violence to make socio-political, cultural and economic claims.

Chapter Conclusion

This literature review explored social movement theory as the theoretical framework. In the first section, I give rationale for using social movement theory to contrast the FLQ and the FLNC. Second, I outlined the evolution of social movement theory and SMOs to conclude that most literature no longer separates cultural and political approaches. The focus on mechanisms and repertoires as a form of comparison, in this thesis, follows a contemporary theory of social movements that appropriately combines both political and cultural approaches. SMOs are considered active instruments in the movement, which supports the comparison between the FLQ and the FLNC.

The third section on repertoires and RFE outlined three elements of comparison between the FLQ and the FLNC: McAdam et al’s model of mobilization supports the empirical contrast between the mobilization processes of the FLQ and the FLNC throughout their timelines; Haines’ RFE informs the analysis of interaction between violent and moderate factions as a way to understand the changes in radical spaces; and repertoires provide
elements of comparison via tactics and actor constitution in order to understand and fully explore the two networks, thereby providing a context necessary to answer the question of why the FLQ and the FLNC chose violence over peaceful electoral methods.

Although this literature review has been presented systematically by themes, the theory, models and approaches very much overlap to provide an informative review of literature that will be used and considered during the following chapters. These elements of comparison are important to study and understand the FLQ and the FLNC and how they shaped radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica.
Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

In social science research on political violence, there is still a ‘lack of individual-level data-driven evidence to test hypotheses, build reliable case studies, and support the emergence of new theories’ (Horgan 2011: 195). There is a reluctance to either interview extremists or share the experiences of having done so; therefore, this chapter provides transparency of my research, both archival data and interviews. Building on the discussion of social movements and contentious politics in the last chapter, this chapter describes the research design, methodology, data collection and how the data was analyzed.

This research was a longitudinal study, which involved repeated analysis of the same variables over a period of time. As a comparative historical analysis, this project utilized archival data and interview methods, including semi-structured and unstructured interviews. As Glaser and Strauss (1967) attest, qualitative approaches help elucidate and explain complexity. The purpose of the design was to map the networks with archives, secondary data and primary accounts by extremists themselves, and to use comparative analysis, a technique that compares and contrasts variables between cases, to understand this data.

This thesis developed from an interest in, what is arguably, one of the most contentious moments in Canadian history, the October Crisis. Why did Quebecois choose to take great risks in order to challenge the social norms during the 1960s and 1970s when ‘social actors often resigned themselves to the existing social order’? (Lachmann 2013, 31) The case of the FLQ contributes to a growing literature on violent nationalism that places an importance on case studies, as it is argued that nationalism lacks a theoretical ‘blueprint’. While violent nationalist networks, such as the IRA and ETA,
have been studied under many lens\textsuperscript{11} and has been compared to Corsica, the FLQ has not. Many of the earlier texts, and academic research, cited documentation and sources that have become contentious after it became clear that many left-wing individuals who had never participated in the FLQ were arrested under the WMA. Although Crelinsten (1987) and Charters (1997) analyzed the activity and dynamics of the movement, the journal articles were still limited to the October Crisis and utilized basic data collections with an emphasis on newspaper articles.

In 2013, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) released a declassified version of ‘The Intelligence Assessment, 2012 Domestic Threat Environment in Canada: Left-Wing/Right-Wing Extremism’, in which it stated that most of Canada’s politically motivated attacks were the work of domestic extremists. The report referred to a broadly left-wing group of extremists in Quebec, the Initiative de Résistance Internationaliste (IRI); since December 2004, the IRI has committed three politically motivated attacks in Canada. All three attacks were bombings that targeted symbolic

infrastructure\textsuperscript{12}, similar to ‘urban guerilla’ tactics used by the Front de Libération du Quebec (FLQ) from 1963-1971. This CSIS report not only made this study topical, but it also proved that sub-state violent contention continues to use similar tactics to the FLQ.

In order to better understand the FLQ, I chose to compare it with the FLNC in Corsica. After having studied French history, regionalism, and Corsica at the Sorbonne (Paris IV), I realized the FLNC would create an intriguing contrast in order to inform the FLQ case. Both the FLQ and the FLNC began with limited violence, targeted symbolic infrastructure, and advocated left-wing ideology, yet the mobilization mechanisms, state relationship and response, social structure, and culture were very distinct.

The FLNC was well known on the mainland, had a constant presence in the media, and yet the academic literature was highly descriptive. Crettiez’s ‘La question corse’ and Robert Ramsay’s ‘Corsican Time Bomb’ are two typical examples; however, Ramsay’s account was narrative and ended in the 1970s, while Crettiez analyses the FLNC generally and with little detail to the internal dynamics. Transparency of research methods allows the reader to ‘adequately judge the validity of observations’ (Taylor 1993: 9-10), and the little Corsican literature was found to be less than forthcoming about data, often due to secrecy; this was especially evident with Poggioli’s (2003, 2006, 2011, 2013) several accounts about his participation with the FLNC. Even Charters and Crelinsten’s data shows a narrow data collection of media articles and secondary literature on the FLQ; neither cited the newly-released and extensive RCMP archival information in their short articles or book chapters.

This research is concerned with contrasting the two movements in Quebec and Corsica, a contrast that has never been undertaken before. By understanding the different profiles of the individuals (the actors) that joined

\textsuperscript{12}‘Bomb Attack On a Hydro-Quebec Tower,’ 6 December 2004, CBC; ‘Police confirm oil exec’s car blast,’ 16 August 2006, CBC; Quebec anti-terror squad probes oil exec’s car blast,’ 8 August 2006, CBC.
and organized the networks and the mechanisms and processes for mobilization, I was able to analyze how these movements affected radical, and thereby larger, ideological spaces. The strategy, ideology, network organization and recruitment of the FLQ and the FLNC are studied and compared systematically over three different time periods in three empirical chapters. The cases of the FLQ and the FLNC are very different, yet it is in these differences, or absences, that we are able to better understand violent nationalism in Quebec and Corsica.

Lachmann (2013) argues that as researchers of contentious politics, our ultimate goal is to explain how these protests and periods of violent matter, and ‘to do that we need to construct theories of how structural change occurs. Protesters’ thoughts and actions are part of that protest, but they can’t be studied alone’ (47). In agreement with Lachmann, my data collection looked further than official organs and writings of the extremists themselves, as they were idealistic and did not accurately represent the views and actions of all the actors. I look further into causal mechanisms that explain ‘the process of popular mobilization and the effects of such mobilization upon social structure’ (Lachmann 2013, 47).

Mahoney and Reuschemeyer (2003) suggest that comparative historical analysis is ‘oriented towards the explanation of substantively important outcomes. It is defined by…an emphasis on process over time and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison’ (6). Skocpol also finds that historical sociological studies highlight the varying features of social structures and patterns of change, while also looking at meaningful actions and structural contexts to ‘make sense of the unfolding of unintended as well as intended outcomes in individual lives and social transformations’ (4). My research focuses on a contrast of mechanisms that help to understand how the FLQ and the FLNC sought to create and extend radical ideological space in which their agendas would create factions. In doing so, this thesis employs a very large importance on socio-political and cultural context. By dividing the analysis into three chronological chapters, my thesis displays a development of the movements themselves and the ideological radical
spaces. My research had the further issue, however, of balancing two very different time periods. While there are huge contrasts between the FLQ and the FLNC anyway, I also had to balance the influences of the time periods on the ideological spaces; the international influences between the 1960s and the 1980s, for example, are vastly different, and had to be taken into consideration. This thesis is written so that it balances a confidence in the intellectuality of the reader while not demanding too much of him or her by bouncing back and forth between time periods excessively.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

This study mainly drew on archival research data from the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa and les Archives Nationales in Montreal for the Quebec component; the center of Corsican scholarship at Université de Corse in Corté and the archives départementales de Haut-Corse in Bastia and Corse du Sud in Ajaccio supplied the archival data for the Corsican component. Beyond the archival research, I was also able to access further text data through newspaper archives. The RCMP documents of the FLQ and newspaper articles are considered contentious due to the suspicion surrounding the clandestinity of the network, and the official organs of the network were accounts written by the members themselves, proving to be very idealistic; therefore, they were cross-referenced with primary data, such as newspapers, police documents, and transcripts of court cases, and secondary accounts by Laurendeau (1990), Fournier (1984), Vallières (1990). Equally, Crettiez (1999), Ramsay (1983) and Poggioli (2003, 2004, 2006, 2011, 2013) provide important accounts of the FLNC and Corsica that aided the analysis of the manifestoes within this study. Further information of specificities is given within the sections detailing fieldwork in both Canada and France.
Canada: Ottawa and Quebec

My research involved two periods of fieldwork; a period of time spent in both Canada and France. I spent two months in Ottawa and Quebec researching at the National Archives of Canada and les Archives nationales in Montreal. In Ottawa, my fieldwork began with a workshop with the Research Network on Terrorism, Security, and Society, where academics and policy-makers met to present and discuss research on the above subjects in Canada. This research network workshop aimed to bridge the gap between academics and policy makers, and allowed me to place my own historical research into a larger network of contemporary issues of violence and security in Canada. I then spent the rest of the time in Ottawa collecting data from the National Archives of Canada; I looked specifically at RCMP documents in collaboration with the Surêté du Québec, many of which were redacted, and newspaper articles about the FLQ and specifically the October Crisis. The collections of RCMP documents had been partially used in order to study Mario Bachand.

In Quebec, I gained access to court records and copies of the organ of the FLQ, La Cognée, held at les archives nationales. These documents proved to be extremely informative for membership, ideology and activity, as long as they were read with bias constraints; RCMP documentation about individual arrests was contentious as they arrested many left-wing Quebecois who had no ties to the FLQ, and the La Cognée articles were obviously propagandist as they were written by the members themselves. Despite their idealism, La Cognée articles were informative to the analysis of what the different cells believed, and what they were striving for as a way in understanding the difference between the moments. Newly released RCMP documentation aided in supporting and critiquing secondary literature.

Research at the Archives Nationales in Quebec proved to be more difficult than the simple system at the national archives in Ottawa. I went through a series of security checks that took up to a week and a half in order to gain access to the requested documentation on the FLQ and its members,
and it was soon discovered that the unexpected delay was due to the information that was accessible amidst the court transcripts: detailed information on how to build several kinds of basic bombs. Day to day fieldwork in Ottawa and Montreal consisted of full days of leafing through, reading, taking note of, and photographing archival documentation.

France: Aix-en-Provence and Corsica

I traveled to the south of France and Corsica for further research. I had obtained my level two ethics as I had planned to set up interviews in Corsica, but I first planned to conduct research at the Centres des Études Corses, the center for Corsican studies at the Université Aix Marseille. Upon reaching Aix-en-Provence, I was informed that the Centres des Études Corses had recently shut down. Those who were around were unable to locate the documentation held there. Instead, I was able to access the PhD thesis of Pierre Poggioli, a former member of the FLNC who has since become a prominent politician in Corsica.

In Corté, Corsica, the international office at the Universita di Corsica was very cooperative in organizing university privileges for me. The library held a small center of Corsican scholarship, which included the FLNC manifestos and secondary literature on the FLNC, independence and Corsican culture. At the university, I also met an art professor, of French nationality, who was very helpful in opening doors for my research and introducing me to Corsican culture. Interestingly enough, many individuals suggested over the course of my fieldwork that people were more open to my research because I was not French and writing in a different language; many individuals were excited about a foreign interest in the Corsican case.

Besides these informal, conversational interviews, and in agreement with Nunkoosing (2005) who emphasized the importance of the interview by enabling the interviewee to think and talk about their experiences, understandings, predicaments and needs, I also conducted semi-structured interviews with Pierre Poggioli and Jacques Thiers in order to further
support the analysis of secondary information and archival work. Although there are certainly power relations between the interviewer and the interviewee (Anyan 2013), I attempted to ‘control the power imbalances’ by practicing reflexivity and supporting the interviews with other methods and theory. I give rationale for these interviews in the following paragraphs.

Pierre Poggioli was a former member of the FLNC Direction, the small leadership cell of the network, between 1977 and 1989; he was also elected the Assemblé de Corse between 1984 and 1998. He received his doctorate at Université Aix Marseille by comparing the FLNC to the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Basque Country and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and has authored several books about the FLNC and Corsican nationalism. The interview with M. Poggioli was very informative as he had a keen understanding of the clandestine network. My access to an interview with him was based on luck and small-town networks. The postgrad student that I happened to sit across from one of my first days in Corté happened to be long time family friends with Poggioli and his son; Poggioli himself contacted me the next day. I had spent quite a bit of time attempting to track him down before his chance meeting. I met Poggioli in Ajaccio at a café bar; he provided me with ample information about his own experiences within the FLNC and general information about membership but was hesitant to discuss details of specific attacks, actors or clandestine dynamics.

Second, I met with Jacques Thiers, a connection that I made before my arrival to Corsica thanks to an organizer of the Jeunes Rechercheurs conference that I presented at in Berlin. Jacques Thiers, a professor of linguistics at the Université de Corté since 1983, has been a leader in the literary and cultural movement in Corsica promoting and preserving the Corsican language. Since 1994, Thiers has led the Service Commun du Centre Culturel Universitaire (CCU), which organizes cultural and artistic workshops, publications and a periodical journal entitled ‘À l’asgiu’, conferences, drama and literary competitions on campus, the continent, and across the Mediterranean. I initially met with Thiers to understand the cultural component of my research, but his interview further informed my
contrast between the responses to the FLQ and FLNC activity; due to Thiers’ involvement with the cultural movement, he was named as an FLNC member in the media. Thiers suggested that he ‘woke up one morning to find [his] face on the front of a newspaper declaring that he was a leader of the FLNC’, which he was not; this situation is comparable to the many cultural activists in Quebec who were arrested under the suspension of Habeas Corpus as FLQ suspects. Many artists and left-wing Quebecois were targeted.

In both cases, my data collection was mainly archival work and the use of texts. Texts were most accessible to me than interviews with past extremists, and they also balanced the ‘artificial process of interaction’ that occurs in interviews or focus groups (Hancké 2009, 62). In Corsica, I also spent time at the two regional archives in Ajaccio and Bastia where I accessed newspaper articles and ‘Le memorial des Corses’ between 1945-1980 and 1980-1990s. These texts provided accounts of the FLNC activity and key moments, and were written by Corsican, rather than French, academics, which was very informative as most newspapers were supported by and supportive of the French state. The texts also included several photographs and propaganda that aided the contextualization and the comparison.

Lastly, all research has been conducted in French. RCMP documentation was often in English, but all other sources and interviews were in French language, in which I am fluent.

While interviews were certainly not enough to create a contrast between the FLQ and FLNC, they aided in informing the context of the movements, elements of the internal dynamics, and further supported the archival and secondary source analysis. Similarly, Andrew Silke (2001) conducted a survey of published work on political violence, and argues that very few researchers actually conducted interviews with extremists; those who did identify interviews as part of their methodology articulated that interviews ‘represented a very minor feature of the overall effort and contributed to no more than four per cent of the information contained in the
Main data focus of researchers came from secondary data analysis. Much of the analysis resulted from the contrast of mechanisms and processes between the two movements. As Glaser and Strauss (1967) attest, that by comparing where the facts are different, ‘we can generate properties of categories that increase the categories’ generality and explanatory power’ (24).

Due to access to court transcripts, I was able to cross-reference RCMP documents, primary accounts, secondary literature and newspaper articles to map members of the FLQ. Transcripts of court cases against FLNC militants were inaccessible to me in France, less militants were arrested and proven guilty, and the levels of secrecy and clandestinity made it much more difficult to map specific individuals. I was, however, able to gain accurate knowledge on membership through formal and informal interviews, primary accounts by militants, and introductions to militants by individuals who supported my research project. A combination of these primary sources informed my research on membership and specifically looks at who was forming the leadership, who was being recruited and who joined the FLNC in contrast to the FLQ, and who was absent; thus, studying why the FLQ and the FLNC were appealing to different profiles.

I conducted qualitative research interviews (QRIs) that engaged in active listening in order to gather information and facts (Weiss 1998), and sought to ‘understand human behavior, elicit information and meaning, and learn from participants’ (Rosetto 2014). Semi-structured interviews collect data in a style that is somewhat conversational, and to gather detailed information on a topic (35). As Dolnik (2011) suggests, interviews with extremists very rarely yield ‘ground-breaking’ information. Very often the interview responses are idealized and do not provide new information. In the case of my interviews in Corsica, even the interviews that did not provide new data were still informative for supplementing potentially questionable research; others were helpful in my understanding of the role of culture and history within Corsican society. Others were able to share information about membership profiles that would be difficult to publish
locally, as much of the information were about family and neighbours. Making contact, or contact attempts, were very different in Quebec and Corsica. While certain past FLQ members were present on social sites such as LinkedIn and were available by e-mail or through work offices, my attempts to contact for interviews were ignored. Social media was not even an option in Corsica, and interviewees were contacted through social connections. My interview with Gerard Bouchard, historian, sociologist, chaire de recherche du Canada sur les imaginaires collectifs, and brother to former premier Lucien Bouchard, was helpful for background information, but was also difficult to organize and was made possible by my aunt, a colleague and mentee of Bouchard.

I traveled to Corsica with hopes of making connections to obtain interviews, especially one with Pierre Poggioli, whose thesis I read in Aix on the FLNC and had read several of his written accounts of his participation with the network. Interestingly, I had the luck of sitting down for lunch across from a postgrad student originally from Ajaccio; he coincidentally was best friends with Poggioli’s son and was able to put me in contact with Poggioli.

My choice to spend most of my time in Corté was an obvious one. First, the two port cities, Ajaccio and Bastia, that were home to the archives were very tourisy. Second, the only university on the island is located in Corté, therefore it was a good point of contact for fieldwork, and it was extremely culturally rich. (Many classes were offered in the Corsican dialect, and all signage was in Corsican rather than French.) Finally, Corté was the capital of the Corsican independent state during the period of Pasquale Paoli, and is known for being very nationalistic. The Corsicans that I met in Corté were enthusiastic about participating in research. One respondent suggested that it was because I was a native English speaker from abroad; I represented an international interest in the Corsican case, and the idea of my thesis being written in English meant that more people would be able to read and learn of Corsican nationalism. Because Corté was a small town in the interior of the island where tourists would move through and spend only a couple of days
at the most, my extended presence was noted. I became known, kindly, as ‘la Canadienne’ to those who did not know me.

**Ethics and Positionality**

While it is often thought that data collection for research on violence could be highly dangerous, Silke (2004) argue that this is unfounded if the researcher is experienced and well-prepared (13). Many of the issues of researching in a conflict or post-conflict zone were not legitimate risks in Corsica and Quebec; kidnapping and murder were highly unlikely and landmines are nonexistent. Taylor (1993), however, identifies a triad of dangers faced by any fieldworker: legal, health and personal. For the purpose of potential risk to my own health and safety, and of the legal status of my data collected, it was recommended during my first year board review that I undertook a level two ethics clearance for the Corsican component of my research in case of any issues with policing and/or working with extremists.

A level two ethics clearance is ‘required for research on sensitive topics or illegal practices, research involving vulnerable groups or children, research that could adversely affect participants or the researcher, or in cases where there are impediments to obtaining the informed consent of participants’ (Research Ethics, University of Edinburgh 2014). In completing this level 2 ethics assessment, it allowed me to manage any potential risks of my research that could threaten the participants or myself as researcher. I attempted to avoid the possession of incriminating evidence of participants: background and informal interviews were kept anonymous; quoting verbatim was avoided so as to protect the identity of the participants; written consent was not obtained due to a higher risk of a paper trail, and a higher risk that confidentiality would be broken; and I attempted to formulate interviews without the discussion of specific violent acts and events. In order to protect participants from forced disclosure of information to police officials, I stored all interviews on a G drive separate from my computer. In
order to avoid the risk of self-incrimination on record, I stopped recording when incriminating activities were discussed. Those who are named in this thesis are known publicly for their involvement with the FLQ and the FLNC. I also made it clear that contacts at the Universita di Corsica would be aware of my whereabouts when traveling for interviews with past members, and we met in public locations. Although meeting in cafés slightly affected the data collection and the discomfort of speaking about personal connections to the movement in a public place\textsuperscript{13}, it was necessary for the sake of the researcher.

Going into the research, I was unsure as to how my profile would affect my data collection with masculine subjects; I was told by another respondent, however, that being a young-looking, white female on her own also potentially aided my research as Corsica had a clan system historically that placed an importance on family values. Further, my eagerness for my research and my polite attitude to elders was said to be respected within the community. While research has found that people form 60\% to 80\% of their opinions about the researcher in less than four minutes (Pease 2004), I suspect that the positive reputation aided the entire process, as it was particularly productive.

Through my experience, there were several surprising factors that aided my research: first, my nationality was foreign but NOT French; second, being a young-looking female traveling and researching alone; third, my undiscriminatory enthusiasm for the culture and my research. I would argue that the second factor was due to the importance that Corsican culture placed on family and the clan; when it was discovered that I was alone for Easter, the local Corsicans were very open and friendly to me and invited me to their homes. I became a regular at the Cyrnea bar and café, where I would work when I wasn’t on campus, that people began to approach me. Some would invite me to their tables to discuss Corsican culture; this often took

\textsuperscript{13} One experience noted was during my interview with Poggioli. I asked a question about membership in the movement, in which the five other men in the café went quiet and Poggioli became noticeably uncomfortable.
several days of polite discussion, music, and generally the acceptance of a
drink. The owner of the Cyrnea even expressed his allegiance to the FLNC
one evening. While these discussions did not provide hard data for my
analysis, it provided an understanding for the culture, the people, and the
movement itself that I lacked before my fieldwork.

I keep in mind that there are biases within their accounts, but the
knowledge of the internal dynamics, and ideologies, are useful in comparing
the FLQ and the FLNC and how the movements developed radical spaces. I
was able to gain experience with the process of a level 2 ethics clearance, and
it was reassuring to have when I completed my research. Although violent
acts occur in Corsica, I at no point felt that my research or I was threatened. If
anything, my presence was embraced by Corsicans, French and FLNC
members past and present, as my presence and my thesis proved an
international interest in the Corsican question.

Chapter conclusion

I am aware of the limitations of this data collection on such a subject,
especially interviewing; however, an awareness of these limitations, I
believe, has justified my method choices and allowed me to problematize my
data accordingly. Due to the secrecy and contention surrounding both cases
in this thesis, I have ensured an intensive cross-referencing of sources.
Interviews, RCMP documents, primary accounts and secondary literature
were thoroughly studied in order to create the contrasts in the following
chapters.

Data collection involved an extensive engagement with the archives,
but this chapter does not fully make clear the many people that have molded
my cultural and social understanding of the sub-states. Despite the many
hours behind a desk with boxes of archives, human engagement was
particularly important to my research. I was very lucky in Corsica especially
to have cultural mentors\textsuperscript{14}, and although this engagement did not provide raw data, it manifests itself in other ways throughout the thesis.

\textsuperscript{14} A professor at the university, and her friend ‘the baron’, were kind enough to take me around Corsica to cultural fairs to help sell local bread made from wheat grown in Corté.
Chapter 4: Mobilization of the violent networks: a contrast of the early FLQ cells and the original FLNC network

“Aio! Tutti! Fratelli chi he l’ora
D’Arma Shjoppi e di cigne carchera […]
Aio! Tutti! Fratelli chi he l’ora
Di stirpa sta razza maladetta […]

[...] A populu fattu
Bisogna a marchja

Tutti sotto a listessa bandera
Bianca, ornate di la testa Mora,
Aio Corsi Chi turnata he l’ora
Di l’antica nostra liberta\

Come! All of my brothers, it is time
To arm the guns and attach the cartridges
Come! All of my brothers, it is time
To remove this cursed race…

…The people united
must march

All under the same flag
Black decorated with the Maure head
Come on Corsicans, the hour has come
Of our ancient liberty

As the Sunata Lu Cornu song articulates, actors in Quebec and Corsica armed themselves with guns and dynamite to fight for nationalism against a perceived colonial relationship with the state. While this chapter avoids the emotional nature of the movements, cultural texts such as this song were highly popular during the 1960s in Quebec and 1970s in Corsica. These texts demonstrate the tensions in the sub-states that is important to consider during this politically and economically-focused comparison.

This chapter looks at the development and mobilization of the FLQ and the FLNC, beginning in 1963 in Quebec and 1976 in Corsica, and compares structure, ideology and membership as mobilizing mechanisms to inform the shaping of radical spaces. Frame analysis is used in the conclusion as a way “to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences” (Snow et al. 1986: 464) and “selectively punctuate and encode objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one’s present and past

15 ‘Sunata Lu Cornu’ appeared in 1976, the year of the creation of the FLNC. The song was written by Canta u Populu Corsu, a group that strived for protection of the Corsican culture, and was hugely popular by account. While elements of the lyrics are radical indeed (“to remove this cursed race” in reference to the Algerian population), it provides a context of the cultural propaganda occurring in Corsica during the first moment.
environment” (Snow and Benford 1992: 137). Framing the actions of the individuals discussed in the following empirical chapters channel the individual behaviors into patterned social ones (Oliver and Johnston, 2000).

The structures of the FLQ and the FLNC not only influence the movement of information and resources, but also help to explain the sustainability of the movements. The ideologies inform a contrast between the demands of the two networks, and the changing demands between FLQ cells and decades of the FLNC network map a development of the radical spaces over time. Finally, membership explains which profiles were choosing to mobilize. Concluding analysis of these mechanisms, within collective action frames, at the end of the chapter illuminate why actors chose violence in democratic sub-states Quebec and Corsica, and inform the larger question of how the radical spaces developed throughout the timelines of the larger networks.

**FLQ**

“Au Quebec prévaut également cette situation injuste et paradoxale qui se trouve un bon exemple dans la comparaison entre le quartier Saint-Henri et celui de Westmount. D’un côté nous trouvons une masse typiquement québécoise, pauvre et miserable, tandis que de l’autre une minorité anglaise étale le luxe le plus honteux” (Manifeste du FLQ à la Nation, 1963).

Neither the FLQ nor the FLNC developed out of thin air; both networks developed in response to social and political frustrations with the state due to a belief that the democratic electoral system, ‘instilled by the colonizers on the colonized’ (La Cognée, 1965), was not supporting their needs. Tarrow (2012) argues that cycles of mobilization are influenced by the opening and closing of groups’ access to the political process; while Corsicans and Quebecois were included in the democratic system by electoral vote, the individuals that formed the contentious political networks felt marginalized,  

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16 “In Quebec we also have the unjust and paradoxical situation that is exemplified in the comparison between St. Henri and Westmount. On one side, we find a mass typically Quebecois, poor and miserable, while on the other side an English minority shows off the most shameful of riches”. Translated by Mitch Abidor
disempowered, and that they were becoming minorities on their own land. Violence provided an alternative strategy to make frustrations known and to put forward a new socio-political and economic agenda. In both cases, the originating members met through other existing political organizations, but found that the previous organizations were not inclusive of their ideologies, strategies and demands; therefore, they developed the FLQ and the FLNC. While the founders were of different socio-economic background, they were united in their left-wing and nationalist ideologies. Although both the FLQ and the FLNC looked to further political power or gain independence as the ultimate goals, neo-marxism and a frustration with other ethnic groups having control over capital were important factors for mobilization.

In Quebec, the Jean Lesage liberal government had been elected into provincial power during the 1960 election. As mentioned during the context section in the introduction, this election proved a changing mindset in the province. This shift had been developing since the 1940s and 1950s, and focused on modernization, the separation of church and state, and a need for taking on the role of ‘masters at home’ through social and economic reforms. While parts of Quebec were experiencing this economic expansion and secularization, East Montreal was going through deindustrialization. The bourgeoisie predominantly gained from the nationalization of private companies as the rate of people on social assistance in Pointe-Saint-Charles tripled between 1966 to 1974 (Mills 2010), which caused frustration and activism to grow in South-East and East Montreal. The student mobilization of the FLQ was associated with the strong union presence on university campuses through research funding and presenting papers at conferences and functions (Rouillard 1989).

