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Collective Relationships & the Emotion Culture of Radical Feminism in Britain, 1983-1991
Lisa Kalayji

PhD Sociology – The University of Edinburgh, 2018
Abstract
The political tensions between different feminisms, emerging virtually in tandem with the origins of 'second wave' women's movements themselves, continue to present challenges for cooperation and collective action. If flourishing feminist solidarities are to be forged, it is imperative to attend to these divisions, requiring a robust understanding of how they have developed. Though a growing body of research exists on the emotions of feminism, alongside a much more expansive one on emotions and social movements more generally, the emotions of specific feminist movements remain relatively under-explored. This research aims to generate a deeper understanding of radical feminism through a historical examination of its emotion culture during the crucial transition between the development of the ‘second wave’ of Women’s Liberation in the 1970s and the emergence of the ‘third wave’ in the 1990s. It takes radical feminist writings about the timely and controversial paradigms of medicine and psychoanalysis as a window on the movement’s emotion culture in the 1980s.

Employing archival documentary methods and a case study approach, the research draws upon the pivotal radical feminist magazine *Trouble and Strife* as its sole data source. Exploring the text through literary ethnographic analysis and foregrounding a historical lens, it surfaces radical feminism’s emotion culture and highlights the way that its development was bound up with the specificities of its historical moment. The movement’s emotion culture was fundamentally a relational one, constituted through its specific political lens on the relationships in which radical feminists were entangled. As the 'heady days' of 1970s radical social movements gave way to the British state's turn to neoliberalism, the proliferating reach of its individualist ideological paradigm, and deepening divisions between the evolving strands of the 'second wave', radical feminists were confronted with an array of changing relationships to negotiate. Their uniquely uncompromising stance toward men, their long-established tense relationship with socialist and Marxist feminisms, and their critical view of ascending feminist uptake of psychoanalysis gave rise to an emotion culture which centred around their relationships with each of these.
This research contributes to theories of emotions in social movements by focusing on the historically and ideologically specific, rather than emphasising the more general social movement strategic goals which are a common (though not universal) focus in this area. It adds to a small body of work on background emotions, and shows one way that they can be studied empirically. It also contributes to the growing body of work on feminism and emotions, and particularly to research which aims to explain the contentions between feminisms, as feminist researchers move away from the outmoded view of these contentions as simplistic generational divides and seek out explanations through the complex emotionality of feminist relationships.
Lay Summary

This thesis aims to explore the emotion culture of radical feminism in the 1980s. Its purpose is to explain how contemporary radical feminism came to work the way that it does emotionally by examining the development of the movement’s emotions at an earlier, formative point in its history. The research asks a deliberately open and flexible question: What was the emotion culture of British radical feminism in the 1980s? An emotion culture is the set of norms and guidelines within a social movement which indicate to participants how they ought to feel about themselves, other groups of people in their social context, and dominant groups. These guidelines are then put into practice in movement participants’ day-to-day thinking, feeling, and experiences, shaping their relationships with themselves and others.

The concept of emotion culture is productive for examining the emotions of radical feminism because a central aspect of what causes any social movement, including radical feminism, to work the way that it does emotionally are the relationships that the movement group has with participants in their own movement and with different categories of others outside their group, including individuals as well as groups and institutions. Emotion cultures provide an emotional map of the social world for participants in a social movement, indicating who allies and enemies are and what various events, social structures, cultural paradigms, and experienced realities should signify to movement participants about the state of the world they inhabit and their place within it, and by extension, how they should feel about it.

The research involved analysis of Trouble and Strife, a radical feminist independent magazine which was published in print from 1983-2002. The study focused on the period from 1983-1991, beginning when the magazine commenced publication and ending just before the start of the 'third wave' of feminism. It examined radical feminist writings about topics relating to medical and psychiatric health and well-being, which were intensely debated topics in radical feminism at the time as well as...
a significant area of division between radical feminism and other strands of the Women’s Liberation Movement. These roiling debates raised deep emotional relationships as well as fractures and fault lines, and were therefore a vivid lens through which to see the movement's emotional workings.
The research found that relationships with different groups were at the core of the movement's emotion culture, and specifically that the character of these relationships depended upon the extent to which various individuals and groups were perceived to conform to radical feminism's political ideology. Medical and psychiatric practices and institutions were seen to be dominated by men and patriarchal thinking, which were the most distant possible opposite to radical feminism's political values, making these institutions the objects of a range of adverse emotions, including horror, fear, anger, and annoyance.

Strands of the Women's Liberation Movement outside of radical feminism drew less intense adverse emotions than did men and the institutions they were seen to dominate, but they nevertheless engaged in practices and subscribed to ideological tenets which were incompatible with radical feminism's own internal culture. Consequently, radical feminists maintained a relationship of antipathy toward these other strands of the women's movement, retaining an inclination to disagreement, rejection, and dislike which permeated their emotions toward them.

Finally, within radical feminism itself, participants in the movement sustained relationships of strong affinity. Radical feminists alone were seen to participate in the ideology and approach to women's liberation that radical feminists favoured, and their favourable emotions were therefore reserved for one another. That affinity was highly valued, and when it was breached, the reaction was immediate and strong, and participants in the movement censured violators of their intra-group affinity in order to reject the violation and re-establish the affinity which had been undermined.
Declaration of Original Work

I hereby confirm that I have composed this thesis and that it is all my own work. I also declare that this work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Lisa Kalayji
Edinburgh, 30 April 2018
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Some of the people I most need to thank are those whose names would swell the page beyond any reasonable limits: the thinkers, feminists, revolutionaries, and educators who have shaped my thinking. Two in particular have enriched my work and sustained me as a human being to a degree which would be difficult to exaggerate. To Audre Lorde and Sara Ahmed I am indebted for the nourishment of their writing and their courage, and for helping to keep me viscerally conscious of why I chose to do this work.

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Feminist scholarship is a collective endeavour, and my development as a thinker has benefited endlessly from the comradeship, warmth, and passion of my feminist colleagues. Lauren, Nikki, Marie-Eve, Mary, Katherine, and Martina have provided me the joys of sisterhood and much-needed reprieve from the harsh light of reality. Particular thanks go to Órla, my co-author and frequent interlocutor, for the privilege of her insight, the fuel of her solidarity, and the pleasure of her conversation. All of these fiery and formidable intellectuals are a constant source of inspiration, and remind me of why misogynists are so intimidated by feminists.

Finally, I am thankful to my students for making academic work worthwhile and demonstrating what the different world that we feminist scholars are working toward might look like. Teaching them has kept the wind in my sails throughout the
process of doing this project in a way that nothing else could, and I continue to be astonished that my path has led me to the privilege of sharing classrooms with them.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

At the time of this writing, it is 2018. Feminism is having a moment, and there is some disjointed but audible talk of the highly visible ongoing surge in feminist activism and discourse proliferation being constitutive of a 'fourth wave' of feminism. As is always the case during a feminist 'wave' (and between them), feminist movements are lively, energetic, zealous, and a formidable threat to patriarchal complacency. As is also always true of feminisms, sub-strands within the broad and never-unitary movement dubiously swept under the singular banner 'feminism' are differentiated, diverse, internally contradictory, ambivalent, and sometimes fraught with heated disputes. The prevailing narrative of the 'second wave', which saw its UK emergence in the 1970s, is that it eventually became too deeply fractured by 'identity politics' to be sustained. Differences between women and the challenges of uniting women under a single liberation movement across the chasms of differences of positionality and experience bore more weight than the movement could bear, and it disintegrated.

That narration has come under some scrutiny, and this thesis will endeavour to contribute to the current outgrowth of historical re-evaluations of 20th century feminisms. Problematic though the generally accepted narrative is, however, it is difficult to dispute that feminist movements do struggle with division, strife, and controversy, and those divisions tend to amplify over time rather than recede. The current surge in feminist activity shows a great deal of promise for meaningful social change, but it also reflects patterns of conflict and misunderstanding which have plagued feminism in the past, even if the generally accepted historical account of that process has been overly simplistic. This research aims to generate a better understanding of one feminist movement - radical feminism – at a crucial juncture in its past, but my reason for undertaking the work is about feminism's present. This research proceeds from questions about how feminism is shaped by feminists' own historical understandings of our politics: How might feminism be different if
feminists across different feminist movements had a better, deeper, more historically-rooted understanding of feminist liberation struggles? How might the relationships between different feminist movements be more productive, cooperative, and constructively critical if the ideologies and emotions of feminist movements as they exist in the present were deeply, vividly, and richly understood as products of their particular historical locations and developmental trajectories? Though these questions may seem to skew uncomfortably near a plea for consonance and the cultivation of a 'happy sisterhood' which feminists have long known to be untenable, this is not the intention here. Rather, I pose these questions because any problem, including inter-feminism strife which siphons away energy that could be better placed elsewhere, must first be understood if there is to be any hope of solving it. While the solution here is unlikely to come in the form of a blissful family of universal feminism, deeper inter-feminist understanding may create greater space for feminists to work strategically with our differences rather than against them toward the collective aim of unravelling patriarchal hegemony.

It has never been a secret to feminists that politics are emotional. The suffragist activists of the 'first wave' faced the anger of men in their own homes as well as that of the state, and exhibited what were then, and still largely are, considered quite unladylike emotions in their collective actions and agitations for change. Emotionally intense divisions in the movement around questions of race and slavery abolition were a prescient forecast of similarly heated feminist fractures to come later, providing a clue to a fundamental aspect of the inner lives of feminist movements which is at the heart of the findings of my research: that the emotions of feminist movements are about relationships. Scholars of feminism have always given a great deal of attention to the various relationships that women must navigate, because relationships are where the power dynamics which shape women's lived realities are located. Women struggle through relationships with the state, with family and partners (who, in times past, were effectively their owners and keepers), with children and dependents, with non-state institutions, same-sex and different-sex lovers, friends, and cutting across all of these, each other.
Interestingly, however, the emotional lives of feminist *movements* have not received a great deal of scholarly attention. The emotions of feminist movements qua social movement call for further exploration. Feminist emotions have tended to be explored in a more general way which does not take the distinct emotional interiors of individual feminist sub-movements as a point of inquiry. Largely for this reason, it did not occur to me at the outset of this work on radical feminism to look at emotion, a focus which would come later. The earliest iteration of my research project was not about emotion at all, but was instead intended to be an exploration of the historical origins of anti-transgender *thought* in radical feminism (an ideological anomoly which substantially distinguishes it from other feminist movements). It was only by reading historical radical feminist literature, rife as it is with emotion and layered thick with webs of relationships, that it became clear that any endeavour to understand the collective ideologies of feminist movements required a specific exploration of their collective emotions; those collective emotions needed to be examined not only as emergent from common experiences of womanhood, but of shared uptake of distinct narratives, meanings, and cultural interpretations which pervade each sub-strand of feminism. My early explorations of radical feminist literature revealed that the movement's emotions were not merely the emotions of womanhood which had been dropped into a movement called 'radical feminism' – instead, people with emotive lived experiences of womanhood chose radical feminism from amongst the other feminist movements available because it resonated with their thinking and feeling in a way that the others did not.

This project aims to answer one principal research question: What was the collective emotion culture of British radical feminism in the 1980s? The question is deliberately broad, allowing for all aspects of the emotional life of the movement to emerge. It is also intended to take a holistic view of the emotions of the movement, examining how emotions work in radical feminism in general, rather than how a specific emotion or emotional dynamic manifests or operates. These sorts of holistic studies of the emotion cultures of social movements have only rarely been
undertaken (though sometimes have been, e.g. Gould, 2009; Holmes, 2000), with social movement emotions research more often taking a narrower focus. The typically more targeted frames of research on social movement emotions have enabled scholars to generate a powerful conceptual toolkit for explaining how emotions move, and are moved by, politics and social movements. Recognising that social movements necessarily involve both emotion and strategic decision making (Ruiz-Junco, 2013), this body of work has surfaced the interplay between the two, showing how movement participants use emotions to do the work of creating political change. This literature is reflective of the historical trajectory of the subfield of social movement studies, which struggled with overly-emotional accounts of social movement action and then moved to overly-cognitive ones, before eventually uniting the two. Much of the sociology of emotions and social movements consequently examines the dynamic interplay between social movement strategy and emotion, being careful not to push either out of the frame.

An area that the subfield consequently leaves under-explored is the more organic and less instrumental lens on social movement emotions. Social movement actors do the work that they do, including emotional work, in order to achieve political results, but that is not the only reason. They are also complex human subjects embedded in messy arrays of relationships, historical events, structures, cultures and subcultures, and communities, each generating distinct 'structures of feeling' (Williams, 2013[1969]). The substantial focus on emotional strategies and opportunities in the field of social movement emotions, shaped by the field's own genealogy, has led to less exploration of social movement participation as a way of being – an identity first and an approach to organised strategic action second. I do not propose that it may be a mistake to research the emotions of movements through the lens of strategic action, and as a vast body of work in this area has shown, studies of this type yield highly productive analytic results. Rather, I aim to contribute to an expansion of the borders of this subfield, exploring the way that engaging with the social world as a radical feminist might shape the movement’s emotion culture, even independently of questions of social movement strategic
action.

The research was always intended to intervene in the problematic discussed above – that of helping feminists placed in different sub-movements to better understand one another’s perspectives – but it later became about how to do this by better understanding the emergence of those perspectives through the emotional lives of movements in their particular historical locations. This is another aspect of the emotions of feminisms that can benefit from further sociological attention. Identity, experience, and positionality have been central to research on feminist ideology and culture, and while historical specificity is always a relevant consideration, it tends to be placed in the background. This research is a historical study, predicated on the observation that we are better equipped to understand the dynamics of the present moment if we first figure out how we got here. Its lens foregrounds the local and specific, digging narrowly but deeply into a small cross-section of the expansive life of British radical feminism in order to unearth the shaping of the movement’s development as it was anchored in the many-layered, local, and specific conditions with which radical feminists themselves would have grappled as they constructed their collective movement culture. Moving beyond acknowledging the relevance of socio-historical context, the research is about the history of the movement itself, with a view to using the findings as a tool to better understand present-day radical feminism only afterward.

There is some scope for questioning to what movement and associated ideology the label ‘radical feminism’ refers. In addition to being spread across a range of differing local contexts, the movement included differing ideological strands. What unites them is the premise that the oppression of women is primary and cross-cuts all other axes of difference (Millett, 2000[1969]; McNeill, 1996: 53). However, under the umbrella of that unifying claim, radical feminists have differed with respect to what they see as the appropriate strategies for achieving women’s liberation, and what those strategic preferences imply about how women’s oppression actually operates. (There is also a long-running assumption that radical feminism is a relic of the ‘second wave’ period of the 1960s and ’70s, though this
has been sufficiently well refuted that I will not elaborate that debate here – see, e.g., Mackay, 2015). The two broad camps into which radical feminism is generally seen as having divided are radical libertarian feminism and radical cultural feminism.

Radical libertarian feminism held that masculinity and femininity are socially and culturally constructed, and that these arbitrary divisions between male and female 'natures' ought to be eschewed; women ought instead to combine characteristics and behaviours culturally coded masculine or feminine as they saw fit (Millet, 2000[1969]) and women's oppression through reproductive service to men and patriarchal society ought to be entirely eradicated (Firestone, 2015[1970]). Alternatively, cultural approaches to radical feminism held that there was some merit to the idea of femininity or an essence of womanhood (though perhaps not to the word feminism), and that women's essence was superior to masculinity (Daly, 1979). Rather than being inherently oppressive, the embodied experience of being a woman was seen as having been made oppressive through men's violent control of it (Rich, 1986[1976]). As I argue in the chapters that follow, a strong presence in radical feminism as a whole was ambivalence, and ultimately this stark typology of libertarian versus cultural radical feminism is difficult to rely upon empirically. *Trouble and Strife* contains clear influences of both, and some of the negotiations between authors and readers (through letters to the editorial collective) reflect efforts to come to a radical feminist consensus which do not bear out this partisan binary. I wish to highlight, therefore, that though 'radical feminism' is represented monolithically throughout the thesis, its representation as either unitary or divided into clear ideological camps would be equally dubious, and my intention is to illustrate the complexity, ambiguity, and active negotiation that necessarily gives shape to a movement's historical development.

The history of radical feminism is long, reaching back roughly as far as the onset of the 'second wave' Women's Liberation Movement itself around 1970. Each period of the movement's history has contributed to its development in particular ways, and though each merits study in its own right, there was one time period in particular that recommended itself for the purpose of addressing the underlying
objective of the research in helping other types of contemporary feminists to better understand it: the 1980s. The 1970s saw the rapid growth of the Women’s Liberation Movement as a whole and its early fracturings. The postmodernism-informed ‘third wave’ emerged in the early 1990s, unsettling many of the assumptions, premises, and social categories that structured feminist thought and formed the logic of Women's Liberation Movement mobilisations and campaigns up to that point. Between these two decades lay the 1980s, a period during which the neoliberal epoch took hold and dramatically transformed public institutions and their underlying ideological logics. It was during the 1980s that the postmodern turn took shape and gained traction, and the feverish radical social movement activity of the 1970s largely gave way to still-consequential but less flashy forms of political organising as the activists of the 1970s grew up, established careers, raised children, and became preoccupied with the immediacy of the local and specific policy changes that the turn to neoliberal individualism had brought.

One of radical feminism’s most striking characteristics is its ideological continuity, which somehow made it from the 1970s across the bridge of the 1980s and into the 1990s and beyond with a politics which demonstrates remarkable resilience. The grip of neoliberal individualism and postmodernism have radically altered the social and cultural landscape since their onset in the 1980s and ‘90s respectively, but radical feminist thought has proven overwhelmingly impervious to the influence of these paradigm shifts. The movement’s internal culture when it entered the 1990s, whatever its attributes, was of ironclad construction. That radical feminists had built a culture that has withstood the dramatic shifts in its context raises questions about what exactly it was that the movement had built, and that is an underlying question which the findings of this thesis help to answer. Following in the long-established sociological tradition of investigating that which appears not quite as one might expect to find it, the project explores radical feminism’s emotion culture at the pivotal moment of the 1980s, when it shored up its defences against the significant ideological turns of that decade and reinforced itself sufficiently well to withstand the pull of the still further changes to come in the 1990s and after.
Radical feminists, like other strands of the 'second wave' WLM, subscribed to the view that 'the personal is political', and this was reflected in the political gaze that they turned upon every aspect of their world and lives. This research focuses specifically on one general area of the movement's thought which had raised some of the most ideologically and emotionally complex debates and textures within radical feminism and between the movement and its context: medical and psychiatric health care. The research employs literary ethnography, examining radical feminist writings in the flagship British radical feminist magazine *Trouble and Strife* concerned with topics in this area. *Trouble and Strife* served as a sort of textual home for the movement, and the nuanced debates and multifaceted emotions that surrounded radical feminists' engagements with their context through their engagements with medical and psychiatric care were unpacked in illuminating detail in the magazine's pages.

The ensuing chapters draw upon a range of concepts and terms, some of which will be explored in some depth. At the outset, there are some key issues of terminology to note. The most significant concept in the thesis is 'emotion', which is explored in chapter 2. By way of providing here some idea of how the thesis will use the concept of emotion, I draw principally on theorisations of emotions as relational, bearing out the foundational premise of the field of the sociology of emotions itself: that emotions are social, and that they can therefore only be understood through how they are constituted in and through social relations. Like others who see emotions as relational (e.g., Ahmed, 2014[2004]; Burkitt, 2014a), I recognise the significance of the bodily, the affective, the cognitive, and the socio-cultural in the ‘complexes’ (Burkitt, 2014b) that comprise emotions. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore in depth all of these dimensions, but by way of introduction, this project takes as its emphasis the processes by which emotions become collective, tied to social structures and cultural meanings, and constituted in the relations between actors and their contexts. Where the term ‘emotion’ is used, it refers to emotions as relational.

The complex emotions at issue in this research are those of British radical
feminism, a sub-strand of the ‘second wave’ Women’s Liberation Movement (WLM). In the interest of brevity I will refer to it simply as ‘radical feminism’ or ‘the movement’, but it should be understood that this always refers to the British radical feminist movement unless otherwise specified (there is a case to be made that there may be significant commonality of this movement across other contexts, but further research is needed to explore this possibility). I will also refer to the movement in the past tense, and though its past extends farther back than the 1980s and continues past that period and up to the present, all references in this thesis to radical feminism’s past refer to the period covered by the research unless a different one is specified. I also regularly refer to the time period covered by this study as ‘the 1980s’, though the dataset begins from 1983 and ends at 1991. By terming this period simply ‘the 1980s’, I aim to acknowledge that the defining attributes of decades tend to take on the character of the ‘late and long’, taking a bit of time to take shape after their onset and a bit to wrap up after their conclusion (the way that researchers bracket periods of time are, in any case, always open to interrogation and somewhat unduly drawn to the consonance of round numbers). The key attributes of the decade of the ‘80s that I highlight for purposes of this research bled out of its edges, but are nevertheless strongly associated with it: the establishment of the Thatcherite neoliberal paradigm, the ‘gap’ between the ‘second wave’ surge of the 1970s and the ‘third wave’ of the 1990s, the cultural turn in British feminism, and the transition from modernist feminist political lenses that largely dominated the 1970s to the postmodern turn in the early 1990s.

The research uses text-based data, but what constitutes ‘text’ is a wide area of exploration unto itself. I use the term ‘text’ to refer in a general way to hard copy material, including words, images, and where relevant, material aspects such as paper, ink, and binding. Text can also include digital materials (and in fact some of the data collection for this project was done by this means, an issue which is explored in chapter 3), but I do not use the term to incorporate the digital except where specified in discussions of methodology. There are meaningful specificities to the production, circulation, and consumption of digital content which this historical
research does not explore. The later-emerging digital dimension notwithstanding, *Trouble and Strife* was originally published and read in hard copy format, and it is the formation of the movement’s collective emotion culture through that hard-copy text which this research examines (leaving the intriguing question of how it might have been different if formed in the digital age for another project). Additionally, references to ‘the text’ shall refer to the text of *Trouble and Strife*. There is a further distinction to be made with respect to the textual genre of *Trouble and Strife*. The periodical publications of the ‘second wave’ are sometimes referred to as journals, though they included magazines, broadsheet-style newspapers, and more academically-oriented journals. Because my research is about how radical feminists themselves constructed their emotion culture in and through *Trouble and Strife*, I have aimed to take on board their own understanding of what it was. The editorial collective referred to it as a magazine, so I have adopted this characterisation; debates about what might constitute the difference between a magazine and a journal are not explored here.

Within the topical frame of the research are multiple components of the broad area of medical and psychiatric health, care, and well-being. As will be explored throughout this thesis, radical feminists saw physiological and psychiatric health care as dominated by men and patriarchal ideology, and recognised a long history of men using these ostensibly caring frameworks, institutions, and practices to control and oppress women. Though a visit to a general practice doctor might be seen as quite unrelated to participating in group therapy, the radical feminist lens saw these as linked at a fundamental political level, and it is therefore helpful to have a term to unite the entire structure of these care and well-being regimes. I have termed these ‘male-dominated regimes of care’ (or ‘MDRCs’), denoting all institutions, practices, theoretical frameworks, and practitioners involved in the infrastructure of medical and psychiatric research and practice. This term is used where it is necessary to denote the broad patriarchal caring regime in general, and the term is deliberately designed to incorporate radical feminists’ own lens on these regimes as inherently male-dominated (even where a particular practitioner was
female).

It is sometimes necessary to refer to specific areas falling under this broad umbrella as well. I term ‘medical care’ or ‘physiological medical/health care’ those aspects which refer to general practice, gynaecology, and other areas of medicine concerned with the bodily rather than the psychic. Where the psychic is concerned, I will generally refer to psychoanalysis. There is a distinction to be made here between psychoanalysis (the theoretical framework) and psychotherapy (or simply ‘therapy’, both referring to the clinical practice associated with the psychoanalytic framework). Radical feminists saw the practice of psychotherapy as problematic largely (though not exclusively) because it was informed by a framework which they contended had patriarchal assumptions, and sometimes overt misogyny, embedded into its foundations. I refer to ‘psychoanalysis’ where the entirety of the psychoanalytically-informed lens and its implementation in clinical practice is at issue. I refer to ‘psychotherapy’ or ‘therapy’ only where it is specifically the clinical or practical dimension that is of concern.

As has been mentioned above, this research takes as one of its foundational assumptions the idea that social movements are founded in ideologies. For immediate purposes, I take ideology to mean frame (what is considered pertinent and how those things ought to be understood) plus values (normative evaluations of the consequences of the frame, and how this relates to a broader moral logic) (Ferree and Merrill, 2000: 458-59). Much of the process of producing, negotiating, contesting, and (re)producing radical feminism's emotion culture involved questioning its frames and their ideological consequences. The radical feminist ideological lens to which I frequently allude throughout chapters 4, 5, and 6 incorporates the movement's core ideological tenets, which were taken to be the measure of 'good' radical feminist politics, and against which disputed norms and claims were therefore measured. Discussions of framing, peppered throughout the analysis, refer to places within the text of *Trouble and Strife* where the movement's existing frame was being either invoked or contested, drawing upon collective normative values embedded in the movement's ideology and sometimes suggesting
that the frame might need to be altered in order to better fit with those values.

The thesis proceeds in a total of seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview and discussion of the literatures in which this research is situated. The project is situated within the literature on emotions in social movements, and specifically within work on emotion cultures of movements. The relational view of emotion which I advocate has not had significant traction thus far in the study of social movements, nor has the concept of emotion culture been widely used in research on movements. Chapter 2 will explore the potentials for bringing these two concepts into more application in the study of movement emotions. I argue that in addition to possible benefits of employing these concepts in future research, there is scope for re-reading the existing literature through the analytic lenses of relational emotion and emotion culture, and though more research can and should be done to build upon this, when viewed through a different lens, much of this work can be seen to have been (inadvertently) done already.

The research methodology will be covered in chapter 3. This incorporates discussions of the feminist approach employed in the research, the literary ethnographic approach used, the research design, archival data collection, and sampling, and the analysis of the data. Literary ethnography is a surprisingly uncommonly used method for the study of texts, but I argue that it is particularly beneficial for research on emotions. Building on a small body of existing work on this method, I suggest that the epistemic assumptions which necessarily go into studying emotions in texts using literary ethnography are a natural complement to a feminist epistemology, making this method ideal for feminist research on emotions using textual data.

The thesis does not incorporate a chapter dedicated specifically to 'theory'; theory on emotions is discussed in chapter 2, and issues of text and epistemology are explored in chapter 3. The mid-range nature of emotion theory has been reflected in the way this literature has been constructed, with emotion theory nearly always emerging from empirical research. Likewise, issues of epistemology are inextricably intertwined with questions around the reading and
interpretation of text. Theoretical questions have therefore been explored in these two chapters.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 expound the analysis. They are divided into the three key relationships in radical feminism’s emotion culture. Chapter 4 explores the movement’s relationship with men, patriarchy, and the male-dominated institutions and paradigms of medical and psychiatric care. Chapter 5 examines radical feminists’ engagements with other strands of the Women’s Liberation Movement, surfacing the background emotions that pervaded these challenging relationships. Finally, chapter 6 delves into the relationships within radical feminism itself, highlighting the distinctiveness of the emotional enclave of the movement and elaborating how it was maintained, challenged, and ultimately repaired and reinforced.

There are two technical matters of note regarding extracts from the text of Trouble and Strife. Firstly, a number of the extracts include quotations within quotations. The text of Trouble and Strife itself was inconsistent with respect to where it used single quotation marks and where double ones, in some cases alternating between them within a single piece and without apparent reason. In the interest of consistency, I use single quotes to indicate my quotations from the data, and place any quotations within those extracts in double marks. It should be noted, therefore, that this is one possible incongruity between how the original text of the magazine appears and how I have represented it. Additionally, all extracts are cited with the issue number of the magazine included. I have done this to give the reader a sense of the order in which different pieces and discussions appeared in the magazine – quoting with the date only would obscure the ordering, because there were multiple issues per year.
Chapter 2
The Sociology of Emotions in Social Movements

2.1
Introduction

The sociology of emotions is considered a comparatively young subfield, but its genealogy began with classical sociology. Emotions have only in roughly the past 50 years become an overt sociological topic in their own right, despite the discipline’s reliance on them for some of the early accounts of the relationship between the individual and the social. Émile Durkheim’s work on the emotional power of religious ritual (1995[1912]) and the social determinants of suicide (2002[1897]), Karl Marx’s (1959[1844]) understanding of the misery of workers alienated from the products of their labour¹, Georg Simmel’s (2002[1903]) account of the blasé relations between residents of densely populated urban centres, and Norbert Elias’s (2000[1939]) theory of the civilising process all elucidated the central place of emotion in mediating social relations and giving rise to social actors’ experiences of and responses to being embedded in particular types of social structures and cultural mileux. However, emotion was rather paradoxically left behind when later sociologists picked up the threads laid down by these foundational thinkers, and emotion was relegated to background noise in social theory. Ironically, these forebears of the sociology of emotions would prove to have been more successful at synthesising thought and feeling in their implied accounts

¹ Marx’s alienation is an oft-cited example of emotion theory in classical sociology, but it is worth noting that alienation in Marx’s understanding was concerned with the nature of the relationship between workers and the products of their labour, rather than with a feeling of alienation in the social actor’s emotional life. That version of alienation would emerge later from Arlie Hochschild’s (1983) analysis of the condition of workers under capitalism through alienated emotional labour. Though both Marx and Hochschild term this condition ‘alienation’ and link it to capitalism and labour, what they each mean by ‘alienation’ differs.
of the social subject than sociologists (including social movement scholars) would come to be again for many decades.

The sociology of social movements has had a fluctuating relationship with emotions as an analytic lens, and the body of work which now dominates understandings of the place of emotions in movements has emerged only in recent decades. In order to better understand what currently prevailing theory on emotions in movements does, it is beneficial to have a clear view of the trajectory by which the field has arrived at its present point. Accordingly, this chapter will divide into three sections, first overviewing the history of the subfield of emotions in social movements before laying out the work that this body of scholarship has come to do. Section 2.2 will briefly overview the history of the study of emotions in social movements, tracing how the study of movements has oscillated in the extent to which it has engaged questions of emotion (and the alternative once taken to be emotion’s opposite, instrumental rationality). After having moved through a series of shifts in both its philosophical foundations and its mid-range theory, research on emotions in movements has now landed decidedly in a constructivist ontology, and section 2.3 will briefly discuss constructivism’s benefits for this field of study. The chapter will then focus on the recent decades during which the body of research on emotions and social movements as we now know it emerged, exploring two primary explanatory functions of this area of scholarship: (1) social movement phases and (2) emotion work\(^2\) (Hochschild, 1979). Section 2.4 will discuss research on emotions in the progressive phases of social movements. This work explores the role of emotion in the emergence, mobilisation, sustenance, attrition, and abeyance of movements. Intertwined with this phasing-oriented research is another aspect of the field, which focuses on the emotion work done by and within movements. This research will be examined in section 2.5, showing how emotion work of various

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\(^{2}\) ‘Emotion work’ is the active, reflexive effort to change what one feels in order to experience emotions that better conform to what is understood to be expected or appropriate in a given situation. The term derives from Arlie R. Hochschild's (1979; 1983) dramaturgical account of emotions, which drew on Erving Goffman’s (1973[1956]) conception of performative social interaction. Though some of the foundational assumptions of dramaturgical accounts of emotion have come under critique, the perspective remains popular in the study of emotions in social movements – some of the problematic conceptual issues at play will be explored in the sections that follow.
types is at the heart of research on emotions in movements as we now recognise it. As a component of and in relation to this emotion work perspective, section 2.5 also explores the relatively small body of research on the emotion cultures of social movements. Though not a great deal of research on emotions and social movements names emotion culture as its explanatory concept, I argue that emotion culture is a much stronger presence in the literature on emotions in movements than the infrequent appearance of the term might suggest. Looking for emotion culture in research on emotions in movements which does not invoke the concept explicitly, it can be seen that a substantial amount of existing research in this subfield contributes to understandings of the emotion cultures of social movements. It is to this considerable, but largely hidden, strand of scholarship that my research contributes.

2.2

Emotions in the Sociology of Social Movements

The study of social movements has moved through three fairly distinct phases. In its early iteration, the field was dominated by a crowd psychology model, viewing protest movements (a term often elided with social movements – I will return to this point below) as feverish outgrowths of intoxicating collective feeling. Drawing from Durkheim’s (1995[1912]) concept of collective effervescence, it assumed that protest movement participants lost their ability to think and reason as they were swept up in the emotional intensity (what we would now theorise as affect) of a protest event. In addition to an obvious understatement of social actors’ reflexive capacities, such a model has been used to justify coercive and violent policing aimed at bringing unruly protesters under control by any means necessary, a consequence which has only recently begun to be rectified (see Gorringe et al, 2012). Underlying this understanding of social movement actions is the culturally ubiquitous cultural precept that emotions are inherently irrational (Burkitt, 2014a: 44; Ahmed, 2014[2004]): 3; Lyman, 2004: 134-5; Barbalet, 2001: 29-32). The
denigration of emotion as inferior and as the *modus operandi* of the socially subjugated is traceable as far back as Hellenic Greece (Ost, 2004: 231), and it continues to reverberate through social life and to haunt sociological scholarship. An awareness emerged amongst sociologists of social movements that characterising movement participants as emotional was politically problematic as well as conceptually flawed, and scholars turned their interests to other ways of understanding protest.

The subfield then turned away from emotion altogether and saw movement participants as being purely rational actors (Ruiz-Junco, 2013: 45-6). All protest and movement actions, even where they appeared intensely emotional, were taken to be the product of careful premeditation and rational cost/benefit calculation. When the emotionally heated social movements of the 1960s and ‘70s emerged, the sociology of social movements was permeated by positivism and unequipped to theorise them, having marginalised the necessary constructivist and culturally-oriented lenses (Ost, 2004: 233). Theorists during the middle of the 20th century had recognised movement participants’ careful attention to their social contexts and abilities to make strategic decisions on the basis of what effects particular approaches to collective action might have, but in so doing, had forgotten that feeling did not stop wherever thinking began. Strategy and instrumentality are essential to theorising social movements (Jasper, 2004), but movement participants are not reducible to their capacity for strategic calculations (Gould, 2002: 197). In order to robustly theorise social movements, scholars must account for both emotion and strategic decision-making (Jasper, 1998: 421).

The 1980s and ‘90s saw the cultural turn in the social sciences, and the study of social movements began to take culture and the self more seriously; the cognitive view of the interior of the self, however, persisted (Goodwin *et al*, 2000). Rumbling under the surface of the sociology of social movements through the 1990s was the growing impression that emotions needed to be returned to the analytic fold, and research began to be done to theorise the way that emotions and instrumental rationality were used in tandem by social movement participants. This body of work
began to appear in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and it is from that point to the present that most of the research in this area has emerged. A vast array of different types of movements have been studied, generating an expansive and productive toolkit of concepts for explaining how emotions work in movements. Though there are many different ways to categorise this research, a productive one is to see it as divided into two general categories (with much research having a foot in both camps). One is concerned with the effect of emotions on different phases of social movements: the conditions under which they are able to emerge, what enables them to generate emotional energy and collective action for specific mobilisation events, what keeps participants committed and involved in order to sustain movements over time, how emotions undermine the endurance of movements and contribute to attrition, and how emotions keep movements smouldering under the radar during periods of abeyance. The second broad branch addresses emotion work: what types of emotion-transforming efforts movement participants engage in to elicit the emotions from themselves and relevant others (like policy makers or the general public) needed to achieve movement goals.

These two areas are substantially intertwined, as the emotion work required in movements is often concerned with bringing about or advancing different phases of a movement’s progression. The subfield of emotions in general, and emotions in movements in particular, is brimming over with typologies, taxonomies, and categories largely because scholars have attempted to order and organise a body of knowledge which stubbornly resists the linear, geometric, and discrete. Some researchers have been left wondering whether it is analytically fruitful (or empirically justified) for us to generate myriad taxonomic systems when no two of them seem to align (Berezin, 2002: 37), a curiosity which I confess to sharing. Different emotions bleed into one another, scholars default to colloquial definitions of emotion words (Jasper, 2011: 286) and thereby potentially talk past one another in the literature, and participants in social movements remain entangled in vast arrays of networks and relationships which confound any effort to isolate the emotional dynamics rooted in movements themselves. Clumsy and imperfect an
enterprise though it may be, however, some order must be imposed on the complex quagmire of emotions in social movements so that it can be talked about. I have divided the scholarship into movement phases and emotion work because the analytic concepts that pertain to emotion work tend to be different to those concerned with movement stages, even if the social process involved are inextricable. It is these two general strands of social movement emotion theory with which sections 2.4 and 2.5 are concerned.

2.3 The Ontology of Emotions

Debates persist about what precisely an emotion is. There are a few key attributes of emotion which define it and distinguish it from related concepts, such as feeling and affect. Feelings involve physical sensations which can be involved in emotion, but can also be independent of emotion and concerned with other functions of the body (such as hunger or sleepiness). Emotions involve the interpretation of these feelings and the attribution of relational significance to them.

Norman K. Denzin (1984) provided a valuable foundation for this relational account of emotion by highlighting that a key component of emotion is the feeling subject’s awareness of and feeling toward the self. It is the self in relation to another, and the understanding that this signifies something about that relationship, that makes feeling an emotion. These relations are necessarily always relations of power (even if not unequal power), further highlighting the inevitably relational in emotion – how one feels about oneself can only emerge from how one is positioned in terms of power in relation to others, and vice versa (Kemper, 1990; Heaney, 2011). Ian Burkitt (2014a) has extended this view of emotions, theorising them as inherently relational and recognising that emotions necessarily bleed into one another and involve complex entanglements of physical sensations, meanings and interpretations, and the attribution of emotional significance to these. Emotions are also understood to be episodic, having a start and end point and lasting a comparatively short time (von Scheve, 2018: 2), though as I will argue in chapter 5,
there may be scope to reconsider this component of the definition.

All of these components of emotion rely upon the union of the embodied with the social and the cultural, relating to how social actors are positioned in structures and cultures in relation to one another. Proceeding from this observation, research on emotions in movements is virtually all firmly rooted in a constructivist ontology, with differences being confined to emphases on culture (e.g., Reger, 2004; Groves, 1997; Taylor, 2000) or structure (e.g., Whittier, 2001; Goodwin, 1997; Guenther, 2009). Where theorising social movement emotions from the perspective of a realist ontology is attempted (Mizen, 2015), it proceeds from the colloquial elision between subjectivity and opinion, arguing that movement participants’ evaluations of the political realities that they mobilise against are objective, and therefore not sullied by the inferior reliability of subjective assessments. This emphasis on the ‘real’ follows the critical realist ontology from which the concept of the reflexive internal conversation (Archer, 2003) derives. Reflexivity is an indispensable concept for understanding emotions sociologically (Holmes, 2010), and Archer’s and Mizen’s concerns that constructivism minimises the causal (and political) significance of emotions and reflexivity are not entirely unfounded; while it does not follow that emotion’s status as socially constructed makes it causally insignificant, in the broader context in which academic knowledge is itself situated, there is a tendency to imbue the immutably real with greater import than the ‘merely’ constructed.

The constructivist ontology, however, remains widely accepted across the sociology of emotions (Clarke et al., 2006) because it allows for the recognition of the socio-cultural contingency of emotions themselves, as well as the conditions in which emotions arise (Burkitt, 2014a; Williams, 2013[1961]; Reddy, 2001). This is not tantamount to a suggestion that in a different sort of social context, people might not have emotions or internal dialogic reflections at all (the implication which appears to be at the heart of realists’ anxieties). What it does highlight is that social structures and cultural mileux shape what emotions are available to be felt and within what social relations those emotions can be experienced – in effect, creating
emotions themselves, not merely channelling already-existing emotions into constructed structures and cultures. As the research on emotions in social movements shows, movement participants navigate matrices of social relations and draw on cultural toolkits of available emotions in order to enable their own collective actions, to transform their ways of relating emotionally to their realities, and to influence outsiders’ perceptions of the political issues which their movements are meant to transform. The constructivist account of emotions enables scholars to capture those processes.

2.4

Social Movement Through the Lens of Time: Emotions & Movement Phases

Different social movements run for different durations, with some emerging seemingly unexpectedly, exhibiting significant activity, and then fading as quickly as they appeared, while others subsist over many decades. There are some general consistencies in the way that emotion affects the phases of social movements, however, and which enable scholars to discern the emotional conditions of possibility for a movement to form, mobilise, persist, and ultimately decline. Particular emotions are understood to be generative of collective action (anger features prominently here, but other emotions have come to be taken increasingly seriously as sources of mobilisation), while others lead movements to lose momentum and erode (like grief and alienation).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, anger is the emotion most commonly associated with social movement activity, in spite of appearances of its inverse, joy, in some parts of the literature (see, e.g., Wettergren, 2009). In addition to common-sense associations between social movements and public displays of anger at well-publicised public protest demonstrations, social movements are intended to redress grievances. Movement formation and mobilisation, therefore, rely upon anger and discontentment\(^3\). The anger of oppressed and disadvantaged groups performs the

\(^3\) These emotions are sometimes termed ‘negative emotions’. The characterisation of some emotions as negative and others as positive does resonate with common-sense usage and emotional experience, but the distinction is potentially problematic, particularly within a literature which substantially argues that emotions like anger and disaffection can be used to create a more just world. Whether any given instance of anger is ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ is itself an evaluation
essential function of bringing to light injustices which those in more privileged positions might not otherwise be aware of at all (Lyman, 2004), and it is used by movements as a mechanism of demanding accountability (Holmes, 2004: 224). There is political value to subjugated groups exhibiting emotion even independently of to what purpose they put it: anger is generally conceived as the appropriate and legitimate emotional purview of the powerful, and it becomes an act of resistance in its own right for the oppressed to lay a claim to the legitimate experience and expression of anger (Flam, 2005: 26; Ost, 2004; Taylor, 1996; Gould, 2002; Hercus, 1999). For these reasons, it serves a particular function in the early period of a movement or a mobilisation (a specific collective action within the longer life of a social movement) (Sampietro and Ordaz, 2015).

The findings of this research have sometimes implied that particular emotions are inherently motivating or immobilising, but it has become increasingly clear that what sort of effect an emotion has on social movement participants’ engagement or attrition depends largely on context. No emotion has meaning in itself – an emotion emerges and signifies something to the person feeling it because of what they understand to be arousing it. For social movement participants, inferences about the causal origins of emotional experiences are sensitive to context, culture, and relations of power, pointing to the relational nature of emotion (Burkitt, 2014a; Emirbayer and Goldberg, 2005; Goodwin et al, 2000). In order for grief to be mobilising in one instance and demobilising in another, the social actors feeling it must have some conception of what their grief says about their relationship with the world. That grief raises questions for them about who is causing them to feel it, whether that feeling is one they want to embrace or escape from, and what they ought to then do about it. That emotions are not interior states, but modes of relationship which are necessarily bound up with narratives, necessarily rooted in a particular perspective – even where there is consensus that the social change generated through anger is desirable, it is easier to see unpleasant emotions through rose coloured glasses when viewing them from a place of calm and distance (Holmes, 2004: 224). I will refer to what might otherwise be termed negative and positive emotions as adverse and favourable, respectively. Though it might seem preferable to eschew the distinction between good and bad emotions altogether, research on emotions and movements clearly demonstrates its analytic value, showing how movement participants use adverse and favourable emotions to divide up the world into allies and adversaries.
discourse, and signification was key to shaping the emotion culture of radical feminism, and I will return to this in chapters 4, 5, and 6.

2.5

*Using Emotions for Social Movement: Emotion Work*

Emotions are an invaluable resource for social movement activity. They enable participants to identify with communities of others who share their political interests (Hercus, 1999; Polletta and Jasper, 2001), to affectively bond with people involved in their movement groups (Jasper, 1998; Taylor and Rupp, 2002), to transform their emotional relationships with themselves and their contexts in ways which buoy their political values (King, 2006; Groves, 1995; Ryan, 2015), to motivate and embolden them for action (Gould, 2002; 2009; Kleres and Wettergren, 2017; Wettergren, 2009; Mizen, 2015; Yang, 2000), and to influence policy makers and the public in order to achieve their aims (Coe and Schabel, 2011; Cadena-Roa, 2002; von Scheve *et al*, 2016). Emotion work can be oriented inward, toward the social actor’s self or the interior community of the social movement group, or can be directed outward, using emotional framing to persuade others to sympathise with the movement’s claims (and sometimes to create a public relations conundrum for powerful elites which compels them toward a desired action).

