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Explaining Small States’ Changing Patterns of Peacekeeping Contributions through Role Theory: The Case of Austria and Belgium

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Thesis presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Relations

at

The University of Edinburgh

2018

Principal Supervisor: Professor Juliet Kaarbo
Secondary Supervisor: Professor Laura Cram
Declaration

I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself, Victor Adolphe Gigleux, and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where states otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own.


Signed Victor Gigleux

Date  Wednesday 22nd of August 2018
Abstract

This doctoral project explores the ways in which European small states’ approaches to peacekeeping have been affected by the changing nature of peace missions. The central objective is to explain the choices made by small states’ governments to participate in missions which no longer fit traditional peacekeeping models. The increasing need for comprehensive and robust responses to international crises characterised by intra-state violence has challenged small states whose elites and publics have been accustomed to deploying troops to low intensity missions tasked to separate parties. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, traditional peacekeeping developed along the norms of non-use of force, impartiality and consent. Identifying positively with the objectives and normative underpinnings of traditional peacekeeping, small states have actively committed their armed forces based on a perception of themselves as international norm entrepreneurs. This thesis challenges the notion that small states’ governments commit material and human resources to new types of peace operations motivated by such self-images. Transformations in the practice of peacekeeping are forcing foreign policy agents in small states to rethink the function(s) that their states should play in the international system towards peacekeeping. Three questions are considered: I) what new or existing roles are small states adopting in this evolving peacekeeping system? II) through what political processes do these roles emerge? and III) how do these roles affect decision-making on peacekeeping deployments? Small state research cannot effectively answer these questions nor comprehensively explain what small states do in international affairs because it lacks analytical tools to link structure and agency. A theoretical approach grounded in role theory is better suited to understand the foreign policies of small states and re-evaluate their peacekeeping credentials. A model depicting the interaction between role socialisation and domestic role processes is constructed to guide four empirical analyses of recent peacekeeping decisions taken by Austrian and Belgian governments. This theoretical foundation allows the contention that small states’ changing self-perceptions do not necessarily originate from internal ideational factors, as the norm entrepreneur argument suggests. Each case study traces how the interplay between external role demands and domestically conceived ideas about the state’s position in an evolving peacekeeping system informs Austria’s and Belgium’s adjustment to new peace missions. Austria’s decisions to withdraw from UNDOF in 2013, and to participate in EUFOR Chad 2007-2008, are telling cases of a small state adapting to new forms of peacekeeping through a reconfiguration of roles. This thesis also investigates the roles that have motivated the contributions made by two Belgian governments towards the Malian crisis, 2012-2013 and the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. This project contributes to small state research by showing that these actors fulfil a broad range of functions in the international system. It also improves the way we explain small states’ foreign policy actions by providing a dynamic framework capturing the relationship between structure and agency, and by delving into the decision-making processes of small states. Additionally, it adds to the peacekeeping literature by providing an original account as to why states, and in particular small states, contribute troops to missions operating under evolving conditions. Finally, inputs are made to the scholarship on role theory by exploring how state size influences role conceptions and investigating how role socialisation and domestic role dynamics interact to affect the roles and decisions of an under-studied category of states.
Lay Summary

This doctoral thesis deals with small countries in international politics. There is a consensus that small countries display different behaviours than more powerful states. For example, small states are believed to undertake activities seen as ‘good’ international behaviour because it improves their international image and enhances their voice on the international stage. This includes activism towards the economic development of low-income countries, disarmament and/or the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This project reevaluates the claim that the governments of small states willingly send military personnel to peacekeeping operations whenever a violent crisis or conflict erupts, and the international community decides to act. While small states have been substantial contributors of peacekeeping personnel during the Cold War because of their image as neutral, impartial and non-violent actors, the increasing need for more robust responses to international crises has challenged small states whose elites and publics have been accustomed to deploying troops to low intensity missions tasked to separate parties. Thus, changes in the practice of peacekeeping are forcing governments in small states to rethink whether their countries should continue to contribute military troops in dangerous operations. This project seeks to answer two key questions: I) what roles are small states playing in this evolving context? And II) when and how governments in small states decide to participate in peacekeeping missions which are increasingly resembling war-like situations? To help answer these, this project relies on the notion of role. In the same way as individuals play different roles in everyday life, including the role of parent, teacher or mentor, states also adopt certain roles which help politicians in charge of foreign policy make decisions. This project argues that the roles small states come to play have important consequences for the decisions they take to participate in peacekeeping missions. An important objective of this project is to examine how small states come to acquire these roles. For this, it focuses on both the demands coming from other international actors such as France, the United States and/or the United Nations, on the one hand, and the ideas generated domestically by small states themselves about the state’s position vis-à-vis peacekeeping, on the other hand. This dual process, and how it informs adjustment to new peace missions, is observed on two small countries; namely Austria and Belgium. Austria’s decisions to withdraw from UNDOF in 2013, and to participate in EUFOR Chad 2007-2008, are telling cases of a small state adapting to new forms of peacekeeping through a reconfiguration of roles. This thesis also investigates the roles that have motivated the contributions made by two Belgian governments towards the Malian crisis, 2012-2013 and the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. This project contributes to small state research by showing that these actors fulfil a broad range of functions in international affairs. This implies that small states are not necessarily ‘good’ international actors at all times. This thesis also improves the way we explain small states’ foreign policy actions by providing a framework capturing the relationship between international constraints and decision-makers’ ability to innovate, and by delving into the decision-making of small states. It adds to the peacekeeping literature by providing an original account as to why states contribute troops to missions operating under new conditions. Finally, inputs are made to the scholarship on role theory by exploring how state size influences role conceptions, and how the dual process affects the roles and decisions of an under-studied category of states.
Contents

List of Tables viii
List of Figures ix
Acknowledgements x

Chapter One Introduction 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 The Engagement of Small States in Peacekeeping Operations: Behavioural Patterns and Existing Explanations 4
1.3 Peacekeeping Changes and Dilemma 8
  1.3.1 Historical Evolution 8
  1.3.2 Doubts and Reassessments 9
1.4 The Peacekeeping Dilemma of Small States 11
1.5 Looking for Clues: The Prospect of Role Theory 13
1.6 Aims, Objectives and Structure 18

Chapter Two Small States in International Relations 21
2.1 Introduction 21
2.2 The Contributions of IR Theories 23
2.3 The Norm Entrepreneur Argument 30
2.4 Moving Towards a New Framework 32
2.5 Conclusion 36

Chapter Three A Role Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Small States’ Foreign Policies 37
3.1 Introduction 37
3.2 Moving Beyond a Constructivist Understanding of Small States’ Foreign Policy Behaviour 38
3.3 Linking Structure and Agency in the Analysis of Small States: The Promise of Role Theory 42
3.4 A Socialisation Model for Studying Small States’ Roles in Peacekeeping 44
  3.4.1 The Roles of Small States as Responses to Outside Pressures 44
  3.4.2 Explaining Peacekeeping Contributions Through Role Socialisation 49
  3.4.3 The Roles of Small States as Role Conceptions 53
  3.4.4 The Missing Link: Foreign Policy–making Unit 55
3.5 Conclusion 58
# Chapter Nine  Decision to re-engage in UN peacekeeping, 2006

9.1 Introduction  
9.2 Background to UNIFIL II, the Israeli-Hezbollah War  
9.3 The Belgian Domestic Context  
9.4 UN Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions  
9.5 European Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions  
9.6 Concluding Discussion  

# Chapter Ten  Decisions towards the Malian Crisis, 2012-2013

10.1 Introduction  
10.2 Background to the Malian Crisis, the Terrorist Threat  
10.3 The Belgian Domestic Context  
10.4 UN Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions  
10.5 French Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions  
10.6 EU Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions  
10.7 Concluding Discussion  

# Chapter Eleven  Conclusion

11.1 Introduction  
11.2 The Roles of Small States in International Peacekeeping  
11.3 Small States and Role Theory Research: A Mutually Beneficial Relationship  
11.3.1 What the Roles of Small States Tell us about their Foreign Policies  
11.3.2 Contributing to Role Theory through Small States  
11.4 Contributions to the Study of International Relations  
11.5 Limitations  
11.6 Future Research  
11.7 Conclusion  

# Bibliography

# Appendix
List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Top Ten Troop-Contributing Countries to UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1991 – 2015</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Overview of Content Analyses and Associated Case Studies</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Overview of the Case Studies</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>Summary of Austria’s Foreign Policy Traditions and Roles</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>Summary of Belgium’s Foreign Policy Traditions and Roles</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

| Figure 1 | A Role Theoretical Model for Understanding Small States’ Peacekeeping Decisions | 59 |
| Figure 2 | The Role Theoretical Model: A Revision | 205 |
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1.1 Introduction

On 1 July 2013, Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’ resonated in the streets of Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, as the country of 4.4 million citizens joined the European Union (EU) twenty years after gaining independence from Yugoslavia (The New York Times, 1 July 2013). It was deemed a ‘landmark’ for both a Union in crisis and Croatia on its path to recovery after experiencing Europe’s last conflict (Independent, 30 June 2013). On 17 December 2014, the front page of the Washington Post read ‘The Cold War Died’ after United States President Barack Obama announced the decision to normalise relations with Cuba, signalling America’s engagement in the region and the end of Havana’s international isolation (Washington Post, 17 December 2014). On another revealing note, newly-elected US President Donald J. Trump ‘shoved’ Montenegro Prime Minister Dúsko Marković during a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) meeting in May 2017 partly dedicated to welcoming this country of less than one million citizens into the Alliance (The Guardian, 26 May 2017). These recent episodes underscore the integral parts that small states play in the international system by interacting with other actors and participating one way or another in major political developments.

This doctoral project contributes primarily to our understanding of small states in International Relations (IR) by focusing on their foreign policy decisions to participate in international peacekeeping. Small states have captivated the attention of practitioners and observers since the Peloponnesian War (Maass, 2017). However, it was not until after the Second World War that efforts to systematically analyse their foreign policy behaviours have

1 The matter of defining a ‘small state’ has been widely discussed. See Maas, 2009; Kassimeris, 2009, Steinmetz and Wivel 2010. For a concise review of the definitional issue, see Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006. For a more recent and critical take on it, see Long, 2017. Because the theoretical framework presented below gives weight to both states’ material capabilities and leaders’ own interpretations in the process of role location, small states are defined here using material and perceptual elements. As the framework also includes a significant interactional element, it is appropriate to consider a small state as ‘the weaker part in an asymmetrical relationship, which is unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship on its own’ (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005; Grøn and Wivel, 2011; Wivel, Bailes and Archer, 2014). This definition brings into focus the distinction between small state size and weakness. Starting from the perspective of the international system, scholars have often equated small size with weakness. Yet, the example of Switzerland’s leverage in the financial sector shows that a state may be small but not necessarily weak depending on context. Handle (1981) advances a definition of weakness comprising several criteria, including population, area, economy, military power and influence. This author further argues that state weakness is dependent on historical periods and geographical areas (p.5). Patrick (2006) adds a governance element arguing that weakness ‘can be measured by a state’s ability and willingness to provide the fundamental political goods associated with statehood’ (p.29). Research on asymmetrical relationships also relies on weakness, but in the contexts of power differentials (Womack, 2016; Long, 2017). This literature classifies Mexico or even Brazil as weak(er) states in relations to the US, yet they cannot be considered small states on a global scale.
gathered pace. Ever since, analysts have tried to understand the foreign policy predicaments, objectives and instruments of small states towards a range of phenomena and processes from war and peace, to regional integration and multilateral economic negotiations (Narlikar, 2016). It is commonplace to highlight that small states have been overshadowed by an IR bias towards great powers to the detriment of the overall discipline (Gvalia et al., 2013; Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006; Lamoreaux, 2014). That is partly accurate. As large states dominate the international system by shaping its forces and structures, there is an understandable preoccupation for the geopolitical, economic and military dynamics amongst great and emerging powers. Research is also driven by academic and popular audiences’ interest in the isolationist and interventionist tendencies of the United States, the ups and downs of Franco-German cooperation, the United Kingdom’s relationship with the EU, or in China’s expansionist claims in East Asia. The extensive interest, displayed at international conferences and in university courses, in emerging powers as new players to be reckoned with is testament to this ongoing trend.

This should not eclipse the fact that research on small states has grown rapidly owing to systemic shifts such as decolonisation, the Soviet Union’s collapse, and globalisation, which have generated major implications for small states (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006). Scholars have dedicated significant efforts to developing a definition of ‘small state’ using a range of quantitative and qualitative criteria, although the issue remains highly contested (Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006:652). In behavioural terms, small states have been credited with a tendency to ally with a dominant power allowing them to alleviate their vulnerability vis-à-vis great powers’ demands and aggression (Walt, 1987:25). There is also an understanding that small states seek to join multilateral institutions to pursue security and foreign policy goals (Wivel, 2005). Under anarchy, small states may also aim to evade direct participation in power relations, choosing to ensure their survival and maintain their political independence through neutrality or non-aligned strategies instead (Goetschel, 2011:314). They have also been shown to emphasise internationalist principles, international law, and other ‘morally minded’ ideas (Ingebritsen, 2002; Céu Pinto, 2014). In terms of foreign policy instruments, small states favour diplomatic and economic, as opposed to military, tools (Hey, 2003:4).

This thesis begins from the notion that, despite significant conceptual, theoretical and empirical progress, effective knowledge accumulation about what small states do in international relations, how they achieve their foreign policy objectives and the factors that affect their behaviours, has recently stagnated. Recent scholarship points to potential reasons for this, including the absence of consensus around a definition, contradictory findings (Long, 2017), a lack of critical inspection and diversity (Lamoreaux, 2014:565), as well as an excessive emphasis on Western small states (Gibert and Grzelczyk, 2016). This project
emphasises the failure to recognise that small states perform wide-ranging foreign policy behaviours, thereby obscuring the contradictory nature of some the conclusions drawn over the years. IR scholars have uncritically included small states’ bandwagoning tendencies, preference for multilateral institutions, normative aspirations and independent course of action all under the title of “typical small state behaviour”. These findings reflect the ebb and flow of (neo-)realist, liberal and constructivist interpretations of small state behaviours. While they have individually shed light on important aspects, be it vulnerability, multilateralism or small state identity, they reinforce the one-size-fits-all approach to the study of small states. Because small states have in common their size, conclusions about their foreign policy behaviours have been overarching and have concealed significant differences in the perceptions, interests and external strategies of small states. Research on the influence of domestic politics on small states’ foreign policies has been a positive development, but it has, unfortunately, remained unconnected to our understanding of the ways in which small states position themselves in, and contribute to, the international system. Thus, there is a need to reconcile inconsistencies through new frameworks designed to bridge different strands of the scholarship. A more nuanced approach to understanding the foreign policy actions of small states must be devised to explain the conditions under which small states behave in a particular way and their motivations for doing so.

To overcome these challenges, the focus of this thesis is placed on analysing the decisions that the governments of small states take regarding the deployment and contribution of national resources to peacekeeping operations. This is for two reasons. First, small states have actively participated in the peaceful resolution of conflicts as a ‘major avenue’ through which to maintain international security (Krishnasamy, 2003:24) and pursue foreign policy objectives. As Anderson (2007) notes, ‘the decision to participate in peace support operations (PSOs) represents a political statement at the strategic level and is a part of the making of security policy and by extension also foreign policy’ (Anderson, 2007:477). Second, and relatedly, the policy-area of peacekeeping has been the focal point for many researchers to argue one of the most pervasive theoretical claims about small state behaviour: the norm entrepreneur argument (Ingebritsen, 2002). Therefore, if one seeks to critically evaluate key tenets of the small state literature, investigating their evolving relationship with peacekeeping is an essential starting point. While the peacekeeping literature is vast, addressing a range of issues around the actors, strategies, effectiveness and ideological underpinnings of peace operations, this project focuses on peacekeeping as a foreign policy matter from the perspective of small European troop-contributing countries (TCCs).
1.2 The Engagement of Small States in Peacekeeping Operations: Behavioural Patterns and Existing Explanations

The concept of peacekeeping generally refers to ‘the deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security’ (Fortna and Howard, 2008:285). As it will become clear, this project necessitates a broad definition of peacekeeping which includes, but is not limited to, traditional function of party separation undertaken by the United Nations (UN) with the host country’s consent. Peacekeeping is also defined here as a multidimensional activity incorporating peace-making and peacebuilding initiatives performed by a wide range of actors using all necessary force if necessary and authorised (Autesserre, 2014:493; Beardsley, 2011:1052). The generic term of ‘peacekeeping’ will be used throughout this project unless otherwise stated.

An assessment of small states’ contributions to peacekeeping operations reveal an ambivalent pattern. There is little debate that small states have ‘formed the backbone of peacekeeping operations’ during the cold war (Goetschel, 2013:267). The Nordic countries of Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark led the way in ‘punching above their weight’ in a bipolar system dominated by military power and alliances, through substantial contributions to peacekeeping missions (Jakobsen, 2007:458). This trend extended beyond Scandinavia to other small and middle Western states including Canada, Ireland, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands which ‘played pivotal roles in the conceptualisation of UN peacekeeping’ and made large contributions to the ONUC (Congo, 1961), UNFICYP (Cyprus, 1972), or UNIFIL (Golan Heights, 1974) (Bellamy and Williams, 2009:40; Goetschel, 2013:267). These contributors became known as ‘Western internationalists’ in reference to their support for the UN system and their determination to enhance the organisation’s ‘capacity to act as a relatively independent and impartial arbiter of international disputes’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2009:42). The surge in peacekeeping troop contributions from small Western states during the cold war followed the widespread perception that great powers were unsuitable providers of peacekeeping troops because of extensive national interests in the theatres of deployment. Forces from great powers were not seen as sufficiently impartial to effectively maintain the peace between conflicting parties. Conversely, small states’ limited interests and evolving policies of neutrality and non-alignment meant that belligerents could trust that their troops would not be politically motivated when keeping the peace. Participation in peacekeeping operations became a significant component of small states’ foreign policies and a key feature contributing to their self-definition in the international system (Bellamy and Williams, 2009:40). However, not all small states punched over their weight through peacekeeping activism. In fact, it appeared to be a Western trend as small states from other regions did not engage as extensively as those in Europe or the West during the cold war. Even amongst small Western states, there were some noticeable absences, exemplified by the low peacekeeping engagement of New Zealand, Portugal, Greece and Switzerland.
Further variations can be identified when we consider the peacekeeping contributions of small states after the cold war ended. While small European states initially sustained high levels of peacekeeping engagement in post-cold war operations, they recorded a sharp decline by 2000, leaving a gap filled by non-Western counterparts. Out of the forty-nine states reported by Findlay (1996), which since 1989 have participated in a UN peacekeeping mission for the first time in their history, thirty-two can be considered small (p.4). Twenty-two of these small states were non-Europeans. Table 1 shows a similar pattern whereby small European states fell out of the top ten UN contributing countries (Austria, Finland and Ireland) in the early post-cold war period. They were replaced by small states from other regions including Bangladesh, Jordan and Nepal. This is confirmed by Bellamy and Williams (2009) who report that the combined contribution of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Ireland declined from 25% of all UN troops during the cold war to only 5.4% by December 2000 and 1.6% by December 2001 (p.43). Yet again, a retreat from UN peacekeeping by small European states is not necessarily a pattern that applied across the whole category. The post-cold war setting provided other small states like Portugal opportunities to step up their engagement (Céu Pinto, 2014:390). At a global level from 1991, between five and six small states have consistently remained in the top ten countries contributing to UN operations. These observations indicate significant quantitative differences in the contributions that small states make to peacekeeping operations across and within regions as well as over time. It is evidence of the inadequacy to consider small states as a unified category displaying similar foreign policy objectives and behaviours, especially when it comes to evaluating their peacekeeping commitments. This project aims to explain why small European states differ in their patterns of peacekeeping contributions given that it has previously been assumed that they uniformly provide large contingents to many ongoing operations.
Table 1  Top Ten Troop-Contributing Countries to UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1991 – 2015

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Research seeking to explain why states provide peacekeeping troops has identified a number of political, economic, security, institutional and normative motivations (see Finlay, 1996; Sorenson and Wood, 2005; Daniel, Taft and Wiharta, 2008; Bellamy and Williams, 2009; 2010; 2012). At a political level, a state may engage in peacekeeping because it enhances the country’s prestige, image and standing on the international scene (Meiske and Ruggeri, 2017:14; Beswick, 2010; Findlay, 1996; Krishnasamy, 2003). Involvement in peacekeeping may be rewarded with a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council, greater leverage over the conduct of the operations, and more influence in international institutions, as well as on matters of international security (Bellamy and Williams, 2012:3-4). States may also be motivated by economic and financial considerations. By contributing to peacekeeping operations, some governments hope to receive additional aid in return, while UN compensation payments can benefit national budgets, security sectors, and individual soldiers as well as their families (Bellamy and Williams, 2009:4). Another strand of the literature contends that states contribute to peacekeeping because it helps maintain international peace and security. Some scholars argue that states seek to provide a public good by deploying peacekeeping troops because ‘the end of a conflict and increased stability not only favour the contributors to the peacekeeping mission but also promote the security of non-contributing countries’ (Gaibulloev et al., 2015; Meiske and Ruggeri, 2017:18). Others place a greater emphasis on the private dimension of peacekeeping arguing that states offer troops because it is ‘in their national security interests’ (Findlay, 1996:8), or because it maintains the status quo (Neack, 1995). Another explanation suggests that peacekeeping participation is influenced by civil-military bureaucratic relations inside governments (Velázquez, 2010) and by institutional considerations over the role, posture, experience and resources of the armed forces (Haaland, 2007, Bellamy and Williams, 2009:5). Finally, it has
been claimed that states actively engage in peacekeeping out of a desire to act for the greater good which, as a result, also promotes an image of themselves as good international citizens (Brysk, 2009). It should be noted that such a normative consideration is closely connected to political motivations for influence and status.

This last claim has been the basis on which Ingebritsen’s (2002) norm entrepreneur argument developed and became the dominant understanding of why small European states partake so actively in peacekeeping operations. At its core is the notion that Scandinavia possesses inherent geopolitical and economic features generating a particular identity which drives Nordic countries to shape international standards of appropriate behaviour (Ingebritsen, 2002:13). The Nordics gained ‘a global reputation as trustworthy and effective negotiating partners’ which became ‘the cornerstone of Scandinavian diplomatic relations’ (Ingebritsen, 2002:13). This approach to foreign policy translated into ‘bridge-’ and ‘confidence-building’ initiatives designed to alleviate the risk of wars between the great powers during the cold war (p.16). In the field of peacekeeping, it gave rise to the ‘Nordic model’ which closely followed the UN approach to peacekeeping defined by impartiality, consent and limited use of force (Jakobsen, 2006; 2007). The model involves the creation of institutionalised channels of cooperation between Nordic governments on peacekeeping issues, joint UN peacekeeping training and the formation of national standby forces (Jakobsen 2006:382). Its last element includes ‘a high willingness to provide personnel for UN operations’ influenced by:

‘common interests emanating from cultural, historical, social and political similarities and their [the Nordics] common fate as small states whose security in the final instance depended on the great powers. This naturally resulted in foreign policies whose long-term objectives aimed at strengthening the rule of law and promoting the peaceful settlement of all disputes’ (Jakobsen, 2006:383).

This PhD project begins with the assumption that the norm entrepreneur argument, and its application to peacekeeping, should be re-examined. It asks to what extent small states see themselves as norm entrepreneurs and whether such self-perception continues to motivate them to engage in a range of peacekeeping operations. To be sure, the norm entrepreneur line of argument effectively sheds light on the ‘general predispositions’ of small states towards the UN and peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams, 2012:3, original emphasis). Yet, Bellamy and Williams (2012) rightly argue that ‘a positive disposition towards the UN or peacekeeping in general does not determine individual decisions about contributing to particular missions’ (p.3). Based on this insight, this research stresses two elements overlooked by the peacekeeping and norm entrepreneur literatures; namely decision-making processes and contextual factors. Only by investigating whether, how and when the governments of small states decide to deploy peacekeeping forces in light of the international political process preceding each deployment and the conditions on the ground, can we
account for variations in the peacekeeping involvement of small states. In fact, research shows that even the Nordic countries do not form a category as homogenous as the Nordic model suggests. Closer inspection reveals varied levels of commitment and different preferences about the institutional framework for peacekeeping activism amongst Nordic countries (Anderson, 2007:489). The main reason is that the Nordic countries and other small states have not addressed ‘the strategic and political issues of ‘when’ ‘where’ and ‘with what partner’ to get involved in peacekeeping operations (Anderson, 2007:476, 491). This point underlines the fact that the norm entrepreneur argument is founded on a relatively small and specific sample of states and is poorly equipped to capture the ups and downs of small states’ peacekeeping commitments. Therefore, generalisation across the category of small states is premature before decision-making processes and context are seriously examined.

1.3 Peacekeeping Changes and Dilemma

When considering peacekeeping engagement, small states are required to make important political choices in light of the peacekeeping context. However, at present, this context is in flux. The position of small states has been challenged by quantitative and qualitative changes in the nature of peacekeeping which have accelerated owing to post-cold war reconfigurations. Governments in small states are confronting increasingly numerous and complex decisions.

1.3.1 Historical Evolution

As the cold war ended, the UN launched an unprecedented number of operations, raising the demand for peacekeepers. Between 1988 and 1993, seventeen new missions were established, principally to respond to conflicts which were legacies of the superpower rivalry. After 1989, the UN was forced to address a wider range of threats previously inhibited by superpower competition (Kaplan, 1994; Bellamy and Williams, 2010:94). The end of the superpowers’ ideological and power struggle, and its regional manifestations, created fertile grounds for the emergence of dormant ethnic and religious antagonisms fuelled by collapsing central authorities and their ensuing incapacity to deliver services (Wilkinson, 2000:65). The surge in peacekeeping operations also resulted from the resumption of cooperation in the Security Council where a forty year-long deadlock amongst the permanent five ended (Makdisi et al. 2009:8). Another major quantitative development was the increasing number of states willing to deploy troops to peacekeeping operations including great powers which had remained on the margin of peacekeeping during the cold war (Bellamy and Williams, 2010:100). While great Western powers somewhat retreated from UN peacekeeping after 2000, non-Western great and emerging powers including China became active peacekeepers (Table 1).
Qualitatively, the practice of peacekeeping during the cold war involved a UN force deployed to separate consenting parties and/or to ensure that an already agreed peace settlement was being conformed to. Troops were minimally armed as the use of force was strictly limited to self-defence. The intervening force had no mandate to become involved with the parties or with the political conditions of ensuring lasting peace. This traditional approach to peacekeeping, characterised by consent, minimum use of force and impartiality, was a specific product of the cold war (Malone and Wermester, 2000:37). Its limited scope is evident from the first UN operation in 1948 involving unarmed military observers tasked to oversee a ceasefire between Israel and its neighbours (Makdisi et al. 2009:7). Peacekeeping initiated immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union initially followed the traditional approach, but also ‘showed signs of improvisation and change’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2010:97). The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) operation in Namibia reflected a shift from ‘traditional’ to ‘complex’ operations, typified by a larger civilian dimension, election monitoring functions, and disarmament as well as demobilisation tasks (Malone and Wermester, 2000:38).

Optimism about the effectiveness of peacekeeping was widespread in the early 1990s and led to the deployment of additional missions in Cambodia (UNTAC), Somalia (UNOSOM) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR). In the latter two, conditions deteriorated rapidly, forcing the UN to widen the mandate and reinforcing the notion that peacekeepers should be ready to confront violent opposition groups (Thakur, 1994:394). These changes were institutionalised by Boutros-Ghali in 1992 through the establishment of the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the release of An Agenda for Peace. At the core of this report was a dilemma between the need for adaptation to more complex operations, opening the door for peace enforcement on the one hand, and the imperative of retaining peacekeeping’s defining features of impartiality, consent and non-use of force (Thakur, 1994:394). Its main conclusion was that peacekeeping could remain an effective tool for managing peace as long as peacekeepers were mandated to take on a wider range of tasks as part of more complex operations and were provided with adequate resources. It was even suggested that consent was no longer a necessary requirement. By 1995, however, Boutros Boutros-Ghali reversed his position asserting that core principles were not to be dismissed and large-scale enforcement activities not to be performed (Donald, 2002:22; Malone and Wermester, 2000:47). The stage was set for a more ‘comprehensive approach, actively promoting sustainable peace processes and supplementing classical peacekeeping with mid-to long-term peacebuilding mandates to manage peaceful transitions’ (Franke and Warnecke, 2009:407).

1.3.2 Doubts and Reassessments

Between 1992 and 1995, four tragedies questioned the very foundations of
peacekeeping. Peacekeepers deployed in Angola (UNAVEM II) to demobilise ex-combatants and supervise elections were unable to stop the fighting which broke out after the elections of September 1992, resulting in 300,000 casualties. The lack of cooperation from the parties meant that disarmament had not proceeded as rapidly as anticipated (Bellamy and Williams, 2010:104). On 5 June 1993, over twenty Pakistani peacekeepers operating in Somalia (UNOSOM) were killed by a rebel group seeking to overthrow Siad Barre’s government. Neither the authorisation to use all necessary force by the Security Council, nor the deployment of US troops succeeded in stopping the violence against civilians and foreign troops. In 1994, ten Belgian peacekeepers part of UNAMIR’s force deployed in Rwanda were murdered by extremist militias precipitating the withdrawal of UN troops and the Rwandan genocide. Dutch peacekeepers assigned to ensure the security of Srebrenica in 1995 did not have the mandate to halt the murder of over 7,600 Muslims by Bosnian Serb forces who were residing in an area identified as ‘safe’.

Amongst the main causes of these failures, a succession of inquiries and reports emphasised a widespread unwillingness to provide adequate resources, to implement mandates suited to the challenges in the field and an inability to provide clear rules of engagement. A common feature was a gap between what the mandates demanded the peacekeepers achieve, and the conceptual and material instruments, inspired by traditional peacekeeping, which they were provided with (Bellamy and Williams, 2010:117). When situations escalated, communication failures and a reluctance to engage meant that peacekeepers were given poor guidance as to how they were to respond. Jakobsen (2000) summarises well the situation at the end of the 1990s: ‘the problems experienced by the UN…exposed the limitations of the traditional peacekeeping principles in operations characterized by limited consent in the middle ground or grey area between traditional peacekeeping and large-scale peace enforcement’ (p.36). As a result, faith in peacekeeping disappeared and UN member states, especially in the West, turned highly reluctant to contribute troops to its operations. They complained that mandates were inadequate, UN command and control structures did not allow for clear military objectives to be articulated, and that the absence of peace as well as robust rules of engagement placed their troops under too much risk.

A period of dissatisfaction with, and lesson learning around, peacekeeping ensued until 1999 when violence in Kosovo and East Timor required the international community to act. Responses to the crises, however, were not UN-led, but took the form of coalitions of states under the command of NATO in Kosovo and Australia in East Timor. These deployments ushered a trend whereby formal and informal regional arrangements as well as wider ad hoc coalitions emerged as alternatives to UN peacekeeping deployments (Bellamy and Williams, 2005). Such arrangements proved attractive to many states dissatisfied with UN peacekeeping, but willing to engage, thereby, accounting for the increasing deployment
of peacekeepers under non-UN auspices (Bellamy and Williams, 2010:124). The main effect of these developments was to instil a sense that peacekeeping could be put back on track by applying the lessons learnt from the 1990s failures. This was the objective of the Brahimi report which set forth a number of proposals designed to articulate new approach to peacekeeping.

The report introduced the notion of ‘complex peace support operations’ founded on the assumption that a ‘symbiosis between peacekeeping and peacebuilding’ should be achieved (Thakur, 2001:117). UN officials argued that peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building initiatives with the consent of the hostile parties should be combined with peace enforcement actions without the necessary consent of the parties. Furthermore, the UN should be prepared to support the implementation of peace agreements, protect civilians, assist the building of state institutions and/or supervise elections as part of complex ‘multifunctional’ operations demanding large civilian components (Makdisi et al. 2009:7).

The implication was that the UN should lead more ‘robust’ operations employing the use of force when necessary to protect civilians and peacekeepers (Karlstrud, 2015:42). This doctrinal evolution also originated from Western governments which, concerned with the destabilising effects of humanitarian crises in their neighbourhoods, sought to ‘lift the doctrinal fog’ and agree that ‘(impartial) peace enforcement will be required in most intrastate conflicts and complex emergencies and that peace forces must be armed and organized accordingly’ (Jakobsen, 2000:40). The overall effect of these transformations was to gradually erode the basic principles of traditional peacekeeping. Arguments have been made over the need to adapt impartiality to contemporary challenges (Donald, 2002), whether and how to build consent amongst parties (Johnston, 2011) and the appropriateness of the use of force (Wilkinson, 2000). Finally, another recent trend whereby peacekeeping, even UN-led, has sought to use ‘military means to stabilise a country, often with all necessary means to neutralise potential ‘spoilers’ to a conflict’ (Karlstrud, 2015:42). Such a stabilisation approach, encapsulated in the Capstone Doctrine, has intensified the contradiction with traditional peacekeeping.

1.4 The Peacekeeping Dilemma of Small States

Changes in the doctrine and practice of peacekeeping have challenged small TCCs, from the Nordic countries to Austria and New Zealand, whose peacekeeping activism is closely tied to the traditional approach to peacekeeping (Stamnes, 2007:450). During the cold war, it was the development of peacekeeping along the principles of impartiality, consent and non-use of force which placed small states in prime position to become large contributors. This conceptual triad matched small states’ own approach to international peace and security, generating the idea that peacekeeping was best performed by the smaller members of the international community. Troop deployments by small states enhanced the
operations’ legitimacy. On the other hand, traditional peacekeeping presented them with opportunities to excel internationally and gain international reputation. Policy-makers from small states were the first approached by UN officials when troops were required for an operation. As exemplified by the case of Finland, troops from small states were seen to be of ‘peaceful, quiet disposition, together with their ‘down-to-earth-ness’, discipline and resilience’ (Stamnes, 2007:453). In other words, small states’ foreign policy orientation and the qualities of their troops made small states ‘perfect for the job’ of keeping the peace (Jakobsen, 2007:382). However, the job has changed in significant respects, forcing small states’ policy-makers to make difficult decisions.

Quantitatively, the increasing number of missions and their expanding size have applied pressures on the limited capabilities of small states. Successive assessments that peacekeeping failures were due to the lack of material resources signalled to small states that more was needed. Small states have been pressed to meet intensifying demands for greater commitments to a field that has become increasingly crowded and competitive. As emerging and great powers stepped in to fill some of the material and operational gaps in the conduct of peacekeeping operations, small states have found it difficult to keep pace to the detriment of their status as major troop contributors (Anderson, 2007). This has also negatively affected their ability to shape the way peacekeeping is operationalised and conducted. As Jakobsen (2007) accurately reports, growing competition amongst TCCs means that ‘traditional battalion-sized contributions were not sufficient to obtain operational influence and autonomy in operations led by the great powers’ (p.458). Consequently, great powers have gained greater leverage in framing and designing operations which risks undermining the impartiality criteria. Furthermore, shifting ideas about the tasks that peacekeepers are expected to perform on the ground have generated ‘complex demands’ testing the willingness and ability of small states to deploy forces as intensively as during the cold war (Bellamy and Williams, 2012:1). At the core is a growing incompatibility between the way peacekeeping is evolving and the ‘security identity’ of small states (Wivel, 2005:396). Evidence indicates that policy-makers in small states are becoming uncomfortable at the prospect of having to deploy forces in higher intensity missions especially those involving enforcement activities.

Therefore, the dilemma that small states are currently facing is the following: On the one hand, small states may prioritise maintaining a strong peacekeeping reputation by accepting the demands of international actors to contribute troops to a wide range of missions. This strategy allows small states to retain some influence on the way operations are constructed and undertaken while keeping a voice in international institutions. However, their international image as good international citizens may be tarnished by having to undertake tasks closer to enforcement and combat operations than peacekeeping. Additionally, preferred rules of engagement may be difficult to attain as they are negotiated
in cooperation with more influential actors (Haaland, 2007:505). In turn, this strategy may become politically costly given the difficulty of justifying engagement in high intensity, potentially dangerous, missions to domestic constituencies attached to traditional peacekeeping. On the other hand, to offset these drawbacks, small states may be selective in their peacekeeping participation, contributing to operations that fit the traditional model while remaining on the side-line of those more politically and operationally challenging. This strategy has the advantage of protecting the domestic consensus over participation in traditional peacekeeping operations. Non-involvement in operations led by great powers means that small states can continue to cultivate their normative qualities and promote good international behaviour. Yet, they will no longer be able to rely on their status as active peacekeepers and will gradually lose their say on future peacekeeping developments including during UN reforms.

1.5 Looking for Clues: The Prospect of Role Theory

This dilemma raises the central question of this project: how have small states’ policy-makers responded to the shift from traditional peacekeeping to the ‘complex emergencies’ typifying modern conflicts (Wilkinson, 2000:64)? The objective is to analyse the foreign policy decisions of small states when confronted with other forms of peacekeeping. Based on the assumption that small states are unlikely to respond similarly, this thesis argues that how small states navigate this dilemma depends on the roles they play as demanded by a particular peacekeeping context and negotiated in decision-making. A case is made that a role approach, grounded in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), is better suited to account for variations in small states’ foreign policy behaviour than conventional IR perspectives (Gigleux, 2016:28). FPA’s attention to the purposeful actions of human decision-makers and their consequences for the external behaviour of states is a suitable foundation to link the effect of state size to foreign policy action (Hudson, 2005:3). The theoretical framework articulated in this project draws on the concept of roles, or national role conceptions (NRCs), defined as ‘policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system’ (Holsti, 1970:246). Roles also emerge from a process of socialisation through which states adopt roles that other political actors expect them to occupy (Barnett, 1993:275; Thies, 2013). Thus, roles are a combination of self-conception (ego) and social recognition prescribed by Others (alter) (Chafetz, 1993:733). According to Krotz (2002), roles affect national interests not only by generating ‘wills, goals and actions’ but also by ‘making interests … intuitively implausible’ and by inducing a particular policy-making style (p.7). They consist of motivational statements on the part of policy-makers, making them valuable analytical tools for researchers aiming to explain states’ foreign policy actions.
A role approach draws on a constructivist insight bringing to the fore the perceptions of policy-makers and citizens about the position(s) of their states in the international system (Breuning, 2011:20). This is appropriate given that scholars have long recognised the primacy of self-perception for small states’ policy-makers in defining the scope of action available to them (Keohane 1969:296). Focusing on roles allows conceptualising norm entrepreneurship as a role that small states have traditionally seen themselves playing, and which has long guided their foreign policy behaviours as well as their peacekeeping strategies. However, a changing peacekeeping context is expected to make it more difficult for small states to continue enacting a norm entrepreneur role. Thus, this project asks: what other roles do small states play in peacekeeping and international affairs? This is an important question because role theory research has overlooked the roles of small states, focusing instead on those played by middle and great powers (Thies, 2013; Harnisch, 2011; 2016, Wehner, 2014). It is also crucial for this research to analyse small states’ roles ‘in relations to a specific policy area’ since ‘decision makers’ perceptions of their state’s role within the system may differ with respect to different issue areas’ (Breuning, 1995:237). Researchers have already turned to roles to explain states’ compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation regime (Chafetz et al., 1996), foreign aid policy (Breuning, 1995; 2010), foreign policy status (Thies, 2013), attitudes to peace processes (Barnett, 1999), engagement in military interventions (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2013) and membership in multilateral economic blocs (Wehner and Thies, 2014). Yet, the decisions of small states to participate in peacekeeping has not yet been analysed with reference to their roles.

One exception is Goetschel (2013) who argues that ‘while these [small] states have continued to pursue ambitious peace polices since the cold war ended, the content of these policies has changed significantly’ (p.260). Goetschel’s starting assumptions and theoretical approach using roles as a basis for clarifying the evolution of small states’ peace policies are analogous to those of this project. His main proposition is that changes in peace policies reflect a shift towards the idealist functions of European small states’ role concepts at the expense of realist ones (Goetschel, 2013:268). However, while the theoretical and empirical insights into the variations of small states’ attitudes to peace issues are highly informative, Goetschel’s work is driven predominantly by a concern for neutrality. The analysis appears to be more focused on unpacking the concept of neutrality rather than on considering the full range of role conceptions that small states may adopt, and how roles inform their responses to current peacekeeping dilemmas. This prevents Goetschel from making the most of role theory’s rich conceptual toolbox by systematically considering how policy-makers in small states have domestically conceived new roles in light of external expectations.

2 Role theory scholars have used a number of terms to denote the concept of roles as applied to states including “national role conceptions” (NRCs), “national roles”, “role conceptions” or just “roles”. The latter will be used throughout this project unless quotations require otherwise.
One of these tools is role socialisation. Broadly defined, state socialisation refers to the internalisation of ‘patterns of behaviour and role expectations which characterise the groups in which they [states] interact’ (Alderson, 2001:416; also see Armstrong, 1994:7-8). It is a prominent feature of relations amongst states and, therefore, has been conceptualised by many IR theories. Consequently, widely different conceptions of ‘what it is, who its affects or how it operates’ have emerged (Alderson, 2001:416). While neorealists view socialisation as a process through which anarchy instils notions of self-help to states (Waltz, 1979; Thies 2010), constructivists emphasise international norms and co-constitutive interactions as socialising forces generative of states’ identities, interests and behaviours (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Wendt, 1992). English School theorists posit that socialisation help explain how states on the fringes of the international system consent to follow common rules and values, thereby integrating the international society of states (Cantir, 2011; Checkel 2005; Schimmelfennig 2000). Socialisation has also been a significant theoretical point of reference for those interested in the trajectory of EU integration and expansion (Checkel, 1999; Beyers, 2010; Engert, 2010; Schimmelfennig, 2005; Flockhart, 2006). Their contention is that European integration does not progress as a result of strategic exchanges between rational national agents, but through ‘social learning, socialization, routinization and normative diffusion, all of which address fundamental issues of agent identity and interests’ (Checkel, 1999:545).

Role theory proposes a different view of socialisation. Thies (2012; 2013; 2015), who pioneered a role approach to socialisation labelled role location, defines it as a process ‘where role expectations of the self and other, role demands of the situation, and cues from the audience all come together to produce a role for the actor and set the conditions for its appropriate enactment’ (Thies, 2013:35). In this way, socialisation is ‘a role bargaining process’ involving both ego choosing a role based on its status and material capabilities and an assessment of that choice by relevant alters expressing role expectations (Thies, 2013:35). I develop a more comprehensive framework around role socialisation in Chapter 3, but here it is important to offer some early indication of its relevance and manifestation in the peacekeeping domain. This project views the period before a peacekeeping deployment as a highly political phase during which negotiations between conflicting parties, the UN and other interested actors take place over three interrelated issues. First, the need for a peacekeeping operation must be negotiated. Deployment is unlikely to happen without international momentum to halt a crisis, an agreement from the conflicting parties and a consensus in the Security Council. Second, a mandate providing the legal basis, purpose and tasks of an operation must be established. Third, international actors must be willing to take the lead in generating and coordinating forces to implement the mandate. These efforts must be met positively by potential troop contributing countries. This latter phase is highly relevant for this project because it establishes interactions between international institutions,
lead nations (alters) and small prospective TCCs (egos). These interactions form the material, social and normative context in which small states are confronted to certain expectations and locate the type of peacekeeper they are expected to be. Before small states can contribute to separating factions, stabilising volatile areas, training security forces or providing humanitarian assistance, they must first be socialised into adequate peacekeeping roles. In line of the conceptualisation of role socialisation offered in chapter 3, this thesis operationalises the concept broadly in that it identifies role socialisation as any forms of behavioural expectations implicitly and explicitly expressed. One might anticipate notions of responsibility and solidarity as well as influential peacekeeping norms to be significant in this process. Thus, a peacekeeping role encapsulates three dimensions: the actual demands of expected peacekeeping behaviour, who demands it and the norm on which it relies.

One major clue that an investigation of small states’ roles is valuable lies in the conceptual proximity between role theory and concepts such as identity and (self-)image (Breuning, 2011:20; Hermann, 2003). The latter two have been prevalent features of small states’ peacekeeping engagement. Stammes (2007) notes that ‘participation in peace support operations forms a natural part of the Nordic states’ self-images’ while national identity has been both a factor and a product of the peacekeeping activism of small states (p.453). Yet, these constructivist concepts do not get to the bottom of what explain the peacekeeping decisions of small states’ governments when confronted by the current dilemma. Nor are the literatures on small states and peacekeeping anymore helpful given that they offer conflicting expectations. On the one hand, the foreign policies of small states are expected to reflect the imperatives of the international system, making system-level explanations ‘most relevant’ for explaining their foreign policy choices (Elman, 1995:175). Conversely, the peacekeeping literature has a tendency, especially when it comes to small states, to locate the factors of peacekeeping engagement inside states while overlooking the effects of contextual elements, although these have been well documented in separate studies. Therefore, a role approach is beneficial because it offers the possibility of bringing together different levels of analysis and bridging the gap between structure and agency (Wehner and Thies, 2014:412). It also allows researchers to pay greater attention to processes in identifying the causes of states’ peacekeeping contributions, a move consistent with the need to consider decision-making in explaining peacekeeping participation. Through this, we can effectively identify the external and domestic sources of the roles that small states pursue, thereby providing a comprehensive understanding of the processes through which they emerge and of what influences their peacekeeping decision-making.

The above historical overview has underlined the importance of international institutions in conditioning small states’ peacekeeping decisions. However, the dynamics of the institution–small state relationship are complex and multidirectional. On the one hand, institutions form part of the context in which small states interpret a situation and conceive
their own roles (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013:30). In this way, institutions act as alters influencing role-taking through the dissemination of common rules, expectations and practices. On the other hand, the distinction between small states as egos and institutions as alters is not clear-cut since small states, as members of these institutions, exercise agency within them by remaining the arbiter of compliance and shaping the meaning afforded to institutions and the specific goals they are established to achieve (Charon, 2001:46). Therefore, it must be acknowledged that small states are institutionally involved in shaping the rules, norms and practices of peacekeeping through strategies designed to enhance their influence within these institutions. Yet again, this is counterbalanced by their limited capabilities and status which limit their voice in the EU and continue to exclude them from the UN Security Council where mandates are formulated and agreed upon, unless they gain a non-permanent seat. This discussion reflects the inherent tensions between structure and agency at the heart of this project.

Before laying out how this research will proceed, it is worth specifying the type of inquiry it performs to generate knowledge about what small states do in international peacekeeping. The overarching purpose is to identify the causes of small states’ policies and decisions when confronted with new forms of peacekeeping. From this perspective, this thesis conducts a ‘scientific’ analysis evaluating the causal influence of roles on small states’ peacekeeping behaviours, using the language of causal inferences such as ‘influence’, ‘impact’, ‘effects’ and ‘outcome’. Yet, Jackson (2011) is sceptical about the possibility of clearly demarcating the criteria for defining ‘science’, which ‘opens the door for IR scholars to reach into an alien field of study and pull out something that fits their immediate aims’ (p.15-16). The ‘immediate aim’ of this research is to understand how political agents in small states are renegotiating the social positions of their states in peacekeeping through a dual process of role socialisation and conception. It implicates an interpretive approach designed to inductively understand the social meanings which underpin political actions and to locate these meanings in their social, cultural, institutional and historical contexts (Bevir and Daddow, 2015:277). I draw on Bevir and Daddow (2015) who offer ‘an alien field of study’ by positing the logics of explanation and interpretation as compatible. The ‘covering-law’ model of explanation must be abandoned in favour of one which incorporates agents’ beliefs and perceptions in order to understand ‘how the processes of social representations are formed and internalized’ in the realm of the ‘international’ (Hollis and Smith in Bevir and Daddow, 2015). This position stems from the assumption that we cannot effectively account for states’ foreign policies without considering ‘the media by which external conditions and factors are translated into a policy decision’ (Singer in Bevir and Daddow, 2015:277). Therefore, this thesis performs an interpretive exercise to assess how small states’ foreign policy-makers understand their historical, normative and material contexts and, as a result, socially and discursively make sense of ‘who their state is’ in the international social system.
It is a compatible and indispensable step towards explaining small states’ peacekeeping decisions and policies.

1.6 Aims, Objectives and Structure

The research questions presented above have generated specific aims and objectives. The primary aim of this PhD project is to investigate how small states are adapting to changes in the doctrine and practice of international peacekeeping. Relatedly, the aim is to ascertain the factors explaining why small states continue to participate in, or refrain from contributing to, complex peacekeeping operations. To achieve these, the objective is to look at the influence of the roles that policy-makers in small states see their states playing in this new context on their decisions to participate, or not, in new types of peacekeeping. A role approach does not seek to compete with other explanations of foreign policy behaviour. Thus, the objective is not to test how well role theory fetches in comparison to other theories, but to analyse how roles intersect with other peacekeeping considerations in decision-making. This strengthens the need for the interpretive approach presented above. Four case studies (Chapters 6, 7, 9 and 10) analyse recent peacekeeping decisions taken by Austrian and Belgian governments. Each exposes a novel way of undertaking peacekeeping and investigates Austria’s and Belgium’s responses to it.

Chapter 2 reviews the main IR theories explaining the foreign policy behaviours of small states and concludes that none sufficiently consider structure-agency interaction necessary to effectively accounts for the choices small states are having to make when considering participating in modern peacekeeping operations. Therefore, the second aim of this research is to improve the analysis of small states’ foreign policies by bridging the gap between structure and agency through role theory. The objective of Chapter 3 is to construct a theoretical framework allowing the analysis of how policy-makers interpret external pressures on their small states, to perform certain roles in this new peacekeeping environment, and how these interpretations inform national peacekeeping decisions. This effectively meets the requirement posited in this introduction to consider decision-making and context in explaining peacekeeping decisions.

A third aim is to debunk the idea that small states’ participation in peacekeeping operations is automatic and motivated by a single uncontested perception of themselves as norm entrepreneurs. The objective is to determine what new or existing roles small states adopt in this evolving peacekeeping system. Chapter 4 devises a methodology combining deductive and inductive approaches which provides both methodological rigour for the systematic observation of roles and the flexibility to capture roles previously unreported by researchers of small states. The cases of Austria and Belgium were chosen mainly because they offer opportunities to assess whether the norm entrepreneur argument applies to non-Nordic small states. Additionally, the changing nature of peacekeeping has forced Austria
and Belgium to make important policy adjustments to their respective peacekeeping approach involving difficult decisions. Performing an analysis of states’ roles involves collecting rhetorical data from primary sources as well as identifying roles from existing reports and analyses. In the initial stages of this research, a valuable source of data was the diplomatic historical literature which often refers to roles as leaders attempted to position their states between the two-bloc confrontation of the cold war. With regard to the case-studies, I first followed the initiative of previous role theorists (Below, 2016) and examined state leaders’ UN speeches to identify the role inclination of an incumbent government. When it came to the specific decisions, I was primarily interested in retracing the course of events and how different actors socially positioned their states towards a particular crisis. I searched for declarations by representatives of international institutions and leading states to gain a sense how they defined the situation and what demands they were making about who should act. I turned my attention to reports of the force generation process, and previous bilateral and multilateral meetings, to gain access to these declarations. Then, I examined press articles reporting spontaneous declarations by small states’ elites who were expected to respond to these demands and to rely on roles to justify their decisions. I also consulted parliamentary documents to discern other domestic voices expressing views about the role(s) the state should be playing in the context of an ongoing international effort to address a crisis. I also referred to official press releases from the governments under study to reconstruct the role evolution of these elites as a decision was approaching.

The fourth aim is to better understand where the roles of small states come from and through which processes they affect decision-making on peacekeeping deployments. Using the theoretical framework devised in Chapter 3, the objective is to empirically investigate the interactions between structural forces of role expectation and domestic dynamics of role negotiation. Chapters 5 and 8 provide the foreign policy background on Austria and Belgium retracing the evolution of their foreign policy roles. They provide the foundations for the following chapters to analyse, through the comparative case study method, how the interplays between external role demands and domestically conceived ideas about the state’s position affect Austria’s and Belgium’s adjustment to new peace missions. Chapter 6 investigates Austria’s decisions to participate in EUFOR Chad, 2007-2008, while Chapter 7 is interested in the country’s withdrawal from UNDOF in 2013; two telling cases of a small state adapting to new forms of peacekeeping through a reconfiguration of roles. Chapter 9 and 10 examine the roles that have motivated the contributions made by two Belgian governments towards the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war and the Malian crisis, 2012-2013 respectively. For each, a concluding discussion theorises about the effects of external pressures to adopt certain roles on decision-making dynamics of small states.

This research contributes to an improved understanding of small states in IR via the refinement of the role approach to analysing the foreign policies of the international system’s
smaller members. However, the role theoretical approach also has broader relevance for IR theories. Walker (2017) reminds us that role theory is guided by the assumption that ‘understanding the relations between states is enhanced by recognising their respective roles in a system of states’. Given that a role theoretical approach provides us with ‘a perspective for describing cooperation and conflict between states as a social system’, this thesis also speaks to the broader IR discipline in three ways. First, it offers valuable insights into the co-constitution of states’ identities and interests through social interactions and, therefore, builds on constructivist efforts to resolve the structure–agency problem (Wendt, 1987). Wendt’s “generative” approach has been criticised because it ‘conflates agency and social role’ and ‘obscribes precisely those elements of agency which are central in a worthwhile conceptualisation of agency–agency interpretability and choice’ (Friedman and Starr, 1997:13). Role theory fills the gap by acknowledging that ‘agents may play a plurality of oftentimes competing social roles associated with divergent interests, and that agents may value each of the roles in this set to a different extent in any given decision-making context’ (Friedman and Starr, 1997:13). Second, this thesis’s role theoretical framework speaks to research on international norms by studying how the interactions between external expectations of, and the domestic ideas about, one’s roles influence states to assume (or not) the entrepreneurship of norms. Third, by formulating propositions which help ‘explain the dynamics of interactions between and among actors with different roles’ (Walker, 2017), role theory can shed light on the most common type of interactions in the international system, those characterised by asymmetry (Womack, 2016). It can act as a reminder that the forms and trajectories of asymmetrical relationships are the results of material, interactional and social dynamics. This last point also has implications for the scholarship dedicated to states’ balancing and bandwagoning behaviours, especially as debates over whether smaller states have the capacity and willingness to resist the demands of more powerful neighbour or hegemons.
2.1 Introduction

Small states have been studied since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006:9). However, academic interest in the place, function and foreign policy behaviour of small states has fluctuated mirroring major shifts in the international system. The problematic position of small European states in the midst of the Second World War was the central concern of Annette Baker Fox (1959) who, with the publication of *The Power of Small States*, formally initiated small state studies. Research intensified steadily in the post-war era addressing the puzzling question of small states’ survival. Decolonisation in the mid-1970s witnessed an upsurge of work on the trade and industrial strategies of small states (Höll, 1983) as well as on the effects of limited material capabilities on their foreign policies (Barston, 1973; East, 1973; Waltz, 1979). This growing interest paused when observers began questioning the usefulness of small states as an analytical tool (Baehr, 1975). It was revived following the material and ideational shifts of 1989-1991. The end of the cold war not only contributed to a proliferation of small states, but also fundamentally altered their position in a new environment characterised by deeper economic, political and security interdependence as well as by processes of economic liberalisation and regional integration (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006:13). From then on, research sought to examine the implications of this evolving and globalising context for small states.

Therefore, while scholars are accurate in noting that small states have been relatively understudied, we should not underestimate the extent to which small states have drawn scholarly attention (Gibert and Grzelczyk, 2016). In fact, Long (2017) emphasises that ‘there is impressive and growing empirical and conceptual richness in the field of small-state studies’ (p.144). However, a growing number of scholars, dissatisfied with the way the scholarship has progressed over the last decade, is arguing that small state research has now reached an impasse. Lamoreaux (2014) notes that ‘problematically, substantive content within small-state studies, especially with a European emphasis, has stagnated’ (p.565). The sources of the current dissatisfaction lie in a lack of diversity, theory building, and knowledge accumulation, as well as in poor cross-regional comparisons and in the absence of conversation with the wider IR discipline (Wivel et al., 2014; Lamoreaux, 2014, Long, 2017; Gibert and Grzelczyk, 2016). Lamoreaux (2014) develops his critique by pointing to the repetition currently characterising the field: ‘the issues that European-focused scholars
highlight are largely the same, their key assumptions and expectations are the same and their claim that small states are worthy to be studied as a group is the same’ (p.565). This project agrees with these assessments and positions itself with other works seeking to rejuvenate the field (Crandall and Varov, 2016).

Long (2017) attributes this dead end to the definitional debate which, through a lack of consensus, has inhibited knowledge accumulation on what foreign policies small states pursue, and ‘turned the study of small states into cul-de-sac infrequently visited by IR scholars’ (p.149). In the same critical spirit, I argue that the current impasse is attributable to a lack of research explicitly demonstrating how small states’ foreign policies are shaped by interactions between structure and agency. In 1992, Carlsnaes complained that, although we are conscious that both agents and social structures entertain reciprocal relationships that are central to any comprehensive account of social behaviour, IR and FPA still lack a framework that captures ‘the dynamic interplay’ between the two (p.246; 255, original emphasis). The sub-field of small state research offered much potential for resolving the agency-structure problem owing to small states’ responsiveness to structural variables, in particular. The primacy of the structure-agency issue to analysing small states can also be detected from Carlsnaes’s empirical inspiration in ‘the sudden volte-face on the issue of membership in the European Community (EC) of the nonmember West European neutrals’ (p.247, original emphasis). Much, if not all, of the discussions around small state foreign policy relate to the interplay between structure and agency, but research has not explicitly established a link between the two. In turn, the scholarship has been trapped in endless debates over whether small states are structurally too weak to achieve any ambitious and independent foreign policy or, on the contrary, are able to overcome structural constraints and exercise power in a wide variety of material and non-material ways (Long, 2016; Chong and Maas, 2010). The introductory article of Third World Thematics’ special issue by Gibert and Grzelczyk (2016) entitled ‘Non-Western small states: activists or survivors?’ reflects the continuing relevance of this debate. Knowledge about the conditions under which small states are unable to affect international change or become influential international actors remains insufficient, in part because small states display wide disparities in behaviour. Long (2016) rightly comments that small states ‘might have different sources of power, differently exercised, to varying degree, across a range of issues’ (p.9). Recently, Gebhard (2017) has shown that even the foreign policies of small Scandinavian states, expected to display significant similarities owing to a common strategic environment and political culture, have diverged especially in terms of the institutional platform through which they are carried out. Such variations have not been adequately captured or explained because the gap between structure and agency remains unfilled.
Ultimately, this shortcoming is partly due to the strong emphasis which the existing research and theories place on structural factors for understanding small states’ positions and interactions in the international system. (Neo-)realism, liberal institutionalism and social constructivism focus primarily on examining how different constraints and opportunities condition small states’ relations. They provide clues about the scope of action and the strategies available to small states, but are less effective at explaining their foreign policy behaviour through frameworks incorporating both structure and agency. In fact, small state research has struggled to escape the argument that small states respond first and foremost to the imperatives of the international material structure. This is not to deny the contributions of actor-specific perspectives which have considered the agency of small states within different structures and, therefore, made valuable inroads into combining structure and agency (Gebhard, 2013; Rickly, 2016). Yet, when research focuses on the agency of small states, it has done so with a state-level conception of agency and, therefore, paid insufficient attention to how state agents perceive different structures and whether they are constraining or enabling. Thus, small state research has not fully addressed the gap between structure and agency because it has not yet articulated a framework allowing for the systematic analysis of the effects of structures on foreign policy decision-making and how structural effects are perceived and interpreted by foreign policy agents at the domestic level.

What follows is a review of the key contributions made by the main theoretical lenses to our understanding of small states. The specific expectations they have generated about the action scope and the strategies available to small states in order to achieve their foreign policy objectives will be critically examined. This will be achieved alongside definitional considerations because IR theories are inextricably linked to different definitions of small states. The way one defines a small state is closely intertwined with the theoretical perspective used to understand its foreign policy behaviour given that each lens focuses on particular defining criteria.

2.2 The Contributions of IR Theories

Realism has dominated our understanding of small states in the international system. Its main assumption, as articulated by Waltz (1979) in *Theory of International Politics*, that states seek material capabilities to ensure security in an anarchic environment, has oriented small state scholars towards power resources, defined in absolute or relative terms, as indicators for defining small states and conceptualising their security predicaments (Wivel et al., 2014:6). Realists define small states using quantifiable criteria including GDP, military assets and population as well as territorial size (Rothstein, 1968; Vital, 1967). Small states are those falling below a pre-defined threshold on one, or a combination, of these criteria. Thus, small states are seen as vulnerable actors lacking traditional resources of power (Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006:652). Operating in an anarchical environment with an inferior
set of capabilities means that small states experience strong constraints on their foreign policy choices (Waltz, 1979). According to a realist perspective, the survival of small states can never be guaranteed because a lack of capabilities does not allow them to effectively anticipate international trends, shape international events or withstand the economic, military and/or political pressures from great powers (Wivel, 2016:93). Writing during the cold war, Vital (1967) finds that there is very little that small states can achieve independently of great powers.

This alludes to a key tenet of the realist take on small states expecting that the international structure, defined in terms of distribution of capabilities, will be the primary driver of their foreign policies (Hey, 2003; Long, 2016, Wivel, 2016, Waltz, 1979; Rothstein, 1968). Experiencing greater threats to their survival than larger powers, small states cannot afford to overlook where power lies and what great powers do when shaping the international system (Elman, 1995:175). In a recent structural realist examination, Maas (2016) attributes small state disappearance and proliferation to their structural irrelevance within ‘the particular set-up of the state system’ (p.1304). Neorealists have elaborated this structural argument by investigating how different power configurations have affected small states’ room for manoeuvre and foreign policy strategies (Rothstein, 1969:14-15; Handel, 1985). Jesse and Dreyer (2016) discuss how unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity have generated varying opportunities for small state survival and influence in the system (p.22). The instability of a multipolar system lead realists to expect small states to either bandwagon with, or balance against a great power (alliance strategy, Rothstein, 1968) while they can also choose a passive strategy of neutrality (Jesse and Dreyer, 2016:23). A bipolar system offers small states fewer foreign policy options. Under bipolarity, Long (2016) notes that ‘incentives to bandwagon will be increased, and possibilities to gain influence by shifting sides will be reduced’ (p.4).

Wivel (2016) positively assesses the realist approach to small states by asserting that it helps understand how ‘inequality in capabilities creates inequalities in opportunities for survival and influence internationally’ (p.93). It emphasises the important notion that small states have inherent characteristics which place them at a disadvantage. Any analysis seeking a comprehensive picture of what small states do in international relations will not be able to ignore such ‘inherent vulnerabilities of being small’ (Bailes et al., 2016:10). A realist lens allows insights into the position of small states in the international hierarchy. In essence, realism shows us that the international material structure is in-built in the notion of smallness, implying that one cannot evade asymmetry as a structural factor when analysing small states’ foreign policy actions. However, a growing body of research has disputed realist assumptions and findings. In terms of definition, Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006) contends that defining small states in terms of power ‘tells us little about the behaviour of small states or the challenges that they face’ (p.653), or the different ways they might
exercise influence through other sources of power. For example, Long (2016) proposes that small states might specialise in exercising particular-intrinsic, derivative and/or collective form of power (p.2).