The FLQ developed from a ‘daisy chain’ of political organizations that composed a contemporary independence movement in Quebec. As early as 1957, the Alliance Laurentienne (AL) began to promote Quebec independence with a vision of a free Catholic Quebec named ‘Laurentie’ (Manifeste de l’Alliance Laurentienne, 1962). Independence was promoted as the only way to ensure that the Quebec identity, including language, culture
and religion, would be preserved. Membership of the AL included Catholic nationalists, students, some professionals and right-wing intellectuals (Griffin 1985). Rassemblement pour l’Indépendence Nationale (RIN) was created out of a frustration with, and in response to, the AL’s right-wing policies (“L’indépendence” 1962). The RIN was founded on 10 September 1962 as a neutral organization to accommodate a wide range of political associations. In October 1962, the Réseau de résistance pour liberation nationale du Quebec was founded as a military wing of the RIN, but the members mainly participated in petty crimes of vandalism. Posters that declared a ‘Quebec libre!’, a liberated Quebec, were taped on bus stops and street lights. (Schneider 2002, 58) When the 1962 election presented an opportunity not only for discourse, but also to challenge the political system in the polls, the RIN needed to focus on a political agenda; it quickly cemented a left-wing and secular agenda (Griffin 1985), and dropped the Réseau de Resistance as it was considered too radical. On the 3 March 1963, the RIN officially became a political party and five days later, the FLQ committed its very first bombing. RIN members who felt that the RIN was not radical enough formed the first cell and incarnation of the FLQ. In order to develop an ideological radical space, the FLQ used bombs and violent activity to attract attention to their plight of left-wing nationalism. Similarly, former RIN members used the peacefully-political organization to recruit other discontented members, both workers and left wing students, for the FLQ cells (Fournier 1982).

On March 8, the FLQ attacked three military barracks in Montreal and Westmount with bombs. In April, the FLQ committed another series of attacks before publishing and distributing the first FLQ manifesto, ‘Message du FLQ à la Nation’, on the 16 April: on the 1 April, a bomb exploded in the ventilating system of the Income Tax Building; on the 4 April, CNR tracks at Lemieux where Prime Minister Diefenbaker was traveling was blown away by dynamite; and two days later, a bomb of 23 sticks of undischarged dynamite was found at 2:30 a.m. the base of the CBC television tower on Mount Royal (Div file no: 63 HQ 1184-1).
Membership

“...it is suspected that the FLQ is composed of the young element of the separatist groups. They have expressed themselves in the beginning in the form of slogan writings and gradually gained momentum by expressing themselves in a more militant way which would tend to indicate that the element of adventure and excitement is playing an important part. However, judging from their most recent actions and their method of operations particularly concerning the handling of explosives, the possibility the movement has the availability of either professional saboteurs or highly qualified personnel in the handling of explosives and time mechanisms come to mind but we have no information to that effect” (RCMP, code no. 0900 18-4-63)

Scholars (such as Rapoport 1988; Hoffman 1998) assess that the careers and profiles of individual members reveal patterns that help to understand the rise and fall of the strategy and networks within the violent nationalist movements; researching who joined and participated informs the internal dynamics of the organization. In order to map out the membership comprehensively as a mechanism of violence that shaped the radical space, I introduce key members and look analytically at each cell through a lens of six precipitants: economic, political, cultural, ethnic or nationalist influences, geographical influences and gender. This serves as a way to study the internal dynamics of the organization as a whole. These precipitants are not distinct, and often overlap. It is also important to note that the members discussed within this chapter admitted or were convicted of their membership; this provides the contrast with an accurate analysis of the movement itself despite the contentious arrests of many Quebecois. Focusing on key membership, ideologies, and influences within a larger framework of collective action frames, informs not only the internal dynamics of the FLQ but the social elements that influenced the radicalization and mobilization of students and workers from East Montreal.

In several accounts (Morf 1970; Palmer 2008; Levinson, 1963), Georges Schoeters is declared to be the ‘leader’ of the central node, yet was known amongst his peers as a much lesser advocate of violence than his co-organizers Gabriel Hudon and Raymond Villeneuve. Schoeters’ experience
and matured age, however, would certainly allow him to appear as leader and sole founder; he arrived in Quebec in 1950 from Belgium where he was a part of the resistance against the Nazi Occupation in World War II and was imprisoned by the Germans during the Bataille des Ardennes.

Schoeters was well known for his Marxism, however Hudon, Villeneuve and Schoeters all created the FLQ with Marxist demands and believed that independence must involve a socialist component; readings of Marxist and revolutionary literature were organized on almost a weekly basis at a series of restaurants in Montreal (Div file no: 63 M 11-84-1). For Schoeters, this political ideology was personally cemented upon a trip to Cuba, during the summer of 1959, that he organized for students from the Université de Montreal after he obtained his masters degree in Economic Sciences. The group met Fidel Castro and Camilo Cienfuegos. In Autumn 1959, he returned to Cuba to work in agrarian reform, and during this time, he met Che Guevara. Upon his return to Quebec in 1959, he married a Québécoise named Jeanne Pepin (Fournier 1982). Although he himself was not Quebecois, Schoeters’ relations with a Quebecoise would have assisted his ethnic position exponentially within the movement.

Pierre Schneider published a book in 2002 about his experiences with the first wave of the FLQ. Originally a member of the RIN at the age of 16, he noted that he experienced the ‘rotten democracy’ at work in Quebec at age 17 when assisting with Marcel Chaput’s campaign as independent candidate in the 1962 election (68). His nationalist perspective was inspired by his childhood in Outremont with his grandfather, who was a supporter of Lionel Groulx, and his poor relationship with his Anglophone father. Schneider placed bombs for both the Réseau de Resistance and the FLQ while he was working for Radio Canada.

Raymond Villeneuve and Gabriel Hudon, both Québécois, came from different socio-economic backgrounds. Villeneuve, the youngest at 19 years old, had graduated from école secondaire at Saint-Stanislas where he was president of the student association. He went on to work at a boulangerie
after graduation. Hudon, at 21 years old, was the son of a ‘debardeur’, a worker on the shipping docks, and had been working since the age of 17 as a drafter at Jerry Hydraulique, a factory for airplane parts (Fournier 1982). It is interesting that the initial ‘noyau de direction’, central node, involves ‘representatives’ of the three backgrounds within the FLQ membership: students, workers, and older immigrants with international influences.

Villeneuve was considered a very apt recruiter in enlisting friends as the first FLQ members, and then drawing from members of the RIN and l’Action Socialiste (Fournier 1982; Div file: 63 M 1184-1). Villeneuve also recruited a newly formed organization, le Réseau de libération nationale, to join the FLQ as a whole; it was comprised mainly of students from the Collège Saint-Denis. These students, in 1963, were influenced by the New Left, and were radicalized on University campuses; they were influenced by the French and British New Left ideas, which drew on Mao Tse-Tung’s theories of materialism and anarcho-surrealism. The students were also “overwhelmed by the American [New Left] example” (Kotash 1980: xiii), and they followed the young Marx of 1844 and read his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*. The New Left differed from the Old Left by focusing less on class struggle than on the refusal to succumb to bureaucracy, and was inclusive to both students and workers; it wasn’t until 1964 that New Leftism attracted non-students off campus through student engagement with their community and society (Palmer 2008). Bachand was a felquiste from a lower middle-class background- his father was a draughtsman. He stated that he became influenced by the political left in Bohemian coffee houses on Clark Street across from the Beaux Arts. At these cafés, he rubbed shoulders with students, anarchists, socialists and Marxists: “I became an anarchist” (Bachand in Taaffe 1963). Bachand participated in Socialist Independence Party meetings where he met writers from Partis-Pris, a separatist-socialist magazine founded in early 1963; it was through this network that he was introduced to the concept of revolution that he would advocate until after his jail sentence, and would become involved with the RIN and the FLQ (Gerald Taaffe 1963). This interesting mix of the student New Left and the working Marxist ideology attracted individuals to join the FLQ.
Violent activity of the first FLQ cell solely included a series of bombs placed around Montreal in April, including: a bomb in the ventilating system of the Income Tax Building on the 1st April; the CNR tracks at Lemieux, Quebec where Prime Minister Diefenbaker was traveling on the 6 April; a bomb consisting of 23 sticks of dynamite was found at the base of the CBC tower on the Mount Royal on the 20th April, as well as 10 sticks of dynamite behind the garage at the back of the RCMP building on the 20th April; a bomb was placed against the Black Watch building on the 9 May; two bombs exploded at the RCAP building; and a bomb was also placed near the oil reservoir at the Golden Eagle Refinery (Div file: 63H! 1184-1). Ten mailbox bombs were placed in the richer area of Westmount on the 18th of May, and exploded in the early morning, seriously injuring Sgt Major Walter Leja, a 42 year old non-commissioned officer (“Mario Bachand Pleads Guilty” 1963).

Several men (18) were then arrested and charged for FLQ participation. Mario Bachand was found guilty of terrorist acts and charged for having placed the explosives in the mailboxes; he also admitted to having conspired to place dynamite at the bottom of the CBC television tower. Roger Tetreault, a 22 year old unemployed reporter, was charged for placing a bomb in the Place d’Armes on 3 May 1963. Gilles Pruneau, a 19 year old office clerk, was charged with having placed bombes in mailboxes and having broke his bail in September (“Mario Bachand Pleads Guilty” 1963). In the end, only 7 of the 18 persons charged for FLQ activity were not able to secure bail.

After their arrests, Pierre Schneider, Mario Bachand and Roger Tetreault attempted to flee to Cuba via les iles de Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon and the United States (Schneider 2002, 16). They were arrested, opted for voluntary return to Montreal, and were sentenced to three years in prison (Schneider 2002, 19-20).

The five persons- Schoeters, Hudon, Villeneuve, LaBonté and Giroux- who were charged for non-capital murder of army civilian employee Wilfred O’Neil, and two others who refused to testify for the Crown. The cell disintegrated after the arrests of the key members. When Bachand was asked
why he left the FLQ, he responded: “Well, I was arrested. I was three year in jail and after that I go out and the FLQ was never a very formal group; it is people who started all over again you know so it has changed policy you know, it was not a political movement” (unmarked interview in CSIS records 92-1-00134 part 1).

During the trials of FLQ members, it was found that Jeanne Pepin, wife of Schoeters, assisted at various meetings but did not participate actively in the movement; she stated that the independence of Quebec was for her the ideal future, and that she was present in the house when her husband made the bomb for the Black Watch building on Bleury Street, but she had no interest in participation (RCMP document no: 63 M 1184-1). Pepin was given a suspended sentence (“Mario Bachand pleads guilty” 1963). When questioned about the lack of female involvement by Contributing Editor Gerald Taafe, Mario Bachand responded: “The women of Quebec don’t care much for revolutionary movements” (Gerald Taaffe 1963). Whether this was an accurate analysis, Bachand was correct in foreshadowing that female participation in the FLQ was to be limited over the course of the organization’s existence. During the existence of this first cell, bombs were placed against symbolic infrastructure but most of the activity revolved around organized revolutionary readings and knowledge sharing. As members were not required to participate in violence, the movement was open to left-wing individuals of varying radicalism. The first cell was short-lived and did not yet have a high level of insurgency, but it was successful in shaping the radical space so that other cells might occupy and develop the space.

While researching the membership of the FLQ and the FLNC, the lack of female involvement became blatantly apparent. In Quebec, the appearance of only a single female FLQ member, and a few others affiliated to the organization, seemed at first surprising due to the level of agency of Quebecois women during the 1960s; women at that time were involved in various facets of oppositional politics (Mills 2010). While the three empirical chapters will look at specific female individuals and their involvement with
the organizations, this section introduces an explanation as to why most women did not involve themselves with the violent clandestine movement of the FLQ.

During the early 1960s in Quebec, women were active in other political spheres; left-wing female activists focused on fitting feminism into Marxist frameworks. Margaret Benston (1969), for example, wrote the highly popular ‘Political Economy of Women’s Liberation’, in which she argued that the function of housework could be outlined within capitalism. The Front de Libération des Femmes (FLF), although unsupportive of the violence created by the FLQ, was connected to the organization through their active demonstrations over the arrest of Lise Balcer during the hearing of Paul Rose, FLQ member of the Chenier Cell further discussed in Chapter 6. The FLF was created by a collaboration of Anglophone and Francophone Quebecoises, originating with Naomi Brickman, a McGill student, and Nicole Therien, an activist and employee of the CSN; they organized an informal group of women from the CSN and McGill who decided to create the FLF with the main goal of liberation through the creation of an independent and socialist Quebec (Mills 2010); it was a group of women from the FLF that occupied the jury boxes of a Montreal courthouse during the hearing of Lise Balcer, a witness in the trial of Chenier FLQ cell member Paul Rose. Balcer refused to testify as witness because women were not allowed to sit as jurors in Quebec; Balcer was found in contempt of court for her actions. When she was in the witness box, having explained the reasons for her refusal to attest, seven FLF members sitting in the audience took over the jury benches, screaming “discrimination!” and “la justice, c’est la merde!” (Paul Rose trial transcript; Mills 2010: 128). Each woman, including Lise Balcer, was charged with one to two months in prison for her actions.

Although supportive of Balcer’s plight and female jurors, the FLF and Montreal Women’s Liberation Movement (MWLM) became wary, in the late 1960s, of radical groups and began to question male theorists who did not consider female experiences. Inspired by radical feminism in the United States, The MWLM wrote of radical groups that fought for “the liberation of
all oppressed peoples, yet oppressed the women right among them” (Birth
Control Handbook, 1968). Due to the “schizophrenia” of groups such as the
FLQ, women formed and organized their own in order to develop their own
terms of reference with a nationalist voice, and without the violent activity of
the FLQ. Both Mills (2010) and Dumont (1992) suggest that radical women
defended their rights from within the language of anti-colonialism; it was a
combination of ideals from the Montreal Left and women’s liberation. The
FLF adopted the slogan: “no liberation of Quebec without the liberation of
women, no liberation of women without the liberation of Quebec”.

In 1971, in response to the manifeste du FLQ of 1970, the Manifeste
des Femmes Quebecois was released; the manifesto denounced the
discrimination of women in left-wing groups and rejected national liberation
groups that did not include female liberation, such as the FLQ (Dumont
1992). Interestingly, and despite the attempts to separate their goals for
liberation from male-dominated radical groups, the FLF relied on Vallieres’
discussion of his mother in Nègres blancs d’Amerique (Mills 2010). As Mills
(2010) rightly suggests, a contemporary perspective would view his
portrayal of his mother as almost misogynous in the way that he denunciates
his mother and her clerical repression on the family. During the 1960s,
however, the radical women movement cited Vallieres’ argument
“capitalism and religion have mass-produced mothers like mine” (Vallieres
1968) as a ‘damning indictment of the ways in which the combined forces of
capitalism and colonialism stripped individuals of their humanity’ (Mills
2010: 132). This citation was then used to enforce the argument that in order
to achieve a women’s liberation, the individual must have control of her own
body.

Further analysis into Vallieres’s Les Nègres Blancs d’Amerique proves its
popularity amongst the women’s liberationist movement to be even more
surprising. As Vallières attempts to level ideological differences between
supporters of politically motivated violence in Quebec in his text, he
completely disregards female participation. He calls ‘les gars’, the boys, to
action. Hunsaker (1999) suggests that the only female character Françoise,
who enters Vallières’ narrative briefly in order to encourage him to return to Quebec, is only as an ‘erotic object in which to console himself’ (72); she is described in detail while cleaning the dishes half naked. This sexist presentation of women in *Nègres Blancs* highlights a masculine focus not only in Vallières’ writing, but among FLQ ideology; women were ignored during the recruiting process as Vallières and his followers focus on left-wing and/or working class men: “Hey Georges, what are you waiting for to make up your mind? And the rest of you, Arthur, Louis, Jules, Ernest? On your feet, lads, and all together: to work!” (Vallieres 1968).

As Mills and Sheila Rowbotham suggest, the mythological image of the solitary urban guerilla that gives up on the comforts of capitalism for the good of his people attracts predominantly males; ‘for if it attracts a minority among men, it fits even fewer women” (Rowbotham in Mills 2010: 185). While women, generally, were not involved with the violence of the FLQ, women were arrested for delivering communiqués and hiding and hosting the members. During the 1970s through to the 1990s, women were not arrested for involvement with the FLNC, with the exception of Louise Lanctot. While Schoeters suggested that he built bombs for the first wave of the FLQ in his house with his wife present and knowledgeable of his actions, most members of the FLNC suggested that they keep their violent activity clandestine and separate from their home life.

In order to fully understand FLQ membership, it is important to understand who participated and who did not. While economic change during the Quiet Revolution problematized male identity and created alienation, female participation in the FLQ is noticeably absent, with the exceptions of partners and sisters that had ties to the felquistes. An understanding of the individuals that first mobilized as felquistes will further inform the ideology and the network structure in the following sections.

**Ideology**
This section introduces the decreed ideology of the original FLQ cell through analyzing the first manifesto, Manifeste du FLQ à la Nation. The manifesto itself highlights the reality of differing ideologies within the original network. While actors of different profiles were united under a similar cause of fighting the current ‘colonialist system’, that was being profited by an anglosaxon bourgeoisie, they held different beliefs of how to do so. The range of ideologies in the network developed an inclusive radical space that allowed actors of political allegiance across the left of the spectrum to join and shape the space.

The three founders of the FLQ were militants of the Réseau de Resistance, the resistance network of the RIN as mentioned in the previous section. The founders, Georges Schoeters, Gabriel Hudon and Raymond Villeneuve, met at a mutual friend’s apartment where they decided to organize the FLQ due to a consensus that the potential for radicalism had become limited under the RIN as the organization worked towards becoming a political party. Due to a sentiment amongst some of the younger RIN members that violence was necessary to achieve the end goal of independence, the original FLQ network was created separately from the RIN. Mario Bachand, an original felquiste, stated in an anonymous interview that he considered the RIN to have become a “petty bourgeois party” (‘A convicted member of the original FLQ is interviewed by Contributing Editor Gerald Taaffe’. Translated for RCMP use). Therefore, the RIN, while attempting to recreate itself as a democratic political party, had effectively alienated radical left-wing actors.

The first manifesto, ‘Manifeste du FLQ à la Nation’, was distributed on the 16 April 1963, and appeared two years later in La Cognée. In the manifesto, the FLQ states that Quebec is colonized by ‘imperialist’ English Canada, and supported by an elite that is more interested in serving its own political economic interest than serving the interest of the Quebec nation (Manifeste du FLQ à la Nation, 1963). The manifesto cites grievances such as: ‘anglosaxon domination of the federal government’, in which ‘anglo saxon interests [are imposed] to the detriment of those of Quebec’; foreign control
of the economy; the domination of English language in Quebec; and assimilation. The FLQ also expressed their need for violence outside of the moderate factions; the writers argued that the ‘independantiste political parties would never have the power to defeat the colonial political and economic power’, and suggested that independence was not enough; the original FLQ cell demanded a ‘total’ revolution.

While the original manifesto is particularly revolutionary in language, the ideologies of the actors were diverse across the left of the political spectrum. Bachand stated in the same interview: “there were nationalists among us, but certainly I was no nationalist. Let’s say that the political opinions of the FLQ ranged from liberalism to communism” (‘A convicted member of the original FLQ is interviewed by Contributing Editor Gerald Taaffe’. Translated for RCMP use). When arrested for the death of Wilfred O’Neil, many of the 15 original felquistes at their trial demanded to swear on Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth as a ‘revolutionary bible’ (Morf 1970). One individual, whose identity was redacted due to the Access to Information Act, stated that he was not interested in the independence of Quebec; he simply placed the bomb that killed O’Neil “for kicks” (Cpl JP leCocq 1968: 10). These contrasting articulations create a ‘hodge podge’ of ideals, ideologies and levels of radicalization. While some of the students seemed to have articulated an idealized battle against the English-speaking bourgeoisie, others embraced Fanon’s theory that preaches anti-colonial revolution through the strength of the working class, while the others admitted to an involvement in the violence ‘for kicks’. The original members of the FLQ were very different in socio-economic and political backgrounds, yet they united through a perspective that achieving independence through coercion was necessary, yet no longer welcomed by the RIN.

**Network structure**

Between 1963 and 1971, the FLQ encompassed seven cells. Often there was a single cell that disbanded and another was organized; twice were there
two cells at the same time. During the 1960s and early 1970s, cells continued to develop after police ‘shut down’ previous cells by arresting the members. The creation of cells, after the dissolution of previous ones, also created limitations for policing and thereby continued the lifespan of the movement. Whereas authorities can use specific tactics to dismantle larger, hierarchal and centrally organized extremist networks, police could only target FLQ cells one at a time as they surfaced. The resurgence of FLQ cells not only made it difficult to police, but also informs a response to social conditions, including the poverty in East Montreal, the widening of disparity in Quebec, and an increasing popularity of the Left. The social conditions in Quebec influenced actors of different profiles to mobilize and organize FLQ cells, creating a loose structure of small cells that generally developed and disintegrated one after the other. In doing so, these actors developed a radical space that was inclusive to left-wing individuals of different backgrounds.

Thus, the network structure of the FLQ was influenced by the ideological space, and political and economic frustrations of the Quebecois. The inclusive nature of the loose cell structure, open to many different profiles of actors, allowed for a range of ideologies in the network.

**L’Armée de Libération du Québec (ALQ)**

The second cell of the FLQ reorganized in the summer of 1963 into two branches: L’Armée de Libération du Québec (ALQ), and the political branch that focused on the official organ, *La Cognée* (Gendron 1965); the ‘goal’, as described in *La Cognée*, was to apply and teach the politics of the FLQ during its battle for liberation of the Quebec people, and to defend against the police regime that was developing in Quebec (La Cognée, 15 August 1965). The ALQ was comprised of students from Outremont and young workers from East Montreal, and the ages of the ALQ members ranged from 18-27 years of age. Two members of importance were Robert Hudon and Jean Gagnon, both of whom had brothers in jail at the time for
FLQ participation in the original cell. Hudon was considered a charismatic individual and was described by many members of the press as the ‘Robin des Banques’ \(^{17}\) (Fournier 1984). Both were sentenced to 8 years in prison for stealing $100 000 in goods and money between the 26 September and the 9 April 1963. Hudon was released on parole in December 1967. Equally interesting is the involvement of Jules Duchastel, student of Philosophie at College Sainte-Marie, and son of baron Duchastel de Montrouge. Recruited as a student, he was the sole member of bourgeoisie background that joined the FLQ, and was the ‘lone wolf’, distinct from the working class or the students that felt isolated from the motivations of the politically elite. Duchastel was charged for armed theft and possession of dynamite after attempting to rob the Banque Royale de Canada in Notre-Dame-de-Graces and leaving a very elementary bomb: dynamite hooked up to a watch. Duchastel and Claude Soulière were caught and were sentenced to two years in prison (Fournier 1984), although Duchastel only spent one year behind bars.

Members of the ‘comité central’ for La Cognée were in communication with the ALQ, but the individuals are unknown; all writers of La Cognée used pen names. Certain Québécois authors were printed in the journal, and it is unknown today as to whether they collaborated or were printed illegally. The list includes Paul Chamberland, Jacques Renaud, Jean-Marc Piotte, Robert Maheu, André Garand and Philippe Bernard (La Cognée, Aug 1965 to February 1966). Between April 21 and May 1964, André Wattier, Pierre Nadon, Claude Peron, Georges LaPorte, Maurice Leduc, and Claude Soulèrie were all apprehended. Robert Hudon and Jean Gagnon were the last to be arrested on the 5 May 1964. La Cognée allowed for the authors to write and distribute political responses, demands and instructions to felquistes and left-wing Quebecois. Through La Cognée, the FLQ were able to expand the radical space.

\(^{17}\) Translated as ‘Robin of the banks’ by author.
The FLQ shaped a space in which the perceived marginalized could choose, or support, minimal violence as a way to articulate frustration with the power and the false consciousness within Quebecois society. The FLQ became an umbrella term for such frustrated activists. This section introduced the development of the FLQ in 1963 and explored the network structure, ideology, and membership as mobilizing mechanisms. While analyzing the mobilization and disintegration of the first three cells, the reader can form an understanding of the broken network that developed in Quebec. As one cell disintegrated, another cell mobilized in its place and further shaped the radical space. Consistent amongst the cells was a feeling of frustration with capitalist exploitation and a perceived colonial relationship with the state that resulted in an Anglophone bourgeoisie.

The following section will outline the original FLNC network of the 1970s. The section will similarly look at membership, ideology and structure as mechanisms and elements of contrast with the FLQ.

**FLNC**

With their leader, Edmond Simeoini, serving time in prison due to the Aleria Affair, as discussed in the context section of the introduction, the l’Azione pa a Rinascite di a Corsica (ARC) dissolved on the 28 August 1975, leaving the space for the struggle for autonomy without an organized political group; as a result, the L’Assocu di I Patrioti Corsi (APC) was founded on the 26 January 1976. With similar goals of regional autonomy within the larger Republic and legal recognition of the Corsican people to the ARC, the APC—under the leadership of Marcel Bartoli, Lucien Alfonsi and Max Simeoni—made certain to reinstate its positions on three different factors: the state, violence, and racism. Violence was rejected immediately; Edmond Simeoini wrote from prison: “I repudiate those who fight for my liberation, and those of my comrades, by murdering and taking hostages, and I refuse all negotiations by these methods” (Simeoini 1975: 189-190). Similarly, the APC
responded directly to the xenophobic actions of the ARC towards the ‘pied noir’ before Aleria; Max Simeoini issued a statement that was much more inclusive: “In Corsica only one community need exist, formed by Corsicans of birth and all who have come to Corsica by choice—either personal or by necessity to live—and who integrate or want to integrate amongst us; meaning that they share in our existence and our difficulties, our joys, our hardships, and respect our culture and traditions” (Fournier 1984: 37). The elected clans demanded the liberation of Edmond Simeoini (Poggioli 2013: 22). During the keynote speech, Bartoli made it very clear that the new APC were not ‘separatists’: “We are not separatists and, even less, are we irredentists. We do not wish to leave the framework of the French Republic. We demand only the right existence for the Corsican people and we demand that that existence be acknowledged in a legal statute” (Bartoli in Ramsay 1983: 114). The APC’s wish to exist with further rights and freedoms within the French Republic in mid 1970s is an element of contrast with the moderate faction in Quebec during the early 1960s, the RIN, who strove for independence (Manifete des Rinistes de 1960: “l’indépendence totale du Québec”, 1960).

The ‘legal’ nationalist organizations (or moderate factions)- the ARC, UPC, and APC- attracted the petit bourgeoisie, such as members of liberal professions, hotel owners, and commerçantes; the organizations were aware that their survival and success relied on this membership, and took their interests into account (Poggioli 2012: 278). The ARC, and succeeding movements, completely ignored the benefits of capitalism being reaped by the repatriated Algerians and the French. Frustrated that the interests of the bourgeoisie were being prioritized in the legal organizations, and feeling that the movement needed to radicalize as a united front, members of the ARC joined with the FPCL and the GP to create the Fronte de Liberazione Naziunale Corsu (FLNC) in the wake of the FPCL dissolution (Bernabéu-Casanova 1997).

In April 1976, the original eight members of La Direction met in Porto-Veccio and at a militant’s house in Folelli to plan the first nuit bleue on 5
May 1976. The FLNC presented itself to the world on the 5 of May after a series of 20 attacks in Corsica, Nice, Marseille and Paris. Between 21.30 and 23.00 in Ajaccio, four attacks were committed against Cynreacolor, a bar owned by Camille Guerra, a repatriated North African. The bombs were so powerful that neighbouring buildings had to be evacuated. The car of the secretary general of the prefecture and the Direction Departementale de l’Equipement (DDE) were also attacked; 200 grammes destroyed the Citroen DS 19 owned by M Yves Mansillon. At midnight, a Volkswagen car that belonged to the society Ecotra, in which the manager was a repatried North African, exploded as the last attack in Ajaccio. In Sartene, a kilo of explosives were detonated at midnight against the wall of the sous-prefecture. The fact that the bomb was placed against the building rather than in it suggests that the militants could either not gain entrance to the building or it was meant to simply be symbolic.