Social movements are a powerful topical focus for the exploration of the concept of emotion work. Movements must engage in significant emotional reflexivity (King, 2006), evaluating their own emotions and those of relevant others, and then act upon them to achieve the desired results. There are frequently disparities between which emotions movement participants or their publics feel and which ones it would be expedient for them to feel (and express), and the literature on social movement emotion work consequently draws heavily on Arlie Hochschild’s dramaturgical perspective on emotions. In her wildly influential research on the emotional labour of flight attendants, Hochschild (1983) argues that the job of a flight attendant requires the expression of warm and conciliating emotions which the workers with whom she researched often did not actually feel. The friendly emotional expression of flight attendants was a component of the experience that
airlines sold to their customers, effectively commoditising workers’ emotions. Positioning this analysis within a critique of the alienating effects of paid labour under capitalism, Hochschild highlights the dissonance between what flight attendants ‘really’ felt and what emotions they were compelled by their employers to perform. Her work distinguishes between ‘surface acting’ (the performance of emotions which are not actually felt) and ‘deep acting’ (the endeavour to change what one actually feels, so that the emotions that must be performed for the job can be sincerely felt and honestly expressed, mitigating the alienation experienced when the two are out of sync). She thereby generated two categories of emotion work: one which pertains to emotional expression alone (surface acting) and another capturing work upon feeling itself as well as its expression (deep acting).

Social movement scholars have rightly seized upon the traction of this analysis for theorising situations faced by social movement participants (Maney et al, 2009; Perry, 2002; Reger, 2004), who often have an instrumental need to feel and express emotions that they do not (yet) feel, or at least do not feel with enough intensity to meet the demands of their predicament, such as when emotional work is needed to overcome the fear induced by violent protest scenes (see, e.g., Mizen, 2015; Kleres and Wettergren, 2017; Yang, 2000). However, Hochschild’s framework hints at a psychological, rather than a sociological, view of the self, indicating that there are true and false emotions, and accounting for the emotional dissonance felt in emotional labour by reference to a disjuncture between the two (Wouters, 1989: 97). There is scope to reread the literature on emotion work in movements through the lens of relational emotion rather than dramaturgy, seeing emotion work as the transformation of emotional relationships rather than as a performance-oriented exercise (performance, after all, can only be necessitated by the need for particular types of relations between self and other). In the remainder of this section, a significant amount of material framed through dramaturgy will be discussed, but a possible pivot on this research will also be suggested wherein we can reinterpret dramaturgical emotional work as work upon relationships. As I will argue in later chapters, it is this relationship-shaping emotional work that defined the emotion
culture of radical feminism (and, I would contend, other movements’ emotional worlds which have been theorised through dramaturgy).

2.5.A

**Working on the Emotions: Emotion Management & Emotional Channelling**

Social movements are emotionally demanding. They require motivation, energy, commitment, courage, resilience, and passion, all of which can be difficult to summon and sustain. Additionally, emotional experiences are shaped by context and culture, and movement participants consequently often find themselves feeling emotions which conform to the emotion rules of the hegemonic culture around them, but do not align with what their counter-hegemonic values indicate they ought to feel. A significant amount of emotional work happens in social movement groups to address this disparity, enabling participants to cultivate the emotions that they need to politically engage. It is obvious, then, why Hochschild’s dramaturgical theory is so pervasive in social movement emotions literature. Her distinction between emotional evocation (arousing or inciting a desired emotion which is absent) and emotional suppression (attempting to contain an undesired one) (1979: 561) seems instructive for explaining what is done emotionally within movements.

The emotional work done in movements requires strategies which enable participants to feel what they need to feel and move away from emotions which impede their activities. Social movement groups are pervaded by a range of emotions in need of this sort of management, and some of them are used as mechanisms for managing others. For example, Jochen Kleres and Asa Wettergren (2017) describe the use of some emotions as mediators of others in the global movement to resist climate change. Participants, they argue, used hope to mediate fear, preventing fear from becoming immobilising and allowing it to be experienced as a cue to a threat which demanded an organised response. The cultivation of hope functioned to prevent fear from becoming too overwhelming to be used productively. They also found that love was used to mediate anger, because activists perceived some anger as productive, but too much as incompatible with the values and character of their movement. The lineage from earlier social movement studies
is clear here, with emotions being used as tools by activists for instrumentally rational objectives.

Emotion management can alternatively take a more passive form, with prospective movement participants managing their exposure to experiences which might elicit emotions that they do not want to experience. In research on social movement non-participation, Norgaard found that people who were not yet involved in movements and wanted to avoid feeling spurred to action would elect to avoid exposure to information which might make them feel pressured to mobilise. The prospect of feelings of guilt, hopelessness, or being out of control led movement non-participants to eschew media messages which might rouse these feelings. By not engaging with ideas that might be emotionally loaded with a moral imperative to take collective action, movement non-participants were able to maintain their senses of self as good and righteous people in spite of their inaction.

Likewise, however, the endeavour to cultivate a particular self-identity can lead to emotion management which drives movement action, and can explain how activists are able to generate the emotions necessary for staggering acts of self-sacrifice. Drawing on Hochschild’s emotion management perspective, Guobin Yang (2000) proposes the concept of ‘emotional achievement’ to explain how activists in the 1989 Chinese student movement were able to risk and sometimes lose their lives without being deterred by fear. When doing movement work becomes not merely instrumental, but a form of emotional self-actualisation, even otherwise overwhelming levels of fear can give way to activists’ desire to have particular ‘self-feelings’ (Denzin, 1984). Activists’ emotional investments in their views of themselves, then, became means of managing fear, making risky and dangerous collective actions possible.

Though Hochschild’s framework remains popular, some scholars of movement emotions have found it limiting. Mary Holmes (2004) argues that the view of movement participants as performing emotions in conformity to emotional rules or managing emotions for purposes of performance has some utility, but is unable to account for feelings of ambivalence and tensions arising when different
emotion rules come into conflict. Taking a different entry into the idea of emotion work than emotion management, Debra King (2006) explores activists’ use of emotional reflexivity to transform their emotions. Through research on multiple activist groups in Australia which engaged in the practice of ‘re-evaluation counselling’ (a psychoanalytically based approach to reflexive emotional work) King describes how movement participants endeavoured to break free of oppressive dominant discourses which they had come to internalise. Through re-evaluation counselling, activists were enabled to participate in the emotions of their movements, which ran counter to subjugating discourses.

Though these activists’ engagement with their emotion work through the framework of re-evaluation counselling brought psychoanalytic assumptions about emotions into the practice of emotional reflexivity (an unnecessary approach which ‘second-wave’ feminists avoided by employing the more sociologically-minded framework of consciousness raising), King’s research highlights that there is space to re-conceive dramaturgical emotion work as movement participants’ use of reflexivity to transform their emotional relationships with themselves, other people, institutions, cultures, and values. Rather than seeing the emotion work done by movement participants as the emotional evocation or suppression that the dramaturgical framework proposes, it can be understood as a wilful endeavour to transform relationships through feeling. In his research on the British and Spanish governments’ attempts to direct the public’s emotional responses to terrorist attacks, Ian Burkitt (2005) found that resistance to the government’s authority took the form of the subversive direction of anger. Rather than cooperating with governments’ framings, which encouraged anger toward the attackers, members of the public directed their anger at government elites who had failed to keep London and Madrid safe. Burkitt argues that the ‘potential revolutionary power of emotion does not stem from its irrationality, but rather from its “relational logic” which follows the pattern of people’s attachments to others, to symbols and ideals.’ (2005: 693). Though dramaturgical accounts recognise the rationality of emotion, they remain implicitly rooted in the idea of emotions being internal states which are
projected outward unidirectionally. The relational account captures what emotional reflexivity actually entails, revealing that emotion work is not about summoning emotions from nowhere. Rather, it is a matter of rethinking relationships with the self, with particular other people, with institutions or collectives, and with cultures, ideals, and values – a rethinking which leads to transformed feeling.

In spite of its wide popularity, some scholars of emotions in movements have cast doubt on some of Hochschild’s claims. Even where the dramaturgical account is critiqued, however, its assumptions sometimes prove persistent. Coe and Schabel’s (2011) research on reproductive rights campaigning in Peru explores the emotion work done by participants to enable them to engage with unreceptive policy makers and a general public which stigmatises women’s exercise of reproductive agency. They found that movement participants did engage in what might be considered ‘surface acting’, but they did not feel alienated (as Hochschild argues) by doing so because these performances helped them to achieve desired objectives. Coe and Schabel highlight that coalitions built between different social actors through emotional performance can be a valuable resource – an analysis which closely aligns with Burkitt’s relational account. However, they continue to characterise emotional performance as a tension between authentic and performed emotion, incorporating Hochschild’s distinction between the ‘true’ and ‘false’ self. The common-sense language with which emotion is generally described makes it difficult to depart from these precepts, but an interpretation of emotion work as relationship work recognises conflicting feelings as ambivalence without getting mired in a dubious distinction between authentic and inauthentic selves.

Another concept used to theorise the emotion work done by social movement actors which leans nearer toward a relational understanding of emotion is emotional channelling. When the emotions felt by movement participants are inconsistent with their ideologies or inhibitive to their ability to engage in collective action, they use emotional channelling to transform one emotion into another. This concept began to appear in the late 1990s (Groves, 1997; Jasper, 1997; see also Summers Effler, 2010; Reger, 2004), but the most widely-known and influential
study using it is Deborah Gould’s (2002; 2009) research on the HIV/AIDS movement group ACT UP. Gould highlights that the emotional realities of ACT UP were rooted in the context of the AIDS crisis to which it was a response, foregrounding the omnipresence of grief in the movement as members of ACT UP themselves became infected with HIV. As a result, deeply-embedded members of this activist community were confronted with the need to engage in the radical direct action protest tactics of the movement while simultaneously being constantly afflicted with the grief of losing their loved ones to the disease.

Gould argues that the emotions which would otherwise hinder activists from remaining engaged in the movement, such as grief over their losses and the shame associated with being gay or lesbian in a homophobic cultural context, had to be channelled into other, more mobilising emotions. Activists channelled grief into anger in order to energise their militant street protests, and channelled the shame of homophobic stigma into an outward-oriented shaming (or blaming) of the government for its failure to intervene in the crisis. Emotional channelling avoids the dramaturgical claim that emotions are evoked from no particular apparent source, or suppressed to be contained in no clearly delineated place, coming nearer than do other emotion work concepts to highlighting the inherent relationality of emotions. In order to channel one emotion into another, movement participants need to reflect upon the situation they are mobilising about, place blame with those they deem responsible, re-evaluate their relationship with those responsible (the government is supposed to protect public health, but turns its back on the AIDS crisis, ergo the protective relationship between government and polity is being violated), and only as a result of that reflexive deliberation can the channelling of emotion take place.

That emotion is necessarily relational, then, is implicit in much of the research on emotions and social movements, though the concepts that dominate the literature on social movement emotion work do not acknowledge it. By re-evaluating the literature through the lens of what we now understand about the relationality of emotions and the relationship-transforming function of activists’
emotional reflexivity, it becomes clear that the emotion work of social movements is not a matter of evocation and suppression, but of changing relationships between the activist’s self and the people, institutions, and cultural paradigms which comprise their context. The dramaturgical perspective’s resonance with common-sense experience of having to perform emotions to meet the demands of social situations has contributed to its wide uptake in social movement studies, but dramaturgy ultimately falls short of accounting for what it is that movement participants actually do in order to fulfil what they judge to be the emotional demands of their movement activities. The relational view of emotions fills the gap, offering an explanation for how activists can transform their emotions (through reflexive re-evaluations of relationships and their normative implications) and providing a more robustly sociological understanding which displaces emotion from inside the social actor and locating it in the social relationships with which movement participants are themselves concerned.

2.5.B

Working on Others’ Emotions: Emotional Framing

What social movement participants do to act upon their own emotions is just one component of the emotion work of movements. The other crucial one is the work done upon the emotions of others. Social movements must persuade relevant actors outside of their own movement (such as policy makers, elites, prospective movement participants, and the general public) that the movement’s grievances are just and its demands should be met. They use framing to achieve this, drawing upon discourses and cultural narratives which are accepted by the target audience of the frame in order to draw their support. Social movement framing literature took shape with emotion excluded from its lens, but work is emerging which recognises framing as a strategic approach to appealing to and working upon the emotions of an audience.

The concept of emotional framing draws upon Erving Goffman’s (1974) Frame Analysis, and is concerned with the way that social movements can invoke already-prevailing beliefs, understandings, and values to incite audiences to share in
their emotions. Framing is central to movements’ emotional working on audiences, because it establishes which ideas, actors, institutions, and events are related to one another (Ferree and Merrill, 2000: 456). The intended consequence of emotional framing is the achievement of frame resonance, which establishes a connection between what the audience already feels and the emotional messages articulated by the movement (Ruiz-Junco, 2013: 49), generating their support. The extent to which a frame ‘resonates’ with an audience varies depending upon what assumptions and values audience members bring to their interpretation of the movement’s messages (see Hall, 1973), with frames which appeal to beliefs and values of greater importance to the audience achieving greater resonance (Benford and Snow, 2000: 621; see also Walgrave and Verhulst, 2006). Proceeding from an understanding of the local context and the salience of different values, social movements are able to make informed strategic decisions about what frames will achieve the most resonance.

Emotional framing can be used to politicise issues which prospective movement supporters or participants would be otherwise inclined to see apolitically. Schrock et al (2004) found in their research with a transgender support group that the emotional work done by members of the group to alleviate their feelings of shame, fear, powerlessness, alienation, and inauthenticity was not adequate to resolve those emotions. Their continued emotional struggle enabled transgender rights movement organisations to draw them into movement participation by using ‘motivational framing’, promising them that activism would provide them with the feelings of pride and righteousness that they needed to more effectively resolve the emotions that the support group had not. This instance of emotional framing recognised the audience’s distress, and promised that activism itself would provide a solution, motivating the support group members to become active in the movement.

Frequently, however, it is necessary for social movements to establish or reinforce an attribution of blame for a problem in order to achieve frame resonance. The emotional framings affect to whom audiences ascribe blame, with
consequences for the actions they then take. When the frame ascribes blame to willing actors, the audience’s ‘unpleasant emotions’ (such as anger or outrage) are directed toward those actors, leading to collective action and willingness to undertake risks to achieve change, whereas frames which blame abstract causes like systems and ideologies result in anxiety, fear, uncertainty, and inaction (von Scheve et al, 2016). In Jorge Cadena-Roa’s research on the movement for housing for the poor in Mexico City, he found that the emotional narratives embedded in the culturally ubiquitous sport of wrestling were drawn upon to energise mobilisation. Actors participated in the movement as Superbarrio, a fictional superhero for the movement who symbolised the narrative of unfairness and the righteous underdog which is characteristic in wrestling, linking that narrative with the injustice of the government’s inaction on the housing crisis and encouraging movement participants to identify with the underdog. The government’s reaction against these unflattering framings only served to buoy the narrative, and the movement went on to achieve substantial gains in housing reform.

As with the literature on dramaturgical emotion work which might be seen to be implicitly about relational emotions, the literature on framing in social movements offers some insight into emotional framing even where framing processes are not theorised in terms of emotion. This is particularly salient in research on frame alignment: the ‘congruence between participants’ and organizers’ frames’ (Katelaars et al, 2017: 341). Ruiz-Junco (2011) argues that activists in the Spanish environmental movement refashioned their senses of self to bring their narratives of their own biographies into line with the movement’s frame, but she does not conceive of this in terms of emotion. This may be because research on emotional framing tends to focus on specific mobilisation events or the growth of movements, rather than on the way the frame permeates participants’ ways of thinking and feeling over long durations; however, drawing in the relational conception of emotion, it can be seen that this work of refashioning autobiographies involves reflexively rethinking and transforming relationships between self and various others (people, structures, cultures, and values). Activists’
pursuit of frame alignment between their own lives and the movement, then, is necessarily emotional. Likewise, Williams (2016) found that the circulation of cookbooks embedded with women’s suffrage messages which encouraged readers to see themselves as democratic citizens as well as traditionally feminine (cooking within the home), enabling the two frames to align. She does not root the efficacy of this strategy in emotion, but incorporating theory on emotional framing, it is apparent that readers’ emotional investments in traditional femininity was a necessary antecedent to the resonance of the ‘woman as citizen’ frame in the context of cookbooks. Something similar can be seen in Debra King’s (2006) important research on activist reflexivity, discussed above: activists’ efforts to ‘liberate’ themselves from internalised oppressive discourses can be seen as an instance of emotional frame alignment aimed at bringing their understandings of (and feelings about) who they are in relation to others into congruence with the movement’s framing.

All of the different ways in which social movement participants endeavour to alter their own or others’ emotions, then, hint at the same conclusions: emotions are not internal and unidirectionally projected, but relational. The literatures on emotion work and emotional framing elaborate the ways that social movements use emotions to achieve political goals, enabling movement action and making decision-makers and broader publics receptive to their normative claims. However, this area of research has drawn significantly from Hochschild’s dramaturgical perspective, and a rethinking of emotion work as relationship work can better equip scholars of emotions in movements to understand how emotion work and emotional framing actually operate – through reflexivity as a method of transforming emotional relationships. Additionally, reaching backward into social movement studies and rereading the existing literatures through the lens of relational emotion provides a rich base for theorising which transcends the limitations of the dramaturgical account.

2.6

Emotion Culture
The literatures on emotion work, emotional channelling, and emotional framing are largely pervaded by one precept which has emerged from the subfield’s historical trajectory through frameworks of emotion and instrumental rationality: that social movement emotions are instrumental. Because social movements are intended to bring about change (and because the field’s conceptual struggles have set up a debate between emotion and instrumental cognition), scholars examine the emotions within them with an eye to the operation of emotion in helping to achieve outcomes. This lens has come under criticism on the basis that related but independent objectives such as engendering human relationships within a movement group or articulating value positions may be more paramount intentions for collective action than a social change outcome (Sa’di, 2015). Precisely because movement participants are deeply emotionally invested in the issues around which they organise, the emotions of the movement become a part of their own value systems and ways of being (Vestergren, et al, 2017; Hercus, 1999), and social movement emotions become intertwined with the emotional lives of participants outside the activist setting.

The concept of emotion culture addresses this aspect of social movement emotions. Moving beyond the immediately instrumental (though also allowing for instrumental utility), a movement’s emotion culture provides ‘expectations about how members should feel about themselves and about dominant groups, as well as how they should manage and express the feelings evoked by their day-to-day encounters with dominant groups.’ (Taylor, 2000: 274). The concept recognises that the emotional sense-making that social movement participants do continues throughout their daily lives, shaping their emotional relationships with other people and their wider context – this, in turn, better enables them to inhabit the desired emotions within the context of movement participation. Again recalling Debra King’s (2006) work on activist emotional reflexivity, it can be seen that emotionally assimilating into the ideological world of a social movement requires a reflexive transformation of the activist’s relationship with their self, with others, and with institutions, structures, and cultures.
Given how powerful a concept emotion culture is for illuminating the emotions of movements as they emerge from and within their local and historical contexts, it is perhaps surprising that little research on social movements names emotion culture as its organising concept. Verta Taylor’s (1995) research on the emotion culture of women’s organisations pioneered the concept, showing how women’s self-help groups helped to create the emotional vocabulary of postpartum depression by rendering seemingly individual emotional experiences as collective and systemic. It is Taylor and Rupp’s (2002) research on the emotion culture of transnational women’s organisations, however, that provided the most thorough empirical development of the concept. Aiming to understand how transnational feminist organisations (in the period from 1888-1945) maintained transnational solidarity in spite of the profound political conflict between the nation-states in which the women were situated, they identified three different aspects of the process of building emotion culture: (1) the development and performance of rituals of reconciliation which nourished links across national boundaries, (2) the fostering of transnational interpersonal relationships which could transcend national borders, and (3) the collective invocation of the ideal of ‘mother love’ as the lens through which women’s relationships would be understood (not unlike the ‘sisterhood’ associated with ‘second wave’ feminism).

This research highlights all of the key aspects of the building of an emotion culture, showing how action (ritual), relationships, and cultural ideals are all incorporated, and revealing what a movement-specific emotion culture can do – in this case, enabling the persistence of collective identity and solidarity against the backdrop of powerful national narratives which pressured movement participants to see women in other nations as enemies. Contrary to emotion culture research which paradoxically maintains the false binary between cognition and emotion (Kotchemidova, 2010), Taylor and Rupp’s deployment of emotion culture ties together the different threads of social movement emotions, recognising how they are cultivated through emotionalised (but still also cognitive) reflexivity (see Holmes, 2010) and how they are enabled or constrained by the ‘structures of
feeling’ (Williams, 2013[1961]; Koschut, 2017) of their historical contexts.

As I argued with respect to the relational nature of emotion, emotion culture can be seen in much of the literature on emotions in social movements where the concept is not actually used. In her research on ‘second wave’ feminism in New Zealand, Mary Holmes (2000) found that racial and gender norms were contested by feminists in their ways of engaging with one another, such as ‘adopting anger, violence, and confrontation as female (p. 238), but that their avenues for transforming the social order were constrained by its terms having been set largely by men. The emotions of resistance were enabled and constrained by patriarchal culture. While this is sometimes conceived through a structural lens as 'emotional opportunity structures' (Whittier, 2001), it is also a matter of how feminists engaged in relationships with one another and with men in ways which were informed by their reflexivity and the cultural context in which they were situated. In other words, emotional practices which are shaped by a desire to resist the pull of norms is a culture-building process, and can be seen as an aspect of what it is for a movement to create an emotion culture.

Other concepts are also used in place of emotion culture which function to describe essentially the same processes. Deborah Gould (2002; 2009) argues that the emotional ways of being that members of ACT UP cultivated in order to keep their movement going, to be responsive to the oppressive discourses of their context, and to maintain emotional cohesion across their organisation is an 'emotional common sense'. Elsewhere, she argues that the movement's common way of being emotionally was a collective emotional habitus, highlighting that once it had been established, it became habitual and difficult to break away from (a reality to which she attributes the ultimate dissolution of the movement). Both of these concepts – emotional common sense and emotional habitus – refer to much the same process as emotion culture. A social movement group takes account of their social and cultural context, their own situation in relation to more powerful others, establishes shared interpretations, values, and goals, and develops a shared set of emotional relationships to each of those elements which make their emotions
collective and produce unity and coherence.

It can be seen, then, that though emotion cultures in movements are comparatively under-studied, there is a considerable body of research which provides insight into the emotion cultures of movements, albeit by different names. This talking past each other in the literature is a common recurrence, and leads to the seemingly endless taxonomies and typologies mentioned above. Scholars in the sociology of emotions in general have struggled to develop a coherent and consistent language for emotion, in spite of largely (though not universally) being united with respect to the ontology of emotion and having a common favoured set of conceptual tools (such as emotion work).

2.7 Conclusion

The field of the sociology of emotions is unduly young for its age. Some of the earliest murmurings of the discipline exhibited a strong presence of emotion in analysts' thinking, but the historical trends in which sociology was swept up drew its attention away from feeling and toward instrumental rationality. The study of social movements, taking shape before the emergence in the 1970s of the sociology of emotions in its presently recognisable form, therefore took root in emotion's absence, and the subfield's history in theories focused on instrumental rationality continue to be a resonant presence. The culturally pervasive denigration of emotion has affected research on social movements as well as the context in which that research is done, and this has drawn researchers' attentions away from emotions pursued and cultivated in movements which are not clearly oriented toward a discernible instrumental end. There must be instrumental reasons, it is assumed, why social movement actors want to feel the emotions they feel.

There certainly are instrumental reasons, as would necessarily be the case in social movements, which exist largely to achieve social change (though it is worth troubling even that narrative, as many people who self-identify with social movements, including feminism, have no expectation of seeing substantial social change and may never participate in a collective action). A the subfield continues to
proliferate alongside the growing field of affect studies, there will be more space for scholars to explore where the idea of emotions as means to ends exhausts its utility and the possibility of emotions and affective sensations as ends in themselves might begin. Scholars in recent years (Wetherell 2012, Burkitt 2014a, Sointu 2016) have been grappling with the question of how cultural meaning is intertwined with the affective, and a small body of work asks questions about activism and biography; this moves us toward the interdisciplinary explorations that will help us to make sense of social movement participants as fully-fledged social selves embroiled in the complex array of relationships in which their emotions and affects are constituted. What these increasingly hazy disciplinary borders signal for researchers of emotions in movements is that the question on sociologists’ minds ought not only be concerned with what a social movement is attempting to achieve. Movement participants do not check their human subjectivities at the door when they enter into a social movement group, and the neglect of their emotional entanglements across the boundaries of the movement group can obscure what aspects of relationship and of culture they bring into the movement with them.

Interestingly, Goodwin et al (2000) highlight the cultural embeddedness of researchers themselves, partially crediting the increasing arrival of women (with their emotion-oriented socialisation) into the sociology of social movements for having turned the field’s attention more to emotion. An emotional discipline, they imply, is a feminised discipline. That raises intriguing questions about whether the field was previously masculinist, a question which remains relevant today. The now more emotionally-aware subfield of social movement studies remains transfixed by instrumentality, even where emotion is concerned. As will be explored below, research which synthesises emotional with instrumental rationality accounts overwhelmingly focuses on emotion work – on how movement participants use emotions as means to ends, rather than seeing emotions as ends in themselves (this latter being sometimes acknowledged, but generally relegated to footnote status). As the concept of affect continues to gain increasing traction in the sociology of emotions, the deeper question of to what extent emotions are means and where
they might be ends will grow more pressing and offer new avenues for the subfield of emotions in movements.

The hasty assumption that when movement participants experience (or try to experience) an emotion in a movement it is because of the movement is accompanied by another eager conceptual gesture: the common (though again, not universal) elision between social movements, social movement organisations, and protest movements. A protest is a type of mobilisation (although it can take many forms, not being confined only to the newspaper headline street protest often associated with the word), and being involved in a social movement might not ever involve participating in what might be considered a protest. There are also questions about at what point a group of people becomes a social movement 'organisation'. This conceptual framing makes sense in reference to work on frame alignment, where there are leaders and followers organised along a hierarchical organisational structure. There is, of course, no problem with research on these groups, but there is a presence in the literature of a tendency to jump from social movement to social movement organisation, implying an equivalence which does not hold well in relation to movements like radical feminism. The closest thing to an organisation that many radical feminists might have ever belonged to would be a consciousness-raising group of a handful of women – scarcely an organisation.

What these conceptual boundaries (or erasures of them) all do is confound the work of asking the right questions of social movements. The dramaturgical account of emotions has had a tremendous amount of traction in social movement studies because the subfield's emphasis on instrumental rationality always already assumes that there is a movement-related goal behind the pursuit of collective emotions – the question then is what the goal is, how emotions might be used to pursue it, and by what mechanisms movement participants manipulate their own or others' emotions in order to achieve it. What gets left out by this is the deep entanglement of collective movement emotions with the lives of movement participants outside the movement (and for radical feminist readers of a magazine like *Trouble and Strife*, reading the magazine and writing letters to it might be the
only point of contact they had with the movement).

Fortunately, as I have argued throughout this chapter, there is a strong, though often unnamed, presence of research on social movement participants' efforts to transform relationships with and through feeling, and to cultivate emotion cultures. A re-reading of these literatures surfaces the relationship work that movements do, and shows that what have otherwise been conceptualised as conformity to emotion rules or dramaturgical emotion work can be seen to be a much more powerful mechanism of social change: the transformation of the social world through emotionally reordering relationships. Radical feminism was a long-running social movement, and the significant time and effort that they invested in emotional framing and the back-stage work of cultivating an emotion culture would make little sense if they needed to have an immediately identifiable instrumental goal. If the value they placed on their relationships with themselves and key others, and what these relationships suggested to them about the world and their place within it, is foregrounded, however, their reasons for putting forward this exertion and its efficacy becomes clearer.
Chapter 3
Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This research asks a question about radical feminism’s emotion culture, rooted in the view that in order to make adequate sense of this social movement in the present, its historical development must first be understood. There are pertinent reasons why the research needed to use historically-oriented methods to achieve this aim, leading to its use of historical textual data. The methodological core of the research is literary ethnography, a comparatively little-used but highly productive approach to the study of documentary data. Literary ethnography enabled aspects of the emotion culture of a living movement at an earlier stage of its development to be explored in a way and with a depth which could not have been accomplished with human subjects research\(^4\) carried out in the present, and this is just one amongst several advantages to be explored in this chapter which particularly recommended literary ethnography as an ideal strategy for learning about the emotion culture of radical feminism.

The comparatively minimal uptake of literary ethnography and its under-representation as a method in empirical research belies the diversity of approaches to it that researchers take. While this study is a literary ethnography, it is not a literary

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\(^4\) I differentiate ‘human subjects research’ from textual research following from work on ethics which distinguishes the ethical imperatives of work which never involves contact with people (including the authors or users of texts) from research which does involve them. I do recognise, however, that all research affects human subjects, and I do not take the leave of ethical demands which this distinction is sometimes considered to allow.
ethnography ‘as usual’, and there are particular aspects of the methodological literature which suggest that there is no well-established ‘as usual’ to the method’s application. There is room for debate as to what makes a literary ethnography what it is rather than something related but distinct, like a discourse analysis, and some approaches more closely resemble discourse analysis or other analytic methods than my research has done. This study has, I argue, taken the ‘ethnography’ component of literary ethnography more seriously than the standard approaches to its usage urge, and the chapter will explore the reasons why this was done. Though a thorough and clear account of how to do literary ethnography has been laid out by Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus (1994), their approach erases emotion from the research process. A more recent accounting of the method from Benet Reid (2016), emerging from his research on emotions (which has not been the object of study for other authors on the method), better accounts for the role of emotions in research processes in general. Reid’s iteration of literary ethnography is the most fitting methodological framework for what my own research has involved, and it is upon his account of the method that I principally draw.

As Reid argues, and as I also found in this project, doing research specifically on emotions creates a compelling need to emotionally ‘live’ in the life world of the archive, whereas this might be avoided in other literary ethnographic research. I build upon Reid’s account through a deeper exploration of researcher positionality in relation to the object of study; my relationship with radical feminism is different than was his with the medical discourses he studied. Departing a bit further from Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus than does Reid, I will elaborate how this relationship with the research topic adds an additional layer to the utility of the researcher’s emotions in enabling literary ethnographic analysis. When the researcher has not only deep knowledge of the context, but a vested emotional interest in the transformative consequences that the research may have after its completion, the use of emotion in the research moves beyond simply providing the intimate, felt knowledge of social context upon which all textual analysis relies (McKee, 2003: chapter 3). Far from
merely shaping the research questions to be asked (Hammersley, 2000) and equipping the researcher to interpret the text, the emotional investment and values of a feminist sociologist studying feminism fundamentally affects the way that the data is read, yielding productive analytic results.

This research is feminist at every level: a piece of feminist sociology carried out by a feminist-identified researcher about a feminist movement. It was a priority throughout the entire research process to have feminist principles guide the work, from the formulation of the research question to the yet-awaited dissemination of the findings. Many aspects of the project have been meaningfully affected by a feminist research ethos. Following from feminist ethics and feminist epistemology, the reflexive demands of this project have been extensive: methodological, epistemic, ethical, positional, and political reflexivities have pervaded the process. Research is a world-making endeavour (Kempner et al., 2011; Becker, 1967), and knowledge always belongs to an embodied and socially positioned actor rather than a 'generic knower' who ‘could be anyone or everyone’ (Code, 2014: 150). The project has been carried out with these considerations in mind, with the intention that it might help to advance the collective political project of feminism, that it should be accessible to and replicable by others, and that it be robustly honest about its embeddedness in a historical location and enmeshed with particular interests and ends. These aspects of the work will be explored in what follows.

This chapter, like my use of literary ethnography, will take a slightly unconventional approach. In section 3.2, the standard stages of a literary ethnography will be briefly outlined, drawing principally from Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus (1994). The section will then discuss Reid’s (2016) intervention on the method, highlighting the role of emotion in literary ethnographic research and the key differences between his more ethnographically-oriented approach and the arguably less-ethnographic formulations that preceded it. The remainder of the chapter will largely take the structure and form of a narration of the research process, highlighting three crucial problematics as they arose throughout the work: How can this aspect of
the research be brought into alignment with a feminist sociological approach? What types of reflexivities must be used at this stage, and to what ends? How does this aspect of the work align with or depart from prevailing approaches to literary ethnography? These questions pervaded the research and merit discussion in relation to each stage of its progress, and consequently discussions around them will be found where relevant in each section rather than there being distinct sections of the chapter dedicated to them.

Section 3.3 will explore the question of feminist sociology as a way of doing feminism. Its central focus will be an accounting of what I mean by referring to this study as a piece of feminist sociology and what responsibilities I saw myself as taking on board by approaching the work from this perspective. The ways in which these responsibilities were then fulfilled will emerge from the following sections. In section 3.4, the choice of archival textual methods will be discussed, along with the benefits and limitations of this strategy for answering the research question. Section 3.5 will address the case study approach. Archival research methods do not typically take a single publication as a data source, not least due to the obvious limitations of case studies. There were unique advantages to using a case study for research on radical feminism’s emotion culture, however, and these will be explained. Also discussed in section 3.5 are the use of Trouble and Strife as the subject case and the subsequent sampling within it: the 1980s as the targeted time period, and medical and psychiatric health and well-being as the topical frame. Each of these opened up specific potentialities for the exploration of the movement’s emotion culture, and though at a glance the sample may seem narrow, it yielded ends which justified the slightly unusual means. Section 3.6 will elaborate the selection of an archive in which to do the data collection amongst the range of available options, the synthesis of brick-and-mortar archive research with analysis of digital duplicates, and the strategies used for organising the data, phasing the analysis, and recording the analytic process. Finally, section 3.7 will detail the way that the data was read and analysed, highlighting the contrasts between literary ethnographic research in general and the specific demands
of applying it to emotions research. In the conclusion, I return to Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus’s and Reid’s respective accounts of doing literary ethnography, noting how a feminist sociological study about the emotion culture of a feminist movement has aligned with and departed from each, and offering some final reflections on the benefits of a feminist sociological approach for literary ethnography.

3.2

**Literary Ethnography: Documents as an Ethnographic Field Site**

Literary ethnography seems to pick up where other methods fall short. It enables inquiry into aspects of social life to which there are otherwise practical, epistemological, or ethical barriers of access (Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus, 1994: 68; Hodder, 1994; Ulsperger, 2009: 809). Following from sociological traditions which take literature seriously as a source of knowledge about the social world in which it is generated (Lowenthal, 1989; Griswold, 1992), the method allows researchers to peek behind the curtain to see what might be more difficult to get at otherwise. Though literary ethnography is a little-used approach to the study of documents, there is a much wider general acknowledgement of the value of documents of life for the study of social worlds, giving rise to an expansive methodological engagement in this area (see, e.g., Plummer, 2001; Stanley, 2013; Prior, 2003) which places the premise of sociological documents of life research rather beyond the reach of dispute. Literary ethnography is distinct from other textual research methods, however, and its name raises interesting questions about what it is that a literary ethnographer actually does: Can documents be an ethnographic field site? And how is literary ethnographic analysis any different from other textual analysis methods?

This section will begin by outlining the standard six-stage process of doing literary ethnography laid out by Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus (1994). I draw from their account, as do Ulsperger (2009) and Reid (2016), because they lay out most clearly and explicitly what the process of doing literary ethnography entails. I will then
turn to Reid’s recent work on literary ethnographic method. Though he places his work within the camp of literary ethnography, it constitutes a meaningful departure from Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus’s understanding of it, and this proceeds principally from his work having been about emotion. In Reid’s work, as in mine, the tried-and-true approach to literary ethnography did not adequately account for what is necessary to generate an analysis from the data, and finding emotion in text requires specific strategies which cannot be straightforwardly pulled from work on other topics and dropped into emotions research. Literary ethnographies on emotions are, I argue, more akin to field ethnography than are such studies on other topics, a consequence of the unavoidably active and acknowledged engagement of the researcher’s emotions in the process of reading and analysing the data.

There are relevant differences even between Reid’s use of the method and my own, however, and these will also be explored. Reid drew upon his experience as a practitioner to emotionally enter the world of the technical medical discourses he studied, using his emotions as a source of ethnographic expertise. I do likewise in this research, but I additionally bring to it a feminist’s deep emotional interest in the outcome of the work and a biography of lived emotional participation in the broad emotional culture of feminisms writ large (sharing in the anger, frustration, jubilation, mirth, and other emotions that emerge from moving through the world with an awakened feminist consciousness, and doing so in every sphere of my life). This placed my positionality in relation to the data as not only a source of felt, emotive expertise, but truly embedded participation in the emotional life of the feminist world (and the patriarchal world to which the feminist one is a response). This had consequences for the way I read and was able to ‘experience’ the discourse (Reid, 2016: 4).

Literary ethnography is an approach to the study of documentary data which, like field ethnography, is oriented to the inner life of the world from which the documents come. It involves deep immersion in the dataset and its intertextual milieu, equipping the researcher to perceive subtleties, subtextual hints and murmurs, and vague emotional resonances which a more technical approach to analysing the text
would fail to capture. It is upon this last point that it most differs from discourse analysis. Though discourse analysis casts a wide net under which an almost boundless array of analytic approaches might be swept, it crucially focuses on the way that words, phrases, and other signifiers are positioned (in a text or a context) in order to produce certain associations, significations, and from these, experienced social realities (Brown and Yule, 1983; see also Ahmed, 2014[2004]). While discourses are acknowledged to be embedded in and deeply bound up with social context, the systems of signification upon which discourse analyses focus are studied as something distinct from the world of objects which discourses represent.

Literary ethnography, conversely, does not draw as hard a distinction between the social world and its representation in text, and in fact the underlying premise of how texts are approached in a literary ethnography is that texts do not represent social reality, but are social reality. A text is taken to be one of the places where social life happens, much the way that a school, a street, a pub, or a football pitch might be (Reid, 2016: 4). Social life is lived in an array of places, and in literary ethnography, texts – their writing, reading, circulation, what their content means, and what their very existence means – are one such ‘place’. Most discourse analysts would comfortably agree with this premise, of course, but a key difference between discourse analysis and literary ethnography is that discourse analysis focuses significantly on the syntax of discursive representation and its semantic consequences – where ideas, images, and signifiers are positioned in relation to one another, and to what discursive effect – whereas literary ethnography is more phenomenologically-oriented, focusing on how a text is experienced. It is this distinction which makes Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus’s iteration of literary ethnography nearer to a type of discourse analysis than is Reid’s, a point to which I will return below.

Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus (1994) outline a six-step strategy for doing a literary ethnography: (1) Define the scope of the sample (in accordance with a topical frame which would have been selected in advance). (2) Read and interpret the texts, likely reading many of them multiple times (this would follow a period of immersion in
the text and intertext to gain the familiarity requisite for interpretation). (3) Identify themes (an iterative process involving several phases and substantial moving back and forth between texts). This prescriptive orientation toward thematic analysis raises key questions about differences between their approach and the one which Reid and myself have employed – I will return to this. (4) Classification of thematic elements (particular attention to frequency of occurrence of a theme and the strength of its presence across the archive are encouraged). (5) Development of analytical constructs, which generate what they call a ‘composite portrait’ of the social world from which the texts have come – it is at this stage that the literary ethnographer moves beyond description and into sociological inference. (6) Contextual confirmation – taking the final analysis back to the archive, the analyst re-reads substantial portions of the text to ensure that the analytical constructs seem fitting to the original data. Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus also suggest an optional step which precedes this six-stage process: an exploratory phase for gaining familiarity with the archive, developing and refining research questions, and informing decisions about the topical frame.

There are many respects in which my own research has conformed to this template, but important others in which it has differed. The first stage for my research, but an optional stage zero for Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus, was the exploratory phase. They (echoed by Ulsperger, 2009) see the exploratory phase of the research as beneficial but unnecessary, and it is taken to be a viable possibility that the researcher would define the topical frame and develop the research questions prior to the onset of immersive reading of the texts from which the dataset will be drawn. My own research was highly dependent upon the exploratory phase in a range of ways. Significantly, this phase completely changed the research question. The archive was approached with a quite distinct question about the relationship between radical feminism and one of its oft-cited ideological nemeses, transgender liberation (Heyes, 2007). The research question in its first iteration was not about emotion at all, but rather a more general query about why anti-transgender sentiment subsists in radical feminism. A reading of radical feminist literature quickly revealed a turf war ‘fraught
with feeling’ (Hesford, 2013: 6), at which point the research question came to focus on radical feminist emotions about the identity category ‘woman’ - who can and cannot count as a woman, and why. Upon still further exploratory reading, however, it began to appear that the transgender question was not isolated – radical feminists have a different emotional response to an array of things than do feminists of various other kinds. Some feminists express feelings of warmth and affection at transgender women being welcomed into feminist spaces, but radical feminists respond with a deep sense of violation (See Raymond, 1979; Hausman, 1995). The ‘riot grrrl’ punk rock and fuchsia lipstick that fills many ‘third wave’ feminists with exuberance and mirth draws disappointment and frustration from radical feminists. The sex workers’ rights lobbying that elicits respect and pride from postmodern feminists meets with radical feminist dismay and anger. Something about the emotional infrastructure of radical feminism is distinctive, and it was through an exploratory immersion in their writings that it became clear that in order to understand radical feminist emotions about any particular issue or controversy, the underlying foundation of the movement’s emotional life needed to first be mapped. The exploratory phase was not an optional aside, but provided indispensable insight into the emotional world of the movement (something which, again, was not originally an object of intended attention at all), and ultimately gave rise to the research question and the theoretical focus on emotion around which the research has centred.

The remainder of the research followed largely along the lines of Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus’s framework. The details of these stages of the research will be explored in the sections that follow, but there are two components which I wish to expand upon here, and to more thoroughly elaborate with the benefit of Reid’s contributions to literary ethnographic methodology. The first is the reading and interpretation of the texts, and the second is the generation of themes. It is at this point that the nature of the texts under study, the theoretical frame (for these immediate purposes, emotion versus everything else), and the researcher’s relationship with the archive and topic become consequential. Van de Poel-Knotterus
and Notterus explicitly base their framework on the study of fictional texts written in the realist tradition, and position their claims about the viability of making claims about the social worlds in which those texts were written in relation to specifically that type of text (1994: 68-70). Their premise is that the way the social world is represented in realist stories says something about the social world in which the authors and intended readers were situated.

Reid (2016), on the other hand, applies literary ethnography to technical medical discourse on ‘evidence-based health care’. His intention is to excavate the emotional world of ‘participants in’ these EB (evidence-based) discourses, a directive which hastily leads to an earnest engagement with the human subjecthood the researcher:

‘EB-discourse however is inescapably human: its participants write creatively, passionately and whimsically about their perceptions of the powers ascribed to quantitative Evidence [sic]. While the topic of evidence-basedness might imply a striving to transcend what is human, there is no escaping the humanity of EB-discourse; and the social analyst of EB-discourse must appreciate that they too are human, and build this into their rationale for research.’ (2016: 3)

Contrasting his own approach against that of Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus, Reid highlights their emphasis on the systematic nature of literary ethnographic reading, and instead foregrounds the less technical aspects of reading which make literary ethnography a strong alternative to discourse analysis when emotion is the object of study. Literary ethnographic ways of reading, unlike most approaches to discourse analysis, ‘are particularly useful for accessing emotional currents which are buried deeply within rational-technical discourses’ (Reid, 2016: 1).

My own reading of Trouble and Strife was informed by similar concerns. Unlike the rational-technical discourses studied by Reid, feminist writings are rife with open
expressions of emotion, which would seem at first glance to make the study of emotion from such texts a much less hazy enterprise than the same with ostensibly emotionally agnostic texts. What emerged from the reading of Trouble and Strife, however, was that in spite of the ready availability of emotion on the text’s surface (in the form of emotion words and quite overt allusions to feeling), the emotional aspects which were of most interest and value to my research were often those ‘buried deeply within’ the text. While a range of approaches to inferring meaning from text are available – instruments which can be applied to it, standardised metre sticks with which it can be measured – the convoluted embeddedness of texts in the social worlds of which they are a part and their entanglement with living human subjectivities places some of their content in the realm of the rather ethereal:

‘This property of texts is something which one cannot perceive without “being there” in an embodied ethnographic way. It is content buried deeply beneath the structure of texts as socially-produced documents, such that the analyst has to become a feeling participant in the discourse if they are to perceive it.’ (Reid, 2016: 6)

The literary ethnographer who is reading for the implicit and subtextual, then, must ‘live’ in the text and come back out again to report what they experienced, rather than looking at the text from outside and recording observations and associations. This is not autoethnographic self-study, but an approach to data which recognises the subjecthood of the researcher and makes no apologies for instrumentalising it to enable research which only a fully alive, thinking-feeling subject could do.

