The Sociology of Sexual Polarity

Gavin B. Walker

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University of Edinburgh
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I, Gavin Walker, hereby declare that the attached thesis "The Sociology of Sexual Polarity" was composed by myself and represents my own research work entirely.
Abstract

This thesis presents an attempt to create a general approach to the sexes in society through the sociology of Max Weber. This falls into three main sections: a consideration of methodological issues; a set of comparative historical studies located in the Ancient Civilization; and, between them, an essay in sociological theory.

The first section diagnoses a traditional paralysis in the general theory of gender due to the irrational relationship between sociology and anthropology, and turns to Weber's methodological practice for the cure: the comparative historical method of enquiry and a formal conception of the relationship of biology to society in Interpretive terms. This last entails seeing biology not as supervising society, but as an input into social action under the supervision of history; this entails replacing the strategic notion of "reproduction" with a treatment of demographies. Under this strategy, the biological basis is developed through Jungian psychology to give the conception of "sexual polarity" in four elements: fertility and maternity, maturation, sexuality, and aggression; and a basic typology of social action based on or oriented to these is raised.

The second section develops these conceptions and compares them in City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms. The first issue is how different power systems impact upon the economy to produce different demographic regimes, in which sex, fertility, and women must either be controlled or accepted; the struggle for control of the state then makes for different types of family, household, and community arrangements - here the family sociology of Zimmerman is recalled. Local community, household, and family patterns are then compared on their own account; then contrasting patterns in motherhood, childhood and adolescence, sexual relationships, and violence, the protection of personal security, and citizen-
ship. Finally, sexual divisions are examined: in the structures of the state apparatus, the various aspects of the economy, and the bearing of these for stratification.

The third section presents three studies in the position of women in Antiquity: New Kingdom Egypt, classical Athens, and the Roman Empire. Finally, two appendices present, respectively, an outline of the general sociology of Antiquity, and a brief account of the Analytical Psychology of Carl Jung.
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### Appendices:

- A. The Sociology of Antiquity
- B. Analytical Psychology
**Introduction**

The thesis that follows presents an attempt to raise a general account of the sexes in society in terms of the sociology of Max Weber. This seems to be a somewhat heterodox project. Weber himself has considerations on gender (see especially Weber 1978 Part ii ch 3 & 4; Weber 1981 ch 2), but these seem never to have entered the sociological tradition. Weberian sociology has rather mostly stayed with mainstream issues, and has tended to leave gender out of account. There are some exceptions, in the work for example Bryan Turner, Michael Mann and Randall Collins (Turner 1981 ch 10; Mann 1986; Collins 1975 ch 5, 1986 ch 8). But none of this entails the development of a sustained focus on gender. As to feminism, this despite the Weberian origins of the concept of "patriarchy" has very much kept its distance from Weber, presumably due to Marxist influence. Neither has it tried to recover Marianne Weber as an ancestress.*

It has to be stated that the project here does not really relate directly to current sociological debate and practice – indeed, the greatest difficulties that I have encountered have been in trying so to relate it. On the contrary, it is rather an attempt to work out an approach to gender from first principles. If I must relate this critically to the field – and I attempt this with the greatest reluctance – then the fundamental issue that I would point to is the division in the human sciences between sociology and anthropology. It seems clear to me that traditionally anthropology is far more interesting and generous in its treatment of gender issues than sociology is; and indeed, recognizing this, sociology seems traditionally always to have

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*It may be of interest that I have found Marianne Weber’s book "Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwicklung" to be completely unavailable through the British academic library system, despite its recent republication in Germany.
placed the greatest reliance on anthropology to create the basic understanding of gender for both disciplines. Yet sociologists seem to have little understanding of the ambiguities of anthropology's position: ambiguity between sociology and archaeology, ambiguity between society and culture, ambiguity between primitive humanity and humanity in general. Reciprocally, these ambiguities leave sociology ambiguous, between modern society and society in general. But if the locus classicus of the theory of women's oppression in the origins of civilization, of the state and stratification, is in fact the interface not between primitive and complex society but between culture and society, then it is a methodological problem and a historical illusion. In face of this methodological problem, sociology must be prepared, setting aside all that anthropology may do, to raise its own general theory of the sexes in society at the level of the general theory of society by its own methodologies. That is what I have tried to do.

My attempt rests on two methodological planks: the Interpretive conception of social reality and the comparative historical method of enquiry. For the first, two points should be made. Firstly, working with the Interpretive conception of social reality entails dismissing the notions that biology supervises society or that society subserves biology. Rather, biology is merely an input into society under the supervision of history. Above all, this means abandoning the notion of "reproduction" and getting involved with demographics - this indeed is the major strategic issue. It should be noted that this means drawing on cultural anthropological resources. Secondly, although biological supervision is excluded, a door should be kept open to biological explanation, including explanation from ethology or sociobiology. This is controversial, but a sociological "critique" of the natural or the behavioural sciences is clearly irresponsible in principle. Even so, much of the sting of ethological and sociobiological argument can be drawn if it is contextualized with a set of intellectual resources that social theory, for no sane reason that I can find, has always ignored: the depth psychologies of Alfred Adler and Carl Jung.
Turning now to the comparative historical method, this as I have said is the method of enquiry, through which both the comparative and the developmental patterns of gender relationships and practices and the general sociological interdeterminations, e.g. with power or the economy, in which they are located are to be ascertained. The main methodological issue here is scepticism towards preconceptions - especially the preconception that women's position in modernity is unique. Behind this lies the preconception that whatever is not unique about women's position in modernity must be universal. This sort of sociological flat earth-ism desperately needs a Copernican revolution.

Beyond this, the problems are practical: above all the need in a first essay to define a limited substantive field in which studies of some substance can be placed. I have chosen Antiquity, the main reason for this being the desire to highlight the methodological incommensuracies of the sociological and anthropological disciplines and the vacuity of the traditional type of evolutionist approach. Specifically my studies are on: New Kingdom Egypt, classical Athens and the Roman Empire. The sociological typology, of course, is City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms: I try to show contrasting patterns of gender relations and practices in the two types. The contrasts are discussed at length in the four theoretical chapters that comprise Part B of the thesis; I will not try to precis it here. But the basic theoretical conception is of a "material triad" of forces: power, demographics and the economy. Different types of power structure impact upon the economy to produce different demographic regimes, in which women, fertility and sexuality either must be controlled (City-states) or can be acquiesced in (Bureaucratic Kingdoms). I try to analyse such factors as family and household structure, the place of women in the community, practices of parenthood and child-raising and patterns of sexual relationships on this basis, as well as considering for example sexual divisions in the economy and their relation to stratification. Again a division of sociological and anthropological themes can be seen here. But the structure of all this, as I have indicated, is worked out from first principles, as will be seen.
The historical studies themselves each follow the same structure as the four theoretical chapters. They are presented as the final part of the thesis, Part C. These studies presented their own problems. Not least among them is the poor reception of Weber's work on Antiquity into the sociological tradition, and even more into Weber scholarship - a tremendous failure to engage with the fact that Antiquity is where Weber's intellectual career begins. In particular, the appearance in 1976 of an English translation of "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations" has been met with a thunderous silence. Yet this is very much the pivotal work (1909) in which Weber transforms from a classical historian into a World historian. Against this, there is considerable interest in Weber among classical historians, especially thanks to the work of M.I. Finley. Egyptology presents a special range of problems of course: a general remoteness from the historiographical mainstream and above all, a basic lack of economic historical perspectives.*

But more particularly a persistent problem has been that, whereas what I wanted to do was to contrast Athens with Egypt, and then to show Rome changing from the Athenian pattern to the Egyptian as the Republic gives way to the Empire, instead I kept getting drawn into attempts to contrast early Rome with Athens. Partly this was because the historians upon whom I was reliant for general studies of women in classical Antiquity were themselves using this frame: generally they see Rome as a decaying City-state, and are quite reluctant to engage positively with the emergence of new structures in the Empire (see e.g. Pomeroy 1975; Cantarella 1987). My own work here indeed seems to be innovative in this regard. But beyond this there is here the question of Weber's typology of City-states: the Patrician City and the Plebeian City. This is not simply a question of which stratum is dom-

*There is apparently only one authoritative modern study of the economic history of Ancient Egypt, that of Wolfgang Helck (Helck 1975). Being in German, this could only be consulted at a very late stage, and systematic revisions in its light could not be incorporated into the chapter on Egypt (ch 8). However, the impact of Helck's study is clearly supportive of the arguments that I present.
inant: it reflects structural changes, as membership of patrician clans gives way to membership of peasant villages— a territorial as opposed to a personal basis of citizenship. This occurs at Athens at the end of the 6th century, at Rome during the 4th century. But the two Cities then follow quite divergent courses: Athens progresses to radical democracy while Rome reverts to oligarchy. Thus Athens marks a strong break with the Patrician past whereas Rome has a strong continuity with it (see Weber 1978 p 1343 – 49). However, in both cases it is only with the Plebeian City that secure historiography really becomes possible. In consequence, my thesis has no direct focus on the Patrician City, and accepts that the differences between Athens and early Rome are not directly accessible in secure terms. For the most part I speak of democratic Cities and oligarchic Cities when comparing the Athenian and Roman City-states, and this typology is kept very much subordinate to the major typological contrast of City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms. But candidly, I came to understand the issues here much later than I should have done.

What is presented in this thesis necessarily has a provisional character. That is the unavoidable consequence of the comparative historical method: the studies have to be built up gradually, and the first synthetic essays have a limited perspective, limited leverage, and perhaps distortions too. The cure for this is to make further studies and not to expect quick results. But also, what is presented here has a provisional character in that it would have benefitted from further revision. Each element, in methodology, social theory and historical study, reflects on the other elements and changes the way one sees them, especially after the whole thing is written out and the overall pattern finally begins to emerge. Then too some obvious directions of development begin to appear. At this time, then, I am conscious that there are many issues of theory whose resolution is clear enough from the comparative studies but which are not spelt out in the theoretical chapters. Again, I would wish now to make a positive engagement with the question of the social science and cultural science perspectives and the location of Weber's sociology between them— reading A.L. Kroeber seems increasingly to clarify
this. And not least, I would wish to improve weak or defective argument, in particular on matters of the origins of the Ancient Civilization and the City-state as they are presented in Appendix A.

However the resolution of these matters is not the precon-
dition for gender theory, and probably the stage of completion at which one finally presents one's work must always seem arbit¬rarily chosen.

I would like to express my thanks, for criticism, support and getting extensions, to John Holmwood and Gianfranco Poggi. Patricia Jeffery's supervision was also influential in the pro-
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Part A

Methodological Foundations
Chapter 1

Value-relevance and Value-freedom

Something should perhaps be said first about political sympathies. My intention in this thesis is to raise an account of gender in terms of the sociology of Max Weber. This is an exercise in value-free sociology: that is, political sympathies may condition the choice of subject for enquiry, but once that choice is made, the enquiry must be pursued impartially. As against this, gender studies at the present time have a virtually mandatory feminist value-commitment, and almost always take their orientation from Marx (and sometimes Freud). Some discussion of the issues here then will be expected.

Perhaps it is best to start at the level of personal biography, by stating that my commitment to gender as an area of concern, and my adoption of a Weberian intellectual identity, both developed at the same time and in terms of each other, while I was an undergraduate student. There is no question of my coming to gender as a ready-made Weberian. My reasons here were simply dissatisfaction with the way that the intellectual resources were being marshalled against this particularly difficult group of problems, gender and society. On the one side, there seemed to be a feminist polemic, gathered around the "emancipatory discourses" of Marx and Freud; on the other side, a received body of social theory on gender characterized by functionalism, positivism, biological determinism, Idealism, and epitomised in the work of Talcott Parsons. Probably neither of these identifications is wholly satisfactory. But the point is that in this antithesis a great deal of sociology is being left out of account: the sociology of Max Weber and everything that comes from it, in neo-Weberian or post-Weberian sociology, conflict sociology, Interpretive sociology, comparative historical sociology. It seemed to me that,
given the continuing difficulties of the area, these resources should be brought to bear. In this, sympathy for women, the desire to understand society, and (what is by no means the same thing) the desire to understand sociology, all played about equal parts.

I do not want to become involved in a sterile rehearsal of standard arguments. The central questions about facts and values are whether certain political sympathies require certain sets of analytic concepts for their articulation, and conversely, whether certain sets of analytic concepts entail certain (inimical) political sympathies. The critique of value-freedom is above all the possession of Marxism, which would then reject Weber as a "bourgeois sociologist". As I have said, Marxism is the commonest resource and orientation for feminist theory. But it is fair to point out that the bearing of this argument for feminism is not straightforward, for even if Weber is a "bourgeois sociologist", the relationship of Capitalism to patriarchy remains something of an unsolved problem. Indeed, so far as the "woman question" can be considered to be Marxism's great political and analytical failure, we would seem to have grounds here for a rejection, of quite general application, of the whole argument: Marxism has bought its value-commitment in the sphere of socio-economics at the cost of gender-blindness. This surely is a positive argument for value-free sociology. Though it should be kept in view that, in actuality, feminism adopts a range of options in its stance towards Marxism: there are definite tendencies that seek to keep it at arm's-length, and to work only in parallel or on analogy with it.

Against this, the sociology of Max Weber taken at its own estimation can be described as a positive critique of Marxism whose central thrust comprises the systematic qualification of economic determinism through the development of the sociology of power. Now the sociology of power has a self-evident potential for articulating feminist concerns (patriarchy, the subordination of women to male authority), and my explorations of this comprise an essential dimension of my project, as will be seen. But there are other dimensions no less essential. Above all, there is my attempt to deal with demographic history. I cannot see that as a specifically Weberian issue. Any attempt at gender theory which claims
to be historical and materialist surely must consider demography, for sex produces babies - not socialized children or the reproduction of the social order, just babies - and what happens then - not what "must" happen - is matter for historical enquiry. Yet feminist theory does not seem to have thought this way. Some convention of sociology seems to keep women's issues and population issues insulated from each other, and feminists do not appear to have questioned it.

Before going further, however, a basic point must be made: that the subject in view, sociology and gender, can be understood in two quite different ways, according as how one understands the term "sociology". On the one hand, it can mean the general theory of gender and society, that is, society as such, all societies; on the other hand, it can mean the consideration of gender relations in a particular kind of society of sociological interest - usually modernity. Contemporary feminist sociology most usually follows this second sense; its theoretical framework is overwhelmingly the analysis of relations between Capitalism and patriarchy (see e.g. Barrett 1980). This can be done in a number of ways, but it is not to the point here to examine them in detail. Rather there are general strategic problems. The development of women's oppression through Capitalist history is clearly at a lower level of significance than the historical transformations that created (and may end) the Capitalist order itself, so that patriarchy is being made from the outset a second-order phenomenon. Further, the classical formulations of the theory of Capitalism do not adduce gender factors, so that women's oppression is made not constitutive but only restitutive (or reproductive) for the Capitalist social order, in a sort of Marxian functionalism. This again is secondary status; women's oppression is given no causal significance for social change. And with all this, the attempt to maximise in the face of these difficulties the significance of the link between Capitalism and patriarchy has the perverse consequence of implying that women's oppression is specific to Capitalist society - which is palpably untrue. These points are briefly enough made, but the underlying issue is that the theory of Capitalism and patriarchy really requires explicit grounding in a general theory of
gender and society. Equally, a methodological statement is needed, as to how the theory of patriarchy and Capitalism has leverage upon the general theory of gender and society.

To turn to this deeper level, the general theory of gender and society in Marxist conception seems to offer three basic "received" positions: firstly, that women's oppression is universal and invariant; secondly, that women's oppression does not occur in primitive societies but is universal in class societies; thirdly, that women's oppression is specific to, or at least reaches its culmination in, Capitalist society. Although the locus classicus of gender theory used to be the emergence of civilization - stratification and the state - from primitive conditions, the last position here seems now to be the commonest orientation of modern feminist sociology, at least at the level of logical implication if not always of explicit statement. Here again, it is the general criticisms that need to be made: that even by a common-sense knowledge of history and of the modern world, all these positions are palpably untrue; that meta-ethical structures are being imposed here where an empirical enquiry is what is needed; that the premature introduction of value-laden terms such as "women's oppression" introduces confusion. At base of this is exactly the same problem as with the theory of Capitalism and patriarchy: that the classical formulations of Marxism did not adduce gender factors, especially at the level of changes of mode of production, so that the theory of women's oppression again comes out as a sort of functionalist account of second-order phenomena. It would be only fair to admit that Parsons actually does better than this; his treatment of society itself may be weak, but it is properly integrated and all on one level.

The most basic problem with the theory of gender and society is precisely that it is a problem in the general theory of society, society as such, and yet we approach it through two sciences of society: sociology and anthropology. These are institutionalized side by side in our universities with no formalized intellectual relationship between them; how one conceives their relationship is very much a factor of how one sees each discipline. Sociology, as indicated above, may be the general science of society, or it
may be restricted to a focus on modernity; anthropology equally may be the general science of society, or indeed the general science of culture, or it may be the science of primitive peoples.* Formal synthesis in overarching or grand theory, as with Parsons, tends conventionally to be called sociology. Yet "anthropology" has the literal meaning "the science of Man". This betrays, I believe, an implicit assumption of sociology: that the general theory of gender and society is really anthropology's prerogative. This for many reasons: it is a matter of origins, of human nature, best seen in simple "close to nature" societies similar to those of the far past; it is a biological problem, best understood through types of social theory that have a biological input (e.g. functionalism) - these are perhaps the main assumptions. And above all, there is the anthropological tradition of dealing with themes like incest taboo, puberty rites, polygyny, bridewealth and dowry, matrilineal and patrilineal descent, etc. Sociology really has very little to set against all this, and therefore must restrict itself to applying the general theory that anthropology creates to the restricted range of "sociological" societies - modernity. Thus is created an anthropological supervision of sociology, and with it an implicit evolutionist paradigm for the integration of the two disciplines. All this was pointed out 40 years ago by Carle Zimmerman, and although that was contemporary with a fairly early stage in the development of Parson's work, he also pointed out that there was no real difference between the conventional and the Marxist versions (Zimmerman 1947 ch 1 - 5, esp. ch 2). But for the modern feminist sociologist, this irrational situation in regard to anthropology makes it tempting, either to disregard the problem of general theory altogether and consider modernity only, or else to take refuge in the received traditions of grand theory of Marxism and Freudian Psychoanalysis (e.g. Mitchell 1975). These offer an antithesis to Parsonian grand theory at the

*There are important national differences here, especially as between Britain, the U.S.A., and France. Especially important is the distinction between social anthropology and cultural anthropology; though anthropology can also include e.g. archaeology or linguistics. See Diamond (ed) 1980; Barnouw 1975. The problems of relating sociology, social anthropology, and cultural anthropology will come up in this thesis again and again.
level of values; and yet they have the same overall strategy — indeed, Freudian Psychoanalysis is indifferently a resource for both Marxist and Parsonian grand theory — and their anthropology moreover is hopelessly obselete.

In my judgement, it is in these issues that the real heart of the problem with gender theory lies: how to build a general theory of gender that will be valid in terms of contemporary sociology and anthropology, in the face of the uncomprehended lesions between the two disciplines. More specifically, how can the sociologist create gender theory at the level of the general theory of society without adducing incompetent anthropology under an illegitimate methodology? The answer that orients this present thesis is clear-cut: through the comparative historical method. I discuss this at length in the next chapter (ch 2). It may be that other answers could be given. In particular, some might point to contemporary developments in "materialistic" anthropology (c.f. e.g. Ennew 1979; Bland et al 1978). I lack expertise in this, but I would make two points: firstly, that a materialist perspective does not necessarily mean a conflict perspective, and where a focus on environment, population and technology grounds theories of exogenous change in functionally integrated societies, this is a very different thing from the Marxist sociology of the class struggle; secondly, that the strategy of superimposing the contemporary ethnographic record upon prehistory to ground speculative reconstructions of the evolution of conflict society is methodologically dubious to the point of illegitimacy. Parsons pointed out over 40 years ago the ambiguities in anthropology’s position: if on the one hand it is conceived as the study of primitive social systems, then it cannot justify its status as a separate discipline from sociology; if on the other hand it is conceived as the general science of culture, then it cannot justify its traditional focus on primitive peoples (Parsons 1954 p 236 –7). These ambiguities can by no means be resolved by assuming a qualitative difference between primitive society and complex society and a process of "evolution" from the one to the other. Nor should the materialist critique of Idealism be confounded with the difference between cultural science and social science;
the difference between culture and society is that between technology and economy. In fine, there are methodological problems here, and whatever the preferred solution, it must be given explicit statement.

It might be thought that this discussion has strayed from its initial concerns with facts, values, and political sympathies, but this is by no means so. My central point is that feminist theory appears to have grounded itself on the assumption that the adoption of the "emancipatory discourses" of Marx and Freud is the only strategic innovation that requires to be made. This I reject at all levels: there is nothing innovative in applying Marx and Freud to gender theory; it is highly problematic getting any such approach to work; and above all, whether we use Marx and Freud or not, there are still fundamental methodological problems whose resolution is essential. I would make the accusation, then, that feminism's insistence on a value-committed mode of analysis conceals a profound failure of intellectual radicalism. This is what the present thesis sets out to supply: an intellectually radical treatment of gender and society. Most broadly, this means an attempt to conceive gender factors as constitutive of society and contributing directly to general processes of social change.

I approach this through the sociology of Max Weber. But this is not to be narrowly understood. At base is the comparative historical method: the insistence that sociology can and must work independent of and on the same status as anthropology, given that the two disciplines cannot easily be reconciled. With this, the relationship in the abstract of human biology to social reality is to be established through consideration of the Interpretive conception of social reality, not through evolutionist reconstructions. Central theoretical concerns that emerge, as I have indicated, include the sociology of power and the sociology of demographics; it goes without saying that they also include the sociology of economics. However, it will also emerge that the ideological realm is not central in the same way. All this will be seen in the chapters that follow. Another issue is that I make use of Jungian psychology (Analytical Psychology): Jung offers a positive critique of Freud exactly as Weber does of Marx, and so
far as social theory has neglected to consider it, this is an obvious resource for a project in intellectual radicalism. But to draw all this together, the basic point is that in attempting intellectual radicalism, I have not let the desire to belong to a politically and socially radical movement dictate my intellectual choices. That is value-freedom.

It should be added, however, that there are positive attractions, at the level of value-orientation, to working specifically with the sociology of Max Weber. For the modern development of sociology has produced two critiques of "functionalist orthodoxy" successively from different directions: Interpretivism and Marxism. The Interpretive critique focusses especially on reification - treating hypothetical things as real and attributing action to them, when it is only persons who act. This indeed is part of a wider humanist critique found generally in the human sciences, e.g. in psychology or psychiatry, where indeed its thrust is as much against Freud as against behaviourism; it is a critique of positivism, determinism, reductionism - all argument that seeks to treat people as things, or bits or composites of things, instead of persons. Weber is very much a part of this. As against this, Marxism's critique is specifically sociological: it accuses functionalism of defending the status quo as inevitable; of being insensitive to oppression; of lacking a sense of history, of conflict, and of change. But with this, Marxism also makes a critique of Interpretivism, accusing it on the one hand of lacking, like functionalism, a sense of history and of change; on the other, of having false individualistic sympathies instead of collective class sympathies – an error that reflects the nature of bourgeois society rather than penetrates it. In response, Interpretivism might point to the difficulties of Marxist theory in the areas of ideology, consciousness, and revolution: is Marxism humanist or mechanistic?

Above, I argued that to call Weber a "bourgeois sociologist" in the face of persistent difficulties in establishing a relationship between Capitalism and patriarchy could in the gender context be something of a two-edged sword. Similarly here, it can be argued that Marxism's collectivist sympathies are patriarchal
sympathies (what have women to do with class?), whereas Interpretivist individualism reflects women's interests. I stress that some basis for this does emerge in my theoretical discussions (ch 4 - 7 below). But beyond this, the attractions of Weber are obvious: he combines the humanist orientation to the individual with a sociology that is powerfully oriented to history, conflict and change (and that can identify collective interests, though without identifying with them). In short, he goes far towards offering a synthesis of Interpretivist and Marxist positions. And even Marxists respect Weber's comparative historical range, and his sociology of power.

My position in this is not purely an intellectual one. I would like to see the development of critical thought and practice as cumulative, not as a succession of mutually destructive critiques. Not least, I would like to see the sexual revolution and the woman's revolution as cumulative - I hate to see the woman's movement keep company with Mary Whitehouse and Victoria Gilliick. There is immense dissent to the oppressions of modern civilization, however experienced and conceived; I would like to see that dissent brought together and achieve change. I do not want to see it weighed in the theoretical scales of class-struggle and revolution, and found wanting. But it often seems to me that Marxism in the modern West has become an intellectual ghetto, a refuge for those who seek not change but vindication - and a location from which communication with the outside world is impossible. My avoidance of this position has nothing to do with political sympathies.

At any rate, the value-orientation of this thesis is by intention positive towards women's liberation, however sceptical about feminist approaches in social theory. My position is that an impartial analysis on Weberian lines will do most to clarify the sociological issues with which feminism is concerned. There is no question of showing those issues to be illusory.

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The project of raising an account of gender in terms of the sociology of Max Weber is easier to state than to define. Indeed, it is probably easier to carry through than to define, for meta-statements, if they have substance and are not merely programmatic, have most often the character of on-going (which means at least partly retrospective) commentary, rather than that of a recipe provided in advance. Weber himself indicates this in his methodological essays, with the comment that knowledge of methodology is not necessary for science, any more than knowledge of anatomy is for walking (Weber 1949 p 115). Even so, some kind of meta-statement is required here, to try to say what the proposal, to raise an account of gender in terms of the sociology of Max Weber, means.

Weber’s location in sociology is complex and paradoxical. There is an older layer of piecemeal and fragmentary translations, appropriations, criticisms, etc., starting from the end of the 1920’s, in which the major landmarks are: "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism", "The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations", and Gerth and Mills' "From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology". Then there is a newer layer of systematic translation and appraisal, in which the major landmarks are Reinhardt Bendix’ "Max Weber – An Intellectual Portrait" (1960), and the full translation of "Economy and Society" (1968). My own location is wholeheartedly in this newer layer, though it is still developing and changing. But a further range of problems lies in the encyclopaedic nature of Weber’s sociological contribution. On the one side, he gives us, by precept and by example, a sociological methodology; on the other side, he gives us a substantive sociological fabric of analytic concepts – especially in the areas of economy,
power, stratification, law and religion - interwoven with secular theses of historical kind that run all through World history. The Protestant Ethic thesis is only the best known of these. Incidentally, it should be specified that this includes an embryonic treatment of at least some gender issues (see esp. Weber 1978 Part ii ch 3 & 4; Weber 1981 ch 2). The problem, then, is both how to raise and how to locate the account of gender now: do we find it already in the fabric of the substantive sociology, or do we use the methodology to make a new enquiry? And if we choose the latter option and make a new enquiry, will the fabric of the substantive sociology be able to accommodate its results?

Clearly these questions could be answered in different ways: there is here a whole universe of sociological discourse, and there could be as many Weberian accounts of gender as there are Marxist. But there are better and worse answers, and here the example of Marxism is suggestive, for here too there is an embarrassment of riches: Marxism's basic problem with gender is that Marxism does not need to invoke gender as a causal factor for the socio-historical phenomena with whose explanation it is centrally concerned. Or perhaps that is feminism's problem with Marxism. Either way, the consequence is the trivialization of gender issues. And while the parallel with Weber is not exact - Weber's explanatory concerns range more widely - nonetheless it remains true that gender ought to be allowed to explain things, i.e. general socio-historical processes, and not be limited to merely describing itself, and that an honest enquiry cannot have the character of an exercise in damage limitation. This means that the account of gender cannot simply be sought in the corpus of Weber's substantive sociology; it must be raised at the methodological level, in terms of a new enquiry, and the problem of accommodation simply has to be faced. That is, the most radical option should be taken from the outset. In actuality, this is not so much of a problem: the theory of gender may not be to be sought in the corpus of Weber's sociological writings, but many elements of it are nonetheless to be found there, once one knows what one is looking for. Weber's sociological genius is overwhelming. But even so, one must orient oneself to the fact that a full-scale treatment of gender is some-
thing that he did not do.

As to Weber's own considerations on gender, the following comments might be made. The main discussions (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 3 & 4; Weber 1981 ch 2) are evidently largely in response to the Socialist theory of the Family; as such, they are centred on the wife and mother in the family and the household, rather than considering women in society at large. Furthermore, they appear to be based in great part on an untranslated work of Marianne Weber, "Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwicklung" (The Wife and Mother in Legal History - published 1907). This work has never entered the sociological canon, and its recovery would be a major scholarly project in itself. With this, subsequent historiographical and other scholarship has developed without generally taking account of Weber's ideas, and so appears to be of limited value either for confirming or refuting them. Indeed, to work on the scale of "Economy and Society" requires encyclopaedic knowledge, at least partly at the level of primary sources. Otherwise an unacceptable superficiality of treatment results. In sum, on these grounds too I have judged it necessary to start again: to make focussed historical studies and produce a restricted synthesis from them, within a limited substantive arena, appropriating and incorporating the various elements of Weber's gender theory according as it becomes possible to do so - using them as sighting shots rather than starting points, if you will. There are many fragments besides the main discussions, as a reading of especially "Economy and Society" (which is well indexed) will show. All these matters will appear again in this and subsequent chapters.

The problem, then, is placed on the level of methodology. The two methodological planks on which Weber builds his sociology are the Interpretive method and the comparative historical method. A central point here is that Weber used a fusion of these two methods; by contrast, sociology post-Weber seems rather to have pursued them as two quite separate methodological options. With this, while there is a great deal of debate on the questions of Interpretivism, much less seems to have been written about the comparative historical method. Indeed, that is true of Weber's own meth-
odological essays. These however are contributions to an ongoing Methodenstreit in the socio-cultural sciences in contemporary Germany (see Weber 1975 p 16 - 24; Weber 1977 p 10 - 22; i.e. translator's Introductions); they are not prescriptions ex nihilo for how to do sociology. As such, they consider only certain kinds of questions. Modern methodological debate, oriented fundamentally to the differences between the French and German streams of classical sociology, has a different range of concerns, and the apparent philosophical continuities are deceptive. To my mind, these matters might be better understood through the application of less philosophy and more history (the philosophy of science cannot organize the history of science). At least, I do not want to pursue this into a discussion of philosophically grounded methodology for its own sake here - an academic "black hole" if ever there was one. But the questions of the relation between the two arms of Weber's methodology, and the methodological location and nature of the comparative historical arm, do require consideration.

Weber was a historian; he began his intellectual career in the 1850's as a historian of Rome under Theodore Mommsen. He progressed from there via economics and economic history (not forgetting his training in law) to sociology, writing his first formally sociological works (the essays on Protestantism and capitalism) and the essays on methodology in the 1900's, and the great encyclopaedic works ("Economy and Society" and "The Economic Ethic of the World Religions") in the decade following. But his works from the outset (e.g. the "Roman Agrarian History" of 1891 - Weber 1982) are sociological in character, even though their subject matter is from the point of view of modern sociology somewhat arcane. The point is that what drew Weber into sociology was precisely the sociological tendency that is inherent in historiography: Weber became a sociologist because he was a historian. It is this that is the significance of the comparative historical method, and the reason why it can appear somewhat opaque to sociological interrogation. It is a historiographical, not a sociological, methodology - or if you like, it is sociology, seen from a historian's point of view. Weber made this transition within an over-
all neo-Kantian intellectual environment; he contrasts history and sociology in terms of individualizing and generalizing sciences, rather than in terms of e.g. narrative and explanation, since for both disciplines explanation is ultimately grounded in Intentional action and the individual. Again, he is compelled to evolve an account of how mass phenomena can be grounded on Intentionally acting individuals, which is the aspect of his methodology most often discussed now: the notion of ideal types. But this is by no means his starting point, nor is it something uniquely his own; there are similar conceptions among his contemporaries.

But, as I have commented above, our modern practice of viewing these issues solely in the light of the philosophy of the social sciences is not altogether useful. It is perhaps more to the point to make an approach through the history of the social sciences, and ask what it was that Weber, as historian becoming sociologist, did not do. This question should be considered in the light of the contemporary developments in the sciences of society especially in Britain and France (see Evans-Pritchard 1965a, 1981): Weber did not involve himself with the biological sciences or with anthropology. The distinction should be marked here between anthropology and ethnography, for Weber did consider ethnographic material. The distinction seems to lie precisely in the biological sciences: the invocation of biological explanatory principles in the social field, whether in terms of continuity (e.g. race theory) or analogy (e.g. evolutionism). All this Weber avoided; indeed, his development of an Interpretivist position could be seen as a deliberate distancing of himself from such biological tendencies; though there can be little question that his primary disagreements were specifically those of a historian, and on substantive historical grounds. Later (e.g. in "Economy and Society"), Weber would sometimes cite ideas from some of these English and French sources, but he never really debated with it systematically as a form of social theory. If this was because he did not take it seriously, then on the whole modern thought would vindicate his judgement. But it has left us with a difficult lacuna in the history of social theory.

This is difficult ground, for there is a definite heritage
in modern social theory from the biologistic tendency of Victorian "armchair anthropology", coming partly direct through the work of Durkheim and partly by the left hand through Freud. I have to admit here to an outright cynicism as to the standing of Freud in social theory (c.f. Bocock 1976): surely there is a strong element here of invoking an outside authority in order to reinflate notions that we have ourselves discredited. And besides, a critical evaluation of Freud really requires some engagement with the great schismatics, Adler and Jung, which social theory seems never to have done. This is no academic point, for I will be much concerned with Jung in the next chapter (ch 3; see also Appendix B). But staying with more general considerations, I have argued above (ch 1) that the biologistic tendency in social theory seems to be concomittant with a broad assumption in social theory, of very long standing, that since gender issues are grounded in human biology, they accordingly have an affinity with those forms of social theory that have a biological input - whether in terms of continuity (this would now mean ethology or sociobiology) or of analogy (this would usually now mean functionalism, though evolutionism remains a strong, if not always explicit, presence). This, with the institutionalization of sociology and anthropology as parallel disciplines in our universities with no formalized intellectual relationship to integrate them, grounds a tacit strategic assumption that it is anthropology that makes the real fundamental treatment of gender theory, and in this regard "supervises" sociology. This again underwrites evolutionism, whether explicated or no. I have argued this (and recalled Zimm-erman) earlier. To my mind, the traditional difficulties of gender theory are very much located in these issues - and of course, Marx and Freud are both far too much a part of this picture to offer any critique of it.

But to return to Weber: what must be grasped is that, despite distancing himself from biology and anthropology, Weber does still unquestionably intend a general science of society, that will undertake to enquire into the full range of social phenomena at the most fundamental level. This science is not envisaged as requiring complementation by a "science of Man" ("anthropol-
ogy"). Though Weber centres his enquiry on World-historical patterns in which the primitive is peripheral, his rejection of anthropology as I have said is a rejection not of ethnography but of biologism. And it seems to me that it is precisely Weber's position that sociology must adopt now, in face of the modern sociology/anthropology divide: the commitment that, however anthropology may conceive itself, whatever anthropology may do, sociology must undertake gender theory at the level of the general theory of society on its own account, by its own methodologies. Weber's Interpretivism is no renunciation of biologically grounded problems. On the contrary, it is the positive provision of a methodological conception whereby the biological is to be dealt with as a conditioning environment for social action, subject to the process of social construction. He uses this argument in regard to race and other "anthropological" factors; he uses basically the same argument in regard to the material environment for the sociology of economics, though clearly the considerations here will not be identical (see Weber 1978 Part i ch 1 & 2; Part ii ch 5). All this will be taken up in the next chapter (ch 3). For the meantime, however, it must be made clear that this Interpretive conception of social reality and its inter-relation with human biology is intended to do no more than provide the most basic ontological statement - the relationship "in the abstract". No more: as I have said, Weber's fundamental argument with biologistic social theory was that it was bad history, that it could not make a basic statement of the nature of social phenomena without proposing evolutionary sequences and stages that were historically nonsensical. Paradoxically, then, it is precisely the virtue of the Interpretive method that it does not tell us anything. Therefore it leaves us free to find out everything. The comparative historical method is the reverse of this coin: it is Weber's way of finding things out.

I think that it has been worthwhile to spell this out. For it seems to me that, just as modern Interpretive sociology sets out to achieve far more than Weber ever intended for his Interpretivism, so conversely modern sociology has tended to forget that the comparative historical method has methodological force,
and instead has tended to treat comparative historical sociology merely as a body of received knowledge. As I have pointed out before, Weber's substantive sociology is an interwoven fabric of analytic concepts and secular theses in World History. The tendency post-Weber seems to have been to work in terms of this: to extend or consolidate it in specific areas; to argue with it; very commonly to try to rework it so as to reflect a preferred set of values or theoretical assumptions: Marxist, functionalist, evolutionist, Christian, whatever. It seems rather more rare for modern sociology to actually set out in comparative historical terms to find out anything really new, far less to initiate a radical enquiry into a wholly new area. Indeed, there are matters here that merit discussion, for the sake of the thesis that follows.

To come straight to the heart of the matter, modern scholarly historiography seems to have become established in Germany long before it did anywhere else, quite early in the 19th century (see Marwick 1981 ch 2 - 4). In consequence, Weber at the beginning of the 20th century was very strongly placed to write works of comparative historical sociology on World Historical scale, even by comparison with the sociologist in modern Britain or America. With this, the historiographical traditions of Britain and America are not only younger, but also they do not seem to have centrally concerned themselves either with Max Weber or with perspectives on World History (though perhaps more the latter in recent times). This creates difficulties for the modern sociologist both in reading Max Weber and in undertaking comparative historical work himself; for all our respect for Weber, it is not always easy to find out just how far his actual history is sound. (Though in the classical field, the historians do seem now to have discovered Weber - in advance indeed of the sociologists! See e.g. Finley 1973, 1985). It is perhaps this that gives post-Weberian comparative historical sociology its peculiar character: that on the one side, it regards Weber as its great presiding genius, while on the other, it refuses to engage in extended debate with him. (Oddly enough, it seems that the touchstone here is the intellectual reference group, rather than the
intellectual resources as defined by use of the English language — many of the contributors to the post-Weberian tradition have been fluent in German.)

A good example, and one specially relevant for the later concerns of this thesis, lies in the economic sociology of Karl Polanyi (Polanyi et al eds. 1957; Polanyi 1968, 1977). Polanyi shares with Weber a basic concern with the relation of the substantive economy to the formal economy of classical economics, and an extended consideration of this problem in the light of the economic arrangements of Antiquity (see esp. Weber 1976), and his debt to Weber here is considerable and explicit. Yet he theorizes the ancient economy quite differently from Weber, focussing narrowly on the institutions of trade, money and markets, where Weber has a wider focus that also takes in both agrarian and artisanal relations, and also slavery. Moreover, Weber contextualizes this with an account of the ancient polity, inter-relating polity and economy through the concept of non-peaceful economic action. I do not wish simply to assert the superiority of Weber's account, merely to point out that Polanyi never seems to tell us where Weber is wrong, or why his own account is better. This holds not merely at the level of general theory, but also at the level of the specific analyses, which both undertake, of e.g. Mesopotamia or Athens. I would have thought that, by Polanyi's own arguments — that the ancient economy cannot be equated with trade, money and markets, but must be seen in wider terms, including the power structures with which it is contextualized — Weber's account would come nearer to meeting Polanyi's criteria than does Polanyi's own, and I cannot see how Polanyi can not have known that. It should be added that Polanyi has an over-riding value-concern to show that only a market economy (an exchange economy) can ground real inhumanity in general social relations (see Polanyi 1977 Introduction). Accordingly, he will not focus on usury, debt-slavery, the expropriation of the peasantry, the marginality of the urban artisanate, or the slave trade in the Ancient Civilization, though he quotes Weber marginally on these points. Equally, his focus on the market as the diagnostic of the market economy (as against Weber's focus on the enterprise) has the consequence
that Polanyi has no theory of Advanced Capitalism; he draws mid-20th century Capitalist society in the image of the mid-19th century, with neither price-fixing cartels and monopolies nor bureaucratic state intervention. But despite this inadequacy, the point I want to insist upon is not merely that Polanyi holds different views from Weber, but that he never seems to justify the differences. We are just left with a vague impression that since this is later, it's got to be better - Weber was after all writing half a century ago.

I have chosen to discuss Polanyi here not merely for his relevance to my later thesis, where I discuss gender in the context of the Ancient Civilization, but also because he is one of the most original and powerful thinkers to have taken a post-Weberian line in terms of World-historical questions. Other lesser but still classic works could have been chosen to illustrate the issues - e.g. S.N. Eisenstadt's "Political Systems of Empires", or, most recently, Michael Mann's "The Sources of Social Power" (Eisenstadt 1963; Mann 1986). The characteristic paradox is always there: on the one side, the inspiratory orientation to Weber; on the other side, the curious reluctance to actually engage in debate with him. I am frankly sceptical as to what progress in comparative historical sociology is possible in these terms; Weber's work is tremendously robust (and his status is continually growing). I think that we have to take the bull by the horns: to realize that there is a failure of continuity in historiographical scholarship, and that this failure of continuity must not be imported into sociology (where we have enough failures of continuity of our own already). We must be prepared to read our historiography much more critically, and start treating Weber as our contemporary not our ancestor.

I have the right here, I think, to distance this present thesis from the post-Weberian tradition of comparative historical sociology, for my purpose is not to rehearse or revise a familiar thesis in the sociology of economics, power, religion, etc., but to try to do something new: to open up the gender question through the comparative historical method. But having returned to this, it becomes necessary to try to say what the comparative his-
Having insisted upon the methodological status of the comparative historical method, it is now the elements of comparison and history that have to be discussed: their meaning and their reasons. Some of the points here have already been indicated: in particular, I have shown that Weber is a historian before he is a sociologist, and that it is through the process of comparison that he comes from history to sociology. For this reason, the ideal type is not the best place to begin this discussion; it is where Weber winds up rather than where he starts. The ideal type mediates between the comparative historical method and the Interpretive method. Given this, Weber's methodological arguments may rather have the character of exploring the implications of his position than of stating the preconditions of his enquiries — it is only a convention of modern sociology that refrains from reading Weber prior to "The Protestant Ethic". Again, the notion of the ideal type is used by others than Weber, and in other contexts and ways; methodological debate on the concept as such does not necessarily clarify Weber's intentions with it. I do not wish to seem adulatory, but I am always sceptical of approaches to this question whose implicit orientation is that Weber did sociology wrong. I would have said, in view of his achievement, that he did sociology right. But that is by the way. Rather I want to return to a point I made earlier, about Weber distancing himself from contemporary positions in British and French social theory, with their input from the biological sciences. A key issue here resides in the word "society": while the biologistic tendency in social theory has always constituted this in organismic terms as the basic macro-unit of study, Weber has no exact equivalent to this concept. That is, "society" (like "community") has two or more quite distinct meanings: the "Gesellschaft" (or "Vergesellschaftungen") of German sociology rather has the meaning of "association"; not a macro-unit of study, but simply one type of social relationship. A closer equivalent to the conventional sociological concept "society" is given in the sub-title to Part ii of "Economy and Society": "The Economy and the Arena of Normative
and de Facto Powers". But more simply still, it is history that
is for Weber the arena for study: World History. There is no
macro-unit, certainly no reified macro-unit that is capable of
acting, within this arena; only individual persons. Weber's socio-
logy is built upon social action - the socially acting individual
person - in the context of history. To bridge the gap between
these two things is the function of the ideal type.

This then is the "history" of Weber's comparative historical
sociology. It is not a history in which entities "societies" are
located, subject to a passage of time; equally, the comparative
method is not the comparison of entities "societies". It is most
important for the enquiry into gender to realize this: gender re-
lates to history through being a conditioning environment for
social action, and the relations of this social action to history
are not mediated through entities "societies". Especially they
are not mediated through the self-reproduction of entities "soc-
ieties". All that can be said is that history is the product of
social action. The fundamental relation of biology to history is
a philosophical imponderable; whether humanity is still constrain-
ed by the Darwinian laws; whether historical processes must sub-
serve the survival of the species, etc. The biological input into
social theory has resulted in certain strategic assumptions being
made on these matters, although not always being explicated. But
they are no more than assumptions; their worth, as Weber would
say, is to be judged by what they produce in the way of knowledge
and understanding. And here we follow a different way, assuming
that while biology environs and conditions social action, it does
not supervise it: the social realm has its own ecology. Again,
this argument will be pursued in the next chapter (ch 3 - "The
Interpretive Method"). But so far as history and the impact of
biology is concerned, there is one obvious point: that there is
no reason why either the motives, e.g. sexual desire, or the out-
comes, e.g. babies, should be considered to be contained within
the social process or subserve the status quo. They could equally
well be in conflict with it. Indeed, an orientation to the "pop-
ulation explosion" would surely make that obvious. There is sure-
ly a most fundamental strategic point for feminist theory here:
to seek to locate human biology to the processes of social change not those of social continuity. Despite the biologists' word "reproduction" (women do not reproduce; they have babies), there is no reason why this cannot be done.

These comments, however, are perhaps somewhat previous, for the comparative element in the comparative historical method still remains to be discussed. Something on this has indeed already been indicated: that Weber comes to sociology from history through the process of comparison; that sociology in a sense is comparative history. But more than this needs to be said. Weber's sociology is built up of historically filled ideal types; that is, it comprises arrays of contrasted types of social action (typologies), in terms of descriptions; and identifications of the elective affinities and disaffinities between them. As I have said before, analytic concepts and secular theses in World History are interwoven together in Weber's sociology. The process of comparison serves both to establish the definition of the given ideal types, and to establish the patterns of affinity and disaffinity. The process, if freed from its Interpretive setting, is basically a commonsense one: the attempt to separate the necessary from the contingent on the common scientific methodological presumption that the necessary will be a common presence in all alike cases, while the contingent will vary from case to case; or conversely, where a distinctive identity is to be established, the contingent will be a common presence in unalike cases and the necessary will be the unique factor. (As stated earlier, Weber distinguishes history and sociology as the individualizing and the generalizing sciences respectively, rather than as narrative and explanation.)

What makes this more complex is Interpretivism: social phenomena have an essential subjective dimension; action is not simply observed behaviour. This unavoidably intrudes a degree of uncertainty into sociological (and historical) analysis, as compared to the certainties of the natural sciences. However, in compensation, sociology achieves a greater depth of explanation, in terms of the motives and intentions of social actors, their perception of their situations, etc. This methodological position is above all true to the experienced difficulties of historical and socio-
logical enquiry (also incidentally to legal proceedings). Sociology has often set out to achieve something better, but whether it has ever attained it is another question.

Weber's comparativism should perhaps be distinguished from the comparative approach used in classical anthropology, for that approach came in time to be criticized in anthropology both from the point of view of the developing fieldwork tradition and from the point of view of functionalist theory (see Evans-Pritchard 1965b). The point was that isolated traits or practices, often imperfectly understood or inadequately reported, were being wrenched out of their original contexts for the sake of the comparison, which would build them into hypothetical meta-sociological structures. From this point of view, it is interesting to regard Weber's own consideration, and indeed selection, of ethnographic material. But the correctives to this practice, in meticulous reporting and in the interpretation of social phenomena by their place in the totality of which they form a part, can have too high costs; at least so far as the latter entails the suppression of social conflicts and processes of social change in social theory and explanation. Besides, it is surely questionable whether complex societies at least are in fact so tightly integrated, and whether all their phenomena are open to such analysis. There is a level of folk-custom and folk-tale, for example, even in modern industrial society, which the sociologist would not ordinarily concern himself with and could not easily explain. (We tend to select what is significant by what we can explain, but this entails great risk of complacency.) I guess that here social theory is showing Freudian influences: the notion of over-determination, and the insistence that everything is significant, even symptomatic. Yet I would be hard pressed to explain to such criteria why, for example, our civilization presents stories from the "Arabian Nights" in books for young children. It seems to me that sociology must make allowances for a civilization's creative use of a cultural repertoire drawn partly from alien sources. Human creativity cannot be accommodated in closed explanatory structures, yet it is essential that sociology should accommodate it.

In these matters, Weber steers between two poles: his compar-
ison is always grounded both in wide-ranging analysis of the sociological context and in historical analysis of the course of events - and he is, moreover, a skilled historian. This meets the most basic objections. Yet he does this without pursuing analysis to exhaustion, especially in its synchronic dimension. He can do this because of his Interpretivism; because ultimate explanation for Weber lies in finding out why people did what they did, not how the bits of "society" fit together. At the same time, this leaves room for the less systematizable elements of particular situations; it keeps one's options open for what is not readily explicable, without paralysing the overall project of explanation. These surely are the reasons why Weber, as historian turning sociologist, found Interpretivism attractive. It is also another angle on the ideal type. And it is also a fundamental reason why the accommodation of the results of an enquiry into gender into the fabric of Weberian sociological explanation is unlikely to produce the same kind of problems – embarras de richesses – as found with Marxism.

The comparative method of ideal types, then, is rather one of emptying than of filling: its consequence is to build up a battery of analytic concepts and secular theses from which the elements of the contingent and the prejudged have been removed. The impact of this methodology for sociological enquiry is first to get us away from the parochial and local - the phenomena, and (apparent) relations between phenomena, that we are used to and take for granted. Yet there is something further to be said on this, for the comparative historical method is not simply a guard against naivety; rather it is a corrective to sophistication: sociological sophistication. This relates to the argument I made above, on the status of the "tradition" of comparative historical sociology as simply a body of received knowledge. In the light of this, we have a definite apparatus of conceptions as to the world-historical location of modern society, expressed through a whole range of comparative-analytic concepts: capitalism, industrialization, market economy, rationalization, secularization, democracy, nation state, etc. etc. All this is implicit comparison, and it is
concomitant with a quite general sociological assumption: that modern society is unique, and that this uniqueness necessarily qualifies all modern social phenomena. Conversely, any phenomena which are not so qualified and made unique by modern conditions must be universal, and therefore grounded in a deeper, non-sociological, reality - e.g. psychological or biological determinism. Both these tendencies are to be seen in gender theory.

It would be well to set against this a brief consideration of Weber's conceptions. In the first place, then, Weber sees modernity and all World History as being fundamentally comparable; he identifies particular civilizations in terms of syndromes, the component factors of which commonly do appear elsewhere, even in significant combinations (e.g. democracy and capitalism in ancient Athens; capitalism and bureaucracy in the Roman Empire). There are diagnostic features - e.g. the City in Western history; rational capitalism in modernity - but these do not create a civilization on their own, nor render everything else in that civilization sui generis: the fundamental comparabilities across World History remain. It should also be grasped that Weber's views on the elective affinities and disaffinities between ideal types - the component factors of a syndrome - are subtle and flexible: it is quite possible and indeed frequent for the development of one ideal type to draw a second ideal type after it, which in turn destroys the first. Thus the substantive relations between capitalism, democracy, bureaucracy, and class stratification, for example, may be most complex and variable. There is no question here of a destined social order realizing itself; Weber is not that kind of teleologist. There is only the unceasing pattern of development and change of history.

With this, Weber's view of the uniqueness of modern civilization, and its unique significance, is sceptical and reserved. This is probably for two main reasons. First, though modern sociology shows little awareness of the fact, for most educated people up to Weber's time, the Great Event of history was not the Industrial or French revolutions, but the Fall of the Roman Empire, and Weber, for obvious reasons, at least took serious account of that view (see Weber 1982 ch 4; 1970a/76a). Incidentally, there
is nothing inherently absurd about it; indeed it might well be suggested that the Romans' failure to comprehend their economic nemesis could be compared to the failure of modernity to comprehend its ecological nemesis. (The other Great Event, the Biblical Flood, for all that Darwinism throws doubt on it, receives vindication from Assyriology. Evolutionism makes good biology but bad history; catastrophism makes bad biology but good history. But I cannot pursue this here. See Desmond 1977 ch 1.) But however this may be, Weber certainly does see important comparabilities between Antiquity and modernity, though modern sociology may take little account of them: it was in the Roman Empire that Weber first saw the stifling of capitalism by bureaucracy, for example. I will return to these issues for their own sakes later in this chapter.

The second point, though its bearing is less direct for the thesis that follows, is probably even more important for Weber's overall perception of World History: indeed, the key issue. This is, stated simply, that an exclusive focus on the uniqueness of modern civilization in the context of World History contradicts itself: it forces one to realize the unique nature of medieval Western European civilization, such that it did give rise to modernity where other, supposedly indistinguishable, premodern civilizations did not. Hence comes Weber's insistence on the importance of the City, which is not a feature of modern society (it is of course a feature of Antiquity). It may be added, as a symptomatic issue, that the unique Western cultural forms e.g. in music and painting are medieval not modern developments; on the whole, medieval and modern Western culture are in continuity with each other, and Weber observed this and took account of it. In sum, as I have said, Weber's views on the significance of modern civilization were sceptical; he considered that there was a subjective element in our perception of ourselves which could only partially be given sociological vindication. And Weber's work most certainly does not vindicate an exclusive sociological preoccupation with modern conditions, however diagnosed.

Bringing these arguments to bear, then, upon the sociological consideration of gender, the point is simply that we do not
sociologically "know" anything about gender until we have studied it. This is a fundamental methodological point, and one that must be insisted upon. There are two dimensions: the structure of women's history in World History; and the pattern of interdeterminations between gender factors and general sociological factors. Neither may legitimately be "read off" the received wisdom of the sociological tradition - not even that of Marxist sociology. A comparative historical enquiry without preconceptions is essential.

Taking the dimensions in turn; in the previous chapter (ch 1) I commented that there appear to be three implicit paradigms for the overall conception of women's history: either that women's oppression is universal; that gender relations are non-oppressive in primitive society but are oppressive in all class societies; or that gender oppression, in significant degree at least, is specific to Capitalist society. This is to take the Marxist view; functionalist approaches would tend simply to reverse the vector within the same structure, arguing that it is in modern society that women become free from the oppression of traditional sex-roles. But it is the structure, not the vector, that must be rejected, and that in all its variant forms. Most fundamentally, there is no presumption that either the rise of civilization - stratification and the state - or the rise of modernity - Capitalism or industrialization - marks a decisive moment in women's history. (Weber certainly did not think so: in Antiquity he saw the "decisive moment" as the development and universalization of chariot warfare across Asia, North Africa, and Europe in the later 2nd millennium, with its implications for the inter-relations of civil and military administration; this marked the zenith of patriarchy. Yet though very general, this process remains historically contingent; it did not, for example, subvert the emancipation of Egyptian women. Of course, the "rise of civilization" in the above terms is not an assignable historical process, but an attempt to rationalize the division of sociology from anthropology. Weber knew well that civilization has arisen piecemeal and in many forms all across World History - and that state and stratification are also found among " primitives".) Again, the development of modern
society in the West cannot be assumed to entail a unique development of modern gender relations out of an amorphous traditional past. Even if systematic development could be shown, this could equally well represent a restoration of the normal conditions of World civilization out of an anomalous local past, given the unique nature of medieval Western civilization. Indeed, in matters of sexuality especially this is probably more nearly the case. With all this, it can also be said that all societal types—primitive, preCapitalist civilization, and Capitalism—all show marked variation in their gender relations, and that change and development are seen wherever history is known. The historical studies in the present thesis indicate that gender relations in Antiquity are broadly comparable to those in the modern world, not simply "on average", but in their overall pattern of variation and development (see "Conclusions" below). Yet it would be folly to attribute a cyclic pattern to women's history on that basis. Women's history is simply history: it has no metaphysical or meta-ethical structure. Inability to comprehend this is symptomatic of illegitimate methodology.

Turning to the second dimension, the sociological interdeterminations; here the point to be made is the converse of the above: there can be no justification for making gender factors dependent upon certain general sociological factors simply because these are the factors we are used to use to structure World History or to diagnose modernity. In particular, in view of the tradition of Marxist scholarship, it must be stated categorically that there are no evident reasons, either on analytic or on substantive grounds, for trying to make gender relations vary as a factor of the mode of production—nor specifically as a factor of Capitalism. My own comparative studies in Antiquity at least are certainly contradictory of any such view. But this could equally be said in relation to e.g. the market economy, or industrial technology, as indeed it could be said generally of the sociological diagnostic repertoire of modernity that I discuss above—secularization, democracy, etc. But two issues need to be distinguished here—three, really, for the lack of an agreed conceptual apparatus to describe gender relations and the oppressions specific to them
promotes a general confusion. First is the point that sociology must go beyond the level of cliche, must enquire in terms of broad areas of concern such as power or the economy, and not simply modern conditions of these things, however conceived. Second is that the determinations must be allowed to run both ways: we need to know what gender causes, not just what causes gender. It is the absence of that dimension (or its functionalist pre-emption) that reduces so much of gender theory to triviality. And lastly, with all this, it must be realized that the major sociological inter-determinations cannot be specified in advance. Power, the economy, ideology — these (and others, e.g. demographics) can be identified as essential dimensions for sociological enquiry, but the enquiry must be open-ended. There can be no prior commitments, e.g. to economic determinism, or for that matter to ideological determinism (never mind balancing acts between the two). As I have said, it is a basic methodological point that must be insisted upon, that sociology does not know about gender until it studies it — and that is not compatible with an exercise in damage limitation.

It can also be said that no enquiry can answer more than it asks, and that a comparative historical enquiry based on an Interpretive conception of social reality is the most intellectually radical approach to the problem of gender: the one that asks most questions and has fewest preconceptions and prior commitments. Though it will have to be shown what can be made of this.

The comparative historical method, then, is the method of comparative analysis in the arena of history. I have chosen to discuss this closely in terms of Max Weber's work, with a focus on gender enquiry, and more in the light of the history of classical social theory than the philosophy of modern social theory. I believe that it has been legitimate and useful, if somewhat heterodox, to do this, in view of the overall location and intentions of this thesis. There are many other points that could be made, less perhaps about historical sociology — where Weber tried to (analytically) separate the disciplines, the modern tendency is perhaps rather to fuse them — than about the comparative method.
One point is that this is sometimes employed in modern anthropology (e.g. Lewis 1971) between ethnographic studies, where either (or both) the histories of the peoples concerned are not known, or an ahistoric mode of analysis is being used. (This is a more disciplined and restrained practice than the old comparativism, as earlier comments on the developments within anthropology should indicate.) In the widest sense, this too is comparative historical sociology, subject to the peripherality of the peoples in question to World-historical patterns. I have not intended anything that I have written as a critique of modern anthropology, or as a claim that sociology can or should supervise anthropology. My points only are: that Weber worked before the present parallel institutionalization of the two disciplines; that his sociology offers in principle a general approach to gender, which offer in view of our confusions we would do well to consider; that evolutionist grand theory of the kind once fashionable and still sometimes implicitly or explicitly favoured is methodologically suspect. A comment might be added on the relations of the comparative historical method and Marxism. The detailed arguments would have to be different as between Marxist and Interpretive conceptions, of course, but it can surely be said that Marxism should cut itself free from speculative anthropology and from evolutionism, and should not do so at the cost of becoming a parochial sociology of Capitalism. Marxism should be a comparative historical sociology too.

However, I want to conclude this chapter by turning away from general issues to the specific methodological problems of the comparative historical component of this present thesis. Here, most of the basic issues have already been indicated: the intention not to rehearse familiar sociological themes but to create a new sociological enquiry; the need to approach this without restrictive preconceptions from "received" sociology; the discontinuities in both sociological and historiographical scholarship, and the consequent need to engage with Weber as our intellectual contemporary rather than our intellectual ancestor, and to read our historiography critically. Taking these issues together, the first point to come from them is that an attempt at a historical
overview of gender would, as I have indicated earlier, result in unacceptable superficiality. Instead, focussed studies must be undertaken, in terms of specified place, time and course of events. Comparison requires a number of such studies, but their capability for synthesis will again be limited, in terms of the overall arena within which they are located. We are in no position to move direct to the creation of general theory, but must be content with an essay towards general theory, within specified limits, until further comparative studies can be made.

Accordingly, I have chosen to make three comparative studies: New Kingdom Egypt, classical Athens and the Roman Empire, and to synthesize from them an essay in the sociological theory of gender within the limits of the Ancient Civilization. (This essay comprises Part B of the thesis; the studies themselves are presented in Part C.) The reasons for choosing Antiquity are many, but first it should be explained that the three cases are intended to provide a skeletal overview of the contrasts and developments of Antiquity as a whole, within the limits of availability of materials and restrictions of space and time; this with especial reference to Weber's major work on Antiquity, "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations" (Weber 1976). The specific considerations involved here will become clearer as the thesis progresses (and an overview of the sociology of Antiquity is presented in Appendix A). Other studies e.g. of Mesopotamia or Hellenistic Egypt could certainly be added with advantage, and a study of Judaism and Christianity would be an important direction of development. But it is important to start with a finite task.