Two attacks occurred in Bastia against the DDE at its offices at the residence Betrand in the Toga quarter at 21, and at the perception de Bastia at 12.15. The DDE was a new installation in Bastia, and the perception had only been open for approximately two months. In Linguizetta, the nature camp of Corsicana was also attacked. A bungalow of approximately 100 square metres was completely destroyed due to Corsicana’s link to a German patriot entitled simply as M. Hoffman. A bomb that did not explode was found in Casatorra the next day on the 5 May. A bomb consisting of seven sticks of dynamite was placed against a mechanical engine inside the ‘Constructions Metallique’ establishment. This company was directed by Mme Aurelie Belmudes, a repatriated North African (Unite Nazianale; Poggioli interview).

In Corte, at 22.30, two explosive charges were thrown from a vehicle against the Villa du colonel commandant and 20 meters further at an ‘immeuble des PTT’, an old administration building in which a family was residing. Much damage occurred but no one was hurt. In Francardo, 2.5 kilos of explosives were discovered at the ‘Fermette Corse’ between Ponte Leccia and Francardo; this company was directed by a M. Bruneau. Three explosions occurred in the region of Ghisunaccia: the first at 9.15 created
destruction of the ‘station total’, owned by M. Martinez; the second explosion occurred 20 minutes later at the building of SODIPEC, owned by M. Michel Mackiewickz, who was also involved in the Aleria wine fraud; the third exploded at 9.40 and destroyed the office of Mes Maniez et Grimaldi. All of the victims were repatriated North Africans. In Porto Vecchio, two villas were bombed at approximately 1.15 in the morning (Unite Nazionale; Poggioli interview). The FLNC released a pamphlet the next day claiming responsibility for the attacks, and defined a six-point manifesto, that will be discussed in the section on ideology.

While violence was not new to Corsicans, the nuit bleue nonetheless was an impressive show of force during the early 1970s; yet, the FLNC still did not receive a seriously concerned response from the state and policing bodies. In the journal Arritti, the autonomists’ response to the FLNC are represented by Max Simeoni, who wrote sarcastically: “coucou, voila le FLN flambant neuf” (Arritti 1976). Whereas the authorities in Quebec during the 1960s were alarmed by the influences of Marxism and the left, as well as the violence, the local authorities in Corsica during the 1970s initially felt that there was little cause for concern. In Quebec, when a bomb was found on the 1 April 1963 on the CN railway before the train with the visiting Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was to arrive, Diefenbaker stated: “Is this Ireland?”, comparing the FLQ to the much more violent IRA. In contrast, prefect Jean-Etienne Riolacci stated after the first nuit bleue: ‘the FLNC is not a serious threat’ (Pomponi 1982: 462). The difference in reactions to the violent activity indicates the extent of the radical spaces prior to the organization of the FLQ and FLNC. While the FLNC followed in the footsteps of the FPCL and GP, both of whom had waged violent acts in Corsica, the FLNC initially did not seem to offer anything particularly new and shocking. The FLNC would begin to shape radical space with its strength in numbers, its nationalist focus and better articulated ideology with detailed demands in the later manifestoes. Quebec, on the other hand, had little experience with violence, and the FLQ began to shape a new radical

18 ‘le FLNC, allons donc, ce n’est pas serieux’
space that had originally been developed mainly by activists participating in strikes or graffiti.

The difference in the initial radical spaces also affected the structure of the networks. Because the Corsicans were used to a history of violence and clandestine action that Quebec was not, more actors mobilized and a more rigid structure was possible; this becomes evident in the next sections that highlight membership and structure of the FLNC in the 1970s.

**Membership**

“Being a clandestine patriot is not running from responsibility; nor is it, as some argue, proof of cowardice. No, to be a clandestine nationalist is to use anonymity to escape the pursuits of the colonial ‘justice’ longer and to continue fighting… I am 25 years of age; I am originally from Venacu. I have a law degree and I have been working in law for four years to pay my studies.” – Leo Battesti, known member of the FLNC. March 1978

Researching membership of the FLNC was very different to the membership of the FLQ. Because the FLQ ceased to exist after the early 1970s, members were less open to speaking with me but documentation was much more accessible. The secrecy surrounding the FLNC, and even past members, to this day made it very difficult to write about membership; even Poggioli (2009) completely avoids the discussion of membership in his doctoral thesis. Jean-Michel Rossi and Francois Santoni both received death threats for their book ‘Pour solde de tout compte: les nationalistes corses parlent’ (“L’ex-nationaliste corse Jean-Michel Rossi assassiné” 2000). I was, however, able to connect details from the media and the few literary sources that even attempt to discuss membership. This is partially due to the secrecy within the network; leaders of the Cunsigliu were masked during meetings and held code names. My interview with Pierre Poggioli was further proof of the secrecy that even past members abide by; when I asked him about the other members he became visibly uncomfortable, and told me in a whisper to read his books about the FLNC in the 70s and 80s-both of which are lacking in details about members. I was able to, however, get a general idea of membership from him and his publications. Details on certain key members were taken from cross-referencing several newspaper articles and Rossi and Santoni’s publication, and will be used to illustrate the participation
of the original members of the 1970s in both the clandestinely violent and moderate factions; many members contributed to both the radical and peaceful political spaces during their lifetimes, and often at the same time. This overlapping of radical and peaceful spaces differs from the very distinct violent and moderate factions in Quebec. This section will provide a general overview of membership, and will also focus on key members, as in the FLQ section.

Both Crettiez (1999) and Poggioli (2006, 2011), in his books and during an interview with him for this thesis (2014), stated that the earliest FLNC members were mostly composed of agriculturalists, farmers, and small business employees, as it was the Corsicans who lived in rural areas that felt the economic problems of the 1970s the most. Of 32 militants arrested between 1978 and 1980, 11 were employees, 7 independent professionals, 6 farmers, 4 students, 2 workers and 2 intellectual workers. The average age was 28 and a half years old, with ages ranging from 20 to 40 (Kyrrn 1975); this is a contrast to the much younger ages of the majority of the felquistes in the first moment. The bulletin Unione published another study that looks at militants arrested between 1970 and 1980: of 119 arrests, 30 were employees, 19 farmers/agriculturalists, 16 students, 15 of liberal professions, 10 workers, 10 officials, 11 unemployed and 8 artists. Crettiez (1999) argues that the study proves that members of the FLNC were not comprised of the marginalized, but were rather integrated into Corsican society. What he fails to appreciate is that although the militants represented a series of employments and pay grades, all militants were of ‘Corsican’ descent. There was no representation of the repatriated pieds noir and the French bourgeoisie. Although the militants were indeed integrated into Corsican society and not part of the marginalized population per se, they ‘felt’ marginalized due to the benefits awarded to the pieds noir by the French.

Yves Stella’s participation as a founder of the FLNC was well known in Corsica and became known state-wide after his arrest, and was reiterated after his death on the 15 July 2012 (“Décès d’Yves Stella, l’un des membres fondateurs du FLNC” 2012). Stella was born in 1942 at Morsiglia Haute-Corse where he became conseiller municipal and mayor for seventeen years.
Stella was the very first nationalist mayor in Corsica. Stella held a humanities degree and became the director of U Ribombu before creating his own journal ‘Paese’. On the 1 June 1978, at 34 years of age, he was arrested with several other FLNC members as part of a ‘grand offensive’ before the visit of President Valérie Giscard d’Estaing; he was sentenced to 15 years of prison by the Cour de sûreté de l’État, but received a general pardon after three years by François Mitterand. After the internal split amongst the FLNC, Stella founded the MPA and was elected to the Corsican assembly. The dichotomy of Stella’s peacefully political life and his active participation in the clandestine movement initially reveals a hint of irony: Stella participated in an FLNC commando that placed an explosive charge on the television relay of Serra-di-Pigno, ridding the island of television for nearly a year and creating particular uproar as the UPC congress in Furiani was to be held the next day. Years later, Stella became president of the syndicat intercommunal des réémetteurs de télévision du Cap-Corse. He also held the position of directeur du service départemental d’incendie et de secours de la Haute-Corse, in which he implemented prevention programmes to save the maquis, where he had hid during his run from the authorities in May 1976. Corse matin wrote of Stella: a ‘man of reflection doubled as a man of action during a time of ‘nuits bleues’; ‘Yves Stella had two lives, one that destroyed and one that built’ (“Mort d’un des pères fondateurs du FLNC devenu un artisan de paix” 2012). The duality of Yves Stella’s life is very similar to other members of the FLNC. Those who fought for the nationalist movement often involved themselves in democratic politics during or after the clandestine struggle. “Politicians by day, terrorists by night”; although crudely articulated by a Niçois in Nice, France, it aptly articulates the duality of the nationalist movement in Corsica.

Similarly to Stella, Léo Battesti was a key member in the creation of the FLNC, yet denounced the violence after becoming a politician and eventually the vice president of the fédération française des échecs. Battesti was 22 years of age when he participated in the Aleria Incident as a militant beside Edmond Simeoni, and Battesti still attests today that he was not the militant who shot and killed the two gendarmes during the Aleria Incident.
At 23, he helped form the FLNC and participated in the first ‘nuit bleue’ at the same time as he held the position of secretary general of the Corsican student population (SCC) until 1978. In 1978, he was arrested for organizing an FLNC attack against a tax department, la centre des impots mitoyen. Battesti parked his car in front of the école de Toga (Deloire 2005). Police were able to identify his license plate and he was sentenced to 9 years in prison by the Cours de Sureté de l’état. In 1981, like Stella, he was granted amnesty as a political prisoner by Mitterand.

After Battesti’s release, he became a speaker and advocate of the Consulte des comités nationaliste (CCN), and an important member of the consulta in the FLNC. In 1986, he was elected to the territorial assembly and continued FLNC activity until the scission de 1990 (Deloire 2005). Since 1992, Battesti called for the dissolution of all clandestine organizations and factions and a stop to its mafia-like tendencies of the FLNC that developed since the scission of 1990, which will be further discussed in chapter 6. Battesti’s anti-violence stance was reiterated when he ran for president of the fédération francaise des échecs against Diego Slazar, director of the club in Chalons-en Champagne, Marne. (Crozier 2013). Stella and Battesti are both comparable to Paul Rose of the final FLQ moment, in the sense that they founded violent networks, and then eventually denounced them and ran for election to continue the nationalist struggle within democratic institutions. Rose was less successful than Battesti and Stella, who were both elected into the territorial assembly.

Jean-Michel Rossi was also a key member of the FLNC-canal historique at 20 years of age. Rossi was arrested four times for his involvement with nationalist activity outside of the FLNC in 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1997; he was released from prison in 1998. After denouncing and criticizing the new ‘canal habituel’ of the FLNC in 1992, the network banned Rossi from returning to Corsica on threat of death. After the dissolution of the network, Rossi returned to the island (“L’ex-nationaliste corse Jean-Michel Rossi assassin” 2000) and published a book with Francois Santoni in June 2000 entitled: Pour Solde de tous compte: les nationalists parlent. Rossi
and Santoni gave an unflattering description of Jean-Guy Talamoni, chief of Corsica Nazione, and suggested that he had business acquaintances of the extreme-right; this publication, of course, received a backlash and a number of hostile reactions that forced Rossi and Santoni to take on bodyguards. Rossi and his security guard Jean-Claude Fratacci, were murdered in August 2000 at Ile-Rousse (Haute-Corse). Three men appeared at the bar ‘La Piscine’ and fired several shots, while a second group of two men blocked the exit; all five escaped by vehicle. The suspected connection between the publication and the assassination is easier to understand when placed in the violent framework of the early millennium. While there was certainly a history of violence prior to the mobilization of the FLNC, the FLNC developed the radical space from the 1970s to the 1990s as they adopted strategies that were increasingly violent. After the *scission de 1990*, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, the movement divided into two factions, leaving behind its nationalist agenda and focus on social and political reforms for an arms race.

While women in Quebec were participating in many forms of activism and politics, Corsican women were slow to organize themselves into groups driven by gender issues. It wasn’t until the mid 1990s that certain women organized the ‘femmes corses contre la violence’ (‘female Corsicans against violence’), and published the *Manifeste pour la vie* in 1995 in response to FLNC factions.

Women were not without agency, however. Women participated in violence. During the twentieth century, men constituted between 84 and 86% of individuals arrested for violent acts in Corsica; with women between 14 and 16%. Most incarcerations were economic or financial. Looking solely at crimes against the person, women were involved in less homicide, and more so for ‘infractions against the family and children’, in which most cases involved children guardianship (Sanguinetti 2012). Sanguinetti also states that the level of female violence is similar to the national average, and that Corsica does not distinguish itself in either economic crime or crimes against the person. This is not to suggest, however, that women were not involved, historically or contemporarily, in the act of the vendetta: “certain women
convicted the vendetta themselves: it is not of the ordinary, nor is it rare, and is socially acceptable under certain circumstances, especially if the men are unable to avenge the family themselves’ (Wilson in Sanguinetti 2012: 28). 

According to the Global Terrorism Database by the University of Maryland, women were not allowed to join the FLNC. Members interviewed for this thesis did not suggest that women were banned altogether from the organization but rather that recruitment was focused on men, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. The absence of women during press releases supports this; even during those that all members were present and masked to form a show of force.

Although women were not encouraged to join the FLNC, the organization interestingly proposed a popular democracy with a focus on gender in the livre vert of 1977, to be discussed further in Chapter 5. The popular democracy that they would impose if national liberation was achieved, would ‘favor the cultural and professional development of women’ and ‘educate the female members of a nationalist lifestyle’ (Livre vert 1977). While the FLQ avoided the topic of gender altogether, the FLNC of the first moment demanded more opportunities for women. While the FLNC did not invite women to partake in the violent activity, they wanted women to be educated about nationalism. In both Quebec and Corsica, it was assumed that women should or would not participate in violent activity, even though it is evident that women were already active in the radical spaces of both societies. While the FLQ and the FLNC were fighting against economic and cultural exploitation, they were subsequently reinforcing the oppression of women within a patriarchal system.

**Ideology**

In Corsica, the ARC, nationalist advocates of the electoral system, developed an ideology that critiqued the left-leaning Front Regionale Corse

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19 Translated by author.
(FRC). Inspired by the Marxist ideology, young Corsicans on the continent in the FRC demanded change and control of the Corsican identity and an endogenous socialism’. The ARC opposed the economic model of the FRC and focused on institutionally modernizing the island. Inspired by decolonization and radical movements of the 1970s, the nationalists radicalized and conducted events such as the Aleria Affair and the Boues-Rouge; Crettiez rightly argues that this radicalization of the nationalists, with an affirmation of the ‘Corsican people’ and the glorification of the Paoli period, allowed the FLNC to ‘impose a thematic identity in Corsica’ (Crettiez 1999). The FLNC would further radicalize the nationalist discourse by focusing on two points: contesting the state and sub-state relationship by demanding independence; and using violence to achieve it. The early FLNC attempted to unify ‘Corsicans’ against the state as a common ‘colonialist’ adversary; often the pieds noir were considered privileged recipients of a beneficiary state. The FLNC believed that independence would ensure that the repatriated Algerians were no longer given privileges by the state, and the Corsican populace would have control of their own economy and politics: ‘One single solution is possible: national independence’ (A liberta o a morte 1977: 22).

In 1976, the FLNC published a pamphlet with demands that included: the recognition of the ‘national rights’ of the Corsican people; the removal of all instruments of colonialism- the army, the French administration and the colons; a popular democratic government which would express the will and needs of all Corsican patriots; the confiscation of colonial estates and property of tourist industry trusts; agrarian reform to fulfill the aspirations of farmers, workers and intellectuals, and to rid the country of all forms of exploitation; and the right to self-determination for the Corsican people. The document called for a united front against a hopeless French Republic. While this early declaration for independence distinguished the FLNC from the regionalists of the 60s and early 70s, the FLNC published the petit livre vert in 1977 with certain similarities to their regionalist counterparts. The document was left-wing, but also engaged with the socio-economic and cultural realities of the island. The document described a ‘common land
revolution’ with Marxist-Lenist and Maoist influences. Although it did not ascribe Mao’s agrarian revolution, it did suggest that land should be redistributed to Corsican farmers (Liberta O More 1977). The FLNC of the late 1970s share a Marxist perspective to independence with the FLQ during the early 1960s.

In relation to the clans, the FLNC took a similar stance to the ARC and the UPC. The clan system was blamed for the economic and civic decline of Corsica. In a press conference, they hailed themselves as the representatives of a patriotic force for a better Corsica. For the FLNC, the political solution for the Corsican problem was a reform of the political system, currently monopolized by the clans. The FLNC considered militaristic action as an alternative to the corrupt political system (Kyrn 1979, 23).

While the FLNC agreed with the peaceful nationalist groups about the clans, the network took a very different stance to the UPC about Europe. While the UPC sporadically cited a Europeanist rhetoric, in which European integration could facilitate Corsican self-determination, the FLNC was very disinterested in European affairs. During discussions of European parliament, and the elections, the FLNC made it clear from the beginning that they very much opposed European integration. Although the FLNC did participate in CONSEO alongside radical nationalist parties in the 1980s, a coalition was never produced due to differing ideology and ‘conceptualizations of the liberation struggle’ (Elias 2008) amongst all parties despite an obvious opposition to their states (Lefebvre 1992; Crettiez 1999; Elias 2008). Participation in CONSEO was mostly a show of force in the nationalist political sphere; it was important for the FLNC and the FLQ to affirm their places in the global movement, and these contacts assisted with domestic propaganda (Crettiez 1999). The FLQ attempted this during the third moment by plane hijacking, hostage-taking, and assassination, but that will be discussed further in Chapter 6. The FLNC continued its activity, but also organized an annual Journées Internationales de Corte where they displayed the strength of their network to representatives of other radical nationalist movements in Europe (Elias 2008).
Very little changed the FLNC’s opinion about Europe from the 1970s to the 1990s. Elias suggests that the only change was a ‘moderation of tone in which the Euro-rejectionism was articulated’ (Elias 2008). Similarly to the FLQ, the FLNC was influenced by global movements and events. While the initial FLNC network held radical ideology that was inspired by the global Marxist-Leninist movement of the 1970s, the collapse of communism in central and Eastern Europe in 1989 affected a change from the ‘romanticism’ and the ‘utopianism’ of young Corsicans in the early 90s (chapter 6) (Poggioli 1996). The leaders of the ‘new’ network in the 1980s (and chapter 5) realized that Marxism did not fit the economic and cultural underdevelopment in Corsica; the sub-state needed to customize their own program. After the 1980s, the FLNC continued to talk of independence from the French state and continued to define its struggle as the ‘national liberation of Corsica’, however there was very little published of a substantial political program. The FLNC published ‘Projet de Société’ in 1989, which committed the network simply to a model of society that would be determined by the liberation struggle itself (U Ribombu, 1990). Elias, therefore, argues that the FLNC held a ‘principled disinterest’ of articulating political details in response to a relationship with Europe; ideological goals also were articulated in a less radical tone throughout the 1980s (Elias 2008).

The FLNC could have been uninterested in Europe during the 1970s due to a focus on the global decolonization movement; instead of focusing on Europe, the FLNC looked beyond with a much wider scope. Similarly to the FLQ, the FLNC was particularly influenced by Algeria and alternative views that young Corsican students returned to Corsica with from the mainland. Rightly suggested by Elias (2008), the FLNC’s uninterest in Europe in the 1980s was largely due to the internal problems throughout the decade. Disagreements on tactics and militaristic activity influenced ruptures and the creation of different factions while successful policing raids were able to restructure the FLNC (Crettiez 1999) as they did the FLQ. While the FLQ attempted to place themselves within the international movement and gain global attention through, especially in the mid 1960s to 1971, the FLNC used
connections, contacts and strategy to reaffirm domestic strength and predominance not only within the radical space, but in the larger nationalist political sphere in Corsica.

During the 1970s and early 1960s, there was very much a contrast of demands between the FLQ and the FLNC that help to understand the movements themselves, and how they began to shape radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica. Both the FLQ and the FLNC cited groups that benefitted from the sub-state relationship with the state. While the FLNC complained of the repatriated Algerians gaining preferential treatment from France, the FLQ argued that the Anglophone bourgeoisie controlled the economy and gained from the social and economic reforms of the Quiet Revolution. Similarly, while the FLNC demanded to end clan corruption in Corsica, the FLQ wanted the same of capitalist exploitation.

**Network structure**

In the 1970s, the FLNC formed a network structure that included eight regions that functioned separately. A representative of each region sat within *La Direction*, a cell that met periodically to discuss the network as a whole. Each representative in *La Direction* was masked for meetings and adopted a code name, always the name of the present élu claniste, elected clan member, of the region. The eight regions included: Ajaccio, Bastia, Fjumorbu, Casinca, Porto-Veccho, Corte Niolo, Cap Balagne and ‘Zone France’ (Poggioli 2011: 470). Each region had two to seven sectors that accumulated to 25 sectors. The Region Cap would become a part of the region Bastia and the Region Casinca would become the Region Cervione-Camploru. Youth were also placed in contact with *l’équipe des vieux*, composed of ten ‘pères tranquilles’, older men who were involved in the cause but not the violence; these men were ideological mentors (Poggioli 2006). In May 1978, 27 suspected members were arrested in both Corsica and France, which forced the network to reconfigure and replace the members; the success in doing so without dissolving or disbanding proves a much stronger network than the
FLQ in the first moment. While changes amongst the actors in the FLNC were fluid due to the hierarchal nature of the network, individual ‘nodes’ (actors) could change, generally due to arrest or leaving the network for different reasons, without dismantling the entire network. The FLQ cells were so small that the arrest of only a few felquistes meant that the cell would disintegrate or disband.

The structure of the networks informs the shaping of radical spaces in the first moment. Both networks organized based on the radical spaces that were already present; while Quebec was enduring social and political changes with the Quiet Revolution, but had yet to experience any political violence, the first FLQ cells were loosely organized into cells and were ‘relatively amateur’ in comparison to other violent networks (Charters 1997). The early cells of the FLQ shaped the radical space further as it became more violent and attempted to become more revolutionary. Corsica had a history of violence and had experienced activism and violence previously to the formation of the FLNC, therefore the network was able to organize for a higher insurgency and further shape an already radical space. Similarly to the FLQ, the FLNC shows a radicalization of activity throughout the 1970s and an attempt to push the boundaries of the radical space.

As was noted in the previous section, the rigid structure allowed the network to articulate a strong and comprehensive ideology and list of demands. While the regions had a certain level of autonomy for funding and activity, le direction was able to mold the ideology and lead the network in a direction that they believed would be best to achieve their demands. Therefore, the network structure influenced the ideologies of both the FLQ and the FLNC; the looser cell structure of the FLQ allowed for an inclusivity of left-wing Quebecois of different profiles, whereas the rigid structure of the FLNC influenced a strict ideology that was followed by all actors willing to mobilize.
Framing processes have been used as a form of analysis on subjects of activism against subjects ranging as far as neo-liberal globalization (Ayres 2004), collective action (Tarrow; Benford and Snow, 1986, 1988.) and terrorism (Crouch 2010; Della Porta 1995). Based on Goffman’s (1974) work, framing is a process where the actors interpret, and provide reasoning, to challenge and mobilize against socio-political conditions (Bedford and Snow 2000; Ayres 2004). From this perspective, social movements are given agency; recruitment and mobilization can no longer be viewed as ideas that grow from unanticipated events or existing ideologies (Benford and Snow 2000). These frames provide “legitimizing accounts” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988; Kane 1997; Williams 1995; McAdam et al 1996), in which the actors may “shape and sustain their mobilizing campaign” (Ayres 2004: 14) as a form of recruitment. Not only do these mechanisms shape their own networks, but they also shape the radical spaces in sub-states Quebec and Corsica

I am using the three characteristic components of the collective action frame to formulate an analysis of the recruitment of the FLQ and the FLNC. First, the recruitment process must offer the identification and diagnosis of an event, antagonist or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration (Crouch 2010). Both the FLQ and the FLNC framed the state as the antagonists. Beyond that, there was not always consensus over who or what was to blame after suggesting the nature of the problem (Benford and Snow 2000). The FLNC of the 1970s also blamed the pieds noir as benefactors of the state who threatened their culture, while the FLNC of the 1980s focused on the clan system and pursuing democracy without clan ties. In May 1977, nationalists felt that they had gained a supporter when Alex Alessandri was elected as mayor of Antisanti, despite his opponent flying in non-residents from Paris on the day of voting. Alessandri, however, “forgot his origins” and became strongly opposed to nationalist ideals. This change of ideology, and his use of clan-system nepotism when he gave up his position to his son,
created much more skepticism, and distrust for politicians, amongst the autonomists and nationalists who had participated in the electoral system (Poggioli 2006). The FLQ noted that poverty in East Montreal was problematic, and criticized both the English and French bourgeoisie. Gamson (1995) suggests that there is ‘adversial framing’ in which actors delineate between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ to construct protagonists and antagonists. This is very evident with the FLQ; workers and the labour movement were glorified, while the provincial and federal politicians and ‘les big bosses’ were shaped as antagonists (Manifest de 1970).

Second, the ‘prognostic dimension’ is a collective action frame that outlines what needed to be done after identifying the socio-political issues and the antagonists (Crouch 2012). Simply, both the FLQ and the FLNC outlined a nationalist program in order to break ties with the state and ‘rectify’ the economic struggle, however specific ideology changed as new members replaced the former disbanded members. The final characteristic is ‘motivational framing’: a call for arms or a rational for engaging in the action suggested (Benford and Snow 2000: 615). The official call for arms with the FLQ and the FLNC was to gain independence through militaristic struggle. In theory, both the FLQ and the FLNC were to inspire their collective communities to take up arms with an independent nation as end result. In reality, members were recruited for many different reasons. During the first wave of the FLQ, members attempted to recreate the mindset of the Cuban agrarian revolution, yet William McNeil’s single death, that occurred due to a bomb placed by the FLQ, was declared as ‘accidental’; the FLQ cell even apologized for it. Palmer (2009) suggests that New Leftists did not want the program of revolution as much as the adventure, and the response to the death of O’Neil is a good example of how the FLQ were emotionally unprepared for the revolutionary program; many of the working members articulated only a basic knowledge of the ideology that their comrades cited, and the students held a New Leftist idealistic view of the program (Court cases of Labonté and Williams). Unlike Laurendeau (1990), who suggests that the FLQ had a strict ideological orientation from the beginning, due to its first communiqué on the 8 March 1963, I argue that although the FLQ
articulated a need for revolution as a means to achieve an independent Quebec (Laurendeau 1990), the first three cells in this chapter reflect the FLQ as a whole in the sense that they lacked focus, direction and a specific end-goal as a result of appeasing the different ideologies and levels of radicalism.

The FLNC was comprised of students who had studied on the continent and were influenced by Marxist-Leninism, and islanders who had not had the same experiences and level of education, as there was no university in Corsica until 1981. In contrast to the FLQ, the members of the FLNC were able to mobilize around the history of violence, and the use of clandestine violence to pursue a nationalist struggle. The movement developed a much more intricate manifesto and *livre vert* that outlined the demands of the movement, and the tighter organization with levels of leadership diminished the ideological factions during the 1970s.

This chapter highlighted and analysed three main mechanisms of the original networks of the FLQ and the FLNC: membership, ideology and structure. These mechanisms, supplemented by the framing processes, sought to answer why these networks developed in Quebec and Corsica, and how they inform the original mobilization of the FLQ and FLNC; thereby analyzing how the original cells of the FLQ and the FLNC network of the 1970s sought to extend radical spaces.

While the FLQ and the FLNC are two very different cases, the early networks discussed in this chapter were comparable as they were comprised of actors of different profiles who mobilized and chose to use violence as a way to articulate frustrations with the state and the ruling minority that benefitted from the relationship between sub-state and state. While the FLNC was frustrated with clan corruption, so was the FLQ with capitalist exploitation. Similarly, the FLNC blamed the pieds noir for receiving benefits from the state just as the FLQ blamed the Anglophone bourgeoisie.

Both the early FLQ and the FLNC networks attempted to extend radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica as they radicalized, experimented with
tactics, and developed and shared their ideologies through the distribution of written texts. Since Corsica had a history of violence, the radical space was easily adopted from former violent groups, GP and FPCL, while the violent tactics of the FLQ were considered ground-breaking in Quebec. Never before had families in Westmount been scared to check their mailboxes for mailbox bombs that became synonymous with the early FLQ cells. Because of this violence prior to the FLNC, actors were able to mobilize and develop a stronger network structure with greater secrecy and group centrality. While the GP and FPCL were not very organized by ideology, the FLNC pushed the boundaries of the radical space, not only by radicalizing tactics, but also by forming and publishing a set ideology with distinct demands.