The necessity of approaching texts in this robustly ethnographic way when they are being read for emotion (or at least when the investigation seeks emotion which is under the surface of the text) leads to the next area of concern in Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus’s process: the generation of themes. Because their methodological approach was developed to meet the demands of reading realist fiction, in this area it skews a bit nearer to discourse analysis than does the deeply-
embedded, feeling-around approach that Reid and myself have had to take. Their search for themes is built around, to put it simply, looking for what the text says rather than what is happening in it. To return to the question of the ethnographic, it is as if Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus were field ethnographers who only took field notes about what people at their field site said aloud, whereas Reid’s way of producing themes more closely resembles what field ethnographers actually do – noting what is said and by whom, but also more subtle subtextual implications, nervous or excited energies in social space, the lived experience of being in that space (the fatigue of early rising times, the intimate openness of communal meals), and so forth. The active engagement of the feeling subjectivity of the researcher enables a much more ethnographic engagement with texts than does the more technical and emotionally distanced approach which Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus advocate. As Reid argues, Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus ‘conclude... by reassuring their reader of the reliability and integrity of the ethnographic process, so that if properly executed, it produces an accurate portrait. Emphasis on reliability and accuracy carries a whiff of the assertive evidentialism to which the social analyst of EBHC becomes sensitive’ (2016: 5, italics original). The social analyst of feminism, and especially the feminist analyst, is similarly sensitised, and indeed any notion of an ‘accurate’ portrait of social life is fundamentally inconsistent with a feminist epistemology (Hartstock, 1997).

The generation of themes from an emotionally active participation in the text is less a matter of identifying patterns in what texts say than of perceiving patterns in what happens emotionally in the life-world of the data archive. The consequence of this for analytic practice is that the researcher’s emotions must be actively engaged, allowing for lines of analytic inquiry to be opened up by patterns in the researcher’s own feeling as well as recurrences in textual representations. The two approaches to producing the analysis work in tandem, so that the researcher is not bound by ‘assertive evidentialism’ in the way that they read the text, and instead can feel around it, actively inviting their own emotions to draw their attention in particular directions and using that emotional draw as a starting point for deeper investigations. Though
this is not at all specific to literary ethnography, it is a more ethnographic approach to the reading of text than thematic analyses generally are, making more space than other analytic methods for the researcher to reflect upon what it felt like to be in a piece of writing or an archive than thematic coding typically does.

Literary ethnography therefore varies somewhat in the extent to which it resembles field ethnography and in the nature and magnitude of its points of departure from other ways of analysing discourse. I have argued that Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus offer a clear and productive outline of the literary ethnographic process, but that it is not entirely fit for the study of emotions. Reid’s approach is better suited to enabling the researcher to access emotion in text, especially where that emotion can only be found by being felt, and this strategy is a more meaningfully ethnographic one than is the more technical and ‘accuracy’-oriented reading favoured by Van de Poel-Knotterus and Notterus. I have also argued that the optional exploratory phase is actually indispensable for equipping the researcher to feel things out in the world of the text, and that in the case of this particular research, it was only with that heightened sensitivity to emotional currents in the text that the theoretical frame and research question were ultimately developed.

3.3
Doing Sociology, Doing Feminism: Accountability & Feminist Research Beyond Gender

The story of feminist sociology is unsurprisingly convoluted. Feminists acting within the structures of academia have always positioned themselves uncomfortably in tension between the hegemony of ‘traditional’ academic disciplines like sociology and the transformative potential of subversion (Pollock, 2010: 26; Roseneil, 1995: 193-196). When feminists first entered the academy in the 1970s, it was a radical enough notion to suggest that gender ought to be counted amongst widely relevant analytic categories, never mind meaningfully transforming the way academic knowledge is produced, by whom, and to what ends. Some feminists entered research and teaching
posts without PhD degrees, and they brought with them the consciousness-raising model of small group discussions which came to pervade feminist teaching practice (David, 2016) and, later, university teaching more generally. It has never been a straightforward matter to delineate what is meant by calling academic research (or teaching) ‘feminist’.

To paint with a perhaps dubiously broad brush, feminist sociological research can be divided into two general categories: research which advances the aims of feminism (generating knowledge about realities facing women, establishing a secure space for gendered analysis in research, and thereby providing the basis for social and political change to remedy women’s subordination) and research which is done in a feminist way (drawing upon feminist ethics, epistemology, and broader politics to inform decisions about the design and execution of research). My research falls into the latter category. Based in the idea of feminist research, rather than gender research, this project has been designed with the intention that it satisfy feminist standards. It is not about gender, as feminist research need not be. Indeed, to suggest that feminist research must be about gender might unintentionally reproduce the gendered othering of women – an inextricable association between ‘the second sex’ (De Bouviour: 2009[1949]) and gender, such that men act (and research) as human beings, but women only ever as women. It may ring odd that a study about radical feminism – a group necessarily comprised only of women – is not about gender. The distinction I make is that gender is not a central concept in the work, and crucially, the project was not undertaken to solve problems for women as a political class. It is not an example of smashing the patriarchy with research using ‘the master’s tools’ (Lorde, 2007[1979]). It is (an attempt at) sociology done feminist-ly: ‘something better, comprehensible, retaining a commitment to “theory as praxis”. Storm the Bastille! Merde!’ (Stanley, 5

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5 I here refer to work which advances women’s interests as what constitutes feminist research, though I acknowledge that queer and postcolonial feminisms have problematised the deployment of ‘women’ as the collective of feminist subjects. I do not at all contest these critiques; rather, I refer to feminist sociology in this manner here because a critical mass of feminist sociology has taken on board this assumption about for whom feminism exists, and that assumption is reflected in most accounts of its history.
I take feminism in its broadest conceptualisation in my approach to making the research feminist. Though at earlier points in its development, feminism was understood in relatively simple terms as a social movement to liberate women from patriarchal oppression, interventions and developments from postmodernism, queer theory, Black feminisms, and postcolonial feminisms have made that hasty generalisation untenable. I hesitate to use the term ‘intersectionality’ here due to its having taken on the somewhat of the character of a buzzword (Davis, 2008), but what I would draw from this general framework is that the decisions that have informed the way this research was done involved interrogating questions of gender, but also of race, class, citizenship, dis/ability, and sexuality.

Drawing upon Liz Stanley and Sue Wise’s ‘feminist fractured foundationalism’ (2006), I developed a set of three feminist objectives that the research would aim to fulfil: (1) that it take a robust approach to ethics, exceeding the mandatory minimums of institutional ethics review and taking seriously any ethical grey area encountered; (2) that it be fully replicable by other feminists, including the use of retrievable data (Stanley and Wise, 2006: 1.6; 2.6) which could be readily and comfortably accessed by feminists across a range of positionalities; and (3) that the results of the research be widely accessible, both financially and in terms of its readability for academic and non-academic readerships. Of course no piece of research can satisfy feminist standards so unambiguously that it is closed to critique of its feminist credentials, and this research is no exception. These three objectives were not intended to place the research beyond reproach, but instead to engage in the practice of feminist accountability (emphasising practice – the recognition that any such attempt is necessarily imperfect and part of an ongoing striving to do it better the next time).

The sections that follow will elaborate where appropriate upon how each of the three objectives has been approached, but it would be beneficial here to expand on what they entail and highlight the key points at which each has confronted this project. The use of published documentary data may seem like an easy back-door escape on
the question of ethics, but if the context of the research is taken into account, this illusion quickly dissipates. While there were no human subjects involved in the project, *Trouble and Strife*’s authors were and are people, and radical feminism is a movement which has a great deal of value to them and to many others. Though I am not myself a radical feminist, undertaking a study on it placed power over the narrative of its history in my hands, and I was conscious throughout the research of the significant debts that I as a woman owe to my feminist forebears, including the authors of *Trouble and Strife*. In a somewhat ironic twist, many of the contributing authors to *Trouble and Strife* have themselves gone on to illustrious careers in British academia – some of them in sociology – which in turn gives them some potential power over me. I have the power to affect the way that their movement is understood and remembered, and they may well at some point have the power to decide whether I get a job. The power relationship runs in both directions, with both myself and radical feminists having some power over one another, and owing some responsibility to one another in the way we exercise that power.

At the heart of the ethics of the project, therefore, was not so much the project itself, but the world-making that its dissemination might effect. My engagement with ethics has been less about protecting participants than about taking seriously the effect that the research might have on the relationship between radical and other feminisms. Contentions between feminist movements run deep and hot, and though the future can never be predicted, taking seriously the responsibility to produce a piece of work which will enable feminists to better understand one another and make intractable divisions better rather than worse has often been a productive tool in keeping me accountable and emotionally reflexive in the research process. It is this emphasis that has made the ethics of the project feminist, moving it beyond the box-ticking exercise that research ethics can sometimes be and into serious consideration of what kind of world the work is intended to help bring about.

In addition to ethical research practice, a key aspect of feminist sociology is
accountability to readers and facilitation of their critical evaluation of the work. The ideal of fully replicable research does not quite reconcile with the nature of either social realities or the researchers who study them, but the paramount consideration in feminist fractured foundationalism – that of accountability – is indispensable to feminist research. As Stanley and Wise argue, it is hardly feminist to demand that readers of the work merely take the researcher’s word on things, especially when the people writing research skew structurally privileged on every available axis. The specifics of the retrievable data used in this research will be detailed in sections 3.5 and 3.6 but what I wish to briefly highlight here is that the research was intended to be replicable in two ways which proceed from the specific nature of this study. Firstly and more familiarly, the data needed to be retrievable by others. Readers would need to be able to access the data without hindrance from hard barriers, like paywalls, institutional affiliations, or inaccessible spaces (e.g., buildings which cannot be navigated by people with movement disabilities).

Secondly, as I emphasised in section 3.2, perceiving the emotional content of the text required emotional participation in its discourses. This places something of a condition on the replicability of the analysis – whether another researcher will see what I have seen in the data will depend upon their emotional engagement with it, and a range of interpretations are possible other than the one I advance in this project. Again following Stanley and Wise (2006: 2.14), however, I contend that this is not an indication that my analysis is purely subjective in the ‘this is just my opinion’ sense, but rather that social reality and the positionalities within it of different knowers are always complicated, messy, and a site of contestation and dispute. By making the analysis accountable through replicability, I invite alternate readings of the data without conceding that any possible reading is equally ‘right’. The analytic openness of the research dissolves the illusion of an opaque barrier between the researcher and the reader, enabling the wrestling over meanings and interpretations which allow for knowledge processes to be truly collective, communal, and non-exclusionary, and so to align with a rigorous understanding of feminist sociology.
The final feminist aspect of the research, and the one which has, for the most part, not yet been carried out, is ensuring the accessibility of the research outputs. This will involve a significant deal of consideration, as there are many different types of barriers to accessibility. I will not elaborate on these at length because they concern aspects of the process which are yet to be undertaken, but my intention is to disseminate the results of the work in academic and non-academic venues, to ensure that all outputs are available in some form without a paywall, to produce versions of the research outputs which are comprehensible for non-academic audiences, and to consider dis/ability issues in relation to the outputs so that people who cannot read text from a screen can access the material. The entire project has been designed to enact feminist principles in the research process, and to do so in a way which reaches across time – it draws data from feminism’s past in order to transform feminist relations in the present, to cultivate practices of feminist accountability in the process and real-world consequences of the work, and to hopefully help to engender a more feminist future within and outside of sociology.

3.4

Texts as a Window on Emotion Culture: Studying Feminist Emotions in the Archival Turn

The most basic methodological quandary of this project confronted me many times when I told colleagues what my planned research was about:

‘My PhD is about the emotions of radical feminism – I’m trying to figure out why radical feminism is the way it is emotionally.’

‘So you’re going to interview radical feminists, then?’

Drawing from my admittedly anecdotal experience, it would almost appear that qualitative research is interview research until proven guilty of being something else. Human subjects methods such as interviews or ethnography would certainly be a legitimate way to study radical feminist emotion culture, and these methods were both
considered during the design stages of the research. Ultimately, documents were selected as the data source, and within this, published, historical, periodical texts from a single-publication case study. In this section, I will elaborate the rationale for the use of documentary archival research for answering the research question, and the advantages and limitations of this approach. The case study approach, case selection, and sampling will be discussed in the next section.

The emotions of social movements have now generated a considerable body of research, but little of this uses documentary data. Those studies, like this one, are led to the methods they use by the specific demands of their research questions. The research question for this project led to the archive. The general substance of the question need not have done so – the question ‘What is the emotion culture of radical feminism?’ could be answered in some way with almost any qualitative research method. The deciding factor in this case was the question behind the question. The reason the research asks the question that it does is with a view to understanding how radical feminism became the way that it is emotionally. Embedded in that underlying question is an orientation to longitudinal process and change (or stasis) which would be difficult to capture with another method. Another possible way of articulating that secondary question might be, ‘What has been the trajectory by which radical feminism’s emotion culture has arrived at the place it is in today?’ While the principal research question, on its face, does not obviously lead to archival research methods, these secondary driving questions do.

A fuller view of the question which accounts for the other question behind it leads to a study of the movement’s past, but this still does not go as far as to necessitate historical or documentary research. The oft-repeated query - ‘So you’re going to interview radical feminists, then?’ - still stands, and with it, the need to parse out the relative merits of documentary and human subjects methods. The drive to unearth the past of a movement which was comprised of participants who are still around to be interviewed allows dubious assumptions about the relationship between the past and its contemporary remembrance to quickly arise. This research intended to
explore radical feminism’s ‘real’ past, not the way it is remembered or narrated today – a knee-jerk reaction rooted in an unjustified distrust of memory and trust of texts. A distinction between documents which hold records of the movement’s ‘real’ past and the presumed unreliability of participants’ memories easily unravels under scrutiny. What radical feminists in the past wrote down, what they wrote for publication (versus for private use), for whose reading they intended their writings, and other aspects of what went into constituting radical feminist published writings place those texts as much in the realm of embeddedness in the emotional, contextual, and political ebbs and flows of a particular moment in time as are the memories of those same women today. Studying historical radical feminist writings does not unearth the movement’s ‘real’ past, but simply changes which factors have gone into shaping the stories that emerge from the data.

Nevertheless, there are aspects of memory and narrative research which made historical textual methods better fit for this research than interviews would have been. Interview research would have, at its heart, been a study in memory – in what is remembered and how, and in what sorts of stories radical feminists now tell themselves about the past that they lived in light of what has happened to their movement, their world, and their lives since then. That does not make those memories less ‘accurate’ than what can be interpreted from text, however; rather than turning to textual research for increased reliability, methods which do not involve human subjects were used on the basis of a recognition that ‘memory is not the past itself, but rather, how the past is understood, both by individuals and by communities or social groups’ (Oakley, 2016: 1). It is crucial to note that the archive is not the past itself, either, but it is a different kind of record of the past than contemporary memory narratives would be. Interviews are a social and relational interaction in which memories are not so much retrieved as they are constructed in the interactive process of dialogue and recollection (Jedlowski, 2001), whereas the interactive process in play in the production of a publication like Trouble and Strife was concerned with interactions between radical feminists in their place and time. It was those interactive constructions
of emotions and meaning with which the research was concerned.

Though the emotions of social movements are not often studied using archival textual methods, there are some notable exceptions⁶ which I wish to highlight here, as well as one which explores emotions and politics more generally. These include Deborah Gould’s *Moving Politics* (2009) and Victoria Hesford’s *Feeling Women’s Liberation* (2013), as well as Sara Ahmed’s (2004) *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*. These studies are notable as they relate methodologically to my own research, and there are a few key parallels and contrasts worth noting in relation to them. Firstly, Gould’s study is much more ethnographic than are the other two, which are quite straightforward discourse analyses. Crucially, Gould was a participant in the movement she studied, and she used archival textual methods in addition to interviews and participant observation. She alone amongst the three (and she is distinctive amongst textual researchers of emotions and social movements in this way) engaged with the texts she read in much the way described in section one of this chapter – she experienced the text emotionally, with much of that experience being a reliving of her own emotions during her involvement in ACT UP.

Hesford and Ahmed approach their texts in a more discourse analytic way, paying attention to the way that signs, signifiers, and cultural narratives are orchestrated within the text in order to culturally produce particular types of social subjects. Hesford’s research is more closely aligned to my project in its focus on a social movement, whereas Ahmed’s attends to the emotional life of a ‘society’ more broadly; notably, however, Hesford’s research is not about the emotional life of the WLM itself, but rather about how feminists were constituted as the objects of particular emotions through their representation in the mainstream press, a focus similar to Ahmed’s account of the mainstream media. These emotion-focused studies add something essential to our understanding of how discourse, emotion, and politics cooperate,

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⁶ One other which might be counted here is Joshua Gamson’s (1995) periodical-based research on gay and lesbian identity, and some sociologists of emotion do treat it as a study on emotion (see Jasper, 2011). However, though Gamson’s data is rich with emotion and he remarks on its emotionality, emotion is not an analytic focus of the research. It therefore does not shed light on the methodological issues of studying emotions through text.
filling a void left by other research on the way that collectives such as women’s liberationists are represented in mainstream media outlets (see, e.g., Mendes, 2011). Nevertheless, even with these important additions to the literature on emotions and politics, it remains uncommon to explore the emotions of a social movement itself through textual data, and there has consequently been little development of methodological tools for doing this.

The dearth of text-based research on movement emotions seems a strange omission, and archival research on social movement emotions offers fruitful opportunities which will hopefully be taken up more widely in the future. Studying a movement’s emotional interior through text is the only (ethical) way to undertake such research without involving the researcher-participant social dynamics which inevitably change what the researcher finds. Textual research places a researcher in direct conversation with a movement through its texts, making them a sort of fly on the wall. This affects the emotional dynamics, stories, communications, energies, resonances, and flows that they are able to observe and participate in, and creates opportunities for inference which cannot be replicated within the constraints of human subjects research. This is not a reason to substitute archival research for human subjects methods in the study of social movement emotions, but it does make a valuable addition to the methodological toolkit which scholars in this subfield can use in our collective enterprise to better understand the emotions of movements.

3.5 Delimiting a Social Movement in Documents: Case Study Research in the Archive

In spite of their frequent appearance in human subjects research on emotions and social movements, case studies are not generally used in documentary studies of movements (though again it is worth noting that documentary studies of movements are few and far between). Gould and Hesford both draw upon expansive archives for their research, and though there are more narrowly circumscribed case studies on individual publications within sociological studies of movements, including feminism
(see, e.g., Withers, 2011), such research generally draws upon diverse archives of texts from a range of different authors and publishers, and often across different types of periodical and one-off publications. Though there are obvious benefits to this approach, there are also unique advantages to a single-periodical case study, and the advantages and limitations of this approach will be explored in this section. Within *Trouble and Strife*, there was additional sampling done, limiting the dataset to the 1980s and narrowing the topical frame to focus on medical and psychiatric health and care, and this section will also explain the rationales for these entry points.

The value of case studies for understanding the emotions of social movements is well established in research on the topic, and the field abounds with analytically fruitful cases which take this approach (e.g., Cadena-Roa, 2002; Gould, 2009; Flam and King, 2005; Flam, 2013; Goodwin, 1997; Schrock *et al.*, 2004). In practical terms, to do human subjects research on the emotions of a movement seems almost bound to take this approach, as a researcher can only do interviews, ethnography, focus groups, or other types of qualitative research with so many people and groups within the scope of a single study. The implicit epistemological claim of case studies in emotions and social movements is that there is something that can be learned about the emotional workings of a movement from the study of one group or organisation within it and about emotions in movements in general from the study of a single movement; the ideologies, worldviews, positionalities and identities, and sense of community and collective feeling that constitute a movement are understood to be a presence within each group, such that they can be accessed (albeit within limitations) through a given exemplar case.

Textual research tends to be seen differently. The epistemological realities of text-based research are taken to be subject to more extensive constraints than are human subjects studies. On one level this makes perfect sense – unlike human beings, texts cannot be queried for clarification, elaboration, or their own interpretations. The researcher must produce an interpretation solely on the basis of what they find on the page, and this can leave loose ends and unanswered questions which leave the analysis
open to serious interrogation. The interpretative work done by interview researchers, however, may not be as different to the interpretation involved in textual analysis as it may superficially seem, and it is worth asking questions about whether documentary research is being regarded with a somewhat exaggerated degree of suspicion. While human subjects research is often treated as having quite a high degree of generalisability, documentary studies are often at least implicitly seen as being representative of little other than the specific texts under question. Texts, it is assumed, are so beset by their own specificities – the particular biographies of their authors, the purposes for which and readers for whom they were written, the political economic forces that shaped their ideological content, conditions of production, and circulation, and the conventions of genre and materiality that shaped their form and content – that it is unjustified to make general claims about social life from documentary data unless such an extensive and diverse archive of texts is drawn upon that scepticism about analytic inference must yield to the volume of the evidence.

While these issues of specificity and generalisation are well-justified and essential for researchers to engage with (a point to which I will return below), I contend that case studies in documentary research can have more epistemic reach than they are sometimes understood to do, and if the epistemological insights of human subjects research on emotions and social movements are extended to textual studies of the same, productive opportunities open up for explorations of the emotions of movements that are more difficult to achieve with broader datasets. As it would have done with a human subjects study, this research began its investigation of the emotions of radical feminism with a search for some subset of radical feminists to take as a point of entry. Rather than simply assume that a large and diverse dataset ought to be assembled, however, consideration was given to the particular demands of this study in light of its research question. Taking into consideration recent theorising on emotions themselves (particularly their conceptualisation as relational – see Burkitt, 2014a; Ahmed, 2014[2004]), the research design was oriented toward capturing the in-betweenness of emotions at every level, from the most micro-social to the most
macro. The sample would need to reflect the playing out of interpersonal relationships (not just their representation or narration, but their unfolding and evolving in and through text itself – I refer here again to texts as a site of social life), as well as intra-movement emotional dynamics and collective emotions, relations between radical feminism and other social movements (including other strands of the WLM), and radical feminists’ emotional engagements with their broader socio-historical context.

A periodical case study is an ideal answer to all of these requirements. The regular recurrence of issues of a magazine allow for a temporally measured timeline of change across time, enabling longitudinal effects of all of the social levels of the movement’s emotional life to be traced. The relatively insular (but not altogether closed) group of editors and authors (including authors of letters to the editor) provided a level of community continuity that made space for interpersonal dynamics to emerge – not only would radical feminist collective emotions in general appear in the magazine, but affinities, conflicts, and negotiations between specific individuals would sometimes be a visible presence. The breadth of the research question was intended to allow for precisely this sort of open-endedness in the analysis. It was not clear before the research began what would come up as most significant, so a research design which would reflect emotional dynamics and engagements of all kinds was necessary in order to allow the data to speak to any aspect around which the movement’s emotion culture might actually be centred. Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, the narrowness of a case study was needed to make the analysis less constrained.

_Trouble and Strife_ was selected as the case after a survey of feminist writings from across genres and sub-movements. There was some degree of risk of reproducing the independent press ‘canon’ in the research by studying one of the handful of most famous and often-researched publications, so care was taken to explore options which might be lesser-known. Internet searches were of key benefit in identifying independent feminist publications, most valuably the _Grassroots Feminism_ website (ND), which hosts an extensive index of independent social movement publications.
along with brief descriptions of each. This approach turned up many more results than could have been found in any given brick-and-mortar archive, and allowed for a more extensive selection of publications amongst which to select for the case study. Though other feminist periodicals from around the same time were read in the course of the research, including during this exploratory phase, Trouble and Strife stood out as uniquely valuable for a study of British radical feminism.

The most important feature that recommended Trouble and Strife was its explicit and strongly-held positioning as a radical feminist publication. Other periodicals exhibited meaningful overlap with radical feminist thought and politics (Sappho, a lesbian feminist magazine, stands out amongst these), but Trouble and Strife was a sort of flagship periodical for radical feminism within the UK. The editorial collective’s identification of the magazine as a radical feminist one is made explicit in the first issue, and their editorial comment there contained a pithy and recognisable encapsulation of the political premise of radical feminism as a movement:

‘We believe that men as a group benefit from the oppression and exploitation of women as a group. We do not see women’s oppression as secondary in importance to class or any other oppression; nor do we see it as produced by or maintained because of class or any other oppression. Although we recognise that women experience additional oppressions, particularly through race, ethnic origin, age, disability, class, and that these additional oppressions may benefit and be contributed to by women who do not share them, all women are oppressed as women.’ (Trouble and Strife Collective, 1983, issue 1: 2; italics original)

Though in the same editorial the collective notes that they intend to publish content by authors who do not self-identify as radical feminists and some with which they do not necessarily agree, the political thrust of the content of the magazine across its
publication run was, more than any other long-running feminist periodical of the time, consistent with radical feminist thought in general. Some reader letters specifically attend to radical feminism as a movement: defining it, negotiating its boundaries and relationships with other movements, and deliberating what self-identifying radical feminists want their movement to be. The editorial collective’s openness to material which was not overtly radical feminist notwithstanding, then, there was a clear presence across the publication that its authors and readers saw it as a textual home for radical feminist thought, making it a viable textual site for empirically investigating the movement.

Trouble and Strife presents rather a double-edged sword for researchers. Its content is diverse and varied, both in genre of textual forms represented and topics addressed. This breadth provides a wide and clear window through which to see radical feminist culture and politics. The material in the magazine addresses an enormous range of feminist issues, debates, and concerns: sexuality and lesbianism, race and colonialism, legislation and the state, patriarchy as a system, fat and the politics of the body, dis/ability, transnational solidarities, reproductive health, abortion, women’s events and conferences, social class, psychotherapy, feminist movements, and more. To get such a wide array of topics to speak to one another in a cohesive way would require elaboration of the specific debates, events, and context pertinent to every one of these things – without such elaboration, a reader of the research would be at a loss to understand it unless they came to the reading with their own extensive knowledge of feminist historiography and debates. The magazine’s richness therefore presented challenges as well as opportunities, and it was consequently necessary to narrow the topical frame in order to bring the pieces within the sample into reasonably cohesive conversation with one another.

The criteria for the topical frame of the research were that the topic be well-represented within the content of the magazine, span a range of genres of writing, demonstrate a variety of different types of emotional engagement (emotions being present in the text through emotion words, tone and timbre, and more subtly and
implicitly), and be the locus of substantial debate (so that negotiation and deliberation, rather than less instructive uncontested consensus, would be present). There were two topic areas which robustly fulfilled all of these criteria: (1) race and coloniality, and (2) medical and psychiatric health and well-being. Both of these could have been productive points of entry to the movement’s emotion culture, and indeed some of the richest and most complex debates centred around issues of race. What the health and well-being debates offered that was more difficult to get at in the race and coloniality material was deeply ambivalent turmoil. Radical feminists are often faulted for a historical failure to account for and include racially othered women and their political realities within the movement, and while there is a presence of this issue in the magazine which can provide valuable insight into some aspects of the emotion culture, radical feminists were generally agreed upon the question of racism. There was no debate to be had about whether racism really existed, was a genuine problem, or demanded accountability and reflexivity on the part of feminists; the debates were around the enactment of these principles. Conversely, medical and psychiatric health and well-being were seen as open to some degree of legitimate debate about ideology as well as praxis. The question was not simply how to put radical feminist principles into practice, but what some of those principles ought to be.

The medial and psychiatric care debates surfaced some of the haziest and most porous edges of radical feminist ideology, demanding highly reflexive, emotionally-engaged debate amongst radical feminists which drew upon their own lived experiences as well as their shared political lens. The movement’s ideological stance sometimes grated against women’s feelings with respect to their own lives, giving rise to confusion, misunderstanding, ambivalence, and sometimes conflict. There was also, meanwhile, a considerable amount of agreement, produced by radical feminists’ shared lens on gendered history and the use of medicine and psychotherapy as instruments of patriarchal control. These points of agreement gave the movement a shared set of meanings and interpretations around which collective emotions could be organised. Medicine and psychotherapy, then, offer insight into the collectivity of
radical feminist emotion and open up explorations of their fracturing, providing the most widely-open window on the movement’s emotion culture and avoiding the inadvertent foreclosure of aspects which might be obscured within a topical frame around which there was universal consensus or a uniform lack thereof.

A final important benefit of the medial and psychiatric care frame is that debates around these topics were amongst the points of most stark divergence between radical feminism and other feminisms. Radical feminism is distinctive in its adversarial lens on men – every other strand of the WLM in the UK exhibited more willingness to cooperate, to at least some limited degree, with men in political organising. Medical and psychiatric care, like all other social institutions, were under the principal control of men, unavoidably making them a site of confrontation with the enemy for radical feminists, whereas this was at least less straightforward for other strands of the WLM. Radical feminist analysis of medicine and psychotherapy, as will be explored in the following chapters, reflects this lens, and foregrounds what is unique about radical feminism’s emotion culture. This distinctiveness enabled the research to zero in on what is specific to radical feminism.

The differences between radical and other feminisms around medical and psychiatric care led to the next and final sampling issue: time. *Trouble and Strife* commenced publication in 1983, around the same time that feminist cultural and psychoanalytic theory was gaining significant traction in feminist scholarly thought and social movement practices. The historical moment of the 1980s saw a deepening of the fractures between strands of the WLM, with radical feminists doubling down on their ideology as the feminist turn to culture and psychoanalysis bloomed (see, e.g., Brennan, 1989). The increasing tension between the cultural turn and radical feminists’ sense of urgency to retain the feminist gains made during the mobilisations of the 1970s gave rise to heated debates and emotionally-laden reflections. If this research were preoccupied with a question about how emotional (or unemotional) radical feminism was (a question which, in any case, does not reconcile with contemporary sociological theorising on emotion), then focusing on the 1980s might misrepresent it –
such an emotionally charged moment might make the movement appear ‘more emotional’ than it would at a different time (or less so, depending upon which emotions were taken account of). However, the research was qualitatively rather than quantitatively oriented, and for that purpose, the temporal and topical convergence of medical and psychiatric care in the riven 1980s was beneficial. The relevant radical feminist debates ploughed up the ground of the emotion culture and enabled an investigation of both what was on its surface and what was concealed underneath it.

This consideration set the start point of the temporal frame at the onset of the magazine’s publication in 1983, but there remained a question about where to end it. Medical and psychiatric care dwindled as a presence in the magazine’s content toward the end of the 1980s, and more or less disappeared from 1991. With the generally agreed starting point of the ‘third wave’ emerging in 1992, it is unsurprising that radical feminists turned their attention largely to other things around this time. Because it was fortuitously also the underlying intention of this project to map radical feminism’s emotion culture as it existed just before the movement travelled into the ‘third wave’ period, the obvious cut-off point of 1991 and the point at which pieces on medical and psychiatric care disappeared from the magazine coincided in that year.

The case study of Trouble and Strife, bracketed from 1983 to 1991 and centring on medical and psychiatric health and well-being, enabled a thorough investigation of radical feminism’s emotion culture. In this section, I have argued that periodical publication case studies, if executed with sufficient methodological reflexivity, can be a viable and productive way to study the emotion cultures of social movements. Drawing on the orientation to inference and generalisation at work in human subjects case studies and incorporating recent developments in theorising on emotion into research design, documentary case studies can add a valuable strategy to existing methodologies for studying movement emotions. Trouble and Strife, as a de facto flagship periodical publication for radical feminism, was a strong case for investigation, and the roiling intra- and inter-feminism contestations of the 1980s around medicine and psychotherapy offer a clear point of entry on the interplay between radical
3.6

Finding the Text: The Epistemology & Politics of Multiply-Archived Documents

Archival research always presents an array of inscrutable mysteries to a researcher, and the demands of doing archival research in a feminist way, and about feminism, add to the load of quandaries to be resolved. In this section, I will detail the approach taken to working with the archive. This includes the selection of an archive amongst a range of them which hold similar content, the synthesis of physical archive and digital archive methods which was employed in the research, and the reflexive demands and challenges that the archive component of a feminist sociological project about feminism presented. Each of these entails both epistemic and political issues, and the feminist ethos of the research guided both.

The UK is a good place to be a feminist archival researcher. The country hosts a range of archives of feminist materials, including but not limited to the Glasgow Women’s Library (Glasgow), the Feminist Archive North and Feminist Archive South (Leeds and Bristol, respectively), and the Women's Library at the London School of Economics (London), amongst others. Many of the same materials can be found in several different archival locations, which raises questions about which one to use. It may seem that only pragmatic considerations would go into this decision, and indeed it did turn out that the best choice was also the most pragmatic, but a feminist archival project must also take the politics of the archive into consideration. There are questions about physical and financial accessibility, democratic governance, who wields the power of gatekeeping and to what ends, and the emotional politics of the archival space, and these were all examined in the process of selecting an archive.

The most immediate feminist consideration in the work was selecting an archive that anyone could go into without obtaining an institutionally-issued ID card, being a student or staff member at a university or other organisation, or registering their
details with a security desk. These are all exclusionary factors which might bar entry to some and grant it to others, and while none of these would be barriers for me, an important aspect of doing feminist research is doing work that could have been done by any other feminist (or could be retraced by them afterwards). A related but distinct issue is that of the physical and emotional accessibility of an archive location. Whether the building where the archive is located is physically accessible to those with movement disabilities, and how welcoming or intimidating a space it is for a range of different people, speak to the feminist credentials of the archive and its fitness for use in a piece of feminist research\textsuperscript{7}. I aimed for an archive that did not require ascent of stairs, and which maintained a community-oriented environment which would not be too imposing for people of varied gender, racial, religious, class, sexuality, and dis/ability positionalities to comfortably enter. It fortuitously happened that the Glasgow Women’s Library (GWL), the feminist archive nearest my base in Edinburgh, answered all of these requirements. They hold a full archive of *Trouble and Strife’s* publication run, in addition to an array of other feminist periodicals and a wide selection of feminist books, are in a ground floor location, and are easily accessible by public transport.

In addition to the accessibility of the archive space itself and the appropriateness of its contents, the broader structural situation of the archive was considered. Even an archive which is openly and comfortably accessible to everyone is situated within an array of power relations (Eichhorn, 2013). Every physical archive (and digital one, a point I will return to below) has operating costs and must draw its funding from somewhere. There are, in many cases, profits to be made in operating them, and the people who work in them are providing labour which benefits the researchers who use them and those who economically profit from their existence and

\footnote{I would add here that many archival materials are not as widely available as those that this research used, and while it is optimal for feminist research to take all of the issues mentioned in this section into consideration, their satisfactory resolution is not always possible. I would not contend that a piece of research is not feminist if it did not encounter the ease of fulfilling feminist ideals that I had the good fortune to meet with during this project, though I would hope that all feminist researchers would see this as an impediment to feminist research rather than an irrelevancy.}
maintenance. The GWL is a charitably-funded body and the only registered women's history museum in Scotland. They do not charge fees for entry or to obtain a library card, and do not charge late fees for delayed return of borrowed books. They actively engage their local community of Bridgeton, Glasgow (a working class neighbourhood), and specifically reach out to minority ethnic members of the community for part-time paid work in the library. It is therefore an ideal fit for a piece of feminist research which is meant to be replicable by any feminist who takes an interest and to avoid, as well as possible, entanglement with ethically dubious corporate interests.

The politics of the GWL are ideal for feminist research, but as with any archive, there are inevitably some practical constraints on the ease of its use for research. The principal one for my purposes was that it would be substantially time-consuming to scan all of the magazine pages of Trouble and Strife’s print run. As the sampling was done through an iterative process after the archival visits took place, it would have been necessary to scan every page of every issue of the magazine, and GWL has no scanner on site, leaving researchers to carry out their scanning with hand-held devices that they bring with them. Trouble and Strife, conveniently, exists in full text digitised format, and could be accessed in that way without the need to scan it all anew in the GWL. This raised a few issues which are worth elaborating. The first is that digital duplicates, like hard copy originals, are kept somewhere (online) by someone who controls how they are accessed, for which reason there is a politics to the digital archive just as there is to the brick-and-mortar one. The second issue is that the digitised version of a text is distinct from its original, and that needs to be taken into consideration when the research is done – I was able to get a lot from the digital duplicates of the data that I could also get from the hard copy originals, but not everything about a text can be captured and translated digitally, and indeed the document becomes a distinct and different one in certain respects when it is digitally duplicated. Thirdly, there is the question of reading the text, and whether reading and analysing a digital duplicate can yield the same findings as reading the hard copy original. I will address each of these matters in turn.
Trouble and Strife is available in full text PDF (portable document format) online. This is increasingly becoming true of a range of feminist periodicals in the UK, and Spare Rib and off our backs are now also available online in full text. This raises crucial questions for a feminist sociologist: Who has done the labour of digitising these materials? Who has control over whether, how, and by whom they can be accessed? Is anyone profiting economically from their online availability, and if so, who? What is the relationship between the holders and gatekeepers of the digital duplicates and the original publications? As with GWL as the physical archive site, Trouble and Strifes online archive was ideal to satisfactorily answer all of these questions. While Spare Rib is kept online by the British Library, and off our backs is kept with JSTOR, Trouble and Strifes digital archive is on their own website, having been picked up by a new generation of Trouble and Strife radical feminist editorial collective members. The website also features new content, speaking to how central this publication is to the intellectual and political life of the British radical feminist movement. The collective themselves control access to the digital duplicates, which are freely available for download (enabling viewing without an internet connection after the download), and no website registration is required for this. Again here, then, what was most in the interest of making the research process a feminist one and what was most convenient for the research happened to coincide.

The empirical aspect of the research proceeded in two phases, one in the physical archive and one using the downloaded scans of the magazine. The process was ordered in such a way as to ensure that the magazine was read as multi-modally as possible, but allowing for practical convenience where appropriate. What this meant in practice was that the physical archive was visited before the digital copies were ever accessed. I considered it important that my first encounter with the text be with the physical magazine itself. The materiality of a publication conveys clues about its positionality within an intertextual milieu, a reality which comes to the fore in a physical periodical archive. What sort of paper a periodical is printed on, whether it is in colour or black and white (or a combination of the two), how large or small the
magazine is (in length, but also the dimensions of the pages it is printed on), how each magazine is bound (some periodicals were bound with staples, others with colourful yarn, and still other periodicals were merely folded together with no binding), and crucially, how each of these features compares to other periodicals in the archive speaks volumes about the resources that were available to the producers of the magazine, what political values may have gone into their production processes, what sorts of other publications they were positioning their own as being similar to, and which they were more distanced from.

*Trouble and Strife* was printed on standard printer paper and roughly standard (A4) page size. The printing was black and white throughout, but the outside page on which the cover was printed was a glossier paper and brightly coloured. The scanned copies appear fully in black and white, and the colourfulness of the covers is not discernible there. This feature might seem inconsequential, and perhaps more a matter of making the magazine look enticing than of positioning it intertextually (indeed, there is a risk of ascribing too much meaning to every aspect of an archival document – sometimes editors may simply want the page to look a bit more interesting and give the matter no deeper consideration than that). However, it is noteworthy what other publications *Trouble and Strife* resembles in this way and which it is dissimilar to. The periodical that most physically resembles *Trouble and Strife* is Sappho, a lesbian feminist magazine (which is printed on smaller paper, but is otherwise like *Trouble and Strife* in appearance). The Marxist and socialist feminist publications tended toward a broadsheet newspaper style, while liberal feminist magazines like *Spare Rib* had the appearance of a much more professional output, with high production quality, glossy paper, professional photography, and full-colour printing.

The time spent in the physical archive, then, was focused on exploring *Trouble and Strife*’s position within its intertextual milieu, and helped to indicate where the editors wanted the magazine to be placed politically through its similarities and dissimilarities to other publications. Time was spent comparing it to other publications (in its material aspects, but also in others), as well as gaining a general familiarity with
its contents. Beyond this, however, it would not have been feasible to carry out the analysis in the archive itself. The archival original copies of Trouble and Strife could not be written on or taken away from the GWL, and so scanned copies were needed for analysis to be carried out. Rather than take original scans of the magazine by hand, which would have been a time-consuming endeavour and would merely reproduce the labour already done by the Trouble and Strife collective themselves, I downloaded the digital duplicates from Trouble and Strife’s website, and then went back to the archive to compare these to the hard copy originals to ensure that all of the pages were present.

Digital duplicates are not, of course, simply mirror images of the originals. The scanned copies are kept on a website rather than in a physical archive, and are accessible from anywhere with an open internet connection (whereas a physical archive must be visited in person). The digital copies of Trouble and Strife are part of a different leg of the magazine’s history – rather than being a historical document, they are a living part of a significant feminist periodical which has been taken up again many years after it ceased publication and begun a new round of production as a website. This places it in a fundamentally different narrative than the one it left off with when it ceased print publication in 2002 (Dampier, 2008). Reading digital copies of Trouble and Strife from the website, then, is taking up a resource which has been made available by a committed group of radical feminists to continue the tradition of specifically radical feminist writing in a moment in feminist history when radical feminism continues to come under heavy critique from postmodern, queer, and libertarian feminisms. The continuity and persistence of radical feminist ideology which gave rise to this research is embodied in the resumed production and self-digitisation of Trouble and Strife. The significance of this development comes through even more sharply when compared with other now-digitised feminist periodicals of the ‘second wave’, which are kept in online archives by large, wealthy institutions (with no overt feminist affiliation or identification) such as the British Library and JSTOR. These latter are historical artefacts, digitised for wider accessibility than can be achieved with physical archives,
and are available for readers interested in seeing remnants of the textual legacy of the ‘second wave’. It is implied by the way that these documents are archived, by whom, and for what sorts of purposes they are assumed to be accessed that archived periodicals belong to the past. *Trouble and Strife*, on the other hand, digitally archived by its own collective, housed on its own website and under its own control, kept strictly in the hands of radical feminists themselves, and housed online alongside newly written content places *Trouble and Strife’s* history within a living present.

The use of *Trouble and Strife’s* online archive therefore served two purposes. One was that it resolved the practical issue of producing digital copies and provided the necessary hard copy material for the analysis. The second and more significant, however, was that it extended the feminist sociological ethos of the data collection, which began with using a physical archive which is held in a publicly funded and widely accessible women’s history museum. The physical data collection phase was followed by use of a digital archive which is held and operated by radical feminists themselves without control having been ceded to bureaucratic, elite knowledge institutions. Commencing the research in the physical archive ensured that the initial impression of the magazine incorporated its material aspects, so that the magazine’s intertextual positioning would remain a present idea throughout the research (which might have been difficult to achieve if my first encounter with the text had been on a screen). Finally, the use of digital duplicates allowed for printing of paper copies which could be read in a manner similar to how the original magazine would be read – on paper. The ability to read within and across pieces, to do so in a manner befitting the pace and process of analysis, and to allow me to write on the text was crucial to the analytic process. This enabled me to do analytic thinking in the research which would have been difficult to accomplish had the data been confined to a screen or been read from an archival original which could not be written on.

The feminist sociological concerns outlined above preceded a more convoluted one about what it means to undertake feminist archival research as a feminist studying feminism. Archives are spaces that have been heavily romanticised, and this is not
surprising given the potentials that they hold. Knowledge produced from archival data reaches into the past and rewrites it, changing the history from which the present proceeds and opening and foreclosing different ways of imagining what future should and can follow (Hemmings, 2011). All sociological knowledge production comes with the responsibilities that attend the world-making that it entails, and approaching historical archival research from a feminist perspective comes with additional accountabilities. The power that a shared understanding of the past has to shape, frame, narrate, and define the present and future is a significant one for a researcher to wield, and one which must be taken seriously in the research process. This research about radical feminism was intended from its outset to open up new feminist futures through a revisitation of the past, so this was a consideration which was returned to regularly throughout the process. In addition to the epistemic opportunities and limitations of doing archival documentary research on emotions (which will be addressed in the next section), there were relationships to consider: between myself as the researcher and the movement I was researching, between generations of feminists and different feminist ideological camps, and most crucially, between the past and the present.

This research was undertaken with a view toward helping to solve a problem, which might better be solved if more deeply understood. It was my intention, therefore, to make sense of how aspects of present-day radical feminism which I see as a problem came to be through a historical trajectory. Such a stance on the radical feminism of today draws toward a reading of the archive against its grain. Conversely, a deep understanding of any social movement emotion culture relies upon seeing its archive on its own terms, demanding a reading with the grain of the text and an interpretative social scientific approach. This tension was present throughout the research, and resulted in a moving back and forth between reading with and against the grain of the text. Though the reading process often felt deeply ambivalent as a result of this, the against-the-grain critical sense-making process operating alongside the with-the-grain sympathetic reading raised the more subterranean textures of the
text to the surface and allowed for the exploration of radical feminism’s own internal ambivalences. It is important to recognise and acknowledge my own position with respect to radical feminist politics and ideology and the ways in which this pulled upon my reading of the data, but likewise the push and pull of a critical view of some aspects of radical feminist thought alongside a sense of urgency that it be authentically understood, rather than hastily dismissed, enabled a lively wrestling with the text. This produced a deeper reading of it than might have happened otherwise. It also provided a regular mechanism of checking the analytic process against the standard of feminist sociological practice, keeping the reading oriented toward understanding the text’s intended meaning while also remaining accountable to the present and future that the research was helping to create.