As to the choice of the Ancient Civilization as the arena for study, one reason for this is that, for all that sociologists may be unfamiliar with much of Weber's work on Antiquity, there is strong awareness and powerful vindication of it in the modern historiography of classical Antiquity at least, which thus becomes an attractive body of scholarship to work with (see e.g. Finley 1973, 1985). Admittedly the preclassical civilizations are somewhat more problematic; indeed, Egyptology and Ancient Near Eastern studies tend to centre on archaeology and philology, and to be somewhat remote from the historiographical mainstream (see Redford
1979). Again, though there is interest in Polanyi among Ancient Near Eastern scholars, Egyptologists have never really discovered economic history (though see Helck 1975; Janssen 1975). On the other side, these disciplines were still young in Weber's time, and there has been far more scope than in classical studies for scholarship to make dramatic advances. Indeed, Egyptian civilization seems to have undergone a quite profound re-evaluation since perhaps mid-century; it is no longer thought to have been death-obsessed and priest-ridden, with its people groaning under oppression (see e.g. Mertz 1964, 1967; also bibliography to ch 8 below). Weber's views here accordingly require some reconsideration; the principles of his sociology must be taken rather than his substantive views. Yet all in all, this is still probably less difficult than would be trying to work with a Weber-blind mainstream historiographical tradition, and Antiquity as a whole remains an attractive arena.

Yet here lie the problems of discontinuity of scholarship, and it must be said that central among them is sociology's long-standing failure to take account of Weber's early career as an ancient historian — in particular, the work I refer to above as central, "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations". In face of the vindication of Weber's work on Antiquity from modern Graeco-Roman historiography, this situation is absurd. And it faces this thesis with practical difficulties, both in how to read historiography and in how to present sociology. For the first, there have to be two levels: a critical appraisal of the diverse responses of historians themselves to their own rediscovery of Weber the historian; and a more orthodox application of Weberian sociological principles to modern historiographical literature. For the second, the two levels just referred to must be interfused not separated: since the purpose here is not scholarship for its own sake, but the use of the Ancient Civilization as the arena for an enquiry into gender. The primary requirement is to maintain a Weberian thrust through the general analysis of Antiquity. But it would be better if the recovery for sociology of Weber's sociology of Antiquity had gone further.

But there are other kinds of reasons for choosing Antiquity:
its remoteness from sociological preconceptions; its place at the
beginning of World History, and the depth that this gives to a
comparative historical sociological appraisal of gender. This is
especially of value against the persistent evolutionism that, lat-
ent or proclaimed, I believe to be so pervasive in established
genre theory. For there is so much sociological development dur-
ing Antiquity - e.g. the invention of banking, finance and money,
the development of rational law, the development of City-states
and of political philosophy, the invention of writing and of
written secular culture, the rise of the Great World Religions
- that any general sociological thesis that seeks to locate all
significant sociological development in prehistory, e.g. with the
neolithic revolution, simply lacks historical credibility. But
besides this, it can be added that there are both continuities
and comparabilities between Antiquity and modernity that should
lend immediacy to the study. Most obvious among the former are
Roman law and the Christian religion; the latter include democra-
cy, bureaucracy, capitalism (though not rational industrial cap-
itism), imperialism and migrant labour. Also, and perhaps most
interestingly, Antiquity features a cultural realm that is on the
whole this-world oriented, secular and pluralistic, in contrast
to the cultural hegemonies of the Great World Religions in the
medieval Western and oriental civilizations. This seems broadly
comparable to secularized modernity, though the orientation of
the Ancient Civilization to war and politics, to non-peaceful
economic action, provides a positive environment for the non-rat-
ional side of consciousness and culture, where rational capitalism
provides a destructive one. (This is further discussed in Appen-
dix A part iv below.)

Indeed, there are strategic issues here of the location of
Antiquity in World History. For it must be obvious that, so far as
a great part of Weber's work is oriented around the economic
ethics of the World Religions, so also it is oriented around the
rise and fall of the World Religions, a basically cyclic concep-
tion for which the analysis of Antiquity is the foundation. Here
then is the underlying comparability between Antiquity and modern-
ity: civilization without the Great World Religions, before and
after. With this, it should be clearly realized that Weber associated the predominance of ideology in sociohistorical causation with the Great World Religions and the medieval civilizations, not with modernity: the "rationalization and disenchantment" thesis of modernity is a secularization thesis. Weber sees Advanced Capitalism in terms of power (bureaucratization) qualifying economic determinism - again, broadly like Antiquity, though there it is rather the economy that qualifies power. Weber's views on modernity, then, are quite at variance with those of post-Durkheimian and Western Marxist thought. But they are grounded in a far deeper and more wide-ranging historical study, and they are much less confused. (How can it be a "unique" state of ideology that prevents class revolution in Advanced Capitalism, when this was precisely the function of ideology in preCapitalist society? - it is High Capitalism that is unique in its ideological regime. Again, the notions of alienation and reification might better be brought to bear on the general conception of social reality than on a specifically modern state of consciousness and culture.) All this raises one final point: all the classical social theorists. Marx, Durkheim and Weber, were educated in ancient history, and this conditions all their thought. This too is a reason for modern sociologists to study Antiquity.

As to the problems of the "history of women", I have frankly not much concerned myself with this: I have simply worked in terms of the available secondary literature, with a little use of art-books and translated sources. As to the point that women have not left us their own words, being (supposedly) mostly illiterate, I cannot attach much significance to it; the same could be said of the barons of medieval Europe. The methodological individualism of Weber's approach has ontological not epistemological status; the point is to understand the processes of social conflict in which women were located. Do we understand this about modernity? From one point of view, all culture can be taken to be a text that women have co-written with men, just as the various status groups and classes have co-written it together. The decoding of this requires first and foremost an understanding of the gender dimension of social structure. But here again Antiquity becomes
an attractive arena for first study, due to the way that ancient polytheistic religion appears to mirror social structure. Further considerations on these matters are presented below, in the next chapter (ch 3), chapter 7 (especially "Stratification"), and Appendices A part iv and B.

As to the secondary literature, that is, the historiographical literature in broad terms, the basic point is to try to see this as a process, rather than simply as "state of the art". Clearly, we cannot do this at the depth that the specialist would; also, even classical historians have apparently not written much on historiographical methodology (see Nomigliano 1966; Finley 1975, 1985). But the chief necessity for the sociologist is to try to monitor the input of sociological ideas into the historiographical tradition he is dealing with, especially the older ideas (such as the Matriarchy theory!) which may well not be attributed. For as I have said, although sociology now makes little consideration of Antiquity, in the classical sociological era a concern with Antiquity was very common, for both sociologists and anthropologists. Such inputs may continue to be taken for granted by the historian when for the sociologist they have long become obsolete, and therefore possibly unfamiliar. Two especially problematic such areas are: migration, kinship, and the origins of the Greek City-state; and synthetic considerations on ancient religion. (See Appendix A parts iii & iv below.) Here is much of what is meant by the need to read one's historiography critically.

At any rate, these remarks must serve to locate the thesis that follows in terms of Weberian comparative historical sociology.

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Chapter 3

The Interpretive Method

In the previous chapter, I discussed the relationship between the two arms of Weber's methodology, the comparative historical method and the Interpretive method, arguing that the comparative historical method is the method of enquiry, whereas the purpose of the Interpretive method is to constitute the subject for enquiry. Its special virtue in this regard is that it constitutes its subject matter with the minimum of assumptions as to its substantive character - especially in evolutionary or developmental terms; in particular it contrasts sharply here with those forms of social theory which have an input from biological reasoning (e.g. functionalism, evolutionism). But, I have argued, the methodological insulation of Weber's sociology from biologicistic input is by no means a refusal to engage with biologically grounded problems: on the contrary, there is a strong undertaking and a specific methodology towards them, as shown in the matter of race (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 5) and indeed, though minimally, of gender itself. The need is to give this explicit expression and systematic development. That is what is to be undertaken in this and the following chapters.

Interpretivism is above all a conception of the nature of social reality. This conception is grounded on social action, that is, behaviour illuminated by the subjectivity of those concerned, and a certain reciprocality of orientation (see Weber 1978 Part i ch 1). Given this reciprocality of orientation, the tendency is for patterns of social action to crystallize into permanence, the social actors both shaping their actions to and drawing the meanings of their actions from the social environment in which they act - reciprocally pursuing their material and ideal interests. This provides the basis for social continuity, though
this continuity does not amount to stasis; social change remains grounded in human creativity, the capacity for innovation. In Weber's view this has two faces: on the one side, the radical innovations of the individual, to which others may or may not respond; on the other side, the slow accretions of adaptive change made at a general level - charisma and rationalization. There is a good deal more that could be said about these things, in particular the conditions under which innovation of either type will or will not succeed. Again, the relation between the two types of change is interesting and complex: the historical influence of intellectuals. But the argument is not to be pursued for its own sake here (indeed, these matters are too often considered in vacuo). The concern of the present thesis is with gender. Therefore the question is, how is gender to be dealt with in terms of the Interpretive conception of social reality?

Roughly speaking, by "gender" is meant here human biology as it concerns sex and reproduction. It will be necessary to consider this further at a later point, but this statement will do for present purposes - with the proviso that "human biology" should be understood to include behavioural as well as physical components. This then has to be inter-related with a conception of social reality that centres on Intentionality: on social action and its subjective meanings. The basis for this inter-relation is that human biology must be treated as an aspect of the material environment in which social action takes place. That is, the human biology of sex and reproduction relates to the sociology of gender as the geographical environment - land, plants and animals, minerals, etc. - relates to the sociology of economics (Weber 1978 Part i p 7 - 8; p 64). There will be specific issues to consider. But first, the general point should be grasped, that material reality and social reality meet here as distinct realms working by distinct logics, the one causal, the other Intentional: material causes cannot have sociological effects. Material reality enters into social reality only subject to a process of social construction; that is, as social actors attach meaning to it and take account of it in their actions. Thus material factors can function as stimuli or hindrances or precipitating factors in soc-
It is the first point to grasp: that biological determinism in the Interpretive universe is logically impossible. Even the process of social construction into the realm of meaning is not materially determined; it can take various forms.

To take this position in relation to the human biology of sex and reproduction involves specific problems. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the notion of treating behaviour as an environment for action; a rather tenuous notion, it might be argued, unless some kind of dissonance can be shown between them. I shall return to this issue. But most fundamental is the problem that "human biology" is not just a set of facts, but a whole functionally integrated causal realm which asserts the continuity of our world with that of plants and animals. What is the relationship of the biological to the social? Is Man still an animal? If so, how far and in what sense? Does Intentionality, Mind, society, technology, culture, whatever - do these things mean that Man is no longer subject to the Darwinian laws? Clearly there is a large element of philosophical imponderability in these questions; they do not have "right" or "wrong" answers. Clearly too we would be much more cautious towards them now than were the Victorians, whether out of revulsion against Judaeo-Christian inhumanity towards the living world, or increased awareness of the possibilities of ecological disaster, or whatever. But for the practical purposes of social theory, we have to take a position - and, it must be stressed, an explicit position - on these questions. Given the impossibility of "right" or "wrong" answers, our criterion for choosing our position (within the limits of credibility) must be its productiveness, in terms of enquiry and explanation. That is, sociological enquiry and explanation: we should choose the position which gives a specifically sociological enquiry maximum scope.

This means taking a position which (unsurprisingly) runs contrary to the tendency of biologically modelled social theory: it means assuming that, whatever the biological heritage of humanity, the species has on the whole escaped the functional integration of the biological realm. That is, biological reality does not sup-
ervise social reality, and "society" does not subserve biological ends - is not teleologically supervised by the necessity of species survival. This is not to deny that a biological level of humanity remains; far from it. But the functional integration of the causal patterns is fragmented and the elements are left piecemeal. And they condition social action in piecemeal fashion, without providing overall integration. Society cannot be understood in terms of a closed structure, however conceived; all that we have is an unclosed narrative of variation: World History. This can be sampled in the quest for patterns, for affinities and disaffinities between types of social action; it cannot be exhausted, nor defined. Moreover there are within this unclosed narrative of World History no entities whose survival on biological analogy is necessary: no "societies". There are only social actors: people. I have discussed this in the previous chapter.

It can be seen, then, that what is coming into focus as the central problem is the relationship between social continuity and human reproduction. These can by no means be equated with each other, and neither of them is a matter of necessity; they are each contingent upon social action. The question of social continuity I have already discussed at its most general level: the crystallization of patterns of social action and meaning; this is a matter of minute to minute, day to day continuity, and also, as noted, of minute to minute, day to day change. This basic conception of social reality must be contextualized with historical narrative; on the whole, it is the nature of "society" to change, and not to stay the same. That is the meaning of history. Equally it must be contextualized with sociological conflict, for which it constitutes the arena; the reasons why particular continuities and particular changes do and do not take place is very much a matter of the perceptions, interests, and power of the variously located social actors in the given situation. Again, the dynamics here make for change rather than for continuity; the historical dimension of "society" is essential. But these processes which define social continuity and change are not directly factors of the processes of generational replacement, the birth and growth and death of individual persons. Indeed, these are quite separate issues.
The Interpretive conception of social reality is existential; it conceives social actors acting in terms of their immediate social environment, and does not insist on a background of "socialization". On the contrary, "socialization" is a concept at least potentially inimical to the creativity on which Interpretive theory insists. Also, it entails paradoxes that Interpretivism would tend to highlight: how do you "socialize" a child for adulthood, when childhood and adulthood are quite distinct things? And if adulthood requires a preparatory socialization, then why does not childhood too? For children are not incipient persons; they are persons, and the child as much as the adult has a place in society. Or what if childhood and adulthood are typically in physically remote locations? Rural-urban migration, for example, is as old as civilization. And again, how do you "socialize" for the future, for a situation that does not exist and is different from the one in which "socialization" takes place? These problems seem to be the consequences of an ahistoric mode of analysis, suppressing time both as history and as life-cycle, and it is surely surprising to find Marxism as well as functionalism arguing in these terms. Interpretive theory would prefer to assume a basic existential competence (on the part of children as well as adults), and to focus its analysis on ongoing social conflict processes.

It is in the arena of history that social actors reproduce; human biology is the environment for history not for "society". In view of this, it may be questioned whether the term "reproduction" really should be used. Children are not copies of their parents, but new and different persons; perpetuation of the human race is not a sociological consideration. Equally, when women have babies, this is Intentional social action, not biological reproduction. It might be better perhaps to use the term "procreation". But more than this, rather than the imposed meanings of biologists or social theorists, we might consider the meanings that social actors use themselves: when they have their babies, do they think they are "reproducing" or perpetuating something, and if so, what? It is obvious that different social actors have returned different answers here: for example, some might see themselves as perpetuating a lineage, or a status group, or an ethnic or relig-
ious community; others might rather consider themselves to be creating new individuals with their own separate identities and unforeseeable destinies. Most especially we should remember here that pregnancy and childbirth are a consequence of sexual intercourse, and that social actors may orient themselves variously to these facts: some want children, and use sexual intercourse to meet that want; others want sexual intercourse for its own sake, and accept or try to control or avoid having children as the consequence. It is nonsense to argue in human affairs that sex happens "because" of babies, or that babies happen "because" of sex — though it is remarkable how far social theory has favoured the first and ignored the second of these alternatives. But the true relationship is neither functional nor causal, but Intentional, according as the social actors construct and orient themselves to their biology.

These points made, it should be realized that there is no guarantee or even presumption that the consequences of procreation will be contained within the situation in which it occurs — even assuming that situation to have continuity over time. "Reproduction" may equally well be "under-reproduction" or "over-reproduction". Moreover this can apply differentially for variously located social actors and conflicting groups; there is no presumption that the process will even itself out in accordance with the status quo. In sum, procreation — the production of babies — must be seen in the context of demographic history, for its social impact to be theorized.

This is certainly a complicated matter. There seems to be no agreement in social theory as to how population should be treated, or indeed as to whether it should be treated at all. The preference is rather to argue for the "reproduction" of society, especially at the ideal level — socialization. This is perhaps due in part to the overall structure of population history (see Cipolla 1979), which features two episodes of explosive growth, related to the neolithic and Industrial revolutions, but otherwise apparently slow growth or stagnation. This pattern would appear to fit only with types of social theory that focus on technology and that are prepared to engage in reconstructions of prehistory and the
development from primitive to civilized. Much of social theory however is not prepared so to engage, limiting itself to the empirically secure record in terms of contemporary ethnography, or history, or contemporary modernity. Thus the thrust of Weber’s sociology (and surely of Marx’) centres on patterns within the historical record and contemporary modernity, which are seen as fundamentally comparable and in continuity with each other. The problem of the rise of modernity then seems to be in a different frame from that of population problems. With this, it might be said that the broad experience of social theory is that technology is not very useful as an independent variable in social explanation. It would be more accurate, however, to say (again) that there are differences between cultural science and social science – despite the ambiguities of anthropology.

Further to this, we seem to have in social theory two quite opposed classical approaches to population (see Keyfitz 1972). One, which can be termed the Durkheimian, holds that the social process is inherently stable, and that the population process is one of the few endogenous factors that can break through this stability and cause change; the other, which can be termed the Marxist, holds that, although the social process is inherently unstable, it develops by its own dynamics and will always contain the population process (Marx 1976 p 781 et seq; excerpted in Overbeck ed. 1977). The first of these positions indeed has variants: Durkheim’s own suggestion was that population increase causes social change by increasing “social density” – frequency of interactions –, a view that for a time at least Parsons shared (Durkheim 1933 p 256 et seq). This is endogenous and sociological, though the notion of “social density” seems obscure and hard to specify. But other forms of the argument are cultural, treating population increase as an exogenous factor, population the environment of society, and arguing generally that social change is caused by exogenous pressures not endogenous social factors – society’s degree of immunity to such pressures being a factor of the level of technology (see e.g. articles in Spooner ed. 1972; Renfrew ed. 1973; Cohen and Service eds. 1978). Here again is the basic linking of population and technology; indeed this approach has been
turned round to provide theories of technological development as well as of population increase (Boserup 1965). But all approach in these terms is open to sociological criticism: that technology is a poor sociological explanans; that society's capability to deal with environmental contingency even at a low level of technology is being underestimated; that sociological factors of social change are being ignored. It might be added that too much weight is being put here onto archaeological investigations of the neolithic revolution; this is certainly a legitimate field of enquiry, but it cannot be made the preferential basis for building social theory.

In all this matter, the tensions between sociology and anthropology can again be seen. In the next chapter (ch 4), I will make concrete proposals as to how population questions (see esp. Weeks 1978) might be dealt with in Weberian sociological theory. But for the present methodological discussion, only an orientative sketch is needed. Here, the central issue is that the antithetical (Durkheimian and Marxist) positions outlined above might be reconciled if they could be regarded as the opposite poles of the same process. This entails a reorientation to population history. For while the neolithic and modern population explosions are based on imbalance between fertility and mortality, there is a third population process: migration; and the period between the population explosions, civilized World History, has been characterized by migration, not by a simple fertility-mortality balance. Most especially this is rural-urban migration: the countryside over-reproduces and exports its excess population; the city under-reproduces (due to plague, poverty and squalor) and imports the deficit (the modern population explosion, in the West at least, is due to reduced urban mortality). The basic suggestion, then, is that the Durkheimian account is true for the countryside, and the Marxist account is true for the city. In this, the economic and power relations linking the city to the countryside must be grasped: "society" is integrated around mechanisms of conflict that ground a dynamic of change and are typically centred in the city; the countryside is integrated around mechanisms of resistance to exogenous — city-centred — change. (this is why the coun-
tryside presents the appearance of functionality and ahistoric-
ity).

This is at first approximation; moreover my concerns here
are still with methodology, not yet with sociological theory. But
part of the reason for highlighting the migration process is that
it suggests a model by which to see the whole question of gener-
atational replacement: instead of adducing an imperative "goodness
of fit" between procreation and the social status quo, and then
devising the family and socialization accordingly, we can see the
life-cycle as a migration from childhood to adulthood, from the
locus of birth and nurture to the locus of the adult destiny.
This migration may not involve actual physical movement as from
countryside to city; it may be rather a purely sociological re-
location. Moreover,parenthood must be conceived as a possible
element of the adult destiny - though by no means a necessary ele-
ment, given the non-reproductivity of cities. But beyond this, it
should be realized that the various elements of the social struct-
ure differ quite markedly both in how they recruit new personnel,
and in how they treat their members' fertility and progeny. A
closed status group of lineages, for example, will recruit from
its own members' fertility only, and under strict rules moreover
of marriage and legitimacy. A bureaucracy, by contrast, makes a
point of refusing to recognize its members' progeny, and recruits
by a system of appointments - no less rule-bound. It should be
noted that these things are bound up with the general pattern of
conflict in society. Other elements of the social structure, e.g.
the market, or the city itself, come somewhere intermediate be-
tween these two opposed cases; whereas individual people have to
struggle for their livelihood and their "place in society", often
struggling not to avoid exploitation but to obtain a place in
which to be exploited. All this will be pursued in due time. But
the point that must be grasped is that the loci of childhood and
of adulthood do not simply and of necessity subserve one another;
they may well be unlike, remote, and in mutual conflict. The ov-
nerall matrix in which they are located is conflictual in charac-
ter.

In view of these considerations, the first formulation of the
poles of migration must be revised. The former, the countryside, can rather be identified as the local community, the typical arena for procreative and nurturant relations in which the child is born and grows. The latter, the city, is less easy to name, but it can be identified as the arena of political and economic conflict in society. I term this "the central arena" or "central institutions". These arenas may geographically interpenetrate; they are hardly as simply separated as countryside and city. Yet the analytic distinction does typically have some physical embodiment, including divisions within the household - front shop and family quarters, for example. And the basic strategic conception, of pressure and resistance in a conflictual matrix grounding overall change, remains. This indeed will be taken up and developed in later chapters (ch 4 & 5).

To draw the main points of this section together, then, I have argued that the Interpretive conception of social reality invites us to dismiss altogether the idea that biology in any way supervises society, or again, that society can be conceived at any level in terms of closed theoretical structures. Instead it invites us to see the human biology of sex and reproduction in terms of piecemeal conditioning factors upon social action, and a conditioning material environment of history. This entails consideration of actual patterns of social action and meaning, and a consideration of demographic history with the development of a sociological approach; all of which amounts to a considerable project in comparative historical study. But it must be stressed that this is to be evaluated not from the point of view of the logical closure of social explanation, but from the point of view of the comparative historical sociology of gender: a project of an exploratory nature. That antithesis, explanation and exploration, will come up again in the next section.

In the foregoing section, I have tried to establish the most general strategic relationships between the biological realm and the social realm. It will be necessary in due course to pursue this further, to lay down a strategy whereby the range of gender phenomena can be constituted for classification and analysis. But
first it is necessary to consider more closely what "gender" means; to go beyond the rough definition offered above, "human biology as it concerns sex and reproduction", and to work towards establishing the concept for which this thesis is named: "sexual polarity". In particular, it is necessary to engage with the behavioural component, and the conception of behaviour as an environment for action. These are the things that are to be pursued here.

I do not want to become involved in this in a biological exegesis, nor do I think that any real purpose would be served by it. There is certainly a wealth of biological information and theory in regard to sex and gender - though palaeo-anthropological reconstruction, like the archaeological reconstruction of prehistory, does not appear to me to be a secure basis on which to build social theory. But as I have indicated earlier, my stance as an Interpretive sociologist is to regard humanity as sui generis, possessed of biological origins and a biological heritage but in no way subject to biological determination. It is then the overall shape of the biological heritage rather than its details that should be our concern. With this too it seems to me that our focus should be on primary rather than secondary gender factors. Thus for example the average differences of size, weight and strength between the sexes: such differences also occur on other bases than sex, and they surely have little sociological value. The Romans did not conquer their empire because they were big. Even at the most primitive level, humanity is defined by factors of intelligence, technology, culture, society, not by crude physical variables. This is not to deny that such secondary sexual differentiation has biological significance. But dealing in the realm of society, it seems best to direct the thrust of the argument through the sociological impact of the primary biological factors. These can be defined simply enough as: sexual dimorphism with an attendant division of reproductive functions, and a mammalian pattern of reproduction with prolonged childhood dependence. It should be added here that the basic sexual dimorphism is evidently qualified by a broad equivalence of male and female sexuality, in terms of the clitoris, female desire and female orgasm. Here
any notion of the human female as being somehow biologically defective or incomplete is surely nonsensical. Difficulties of modern Western women with arousal and orgasm should be taken in the context of their difficulties in breast-feeding; they are due to cultural ambivalence and equivocation.

So for morphology and function; behaviour is more difficult. However, it can be assumed for the sake of preliminary orientation that there is a basic correspondence between morphology, function and behaviour in the biological heritage of humanity. And certainly it is to the point to try to see the relationships here, not to suppress them as intrusive elements in a project of sociological explanation. Above all, the causal relationship between sexual intercourse and pregnancy must be faced. Although my strategic argument is that biology does not supervise society, I still hold it to be a most important dimension of the environment of society; again, while I argue that the functional integration of human biology (especially at its behavioural level) is fragmented, I do not thereby argue that all the causal elements are atomized. But the problem with "behaviour" is that it is such a generous concept. Indeed, here it cannot be taken to mean anything more (or less) than the framework of analysis of the behavioural sciences.

That is a loose and nominalistic term, covering several disciplines that are pursued in various ways. For present purposes, however, perhaps four main branches can be identified: behavioural psychology, cross-cultural psychology, ethology or sociobiology, and Psychoanalysis. With this, one might tentatively identify three levels of analysis: the input of energy (drive or instinct); the observed trait or pattern of activity or conduct; and consciousness (a concept which may include the unconscious). Different approaches work across these levels in different ways, of course, and concepts such as "instinct" can be variously defined. Now our basic methodological problem is with the reconciliation of behaviour in these terms with action in Intentional terms. The formulation given earlier for this is of stimuli, hindering factors, precipitating factors, etc. to social action, conditioning social action according as actors attach meaning to
them and take them into account in their actions (Weber 1978 Part i p 7 – 8). This conception then requires consideration for each of the three levels just identified. Here it should be realized that consciousness is a special problem, as impinging directly on the areas of Intentionality and meaning. This will have to be discussed at length in due course. But as to the other two levels, it should also be clear that drive or instinct itself, the input of energy, need be no problem. It is only in conjunction with the second level, observed traits and patterns of conduct – the sense most usually given to behaviour – that problems start to emerge, for this gives specific content to the instincts or drives, which in turn give the behavioural patterns a non-cultural basis. Moreover, this is typically worked out without thematization of consciousness, to give "objectively correct" meanings for behaviour patterns. It is here that the conception of stimuli, hindering factors, precipitating factors, etc. must be brought to bear. For it seems to me that social theory must try to grapple with these "objectively correct" meanings of behaviour structures, not to suppress them; an over-culturally-constructed conception of human nature is just as bad as an "over-socialized" conception of humanity (c.f. Wrong 1961). Rather we should see human nature and culture as in dialogue. It must be grasped that there can be dissonance between human nature and its cultural articulation, and that this can be experienced as conflict by the social actor, or can be an unconscious cause of distress or malfunction. We know this well enough in regard to both sexuality and child-raising. Here then it seems to me that biological continuities in humanity are to be grasped and engaged with.

Following these preliminary considerations, it seems to me that the four branches of the behavioural sciences identified above can be taken in two groups: in the first, behavioural and cross-cultural psychology; in the second, ethology and Psychoanalysis. The prime difference resides in the empiricist character of the first group, and its reluctance to engage in grand theory, as compared to the second. This is not pure loss; indeed Psychoanalysis (and in lesser degree ethology in some of its speculations as to human behaviour) has been damagingly criticized from both
the behavioural and cross-cultural psychological perspectives. But the problem is that, on the one side, behavioural psychology is not culture-fair; on the other side, cross-cultural psychology seems able to show this (e.g. Mead 1962; Oakley 1972), but not to create a positive critique or alternative synthesis, possessing neither a wide enough body of data nor a methodology with which to do so. The consequence then is rather to throw one, though with due caution, back to the other two approaches: ethology and Psychoanalysis.

Ethology and Psychoanalysis are both holistic in character, as I have indicated; they orient their observations to a grounding in the macro-explanatory structures of the biological sciences (and indeed, Psychoanalysis builds similar macro-explanatory structures itself). Although ethology is somewhat the younger of the two, they have taken some account of each other, and can to a point be usefully considered together. I have to state here that I have greater interest in the "classical" ethology of Lorenz and Tinbergen (e.g. Lorenz 1964, 1966; Tinbergen et al 1970) than in more modern developments in sociobiology, in terms of games theory considerations applied to the hypothetical behaviour-trait carrying gene (e.g. Wilson 1978). Of course I have no expertise in this, but I understand that sociobiology has its origins in the study of insect behaviour, to which ethological methods were inapplicable; it then perhaps complements rather than replaces ethology. At any rate, sociobiology as a project in reductionist explanation is of no interest here, in a thesis that is basically exploratory in character; whereas the consideration of the behaviour of higher, even closely related, animals does offer something of a positive challenge to social theory, an invitation to ask new questions - or a resource when we do so on our own account (see esp. Morris 1968, 1972). As to Psychoanalysis, it will be seen in due course that this has its cognates and alternatives too.

Ethology and Psychoanalysis share a common orientation to human behaviour as being driven by "instincts" which go decisively beyond the mere search for food and shelter. The major instincts identified usually are, or cluster round, sex and aggress-
ion. These can be given wide and various interpretation; in particular, sex here tends to subsume reproduction. With this, something of a difference of tendencies is apparent: ethology, especially where it tries to discuss humanity, tends to have a strong focus on aggression, though sex and reproduction (and indeed other instincts) are considered too. As against this, Psychoanalysis focusses much more exclusively on sex, and indeed tends to make it the sole instinct on which all human behaviour is grounded. Freud's own treatment of aggression at least seems to be uncertain and equivocal. The main impetus to a positive treatment in straightforward terms of the aggressive instinct in Psychoanalytic thought came from the two great early schismatics, Alfred Adler and Carl Jung. To my mind, the weight of ethology supports them against Freud in this.

The question is: how are these approaches to behaviour to be accomodated in social theory, specifically Interpretive social theory? Here as indicated before ethology and Psychoanalysis require to be considered separately. With ethology, it is as I have already said a matter of a biological heritage of fragmentary behaviour patterns, organized (largely) around the main instinctual impulses. This can be treated as argued above, in terms of a process of social construction into the realm of meaning, where it acts as stimuli, hindrances, precipitating factors etc. to social action according as social actors take account of it in their actions. Perhaps more specifically, one might speak of impulses, predispositions, innate competences, etc. which the social actor may accord more or less of recognition and enjoyment. There is a potential dissonance of behaviour and action, then, a dissonance of biology and culture; this may well be a strongly felt conflict or unconscious source of distress or malfunction for the social actor, as stated before. So far as sex and reproduction are concerned, then, the innate behavioural endowment can as stated earlier simply be assumed to correspond with the primary divisions in morphology and function: basic sexual and parental (primarily maternal) instincts, in terms of instinctually driven behaviour patterns, surviving in fragmented form. However, this conditions social phenomena and does not determine them; the actual
cultural forms will be various. But this stated, the main input for us from ethology is not in filling out this picture but only in stressing its biological parameters, and most especially as a caveat against viewing all biologically grounded human behaviour in terms of sex and reproduction only. This point will appear again below.

As to Psychoanalysis (Fine 1962; Stafford-Clark 1965; Boocock 1976), the problem here is quite different, for Psychoanalysis concerns itself not simply with behaviour but with consciousness. As a biologically grounded psychology, centred in sexual and reproductive relations, Psychoanalysis ramifies into a general theory of consciousness and culture (the latter especially in regard to religion and art), and of socialization and the family (its sociological articulation). There is then a strong tradition of working with Psychoanalysis in social theory, both of Durkheimian and Marxian kinds (though the ultimate compatibility with Marxism might be questioned). Psychoanalysis is certainly problematic. It can be criticized for general lack of scientific methodology; for lack of verification both from behavioural and from cross-cultural psychology, and indeed from psychiatry, where its utility both as therapy and as insight may be questioned; it can be criticized on ethological grounds, as indicated above; and not least, on sociological grounds, for its ahistoricity. Yet Psychoanalysis has an undeniable robustness in the face of all criticism. Even so, the compatibility of Psychoanalysis with Interpretive social theory seems slight. The problem does not reside in the notion of the unconscious, or in the complex nature of motives, for Interpretivism can accommodate this (Weber 1978 Part i p 9 - 10). But the emphasis on the primacy of childhood in the formation of the mind, articulating to social theory through the concept of socialization, has, as I have already argued, little compatibility with the existentialist Interpretive conception of social reality, and the context of this argument, the whole thrust of the system, is biological and ahistorical in character. Psychoanalysis is ultimately a biological, causal, theory of Mind, and that must be incompatible with Intentionality, which takes the acausality of Mind as its basic principle. (It should be noted that, whatever the scien-
tific problems, the philosophical problems here are Freud's.)

But more than this, what must be grasped is the role of Psychoanalysis in social theory, whether of Durkheimian or Marxian kind. This dictates, and in turn dictated by, a strategy towards sex and reproduction that is ultimately biologistic, ahistorical, and Idealist. That is, Psychoanalysis is being used not on its merits but because it fits: not for its exploratory power, its capability to find out new things, but for its explanatory power, its capability to give logical closure to certain structures of social theory. For no system of thought can explore its own fundamentals, and it is precisely on the ground of sex and reproduction in society that Psychoanalysis is based. It is this more than anything else that makes Psychoanalysis inimical to the present thesis: a thesis whose pretension is to set up a non-biologistic, historical, non-Idealist framework, in which, not to explain sexual polarity but to explore it. This, in the face of the traditions of social theory, makes it at least desirable to look for a positive critique of Psychoanalysis on its own terms.

Surprisingly, there is no difficulty about this; such a thing has always existed, in the Analytical Psychology of Carl Jung (Storr 1973; Fordham 1966; Jacobi 1968). I cannot understand why social theory has never taken account of it - except that, as I have said, Psychoanalysis fitted. However, the issue faces me with considerable problems of presentation, in that Jung's thought is apparently very little known among sociologists, and yet is far too complex and ramified for any brief exegesis. Accordingly, I present a brief consideration here for the sake of the present argument, reserving a more full discussion for an appendix (Appendix B).

Preliminarily, it should be understood that Freud twice developed definitive formulations of Psychoanalytic theory: id-psychology in the 1900's, and ego-psychology in the 1920's; and there is little question but that it was the defections of Adler and Jung (1911–13) that compelled the reformulation. The central issues were two-fold: the purposive nature of the psyche, and the aggressive instinct. Of these, the first is a corrective to the purely reactive conception of the psyche in id-psychology; Freud's
conception of the ego in ego-psychology incorporates this successfully enough (and makes the point familiar). The second issue has a somewhat more complex history. Adler (Way 1956) (who himself never really attempted grand theory) tended to substitute aggression for sex as the primary instinct; Freud, as indicated above, came in time to give some indecisive consideration to the idea of an aggressive or death instinct, while keeping the thrust of his system through sex. Jung, however, proceeded to develop a synthesis of Freudian id-psychology with Adlerian conceptions: extravert and introvert are basically the Freudian and the Adlerian personalities, oriented to sex and to aggression respectively. In all this, that is, for Adler and Jung, the conception of the aggressive instinct is of a drive to autonomy and independence, to exploration and mastery of one's environment. The biological basis might in part be the need for individual, as opposed to species, survival. This conception seems to me to be broadly in line with ethological thinking, though the two disciplines develop their ideas in different directions. Freud's conception of aggression is more idiosyncratic by comparison.

These remarks provide orientation. But the main significance of Analytical Psychology for the present thesis resides rather in the general strategy under which Jung raises his psychology. Sex and aggression are the main instincts, the channels for psychic energy (libido), which energy can be diverted from its primary objectives to the attainment of cultural goals. This last is in line with Freud; however, where Freud makes libido current-like, Jung makes it tidal, turning naturally and periodically from one thing to its opposite. But more: for Jung, the basis of the psyche is constituted in an innate capacity for the formation of symbols, emotionally laden concepts which have special value in the deflection or redirection of psychic energy; a capacity which is given content by contact with a specific cultural environment. This is the theory of the collective unconcious and the archetypes - a proto-structuralist conception with similarity to Chomsky's theories of language acquisition. It should be grasped that this conception plays the part in Jung's psychology that the universal Oedipus complex plays in Freud's. Sexual and reproductive relat-
ionships, then, have no special privileged significance here. The psyche interacts with and internalizes the culture in which it is located; the family is no more than the common immediate setting in which this usually occurs. Also the process is one in which the psyche plays a highly active part; though at the deeper level of theory as the theory of Man, where psyche creates culture, sexual and reproductive relationships are an expression of the psyche, as they are of human biology. But the basic point must be grasped: that Jung is arguing in an explicit neo-Kantian framework, raising a theory of Mind and culture in terms of each other, with biology only a background dimension, of (species and individual) origins and continuing physical environment.

The consequence of this is that the capability of Analytical Psychology towards sex and gender is far more exploratory than explanatory. The overall conception here is of an innate psychic apparatus complementary to the biological apparatus. This means a certain reciprocality at the level of the archetypes as between the two sexes; thus man and woman identify parents and lovers in terms of same-sex and opposite sex, rather than simply male and female. But beyond this differentiation, male and female are in principle alike, equivalent. This is the primary level. At a secondary level, culture typically constructs a further differentiation of the sexes, by selectively emphasizing and de-emphasizing certain attributes, e.g. men's intellect as against women's emotions, the culturally de-emphasized attribute being driven into the unconscious. The cultural environment may also permit alternative gender "careers" of cross-identification: the masculinized woman or — though not in our culture — the feminized man. It might be noted here that the conception of primary psychic complementarity between the sexes provides that at the level of symbolism, men and women can "read" and "write" the same "cultural text" differentially. For example, take identifications and emotional relationships with the Holy Trinity: the man identifies himself as Christ, God as his father and Mary as his mother; the woman identifies herself as Mary, God as her father and Christ as her child. This provision should strongly qualify any conception of women living under male cultural hegemony — it is certainly possi-
ible but is historically contingent, and demands flexible analysis.

To take another dimension, childhood: Jung sees this less in terms of socialization than of individuation. That is, the child engages actively with the world, and the psyche is prestructured to acquire cultural content. Some learning of customs, skills, etc. takes place, but this is hardly psychologically crucial. The individuation process is the developing internal and external differentiation of the child, to become a mature, separate and autonomous person. This indeed is a lifelong process, and as such central to Jung's interests (as childhood itself is not). Sociologically, it has two phases: a growing away from childhood dependence towards direct engagement with the world; and a growing away from the world into oneself, the development of a critical and creative distance between the individual and society. But at the first level, the level of childhood, this is a child's eye view: childhood prospective towards adolescence and adulthood. The resonances here of the individuation process with the aggressive instinct, the drive to exploration and mastery of the world, to autonomy and independence, should be noted. Too, it should be noted how this conception avoids the pitfalls of "over-socialization". Social theory has long needed a concept of individuation.

This should be enough to indicate the basic nature of Jung's psychology; more is said in the appendix (Appendix B). As to its value for this thesis, in the first place it is salutary I think simply to realize that it is possible to think about these matters in a manner different from Freud, and that Freud's authority in social theory rests in effect on a false basis, a simple failure to consider the available alternatives. But beyond this, there is the question of making positive use of Jungian insights and conceptions. Here, to summarize, the main points are: the complementarity and equivalence of the sexes (male and female are each the opposite sex); childhood in terms of the individuation process; and sex and aggression as the two primary instinctual channels. It can be added that to me at least, Jung's conceptions are intuitively attractive, even commonsensical; moreover they seem to have a broad accord with biology and ethology.
Indeed it seems possible after all this to reiterate what was said at the beginning of this section: a biological apparatus of sexual dimorphism with an attendant division of reproductive functions, and a mammalian pattern of reproduction with prolonged childhood dependence; and a behavioural (now psychic) apparatus that broadly corresponds to this biological apparatus. The main regard in which this has been qualified through consideration of ethology and Analytical Psychology is the consideration of the aggressive instinct. This could have threefold force: firstly as organizing certain secondary sex differences, such as differences in size and strength (which also, incidentally, differentiate adults and children). However, I have stated earlier that I regard this as a sociologically deceptive line of argument. Secondly, it warns us against trying to derive a total theory of Man from the sexual instinct alone - a warning that is salutary in view of the Psychoanalytic tradition in social theory. Thirdly, there is the Jungian relation of the aggressive instinct to the individuation process. This has force not only for childhood but for adulthood also, where it provides a constant tension, a desire for separateness, in both sexual and parental relations. In the light specifically of this third set of considerations, I hold that the aggressive instinct should be conceived as a basic element of the human biology with which this thesis is concerned, even though it did not appear in the first rough formulation "human biology as it concerns sex and reproduction".

This whole area then I term "sexual polarity". The term "polarity" here is intended to convey the conception of complementarity, of simultaneous oppositeness and equivalence as between the sexes; in particular the idea that, despite the division of reproductive functions, male and female are alike in their sexualities: each is the opposite sex. Male and female then are two ways of being human; differentiation does not necessarily create difference. With this, I try to preserve something of the structural character of human biology, taking a cycle of maturation and growth with its starting point and its end in the adult sexual relationship. Aggression thus cross-cuts and limits sexuality/reproduction, pointing to the wider society. But the opposite is also
true, sexuality/reproduction cross-cutting aggression and pointing to the family, the closed set of sexual and parent-child relationships. All this exists as a program, which can be variously socially constructed and to which the individual can variously react. It does not supervise society, neither directly nor in terms of species survival, but it is a most powerful input into society, of which account must always be taken. The symmetry of the arguments here with those in the previous section in regard to the migrations between local community and central institutions should be noted.

For purposes of sociological analysis, I identify sexual polarity in terms of four themes: fertility and maternity; the cycle of maturation; sexuality; and aggression. These will each be discussed at length and in turn in a later chapter (ch 6), but I give some brief delineatory comments on them now.

**Fertility and Maternity.** This covers all aspects of women's capability to conceive, bear, and raise children, and the mother-child relationship from the mother's point of view. It includes the management of fertility. Although focussing on the female sex, which actually undergoes pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation, male potency and male parenting are also to be noted.

**Maturation.** This is the cycle from birth to the attainment of sexual-reproductive maturity, and to autonomy and independence - adulthood. This includes the development of masculinity/femininity. It is childhood (including the mother-child relationship) from the child's point of view, as both socialization and individuation, with the focus on the latter and on adolescence: childhood seen as prospective for adulthood.

**Sexuality.** This concerns social action and social relationships involving sexual intercourse. It also includes questions of heterosexual and homosexual orientations, chastity and the social repression of sexuality. It should be noted
that, in keeping with earlier comments, a fundamental equivalence of male and female sexuality is assumed, subject to cultural construction. Given the narrow focus on sexual intercourse, this cultural differentiation cannot be equated with masculinity and femininity in the wide sense.

**Aggression.** This concerns social action and social relationships involving the use of force, so far as they have relevance for sexual and parent-child relationships, and so far as they condition the adulthood to which the child aspires. This includes the protection of personal security. Masculinity and femininity are again considered here, as typically differentiated in these regards.

There are various points to add. The resonances between maturation and aggression, somewhat similar to those between fertility/maternity and sexuality, have been pointed out before. A further point is that, if humanity is taken to be driven by the two instincts of sex and aggression, then "sexuality" in the sense of the sexuality of the individual must be taken at two levels: one the "style" of the individual in matters relating to sexual intercourse; the other the total conditioning of the personality by the cultural construction of the individual's male or female biology. This second sense indeed should be "gender" or "genderedness" not "sexuality", and the terms "masculinity" and "femininity" referred to this alone; the first sense, true sexuality, divides as "maleness" and "femaleness". Both these things but genderedness especially I find most usefully discussed under the heads of Maturation and Aggression. But the issues here will become much clearer in the discussions in the next section of this chapter, where a further range of considerations is brought to bear.

In relation to both sexuality and aggression, the intention is to focus on actual sexual intercourse and fighting, for these are sociological not biological activities. Sexuality and aggression should be seen as instinctively based and emotionally illuminated competences, in which skills and lore are transmitted and
acquired, together with creative exploration. This also can be said of breastfeeding, and the most immediate physical interactions of mother and child; incidentally, the "maternal instinct" should be limited to this. But lore can also be withheld, and creative exploration discouraged - this for all three of these fields.

A valuable ethological insight is that in human sexuality, sexual and parent-child behaviour have become interfused, the one drawing on the vocabulary of the other for its expression (see esp. Morris 1972 ch 3). The point of this here is that love, in both sexual and parent-child relations, is to be considered as biological and innate, not as a cultural construction ex nihilo; though of course it is variously culturally constructed and articulated (which includes the possibility of social repression).

Some final comments might be added on the sexual and aggressive instincts. Traditionally, these have always been marginal to social theory - it is in precisely this regard that I find "classical" ethology challenging, for social theory seems to me always to be the theory of society without taking account of human nature. As to sexuality, its evident functionality for society is paradoxical, seeing how obsessed society (or some societies) is with repressing it. Indeed sexuality in traditional social theory seems generally to be either functional or delinquent, or else just an attribute of the personality; in all cases, we never seem to get a simple account of what people actually do. A conflict approach, focussing on actual patterns of social action and oriented to historical outcomes, is probably the best way to explore this, and it is this that the conception of the sexual instinct here must subserve. As to aggression, I am aware that my attempt to theorize this will be controversial (c.f. Siann 1985). I point out first, that the way I have done this, basically through Jungian psychology, requires consideration on its own terms, as indeed does the fact that I work in terms of the Interpretive conception of social reality. Beyond this, it is surely an obvious point that aggression can only be regarded as a disruption of society in the context of consensus theory; in conflict theory aggression is surely assumed. Equally it should be realized that there is much to
be gained from trying to generalize the aggressive instinct through, for instance, a general sociology of power — if one wishes to put all violence in the same analytic framework: state violence in war and the repression of civil unrest; policing and crime; organized crime and "protection"; criminality and deviance; violence against women; self-defense and the protection of others; inter-communal violence; etc. etc. A conception such as Weber's definition of the state in terms of the monopolization of legitimate violence has obvious leverage here. As against this, an insistence that aggression can only mean wrongful violence can answer no more than it asks.

But all these matters must be left now for later chapters (especially chapter 6). For the present, it is necessary, having now defined sexual polarity, to give further consideration to the strategy for its sociological treatment.

In the first section of this chapter, I sought to establish the most basic strategic relationships between the biological and the social realms, identifying the biological realm as an aspect of the material environment of social action, entering into the social realm subject to a process of social construction, according as social actors take account of it in their actions. I argued that such social action, in terms of its outcomes, must be seen not under biological or quasi-biological supervision, but under the supervision of history. In the second section, I went on to examine more closely what this biological realm comprises, so far as this thesis is interested in it: that is, in the general area of sex and reproduction. I identified this as sexual polarity, comprising four main elements: fertility and maternity, the cycle of maturation, sexuality, and aggression; I argued that, while secondary characteristics, e.g. sexual differentiation in size and strength, could be recognized, it seemed best to focus on the sociological impact of this central complex of elements. But the question then arises: how to raise a sociology of gender, covering the whole range of gender phenomena, on this basis? How is the conception of sexual polarity to be given sociological development? This is what is now to be pursued, in the final section of
this chapter.

Having started the chapter formally with the conception of social action and its relations to its material environment, it might be as well to proceed now by giving a brief consideration to the means-ends schema of Weberian methodology, and the four modes of orientation of social action: ends-rational, value-rational, affectual, and traditional (Weber 1978 Part i ch 1). First, then, the point should be made that sexual polarity does lend itself to analysis in means-ends terms, in that it can provide either the ends to which social action is directed, through whatever means, or the means used in social action, to whatever ends, or both means used and ends sought in social action. More than this, sexual polarity comprises a causal realm: in particular, the causal relationship between sexual intercourse and pregnancy. It is then equally open to social actors, either to use sexual intercourse as a means to procreation, or to engage in sexual intercourse for its own sake, disregarding, avoiding, or simply accepting the procreative consequences. Equally, pregnancy may be actively sought, or feared, or avoided, or simply accepted. All this I have pointed out before. But here, the point to be grasped is that, although sexual polarity may in the light of its instinctual basis give great scope to affectual action, e.g. in sexual or parent-child relationships, it also gives great scope to calculation. In this, the demographic dimension, in terms of the economic and power location of fertility, is of great and obvious importance. I have already given some outline considerations on this, pointing especially to the migration process, in particular rural-urban migration, and the conflictual matrix inter-relating the local community as the location of procreation and nurturance and the central institutions where the adult destiny is fulfilled. I have suggested that the local community be seen as integrated around mechanisms of resistance to exogenous change, pressures originating in the central institutions. Conversely, I have argued at various points and on various grounds against the concept of "socialization". What comes now from all this, then, is that these conceptions greatly curtail the scope of the notion of traditionally oriented social action: a category to be used critical-
ly, even sceptically. It should be realized of course that actual historical analysis, e.g. of peasantries, would tend to differ here from general evolutionary overviews.

To sum up, with sexual polarity as with any type of social action, all four modes of orientation of social action are to be met with, and although it is true that there is more interest here than is usual in the affectual mode, nonetheless the thrust of sociological analysis can be assumed to lie, as with the main body of Weber's sociology, in the dialogue of ends-rationality and value-rationality (the affectual elements of sexual polarity being entered by social actors into the general calculus of competing means and/or ends).

Given these points, however, the question still remains, how to constitute a broad field of social phenomena on a somewhat narrow material basis. Here it seems open to us to follow Weber's procedure in regard to the economy (Weber 1978 Part i p 63 et seq), and to raise the sociology of sexual polarity by proposing two types of social action: one directly concerned with matters of sexual polarity; the other taking account of matters of sexual polarity but directly oriented elsewhere. Following Weberian precedent, these can be termed "sexually polar action" and "action oriented to sexual polarity" respectively (with due apology for the clumsiness of such formulations). In terms of ends and means, sexually polar action draws both ends and means from the realm of sexual polarity, whereas action oriented to sexual polarity draws either its ends or its means from the realm of sexual polarity, the other element coming from elsewhere. The main cases for analysis here will be the inter-relations with the economy and power; since Weber uses a similar two-fold typology in relation to both, this will require some expansion. That will be taken up in due course; a discussion of sexually polar action itself is due first. But before turning to this, it should be made clear that all four modes of orientation of social action apply to both types of social action; in particular, sexually polar action itself can be ends- or value-rational. It should also be made clear that the methodological purpose here is not classification for its own sake. The two types of social action are devised in order to raise
an account of primary and secondary gender phenomena in the social realm in terms of the sociological impact of primary biological phenomena only. It is in these terms, as the basis for primary and secondary gender phenomena, that the two types of social action are now to be discussed.

Sexually polar action is social action directly concerned (means and ends) with matters of sexual polarity: fertility and maternity, maturation, sexuality, and aggression. At first sight, then, its field might appear to be sexual and parental relationships. This however is a somewhat deceptive issue. For sexual and parental relationships are not typically free from extraneous considerations; on the contrary, the economic situation of procreation and childcare must always be taken into account by social actors, in the event if not in foresight. The maintenance needs of the dependent child ensure this, and this may extend to the pregnant woman and the mother of the young child also. Besides this, legal and normative factors may also be taken into account: sexual and parental relations are typically subject to classification in terms of marriage and legitimacy, categories that, as Weber pointed out long ago, point beyond the household to the wider society; they refer to the eligibility of the child (or potential child) for membership in some wider social group, such as a lineage, status-group, or political or religious community (Weber 1978 Part II p 357 - 8). Ultimately then their grounding is in the realm of power: the power these groups exercise over their members’ sexual and reproductive conduct; in turn a factor of their policies of monopolization and closure in the general material and ideal struggle in society. Indeed there is a distinction to be made between household and family: the unit of common residence and maintenance and the closed set of relationships, often legally defined, that relate to wider social groupings and conflicts in the realm of power. This is complex, for not all societies or social locations put much weight on marriage and legitimacy, or their opposites in non-marriage (e.g. concubinage) and illegitimacy: the analytic separation of household and family must not confound the comparative sociology of the family. But the point for us here is that the family is not simply constituted in
primary sexual polarity; far from it. The closest that can be said is that stable sexual and parent-child relationships (also sibling relationships) typically must be located in the household, and that a degree of internal closure may be associated (see Weber 1978 Part ii ch 3).

Primary sexual polarity, then, is simply itself, and its four themes must each simply be pursued on their own ground. The strategic conception, as indicated in previous sections, is of two cross-cutting and mutually limiting axes: sexuality, fertility and maternity; aggression and maturation; and of a process of migration between local community and central institutions. But it is crucial to realize that, so far as the city is non-self-reproductive, there is wastage, and accordingly a functionalist strategy is futile. The overwhelming need is to look at actual social practices and individual careers. Thus sexual relationships, for example, can be of various kinds: adulterous, transient, commercial, homoerotic, etc.; equally, fertility can be variously managed and have various outcomes: artificially induced infertility, infanticide, child sale, etc. The household only subsumes stable sexual and parental relationships, and at that sexual polarity cannot be theorized solely from the point of view of the parental couple. There is also the child's point of view, especially the adolescent's, with developing sexuality and fertility. Maturation and aggression direct the individual away from the household into the wider society; sexuality and fertility/maternity direct them back to the household again, though as stated above there is wastage, other careers (e.g. prostitution). But it goes without saying that there are comparative patterns of sexual differentiation in all this. Indeed, even primary child-care, even childbirth, has its comparative sociology.

Turning now to social action oriented to sexual polarity, this, as I have said above, has two main cases: the economy and power. Before pursuing this, it must be recalled that Weber has himself a two-fold typology of social action in both these fields. That is, he distinguishes between "economic action" and "economically oriented action" (Weber 1978 Part i p 63 et seq); the former social action directly concerned with the economy, while the latt-
er has two senses: action taking account of economic factors but oriented elsewhere; and the pursuit of economic ends by non-peaceful means. Again, he distinguishes between "political action" and "politically oriented action" (Weber 1978 Part i p 54 et seq); the former is the use of force as means, to whatever ends, and in practice Weber tends to let this absorb the second sense of economically oriented action; the latter is the attempt to gain control over or influence the actions of any politically acting organization — that is, it gives our commonsense meaning of "politics". Now the inter-relations of these typologies with the concept of action oriented to sexual polarity need not be pursued to exhaustion; as I have said before, the purpose here is not classification for its own sake. The basic point is that we have a set of sexual-economic phenomena, and a set of sexual-power phenomena, and that in both cases we must expect a degree of complexity of structure. The methodological picture then is only intended to guide us in raising a sociological account of secondary gender phenomena, parallel to the account of primary phenomena above.

Taking first the economic case, here the most obvious issue, in the light of previous discussions, is demographics. It should be realized that, whatever the conventions that make demographics a separate discipline similar to (and adjoining) economics, and whatever the conventions of sociology that have kept gender and population questions apart, for us demographics is a key issue, and moreover is constituted precisely in the reciprocal conditioning of economic and sexually polar factors in social action. Another and closely related issue is the household. This, though it may locate stable sexual and parental relationships, is not simply constituted in doing so; the household is the basic unit of residence and common maintenance, and also often of appropriation and labour, and of course it may be a basic unit of domination. Leaving the last point aside meantime, clearly the household is the arena for both types of economic action, and for both types of sexually polar action. On the whole, however, for present purposes it is best considered in terms of economically oriented action and action oriented to sexual polarity: the reciprocal conditioning of economic and sexually polar factors, just
as with demographics (to which indeed the household is basic). This then is one group of issues. Against it is the question of more purely economic phenomena: gender in relation to economic action.

Here the first issue surely is prostitution: the social construction of sexual polarity as utilities. This is subject to the social construction of sexual polarity itself, and may extend to include e.g. erotic dancing; again, there is another stream of the same phenomena in wet-nursing and primary child-care. All this to my mind should be treated as sui generis. Beyond this, there are economic gender phenomena such as the sexual division of labour; sexual divisions in appropriation and consumption also. These however may be legally conditioned, as with sexual differentiation in inheritance rights or in economic competence: there is a substratum from the realm of power here. The basic point, however, is to reconsider economic society in the light of gender, to find the pattern of sexual economic divisions; predictably, this on its own account will have a complex and many-levelled structure. At any rate, the issues here, prostitution and sexual economic divisions, form the second group of sexual-economic issues. As foretold above, the structure of the field is complex; however, the underlying typology of action does have organizatory value.

I turn now to the case of power. Here, there is a preliminary issue that requires some clarification: force can of course be used as a means to attain sexually polar ends, and on analogy with the case of economically oriented action, this itself might comprise a primary case of action oriented to sexual polarity. Against this, it should be realized that Weber raises the distinction between peaceful and non-peaceful economic action, and the identification of "the economy" as such above all with the former, on historical-sociological rather than purely analytic grounds; how far similar empirical grounds might apply to sexual polarity is questionable. But this point should be made: that conventionally the term "economic" is being given here even by Weber too wide a field of reference. The kidnapping of a girl to share one's bed is not really economics, even if it does augment one's household. Yet this has always been a typical element in non-peaceful econom-
ic action. The point is that a comparative historical economic sociology must conceive its field more widely than the economy sensu strictu. Strictly, however, the economy should not be defined simply with reference to all wants, but restricted in terms of a typical range of means for attaining those wants; conversely, the concept of political action should be given a wide field. This Weber in fact does. As to the concept of "non-peaceful sexually polar action", this might not have an obvious strategic place in World-historical developmental patterns, but it is at least a category to be registered.

This stated, the next issue clearly is the aggressive instinct. This I have argued should not be limited to some notion of wrongful violence, though for the present thesis it is needful to keep it tied to the notion of maturation, the cycle from sexual-parental relations through the wider society back to sexual-parental relations again. But I have argued that in principle, given a conflict society and a general sociology of power, the notion of an aggressive instinct should not be sociologically problematic; moreover Weber's definition of the state in terms of the monopolization of legitimate violence surely offers great leverage. This indeed should be taken along with the male monopolization of violence which is a historically most widespread phenomenon: the differential relation of the sexes to the state should be seen as constitutive, not merely reactive (see Weber 1978 Part ii ch 9). This entails questions not only of violence but also of personal security and its protection, of legal rights and personality, and broadly of citizenship: full membership in the political community. There are fundamental issues of sexual inequality here; possibly imponderables, where the temptation to resort to biological determinism on the basis of secondary sexual differentiation, in size and strength, is greatest. But that, as I have indicated before, is resisted in this thesis.

Beyond this, Weber articulates the bulk of his sociology of power through the notion of Domination, with its attendant typologies of legitimation and of structural form. This indeed is the original location both of the household and of the notion of patriarchy, and it is surely sociologically invidious that the sub-
ordination of women to male authority should be kept insulated from the general sociology of power. It should be realized, however, that the location of the household in the domination system, and its patriarchal character, are both historically contingent questions: they should be contextualized with the questions of women's citizenship above. But there is also the question of sexual differentiation in regard to dominational apparatuses: can women hold office or power? If so, under what conditions and on what terms? It seems an intuitively attractive point that the subordination of women to male authority should be reciprocally related to the exclusion of women from power in society. Weber's typology of domination systems then invites a comparative historical sociological investigation of the subordination of women; indeed, this is the most probable basis for a comparative historical matrix of contrasting patterns of sexual inequality - the World-historical structure of women's history.

The foregoing questions mostly concern political action: the constitutive relation of the sexes in polities. Politically oriented action is rather the struggle to control or influence the actions of the state. The main question here would appear to be how sexual polarity relates to the typical bases for such action: does it summate the situations and interests of women and men, or does it differentiate them? Above all, there are the questions of gender and stratification. In view of all that has been written above on secondary gender phenomena, it will be seen that these questions cannot be directly approached. It might be added, however, that the family, as already indicated, is not seen here simply as primary sexual and parental relationships, but in terms of closed relationships, often legally defined, that point to wider social conflicts, often of stratificatory kind. Too, it should be realized that restrictions on women's inheritance rights and economic competence, and also the economic arrangements attendant upon marriage, e.g. dowry, are also part of this picture.

At any rate, this gives the basic outline of sexual-power phenomena. As with sexual-economic phenomena, the structure is complex and many-levelled. It must be pointed out here, however, that in developing this outline (ch 4 below) I will be forced to
argue that there are confusions in the sociological tradition as to Weber's sociology of polity, and that the discussions above of women's citizenship and of women in relation to domination systems are not really two distinct sets of issues, but a single set of issues seen from two angles, or better, in two transformations: the differential constitutive relation of the sexes to the polity and its structuration. It must be insisted upon that the subordination of women to male authority is not a separate issue from this: we should envisage an integrated sociology of power.

The foregoing considerations, then, offer an overview of the Sociology of Sexual Polarity - the social phenomena of gender, divided as primary and secondary phenomena. I do not pursue this further here; the next section of the thesis will do so in extenso, the four theoretical chapters of Part B. But the present statement was needed, for the identification and organization of the issues is distinctive and even heterodox from the point of view of traditional sociology. To conclude these methodological remarks, however, some consideration should be given to the relationship of the primary and secondary phenomena, arising out of sexually polar action and action oriented to sexual polarity respectively, to the division announced in the first section of this chapter, between central institutions and local community. Here the main point is that sexual polarity itself - fertility and maternity, maturation, sexuality, and aggression - is not straightforwardly identified with any single institution: in the first place, both the household and especially the family are much more complex affairs; in the second place, sexual polarity is seen in terms of the two cross-cutting processes (sexuality, fertility and maternity; aggression and maturation) and individual careers grounded in migration, from childhood to adulthood. The best that can be said, as said before, is that the household is the typical location of stable sexual and parental relations; it stands then at one pole of the migration process, at the centre of the local community. But conversely, secondary gender phenomena, the economic and power conditioning of sexual polarity, are found everywhere, in the local community as much as in the central institutions. Considerations on the household and especially the family
illustrate this. Above all, however, it is the demographic processes, and their location in the conflictual matrix of economics and power that inter-relates the two arenas of central institutions and local community, that is the key issue. Sexual polarity is a problem in the general analysis of society.