This first empirical chapter explored the initial mobilization of the FLQ and the FLNC, the structure and the strategy that best fit their nations. The next chapter will analyse and compare the subsequent cells between 1964 and 1968 and the FLNC network of the 1980s, and a further radicalization of the movements. While the original networks were open to different profiles and ideologies, the following chapter investigates the internal conflicts that occurred as a result.
Chapter 5: A radicalization of the FLQ and the FLNC resulting in internal tensions

This second empirical chapter examines the next time periods of the FLQ and the FLNC; between 1964 and 1968 in Quebec and during the 1980s in Corsica. While the last chapter looked at the foundation of the two networks, this chapter studies the radicalization of the subsequent cells and highlights the tensions that developed and influenced the internal conflicts that occurred. This chapter focuses on mechanisms, such as innovative action, polarization, ideology and actor constitution, in order to compare and to understand the FLQ and the FLNC during their subsequent time periods. In doing so, this chapter will inform the larger question of how the networks shaped the radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica.

In Quebec, 1964 was a highly political year. The Lesage government had demanded a review of federal policy and had succeeded in withdrawing Quebec from cost-sharing programs such as pensions, health care and tax-sharing in exchange for fiscal compensation. In 1965, the Caisse de depot et placement du Quebec was created to administer the assets of the Quebec Pension Plan to continue the nationalization of companies in Quebec. The Parent Report of 1964 argued for a public school system away from the control of the church, which meant further secularization of the social spaces in Quebec. While Quebec was coming into its own, and gaining strength and confidence as a sub-state, France in the 1980s was experiencing unrest due to a slow recognition that France was no longer a major player in global politics. An oil crisis in 1979 made matters worse by triggering a decline in living standards and worsened unemployment. In the 1985 election, Mitterand introduced proportional representation for parliamentary elections; Chirac won a small majority, thus forcing Mitterand to appoint Chirac as prime minister in which France underwent a period of cohabitation between left and right.

As was evident in Chapter 4, the socio-political and economic environment and the extent of the radical spaces, prior to FLQ and FLNC
mobilization, affected the organization of the networks; the history of violence and activism in the sub-states influenced network structure. In this chapter, the radical spaces were shaped by the cycles of violence and activity that occurred in both sub-states. While the FLNC responded to moderate political organizations and state responses with phases of violence and peace, the FLQ radicalized with a different program from the first chapter, which failed and then left the radical space to be developed by labour movements and ideological revolutionary leaders for two years; Quebecois chose peaceful activism over clandestine violence until the FLQ reorganized in 1968.

**FLQ**

Unlike chapters 4 and 6, the strategy and ideology of the FLQ are discussed prior to membership so as to analyze the ARQ and the Vallieres-Gagnon cells as the separate entities that they were. It also allows the thesis to introduce Vallieres and Gagnon, and their literature, so as best to understand their role and theoretical influence of the Vallieres-Gagnon cell before exploring the FLQ actors themselves.

**Innovative Action: new strategic program did not fit urban mobilization**

‘Oui, mais me battre contre qui? Contra la Police de Montreal, alors que c’était l’armée Canadienne qu’on avait voulu se mesurer... Et a l’instant meme, je compris toute la complexité de cette guerre de liberation qu’on venait de commencer. Cette guerre-là, me suis-je dit, serait une guerre entre nous autres, Québécois contre Québécois, tandis que les Anglais, eux, regarderaient le spectacle à la television’ (Schirm 1982, 32).

Action is considered innovative by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) when it ‘incorporate claims, selects objects of claims, includes collective self-representations, and/or adopts means that are either unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question’ (8). The two FLQ cells between 1964 and 1968 were both very different from the previous cells. The tactics adopted by the ARQ were more militarist and innovative, yet did not fit the urban environment in Quebec. Due to this, the ARQ was very short lived.
The Armée Révolutionnaire du Québec (ARQ) organized the third cell in June 1964. The ARQ presented itself as a militarist wing of the FLQ. It was founded by three ex-military, all of whom stated that they had experienced discrimination in the Anglophone-focused military towards Francophones. Although bilingualism began to be acknowledged in the mid 1960s, discrimination and unilingualism was still rampant, and it is no surprise that François Schirm, Marcel Tardif and Cyriaque Delisle cite their experiences in the military as a frustration. The year 1964 marked only the beginning of a focus on bilingualism in the military. From 1964-1970, Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jean Allard, created more French-language units and the colonial ‘royal’ designation was removed from most branches in an attempt to create inclusiveness to all Canadians- including ethnic minorities (Decoste 2013). On the 1 May 1964, the Service d’édition des manuels de l’Armée canadienne (the publication section of the Canadian Army training manuals) was formed in order to translate and offer army training manuals in French (Pariseau and Bernier 1986). Arguably, this focus on bilingualism in the military was in response to the conflict in Congo in which Canada was able to lead internationally due to the knowledge of French within the military; it became evident that the unilingual policy of the military no longer corresponded with the accepted concept of Canadian duality (Decoste 2013). Although this was very much a rallying factor for the three cell organizers, there was still very much a shared left-wing ideology amongst the members. While the earlier FLQ cells had mobilized around left-wing ideals, this cell proves that the openness of the FLQ appealed to Quebecois with any language or sub-state frustration and felt disempowered by the system.

François Schirm differentiated himself from most members by age and ethnicity; he organized the ARQ at the age of 32 years, which was much older than his fellow members. Similarly to Schoeters in the first wave, Schirm brought his international experiences to the FLQ. Schirm was born in Budapest, becoming a political refugee in France. At the age of 18 years, he enlisted with the Legion étrangères français, and fought the Vietnamese in Indochina with the French Army; he interestingly fought against the FLN in
Algeria, but quit the Legion in 1956 (Fournier 1986). Schirm stated that the colonial wars clashed with his political views; subsequently, he immigrated to Montreal, worked as a builder and night security guard, and joined the RIN (Transcript of Schirm trial). His comrades were also ex-military: Pierre Toursignant was in the Royal 22 Regiment; Gilles Brunet was in the Black Watch Regiment; and Marcel Tardif was in the Royal Canadian Army, all unilingual regiments prior to the focus on bilingualism. Cyriaque Delisle was an electronic technician with the Royal Canadian Aviation. Brunet and Schirm became friends when they worked together in Steinberg and Miracle Mart. At 27 years of age, Brunet was a father of five (Schirm 1982, 27), and Fournier suggests that Tardif, Schirm and Delisle met at Le Cochon Borgne, a café on Saint-Catherine Street near St. Denis; it was considered a rendezvous for indépendantistes (Fournier 1986). These left-wing cafés were regularly cited as physical spaces for socialist discussion, recruitment and mobilization; Mario Bachand stated in an interview that it was in a similar café that he was recruited for the RIN, and then the FLQ (Transcript of Schirm trial). The ARQ was founded in a motel East of Montreal after the arrests of the ALQ, according to Schirm (1982, 16).

During the summer of 1964, Schirm began a training camp for the members of the ARQ near the village of Saint-Boniface-de-Shawinigan. Schirm had limited knowledge of urban revolutionary tactics, drawing mostly upon his experiences in Algeria, and was unaware that he should have been targeting unemployed youth and workers from the cities. FLQ membership was urban rather than rural, and Quebec farmers were unlikely to join a revolution or participate in violent repertoires as they did in Corsica. The ARQ was not uniformly supported amongst the felquistes, and writers of La Cognée criticized its tactics in the journal. The director of the organ, under the pseudonym of Paul Lemoyne, wrote that certain militants were being impatient with ‘our refusal to skip steps’. ‘They want us to put uniforms on their backs, and rifles in their hands’ (La Cognée 1964). Lemoyne suggested that the endeavors of the ARQ were unrealistic and the

20 Translated by author.
members were overcome by a sense of adventure. Whatever his motive for skepticism of the ARQ, Lemoyne was correct in assuming that most Québécois would not follow such revolutionary tactics in 1964.

The tactics that Schirm adopted were inappropriate for an urban Quebec, and his decisions created a schism between the ARQ and La Cognée. Unsurprisingly, the ARQ was short-lived, as Schirm, Delisle, Brunet, Tardif, and Edmond Guenette, a 20 year old worker at Northern Electric from East Montreal, were all apprehended on the 29 August 1964 during a daytime robbery at a gun store, *International Firearms*, in Montreal; shop owner Leslie MacWilliams and employee Alfred Pinisch were killed. Schirm (1982) describes in his autobiography how after a ‘dozen beer’ in a local tavern, Guenette had shot the Vice-President of Northern Electric McWilliams after being asked to lower his gun during the robbery. McWilliams was shot through the abdomen and died of internal hemorrhage (Morf 1970). After an attempted escape, Schirm was shot in the leg by police, and was arrested with Brunet and Delisle. Guenette managed to escape back to camp where he was then arrested (Schirm 1982). Schirm and Guenette (20 years of age) were sentenced to death. At the age of 28 and 26, Gilles Brunet and Cyrique Delisle were sentenced to life imprisonment; and Marcel Tardif was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. While on death row, Schirm and Guenette received life-long sentences after their cases were heard in the Supreme Court of Canada (Schirm Trial). Schirm spent 14 years behind bars, and was released on the 24 July 1978 as the Felquiste to spend the most time in jail for his actions, and Guenette spent 11 years in prison (Fournier 1982). A group arrest and release of seven other members at the training camp resulted in the end of the ARQ.

During the arrests of ARQ members, Jacques Desormeaux, a writer for *La Cognée*, was arrested and charged as an accomplice to murder after the event for his knowledge of the activity (Fournier 1982). Desormeaux was eventually sentenced to four and a half months imprisonment on the 13 January 1965. Desormeaux’s sentencing proved to the moderate members involved with *La Cognée* that they needed to be even more prudent; their
participation with the organ- but no violent activity themselves- was still an offence, and they could still be sentenced to jail-time. The heavy sentencing of the ARQ members also became a cautionary tale to those felquistes that considered rebuilding a more militarist and adventurous cell. Due to this very public reprimand, the skepticism of La Cognée members to affiliate themselves with another militarist network, and the increased activity of unions and the RIN, dissuaded the reorganization of an felquiste network until 1966.

While the ARQ attempted to be innovative with a different militarist program, the cell instead distanced itself from the moderate writers at La Cognée and became more violent than Quebec society was prepared for, which will be further discussed in the following section on polarization.

**Ideology and polarization: radical space is encompassed by ideological activism rather than violent episodes**

Tilly (2003) defines polarization as the ‘widening of political and social space between claimants in a contentious episode, and the gravitation of previously uncommitted or moderate actors toward one, the other, or both extremes’ (22). Polarization is considered in this section as a widening between violent and moderate factions. Although the FLQ was always distinct from the peaceful nationalist movement, polarization took place when the moderates took control of the nationalist movement between 1964 and 1968 in the absence of an FLQ cell, and gained a larger following of moderate actors. Further polarization occurred between la Cognée and the new Vallieres-Gagnon cell in 1968 that mobilized separate from the official organ of the FLQ.

While the FLNC experienced a period of repression in 1978 and found it difficult for the Cunculta to meet and strategize, the ALQ dissolved completely after the arrests of many felquistes. Nationalist mobilization and popular frustration were rife in Quebec, yet the complete failure of the ALQ, and its increased insurgency, dissuaded other Quebecois to take up arms.
On the 10 October 1964, Queen Elizabeth and Prince Phillip visited Quebec and met with Jean Lesage. Three hundred and fifty police officers and approximately 500 members of the army were deployed around Quebec City to ensure the safety of the Queen. An article in La Cognée described the monarch as a symbol of colonialism and asked felquistes to join the RIN in greeting her majesty (La Cognée, 1964); there was no call for violence. The Queen was greeted by almost a thousand nationalist demonstrators who shouted: “Elizabeth, stay at home” (‘1964 Quebec Riots over royal visit’ 1964) and sang songs from Old France (Pepin in Gratton 2013). Although the crowds were unrelated to FLQ or union activity, the officials responded harshly by beating the demonstrators, tourists and journalists alike with truncheons, which resulted in a retrospective naming of the event as ‘Samedi de la matraque’\(^{21}\). Most police officers had contentiously removed their numbers from their helmets so as to be unidentifiable by the victims (‘1964 Quebec Riots over royal visit 1964).

This event highlights the fear in Quebec, and the attempts by the Sûreté du Quebec, the provincial police, to repress potential violence with force, rather than attempting to focus on the socio-economic and political factors that spurred the FLQ and labour violence. Although the moderate nationalists had no intention for violence, the movement was gaining momentum, and the authorities attempted to crack down on the movement even though the FLQ was inactive. This brings us back to Haines’ RFE, in which the FLQ affected the response to the movement, event though it was distinct and separate from the moderate factions.

‘La Samedi de la Matraque’ was cited as a cause for more violence in La Cognée when the FLQ reorganized in 1966 (La Cognée 1964). As Bachand mentioned in an English-language interview in 1966, after his release from prison, “[The police] started [the violence] you know and people answered them but they always say that we use violence… They use more violence before and after that they get the result. …If they use violence then we will

\(^{21}\) Translated as ‘Saturday of the Truncheon’.
use violence against them...” (Interview on ‘Seven on Six’, Sept. 1966). Bachand, while glorifying his cause, informs this study by suggesting that escalation tactics and the radicalization of members can occur when members feel as though there was an aggressive response by the state or the police force\textsuperscript{22}; this is also evident in Corsica in the 1980s when the FLNC experienced a wave of recruitment to the network after the arrests and harsh convictions of university students and Corsicans alike.

In 1965, Quebec and France signed a co-operative cultural agreement under the watchful eye of the federal state. Throughout the early 1960s, Jean Lesage and President DeGaulle regularly exchanged political representatives; Lesage met DeGaulle three times between 1961 and 1965, and found that Quebec’s attempts to avoid an “invasion of American culture” (“Canadianism says Lesage” 1961).\textsuperscript{23} were aligned with the Gaullists’ views of preserving French culture. This cultural agreement allowed Quebec and France to cooperate directly, but only in the case of provincial legislation; this suggests that the federal government was aware of Quebec’s international initiatives and was attempting to maintain a single Canadian ‘voice’ in international affairs (Linteau et al 1991, 553). The cooperation agreement would not spur the re-organization of Felquiste violence, but it would open the door for DeGaulle’s visit in 1967 that would provide a very public statement supporting the nationalist movement.

**Intellectual contributions and Ideology**

"Pour les masses, le contraire de l’exploitation, c’est l’indépendence”\textsuperscript{24} (La Cognée, 3ieme année no. 48, 1 December 1965)

On 1 June 1965, Pierre Vallières, who was convicted for his political writings for and about the FLQ, was fired as a journalist at La Presse after he was

\textsuperscript{22} Ronald D. Crennsten suggests that repressive response by the state can serve as a reason for escalation tactics among terrorist groups in “The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970,” Inside Terrorist Organizations. D. Rappoport, ed. Routledge: 2001.
\textsuperscript{23} Lesage in Quebec National Assembly.
\textsuperscript{24} Translated as: ‘For the masses, the opposite of exploitation is independence.'
interrogated by the police for his role as director of the Révolution québécoise; in October 1965, he contributed to La Cognée for the first time under the pseudonym of Mathieu Hébert. After his termination of employment, Vallières formed the Mouvement de libération populaire (MLP) and came into contact with the FLQ (Vallieres 1968). Vallières was born in East Montreal where his father was a worker for the Canadian Pacific Railway, and he spent his childhood in the impoverished neighbourhood of Ville Jacques-Cartier. Amongst many other experiences, Vallières spent six months in France where he became discontented with the French Left; he was instead much more interested in the French Algerians living in France (Vallières 1968). Vallières’ interactions with the French Algerians in Paris influenced his writing by focusing on revolution and guerilla tactics as a way to achieve a socialist and liberated Quebec.

In October 1965, Pierre Vallières wrote an article, ‘Le FLQ existe-t-il?’: Does the FLQ exist, that was published in La Cognée under his psyeudonym Mathieu Hébert. The author of the article became known to the wider public when Vallières published ‘FLQ: un projet révolutionnaire’, a series of texts assembled by R. Comeau, D. Cooper, and P. Vallières in 1990. The editor’s note for the article is also included in the book, in which Comeau, Cooper and Vallières suggest that Hébert (or Vallières) was hesitant to join the FLQ as a militant due to the weaknesses discussed in the article (Vallières in Comeau et al. 1990). It is important, however, to note that 1965 marked the beginning of Vallières’ intellectual contribution to the FLQ and a return to a Marxist focus since the first cell in 1964; it was also published at a time when there was no active violence being committed under the name of the FLQ. Carel (2013) attests that Vallières and Gagnon actively participated in other publications in La Cognée, where they produced separate editions for unions and students25 (63).

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25 There were certainly three separate version of La Cognée for students, unions and Felquistes being published at this time, and can be found at the Canadian National Archives and les Archives Nationales in Quebec.
The Vallieres-Gagnon cell mobilized in 1966, and Vallières and Gagnon were in New York when they heard of the arrest of several FLQ members. In response, they protested at the UN in demand for the freedom of their comrades, and freedom for the sub-state in general. Both Vallières and Gagnon were arrested by agents of the US immigration and imprisoned in New York City Jail for three months while awaiting extradition to Montreal (Hunsaker 1999). During this sentence, Vallières wrote Les Nègres Blancs d’Amerique, the White Niggers of America, in which he compares the Québécois in Quebec to the Black minority in the United States of America. Vallières states in the introduction that the book was written after a 29-day hunger strike and “within the framework of an absurd discipline (called prison rules), invented and applied for the purpose of brutalizing the inmates as much as possible” (Vallières 1968, 9).

The text offers Vallières’ criticism of Québécois society, nationalism, and the clergy. Through the Quiet Revolution, Vallières advocated a separation between historical myth and religion by symbolically murdering a key cultural figure: “Let us kill Saint John the Baptist! Let us burn the papier-mâché traditions with which they have tried to build a myth around our slavery” (Vallieres 1968: 20). Hunsaker (1999) correctly states that Vallières not only dismisses the Catholic religion, but he also mocks French Canadian nationalism, which is constructed around a mythic sense of a heroic past, which interestingly clashes with the rituals and scripts of contentious politics and FLQ. Vallières struggles with how the Québécois defined themselves through this historical past rather than aligning themselves with the ‘material realities’- the domination by English-speaking American corporations- that was shared by exploited people around the world (Hunsaker 1999). The answer to the social problems in Quebec, Vallières argues, could be found in ‘total’ revolution: “the heart of the problem is neither metaphysical nor moral. It is material; it is at the same time economic, historical, and military. Consequently its solution must be of the same nature...there is no theoretical solution to the problems it raises. There are only practical solutions” (Vallieres 1968, 56). Although les Nègres Blancs influenced certain FLQ cells, the Chenier and Liberation cells were
influenced by the mythological past of les Patriotes of 1837 of the Lower Canada Rebellion. The comparison of the felquistes to the Patriotes in the manifesto is used as a way to justify the cause of the FLQ; thus embodying the exact idealism that Vallières argues against.

While the FLQ was inactive in the late 1960s, labour occupied the radical space. Labour bargaining opened up a movement for a “second front”, in which workers and citizens of impoverished East Montreal could organize outside of the workplace. The confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN) became a leftist movement that organized around housing and living conditions, as well as imperialism in Quebec (Mills 2010); this mobilization of workers brought labour conditions to the foreground of left-wing radicalism.

By January 1966, La Cognée was being represented by only a few felquistes. The group Vallières-Gagnon was formed and organized itself separate from La Cognée. While the old wave continued to publish a national version of the organ, the new Vallières-Gagnon group began to publish editions that were targeted at specific groups with a socialist perspective. Édition nationale was written for the felquistes, as well as the “patriots who affect[ed] the movement with their financial and intellectual contributions” (La Cognée no.50 1966). The other three editions were distributed publicly in order to achieve maximum distribution: l’édition syndicale was focused for workers, and the édition universitaire et édition des écoles secondaire were written for university and high school students. L’Avant-Garde was a separate edition published five times during 1966; it was presented as ‘the official organ of the comité central du FLQ’, and had a very distinctively Marxist view.

In February 1966, a writer at La Cognée with the pseudonym ‘P.L.’, for Paul Lemoyne, answered an open letter asking why he was one of two current authors writing for the organ. He suggested that the 15 previous authors had left La Cognée for one of three reasons: writers, such as Pierre Gagnon and Mathieu Hebert, had become militants and were now
participating in clandestine action; others, such as Marcel Martel and Francis Choquette, had abandoned the movement due to ‘fear, cowardice or laziness’; and others, such as Paul-André Gauthier, Hudon Lamarche and George Simard, had quit the movement because they no longer believed in the program and ‘were fighting elsewhere so that they could have a drink more often’; in other words, they were now participating in the moderate faction of the nationalist movement. (La Cognée no. 53 1966). Lemoyne then called for more writers; however, the official organ seemed at its end. No publications occurred during June to August until it reappeared in September 1966 under the direction of Pierre Gagnon, psyeudonym Jacques Désormeaux. Gagnon gave himself the title of ‘officier de l’armée de liberation du Québec’, an officer of the liberation army of Quebec.

In March 1966, ‘Paul Lemoyne’ called for a halt of FLQ activity so that rearguard areas, such as houses, liaisons, reserve funds, security agents, and hideouts could be organized. He suggested in La Cognée that liaison, security and finance were important so as not to commit the same errors of 1963 and 1964 (La Cognée no. 55 1966). This article proves that there was a knowledge of tactics, and differentiation between the urban struggle and the rural guerilla by the individuals writing the articles in La Cognée; however, the following militants of this moment either chose not to follow the instructions of Lemoyne or failed to do so.

On the 5 June 1966, Quebec held its last election for the legislative assembly of Quebec. The bicameral system was replaced with a single Assemblé Nationale du Quebec on the 31 December 1968. After a campaign of ‘Quebec d’Abord’, ‘Quebec first’, Daniel Johnson and the Union Nationale defeated the Lesage Liberal government. Although this came as a surprise to many, the reforms in Quebec had been costly throughout the Lesage regime, and the public debt had doubled. Lesage was even nicknamed ‘Ti-Jean la tax’, ‘Little-John the taxman’. Despite having won 6.5% less votes than the Liberals, the UN won 56 seats to 5026. This electoral outcome showed that the

26 ‘1966: Union Nationale defeats Lesage Quebec's Liberals’, CBC archives
majority of Quebecois were also frustrated with the high taxes and expenses of the Quiet Revolution.

This section examined the polarization of violent and moderate factions. Unlike the FLNC, the FLQ was distinct from the moderate factions since the beginning. During 1964 to 1966, however, there was no violent activity under the name of the FLQ particularly due to the harsh response to the previous FLQ cell, the skepticism of the La Cognée writers to affiliate themselves with another militarist network, and the increased activity of unions. Even though Quebecois considered less violent tactics in 1964, the government continued to pursue a violent response to demonstrators during Queen Elizabeth’s visit. Activism, instead, took the form of strikes and intellectual writings, particularly by Pierre Vallières, and other cultural texts, thus shaping the radical space to Marxist-Leninist influences.

**Membership: a new Marxist-Leninist actor constitution**

“Well, I don’t think that the new FLQ see the society as a global thing. They just...they are... they are not a movement for the masses. They are out of it, and this is the point where they are wrong” (Bachand on ‘Seven on Six’ on CBC channel 6 with Pierre Desbarats, held in September 1966 and transcribed by RCMP).

Actor constitution is defined as the ‘emergence of a new or transformed political actor- a recognizable set of people who carry on collective action, making and/or receiving contentious claims’ (McAdam et al. 2001, 216). This section examines the emergence of a new FLQ cell after a period without a felquiste presence. In the absence of FLQ violence, unions occupied the radical space and took to strikes and activism, and the moderates continued to publish ideological and cultural texts. While the previous chapter explored the openness and inclusivity of the previous cells that resulted in a loose ideology, the Vallieres-Gagnon cell differed by embracing a distinct and concrete ideology, which they published and distributed in several editions. This, of course, created conflict between the new FLQ cell and the ongoing La Cognée organ. Therefore, the FLQ shaped the radical space by tightening the ideology to focus on Marxist-Leninism.
The Vallières-Gagnon network mobilized in January 1966, and was composed of workers and students within a young adult demographic; this collaboration of members from two difference social groups fits the larger general analysis of FLQ cells. On the 5th of May 1966, however, an FLQ bomb killed Mlle Thérèse Morin, a secretary at Grenade Shoe Co. where the workers of CSN had been striking for almost a year. The bomb was placed by Gaetan Desrosiers, a 17-year-old high school student from East Montreal. When arrested by the police, he was entrusted to the care of his uncle, a lieutenant police officer in Montreal, instead of a trial (Fournier 1982). Of the compiled list of felquistes in the Vallières-Gagnon cell, seven were sentenced for bombing incidents between 1966 and 1968: Rhéal Mathieu, a 19 year old laboratory assistant, was arrested on the 17 August 1966 and sentenced to nine and a half years for the two bombing deaths of Morin and Corbo (see below); Gerard Laquère, a 24 year old student of social sciences at L’Université de Montréal, was sentenced to six years and eight months for participating in two bombings; Serge Demers, who was a construction worker for Expo 67, was sentenced to 8 years, 10 months for his participation in the death of Mlle Morin; André Lavoie, a 22 year old student in journalism, hid in Mattawin in Haut-Maurivie before his arrest and was sentenced to three and a half years for involvement with the FLQ. Richard Bouchoux, a 27-year-old mechanic originally from France, spent 17 months in prison before being acquitted of murder. Interestingly, Réjean Biggs, a 23-year-old hairstylist, was accused of stealing arms and materials from the sale d’armes du Mont Saint-Louis. Briggs was acquitted and Vallières was instead sentenced to seven years in November, 1968 for this theft (Fournier 1982; transcript of Vallières court case). The acquittal and transfer of sentence from Briggs to Vallières is interesting, especially when Vallières’ involvement with activity and violence is contentious. I have, therefore, included Briggs in my analysis of membership.

Fournier (1982) suggests that the group structured itself into three networks: propaganda, action and the ‘Comités populaires de liberation’. Representatives of each network held a seat in the comité central, which gave
orders to the subsequent cell. There is no evidence, however, that the network was as organized. This network was the first to publicly advocate socialism by suggesting that they worked for ‘the construction of a socialist Quebec’ (La Cognée vol. 1 1966), and converted the battle between indépendantistes and federalists to proletariat and bourgeoisie. This network comprised of at least ten known members between the ages of 16 and 27.

On the 14th of July, FLQ member Jean Corbo died at the age of 16 while placing a bomb at Dominion Textile in Saint-Henri, Montreal, during a strike. It was meant to be an act of support for the striking workers. Serge Demers testified under the protection of the court that Corbo met with members of the FLQ central committee- including Pierre Vallières, Rhéal Mathieu, Gerard Lacquerre, Charles Gagnon, Marcel Faulkner and Claude Simard- none of which had participated in placing the bomb. It was Demers who met with Corbo and gave him the bomb built with a ‘clockwork mechanism’. The bomb was not to go off for 55 minutes, but Demers said that he saw fire trucks heading towards the textile plant from the restaurant that he and Corbo had decided on as a rendez-vous after the bomb was placed in its appropriate location (“Young FLQ Suspect Describes Bomb Raid that Killed Corbo’, 1966). The bomb had detonated prematurely and killed Corbo in the process27. This was the first time that a felquiste had died for the cause.