A distinctly feminist challenge of doing the research was the sense of debt to earlier feminists that those of my own generation owe. To render radical feminism critically seems a gesture of ingratitude from a feminist whose ability to be placed in a university doing a PhD about emotions and feminism (to say nothing of the myriad other feminism-shaped aspects of my daily lived reality) is so substantially a consequence of the labours of the very women whose writing was my object of analysis. At a number of points, I felt a hesitation to be critical of radical feminism, conscious that by doing so I was contributing to the reproduction of a self-defeating (and, on examination, largely unfounded) intergenerational animosity within the milieu of feminisms (Mackay, 2014). There were certainly points at which this seemed an insurmountable barrier to the production of a robust piece of research – to critique radical feminism would reproduce precisely the inter-feminist hostilities that the project was meant to help resolve, and to withhold from doing so would be epistemically dishonest and more a reflection of my own feelings of gratitude toward feminists of the ‘second wave’ than of my sociological analysis.

Ultimately, this was a difficult but highly productive predicament in the thinking process that wove throughout the research. The perfect balance between interpretative and critical approaches remains elusive, but the endeavour to find a
route out of this tension led me to the analysis that ultimately resulted. The questions which were brought to the analytic process were around why feminists placed in this particular moment (the 1980s), with the view and interpretation of history up to that point that they subscribed to, enmeshed in the structural and cultural shifts that they were, embedded in the unique array of relationships of power, affinity, and anomie in which they found themselves, would come to have the emotion culture that they did. This, of course, was essentially the question from the outset, and some would argue that this is the difference between normative bias and social ‘science’. However, no research proceeds from a suspended reality outside of time, space, and relationships, and it required this emotional journey of navigating the feminist responsibilities of the research to bring the resulting analysis to the fore. It was the feminist aim of producing research that would enable more productive feminist futures that formed the basis of the analytic approach. As discussed in chapter 2, this type of analysis is not prevalent in studies of emotions and social movements, and so had not arisen as an obvious lens to take to the work until the demands of balancing my indebtedness to other feminists and my world-making responsibilities as a knowledge producer eventually led to it.

3.7 Reading Emotion Culture from Text: Literary Ethnography & a Historical Lens

The process of interpreting and analysing textual data is different for every combination of researcher and dataset. No two researchers can really carry out the same piece of research, even with the same question and on the same dataset, though they may largely come to the same sorts of conclusions. Following from the framework of feminist fractured foundationalism outlined above, this section will provide an account of how the data involved in this project was read and analysed. The purpose of this detailed account is to make the findings and inferential process by which they were generated accountable and open to scrutiny by the reader, though I simultaneously acknowledge that all knowledge generated through research is anchored in the positionality and subjectivity of the researcher. Accountability is not, as Van de Poel-
Knotterus and Knotterus suggest, a way of creating accuracy of the sort that might guarantee that another researcher will generate exactly the same results if they follow the process I outline, but rather a way of laying open to evaluation the way the knowledge was generated, so that the process, as well as the findings, can be interrogated.

Though this was covered earlier in the chapter, I highlight again here the significance of the exploratory phase of the research in the analysis. The reading of radical feminist literature such as manifestos, essays, academic writings, and consciousness-raising guides was used for two purposes. Firstly, it provided the intertextual familiarity requisite for all textual analysis. Secondly, it served as a sort of affective training ground, in which I as the researcher attuned my feeling self as an affective and emotional instrument for reading and analysing radical feminist writings. I am not suggesting that anyone who extensively reads radical feminist writings will somehow become assimilated into radical feminist subjectivity (whatever that might be), and therefore that this is a fully replicable component of the research. However, because my ability to carry out this research was augmented by emotionally-embedded positionalities as a feminist and a woman, and my motivation for doing the work was an earnest desire to resolve what are perhaps needlessly exaggerated and destructive rifts in the broader feminist movement, my reading of the radical feminist canon enabled me to see radical feminist ideology and ideas on the movement’s own terms, and to cultivate in myself to the greatest extent possible the ability to see things through the movement’s lens – in other words, to empathise with radical feminists.

Though some accounts of research methodology would regard this as an indulgent and unnecessary way of describing the research process, I follow Benet Reid in maintaining that only by becoming a living participant in the world of the text was I able to provide an analysis of the movement’s emotion culture from it. My own emotions were not data, but they were a vital research instrument, and that instrument required calibration, which the exploratory phase of the work provided (I will detail how this was then instrumentalised below).
Following the exploratory phase, the case selection and sampling described in section 3.5 was carried out, followed by several rounds of reading of the data. As with the exploratory phase, the initial reading was intended solely for the purpose of gaining familiarity with the content of all of the pieces included in the sample, and to get a sense of what was happening emotionally in it. The analysis approach incorporated two key elements: multimodality and feeling-led ethnographic reading. The multimodal approach adopted was that outlined by Roland Barthes (1977) focusing on how text and images were read separately and in combination, and how the space of the page was used to contribute to the overall messages in the text. The ethnographic component of the reading attended to the ‘personal account’ of how the text works emotionally to which Benet referred, and served as the starting point for explorations of the relationship between text and context.

This initial stage of the research began what would become a somewhat unexpected excavation process. Unlike the purportedly unemotional technical discourses which Benet Reid studied, the text of *Trouble and Strife* is rife with explicit references to emotions. It is clearly denoted in emotion words, overtly alluded to in images and cartoons, and unambiguously evoked in the reader. It was this surface-level emotion to which the analysis initially turned, precisely because it leaps off of the page. However, the study of emotion culture presents unique challenges for textual analysis. Though there is a lot of emotion on the surface of the text, focusing on this largely pulled the analysis away from the movement’s broad emotion culture. The emotion culture is occupied with emotions as culture – a nexus between the movement’s historical and sociopolitical location, its ideological lens, and the emotional ways of being that prevailed in the movement. It was therefore often the implicit and subtextual emotion that was most relevant to the analysis, and an analytic approach which focused on emotion language and the explicit would have missed much of this. As the initial reading and re-reading of the data and early attempts at analysis unfolded, it became increasingly clear that the material in the text that was often of interest for answering the research question escaped the analytic capture of a
surface-oriented reading of the text.

It was at this point that the phenomenological, affectively-led reading approach advocated by Benet Reid in his work came to the fore. It was common in my reading of the text for me to find that a given passage resonated emotionally but did not explicate emotion – I would sense anger, frustration, affection, or mirth in the text, but could not readily identify the word or phrase that had conveyed it. To borrow Reid’s phrasing, I initially found it ‘difficult to codify’ where the apparent emotion in the text was coming from. This observation then informed the way that the analysis was done. There were three key analytic tools used: the overt instrumentalisation of the researcher’s emotions and emotional reflexivity in the analysis, placing me as a ‘living subject within’ the material; the interpretation of emotional resonances and currents in the text through the postulate of emotions as relational (Burkitt, 2014a; Ahmed, 2014[2004]), which made it possible to analytically explain the emotion I felt in the text; and the historical orientation of the research, which explained emotions in the text by reference to the historical moment in which 1980s radical feminism was situated. The remainder of this section will elaborate each of these three aspects of the analysis approach.

In order to surface emotion culture in the text, it was necessary to analytically account for emotions which were subtle, implicit, and subtextual, and to link these with the movement’s ideology and historical location. It was not sufficient to identify what emotions were commonly expressed in the text – instead, there was a need to generate an account of how emotions work in the movement and to explain how its emotional life was related to the meanings, ideas, ideologies, and world views from which radical feminists’ emotional responses to people and events would proceed, whatever specific emotions they might be. What it means to read implicit emotion from text is difficult to elaborate abstractly, but the following example will provide some idea of what such reading entails, and will make clearer why having the research done by an appropriately emotionally ‘calibrated’ researcher is a practical necessity.

The following extract comes from Sophie Laws’s conference report about the
Women’s International Tribunal and Meeting on Reproductive Rights in Amsterdam in 1984. The general emotional impression of this piece as a whole is one of affection, warmth, and affinity between women (though there are other emotional dynamics within it as well). There are two analytic difficulties here, one being that it is difficult to convincingly represent the overall emotional tone of a piece without quoting it in its entirety, and the other being that these emotional resonances in the text are largely implicit. I here quote a highly illustrative (if also rather lengthy) excerpt from early in the piece:

‘First a kind of list – to give you some idea of the context of the discussions, of the range of women present. A Tamil woman speaks of the persecution of her people in Sri Lanka, of girls selling their bodies to earn a passage to India; a Portuguese woman tells about the fight to legalise abortion there; a woman from Curacao [sic] is working on a quarterly feminist magazine. A Yugoslavian speaks about the problem of women there using abortion as their only form of contraception; Chilean women speak about women being paid a monthly benefit when they are pregnant which may equal the family’s total income. A Spanish woman is on trial for performing abortions; in Zimbabwe, still, young girls abandon babies when they have given birth outside of marriage. A Dutch lesbian doctor reads a statement from the women in Amsterdam jail about their demand for a woman doctor; an Indian woman protests at routine police rape. Costa Rican women talk about pills being given out like sweets while there is not one diaphragm in the whole country; a Brazilian reports that IUD strings are often cut off so that women cannot remove them. A Nicaraguan woman
reports on the progress the Sandinistas are making with health care. Women from many countries report that half the cases in gynaecology wards are of women suffering the effects of dangerous and illegal abortions. A Dutch woman tells of her struggles as the daughter of a mother who took DES, an oestrogen prescribed to prevent miscarriage which has produced cancers in many of the children born after this treatment. Black South African women speak of Black women being sterilised without their knowledge while undergoing other abdominal surgery. They fear for Black women if South Africa follows Britain and licenses Depo Provera. A statement is read from Vanuatu, a newly independent Pacific island state which has recently banned Depo Provera; a British Black woman speaks for the rights of women with sickle cell to bear children. A health education worker is present from the Union of Peasant Women of Ecuador; a number of British and Dutch women with disabilities speak about how they are discouraged from having children. Women from many countries are campaigning against drug companies’ exploitative practices, and there has been some success in the work against the selling of powdered milk. A Thai lesbian talks about her acute isolation in a country, like so many, where making an independent life as a woman is highly dangerous. A Puerto Rican woman talks about how oestrogens in meat are causing “precocious sexual development” in many children, mostly girls. An Indian woman warns that “Third World”
women will soon be being used as surrogate mothers by wealthy western couples.

After dinner one night, some African women tell us how in their countries if a girl-child is born, the women give five cheers, if a boy-child, seven: feminists give eight cheers for a girl. They show us how it’s done.’ (Laws, 1985, issue 5: 34-35)

The long first paragraph provided an account of the women at the conference and the issues that they brought for discussion, but more importantly for purposes of this research, it gave an impression of the scale and magnitude of women’s oppression. The way that Laws chose to represent this, in the form of a long, point-by-point list, was structured so as to be emotionally evocative as well as descriptively informative for a radical feminist reader of Trouble and Strife, who would be going to the magazine with a pre-existing emotional orientation toward women’s oppression. Any analyst could have arrived at this inference, but the first time I read this piece, I felt despondent by the end of that paragraph (and the more so out of consciousness that in many respects, things have not much improved since the time of writing). As a feminist analyst, and one whose own lived experience is that of a woman, I was more emotionally moved by the text than some other researchers might have been.

This was significant due to what came next. The small paragraph at the end of the passage, marked out as distinct from the rest by the paragraph break, closed this otherwise demoralising introduction on a note of hope and affection. She not only highlighted that there were feminists enacting resistance in spite of the overwhelming scale of women’s global oppression, but she selected an example which illustrated resistance through the expression of joy, and added an admiring remark about the example that those women set for other feminists. I felt the warmth, hope, and affectionate admiration in that passage in part because it came at the end of such a bleak preceding section. I am emotionally invested in resistance to patriarchy, and I, like participants in radical feminism’s emotion culture, need hope and the emotional
sustenance of solidarity between women in order to cope with my own social positioning as a woman and a feminist. This is in one sense a type of emotive expertise, but it also ensured that I had an emotional reaction to the text that was in line with the emotional culture of the movement with which it was associated. Indeed, the nourishing power of relationships between women is a strong theme in radical feminist writings, and my exploratory immersion in the radical feminist canon sent me into the data analysis with a less forgiving and more exasperated and angry attitude toward male oppressors than my postmodern, ‘third wave’ background had engendered me with. It is not impossible that a non-feminist or male researcher might perceive the implicit affection and warmth that I did in the final paragraph of that passage, but my socio-emotional situatedness as a feminist woman and my emotionally ‘calibrating’ exploratory research were powerful tools in better enabling me to perceive it and greatly increasing the likelihood that I would. Having had that emotional response to the text, it was then possible for me to probe where my reaction had come from, enabling me to connect the demoralising bleakness of the first paragraph with radical feminism’s ideological conviction that women’s oppression by men was omnipresent, systematic, and deliberate, to relate the last paragraph with the movement’s occupation with women’s separatism and caring relationships between women, and to note the considerable emotional impact of the juxtaposition of the two in the structure of the text.

Those factors that I have just identified highlight the significance of emotion theory in methodologies for studying emotion in text. Reid argues that the emotional currents in a text which are only perceptible to an ethnographically embedded reader are difficult to clearly account for. That is true, and the spectral presence of emotions in text do not always lend themselves to explication in the form of academic writing, which is the form in which the analyst is expected to represent their findings. With that being acknowledged, however, there is a possibility of accounting for the implicit and subtextual emotion perhaps more instrumentally than Reid seems to suggest, by recognising emotional currents and reverberations as shifts, negotiations, and
transformations of relationships. If recent theorising on emotion as relational is brought into the methodology of reading emotion from text in this way, then the implicit emotion that the analyst feels in the text can be seen differently. Rather than the vague emotional timbres and resonances which Reid suggests may not be possible to explain except to say that ‘you had to be there’, emotion indirectly and implicitly represented in text can be understood as emotion represented as its relationality.

Relationships are not only between subjects, of course, and this is important to note if the representation of radical feminism’s emotion culture in text is to be accessible through analysis. Radical feminists had relationships with individual people as well as collectives, groups, and categories of them, but they also had relationships with ideas, paradigms, and values, and those relationships were as subject to negotiation, transformation, and sometimes struggle as any that they had with other people. Accounts of emotion as relational often (and rightly) emphasise the intersubjective, but the other side of a relationship need not always be a subject. Laws’s conference report showed that she had relationships (albeit brief ones) with the other women at the conference, but she also had a relationship with the ideas of women as a collectively oppressed group and of feminists as members of the same political team. When she stated that the African women who cheered at the births of girls ‘show us how it’s done’, and positioned that statement within her longer narrative of women’s overwhelming oppression being counteracted by resilient and joyful resistance, she implicitly (re)produced the abstract but emotionally meaningful idea of feminists as a group warmly bonded to one another through belief in one another’s value. It is that latter relationship – with the idea, rather than the specific people – with which that passage of the text emotionally reverberates.

In spite of the preceding discussion, it may seem that a reading of the latter paragraph of the excerpt from Laws’s piece as resonating with warmth and affection is a bit of an over-reading. There are two final components of the interpretation of Trouble and Strife which are needed to explain how the analysis has worked, and to show why the emotion that I have interpreted from the text has not merely been a
superimposition of my own emotional interior: texts as units of analysis, and emotions as produced within historical locations. The extract above does not appear in *Trouble and Strife* the way it does in this thesis, as an abstraction positioned within a piece of academic writing, and it was not originally authored or intended to be read decades away from its time of writing (though the authors would be well aware, and would likely hope, that the text would remain extant for many years). Both of these factors have directly contributed to my reading of the text, and I will conclude this section by elaborating briefly on each.

A recurrent challenge in producing the analysis here is that because much of the emotion in the text is implicit, and all of it deeply intertwined with its historical location and context, it is impossible to adequately show, within a piece of academic writing, the emotion I have found through the analysis. The extracts appearing in the chapters that follow come from pieces of writing which cannot be exhibited here in their entirety, and some meaning is always lost when a part of a piece is cut away from the whole. Even if a whole piece could be reproduced within the text of this thesis, each piece in *Trouble and Strife* was part of a larger issue, had other pieces positioned before and after it, and the issue as a whole had other issues around it within the longer overall run of the magazine. Though I have just argued that implicit emotion in text can be better accounted for than Reid seems to suggest, I return here to his description of the product of a literary ethnography as a ‘rather personal account’ of how the text works. It may at times appear that the emotion in the text is over-represented, and there is little to say in response to this allegation other than to urge the reader to replicate my research process. Reading a piece as a whole, and especially reading the entire issue in which it appears as a whole, produces a fundamentally different emotional experience of the reading than analysis of any extract can do. Additionally, a feminist reading a feminist magazine is engaged in a different type of experience than is an academic reading a thesis – upon re-reading my discussion of Laws’s piece above, even I am not wholly persuaded of the interpretation. It is not my intention to argue that the analysis should be unaccountable (as I argued above, this is
the direct inverse of what I have aimed for); rather, I highlight that these realities of the way that reading works emotionally do not fall away in concession to what is convenient for academic writers and readers. Participants in radical feminism’s emotion culture in the 1980s read the magazine in their capacity as feminists, and did so in their own historical moment, and it is that type of situated reading of the text that this research has aimed to explore.

As the analysis in the following chapters will show, the historical moment in which 1980s radical feminism was situated was a crucial constituent in its emotion culture. Reading the text through the ‘structures of feeling’ (Williams, 2013[1961]) of that historical moment affects what the reader takes the text to mean. *Trouble and Strife* is a site of signification, but signifiers never only signify their direct referents. To return to Laws’s conference report, the long list of specific issues that she recounted signified who was at the conference and what oppressive issues different women were being subjected to, but it also indirectly signified the scale of women’s global oppression and the bleakness of that moment in time for women. Taken within the broader radical feminist view of the discouraging trajectory of the WLM, it takes on still further meaning. Laws’s piece was published in 1985, several years into the neoliberal turn in British politics and the cultural turn in British feminism. Radical feminists saw changes in the WLM at this time as a pulling away from the radical demands for liberation that characterised the 1970s and toward collusion, cooperation, and coping with the Napoleonic conquest of women, a deeply disillusioning and worrying turn of events for women who had put tremendous time and energy into WLM organising throughout the ‘70s (Owen, 2013). If that lens on the overall life of the WLM is borne in mind with the reading of the extract from Laws’s piece, the emotional impact of its last paragraph is amplified. I noted above how the long and distressing preceding paragraph increased the strength with which the latter paragraph evoked affection and warmth, but this effect is increased further still when radical feminists’ shared view of what was becoming of the world and of the WLM in the 1980s is used actively as a lens for reading the text. Radical feminism’s emotion culture is a strong presence
throughout the text of Trouble and Strife, but the emotional resonances which emerge from pieces and magazine issues as wholes, as well as the significant role of historical moment in the constitution of the text’s meaning, were key aspects of the interpretation process that made the analysis possible.

3.8

Conclusion: Doing Feminist Literary Ethnography on Emotions & Feminism

Literary ethnography is a powerful method for capturing emotions in text which otherwise evade analysis. It provides a flexible toolkit of reading approaches which enable the researcher to instrumentalise their own emotions and their embedded intimacy with the lifeworld of the text to access emotions within it which more aloof and technical forms of reading might fail to capture. Though there is an apparent risk that accounting for analysis in this way may decrease the accountability of the analysis, this can be counteracted through detailed explanations of how the analysis has worked, through the use of retrievable data and a feminist approach to creating genuinely replicable research, and by acknowledging the embodied nature of knowledge and its place in sociological research.

Archival textual methods are particularly useful for researching social movement emotion cultures, because they trace the development of those cultures over longer periods of time than do non-textual methods often used to study movement emotions, such as ethnography and interviews. By historically examining the way that emotion cultures have taken shape over time, the present-day emotion cultures of the same movements can be better understood; in addition to being analytically fruitful, this may contribute to better inter-movement understanding and cooperation between feminist movements which have come to be deeply fractured. Borrowing from the common case study approach of much research on the emotions of movements and applying this to textual research, this project has undertaken a close examination of direct dialogue and interaction in the movement as well as its broader and more macro characteristics, enabling the analysis to account for the interactions
between micro and macro elements of radical feminism’s emotion culture and rooting the research in a quintessentially sociological focus on the nexus of interaction between the individual and the social.

The analysis was highly iterative, allowing the data to guide the analytic method as well as the theorising emerging from the research. This led to a recognition of the need to make analytic space for the researcher’s emotions as a legitimate research instrument, even where the research is not autoethnographic (and by extension, to a rejection of the patriarchal delegitimisation of feeling as a mode of knowing which has long been weaponised against women and impeded knowledge production). Though it was not immediately clear how some of even the strong emotional resonances in the text were produced, the active engagement of theorisations of emotions as relational enabled the analytic capture of implicit emotion in the text as the representation of the (re)production, negotiation, and fluctuation of relationships, including relationships with ideas, paradigms, and values. These relationships are resonant with emotion, and the strength and character of those resonances can be fully apprehended when the historical conjuncture in which 1980s radical feminism was positioned and the ideological lens through which radical feminists saw that moment are taken into account in the interpretation of the text.
Chapter 4
‘The Medical Men’: Using an Emotional Toolkit for Collective Relationships

4.1
Introduction

As discussed in chapter 2, the emotion culture of a social movement provides a guideline for participants about what emotions are appropriate toward different groups of people, including superordinate groups as well as the members of the movement itself and other groups within the social context (Taylor, 2000). As I have also argued, and as the next three chapters will explore empirically, rather than understanding emotions ‘toward’ particular groups of people as inner states inside of social actors which are projected outward, they must be seen as relationships between the actors involved – these relationships are felt emotionally, and are mediated by social actors’ own understandings of how they are situated in the social world and what that situation says about themselves and others (Denzin, 1984).

The exploration of radical feminism’s emotion culture laid out in this thesis will therefore examine two key categories of people toward whom radical feminists had collective emotions (or with whom, I will argue, they had collective emotional relationships): (1) men, MDRCs, and patriarchy; and (2) women and feminists. Women’s liberation, like all social movements, needed allies and enemies in its cultural imaginary in order to form a relational and political logic of collective action, and the emotion culture incorporated distinct collective emotions toward each. As a WLM sub-movement which often favoured women's separatism, political lesbianism, and the premise that all women shared an oppression which cut across all other axes of difference, radical feminism was better suited than other feminisms to have a comparatively straightforward adversarial relationship with the agents of male power. It is this relationship with patriarchy and its agents which will be the subject of this
chapter. Relationships between would-be 'sisters' – women and feminists – were more complex, and sometimes fraught, than were radical feminists' relationships with men and patriarchy; these relationships amongst women will be explored in chapters 5 and 6.

In order to elaborate radical feminists' relationship with men and male power, this chapter will explore constructions of the men who populated the MDRC institutions: doctors, psychiatrists, and medical researchers. The textual representations of men, medical paradigms, and various institutions produced the relationship that radical feminists collectively had with them, giving rise to their place within the movement’s emotion culture. There are three interrelated questions that this chapter aims to answer:

- Who were the figures who populated MDRCs in the radical feminist subcultural imaginary?
- What emotions were associated with them in the text of Trouble and Strife?
- How did the emotion culture of radical feminism (partially) emerge from the movement’s collective emotions toward these figures?

The patriarchal figures explored below appeared in a variety of forms across the text of the magazine. Because Trouble and Strife was a genre-diverse publication, the ways that men and patriarchy appeared in the text varied in accordance with the conventions of genre, and a range of genres is consequently represented in this chapter. The analysis draws from pieces across the dataset, drawing from all of the content which focuses on medical and psychiatric health and healthcare. The data discussed in this chapter include analytic articles, polemics, letters, book reviews, first-person narratives, conference reports, and the cartoons peppered across these. Representations of men are interspersed throughout discussions of a range of topics covered in Trouble and Strife, so rather than taking entire pieces as the unit of analysis, this chapter will focus thematically on representations of men, MDRCs, and other male-dominated institutions where and as they appear.
The chapter will proceed in four sections. The first will provide a foundation for those that will follow, laying out radical feminism’s lens on men, MDRCs, and patriarchal institutions themselves before moving onto explorations of the emotions associated with these. The resonance of the emotional framing done in the text was rooted in a particular view of male-dominated medical institutions, their ways of interacting with women, and the power structures which their activities served. Section 5.2 will therefore provide an overview of radical feminists’ view of medical research, clinical practice, and psychoanalysis as inherently ‘male’, and show what they understood this ‘maleness’ to mean for them politically. The latter sections will then tour the emotions associated with MDRCs in light of the relationships of power surfaced in section 5.2. There are four key emotions which emerge from the movement’s emotion culture in relation to men and MDRCs: horror, fear, anger, and annoyance – these emotions will each be discussed in turn.

It should be noted at the outset that there is sometimes some slippage between these different emotions, and some extracts of the text involve more than one. Still other instances challenge the limits of emotion language, and come somewhere near one of these four key emotions without unambiguously belonging to any one of them. Much of the research on emotions in social movements explores specific individual emotions, but the co-mingling of these four key adverse emotions in radical feminism’s emotion culture troubles the effort to ascertain what any given individual emotion does for the emotion culture of the movement. What emerged from the analysis, as will be expanded upon below, is that the flexibility afforded by the cultivation of a cultural toolkit of adverse emotions was, perhaps somewhat ironically, what allowed the movement’s emotion culture to maintain cohesion. Radical feminists were able to maintain a collective adversarial relationship between themselves and MDRCs without the need for a rigid prescription of specifically which adverse emotions defined that relationship – horror, fear, anger, and annoyance all, at various times, served the purpose equally well. The use of multiple adverse emotions for essentially the same purpose highlights the relational in emotion: what was really important was
not which emotion was felt, but that it signalled an adverse relationship. I will return to this point at the end of the chapter.

The central mechanism by which MDRCs were textually constructed as objects of adverse emotions in radical feminism’s emotion culture was emotional framing (Cadena-Roa, 2002), a concept which will recur throughout the chapter. This is divided into two broad subtypes: naming and framing. In instances of naming, the emotions associated with MDRCs were indicated through straightforward denotation of a particular emotion. Naming emotions is a crucial component of what makes them concrete, specific emotions available to be experienced and understood (Burkitt, 2014a). In cases of what I have called framing, the familiar process of emotional framing occurs, in which the text speaks to the authors’ and audience’s shared knowledge, values, and ideology (Ferree & Merrill, 2000) in order to produce the emotional resonance of a collective emotional orientation toward the situation, person(s), or institution(s) represented in the textual account (but generally does so without naming the emotion involved). In either case, however, the text was used to establish an association between medical and psychiatric institutions and actors and radical feminists’ adverse emotions. The two types of emotional representation and their use across the four key emotions of horror, fear, anger, and annoyance, produced radical feminists’ collective emotional relationship with MDRCs will be explored in sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.

4.2

*Science, Medicine, and the ‘Male’ Power Bloc*

Radical feminism’s emotional relationship with MDRCs and men was rooted in their understanding of the power relationship between men and women. No aspect of radical feminists’ emotion culture, nor their political ideology, can make sense without an apprehension of what it was that they saw when they looked out at a world divided between men who oppressed women and women who were oppressed by men. In this section, radical feminism’s view of MDRCs, and the movement’s relationship with the
broader structures of male power, will be explored. This will form a foundation for the examination of specific emotions later in the chapter, and will help to illuminate the emotional gravity of debates between feminists which will be discussed in the next two chapters.

There were three components to the way that men and MDRCs were constructed in the text of *Trouble and Strife* as distinct from and in political opposition to women, and these will each be examined in turn in the remainder of this section. Firstly, the way that language was used to refer to medical practitioners and women established them as mutually exclusive and oppositional groups. Secondly, medicine and psychoanalysis were framed as an ideological paradigm. Thirdly, and perhaps most crucially, MDRCs were linked with other spheres of male power, such as the nuclear family, the state, and non-state institutions, establishing all spheres of the social world in which male power was exercised over women as different sites within the same battle. I characterise this unified front of male power against women as a patriarchal power bloc, and radical feminists’ view of patriarchal oppression as part of the same power bloc no matter where in daily life it might be encountered was pivotal to shaping their collective emotions toward men in general and MDRCs in particular (see von Scheve *et al.*, 2016).

Radical feminists knew that there were women involved in medical research, medical practice, and psychoanalysis, and some of the pieces explored in this and the following chapters are about precisely these women. However, the language that radical feminists often used implied that women were a categorically distinct group from medical and psychiatric professionals. These uses of language ranged from observations that medical institutions were dominated by men to implied equivalences between medicine and men. For example, in her analysis of the hormonal contraceptive pill, Sue Leigh did the former, observing men’s dominance in medicine:

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8 I distinguish between patriarchy and a patriarchal power bloc because, while the power bloc would generally be considered to be patriarchy itself, a central tenet of radical feminist politics was that men as a class of agents, rather than patriarchy as an abstract system, was responsible for women’s oppression. A structure of power which centres the wilfully oppressive acts of agents, then, was a crucial component of radical feminists’ emotional sense-making.
‘What eventually happened was that more women turned to the male-dominated medical profession for contraception thereby giving them greater power to intervene chemically or surgically in women’s lives.’

(Leigh, 1984, issue 3: 36)

In this instance, she referred to the medical profession as ‘male-dominated’, a description which recurred often throughout Trouble and Strife. This, however, was one of the softest articulations of the claim that medicine was the sphere of men, only acknowledging that they dominated it. Some articulations described medicine as not only dominated by men, but as intrinsically ‘male’. In her report on a reproductive rights conference, Sophie Laws related that medicine was seen by many women as more than simply male-dominated:

‘Others saw science as a male institution, and felt that what is crucial about this kind of practice is that it takes our bodies out of the control of the medical profession.’ (Laws, 1985, issue 5: 38)

In Leigh’s and Laws’s pieces, it was established explicitly through language that medicine was effectively the purview of men. Laws’s reference to ‘our bodies’ being removed from the ‘control of the medical profession’ reinforced the commonly recurring construction of ‘us’ being women and ‘the medical profession’ being men.

In other instances, it was indicated that medicine was a ‘male institution’ without it having been named so explicitly. For example, in her discussion of an adverse experience at a Well Woman Clinic, Lisa Saffron reiterated the apparent categorical distinction between women and doctors, and echoed Laws’s discussion of the power relationship between the two:

‘Women have been labelled as neurotic and complainers by doctors for too long.’ (Saffron, 1985, issue 5: 14)

Crucially, Saffron did not state that doctors were all men, and indeed the reality that practitioners were sometimes women was central to this piece of writing: the account
was about the negative experience that Saffron had at a clinic where all of the staff, including the doctor, were women. However, her remarks about how women were ‘labelled as neurotic and complainers by doctors’ implied that women and doctors were two separate groups of people, with the one having power over the other. This was one case amongst many, as will be seen in later extracts, in which the text did the work of producing women and doctors as two distinct categories of actors with diametrically opposed interests.

Saffron’s account went on to emphasise women’s need for medical care that followed a feminist approach, and again implicitly reinforced the perception that MDRCs were inherently ‘male’:

‘When I’ve talked to friends about my visit to the Well Woman Clinic, I’ve discovered something very interesting – everyone had heard of WWCs but nearly all thought they were clinics where you could see a gynaecologist or be referred directly to a specialist without having to go through your GP. They thought you could be treated at the clinic for any kind of woman’s complaint and be seen by sympathetic female staff who would allow you plenty of time to talk. A few were under the impression that WWCs have some form of feminist philosophy – emphasising self help, prevention of ill health and control over your body.

In fact, the majority of Well Woman Clinics are funded by the NHS, and these provide preventative services only.’ (Saffron, 1985, issue 5: 15)

By taking as self-evident that the NHS was the opposite of a sympathetic, feminist medical practice, the structure of this passage of text positioned feminism and the major UK medical institution as mutually exclusive. Saffron made the gender politics of this opposition more explicit later in the piece:
‘GPs are generally male.’ (Saffron, 1985, issue 5: 16)

Her use of language throughout the piece, then, established a distinction and political opposition between doctors (who were taken to be men) and women (Ferree & Merrill, 2000). The use of language was used to establish that medicine was a ‘male’ institution, both by naming it as one and by treating conventional medical settings like the NHS as the taken-for-granted opposite of what a feminist clinic might be. It was significant that the debate at the reproductive rights conference and Saffron’s narrative were concerned with medical research and practice being done by women, because a recurrent conclusion was that conventional medicine would necessarily be oppressive to women, even if it was being practised by women. MDRCs were taken to be not just male-dominated, but to have maleness woven into their constitution.

The view of medical institutions and practices as both in the hands of men and permeated by an ideology of male power was pervasive as well, building an additional layer onto the references to medicine as male discussed above. This was the case for both physiological medicine and psychoanalysis. In a letter to Trouble and Strife, FINNRAGE, a network of feminists organised around resistance to ‘new reproductive technologies’ (NRTs), outlined their aims as an organisation, naming the patriarchal ideology of medical research on fertility amongst them:

To reject the use of new reproductive technologies in the service of maintaining patriarchal definitions of women and the family.’ (FINNRAGE, 1987, issue 10: 3)

The allegation that reproductive technologies were intended to maintain the dominance of ‘patriarchal definitions’ was a widespread concern, appearing three years earlier in an event report on the first national conference on NRTs:

‘We agreed that we reject the underlying philosophy upon which the medical profession, and we think the Warnock Inquiry, are basing their recommendations for practice.’ (Hanmer and Powell-Jones, 1984, issue 3: 45)

Hanmer and Powell-Jones’s reference to medicine as having an ‘underlying philosophy’
that feminists opposed further illustrated the idea of medical knowledge and practice as an ideological paradigm. They thereby contributed to a shared framing within radical feminist discourse which would provide ground for the emotional resonance of invocations of the frame (Schrock et al, 2004). This framing was echoed yet again by Saffron in her narrative about the Well Woman Clinic:

‘A Well Woman Clinic should be a place where women learn to trust ourselves and each other – to come to have respect for our bodies and for our views of reality. But as long as Well Woman Clinics are under the control of doctors and medical thinking, I can’t see that happening.’ (Saffron, 1985, issue 5: 13)

The idea that medicine was ideological and rooted in patriarchal assumptions about women pervaded the radical feminist lens on medical care, and informed how they interpreted each encounter with practitioners and each historical event (such as the Warnock Inquiry and the development of NRTs) that arose (Taylor, 2000: 274). The way that language was used in Trouble and Strife named doctors and women as two distinct and politically opposed groups and also implicitly produced the two groups in this way in references to doctors and medical institutions as the obvious inverse of women.

The same was true of writings concerned with psychoanalysis. As with physiological medicine, this took the form of explicit articulations that psychoanalysis was patriarchal as well as arguments that psychoanalytic ideology was opposed to feminism. In her detailed critique of feminist psychoanalysis (the possibility of which was frequently denied across the text of the magazine), Stevi Jackson noted that the cultural context around psychoanalysis necessarily influenced it:

‘Analysts’ conclusions on the construction of gender and sexuality cannot but be affected by patriarchal culture and frames of reference drawn from it.’

(Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 36)

Jackson’s piece as a whole was concerned with the necessity for radical feminists to
address the growing trend of feminists taking up psychoanalysis (in an altered, ostensibly less oppressive form) as a feminist practice. Radical feminists were critical of this change, seeing psychoanalysis as intrinsically patriarchal:

‘It is now unfashionable to suggest that therapy is of its origins and nature politically naive or even reactionary. Nonetheless we feel that feminist criticisms of therapy are as valid as they have ever been, for the recent development of women’s therapy leaves the basic therapeutic perspective unchanged.’ (Scott and Payne, 1984, issue 3: 22)

In psychoanalysis, as in medicine, radical feminists saw care regimes as permeated by a patriarchal ideology which could not be purged by feminist practitioners. A letter to Trouble and Strife articulated this particularly clearly. Offering a critique of all of the increasingly popular methods for emotional healing, including psychoanalysis amongst others, Lorraine Davies argued:

‘They are all based on male philosophies, male religious beliefs or male theorists. Most practitioners are not feminists, even where they are that does not give us for example, feminist acupuncture – it gives us a feminist who is doing acupuncture. Just as there is no feminist therapy, only feminists who are working as therapists. Yes, I expect different treatment from a feminist and that her feminist thinking will influence her practice as a therapist, whatever sort she is, but don’t let’s fool ourselves, Freud or Buddha are just around the corner.’ (Davies, 1984, issue 4: 10)

Even where the need for emotional wellness was recognised, radical feminists struggled to imagine what this might actually look like, in much the same way that they wondered whether safety testing of medicines was a patriarchal practice. ‘Freud and
Buddha’, they suggested, would be present in any psychotherapeutic enterprise. In her highly laudatory review of Phyllis Chesler’s book on psychoanalysis as a form of male violence against women, Dale Spender summarised Chesler’s claim that psychiatric health in its existing form was permeated by patriarchal ideology:

‘What was necessary, she argued, was a completely new way of describing and explaining mental health which was free from male politics.’ (Spender, 1986, issue 9: 40)

Throughout discussions of psychoanalysis, then, the underlying logic an ostensibly caring practice was understood to be a patriarchal ideology. Though medicine and psychoanalysis are distinct, practised by different people, in different settings, and maintained generally through different funding sources, they were seen as iterations of the same phenomenon – the maintenance of patriarchal domination of women.

What ultimately cemented MDRCs’ place in the broad patriarchal regime, however, was their perceived linkage with other spheres of male power. The patriarchal power bloc of men in different spheres of social life placed MDRCs within a network of oppressive male institutions, shaping radical feminists’ lens on, and relationship with, them. There were various social structures in which they saw male power operating in collusion with MDRCs. One was the corporate sector, which Helen Murrell alluded to in her letter criticising the use of in vitro fertilisation (IVF):

‘We must remember that the IVF programme in Britain was set up as a commercial venture.’ (Murrell, 1985, issue 6: 3)

Murrell’s letter was a response to a piece in (conditional) defence of NRTs, authored by Sue Leigh on behalf of herself and other women with experiences of infertility, who sought out the use of NRTs and wanted feminist support for making them less violent in practice. This intra-feminism debate will be explored further in chapter 5, as the complexities of women’s lives gave rise to ambivalences which made a wholly unitary emotion culture (see Holmes, 2000; 2004). What is notable here is that even where a
radical feminist had articulated a defence of NRTs, the response from this reader was that the technology and its use must be interpreted through the lens of its entanglement with male corporate power. NRTs, like psychoanalysis, were seen as being contaminated with patriarchal ideology, to the exclusion of the possibility of radical feminists approving of their use, even by feminists.

The corporate sector was only one major institutional bloc seen by radical feminists as in cooperation with the oppressive practices of medicine. Non-governmental third sector institutions and governments were seen as being part of the patriarchal power bloc. In her report from a major international reproductive rights conference in Amsterdam, Sophie Laws raised concerns about the collusion between population control agencies (organisations concerned with lowering the birth rate in response to a moral crisis about global overpopulation) and corporations:

‘An associated problem is the dumping of drugs which are banned in the “first” world, or which are just out of date or damaged in some way. Population control agencies co-operate with multinational pharmaceutical companies and allow such abuses in pursuit of profit.’

(Laws, 1985, issue 5: 35)

She continued shortly later in the piece to extend the power bloc between medicine, non-governmental institutions, and corporations to include governments:

‘They say openly, in writing, that governments are justified in resorting to any measures, suspending any regard for civil liberties, in pursuit of the goal of limitation of births. The present US administration doesn’t see their own level of population as a problem and is attacking US women’s abortion rights. On paper, it is against the abuse of sterilisation, but in Bangladesh people are paid “compensation” by US AID, which amounts to giving incentives. Such payments are
also made to women accepting Copper T IUDs and Depo Provera.’ (Laws, 1985, issue 5: 35)

According to Laws’s account, governments determined what they wished the birth rate in their countries to be, and regulated or deregulated reproductive technologies and medications accordingly, cooperating with the lobbying of non-state institutions and simultaneously inflating the profits of pharmaceutical corporations. Men were seen to be cooperating across all of these institutional structures to control women’s bodies for the interests of men.

Finally, this extensive power bloc of institutions was extended to the nuclear family, drawing an association between men’s domination of women in every sphere of private and public life. In her analysis of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, Pat Spallone criticised the political interests at play in the proposed law:

‘This is protectionist legislation, but if women are protected at all, we come at the bottom of the heap of contesting interests: scientists, doctors, fathers, the state, and each of their claims on the “embryo”.’

(Spallone, 1990, issue 18: 15)

This extensive power bloc was what radical feminists saw themselves as being confronted with, incorporating ‘fathers’ (the nuclear family) as well as all of the major institutional structures of their context. Their struggle for liberation from patriarchy was surrounded on all sides by agents of male power, and medical care practices were seen as being a mechanism for reinforcing women’s oppression. The perceived power battle was so pronounced that even where women were known to be practitioners, what stood out as salient to radical feminists was the functioning of MDRCs as instruments of women’s oppression.

As Sophie Laws’s conference report highlighted, the power bloc was not seen as being confined to the UK context (though much of the discussion of reproductive health in Trouble and Strife was concerned with UK-specific events and legislation). Rather, women’s oppression through medicine was understood as a global
phenomenon, an interpretation which resonated with radical feminists’ view of women as a globally oppressed political class. The scale of this problem was immense, and this ordering of the relationship between women and men formed the foundation for MDRCs’ place in radical feminism’s emotions (Burkitt, 2014a). The magazine published some material covering reproductive rights issues in other countries, in addition to reports on international conferences, linking the power bloc in the UK to its global context. For example, in their report on amnioncentesis (a procedure to assess characteristics of a foetus in utero, such as sex and congenital abnormalities), the Forum Against Sex Determination and Sex Preselection, based in India, complained of the same inter-institutional collusion that confronted feminists in the UK context:

‘The government and the sycophants of population control are actively colluding with the medical profession in their mindless and ruthless pursuit of achieving a Net Reproductive Rate of One (one female child per woman). Therefore it lies in their interest to not regulate any technology which has even the remote potential of helping them achieve this goal.’
(Forum Against Sex Determination and Sex Preselection, Bombay and Saheli Women’s Resource Centre, 1989, issue 15: 38)

Significantly, they also linked this to some of the emotions that will be explored in the next section:

‘In spite of public protest, the alarming rate at which new reproductive technologies are penetrating the core of Indian society is really nightmarish. Sex determination is only one menace. There are a series of medical technologies such as genetic engineering, cloning, test tube babies, surrogate motherhood, which are being glorified by the medical lobby. The
inherent sexist, racist and class bias of these techniques which reduce women to “male producing machines” and raw material for scientists/doctors lusting to enhance the “quality of the population” by conquering the imperfections of nature need to be exposed. Since all these techniques are now internationally patented, and big money is involved, we need to build international resistance to these practices.’ (Forum Against Sex Determination and Sex Preselection, Bombay and Saheli Women’s Resource Centre, 1989, issue 15: 39)

The language in this passage was highly emotionally evocative: ‘alarming’, ‘nightmarish’, and ‘menace’ are all suggestive of horror, and the image produced by their description overall, of a medical establishment ‘glorifying’ the reduction of women to manufacturing devices for more men and the eugenicist objectives of producing a better ‘quality’ of population frames the ‘medical lobby’ as horrific. This instance of framing in particular tied together the construct of the patriarchal power bloc and the horror associated with it. It is the notion of MDRCs as sites of horror that the next section will explore.

Central to the construction of radical feminism’s emotion culture were the individuals and groups with which they shared a collective relationship, and the male power bloc was key amongst these. Through the lens of a radical feminist political ideology which saw all women as oppressed by all men, the construct of a male power bloc emerged which became a significant object of radical feminist collective emotion and a macro entity with which radical feminists had a collective relationship. Taking as a starting point their view of the male power bloc as a global assemblage of men working in cooperation to maintain women’s oppression and ensure that patriarchal ideology permeated every relationship and institution, radical feminists cultivated their toolkit of collective emotions through which to relate to men and MDRCs. The next
three sections will explore the emotions of this toolkit and the ways that they were used to (re)produce radical feminists’ adverse relationship with MDRCs. That the relationship between women and the male power bloc was adversarial was implied by radical feminists’ understanding of the power relationship between the two groups, but the articulations explored in this section do not fully illuminate the emotions of that relationship. In the next four sections, the emotions of radical feminists’ relationship with MDRCs will be examined.