Finally, there is one last type of social action that requires methodological comment: kinship (see Keesing 1975; Barnes 1971; Goody ed. 1971, 1973). Kinship is difficult for the sociologist to discuss, for it is pre-eminently an anthropological concern, and raised mainly in terms of "primitive" societies. Moreover there is a tradition in social theory that at the primitive level, kinship structure and social structure are virtually synonymous. Sociological grand theory, whether of Durkheimian or Marxian kind, seems always to have accepted this without question. In terms of the modern anthropology of the fieldwork era, it can probably be traced back to Radcliffe-Brown (see Kuper 1973 ch 2, also p 95 - 6). Clearly however it also reflects the classical anthropological theory of the pre-fieldwork era (see Leaf 1979 ch 7; see also ch 8), and it is from this not from Radcliffe-Brown that the strategy in sociological grand theory of superimposing the modern ethnographic record on prehistory surely derives. But this is a profoundly unhelpful orientation for a comparative historical sociology, whose main arena of analysis is pre-modern civilization, and which must therefore enquire into the sociological location and inter-relations of kinship in complex societies, and equally, its historical specificity. Leaving aside more recent radical questionings (e.g. Needham 1974; Needham ed. 1971), modern anthropology has always offered alternative approaches. In particular, Kroeber held that kinship represents only secondary social structure, the primary weight of social causation lying rather with residence and subsistence patterns; again, historically, the elaboration of kinship beyond immediate biological relationships to structures running through the whole society appears as an alternative to the development of stratification and the state not as its fore-runner: among many primitive peoples, as in civilizations, it does not occur (Kroeber 1952 a, b, c; see also p 169 - 74). Weber’s views seem to me to be more in line
with this approach; he considered kinship to be a basic social grouping, with primarily legal functions especially in vengeance and feuding, but co-existing with equally basic groupings that carry the weight of economics, domination and political action. In particular, kinship does not generate the household, nor is it the natural basis of the political community or the state. The polity may come to make use of a kinship metaphor (especially in terms of "noble" lineages or clans, closed against the mass of the "commoners"), but this is historically specific not primordial, and is to be treated in terms of political sociology. Above all, it is to be approached through the thematization of a concept of "polity", not a taken-for-granted notion of "society" (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 3,4,5; see also ch 9; see also Weber 1981 ch 2).

These are difficult matters. Central to them is Weber's disengagement of the ancient City-state from primitive conditions and considerations; the development of his views here lies largely in untranslated or neglected texts (Weber 1982, 1924, 1976; also of course 1978 Part ii ch 16). This will come up again below (especially ch 9 and Appendix A iii). But for the meantime, the concern here is methodological. It is clear, then, that for us, kinship can be regarded as action oriented to sexual polarity, of the general order of sexual-power phenomena; the legal dimension would tend to place it in terms of politically oriented action: i.e. with stratification. But this, as indicated above, must be contextualized with a thematization of the polity, not an unthematized notion of "society". That is the best that can be said meantime. But I have commented repeatedly on the problems in social theory of the lesions between sociology and anthropology.

With these remarks, I bring the methodological section of my thesis to a close. The next section (Part B) will attempt to raise a body of sociological theory in four chapters, on the basis of the considerations above. The first will deal with the migration process and its poles in the central institutions and the local community; the second with the macro-analysis of the local community and the nature and location of household and family; the third with primary sexual polarity - fertility and maternity, mat-
uration, sexuality, and aggression —; the fourth with sexual divisions, in the realms of power, the economy, and in relation to stratification. The constitutive basis of these chapters has been provided in this present chapter; the analysis is filled out by consideration of a set of comparative historical studies, as I have discussed in the previous chapter (ch 2). The studies themselves will be presented in Part C, the final section of the thesis.

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Part B

Sociological Theory
This chapter and the three that follow present an essay in social theory: that is, an attempt at social theory, on an interim basis. The substantive field that has been considered for this is a restricted one: the Ancient Civilization; specific studies in this are presented in the final part (Part C) of the thesis. So far is the comparative historical study of gender a terra incognita that I have considered it essential to work in these terms, accepting the costs in the provisional character of the generalizations made and the limited capability to resolve some of the more interesting sociological questions raised.

A general discussion on the Ancient Civilization is offered as an appendix (Appendix A). For present purposes, however, this much must be said: Weber held the basic macro-unit of the Ancient Civilization to be the coastal or riverine city, dominating its agricultural hinterland and engaging in maritime trade and in war. Beyond this, he made a basic typological dichotomy between the Bureaucratic Kingdom and the City-state, sub-dividing the latter into two further types: the Patrician City and the Plebeian City (Weber 1976 Part i; Weber 1978 Part ii ch 16 "The City"). This setting and these typologies will be central to all that follows.

In the previous two chapters, I have tried to establish a methodological framework for the sociology of the sexes in society in terms of social action and history, in which human biology appears as a conditioning factor but the social realm is in no way under biological supervision. This is a conception which is strongly hostile to the concept "society" as conceived in biolog-
istic and reified terms. It also strongly qualifies the concept "reproduction", limiting its sociological use to those cases where it occurs as an actors' meaning; in general terms, we should rather speak of "procreation". The consequence of this position is the necessity to engage with demographics, and with demographic history.

I have already offered some preliminary considerations upon this matter; here I intend to reprise and expand upon them, and to offer some specific proposals for the treatment of demographics in social theory, as I promised earlier. Before doing so, however, I want to emphasize that I do not undertake this for its own sake, and do not envisage a decisive resolution of the area's problems. On the contrary, I am undertaking only what I consider to be an essential orientative exercise for my enquiry into the sexes in society. This point is worth making, for there is always a distinction in sociology between the central ground that we all use for explanation and that all social theory must cover - the economy, stratification, power, the state, ideology, etc. - and those ramified areas that we enquire into if we want to and disregard if we please. Population seems generally to have come into the second category, and it is not obvious why this should be so. Again, the feminist problematic and population issues seem to have usually been kept insulated from each other; it is hard to see why. But my own position is that population should, for present purposes at least, be treated as part of the central explanatory ground of sociology, and that gender issues cannot be kept insulated from population issues. Therefore I have to make proposals for the area.

Population, as I commented before, is a difficult issue, and there appears to be a basic lack of agreement in social theory as to how or even whether to deal with it. One aspect of the problem seems to be the structure of population history itself, which is apparently oriented around the two great population explosions in history: in neolithic times and in modernity. This structure seems to go with the kind of universal sociology (or synthesis of sociology and anthropology) which focusses on the neolithic and Industrial revolutions in technology, giving a
threefold developmental schema of primitive, complex-traditional and modern societies. Parsons is the greatest exemplar of this. Yet the position has problems. Little is known about the development from primitive to civilized, and there are conceptual differences between sociology and anthropology which are accordingly not being brought into focus, especially as between the social science and cultural science perspectives. Again, the development of "modernity" is a complex and many-staged (and contradictory) process. Further, general sociological experience is that technology is not a good independent variable in social explanation; by the same token, most of what is known about social change in historical sociology is here being trivialized. This point is worth stating conversely: the main approaches in sociology which focus on the development of modernity in the context of the historical record, i.e. Marxian and Weberian sociology, seem to have little concern with either population or technology. Yet it is from here that our best understanding of social change and development comes.

There seems on the face of it, then, to be a basic incommensuracy of framework between sociology and population. Yet that view needs qualification, for as I pointed out earlier, the period between the two great population explosions is not simply one of stability or of near-stable slow continuous growth. Population explosion results from an imbalance of fertility and mortality, but there is a third population process: migration. The apparent balance of fertility and mortality through most of recorded history is illusory, for in great part they have occurred in different locations. What is true (more or less) is that, between the two great population explosions, demographic history is the history of the migration process. Above all, this has meant rural-urban migration. Excess fertility in the countryside is balanced by excess mortality in the cities - due especially to contagious disease; indeed, the population explosion in the West at the beginning of modernity is in large part due to reduced urban mortality, above all due to clean water and sewers. Yet the migration process in history has many faces: they include both the founding of colonies and the slave trade, for example. Also the sociologi-
ical relationship between city and countryside should be remembered; it is at least as much a power relationship as an economic one. To this it must be added that there is a history of fertility and mortality too: indeed, the pattern of population increase through most of history tends to be one of quite fast medium-term growth with sporadic strong reversals due to plagues and wars, rather than one of steady increase. Again, there are actual long-term reversals: for example, Egypt's population in medieval Islamic times was often lower than in Antiquity (surely a question of social organization rather than technology, incidentally) (see McEvedy and Jones 1978 p 226 – 9). In all, my view is that these matters, this history, are best seen by high-lighting the migration process: the location of fertility and out-migration; the location of mortality and in-migration; and the tensions between them. That is what I intend to provide in terms of population theory here.

To revert to the questions of orthodox treatments of population, however, in my earlier discussion, I pointed to two further ranges of problem: one, the categorical contradiction between what I identified as the Durkheimian and Marxian views on the relation of the population process to the social process; the other, an apparent uncertainty as to whether population was an endogenous or an exogenous factor – part of society, or part of society's environment. I will pursue each of these questions in turn. First, the opposed classical tendencies: on the one side, the Durkheimian tendency maintains that the social process is inherently stable, and that the population process is one of the few (perhaps indeed the only) factors that can break through it and cause change. This orientation underpins the Parsonian conception discussed above, of course, especially in relation to the development from the primitive to the civilized – where indeed some approach of this kind is commonly adduced. It will come up again later. The Marxist position by contrast holds that the social process is inherently unstable, but is driven by its own dynamic: the population process subserves this, but is always contained by the social process; it is not a factor for change in itself. Now I have suggested earlier that these two opposed positions might in principle
be reconciled, if we conceive them as each descriptions of the opposite poles of the migration process. The accounts then are both partial, and require to be synthesized. The Durkheimian conception is basically valid at the location of excess fertility and out-migration, while the Marxian conception is basically valid at the location of fertility shortfall (or excess mortality) and in-migration. These locations I identified as the local community level of society and the central institutions of society respectively, though the migration process is first introduced in terms of countryside and city. These terms then, for which the present chapter is named, require some clarification.

To take the central institutions first; by this I mean the main arena of sociological conflict, in terms of economic structures, power structures, stratification, etc. These things are diffuse, and penetrate all through society of course. But the notions of "arena of conflict" and "sociological focus" should serve to indicate the centre, and at the centre is the state. As against this, the local community level of society is more difficult to define, if easier to point to. (Indeed it should be realized that here again I am involved with the division between sociology and anthropology, which I have stated from the outset to lie at the heart of our problem.) However, at the centre of the local community clearly lies the mother-child relationship. Clustered around this are the household and the family (by no means the same things). But though the relation of this to the central institutions is antithetical, it is a crucial point that there seems to be more than one mode of division. Rather, there is on the one hand the division of central control versus local autonomy; on the other, the division of public control versus private autonomy. It will be necessary to expand on these matters later; indeed, the later sections of this chapter will be devoted to the central institutions and the local community respectively. But for the meantime, the point that must be made is that the division of central institutions versus local community can be taken to subsume that between city and countryside, for these are sociologically not simply geographically inter-related. (It should be remembered that I am working here solely in consideration of
the Ancient Civilization, a civilization in which uniformly the city dominates the countryside.)

But I leave this meantime to take up again the second of the problems in the orthodox treatments of population identified above: uncertainty as to whether population is part of society itself, or part of society's environment. This seems to be more an area of anthropological than of sociological argument, and I am accordingly off my ground. I note again that much of it concerns the "evolution" from primitive to civilized, and accordingly has a somewhat hypothetical character. However, on the one side, arguments on the sociological effect of population increase may be conducted in terms of increase in "social density" - frequency of interactions - which is supposed to make a qualitative difference in social structure. This was Durkheim's argument, and for a time at least Parsons also accepted it. I confess to scepticism: it is at best an interesting idea. On the other side are arguments that increased population and improved technology - either of which can be used to explain the other - create an increasing economic surplus, and thus permit a greater complexity of social organization, with the emergence of stratification, the state, a leisured class of intellectuals, etc. This I call treating population as environment of society. The two variants might be contrasted as Idealist and materialist, though perhaps better as social theory and cultural theory. At any rate, it should be stressed that this "materialist" anthropology has no obvious compatibility with Marxian sociology, for reasons that should become clear in the discussions that follow.* But the point to make against the "materialist" position - leaving aside the speculative nature of the enquiry - is that it over-estimates the degree to which society is at the mercy of its environment, even at a low level of technology (see Leach's "Closing Remarks" in Renfrew ed. 1973). That is the basic criticism that an Idealist anthropology would make: that this approach fails to recognize the element of social construction of the environment which is the irreducible

*It is a conflict anthropology that is needed. Manipulating the relationships between society and culture cannot substitute for this. Nor is it the same issue as materialism versus Idealism.
basis of the economy.

It is this last conception that I want to use now, for it is also Weber's conception, along with the further proviso that at the heart of socio-economics lies not Man's struggle with Nature but man's struggle with man (this as much at the primitive level as at the civilized; there is no "primitive communism"). (See Weber 1978 Part I ch 2). It is these conceptions, rather than technology, that should be brought to bear on the basic relationship between economic resources and human fertility. Here the problem has always been that the relationship is ambivalent (see e.g. articles in Overbeek ed. 1977); on the one side, fertility means increased production capabilities, an increased workforce to exploit the available economic resources; on the other side, fertility means increased consumption needs, more mouths to be fed on the basis of the available economic resources. The question is how to balance these factors against each other. Considering this in terms of a socially constructed (as opposed to naturally given) economy in the context of a conflict sociology, we can argue that, according to general conflictual parameters, it is open to society to socially construct its economic resources so as to maximize scarcity or so as to maximize plenty. In the former case, where scarcity prevails, the primary impact of fertility will be for increased consumption needs, for the workforce can only work the resources available to it. In the latter case, where plenty prevails, the primary impact of fertility will be for increased production capabilities. The question is, then, what are the conflictual parameters that control this choice?

Clearly, these parameters are the stratificatory order and the power structures of society, the system of domination. These indeed and especially the former are shaped by the economic order. But there are two axes here that require separate consideration. For the first, there is the question of exploitation: the conditions of appropriation and of labour under which economic resources are worked. For the second, there is the question of domination: how far and with what bias does the state guarantee or protect the various classes and/or status groups vis-a-vis each other? Relating these two axes to each other, clearly two type-
situations are possible: either the lines of exploitation and domination coincide and reinforce each other, or else they cross-cut and interfere with each other.

The first of these cases occurs where the same class or status group both owns the main economic resources and controls the state, which it uses to protect its own position. The second case occurs where the class or status group of large-scale owners is excluded from control of the state. This occurs above all where a king suppresses his nobles and rules through a bureaucratic apparatus; typically in doing so he also protects the common people against exploitation. At the extreme, the nobility of ownership may actually be dissolved into a nobility of office, dependent upon salaries derived from the taxes they collect in lieu of rents—a process wholly under the king's control. It is the conflicts between ruler, apparatus, and wealthiest class or status group, then, that are the issue here, and that have to be set against the more straightforward situation of stratificatory conflict and rule. Thus the polar opposite of the bureaucratic situation occurs where no king emerges from the nobility, who exercise rule conjointly themselves, directly and without apparatus. The clearest case of this is the Patrician City-state, and indeed it is generally in the City-state that power conflicts are on a straightforward stratificatory basis, and rule is by class or status group.

Thus the two type-situations that I have proposed, domination either coinciding with and reinforcing exploitation, or cross-cutting and interfering with it, can be identified with Weber's basic typology for the Ancient Civilization which I introduced at the beginning of this chapter: City-state and Bureaucratic Kingdom. (See Weber 1976 Part I, esp. p 69-79.)

A comment should be added here on the two sub-types of the City-state: the Patrician City and the Plebeian City. As I have said, the former occurs where a nobility rules without either king or apparatus. There are class and/or status conflicts between patrician and plebeian strata, which can have various outcomes. The Plebeian City occurs where an element of the common people (not necessarily all of it) either takes a share in the state, or
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else takes control of it outright. But in doing so, they continue to exercise rule on the same basis as the nobility, i.e. conjoin-
tly and directly, with neither king nor apparatus (this of course
is the origin of democracy). This does not transcend the category
of coincident domination and exploitation, though the class (or
status group) that controls the state is not the wealthiest (or
at least, not at an individual level). With this, the impact of
plebeian rule for the social construction of scarcity is of the
order of using the state to protect specifically plebeian inter-
est; it is not generally ameliorative for the common people. The
contrast of Patrician and Plebeian City, then, while important,
remains secondary to the contrast of City-state and Bureaucratic
Kingdom. (There will be a further note on these issues at the end
of the chapter.)

To reprise, then, what is at issue here is the economic im-
pact of fertility, whether for increased production capabilities
or for increased consumption needs. I have argued that this is
best answered in comparative typological terms, in consideration
of general sociological variables in economy, stratification, and
power. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, the impact of fertility is for
increased production capabilities; in City-states, it is for in-
creased consumption needs. This argument is subordinate to a con-
ception of the population process as migration process: migration
from local community to central institutions. Rural-urban migra-
tion is the most obvious case of this. But the point is to estab-
lish the dynamic between the two poles: to show how different
conditions at the one imply different conditions at the other.
The above remarks have sketched this. But it now requires to be
pursued through focussed discussions of the two poles of the mig-
ration process: central institutions and local community. The
following two sections will consider these in turn.

In the foregoing section, I identified the central institut-
tions of society as the main arena of sociological conflict, in
terms of the economy, stratification and power, with the state
at the centre. Following the Marxist approach, that the conflicts
in this arena develop by their own dynamic, which the population
process subserves but does not independently affect, I argued that the central institutions should be seen as the negative, receiving, pole of the population process, viewed as a process of migration to the central institutions from the local community (which in turn is centred on the mother-child relationship). Yet conditions at the central institutions imply conditions at the local community; they are to be seen as the two poles of a single process. Again, at an earlier point (in ch 3) I argued that the local community should be seen as integrated around resistance to exogenous change - change originating in the central institutions. The consensual, traditional, timeless conception of the local community then is an illusion. But that is a matter for the next section.

To pursue this analysis of the central institutions, I want first to make some observations on Weber's sociology of power. First, I want to repeat a point made in discussing the comparative historical method above (ch 2): that Weber does not work with a conception of society of reified and/or biologistic kind, but simply conceives social action in the arena of history. Where the term "society" is used, it is probably best understood in terms of the sub-title given to Part ii of "Economy and Society": "The Economy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers".

This point made, I want to consider the question of texts. The main writings on power in Weber's works seem to come in three phases.* Firstly, there is a brief consideration on Bureaucratic

*More accurately, there are four phases; the essay of 1905 on the social arrangements of the early Germans comes first (Weber 1924). However, this text remains untranslated; the gradual disengagement of German (and medieval European) origins, Graeco-Roman (and ancient) origins, and ethnographic parallels, in the earlier phase of Weber's career is difficult ground; and perhaps most of all, some knowledge of early German history would be essential for any real discussion. Even so, this essay does underlie important considerations in both parts of "Economy and Society": the contrast of warrior-following and manor has much the same kind of bearing for the types of charismatic and traditional domination as does the contrast of City-state and Bureaucratic Kingdom in "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations". Weber's mature typology of power is greatly enriched by these comparative studies, but its presentation in the later texts can be hard to puzzle out. (See Roth's "Introduction" in "Economy and Society" vol. 1 p XLII - XLVI.)
Kingdoms and City-states, very much as I have given it above, at the end of "Economic Theory and Ancient Society", Part i of "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations" (1909). Secondly, there is Part ii of "Economy and Society" ("The Economy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers") - to which I will return (c1910 - 18). Thirdly, there is Part i of "Economy and Society" ("The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations") chapter 3 (1918 - 20). It should be stressed that the chapter in "The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations", though it may appear to be an exhaustive re-working of the relevant chapters in "The Economy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers", actually envisages both a chapter on the state and a chapter on revolutions. Neither of these ever appeared, though chapter 16 of "The Economy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers" ("The City") may fill some of the gaps. This situation must direct us to "The Economy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers" as Weber's most encyclopaedic, if not most refined, work, in power as in most sociological matters (with the striking exception of the economy).

Equally, it must condition our view as to which chapters of this work are in fact relevant. The chapters on power here again fall into three categories: there are two "contextualizing" chapters that examine the relations between political and economic power and between political and religious organizations respectively (chs 10 & 15); there are the chapters on legitimate domination and the various types of domination system (chs 11 - 14, ch 16); and there are the chapters on race, ethnicity, and political communities (chs 5 & 9). Although for present purposes the first category can be left aside, it is in my view essential that the other two be taken together, and in particular, that the third category, the chapters on race, ethnicity, and political communities, be related back to the first point that I made in this discussion: that Weber does not work with a reified concept of "society". It is probably fairly generally understood now that this concept, in orthodox usage, actually masks the political unit - nation state, country, "tribe" (or tribes - sic!), etc. Therefore we must have a thematized sociology of it. To fail in this cannot but confound the sociology of the state, and makes the whole rel-
ation of state and society — that is, the sociological location of the state — ambiguous and confused.

Other scholars have certainly considered these questions. For example, Michael Mann (Mann 1986) has argued that we should discard the orthodox concept of "society", and rather conceive of overlapping networks of power, which he draws largely after the fashion of Weber's sociology of legitimate domination. Randall Collins (Collins 1986) has argued, taking Weber's main statement of the sociology of power to lie in "The Economy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers", that the chapter on political communities (ch 9) should be taken to introduce the chapters on legitimate domination, which should be seen then in geopolitical context: the struggles of political communities and imperialism (however, he ignores the chapter on race and ethnicity — ch 5). Anthony D. Smith (Smith 1986) has argued for the use of the concepts of ethnicity and nation, grounded in Weber's discussions (especially ch 5 of "The Economy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers"), in political sociology; though he can be criticized for putting too much weight on these notions, and not giving proper consideration to the state or to domination systems. These three scholars, then, have all of them approached the orthodox discourse, in political sociology, the sociology of power, the sociology of the state, in the light of a reconsideration of Weber, and have found it wanting. Yet since they have all made quite different critical points and suggestions, it seems to me that a further consideration of Weber might lead to a synthesis.

To argue this synthesis, the first necessity is to set up a concept wide enough to accommodate all the phenomena that are under consideration: "the polity". I propose, then, that we can discuss the polity in terms of four aspects: a centre of authority; an apparatus through which authority is exerted; a boundaried field (in terms of people) within which authority applies; and a stratificatory order of relations to authority within that field. In terms of these four aspects, I hold that we can identify two contrasting historical aetiologies of the polity: one starting from a centre of authority; the other starting from a boundaried field.

In the first case, a king or prince will exert his power as
far as he can, until he meets limits of a pragmatic kind in terms of geographical or geopolitical factors. The development of an apparatus and his relationship to it will be an expression of his geopolitical success. But his authority is not limited to any one community; it has only pragmatic limits. Indeed his authority, so far as it is durable, creates a community, of those who accept his authority as legitimate. A stratificatory order will emerge here, shaped between apparatus and economy. A point is that the king's subordinates may have power themselves that extends beyond the pragmatic boundaries of his own power; this is a factor of the geopolitical dimension of apparatus. This then is Mann's situation of overlapping power networks.

In the second case, a boundaried field creates itself through a number of social actors agreeing to a common political identity and destiny. There may be a pre-existent basis for this, in terms of a belief in common ethnicity, etc. Typically a stratificatory order emerges grading the degrees of membership of the political community (the boundaried field), e.g. in terms of nobles and commoners. A single authority-centre (i.e. a king) may emerge, at least for a time, but power is more typically shared among the nobles on a collegiate basis, often with wider involvement e.g. a warriors' assembly. Such a collegiate direct exercise of power subject to some kind of wider control marks the greatest extent to which an apparatus is likely to emerge. Above all, this situation is characterized by a hard boundary between citizens and foreigners, which may also find expression in terms of free and slave. This alternative situation, then, perhaps reflects something of Smith's conceptions.

Now obviously what I have described here corresponds again to Bureaucratic Kingdom and City-state, and indeed, I pointed to this typology, in "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations", as the first statement of Weber's sociology of polity. But what is more to the point is that the above also has correspondence to the types "traditional domination" and "charismatic domination". For bureaucracy is not necessarily rational-legal; only the modern, purest case is so. Historically, bureaucracies have generally been of traditional (patrimonial) kind. Equally, char-
isma is not limited to the case of the following of a hero or a prophet. The tie of brotherhood or common loyalty is also charisma, including the sworn confraternity on which the Plebeian City is based. Again, there is the blood or lineage charisma of the Patrician City or the clan state.

It can be difficult to analyse Weber's intentions here, for he both treats the political community as a distinct issue and presents much of the material again in the discussion of charismatic domination; well, that can also be said of the household, which is discussed both as a basic sociological grouping (ch 3 of "The Economy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers") and at the beginning of the discussion of traditional domination (ch 12). Again, the material presented in "The City" (ch 16) also appears variously in the chapters on political communities (ch 9) and charismatic domination (ch 14) — and indeed, this last seems to be paralleled in the later treatment in "The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations" (ch 3). In particular, it is in the chapter of "The Economy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers" on political communities that stratification is discussed. But this point must be made: that neither the political community nor the structures of traditional domination are necessarily co-extensive with the polity, and their relations to each other can be quite various. The next section, and indeed later chapters, will have to concern itself with this. But it must be realized that my focus, unlike Weber's, does not extend to ethnographic or early medieval European material, but is wholly on the contrasting types of developed ancient polity.

It is perhaps worth spelling out the implications of this argument for Weber's general sociology of polity. What I am suggesting is that we identify the polity in four aspects: centre of authority, apparatus, field of application, and stratificatory order. Two developmental patterns then can be identified: the traditional, starting from a centre of authority, and defining its field of application in geopolitical conflict and through the notion of legitimacy, in the course of which also an apparatus and a stratificatory order develop; and the charismatic, starting from a self-defining boundaried field, and developing a stratif-
icatory order of internal closure (possibly with geopolitical considerations), following which a centre of authority and an apparatus may emerge. These two patterns are together the aetiology of the modern rational-legal polity; indeed, the components "rational-legal" echo "traditional-charismatic", and the point is precisely the rationalization of the relationships between the two arms in terms of each other. This is not simply an analytic point, but also a historical one, especially in regard to the Roman Empire and the medieval European Standestaat, both of which feature conciously rationalized systems incorporating City-states into wider traditional realms. The growth of the Roman citizenship - described in a later chapter of this thesis (ch 10) - is particularly to be noted.

However, I cannot pursue these wider issues for their own sakes here. Indeed, although the underlying principles of traditional and charismatic domination should be kept in mind, it is only in terms of specific sub-types that the argument can at present be pursued: traditional (patrimonial) bureaucracies, and ancient City-states. The purpose of contrasting these two types of polity is, in pursuit of the demographic argument in the previous section, to analyse their contrasting conditions of recruitment. To this end, it should first be reiterated that the typical main structural conflicts, in which recruitment is located, are different in the two types - this I have already sketched.

In traditional polities (see Weber 1978 Part ii chs 12 & 13), the main structural conflicts are between ruler, apparatus and subjects, especially the most privileged stratum. In terms of traditional (patrimonial) bureaucracy, there are two main aspects to identify. For the first, the ruler strives to maintain his pre-eminence over his nobles, who in turn try to reduce him to their own level, or else to assert their autonomy in the geopolitical dimension. For the second, the ruler strives to keep his officials dependent upon him, both for the means of administration and for their own subsistence; his officials on the other hand try to appropriate the means of administration and of their own subsistence, and to become an autonomous nobility. A definitive issue here is that a bureaucracy collects taxes for the king, from which
he pays his officials a salary. By contrast, a nobility will collect taxes for themselves, and pass on the excess to the king, or perform services for him (the purer, non-bureaucratic, forms of patrimonialism). With this, the conflicts between bureaucracy and nobility are best seen in terms of, or at least in the light of, two alternative types of domination, rather than two rival elements in a single structure. A nobility may co-exist with a bureaucracy, as an economically, and perhaps legally, privileged stratum, but with no effective claim to power. But this is really an intermediate situation. The pure type of bureaucratic polity will rather dissolve the nobility altogether. One way to do this is by a general expropriation of private wealth and an endowment of temples, in which the nobility must seek office; this was done in Egypt, and probably broadly across the Ancient Near East. But the main resource is the state apparatus itself. I will return to this.

Against this, in City-states the main structural conflicts, given that the nobles have suppressed the king (i.e. that this is a City-state and not a traditional City-kingdom), are stratificatory in nature, over the closure of the political community. Here indeed the issue, rather than being the control of the means of administration, is rather the control of the means of warfare, for the citizen is a self-equipped soldier, whether a noble in a chariot or on horseback, a commoner armoured foot-soldier, or even exceptionally the oarsman of the galleys. (In the Bureaucratic Kingdom, by contrast, the soldiers are typically professional and salaried, and are equipped from the king's armouries - the latter point will hold even where a grant of land is made for the soldier's support, instead of a standing army being kept in barracks.) On the one side, then, the nobles strive to deprive the common people of their political and legal rights, and reduce them to a dependent following and/or workforce, possibly even to enslave them. On the other side, the common people, or elements of them, strive to overthrow the privileges of the nobles and to assert a general political and legal equality of citizenship. In Antiquity, these conflicts featured struggles over the ownership of land, and over usury and debt-slavery (this is discussed more
fully in Appendix A, especially part ii). Three status categories then are typically defined in these stratificatory conflicts: patrician, plebeian, and proletarian; they correspond broadly to: large land-owners, peasantry, and urban artisanate. These struggle to monopolize political and legal rights, and the apparatus of magistrates, councils, and assemblies through which the political community administers its public affairs — thus creating the familiar forms of oligarchy and democracy. Generally, the plebeians might, with more or less success, assert their ultimate status equality (i.e. common citizenship) with the patricians, but it was unusual for the proletarians to do so, unless exceptionally they were of military importance as oarsmen — Athens is the main example.

It should be noted in all this that "status" here has a very hard meaning, in political-legal terms: it reflects citizenship, membership and participation in the political community. The ultimate status difference is that between free and slave; the status difference between citizen and non-citizen (who may be liable to enslavement) must also be noted. This is the context within which internal closure of the political community should be seen. (Incidentally, this is also surely the paradigm case of "status" for Weber, as his intellectual biography should make clear.)

As I have said, then, these contrasting patterns of structural conflicts locate and condition the processes of recruitment, of in-migration into the central institutions; indeed, the contrast between the two types is sharp. To show this, the general relationships between power, wealth and progeny in each type must be considered.

For this, it is best to take City-states first. Here we have a closed political community; closed both externally against foreigners and slaves, and internally in terms of the stratificatory order. With this political closure goes economic closure, in particular the appropriation of the land, and the stratificatory order is linked closely, and indeed in juridical terms, to property holdings, for the different categories of military service entail different levels of self-equipment (a chariot and horses as against a hoplite's armour, for example). This is definitively
a hereditary system, in which children succeed to their parents' positions, and on the whole the only way of access to these positions is through birth. Above all, the implications should be grasped for children for whom no provision is made: exile or enslavement. But it must also be grasped that this system requires the transmission of intact estates down the generations, and therefore the limitation of the numbers of those with a claim against an estate at its devolution. If the numbers of children exceed replacement level, estates will fragment and their incumbents will be declassed, unless the process of fragmentation can be balanced by one of re-accumulation. In the face of economic closure, especially the appropriation of the land by the politically dominant strata, that is problematic. Generally, then, there is great economic pressure on fertility: a socially constructed pressure grounded in the stratificatory order, and affecting all strata.

This picture must be set in the context of stratificatory conflicts. Basic to these are the class struggles between large and small land-owners, in which the latter become forced into debt and expropriated or enslaved; expropriated peasants become the urban proletariat. The large land-owners may either rent out their lands to share-croppers or have them worked by slaves, more typically the former. Slaves are typically domestic servants; or else artisans in the city, paying a body-rent. Rents of one kind or another (rather than e.g. direct labour services, or the handing over of the labour-product) are the typical form of exploitation. Yet this process does not typically run its course. Mainly, military reasons account for this: firstly, in that the geopolitical situation of the City-state makes for a collective interest in maintaining military strength; secondly, in that the hoplite, the self-equipped small-holder heavy infantryman, comes historically to dominate the battlefield. On the basis of this, the plebeian stratum at least keeps a presence in the state, and may well come to dominate it. Exceptionally this can also extend to the urban proletariat, if the City develops a fleet of galleys in which they provide the oarsmen. At the same time, the big land-owners are contained, their monopoly of the state broken and the
laws of usury and debt-slavery annulled. But this again does not run its course; they keep their patrician status, and they are not expropriated. In Antiquity, the demands to cancel debts and redistribute the land are often heard; but they are never fulfilled. The class-conflicts result in compromise, though a status conflict between the orders remains virtually a permanent feature of the City-state world.

These processes have various outcomes, as seen for example at Athens or at Rome. More will be said of them in the later chapters of this thesis. But for the present, two points should be made. Firstly, there is pressure here to foreign predation, to the acquisition of new economic resources. If the internal predation of the patricians is blocked, then they are likely to turn to imperialism: non-peaceful trade, the exaction of tribute, regular (though farmed) taxation. On the basis of this, they may resume internal predation, as shown spectacularly at Rome, where imported slaves drove out the free peasantry. But equally, if the plebeians or even the proletarians come to dominate the state, they also are likely to be forced into foreign predation, in the same forms. Athens illustrates this. The other point, which is at the heart of our present concerns, concerns population movement—migration. In the ancient City-state world this has many faces: the flight of the landless to the city; colonization (i.e. the founding of new Cities); the influx of the slave-trade from abroad; the general wanderings around the world of landless mercenary soldiers. These are typical features of classical Antiquity (at least until the Roman Empire). The underlying reasons should now be clear.

As I have said, the City-state is oriented to replacement: to the transmission of estates down the generations without division. This is defined, like the economic pressures on fertility themselves, not by absolute factors but in terms of social closure: marriage and legitimacy. Only children born to sanctioned unions have a claim to property or to citizenship. Other children have no claims. But beyond this, the numbers of legitimate children may be controlled, especially by exposure. This is not simply infanticide; the child may well be found and raised by others.
But it is expulsion from the political community; indeed, most often the child will be raised as a slave. More often exposure happens to girl-children than to boys. For this, there are many reasons: males are valued more for their military functions; the need to dower girls makes raising them an expense; but ultimately the reason is surely that females are the bearers of fertility. Sexual relations with non-citizen and slave women, often prostitutes, are a major resource whereby citizen men limit the numbers of their legitimate children; this is commonly the destiny of the exposed citizen girl-child. Thus the pattern completes itself. This indeed is the ground for the sociology of prostitution.

(Whether this can lead to an actual sex-ratio imbalance, as some have suggested, is hard to say; exposure, as noted, is not infanticide. See Guttentag and Secord 1983 esp. ch 2; Pomeroy 1975 Appendix. See also Appendix A part ii below.)

It should be stressed that marriage and legitimacy are located in the stratificatory conflicts of a closed political community. In particular, the question what is the status of a union between partners of different status, and of the child of such a union, is matter for conflict. Typically, patrician strata will try to monopolize marriage for their own daughters, taking commoner girls as concubines; this both in order to monopolize full citizenship and to protect their property. In this, they may prefer intermarriage outwith the political community, with foreign aristocracies. This is an essential aspect of internal closure.

Against this, the lower strata (especially the plebeians) will insist on the validity of their own marriages, and will try to force the patricians to acknowledge unions between the strata, and the children born of them. Possibly they will pass laws forbidding or restricting marriage to foreigners (Pericles' citizenship law at Athens; the Roman laws on conubium). Again, special forms of marriage that convey legitimacy but not inheritance may be evolved (as apparently at Rome). But most of all, the citizenship of the illegitimate child is protected: the patrician stratum is not permitted to use its marriage practices to monopolize citizenship. In the ancient City-state, marriage and legitimacy are concerns of the status groups, which indeed may have their
own distinct forms, rather than of the state. In the last analysis it is the citizenship of the parents, not the nature of their union (though it should reflect their citizen status), that is the basis of the child's claim to citizenship. But equally, it should be noted that, as a charismatic community, the City does not grant membership simply on the basis of birth, at least, not to a male. Even if the child is raised and not exposed, there will be an initiation and registration as citizen, at coming of age. It is this if anything that the state controls.

Finally, a point that should be stressed for the City-state situation: the urban proletariat is not ordinarily self-reproductive, recruiting itself rather through the migration process. This can be the flight of landless peasants or the influx of foreign slaves, or both. The non-reproductivity is basically due to poverty and squalor: men's work will not ordinarily support dependents, and much of women's work is in prostitution, which has little compatibility with the bearing and raising of children; also in wet-nursing, which may follow upon the woman's own child being exposed, or at least reduces its chances for survival. An inclusive democracy such as Athens might somewhat ameliorate these conditions, but this is unusual and of limited effect. Many practices -- the artisan's ambition to buy a slave to support him in old age; the burial clubs of the urban poor in the Roman cities -- all speak of the absence of families at this level.

Turning now to Bureaucratic Kingdoms: here, as stated earlier, the central issue is the conflicts between king, apparatus and nobles. The king sets aside the nobility and rules through officials whom he appoints and whose careers he controls; the officials collect taxes and remit them to the king, who then pays them a salary. Thus the means of administration and of the officials' subsistence are both kept in the king's hands. Against this, the officials struggle to appropriate their offices and transmit them to their sons; also to appropriate the means of administration and subsistence, collecting taxes for themselves and passing on so much to the king, or providing services for him. In all these matters, a range of compromises may be reached, including the appointment of sons to their fathers' offices, or at least to
an equivalent bureaucratic career. But the point is that, in principle, this is a specifically anti-hereditary system.

In this, the nobility are excluded from playing a role in the state, and indeed, so far as they remain a threat, the king's interest is to dissolve the nobility altogether. This requires an attack on its property base, in terms of large estates of hereditary transmission. Expropriation is the most obvious means, but this has limits: unless clearly episodic it entails risk of rebellion. Again, there is the question what to do with the expropriated property: to redistribute it will simply create a new nobility. Instead, then, the king takes it into his own hands, appointing officials to administer it for him. Again there will be compromises here. Some expropriated wealth will be redistributed as private property. A distinction in principle will arise between the king's private property and the property of the state. There may also be the endowment of land to religious foundations; the gods thus become the new nobility, and are served by their own bureaucracies, like the king. But the point is that it is now office in the administration of the king's property (or state or temple property) that is given as a reward for service or to the important, rather than a gift of property outright, and this at least theoretically subject to the appointments system. Equally, though property still ultimately supports the great, it does so not in terms of simple ownership but through a system of taxes and salaries routed through the royal treasuries. Basically, then, what is here is less the displacement of one privileged group by another than a transformation of the conditions of property (including its preconditions and consequences). In fact, it is likely that to a fair extent it is the quondam nobility who will make up the new salariat. A bureaucracy then is a nobility transformed.

There is, then, here a basic transformation in the conditions and inter-relations of property, income and participation in the state. As I have indicated before, the new system is specifically anti-hereditary; this applies to all its aspects. For the survival or re-emergence of a nobility requires a property base in large transmissible estates, and, as I have shown in regard to City-states, the transmission of these intact down the generations
means the limitation of the numbers of heirs who can claim against the estate at its devolution. Again, as I have shown, privileged men do not typically achieve this by denying themselves women, but rather through closure practices: inheritance rights are restricted in terms of marriage and legitimacy (backed by child exposure and the use of prostitutes). But in the Bureaucratic Kingdom, the king controls the law. He can then protect the inheritance rights of younger sons, daughters, wives, concubines, illegitimate or disowned children etc. There may be limits here. But a category especially to be noted is the children of the divorced wife where there has been re-marriage. By protecting a wide range of inheritance rights, the king ensures that, at devolution, property fragments. Thus the continuity of large property down the generations is, if not made outright impossible, at least kept within the king’s control. Instead of a system of hereditary transmission, then, a circulation of property is established: estates are built up largely through purchase, are fragmented at devolution, and have to be re-accumulated through purchase again. The basis for purchase is typically the salary from bureaucratic office. Private estates of some size may exist, then, but they lack continuity over time. Equally, the children of the privileged must depend on royal appointment rather than inherited wealth to maintain their position: there are great persons but there are no great families.

It should be added that the king himself must stand above this: his own patrimony must be transmitted intact if his line is to endure. Equally, special considerations must govern royal succession. But it must not be assumed that simple descent provides the norm for this, or even that the process is rule-bound. Many of the Roman emperors, for example, adopted a younger colleague as successor; perhaps this is the pragmatic regulation of power struggle.

It should not be thought that the consideration of the conflicts between king, apparatus and nobles entails a restricted focus on the upper levels of the stratificatory order. On the contrary, bureaucratization rather has the effect of levelling the stratificatory order downwards. Especially the tendency to appoint
and salary junior officials directly, and to allocate senior officials their staffs (instead of requiring senior officials to provide and salary their own staffs), goes with the payment of senior officials on quite moderate scale, to meet their private needs only. Just as this system does not create a nobility, so also it does not create a peasantry. Small property may be allocated to quite humble persons, and a variety of compromise arrangements might provide hereditary allocation in return for hereditary service - this is especially found with soldiers, and is especially characteristic for New Kingdom Egypt. But there is neither economic closure nor hereditary status here; the king can always make new appointments and allocations, and the incumbent does not have to maintain a style of life - soldiers are equipped from the royal armories. On the whole, then, small property is simply a stage in the cycle of property; characteristically, it is bought and sold rather than inherited. With this, bureaucratization tends to produce a hierarchy of grades of appropriation (as opposed to the hard dichotomy of ultimate ownership and immediate possession in the City-state): the private ownership of the king; state property; property endowed to a temple; allocation of property from any of these three categories in return for service; private property; cash-rent; share-cropping arrangements; etc. Matching this is a hierarchy of grades of dependent labour, from the official appointed to his post to the agricultural labourer appointed to his field - the two cases are quite comparable. Too, however, as there is private property, so also are there free persons.

The stratification system itself is basically in terms of status; it must be so, unless the market is more strongly developed than ever occurs in Antiquity. But bureaucratic rule is hostile to the "hard" political-legal status of City-states; there is rather a "soft" status in terms of Weber's frequently-quoted "reckoning of social honour". These issues will come up again in later chapters (especially ch 7). The basic status distinction separates officials, priests, and perhaps soldiers, on the one side, from the mass of agricultural labourers, artisans, shop-keepers and small traders on the other. The last three of these together comprise the urban market class. Agrarian labour is typ-
ically on a share-cropping basis, not typically personally unfree or bound to the land. Strikingly, there may be no clear concept of "slave".

What needs to be grasped here is the political-economic system's orientation. This is not, like that of the City-state, a matter of the maintenance of the appropriate style of life in terms of civic - military - contribution of hereditary privileged status groups. On the contrary, the orientation here is to subsistence: to balancing the utilization of economic resources with the utilization and maintenance of the workforce. Tasks, staffs and rations are allocated together and in terms of each other, as with a modern army. There are gradations in this, but no extremes of wealth or poverty. Again, the system is controlled by state allocation, not by family inheritance. There is, then, in principle no limit to its capability to accommodate its population. Younger sons, retired fathers, daughters, sisters, all can be appointed, used, and maintained. This system has none of the pressures to rural-urban migration of the City-state situation; usury, debt-slavery and the expropriation of the peasantry are wholly absent. As noted, there may be no clear category of slave, though there may be an influx of slaves from abroad. The economy is socially constructed so as to maximize plenty. In particular, colonization (both external and internal) is highly characteristic, and wholly ameliorative in character: it is the breaking of economic closure by the creation of new settlements and opening of new economic resources, especially in land. Above all, this is the state's re-endowment of the landless.

Again, this system's orientation to subsistence entails none of the pressures to family limitation found in City-states. Family property does not have consequences in status or in privilege; there is no point in trying to preserve it by limiting the number of heirs, nor is there much possibility of doing so where the king protects inheritance claims, as discussed. On the other side, there is no difficulty in obtaining subsistence for family members; in principle the economic system is quite capable of using and providing for younger sons, illegitimate children, women, or the old. But that is under state not family control. There is
then no element of the population that orients its fertility to replacement levels, and the practices associated with this, especially exposure and prostitution, are minimally found. As to marriage and legitimacy, these do not reflect the closure conflicts of a political community, though status difference may be involved. The referent is more likely simply to be property inheritance law - this having no significance beyond itself, as shown. Concubinage may reflect status inequality, but it might rather be a matter of a union between status-equal partners with children from previous unions, whose inheritance rights they agree to protect. I judge this to have been so in Egypt. The notion of illegitimacy of children then will be of minimal weight.

In all this it can be seen what is meant by the general amelioration of social conditions under bureaucratic rule, and it is to be stressed how far this is based on state coercion rather than facilitation: the king's dissolution of the nobility. Due to this, and the attendant reorganization of the economy, the economic pressures on fertility found at all levels in the City-state are not found at any level in the Bureaucratic Kingdom, and the migration process in all its aspects is greatly reduced both in volume (colonization excepted) and in trauma.

Though focussed on the countryside, the foregoing observations should extend broadly to the urban poor. These may derive from the countryside, though more pulled by opportunity than driven by necessity; their range of occupations and substantively free but largely unprotected position is much the same as in the City-state. The occurrence of families, however, is likely to be higher, due to greater economic capability to support dependents, including a wider and more suitable range of women's work - prostitution and wet-nursing are not typical. As to mortality factors in terms of squalor and disease, public works in terms of clean water supplies and sewers may do something to reduce these. However, it may be that it is the fusion of City-state and Bureaucratic Kingdom, rather than either type alone, that makes for this: the Roman Empire is the great example. The distinctive natural environment and lack of urban archaeology for Egypt make a comparative statement within the limits of this thesis difficult.
The discussions that I have just presented on the general inter-relations of wealth, power, and progeny in two contrasting types of polity (one with two sub-types) should serve to show how the main structural conflicts of the central institutions of society condition the population process, the flow of people through society (seen here as a migration from local community to central institutions). The contrast of the two types could be stated as follows: in the City-state, power and property are formally, juridically, linked, through the external and internal closures of the political community, causing tremendous economic pressure on fertility. The consequence is a policy, at communal and individual level, of exact replacement (again juridically defined), which results in a constant migration: the expulsion of the unwanted from the community of the privileged. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, by contrast, property and power are disengaged, at least in formal terms, through the organization of the economy through the state bureaucracy. The economic pressures on fertility are minimal, and do not make for policies of family limitation. Economic resources are allocated on the basis of need not inheritance; there is less migration and it rather has the opposite significance: colonization is the re-admission of the dispossessed. These things centre on the state, which is at the heart of the structural conflicts of the central institutions. But they also go far to shape the family, as remarks above have shown, especially in regard to marriage, legitimacy, inheritance laws, etc. Further than this, there are contrasting syndromes: corporativeness and continuity versus individuality and ephemerality. These issues indeed must now be pursued. That is the task of the next section, which must discuss the other pole of the population process: the local community.

I have touched on the local community level of society at many points in the earlier sections of this chapter. I have stated that I find it more difficult to define (in an analytic sense) than the central institutions, though easier to name, and also that here my recurrent concern with the divisions between sociology and anthropology arises yet again. With this, I have identified the local community as centring on the mother-child relation-
ship, with the family and the household clustered around it. My other remarks have related to the nature and location of the local community in relation to the central institutions and the population process. Now that I pick up these threads for systematic discussion, it must be made clear first that there are two distinct sets of issues here, that must be given separate treatment. The macro-sociological analysis of the local community in itself will provide the material for the next chapter (ch 5). The macro-sociological location of the local community, in relation to the central institutions and the population process, is what will be dealt with here, answering and completing the discussions of the previous two sections of this chapter.

The local community, as I have indicated earlier, is seen here as the source of population and of out-migration, the positive pole of the population process. With this, it is seen under a broadly Durkheimian orientation. That is, pace population functions, and in contrast to the central institutions, it is seen as lacking any internal dynamic of change, being integrated rather around principles of continuity. However, I have earlier suggested a (positive) critique of this orientation: that if society is seen as comprising both central institutions and local community, with the population process a migration between them, then the apparent functional integration, timelessness, ahistoricity, traditionalism etc. of the local community is revealed rather as a dynamic of resistance to exogenous change, answering the dynamic of change in the central institutions. Much of the force of this should already be clear from the discussions of the previous sections, though further clarification should follow here.

However, within this strategic conception of integration around resistance to the central institutions, there are two cases to be distinguished, in terms of the type of polity. This too I have touched on earlier. The Bureaucratic Kingdom comprises a central authority extending itself in geopolitical terms, that is, subordinating local princes to become nobles and controlling them through, or dissolving them into, a bureaucratic apparatus. Resistance to this has a geopolitical character: that is, first, it is specifically local. This is not meant in the simple sense of
remoteness from the centre, but rather in the sense of the tendency for a kingdom to fragment into a series of localities. But second, there is also the aspect of hierarchy and subordination. Here the tendency of the king to support the common people and suppress the nobles comes into play, in terms of the incorporation of the village council and/or headman into the state, as its lowest level of administration. Resistance here may in fact be minimal; it is rather the nobility that have the problem of resisting, as shown in the discussion of the central structural conflicts of Bureaucratic Kingdoms above. All this could probably be more clearly revealed by the consideration of other sub-types of traditional domination; unfortunately, however, there is no historical base for this in the present thesis.

As to the City-state, here resistance is in another dimension. For what is here is a charismatically structured political community, and therefore there emerges a conflict of public common interests as against private sectional interests. It should be stressed at once that this must be seen in relation to the stratificatory conflicts and constitutional forms of the City-state (oligarchy and democracy), and that "sectional" does not mean "individual". A good example of the private affairs of a patrician is his private following: the phenomenon of clientage. This may convey great power in the City's politics, including power to defy or overturn the constitution. In conditions of democracy, this is greatly curtailed, and the citizens stand equal. But their private affairs still extend to control over dependants who have not themselves the right of participation in public affairs: womenfolk and children, slaves, and sponsored non-citizens such as freed slaves and resident foreigners. The political community is closed, externally and typically also internally (i.e. against the proletarians). It is basically a community of heads of households, and their households are their private affairs. There is no question of universal citizenship; that indeed belongs to the Bureaucratic Kingdom, though the content of citizenship there is more dilute. Individualism likewise belongs to the Bureaucratic Kingdom. But to clarify these issues, it is necessary to turn now to types of family and household.
Some indications on this too have already been given, in the previous section. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, political recruitment and economic transmission have been wholly disengaged from each other, at least in formal terms, and a pattern of circulation of property has been set up: estates fragment and are re-accumulated. As part of this, the claims against an estate at devolution are wide-ranging, and are protected as such at law. There is no continuity of property; equally, there is no continuity of family. The family rather comprises simply the household membership at a given time, subject to considerations of sexual partnership and child-care. In this, marriage and legitimacy, though they may have a basis in considerations of status, are most likely simply to reflect intentions in regard to transmission and inheritance. That is, they have only economic, not political, significance. With this, the family has no corporate identity. Its members all relate to the state as individuals in their own right - at least, with the exception of very young children.

In City-states, the situation is quite the reverse. Political and economic transmission are tightly and formally, juridically, linked, and the individual family aims at exact replacement; there is strong continuity of property down the generations, and continuity of the family with it. The family here is a lineage. This lineage defines itself in terms not only of descent but also of marriage and legitimacy, defined in relation to internal closure (status) conflicts within the political community; the implications for inheritance and for citizenship are matter for conflict and may be various. The family here is corporative, relating to the state solely through the adult males (the lineage is agnatic); possibly only the eldest male, or one male of military age (another issue for conflict). Other members of the family do not relate to the state directly and in their own persons, but only through the adult males, with a partial exception for boys growing up into adulthood. The bulk of this has been indicated in the previous section.

It should be apparent that there is considerable vindication here for the family sociology of Carle Zimmerman (Zimmerman 1947); indeed, the two types can be named with his terms: "the atomistic
family" and "the domestic family". Zimmerman certainly invites criticism. For one thing, he presents the domestic family as a somewhat hazy intermediate form between the atomistic family and his third type "the trustee family", something which (as he recognized himself) rightly belongs to a little-known historical background (e.g. Homeric society). I have rather shown that the atomistic family and the domestic family are two main types in themselves, capable of being sharply defined and contrasted. For another, Zimmerman insists on arranging his three types, trustee family, domestic family and atomistic family, into historical sequences instead of viewing them comparatively, equating the atomistic family with the "decadent" stage of civilization. Now it can be agreed that, where the domestic family is defined by marriage and legitimacy in relation to a political community and its status stratification, then families outside marriage and legitimacy, e.g. concubinage and illegitimacy or the families of slaves, will rather be of the atomistic type. But Zimmerman wholly fails to see — indeed, with his values would be most resistant to seeing — that the atomistic family is however positively "functional" for the Bureaucratic Kingdom, and that the emergence of domestic families here would be a clear sign of social breakdown: the decay of the state bureaucracy and the emergence of a hereditary nobility. Bureaucratic Kingdoms are not decadent City-states, regardless of the historical location of the Hellenistic and Roman Empires in relation to classical Athens and the Roman Republic. These civilizations can become "decadent" too — if we do not define decadence tautologically with the prevalence of the atomistic family! Even so, despite his errors (and his lack of value-freedom and his general tone) Zimmerman remains an interesting and genuinely heterodox thinker in this field.

Zimmerman's "trustee family" is perhaps best equated with Weber's concept of "the household" (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 3), the basic unit of production and of domination in which sexual and parental relations, especially mother-child and sibling relations, are located as units of shared consumption. This will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. But the point here is that there are two processes in the development of the household
in which the family is defined, and they should be distinguished. One is a process of internal closure; the other is a process of reduction in household size. For the first, internal closure within the household separates off different sets of sexual and parental relationships. In particular in this "the family" may be separated off from the slaves and other retainers; again, different "families" may be distinguished. Marriage and legitimacy play a definitive part here especially with regard to the former point, though it should be stressed that non-marital and illegitimate sexual and parent-child relationships are also recognized. As to reduction in household size, this may make for the setting up of separate households for each "family", or to the reduction or elimination of slaves and retainers (to form their own households where appropriate), or both.

Between these two processes, two situational types can be identified. In the first, internal closure within the household occurs in terms of marriage and legitimacy operating with reference to citizenship and "hard" status; here each "family" tends to have its own household. This is the pattern of the City-state and the domestic family. It should be noted that the same considerations, especially juridical considerations, apply for both the patrician and the plebeian strata. There is the difference that patricians will have more servile dependants, and there are more likely to be non-legitimate unions and families, formed with them or between them. The patrician household structure is consequently more complex. The process of reduction in household size most strongly affects the plebeian stratum.

In the second type, internal closure within the household occurs in terms of marriage and legitimacy operating with reference to property inheritance rights only, status considerations playing at best a secondary role on a non-juridical basis. This is the pattern of the Bureaucratic Kingdom and the atomistic family. Here again each "family" tends to have its own household; but there is something of a countervailing tendency, in that property, although separately owned (i.e. after devolution), may continue to be jointly administered for a time to prevent fragmentation. This indeed is also found in City-states, as a notion-
al, legal, arrangement. But here it is a matter of actual shared occupancy, and a household structure of co-equal families living together can result. As against this, the economic pattern, of maximized distribution of resources under a hierarchy of appropriative categories and with a spectrum of semi-servile statuses, makes it common for the unfree and semi-free to form their own households, or sub-households. Thus the elimination of retainers constitutes a typical tendency to reduction in household size in Bureaucratic Kingdoms.

On the ground and at first sight, the family and household situations in the two societal types, City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms, might seem rather alike: the most general form is a small nuclear family with a few slaves or servants, with larger households of retainers among the upper strata. But the similarity is superficial only; closer inspection shows variations that are significant, and the underlying processes are in sharp contrast, as I have shown. In particular, large household size can be a factor of patrician wealth and dependants or of possibly quite moderate shared property; atomistic families can be a factor of politically excluded status in the face of the domestic families of the citizenry or the general societal type for all strata; domestic families can be a factor of citizen status and a general societal type or an emerging form among the privileged symptomatic of the weakness or breakdown of the state. I may add that I have not found the concept of "the extended family" useful in the sociological context of Antiquity.

The household is the essential location of the mother-child relationship, the source of population, in which the economic maintenance of mother and child is secured. There is then a question of economic allocation at local community level. This allocation may be in terms of maintenance rights and rights to work given economic resources, rather than of outright appropriation as property; this is especially typical for Bureaucratic Kingdoms, as earlier discussions should have shown. The allocation of personnel to economic resources comprises the recruitment of the local community itself. It is in relation to these matters that the integrative resistance of the local community should be
seen: a negotiation of rights with the central institutions. These rights will include "traditional" rates of exploitation, intensities of labour, including the use of family labour, etc. - purely economic questions that will be taken up in a later chapter (ch 7). But they also importantly include legal principles, especially principles of inheritance. It is to the point that the linking of these with human biology, as kinship relations, tends to be a rural, agrarian phenomenon. In the cities, it is likely rather to be guilds that have such functions - though with slavery in Antiquity there really is no autocephalous control. The point here once again is the non-reproductivity of the urban poor.

These matters again relate to the type of polity, and the question whether the division between the central institutions and the local community takes the form of centre versus localities or public versus private affairs. In the former case, the negotiated balance will very much be a matter of the power of the state. With a bureaucratic apparatus, this power is typically greatest, and, as commented before, local structures and offices actually become incorporated into the state as its basic level. But the impact of this is by no means simply for high labour intensities and high exploitation. On the contrary, bureaucratic rule tends to be rather humane and indeed protective (and to commute rents to taxes). One must rather look at the opposite situation, where the division is of public versus private affairs. Here it is a private domain of personal domination that is being secured: basically, the private household. Within this domain, family and servile labour can be compelled and exploited at will. So far as there is protection for the former, it will come from the woman's kin rather than from the collectivity - though even for the latter group there may be collective norms governing such matters. More to the point, it is the woman's kin who will activate protective norms, whereas no-one will do this for servile labour. But it is precisely this kind of private domain that the Bureaucratic Kingdom breaks down, by according and protecting individual rights, including the right to approach the state, to everyone. This again fits with what has already been said about
the domestic and atomistic types of family, and it constitutes the universal citizenship (at least legal personality if not political participation) and the individualism which I refer to above as characteristic of Bureaucratic Kingdoms.

Lastly, I turn to kinship. I have indicated in an earlier discussion (in ch 3) that I am unhappy with this topic, an anthropological theme that I am uncertain how to handle. Dealing now at the level of sociological theory rather than methodology, I am nonetheless brought back to the point that Weber's views on kinship were conditioned by his perception of the need to disengage the ancient City-state, its origins and structures, from primitive conditions and considerations. Especially this means separating the tribus (phylum), gens (genos), and curia (phratry) from the kinship systems of primitive peoples, and this seems to lead him to a general consideration that, though the polity may employ a kinship metaphor, this is not really kinship and is rather to be approached through the sociology of polity. As I said before, these are difficult matters involving untranslated texts; yet there is increasing interest among modern scholars on the historiographical side in Weber's views (e.g. Finley 1983 ch 2; Finley 1985). I discuss the issues more fully in later chapters and an appendix (ch 9 & 10, Appendix A part iii).

Sociologically, then, there seems to be here a heterogenous collection of phenomena. On the face of it, perhaps three categories are apparent. First, there is the set of relationships governing economic inheritance rights, rooted in the family with a negotiated recognition by the state. Second, there is lineage, a descent system of economic and political force conveying both property and citizenship; it is rooted in the family with direct articulation to the state. In Antiquity, this is always agnatic. Thirdly, there is the issue of clientage, and the commoner followings of patrician lineages. Of these, the first two can easily be located to the preceding discussions, the first in the resistance mechanisms of the local community in the Bureaucratic Kingdom; the second in the citizen households of the City-state. Indeed, they are basically equivalent to each other. The third case, however, is more complex, and needs some unpacking.
This requires some consideration of the societal sub-types "Patrician City" and "Plebeian City". The difference between these is not simply a question of which stratum controls the state; the political struggles of Antiquity are more complex than this. What is at issue is structural change. The Patrician City is based on patrician clans and their poorer followings, on a personal basis of citizenship; the gens (genos) and curia (phratry) apparently expressed this. The Plebeian City by contrast is based on villages (demes), a territorial basis of citizenship. With the change, the gens (genos) and curia (phratry) are disengaged from the state and from each other (though they may survive), and the patricians are forced to join the tribes (phyla) and register in a village like the commoners. This happens both at Athens and at Rome. But where Athens then proceeds in a democratic direction, the plebeians and even proletarians dominating the state, Rome rather reverts to oligarchy, a resurgence of patrician dominance. Indeed, there is no pure Patrician City in this thesis, though observations can be made about the sociological type on a synthetic basis. I will return to this issue.