In this vein, works on small states have challenged the realist premise that small states are weak actors dependent on will of great powers. Attention began shifting away from quantifiable objective criteria of definition because they obstruct examinations of, not only the challenges, but also the opportunities that small states can exploit to secure foreign policy autonomy and influence (Wivel et al., 2014:7). Relatedly, Bailes et al. (2016) find that the concepts advanced by traditional alliance theory ‘do not capture well small state motivations and alliance conduct’ which cannot be boiled down to ‘one size fit all’ (p.12). These critiques can be seen as responses to observed variations in the behaviour of small states which a realist focus on material capabilities and international structures does not capture and is ill-equipped to explain. Neorealism, in particular, struggles to account for differences in foreign policy behaviour among small states possessing similar material limitations and evolving under similar structural constraints. This observation concurs with a recent call to ‘improve our understanding of how and why the conditions for small state strategy vary across the international system’ (Wivel, 2016:93).

These limitations have not undermined the significance of realism. Small state scholars have sought to refine the traditional concepts of bandwagoning and balancing to examine small state behaviour under the new conditions brought by a post-bipolar system. This adaptation was founded on a definitional shift away from power possession, or the power small states do not possess, to concentrate instead on ‘the experience of power disparity and the manner of coping with it’ (Rickli, 2008; Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006; Wivel, 2005). This new emphasis led numerous researchers to define small states in relational terms as ‘the weaker part in an asymmetrical relationship, which is unable to change the nature or functioning of the relationship on its own’ (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005; 2012; Wivel et al., 2014:9; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010). The effect of this shift was to place small states’ relationships with more powerful states at the heart of future analyses and to open up new avenues of research which this project seeks to exploit. Lobell et al. (2015) explore what hegemony means for the action scope of secondary and tertiary states, and how these states deal with a global and regional hegemon. The argument advances that a global hegemon’s level of engagement, the number of regional hegemons and hegemons’ level of influence determine the constraints and opportunities available to secondary and tertiary states, which in turn influence whether these middle and small states resist, accommodate and/or remain neutral vis-à-vis hegemons (Lobell et al. 2015:151-153). Small state researchers have developed this relational line of inquiry by contending that the concept of asymmetry is key to understanding the specific security and foreign policy dilemmas of small states (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005; Wivel, 2005; Grøn and Wivel, 2011; Steinmetz
and Wivel, 2010). Considering asymmetry induces ‘analysts to ask, not how ‘scarce’ resources spur common behaviours, but how power differentials affect the ability to influence or resist influence’ (Long, 2017:149). By arguing that what matters is not size but relations between states, Long (2017) persuasively argues that ‘IR scholars should stop defining and redefining the concept of ‘small state’’, and turn their attention to how dynamics of power differential shape relationships, incentives and behaviour (p.146).

A greater focus on asymmetrical relationships between small states and greater powers has been accompanied by an emphasis on small states’ geopolitical space. Wivel (2016) argues that ‘location’ and ‘distance’ are important for small states because their strategic options ‘are dependent upon how much action space they are allowed by other states, in particular the great powers in their close vicinity’ (p.92; Mouritzen and Wivel, 2014). Bailes et al. (2014) and Rickly (2008; 2016) engage with the issue of small states’ alliance choices when confronted with shifting security environments including greater interdependence or diminished great power involvement. They offer a novel approach to traditional concepts by providing a framework illuminating the dilemma between autonomy and influence that small state face when considering joining an alliance (Bailes et al. 2014:32; Rickly, 2016:134). By arguing that the resolution of this dilemma depends on ‘both the changing balance of power at the systemic level and the perceptions of it by national decision-makers’, Rickly (2016) effectively incorporates another level of analysis and a perceptual variable into a neorealist explanation, thereby making a valuable contribution towards linking structure and agency (p.135). In a different geopolitical context, Cheng-Chwee (2008; 2016) discusses to what extent small Asian states display bandwagoning, balancing or hedging behaviour in response to China’s rising power. In attempts to further refine realist notions, several authors have investigated the extent to which small states can successfully balance against great powers using soft strategies (Cantir and Kennedy, 2015; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012). Bailes et al. (2016) are sceptical about the value of bandwagoning and balancing ‘to understand and appreciate the contingency of small state alliance behaviour’ (p.10). They seek to accommodate traditional alliance theory through the concept of shelter, whereby small states seek arrangements with an outside entity to dampen external vulnerabilities. Their argument is that the idea of shelter helps capture small states’ domestic incentives for aligning with larger entities and gives wider recognition to the role of regional and international organisations in providing small states with, not just military, but political economic and societal protection (Bailes et al., 2016:13-14). The adaptation of realism performed by these latter works is beneficial for this project because it offers the prospect of incorporating its precepts into frameworks which allow the study of what inequalities in capability mean for the agents involved in negotiating asymmetrical dynamics.

What has become evident is that small states are increasingly operating in an
environment characterised by greater interdependence and institutionalisation of inter-state relations. Realist precepts have come under fire for overstating small states’ preoccupation with survival in the face of traditional military threats, overlooking international norms and rules as determinants of small states’ foreign policy responses to new security challenges (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006:20; Thorhallsson, 2012:141; Thorhallsson and Bailes, 2013). Thus, analysts have drawn on liberal IR theories to explore ‘how small states use institutions to enhance security and pursue their interests’ (Long, 2016:7). Based on Keohane and Nye’s argument (1977) that ‘international organisations are frequently congenial institutions for weak states’, a wide scholarly consensus has formed suggesting that small states favour international and regional institutions because rule-based environments alleviate the negative externalities of interdependence (Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006), mitigate the power of large states (Wivel, 2005) and offers small states forums and tools for advancing their interests (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Through a liberal institutionalist approach, small states can, for the first time, be conceptualised as having agency in the international system since institutions give them a wider scope for manoeuvre and a platform from which to be heard (Browning, 2006:672; Long, 2016). This theoretical shift came hand-in-hand with a definitional development emphasising context as a necessary element to a more nuanced definition of small state. There was recognition that a small state may be weak in certain circumstances, such as negotiating a security arrangement with a great power, but that in other, more institutionalised contexts, small states can specialise in a particular policy-area, shape the agenda and gain leverage over larger members. A wide body of research has flowed from liberal institutionalism exploring to what extent and how institutional arrangements allow small states to ‘punch above their weights’ in international affairs (Thorhallsson, 2000; Panke, 2012). Thorhallsson and Bailes (2013) note that, by joining the UN, small states can be recognised as equal members of the international community and gain access to additional diplomatic resources (p.100). According to Ingebritsen (2004), small European states choose to relinquish national sovereignty in favour of participation in European institutions because they can sit at the decision-making table, have a bigger say in the development of the EU vis-à-vis US hegemony, and increase their leverage in influencing the agenda on global issues. Hey (2003) asserts that small EU member states have sought to bolster European institutions to safeguard their interests against both German-French rivalry and dominance. Interest in the capacity of small states to profit from institutionalised frameworks has also generated research on the strategies they employ to ensure influence inside institutions (Nasra, 2008; 2011; Grøn and Wivel, 2011). Thorhallsson (2012) critiques liberal institutionalism on that ground that it does not fully acknowledge the possibility of small states affecting outcomes in international institutions according to their interests as the focus remains on differences in capabilities (p.142). To overcome this pitfall, researchers should concentrate on the ‘qualitative means’ that small
states can develop, such as good image, administrative competence and favourable diplomatic multilateral arrangements. Panke (2012) finds that small states’ fewer administrative and financial resources, which are likely to inhibit their influence on international negotiation outcomes (p.316), can be compensated for through a range of ‘capacity-building and shaping strategies’ (p.318).

The main criticism that can be levied against a liberal institutionalist approach is that it tends to assume that international and regional institutions benefit small states and that their foreign policies will be conducted through institutional arrangements. Should we continue to assume that participation in institutions is unproblematic for small states because the benefits they draw from a level playing field outweighs the constraints they experience within them? This is not to say that the literature has omitted to highlight the disadvantages that small states face within institutions. Thorhallsson and Steinnsson (2017) underline that small EU member states have to deal with ‘the uneven allocation of votes in the Council of the European Union, their limited number of seats in the European Parliament, and the smallness of both their public administration and foreign service as compared with the large states’ (p.12). Similarly, Wivel (2005) recognises that, although the EU continues to be ‘an attractive security organization for most small states’, political and institutional developments designed to transform the EU into an autonomous security actor have challenged the traditional security identity and interests of the region’s small states (p.395). Bailes and Thorallsson (2013) have also called for rethinking the institutionalist approach to accommodate ‘the modern spectrum of ‘softer’ security concerns, and the increased variety of international or regional organizations now addressing such issues - some of them with unprecedentedly transnational and integrative approaches’ (Thorhallsson and Bailes, 2013:100-101). Yet, again, the assumption remains that new institutions dedicated to addressing soft security threats represent an ‘added value’ for small European states.

Reflecting the wider critique articulated in this project, it becomes important to nuance the institutionalist take on small states’ foreign policies by focusing on the conditions under which small states integrate institutions and actively participate in their development. Because research has been absorbed by how institutions have empowered small states, and how small states have, in turn, sought to influence institutional norms and processes, there has been limited work on the effects of institutional rules, norms and institutions on the foreign policies of small states. As Thorhallsson (2012) notes, ‘the power of institutions, then, also lies in the structure, consisting of laws and treaties, which states create and by which they have to abide’. This project accepts the liberal institutionalist notion that institutions are effective platforms for small states to perform peacekeeping activities while recognising that small states have contributed to constructing the meanings, norms and rules underpinning them. Yet, drawing on liberal institutionalist approach, it also calls for considering institutions as part of the normative contexts in which small states’ peacekeeping
roles and endeavours operate.

The constructivist turn in IR has had profound impacts on the way small states were defined and their foreign policy behaviour understood and explained. Attention to ideas norms, perceptions and identity enabled novel conceptions of small states to emerge not solely based on material considerations. In 1969, Keohane defined a small state as ‘a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system’. He strengthened his perceptual definition by stating that ‘perception of systemic role, more than perception of need for external aid in security, seems to shape small powers’ distinctive attitudes towards international organizations’ (quoted in Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006:61). Social constructivism permitted to fully exploit Keohane’s perceptual element. A constructivist take on definition underlines the socially constructed meaning of smallness by looking at collective perceptions of vulnerability which have been historically interpreted and guide future behaviour. Crandall and Varov (2016) combine relational and perceptual definitions by positing a small state as ‘one that perceives it is the weak part in an asymmetric relationship’ (p.4).

These definitions allowed social constructivism to challenge neorealist assumptions that small states are rational and unitary actors acting in accordance with the requirements of the international system (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2017:16). Constructivists argue that what matters is not material factors of size, but identity (Browning, 2006), values (Lamoreaux, 2014) and status (Crandall and Varov, 2016; De Carvalho and Neumann, 2014). Moving away from material considerations made it possible to argue that small states had ways to circumvent the influence of hard power and exercise international influence through ideational power (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006:15). Chong (2010) shows how the Vatican and Singapore have used their political economy potential, models of good governance and diplomatic mediation to project soft power internationally. Browning (2006) uses a discursive approach to small state identity ‘leaving open the possibility that smallness can be told more positively than Keohane indicates’ (p.673). Thus, ‘more positive readings of smallness may create opportunities for action and innovation’ (Browning, 2006:674). Cooper and Shaw (2009) put forward that ‘what small states lack in structural clout they can make up through creative agency’ engaging in ‘resilient diplomacy’ (Cooper, 2009) and ‘smart’ strategies (Prasad, 2009; Grøn and Wivel, 2011) to reshape global practises and maximise their influence. The application of social constructivist thought to our understanding of small states is not without limitations. A more comprehensive critique of it is developed in the next chapter as a basis for developing the theoretical framework of this research. Here, I turn to the argument which has drawn most heavily from constructivist insights; in other words, the norm entrepreneur argument.
2.3 The Norm Entrepreneur Argument

This strand of the scholarship is directly influenced by, or seeks to continue, Ingebritsen’s influential argument of small states as “norm entrepreneur”. Her 2002 article contended that small states’ lack of material capabilities prompts them to seek and achieve international influence through the promotion of international norms. It was a landmark study because it emphasised that small states could exercise ‘independent influence’ using not economic or military capabilities but ideational means (Ingebritsen, 2002:11). She demonstrates that geographical remoteness, limited material capabilities and unique domestic institutions have given small Scandinavian states a particular identity oriented towards active internationalism, pragmatic economic development, and consistency. It became the basis on which small Nordic countries sought to influence what counts as appropriate behaviour in the fields of environmental policy, multilateral security and global welfare. Many have followed in Ingebritsen’s footsteps and dedicated their research to demonstrating that small states ‘punch above their weights’ by advocating international norms in a wide range of policy-areas (Björkdahl, 2007). Bower (2015) shows that ‘effort on the part of less materially powerful actors to use multilateral institutions’ has resulted in the construction and maintenance of new norms in the fields of security, human rights and environment despite great power non-involvement (p.348). Small states have been active in creating new understandings around environmental protection aimed at curbing climate change (Benwell, 2011; Jaschik, 2014), in shaping what is seen as appropriate behaviour in military interventions and in promoting a civilian approach to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Jakobsen, 2009).

As presented in the introduction, a key objective of this project is to critically re-examine the “norm entrepreneur” argument as it pertains to small states’ participation in peacekeeping, by questioning some of the interconnected assumptions on which it rests. First, partly owing to the argument’s popularity, it has fostered the impression that all small states pursue normative and ethical foreign policy objectives at all times. In this way, it displays a tendency to take small states’ ability to punch above their weight for granted. There has been limited consideration and analysis of small states choosing not to promote international norms when presented with the opportunity or failing in their norm advocacy. One exception is Gebhard (2013) who points out that Sweden did not take up the opportunity to collaboratively promote the Northern Dimension framework within the EU, preferring instead to selectively pursue elements which aligned with its own national agenda (p.378).

This omission is rooted in the second assumption that small states are likely to pursue normative foreign policy goals at the expense of national self-interests. The prevailing notion in the small state literature is that, because they ‘exhibit a low level of participation in world affairs’ and ‘address a narrow scope of foreign policy issues’ over a limited geographical area, small states do not pursue a wide range of foreign policy interests in the
same way as great powers do (Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010:25). This has instilled the idea that their foreign policy behaviour is not driven by self-interest. Shortages in material resources means that small states are unable and unwilling to enter in competition for material power. Instead, they strive to gain influence by ‘doing the right thing’ and by acquiring a reputation as good international actor. Thus, by positing that size shapes states’ senses of responsibility towards international norms of appropriate behaviour, the norm entrepreneur scholarship reinforces the view that small states are “‘good” and large states “bad” international citizens (Browning, 2006:672). This view overlooks the possibility that their normative ambitions might come into conflict, not only with their own interests, but also with those of external actors. Also, the proposition that small states might defend their national interests more intensively than great powers has rarely been considered. Ingebristen (2002) argues that ‘while some critics may view the role of norm entrepreneur as strategic action by a small state, this does not discount the effects of Scandinavia’s pursuit of different models of interaction, models that structure the choices available to states in international politics’ (p.13). However, research on small states as norm entrepreneurs needs to be more explicit that, ultimately, small states endeavour to strengthen international rules because it increases their chances of survival and influence (see Goetschel, 2013:261).

Third, the self-interested nature of small states’ norm advocacy has not been thoroughly investigated because identity is identified as the main driver of small states’ norm promotion. Geopolitical and historical exposure to great power dominance, economic dependence, geographical remoteness, consensus-oriented policy-making have combined to create a particular small state identity deemed to motivate their promotion of international norms. For example, small states have presented themselves, and been regarded, as taking non-military approaches to security issues (Wivel, 2005). In essence, small states are thought to possess characteristics naturally predisposing them to become norm entrepreneurs defined by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) as actors with ‘strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community’ (p.896). Although this identity-based rationale shifts the analysis away from purely material considerations, it assumes a direct linkage between state features and identity construction on the one hand, and between a small state identity and norm entrepreneurship behaviour on the other hand. In this vein, a Swiss Political Science Review’s special issue edited by Goetschel (2013) asks to what extent Western European small states with their history of conflict and conflict resolution are ‘destined or “bound” to be peaceful’ (p.260). I concur with several contributions in this special issue that there is no automatism between features of small state size and norm promotion. It remains that more attention should be paid to processes through which norm entrepreneurship by small states have been influenced by domestic and external actors’ expectations regarding the position and function that small states should occupy in the international system.
Fourth, the norm entrepreneur argument overlooks the extent to which small states’ norm advocacy is dependent on the international structure, materially and ideationally defined. Ingebritsen (2002) builds her analysis on the life-cycle of norms arguing that small states contribute to the norm emergence phase. Beyond this, no consideration is given to how norm entrepreneurship is also constrained by small states having to conform and adopt standards of appropriate behaviour. Additionally, Thorhallsson and Steinsson (2017) note that ‘for small states, it has never been as easy being small as it is in the current international system with its unprecedented degree of peace, economic openness, and institutionalization. Small states can and do influence world politics in an international system as permissive as the current one’. This claim underlines that the norm entrepreneur argument could more explicitly recognise that small states are only able to act as such thanks to a greater scope for action. Therefore, Ingebritsen’s expectations could be refined to better account for other functions that small states may be driven to fulfil as a result of shifting international conditions including crises or great power assertion. This latter development, for instance, brings asymmetry into the equation generating questions about whether small states could continue, and be successful at, promoting norms even if it goes against the interests and expectations of great powers.

2.4 Moving Towards a New Framework

The limitations identified in the norm entrepreneur argument reflect those involved in applying IR theories to understanding small state foreign policy behaviour. Many drawbacks arise from the inability of these theoretical frameworks to adequately address the structure-agency gap as a necessary step to offering a more complete, yet nuanced, picture of small states’ foreign policies. Constructivists have come the closest to effectively address the structure-agency gap based on Wendt’s “generative” approach (1987). It proposes that structures should be defined as ‘sets of internal relations’ generative of states’ identities which, in turn, provide them with the agency to affect international structures (Wendt, 1987:344). However, the introduction of this project has already alluded that Wendt’s “generative” approach omits ‘the defining properties of agency, subjectivity and choice’ and, therefore, reinforces the small state scholarship’s unitary and state-level conception of agency. Long (2017) makes a broader, yet related, point suggesting that IR theories’ ‘search for common characteristics in terms of opportunities, limitations and behaviors have not produced sufficient consensus or cumulation’ (p.156). As a result, existing theoretical lenses have a tendency to impose a blanket upon the whole category of small states, ignoring important behavioural variations. While liberal institutionalist and constructivist agendas should be credited for ‘breaking the mould of small state vulnerability’ established by neorealism (Chong, 2010), they go too far the other way by exaggerating the ability of small states to shape the international system through multilateral channels in particular.
Importantly, small state agency-oriented research relies on an inadequate conception of agency as a collective actor as opposed to one that grants human decision-makers creativity in responding to structural imperatives (Hudson, 2005:4). Hudson (2005) brings up the FPA concept of ‘foreign policy substitutability’ which refers to the presence of variability ‘for any possible combination of material and structural conditions’ (p.4). She argues that ‘FPA’s agent-oriented and actor-specific theory is what is required in attempting to explain that variability’ (Hudson, 2005:4). The continuing use of agency as an unitary actor strengthens the black-boxing of small states and represents the key obstacle to linking structure and agency in the analysis of small states. As Carlsnaes (1992) reasons, ‘it is individuals who create social structures, and that these structures both constrain and enable the subsequent choices of the same individuals or those of future generations’ (p.256, original emphasis). Thus, what we need is ‘the current mainstream approach within foreign policy analysis’ which ‘retains the notion of “interpretative” individuals but takes the ontological step from collectivism to individualism’ (Carlsnaes, 1992:253, original emphasis). This critical point is introduced into the field of small states by Veenendaal (2014) who puts forward that ‘in order to be able to explain the international behavior of small states, scholarly analysis … should also focus on the incentives, motivations, and attitudes of the people who craft small state foreign policy’ because how domestic actors ‘confront’, ‘deal’ and interpret political and economic vulnerability ‘remains largely unclear’ (p.4). Positioning human decision-makers as focal point is necessary to appreciate that ‘leaders have choices in the face of the limitations that size and dependence place upon policy options available to them’ (Breuning, 2007:153). It allows us to better grapple with how small states foreign policy behaviour is the product of a ‘dynamic relationship’ between structuring agents, on the one hand, and constraining as well as empowering structures, on the other (Carlsnaes, 1992). It provides small state research with a new ‘ground’ to account for behavioural differences which cross-regional comparisons have brought up by retaining and connecting the various strands of IR theories (Long, 2017:156; Hudson, 2005).

The core of FPA lies in ‘explanations involving psychological factors, small and large group effects, culture and social discourse, and domestic politics’ (Hudson, 2007:143). With reference to small states, Breuning (2007) argues that ‘insight into decision-making process can help us untangle the motivations behind the foreign policy actions’ (p.153). However, agent-based and decision-making approaches have had limited impact on the study of small states owing to both small state and FPA subfields. Small state scholars have been primarily concerned with determining which level of analysis best accounts for small state behaviour. Long (2017) opines that the debate has produced few satisfactory results because ‘on their own, levels do not tell much that seems unique about ‘small states’ as a category, nor have they led to much theory building’ (p.150). It can even be argued that the debate continues to be dominated by a strong consensus that systemic factors are most influential in
explaining small state foreign policy. A high level of external threat forces small states to pay more attention to external developments and constraints than to domestic preoccupations (Elman, 1995). Even when domestic variables have been considered, it has not resulted in comprehensive investigations of decision-making because analysts have operated under the assumption that domestic politics in small states are dominated by consensus. Katzenstein (1985) showed that small states have domestic arrangements characterised by consensual politics which enhances their capacity to respond effectively to external pressures. The argument is straightforward proposing that ‘an open economy and a position of international marginality generate a common outlook shared across the main political divisions in domestic politics’ (Katzenstein, 1985:35-36). External threats and vulnerability prompts policy-makers to agree on foreign policy issues since divisions would endanger the survival of the state. Analyses of this strand overlook disagreements amongst domestic actors due to the significance that they still attach to the constraining effect of the material structure. Assuming consensus allows holding domestic politics constant to generalise about what small states do externally, thus improving little upon previous neorealist models. Others have delved deeper into the effects of small public administrations, foreign services and limited policy-making expertise on small states’ chances to gain influence in international organisations (Panke, 2012; Thorhallsson, 2017; Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 2017). These studies contend that small states have developed strategies to overcome domestic structural weaknesses, but leave agents’ creativity, and how it manifests itself politically in-between international and domestic processes of interaction, largely unexplored.

The FPA subfield first addressed small state size through research on the effects of national attributes such as natural resources, geography, population characteristics and size on foreign policy direction (East, 1973, 1978; East and Hermann, 1974). This scholarship prioritised large N-studies drawing broad generalisations about states’ level of foreign policy activity and likelihood of going to war based on their size. However, by relying on characteristics associated with traditional sources of power, this scholarship tends to reify small state weakness (Hudson, 2007:144). Statistical correlations between state size and foreign policy behaviour variables were ‘unable to uncover any lawlike generalizations’ (Hudson, 2005:13). Nor did national attribute research investigated the impact of small state size on decision-making, despite alluding to the hypothesis that a small bureaucracy, in particular, is likely to affect decision-making processes. Challenging previous research suggesting that a small bureaucracy is a disadvantage due to the limited amount of information it can gather and process, Hey (2002) argues that it can have a positive effect on policy-making because the ‘small community effect’ enables close relationships to be developed amongst personnel, consequently improving communication (p.221). Elman (1995) argues that domestic institutional choices rather than international determinants should be investigated to account for small state foreign policy. More recently, Doeser
(2011) finds that shifts in both party and public opposition contributed to a change in the Danish ‘footnote policy’, demonstrating that small states’ foreign policies can be influenced by domestic political factors. Doeser (2017) complements his previous research by introducing the ideational variable of strategic culture and analysing its interaction with domestic political calculations in influencing small states’ decisions to participate military interventions. Crandall and Varov (2016) draws on a psychological approach to gain insight into how the collective perception of status helps small states define themselves and drives their foreign policies. Unfortunately, by adhering to ‘state based actor-general theory with psychological frameworks’, this research falls short of looking at how psychological factors plays out into decision-making of small states (p.5). Perhaps, a more promising avenue is pursued by Gvalia et al. (2013) who claim that elite ideas, identities and preferences are key to explaining continuity and change in the foreign policies of post-Soviet small states in transition (p.131). The focus on elites draws our attention to the role of individuals in shaping the decision-making and content of small states’ foreign policies. Hey (2002) shows that the small foreign policy bureaucracy of Luxemburg allows a Prime Minister with initiative, expertise and an orientation towards foreign policy issues, such as Jean-Claude Juncker, to exercise ‘a great deal of influence over the foreign policy process’ (p.222; 2003:10). Bringing perceptions into the mix, Mellander and Mouritzen (2016) explain Swedish and Danish assertiveness towards Russia by looking at personal ‘lessons of the past’ of key individual decision-makers. Overall, these works have made positive contributions to small state research by opening up the black-box of small states and moving beyond structural domestic limitations. They seriously consider decision-making factors while incorporating ideational and perceptual elements. This body of research ‘reminds us that the leaders of small and dependent states, like those of any other type of states face dual pressures: the international environment is one source of constraints – and sometimes opportunities – but the imperatives of the domestic environment cannot be ignored’ (Breuning, 2007:153). Nonetheless, systematic efforts to link different levels of analysis remains limited; a shortcoming which can only be overcome through a theoretical framework incorporating both structure and agency.
2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the main theoretical approaches used to interpret the foreign policy actions of small states. It has identified that (neo-)realism, liberal institutionalism, social constructivism or FPA approaches have, on their own, not fully addressed how the international behaviours of small states result from interactions between structural constraints, materially and ideationally defined, and policy-makers making choices under international and domestic imperatives. Therefore, the chapter has argued that as long as the structural and agential dimensions of small states’ foreign policies are considered in isolation, the study of small states will continue to stagnate. Developing a theoretical framework that enables researchers to capture the interplays between structure and agency is vital for understanding when and how small states become norm entrepreneurs or perform other international roles. The FPA sub-field provides an adequate starting point for such framework because it ‘has consistently shown the significance of domestic politics and decision making to issues central to international politics’ while incorporating ‘agent–other interactions and agent–structure relations’ (Kaarbo, 2015:195-200). In fact, this review has shown that there is no reason to assume that either international structural constraints or agency exercised at domestic level predominantly influence the actions of small states. Moreover, an FPA approach meets the requirement identified in the introduction for a focus on both decision-making and context in order to better understand states’ response to the doctrinal shifts in peacekeeping. The following chapter goes a step further by using the notion of roles to fill the gap between structure and agency in the study of small states.
CHAPTER THREE A ROLE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SMALL STATES’ FOREIGN POLICIES

3.1 Introduction

This chapter argues that a theoretical framework grounded in role theory is well suited to studying small states’ foreign policy behaviours and peacekeeping patterns for two reasons. First, role theory allows drawing on important constructivist insights while moving beyond a focus on identity. In this way, it offers the prospect of refining the norm entrepreneur argument. Second, role theory is believed to provide the theoretical bridge necessary to link structure and agency. This bridging function can help the study of small states overcome its current impasse by painting a more complete picture of the conditions under which small states act in international relations. In turn, these two arguments form the foundation on which a theoretical model, taking Thies’s (2012; 2013; 2015) concept of role socialisation as starting point, will be developed to guide the analysis of the decisions taken by small states’ governments towards peacekeeping deployments. The model also incorporates other analytical tools provided by role theory to investigate how the process of socialisation is domestically negotiated (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016a; Brummer and Thies, 2015). Through this, we will be able to assess the domestic politics behind small states’ contributions to peacekeeping operations.

Role theory originates from social psychology where it has been approached from both a structural and a symbolic interactionist angle (Harnisch, 2011). Its central claim is that states and their leaders conceive their states as having particular functions in the international system. These conceptions, or roles, generate certain behavioural expectations which guide foreign policy actions (Harnisch 2011; Holsti 1970; Walker 1987). Holsti’s work (1970) advanced our understanding of IR by positing that roles, traditionally used to study the behaviours of individuals, could be applied to states. Thereafter, role theorists developed a wide range of concepts including role conception, role enactment (behaviour), role expectation, role demand, role location, role set and role conflict. Combined, these concepts provide researchers with a rich analytical toolbox to explore issues pertaining to policymakers’ own perceptions of their states’ role(s), the origins of roles, how interactions between agents and structures shape roles, role conflicts and how role conceptions inform foreign policy actions (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:3).

In constructing this project, two elements emerged as early indicators that a role theory framework was highly appropriate to understand small states’ foreign policies. First, like other IR sub-fields, small state research often refers to, and uses the language of, roles without exploiting role theory’s ‘rich array of concepts’ to analyse their foreign policy behaviours (see Thies, 2017:664). Already in 1969, Keohane asserted that ‘perception of [one’s] systemic role, more than perception of need for external aid in security, seems to
shape small powers’ distinctive attitudes towards international organizations’ (p.297). Following Keohane’s lead, small state researchers have long understood that ideational considerations such as identity, status, norms and/or strategic culture were important to small states’ leaders when developing foreign policy. However, one thing that a review of the literature has shown is that focusing exclusively on ideational or material concerns will only lead to a partial understanding of their international positions and actions. Neither can be prioritised at the expense of the other. This leads us onto role theory’s second advantage in that both ideational and material factors contribute to state leaders’ conceptions of their international roles. Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) capture this point well at multiple levels of analysis by pointing out that ‘roles also combine ideational and material factors to get to the bottom of how leaders’ conceptions of their country’s place in the world interact with both ideational and material constraints from outside of its borders’ (p.4). Therefore, a role theory framework can provide insights complementing IR theories into the effects of state size on foreign policy behaviour by considering how decision-makers in small states understand the implications of having fewer material capabilities through the conception of roles for their states. As Breuning (2007) notes, ‘classifications of states into small, middle and great powers are often as much about the roles states play in international politics as about objective power differences’ (p.159).

3.2 Moving Beyond a Constructivist Understanding of Small States’ Foreign Policy Behaviour

If, in 2003, Kaarbo noted that ‘the study of foreign policy has taken an ideational turn … consistent with much of the constructivist perspective’, those interested in the foreign policy choices of small states have not missed the turn (p.159). These scholars assumed that small states’ lack of material capabilities made it logical to pivot towards ideas and other non-material factors as likely sources of their foreign policies. The focus shifted towards how perceptions of vulnerability translated into ideas about the nation, and on how these ideas were constructed and articulated in the domestic political discourses of small states with consequences for their external behaviours (Gstöhl, 2002:21). As argued by Goetschel (2013) ‘for small states, ideas are both constitutive of their national identity (as for other states too) and a crucial foreign policy instrument to achieve their foreign policy objectives’ (p.262). Thus, the issue of state identity was increasingly recognised as a significant factor influencing many of small states’ foreign policy priorities and strategies. It permitted researchers to challenge the neorealist assumptions that small states are rational and unitary actors exclusively acting in accordance with the requirements of the international system. Instead, it was argued that small state size is not a natural condition, but one that is socially constructed and historically interpreted through collective perceptions of vulnerability (Wendt, 1999). This constructivist perspective explores how ‘smallness’ is given meaning(s)
to form a national identity informing and guiding the state’s interests on the international scene (Lee, 2006:23). A small state identity can be defined as ‘a product of past behaviour and images and myths linked to it which have been internalised over long periods of time by the political elite and population of a state’ (Goetschel, 1998:28).

Nonetheless, small state research has relied excessively on the concept of identity with the effect of obfuscating the variety of ways in which small states perceive themselves in the international system. Browning (2006) had hypothesised that ‘smallness’ can be constructed differently in different identity narratives, with different narratives in turn entailing different implications for state action’ (p.669). However, it now appears that all (Western European) small states cultivate a similar identity, displaying commitments to ‘a multilateral and non-military approach to security policy based on ideals of conflict resolution, peaceful coexistence and a just world order’ (Wivel, 2005:395). This identity has been the basis for their high levels of peacekeeping contribution. This uniformity is partly due to scholars identifying the sources small states’ distinct identity in their geopolitical position, either on the periphery or at the heart of big power politics, limited material capabilities (Ingebritsen, 2002) and social democratic institutions (Katzenstein, 1985). Unfortunately, these findings improve little upon previous realist perspectives as small state identity appears to flow directly from inherent and material conditions of international weakness. This establishes a close link between small states’ international weakness, the construction of a particular identity and their behaviour as entrepreneurs of peaceful and environmental norms (Ingebritsen, 2002). Campbell and Hall’s (2009) argument reflects this flaw by suggesting that the strength of national identity in small states is dependent upon the degree to which the state is perceived as vulnerable. Can we continue to assume that small states’ intrinsic characteristics generate an identity as ‘good international citizen’ and, therefore, that all small states have a ‘natural’ predisposition motivating them to relinquish national interests in favour of acting impartially and peacefully towards international conflicts? This is not to deny the influence of identity as a factor on the foreign policy of small states nor that small states represent the weaker side in asymmetrical relationships. Instead, the contention is that some constructivists have failed to recognise the presence of intervening variables contributing to an identity being interpreted in varying ways. There is a need to consider the multiple roles that small states may play in the international system. Banchoff (1999) refers to this when contending that identity-based accounts lack the analytical tools to investigate and specify the content of state identity. Part of the problem is also identified by Kaarbo (2003) who suggests that ‘although many who use the concept of identity try to avoid the individual or psychological level of analysis, identity remains a fundamentally psychological concept in that it concerns the ways in which people (or states) view themselves’ (p.160, original emphasis). This omission obstructs analysts from exploring how, and for what purpose, policy-makers domestically activate some features of national
identity at the expense of others, and how these choices inform foreign policy decisions. In this way, identity-based explanations have reinforced the black-boxing of small states. Research on the norm entrepreneurship of small states has been criticised for omitting agents acting in their domestic political environment. Petrova’s research (2007) is particularly significant because ‘it highlights the important role key individuals play in defining new norms, making use of state identity discourses and thus solidifying or reshaping certain perceptions of the roles states could and should play internationally’ (p.3).

There is much overlap between constructivism and a perspective grounded in role conceptions. The two approaches ‘share in common the wish to move our understanding of foreign policy decision-making beyond the observable material characteristics of states – such as size, military capabilities, or economic performance’ (Breuning, 2011:20). Roles are fundamentally relational and social (Harnish, 2011:8) since individuals and states acquire notions of what is expected of them through interactions (McCourt, 2011:150; Biddle, 1986:69). This is a key reason why the role approach is particularly suitable to the actions of small states as it allows insight into the social dimension of being a small state. This contention rests on the notion that ‘without the experience of social interaction, physical attributes have no meaning’ (Chafetz et al. 1996:736). This point exemplifies what FPA role theorists have identified as ‘a natural connection … between state identity and previous research on role theory’ (Kaarbo, 2003:160). However, roles have often been overlooked by scholars interested in demonstrating the impact of ideational factors on small states’ foreign policies. In order to better conceptualise the relationship between the two approaches, one has to look at the ‘theoretical nexus’ between the concepts of role and identity (Harnisch, 2011:9; Nabers, 2011:82). Although some researchers do not differentiate between the two and use both interchangeably, others argue that a distinction should be drawn pointing to their distinct conceptual properties (Chafetz et al. 1996; Wehner and Thies, 2014:418). The argument has been made that an identity represents ‘something more intrinsic about an actor than a role conception’ (Breuning, 2011:21). While roles emerge through an interactive process with an external Other, the constitution of identity does not necessarily involve interactions with outside actors (Wehner and Thies, 2014:418). When constructivists refer to the Other, it is always ‘from the vantage point of the Self as a means of legitimizing and validating the identity of the self toward the Other’ allowing the claim that the Other lacks agency (Wehner and Thies, 2014:419). Thus, a constructivist account of identity relies too much on the Self (ego) at the expense of investigating how the Self is actively casted into specific roles by the expectations held by Others (alter).

Importantly, McCourt (2011) argues that identity is not necessarily an action-orientated concept (p.1605). This creates difficulty in drawing a direct connexion between state identity and action. McCourt (2011) further contends that agency must be introduced because it is through the conception and adoption of roles by actors that identity is affirmed.
and actions made socially meaningful (p.1608). The affirmation of identity can only occur through social roles leading to the conclusion that roles, especially in the context of small states behaviour, act ‘as methodological tools to capture the links between national identity and foreign policy formulation’ (Goetschel, 2013:263). An identity presents actors with a variety of possible roles but gives no specific information as to which one(s) should be played. Agency is exercised when actors interpret the national identity in which they are embedded, thereby undertaking a selection process ‘to select which of many roles they will attempt to enact in a given situation’ (Wehner and Thies, 2014:419).

This argument is in line with Holsti’s (1970) notion that policy-makers express multiple roles when conducting foreign policy (see also Breuning, 2017, Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016 and Aggestam, 2006). States do not adopt a single role guiding their behaviour in all situations, issue-areas or sets of relationships in contrast to what was generally believed (Holsti, 1970:254). The main reason why a state can play a range of different roles at any one time is that roles have numerous sources. They can emerge from states’ material features such as size (Breuning, 2011) and economic performance (Alden and Schoeman 2013), but also through interactions with external actors (Thies, 2013). Additionally, roles originate from a state’s history, culture and identity (Aggestam, 2006; Krotz, 2015), as well as from domestic political dynamics (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016). Thus, states play numerous roles because they are embedded in different institutional contexts simultaneously, at both domestic and international levels (Aggestam, 2006 and Barnett, 1993). This multiplicity indicates that roles ‘are not exclusively generated by the international distribution of power’, strengthening the possibility that small states’ lack of power is not the only source of self-identification in the international system. (Aggestam, 1999). In other words, although the size of small states may not allow them to play any role they like, their foreign policy-makers are still confronted with a choice over which roles are to be pursued. While introducing much needed diversity in the study of small states, a discussion around the multiplicity of roles adopted by states underlines the potential of role theory to expose, if not link, structure and agency.
3.3 Linking Structure and Agency in the Analysis of Small States: The Promise of Role Theory

The main weakness plaguing small state research today lies in the lack of dialogue between work on the influence of structural factors, on the one hand, and agential determinants, on the other, when accounting for small states’ foreign policy choices. The literature review has cited a number of works which have attempted to go beyond this “either or” approach. Yet, we still lack a framework that explicitly connects international structures and domestic agencies. As a result, we have little insight into how small states’ foreign policies are the products of dynamic relationships between structures and agencies. Role theorists agree that ‘role theory … provides the tools that permit systematic empirical investigation of the relative importance of agent and structure as determinants of foreign policy behaviour’ (Breuning, 2011:16). When confronted with a foreign policy problem, agents will rely on roles for guidance. These roles are informed by both the material environment and the rules provided by political institutions and identities (Aggestam, 2006:14). They also are the products of agents’ own ‘judgement and skill’ (Hollis and Smith, 1990:168). Thus, role theory actively bridges the gap between actor-centric and structural approaches by incorporating ‘the manner in which foreign policy is both purposeful and shaped by institutions context’ (Aggestam, 2006:14). It becomes an indispensable feature to provide small state research with a much needed ‘synthetic framework of analysis…consisting of an intentional, a dispositional and a structural dimension of explanation’ (Carlsnaes, 2007:17; original emphasis). By emphasising ‘the structure of the international and domestic systems, how states and individuals perceive their role(s) within those systems, as well as how the structure affects those perceptions’, role theory effectively exposes ‘the reinforcing nature of agent-structure relationship’ (Below, 2016:27). Through this, the conditions under which small states do exercise disproportionate influence can be uncovered while taking into account the constraints imposed by social and material structures upon their foreign policy scope. Role theory is implemented in the following analyses by exploring how roles are constructed via an interactive process whereby political actors in small states interpret intensifying and novel behavioural expectations emanating from a peacekeeping context in transition while remaining free to formulate their own vision of the role(s) their state should play in international peacekeeping.

Role theory has traditionally been approached from a structural angle stressing the limitations imposed on policy-makers’ choices of roles by the international system (Walker, 1979; 1981). A prevailing notion is that states’ social position in the international system is contingent upon their material capabilities whether militarily or economically defined (Wehner and Thies, 2014:414; McCourt, 2012). Put plainly, Thies (2012) asserts that ‘virtually any role is open to a state that has the capabilities to enact that role’ (p.29). From this perspective, it is easy to see how role theory has been closely connected with research on
national attributes (Wish, 1987) and state size in particular (Adigbuo, 2007; Chafetz et al. 1996). In this way, the size of states has significant consequences for the roles they play in international politics (Breuning, 2011:18; 2017). Importantly, the structural approach has evolved along an interactionist line placing the interactions between a role-seeking state (ego) and other international actors (alter) at the heart of the process through which ego conceives roles for itself. Harnisch (2012) effectively presents this symbolic interactionist view by underlining that ‘the social structure is thick (enough) in world politics for inter- or transnational role expectations to grow’ (p.52). The effects of structures work through the expectations that other actors (alters) have regarding the role(s) that a role-seeking state should occupy. Whether these role expectations emerge from the distribution of capabilities in the system or from institutions, they establish limits on the range of roles that policymakers perceive as acceptable (Aggestam, 2006:18).

The usefulness of an interactionist approach also rests on its ability to bridge agent and structure as external role pressures, generated by ego-alter interactions, prompt agents from role-seeking states to innovate regarding the role(s) they envision their states playing in the system (Aggestam, 2006). Moreover, structural approaches cannot account for the wide variety of roles that states play in the international system (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:4; Breuning, 2017). Agency is exercised through role conception defined as ‘the normative expectations that the role-beholder expresses towards itself, i.e. the ego part’s own definition’ (Aggestam, 2006:19). Foreign policy decision-makers matter in this process. States and their agents are seen as being ‘actively involved in categorizing and classifying themselves’ rather than as objects passively adopting roles imposed upon them by other actors (Aggestam, 1999; Barnett, 1999:276). Thus, role analyses can foster more comprehensive understandings of small states’ behaviours by introducing the notion of agency. However, agency-based approaches risk overlooking ‘structural factors which, one can assume with regard to small states, are particularly constraining in terms of available policy choices’ (Carleanes, 2007:16). This is where role theory is most valuable for small state research as it considers the ability of policy-makers ‘to create, modify, and violate expectations that emerge from and within relations with others and from the limitations of structures’ (Wehner and Thies, 2014:414). In combination with FPA, role theory shows that foreign policy is conducted by ‘situated actors’ who are embedded in various institutional structures that generate expectations of certain role behaviour’ while remaining ‘reflexive vis-à-vis these institutional rules of action’ (Aggestam, 2006:25). Foreign policy-makers in small states should be seen as having the capacity to act creatively within the constraints of a given situation (Wehner and Thies, 2014:414; McCourt, 2012:378). Also, in the FPA tradition, role analysts made significant inroads into ‘more complex understandings of agency’ by examining how roles are internally debated within states and affect decision-making (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016; Brummer and Thies, 2015). Role theorists are
continuously developing new and sophisticated ways to link structure and agency through frameworks incorporating institutional, interactional and intentional perspectives (Aggestam 2006), role socialisation (Thies, 2012; 2013), role contestation (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016) and role learning (Harnisch, 2012). Yet, many role theorists pursue research on either the international/structure or domestic/agency side of role theory, with little engagement between the two. Thus, the two branches of role theory appear to be evolving in interesting and valuable directions but in isolation. The following model builds on this body of original research to make a novel contribution towards strengthening role theory’s analytical capability to bridge structure and agency and help the analysis of small states’ peacekeeping decisions.

3.4 A Socialisation Model for Studying Small States’ Roles in Peacekeeping

3.4.1 The Roles of Small States as Responses to Outside Pressures

Having demonstrated that role theory could help us better explain the foreign policy actions of small states by improving identity-based accounts and bridging structure and agency, our attention now turns to devising a model that fulfils these promises and effectively guides the analysis of peacekeeping deployments initiated by small states’ governments. For this purpose, this project focuses on the way roles emerge through an interactive process between ego (a small state) and alter (other), where the former selects an appropriate role for itself partly in response to the expectations, cues and demands of the latter (Aggestam 2006; Harnisch 2011; McCourt 2012; Wehner and Thies 2014; Beneš and Harnisch 2015; Beasley and Kaarbo, 2017). I draw directly from Thies (2012; 2013; 2015) who developed a role approach to socialisation labelled role location; a process ‘where role expectations of the self and other, role demands of the situation, and cues from the audience all come together to produce a role for the actor and set the conditions for its appropriate enactment’ (Thies, 2013:35). Here, socialisation is conceived as ‘a role bargaining process’ involving both ego choosing a role based on its status and material capabilities and an assessment of that choice by relevant alters expressing role expectations (Thies, 2013:35). This conception of socialisation is used to show how members of an international system emerge and transition from one status to another only after being socialised into certain roles (Thies, 2013:43). A theoretical zoom on role socialisation allows making the general hypothesis that the adaptation of small states to new forms of peacekeeping will be accompanied by socialising efforts led by a range of external actors with a stake in the modern peacekeeping system, thereby expressing views about appropriate peacekeeping behaviour. As it will become clear, this model does not give precedence to role socialisation at the expense of other role dynamics, especially those steered by state agents within their own domestic context. But why does role socialisation form the starting point of the model?
First, role socialisation as developed by Thies (2012; 2013) affords the structure a significant degree of influence in determining any state’s role(s). The structure is the initial determinant, or ‘ultimate arbiter’, of the roles that states can and cannot play in the international system (Thies, 2013:37). Thies (2013) exemplifies its effect on states’ role choice by noting that ‘a state with few capabilities could choose to enact the role of a great power but would be punished by other states acting on structural imperatives’ (p.37). The possession of relatively inferior capabilities by small states establishes a context which conditions, but by no means determines, their positions in the international system and interactions with other states. There is no way around it: any model failing to acknowledge this structural reality will result in a skewed appreciation of the ways they act in international relations.

Second, role socialisation suggests that ‘structures do not exercise direct effects, or act as agents do, but rather affect behavior indirectly through socialisation and competition’ (Thies, 2013:36). An audience of states ensures that ego does not deviate from ‘the expected norms and roles for interaction in the system’ (Thies, 2013:37). To successfully emerge and operate within a system, ego is required to select roles in line with the ‘social reality’ sustained by an audience of states and the role expectations emanating from relevant socialisers. This claim makes an important contribution because it improves upon the neorealist assumption that small states respond principally to a structure defined materially. Furthermore, the norm entrepreneur argument assumes that small states have the capacity to alter the normative structure without paying attention to how this structure constrains their identity construction and normative behaviour in the first place. Therefore, role socialisation usefully emphasises the complementing influence of an ‘intersubjective international structure’ on the roles small states come to play (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012).

Third, a role approach to socialisation sheds light onto the social nature of the interactions taking place in the context of small states’ asymmetrical relationships with more powerful actors. When socialisation occurs, a role relationship is established between a ‘member’ and a ‘novice’ characterised by ‘relative differences in power, status, and prestige’ (Thies, 2012:28). Because a member is well established into its roles and has the capabilities to enact a large number of them, it holds a ‘great’ or ‘regional power’ status and exercises socialising influence upon the ‘novices’ and ‘small members’ present in its sphere of influence (Thies, 2012:28). In contrast, ‘novices are new states that emerge in the system’ while ‘small member states’ represent a higher status typified by ‘a larger number of roles, and more well-developed roles than emerging states’ (Thies, 2013:43). It should be noted that small states will always remain either ‘novices’ or ‘small members’ because of their inability to acquire the capabilities to transition to a ‘major member’ status. Thies (2012) underlines that ‘the asymmetry between the member’s and novice’s views of reality is important because the member largely structures the reality within which the novice must
operate’ (p.28). As established members of the system, great powers have the responsibility of socialising ‘novices’ and ‘small members’ because these small states are unfamiliar with the ‘rules of the game’ and the roles they are supposed to perform in the system (Thies, 2015:288). Therefore, the expectation generated by a role socialisation perspective is that small states will find themselves under ‘high’ to ‘medium socialisation pressure’ leading to their roles being ‘mostly ascribed’ (Thies, 2015:289).

In these ways, role socialisation allows a more complete analysis of how outside pressures come to shape the self-perceptions of small states, an area overlooked by both neorealist and identity-based explanations. We know how small states are keen to portray themselves as, and take on the role of, norm entrepreneur (Ingebritsen, 2002), but there has been limited examination of the ways outside actors have perceived such role and evaluated small states’ normative ambitions. It is not enough for small states to see themselves as international normative agents, they also need to be recognised as such by members of the international community to have any normative impact and legitimacy. This line of argumentation suggests that for small states to be successful norm entrepreneurs, they first need to be norm takers. A consideration of how small states are socialised into international roles moves away from ‘nature’ as the source of small states’ activism towards issues of international peace including peacekeeping. Instead, role socialisation demonstrates that small states are also ‘nurtured’ to act as entrepreneurs of peaceful norms or to perform other roles.

These propositions lead to a more refined understanding of the effects of material capabilities on small states’ foreign policy behaviour. In an article dedicated to the rising power of China, Thies (2015) shows that an increase in material capabilities is accompanied by efforts from the United States to socialise China into specific roles supportive of the system advocated by Washington. Thus, Beijing does not acquire its rising power status independently of social (sometimes conflictual) interactions with the dominant power. Similarly, inferior material resources mean nothing outside ‘the mechanisms of socialisation’ which condition small states (Thies, 2015:287). Small states’ identities, positions in the international system, and foreign policy trajectories, do not flow directly from the possession of limited material resources. It is mediated by patterns of interaction characterised by negotiations with more powerful socialising states to determine appropriate roles and accepted behaviour. IR theories tell us that a lack of material capabilities drive small states to promote international norms, join alliances and/or stay neutral. Yet, small states do not develop nor pursue these strategies independently of relations with other actors or preceding their socialisation into a norm entrepreneur, a faithful all and/or an active independent role respectively.
At this stage, an additional building block needs to be added to the model by clarifying the conception(s) of socialisation used. Thies’s conceptualisation is developed on a critique of the constructivist view of socialisation ‘as a process of inducting actors into norms and rules of a given community’, in other words, as norm internalisation (Checkel, 2005:804). The reasons are that scholars interested in internalisation fail to distinguish whether socialisation is a process or an outcome or both. Nor do they consider that socialisation might include more than norms and that states might adapt their behaviour to meet others’ expectations, but not internalise norms (Thies, 2003). Beasley and Kaarbo (2017) agree with Thies that norm internalisation is ‘problematic’ because ‘it presents too limited a vision: first, with regard to the potential for socialisation to fail; and, second, with regard to the neglect of non-normative aspects’ (p.3). Thies (2003) acknowledges that the content of socialisation ‘could include norms, but might also include roles, beliefs, principles, or rules’ (Thies, 2003:545). In line with this inclusive definition, I argue that norm internalisation is an essential component of role socialisation because explicit role expectations and demands from alters cannot be made outside of a broader normative context. Norms and role expectations are two sides of the same coin. Socialisers rely on common understandings of appropriate behaviour to demand certain roles and socialisees adopt their roles by both meeting alters’ demands and internalising the norms supporting the demands. An example should illustrate this point. According to a role socialisation approach, ‘the role of professor is meaningless without another actor in the role of student’ (Thies, 2003). While this is accurate, it sidesteps the norm(s) that make these roles possible in the first place. It should be added that these roles are meaningless without their normative framework of which the norm of attending classes is most important. A professor is unlikely to be appointed in that position if he or she refuses to teach a class. Nor can he or she expect students to fulfil their role by attending this non-existent class. For their part, students are likely to be expelled, and cast out of their student role, if they fail to show up to class.

Norm internalisation should be incorporated as a mechanism of socialisation into a role approach for two more reasons specific to this project. First, attention to both norms and roles offers a comprehensive view of the socialising influences of institutions. Constructivist research argues that international institutions socialise states by persuading policy-makers to accept and abide by international normative standards (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Barnett (1993) builds on this argument from a role perspective by advancing that ‘it is in the process of interacting and participating within an institutional context that the actor comes to occupy a role’ (p.275). Role theorists have increasingly recognised that international and regional institutions can act as alters expecting adherent and prospective states to adopt certain role behaviours. Those seeking entry into an institution will be pressed to adopt certain roles as a rite of passage to become part of the community. Yet, while there is nothing to suggest that norms have disappeared from this process, role theorists have not sufficiently
looked at the relationship between norms and roles in the socialisation of states by institutions. Folz (2011) is perhaps an exception contending that states change roles as their policy-makers decide to comply with the community norms, thereby internalising new practices and rules. This internalisation prompts actors to re-conceptualise their identities (Folz, 2011:149). Considering that small states prefer to operate within institutions, overlooking the different ways the formers are socialised into the latters would be a serious omission. Second, the peacekeeping policy-area under scrutiny requires a dual consideration of norm internalisation and role adoption. Indeed, Björkdahl (2006) contends that ‘peacekeeping operations are not undertaken in a normative vacuum’ (p.215), but in a context defined by prevailing understandings of appropriate behaviour. If one is to fully understand the attitudes of small states towards peacekeeping, their relationships to dominant peacekeeping norms must be understood as well as the roles they are expected to perform as required by key institutions. This is in keeping with Harnisch (2012) who found that greater institutionalisation of interstate relations, as in the peacekeeping subsystem, causes an increase in the number of external expectations as ‘the proliferation of significant (states), organised (institutions) and generalised (international community) others fosters the density of social expectations’ (p.49).
Crucially, role socialisation is identified in this project as an effective tool to analyse how small states conceive their interests to partake in international peacekeeping. It can unveil the process through which small states decide to deploy their armed forces to peace support operations characterised by new peacekeeping doctrines and practices. A focus on role socialisation in this context requires conceptualising peacekeeping, not only as a policy-area that small states target in their foreign policies, but also as a social subsystem constituted of agents, structures, interactions and a physical environment (Tang, 2014:487). Only by considering peacekeeping as a social subsystem can the transformations within it, and what they mean for small states’ roles, be effectively captured.

The end of bipolarity followed by a succession of peacekeeping failures (physical environment) have triggered changes in the conduct of peacekeeping (structure) and witnessed new actors (agents) entering the subsystem. In turn, the balance of power in terms of who participates in peace operations, with what means and what influence on the ways missions are performed has been altered (structure). In the past, small states had become highly specialised in undertaking traditional peacekeeping. The principles of impartiality, consent and limited use of force fitted well with their own self-conception as entrepreneurs of the norm pertaining to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This suitability and willingness to deploy under these conditions bought small states significant leverage over peacekeeping practices and the rules of engagement under which specific operations took place. However, failures in Rwanda, Kosovo, Somalia and Cambodia exposed a gap between traditional peacekeeping and the need for multifunctional and robust operations to address the complex emergencies of intra-state conflicts involving a range of state and non-state actors. It became doubtful that peace could be established without mandates allowing enforcement tasks and more permissive use of force to protect civilians and peacekeepers as well as to repel spoilers. Consequently, Britain, France, the US and NATO took the lead in devising a new doctrine of ‘grey area operations’ characterised by an agreement on more extensive use of force and different combinations of traditional, consent building (carrots) as well as enforcement (sticks) techniques (Jakobsen, 2000). Therefore, Jakobsen (2007) argues that ‘strategic changes triggered by the end of the cold war and changes at the operational level ‘pulled the rug’ from under’ the traditional approach as practiced by small states, most prominently the Nordic countries (p.459). The argument goes that ‘as peace operations moved from the margins to the centre of Western security policy and many new states, including the permanent members of the UN Security Council, entered the scene, it became impossible for the Nordics [and other small states] to maintain their status as major troop contributors’ (Jakobsen, 2007:459). Nor could they remain in the driving seat of emerging operations, as great powers invested more strategic and material resources in peacekeeping.
than ever before. These (sub)-systemic shifts forced small states out of their traditional peacekeeping roles positioning them as ‘novices’ (Thies, 2013:17). Because small states are no longer familiar with the rules of the game, they ‘must be socialised into appropriate norms, roles, and behaviours for social interaction’ (Thies, 2013:37). Socialisation has hardly been used to account for small states’ motivations and preferences towards international peacekeeping in this new context. One exception is Céu Pinto (2014) who explains Portugal’s increasing positive attitude towards UN peacekeeping after 1974 by pointing to the Portuguese elites having ‘internalised many international peace maintenance and human rights norms’ as a consequence of Lisbon’s participation in the organisation (p.396). This internalisation induced the elites ‘to rearticulate their conceptions of the national interest’ in line with UN values and norms (Céu Pinto, 2014:391). Yet, this analysis does not explore how Portugal was cast into new roles as a result of the Portuguese elites meeting the role expectations emanating from UN actors and the international community.

Céu Pinto’s (2014) emphasis on the UN as a location of socialisation where small states conceive peacekeeping roles by internalising new peacekeeping norms and responding to role demands is, nonetheless, well judged. The UN should be considered as a primary socialiser because it ‘has often taken the lead in building new norms related to international peace and security’ (Björkdahl, 2006:221). It has been at the forefront of peacekeeping reforms through the Security Council decisions, debates in the General Assembly where member states have lobbied for changes in the practice of peacekeeping and initiatives led by various Secretary Generals in introducing new peacekeeping concepts. On specific operations, it is through the UN that the nature of conflicts is defined, and possible solutions identified. Security Council resolutions and UN mandates are key medium through which to convey standards of appropriate peacekeeping behaviour, implicitly casting troop contributing states into certain roles. According to a role socialisation perspective, the UN should also be seen as an alter expecting member states to fulfil certain roles in relations to particular missions. Role relationships between the UN and potential troop contributing states are especially likely to emerge in the context of the UN force generation given that it is ‘a politically charged decision-making process – a back and forth between high-level government officials weighting carefully the pros and cons of a particular peacekeeping deployment’ (Henke, 2016:1). Focusing on force generation creates the expectation that the Secretary General and the UN Peacekeeping Department, as UN actors traditionally in charge of this negotiating process, will communicate role expectations to potential troop contributing countries in order to solicit their participation (Henke, 2016:5). Given their reputation as active peacekeepers, one can anticipate small states to be on the frontline of such role socialising pressures. Following Henke’s (2016) finding that ‘powerful states can be critical in building a credible UN force’, they should also be seen as key socialisers within the formal institutional context of the UN (p.21).
Great powers’ growing interest and involvement in international peacekeeping is relevant in light of another major development whereby ‘a variety of non-UN actors have conducted peace operations’ in cooperation with, but sometimes at the expense of, the UN (Bellamy and Williams, 2005:157). This is an additional feature of the evolving peacekeeping system which leads one to expect that small states will come under more role socialisation than ever before. It represents a response to the UN’s increasing inability to meet the demands of modern peacekeeping due to overstretched capabilities (Dee, 2001). One way the UN has sought to fill the gap has been to authorise regional or international ad hoc coalitions of the willing, formal regional institutions and individual states to lead and carry out peacekeeping operations (Bellamy and Williams, 2005:160; Dee, 2001:2). More worrying for the UN system’s credibility, such arrangements have also acted without UN mandate. Coalitions of the willing can be defined as ‘groups of actors that come together, often around a pivotal state, to launch a joint mission in response to particular crises’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2005:169). They have proven to be an attractive option as formal regional organisations have sometimes been unprepared for deployment, hesitant to engage and/or unable to build consensus amongst their members; all of which have delayed action. Ad hoc coalitions materialise from the impetus of a lead nation which will often be a regional hegemon unwilling to act alone. This hegemon will seek to assemble a force with regional partners to add legitimacy and material strength to an operation (Bellamy and Williams, 2005:169). There is an interesting literature assessing the efficacy of ad hoc coalitions (Ryan, 2002; Wilson, 2003; Morris et al, 1999; Dee, 2001). However, the characteristic of interest here is that they generate a different pattern of interaction among their participants than in UN operations (Greco, 1998:201). Indeed, ‘the risk that the power of some regional hegemons may become consolidated’ is exacerbated in such coalitions where ‘interaction among troop-contributing states is promoted through ad hoc mechanisms’ (Greco, 1998:201). Coalitions create ground for asymmetrical role relationships to form as hegemons attempt to socialise small partners into roles which will induce their contributions to a given operation.

Regional organisations have increasingly taken on peacekeeping and conflict management responsibilities (Bellamy and Williams 2010:301). Focusing on European institutions, the EU emerged as a peacekeeping actor through wider institutional developments designed to provide the Union’s with the capabilities to act externally. Initiated in 1998 with the St Malo declaration in which the UK and France established the
basis on which to build the ESDP, these developments culminated with the Lisbon Treaty which ‘represented the first time a fundamental treaty explicitly referred to the term peacekeeping’ (Brosig, 2014:78). Its Article 43(1) stated that the EU should become an active participant in ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization’ (The Lisbon Treaty, 2007). Thus, the insertion of peacekeeping into the Lisbon Treaty prompted the EU to conceive a wide-ranging approach to peace operations including a ‘fairly comprehensive spectrum of crisis management akin to those of the UN’ (Brosig, 2014:78). NATO engaged in peacekeeping as an inevitable step towards finding a post-cold war rationale in a shifting strategic environment marked by new threats from the Balkans in particular (Tardy, 2006).

While ‘the existing NATO military doctrine corpus’ is heavily relied upon for a peacekeeping strategy, the organisation has invested substantially in the development of a concept which also incorporates a civilian dimension such as disaster relief operations, civil protection, civilian crisis management and peacebuilding (Tardy, 2006:28). Consequently, NATO contributed to transforming peacekeeping into the much wider concept of Peace Support Operation (Frantzen, 2006:2).

By signalling their readiness to engage in the full spectrum of peace operations from traditional to combat activities, the involvement of Euro-Atlantic institutions has reinforced the widening of the peacekeeping concept. Small European states have sought to integrate their armed forces into these regional arrangements following national decisions to restructure and reduce the size of their armed forces (Haaland, 2007:505). This trend has accelerated since the 2008 financial crisis which has compelled small states to divert resources away from defence. Deeper integration allows small states to participate in decision-making and draw on the collective strength generated by the pooling of military and civilian capabilities for peacekeeping purposes. Yet, the capabilities that small states can bring to the table are minimal compared to those of other members. Small states will find it difficult to influence the way EU and NATO missions are conducted in a way they once did in a UN framework. Haaland (2007) underlines that ‘decisions about where to deploy and which rules of engagement to apply will have to be made in cooperation with other countries’ implying that ‘military capabilities count when political decisions are made’ (p.505). Opportunities to weigh in on peacekeeping standards, practices and decisions will be few in a policy-area which has grown more significant in the overall security policies of more powerful member states. Therefore, small states will feel pressured to adapt to the capabilities and operating procedures imposed by larger members at a regional level (Haaland, 2007:505). Remaining on the side lines will increasingly be an unattractive option for small states’ governments which do not want to be seen as unreliable partners in a system they used to lead. Nor do they want to obstruct institutional developments intended to
provide organisations with capabilities to deploy externally by refusing to internalise norms promoted at a regional level. Ultimately, the transformation of the EU and NATO into peacekeeping actors create new sites where small states will undergo role socialisation. Small states’ peacekeeping roles are being renegotiated as institutions advance new peacekeeping norms and practices reflecting larger members’ preferences. This process will intensify as combat-related norms find their way into the EU’s and NATO’s peacekeeping doctrines and come into conflict with small states’ own conception(s) of peacekeeping and their place within it (Wivel, 2005). One strategy that small states can follow is to ‘enhance their political profile’ by acquiring ‘indispensable niche capabilities in short supply’ (Jakobsen, 2007:472). However, this strategy can only be successful if it matches the role expectations embedded in these institutions.