4.3 Psychoanalysis & Horror

As was evident in section 4.2, constructions of MDRCs sometimes implied horror, and in this section, their construction as horrific will be more fully surfaced. Horror was associated with MDRCs in various contexts, but this section will focus on the most salient and recurrent case: Freud and psychoanalysis. By framing Freud and the psychoanalytic framework as horrific, contributors to *Trouble and Strife* (re)produced their collective relationship with both, linking radical feminist values and ideology to feeling horrified by psychoanalysis. This section will discuss the naming and framing of the horror of psychoanalysis. Firstly, examples of explicit descriptions of psychoanalysis or psychiatric clinical practices as horrific will be examined. Secondly, instances in which radical feminists’ shared knowledge, values, and ideology were invoked in horrifying framings of psychoanalysis will be explored.

References to Freud and psychoanalysis as horrifying differed in the extent of the emotional evocativeness of their expression, but they did the work of associating horror with psychoanalysis nevertheless by naming it as such:

‘There is no reason why a very specific form of psychiatric “treatment”, lobotomy – in which nerves in the brain, usually in the frontal lobe, are cut – should not be used to illustrate the psychiatric profession’s overall attitude to women. In itself the information in
Di’s article about the history and present day approach to psycho-surgery in relation to women is horrifying and fascinating.’ (O’Sullivan, 1984, issue 3: 53)

O’Sullivan’s statement was situated within a discussion of a feminist text (which was itself an analysis of yet another text). Her description named an account of psycho-surgery on women as horrifying without expressing feelings of horror, which might otherwise have been achieved by describing the affective sensations that she felt while reading the article. Nevertheless, ‘horrifying’ was an adjective used to describe the content of a description of psycho-surgery, and while this one instance alone would not be sufficient to make psycho-surgery horrifying in the movement’s emotion culture, the cumulative effect of a range of similar instances did so. Sue Leigh’s description of her reading of narratives of women without access to contraception functioned similarly:

‘Reading the letters from working women giving their experiences of child-bearing in 1915 makes horrifying reading’ (Leigh, 1984, issue 3: 34)

In both of these instances, the authors were describing their reactions to reading ‘horrifying’ accounts, but did so in a way which was more matter-of-fact and less emotionally evocative than the framings that will be explored later in this section. They formed one part of a broader array of linkages across the text between psychoanalysis and horror.

Florence Rush’s lengthy analysis of the history of Freud’s thought and the consequences of its wide-reaching influence named horror as well, but did so in a more emotionally evocative way. Describing how Freudian ideas were put into contemporary practice with abused children, she used the naming of horror alongside other conceptual elements that brought the sense of horror to life in the text:

‘The child’s experience is as terrifying as the worst horror of a Kafkaesque nightmare: her story is not believed, she is declared ill, and worse, she is left at
the mercy and the “benevolence” of psychiatrically oriented “child experts”’. (Rush, 1984, issue 4: 34)

This instance straddled the mechanisms of naming and framing. Horror was named, but emotional framing was also employed in order to make that naming more emotionally resonant. The additional terms ‘terrifying’ and ‘Kafkaesque nightmare’, alongside Rush’s sketching of a scenario of silencing, pathologisation, and helplessness (a reality familiar and distressing to radical feminists, who saw women as being constantly plagued by this sort of situation under the male power bloc), and her use of quotation marks to indicate the falsehood of practitioners’ ‘benevolence’ and ‘expertise’, all worked in concert in the passage to both name and frame Freudian psychoanalysis of abused children as horrifying. Another such instance appeared on another page of the same piece:

‘To insist that these advances are imagined is to underestimate a child’s perceptive capacity, create doubt and confusion, and undermine self-confidence, and provide the food upon which nightmares are nourished.’ (Rush, 1984, issue 4: 29)

The idea of nourishment of nightmares is deeply jarring. Though it is difficult to apprehend the emotional weight of these articulations in abstraction from the piece as a whole, their emotional impact was buoyed by the emotional flow with the other explicit and implicit references to horror in the same piece – this will become clearer later in the section as other aspects of Rush’s piece are explored.

In other parts of the text, horror was not named, but emotional framing was used to associate horror with psychoanalysis. Drawing on shared knowledge, ideology, and values, the text presented a scenario, image, or idea which would resonate with participants in in the culture of radical feminism (and in some cases, the culture of Britain more generally) to produce collective horror. Returning to Rush’s piece, there were instances in which horror was framed, but not named:
'If a female child developed normally (that is, had faith that someday she would grow up, be married, get the penis, baby, and all), Freud assured us she would not be overwhelmed by the flood of anxiety and guilt coming from the incestuous desire for her father, and an external stimulus – an actual seduction – would be harmless.' (Rush, 1984, issue 4: 34)

This is one of the cases alluded to in the introduction of this chapter which straddles more than one emotion – there is a viable case to be made for reading this passage as resonant with anger at the violence of pathologising girls for being traumatised by assault. The multiplicity of adverse emotions toward MDRCs will be discussed later in this chapter, but one of the emotions that emerged from the passage above was horror. In the context of a piece of writing largely concerned with how Freudian ideas had come to permeate health and social service provision, and also incorporating the allusions to horror and nightmare appearing elsewhere in the piece, the passage invoked horror by setting the frame around the helpless and ‘nightmare nourishing’ scenario of an abused girl having the trauma of her experience denied by Freud. The radical feminist readership of Trouble and Strife would bring an already-existing emotional culture of horror, fear, and anger toward sexual abusers to their reading of the text, and as discussed in section 4.2, they already shared a consensus that MDRCs were violent to women. What Rush’s framing in the passage above did was to draw on those shared meanings in order to engender collective horror (and here, possibly also anger) toward Freud.

Seeing that Freud was constructed as the object of collective horror through invocation of already-shared meanings and emotions, it begins to become clear how radical feminists’ collective emotions toward figures like Freud constituted a collective relationship. The horror was not inside each individual radical feminist and individually projected toward Freud, but rather was constituted through women’s relationships with men across the power bloc in their own lives and the lives of other women.
(Burkitt, 2014a), and horror was rendered a part of the movement’s shared emotion culture through its place in the discourses and framings of the movement (Taylor, 2000). This type of emotional framing differs from much of the other framing done by social movements, because much of that framing is geared toward people outside of the movement itself. From radical feminists’ cultivation of collective horror in their emotion culture, it can be seen that emotional framing was also central to the emotions inside the movement, with participants framing ideas, values, and emotions for interpretation by one another in order to (re)produce collective relationships with key others such as MDRCs. These emotional framings were not merely a means to an instrumental end, but served less immediate, but still valuable, purposes for the life of the movement (Sa’di, 2015).

The association of horror with Freud was further amplified by other accounts which more directly associated him with sexual violence, insinuating that he had sexually violent tendencies himself as well as having produced a theoretical framework which enabled abuse. In her analysis of the famous case study of Dora (a sexually abused girl analysed by Freud who withdrew from his treatment upon realising that he sided with her abuser), Jane Rondot used her recounting of Freud’s reaction to the details of Dora’s case to frame him as a sexually (as well as clinically) violent figure. Dora, a girl at the time, was pursued and propositioned by an adult man called ‘Herr K’, whose advances she refused. Extending the thesis laid out by Rush a few years earlier, Rondot represented Freud as a would-be sexual assailant through her framing of his analysis of Dora:

‘Freud appears to admire Herr K whose proposal is “unlucky”. He wonders if Herr K would have “done any better if he had pressed his suit with a passion”. What sort of passion is he talking about? “Pressed” indicates force. Freud knew Herr K’s intentions were “immoral” yet speaks as if he was conducting a romantic Victorian courtship. According to Freud, Herr K should
have forced himself upon Dora, because she slapped his face and ran away, but this “by no means signified a final no”.’ (Rondot, 1989, issue 15: 21)

As with Rush’s piece, this extract is one small piece of a much longer deconstruction of Freud’s thinking and its anti-feminist implications (some of which will be explored below), but even this small segment of the text did a significant amount of emotional framing work. With reference to Freud himself, it produced Freud as a figure who advocated rape of girls by grown men. That alone was sufficient to inscribe horror on him for any reader who subscribed to the view that rape of children was horrific (this would include most people in British society at the time, as sexual violence against children was a universally agreed moral horror in the cultural context, but the horror would be even greater for readers sensitised through a highly developed feminist consciousness to the realities, the erasure, and the traumatic consequences of sexual violence), and thereby to align the radical feminist frame with a broader moral frame (Williams, 2016).

Further to this, however, it invoked the feminist anti-rape edict that ‘no means no’, highlighting in the last sentence that Freud did not consider Dora’s ‘no’ to be binding on Herr K. The allusion to the over-riding of a sexual violence victim’s ‘no’ linked Dora’s situation with a culturally established horror familiar to radical feminist readers: women’s bodily autonomy being undermined and controlled by men. Recalling again the emphasis on control which permeated the construction of science as ‘male’ and the oppressive power dynamic inherent in this, Rondot linked the violation of women’s and girls’ bodily self-determination by clinicians such as Freud to the sexual violence experienced by women in their personal lives – another effect of the male power bloc – when their refusals of sexual advances were over-ridden. Many radical feminist readers would have lived experience of this sort of sexual violation, making the framing resonant with horror in a particularly visceral way (Sointu, 2016). Even those who had not experienced sexual violence subscribed to the feminist political lens and value system that saw sexual violence as an urgent and passion-evoking political
emergency. Rondot’s framing appealed to radical feminism’s existing horror and anger about sexual violence in a way which would produce resonance with readers committed to the political ideology of radical feminism (and in this case, even with many members of the British public more broadly). As with Rush’s representation of Freud, the anchoring of horror in the shared politics of radical feminists shifted the emotions from individual to collective and positioned them within a relational emotion culture – rather than any individual reader feeling that ‘I am horrified by Freud’, representations like those of Rush and Rondot, published in a radical feminist magazine, tied into discourses, values, existing frames (like the male power bloc frame), and ideologies shared by radical feminists, drawing the movement together in collective emotion: ‘we (radical feminists) are horrified by Freud, because Freud is horrifying’ (Ahmed, 2014[2004]). Framings of Freud as horrifying did the double duty of (re)producing radical feminists as a group through their shared emotions while also drawing on their already-existing status as a group to shape their emotional relationship with figures like Freud.

Of course radical feminists were situated in a broader context, and the emotional frames of that context were entangled with those of the movement, providing producers of texts like Trouble and Strife with additional tools for producing emotional resonance. Earlier in this section, Florence Rush’s explicit and implicit invocations of horror were discussed, but I now return to the beginning of her piece. Like most every piece in Trouble and Strife, Rush’s article included images, and one large and striking one formed the heading of the article. There are two aspects of the use of the images in the piece that are worth exploring here. Firstly, the image’s content used familiar genre conventions to produce an emotional framing of Freud as horrific. Secondly, the use of space on the page was used to reiterate and reinforce the emotional framing produced by the initial image at the beginning of the piece.

The piece began with a drawing by Judy Stevens which drew upon familiar aesthetic features of the genre of horror to cast Freud as a horrifying villain:
This powerful image incorporated many aspects which set the stage for the emotional framing work built throughout the piece. Reading the image from left to right, the first component to jump from the page is the deadened-looking face of the girl. The bright light shone on her face suggested an interrogation, and the blank expression on her face and dark shadows in place of her eyes showed a helpless child resigned to torment by a powerful adult. To the right of the frame, Freud can be seen, situated slightly higher in the frame than the girl and staring at the back of her head rather than at her face. By looking at her from this perspective, her status as an object was foregrounded – to look her in the face would render her more as a subject. His positioning as above her within the frame of the image created the impression that he
was glowering down at her, and the calm indifference of his posture and expression emphasised that he possessed all of the power in the room. Looking beyond the two figures, the room was strewn with flung-open books, imbuing the scene with a sense of chaos and disorder.

At the most culturally general level, the image invoked horror through the aesthetic of the horror genre. This gave it the potential to emotionally resonate with a much wider audience than radical feminists, and it provided an additional layer to the emotional resonance of the frame for radical feminist readers. The representation of the complete imbalance of power and the subject/object relation between Freud and his patient aligned with radical feminism’s power critique of psychoanalysis and Freud, and the emotionally evocative representation of the girl as emotionally deadened, resigned, and helpless augmented the emotional framing as one of horror. The piece having been opened with this image, followed later by Rush’s references to ‘the food upon which nightmares are nourished’ and ‘the worst horror of a Kafkaesque nightmare’ created an unambiguous emotional framing of Freud as horrifying.

The space of the text was used to amplify this framing further still, and to extend it beyond the first page of the piece:
The positioning of these extracts from the image on opposite sides of the page reproduced the power imbalance and subject/object relationship represented in the original image, and kept the horror framing threading through the piece. In contrast to the instances of naming horror discussed at the beginning of this section, this use of image and space on the magazine's page was the least explicit reference to horror (demanding a more active reading-in from the reader), but was nevertheless powerfully evocative and instrumental in the emotional framing effected by the piece as a whole. Image and space were used similarly in Rondot's piece on Freud and Dora (which I have produced in its entirety here for that reason, though here I wish to highlight the images specifically):
HYSTERIA OR RESISTANCE?

Dora: the great Freudian cover-up Part II

In the early 1970s Florence Reath began the public expose of Freud's deliberate denial of child sexual abuse. Jean Frenkiel continues this feminist project by re-reading the famous case history of 'Dora', the 'hysteric'; in this context and exposing Freud's perverse and willful manipulation of the evidence.

In 1905 Freud perfected his theory that hysterical symptoms were caused by sexual abuse in childhood and supposed the purpose by using his case histories. "The behavior of the patient who is bearing these objective experiences of sexual abuse in a way that is open to the suspension that the patient's sexual energy is open to the suspension and cannot be identified as a sexual energy. But what is the energy that is open to the suspension that the patient's sexual energy is open to the suspension and cannot be identified as a sexual energy."

Despite his intentions, the paper "The Psychology of the Normal Person" received an "open contempt" from the alabama medical profession, which research described as a "scientific howler." "He was not mentioned in medical journals and Freud was excluded by the research. Why was this reaction so common?"

In a Freudian model children were more at risk than women, who are mostly at risk when pregnant. Women are mostly at risk at birth. Freud's theory is that children were more at risk because they were not as open to the suspension and cannot be identified as a sexual energy."

My argument is that the idea that psychiatrically manifested symptoms and emotional disorders were not as open to the suspension and cannot be identified as a sexual energy."

The inclusion of Dora

It is not that the case of Dora, "Dora", was left open to the discussion. Dora was identified in the 1960s and revised in the 1970s. Dora's case was written up in 1914. It seems a strange coincidence that Freud published his "New Psychoanalytic Theory" in 1914. Freud described it as the "Outside Theory". Freud seemed to have eliminated the idea of self-healing. Although Freud insisted on the theory of self-healing, his colleagues could not have understood what was child sexual abuse was established in that, fathers would assume or lie to him as mothers.

The birth of a phantasy

In the early 1970s two cases were published, one between 1909 and 1913. Freud published the "Outside Theory" and revised Dora's case with the "Phantasy Theory" which lay the ground for the Outside Theory.

If there were no symptoms in a patient who had been given to the patient, it was clear that the patient's sexual energy was open to the suspension and cannot be identified as a sexual energy."

A recent study by the Outside Theory has been that the Outside Theory has been more consistent with the evidence of the phantasy. Freud stated that it was published in 1914 and the evidence of the phantasy. Freud stated that it was published in 1914 and the evidence of the phantasy. Recent attempts to achieve the "Inside Theory" have also been ignored by the Freudian faction in order with the same ("insomnia") which gained Freud in 1914. Freud's study was ignored, and Jeffrey Masson reported from his problem in practice of the Freudian Institute in 1914.
A scientific model

The technique whereby Freud arrives at his interpretation of Dora's words, actions and dreams is described because it would confound the reader. However, I gather that the technique (which is a series of guesses which always turn out to be spot on) "I could not trace a process; I could not have guessed."

His dream interpretations are also speculative and unproveable. Freud's "insights" are usually derived by Dora herself, when she says "I am thinking about--" she actually means "yes." The "yes" is desired because it supports the theory, but when it is not forthcoming, "yes" confirms it just as well.

The text is filled with Freud's predictions. In this case, it says "nothing's" and "nothing's" are usually derived by Dora herself, when she says "I am thinking about--" she actually means "yes." The "yes" is desired because it supports the theory, but when it is not forthcoming, "yes" confirms it just as well.

The behavior of the child of螽 was already described and complete before I started to write. It was made to appear as if it was derived by Dora herself when she says "I am thinking about--" she actually means "yes." The "yes" is desired because it supports the theory, but when it is not forthcoming, "yes" confirms it just as well.

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Freud appears to admire Herr K., who is described as "a model of normality." However, there is another view that normality is a fiction. The two views are presented in a manner that casts doubt on the reality of normality. Freud's theory of the unconscious mind suggests that the normal mind is a fiction and that only the abnormal mind is real.

How to deal with female resistance

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Freud appears to admire Herr K., who is described as "a model of normality." However, there is another view that normality is a fiction. The two views are presented in a manner that casts doubt on the reality of normality. Freud's theory of the unconscious mind suggests that the normal mind is a fiction and that only the abnormal mind is real.
The two types of objects seen in the drawings are of a therapist’s sofa and a bed. Recalling that Rondot suggested in the piece that Freud was a sexually violent figure, the interspersed images of the sofa and the bed (the site of sexual abuse in the household) implied that the one could be exchanged for the other – both, it was suggested, were places where sexual violence took place. That message was made clearer by the increasing size of the images as the piece progressed, with the sofa fading into smallness on the final page and being replaced by an increasingly large bed. The cumulative effect was a sub-narrative across the piece that the therapist’s sofa was being revealed to be actually the bed of an abuser.

The use of images and their placement on pages, then, were instrumental in the emotional framing done with the text (Ahmed, 2014[2004]), making the framing more resonant by drawing together movement-specific knowledge and values about the horrifying violence of sexual abuse and broader cultural knowledge about the genre of horror to produce a high degree of emotional resonance in framings of Freud as
horrifying. Authors and editors of the text used both naming and framing to inscribe horror on psychoanalysis, deploying language, images, and the multimodal combination of the two at various points to reiterate a consistent framing of psychoanalysis and Freud as horrifying. Some instances in which horror was invoked used comparatively emotionally-neutral and matter-of-fact expression, while others forewent the cognitively-oriented use of explicit language and instead used images which seemed chilling or horrifying (due to the cultural forms and ideas to which they referred) to make the subject of the text horrifying by making the text itself horrifying⁹.

Radical feminists’ shared ideological lens on medical practitioners as inherently violent to women and part of a male power bloc which straddled public and private life was drawn upon to (re)produce Freud and his framework as violent and horrifying, and Freud was used as an archetypal villain in the movement’s emotional culture as an illustration of the horror of psychoanalysis. The rootedness of emotional framings of Freud and psychoanalysis in the shared ideology, values, narratives, and meanings of radical feminism reproduced radical feminists as a cohesive political collective, sewing them together through their shared ideas and feelings. Inscribing horror on Freud placed him within the movement’s emotion culture, and the entanglement of the emotion of horror with what Freud and psychoanalysis were understood to do and to signify – power-enabled violence against women and vulnerable girls – rooted that collective horror in what radical feminists understood to be women’s relationship with psychoanalysts. Departing from the dramaturgical view of emotions, radical feminists’ shared relationship of horror with Freud illustrates that emotions ‘toward’ an idea, paradigm, or figure are not unidirectional in the way that the word ‘toward’ might suggest, being inextricable from the in-betweenness of social relationships. To feel horror ‘toward’ Freud was for radical feminists to recognise that he wrought horror upon them, making their collective emotions toward him necessarily a collective

⁹ The multimodal representations of Freud as horrifying are a particularly salient example of where the researcher’s emotions were instrumental in finding emotion in the text. As I argued in chapter 3, I do not contend that someone who was not embedded in the emotional life of feminism could not have produced the same analysis, but my own horrified experience of reading drew my attention to implicit aspects of the text which might otherwise have been overshadowed by other textual elements.
As the following sections will show, however, the emotion culture of the movement required more than just one emotion, even toward a single paradigm or figure like psychoanalysis or Freud. Radical feminists encountered MDRCs in their personal lives as well as organising politically about them, and different situations involved different emotions. An understanding of the movement’s emotion culture requires recognition that even emotional cultures that are specific to a particular social movement are not, as some suggest, clearly tied to instrumental ends (e.g., Jasper, 2004), but instead are part of farther-reaching emotional projects in the lives of movement participants (Sa’di, 2015; Yang, 2000). What was needed for the movement to maintain emotional continuity was for it to have the flexibility to bend to the emotional demands of different types of scenarios where issues around MDRCs might arise while preserving radical feminists’ collective adverse relationship with them. The movement’s culture exhibited precisely this sort of flexibility, and sections 4.4 and 4.5 explore the other emotions involved in radical feminists’ contentious relationship with MDRCs.

4.4 Fear & the Clinical

A second emotion that in radical feminism’s emotional toolkit for its relationship with MDRCs was fear, an emotion related to but distinct from horror. Horror and fear are both emotions involved in an awareness of vulnerability or helplessness – disempowering emotions, for which reason literature on emotion work and emotional channelling in movements is often concerned with the transformation of such emotions into more empowering ones (Gould, 2009; Mizen, 2015; Yang, 2000). The discussion in this section will explore radical feminists’ feelings of fear in their relationship with MDRCs, examining the vulnerability involved in interactions in which women were seen to be at a disadvantage in terms of power and in a position to be potentially harmed or controlled by clinicians (but in a way which falls short of the
absolute imbalance of power and acute level of harm associated with horror). In section 4.5, the more empowering emotions of anger and annoyance will be explored.

As with horror, naming was used to define particular situations as fear-inducing, explicitly stating that MDRCs created situations which caused women fear:

‘I was fitted with the cap in a tiny and far from private cubicle, where I could hear what was happening to the apprehensive women on either side of me. If we had been less divided (expressing only our fears to each other in the waiting room) we might have given each other advice and support, but the circumstances made the fittings furtive and hasty.’ (Leigh, 1984, issue 3: 36-37)

In this account of having a cervical cap fitted, Sue Leigh explicitly articulated that she and other women felt fearful, linking the clinical setting with fear. She extended this association later in the piece, elucidating how MDRCs’ ways of managing contraception led to women’s lives being pervaded with fear:

‘Women have replaced the fear of pregnancy with the constant fear of illness so that women who take the Pill have to be constantly watchful for side effects, lumps and positive smear tests.’ (Leigh, 1984, issue 3: 38)

Her explicit namings of fear were one component of a larger emotional framing: her description of ‘furtive and hasty’ fittings with ‘apprehensive women on either side’ constructed an image which would emotionally resonate for the readers of Trouble and Strife, who were themselves women (as radical feminists necessarily were) and had likely had similar experiences. Her incorporation of that narrative of the clinical setting into a larger analysis of the politics of fear then wove that emotionally resonant lived experience into a radical feminist political analysis, arguing that MDRCs kept women in constant fear, merely rearranging the circumstances through which fear was inflicted.

Both through her naming of fear, then, and through her linking it to emotionally
resonant narratives and the radical feminist political analysis of the systemic violence of medicine, Leigh’s representation produced an emotional frame linking contraceptive medicine to fear, and incorporating emotional participation in that frame to radical feminist political ideology.

These sorts of emotional framings did not always incorporate the naming of fear, however, and women’s fear was linked with MDRCs without its having to be named. In her review of Phyllis Chesler’s work on women and psychoanalysis, Dale Spender argued that the frameworks of pathologisation were used as an instrument of control through fear:

‘In the context of male meanings, all women are defined as mad, or beyond normal explanations – when normality equals male – and women are required to be different: the ones who are directly penalised are arbitrary victims. The threat of punishment applies to all women and serves as intimidation and is quite sufficient to keep many women in their place.’ (Spender, 1986, issue 9: 41)

Spender’s argument framed all women as living under constant threat of pathologisation and ‘punishment’. The punishment to which she referred included violent psychoanalytic interventions such as institutionalisation and neurosurgery, highlighting the intensity of the threat under which women lived. Like Leigh, she generated an image of women being made by male clinicians to move through the world fearfully. These framings were tied to radical feminists’ lens on medicine and psychotherapy as inherently patriarchal, using radical feminists’ emotional reflexivity to link women’s daily lived realities to the male power bloc which confronted them in all aspects of their lives (see King, 2006). Both physiological medicine and psychotherapy were framed as sources of fear, and the (implicitly male) practitioners involved in them as sources of the inescapable fear used to ‘keep many women in their place’.

Though Leigh’s and Spender’s writings had the potential to be powerfully
emotionally evocative (depending upon the biographical experiences which a reader might bring to her reading of the text), they did not rely on intense expressions of fear or evocations of the reader’s fear in order to produce their framings. Instead, they engaged the radical feminist political analysis of men and MDRCs to locate doctors and psychoanalysts within radical feminism’s emotion culture (Schrock et al, 2004) – as fear-inducing objects. In this way, they incorporated the idea of MDRCs as sources of fear into radical feminism’s emotion culture, even if they were not manifestly expressing their own fears or evoking those of their readers. Radical feminists’ adverse relationship with MDRCs was (re)produced by this emotional framing, allowing that relationship to be maintained through the combination of emotion and political analysis.

Much of the framing of fear in Trouble and Strife took the evocative form of images which accompanied written articles. These images allowed for a sub-narrative of fear to form alongside an analysis which was not itself concerned with fear, threading the emotion culture through the magazine. For example, in a piece about legal curtailments of lesbians’ parenting rights (in favour of the primacy of having fathers involved in their children’s lives, a logic which radical feminists saw as engineered to keep women and children within the grip of the control and abuse of men), a cartoon by Cath Jackson was used to illustrate the fear (and anger) inflicted by the judicial system’s oppressive surveillance of lesbians’ parenting practices:
(Jackson, 1984, issue 3: 13)

The mother (left) was shown cowering in fear of the ‘custody drone’. The article itself argued that lesbians’ parenting was closely watched by the state in order to maintain men’s control over women who had left male partners and become lesbians, and that lesbianism was pathologised and the heterosexual family valorised by psychoanalysts and the state. The cartoon, in conjunction with the rest of the article, drew upon the male power bloc concept, linking men in the family, in the state, and in psychoanalysis and arguing that the three colluded to control women’s lives and keep them in constant fear of losing custody of their children. This particular image also showed another woman (by inference, the mother’s partner) being angered by the way that her partner was emotionally terrorised, drawing in another aspect of the emotional toolkit of the relationship between radical feminists and men to emotionally frame them in two ways at once. The use of these two emotions in a single cartoon illustrates the centrality of relationships, rather than specific emotions, in the movement’s emotion culture. The image uses emotions to represent an oppressive relationship between lesbians and the (male-dominated) state; it was this ‘pattern of relationship’ (Burkitt, 2014a) that (re)produced the movement’s emotion culture. The significance of relationships over narrowly-defined specific emotions highlights the limitations of an ‘emotional channelling’ perspective. Though emotional channelling is a highly productive concept for explaining what enables various forms of collective action, it is less able to explain the broader emotion culture in which those actions are situated.

In a number of other cartoons, the women were represented in clinical encounters:
(Jackson, 1985, issue 5: 14)
The cartoon above, from Lisa Saffron's personal narrative about her experience at the Well Woman Clinic, represented a woman in a vulnerable position in relation to an objectifying doctor who did not appear to notice that she was a human being (expanding upon Saffron's explicit argument to this effect in the piece). The facial expression of the patient in the image reflected distress, but is difficult to define emotionally. It could be read as discomfort, fear, anxiety, or embarrassment. It is particularly clear in cases such as these why the emotional culture did not require
clearly delineated emotions which were disciplined through feeling and expression rules. Any one of the possible readings of the emotions of the image could be used to serve the same underlying purpose for the emotion culture: to frame medical and psychiatric practitioners as sources of adverse emotional experience, and thereby to maintain a collective adverse relationship with them.

Other images representing encounters between women and clinicians more clearly indicated fear, reinforcing a specific framing of doctors as using their power to inflict fear upon women:

(Trouble and Strife Collective, 1987, issue 10: 5)
The woman in the image above, similarly to the one in the image about the ‘custody drone’, was shown cowering in fear with the blankets pulled up to her face. Her raised eyebrows suggested fearful concern, and the doctor was represented as indifferent (particularly by his not having discernible eyes). The explosion lines around the vial he held in his hand hinted that the chemicals he planned to use on his patient were
dangerous, an impression further bolstered by the plume of smoke emerging from the equipment behind the bed (the mysteriousness of which was exaggerated by the question mark). The overall emotional framing of this image was that a woman, vulnerable in the situation both by her being less in control than the doctor and by her being laid down in a bed while he was standing over her, was afraid for her safety and that the doctor was the sort of figure who she ought to be afraid of. This framing drew the reader’s sympathy toward the patient, engendering a collective of relationship of fear toward doctors.

This framing was repeated in other images which portrayed doctors as not merely indifferent, but actively malevolent:

(Taylor, 1984, issue 3: 45)

The caption in the image above highlighted that the violence done to women through reproductive technology was framed by doctors (and the rest of the male power bloc) as a boon to them. The image below the caption countered this framing, showing a doctor with scissors in hand (alluding to invasive reproductive surgeries) and a maliciously eager facial expression (the smiling mouth and angry eyebrows conveyed the doctor’s malicious pleasure). The overall message implicit in the image and caption
combined was that ‘strides in reproductive technology’ were actually doctors eager to cut up women’s bodies, a framing suggestive of the fearsome even without there being a woman represented within the image. The framing (re)produced doctors as a source of women’s fear, again reinforcing their place within the movement’s emotion culture as objects of fear.
Combining the portrayal of dangerous and frightening medical equipment with that of the gleefully malevolent doctor, the image above represented doctors as eager to exploit women’s desire to have babies. Reproducing the representation of the patient’s disempowerment by her position in a bed (this time also illustrating her lack of agency in the situation by her arms being concealed under the bed, leaving her defenceless), she was shown as wide-eyed and small by contrast to the scale of the confusing equipment around her. As with some of the other framings, the specific emotion that might be read from the image was considerably open to interpretation – it could be read as bewilderment, confusion, or fear – but it was the emotional framing of her relationship with the doctor that indicated where doctors fit into the movement’s emotion culture. All of the cartoons depicting clinicians were concerned primarily with framing the doctors rather than the patients. One did not include a representation of a patient at all, and others portrayed women whose precise emotions were difficult to clearly discern. The common thread across all of them was that doctors were represented as the sorts of figures that a woman ought to be fearful of. What doctors were in relation to women was represented through a combination of the doctors’ emotions, their patients’ emotions, and the infrastructure of ‘male science’ equipment in the clinical setting, constructing radical feminists’ collective relationship with doctors.

This section has explored radical feminists’ collective fear toward doctors and psychoanalysts. The fear that all of the various namings and framings referred to, while represented as a significant presence in women’s lives, was not of the same character as the horror seen in the last section, but both emotions served to reinforce MDRCs’ and men’s adverse relationship with radical feminists. The relationship was defined by the horror and fear that MDRCs were seen to cause women, but for purposes of emotion culture cohesion, it was of little consequence whether the emotion in play was horror or fear. The incorporation of emotional framings of these two emotions
toward the same MDRC figures provided the emotion culture with the flexibility to maintain an adverse relationship without being anchored to one specific emotion. Horror and fear were two of the emotions in the emotional toolkit that radical feminists used to cultivate their collective relationship with ‘medical men’, extending the movement’s interpretation of MDRCs as a component of a broader patriarchal power bloc and linking male power over women to the disempowering emotions of horror and fear.

4.5

Empowering Emotions: Anger & Annoyance

The last two sections have explored the disempowering emotions of horror and fear in radical feminists’ collective relationship with ‘medical men’. They have shown how the power critique in the movement’s ideology was brought to bear upon radical feminists’ emotions in relation to MDRCs, and how framing in the text of *Trouble and Strife* drew upon that shared ideology to incorporate horror and fear toward doctors and psychoanalysts into what it meant to be a radical feminist. In the next two sections, the more empowering emotions of anger and annoyance will be examined. As discussed above, much of the research on emotional channelling in movements is concerned with the transformation of disempowering emotions like fear into empowering ones like anger, suggesting that it is beneficial for movements to eschew disempowering emotions in order to generate mobilisation. Independently of emotional channelling for mobilisation, however, the emotion culture of radical feminism used disempowering emotions alongside more empowering ones to produce a multifaceted adverse relationship with MDRCs. As I have argued thus far, which specific adverse emotion was in play in any given circumstance was less important than the nature of the relationship implied by that emotion.

Anger was a key component of the emotional toolkit, directing the movement’s collective emotions in an empowering way and providing the emotional dimension of the conviction that women were entitled to a better situation than their patriarchal
oppressors were extending them. Collective anger was engendered through a variety of textual mechanisms in *Trouble and Strife*, and as with horror and fear, was sometimes named and at other times framed, and was represented in both matter-of-fact, descriptive ways and through more emotionally evocative framings. All of these contributed the cohesive presence of collective anger toward men across the movement’s emotion culture, and the diversity of methods used to frame men and MDRCs as objects of anger enabled the collective relationship that radical feminists had with them to be threaded throughout the movement’s culture.

Naming was used to indicate radical feminist anger toward MDRCs in a matter-of-fact way which conformed to the typical tone of an analytic article. Writing of her anger about (ostensibly) new discoveries of cancer risks associated with the hormonal contraceptive pill, Sue Leigh reflected on her own emotional response:

‘I talked to several friends who gave up taking the Pill a few years ago, and who thought they might be at risk, and I became increasingly angry at the thought of one of them getting cancer as a result of what, at that time, seemed to be a way for women to gain greater control over their own reproduction.

First of all I asked myself why I was so angry about the Pill... I think I was angry because taking it involved a free choice – women choose to take it or settle for another form of contraception, or can abstain from penetrative sex.’ (Leigh, 1984, issue 3: 34)

The word ‘angry’ appeared three times in this relatively small passage of text, treating Leigh’s anger as an object of reflection and analysis. This contrasted with the more evocative representations of anger which will be explored below. In this way, the premise that radical feminists were angered by doctors and medical researchers was incorporated into their political analyses.

The representation of anger sometimes straddled the line between explicit
naming and implicit framing, combining explication with descriptions of the embodied experience of anger. Recounting her conversation with the doctor in a Well Woman Clinic about her uterine perforation and miscarriage, Lisa Saffron narrated her own anger as well as the doctor’s:

“"You'll have to have a scrape. You don’t know that everything came out. It’s a very minor operation, just one overnight stay.” Her voice quivered with contempt at my cowardice and distrust.

Glancing down at my medical history, her eyes lit up when she read that my uterus had been perforated by a coil 11 years ago.

“That can’t be possible;” she cried. “It’s very, very rare – only one chance in a million of that happening. You must be mistaken. Explain to me exactly what happened.”

Indignant at not being believed, I glared at her.

“Actually the incidence of perforation is about two per 1000 insertions of the coil and some studies have found a rate of 8.7 per 1000,” I said between clenched teeth and told her my Perforation of the Uterus by a Coil story in medical language so she’d believe me.

“Yes, very rare;” she said. About one in 100,000.” I was just about to bargain her down to 1 in 10,000 when she leaned towards me and said, “You’ll have great difficulty getting pregnant again. You probably miscarried because of that perforation. You need a D and C and a full check-up. Otherwise you just won’t be able to have a baby. You should start antenatal care much earlier and you should have
hormone injections to prevent another miscarriage.”

(How dare you resist our control" If you don't submit
to our authority, you will be cursed and cursed be the
fruit of your womb!’) (Saffron, 1985, issue 5: 15)

Explicitly stating that she was ‘indignant at not being believed’, Saffron named the
doctor as a source of anger, and that emotional inscription was furthered by her
reference to her ‘clenched teeth’, a familiar physical manifestation of anger. Her
narration that the doctor ‘quivered with contempt at my cowardice and distrust’ and
that her ‘eyes lit up’ at the sight of the medical records implied the doctor’s own way of
relating emotionally to Saffron. Though this might be considered a manifestation of
affect rather than emotion, its politicised interpretation shows that these bodily
feelings were not ‘autonomous’ from sense-making and reflexivity (see Massumi,
1995), but the bodily component of a culturally-mediated emotional exchange (Burkitt,
2014b; Wetherell, 2012). She emphasised the doctor’s apparent craving for power and
control, and her angry reaction at Saffron’s own intellectual empowerment with
medical knowledge.

The emotional exchange that this narrative incorporated the radical feminist
political analysis of doctors as oppressive and as objects of feminist anger, and
highlighted that the emotions of each were in relation to those of the other. Radical
feminists’ anger toward doctors was not represented as being an internal state which
was projected onto doctors, but instead an emotional emergence from the relationship
between doctors and women (the two, as argued earlier in this chapter, being treated
as mutually exclusive even where the doctor was a woman). Sue Leigh’s discussion of
hormonal contraception functioned similarly, framing radical feminists’ anger as a
consequence of the way that the medical establishment related to women:

‘The side effects, which became evident over the
years, provide a staggering list of nasties, which are
consistently smoothed over by the medical profession.
They were of the opinion that certain side effects
would go away with a change of Pill, or go away after a few months. Anyway most women who developed blood clots, strokes and so on were taken off the Pill before they died.

The side effects were also blamed on other factors which exacerbated them and which were often thought to be within a woman’s control. They were blamed on the combination of the Pill with the woman’s own lifestyle. She was the one who was asked to change her habits rather than be offered alternative methods of contraception.’ (Leigh, 1984, issue 3: 37)

Her manner of representing the medical response to side effects implied the indifference that doctors had to women’s safety. Though she did not quote a doctor, the flippant tone of her remark that ‘anyway most women who developed blood clots, strokes, and so on were taken off the Pill before they died’ ran counter to feminists’ feelings, which would entail anger, rather than flippant indifference, toward doctors’ negligence. The way she represented this attitude, then, was not a conveyance of her own feelings, but a mimicking of doctors’ attitudes to patients. This representation drew on radical feminists’ lens to frame doctors’ indifference to women’s safety as a cause of feminists’ anger. Her subsequent argument that the adverse effects of contraception were blamed on women, rather than on the doctors who had developed and prescribed the medication, then built upon the resonance of that initial framing, showing multiple angering aspects of the way that doctors related to women. In Leigh’s and Saffron’s accounts, doctors were represented as seeking to control and harm women with impunity, drawing upon radical feminist political analysis as well as women’s lived experiences of clinical interactions to frame doctors as objects of radical feminists’ collective anger.

Where they could not outright blame women, men were seen to collude inure one another from accountability. The association with this unaccountability and
feminists’ anger enabled the embedding of emotional frames into text which did not make any mention of, or even allusion to, emotion, relying upon the readers’ already-existing participation in the political ideology and emotional world of the movement to generate emotional resonance. For example, in a letter to Trouble and Strife, the Sheffield Rape Crisis Centre provided an account of a sexually predatory psychotherapist who had been protected from accountability by the collusion of others in his profession:

‘When these women spoke out in June it was immediately apparent that there was no mechanism at all to deal with issues of this sort in the therapeutic community in Sheffield. The therapeutic organisations that Brian was very active and central in initially felt it was not within their terms of reference to consider censuring him. His employers at Flame Foundation (who own Unstone Grange, the conference centre used by many therapy groups where he was resident caretaker) and those at the University did not feel able to take any action unless some other organisation had done something first. There was no professional validating body to appeal to for assistance with disciplinary procedures, although if only one such complaint had been upheld against a GP he would have been immediately and permanently struck off the register. There was no recourse in law, and even if there had been it is a notoriously difficult and distressing process to invoke. There was considerable disbelief within the therapeutic community that the women were telling the truth, or even that they were able to tell it from fantasy. There was also considerable
sympathy for Brian and several practitioners wanted the whole business kept quiet.’ (Sheffield Rape Crisis Centre, 1989, issue 17: 4)

The tone of this passage was matter-of-fact, with no explication given about why this situation ought to be a source of anger. However, when read through the lens of radical feminist politics, including the male power bloc and the view of psychiatric institutions as designed to facilitate violence against women, the factors included in the frame (lack of accountability, protection by colluding others, disbelief in women’s testimony, sympathy for the abuser, silencing women’s truth) made it an emotional frame, engendering collective anger by invoking existing angry associations (Cadena-Roa, 2002). This framing strategy could be further augmented through the use of emotionally-imbued punctuation. Across the text of *Trouble and Strife*, quotation marks and parentheses were used to mark out a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, distinguishing different groups and positioning them within the movement’s emotion culture. In her discussion of psychoanalytic frameworks used by the state to justify and enable male violence against women, Lynn Harne used punctuation to highlight those aspects she found most angering and to produce a distinction between the offending authors and radical feminists that would function as a foundation for their emotional opposition:

‘Bowlby and maternal deprivation theories have, according to it, undermined the importance and the role of the father in a child’s development. The members’ underlying motives, to regain some of the control that men have lost, can be seen quite clearly in some of its past documents; for instance, in its “evidence” on Violence in Marriage submitted to the Parliamentary Select Committee of the same name in 1975. It stated that, “We believe it fair to see much of the physical violence.... As a final response to violence
inflicted in other forms, especially by women, verbal violence” and they go on to state that the causes of domestic violence are due to (male) frustration. FNF does not explain, however, why it is that men beat women up and not the other way around. Where violence has been involved (FNF calls it alleged violence) it emphasises that men must still have access to their children. It states that “It is always better for children to see their father” - and fathers who are excluded from their children may resort to (justifiable) assault, manslaughter and even murder. In a 1981 document it states that there has been a “deep psychological wound” imposed on fathers who do not get custody which is “little appreciated by the divorce courts”. (Harne, 1984, issue 12: 14)

Her use of quotation marks and parentheses identified the most objectionable claims. To a general reader (or especially to a reader sympathetic to the framework she was discussing), this would not have produced emotional resonance. To a radical feminist reader, however, the use of punctuation invited participation in Harne’s emotional frame, (re)producing the movement’s collective emotions toward the male power bloc.

In addition to framing men’s violence toward women as an object of collective anger, the benefits that men gleaned from exploiting their power over women were raised as reasons for anger. Harne’s discussion incorporated the state and MDRC components of the male power bloc, and the cooperation of the different components of this bloc continued to arise in framings of mens’ gains at women’s expense. In her interpretative ‘translation’ of the medical discourses on new reproductive technologies, Diana Leonard noted medical researcher’s exploitation of the state and

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10 FNF is an acronym for Families Need Fathers, a fathers’ rights advocacy organisation formed in the 1970s.
prospective mothers’ desires for parenthood to generate private profit:
‘Note that Steptoe and Edwards’ work was developed using public and charitable funds (NHS, University Laboratories, Ford Foundation). They then went private, charging up to £2000 to couples desperate for a child. They will only consider using the egg of a married woman and her husband’s sperm.’ (Leonard, 1984, issue 3: 46)

By incorporating the various elements of the power bloc into the frame: the state, private profit motives, and the policing of women’s sexualities (by only permitting women to be artificially inseminated by men to whom they were married, barring lesbians and single women from having children), Leonard invoked existing radical feminist anger toward men and their power bloc (Owen, 2013) to frame the specific historical event of the development of this reproductive technology as angering. By drawing upon the radical feminist political analysis of the male power bloc and directing existing anger toward it at this one issue, Leonard used radical feminist readers’ own knowledge and collective feelings to build upon and reinforce the movement’s emotion culture.

Not all emotional framings which produced collective anger took this comparatively matter-of-fact tone, however. Others were more emotionally evocative, acknowledging the author’s feelings and inviting the readers to share in them. For example, in her explanation of artificial insemination, Leonard provided a lengthy description of grisly medical procedures to which women’s bodies were subjected in the process before then noting what men’s involvement in it entailed:
‘To obtain semen, the man simply jerks off into a clean glass or china container. Most AID\textsuperscript{11} uses semen from male medical students (who are paid a fee – unlike blood donors). (Leonard, 1984, issue 3: 48)

\textsuperscript{11} Artificial insemination by donor, using donor sperm for conception.
The contrast between the unsettling descriptions of invasive and painful procedures for women and the simple and pleasurable contribution that men made to artificial insemination, buoyed by the annoyed and colloquial tone (‘the man simply jerks off’), conveyed Leonard’s own adverse feeling. That feeling was amplified still further by her parenthetical aside that men were paid for this – a particularly angering fact to include after having explained that ‘desperate’ couples were charged thousands of pounds for IVF treatment. The combination of these two elements – Leonard’s expression of adverse feeling and her mention of the (implied) unfairness of men being paid – produced an emotionally resonant frame.