Clientage then has very different force in the Patrician City and the Plebeian City. In the former it is part of the constitution of the state, of public affairs. In the latter, it is private. You could say, then, that clientage in the Patrician City should not be assimilated to kinship; in the Plebeian City it could not be mistaken for kinship. It is the failure to separate the two cases that produces confusion. As to its occurrence, bureaucracy and democracy both tend to break clientage down, though for different reasons: in bureaucratic conditions it is feared as a rival form of power; in democratic conditions the citizens wish all to stand equal and independent. On the other hand, both wish power to be exercised openly and under the law. However, clientage certainly does survive under oligarchic conditions in a Plebeian City: Rome is the outstanding example. It is with reference to this that I identify clientage above as a private, sectional, patrician sphere.

The sum of this discussion, then, is that, excluding clientage in the Patrician City, all these categories of "kinship" ap-
pertain to the local community. With lineage and clientage, as factors of the City-state, this is a matter of the private, sectional, as opposed to public, communal, spheres; in the case of inheritance laws only, as a factor of the Bureaucratic Kingdom, this is a matter of negotiated local resistance to central authority. The more overtly political character of the first group, as against the more economic character of the second, can also be noted.

Finally, I close this section by returning to the definitional problem of the local community. This, not unnaturally, answers the problem at the beginning of the previous section, of defining the central institutions, where I try to reconcile two different streams in Weber's sociology of polity. Something of the same kind is needed here. In this, it must be faced that Weber himself treats the household and the local community as universal groups; he has some developmental reflections (probably limited to a consideration of Western history) but he does not really pursue a comparative analysis (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 3 & 4; see also Weber 1981 ch 2). Against this, however, in the light of the considerations above, it can be suggested that the contrast of City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms can be pursued as a contrast between "household societies" and "community societies". The irreducible elements are the mother-child relationship as a subsistence unit, and spatial location. But only where rule is exercised through an apparatus does the element of spatial location acquire (geo)political significance. Where, by contrast, rule is collegiate and direct, it is the household that acquires political significance. Only in this latter case does the household become the private sphere of unrestricted patriarchal power - the Greek oikos or Roman familia. Set against this, communal affairs are public affairs - politics. An apparatus, on the other side, negotiates with the local structures in which the household is located, and in this, patriarchal household authority too becomes negotiable, and may wholly disappear, if the state is powerful enough. A key issue in this of course is the control of family labour to hold down "traditional" labour intensities and exploitation levels. The contrast here, however, is not between private and public,
but between local and central.

These matters, and the typology of household society and community society, will be pursued in the next chapter (ch 5). But the point for now is that the term "local community" must serve to cover both cases.

In this first theoretical chapter, I have set up the societal types Bureaucratic Kingdom and City-state, with the subsidiary sub-division of the latter as the Patrician City and the Plebeian City. This structure will be kept, with one proviso discussed below, through the three chapters that follow; therefore one or two general points might be made about it. First, it might be repeated that underlying the typology is the distinction of traditional and charismatic domination: I have evolved my position here, as discussed above, by reading "Economy and Society" "through" "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations", especially its introductory essay "Economic Theory and Ancient Society". Second, it should be remembered that there is a wider sociology of domination, in particular many types of traditional domination that are not brought under scrutiny here. The structural conflicts of patrimonial bureaucracy are thus the less clearly highlighted; an unavoidable cost of working in terms of a finite historical task. But it should be remembered that all that is being presented in these chapters is a first approximation: an essay in sociological theory.

Third, as noted earlier, it has to be realized that there is no direct focus here on the Patrician City, though it is in the background both at Athens and especially at Rome. It seems that patricians only turn to writing history when they lose power; at least, neither the history of early Athens nor that of early Rome is really securely known. What is in view is the difference between patrician and plebeian dominance in a structurally Plebeian City - oligarchic and democratic Cities. This is the proviso referred to above.

Lastly, it should be specified that historically, City-states have both grown into Bureaucratic Kingdoms and been absorbed by Bureaucratic Kingdoms - especially the Roman Empire. Consequently
there are both mixed types and transitional types in the substantive record.

These points stated, I proceed with the argument.

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Chapter 5

The Macrosociology of the Local Community

In the previous chapter, I discussed the macrosociological location of the local community in relation to the central institutions and the population (migration) process. In this chapter I intend to discuss the macrosociological analysis of the local community itself. In this, there will be two sets of themes. First, there is relations within the household, especially sexual and parent-child relations. This will include a treatment of marriage, and related questions such as choice of spouse; dissolution of marriage; and also questions of property endowment and devolution. The family is located in these matters. Second, there is relations in the wider community, including the location of the household in the community, e.g. in regard to social life and leisure activities, the existence and status of women's quarters in the household, and women's freedom to move abroad. These two sets of themes can be seen to relate to the considerations announced at the end of the previous chapter, where I argued that the household has political significance for City-states, whereas the local community has (geo)political significance for Bureaucratic Kingdoms. The basic patterns that will emerge, then, are on the one side of seclusion and subordination of women within the household; on the other, of participation and equality of women in the community. This corresponds again to the types of City-state and Bureaucratic Kingdom; one may speak correspondingly then of "household societies" and "community societies", as I indicated before.

Before pursuing this, it might finally be repeated that Weber himself covered this ground (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 3; see also Weber 1981 ch 2) in terms of universal groups, without undertaking a systematic analysis of variations or societal types. In consid-
eration of his subsequent chapter (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 4), it
might be suggested that he was most interested here in Western
history, and saw it mostly in the light of City-state patterns.
At any rate, while I have, I think, kept his broad conceptual
approach, especially as regards the household, internal closure,
marrige, legitimacy, etc., I have seen little gain in presenting
a formal precis of his considerations here.

On the household and family indeed, much of the material I
wish to present has already been introduced in the previous chap-
ter. As weber says, only the mother-child relationship is really
biologically given; all other sexual and parental relationships
(including those between siblings) achieve permanence only when
incorporated in a unit of common maintenance, and that, in sett-
led agrarian conditions at least, is the household. This is cer-
tainly universal for the ancient civilizations that I have dealt
with.

Within the household, there is internal closure distinguishing
different sets of sexual and parental relationships, and here
considerations of marriage and legitimacy, resonating with wider
social considerations, come into play. As I have argued earlier,
"the family" may be separated off from the servile dependents,
including perhaps concubines and their children. In City-states,
the reference group for this will be the political community: "the
family" will be citizens, the others, non-citizens. Yet as I have
argued earlier, marriage and legitimacy themselves will be defined
rather with reference to the status groups within the citizen-
ry, and will be slightly dissonant with citizenship as such. As
against this, in Bureaucratic Kingdoms marriage and legitimacy
will refer primarily to economic inheritance rights. If there is
a status dimension, it will be secondary and non-juridical in
character. Internal closure here rather distinguishes different
"families" of equal status; this might even include concubines
and their children. That is, instead of a hard status dichotomy
(as between citizen and non-citizen), there is a blurred gradat-
on of statuses. With this, actual marriage may well be dispensed
with, at any level of society. This was apparently commonly the
case in Egypt.

There is a sharp contrast in the matter of the continuity of the household. Where internal closure distinguishes a family with reference to a political community, the family becomes a lineage, and the household its endowment in property and dependents. Transmission and fertility practices alike will be geared to the perpetuation of this situation. This has been discussed before; it is the situation of the "domestic family" of City-state citizens. It is characterized by continuity and corporativeness, and the position of adult males as holding authority within the household and comprising the household's sole representation and link with public affairs. This is the Greek oikos or Roman familia. On the other side from this is the situation where internal closure within the household operates only with regard to property inheritance, and the property accordingly is allowed to fragment at devolution. Here the household lacks continuity over time; in terms of both property and personnel it is simply a temporary existential unit. This is the situation of the "atomistic family", characterized by ephemerality and individuality; all members have enforcible rights against each other and free access to the state, and household authority is only the authority of adults over young children.

It might be noted here that, although the term "family" comes from the Latin "familia", neither Greek nor Latin has an exact equivalent to the modern term. Equally, the term "family" is not especially useful in discussing Graeco-Roman sociology. It is rather "the household" that should be the basic sociological concept - as in Weber's own usage. The points apparently hold for Egypt also. But the reasons are in contrast: the extent of patriarchal authority over household members in City-states; the lack of real status-differences among household members in Bureaucratic Kingdoms. "The family" is defined by status, at best legal, factors resonating with the wider society. It only becomes an "obvious" concept where a process of reduction in household size has brought family and household into correspondence. This nowhere happens in Antiquity, and indeed is surely far less typical of modernity than sociologists have imagined.
It is to the process of reduction in household size that I now turn. In City-states, this is clearly a factor of simple wealth. Yet there is first the political dimension, that the household is the basis in property and personnel for a citizen. That is, the adult male citizen is typically head of his own household.

However, there are problems here; the differences between Athens and Rome are hard to systematize. In both cases, we do not really know the practices of the earlier, Patrician City. What we see is the contrast of plebeian (and even proletarian) democracy at Athens with patrician oligarchy at Rome, both Cities being structurally Plebeian. But it might be taken that Rome shows greater continuity, and Athens greater breach of continuity, with the Patrician City.

At any rate, in both cases and at all citizen levels, the household (in terms of actual common residence) is based on a nuclear family; it does not typically run to three generations. This means that the devolution of property must be linked to practices of coming of age and retirement. But Athens and Rome deal with this in quite different ways. At Athens, the father retires at age 60; the son attains full adulthood at 30. It is then that he marries and takes over the household; his father now lives as his dependant. At Rome, by contrast, the father does not retire, but retains his property and authority until death; his son, theoretically, remains a propertyless minor until then. In practice, however, he is given interim possession of property from about age 20, and he marries and sets up his own household at about that time. Another difference is that at Athens, daughters are only residual heirs, moreover the daughter without brothers perpetuates her father's lineage instead of her husband's; whereas at Rome, daughters inherit equally with sons. (In both cases, their property reverts to their agnates.) One feels here that the Romans are thinking in patrician terms, of three generations, great wealth, and a grandfather's authority over many dependants, whereas the Athenians are thinking in plebeian terms, of two generations, moderate wealth, and a father's authority over few dependants. It has been pointed out (Lacey 1986) that in Rome it is the author-
ity, in Athens the property, that emerges as the key issue - patria potestas versus oikos. However, it is also striking that the Romans are willing to disengage their legal concepts from the concrete actuality of the household in a way that the Athenians are not. The Roman situation undergoes tremendous development from these beginnings.

Leaving these difficult questions, however, what can be said is that there is a common pattern for City-states of actual households based on the nuclear family, with a following of slaves the size of which is conditioned by the household's wealth. At Athens, slaves were not normally permitted families. There might be a slave concubine; if she bore children, they would usually be freed. At Rome, slave families are more common, at least in urban households. This is probably due to Rome's continuing patrician dominance, for in Rome, a freed slave becomes a citizen, and his master's client, whereas in Athens he becomes a metic. Clientage plays little part in Athenian society, but it is always important at Rome. It seems then that it is not simply a patrician household but a continuing patrician dominance in the City that makes for slave families and large households, although the wealth of the household is certainly a factor.

To turn to the Bureaucratic Kingdom, however, here there is no political dimension to devolution, but only an economic dimension in which fragmentation not continuity of property is the pattern. Not only do sons and daughters both inherit, but devolution is bilateral: husbands and wives transmit separately to their children (this in Egypt and in the later Roman Principate). A consequence of this fragmentation is that here again the basis of the household is the nuclear family, though the reasons are entirely different from those obtaining in the City-state. Again, in an economy where property is fragmented and re-accumulated, the setting up of a household is more a factor of acquiring economic opportunities (e.g. an official appointment) than of inheritance. Equally, coming of age and retirement are not a problem, since property does not have continuity and is not the typical basis for subsistence. (Devolution in Egypt was at death.) But with the circulation of property there is also, as remarked earlier, a
gradation of categories of appropriation, and of status categories. Between these processes, the servile are likely to create their own semi-independent households. If the household in the Bureaucratic Kingdom extends, then, it is likely to be in terms of co-equal units (families), and to reflect a resistance to fragmentation of property by having the estate jointly administered and shared. (This can happen in City-states too, but rather in terms of a legal arrangement covering the administration of rented out property, with no implications for the household as an actual unit of residence. Again, this is typical of Rome rather than of Athens.) The larger household, then, comprises several nuclear families living together. In this marriage and legitimacy may be more or less of an issue, but it does not entail a large following of dependants. Moreover, it is not necessarily a wealthy household.

A final point may be added: ancient families are small in terms of numbers of children - typically of the order 2 - 3. This certainly for all the Graeco-Roman World, and probably for Egypt too. The previous chapter has shown the basis for this for City-states, but for Bureaucratic Kingdoms it is rather surprising. I will return to the question in a later chapter (ch 6; see also Appendix A part ii).

Family types, the domestic family and the atomistic family, I have already discussed, and not much more needs to be said here: it is a political difference. It should be remembered that the atomistic family is a factor not only of Bureaucratic Kingdoms but also of slave families and families based on concubinage in City-states. It is basically only the legitimate families of the City-state citizenry that are of the domestic type, although freed slaves or resident foreigners may imitate the citizen pattern - the proverb "when in Rome do as Rome does" is general to the City-state world. The protection of the Roman citizenship in the Principate had the effect of perpetuating some aspects of the domestic family pattern; this by conscious and sustained legal policy. This mostly affects forms rather than realities, but it produces some surprising anomalies, as will be seen. The Roman Empire never wholly comes over to the Egyptian pattern. However, the basic iss-
ue to keep in mind is the contrast between strong male household authority and general (including female) community participation. The difference of prevalent family type relates to this.

Internal closure within the household is a factor of marriage and legitimacy. These are things which look beyond the household to the wider society, yet they are not the concerns of either the state or public religion. In City-states, they are rather located in the attempted closure of status groups; in Bureaucratic Kingdoms, in relations of economic inheritance. In both cases, concubinage is also a recognized relationship, publicly and legally, and the concubine's children have a distinct status, quite different from the families of slaves. Again, in City-states the illegitimate child is not necessarily a non-citizen. No hard boundary then exists between marriage and concubinage; the latter may be marriage across wide status difference, which may include one partner (usually the female) being non-citizen or slave. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms however there is another possible factor, provided by the bilateral devolution of property: the shared desire of equal partners to reserve their respective property for their own children by previous unions. But concubinage is a broad phenomenon, not easy to define: a negatory relationship to status pretensions and to inheritance seems to be the best common factor. There will be more on this later (especially in the next chapter).

Marriage then is a private affair of the families and individuals concerned. Marriage is also important as an occasion for the devolution of property and the setting up of a new household, and I will turn to these aspects in due course. But first, the difference can be pointed out, that in City-states it is rather the family, and in Bureaucratic Kingdoms the individuals, who have control in regard to such matters as choice of partner, consent to the union, etc. In the City-state, it is specifically the male head of the household - at Rome the head of the lineage - who does this, though not necessarily arbitrarily or without taking advice. The choice of partner is likely to be directed by family interests, in particular the desire to protect property by setting up reciprocal patterns of marriage within a small group who have inheritance rights against each other. This is in the nature
of patrician strata anyway, but in plebeian strata too marriages may be made preferentially with near kin. This happened at Athens, though not so evidently at Rome. This seems in keeping with the differences between the two Cities as discussed above.

A comment should be added on the question of political marriages - marriage as alliance. For City-states, this really needs to be seen in the context of a stratified political community subject to conflicts of internal closure (the case of royalty and nobility in bureaucratic conditions will be considered later). I have commented before (ch 4) that patrician strata may prefer to intermarry with the patricians of other Cities, denying conubium to their own plebeians, but that the plebeians will try to forbid this, and to insist upon conubium as proof of common citizenship, and upon the integrity of the political community. Similarly, marriage alliances between patrician lineages within the City-state can only be a factor of political faction within the patrician stratum; accordingly, the collective interest is to forbid or prevent it. Practices making for this include the restriction of property exchange between lineages on marriage, and the outright transfer of the wife from her father's to her husband's lineage. That is, the wife's property is typically restricted to a small dowry - all other property devolves back to her agnates - and her family have no interest in her children: the lineages are strictly agnatic. Against this, the wife's father keeps a last resort protection over her and her children's status, in the right to withdraw her from the marriage.

At any rate, these are the practices at Athens and initially at Rome. Later at Rome, another form of marriage, apparently based first in marriage between the patrician and plebeian strata, becomes generally prevalent: so-called "free marriage". Here the wife remains in her father's lineage, and does not enter her husband's. Moreover she remains (strictly speaking) in her father's authority. With this, women's ownership of property becomes commonplace, and indeed it becomes practice for women to handle their own affairs. Too, dowries start to become larger (though never really large by broad comparative standards). It is hard to account for this change in prevalent marriage form, but it seems to
be associated with the breakdown of the Republic. But in my chapter on Rome (ch 10 below), I argue that stable factions do not in fact emerge within the patrician stratum; the social practices simply do not permit of marriage alliances. The stratum actually fragments in the civil wars and preceding conflicts. If "free" marriage (and larger dowries) were intended to support such experiments, then the experiments failed. Again, Augustus did not try to suppress "free" marriage.

Between political and economic family interests, then, the partners to marriage in the City-state will have little individual choice; even their consent may be nominal, especially the girl's. However other factors enter here: the age and maturity of individuals. It is general to Antiquity that girls were married very young, about 13 - 15; they would thus probably accept the choices made for them. An older woman remarrying after divorce or widowhood might have some say in her destiny; probably so would even a young man at first marriage. If the individuals did initiate matters themselves, the consent of the head of the household would still be required. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, however, the factors involved in choice of partner are very different, for the political implications of devolution are missing, position and subsistence alike being rather a factor of appointment, and the system of devolution and its economic location are different too (not to mention household authority). Here the choice of partners then seems to be very much at their own discretion, and is made within the community and on emotional grounds. Some kind of parental consent might be customary, especially from the girl's family. But the disregard of the young girl in love for parental authority is clear in the Egyptian love poetry. There is no question of a marriage being imposed without the free consent of both partners.

At least, this holds so far as the common people are concerned, and in a pure kind of Bureaucratic Kingdom this will be the general pattern. However, there is a further consideration: the marriage practices of nobilities and royalty. This should be seen in terms of the structural conflicts of these elements as described in the previous chapter, especially their geopolitical dimen-
sions. Thus as nobles wish to assert conubium and status equality with the king, so the king wishes to deny it, and to assert his supremacy. He will then marry only with foreign royalty, or within his own household, or with commoners. But it should be realized that marriage here implies status equality and autonomy, and if the king’s realm has only pragmatic (as opposed to legal-conceptual) limits then marriage with foreign royalty—reciprocal marriage exchange at the level of principal wives—will be refused. Both Egypt and the Roman Empire illustrate this (though in the latter case there is also another reason, grounded in the protection of the Roman citizenship: the old barrier against patricians marrying outwith their City). Again, if the king’s pre-eminence is assured, then all marriage outwith the royal house itself is marriage with commoners—the great official is a commoner not a noble—and again is marriage of choice. Against this, there may be a practice of inter-marriage of close royal kin, to protect the royal patrimony from fragmentation. These marriages may be nominal or real, and will certainly co-exist with other sexual and parental relationships; they seem to have no clear relationship to the principles of succession. Outwith this, however, the pattern of the common people is practice here too. A feature of this is that the marriages of princesses and other women of the royal household are basically unrestricted and at their own will (indeed one could on these grounds question whether the term "princess" is appropriate).

It can be seen that I have doubts as to the occurrence of marriage as a tool of political alliance in Antiquity, at least as any major typical practice for any of these societies. I might add that the Roman emperors were never worried about surviving daughters of previous dynasties, leaving them free to marry as they pleased. Also, as I have commented before, it is not clear that royal succession is always rule-bound. It might rather reflect the pragmatic outcome of power struggles—that could be suggested for Egypt as well as for the Roman Empire. The situation of nobilities and royalties in later Western history is something quite different from what is found in Antiquity.

Marriage in Antiquity is a private affair, controlled by the
family and (in the City-state) the status groups. It is not a
matter for the state or the public religion; in witness of the
latter point, we in fact have very little concrete knowledge of
marriage ceremonial for any of these societies (especially Egypt).
It is, as already stated, coming of age and registration as a
citizen that is likely to be the state's point of control; this
again for City-states only. Even so, there is a public aspect to
marriage, in that the relationship must satisfy certain criteria
of conduct. This is especially notable in regard to the adultery
laws, where the punishment of the wife is mandatory; it is not in
the husband's discretion. The marriage procession that takes the
couple to their new home may symbolize the public appropriation
of their relationship. In these matters, the Roman Empire made a
concious and sustained effort to preserve City-state practice, as
a factor of protecting the Roman citizenship. Egypt provides the
contrast: there the marriage may often have in effect been in the
control of the couple themselves, by virtue of a simple decision
to live together, and always theirs would be the controlling say.
No outside agency seems to have tried to control their conduct,
although their rights against each other were protected. There
will be more discussion on these matters in the next chapter.

But to go further here, the question of devolution of prop-
erty must be further considered, and the setting up of the new,
or handing over of the old, household. A key question in this is
whether the major devolution of property occurs at the children's
marriage or at the parents' death. As I have noted, at Athens the
former alternative is chosen, and the father retires; at Rome, it
is the latter, but the son receives an interim devolution on
which to set up his own household and marry. It should be recalled
that the Athenian son takes over his father's household whereas
the Roman son sets up his own; as noted earlier, the Romans dis-
engaged their legal concept of the household from concrete house-
hold actualities. Too, a point of difference mentioned before is
that at Athens, devolution is ordinarily to sons only, daughters
being only residual heirs; whereas at Rome, especially given free
marriage, sons and daughters inherit in equal shares. In both Ath-
ens and Rome the daughter is dowered, but in Athens this is in
lieu of inheritance; in Rome it is interim — and indeed, with "free" marriage the daughter may be given interim possession of property like a son as well. But in both Athens and Rome, property reverts to the agnates. I have already discussed the problems of trying to account for the differences here on patrician/plebeian lines. It can be credibly argued that Athens developed practices that were directed to the long-term protection of small property, something Republican Rome clearly failed to do. It should also be specified that at Athens, the laws of succession were binding, whereas Rome had a fair degree of freedom of testacy.

But it is the contrast with bureaucratic Egypt that should be noted. Here transmission of property is bilateral, inheri- tance being shared between the surviving spouse and the children, sons and daughters alike, and devolution taking place at each parent's death. There is freedom of testacy. Here marriage is not a major occasion for the devolution of property, and the material endowment of the newly set up household seems to be otherwise achieved: by interim devolution, gifts, or purchase of or appointment to support from economic resources. There is no dowry. It should be noted that a new household is created, and the conception is of creating a new household, not perpetuating a lineage. There seems to be an expectation that \( \frac{2}{3} \) of the new household's endowment will come from the man's side, \( \frac{1}{3} \) from the woman's. This is in effect interim devolution against inheritance. Again, in keeping with these principles, the principle of property holding is not coorporative: the partners continue to hold their property separately, distinguishing what each one owns or acquires and what is owned or acquired jointly. Incidentally, the age of marriage for both sexes here is just after puberty (i.e. early to mid-teens), save possibly for boys following a scribal education. The above account describes Egypt, but at Rome there are also developments towards separate ownership and bilateral devolution. Increasingly as the Principate progresses, women's testacy and even intestate cognatic devolution (i.e. to their children) become established.

These property arrangements, and the political considerations outlined above, also condition the terms of the dissolution of
marriage. Again here there are differences of detail between Athens and Rome that are hard to systematize, but a sharp contrast between City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms. It should be commented first that in all cases divorce is relatively unrestricted. At Athens and initially at Rome, the husband can divorce at will; also a marriage can be broken up by either partner's father. The wife can try to gain a divorce through her kin or the magistrates. In Egypt, both partners (and only they) can divorce at will, and this also comes to be so at Rome. Like marriage itself, divorce is not a concern of the state or public religion in any of these societies.

The sharpest contrast, however, is in the arrangements for custody and maintenance. At Athens and at Rome, the wife returns with her dowry to her male kin, who will arrange her remarriage. Her children stay with her husband; the wife has no right of access. There is no maintenance. These arrangements may also follow for widowhood, or the wife may remain to raise the children. Remarkably, there does not seem to be development at Rome in these matters. In Egypt, however, although the divorced wife leaves the marital home, she takes her children with her, and also her property, and there is also a maintenance arrangement. Probably she goes to kin, but this is for practical reasons; she is her own mistress. Again, this is not simply a return to her household of origin, which is likely to have broken up. Also, importantly, the inheritance rights of the children of her ex-husband's subsequent marriage will have to be negotiated with her and her children. This is a common source of Egyptian litigation. Her own remarriage (which she arranges herself) does not compromise her rights in this, though it might itself be a source of parallel litigation. The Roman Empire does not seem to follow this pattern, at least, not during the Principate. But I would attribute these patterns to the City-state versus Bureaucratic Kingdom dichotomy. Rome is an intermediate case, especially in terms of the continued protection of the Roman citizenship.

The household has on the face of it universal functions, in production and consumption and as the setting for the family. Yet
I have shown that there are differences, especially as between City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms, especially in terms of political setting and of property holding and administration. These condition household structure, and also relations within the household: in the City-state the household is a unit of authority, especially of free adult males over slaves, women and children; in the Bureaucratic Kingdom there is rather at most conjoint authority of parents over young children, and the household is simply a unit of common residence and maintenance.

Here the contrast between Athens and Egypt should be seen with the change at Rome: the emerging prevalence of "free" marriage as a general practice for all strata from early in the Late Republic. This is marriage without "manus", that is, the husband's domestic authority over the wife. There are difficulties in seeing exactly what this means, for as indicated earlier, at Rome the father keeps his position until death, and his adult sons are given an interim possession of property on which to marry and found their own households; with this goes interim household authority, under the ultimate authority of their father. Here perhaps we know too much of Roman law and not enough of Roman social practice - though a basic point, as I have said before, is the Roman disenagement of legal concepts from concrete household actualities. At any rate, in "free" marriage the wife remains under the ultimate authority of her own father; with this she may be given an interim possession of property on the same basis as a son, a thing quite apart from her dowry. She does not come under her husband's household authority, or at least, not on the same basis as slaves or children. However this does not make the wife conjoint head of the household or co-administrator of joint property. Moreover her property, as stated before, reverts to her agnates.

But regardless of these differences, there is still a surprising degree of common character to the household across the different societal types. In particular, the position of the wife within the household in the City-state seems paradoxically strong: for all that she is under male authority, she is still mistress of the household. What seems to be the underlying issue here is the division between public and private spheres: exclusion from
public life is the key to women's subordination. Within the household, the wife controls the slaves and young children — the boys until school age, the girls until marriage —; she controls labour, materials, and keeps the storerooms. Even the young wife, after initial tuition from her husband, will have a free hand in controlling these affairs. However, all transaction that goes beyond the household must be conducted by her husband, and even the handling of her own dowry or property will be in her husband's hands, or conducted through a male agent. Again, the erosion of these practices at Rome is as striking as their continuing prevalence at Athens. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, the range of the wife's functions in the household is similar, but she is not restricted in her dealings to the household or excluded from public life in the same way, and she can transact freely with the outside world in her own person, either for the household or for herself. It is towards this that Roman practice develops in the Late Republic and Principate. But the point should be grasped: the position of the wife within the household in the City-state even under democratic conditions is paradoxically strong. The household is the material basis of citizenship, and it is in her day to day care (though this is limited to the household itself, and does not extend to the fields, or to other property). In my chapter on Athens (ch 9), I suggest that it may be that Athens actually under-represents this strength (i.e. in comparison to the wider Greek, or indeed City-state, world), due to the predatory income of the political community from empire providing an alternative material basis for citizenship.

Too, it should be grasped that the role of the wife in the City-state household is to be its mistress. She also bears children to perpetuate her husband's lineage, and their raising is under her oversight. But only in restricted sense is she a mother; so far as possible, the care of children is left to slaves, even wet-nurses. This will be discussed again in a later chapter (ch 6). Similarly, only in restricted sense is she a housewife; housework will be done as far as possible by slaves. The wife's main actual labour will be in textiles — this above all is women's work in Antiquity. This too will be discussed again in a later
chapter (ch 7). But the contrast with the Bureaucratic Kingdom is discernible: there the wife is mistress of the household, but controls and shares in family labour rather than directing slaves. Again, her authority extends beyond the household itself, to the fields and to other property. Moreover the children are hers as much as her husband's, and she raises and cares for them herself—this includes breastfeeding. The wife here is both housewife and mother in the full sense. Textile production is still typical female labour, but this will be her own economic asset rather than the household's.

A point that should be stressed in all this is the control of large households by young girls. This holds for all societal types: there is a common pattern in Antiquity of small nuclear families and young female marriage. In City-states, where the husband is generally somewhat older (at Athens, much older), the husband may initially supervise his wife, but even here she soon takes control of affairs, and in no case is the wife under the permanent supervision of resident female kin. This should not be assumed on "commonsense" grounds to be an unwise arrangement. The immaturity of young girls is a matter of knowledge withheld, or its validation withheld through cultural equivocation. It is not a matter of simple inexperience.

Relationships within the household may be variously conditioned by the social division of public and private spheres. This division is specific to City-states, and is complex: as I have said before, the private is the realm of sectional rather than individual interest. Again, the local community is basically just the political community in its private aspect. The status-strata, especially the patrician and plebeian strata, are sectional groups; so also are the client followings of patrician lineages. With this, as I have indicated earlier, the quasi-kinship structures, the genos (gens) and phratry (curia), may have an ambivalent role between the public and the private spheres, given the endemic status conflicts between the patrician and plebeian strata.

In this setting, men in City-states typically have a social, recreational life that is politically conditioned in content, and
from which their womenfolk are excluded. This social life characteristically centres on male clubs, political debating, and physical sports; it features male friendships and professional female companionship. Where this occurs, the household either is not a location for social life, at least not for men, or more typically, an internal division is set up within the household, between the public quarters and the women's quarters. Women are kept away from company and secluded in the latter, though they might receive their own (female) guests there. This pattern is clearly marked at Athens. However, matters are different at Rome. There the public social and recreational life of men exists much as at Athens, but the household too is a location for social life, and without internal divisions. There is no internal seclusion of women, but an active sharing of recreational life, including political discussion, between citizen men and women. With this, women too have something of a recreational life outwith the household paralleling that of men. This pattern seems to start before the Republic even begins to decay. The reasons for these (and other related) differences between Athens and Rome will be taken up below.

However, it is the Bureaucratic Kingdom of Egypt that gives the strongest contrast, for here the sectional political basis for an exclusively male social life does not exist, and recreational activities are among the household's major functions. These are shared equally between husband and wife (and indeed children); there is no question of seclusion. On the other hand, there are distinct women's quarters; but the meaning of this, in keeping with the arrangements of the property basis of the household, is that the quarters belong to the women. That is the opposite case to Athens, where the women belong to (or in) the quarters. But the whole public-private division is not a significant dimension of social structure in this type of society.

The social division of public and private spheres, with the exclusion of women from public affairs, may result in an actual seclusion of women: that is, a physical restriction of their movements in the community beyond the household. This occurred at Athens, though it is not clear how thoroughgoing it was, and it clearly did not extend to the urban proletariat, despite their
real citizenship. On the other hand, there is no trace of this at Rome. The main factor here seems to be the structure as outlined above of the social and recreational life of men, and it seems reasonable to relate this to the stratification (closure) conflicts within the political community. The point is that, in the City-state, political affairs are public affairs, conducted in the Council and the Assembly by means of the spoken word - rhetoric is one of the great branches of learning in the City-state world. In the stratificatory struggles for control of the state, then, the plebeians strive to create public political associations and to make them centres of power; the patricians respond by using their own households for their political meetings, and communicating privately among themselves by means of writing. This is the location of much of classical Greek and Latin literature, especially in historiography and political philosophy, and it is also much of the reason why we really only see the Patrician City in retrospect.* The broad consequence is a process of polarization whereby patrician closure is directed at the plebeians, whereas plebeian closure is directed at women. That is, the public nature of political life, and equally the political nature of public life, are stressed in conditions of plebeian control, and a strong division of sex-roles in terms of the contrast of the public arena with the (inner) household is set up. As against this, the patricians, especially in conditions of patrician control, will soften these divisions and stress the supreme value of patrician status. Actual life in public will be correspondingly depoliticized. It is the difference between a large group trying to challenge closure and a small group trying to defend closure. I will return to these issues again later. But it might be suggested that the initial impulse to seclude women is a factor of the stratificatory conflicts of the Patrician City, and is based on the plebeians' desire to prevent patrician men from taking their daughters as

*Indeed it should be stressed as a point of general methodology how far our literary sources for the whole study of Graeco-Roman Antiquity are conditioned by these factors. Though literacy is a two-edged sword: written law-codes typically resulted from plebeian demand. But that was to break the patrician monopoly of legal knowledge.
concubines (i.e. refusing them marriage and equality of citizen status). At any rate, the seclusion of women seems to be a social practice linked to either or both plebeian status and democratic conditions; it is contra-indicated for patrician status or for conditions of at least secure patrician dominance. With this, it appears to be a practice specific to the City-state; there is no basis for it in the sociology of the Bureaucratic Kingdom.* In both Egypt and the Roman Empire women's movements are basically unrestricted.

The local community in the City-state is the political community in its private aspect. City-states stage recreational and religious events - the former evidently evolving out of the latter. These include theatre, games, gladiatorial contests, circuses, etc., as well as festivals and processions. This is one aspect of public life in which women are included; indeed, it is the one respect in which their citizenship is real. Yet there may be sexual differentiation: women are likely to be excluded from matters related to war and politics, and conversely men will be excluded from matters relating to sex and fertility. At Athens these principles (especially the former) were kept strongly; women attended the theatre and religious processions only. At Rome, women attended the full range of public entertainments, though often the sexes were seated separately.

In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, there is somewhat similar public entertainment, but it has a different location: religious festivals and processions and public state functions (e.g. royal processions) have rather a geopolitical significance; and the people relate to it as subjects rather than as citizens. There is no question of the exclusion of either sex, though interestingly there can still be sexual differentiation and segregation. But the significance of this is to give each sex its place, rather than to exclude one or other of them (on the same reasoning as

*I have no basis for discussing the seclusion of women in the Ancient Near East in this thesis. Whatever its occurrence, however, it should be realized that the Ancient Near East is sociologically various: the Phoenicians are a City-state people, for example, and the Jews are a political/religious community rather than a traditional kingdom.
with women's quarters in the household).

Given this background, it is interesting to note that sexual differentiation in dress is universal to these societies. This may be part of a spectrum of dress differentiation relating to the spectrum of general status stratification. This is clearly marked at Rome, though largely absent at Athens, due to the democratic character of the City. Status distinction in dress, hair, etc. between citizen women and prostitutes is also part of this spectrum. Again this is clear at Rome, though absent at Athens; but the reason for this absence is rather the seclusion of Athenian citizen women. Status at this level is equally a factor of Bureaucratic Kingdoms, and the distinctions are maintained in the Roman Empire, though the protection of the Roman citizenship is again probably a factor here. The general system of status stratification is much collapsed compared to that of the City-state. In Egypt, status distinctions in dress, except where associated (for both sexes) with physical labour, seem much less clear, beyond the basic differentiation of the sexes. Incidentally, the veiling of women fits into this general context, basically as distinguishing the decent woman from the prostitute, though it was not actually practiced in any of the societies studied here - it was rather a practice of the Oriental and Greek East. The issues here will be discussed again in a later chapter (ch 7).

Approaching matters via the City-state and the household carries a tendency to focus on the citizenry and the wife and mother. From one point of view, this should be the central focus, as should be clear from the previous chapter, since these are the main reproducing (and conflicting) strata. Nonetheless, there is a need to look somewhat more widely. This means in two directions: servile agrarian labour, and the urban proletariat.

For the former case, this entails looking at the household as the basis of a wider domination that extends over land, slaves and livestock. The basic question here is whether the agrarian workforce is a slave-gang, working perhaps literally as a chain-gang under the supervisor's lash, or a force of share-croppers, working on a family labour basis and possessing their own households. This is very much a contrast between the City-state under
oligarchic conditions and the Bureaucratic Kingdom – patrician estates in the democratic City tend to be on broadly similar terms to the latter. (It should be remembered that a free peasantry is a typical condition for Antiquity; indeed, it is the basis of the plebeian citizenry of the City-state. Thus it is of course not considered here. Again, it is only large estates that have a servile workforce. And again, it was not the general practice of Antiquity to use slaves in agriculture. See Appendix A part ii for further discussion.) With a slave workforce, the domination of the household head is absolute, operating maybe through a private apparatus but meeting no organization of the workforce from the underneath. A serf or share-cropping workforce, however, will have its own village organizations, councils and headman, which will negotiate labour rates and practices, exploitation levels etc. with the estate owners (and with the state itself in regard to corvee), and the state will protect these arrangements. These organizations will likely also have local functions in settling disputes, adjudicating inheritances, etc. As such, men and women may participate equally in them, and women will then have distinct rights, and personality to demand those rights; a powerful modification of the household authority of their menfolk. This was the situation in Egypt, and in time Rome also developed in this direction, with the development of the colonate. This comes slowly during the Principate and is eventually associated with its fall, and with the Dominate that follows. But that is to cross the threshold into medieval Christian civilization. (As to village councils in City-states, these are simply the local citizens dealing with the local administration of the political community. They have little significance.)

Turning to the urban proletariat: this in the City-state is a conglomerate of landless citizens, resident foreigners and slaves living away from their owners, generally recruiting by migration rather than by their own fertility, as I have discussed before. In Athens, the citizen element was politically and militarily engaged, but that is exceptional. In Rome, this was rather a field for clientage; again, an extension of private domestic authority. This is interesting, in that the private authority of
the patron over his clients is quite disengaged from the author-
ity of the head of the household over his wife; indeed, the wife
herself may be a patron (so indeed a woman may be a client). This
is illustrative of how far the wife is free of domestic male
authority; something that begins in the Late Republic and increas-
ingly develops through the Principate. Incidentally, voluntary
associations - basically the burial clubs of the poor (collegia)
- took patrons too; indeed for a time even Cities might do so. It
was not just individuals who were clients.

In the fully developed Bureaucratic Kingdom of Egypt, howev-
er, the urban poor are basically a single stratum without intern-
al distinctions, as indeed becomes the case in the Roman Princip-
ate. Their organization is very much on the same lines as with
agrarian labour: local councils and headmen. However, the control
over craft labour and markets does not face exactly the same pro-
blems as with agriculture; unfortunately, little is known about
this. Closed hereditary recruitment of craft labour, though it
may appear in the Roman Dominate, does not appear to be a factor
anywhere in the Ancient Civilization proper.

In fine, to approach society in terms of servile agrarian
labour and the urban poor is basically to highlight the Bureaus-
cratic Kingdom and the local community organizations - themes
which can be projected back through the chapter through the dis-
cussions of e.g. public entertainments, the seclusion of women in
the community, internal divisions within the household, etc. As I
stated at the outset, the contrast is of household societies with
community societies, though both types have both households and
communities. Women either are secluded and subordinated in the
household, or participate and have equality in the community.

A fairly sharp and consistent contrast can be maintained in
these terms between City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms; at
least Athens and Egypt are clear instances. The case of Rome is
more complex; the process of transition is clearly discernible,
but the protection of the Roman citizenship does make for a sur-
prising maintenance of City-state patterns in certain regards,
focussing not unnaturally on the transmission of political status.
Further complicating the picture are the initial differences of
the Roman City-state from the Athenian; indeed, it must be admit-
ted that the lesser sociological contrast of the sub-types of the
City-state seems rather more difficult to draw and maintain. The
basic reasons for this were indicated in the previous chapter:
Weber’s basic sub-types are the Patrician City and the Plebeian
City, but I have not found adequate sources (or space or time)
for the analysis of gender relations in the Patrician City, and
only consider the differences between conditions of oligarchy and
democracy in Cities that are structurally Plebeian. I have to add
that I find it hard to reduce all the differences that stand be-
tween Athens and Rome to this basis; I cannot but be aware of the
wider Greek civilization, and indeed, the enigma of the cultural
heritage from earlier (e.g. Mycenaean) Greek history.

Even so, it seems clear what the basic differences for our
purposes between oligarchic and democratic City-states at least
are. In the former, there is greater extension of the private do-
main in terms of clientage, a biasing of the political community
towards political-legal rather than military affairs (internal
rather than external predation), and a greater participation of
women, albeit informally, in these affairs. Basically, there is
an attempt to appropriate public affairs by privatizing them (and
a corresponding depoliticization of actual life in public). As
against this, democratic City-states eschew clientage in favour
of brotherhoods, bias public affairs towards the military dimen-
sion and war (external rather than internal predation), and rigor-
ously exclude women from public life, to the point of seclusion
and restriction to women’s quarters within the household. The
division of public and private spheres here is rigorous. The un-
derlying reasons for these differences have already been indicat-
ed, in the struggle between the strata for control of the state,
the different strategies of a small group defending closure and a
large group challenging closure. It should be kept in mind in
this that the strata are political-military in character not econ-
omic, and that the economic role of women, as mistress of the
household, gives them a paradoxically strong position, especially
where the menfolk are absent on account of war. At Athens, the
alternative economic basis of the citizenry in the booty of empire undercut this. But at Rome, patrician women are players not pawns. To this can be added that close-kin inter-marriage for the protection of property will have greater impact in a small patrician group than in a large plebeian one, and also that patricians, through their greater wealth, have more latitude with the management of their womenfolk’s fertility than have plebeians. In all, it seems clear that patricians need to use their women; plebeians need to control theirs. The difference in the position of women, especially the position of women in the community, is a conspicuous element in the differences between the two types of City. More on these matters will appear in the next two chapters.

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Chapter 6

Sexual Polarity

Introduction

In this chapter I turn to the consideration of sexual polarity itself. In discussing this earlier at the methodological level (ch 3), I defined it in four elements: fertility and maternity; maturation; sexuality; and aggression. I argued that internal resonances could be found, on the one hand, between fertility/maternity and sexuality; on the other, between maturation and aggression. I argued too that sexuality and aggression, and maternity also, should be seen not simply as instincts, but as emotionally illuminated competences which are (or may be) the basis for skills and lore to be acquired and transmitted—though on the other hand, these may be disapproved or withheld. That is, they should be seen as forms of social action. The intention in this chapter is to look at social action, social relationships and practices.

Integrating this with the material of the last two chapters, there are two key issues to highlight. One is the demographic dimension: in City-states, procreation is problematic, for all strata; in Bureaucratic Kingdoms, procreation is on the whole unproblematic. The other issue concerns local community structures: in City-states, the household controls the property and personnel of the lineage, under the authority of the adult males; in Bureaucratic Kingdoms, the household is a pragmatic unit of shared subsistence without corporate identity or continuity, and its members are co-equalit y individual participants in the wider community. Taking these points together, the social articulation of sexual polarity can be seen in terms of a simple dichotomy: in the one case, as a realm requiring to be controlled and contained;
in the other, as a realm to be accepted and accommodated. In both cases, the economic impact of fertility is analytically the first issue, but beyond this is simply the conflict between natural impulses and the institutions set up to control them. Strikingly, these institutions are the household and male domestic authority in the City-state; in the Bureaucratic Kingdom they are unfilled. Indeed, women have a positive protection from such things.

Fundamentally, then, we can speak of "control societies" and "acquiescent societies": City-state, domestic family, lineage and household; Bureaucratic Kingdom, atomistic family, existential non-corporative unit and local community. Again, two basic aspects in which the contrast is clear can be identified. Firstly, do social actors use sexual intercourse as a means to procreation, or do they enjoy it for its own sake without regard to the consequences? This point I have raised earlier, in my methodological discussions (ch 3). Secondly, do social actors demand social criteria for membership and recruitment to their social groups in terms of legitimacy, acknowledgement by the father, initiation at "coming of age", etc.? Or do they accept membership and recruitment simply in virtue of the natural process of birth? Such social criteria relate to the social closure processes discussed in previous chapters, especially in regard to the domestic family, the political community, and its status stratification. The two aspects then clearly reflect each other. We can speak accordingly of "reproduction societies" and "procreation societies".

This is once more to set up dichotomies in terms of the main typological orientation of this thesis: City-state versus Bureaucratic Kingdom. The correspondences have been indicated. As to the secondary typology, the sub-types of the City-state, I have argued in the previous chapter that the stratificatory conflicts of the patrician and plebeian strata make for a polarization of the social practices related to their closure strategies. In this the characteristic gender practices of the City-state are, by comparison with the Bureaucratic Kingdom, softened under oligarchic conditions and hardened under conditions of democracy. Patricians need to use their women; plebeians to control theirs. The oligarchic City-state then is acquiescent rather than controlling
in certain respects of sexual polarity, though it retains its overall orientation to reproduction rather than procreation. How this applies across the different elements of sexual polarity will emerge in the discussions that follow.

These preliminary points should provide a basic orientation for what follows.

**Fertility and Maternity**

The subject at issue here is primarily women's relation to their own reproductive biology, the functions of fertility and motherhood. Secondarily, male parenting is also an issue. As discussed above, these things are to be seen in terms of skills, knowledge and emotion, as meaningful social action, not simply as biological processes.

The first issue then is women's knowledge of their own biology. Here a point universal for Antiquity is the young age of girls at first marriage: generally of the order 13 – 15 (sometimes younger), apparently just after puberty. With this, it is also universal that girls are brought up in small nuclear families set in wider households, though the nature of the wider household is matter for variation. In City-states, the household will include slaves; in conditions of oligarchic control and where wealth permits, this will include slave families, though typically in democratic conditions and especially at plebeian level it will not. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms the household will often run to, or be closely associated with, several nuclear units, of whatever status.

This, then, is the situation in which the girl's childhood takes place. It is also the situation that she goes into at marriage, and as mistress of her own household despite her youth. In the City-state, she may be initially under the tutelage of her husband, at least in democratic conditions where the age difference between husband and wife is typically great. In no case however is the wife under the permanent supervision of resident female kin, neither her husband's nor her own. She is mistress of her household. As such, she will have control of a female staff;
under oligarchic conditions or at patrician level generally this is likely to include her own female slaves, brought with her from her own household at marriage.

The upshot of these points seems to me to be that generally for Antiquity there is no occasion and no possibility of withholding knowledge of their own biology from girls. Only in plebeian households in democratic City-states would this be possible, and even here there seems to be no consistent attempt at it. It should be added that ancient religion and mythology is universally rich in sexual and reproductive themes and imagery, and that women were exposed to this and indeed were often its specific bearers.

The low age of female marriage may appear puzzling in regard to City-states, where the economic pressures on fertility are high. But it should be remembered that we are dealing here with a political community, not with a complete population. The main means through which excess fertility was controlled was exposure, especially female exposure. I will return to consider this below. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms none of these considerations apply, and the young age of marriage is not remarkable.

Pregnancy and childbirth generally follow soon after marriage. I have already given some considerations on the household situation in which these things occur: generally the wife is mistress of her own household, and her control over how she experiences these things and over her sources of knowledge and advice is likely to be good. Female kin may be supportive or destructive; where the continuity of a lineage is in question, probably there is risk that the husband's female kin will be destructive, whereas the wife's own kin will generally be supportive. But in ancient City-states the wife has a strong, although somewhat isolated, position against such pressures - especially in plebeian households in the democratic City. Midwives assist the birth in all cases. It is interesting that in Egypt and the Roman Principate, these were trained and recognized paramedics, associated with the physician's craft, whereas at Athens, they were of much lesser training and status, and were apparently sometimes simply neighbours. This was probably also so at early Rome. The modes of childbirth too can be contrasted. At Athens, the woman was put to
bed, and made wholly passive; in Egypt, she squatted "on the bricks", and played a far more active part. At Rome, a special birthing-stool was used, which seems to give the woman a limited active involvement.

Child-bed mortality should be given consideration, but it is hard to discuss: we do not have adequate empirical data (especially for rural populations) even for the Roman World. It can be suggested that the seclusion of women makes for poor standards of health and physical fitness, and thus increased difficulties at childbirth. This clearly marks Athenian women as more at risk than Egyptian or Roman.

However, to go beyond this and try to evaluate the effectiveness of the midwife's craft is difficult. It certainly cannot be straightforwardly assessed from ancient medical literature, for that is to beg questions both as to the medicalization of childbirth and as to the social location and typical uses of literacy. The latter issue I discuss below, in considering contraception and abortion: the basic point is that the Graeco-Roman medical writings typically have little bearing for the actual practised physician's craft, though that is not true for Egypt. For the former issue, it should be realized that even if childbirth is not medicalized but is regarded as part of household management, it can still be under male control. On the other hand, where the medicalization of childbirth is accompanied by the assimilation of the midwife to the physician's craft, and even some opening of the physician's profession to women, this does not mean the development of male control over female reproductivity. In both cases, the question is: who is the midwife's client, the woman in labour or the male head of the household? In both Egypt and the Roman Principate, the medicalization of childbirth meant medically trained midwives and female physicians, and the woman in labour as herself client as well as patient. But the contrast with Athens should not be overstated: the structure of Athenian religion protected the relationship between midwife and patient from male supervision.

Returning however to the midwife's effectiveness, it can be assumed that the training and wider experience that accompany
professionalization made the Egyptian and Roman midwife more resourceful than the Athenian. But that training is mainly practical. Its relation to the medical writings is first and foremost a question of how far the midwife informed the medical writer. Only in Egypt is there anything approximating to the medical textbook; Graeco-Roman medical literature is literature. Its gynaecological content can vary from quite eccentric speculative philosophy to fairly solid empirical content; the latter is more likely where there are women physicians and where the physician's text is a typical use of literacy. That develops to an extent in the later Principate, though never so fully as in Egypt. But the former, speculative, component arises precisely in conditions of remoteness from practical applications and considerations. Whatever its impact for subsequent Western medicine, Graeco-Roman gynaecological speculation had no impact for actual gynaecological management at the time. Conversely, the practised midwife's craft was empirically not speculatively grounded. There are at least no grounds for questioning its effectiveness.

There are sharp differences between the societies in the mother's relationship to her children. I have pointed to this in the previous chapter. In the City-state, the wife is producing children to perpetuate her husband's lineage; they are his children not hers. It is the husband who decides whether to acknowledge the child, and who names it; these are ceremonies that follow a few days after the child's birth. At Athens and Rome the father has at least in principle the right to decide whether the child is to be raised or exposed, and this seems very widespread in Antiquity, especially in Graeco-Roman Antiquity. It is the husband who keeps the children if the marriage is dissolved; the divorced wife has not even access to them. The wife's role, then, is to bear children; it is not to raise them. That is done by slaves, supplemented later by schools. Where possible, even wet-nurses are used, in preference to the mother herself breast-feeding, though this is dependent on a certain development of the economy. It happens at both Athens and Rome.

In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, however, the children belong to the parents in partnership. In Egypt it was apparently the mother
who named the child, and there is no question of the father's giving or withholding acknowledgement. As to exposure, the Egyptians did not practise it. In the event of dissolution of marriage it is the wife who keeps the children, though it is also she who leaves the marital household; securing the inheritance rights of the children may become matter for litigation. I am not clear what access rights the Egyptian father has, but the inheritance situation probably indicates it: the wife will be eager for her children to visit their father's household, though his subsequent wife if he remarries will resist this. These again are typical litigational matters. Indeed such matters show in the myths of Isis and Horus. The mother in Egypt nurses and raises her children herself, even at the upper levels of society; she does not entrust this to slaves. But although the pattern here can be attributed to the bureaucratic character of Egyptian civilization, the Roman Principate does not really move towards it, but rather stays rooted in City-state practice. I have suggested earlier that the continuing protection of the Roman citizenship under the Principate is probably the main reason for this.

These factors (rather, surely, than child mortality rates for example) condition the emotional involvement of parents with their children, and indeed those of children with their parents. In the City-state, the mother's emotional involvement with her children is slight, and the father is basically an authority figure. The main emotional relationship is between children and the slaves who raise them, especially wet-nurses. Too, there may be strong bonds between free and slave children raised together. Against this, in Bureaucratic Kingdoms the emotional relationships between parents - both parents - and children are warm and uncomplicated, on both sides. Thus as I indicated in introducing this chapter, the question is whether Nature is controlled or accepted - a question on which it is possible to have altogether too much methodological sophistication.

As to the non-citizen mother, there are two main categories here: the concubine and the slave-mother. As earlier discussions should have made clear, the definitions and boundaries of these categories with each other and with marriage are hazy and complic-
ated. Typically, though, concubinage is a union of choice, across wide status difference, especially in the City-state where the woman is often slave or non-citizen. Always the relationship is legally recognized and protected; and typically it is the mother rather than the father to whom the children are attributed. In consequence, this tends to create family relationships and emotional ambience after the pattern of the Bureaucratic Kingdom. This is discernible at Athens and quite unmistakable at Rome.

As to the slave-mother, this is typical only of patrician households and the oligarchic City, and even here the urban household must be distinguished from the rural estate. In the latter, children simply add to the master's wealth; they are attributed to the mother only and are often the consequence of promiscuity. But slave-breeding was never successfully practised in Antiquity, although incentives - e.g. freedom for the mother of three or four children - were sometimes given. Broadly, the pattern in relationships and experiences here again is similar to that of the Bureaucratic Kingdom. The urban household by contrast is the setting rather for stable slave unions; the children would be brought up together with the free children of the household, as noted before. With this, the female slave's experience of fertility and maternity would be similar to, and indeed would reciprocally condition, that of the mistress of the household. Among such household slaves there is an aspiration to freedom, indeed at Rome to citizenship, though slave families did risk break-up through sale. Here then the tendency is rather towards the City-state citizen-family pattern. But the arrangement, of permitting slave families in richer urban households, though favoured was far from universal.

In sum, it is household and community structure that condition the experiences of fertility and maternity rather than the woman's stratificatory location, although the City-state has, broadly speaking, opposite patterns for citizen and non-citizen households in regard at least to maternity and parent-child relationships. On the whole, the latter accord with the pattern that is universal for the Bureaucratic Kingdom. This is as indicated in the previous chapter, in discussing family types and household
structures. But the discussion of the universal characteristics of the household there should also be recalled.

Lastly, I turn to the questions of the control of fertility and the limitation of family size. Here there are four main possibilities: infanticide, exposure, contraception and abortion. They can be taken in pairs.

The first point is that, although exposure is commonplace in Antiquity, the presumption is that the child will be found and raised; outright infanticide is exceptional. This at least holds for the societies that are considered here; in the Ancient Near East one sometimes finds mention of babies being "thrown to the dogs". It must be added that the Egyptians do not ever seem to have practised exposure. In classical Antiquity, the father in a citizen household had the right to decide whether to raise or expose the child, as I noted earlier; with this, poor urban women must often have exposed their children. Yet it is puzzling: there are indications that exposure may not actually have been practised in classical Athens, despite its accepted place in Greek culture. The democracy had some impact for increasing economic opportunities (including the tribute of empire) for the poor, and hence increasing the possibilities for them to raise their children. However, the matter must be left open.

The economic pressures on fertility that motivate exposure I have explored in a previous chapter (ch 4); the corollary point is that the exposed child would commonly be raised as a slave. With this goes the preferential exposure of girl-children, to be raised as prostitutes. In the light of the earlier discussions, it can be suggested that all this comprises far more an oligarchic pattern than a democratic one; in the democratic City, the economic pressures are contained and the slaves are imported. Against all this, in the Bureaucratic Kingdom all these pressures and conflicts are simply absent. This I have discussed before. At any rate, exposure is the father's decision. Protective amulets left with the child might be attributable to the mother. These had practical value, for by them the child's identity or free-born status might be proven at a later time; the child could then be reclaimed, or claim its freedom.
Contraception and abortion are also attested throughout Antiquity, a range of means for both being known. Some methods were worthless or dangerous; others, including spermicidal cervical occlusions and surgical abortion, were unquestionably effective. But there are problems in discussing this: most of our knowledge comes from medical writings, and contraceptive or abortifacient lore is not necessarily an aspect of the physician’s craft, depending who wants these facilities. Again, medical texts may exclude surgery, as a craft taught by apprenticeship; our lack of knowledge of Egyptian surgery is probably for this reason. Beyond this, there are all the questions of the location of medicine in ancient knowledge and the nature of ancient science, and their relations to ancient literature. These issues are too large to go into here, but some points should be made: above all, that only briefly in Hellenistic Alexandria did true medical science ever occur in Antiquity. Generally, Graeco-Roman medicine is simply a branch of literature, ranging from on the one side speculative philosophical enquiry to on the other mere antiquarian compilation. The "medical writer" is not necessarily a physician, have patients or pupils; and there are no medical schools with set text-books. As against this, the Egyptian papyri seem to be the notebooks of working physicians, and to be a much less problematic reflection of the state of the art. In sum, I have to say that both Egyptian and Graeco-Roman medicine are capable of vast inflation, though in different ways: the Egyptian for its empirical content, the Graeco-Roman for its theoretical. The point however is perhaps rather that neither of them knew how to put the two things together (with the brief exception noted).

One reason for stating the above is that it should not be assumed (as Hopkins assumes – Hopkins 1965/6) that contraceptive and abortifacient lore is necessarily a scientific innovation in a hostile traditional (or religious) environment. It is rather a question of competing traditional lores in a context of cultural change. This is especially so at Rome.

More broadly, though, we need to ask first: who is the client? A sharp distinction must be made between the man’s desire to limit the number of legitimate children he raises, and the
woman's desire to limit the number of children she bears. The man may attain his end by means of exposure, or by avoiding sexual intercourse with his wife. If so, and if the husband is the physician's client, then the wife will not be the physician's patient for contraceptive or abortifacient treatment. These things then will only be part of the physician's craft so far as prostitutes (or their owners) are physicians' clients — surely a limited extent. Such lore as there is will be unwritten, and found among midwives and prostitutes. This seems to have been the situation at Athens. In Egypt, by contrast, exposure is not practised and the wife's sexuality is not under her husband's control; moreover it is the wife herself who is the physician's client as well as patient. This last point extends to women generally, regardless of personal status. Thus there is contraceptive knowledge at least in the medical texts; surgical abortion was surely also known. At Rome, the situation seems to have changed from the Athenian to the Egyptian pattern, although there was always traditional disapproval of the citizen woman taking affairs into her own hands in this way. But the basis of this disapproval should be understood: that exactly as with exposure, it should be the husband's decision. There is no ethical disapproval of contraception and abortion as such, until the Christian writers. Even interdicts against abortifacient drugs are directed at protecting women from dangerous potions; surgical abortion is not similarly interdict. This is so in the Roman Principate; it might possibly also have been so in Egypt.

The demographic impact of contraception and abortion cannot be assessed without knowledge of general population parameters that we do not have. This applies especially to the rural population. Child-bed mortality rates and female life expectations cannot be assessed from urban data, even if this can be reliably gathered. (These matters are briefly considered in Appendix A part ii below.) But the pattern, general to Antiquity, of young female marriage but small families requires us to propose low fertility, and exposure and restricted sexual contact for wives cannot be the general explanation; it would apply to City-states only. Religious opposition to contraception and abortion appears
only late in Antiquity, as the Roman Principate is ending (the reasons for the Christian attitudes cannot be clarified here). The implication then seems to be that contraception and abortion do have a demographic impact at least in Bureaucratic Kingdoms. Modern experience suggests that advanced rational technology is not altogether a necessary precondition for this; rather the practice brings the technology.

A comment might be added as to non-conceptional sexual practices: oral and anal intercourse, coitus interruptus, etc. These practices really require to be seen in the context of the sexual relationship, something to be considered in a later section. The basic point however is the conception of marriage in the City-state as a relationship geared to legitimate procreation, not to sexual release. These practices then would have been used with prostitutes or concubines, not with wives, and at that probably seen more as sexual variety than as fertility limitation. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, however, or indeed in the development at Rome, the conception of marriage is different, including and even focusing on preferential sexual partnership. Here these practices will come into play; they will work in conjunction with contraception and abortion as above.

Maturation

Maturation is conceived here as a cycle running from birth to parenthood. In this, the intention is to focus on childhood from the point of view of the child growing towards adulthood. The child's growth is seen in terms of two reciprocal processes: the acquisition of skills, knowledge, values etc. (socialization); and the acquisition of individual identity and personal autonomy (individuation). Masculinity/femininity develops through both these processes.

To start at birth, at Athens and at Rome there is public announcement of the child's birth by decorating the house's doorposts. The sex of the child is declared by the symbol displayed (laurel or wool). Too, there are ceremonies soon after the birth of the father's acknowledgement and naming of the child, and at
Athens the phratry would be informed, at least for the birth of a son. At Rome from the start of the Principate citizen births were registered with the state. At Egypt, the mother goes through a period of post-natal purification, but ritual beyond this does not seem to be known. Apparently it was the mother that named the child. Swaddling probably has no consequences for personality formation, but it may indicate a cultural attitude to human nature and its relation to society. It was practised at Athens and Rome, but in Egypt babies and infants went naked.