The arrested FLQ members were represented in court by M. Robert Lemieux, a 25-year-old lawyer who had just recently finished his law degree at McGill University and been admitted to the bar. Lemieux became known as the lawful representative of the FLQ, representing Vallières, Gagnon and the Rose brothers among many other felquistes over the years. Lemieux was fired from his position at an Anglophone law firm, O’Brien & Smyth, in January 1968; his mother, Jacqueline Lemieux, suggested to the Montreal Gazette on the 14 October 1970 that Robert Lemieux’s termination of

27 To this day, Corbo remains an intriguing character who has inspired Quebecois film entitled ‘Corbo’, directed by Mathieu Denis and released at the Toronto Film Festival in 2014
employment was due to certain “legal aid cases that did not fit the company’s image” (Allan 1970, no page number). Me. Lemieux was given half the bonus of the other partners and was told to leave or be fired. Lemieux was not proven to have engaged in the violence himself, but was very sympathetic to the felquist political prisoners; his friend, lawyer Bernard Mergler, named him a “judicial guerilla” after his death in 2008 (“Robert LeMiex- a man of his time”, 2008). In an interview with Peter Gzowski, he stated: “I felt that the government was lying and giving an impression that was not good... the government must recognize that there has been a great amount of irregularity in the case of political prisoners” (CBC archives, 1970). Although Lemieux was not an FLQ member, he was an important individual to the nationalist movement in Quebec and the development of a radical space in Quebec; Lemieux ensured fair and sympathetic representation for Felquistes on trial in Quebec.

The involvement of Vallières and Gagnon within the cell is unclear, but it is clear that they were, at the very least, ideological leaders of the FLQ during this period (Fournier 1982; Rapoport 1988; the Cossette-Trudels in Laurendeau 1990); Vallieres was sentenced in court for his political writings rather than his participation28. Vallières described the FLQ in 1966 as the ‘revolutionary vanguard’, whose mission was to organize the armed struggle. This statement was inspired by Che Guevara’s foco model of revolutionary organization and action, in which a guerilla organization could mobilize support for a revolution (Che Guevara in Charters 1999). It is evident, suggests Charters, that Vallières and Gagnon overlooked the conditions particular to Cuba that attributed to Guevara’s success, but were not present in the Canadian socio-economic and political environment: “the fact that the Batista regime had managed to alienate almost every sector of Cuban society, including the middle class, and had been abandoned by its ally, the US” (Charters 1997, 144). The foco method was not an appropriate model for Quebec, and Vallieres’ attempt to instill Che Guevara’s model of

28 Robert LeMieux stated: “you get the court of appeal in the Vallières case that he was sentenced for, he was found for his political writings rather than his participation” (“Peter Gzowaski interviews FLQ lawyer”, 1970)
revolutionary action amongst the FLQ proves a hastiness to jump in without consideration of the social spaces in Quebec and Cuba. Although the Vallieres-Gagnon cell attempted to shape radical space without consideration of Quebecois society, it did succeed in creating a stronger ideology based on a particular model.

Actor constitution of the Vallieres-Gagnon cell differed from the previous cells of the FLQ in the sense that members were mobilized with a distinct ideology. The first three cells were inclusive and open to left-wing actors along the left of the political spectrum. The perception of the state as the colonizer is still reflected in the ideology of this cell, however the tactics and action (including the distribution of an organ separate from La Cognée) reflected the foco model and an image of a revolutionary vanguard.

**FLNC**

During the summer of 1979 in Corsica, the FLNC’s near dissolution would herald a new network. Twenty-one militants had been arrested and the FLNC was declared dissolved by the French state. On the 4 June, the militants were to be judged in court, therefore a nuit bleue in Paris was organized. Although the court dates were changed to the 14 June, the attacks occurred anyway (Poggioli 2011). The 25 attacks around Paris focused on national banks and tourist agencies, proving not only that the FLNC still had an active faction in Paris and on the mainland, but that ‘colonial control’ over Corsican tourism and the economy was still a perceived frustration amongst the actors. This chapter shows a development of the radical spaces in Corsica and Quebec: the ARQ cell attempted to radicalize differently than the previous cells of the FLQ, which proved unsuccessful with limited popular support; and the FLNC in the 1980s responded to an appearance of instability by radicalizing further.
Innovative Action and Membership: strategic adaptation to political repression, new technology and tensions amongst the factions

Just as the ARQ and Pierre Vallieres cells increased in activity and attempted innovative action, so did the FLNC during the 1980s. The FLNC not only attempted new action, such as breaking into prisons in order to kill offenders, but the actors also became more responsive perceived social issues in Corsica. As will be discussed later during this chapter, the activity included interference into the drug trafficking on the island and issues of censorship in the media. The increased activity throughout the 1980s also created a build up of internal tensions, which would result in the *scission de 1990*, to be discussed in the following chapter.

As mentioned in the previous sections, the new strategy adopted by the ARQ cell proved unsuccessful on several fronts; death during a robbery to finance the cell limited popular support and dissuaded mobilization and recruitment for another cell for two years. The FLNC also introduced new innovative action during the late 1970s and early 1980s; one tactic was to use the media for recruitment purposes, to respond to political repression, and to gain international interest. On the 26 March 1978, the FLNC organized a press conference in the Aleria cave in which Leo Battesti, a militant in the Bastia network, removed his *cagoule*\(^{29}\) to show his face and identity. After the Solenzaro attack, there were rumours that the FLNC were being ‘manipulated by international powers’ (Poggioli 2006) or even ‘mercenaries from abroad’. This media stunt of producing Battesti, a young and well-known militant, was to prove to the islanders that the FLNC was comprised of local Corsicans and gain support and recruitment for the movement.

With Battesti as a known militant, the police were able to link many of the other militants to their participation in the FLNC. In May of 1978, with the imminent arrival of President Giscard d’Estaing on June 6 (Ramsay 1983),

\(^{29}\) Translated as balaclava
the police invoked a wide-spread investigation, and 21 suspected members of the FLNC were arrested; several of them were caught red-handed moving arms and explosives (Ramsay 1983). Of the 21 arrested, there were 9 employees, 4 students, 3 agriculturalists, 2 artisans, 1 police officer, 1 worker, and 1 academic (Crettiez 1999, 73). The networks in the North of the island- Bastia, Casinca, Cap, and the cote orientale - were seriously affected by the investigations, and were practically cut off from the rest of the larger FLNC network. Leo Battesti was also found in a hideout in Aleria, and Pierre Poggioli ‘took to the maquis’ until 1981. Further, the members that avoided arrest no longer held the authentication code that was agreed upon with the journalists; the FLNC, therefore, no longer had legitimate contact with the media (Poggioli 2006).

On the 7 June, existing members of the FLNC fired at a police car in Ghisonacci, and an officer was injured. The members gave an interview with the journal “Liberation” in which they articulated to the rest of Corsica that the FLNC had not been dismantled. In reality, the network had been severely destabilized, and this was the closest the FLNC would come to dismantling until they laid down their arms for good in June 2014. In order to continue to influence and shape the radical space in Corsica, the network had to adapt to the increased security on the island.

The network, over time, was successful in replacing the 'lost' leaders; two coordinators used a system with a letter box in order to make contact with all of the regions; however one individual, known only as LC, was arrested in April 1979, and ‘J.S’ took to the maquis in May (Poggioli 2006). Poggioli, from hiding in the Maquis, made contact with the media about a new code (Interview with Poggioli, 2014).

On 17 June 1979, Michel-Ange Filippi, a student of the Cunsulta di i Studienti Corsi (CSC) in Nice, was jailed for radical activity. Furthering this arrest, a dozen university and high school students- including minors- were arrested, and six were also jailed: Jean-André Orsoni, Stephane Predali, Pierre Pagani, Jean-Charles Pellegrini, Christian Perès, and Francis Luciani
(Poggioli 2006: 125); they were released on the 11 June 1981. Responsible for a series of bombings in response to the arrests of the university students, Oliva, Christofari and Leoni were sentenced to a further two years on their original sentences for FLNC graffiti. Shortly after, the individuals responsible for the attack against the Fort LaCroix in 1978- Matthieu Filidori, Etienne Graziani, Hean-Pierre Darnaud, Francis Lorenzi, Antoine and Dominiqu Mattei- were further sentenced with five to ten years in prison. Sauveur Costa, incarcerated for firing shots at Maitre Biaggi’s vehicle, avoided his sentences due to a masked complice that helped him escape from the Bastia prison. Despite two broken legs from a leap over the jail wall, he succeeded in escaping. When he was arrested in November, he was sentenced to death.

Although none of the cases had resulted in loss of life or injury, the sentences were much more severe than with the Aleria case. As the State Security Court was, and is, highly political, the stricter sentences proved that the state responded harshly to violence in Corsica during the second moment; it also proved that the government considered the threat of violence more important than the threat of public backlash. Due to the series of arrests and repression felt by the state, however, the FLNC experienced a wave of recruitment to the organization, especially young militants eager to be a part of the movement. While the ARQ cell of the FLQ did dissolve due to a series of arrests and did not influence the development of a second cell, the FLNC developed new tactics for recruitment to replace lost members and were able to avoid dissolution.

The introduction of a ‘double direction’: further security resulted in further organizational changes to the network

The repression by the state, military and police forces in 1978 made it difficult for the Direction to meet; however, the leaders of each region were finally able to do so in the summer of 1979 (Poggioli 2006). During this meeting, the members of the Direction formulated a new organization to the leadership. Each region would be represented by a ‘double direction’ entitled the ‘Ghjunta’. The Ajaccio network was also re-distributed into three sectors: Ajaccio-Porticcio, Vico-Sagone and Propriano-Sartene (Poggioli 2011).
Besides the representatives of the Gjunta, each region would nominate a representative for the Cunsigliu, the executive of the Front movement. Two members of the Cunsigliu (Poggioli was one of the two) would then meet with the Ghjunta; these meetings would serve as a space for political formation and allow the members of the Cunsigliu to replace those who have ‘fallen’ (Poggioli interview, 2014). Creating so many positions of leadership, of course, inspired a debate over strategy and tactics, and resulted in little activity over the summer. The reorganization of leadership was an attempt to combat the pressure and limitations of the state response; in order to continue to encompass the social space that the FLNC of the 1970s had created, the FLNC of the 1980s had to reorganize, recruit and adapt strategy. Not only were the FLNC responding to the increased security in Corsica, but they were also attempting to fill a political vacuum during the 1980s. The elections of 18 and 25 March 1979 reflected a ‘static nature’ (Ramsay 1983) with little change; 17 of 24 members in the General Councils were re-elected and the autonomists boycotted the elections. The strategy of a united ‘Front’, proposed by the FLNC, attempted to represent the Corsicans striving for independence even further within the political sphere.

On the 23 January 1980, over 40 FLNC militants held a conference on the eve of the Collectif des 44. At this press conference, the FLNC articulated the raison d’etre for their violence (Poggioli 2006, 56). The militants stressed the importance of the political element to their struggle: the ‘Corsican situation was (and is) political, and so must be the battle’. While the press conferences of the 1970s portrayed hunting guns, basic pistols, a couple of revolvers, Sten and Schmeiser guns that were used during World War II by the Germans, this conference highlighted the presence of impressive and up-to-date arms. The possession of high quality arms shows a shift between the first and second moment; it proved a new professionalism surrounding funding, procuring the arms, and theft, as well as a new relationship with the peaceful political sphere. Although the FLNC owned an impressively large amount of arms that were displayed at press conferences, the members very rarely used them. Unlike the FLQ cells, of whom the members remained clandestine, the FLNC invoked a level of theatre ritual as tactics.
The ritual of the conferences—especially while collecting the journalists—further informs a shift towards a more radical network: the journalists were asked to collect information from the toilets in a local bar, which instructed the journalists to meet at a location outside of town. One motorcycle followed the journalists while another kept watch on the meeting area; both extremists communicated via walkie-talkies. At the meeting point, two masked and armed militants loaded both journalists into a vehicle and placed bags over the journalists’ heads, while the first motorcyclist returned to make sure that they were not being pursued. Finally, the journalists were forced to walk a kilometer continuously blindfolded before reaching the venue (Poggioli interview 2014).

Poggioli stated that this press conference of the 23 January 1980 was meant to be a ‘pied de nez’ at the police force. The FLNC used a set of repertoires and scripts (McAdam et al 2001) to display an increased level of strength and advancement from the network of the 1970s. The use of technology, walkie-talkies and modern arms, and secrecy added a level of mysticism to the clandestinity of the movement. Unfortunately, both journalists were censored by the editors of their newspapers, invoking a state-directed crackdown on nationalist propaganda; Corse-Matin published nothing and Provencal published a very short article without photographs that displayed the participation of 40 actors (Poggioli 2006).

In September 1980, the Cunsigliu were meeting once a month in different locations; frequent meetings meant further organization around strategy and activity. The 1980s saw a much more competitive relationship between the police forces, the state and the FLNC; a show of strength from one side resulted in a show of strength from the other, creating a vicious cycle. When the Police announced that the FLNC had been dismantled in Aix-en-Provence and Marseille, nuits bleu were organized in both locations to prove the announcement wrong (Poggioli 2011).
One of the most famous attacks in Corsica occurred in 1984 in response to the kidnapping and murder of FLNC member Guy Orsoni. On the 17th June 1983, FLNC member Guy Orsoni was kidnapped by the Corsican mob, directed by Jean Alfonsi, beat and left in his uncle’s car trunk to die (Historique de la LLN et du FLNC film). On the 25 June 1983, more than 2000 people held a demonstration on the cours Napoleon in response to Guy Orsoni’s disappearance, which shows an avid public response to the violence and a frustration with attacks against individuals. On the 10 July 1983, several masked and armed men placed a plaque in memory of Jean Orsoni, followed by a long procession of sympathizers. On the 7 June 1984, three FLNC militants broke into the prison in Ajaccio where the kidnappers of Guy Orsoni were being held; they neutralized the officers and killed the two men responsible for the assassination of Orsoni. The three FLNC members, Petru Albertini, Noel Pantalacci and Pantaleone Alessandri, were captured and deported to France (“Le FLNC s’oppose au milieu et tue deux de ses membres” 2015). This planned attack displays a very evident change in strategy, organization and a higher level of insurgency than the FLNC of the 1970s; while the early FLNC attacked symbols of colonialism and avoided the loss of human life, the FLNC of the mid to late 1980s were becoming more radical. As tensions rose between nationalists and anti-nationalists throughout the 1980s, both networks became more violent. The attack on the murderers of Orsoni by FLNC members, and other activity between the FLNC and anti-nationalists, can be informed by the traditional Corsican vendetta, in which ‘an eye for an eye’ is invoked. The radicalization during the 1980s, therefore, was not only an increase in insurgency, but also a return to cultural violent traditions. In Corsica, culture and tradition cannot be extracted from the analysis of the activity of the movement, which is why the contextualization of the causal mechanisms is so important throughout this thesis.

This attack suggests a very distinct contrast with the two FLQ cells discussed of this moment. First, neither of the FLQ cells were experienced or trained enough to be able to complete an attack such as this, and second, the loss of human life during the ALQ’s robbery very much influenced the state
response, the negative popular response and, therefore, the dissuasion of another FLQ cell and mobilization of political guerilla warfare.

On 2 January 1986, the FLNC assassinated Mohamed Sara Sgatni and Hassan Saari on rue Trois-Marie in Ajaccio, who they accused to be trafficking drugs. In the Mémorial de Corse, the author attests that the FLNC were incorrect and that it was in reality a case of racism towards the Maghrebians (Pomponi 1982). Either way, this assassination kick started a program against drug trafficking in Corsica. Slogans “a droga basta” and “a droga fora” were painted on walls across the island, while nationalist groups printed and wore t-shirts with the same slogans (“FLNC: cinq assassinats assumés en 35 ans” 2011). Whether or not Sgatni and Saari played a role in the drug trafficking movement in Corsica, this assassination and program proved a further development of radical space in Corsica into the social and political spheres; the FLNC began radically targeting individuals that played into or spurred social issues on the island, and proved that the FLNC could influence moderate activism, which will be further discussed as polarization.

The increased action in the 1980s was not constant; it was used as a political instrument in between elections. Arms were often lowered when there was a possibility of an election outcome that pleased the Corsican populace. This raising and lowering of arms created a cycle of polarization in Corsica, and the increased violence influenced the publication of a new manifesto, updating the ideology of the 1970s. Both of these elements will be discussed in the next section.

**Ideology and Polarization**

Just as the FLQ experienced a widening of ideological space between moderate and violent factions, the FLNC partook in cycles of violence in which the network would lower arms if they felt that a political party represented their ideology.

On the 1 April 1981, the FLNC published the ‘livre blanc’ in a special edition of the journal Ribellu. While the ARQ and Vallieres-Gagnon cells of
the FLQ did not publish manifestes, the FLNC’s livre blanc outlined the network’s new programme. The Livre Blanc articulated a new strategy that the network, and specifically the Cunsigliu, had developed in order to survive the increased security measures of local police and state. The ‘Lutte de Liberation Nationale’ (LLN) defined the new strategy in which a ‘direction politique’ would be in charge of structuring and organizing the network around three types of ‘struggle’ that would act autonomously but compliment and support the others: armed struggle, institutional struggle and mass struggle. The focus of a popular ‘front’ as an entity was to ‘defend the Corsican identity’ and their national rights through reappropriation of production, import and export. The FLNC’s role was to ‘designate enemies’, articulate a political perspective for the front and ensure that the front was working towards national independence, and finally target and hit symbols of colonialism militaristically. The livre blanc highlighted that the front was not to make war against France, as it would be inefficient and unable to succeed in such an end-goal; liberation had to be achieved politically, but only the struggle for national liberation would resolve the Corsican problem (livre blanc, 1981). This new strategy articulated a need for moderate and violent factions within a unified movement; this was different from the FLQ, which mobilized separately and distinctly from the peaceful political movement.

The FLNC had already put the new tactics of the front into action with the creation of the first public organization in December 1980; the Cunsulta di I Cimitati Naziunalisti (CCN) politically challenged the UPC and the autonomists, and further expanded the radical space into the moderate non-violent political sphere. Further, the FLNC kept to their claim that their struggle was political following the publication of the livre blanc. In April and May, the FLNC suspended their militaristic activity, for the first time since its inauguration, for the presidential election in hopes that the Left would be successful. With the election of Francois Mitterrand, the first Socialist president of the Fifth Republic, the FLNC stated that they would abstain the violence indefinitely to ‘see what happens’.
In July 1981, the FLNC further expanded its propaganda to include not only print but also radio and television. Until this point, television was considered the voice of France, therefore the inclusion of an interview with the FLNC on television proves further development and expansion of the radical space; it also suggests that the French citizens on the mainland were intrigued by the plight of the FLNC and the ‘Corsican problem’. The two hour interview was shown during the ‘Nouveau Vendredi’ show in September where a masked Pierre Poggioli explained the livre blanc and the strategy of the FLNC. For the first time, the FLNC was able to freely express their views, demands and ideals. By including modern media, the FLNC succeeded in gaining more interest in their plight and allowed the FLNC to situate itself within a larger movement. The interview with FR3 by Judith Radiguet proved so contentious amongst the barbouzes and supporters of the French state, that Radiguet was physically threatened and had to be placed under police protection after her apartment in Corsica was ransacked (Poggioli 2011).

Similar to the development of the Vallieres-Gagnon cell in the wake of the election, the FLNC took up arms again on the 11 February 1983; despite the re-opening of a University in Corté on the 26 October as well as the liberation and amnesty of several political prisons, the FLNC continued to pursue violence tactics against a perceived colonial problem (U Ribombu 1984). This pattern, of lowering arms when the organization was in a period of negotiation and then picking them up again when negotiations have not been met, would cycle throughout the 1980s, but also proved that violence was used as a political instrument by the militants to weigh in on public political debate.

While violence was being used as a political instrument, it particularly began to increase between 1987 and 1988. The increased violence, however, resulted in tensions within the network itself. Poggioli stated that some members wanted to radicalize even further and organize all networks with a militarist focus rather than a political one; this was in part due to further repression by the state during the summer of 1987. A congress was
organized in 1988 in order to attempt to discuss the internal conflicts. The late 1980s also saw a further participation in Corsican activism and society. Activity no longer solely included bombing symbolic infrastructure; the FLNC responded to local injustices with innovative action. For example, three major journalists working at the regional television center were censored by the state after investigating nationalism and violence in Corsica and the rédacteur en chef of the station was called ‘back’ to France by the interior minister. When his replacement, Michel Satti arrived in Corsica, a commando of FLNC kidnapped him; they released him when he promised to leave the island and withdraw as rédacteur en chef (Poggioli 2011).

On the 31 January 1988, the FLNC organized its very first clandestine congress. This space allowed the militants of the FLNC to explain the political motivations of their clandestine actions and respond to questions and interrogations. As the two ideologies of propaganda and warfare continued to conflict, this congress was meant to find a compromise, but the need for this congress only foreshadowed the ‘scission de 1990’. Minutes of the congress show frustration over a centralized direction, especially when it came to finances. In 1983, the FLNC instigated the ‘impot revolutionnaire’, revolutionary tax. According to Crettiez, a member of the Cunsigliu stated that the leaders of the sector made the decision to invoke the tax as they did not believe it fair that the members had to pay from their own pockets. Money raised was distributed evenly to the sectors; however, some militants and sectors autonomously collected the racketeering money for themselves without referral to the direction (Crettiez 1999). In 1983, a hairstylist was assassinated for refusing to pay the revolutionary tax. The event became known as ‘l’affaire Schock’. Poggioli argues that the murder was without knowledge and referral of the direction (interview 2014), which informs the structure of the network; the movement had no way of penalizing and thus controlling the nearly autonomous sectors. This lack of ‘punishing’ mechanism will allow for the scission de 1990.

L’affair Schock marked the beginning of rising conflict between the sectors and the direction over coordination of the network and a central
direction; these problems surrounding command and progressive autonomy is evident in the notes of the congress of 1988 that brought together participatory FLNC members from all regions (FLNC congress notes 1988). By accepting to decentralize the economic logistics of the tax, the leaders of the direction began to lose some control of the sectors. Due to this, in part, the hierarchal organization of the FLNC during the 1970s slowly began to disintegrate until 1990. By 1989, however, the nationalism movement in Corsica was in crisis. With a return to the Left, there seemed to be more representation within the electoral political sphere, and the structure of the FLNC weakened as sectors became stronger and less unified. While other clandestine groups began to disappear, the FLNC continued to be innovative with their action and activism that targeted local injustices beyond the scope of their official demands. The polarization between moderates and clandestine actors, however, began to expand by 1988 and the radical space began to shrink and contract.

**Chapter Conclusion**

This chapter is ultimately characterized by a struggle by both movements to maintain their networks against a state response. Several arrests happened in both sub-states during this moment, and both movements responded differently; while the ARQ cell of the FLQ completely dissolved, and influenced a two-year calm, the FLNC was forced to reorganize and adapt in order to replace ‘fallen’ members. The inappropriate program of the ARQ, and the unnecessary death and violence, left a bad taste in the mouths of the Quebecois. Yet, in the absence of active clandestine violence, the union movement and an ideological movement of Vallieres, Gagnon and the organ La Cognée occupied and developed the radical space in Quebec so that the actors of the Vallieres-Gagnon cell could mobilize the FLQ movement once again. During this chapter, there was evidence of polarization and RFE between moderate and violent factions with both the FLQ and the FLNC, yet polarization will be even more prominent in the following chapter, which discusses the emergence of the political party, the Parti Quebecois (PQ).
The FLNC of the 1980s distinguished themselves with cycles of violence, in which they used violent episodes as a political instrument to weigh in on public political debate. Violence increased during tense political situations with the central power, but also responded to local injustices on the island. During periods of minimal activity, specifically from 1981 and 1988-1990, the FLNC were in negotiation with the state, specifically over the release of political prisoners. The lowering of arms during periods of 1 April 1981 to the 25 February 1982; 1 July 1985 to the 2 January 1986; 31 May 1988 to the 30 September 1988 (Crettiez 1999: 106) represented short terms of faith in the government and the electoral democratic system. The use of violence also allowed the FLNC a ‘political visibility’ to Corsican nationalism that the moderate regionalists were not able to achieve. As the movement evolved from the first moment, violence became the method for negotiation with the state. The members of the FLNC viewed themselves as the voice of the public over the elected clansmen that had monopolized the electoral system (Crettiez 1999).

The shaping of radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica was further influenced by another causal mechanism of innovative action. Beyond the cycles of violence, both the FLQ and the FLNC adopted new techniques and strategy in this second moment. While the ARQ adopted a program that was less than effective within Quebec, the FLNC invoked theatricality so as to display strength amongst the media and gain interest in the ‘Corsican problem’. While repression resulted in dissolution of the ARQ, it forced the FLQ to consider other innovative action for both activity and recruitment, and influenced a re-structuring of the network.

Beside the FLQ, and the single homicide during a robbery-gone-wrong by the ARQ cell, the FLNC of the 1980s could seem to be particularly violent. Although violent episodes were particularly constant and regular in Corsica, the FLNC of the 1980s had relatively low death rates in comparison to other clandestine movements in Europe, such as the Basques (ETA) or the Irish (IRA). Three people outside of the ‘nationalist conflict’, of the FLNC or anti-nationalist clandestine networks, were killed by FLNC activity: two
business owners that refused to pay revolutionary taxes, known as the impôt révolutionnaire, and the owner of a camping site who tried to deactivate the bomb in his establishment. When the FLNC is placed in a European context—especially in Corsica with its history of violence and vendetta—the level of insurgency could be considered low. The level of violence can especially be explained by the organization of the network; as the extremists attacked the regions in which they resided, they were more likely to target symbolic infrastructure and less likely to facilitate activity that would produce high death rates amongst family and neighbors. While the organization of the network influenced a lower insurgency and level of violence, it instead allowed for infiltration into the population and an excellent knowledge of the environment and terrain. This organization would change within the third moment as the movement divided into two factions.

While the FLNC created a cycle of violence as a tool for negotiation with the state, the FLQ cells were never able to achieve that discourse with the Canadian federal government. First, the FLQ was not active enough to be a threat. Second, the police were able to aptly shut down the cells of the first two moments. Finally, the state government had no interest in negotiation. The moments of inactivity were due to arrests and repression, while the FLNC actively chose to lower arms in hopes that the political system would favor their demands, and the state and moderate nationalists responded positively to the action by participating in negotiations.

A final mechanism that is explored in this chapter is membership (or actor constitution). As discussed during this chapter, members are ultimately male and masculine in this moment. While Pierre Vallières masculinizes the entire nationalist program, women are not included in FLNC membership. Membership continues to involve left-wing individuals of 16-32 years old in Quebec, and in their 20s and 30s in Corsica. The opening of the university in Corté during this moment resulted in a larger population of young students on the island who no longer had to leave the island for university; while students were part of the FLNC in the first moment on the mainland, they were now able to participate in activity on the island.
The radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica were shaped by the cycles of activity that responded to the moderate political spaces and state repression. During the 1980s in Corsica, the radical space still included both clandestine and moderate nationalists particularly when the FLNC chose to negotiate with the French government, but even when the FLNC used violence against social injustices; for example, the safe removal of the new French editor was supported publicly. In Quebec, the radical space was developed by union movements and ideological leaders in the absence of the FLQ after the homicide by the ARQ left the Quebeccois choosing activism over clandestine violent episodes for a period of two years.

This chapter can be characterized as ‘the beginning of the end’. The tensions around financing and organization that lead to the downfall of a cohesive FLNC network begin to become apparent in this section, and will only become more volatile in the following chapter; the differing views on how the movement should respond and interact with the government will be the ‘final straw’ and result in a splitting of the network into two canals. The empirical chapters highlight a general increase in felquiste radical activity from the original cell in 1963 to the Chenier and Liberation cells in 1970, when they come head to head with Prime Minister Trudeau and the federal and provincial governments during the October Crisis.
Chapter 6: ‘The government is using a sledgehammer to crack a peanut’: a comparison of the FLQ during the October Crisis (the ‘peanut’) and the FLNC in the late 1980s and early 1990s

The previous chapter highlighted the rising tensions in both Quebec and Corsica, as well as amongst the militants themselves. This chapter explores the height of violence of the FLQ and the FLNC, which resulted in the dissolution of the FLQ and the traditional FLNC. The FLNC of the early 1990s divided into two competing factions without the cultural and language demands of the FLNC of the 1970s and the 1980s.