This discussion shows that an increased number of actors is now engaging in peacekeeping activities making the subsystem more crowded than ever before. Small states are no longer the sole entrepreneurs of peaceful norms through active peacekeeping participation. The involvement of numerous international actors in preserving peace in unstable theatres has created a dense normative environment for small states. New relationships have also generated multiple role demands and expectations upon small states. For any given conflict, their policy-makers will find themselves confronted with different interpretations of the situation, perceptions of threats and visions of what is appropriate behaviour to resolve the crisis. Therefore, it can be anticipated that the way(s) small states adapt to changes in the subsystem will partly be out of their hands. A wider range of actors means an increase in socialising pressures resulting in small states’ roles being ‘mostly ascribed’ (Thies, 2015:289).

3.4.3 The Roles of Small States as Role Conceptions

The contention that small states are re-learning their place within the peacekeeping subsystem exclusively through structurally-driven roles is debatable given that ‘most FPA scholars seem to agree that role players are not dupes that merely ‘take on roles’ defined by society’ (Harnisch, 2012:49). A small state’s exposure to, and uptake of, external role demands has real consequences for its conception of its own role. Harnisch (2012) builds on Mead’s approach of symbolic interactionism to demonstrate that, in interacting with various alters, ego is not ‘a passive recipient of social rules’, but undergoes a process of self-reflection whereby it becomes ‘an active interpreter of social attitudes’ (p.53). Nonetheless, states have no interpretative capacities of their own. Agents working on their behalf in various agencies and operating within a wider domestic and foreign policy-making setting do. It becomes necessary to move beyond role theory’s tendency to black-box the state and heed its practitioners’ recent calls ‘to integrate a more complex understanding of agency into its analyses by opening up heretofore ignored domestic political processes’ (Cantir and
Kaarbo, 2016:6; see also Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012; 2013; Harnisch, 2011; 2012; Brummer and Thies, 2015; Jones, 2017). Delving into internal role dynamics offers the prospect of uncovering ‘the process whereby a NRC [or role] is selected to represent the state’ (Brummer and Thies, 2015:273). For Cantir and Kaarbo (2016), it holds the key for effectively bridging structure and agency because ‘a proper understanding of the complexity of the ego and alter is as necessary as analysing their interaction’ (p.16). They contend that ‘black-boxing the state … could obscure the dynamics occurring within an agent’ which ‘more likely than not influence the process of interaction’ (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:16). From this perspective, the socialisation of small states into new peacekeeping roles can partly explains their adjusting behaviours towards new forms of peacekeeping. Accounts must incorporate an understanding of how socialising efforts to cast small states into certain roles are perceived by different agents of small states (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:6). Policy-makers’ perceptions are key, shaping the domestic processes through which roles are conceived, defined and selected (Breuning, 1997, 2011). The gist of the argument is well captured by Brummer and Thies (2015): ‘even if external actors attempt to persuade a country to adopt a certain role, it is within the domestic political system that potential NRCs are debated and contested, ultimately yielding an official NRC for the country’ (p.277).

Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) incorporate insight from existing FPA research on the relationship between government and opposition, foreign policy under multiparty coalitions, and bureaucratic politics to investigate how roles are domestically generated, contested and selected (p.9). Such headway provides a unique opportunity to open up the black boxes that are small states. It becomes possible to draw on, and complement, the growing research dedicated to demonstrating the influence of domestic determinants on small states’ foreign policies (see review). Importantly, the point at which external socialisation enters the domestic realm is also where societal sources of roles including culture (Aggestam, 2004), historical experiences (Krotz, 2015), national identity and values (Fazendeiro, 2016) interact with agents’ perceptions. At this stage also, more immediate political, financial and institutional considerations involved in deciding to deploy a peacekeeping force will weigh in on agents as they conceive a role for the state with regard to a particular mission. Given this complexity involved in the role conception process, Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) are accurate in emphasising the unlikelihood that domestic actors will agree about which role is most appropriate for the state. Each state agent will perceive socialisation attempts differently, diverge in their interpretations of domestic role expectations emanating from various sources and prioritise different peacekeeping imperatives. This justifies exploring how roles are contested horizontally, amongst elites, and vertically, between elites and masses (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:9). Moreover, as small states come under increasing pressure to participate in controversial operations involving elements of combat and peace enforcement, their traditional political consensus on defence, security and peacekeeping
participation will weaken (Haaland, 2007:506). Vertical contestation is likely to occur as publics in small state find it difficult to approve shifts away from traditional peacekeeping roles pursued by their elites in response to international partners’ demands for solidarity in a wider range of missions. Nonetheless, I take a step back from Cantir and Kaarbo’s emphasis on contestation given the diverging expectations regarding the degree of consensus or disagreement in small states’ foreign policy-making. This project still follows their lead in drawing from FPA research on government and opposition, foreign policy in small groups and under multiparty coalitions as well as on bureaucratic politics, but to investigate how roles are internally negotiated, rather than contested (author’s emphasis). The objective is to analyse the effects of role socialisation on internal role dynamics, and to understand how these dynamics influence the decisions that small states’ governments take on peacekeeping deployments. It is about studying the pathway through which domestic actors respond to external role pressures and use resulting role conceptions domestically in interactions with other actors to inform peacekeeping behaviours. Whether role socialisation drives domestic consensus or disagreement over roles in the foreign policy-making of small states on peacekeeping remains an understudied issue. This project will address it empirically.

3.4.4 The Missing Link: Foreign Policy-Making Unit

While in agreement with Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) that ‘the impact of international norms and role structures is not automatic, as it is shaped by the agents in the domestic political process’ contesting roles, I contend that role theory requires additional analytical tools to effectively link structure and agency. By pursuing research on either the structure or domestic side of role theory with limited dialogue between the two, role theorists risk reinforcing the divide they are meant to be bridging. Harnisch (2012) has already pointed out that ‘FPA role theoreticians have implicitly assumed that roles are either ego/agent or alter/structure-driven entities’ (p.48). To escape this pitfall, the present model incorporates a final building block in the form of the foreign policy-making unit composed of the head of state (Prime Minister), Foreign Minister and Defence Minister. The logic is akin to Hermann and Hermann’s (1989) when developing their typology of decision-making units in that, like other international influences, socialisation attempts have to be ‘channelled through the political structure of a government’ via a unit with agency capable of conceiving, selecting and enacting roles (p.362). The first reason why focusing on this foreign policy-making unit might be a productive way forward is that it recognises that who the decision-makers in power are matters for the selection of roles. For instance, different unit configurations are likely to result in different role choices, as members differ in their perceptions of external attempts to impose a role on their state. Thus, attention is given to the composition of the unit in terms of who the members are including their party affiliations and political backgrounds. This project offers some indications of the members’ foreign policy outlook to
uncover how their identities might influence the role statements they make (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:8).

The second reason is that these governmental posts ‘tend to be the positions most likely to influence the debate about the proper NRC for the state’ (Brummer and Thies, 2015:278). Furthermore, decision-making processes have been overlooked in explanations of states’ contributions to peacekeeping (Velázquez, 2010). Velázquez (2010) argues that, because peacekeeping ‘involves the willingness by states to use military force, even if the intentions are benign, peaceful, or defensive in nature’, the two key governmental bureaucracies likely to shape decisions to participate in a peacekeeping operation are the defence and foreign ministries (p.171). This exposes an overlap in terms of the most influential actors shaping both national roles and peacekeeping decisions.

Third, the foreign policy-making unit straddles international and domestic spheres where role expectations from external and domestic actors converge to be interpreted and responded to. This makes it a suitable governmental location to study the effects of role socialisation on coalition, bureaucratic and leadership dynamics, and determine whether external role expectations foster consensus or conflict amongst small states’ governing elites. It is a necessary first step before analysing role processes between governments and masses on the one hand, and political oppositions on the other, because what initially goes on inside the unit determines the shape of the wider domestic debate. For instance, if unit members reach a consensus over a role informing their decision to deploy a combat element, a common front will be established which the political opposition in parliament and the wider public will find difficult to contest (Kreps, 2010). Additionally, the unit is the primary receiver of external role demands and acts as a filter through which role pressures from outside the state are framed in ways compatible with the role expectations held by domestic audiences. In much the same way as elite responsiveness is key for public opinion to affect a government’s foreign policy decisions (Dimitriu and de Graaf, 2016), if socialisation is to have any impact on foreign policy-making and the domestic debate, unit members have to be responsive to external role demands while outside norms must also resonate with their foreign policy outlooks and orientations (Folz, 2011). This perspective is in keeping with the process of peacekeeping force generation whereby a request for a troop contribution based on certain roles is initially addressed to the head of state and/or the cabinet members in charge of foreign policy, following both formal and informal contacts between these elites and the actor leading the mission. The general population and parliament are informed by this governing elite only after a formal demand has been extended and informal discussions have already taken place amongst these three agents.

Most small European states are parliamentary democracies entailing that the unit’s authority will often be shared amongst at least two parties. The Prime Minister, Foreign and Defence Ministers will belong to different parties since these are the posts most sought after
during coalition negotiations (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:13). One might expect these agents to disagree over roles because ‘role contestation may stem from party ideology and be institutionalised in electoral platforms’ (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:13; Brummer and Thies, 2015:278). On the other hand, they might also be driven to agree on roles in order to avoid deadlock which might jeopardise the coalition’s chances of remaining in power. Importantly, Willigen (2016) has already observed that ‘coalition politics determines for a large part the [Dutch government’s] decision to participate or not to participate’ in UN peacekeeping (p.717). Because unit members might be acting within cabinet as representatives of their respective bureaucracy, they can often advocate roles supporting the interests of their respective organisation (Brummer and Thies, 2015:278). Looking at Chinese foreign policymaking, Jones (2017) found that ‘different bureaucracies within China adhered to different NRCs’ and that ‘role conceptions appear to broadly coincide with each actor’s respective bureaucratic interests’ (p.14). Velázquez (2010) expects relations between civilian and military bureaucracies to play a significant part in national decisions to take peacekeeping action because they ‘often have different views of the world and sometimes disagree when force must be used’ (p.171). Generally, foreign ministries tend to emphasise diplomatic solutions and are inclined not to promote the use of force to resolve crises (Velázquez, 2010:171). Thus, they may display a wariness towards highly robust peacekeeping deployments and seek alternatives in more civilian roles within an operation’s division of labour. However, diplomatic organisations are keen to entertain good diplomatic relations with international partners and seek international visibility and prestige through peacekeeping, making them inclined to accept external role expectations. Armed forces may display a preference for engagements in large multilateral coalitions with robust mandates. This is because militaries, especially in small states, can gain valuable military experience in challenging environments and improve their capabilities by collaborating with larger counterparts, thereby strengthening their raison d’être towards domestic constituencies seeking to downgrade them. For instance, small European states’ militaries have been increasingly dissatisfied with the slow pace of peacekeeping deployments under the UN flag as they have required long term commitments and drawn on little of their military expertise. In turn, NATO and EU have become their preferred frameworks of deployment. It should be noted; however, it is not necessarily the case that militaries prefer the use of force to solve crises (Velázquez, 2010:172). Finally, there is very limited, if any, research on the impact of individual decision-makers on peacekeeping decisions. Yet, role theorists have hypothesised that leaders including their decision-making styles and personalities can have important leeway on role conceptions and the way they are advocated domestically. It has already been suggested that the small size of bureaucracies in small states do not impose strong constraints on executives allowing an individual decision-maker with institutional power, diplomatic skills, an interest in foreign policy and charisma to have significant influence on his or her
country’s foreign policy (Hey, 2002:222). As a result, it may not be surprising to witness a predominant leader pushing his or her preferred national role(s) through the domestic system of a small state in order to shape its peacekeeping trajectory.

3.5 Conclusion

Figure 1 summarises and illustrates the role theoretical model developed in this chapter to better explain small states’ foreign policy decisions to participate in modern peacekeeping operations. A crisis is deemed necessary for the whole process to begin because it prompts international actors to act, thereby translating international structures into role expectations directed at smaller prospective contributing countries. Importantly, the conclusion of this thesis (chapter 11) completes and refines the model in light of the findings emerging from the case studies.

The model is founded on a critique of the constructivist argument that small states’ foreign policies reflect primarily their common identity. Constructivists rightly emphasise the social construction of small state size. However, they fail to demonstrate theoretically and empirically the full extent of the social and relational nature of identity construction. Therefore, I argue that small states’ foreign policies are not guided by one uniform and unchanging identity, but by a range of different identities which change over time as a result of external bargaining and domestic negotiation. I further contend that constructivists are missing an important step in their endeavour to show that identity influence the behaviour of small states. In fact, the notion of role is essential for policy-makers to make sense of who they are, and what function their states should fulfil, in the international system. This is additionally relevant for small states which have been socially disoriented by the changing nature of peacekeeping and, therefore, must re-learn their position as international peacekeepers. Finally, this chapter makes an important theoretical contribution by bridging socialisation and domestic negotiation in a way not achieved before by role theory research.
Figure 1 A Role Theoretical Model for Understanding Small States’ Peacekeeping Decisions
CHAPTER FOUR METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodological approach used to translate role theory into a suitable instrument for the empirical analyses of peacekeeping decisions taken by Austria and Belgium. Role theory’s lack of agreed-upon methodology has led to criticisms that it is methodologically underdeveloped (Walker, 1979:176). Breuning (2017) recently argued that role research is not so much methodologically poor as it is ‘eclectic’, since role theorists have used a wide range of existing social research methodologies to capture the influence of roles on foreign policy behaviour including game theory, process-tracing, as well as narrative and interpretive analysis (p.7). The fact is that a number of methodological questions remain unanswered: What sources should be sought to observe roles? What qualifies as a role? Are the same roles present across different historical periods, geographical areas or issue-areas? Should roles be considered as independent or dependent variables? Should researchers analyse the meanings given to roles by foreign policy actors? Can and should roles be distinguished from policy? Although the main contributions of this project are not methodological, some of these issues must be addressed in order to present a transparent and sound research strategy for the following empirical analyses. It represents a first step towards future and more comprehensive efforts for methodological development in role research.

4.2 Methodological Review

The value of Holsti’s (1970) original article lies largely in its methodological dimension. Holsti constructed the first role typology by inductively coding, and providing examples of, statements made by foreign policy-makers when depicting the position of their states in the international system. His research demonstrated that rhetoric of high level foreign policy officials could serve as indicators of roles (Breuning, 2017:21). Holsti’s seventeen-role typology provided the basis for many subsequent role theorists, especially those interested in quantitative analyses designed to measure the frequency at which foreign policy elites express certain roles (Catalinac, 2007; for a critique of this approach see Kaarbo and Cantir, 2012:9). In fact, systematic content analysis has been a widespread methodology for applying role theory. Researchers working in this tradition have either used Holsti’s typology or devised their own role template (Breuning, 1995; Hansel and Moller, 2015) to identify and code roles from a wide range of sources including policy documents, parliamentary debates, speeches and interviews. The data obtained is quantitatively or qualitatively connected to the foreign policy behaviour under scrutiny allowing inferences to be made about the explanatory power of roles.
Interest in the relationship between the international structure and roles prompted Walker (2011) and Thies (2013) to develop formal models grounded in game theory in order to guide their empirical investigations of the interactive process through which states bargain amongst each other to locate their roles. Thies (2013) complements his socialisation model with an analytic narrative approach allowing him to examine the historical record and document the path from foreign policy crisis to role location and enactment. This approach is refined by Wehner and Thies (2014) who incorporate the concepts of dilemma, narrative and tradition. Their narrative analysis is effective at reconstructing foreign policy actors’ interpretations of events as they draw on existing traditions to recast their roles when confronted with a dilemma. The historicism of their methodology is shared by Krotz (2015), whose qualitative historical strategy is suited to coding the ‘domestically-anchored’ and historically constructed roles of France and Germany. Krotz (2015) focuses on ‘various types of empirical data’ to ascertain the influence of ‘historical domestic constructions’ on national interests.

Theoretical developments which have brought domestic role processes more sharply into focus have required methodological adaptation. The methodological advances made by Thies, Wehner and Krotz underline the benefits of the case study approach to empirically demonstrate the influence of roles on foreign policies. Cantir and Kaarbo’s (2016) edited volume compiles a number of case studies carried out through process-tracing, secondary historical research and structured comparisons to analyse the effects of role contestation on the foreign policy decision-making of a wide range of states. Below (2016) also combines a case study strategy with process-tracing and structure-focused comparisons to understand the decision-making of Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina in the issue-area of environmental foreign policy. However, Below (2016) argues that case study is well suited to discovering the sources of role conceptions where roles are dependent variables as opposed to independent variables. This approach is conducive to testing whether known assumptions about role formation apply to these Latin American cases in policy-areas of ‘low politics’, thereby, helping generate new hypotheses (Below, 2016:34).

Intellectual shifts towards internal role dynamics have also led role scholars to take on more interpretivist approaches by considering different ways in which actors have re-interpreted existing roles. This became essential as it emerged that decision-makers do not necessarily abandon entrenched roles but reinterpret them to fit new conditions or demands. Attention shifted towards examining the multiple ways actors re-interpret dominant roles. Oppermann (2012) contends that, although Germany maintains a civilian power role, German decision-makers have increasingly had more opportunities for ‘creative role interpretations’ (p.506; see also Harnisch, 2012). McCourt (2011) goes a step further advancing a reflexive analysis, which not only considers the roles held by British foreign policy actors, but also investigates the political effects of analysts and commentators when
 invoking Britain’s international role (p.146). His argument suggests that descriptions of Britain’s role in the world by policy-makers, academics and journalists are political performances advocating a particular course of action. The static language used in these descriptions stereotypes the UK’s international position and obstructs discussion around the more pressing issues of foreign policy objectives, capabilities, instruments and ethics. While a linguistic ‘therapy’ founded on a critical social constructivist approach can help deconstruct the ‘tropes’ and ‘clichés’ characterising the language around the UK’s foreign policy, a sociological approach is also necessary to investigate the structure of the British foreign policy establishment as a possible source of foreign policy continuity (p.147). Similarly, Teles Fazendeiro (2016) conceptualises roles as comprising a narrative component which are ‘sources of understanding’ constitutive of the ‘world out there’ (p.488). The author shows that the role scholarship, through role attribution, plays an important part in creating narratives and reproducing particular understandings of states. Role researchers are encouraged to be more reflexive when attributing roles ‘to increase awareness of the “world”-making power of roles’ (p.492).

4.3 Methodological Approach

This project considers roles as social constructions which emerge historically through interactions between foreign policy actors at both international and domestic levels. It does not fully embrace an interpretivist perspective as roles are afforded some degree of independent “reality”. Roles already are interpretations of a national culture, identity and international expectations which ‘generate motivational dispositions’ (McCourt, 2011:1605). They do not need to be reinterpreted to cause effects on behaviour. This ontological standpoint aligns with the project’s aim of studying the causal mechanisms through which actors carrying pre-existing roles influence the decision-making of small states on peacekeeping deployments. The project has two empirical parts dedicated to Austria and Belgium. Both proceed along the same format involving three stages. Each stage is characterised by its own methodology. The overall methodological strategy emulates Below’s (2016) ‘multi-method approach’ combining content analysis of UN speeches and case study methodology. An initial step using Wehner and Thies’s (2014) narrative analysis is introduced as foundation.

At every stage, roles are independent variables hypothesised to explain the dependent variable: small states’ peacekeeping behaviour. It should have become clear that roles do not affect outcomes directly, or independently of other material and ideational factors at the system, domestic and individual levels. In this way, I concur with Krotz (2015) who points out that roles ‘will mingle with other causal forces in moulding national interests and foreign policies’. Determining the exact combination of factors is an empirical question focused on a particular policy-area and time. Thus, the aim of this research is not to test how
well role theory competes with alternative explanations, but to analyse how roles intersect with financial, geopolitical, institutional and normative considerations in decision-making on peacekeeping deployments. Doing so will provide clues about the causal proximity of roles to the dependent variable (Krotz, 2015).

The complexity of modern conflicts and conflict resolution strategies makes it inadequate to reduce the dependent variable to ‘participation’ versus ‘non-participation’ in peace operations. Nor do quantifiable indicators, such as the number of troops deployed, sufficiently capture the nature of the commitment made by TCCs. Governments contemplating participation in peacekeeping are required to weigh up an increasing number of considerations beyond the mere number of troops intended for deployment. These include whether the mission has an observing, peacekeeping or enforcement mandate, the conditions for the use of force, the risks to troops and the activities to be performed once on the ground. Analytically, the dependent variable is disaggregated into three components, namely the number of troops deployed, the mission’s framework and the operational role of peacekeepers. Therefore, roles are expected to explain small states’ choices on these three dimensions. In combination, they form a robust indicator of a state’s attitude towards a mission and the type of peacekeeping it involves. The rest of the chapter details each stage in turn justifying the methodological choices involved in their design.

4.3.1 Stage 1: Identifying National Roles

The first stage identifies the traditional foreign policy roles of Austria and Belgium using Wehner and Thies’s (2014) concepts of narrative, tradition and dilemma. Roles are inductively extracted through historical research of secondary material relating to Austria’s and Belgium’s post-war foreign policy traditions. Based on Bevir et al. (2013)’s assertion that ‘agency always occurs against a particular historical background that influences it’, Wehner and Thies (2014) argue that a tradition represents a useful analytical focal point because it ‘encompasses the historical inheritance (or patterns) as the starting point for human activity, in which individuals act and reason’ (p.416). Thus, traditions can be defined as the first (yet not the only) ‘sets of understandings an actor receives during socialization’ but which can be modified through agency. The investigations focus on dilemmas because they are critical points at which actors reassess national roles in light of new developments by drawing on existing traditions. It is around dilemmas that roles manifest themselves most clearly. While I initially relied on Holsti’s typology to link traditions with roles, it quickly became apparent that his role conceptions did not sufficiently match those of Austria and Belgium, especially as both reassessed their roles after 1989. This underlines the main drawback of Holsti’s typology. Having been constructed in a cold war setting, it does not fully reflect the roles played by states under a multipolar system (Below, 2016:44). Consequently, I also drew on roles found in other empirical analyses. The key benefit of
inductively searching for roles in small states’ foreign policy traditions lies in the prospect of discovering roles so far unrecorded. In this way, this research takes a first step towards updating Holsti’s typology by mapping a new pool of roles better suited to the current international system. It offers an up-to-date foundation for future empirical role analyses.

This stage does not seek to reconstruct narratives as intended by Wehner and Thies’s (2014), but to catalogue, define and provide examples of the roles that both small states are expected to play in their approach to peacekeeping. It contributes to the overall framework developed in chapter 3 by providing a repertoire of roles towards which governing decision-makers and other domestic actors are likely to turn to when confronting with peacekeeping dilemmas. Traditions and associated prevailing roles are identified from an extensive body of historical and contemporary research. In line with the argument that states enact multiple roles simultaneously, the role theory literature often refers to states as having a number of ‘role sets’ which themselves comprise several individual roles. Role sets are held concurrently and are linked to different audiences and policy-areas in which the state is engaged in. The argument has been made that states have ‘a dominant role set and a secondary one’ in which some roles can be added, others reinforced or discredited and abandoned (Adigbuo, 2007:91). What this discussion indicates is that certain roles are more dominant than others in that they are referred to by policy-makers on a more regular basis and, therefore, have a stronger influence on the state’s foreign policy orientation and decisions. It also implies that roles, and their articulation, can be measured. The present research follows a similar logic since it attempts to identify the most important roles (“prevailing roles”) which inform foreign policy-making. Yet, these “prevailing roles” have not been identified by rigorously measuring their frequency, but through comprehensive inductive research which has allowed a judgement to be made about their significance for policy-makers and the decision-making process.

These are important roles to identify given that they will ultimately feed into the discourse surrounding Austria’s and Belgium’s participation in modern peacekeeping operations. This stage functions as a codebook signposting the type of evidence that one expects to observe and code in UN speeches and other statements selected for the case studies. The option of developing a role typology suited to the policy-area of peacekeeping was considered in light of Breuning’s (1995) argument that ‘it is important to study national role conceptions in relation to a specific policy’ (p.237). The decision was made not to follow Breuning’s lead for the main reason that peacekeeping remains in the realm of security policy which inspired initial role typologies in the first place. It will be shown that the foreign policy roles found in the cases can easily be transposed to the policy-area of peacekeeping. Moreover, a central theme of this research suggests that the boundary between peacekeeping and other types of foreign interventions are becoming ever more blurry. This makes devising a new typology unnecessary and potentially obstructive to capturing relevant
roles. Another downside of designing a new typology specifically for peacekeeping is that it is likely to prevent generalisation in the broader fields of IR and FPA.

4.3.2 Stage 2: Determining Governments’ Role Inclination

The second stage involves content analyses of speeches given by Austrian and Belgian foreign policy officials at the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Each content analysis is the foundation of its associated case study (table 2). The speeches selected are those given by the administration which took the decision under investigation in the following case study. Initially, only those given in the lead up to the decision were selected. However, because in some cases the decision came relatively quickly after the government came into office, giving officials no opportunity to make statements at the UN, all the speeches made by an administration at the UN were retained regardless of whether these were given before or after the decision. The goal is not to identify the cause of the decision under scrutiny by measuring the frequency at which a particular administration was expressing certain roles. This stage simply seeks to provide initial indication as to the role inclination of an administration and to offer examples of how roles are articulated. The results are presented in tables (see appendix) and should be considered as complementary to the domestic political background of each decision. This is an important stage given that the framework emphasises central role-conceiving function of the foreign policy-making unit. The assumption is that roles may fluctuate from one government to another. As new political actors arrive in office following an election, they may bring with them a different foreign policy orientation and role preferences.

Although stage one provides information about the roles likely to appear in the speeches, the main difficulty of this approach is to determine what type of statement should be regarded as a role. The decision to code for a role was informed by Hansel and Moller’s (2015) criteria specifying that the word ‘Austria’ and ‘Belgium’ (or a substitute term such as “We,” “Us,” or “Our”) had to be present. Statements also had to indicate a ‘particular responsibilities or functions … [either Austria or Belgium] performs in the international system’ (p.82; emphases added). Below’s (2016) choice to code statements making ‘specific reference to the country’s place in the international or regional system’ was also useful to approach the material (p.33; emphasis added). The principal risk involved here is to code statements that are not expressions of roles. This is particularly acute when using UN speeches as national policy-makers often speak in the name of the international community making general observations about the state of the international system. Hansel and Moller’s (2015) primary criteria should alleviate this problem. Nonetheless, the General Assembly and Security Council, of which Austria and Belgium were non-permanent members at times covered by the analyses, are rare opportunities for small states’ policy-makers to promote the contributions made by their country to relevant international issues such as peacekeeping.
Speeches made in these arenas are, therefore, likely to articulate roles. UN speeches also offer a systemic source of evidence in the English language allowing for more valid and robust comparisons to be made.

Table 2 Overview of Content Analyses and Associated Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Studies</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Speaker(s)</th>
<th>No of Speeches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Chad</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>Gusenbauer</td>
<td>U. Plassnik, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2009-2012</td>
<td>Faymann I</td>
<td>M. Spindelegger, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL II</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>Verhofstadt II</td>
<td>G. Verhofstadt, Prime Minister; K. De Gucht, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malian Crisis</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2012-2014</td>
<td>Di Rupo</td>
<td>E. Di Rupo, Prime Minister</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.3 Stage 3: Connecting National Roles to Peacekeeping Behaviour

The final stage involves case studies of two peacekeeping decisions made by different Austrian and Belgian governments using process-tracing methodology and structured-focused comparisons. Below (2016) uses this methodology to investigate the effects of Latin American presidents, mediated by domestic and international factors, on role formation in the area of environmental foreign policy (p.33-35). Yet, the case studies undertaken here do not seek to identify the origins of roles. Rather, drawing on Thies’s (2013) emphasis on process, their purpose is to reconstruct ‘the stream of events’ through which roles became salient in the decision-making and informed governmental actors in their decisions to involve their country in peacekeeping missions. Having identified and narrowed down the pool of roles likely to be played by Austria and Belgium in stage one and two respectively, stage three employs case studies to connect roles to foreign policy behaviour (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:20). Like most IR subjects of inquiry, the national decision to deploy peacekeeping troops to a conflict zone is a complex phenomenon involving interactions amongst numerous material and ideational factors present across multiple levels of analysis (Bennett and Elman, 2007:171). This is a challenge most effectively dealt with using process-tracing since the aim of this methodology is to ‘understand the processes linking the different relevant factors to the outcome’ (Ulriksen and Dadalauri, 2016:224). It is highly effective at uncovering what stimuli actors are responsive to (George and Bennett
The method is, therefore, suited to disentangling how roles interact with other peacekeeping factors to motivate Austrian and Belgian actors’ peacekeeping decisions. Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) argue that process-tracing ‘may be useful in identifying the causal mechanisms through which role contestation affects a country’s foreign policy decision-making process or behaviour’ (p.20). Thies (2013) adds that ‘the process-tracing procedure applies … also to collective actors in regional or international systems’ (p.26). Thus, process-tracing is well equipped to meet the empirical demands of this project, generated by its multi-level theoretical framework, of demonstrating how external socialisation of peacekeeping roles interact with domestic dynamics of role conceptions within Austria and Belgium.

The notion of “role compatibility” is recurrent throughout the case studies (and the previous methodological phases of this project). To clarify what is meant by “role compatibility”, it is useful to consider that roles may be incompatible with one another, which is referred to as interrole conflict when ‘an individual [or state] finds himself [itself] concurrently in two or more positions requiring contradictory role enactments’ (Thies, 2009; original emphasis). In this research, the expectation is that certain roles demanded by a peacekeeping context which is likely to place a premium on more comprehensive and robust operations might be incompatible with small states’ traditional roles associated with good international actorness (Wivel, 2005). Role incompatibility (or compatibility) in the context of peacekeeping might also emerge when considering who to partner with (Pedersen, 2018) and what tasks are to be performed. For instance, small states will likely struggle to reconcile a Global System Collaborator (GSC) and a humanitarian actor role if the UN demands peacekeeping troops to perform enforcement activities. In a historical perspective, roles tied to neutrality are incompatible with the role of loyal ally because the latter implicates participation in great power politics. Yet, roles are not entirely independent of the interpretation given to them by their emitters. In fact, Thies (2009) notes that ‘mechanisms must be found to prevent the dysfunction that would result from the incompatibility among the roles’ (p.7). This means that agents can actively fashion “role compatibility” by reinterpreting and discursively adapting the meanings attached to roles, or what it means to play the neutral role, for example.

The ambition behind undertaking four case studies is to produce comparable data on small states’ decision-making towards peacekeeping deployments. To ensure comparability, the case studies are ‘structured’ around a set of general questions reflecting the research objective of understanding the peacekeeping behaviour of small states (George and Bennett, 2005:67). They are also ‘focused’ in that they address only features that the theoretical framework sheds light on, in this case, the relationship between external role socialisation and domestic role processes (George and Bennett, 2005:67, 70). The following questions, and their connection to the role theory framework, were used to guide in each case study:
What are the root causes of the conflict under scrutiny and how has the peacekeeping mission emerged?

This question is designed to provide background information on the conflict that the mission being studied was set up to address. Its answer helps map out the main international actors that have contributed to establishing the mission and its mandate, which itself prescribe certain peacekeeping behaviour. This section outlines the type of peacekeeping involved in the operation.

What government was in power when Austria or Belgium considered participation?

This question establishes the domestic context in which the peacekeeping decision was made. It determines the formation, composition and political orientation of the government that took the decision. It seeks to uncover who the main actors making up the foreign policy-making unit were. Attention is given to the foreign policy orientation or outlook of each actor. This should help determine which domestic actor is likely to be most influential in the decision-making and what type of foreign policy decisions they are likely to take. The findings of the content-analyses provide some answer to this question by revealing the role inclination of the administration under scrutiny.

Who were the main socialisers (alters) of Austria or Belgium?

This question reflects the theoretical priority afforded to socialisation. The reasoning suggests that small states experience disproportionately strong socialising pressures. As a result, policy-makers must first account for these pressures before taking into account domestic considerations. This requires identifying the international actors who have attempted to shape the peacekeeping behaviour of Austria and Belgium when considering a participation. Answers to the first question should provide useful pointers. It is here important to focus on the organisation or the leading nation offering the operation’s framework. These international actors are likely to solicit the help of Austria and Belgium and express demands on what type of contribution is expected of them. In answering this question, one has to look at the points at which Austrian or Belgian foreign policy-makers have entered international debates surrounding the mission because they are likely location of role bargaining. By doing so we should obtain information on when and how small states’ actors have interacted with international actors.
**What peacekeeping norms or mission types were the main socialisers promoting?**

Having identified the actors, it is now necessary to assess what they were saying and what demands of peacekeeping behaviour they were asking Austria and Belgium to perform. In line with the definition of socialisation provided in chapter 3, the objective is to outline the dominant normative context within which the mission emerged and unfolded. This requires identifying the peacekeeping norms that international actors are promoting. Answers to this question should also provide information about how the normative context has been translated into direct demands of expected peacekeeping behaviour.

**How did these demands resonate with the domestic agents making up the main policy-making unit?**

This question steers the analysis into the domestic realm. Role research focuses primarily on high level foreign policy-makers as the main agents involved in the conception of roles. It also came to my attention that only a small unit of foreign policy-makers was involved in the making decisions on issues of peacekeeping deployment. Thus, I hypothesised that these actors were primary receivers of external socialisation and acted as intermediaries between external demands of peacekeeping behaviour and domestic role expectations. Having assessed the foreign policy orientation of the main agents in the policy-making unit in question two, it becomes possible to assess the extent to which each actor is prepared to integrate peacekeeping norms and accept peacekeeping socialisation.

**Were new peacekeeping norms and direct demands of peacekeeping behaviour sources of role contestation amongst members of the main policy-making unit, within parliament and at the public level?**

Following the theoretical framework of horizontal and vertical role contestation, this question helps determine the extent to which the members of the policy-making unit agree on an appropriate role and whether they were inclined to open it for debates within the wider political class and the general public.

Answers to these questions are sought using evidence from press articles, secondary material, UN documents, and parliamentary debates as well as WikiLeaks sources. The aim is to use as many reliable sources as possible to assemble ‘bits and pieces of evidence into a pattern’ (Thies, 2013). In combination, they help to construct a story around a particular mission and how Austria and Belgium came to their decisions. As much as possible, only evidence dating prior to the decision was selected. This ensures that the process of role conception did not overlap with role enactment. This step should help consolidate the claim that observed roles made their way into the decision-making and were influential factors affecting outcomes.
The selection of the cases follows a research design combining cross and within case analyses. This design creates more opportunities for comparisons as each case can be compared in two different ways (Lamont, 2015:134; Bennett and Elman, 2007:176). In practical terms, this means that for both small states selected, two instances of decision-making on troop deployment were studied.

The rationale behind the choice of peacekeeping missions used to explore the Austrian and Belgian decision-making should now be outlined. They were chosen as ‘test sites’ to add the number of observations and explore how the relationship between external socialisation and domestic role processes shapes small states’ peacekeeping roles. Ulriksen and Dadalauri (2016) underline that single case studies, undertaken through the process-tracing approach, have traditionally been employed to build theory and explain single outcomes (p.224; Gerring, 2007; Mahoney, 2012). However, this research design follows their argument that ‘this method can be useful to test and modify theoretical frameworks by uncovering and evaluating theoretically specified causal mechanisms’ (p.225-226). In this way, each case study concludes with a discussion of how role socialisation was domestically negotiated, thereby, helping to theorise further about foreign policy-making processes in small states. For Austria, cases include the 2008 deployment to the EU mission in Chad (EUFOR Chad) and the decision of Chancellor Faymann’s government to withdraw from the United Nations Disarmament Observation Force (UNDOF) in 2013. The Belgian decision-making is studied around the country’s contributions to the 2012-2013 Malian crisis and its re-engagement in UN peacekeeping in 2006 with a deployment to the reinforced United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II).

The selection of UN and EU missions was important to assess both small states’ attitudes towards different institutional frameworks under which modern peacekeeping takes place. An essential criterion for choosing these missions is their capacity to illustrate broader peacekeeping developments. Each represents an unique moment at which the doctrine and practice of peacekeeping was actively being transformed by a range of international actors. The cases studies aim to survey these transformations and the ways in which Austria and Belgium have responded to them. Furthermore, the missions have been selected based on expectations that the theoretical processes of interest will be empirically present. Rapid peacekeeping transformations implicate a shifting normative context generating new demands of appropriate behaviour. As small states with a long tradition of troop contribution, Austria and Belgium are expected to be confronted with important socialising pressures to adapt their roles as a result of this new environment. These missions generated much uncertainty for the governments which have considered deploying troops to them. They have been dilemmas, thereby increasing the likelihood of political elites having invoked roles to justify their decisions. As some of these decisions were contentious, one may anticipate the
presence of domestic role contestations. Finally, role theory requires theoretical development to better integrate external role socialisation and domestic processes of role conception. Therefore, the case studies strive to create new hypotheses about the missing link between external role socialisation and domestic contestations by focusing on the foreign policy orientation and role inclination of policy-making units.

While the aim is not to perform strict comparisons, it remains necessary to control for some variables, explaining why Austria and Belgium were selected according to a most similar system design (Bennett and Elman, 2007:176). Although their peacekeeping patterns have been generally similar to the extent that both have contributed comparable numbers of troops over the years under UN, EU and NATO flags, variations on the dependent variable can still be detected when considering particular missions. It is not rare to see the troops of one absent from a given mission while the other is participating with a large contingent. They also differ with regard to the institutional framework within which they prefer to deploy troops. Belgium is generally more willing to participate in EU and NATO missions than Austria for instance. The complexity of decision-making on peacekeeping issues means it is unfeasible to hold all variables constant but one, national roles. It is highly unlikely to find two ‘perfectly matched’ small states with wide disparities in roles (Bennett and Elman, 2007:175). Nonetheless, the selection of Austria and Belgium controls for some important variables including state size, geographical location, political system, level of EU integration as well as economic development. Controlling for these variables will strengthen the claim that roles were at play in the Austrian and Belgian decision-making and that differences in peacekeeping behaviour can be explained by the different roles that informed governmental decisions.

Austria differs from Belgium in one significant respect; it is constitutionally neutral. Differences in peacekeeping behaviour can easily be attributed to Austria’s neutrality and Belgium’s deeper commitment to military alliances, most significantly through NATO membership. Small neutral countries are argued to contribute more peacekeeping troops than larger, but also non-neutral small states, because their commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts makes them well equipped to fulfil the requirements of impartiality and limited use of force traditionally demanded by peacekeeping. In designing this project, the option of holding the security policy variable constant by replacing Belgium with another small neutral state like Ireland was considered. This was rejected, however, because it would have restricted the generalisation of the findings to the smaller population of small neutral states. The project intends to advance our understanding of the foreign policy and peacekeeping behaviours of the whole category of small states, the majority of which are not neutral. The second option of abandoning the case of Austria was also ruled out because, in order to understand small states’ evolving approach to peacekeeping, it is critical to investigate how neutrality has been reinterpreted to deal with developments in international peacekeeping.
The empirical sections of this research show that it no longer makes sense to demarcate neutral and non-neutral small states into distinct categories. Over time, both have displayed foreign policy patterns typical of the other category. Finally, the security policy variable is closely intertwined with small states’ national roles. Thus, the inclusion of both a neutral and non-neutral small state is justified as it introduces variations on the variable of interest.

Equally significant to this project is the notion of variation within cases. A key criterion for selecting Austria and Belgium is that each display wide variations in the number of troops deployed over time and from one mission to another. Taking into account these fluctuations allows the identifications of turning points illustrative of significant increases or reductions in the number of troops deployed. Interesting questions emerge as to why, for example, Austria and Belgium remained on the side-line of a mission they were expected to participate in large numbers given its status as a significant contributor of peacekeeping troops. The following case studies are meant to explain such puzzles by focusing on the relationship between the cases’ national roles and important shifts in the doctrine and practice of international peacekeeping. In sum, within cases comparisons provide insights into the evolution of one small state’s approach to peacekeeping while comparing Austria with Belgium will allow for inferences to be made about the category of small states as a whole and its relationship to the changing nature of peacekeeping.
Table 3  Overview of the Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Institutional Framework</th>
<th>Date (mission start /decision)</th>
<th>Contribution Size / Decision Type</th>
<th>Government Type</th>
<th>Members of decision-making unit (party)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria and EUFOR Chad</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>15 March 2008 / 9 November 2007</td>
<td>160 troops / Deployment</td>
<td>SPÖ-ÖVP Coalition</td>
<td>Gusenbauer (SPÖ); Plassnik (ÖVP); Darabos (SPÖ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria and UNDOF</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>31 May 1974 / 6 June 2013</td>
<td>370 troops / Withdrawal</td>
<td>SPÖ-ÖVP Coalition</td>
<td>Faymann (SPÖ); Spindelegger (ÖVP); Klug (SPÖ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium and UNIFIL II</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>August 2006 / 26 August 2006</td>
<td>400 troops / Deployment</td>
<td>Purple Coalition - Liberals (VLD/MR) Socialists (PS/Sp.a)</td>
<td>Verhofstadt (VLD); De Gucht (VLD); Flahaut (PS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium and Mali</td>
<td>Ad-hoc coalition, EU and UN</td>
<td>Serval (January 2013); EUTM Mali (February 2013); MINUSMA (April 2013) / 15 January 2013</td>
<td>2 C-130 aircrafts; 2 medical evacuation helicopters; protection force / Deployment</td>
<td>Coalition – Socialists (PS/Sp.a) Christian Democrats (cdh/CD&amp;V) Liberals (MR/VLD)</td>
<td>Di Rupo (PS); De Crem (CD&amp;V); Reynders (MR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter sought to address some of the methodological questions surrounding the use of the role approach to empirically understand the political behaviours of states in IR. It also positions itself as a modest contribution to the ongoing collective effort in the role theory scholarship dedicated to making the role approach more systematic. The strength of the methodology presented here is that it unfolds in multiple stages and incorporates multiple cases, permitting a satisfactory level of depth and breadth to be achieved simultaneously. It allows the researcher to investigate the historical record as well as the more immediate context and to reconstruct events across several cases. Therefore, not only is it highly suited to the demands of the theoretical framework, it also provides scope to construct thick accounts and undertake theory-building.

A final note should be made on the sources used for the empirical analyses. I relied primarily on secondary literature. The political history literature used in stage 1 was particularly useful in that it often refers to the roles of Austria and Belgium in a historical perspective without systematically using the tools of role theory. Given that historical and
process-tracing research require the collection of large amounts of data, I have complemented the findings extracted from secondary material using media accounts, parliamentary records, states’ official press releases and officials’ spontaneous declarations. This wide range of sources allowed me to corroborate initial findings. Tansey (2007) rightly argues that elite interviewing is an important source of data when undertaking process-tracing because it ‘frequently involves political developments at the highest level of government, and elite actors will thus often be critical sources of information’. Consequently, one methodological weakness of this research lies in the absence of evidence drawn from Austrian and Belgian elites themselves. This drawback was partially offset by following the initiative of role theorists (Below, 2016) and examining state leaders’ UN speeches to identify the role inclination of an incumbent government. When it came to the specific decisions, I was primarily interested in retracing the course of events and how different actors socially positioned their states towards a particular crisis. I searched for declarations by representatives of international institutions and leading states to gain a sense how they defined the situation and what demands they were making about who should act. I turned my attention to reports of the force generation process, and previous bilateral and multilateral meetings, to gain access to these declarations. Then, I examined press articles reporting spontaneous declarations by small states’ elites who were expected to respond to these demands and to rely on roles to justify their decisions. I also consulted parliamentary documents to discern other domestic voices expressing views about the role(s) the state should be playing in the context of an ongoing international effort to address a crisis. I also referred to official press releases from the governments under study to reconstruct the role evolution of these elites as a decision was approaching. The absence of interviews was also addressed through the use of WikiLeaks documents. Scholars of political science have been reticent to use the information revealed by the leaks as evidence in research because of concerns over selection bias, the quality and unknown provenance of the information as well as the harms its publication could cause (Michael, 2015:178). However, the documents proved to be a valuable source of data on the diplomatic relationships between Washington and both small states. Significantly, they provided essential contextual details and exposed some of the demands and expectations that a great power is likely to generate regarding the foreign policy and peacekeeping behaviour of a smaller partner.

3 The use of WikiLeaks in the case studies are referenced in text as “Embassy Vienna” or “Embassy Brussels” given that most were cables produced by the US Embassy in both capitals for the State Department.
CHAPTER FIVE  THE FOREIGN POLICY DIMENSIONS AND ROLES OF AUSTRIA

5.1 Introduction

This chapter forms the basis for the next two case studies and serves two analytical purposes. First, it provides an overview of Austria’s post-war foreign policy by reviewing key foreign policy traditions and by identifying the roles that successive Austrian governments have sought to play on the international scene. Early connections are made between uncovered roles and their effects on different Austrian governments’ decisions to engage in international peacekeeping missions (see table 4). Second, it provides the researcher with a repertoire of roles that one expects Austrian policy-makers to refer to and draw on when socialised by external agents in the two peacekeeping episodes explored in the case studies.

5.2 Tradition of Neutrality

The tradition of neutrality forms the main pillar of Austria’s post-war foreign policy. Austria was liberated from Nazi rule in April 1945. A period of Allied occupation followed during which the political elite progressively returned from exile to organise the recovery and negotiate an independence treaty with the occupying powers. Ten years of negotiation culminated on 15 May 1955 when the State Treaty was signed, and Austria officially regained its independence as a sovereign state. The Treaty was only made possible as Austrian leaders agreed to the Soviet Union’s demand of implementing a neutral status based on the Swiss model (Gebhard, 2013:283). The Soviets wanted to turn Austria into ‘a buffer state’ to prevent close cooperation with Germany and integration into Western military alliances (Bischof, 1995:126; 1999:141, 144, 147). For Austrian leaders, neutrality was the price to pay to end the occupation (Gehler and Kaiser, 1997:98).

The years following independence saw neutrality become the basis for a neutral role. In a conflict situation, neutrality legally entails an abstention from joining any one side. In peace times, a neutral state needs to ensure that neutrality remains credible by refraining to enter in military alliances, to station foreign troops on its territory or to open its airspace to military overflights (de Flers, 2012). Although the link between an emerging tradition of neutrality and a neutral role may be obvious, this chapter regards neutrality as ‘an essentially contested concept’ which is interpreted through the adoption of different roles (Devine, 2011).

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4 In May 1945, the Allies reached an agreement on the division of Austria into four sectors. The Soviet Union controlled the East, the United States the North, the United Kingdom the South while the Tyrol and the Vorarlberg regions in the West were administered by France.

5 For comprehensive analyses of the evolution of neutrality in Europe see Agius (2011); Agius and Devine (2011); Devine (2011); Goetschel (1999). Gärtner (2017) provides the latest volume on
neutrality.
As the Austrian case shows, a neutral role may be one of many roles enacted by states with a tradition of neutrality. Surprisingly, the neutral role does not figure in Holsti’s original typology. It is conceptualised by Thies (2012; 2013) who finds that the US and Israel sought a neutral role in their early statehood. Brummer and Thies (2015) also identify the neutral role as one of several role options available to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the democratisation period following the Second World War. In the German context, the role’s guiding theme indicates ‘that no foreign policy action must be taken that jeopardized the prospects of bringing Western and Eastern Germany back together’ (Brummer and Thies, 2015:281). Its goal was ‘to reunite a sovereign Germany and afterward keep it out of the military blocs of both the west and the east’ (Brummer and Thies, 2015:281). Their use of the neutral role is instructive since the German question is closely intertwined, and bears many similarities, with the emerging foreign policy of Austria. Significantly, the neutral role had a much more profound effect on the Austrian case than on the German one. It permitted Austria to defend its newly regained independence and re-claim international status after the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1919 and assimilation into the Third Reich in 1938. Thies (2012) expects that ‘new states will often seek a neutral or nonaligned role upon entry into the international system’ as a strategy of survival designed to avoid entanglements that may drag the state into war (p.39). This expectation is substantiated by the case of post-war Austria as a neutral role was sought primarily to diminish the risks of entrapment (Gärtner, 1998:66).

Thies (2013) also accurately asserts that the roles of a novice state like Austria will largely be ascribed by its socialisers due to limited capabilities. In fact, the neutral role developed as Austrian leaders confronted the dilemma of upholding the country’s sovereignty in the face of Soviet and Western pressures as tensions between East and West intensified. Its main advocate was Austrian Chancellor Julius Raab of the Austrian People’s party (ÖVP). In the years after the State Treaty, his intention was to position Austria at equidistance between the two superpowers. The United States, Great Britain and the FRG had been highly critical of Raab’s independent course with Moscow during the State Treaty negotiations and had long opposed the neutrality option. It was perceived ‘to be the first step into pro-Soviet non-alignment’ (Rathkolb, 2001). Therefore, Western powers applied significant pressures before and after the State Treaty to orient neutrality towards the West. The Eisenhower administration only accepted neutrality on the condition that Austria would be secretly rearmed with extensive US military aid and technical assistance (Rathkolb, 1995:133). Soon after independence, US shipments of military equipment intensified; a cooperation which was formalised with the signing of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in June 1955 (Harrod, 2010:225). NATO saw Austrian neutrality to be performing an important function creating the exception that Austria should create ‘its own army that could easily hold western Austria in the service of the alliance in any conflict’ (Harrod, 2010:220).
FRG’s Chancellor Adenauer and Raab differed dramatically in their foreign policy objectives (Gärdner, 1998). As a fierce proponent of Western integration, Adenauer demanded Austria to remain ‘absolutely loyal to the West and suspicious of the Soviet Union’ throughout the negotiations (Rathkolb, 1995:131). Attempts by the West to cast Austria into a secret ally role resonated positively with a number of domestic actors and were, therefore, influential in the implementation of anti-Soviet policies (Rathkolb, 1995:136). In February 1956, Austria joined the Council of Europe, and in October 1956, Vienna offered a pro-Western response to the Hungarian crisis by providing humanitarian assistance and asylum to refugees while criticising the Soviet repression of the uprising (Rathkolb, 2001). It must be noted that the Austria’s reaction to the crisis is the origin of a humanitarian tradition closely intertwined with neutrality. As more than 170 000 Hungarians sought refuge in Austria, officials in Vienna began to see it as Austria’s responsibility to assist people repressed by their regimes and in need of humanitarian aid. This humanitarian actor role permitted a new sovereign state to walk the fine line between Soviet accusations of breaching neutrality by acting as a ‘springboard’ for Hungarian dissidents and embracing its Western values by showing solidarity with the suffering of Hungarian people.6

In fact, Raab made significant efforts to maintain a neutral role by counter-balancing Western inclinations with attempts to normalise relations with Moscow. He believed that a neutral role was essential to preserve Austria’s political independence and territorial integrity from Soviet interference. The violent repression of the Hungarian revolution on Austria’s border emphasised the Kremlin’s readiness to respond with force to any threats likely to jeopardise its security interests and sphere of influence (Rathkolb, 1995:137). The dependence of Austrian sovereignty on Soviet goodwill justified a neutral role. The Raab government was extremely cautious to avoid any action that could be perceived by Moscow as a threat. Moscow effectively socialised Austria into a neutral role; a process which influenced the Austrian decision not to join the European Economic Community (EEC) when created in 1957. This role also affected Raab’s preference for joining the UN in 1955 as opposed to formally integrating Austria into Western institutions (Rathkolb, 1995:137). This underlines the origin of a close connection between a neutral role and Austria’s commitment to the UN system.

6 The Austrian tradition of giving asylum to refugees is disputed. For a discussion of Austrian credentials as an asylum country see Granville, 2006 and Rathkolb, 2001.
5.3 Tradition of Independence

By 1958, growing US opposition to the policy of equidistance became a significant dilemma for the Raab government. Pro-Soviet rhetoric, abstention on the issue of China’s UN membership and a visit to Moscow by the Austrian Defence Minister, damaged relations with Washington (Rathkolb, 1995:140). This situation worsened as Raab argued that US military flights transiting through Austrian airspace in the context of the US intervention in the Lebanon crisis were violations of neutrality. The Chancellor’s decision to retract transit rights previously granted to the US as a secret ally, dealt bilateral relations with Washington another harmful blow (Rathkolb, 1995:144). The Eisenhower administration rejected Austria’s neutral role, making its advocacy increasingly untenable. This dilemma forced the Austrian foreign policy elite to reinterpret neutrality through the performance of new roles. Raab himself conceded that ‘his idea of remaining equidistant from both superpowers had not really worked’ (Rathkolb, 1995:144). A ‘lack of conviction’ about neutrality in the early years created ‘inconsistencies, disloyalties and dubious morality, all of which affected the country’s precarious position between East and West’ (Gehler, 2005:136).

Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ) became the driving force behind establishing a tradition of independence and activism when appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1959. His tenures as Foreign Minister until 1966, and as Chancellor between 1970 and 1983, were marked by his personal influence on positioning Austria as an active independent, mediator-integrator and humanitarian actor. Throughout the cold war, Kreisky’s leadership permitted Austria to play an increased number of roles conveying an image of Austria as a ‘peaceful small state with altruistic intentions’ and ‘a commitment to building bridges’ (Gebhard, 2013:285). These roles helped Kreisky translate into practice his active interpretation of neutrality which fell between the passive model of Switzerland and the Swedish policy of non-alignment (Höll, 1994). The role promotion pursued by Kreisky corroborates Thies’s observation that ‘as states mature in the system, they generally drop the neutral role in favour of a more active stance in world politics’ (p.116).

Kreisky’s primary commitment lay in an independent foreign policy course (Höll, 1994:34). It originated from his rejection of a secret ally role which expected Austria to meet the strategic interests of NATO through armament and alignment in case of conflict with the Soviet Union. His objective was to disentangle Austria from any military commitment as foundation for cultivating an active dialogue between East and West in the aim of fostering détente. Kreisky pursued an active foreign policy by seeking a comprehensive approach to détente. It aimed to improve bilateral relations with Austria’s Soviet neighbours, while maintaining dialogue with Khrushchev. This marked a break from Raab’s limited strategy which prioritised top-level negotiations with Moscow (Rathkolb, 1995:145). These regional initiatives allowed Kreisky to position himself as trusted intermediary between Moscow and Washington. He was effective at minimising suspicions with the Soviet Union, while his
‘Atlanticist’ orientation made him a reliable interlocutor from the perspective of US officials (Höll, 1994:34). Between 1958 and 1963, the ‘Kreisky channel’ was solicited multiple times to arrange secret meetings and pass on information in the context of the Berlin crisis (Kofler, 2006:180). During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy was advised to meet Kreisky for his analysis of Soviet intentions, and his recommendation on a missile trade was considered by the National Security Council (Kofler, 2006:180). A combination of independence, ‘mediation functions’ and ‘an active program to extend diplomatic relations’ testifies that Kreisky acted upon an active independent role (Holsti, 1970). However, the Foreign Minister was only able to perform this role as it became accepted by both superpowers. Whereas the Eisenhower administration fought against Austria playing any role toward an East-West rapprochement, Kennedy was far more sympathetic to an active interpretation of neutrality. The fact that Moscow did not perceive Austria to be fully integrated into the West also worked in favour of an active independent role.

This conception of Austria during Kreisky’s term as Foreign Minister was concomitant with the UN launching its largest peacekeeping mission of the cold war in 1960, the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC). It provided Kreisky with an opportunity to advance the South Tyrol issue at the UN. While Austria’s precarious geopolitical position made the deployment of an armed military contingent difficult, Austrian officials eventually agreed in September 1960 to send a medical unit as an alternative (Schmidl, 2015:721). This first experiment meant that Austria found it problematic to decline the UN request for a troop contribution when the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was created in 1964. Before that, the Austrian government had no plans to pursue additional deployments. The UN demand for a 700-strong battalion was unfeasible in the eyes of Austrian leaders considering that Austria remained without legal provision for the deployment of military troops on foreign soil (Schmidl, 2015:723). Once again, a medical unit appeared to fit Austria’s roles as neutral and active independent better.

The Austrian failure to negotiate an association agreement with the EEC in the late 1960s largely accounts for the decision to intensify and geographically widen the foreign policy of activism (Höll, 1994:37). As he became Chancellor in 1970, Kreisky sought to perform an active independent role on a global scale. Austria’s active foreign policy was multilateralised through new diplomatic contacts with leaders of developing countries and active participation in international organisations (Schmidl, 2015:720). A strong commitment to performing an active independent role at the UN in the 1970s contributed to improving Austria’s reputation within the organisation. This role pattern led to Austria serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the first time in 1973-

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7 The South Tyrol region has been part of Italy since the end of World War One when it was seized from Austria as the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed. It has a large German-speaking population and is subject of a long-standing territorial dispute between the two Alpine countries. In 1960, Kreisky was determined to bring the issue in front of UN General Assembly.
74. It also induced a number of peacekeeping deployments to UN missions. The election of Kurt Waldheim as UN Secretary General in 1971 ensured support for Kreisky’s preferred role inside the UN. In 1972, Waldheim pressed for Austria to increase its contribution to UNFICYP with a battalion of 300 troops (Schmidl, 2015:725). Following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Kreisky government responded positively to a UN request, deploying 602 men to the second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II). The number of Austrian peacekeeping troops increased tenfold within two years of a globally-oriented active foreign policy and associated roles (Schmidl, 2015:725). In June 1974, the troops serving in UNEF II transferred to Syria, where the Austrian contingent became the largest serving in the new UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). It is interesting to note that, in 1974, Kreisky refused to dispatch three battalions to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) because Austria risked compromising its roles as active independent and neutral by taking part in an operation perceived to be outside traditional peacekeeping (Schmidl, 2015:726).

The Austrian involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts should also be understood in light of Kreisky’s ambition to mediate in North-South conflicts. His activism in the Israeli-dominated Socialist International and his commitment to Palestinian rights contributed to the Chancellor’s perception that Austria had a responsibility to fulfil ‘special tasks’ to assist Israelis and Palestinians reconcile their differences (Holsti, 1970:262). The role conception of Austria as a mediator-integrator motivated Kreisky to actively work towards the Middle East peace process. He led the international reaction to the Yom Kippur War, organised fact-finding missions and built trust between Israeli and Palestinian leaders to facilitate dialogue (Gebhard, 2013:286). It should be added that the foreign policy led by Kreisky was founded on, and strengthened, the humanitarian tradition of Austria. He believed that détente should also contribute to improving the humanitarian situation in the Soviet Union and that the North had a responsibility in implementing economic policies conducive to poverty alleviation and the respect of human rights throughout the developing world (Höll, 1994:39). These beliefs were at the root of his conception of Austria as a humanitarian actor dedicated to building international momentum for achieving humanitarian objectives.
5.4 European Tradition Rediscovered

International and domestic shifts during the 1980s challenged the continuing performance of an *active independent* and *mediator-integrator* roles. The end of east-west détente marked by the election of Ronald Reagan, the Teheran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan generated a constraining environment for Austria’s mediating function (Höll, 1994:50). Regionally, the EEC initiated in 1985 a new integration phase aimed at eliminating non-tariffs barriers and creating an internal market of goods, capital, services and people (Gehler and Kaiser, 1997:95). As a small industrialised nation, Austria is heavily reliant on exports to European markets (Kaiser, 1995). Non-participation raised the prospects of negative economic consequences in the form of competitive disadvantage. Moreover, the prospect of the EEC and the US failing to reach an agreement at the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) discredited economic protectionism as viable economic strategy (Müller, 2009:8). Growing economic interdependence contributed to the belief that maintaining independent-oriented roles was increasingly infeasible. Domestically, the growing gap between new international realities and Kreisky’s roles generated much contestation from the conservative (ÖVP) opposition (Höll, 1994:50). Domestic criticisms gained additional traction as Austria was experiencing a period of low economic growth and high inflation, which the opposition attributed to an overregulated service sector and a large nationalised industry sustained by Kreisky’s policies (Kaiser, 1995:412). Even the SPÖ-led coalition which replaced the Kreisky government in 1983 could not continue performing prevailing roles in this shifting international environment. An active and global foreign policy was bound to be downgraded.

The transition to an ÖVP-led coalition following the 1986 federal elections was a key factor behind a role change in the second half of the decade. New Foreign Minister Alois Mock (ÖVP) was determined to re-evaluate Austria’s roles in line with emerging global demands by drawing on the country’s European tradition. From early statehood, Austria has sought to maintain its sovereignty through neutrality while simultaneously pursuing ‘a policy of informal, that is, partial economic integration’ with Western Europe, conferring Austria a distinct European orientation (Gehler, 1998:197). In 1959, the Raab government announced participation in the establishment of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). This option avoided isolation by continuing to profit from trade with EEC members, while evading Soviet pressures and the legal requirement of downgrading neutrality (Gehler and Kaiser, 1997:88). It was also hoped that EFTA participation would bring Austria closer to, and facilitate, a future EEC accession. However, in 1967, the EEC rejected a European role for Austria when Italy vetoed an association agreement. It was not until 1972 that a free trade agreement was signed preserving Austria’s economic interests, permitting Kreisky to keep Austria away from full membership as he believed that it would prevent Austria from performing a mediating role between east and west (Gehler and Kaiser, 1997:90).
By 1988, the regional drive towards deeper integration solidified the belief that any solution short of full membership would be insufficient at preventing serious comparative disadvantages. Given that EEC policies would have direct consequences on the economic performance of Austria, Vienna could no longer afford remaining outside common decision-making institutions (Kaiser, 1995:412). Thus, economic incentives were most significant in motivating the government of Frank Vranitsky to formally apply for membership in July 1989. However, a regional subsystem collaborator (RSC) role had to be articulated in order to demonstrate that Austria had a rightful place in the integration project. Under pressure from the Commission to enhance the compatibility of neutrality with existing Treaties, the elite endeavoured to depict Austria as making ‘far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities’ (Devine, 2011:348; Holsti, 1970:267). A rhetorical shift discrediting neutrality as a meaningful foreign policy principle was undertaken (Ferreira-Pereira, 2006:102-103). The new narrative presented neutrality as having been unfairly imposed, and indicated that Austria had been ‘always European’ (Agius, 2011:378, original emphasis). Foreign Minister Mock was the main advocate of a RSC role arguing that Austria as ‘a European core country’ would not be an obstacle to integration. Entry negotiations took place simultaneously as the Treaty of Maastricht materialised envisioning the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Anxious not to derail negotiations, the Austrian government announced in 1992 its readiness ‘to participate in the CFSP and in its dynamic development actively and in a spirit of solidarity’ (Kaiser, 1995:421). From then on, solidarity became the cornerstone of Austrian foreign policy. Its inclusion in the 1994 White Paper signalled that Austria was performing a RSC role committed to fully participating in the development of the EU as a security actor. Reassured that neutrality remained a significant element of security policy (Agius, 2011:378), 66.6% of the public voted in favour of membership in a referendum in June 1994. Austria officially became a member of the European Union (EU) on 1 January 1995.