The care of babies and infants is everywhere the task of women, but there are as indicated previously differences between the societies in household situation. In City-states it is slaves who care for children, including wet-nurses; in larger households in the oligarchic City there may be a shared up-bringing with slave children. In Egypt it is the mother who cares for the children, and if the household is extended it is with limited formal status differences. At Athens, infants are confined to the women's quarters. There is no parallel to this in Egypt, nor at Rome except when guests are being entertained in the home. The sexual differentiation of infants in terms of toys, games, clothing etc. seems to have been fairly limited in all cases.

It is about the age of six or seven that the child starts to go into the wider world, and that real sexual differentiation begins: the boy now passes into his father's care, while the girl stays in the care of her mother. Too, the boy now has male slave attendants, while the girl stays with the female ones; at least this differentiation is made in richer households. This pattern is most marked at Athens, where boys only go to school while the girls, like most citizen women, remain secluded in the home. At Rome, boys and girls go to school together, and this is old established custom — it is impossible to say why. In both Cities, the availability of schooling extends quite far down the social scale; this holds for Roman boys and girls alike, although there might be a preference to educate the upper strata girl privately at home. This pattern of education endures and even extends under the Principate. For Egypt, far less is known. Schools run by the state bureaus were probably for boys only, but there appear to
have been temple schools also, which probably accepted girls. There may also have been private education. At the least, since there were literate women, in the temples and elsewhere, some systematic provision for it must be assumed. The uptake of school education must be assessed in terms of the extent of literacy and the size of the state and temple bureaucracies and the priesthood.

In all cases, schooling includes literacy as a central element; therefore something must be said about the place of literacy in culture and society. There are sharp contrasts: City-states run their affairs in oral not in literate terms, whereas literacy is of the essence of bureaucracy. Thus literacy in the Bureaucratic Kingdom should really be compared with rhetoric in City-states. Rhetoric was a specialized advanced education for young adults, and in all City-states restricted to males. Literacy in City-states is a factor not of public affairs as such but of closure conflicts in the political community. The plebeians demand a written law-code, to break the monopoly of legal knowledge of the patricians; the patricians for their side develop a literature of political commentary as a private means of communication among themselves, circumventing the Assembly. These things are a factor of the change from Patrician City to Plebeian City, and of subsequent stratificatory conflicts within the Plebeian City. The Patrician City itself is basically preliterate.

Culture in the City-state always retains a strong oral element, as for example the theatre, but this holds much more in the democratic City, where education will also include strong non-literary elements such as singing and dancing. Again, the democratic City has no use for literate women, though prostitute companions (hetaerae) with an education in non-literary culture will be valued. But the oligarchic City does have a use for literate women, due to the greater companionship, the sharing in social life and even the informal culture of political life, between citizen (especially patrician) women and men. Again, literacy can be of use in controlling large households. Indeed, given this, and its bearing on the origins of bureaucracy, as against the oral nature of the Council and Assembly of the City-state, it is hard
to justify any preliminary sociological assumption that it must be men who are literate, women illiterate. It could even be credibly speculated that it was women that first invented writing. Incidentally, it should be realized that the writing down of older material, e.g. Homer, in City-state civilization is basically a support for a continuing oral tradition; likewise that the reading of literary texts often means reading aloud by slaves. This last is a typical Roman practice; presumably a factor of oligarchy and patrician status.

As to the Bureaucratic Kingdom, in Egypt the monopolization of the state apparatus by men is partially offset by the participation of women in the priesthodies and (though perhaps in less degree) the temple bureaucracies and the administration of private households, as well as their control of their own households and private affairs. There is also cultural companionship between the sexes, even more than at Rome. Literature also exists here, though it is comparatively slight; its location is simply that of the recreation of the literate strata. Both sexes share in the enjoyment, and perhaps the creation, of this. This character emerges too to a certain extent in the Roman Principate (and apparently in the Hellenistic Kingdoms). The underlying factor is the expansion of literature at the expense of rhetoric as the City loses its political functions and becomes an administrative entity. However, a certain cultural continuity of the Roman Principate with the Roman City-state remains; indeed, there is a cultural continuity that runs through the whole of Graeco-Roman civilization. But however that may be, the final comment must be made that, in view of these considerations on the sociology of literacy, I would assume literacy rates to have been as high in Egypt as in the Roman world, and, due to the literacy of women, higher than at Athens.

In City-states, education must also include physical and military training, and an introduction to public affairs. This is for boys only, and begins at the mid-teens. Gymnasium training is one aspect; actual military training will begin rather later, and is focussed on disciplined infantry manoeuvring rather than weapon-craft. Besides this, the youth will begin to be taken to the
Assembly and to hear speeches and legal proceedings, though he will not at this stage take part in them. This aspect of his education will probably be undertaken by his father, and is likely to be accompanied by an introduction to a politicized social life, in terms of introductions to the influential, dinner-parties at which politics are discussed, and so forth. It may also be accompanied by a formal education in rhetoric, though not in the first years. This stage of the boy's upbringing is marked by ceremonies of coming of age, which mark the formal ending of childhood. The boy is registered on the citizen-rolls of his City (or the Roman citizenship), and at Athens he would join his father's phratry. At Rome this would occur somewhat earlier than at Athens (perhaps about 14 - 15), but the liability to military service would only follow later.

But these matters have to be considered in the light of the discussions above (ch 4 & 5) on property inheritance, marriage, and the household. In City-states, full adulthood means being head of a household and owner of a lineage's property, and full participation in public affairs is conditional upon this. This, as discussed, entails the retirement or death of the father — at Athens the former; at Rome the latter. Thus City-states have a prolonged male adolescence, a period of some years during which the young male passes by stages from childhood to full adulthood. The coming of age ceremony only marks the start of this process; the beginning of military service (about age 18) marks another stage. Beyond this, the situation at Athens is that the son will take over his father's household and will marry at about age 30; he becomes a full citizen, playing his part in the Assembly and law courts and eligible for Council membership or a magistracy, only from that time. At Rome, however, the son receives an interim devolution of property at about age 18, on which to set up his own household and marry; nonetheless he remains strictly a minor so long as his father lives. This status however is largely notional, and ceases to have effect on his public status from age 25; for all practical purposes including his public career he is a full adult from that time.

With this, the two Cities have different patterns in regard
to sexual relations and sexual companionship. At Athens, sexual companionship is sought with cultured prostitutes (hetaerae) or in homoerotic relationships; these last are typically between a young man in his twenties and a youth in his teens. At Rome, sexual companionship is developed between husband and wife, and young men below the age of marriage visit brothels for sexual release. There are no hetaerae at Rome, and for long homosexuality was disfavoured. These matters will be discussed more fully in the next section. But it should be noted that there is for men a positive expectation that they will have sexual relations during adolescence. This holds for both Cities.

As with material in the previous chapter, these patterns at least make sense in terms of the differences between democratic and oligarchic Cities, though it is difficult to insist on this as their ultimate ground. The more military slant of citizenship at Athens and its more political-legal slant at Rome might be noted.

As to Bureaucratic Kingdoms, here there is no political citizenship and the army is professionalized; the closest equivalent to the education for citizenship then might appear to be the scribal education in literacy and literate administrative skills. It may be indeed that a certain deferment of adulthood is associated with this. However the point is deceptive. For one thing, it is precisely the scribal career that is most closely associated with the system of appointments rather than inheritances. For another, there is a citizenship here, albeit more curtailed, in terms of the rights to participate in or appear before the various councils and legal tribunals. The point is precisely that there is no constraint upon this status in terms of the inheritance of lineage property. It is simply a question of acquiring economic autonomy, which is generally a factor of appointment rather than inheritance. In practice, adult status appears to be attained simply in virtue of acquiring economic autonomy and marrying—founding one's household. The taking over of one's own affairs and the citizenship referred to above would accompany this. The matters in question would probably be learnt by informal participation rather than a formal induction by the father as in the
City-state, together with formal education and training in the state bureaucracy itself. On the other hand, there does appear to have been a coming of age ceremony in Egypt. It was apparently purely a family affair, and may have been held for both sexes. As to military service, this, being professionalized, does not have the same significance as in the City-state.

The age of marriage for men is generally young, mid-teens, though this might perhaps be deferred during a scribal education. Sexual relations with prostitutes might perhaps be associated with this. The expectation, however, is of sexual companionship between husband and wife. It must be added that marriage in Egypt is apparently at the couple's own choice. Accordingly, courtship is an important, and indeed definitive, element of adolescence. Again, this makes for a quite distinctive pattern of sexual relationships, as will be seen. However, this adolescence of courtship is a comparatively brief affair compared to the long citizen-apprenticeship of the City-state. Moreover full adulthood seems to have been acquired at once rather than in stages.

The Roman Principate shows certain developments towards the Egyptian pattern in these matters. The professionalization of the armed forces and their use as a means of extending the Roman citizenship both go some way to replacing the system of political-economic inheritance with a system of appointments; moreover this is set in the context of colonization programmes which are ameliorative of economic pressure. The appointment of patricians to administrative and military posts has similar impact at this level. However, the heritable status and expectation of military or administrative service of the Roman citizenship and its patrician strata status still remain; moreover the serving soldier was not permitted to make a citizen marriage. Again, the City is retained as a basic unit of the Roman administration (often possessing its own if not the Roman citizenship), though the active participation of the citizen is much curtailed. In sum, then, a male adolescence of military and political apprenticeship, especially for those of citizen status, continues to be the general pattern under the Principate.

So much for boys; for girls, the City-state pattern is that
they are kept in their mother's care, out of public life, and that childhood ends at marriage. This occurs soon after puberty, about age 13 - 15 (even younger at patrician level at Rome). Yet there are differences. At Athens, the girl is secluded (like her mother), and stays in the women's quarters in the household. At Rome, girls go abroad for example to the baths or the circus; they go to school together with boys, and have a preparation for a shared social life and companionship with their husbands. Yet as pointed out before, neither Athenian nor Roman girls will do housework or raise children. They will direct their households; the Athenian girl will work textiles; the Roman will manage her affairs. These are the skills their mothers are likely to teach them. They may also acquire knowledge of sex, childbirth, etc., from their slaves if not from their mothers; the Roman girl, as discussed before, has the more advantaged situation here.

As against this, in bureaucratic Egypt the girl, though strictly speaking in her mother's care, goes about freely, learns her legal rights at the village council and higher tribunals, and has a brief adolescence of courtship between childhood and marriage. She might have schooling; I have noted above the difficulties in assessing this. She will also learn household skills, including housework and childcare, and also textile work; too, she will learn how to handle her business affairs and transactions. She will also learn about sex and childbirth. All this she can be taken to be positively taught, though how far by her mother and how far in the wider household and community is another question; the household is much less an agency of control here. Like the boy, she probably learns her rights especially at the local council by informal participation. Again, as with the boy, courtship is an important element of the girl's adolescence, and although the mother does seem to have had some control, it does not appear that the Egyptian girl's virginity was insisted upon. It should be added that, since the Egyptian girl does have a real citizenship in legal terms, it is at marriage that she becomes adult. That is, it is when she sets up her own household (with her husband) that she becomes a full participant in her local council/tribunal, and takes full charge of her own affairs. If the Egypt-
ian girl's adolescence is brief, this is a factor of the type of society she is in, not of her sex.

In the Roman Principate, there develop similar considerations of legal personality. Other factors are also important: the system of devolution of property, the system of marriage without domestic authority, the decline of the guardianship of women. Between these processes, women come to adulthood under much the same conditions as men, that is, gradually between the age of marriage and their father's death. In actuality, Roman practice was to consider a person, whether man or woman, fully adult from age 25.

All this is to deal with propertied strata, at least so far as City-states are concerned. But as discussed before, the urban poor are basically not reproductive. There is consequently little need to consider a specific upbringing or education in crafts and trades. Where this occurs, the form is simply inductance into a workshop, whether as child, apprentice or slave. Inductance into prostitution is also made in these terms: household and workshop are little distinguished in Antiquity, and a brothel (or an inn or tavern) is simply a workshop or household. The education of hetaerae may be a different matter, including skills in music, dancing, etc. But basically this is still simply a matter of being brought up in a hetaera's household, as her "daughter". More will be said of these matters in later discussions (especially in ch 7).

To sum up, what can be said about the contrast in maturational patterns is as follows. First, adolescence, in the sense of a gradual acquisition of adulthood deferred until after physical maturation, is basically a matter of males in City-states only, with a tentative and limited occurrence for scribal class males in Bureaucratic Kingdoms. There is no female adolescence in the City-state. Against this, however, there is the brief courtship phase that both sexes share in Bureaucratic Kingdoms; this too is adolescence. Second, membership, especially male membership, of political communities seems to require social affirmation, especially at birth, at coming of age, and at final adulthood. Membership of the lineage is most powerfully conditioned by this. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, by contrast, simple birth and physical maturation
seem to be enough, both at general societal and at household level. As I suggested earlier, the question is whether human nature is seen as having to be controlled and contained, or rather to be accepted and accommodated.

Beyond this, a contrast can also be drawn in terms of the two component processes of maturation: socialization and individuation. In the sense of which process is most stressed, we can speak of City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms as "socialization societies" and "individuation societies". The contrast is most obvious for girls, since women in City-states have little autonomy, especially in conditions of democracy. But it is also true for boys. For in the City-state, the man aspires not to autonomy but to domestic authority, and his individual identity is at least partly submerged in his lineage. It is in the Bureaucratic Kingdom, as argued before, that autonomy and individual identity are found.

Sexuality

Sexuality, as discussed before, is to be seen in terms of instinctually driven and emotionally illuminated competences, in which there is scope for skills and lore to be acquired and transmitted (or again, disapproved and withheld). That is, it is to be seen in terms of what people do rather than what they are. The focus then is on types and meanings of social action and relationship. Consideration of sexuality in consciousness and culture should be grounded in the consideration of sexuality in social structure, rather than in for example a universalistic psychology (Psychoanalysis) or a "history of ideas".

The basic types of sexual relationship include: marriage, adultery, concubinage, mistresses, love affairs, casual sex, relations with prostitutes, etc. There are also questions of heterosexuality and homosexuality, and indeed, of positive and negative evaluations of sexuality and sexual activity. And there is the question of love. Organization of this field entails establishing how these things contextualize and contrast with each other, how they inter-relate. In this, contrasting syndromes can be identif-
ied, corresponding to the different societal types.

In City-states, marriage is located in the continuity of political community, status group and lineage, as I have discussed before. Marriages are arranged, the girl especially having little say in the choice of partner; moreover there are age differences, often acute, between the partners.

Yet there are great differences between Athens and Rome, some at least of which reflect the democratic and oligarchic City types, as noted before. In Athens, the age difference is greatest: men marry at 30, girls at 15. Moreover the structure of household and social life excludes and secludes women, and education and the transmission of culture reflect this. Husband and wife then are in no sense companions to each other, and the marital sexual relationship seems to be directed wholly to procreation — which in turn is limited. The Athenian husband uses alternative sexual outlets, especially hetaerae; that is, cultured prostitutes who sell professional companionship as well as sexual intercourse. Much of male recreational life is made up in these terms. Besides this, the Athenian man may have other arrangements prior to marriage: a concubine, probably a bought slave, either within his father's household or set up in her own; a homosexual love-affair with another young citizen; also the intermittent use of hetaerae or ordinary prostitutes. Indeed, he may maintain such arrangements instead of marrying; perhaps more typically, an older man might do so instead of remarrying. In face of this, the Athenian wife will have a very limited sexual experience. Entering into marriage a virgin, her husband may initiate her into sexual intercourse, but he is unlikely to maintain the sexual relationship for long, even past the first pregnancy. Yet her chastity will be insisted upon; she will have no other sexual outlets.

At Rome, by contrast, husbands and wives share a social and recreational life in common, and citizen girls are educated for this. Although the arranged nature of marriage is the same as at Athens, though typically with far smaller age differences (say 20 and 14), still the companionship of husband and wife is central to marriage. Rome has no hetaerae. Citizen youths use prostitutes before marriage, and purely for sexual intercourse. Concubines
and mistresses may be kept before marriage, or in preference to remarriage; typically these (the former at least) will be bought slaves or freedwomen, living in the man's own household or set up in their own but with the man's slaves. But once married, the man would make and maintain a positive sexual and emotional relationship with his wife, and it seems clear that this practice was much conditioned by the experience of relations with mistresses and concubines. For the wife's side, she would enter marriage a virgin, and would be initiated into sexual intercourse by her husband. But the sexual relationship is also a relationship of companionship, and it is enduring and is not limited by the constraints on procreation. Roman wives learnt skills of lovemaking, and it seems that they must also have learnt skills of fertility limitation and used the services of contraception and abortion. The freedom of movement of Roman wives, and their freedom within the household, is basically unrestricted, so that their chances for non-marital sexual outlets are fairly good. Even so, traditionalist criticism of the morals of Roman citizen women is probably more directed at their style of marriage than at actual adultery or promiscuity. It should be noted, incidentally, that whatever the traditionalist past, the above pattern clearly develops in the Late Republican oligarchic City, although the Principate is in strong continuity with it.

In Burecratic Kingdoms, the location of marriage is essentially different; it is very much the affair of the couple themselves, though perhaps with a formal requirement of consent from the girl's parents. It appears that the couple have their free choice of each other, and that consequently courtship is an important element of adolescence - indeed, probably a definitive element. In this, the girl might yield her virginity and the couple begin their sexual relationship premaritally. All this is to judge from the Egyptian love-poetry, which is apparently the shared entertainment of married men and women together, for example read aloud or sung at banquets, and reflects their own courtships. This is in contrast to Roman love poetry, which rather reflects upper strata men's dealings with their mistresses. At any rate, the companionship, education for companionship, and
shared social life of husband and wife are clear. But there is little obvious antithesis to the marriage relationship. Concubines seem most to have been favoured when it was desired not to complicate inheritance situations, a desire that could come from both sides. Love affairs either lead to marriage, or else to the breakup of marriage and possibly on to remarriage. Prostitutes might perhaps be used before marriage but only if the scribal education demanded that marriage be deferred. This is tentative; in truth, there is very little concrete attestation of prostitution in Ancient Egypt. On the girl’s side, marriage is made young and to a freely chosen partner of equal age; the sexual relationship is strongly and mutually developed and maintained. Probably the wife uses techniques of fertility limitation, though procreation here is less problematic. Incidentally, prolonged lactation is a known practice here which may have been a factor in this. Freedom of movement and freedom in the household being unrestricted, the wife’s chances of other sexual outlets are as great as the husband’s. Indeed, it is adultery, rather than prostitution as in the City-state, that provides the antithesis to marriage in this type of society.

This gives the basic outline of three contrasting syndromes. Much remains to be added of course. One point is that marriage in the City-state is always something of a public possession; that is, it is located between the public and private spheres. The wedding procession that takes the couple to their new home (more accurately, the wife’s new home) amid ribaldry surely marks the public appropriation of their sexual relationship; that they are not simply free to establish their intimacy on their own terms. No equivalent to this in Egypt is known.

Again, the conceptions of adultery are different. In Citystates, adultery is the sexual misconduct of any woman within a man’s domestic authority: not only the wife but also the daughter, divorced sister, or even widowed mother. This can also extend to a concubine living in his household. This applies to women only; the reciprocal crime of male sexual misconduct is intercourse with a woman who is in another man’s domestic authority, and the offence is against that man. Moreover, all this is in the
realm of public law. The husband does not have the choice whether to divorce the adulterous wife; he must do so. These principles appear to be general to City-states; indeed Augustus passed legislation re-affirming them for the Roman citizens (at least the upper strata) in the Principate. The interpretation is difficult, but it is surely not a question of protecting virginity, preventing illegitimacy, or controlling procreation; neither is it a matter of "morality" in traditional-religious sense. Directly, such laws protect the citizen-standing of the household head; above all, his right to secure citizen-marriages for his womenfolk. One aspect that should be pointed out is that, where fines and compensation are common resources of the law, the demand that the adulterous wife must be divorced protects the wife from being prostituted. But fundamentally it is surely the political community itself that is being protected here: protected from internal strife. This strife is not on lines of closure but of faction, or even of piecemeal conflict. For the political community is a community of household heads, controlling both property and lineage; and yet, as discussed earlier, marriage and legitimacy are equivocally located in the status groups and their closure conflicts. It is this equivocal location that gives laws on adultery an importance in their own right.

However these matters may be, adultery in Bureaucratic Kingdoms is a wholly different affair. It is simply sexual misconduct of wife or husband, and is a private offence against the marital partner only, justifying divorce at the partner's discretion. It is wholly a private not a public concern. This is so in Egypt; the Roman jurists also begin to talk this way from the 2nd century A.D., though the Augustan laws on adultery remain in force.

As to Augustus' reintroduction of legislation governing adultery and fornication at the birth of the Principate, this is a notorious historical problem, and I discuss it as such below (ch 10). The thrust of his legislation seems to have been directed at the Roman patricians, intending to compel them to keep their legitimate marriages among themselves and their non-legitimate dealings with prostitutes, concubines and mistresses separate and distinct. This however should be seen in the context of Augustus'
overall program, together with some assessment of that program's success. Augustus put an end to the factional wars of the Roman patricians and their dispossessed plebeian followings, re-establishing the Roman citizenry as a coherent though stratified body; at the same time disengaging the legal concept of the Roman citizenship from the concrete actuality of the city of Rome. The Roman citizenship was thus perpetuated as the basis of the empire. This is a purely political achievement, and has nothing to do with "morality". Two points especially to be noted are that Augustus made no attempt to curtail "free" marriage, and that the criminal proceedings for women's sexual misconduct are now transferred from the family council to the state. However, although Augustus succeeded in re-establishing the plebeian citizenry and in curtailing the patricians' factionalism, he did not succeed in re-establishing the patricians as a stable, self-reproducing and politically engaged stratum. Under the Principate, the patricians increasingly are dispossessed, fail to reproduce themselves, and become dependent upon imperial appointments and salaries rather than inherited wealth. With this, although love affairs among upper strata citizens might be dangerous, the general ambience of sexual relationships in the Principate seems to be in strong continuity with the Late Republic. Only the most overt cultural expression at patrician level is curtailed: in particular, the Roman love-poetry does not survive the Republic (that is, as a living art). It should be noted that the subsequent emperors maintained the Augustan legislation, although it was perhaps not consistently enforced.

If marriage provides one angle from which to approach the field of sexual relationships, then prostitution certainly provides another. Prostitution has been discussed in earlier chapters; especially its basis in demographic processes has been indicated (ch 4); and it will be discussed again later, especially in the discussion of sexual divisions in the economy (ch 7). However the intention here is to consider it as an angle of approach to sexual relationships, as stated. Even so, it should be recalled first that prostitution is typically located in demographic processes of supply and demand, and that these are associated with
political communities and their strategies of closure: on the one side, the exposure of citizen girl-children; on the other, the non-marital sexual relationships of citizen men. Initially, this is a pattern of the Patrician City, where it relates to the expropriation of the peasantry; in the subsequent development of the stratificatory conflicts, citizen girls may come to be relatively protected, and the source of prostitutes, like that of all slaves, become a matter of forcible acquisition abroad. This happened at democratic Athens, and for a time in the Roman Republic too, especially before the Punic Wars, though the later Roman oligarchy revived the expropriation of the Italian peasantry. But in either case, the location of prostitution in slavery and in the exclusionary relationship to the political community is of the essence. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms where the demographic pressures are ameliorated there is neither the demand nor the supply; prostitution is much less prevalent and moreover is quite differently located. Here it is basically a profession of choice for free women, with a clientele mostly of travellers, merchants, seamen etc.

Prostitution in the City-state and in the Bureaucratic Kingdom then is two very different things. In the City-state, prostitution will tend to absorb all forms of non-marital sexual relationships; in the Bureaucratic Kingdom, there will rather be love-affairs of various kinds, and prostitution is something of a residual phenomenon.

To stay with City-states, then, prostitution here can take many forms, but two main streams can first be identified: the common prostitute and the courtesan (hetaera). The first sells simple sexual intercourse, in a brothel or inn or in the streets. Her clientele are likely to be in large part her own class: the urban proletariat who, in the City-state, are not typically able to marry or support families. This clientele incidentally includes slaves. But besides these, the prostitute's clientele may also include travellers such as sailors or soldiers, and again it may include the citizen, even patrician, young; this was apparently always so at Rome. The other main strand, the courtesans, are girls or women with some education who can offer cultural, though
also sexual, companionship. Their clientele are commonly citizens. I have already argued that this is typically co-existent with marriage, and is a factor of a sexually segregated social life: a typically democratic City pattern found at Athens and not at Rome.

In the light of these considerations, a third stream can also be identified: the bought or freed mistress. Typically this is a girl raised as a slave for sale or rental to a patron, who will free her and set her up in her own household, in the care of his slaves. When the liaison ends, say with the patron's marriage, the girl is free to find new liaisons at her own discretion, possibly expecting gifts rather than actually demanding payment. This again is typically Roman, though it has Hellenistic precedent, and is apparently a factor of the decline of the City-state. As such, it appears in Hellenistic and Roman comedy, and in particular it is this that underlies the love poetry of the last century of the Roman Republic.

The girl in this third stream is something between a hetaera and a concubine, and the phenomenon is one of transition: a transition between prostitution and love-affair. This is most obvious at Rome. But it should be realized generally that love, and sexual pleasure also, are by no means incompatible with prostitution; on the contrary, the situation is just as complex as with marriage. There are evident conflicts: the girl's owner may want to have a man in love with her in order to maximize payment from him; the young man may want the girl to be in love with him for the sake of love, security, or faithfulness; the girl may want the young man to be in love with her, for love's sake, or for the sake of wealth, or to get her freedom. The prostitution situation then must be compatible with courtship. Again, the girl may value her sexual freedom, or being sexually manipulated by her owner, for the leverage it gives her over her lover, or for the sake of sexual enjoyment. Mutatis mutandis, all this probably goes for the common prostitute in the brothel too, whether in dealings with a lover of her own class or a citizen youth. A brothel was never a factory, and both inscriptions and demotic art such as lamp decoration clearly indicate tenderness and mutuality at this
level.

It is not the type of prostitution then but the type of society that controls the ambience of the sexual relationship: the difference again between Athens and Rome. At Athens, prostitutes, whether common prostitutes or hetaerae, are used simply for sexual release - the hetaerae also for entertainment. The distinction of the common prostitute and the hetaera is as argued earlier a factor specifically of the democratic City, but the use of prostitutes without emotional involvement is surely general to City-states. And of course, it goes with a comparable attitude to sexual love in marriage. The approach we see at Rome then is a factor less of the oligarchic City than of its breakdown and subsequent transformation into the Principate - the breakdown of the City-state itself. As indicated before, there is Hellenistic precedent. Here prostitution at all levels is penetrated by emotional involvement and elides into the love affair, and this pervades marriage also. In ambience, the situation quickly begins to resemble that of the Bureaucratic Kingdom, though structurally there remain great differences: as argued above, sexual relationships in Bureaucratic Kingdoms are typically those of marriage and adultery, and prostitution is something of a residual category, for a mixture of demographic and economic reasons. Against this, prostitution in the Bureaucratic Kingdom has its own distinctive ambience: as a craft of choice freely practised and directed mostly to transients, it is likely to be oriented rather to sexual pleasure than to emotional involvement.

Finally, a comment might be made as to temple prostitution. In Antiquity, this appears to be specific to the Ancient Near East, where it is due to a conjunction of factors: the existence of goddesses of sex and fertility; the economic functions of the Ancient Near Eastern temple; and the disposal of daughters by substantial families to priestessships in the temples instead of marriage. This last was presumably a way of controlling the family's numbers relative to its resources; the demographic situation here is broadly in line with what has been discussed before (ch 4). Temple prostitution does not occur in Egypt, probably due to the suppression of the nobility, women's greater autonomy, and
perhaps to a less developed economy. I have not gone into the soci-ology of the Ancient Near East in this thesis, however. Exceptionally, temple prostitution is found in the Graeco-Roman World, the temple owning slave prostitutes much as it might own farm-lands as the basis of its support. However, temples in the Graeco-Roman World are economically passive and limited compared to the Ancient Near East or even Egypt.

Homosexuality now needs to be considered. Here it must be made plain at the outset that almost nothing is known about lesbianism in Antiquity. Even Sappho herself is a shadowy figure from a little known society. Not much can be made from mention of dildos in Hellenistic comedy, or the presence of concubine dolls in Egyptian women's grave goods. Most indicative perhaps is the absence of lesbian themes in ancient mythology, though the example of Sappho shows that the subject was not forbidden. But however that may be, homosexuality here must mean male homosexuality.

This is difficult. Homosexuality is a characteristic of Greek culture in general, regardless of City type; initially it was strongly repressed at Rome, and in Egypt likewise; at Rome it came increasingly to be tolerated as the Principate developed. Nothing obvious can be made of this in terms of societal types. Too, there is a universal reckoning that to submit to homosexual relations was to compromise one's political status - a clear distinction of active and passive partners being made. This probably relates to sexual power-divisions and the link between political rights and military service. But it is odd to find this reasoning in Egypt. The Greeks make a more complex picture here, but with the same elements included. Homosexual prostitution, or homosexual intercourse with slaves, was practised both at Athens and at Rome. Homosexual prostitution at Athens could cost one's citizenship; passive homosexual intercourse by a citizen at Rome could be punished by death. Too, it should be added that the active homosexual at least was usually bisexual, not exclusively homosexual.

Yet in Greece, the homosexual relationship was also a factor of initiation into the warrior-brotherhood of the citizenry; certainly at Athens the relationship was conceived as paedagogic.
Typically it should be between a man in his twenties and a boy in his later teens; through the relationship the younger should acquire citizen skills and moral excellence. Sexual fulfilment was equivocally regarded; the younger should be pursued but should not yield, or should yield reluctantly, and without taking pleasure himself. The elder, the pursuer, should be motivated by love of beauty, not by lust. Intercourse, incidentally, was interfemoral (between the thighs), not anal.

Interpretation of this is difficult. It could be said that the Athenians made homosexual relationships as complicated and unsatisfactory as heterosexual; when the Romans did finally accept homosexuality, they just made it a matter of ordinary love-affairs. It can also be questioned how far this Platonic ideal really reflected Athenian practice. But my own suggestion is that homosexuality at Athens was basically a patrician affectation, and that often homosexuality does occur as part of the status culture of patrician strata, especially where they are dispossessed by the rise of the plebeians. However, the basis in initiation and military brotherhood must be remembered, and the poor companionship between the sexes. It has to be reiterated that the basic societal typology here does not offer obvious leverage on this problem.

Following from these matters, it can be remarked that it does not seem to me that the hard distinction in Antiquity between active and passive homosexual partners reflects a general conception of women as sexually passive in heterosexual intercourse. Certainly the citizen wife in the City-state is considered as the passive partner in reproduction, to which her sexuality is subordinated. But no such conception applies to prostitutes, courtesans, concubines or mistresses; moreover the conception is not found in bureaucratic Egypt and quickly breaks down at Rome. Indeed, at Rome it seems that a female partner is valued precisely for being an active partner, and this is part of the specific attraction of heterosexual intercourse. Too much concentration on homosexuality at the expense of prostitution, on literature at the expense of art, and on the City-states at the expense of the kingdoms and empires even within the Graeco-Roman World, surely
produces a distorted view of these matters.

As to sexual pleasure, it seems to be generally accepted in Antiquity that male enjoyment is conditional upon female enjoyment. This insight indeed is basic to erotic culture in many civilizations, oriental and modern as well as ancient. Sex is never a zero-sum game: a man might wish to impregnate an unaroused wife, but not surely to have intercourse with an unaroused prostitute.

The basic question, as I have argued before, is whether the orientation is to sex for its own sake or sex for the sake of reproduction. It seems general to Antiquity that wherever the latter prevails, the consent of the sexual partner is essential. This holds regardless of the power relations at local community or private level – clientage, slavery, etc. – with which the sexual relationship might be contextualized. These things were simply taken-for-granted social structure.

Much more could be said about different types of sexual relationship and practice. All Antiquity shows a wide range of sexual technique, without apparent traditional or religious restrictions. "Perversions" such as sado-masochism seem rare, although bestiality is a theme in Greek mythology. Child-sex was certainly accepted at Rome, though probably with boys not girls: an extension of the passivity of the homosexual partner. Again, the Romans made homosexual use of eunuchs. These were imported; the Romans did not practise castration. But it seems that generally the Romans accepted that a female partner was an active partner; although patrician girls might be married very young this hardly indicates a general taste for intercourse with prepubertal girls! Again, I have not heard of cliterodectomy at Rome (nor indeed at all in Antiquity).

The cultural ambience of sex and love in Antiquity is probably best seen in the light of the Roman situation and its developments. Overwhelmingly it is City-states that find sex and love problematic whereas Bureaucratic Kingdoms do not; moreover the first signs of breakdown in the City-state see this structure of problematizations disintegrating – or the field re-integrating. The characteristics are: the separation of sex and love, the separation of sex and reproduction (prostitution and marriage), the
problematization of sex in marriage, and the general problematization of love. The demographic pressures on the marital relationship, and their bearing for both the supply and the demand for prostitution, are certainly key factors here. Indeed sex in marriage is problematic simply for its impact on reproduction. But there is more than this. The marital relationship is a public possession, geared to the continuity of lineage and political community, and the couple's own desires and emotions must be subordinate to this. Love may impel a young man to marry the wrong girl, or to refuse a citizen wife, preferring his concubine; it may impel the young girl to refuse the husband chosen for her. Equally, it may impel the couple to resist the breakup of a politically inconvenient marriage. Love, then, whether in the field of marriage or of prostitution, is subversive. There may be an expectation of love of a kind in marriage, as a sort of dispassionate partnership, but that is a very different thing from the passionate love between say a man and his mistress. Even sexual pleasure in marriage may be considered inappropriate; presumably this is for its emotional consequences. Relations with prostitutes too should be emotionally disengaged, so that they do not become preferable and hence a threat to marriage.

It should be realized however that there is no repression of sexuality as such here, as is found later in Christianity. Sexual abstinence prior to the performance of religious rites is found generally in Antiquity, but it is strictly bound to its context. Again, neither is there anywhere a general repression of female sexuality as such. What there is here is an unemotional but otherwise unrestricted enjoyment of sexual relations with prostitutes. It is love, not sex, that is repressed.

This general repression of love, and problematization of the relationship between love and sex, may go some way to account for the cultural ambience of homoerotic relations, especially at Athens. For here companionship and emotional mutuality between partners are possible. The relationship seems to imitate a general pattern of heterosexual relations: protectiveness and tenderness towards a younger and more naive partner, who responds with admiration and obedience. Again, the specific attraction of this for
the passive partner is evident enough. Yet it is puzzling why physical mutuality was eschewed: that is surely not a necessary characteristic of homosexual intercourse. However, it should be remembered that most typically it is bisexuality rather than exclusive homosexuality that is to be considered, for the active partner at least (and the passive lover of the teens would become an active lover in his twenties). Perhaps then homosexual love simply has to be accepted as a "refined" taste.

As stated, all this is specific to the City-state, and quickly changes when the City-state starts to break down. That is seen in the Roman Republic, and from the Hellenistic cultural heritage (there are even indications of it in 4th century Athens), even without reference to the Principate or Egypt. Most characteristic is the re-integration of love and sex, and the rise of the love-affair, passionate sexual love, as something that invades the spheres both of marriage and of prostitution. With this, sexual love becomes a supremely meaningful experience, far more important than the morality of social or traditional expectations. This transfer of sexual love from the realm of morality to that of aesthetics is highly characteristic of the development of Graeco-Roman culture. Yet it must be seen in the context of the re-integration of sex and love, a re-sexualization of love as much as a re-emotionalization of sex; and above all, it is love that has been deproblematized.

This is to take matters from a City-state starting point. Considering now the Bureaucratic Kingdom, whether Egypt or the Principate, it is remarkable how little different in ambience they are from the Roman Late Republic — this despite the structural differences, especially in Egypt. Possibly these societies are more matter of fact in their assessment of sexual love; at least they are not experiencing the same conflicts over it. Again, lovers are perhaps typically on a somewhat more equal standing; the division of love-roles noted above between protector and admirer is somewhat less evident. (As a heterosexual orientation that would seem most characteristic of the Late Republic; though indeed it is seen in relations with young heterae at Athens, though not as the basis of an enduring love-affair.)
Again, there is perhaps a calmer acceptance of love as transient, and of shifting and changing partnerships. Something of the pattern here can be seen in the Roman novels (which apparently have Hellenistic forerunners), and even more in the Egyptian love-poetry. This last, despite translation difficulties, is remarkably accessible to a modern sensibility.

There are two general points that I would like to draw from this discussion. The first is that the comparative considerations presented here make it clear enough that City-state arrangements cause a distortion of human nature, which springs back at the first available chance. I have remarked elsewhere (especially in ch 3) that it is possible to have too much methodological sophistication on questions such as this. We should propose a dialogue between human nature and culture; it is not a necessity of the sociological perspective to see humanity as totally malleable, a cultural artifact ex nihilo. Neither is there serious danger of biological determinism. Especially to be noted here is the constellation of emotional relationships between children and the slaves who care for them, especially wet-nurses, between free and slave children raised together, between men and their concubines and their children by concubines. This constellation appears as soon as the City-state weakens. It even seems to make an appearance in 4th century Athens; though probably the democratic City is harder against it than the oligarchic City. With this, it is to be noted how far the cultural ambience of sex and love in the Roman Late Republic and Principate (and apparently the Hellenistic world) resembles that in Egypt, despite the structural differences and despite the cultural continuities of Graeco-Roman civilization. The interpretation of this seems to me to be unavoidable.

The second point is closely related: it should not be thought that civilization "learnt" anything essential for the long run about sexual love from Athenian homosexuality. For one thing, evaluative comparison cannot assume the same privilege for Western civilization in matters of love and sex that it can with science and technology. Many would maintain that the West has always compared poorly to the oriental civilizations in this field,
at least until very recent times. But beyond this, Egyptian and equally Roman culture both give clear evidence of their people's experience of sexual love. This has perhaps not the same culturally brilliant reflection as at Athens, but that is hardly the point: one's experience of sexual love is grounded in one's social relationships, not in one's cultural heritage. The truth is that Christian civilization has found Athenian homoeroticism impressive precisely because it has always found love and sex problematic too. Intellectuals should not fail to question this simply because they make their living by intellectualizing rather than by making love.

Finally, I turn briefly to religion. In all Antiquity, themes of sex, fertility, maternity, etc. are central components of religion, linking together cosmology, nature, agriculture, animal husbandry and human affairs. The imagery includes ithyphallic gods and the phallus itself (though apparently not female equivalents), as well as various female deities. These things are also common concerns of art and literature, and show also in demotic items such as amulets or, say, lamps and other household goods. Religion also has other concerns, especially the state, and the themes may be interwoven in many ways. Indeed, ancient polytheism, and the origins of the Great World Religions in it, is a complex and under-analysed affair: even Weber's treatment is very incomplete (see Weber 1978 Part ii ch 6 passim). But it should be realized that the Judaic religious tradition is grounded in an attempt to eliminate the themes and deities of sex and fertility and to build the religion solely in terms of the god of the political community. The underlying reason for this was the Jews' conflicts with neighbouring peoples such as the Philistines. Too it should be realized that this is historically quite unique. In time it found echo, of a kind, in Greek culture, where demographic concerns made sex and love politically problematic, as I have shown. These two things together (more or less) made up the Christian tradition, though with other, exogenous, elements such as Persian theodicy (Manichean dualism).

The full analysis of these matters would require a comprehensive consideration of Antiquity to ground it: the Ancient Near
East, Israel, the Hellenistic World, the Eastern Roman Empire. Only some preliminary comments can be offered here (though there is a further discussion in Appendix A part iv below). But the key issue is that there is no single uniform development in the conceptions of sex and sexual relations in Antiquity, not even in Graeco-Roman Antiquity. The Romans always had different ideas from the Greeks, and were always ambivalent about Greek ideas, in these areas; as their culture developed, they moved rather to similar ideas to the Egyptians. The rise of the goddess Isis in the Roman World is symptomatic of this. Against this, Christianity develops first in the Greek East, and its ultimate triumph comes with the failure of Roman culture, after the Principate ends. This is, all of it, a most complex process with surely a great deal to it that is historically contingent: one should not assume that everything about the Jews and the Greeks is teleologically oriented to the future shape of Western civilization. Nor should one assume that Christianity marked a humane advance over Roman culture - quite the reverse! And not only in matters of women and sex.

These things should be viewed in their World-historical context; ideally perhaps in contrast with Far Eastern culture and religion, where the sexualized cosmology is retained and indeed may be much elaborated, as for example with Taoism or Tantra. Nothing of this can be attempted here. But I would see more hope, as I have indicated before, in such a comparative sociological approach than in for example a universalizing psychological approach such as Freudian Psychoanalysis.

What I have tried to do here, however, is only to show the most basic contrast of societal types, as a sociological context for further historical analysis. In this, the basic issue that emerges is that City-states, especially in conditions of democracy, are repressive and controlling of sex and love, whereas Bureaucratic Kingdoms are permissive and unanxious about them.

**Aggression**

The sociological treatment of the aggressive instinct here
is something of an innovation. This I indicated before (ch 3) in my methodological discussions; pointing out however the resonances of the aggressive instinct with the maturational cycle and the individuation process. Aggression thus cross-cuts sexuality. It also parallels it, as a primary instinctual channel. Accordingly aggression like sexuality is to be seen sociologically in terms of instinctually driven and emotionally illuminated competences in which skills and lore are acquired and transmitted, or may be disapproved and withheld. The intention then is to focus on social action and relationships, and it should be stressed that the centre of this is actual fighting, just as the centre of sexuality is actual intercourse: these are sociological, not biological, things.

It should be realized at the outset that violence in society entails social relations and technology, and training also, just exactly as with the economy. With this, men's greater size and strength is probably of no more relevance between the sexes than the differences in size and strength among men are in the sociology of power. Equally, the potential of the typical female structure and (if any) temperament for fighting might best be viewed in the light of such arts as karate and aikido: victory does not automatically go to the more muscular or more belligerent.* Fighting is a skill, which like any skill is capable of monopolization, or of unequal social access. It is unsociological to argue from a "state of Nature".

It is a very general sociological pattern that women are the victims of violence, men the exponents. War is the best illustration of this: almost everywhere war is an exclusively male activity. But it also conditions violence in society and the protection of personal security generally, and also the judgement and punishment of crime. These are matters which relate to the general sociology of power: to the sociology of the state and the sociology of law as well as the sociology of domination. A key question in this is of course the location of the military factor in

* It might be interesting to compare the stereotypic feminine temperament (and even physique) with that of the Far Eastern peoples, and the virtues of the Buddhist religion.
society, and the ownership of the means of warfare; with this go questions of citizenship and domestic authority and/or subject status. These questions, and these themes, I will pursue in due course. But the first need is to find a sociological ground for the most general pattern, at the base of which is the exclusion of women from the social relations of coercion, the monopolization of violence with its technologies and skills as a male domain. It may be added that, so far as any ultimate theory of the causes of women's oppression can be given, it is surely located here. (It might also be added, incidentally, that this, the argument that follows, is actually the origins of the present thesis, the oldest stratum of argument.)

Curiously, the basic argument is in fact given to us by Weber himself, although in embryonic form; he does not try to ground a theory of gender on it. But he makes a point of the incompatibility of charisma with routine economic activity, stressing that the latter is entailed in the permanent sexual and parental relationships of the family. Charismatic associations tend to be communicative, and to have their own ad hoc economic arrangements. Religious groups can be one case of this, but it is also characteristic of coercive associations such as groups of warriors. The use of force and its life and death implications, and the co-option of the members themselves on this basis, provides a transcendent character of specialness to the coercive association (see Weber 1978 Part ii ch 9, esp. p 901-10; ch 14, esp. p 1119-20; see also ch 3 & 4). Of course there are widely varying forms in practice. But even the most bureaucratized army has morale as one of its most tangible features. Moreover it is likely to locate many of its soldiers in barracks, with distinctive sexual arrangements; indeed the latter point is general for soldiers on active service. The argument is then that women are excluded from the social relations of coercion because their fertility is potentially subversive of the coercive association's integrity, tying its members down collectively and severally to routine economic activity for the maintenance of dependants, especially children. Women are also potentially disruptive in terms of causing conflicts of loyalty, internal closures, and
attempts to monopolize membership: all faces of the institutionalization and routinization of charisma. With this, it should be noted that charismatically structured groups not only exclude family; they also exclude entry by birth. There must always be a "second birth", an individual initiation, even if only of confirmatory kind.

This theory should not be seen in terms of a "historic defeat of the female sex" located somewhere in prehistory; it should be seen in terms of continuous and/or recurrent social processes. Indeed, it is surely a basic requirement for the general theory of "patriarchy" that it must conceive continuous and/or recurrent social processes, and moreover processes related to the general processes of social change rather than continuity, if it is to deal with the problem of the (apparent) universality of "patriarchy" and its immunity to history in a way that avoids biological determinism. To argue through the notion of charisma meets this need at least in principle, as shown in my earlier discussions of the Interpretive conception of social reality, social continuity and social change (see beginning of ch 3; also discussions in ch 2).

But however this may be, to develop the general theory of the exclusion of women from coercive associations in the direction of specific context and content here requires comparative consideration of the social location of coercive associations in relation to the general sociology of power. This returns us to the arguments introduced above (ch 4) on the types of polity and central institutions versus local community inter-relations. The City-state is a consociation of (self-equipped and self-subsistent) warriors: it is a charismatically structured coercive association. That is what the political community is, with exclusion of women and children from participation and their relegation to a private sphere of domestic authority. The Bureaucratic Kingdom by contrast is rather an extension of the king's household: the soldiers are separated from the means of warfare (equipped from the king's armouries) and the localities conduct their affairs, women and at least older children on an informal basis included, under the supervision of the state officialdom. The implications
of these matters for the apparatus of domination itself will be considered further in the next chapter. But there is here a sharp contrast at the level of citizenship, and that is what is to be discussed now.

Citizenship in the City-state comprises a nexus of political, legal, military and economic rights and obligations. The City-state is a closed community defined by its own law code: typically this will feature the monopolization of land, houses, livestock and slaves by the citizens. Type of military service is graded by property-holding, and this defines a juridical order of allocation of political and legal rights. Political and legal institutions have little or no formal separation: indeed, they are also basically military institutions. The basic organs are: Council, magistracies and Assembly. Stratification conflicts may result in the patrician monopolization of the Council and magistracies, and the reduction of the role of the Assembly to passive voting or even acclamation - oligarchy. Alternately, the Assembly may become the main arena for debate, and the magistracies and Council open to all - the democratic pattern. Trials are held before the Assembly, or the Council, or juries drawn from the citizenry; magistrates "speak the law" but do not function as judges. Again, they authorize litigation but do not prosecute. The City-state has no state prosecutor; it leaves citizens to bring their own cases, but permits certain types of cases to be brought by any citizen, "in the public interest". (The word "informant" is sometimes used, inappropriately, to describe this.) A written law code is an early outcome of stratificatory conflicts, but constitution and law are not distinguished.

Given all this, it should be realized that citizenship here does not reside in the content of specific rights, but simply in participation. The degree of participation varies according to status and closure conflicts. But the basis of it is recognition as a participant: the capability to appear in one's own interest and person before the magistrates and in the Assembly, and to claim protection from arbitrary action. Citizenship is personhood. It should be realized that the foreigner has in principle no rights: he cannot approach the Council, Assembly or magistrates;
indeed, strictly he cannot own property and is subject to enslavement. His presence in the City requires a citizen sponsor, and it is this person who will act for him in all his legal affairs. These arrangements become progressively institutionalized, as do alliances and treaties with other Cities. Even so, the position of Women should be seen in the same light: they too like the foreigner cannot approach the City's Council, magistrates or Assembly; they require a male guardian to control their legal affairs for them. Their property rights are similarly qualified: although property may be vested in them, they cannot administer it themselves, but their guardian must do so for them. Similarly, they cannot transact for their household without their guardian's authorization, although the wife is mistress within the household itself. This guardian will ordinarily be the woman's father or husband, or failing these, her brother; these are ordinarily the men who have domestic authority over their womenfolk.

Women then do not have personhood; they are not recognized as participants in public affairs. This is a sweeping principle: not only can a woman not litigate for herself (far less bring a case "in the public interest"), but also she cannot give evidence, at least not in person before the court, and neither can she ordinarily be tried for crime. The criminous woman is tried by a family council, and she is punished within the family (whether parental or marital).

Of course, there are exceptions and limitations. A woman with no male kin must approach the magistrates in person to ask for a guardian to be appointed; a woman's evidence might be accepted in an exceptional case, or subject to oath before the priests; certain priestesses might be given a special quasi-male status, etc. Also, women do have a residual citizenship in their participation in religious festivals and processions, some of which indeed may be their monopoly. Again, there are variations between City-states; Athens may actually be a rather extreme case, compared with other Greek Cities as well as with Rome. But the basic pattern is quite clear: women are not citizens. As with property, citizenship may be vested in them, but they cannot "administer" it themselves; they do not in any meaningful sense
"have" citizenship.

In the Bureaucratic Kingdom the conditions of citizenship are quite different. Here the polity is defined by the geopolitical extension of the king's authority, exercised through the bureaucratic apparatus; in this, the local nobilities are suppressed and the village councils are incorporated as the basic level of the state. This type of polity is not a closed community; indeed the king's authority is in principle universal, though it may accept pragmatic limits. Neither is the polity characterized by internal closure, in the sense of hard juridical statuses; nor is there monopolization of property ownership as in the City-state. With this, this type of polity has no political dimension, at least, not at the level of the common people. Yet citizenship here still has common characteristics with the citizenship of the City-state: it is a matter of active participation. The basic question is recognition of personhood, upon which protection from arbitrary action on the part of neighbours or officials depends. The basic forms this participation takes are: appearance in the village council, both to present one's own affairs and to hear the affairs of others; and appearance in one's own interest and one's own person before the officials of the higher, state appointed, judiciary. This citizenship then is purely legal in character.

In principle, recognition in these terms is universal, especially at the level of the state appointed judiciary. The village council may distinguish between residents and incomers (though perhaps not between free and slave); this is one reason for speaking of citizenship rather than subjecthood. But as stated, the polity is not closed and authority is in principle universal: the foreigner does not require a citizen representative to act for him. Nor does the woman require a male guardian: the village council goes with minimal household authority, no more than the control of parents over young children. Women come before the state judiciary on just the same basis as men, in their own persons and their own interests. Equally, they share in the village council, both to present their own affairs and to hear the affairs of others. Women then are fully recognized here as
persons in their own right. This recognition goes beyond litigation; it applies equally to testability and the laying of information, although since Bureaucratic Kingdoms do have state prosecutors this last has not the same significance as in the City-state. Again, the criminous woman is tried and punished by the state in exactly the same way as a man; and her menfolk and family do not have the authority to do this themselves.

In short, women in Bureaucratic Kingdoms do have a real citizenship; like their property and economic rights, it is unrestricted. Citizenship in the City-state is both political and legal, and is held by men only; citizenship in the Bureaucratic Kingdom is legal only, and is held by women and men alike.

At Rome, the development can be clearly seen from City-state to Bureaucratic Kingdom. This comes in four elements. First, there is the rise to prevalence of "free" marriage, the progressive attrition of the guardianship of women, and women's increasing control over their own affairs. Second, women's rights before the older legal organs develop, their testability and their right to bring a case in their own interest, and even certain restricted categories of public interest, becoming accepted. Third, with the development of new legal organs under the Principate - the "extraordinary" jurisdictions - women are accorded the same recognition before them as men. Fourth, again from the Principate, criminous women cease to be tried and punished in the family, and come to be tried and punished on the same basis as men by the state. It is especially to be noted here that Augustus' legislation on adultery and fornication makes women's sexual misconduct a matter for the state not for the family council. At the same time as all this, as the Republic gives way to the Principate, the political citizenship of men is of course progressively eroded. Thus at the end, both men and women have come to share a citizenship that is now purely legal in character.

Consideration must also be given to the question of the protection of personal security. Here it must be realized that the legal system of the City-state is not self-activating; it must be activated by a citizen, acting in his own or the public interest. If force is needed to bring an accused before the magistrates or
Assembly, it is the accuser who must supply that force, and of course the accused can forcibly resist. The public use of force then is commonplace, and it is not the state but clientage or brotherhood organizations (or simply friends) which provide the resources here. It is these which will protect a man against being kidnapped or enslaved, either by rescue or by prosecution, or both. The situation of the woman, or the foreigner, or indeed the slave, in this regard is not categorically different: they must find their protector - guardian, patron, sponsor, owner, etc. - who will guarantee them. But of course this is an unequal relationship; it is not a mutual guarantee, and qualitatively their protection and freedom will be far less. In the Bureaucratic Kingdom by contrast the state is self-activating and anyone may lay information, moreover only the state may rightfully use force. The protection and freedom of movement of small people then is in principle unlimited. Indeed the public safety of women may (as in Egypt) be proverbial as a criterion for good order.

Beyond this lies the question of rape. In the City-state world this must be seen in its geopolitical dimension, in terms of war and slavery, together with marriage and prostitution in the City-state. "Rape" in classical Antiquity often seems to have the meaning of "carrying off" rather than simply "forced sex". The point is that both lineage and City are closed communities whose continuity is dependent on the legitimate fertility of its womenfolk. To remove the women, or to subvert their fertility by intercourse with outsiders, is to destroy the community in the long run. It cannot be continued by non-members, and its own logic is that of agnatic descent. In war, then, women are a valued but fragile resource; to enslave them and perhaps prostitute them is the victor's right, unless a treaty is made with the defeated enemy.

Within the City-state, rape and adultery are little distinguished; both damage the integrity of the household, and the woman cannot be exonerated. Indeed women, not being citizens, are not thought capable of giving or withholding consent. Criminal prosecution is brought by the menfolk; it is they who are the victims. The action for the rape of a slave is not much different,
although this is purely a question of property, and may relate to the possibility of the slave running off to a lover.

Nevertheless, there is another aspect to the matter precisely for the general difficulties in the protection of personal security in the City-state, unlawful force becomes a very serious crime, and one where anyone can prosecute in the public interest. This law can be invoked against rape, and gives women, even non-citizen women, a degree of personal recourse, though this might be negotiable in practice.

Contrasting the Bureaucratic Kingdom with this, the first point is that rape is seen simply as forced or coerced sex; as such, it is a crime against the woman herself, which she herself prosecutes. Moreover it has no implications for her marriage. This holds both in Egypt and in the Roman Principate. Egypt also gives protection against the sexual abuse of power; that is, an interdict may be obtained keeping a man's boss away from his home and the woman who lives with him - this irrespective of marriage. It is not wholly clear who can do this: the man certainly, and presumably the woman also; at least if she continues to live with him her consent is implicit. But perhaps any member of the community can bring the action: it seems that it is the community, rather than a lineage or even household, that is being defended against the abuse of official power.

But beyond all this is the point that the general pacification of the world, together with the atomistic orientation of bureaucratic monarchy which sees women as individuals not as resources for political communities or lineages, all work tremendously to women's advantage. The whole syndrome of war, slavery, marriage and prostitution is ameliorated or even absent.

There are other aspects of aggression that could be considered. For one thing, there is the training in fighting skills that is a basic part of male education in the City-state, though rather reserved for the actual soldier in the Bureaucratic Kingdom. This training is not simply in weapons but in disciplined manoeuvring in formation: this is the most important battlefield skill. (That is well established for the classical era, but it probably has some application too for Egypt and the Near East in
the second half of the 2nd millenium.) To this women have no access. Their access to gymnasia, and to sports like wrestling and boxing is uneven; some City-states did train their women, even in weaponcraft (e.g. Sparta), others not. Bureaucratic Kingdoms might open such facilities to women, and make them less mandatory for men; the basis for male education here is more typically literacy. But all Antiquity is oriented to war. (Incidentally, the image of the warrior woman is very common in ancient religion - Egypt and the Near East as much as Greece and Rome.) It would be interesting to compare all this with the sociology of fighting skills (e.g. karate or aikido) in the Far East.

Another issue is the Roman Games. These admitted women as spectators, though actual participation was rare, except where criminal punishment was involved. Although the Romans were cruel, I doubt that this can usefully be called "sadism"; there seems little specifically sexual about it. The Games, however, were an occasion on which public demands could be expressed, to emperor, prefect, governor etc., and this indeed became a most important practical aspect of citizenship, especially in view of the attrition of the Republican political institutions. Entry to the Games was free to all citizens. In this, then, women shared equally with men. It seems an appropriate point on which to end this discussion.

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Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have discussed the primary phenomena of sexual polarity. Now, in this final theoretical chapter, I turn to consider the secondary phenomena, of sexual divisions. The methodological foundations for this were laid down before (ch 3); there should be no need to reiterate them here. The point is that we have a set of sexually conditioned power phenomena, and a set of sexually conditioned economic phenomena, giving rise to comparable sets of sexual divisions in the two spheres. These have to be discussed; at the same time, the analytic relation of these sexual divisions with stratification also requires consideration. The chapter will be presented in three sections accordingly.

Power

Power is a notoriously amorphous concept, but the concern here is with power-structures, especially as Weber discusses them in his Sociology of Domination. The term I have used in earlier chapters, "polity", does not seem to be very widely used; we tend rather to speak of "the sociology of power". But my arguments here will be in continuity with my earlier arguments on the polity, and on Weber's intentions in regard to these matters (see ch 4 above).

The relation of the present discussion to that of the last section of the previous chapter, on aggression, needs some clarification. There I consider the aggressive instinct as an aspect of primary sexual polarity. But so far as the sociology of power
is ultimately grounded on the notion of political action, that is, action, to whatever end, defined by the use or threat of force as its means, the aggressive instinct would appear to be entailed in it. How, then, is an analytic separation to be maintained? The first answer to this is: by the specific and narrow focus of the present discussion on state power structures, in terms of rulers and apparatuses. The previous discussion by contrast was mainly concerned with matters of citizenship, law and the protection of personal security: the relation of the individual to the state and to the other individuals around him. Even war was considered in this light. The structures of the state were really only considered in regard to legal arrangements. Here however it is general administration that is in question.

Yet a deeper problem can be raised. In my first discussion of the polity (ch 4 above), I identify four elements: ruler, apparatus, field of authority (or political community), and internal closure (or stratification); I contrast the traditional and charismatic types of polity, arguing that the traditional polity develops from a ruler and an apparatus (e.g. a Bureaucratic Kingdom), while the charismatic polity develops from a political community and internal closure (e.g. a City-state). It might appear then that my discussions in this and the previous chapter are asymmetrical: that the previous discussion was inherently weighted towards the charismatic polity, as this present discussion (dealing as it does with rulers and apparatuses) must be weighted towards the traditional polity. There is indeed a degree of truth in this, though less than it might seem: City-states do have rulers and apparatuses - just as Bureaucratic Kingdoms have soldiers and citizens. Beyond this, it can be held that there is a real difference in kind and emphasis between the two types of polity that requires to be fairly reflected.

More to the point however is the continuity in the argument of the two discussions. For in discussing aggression, I propose a theory of the exclusion of women from the social relations of coercion, arguing that, so far as any ultimate explanation for sexual inequality could be given, it should be located here. At the same time, I concede that it is difficult to provide specific
content and context for that theory. It seems to me that it is through the discussion of the polity that this must be pursued. Preliminarily this has been done in the previous discussion, in terms of citizenship and legal personality. But the main thrust of the argument should surely lie through the sociology of domination. As I observed before (in ch 3), it is invidious that women's subordination to male authority should be isolated from the general sociology of power: one should surely seek for an integrated treatment. With this, it should be self-evident that in terms of general social theory, it would be a satisfactory solution to ground women's oppression in the sociology of power. It does not have to be grounded in the economy (or for that matter in ideology). Indeed the realm of power must always be a problem in sexual inequality, even if the theory of sexual inequality is grounded elsewhere. For all the arguments that I have raised in earlier chapters (ch 4, 5 & 6): on demographic issues, the control of women in household and community, the control of fertility, maternity, sexuality - all this is posited on a certain pattern of sexual divisions in power in society, a pattern which gives power to men. But the power structures of society cannot be seen as external and supervisory to society. They are simply part of the way that society is arranged, part of the pattern of general social arrangements. (Equally, society cannot be "derived" from the family.) The absence of women from the power structures of society is not because women have not been included; it is because they have been excluded. The general exclusion of women from the power structures of society, then, is the specific expression in the polity of women's exclusion from the social relations of coercion.

This exclusion of women from structural power is not absolute and unqualified. There are factors which will exceptionally put women into positions of power. Of these, perhaps the two most obvious are personal charisma and residual inheritance (i.e. in the failure of male heirs). However, both these invite scepticism. Personal charisma certainly happens, for instance Joan of Arc; but a succession of powerful women, as for example in the 18th Dynasty of Egypt, can hardly be explained on this basis. As
to residual inheritance, this, as with property and indeed citizenship, may only vest the power position in the woman without letting her exercise power herself. One has to look deeper to find what factors control whether this does or does not occur. Besides, it is difficult to accept that explanation ends with the specific content of laws. One wants to ask, why these laws? These points hold also for a third case, where a queen (or noblewoman) acts as regent for her young son. Possibly this relates to laws of residual inheritance but it is by no means always the mother that is chosen as regent, and again, the position may be nominal, actual power being wielded in her name by another.