The radical spaces during the periods of this chapter are very different than in Chapter 5: Quebec society was radicalizing in the late 1960s; general and trade unions and workers movements were becoming popular and stronger; and the Parti Quebecois was developing momentum as a peaceful political party committed to democracy, while an insular nationalism was also gaining popularity in Corsica and the FLNC struggled with the limitations of the original nationalist discourse. Because the socialist government chose to negotiate with the FLNC after 1987, and considered the ‘Corsican problem’ a distinct issue to be handled separately from the rest of the Republic, the government was able to avoid further violence amongst the canal in Ajaccio. This negotiation, and the demand for further violence by many younger members, influenced older FLNC leaders, such as Pierre Poggioli and Alain Orsoni, to quit the movement and pursue nationalism through the insular democratic political system.

While Corsicans were becoming uneasy with violence- groups such as les femmes contre la violence (women against violence) developed in the late 1980s- Quebec society was radicalizing and looking to the protest movements of the 1960s in the United States and nationalist movements abroad. The FLQ embraced new tactics such as plane hijackings and kidnappings. In response, the English-speaking judicial system responded
with harsh sentences; Pierre-Paul Geoffroy, leader of the Geoffroy cell, received 24 life sentences in jail. The use of the new tactics, and the stronger responses by Canadian institutions, publicized the plight of the FLQ as they attempted to settle within an international movement.

Thus, the further the FLQ and the FLNC radicalized, the further they distanced themselves from the peaceful political space. Many members chose to pursue the peaceful nationalist movement, thereby re-shaping the radical space. This final empirical chapter explores how the October Crisis and the dissolution of the FLQ, and the ‘scission de 1990’ and changed violence of the FLNC re-shaped radical spaces.

**FLQ**

“I think that the prevalent view is that the FLQ is not someone who is sitting in their home or a bar; it is a membership through action. My view is that people of St. Laurent, Winsor… these are workers involved who adopt radical solutions to their problems which are always Quebec type problems. The youth are the more revolutionaries with a global view and want to do more action. It is membership through action… if you speak to them, they consider themselves as such. –Robert Lemieux, 1970 CBC Archives

**The Geoffroy cell and La Victoire: heavy-handed state and provincial responses to protest**

April 1968 marked the organization of the Geoffroy network and the new official organ for the FLQ, *La Victoire*. *La Cognée* had dissolved almost six months earlier (*La Victoire* 1967). *La Victoire* was short-lived and lasted only until the end of the summer of 1968; however, the new organ was important to the fifth wave by allowing the Geoffroy cell to articulate and distribute its personal agenda.

The Geoffroy network was founded amongst RIN members and participants of the ‘7-up strike’, a strike by 7-up factory workers, which had begun on the 15 June 1967. All members, therefore, were politically involved
with the left-wing workers movement before joining the FLQ; the felquistes demonstrated this solidarity by bombing the 7-up factory in May 1968 as the cell’s inauguration (Fournier 1984). Once again, the RIN served as a platform for frustrated left-wing indépendantistes to create cells of violence under the umbrella term of the FLQ. On the 27 February 1968, thousands of supporters joined the ‘7-up strike’ in solidarity of the factory workers. Pierre-Paul Geoffroy was amongst them, and was arrested for assault. Charges were originally dropped, but the arrest resulted in a lengthier sentence when he was arrested and tried for FLQ participation on the 4 March 1969 (Fournier 1984; Lebel 1969; Lepine 1969; Whitaker 2011). The actors that mobilized for the Geoffroy network, the group defined the constitution of membership as left-wing Quebecois who were frustrated with international involvement in the market, the federal and provincial relationship, and the perceived ‘English rule’; the Geoffroy cell is interesting as it was mainly comprised of workers who had attempted the traditional form of striking but had found it ineffective. Further violence was sought when the members perceived an inefficacy in the slower, peaceful system of strike action.

The sociopolitical environment in Quebec was certainly radicalizing during this time period; many Quebecois were actively participating in demonstrations and strikes, and the Sureté du Quebec responded heavily. Sub-state frustrations also resulted in changes in the democratic electoral sphere: On 28 October 1968, Rene Levesques’ Mouvement- Souverainete-Association and the Ralliement National merged to create the Parti Québécois. The PQ would lead the democratic independence movement and gain political momentum in Quebec. The PQ would create a polarization with the FLQ during the October Crisis as they made an effort to distance themselves from the felquiste violence.

$Lundi de la Matraque,$ a demonstration held earlier on 24 June 1968, resulted in a heavy handed response from the authorities, and shows an attempt by the authorities to curb the increasing radicalism in Quebec with repressive tactics. With no known links to the Geoffroy cell, a group of several hundred Quebecois held a demonstration at the St-Jean Baptiste
Parade in Montreal on the eve of the federal election. Two hundred and ninety people were arrested, including Jacques Lanctot and Paul Rose of the Chenier and Liberation cells of the FLQ in 1969-1970. The police force responded forcefully to the demonstration and 125 demonstrators were injured. It is suggested in the book ‘Le lundi de la matraque’ that Lanctot and Rose met during this event in the back of a police car when both were arrested (Collectif 1968). The Anti-Terrorist Squad, composed of the Montreal Police Force, the RCMP, and the Sureté du Québec (Whitaker 2011), took a very ‘hands-on’ approach with public demonstrators. They targeted the immediate problems as they developed rather than attempting to pursue the social issues and frustrations of the actors. Although policing officials were heavy-handed in Quebec, radicalism continued through demonstrations, strikes and FLQ activity due to the continuation of leftist thought and social issues that were not being addressed politically.

The next day after the demonstration, on the 25 June 1968, Montreal-born Pierre Eliot Trudeau was named Prime Minister of Canada. Originally viewed as a success for Quebec, Trudeau would certainly burn bridges with his federalist policies and his response to the FLQ during the October Crisis.

While Quebecois society was radicalizing, so was the FLQ. Tactics became more innovative and spectacular. The Geoffroy cell built the largest bomb that Quebec had seen, and two members even escaped Canada by a plane hijacking. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly suggest that social appropriation, a cultural process in which groups or networks are redefined as appropriate sites for collective action (Aminzade 2001, 37), ‘paves the way for innovative action’ (316). Innovative action often occurs in order to certify the legitimacy of the actor and his or her claims. The ‘typical result’ of innovative action is the formation of a new actor category and an identity shift by the group as a whole (316). Strategy is also embedded within a structure of symbolic meaning (Bourdieu 2000; Geertz 1973). This section

30 Translated as ‘Monday of the truncheon’ by author.
looks at the innovative action and the actor constitution of the Geoffroy cell in 1969.

On the 19 February 1969, the Geoffroy cell set a bomb in the Montreal Stock Exchange that blew out the northeast wall and injured 27 people. This bombing would be the most spectacular ever placed by the FLQ, and caused the highest count of injuries. For the Geoffroy cell, the Montreal Exchange represented ‘Anglo-colonialism’, and the attack served as a message to English-speaking investors in Quebec (La Victoire 1969). The increase in violence proves a deeper frustration, and could certainly have been influenced by the other complications of strike action and unemployment of the 7-up workers. The increased insurgency of the Geoffroy cell attracted actors that were willing to adopt a more radical approach. Charrette and Alard’s attempts to escape arrest by plane hijacking acts as evidence to this argument. The radicalization of tactics by the Geoffroy cell, and of the social spaces in Quebec, foreshadows the violence of the October Crisis of 1970.

Shortly after, on the 4 March 1969, Geoffroy was found, arrested and confessed guilty to all charges because he did not want to betray his accomplices. Geoffroy was a left-wing 26 years old student at Collège Saint-Marie at the time of his arrest (Behiels 2011), and former RIN member. His involvement with the FLQ in a leadership role influenced the largest sentence ever given in a Commonwealth Judicial Court: 24 lifetime sentences in jail. He was eventually freed after 12 years on the 15 February 1981. Although he served only a fraction of his extensive sentence, the fact that he was sentenced so harshly proves the fear of extremism, and of the FLQ, in Quebec in 1968- and specifically by the largely English judicial system. The symbolic violence of the Geoffroy cell, and the obvious increase in violence, responded to the frustrations in Quebec that were shaping the radical space.

The other members of the cell were recruited through the RIN and had been present at the strike. Two such members, Pierre Charrette and Alain Alard, escaped Quebec after the arrest of cell leader Geoffroy through unconventional means. Charrette, a 24 years old employee at Radio Canada,
and Alard, a 23 year old electronic technician at Canadian Marconi, hijacked a Boeing 727 plane of National Airlines flying from New York to Miami with a .38 calibre revolver, and forced it to land in Havana, Cuba (RCMP report 1969). This felquiste activity was not considered unusual within political activism of the time; it was one of 82 plane hijackings during 1969, the biggest year ever for hijackings in the United States (Holden 1986). This hijacking was one of the most extreme acts by the FLQ to this point in time, and allowed the FLQ to become a ‘player’ in the international liberation movement during the sixties. Yet, as Holden suggests, the hijacking itself was routine; airliners carried approach plans for the Havana airport and crews were instructed not to resist hijackers” (Holden 1986: 881). The hijacking by Charette and Alard, though effective for their escape to Cuba, lacked the surprise and creativity of a ground-breaking violent act; therefore, although the FLQ members began to settle themselves amongst the international movement of decolonization extremism, they were in no way leading it. The members, themselves, continued to avoid a level of insurgency to be considered ‘terrorists’.

Although past felquistes generally did not take up arms again after serving jail time- Jacques Lanctot, however, was arrested, released on bail and continued with FLQ activity- some continued to remain political and many occupied the radical space and participated in the zeitgeist of the late 1960s.

**Language and cultural tensions as mobilizing mechanisms for other Quebecois activists**

After the dissolution of the Geoffroy cell, the radical space continued to be occupied by language and culture activists in Quebec. Language and cultural tensions continued to be cited as a frustration and acted as mobilizing mechanisms for marches and demonstrations.

On the 28 of March 1969, Bachand organized the Opération McGill français, where approximately 10 000 trade unionists, leftist activists, CEGEP
students and a few McGill students demonstrated on the university campus for a francophone university that was pro-nationalist and pro-worker (Chester 1999). This strike action brought together the student movement, the socialist movement and the nationalist movement (Warren 2008, online). The link between the student and workers movements was the ‘internal link between the liberation of the education system and of Quebec’ (Béland 1969, 18). The demonstration did not attempt to storm the campus and occupy buildings as students had at Columbia, Harvard and Berkeley (Mills 2010), and little violence occurred due to a massive police presence. The pressure to francicize McGill University lessened in the fall of 1969 with the opening of l’Université du Quebec a Montreal (UQAM) (Levine 1991, 77).

In addition to the Operation McGill français, Montreal experienced other linguistic crises in 1969 as a part of a revolt against the “dualism” hierarchy; the school conflict in Saint-Leonard occurred in the aftermath of the demise of Bill 85, a proposal that school boards would teach in both languages if requested by parents, although French language proficiency was mandatory for all students. Bill 85 was proposed after a group of Italian immigrants in Saint-Leonard demanded bilingual education in English and French. The Ligue pour l’intégration scolaire (LIS) continuously organized agitation in Saint-Leonard in support of unilingual policies, which often ended in scuffles between Francophone and Allophone counterdemonstrators. Robert Lemieux, leader of LIS, declared that the “provincial government should close the door to immigration until the language problem in Quebec is regulated” (Levine 1991, 78), and in September 1969, mayor of Saint-Leonard Leo Ouellet warned of a “racial explosion” (“St. Leonard’s language issue remains in doubt” 1969).

On 10 September, the LIS organized a march through the neighbourhood of Saint-Leonard, and Italians lined the streets and heckled the demonstrators. A riot broke out between the two groups, with an estimation of 1000 citizens involved. One hundred were injured, 50 arrests were made, and the Riot Act was read in Montreal (Lemieux in Levine 1991, 78). The first time that the Act had been read since 1957, it established
curfews to restore order. The demonstration in Saint-Leonard of September 1969 was cited as a grievance by the Québécois, and represented the socio-economic, cultural, and political pressures of linguistic separation and elite accommodation.

Although the FLQ during the late 1960s to early 1970s articulated an importance of French language and culture, it was more of a side-note to their postcolonial and Marxist demands. The Felquistes wanted a socialist and independent Quebec, achieved through revolution, and the protection of the French language was simply a ‘means to an end’; the linguistic hierarchy of English and French in Montreal was a symbol of colonial oppression that needed to be challenged in order to achieve their end goal. Louise Lanctot (1981) of the Liberation cell wrote: “Dans l’absolu, le terrorisme felquiste n’était qu’un exutoire alors que le marxisme-léninisme a été une structuration et une implication personnelle dans la société”31 (120).

The focus on protecting language and culture in Quebec resulted in ethnic tensions and shaped the radical space while the FLQ was inactive. These events demonstrate a need to protect language and culture from all influences, be it state-induced, American involvement in the market or immigration; they also prove that the radical space did not disintegrate with the FLQ. Frustrations of an elite English-speaking bourgeoisie did not only invoke a radicalization of felquistes, but of Quebec society in general throughout the late 1960s. Although the felquistes of the Geoffroy cell were much more violent than that average Québécois, they were responding to, and becoming radicalized by, the same issues in Quebec.

31 In absolute terms, the Felquite terrorism was simply an outlet, while Marxist-Leninism was a structure and a personal identification in society.
The October Crisis: the formation and dissolution of the
Liberation and Chenier cells

"Je ne veux pas eriger Octobre en programme, encore moins en modèle
d’organisation. Je ne veux pas dire que je suis certain d’avoir eu raison, d’avoir
posé le geste qu’il fallait. Peut-être que nous avons eu tort, que nous avons manqué
notre coup. Mais avec seulement des peut-être ou des si, tu ne fais rien, tu ne
changes rien, tu ne prouves rien, tu ne montres rien. Pour moi, tu as toujours tort’
(Simard 1982, 195)

After the election of the Robert Bourassa Liberal government on the 22 of
May, the last two cells of the FLQ developed in September of 1970: the
Chenier and Liberation cells. Similar to the Vallières-Gagnon and Geoffroy
cells, the Chenier and Liberation cells returned to a socialist and
‘indépendantiste’ perspective, citing Marxism as its political ideology with
Latin-American guerilla influences. The felquistes of the Chenier cell were
also interested in Marighella’s theory of urban guerilla warfare; the
Liberation cell gave James Cross a copy to read while he was kept hostage
(Cross documents given to Centre of Canadian Studies, University of
Edinburgh). Marighella (1969) argued that guerilla warfare in urban areas
would drive the government to respond with repressive means, and
subsequently spark an uprising. Charters (1997) argues that Marighella was
solely influential on a tactical level by liberating prisoners and gaining
publicity; this lack of revolutionary discipline only underlines the
amateurism of the FLQ during the October Crisis.

While there is much contention around the relationship and the
interactions of the Chenier and Liberation cells, Marc Laurendeau,
influenced by a personal interview with Jacques and Louise Cossette-Trudel,
suggested that the Chenier and Liberation cell loosely began as a single cell
(Laurendeau 1990). At the very least, it is certain that there were relations
between the two cells. Yves Langlois of the Liberation cell was a friend of
Francis Simard in the Chenier cell; there are accounts of their travels in
England together before 1970. Louise Cossette-Trudel (née Lanctot) lived in a
house rented by Paul Rose under the name of Paul Blais. Laurendeau also suggests that Paul Rose and Jacques Cossette-Trudel met to discuss strategy on Queen Mary Street on the 13 October, four days before the murder of Pierre Laporte (Laurendeau 1990); it is also certain that the Chenier and Liberation cells were two distinct groups during the October Crisis, and will be discussed separately in the following sections.

**Liberation Cell**

Membership in this moment was very much shaped by personal connections and links between the actors. The members of the cells were often related, were involved romantically, or were friends, and were mostly in their early to mid 20s. This section explores the actors of the liberation cell, and how they formulated the cell structure.

Jacques Lanctot, considered the ‘leader’ of the Liberation cell, was 24 years old during the October Crisis. Lanctot became a member of the FLQ at the age of 17 and was involved in two of the three moments; this was highly unusual as most felquistes returned to society and participated in the electoral system after being arrested. In 1963, he was sentenced to two years in prison for placing bombs as a part of the FLQ. After his release, Lanctot worked as a taxi driver; he was very involved in the Taxi Liberation Movement, organized in 1968 by taxi drivers and workers against the company Murray Hill with demands for better working conditions. Lanctot was responsible for the Journal du Taxi, the organ of the movement. Lanctot stated in the Last Post: “What led me to join the front and to take action, the direct means to change government and its institutions, was let’s say a progressive discovery which came about especially during the years when I started driving a taxi. (RG 146 file number 1025-9-9057 p. 88). Before the October Crisis in 1970, Lanctot had been living clandestinely since March and his brother was still in prison for FLQ participation (Fournier 1987, 257).
The Liberation Cell was also comprised of Lanctot’s sister, Louise Lanctot, and her partner Jacques Cossette-Trudel, both of whom were recruited by Jacques Lanctot and 23 years of age; Jean-Marc Carbonneau, a 37 year old taxi driver, and driver of the vehicle during the Cross kidnapping; 23 year old Yves Langlois, and Nigel Barry Hamer. Hamer is the only Anglophone that was charged and tried for felquiste participation; he was a self-declared socialist, student at McGill University (Tetley 2006) and was introduced to Cossette-Trudel by a mutual friend named Pierre Louis Bourdet (Fournier 1982, 258). Similarly to many other felquistes, the Cossette-Trudels were studying degrees of law and political science, and were similarly involved with political movements on campus. Louise Cossette-Trudel (née Lanctot), who distanced herself from her father’s right-wing allegiance, in Quebec (Lanctot 1981, 14), and Jacques Cossette-Trudel were expelled as leaders of the student movement the previous year during an occupation of the Cégep Maisonneuve after almost a dozen professors were fired (Fournier, 1982; Rapoport, 1986; interview with the Cossette-Trudels in 1978 by Laurendeau), proving to be radical activists before their participation with the FLQ. Similarly to the Geoffroy cell, the Liberation cell was comprised of actors who were already subscribing to the radical space in Quebec.

Outside of the cell, there were individuals who assisted the felquistes in hiding and delivering communiqués, although they were not involved in the activity and sometimes had no knowledge of the cell’s plans. On the 5 September 1970, Louise Lanctot and Jacques Cossette-Trudel moved out of their home and in with Denise Quesnel, 38 years old, on 1485 rue Laurier (Fournier 1982, 57). She was also in contact with Louise Verreault, 28 years old, who was a friend of Paul Rose. These connections allowed communication between the two cells, and both Quesnel and Verreault were charged with illegal affiliation with the FLQ (‘Trois témoins racontent la vie quotidienne des supposes ravisseurs’ 1970). Cossette-Trudel and Lanctot eventually moved, according to Fournier, to 10945 rue des Recollets in Montreal-North and rented the apartment under the name of Jacques Tremblay (Fournier 1982, 257).
While a small cell is most secure, especially with tight, personal ties, yet without a network, it compromises the ability to gain support and funding from outside sources (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001). Similarly to the other felquiste cells, the Liberation cell was forced to finance and arm itself due to the cell structure; at no point did an FLQ cell receive funding by foreign investment, government or revolutionary tax. The FLQ were not violent enough, not were they structured in a way, to impose a tax or inspire outside funding, therefore the cells did not achieve a higher level of insurgent action. Although tactics did become more innovative, theft continued to be the sole source for financing the violent activity. One hundred and twenty five sticks of dynamite was stolen on the 26 September from the CIL gun powder supply McMastervill on the South Bank of Montreal, and 450 batons were stolen the next day from la carrière Demix near Saint-Hilaire; it is suggested in the Keable report that Nigel Hamer and UQAM colleagues Jean-Pierre Piquet, Gilles Cossette, Rhéal Michon, and Robert Comeau were responsible for these thefts in order to arm the Liberation cell (Commission Keable 1981, 219).

Since the ties between nodes (the actors) were especially stronger in this cell, innovative action was possible; it becomes evident that the lack of funding and support made the kidnappings of the October Crisis more difficult\(^{32}\), yet both the Liberation and Chenier cells chose to join in the international trend of kidnapping political officials.

On the 6 October, 1970 the Gazette published an article entitled ‘1970: the year of the terrorist kidnap’. The article was written in response to the kidnapping of James Cross, trade attaché with the British High Commission in Montreal, on the 5\(^{th}\) October; and declared Cross as the 13\(^{th}\) victim of a larger global movement before summarizing the other twelve kidnappings, most in Latin America (United Press International 1970). By kidnapping a

\(^{32}\) Cross suggested that he was given minimal to eat and lost 22 lbs (‘Taped memoir of Cross’ experiences’ 1971)
politician, the Liberation Cell not only placed themselves alongside larger, more organized extremists, they also gained larger national attention.

Kertzer (1988) suggests that action is “wrapped in a web of symbolism” (9), which ties into McAdam et al.’s action as repertoires with scripts; strategy and action were framed within these larger repertoires to send a message to government and populace and gain the demands of the movement. While the strategy of former FLQ cells of placing bombs in symbolic infrastructure allowed the press and the populace to interpret the actions and create a narrative for the FLQ (Crelinsten 1987); the FLQ had little debating power. After the kidnapping of James Cross, however, the Liberation cell was able to use the media as a vehicle for communication with the government; it also forced negotiations to be made in public, which created a checks and balance of the government response by the populace, and maximized publicity for the political goals of the cell (Crelinsten 1987). Due to its very small size and radical tendencies, the political credo of the Liberation cell was not enough to draw the attention of larger national populace; the cell was only able to do so with dramatic action.

Three days after the kidnapping of Cross, on the 8 October 1970, the FLQ manifesto released to the press was read over CBC/Radio-Canada. The demands included: the cessation of all police activity designed to find the kidnappers or their hostage; the publication of a political manifesto on the front pages of all major Quebec newspapers and its broadcast on Radio-Canada during a prime-time broadcast in which released FLQ prisoners would be permitted to read and comment on the text; the release of 20 ‘political prisoners’ including Francois Lanctot, Lanctot’s brother from an earlier wave, and Pierre-Paul Geoffroy; the provision of a plane to fly them to Algeria or to Cuba, accompanied by their lawyers and at least two escorts; the rehiring of the LaPalme Boys, a union of postal drivers who had been replaced by the Federal Minister of the Post Office; a ‘voluntary tax’ of $500,000 in gold ingots to be placed on the plane with the political prisoners upon their release; the publication of the name and photo of the presumed informer who had led to the break-up of the Burgess plot (FLQ Liberation
cell communiqué; Laurendeau 1990; Fournier 1982). The header on the communiqués was printed in the colours of the flag of the Patriotes, and the silhouette of les vieux Patriotes was watermarked behind the text (Liberation cell FLQ Manifesto 1970). In doing so, the Liberation cell attempted to provide continuity and legitimacy to their cause by visually connecting their intentions and motives to the ‘invented tradition’ of the Patriotes during the 1837 rebellion. The communiqué also made a verbal connection by stating: “thousands of Québécois have understood, like our ancestors of 1837-1838, that the only way to assert our survival is by total national and economic independence” (Communiqué 1 by Liberation cell)\(^{33}\). While the statement was certainly an exaggeration of Quebecois support for the movement, the FLQ drew upon the history of the Patriotes and used it to provide further support for their plight.

The first communiqué by the Liberation cell stated that the kidnapping of James Cross was to attract international attention to the reputed colonial relationship between Quebec and Canada, and the monopoly of economic interests by the United States. The communiqué also attempted to place the FLQ within a global movement:

The FLQ supports unconditionally the Black [power movement] in the US and in Africa; the liberation movements in Latin American, Palestine and Asia; the revolutionary Catholics in Northern Ireland… the FLQ wishes to especially salute the Cuban and Algerian people who fight against imperialism and colonialism in all of their forms. We believe that the only valuable support what we can give these people who march towards their liberation is to liberate ourselves (Communiqué 1 Liberation Cell 1970).

This propaganda was to spur the ultimate goal of the Liberation Cell: to publicize the plight of Quebecois internationally, and to reconstruct the image of the FLQ as an organized force with a political program. The kidnapping did not create a sense of extreme crisis within the government, and after a strong stance by Trudeau and Bourassa, the Liberation cell dropped five demands to push their top two: the release of political prisoners

\(^{33}\) Translated by author.
and the cessation of police activity. While the new strategy of kidnapping an English-speaking politician was not radical enough to achieve their demands from the government, the new strategy of having the manifesto read over television and radio did gain public sympathy for their political manifesto; Crelinsten suggests that the reading of the manifesto on the 8th of October created a ‘swell’ of public sympathy for the cause of the Liberation cell (Crelinsten 1987, 63). In an interview with CBC during the October Crisis (and before the death of Pierre Laporte), FLQ lawyer Robert Lemieux stated: “I would go so far as to say that the majority of French-speaking Quebeckers [support the FLQ]...support and sympathy run to different degrees and intensity, and I think that there is sympathy for this particular action” (“Peter Gzowski interviews FLQ lawyer”, CBC Digital Archives 1970).

While this section introduced the Liberation cell and the kidnapping and manifesto that began the October Crisis, the following section looks at the second cell: the Chenier cell. While there were connections between the cells, as discussed previously, both cells acted separately from each other and had little if no communications during the October Crisis. This was unclear to authorities and the populace, therefore, the different manifestos and communiqués complicated negotiations and created a mystery surrounding the network as a whole.

**Chenier Cell**

“the kidnappers were... ‘a group of bumbling punks with incredible luck who didn’t even have the money to buy their captives food’ (McKenna, 1971)

On the 10 October 1970, Deputy Premier and Minister of Employment and Immigration in Quebec Pierre Laporte was kidnapped by four felquistes that called themselves the Chenier Financing cell. Paul and Jacques Rose were travelling to the United States with their mother Lise Rose, her daughter Claire, and Francis Simard when they heard on the news that the Liberation cell had kidnapped James Cross (Simard 1982, 19); they hurried home to quickly organize their own kidnapping (“FLQ terrorist convicted of killing
cabinet minister Pierre Laporte has died” 2015). Transcripts of Paul and Jacques Rose’ mother, Lise Rose, and Bernard Lortie’s court testimonies in the Montreal Gazette articulates the rush to kidnap Pierre Laporte. In Texas, the Roses, accompanied by Simard, heard of the Cross kidnapping: “My son said: that’s incredible, that’s crazy. The government won’t give in for a guy like that” (Mrs. Rose testimony 1970). They drove straight back and arrived in Montreal on the 8 October 1970, where they met Lortie: “We had been thinking and talking about kidnapping somebody for quite a while at the house at 5630 Armstrong Street. We met at the house after the Cross kidnapping and prepared to kidnap Pierre Laporte” (Lortie in Bauch, 1970). This kidnapping would quickly undermine the newly acquired public sympathy, as well as the conciliatory approach taken by Justice Minister Jerome Choquette.

The individual who would become most well known as a member of the Chenier Cell is undoubtedly Paul Rose. Rose was 26 years old at the time of the October Crisis. Although viewed as the leader of the Chenier cell, Rose articulated his dislike for such a title (Rose in Laurendeau 1990: 284). Rose was born in Saint-Henri and completed a degree in Political Science from the Collège Sainte-Marie; before the October Crisis he worked as an instructor of maladjusted children (Rose in Laurendeau 1990). Both of his parents were factory workers, so Rose very much had two perspectives of living in Montreal: living in the working-class district of Montreal as a child, and living in Montreal as a student in a middle class milieu.

Similar to the Liberation Cell, the Chenier Cell was comprised of tight bonds and relationships, such as family members and relationships. Other members of the cell involved in the kidnapping included Paul Rose’s 23 year old brother, Jacques Rose; 24 year old Francis Simard; and 19 year old Bernard Lortie. Francis Simard and Bernard Lortie had both met Paul Rose in 1969 through other leftist spaces. Simard met Rose while campaigning for the French language at McGill, organized by Mario Bachand. Lortie met the Rose brothers in the summer of 1969 at the Maison du Pecheurs alongside other individuals who were charged and convicted with assisting the felquistes
(Simard in Bausch 1970). Again, similar to the Liberation cell, individuals were arrested and charged for assisting the FLQ: Richard Therrien, for example, was sentenced to a year imprisonment for building a hideaway cupboard in the apartment, in which the Rose brothers and Lortie once hid to escape the police. Collette Therrien, Richard Therrien’s sister and Jacques Rose’s girlfriend, and Francine Belisle were both sentenced to six months for serving as messengers of the Chenier communiqués (“Drama in Quebec; co-stars in court” 1971).