5.5 International Engagement

The re-conception of Austria as a RSC took on added significance as the Iron Curtain was brought down by the events of 1989-91. The disintegration of the Soviet Union confirmed the perception that cold war roles had become redundant. As Plassnik (2013) notes, for Austria, the end of the cold-war ‘marked the end of its beloved self-definition as a builder of bridges and a mediator between East and West’ (p.55). Austria confronted its most significant dilemma since the signing of the State Treaty in 1955. While a RSC role guided Vienna’s evolving relationship with the EEC (soon to become the EU), the roles that Austria would come to play, and be demanded to perform, vis-à-vis Washington and the transatlantic alliance remained uncertain. Both EU rapprochement and Washington’s perception that Austria no longer occupied a strategically significant position were challenges to Austrian
policy-makers attempting to maintain a constructive partnership with the new hegemon (Bischof, 2013:17). Institutional transformations within the EU, NATO and the UN, accelerated by international crises in the Balkans and the Middle East, added further pressures on Austria to redefine its neutrality and find new roles in a post-cold war context (Reinprecht and Latcheva, 2003:440).

Austria did not confront the new international system through isolation. Its post-cold war doctrine evolved out of the perception that ‘the current threats to Austria’s security cannot be countered by any single country, but only through international cooperation within an international (reliable) security partnership’ (Hauser, 2006:211). The logic which had induced a RSC role was broadened to a global level, encouraging the conception of Austria as a global system collaborator (GSC). Both roles contributed to the re-evaluation of its international position away from neutrality towards an alliance-free position (Hauser, 2006:2011). Absent from Holsti’s typology, the categorisation of GSC is formulated by Chafetz et al. (1996) to capture the role that a number of states pursued in a post-cold war setting. States adopting a GSC role display ‘far-reaching commitments to cooperate with other states to support the emerging global order’ (Chafetz et al., 1996:734). Evidence of Austria acting as a GSC can be found in its evolving relationship with the UN. As bipolarity froze the peace and security functions of the UN, the organisation became the institutional platform of choice for Vienna to enact its neutral and active independent roles. Austria developed a solid UN tradition evident from its reputation as a reliable UN peacekeeper (Plassnik, 2013:81). The rebirth of the UN as a peace and security actor offered Austria an opportunity to draw on its UN tradition and introduce a new momentum for multilateral diplomacy (Plassnik, 2013:86). In terms of peacekeeping, this translated into a policy of participation in as many operations as possible even if it meant making token contributions (Schmidl, 2015:727). An additional sign of Austria developing a GSC role lies in its commitment to an UN mandate as a precondition for supporting and/or participating in international deployments (Gärtner, 2017). It highlights the value of a multilateral order for Austria, and its determination to preserve it. The Austrian response to the Gulf War should be understood in terms of the Vranitsky government being motivated by a GSC role. It was only after the UN sanctioned the regime of Saddam Hussein and authorised a military intervention that Austria permitted US aircrafts to fly over Austrian territory on their way to the Gulf (Bischof, 2013:22). Underscoring the re-interpretation of neutrality through a GSC role by the Austrian leadership during the crisis, President Klestil remarked that ‘when the members of the United Nations act against an aggressor, there can be no question of neutrality, only of solidarity’ (quoted in Lahodynsky, 1992). Austria played the same role in 1999 when the government of Chancellor Klima refused to open Austrian airspace for the NATO intervention against Serbia due to the absence of UN authorisation (Bischof, 2013:28). This time, however, support for the multilateral order came at the expense of
solidarity with Western partners attracting much US criticism.

In 1995, Austria joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP); a security system designed to enhance military coordination and interoperability amongst NATO members. Participation committed Austria to ‘supporting the tasks of NATO’s PfP, including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace enforcements’ (Hauser, 2006:211). Accession to the Partnership signalled an important change for Austrian participation in peace operations (Schmidl, 2015:727). It underscored that increased participation in peace operations would become a priority and demonstrated Austria’s readiness to assist the post-cold war transformation of NATO by assigning its armed forces far more peacekeeping responsibilities than ever before (Schmidl, 2013:113). Moreover, instability in the Balkans was a direct threat to Austria’s security and commercial interests. The increased engagement of NATO and the EU in the region motivated the Austrian decision to perform a wider range of peacekeeping activities as part of these frameworks (Schmidl, 2015:729). Again, national interests have shaped Austria’s role evolution. In 1995, a logistical unit was sent to NATO’s Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This NATO commitment was extended after the mission transitioned to the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in 1996. In 1999, the decision was made to assign a battalion task force to NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) (Schmidl, 2015:729; 2013). Importantly, the enforcement nature of the IFOR, SFOR and KFOR missions including mandates to use force for non-defensive purposes did not become an obstacle to participation (Neuhold, 2013:195).

The perception of many that the PfP was an intermediary stage to full membership sparked an intense domestic debate in 1998 on whether NATO membership should be included as an option in the report from which a new security doctrine was being developed. At the heart of the debate was the question of whether Austria should complement its post-cold war roles with an Atlantic partner role. The role involved committing to mutual assistance with NATO members and to common security endeavours in the geographical areas identified by the Alliance. Determining Austria’s roles within the emerging European security architecture generated intense horizontal contestations amongst the SPÖ and ÖVP members of the coalition headed by Chancellor Klima. As junior partner, the ÖVP supported an Atlantic partner role based on the ambition of former Foreign Minister Mock to avoid post-cold war isolation by fully integrating Austria in the West (Bischof, 2013:22; Lahodynsky, 1992). Incoming Foreign Minister, Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) became the main advocate of the Atlantic partner role declaring that the principle of neutrality would have to be abandoned in favour of solidarity. His position was shared by many in the ministries of foreign affairs and defence who regarded participation in the PfP as a transitional stage (Gärtner and Höll, 2003: 190). Schüssel’s inclination towards this role is also apparent from his belief that NATO and the US remain relevant security providers (Schüssel, 1998).
On the other hand, Social Democrats (SPÖ) along with the Greens, contested an *Atlantic partner* role on the ground that Austria should not be affiliated with what they regarded as an extension of US hegemonic influence in Europe (Bischof, 2013). For them, further rapprochement to NATO would undermine the peace credentials of Austria as the organisation encourages military expansions and arms races (Benke, 2003: 283; Devine, 2009). The Greens remained committed to an *active independent* role by suggesting that neutrality was ‘a modern idea, since neutral states can fulfil important functions as active mediators in a conflict’ (Van der Bellen quoted in Perrault, 1999). Furthermore, the public played an important part in the debate and in wider discussions about Austria’s role in the emerging European security architecture. While the political elite, especially the conservatives, had gradually narrowed the interpretation of neutrality to its military core since the mid-1980s, the public had remained deeply attached to its traditional interpretation. Neutrality had become the central element of what it meant to be Austrian. This feature goes a long way in explaining public opposition to any proposal of abandoning neutrality in favour of NATO membership. Moreover, the war in ex-Yugoslavia contributed to strengthening the public’ pro-neutrality attitudes (Reinprecht and Latcheva, 2003:440). Ultimately, aware that the public continued to favour *neutral* and *active independent* roles, and that negative electoral results would follow if these were not sustained, the SPÖ shut the door to NATO membership by excluding it from the option report of April 1998 (Ferreira-Pereira, 2006:111).

The 2001 Security and Defence Doctrine calls for ‘Austrian solidarity and active participation’ in institutional endeavours to provide the EU with the means necessary to act externally. Yet, debates over NATO membership exposed the continuing relevance of traditional roles as held by the left of the political class and the public. As the EU deepened security and defence integration, the inconsistency of maintaining a *neutral* and an *active independent* role for domestic consumption have become increasingly unsustainable. By 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam had laid out the legal basis for a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), including plans to integrate the Western European Union (WEU), and its mutual defence clause, into the EU and to enhance its capacity to respond to international crises. The Petersberg tasks envisioned the Union taking on responsibilities across the full spectrum of crisis management from low intensity activities such as conflict prevention to traditional peacekeeping, to separation of parties and peace enforcement through the use of force (Hauser, 2006:216; Devine, 2011:351). Austria subscribed to the entire scope of the Petersberg tasks (Gebhard, 2013:291). In 2003, defence reforms aimed to prepare the armed forces ‘to participate in the whole spectrum of international operations, from robust combat missions to traditional peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance’ (Schmidl, 2013:116). Participation in more demanding tasks was framed and justified in terms of peacekeeping and crisis management as a way to appease domestic concerns...
(Ferreira-Pereira, 2006:105). Nonetheless, Plassnik (2013) argues that ‘the question whether … Austria would assist in EU actions as specified in the ‘Petersberg Tasks’, without an explicit mandate by the UN Security Council’ remains the most significant dilemma for successive governments (p.81). If this scenario materialised, it would force decision-makers to choose whether to perform a RSC or GSC. This underlines that, as Austria seeks to play an increasing number of roles in a post-cold war system, inconsistencies amongst them are likely to arise.

Proposals to insert a mutual defence clause into an EU Treaty were even more challenging to Austria’s roles. A RSC role predisposed Austria towards accepting an EU-WEU merger. However, a neutral role was incompatible with, and might have made it impossible for Austria to agree to, a mutual defence clause as it would have implied membership in a military alliance. Again, the public was the main carrier of the neutral role accounting for its opposition to a mutual defence clause (Devine, 2011:357). The governments of European neutrals, under the leadership of Ireland, succeeded in shaping the final wording of the Amsterdam Treaty in a way that accommodated their neutrality policies (Hauser, 2006, Devine, 2011:358). Nonetheless, the subsequent Nice and Lisbon Treaties intended to transform the EU into a more assertive international actor through expanding the Petersberg tasks, the creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) in defence and the re-introduction of a mutual defence clause. Although these provisions were in fundamental contradiction with Austrian neutrality, pressures to adapt made it unfeasible for the elite to reject them. This effectively solidified Austria into a RSC role, side-lining its neutral position, yet without fully relinquishing it due to domestic constraints. The elite performed a balancing act between professing solidarity, and seeking coordination, with European partners in the context of the CSDP while assuring pro-neutrality constituencies at home that Austria remained a neutral state (de Flers, 2012). This situation resulted in the elite adopting the principle of ‘solidarity within Europe, neutrality in wars outside Europe’ (Devine, 2011:357). This formula became the basis for active participation in EU operations. In 1995, a police contribution was made to the EU administration in Bosnia Herzegovina. Austria was one of the largest contributors to both EUFOR in Bosnia. In 2003, attempts were made to meet EU ambitions by making meaningful contributions to three crisis management operations, EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, CONCORDIA in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Rezac, 2003). In 2008, Austria made a significant deployment to one of the most challenging EU missions; EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic (see chapter 6). Finally, Austria contributed elements to EU’s ‘battle groups’ in 2011 and 2012 which has been interpreted as further commitment to the CSDP (Schmidl, 2015:730).
5.6 Conclusion

The examination of Austrian foreign policy traditions revealed that Austria has performed numerous roles in the international system despite its small size and policy of permanent neutrality. These have shifted over time as successive governments responded to emerging foreign policy dilemmas. Importantly, initial traditions have continued to influence Austria’s roles and foreign policy well beyond the early years of statehood, as evident with the neutral role which remains highly significant in shaping Austria’s relationship with European institutions (de Flers, 2012:2). They have remained part of a role set albeit in a less dominant way. This chapter also emphasised that the ways Austria has conceived itself since independence motivated active participation in international peacekeeping. We are now equipped with a pool of roles expected to be influential in the decision-making of Austrian governments over recent peacekeeping deployments as Austria seeks to increase its participation in peacekeeping operations in the framework of NATO, EU and UN missions (Hauser, 2006:239). The identification of Austria’s foreign policy roles created expectations regarding the type of peacekeeping, and the institutional framework under which Austrian troops were likely to operate. While the neutral, active independent and/or humanitarian roles predispose Austria toward traditional peacekeeping under UN command, a GSC and/or RSC roles may indicate a commitment to supporting both the UN, the EU and NATO in their evolutions towards more demanding tasks. There appears to be a linkage between a RSC role and Austrian troops performing the peacekeeping tasks demanded by, and necessary to, the development of the Union as an international actor. These are only expectations requiring further empirical evidence to be refined by the following case studies. It is worth noting that the fluidity of modern peacekeeping rules means that Austria is likely to find itself in position of asymmetry in relation to new peacekeeping actors. As Austria pursued an increasing number of roles over the years, the prospect of inter-role conflict has also been raised, in turn, generating uncertainty regarding peacekeeping behaviour. The ways Austrian policy-makers discursively adapt existing roles and justify the adoption of new ones must be investigated further in light of current peacekeeping dilemmas. Whether a neutral, GSC or RSC role will motivate future deployments is an open and empirical question. It is one likely to be determined on a case-by-case basis given that the changing nature of peacekeeping has introduced additional variables into the decision-making process. Significantly, initial expectations of the EU developing into a civilian actor focused on projecting soft power did not materialise. The militarization of the EU’s external actions, already observable since the 1999 Franco-British summit in St Malo with robust operations such as Artemis, has accelerated with the Lisbon Treaty coming into force, thereby creating new dilemmas for European neutrals including Austria (Aquis, 2011:381-382). With regard to two missions characterised by shifting peacekeeping practices, the following chapters seek to determine which roles Austria has sought to play to navigate a shifting peacekeeping environment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tradition</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Prevailing roles</th>
<th>Main advocate</th>
<th>Main peacekeeping deployments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>1986 – present</td>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Alois Mock, Foreign Minister, ÖVP</td>
<td>Participation to UNFICYP, UNTSO and UNDOF maintained throughout this period 1988 – Iran/Iraq border, UNIMOG, military observers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER SIX  DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN EUFOR CHAD, 2006

6.1 Introduction

The EU authorised in late 2007 EUFOR Chad/CAR, a one-year military operation in eastern Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) to address the security and humanitarian crisis emerging from the neighbour region of Darfur in Sudan. Being ‘the most ambitious’ and ‘largest autonomous military operation’ since launching the European Security and Defence Policy in 2003 (now the Common Security and Defence Policy), it is often regarded as a milestone in its development (Dijkstra, 2010:405 and IISS, 2008:1). EUFOR Chad was multinational with twenty three member states contributing a total of 3700 troops. The geographical remoteness, difficult terrain, water scarcity and weak infrastructures characterising the area of operation made EUFOR Chad logistically and militarily challenging (Helly, 2009:342; IISS, 2008:1). Its ‘bridging’ function, whereby EU military capabilities were deployed to prepare the ground for a subsequent UN operation, set new standards in EU-UN cooperation for peacekeeping purposes (Dijkstra, 2010:405; Tardy, 2005). EUFOR Chad has received ample scholarly attention identifying the EU’s motives for deploying forces in Africa, assessing whether the mission’s objectives have been met and if they have positively contributed to the development of the EU’s international actoriness. France’s leadership role in generating momentum for the mission has also been thoroughly investigated (Mattelaer, 2008). However, research has overlooked what drove other European governments to participate in the mission, notwithstanding varying degrees of enthusiasm during the force generation process (Franke, 2010; Bono, 2011:39).

On 9 November 2007, the Austrian Parliament voted in favour of contributing 160 troops making Austria the fifth largest contributor after France, Poland, Ireland and Sweden. Most Austrian troops were special forces tasked to provide information about potential threats in the area of operation. It was the first time Austria deployed special forces to a peacekeeping operation (Zeche, 2015:327). In January 2008, twenty Austrian soldiers took part in the initial deployment with Swedish, Irish and French forces to prepare the arrival of EUFOR Chad’s main contingent which meant that ‘Austrians stood on the forefront of the mission’ (Brettner-Messler, 2008). Such meaningful commitment was unexpected considering Vienna’s limited military capabilities, neutrality, lack of knowledge about Chad and earlier reluctance to engage in Africa (Franke, 2010). Importantly, EUFOR Chad developed into an operation diverging from the traditional peacekeeping engagements in which Austria normally prefers to be involved. First, it operated in an environment where approximately 700 000 refugees had been driven out of their home by warfare between Su–

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8 As this chapter only addresses the security situation in the border region of Western Sudan and Eastern Chad and, therefore, overlooks the dimension of the operation in the Central African
Republic, the mission will be referred to as EUFOR Chad.
danese and Chadian-backed militias (Dembinski and Schott, 2013:284). Thus, troops faced a
highly volatile and dangerous environment. Second, the mission was granted an extensive
mandate under Chapter VII (Dembinski and Schott, 2013:284). UN Security Council
Resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007 authorised the EU ‘to take all necessary measures’ to
protect civilians in danger, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and provide UN
personnel with protection and freedom of movement. Third, EUFOR Chad deployed despite
the lack of a peace agreement between the conflicting parties (Brettner-Messler, 2008).
Finally, the operation’s neutrality remained ambivalent as EUFOR Chad was closely linked
to France’s colonial legacy in Africa and French interest in the Chadian regime’s stability
(Bono, 2011:37).

EUFOR Chad constituted a more intrusive and robust undertaking than the
peacekeeping of interposition Austrian troops had traditionally been accustomed to.
Combined with French leadership, this is likely to put Austria in a position of weakness
unable to have the voice within, and exercise the influence on, the mission it once could have
under traditional peacekeeping. This chapter seeks to understand why the Austrian
government made a sizable contribution when there was little to suggest that Austria would
participate, let alone deploy special forces. While the official justification indicates that
Austria was acting for humanitarian reasons, Brettner-Messler (2008) contends that the Chad
engagement represented an expression of the country’s neutrality. Schmidl (2015) interprets
the deployment as an attempt by Austrian officials to regain the prominent role the country
had once played in international peacekeeping (p.730). Relationally, Pohl (2014) argues that the
Austrian government attempted ‘to show off its credentials as a security provider at a time
when it geared up for a UN Security Council seat’ (Pohl, 2014:140). Along a similar line of
argument, Franke (2010) proposes that the Austrian contribution to EUFOR Chad served a
number of national self-interests. To better understand the motivations behind the
government’s decision, the chapter analyses the underlying roles it articulated and selected
throughout the force generation process. It specifically focuses on the influence exercised by
France on European partners and potential contributors. The case is made that, had France
not socialised Austria into roles conducive to a participation by promoting key peacekeeping
norms and making direct demands, Vienna would have likely abstained from contributing so
substantially.

6.2 Background to EUFOR Chad, a Refugee Crisis

The security instability in eastern Chad should be understood as an extension of the
Darfur conflict which has unfolded since the 1980s owing to internal, yet interrelated,
dynamics in both Sudan and Chad. Since gaining independence in 1960, Chad has been ruled
by a succession of authoritarian regimes implementing discriminative measures against rival
ethnic minorities (Berg, 2008:10). The failure of Chadian leaders to bridge the divide between southern and northern communities has thrown the country ‘in a state a permanent conflict’ (Bono, 2011; ICG, 2008:20). Groups discriminated against have consequently sought refuge in the Darfur region where they have organised politically and militarily to oppose their government’s oppression (Bono, 2011:26). Current president, Idriss Déby of the Zaghawa ethnic group accessed power in November 1989 through a military coup disposing of Hissein Habré who had forced the Zaghawa people into exile and established a dictatorship favouring the members of his own Gorane ethnic group (Bono, 2011:27). Hopes for reconciliation and political openness following the overthrow of Habré were short-lived. Déby continued a policy of repression and increased his domination over the political life. Regionally, Déby entered an arrangement with the Sudanese government whereby Sudan would prohibit Chadian rebel groups from setting up base in Darfur while Déby similarly agreed not to support Sudanese dissidents in their rebellion against Khartoum (Bono, 2011:27). Domestically, the most recent crisis erupted in 2005 after Déby amended the constitution to maintain himself as president for a third successive term (ICG, 2008:3).

In 1987, the government of Sudan began implementing an ideological program designed to hand Arabs greater political power and autonomy over other non-Arab groups (Helly, 2009:364). As a result, conflict between Khartoum and a Darfur-based alliance of insurgents, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Justice and Equality movement (JEM), ensued for the next twenty years. In 2003, violence intensified when the Sudanese government unleashed an offensive against rebels, most notably by deploying Janjaweed militias which killed, raped and looted rebels and civilians indiscriminately. By 2005, nearly two million Darfurians had been forced to flee their villages of which 200 000 travelled to Chad to find refuge (Bono, 2011:28). This shifted the attention of the international community to eastern Chad where the influx of Sudanese refugees altered the demographic makeup of the region and generated further instability (Churruca, 2015:218; Berg, 2009:57). Ethnic tensions arising from competition over resources, militia movements across the Chadian-Sudanese border, the militarisation of refugee camps and the resulting violence against civilian populations came to be seen as significant security threats (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2011:7; Churruca, 2015:218). From mid-2005, Déby began breaking the Chadian-Sudanese agreement by supporting JEM fighters, many of whom belonged to his Zaghawa ethnic group. The move was a response to internal pressures from Zaghawan members of the Chadian army who had become dissatisfied with Déby’s agreement with Sudan (Marchal, 2008:432). In retaliation, Khartoum provided Chadian opposition groups with resources and sanctuary in Darfur, from where to launch attacks against Déby’s regime (Marchal, 2009a:21). This was unsurprising given that Sudan had always intervened in Chadian affairs with the aim of establishing a friendly Turabist government (ICG, 2008:25). By 25 December 2005, N’Djamena and Khartoum were
unofficially at war, fighting each other by proxy in eastern Chad and causing unprecedented violence against civilian populations (ICG, 2008:23-26; Marchal, 2009a:21).

By then, the international community had failed to act in time to prevent the crisis from escalating to regional level despite expressing concerns for the humanitarian crisis, UN resolutions against Khartoum and peace negotiations in October 2004 and February 2006 (Darfur Peace Agreement). It was not until August 2006 that the UN acted decisively, passing Resolution 1706 which expanded the mandate of UN Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS authorised under resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005) to include a security presence in eastern Chad and CAR (Seibert, 2010:7). However, the plan envisioning the deployment of a hybrid African Union (AU)-UN peacekeeping force did not materialise immediately because of disagreements amongst international actors over whether the conflict in Darfur amounted to genocide requiring a robust UN military intervention. Additionally, Western governments were highly wary of another open-ended deployment at a time when interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were proving more complicated than expected (Le Monde, 1 July 2008). While the EU had grown increasingly concerned with the aggravating humanitarian situation and supported an AU mission, its member states were disinclined to become direct contributors by placing boots on the ground (Bono, 2011:31). Importantly, Secretary-General Annan was averse to deploying UN troops because continuing militia confrontation and Déby’s refusal to accept a UN presence meant that the conditions for a UN operation were not being met.

Following the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as French president in May 2007, Paris began a diplomatic offensive advocating the deployment of an EU force which would provide a security umbrella to the political and humanitarian work of the UN (Mattelaer, 2008:9). This option was politically acceptable to the Chadian government with which France maintained close ties. After a strong diplomatic push by France in Brussels from March 2007, European partners reached an initial agreement by August over the appropriateness of a EU mission. A month later, UN Resolution 1778, authorised a ‘multinational presence’ consisting of the United Nations in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT I) in charge of training Chadian police and a complementing EU presence to protect civilians, ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and provide protection to UN personnel (Styan, 2012:658). The EU deployment was both a humanitarian and security endeavour.

6.3 The Austrian Domestic Context

A Grand Coalition (SPÖ-ÖVP) headed by Social Democrat (SPÖ) Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer was sworn in on 11 January 2007, only two months prior to first hearing about the French proposal to act in eastern Chad. The coalition was entering its tenth month in office when it officially announced that it would actively participate in EUFOR Chad. The
Gusenbauer government formed following the 2006 parliamentary elections, ending six years of ÖVP-led coalitions with the FPÖ radical right party (Schüssel I, 2000-2003 and Schüssel II, 2003-2006). The SPÖ surprised many by overcoming the ÖVP as the largest party, albeit with a narrow lead of 1% and losing votes from the previous elections. Recording an 8% decline in the vote, and losing the chancellorship as a result, was felt as a major defeat by Christian Democrats (ÖVP) (Duncan, 2007:24). Another unexpected result came from the Greens who managed to translate progress in the polls into electoral success. They achieved their best ever result securing third place. The elections were also marked by the renewed ascent of the far right with the FPÖ achieving 11% share of the vote; a better result than expected due to vote transfer from both ÖVP and SPÖ. This allowed the FPÖ to strengthen its position on the right following intra-party protests and the creation of Die Freiheitlichen (BZÖ) in 2005 (Duncan, 2007:24).

Arduous coalition negotiations ensued during which the two main parties found themselves on an unwanted collision course (Luther, 2008). Although the SPÖ preferred talking to the Greens about a possible coalition, it could only secure the chancellorship by negotiating with the ÖVP (Luther, 2008:1011). The return of a Grand Coalition seemed inevitable after both SPÖ and ÖVP ruled out coalitions with the Greens and the Freedom Party respectively (Duncan, 2007:27). During the negotiations, the ÖVP sought to capitalise on the Social Democrats’ eagerness to return in office after six years in opposition (Fallend, 2009:2). Despite losing the elections, outgoing ÖVP Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel led the negotiations for his party determined to safeguard his legacy of neo-liberal policies (Luther, 2009). The negotiations saw deep mistrust, confrontation and animosity between the two parties. One contentious issue was the purchase of eighteen Eurofighter jets by the Schüssel I government. Motivated by their anti-militarism and desire to redirect resource towards social programs, the Social Democrats had made the campaign pledge to cancel the contract. SPÖ-ÖVP relations during the negotiations worsened when, at the parliament’s inaugural meeting, the SPÖ voted in favour of a parliamentary enquiry into the Eurofighter contract (Luther, 2008, Meyer, 2007:18). A deeper cause of the growing hostility lies in the ÖVP’s decision in 1999 to break the cordon sanitaire and form a coalition with the FPÖ. It was a major turning point after which both traditional parties displayed decreasing willingness to work together (Duncan, 2007:13). Irreconcilable divisions on key policy areas emerged signalling a ‘shift from Austria’s traditionally consensual style of party interaction towards an increasingly conflictual, zero-sum style of competition’ (Luther, 2008:1012). In the end, SPÖ leader Gusenbauer paid a heavy price for his ambition to become Chancellor forced to concede seven cabinet positions including the key ministries of finance and the interior (both traditionally held by the SPÖ in Grand Coalitions) as well as the foreign ministry.

The ÖVP’s retention of foreign affairs allowed Ursula Plassnik (ÖVP) to be re-appointed as Foreign Minister. She became a key ‘asset’ for the Christian Democrats within
cabinet (Embassy Vienna, 23 January 2007). Her background indicates a substantial experience in foreign policy having acted as Schüssel’s Chief of Staff when he was himself Foreign Minister, as Ambassador to Switzerland and as Foreign Minister since 2004. Consequently, Plassnik has developed a dense network of relationships with foreign counterparts (Embassy Vienna, 23 January 2007). Her previous positions in several Austrian representations at European institutions and her leadership during the Austrian EU presidency have given her significant knowledge of, and interest in, EU affairs.

The appointment of Norbert Darabos in the defence ministry came as a surprise. Many had expected his nomination as Interior Minister after playing an instrumental role in the SPÖ’s electoral success (Embassy Vienna, 23 January 2007). Doubts were even raised over whether Darabos himself aspired to get the job. From the start, his appointment was controversial and regarded with great scepticism in the Armed Forces. It had been thirty years that the office had not been occupied by a SPÖ minister. Moreover, the fact that Darabos was the first Defence Minister to have fulfilled his mandatory service through a civilian rather than a military path did not help him gain the trust of the military establishment (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008; Embassy Vienna, 18 December 2008). He was criticised early on for being ‘unable, perhaps unwilling, to secure increased funding for the armed forces’ (Spiegel Online International, 8 December 2010) This should be understood in light of Darabos’s primary responsibility to undertake ‘a strategic re-orientation of the Ministry’ away from territorial defence which no longer corresponded to the requirements of Austrian and European security (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008). One can also detect signs of anti-Americanism in Darabos’s foreign and defence outlook, especially regarding US pressures to instigate a greater Austrian military role in Afghanistan (Embassy Vienna, 11 May 2007).

New Chancellor Gusenbauer arrived in office with a weak political position. Many in his own party criticised him for having conceded too much in the negotiations to fulfil his personal ambition of becoming Chancellor. However, he brought with him an extensive expertise in international affairs, gained through his years in the field of development assistance and in the Socialist International. Although Gusenbauer called for close relations with the US in his first weeks in office, given the conflictual context which saw him rise to the chancellorship, the US ambassador anticipated that he could ‘indulge in confrontational rhetoric [with the US] when it suits his needs’ (Embassy Vienna, 11 May 2007). Such expectation came after he stated that ‘the U.S. has to understand that they are not the only ones that are going to determine what is happening in the world’ (Embassy Vienna, 11 May 2007).

In short, the new government’s decision to contribute troops EUFOR Chad was taken in a highly volatile political climate. Yet, both parties reached a stable agreement on the coalition’s foreign policy program which reflected the vision of Foreign Minister
Plassnik (Embassy Vienna, 25 January 2007). This ensured much continuity with the ÖVP agenda pursued during the Schüssel era. It proposed no major change to Austria’s traditional foreign policy posture, thereby reinforcing the ‘stable consensus among all Austrian political parties that neutrality is the cornerstone of the country’s security policy’ (Embassy Vienna, 11 May 2007). Drawing on the momentum created by Austria’s EU presidency the previous year, the coalition included a significant European component to the program. The government expressed readiness to actively contribute to EU’s efforts to integrate the Western Balkan states and strengthen the European Neighbourhood Policy focusing specifically on closer cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova (Embassy Vienna, 25 January 2007). By pledging active commitment to ESDP goals, the coalition signalled that ‘European integration and policy coordination remain at the centre of Austria's world view’ (Embassy Vienna, 11 May 2007). Importantly, the new administration decided to accentuate Austria’s image as ‘a committed supporter of the UN system’ in view of its campaign to win a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council in 2009-2008 (Embassy Vienna, 11 May 2007). The Grand Coalition vowed to continue the country’s engagement in international peacekeeping missions with a focus on the Balkans and on supporting the Middle East peace process (Embassy Vienna, 25 January 2007).

From the US perspective, however, Austria’s peacekeeping position is not interpreted as active as it is from a domestic perspective. US Ambassador Kilner’s description is revealing:

‘An important element of this [foreign policy] consensus is a scepticism of the value of active military operations. Austrians of all political stripes are unapologetic about their lack of support for military engagement in the world's crisis areas. Instead, they believe that Austrian participation in classic UN peacekeeping operations, together with a relatively robust engagement in the Balkans, constitute an active contribution to the world’s security’ (Embassy Vienna, 11 May 2007).

Appendix 1 presents some of the roles the Gusenbauer administration sought to articulate on the international stage while in office. The findings presented in the table should be considered with caution. As mentioned in the methodological chapter, the order in which roles have been included do not reflect rigorous quantitative measurements of role articulation. The aim was to expose the diversity of roles communicated by the administration at the UN. The following case study analysis does not rely on the full range of roles presented in the table but focuses only on those which come back in the discourse of Austrian policy-makers when considering a deployment to Chad. As it will be shown below, two appear most prominent; namely the Global System Collaborator (GSC) and Regional Subsystem Collaborator roles (RSC), reflecting the choice faced by the Austrian government with regard to the institutions, and associated norms and rules, in which to anchor its peacekeeping initiatives. Other roles not articulated at the UN have also become salient in the decision-making process including the Humanitarian actor role which refers to how the
government defined this particular situation and how it conceived type of response Austria should offer. This last feature validates the decision to combine methodological approaches.

6.4 French Socialisation

Being the chief architect behind EUFOR Chad and its framework nation, France could arguably be seen as the main socialiser of Austria’s roles towards the operation. Paris defined the nature of the crisis as a ‘humanitarian emergency’, advocated a particular solution by diffusing peacekeeping norms and lobbied European partners to follow its plan of action.

The socialising influence of France originates from the leadership role it has played from 2003 addressing the deteriorating situation in the border region between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. This leadership is rooted in French colonial legacy and ongoing cooperation with Chad (Berg, 2009:62). Since 1986, France has a military agreement with N’Djamena involving French protection of Déby’s regime in return for Chadian backing of French geostrategic interests in the region (Bono, 2011:29). It materialises itself through Operation Epervier which maintains around 1000 French troops and six Mirage aircrafts near the capital and in Abéché, providing military and intelligence assistance to Déby’s government. A thorough review of Franco-Chadian relations is beyond the scope of this study (see Marchal, 2009b), but one episode illustrating the nature of their relationship must be mentioned. On 2 February 2008, days before EUFOR Chad was due to deploy, a convoy of rebels attacked N’Djamena determined to remove Déby from power. Much secrecy surrounds the extent to which Epervier troops were involved in suppressing the rebellion, but reports indicate they provided Chadian forces with intelligence on the rebels’ movements, secured N’Djamena’s airport and supplied presidential forces with ammunitions from Libya (Styan, 2012:663; Mattelaer, 2008:10). Under pressure to salvage EUFOR Chad’s neutrality, the French government maintained that they did not participate in direct combat and that operation Epervier remained separate from the European force. Nonetheless, this episode reinforced existing suspicions amongst European partners that France was instrumentalising the EU to serve its own interests. This remained the main issue behind member states’ reluctance to become more actively engaged in EUFOR Chad.

Between 2003 and 2006, French foreign policy-makers kept a close eye on the repercussions of the crisis in Darfur on neighbouring states, pushing the EU and the UN ‘to treat the conflict in Chad as a crisis in its own right’ (Berg, 2009:58). Yet, neither France nor the international community perceived the instability in Chad as a humanitarian priority. It was the plight of civilians in Darfur which the French public became aware of during the 2007 presidential campaign, forcing both candidates to pledge action if elected (Marchal, 2009b). Upon winning the elections in May, Nicolas Sarkozy appointed socialist Bernard Kouchner as Foreign Minister in a move to co-opt his left-wing opposition (Marchal, 2009b).
On his first day in the Quai d’Orsay, Kouchner organised a meeting dedicated to Darfur and proposed a plan to establish a ‘humanitarian corridor’ for the provision of humanitarian assistance. It was received with great scepticism by international actors, and NGOs in particular. They pointed to the lack of consent from the Sudanese government without which the delivery of humanitarian aid would be counterproductive (Pohl, 2013; Marchal, 2009a:23; Le Monde, 2 June 2007). Unhappy to have his plan rejected, Kouchner turned his attention to protecting refugees in Chad through a European mission (Koepf, 2012:337). As founder of Médecins sans Frontières and long-time advocate of humanitarian interventions, Kouchner was instrumental in interpreting the instability in Chad through a humanitarian prism. It contributed to his belief that the EU should ‘do something’ to stop the suffering of Darfurian refugees in Chad caught in the middle of militia fighting (Bono, 2011). He insisted that EUFOR Chad ‘will look after populations which must be protected’ and ‘if possible, we will securitise the zone which will allow Chadian populations to rebuild – it is also a development operation – their villages’ (French Government, 22 February 2008). Defending that the operation fulfilled French interests, the Foreign Minister conveyed his pride that ‘the French army, and seventeen other armies, is going to look after the populations which are suffering’ (French Government, 26 February 2008). Therefore, Kouchner became the main proponent of the civilian protection norm and set out to actively diffuse it in European circles by relying on special adviser for crises and conflicts, Eric Chevalier, a long-time collaborator who previously directed Médecins du Monde’s international missions (Glavier and Smith, 2008:63-69). As he likely shared Kouchner’s normative disposition, Chevalier became an effective agent advocating the norm in European capitals as a way ‘to drum up troops for EUFOR Chad’ (Glavier and Smith, 2008:63-69). Henke’s work (2012) confirms that Paris was pressing Europeans to adopt certain roles and that French diplomats ‘travelled from European capital to European capital to negotiate contributions’ using ‘every bilateral or multilateral meeting to approach potential force contributors’ (p.199-200). Relying on the testimony from a high-ranking French military official, Henke (2012) describes the French approach to convincing potential contributors:

‘French embassies in Europe did most of the preparatory work. They approached their host governments to ask for contributions. The information was then transferred back to Paris, where senior officials in the Quai d’Orsay under Chevalier’s guidance organized the follow-up work’ (Henke, 2012:199-200).

Only when member states turned out to be more reluctant than expected did Foreign Minister Kouchner, Defense Minister Morin, and President Sarkozy step in the negotiations. Member states’ fears that Paris was using the EU to serve its own interests were partly justified as France was seeking to remove itself from neo-colonial relationships with former colonies. Considering Epervier as a waste of resources, Sarkozy wanted European states to assume a greater role in assisting France stabilise and reconstruct Chad in order to ensure a smooth departure of French forces (Marchal, 2009b; Glasier and Smith, 2008:63-69).
provided France with a strong incentive to socialise European partners into roles conducive of their participation, although this self-serving argument was never explicitly used. In fact, Chevalier attempted to diffuse doubts amongst EU states by pushing them to take on a more active role: ‘your fear of being instrumentalised should be another reason to become engaged. The more in it you are, the better you can control EUFOR Chad/CAR’ (quoted in Glasier and Smith, 2008:63-69).

Records of meetings between French and Austrian diplomacies are rare as most discussions took place informally. Yet, one 2005 episode in the lead up to the Austrian EU presidency is indicative of French effort to ensure Austria remained away from its neutral role. Then French Foreign Minister Alliot-Marie appeared ‘convinced that in the course of its EU presidency in 2006 Austria will be able to make progress with pending issues in European defence policy’ since Vienna ‘realised better than other neutral countries in Europe that neutrality makes ever less sense in the European context’ (BBC Monitoring European, 1 December 2005). This socialising pattern is likely to have persisted under Sarkozy and to have intensified in the run up of EUFOR Chad’s deployment.

French officials presented Chad as a humanitarian problem which should be addressed by protecting civilian lives (Styan, 2012:666). Importantly, Bono (2011) argues that ‘the framework of ideas captured in the notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ did act as a political mobiliser of initial consensus within the EU’ (p.28). This suggests that the civilian protection norm was used by France as a socialising device to cast likely contributors into a humanitarian actor role. Moreover, there is evidence that French diplomats sought to convince neutral member states to participate as a mean to bolster the mission’s legitimacy (Henke, 2012:197). It was not lost on French officials that a humanitarian argument was likely to resonate positively amongst neutrals and, therefore, have significant socialising effects on them. Demanding neutrals to perform a humanitarian actor role ensured they did not revert to a neutral role, which would have obstructed their participation, while simultaneously tapping into their traditional mode of peacekeeping.

6.5 EU Socialisation

French activism in generating international momentum also aimed to galvanize interest within the EU. Both the UN’s overstretched capabilities and France’s aspiration to multilateralise its Africa policy made the EU the ideal framework for ‘doing something’ in Chad (Bono, 2011; Charbonneau, 2009:555-558). Crucially, French and EU officials shared a belief that ‘it was time for a new military operation to foster the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a crisis management tool’ a year after EUFOR RD Congo mission (Mérand and Rakotonirina, 2009:124, Mattelaer, 2008:15). This turned the EU into a socialising agent promoting ideas about how its foreign policy should operate, ultimately, casting member states into roles conducive to achieving key crisis
management objectives (Wong in Hill and Smith, 2008:147). From 1999, the EU has identified the management of conflicts in Africa as a priority of the CFSP and ESDP. It has strived to become a ‘unified actor’ towards Africa by coordinating its member states’ differentiated policies, producing a coherent Africa conflict management strategy and undertaking numerous policy initiatives, beginning with the 2000 EU-Africa summit in Cairo (Furness and Olsen, 2016:107; Olsen, 2009:246-247). Consequently, member states’ roles towards the management of crises on the African continent have increasingly been the products of institutional demands for greater policy coherence and coordination. This fits well with France’s aim of ‘demonstrating that the EU is an independent international conflict manager, at least in Africa’ (Olsen, 2009:256).

The Union’s norm advocacy throughout the formation of EUFOR Chad fell in line with the one conducted by France emphasising civilian protection, most likely owing to Paris having uploaded its preference to the EU level. As Churruca (2015) notes, the ‘protection of civilians not only has become a priority of all UN peacekeeping missions, particularly in Africa, but also seems to be the natural objective of an actor which has done the promotion of human rights the cornerstone of its external action’ (p.216). The EU promoted the norm since 2003 when the EU Council integrated guidelines into the CFSP for the protection of civilians during EU-led crisis management operations (Dembinski and Schott, 2013:283). The norm guided EUFOR Chad’s objectives as reflected by the EU joint action plan aimed at ‘improving the security of refugees and internally displaced persons, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and creating favourable conditions for reconstruction and development efforts in these regions’ (European Council, 15 October 2007). On 17 July 2007, the EU applied significant socialising pressures on its member states to perform a humanitarian actor role. In a Political Security Committee (PSC) meeting, head of the UN DPKO, Jean-Marie Guehenno, requested Foreign Ministers to commit a significant number of troops contending that: ‘this is a humanitarian emergency in Chad’ (quoted in Melander, 2007; Bono, 2011:26, 32). This meeting was important in socialising member states because the ‘normative socialisation processes which inform the work of the PSC have succeeded to an appreciable extent in allowing a trans-European strategic culture to begin to stamp its imprint’ on EU foreign policy (Howorth, 2010:4).

However, researchers found that European states participated in EUFOR Chad ‘to prove the EU’s capacity to act alone, and not first and foremost to answer to a humanitarian crisis’ (Bono, 2011:24; Gegout, 2005:435-436). Berg (2009) asserts that ‘European interests’ which had ‘nothing to do with the conflict in Sudanese/Chadian border region’ motivated the deployment of EUFOR Chad (p.62). Witnessing the UN’s incapacity to contain the violence in Darfur and deploy in time in Chad, ‘European governments may have found the idea of the EU making its mark as an effective actor in this conflict-torn region rather appealing’ (Berg, 2009:62). Bailes (2008) claims that such ‘self-regarding’ consideration has dominated
the EU rationale for establishing the ESDP at the expense of ‘help[ing] the suffering’ (p.119). It suggests that the negotiations around EUFOR Chad saw member states experiencing pressures from the EU to act in its interests by performing a RSC role. The prescription of this role was important in that it ensured that member states were dedicated to the development of an effective and coordinated common defence.

Preparations for EUFOR Chad took place at a time when the twenty-seven were due to sign the Treaty of Lisbon on 13 December 2007. Thus, the timing of the operation amplified EU socialisation of member states into RSCs as national governments felt necessary to show solidarity with the EU in order to avoid derailing the process. Substantively, Devine (2011) finds that the Europeanisation process generated by the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty led elites to yield to ‘big power pressure not to object to high-intensity missions’ (p.359). Foreign policy leaders no longer sought to resist the demands of the big powers by advancing the principle of ‘constructive abstention in defence’, in so doing transforming their ‘former peacekeeping concept with the UN in order to implement the EU’s high-intensity Petersberg Tasks’ (Devine, 2011:359). Austria has found itself on the front line of this socialisation because its low defence spending has generated doubts amongst EU actors that Vienna was committed to act as a RSC. Former chief executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA), Nick Witney (2008) emphasised that Austria did not meet the minimum requirement of 1% of GDP in defence spending as a ‘fundamental criteria’ for the advancement of ESDP (p.4). This meant that Austria qualified more as a ‘laggard’ than as a member of the ‘pioneer group’ (Witney, 2008:4; Franke, 2010). Also deploring the little investments made by Austria into defence, commentators urged Vienna to ‘intensify its efforts in the field of security policy in order to maintain its influence’ (Reiter and Frank, 2004:1).

Arguably, EU socialisation of Austria also came from EU Commissioner for External Affairs and former Austrian Foreign Minister (ÖVP), Benita Ferrero-Waldner, at a critical time when, in February 2008, the first wave of Austrian troops was caught in fighting which saw Darfurian rebels trying remove Déby from power. As the Gusenbauer government was under intense domestic pressure to bring troops home, Ferrero-Waldner weighted in by casting Austria into a RSC role. In an interview on 7 February 2008, she expressed her preference for ‘keeping Austrian soldiers in Chad’, recalling that the mandate was to ‘protect refugees against persecution’ and referring to the powerful notion that ‘we Europeans want to avoid a second Srebrenica’ (BBC Monitoring European, 8 February 2008). The allusion to the 1995 failure was a clear appeal to member states, including Austria, that they should actively contribute to improving the EU’s capacity to act externally. It should be noted that, in 2000, Ferrero-Waldner made the case for including a mutual defence clause in the Treaty and, in 2003, played an active part in coordinating the neutrals’ position(s), eventually convincing four of them to accept the clause (Bischof et al. 2006:235
in Devine, 2011:358). Devine (2011) links Ferrero-Waldner’s ‘instrumental role in the elimination of neutrality and non-alignment in the EU’ with her appointment as EU Commissioner for External Affairs between 22 November 2004 and 1 December 2009. In September 2007, she had already made her position clear that ‘EU battlegroups could act without UN mandate’ (BBC Monitoring Europe, 11 September 2007). Asked whether Austria should solely undertake peacekeeping missions or also combat missions, she refused to comment on what she regarded as a matter of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, she highlighted that ‘all EU countries are participating with solidarity in the common foreign and security policy’ (BBC Monitoring Europe, 11 September 2007).

6.6 Austrian Reactions and Role Conceptions

The aim is now to assess the extent to which role expectations flowing from the normative framework established by Paris and Brussels resonated amongst foreign policy actors in Vienna. It involves analysing how external role expectations have been domestically negotiated to understand how they have informed the decision to deploy 160 Austrian troops to EUFOR Chad.

As European states were first considering the idea of an EU mission throughout the summer of 2007, the Gusenbauer government remained silent about its views on the French plan. Austria’s constitutional requirement for an UN mandate explains why the government was reluctant to make an early commitment until a political framework was established by the UN. Moreover, initial reactions to the French proposal emerging from European capitals were unfavourable. Holding the EU Council Presidency, Germany was already expressing doubts over France’s true motives in light of its dubious role as both a European leader and a former colonial power (Berg, 2009:60). The passage of Resolution 1778 on 25 September 2007 authorising the EU to intervene gave the governing foreign policy unit in Vienna the green light to develop a more tangible position. It positively perceived the idea of an EU military force acting as a bridge to a subsequent UN operation because a participation could contribute to existing ambitions, expressed by the foreign ministry under minister Plassnik’s leadership, to position Vienna as ‘a hub in an ever more tightly knit network of links between the UN and the EU’ (Zecha, 2012:134; European Integration and Foreign Affairs (EIFA), 22 February 2007). Thus, Austria first appeared less reluctant than its partners because it saw an opportunity to strengthen its role as ‘loyal partner of the United Nations’ (or GSC) pursued ‘for decades’ having ‘always actively participated in joint international peace missions’ (EIFA, 19 June 2007). Moreover, this role served the Gusenbauer administration’s interest in securing a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council between 2009 and 2010 for which it was campaigning. Schmidl (2015) argues that, during the candidature, ‘Austrian diplomats worried that by then little was left of the once prominent role the country had enjoyed in UN operations’ (p.730). This clarifies why
Foreign Minister Plassnik presented the operation as first and foremost an ‘UN mission in Chad and in central Africa with the inclusion of military forces from the EU’ (BBC Monitoring European, 26 September 2007). A participation in a joint UN-EU peace operation in Chad would be an expression of Austria’s loyalty to both institutions; its key selling point of its campaign to secure a seat. As discussions on Chad were in full swing, Austrian State Secretary, Hans Winkler declared at the UN General Assembly: ‘our efforts are characterized by consistency, both in the EU and in the United Nations. We do not make any absurd promises just to get elected but intend to sustainably strengthen and enlarge our profile on an international level’ (EIFA, 4 October 2007).

That the Austrian participation was the result of a role purely motivated by self-interest for a non-permanent seat is only one piece of the puzzle. That argument overlooks the effect of French and EU socialisation in influencing Austrian foreign policy agents to conceive Austria as a humanitarian actor. By early November, members of the governing foreign policy unit advanced a more self-assured position in favour of a troop deployment claiming they were pursuing a humanitarian agenda (Pohl, 2014:200). External pressures to adopt a humanitarian approach aimed at protecting refugees resonated positively with Foreign Minister Plassnik who favoured a humanitarian mission so that Austria could make ‘a meaningful contribution … in the spirit of its humanitarian tradition’ (BBC Monitoring European, 26 September 2007). Demands for a humanitarian role aligned with the foreign ministry’s goal of ‘lending a hand wherever real suffering can be alleviated’ (EIFA, 4 April 2007). Austria had recently enacted this role by actively participating in the elaboration of the Ottawa Convention designed to implement an international ban on anti-personnel mines. Defense Minister Darabos echoed a similar humanitarian role for Austria in EUFOR Chad which he qualified as a ‘true humanitarian mission’ (The Vienna Review, 1 February 2008; EIFA, 4 April 2007). The socialisation of Austria into a humanitarian role accounts for the government’s initial proposal to deploy up to 240 soldiers, twice as much as originally intended (BBC Monitoring European, 7 November 2007). It was justified in reference to the ‘human suffering in Darfur’ which mirrored the logic and rhetoric used by Kouchner who defended a deployment in Chad on the ground that it was a response to the Darfurian crisis (BBC Monitoring European, 26 September 2007). The reality was that an EU deployment to protect refugees in Chad only partially addressed the political, humanitarian and security emergency unfolding in Darfur. Therefore, Austria’s positive response to French and EU socialisation aligns with the previous finding that EU states ‘gave political legitimacy to an operation by reacting to the call of ‘humanitarian emergency’’ before any domestic debates could take place (Bono, 2011:38).

Interestingly, Chandler (2009) asserts that Western governments’ inclination to approve calls for humanitarian intervention arises from their inability to formulate coherent foreign policy trajectories informed by both values and interests, and their failure to build
domestic consensus around these foreign policy goals (p.183, 206). This argument suggests that the Gusenbauer government gave in to external pressures for a humanitarian role because it could not generate a domestic consensus amongst the wider political class and the citizenry around an Austrian participation in EUFOR Chad. In fact, the government’s proposal to contribute 160 troops to the mission was met with unprecedented contestation from both opposition parties and public. In Austria, peacekeeping deployments traditionally receive widespread domestic support (Schmidl, 2013b). Parliamentary debates held on Friday 9 November 2007, prior to a vote on the government’s plan, saw strong opposition from the Greens, Freedom Party (FPÖ), and Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ). Their main argument was that participation in EUFOR Chad was incompatible with neutrality (Brettner-Messler, 2008). The Green party criticised the government for not acting upon a neutral role, depicting the operation as ‘a French Foreign Legion mission with Austrian support’ (Agence France-Press, 9 November 2007). The reference to the French Legion underscores the opposition’s perception that Austria was shifting its approach to peacekeeping to a more militarised one. Similarly, the FPÖ condemned the move as a ‘reckless adventure’ violating Austria’s policy of neutrality (Agence France-Press, 9 November 2007). An additional argument made by the opposition, most vocally by the Green party, was that Austrian forces were not adequately equipped to undertake this type of mission (Brettner-Messler, 2008). This contention had gained traction when reports emerged that Austrian helicopters were fitted with neither engine filters required in desert operations nor with armoured fuel tanks (BBC Monitoring European, 5 November 2007). The findings stalled the recruitment of volunteer pilots who became unwilling to fly in the dangerous conditions prevailing in Chad with inadequate equipment. Although a technical issue, the opposition used it to demonstrate that the government was not playing an appropriate role for Austria by sending troops to a mission where their security could not be guaranteed.

The opposition parties’ role contestation resonated well amongst the Austrian public, a majority of whom rejected the deployment on the ground that it violated neutrality (Wiener Zeitung, 7 November 2007). Public opposition reached 70% making the Austrian public the least supportive of the mission amongst other EU member states. (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008; Embassy Vienna, 23 November 2007). The scepticism of the Austrian people also lied in the emerging character of the operation. Minister Darabos underlined that EUFOR ‘could be the most-dangerous mission [that] the Austrian army has undertaken in peacetime’ (Wiener Zeitung, 7 November 2007). The intensification of war language alongside claims of humanitarianism sent confusing messages to the public. Introducing the possibility of war-like situation certainly exacerbated existing fears that the mission was becoming more militarised than first thought. The public had grown increasingly suspicious in what it saw as ‘a mission to a far-off dangerous country’ (The Vienna Review, 2008). This perception suggests a reluctance to support peacekeeping undertakings out with traditional types of
deployment. On 5 February 2008, a demonstration of around 50 people, organised by the League of the Socialist Revolution and the Anti-Imperialist Coordination, took place in front of the chancellery in protest against Austria’s involvement (Austrian Times Online, 6 February 2008). Although small in size, the rally was nonetheless significant in a country where peacekeeping missions conventionally receive high public approval. Protesters were also calling for a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty due to be ratified the following April. Arguably, this indicates a linkage in the public’s mind between the Lisbon Treaty and the coalition’s EUFOR decision. People perceived the Austrian participation as the domestic outcome of the new EU treaty. In other words, an attack was being made on the government’s enactment of a RSC role.

Although political and public dissent failed to sway a parliamentary vote against the deployment, elite contestation intensified in February 2008 when Darfurian rebels attacked N’Djamena, days after the Austrian advance team had been dispatched. All three opposition parties rushed to attack the government claiming that their initial concerns were warranted, and that France was no longer neutral party in Chad (Embassy Vienna, 6 February 2008). FPÖ party leader, Heinz-Christian Strache stated that ‘if the situation escalates and the French increase their military presence, it will be only a matter of time before every European soldier in Chad is perceived as an enemy’ (Embassy Vienna, 6 February 2008). Underlying the party’s perception that the government was deviating from a neutral role, he added that Austrians ‘should not fight a foreign war on foreign soil’ (Embassy Vienna, 6 February 2008). The accusations held some legitimacy as Chad’s largest rebel group, the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), issued in December 2007 a ‘state of war against French and other foreign forces’ owing to the ‘diplomatic, strategic and logistical aid’ they brought to Déby (BBC News, 3 February 2008). Strache went as far as to demand Darabos’s resignation when it appeared that the Defense Minister failed to provide parliament a critical piece of intelligence (Franke, 2010). The undisclosed document underlined that the Chadian situation was more volatile than the government was willing to admit, and that the role of France was threatening the impartiality of the mission. One may speculate that the government omitted these findings to ensure a parliamentary majority in favour of the mission (Zecha, 2012:137). FPÖ leader alluded to the report’s conclusions when claiming that the conditions were ‘not quiet and not stable’ and that it would be ‘disastrous’ to send personnel under these circumstances (Embassy Vienna, 23 November 2007). In essence, opposition parties contested the government’s decision by invoking a neutral role for Austria. They disputed that the government was truly pursuing a humanitarian role, which would have been congruent with their role preference. Ultimately, this role contestation was not enough to force the government to reverse its decision and end Austria’s participation in EUFOR Chad.

Neither external role pressures nor role contestation from the political opposition
produced disagreements in cabinet over the appropriateness of a humanitarian actor role. Expectations of role contestation in the foreign policy unit between SPÖ Chancellor and the Defence Minister on the one hand, and ÖVP Foreign Minister Plassnik, on the other, were high given the confrontational atmosphere prevailing amongst coalition partners on all other issues. While all three accepted demands for a humanitarian role, US ambassador in Vienna identified Darabos as ‘the main driving force behind the mission’ (Embassy Vienna, 18 December 2008). This leadership is closely intertwined with the minister’s domestic task of reforming the armed forces. This involved reducing expensive territorial defence structures while upgrading capabilities in ‘network-integration, smart weapons and precise strike, joint operations and expeditionary warfare’ (Gressel, 2013). The third element was to keep Austria engaged as ‘an active participant in the European security structures and international missions’ (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008). In a November 2007 speech, he clarified his intentions:

‘The new orientation of Austrian security policy undoubtedly and above all means Europeanisation. As a middle-sized EU member state we have, in view of the changed security landscape, no alternative to putting our entire security structure in a European context’ (quoted in Global Security Online, 2007).

This indicates that Darabos’s priority on re-orienting his ministry made him a receptive agent of EU socialisation. His determination to deploy troops in the face of domestic opposition is, therefore, better understood as part of his plan to implement a new strategic concept for Austrian defence. Another key component of the reorientation consisted of finding new partners to enable troop training, international defence cooperation and enhanced capabilities. A declining interest in the Balkans combined with an aversion to assuming a greater military role had distanced Germany from Austria as a suitable partner since the mid-1990s (Gressel, 2013). Italy and Hungary could have shared leadership responsibilities with Austria towards the Balkans if it were not for the financial difficulties of the former and the political weakness of the latter. The only option remaining was for Austria to ‘follow the French’ (Gressel, 2013). This strategy was attractive because Paris saw the EU as the primary framework for coordinating defence affairs and had an ‘ambitious and robust expeditionary agenda’ which would allow for an efficient modernisation of the Austrian defence. A partnership with France was the option least likely to attract criticisms from neutralist voices at home as it evaded deepening involvement in NATO or participation in US defence endeavours. This confirms the claim that an Austrian participation in EFOR Chad was ‘a move to avoid having to contribute more than a few staff officers to ISAF, which would have been highly unpopular in Austria’ (Schmidl, 2015:730). Thus, the defence ministry’s need for new partners explains why socialising demands from Paris were likely to be positively met by Darabos who sought to combine a humanitarian actor role with a French partner (or loyal ally to France) role. While this provides evidence that a French
*partner* role motivated Darabos to push for a participation in EUFOR Chad, domestic contestation against this role means that defence officials were cautious not to articulate it explicitly. Nonetheless, analyst Antoine Glaser conveys well the reasoning likely to have predominated following the rebels’ attack and calls to bring the troops home. He opined that withdrawing Austrian troops ‘would be a serious blow for Paris’ (Embassy Vienna, 6 February 2008). Developing further, he pointed out:

‘Eric Chevallier, advisor to French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, has been committed for months to putting the EUFOR force together, and he had a really tough time of convincing Poland, Austria and Ireland of deploying small contingents ... All his efforts would be in vain’ (Embassy Vienna, 6 February 2008).

Additionally, the view of an official from one of the neutral member states reported by Mattelaer (2008) is indicative that many, even neutrals, in Brussels sought a *French partner* role:

‘We know the French have certain national interests in Chad and that they are in it with a somewhat different agenda. But without the French nothing would happen at all. By and large, we believe the French are honest about this and trying to do the right thing’ (p.15-16).

The adoption of a *French partner* role by Darabos was not devoid of bureaucratic and political calculations. First, it served the purpose of improving the minister’s relationship with the military. Darabos anticipated that acquiescing to France’s demand for troops was important for improving Austrian defence and was likely to be received positively in the military. The prospect of deploying with a weighty European military generated much support for the mission in the armed forces (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008). Second, and as a result, it allowed Darabos to strengthen his political and bureaucratic position vis-à-vis the foreign ministry and his ÖVP coalition partner. In fact, his first months in office turned out to be challenging as he came under heavy criticisms for trying to renegotiate the purchase of Eurofighters. On 26 March 2008, the Defence Minister attended a meeting with UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon in New York during which he expressed his view that ‘Austria’s participation in the framework of the European Chad mission was temporary’ but nonetheless ‘crucial’ to provide humanitarian assistance and avoid negative spill over in Europe (Federal Chancellery, 31 March 2008). A source close to the Minister admitted that the ‘meeting was an intrusion into Foreign Minister Plassnik’s turf’ and that Darabos met the Secretary-General in the aim of scoring political points (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008). The episode indicates a more antagonist relationship between the Defence and Foreign Affair Ministers than the official consensus on a *humanitarian actor* role suggests. A comment made by FPÖ party leader urging Darabos to ‘free himself from the ÖVP’s stranglehold and end the African operation’ hints at a slight competitive undercurrent between Darabos and Plassnik (Embassy Vienna, 6 February 2008).
Differences in role preferences between the two Ministers can also be detected in the lack of reference to a French partner role by Plassnik who placed greater emphasis on Austria’s partnership with the EU in addressing African crises. The expression of a RSC by the Foreign Minister is predictable given that she was ‘a prominent pro-EU voice in Austria where many people are Eurosceptics’ (Reuters Online, 9 November 2009). Her EU-orientated outlook is likely to have facilitated the socialisation of Austria into a RSC towards Africa. Austria began formulating a more comprehensive foreign policy strategy towards Africa when taking the EU Council Presidency in 2006 during which Vienna actively worked for implementing of the EU’s Africa Strategy (Austrian Council Presidency, 8 May 2006). Referring to the government’s endeavours in the years leading up to the Presidency, Plassnik stated that ‘we [Austria] have developed ever closer and broader cooperation between the EU and Africa’ (Austrian Council Presidency, 8 May 2006). Following the EU-Africa Summit held in December 2007, which was a significant step in the development of a common Africa strategy, the Foreign Minister commented that Austria ‘shall assume a leadership role’ in contributing ‘pro-actively to the EU-Africa Strategy and co-shape it in a dedicated way’ (EIFA, 14 January 2008). This commitment is grounded in the belief that ‘developments in Africa are having an increasing impact on Europe’ (EIFA, 9 November 2007). In this context, the foreign ministry acknowledged that ‘stronger international integration - including Africa - calls for a partial realignment of the security and defence policy pursued by both Europe and Austria’ (EIFA, 9 November 2007).

In this socialising context of the EU’s Africa strategy, EU demands for a humanitarian role in Chad gained resonance amongst foreign ministry officials, especially Plassnik who was committed to integrating Austrian foreign policy towards Africa in a European framework. State Secretary Winkler justified the government’s EUFOR Chad decision before Parliament by underlining that ‘for decades now, Austria has seen itself as a loyal partner of the United Nations and the EU. We have therefore always participated pro-actively in joint international peace missions’ (EIFA, 9 November 2007). This substantiates the explanation suggesting that Austria participated in EUFOR Chad to improve its image as a reliable EU partner following widespread domestic Euroscepticism and mounting pressures from European circles to do more towards the ESDP (Franke, 2010; Reiter and Frank, 2004). To be sure, the defense ministry accepted a RSC role anticipating that ‘missions in Africa for [the Armed Forces] will become more and more likely’ given that ‘Austria will not be able to shirk the common responsibility of the EU’ (Austrian Armed Forces Online, 2006). Nonetheless, by 22 February 2008, the Defense Minister’s commitment to a RSC role was wavering in light of delays accumulated by a continuing lack of helicopters for the mission.
Darabos criticised EUFOR Chad as ‘badly prepared’ concluding that ‘if the EU takes its commitment to security and stability outside its borders seriously, then this must be discussed’ (BBC Monitoring Europe, 24 February 2008).