However, there are a number of other factors beyond these that consideration of ancient history suggests as putting women into positions of power. First, there is the woman’s position as mistress of the household; this quite irrespective of the structure of public life. This gives the woman experience and knowledge as well as resources, especially where she also has the administration of her own property or of wider estates. Second, there is the need of great houses (royal and noble) to make active use of, and therefore give active involvement to, their womenfolk, due to sheer lack of numbers. This can even affect a small City-state; consider Plato’s well-known comment, that a City which does not use its women is misusing half its human resources. (I have discussed elsewhere – in ch 5 – my scepticism as to the passive use of women in Antiquity in terms of marriage alliances.) Third, there is the system of property inheritance: where women have been heirs to, and have had actual control of, large property, this has been a source of power. It should be clear from earlier discussions (especially in ch. 5) that this arrangement is typical of Bureaucratic Kingdoms. These factors together have permitted women in Antiquity to take advantage of, sometimes even to manufacture, political crises, and to contend with men for power. This is found in the Kingdoms of Egypt and the Near East, the Hellenistic Kingdoms, to an extent in the patrician houses at the close of the Roman Republic and the early Principate, and more clearly again with the Severan women at the Principate’s end. It can be stated that these factors are cumulative. In the democratic
City the first only appears; in the oligarchic City the second appears also. However the military and communal character of the City-state is generally against these processes. They have far freer rein in the pacified and atomistic conditions of the Bureaucratic Kingdom; here all three factors appear together.

This is to deal with the actual holding of supreme power. More important, however, is administration: the holding of position in the state apparatus. Here again there seems to be the same general historical pattern: a general exclusion of women modified by certain factors. In actuality however it seems possible to say that in World-historical terms, the main systematic basis of women's presence in domination systems comprises just those factors outlined above in conditions of private appropriation of domi¬natory position. This general pattern becomes apparent from the consideration of Antiquity precisely because the City-state and patrimonial bureaucracy are those sub-types of charismatic and traditional domination respectively where private appropriation of position in the domination system is excluded - at least, except for the level of royalty or of hereditary Council (Senate) membership. This is what distinguishes them from, say, feudalism or non-bureaucratic patrimonial arrangements. As against this, the routine inclusion of women in even state bureaucracies seems to be specifically a factor of modernity - of rational-legal domination. But this is to anticipate. The City-state and the Bureaucratic Kingdom should each first be given their separate consideration.

The apparatus of the City-state comprises its Council, magistracies and Assembly, as outlined before. This is not a "political" structure, for there is no civil service: these are the organs of actual administration, political, legal, military et al. It should always be realized that ultimately democracy is a sociological fact, not a political philosophy. In its ancient (or medieval) setting at least it is a type of domination. As to the relations of democracy to the City-state, this as I have pointed out before is a matter of internal stratificatory closure and the monopolization of the political organs - at least after the development of Plebeian structure: territorially based citizenship.
The Patrician City sees the Council and magistracies monopolized
by the patricians, and the Assembly basically acclamatory. Oligar-
chy, patrician control in a Plebeian City, is closely similar,
though elections rather than simple patrician birth may now con-
trol the holding of magistracies and Council membership. Democracy
sees power moved to the Assembly, and the magistracies and Council
opened to the plebeians, through elections and sortition. But the
point here is that in all cases and in all respects, the dominat-
on system of the City-state is an adjunct of citizenship. As
such, it is strictly confined to adult males. So far is this a
clear-cut principle that there is little more to be said: the ex-
clusion of women is absolute.

One or two comments can be added. Priestesships in the
state cults (e.g. the Vestal Virgins) might convey a marginal
quasi-magisterial position; an extension of women's residual cit-
izenship in the religious dimension. Also, despite women's exclu-
sion from political life in the City-state, it is precisely the
City-state that questioned this exclusion, as part of its polit-
ical culture. The specific content here differs with different
intellectuals - Plato, Aristotle, Aristophanes, Euripides - and
in this some scope for individual genius must be allowed. But
what is most significant is that the question was on the agenda
at all. The basis for this is apparently the general character of
ancient political commentary as a patrician reaction to plebeian
usurpation - notably these intellectuals are all Athenian not
Roman. As commented before, patrician strata in this situation
have an incentive to let their women actively participate in pol-
itical life, in sheer lack of numbers. At Athens, it was women's
citizenship (i.e. at the Assembly) that was the most obvious
issue, but this implied office-holding.

The above are the basic considerations. But it must be added
that, as well as City-states comprising autonomous polities, they
are also found as semi-autonomous administrative units, especial-
ly in the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman Empire. These Cities
were overwhelmingly oligarchic rather than democratic in charact-
er; in the Hellenistic world, and thereafter in the Eastern Roman
Empire, this was characterized by the private (and hereditary)
appropriation of office. A lasting consequence of this is a small but continuing number of women magistrates. The basis for this has already been indicated. Interestingly, it does not seem to have occurred in the Western Empire, though this is not wholly certain. The specific magisterial functions in the East may have become empty and the positions sinecural - there are administrative differences between East and West throughout the Empire's history. But the point may be added that the Roman Principate also permitted women to act as patrons, not merely to individuals such as their own freed slaves but to organizations such as artisans' burial clubs (collegia). But this, though suggestive, is power in the private sphere, not public power.

Turning now to the Bureaucratic Kingdom, here the main focus clearly is on the bureaucratic apparatus itself. Yet the picture is not quite so simple: at the head of the apparatus is a royal house, and although such houses have already been considered, there will also be a private bureaucratic apparatus through which the royal household and estates are administered. This indeed was the origin of the Roman imperial bureaucracy. Besides this, there will also be religious bureaucracies in the temples. Indeed, there may be two levels here: a secular bureaucracy administering the temple's economic endowment, and a religious bureaucracy of personal attendance upon the deity - the priesthood. In Egypt especially these are distinct and separate. It should also be borne in mind that the Bureaucratic Kingdom too has citizenship in its fashion, as discussed in the previous chapter, in terms of membership of local tribunals or village councils and legal personality before the state judiciary and officialdom. Although it is the state bureaucracy that is the main focus of concern, these points should be kept in mind. For again it is possible to state at the outset that the overwhelming pattern here is of the exclusion of women from the state bureaucracy. This is surprising, in view both of the general social context and of modern state bureaucracies, and it seems hard to account for it. It should then be all the more clearly highlighted.

In matters of citizenship, men and women stand very much equal, as the discussion in the previous chapter has shown. At
the level of royalty, women have an active participation, and even a chance to contend for supreme power. In private and temple bureaucracies, a general prevalence of men is offset by two factors: first, that a female employer (queen, goddess, or whoever) is likely to prefer female staff for a wide range of functions; second, that female labour may attract female supervision. Beneath this, two further factors appear: first, a tradition, though not strongly marked in Bureaucratic Kingdoms, that women deal with what is within the household, men with what is beyond it, i.e. in the fields and workshops; second, the traditional sexual division of labour. Both these things are negotiable. It should be noted that there is a strong female presence in the temples, subject to a sexual division of religious functions. In Egypt all deities regardless of sex must have both male and female staff, that is, attendants. Goddesses besides have female as well as male administrators. At Rome, certain state cults required female staff only - Vesta, and the cults of Roma and the Imperial women. The organization of these temple bureaucracies is controlled by the state and runs parallel to the state bureaucracy. But all this serves only to highlight the absence of women from the state bureaucracy itself, an absence which appears to be virtually complete.

It seems, as I have said, hard to explain this exclusion. But one basic issue is that the state bureaucracy originates in structural conflicts between king and nobility, and it is in these conflicts that women’s rights are established, as I argued in an earlier chapter (ch 4). In terms of these conflicts, the king has no interest in giving bureaucratic office to women. If anything, his interest would be in appointing eunuchs, though this was not done either at Egypt or at Rome. For the bureaucracy is in effect a subordinated nobility, prevented from appropriating their posts and transmitting them to their sons. That women could do as much as men (and incidentally to their daughters as much as to their sons). With this, the temples serve in great part as an organization of sinecures - especially the priestly functions themselves. One part of their purpose is to absorb the surplus of the official class, and therewith to preserve the rationality of the state bureaucracy, and the king’s control over it. There is no shortage
of skilled literate labour. It is in the temples then that women of the official class are found. Beyond this, it is general to Antiquity that there is no thoroughgoing separation of civil from military administration and command, and a single career would often include both. This is to be expected for a civilization based on non-peaceful economic activity, where war, slavery and imperialism are typical. It is, then, ultimately the military factor that is being met with here again, as with the City-state. This seems finally to be the explanation.

Other explanations might be devised. But the general point should be grasped: that compared with City-states, the position of women in Bureaucratic Kingdoms in all respects is so strong that their exclusion from the domination system really stands out by contrast. There is all the more reason why the attempt should be made to deal with this in terms of an integrated general sociology of power.

To conclude, then, in this section I have been contrasting two types of polity, the City-state and the Bureaucratic Kingdom. For the most part, I have contrasted their structures. But they are sub-types of the charismatic and traditional types of polity respectively, and these are named for the principles of legitimation of authority, which is diagnostic for structure. In the City-state, authority is charismatically legitimated, in terms of blood-charisma (patrician lineages), elections, selection by the gods (i.e. sortition) etc. In the Bureaucratic Kingdom, authority is traditionally legitimated, the officials being appointed by the king to administer for him in terms of established expectations and norms. Something can perhaps be said then about these principles of legitimation themselves: above all, that if charismatic legitimation bears an obvious relationship to charisma, it should be realized too that legitimation and charisma are themselves related concepts. All power is charismatic, in greater or lesser degree. This, taken apart from the specific articulation of military organization, might help to account for the general historical pattern of exclusion of women from domination systems. Because of their fertility, the participation of women is felt to compromise the freedom of action, the freedom from
immediate necessity, and the ability to act, to control or at least respond to events, of the authorities.

This is similar to the theory presented in the previous chapter. Again, it is difficult to provide specific content and context. But it should be reiterated that, from the point of view of general social theory, it is in principle adequate to ground the theory of sexual inequality ultimately in the sociology of power. All pointers towards such a solution should be given statement. Moreover, there is a prediction, or a broad generalization, here: that women's oppression will be greater under charismatic systems of domination, lesser under traditional systems. Indeed, this can be stated quantitatively: the greater the degree of charisma, the greater women's oppression. Of course, this might have to be qualified in the light of other factors. In particular, a charismatic community might be religious rather than political - a Church. This would presumably apply especially to medieval Islam and Christianity. But the prediction even so certainly seems quite accurate for the Ancient Civilization as studied here. I will take this up again at the end of the thesis.

Economy

The discussion in this section relies most heavily on two chapters from the works of Max Weber: "Economic Theory and Ancient Society" (1909 - the introductory essay to "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations"), and "Sociological Categories of Economic Action" (1918 - 20; chapter 2 of "The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations" - Part i of "Economy and Society"). Of these, the former has of course special significance for the present thesis. It is accordingly given a separate precis in an appendix below (Appendix A part ii). However, the more formal conceptual discussion of the latter provides a more useful opening here. It should not need to be added that Weber's considerations on the ancient economy were deeply formative for his general economic sociology and history.

Weber distinguishes two types of social action in relation to the economy: economic action and economically oriented action.
The former is defined as action in pursuit of economic ends by peaceful means. The latter has two cases: the consideration of economic factors in action oriented elsewhere, and the pursuit of economic ends by non-peaceful means. Although it is mainly in terms of peaceful economic action that Weber pursues his economic sociology here, the category of non-peaceful economic action is highly typical of Antiquity. But in all cases, action is defined by reference to "the economy". This is defined in turn in terms of a demand for utilities - goods and services - and a continuous provision for supply to meet that demand. Utilities, then, are grounded in the social construction of material reality; nothing is economic "of itself".

In my methodological considerations (ch 3 above), I base my own treatment of sexual polarity on this model (although the analogy of course is not precise), both in terms of a process of social construction of material reality and in terms of two types of social action: sexually polar action, and action oriented to sexual polarity. Of the latter type of social action, one case is of course where economic considerations and sexually polar considerations are involved together. I point out that there is no virtue in pursuing typological elaboration for its own sake; the point is simply that there is a realm of economic-sexually polar phenomena to consider. But so also is there a realm of sexually polar-economic phenomena, and a degree of analytic separation should be maintained between the two. Demographic issues then and the location of the mother-child subsistence unit in the household have accordingly been dealt with elsewhere (ch 4 & 5), and will only be touched upon here where essential. The present discussion will be limited to the economy as (more or less) conventionally understood.

Even so, the sexually polar conditioning of economic phenomena has different levels, and it is essential here to start from the socially constructed nature of the economy. For the first and most obvious matter is the social construction of aspects of sexual polarity into the economic realm. Prostitution and wet-nursing are the two basic cases of this. But sexual polarity is socially constructed too, and so these things are extended
into a range of what are culturally understood to be typical female sexual and childcare services. These may include for example erotic dancing or other artistic performance; or again, nannying generally. It must be conceded that prostitution is not necessarily female. It does however seem typically to be for a male clientele not a female, whether heterosexual or homosexual. The point should also be made that prostitution is not always easily definable from an economic point of view. There is a whole spectrum of sexual relationships, and most of them include some kind of economic element, the gifts between lovers as much as the common household of marriage. One follows a conventional definition then (and with due scepticism), and looks for a continuous craft or an explicit practice. Prostitution is a meaning given to sexual intercourse. Mutatis mutandis, all this could also be said of wet-nursing and nannying relations too (there are differences: who feeds the wet-nurse's child? Her own milk may not be sufficient.) But the basic point that has to be made is that all this shows at the outset the greater power of men than women in the process of social construction. This must I think be seen in terms of negotiated settlements in a conflictual process, not as a unilateral imposition upon women by men. The sharing of meanings is a subtle and complex affair, in which texts can be differentially written and read, as I have argued before (ch 3 above). But this is not the place to pursue such methodological issues.

Beyond these beginnings, Weber develops his economic sociology by distinguishing two modes of orientation of economic action: profit-making and wants-satisfaction. These in turn give rise to two different types of economic organization: the enterprise and the oikos. Both have compatibility with the market, though the enterprise has a special elective affinity for it. But at this point it becomes necessary to narrow the focus to Antiquity, and to start to work more in terms of the text "Economic Theory and Ancient Society". For the ancient economy in Weber's analysis is characterized by the oikos in distinctive inter-relation with the market, an orientation to wants-satisfaction and, perhaps above all, by non-peaceful economic action.

As indicated earlier, a separate precis of this is presented
elsewhere. Only a basic outline will be given here. The starting point, then, is the oikos. This is the household, workshops, lands etc. of the citizen, including the livestock, slaves and other persons. At base, it is the peasant's farm, but it extends to the whole property and following of a patrician or a king (or a god). Ideally, the oikos is self-sufficient, though it sells off its excess produce. The market then is not the supplier of essentials, but deals mainly in luxuries and in excess produce. The urban proletariat of artisans and shop-keepers comes mostly from migration; it is not self-reproductive. There are both slave and free, citizen and non-citizen, elements here. The slaves live as free but pay body-rent to their owners; on the whole, it is the general characteristic of this economy to produce rents rather than profits. Trade, which is typically maritime, is discontinuous; war for slaves, booty and tribute, and "political capitalism", for example tax-farming a conquered province or contracting to supply the army, are the typical forms of acquisition. Slaves come partly from expropriation of the peasantry, partly from foreign purchase and capture in war. Expropriation of the peasantry is most pronounced in the Patrician City or in oligarchic City conditions; foreign predation characterizes the Plebeian City whether under oligarchic or democratic control. By contrast, the Bureaucratic Kingdom is both relatively pacified and relatively protective of its lower strata, both rural and urban. Migration is less characteristic and the latter come nearer to self-reproductivity. But the Bureaucratic Kingdom can undercut its own economic basis, precisely by being too peaceful and protective. These remarks must suffice for the meantime.

To take up again the question of sexual divisions, the first point surely is that women are on the whole excluded from the realm of non-peaceful economic action. On the other hand, they are very much among its victims, in terms of slavery; this is a common route into prostitution. The pacification of the Bureaucratic Kingdom is then very much to women's advantage. Of course it should be realized that a general restriction on women's chances for acquisition is clearly entailed in this issue.

After this, the next issue might seem to be appropriation.
There are three main routes to this: inheritance (and dowry), gift and transaction. I have discussed inheritance and dowry in an earlier chapter (ch 5). The laws are various: at Athens, women are largely excluded from inheritance (though they have dowries), but at Rome and in Egypt women and men inherit equally. Since this was always Roman practice, it is hard to systematize this; the differences between Athens and Rome cannot all be securely attributed to that between democratic and oligarchic development (what was earlier Athenian practice?).

But the angle of approach is false, for appropriation and property are complex and many-levelled concepts. In the City-state, a distinction is made between the constituents of the basic oikos ("res mancipi" in Roman law) - land, houses, livestock, slaves - and other property. Again, ultimate ownership is distinguished from immediate possession, though this point does not seem to be sexually weighted. Res mancipi however are protected by a complex of laws. They are typically reserved to the citizens, and free alienation and freedom of testacy may be slow to develop - neither ever come at Athens. These laws include restrictions on women's economic agency, an aspect of the guardianship of women discussed before (ch 6 Aggression). There are two main faces to this: first, res mancipi in the ownership of a woman must be administered through the authority of a male guardian; second, though the wife is mistress of the household, she cannot transact for the household with the outside world. These principles fall into desuetude at Rome from the Late Republic, and there are always detailed differences between Rome and Athens, but the basic principles seem universal to the City-state world. The underlying concern is the continuity of the lineage, and of its economic basis. Women's inheritance and dowry systems could be fitted to this in various ways. But women's economic agency is more difficult: women are not legally answerable; they may have conflictual loyalties to their own kin; they might be naive or open to seduction; or they might simply have a clash of interests or of wills with their menfolk. The possible consequences of mismanagement in terms of expropriation and debt-slavery should be remembered. (There is an interesting contrast with Mesopotamia, where there
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is a similar economy but different laws. See Bottero 1974.

At any rate, Bureaucratic Egypt is a complete contrast to all this, for there the categories of property are not distinguished, and there is no restriction on women's economic agency, either on her own account or that of her marital household. The continuity of property here is of no consequence, for there is no continuity of lineage. I have discussed these issues before (ch 4 & 5).

Other considerations on women's property tend to follow the above pattern: the restrictions are found in City-states only (though the formal attrition in the Roman Principate is slow), and centres on res mancipi and citizen women. Dowry is always administered by a male guardian. Women's property reverts to her agnates — cognatic transmission comes at Rome in the 2nd century A.D. Gifts to women which reduce a citizen patrimony may be prevented. The accumulation of large property in women's hands may be considered politically undesirable, perhaps as enabling women to play at political factionalism (perhaps rather as permitting patrician houses to do so — but with the women too as active players). But the difference, that Athens largely excluded women from ownership of property while Rome permitted it freely, is puzzling. Above (ch 5) I suggested that the underlying difference is between the protection of plebeian small property at Athens and of patrician grandfatherly authority at Rome. The Romans seem to have been less worried about estates fragmenting, at least at patrician level. Again, as I have said before, the Romans were much more innovative with their legal system. The greater chances for political acquisition, and the revival of class conflicts and the expropriation of the Italian peasantry at Rome in the Late Republic, seem to fit in with all this. However, a further and deeper difference for women is that Athens maintained a rigorous system of guardianship, whereas Rome first softened hers and then let it fall wholly into desuetude (changing the form of marriage also). This process is a factor of the transformation of the Roman City-state to Empire; it runs through the Late Republic and the Principate.

Against all this, there is no formal differentiation between
the sexes in matters of appropriation and property in the Bureaucratic Kingdom of Egypt.

Turning now rather to sexual divisions in economic functions, these must be discussed in relation to both the oikos and the market. Moreover within the former, distinction should also be made between household, workshop and fields — though there may in fact be no physical separation of workshop from household. Against this it should be noted that many economic functions in oikos and market are just the same. The orientation of the oikos to self-sufficiency, and the presence in the market of slaves paying body-rent, should show that. Some preliminary generalizations then can be made.

Most artisanal work in Antiquity is male, especially work with durable materials such as stone, metal, ceramics, wood, and so on. Textiles by contrast are a field of mainly female labour, though where this work moves into the market, men also enter into it. This holds for linen in Egypt as well as for wool at Athens and Rome, and it extends to fulling and dyeing as well as spinning and weaving, and clothes making and mending too. Dealing with foodstuffs and cooked food in the market again tends to be female, though nowhere exclusively so and especially not baking in bulk. In these latter areas, family workshops may be found, with an internal division of functions between the sexes. Again, there may be a tendency for men to make or grow or catch, while women sell their menfolk's produce. Of course, these things have to be qualified by the practical restrictions on families at the urban proletarian level.

Against this, specifically female crafts include beautician, hairdresser and mid-wife. Here, the sex of the client is a conditioning factor. Again, entertainment is a set of crafts that tend rather to be female, though by no means wholly so: singing, dancing, playing musical instruments, and so forth. This is conditioned by a largely, though not exclusively, male clientele. Even so, the amounts spent on the equivalents to these things in modern times should warn us against too casual an assimilation of this to prostitution. It should also be noted that Egyptian women (i.e. in preclassical times) were proverbially skilled here.
Indeed, singing, playing music and dancing were clearly recrea-
tional activities for women of the more privileged strata in Phar-
aonic Egypt. This suggests that these skills were valued for
their own sakes, and that their performers enjoyed them too, and
this could well be of general application. As to prostitution,
this is always for a male clientele, and is predominantly though
again not exclusively female. Wet-nurses must be female of course.

As to literate crafts, such as secretary, librarian, teacher
or (perhaps) physician, positions in patrician households, in
temples and in the market might occur. As I have argued before
(ch 6 Maturation), literacy has a distinctive sociological locat-
ion in Antiquity. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms it is above all an ad-
junct of bureaucracy, but in City-states rhetoric is the function-
al equivalent of this, and literacy is located in the closure
conflicts of the patricians and plebeians. It is on the whole
then in patrician households that literate crafts are practised
in City-states, and above all by slaves. Secretary and librarian
are typical functions. The sex of the slave here will be a factor
of the sex of the employer, and this has no bearing on the liter-
acy of citizen girls. Beyond this, City-states have school teach-
ers, apparently always male, but literate crafts in the market
are otherwise unusual. Physicians might be literate, though not
necessarily so; this too I have discussed before (ch 6 Fertility
and Maternity). Democratic Cities might have a few literate
slaves in state employment; these would be male. Against this,
Bureaucratic Kingdoms give a far wider scope for literate crafts,
and typically as free employment. Above all, there is the state
bureaucracy itself. Women are excluded from this, but there are
literate women in the temples and in private households, perform-
ing similar administrative functions. Here again the sex of the
employer is typically a factor. Literate women are apparently
also found in the market, for example as letter-writers or draw-
ers up of documents. Too, physicians here are typically literate,
and this craft is open to women.

In all the foregoing, there is much that is common to all
Antiquity, and much variation that is easily accountable, but
there are other variations that are hard to systematize. Thus for
example in Egypt, men wash clothes; in Athens acting and athletics are amateur not professional; in Rome, until late on at least, physicians have low status; etc. Further examination might make something of such differences, but only a first drawing of ideal types is attempted here.

Many of the above functions are found alike in oikos and market; indeed the placing of slaves in the market paying body-rent is simply the oikos disposing of its surplus again. But of other domestic functions, women tend to have the bulk of the actual housework, in cleaning, drawing water, grinding meal, cooking, care of young children and personal attendance upon their mistresses. They also have the work involved in the making and caring for clothes. Male domestic staff may be preferred by the rich as cooks; they will look after older male children, and will be personal attendants upon their masters. On the whole, however, the tendency is towards female domestic staff. Here the Bureaucratic Kingdom differs from the City-state chiefly in the greater direct involvement of the mother in the care of her children, and a generally reduced reliance upon slave labour. Converse to this, the tendency is for the bulk of fieldwork and the care of larger livestock to be done by men. The economic functions of rural and urban households as households are little different. But in Bureaucratic Kingdoms women may share in field-work, subject again to a division of roles: for example men cutting the harvest, women gathering it. Again, women may follow the herds, to cook and provide other services for the men. The absence of women from outdoor agricultural work in City-states is perhaps due to the risks of abduction and enslavement. This holds especially for the democratic City, where the use of slaves in agriculture is limited. It would also limit adultery.

Mining and quarrying tend to be associated less with artisanship than with military conscription or criminal punishment. For these reasons they are typically male, though women did grind ore at the mines under the Roman Principate. Shipping again is male, basically for its non-peaceful associations and insecurity; however Egyptian women are seen on board ship. Again, entreprenurial functions tend to lie in the direction of non-peaceful
economic activity, and also to require legal answerability. In the City-state, this restricts the investment of women's wealth, as well as their engagement in person. But in Bureaucratic Kingdoms women are found in such roles, in relation to peaceful activities. These include small-scale banking, own-account trade, producing and supplying goods on contract, etc.

Prostitution merits separate discussion. I have considered it earlier in this thesis at many points (especially ch 4 and ch 6 Sexuality). Prostitution in City-states is located in demographic processes of supply and demand, based on the socially constructed economic pressures on fertility, and the associated stratificatory conflicts. Expropriation of the peasantry, exposure of girl-children, and the capture and purchase of slave-girls in war and other predation, are the main sources; prostitution is thus intimately related to slavery. Conversely, the demand is for sex-partners who constitute no economic liability, especially to the citizen's patrimony, neither for themselves nor for their progeny; only the immediate price. Expropriation of the peasantry and exposure of citizen girl-children are typical of the Patrician City; the Plebeian City under democratic control ameliorates these practices and turns instead to foreign predation. Under oligarchic control, however, the older practices may be revived in conjunction with external predation, as strikingly at Rome. With these differences, the patterns of sexual relations are also in contrast. In the democratic City, the citizen uses prostitutes supplementary to marriage, a cultured courtesan stratum is distinguished, and the man enjoys sexual intercourse without emotional involvement, perhaps reserving his love for a homosexual partner. In the oligarchic City, the citizen uses prostitutes before or instead of marriage, prostitutes are all of one stratum, and the man may build a durable love-affair which suspends or terminates the girl's prostitution. The contrast here also qualifies the relations of non-citizen men with prostitutes: in both cases they tend to follow the citizen pattern.

In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, all the processes here are ameliorated, especially the economic pressures on fertility. Citizenship is not closed or entailed with property; the lower strata
are relatively secure, and war and predation are limited. Thus there is neither the supply nor the demand for prostitutes in the same way. Moreover women have citizenship here, and protected legal rights; they have recourse against attempted enslavement. They also have economic agency and a greater range of economic opportunities. Where prostitution does occur, then, it is not associated with slavery, but is a free craft of choice. The clientele is probably mostly travellers. But above all, here the balance of power between the sexes in socially constructing the economy is far more even, and so prostitution tends to dissolve into other types of sexual relationship, whether enduring or casual. (The breakdown of the City-state sees the beginnings of this development, but it requires the growth of a large state bureaucracy to reach full force. This never happens at Rome.)

Against this background, the prostitute considered in economic terms is simply an artisan: the brothel is a workshop. The relation of prostitutes to their premises could be various, but the brothel was usually a place of work only, not a place of residence. However prostitution is also found at inns and taverns, or simply in the streets and arches. Prostitutes might be slave or free, citizen or non-citizen; they would all practise their craft on the same basis. Typically, then, the slaves are living independently and paying body-rent to their masters, like any slave artisan - as I have said, the ancient economy produces rents rather than profits. The owning of premises for prostitution was a recognized business investment, and there were state brothels. But the owning of prostitutes themselves is quite a different matter. Typically, then, the prostitute would probably pay rent for her premises, and would not be under direct supervision - the direct supervision of artisan labour is not typical for Antiquity. The prostitute would then be relatively free to choose her clients, and her times, subject to paying her rent and other expenses - prostitution was commonly taxed. It should be added that the involvement of prostitution with slavery and clientage (in terms of freed slaves) provides a degree of protection for the prostitute from pimps and bullies, and indeed from the law - prostitution of course was not criminalized.
Slave-prostitutes are objects of trade: there is both the importation of captives for sale and the raising of the exposed for sale. Although the former, for its non-peaceful dimensions, excludes women as entrepreneurs, they certainly featured in that role in the latter. Generally in Antiquity the artisan's ambition is to buy a slave to keep him in old age - the artisans being basically non-reproductive, they have no children to do this for them. Prostitution is quite typical here. Exposed girls might be given a cultural education. Girls might be sold or rented on long contract; often the intention was to trap a wealthy young man into falling in love with the girl, so that he would pay a high price for her. However, a girl's owner might simply send her to a brothel, and collect body-rent from her. The owning of prostitutes carried civil disabilities, at least at Rome, and the magistrates would typically refuse to protect the whoremaster's property right if the girl's lover abducted her. This seems to appear early, perhaps before the beginning of the Late Republic. Indeed there seem to be typical differences here again between Rome and Athens. Again, later Roman law (in the Principate) protected a slave-girl from being prostituted, other than as a punishment.

At Athens, there are two strata of prostitutes: hetaerae trained to be cultured companions for the wealthier, and pornai giving simple sexual intercourse to the poor. However there should be no illusions as to whether the hetaerae gave sexual intercourse too. At Rome, there are rather the categories of prostitute and mistress; the latter often a former prostitute who, having been bought and freed by a lover, has now parted from him and lives by choosing her lovers and accepting gifts from them. This is a more borderline case of prostitution. One consequence of this is that at Rome, but not at Athens, actresses and mimes are assimilated to prostitutes, for example in the Augustan legislation on fornication and adultery. There came to be a strong erotic content to the Roman popular theatre. Indeed that is so of private entertainment in both Athens and Rome; whereas there is no professional theatre at Athens, which makes the task of comparative analysis more complicated. But the prevalence of love-affairs on the borderlands of prostitution at Rome is clear;
whereas I have warned above of the danger of too easy an assimilation of music and dancing to prostitution. These were skills valued in their own right, even at Athens.

All this is to focus on the City-state. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms the situation is far simpler, at least in terms of economics. The girl is simply a free artisan, quite possibly owning, or sharing in the ownership of, her own premises. These might be her home, or she might work at an inn or tavern. Since she has full citizenship and her craft is neither criminalized nor carries disabilities, there is little more to say. Little indeed is known of prostitution in Egypt. (The situation in Mesopotamia might throw some light on it. See remarks on temple prostitution in ch 6 Sexuality above; see also Bottero 1974.)

Finally, a comment on the exploitation of prostitution might be in order. It is essential here to distinguish between the girl's relation to her client, and her relation to her owner. Exploitation occurs when the girl cannot get and keep her fee; a factor of her relationship to those to whom she pays rent or taxes. Again, the quality of her relationship with her client is a factor of choice of client, choice of occasion, and the general emotional ambience of sexual relationships. The position of the wet-nurse should be contrasted: not only is her conduct, in for example diet, hygiene, sexual relations, likely to be strictly controlled, but also her own baby is put at risk of malnutrition or even exposure. Prostitution is not inherently a paradigm of exploitation.

As to the wet-nurse, this might be a household slave, but is most likely to be a woman of the urban proletariat, whether slave, freed or free. The lack of women's work compatible with motherhood underlies the practice, that is, on the supply side. The demand might best be attributed to the insecurity of the mother-child relationship; I have given indications on this above (ch 6 Fertility and Maternity). In any case, the preference was for a "decent" girl not an ex-prostitute. The practice would as stated certainly put her own child at risk, and indeed might follow its exposure. However child mortality was in any case high. Wet-nursing was common to both Athens and Rome; it became increasingly
favoured at Rome from the Late Republic. As noted elsewhere (ch 6 Fertility and Maternity), there is little convergence between the Roman Principate and Egypt in matters of motherhood. Wet-nursing was not an Egyptian practice.

Other aspects of sexual economic divisions could also be considered: divisions in consumption patterns, for example. Thus women's preferences for jewellery, expensive clothing materials, and other beauty culture - perfumes, cosmetics, coiffure - is surely a way of holding and enjoying wealth in a situation where women move between the households of men and do not have secure claim to a household of their own. Against this, household furnishings will appear as a typical way for men to enjoy their wealth. This is known for Rome. Such issues should not be disregarded simply because "economic sociology" does not know what to make of them. The discussions above on restrictions of women's inheritance rights and economic agency, together with questions of residence patterns, is surely their context.

However, I turn now rather to enquire whether on the basis of the above account any summary statement can be made as to the principles at work in the realm of sexual economic divisions. Here it must be realized clearly that there are limitations inherent in the analytic framework: "Antiquity" in this thesis is basically a single economic order divided into sub-types by different systems of power. But granted this, I think that a number of general points can be made, though some of them tentatively.

First, then, there is the unequal balance of power between the sexes in the social construction of the economic realm. With this, there is the potential for constructing sexual polarity (to which the same considerations apply) into the economic realm - prostitution, wet-nursing, even slave-breeding so far as this occurs, and their cultural penumbra. Second, there is the exclusion of women from non-peaceful economic activity and the major chances for acquisition with it, though they remain its victims, especially in terms of slavery and of restrictions on freedom of movement. Third, there are the demographic patterns: the social construction of economic resources as plentiful or scarce, and its impact on fertility. Scarcity, the City-state pattern, grounds
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a distinctive syndrome of: agnatic devolution of property, protection of patrimony from female economic agency (the economic guardianship of women), selective expropriation (female exposure), and prostitution. Basically, all this is missing in the Bureaucratic Kingdom, where economic resources are socially constructed as plentiful.

To go beyond this, to the sexual division of economic functions, is more difficult. Broad tendencies perhaps are: women work in the household, men in the fields; men produce goods; women sell goods and provide services; women provide cooking; cleaning and childcare, men deal with hunting, fishing, extraction and transport. Also, women deal with textiles, men with durable materials (metal, stone, clay, wood). But there are plentiful exceptions to all this, and clearly many other factors enter. On the whole, it is slaves who do menial work, and with this, the sex of the slave is often conditioned by the sex of the person served. Also, the migrant and non-reproductive character of much of the labour force emphasizes broad rather than fine economic divisions. Where both sexes work together in a workshop or the fields, finer divisions appear: women spin while men weave; men cut the harvest while women gather it; and so on.

Trying to account for the broad pattern here, I would again bring in the conflict of charisma and routine economic activity referred to above (ch 6 Aggression). As Weber himself describes the "original" sexual division of labour, men seem to have the charismatic activities such as hunting or metal-working, while women have the routine, continuous activities such as crop growing (Weber 1981 p 38 - 9). (Oddly, Weber seems not to have seen the point here himself.) In the Ancient Civilization, this seems to be fairly simply modified on stratificatory lines: lower strata men are forced into continuous labour, while upper strata women are moved into supervisory roles. In this, the bulk of heavy agricultural labour is transferred from women to men; but this occurs in prehistory.

As to the economic exploitation of women by men, this is not given in the sexual division of economic functions as such, but depends on them being brought together within economic organizat-
ions in specific ways. As I suggested in an earlier chapter (ch 4), this especially happens under conditions of traditional domination, where the local community negotiates economic questions with the central institutions: availability of resources, intensities of labour, levels of exploitation, and so forth. In this, the man strives to reserve the labour of his woman and children for himself, under his own control, to offset what is required from him. But traditional bureaucracy has precisely the character of breaking this down: of dealing with the woman at least in her own person, and the children under joint control. Against this, in the City-state slaves and the urban proletariat do not typically have families at all, recruiting rather by migration (and citizen households work their own resources for themselves). Thus the general pattern for Antiquity is that women and men work and are exploited side by side, their exploitation being articulated through the factors mentioned above—especially slavery and the demographic questions. The sexual division of economic functions is unequal, but not I think inherently exploitative; indeed, it seems to me to show, especially in Bureaucratic Kingdoms (and in finer divisions where the sexes work together), a definite negotiated character.

In conclusion, then, I end this discussion of sexual divisions in the economy with the judgement that the economic realm appears rather to be receiving and embedding the forces of women's oppression than giving rise to them. That must also be said of the demographic realm, of course. This accords with the views that I have expressed before (ch 6 Aggression; ch 7 Power), that the sources of women's oppression lie in the sociology of power. I will take this up again at the end of the thesis.

Stratification

Stratification theory is something of a sociological battleground, so some introductory comment must be given here. In particular it must be specified that, in keeping with arguments presented earlier in this thesis (especially ch 2 & 4), I am "reading" Weber's conceptions on stratification very much in the
light of his considerations on Antiquity, and their place in the development of his general sociology.

Initially, stratification itself can be defined as a set of mediating structures that run (both ways) between the economy and the polity, and have important consequences also in the realm of culture. Weber's two basic stratificatory concepts are class and status. Class is defined specifically with reference to the market, and it must be recalled that Weber's economic sociology is largely concerned with premodern civilizations where local and perhaps inter-local markets co-exist with other economic organizations. The development from this to the modern "market economy" where the market in the abstract integrates all economic organizations is very much what he is concerned to explain. In face of this, and given that the central thrust of Weber's sociology lies through the consideration of the economy and the polity as co-equal realms, status should not be assimilated to a functionalist central values system or the Marxist notion of ideology. It belongs rather to the non-market economy and the realm of power.

In view of the origins and development of Weber's sociology, there can be little question that his first concern with the notion of status was with the ancient City-state: the closure of the political community that I have outlined elsewhere (ch 4, ch 6 Aggression; see also ch 9 & 10). The first statuses then are: patrician, plebeian and proletarian, and with them citizen and metic, free and slave. These are juridically defined categories with precise political-legal force; their ultimate basis is if anything military. Weber broadened this conception, almost certainly first in consideration of the honestiores - humiliores status distinction of the Roman Empire (see ch 10 below). Many factors can ground status stratification, including such factors as race, ethnicity, language or national community, so far as they become reflected or embedded in the pattern of economic arrangements. Moreover, status is often a persistent phenomenon when the sociological forms have moved on and the conditions that first gave rise to it are gone. Thus in existential sense one can speak of "social honour" as the basis of status in general. But the historical origins of specific status groups and status
stratificatory systems can be various; very often they are military.*

As outlined in the previous section, Weber distinguishes two modes of orientation of economic action, wants-satisfaction and profit-making, and derives from them two basic types of economic organization, the oikos and the enterprise. The latter has a special affinity for the market, and it is in terms of the rise of an entrepreneurial class that Weber accounts for the development of the modern "market" economy. A part of this process is the separation of the enterprise from the household (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 4). But the ancient economy comprises a distinctive inter-relation of the oikos and the market, as described elsewhere (see especially Appendix A part ii below). The Ancient Civilization, then, like all premodern civilizations, features an array of classes and statuses.

Here, the orientation of the oikos to wants-satisfaction and the overall orientation of the civilization to non-peaceful economic activity should be borne in mind, together with the limited role of the market. This is really only a market for goods, not for labour (except as slaves), and only discontinuously for capital. In the City-state, the basic statuses are as I have indicated defined by closure of the political community. Details vary, and I have, following Weber, taken terms from early Rome for general sociological use. Patrician and plebeian confront each other in status conflicts over citizenship. They also in certain eras confront each other as classes in relations of usury and debt; this is basic to the growth of large estates and the expropriation of the peasantry. The urban proletariat is the status of the excluded. It comprises various elements: landless peasants, resident foreigners (forbidden to own land), and slaves and freed slaves. These all function in the market, as craftsmen, artisans, shopkeepers. There is little real class-difference between them. There may be a richer few, but their wealth will not get them entry to the political community. Class conflict in Antiquity

*Weber's other formative work on general stratificatory considerations is his (untranslated) essay on the Social Conditions of the Ancient Germans (Weber 1924; see esp. p 554 - 5).
centres on the relations of debt as above. Slaves are also found in the oikos and in the most various functions; the status does not of itself define economically grounded life-chances.

In the Bureaucratic Kingdom, the chief difference from this is the absence of a closed political community. This has consequences for the status system: it becomes, if not simpler at least softer, in the context of a basically universal legal citizenship. The Roman honestiores - humiliores division was simply a rough division of rich and poor which had consequences in the criminal law. Even the difference between slave and free began in time to dissolve into this. In Egypt the situation was even more amorphous. There were finer distinctions: between imperial and provincial nobility at Rome; between scribe and priest at Egypt. But generally the basic matrix seems to remain between the rich and the poor, and between the city and the countryside, locating three strata: the rural poor, the urban poor, and the rich, who transcend the division of rural and urban. Again, the urban poor are rather defined by the market, and there is little class differentiation among them, the more so as market wealth is no longer excluded from citizen participation.

The main point then to emerge from this comparison is the distinction between "hard" status, the juridically defined status categories of the City-state, and "soft" status, less formal in its definitions and consequences, though the law may still take account of it, as in Bureaucratic Kingdoms.

This gives only an outline, but the question at issue is: how is one to inter-relate sexual divisions with stratification? Clearly this must be done at a number of levels. Preliminarily, it should be pointed out that primary sexual polarity interacts with stratification to generate demographic processes, which are sui generis. It is only secondary phenomena that are being considered here. But that stated, the first and most obvious point is that male and female themselves are statuses, and this moreover generally in the sense of "hard", juridically defined, status. That is explicit in the City-state, but it shows far more widely in history, in the exclusion of women from power and from military affairs, and very commonly also (though little in Anti-
quity) in an explicit religious secondariness. This last typically features exclusion from the priesthood. Generally, Bureaucratic Kingdoms are the most moderate in sexual inequalities of these kinds.

Beyond this, women are status-stratified into the same general stratificatory groups as men. But it should be noted that the considerations here are not simply birth, sexual relationship, common household, and the like. They are rightful birth, sexual relationship and common household, in terms of marriage and legitimacy. These things (or their absence) are typically definitive for status groups. Women then possess status in their own persons. With this, a status differentiation among women also arises: that between the decent woman and the whore. These patterns appear general, but they are most clearly marked in societies of "hard" status such as City-states. It should be stressed that here the distinction of the decent woman and the whore can again be juridical in character: the Augustan legislation illustrates this. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, however, the status pattern may come to little more than the basic status distinction of the sexes, in moderate form, together with a broad dual-sex status difference of rich and poor on the lines of the Roman honestiores - humiliores. The distinction of decent woman and whore would dissolve into this last.

Class is perhaps more difficult. The first point is the social construction of sexual polarity into the economic realm, which underlies prostitution and related and comparable phenomena. These cannot be defined with reference to the market alone, but they have a positive affinity with it. Moreover in conditions of the market it seems undeniable that this comprises a distinct class, where life-chances are conditioned by factors of gender. (There is homosexual prostitution too. But the overall tendencies are for men to buy, for women to sell.) It should be stressed that the shape and extent of all this is conditioned by the social construction of both the economy and sexual polarity: the contrasts between the City-state and the Bureaucratic Kingdom are strong. Also there is the relation between the class of prostitute and the status of whore; the latter is not limited to the
market, but includes for example concubines. It should be noted too that wet-nursing and nannying run parallel to this; indeed they seem to assimilate to it.

The second point is the sexual division of economic functions. This unquestionably is anterior to the market and indeed to stratification itself, though stratification, as I have suggested in the previous section, may reshape it. I have described this division as embedding power relations, a negotiated outcome of conflict; as unequal though not antagonistic as between the sexes in pattern. It seems undeniable then that the sexual division of economic functions in conditions of the market must tend to produce separate class positions for women and men. However, this has to be qualified: the sexual division of economic functions is not a clear-cut pattern but a set of tendencies, with many exceptions and many cross-cutting factors. Moreover, the market has generalizing as well as discriminating functions; stratificatory analysis is not to be pursued simply for the sake of the taxonomical exercise. One is looking rather for relationships to some kind of socio-historical causation, though the relationships may be broad. Stratification is a principle of explanation.

Clearly, then, it is the suffragette and feminist movements of the recent best that provide the immediate incentive to find specific stratificatory identities for women. This indeed should presumably be broadened in consideration of perverse phenomena such as German women's support for Hitler or, more recently, support among women for Catholic positions on contraception and abortion. However, consideration of Antiquity shows that such enquiry is not merely self-serving. Analysis of ancient polytheistic religion, and its developments including the ultimate development into the Western Great World Religions, clearly demands the stratificatory identification of women. This shows for example in the different specifically female cults and the sex-shared cults. The former are female in their deities, symbolisms, concerns and followings; the latter at least in their deities and symbolisms. At Athens, they include Artemis, Hera, Aphrodite, and the goddesses of the Eleusinian Mysteries (Demeter and Persephone). Among these, Aphrodite the protectress of prostitutes and
concubines, and Artemis the protectress of female biology and health, are especially to be noted. In Egypt, the whole spectrum of deities and functions here is covered by the two goddesses Hathor and Isis, and at that, they are not wholly separate and distinct from each other. At Rome, a pattern somewhat similar to (and much influenced by) the Greek gives way in the course of time to one far more like the Egyptian – strikingly in the form of Isis herself.

The statuses of women in Antiquity I have already indicated: woman itself; the grades of the general status order; decent woman and whore. This is clearest for the City-state; in the Bureaucratic Kingdom it tends to come down simply to woman, and a simplified dichotomy in the general status order, into which the distinction of decent woman and whore is dissolved. As to the classes, I have said that the market in Antiquity generates little real class differentiation. To this, I now add that women perhaps provide the exception. This is meant specifically in regard to the social construction of sexual polarity into the economic realm: it is prostitution that makes up a distinct class, together with its cultural penumbra of erotic dancing, mime, etc. and its penetration into the general range of the paid female entertainment of men. Wet-nursing is in principle a parallel stream of the same phenomena; its cultural projection however suggests that the two streams tend to coalesce in practice, despite their analytic differences. This then to my mind is the one class that can perhaps be distinguished in Antiquity from the general run of shopkeepers and artisans. This holds most especially for the City-state, though it takes not only dissolution of the political community but also strong bureaucratic development to wholly eliminate it.

I cannot pursue the questions of ancient religion and its evolution here, though I present some comments on it in an appendix (Appandix A part iv). It is only an illustration. Another point is that the stratificatory groups specific to women interact with primary sexual polarity to make up the sociodemographic process, just as much as any other stratificatory units. Whether women have distinct stratificatory identities then is really
a matter of what questions we ask. The main points in this for general stratification theory are: the analytic separation of the household and the family, and the empirical relationship between the household and the market as types of economic organization, in different conditions of social development. But the initial presumption of stratification theory should be that women possess stratificatory location, class and status, in their own right.

I leave the discussion of sexual divisions and stratification there, and with it I conclude this provisional essay in the sociological theory of sexual polarity. The essay is based, as stated before (ch 2), on three comparative studies in the Ancient Civilization: New Kingdom Egypt, classical Athens and the Roman Empire. These studies are presented now, in the final part (Part C) of the thesis.

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Part C

Comparative Historical Studies
Chapter 8

New Kingdom Egypt

Introduction

When the New Kingdom begins, Egypt is already a very ancient civilization with two great periods of achievement (Old Kingdom and Middle Kingdom) behind her, though both had ended in periods of fragmentation (the 1st and 2nd Intermediate Periods). Geographically, the structure of Egypt is centred on the Nile river, whose annual inundations renew the fertile land. In the south, the river valley is a narrow ribbon of fertility in the desert; in the north, the delta is a wider region of fertility and marshland. Traditionally, these were the South and North Kingdoms respectively, and they always remained separate administrative regions. There is also a line of oases paralleling the river to the west. The recurrent pattern of Egyptian history is that unification proceeds from the south, for the south itself is easily unified, whereas the north tends to remain fragmented. This seems to have been the shape of the original unification, and again of the re-unification that created the Middle Kingdom. The traditional capital, Memphis, is placed where the valley and the delta meet.

The New Kingdom (circa B.C. 1560 - 1160) was created by the princes of the southern city of Thebes. Egypt was then fragmented (the 2nd Intermediate Period) under many rulers, the most important of whom were the Hyksos, Asiatic incomers who controlled all the north. The Theban princes led a war of liberation, apparently consciously nationalistic in character, against them and in due course expelled them. This success was immediately followed by a program of conquests, both south into the Sudan (Kush or Nubia) and west into Asia. There were two distinct policies here. Kush
was made in effect into a new region of Egypt itself like the South and North Kingdoms. In Asia, however, only a hegemony was established, the cities and princes paying tribute and accepting Egyptian supervision. The limits of this empire were established in conflict with the other great kingdoms of the region: Hatti, Mitanni, Assyria and Babylon. Although periodic campaigning was needed to maintain Egyptian authority, the empire lasted until the migrations of the 12th century.

The structure of New Kingdom history seems to fall in two halves, basically the 18th dynasty and the Ramessides. These are divided by the "Amarna episode", when Amenophis iv Akhnaton (circa B.C. 1365 – 1349) announced the solar monotheism of Aten, expropriated the priests and temples (especially those of Amon-re of Thebes), and created a wholly new city Akhetaten (Tel-el-Amarna) as his capital. The Amarna period is associated with stylistically freer art and the official and literary adoption of contemporary language – a change from Latin to Italian, so to speak.

Yet the episode should not be insisted upon too strongly, nor the individuality of Akhenaton himself (see Aldred 1968). There is apparently a longer term tendency for the re-establishment of the old solar religion and the identification of Pharaoh with the sun-god after the fashion of the Old Kingdom. New Kingdom Pharaohs ruled directly: they are soldier-administrators, above all generals. But from Amenophis ii a change can be seen from general to hero, and Amenophis iii did not campaign after his youth. The Aten cult and the freer art both seem to start in his time. Again, there was a longer term policy of curtailing the power of Amon-re, who had been given tremendous endowments and gifts by the Pharaohs – and whose city Thebes (unlike in the Middle Kingdom) remained the empire's capital. Pharaohs had already begun to advance Ptah (of Memphis, the old capital) and Re (of Heliopolis) as counterweights.

Akhenaton's policies were spectacular failures. But in the aftermath, although Amon-re was restored, the capital was moved to Memphis, and later to Per-Ramasse in the delta, and the preference of Ptah and Re continued. Later Pharaohs are not named for Amon. Again, Horemheb and his successors in the 19th and 20th
dynasties are generals, soldier-administrators as before.

The New Kingdom ends in the migrations and wars of the 12th century. These destroyed all the civilizations of their time, even Mycenaean Greece (see Sandars 1978). But Egypt under Merneptah and Ramesses iii defeated her invaders; it was only her Asiatic empire that she lost. Even so, Egypt itself collapsed into economic and administrative confusion not long afterwards. It is hard to say why, and with this, it is hard to say what real contrast there is between the 18th dynasty and the Ramesside era, and whether there was a genuine renewal post-Amarna or only a slow decline. Caution towards the Amarna episode (and towards cultural interpretations), and recognition of the general catastrophe of the 12th century, suggest to me that the Ramesside renewal was genuine, and that the basic causes of the fall of the New Kingdom were exogenous; Pharaoh's loss of the ability to trade abroad to advantage, and thence to pay the bureaucracy, and thence to collect taxes, and thence to pay and equip the army, etc. More than this cannot be said here.

At the time of the New Kingdom, the population of Egypt proper was of the order of 2.9 - 4.5 million, living mostly in cities along the Nile and in surrounding villages (O'Connor 1983; see also Janssen 1975). The archaeology of Egyptian cities (and other settlements) is very limited, and the degree of urbanization is not known.

Ancient Egypt has no historiographical tradition, though she has annalists, and knowledge of the language and its writing were lost at the end of Antiquity and only recovered in the 19th century. Against this, natural conditions for the preservation of documents are quite exceptional, and it is largely from these that Egyptologists have built up their knowledge of Egyptian civilization and history. But Egyptology consequently leans towards philology and archaeology, and tends to be somewhat remote from the historiographical mainstream.
The Position of Women

State and Family

As already indicated, Egypt in the 2nd Intermediate Period was a congeries of small princedoms, with the north under the control of the Asiatic Hyksos. The New Kingdom was created by a nationalistic war of re-unification and expulsion, leading on to the conquest of an empire. In this, Pharaoh* – the princes of Thebes – was able to expropriate a great amount of land and livestock, together with its associated workforce, as well as acquiring much other wealth. He was also able to buy back old royal offices of various kinds that had become privately appropriated. On the other hand, he did not on the whole on the basis of this wealth grant feifs to his lieutenants and supporters; neither did he confirm powerful lords in their possessions in return for declarations of loyalty. On the contrary, the greater part of it he either kept himself or else used to endow temples. The New Kingdom is a bureaucratic not a feudal state.

The relationship between state and family, then, is in the first instance a negative one, in that positions of power are not monopolized and transmitted in terms of lineages and the hereditary ownership of large private wealth. To pursue this, attention should first be given to the temples. The temples of Egypt should be understood more widely as religious foundations. They might centre on a god or a mortuary cult, especially of deceased royalty, or even sometimes on a cult of the living Pharaoh. The temple consisted of a grouping of buildings, wholly or partly within a walled compound, with a population supported from an endowment of lands, livestock and associated workforce, partly local, partly scattered all over Egypt. The population would include religious officiants of various categories but also lay administrators of the temple's material affairs; also artisans and craftsmen, servants etc., not to mention peasants and herdsmen. In short, the religious foundation is an oikos, in which a full range of econ-

* "Pharaoh" means "The Great House".
omic activities is carried on, including inter-local if not for-

eign trade and both agrarian and artisanal production for sale.
But this oikos has no mortal owner, and that is the point.

This system can be seen as a long-term device whereby Egypt
avoided the development of an independent nobility, or rather
whereby Pharaoh avoided it. It is this that throws greatest light
on the oft-quoted notion that Pharaoh is a god — not in itself a
very helpful statement, for there is always a relationship be-
tween royalty and deity and besides, what is a god? Also, Pharaoh
does have a most important mortal side, especially as general —
the crown prince was often made commander of the army. But Phar-
aoh is a god in the sense that he is the only living mortal to
possess outright his own oikos, exactly like the above founda-
tions and on massive scale. This has to be qualified: despite the
notion that Pharaoh owns all the land (which again, given differ-
ent conceptual levels of ownership, is not in itself very inform-
ative), there certainly is private ownership in Egypt. Again, the
great officials of the state and again the inner members of the
royal family will possess their own oikoi, and moreover will ex-
pect to transmit them to their heirs. Even so, Pharaoh is not
only the greatest mortal property owner, but the only one whose
ownership is absolute: all other ownership derives in some sense
from him.

Above all, Pharaoh does not have to make peace with a hered-
itary aristocracy: he is served by a bureaucracy instead. The
basis of this is simply the wars of reconquest, which permit to
Pharaoh the acquisition of wealth and the expropriation of the
great outlined above. Pharaoh cannot keep the whole realm direct-
ly in his own hands but he can compel the great to serve him on
his own terms, setting up a taxation system and using the taxes
to pay salaries, and appointing those whom he wishes to reward
to official posts. Thus in effect the great are compelled to ad-
minister their own wealth for Pharaoh, at his appointment and
under his control. This makes up so to speak the "private sector"
of the Egyptian economy, running parallel to the "state sector"
of the temples and royal domains. The main functions of the bur-
eaucracy are economic: the organization of the workforce, espec-
ially the corvee for controlling the irrigation system and for the harvest; the collection of taxation; and the administration of the granaries, magazines and treasuries in which the taxes are stored. The other major function is the administration of justice. The great of Egypt are defined by this system, and so far as it cannot contain them, they are shunted off to religious sinecures in the temples. The gods are the only nobility of Egypt.

The basic classes of Egypt are the scribes, priests, peasants and artisans. The scribes are the official class, serving at all levels in the bureaucracy from the viziers down to very subordinate local positions. Not all scribes were in state employment; others were employed in the temple administrations or in the great households, and probably some worked as letter writers and drawers up of contracts and documents on the market. The priests are basically the religious personnel of the temples; these have various levels and categories. The major priesthoods in the New Kingdom were organized as a national bureaucracy; indeed, the building of temples of the gods in the New Kingdom is paralleled only by that of royal mortuary endowments in previous eras. But this must be seen in terms of Pharaoh's control over the priesthood, not of the development of an independent Church in potential conflict with the state. Pharaoh was apparently quite free to re-allocate or even re-appropriate temple lands, and though it is not certain (indeed it was probably a point of conflict), the temples probably paid taxes. Again, Pharaoh appointed the priests and also the administrators of the temple domains, treating such posts (and also posts in the administration of his own domains) together with those in the state bureaucracy as all part of an undifferentiated scribal career. Besides these priesthoods, there were also private mortuary endowments, whereby a priest would perform services for the dead, being supported from the endowment for the purpose. Strictly however this should be the duty of the eldest son of the deceased.

Peasants worked under a variety of arrangements: as serfs on the great estates whether royal, temple or private; as tenants on the great estates on a share-cropping basis; or working on their own land. The soldiers were drawn largely from this last class,
and after Amarna times there is a policy of endowing soldier-farmers with land-holdings, which are perpetual so long as the family continues to provide recruits.* But all these categories of peasants appear to have lived together in villages, and to have conducted their communal affairs on a basis of equality. Corvee, the state conscription of labour, bore most heavily on the peasantry, as it was mainly for agrarian functions, especially in control of the inundations and the harvest. Artisans were located in the great households, again whether royal, temple or private. Of course this is typically a city rather than a rural function, though the distinction is far from absolute. How far the attachment is physical and how far notional is hard to say. There appear to be distinct artisans' dwellings, but not necessarily artisans' quarters — so little is known of Egyptian cities. Another difficult question is how far there were free artisans working for the market. Our sources most probably under-represent this dimension of the Egyptian economy. Yet it is clear that artisanal work was done for the market. Finally, slaves should be considered. These were brought in in fair numbers from the campaigns in Asia. Yet Egypt seems to be lacking in a law of slavery (a point to be considered again in a later section). It was perhaps the law that only Pharaoh could make a slave, and debt-slavery seems only to exist as imprisonment and forced labour for the evasion of tax or corvee. The Asiatic captives then quickly become assimilated into the free or semi-free native population. The process of freeing a slave incidentally was by formal adoption.

Citizenship in Egypt is basically a matter of access to the

*Helck (Helck 1975) says that this kind of arrangement runs all through the New Kingdom, and is used for all sorts and conditions of people not just for soldiers. The land would generally be located on the royal or temple domains, and hereditary service could be freely commuted for payment, especially in gold. Helck regards the prevalence of this type of arrangement as a definitive factor in the New Kingdom economy. Helck's work, however, being in German, could only be consulted at a very late stage. A substantial revision especially of this section in its light would be most desirable. However the impact would be to reinforce rather than to alter the thrust of the arguments that I present.
courts, above all the local tribunal of townsmen or villagers. No-one seems to have been excluded; in particular the local tribunals seem to have admitted everyone on the basis of residence, perhaps even temporary residence. Even slaves seem not to have been excluded. Ethnocentric perceptions then seem to have had no legal force. Also it should be stressed that the military profession has no special implications for citizenship. Within this overall homogeneity there is a broad distinction of two levels, broadly similar perhaps to the honestiores and humiliores of the Roman Empire. The upper level comprises the scribes and priests. But there is no discrimination in the legal process. The main point is that the upper stratum is exempt from corvee. Beyond this, the law makes a point of applying equally to all. The Egyptians indeed would have found the Roman terms and their legal consequences unacceptable.

Transmission and inheritance in this situation must be seen in terms of both property and office. In the latter regard, there seems to have been a negotiable principle that the son should succeed to his father's office, subject perhaps to the development of a career. This applies both in the state, temple and royal bureaucracies and in the priesthoods. It might be noted that since there are posts for women in the temples at least, a principle that the daughter should succeed to her mother's position should also hold, though we hear less of it. But formally at least and probably in practice, all this is subject to Pharaoh's confirmation. It should be realized that a great part of peasant and artisanal labour is organized on the basis of appointment to the relevant resources and tasks rather than direct ownership of them. Although there is no formally hereditary principle even in the crafts, the bulk of labour in these areas is probably recruited in this way.

As to property, Egyptian law is little known, and much of the documentation comes from later times; also practice appears to have varied at different eras, at least in emphasis and detail (Pirenne 1959; Theodorides 1971). Something that is hard to say is whether the Egyptians distinguished between real and movable property, and if so what weight they put upon the distinction.
From what I have seen, they do not appear to have done so; certainly there is no evident equivalent to the Roman category of "res mancipi", with its restrictions on administration and alienation. But then the Egyptian political economy is not structured in terms of privileged lineages and entailed property, but of the ultimate ownership of property by Pharaoh and the gods (contrary principles did tend to emerge in the Middle Kingdom and the Intermediate Periods). In Egypt there was always apparently free alienation of property, and all property seems to be alienated by the same straightforward enough process. Also it is clear that wills were always known varying the laws of intestate succession; that children could be disinherited and that special bequests and inheritances could be made. As to family property, the law considered this in three categories: the husband's property, the wife's property, and joint property. This last had in turn two cases: what was brought together into the marriage, and what was jointly acquired after the marriage. The basis of the first was the conjugal fund set up at marriage by the couple's families, ⅓ coming from the husband's family and ⅔ coming from the wife's.