After the kidnapping of Pierre Laporte, the Chenier cell delivered four communiqués before the Liberation cell had the chance to respond. Initially, the Liberation cell believed that the kidnapping of James Cross would spur the meeting of their demands, however it became evident after the first of the Chenier Cell’s communiqués that the Chenier cell was moving beyond the Liberation cell’s focus on propaganda. ; the Chenier cell’s main concern was economically-focused; the reinstatement of the Lapalme union was critical, while the release of imprisoned felquistes was only a secondary demand (FLQ manifesto 1970). Although the Chenier Cell adapted to the tactics of the Liberation Cell by kidnapping Pierre Laporte, the way that they handled negotiations suggests that they were not willing to forego their demands for the potential propaganda gain of a flexible negotiating approach (Crelinsten 1987: 77), unlike the Liberation cell whose central strategy was to change the image of the FLQ from a loosely-constructed group of criminals to a organized force with a political programme (Crelinsten 1987, 71).

When the Liberation cell did finally respond publicly to the Chenier cell’s kidnapping of Laporte, they reiterated their original two demands- the release of the prisoners and the cessation of police activity- and promised that Cross and Laporte would be freed if the demands were met. The communiqué was published on the 11 October. Hours later, the Chenier cell communiqué was published, in which they also stood by their original six demands (Chenier cell communiqué 1970; Crelinsten 1987, 78). Not only did this cause confusion amongst the media and the politicians, it proved a schism between the two cells and the FLQ subsequently lost the advantage of
appearing as a strong and organized network. The Chenier Cell released a fifth communiqué in which they disassociated themselves from the Liberation cell, making the rift between the two cells even more obvious.

The tactics of the Chenier and Liberation cells reflected the way that the two cells differed fundamentally. The liberation cell was anxious to take action immediately and, therefore, prepared propaganda and publicity carefully and set a limited objective. The cell placed their motives within a larger international movement of ‘urban guerilla dogma’\textsuperscript{34} (Crelinsten 1987, 75). In contrast, the Chenier cell was attempting to organize a clandestine financial arrangement in order to conduct a larger attack at a later date; however, because they were panicked at the idea that Operation Liberation had occurred without them, they decided spontaneously to participate; their kidnapping of Laporte was ill-prepared (Charters 1990) and deemed ‘sloppy’ (Crelinsten 1987, 76). The contradiction of the Chenier cell’s strategic philosophy, and their improvisation is important. Where they originally believed that bombings and kidnappings were inappropriate to achieve their long-term goal for a socialist and independent Quebec, they were now willing to adapt a limited tactic in order to stay involved with the FLQ movement, but continued to hold their original ideals for a long-term movement. While they had originally planned to achieve further financing in the US, and thereby expanding the movement across borders, the Chenier Cell was instead pressured to work only in Quebec, thus retaining the radical space within Quebec boundaries.

On the 13 October, Paul Rose and Jacques Cosette-Trudel met for the first time since the beginning of the October Crisis at a friend’s apartment. The Canadian army had been dispatched to Ottawa the day before to protect important individuals and sites. There was much debate between Rose and Cosette-Trudel as to how they would proceed in the event of a government

\textsuperscript{34} “L'image qu'on a du FLQ c'est celle des bombes... Je ne sais pas a quoi ressemble un baton de dynamite. Je n'en ai jamais vu... Pour nous, le FLQ c'était nous organizer. Créer une organization pour aider et soutenir les luttes populaires déjà existant. Susciter d'autres volontés de lutte pour un changement radical de la société (Simard 1982, 140).
refusal; they agreed that while Cross’ life would be spared, Laporte’s death threat would remain. They also agreed that all communication with authorities would be left to the Liberation Cell- who issued a joint communiqué the next day on the 14 October articulating that both hostages would be freed if demands were met (Crelinsten 1987).

Crelinsten rightly suggests that the dissension between the two cells oddly mirrored the divergence between the Federal and Provincial governments: ‘the Liberation cell responded to dialogue and negotiation with the Quebec government, while the Chenier cell reacted to firmness from the Federal government with escalation and intransigence’ (Crelinsten 1987: 40). These conflicting negotiating tactics occurred due to the differing images that the cells wanted to portray and embody. The factionalism informs the internal dynamics of the FLQ by highlighting that the organization was comprised of differing political ideologies, socio-economic backgrounds, and now new tactics, which at times created factions within the larger movement.

At this point in time, before the murder of Pierre Laporte, the shift in strategy and tactics employed more symbolism and had certainly gained more interest in the FLQ. A higher level of interest in sympathy amongst young Quebecois in particular was evident during the press conference, held on the 13 October by FLQ intermediary Robert Lemieux at the Paul Sauvé Arena. Chartrand, Lemieux, Vallieres and Gagnon spoke to 3,000 FLQ sympathizers (Tetley 2007). During his presentation, Vallieres stated that every person there was a felquiste: “The FLQ is each one of you”, and that they were to “organize the fight for liberation in each district, plant, in each office, everywhere” (Behiels et al 2011). Labor leader Michel Chartrand announced that his union executive was ‘unequivocally supporting the FLQ manifesto (Duchaine and Keable Inquiries October Crisis; Charters 1997, 154; Stewart 1970, 50). Gagnon and Lemieux encouraged students at UQAM, the following day, to leave their classes, which spurred the announcement by a group of students at UQAM and other Quebec institutions, on the 15 October, that they would strike until the political prisoners demanded by the Liberation cell were released. That same day, Prime Minister Trudeau was
interviewed by CBC about the military presence through the War Measures Act in Quebec. When asked how far he would go to suppress the militants, Trudeau famously responded: ‘just watch me’ (CBC Digital Archives 13 October 1970).

The FLQ press conference informs this thesis in a series of ways: first, it was the climax of public debate. The goal of the Liberation Cell was to create propaganda for the FLQ, not to mobilize a popular movement as past cells had attempted; this event was the peak of public interest and support, especially after Trudeau’s decisive interview earlier that day. This demonstration proves that there was popular support for the FLQ, especially prior to the murder of Pierre Laporte:

I was very surprised at first but also, like many Quebecois, sympathetic toward those who had taken part in the kidnappings. I suppose that there was a certain amount of romanticism in my reach, but it was more than that. When they [the government] were forced to read the FLQ manifesto over television, I thought that was quite an achievement,...The crisis forced a lot of people to think and this will lead us eventually to a transformation of Quebec institutions (Normand Caron in “Quebec: what now?” 1971).

Second, this event was conducted by FLQ sympathizers, rather than the organization itself, who ‘hijacked’ the image of the FLQ to achieve their own means. Despite the attempts of the Liberation and Chenier cells to create their own image by communicating through the media, the image of the FLQ was still very malleable by second parties. Throughout the 1960s, the FLQ has become a ‘brand’ in which actors could form distinct and separate cells; in times of conflict, it was easy for outside actors, sympathizers, and even the larger populace to also shape the organization. Third, this event was the closest the FLQ ever came to spurring an uprising. Charters (1997) is correct in suggesting that Vallieres’ call for arms during the press conference was potentially revolutionary. Although his speech could have been a ‘potentially decisive opportunity for mass action’ (156), Vallieres did not urge the sympathizers into the streets and the crowd ‘dispersed quietly and slowly’ (Charters 1997, 56). Although his writing called for radical measures,
Vallières was not a revolutionary leader in action. Excluding all other conditions that prevented a popular movement in Quebec, the absence of violent ambition amongst the members, and leaders, was influential in the failure of the FLQ to achieve independence through revolution, the dissolution of the larger movement after the October Crisis, and the shaping of the radical space in Quebec.

The strong presences by both Trudeau and FLQ sympathizers in the press showed a bubbling conflict between state and the FLQ that was about to explode. Trudeau kept to his word, and the federal liberal government took a heavy-handed approach by implementing the War Measures Act (WMA). In 1971, more than 60 men and women awaited trial on a wide variety of charges (Lebel 1969), which does not count the hundreds that were arrested and released under the WMA. The WMA was contentiously used to repress the radical space in Quebec.

At 16.00 on the 15 October 1970, Premier Robert Bourassa announced that he had requested under the terms of the National Defense Act that the Federal government send the Canadian army into Quebec in order to assist the Sureté du Quebec, and ensure “the safety of the people and public buildings” (Premier Bourassa speech, CBC digital archives 15 October 1970). Approximately 1000 soldiers arrived in Montreal within the hour, and more troops were deployed throughout the week (Tetley 2007). On the 15 October, all three leaders of the opposition parties- the Union Nationale, the Parti Quebecois, and the Credit Social- in the National Assembly declared their agreement with Bourassa’s decision. On the 16 October 1970, Trudeau announced the imposition of the War Measures Act (WMA) after Bourassa and Drapeau had made another, separate, request for the application of the WMA. Invoked during peace time for the first and only time in Canadian history, the WMA declared an ‘insurrection real or apprehended’, and allowed for the suspension of habeas corpus, a summons with the force of a court order. In the House of Commons, T.C. Douglas objected to the decision by stating: “We are not prepared to use the preservation of law and order as a smoke screen to destroy the liberties and the freedom of the people of
Canada…the government, I submit, is using a sledgehammer to crack a peanut” (Gray 2000; Margoshes and Barnhart 2004). René Levesque went as far to state ‘Quebec no longer has a government’ in response to the provincial government’s request for the WMA. Levesque and Douglas aptly articulated the contentiousness that would surround the October Crisis, and the governmental response to the kidnappings of Laporte and Cross. While the FLQ shifted to a radical strategy so did the government.

In order to have a better understanding of the October Crisis, I highlight the important events now, which have been cross-referenced and mapped with secondary sources and newspaper articles. Near midnight on the 17th/18th of October 1970, the body of Pierre Laporte was discovered strangled in the trunk of a green Chevrolet car at the Wondel Aviation near the St-Hubert airport. Warrants for Marc Carbonneau and Paul Rose were issued later that day. On the 6 November 1970, a police raid on the apartment at 3720 chemin de la Reine Marie, in which Bernard Lortie, both Rose brothers and Francis Simard were hiding, led to the arrest of Lortie. The Rose brothers and Simard escaped by hiding in a specially-designed cupboard with a hidden compartment; it was ingeniously built, with the help of Richard Therrien, so that it did not sound hollow when knocked upon. Lortie, himself, hid in the wrong cupboard out of panic and was subsequently found by the raiding authorities (Hazlett 1970) Lortie was sentenced to 20 years for the kidnapping and murder of Pierre Laporte. Because the police did not leave any surveillance in front of the apartment, the three felquistes were able to escape by taxi to Mme Denis Quesnel’s residence at 1485 rue Laurier. Claire Larivieres and Yves Roy both assisted the felquistes, and were convicted of aiding and abetting, in transferring to a barn in Saint-Bonaventure-de-Yamaska. Proving difficult to survive in a barn during a cold Quebec winter, Michel Viger, ex-president régional of the RIN, collected the Rose brothers from the barn on the 24 of November and took them to his house in Grand-Pres in Saint-Luc (Fournier 1984, 323-324).

On the 2nd of December, the Cossette-Trudels of the Liberation Cell were arrested after leaving the apartment at 12:36 at the metro station Henri-
Bourassa. Knowing that the RCMP were surveying the apartment, a member of the Liberation cell threw a communiqué out of the window at 2 o’clock in the morning, threatening the death of Cross and requesting a journalist from La Devoir or Quebec-Presse, and lawyer Bernard Mergler. At 8 a.m. on the 3 December, approximately a thousand soldiers and police officers were based outside of the apartment building, and Mergler arrived by midday for negotiations. In exchange for Cross’ liberty, the members were granted safe passage to Cuba (unknown title, Montreal Gazette 1970); by 14.00, Cross, Lanctot, and Carbonneau were joined by les Cossettes-Trudels and Suzanne Lancot and her 20 month year old son, and with the approval of Fidel Castro were flown to Cuba in Canadian Forces Aircraft at 19.45 hours (Fournier 1982: 325). After being held for 59 days, Cross was released from his room on Rue des Réclolets. Jacques Lanctot spent four years in Cuba, and four years in France with the other abductors of James Cross (Fournier 1982, 258). Lanctot returned to Quebec in January 1979, and was sentenced to three years in prison; he was released in 1981. The Cossette-Trudels returned to Quebec on the 13 December 1978; they were sentenced to two years in prison and released after 8 months. The last to return to Quebec was Marc Carbonneau in 1981, and he was sentenced to 21 months in prison (Fournier 1982, 259).

The Liberation cell dissolved after their hideout was found on the 28 December 1970 by police, and with no assistance from the emergency powers of the War Measures Act (Rapoport 1988, 62). The Rose brothers and Simard were arrested in a farmhouse near St. Luc, during the third raid of Viger’s residence: armed with a single-shot shotgun and a starter’s pistol with a clip of 0.22 calibre bullets, and hidden in a 25 foot-long, 4 foot-high dugout under the house, the three felquistes refused to negotiate with the Quebec government’s proposed mediator, publisher Jacques Hebert, president of the Montreal Human Rights League. Both sides agreed to Dr. Jacques Ferron as the chosen mediator; Ferron was president of the Canadian Peace Congress in 1954 (Faron in Cohen et al. 1996) and founder of the serio-satirical Rhinoceros Party in 1963, which suggested with tongue-in-cheek that national unity could be achieved by tearing down the Rocky Mountains
(Remple 1973). Ferron was an ironic character that seemed to fit the motives of both parties; his left-wing ideology— he was a self-proclaimed socialist— and literature that portrays the uneasy relationship between Quebec and English-Canada would have been considered beneficial to the Chenier cell members. All three were patients of Ferron and had worked with him in the political sphere. Equally appealing for the government, Ferron’s literature consistently articulated a concern for Canada’s French-speaking population, which was very much aligned with Trudeau’s bilingual policies. In other words, the irony of Ferron’s experiences as president of the Peace Congress, military doctor and advocate of a peaceful state and sub-state relationship, yet founder of the satirical Rhinoceros party and left-wing activist made him trust-worthy to both the government and the felquistes as mediator.

Paul Rose and Francis Simard were convicted of the murder of Pierre Laporte and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment each. Both were given conditional release and granted parole in 1982—Simard in September and Rose in December. Jacques Rose was convicted of being an accessory after four trials for complicity in the death of Laporte, and was freed conditionally in July 1978. Michel Viger also served eight years for complicity, and housing the felquistes; he was also freed conditionally in July 1978. Other individuals were sentenced to six to nine months for aiding the Chenier Cell felquistes, by housing them or carrying out services for them. These FLQ supporters include: Francine Belisle and Collette Therrien, partners to the Rose brothers (“Un Communiqué a disparu à L’U. de M.” 1970); Lisa Rose, mother to the Rose brothers; Normand Roy, who helped transfer the Rose brothers and Simard to the barn hideaway; Francois Belisle, who delivered communiqués for the Chenier Cell; and Robert Dupuis, who was sentenced to two years imprisonment but was freed conditionally after a year for putting Viger and Rose brothers in contact for housing. Therrien was sentenced to a year imprisonment for his assistance in building the cupboard with the hideaway compartment that the Rose brothers and Simard used to escape arrest. Therrien became a Quebec judge, but was dismissed in 2001.

for having concealed his involvement with the FLQ (‘Supreme court rules against judge with FLQ past’ 2001). In 1982, Simard wrote of the murder: ‘Pierre Laporte a été tué. Sa mort n’a pas été accidentelle. Dire cela, ça ne veut pas dire que sa mort a été voulue’ (193). After Rose was freed in 1987, many felquistes were pardoned of their violent activities.

The focus of this section was to introduce the FLQ cells of the late 1960s and into the 1970s. Tactics became more innovative and action became more violent with a higher level of insurgency. By studying the actor constitution, the cell structure, and the innovative action, I was able to distinguish the differences between the cells and how their interactions affected the radical space in Quebec. The cells radicalized and shifted to strategy that was more ‘timely’. The kidnapping and plane hijackings, two tactics that were being used within the global decolonization movement, brought local and international attention to the FLQ. When the FLQ attempted strategy that involved injury or death, however, the populace responded very negatively, thus, shaping the radical space. By pardoning all felquistes of their criminal records in the late 1980s allowed the individuals to return to society and participate in the peaceful electoral system as democratic citizens.

**FLNC**

While the Quebec provincial government, Canadian federal government and the provincial judicial systems attempted to crack down on extremism with harsh sentences and the WMA, the French government, and specifically the minister of Interior Charles Pasqua, in the late 1980s also attempted to use repression to control the violence. When Francois Mitterand was re-elected in 1988 and appointed Pierre Joxe as interior minister, the socialist government responded to the support of the FLNC and attempted a new approach of discussion. The increased repression of 1986-1988, as discussed in this

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36 ‘Pierre Laporte was killed. His death was not accidental. Saying that, it doesn’t mean that his death was wanted’. Translated by author.
section, is included in this chapter to show the shift in approaches by the two French ministers, and how the authoritative approaches influenced the scission of the FLNC into two factions, and thus affecting the radical space in Corsica.

At the beginning of the third moment, Charles Pasqua, appointed as minister of the interior for Corsica in 1986, intensified his predecessor’s program of repression against the extremists. On 16 June 1986, Pasqua stated that to combat the FLNC, it was necessary to “terrorizer les terroristes” (Rochiccioli 2010). Pasqua stated earlier in April that there was no need for extremism as there were mediums of expression through freedom of the press, freedom of reunion, and freedom of association (Charles Pasqua, ministre de l’interieur, France 24); soon thereafter, ironically, the editor of FR3, Sampiera Sanguinetti, was fired and two journalists were transferred to the continent (Crettiez 1999) after writing and publishing articles that were pro-Corsican. This event suggests that the Corsicans did not have complete access to the freedoms that Pasqua discussed in April of that year; they were still managed by the state.

The state proceeded to further the program of repression through a series of arrests during the year of 1987: on the 4 March, 23 FLNC members were arrested in Porto-Vecchio and approximately 20 in Fiumorbu; On the 8 May, 30 extremists were arrested in the region of Gruzzini; and on the 1st October, Yves Stella, Leo Battesti and Antoine Verdi, members of the direction, were arrested in the offices of U Ribombu in Bastia, and 10 more extremists were arrested in Corté in November (Crettiez 1999). The militants predicted that the repression was to occur as a response to the upcoming presidential election of 1988; on February 1987, the FLNC wrote in the bulletin interne for members to note that for 6 or 7 months, the state and police forces would use much more repressive means until the election (“Réflexions de secteur P”, Bulletin Interne de FLNC). As the government

37 Translated by author as: ‘terrorize the terrorists’
became more repressive of both the peaceful and violent nationalists, the FLNC radicalized.

After Francois Mitterrand was re-elected and hired Pierre Joxe as the new interior minister, the FLNC announced a 120 day cease-fire on the 31 May 1988. When announcing the decision of the organization, Pierre Poggioli stated: ‘la balle est dans le camp des socialistes’, ‘the ball is now in the socialists’ camp’ (Poggioli 1996: 69). In response, Paul Joxe, new minister of the interior, met with the Cuncolta on the 21 July, and continued to visit Corsica during the late 1980s (Crettiez 1999; Quinio and Hassoux 2001). For Pierre Joxe, Corsica was considered the ‘only insular region of France’; this notion that Corsica was distinct from the rest of the Republic would further shape discussion around the Corsican Question and lessen the state repression greatly.

On the 22 August 1989, the final three imprisoned FLNC militants who were considered ‘political prisoners’ were liberated by the state. Since the ceasefire of 1987, 52 militants were released, thus supporting the new approach by Joxe and proving a willingness to treat Corsica as an entity with a different identity. This approach contrasts the usual tripartite model of French policy. While the UPC openly negotiated with the state, certain members of the FLNC continued to question the sub-state and state relationship despite the attempts of Joxe and the government. Others, such as Poggioli, felt that violence was no longer necessary to achieve political representation. On the 24 October 1989, Pierre Poggioli announced his departure from the FLNC to create the Accolta Naziziale Corsa (ANC), a political space without militarism and violence of the FLNC; he was voted into the territorial assembly that year. Subsequently, a year later, the Cuncolta dissolved after the departure of Alain Orsoni and the Mouvement pour l’autodetermination (MPA) was created as a political arm of the FLNC canal habituel. Interactions with the government and the loss of key militants created tension within the FLNC that would soon grow to outright conflict.
A deep division amongst the FLNC began to occur during the year 1990. While the branch in Ajaccio chose to negotiate with the state and insisted on continuing a dialogue with Joxe, the sector ‘Gravona’ of Bastian extremists refused to negotiate and formulated a militaristic strategy for the 
front. In November 1990, the sector ‘V’ in Ajaccio, led by Alain Orsoni, quit the direction of the FLNC to form the FLNC canal habituel, taking the authentication code for the press with him. In opposition, the sectors G and certain groups in Bastia and Balagne formed the FLNC canal historique (Crettiez 1999). The rest of the canals became inactive.

The result of this scission between FLNC factions was an arms race; it became important to reinforce a militaristic advantage on the island. As Poggioli rightly noted: ‘during this era, there was finally a peaceful option and therefore the FLNC networks became competitive to gain arms, supporters and territory” (Poggioli interview 2014). The furthered violence and militarized tactics influenced previous members of the direction, such as Yves Stella and Leo Battesti, to leave the FLNC and the increased violence came close to mafia and banditry. Yves Stella subsequently joined the MPA and pursued nationalism through peacefully political measures; he also became editor of the MPA’s journal Paese until 1992 (Corsica infurmazione, 2014).

Recruitment after 1990 was hasty, and targeted disassociated youth who were hardly political in comparison to their contemporaries; this led to the organization of several small violent sub-sects to the different FLNC networks that were minimally controlled and very active. Crettiez noted between 148 and 216 violent attacks between 1989 and 1990, and most were still focused on symbols of colonialism; in 1992 alone, 333 attacks occurred with 260 gun attacks and 40 homicides (Crettiez 1999).

While Crettiez (1999) states that the average age of presumed members of the FLNC between 1985-1989 was 32.3 years old, membership during the 1990s was younger, estimated between 15-25 (Tafani 1996). Pierre Poggioli described a surge of youth having joined the FLNC during the early
1990s who had little to no knowledge of the nationalist culture. Poggioli states: “What is even more worrying is how the young and depoliticized militants within the clandestine structures, galvanized during the Borgo press conference of 1990 and subject to the pressure of ‘crazy killers’ who are profiting from the antidrug campaign, are climbing the ranks of the organization” (Poggioli 1996, 175). The FLNC created a community of belonging for youth that offered an identity of militancy in an anti-colonialist army; this new, younger actor was of similar age to many of the FLQ members.

The use of media encouraged recruitment to the FLNC canals. While the members of the 1990s were younger than the previous moments and between the ages of 15-25, the FLQ members were generally older than the previous moments; this was true of the Liberation Cell partially due to Jacques Lanctot having aged since his membership in the first moment and being particularly involved in recruiting his sister and her partner Louise Lanctot and Jacques Cossette-Trudel. The members of the Geoffroy cell were in their mid-20s, and the Chenier cell aged between the ages of 19 and 26. The cells of the third moment were comprised of members who had been active in the nationalist movement during the second and/or first moments, and had simply aged since their involvement in the university and working protest movements; while younger FLNC members were targeted for recruitment and responded to the higher insurgency of violence.

With the factions, splits, and development of new cells and sub-groups, it is difficult to decipher the amount of active members; however, it was clear that approximately 500 to 600 individuals were present at the press conference in 1996 (FR3 Corse 1996). Similarly to the other ‘moments’, and the third moment of the FLQ, new members were recruited by friends and family. Personal connections were always the most reliable links amongst the FLNC; however, the divisions of the 1990s influenced a scramble to recruit new members, encouraging the recruitment of younger, masculine

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38 Translated by author
individuals. These new networks were loosely-organized and considered their existence legitimized by repression, but also offered a space of belonging; in the 1990s, the FLNC was as much an inclusive space for the disassociated and depoliticized youth as it was a space for the militarist nationalists of the past.

While it could be convenient to suggest that there was a tripartite structure in Corsica in the 1990s, in which the canal historique encompassed the North, the Canal habituel the South and the Resistenza in Ajaccio and Corte, there were also smaller cell-like groups that separated further. Cells were as small as ten members and as large as networks of over one hundred militants. While *Le Devoir* merged all violence under the umbrella term of the FLNC, Crettiez maps 26 clandestine organizations between 1989 and 1996.

With factions came alliances; the MPA was known to be closely in communication with the Canal habituel (Chemin 2012), which would make MPA members targets of the Canal historique, the Cuncolta and those loyal to Francois Santoni (Chemin 2012).

The scission between the two factions and the competition that erupted as a result also changed the focus and orientation of the organizations; respect for the environment, defense of a rural Corsica and equality were no longer prominent issues and became less and less important as demands, nor did they influence the targets. For example, the development on the coasts for tourism, mainly French-owned and originally targeted as a symbol of French power, were less targeted as the factions received financial support from owners and promoters in return for the

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39 Groups included: FLNC historique, FLNC habituel, Resistenza, FLNC, ALNC (appeared shortly in 1983), Brigades révolutionnaires Corses (also appeared in 1982), Ghjustizia Corsa, Mouvement national armé, Ghjustizia, les FARC, Indipendenza, Cunsulta per L’indipendenza Nazionale, Fronte Corsu Economicu, FLB (B for Balagne), I Stuendti Corsi, FLCI, V, le Front paoliste de liberation nationale, Protection du littoral corse, l’Armée republicaine corse de liberation nationale, les Cellules revolutionnaires corses, les Combattants de la drogue, A Droga Basta, Organisation des forces revolutionnaires active (appeared shortly in 1976), le CPE, Fronte Ribellu (Crettiez 1999, 128).
safety of themselves and their buildings (Crettiez 1999). The MPA, especially, focused less on independence and more on economic development (Lefevre 1996).

After the scission, the canal historique began to wear red and white clothing that resembled the ‘corps d’élite’ of the national police. Just as the FLQ invoked symbolism during the October Crisis by comparing themselves to the Patriotes in the Rebellion of 1837, the Canal historique implied that by wearing the clothing of the French national police they were taking on a similar role for Corsica; the comparison suggested that they were serving the safety and the well-being of the Corsican populace. Strategy also required modern arms; during the press conference of the 11 January 1996, the FLNC-canal historique displayed several new guns alongside modern communication technology and miniature scanners: Jericho Israeli pistols, Austrian Glock, two Galil guns, several Uzi, Heckler und kauch guns, famas, and the M16 (Crettiez 1999). This press conference had approximately 600 members present, and was organized hours before the arrival of Jean-Louis Debré, new Minister of the Interior. The press conference was to announce a three month cease-fire, to ‘be conciliatory with the government’ and to send a message to the FLNC-canal habituel of its strength after the violence of 1995 (Benhamou 1996a). The violence of the FLNC-canal historique and FLNC-canal habituel during the early 1990s was more to impress the other FLNC faction and to maintain an appearance of unifying members against the state.

Further, the scission of 1990 decentralized the finances of the FLNC, allowing an autonomy of each group and cell. Similarly to the cells in the FLQ, the groups were in charge of their own finances; in Corsica, this quickly became an arms race between factions. The Canal-historique focused on the industrial and commercial sector by extortion of funds, and fictitious employment for militants. For example, certain members of the Cunculta bought Bastia Securita in the early 1990s and employed exclusively nationalist militants; as a monopolistic industry in Haute-Corse, Bastia Securita ensured a financial arrangement for the Canal-historique (Crettiez
The liberation newspaper wrote in 1996 that between 1990 and 1993, the Canal historique bought 3 millions francs in arms (Benhamou 1996b). The stewards of the Football Club in Bastia were also composed of nationalists that were close to the canal historique. In 1996, Robert Sozzi, militant of the FLNC historique, denounced the collusion between the clandestine group and the neo-clan and was subsequently murdered. The FLNC-Canal habituel attacked revenues of the tourism sector instead, such as bars, restaurants, clubs and casinos. The protection of infrastructure and individuals in return for funding harks back to the clan system in which the ‘clients’ awarded their vote to a candidate in return for social protection. As an arms race developed, financing became particularly important and extortion was rampant.