The overall image that Leonard’s discussion produced was of men who profiteered off of women’s ‘desperation’ for motherhood in order to extract wealth from the state and from women themselves, to police women’s sexuality and curtail their reproductive freedoms (requiring them to have babies only with their husbands), and in situations involving sperm donors, to create an opportunity for men to profit financially from women as a reward for ‘simply jerking off’. Images were used to exaggerate the emotional impact of this framing, showing the radical feminist interpretation of men’s emotional experience of the arrangement:
The appearance of the above image alongside Leonard’s writing augmented the emotional frame of anger which was built throughout the piece, highlighting the unfairness of men benefiting in all spheres of the male power bloc – interpersonal life, the private profit sector, the state, and medical control of women – at women’s expense.

Within the overall text of Leonard’s piece, the images and verbal components of the text were used to convey a synthesised message, but in other pieces, the images were used to tell a related but distinct story. The header image font and cartoons in Dale Spender’s review of Phyllis Chesler’s book on women and psychoanalysis was used to produce an emotional frame of anger to run alongside the content of the piece itself:
Much of the piece discussed women’s ill-treatment at the hands of psychiatric professionals, elaborating how they were imprisoned in the home or in psychiatric institutions in order to keep them submissive to men. The header above, printed in what looks like hand-written script scribbled with a shaky hand and in all capital letters, was suggestive of the institutionalised woman. This abstract ‘crazy’ woman was worn and fraught from years of pathologisation, institutionalisation, and abuse by men.
(hence the shaky hand), but remained defiant (writing in all capitals, suggesting a written form of shouting – of refusing to be made meek or small). That image set the emotional frame for the rest of the piece, which strongly praised Chesler’s book for its uncompromising stance on psychoanalysis as violent to women and a straightforward mechanism of patriarchal control.

The implied ‘crazy’ woman was then shown on later pages of the piece:

(Courtney, 1986, issue 9: 43)
The woman's worn and wrinkled face, the uneven hand in which it was drawn, and her bloodshot eyes suggested that she had been through a long ordeal, but her smiling face and the defiant anger expressed in her eyebrows portrayed resistance to men’s control – a message made clearer by the caption. This image was followed two pages later by another representation of the same woman:

(Courtney, 1986, issue 9: 45)

The emotional framing across the piece was multifaceted, incorporating the difficult-
to-define emotional satisfaction of defiance as well as anger at men’s pathologisation of women, but this last image foregrounded anger. The woman in it appeared panicked and trapped (her entrapment being represented by the inversion of light and dark), and indicated the sort of ordeal that the defiant woman in the previous image had endured. This latter image is indicative of why the script at the heading of the piece would have been scribbled with a shaky hand, as if by a ‘crazy’ woman driven mad by the oppression of male control. The three images across the piece taken together added an evocatively emotional dimension to what was otherwise not an emphatically emotionally expressive piece, connecting the radical feminist analysis of psychotherapy (the topic of the verbal text) to the anger evoked by the grim reality alluded to in the images.

As had been the case with images representing horror, the spacial arrangement of some pieces was also used for emotional framing. Sue Leigh’s piece on hormonal contraception included a wide array of small images in the margins illustrating the patriarchal narrative behind contraceptive medicine, and in one image in the piece, these smaller image extracts were combined spacially to produce an emotional framing:
"Life's easier you know — with The Pill!"
(Stevens, 1984, issue 3: 35)

The image showed a woman confined to a domestic life, standing over her kitchen sink with an apron around her waist and a feather duster in her hand. She stood with her eyes closed, appearing to be trying to remain calm as a deluge of patriarchal narratives surrounded her. The image extracts organised around her and along the side of the page include patronising doctors, assurances that ‘experts agree’ on the safety of hormonal contraception and that it ‘life’s easier you know – with The Pill!’, a diagram of the female brain made up of pain, pressure, and tension, a pictographic of a (supposedly) happy couple acknowledging that the woman was now unable to excuse herself from sex (the argument made on another page of the article where this image appeared in the margin), and a woman who would prefer ‘anything rather than another’ child. The bottom of the image was marked ‘today’, and the top ‘the tomorrow things’, indicating that the woman centred in the image would be ‘in control’
by taking the pill today, and over time all of the distressing things represented in the smaller images would pile on top of her.

In this way, the space of the page was used to draw together the threads of the emotional frame of the rest of the piece, elaborating Leigh’s argument that she was angry about the way that women had been misled about the safety of the pill, been left little alternative if they wanted to successfully avoid pregnancy, and been dismissed or blamed by doctors when adverse side effects arose (Ahmed, 2014[2004]). The image added an additional layer to the framing of these realities as angering by suggesting that all of them piled on top of women at once, avalanching them with patriarchal harm. Doctors were framed as the objects of feminists’ collective anger through the cumulative emotional effect of the various ideas and claims represented in the smaller images and their linkages with components of the argument made across the piece, producing an emotional frame which was more strongly resonant than the individual parts of the piece taken separately.

Images, then, were powerful tools of representation for the building of frames of anger into the emotional toolkit of the emotion culture, but there was another empowering emotion for which images were also productively used: annoyance. Annoyance was a presence in some of the frames of anger seen above as well – as discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the different emotions sometimes bled into one another. Annoyance was also represented in its own right separately from anger, however, and it performed its own function in the emotional toolkit of radical feminists’ relationship with MDRCs. Frames of anger incorporated women’s oppression by men, generating emotional resonance by appealing to shared political values and common interpretations of men’s power over women. Frames of annoyance, conversely, framed men as ridiculous or laughable. These framings were less linked to women’s oppression by men and more associated with representations of men as stupid or not worth getting emotionally agitated about.

Frames of annoyance reduced men to buffoons or pestilences, adding a layer to the emotional relationship between radical feminists and men which did not require
the emotional agitation that was aroused by frames of horror, fear, or anger, all of
which were, for radical feminists, concerned with oppression. Independently of the
ideological lens which saw men as powerful and oppressive, they were framed as
absurd. For example, in Stevi Jackson’s critique of feminist psychoanalysis, two
cartoons appeared representing Freud, one literally and one figuratively. The literal
representation amplified Jackson’s overall argument that Freudian theory was logically
unsound in addition to being anti-feminist:

I HAVE BEEN
STUDYING WOMEN
FOR OVER 50 YEARS

TRYING TO FIND
OUT HOW THEIR
MINDS WORK.

I HAVE FOUND
NOTHING.

MY LIFE’S WORK!
NOTHING!

I CAN COME TO
ONLY ONE
CONCLUSION...

WOMEN HAVE
NO MINDS.

(Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 35)
The shifts in Freud’s facial expressions through the cartoon, progressing from his
becoming angry at his intellectual failing, to then embarrassed in the fourth frame, and
finally blankly dumbfounded in the final frame, portrayed him as dim-witted and ill-
humoured. This was in sharp contrast to other representations of him as a powerful figure of horror. The flexibility of an emotional toolkit in the movement’s emotion culture allowed radical feminists to feel different emotions toward Freud at different times, depending on their moods, immediate situations, and contexts, while preserving the adverse relationship which was central to their shared emotion culture.

Another cartoon in the same piece alluded implicitly to Freudian theory without explicitly depicting him. It produced a similar emotional frame to the image above, however, representing Freud (and his theory) as annoying:

(Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 38)
The penises flying through the air were depicted as analogous to annoying insects which had to be repelled. The indifference of the woman portrayed in the image, who was sufficiently unperturbed by the pests that she did not turn her gaze toward them,
again reduced Freud to something annoying and, crucially, insignificant. Emotions such as horror, fear, and anger all implied that radical feminists were under the grip of men, but emotional frames of annoyance incorporated the possibility of relative indifference to men while maintaining their position in the movement’s emotion culture as objects of adverse emotion.

Significant figures like Freud were not the only objects of annoyance – men in general were represented as ridiculous as well, extending the reach of this emotion into other parts of the male power bloc. In a piece about a moral panic about ‘virgin births’ (women having babies through in vitro fertilisation without being sexually active), Jill Radford framed mens’ reaction to the phenomenon (which might otherwise have been framed through anger) as annoying:

‘Because of this history and our personal knowledge of quite a few women who have had or are currently having children through donor insemination, the Lesbian Custody Project was not expecting the phone lines at Rights of Women to be suddenly besieged in March this year with calls from journalists, mostly male, on the verge of hysteria.

“Is it true?”; “Is it possible?”; “Can women have babies without men?”; “Will virgins throughout the land start giving birth?”; “Is this the end of the family?”; “Is this the end of society?”; “Can you find us some virgin mothers to interview?”; “What does it mean... (gasp)... for men?”; “Will we be laid off?”; “Are we redundant?”; “Mass castration?”; “Is it legal?”; and, from the so called “quality press”, “Will you help us with an objective piece? Of course we are sympathetic really, but we do need to cover all perspectives. Can you find us some virgin mothers to interview?”; and
“Are lesbians virgins?”. The most unpleasant caller asked us, in the same breath and without any sense of irony, to find both virgin mothers and wives with experience of marital rape.

Having agreed to appear as the “other Jill”, i.e., one yet to be knighted, on the Silky Kilroy show (LCP’s funding crisis is such that we have to accept all the fees we are offered) it seemed necessary to give thought to the question I’d put to the first journalists: “What exactly is the problem?” (Radford, 1991, issue 21: 8-9)

In this account, men were framed (and denoted) as hysterical in much the way that their own patriarchal discourse typically framed women. Radford’s representation of a calm woman receiving a deluge of fearful, panicked calls from men who were afraid that they might be dispensable (a role which, again, was usually reserved for women) produced men as the objects of radical feminists’ collective indifferent annoyance. The inversion of gendered representations of emotionality, with men being hysterical and reactionary and women being calm and in control, made annoyance an empowering emotion which could counter-balance the disempowering emotions in other parts of the emotion culture.

That inversion was extended further through images. For example, on a later page in Radford’s piece, an image portrayed a man being anguished about women objectifying him:
The woman was placed in the foreground of the image, facing the reader. Her expression was good-humoured and eager. By contrast, the man was placed in the background, his objecthood exaggerated by his facing backward, in tears over precisely the sort of objectification usually enacted by men toward women. Radical feminist ideology contained as one of its core tenets the idea that women were objectified and possessed sexually by men (one reason for the outgrowth of political lesbianism), making this framing particularly emotionally resonant. Though the cartoon on its own did not clearly convey annoyance, and might be read instead as mirth, the conjunction of the cartoon with the overall message of the piece drew it into an annoyance frame.
With radical feminists’ emotional relationship with men being pervaded by a felt awareness of being overpowered and controlled – horror, fear, and anger – the satirising emotional frame of this piece reduced men to something ridiculous and laughable, and the objects of a type of annoyance which inverted who was framed as having power over whom. Contrary to the common perception that anger is the political emotion (e.g., Ost, 2004), the use of humour and mockery achieve crucial political ends and demonstrate that to see only some emotions as political is unduly reductionistic (Wettergren, 2009).

Annoyance was a crucial inclusion in the movement’s emotional relationship with men, because it gave radical feminists the flexibility to reproduce their adverse relationship with men in situations in which they did not feel emotionally agitated and where the other emotions in the toolkit would not have been appropriate. Radical feminists were living, socially-embedded people, and no one can be horrified, fearful, or angry all of the time. The inclusion of an indifferent type of annoyance made it possible for the recognisable shared emotional toolkit of the movement’s relationship with men to reproduce an adverse relationship in texts (and, by extension, in-person interpersonal interactions and private reflections) when radical feminists were not sufficiently emotionally aroused to engage the other emotions in the toolkit. It also provided an emotional mechanism for inverting the relationship of power. Though anger is more empowering than horror and fear, it also emerges from the experience of struggle – in order to be angered, one has to be in the emotional grip of another. The indifferent annoyance framed in Jackson’s and Radford’s pieces shows that a less intense emotion could be used to round out the emotion cultural toolkit, stocking it with emotions ranging from complete powerlessness (horror) to an inversion of the power relationship (indifferent annoyance), all while maintaining the adverse relationship.

4.6

Conclusion
Like all emotion cultures, radical feminism’s emotion culture provided
guidelines for how participants ought to feel ‘toward’ particular others. In this chapter,
their emotions toward men and MDRCs have been explored. The foundation of their
collective emotions toward MDRCs was their ideological stance on male power, seeing
all men as being united in an effort to reproduce women’s oppression and keep women
under the control of men in every sphere of their lives. With that idea in the minds of
participants of the movement, individual figures and events relating to MDRCs were
interpreted to be signs of the male power bloc at work. Threading across different sorts
of textual forms, radical feminists represented and textually (re)constructed their
collective emotions toward MDRCs, drawing upon their already-existing shared view of
male power in order to produce emotionally resonant frames which would be
compatible with the movement’s ideology.

Emotions in social movements are widely understood through a dramaturgical
lens which sees emotions as internal, varying in degrees of authenticity or
inauthenticity, and unidirectionally projected outward. Though it is acknowledged that
emotions arise in the context of relationships (and within the study of social
movements, these are particularly often concerned with relationships of power), this
has not generally been fully reflected in understandings of how emotions work in social
movements, seeing the emotion work that movements do as relationship work. What
this chapter has shown is that collective emotions cannot be understood except by
reference to their situatedness in relationships. There are analytically significant
consequences to this. One is that explorations of movement emotion cultures need not
be concerned with one or two specific emotions, and indeed the data explored in this
chapter shows that it is not always clear what emotion is involved at all. Representations of emotion are sometimes ambiguous, particularly (though not
exclusively) where images are concerned. The study of emotions in movements, then,
need not be constrained by emotion words and the impulse to cleanly categories
instances of emotion as one particular emotion or another. Furthermore, the
ambiguity of these emotional representations troubles emotion theories which confine
emotions’ place in culture to emotions which are clearly named and represented (e.g., Barbelet, 2001) and locate all other aspects of emotion in social structure, and similarly troubles the displacement of ambiguous feelings to the realm of affect (e.g., Massumi, 1995; 2002; see Wetherell, 2012 for a decisive critique). A second major consequence, as I have argued throughout this chapter, is that the emotions themselves are in fact secondary in emotion culture. The cultivation and maintenance of an emotion culture is less about any specific emotion than about reproducing particular types of relationships between the movement participants and key categories of others. While Verta Taylor’s (2000) foundational work on emotion cultures of movements argued that emotion cultures indicate how participants ought to feel toward themselves and others, this chapter has argued that a more fitting question is what sorts of relationships are produced and maintained through collective emotions, allowing for the possibility that there may be quite a lot of oscillation between different emotions in order to produce what is ultimately the same relationship.

Radical feminists represented MDRCs alternately as horrifying, fearsome, angering, and annoying, using familiar cultural forms such as the genre of horror along with more movement-specific shared meanings to produce resonant emotional frames. They named MDRCs as objects of these emotions explicitly as well as framing them emotionally through their shared political lens, and used verbal text, images, and syntheses of the two to produce consistent emotional frames across the text of the magazine. Even with variation in content and form of pieces, a cohesive and consistent relationship with MDRCs emerged. The flexibility afforded by an emotion culture toolkit allowed them to maintain their adverse relationship with MDRCs without being tethered to any one specific emotion, freeing them to build emotional frames in ways which were responsive to their immediate situations. The disempowering emotions of horror and fear produced an emotional relationship which reflected men’s power over women, while the more empowering emotions of anger and annoyance engendered resistance and enabled the reproduction of the adverse relationship in instances of comparative emotional indifference. Through the use of all of these emotions, a
consistent collective relationship was cultivated and maintained, allowing radical feminists as a group to participate in a shared relationship with men and MDRCs. Their ideology was drawn upon for resonant emotional frames, and through that resonance, buoyed the movement’s ideology. Men were the key adversary in the movement’s emotion culture, but not the only one, and chapter 5 will explore another contentious relationship in radical feminism’s emotion culture: that between radical feminism and other strands of the WLM.
Chapter 5
Those Other Feminisms: Antipathy, Ambivalence, & the Emotional Background

5.1 Introduction

In chapter 4, radical feminists’ collective relationship with men was explored. I argued that collective emotions ‘toward’ men actually constituted a collective relationship with them, providing a flexible but cohesive toolkit through which radical feminists could make sense of their ongoing experiences and reproduce their collective emotional relationship with MDRCs. They used emotional framing to represent actors within MDRCs as horrifying, fearsome, angering, or annoying, cultivating a collective adverse relationship with them which had the malleability to travel across situations involving different adverse emotions while remaining within the framework of that fundamentally cohesive adverse relationship.

The same conception will be deployed in this chapter, which explores the relationship between radical feminism and other strands of the WLM. Like their collective relationship with men, radical feminists’ relationship with other feminisms was positioned in their emotion culture not in relation to a specific script for what emotions radical feminists ought to feel toward other feminists, but rather using a loose and permissive emotional guideline which enabled the (re)production of particular types of relationships between feminisms. Radical feminism was ideologically distinct from other segments of the WLM, and its ability to differentiate itself was sustained in part by the emotional relationships which maintained the divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ seen in radical feminism’s collective relationship with men in chapter 4.

Radical feminists’ relationship with other feminisms had many more layers than can be unpacked in a single chapter. The analysis here will focus on one important
aspect of it which has been particularly under-explored in existing literature on emotion: the background emotions. It will focus principally on antipathy (contrasting this with its opposite, affinity). Affinity and antipathy are amorphous and difficult to define background emotions which evade straightforward theorisation, and it is unsurprising that theoretical approaches to these vague feelings are often rooted in theories of affect rather than emotion. However, this chapter will argue that antipathy can be understood as a background emotion, and that antipathy toward other parts of the WLM (notably socialist feminism and ‘cultural feminism’, in which feminism’s turns to psychoanalysis and alternative medicine were rooted) was a key component of radical feminism’s emotion culture. I define antipathy as the emotion of ‘no’ - a general disposition (Burkitt, 2014a: 16-17) toward disagreement and rejection which is not as episodic (von Scheve, 2018: 2) as other emotions, but which I contend should nevertheless be considered an emotion. Antipathy has in common with other emotions that it emerges from relationships and is entangled with meanings and interpretations. To feel antipathy, or an inclination to disagree, reject, or be against, permeated radical feminists’ relationship with other strands of the WLM, making a background of antipathy a diffuse presence in that relationship. Seeing antipathy as a background emotion, I contend that it is similar to a ‘structure of feeling’ (Williams, 2013[1961]), but bears an important distinction from this due to its specificity to a subaltern emotion culture rather than being emergent from hegemony, the source of culturally pervasive structures of feeling.

Contrasted with antipathy was affinity, the inverse of antipathy and the background emotion which permeated radical feminists’ relationships with one another. Affinity will be explored further in chapter 6, but it is highlighted in this chapter because it inevitably arises (by its presence or its absence) where antipathy does. Just as the emotional toolkit of radical feminists’ relationship with men joined them together as a group through shared relationship, their shared antipathy toward other feminisms produced the affinity that they shared amongst themselves. Where affinity and antipathy came into tension, ambivalence arose, and the presence of
ambivalence was another clear presence in the movement’s emotion culture which will be examined in this chapter. By focusing on these vague but consequential background emotions, a more complete picture of the movement’s emotion culture can be formulated – one which is less confined by the limitations of clearly-defined emotion words, but which allows vaguely-defined emotions to still be theorised as emotions.

It is unsurprising that background emotions have been comparatively neglected in studies of emotion – they are notoriously difficult to pin down empirically. All emotions are relational and wedded to historicity and context, but this may be even more emphatically the case for background emotions. Questions about emotional background lead directly and immediately to a thorough examination of the context, because it is there, lurking quietly in the context, where the subtle currents of background emotion are located. In order for the emotional framings explored in the analysis in this chapter to make sense, it is helpful here to revisit some of the details of the historical moment that confronted radical feminists in the 1980s, and in light of which they interpreted the significance of ongoing developments in feminism and forged their relationships with other parts of the WLM.

Though this chapter does not centre around radical feminist subcultural villains such as Freud, there was a hegemonic cultural figure which haunted their ideology and collective emotions, and which will recur as a regular (if sometimes subtle) presence throughout the chapter: the innately caring, nurturing, and nature-attuned ‘earth mother’ stereotype. Radical feminists’ emotional relationship with the ‘earth mother’ was less straightforward than the one they built with the figures explored in chapter 4. Radical feminism, like all feminisms, roiled with internal dissonances and debates. Some radical feminists rejected as misogynistic any notion of women as innately maternal, caring, loving, or ‘in tune’ with their bodies or their feelings. The presupposition of women’s emotional and caring ‘nature’ was a powerful discursive tool for the very conscription of women to the private, domestic sphere which the ‘second wave’ largely sought to dismantle (Holmes, 2004). Other radical feminists, however, saw revolutionary potential in the embrace of modes of relation and selfhood
generally coded as feminine. Masculinist traits such as assertiveness, anger, violence, and purportedly unemotional ‘rationality’, they suggested, were not a model to aspire to.

There was an internal tension within radical feminism, then, and it will surface in this chapter’s discussion of ambivalence. Radical feminists were divided amongst themselves, and even sometimes within themselves, about the political tension between the feminist turn to ‘feminine’ modes of relation (and its reclamation from patriarchal cultural inscriptions) and the individualist turn which they saw as overtaking feminism. To embrace emotions and practices associated with the ‘earth mother’ stereotype risked reproducing patriarchy, but likewise the embrace of healing practices like psychotherapy and alternative medicine might replace collective responses to patriarchy with depoliticising, individualist ones. The early 1980s as a moment in feminism coincided with another key historical moment: the neoliberal turn in Britain. Just when it seemed to be more crucial than ever to maintain the collective consciousness that had been painstakingly built in the previous two decades, feminists began to increasingly adopt psychotherapy and alternative medicine as ways of practising feminism. These developments had emotional consequences for radical feminism, and the antipathy emerging at this time will be explored throughout the chapter.

Drawing again from Verta Taylor’s definition of emotion culture and uniting this with the idea of emotions as relational, this chapter sees radical feminism’s emotion culture as guiding movement participants regarding how they ought to feel about themselves and other feminisms, and I contend again here that the two components – how participants should feel about themselves and how to feel about others – makes emotion culture always already about relationships. As with their collective relationship with men, radical feminists engaged in inward-facing emotional framing. They produced framings of other feminisms for an audience of their own movement in order to produce collective emotions, and the concept of emotional framing will be used throughout the chapter. Framing did not manifest in precisely the same way here
as it did with framings of men, however. While the fundamental operation of emotional framing was similar, radical feminists’ relationship with other feminists – even those with whom they strongly disagreed – was not as adversarial as their relationship with men.

The data examined in this chapter incorporates pieces in which radical feminists most directly addressed themselves to other strands of the WLM. Book and article reviews were central to this, and three richly detailed reviews are examined here. Other genres of text included are report, letter, and analytic article. All include a topical focus on the growing popularity of ‘alternative’ medicine and feminist psychotherapy, addressing the tensions between radical feminism and other feminisms on these issues. The chapter proceeds in three sections. Section 5.2 will surface radical feminists’ awareness of the ascending uptake of alternative medicine and feminist psychotherapy, illuminating the reasons why these issues were a locus of antipathy for them and showing how these trends grated against radical feminism’s political ideology. As was the case with the male power bloc, radical feminism’s emotions toward these developments can only be understood in light of their shared thinking about them, and their interpretation of the shifts in feminism and what they signified will clarify their emotional responses to them. Section 5.3 will explore antipathy between radical feminism and other strands of the WLM, showing how the movement’s ideological opposition to alternative medicine and psychoanalysis, as well as fractures in the WLM which had formed prior to the 1980s, manifested emotionally in adverse relationships. Finally, section 5.4 will explore the hazy area of ambivalence. Radical feminists were not as united in their feelings about alternative medicine and feminist psychotherapy as they were about male power, and some were divided even within themselves. With a strong objection to male-dominated care, woman-centred alternatives had significant appeal, even if radical feminists saw reason to object to them as well. These contradictions in the realities of their context left them with no consonantly appealing option, and section 5.4 will explore radical feminists’ ambivalence within contradictions and how they endeavoured to resolve them.
5.2

A ‘Tendency’ in the WLM: The Growing Reach of Alternative Medicine & Psychotherapy

Emotion pervaded radical feminists’ engagements with other feminisms and the changes happening in the WLM throughout the 1980s. Just as their emotional response to medical institutions was formed substantially in light of their view of medicine and psychoanalysis as formed through long histories of medicalised violence against women, their emotional responses to the changing WLM was rooted in their understanding of its past and, crucially, their concerns about its future. This section will draw out a few salient examples of radical feminists’ interpretation of the rising popularity of alternative medicine and feminist psychotherapy. These examples will help to illuminate their collective emotions, which will be discussed later in the chapter. It should be noted that there is no clear division between emotional and unemotional references to other feminisms in the text of Trouble and Strife – the examples in the present section include emotion, and those in the sections that follow bear out the themes raised in this section (which is not about emotion per se). However, the emotional weight for radical feminists of the WLM’s shifting during the 1980s farther and farther away from radical feminist ideology is difficult to apprehend fully without first being aware of how present in radical feminists’ minds that shifting was.

Radical feminists’ concerns with feminists turning to alternative medicine and psychoanalysis were based partially in an awareness that patriarchy was difficult to purge:

‘There has been a feminist response – the development of a feminist psychology and feminist therapy – but there has been no essential change in the ethics of mental health, partly because it is so inextricably interwoven with the concept of male-as-
norm, a concept which shows few signs of being dislodged.’ (Spender, 1986, issue 9: 45)

However, more at issue for the relationship between radical and other feminisms was radical feminists’ own awareness of the growing popularity of psychoanalysis and alternative medicine. Their emotional responses to medicine (alternative and otherwise) and psychoanalysis were not responses to those things in abstraction from their histories, contexts, and meanings. Rather, as explored in chapter 4, these medicalised practises and their pervasiveness signified something about the broader trends afoot in feminism and in Britain more generally.

The issue of historical change toward alternative medicine and psychoanalysis was a strong presence on radical feminists’ minds at this time, and came through in the political thought and emotional frames in Trouble and Strife. A recurrent theme in this area was that of tendency – of what was becoming increasingly standard in the WLM. For example, the opening of Stevi Jackson’s critique of feminist psychoanalysis acknowledged the inescapability of the shift:

‘It is no longer possible for those of us who reject psychoanalysis to ignore it. It has gained too strong a hold to be easily dismissed.’ (Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 32)

Later in the piece, she went on to make clearer why this was a matter of growing concern for herself and other radical feminists:

‘Even those who are critical of psychoanalysis and opposed to its being used as an explanation for the persistence of patriarchy frequently display considerable deference towards it. There is a tendency to assume that any aspect of women’s experience, especially sexual experience, that is not immediately explicable by any other means must come within the realm of psychoanalysis, that psychoanalysis provides
a key for decoding mysteries which would otherwise remain unfathomable.’ (Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 32)

It was precisely that change – that even those who were critical of psychoanalysis were growing increasingly drawn to its frameworks – which aroused radical feminists’ discomfort. Their awareness of the weakening influence of feminist critiques of frameworks such as psychoanalysis signalled to them a weakening of the WLM itself (a point which will be explored further below), and heightened the antipathy they felt toward strands of the WLM which were promoting these ideological shifts. The movement’s emotion culture was rooted in its political ideology, but also in the shifting context in which it was situated. While it is known that movement emotions change in response to changing contexts (e.g., Gould, 2002), in this circumstance the antipathy within radical feminism’s emotion culture did not change in quality, but rather intensified.

Discussions of ‘tendency’ and trend toward feminist psychotherapy were not only focused on the feminist engagements with psychoanalytic theory to which Jackson referred, but also on the growing popularity of psychotherapy as a practice which was being taken up as a legitimate part of women’s liberation work. In her book review of their book *Feminist Revolution*, Sara Scott highlighted the contemporary relevance of Redstockings’s critique of psychoanalytic socialisation theory:

‘There is another reason why the critique outlined above seemed to appropriate to the present: the rise of “feminist” therapy. The listings of professional therapists in *Spare Rib* get longer by the month, and, at least in this part of the country, the small women’s therapy group appears to have replaced the consciousness-raising group. It seems to me that here we have the most recent version of an orientation which situates the state of our heads rather than the
overthrow of male power at the centre of the solution to women's oppression.’ (Scott, 1983, issue 1: 25)

Scott’s allusion to the centring of individualistic emphasis of psychotherapy was a common concern, and expressed even more emphatically by Lorraine Davies in her admiring letter to Trouble and Strife about a piece critiquing feminist therapy:

‘Who can we turn to when we become casualties? Psychotherapists – there are some who call themselves feminist therapists – can they help? Or maybe it’s physical – what about one of those osteopaths or acupuncturists everyone is going on about. Could it be diet – maybe a herbalist? It’s probably a disease – better a homeopath. What if it’s physical and mental – maybe one of those deep massage people – chiropractor or rofier or... I’ve no doubt that some some [sic] of these “therapists” help women but where does feminism come in? How does power operate? How is it abused?...

Such is the state of our women’s liberation movement, so softened by “feminist therapy” and alternative medicine that EST*¹² is back with a vengeance. Change your life (I thought we already had), you too can be as aggressive and hard sell as other ESTers (sorry assertive) – for £250 we will strip your psyche, verbally abuse you (haven’t we had enough?), make you into nothing then rebuild your new self (brain washing).’ (Davies, 1984, issue 4: 9)

The former paragraph of the letter conveyed Davies’s sense of the creeping ubiquity of these practices. It made more manifest what was also suggested by Jackson and Scott –

¹² Ehrhardt Sensitivity Training
that therapies purporting to be feminist were becoming too widespread to readily ignore. In all three pieces there was a felt sense of adverse emotion, and though the emotions involved were not clear from these small extracts, they convey some indication of radical feminists’ awareness of how psychotherapy and alternative medicine were changing the WLM.

The latter paragraph of the extract above highlighted radical feminists’ association of the turn to feminist therapy with a feminisation and depoliticisation of the WLM. Davies referred to feminist therapy and alternative medicine as a sign that the ‘state of our women’s liberation movement’ was ‘softened’, alluding to the ‘earth mother’ stereotype which formed a locus of antipathy for radical feminists. This, too, will be explored in greater depth in the sections that follow, but it is worth generating here a portrait of what radical feminists saw when they looked out at the WLM at this point in time. As Scott argued, consciousness-raising groups were fading from sight and being replaced with women’s therapy groups. According to Davies, questions of power and its abuse were being forgotten in favour of a focus on which trendy remedy might be used to heal any particular ill that women might experience, softening the movement and turning its attention to care and well-being rather than the dismantling of patriarchal power structures. These observations formed the basis of the persistent under-riding antipathy which will be explored below.

Even where there was not such a salient sense of irritation, the perception that alternative medicine was a sweeping craze was a strong presence in radical feminists’ thinking. Sue O’Sullivan described in a brief aside within her review of Catcall magazine issues 15 and 16 her own direct encounter with the omnipresence of women’s growing preoccupation with alternative medicine and her interpretation of its depoliticising effect:

‘A few months ago I co-ordinated a day workshop on “Women, Health and Sexuality” at an adult education institute. I quite expected that there would be a diverse group of women; what I wasn’t prepared for
was the number of women who were so wound up in holistic medicine that reactions to oppression and exploitation, as well as health, were individualised into a matter of a “state of mind”. Not only could you prevent cancer through being “in tune” with your mind and body, you could transcend sexism by the same method.’ (O’Sullivan, 1984, issue 3: 51)

O’Sullivan made still more explicit a line of thinking which has been surfaced throughout this section: that the WLM was becoming ‘wound up in’ alternative medicine and psychotherapy, and that the fixation had political consequences. Not only might women make use of therapies which radical feminists saw as politically flawed (for the reasons discussed in chapter 4), but the ideological foundations of these practices were seen to be contaminating women’s thinking about gendered oppression itself. The quotation marks that O’Sullivan used to mark out women’s reduction of oppression to a ‘state of mind’ which could be remedied through being ‘in tune’ with one’s self conveyed a sense of incredulity, differentiating women who subscribed to this view from O’Sullivan and her radical feminist readers (who were invited by her phrasing and use of punctuation to share in her incredulity).

Radical feminists’ collective emotional relationship with different strands of the WLM through the 1980s developed in the light of this thinking. The movement’s lens on medicine and psychoanalysis themselves were just one component of the ideology through which they interpreted concrete historical developments. They also brought to their interpretations a particular account of the unfolding trajectory of the WLM: the movement was becoming depoliticised, ‘wound up in’ therapy and alternative medicine, and these trends were leaving less and less space for what radical feminists saw as a sound political analysis or approach to pursuing liberation. Their relationship with men was unambiguously adversarial, with men being the oppressor class and the objects of horror, fear, anger, and annoyance. Other feminisms, meanwhile, were seen to be culpable for changes to the WLM which were breaking it down from within,
pushing radical feminist analysis farther out to the margins of the WLM as a whole and implementing as the WLM’s modus operandi practices which radical feminists saw as incompatible with a successful women’s movement (Owen, 2013). That interpretation formed the foundation for the movement’s collective antipathy toward other feminisms, the topic of the next section.

5.3

**Antipathy in Inter-feminism Relationships: Radical & Other Feminisms**

As the last section suggested, the relationship between radical feminism and other strands of the WLM hinged largely on their respective politics. Radical feminists saw men as wilfully oppressive of women and sure to hold to their dominance if able to do so, and therefore saw anything which might de-centre the question of power from feminist thought and practices as dangerous to the future of the WLM. The 1980s came after roughly a decade of WLM action, however, and fractured relationships had formed between different feminist movements in the 1970s through their interpersonal encounters with one another as well. These contentions carried over into the ‘80s, and were entangled with ideological differences. In this section, radical feminists’ antipathy toward other feminisms will be examined, with that antipathy proceeding from differences of politics as well as radical feminists’ adverse emotional experiences of dealing with feminists outside their own movement (either in person or through their writings). Notably, antipathy toward other feminisms was a particularly strong presence early in *Trouble and Strife*’s publication run, and this section will focus on the first two years of the magazine’s life. As the decade wore on and the context surrounding radical feminism continued to change, radical feminists’ own feelings exhibited some degree of change, giving rise to a stronger presence of the ambivalence which will be discussed in the next section.

The emotional timbre of each piece examined in this section is unique. Where emotional framing is concerned, representing the emotions of these pieces of writing in the form of small extracts does them some considerable degree of violence. In the
interest of maintaining as much emotional cohesion as possible for an exploration of
the subtlety of antipathy, the data in this section will be presented in chronological
order rather than thematically. Exploring each piece in turn will enable the emotional
currents to come forward a bit more visibly than they would otherwise do in the form
of extracts. Antipathy is a deliberately ambiguous emotion word which captures an
emotional aversion involving feelings of dissatisfaction, rejection, disagreement,
discontent, and some of the emotions explored in chapter 4 like anger and annoyance.
What the concept of antipathy as a background emotion does that other emotion
concepts do not do is break free from the episodic nature of emotion, accounting for
the reach of the emotion across time and throughout a long-running relationship.
Longer-lasting feelings are more often understood as 'structures of feeling' (Williams,
2013[1961]), or affects (Massumi, 2002), which are less firmly anchored to specific
ideas, meanings, and interpretations. I argue that radical feminists' collective antipathy,
however, is an emotion precisely because it proceeds from a shared interpretation of
the world and is attributed to a commonly understood set of causes, though the
emotion, like an affect, stretches across long expanses of time and travels across
different immediate situations. The feminists and feminist ideas that radical feminists
grappled with in each of the pieces extracted below were emotionally framed
differently in different cases, but what united them all was the antipathetic relationship
between the movements that was (re)produced by those framings.

Radical feminists actively saw through the lens of their interpretation of the
tendencies and trends in feminism, and they were likewise actively engaged with the
relationship between radical feminism and other parts of the WLM. In her review of
Feminist Revolution in the first issue of Trouble and Strife, Sara Scott highlighted radical
feminists’ interest in inter-feminism relations:

‘Redstockings were not only concerned by the
disappearance/misinterpretation of radical feminism,
but also with clarifying radical feminism’s direct
relationship with other strands of the WLM.’ (Scott, 1983, issue 1: 24)

The active presence of the relationship between feminisms in the minds of radical feminists was significant for their emotion culture, because ‘other strands of the WLM’ did not fall into a place in the movement’s emotion culture passively or by accident. Rather, radical feminists actively deliberated what their relationship with other feminist movements was and what those relationships meant for the women’s liberation project. (Their active interest in how feminists related to one another also gave rise to significant consequences for relationships within radical feminism itself, a matter which will be explored in chapter 6.)

With inter-feminism relationships in active focus, there was scope to ascribe political (and by extension, relational and emotional) significance to the way that other feminisms engaged with radical feminism:

‘The first section of Feminist Revolution, from which the title of this article is taken, discusses the way in which radical feminist ideas and slogans become disembodied, and therefore open to whatever interpretation and use others want to make of them. My own experience confirmed the truth of this, in that my knowledge of Redstockings until very recently extended only to the ability to attribute to them the statement: “We take the woman’s side on everything”. The “foolishness” of which socialist-feminist friends kindly pointed out to me five years ago by insisting that such a position implied at least tacit support for Margaret Thatcher. Not having access to the manifesto which delineates the meaning and implications of their slogan, I believed what I was told about radical feminists, all of which contributed to an image of a
“lunatic fringe” which lurked only in the furthest corners of the “real” (socialist) women’s movement.’

(Scott, 1983, issue 1: 23-24)

In this small selection of text, Scott represented a variety of layers to the relationship between socialist and radical feminism. Firstly, she raised the issue of representation and interpretation, expressing annoyance that socialist feminists had misrepresented radical feminism to her. Her dissatisfaction about this suggested that she understood there to be a reasonable expectation that feminists would not mischaracterise one another, and the violation of that expectation by her socialist feminist ‘friends’ influenced her relationship with that movement. That she termed as ‘kindly’ their injunction that a radical feminist slogan implied ‘at least tacit support for Margaret Thatcher’ proved to be sarcastic when seen in light of the rest of the extract and the piece, in which she complained that what socialist feminists were saying about radical feminism was being believed by others (including herself) despite its misrepresentativeness.

It would be difficult to pinpoint a specific emotion conveyed by Scott’s sarcasm. It framed socialist feminists as perhaps angering or frustrating, but without naming any emotion and without expressing emotion per se. There is therefore no emotion rule in the conventional sense of the term – no specific emotion that ought to be felt or expressed – but rather a rule about the ‘pattern of relationship’ (Burkitt, 2014a) that ought to be (re)produced. The impression on reading this segment of the text is not that Scott actively felt irritated or angry as she was writing it (though perhaps she did), but the use of sarcasm which named socialist feminists’ actions as ‘kindly’ while obviously intending to indicate the contrary framed socialist feminists as the rightful objects of some adverse emotion. What this framing did was invite the like-minded radical feminist reader to participate emotionally in an emotion culture which placed socialist feminists as an object of antipathy without clearly or explicitly delineating what adverse emotion to direct toward them. Depending upon the mood of the reader or her own relationship with socialist feminists, she might read Scott’s account as
angry, irritated, or disaffected. The unifying thread across all of the possible readings was the relationship with socialist feminists that any of those emotions would imply. As with their relationship with men, what was most important was not which specific emotion a radical feminist felt toward socialist feminists, but that a relationship of antipathy was maintained.

The other crucial component of this section of Scott’s piece was her representation that socialist feminists portrayed radical feminists as a “lunatic fringe” which lurked only in the furthest corners of the “real” (socialist) women’s movement. Again echoing their relationship with men, stereotypes and cultural figures appeared as significant in the movement’s emotion culture. A repeated pattern in the emotion culture was a concern with the type of cultural character or role that various actors were cast into. In their discussions of men, radical feminists complained of being portrayed by doctors as neurotic complainers or hysterics, a common mechanism for the oppression of women (Collins, 1990: chapter 4). They responded by creating an assembly of subcultural figures through which to represent and relate to men (horrifying villains, annoying buffoons, etc.) which organised the movement’s collective relationship toward doctors as permeated by a toolkit of adverse emotions. In their relationship with socialist feminists, Scott represented quite a vivid image of a ‘lunatic’ who ‘lurks in the corner’ of a space which was principally occupied by the ‘real’ women’s movement. With an established precedent for adverse emotions in the movement’s emotion culture in relation to how doctors and men represented women (in relation to themselves), this framing of socialist feminists’ dishonesty about radical feminism connected to a familiar source of a full range of adverse emotions in order to achieve emotional resonance. By framing socialist feminists as having implied that they themselves were the ‘real’, superior women’s movement, and radical feminists were ‘lunatics lurking in the corner’, Scott generated a resonant emotional frame which was clearly linked to an established narrative and source of adverse emotions in the movement.

Cultural figures did significant emotional work in the movement’s emotion
culture. They provided a locus of emotional relationship (providing a relatively cohesive, concrete object with which to emotionally relate), they facilitated the linking of emotions and ideas with familiar and immediately recognisable representations, and they associated abstract collectives (like men or other feminisms) with radical feminism’s ideological lens on power relations and the historical moment in which they were situated. Radical feminists’ paramount concern with power and the success of the women’s movement made ‘good’ feminist politics a key aspect of which frames would achieve emotional resonance, and by extension, made linkages between ‘bad’ feminist politics and the broader patriarchal context a source of collective antipathy. In the extract above, Scott’s framing was resonant with radical feminism’s existing ideals and values because it associated socialist feminists’ conduct toward radical feminists’ with men’s oppressive behaviours. In other places, an even wider range of components of the context were drawn into the same frame, setting radical feminism apart as a uniquely ‘good’ feminism by anchoring other feminisms to the oppressive ‘earth mother’ stereotype:

‘Redstockings were watching a process of de-radicalisation, not only of feminist ideas as they became more widely disseminated, but also of the WLM itself. In her article “The Retreat to Cultural Feminism” Brooke accords cultural feminism the responsibility for a reduced emphasis on political change, replacing radical feminist principles with an individualistic morality. She describes this strand of feminism as being concerned with lifestyles, and the setting up of “alternative” situations within the status quo, which tend to co-exist with, rather than challenge, male power. She considers that these embody the back-to-nature trends of the 1960s, and as with therapy of the careerism of liberal feminism find the
solution to our problems in individual changes.’ (Scott, 1983, issue 1: 25)

This small selection of text tied together the historical moment (individualism was a particularly great threat at this time, with the neoliberal turn under way and the radical social movements of the 1960s and ‘70s dissipating), problematic trends in the WLM (such as perceived de-radicalisation), the cultural turn in feminism, the rise of psychotherapy, ‘the careerism of liberal feminism’, and the ‘back-to-nature trends’ (which were themselves associated with the widespread ‘earth mother’ stereotype about women).

Though this segment of the text was not emotionally expressive (in other words, it did not give the impression that Scott was emotionally agitated in writing it), it nevertheless contributed to the production of antipathy toward other feminisms in radical feminism’s emotion culture. The historical phenomena, cultural trends, and harm to the progress of the WLM with which ‘cultural’ feminism and liberal feminism were linked positioned them as objects of the same sorts of emotions as the other components represented in the frame. This aspect of emotion culture is key, and is one of the more crucial components to note in theorising it. Research on social movement emotions generally focuses on the expression of emotion itself, looking for emotional expression or accounts of participants’ emotion work (e.g., Coe & Schabel, 2011; Gould, 2009; King, 2006; Kleres & Wettergren, 2017; Yang, 2000). What can be seen in the extract above is that given the theorisation of emotion culture as a guideline for participants about how they ought to feel about themselves and pertinent others, there need not be a representation or expression of feeling for movement discourses and narratives to convey something about their emotion culture. Scott’s framing produced all of the phenomena she named as being related to one another (Ferree & Merrill, 2000), anchoring the movement’s established antipathetic emotions toward each of those phenomena to the others. In addition to guiding the movement’s shared emotions toward all of these things, her marking out of radical feminism as the other, better thing – as that from which these other things all departed – produced radical
feminists themselves as objects of affinity to themselves and one another (a valued intra-movement emotional relationship which was closely guarded and protected, as will be explored in chapter 6).