Ultimately, the two Ministers only displayed minimal differences in the role emitter they were prepared to accept demands from. Whereas Darabos was more likely to meet French expectations for bureaucratic reasons, Plassnik was a receptive agent of EU demands as she perceived the EU to be giving ‘medium-sized countries the opportunity to contribute as active co-designer’ (EIFA, 4 October 2007). Role contestation inside the foreign policy unit was avoided as France and the EU converged in demanding a humanitarian role which Darabos and Plassnik favoured. Both also perceived significant benefits in accepting demands for solidarity in terms of bringing Austria back from the margins of European defence integration and fostering new partnerships with influential European powers. Anticipating negative reactions at home, the selection of a humanitarian role served the purpose of appealing to the neutralist values of the electorate and the political opposition (Pohl, 2014:200-202). Rhetorical manoeuvring was undertaken to make a humanitarian actor role consistent with a neutral role and increase the sense that Austria was sticking to its traditional approach to peacekeeping. Those favouring a deployment argued that ‘as neutral country, Austria was well-placed to help refugees and to protect displaced persons’ (Franke 2010). It is also how one should understand Darabos’s declaration that ‘Austria practically has an obligation to get involved in such a mission … this is completely compatible with neutrality; after all, neutral Ireland provides the mission commander, Lt Gen Pat Nash’ (BBC Monitoring European, 7 November 2007). His advisor, Johann Pucher defended the mission in similar terms by reasoning that ‘neutrality does not mean sitting still’ (Agence France-Press, 9 November 2007). To diffuse ‘a certain level of suspicion with regard to the French agenda’ amongst domestic constituencies, Austria led a group of neutral countries seeking a limited mandate based on neutrality and a restricted deployment period of one year (Mattelaer, 2008:15; EIFA, 4 October 2007). Austria participated in EUFOR Chad because it was successfully socialised into the roles of RSC, French partner and humanitarian actor. Defence and Foreign Ministers openly embraced the latter as it offered them an opportunity to convince domestic opponents of the appropriateness of the mission while simultaneously responding to external role demands.
6.7 Concluding Discussion

French leadership in establishing EUFOR Chad through the EU, which itself was Europeanising an Africa strategy, indicates that Austria faced strong socialising pressures in the form of role prescriptions intended to elicit a consequential Austrian participation. Austrian agents most active in the decision-making positively identified with a humanitarian role demanded by Paris and Brussels. They also perceived benefits in adopting the expected role of humanitarian actor. Austria could enhance its chances of gaining a UN Security Council non-permanent seat, enter the core of EU defence cooperation and foster a new partnership with France required for re-orientating the armed forces towards new tasks. At least, they sought to halt the deterioration of Austria’s reputation as a ‘laggard’ in the construction of a common European defence. These perceptions contributed to the socialisation of Austria into a French partner and RSC. Had Vienna not been socialised, the Chadian crisis is unlikely to have appeared on the Gusenbauer government’s agenda given that Chad had not been a foreign policy priority for any previous government. Moreover, Austrian domestic audiences were more prone to demand action aimed at alleviating suffering in Darfur than in Chad, since that the plight of Darfurian civilians had received more extensive international scrutiny. Hence, the fact that Austria directed its efforts to Chad reflected Kouchner’s inability to intervene in Darfur, indicating Austria aligned its foreign policy priorities to those of France as a consequence of socialisation from Paris.

External socialisation by France and the EU produced unprecedented political and public opposition to a deployment, discontinuing the cross party and societal consensus which traditionally prevails over peacekeeping deployments. This case shows that small states’ decisions over modern peacekeeping missions can be highly contested by opposition parties invoking roles divergent from those advocated by the governing elite in cabinet (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:12; Brummer and Thies, 2015:277). Opposition parties contested the government’s humanitarian role, not on the ground that it was inappropriate for Austria, but because they rightly suspected that it also involved performing RSC and French partner roles. They feared that enacting these concealed roles would jeopardise Austria’s and the mission’s neutrality putting Austrian troops into arms way. Foreign policy roles perceived, conceived and negotiated domestically bear consequences for the troops’ peacekeeping posture and tasks in the field.

There is only mixed evidence that the role contestation between governing and opposition parties was rooted in ideological differences over European cooperation in defence and whether Austria should continue to pursue a neutral role in international affairs. While the FPÖ has been critical of the EU because of a reluctance to delegate decision-making authority over foreign deployments, it has openly called for neutrality to be discarded in favour of NATO membership (Virchow, 2007:61). However, the party oscillates between contradictory calls for downgrading neutrality and retaining it as a key guiding
principle to shore up patriotic feelings. The Greens are the party most supportive of neutrality opposing any foreign policy move that implicates its abandonment. The party supports participation in international peacekeeping based on a neutral role in that missions must be UN authorised and preferably be dedicated to protecting human rights through civilian means (Zecha, 2012:39). Therefore, the roles advanced by the government were not altogether incompatible with those emanating from opposition parties’ ideologies. The Greens could have approved the deployment of troops to protect refugees and the FPÖ could have perceived the operation as an opportunity for secure Austrian security interests through multilateral cooperation. In fact, it was ‘reported that the opposition to the deployment from the Green Party was weak’ as evidenced by the party’s foreign policy spokesman, Ursula Lunacek, who unofficially supported the deployment (Embassy Vienna, 6 January 2008). The evidence suggests that as small states’ political opposition increasingly disputes the roles held by their governments to inform peacekeeping decisions, the source of their contestation does not lie in party ideology. In contrast, the contestation over Austria’s roles towards EUFOR Chad emerged from opposition parties seeking to play the electoral game (Brummer and Thies, 2015:277). They aimed to appeal to a pro-neutrality public in the hope that it would punish an already fragile coalition for enacting the RSC and French partner roles.

Further undermining the argument that role contestation unfolded along ideological lines is that disagreements did not spill over inside the divided foreign policy-making unit. It is surprising that a SPÖ Minister headed the charge for a French partner role given that the party has been a major force in retaining neutrality. Although the SPÖ has embraced a European agenda since 1982 including the whole spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks, it retains Eurosceptic tendencies translating into an uneasiness towards integrative plans envisaging automatic obligations to participate in military operations (Rickly in Wivel and Steinmetz, 2010:186). There is little sign that Darabos accepted this Euroscepticism which likely facilitated an agreement with Plassnik. It was, nonetheless, prevalent within the party, becoming most significantly expressed in June 2008 when Chancellor Gusenbauer and acting leader, Werner Faymann pledged to put all future EU treaties to popular referenda in response to growing public discontent with the Lisbon Treaty (Lansford, 2015:86). The policy shift caused the ÖVP to defect, bringing the coalition to an end on 7 July (Luther, 2009:1051). The ÖVP has been the most forceful advocate of abandoning neutrality, arguing that Austria should be fully integrated into European defence structures (Gebhard, 2013:289). This view is shared amongst large parts of the foreign and defence ministry, confirming that Darabos’ role preference was largely grounded in bureaucratic reasons rather than ideology (Gärtner and Höll, 2001:190). It could be argued that bureaucratic interests in multilateral and bilateral cooperation at European level explain why this ideological divide coalition partners did not become active and lead to role contestations inside the unit over EUFOR Chad, despite deep fragmentation within cabinet. The role selection process
regarding the European mission did not generate intra-cabinet disagreements comparable to those which ended the coalition months later. Hagan (1995) substantiates this point by asserting that ‘although there are numerous cases of these divided cabinets, there are also numerous examples of coalition governments whose members were able to reach meaningful agreements for foreign policy action’ owing to a ‘consensual style of coalition decision making’ (p.132).

A key finding of this examination indicates that the Gusenbauer government successfully overrode strong political and public opposition to meet external role expectations. This supports the argument that the governing elite of small states may experience little domestic constraints when selecting the roles that their states will come to play in modern peacekeeping. Despite a record level of opposition, the coalition was not punished electorally for the enactment of the RSC and French partner roles. Another SPÖ-led Grand Coalition was re-elected in September 2008 following snap elections held after the collapse of the Gusenbauer government. Defence Minister Darabos survived politically being maintained in that function after the elections. It raises the question as to what strategies the coalition used to overcome the opposition and reduce the risk of an electoral backlash. Based on Hagan’s (1995) suggested ‘dynamics by which the games of building policy coalitions and retaining political power influence foreign policy’, the Gusenbauer government confronted domestic opposition through manipulation designed to generate new support for its decision (p.127, 129; original emphasis). This was the primary purpose of a humanitarian actor role which was used strategically to appeal to the majority of Austrians who still regarded neutrality as the cornerstone of Austria’s foreign policy.

It can be argued that external demands for a humanitarian role suited the governing elite in that they offered the prospect of both regional cooperation and domestic legitimisation. The latter was crucial since the government had given its approval to participate in EUFOR Chad prior any domestic discussions (Bono, 2011). Darabos maintained efforts to mobilise support for the mission after the deployment began claiming, in an April 2008 visit to Chad, that the Austrian armed forces’ work was valued by international partners (Embassy Vienna, 21 April 2008). A mobilisation strategy founded on a humanitarian role failed to influence the political opposition in parliament. Yet, the government was not forced to adjust its roles owing to an institutionally weak parliament. In Austria, the main institutional hurdle is the Main Committee of the National Council (first chamber of parliament) which must formally approve any decision to deploy personnel on foreign soil (Schmidl, 2013b). However, the delegation of authority from the plenary to the main committee limits parliamentary control of military operations (Wagner, 2006:36; Mello, 2014:13). Green chairman at the time Alexander van der Bellin deplored that Austrian parliamentary procedures did not allow him to abstain on the Chad vote (Embassy Vienna, 16 January 2008). Additionally, the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition managed to gain
parliamentary approval for its roles as it controlled a majority of parliamentarians who were strongly behind a participation in EUFOR Chad.

As the government no longer needed to manipulate the political opposition after the parliamentary vote, it began pursuing an insulation strategy intended to ‘override’ additional challenges to its role selection (Hagan, 1995:131; Kaarbo, 2015:203). This approach was successful in deflecting the opposition’s calls to withdraw the troops when EUFOR’s initial contingent witnessed a rebel attack on Déby’s regime in February 2008. The coalition ignored the demands calculating that reputational costs of withdrawing outweighed domestic ones associated with eventual Austrian casualties. The governing elite insulated itself against domestic pressures by agreeing that a neutral role should not keep Austria away from regional peacekeeping partnerships. This finding corroborates Kreps’s (2010) research on NATO-led operations showing that ‘elites are sensitive to the costs of international defection and converge around a commitment to international cooperation, which reduces the electoral and foreign policy effects of public opinion’ (p.192). This case study has gone a step further and demonstrated that consensus over roles in small states’ foreign policy unit can inhibit the appeal of responding to domestic role demands. When no credible political alternative exists to enact a neutral role, ruling parties have no incentive to accommodate the opposition’s role preferences. Thus, while new peacekeeping patterns have eroded small states’ peacekeeping consensus, the evidence suggests that governing parties may continue to follow the norm of consensual decision-making as they come under socialising pressures to adapt and recognise the benefits associated with peacekeeping cooperation. It has allowed successive Austrian governments to override a reticent public and undertake a ‘fundamental shift away from old values and practices related to [anti-] militarism and neutrality’ towards ‘the adoption of EU rationale of participation in crisis management operations as the way to secure peace’ (Devine, 2011:359). Gebhard (2013) similarly contends that the Gusenbauer government has followed a ‘path towards a normalized and inconspicuous national role conception and has pursued a policy of ‘pragmatic neutrality’, albeit without turning into a free rider’ (p.291). The fact that the electorate did not elect an alternative government in the following elections indicates that an insulation strategy succeeded and that the Austrian public is progressively adapting to new roles for Austria in international affairs.
CHAPTER SEVEN  DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM UNDOF, 2013

7.1 Introduction

On 6 June 2013, Austria made international headlines when the government of Chancellor Werner Faymann announced the withdrawal of its contingent from the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights following violent clashes between Syrian armed forces and opposition militants in the area of operation. Austrian troops had been part of UNDOF since its launch in 1974 and were due to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of their participation in the operation. UNDOF was Austria’s longest and most substantial commitment to any peacekeeping theatre and contributed to its status as a reliable UN peacekeeper (Mühlberger, 2016). The departure of Austrian troops (around 380), amounting to a third of the total number (1000 troops) participating in UNDOF, left a significant capability gap threatening the entire operation (Reuters, 6 June 2013; UN News Centre, 2013). Following criticisms from the UN, Washington and Tel Aviv, the decision severely damaged Austria’s UN reputation. This chapter seeks to understand why the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition took a decision that went against Austria’s longstanding UN tradition and would inevitably weaken its reputation as a reliable peacekeeper. Officially, the government justified the pullout on security grounds contending that ‘the uncontrolled and immediate danger to Austrian soldiers has risen to an unacceptable level’ (Europe Integration Foreign Affairs (EIFA), 6 June 2013). Commentators also claimed that the decision was driven by domestic political considerations (Korkisch, 2013). In light of the next general election due to be held the following September, the government worried ‘about adverse public reactions in the event that Austrian soldiers were killed because of the civil war in Syria’ (Schmidl, 2013).

The account presented in this chapter builds on these explanations but offers a more comprehensive picture suggesting that the worsening security situation on the ground, combined with uncertainty about how the mission was to evolve, generated inconsistencies in the peacekeeping roles the Faymann government intended to play. The initial deployment of Austrian troops to UNDOF in 1974 was driven by Kreisky’s determination to perform a neutral and an active independent role in the context of an active foreign policy, especially towards the Middle East (Mühlberger, 2016). Having sustained a large contingent over the years, the participation in UNDOF became synonymous with Vienna’s commitment to the UN system and its peacekeeping endeavours. In other words, successive Austrian governments have sustained a substantial contribution to UNDOF driven by a GSC role. However, the prospect of UN-led adjustments to the mission, designed to shift its character
away from traditional peacekeeping towards more demanding tasks with a lower threshold for the use of force, challenged Austria’s neutral role. As UNDOF became entangled in the Syrian crisis, it became increasingly difficult for Vienna to perform the roles of GSC and neutral simultaneously as basis for its participation in the operation. A decision had to be made over whether to remain a GSC, supporting the UN regardless of how robust the mission may become, or revert back to a neutral role restricting Austrian troops to traditional peacekeeping duties. This case could be conceptualised as one of failed socialisation. The Faymann administration rejected calls made by international actors proposing changes to the mandate in order to allow for interventions between Bashar al-Assad’s forces and the armed opposition endowed by greater use of force. By failing to integrate the norm pertaining to the use of force in peacekeeping and meet direct demands for a smooth transition, the Austrian government gradually abandoned its GSC role. External pressures to maintain it were successfully withstood, demonstrating the enduring influence of domestic constraints, ideationally and materially defined, on Austria’s self-definition.

### 7.2 Background to UNDOF, the Israeli-Syrian Conflict

UNDOF was established in 1974 to mitigate the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The origins of the conflict can be traced back to 1948 when Syria advanced westwards from the Golan Heights up to the Jordan River taking over a small piece of land assigned to Israel under the 1947 Partition Plan. The move aimed to secure Syria’s access to the waters of the Jordan River and Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee) (Daoudy, 2008:218; Slater, 2002:83). This geopolitical episode forms the context in which the dispute over the Golan Heights between Israel and Syrian has unfolded. As Neff (1994) notes ‘the guide to understanding the security issue facing the two countries lies not on the heights themselves but in the valley below’ (p.26). The area is strategically significant as it comprises the sources of the Jordan River, the Yarmuk triangle south of Lake Tiberias and the western part of the Jordan. It provides whoever possessing it access to water and control over the quantity running downstream (Daoudy, 2008:218). In a compromise solution negotiated by the UN in July 1949, Syria agreed to withdraw on the condition that the area was transformed into demilitarised zones (DMZs). However, from 1951, Israel sought to gradually claim its authority over the DMZs and to take hold of the Syria-controlled Golan (Slater, 2002:89-91). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Golan Heights became seen by Israeli leaders, not only

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9 For comprehensive examinations of the security issues between Israel and Syria leading to the Six Day War see Cooley, 1984; Daoudy, 2008; Neff, 1994 Slater, 2002; Shuval, 2000. These also include references to the debate over whether control of water sources in the area of the Jordan River basin should be seen as a cause of conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours.
as highly symbolic to the realisation of Greater Israel, but also as an invaluable asset offering
the necessary security and water resources to achieve settlement plans (Slater, 2002:89-91).
Tensions arising from Israeli assertiveness and Syrian retaliation steadily escalated until to
the outbreak of the Six Day war in June 1967\(^\text{10}\). Within days, Israeli forces had taken control
of the Golan Heights. Determined to regain this lost territory after gaining power in
Damascus, Hafiz al-Assad entered a military alliance with the Soviet Union providing Syria
with material capabilities to compete with Israeli military strength (Slater, 2002:93). On 6
October 1973, Syria took advantage of Egypt’s attack against Israel in the Sinai to open a
second front in the Golan Heights. Israeli forces were caught off guard allowing the Syrian
army to recapture the Golan. This military achievement was short-lived. Israel instigated a
counter-offensive which saw the IDF retake the Golan and capture additional territories.
Israel advanced into Syrian territory to such an extent that it threatened to attack Damascus
(Tzabag, 2001:195)\(^\text{11}\).

The danger of escalation to a global war between the Soviet Union and the US,
which had recently negotiated a period of détente, enabled the Security Council to adopt
Resolution 338 calling for a cease-fire (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015). Fighting ended on 24
October marking the start of drawn out negotiations mediated by Washington in the context
of the Geneva Conference. As both parties had interests in finding a peaceful solution
(Tzabag, 2001:201), Syria and Israel signed the Disengagement Agreement on 31 May 1974
laying down plans for the separation of forces (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015). To that effect, it
stipulated that UNDOF would be deployed in the Golan Heights to maintain a buffer,
demilitarised zone. The zone was divided into Areas of Separation (AOS) and Limitations
(AOL). To this day, the AOS delimit the area that neither side is authorised to occupy.
Expanding outwards to either side of the AOS are the AOLs which impose different limits
on armament allowed to be stationed within them. The mandate is set forth in UN Resolution
350, assigning the Force to ‘maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria’, ‘supervise the
disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces’ and ‘supervise the areas of separation and
limitation’ (UN Online, 2017). UNDOF’s role is to monitor Israeli and Syrian military
activities in the area of operation ensuring that neither side enters the AOS nor mobilises
military equipment exceeding the limits set for each AOL (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015). The
Force is limited to a maximum strength of 1250 peacekeepers and includes unarmed
observers and lightly armed soldiers. These constraints ‘reflect compromises between Israeli
and Syrian negotiating demands’ (Lindley, 2004:154). It should be noted that UNDOF was

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\(^{10}\) For an in-depth examination of the immediate causes of the Six Day war see Ziser, 2002.

\(^{11}\) For a detailed account of the Israeli decision-making during the war see Tzabag, 2001.
largely the product of American diplomacy led by Kissinger at the UN’s expense. The UN only had a limited input because Secretary-General Waldheim was neither fully dedicated to the missions that emerged during his mandate nor able to act independently of American influence to shape their developments (Kille, 2006:149).

In nearly forty years, UNDOF positively contributed to stability in the Golan Heights region having maintained the 1974 ceasefire and prevented a major conflict between Syria and Israel. Rudloff and Diehl (2015) emphasise that, aside from minor incidents and violations, the operation has a ‘sustained and solid record of conflict management in patrolling the Golan Heights and separating Israeli and Syrian forces’ (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015). One of its main achievements is that it increases transparency by conducting bi-weekly inspections of both sides’ positions and by reporting violations. In this way, it reduces uncertainty about the intentions of either side and helps build confidence between the parties (Lindley, 2002:161). Additionally, UNDOF was able to gain the trust of the parties and is, therefore, seen as a reliable channel of communication. On the challenges faced by UNDOF, Lindley (2002) found that its Standard Operating Procedures (SPOs) represent the main obstacle to more precise confidence-building inspections. SPOs prevent inspectors from undertaking unexpected and more intrusive inspections that can be verified independently of Israeli and Syrian officials (Lindley, 2002:156). UNDOF’s key limitation lies in its poor conflict resolution record having failed to bring the parties to sign a permanent peace agreement (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015)\textsuperscript{12}. However, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 became UNDOF’s most pressing and challenging test yet, throwing the whole operation into doubts. By early 2012, clashes between the Syrian army and anti-Assad rebels had moved into the area of operations leading to a number of serious ceasefire violations. Most notably, Syrian armed forces crossed into AOS to undertake military operations against the rebels, consequently sparking Israeli protests (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015). While the ceasefire has not broken down, the risk of escalation between Syria and Israel has intensified significantly. The danger is that Israel might lose confidence in UNDOF’s capacity to fulfil its mandate prompting Israeli leaders to take unilateral actions against Syria. In October 2012, the IDF was reported to have already ‘reinforced its troops along the fence’ as a ‘precautionary measure’ and to have crossed the ceasefire line to observe activity (UNSC, 30 November 2012). Furthermore, unrest drastically raised the level of risk for peacekeepers. Numerous incidents have occurred where UN troops have been threatened, held hostage and fired on. Having increasingly been restricted in their freedom of movement, and sometimes

\textsuperscript{12} On failed negotiations between Israel and Syria during the 1990s and early 2000s see Slater 2002; Daoudy, 2008.
forced to seek shelter, peacekeepers have not been able to achieve their mandate. The crux of the problem is that UNDOF was established as an interposition force mandated to supervise an inter-state ceasefire. Therefore, it lacks the mandate and material capabilities to deal with an internal conflict and potential emergencies emerging from it (Rudloff and Diehl, 2015). What remains to be seen is whether and how UNDOF and its participants will adapt to the challenges posed by the Syrian civil war.

7.3 The Austrian Domestic Context

The Grand Coalition (SPÖ-ÖVP) headed by Chancellor Werner Faymann (SPÖ) had been in power for over four years when it took the decision to bring Austrian troops home from UNDOF. It formed following the snap elections of 28 September 2008, held after the previous SPÖ-ÖVP coalition led by Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ) suddenly collapsed. The Gusenbauer coalition had been highly dysfunctional, marked by governmental stalemates and public dissatisfaction from the start (Müller, 2009:492). Only eighteen months after taking office, it was brought down by a dispute over EU referenda. In late June 2008, Chancellor Gusenbauer and Werner Faymann, Infrastructure and Transport Minister and acting SPÖ leader at the time, committed their party to putting all future EU treaties to popular referenda. It was a response to growing public discontent with the Lisbon Treaty which had recently been ratified by the Austrian Parliament in April 2008 (Lansford, 2015:86). The policy shift was enough for ÖVP leader, Wilhelm Molterer to end the coalition on 7 July (Luther, 2009:1051).

The 2008 elections were disastrous for the main parties, both recording their lowest ever results. The ÖVP performed the worst, gathering only 26% of the vote. It was a major disappointment for the party which had hoped to make significant electoral gains and become the largest party by blaming the coalition’s failure on the Social Democrats. Molterer resigned as party leader following the results and was replaced by Josef Pröll. The SPÖ performed only slightly better, winning 29% of the vote. The party could, however, be comforted by its success in fending off ÖVP’s electoral offensive, thereby securing the chancellery for a second consecutive term. The main winners were the two extreme right parties, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) led by charismatic leader, Jörg Haider since breaking away from the FPÖ in April 2005. Respectively winning 17.1% and 10.7% of the vote, they far exceeded their performances in the 2006 elections. When combined, they formed the second largest political force in the country. Their success meant that the Greens lost, albeit marginally, votes from the 2006 elections recording a score of 10.4%. A number of factors contributed to limiting coalition
options. First, the SPÖ had renounced entering into a coalition with an extreme right party. Second, new ÖVP leader, Josef Pröll favoured a coalition with the SPÖ and managed to appease voices inside his party calling for the ÖVP to go in opposition (Luther, 2009:1057). Third, the sudden death of Jörg Haider in a car crash in October ended FPÖ-BZÖ talks about a possible alliance for re-entering government. This context made a new Grand Coalition between Social Democrats and Conservatives inevitable. The Faymann I government was sworn in on 2 December 2008 after straightforward and short negotiations.

Observers had mixed expectations about the formation of another Grand Coalition following the failure of the previous one to overcome divisions. Optimistic views contended that this coalition would be more effective and reliable because both governing parties had new leaders who appeared willing to put their ideological positions and goal scoring mind-sets aside for the sake of consensus (Luther, 2009:1060). Moreover, economic and political instability generated by the emerging global financial crisis was expected to force both parties into cooperation (Spiegel Online, 24 November 2008). Detractors criticised the return of the same traditional parties which had shown little efforts to work together in the past, deriding the new administration as a ‘coalition of losers’ (The Economist, 2 October 2013). There were fears that, instead of acting as a driver of consensus, the global economic downturn would cause divisiveness as it demanded many difficult decisions. On foreign policy, the governing parties found a compromise on the EU referenda question. They agreed to publicly support referenda for future EU treaties as long as neither would call for one without the other’s approval (Luther, 2009:1058).

Below the surface, the issue highlights a fault line along party lines within the coalition with potentially important consequences for the government’s foreign policy. Having instigated the SPÖ’s policy shift, Faymann ran the campaign based on a Eurosceptic message designed to divert votes away from the FPÖ and the BZÖ (Luther, 2009:1059; Politico, 3 July 2016). This strategy provided Faymann with ‘unprecedented support’ and electoral success (Müller, 2009:515). His election as Chancellor introduced isolationist tendencies into the coalition in the form of a more critical stance towards the EU. This Euroscepticism found no opposition within the party and, therefore, was likely to be supported by SPÖ colleagues in cabinet. On the other hand, the ÖVP continued to support greater EU integration ‘stressing the need to remain a reliable and responsible partner in the EU’ (Müller, 2009:515). Early foreign policy activity indicated that the coalition ‘has largely ignored foreign policy since its formation in December 2008’ (Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009). This initial trend raised doubts about the willingness of the Faymann government to engage internationally. The economy diverted the attention of new Austrian leaders away from foreign policy and forced significant cuts in the foreign affairs and defence budgets. These budgetary constraints restricted resources necessary to conduct an active foreign policy and sustain current overseas deployments (Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009).
Similarly, the new government showed minimal interest in utilising the election of Barack Obama to seek a relationship with Washington more constructive than it had been during the tense years of the Bush administration (Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009). Thus, at least early on, there were limited indications that the Faymann government was actively pursuing a RSC or an Atlantic partner (loyal ally) role, underlining further the administration’s inclination not to fully engage with international developments.

Partly responsible for this trend were the new political actors whose foreign policy outlooks were likely to shape Austria’s international roles and foreign policy choices. Werner Faymann was largely unknown to the public when elected Chancellor. While the press labelled him as a ‘blank page’, political opponent and former Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik (ÖVP) was even more critical by describing him as a ‘man without character’ (quoted in Politico, 3 July 2016). Importantly, it quickly became apparent that Faymann had neither significant experience nor personal interest in foreign policy (Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009). The coalition negotiations produced few changes in the allocation of governmental portfolios. The ministries of foreign affairs and defence both remained under ÖVP and SPÖ leadership respectively. Michael Spindelegger replaced Ursula Plassnik as Minister of Foreign Affairs and was ‘widely credited with good intentions’ (Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009). Yet, criticisms have stressed his lack of leadership when he failed to give the ministry a clear direction from the start. His early initiatives underlined a commitment to expand Austria’s role in the Black Sea region as a way to secure economic interests (Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009). Spindelegger’s political profile was enhanced in 2011 when he succeeded Josef Pröll as ÖVP leader after the latter resigned due to health issues. Norbert Darabos (SPÖ) was re-appointed as Defence Minister until March 2013 when he was substituted for Gerald Klug (SPÖ). Darabos gained a poor reputation as part of the previous administration. International and domestic partners alike saw him as ‘uninterested in foreign and international security affairs’ as well as ‘openly hostile to deploying Austrian troops on dangerous missions abroad’ (Embassy Vienna, 20 August 2009). There is limited evidence available to construct Klug’s foreign policy outlook. His appointment in the midst of the Syrian crisis suggests a period of transition in the ministry at a time when Austria was re-considering its participation in UNDOF. Klug spent little time in office before having to adopt a position on the matter. Overall, this examination reveals that the decision to withdraw was taken by a government reluctant to engage internationally owing to its members lacking experience, interest and leadership in foreign policy and to a constrained international environment brought on by the financial crisis. This general foreign policy orientation provides preliminary indications that the decision-making unit responsible for re-considering Austria’s peacekeeping role towards UNDOF was predisposed to respond better to domestic role preferences than external role demands.
Appendix 2 presents some of the roles the Faymann administration sought to articulate on the international stage while in office. They form a role repertoire from which the Faymann government is expected to draw when re-considering the presence of Austrian troops on the Golan Heights. These roles form the role domestic context in which the foreign policy agents of the administration have to operate, and act as a resource when these agents must creatively confront the dilemma of UNDOF’s changing nature. Like most states, Austria is enacting a wide and diverse range of roles at the UN reflecting the numerous foreign policy-areas it is involved in. Yet, the following analysis focuses only on those which appear most prominently in the discourse of Austrian policy-makers when re-considering Austria’s participation in UNDOF. Interestingly, this peacekeeping episode will become a challenge to the roles which Austria performs most actively at the UN, in other words the Global System Collaborator, Humanitarian Actor, Regional Subsystem Collaborator roles. The role of neutral will emerge as significant as events unfolds, challenging Austria’s commitment to multilateral solutions and represent a departure from the roles articulated at the UN.
Austria’s Role Conceptions in a Shifting Security and Normative Environment: A Case of Failed Socialisation

Austria was one of the first contributing countries to experience the security threat engendered by the Syrian civil war directly. On 29 November 2012, a convoy transporting Austrian UN peacekeepers to Damascus airport for a scheduled rotation was caught in fighting between the Syrian army and the armed opposition. Five Austrian personnel were injured, including two severely (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 19 December 2012; International Business Times, 29 November 2012). The Austrian foreign ministry called an emergency meeting with the Syrian Ambassador during which Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, Johannes Kyrle, requested the Syrian government ‘to take all measures to make it possible for the Austrian UN troops to fulfil their mandate under the UNDOF mission (supervision of the ceasefire on the Golan Heights)’ (EIFA, 29 November 2012). The diplomatic episode was drawn to a close without Austria’s participation being questioned. Two days earlier, Foreign Minister Spindelegger had reaffirmed his commitment to a GSC role by supporting Austria’s contribution to international operations abroad including in the Golan Heights. It came from his perception that ‘we [Austrians] will not be able to ensure our own security in a globalised world if we pursue a head-in-the-sand policy or display a free-rider mentality’ (EIFA, 26 November 2012). His justification underscores a belief that the small size of Austria and its economic dependency on exports do not allow for isolation but require good integration in ‘international networks’ of cooperation (EIFA, 26 November 2012). This reasoning also encouraged references to a RSC role: ‘Austria is actively involved in European crisis management in its own interest … we cannot afford to reduce our efforts in this field’ (EIFA, 26 November 2012). Aside from the fact that the incident occurred outside the area of operation, the dedication of the Austrian foreign ministry to pursuing GSC and RSC roles ensured that the contribution to UNDOF remained undisputed.

The incident, nonetheless, raised concerns amongst international stakeholders that UNDOF may not have the mandate nor the capabilities to function effectively in this increasingly challenging environment. In November 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported to the Security Council that ‘the military operations carried out by the Syrian Arab armed forces have affected adversely the efforts of UNDOF to effectively carry out the mandated tasks’ (UNSC, 30 November 2012). Fears that Israel might forcefully respond to these military activities also began to spread. Conflict escalation between Syria and Israel became a major source of alarm in light of the IDF having mobilised military capabilities, crossed into the AOS for observation purposes and retaliated fire across the cease fire line.
(UNSC, 30 November 2012). The incident was condemned and prompted the Security Council to ‘stress the need to enhance the safety and security of UNDOF personnel’ (UNSC, 19 December 2012). Both Ban Ki-moon’s November report and Security Council Resolution 2084 instigated a re-examination of the normative framework in which UNDOF and its troop contributing countries operated. At the heart was the question whether the norm pertaining to the minimal use of force continued to be appropriate in ensuring troop safety and mandate completion. This reassessment reflected realities on the ground which had already compelled the force to ‘adapt its operational posture’ and take ‘necessary security measures to ensure the safety and security of its personnel’ (UNSC, 30 November 2012). This entailed limits on movements, the use of armoured vehicles, enhanced patrolling and the construction of additional defensive positions. Such adjustments were also essential considering operational challenges owing to the Canadian pull out in September 2012 and Japan’s decision to bring its 46 personnel home in early January 2013. Sensing that others might follow, Israel began weighing in as a socialiser, making explicit role demands to states to remain present in the field including Austria, Croatia, India and the Philippines. Israeli officials perceived that, more than ever, they were performing an important role ‘ensuring that the situation along the border does not get out of control’ (BBC Monitoring Middle East, 19 December 2012).

A turning point occurred on 6 March 2013 when 21 Filipino peacekeepers were kidnapped and detained for three days by a Syrian militant group. The peacekeepers were eventually released unharmed. Discrepancy between the character of UNDOF as a traditional peacekeeping operation and the increased seriousness of the attacks against UN troops became wider than ever. This point is emphasised by Kertcher (2014) who contends that ‘the main difficulties plaguing peacekeeping missions along Israel’s borders in the past decade stem from the fact that they operate according to first generation rationale, while their environment is more suited to second-generation missions’ (p.9). In fact, UNDOF remains highly restricted in what it can do. It is only mandated to separate conflicting parties, and observe the ceasefire between, Israel and Syria. It cannot interfere in the Syrian civil war between Bashar al Assad’s forces and rebels. This is certainly not an option given that its troops are only authorised to use force in self-defence (World Politics Review, 8 March 2013). Consequently, the argument contending that ‘the mandate is not strong enough’ gradually gained traction and led experts to call for its modification to ‘allow for certain amount of interventions in hostilities’ (Deutsche Welle, 25 June 2013).

Such proposals raised the expectation that peacekeepers should do more than observe and use force if necessary. The norm specifying that peacekeepers should not use force except in self-defence was gradually being redefined. Sloan (2014) offers a useful
typology of UN peacekeeping missions according to their approach to the use of force (p.675). UNDOF falls within the ‘defense of mandate’ category having emerged after the first United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez (UNEF I) at a time troop contributing countries pressed for more guarantees of troop safety. With the launch of UNEF II and UNDOF, the concept of self-defence was broadened to include, not just the use of force for peacekeepers’ protection, but also ‘to prevent interference with the peacekeeping operation’s mandated duties’ (p.684). The concept was never implemented in practice, however, because it authorised the use of force beyond what was required on the ground. The observational character of UNDOF also bears resemblance with earlier peacekeeping missions which imposed strict limitations on the use of force. Operational and tactical considerations set in motion UNDOF’s transformation of what was a ‘non-forceful’ mission into ‘forceful operation when confronted with crisis’ (p.685). The entrapment of UNDOF in the Syrian conflict tapped into international actors’ fears of peacekeeping failure or mission creep. Precedents include the United Nations in the Congo (ONUC), the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). All these missions began with authorisations to use force only for self-defence; limitations which turned out to inhibit peacekeepers in responding effectively to the threats and emergencies that eventually arose. In desperate attempts to salvage these operations the UN subsequently authorised to use of offensive force (p.685). In the same way, the Syrian crisis motivated international actors to take pre-emptive steps by considering providing peacekeepers with a wider scope for the use of force.

By March 2013, the high security threat compelled the UN to react by choosing from three different courses of action, identified by Kertcher (2014:11). Each carried important implications for the roles that Austria would be able to perform towards its participation in UNDOF. These roles would come to play an important part in determining the position of the Faymann government regarding the continued presence of Austrian peacekeepers in the operation. The first option was to maintain UNDOF under its current mandate regardless of the changing situation on the ground. For Austrian policy-makers, this option was attractive in that it kept Austrian soldiers away from more robust and dangerous tasks. In this way, it did not challenge Austria’s neutral role and mitigated the risks for the troops. However, it left them poorly equipped in legal and material terms in case of escalation. The second alternative was to bring UNDOF to an end. This ensured the safety of Austrian troops and the successful enactment of a GSC role without compromising a neutral role. The reputation of Austria as reliable peacekeeper would be intact, if not strengthened, considering Vienna would have contributed the largest contingent, without interruption, to the entire operation.
A third option involved a large-scale enforcement operation carried out by a coalition of the willing in the aim of halting the oppression of civilians by Bashar al Assad’s regime. This was an unlikely scenario given Chinese and Russian vetoes, meaning that Austrian officials never had to seriously consider its consequences for Austria’s roles. The fourth option involved the Security Council pursuing ‘a complex model resembling those adopted in the civil wars in the Sudan, Sierra Leone, Mali, and the Congo in the past decade’ (Kertcher, 2014:12). This implicated shifting UNDOF from an observing to a fighting force capable of discouraging and repelling military activities in its area of operation (Kertcher, 2014:12). While most contributing countries would have seen this option as providing their troops with the necessary legal and material capabilities to defend themselves, for Austrian policymakers, it was the most problematic as it forced Austria out a neutral role if the priority was set on maintaining GSC role. It also entailed considerable risks for Austrian troops.

The report presented by Ban Ki-moon in March 2013 in response to further deterioration in the security environment took a significant step towards the fourth option, thereby moving closer to the use of force beyond self-defence and defence of the mandate. It drew on a military capability study undertaken in January 2013 recommending the ‘need to further support the efforts of the mission to adapt, strengthen and reconfigure its capabilities to the ongoing situation’ (UNSC, 19 March 2013). While no call was made to alter the mandate, the scope for the use of force was widened within the existing one through a focus on enhancing force protection. Analysts have emphasised that this evolving normative context expected peacekeepers to ‘interpret their mandate more extensively, i.e. including the use of weapons to enforce UN law’ (Kurier in Gebhard, 2013:291). The effect of this normative development was to socialise Austria into a GSC and out of neutral role. Vienna was forced to decide whether this role configuration was compatible with neutrality and acceptable to domestic actors favouring a neutral role. Such decision-making was complicated by uncertainty regarding which formula the UN leadership would implement and the decisions of other troop contributing countries. In fact, the report coincided with the announcement by Croatia that it was withdrawing all its military personnel for security reasons (UNSC, 19 March 2013). Moreover, Austrian officials had limited opportunities to influence the shape of the operation in a way that would not bring the neutral and GSC roles into conflict. Austria was not even a non-permanent member of the Security Council; a position that would have afforded some leverage.

The release of the report did not cause the Austrian government to shy away from its international commitment towards the mission. Gebhard (2013) notes that a normative shift towards more permissive use of force would have, in the past, been enough for the government to ‘withdraw its troops immediately to prevent them from getting involved in fighting’ (p.291). However, acting Defence Minister Darabos (SPÖ) only expressed ‘concerns’ while the Austrian commander ordered ‘business as usual’ (Gebhard, 2013:291).
Foreign Minister Spindelegger positively perceived the measures taken by the UN arguing they were ‘necessary’ and required to be ‘reviewed constantly and adjusted to the situation in the area of the mission’ (EIFA, 28 March 2013).

Attempts by the government to maintain both roles in a strategy of wait-and-see fell under further institutional pressures as divisions amongst EU member states over the Union’s arms embargo began to show during a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Dublin on 23-24 March 2013. The issue was whether the full arms embargo imposed by the EU on Syria in May 2011 should be lifted to allow for the delivery of weapons to the Syrian opposition (SIPRI, 13 November 2013). The UK and France were the only member states in favour of supplying arms to rebel groups. They argued that arming moderate opposition groups would reduce violence and force the Assad regime to the negotiating table. On the other hand, the majority of EU states led by Austria and the Czech Republic firmly opposed the Franco-British initiative. They believed that introducing more arms into Syria would only increase the likelihood of such weapons falling into wrong hands including Islamist groups (The Guardian, 28 May 2013). The risk for Austrian policy-makers was that the absence of European consensus on sustaining the embargo would place the EU as a party to the conflict, drawing Austria out of a neutral role. In an interview following the Dublin meeting, Spindelegger did not raise any doubt about the Austrian commitment in the Golan but did ‘not think that it is right for the European Union to abandon the policy it has pursued so far by clearly siding with one party’ (BBC Monitoring European, 26 March 2013). As EU disagreements constrained Austria’s roles, the option of leaving the Golan mission began to be seriously considered within the coalition. During a visit to Israel and the Golan, the Foreign Minister expressed to Israeli officials his reservations about the future of the mission. He warned that ‘Austria may pull its soldiers from the UNDOF peacekeeping force on the Golan Heights if the EU fails to renew its arms embargo against Syria’ (The Jerusalem Post, 12 April 2013). On 14 April, Defence Minister Gerald Klug (SPÖ) entered the debate observing that the situation was ‘still manageable’ but that Austrian troops were ‘staying … only under very specific conditions: the nonpartisan nature of the mission must be beyond doubt by those involved, the rotation and supplying of the troops through Israel must be guaranteed and the United Nations must replace the contingent from Croatia’ (BBC Monitoring European, 14 April 2013).

These declarations indicate a shift away from previous emphases on Austria’s commitment to the UN in fostering peace and security in the region, towards a more qualified engagement conditioned upon Austria remaining a neutral actor. References to a GSC role became less frequent and definite. For instance, Klug categorically excluded a possible enlargement of the contingent. Asked whether sending EU battlegroups to the Golan was an option, the Minister refused to comment arguing that ‘the question of how the peacekeeping mission on the Golan is to develop further is presently so sensitive’ (BBC
Monitoring European, 14 April 2013). His response underlines a discomfort with any attempt to amplify the mission’s robustness. Interestingly, the Defence Minister still believed that having an Austrian as deputy commander of UNDOF could help in generating military plans which would ensure that Austrian peacekeepers could enact, at an operational level, the neutral role that the elite sought at a foreign policy level (BBC Monitoring European, 14 April 2013). It should be pointed out that the foreign ministry appeared to remain more supportive of a GSC role than the Defence Minister. State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Reinhold Lopatka (ÖVP) commented two days after Klug imposed his conditions that:

‘550 Austrian soldiers are currently deployed in three UN peacekeeping missions in the Middle East and contribute their share to stability and peace in the region. We are determined to maintain this presence as long as our troops are able to fulfil their mandate. This applies to the tense situation on the Golan Heights as well’ (EIFA, 16 April 2013).

Although any difference should not be exaggerated at this point, the evidence reveals that statements from Defence Minister Klug expressed a neutral role to a greater extent than those from officials in the foreign ministry who tended to emphasise international commitments instead. The fact that the SPÖ controlled the ministry of defence and that the foreign ministry was led by the ÖVP should not yet be discounted as an explanation of possible differences in role promotion between the two governmental Ministers.

The coalition remained united when confronted by the failure of EU member states to reach an agreement on the arms embargo renewal. On 28 May, long EU negotiations achieved no consensus as Britain blocked a compromise solution envisaging an easing of the embargo while explicitly stating what could and could not be sent. All EU member states backed the proposal including France which had rallied behind it for the sake of a common approach (The Guardian, 28 May 2013). UK Foreign Minister, William Hague was inflexible however, demanding the full ban to be lifted immediately and only reinstated through a consensus vote; demands that were unacceptable to his European counterparts (The Guardian, 28 May 2013). The lack of unanimous agreement meant the EU sanction regime expired on 31 May leaving member states free to implement their own sanction policy. The negotiations saw the Austrian and British Foreign Ministers going head-to-head with Spindelegger blaming Hague for the failure of the talks (The Guardian, 28 May 2013). The former lost little time to declare that ‘Vienna would now have to reconsider its deployment on Golan’ (The Guardian, 28 May 2013). While the Foreign Minister maintained that the end of the embargo would not ‘automatically’ cause Austria to withdraw, the militarisation of the conflict and its consequences for UNDOF’s mandate represented significant preoccupations for the government: ‘we do not see that it is impossible to keep Syria and Israel apart - which is the mandate - but that groups are fighting in Syria, including the Golan - and this has nothing to do with fulfilling the mandate’ (BBC Monitoring Europe, 29 May 2013). Spindelegger came to recognise that the end of the embargo clearly meant that Austria could
no longer perform a *neutral* role. He concluded that ‘the absence of such neutrality would increase the danger to the extent it may not possible to remain’ (The Jerusalem Post, 12 April 2013). This diplomatic episode at the EU level underscores increasing great power interest and involvement in theatres of deployment to which Austria and small states have sent peacekeepers.

The termination of the embargo was a significant, yet not decisive, factor in the Faymann government’s decision to withdraw from the Golan a week later. Its main effect was to push Austria onto an independent course. The catalyst came when fighting between Syrian armed forces and opposition groups escalated quickly on 6 June within the area of deployment, forcing UNDOF personnel to seek shelter in their positions (UNSC, 12 June 2013). Two peacekeepers were injured. From the standpoint of decision-makers in Vienna, the incident only confirmed that the security situation had become too dangerous and would only deteriorate further as weapons would soon be delivered to opposition groups. Hours later, the government officially announced the end of Austria’s participation citing troop safety as main reason (EIFA, 6 June 2013). However, spontaneous declarations after the announcement reveal that, more than security concerns, the government was uneasy at the prospect of having to forego a *neutral* role as a result of likely changes to the mandate.

Britain’s UN ambassador, Mark Lyall Grant believed that ‘the UN mandate in the Golan might not be sustainable over the long term’ (The Foreign Policy Group, 8 June 2013). The Security Council was prepared to implement necessary adjustments as recommended by the Secretary-General. Such prospect induced Chancellor Faymann (SPÖ) to declare that ‘we never could have and would never have wanted to take on a military mission to mediate or intervene between the opposition rebels and governmental troops’ and added that Austria ‘took on a different mandate, which was appropriate for a neutral country’ (Reuters, 10 June 2013). The security threat prompted Austrian policy-makers to pursue an independent course, brought upon them by EU developments, by enacting a *neutral* role. It confirms the pattern observed by Mayer (2015) describing that ‘when the situation on the world stage becomes uncomfortable, Austrians all too gladly fall back on neutrality – formally and informally’ (p.2).
External actors could not sway the Faymann government to maintain its troops because Austria failed to be socialised into a GSC. The Austrian government rejected the notion that self-defence capabilities should be strengthened, and more permissive use of force implemented to prevent further attacks on peacekeepers and allow the mandate to be achieved. Additionally, socialisation was unsuccessful as the coalition resisted casting attempts by external actors to adopt a GSC role. The UN expressed regrets that Austria as ‘the cornerstone of UNDOF’ will proceed in a ‘withdrawal that will adversely affect its ability to act’ (BBC Monitoring European, 10 June 2013; The Telegraph, 6 June 2013). Israel saw the move as ‘a betrayal of the United Nations’ commitment to regional security’ and of the trust conferred upon troop contributing countries to stabilise the border in time of trouble (The Guardian, 6 June 2013). Aside from these criticisms, however, there is limited evidence, at least openly available, indicating that international actors applied extensive socialising pressures on Austria to enact a GSC role in the lead up to the decision. The rapidity with which the government arrived at its decision provided little time for the process of role location to unfold. Furthermore, the government was determined to withstand criticisms for its decision, as indicated by the Chancellor’s statement that ‘it is our right to make such a decision in view of the circumstances’ referring to both the EU arms embargo and the fighting in the Golan (BBC Monitoring European, 12 June 2013). There is ground to suggest that the decision was influenced by concerns over negative reaction from the public if Austrian soldiers were to be killed. It would have seriously threatened the governing parties’ chance of re-election at the end of September (Wurz, 2013; Schmidl, 2013). Yet, it could be argued that the government anticipated negative public reaction, not only for putting troops at risks, but also for compromising neutrality by involving Austria in a wider, more robust mandate. The argument proposing that the decision was taken purely for security reasons is further undermined by a report indicating that the risks during the 6 June episode were actually minimal (BBC Monitoring European, 12 June 2013). The decision should be seen as a move by ‘both governing parties to serve the deeply ingrained desire of the majority of Austrians to remain neutral in conflicts’ (Mayer, 2015:2). In other words, it can be argued that the neutral role that guided Austria out of the Golan was shaped by a public reluctance to see Austrian soldiers die.

Evidence indicates that the cabinet enacted a neutral role on the assumption that UNDOF would be terminated following the Austrian withdrawal (BBC Monitoring European, 12 June 2013). The timing of the decision, days before Ban Ki-moon was due to
evaluate the mandate before renewal by the Security Council, adds to suspicions that the Faymann government expected the pull out to force the UN to end the operation. Yet, the decision reinforced the UN determination to adapt to new circumstances. The Secretary-General recommended ‘as matter of priority’ enhancing the self-defence capacity of the mission and reinforcing its force strength to 1250 troops (UN Press Centre, 13 June 2013; Wall Street Journal Online, 27, June 2013). These recommendations were accepted by the Security Council with the adoption of Resolution 2108 on 27 June 2013. Interestingly, this adjustment process carried with it direct demands for Austria to keep performing a GSC role regardless of the departure of its troops. It was only after the announcement that the UN began casting Austria more extensively into a GSC role. Foreign policy officials in Vienna were requested to delay the withdrawal and ‘leave all its equipment with UNDOF’ so as ‘to ensure a smooth transition with incoming troop-contributing countries’ (UN Press Centre, 13 June 2013). The DPKO unambiguously socialised Austria into a GSC by ‘trusting that Austria, given its long-standing and valuable contribution to the Mission, will keep the interest of the Mission at heart while withdrawing its personnel’ (UN Press Centre, 13 June 2013).

The choice to terminate the Austrian contribution to UNDOF was not disputed by opposition parties and the public, demonstrating the political endorsement of a neutral role. Nevertheless, the intensification of socialising pressures to adopt a GSC role generated significant domestic contestations within the coalition and between bureaucracies. The central issue concerned whether Austria should organise an ‘orderly withdrawal’ in cooperation with international and European partners or proceed with an ‘immediate pull out’ (BBC Monitoring European, 12 June 2013). Settlement of the issue involved role location through negotiations with the UN and internal bargaining over roles amongst domestic actors seeking political goal scoring in light of the upcoming elections. Domestic confusion owing to international criticisms was already visible three days after the declaration when Spindelegger suggested that Austrian troops ‘might stay longer’ while government spokesmen hinted at a possible return to the Golan at a later date (Korkisch, 2013). Positively responding to UN demands for an orderly transition, Spindelegger favoured postponing the pullout until 31 July. His justification indicated a GSC role: ‘it is a matter of Austria being perceived as a reliable partner. If you have international obligations you have to respect them’ (The Jerusalem Post, 18 June 2013). On the other hand, Defence Minister Klug proved to be more resistant to UN role demands. He maintained that the withdrawal should be completed as soon as possible arguing that ‘after all the UN has two to four weeks to seek a replacement’ (BBC Monitoring European, 10 June 2013). His position indicates a clear rejection of the GSC role choosing instead to emphasise Austria’s right to withdraw according to its own timetable. Contestations between a GSC role stressing Austria’s international commitments and reliability and a neutral role which promotes
Austria’s right to make independent foreign policy decisions ‘exposed splits between the Social Democrats-led defense ministry and the conservative-led foreign ministry ahead of elections due by the end of September’ (The Jerusalem Post, 18 June 2013). Ultimately, Faymann acted as arbiter siding with his SPÖ Minister and insisting that the observer position needed to be abandoned (Korkisch, 2013). The government’s decision to abandon a GSC role and proceed to an immediate pull out was disputed by the foreign ministry and the military on the grounds that it could have damaged Austria’s image abroad. Ambassadors complained that Austria will no longer be relied upon in critical questions of security (BBC Monitoring European, 12 June 2013). In the military, officers argued that there was enough time to cooperate with the UN and European stakeholders and ‘go about it more softly without offending Austria’s partners’ (BBC Monitoring European, 12 June 2013). Commenting on the consequence of the decision, one officer noted that ‘life will be difficult for us in challenging missions in the future’ (BBC Monitoring European, 12 June 2013).

7.5 Concluding Discussion

Within six months, Austria went from highly committed to UNDOF to ready to jeopardise its reputation as reliable UN peacekeeper. This chapter demonstrated that the decision to leave UNDOF resulted from a failed process of role socialisation. Following a deterioration in the security conditions owing to the Syrian civil war, international actors began calling for a wider mandate. The security ramifications of the Syrian conflict on UNDOF were reminiscent of past peacekeeping debacles which international actors wanted to pre-empt by expanding the norm relating to the use of force beyond self-defence. The normative framework within which UNDOF traditionally functioned was being transformed to allow for more robust peacekeeping. This shifting context meant that Austria could no longer sustain a GSC and neutral roles as a basis for participating in UNDOF. This followed the decisions of Canada, Japan and Croatia to withdraw their contingent from UNDOF as well. The Faymann government abandoned a GSC role by rejecting international efforts to grant UNDOF tasks designed to mitigate violence between the parties of Syrian conflict using force if necessary. This case study examination has uncovered decision-making dynamics with which internal processes of role selection have intersected, shaping Austria’s response to socialising demands. A discussion of these interactions is necessary to inform on potential domestic factors affecting small states’ likelihood to accept socialisation. It speaks, therefore, to wider debates about the effects of structure-agency interactions on the socialisation of small states into the international system.
Evidence suggests that the governing elite initiated the pull out with the aim of increasing its public support for the upcoming parliamentary elections. Such domestic consideration can be connected to what foreign policy analysts have theorised and labelled as diversionary foreign policy (Smith, 1996; Fravel, 2010; Hagan 2017; De Rouen, 2000). Diversionary theory expects leaders to engage in adventurous foreign policy, most often by initiating conflict, to divert domestic audiences from internal social, economic and/or political challenges (Fravel, 2010:311). The assumption is that diversionary foreign policy does not apply to small states for the simple reason that it would be risky for their leaders to initiate conflict under any circumstances, let alone for domestic popularity. Additionally, small states’ foreign policy identity(ies) emphasising anti-militarism and peaceful resolution of conflicts render this course of action inconceivable. Publics would perceive any aggressive move by their elites, not as evidence of their aptitude to govern, but as a sign of their irrationality and incompetence. However, this reasoning overlooks the ultimate purpose of diversionary activity which is to ‘help a government retain power’ (Smith, 1996:133).

There is no reason to assume that governing elites in small states do not seek re-elections nor divert domestic audiences from internal troubles as an opportunistic move to maximise their chances of remaining in office. They might only do so through foreign policy strategies likely to find public approval. Limitations in material capabilities mean that small states’ governing agents may divert attention away from poor domestic performance by invoking roles at the international level which resonate positively amongst the public. In Austria, debates about participation in common security and defence endeavours have always seen the neutrality issue surfacing as ‘an important topic for public opinion, which has continuously endorsed a retention of the…country’s neutral status’ (de Flers, 2012). The Austrian public expects its government to pursue a neutral role on the international stage. International security cooperation is acceptable only to the extent that Austria can continue to act as a neutral one way or another. Security developments on the Israeli-Syrian border had made this increasingly complicated. Moreover, although the public is generally in favour of peacekeeping deployments, especially when they allow enacting of a neutral role, Schmidl, (2015) notes that it has become increasingly challenging to justify to the public ‘the political benefits’ of maintaining around 1000 troops abroad: ‘for a small power, the political wisdom that it is positive to have a stable international environment is sometimes difficult to convey to the public’ (p.731). While the Faymann government valued the reputational benefits of peacekeeping participation, it can be argued that the domestic electoral context in which the selection of role towards UNDOF took place, increased the domestic costs of remaining in a long-running mission which was losing public interest, could cast Austria out of its neutral role and cause Austrian casualties.
This corroborates the argument that ‘the mechanism of elections causes the government to behave against the national interests when forming policy’ (Smith, 1996:133). Adapting Fravel’s (2010) diversionary logic to a small state context allows explaining the Faymann government’s decision when confronted with a choice between a GSC and a neutral role. ‘When faced with the prospect of an upcoming defeat at the polls, unpopular leaders’ in small states may ‘gamble for resurrection’ by performing a role which will both strengthen national identity and show their competence to lead (p.312). Such diversion can be seen as an opportunistic effort on the part of an unpopular governing elite. The governing elite had much incentive to enhance its public support. It had been highly unpopular from its election in 2008 and continuously lost support as domestic ‘politics centred around an endless series of corruption scandals’ (Dolezal and Zeglovits, 2014:644). Given that neutrality is an integral part of what it means to be Austrian, the evocation of a neutral role towards UNDOF offered the prospect of generating ‘ingroup identity’ vital to successfully undertake a diversionary foreign policy and increase public support in the government (Fravel, 2010:311). Furthermore, the governing elite needed to be seen as taking a ‘good’ decision. Bringing the troops home to avoid casualties was likely to be perceived as sensible decision by the public. At least, it was a good enough reason to justify a potentially damaged reputation. The role contestation which took place surrounding the pace of the withdrawal is evidence that party and bureaucratic competition was intensifying and that electoral concerns were at play in the dual processes of role socialisation and selection. This case showed how domestic electoral cycles can influence the propensity of small states’ leaders to positively respond to external role demands. If these differed from the roles expected by their public, looming elections and poor domestic record generate incentives to divert domestic attention by selecting a role in line with public expectations, thereby rejecting socialisation.

An additional condition was necessary for the government’s diversionary strategy to be effective. The cabinet remained vulnerable to contestation from the public and the political opposition that it was abandoning a GSC role and undermining Austria’s reputation as a result. A successful diversionary decision resting on a neutral role was dependent on domestic audiences being casualty averse. All governments must be sensitive to the possibility of casualties ‘whenever the military is asked to perform its duty’ (van der Meulen and Soeters, 2005:485). Concern over casualties now ‘plays a major role in dissuading them from initiating or continuing military action’ given that the phenomenon has ‘grown stronger’ and elected officials have to answer for putting soldiers at risk (Smith, 2005:487).
Casualty aversion is also present with regard to humanitarian and/or peacekeeping deployments. There is little research on the level of casualty aversion in small states, especially regarding Austria. Nonetheless, one can hypothesise that neutrality is, in part, expression of a country’s aversion to casualties indicating that Austrian domestic actors may be relatively averse to casualties. Overtime, a permanent policy of neutrality is likely to have instilled a widely shared reluctance to see Austrian soldiers dying in a global competition for power; a cause that Austria has not been pursuing. Additionally, Austria as a small state does not have as many national interests to protect as great powers, thereby diluting the main justification for which losses can be tolerated. This is the key reason why ‘aversion to casualties in UN peacekeeping is also widespread’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2012:8). The constraint imposed by domestic actors’ aversion to casualties on foreign policy-making is evident in the extensive emphasis which Austrian policy-makers place on appropriate deployment conditions and force protection. This supports the argument that the Faymann government was constrained by a casualty averse public as state agents decided to withdraw under the assumption that the loss of Austrian troops would not be tolerated and bring a decisive blow to the governing parties’ chances of re-election (Schmidl, 2015:730). However, the public and the political opposition did not voice their concerns over casualties, nor did they apply pressures on the government to withdraw because of disproportionate risks. This alludes to Smith’s (2005) observation that ‘policy-makers may create casualty aversion among the public where it did not exist’ (p.489). They may do so for external reasons such as an unwillingness to contribute troops to a politically or logistically difficult mission. But governing elites may also decide to activate domestic aversion to casualties to serve a domestic political purpose. Therefore, it may be argued that the Faymann government opportunistically heightened fears because it reinforced the necessity for a neutral role, which itself was key to increasing public support in the governing elite. The claim that the government may have exaggerated the risks run by Austrian troops is supported by reports indicating that the situation was not as dangerous as suggested by official statements. It served the purpose of containing contestation in favour of a GSC role and of showing that the appropriate role was being pursued and the right decision taken. No one could dispute efforts to protect Austrian troops. Had domestic constituencies been willing to bear losses, the decision to withdraw would unlikely have been regarded as appropriate. That also helps explain why contestation emerged regarding the withdrawal strategy from diplomatic and military agents who likely had more accurate information about the level of threat on the ground than the public.
It could be argued that the Austrian withdrawal from UNDOF did not constitute diversionary behaviour, but that it was simply an opportunistic move by the governing leaders designed to avoid having Austrian casualties appear in the media on the eve of an election. There is solid ground to argue that this was the case. However, it should be noted that the opportunistic argument does not place enough emphasis on the steps of external actors towards a more robust mission and the deeper domestic context marked by the governing elite’s unpopularity and the Austrian public’s growing disinterest in peacekeeping especially if it ran counter to a neutral role. One could question whether had these conditions not been present, the governing elite would still have withdrawn the troops. The answer might possibly be negative in that they increased the incentives for the government to pullout. Importantly, the argument put forward here is that opportunism and diversionist tactic are not mutually exclusive and that both were at play during the UNDOF episode. It is important to consider these concepts together as they allow for a connection to be made between the external and internal factors contributing to the final decision. In fact, it was very opportunistic of the governing elite to frame and construct the violence on the ground and the changing nature of the mission as challenges to the neutral role. This particular role guaranteed to stimulate positive sentiments amongst the public. This argument further demonstrates that even material and physical concerns are likely to be accompanied with role processes.

Overall, the Faymann government’s refusal to adopt roles expected by external socialising agents reflects a role shift which lies at the heart of what Kramer (2016) notes as a ‘de-activation of foreign policy’ (p.56). The Faymann I coalition embodied a ‘change in Austrian foreign policy profile from active international political player to an increasingly reactive and inward-looking attitude in international affairs’ (Kramer 2016:56). This case has traced the external and domestic political processes which have contributed to Austria’s changing roles in peacekeeping and international affairs. Its findings substantiate those who point to ‘the growing impact of domestic politics’ as Austria’s ‘foreign policy decisions are more and more influenced and dominated by domestic political pressures, by party politics and the media’ (Lehne, 2015). This case study underscores that the socialisation of small states is not automatic. It is dependent on role selection which may take place concurrently with the electoral game. This is likely to prompt governing elites to respond to, but also manipulate, public role expectations.
8.1 Introduction

In the same way as the Austrian cases were approached, this chapter provides the foundation for the next two case studies, serving two specific analytical purposes. First, it provides an overview of Belgium’s post-war foreign policy in a historical perspective by reviewing key traditions and identifying the roles that Belgium has sought to play on the international scene. Initial links between the observed roles and their effects on Belgium’s pattern of peacekeeping deployment are made (see table 7). Second, this chapter contributes to the wider role approach of this project by offering the researcher a repertoire of roles that one expects Belgian policy-makers to draw on when responding to the socialising pressures applied by external actors in the two peacekeeping episodes explored in the case studies. In essence, these roles are expected to play an integral part in domestic processes of role negotiation.