In 1995, the competition developed into a fratricidal war, which resulted in several attacks on nationalists, and dozen of deaths. Six deaths were amongst the ‘Mouvement pour l’Autodetermination’ (MPA) and the FLNC-Canal Habituel; 8 amongst its rival organizations the Cuncolta Naziunalista, the FLNC-Canal historique; and one member of the Accolta Naziionalista Corsa (ANC) was killed (Lefevre 1996). Pierre Albertini, an important member of the MPA, was assassinated in August 1995 (Benhamou 1996c). Leaders of nationalist organizations responded to the violence by denouncing the ‘vicious yob rule’, thus articulating a frustration with the violence when there were peaceful left-wing groups to support nationalism; Alain Orsoni, secretary general of the MPA called for dissolution of the Canal habituel, but the initiative was very much contested. One militant argued that it would be ridiculous to dissolve the Canal habituel when the Canal historique was still active. At the end of the two day MPA congress of 150 members in Ajaccio in March 1996, 45 voted for the continuation of the Canal habituel and 90 voted for its dissolution. Alain Orsoni was not present due to the lack of security as there had been threats on his life since the fratricide war of 1995 (Benhamou 1996c).

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40 Translated by author as: movement for self-determination
The intensity of the violence during the early to mid 1990s responded directly to the divisive changes of the organization of the networks; the factions, their finances, materialism, and competition became more important than the demands of the original FLNC and the ideal of independence. Nationalism was still cited as the inspiration, but almost in a mythical context. The government attempted an approach of negotiation with the FLNC, which encouraged many to give up violence either temporarily during a cease-fire or permanently; however the approach also created conflict within the FLNC when certain canals continued to meet for discussion while others created new militaristic programs. While the violence responded directly to the divisive changes after the scission, it is interesting to note that the original conflicts were spurred by interactions with the government. Thus, while attempting to diminish the violence in Corsica, Joxe accidentally spurred an increase in insurgency and the development of a radical space.

In December 1996, two leaders of the FLNC-Canal historique, Francois Santoni and Jean-Michel Rossi, were arrested. In June, a series of militants quit the official organization A Cuncolta in support of leader Jean Biancucci. Santoni’s place of leadership in the FLNC became a contest for succession between Bati Cononici and Marcel Lorenzoni. Lorenzoni, however, was a known critic of the Cuncolta and the institutional engagement of the network. By September 1996, the FLNC-Canal historique was in crisis (Benhamou 1998). On the 6 February 1998, prefect Claude Erignac was assassinated at 21.00 on his way to the theatre Kallisté to meet his wife for a classical music concert. Erignac was shot in the back three times by a caliber 9 mm Beretta pistol. The gun was stolen in 1997 from the gendarmerie in Pietrosella near Ajaccio (“Il ya 15 ans, le préfet Erignac était assassiné à Ajaccio” 2013).

On 9 February, an anonymous group took responsibility for the assassination. On 2 January, Marcel Lorenzoni officially separated from the Cuncolta to create le Collectif pour la nation; it was under the pressure of another faction within the FLNC-Canal historique that they held a press
conference on the 25 January to proclaim an end to the cease-fire (Benhamou 1998). At no point did the FLNC claim responsibility for the shooting (Benhamou 1998). Yves Colonna, a former shepherd, was captured in a shepherd’s hut in Porto Pollo in 2003 and was tried as assassin and found guilty, but was retried after the original sentence was overturned on a minor procedural error in 2010 (“France Corsica: Eignac killer Colonna to stay in jail” 2011). Although the murder was never proven in court to be an act by the FLNC, it became well considered amongst the media and on the island that the FLNC had played a part, which resulted in a negative public response.

The 1990s in Corsica saw an extreme shaping of the radical space. While many key members of the FLNC left the space to pursue nationalism peacefully and canals became inactive, the factions that continued intensified and young members were recruited to occupy the radical space and take the place of the past members. Similarly to the FLQ, the assassination of Erignac created negative press and feelings towards the FLNC. Although assassinations and murders had occurred before; this was high-profile. The negative response resulted in a further shaping of the radical space as many sympathetic turned to the growing political parties and the electoral system. The FLNC that did continue was altogether different from the previous two moments and the movement of the past; worries about the environment, language and culture were replaced with worries about finance, arms and power.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter compared membership, the innovative action (strategy and tactics) and the ideologies of the FLQ cells and the FLNC networks. Polarization and RFE, in the form of interactions with the governments, was also discussed throughout the chapter and will be compared further in this section. For the ease of the reader, I have divided the conclusion into subsections. While some information is certainly repeated from earlier in the
chapter, it allows for a concrete comparison of the networks of the late 1960s and early 1970s in Quebec and late 1980s and early 1990s in Corsica; this comparison will further inform the final concluding chapter.

Membership in the FLQ in the 1970s was formed due to close ties; the Liberation and Chenier cells were comprised of family members and friends. All actors had participated in left-wing activism in Quebec prior to their participation in FLQ activity. In the Liberation Cell, Jacques Lanctot recruited his sister, Louise Lanctot, and her partner Jacques Cossette-Trudel. Even Nigel Barry Hamer, the only Anglophone of the FLQ cells (Tetley 2006), might seem like an oddity amongst the strong relationship ties of the other actors, but was in fact a friend of Cossette-Trudel (Fournier 1982, 258).

Affiliates of the cells were often partners or family members, as well. In the Liberation cell, Denise Quesnel, a friend of Louise Lanctot, was charged with illegal affiliation with the FLQ for allowing Lanctot and Jacques Cossette-Trudel to stay with her while participating in felquiste activity (Fournier 1982, 57).

The Chenier cell was similar in the sense that the cell was comprised of the Rose brothers and their friends; Francis Simard even travelled on a holiday with the brothers and their mother. Bernard Lortie met the brothers in the summer of 1969 at the Maison des Pecheurs. Again, friends and partners were also charged for illegal affiliation with the cell; they chose, or felt an obligation, to support or collaborate with FLQ members, but did not consider themselves a member, nor had they participated in the violent activity. Jacques Rose’s girlfriend, Collette Therrien, (Montreal Star 1970) ordered wood to build a cupboard for a secret hideaway, delivered communiqués, and opened a safety deposit box in a Côte des Neiges district bank for ‘important papers’. She was also present during the police raid on the 6 November, in which she assisted Jacques and Paul Rose and Francis Simard to hide in the cupboard. Therrien was not a member of the FLQ and had no knowledge of the cell’s plans, but assisted the Chenier cell with small tasks due to her relationship with Jacques Rose. In the courts, collaborators of FLQ activity were viewed as members of a centralized organization and
were often charged for their participation; Therrien was charged as an accessory to the kidnapping of Pierre Laporte.

Stohl and Stohl (2007) hypothesize that ties of friendship and acquaintance can form the bedrock of a resilient network, and are often strong ties that appear to be weak (101-102). These collaborators might seem weak as they were not financially responsible to the cell, nor were there violent consequences or threats when detaching from the network; these ties of friendship and family were emotionally involved and, in reality, created the strongest ties within the network. Weak ties between the Chenier and Liberation cells were kept at a minimum as it reduced visibility of the network and a chance for information to leak out of the network (Krebs 1994, 48), however, this created a much looser and less-established network that limited the activity of the cells, the communication between them, and the ability to gain funding (Arquila and Ronfeldt 2001) thereby making the network less active and less radical.

FLNC Membership is even less known during the early 1990s, as popular FLNC leaders quit in contestation of the increase in violence for a peacefully democratic movement that was gaining ground in Corsica. While the FLQ in this chapter formed small and tight cells with friends and family ties, the FLNC was forced to mobilize younger and more radical members. While the FLNC network of the 70s and 80s was strict about mobilizing new members that were considered neighbours and friends, or at least well known to both the canal and the direction, the FLNC canals after the split did not have the liberty to be so choosy. A race for membership and arms meant that both FLNC canals embraced many new radical members between the ages of 15-25 (Tafani 1996) who no longer had the nationalist perspective of their fore-fathers. While the FLQ held strong ties, but a less-established network, the FLNC during this chapter began to loosen their ties. Despite the scission de 1990, the network prior and the canals afterwards maintained an established network that was able to continue a higher level of insurgency, and continued to collect funding.
While both the FLQ and the FLNC were becoming more violent and employing tactics such as kidnapping, they also increased the theatricality as part of their strategy. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) suggest that contentious repertoires are claim-making routines available to actors and identities. The FLNC always staged their press conferences similarly, as a ritual. The leaders sat at a table, separating themselves from the media as politicians would during a political press conference; the other militants stood behind them clutching weapons as a show of force. All were solemnly masked. A Corsican flag was almost always shown to symbolize and represent nationalism. These press conferences allowed the members to participate and celebrate the unity of the group and the symbolic death of the state, comparable to religious rites. Although the staging of the press conference made it appear to be a symbolic ritual of violence in the form of a religiously prescribed ceremony, it in fact encompasses a legitimate and democratically political space. Instead of violent acts to get their messages across, the members exercised their freedoms by sharing their demands with the press, assuring the state that they represent the Corsican populace.

While the press conferences of the FLNC over the decades displayed a modernization of arms, the staging continued to remain relatively the same; the choreography attempted to reinforce a ‘messianic’ symbol. The conference acted as publicity for recruitment, support, and a warning to the state; and attempted to create a sense of nationalism and unity (Poggioli interview). Finally, these conferences ultimately overlapped the radical space of the clandestine community and the peaceful political space.

In contrast, the Chenier cell decorated the FLQ manifesto with the colours of the flag of the Patriotes, and a watermarked silhouette of la vieux Patriote; this imagery attempted to glorify the FLQ by comparing itself and its plight to the 1837 rebellion (Communiqués FLQ 1970). Similarly, the communiqués connected the radical space in Quebec to the peaceful sociopolitical space by peacefully discussing the ideology and demands of
the network. While the FLNC chose to display its strength and numbers behind masks, lending a mystique to the balaclavas and the clandestinity of the movement, the FLQ was not large or strong enough to show off their small cells; instead, they used their absence to create a similar mysticism. While viewers in Corsica could be astounded by the participation of the FLNC, viewers in Quebec and Canada were terrified by the unlimited possibilities of cells, networks and members.

While the FLNC used theatricality with the modern press through televised press conferences as a means to communicate with the populace, recruit and show power and strength, the Liberation and Chenier cells of the FLQ used written communiqués as a means to communicate their demands not only to the populace, but also to the state. While there was much more discourse between FLNC canals and the state due to their connections with the democratic nationalists, the FLQ only had the media in order to communicate their needs, demands, and philosophy. Negotiating publicly maximized publicity for its political goals, but also encouraged the state to crack down harder on the violence as a show of strength to the populace.

The FLQ used the media to interact with the government, forcing them to make their interactions and discussion public. While the publication of the FLQ demands on both television and radio was considered a win for the FLNC, and Quebecois in general, the publicity of the FLQ and the FLNC demands highlighted the amateurism of the two cells and created confusion. While the Liberation Cell would send a communiqué with certain demands, the Chenier Cell would send another with contradictory demands. Ultimately, the public interactions with the government worked against the ‘brand’ of the FLQ, their attempt for mysticism, and proved to the world that the FLQ was exactly what the government suspected: a ragtag ‘network’ of radical youths, rather than a strong and organized network.

In Corsica, the arrival of Pierre Joxe, the new minister of Interior, brought with him a peaceful option of government interaction and discussion that the nationalists had never experienced before. While the
branch in Ajaccio insisted on negotiating with Joxe and the state, the ‘Gravona’ sector of Bastia and surrounding areas preferred to militarize further, which added to the other tensions in the FLNC and led to the scission (Crettiez 1999). Similarly to the FLQ, interactions with the government became a mechanism for the downfall and disintegration of the FLQ and the FLNC of the 1970s and 1980s.

**Ideology**

While the FLQ cells of the late 1960s and early 1970s held a postcolonialist perspective and articulated Marxist demands, the Chenier cell articulated a frustration with ‘les big bosses’, an elite English-speaking bourgeoisie, and the French politicians that ‘conspired’ with them (Manifeste de FLQ 1970).

The FLNC, on the other hand, lost their focus on nationalism and the demands surrounding the protection of culture and environment as they lost leaders such as Poggioli, who quit to form the ANC, and Orsoni, who left to join the MPA; both important figures felt that political representation was now possible to acquire peacefully. In the past, violence was very much intertwined with politics in Corsica, but the 1990s proved a frustration with the violence in all social spheres. Economic development became a focus by all over independence. In both Corsica and Quebec, economic frustrations influenced the need for further representation politically. The tactics of the FLNC in the 1990s no longer embodied the cultural frames that best highlighted the group’s motives for actions, as discussed by Taylor and Van Dyke (2004), as the canals morphed into an arms race and a different type of warfare.

While society was initially radicalizing during the late 1960s in Quebec, the October Crisis brought any interest of revolution and violent extremism to a halt. Comparatively in Corsica during the 1990s, the populace became increasingly uninterested in the FLNC and the criminality that was rampant on the island. The further the FLQ and the FLNC radicalized, the further the canals and cells distanced themselves from the peaceful political
movements proving a negative RFE. Many members ‘jumped ship’ and crossed over into the peaceful political space to pursue nationalism through peacefully democratic means.

This chapter explored a disintegration of the FLQ, and the traditional FLNC into two competing factions, as well as a shift in strategy by the governments and policing bodies. The conclusion chapter looks further at why the FLQ did not reform new cells after the October Crisis and why the FLNC morphed into a different type of militarism in Corsica. What is truly important to note here is the shifting of strategies by the governments and policing bodies, the popular frustrations in both Corsica and France towards the violent tactics, and the increased popularity and access to peaceful nationalist and left-wing groups. In both cases, the radical space changed extensively as workers movements and protests occupied the space in Quebec after the October Crisis, and younger radical members of the FLNC canal habituel and canal historique pursued an arms race and violent action without the cultural and national perspective. In both cases, the FLQ and the FLNC sought to, and failed to, extend the radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica.

“Je ne regrette rien et ne renie rien. Comment regretter ou renier toute une partie de ma vie, tout ce qui fait qu’aujourd’hui je suis ce que je suis” (Lanctot 1981, 21)
Conclusion

This thesis has three important aims: first, the thesis has argued that the FLQ and the FLNC sub-state violent contention can be understood by their members’ aim to extend radical space. While the groups were able to maintain and/or extend radical space at certain points, public support was often undermined by radical activity. Ultimately, the FLQ and the FLNC failed in sustaining the extension of ideological radical space, but Radical Flank Effect (RFE) proves that the substate violent contention turned nationalist and radical support to the moderate political parties, who in turn extended radical space by holding referendums for independence.

Second, this argument drew on contentious politics and social movement literature, which it combined with RFE to answer the central question: what explains the contrasting patterns of sub-state violent contention in Quebec and Corsica. Finally, to provide and map an analytical account of the FLQ and the FLNC. Using newly released Canadian policing records and documentation, this thesis was able to clearly map the interactions between individual felquistes and cells. Transcripts of court cases were cross-referenced with RCMP documentation, primary accounts, and other archival data.

The comparison of the FLQ and the FLNC necessitated a contrast of many elements: global vs local influences, sub-state vs state, crime and reform, cultural influences, history of violence, and different time periods. By examining the FLQ and the FLNC as networks of actors that sought to extend space, all of these elements were included in, or affected, the analysis. I have begun to unpack the effect of radical space on sub-state violent contention within democratic regimes as a way to understand the use of scripts, processes and repertoires by violent extremists. The continued mobilization and radicalization, after the dissolution of several cells, until a turning point suggests a larger sociopolitical challenge that is discussed further in this chapter.
Substantive Findings

The main empirical findings are specific to the empirical chapters, 4-6. This section will synthesize the empirical findings to answer the two research questions of this thesis:

*What explains the often-contrasting patterns of sub-state violent contention in Quebec and Corsica?*

The empirical chapters offer answers to the thesis question, where one can most easily note the patterns that develop. The two groups shared an arc of mobilization: initial mobilization, radicalization and use of even more violent tactics, then a tipping point and the disintegration of violent activity. I will, however, condense the chapters into a single response here.

This thesis used RFE as a tool to contrast sub-state violent contention in Quebec and Corsica. RFE requires that groups are separate and distinct, and were distinguishable in the eyes of the external actors, the populace, state and sub-state governments. As articulated throughout the empirical chapters, the FLQ was quite distinct from the constitutional Parti Québécois (PQ). The PQ condemned the violence of the FLQ, and the FLQ equally complained in the FLQ manifesto of 1970 of the ‘bourgeoisie’ presence in the PQ; they particularly singled out René Levesque. Although certain actors in the FLNC were active in both the violent and constitutional movements, the two movements were distinct from one another; the FLNC equally articulated a frustration with the ARC-turned-APC, who the FLNC accused of serving the interests of the bourgeoisie.

Since RFE, however, did not explicitly consider the levels of strategic interaction within the movement (Alimi et al. 2012), then internal dynamics needed to be studied. The empirical chapters, therefore, focused on four key elements of contrast: membership, ideology, network structure and strategy. RFE, supplemented with strategic and internal factors, helped to understand
the contrast and patterns of sub-state violent contention in Quebec and Corsica.

The constitution of actors and/or members affected the course and the outcome of the mobilization process (McAdam et al. 2001). The membership of the FLQ changed as each new cell was formed; generally actors were left-wing students or workers from East Montreal who were disaffected by capitalism and the electoral system. The exception was, of course, the ARQ that was led by three ex-military who were frustrated with the absence of French language within the military. FLNC membership, in contrast, generally stayed constant until the scission de 1990 as there were several key figures that were active throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Friends and trusted neighbours were recruited, and each canal had an element of autonomy, but were overseen by the direction, la Cunculta. Members were of different profiles, but always considered themselves ‘Corsican’. Actors, as in theatre, manipulate, modify and reinterpret their identity of contention (McAdam et al 2001: 24), and it was found in this study that the profiles of the FLQ and FLNC members developed a pattern of violent contention that they hoped affected the radical ideological space.

Both the FLQ and the FLNC subscribed to Marxism and post-colonialism. While the FLQ cells differed in ideology depending on the membership, the members sought to extend radical space in order to combat what they termed ‘the Anglosaxon colonial power’. While the personal ideologies of the members spread across the left of the political spectrum, the manifestoes and political publications described the average felquiste as an ‘urban revolutionary’, and subscribing to Vallières and Fanon’s manifestoes. The FLNC, in contrast, embraced Mao and agrarian reform. While the FLQ pursued economic and political reform, the FLNC placed a greater importance on land and culture. These differences in ideology were key contrasts between the violent contention in Quebec and Corsica.

The network structures were influenced by the sociopolitical environments and radical spaces in Quebec and Corsica. While the FLQ had
hopes for revolution, the urban guerilla tactics were tailored to the sociopolitical environment in Quebec. They understood that if they had attempted different tactics (further bodily harm), the populace would not have supported the violence. The cell-like structure was influenced by the limited numbers of actors that did not have the man-power or resources to employ further tactics, as will be discussed next, but they also organized in small cells to avoid detention by the state. The FLNC had more members, and was able to develop a regional network structure that encompassed the island with more violent tactics. While the FLNC opposed the clan system in Corsica, the network took advantage of the system and organized around family and clan ties.

Social, political and economic processes constrain the tactical options available to social movements. Tactics are adopted due to their efficiency as a way to resonate the beliefs, ideas and cultural frames (Darnovsky et al 1995). Taylor and Van Duke (2004) conclude that actors choose amongst tactical repertoires for those that best conform to their ideologies and collective identities, and embody the cultural frames that best highlight the group’s motives for action (277). The FLQ and the FLNC subscribed to popular violent performances amongst international decolonization and nationalist movements; bombings, hijackings and assassinations were part of the protest culture of the 1960s and 1970s. As stated above, the FLQ did not initially employ the same strategy as other violent movements of its time period, but as time progressed they became open to new tactics like plane hijacking and kidnapping as a way to place themselves within the global movement and achieve international recognition. The FLNC already had a history of violence, therefore they were able to use tactics that were more violent and routinized without achieving the same shock factor as in Quebec; they were also much more focused on gaining momentum ‘at home’ rather than abroad. While the FLQ saw itself as part of a global New Left movement, the FLNC’s program of agrarian revolt was distinct to Corsica. Both groups sought to extend radical space in Corsica and Quebec in very different nations, which affected the strategy and choice of tactics. Tactical repertoires,
therefore, also helped to explain the patterns of sub-state violent contention in Quebec and Corsica.

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s mobilization model was also conducive to analyzing the patterns of sub-state violent contention in Quebec and Corsica. The model expands on framing (Snow et al 1986) to involve the interaction between actors, their opponents and the media. While the use of RFE outlined the relationships between the extremists and their moderate factions- the FLQ and the PQ were separate and distinct, and did not respond to the moderate movement as the FLNC did, which chose strategy and tactics in response to political outcomes- the mobilization model looked at the interaction between the extremists themselves. In doing so, an arc of violent mobilization becomes apparent, and the mapping element of the cells within the movements becomes important to this thesis.

After the FLQ and the FLNC had developed in 1963 and 1976, respectively, both movements responded to their sociopolitical environments and understanding the electoral and legal processes in colonial terms. The members of the FLQ and the FLNC felt disenfranchised with capitalism, so the exclusionary implications of majority rule and the lack of representation within constitutional groups influenced the members of the FLQ and the FLNC to propose alternative and open public spheres of political discussion. During the trajectories of the FLQ and the FLNC, the radical ideological space was maintained, extended or even minimized by a radicalization of tactics, shifting ideologies, the responses of the governing authorities, and the adaptability of the movements. Both networks shared an arc of violent mobilization: radicalization until a tipping point and then a decrease of nationalist-focused violence until dissolution. This overall pattern was mapped and explained in the empirical chapters through comparative historical analysis with social movement literature and RFE.
Why didn’t the FLQ re-form after the October Crisis as it had since the dissolution of the first cell in 1962?

While the FLQ never had an intricate network to of cells, the fact that FLQ cells ceased to develop after the October Crisis of 1970 requires an explanation. Although it might be easy to suggest that the instigation of the WMA was enough to ‘break’ mobilization and violent activity under the umbrella term of the FLQ, I argue that the FLQ ceased to form further cells due to several reasons.

First, the development of several separate cells during the 1960s to early 1970s implied that the FLQ were drawn by ideological commitments to Marxism, and attempted to radicalize and revolutionize Quebec against the colonial state. Felquistes were frustrated over social conditions, capitalism, the democratic electoral system and government. After the instigation of the WMA and the removal of Habeas Corpus during the October Crisis, other political options became apparent. The PQ became an effective political vehicle for political and economic change.

Second, the New Left was losing momentum in North America in the 1970s, and coupled with the debacle of the October Crisis, revolution was no longer likely. FLQ cells were developed, between 1962 and 1970, by leftist extremists who subscribed to Marxism and post-colonialism. FLQ members held contrasting articulations as to their membership; there was a ‘hodge podge’ of ideals, ideologies and levels of radicalization. While some of the students seemed to have articulated a nationalist struggle against the Anglophone bourgeoisie, others embraced Fanon’s (1961) theory that preached anti-colonial revolution through the strength of the working class, while others admitted to an involvement in the violence ‘for kicks’. Unlike Laurendeau (1990), who suggests that the FLQ had a strict ideological orientation from the beginning based on its first communiqué on the 8 march 1963, I argue that although the FLQ articulated a need for revolution as a means to achieve an independent Quebec, it lacked focus and direction as a result of appeasing the different ideologies and levels of radicalism.
Third, the constitutional nationalist option had a political party for the first time with the appearance of the PQ. In 1968, the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association and the Ralliement National merged to form the Parti Quebecois, and was gaining political popularity due to the popular and dynamic René Levesque as its founder; Quebec finally had a political party that focused on independence gaining momentum. While the radical space was extended in this period, it was not due to the tactics of the FLQ but to the growing support for nationalism through the PQ.

A lack of FLQ structure, a harsh response by the federal government and the populace to the murder or Pierre Laporte, and the decline in popularity of the New Left, together affected the dissolution and the absence of the FLQ after 1971.

*Why, in contrast to the FLQ, did the FLNC experience the scission de 1990 and morph into a competitive arms race and fratricidal war?*

This question is ultimately easier to answer. The short answer suggests that there were a series of increasing tensions within the FLNC that mainly developed around the organization and decision-making of the direction, *le Cunsigliu*, while the constitutional politics became more effective towards pursuing independence. Chapter 5 described the tensions that were building within the FLNC during the late 1980s. Influenced by *l’affair Schock*, *le Cunsigliu* decided to decentralize the revolutionary tax that they collected from businesses to finance the network, which caused stir amongst the regional cells, or *canals*, and the central unit began to lose control of certain cells and individuals. The network became less unified and, therefore, less organized. The refusal to punish those who disobeyed *le Cunsigliu* also meant that they had less control as the members began to test the central power of the FLNC.

Finally, during the late 1980s, as members radicalized and began to lose sight of Corsican independence, nationalism and cultural and
environmental demands, many of the older members that had been a part of the FLNC throughout most of its existence began to leave the network to participate in the moderate political movement. With Francois Mitterand and the socialists in power there was more opportunity for discussion, especially with Joxe as Corsica’s champion; there was, therefore, more opportunity by supporting the constitutional groups and parties. Just as McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) suggest, polarization involves the widening of political and social space between claimants in a contentious episode forcing the previously uncommitted or moderate actors towards one, the other or both extremes (21). By ‘hollowing out’ members stuck between the two extremes, polarization raises the stakes of winning or losing and promotes violence with the other members (22). As the less violent members left the FLNC for the moderate movement, the FLNC radicalized tactics and strategy, and grew increasingly isolated in terms of support.

Unfortunately, this political support by the state was in fact the ‘tipping point’ that led to the scission and further violence. Without the leadership of Poggioli, Stella, Batesti and their contemporaries, the FLNC not only radicalized, but it also divided into two factions that began to compete in an arms race. The decentralization of finances furthered the competition, and soon the factions were employing illegal means in order to gain more financing, arms, and members. Particularly fascinating is that Joxe was the first interior minister to view Corsica as a separate entity from France, yet while attempting to end the violence in Corsica with an engagement rather than repression, he spurred an increase in insurgency and violent activity.

The FLQ and the FLNC should not be considered unified movements against a unified opponent in a social vacuum. The introduction was necessary to frame the sociopolitical environment in Quebec in 1963-1971 and Corsica in 1976-1990, respectively. The three empirical chapters analyzed comparative mechanisms to develop patterns of sub-state violent contention; both the FLQ and the FLNC adapted to changes in sociopolitical environments, influences and governments over the course of their trajectories. While the FLQ and the FLNC are no longer active in Quebec and
Corsica (the FLNC laid down arms in 2014 after my fieldwork), both substates continue to fight for their identities, politically and culturally. Many jailed felquistes and FLNC members returned to society and embraced the peaceful and democratic electoral processes. In Quebec, many ex-felquistes survive a new generation that continues to shape radical space with student movements and action. In Corsica, violence continues without the nationalist demands of the FLNC.

Quebecois culture, in the 45 years since the October Crisis, continues to embrace activism and protest. Movements—especially the recent student movement—mobilize and gain support in a way that is different than the rest of English Canada; therefore, I speculate that radical space continues to be shaped and maintained in Quebec. The shaping of radical space today, however, is now constitutional rather than violent. Parties on the nationalist left of the political spectrum, Québec Solidaire and Option Nationale, attempt to move the PQ to reinstate itself on the left. These groups are more social democratic and radical, and attempt to shape radical ideological space by influencing both the PQ and its constituents to radicalize.

An arc of violent mobilization is conducive to the development of the two movements: an initial mobilization that developed from a frustration with moderate political groups; a radicalization until turning points that included the assassination of Pierre Laporte by the FLQ and the division of the FLNC into competitive factions; and then a decline of nationalist activity, mobilization and recruitment. Although the FLQ and the FLNC experienced certain periods when they maintained or extended radical space, they both undermined their own public support through radicalization and were unable to sustain the extension of radical space, as reflected by RFE. Many of the members and supporters, instead, turned their political action to the electoral system in support of the moderate nationalist movement. Revolution was exchanged for referendums, thereby extending radical space.
“Mon histoire n’est pas un recit guerrier, mais bien une histoire d’amour avec ses joies et ses chagrins, celle qu’a vécue un Québécois, un militant du FLQ, un révolutionnaire… Salut Quebec, je t’aime” (Schirm 1982, 211).


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