The basic principles of intestate succession were that each partner's own property devolves to his/her children at his/her death, and is divided equally amongst them. In the failure of children, the estate would be divided among the deceased's brothers and sisters. A will might vary this: in particular, a husband might make his wife joint heir with his children or even sole heir in the failure of children, though the reverse of this does not seem to be known; again, the wife might benefit from a specific bequest (Theodorides 1976 p 47 - 8). As to joint property, at either partner's death the conjugal fund is divided, ⅔ going to the surviving partner, the other ⅓ being divided amongst the children; the surviving partner keeps the usufruct of the common acquisitions but these are entailed for division amongst the children at his/her death. It should be noted that in all these matters the children inherit in equal shares regardless of sex (Theodorides 1976 p 46 - 50).

The estate might continue to be administered as a unit after devolution, unless one of the heirs raised an action for division.
This might indicate a continuing joint household; in any case one person would be appointed to administer the estate. Traditionally a son, usually the eldest, would have responsibility for his parents' mortuary cult, and might have a larger share in the inheritance on account of this. Commonly, however, in the New Kingdom a bequest was given to a mortuary priest - an "adopted son" - to perform this function, thus creating a religious foundation; the unequal division of estates on this basis does not seem to have been practised in this time. Mortuary cults in any case appear commonly to have fallen into desuetude within two or three generations, the endowments being peculiarly subject to private appropriation. A point of tension to be noted in the inheritance laws is the capability of the divorced woman to secure the inheritance rights of her children against those of her husband by a later marriage.

It can be seen that there is here a tremendous tendency for property to fragment. Property, that is, does not have continuity over time but a cycle of fragmentation and re-accumulation. This is located in an economy whose strong tendency is to construct its economic opportunities in terms of appointments rather than possessions. This holds as I have pointed out for agrarian and artisanal labour as well as for scribes and priests, though as comprising the privileged stratum the latter have the greater political importance. Indeed, these economic opportunities are subject to private appropriation. Religious endowments in particular seem to have been subject to this, and the religious foundations could become quite hollowed out in consequence, turning in effect into secular towns. This of course is characteristic of Intermediate times rather than of the strong centralized kingdoms. But Pharaoh seems to have used the creation of religious foundations partly as a means of bringing marginal lands into use - the marginality of land in Egyptian conditions being largely a factor of the input of work. With this and the bureaucratized nature of the economy as a whole there is no lack of economic opportunities, of all kinds and at all levels, whether actually productive or sinecural. It is indeed on the basis of such opportunities that the re-accumulation of property seems to be made, though approp-
ration of allocated resources is also a factor. But especially to be noted is the wide availability of religious sinecures to the privileged stratum, subject at least in principle to Pharaoh's appointment and the actual ownership of the resources by the gods.

In sum, the Egyptian economy is characterized not by closure but by openness and even expansion. It is difficult to say what controls the rise and fall of such an economy; probably Pharaoh's tribute from empire is essential to keep the system working and in balance. But the upshot of it is that neither as a whole nor severally did the Egyptians experience economic pressures on their fertility, neither in fact nor in subjective perception. There are no constraints on family size at any level of society of this kind. Especially the Egyptians do not appear to have either sold or exposed their children.

The relationship between state and family, then, rather than being simply negative might be described as formally negative but substantively positive, in that the state does provide a supportive economic environment, although it is more equivocal in legal terms. In fact, the state does treat the family as a legal unit, in accepting the son's claim to (if not right to) his father's position, and generally in securing the laws of inheritance. Also a family can apparently be held collectively responsible for a tax default or an evasion of corvee, and be punished with the imprisonment of all or any of its members. But equally the state recognizes the rights of family members against each other, and it does not appear to vindicate domestic authority over adults, whether women or grown children. In the matter of their rights as opposed to their duties, the state seems to recognize only individuals. As to the founding of a family, the state seems to have had no hand in this (nor the temples); it was purely a question of the couple setting up house together. Some kind of consent from the girl's family might be needed, and there was a property endowment to the couple as discussed above. Beyond this, the marriage was perhaps announced before the local tribunal and the marriage contract registered with the central bureaucracy (Theodorides 1976 p 21, p 44 - 5; Theodorides 1975 p 94 - 5). But
indeed of marriage little more is known than that it could be distinguished from concubinage, though what the difference was is not clear.

The Egyptians practised monogamy, apart from Pharaoh himself; moreover they seem to have had reciprocal expectations of each other as to sexual conduct. Concubinage appears to have been de facto marriage, commonly found among the lower strata where there is less likely to be property or property considerations. It is not clear what defines these issues. Marriage does not seem to have been restricted in terms of laws of citizenship or even of slavery—marriage to a slave gave the slave freedom—not by formal status considerations. Egyptian society is not structured in these terms in the way that the Greek or Roman City-states are. It can probably be assumed that where a man of some standing takes a concubine in preference to a wife considerations of inheritance rights are a factor. She and her children will probably be endowed in terms of bequests, with minimum impact on the inheritance rights of children from another union. Generally this will mean a previous marriage. It should be noted that it might be the woman that prefers this arrangement: either or both partners may have children from previous unions. The concubinage arrangement is not necessarily an asymmetrical one. However, concubinage might also be a matter of giving a recognized status to the partner in a stable sexual relationship in the face of great social inequalities. Common household would be an incidental element here. Too little is known on all these matters for certainty. But as to the master's sexual access to the maidservants in his household, much might be assumed, but one feels that the wife would have something to say about it.

As to illegitimacy, it is not clear that this term can be rightly used. There is apparently a stigma on fatherlessness, at least at upper strata level. But this does not relate to the difference of marriage and concubinage; it is rather a refusal of any acknowledgement of the relationships. That could be at the will of the mother as much as the father. The inheritance rights of the fatherless child in relation to his mother's property and her other children do not seem to be affected, at least so far as is
known. But in relation to the inheritance rights of children from their father (or from joint property), the differences between marriage and concubinage would surely rest on consent and contract, not on prescribed legal categories based on status difference. That is, the concubine and her children will only be treated differently from the wife and her children where the man has both, and has made different contracts with each of them. (This would be a matter of successive rather than simultaneous arrangements.) The concubine's children then are not illegitimate. Too, it should be remembered that the property and inheritance situations are basically symmetrical: it could be the man that is the concubine. All these are complex issues however, and even Theodorides does not really clarify them (Theodorides 1976: see especially p 26 – 7). Beyond this, however, there does not seem to be any question of civil disabilities attending upon fatherlessness.

Only Pharaoh himself was polygamous. In the first place, he had a Great Wife. This was an office in itself, with a complex position in the succession system, and could be transmissable mother to daughter. The Great Wife possessed her own oikos, and might hold other offices, especially in the priesthood, where she might be titular head of all the female staff of the temples, or at least of the temples of Amon–re. Besides this, Pharaoh had lesser wives. Some of these were daughters of lesser Asiatic princes, and occasionally of a great king, for example of Hatti or Mitanni. But although Ramesses ii apparently made a Hittite princess his Great Wife for a time, no Pharaoh would ever give a daughter in return. This, then, is not exactly dynastic intermarriage. Again, Egypt having no nobility, there is no preferential marriage with the nobility: a native Egyptian wife can only be a commoner. Beyond this again, Pharaoh had a number of concubines.

Unquestionably out of this entourage Pharaoh had, or could have, many sexual partners, and many women might bear his children. But for the most part these are simply the female personnel of a great household, working especially in textiles and in domestic service, and entertaining as dancers and musicians. The women have male attendants and supervisors; it is not a stereo-
typical oriental harim (there are no eunuchs in Egypt). It is not clear then how far these women were forbidden other sexual relationships. In all probability Pharaoh's great servants and his adult sons found their wives and/or lovers here, though this might possibly be subject to his permission or gift.

All this again is to be seen in the light of the temples. These all have their female complement, of adoratrices, chantresses, dancers etc., and there are always the god's wives and concubines. But these names do not indicate a sexual function; the Egyptians practised neither temple prostitution nor temple virginity. These are simply the female personnel of a great household. Often, though by no means always, they were married to the priests or to other male functionaries. But the point here is that a woman's place in a household cannot always simply be told from her sexual and reproductive relationships, nor vice versa. The names of these offices is no guide to function. The oikos is not simply a family household, and women have a place in it in their own right as individuals. There will be more to say on these matters later on.

Egypt's population is thought to have expanded slowly but steadily all through ancient times, to a peak of perhaps about 7.5 million in Hellenistic and Roman times. The figure for the New Kingdom of 2.9 - 4.5 million cited earlier can be located in that overall process. There is some influx of captives from the Asian campaigns, and some recruitment from the south and the adjoining deserts to the police and the army. Also, Egypt used to let nomads from Asia wander into the delta in times of hardship, giving them construction work - there are stories in the Bible that can be related to this. On the whole, however, the migration process does not seem to define Egypt's demographic history in the way that it does that of the Graeco-Roman world. In particular, rural-urban migration gives the impression of having been a balanced two-way process, not impelled by land expropriations and with little difference in conditions and reproductivity at the two ends - though one would expect urban mortality rates to be higher. General low life expectancies and high mortality rates, or perhaps naturally low fertility rates, seem to have made for
the comparatively slow growth of the Egyptian population.

Family and Community

"To found a household" is one of the common Egyptian expressions for "to marry". This means the creation of a new household, separate from either partner's household of origin. The Egyptian family is not a lineage; the cult of the dead is not an ancestor cult, and typically soon falls into desuetude. Moreover the family property does not have continuity over the generations. The devolution of property, as discussed above, occurs at each parent's death, subject to provision for the surviving partner, and there is equal division of property among all the children. The economic endowment of the marriage even over the long term, then, is likely to be based on the acquisition of (or appointment to) new economic opportunities rather than inheritances. As to its immediate endowment, a conjugal fund is set up for the couple at marriage on the basis of interim devolution. This comes \( \frac{2}{3} \) from the husband's side and \( \frac{1}{3} \) from the wife's. Apparently the girl has a legal right to demand this from her family (Theodorides 1976 p 47 – 8). The items will be recorded in an inventory.

The marital household centres on the nuclear family. It might be extended by unmarried brothers or sisters or a widowed or infirm parent, but it will not ordinarily extend to three generations. Indeed, extension is if anything more likely to be lateral, in terms of a divorced or widowed sister and her children. The household is however likely to include servile elements. These might be slaves, originating mostly from the Asiatic campaigns, but as noted before, Egypt seems to lack clear-cut laws of slavery such as would perpetuate the chattel status. Mostly then the servile elements of the household appear to be formally free, at least in the sense of being free to leave. In terms of domestic authority, they appear to be rather the servants than the slaves of the master and mistress. Most important of all, the larger households at least place the servile dependants in their own quarter of the courtyard, where they have households of their own and can form their own families. This seems to have been typ-
ical for Egyptian cities as well as for country houses, producing a mixing rather than a separation of the strata. As to the size of the Egyptian family, this is not known with certainty, but the impression may be of slightly larger families than the 2–3 children of Graeco-Roman Antiquity. I will return to this issue in a later section.

On Egyptian marriage, surprisingly little is known. As I have noted above, a distinction is made between marriage and living together or concubinage, though it is not clear what the difference is. Marriages are made young, both partners being about 14 or 15, though in the scribal class the boy might perhaps be a little older. On choice of partner, some authors assume that the girl’s father chooses her future husband, but this view seems to owe much to caution. The texts that speak most clearly, as is generally acknowledged, are the love-poems, and these seem to envisage a courtship initiated by the couple themselves (the boy perhaps more actively than the girl), followed by an approach by the boy to the girl’s mother. The apparent location of this poetry as the literature of upper strata married couples reflecting their own courtships surely makes this a credible view, and there is nothing inherently unlikely about such a system. Theodorides takes this view (Theodorides 1975 p 96–7). He also notes the value placed on good relations between the generations: parents are more concerned to care for their children and to endow them for adulthood than to discipline and chastise them. Indeed, there are not the obvious structural reasons for inter-generational conflict here that there are for example at Athens. As to the consent to marriage, it is not clear if this could be withheld, but Egyptian law does give children legal rights against their parents (Theodorides 1975 p 117), and the girl as noted earlier has a right to a marriage portion. Incidentally brother-sister marriage was never practised in Pharaonic Egypt.

As to betrothals or engagements, no more is known than can be inferred from the above: that the couple would decide themselves and get the agreement of their families. Decision, agreement and marriage itself would come in turn, but it is not known how long all this would take — one would tend to assume a quick pro-
cess. As to the ceremonies or rituals of marriage, there is nothing known with certainty. It appears to have been a family occasion, with no involvement of the temples and minimal involvement of the state. Theodorides suggests that there was a family feast with neighbours invited, and that the local tribunal might be informed - this last is typical of Egyptian legal proceedings, for example with an adoption. He also says that a marriage contract was probably obligatory; its form was set by the law and could not be varied by the partners, and it would be registered with the central administration (Theodorides 1976 p 21, p 44 - 5; Theodorides 1975 p 94 - 5). There are uncertainties in these matters, but this is probably the best account that can be given.

These things might help to distinguish between marriage and concubinage. However it is unlikely that concubinage really is any one thing. Probably at least two different situations are involved: the first a simple living together among the lower strata where there are no considerations of property and therefore nothing for a contract to govern; the second an arrangement intended to protect a pre-existing pattern of inheritance rights where either or both of the partners already has children. Again, concubinage might give a degree of recognition short of full inheritance rights where there are great social differences between the partners. On analogy with other civilizations, these last two cases might be governed by contract, and might even have the consent of the girl's family. In truth, in all the Ancient Civilization concubinage is hard to pin down. But whereas in the Graeco-Roman City-states the key issues are citizenship and status, it seems to me that in Egypt the central question is the problems of the effects of remarriage upon inheritance. As to remarriage, I see no question but that the partners arranged this for themselves, irrespective of sex and at their own discretion.

The economic endowment of the household comprises various elements. As noted before, there is the conjugal fund set up for the couple at marriage, coming \( \frac{3}{2} \) from the husband's family and \( \frac{1}{2} \) from the wife's. There could also be gifts from friends, neighbours or others at marriage, though this is not known. Either partner may have movable or indeed real property (so far as the
distinction should be made), though devolution being a factor of the parents' deaths, inheritances are likely to appear later. More to the point, since estates are divided amongst all the children, inheritances are likely to be small, and to play a limited part in the household's material basis. For the long term, then, the material basis of the household should be seen in terms of the acquisition of, or appointment to, new economic resources, rather than the simple ownership on the basis of inheritance of land and livestock. This could mean appointment to bureaucratic or priestly office; equally it could mean appointment to some function in a household or workshop, or on the land or with the herds. Again the employer could be of various kinds: the state, a temple, the Great House or a private domain. It should be noted in this regard that women are capable of appointment too, especially in a range of temple functions and in household service. These things condition the terms in which property is held by the couple, and also the arrangements for the dissolution of marriage.

Family property, as I have indicated before, is considered in different categories. Each partner keeps his or her own property; there is also the conjugal fund on which the marriage is established; and there are the common acquisitions. It should be noted that the separate reckoning of these categories is maintained in practice. The marriage contract is drawn up in these terms, providing for the eventualities of dissolution and maintenance; the formula for this, as indicated before, is laid down by the law and cannot be altered at will. An inventory of the wife's contribution to the conjugal fund will be attached to the contract. Admittedly documents of this kind, including documents of divorce settlement, are mostly known from later times (Pestman 1961, 1969; Allam 1981), but the general pattern of the provisions is generally agreed to have run all through Egyptian history, though with variations in detail in different eras (see especially Pirenne 1959). Indeed it seems likely that the later documents were actually intended to protect Egyptian practice in the face of immigrant communities and periods of foreign domination - Theodorides takes this view.

In the event of widowhood, the deceased's own property is
divided amongst the children, unless a will provides otherwise; but the surviving partner's property is unaffected. Joint property is split up: the survivor keeps $ of the conjugal fund and the usufruct of the common acquisitions, the rest being divided among the children. In the failure of children, the deceased's property is divided amongst his/her collaterals, but apparently all joint property goes to the survivor. As noted earlier, husbands did commonly vary all these terms to their wives' advantage, making them joint heirs with the children or sole heirs instead of the collaterals in their property, or simply making special bequests to them. But basically this is compensation for loss of income: as noted before, it is appointment rather than property that is likely to provide the family's material basis. On widowhood, the wife will remain in the marital household and keep charge of the children. She will also keep charge of the family property and the household's affairs, and will guard the children's interests until adulthood.

Divorce appears to be quite unrestricted, and to consist of simple repudiation at will by either partner. Marriage contracts envisage this, stating typical causes for divorce as failure of love or love for another. Theodorides suggests that the divorce, like the marriage, may have been announced at the local tribunal (Theodorides 1976 p 48 - 9). There seems to be no question of any other parties having the right to initiate a divorce, or to refuse consent to it (as in the Graeco-Roman civilization). The settlement on divorce consists in each partner taking his or her own property and a division of the joint property. The precise terms for this will be set in the marriage contract, but the basis for it is that the wife will take her own share of the conjugal fund and will moreover be given an agreed compensation for her share in the common acquisitions. There may also be a specific provision for her maintenance and that of the children. However, if the divorce is at her initiative or is in response to her misconduct (e.g. if she takes a lover), then she may forfeit compensation and maintenance, being left only with her own property and her share of the conjugal fund. It appears that in the event of divorce, and regardless of fault or initiative, it is the wife
that leaves the marital household. It appears too that typically she takes the children with her. The economic situation of the divorced woman, like that of the widow, can be difficult. She may go to live with a brother or sister, and it seems possible that she might have difficulty in arranging a new marriage. Her former husband's right of access to his children is not known, but this is most likely to be a question of their visiting him. A question of great tension in all this that can be treated as diagnostic is the securing of the inheritance rights of the children against their father's children by a subsequent marriage. This is a characteristic issue both of contract clauses and of litigation. The mother's litigation for her child's rights also appears in religious mythology, Isis and Horus, though the legal details are different. I have suggested too that it is these issues that throw most light on the nature of Egyptian concubinage. The situation is in principle symmetrical between the sexes, but in practice men have greater wealth, and the advantage will lie with the woman and children who are actually in the household at the time. It should be borne in mind however that regardless of their unenviable economic situations, neither the widow nor the divorced woman is under any kind of civil disability. Indeed their protection, both categories alike, was a proverbial standard of good rule.

Within the household the wife is mistress; indeed, "mistress of the house" is her title. As such, she will have full control over the storerooms, materials and provisions, and of the domestic workforce. Given the nuclear basis of the household, she is not subject to the supervision of a resident mother-in-law. There may be ongoing relationships with both her own and her husband's female kin, but these relationships should be co-equal. Given the complex nature of the household property as discussed above and its possible co-existence with income from office, it is hard to be clear on a precise division of authority and functions. Theodorides holds that the husband administers the conjugal fund and operates the sharing of the common acquisitions, and that it is not clear how far the wife is involved in this - whether she has to consent or to be informed (Theodorides 1976 p 46). On the
other hand, it is clear that wives did for example accompany their husbands to inspect agricultural work on the estates, and the general impression certainly is of joint affairs jointly administered. Again, it is clear that the wife could act independently in the couple's joint affairs without restriction - a separate reckoning being kept of what each partner acquires for the couple jointly. With this of course the wife's own property, including her profit from her textile production, is entirely her own affair. But beyond this, the wife probably simply controls the household, leaving wider joint affairs in the hands of her husband. If her husband has both property and office, however, he will probably hand over the former to be controlled by a steward. Women who hold office of course might do likewise. Beyond these matters, it should be noted that the Egyptian wife is typically involved in domestic work herself, especially in weaving linen, in cooking and cleaning, and in child-care. The former functions will be shared with a female workforce, but the Egyptian woman is very much mother to her own children, even when they are of school age.

Although Egyptologists use the word "harim", the women's quarters of the Egyptian household should rather be seen in terms of the underlying property relations: the part of the house that belongs to the woman, not the part that the woman belongs to (or in). This will include the loom workrooms; what she weaves is her own. There is no question of any seclusion of women in Egypt. Women conduct business both for themselves and for their households, and they receive guests both on their own account and as hostess with their husbands. The household indeed is a focus for social life, for dinner parties and banquets, for example. Both sexes attend these together; interestingly, they are seated separately for the latter. Privately, the family eats together as a unit. There is no public social life from which women are excluded; again, the public rooms of the household are not specifically men's rooms. Also, there are games, a kind of chess for example, that are played by husband and wife together, and other such shared recreations, and indeed, the family also goes out for recreation together, for example wild-fowling in the marshes.
Women also move abroad freely: indeed, their ability to do so unmolested (and unescorted) is a proverbial standard of law and order. Women go to market both to buy and to sell, though the hawking of goods round the doors is also common economic practice. Women visit friends, and go to dinner parties and banquets, as indicated above. They also go to the temples. Interestingly, women are often shown on board ship in Egyptian paintings — the Nile of course was used for both inter-local and foreign trade, as well as for travel, fishing, etc. Public entertainments like the Athenian drama or the Roman Games are little known for Egypt, but we know of nothing of the kind that women did not attend. Most importantly, women took full part in all the religious festivals and processions. (Again, the principals in this may have been sexually segregated.)

It should be added that women's position in the Afterworld is taken to be precisely the same as in this one, though there is perhaps a tendency to highlight the more conventional aspects — to show how things "should" be rather than how they really are.

These comments may seem to have focussed on the more privileged — and therefore more evident — strata, but this is deceptive. In actuality, they should apply mutatis mutandis to the bulk of the peasantry and artisanate also, apart from the obvious points about servants and property, for it is the privileged rather than the impoverished style of life that is missing in Egypt. The contrast should be with the temples and the great households, especially the Great House itself, and here the point is precisely that it is the privileged who are the servants. As I have said before, it is the gods that are the nobility of Egypt. But the nature of the service that privileged women perform is mostly providing music and dancing, or else the organizing of those who provide them, and of the menial staff that serve them in their turn. Admittedly the royal wives in the Great House are spoken of as "the secluded ones", though who they are secluded by and what they are secluded from is not made clear. (But ambassadors visiting foreign princesses among Pharaoh's wives complained that they were not given access to them.) Possibly the term indicates those women of his household with whom Pharaoh does have
sexual and reproductive relationships, and the phrase may not mean what it says. But this is an exceptional case in any event. For the rest, even slaves appear to have been free to marry and to have children, on the same basis as anyone else in the same substantive situation.

Egypt does not have any structure of clans or phratries integrating aristocratic lineages or organizing their commoner followings; if such a thing ever existed, it has been swallowed by the state bureaucracy or dissolved into the temples. As shown above, the Egyptian family is not at any level short of Pharaoh himself a lineage. Again, the reckoning of kinship does not appear to extend beyond immediate family relationships. Its greatest field of application is in inheritance law, though there are also for example injunctions to state officials to treat their kin who appear before them with neither more nor less than impartiality.

Against this, the state bureaucracy penetrates down to the local level of Egyptian society, regardless of temple or private ownership. This is largely for taxation purposes, and for the registration for military service and corvee. Balancing this, the administration of justice offers a system of recourse, and the most basic level of this is the local tribunal or village council. This deals with all kinds of local disputes, complaints and malfeasances. Women appear to have had full access to this on exactly the same basis as men, with no restrictions on raising complaints and actions against their own menfolk. Women apparently also actually sat on the tribunals. Women are then individuals and full members in their own right of the community. They are not in any but the most immediate and pragmatic sense under the domestic authority of men. The issues here will be further discussed in later sections of this chapter.

Sexual Polarity

Fertility and Maternity

Egyptian girls married young, about age 14 - 15. Presumably this was soon after puberty. Brought up in large, though nuclear-
based, households with a reproductive servile staff there or nearby, it is probable that their knowledge of their own biology was good. At least there are no evident reasons for withholding such knowledge from girls, and the possibilities for doing so are limited. Again, there are strong sexual and reproductive themes in the religion and mythology. Besides, as mistresses of their own households without supervision from older female kin, their access to information after marriage was in their own control.

In this situation, pregnancy and childbirth are likely to have followed soon after marriage. For these, skilled assistance was available: professional midwives whose training was associated with that of physicians, and physicians, including women, with knowledge of gynaecology. Egyptian medicine, though its treatments are not all practical, generally has a strong empirical basis, and assistance and intervention here are likely to have been of some effect. Childbirth was accomplished squatting "on the bricks" - the function of these was to lift the woman off the ground. This position should give the woman a good active involvement in the childbirth process herself. In large households at least, childbirth took place in a secluded arbour, and the woman stayed there for two weeks afterwards, a purification period. Within the limits of practicability this was probably general.

On balance, in Egypt the child is the mother's. It is thought to be she that names the child, and as I have noted, it is apparently she that keeps the children if the marriage is dissolved, whether by divorce or widowhood. Against this, there is apparently some social stigma attached to fatherlessness at least at upper strata level, though there does not seem to be an identification of illegitimacy as such. The Egyptians do not appear to have practised infanticide or exposure, and neither parent has the right to sell a child. With this, Egyptian women breastfed their babies themselves rather than using wet-nurses, and they cared for their children and looked after them themselves rather than entrusting them to servants or slaves. The emotional commitment of the mother to her children was strong, and mutual.

Children remain in the mother's overall care, both sexes
alike, even after school age (it may be that it was mostly only boys that went to school). Only when the boy starts to acquire a craft or to work does he start to come more into his father's domain. But the father also is involved in childcare, at least to the extent of common family meals and entertainment, and of handling the children and playing with them. As noted earlier, the relationship of parents to their children in Egypt is generally caring rather than disciplinary.

The typical size of the Egyptian family does not seem to be known. It seems clear however that children were welcomed and valued: there is not the same fear of too many children as in the Graeco-Roman civilization. Nor are there periods of population decrease apparent in Egyptian history, at least until medieval times. Perhaps the impression is of families above the 2 - 3 children typical for the Graeco-Roman civilization, but there seems to be no question of an approach to the theoretical maximum of 10 - 12. A guess would be 3 - 4 children at most. The population increase, though apparently steady, is slight. This seems to indicate high mortality rates, including probably both child mortality and child-bed mortality. Yet it has also been suggested that Egyptian women had low fertility (Masali and Chiarelli 1973 p 168), though the reasons do not seem to be known. One factor that might be suggested is that lactation may have been prolonged — one contemporary Wisdom text, that of Ani, speaks of the mother breastfeeding her child for three years (see Lichtheim 1976 vol 2 p 135 et seq). As noted above, the Egyptians did not use wet-nurses. At any rate, if Egyptian families were of this order of size then this highlights the difference between actual family size and its subjective perception: one's family is large or small in relation to one's resources in the face of one's expectations as to life-style. The Egyptians were not worried about their resources, for reasons that have already been examined. But it is probably that lack of anxiety more than actual numbers of children that marks the difference between them and the Greeks and Romans.

As to family structure, it is hard to be clear if there was any preference as between sons and daughters. Such a preference
does seem to have appeared in other eras when the eldest son was responsible for his parents' mortuary cult, or among state officials where the son might succeed to his father's office in a career closed to girls. But in the New Kingdom the mortuary cult was commonly passed to a priest, and the other point does not have general application. Apart from the question of different social levels and occupations, it can also be asked whether both sexes had the same preference. Wives might have preferred daughters, and there are transmissible offices and careers that are closed to men. Again, the Egyptians do not seem to have much problematized the management of their daughters' fertility or the endowment of their marriages; conversely, they did not place special value on the military profession. Also a daughter like a son could support her parents in old age, or bury them. Probably then sons and daughters were equally valued. At any rate, the sex ratio in the general population seems to have been basically in balance (Masali and Chiarelli 1973 p 163), and since there were no practices of selective female exposure and slave-prostitution in Egypt as in the Graeco-Roman civilization, typical family structure can be inferred from this.

Although they apparently did not practise infanticide, exposure or the sale of children, the Egyptians did use contraception and abortion. Egyptian medicine, unlike Graeco-Roman, is known not from literary texts but from papyri that are apparently the notebooks of working physicians. For this reason, the comparison with Graeco-Roman medicine is difficult, and perhaps deceptive. The empirical content, including the gynaecology, is quite strong although knowledge is limited; also there is some impractical or superstitious content in the prescriptions. But there are sound contraceptive prescriptions, for example spermicidal and occlusive vaginal pessaries, and there is no reason to think that access to them was limited. As to abortion, almost certainly the main techniques were surgical, and therefore we do not have records of them; surgery was taught as a craft, by apprenticeship, not from texts, it seems. The effectiveness of these techniques need not be questioned. Some authorities say, though without offering substantiation, that the Egyptians made abortion illegal
I doubt that we have that kind of knowledge of Egyptian law. However, an ethical restriction on abortifacient drugs because of their danger to the patient seems possible. A law of this kind was passed in the later Roman Principate.

Finally, the conception of motherhood in religion is worth a note. The Egyptians have deities who protect women's biological functions, including childbirth, but the great image of motherhood is Isis, the widow of Osiris and mother of Horus. This triad is central in Egyptian religion, linking the cult of Pharaoh to the cult of the dead. Isis goes in search of the body of her murdered husband, conceives his postumous child, bears and raises him in secret, then declares him, litigates for him and contrives for him to come into his inheritance. This is no passive protectress: Isis is a hero, who through her Quest secures the continuity of the World (the myth superimposes political themes upon an agricultural cycle, with implications for life after death). We should realize that, if we want to see motherhood through the Egyptians' own eyes.

**Maturation**

Despite the extended nature of the Egyptian household, the family unit remains nuclear, and it is the mother herself who looks after the children. As discussed earlier, the mother-child relationship seems to have been emotionally committed and warm, and it may be added that this clearly holds for sibling, especially brother-sister relationships also — "brother" and "sister" were used as endearments between lovers. In the first years of childhood, there appears to be little overt sexual differentiation in the treatment of boys and girls. Interestingly, both sexes appear to go naked until puberty. Toys and games are known for both sexes: they include combat games for boys and dancing for girls. But on analogy with their parents, it seems possible that the sexes played some games together or shared some toys. Again, as stated earlier, there is entertainment and recreation of the family as a unit together.
It is hard to be clear when real differentiation of the sexes begins. Probably it is conditioned by the acquisition of adult skills and the introduction to adult tasks, so far as these are sexually differentiated. If so, it will probably begin in mid-childhood. As against this, the development of sexual differentiation is not conditioned by an exclusively male military, political and legal citizenship as it is in the Graeco-Roman civilization. The teaching of crafts is simply by apprenticeship. In this a boy may often follow his father's trade, but there is no formally hereditary principle. Military training itself is simply a factor of military service, which generally means following the military profession.

Schooling seems to have been very much a factor of literacy and literate skills. Some study of literature is involved, if only in terms of copying exercises, but mostly the focus is on the practical skills of the civil servant. These would include for example taking inventories, simple mathematics, surveying and building techniques, etc. The thrust of this is towards the career in the state and other bureaucracies. The scribal schools seem to have been run by the state bureaus and by the temples. The former were probably for boys only, but it seems likely that the latter also accepted girls. At least, a certain literacy of women is known especially among the temple personnel, and it is known too that there were female scribes, though not apparently in the state bureaucracy itself. This must then be thought to have some systematic basis. Besides, the strong companionship evident between husbands and wives at scribal and priestly level suggest some element of common education. The temples also appear to have trained physicians and mid-wives (the former at least being a literate craft), and to have served as libraries. In the schools of the state bureaus, education seems to have lasted several years, into the teens. But where schooling becomes employment is another question: on all these matters too little is known. How far access to the schools extended through society is not known, but it should not be assumed to have been restricted to a wealthy handful. An intensive bureaucracy entails a fairly high degree of literacy. Besides the scribes and the priests and
such others as physicians, there could also apparently be for example literate artisans.

The girl's training in household skills will include weaving, and commonly also it seems the playing of a musical instrument. It would also extend to cooking, house-care and child-care. It is hard to say what actual instruction the girl is given on her own biology, but it seems most unlikely that knowledge is, or could be, withheld from her. It should be noted that her skills, weaving especially, will not simply and necessarily restrict her to her husband's household. Equally the Egyptian girl will be taught, presumably by her mother, how to handle her property and to make transactions.

Prostitution is very little attested for Egyptian civilization at any period, though scribal candidates are warned away from drink and girls. But marriage is young, for both sexes, and the love-poetry indicates that the couple have their own choice of each other and court each other freely. The indications are that their courtship extends to sexual consummation: virginity does not appear to be mandatory for Egyptian girls.

The introduction to citizenship, that is, to legal rights and capabilities, is presumably learnt partly from the parents and partly within the community. It should be noted that this holds for boys and for girls equally. There is a coming-of-age ceremony,* but it is not known if this must occur at a set time or simply when the person is judged mature. It seems to take place sometime during the teens (Theodorides 1975 p 91). Marriage, which also takes place in the mid-teens, also marks a turning point in the person's life (Theodorides 1975 p 94).

Sexuality

Couples married young, both in their mid-teens, and I have

*It must be admitted that my authorities do not explicitly consider whether children or only boys have a coming-of-age ceremony. But in view of the strong individual status of Egyptian women, the absence of any military or religious initiation for men, and the shared citizenship of the two sexes, it seems a reasonable interpretation that girls had this too.
suggested above that they generally had their choice of each other and a relatively free courtship. This must of course have been so for remarriages, which are likely to have been common, though perhaps easier for men to make than women, in view of the custody arrangements as discussed above. Much depends here on what one makes of the Egyptian love-poetry, but all Egyptian art and literature are agreed on the strong affection and companionship between husband and wife. This includes both a shared public social life, for example attending banquets, and intimate companionship, for example playing a kind of chess together, or she playing music for him in their own home.

To set this in its wider context for the moment, the Egyptians might have concubines, though often this simply means de facto marriage, and certainly there are women, for example in the temples or owning property, who may have great sexual freedom. But there is very little known of prostitution, and the Egyptians do not appear to have had either hetaerae or mistresses. This seems to define the location of the Egyptian love poetry as belonging to the same universe as marriage: whether read or sung – the poems may be songs – it was apparently entertainment for banquets and dinner parties, that is, for men and women together, mostly as married couples. With this, its content seems to reflect the amours of its audience, and apparently typically in terms of the courtship of the young. The poems are then, despite the continuing uncertainties of translation, readily accessible to a modern sensibility. (See translations in Lichtheim 1976 vol 2; Simpson ed. 1973). This really does reveal the married couple as lovers.

The wider context of marriage as a sexual relationship seems then to be one not of prostitution but of general sexual freedom. In this, the question of adultery is problematic. Some texts, both contemporary and in the later divorce documents, show a reciprocal expectation of fidelity, though it is easy – too easy – to assume that fidelity was expected of the woman only. The penalties can hardly have been equitable, given the principle that it is the woman that leaves the marital household on divorce. There are indications in some tales that a woman's adultery was
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punishable by her husband with death, perhaps by burning. This however must surely reflect alien - Asiatic - intrusions: it is quite incompatible both with the woman's legal position and with the restrictions on the death penalty, which must be confirmed by the vizier. In actuality, it seems clear that adultery simply led to repudiation (see Eyre 1984; also Theodorides 1976 p 50 et seq). It seems that (as with Attic tragedy) the Egyptian tales cannot be taken as a guide to contemporary conditions, whereas the love-poetry (like the Attic comedy) is specifically a contemporary creation and reflection.

Incidentally, there is no obvious reason why some of the love-poetry should not have been written by women. They are its subjects, audience, performers, and they are literate. Also to the point is the concern the poems show with the woman's thoughts and feelings (though also the man's); this suggests that there was a good degree of empathy between the sexes.

Besides adultery, I have commented already on the probable practice of premarital sex in the context of courtship. Presumably pregnancy here would simply precipitate marriage, or among the lower strata especially, living together.

Concubinage can have this sense of de facto marriage, or it can be something explicitly antithesized to marriage. Above I have suggested that the main reasons are likely to concern inheritance rights. The relationship of this to marriage will be one of successive not contemporary arrangements. It should be remembered that the relationship is not necessarily asymmetrical, and that even where it is, it may be the woman who is the more privileged partner - that is, it may be the man that is the concubine.

Prostitution is hard to identify, perhaps as much because of the unfamiliarity of the economic forms as for any specific reason of sexual relationships and practices. What little evidence there is suggests that the brothel is the typical location, and presumably the girls are free and working on their own account. The clientele might be scribal students, travellers (including inter-local traders) and soldiers. But all this must be conjectural; nothing seems to be known with real certainty. Even the
Turin Erotic Papyrus, in Manniche's publication and discussion at least* (Manniche 1987), gives no indication of any payment being made. Market and quayside scenes in art do not show prostitutes, and even more, Asiatic slave women seem to have mostly had craft skills in textiles, and not to have been destined for prostitution. In sum, even scholars who look for prostitution find nothing concrete, and the impression is that Egyptian women had too much autonomy and too many economic alternatives for prostitution to thrive. There was no prostitution in the Egyptian temples, and that may be the most indicative thing of all.

Homosexual intercourse between men is recorded in the "negative confession" of the Book of the Dead, and also is mentioned as an aggressive act against a man. However it is not attested as a preferred form of sexual practice or relationship. Nothing seems to be known of lesbianism.

The general pattern of sexual relationships in New Kingdom Egypt, then, emerges as one of physically and emotionally mutual heterosexual relationships of some stability centring on marriage. A free courtship leads into this, and adultery generally has similar consequences: a re-arrangement of partners. This may be supplemented by more or less of promiscuity. What is missing is prostitution, and the differentiations and asymmetries of physical and emotional relationships between marriage and prostitution, and between men and women, characteristic of the Greek and Roman City-states. With this, there is a general absence of problematization of sexuality and of sexual love.

Sex in Egyptian religion and culture is on the whole treated in a manner that is neither prurient nor prudish. The love-poetry is about love, illuminated by sexual desire and sexual expression where appropriate. There is a matter-of-fact linking of sex and reproduction, which holds equally in the affairs of men, animals, vegetation and gods. Even the legitimacy of one or two of the Pharaohs is supported by accounts of their mother's intercourse with the god Amon. One of the great goddesses, Hat-hor, is the

*There is a book-length publication and commentary on this papyrus in German (Omlin 1973); however this could not be used for the present thesis.
patroness of love and pleasure (or sex and drunkenness!). She is almost an avatar of Isis ("Hat-hor" means "mother of Horus"; "Isis" means "the throne"). She is favoured by all women; there is no Egyptian goddess specific to prostitutes or concubines like the Greek Aphrodite. Women approach her to be given the man of their choice, or to become pregnant. There are also ichthyphallic gods and phallic amulets: the significance of the latter is probably protective or for fertility. A household god Bes seems to protect sexual functions.

The sexual ambience of Egyptian civilization seems to be characterized by an uncomplicated and positive attitude to both sex and reproduction, and by good relations and empathy between men and women (and indeed between parents and children). Both love and material partnership are valued between the sexes. Above all, this is characterized by a high degree of female autonomy and an absence of obvious exploitation.

Agression

Like all the Ancient Civilization, New Kingdom Egypt is oriented to war and to non-peaceful economic activity. Indeed, the New Kingdom rises in war and falls in war, and maintains an imperial hegemony in Western Asia supported by periodic campaigns which take tribute and captives in great quantities. This is basic to the New Kingdom economy; the loss of the Asiatic empire seems to underlie the final collapse. All this is an exclusive male domain, and one which victimizes women, who may be enslaved through it.

The Egyptian army is part professional, part conscripted, and is bureaucratically controlled and equipped from Pharaoh's armouries. There are soldier-families with special land-holdings that are conditional upon the hereditary provision of recruits, but even these are not self-equipped. Military training appears to be a factor of actual military service. In form, the Egyptian army in the New Kingdom seems somewhat to prefigure the Marian legions of Rome, though with different weapons - chariot and bow - and different special skills - combined land-sea operations.
But the point here is that military service is not the adjunct of an exclusively male citizenship: it is half profession, half corvee, though it is specifically male labour.

We have no Egyptian law-code. This may be indicative: written law-codes in Antiquity seem typically to be the outcome of class-conflicts, and to be concerned with the control of usury and debt-slavery. I have noted earlier that Egypt lacks clear-cut laws on slavery such as would perpetuate the chattel status, and that slaves quickly disappear into the mass of the population. All this may be one, in accordance with the view I have taken earlier on the bureaucracy, the temples and the suppression of noble lineages.* However this may be, the administration of justice is a basic function of the Egyptian state, conducted through a series of tribunals ranging from the vizier's council down to the local village council. This level seems to be made up of the villagers themselves, though it is best known from an isolated settlement of workers on the royal tombs at Deir el Medina that could be atypical. But the basic point is that women have full legal personality at all these tribunals, to bring any kind of case in their own person or to testify in any kind of case. With this, it appears that women were also actual members of the village councils themselves (Cerny 1975 p 624). Women's membership of the more senior tribunals is apparently exceptional; Wenig mentions one example, but does not specify if this was during the New Kingdom (Wenig 1969 p 16). It might perhaps have a systematic basis, however, if the woman were an important priestess or local land-owner; but this is conjecture. But besides this, women are the bearers of rights, which appear to be in all regards the same as those of men. There is no Egyptian equivalent to the Greek or Roman guardianship of women. Again, it should be specified that we know of cases in which women have litigated against their menfolk, even their fathers, successfully and with no accusations of impiety. The Egyptian concept "Ma'at", which means truth, justice, fairness, the established order of things, has no implications of women's subordination or exclusion; on the contrary, it

*A full treatment of this issue would have to consider the full range of Egyptian history, and that cannot be undertaken here.
includes women.

It might be noted that, although a woman can apparently be taken into forced labour for her husband's default on taxes or evasion of corvee, a husband does not have the right to sell his wife, nor a father his daughter, into slavery. Indeed, there seems to be a principle that only Pharaoh can make a slave. Equally, only the vizier's court can give the death penalty, and this should be sparingly applied. Earlier I commented on adultery, that tales which speak of the husband killing his adulterous wife must be alien intrusions; that they speak of burning to death suggests an Asiatic origin. Pirenne says that the Egyptian husband does not even have the right to beat his wife (Pirenne 1959 p 74). (Incidentally, in "The Tale of Two Brothers" the woman's crimes are not adultery but attempted murder.)

In the matter of adultery, the basic penalty seems simply to have been repudiation, with loss of rights of maintenance and of compensation for her share in the common acquisitions of the marriage. The underlying idea is that the couple live together freely, on an agreement of faithfulness that holds for both partners. Whether the husband would actually divorce his wife for a single isolated incident is another question. Again, the wife might answer a charge of adultery by swearing an oath as to her innocence. (This again indicates her citizen status.)

The courts also recognized enticement and sexual harassment, especially by a man's foreman or overseer: the underling could ask the courts to order his superior to keep away from his wife. Here the wife is not accused of any crime. Her agreement to the action is presumably given in her continued cohabitation, so far as she does not act herself. But it seems clear that here the act of adultery itself has had no effect on the marriage - and marriage contracts speak of loving another, not of acts of adultery, as foreseen causes for divorce. At any rate, all this highlights the state's basic lack of interest in adultery as such, in contrast to for example Athens or Rome. Incidentally, the questions of enticement and harassment seem to hold indifferently for marriage and for cohabitation. (See Eyre 1984.)

It should be added that Eyre points out that the Egyptian
word for "copulation" being used here means equally "rape", "seduce" or "make love with", and that the above matters may colour the way in which rape is seen.

As I have noted earlier, Egyptian women moved abroad freely and unescorted. It was a proverbial statement of law and order that a woman could do this without fear of being molested. On the other hand, rape certainly occurred. In contrast to the classical civilizations, this means simply forced or at least coerced or unfree intercourse, rather than carrying the implication of abduction, and it is most unlikely that the law would exclude any woman, whether slave, prostitute or foreigner, from its protection. The crime is seen as being against the woman herself; she brings the complaint in her own person, and has no difficulty in doing so. The penalties however do not seem to be known.

A tomb painting of an agricultural scene shows two peasant girls fighting — presumably as an amusing detail. Not much can be made of this perhaps. But if fighting skills are acquired in the fields and streets and courtyards rather than in exclusively male training grounds and gymasia, then Egyptian women may not have been as helpless in the face of violence as the women of Athens or Rome.

Sexual Divisions

Power

Egypt in the New Kingdom is a bureaucratically governed monarchy, and the New Kingdom bureaucracy is remarkable for its rationality of structure and for its degree of penetration through the land (see Hayes 1973; O'Connor 1983 especially diagram on p 208). For this last, the good communications offered by the Nile are largely responsible. Pharaoh is chief magistrate and administrator, and also chief priest for all the gods: all officials and all priests are notionally his delegates. He is also commander in chief, and often general in the field, of the army.

Pharaoh himself is usually male. The succession system is complex. The chosen son will be made commander of the army, per-
haps declared as co-regnant, perhaps legitimated by the Amon priesthood (at least in retrospect). He may be the son of the Great Wife, or he may take her daughter as his own Great Wife. The basis on which he is chosen however is not wholly clear, and may contain elements of pragmatic power struggle.

The position of Great Wife is important. She has her own oikos, and may hold office in the Amon priesthood as god's wife and head of the female religious staff of the temples of Amon. Moreover she may transmit her position to her daughter. On the basis of this position, Egyptian royal women consistently play an important part in the conduct of affairs, including foreign affairs. They can be regents for their children or co-regnants with their husbands, and can exceptionally become Pharaoh on their own, especially at the end of a dynasty. The Great Wife (and her mother or her daughters) is a great lord in her own right, then. Other than on campaign it is possible that she is one of Pharao'h's council, though this is not clear. It should be noted that Pharaoh ordinarily accepts foreign princesses only as lesser wives, and that he never gives a daughter in return.

The state bureaucracy is mostly concerned with the assessment and collection of taxes, the maintenance of the granaries, treasuries and magazines, and the registration and control of the labour force for corvee and military recruitment. The system is centralized, and is controlled by the viziers. There is also a system of tribunals, down to local level, for the administration of justice; the viziers are at the head of this also. Pharaoh's own estates and household are controlled by a parallel bureaucracy, and so also are those of the temples; this last too is centralized and under Pharaoh's control. In a sense the priesthood too (mortuary priests aside) are a state department with a basic centralization. All appointments across all these fields are controlled in principle by Pharaoh, though with concessions in practice to claims for hereditary succession.

These bureaucracies are the basic career of the scribes, the literate officialdom. So far as is known, the state bureaucracy itself is wholly male, and the bureaucracies of the royal domains and the temples will have tended to follow this. So also perhaps
will the administrations of private oikoi. Yet female scribes are known to have existed. Apparently there is a tendency for women to prefer women for at least some administrative and secretarial functions; this would surely extend from royal and other great women to goddesses. Again, a female staff may attract female supervision, especially in regard to the female contingent in the temples. These processes, then, and especially the first, appear to provide countervailing tendencies. As to why women are excluded from the state bureaucracy, the lack of a clear-cut separation of civil and military administration, and indeed of corvee from military service, are perhaps what underlies this. Again, the dependence of Pharaoh himself upon predatory foreign income and non-peaceful economic activity will have a similar effect for the administration of his own domains.

The gods of Egypt both serve as local deities and are integrated into a functional pantheon. Local deities can be either male or female; some of the goddesses then can be armed or lion-headed or both. Others of the goddesses are protectresses; many appear in both roles. All gods have both male and female attendants: the men provide personal service; the women are the god's wives, or musicians, singers and dancers. The model for this appears very much to be the personal household of a mortal lord. The structure of the staff is the same regardless whether the deity is male or female. Women personal attendants, that is actual priestesses, are more rare and apparently mostly for goddesses; the principles for this have been indicated above. But only the more senior positions in the religious hierarchy convey more than a local sinecure. As noted, these offices are in Pharaoh's gift, and will more ordinarily be given to men. As indicated earlier, the religious institutions of Egypt are firmly under Pharaoh's control.

Economy

There is a lack of specific studies of the Egyptian economy. Even Helck complains that many of the relevant papyri are scattered or even fragmented, unpublished and untranslated, and that
an economic history of Pharaonic Egypt can accordingly only be provisionally offered (Helck 1975 Foreword).* Janssen's "Prolegomena" however is generally in support of the substantivist views of the general economic historians of Antiquity (he cites Polanyi)(Janssen 1975; see also Polanyi 1968, 1977; Polanyi et al eds 1957; see also Heichelheim 1958; Weber 1976). Helck's work itself is clearly in line with this approach.

The state itself, then, is the greatest oikos, collecting taxes and paying salaries, but others are Pharaoh's own domains and those of the temples, and there are besides private estates, generally gifts to the high officials or to members of Pharaoh's inner family. There are local markets between city and countryside into which the oikoi also sell, and inter-local trade is carried on by the temples and other major oikoi, foreign trade by the Great House. The river of course carries foreign trade and inter-local trade alike. There is also quayside private trade between sailors and own-account small-traders. All transactions are in natura; values are expressible in terms of gold, silver, copper and grain, but there is no coinage. Craftsmen appear to work on their own account for the market as well as in the royal and temple and other great oikoi, at least on a part-time if not a full-time basis. In sum, the economic arrangements fall within the mixture of oikos and market typical of Antiquity.

As to sexual economic divisions, the first point is that women's rights of transaction, ownership and management are in no way differentiated from those of men. There is no equivalent to the guardianship of women in the classical civilizations. With this, it is hard to identify a conceptual distinction of real and movable property, as I have commented before. The point here perhaps is that the referrent for such a distinction could not be the entailed property of lineages in the Egyptian situation. Rather there is the notional ownership of all land by Pharaoh, and a general tendency to construct the economy in terms of appointment rather than ownership. With this, property fragments at

*As indicated earlier, consultation of this work was only possible at a late stage, and a systematic revision of the chapter in the light of it would be most desirable.
devolution owing to the multiplicity of heirs, and if the fragments are too small for viability they must be sold, and new property that can be consolidated into a viable block bought in their place. Given this process of circulation, land and buildings would not be likely to emerge as a distinct property category. (Incidentally one might note that it is land, buildings, livestock and slaves that make up the special property category of Graeco-Roman civilization—the res mancipi of Roman law.) At any rate, there is neither an association of real property with citizenship nor an exclusion of women from (active) citizenship in Egypt, and there are none of the restrictions on women's economic rights and capabilities that would go with this. In all these matters the Egyptian pattern is quite different from that of the classical civilizations.

Property of all kinds women can own without restriction, and they can acquire, administer and alienate it likewise. Slaves can apparently only be freed by adoption (though marriage to a free person also frees a slave), but a woman is quite competent to do this. In practice, ownership can come through inheritance, gift or transaction. The inheritance laws have been discussed above. Their basis is that each partner's property is kept separate, and devolves to the children at death, being divided equally among them. Here husbands and wives are not each other's intestate heirs. In the failure of children the heirs are the collaterals. In either event, males and females share the estate equally. Joint property is treated separately, being shared between the surviving spouse and the children, the survivor keeping ⅔ of the conjugal fund and the usufruct of the common acquisitions. In all these matters the sexes are treated exactly the same; however, wills commonly adjust matters in the wife's favour; for example giving her a special bequest, or making her joint heir with the children in her husband's property. Basically this is compensation for loss of income. Women can make wills just the same as men. Where an estate is inherited by a number of children, a daughter as much as a son can be made its joint administrator, or again the mother can act in this capacity until the children reach adulthood. Again, a daughter as much as a son can raise an
action for the division of an estate.

As to acquiring property by transaction, the woman has a typical basis for this in her own property and her textile production. These she manages wholly at her own discretion. As to joint property, it has been commented above that the division of authority between husband and wife in the administration of this is not wholly clear; it may be that the husband has a certain priority. It is clear however that the wife can transact independently for the couple on her own account — what she acquires on this basis is reckoned separately from what she acquires for herself. It may indeed be that the husband's supposed priority is simply a matter of his doing the same thing in his own sphere. At any rate, ownership of property by Egyptian women in fact, including ownership of land, was apparently commonplace.

As to acquisition by gift, there are no obvious points relevant to sexual divisions.

In terms of agricultural labour, women were included in the work in the fields, though their functions might be specific: sowing, carrying in the harvest, scaring birds away, for example, while men do the heavier work such as ploughing and tend the larger livestock. In principle both sexes seem to be liable for corvee — ushebti, spirit-servants who will take one's place in the corvee in the afterlife, are put into the tombs of both sexes. But in practice perhaps only men were normally called, except for the harvest. Men certainly do the heavy work of quarrying and mining, which are often organized by corvee. But these activities often take place in outlying regions, and are accordingly assimilated to military service. Women seem to have tended fruit trees and kept flower and vegetable gardens. Again, the single peasant woman, for example the widow, might well have to work her own land.

In the household, women's work included weaving linen; also grinding corn, and making bread and beer— these last are related processes. They also did the bulk of ordinary cooking, though male cooks are found in rich households. They also deal with routine house-cleaning. Water carrying is another female function. Also of course women deal with child-care.
Household and workshop cannot entirely be distinguished. However the bulk of crafts are certainly male: work in stone, wood, metal, leather, ceramics etc., and also building. Weaving in workshops with larger looms is also done by men, and there are also male large-scale bakers. Too, there are male laundrymen. But it is not clear how far there might be family workshops, or how far the wife might sell her husband's produce. It must be admitted however that a system of workshops located on large domains would probably militate against family workshops and for a sexual division of crafts. Against this, it should be realized that the woman's household labour outlined above is not necessarily restricted to her husband's household, and much of it is saleable, especially her textile production.

Literate crafts include the physician's, which is apparently open to women and without restriction to gynaecology. The midwife's craft is associated with this; this is a specifically female craft. Both physicians and mid-wives are apparently trained in the temples; indeed some types of physician are associated with the priesthood.

Beyond this there are the scribes. Most evidently these are the officials of the state bureaucracy and the bureaucracies that administer the temple and royal domains. However there are similar organizations on smaller scale for private domains, and probably there are also scribes working on the market, writing letters for example, or drawing up contracts and documents. As discussed before, the state bureaucracy is exclusively male and so probably is the royal domains administration, but there may be participation of women elsewhere, especially serving a female employer such as a royal woman or a goddess. At least, women scribes are known to have existed, though their location is nowhere specified. Again there could be women scribes working in the market. A question that might be asked here, and also in regard to such crafts as the physician's, is whether a father might bring his daughter into his craft, especially in the failure of sons.

There is also a large female complement in the temples. Leaving aside the questions of administrators and priests, there
are always the god's wives and concubines, chantresses, musicians and dancers. There is also the supervisory staff for this entourage, and equally there are its servants and attendants. Most of the posts here are sinecural, but of course the temple is an oikos with a full range of economic activities, and will have both male and female workers in a wide range of occupations accordingly. Many of the temple personnel will marry and form common households with each other; but the women will commonly have their own economic appointments even so. The sinecural positions here are mostly for the privileged strata, though there is some entry for the lower strata also. Mortuary priests in this period appear always to be male. Again, the god always has a male staff of priestly attendants, and their supervisors and their servants; and the temple administration, as already discussed, is mostly typically male too.

Foreign and inter-local trade are initiated by the great oikoi, and are mostly both controlled and actually carried out by men. There is room for exception here, especially in regard to Pharoah's Great Wife, who has her own oikos, and perhaps the greater female personnel of the temples. As to actual agency, women are sometimes shown on board ships, or in trading booths at the quayside, and again in trading booths at the market (however these are not very common themes in Egyptian art). It is clear then that Egyptian women are own-account traders, on the small scale that is typical of Egyptian own-account trade. Their goods might include textiles, footwear, foodstuffs and drink. As typical female products, these suggest independent rather than family dealings. (See Hayes 1973 p 386 - 8.)

Besides this, women could certainly travel their own crafts, especially as musicians, singers and dancers; indeed they may well have taken these to foreign lands. These are free women acting on their own account, not slaves; for these skills are learnt by women of the upper strata, as noted earlier. It should by no means be assumed that this is some kind of adjunct to prostitution. Some dancing girls are shown with the figure of Bes, a household god who guards sexual functions, tattooed or painted on one thigh. But they are shown dancing for mixed company, husbands and
wives together. These girls may well be sexually active, but that does not mean that they charge for sexual intercourse.

Of prostitution itself, as I have indicated earlier, very little concrete is known: indeed, if we insist definitionally on payment as a precondition for intercourse then nothing is really known. Temple prostitution is seemingly based partly on the religious significance of sexual intercourse for crop and animal fertility, partly on the economic importance of the temples. Both these things are evident in Egypt, but there is no temple prostitution; it is a practice of the Ancient Near East. Other factors then, probably of sociodemographic kind, are apparently involved (see Bottero 1974). Again, female slaves from Asia are usually skilled, generally in textile work; they are not made prostitutes. So far as there are prostitutes, then, they must be assumed to be free Egyptians working on their own account, in brothels or possibly taverns, with a clientele of sailors, soldiers, traders (including inter-local traders) away from home, and perhaps minimally the young of the scribal class. But choice more than economic necessity will condition this craft, and likely it might better be described as promiscuity with gifts. Again, there is no specific prostitutes' patron goddess in Egypt.

Our knowledge of the Egyptian economy comes partly from funerary art. As such, it expresses the oikos at the expense of the market, the conventional at the expense of the actual, and the south at the expense of the north. It also expresses the periods of strong consolidation at the expense of the periods of fragmentation; the surviving documentary evidence, whether by chance or for other reason, tends to do the opposite. Probably the Egyptian economy is more like that of the Near East than our impressions of it would have: Helck certainly takes that view, with special reference to the New Kingdom. But there is a crucial difference in the matters of usury and debt slavery: these things are virtually eliminated from Egyptian civilization, yet they are at the basis of the ancient economy. It is this that makes the Egyptian economy distinctive.
Stratification

Social stratification in New Kingdom Egypt is based on the typical ancient economic pattern of inter-related structures of oikos and market. This typically gives a range of statuses in terms of slavery, freedom, and grades of citizenship rather than classes in terms of market location, though the processes of usury and debt slavery can link the two. But beyond this common basis, the New Kingdom stratificatory order is defined by on the one side, a somewhat limited development of the market, on the other, a strongly developed bureaucratic domination. The first makes for a limited emergence of class; the second restricts the field of status largely to a reckoning of social honour, as opposed to real political and legal privilege.

In all, as I have suggested earlier, although there is a distinction for administrative purposes of scribes, priests, peasants and artisans, the status distinction tends to come down to two broad bands: the upper stratum comprises the scribes and priests; the lower comprises the peasants and artisans. This might be further shaped by wealth, a substantial peasant or favoured artisan being assimilated to the upper stratum while a local village scribe or small mortuary priest slips into the lower. But the most practical force of the distinction is the exemption of the upper stratum from the corvee, and their co-option onto the higher legal tribunals. But the same law-code and taxation system apply to all.

With this, the status differentiation of the sexes seems to be minimal. Certainly there are no formal civil disabilities on women, although they are absent from the armed forces and the state bureaucracy. Equally, there seems to be little or no status differentiation among women themselves on the basis of their actual or imputed sexual and reproductive careers. There is certainly no formal civil disability on this basis. Rather Egyptian ideology seems to be weighted towards the lesser, to egalitarianism and protectiveness and against arrogance; difference of wealth and career being given matter-of-fact treatment. It should be remembered that formally the privileged, men and women, are the
servants of Pharaoh or the gods.

There is certainly a differentiation of economic chances for the sexes: men have much the greater chance to hold office, and therefore to acquire wealth and property. They also have the greater chance of heavy and ill-rewarded labour, in the quarries for example, and as to the crafts, while men have far the wider range, this is not all pure advantage. But the pattern of sexual divisions here also protects a specifically female sector of the economy, which is by no means all service or all male-exploited. It is a definite sphere of female economic autonomy. Strikingly this is not based on either prostitution or wet-nursing: basically neither are Egyptian practices.

Egyptian society does not produce stratification-based political conflicts after the fashion of Graeco-Roman society. The main structural conflicts are rather those between Pharaoh, his officials and the nobility. In this, women's rights and women's power are certainly an issue. But the bulk of the population, both sexes alike, clearly consented to the strong centralized rule of the Pharaohs, and to their relationship to each other within the framework it provided.

Conclusion

The position of women in New Kingdom Egypt stands, as will be seen, in sharp contrast to that in the City-state civilization of Greece and Rome, though somewhat less so to that in the Roman Empire. There can be little question that the main reason for this is bureaucratic monarchical rule. On the one side, this prevents the development of a ruling aristocracy, perpetuating itself through the control of property, position and reproduction in terms of lineage and marriage. It is Pharaoh who controls all these things, and it is part of this that women have citizenship: appeal to Pharaoh against the control of their menfolk. On the other side, the system of taxation, rents, salaries and appointments provides a controlled exploitation of the peasantry, in which the basic standard of living of both peasantry and artisanate is protected, expropriation and enslavement being prevented.
At the same time, a range of harmless sinecures is created for the privileged strata. This takes the pressure off over-reproduction for all strata and makes fertility unproblematic: thus there is no incentive to control women. It also gives to women a fair range of independent economic opportunities. Broadly, the position of women in the different eras of Egyptian history can be measured by these things: the power of Pharaoh and his bureaucracy in the strong centralized realms versus the provincial aristocracies that spring up in the periods of fragmentation (see Pirke 1959).