8.2 The Origins of a Multilateral Tradition

The Concert of Europe granted Belgium its independence from the Netherlands in 1815 and imposed on the newly-created state political neutrality to maintain the balance of power between France, Germany and Great Britain (Breuning, 2016:75). In the late 1930s, Belgian leaders believed that neutrality offered the best line of defence against Hitler’s expansionist foreign policy, preventing Belgium from being drawn into the war (van Tuyll van Serooskerken, 2016:233). However, they miscalculated the readiness of Nazi Germany to disregard international law. Belgium was annexed and occupied by German forces throughout the Second World War. Thus, the one certainty the Belgian elite held at the end of the war was that the role of neutral was unsuitable for Belgium and that alliances should instead be sought (Dujardin, 2007:95). This new foreign policy orientation was personified by Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak who, upon returning from exile in London, proposed the establishment of a ‘regional grouping of Western European countries …whereby the participating states promised each other political and military support in the event of new aggression by Germany’ (Coolsaet, 2009:5). His aim was to foster military cooperation by homogenising arms systems, coordinating armed forces, and exchanging information under the leadership of Britain (Coolsaet, 2009:5). The proposal was founded on the idea that continuing cooperation between former war Allies was crucial and that a small state like Belgium could, and should, work towards that goal. Therefore, while promoting Western cooperation, Spaak endeavoured to build friendly relations with the Soviet Union based on a perception that Moscow’s post-war motivations were legitimate (Van Alstein, 2011:131). By enacting the role of partner to both superpowers, Belgium was seeking a third
way between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to adapt to growing superpower hostility (Van Alstein, 2011:146).

Yet, a combination of domestic and international factors explains Spaak’s inability to successfully position Belgium as a partner to the West and the USSR simultaneously. First, Western partners did not share the Belgian view of Soviet intentions as benign or justified in light of Soviet advances in Eastern and Central Europe, and later Germany. Intensifying tensions between the great powers provided Belgium with a restricted space to promote cooperation and coexistence. Second, Moscow did not believe reassurances coming from Brussels that the Belgian proposal for Western military cooperation was not designed to balance the Soviet Union in Europe despite numerous diplomatic contacts between Belgian and Soviet officials. Third, Great Britain refused to assume a leadership role in this Western military grouping, preferring to develop ‘closer Atlantic ties’ with the United States ‘in the role of junior partner’ instead (Coolsaet, 2009:4). Fourth, a group of Belgian aristocratic diplomats contested Spaak’s interpretation of Soviet actions and was, therefore, ‘never able to perceive the Soviet Union as a partner or an insider in international politics and diplomacy’ (Van Alstein, 2011:147). Advocates of cooperation could not contain the growing domestic influence of this elite, precipitating Belgium into the cold war along an anti-Soviet path (Van Alstein, 2011:147).

The first evidence of Belgium having turned to the role of loyal ally to the United States from 1947 emerged when Brussels accepted the Marshall Plan despite Spaak’s initial scepticism. The enduring belief that Great Britain should be the leader of European cooperation meant that the Belgian administration was initially reluctant to accept the American offer. Yet, the perception that Germany’s recovery and integration was critical to achieve Belgium’s economic interests and political ambition for closer European political and economic cooperation strengthened the loyalty of Belgian leaders to Washington (Coolsaet, 2009:9). The loyal ally role was also grounded in the realisation that, due to its small size, Belgium needed to integrate in Europe and the Trans-Atlantic Alliance in order to defend its interests in international affairs (Gerits, 2012:27). Therefore, in early 1948, when UK Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin launched the idea of Western Union to create closer European ties, Spaak enthusiastically signed the Brussels Treaty because it offered ‘for the first time’ a ‘possibility of achieving this close political-military cooperation between West European states under British leadership’ (Coolsaet, 2009:10). This initiative paved the way for the formation of a North Atlantic Treaty, committing the United States to the defence of Europe (Kent and Young, 1992:42). As with the Marshall Plan, Spaak was reticent to accept US leadership in Europe and, therefore, an Atlantic military pact. However, an alignment of US and Belgian preferences on German integration combined with a shifting balance of power in Europe in favour of the US encouraged Belgian policy-makers to use Washington as the primary point of reference for Belgian foreign policy. Spaak’s original scepticism was
placated when it hit home that Belgium would not be able pursue its national interests without performing the role of *loyal ally*. Belgium was one of the twelve founding members who signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949.

American pressure for Belgium to perform a *loyal ally* role influenced its foreign policy-making throughout the 1950s. When the Korean War erupted in June 1950, American officials sought to ‘anchor Belgium more tightly within NATO’ arguing that Belgium acted as ‘a vital core of stability and leadership in Western Europe’ and that Brussels had ‘international obligations to fulfil’ (Gerits, 2012:25-31). But Belgium was unwilling to send a battalion as demanded by Washington. In 1950, national elections saw the return of the Christian Social Party in a government headed by Prime Minister Joseph Pholien who perceived favourably US demands to increase the defence budget, maintain military service, and take anti-Communist measures (Gerits, 2012:31). Thus, after the UN passed resolutions calling for military action in support of the Republic of Korea, the government ‘moved quickly to support both the United States and the United Nations’ by contributing one battalion to the UN force (Edwards, 2013:72-73). Between December 1950 and June 1955, 3500 Belgian troops served and 106 lost their lives. The *loyal ally* role served to overcome the doubts of the Belgian governing elite when France proposed to create the European Defence Community (EDC) in October 1950 which the Truman administration supported. Although Belgian Foreign Minister Paul van Zeeland supported the project, he feared that the supranational idea of a European Minister of Defence would diminish the influence and voice of small states (Gerits, 2012:38). However, the role of *loyal ally* was re-activated when Washington threatened to cut aid if Belgium continued its opposition, motivating Belgium to sign the treaty on 27 May 1952 (Gerits, 2012:38). The influence exercised by a *loyal ally* role on Belgium’s decision can be seen in Prime Minister Jean Van Houtte’s statement to Eisenhower in January 1953 that ‘[Belgium’s] ideas completely coincide with yours with respect to this policy for strengthening the peace, security, and prosperity of associated states. It is with this purpose in mind that the Belgian government has decided to give full support to the establishment of the European Defence Community’ (quoted in Gerits, 2012:41). Similarly, Belgium began actively working towards the European Coal and Steel Community from June 1955 after the US pressed Belgium to participate once ‘it was absolutely certain that the Belgian diplomatic corps had fully embraced the American vision of an Atlantic Europe’ (Gerits, 2012:42).
The early 1960s proved to be a challenge for Belgium’s primary foreign policy roles, namely the *loyal ally* and *colonial power* roles. The Congo became a Belgian colony in 1884-85 when European powers granted King Leopold II a large territory in the centre of Africa on the basis that it would be open for free trade (Breuning, 2007:29). In August 1960, Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba threatened to ask Soviet assistance if Belgium acted in support of Moïse Tshombe, leader of the Katanga region seeking independence. So, when on 9 July 1960, Belgian troops intervened in Katanga at Tshombe’s request after a military rebellion broke out, the international community sided with Lumumba in denouncing Belgium’s move as an attempt to recolonise the Congo (Kaplan, 1967:240). Crucially, the US voted with the Soviet Union, and despite British and French abstention, in the UN Security Council for Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo. This generated much anger in Brussels against the US which was seen as ‘the leader of the Atlantic Alliance in which Belgium had long since buried its independence and to which it had committed its future’ (Kaplan, 1967:241). While the *loyal ally* role had become entrenched enough to help Belgium normalise relations with Washington after this episode, there was nothing that Belgian leaders could do to salvage the country’s role as a *colonial power* given the international criticism of its actions.

However, Dujardin (2007) argues that this loss of status ‘did not affect its [Belgium’s] work towards détente’ (p.9). When Paul-Henri Spaak returned as head of the Foreign Ministry from his time as NATO Secretary-General in 1961, he continued the policy line of his predecessor proposing that a ‘small, sufficiently partial country such as Belgium’ has the potential to successfully negotiate détente with Soviet leaders (Dujardin, 2007:96). Spaak argued that NATO’s military strategy could and should be complemented with a dialogue with the East. Belgium was using its platform within NATO to enact the role of ‘mediator’, ‘peace-maker’ (Delcorde, 1988:25) and/or ‘go-between’ meant to achieve a de-escalation and avoid east-west conflict. Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Rapacki, with whom Spaak was coordinating to organise a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) declared that Spaak’s activism ‘stems from his views on the role of small countries in creating détente’ (quoted in Dujardin, 2007:99). This provided Spaak’s successor, Pierre Harmel, with the necessary foundation to consolidate Belgium’s position within NATO and provide the Alliance with a new direction. He believed that Belgium should play an active role in re-defining NATO’s purpose after the decision of de Gaulle to withdraw France from the Alliance in 1966. In what came to be known as the Harmel report, the Belgian Foreign Minister advanced in December 1967 that, if NATO was to endure, it should ‘promote détente, recognise the right to national initiatives and overcome the division of Europe’ (Coolsaet, 2009:25). It should be noted that Belgium was acting as a *loyal ally* given that US President Johnson relied on Harmel to reinvigorate the Alliance after France’s
departure, while also acting as a mediator by pushing NATO towards negotiations with the Soviet Union (Dujardin, 2007:100). Arguably, the mediator role depended on Belgium’s continuing loyalty to Washington. The ‘Harmel exercise’ would have been impossible without US support, especially given that other Western partners believed it was going too far (Dujardin, 2007:102).

From 1947, the objective of constructing a security and political community across the Atlantic always preceded integrating the economies and political systems of Western European states from a Belgian perspective. Belgium sought complementarity between NATO and the European Community (EC) by ‘linking Britain to the EC both in order to counter-balance the French and German dominance and to enable Western Europe to play a major role in world politics’ (Reinfeldt, 2016:84). Since the Atlantic Alliance was the ‘backbone’ of Belgian foreign policy, European political and economic integration should be pursued within, and in consideration of, the Atlantic framework (Paul Van Zeeland quoted in Coolsaet, 2009:18). To pursue regional integration, Belgium turned first and foremost to its neighbours, undertaking common projects such as the 1943 Benelux agreement aimed at harmonising monetary policies. Such collaborative practice was the first step towards the Benelux countries playing a ‘pace-setting role’ in fostering wider regional cooperation and integration (Maes and Verdun, 2005:332). Prior Benelux cooperation was crucial in reinvigorating the integration process after France rejected the EDC. In 1955, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg signed the Benelux memorandum providing the necessary momentum to convene the Messina conference and sign the Treaty of Rome (Maes and Verdun, 2005:332). By the end of the 1960s, several shifts in the international system prompted West European states to create the European Political Cooperation (EPC); an intergovernmental agreement designed to increase foreign policy cooperation and coordination (Reinfeldt, 2016:83). The emergence of other centres of power and the achievement of détente led European policy-makers to suspect that the US might discontinue its engagement in Europe. Additionally, having gradually relinquished their colonial empires and moved away from financial dependence on Washington, European states became ‘self-confident enough to feel that they could each devise their own distinctive approach to east-west relations’ (Ludlow, 2007:5). In Belgium, these developments motivated policy-makers to emphasise their ‘intermediary role’ in a European context dedicated to ‘mediating between the foreign policies of their partners’ (Reinfeldt, 2016:84). Fearing American retreat and German economic rise, Foreign Minister Harmel pressed reluctant French officials to accept progress towards a common security and defence policy. The idea of pursuing further European foreign policy integration to provide the EC with more power on the international scene was the main determinant behind Belgium’s support for the EPC (Reinfeldt, 2016:84).
The latter stages of the cold war saw Belgium re-emphasise its Atlantic tradition. Belgian policy-makers’ security perceptions began converging again on the primacy of NATO as they gradually lost interest in the diplomatic tradition of the Harmel policy (Coolsaet, 2009:29). Pierre Harmel’s successors, Renaat Van Elslande (1973-1977) and Henri Simonet (1977-1980) deemed his approach inappropriate in light of Belgium’s achievements in the European integration process and the perceived resurgence of the military and ideological threat from the Soviet Union. The dominant notion became that Europe in the form of NATO needed to present an undivided front led by the United States (Coolsaet, 2009:31). Simonet attacked Harmel’s vision directly in the following terms: ‘Those who concentrate on a mediating role need never take a position. I reject that kind of laziness’ (quoted in Coolsaet, 2009:29). Ideas of de-escalation were substituted by beliefs of countering the Soviet threat; a shift that took place hand in hand with, and was informed by, a desire to act as a loyal ally (van der Beek, 2016:40; Coolsaet, 2009:30). Successive governments throughout the 1970s and 1980s consistently enforced defence budget increases in line of NATO requirements, supported the modernisation of the organisation and approved the deployment of American cruise missiles (van der Beek, 2016:50).

This latter decision produced significant internal divisions related to the role Belgium should play in reacting to the dilemma brought by the end of the détente (De Wilde, 2014:285). The push for a loyal ally role effectively discontinued the domestic agreement on the compatibility of ‘Atlantic cooperation’ and ‘European construction’. Political actors fell on each side of ‘a broad politically destabilizing gap’ between ‘Atlanticists’ and ‘Europeanists’ (Coolsaet, 2009:30; Hoffmann quoted in Thies, 2009:183). The Belgian peace movement launched an extensive campaign demanding the Martens government to enact a specific role that would preclude a Belgian approval of NATO’s decision to deploy nuclear missiles. Based on a perception that both Moscow and Washington were threats to international security, the movement advanced that Belgium, as a small country, should take ‘guiding roles in realizing a nuclear weapon-free-world’ (van der Beek, 2016:40). At an elite level, the Europeanists which included Social Democrats from both regions, younger members of the Flemish Liberal Party and a minority of parliamentarians from the ruling Flemish Christian Democratic Party, challenged the Atlanticist view held by Foreign Minister, Leo Tindemans (1981-1989) by emphasising Belgium’s responsibility towards disarmament rather than vis-à-vis the US. Unlike the peace movement’s preference for an independent and autonomous policy, Europeanists advocated greater European cooperation in easing tensions between East and West (Coolsaet, 2009:31). The opposition succeeded in forcing the government to retain the right to reassess its position depending on the Alliance’s result on the arms control track, delaying a formal decision (Thies, 2009:183; The New York Times, 1979). Yet, it ultimately failed to stop the enactment of loyal ally role when the

8.5 A European Tradition

Belgium’s uncertainty about its place in post-cold war security structures was exacerbated by the eruption of the Gulf crisis in August 1990. Belgian foreign policy-makers were apprehensive of American intentions and feared unilateral action (Coolsaet, 2009:38). High levels of uncertainty combined with the emerging norm of European coordination created propitious conditions for Belgian policy-makers to positively identify with the EC and the WEU as a basis for Belgium’s response to the crisis. Underlying the Martens government’s wish to perform a regional subsystem collaborator (RSC) role, ‘Belgium consistently insisted upon a European framework in order to achieve the joint European playing-down of an exclusive military option’ because the ‘government believed it could pursue a broader political agenda’ than it would have as a small member of NATO (Coolsaet and Soetendorp, 2000:137-138). This role motivated the government to participate in a Benelux contribution to the naval blockade, but only on the condition it was carried out within a WEU framework as opposed to under US leadership (Jørgensen, 1997:24; van Beveren, 1992).

However, divisions amongst European states over how to manage the crisis prevented the Belgian government from fully performing its European role. France and Britain advocated a maximalist approach driven by desires to play leadership roles. In contrast, other member states favoured a range of minimalist responses determined by concerns for ally solidarity, their bilateral relationship with Washington and their own historical experiences (Jørgensen, 1997:22). It is in the context of the Gulf war that Foreign Minister Eyskens declared his famous quote: ‘Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm’ (The New York Times, 25 January 1991). Unable to act jointly with European partners, cabinet ministers disagreed about the role Belgium should take in responding to the crisis. British demands for an active military role by providing ammunition to the campaign generated additional conflicts in the Martens VIII coalition government. As a CVP (Flemish Christian Democratic Party)-led coalition, a majority of ministers including Prime Minister Martens and Foreign Minister Eyskens favoured an active international engagement based on concerns for solidarity and loyalty amongst allies (Interview of Eyskens by Deschamps, 2010:36; Houben, 2005:46). It is on this basis that the government dispatched minesweepers, two frigates to the Gulf and provided Egypt with two transport aircrafts for the evacuation of refugees (UNGA, 1990). Yet, losses by the CVP to Socialist Parties in the previous 1987 elections had forced Christian Democrats to include more Socialists in the cabinet (Wilsford,
In this way, Guy Coëme from the French-speaking Socialist Party (PS) succeeded Liberal François-Xavier de Donnéa as Minister of Defence in 1988. Members of the Belgian Left articulated a narrative emphasising international solidarity, the credibility of international law and humanitarian concerns as preconditions for international interventions. They envisaged Belgium into a non-military role acting as promoter of international law (Frank, 2011). In cabinet, they argued that the government ‘was going too far’ and failed to exhaust all other ‘diplomatic, verbal, possibly financial’ options (Eyskens in Deschamps, 2010:36). Defence Minister Coëme played a significant part in Belgium’s refusal to meet British demands for military supplies (Eyskens in Deschamps, 2010:36; The Herald, 2000). The socialist influence in constraining Belgium’s military role was noticeable when Prime Minister Martens did not seek to overrule Coeme’s decision and failed to act on his promise to contribute F-16 fighters to the campaign (The Guardian, 2013). Public opinion was neither distinctly ‘activist’ nor supportive of ‘political and military adventures’ (Houben, 2005:46). Concepts of ally solidarity and/or humanitarian intervention did not resonate broadly amongst the Belgian public, thereby constraining the government from taking a ‘front line attitude’ through the deployment of ground troops (Houben, 2005:46; Jørgensen, 1997:22). The Belgian contribution was seen to be one of limited support for its transatlantic ally (De Wilde, 2014:284). In fact, the government chose to present its position as ‘participating in the international solidarity effort’ rather than in terms of support for the US intervention (UNGA, 1990). It was a compromise ‘heavily criticised’ by those who thought the government was ‘not very brave’ by limiting its support to ‘exasperated allies’ (The Guardian, 2013).

The adoption of UN Security Council resolution 678 authorising ‘all necessary means’ to enforce the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait strengthened Belgian leaders’ belief in the UN as ‘the most legitimate player on the international stage’ (Liegeois, 2016:26; Coolsaet, 2016:13). The close alignment of Belgium’s foreign policy principles with those of the UN indicates that the Belgian elite identified positively with the institution’s mission in security affairs (Liegeois, 2016:26). Belgium feels a responsibility to extend what it achieved in ‘the process of European unification’ to an international level and ‘defend in priority the common interest, namely, in this case, that of the United Nations’ (Liegeois and Glume, 2008:116). In this way, the reorientation towards the UN is a direct consequence of the common European security policy remaining inoperative. The UN narrative describes Belgium as a promoter of ‘human rights, the rule of law and right to peace and dignity’ which introduces a concern for human security in Belgium’s foreign policy outlook (Liegeois, 2016:26, 33). It enabled Belgium to fashion for itself a tradition as a ‘staunch defender of … the UN system’ (Permanent Mission of Belgium in the UN Online, 2016). The roles of humanitarian actor and UN activist (or GSC) have been the foundation of Belgium’s international activism in signing disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.
Belgium also called on the UN to take a more prominent and efficient peacekeeping role (UNSC, 1992). A period of intense UN activism ensued during which major contributions were made to UN operations including Western Sahara (1991), Cambodia (1992) as well as Somalia (UNOSOM), Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR and UNTAES) and Rwanda (UNAMIR) (Coolsaet, 2009:39). Belgium was successful in gaining a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council from January 1991. In the end, the Gulf war established a strong consensus in Belgium regarding the need for a UN mandate and a EU framework as preconditions for taking part in military operations (Coolsaet, 2016:13).

8.6 The End of a Colonial Tradition

On 7 April 1994, ten Belgian paratroopers of the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda (UNAMIR) were assassinated by soldiers of the former Rwandan army. The government of Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene immediately terminated its contribution to the mission precipitating the ethnic cleansing of the Tutsi population. The loss of Belgian lives in the context of a UN operation and the intensity of the violence that followed were traumatic experiences for the Belgian public and political establishment. After much public condemnation of the government’s attempts to conceal the full extent of what happened in Kigali, a parliamentary commission of inquiry was established in April 1997 to investigate Belgium’s role in the Rwandan genocide (Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:308). The actual conflict as well as Belgium’s process of self-evaluation had profound consequences for political actors’ views regarding the roles their country should have in Africa and as an international peacekeeper.

The initial decision to deploy 370 Belgian peacekeepers to Rwanda can be explained by the government seeking to perform contradictory roles. Following the refusal of other potential contributors, Belgium felt under pressure to accept the UN Secretary General’s request for a troop contribution. Brussels was reluctant to undermine its UN activist (or GSC) role. However, both UN and Belgian leaderships overlooked the dominant peacekeeping norm stipulating that no blue helmet should originate from a state with interests in the area of deployment. There is clear evidence that Belgian policy-makers sought to enact a former colonial power role. They saw a participation in UNAMIR as ‘a unique opportunity of strategic repositioning in the middle of the Great Lakes region’ (Liegeois and Glume, 2008:118). Political concerns for maintaining good alliance relations with the Rwandan leadership despite its poor human right record had driven Belgium’s policy towards Rwanda since 1990 (Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:320). Conscious of these contradictions, the Belgian government contributed to UNAMIR half-heartedly, thereby accounting for the poor design of the operation, the lack of capabilities and the absence of a contingency plan (Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:320; Liegeois and Glume, 2008:118). It is a clear case of how a decision motivated by incompatible roles can have dramatic consequences.
In January 1998, the parliamentary inquiry delivered its main recommendation that ‘Belgium should not send armed troops in countries with which we had colonial bonds anymore’ (in Liegeois and Glume, 2008:119). Belgium also sought distance from its UN tradition by rejecting the organisation’s peacekeeping norms. Prime Minister Dehaene criticised the DPKO for refusing to provide UNAMIR with the necessary mandate when peace had collapsed (Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:313). Koops and Drieskens (2012) note that ‘it was the experience in Rwanda that turned Belgium’s ruling elite and society into UN-sceptics’. Belgium’s malaise with UN peacekeeping is apparent in the shifting discourse of Belgian leaders at the General Assembly. To be clear, they did not oppose the organisation’s role in peace and security but perceived the primary function of the UN as now lying in social and economic domains (UNGA, 1995). Greater emphasis was given to Belgium’s effort on ‘preventive diplomacy’ and ‘conflict prevention’ in the framework of European organisations (UNGA, 1998). According to Brussels, regional arrangements should be granted a more extensive role in supporting the UN’s security activities. Belgium was increasingly portrayed as a European state committed to addressing conflicts at their earliest stages in Europe. In the context of Belgium’s contribution to the NATO-led implementation force (IFOR), Foreign Minister Derycke stated that his ‘country is, with its partners, part of this peacekeeping operation whose role is to be a force for solidarity, reconstruction and hope for a new Europe’ (UNGA, 1996). The purpose of this narrative was to justify the ‘political choice made to concentrate Belgium’s peacekeeping contributions in NATO and EU missions’ (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). Having lost faith in traditional peacekeeping practices, Belgium took it upon itself, through a UN reformer role, to request changes in the UN approach. Deheane asserted that ‘the credibility of the United Nations peace operations can be ensured only if certain conditions are met’ (UNGA, 1995). These were laid out in the inquiry’s report and included more permissive rules of engagements, maximum guarantees for troop safety and explicit authorisations to use force (in Liegeois and Glume, 2008:119). The Rwanda trauma along with the inquiry’s conclusions have created powerful domestic constraints on Belgium’s roles towards Africa and peacekeeping.

The Rwanda episode made it clear that a former colonial power role, which traditionally shaped Belgium’s approach to managing crises in Africa, had become out of tune with the international norms of democratization, support for the rule of law and ‘African ownership’ (Belgium underwent a similar process in the domain of development cooperation see Breuning, 2016:76; Coolsaet, 2016:13). Nevertheless, the post-Rwanda adaption process generated a rift in the political class regarding the roles Belgium should continue to play in facilitating peace and security on the African continent. Disagreements surfaced as the second Dehaene government (1995-1999) attempted to react to the refugee crisis in eastern Zaire during 1996-97 involving a complex interplay of civilian and military cross-border movement between Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda, ethnic antagonisms and large-scale human
right abuses (Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:308). A significant sign of change was Brussels’ recognition that Africa policy should increasingly be conducted multilaterally (Coolsaet, 2016:13). Yet, the international community’s lack of interest in the Zairian crisis exacerbated uncertainty and frictions amongst domestic actors surrounding Belgium’s role. Christian Democrats (CVP) favoured a former colonial power role based on a perception that Belgium should continue to ‘play a political role in the former colonies’ by furthering cooperation with the governments of the Great Lakes region (Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:308). This role is expressed in terms of special relationship with former colonies. Its principal carrier inside the government was State Secretary for Development Cooperation Reginald Moreels. As a fervent supporter of humanitarian interventions, Moreels was a key agent in promoting the CVP’s policy line envisaging a deployment of Belgian troops to come to the aid of Zairian refugees. Former Prime Minister and Foreign Affair Minister Eyskens expressed the role and its policy implications most clearly:

‘We have a right to intervene. I would say that right should become a military duty to intervene. The ideal would be a UN intervention. As a former colonial power, we should not say that we will never send Belgian troops to the region. We should not be guilty of non-assistance’ (quoted in Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:328).

The Socialist Party, the second largest of the coalition, rejected any intervention with colonial undercurrents. An established member in the party, Foreign Minister Derycke believed that Belgium should take its distance with ex-colonies especially when these were governed by undemocratic leaders like Zairian president Mobutu. He wanted Belgium to enact a promoter of democratisation and human rights role by making cooperation conditional upon progress on these dimensions. On the refugee crisis, Derycke found himself in a difficult position between his coalition partners’ demands for a more active role without overlooking the Rwandan legacy, new international norms that corresponded to his party’s position and the fact that an intervention would provide president Mobutu military and political support. He expressed his preferred role in the following terms:

‘The crisis in the Great Lakes region is a moral challenge for the United Nations. It imposes on us the duty of solidarity. We must help Africa to find solutions and to implement them without interfering or trying to impose solutions’ (Derycke in UNGA, 1998; author’s emphasis).

This dilemma was a middle ground response in the form of logistical and financial support to an intervention ‘within the framework of a policy of conflict prevention which the European Union, in cooperation with the OAU, is trying to elaborate’ (UNGA, 1996). The Belgian government was not ready to take the lead of an intervention nor to send any troops to a former colony (Verwimp and Vanheusden, 2004:328).
8.7 An Integrationist Tradition in a Post-Cold War Environment

In 1999, EU member states collectively reshaped the structures of European security by launching the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a response to their failure to act jointly in addressing the Balkan conflicts. Individually, they had to reassess their commitments to alliance solidarity, existing allies and European integration, feeding into the roles they wanted to play politically and militarily within existing and emerging security structures. The uncertainty of this process was heightened by the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing US war on terror.

In the mind of Belgian policy-makers, the American invasion of Iraq and European defence integration were closely intertwined. Washington’s unilateral action had re-awakened old fears of great powers acting outside international rules to the detriment of small states’ autonomy and survival (Coolsaet, 2009:48). The crisis showed that the norms of European coordination and UN legitimacy, internalised during the first Iraq war, affected the roles of Belgium to a greater extent than US attempts to cast Belgium into a *loyal ally* role. The Verhofstadt government enacted a *promoter of international law* role, predisposing it to attach weight to the ‘external legitimacy of an operation’ (Houben, 2005:54) and side with France, Germany and Luxembourg in opposing the war.

Belgium sought stability in its entrenched tradition of actively promoting European integration. The perceived necessity for stronger legal structures led Brussels to assume a leadership role in advocating ‘increased intra-European defence cooperation’ along with ‘Europe’s autonomy in world politics’ (Coolsaet, 2016:18). Belgium’s role as a leading advocate of deeper defence integration is also rooted in policy-makers’ belief that the CFSP and the ESDP enhance foreign policy opportunities and leverage for Belgium (Coolsaet and Soetendorp, 2000:137). Soon after 9/11, Prime Minister Verhofstadt wrote to the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac urging a new impetus ‘to relaunch the idea of a European defence and rekindle the Saint-Malo spirit’ (Verhofstadt in Haine, 2003:113). Belgium took the lead in April 2003 by convening the ‘Chocolate Summit’ which gathered the European opponents of the war on terror (The Amazing Strategic Orchestra of Belgian Defence (ASOBD) 2015:41). By introducing the key concepts of European Defence Agency (EDA) and Battlegroups, the summit was testament to Belgium’s role as ‘leading theologian of European defence’ (Biscop, 2015:39; ASOBD, 2015:41-42). Furthermore, Belgian personnel have been present in almost all EU missions, whether military or civilian, since the first deployment in 2003 (Coolsaet, 2016:18). It should be noted that such European roles create an important degree of constraint on Belgian decision-makers who will find it increasingly difficult to abstain from participation as the CFSP extends further into ‘hard’ military components (Coolsaet and Soetendorp, 2000:139).
In contrast, the new norms that NATO was developing as part of its post-cold war reorientation impacted minimally on Belgium’s roles during the Iraq war because the foreign policy elite was reticent to accept the ‘out of area’ military ambitions of the Alliance, especially if undertaken outside a UN mandate (Coolsaet, 2009:49). There were also fears in Brussels that the US would come to dominate the Alliance. Belgian scepticism about the evolution of NATO is reflected in the Prime Minister’s letter to Blair and Chirac:

‘It looks very likely that NATO will cease to be an alliance in the future. The US seems to be pushing NATO in the direction of a loose coalition that will be formed differently and will deploy different resources depending on the enemy’ (Verhofstadt in Haine, 2003:112).

Expectedly, this position carried negative consequences for Belgium’s role as a loyal ally. The assertion by Foreign Minister Michel upon taking office that Belgium would not be ‘the United States’ servant’ indicates a reluctance to allow Belgium’s roles to be determined by US pressures; a political choice not to prioritise strategic relations with Washington (quoted in Coolsaet 2009:44).

The roles pursued by the Belgian government inside the ESDP integrate both French and German ideas of European security. It shares the French vision of the EU as a powerful independent actor in world politics. Like their German counterparts, Belgian leaders perceive an internal risk in the renationalisation of defence policies that only deeper integration and formal equality between members can prevent (Aggestam, 2004:93; Verhofstadt in Haine, 2003:112). On transatlantic relations, Brussels balances French reluctance to accept American leadership with German Atlantic orientation envisaging the EU as a European pillar of NATO. Moreover, Belgium sees its purpose as working towards an EU that is capable to ‘counterbalance’ US dominance (Michel in Coolsaet, 2009:48). Defence Minister Flahaut stated that ‘striving to maintain American engagement does not mean that there can be any place for hegemony’ (quoted in Coolsaet, 2009:49). Nonetheless, the development of the EU into an independent security actor is regarded as a precondition for the continuation of a strong transatlantic relations (Biscop, 2015:39).

Importantly, Belgium distinguishes itself from its two neighbours by seeking to limit their directorate in security policy-making. For Belgium, a chief concern lies in the risk of abandonment in decision-making when a functioning Franco-German partnership decides to act outside institutionalised mechanisms (Wivel, 2005:400). For this reason, Belgian policymakers strongly believe in supranational arrangements as most effective in securing the interests of small states (Houben, 2005:38). The prospect of a Franco-German directorate activates Belgium’s self-conception as a promoter of international law and multilateralism preconditioning the country to reject any move undermining the role of institutions in the decision-making of security and defence issues. This suggests that not every form of multilateralism is always beneficial to small states (Wivel, 2005) and that the roles they
choose to play within multilateral institutions shape their directions and development into security actors (Aggestam, 2004).

To conclude this analysis, several factors have undermined the external credibility of the RSC role and Belgium’s ability to perform it. First, even pro-integration Belgium was not immune to disagreement amongst political parties over Belgium’s roles towards EU military crisis management. Liberal and Socialist coalition members in Verhofstadt I (1999-2003) and Verhofstadt II (2004-2007) differed over the extent to which Belgium should be involved in European crisis management. As a member of the French-speaking Socialist Party (PS), Defence Minister Flahaut did not oppose Belgium participation, but nor did he promote it as vigorously as Prime Minister Verhofstadt (Vanhoonacker and Jacobs, 2010:575). Socialists saw with scepticism the use of military force and the alignment of the EU external crisis management with US foreign policy objectives in the context of the war on terror (Vanhoonacker and Jacobs, 2010:575). They favoured Belgium to perform an active independent role implicating greater autonomy from Washington. Conversely, Prime Minister Verhofstadt was a committed federalist who ‘saw an active contribution to ESDP as a further expression of Belgium’s commitment to further European integration’ (Vanhoonacker and Jacobs, 2010:575). Second, the political deadlock following the 2007 elections gave the image of Belgium as a dysfunctional country at the heart of Europe. Third, Belgium was failing to sustain the necessary defence spending to support its rhetoric of European security autonomy (Coolsaet, 2016:18). Regional partners have repeatedly demanded Belgium to act upon its RSC role to a greater extent. Fourth, acting on the perception that the previous government had neglected transatlantic relations, the Christian Democrat-led coalition headed by Yves Leterme came into power in 2008 with the objective of implementing a ‘more pronounced pro-Atlanticist position’ (Coolsaet, 2009:51). Rather than a fundamental shift in roles, this development suggests a return to a more equal balance of responsibilities between European autonomy and transatlantic solidarity.

8.8 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the main dimensions of Belgium’s foreign policy through its relationship with different multilateral institutions. It can be difficult to understand how Belgium combines UN activism (GSC), NATO solidarity (loyal ally) and EU construction (RSC) into a coherent foreign policy, contributing to the criticism that Belgium lacks a clear foreign policy line (Coolsaet, 2016). By analysing the responses of Belgium to a series of foreign policy dilemmas, the aim was to clarify some of this ambiguity. One important finding confirms that small states’ relationship with multilateralism is not as unambiguous as the literature makes it seem. In fact, the Belgian case shows that small states’ commitment to multilateral institutions can vary significantly from one platform to another and over time. Furthermore, a recent review of the diplomatic mission of Belgium concluded that ‘in order
to pursue a pro-active multilateral agenda, a country needs an adequate bilateral network’ (Coolsaet, 2016:20). This substantiates the view that small states do not necessarily prioritise multilateralism because their elites also perceive the disadvantages of doing so, choosing instead to maintain their autonomy or deal with strategic partners on a bilateral basis. Yet, the choice to maintain bilateral ties also entails a move outside the formal rules of multilateral institutions which is likely to position Belgium in greater asymmetry with more influential partners. Belgium continues to struggle to reconcile NATO’s demands of greater solidarity, especially when these come from Washington, and European expectations for a Belgium contribution towards the development of a common and defence and security policy. This was the case when détente ended in the 1980s, as the Berlin Wall came down and again during both Iraq wars. As these fault lines have shaped Belgium’s post war foreign policy, the following case studies investigate how the roles embedded in them have played out in Belgium’s decisions to participate in two recent peacekeeping operations.
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<tr>
<th>Tradition</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Prevailing role(s)</th>
<th>Main advocate(s)</th>
<th>Main peacekeeping deployments</th>
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9.1 Introduction

On 26 August 2006, the government of Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt authorised the deployment of 400 Belgian peacekeepers to the ‘enhancement’ of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) after twelve years of Belgian absence from UN peacekeeping. This re-engagement offers a unique opportunity to analyse the country’s evolving role conception(s) in the field of peacekeeping. The death of ten Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1994 underscored that the roles of former colonial power and UN activist should together no longer guide the country’s decisions to participate in peacekeeping missions.

The decision was also significant because it was part of a wider regional pattern of a ‘European return to UN peacekeeping’ (Mattelaer, 2009:7). In their response to the escalating crisis, EU member states displayed signs of unity, cohesion and coordination not seen since the divisions over the Iraq war (Gross, 2009:46; Biscop, 2007:3). This common front enabled the EU to take on a leading role in UNIFIL II as shown by member states committing over 70% of the total number of UN troops (Biscop, 2007:3). This step should not overshadow the fact that troop commitments remained a difficult political choice for member states. A key reason for their hesitation was that UNIFIL II represented a junction in terms of peacekeeping practices. Mission commander General Pellegrini commented that ‘UNIFIL of summer 2006 appears to be a real laboratory where new ways of approaching peace missions were being developed’ (quoted in Morselli, 2012:540). All actors involved in the conflict and its resolution expressed their own visions for the mission’s framework, its mandate and the exact roles that peacekeepers would assume on the ground. In Belgium, the trauma of Rwanda coupled with uncertainty around the conditions of deployment made a decision to commit troops a ‘highly sensitive political issue’ (Liégeois and Glume, 2008:124). This was evident in the lengthy and hesitant process the Verhofstadt government underwent to reach its decision.

Belgium was confronted with a dilemma as the international community converged on the need for the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Lebanon. The mission’s UN framework was simultaneously appealing and problematic for Belgium. Peacekeeping reforms within the UN since the mid-1990s generated a willingness from the Verhofstadt government to play a Global System Collaborator (GSC) role which was reminiscent of the previous UN activist role. Yet, the UN approach to mission conception and management continued to be at odds with the peacekeeping practices of many European states. In Belgium, it went against the recommendations made by the Rwanda commission, thereby reigniting fears of peacekeeping failure. Moreover, Belgium’s peacekeeping roles had been increasingly influenced by the socialising influence of the EU. Belgian policy-makers’
positive attitude towards developing a European common foreign policy and defence contributed to a Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC) role becoming a powerful driver behind their approach to peacekeeping.

This case study argues that the decision resulted from Belgium having been socialised into a humanitarian Actor and GSC roles. The main foreign policy-making unit positively identified with new peacekeeping norms emerging from UN reforms and responded favourably to direct UN demands in the context of UNIFIL II’s force generation process. Yet, the enactment of these two roles would have been impossible without EU and French activism in influencing the mission’s ‘robust’ mandate. The Belgian government welcomed this activism, and also adopted a RSC role to overcome the hurdles established by the Rwanda Commission.

9.2 Background to UNIFIL II, the Hezbollah-Israeli War

On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah militants attacked an Israeli army patrol across the Blue Line capturing two soldiers and killing another eight. Hezbollah rockets were launched from Lebanon onto Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) installations and the large urban centre of Haifa. Two civilians were killed. The Israeli government’s response was swift and robust. A large military operation including a blockade of Lebanon, airstrikes throughout the country and a major ground deployment in Southern Lebanon was unleashed (Schmitt, 2008:127). Hezbollah and Israel engaged in a 34 days-long conflict causing significant civilian casualties (Abdenur, 2016:395).

The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war was the latest manifestation of decade long unresolved tensions rooted in the Lebanese civil war and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Mattelaer, 2009:9). Significantly, it signalled the failure of UNIFIL, first deployed in 1978 following the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in an effort to dislodge Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) bases. On 19 March 1978, Security Council Resolution 425 called for Israel to immediately cease its operations and withdraw its forces. Resolution 426 authorised the deployment of UN troops to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security and assist the government of Lebanon in ensuing the return of effective authority in the area (UNSC, 1978). UN forces were instructed to maintain ‘complete impartiality’ and use force strictly for self-defence (Makdisi et al, 2009:14). However, such ‘unrealistic mandate’ combined with poor preparation severed UNIFIL’s chances of success from the start (Nachmias, 1999:105). The resolutions were received with strong reservations by both conflicting parties. While the PLO criticised the resolutions for failing to address the Palestinian question, Israel condemned the UN’s limited effort in ensuring the removal of ‘terrorist’ groups from South Lebanon (Makdisi et al, 2009:14). In this context, the objectives of removing Israeli forces out of Lebanon and containing Lebanese resistance factions were simply unachievable (Nachmias, 1999). The mission
remained characterised by major discrepancies between an overambitious mandate, restrictive rules of engagement and violent realities on the ground. The lack of peace coupled with conceptual ambiguity meant that troops never received coherent strategic instructions on how to achieve their mandate.

International and regional shifts in 1982 further contributed to UNIFIL’s weaknesses. The election of Ronald Reagan as US president ended US-Soviet détente and the Security Council’s fragile support of UNIFIL. The nomination of Ariel Sharon as Israeli Defence Minister after 1981 elections accentuated the confrontational character of Begin’s cabinet (Makdisi et al, 2009:15). The reinforcement of UNIFIL with a total number of 7000 troops did nothing to prevent Israel from launching operation *Peace for Galilee* on 6 June 1982 in a bid to implement Sharon’s ‘New Middle East’ plan designed to remove the PLO from Southern Lebanon, establish a Christian-controlled government and weaken Syrian influence (Nachmias 1999:100). However, Israeli leaders had not anticipated the strong resistance of both Palestinian groups and Lebanese Shia fighters. The invasion was a human tragedy accelerating the radicalisation of Lebanon’s Shia communities, which already were being mobilised by Tehran around the objective of the Iranian Revolution (Schleifer, 2006:4; Norton, 2007). Both processes contributed to the emergence of Hezbollah which became an attractive alternative for many Shias determined to combat Israeli occupation and, what they saw as, a secular and corrupt Lebanese political system (Norton, 2007:477). The ideological, financial and military support provided by Iran enabled the ‘Party of God’ to develop into a coherent fundamentalist, anti-Western and anti-Israel movement with an effective insurgent force (Schleifer, 2006:4). The birth of Hezbollah demonstrates UNIFIL’s incapability to deal with ‘the near-impossible mission’ of containing the political and ethnic conflict amongst the various factions comprising the Lebanese political system (Nachmias 1999:98).

Israel occupied the area for the next eighteen years assuming that a withdrawal would create ground for armed resistance. The story repeated itself throughout the 1990s. Major Israeli offensives against Hezbollah took place in 1993, *Operation Accountability* and in 1996, *Operation Grapes of Wrath* watched by UNIFIL’s powerless troops. Instead of achieving their objective of forcing Hezbollah out of South Lebanon, they led to large number of civilian casualties and drove populations to rally behind Hezbollah’s armed resistance (Makdisi et al, 2009:16). By 2000, Israel calculated that the costs of occupation were unsustainable and took the unexpected decision to withdraw unilaterally from its ‘security zone’. The inability of UNIFIL and the Lebanese army to assert authority in the area created a vacuum rapidly filled by Hezbollah. Israeli reluctance to withdraw from the Sheba’a Farms area and to release Lebanese prisoners remained major sources of tension. It is against this background, and the international community’s failure to address these enduring issues within a broader framework of Arab-Israeli conflict resolution, that confrontation broke out in 2006 (Makdisi et al, 2009:5).
The Belgian Domestic Context

The political institutional setting in which the government Verhofstadt II decided to re-engage in UN peacekeeping emerged following the unprecedented 1999 federal elections. Christian Democratic parties registered their worst electoral performance since the Second World War (Delwit and Pilet, 2004:33). Flemish Christian Democrats (CVP) was demoted as the country’s largest party by the Flemish Liberals (VLD), while Socialists remained ahead in Wallonia (Parti Socialiste, PS). The Greens emerged as the main winners gaining unprecedented support in both Wallonia and Flanders (Deschouwer, 2000:126). Motivated by a desire to force the Christian Democrats into opposition, Liberals, Socialists and Greens from both linguistic regions swiftly formed a ‘rainbow coalition’ headed by Guy Verhofstadt (VLD) (Verhofstadt I) (Van Assche, 2003:3). For the first time in Belgian history, Christian Democrats did not participate in a coalition government (Van Assche, 2003:2).

Verhofstadt I instigated a foreign policy distinctly more proactive and European-orientated than its predecessor (Fitzmaurice, 2004:148). The 1998 St Malo agreement between France and Britain designed to revitalise the idea of European defence provided the coalition with an opportunity to reinvigorate Belgium’s European tradition (Coolsaet, 2009:44). This came hand-in-hand with a distancing from NATO because of concerns the Bush Administration was transforming the Alliance into ‘a loose coalition’ deployed differently depending on Washington’s preferences (Coolsaet, 2009:44). The Verhofstadt government was not prepared to adopt the role of loyal ally, contributing to a deterioration in US-Belgium relations (Sauer, 2013:37). In 2002, the government decided to participate in ISAF by choosing to secure Kabul airport; a decision which ‘tells a lot about the political rationale that has been prevailing in Brussels when discussing troop deployment’ (Liégeois and Glume, 2008:121). This option demonstrated engagement through airlift function traditionally performed by the air force, while minimising the risks and ensuring effective contingency planning. Averse to US-style security formation, Belgium deepened its commitment to multilateral institutionalism as embodied by the UN and the EU. Verhofstadt I should be credited for re-emphasising the central role played by the UN in Belgian foreign policy and international security.

Preferences for European coordination and a UN framework converged to dictate Belgian opposition to the Iraq war which began at the same time as the campaign for the 2003 federal elections. The war did not figure predominantly in the campaign as all parties unanimously condemned the intervention, especially for its lack of UN legal framework (Delwit and Pilet, 2004:34; Van Assche, 2003:3). Calls by some Christian Democrats that such anti-US position ‘would weaken the Belgian role within NATO’ were unlikely to be popular amongst an anti-war public (Delwit and Pilet, 2004:34). Although it was not a decisive issue in the elections, it highlights the Christian Democrats’ inability to stop their loss of popularity between 1999 and 2003. A change of leadership and name (CVP became
CV&D) were not enough for the Flemish Christian Democrats to overtake the VLD as largest party (Delwit and Pilet, 2004:34). Compared to 1999, Liberals and Socialists improved their performances in Flanders and Wallonia while CV&D lost further ground. Green parties suffered heavy losses due to their inexperience and concessions made as part of the previous coalition (Fitzmaurice, 2004:155). The election results suggest that the electorate positively evaluated Verhofstadt I’s record and chose to afford it a new mandate.

A four-party coalition of Liberals (Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats, VLD/Mouvement Réformateur, MR) and Socialists (Socialistische Partij Anders, Sp.a/Parti Socialiste, PS) (Verhofstadt II) emerged on 12 July 2003 following difficult negotiations marked, on a foreign policy front, by ‘an unmistakable hypersensitivity to anything that might rub the Americans up the wrong way’ (Anciaux quoted in Coolsaet, 2009:46).

The elections did not alter the foreign policy-making unit from its setup between 1999 and 2003. Prime Minister Verhofstadt emerged from the elections politically strengthened having successfully led a fragmented coalition that many predicted would collapse early. His free-market views, for which he was labelled “baby-Thatcher”, superseded during his first mandate in favour of more centre-ground policies (Independent, 2016). He entered a second mandate as an ardent advocate of European common defence and ‘ethical diplomacy’ (Heremans, 2013:81). This diplomatic approach was also central to the foreign policy outlook of Foreign Minister Louis Michel (MR). Michel was initially maintained in that post after the elections but was then replaced by Karel De Gucht (VLD) following a government reshuffle in July 2004. Although De Gucht’s appointment amplified the influence of Flemish Liberals in the unit, it introduced the possibility of a break from the ethical diplomacy and of conflict with the Prime Minister. André Flahaut (PS) was re-appointed as Defence Minister. Humanitarian activism was a salient characteristic in Flahaut’s approach to defence and had motivated him to orient the armed forces towards humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping (Embassy Brussels, 10 May 2007). He was a key agent in establishing B-FAST; a combination of procedures and operational capabilities enabling rapid mobilisation to respond in emergency situations where human lives are at stake (Liégeois and Glume, 2008:121; Kingdom of Belgium Online, 2017).

The composition of this foreign policy-making unit injected a ‘rare continuity in the conduct of Belgian foreign and security policy’ (Liégeois and Glume, 2008:121). The coalition agreement advanced that Belgium would conduct ‘an active, dynamic, voluntarist foreign policy based on ethical principles’ (Grip, 2003, author’s own translation). Although the new coalition appeared willing to improve relations with Washington after the departure of Michel whose harsh anti-American rhetoric had alienated US officials (Embassy Brussels, 10 May 2007), the idea of ‘New Atlanticism’ introduced by Verhofstadt, advancing a strong European common defence as foundation for new EU-NATO relations, reduced the prospect of normalisation (Coolsaet, 2009:46). Significantly, the coalition agreed on the possibility to
examine, within the recommendations of the Rwanda Commission, whether Belgium could ‘undertake peace operations over short periods of time under the UN or the EU flag which would aim to halt human tragedies’ (Grip, 2003; author’s own translation).

Appendix 3 presents a broad range of roles which the Verhofstadt II administration sought to articulate on the international stage when it entered into office. Yet, the following analysis will only focus on those which have figured predominantly in the process that led to the government’s decision to actively participate in the reinforcement of UNIFIL; namely the *Global System Collaborator, Regional Subsystem Collaborator* and *Humanitarian Actor* roles. The first two reflect the dense institutional setting in which Belgium had to reconsider its relationship with peacekeeping while the role of *humanitarian actor* exposes the distinct foreign policy inclination of the Verhofstadt-led foreign policy unit and the new basis on which Belgium was re-examining the possibility of re-engaging in peacekeeping and the reasons for doing so.

9.4 UN Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions

The diplomatic process preceding UN Resolution 1701 was highly contested amongst the conflicting parties and interested great powers. All conveyed peacekeeping behaviours they believed appropriate, thereby shaping the normative context in which conflict resolution would take place and peacekeeping troops would operate. France, the US, Italy, the UN and both conflicting parties agreed to deploy an international force but found no consensus on its framework or participants (Mattelaer, 2009:11). France and the US submitted a draft resolution on 5 August 2006 proposing an intervention, most likely NATO-led, mandated by Chapter VII primarily to disarm Hezbollah (Makdisi et al, 2009:22). The proposal reflected Israeli, American and French preference for a robust intervention capable of neutralising Hezbollah and removing Syrian influence from Lebanon (Engberg, 2014:63; Makdisi, 2011:19). French President Chirac was unconvinced by the idea of reinforcing UNIFIL (Calculi, 2014:6). Nonetheless, the Lebanese government, under domestic pressure from Hezbollah, rejected the plan and clarified that only a more restrictive mandate under UN command was feasible. Israeli Prime Minister Olmert accepted a UN framework on the condition that European states were the main contributors (Mattelaer, 2009:11).

This agreement paved the way for Resolution 1701 which was adopted by the Security Council on 11 August 2006 and authorised a troop increase up to a maximum of 15000. Its mandate was to a) monitor the cessation of hostilities, b) accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in South Lebanon, c) coordinate its activities with the Governments of Lebanon and Israel, d) extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons and f) assist the Government of Lebanon in securing the border and preventing the entry of arms or related materiel (UNSC, 11 August 2006). UNIFIL’s new mandate socialised potential troop
contributing countries into more robust peacekeeping behaviour by diffusing standards of appropriate behaviours along a broader range of tasks including the support to the Lebanese Government and the implementation of a demilitarised zone. Paragraph 12 enhances UNIFIL II’s robustness by authorising ‘all necessary action … to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities’ (Makdisi et al, 2009:23). Makdisi (2011) contends that the language of Resolution 1701 leaves room for two contrasting interpretations of UNIFIL II’s role(s). On the one hand, UNIFIL II continues to function as a ‘traditional operation’ having removed references to enforcement instruments from the previous proposal (Makdisi, 2011:15). However, UN discourse was permeated with US ‘war on terror’ narrative with the effect of ‘de-naturalising’ Hezbollah as a legitimate actor and legitimising UNIFIL as ‘a new stabilisation’ force (Makdisi, 2011:6-14). The argument goes that ‘although UNSCR 1701 was a Chapter VI resolution, its text includes Chapter VII language that clearly recalls the earlier, defeated 5 August draft’ (Makdisi, 2011:15).

A major element of the enhanced mandate was the inclusion of a provision dedicated to protecting civilians. The high human cost of the confrontation made it necessary to incorporate peacekeeping strategies in UNIFIL II designed to mediate the dramatic effects of war on populations. Previous mandates had failed to specifically call for civilian protection (Murphy, 2012:375). In Lebanon, 1200 civilians were reported dead, thousands injured and around one million displaced. Women and children were the most affected (UNSC, 18 August 2006). The impact on Lebanese infrastructures and economy was extensive as a large number of homes and transport routes were destroyed. Hezbollah’s rocket fire killed 170 Israelis including 52 civilians (Murphy, 2012:376). The scale of the crisis underscored the continued failure of peacekeeping operations to protect civilians from targeted attacks and collateral damages (Smith et al, 2011:27). It was a reminder of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon during which civilian suffering became a major concern in light of Israeli heavy-handedness. The bombing of Beirut and the Shabra Massacre, perpetrated under the implicit support of Israeli forces, shocked the international community and drew its attention to the vulnerability of civilians. UNIFIL’s responsibility towards civilians was again thrown into the spotlight in 1996 when 100 Lebanese were killed by an Israeli shell as they sought refuge inside the Fijian UNIFIL headquarters (Nachmias, 1999:105). Nonetheless, the absence of mandate, capabilities and willpower to enforce a cease fire meant that UNIFIL peacekeepers incrementally shifted their role to providing humanitarian aid to local populations (Murphy, 2012:382). Until 2006, UNIFIL’s main success had been the delivery of a wide range of humanitarian services representing a vital lifeline to many Lebanese communities (Makdisi et al, 2009:18).

UNIFIL II’s stronger humanitarian mandate illustrates a broader normative change within UN peacekeeping whereby civilian protection has been given greater emphasis (Smith et al, 2011:28). This development is grounded in ‘the norm that civilians are not legitimate
targets in war and should be protected from the consequences of violent conflict’ (Smith et al, 2011). Surprisingly, civilian protection has not always been high on the UN’s agenda and has figured little in peacekeeping mandates, if at all. Peacekeepers’ inability to prevent deliberate attacks on civilians in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti and East Timor amongst other theatres demonstrated that traditional peacekeeping tasks were no longer effective in creating safe environments for populations (Smith et al, 2011:31). It took until 1998 for UN reforms to reach a breakthrough when new Secretary-General Annan recognised civilian protection as a ‘humanitarian imperative’ (Smith et al, 2011:32). The norm gained further acceptance during the 2005 UN World Summit as member states pledged their support to the idea of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) with which civilian protection shares normative underpinnings. The adoption of Resolution 1674 confirmed the Security Council’s commitment to R2P only four months prior the conflict and Resolution 1701 (Williams, 2010:13). Williams (2010) argues that, as civilian protection became central to UN peacekeeping, the capacity to operationalise it effectively has come closely intertwined with the legitimacy of the overall UN system (p.5). Annan established the link between civilian protection and UN legitimacy in the Lebanese-Israeli context by complaining that Resolution 1701 took too long to materialise ‘while civilians suffered such a terrible, unnecessary pain and loss’. He assessed that ‘this inability to act sooner has badly shaken the world’s faith in its [the UN’s] authority and integrity’ (quoted in Makdisi et al, 2009:22). This statement had a powerful socialising effect on actors considering a participation in the enhancement of UNIFIL. It affirmed that those who are serious about upholding UN’s legitimacy as the main actor in international security are expected to commit themselves to protecting civilians on the ground.

The objective is now to assess the impact of this emerging normative framework and socialising forces on Belgium’s role selection during the crisis. The UN needed to socialise European states into GSCs as incentive to contribute troops. Although Belgium did not have the diplomatic clout to participate in negotiations over a ceasefire, Belgian officials ‘kept a close eye on ongoing events’ (Liégeois and Glume, 2008:123). Even though a formal decision was delayed until 25-26 August, it was clear that the Verhofstadt coalition was considering deploying blue helmets when it transpired that the EU and NATO options were unfeasible. As early as 25 July, Defence Minister Flahaut stated that a contribution to an international force ‘was not excluded’, but that any formal commitment was ‘premature’ until the mandate and conditions for deployment were established (Le Soir, 25 July 2006). Belgian interest in contributing to a resolution was confirmed when the Commission of External Relations held an Exchange of Views on 2 August to debate options. Foreign Minister De Gucht took the opportunity to plead in favour of an active role for Belgium because ‘if the necessary conditions are met for the formation of a peace force, the countries that do not participate will pay the political price and will not be able to make their voice
heard in future discussions on the Middle East’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 2 August 2006). His preference was for a UN mission as it would allow Muslim countries to contribute, thereby dampening claims of European dominance. At the core of the Minister’s position was an aspiration to conform to the UN security system in view of Belgium’s upcoming entry in the Security Council as non-permanent member. He argued that:

‘As non-permanent member, we will not have as much influence as permanent members, but we will nevertheless have a particular responsibility to assume. Therefore, we intend on playing an active role in the Security Council, for example in the area of conflict and state building (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 2 August 2006; author’s translation with original emphasis).

Belgium’s early position of activism towards a resolution was driven by a GSC role. The prospect of holding a UNSC non-permanent seat was the primary motivation behind this role conception, leaving Belgian policy-makers highly exposed to the demands and normative requirements of the UN security system.

Interestingly, the concerns emanating from the commission’s members revolved primarily around the role of Belgium in the resolution process (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 2 August 2006). Dirk Van der Maelen (Sp.a), Mohammed Boukourna (PS) and Brigitte Wiaux (cdH) pressed the minister to play a greater role in enforcing international law upon states that have undertaken disproportionate attacks on civilians. These demands converged with De Gucht’s earlier assessment that the violence between Israel and Hezbollah had resulted in ‘inacceptable’ consequences on civilian populations (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 2 August 2006:2). These exchanges indicate that humanitarian concerns had already entered the debate in Belgium. Other members urged the minister to assume more active diplomatic functions in concert with EU member states in order to reach a ceasefire agreement and gain greater influence inside the Security Council (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 2 August 2006). These interventions showed that some members had more limited faith in the UN system in light of its ‘withered reputation’ and, therefore, demanded a more pronounced RSC role (p.18). However, members were generally in agreement with the activist line advocated by the government and did not oppose an eventual Belgian deployment (p.16). Its president confirmed the prevailing GSC role by asserting that ‘Belgium cannot remain on the side line considering it aspires to a seat at the Security Council’ (p.16).

A day after Resolution 1701 was passed, Defence Minister Flahaut decided in concertation with Prime Minister Verhofstadt and Minister De Gucht that a Belgian C-130 plane will undertake the delivery of humanitarian aid provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Le Soir, 12 August 2006). This initiative demonstrates that earlier concerns for civilians were being translated into action, highlighting the humanitarian nature of Belgium’s emerging response. The Verhofstadt government was incrementally integrating the norm of civilian protection and developing its role as
humanitarian actor in the crisis. Resolution 1701 also came with an intensification of direct UN demands for troop contribution, especially as France announced that it would only provide 200 troops on the ground that the mandate and rules of engagements (ROE) remained unclear according to French authorities (Gross, 2009:53; BBC News, 18 August 2006). UN Deputy Secretary-General, Malloch Brown casted European states into GSCs by insisting that it was ‘now very important that Europeans make troop offers so as to ensure that UNIFIL II has a truly multinational character which will strengthen its legitimacy’ (Le Soir, 18 August 2006). Belgian officials were under pressure to meet the demand, but remained reluctant to do so without a substantial French engagement and clarifications regarding the mandate and the conditions of deployment (BBC News, 16 August 2006; Le Soir, 22 August 2006). In Brussels, foreign policy makers needed to ensure that a participation fulfilled the requirements set out in the 1998 guidelines. Assurances were required that Belgian troops would be authorised to use force if necessary and would not be required to carry out activities which would position them as belligerents.

A series of meetings between Belgian foreign policy leaders and Israeli, Lebanese and UN officials were critical in casting Belgium into role(s) acceptable to both Belgian domestic actors and external socialising agents. On 23 August, Foreign Minister De Gucht met his Israeli homologue, Tzipi Livni who, on the same day, pressed EU member states to invest themselves actively in the UN mission by not sending ‘spectator’ troops (La Libre, 24 August 2006). A day later, De Gucht conveyed to Israeli Defence Minister, Amir Peretz, Belgium’s intention to assume demining functions arguing that ‘it is a very important element’ to guarantee the security of soldiers and populations (Le Soir, 24 August 2006). This came with a request to hand over mine maps to Belgian Defence officials. Although no record of these meetings exists, they are likely to have been arenas of socialisation in which the Belgian government’s choice of role(s) was evaluated by Israeli leaders in light of their preference for active troops in containing Hezbollah. Interestingly, Peretz emphasised to De Gucht the priority of preventing Iran from reasserting its influence in South Lebanon through the delivery of humanitarian aid from Tehran for example (La Libre, 25 August 2006). The humanitarian role of Belgian troops proposed by Belgium was accepted by Israel as evidenced by De Gucht’s subsequent statement that demining was ‘one of the activities we are seriously considering’ and Israeli approval to share maps of the area (Le Soir, 24 August 2006). From Tel Aviv’s perspective, a Belgian contribution of humanitarian character reduced the political effect of Iranian aid. The Belgian proposal was also tolerable to the Lebanese government which could not otherwise accept more interventionist activities including disarmament. Moreover, UN socialisation of Belgium culminated at a meeting between Kofi Annan and Prime Minister Verhofstadt before the Secretary-General attended an emergency meeting of EU Foreign Ministers where member states where expected to make formal commitments. At a common press conference, Annan socialised European
states by expecting them to assume their role in alleviating the plight of Lebanese civilians:

‘I have confidence in Europe. I am confident that we will have a successful meeting this afternoon and Europe will assume its responsibility and show its solidarity with the people of Lebanon and in that region’ (Radio Free Europe, 25 August 2006).

In the same allocution, he cast Belgium into a GSC by expressing ‘his confidence to leave Brussels with a large number of soldiers, and that Belgium will play its role’ (La Libre, 25 August 2006).

On 25 August, an inner cabinet council was convened ‘to decide on a participation, troop numbers and the tasks they will accomplish based on UN demands’ (Verhofstadt quoted in Le Soir, 25 August 2006). Upon its conclusion, Prime Minister Verhofstadt officially announced that Belgium would participate in UNIFIL II by dispatching a task force of engineers, medics and mine clearance specialists, amounting to 300 personnel to be subsequently reinforced by another 100 (Le Soir, 24 August 2006). It was also decided that the Belgian contingent would establish a military hospital in South Lebanon and provide its own force protection composed of around 80 personnel. For the Prime Minster, the Rwanda Commission should no longer obstruct Belgium from performing its GSC role:

‘We have drawn the lessons of the past, but the Rwanda Commission has never said that we could never participate in a UN intervention. We cannot systematically avoid our responsibilities’ (Le Soir, 28 August 2006; author’s translation).

Members of the unit insisted that Belgium’s engagement in demining, medical and reconstruction domains responded to specific demands formulated by the UN. It allowed Belgian officials to claim that Belgium has ‘taken its responsibilities’ having ‘up until now correctly fulfilled all its international engagements’ (Le Soir, 24 August 2006). UN calls for greater emphasis on humanitarian aspects of the conflict were met by the Verhofstadt government which focused it contribution on ‘reviving activity in the region’ (Le Soir, 24 August 2006). Highlighting that Belgium was acting on both a GSC and a humanitarian actor role, Flahaut stated that the government ensured that this ‘substantial contribution’ was ‘as useful for the United Nations as for the civilian population’ (Le Soir, 24 August 2006; author’s translation).