The emotional expression in Scott’s piece was subtle, conveyed through sarcasm and implicitly encoded into her historical and contextual analysis. Other pieces represented feeling more overtly. All of the pieces which discussed other feminisms centred history and context, locating radical feminists’ emotional responses within broad feminist debates and historical trends, but there were variations in the extent to which the text read as emotionally ‘hot’. Stevi Jackson’s critique of feminists’ attempts to redeem Freud from charges of misogyny used emotional framing in much the way that Scott’s account of her encounters with socialist feminists did, but used more open emotional expression to do so:

‘The original feminist gut-reaction against Freud was, I believe, justified. I do not accept that we “read” his work incorrectly or misunderstood and misrepresented him. It is sheer arrogance to suggest, as Juliet Mitchell does, that we could only come to this negative conclusion on the basis of second-hand, popularized versions of Freud, or because we only read the bits on femininity without understanding their place in psychoanalytic theory, or simply because we thought penis envy was a sill idea. (Mitchell 1975, see pp xv-xvi) We are now told that new “readings” of Freud, specifically those deriving from the work of Lacan, have purged his work of all the elements which feminists found unsavourary, magically disposing of all its sexist elements – these were in any case products of our misinterpretations.’ (Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 33)

Like Scott’s piece, Jackson’s articulation produced antipathy toward psychoanalytic
feminists by framing their work as having insinuated that radical feminists (and others who shared their view of psychoanalysis) were inferior. Socialist feminists were represented as having accused radical feminists of supporting Margaret Thatcher, whereas psychoanalytic feminists had accused radical feminists of misinterpreting Freudian writings. Also like Scott, Jackson used quotation marks to indicate her rejection of claim she was paraphrasing, implying that she did not accept that there were different ways of ‘reading’ Freud. The cumulative effect that developed across these different pieces was that radical feminism was distinct from the other strands of the WLM, which were all positioned, for similar but different reasons, as objects of antipathy.

The tone of this selection of Jackson’s piece was representative of its entirety. The quotation marks on ‘read’ and ‘reading’ signalled rejection, and they took on the emotional timbre of irritation or anger when read within the context of other components of the extract. Jackson’s characterisation of Mitchell’s claim as ‘sheer arrogance’, followed by her paraphrasing of Mitchell’s argument that feminist critics of psychoanalysis ‘could only come to this negative conclusion on the basis of second-hand, popularized versions of Freud, or because we only read the bits on femininity without understanding their place in psychoanalytic theory, or simply because we thought penis envy was a sill idea’ followed much the same emotional framing formula as Scott’s. In both cases, feminists from other strands of the WLM were represented as having reproduced men’s framings of women. In Scott’s critique, socialist feminists had portrayed radical feminists as a ‘lunatic fringe’, echoing doctors’ stereotypes about women, and in Jackson’s formulation, psychoanalytic feminists had insinuated that radical feminists were ‘too stupid to see the great Truths’ (Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 34).

Antipathy travelled through these two framings of the relationship between radical feminism and other feminisms. Two key ‘others’ were highlighted – socialist feminism and psychoanalytic feminism (which was largely associated with the cultural turn in feminism to which Scott also referred), and though the emotions involved in the framings were sometimes vague or flexible, they produced other feminisms as objects
of antipathy. Some readers of Scott’s piece might read it as angry, while others would read irritation or other adverse emotions, and some radical feminists might read Jackson’s piece as annoyed, while others might see it as angry or even indignant. What was important for radical feminism’s emotion culture was not whether these other feminisms were produced as the objects of anger or of irritation, but rather that a contentious and antipathetic relationship with them was (re)produced.

In Scott’s and Jackson’s framings, real people were implicated and linked to ideologies, but the ideological frameworks of other feminisms were in other cases implicated without the need to level blame at particular individuals. In their critique of feminist therapy groups (as a practice), Sara Scott and Tracey Payne used a similar emotional framing to place feminist psychotherapy as an object of antipathy for radical feminists, but did so without naming particular individuals as the source of their adverse emotions:

‘Therapy’s emphasis on the past is based on the idea that we store up emotions which we couldn’t then express, and that these emotions remain blocked inside us until we find a way of letting them out. These blocks are the source of our problem in the present: they are what prevent us from (here we go again) being the whole, happy people we really are. Therapy becomes a sort of mental laxative. This perspective leaves us reaching constantly backwards into our own past experience rather than outwards to the experiences of other women to find explanations for our lives.’ (Scott & Payne, 1984, issue 3: 22)

Scott and Payne expressed some of the same ill-defined but unambiguously antipathetic emotions that were present in the other writings. Their parenthetical

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13 Indeed, in doing the analysis, I read the text in all of these ways on different days in the analytic process.
aside about psychoanalytic claims - ‘(here we go again)’ suggested annoyance, irritation, exasperation, or disaffection. It is not clear which of these emotions they were feeling, nor which, if any, they intended their readers to feel. The relationship between radical feminism and proponents of feminist therapy was one of antipathy regardless of which specific emotions were involved in the writing and the reading, enabling the text to do the work of (re)producing antipathetic relationships in the movement’s emotion culture without the need for clearly-defined and specific emotions.

In addition to producing other feminisms as objects of antipathy due to how they made radical feminists feel (misinterpreted, misrepresented, maligned, or pathologised), they were represented as having particular types of traits in themselves which made them appropriate objects of antipathy. Scott and Payne’s summary of therapy in the first three sentences of the extract above demonstrated a good understanding of the perspective of their presumed (radical feminist) reader’s ideological stance, recognising that the emotional effect of reading the text would be shaped by what the reader themselves brought to the reading (Hall, 1980[1973]). To a reader who favoured therapy, their representation would likely be upsetting and possibly offensive, but to a radical feminist critic of therapy, their framing resonated, helping to augment the perception of therapy as ridiculous (Schrock et al, 2004). Feminists who favoured therapy were not only the objects of antipathy because of what they said about radical feminists (as in Jackson’s account), then, but were also represented as being absurd in themselves. That absurdity was also part of an emotional frame which (re)produced other feminisms as objects of antipathy. In framing feminist therapy proponents in this way, Scott and Payne reiterated the affinity that subsisted between radical feminists themselves, as the more critically-minded feminists. The framing of other feminisms as objects of antipathy was necessarily relational, then, because the frame that produced other feminisms as ridiculous simultaneously produced radical feminism as superior.

The framing of other feminisms as ridiculous did not require expressions of
annoyance or irritation, however, and could be achieved through more emotionally subtle framings. In her review of *Catcall* 15 and 16, Sue O'Sullivan, heavily quoting Sophie Laws, achieved the same emotional framing as the one seen in Scott and Payne’s piece, but without the apparent annoyance that they expressed:

‘She tellingly questions a tendency to romanticise a golden past of female healers when women were supposedly in control and in contact with nature, able to use herbs and “home” remedies to heal the people of their community. This uncritical harking-back has less to do with the harsh realities of life in previous centuries than with our present day awareness of how male dominated medicine and technology has alienated us from what little women did control in those past days.

I liked Sophie’s discussion of “nature” and feminism in relation to alternative health treatment. “there must be other reasons, though, for all this willingness to believe – we do not, for instance, go on pilgrimages to Lourdes because generations of women have believed it was good for them to do so. I’ve been thinking that maybe one of these is that many feminists are attracted to the idea of nature that the alternative disciplines teach. Instead of the doctors’ image of nature as a battleground of germs versus chemicals, the ‘natural’ faction offers a much pleasanter vision where natural foods exist to keep us healthy, where a plant exists to match every kind of breakdown our bodies are subject to. We are to live in harmony with ‘Mother’ Nature. Women are often felt to have a special
relationship with nature, a duty, even to defend ‘her’ from bad men who seek to deny ‘her’ goodness and to dominate ‘her’.

This is good stuff and I would have liked it to go on more – more about how this view links into a quite traditional view of the “feminine” which extends beyond matters of illness and health and can be seen at work in some of the appeal of Greenham Common.

(O’Sullivan, 1984, issue 3: 50)

O’Sullivan’s framing depended largely upon Laws’s representation, but it inscribed ridiculousness on feminists who subscribed to alternative medicine just as Scott and Payne’s framing had inscribed it on feminist proponents of psychotherapy. In both cases, the authors’ knowledge of and participation in radical feminist ideology and their lens on the historical context was used to produce emotionally resonant frames. Both framings incorporated echoes of the patriarchal ‘earth mother’ stereotype, linking it to tendencies in other strands of the WLM and ongoing trends within it (including the Greenham Common peace camp) and reproducing them as ridiculous and as objects of antipathy. The emotional agitation with which Scott and Payne’s piece was imbued was not a necessary component of O’Sullivan’s piece, because it was equally effective as a textual reproduction of the movement’s emotion culture without giving the impression that the author was herself emotionally agitated in the act of writing. Antipathy sometimes took the form of active, ‘hot’ adverse emotions, but it was equally valuable to the emotion culture in a subtler, ‘cooler’ form which nevertheless reproduced an antipathetic relationship.

As I have argued, representations of other feminisms as objects of antipathy exhibited a range of emotions, some more overt and others more subtle. I have also argued that the antipathy directed at other feminisms always simultaneously produced its inverse: affinity toward radical feminists themselves. Radical feminists’ consciousness of the trends sweeping the WLM gave their antipathy toward other
feminisms and affinity toward their own movement a sense of urgency, and in closing this section, I turn to a reader letter from Lorraine Davies which conveyed the antipathy that has been explored thus far and expressed the agitation of urgency at this historical moment:

‘Psychotherapy has crept into our feminist theory to such an extent that women write books on feminist therapy, women advertise themselves as feminist therapists and in doing this rip other women off. We live traumatic lives making us vulnerable to this attack. Now alternative medicine is well on the way to becoming the “new feminist therapy”. Its theories and practices not being questioned. Women are devouring its theories and assimilating it with feminism – our theory.’ (Davies, 1984, issue 4: 9)

Davies’s language tethered the shifts in feminism to which she referred to notions of violence and violation: ‘crept into our feminist theory’, ‘rip other women off’, and ‘vulnerable to this attack’ all framed the growing popularity of psychoanalysis and alternative medicine in terms of danger and threat. Within the movement’s understanding of medicine and psychoanalysis as male (and therefore inherently violent), Davies’s language associated feminists’ ‘devouring’ and ‘assimilating’ patriarchal paradigms as not merely ridiculous, but violent. Like Scott’s piece on *Feminist Revolution* and Jackson’s on psychoanalytic feminism, Davies framed the practices of other segments of the WLM as being analogous to what men did to women, placing them within the normative framework of the movement as objects of antipathy. The final sentence of the extract, in which she referred to feminism as ‘our theory’ did the same dual work as other authors’ framings of psychoanalysis and alternative medicine, implicitly producing radical feminists’ collective affinity toward themselves and one another in the same phrase which produced other feminisms as antipathetic.
In this section, I have argued that radical feminists’ writings during the early years of *Trouble and Strife’s* publication exhibited a powerful awareness of the changing ideological tides of the WLM. These changes ran contrary to radical feminism’s ideology and its vision for the future of the WLM, entrenching contentious relationships between feminisms that had formed in the 1970s. Radical feminists emotionally framed other strands of the WLM as objects of antipathy, using a flexible array of emotions similar to that found in their relationship with men. Unlike that relationship, however, the emotions involved in their relationship with other feminisms were often vague, expressed implicitly, and more open to a range of interpretations. Regardless of which possible interpretation a radical feminist reader had, however, the antipathetic relationship between radical feminists and other feminisms were maintained through the emotional framings in the text. The positioning of radical feminism itself as the superior alternative to these other feminisms, by implication, produced the movement’s relationship with itself, engendering radical feminists’ affinity toward their own movement and making their antipathetic collective emotions toward other feminisms always-already relational.

5.4

**Rock & Hard Place: Radical Feminist Ambivalence**

In spite of the apparently clear radical feminist stance on psychoanalysis and alternative medicine, participants in the movement did harbour some ambivalence about these practices. As Davies’s letter stated, ‘we live traumatic lives’, a reality which made healing practices of almost any sort appealing to some degree. The emotion culture of the movement was deeply marked by the antipathy explored in section 5.3, but it would be a misrepresentation to suggest that there was a rigid ideological and emotional line on these issues. Even some of the authors of the pieces quoted above alluded to some ambivalence, suggesting that there were dissonances present even where they were not made explicit (Ost, 2004), and that ambivalence will be explored in this section. As in the last section, the analysis will progress chronologically rather
than thematically. The whole section will focus on ambivalence, but what emerges from a chronological examination of it is the progression of the ambivalence toward greater and greater openness to the possible merits of the therapies strongly critiqued in the earlier years examined in section 5.3, and the progression concludes with a crossover case in which framing strategies were undertaken to allow for an exception to the existing radical feminist position, providing a unique instance of affinity toward psychotherapy. The temporal progression demonstrates the effect that radical feminism’s changing context had on the emotion culture of the movement (see Gould, 2002), and while it remained overwhelmingly ideologically (and emotionally) intact, by the 1990s some flexibility had begun to appear in its ideology and emotion culture.

In the early ‘80s, there were signs of ambivalence in radical feminism about the new therapeutic trends emerging from their recognition that as problematic as they were, these therapies addressed real and legitimate needs:

‘We are not suggesting that we do not still need to talk about ourselves at length with the support of other women: it seems to us that the rise of the small self-help therapy group owes much to the gradual disappearance of consciousness-raising. Therapy groups are often the first point of access for women new to the Women’s Liberation Movement. We feel that their popularity is a comment on the fact that we still need a space to discuss personal experience, rather than showing an attraction specific to therapy.’

(Scott & Payne, 1984, issue 3: 23)

That acknowledgement sometimes extended beyond a recognition that there was a need for the therapies, including admissions of making use of them to some degree:

‘Sophie’s clear look at a tendency for feminists to fall into an individual sampling of the different alternatives to conventional medicine – her insistence that as
feminist we should ask political questions about the theories and practices of different treatments – is appealing to me. And yet... when I turned to Carol Smith’s article, *Is Alternative Medicine Necessarily Better for Women?*, (pretty much a qualified yes), I was also in sympathy. I am a sampler of alternative health care, I am a “believer”, if not in a big way, and especially in relation to chronic health problems.’ (O’Sullivan, 1984, issue 3: 51)

O’Sullivan’s emotional framing was an ambivalent framing. In this instance, she did not express antipathy and then simply acknowledge the possible merits of an opposing stance on alternative medicine, but actually narrated her own ambivalent experience of reading and relating to arguments in *Catcall* which fell on both sides of the issue. Though the emotion culture of the movement directed radical feminists’ emotions toward antipathy with respect to alternative health care, that did not make them immune to the draw of the trend in favour of it, and in the face of health difficulties, it would take a great deal of emotional work for them to remain strictly faithful to the emotion culture of the movement. Straightforward emotion rules dictating how movement participants ought to feel are inadequate for explaining this tension (Holmes, 2004), because their emotions were not merely instrumentally-oriented means to a political end (as is sometimes implied – see, Jasper et al, 2000). The conflict between their context (more health options becoming available, and more testimony being circulated that alternative therapies were effective) and the movement’s emotion culture placed pressure on that culture, giving rise to ambivalence which itself found its way into the movement’s emotion culture.

Their shared awareness of their collective emotion culture created a need for this ambivalence to be accounted for. O’Sullivan resolved the tension by rejecting the premise that it was necessary to choose between the WLM and psychotherapy, another antipathy-associated therapy which she acknowledged using:
‘I don’t need therapy to understand my oppression as a woman, nor to identify where that oppression comes from. But none of this is enough to help me change the often unconscious, negative repeating aspects of myself which are rooted in the socially determined but individualised way I grew up in a western, patriarchal, capitalist country. If I had to choose I’d choose the women’s liberation movement over therapy in one second flat. But I don’t have to choose, I’m willing, through what feels like personal necessity (and opportunity!), to go to someone who says she has skills, to try to understand those inarticulated [sic] patterns and defences which have had pretty disastrous [sic] effects on my life.’ (O’Sullivan, 1984, issue 3: 52)

Though as a whole the piece presented an argument against the ‘back-to-nature’ trends and their links to femininity, O’Sullivan’s narration of her own use of therapy as a necessity (and its publication in Trouble and Strife, an avowedly radical feminist magazine) used some aspects of the movement’s emotion culture to mediate others (Kleres & Wettergren, 2017), making space for change in the emotion culture on these issues. Crucially, however, the incorporation of this ambivalence in a piece in which she also critiqued illusions about the ‘golden past of female healers’ retained the antipathetic relationship with other strands of the WLM even as ambivalence was used to open up space for change in radical feminism’s internal ideology.

This was still at an early point in the magazine’s run, but as the ‘80s wore on, there continued to be evidence of ambivalence. Radical feminists’ political commitments demanded seemingly contradictory stances from them on some issues, providing them with no clear emotional frame to associate with their political ideology. For example, in her review of reflective writings by women who worked in health care,
Laura Potts discussed the issue that dealing with illness and unwellness through medicine individualised problems, looking at the symptoms rather than the social causes. She also, however, highlighted how problematic it potentially was to demand that other women eschew these individualising approaches:

‘We cannot be bullied into feminism and the notion of sisterhood may seem to be of uncertain benefit. Respect for each other implies not imposing a political analysis, as much as not imposing a particular treatment. As Jean Orr says:

“What right do we have to encourage women to raise their consciousness if we cannot follow through with the help they may need? Are we to be just another form of tyranny, forcing women to confront aspects of their lives which are too painful for them to change?’ (p. 71)”

Our health may be our only reference point for dissatisfactions and complaints. As Merryn Cooke points out, we tend to regard physical ailments as entrance tickets to help and support.’ (Potts, 1987, issue 11: 46)

Potts drew upon different aspects of radical feminism’s political values to frame the imperative to avoid individualising therapies as an object of ambivalence. Radical feminists rejected individualism and saw practices which relocated collective problems into the realm of the individual as incompatible with women’s liberation, but they also rejected the placement of demands upon women which it was not possible for them to fulfil or which would require martyrdom from them. Rather than rejecting either of these in favour of the other, her emotional frame incorporated these two strands of radical feminist political thought and showed how they came into contradiction in the material reality of medical care. The emotional frame that resulted was an ambivalence
frame, rejecting both antipathy and affinity.

The ambivalence of these conflicting political ideals was not always held intact, and instead framing could be used to resolve the ambivalence and allow an atypical relocation of an object of antipathy into the category of objects of affinity. Emotional frames of psychotherapy across Trouble and Strife were consistently either antipathetic or ambivalent, but in one isolated case, feminist psychotherapy was framed in a way which allowed for the practitioners to be represented as objects of affinity. In her report on the Shanti women’s therapy service (a service for under-served women in South London), Sophie Laws demonstrated that a way that radical feminists resolved ambivalences was finding ways to relocate them in the emotion culture matrix even when they seemed to belong with the men:

‘Shanti takes psychotherapy to a populations of women who are rarely offered it. Do they welcome it, or is psychotherapy a middle-class way of dealing with problems? Mo turns the question back, to look at it another way: who says this is a middle-class thing? Maybe Freud and Co hijacked something ordinary people did all the time anyway. After all, at bottom psychotherapy is simply about talking to someone who “will not judge you, not lash you down with blame, or top you up with guilt, not tell you to pull yourself together, or pull yourself up by your socks, but give you a sympathetic hearing”. That has a history, with roots much wider than the middle class.’ (Laws, 1991, issue 20: 10)

Rather than rejecting the premise of psychotherapy regardless of where and by whom it was practised (as Davies had recommended in her injunction that ‘Freud and Buddha are just around the corner’), Laws provided an account of her interviewee going behind the ideological wall of radical feminism to encourage an embrace of psychotherapy by
drawing upon the movement’s own political values. Radical feminism (ideologically, if perhaps not in practice) was opposed to exclusion of working-class women, and framing criticism of psychoanalysis as classist allowed for permissiveness toward therapy to be consonant with radical feminist political values. Positioning Shanti as having radical feminist values then positioned them within a relationship of affinity, rather than antipathy, in radical feminism’s emotion culture.

The movement’s structural critiques of psychoanalysis were extensive and forceful, however, making it impossible to wholly resolve ambivalence. Laws incorporated into her report on the service a carefully-articulated discussion of its structural position, allowing ambivalence to emerge from measured representations of antipathy:

‘Shanti exists within the NHS, an extremely hierarchical bureaucracy, where everyone is paid according to their place within the professional hierarchies. Counsellors may be qualified psychologists, psychiatric nurses or social workers, with further training in psychotherapy. Asked about their internal structure Avan says they “try to work as a collective”. The obvious contradiction are too tender to discuss on the day I visited. The creche workers, not seen as particularly important by the managers who planned the service, have worked hard to gain a place within the staff group. The women at Shani often feel that they survive despite the Health Authority rather than because of it. The problems created by working within the NHS are very raw at Shanti at present.’ (Laws, 1991, issue 20: 10)

By discussing Shanti’s struggle with their institutional status, but also alluding to the contradictions in their position (as part of a major medical institution but also as a
group endeavouring to operate ‘as a collective’ which was undermined by that institution), Laws reiterated radical feminists’ adverse emotional relationship with medical institutions while also making space for a possible exception for Shanti. As argued in chapter 4, women in major health institutions were positioned in the movement’s emotion culture as de facto men; however, portraying Shanti as being in struggle with the NHS allowed them to be excepted from this. Laws’s framing of Shanti as a whole, then, resolved the ambivalence emerging from the tension between the movement’s commitment to opposing classism and its commitment to opposing ‘male’ medical institutions like the NHS by representing Shanti as a service within the NHS that was, for emotion cultural purposes, not really part of that institution.

5.5 Conclusion

Antipathy and affinity are amorphous emotions which are difficult to define, but which nevertheless play a strong role in the cultivation and maintenance of collective relationships. The histories of disagreement, misrepresentation, frustration, anger, and difficulty between different strands of the WLM that had taken shape in the 1970s followed it into the 1980s, permeating relationships between feminisms in non-episodic ways which stretched across these relationships through time. As was the case in radical feminists’ collective relationship with men, their political ideology was the prism through which they saw their relationships with other strands of the WLM, and just as the male power bloc had defined their emotions toward men, the changes taking shape in the WLM in the 1980s affected how radical feminists related to the ideas and practices of other feminists.

There were key differences between the movement’s relationship with men and that with other feminisms, however. Their relationship with men involved the cultivation of an emotional toolkit to allow them to maintain an adverse relationship. This often involved clear emotional frames which represented men as the objects of strong and often (though not always) clearly-defined adverse emotions. Their
relationship with other feminisms, however, was not as directly adversarial as that with men, leading to a different framing approach which did not involve the representation of other feminists as emotionally-laden caricatures. Instead, there was a diffuse framing of the averse feelings of disagreement, rejection, and objection which were less clearly-defined than most of their emotions toward men, but which nevertheless allowed for the reproduction of an antipathetic relationship.

Also unlike men, other feminisms advanced ideas which radical feminists did not wholly reject, for which reason ambivalence sometimes arose. Radical feminists’ political values were not entirely unlike those of other feminisms, and the practices that these other strands of the WLM had developed in order to provide women an alternative to the oppressive regimes of care that radical feminists also rejected had some degree of appeal for radical feminists (who, after all, had to get their medical and emotional care from somewhere). As the influence of these practices expanded, radical feminists’ ambivalence toward them became a stronger presence in the movement’s emotion culture, even as they remained committed to the same core ideology, and this trend ultimately culminated in the early 1990s with the appearance of some efforts to reorganise the movement’s emotion culture to allow for affinity toward (select) feminist psychotherapists.

Across these relationships of affinity and ambivalence was the implicit presence of affinity. By developing relationships of affinity with all feminisms which were not radical feminism, radical feminists effectively created an emotionally significant group which was unique in its own emotion culture. Radical feminists themselves remained marked out as the only group which was not an object of adverse emotion or antipathy. The relationships in the movement’s emotion culture were consequently multiple – in addition to radical feminism having relationships with men and with other feminisms, the uniqueness of their implied affinity toward one another connected all other groups to one another, partially fusing them together as that which was not radical feminism. The forcefulness of this distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ surfaced implicitly in their antipathy toward other strands of the WLM, but was surfaced
extensively in their direct engagements with one another. This intra-movement affinity and its textures will be examined in the next chapter.
Chapter 6
Relationships Within the Sisterhood: The Maintenance, Rupture, & Repair of Intra-movement Affinity

6.1 Introduction

In chapters 4 and 5, I have argued that radical feminism’s emotion culture revolved around relationships, which themselves were rooted in the movement’s politics and its lens on the past, the present, and the future. The direction that the movement’s emotion culture provided for radical feminists about how they ought to feel about themselves in relation to various others pulled toward particular common emotions: their relationships with men brought up horror, fear, anger, and annoyance, and their relationships with other strands of the WLM aroused vague and ill-defined emotions of antipathy. In both cases, there were no rigid emotion rules about what emotions ought to be felt or expressed. Rather, there were particular types of relationships that needed to be (re)produced in order to maintain the movement’s emotion culture and to keep it consonant with radical feminist politics, and flexible toolkits of emotions were drawn upon as appropriate for that purpose.

In this chapter, the relationships within radical feminism itself will be explored. The affinity discussed in chapter 5 was of paramount importance to relations between radical feminists, and this chapter will examine the presence of affinity between radical feminists and their efforts to maintain it, even where they felt anger, frustration, or disappointment with one another. The chapter will also explore some nuances in relations of affinity, showing where there was flexibility in the expectation that such relations would be maintained. Finally, an explosive breach of the integrity of radical feminism’s internal emotional relations will be explored. In an uncharacteristic move, one radical feminist violated the affinity which characterised relations between radical feminists, and there was a forceful response from others in the movement to censure
this violation and reinforce the intra-movement relationships which had been violated. The powerful reaction to the breach made clear how significant affinity was to radical feminism’s emotion culture, and highlighted again that emotional relationships across the movement’s emotion culture were at their foundation a matter of what were considered to be consistent or inconsistent with radical feminist politics.

The chapter proceeds in three sections. In section 6.2, the significance of relationships of affinity within the movement will be discussed. This section will show how radical feminists used the text to express their investment in the affinity of radical feminist relationships, and to maintain them even in situations of disagreement and adverse emotions. It will then go on to explore textures in affinity, showing where particularities of specific radical feminists allowed for less scrupulous adherence to affinity and invited more adverse ways of engaging with one another. Section 6.3 will examine the landmark breach of the relationship of affinity, dividing this discussion into two parts. Firstly, Stevi Jackson’s unreservedly critical review essay of psychoanalytic feminist books will be revisited, showing in more detail the antipathy which characterised her discussion of writings by women outside of radical feminism. The antipathy of Jackson’s review will then be used as a point of comparison for Marge Berer’s book review essay by a different set of texts authored by radical feminists. The striking similarity in the antipathy in the two essays will make clear why Berer’s piece was considered by other radical feminists to be a breach of intra-movement relations of affinity amongst radical feminists. Finally, section 6.4 will explore the responses to Berer’s essay, which were dominated by (though not universally) expressions of censure. Through the rejection of Berer’s way of relating to other radical feminists, readers of the magazine who wrote letters of response to *Trouble and Strife* resurrected the relationships of affinity that defined the emotional interior of the movement and repaired the relational damage done by the breach.

6.2

The Ideal of Sisterhood: Affinity & its Maintenance Under Strain
The idea of a feminist ‘sisterhood’ had already become something of a trite trope by the time *Trouble and Strife* commenced publication, and at the time of this writing, it is so widely rejected a notion that it is almost unutterable in feminist scholarship. Nevertheless, ‘second wave’ feminism in general, and radical feminism in particular, exhibited an investment in the idea of sisterhood which gives the concept significant explanatory power, even if the ideal has since come to be discredited. Radical feminists’ defining ideological conviction that all women were oppressed by men *because* they were women (regardless of in what other capacities they might also be oppressed) created a foundation of bondedness which made the ideal of sisterhood uniquely pertinent to radical feminists’ relationships with one another. Like the ideal of ‘mother love’ which was a key component of Taylor and Rupp's (2002) formulation of the concept of emotion culture, the ideal of sisterhood provided a cohesive cultural basis to guide radical feminists’ ‘patterns of relationship’ with one another.

Most manifestations of the affinity of sisterhood in *Trouble and Strife* appeared as implicit allusions aimed at maintaining it. To set the stage for these subtle reproductions of affinity, however, it is worth first briefly visiting an atypically explicit and clear articulation of the ideal, appearing in Dale Spender’s warm review of Phyllis Chesler’s book on women and psychoanalysis:

‘What women need to do is to turn to other women and to show some of the care and compassion for each other that for centuries women have lavished on men. (Thus echoing some of Robin Morgan’s words in *Going Too Far*, 1978.) Phyllis Chesler is distressed by our inability to live up to our own ideals of sisterhood and urges the greater effort and understanding necessary to a revolutionary goal.’ (Spender, 1986, issue 9: 44)

Whatever feminists at the time or since may have thought of this ideal, the familiar manner in which Spender (and according to Spender’s representation, also Chesler) referred to it demonstrated how taken-for-granted its status was for the movement. It
is worth noting the compassion that Chesler called for, because it was a widely-noticed absence from Marge Berer’s breaching incident.

Throughout most of *Trouble and Strife*, however, allusions to sisterhood and affinity were not explicitly named in this way, but rather manifested in authors’ efforts to express their ideas in ways which preserved affinity when it might otherwise be compromised. When disagreement was expressed, it was framed in language which avoided overt confrontation:

‘I found myself struggling with contradictory responses to Brooke’s position.’ (Scott, 1983, issue 1: 26)

Scott’s use of a phrase like ‘struggling with’ averted some of the adverse emotion away from Brooke (the author she was reviewing) and placed some of it with herself. Where she more explicitly directed criticism at the Redstockings, she still withheld from the level of antipathetic expression which appeared in radical feminists’ writing about Marxist and psychoanalytic feminists:

‘I have left till last those aspect of Redstockings’ work which are most difficult to deal with.’ (Scott, 1983, issue 1: 26)

Her representation of the parts of the text she found objectionable as ‘difficult to deal with’ again placed some of the problem with herself, even if not suggesting that her own reading was the source of the problem, and enabled her to express disagreement in a way which did not compromise the affinity of the relationship between herself and the Redstockings.

A recurrent textual strategy for expressing criticism between radical feminists was to state that something objectionable was ‘confusing’, ‘curious, or ‘surprising’. There are a number of examples of this across the magazine, and though any one of them on its own does not clearly suggest an underlying effort to maintain relationships of affinity, the frequency with which this framing appeared indicated that there was a tacit understanding that this manner of expressing objection was more sisterly and consistent with the integrity of radical feminists’ relationships with one another than
more accusatory phrasings might have been. Scott used this framing in her piece on Redstockings:

‘There is no romanticism about anti-sexist men; indeed, Carol Hanisch’s article on men’s liberation is the most cutting imaginable. At the same time Hanisch has printed an open letter to Don McLean asking him why he says such horrible things about women in his songs and how nice it would be to have his music on the side of women, the effect of which is, to say the least, confusing.’ (Scott, 1983, issue 1: 26)

This instantiation of the framing of disagreement as confusion did not, on its own, seem to suggest the presence of a convention around how radical feminists ought to express themselves and relate to one another. By itself, the extract above seemed straightforwardly to suggest actual confusion. However, when taken alongside the recurrence of this tendency across the text, it appears as one of the relational practices in the movement to preserve affinity. Though this might otherwise be taken to be an emotion rule or emotional expression rule when viewed through the lens of the dramaturgical account of emotions, to understand it as a strategy of maintaining relationships better accounts for the circumstances under which it was used. Movement participants are emotionally affected when their movement's emotion cultures do not accommodate differences (Klatch, 2004), but it was nevertheless necessary for discontent to be expressed in ways which would maintain the integrity of intra-movement relationships. Where overt anger did appear, it was because the person at whom anger was directed was seen to have failed to conform to radical feminist ideology, but explicit anger was foregone in favour of less affronting language where the political values of all of the women involved were in line with radical feminism's movement ideology. This demonstrates that ‘good’ radical feminists were related to differently than feminists who did not meet the movement’s ideological benchmark.
Even where an author needed to express significant anger, other women’s radical feminist political ideology produced an imperative to maintain affinity within them. For example, in her angry piece about the exclusion of infertile women from feminist debates about fertility treatments, Naomi Pfeffer expressed curiosity and confusion rather than anger:

‘Because of their absence, this debate appears, from the perspective of an infertile woman, to be curiously ill-informed in terms of what it is like to be infertile, socially, medically and emotionally.’ (Pfeffer, 1985, issue 5: 46)

This pattern was repeated throughout the piece. Three additional instances are extracted below so that the emotional weight of the repetitive pattern might be visible:

‘However, unlike the Warnock Report, I am including here the techniques which the majority of infertile women will experience in doctors’ surgeries and in hospitals all over the world today, techniques which, curiously, are never mentioned.’ (Pfeffer, 1985, issue 5: 46)

‘What I am referring to are those techniques practised today by a whole range of medical practitioners of varying degrees of expertise. Surprisingly, the procedures most often used are those most rarely discussed.’ (Pfeffer, 1985, issue 5: 47)

‘Because no one has bothered to consult infertile women, a curiously distorted stereotype has emerged. The word “desperate” appears so frequently in conjunction with infertility that the reader could be
forgiven for believing that infertility is in fact a disease of the personality rather than the body.’ (Pfeffer, 1985, issue 5: 49-50)

As I argued above, any one of these instances in isolation is not noticeably a way of expressing anger, but the cumulative effect of repetitions of this framing across the text produce an impression of anger even where it has not been explicitly expressed. This enabled authors to convey anger without violating the integrity of the relationships of affinity between radical feminists. Though readers would presumably perceive the anger (and that was likely the intention), the use of this sort of language gestured a desire to preserve relationships even at times of disagreement – a concern which was not present in radical feminists’ ways of writing about other strands of the WLM or about men.

Any uncertainty about Pfeffer’s feelings was addressed in an emotional disclosure near the end of the piece, wherein she explained her reasons for having written it:

‘I write this article after many bitter and angry attempt to put down what I feel about the feminist response to reproductive technology. Several years ago, Anne and I made valiant efforts to set up workshops on infertility at women’s health conferences and in our own homes. The response was nil. We had no preconceptions about how we wanted infertility to be discussed, we just wanted it to be put on the feminist agenda because we believed that we could find support from our sisters. Sadly, our efforts failed.’ (Pfeffer, 1985, issue 5: 50)

Her investment in relationships of sisterhood and affinity was implicit in her own emotional expression throughout the piece, and she made explicit in these concluding remarks that she was angry, bitter, and disappointed to not have received the same from other feminists. Her understanding that there was an expectation across the
movement of sisterhood and affinity was therefore present in her feelings about not having had that expectation fulfilled toward herself (Klatch, 2004), and in her continued fulfilment of the expectation through her own writing (in spite of her disappointment).

A letter in response to her piece revealed again that there were dual expectations that relationships of affinity should be maintained and that the significance of that imperative was relative to how well someone was seen to adhere to radical feminist political ideology:

‘I was surprised that Naomi Pfeffer failed to see the significant difference between ‘In-vitro fertilisation’ (IVF) and the technologies which make it up and have been used for considerably longer.’ (Murrell, 1985, issue 6: 2)

Murrell adhered to the recognisable practice of framing disagreement as ‘surprise’. Consistently, then, where disagreements unfolded amongst participants in the movement who generally adhered to its ideology, there was a tacit expectation that relations of affinity could be expected and would be maintained.

The centrality of power critiques in radical feminist ideology troubled this relational imperative in some instances, however. Not all radical feminists were positioned identically – some had more power (of various sorts) than others, and additional power was seen to come with additional responsibility. Where a radical feminist with an atypical amount of power was seen to be wielding that power in an objectionable way, the imperative to exhibit the compassion that Chesler had called for and express emotions toward her in a way which maintained affinity was softened. The flexibility in intra-movement affinity surfaced in Amanda Sebestyen’s review essay about books by renowned radical feminists Germaine Greer and Robin Morgan. In their introductory blurb to the review essay, the Trouble and Strife editorial collective laid out the reasons why Sebestyen’s review might be subject to less rigid expectations of affinity than pieces about radical feminists would generally be:
‘Famous feminists such as Robin Morgan and Germaine Greer receive a lot of attention in the media and are seen, often to our annoyance, as speaking for the women’s liberation movement generally. What’s more, people will buy their books whatever they write.’

(Trouble and Strife collective, 1984, issue 4: 50)

Because Greer and Morgan were seen to have a significantly greater degree of control over how the WLM was perceived and understood, they were also levelled with additional responsibility, and were met with less leniency if they were seen to be in error. Just as Scott had complained that socialist feminists had harmed radical feminism by misrepresenting it, it was important to radical feminists that famous feminists like Greer and Morgan did not misrepresent the WLM.

Sebestyen reviewed one book by each author, and the reviews incorporated praise of their strengths as well as critiques of their shortcomings. Notably, the criticisms were expressed in ways which would generally be reserved for people outside of radical feminism:

‘Just as The Obstacle Race championed free-living Modern Art and castigated Victorian academic women as if postwar changes of taste (and feminism!) had never happened; so Sex and Destiny drags in an irrelevant Shakespeare sonnet, talks like some benign dowager about “the working girl”, and manages to roll back the colonial clock so far as to describe Vanuatu as “the New Hebrides”.’ (Sebestyen, 1984, issue 4: 51)

This unreserved criticism of Greer’s book included name calling (‘some benign dowager’) as well as complaints about the quality of its analysis, demonstrating a sharp contrast to the relations of affinity seen in the pieces addressed to and between radical feminists who lacked Greer’s public platform. Morgan’s book was represented with similar criticism:
'One minute we’re in high hyperbole, a kind of cosmic “Call My Bluff”: “We are the particles, the waves, the bumps on the ribbon, the negentropic information gathering itself to itself for the sheer joy of communicating through interference waves which also are part of the field to other negentropic photons of light-darkness-matter-illusion-energy. We are the holomovement.” We are the walrus, too, I expect. The next minute everything’s scaled down to domesticity and cuteness.’ (Sebestyen, 1984, issue 4: 53)

These sorts of remarks were emotionally similar to comments on feminists from other strands of the WLM, but would generally be considered too cutting and unsisterly for radical feminists. In the case of famous feminists who had substantial influence over the movement’s reception in the broader public, however, the expectation of affinity was diminished.

The value of affinity between radical feminists was not altogether eliminated in these special cases, however. While socialist and psychoanalytic feminists were not extended any affinity, Sebestyen expressed warm admiration of Greer’s and Morgan’s work which maintained some degree of the affinity expected within the movement and counterbalanced some of the antipathy that might emerge from her harsher criticisms:

‘Greer spent six months in India researching for *Sex and Destiny*, and I don’t think that the Women’s Liberation Movement has itself succeeded in putting so much material together in such an accessible form.’

(Sebestyen, 1984, issue 4: 52)

‘The poet’s skills have been growing in the years since *Monster*, and there are passages of sustained
metaphor where she makes the truth known with a beauty I’ve seldom read.’ (Sebestyen, 1984, issue 4: 54)

These remarks indicated that even powerful radical feminists were positioned within the emotion culture of the movement alongside other radical feminists, though they were nearer to feminists in other strands of the WLM than were most radical feminists:

‘We are now the Feminist Constituency, we can’t pretend to be entirely powerless any more. Don’t we owe it to these women to free them of the burdens of celebrity, to read their books with loving rigour, to stop publishers encouraging them to push out big overwritten manuscripts because every word means money? Like science fiction readers, we’re very close to our writers – as close, Robin Morgan points out, as mother and child; so close that we often change places.’ (Sebestyen, 1984, issue 4: 54)

The emotion culture had some flexibility, allowing radical feminists to remain ‘very close to our writers’, placing them within the intra-movement affinity that characterised relationships between radical feminists. Affinity was not a matter of unthinking partisanship, but emerged from movement participants’ ongoing reflexive evaluations of the movements politics and practices. The distinction between famous feminists and ‘the Feminist Constituency’ emerged from a ‘relational logic’ (Burkitt, 2005), intertwining political reflexivity with emotional relations. This created space for the critiques of power which were so central to radical feminism’s ideology to be enacted in the emotion culture through a diminished expectation of consistent affinity.

In this section, I have returned to the affinity explored in chapter 5, showing that radical feminists expected affinity from one another and endeavoured to maintain it in their ways of expressing feelings about and toward one another. They framed adverse emotions as less confrontational ones in order to preserve affinity while still allowing their readers to understand the feelings that they were expressing. The extent
to which someone was considered part of the intra-movement emotional relationship of affinity depended upon the level of her adherence to radical feminist political ideology (with less ideologically conforming feminists being objects of less sisterly relationships – this will be explored further below). Some radical feminists were positioned as having more power over the life and success of the movement than others, and they were subject to close scrutiny and extended less affinity if they were seen to be misusing the benefit of their prominent positions. Evident across radical feminists’ engagements with one another was the importance of preserving sisterly relationships, and as with the movement’s emotions toward men and other strands of the WLM, which specific emotions were involved was less important than the (re)production of particular types of relationships. Though the maintenance of affinity might otherwise be conceptualised as an emotion rule, the flexibility about which specific emotions were involved (in radical feminists’ relations within their own movement and with various others) does not reconcile with this theorisation. Throughout the emotion culture of the movement, it can be seen that the maintenance and reproduction of particular qualities of relationship are the underlying work done by collective emotions. The special exception to the expectation of affinity made for Germaine Greer and Robin Morgan showed that even in relations with radical feminists whose place in the interior of the movement was not contested, conformity to radical feminist political ideals (including ideals of horizontal relationships of power) was the key factor that mediated the movement’s collective emotional relationships with individuals and groups.

6.3

The Imperative for Affinity & its Breach

The maintenance of affinity amongst radical feminists was generally consistent (with due exceptions for those such as Greer and Morgan), but it was not without exception. In one particularly noteworthy case, Marge Berer wrote a book review essay authored by a coalition of radical feminists concerned with the dangers of New
Reproductive Technologies. This review was highly critical and scathing in tone, much more closely resembling radical feminists’ writings about those outside of radical feminism than the emotion culture of the movement allowed. The publication of her piece was met with heavy backlash from readers, and the magazine published 9 reader letters in response to it – far more than the approximately zero to three letters that pieces in *Trouble and Strife* typically generated. The letters signalled that readers regarded Berer’s manner of treating the work of other radical feminists as a serious breach of the relations in their movement.

In this section, Berer’s breach of the relationships of affinity within radical feminism will be explored. Drawing from Harold Garfinkel’s (1984) ethnomethodology, it will use this norm-breaching incident and the subsequent adverse response to it to evidence that there were strongly established norms in place, and that these were of emotional significance to participants in the movement. For frame of reference, the section will open with an exploration of Stevi Jackson’s critical review essay on the work of Rosalind Coward’s and Juliet Mitchell’s writings on psychoanalysis, showing how antipathy appeared in the text in radical feminists’ dealings with other strands of the WLM, where the preservation of affinity was not considered necessary. Berer’s review essay will then be examined, highlighting the emotional similarities between the antipathy of Jackson’s piece and the emotions of Berer’s essay. The antipathy of Berer’s piece constituted a breach of the emotion culture of the movement, which demanded that she express criticisms in affinity-preserving ways. Readers then used their letters to respond to Berer’s breach and remedy the harm done to the integrity of the movement’s interior relationships of affinity – this response will be explored in the next section.

In her critique of psychoanalytic feminism, Stevi Jackson represented it as an appropriate object of antipathy, using sarcasm and satire, and expressing annoyance and irritation (and, it might be argued, also low-level anger). Her manner of relating to this strand of feminism was similar to Sara Scott’s in relation to socialist feminism. Like Scott, she used quotation marks to convey her rejection of other feminists’ claims:
‘It is always important for feminists to understand ideas that seek to “explain” female subordination as “natural” or as unchanging and unchangeable. It is for this reason that I ask you to bear with me as we pick our way through what may seem nonsensical rubbish.’

(Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 32)

More significant in this passage than the emotionally-imbued use of quotation marks, however, was her overt naming of psychoanalytic texts as ‘nonsensical rubbish’. Even in Naomi Pfeffer’s ‘angry and bitter’ writing, she did not resort to this type of representation, and she consistently adhered to the relationship of affinity in radical feminism by framing her strong adverse emotions as less confronting ones. Jackson’s writing was not about the work of radical feminists, which removed the imperative to express adverse emotions in affinity-preserving ways. Furthermore, by using the collective ‘we’ (‘we pick our way through...’), she amplified her already-implicit invitation to the reader to share in her emotions toward psychoanalysis and to see themselves as part of the same group to which Jackson herself belonged. As discussed in chapter 5, expressions of antipathy were used to do the dual work of engendering antipathy toward people outside of radical feminism and producing affinity toward those within it. The intra-movement relationship of affinity was not only preserved here, but strengthened, with the various emotions which might be read from the text (depending on her own feelings, a reader might read the passage above as mildly irritated or substantially angry) consistently preserving and reproducing the relationships in the movement’s emotion culture.

Also like Scott’s discussion of socialist feminism and Sebestyen’s of famous radical feminists, Jackson’s emotions toward other feminists were concerned with differences of ideology and power:

‘The unwillingness or inability of the proponents of psychoanalysis to translate their ideas into terms which the uninitiated can comprehend has been rightly
damned as elitist. It makes these writers relatively immune from criticism from outsiders and this, I think, accounts for much of the deference towards psychoanalysis. How can we presume to criticise something we don’t understand? Those working within this framework can smugly [sic] reassure themselves that if the rest of us have doubts it is only because of our ignorance. Juliet Mitchell’s work, being less directly influenced by Lacan than many of the other writers of this genre, is more comprehensible. She makes up for this by constantly implying that if we reject Freud it is because we are too stupid to see the Great Truths that he has uncovered. The whole tone of *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* is arrogant and condescending.