It can be argued that UN socialisation was paramount in casting Belgium into these two roles. Yet, Belgium may not have re-engaged in UN peacekeeping on this occasion had the members of the unit not been receptive to UN norms and demands. Upon his election in 1999, Guy Verhofstadt initiated a radical foreign policy shift designed to lead an ethical diplomacy based on the primacy of human rights (Rosoux, 2014:27). A foreign policy grounded in moral principles aimed to improve Belgium’s international image after a series of domestic scandals, a widening regional divide and a reprehensible colonial past. American diplomacy towards Europe after 9/11 had a formative effect on Verhofstast’s foreign policy
outlook, strengthening his belief that, if EU member states fail to coordinate, the UN remains the ultimate provider of international rules capable of reducing great powers’ influence on small states (Rosoux, 2014:28). Ethical diplomacy was synonymous with respect for, and promotion of, a rule-based environment. Furthermore, Verhofstadt’s party affiliation increased his receptivity to UN socialisation. Belgian Liberal parties tend to be ‘more “interventionist” than their Socialist counterparts who had controlled the Foreign Affairs Ministry in the Dehaene government unseated in June 1999’ (Kelly, 2007-08:72). As a Liberal Prime Minister, Verhofstadt led two coalitions inclined to re-interpret the conclusions of the Rwanda Commission and intervene abroad. Between 1999 and 2006, Belgium pursued a policy of bilateral and multilateral interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Kelly, 2007-08) and another of ‘cautious engagement’ with Rwanda (Hayman, 2010). Arguably, an interventionist tendency and a commitment to maintain UN legitimacy converged to facilitate a positive response to UN demands for a GSC role. As instigator of Belgium’s ethical diplomacy, Verhofstadt identified positively with the UN mission of promoting the civilian protection norm and was, therefore, a key agent in conceiving the humanitarian actor role during the war. Defence Minister Flahaut was the most receptive to UN efforts emphasising the humanitarian dimension of the crisis because they resonated extensively with his intention to orient Belgian defence towards humanitarian tasks. In this way, Flahaut is perhaps the most influential agent behind the humanitarian actor role. Liégeois and Glume (2008) report that the option of sending an armoured infantry battalion was deemed ‘too military’ for the Defence Minister who believed that ‘patrolling … offered few opportunities to win hearts and minds’ (p.125). His focus was on reconstructing, alleviating the living standard of Southern Lebanese and reviving the local economy. There is little to suggest that Foreign Minister De Gucht was as committed to an ethical diplomacy as his two colleagues and his predecessor. His tenure began with a controversy when, after a visit to the DRC, he ‘criticized Congolese leaders…for corruption and bad governance’ and threatened to reverse the government’s ongoing re-engagement in Africa (quoted in Kelly, 2007-08:79). This episode indicates a tendency to emphasise the responsibilities of Belgium’s partners and aid recipients, making De Gucht less inclined to intervene unconditionally abroad. One may speculate that his position on the Lebanon war is likely to have been influenced by internal pressures to follow the government’s line of action and roles following his prior divergence with the coalition on the African dossier.

9.5 European Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions

Belgium’s role conception towards conflict resolution in Lebanon took place in, and was influenced by, a framework of European foreign policy cooperation since the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a prominent issue on the EU’s foreign policy agenda (Mueller,
In the early 2000s, the EU was confronted with a number of challenges in its Middle Eastern neighbourhood. The collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in September 2000, the Iraq war, the Israeli reoccupation of Palestinian territories and Iranian nuclear proliferation put pressure on EU foreign policy actors to foster common positions amongst member states, enabling the EU to become a more consequential player in the Middle East peace process. Failure to do so threatened to undermine earlier efforts to reinforce the EU’s ability to act externally when it created ESDP in 1999 (Mueller, 2012). These external and internal developments required ‘the role of the EU … to shift from diplomatic and financial support of the Peace Process to largely crisis management and the promotion of conflict resolution’ (Altunisik, 2008:110). By 2006, the EU had joined the Middle East Quartet designed to coordinate international diplomacy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, intensified its conflict prevention activities by launching the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and established its first ESDP mission (EU-BAM Rafah) to monitor the Egyptian-Gaza border (Altunisik, 2008:112; Mueller, 2013:30).

The outbreak of violence in Lebanon generated serious concerns amongst EU and member states officials who believed that ‘European interests were at stake and the EU needed to play an active role’ (Engberg, 2010:412). A common approach to the crisis was necessary to avoid undoing the ‘potentially coherent and mutually reinforcing set of policies’ developed thus far (Gross, 2009:48). This remained an arduous task given member states’ differing national foreign policy positions on the Middle East (Mueller, 2012). As the hostilities unfolded, EU states diverged during the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting held on 17 July, over whether to call an immediate ceasefire and how to qualify the Israeli intervention. Britain and Germany remained faithful to their transatlantic partner. Both joined the US in minimising the intensity of Israel’s intervention and were reluctant for the EU to request an immediate ceasefire. In contrast, France led a group of smaller EU member states determined to demand a ceasefire having condemned Israeli unrestrained actions (Gross, 2009:51). Despite these disagreements, Gross (2009) argues that EU-level institutions ‘played a crucial role in building collective will among EU member states to make a common contribution to UNIFIL’ (p.51). This argument shows that:

‘the increasing role played by its [EU’s] foreign policy institutions, particularly the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which increasingly serves as locus of consensus-finding and socialization, helps explain why the EU was playing a more active role in the Middle East; and why member states accepted and supported the EU as an important platform for political negotiations and decision-making in the crisis in Lebanon’ (Gross, 2009:46).

Similarly, Mueller (2013) claims that the EU’s Middle East diplomacy during the 2000s has been characterised by ‘a further strengthening of the role of supranational actors’ (p.31). Morselli (2012) concurs that ‘UNIFIL II was an opportunity for ESDP institutions to exercise a certain pressure on member states’ (p.550). These arguments allow the assertion that member states experienced significant socialising pressures from EU’s foreign policy.
institutions to perform a RSC role. EU socialisation and role-taking by member states were indispensable in generating the common approach required for the EU to meet its internal and external expectations of an enhanced role in resolving the conflict.

EU interventions in the Middle East have traditionally placed a strong normative emphasis on the respect of human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law (Tocci, 2010:111). Aware that the EU’s credibility in the region rested on its status as the main provider of humanitarian aid, the Commission authorised an action plan for humanitarian relief to Lebanon of €18 million for reconstruction (Engberg, 2010:411-420). Sustained cooperation between member states in the development of the EU as a normative actor created incentives for them to act as humanitarian actor and incorporate a humanitarian dimension into their conflict resolution approach to the region. It is in this normative context that member states were now expected to make significant troop contributions to ensure that the EU remained a credible actor. An additional element of EU socialisation has been the prominent role played by EU High Representative, Javier Solana. Having visited the region on multiple occasions to meet Israeli and Lebanese representatives on behalf of the EU, he was in a prime position to liaise with EU Foreign Ministers and foster the political will amongst member states to coordinate an active EU participation in conflict resolution (Dijkstra, 2011:11-12). Therefore, Solana was a significant alter casting member states into RSC role.

The socialisation of member states into this role was facilitated by their common distrust in UN peacekeeping originating from painful experiences in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Mattelaer, 2009:11). The emerging UN framework meant that European troop contributing countries would have limited control over the operation as their personnel would remain under UN command (Morselli, 2012:541). European governments shared a concern that UN command structure and ROE were inadequate in ensuring troop safety in case of hostilities. Furthermore, they resented the UN flexible approach to mission conception for providing little strategic guidance on how to carry out the objectives outlined in the mandate on the ground (Mattelaer, 2009:15). Thus, the planning process was marked by strong tensions between European governments and the DPKO over how to plan and conduct peacekeeping operations. Determined to reshape UN peacekeeping, Europeans pushed hard to create a new military structure inside the DPKO, the Strategic Military Cell (SMC). This new body allowed the Force Commander to bypass the Secretary-General Representative (SGR)’s veto on the use of force and increased the oversight capacity of European governments as their own officers came to staff the SMC. The influx of European military personnel was meant to balance, what they saw as, an overly civilian staff in the UNIFIL Headquarters (Liégeois and Glume, 2008:128). Importantly, it imported ‘a completely different mindset on how to plan and conduct military operations’ based on NATO structures and procedures (Mattelaer, 2009:28). UN officials believed that the SMC
failed to acknowledge that UN peacekeeping works as a highly decentralised system light
on top-level bureaucracy’ (Mattelaer, 2009:26). That was precisely what European policy-
makers were trying to avoid. What they wanted was an additional body able to effectively
translate in military terms the political orientations emanating from New York and respond if
troops were to be targeted. While the SMC remains intergovernmental, its establishment
‘signals a shared military doctrine acquired outside of the EU but used for both national
aspirations and the strengthening of the EU as a security actor on the international stage’

The task is now to assess the extent to which the development of the EU’s Middle
East policy and European bargaining over the mission’s command structure led Belgian
policy-makers to display ‘far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states
to build wider communities’ contributing to an effective EU response to the Israeli-
Hezbollah war (Holsti, 1970:265). In the early 1990s, Belgium was committed to giving the
EU an active role in the Middle East peace process, but the lack of common foreign policy
tools meant that it remained a facilitator of dialogue between Arabs and Israelis. The
emergence of a more coherent EU Middle East policy drove successive Belgian governments
away from bilateral strategies and tie their foreign policies further to the EU’s multilateral
approach (Herremans, 2013:81). Kelly (2007-08) argues that ‘a multilateral strategy that
favors the EU is more beneficial to Belgium’ because the Union has acquired a range of
instruments from conflict prevention to peace building policies enabling it ‘to play a
significant role throughout the life of a crisis’ (p.70; Martinelli, 2006:286). This context
exposed Belgium further to the socialising pressures of EU institutions as they demanded a
RSC role. In this context, it should be noted that former Foreign Affair Minister Louis
Michel occupied the post of EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian aid as the
crisis emerged. His influence as alter to Belgium’s roles should not be overstated as no
evidence was found that he explicitly demanded the Verhofstadt government to perform a
RSC role. Nonetheless, his influence on shaping the humanitarian character of Belgian
contribution to an overall European effort cannot be discounted. He used his position to
criticise both Israeli violence on Lebanese civilians and the difficulty of finding a European
consensus because ‘there are still too many member states which are nostalgic of their
former power’. Without citing Belgium, he added that ‘some small states are also stuck with
ambitions for influence when it comes to their external affairs’ (Le Soir, 2 August 2006).

Verhofstadt unambiguously advocated a RSC role after a GAERC meeting requested
by France seeking to foster greater European solidarity. He stated that ‘coordination is what
our country expects’ and assessed that the current situation offers ‘an opportunity to form a
European force with a real coordination, a prelude to a future rapid reaction force’ (Le Soir,
22 August 2006). The reasoning prevailing at the time in Belgium was that participating in
UNIFIL II alongside EU member states would ‘simultaneously consolidate its [Belgium’s]
place in Europe and Europe’s place in the world’ (Le Soir, 3 August 2006). When Prime Minister Verhofstadt addressed the Parliament to seek approval, both a RSC and a humanitarian actor roles were predominant in his justification of the government’s decision:

‘We wanted to assume our responsibilities. We think that it is essential to stabilise the situation in order to end the war and the suffering of the people of South Lebanon … and, finally, to ensure that Europe is fully assuming its responsibilities. We therefore intend to bring an end to the conflict and enable Europe to play a major role in the search of a political solution’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 28 August 2006:4; author’s translation).

His conceptions of Belgium’s role were broadly accepted by parliamentarians. Fully endorsing a RSC role, De Crem (CD&V) insisted that ‘if we want the EU to play a role in the world, we cannot remain on the side line in the Middle East’ (p.8). A statement by parliamentarian Goris (VLD) clearly reveals the socialising effect of the EU on Belgium’s role:

‘Our contingent of four hundred soldiers meets what we normally expect of us in the framework of the common European security and defence policy … This participation will give us the right in future decision-making processes, notably concerning the future role of our soldiers’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 28 August 2006:17; author’s translation).

The most vocal contestation came from Van den Eynde of the Flemish extreme right party, Vlaams Belang, who criticised the government’s ambition to lead, what he perceived as, a “francophile foreign policy founded on friendship links with France and on a nostalgia to play a role on the global scene” (p.8). On a less, but still critical note, Vandenberghè (Sp.a) appears sceptical about the way the European role was enacted through military means: ‘Belgium can be made to play an important role in the European context. A common foreign policy being preferable to a common defence, I recommend more diplomacy and less soldiers’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 28 August 2006:13; author’s translation).

A RSC role can also be detected in Belgium’s position vis-à-vis Israel during the crisis. Belgium-Israel relations became highly strained from 2002 after an upgrade in the Belgian law of universal jurisdiction made it possible for Ariel Sharon to be indicted for his role in the Sabra and Shatila massacres (Herremans, 2013:81). From 1999, Verhofstadt I had endeavoured to bring Belgian law in line with the Geneva Convention permitting the prosecution of individuals suspected of genocide and crimes against humanity. However, this dimension of the ‘ethical diplomacy’ caused significant frictions with key partners including Congolese President Kabila, the Bush Administration and the Israeli government (La Libre, 13 July 2003). International and domestic pressures forced Verhofstadt II to dilute the law when it took office in 2003. Foreign Minister Michel made important bilateral efforts to repair relations with Israel (Le Soir, 17 February 2004). Yet, his conciliatory and ‘balanced approach’ was discontinued as new Foreign Affair Minister De Gucht began integrating relations with Tel Aviv further into the EU’s legal and multilateral framework (Herremans,
De Gucht favoured conditioning the upgrade of EU-Israeli relations upon Israel’s respect for international law. The influence of De Gucht was critical in bringing Belgium’s position on Israel and a ceasefire in line with a majority of member states, demonstrating that Belgium ‘contributes to the EU’s effectiveness as a normative actor’ (Herremans, 2013:90).

The main obstacle to Belgium performing a RSC role lied in French indecision to commit troops. Paris surprised its partners when it pledged only 200 troops, a fraction of what was initially offered. President Chirac believed that the UN demand for a total of 15000 troops was ‘excessive’ and that too many uncertainties remained over the mandate, the chain of command and the use of force (The New York Times, 25 August 2006). The announcement created a regional dynamic threatening to undermine the whole mission. France was unwilling to make a definite commitment until the contributions of other member states became clearer. However, these countries were ‘waiting to hear what Paris will decide’ (BBC News, 16 August 2006). Highlighting the weight of the French position in Belgium, a military adviser to the Prime Minister reported that ‘the French and Italian contribution to the force would probably exercise a decisive influence on what the Belgians (and other EU members) finally decided to do’ (Embassy Brussels, 16 August 2006). Belgian actors’ sensitivity was heightened because their concerns over the conditions of deployment were identical to those of France. Belgium did not have the resources to make a contribution substantial enough to extract concessions from the UN. Therefore, Belgian officials relied on France’s bargaining power towards, and ongoing negotiations with, UN leaders to establish a chain of command dominated by member states’ military officers rather than civilian UN staff, and bring about the necessary conditions to meet the Rwanda Commission’s requirements. Under heavy pressure from Annan and threat to lose its leadership role to Italy, Chirac agreed to his initial commitment of 2000 troops saying that France had obtained the ‘necessary clarifications on the chain of command, which must be simple, coherent and reactive’ (BBC News, 25 August 2006). The timing of the Belgian decision to participate, which came a day later, confirms that the enactment of a RSC role by the Verhofstadt government depended on France assuming its leadership role as a crucial step to generating a common European willingness to act. In this context, it can be argued that the Verhofstadt government needed to present Belgium as a RSC if it wanted to draw on both French and EU political influence vis-à-vis the UN as a way to reshape peacekeeping practices according to its own preferences. This is further evidence that small states, including Belgium, are becoming increasingly dependent upon wills and preferences of great powers with regard to the formats of the operation, which represents a significant new factor to consider.

A RSC role was not unexpected given that all members of the foreign policy-making unit displayed characteristics making them inclined to respond positively to European socialisation. Prime Minister Verhofstadt guided Belgium through the Lebanese crisis as a fervent advocate of a common security and defence policy. Most significantly, Verhofstadt...
personally injected new integrative momentum after 9/11 by urging Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac to ‘relaunch the idea of a European defence and rekindle the Saint-Malo spirit’ (quoted in Haine, 2003:113), and by convening the following ‘Chocolate Summit’ (Amazing Strategic Orchestra of Belgian Defence, 2015:41). A press report directly links the ‘Chocolate Summit’ to the Prime Ministers’s readiness to coordinate a European response to the Lebanese crisis (Le Soir, 22 August 2006). Although Flahaut is known for his humanitarian activism, his commitment to European defence in influencing the Belgian role conception should not be underestimated. Already upon taking office in 1999, he intended ‘to integrate the Belgian army simultaneously in the new NATO initiative on military capabilities and in the ESDP’ through cooperative projects with the Netherlands and Luxembourg. In this way, Flahaut displayed early signs of wanting to present Belgium as a ‘small motor in constructing European defence’ (Le Soir, 18 January 2000). He also demonstrated an awareness to the highly changing nature of the European context and an evident willingness ‘to adapt to what Europe will want to put in place in terms of common defence’ (Le Soir, 18 January 2000). Therefore, the Defence Minister was an important agent with whom the norms of coordination and humanitarian support advocated by the EU during the Israeli-Hezbollah war were likely to resonate strongly. Foreign Minister De Gucht was perhaps the least dedicated to the principle of European security and defence integration. Rare were his statements about pursuing a coordinated response in order to improve the EU’s capacity to act in international affairs. The EU norm that resonated positively with De Gucht was the one of conditionality whereby the EU establishes trade and association agreements with Middle Eastern partners depending on their progress on human right and peace process tracks. As a result, De Gucht was by no means an obstacle to the overwhelming domestic consensus around the RSC role.

9.6 Concluding Discussion

The aftermath of the Rwandan failure saw Belgium effectively abandon its roles as a UN activist and a former colonial power. Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Belgian elite chose to position the country as a partner to the EU and NATO; a choice approved by the public who had been shocked by the events. This role selection was institutionalised in the Note of General Policy regarding the Belgian Participation in Peacekeeping Operations proscribing Belgium from providing troops to UN operations, especially those in former colonies. The policy was closely abided by successive governments (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). Therefore, the foreign policy shift embodied by the Verhofstadt government’s decision to make a meaningful contribution to UNIFIL II should not be underestimated. It initiated a trend whereby Belgium consistently maintained between 130 and 500 troops in various UN operations. This chapter investigated the process through which the roles of Belgium in peacekeeping were potentially re-conceptualised,
how this role change influenced the decision to re-engage in UN peacekeeping. The findings speak to a growing body of research exploring the capacity of role theory to explain foreign policy changes (Harnisch, 2012; Breuning, 2011; 2012; 2016; Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016). Its central assumption is that ‘as role conceptions change, foreign policy change should follow as well’ (Breuning, 2012:3). Breuning (2012; 2016) has, utilising works on foreign policy change, made significant theoretical and empirical inroads into understanding the conditions under which role conceptions change as a basis for policy shifts. One argument proposes that foreign policy decision makers in gatekeeping positions are key to fostering or preventing role and policy change (Breuning, 2012). It was empirically shown that Belgian State Secretary for Development Cooperation, Reginald Moreels, failed to align Belgian roles in foreign aid with international norms because of his inability to navigate the political institutional context and to frame his proposed role change in a way that resonated with political and public actors (Breuning, 2012:15). This argument was later refined by contending that Moreels’ attempts to change Belgium’s roles took place through a process of horizontal role contestation pitting gatekeepers in favour of retaining a trading role against Moreels who advocated a partner in development role. Based on these findings, Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) theorised that ‘examinations of the domestic political conflicts over roles can provide role theory with the underlying mechanisms to account for the changes in roles and foreign policy when the domestic political conditions change’ (p.185).

The present case found that the political process leading to the formation of UNIFIL II involved various international actors diffusing new peacekeeping norms and expecting concerned parties, including Belgium, to perform certain roles. These socialising influences have encouraged and created openings for the Verhofstadt government to change Belgium’s roles towards UN peacekeeping. It highlights the fact that role theorists have overlooked role socialisation as an important source of role and foreign policy change. This is surprising given that ‘the role concept also captures processes of socialisation and thus provides insights into foreign policy change’ (Aggestam 2004:88). Breuning (2012) alludes to the possibility of role change as a result of socialisation when reporting that ‘changes in the national role conceptions that guide foreign policy decision makers are not independent of the changes in international norms’ (p.3). However, echoing a theoretical argument made earlier, international norms are unlikely to produce role change if they are not carried and expressed by international socialising agents through role expectations. Similarly, the effectiveness of role socialisation diminishes if performed outside a normative framework. In this way, international norms can be thought of as the message, or content, of role socialisation. Socialising agents cannot effectively perform their function if they do not have a message with which to socialise other actors into roles. Nor will socialisees be able to locate their role(s) in the absence of normative referents indicating the appropriate behaviour that is expected of them. This case study has shown empirically that role and norm
socialisation complement each other. The main message, or norm, actively diffused by the EU and the UN in the context of the Israeli-Hezbollah crisis was that concerned states should work to protect civilians caught in the conflict. Belgium’s long tradition of multilateralism in both institutions ensured that its elite was receptive to these socialisers and was, therefore, highly exposed to the norm.

Breuning (2012) is accurate to note that role change is difficult to achieve because domestic agents ‘must overcome a tendency towards stability and status quo, something that is more likely to succeed under unusual circumstances’ (p. 5). The cautious approach taken by Belgium towards UNIFIL II is evidence of this domestic hurdle. The lessons drawn from the Rwandan experience and their institutionalisation in policy constituted the greatest obstacle to role change. Long into the force generation process, Belgian policy-makers remained sceptical that the operation fulfilled the national requirements for participation in UN operations. They were unconvinced that the UN could provide an effective command and control structure allowing Belgian planners to retain control over the day-to-day running of the operations (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). This was compounded by the lack of French leadership on which Belgium relied to bring about the necessary conditions. Yet, ‘unusual circumstances’ at the international level created opportunities and incentives for the Belgian elite to rethink the country’s role in UN peacekeeping, thereby limiting the constraints of the post-Rwanda recommendations. First, the prospect of a non-permanent membership in UN Security Council between 2007 and 2008 provided Belgium with an opportunity to act more proactively as a GSC by following UN norms. It is likely to have induced the governing elite to question whether the post-Rwanda constraints obstructed Belgium from meeting its international responsibilities. Second, the crisis led to a Europe-wide cooperative momentum at an intergovernmental and supranational levels which had not occurred since the Iraq war. Belgian policy-makers were given a ‘window of opportunity’ to re-engage in UN peacekeeping while simultaneously showing solidarity with the EU as a RSC role would expect. The last-minute input from France which also secured an unusual NATO-like command structure for UNIFIL II opened the door for role adaption and Belgian participation. The main effect of these opportunities was to intensify the socialising pressures on Belgium to recast its roles in favour of GSC and RSC roles.

The results of this case study substantiate Breuning’s (2012) contention that ‘the adoption on international norms by a state depends on the active support of decision-makers in key gatekeeping positions’ (p. 1). Nonetheless, Belgian decision-makers were unlikely to support the humanitarian norm on its own. The norm likely resonated with them because it was accompanied by UN and EU demands to perform a humanitarian actor as well as RSC and GSC roles. Importantly, the political setting established after the 1999 elections enhanced elite resonance in the UN and EU promotion of the norm. This validates the notion that foreign policy change may follow the arrival of a new elite receptive to socialising role
demands and seeking to promote new roles as a result (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:185). The elections removed Socialist Foreign Minister Derycke who had opposed the enactment of interventionist roles (Kelly, 2007-2008:86). As Liberal parties gained this key portfolio, Louis Michel, an individual eager to re-engage internationally including in former colonies, was appointed Foreign Minister. Kelly (2007-2008) argues that his appointment was a ‘strategic choice’ because it allowed the Liberals to express their ‘interventionist’ leanings (p.86). The domestic power shift away from the Socialists but also the Christian Democrats, who favoured the traditional interventionist role of former colonial power, paved the way for a change in role and foreign policy most evident in Belgium’s Great Lakes policy. Soon after becoming Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt ‘officially recognized the responsibility of the Belgian state in the negligence…of the international community’ during the Rwandan genocide while advocating greater EU involvement in Central Africa (Roosens and Lanotte in Kelly, 2007-2008:74). The ethical diplomacy pursued by Verhofstadt ensured that the new interventionist-oriented roles aligned with the norms emerging from the international community.

There was limited pressure on Verhofstadt ‘to craft an appealing message’ in order to gain support in the unit for new roles given that the humanitarian activism advocated by Defence Minister Flahaut provided a natural extension for the roles being pursued (Breuning, 2012:4; Koops and Drieskens, 2012). Flahaut even took the lead in promoting a humanitarian role for Belgium in UNIFIL II with implications for the tasks Belgian troops were to perform. Contestation for the roles selected by Verhofstadt and Flahaut was most likely to come from Foreign Minister De Gucht who preferred restraint and conditionality in international engagements. Having previously deviated from the cabinet’s policy line towards Congo and then been overruled by Verhofstadt, De Gucht’s influence on preventing a role change towards UNIFIL II was muted by cabinet and party pressures. Furthermore, Prime Minister Verhofstadt embodies a dominant leader able to use a charismatic personality to centralise authority and push for his/her preferred roles, or at least generate consensus (Magone, 2017). When minor contestation emerged in parliament the government took care to emphasise that the roles it adopted were compatible with, and fulfilled, the post-Rwanda recommendations. It was argued that these should not hamper Belgium from meeting its multilateral responsibilities, thereby tapping into Belgium’s deep commitments to multilateralism around which a strong consensus exists. Framing the operation as European diffused fears that the UN would lead the operations and created support for what is a traditionally agreed-upon RSC role.

Breuning (2016) presented a negative case whereby Belgium’s development cooperation policy could not be brought in line with international norms because of a gatekeeper’s failure to convince other decision-makers to transition from trading state to a partner role (p.73). The present case study has shown that a successful shift from a former
colonial power role to humanitarian actor, GSC and RSC roles opened the door for a contribution to UNIFL II. This role and policy adaptation would have been improbable in the absence of socialisation, through both norm diffusion and role expectations, by international actors Belgium is traditionally receptive to. Socialisation peaked when the UN Secretary-General directly interfered in the domestic process of role selection during the force generation phase. Although the change took place in a different policy-area, Belgium did, in time, relinquish roles associated with national self-interests and enacted new ones orienting Belgium towards a more value-based foreign policy concomitant with international norms. While a campaign to gain a non-permanent seat in the Security Council and European cooperation created windows of opportunity, the arrival of a new administration dominated by Liberal policy-makers was key to effect this change because they displayed a greater propensity to integrate new norms, meet role expectations and conceive new roles. Research on foreign policy change has focused on either international or domestic sources of policy change. This chapter demonstrated that the interplay between external socialisation and domestic receptiveness is critical to better understand foreign policy changes in small states and, therefore, their adaptions to new forms of peacekeeping.
10.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates Belgium’s roles in, and contribution to, the international effort to end the Malian crisis. It is an interesting case because different types of peacekeeping and crisis management frameworks were employed by a variety of international actors. The UN was involved early in 2012 passing three resolutions and establishing a stabilization mission (MINUSMA) in April 2013. The EU has been active in the Sahel since 2008. The Union’s contribution to the region culminated with the deployment of a training mission for the Malian armed forces (EUTM Mali) in February 2013 (Furness and Olsen, 2016:113). As a former colonial power and current defence and economic partner, France was the leading force behind all international endeavours towards Mali. Paris mobilised extensive diplomatic, economic and military resources in both bilateral and multilateral frameworks to shape the character of the international response. In January 2013, the government of Francois Hollande launched Operation Serval to defend Bamako from an Islamic takeover. These overlapping frameworks make the Malian conflict an adequate empirical testing ground to assess the way and the extent to which Belgium was socialised into peacekeeping roles. These roles are expected to provide answers to this chapter’s empirical puzzle: why did the Belgian government promptly contribute to Serval, an ad-hoc coalition led by a great power, while being reluctant to participate in the subsequent EU mission? Belgium’s token contribution to MINUSMA adds another intriguing layer to the Belgian response.

10.2 Background to the Malian Crisis, the Terrorist Threat

Beset by security, political and economic challenges, the security situation of Mali deteriorated rapidly in the first months of 2012. An armed rebellion drove government forces out of the country’s northern territories threatening to establish an independent state ruled by Islamist principles. The crisis culminated on 21 March 2010 when a military coup in Bamako removed President Amadou Toumani Touré from power. How Mali came from being regarded as a stable democracy to a failing state is accounted for by conjunction of internal and external dynamics.

A chief contributing factor is the political and economic status of the Tuaregs who inhabit large parts of the Sahara in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger and Mali. On the independence of Mali in 1959, the Tuaregs became an ethnic minority governed by a central authority which they regarded as illegitimate, irresponsible to their needs and intrusive on their way of life (Lavallée and Völkel, 2015:162). Resentment turned violent in 1960s, 1990s and again in 2006. While the government dealt with the first rebellion with force,
reconciliation was pursued in 1992 through the signing of the National Pact. Rebel groups consented to disarm in exchange for greater regional autonomy and more financial support for the development of the North (Arieff, 2013:6). The failure of the government to deliver on its promises of economic and political progress for Tuareg communities, not only deepened the country’s ethnic, political and geographical divide between North and South, but prompted another uprising in 2006 (Bøås and Torheim, 2013:1284). Although a new peace agreement was reached on 4 July 2006, violent confrontations between Tuaregs and state factions remained frequent.

The second dynamic stems from the regional ramifications of the 2011 Arab Spring. The fall of Qaddafi precipitated the return of over 20000 Tuaregs to their homeland in Northern Mali, having fought as mercenaries for the Libyan regime (Koenig, 2013:115). They brought back military training and large amount of weaponry while straining the fragile local economy (Fiott, 2013). Importantly, this influx of military means contributed to the formation of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and, on 18 January 2012, to the launch of a new offensive aimed at securing the full independence of Azawad from Mali (Lavallée and Völkel, 2015:163). By March 2012, the MNLA had inflicted the Malian army significant human and territorial losses. In the South, dissatisfaction at the government’s handling of the rebellion culminated on 22 March when a group of army junior officers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo ousted the civilian government of Amadou Toumani Touré from power in a military coup. The army fell further into disarray and was ultimately forced out of all northern territories by MNLA fighters (Wing, 2016:62). Taking advantage of the political crisis in the capital, the MNLA declared the independence of the Azawad state on 5 April (Wing, 2016:62; Koenig, 2013:115).

The crisis worsened following the Tuaregs’ failure to remain united (Bøås and Torheim, 2013:1285). The group cohesiveness was weakened by traditional divisions along ethnic, family and generational lines. A history of internal competition for power in addition to more recent conflicts over the control of trans-Saharan trafficking routes have impaired the cohesiveness of the separatist movement from the start (Wing, 2016:62). Islamist groups including Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine (‘helpers of religion’) exploited these feuds to infiltrate local populations (Bøås and Torheim, 2013:1286). The extensive financial resources accrued over the last ten years from trafficking and kidnapping helped Islamist groups integrate local communities. By late June, Islamist rebels took over all of the northern territories that the MNLA had previously conquered including the major cities of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. From then on, Mali became a major concern for the international community.
10.3 The Belgian Domestic Context

The onset of the Malian crisis coincided with the formation of a new coalition government (Di Rupo I) in Belgium. On 6 December 2011, the six-party coalition headed by Francophone Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo (PS) was sworn in after a record breaking 541 days of negotiations between Francophone and Flemish parties. The June 2010 federal elections were a success for the conservative Flemish-nationalist party (N-VA) and the French-speaking social democratic party (PS), both becoming the dominant political force in their respective region. However, polarisation of preferences over the constitutional arrangement of Belgium meant that no consensus could be found on government formation (Abts et al., 2010:448). In the end, the N-VA left the negotiations allowing Di Rupo to form a coalition comprising the Socialist Party (PS), Reform Movement (MR), Democrat Humanist Centre (CDH) and Christian-Democrat and Flemish (CD&V), Social Progressive Alternative (SP.a) and the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open VLD).

In Belgium, foreign policy decision-making lies primarily at the core of the government (Joly and Dandov, 2016:5). Article 167 of the Constitution assigns the power to authorise foreign missions to the executive. While the government has the responsibility to notify the Parliament, decisions can be made without prior parliamentary approval (Biscop, 2013:36). The constitution effectively side-lines the Belgian parliament as a ‘peripheral actor’ (Reykers and Fonck, 2015:94). Inside cabinet, the foreign policy-making unit exercises significant influence on decisions to deploy troops even before formal discussions in the overall cabinet takes place (Moyse and Dumoulin, 2011). Leading the incoming unit, Elio Di Rupo was the first Walloon and Socialist Prime Minister in over three decades. Despite having ended the crisis, Di Rupo was labelled early on as the ‘weakest prime minister in Belgian history’ (Independent, 7 December 2011). Didier Reynders was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs after spending twelve years as Finance Minister. His background does not indicate deep commitments to grand principles nor to humanitarian issues. His appointment marks a break from the humanitarian legacy left by Foreign Affair Minister Louis Michel (1999-2004). In the ministry of defence, Pieter De Crem (CD&V) was reconvened in the same function he had occupied under the last four coalitions. De Crem came to be known as a fervent supporter of Belgian deployment to missions under NATO framework, an orientation rooted in his pro-Atlantic leanings (Coolsaet, 2009; Koops and Driesken, 2012). As these three actors were expected to be most influential on Belgium’s policy response towards the instability in the Sahel, the focus should be placed on their level of receptiveness to the numerous socialising pressures and how such top-down influences have affected the role(s) they have conceived for Belgium with regards to the Malian crisis. Moreover, Joly and Dandov (2016) posit that Belgian political parties are influential in defining foreign policy (p.17). This argument leads to a consideration of whether the party affiliation of the members belonging to this fragmented unit affected their receptiveness to
external role demands.

The Belgian crisis did not mean that political life came to a halt (Devos and Sinardet, 2012:167). As it became clear that negotiations would endure, a caretaker government led by Yves Leterme was granted extensive powers to deal with socioeconomic, finance and foreign policy issues (Devos and Sinardet, 2012:169). In fact, major foreign policy initiatives were undertaken by the caretaker government. It navigated Belgium through the financial crisis and EU bailout packages, held the Belgian Presidency of the EU which incorporated an important dimension on common European security and defence, and contributed troops and F16s planes to the NATO mission in Libya on humanitarian grounds (Devos and Sinardet, 2012:169; Rihoux et al, 2012:44-46). These undertakings were not domestically contentious because they were seen as unavoidable if Belgium was to keep fulfilling its international and European obligations under this unusual state of affairs. In other words, the Di Rupo government inherited a rather active foreign policy.

Upon taking office, Reynders insisted that the foreign policy of the new government would be ‘in the same line as the one followed by the previous administration’ (Le Soir, 2011). The coalition agreement of Di Rupo I reaffirmed Belgium’s role as a RSC (Biscop, 2011:2). The government also committed itself to maintain the previous Leterme government’s position in taking American sensitivities more into account and building ‘credible partnerships’ with allies, in particular within NATO (Biscop, 2011:37). Importantly, it was no secret that the time spent by Defence Minister De Crem in the previous administration had been mainly dedicated to positioning Belgium into the role of small but reliable partner which has its roots in the loyal ally role (Delcourt, 2013).

In a similar fashion as in the previous chapters, appendix 4 provides a more comprehensive assessment, based on the analysis of the speeches made by the administration of Elio Di Rupo at the UN, of the roles that the coalition selected for Belgium and may have influenced the cabinet’s peacekeeping response towards Mali. The findings indicate a diversity of roles which it has sought to articulate on the international stage while in office. Yet, the following analysis focuses only on the Global System Collaborator, Regional Subsystem Collaborator and Loyal Ally roles as they are expected to have been most influential in assisting the administration’s position with regard to the international efforts towards Mali. As it will be shown below, the humanitarian actor role only had a minimal influence given that the Di Rupo has offered a different definition of the Malian situation indicating that it has sought to act on a different basis than the Verhofstadt cabinet during the UNIFIL decision-making process for instance. Moreover, it is interesting to note that, even at the UN where multilateralism generally prevails, the administration has chosen to articulate the role of loyal ally suggesting an emerging preference for bilateral agreements when engaging in peacekeeping.
The UN should be considered as a primary socialiser because it ‘has often taken the lead in building new norms related to international peace and security’ (Björkdahl, 2006:221). The close link between the security and humanitarian dimensions of the conflict made it challenging for the UN to find an appropriate frame (Haysom, 2014:3). Initially, as reflected in Resolutions 2056 and 2071, the UN perceived the lack of constitutional order and the deteriorating humanitarian situation as the main sources of instability (The Guardian, 27 September 2012; UNSC, 5 July 2012; UNSC, 12 October 2012). However, the Malian Transitional authorities and leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) pressed the UN to consider ‘the seriousness of the terrorist threats in northern Mali’ (UNSC, 20 December 2012). They promoted this interpretation to convince the Security Council to meet their demand for the deployment of a stabilization force. On 12 December 2012, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2085 authorising the deployment of African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Its mandate was to support the Malian authorities in strengthening the capacity of Malian defence and security forces and in recovering areas in the North (UNSC, 20 December 2012). It marked a distinct shift towards greater emphasis on the ‘serious and urgent threat’ posed by the ‘entrenchment of terrorist groups and criminal networks in the north of Mali’ (UNSC, 20 December 2012). On 25 April 2013, after the launch of both French and EU operations, Resolution 2100 established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), a deployment of 12000 UN troops to stabilise key population centres and support the reestablishment of state authority throughout the country (UNSC, 25 April 2013). Peter (2015) argues that the resolution contributes to an emerging trend whereby the UN mandates missions to undertake a wider set of activities including the ‘enforcement of political solutions through support of a government’s state-building ambitions … through offensive use of force’ (p.353). This approach is a fundamental departure from the traditional peacekeeping norms of consent, impartiality and non-use of force and ‘bear resemblance to the stabilization missions in Iraq and – even more starkly – Afghanistan’ (Peter, 2015:353). While humanitarian reasons may have activated the UN’s initial response, a subsequent re-interpretation of the conflict contributed to the formulation of a mandate designed ‘to support the government of Mali … in its fight against Islamist rebels’, in other words to stabilise a country through military means (Peter, 2015:355). The UN was reshaping the normative context of peacekeeping by discarding traditional norms of defensive peacekeeping and embracing ‘stabilization’ through offensive deployments as a new peacekeeping norm (Boutellis, 2015:3).

The norm of African ownership was highly prominent in the UN’s strategy towards the crisis. The norm emerged from African states’ determination to find their own solutions to the problems of the continent following the inability of the international community to halt
the Rwandan genocide and the state collapse in Somalia (Kasaija, 2013:121). Interventions conducted by external actors even mandated by the UN import foreign political influence which has negative consequences on the continent’s military, socio-political and economic developments (Mays, 2003). Therefore, the ‘African ownership’ norm found expression in UN statements emphasising that ‘the Malian authorities have the primary responsibility for resolving the interlinked crises facing the country and that any sustainable solution to the crisis in Mali should be Malian-led’ (UNSC, 20 December 2012). Furthermore, the Security Council stresses that the ‘responsibility to protect’ falls in the hands of the Malian government in cooperation with regional partners (UNSC, 20 December 2012). There are some grounds to argue that this UN advocacy socialised concerned European states, including Belgium, out of a former colonial power role. The international community was requested to merely ‘provide coordinated assistance’ to the Malian forces. In operational terms, the developing norm was driven by a reluctance to get directly involved in combat operations.

The objective is now to determine the extent to which the Belgian government was receptive to these norms, thereby meeting the UN role demands. Following the failure of neutrality to prevent Belgium from being drawn into two world wars, multilateralism became the core of Belgian foreign policy (De Wilde, 2014:277; Liégeois, 2016:37; Renard, 2016:7; Delcorde, 2010:90). UN membership is the most enduring feature of this commitment. Belgian foreign policy-makers are eager to underline the country’s status as founding member of, and active participant in, the organisation. This status makes Belgium a deeply institutionalised member likely to adopt the roles demanded by the UN. In the early 1990s, Belgium had conceived itself as an UN activist (or GSC) which manifested itself in a reluctance to decline UN requests for troop contributions (Liegeois and Glume, 2008:118). However, Belgium’s roles towards UN peacekeeping changed significantly after the Rwandan crisis but were then again re-evaluated in 2006 (see chapter 9).

Belgium entered international debates on Mali at the UN General Assembly (UNGA, 26 September 2012) in September 2012. Represented by Prime Minister Di Rupo, Foreign Minister Reynders and Minister for Development Cooperation Paul Magnette, the Belgian delegation intended to contribute to the issue of Mali and affirms its international roles (La Dernière Heure, 25 Septembre 2012). Di Rupo’s speech was distinctly oriented towards humanitarian themes including Belgium’s adherence to the principle of ‘responsibility to protect victims of violence everywhere in the world based on mutual respect’ (UNGA 26 September 2012, emphasis added). He also pointed out that Belgium was the fifteenth largest contributor to the organisation and stood by its engagements with the UN. According to the Prime Minister, such commitments made Belgium ‘a serious and responsible partner’ (La Dernière Heure, 25 Septembre 2012; author’s translation). His role expression was relayed by Minister Magnet: ‘the Nordic countries like Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands
present themselves as the largest contributors, but we are doing as much’, something that Belgium is appreciated for within the UN and should be more vocal about (La Dernière Heure, 25 Septembre 2012; author’s translation).

In the margins of the Assembly, Reynders took part in a high-level meeting dedicated to Mali, exposing Belgium further to the UN socialising influence. At the end of the meeting, he declared that Belgium was ready ‘to support an international military intervention in Mali’ by providing logistical and training assistance ‘while maintaining a cautious and critical approach until details are clarified, in particular in the framework of a UN resolution’ (Le Soir, September 2012; Sénat de Belgique, 5 December 2012; author’s translation). It is worth noting that, at this stage, the UN remained reluctant to authorise a military intervention for fear it would exacerbate the humanitarian situation. UN officials preferred to insist on a political dialogue despite African demands for a deployment (Sénat de Belgique, 5 December 2012). Reynders believed that the challenges in Mali surpassed the ‘African scene’ indicating his willingness to extend the responsibility to act to the wider international community. However, the swiftness with which Reynders positioned Belgium on military interventionist track suggests an ambition to play a role more in tune with international partners’ demands than with the UN’s preferred line of action of political dialogue.

In Belgium, a strong consensus exists on the need for a UN mandate and EU framework as preconditions for taking part in military operations (Coolsaet, 2016:13). The historical experiences of being subjugated to the wills of great powers acting outside international rules have led Belgium to conceive for itself a role of promoter of international law. This role conditions Belgium to attach weight to the legitimacy of UN mandates. Nonetheless, in a June 2012 interview on Syria, Reynders asserted ‘he would not exclude an intervention outside a UN framework in the case of persistent vetoes inside the Security Council’ (Delcourt, 2013). Although the remark was made in the Syrian context and later mitigated with commitments to international law, it indicates that the Foreign Minister identified less positively with the UN’s mission in security affairs than his predecessors and coalition partners. Given the autonomy afforded by Di Rupo to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, this inclination is likely to make Belgium less receptive to UN role socialisation and demands.

MINUSMA took over the African-led mission in Mali (AFISMA) on 1 July 2013 as envisaged by Resolution 2100. This UN operation was granted robust rules of engagement and extensive capabilities (UN Peacekeeping Online, 2016; Karlsrud and Smith, 2015:3). Interestingly, European states contributed significantly to MINUSMA, which was the largest participation of European troops in UN peacekeeping since 1996 (Karlsrud and Smith, 2015:3). The Dutch contingent was the largest with 380 troops, followed by a Swedish of 200 troops and the provision of 15 intelligence experts by Norway. Denmark, Germany,
Finland, France and Portugal also made sizable contributions (Karlsrud, 2015:46). However, Belgium was virtually absent, committing one police officer who was eventually pulled out after two months of deployment (UN Peacekeeping Online, 2016). Karlsrud and Smith (2015) argue that MINUSMA presented European governments with an opportunity to reorient their armed forces towards other conflict theatres and mission types following the end of their presence in Afghanistan (p.3). Yet, Belgium’s withdrawal from Afghanistan appeared slower than its European partners. On the same day as the Security Council passed Resolution 2100, Germany expressed a wish to see Belgium maintain its military presence alongside the Bundeswehr as part of NATO’s ‘Resolute Support’ mission in northern Afghanistan. This demand came after a meeting between German Defence Minister, Thomas de Maizière and his Belgian counterpart, Pieter de Crem. No formal response was given, but Reynders declared that ‘Belgium will remain active in Afghanistan beyond the end of ISAF’ (La Dernière Heure, 25 April 2013). By July 2013, it was clear that De Crem favoured maintaining Belgian troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014 (La Dernière Heure, 10 July 2013). The following December, France approached Belgium to request assistance in the form of air transport to the planned operation in the Central Africa Republic (CAR) (La Dernière Heure, 4 December 2013). These elements demonstrate that, around the time MINUSMA materialised, the Belgian government was under multiple pressures to meet its obligations as a European, EU and NATO partner, forcing the Di Rupo government to prioritise. Belgium’s non-participation in MINUSMA can be partly explained by Belgian foreign policy actors being highly receptive to the socialising influences of EU and NATO allies, leading to the enactment of a small but reliable ally role. In contrast, these actors appeared less open to the new UN peacekeeping norm of ‘stabilisation’ resulting in a low level of internalisation. The lack of domestic debates around an eventual contribution to MINUSMA indicates that this UN endeavour never gained any traction domestically; a surprising outcome considering the norm fulfilled the conditions for deployment advanced by the Belgian elite after the Rwandan crisis. Karlsrud (2015) contends that ‘the escalating violence and tension could put the UN in an awkward position, as it is torn between its mandate to be an impartial mediator and the charge to help extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country’ (p.46). This situation forces contributing countries to play conflicting roles. For Belgium, it is reminiscent of Rwanda where Brussels found it impossible to reconcile its UN activist and former colonial power roles. Therefore, Belgium’s absence form MINUSMA can be interpreted as an elite reluctance to perform contradictory roles in the context of UN peacekeeping. Informed by the dramatic consequences of Rwanda, Belgian policy-makers continued to perceive a fundamental contradiction between the UN norm of impartiality and the concept of external intervention to stabilise an African state. Finally, the operation is likely to have been perceived as too risky. Conditions on the ground remained highly volatile making the use of force in ensuring implementation of the mandate likely. Moreover, a
Belgian contribution conflicted with the pacifist inclinations of the Belgian public (Karlsrud, 2015:45; Biscop, 2013:36).

10.5 French Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions

As one of the leading military powers in Europe, France is the second key socialiser of Belgium’s roles towards Mali (Spiegel Online, 21 January 2014). On 9 January 2013, Islamist rebels controlling northern territories launched a military offensive southward to overthrow the interim government of Dioncounda Traoré. Fearing the Malian army would not be able to withstand the attack, President Traoré made an emergency request to France for military assistance. The next day, French President Francois Hollande ordered the immediate deployment of troops to stop the advance of terrorist groups (Boeke and Schuurman, 2015). On 11 January, the French counter-offensive named Operation Serval began (Heisbourg, 2013:10). Soon a coalition of willing partners including the UK, Germany, Spain, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, US, Canada and the United Arab Emirates was formed, pledging different levels of logistical assistance to the French-led operation (Bruxelles2, 26 January 2013). The Belgian government announced on 15 January its decision to contribute two C-130 transport planes and two medical evacuation helicopters (La Libre, January 2013). This section seeks to understand why the Di Rupo government decided in a short timespan to make this relatively large contribution as part of an ad hoc coalition led by a great power; a framework Belgium has conventionally sought distance from. In fact, the lack of support demonstrated by Belgium’s allies for its colonial policy during the Congo crisis has ‘made Belgium turn away from ad hoc coalitions’ (Senior official quoted in Houben, 2005:267).

The influence of France in shaping the international community’s response to the crisis should not be underestimated. The above-mentioned UN shift towards a more assertive approach was the outcome of an active French diplomacy (Boeke and Schuurman, 2015:809). Moreover, Paris was the main force behind EU actions by generating momentum for a response and shaping its content according to France’s preferences (Furness and Olsen, 2016:114). The claim advanced here is that France also socialised concerned parties into mission partners by diffusing its own threat perception and interpretation of the conflict on a bilateral basis. Belgium was on the front line of this process. Domestically, this socialising interaction was not obstructed by Belgian foreign policy actors. It resonated with pre-existing aspirations to improve Belgium’s credibility towards allies. This made Belgian leaders highly receptive to French socialising efforts and consolidated the small but reliable partner role. The alignment of external role demands and prevailing role conceptions accounts for the speed and intensity of the Belgian involvement.

One element that raises the expectation of significant socialising influence from Paris was that the rapidity and effectiveness of Serval very much depended on logistical
support. Boeke and Schuurman (2015) emphasises that ‘without the assistance of cargo planes from NATO partners the deployment would have been delayed by weeks’ (p.809). Furthermore, the Hollande government was keen to claim that France was ‘not alone’ to evade criticisms that his government continued to pursue the colonial policy of Francafrique (Koenig, 2016:126). Since the early 1990s, it had become increasingly customary for France to deploy in Africa within the multilateral framework of international institutions rather than unilaterally (Olsen, 2014:294). However, French officials argued that EU decision-making was too drawn out and slow to provide a timely response to the emergency. Therefore, France counted on like-minded governments to buttress the mission in both legitimacy and operational terms. But before they could become loyal allies or reliable partners, these governments needed to share the same threat perception and adopt a similar understanding of the conflict. Paris perceived a threat in the establishment of an Islamic regime in Mali which would harbour terrorist bases (Le Monde, 16 January 2013). French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius explicitly ‘refused to see the country become a safe haven for terrorists’ (L’express, 14 January 2013). The prevailing understanding in Paris was that France was engaged in a fight against terrorism. President Hollande refuted any claims that the intervention was designed to protect national interests (Le Monde, 16 January 2013). French diplomacy actively conveyed the idea that the instability in the Sahel represented a security threat not just to France but to Africa and the whole of Europe (Furness and Olsen, 2016:114; Hollande in The Gardian, 27 September 2012). In effect, the French government actively securitised developments in Mali and spread a sense of urgency (Koenig, 2016:126).

Although France did not notify partners of its imminent intervention, informal contacts were established early on between French and Belgian officials (La Dernière Heure, 14 January 2013). These had prepared the ground for a formal demand of logistical support submitted on 14 January 2013. Willing to take on most of the burden and risk, France made no official request for combat troops. Doing so meant that France refrained from socialising Belgium into a former colonial power role, perhaps aware that it would receive little domestic acceptance. Importantly, Franco-Belgium defence cooperation had intensified in the months leading up to Serval. Both cooperated closely on pilot training and the evacuation of citizens from African crisis zones while also envisaging the creation of a common air force unit (Bruxelles2, 4 September 2012; Chambre de Représentants et Sénat de Belgique, 11 February 2013). In a September 2012 meeting between both Defence Ministers, Jean-Yves Le Drian, casted Belgium into a loyal and reliable partner role most explicitly: ‘Belgium is our most constant partner, the most loyal, with which we have a cooperation without hidden agendas’ (cited in Bruxelles2, 4 September 2012). A commentator added that ‘there is neither rivalry nor extensive ideological discussions between France and Belgium’ as ‘their common approach is based on pragmatism’ (Bruxelles2, 4 September 2012). Furthermore, both governments were negotiating the possibility of making one Belgian C-
130 plane available on a ‘semi-permanent’ basis for the transport of French troops to and from Afghanistan (Bruxelles2, 4 September 2012). It is an interesting dimension because it highly resembles the activity Belgium undertook in Mali. Through this initiative, France was able to express the type of function that it wanted to see Belgium fulfil on common security endeavours. More broadly, such close bilateral cooperation is expected to be the location of significant socialising influence from the larger power onto its smaller partner. Brussels’ cooperative relations with France have contributed to internalising French defence culture and practices. The rapid response of the Di Rupo government is partly attributable to this social process which resulted in Belgium performing a small but reliable partner role.

Two elements made the members of the foreign policy-making unit open to French influence and demands. First, Defence Minister De Crem was seeking to orient defence policy away from the legacy of former Minister André Flahaut who had attempted to give Belgian armed forces distinct humanitarian and non-military roles (Delcourt, 2013). Second, incumbent Belgian leaders positively evaluated the previous administration’s decision to make a significant contribution to the NATO operation in Libya because it had reinforced Belgium’s credibility within the Alliance (Le Soir, 8 December 2011). Therefore, Serval represented an opportunity to demonstrate the army’s ability to deploy in robust missions and capitalise on the role Belgium had played in Libya. The prospect of a solid Franco-Belgium partnership within the Alliance after France reintegrated NATO in 2009 was not lost on pro-Atlantic De Crem either.

On the day of the rebels’ advance on Bamako, De Crem announced that Belgium was ‘ready’ to intervene in Mali and that this position had been made clear to French leaders (Le Soir, 12 January 2013). However, De Crem’s eagerness was dampened by a more cautious approach taken by the ministry of foreign affairs. Following the start of Serval, foreign affair officials were more concerned with distinguishing France’s actions and the Belgian proposal which they interpreted as a contribution to a common EU response (Le Soir, 12 January 2013). Their intention was to distance Belgium from what was seen as a unilateral intervention in the context of Franco-Malian relations. At this stage, they perceived no urgency to act. Any difference in attitudes between the two ministries appeared to have been amended when an inner cabinet council agreed on 15 January to support the French forces with air transport and medical assistance (La Libre, 15 January 2013). The official justification fully aligned with the views and interpretations emanating from French foreign policy circles. Prime Minister Di Rupo identified that ‘a centre of radicalism and terror was developing at the heart of the Sahel, very close to Europe’ while Reynders reminded the foreign affairs commission that the intervention was ‘for a range of reasons specific to the situation in Mali, but also in the context of a struggle against jihadists, and radical groups’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 20 February 2013:6; author’s translation). Analysts confirmed that most European decision-makers appeared to ‘share the French perception of
the threats to Europe stemming from the region’ (Olsen, 2015:235; Delcourt, 2013). Nonetheless, the government insisted that no Belgian troops would be deployed in combat zones and that the ultimate objective was to hand over control of the operations to African countries as soon as possible (Reynders in Chambre de Représentants et Sénat de Belgique, 11 February 2013). This indicates that, although the government was playing the role of small but reliable partner, it was unwilling to do so beyond the limits imposed by domestic audiences and constraints.

The government informed the parliament of its decision, prompting a resolution and an exchange of views within the foreign affairs and defence commissions. Even though the government did not require parliamentary approval, no major opposition was mounted by any parliamentary group against Belgium’s participation in Serval. Yet, one can still detect a range of more or less favourable views evoking Belgium’s roles in this episode. Representative of the Flemish extreme right party Vlaams Belang (VB), Annick Ponthier was the only parliamentarian in opposition to an intervention as she evaluated that a small but reliable partner role served excessively French interests (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 16 January 2013). Others including Flemish Nationalist (N-VA) Francken and De Vriendt from the Green Party (Ecolo-Groen) supported the government but would have liked to see Belgium taking on a more prominent role in pushing for political reforms and dialogue, as well as in delivering humanitarian assistance to the Malian population (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 16 January 2013). The latter preferred a more restricted enactment of the small but reliable partner role so as to avoid being drawn into an expanded mandate once on the ground. In the exchange of views held on 11 February, N-VA members were most supportive of the role advocated by the government arguing that ‘Belgium is a loyal partner and that the demand from France, a NATO ally and neighbour, must be considered seriously’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 16 January 2013). Both Flemish (Sp.a) and Walloon (PS) socialist parties were more motivated by Belgium’s obligation ‘to respect loyally its engagements towards both EU and UN’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 16 January 2013; author’s translation). A member of the Christian Democratic and Flemish Party (CD&V) also referred to Belgium’s humanitarian responsibility highlighting the ‘west has no other choice but to bring assistance considering the humanitarian situation and the demands of international norms’ (p.13).

The weeks after the deployment consolidated the elite’s view that the government acted on an appropriate role. Parliamentarian Dallemagne from the French-speaking Christian Democratic Party (cdH) expressed that position most clearly:

‘Even if our participation was limited, we were there. It is important to underline that a country sometimes presented as weak was able, in this instance, to assume its role at an international level, and even a bigger role than some European powers. We have to congratulate ourselves on Belgian international presence … Moreover, this was about the security of Europe and of our populations as well as a fight against radicalism’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 20 February
Further parliamentary discussions after Serval revealed that the government, along with other parliamentarians, used the Malian issue to revisit the debate about the Rwanda commission’s conclusions. Foreign Minister Reynders was the main proponent of reopening the debate, calling on parliament to reconsider the constraints imposed after Rwanda as they did not allow Belgium to fully enact a small but reliable partner role. He believed that if Belgium was to be credible, it was impossible to ‘intervene actively in Libya with F-16s, be present in Afghanistan and undertake demining activities in south Lebanon … and then be satisfied with little logistics and training in Mali, but never be in the front line’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 20 February 2013:27; author’s translation). His opinion was that Belgium should have adopted an even more prominent role, perhaps, by deploying combat troops in Mali. Reiterating the statement of a CEDEAO official that ‘it was an African call made by Africans to a former colonial power’, Reynders concluded that Belgium ‘should therefore break away from its ‘locks’ and reopen the debate’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 20 February 2013:27; author’s translation).

10.6 EU Socialisation and Belgium’s Role Conceptions

Belgium’s peacekeeping roles in Mali were also shaped by the EU’s socialising influences. The declining security and humanitarian conditions throughout 2010 prompted the European External Action Service (EEAS) to develop a regional strategy. In March 2011, the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (Sahel Strategy) was launched. Its main objectives are to improve security and development in the region as well as ‘counter violent extremism and radicalization’ through a comprehensive approach of hard and soft tools (Olsen, 2014:301). However, the EU could not keep up with developments brought by the Arab uprisings and numerous terrorist attacks against European interests and nationals in North Africa. Although the March military takeover was a major warning for EU officials, their response remained limited to diplomatic condemnation and humanitarian aid (Koenig, 2013:118). France stepped in militarily in early January receiving full support from the EU and its member states. An extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council on 17 January established the Military Training Mission (EUTM Mali) aimed at supporting Malian armed forces. EU personnel were not mandated to participate in combat operations (Coolsaet et al., 2013:3). A record breaking twenty-three member states marked their approval with a contribution. The largest contributors were France, Germany, Spain, the Czech Republic, Britain and Belgium (Koenig, 2013:118). The first EU troops arrived on the ground on 2 April 2013.
Under the Lisbon Treaty, member states renewed their commitment to coordinate their external policies to achieve greater EU foreign policy coherence. The post of high representative for foreign and security policy as well as the EEAS were designed to bring differentiated approaches under common institutional frameworks (Menon, 2011:78). Member states’ leaders have deepened their identification with this European endeavour facilitating the integration of EU foreign policy norms at state level. This raises the expectation they have increasingly seen their state playing a RSC role, motivating them to provide a Europeanised response to the Malian conflict (Furness and Olsen, 2016:108). One indicator of a RSC role being performed in EU capitals consists of statements acknowledging the Malian instability as a threat to Europe. By doing so, policy-makers refrain from perceiving the threat in purely national terms and locate the responsibility to act within Europe (Coolsaet et al., 2013:3).

Member states’ participation in EU framework generated pressures to follow three norms encapsulated in the Sahel Strategy. First, a strong emphasis was placed on the comprehensive approach to crisis management. It demands the coordinated use of humanitarian, development, diplomatic, civilian and military policy instruments to address the intertwined challenges of Sahel (Lavallée and Völkel, 2015:160). Analysts have underlined that ‘the comprehensive approach that is thus called for is exactly what the EU Strategy for the Sahel envisages’ (Coolsaet et al., 2013:2). Second, the EU believes that the coherence of its external actions can be enhanced if security and development are pursued simultaneously (Furness and Olsen, 2016:108). The Sahel Strategy re-emphasises that neither security nor development can be improved without developing the other (Keukeleire and Raube, 2013:558). Third, the Sahel Strategy aligns with international normative development by advocating the idea of ‘African solutions to African problems’ which has translated into debates about the types of assistance that should be provided to African actors if European troops are not to be directly engaged (Olsen, 2014:293).

Scholars tend to agree that the EU was unable to fully implement the comprehensive approach to the Malian crisis and therefore failed to provide a truly Europeanised response. Of the more positive analyses, Rouppert (2014) evaluates the Sahel Strategy as a success because, for the first time, twenty-seven member states had agreed on a wide ranging and coordinated approach to a specific region (p.9). It enabled the launch of two civilian missions including EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUBAM Libya and a military one (EUTM Mali). Furness and Olsen (2016), in turn, argue that the comprehensive approach was partially implemented as the EU only responded when ‘a direct threat’ was identified and ‘a key member state has taken the lead in mobilising the rest of the EU’ (p.106). Koenig (2013) concurs by asserting that ‘it was not the Union’s best demonstration of collective action’ (p.133). Bello offers an altogether more critical approach by arguing that the Sahel Strategy focuses excessively on development issues at the expense of ‘direct security commitment’ and its associated ‘use of
military power’ (quoted in Koenig, 2013:121). A key factor affecting the EU’s effectiveness remains the fundamental divergences of approaches towards, and interests in, Africa amongst member states (Lavallée and Völkel, 2015:174).

What we need to assess is whether Belgium enacted a RSC by integrating the comprehensive approach. Based on Belgium’s foreign policy traditions, there is a high expectation that its response to the Malian conflict would be informed by a RSC role. Belgium is a founding member of the EU and a major proponent of a deeper European defence and security integration. Its foreign policy is likely to be deeply institutionalised by EU rules, norms and practices. The role has been prominent in guiding Belgian foreign policy since the 1990s and has not met any major domestic contestation. Additionally, the presence of a European framework is one of two key conditions for the deployment of Belgian troops. Nonetheless, Belgium has increasingly come under criticism for not performing this role consistently through participation in EU frameworks (Biscop, 2011:1). When it comes to the RSC role the country has sometimes fallen short of meeting words with deeds (see Breuning, 1995). In this way, Belgium has, at times, hampered Europe’s search for foreign policy cohesion and coherence.

Belgian policy-makers repeatedly expressed their intentions to internationalise an intervention in Mali ever since September 2012 when the EU became actively involved. This commitment was reaffirmed immediately after the decision had been taken to participate in Serval. The initiative to freeze all development aid to Mali in response to the military coup in March 2012 was an early sign of Belgium adopting a European role. Minister of Development Cooperation, Paul Magnette justified his decision by emphasising that it ‘complies with the European line’ which demands the return of constitutional order (Le Soir, 27 March 2012). Furthermore, Belgium was part of a group including France, Spain and Italy which acted as catalyst to the deployment of civilian missions in the region (Rouppert, 2014:9). In December 2012, a parliamentary note on Belgium’s general foreign policy declared, in light of the successful launch of EUCAP Sahel Niger, that ‘Belgium will continue to translate in actions its political engagements in favour of CSDP by participating in a range of EU operations’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 21 December 2012:12). Significantly, numerous statements were made by Belgian leaders referring to the Malian crisis as a threat to Europe. Belgian elites from all parties perceived stability in Sahel as being in the common European interest.

The force generation conference for EUTM Mali began on 29 January 2013. Its outcome was unexpected as almost all member states announced a contribution, and many committed more than initially promised. Even EU members with traditionally low interest in Africa such as the Baltic countries and the Czech Republic insisted on participating (Bruxelles2, 29 January 2013). Yet, a lack of enthusiasm remained when it came to forming the mission’s protection force. As Belgium remained one of the last member states to commit
troops, pressure began building on Belgian leaders to make a contribution (Bruxelles2, 2 February 2013). However, the government continued to delay a formal decision while expressing further support for Serval (Bruxelles2, 5 February 2013). Reports emerged suggesting that tensions between Reynders and De Crem were behind the government’s indecision. It would appear that the Defence Minister had taken the decision to engage Belgian armed forces in Serval with little prior consultation with coalition partners, an initiative which was not well received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bruxelles2, 5 February 2013). Furthermore, De Crem is generally not a fervent supporter to the idea of a ‘European pillar’, preferring to invest Belgian defence resources in NATO financing and operations (Bruxelles2, 21 May 2012). This made De Crem, who at the time was also candidate to the post of NATO’s Secretary-General, one of the least receptive governmental actors to EU norms and expectations (Bruxelles 2, 25 October 2013). In general, coalition ministers from all six parties were unwilling to make a substantial contribution because of budgetary concerns, indicating reluctance within the governing elite not to accept a RSC role (La Libre, 5 February 2013).

Reynders argued in parliament that Belgium could not be expected to carry most of the responsibilities while others’ contribution remained limited: ‘A demand was issued to us. We replied that we are ready to bring a complement. We do not wish to be on the front line leading this protection force, but in the case of a contribution, it will be proportional to others’ commitments’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 20 February 2013:22; author’s translation). He added that:

‘We cannot argue for European defence and not step in an operation like this one. Belgium needed to be present, but … the government wanted a proportional contribution. Some countries announced five, ten trainers. We are already present in more substantial ways’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 20 February 2013:5; author’s translation).

His argument resonated well within some members of parliament. Christophe Lacroix (PS) supported the government’s position on the ground that:

‘We have to be proactive and act in solidarity to these missions, in particular when defined by Europe, but in a proportional way. We have already done a lot. It is necessary that interventions be proportional and that we are not taken advantage of by those who do not assume European defence’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 20 January 2013:7; author’s translation).

This feet-dragging was met with intensified efforts from external actors to socialise Belgium into a RSC role. The EU’s high representative at the time, Catherine Ashton, sent a letter to Belgian officials formally demanding Belgium’s participation. Both French President Hollande and Foreign Affairs Minister Fabius contacted their respective counterparts in Belgium insisting on a complementary contribution. A compromise was eventually reached between France, Belgium and Spain whereby responsibility for forming and leading the protection force would be shared among the three member states. External socialisation found its way into the domestic debate as shown by parliamentarian Van der Maelen (Sp.a)
who exercised pressure on the government by commenting that:

‘In Libya we figured amongst the first countries (accepting to participate). Concerning EUTM Mali, however, Belgium ranks amongst the last. I condemn this because our country enjoys a good reputation in this domain. What concerns me is the difference of strategy between operations led by France, or the one in Libya, and European operations. If it takes Belgium time to be considered by other states as a reliable partner within European defence, it takes much less to lose that confidence’ (Chambre de Représentants de Belgique, 20 January 2013:6; author’s translation).

The following statement by De Crem indicates a clear change of role position as a result of EU socialisation. De Crem who is not a fervent supporter of European defence, at least not at the expense of NATO loyalty, was now affirming that:

‘We cannot continue to argue in favour of a deployment and a Belgian participation within a common European and then remain on the side line … In this way, we demonstrate again our positive spirit to the development of a European defence’ (Chambre de Représentants et Sénat de Belgique, 20 January 2013:11; author’s translation).

This is further evidence of small states’ weakness in the context of modern peacekeeping when confronted with the combined socialising influence of a regional institution, along with its rules and norms, and the leadership of a great power seeking to multilaterise its peacekeeping operations through such institutional framework.

10.7 Concluding Discussion

This case reinforces the notion that small states’ commitment to peacekeeping is not unconditional and can vary from one institutional platform to another and over time. A key dynamic contributing to this pattern is the emergence of a plethora of international actors seeking to deploy different peacekeeping instruments and strategies. In Mali, ECOWAS, the UN, the EU and a great power mobilised resources to contain the violence through stabilisation, combat and state-building instruments. From the perspective of small states, this has generated numerous understandings of what is appropriate peacekeeping behaviour and produced multiple institutional frameworks within which to perform peacekeeping activities. Crucially, it has intensified the socialisation of small states into a wider range of peacekeeping roles. To understand the effects of these multi-directional socialising pressures on Belgium’s role selection, the ways Belgian policy-makers have received and interpreted role expectations emanating from external actors and institutions in the context of the Malian conflict have been examined. The socialisation of Belgium was influenced by how domestic agents’ interpretations interacted with their own ideas about Belgium’s place in peacekeeping within a context of coalition decision-making.

The main finding indicates that, whether the UN, the EU or France acted as a socialiser of Belgium’s roles regarding the Malian crisis, no major role contestation emerged in the foreign policy unit, the cabinet or the wider political class. This challenges
expectations that coalitions are too fragmented to reach consensus and make meaningful policy decisions. As no single actor has the authority to commit the decision unit without the approval of others, foreign policy analysts anticipate coalitions to be highly constrained in their ability to achieve agreement. Consequently, they tend to be ‘internally deadlocked and unable to act’ (Hagan et al., 2001:173). Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) argue that ‘role contestation that is institutionalized in political parties may surface in the cabinet—the primary body for making foreign policy decisions—if the cabinet is a multiparty coalition’ (p.13). This body of research raised expectations that Belgian domestic actors would disagree over the role(s) that Belgium should adopt, especially as numerous socialisers demanded different roles. The prospect of contestations was high given that parties are key actors shaping Belgium’s foreign policy (Joly and Dandov, 2016:17) and that the Di Rupo coalition was highly fragmented with three different parties occupying the main foreign policy posts.

However, Prime Minister Di Rupo, Foreign Minister Reynders and Defence Minister De Crem formed a solid consensus around Belgium acting as a small but reliable partner. The implication was that there was no contestation over the decision not to pursue a UN activist role, accounting for Belgium being minimally socialised by UN role demands, and its limited presence in MINUSMA. Similarly, scepticism towards EU plans was shared within the unit. When the decision was taken to partially enact a RSC role following socialising pressures from EU partners and concerns in the opposition that Belgium’s reputation was being tarnished, no member of the unit or the cabinet challenged it. The decisions to deflect UN and EU socialising demands were heavily influenced by a prior ambition in the unit to perform a small but reliable partner role, encouraging a participation in Serval. The role was introduced early, was uncontested and dominated the decision-making process. This case offers an opportunity to tease out the factors which may contribute to a fragmented coalition reaching a consensus on the role(s) that a small state should play in peacekeeping crisis.

Before a consensus was formed, the role had first to be introduced into the decision-making process. Although Foreign Minister Reynders and Defence Minister De Crem initially disagreed over EUTM Mali, the disagreement was more about the latter’s assent of French role expectations without prior consultation with the former than a fundamental difference in role preferences. This indicates that De Crem acted as ‘role entrepreneur’ as he previously advocated of the role and managed to impose it on the domestic negotiation process (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:178). Although De Crem did not have the Prime Minister’s authority, as one would expect for a role entrepreneur (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016:178), his re-appointment in the Di Rupo coalition from the caretaker government, where he had established a solid foreign policy line based on a small but reliable partner role, likely reflects the new coalition’s approval of his role preference while strengthening his position inside cabinet. This corroborates Joly and Dandoy (2012) who found preliminary
evidence that ‘the party with the largest influence on foreign policy is the party of the defence minister’, indicating significant influence of this actor on Belgian foreign policy compared to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister (p.22). To understand why Di Rupo and Reynders agreed to follow his role position in Mali, we can turn to clues provided by Hermann and Hermann (1989) as to what factors affect the likelihood of a ‘prompt group consensus’ (p.367). A key element is that ‘group members share a common ideology … in other words, a common set of values and beliefs with regard to the problem at hand’ (Hermann and Hermann, 1989:367). While Reynders and De Crem belonged to different parties, party families and regions, neither appeared averse to deploying troops to challenging missions abroad. They also shared a rejection of the value-based and humanitarian foreign policy which had seen their predecessors re-engage in UN peacekeeping in 2006. Given the view of the francophone Socialist Party that UN peacekeeping is the ‘conditio sine qua non’ for participation in more robust operations, Prime Minister Di Rupo was the most likely to oppose a small but reliable partner role opening the door for participation in ad hoc coalitions (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). His acceptance should be seen in light of his institutional role as Belgian Prime Minister who traditionally ‘does not impose decisions or solutions by means of authority, but settles disagreements through consensus, to maintain the stability of his coalition’ (Dewachter in Dandov and Joly, 2015). Di Rupo’s experience in negotiating the coalition agreement which ended the Belgian political crisis likely strengthened his credentials as ‘a political broker whose most important skills are those of conciliation, compromise, and consensus-building among powerful colleagues’ (Baylis, 1989:89; Kaarbo, 1996:511). In fact, no cabinet or unit member had an interest in threatening the coalition’s stability after a year and a half of deadlock. Moreover, there is domestic agreement that ‘participation [in crisis management] must not constitute a political risk to the stability of the coalition at home’ (Houben, 2005). As the political crisis had received much international media coverage which damaged Belgium’s image abroad, political leaders converged in their ambition to rebuild the country’s reputation. A small but reliable partner role precisely served that purpose.

Socialising pressures do not, on their own, explain a small states’ pattern of peacekeeping contribution. Role socialisation of small states may be more likely when an agent first introduces a role on which an agreement, through ideological proximity and consensus-oriented norms and leader, is then formed. This creates a role disposition which increases or decreases a small state’s susceptibility to be socialised by different socialising agents. Once a ‘prompt consensus’ is achieved and a small state becomes inclined towards a role, agents in the unit ‘reinforce each other’s predispositions and feel secure in their collective decision’ (Hermann and Hermann, 1989:367). They will have no incentive to consider alternative roles. This may explain why a rapid agreement in the Di Rupo unit that a small but reliable partner role should be performed with France inhibited subsequent
socialising efforts.

Decision-making dynamics in Belgium regarding its involvement in Mali cannot be fully understood without references to at least two historical analogies, or precedents. Historical analogies shape foreign policy choices as policy-makers use past events to identify successful and unsuccessful courses of action and gain clues about what is be done in a present case (Brunk, 2008:303; Khong, 1992). They contribute to a learning process whereby lessons are drawn from past cases perceived to be similar to the situation at hand. This strand of research allows the hypothesis that historical analogies influence role selection by helping policy-makers determine the roles that were either appropriate or inappropriate in a similar past. In this way, roles act as a template for action. Beneš and Harnisch (2014) have already advanced that roles can be learned through the ‘historical self’ which ‘may play the role of the significant other’ or main socialising agent (p.6). In Belgium, the trauma of Rwanda ‘still marks Belgian political discourse, public perception and strategic thinking related to UN-led peacekeeping’ (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). It is a ‘readily available referent’ for domestic actors as to what must be avoided in peacekeeping, namely contributing to under-resourced UN missions in former colonies operating under poorly-defined rules of engagements and an ineffective command structure (Brunk, 2008:304). Belgium’s reluctance to fully re-embrace its UN activist role in Mali was surprising given that MINUSMA had far more military resources, a wider mandate and permissive rules of engagements. The crux is that Belgium does not shy away from greater use of military instruments, but its elite is reluctant to do so under UN command. In fact, ‘based on the negative experiences in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, but also on their experience during Belgium’s 2007-08 membership of the UN Security Council and its recent experiences during UNIFIL, many question whether progress has been achieved in terms of reforming the UN’s command and control structures’ (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). This explains why NATO and the EU are perceived as ‘more natural partners’; a view very much associated with De Crem (Koops and Drieskens, 2012).

There is ground to suggest that the Belgian contribution of F-16 fighter jets and a frigate to the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya served as a precedent for the Serval operation in Mali. To be sure, the two operations differed in their objectives and conduct. The former sought to implement a no-fly zone for humanitarian purposes without the deployment of ground troops while the latter was designed as an anti-terrorist operation. Yet, in the eyes of Belgian policy-makers, both were seen as initiatives led by European military powers to which visible contributions could be made outside UN command (Koops and Drieskens, 2012). The case for a Belgian presence in both was headed by De Crem’s ambition to orient the armed forces towards ‘offensive’ functions; an important step towards improving Belgium’s reputation vis-a-vis key partners. It found unanimous support from
cabinet and opposition members who shared a desire to be ‘on the front line’ (Rtbf Online, 18 March 2011). French socialisation of Belgium in the context of Serval prompted Belgian actors to think about the lessons of Rwanda and Libya. An important one questions the continuing value of post-Rwanda roles which have imposed restraint on peacekeeping deployments. Increasingly, doubts are being raised about whether these roles are preventing Belgium from improving its international reputation.
CHAPTER ELEVEN   CONCLUSION

11.1 Introduction

This PhD project began with the proposition that changes in the doctrine and practice of international peacekeeping have had significant consequences for troop contributing states. Small European states, in particular, have increasingly been confronted with dilemmas involving difficult choices over their roles as peacekeeping contributors. The main objective was to examine how the governments of small European states have dealt with these changes and re-conceptualised the roles their states play in international peacekeeping. The primary aim was to contribute to the study of International Relations by bridging structure and agency as a way to gain a more comprehensive understanding of this category of states and their behaviour in the policy-area of peacekeeping. This concluding chapter reviews the key theoretical and empirical findings, and considers how they advance small state, FPA role theory and IR research at large.

11.2 The Roles of Small States in International Peacekeeping

This project has challenged the notion that small states participate in peacekeeping operations driven by a single uncontested perception of themselves as international entrepreneurs of peaceful norms. Small states have gradually found their traditional role of norm entrepreneur to be at odds with the intrusive, robust and multi-dimensional nature of modern peacekeeping. It has become difficult for small states’ governments to ensure that their troops remain neutral, act upon consent and use limited force, when operations now require defending a regime from rebel attacks, building state institutions, protecting refugees and containing violence from neighbouring civil wars. All four case studies have exposed the complex political processes unfolding at the international level when international actors agree to mount, and generate forces for, a modern peacekeeping operation. This partly explains why none of the decisions taken by Austria or Belgium were straightforward as governing elites could no longer rely on a norm entrepreneur role to guide them through this complexity. The insistence by governments to decide participation on a case-by-case basis is further evidence of the uncertainty prevailing amongst small states over the position they should occupy in international efforts to manage crises.

An important finding suggests that small states have confronted this new environment by playing a wider range of roles as part of more fluid role sets. This means that small states have sought to take on a diversified set of peacekeeping responsibilities, but that these responsibilities vary significantly from one peacekeeping scenario to another. In the past, the role of norm entrepreneur used to provide a one-size-fits-all formula for the deployment of troops to a particular, and only, type of peacekeeping mission. First, a
prominent role adopted by Austria and Belgium is the *Global System Collaborator (GSC)* role, indicating that Austrian and Belgian governments have contributed to peace operations because of their aspiration ‘to undertake far-reaching commitments to cooperate with other states to support the emerging global order’ (Chafetz et al., 1996:734). This is an expression of small states’ deep commitment to international rules and multilateral solutions to resolving crises. It is also a manifestation of their belief in the UN system and their ambition to contribute to it. While such role taking may be unsurprising, this role was unavailable to small states during the cold war while successive peacekeeping failures in the early 1990s have left some governments reluctant to perform it. In fact, Belgium has placed more extensive conditions on enacting a GSC role than Austria owing to the Rwandan episode, despite a long-seated commitment to multilateralism.

Second, Austria and Belgium have both positioned themselves as a *regional subsystem collaborators (RSCs)* indicating that small states are engaging in new peacekeeping operations to support the development of regional institutions into more assertive peacekeeping actors. This is a new pattern reflecting the proliferation of regional bodies and command structures undertaking a wide spectrum of peacekeeping tasks (Bellamy and Williams, 2005:167). The findings highlight that small states actively contribute to this pattern. An illustrative example is Belgium’s re-engagement in UN peacekeeping, which would have been less likely had the prospect of a co-ordinated European effort been absent. A reluctance to see the EU fail to deal with the Chadian refugee crisis also partly motivated the Austrian decision to participate in EUFOR Chad. At other times, both small states have sought to distance themselves from the EU as an appropriate framework to channel their peacekeeping effort as shown most by Austria’s and Belgium’s attitude in UNDOF and EUTM Mali, respectively. While the Faymann government feared being entrapped in an EU-wide move to militarise the Syrian civil war, the Di Rupo coalition complained that Belgium was pulling a disproportionate political and military weight relative to other member states.

Third, a self-perception as *humanitarian actor* has been a driver behind Austria’s and Belgium’s deployments between 2006 and 2013. Importantly, a *humanitarian actor* role is the most similar to the one of norm entrepreneur given that it expresses a rejection of power politics and self-interests pursued through military means, in favour of a value-based and civilian approach to international relations and peacekeeping. A desire to alleviate the suffering of civilians in war zones has become an important motive for small states to engage in peacekeeping missions. This trend has been complemented by international actors who placed deployments for humanitarian purposes higher on their agendas. In the same way as the other roles, it has not been unequivocally embraced by Austria and Belgium. While a humanitarian role influenced the Verhofstadt coalition to partake in UNIFIL II, Belgium shifted towards a more military and robust role in 2013 when the Di Rupo administration
provided logistical support to a great power’s fight against terrorism in Mali. Austria chose not to enact a humanitarian role when it withdrew from UNDOF despite a large number of civilian casualties caused by violent clashes between the Syrian regime and opposition militants.

The fourth role informing the peacekeeping decisions of Austria and Belgium is the one of a neutral. For small states, it has long been a source of peacekeeping activism alongside a norm entrepreneur role. However, in the new peacekeeping setting, it now implicates restraint when activities jeopardising troop impartiality and/or demanding the use of force are involved. A neutral role provided the Faymann government with grounds to withdraw from UNDOF. Although it has not been articulated in the same way as in Austria, the neutral role has informed successive Belgian governments to refrain from participating in UN peacekeeping missions between 1994 and 2006. Whilst initially this role gave them a good reputation as peacekeeping actors, its enactment now damages their reputation.

Fifth, all case studies have revealed that Austria and Belgium have committed troops to various operations motivated, to varying degrees, by an ambition to act as a reliable partner. Each crisis under investigation has uncovered French leadership in crafting, initiating and/or carrying out peacekeeping endeavours. Austrian and Belgian policy-makers have perceived these peacekeeping missions as opportunities to demonstrate their reliability to Paris, thereby seeking to maintain good relations and foster security and defence cooperation with a great power. This important finding challenges previous research arguing that small states are primarily committed to multilateral efforts towards peace in a formal institutional context. This is a valid claim. Nonetheless, it is shown here that small states’ preoccupation with maintaining sound bilateral relations with a proximate great power remains an influential factor driving their foreign policies and peacekeeping behaviours.

The main conclusion emerging from this project’s role examination is that roles on their own account less for small states’ peacekeeping adaptation than the combination of roles selected by small states to overcome the dilemmas presented by new ways of doing peacekeeping. For instance, a humanitarian actor role dominated Austrian decision-making towards EUFOR Chad. Yet, it is uncertain whether Vienna would have been such a keen participant had the opportunity to partner with France not existed. There is no single peacekeeping formula that can be applied to manage different crises. Therefore, as peacekeeping norms and practices are continuously being renegotiated with each operation, so too are small states’ roles and behaviours likely to diversify and fluctuate. Only through role analyses can we capture this diversity and effectively explain the peacekeeping decisions of small states.
11.3 Small State and Role Theory Research: A Mutually Beneficial Relationship

11.3.1 What the Roles of Small States Tell us about their Foreign Policies

The choice to concentrate on the roles of small states as opposed to their external material constraints, vulnerability, national identity or bargaining strategies in multilateral institutions, for example, was made because of IR theories’ lack of explicit efforts to connect various, yet valuable, understandings of how small states behave in international affairs, let alone in a fast-changing peacekeeping environment. Whether a (neo-)realist, liberal or constructivist lens is applied, one is confronted with a lack of dialogue surrounding how perspectives on whether small states are weak or influential international actors, whether their foreign policies are driven by material or ideational factors and whether such factors emerge outside or inside the state, can be reconciled.

Scholars interested in small states argue that we cannot effectively understand how the international system is structured without exploring the foreign policies of those actors which numerically dominate it. A close connection between interest in small states and a concern for the system, in conjunction with the fact that small state size is an inherently structural variable (Breuning, 2011), illuminate why structural explanations have long been at the forefront of the small state research agenda. Yet, studying small states is also a state-centred endeavour which can only benefit from an approach stressing ‘the role of the central decision-making unit and the subjective understandings of leaders as funnels for other international and domestic factors’ (Kaarbo, 2015:191). In other words, small state research straddles IR and FPA scholarships. Therefore, this project drew on a role theoretical perspective which incorporates both an IR focus on international structures and a FPA interest in agency (Breuning and Thies, 2012). The overarching contribution of role theory to this project was to theoretically explain and empirically show how structure and agency interact to influence small states’ foreign policy adaptation to new forms of peacekeeping. Integrating structure and agency through a role theoretical framework aimed to rejuvenate small state research and make it a field visited by both IR and FPA scholars (see Long, 2017).

Closer structure-agency integration in the study of small states was pursued primarily by considering how small states are socialised into peacekeeping roles. Small state research benefits from a theoretical framework which moves away from competition as the process through which structures affect behaviour because it evades the assumption that small states are weak international actors (Thies, 2013). Yet, it retains a structural emphasis yielding to the contention that small states are highly exposed, and respond primarily, to international structures. Realists’ emphasis on the constraints imposed by the distribution of power was taken into account by recognising that differences in peacekeeping resources between small and larger states influence the roles they can play towards a crisis. The norm
entrepreneur argument overlooks the fact that small states do not have the capabilities to be initiators of peace operations. The four case studies have shown that great power(s), conflicting parties and international institutions are the prime movers in mounting operations. However, the framework moves beyond material structures by proposing that these actors also set the parameters for crisis management, thereby socialising other actors into acceptable roles. Thus, the peacekeeping choices made by small states’ governments are not exclusively determined by the possession of inferior capabilities. A key claim of this doctoral project is that role expectations generated from prevailing norms and diffused by socialisers condition small states’ roles and influence their governments’ decision over troop deployment. Chapters 6, 9 and 10 show that Austria and Belgium were unlikely to have participated in the missions had strong socialising pressures not been applied on their leaders. Neither Austria nor Belgium had extensive interests in the Chadian and Malian crises respectively. Yet, they responded present when a regional power and the institutions in which they were embedded in became active and requested their participation. EU and UN socialisation was highly influential in inducing Belgium’s 2006 decision to re-engage in UN peacekeeping.

The use of social constructivism to explain the activism of small states in peacekeeping has downplayed international structures as relevant factors. From a constructivist perspective, small states appear to be unconstrained actors able to shape the international normative order through active peacekeeping participation. Research has ignored the socialising influence which the political process prior to deployment can have on small states when considering a participation. This project’s socialisation argument advances our understanding of small states’ foreign policies by uncovering the simultaneous effects of material and ideational structures on their peacekeeping choices. These structures constrain the peacekeeping actions of small states through the diffusion of norms and role expectations by active socialisers at the international level. This proposition improves upon the norm entrepreneur argument by suggesting that there is nothing intrinsic in small state size driving small states to be active contributors of peacekeeping troops. Small states’ attitudes towards new peacekeeping missions are, to a significant extent, the products of social interactions with external socialising agents generating expectations of appropriate peacekeeping behaviour.

To establish a better connection between structure and agency, this project has theorised and empirically investigated the processes through which agents inside small states respond to external socialising influences. This was made possible by recent developments in the role theory scholarship which has emphasised that agency exercised by domestic actors within their own domestic context can have a significant impact on external processes of role location (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016; Brummer and Thies, 2015). Role theory provided the theoretical resource necessary to investigate how roles are domestically negotiated in small
states, thereby contributing to the work of scholars who have already indicated the influence of internal factors and processes on small states’ foreign policies (Doeser, 2011; 2017; Hey, 2003). A contribution was made by showing that domestic debates over peacekeeping troop deployments in small states are both stimulated by external expectations for certain roles and grounded in domestic actors holding different ideas about what role(s) their state should play in peacekeeping. It underlines the notion that small state research will not be able to fully understand the effects of international structures until it examines the ways agency is exercised domestically vis-à-vis structural constraints. This project took a step in this direction considering how small states’ agents have responded to the pressures of role socialisation as they re-learn their place and responsibilities in peacekeeping. The case studies have exposed policy-makers, principally in the foreign policy-making unit, exercising agency as they perceive, interpret and respond to what is expected of their state. Chapters 6, 9 and 10 exhibited agents positively identifying with external demands for their states to become humanitarian actors, reliable allies and/or global as well as regional collaborators in peacekeeping. Conversely, chapter 7 was a case of domestic agents seeking to defy evolving structures as Austrian officials rejected international requests for Austria to take on more extensive peacekeeping responsibilities as part of UNDOF’s adaptation to new realities.

It was posited at the outset of this project that determining whether small states’ agents form a consensus around, or contest, the roles expected of them by international actors was an empirical task. Results from the case studies indicate that a more extensive consensus was achieved amongst Belgian actors than by policy-makers in Vienna. In Brussels, no one disputed the decision of the Verhofstadt cabinet to meet the expectations for a GSC, RSC and humanitarian actor roles. Defence Minister De Crem was unconstrained in enacting a small but reliable ally role as expected by France when intervening in Mali. On the contrary, the Austrian political opposition and public criticised the Gusenbauer government for pursuing a humanitarian role because it represented a positive response to European and French role expectations. They feared that the cabinet was pursuing a hidden agenda involving roles threatening neutrality. In 2013, bureaucratic agencies attempted to bring the Faymann government in line with external role expectations by contesting the selection of a neutral role as a basis for withdrawing from UNDOF. Interestingly, neither case of role contestation succeeded in swaying the governing elite to change its initial role position. These findings contribute to the small state scholarship by both challenging and supporting the argument that foreign policy decision-making in small states is characterised by consensus. While we should not assume that external pressures to adopt certain roles lead domestic actors to form an agreement, the argument cannot be dismissed altogether. The point here is that to understand the conditions under which consensus or contestation over roles emerges, and its impacts on peacekeeping behaviour, one must probe into decision-making processes.
Each case study offered the opportunity to gain a more refined understanding of foreign policy decision-making in small states. It was uncovered that decision-making could be affected by the interactive effect of the electoral cycle and the public aversion to casualties. Emphasising further the impact of domestic politics on small state foreign policy, it was found that leaders in small states could divert the public from difficult domestic conditions by taking safe foreign policy actions. Another finding indicates that Prime Ministers were not as extensively involved in decision-making processes as expected. This was the case of Belgian Prime Minister Di Rupo and Austrian Prime Minister Gusenbauer who chose a removed, conciliatory approach to decision-making to ensure the continuation of their fragmented and fragile coalitions. However, Prime Ministers Verhofstadt and Faymann exercised greater leadership and influence on their government’s decision to re-engage in, and retreat from, UN peacekeeping respectively. Chapter 6, 9 and 10 suggest that Defence Ministers in small states are actively engaged in decision-making on the deployments of troops abroad. Each Defence Minister held a firm vision of what the role of armed forces should be. Darabos oversaw the re-organisation the Austrian armed forces which, he believed, should involve closer cooperation with new partners. De Crem was determined to position Belgium as a small but reliable partner in sharp contrast to Flahaut who, in 2006, had been committed to orientating Belgian armed forces towards humanitarian tasks. Bureaucratic interests in achieving these visions through peacekeeping deployments account for the Ministers’ attempts to shape decision-making.

The cases tracing Belgian decision-making exposed the weight of historical precedents on small states’ agents when conceiving roles and making peacekeeping decisions. It was also identified that international calls for more active roles could prompt domestic agents to reinterpret the lessons of past failures and rethink the domestic constraints imposed in their aftermaths. The cases did not exhibit evidence that publics in small states seek to mount strong opposition to the peacekeeping decisions of their governments. When they did, they were unsuccessful in inducing change. The Belgian public did not interfere nor contest the decisions of the Verhofstardt and Di Rupo cabinets to participate in UNIFIL II and the international effort in Mali respectively. In 2008, the Austrian public opposition failed to obstruct the Gusenbauer government’s plan to take part in EUFOR Chad. The only indication of public influence comes from Austria when the Faymann government pulled out from UNDOF anticipating that the Austrian public would not accept casualties and the abandonment of a neutral role. Even in this case, the public never campaigned for the government to withdraw. These findings implicate that agents in the foreign policy-making unit effectively lead decision-making and can insulate themselves from public demands. Thus, a key conclusion suggests that the interactions between agents in the foreign policy-making unit have significant impact on foreign policy decision-making in small states.
Examinations of small states’ decision-making have underlined the relevance of national self-interests for policy-makers when deciding on peacekeeping deployments. The Belgian and Austrian respective decisions to participate in UNIFIL II and EUFOR Chad were largely motivated by the prospect of gaining an UN Security Council non-permanent seat. This incentive explains why policy-makers sought to position their small states as GSCs. Similarly, the political and military benefits involved in cooperating with a regional power in peacekeeping deployments were not lost on Austrian and Belgian leaders when choosing to enact a reliable partner or ally role. European interests in developing the capabilities of the Union to act outside of its borders also motivated Austria’s decision towards EUFOR Chad and Belgium’s participation in UNIFIL II. The Faymann government brought Austrian troops home primarily in the national interest of protecting Austrian peacekeepers and for political survival at home. The key implication for the small state literature is that investigations looking inside the state should not exclusively focus on national identity as other more self-serving incentives may also drive small states to contribute to peacekeeping operations. Rather than suggesting that identity is irrelevant, the findings show that it is only one source of roles agents may or may not turn to as they navigate the dynamics of role negotiation within, and set in motion by, outside expectations for certain roles. While the Faymann government was concerned with the troops’ safety, it also relied on neutrality as an element of national identity to confront changing structures at the expense of its interest in international reputation.

Explanations of small states’ foreign policies have for too long adopted an ‘either or’ approach. The have either been preoccupied with the effects of inferior capabilities or explored a range of material and ideational domestic factors including perceptions (Gvalia et al., 2013), identity (Ingebritsen, 2002; Wivel, 2005), public opposition (Doeser, 2017) as well as bureaucratic size and skill (Panke, 2012; Thorhallsson, 2000; 2012), independently of structural pressures. The scholarship has also extensively assumed that small states do not pursue self-interests when contributing to peacekeeping operations, overstating the influence of national identity on agents instead. Consequently, the impacts of structure-agency interactions on their foreign policies and peacekeeping choices have largely been overlooked and under-theorised. By looking at how roles are both externally expected and internally negotiated, the approach presented in this project contributes to the norm entrepreneur argument and the wider small state scholarship by unpacking the processes through which multiple international structures interfere in decision-making dynamics. In turn, the motivations of agents and their responses to structural constraints can be more effectively identified. Through role theory, this research enhances the compatibility of structural explanations with a number of domestic factors in accounting for small states’ foreign policies. This bridge between structure and agency can generate better understandings of what leads small states to become norm entrepreneurs, global and regional collaborators,
humanitarian actors, as well as reliable allies.

11.3.2 Contributing to Role Theory through Small States

The observations made in the case studies contribute extensively to the development of role theory. For the same reason that role theory was an effective tool to inspect what small states do internationally, the category of small states is a valuable subject on which to observe and theorise the workings of roles on foreign policies. Numerous role analyses have been undertaken on great, regional and emerging powers, but the roles played by the smaller members of the system have often been overlooked. This is a serious omission since our knowledge of leadership will remain imperfect until we understand those who are led. The consideration of small states provides an opportunity to analyse simultaneously alter and ego, and their interactions, given that structural and agential factors have been shown to be equally relevant in influencing small states’ foreign policies. This should encourage role theorists to move beyond a tendency to abstract either internal role dynamics when interested in how states locate their role(s) internationally or the influence of alters when focusing on ego’s internal processes.

Attention to mission operationalisation and force generation processes has uncovered various ways in which alters have intervened into egos’ role selection. The primary functions of alters was to stimulate ego to think about its role(s) in an emerging crisis and elicit certain roles. This happened diffusely as UN agents called on UN members to meet their responsibilities in maintaining international peace. It took on a more direct form when DPKO officials applied pressures on European states to send resources to UNIFIL II. The UN, as an alter, interfered most directly in ego’s role selection when Secretary-General Annan communicated in person to the Belgian Prime Minister his expectation that Belgium should play an active role in UNIFIL II. The French diplomatic round of European capitals was designed to achieve a similar purpose and led to domestic debates about whether it was appropriate for Austria to play the role of partner supporting French objectives in Chad. As regional institutions have become peacekeeping actors and small states increasingly turned to them to perform peacekeeping duties, institutional expectations have made their way into, and increasingly affected, domestic debates over roles. Belgium’s decision-making vis-à-vis EUTM Mali underscored the fear of some in the Belgian elite that the country would become isolated if the government rejected calls for European solidarity. Importantly, alters often influence internal role dynamics through domestic agents determined to meet external role demands.

Chapter 7 showed that outside events can place small states’ agents into predicaments over roles and, as a result, intensify role contestation (Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016b:183). The Syrian civil war forced Austrian officials to think about how to sustain a neutral role as part of UNDOF. The decision to uphold this role even though it meant
undermining Austria’s reputation was highly contested by the foreign ministry and sections of the military. All the case studies have revealed that alters articulated role expectations by relying on key peacekeeping norms. This finding corroborates Breuning (2016) who found that roles entering domestic negotiations often originate in international norms. Additional research needs to be undertaken on the relationship between outside events and norms on the one hand, and external role expectations generated by alters on the other. Nonetheless, this research has established that outside events and norms are unlikely to impact domestic role negotiations if active alters are absent to push for certain roles and activate ego’s role conception. The above findings show that alters can take different forms and be more or less direct in articulating their expectations. However, it does not remove the fact that ‘alters can become yet another factor’ in role negotiation dynamics (Kaarbo and Cantir, 2016b:182).

This project went a step further using the case studies to tease out the policy-making processes set in motion by alters’ expectations, thereby influencing role selection. This contributes to role theory by shedding light on the conditions under which ego meets or defies the expectations emanating from different alters. The case studies exposed mixed results about the importance of public opinion for the domestic negotiation of roles. The Austrian and Belgian publics were expected to be important players in selecting roles given their deeply-seated pacifist inclinations. Outside pressures for Belgium to be an active player in UNIFIL II and an ally to France in Mali were not perceived as threats to country’s pacifism by the Belgian public. The Belgian public remained a passive decision-making player in both cases. Conversely, French and European demands for Austria to take on a humanitarian role as part of EUFOR Chad awakened public fears of entanglement in dangerous foreign ‘adventures’. Developments on the ground and intensifying international efforts to widen UNDOF’s mandate increased the aversion of the Austrian public to casualties. In both cases, the public acted as an active constraint on governmental plans to deviate from a neutral role. While the Gusenbauer cabinet managed to bypass public opposition, public opinion was a primary concern for the Faymann government and directly affected its ability to meet external expectations. All the cases also shed light on elite interactions during role negotiations, some of which were conflictual. An important finding is that cabinet actors often advocated roles along bureaucratic interests. Austrian foreign ministry officials wanted to return to a GSC role because of concerns that Austria’s international diplomatic image was being tarnished following the government’s decision to implement a neutral role vis-à-vis UNDOF. Also, several Defence Ministers pushed for roles they perceived as enabling a specific orientation and significant benefits for the armed forces. These observations allow the assertion that external role expectations are more likely to find domestic resonance and acceptance if they align with the bureaucratic interests of one or more domestic actors.
The cases have also uncovered internal dynamics previously unreported by role theorists, but potentially significant for the domestic selection of roles. For one, electoral cycles can influence the roles that agents prioritise and, therefore, the likelihood that a state will meet external expectations especially if it involves an issue salient to the public. As an election approaches, a government may enact a role traditionally held by the public and abandon those demanded by outside actors in order to divert public attention away from poor domestic performances. It was also found that policy-makers rely on historical precedents to conceive and select roles. Specifically, external expectations for certain roles can be an incentive for agents to rethink domestically-entrenched roles and convince reluctant constituencies to perform a role change. In fact, attention to the interactions between role socialisation and negotiation has helped refine our understanding of what drives state agents to transition to new roles. The likelihood of role change increases when a domestic role entrepreneur in a decision-making position is receptive to external demands, can overcome institutional hurdles and is effective at framing his/her proposal in a way that resonates with other decision-makers. Chapter 6 showed that external expectations can generate consensus amongst the members of the foreign policy unit, enabling this governing elite to limit further debates and insulate itself from contestation. Underlining further the importance of electoral calculations in role selection, elite consensus decreases the electoral incentive of enacting alternative roles requested by opposition and public actors.

Importantly, this finding makes a much-needed contribution to the role theory scholarship as it emphasises the value of the foreign policy unit as an analytical tool linking alter and ego. The unit mediates the effects of role socialisation on internal processes of role negotiation. Whether broad role contestation emerges at a domestic level, and affects the final selection, is to a significant extent dependent on what happens in the unit. Public and opposition actors rarely initiate contestation without the governing elite first expressing its intention to perform a certain role. Unit members may choose not to seek parliamentary approval for the role(s) they intend to enact when not legally required to do so. Chapter 9 revealed that a dominant leader, personified by Guy Verhofstadt, could impose his/her preferred role, limiting the ability of other actors in the unit and the wider domestic scene to contest his/her chosen role(s). On the other hand, a less dominant leader may provide more opportunities for contestation. Additional research is needed to identify the circumstances under which individuals in the unit, and initial role dynamics amongst them, influence domestic consensus or contestation over roles. However, role theorists can benefit from focusing on different foreign policy units because it is where initial perceptions of what is expected of the state are formed and where the governing elite frames their chosen role(s) and strategizes to achieve domestic acceptance.

Finally, the case studies have emphasised the relevance of national interests in role selection, challenging role theorists’ assumption that roles exclusively help policy-makers
define their interests (Ifantis et al., 2015:3; Le Prestre, 1997:5-6). Belgian policy-makers enacted a GSC role because it improved Belgium’s international reputation and increased the country’s chances of getting elected at the UN Security Council. Austria and Belgium sought to appear as **reliable partners** in Chad and Mali as their elites perceived significant reputational and material benefits from cooperating with Paris. The findings underline the need for further work focusing on the relationship between roles and interests. Nonetheless, the existing hypothesis that roles and interests interact reciprocally in a way that interests are also an important source of roles has been supported by some of the findings (Thies, 2013).

**Figure 2** The Role Theoretical Model: A Revision

### 11.4 Contributions to the Study of International Relations

The findings have wider consequences for how we understand some important theoretical issues of International Relations beyond the integration of structure and agency. First, they add to the growing literature on the supply-side of peacekeeping exploring why states contribute to peacekeeping operations (Meiske and Ruggeri, 2017). When small states are concerned, it is generally argued that domestic ideas motivate their participation in peacekeeping. This project strengthens this scholarship by taking into account more immediate, mission-specific and political factors associated with the formation of peace operations. As peace missions widen their scope, the tasks and parameters under which
troops operate, and how these are negotiated at the international level prior deployment, are becoming increasingly salient for policy-makers at home. Understanding the evolving concerns of policy-makers in troop-contributing countries is essential to ensuring the continuing provision of peacekeeping troops to an increasing number of peace operations.

Second, I have argued that a norm entrepreneur is a role amongst others that small states may choose to play on the international scene. The findings of this research speak to research on the emergence and influence of norms in world politics by spelling out the mechanisms propelling some states to become norm entrepreneurs. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that the origins of norms are primarily domestic (p.893). States hosting such normative development are endowed with ‘strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community’ and, therefore, incentives to convince other international actors to follow suit (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:896). It is through these processes that Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) claim that a state becomes a norm entrepreneur. Yet, evidence presented here indicates that, in conjunction with pre-existing domestic norms, prior social interactions between outside actors (alters) and a prospective norm entrepreneur (ego) as well as policy-making dynamics in both are significant in consolidating a state’s position as a norm entrepreneur and ensuring effective norm promotion. This study highlights the social and policy-making foundations of norm entrepreneurship.

Third, the findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of asymmetrical relationships. Through this, the present thesis contributes further to small state research because it heeds Long’s (2017) call for relinquishing ‘size’ as analytical device in favour of relationships between states (p.145). Long (2017) argues that analyses of asymmetrical relationships should explore how material disparities shape the definition of agendas and interests on both sides (p. 155). Such valuable research could be complemented by examining negotiations over roles, and how these are affected by agency in both sides. It is a reminder that roles are predominant and vital features of asymmetrical relationships. Thus, IR research into asymmetry would benefit from exploiting the concepts of role location and altercasting whereby ‘smaller’ states bargain over, and attempt to sway preponderant powers to accept, their chosen role(s) (Thies, 2016; Harnisch, 2016; Cantir and Kaarbo, 2016b:182).

Fourth, the insights of this project can add to our knowledge about how alliances form and persist by shedding additional light onto the bonds between alliance members. Specifically, focusing on role can help analysts to determine when small states are likely to bandwagon with a great power because it considers the ideational and social underpinnings that make alliances between materially unequal units possible or impossible. Bailes et al. (2016) introduced the useful concept of alliance shelter defined as an ‘alliance relationship with a great power or regional or international organisation whereby the small state yields effective control of its political decision-making in specific areas’ and alleviates the inherent
vulnerabilities of being small (p.10). However, the availability of shelters, the interests of small states in seeking them as well as the likelihood of great powers and institutions to provide them could be more thoroughly understood through role analyses. Finally, it has been theoretically and empirically shown that roles are deeply embedded in institutions (Aggestam, 2006:15) and that small states have ambivalent relationships with them. Thus, the roles of small states towards and within regional and international institutions are critical to understanding both the trajectory of these actors’ integration in institutions and how the social order that underpins institutions is maintained.

Fifth, many of the roles reported in this study were pursued by policy-makers with an eye on sustaining a particular reputation suggesting a likely relationship between the roles that a state plays and its international reputation. The function of reputation in international relations has long been studied as a mechanism used by states to communicate information about resolve (Crescenzi and Donahue, 2017; Schelling, 1966, Press, 2005), and as a factor contributing to cooperation and coordination (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). Researchers of small states often refer to reputation as a foreign policy objective pursued to compensate for material inferiority. Small states want to develop a good international reputation, so they can be relied upon to perform certain tasks and, therefore, exercise disproportionate influence. Yet, reputation from a foreign policy angle remains under-studied and under-conceptualised, especially as it pertains to small states. Common roots in social psychology (Mercer, 1996) and shared emphases on perceptions and interactions underline the value of dialogue between research on role theory and reputation. In fact, much like a role, a reputation is both an image that one pursues, and that others perceive. In particular, the above chapters provide initial evidence that a focus on roles could illuminate how reputations are formed and altered as agents carefully consider the implications of enacting certain roles for their state’s international reputation. It may also be hypothesised that gaining a good reputation is based on performing certain roles which must be accepted by others.

11.5 Limitations

Several points of criticism may be levied against the assumptions and findings of this research. One limitation is that the effects of role taking by states on international structures have been overlooked. Harnisch (2012) argues that ‘the “role taking capacity of an actor” functions “as the “causal” mechanism for understanding the stability of the social structure of international relations’ (p.54). To be sure, the project effectively analyses the phenomena of peacekeeping troop provision by exploring small states’ roles and choices when faced with new peacekeeping practices. Nevertheless, this research fails to address the implications of small states’ role taking for regional institutions’ ability to undertake operations, the UN’s continuing legitimacy in peacekeeping or the operations’ effectiveness. In other words, questions remain unanswered as to how the re-learning undertaken by small
states affects the overall peacekeeping system. The feedback loop on the above figure 2 shows an awareness of the effects of such structuration processes. However, the decision was made to concentrate on how agents perceive and interact with international structures, both materially and socially defined, and on what this meant for small states’ learning process. This is understood here as a necessary first step before any examination of structuration can take place.

Scholars of small states could contend that I underestimated the agency, influence and/or power that small states can exercise at the international level by overstating the extent to which small states’ foreign policies are structurally determined. Two reasons provide clarification for this. First, there is an agreement that small states are more constrained than larger states, by the distribution of power, institutional rules and international norms, although constructivists have not sufficiently recognised that normative structures also shape what small states do. Thus, there was a need to bring together material, institutional and normative pressures into one framework, to better appreciate the interactions between different structures and the multi-dimensional constraints under which small states’ foreign policies are performed. Second, a structural emphasis was necessary to question Ingebritsen’s argument without rejecting it altogether. I do not contest that small states can modify international structures through norm entrepreneurship, but there was a need to investigate different processes to determine whether and how small states come to be norm entrepreneur in the first place.

Another shortcoming is that the findings of this research are only relevant for small European states with parliamentary democratic systems. In this way, the thesis fails to heed Gibert and Grzelczyk’s (2016) call for ‘looking at cross-sections of small non-Western states from a comparative perspective and/or at considering how their international behaviour on the international scene may be changing’ (p.2). Given that non-Western small states are ‘doubly peripheral’, we should not assume that these states locate, conceive and play the same roles, and through similar processes, as those revealed in these pages. Yet, a role theoretical framework is well suited for future research to study how non-Western small states’ own ‘historical characteristics’ have shaped the negotiations of their roles at different stages of state emergence (Gibert and Grzelczyk, 2016:3).

Having chosen not to abstract internal role dynamics or considerations of external actors, the findings may be revealing too many uncontrolled variables. Consequently, one may be left uncertain about what really lies at the heart of small states’ peacekeeping adaptation. Knowledge accumulation regarding small states’ foreign policy behaviour may also be negatively affected by this. I would argue that it was the inevitable consequence of a necessary task. Both small state and role theory research agendas suffered from imperfect structure-agency integration despite much potential. Therefore, intellectual progress in these two fields depended on this project’s efforts to show that ‘human agents and social structures
are, in a fundamental sense, dynamically interrelated entities and hence [that] we cannot account fully for the one without invoking the other’ (Carlsnaes, 2007:16). The benefit was to expose variables, and interactions amongst them, previously unexplored by either role theorists or small state scholars. It forms the foundation for future research dedicated to testing these variables in more controlled environments.

A final limitation lies in the lack of a more systematic and rigorous methodology for observing roles. The absence of better-defined criteria means that this research may have overestimated the presence of certain roles and/or overlooked others. Role theory remains imperfect in laying out a common bench mark for role identification, which remains too reliant on researchers’ own judgements. Yet, the inductive and flexible approach used here may have allowed the detection of some roles which would have remained concealed had narrower and pre-defined criteria been used. Moreover, it has been found that roles may be articulated by alters and ego in various ways. An agent does have to be expressing a role explicitly for role taking to be present and inform decision-making. More research is required to assess how role expectations and conceptions interact with notions of responsibility and values, for instance, and how they are communicated to other actors. Importantly, there is a pressing need to update Holsti’s categorisation along agreed-upon standards so that role theory research remains up-to-date, generalisable and replicable in the fields of IR and FPA. This project could have used other sources including parliamentary debates in a more systematic manner. This would have enabled stronger claims based on quantifiable indicators to be made about the roles that Austria and Belgium have chosen to play at the expense of others. Nonetheless, the value of parliamentary debates for case studies of decision-making which unfolds over a short time span is lesser than for longitudinal role analyses. One may also dispute the use of WikiLeaks as a data source for roles. However, Wikileaks documents proved a valuable source of primary evidence, frequently discussing issues of peacekeeping and international engagement. From a role theory perspective, these effectively contributed to assessing alters’ (primarily the US’s) perceptions and expectations of small states. Methodologically, they benefited this project’s purpose by providing key pieces of the puzzle that is small states’ engagement in peacekeeping. The use of interviews would have also reinforced the findings, something that will be done in the future.
11.6 Future Research

The contributions and limitations of this thesis highlight interesting avenues for future research. Students and scholars should continue to study small states, but not from a point of departure that emphasises either weakness or agency. This research has confirmed the value of an emerging trend which places dynamics of asymmetrical relationships at the heart of small state studies (Long, 2017). Making the case that roles are unavoidable components of asymmetrical relationships underscores the need for future research to analyse simultaneously their material and social foundations. It would enable researchers to consider different asymmetrical relationships between alter and ego, and through comparison, assert the scope available to small states for exercising influence. In this way, this project’s findings should be used to identify and devise strategies through which small states can be influential international actors. A role approach is well equipped to determine when and how small states can make their mark on international relations. Subsequent research questions may include: What roles should small states pursue to exercise influence? How can small states use role socialisation to their advantage? What diplomatic strategies can they employ towards a range of alters to ensure the enactment of their roles? Should small states’ policy-makers display a common front to deal with role socialisation?

Relatedly, innovative research on small states should pay attention to their ‘networks of relationships’ as a basis for comparison rather than take a purely state-centric approach (Long, 2017). Partly to counter isolationism, small states maintain denser networks of relationships across a wider range of policy-areas than usually recognised. The implication is that the socialisation of small states by different alters overlap, forcing policy-makers to find ways to accommodate different expectations. Great powers may use international institutions to socialise small states as shown by France which acted through European institutions to cast partners into roles. A similar scenario recently unfolded when the United States threatened to halt aid transfers to many small states if they did not remain loyal to Washington at the UN even though it undermined the UN system (The New York Times, 20 December 2017). Additional work should explore how small states resolve role conflicts generated by overlapping expectations from different alters. Moreover, we need to better understand how small states’ roles in one policy-area are affected by decisions in another. This thesis left unexplored the impacts of foreign aid policies on peacekeeping choices although the two are closely connected. Also, ‘networks of relationships’ as a new ‘structure of comparison’ can help small state research go beyond its Western centrism allowing comparisons of asymmetrical relationships to be made across regions (Long, 2017).

A focus on roles has emphasised the significance of perception in interactions between small states and great powers. Yet, there is a need to learn more about how foreign policy agents in great powers perceive small states and their roles in the international system. Future research could be designed around a great power and its relationships with a range of
smaller states to determine how perceptions and expectations of small states as allies, mediators and/or regional collaborators emerge. This would be beneficial to researchers of both small states and great powers, and contribute to a dialogue between the two. It is also a call for role theorists to pay more attention to the dynamics inside alter. An interesting avenue for future research is to analyse how such dynamics influence decisions to socialise other actors, perceptions of socialisees’ roles and socialisation strategies.

It follows that if role theory is to effectively contribute to IR research through novel insights into international structures, it must refine its understanding of different alters. First, there should be greater awareness that role socialisation can be undertaken by a wide range of actors. Second, the importance of international norms for role socialisation should not be underestimated. Role theorists must clarify the relationship between norms and roles in international relations. There is a pressing need to clarify how norm integration and role expectation interact and affect foreign policy behaviour. A key question is to what extent and how do alters use norms to socialise other actors into roles? In essence, subsequent role theoretical work on the structural side should explore other ways in which states are socialised into roles, and how these other types of socialisation combine with the one advanced by role theory. Third, it will be important for role theorists not to focus excessively on successful cases of socialisation. Future work should comparatively and systematically investigate the conditions under which socialisation fails. To strengthen the bridge between structure and agency through role theory, this additional research should analyse how domestic actors and policy-making processes contribute to the success or failure of different types of role socialisation.

Our knowledge about the influence of domestic actors, institutions and processes as determinants of small states’ foreign policy behaviours remains limited. Thus, researchers are invited to test the domestic variables uncovered in this thesis, through approaches that do not necessarily rely on role theory, to corroborate or refute the findings. Further work must be undertaken to assess how small states’ foreign policy choices are affected by the individual policy-makers, bureaucratic agents, public opinion and political opposition. The decision-making approach used by FPA scholars, through in-depth case-studies in particular, has not been the norm in small state research. Yet, it offers much potential for uncovering the policy-making processes responsible for shaping small states’ foreign policy trajectories while making analytical room for international structural factors. It is critical that research on the domestic factors does not evolve independently of structural processes and variables. Research questions include how does foreign policy decision-making influence the outcome of small states’ asymmetrical relationships? To what degree is decision-making also conditioned by these relationships? What are the decision-making factors enabling small states to exercise international influence? These questions must be addressed to reinforce the notion that if small states are to have international agency, one must first understand their
domestic agency(ies).

Our understanding of agency through role theory’s focus on ego has progressed rapidly in the last few years. Yet, there should be greater awareness that state agents do not receive external expectations nor negotiate roles at home independently of their political background and ideology which likely predispose them to select certain roles over others. In the case studies, attempts were made to tease out the main characteristics of key agents’ foreign policy orientation, but this should be undertaken more thoroughly and systematically along pre-defined criteria. An individual level of analysis may be a promising way forward for those interested in asserting the effects of political parties on role conception. Furthermore, based on a common assumption that individual decision-makers matter for conceiving roles and making foreign policy decisions, a dialogue between role theorists and political psychologists should be more actively pursued. It would allow valuable analyses to be carried out into how agents’ beliefs, leadership styles and personality traits affect domestic role contestation and their receptivity to external role demands. A focus on individuals may become increasingly needed as role theorists continue to devise analytical tools to better integrate structure and agency.

11.7 Conclusion

This PhD project has not provided definite answers as to how small states behave in international relations and peacekeeping, therefore allowing the formulation of readily-available recommendations for policy-makers. However, its main achievement has been to expose previously ignored interactions between a range of structural and agential variables, commanding the foreign policy trajectories of small states and their peacekeeping choices. This research has taken a step back from the tendency of small state research to generalise across cases. This was necessary to allow scholars and policy-makers to understand, first and foremost, the conditions conducive to small states shaping the normative order, allying with a great power or ensuring survival. The main finding reveals that, as all social phenomena in International Relations, the actions of small states are the products of the relative importance of structure or agency. What matters for explaining states’ foreign policies regardless of their size, is the interaction between the material and ideational structures of the international system and different state agencies. Given that these interactions are highly variable, it is unsurprising that small states display many variations in their peacekeeping contributions and foreign policy paths. The behavioural patterns, their structural and agential origins, and processes observed in small states do not differ significantly from those characterising other states’ foreign policies around the world. Small states rely on roles to conduct foreign policy as much as middle and great powers do. Therefore, while we should keep researching small states, it is essential to relinquish the idea that they form a distinct analytical category typified by specific foreign policy dynamics. By focusing on the roles of small states in
peacekeeping, this PhD thesis goes some way to re-positioning interest in small states at the heart of IR research and opening a new window into greater integration between IR and FPA research.
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## Appendix

**A1 Summary of Role Articulation by Gusenbauer Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global System Collaborator</strong></td>
<td>U. Plassnik, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>‘Based on our long-standing engagement for the principles and values of the United Nations, I pledge that Austria will be a responsible and reliable partner as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the term 2009-2010. We hope that the Members of the United Nations will entrust Austria with that responsibility, which we stand ready to shoulder to shoulder in a spirit of true partnership’ (GA, Sep. 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region Subsystem Collaborator</strong></td>
<td>U. Plassnik, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>‘We Europeans want each and every person in Kosovo to live in dignity, freedom and security. The international organizations concerned, including the European Union, must spare no effort towards that end’ (GA, Sep. 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promoter of Multilateralism and International Law</strong></td>
<td>U. Plassnik, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>‘A just and effective international order needs to be based on rules applicable to every member, big or small, strong or weak. Respect for the rule of law is indispensable if we want to prevent conflicts and promote peace and sustainable development. Austria has therefor consistently promoted efforts to develop international relations based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and all the other instruments that form our international legal system’ (GA, Sep. 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norm Entrepreneur</strong></td>
<td>U. Plassnik, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>‘A consistently growing number of States is rallying behind our call for the adoption by 2008 of a legally binding instrument to prohibit cluster munitions, which cause unacceptable harm to civilians. Austria is determined to continue leading this process by example, with a total ban of this atrocious weapon’ (GA, Sep. 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mediator Integrator</strong></td>
<td>U. Plassnik, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>‘Austria has a long experience in promoting dialogue among civilizations, religions and cultures, and we will continue our activities in that field with vigour’ (GA, Sep. 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peacebuilder</strong></td>
<td>U. Plassnik, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>‘To this end, Burkina Faso and Austria will co-host a conference in Ouagadougou in November on how to create sustainable peace. This meeting will unite participants …in an endeavour to provide common input to the Lisbon summit – by furthering policies of good neighbourliness, the rule of law and good governance; by fighting the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; by creating employment for young people; and by actively promoting the education of girls’ (GA, Sep. 2007).</td>
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### Summary of Role Articulation by Faymann Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global System Collaborator (GSC)</strong></td>
<td>M. Spindelegger, Foreign Affair Minister</td>
<td>‘Austria has 50-year-long track record of contributing to United Nations peacekeeping operations. And we will continue our engagement’ (GA, Sep. 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Actor</strong></td>
<td>M. Spindelegger, Foreign Affair Minister</td>
<td>‘Austria remains greatly concerned about the ever more desperate humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and its effects on the civilian population (GA, Sep. 2009).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mediator Integrator</strong></td>
<td>M. Spindelegger, Foreign Affair Minister</td>
<td>‘I have made it one of my foreign policy priorities to position Austria even more firmly as a platform for peace and dialogue’ (GA, Sep. 2009).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norm Entrepreneur</strong></td>
<td>M. Spindelegger, Foreign Affair Minister</td>
<td>‘Austria, as Co-Chair, together with Costa Rica, of the 2007 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and co-leader of the process for the past two years, is proud to have contributed to bringing the Treaty closer into force’ (GA, Sep. 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC)</strong></td>
<td>M. Spindelegger, Foreign Affair Minister</td>
<td>‘Austria will continue to help establish the economic foundation and the institutional infrastructure of a future Palestinian State. It will also, within the framework of the European Union, contribute to the efforts to promote a dynamic and results-oriented peace process’ (GA, Sep. 2009).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Reformer</strong></td>
<td>M. Spindelegger, Foreign Affair Minister</td>
<td>‘Significant efforts are under way to ensure and sustain UN peacekeeping as an essential tool for achieving the goals of the UN ... Austria fully supports the ongoing peacekeeping reform and stands ready to play its part in a renewed global peacekeeping partnership’ (GA, Sep. 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promoter of International Law</strong></td>
<td>M. Spindelegger, Foreign Affair Minister</td>
<td>‘As a medium-sized country and a strong supporter of multilateralism, Austria attaches particular importance to the rule of law, including at the international level’ (GA, Sep. 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peacebuilder</strong></td>
<td>M. Spindelegger, Foreign Affair Minister</td>
<td>‘Since peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be approached in an integrated manner, we strongly support the enhanced interaction of the Security Council with the Peacebuilding Commission throughout conflict cycle’ (GA, Sep. 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active Independent</strong></td>
<td>M. Spindelegger, Foreign Affair Minister</td>
<td>‘For many years, Austria has maintained close and friendly relations with all the countries of the Middle East’ (SC, Jan 2009).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Example</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Global System Collaborator (GSC)</strong></td>
<td>K. De Gucht, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>‘Only through constant commitment will we make the United Nations the primary instrument for international relations…We must once again make the United Nations the instrument par excellence of our strategy to build a more stable and prosperous world for all…Belgium is willing to rise to that challenge and shoulder its responsibility’ (GA, Sep. 2005). ‘As a member of the Security Council, Belgium has had the opportunity to be at the heart of the international system’ (GA, Sep. 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC)</strong></td>
<td>K. De Gucht, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>‘As for the European Union, it has supported MONUC’s effort in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It will also contribute to curbing the humanitarian crisis in Chad and in the Central African Republic by sending a military force to support the United Nations missions in the region. Belgium will participate in this effort … [and] welcome this regional input’ (GA, Oct. 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multilateral Actor</strong></td>
<td>K. De Gucht, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>‘In July 2007, Belgium organized, in the presence of the Secretary-General…That was a new opportunity to demonstrate our firm multilateral commitment’ (GA, Oct. 2007). ‘Belgium believes that only through close cooperation and enhanced multilateralism will we be able to respond to these challenges’ (GA, Sep. 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Actor</strong></td>
<td>G. Verhofstadt, Prime Minister</td>
<td>‘My country wishes to express its full support to the speedy establishment of the Human Rights Council. We are pleased that the concept of “responsibility to protect” has finally been recognized. Let us all hope that henceforth this should enable us to avoid tragedies like the one in Rwanda in 1994 (GA, Sep. 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norm Entrepreneur</strong></td>
<td>K. De Gucht, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>‘That clearly illustrates the urgent need the develop mechanisms that break the link between the illegal exploitation of natural resources and conflict. This issue was the central theme of our presidency of the Security Council last June (GA, Oct. 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Reformer</strong></td>
<td>K. De Gucht, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>‘We must improve and strengthen the UN apparatus. We fully support the Secretary-General’s efforts in this difficult task. At the same time, we believe that the United Nations system should better reflect the new international realities’ (GA, Sep. 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace and Nation Builder</strong></td>
<td>K. De Gucht, Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>‘While the Congolese authorities are preparing for elections, which will strengthen democratic culture across the country, they need our full support. Belgium will continue to mobilise the attention of the international community on this important matter (GA, Oct. 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Example</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global System Collaborator (GSC)</td>
<td>E. Di Rupo, Prime Minister</td>
<td>‘No one can end a famine or stop a tyrant alone. Peace is a shared responsibility. That is why there is no alternative to multilateralism and politics, if we seek to improve humankind. That is what motivates Belgium’s commitment, which is political, financial and at times even military, as the fifteenth most significant contributor to the United Nations’ (GA, Sep. 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Actor</td>
<td>E. Di Rupo, Prime Minister</td>
<td>‘My country participates actively in efforts to provide assistance to populations that have been victims of fighting’ (GA, Sep. 2013). ‘For my country, respect for life and human rights is fundamental’ (GA, Sep. 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm Entrepreneur</td>
<td>E. Di Rupo, Prime Minister</td>
<td>‘As a crossroad of many cultures, Belgium has always been one of the most open countries in the world. It has a high standard of living … That is largely due to the civil support, which is organized by the Belgian State…Belgium, like the European Union, is moving on a path of solidarity with peoples who are encountering difficulties’ (GA, Sep. 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator Integrator</td>
<td>E. Di Rupo, Prime Minister</td>
<td>‘Going to war, building walls and curtailing rights is always easier than building bridges and keeping the peace…That is why Belgium supports the efforts of Mr Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, as he seeks to bring the parties to the negotiating table (GA, Sep. 2013). ‘Members of the Assembly may rest assured that my country will continue to do everything it can to bring people together’ (GA, Sep. 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyal Ally/Regional Subsystem Collaborator (RSC)</td>
<td>E. Di Rupo, Prime Minister</td>
<td>‘When we work together, we achieve results. Mali is a proof of that’ (GA, Sep. 2013). ‘Beyond the humanitarian support it has already brought to the Iraqi people, Belgium recently decided to send six F-16 fighters in support of the fight against terrorism in Iraq. My country wants to strengthen cooperation among States. Belgium wants to intensify the exchange of information at the European level and within NATO’ (GA, Sep. 2014). ‘I welcome the American initiative to launch a process of reflection on the role of the United Nation peacekeeping (GA, Sep. 2014).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>