Faced with either incomprehensibility or condescension our confidence is undermined and we are denied the possibility of assessing what, if anything, psychoanalysis has to offer... I believe that we must resist being cowed into silence by elitist mystifications.’ (Jackson, 1983, issue 1: 34)

Jackson’s representations of psychoanalytic feminists produced them as objects of antipathy, simultaneously reinforcing the affinity of radical feminism. The image she represented was of a smug elite of scholarly feminists who did not give other women credit for sufficient intelligence to understand a framework which they saw as oppressive. Because these were not radical feminists, she was able to represent them in a way which somewhat resembled representations of men – angering figures who lorded over women and dismissed their objections and complaints as irrelevant and ill-founded. The ideological difference between psychoanalytic and radical feminists placed authors like Juliet Mitchell in the movement’s emotion culture such that there
was no relationship of affinity to preserve, and the ‘deference to psychoanalysis’ on which Jackson saw Mitchell as relying effectively made Mitchell a beneficiary of male power (in this case, drawing intellectual authority from the pervasive influence and acceptance of Freud’s ideas).

Recalling again the relationships of affinity between radical feminists, it is clear that even an emotionally heated disagreement between participants in the movement would not allow the type of expression seen in Jackson’s review. Her representation of psychoanalytic feminists engendered antipathy toward them as people as well as rejection of their ideas, and her recurrent references to and self-identification with the radical feminist group who collectively shared that antipathy (‘as we pick our way through.’, ‘how can we presume to criticise…’, ‘we are denied the possibility…’, ‘we must resist being cowed into silence’) consistently reinforced radical feminists’ own distinct place within their emotion culture. Affinity was preserved for radical feminists alone (with some flexibility where marked power differential existed, such as with Greer and Morgan). Everyone outside the movement had a more antipathetic relationship with radical feminists which allowed for less (to borrow again from Spender’s paraphrase of Chesler) ‘compassionate’ expression. In disagreements between radical feminists, the same emotions which were present in Jackson’s review would have been expressed quite differently, allowing for adverse emotional expression while preserving the affinity within the movement.

Marge Berer’s review essay was about a series of writings by women involved in FINNRAGE (Feminist International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering). Though the FINNRAGE network was radical feminist in politics and largely organised by radical feminists, Berer’s review essay produced the authors whose work she reviewed as objects of antipathy rather than affinity. The relationship of affinity was not preserved, and Berer’s emotional expression placed radical feminist authors in the wrong place within the movement’s emotion culture.
There were several parallels between Jackson’s essay and Berer’s which illuminate the violation of the movement’s emotion culture implicit in Berer’s piece. The first was its naming and blaming of specific women:

‘It is my impression that most of the eight women involved in these three books are the guiding force behind FINNRAGE and primarily responsible for its public face: they are Gena Corea, Renate Duelli Klein, Jalna Hanmer, Helen Holmes, Betty Hoskins, Janice Raymond, Robyn Rowland and Roberta Steinbacher.’

(Berer, 1986, issue 9: 30)

Jackson similarly named Rosalind Coward and Juliet Mitchell as key figures in psychoanalytic feminism, singling them out for blame, but notably Naomi Pfeffer did not name specific people in her discussion of feminists from whom ‘the response was nil’ when she attempted to garner support from them – naming specific figures rather than systems or phenomena, as von Scheve, Zink, and Ismer (2016) have argued, engenders more angry responses, and the text of these pieces seems to reflect an intuitive awareness of this. Within radical feminism, part of the maintenance of affinity involved the direction of criticisms at ideas and practices where possible, eschewing naming and blaming. Because the writings by Stevi Jackson and Marge Berer were book reviews, it might seem common-sense that the authors were named, and not an emotionally consequential gesture. However, readers saw Berer’s articulated ‘impression that most of the eight women involved in these three books are the guiding force’ as an aggressive and unsisterly gesture, suggesting that it was incompatible with the intra-movement emotion culture of radical feminism – this reader response will be examined in the next section.

As discussed in chapter 5, a key ideological aspect of radical feminism was its view of men as oppressors and enemies of women, which gave rise to much of their reticence to adopt ‘male’ medical practices and ideologies. This placed an embargo on collusion with men for radical feminists, which explained Jackson’s antipathy toward
women who exhibited ‘deference’ toward psychoanalysis (or worse, those who suggested that women who did not agree with it were ‘too stupid’). Emulating the pattern of relationship toward psychoanalytic feminists rather than radical feminists, Berer responded to one section of a FINNRAGE text by siding with the male doctor rather than his radical feminist critic:

‘She describes an interview with a scientist working on cloning which also conveys her horror of him, and not much else. It turns out that this scientist is interested in cloning because he thinks it may lead to useful information about cancer and therefore to possible ideas for prevention or cure of cancer. Is this a valid reason to do research on cloning? She doesn’t say, and she doesn’t ask. Instead she draws him out on how it might be used on another planet, and then goes on to describe a totally discredited book about an experiment in cloning people which never took place, by a man called Rorvik.’ (Berer, 1986, issue 9: 31)

Her representation portrayed the radical feminist author as unreasonable, unfair to a well-intended man, and ill-willed (‘she draws him out on how it might be used on another planet’). She represented the doctor in this interaction as worthy of sympathy and the feminist interviewer as indictable, violating a core tenet of the emotion culture of the movement. She encouraged antipathy toward the radical feminist, and even worse than engendering affinity toward other strands of the WLM, she represented a male doctor as a rightful object of affinity:

‘The book includes the texts of ethical and scientific evaluations of the technology by US, British and Australian medical bodies, which are amazingly sensible in many respects… There are points in it that I think are naive… But overall, it is sane and more
informative than Corea’s et al, and an excellent counterpoint to them.’ (Berer, 1986, issue 9: 34-35)

Echoing men’s misogynistic constructions of women as inherently pathological, Berer’s praise of male-authored texts on the grounds that they were ‘sane’ and ‘amazingly sensible’ inverted the places of radical feminists and men as objects of affinity and antipathy. Berer’s apparent sympathy for what she represented as misunderstood doctors was also highlighted in readers’ criticism – this will be elucidated in the next section.

In another parallel with Jackson’s critique of Coward and Mitchell, Berer framed radical feminists as deliberate manipulators of women. In Jackson’s case, this took the form of suggesting that psychoanalytic feminists used impenetrable language to confuse women and prevent them from having the intellectual confidence to criticise psychoanalytic theory. In Berer’s case, she suggested that radical feminists encouraged women to fear what they did not understand:

‘What is wrong with many of the pieces on the new technology is that they are, in fact, fantasies. They posit futures that frighten because they are awful: and that seems to be their purpose. They are effective because some of them are imaginative and well-written fantasies. The writers do not examine the technology for what it is, but can dismiss it for what it might become. They do not then need to offer reasons for why it has come about, nor explore the reasons why women are queueing up to take advantage of it. Instead, they make you fear it, as Eve was made to fear the apple, because of the knowledge it would bring.’

(Berer, 1986, issue 9: 31)

The religious parallel was particularly powerful, drawing an analogy between the idea that women are responsible for the downfall of humankind and radical feminists’ texts.
In addition to conveying her own antipathy toward the radical feminist authors she critiqued, her framing encouraged her readers to see them as a threat to their own intellectual autonomy. Such a framing relocated these particular radical feminists from their place of affinity within the emotion culture to one of antipathy, and reordered the collective ‘we’ to which Jackson had referred to include Berer and her readers but exclude the FINNRAGE authors.

Making the displacement of the FINNRAGE group from radical feminism’s interior of affinity even more pronounced, later in the piece Berer explicitly argued that Gena Corea wilfully manipulated other feminists’ emotions:

‘Corea uses her skill as a writer to manipulate the reader’s feelings, by turning the information she has collected against its source to support her own point of view. Using images of breeding brothels, egg farms, war on the womb, hormonal bombardment of the ovaries, and subversive sperm, she takes the reader on a fascinating tour through her vision of woman as victim. It is sensationalist journalism at its best.’ (Berer, 1986, issue 9: 34)

The tone of this characterisation was similar to that of Jackson’s discussion of psychoanalytic feminists, and again demonstrated a marked contrast to Pfeffer’s affinity-preserving piece. There were three relevant actors involved in the emotional framing that Berer used here: herself, the authors whose books she reviewed, and her own readers. Her representation of Corea as a manipulative ‘sensationalist’ violated the terms of her own expected affinity with Corea, and additionally extended that violation to Trouble and Strife’s readers, encouraging them to break with their affinity towards radical feminists like Corea. This potentially far-reaching violation of the internal integrity of the relationship of affinity within radical feminism constituted a significant breach of the movement’s emotion culture, and the extent to which intra-movement affinity was valued was evidenced by the forceful response from the
readers – it is to this response that the next section will turn.

6.4
Reconstructing the Movement through Emotional Relationships: Enforcing Sisterhood

The movement’s internal relationship of affinity was (re)produced in many settings, and the text of radical feminist publications like Trouble and Strife was one of them. As I argued in chapter 3, texts are a site of social action in its own right as well as of representation, and Marge Berer’s breach of intra-movement affinity in her review essay was a breach of the relationships she represented textually. That left the movement’s internal affinity in a fractured state after her review, demanding a response. Either the breach would be allowed to pass, which would signify a shift in the movement’s emotion culture and a transition to a different relationship between radical feminists, or the fracture would have to be repaired. The readership elected for the latter, and responded to Berer’s piece with an onslaught of letters far exceeding the number typically published in response to even relatively controversial articles. Their critical comments about Berer’s piece highlighted her violation of precisely the aspects of affinity maintenance which have been discussed thus far, confirming that these relational norms were understood and expected by radical feminists. The manner in which they related to Berer herself in their letters also confirmed that whether someone was included in the radical feminist relationship of affinity hinged upon the political ideals to which they apparently subscribed and which they enacted in their behaviour, giving rise to antipathetic responses to Berer from the magazine’s readership despite her self-identification as a radical feminist. In this section, two aspects of the response to Berer’s piece will be explored: drawing on ethnomethodology, it will highlight how the adverse responses to the breach of the prevailing terms of relationship in the movement illuminate the presence of an imperative that could be breached, and it will explore the readers’ strategies for reconstructing the affinity that had been harmed by the violation.
There were a range of bases for objection to Berer’s way of relating to the radical feminists of FINNRAGE. One of these, as highlighted in the last section, was her naming and shaming of specific women. Berer’s direct criticisms toward specific individuals was considered incompatible with the affinity that participants in the movement were expected to feel and express toward one another as well as an aberration from the movement’s political principles. Naming themselves as ‘founder, and past, members of the Trouble and Strife Collective’, and opening their letter with a claim that ‘the current issue shows a marked turn to reactionary politics’ (Hanmer and Saunders, 1987, issue 10: 8), the authors of a joint letter stated that,

‘This is a straightforward attack on radical political theory expressed in the form of a brutal critique on the writings of individual feminists.’ (Hanmer and Saunders, 1987, issue 10: 9)

As had been in the case in radical feminists’ relationships with men and other strands of the WLM, the movement’s political ideology was a key pivot of relationships within the movement, and attacks on ‘radical political theory’ were intertwined with attacks on the emotion culture:

‘The article by Marge Berer, (T&S 9), in which she attacks certain feminists and feminist critiques of reproductive technologies, can be criticised on many points; one of these is the personal, defamatory remarks against Gena Corea, Helen Holmes, and other women portraying them as hysterical ring-leaders of the international feminist network FINNRAGE.’ (Spallone, 1987, issue 10: 5-6)

There was a dense recurrence of complaints from readers that the FINNRAGE authors had been personally attacked, demonstrating that they shared an understanding that this would not happen within radical feminism:
'I write in response to the article (supposedly) a book review) [sic] you published by Marge Berer, “Breeding Conspiracies. Feminism and the New Reproductive Technologies”. This article attacks a number of women who are my colleagues but also myself, both professionally and personally.

Unfortunately it does not grapple with the debates or the facts themselves within the area of the new reproductive technologies. It does not deal with the issues but resorts to snide dismissal.’ (Rowland, 1987, issue 10: 3)

Though all of these objections also highlighted that Berer ‘does not grapple with the debates or the facts themselves’, they also all specified personal attacks. The similarly scathing review essay that Stevi Jackson had written about Rosalind Coward’s and Juliet Mitchell’s work had not elicited this response – readers raised no objection to Jackson’s ‘personal attacks’, despite her naming specific women as ‘arrogant and condescending’. Because Coward and Mitchell were outside of the bounds of radical feminist affinity and placed in the movement’s emotion culture as objects of antipathy, to write of them in that manner did not constitute a breach and therefore did not create a need to repair relationships.

The threat that Berer’s manner of relating to other radical feminists had posed to the affinity of the movement raised an occasion for the value that radical feminists placed on the intra-movement relationship to become more visible. Berer was seen to have ruptured the bonds of affinity:

‘Not only do we need to describe what we see but we must also analyse what we feel. For example, the patronising way in which Madhu Kishwar’s work is dealt with is no less than disgusting. On page 35: “Madhu Kishwar’s piece in Man-Made Woman
deserves to be in a better book.” How dare you presume that Madhu Kishwar did not positively choose to publish her work in a book which she believes is dealing with issues hitherto ignored by white western women who think that there might be something in it for them!’ (Hanmer and Saunders, 1987, issue 10: 9)

Hanmer and Saunders’s outrage was directed at Berer’s suggestion that Madhu Kishwar ought to be separated out from her co-authors. In addition to undermining the assumption that Kishwar made that choice under her own deliberate agency, Berer’s remark implicitly drove a wedge between Kishwar and the other authors, adulterating the relationship that they had developed amongst themselves (and their work). The relational ideal that Hanmer and Saunders were defending was one of radical feminists united in the bonds of affinity and sisterhood (even if sometimes disagreeing amongst themselves), and Berer’s suggestion that Kishwar ought to have been extracted from that group and placed elsewhere portrayed a quite different image of atomistic individuals whose feminism and writing could be chopped up and separated out, and of a contrarian relationship between Kishwar and the other authors. The passion of Hanmer and Saunders’s anger at this illustrates how deeply felt radical feminists’ affinity toward one another was, and how urgently they felt the need to defend it against threat. Though the cultural ideal of sisterhood was not explicitly invoked, it was nevertheless a prominent guiding principle in radical feminists’ relationships with one another which became more apparent when violated.

Berer’s perceived violation of the relational bonds within radical feminism also created a need to reclassify her in relation to the emotion culture. Her manner of relating to the FINNRAGE authors had not been consistent with intra-movement emotions, which required that her status as a radical feminist be addressed. Some letter-writers consequently dislodged her from her place in the radical feminist affinity relationship and positioned her alongside feminists outside the WLM:
Comfortable and smug middle-class women should not be selfish enough to believe that their own sense of personal control in their world is automatically a control exercised by all women.’ (Rowland, 1987, issue 10: 4)

‘Comfortable and smug middle-class women’ was a phrasing similar to Jackson’s discussion of Coward and Mitchell, using emotions to contest the legitimacy of Berer’s place amongst radical feminists. Rowland did not use any emotion words or allude to her own emotions overtly, but her manner of referring to Berer in this scornful way altered the terms of her own (and by extension, other radical feminists’) relationship to Berer. Though personal attacks had been the topic of many of the criticisms levelled at Berer, in a case in which someone’s place within the radical feminist intra-movement relationship was contested, such attacks – and what they signified about the relationships between those involved – could be used to move Berer from the relationship of affinity to that of antipathy, using emotional framing to emotionally exile her from radical feminism.

A second locus of criticism against Berer, and one which helps to explain the perceived need to use emotional framing to remove her from the radical feminist intra-movement relationship, was her mimicking of men’s denigrations of women:

‘Berer makes it sound as if the hundreds of women who interact via the FINNRAGE networks are duped, blindly following a fantastic conspiracy theory constructed by a few women. This is insulting to all the women involved – many of whom have been criticising reproductive and genetic technologies since the late 1970s, and all of whom are part of the whole, many-faceted FINNRAGE story.’ (Spallone, 1987, issue 10: 6)

Men’s framings of women as ‘too stupid’, hysterical, or crazy were familiar to radical feminists, and the emulation of these framings by women were the subject of some of
radical feminism’s contentions with other strands of the WLM (as suggested by Jackson’s claims about psychoanalytic feminism and Scott’s about socialist feminism). For Berer’s argument to have been accepted, then, would have implied an acceptance of these framings of radical feminists (the ‘lunatic fringe’ to which Sara Scott had referred). This precise concern was made more explicit in a letter from Gena Corea, one of the authors critiqued by Berer, in her letter:

‘In general, the Trouble and Strife article has portrayed feminist critics of the NRTs as crazy, paranoid and hysterical. The Singer and Wells’ book is “sane and more informative than Corea’s et al.” We are accustomed to portrayals of feminists as crazy and male defenders of patriarchal interests as “sane.” Historically these techniques for silencing feminists and helping them to disappear from public view have not been used by people identifying themselves as feminists. Nor have they appeared in journals labelling themselves “radical feminist.”’ (Corea, 1987, issue 11: 6)

The breaches were laid bare here: Berer had violated the terms of the radical feminist relationship by representing other feminists in the same ways that patriarchal men did, distancing her from radical feminist politics. Furthermore, Corea linked Berer’s argument with Trouble and Strife as a publication, illuminating a concern about what the editorial collective’s choice to publish Berer’s piece suggested about radical feminism itself and signalling a need to defend the movement’s integrity from attack.

What distinguished the relationship of affinity in radical feminism from the more antipathetic relationships outside of it was that how radical feminists made one another feel was considered consequential. Their antipathy toward other strands of the WLM and toward men did not require them to give consideration to how their emotional frames would affect the people about whom they were writing, but the
affinity of radical feminism did necessitate this. Critics of Berer’s piece noted the way that her manner of writing about the FINNRAGE authors might affect them:

‘FINNRAGE was formed out of the women’s movement; we are growing and we enjoy a plurality of opinions on the matter of reproductive and genetic technologies. Our resistance is based on our assessment of what these technologies mean for all people, particularly women. Perhaps a helpful analogy is how we resist nuclear technology despite the apparent benefits (jobs, energy). Would not a better feminist tactic be to listen to each other, not castigate?’ (Spallone, 1987, issue 10: 6)

The characterisation of listening to one another rather than castigating as a ‘better feminist tactic’ linked the practice of compassionate listening to feminist practice, and demonstrated that the relationship itself was a topic of conscious interest in its own right as radical feminists read Trouble and Strife. By calling for modes of interaction which were more compatible with the preservation of affinity, Spallone reinforced the intra-movement relationship that had been threatened by Berer’s more antipathetic way of relating to other radical feminists through the text.

Dale Spender still more directly addressed the issue of how feminists made one another feel through their manners of reviewing written work. Referring to research she had done about women’s experiences of having their writings reviewed (by a male-dominated mainstream media which tended to give women authors ‘bad press’):

‘But my investigation of Gatekeeping led me to an area that I had not anticipated; I soon encountered some of the women who had been on the receiving end of the “bad press” and who had been left raw by the experience.'
When I wrote to all the women whose work I had summarised in *For the Record* – to ask them whether they felt their views had been fairly represented for I had no desire to be a “gatekeeper” of their work or to distort their meanings – I was very disturbed by some of the responses that were returned to me. For without exception the authors recounted such horrific stories about being reviewed that they even entertained the idea of abandoning their writing on the grounds that it was not worth the risk of such repudiation – which not only took so long to deal with, but which also took its toll the next time they took up their pens.’ (Spender, 1987, issue 10: 6)

Spender’s focus on the emotional impact of being reviewed helps to demonstrate why the dramaturgical account of emotions is inadequate to explain radical feminism’s emotion culture. Theorisations of emotion rules are concerned with what is felt and what is expressed. Where the person on the receiving end of emotional expression is concerned, the concept of emotion rules jumps the gap between the actors involved and focuses on what the receiving person feels and expresses. What is missed out by this theorisation is the *quality* of the relationship that is engendered by what emotions are felt, expressed, expected, or encouraged – what subsists *in between* the actors. Spender’s concern with how practices of reviewing emotionally impacted feminist writers demonstrates a concern with the relationships that those authors have – with themselves (whether they feel confident enough to continue writing) as well as with other feminists.

Linking this finally with the political ideology which was central to all aspects of radical feminism’s emotion culture, Spender referred back to the writing of Phyllis Chesler, whose book on women and psychoanalysis she had reviewed for *Trouble and Strife*. Chesler argued that women needed to find less scathing ways to relate to one
another and to review each other’s work, and Spender echoed this sentiment:

‘This is my stand as well. For unless we find new ways
to comment, review – exchange ideas and views –
there will be no necessity for patriarchy to oppress
women; we will destroy each other.’ (Spender, 1987,
issue 10: 7)

The way she framed the link associated antipathetic ways of relating amongst feminists
with doing the oppressive work of patriarchy on men’s behalf. The implications that
women oppressing one another would have for the movement’s emotion culture were
highly damaging, and required a rebuke as well as the sort of displacement from radical
feminism’s intra-movement emotion culture that was seen in reference specifically to
Marge Berer above. Gena Corea extended the interrogation of Berer’s place in radical
feminism which had been implicit in others’ emotional framings to also include Trouble
and Strife itself. Referring to the book by male scientists which Berer had described as
‘sane’ and ‘an excellent counterpoint to’ Corea’s writing, Corea responded:

‘Yet the Singer and Wells book praised by Trouble and
Strife advocates a much greater role for the state. It
advocates a state-run surrogate mother “service”
through the formation of a State Surrogacy Board... But
the article does not criticise Singer and Wells when
they advocate the formation of boards enlarging state
control over women’s bodies. Why? In a radical
feminist journal, why?’ (Corea, 1987, issue 11: 6)

Unlike some other letter writers, Corea attributed the praise of men’s work to Trouble
and Strife rather than only to Berer. In this way, she eschewed the use of blaming
individual people as a mechanism for reordering how people were placed within the
emotion culture of the movement, but she implied a greater degree of responsibility
for the Trouble and Strife editorial collective as gatekeepers for what were counted as
radical feminist ideas. Within her framing, the relationship that had been ruptured by
Berer’s piece was not only that between Berer and other feminists – the gatekeeping decision made by the editors of as significant a radical feminist publication as *Trouble and Strife* had shaken the ground of the movement’s ideological and emotional integrity:

‘The men describe one advantage of the State Surrogacy Board: “... since the Board would act as a buffer between the couple and the surrogate, it would make it much more difficult for the surrogate to extort additional money from the couple.”

Oh those greedy, evil heartless women! Oh those poor abused men who, in all good faith, hired the women’s bodies!’ (Corea, 1987, issue 11: 5)

Similarly to Stevi Jackson and Sara Scott, Corea used a sarcastic rendering to emotionally frame misogynistic discourse as the rightful object of adverse emotion. *Trouble and Strife* decision to publish Berer’s praise of these misogynistic claims, thereby ratifying it as a legitimate radical feminist stance, ruptured the ordering of the movement’s emotion culture. *Trouble and Strife*, in Corea’s representation, had sanctioned affinity toward men and antipathy toward radical feminists, and Corea’s adverse emotional response (marked out as a passionate one by her use of exclamation marks) illuminated once again the strongly held imperative in the movement’s emotion culture for affinity between radical feminists. Each of the critical reader letters, as well as the high number of them that *Trouble and Strife* received, reflected the significance of the relationship of affinity within the movement and the intensity of the adverse response when it was violated. The letter writers used a variety of strategies to re-establish affinity between radical feminists, displacing Marge Berer (and contesting the place of *Trouble and Strife* as a publication) within radical feminism in order to do so.

The *Trouble and Strife* collective had been confronted, with varying levels of directness, by letter writers, and the rupture in their own relationship with the radical
feminist readership required repair as well. Given the substance of the critiques of Berer’s piece, it was not possible for the collective to defend it while also maintaining its adherence to radical feminist political ideology. It was therefore necessary to respond with a disclaimer which excused them from responsibility and showed why their choice to publish the piece was not a breach of their own relationship with the readers:

‘Editorial note: The article was written by Marge Berer and published by T&S. We state on our masthead “we do not necessarily agree with everything we publish”’

(Trouble and Strife Collective, 1987, issue 11: 6)

No further response to the letter writers was given, but this answer was sufficient to confirm that the collective still subscribed to the radical feminist political lens that the readership had advocated, and they did not contest efforts to displace Berer from her status as an emotionally included radical feminist or come to her defence.

They did, however, also publish letters in support of Marge Berer, which were much less numerous but not entirely absent. Some readers were pleased that the piece had been published, and their reaction to Berer’s manner of emotionally engaging with other radical feminists helps to illuminate the reason for all of the emotion culture productive work done throughout the text of the magazine. One letter of support confirmed Berer’s interpretation:

‘I’m glad Trouble and Strife published Marge Berer’s article on how feminists are tackling the issues brought up by new (and old) reproductive technologies. I’ve been sorry to see FINRAGE, the most visible feminist organisation interested in reproductive technology, focusing so exclusively on the scariness of technology. Telling women to be afraid of technology feeds right into what men keep trying to tell women – technology is not a woman’s business.’ (Henry, 1987, issue 10: 10)
The movement’s emotion culture was not unanimously agreed, then, and the continued (re)production of the emotion culture across the text can be seen to have a purpose – if that reproductive work was not done, the less popular (but not absent) contrary might become more dominant. Wider acceptance of Berer’s antipathy toward radical feminists and valorisation of ‘medical men’ might be a stronger presence across the text if so much of its content was not preoccupied with reproducing radical feminists’ relationships with men, other strands of the WLM, and with other radical feminists, adding purpose and value to the significant amount of emotional framing that was present in the magazine.

The ideal of sisterhood and affinity was strong in spite of some degree of difference within radical feminism, and it was manifest even defences of Berer. There was concern about personal attacks against Berer on the same relational grounds that there had been objections to Berer’s attacks of the FINNRAGE authors:

‘I was dismayed to find in the Summer issue of T&S11, yet another letter attacking Marge Berer’s article on reproductive technology in issue. In all the issues of T&S so far, and I have been a subscriber even before the first issue dropped through my letterbox, I have yet to read such a sustained barrage of letters against any one specific article.’ (Jennings, 1987, issue 12: 2)

The intra-movement relationship of affinity was of significance amongst women with differing views on science and technology, and the expectation of affinity was maintained even by those who were sufficiently receptive to science to be willing to permit of its violation in relation to the FINNRAGE authors. Recalling her own encounters with feminists from FINNRAGE (noting that she herself had a background in genetic engineering of bacteria), Jennings conveyed that she had experienced an adverse response which resembled that to which Berer had been subject:

‘I was open-minded about the issue and was really interested in why my companion was so passionately
involved in campaigning against RT. My openness was misinterpreted as being against the aims and objectives of FINNRAGE and my scientific background condemned me anyway, no matter what I said, or so I felt at the time. I was accused of perpetrating similar splits among feminists around RT as has happened with the pornography debate in the States.

I was astounded at this allegation, feeling that I was attempting to engage a sister feminist in why she had chosen RT as her political priority whereas I, who had done laboratory research in genetic engineering and although keenly interested in this field, had not chosen it as my political priority. It was more an attempt at an analysis of why one chooses one’s political priorities, self-reflective on my part and was certainly not an attack on her. However, although this is a personal anecdote, I have subsequently met a similar response in other women who condemn one as anti-feminist almost, if one is not as adamantly against reproductive technologies as they deem appropriate.’ (Jennings, 1987, issue 12: 2)

Jennings’s response showed that the emotion culture was always in a state of potential flux, maintaining an expectation of affinity but exhibiting some flexibility where differences of ideology were beginning to take shape. Radical feminists were united in seeing their emotion culture as divided into affinity and antipathy groups by ideology (with radical feminist political ideals being associated with affinity and divergence from these being objects of antipathy), and though that ideology was overwhelmingly consistent, ambivalences and disagreements did occur. The majority were prepared to defend the movement’s generally agreed ideology and the relational norms that
accompanied it, however, and Berer’s status as a radical feminist did not protect her from backlash when she was seen to have violated the movement. They responded with attempts at remedy: they were affronted at the breach, they censured Berer for violating what was a deeply valued relationship within the movement, and they sought to reinforce intra-movement affinity and prevent ways of relating such as those exhibited by Berer from becoming accepted within the movement.

6.5  
**Conclusion**

Though the ‘feminist sisterhood’ is now an antiquated notion, its grip was still strong in the 1980s, and radical feminists’ view that they had been pushed to the margins of the WLM exacerbated their emotional reliance on this ideal in order to emotionally navigate it. They continued to value compassion toward other women, and particularly expected this between radical feminists. When they did strongly disagree, they represented this in the text by using non-confrontational language of ‘surprise’ and ‘curiosity’ in order to demonstrate that they wished to preserve relationships of affinity throughout periods of disagreement, and more affronting expression was reserved for their writings about those outside of radical feminism.

Participation in this relationship of affinity was near-universal, but in one atypical instance of breach, Marge Berer represented known radical feminists in ways which closely paralleled other authors’ representations of women from other strands of the WLM (and which sometimes mimicked even men’s framings of women). From Berer’s piece alone, it was not clear whether her willingness to do this was a sign that the relationships within the movement were shifting away from affinity and becoming more antipathetic, or whether she had simply violated the terms of relations for radical feminists. The heated response from readers suggested that the latter was the case, and other radical feminists demonstrated a forceful eagerness to censure Berer for her violation and *Trouble and Strife* for their ratification of it, and to re-establish the affinity and compassion which they considered indispensable to the movement’s internal
emotion culture. Though there was some degree of support for Berer, even this was rooted in a commitment to the ideal of sisterhood between radical feminists, showing that it was a powerfully entrenched ideal in the emotion culture in spite of the ideological ambivalences that had begun to emerge in the movement.

The affinity that subsisted between radical feminists was unique in its emotion culture. No other group was extended this type of relationship. People who might be expected to be objects of affinity, like doctors, therapists, and other feminists, were subject to various types of adverse emotion and antipathy. Radical feminists’ historical lens on the development of MDRCs and of the WLM set radical feminism itself apart from all other groups in the minds of its participants, engendering a treasured relationship of affinity which was reproduced consistently across the text, and the passion of the adverse response to its violation highlighted more clearly how significantly people in the movement valued this relationship than could have been done without the presence of a breach. For radical feminists, the success of women’s liberation from oppression by men was paramount to who was an ally and who an enemy, and the meting out of emotional relationships hinged on interpretations and predictions concerning what ideas, practices, and behaviours would benefit women’s liberation and which would undermine it. Radical feminists’ affinity, then, was not a partisan attachment to like-identified women, but a considered mode of relation which was inextricably linked to the movement’s political ideals and which could be severed if those ideals were violated.
Chapter 7
Conclusion

This research has explored the emotional life of British radical feminism in the late and long 1980s. It set out to describe what the movement’s emotion culture was like, and how it developed historically during this consequential period. The findings show that relationships – within radical feminism, between it and other feminist movements, and between radical feminists and men (and their proxies) – were the central pivot of the movement’s emotion culture. Through explorations of the debates within radical feminism about medical and psychiatric sciences and care, the analysis surfaced the movement’s collective emotions, illuminating how they were constituted in the social relationships between individuals and collectives. Literary ethnography was used to enable the analysis to draw out emotion from the text in the widely varied ways in which it was represented, instrumentalising the feeling and embedded researcher as a tool of inquiry as well as focusing on the uses of discourses and framing in the structure of the text.

The emotionally-imbued relationships of radical feminism, taken together, formed a cohesive emotion culture. The three key relationships – with men, with other feminisms, and with radical feminism itself – formed a clear relational logic which guided movement participants’ emotions and helped them to use emotions to cohere as a social movement group. Frames of terror, fear, anger, and annoyance in relation to medical and psychiatric professionals through their textual representation (re)produced radical feminists’ collective emotions toward and relationship with these figures. The movement’s collective background antipathy toward other strands of the WLM emerged from the confluence of its ideology and the historical moment of the 1980s, as radical feminists interpreted changes in Britain and in feminism as an erosion and depoliticisation of the WLM. Finally, the radical feminist intra-movement relationship of affinity regulated radical feminists’ ways of relating to one another,
ensuring that their bond would be maintained and that breaches would be rectified and affinity restored.

At a glance, the emotions emerging in this research might seem to reinforce the perception that feminist movements are dominated by unpleasant emotions, buoying stereotypes about angry and ill-humoured feminists. Radical feminists’ emotions toward men and other feminisms were adverse ones, producing the impression that radical feminists spent most of their time embroiled in adverse feeling. However, the research was intended to explain how emotions worked in radical feminism and to excavate their causation; it was not designed to generate an account of which emotions were present or dominant in radical feminism and which ones were absent. The topical focus of the research, which strategically took one of the most ambivalent and complicated areas of feminist thought as its entry point into the movement’s emotional life, led to an over-representation of unpleasant emotions. It is worth highlighting that a study drawing upon radical feminists’ extensive writing on the transformatively nourishing power of caring and affectionate relationships between women would paint a picture of a movement dominated by love, compassion, and kindness. My research findings indicate from what types of sources radical feminist collective emotions sprung and how historicity was involved in the process – the question of which emotions were or were not characteristic of the movement remains for further research to answer.

One of the primary conceptual findings of the research is that emotions, in social movements as elsewhere, must be understood by reference to relationships. Even where the relationship is with the self, emotions must have an object, and how social actors feel is intimately bound up with how they interpret the relationships they find themselves in and what those interpretations signify. Radical feminists were unique amongst strands of the WLM in their staunch unwillingness to cooperate with men, and they saw any such cooperation as undermining to the success of the movement. They similarly saw concessions to the individualising paradigms of medicine and psychotherapy as depoliticising, drawing women's attention away from
the common causes of their ills (including physiological and psychological ones) and toward their atomistic, individual selves. It was these interpretations that gave rise to their collective emotions. Freud could be horrifying for a woman who had been sexually abused, but the horror of a powerful and widely influential figure who could cast a net of abuse and pathologisation over all women (and girls) was a much more serious horror. The frustration and annoyance of an unpleasant interaction with a socialist feminist could be irksome, but that their interpretation of radical feminism should become dominant, leading even those with no familiarity with the movement to see it as a 'lunatic fringe' and ensuring that the most radical and zealous elements of the WLM would be those least likely to gain adherents and advance women's liberation was a source of adverse emotion which diffused entire inter-feminism relationships with antipathy. The quality and intensity of radical feminists' emotions, then, were produced not merely by what they immediately experienced, but what those experiences led them to expect of their futures and of the future of women's liberation.

This entails a departure from the dramaturgical account of emotions in multiple respects. Concepts of emotion rules implicitly, if not explicitly, place emotions inside of individuals, projecting outward. This theorisation fails to adequately account for the inseparability of each social actor's emotions from the interpretations and emotions of others, and does not explain the collectivity of emotions. Research on the emotions of social movements which uses this framework tends to reduce movement actors' emotions to performances and conformity to (or defiance of) rules and norms, failing to surface the world-making that actors do when they transform relations between self and other through feeling. The inward-facing emotional framing done through movement-specific texts like Trouble and Strife would have little use if emotions toward people who did not read those publications were a matter of performance. Because their own relationships with men and with other strands of the WLM were forged through their emotional frames, however, it was highly productive for radical feminists to consistently reproduce those relationships, even out of the line of sight of
those outside their own movement. Adverse emotions toward men and antipathy toward other feminists were not only needed for mobilisation – they were a part of how radical feminists understood what they themselves were through their shared feelings toward what they were not.

Though the concept of emotion rules is inadequate on its own to explain emotions in movements, the affinity between radical feminists did incorporate a clear disciplinary element. As with relationships outside the movement, however, this is best understood as a rule about relationships, rather than about emotions as such. Which emotions were felt and expressed was of less consequence than how other radical feminists were made to feel and what sorts of relationships were created through feeling. An antipathetic way of relating between radical feminists did not merely feel badly, it risked fundamentally changing what radical feminists believed they owed to one another, what set them apart from other feminisms and from men, and thereby compromised the ideological as well as the emotional integrity of their movement. The flexibility with which emotions could be felt was even clearer in radical feminists’ relationships outside their movement. I have argued that their relationship with men should be conceived as a toolkit, allowing them to call upon any adverse emotion that seemed to answer to the immediate demands of their situation while preserving the adverse relationship that those emotions all enacted.

This is a distinctive addition to theory on movement emotions which can open up a new strand of work. Research on movement emotions usually focuses on one or two specific emotions (e.g., Cadena-Roa, 2002; Goodwin, 1997; Hercus, 1999; Holmes, 2000; Mizen, 2015; Ost, 2004; Perry, 2002; Sampietro & Ordaz, 2015), illuminating what particular emotions do in movements but overlooking how different emotions play with and against one another. Even where this multi-emotional play is elaborated (e.g., Gould, 2009; Kleres & Wettergren, 2017), the different emotions tend to be organised along a timeline, showing why movement participants move from one emotion to another. The concept of emotional toolkit enables theorising about different emotions all in play in a movement at the same time and, most importantly in
the case of my research, for the same purpose. Rather than using some emotions to manage others, as Kleres and Wettergren (2017) suggest, or transitioning from some emotions to others due to changing contextual conditions, as Gould (2009) elaborates, the emotional toolkit shows how movements assemble an array of emotions within their emotion culture which accommodate fluctuations in immediate situation and broader context while maintaining emotional and political consistency.

My findings add to explorations of the dynamic relationship between a social movement and its context. Scholars interested in how the personal biographies, social positionalities, and general lived experiences of movement participants affect the emotion cultures that develop within movements themselves will find this research informative for elucidating how some of those links might work, and to help generate new research questions in this area. The answers that have emerged have raised still further questions which highlight the significance of history and context: How might radical feminism’s emotion culture look today if psychotherapy had never been taken up by feminists? What would the relationship between radical feminists and medicine be like if most doctors were women? The historical study of movement emotions draws attention to the many layers of a movement’s context, and hints at an array of potentially fruitful areas where future research might dig more deeply.

The project came up against many more fascinating questions than its scope permitted it to answer, and it wrestled with theories of emotion (and implicitly, affect) in ways which can be productive for other scholars thinking about where conceptual boundaries ought to be drawn: between emotion, affect, and background emotion, and between cognition and emotion. I have argued that the temporally diffuse antipathy which characterised radical feminism’s relationship with other strands of the WLM can be conceived as a background emotion, but it might alternatively have been seen as affect or as simply an ordinary emotion. The boundaries between each of these can be porous, and it is little wonder that researchers continue to debate about them three decades after the emergence of the sociology of emotions. These deep theoretical questions proved a seductive draw as the research progressed, and as the
subfields of emotions and affect in the social sciences continue their presently-ongoing meteoric rise, this research may be productive as a tool for thinking through these issues.

This project addresses itself to the question of how the emotions of specific feminisms affect the relationships between different feminist movements, an area which has received little attention thus far. The contentious relationships between feminist movements show no sign of cooling, and it would be beneficial for research taking inter-feminism relationships as a focus to be undertaken. As the ‘archival turn’ in feminism continues and feminists endeavour to work on feminism’s present by rethinking its past, an eye on the historical can have significant impacts on feminist theory and praxis. While research on feminist history and feminist emotions are both comparatively common, historical research on feminist emotions is substantially absent, and this may prove a rich area for building a transformed collective memory of where feminism has been and a renewed vision for where it might go.

As Clare Hemmings (2011) has influentially argued, the ‘political grammar’ of feminist historiography affects what is available to be imagined of the future as well as remembered of the past. She highlights the constraints that widely accepted narratives of feminism's history place upon the questions that can be asked about that history, and locates much of the sedimentation of these stories in influential sites of academic knowledge production, proposing that the syntax as well as the semantics of feminist stories be experimented with. While these are crucial points to make, her account does have a certain disembodied quality (her discussion of the affectivity of texts notwithstanding). The rearrangement of narratives, signifiers, and historical plot lines is a powerful mechanism for helping feminists to think the past, the present, and the future differently, but these signification games also might inadvertently draw stories away from their anchoring in the concrete, embodied, local, specific, and minute. The findings of my research help to illustrate that even within the relatively local, temporally-bounded, and narrow (a single strand of feminism in a single decade in a single country), feminist movements have been rife with uncertainty, ambivalence, and
struggle.

Rather than replace or extend ‘progress’, ‘loss’, and ‘return’ narratives (Hemmings, 2011) or generational genealogies and ‘waves’ (Muller, 2017) with an array of alternative stories, then, we might regard the grand narrative itself with a greater degree of suspicion. The grand narratives of feminism rely upon particular ways of dividing up time and narrating feminism's pace and tempo as well as its substance (Sreekumar, 2017). In these stories, feminism is, if not necessarily singular, at least heavily simplified so that it can be organised along a timeline. A move away from the compelling draw of the grand narrative is not a form of ‘progress’ from simplicity to complexity (a danger that Hemmings rightly warns against), but an emphasis on the specific for its own sake, letting go of the end goal of producing expansive, cohesive accounts. The internal tensions and complexities of radical feminism which emerged from this research, as I mentioned in chapter 1, do not map onto typologies even of radical feminism itself, and by looking to retell this movement's story through its collective relationships on the movement's own terms, more ambivalent stories surfaced which help to trouble familiar stories and raise new questions.

The principal audience for whose sake the research was done is also the least clearly-defined: feminists. The impetus for the project was to enable feminists who are not themselves radical feminists to better understand this movement – one which has largely fallen out of favour and is the subject of many of the most heated feminist disputes. Radical feminism finds itself at the heart of ‘no-platforming’ controversies (the denial of invitations to speak in public venues due to the possible promotion of discrimination or hate speech), debates about to what extent trans women should be afforded the rights and protections extended to other women, and struggles over how best to serve the safety and dignity of people involved in sex work, amongst other issues facing feminists as the second decade of the 21st century draws to a close. Most feminists who wish to see radical feminism better understood are themselves radical feminists who aim to change perceptions of their own movement (e.g., Mackay, 2015). I, on the contrary, am not one, and have sought to meet this ill-understood movement
on its own terms and to share that interpretative understanding so that feminists across the political spectrum can be better equipped to disagree productively. The debates are certain to remain turbulent, but the support of detailed historical background knowledge can be used as a corrective to the straw man fallacies that so frequently appear on all sides. I began from the premise which all feminist knowledge producers share: that all knowledge is historically located, positional, and incomplete, and that the most productive thing that any one researcher can do is to create something that others can use, work upon, critically engage, take apart and reassemble in better form, and otherwise put to their own ends. My hope is that feminists ‘on the ground’ will find this research useful for doing feminism better, whatever that might mean to them, but having completed it, I now release it. What the others make of it is for them, with their own knowledge, experience, insight, and ingenuity, to decide.

At the earliest conception of this project, it proceeded from a much more presumptuous and less generous place. Like many feminists of my generation who have come of age and into feminist consciousness during or after the postmodern turn and the ‘third wave’, I found it easy to deride and dismiss what seemed to me an antiquated politics of a feminist movement which has in fact been instrumental in bringing about the conditions of possibility for much of my own self-satisfied complacency. My conviction that radical feminists had things all wrong also took shape early in my feminist life, preceding many of the lived experiences of my adolescence and adulthood which have made me all too sympathetic to the precept that men oppress women by design rather than out of benign ignorance, and ought to be engaged with accordingly. Researching the intimate inner life of radical feminism has left me a different thinker and a better feminist than I was at the outset. What I have learned about radical feminism itself is useful, but the more significant benefit to my feminism is that it has compelled me to make uncertainty my permanent home, always aware that the urge to hastily dismiss feminist perspectives which seem self-evidently wrong is likely to proceed from a want of understanding and a craving for cognitive and emotional consonance, rather than from a robust apprehension of the realities at
stake. This does not mean that feminists ought not to take firmly-held points of view, nor that we will necessarily change our minds as a result of better understanding one another’s perspectives. What it does mean, however, is that it is necessary to be mindful of the politics of empathy and bearing witness in the way that we practise feminism. Giving a fair and open-minded hearing to other feminists is not the same thing as offering it to misogynists, nor does it attend to the same sorts of ends. We must reflect this crucial difference in our decisions about to whom we extend the time, attention, and emotional work of listening humbly, even where doing so can be disorientating, frustrating, or confusing. Since undertaking this research, I have endeavoured to cultivate in myself and my students the humility that this dissonant uncertainty engenders, and my hope is that the reading of this text may do the same for feminists beyond the reach of my classrooms.
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