As to the contrast of Egypt with the Ancient Near East (which I have not considered in this thesis), of course that civilization is not all one. But the greater advancement of some of the Near Eastern economies is a deceptive point. For one thing, Egypt's economy in the New Kingdom at least probably was comparably advanced, as I have noted above. But more fundamentally, the key issue in the ancient economy is not trade, money and markets but usury and debt-slavery. It should never be forgotten that the wider range of economic options open to the Mesopotamian woman include being bought and sold as well as buying and selling. Beyond this, the Near Eastern law-codes clearly give the husband great power over his wife, and do not give her appeal to the state against that power. Indeed her punishments are often mandatory not discretionary. (See Mendelsohn 1949; Bottero 1974).

The sources on Egypt lean too much to state and temple, to Thebes and the south, and to funerary art and artifact. There are other problems. I have been forced to suggest that in the literature some of the tales show Asiatic intrusions, and to propose a distinction between these and the love-poetry comparable to that commonly made for Athens between the tragic drama and the comedy. Again, the bulk of the marriage and divorce documents are from a later time, and their bearing for the New Kingdom has had to be established. But it must be stated without apology that the long tradition of Egyptology has always stressed the strong position of women as a distinctive feature of Egyptian civilization. "Caution" means going with that tradition, not seeking to "correct" it.
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Chapter 9

Classical Athens

Introduction

The classical period of Athenian history runs from about B.C. 510 – 340, and it should be stated at the outset that almost all that we know about Greek civilization and history up to the end of that time comes from texts written at Athens or by Athenians in the classical period, and that with this, it is only classical Athens itself that is really capable of empirically secure analysis. Even so, something of the location of classical Athens in the wider, and deeper, Greek world should be indicated.

The Hellenes ("Greeks" is the Roman name for them) were an ethnic community, identifying themselves by common language, religion and customs. They reckoned themselves in three legendary branches, Ionian, Aolian and Dorian (plus some oddments), which had supposedly migrated in separate waves into their present lands, and which traced a common genealogy through legendary heroes to the gods. Their present lands were the Greek and Turkish coasts and islands of the Aegean – somewhat south and east of modern Greece. However, colonizatory emigration from the 8th century had created a plethora of new City-states (about 1,500 in all, most of which are virtually unknown), ranging from Sicily to the Crimea (with a few beyond), and that is the Hellenic world. Its time-period ranges from about B.C. 1100 – 340, and is divided into Dark Ages, archaic and classical periods. The Dark Ages end with the time of Homer, the first half of the 8th century.

However, there is an older civilization, the Helladic, in the 2nd millennium, culminating in the Mycenaean civilization (cB.C. 1600 – 1100). It is this civilization that supposedly fought the Trojan Wars about B.C. 1250, and was destroyed by the
Dorian Invasions not long after; both events are historically somewhat insecure. Homer names these people Achaeans, and that name seems to occur in Hittite and Egyptian annals of their own time, for example among the Sea Peoples that Merneptah and Ramesses iii defeated (Sandars 1978). The relationship of Achaeans to Hellenes is problematic, but there is tremendous continuity in religion, mythology and legend. Homer exemplifies this. Homer himself apparently wrote in the Ionian Islands in the 8th century. Yet though there are remembered Mycenaean elements in his poems, he had no understanding of the nature of Mycenaean civilization — a congeries of small bureaucratic City-kingdoms — and rather gave a mixture of contemporary conditions and recalled conditions of a century or so before (that is, a mixture of late Dark Ages and early archaic conditions).

All this is confusing. But it has to be realized that the Greeks had both a strong awareness of the depth of their own history and a hopelessly confused and mistaken conception of its nature. Scepticism about this goes back to the Greeks themselves; indeed it is, quite literally, the beginning of the Western historiographical tradition. But it is only since the decipherment of Linear B — Cretan and Mycenaean writing — that matters have begun to be decisively clarified.

There are two reasons for going into this here. One concerns the sources on women's position in classical Athens. The Attic tragic drama of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides is almost without exception concerned with retelling Mycenaean legendary history, subject to the tradition of distortion laid down in Homer. This is probably completely unusable as a source on contemporary Athenian conditions. (As against this, the comedy of Aristophanes is specific to its contemporary context, and is highly usable as a source. Ehrenberg has demonstrated this — Ehrenberg 1951.)

The second reason concerns the origins and institutions of the polis (City-state): phylum, phratry and genos. A long-standing tradition of scholarship, going back to e.g. Morgan and Fustel de Coulanges, has associated these with the kinship systems of primitive peoples, arguing that the Greeks in their Dark Ages were in
comparable condition, prior to the formation of their City-state civilization. The City-state then originated in these structures, and in time superseded them. This view is not compatible with what is known either of Mycenaean or of Homeric society. Moreover it is hard to reconcile it with society in the classical period. For the less civilized up-country states that did not develop the polis but are termed "ethne" do not have these structures. They are specific to the City-state; moreover they do not fade away in the course of the City-state's history. It may be added that Weber pointed all this out (he was also on the right lines as to the nature of Mycenaean civilization). These matters are further discussed in Appendix A part iii below.* (Also, see Finley 1985; 1983 p 44 - 5.) But the point for us here is to identify the phylum, phratry and genos as sui generis arrangements of ancient City-state civilization, belonging to the realm of political macro-structure, and relating to the position of women through the polis and citizenship, not through the family and marriage. This will be expanded in due course.

As to Athens itself, although actually a Mycenaean foundation, it does not come centre-stage in Greek City-state history until late. Sparta and the Ionian states of the islands and Turkish coastline are more prominent in archaic times. But Achaemenid Persia, rising in the mid-6th century and expanding to the Aegean coast, came into conflict with the Ionian states, leading to actual invasions of the Greek mainland (B.C. 490; 480 - 479). Athens became the main naval power opposing this, with Sparta the main land power. Following the Persian Wars, Athens created a naval alliance (the Delian League) against the Persians among the Ionian Islands, which she quickly converted into an empire. But this in time brought her into war with Sparta (The Peloponnesian Wars, B.C. 431 - 421; 413 - 404), in which she was defeated and her empire destroyed. However, Athens kept her autonomy, and even rebuilt her empire in time, though without wholly recovering her previous wealth or power. In the meantime, Spartan power failed.

*There is a definitive modern study of these matters - Roussel 1976. Unfortunately, however, this could not be used for this thesis. See review by Gauthier (1978).
Fourth century Greece is a period of shifting hegemonies and alliances and of internecine wars, under the shadow of greater kingdoms. In B.C. 338 an alliance of City-states led by Athens and Thebes was defeated at Chaeronea by Phillip of Macedon, father of Alexander the Great. This ends the classical, and indeed the Hellenic, era.

As to internal affairs, Athens had apparently suffered typical social conflicts over usury and debt-slavery in the archaic period, leading to a program of political and economic reform devised by Solon and imposed by the Peisistratid tyrants; this in the 6th century. The expulsion of the tyrants in B.C. 510 led to the institution of the Athenian democracy: the reforms of Cleisthenes. Athens maintained and broadened her democracy, with brief interruptions during her wars with Sparta, until after Chaeronea. The economic aspect of the reforms of the 6th century include state support for the introduction of vines and olives to replace barley - their value is greater, but they do not bear in their first years. Corn now becomes mostly imported wheat, imported under constant state supervision. In the early 5th century, silver deposits were found at Laureion in Attica; silver coins became an important economic asset. But tribute from the empire is basic to the Athenian economy: it is redistributed to the citizens as military pay and also pay for civic duties such as attending the Assembly. The enfranchisement, military service, and state support for the poorest citizens is distinctive to Athens, a factor of her naval character. Yet this system becomes increasingly difficult to support as it grows in the 4th century. Agriculture, damaged in the Peloponnesian Wars, is never wholly restored. Athens increasingly involves herself in trade - not as producer and exporter but as emporium, for the sake of the revenues. With this go increased rights for metics, and there is also an increasing use of foreign mercenaries.

Athens was a very big City-state for its time, both in area and in population. Attica was about 800 square miles, with a total population of about 340,000. Of these, about 130,000 were slaves, and 40,000 metics (resident foreigners). Athens itself with its port Piraeus was the only city; together their populat-
ion was about 130,000 in the 5th century, rising to 170,000 in the 4th - that is, 33% rising to 50% urbanization (Roberts 1984 p 21, p 38 - 40; Finley 1977 p 54 - 8, p 71 - 3).

Classical Athens has a tremendous contemporary literature, which includes both historiography and political-social analysis. There is no lack of sources, then, though as the focal point of a wider and deeper Greek culture some of these can be difficult to use - in particular, I have pointed to the problems of the Attic tragedy.

The Position of Women

State and Family

Athens (her empire apart) is a fairly typical ancient City-state: a city located near the sea with a compact hinterland. Despite its size, no point in Attica is more than 30 miles from the city itself, an acceptable journey for the times. In all ways, military, political, economic, cultural and religious, this is a city-centred civilization.

The characteristic institutions of the ancient City-state (the polis) are: the Council of Elders, the magistrates who actually wield power, and the popular Assembly. The continuum of democracy and oligarchy is only a question of the balance and inter-relations of these elements. The development of the Athenian democracy will be discussed in due course, but there are some general fundamental points to be considered first. To begin with, there is the rule of law. Power should be exercised under rules and not arbitrarily. However this does not really develop into a notion of the law operating on two levels, one of which supervises the other - a constitution. In Athens early in the 4th century such a notion begins exceptionally to half-emerge. Next, political and legal institutions are not separated. The Assembly is both parliament and law-court; though at Athens jury-courts comprising quara drawn from the Assembly were developed. Next, rule is direct citizen power. The magistrates do not head a civil service but take the place of a civil service. Equally, there is no state
prosecutor. More will be said on these heads later, but it should be realized now that the polis does not make for professional politicians or lawyers, and that where the state is not monopolized by a wealthy class it becomes open to a polemic to which we are now all too sensitive. In particular, the "demagogue" and the "informer" (the Greek word is "sycophant") are simply actively engaged citizens, with no presumption of vexatiousness. But democracy in Antiquity is always seen as tyrannical and illegal, and attacked as such. This is perhaps the most fundamental point of all: that ancient democracy is a sociological fact, a type of domination. It is not a political system far less a political philosophy.

The institutions of the polis also include the phylum, phratry and genos. As I have indicated above, there are problems here (see e.g. Andrewes 1971 ch 5; Littman 1977; Finley 1985, 1983 ch 2; see also previous footnote): these structures should not be interpreted in terms of a recent emergence from the primitive; but neither should we be drawn too deeply into reconstructions of the early polis. Chariot warfare in archaic times apparently made for aristocratic clans: the genos inter-related the aristocratic lineages and the phratry organized their commoner followings - especially perhaps as the hoplite infantry developed. The polis is created by a fusion of neighbourhoods; the phyla are created for the sake of a division of powers to reflect this. That is one view. But I have commented elsewhere on the priority in historical analysis of sources over origins; the place to start with this is the reforms of Cleisthenes. However, aristocratic lineages (the eupatridae) survive through the classical period, as do the genos and the phratry - though these are now private associations disengaged from the state, and the genos no longer controls the phratry (if it ever did).

The reforms of Cleisthenes (c508) institute the Athenian democracy, and open our period. It is not easy to discuss them without discussing what they reformed: the older institutional arrangements and the earlier reforms of Solon, although since that entails reconstruction it is preferably avoided. At any rate, Cleisthenes expanded the Council of 400 (created by Solon
as counterweight to the Areopagus Council) to 500, and made it the steering committee – the Proboula – for the Assembly; moreover he made the Assembly the ultimate location of power. With this, he also rearranged the phylae from four to ten, and changed their basis: dividing Attica into about 140 demes (villages or city wards), he brought these together in a complex arrangement that mixed city, coastal and inland demes together in each phylum. The demes were the units of local government and kept the citizen registers; the phyla provided 50 members each to the Proboula and put forward the candidates for office – these would be finally chosen partly by election, partly by sortition. With this again, the genos and the phratry are disengaged from the political system: they survive as private associations only.

These reforms create the moderate democracy. Following the Persian Wars and the rise of naval power, the radical democracy emerges: the (older) Areopagus Council declines to become only a special court for homicide, and the Proboula takes over its functions; the nine (older) archon magistrates, from whom the Areopagus is recruited, decline in importance, and boards of magistrates drawn from the Proboula or the Assembly itself take their place. Of these, the most important are the ten strategoi (admirals/generals). With this, the holding of office becomes open to the hoplite class (the zeugetes), though not to the urban poor (the thetes). Broadly, this remained the shape of Athenian democracy thereafter.

The polis is a consociation of warriors. As such, it is a legally defined community with its own laws: membership in the community is citizenship. Citizenship is hereditary: that is the basic relationship between state and family. Citizenship comprises a nexus of political-legal rights and duties, property ownership especially in farming property, and military service. All military service is in principle self-equipped; typically there is a status order in terms of the degrees of political-legal rights and duties and the type of military service, based on the size of property holding. At Athens four grades were established, from the time of Solon: pentakosiomedimnoi, hippeis, zeugetes, and thetes. The measure here (medimnos) is the yield of corn, oil
or wine; the levels are: 500+, 300–500, 200–300, 200 or less.
The topmost class bears the major leiturgies, the public burdens
which largely take the place of a tax system: for example, equipping a warship. The hippeis provide the cavalry; the zeugetes are
the hoplites, the heavy infantry; the thetes provide the peltasts
(light-armed troops) and above all, the rowers of the fleet. The
holding of magistracies is monopolized by the upper two classes
in the moderate democracy, and is extended to the zeugetes under
the radical democracy. In all other political and legal matters,
the four strata stand equal. As I have indicated, state income
from the empire and from war was divided among the citizenry,
especially in the form of pay for military service, attending the
Assembly, sitting on the jury-courts, and other such citizen
functions. This permitted a degree of citizen participation to
the thetes – the urban poor – that is exceptional for an ancient
City-state. It is a factor of Athens' naval power and dependence.

Besides citizens, Athens also had metics and slaves. The
metics were mostly of zeugetes or thetes level. They were liable
for military service but had no citizen rights; they must have a
prostates, a citizen who would act for them. Also, they paid a
special tax. Much of Athens' trade and finance was in metic hands
– metics were forbidden to own land or houses. But in the 4th
century conditions on all fronts were made somewhat easier. As
to slaves, these were mostly war captives or else bought in the
north and east: Thrace, Scythia and Phrygia. The influx is con-
stant; Athens did not breed her own slaves. It should be noted
that a freed slave at Athens becomes a metic, his former owner
his prostates.

Citizenship is hereditary; it is transmitted through agnatic
lineages of property owners. The term for such a lineage is
"oikos" (although sociologically this term is used more widely).
This does not mean "family"; there is no exact equivalent for
that (and indeed, "family" has more than one meaning in English).
"Oikos" means a household, including its personnel and its live-
stock – the slaves rather being counted with the latter – and
also the house and the land itself. The concept should also ex-
tend to funerary property, the graves of the lineage's ancestors,
on the ancestral land. The term "oikos" groups with three others: "kleros", "kyrios" and "kyreia"; there is also a related term "epiklerate". The kleros is the share in the agricultural land, in principle owned by all full citizens. In the 5th century empire, Athens created kleruchies, military colonies in allied lands (mostly Ionian Islands), partly to pacify them and partly to give land, and with it zeugetes status, to some of her landless thetes. The kyrios is the head of the oikos, the owner/master. Kyreia is his relationship of ownership/domination over his property and dependants; it can be translated as "guardianship", especially in relation to women. There will be more to say on the guardianship of women in later sections. In principle it is the kyrios of the oikos who is the full citizen. As stated earlier, it is only Athenian citizens who are permitted to own land and houses.

Property is transmitted basically in terms of intestate succession. That is, there is no freedom of testacy; wills are made to make bequests only, and even here there are limitations, to protect the integrity of the estate. Again, wills are used to specify the terms of division of the estate between heirs. But the heirs are the sons, and they cannot be disinherited. Daughters ordinarily have a dowry, in place of inheritance. Failing sons, the daughter inherits; this is the epiklerate – the "inherited daughter" – to be discussed below. Failing all legitimate children, the heirs are the agnatic kin, in a hierarchy that considers the males of each degree before the females. There is no inheritance to wives or cognates. The only means to avoid these intestate arrangements is by adoption, that is, the adoption of an adult, usually male. But the point to be grasped in all this is the continuity of the oikos itself: it is considered a great misfortune both for the individual and for the polis that an oikos should die out, and everything possible is done to avoid this. But with this, in the simplest case, where the sons succeed their father, the division of the estate creates a new oikos for each son. Thus the number of the City's oikoi should tend to increase over time; it is not a fixed quantity.

The epiklerate, the daughter (or daughters) who inherits in the failure of sons, are the subject of special laws: the man who
marries her does not take her into his oikos, but enters that of her (deceased) father, and the children continue that lineage. The father's male kin must provide either a husband or a dowry for her. Again, the law provides that the husband of an epiklerate must have intercourse with her at least three times a month. Presumably this is to protect the girl from fortune seekers, and to ensure that the lineage will be perpetuated. Schaps sees here only a desire to see that all Athenian girls are married (which I find dubious on general grounds), but most commentators see here the desire to perpetuate the oikos left without males. (Again, Schaps says that the epiklerate arrangement would not achieve this; that adoption is the only means that would, but I am not clear on his logic, at least in regard to the former point.) (Schaps 1979 p 32 -3, 39 - 42.)

To return however to the simplest case, the inheritance by sons, the point must be made that the devolution of property does not take place at the father's death but at his retirement. This usually occurs at age 60, when he becomes no longer liable for military service. He does not forfeit his citizen rights, but he hands over his affairs to his son(s), and becomes a dependant in his own household. The converse of this is that the son only achieves full adulthood at age 30. This is when he attains full citizen rights, and it is only now (as a rule) that he marries. This as will be seen is basic to Athenian household structure. But during early adulthood - typically age 18 to 30 - the son lives as a dependant in his father's household, subject to his authority and strictly, with his father actual owner of all his property. There is in all these arrangements considerable scope for inter-generational conflict.

The transmission of citizenship is as stated basically hereditary in terms of citizen lineages. Initially, the rule was that the child must have an Athenian citizen father, but Pericles passed a law (B.C. 451) that the mother must be an Athenian citizen too. This is often said to be intended to ensure that Athenian girls were not left unwed, though perhaps another reason can be suggested. But first, there are two other things to be considered: illegitimacy and concubinage. It is difficult to say much
that is definitive on either head; that indeed is part of the point. But there were apparently Athenians who at least had a claim to citizenship yet whose parents were not married. There is a tradition that Cleisthenes removed the illegitimate from the citizen rolls as part of his reforms, though this does not speak for later practice. Points to note here are: first, the lack of properly controlled centralized citizen registers, and second, that in Athenian law, a person who falsely exercised citizenship was liable to enslavement. These points will come up again in a later section. As to concubinage, this can mean many things, and although legally recognized it is not legally defined. But broadly, it is a relationship of common household with a woman with a view to the procreation of free children—free, not citizen. The status of the woman might be various: she might be a slave (in which case her children would be freed), or a metic, or an Athenian citizen. In any case, the children would be illegitimate. But the point is that here is a relationship which is like marriage but is not marriage. I am unclear as to exactly how the Athenians themselves defined these things in relation to each other, and indeed it may well be that they never really did so. Certainly marriage was a private compact between oikoi; it was not a function either of the state or of the public religion. But the question is: are the children of an Athenian citizen concubine citizens?

I believe that the best answer to this question, and the best understanding of all the matters in the above paragraph, comes from consideration of the status stratification of the Athenian citizenry, and the background of social conflicts between the strata. On the one side, an aristocracy does not willingly accept status equality with the common people, and one of its main resources in this is to distinguish between sexual unions among themselves, and the children born of them, and sexual unions formed with the common people, and the children born of them. Only the former are considered to be "marriage" and "legitimate". On the other side, the polis is a community, a consociation of warriors, in which the common people will insist upon an ultimate equality of status of all citizens. Again, in this the touchstone
will be the legitimacy of sexual unions and of the children born of them. The balance between the strata in these conflicts is largely decided by military factors, especially the rise of hoplite infantry formations. But it was common in Antiquity for Cities to interfere in each others' affairs, or for warring factions to call in external aid. In particular, it is a common resource for aristocracies to intermarry with foreign aristocracies.

In sum, what I am suggesting here is that concubinage is (or at least is decisively shaped by) a union between aristocrat and commoner. Thus it has the characteristic that, while the children do not have full inheritance rights, the woman does have a protected status and, most importantly, the children have citizenship. With this, a broad principle is established: that in the last analysis the arbiter of rightful birth is the citizen community as a whole not the aristocracy, and that a child cannot be disqualified from citizenship on the basis of a refusal of recognition by the father or his kin. Illegitimacy is never much spoken of in classical Antiquity. Marriage is not the condition of citizenship and, as stated, is a private compact between oikoi only. In time, with Pericles' law, this extends to a recognition that the mother plays a part in conveying citizenship, and also to interdict the aristocracy from intermarriage with the aristocracies of other Cities, compelling them to intermarry within their own City. This should be seen in the context of the consolidation and development of the Athenian democracy (though this in turn occurs in the context of developing empire and continuing inter-City struggles). But the processes are general to Antiquity, and something similar can also be seen at Rome.

Concubinage, whatever its background in terms of status unequal unions within the citizenry, is also found as a union across the status differences of free and slave, and of citizen and metic. This indeed is apparently the common form of concubinage in the classical period. In both cases, marriage is forbidden; in the former case, the children would ordinarily be freed, and therefore would be metics. Although little concrete is known of concubinage, it seems that in the 4th century especially some
citizens were taking concubines in preference to marrying. The relationship and status are legally recognized: for instance, concubinage is covered by the laws on adultery just as marriage is.

From one point of view, the oikos can be regarded as the material basis of citizenship, in particular, in terms of land, livestock and slaves – farming property. The Solonic classes were defined on this assumption, as I have already indicated, though in fact the lowest class, the thetes, were typically the urban poor, often owning no more than a garden plot at best (leaving house ownership aside). The Solonic reforms themselves are not securely known, but as I have indicated earlier, they were intended to resolve typical social conflicts over usury and debt slavery. Apparently they freed the enslaved and possibly cancelled debts, though they did not redistribute land. But in the Peisistratid tyranny that followed, state support was given to increase the income from small farming, in terms of substituting olives and vines for barley (which became increasingly replaced by imported wheat). The point to grasp here, and it is general for ancient City-state civilization, is the marginal position of the small peasant. At best, his citizenship depends on his being able to equip himself as a hoplite; at worst, economic misfortune – and the denial of justice – can expropriate him and lose him and his wife and children their freedom. In this situation, reproduction is precarious: under-reproduction may result in the oikos dying out, but over-reproduction can result either immediately in too heavy demands on the economic resources (which cannot absorb the extra labour), or subsequently in the sub-division of the oikos between heirs into units too small to support dependants. The ideal situation of the peasant citizen is to have one son only, or two to insure against the risks of war and disease. He must also have a wife, and a daughter to exchange for the wife of his heir, but in principle the womenfolk are at least as much a liability as an asset. This is the location of Hesiod, a Boetian peasant of archaic times, and this is the explanation of the misogyny which he introduces into Graeco-Roman culture (it is also in Jewish culture, and for similar reasons).
At Athens in the classical period all this is background. Usury and debt-slavery are in the past, and the zeugetes and even the thetes are recognized as militarily essential and have a strong political and legal position. Moreover there is state pay for military service and performance of citizen duties such as attendance at the Assembly - the basis of this being profits from war and tribute from the empire. It is this that enables the zeugetes and thetes to exercise an active citizenship in practice; it also makes war attractive, and peace unattractive, for these classes, especially the urban poor. However it should be realized that this does not radically alter the situation of the peasant citizen. It ameliorates his condition in that now the worst he faces is declassment to thetes level; a change in both political and military conditions, and perhaps a move from the country to the city. In practice, peasant citizens will have generally transmitted the farm to the elder son, and let the younger son go to the city to become a thetes. But though the pressures are lessened, the situation of the peasant, and his ideal response to those pressures, are exactly what they were. It is the condition of the urban poor that has radically changed.

The urban poor are typically artisans, craftsmen and shopkeepers - wage labour is uncommon. All these activities are shared indifferently with slaves. Indeed, so far as an active citizenship implies a certain degree of leisure, the tendency is to have slaves in these activities. State pay then for military service and performance of citizen duties was important. The basis here was simply that the political community should divide its spoils: as stated, the polis is fundamentally a consociation of warriors. But the significance of this additional income goes somewhat beyond questions of citizenship. Ordinarily, the urban poor of ancient Cities are not a self-reproductive class; this by reason of the generally poor hygiene of cities, compounded by poverty, squalor, and a lack of women's work compatible with pregnancy and motherhood. The recruitment of the urban poor comes mainly from immigration from the countryside - the pressures that drive this should be clear from the foregoing paragraphs. The other major source is the importation of slaves. Indeed, the two
things are related, for if debt-slavery is eliminated, then importation on whatever basis must become the source of the slave supply. At Athens, both inputs to the urban population are found - as the great size of the city suggests. But it also seems clear that the thetes themselves contributed to the city's reproduction: unlike the urban poor of most ancient Cities, they did marry and raise children (although mortality rates may have been high). It should be noted however that state pay is for adult males only, and takes no account of dependants. Although productive property and its division on devolution are not factors here as they are for the peasant, nonetheless the economic pressures to have few children are overwhelming.

As to the upper Solonic classes, these are basically owners of property, farming and urban, including slaves, living off rents and the produce of their estates (trade and finance are metic activities). On the face of it, these should be free from the kinds of pressures discussed above, but that is deceptive. The need is to maintain a status, and therefore the economic basis for that status, in the face of limited chances for the acquisition of new wealth. Therefore the pressures on the division of patrimony, and for the limitations of the numbers of children, are essentially the same as for the peasantry. What is most interesting here is that an aristocracy will usually try to meet this situation by distinguishing between legitimate and non-legitimate sexual relations and procreation, limiting the division of patrimony to the former. I have already discussed the issues involved in this. At Athens, the common people insisted on an ultimate conubium restricted to the citizenry.

In sum then, the pressures on all citizen strata are to few children. Especially the pressures are to few daughters, for daughters must be dowered, and moreover are generally not very productive economically (as will be seen later). But also, as stated earlier, the ideal is to have one son, plus one in reserve perhaps. This is to consider the raising of legitimate children within the citizenry only. The obvious recourses then are infanticide and exposure. These indeed are taken for granted throughout classical Antiquity (and indeed all the Ancient Civilization);
perhaps for that very reason, it is difficult to say anything concrete about them specifically at classical Athens. But the point can be made that it is exposure of children that is the attested practice, and that this is one of the inputs into the slave trade: in particular, exposed girl-children are often found and raised as slave prostitutes. Prostitution itself offers a further recourse against over-reproduction, in that the reproductive outcome (for the man) need not be considered. This will be taken up later.

As to the non-citizen elements of the population, these are metics and slaves. In the classical period, slaves are mostly imported or war captives, the sources usually being to the north and east: Thrace, Scythia and Phrygia. The women were mostly used in domestic service; many of the men worked in the silver mines at Laureion, though some worked in the city at crafts and trades, often living independently from their owners. But slaves even in this category did not usually have families, and the Athenians did not try to breed slaves or to encourage slaves to breed. If a slave-girl had children by a citizen father (which was not unusual), the children were usually freed. A freed slave became a metic. Most metics however were immigrant, or of free immigrant origin; mostly other Greeks, but in the 4th century also for example Phoenicians or Egyptians. Most metics were of zeugetes or thetes level, but they were forbidden to own land or houses. Some made their living as artisans and shopkeepers like the rest of the urban poor, but their significance was especially in trade and in finance, which were largely in metic hands. But although both the economic and the civic position of the metic are distinctive, it is doubtful that this would result in distinctive family practices. The proverb "when in Rome do as the Romans do" is general to classical Antiquity. As against this, many of the heterae of Athens were metics; again, Athenian men might take metic girls as concubines (marriage with them being forbidden). There will be more to say on this later.

The classical period at Athens is really too short for much to be said about population movements. The city itself certainly grew tremendously, especially in the 5th century, though this
probably reflects rural-urban migration and the slave-trade more than simple increase of the citizenry. Mortality always tends to be episodic; Athens was not well provided with clean water and sewers like a Roman city, and the civic splendour of her public buildings contrasts with private squalor in her streets and houses. There was a severe plague at the beginning of the Peloponnesian Wars. Also it is interesting that after the classical period many of the richer families began to die out for lack of children—this also happens at Rome at the end of the Republic. However it is outside the scope of the present chapter.

What should be mentioned is that some scholars have suggested that the sex-ratio at Athens was out of balance, perhaps to the extent of two males to every female. Pomeroy considers this to hold throughout classical Antiquity; Guttentag contrasts Athens with Sparta (Pomeroy 1975 Appendix; Guttentag and Secord 1983 ch 2). It is doubtful if there is evidence capable of resolving this; also, exposure of girl-children, which is cited as a major factor, would not have this result if the girls were taken and raised as slaves (nor is it certain that exposure was practised at classical Athens). Broadly, however, a sex-ratio imbalance among the citizenry at Athens does at least make sense; it is a possibility that should be borne in mind.

Family and Community

The oikos, as well as being the lineage and its material endowment in land and livestock, is also in direct sense the household. As such, it typically centre on a small nuclear family plus a few slaves. This picture must be qualified by the system of property devolution. As I have indicated earlier, Athenian men do not come to full adulthood until age 30, and they continue to live in their parents' household until that time, but the father generally retires at age 60, and passes control of his oikos to his son. If he has more than one son, there is a division to form new oikoi. It is only now, as kyrie of their own oikoi, that the sons will marry. The adult son, then, does not bring a wife into his father's household. However, the retired parents will go to
live as dependants in one of their sons' households. But it is only in this limited sense that the Athenian household extends to three generations. Moreover authority is clearly with the kyrios, not with the eldest male, and it is the nuclear family that is basic. It should be realized also that the frequency with which this situation actually occurs is subject to high mortality rates.

Men's marriages were ordinarily deferred until the attainment of full citizenship, but girls were married young, about age 15. Formally, the man might act here for himself (though his father might decide the matter for him), but for the girl, the marriage is arranged by her kyrios—father, brother, or whoever—and she may not even be informed in advance, far less have to consent. This holds especially for first marriages; on remarriage the woman might perhaps at least make her voice heard. In practice, marriages are generally arranged, often through go-betweens (generally older women), and considerations of property and inheritance are often paramount; the partners are often within the anchisteia, that is, the hierarchy of kin relations which (on the father's side) determine the laws of inheritance. (Thus the partners are at least likely to be known to each other.) This offers some protection to the property of the lineage against repeated divisions and fragmentation. There are incest laws limiting this, but they permit marriage even as close as half siblings. Again, I have mentioned that the epiklerate must be either married or dowered from within her anchisteia. At the level of the eupatridae of course there is a wider and more long-standing principle of inter-marriage at one's own social level. This practice is likely to differ a little from that of the lower strata, in exchanging property between lineages and in reinforcing the solidarity of the upper strata. It would at least be a question of genos rather than of anchisteia.

Legally, marriage is a private compact between oikoi. It is not a function of the state or of the public religion, as I have said before. Again, the definitions that distinguish it from concubinage (so far as there are any) are not wholly clear. But the basis of legal marriage is the betrothal, made before witnesses,
at which the purpose of bearing legitimate children is specified, and the dowry is agreed. This ordinarily takes place shortly before the marriage itself. The marriage too is ceremonially marked, culminating in the procession that takes the couple from the wife's parental household to the marital household (and later puts them to bed with each other); and so also is the day after the marriage, on which the dowry is handed over. But all these are family affairs, and the religious dimension of the ceremonies is at the level of the household gods and shrines, not those of the City. It should be realized that the crucial public ceremony, political, legal and religious, is the son's coming of age. It is then, not at his birth or at his parent's marriage, that his right to citizenship is established. This will be discussed in a later section.

The wife's dowry is set against her inheritance portion — women's inheritance rights at Athens are quite restricted, as will be discussed later. The dowry might be in property or in cash. It is intended for the girl's maintenance throughout her life, and whoever controls her dowry is responsible for her maintenance. For the dowry is not in her possession but in that of her husband; if the marriage is dissolved, then it is passed to whoever her kyrios now is — her father, brother, or other male agnate. But the dowry cannot be used at their discretion or for their own purposes; she has a definite right against it. Dowry is not essential to marriage, but it is important, and kin have a responsibility for it; indeed the provision of dowries for the poor can be a public benefaction. Again, the size of dowries is a controlling factor making for marriages at the same social level. In addition to dowry, the woman may have a trousseau of personal movable property, probably of small size.

Divorce is basically unrestricted, on the initiative of the husband or, initially, of the wife's father; he however loses the right to dissolve the marriage when the first child is born. As to the wife's right to divorce, formally she can do so freely, by presenting a written deposition before the polemarch magistrate. In practice however, women were largely illiterate and largely secluded, as will be seen, so that there are real difficulties
here, and besides, the woman must have somewhere to go. In effect, one can assume that she would have to have the support of her male kin. It should be noted that in the event of adultery the man must divorce his wife; he has no choice in this. Also, a recognized cause for divorce is the wish to marry an epiklerate, especially a rich one. Against this, regardless of any question of initiative or fault, the divorced wife's dowry is never subject to confiscation or fine. It is always handed over intact to her new kyrios.

In the event of dissolution of marriage, whether through divorce or widowhood, the wife will return to her family of origin. Her dowry is her maintenance. Her children however will remain with her husband or with his kin, and if she is pregnant at the time of dissolution, this child too will be handed over some time after birth. Moreover, the wife does not have a right of access to her children: they are her husband's children, not hers. As against this, remarriage is common; the divorced or widowed woman does not expect to stay single. However, her marriage again will be arranged.

Within the household the wife is mistress, despite her youth (especially relative to her husband). It is possible that her husband's mother may also be in the household, but the basic family is nuclear, and it is the wife who shares with the husband in the household cult, who controls the slaves and young children and girls, allocates work and materials, and holds the keys to the storerooms. Commonly however the husband will keep her under his tutelage in these matters for the first year or two of their marriage — perhaps till after their first child is born. But it is in the above terms that the wife's role in the household is to be seen: even the poorest families are likely to have had a slave housemaid, and the bulk of housework and of childcare are so far as possible devolved to slaves. The wealthier will even employ wet-nurses, in preference to breast-feeding their babies themselves. Among the most important household duties are spinning and weaving: the wife will engage in this and also teach it to her daughters. Bread is bought, though most other cooking is done at home. But the wife's functions are centrally to bear children —
not to raise them —, to oversee the workforce — not to do house-
work herself —, and to be chatelaine of the household's stores
and contents. But with this, Athenian house structure is defined
by a strongly marked separation of public quarters and women's
quarters, and women are confined to the latter — possibly even
locked in at night by the kyrios.

In keeping with this, the position of women in the community
beyond the household is negligible. An exception must be made
here for the thetes women, who must sell their wares in the agora.
But above this level women seem to have been largely secluded.
Even shopping was dealt with by the menfolk or by slaves. And all
public life in terms of political, legal and military affairs was
for men only. Only the religious festivals and processions involv-
ed the citizen women in the life of the City. It is not certain
how far this includes the drama — this was performed at the fest-
ivals of Dionysus. Women may have attended the tragedy but not
the comedy. In private life, women might visit kin or neighbours,
especially for the birth of a child. Again, drawing water was
women's work, and the wells might have been meeting places for
women. Also there are women's public baths, though these have
nothing of the place in social life that they have at Rome.
Broadly, however, although the dictum in the speech that Thucyd-
ides constructs for Pericles (Thucydides 1962 p 122), that a wom-
an should so conduct herself: that nothing is said of her for good
or for ill, is usually quoted out of context (it referred only to
the expression of their grief for the dead, on that one occas-
ion), it does seem an apt generalization: that beyond the poorest
stratum, Athenian women had no place in communal or public life.

In keeping with this also, the domestic household is not a
centre of social life. On the contrary, social life is conducted
where men meet: in the agora, at gymnasia, etc. Men were members
of thiasai (dining clubs), and would eat and meet with their
friends there rather than at home, where only women, children and
slaves ate together. Otherwise, if the domestic home were used,
it would be the public quarters (literally, the men's quarters),
while the womenfolk remained in the women's quarters. Wives neith-
er played the hostess nor accompanied their husbands as guests.
Where there was female company, it took professional form: flute-girls, dancing girls and hetaerae. But symposia – dinner parties – would often go into talk on public affairs, or (what was related) into sophistry or philosophy or other cultural matters, which were assumed to be beyond the competence of women. It is a strongly marked characteristic of Athenian society that men and women are not companions to each other, especially within the citizenry and within marriage. This colours the pattern of family relations, and also of sexual relations, both with hetaerae and with homosexual love. Again, I have pointed earlier to the contrast between splendid public buildings and cramped and squalid residential streets and houses.

All this is to deal with the citizenry, and with the proviso that for the thetes level arrangements must have differed somewhat. This leavesmetics and slaves to be considered. For the former indeed, I have suggested that the principle "when in Rome do as the Romans do" held, at least for ordinary families. However, it should be remembered that hetaerae were often metics; and indeed, a brothel or an inn (often little different) is a household too. But to turn rather to slaves, many male slaves were at the silver mines at Laureion; as against which the usual household slave was female, though there were also male house-slaves. The Athenians did not encourage sexual relations between their slaves; on the contrary, they tended to lock up their female slaves in the women's quarters, on the same basis as their wives and daughters. On the other hand, sexual relations between the free men of the household and the slave-girls were taken for granted. Indeed, given that adult sons were remaining as single dependants in their fathers' households until age 30, such relations were favoured, and the son might be bought a slave-girl specifically for this purpose. This is one of the forms of concubinage; as I have said earlier, the children (if any) would usually be freed. Presumably at marriage the girl too would be given her freedom – for these relationships were often emotionally committed. Indeed, in the 4th century especially some citizens appear to have preferred these relationships to citizen marriage, and there is little question that emotional warmth is the
reason (this can also be seen, much more clearly, at Rome). However, this is not the only source of concubinage. More will be said on this later.

This is for the city households. For the country, less can be said, although slaves do not seem to have been much used in agriculture. But generally the position of female slaves in country households is unlikely to have been different from the town: the Athenians did not typically use female labour in the fields, except perhaps at harvest time, when extra labour was likely to be on temporary hire. For slaves, a greater difference is likely to have been for those in the city practising their crafts independently and living away from their owners. In most respects, these would simply be part of the urban poor. But both because almost all crafts are male work – therefore such slaves are male – and for poverty (slaves have no state pay of course), it is hard to envisage slave families in this location. Rather these men will have formed transient relations with prostitutes – the only equivalent female craft, and one with little scope for pregnancy and motherhood. To an extent, this is also likely to have held for the poorer element of the metics, though they should be paid for their military service. Broadly, then, it is only in regard to the citizen element of the urban poor that Athens is atypical in providing the conditions in which they can maintain dependants and raise families. For the rest, as in most ancient City-states, this was not generally possible.

Metics pay the metic tax, and they have no political-legal citizenship; they must have a citizen sponsor, a prostates, to act for them and answer for them. A freed slave became a metic, his (or her) former owner his prostates. But the duties of freed slave to former owner are limited, indeed may be non-existent. Patron-client relations are not really a feature of Athenian society. More important are private associations, such as the dining clubs (thiasai) mentioned earlier, and the phratries. These last were, as I have said, disengaged from the political macro-structure by the reforms of Cleisthenes, which now based the phylae on the demes; again, if formal links had subsisted between the phratry and the genos, these are now lost (genoi being limited to the
eupatrid lineages). But the phratries remained important: in particular, they kept account of marriages and births and comings of age, so that the evidence of the phratry could be important if there was a legal challenge to one's right to citizenship. (The unrightful exercise of citizenship was punishable with enslavement.) Yet it was generally to one's demesmen that one turned for testimony as to one's character in legal proceedings. The force of these points will be seen more clearly later when the legal system is discussed. But the central point is that Athens has no state prosecutor and limited policing arrangements: the legal system functions on the basis of citizens' self-help. In this, it is important to have friends or kin who will act to protect one and see that everything is done legally.

As to actual kinship, the basic structure, as indicated before, is the anchisteia. This seems to centre on one's siblings and half-siblings and their descendants - in the case of half-siblings, common father is considered before common mother -; and it extends out as far as either children of cousins or children of second cousins - it is not certain which. For inheritance purposes the anchisteia is only reckoned agnatically, but for other purposes no distinction seems to be made between agnates and cognates. These purposes would include for example vengeance in the case of homicide. Again, provision of dowries or burial of the dead would be provided by the anchisteia, and as I have mentioned, marriages are often within the degrees of the anchisteia, in order to protect property against fragmentation. However, it should not be thought that because here is a structure, the Athenians must have done everything on the basis of it. Even legal self-help groups and supporters might be drawn from one's phratry, deme, neighbours (one does not necessarily live in the deme where one is registered), or just friends. The anchisteia is more important as a set of conceptions built into the law than as a blueprint for actual acting groups of people.

In all these matters - prostates relations, private associations, kinship - the central point to grasp is that the division between public affairs and the private household remains absolute, and that public affairs are the domain of men only. This
holds at the level of the local community as much as at that of the state. Women are confined to the domestic sphere and are kept within the authority of their menfolk, with little qualification. So far as this is softened, it is as much at the level of the state – religious festivals and processions, even the written approach to the polemarch for divorce – as at the level of the community – mainly the wife's continuing relations with her kin, and presumably some informal contacts with neighbours. The situation here (in strong contrast to Rome) is quite coherent and straightforward.

**Sexual Polarity**

**Fertility and Maternity**

Men marry about age 30; women about age 15. The purpose of marriage is specified as the procreation of legitimate children, and pregnancy and childbirth will typically come soon after marriage. Having been brought up in a small nuclear family, where the slaves do not usually have families, the girl's knowledge of her own biology may well be limited. On the other hand, since the age of marriage is near that of puberty, there is no obvious reason to withhold knowledge, and Greek mythology draws heavily on themes of sex and fertility. On the whole, it does not appear that Athenian girls were wholly ignorant or misinformed, though they may have been naive. Again, the young wife is mistress of her own household; she is not under the authority and supervision of the resident female kin of her husband, though it is possible that her mother-in-law is in the house. If she is initially under supervision, it is likely to be that of her husband. But she is relatively isolated, even from her own female kin, moreover the female slaves are her husband's rather than her own, and also may not be very fluent in Greek. On the whole, the young wife does not have much positive female support, nor good access to dependable information.

Childbirth itself is something which does involve female kin and neighbours. These will include an experienced midwife who will
assist at the birth. On the other hand, this is apparently remote from the physician's profession, and pregnancy and childbirth are unlikely to have actual medical supervision. Childbirth takes place lying down in bed, a position and location which emphasize the woman's passivity. There will certainly have been both infant and childbed mortality, but their rates cannot be assessed.

The child's birth is publicly announced at once, by displaying on the doorposts of the house a laurel wreath if the child is male, a strip of wool if female. But it is not until five days later for a boy, seven for a girl, that the father normally accepts the child. Five days after that, the child is named, and the mother's post-natal purification is completed. It is not certain whether exposure was practised at classical Athens, but formally at least the father seems to have had the right to decide whether the child should be exposed or raised, and also to have been the one to name the child. For the child is part of his lineage; as noted earlier, it is he who keeps custody of the children if the marriage is dissolved. The wife will not even keep a right of access. The basic orientation is to the perpetuation of the husband's oikos.

Young children are in the overall care of their mother, and are kept in the women's quarters. This lasts until the age of 6 or 7 for the boy, after which he passes into his father's hands; for the girl, it lasts until her marriage. The boy's education is the father's responsibility, but it is the mother who sees to the girl's, and who oversees her conduct. But in actuality, the bulk of child-care is the work of slaves - even the poorest households will have one or two domestic slaves, whose duties will include these functions. The better off will also use wet-nurses, rather than breastfeed their babies themselves. These may be slave or free, but in either case are likely to come from beyond the household - that is, to be brought in for the duration of their contract. Typically the relations between wet-nurses, and childcare slaves generally, and their charges were warm and enduring. But the mother's emotional involvement with her children is likely to have been limited, though possibly less so with her daughters. The wife's function, as I have remarked, is to bear children, not
to raise them. Yet divorce never became as casual at Athens as it did at Rome.

Slave families are not typical for Athens, but there were certainly families based on concubinage. Here the pattern of mother-child relations is likely rather to have followed that of wet-nurse and childcare slaves with their charges, for the relationship is more secure: the children, being illegitimate (and usually free) are not part of the father's lineage, and whatever property settlements are involved will be in terms of bequests not of inheritances. The greater (and more uncomplicated) emotional warmth here is, as with the sexual relationship itself, apparently the major attraction.

Athenian families are small: typically 2 - 3 children. This is general to all classical Antiquity, and the kinds of reasons for it have already been discussed. But the means by which the limitation is achieved is another matter, in which it must be remembered that what is being considered is not the number of children the wife bears, but the number of legitimate children the husband raises. There are then four obvious ways of limiting family size: infanticide, exposure, contraception and abortion. For the first two, I have already commented that in Antiquity children are generally exposed, with a fair chance of being found and raised, rather than actually killed outright (or thrown to the dogs, as apparently in the Ancient Near East), and also that we cannot be sure whether this was practised at classical Athens. However, probably prostitutes and similarly placed women did have to abandon their babies. This might (logically at least) be the background for some wet-nurses, though the preference is generally for a woman of good character not an ex-prostitute.

As to contraception and abortion, there are again difficulties, for our main sources are medical and similar texts, and this may not be wholly appropriate. In the first place, Athens is not a centre for Greek medicine; the Ionian islands of Cos and Cnidos are the centres. Secondly, classical Greek medicine is largely a matter of trying to relate the subjective report of symptoms to the systems of natural philosophy, without engaging in dissection. Its anatomy and physiology then are limited, and its gynaecology
is frankly eccentric. Only briefly at Alexandria in Hellenistic times does a true medical science appear in Antiquity. The best that can be said is that Athenian citizen men do not seem to have wanted contraception and abortion for their wives. On the other hand, there will certainly have been a lore among midwives and prostitutes on contraception and abortion methods. As with Egyptian medicine, this lore could have had strong empirical elements.

Beyond this, there are sexual practices that do not lead to pregnancy, for example anal or oral intercourse. It seems clear that the Athenians used these whether or no with their wives. But it seems hard to avoid the view that on the whole, Athenian men adjusted their sexual intercourse with their wives to the needs of procreation, and otherwise used other women, especially prostitutes. This will be taken up in a later section.

Maturation

Families were small: 2 - 3 children in a nuclear household, with slaves but probably without slave children. Babies were swaddled; this might suggest something about cultural attitudes, though it presumably has no bearing on personality development. For the first years, boys and girls seem to have been little differentiated, apparently sharing the same toys, games and pets. They are cared for by slaves and kept in the women's quarters, under the overall care of their mother. Sexual differentiation comes in the 6th year, when the boy is handed over to his father's care, and starts school. The girl meantime continues at home, in the care of her mother in the women's quarters.

Greek education has a complex history, but only some basic points need to be presented here. Boys go first to grammar school; there they are taught reading and writing, poetry (especially Homer), and mythology, music (especially the lyre), and dancing - display-dancing, that is, not dancing with a partner. Physical training comes at a later stage, in adolescence. This takes place at the gymnasium, and is where the boy acquires the basis of his later military skills as a soldier. Principally this means as a hoplite: it is not clear how far down the social scale education
extended, but it probably did not include the urban poor, either at gymnasium or grammar school. Literacy even among men seems to have been well short of universal.

There is a higher level of intellectual education that enters Athens in the mid-5th century. On the one side, it comprises teaching in the citizen skills of public speaking, often taught by alien intellectuals (sophists); on the other side, there is an Athenian response of critical analysis of such speeches and the issues they deal with. These, as rhetoric and philosophy, eventually became the two pillars of Graeco-Roman education. Initially however the Athenians were rather hostile. Mainly, this higher education was taken up by (or aimed at) young adults, that is, young men in their twenties. However, there were often paedagogic relationships between this age-group and adolescents at the gymnasia, introducing them into citizen affairs: this is the classic location of Athenian homosexuality. I will return to this in the next section.

At age 18, the father introduces his son into his phratry, at a ceremony called the apatouria; and he is also registered as a citizen with his deme. After a year as an ephēbes, the young man becomes liable for military service. But he is still a dependant in his father's household, under his father's authority.

The son will have sexual relationships, with prostitutes or hetairai or with a concubine, a slave-girl in his father's house (with his father's consent). But not until age 30 does he marry and come into his inheritance, taking over his father's oikos or founding his own. And only at age 30 does he acquire Assembly rights, to vote, speak, hold office, and so on, and become a full adult citizen.

At the level of craft skills, training is mostly by induction into the workshop, whether as child of the family, apprentice or slave. The workshop and the household were generally little differentiated, and free and unfree labour worked side by side indifferently. But much of the recruitment of the City's craftsmen came from the influx of trained and skilled slaves. It must be said that prostitution probably recruits in these ways too, at least at its more basic levels. The brothel or inn is simply a
workshop/household, and the prostitute an artisan. The education of the hetaera however might be a different matter. But the citizen girl should be considered before taking this up.

Girls remain at home in the women's quarters, and in their mother's care, until marriage. That is, they pass directly from childhood into adulthood. Their education in this time is limited, above all to spinning and weaving. They might learn something about household management and the control of slaves by observation, and they might be told something about childcare, and about their own biology. Again, they must have some knowledge of mythology, to take part in the City's religion - festivals and processions. In particular, Artemis guards women's lives and functions: childhood, virginity, menstruation, childbirth, sickness and death. The girl must then learn something about this. However literacy among women was probably rare. Even so, the paradox should be grasped, that the control of a big household demands literacy in a way that the Assembly does not.

The girl's marriage is about age 15; menarche is probably about age 13. Whatever knowledge she has, the girl will be a virgin. On the eve of her marriage, she dedicates her childhood toys and clothes to Artemis, and her childhood ends.

Hetaerae are often metics: Corinth and Cyprus are the two great centres of prostitution in the Greek World, not Athens. Yet girls (usually slaves) are also brought up to become hetaerae, perhaps foundlings or bought as children, with the purpose of enabling the madam-hetaera to retire. In some ways, the education of these girls resembles that of citizen boys, especially in terms of dancing and music (though here this means the cithara, flute and voice). There might also be some knowledge of literate culture, though this might rather be acquired by an older woman. "Hetaera" means "companion"; there was little companionship between husband and wife. The hetaera was also taught social deportment and conduct; indeed one senses a certain resonance here with the upbringing of the citizen girl, for Athenian men apparently liked shyness and naivete in their sexual partners (this shows also in homosexual love). But above all the hetaera is a sexual companion; she will be taught skills of lovemaking, and probably
also of fertility control. The madam's ultimate ambition may be to sell the girl, or at least to let a patron buy her freedom. There will be more on these matters in later sections.

Sexuality

Men marry about age 30, to girls about age 15. The man will already have sexual experience, for example with prostitutes; the girl will be a virgin, and although not necessarily wholly ignorant of sexual matters, is probably fairly naive. These points I have already discussed. But the quality of the sexual relationship in marriage, so far as it can be assessed, is probably grounded less on these matters directly than on the location of marriage in the legitimate perpetuation of the lineage and the citizen body, subject to the pressures on fertility discussed earlier: there must be children, but not too many. I have suggested that the basic way in which Athenian men achieved this was by not using their wives as their main sexual outlet, but orienting the marital sexual relationship to the needs of procreation. This does not necessarily mean that no sexual harmony was established, but rather that it would tend to be of brief duration, lasting for the first year or two only (perhaps until the first pregnancy). Beyond this, husbands would have relations with prostitutes or hetaerae. It seems that generally, husband and wife did not sleep together, but the menfolk would often sleep in the public (men's) rooms of the house. However, there seems to be no denial of the existence of the wife's sexuality: no conception of feminine "purity". There is a public interest in the marital sexual relationship: in the event of adultery, for example, the man must divorce, and any citizen can prosecute the wife's lover. Again, the husband of the epikleros must have intercourse with her at least thrice per month (incidentally, that figure surely says something about the expected frequency of sexual intercourse in marriage). The rituals of marriage entail strong pressures to the defloration of the bride on the wedding night, indicating that their sexual relationship is not simply their own affair.

Adultery at Athens means sexual intercourse with any woman.
within another man's kyreia. This could include his wife, daughter, sister, or even widowed mother, or again, a concubine living in his household. The woman is publicly disgraced - if his wife, he must divorce her - and the man may be killed on the spot, or prosecuted before the Assembly. In face of this, and given the seclusion of women, there is limited scope for love-affairs between citizens. As to women indeed, rape and seduction are little distinguished; seduction is considered the greater crime in that it corrupts the woman's mind as well as her body (and may put the husband's property as well as his progeny at risk). But both are crimes against the husband, and neither exonerates the woman herself. (The oikos being a religious community, it would be sacrilege for a stranger, that is, an illegitimate child, to offer sacrifices to the ancestors or to the household gods.) As to men, extra-marital sexual relations are with concubines or hetaerae, or with other men. There is besides of course the more or less casual use of the household slave-girls.

Concubine, hetaera and prostitute rather form a continuum. Concubinage may be difficult to legally distinguish from marriage, as I have argued earlier, but as a sexual relationship it is distinguished by its private and voluntary character and therefore the absence of all the pressures on marriage discussed above. The girl might be citizen, metic or slave; she might be taken by arrangement with her family on terms essentially similar to those of marriage, including a dowry. Generally the understanding seems to be that the relationship is for the procreation of free children; this and common household distinguish the concubine from the hetaera and the prostitute. But indeed, the girl may have been a hetaera or a prostitute, sold by her owner or consenting as a free person herself. It could be the ambition of a hetaera or a prostitute to become a concubine, for the sake of security and love; again, it could be the ambition of those who brought up such girls to sell them as concubines. But in truth there is a lack of hard knowledge as to concubinage, and some of the points above are hard to reconcile with the slave-girl bought for the young man of the house. There is, then, more than one category of concubinage; it is part of a continuum.
As to prostitution, the hetaera and the porne should be distinguished, though again this is a continuum (and there are many Greek terms for prostitutes). "Hetaera" is literally "companion"; "courtesan" is the conventional translation. The term indicates a degree of cultural refinement, though the companionship in question is certainly sexual: the evidence of literary anecdote should be taken with the orgy scenes of the vase-painters. As against this, the porne is the common prostitute of the brothels, inns and streets, offering simply sexual intercourse, and probably to a less refined clientele. Generally the clientele of the hetaerae were more affluent, while that of the pornai were the urban poor (including slaves) and visiting sailors. Neither clientele, it should be noted, specifically includes the young.

In terms of background and status, hetaerae were often metics, or the slaves of metic hetaerae; important centres from or at least through which they might have come are Corinth and Cyprus. Pornai are more likely to have been slaves, often from the north-east: Thrace, Phrygia and Scythia. Yet there are probably also poor citizen girls here. Exposure of baby girls is a classic source for recruitment into prostitution. Graeco-Roman comedy from Menander onwards uses the theme of the young man in love with a courtesan that he cannot marry, until the amulet she has worn since babyhood is found to prove that she is of citizen birth. But this begins just after our period ends, and as I have said earlier it is not clear whether this happened at Athens itself. After the ending of debt-slavery most of Athens' slaves come from predation abroad.

Prostitution will be discussed again, under the head Sexual Divisions in the Economy. But considered here in the realm of sexual relationships, it is perhaps the compatibility with courtship that should be stressed, for the young hetaera at least. This could lead to her becoming a concubine, or having her freedom bought and being set up in her own establishment as her patron's mistress. From this she might progress to running her own establishment, and raising and training girls herself. But the hetaera's household is basically a brothel; hetaerae do not merely accompany their clients to dinner parties. Again, the activit-
ies at brothel and inn are probably not much different, even if the company is less refined. As I have said, this is a continuum.

Homosexuality, as I have indicated earlier, is most characteristically a relationship between a young man in his twenties and an adolescent boy, and is directed to forming the boy's character. This indeed is fairly general in archaic Greek civilization, the forms being adapted to local conditions. There is a distinct ethos here, distinguishing the roles of lover and beloved; for the latter, to be pursued was cause for pride, but to surrender was cause for shame—at least, to surrender too easily. Again, the lover would give his beloved gifts, but a citizen who prostituted himself lost his citizenship. Yet the affair did come to consummation. The mode of sexual intercourse was interfemoral (between the thighs); this should be a favour that the beloved grants to his lover, while making a point of remaining unmoved himself. The lover's role was also not unequivocal: he should be moved by love and beauty, not simply by sexual desire. But indeed, the location of homosexuality in Athens is equivocal. There are other forms, for example male prostitution; and men who were preferentially homosexual rather than bisexual, and kept this orientation into later life, might be regarded with contempt. Older men were kept away from watching boys at the gymnasia. With this, it is possible that the homosexual culture at Athens was a factor of eupatrid discontent with the democracy, and an admiration of and desire for alliance with Sparta—despite the rivalry and even wars between the Cities.

Of lesbianism, virtually nothing is known. (Sappho herself lived in archaic times, on an Aolian island; besides, very little is known about her.)

The treatment of sex in Athenian culture is not altogether easy to assess. There are strong themes of sexuality and fertility in the mythology and religion, and this shows in for example monumental sculpture on the temples, as well as in the tragic drama. Yet as I have said earlier, much of this is grounded in an older and little understood civilization, and the classical Athenians were not wholly at ease with it. As against this, the comedies of Aristophanes are sexually outspoken, largely for purposes.
of political satire. There is little love-poetry. There is however a discovery of the female nude, especially in the 4th century, and also an interesting evolution in vase-painting, from general orgy scenes to scenes of isolated couples, shown with some tenderness.

In religion, it might be specified that Aphrodite is the goddess of sexual intercourse, rather than of "love". She is associated with Adonis, in what seems to be basically the same myth as links Demeter and Persephone with Iacchus/Dionysus - these are the deities of the Eleusinian Mysteries. But it is the transience of their love, and its lack of issue, that is emphasized here. Aphrodite's cult is especially favoured by prostitutes and concubines: she can probably be taken as their own self-image.

The sexual ambience of Athenian culture I have already touched upon, both in regard to hetaerae and to homosexual relations. Athenian men seem to have enjoyed pursuing naive and shy partners, who surrendered with reluctance (but did surrender). Beyond this, they seem to have regarded sex as physically uncomplicated pleasure, but love as something to be both desired and feared. There is a curious stress, especially in homosexual relations, on keeping one's self-control. In heterosexual relations at least there seems to have been an acceptance that even an unfree partner must be willing. For example, the game of kottabos (throwing the wine dregs) played with hetaerae at parties was used to give them their choice of partner. There is no sado-masochism evident in Athenian sex (and bestiality is a theme of mythology only). But on the whole, the Athenians seem to have found it difficult to reconcile mutual love and sexual enjoyment; the lack of physical mutuality in their homosexual love is as striking as their lack of emotional mutuality in heterosexual intercourse. This is ultimately due, I judge, to the reproductive pressures on citizen marriage, and was best met ultimately in terms of concubinage. The 4th century especially shows this.

Aggression

Classical Athens was strongly oriented to war even by the
standards of the Ancient Civilization: Warfare is continuous throughout the classical period. What is more, the welfare of the common people was dependent on war: state pay for military service and civic duties, derived from booty and tribute. Too, war is directly or indirectly the source of slaves. As such, war victimizes women, as well as excluding them. Military training itself is not merely a matter of weapon craft but also of infantry tactics, manoeuvring in formation. Also of course there is galley rowing. Some Cities would teach their women basic weapon skills, for the last defence of the City in the event of siege and sack ing; Athens however never did this. But there was nowhere any question of women taking the field, or to the seas. At Athens in fact men seem to have monopolized virtually all physical sports and games.

Citizenship, then, as a nexus of political-legal rights and military service is a realm which completely excludes women. Only as members of the religious community of the polis do they have an active citizenship, attending the festivals and processions. This is what the guardianship (kyreia) of women means: that a woman is life-long in the authority of some man, father, husband, brother, adult son, who must act for her in all public matters. This includes control of her dower, and of any property she may have, and also of any economic transactions she undertakes beyond the oikos involving values beyond one medimnos. This is not a negligible amount, perhaps half a week's grain for a household, but it is interesting that the reckoning should be made in terms of natura not of money. All this will be discussed in a later section. Besides this, the woman's guardian (kyrios) must act for her in any legal matter: a woman cannot approach the Assembly in her own person, other than exceptionally by special invitation. What access a woman may have to the magistrates is less clear. The approach to the polemarch for divorce has already been mentioned, and these women traders and shopkeepers must have dealings with the magistrates who oversee the market. But generally it seems that women could not deal with magistrates directly, but only through their kyrios. Again, women seem to have had no appeal against their kyrios' conduct to either magistrates or Assem-
bly, but would have to approach their kin on the matter. However a woman with no kin would approach the magistrates to have a kyrios appointed for her. As against this, it is interesting that a metic woman with no male kin in Athens would be "kyrios of herself" — though she would have a prostates, of course. Even so, it is questionable how far the Athenians really believed women naturally incapable; these were simply the local laws.

Ancient City-states do not really separate their political and legal systems. The Assembly (or Council) is both parliament and law court, and the magistrates are both leaders and law officers — though trials are decided by juries not by judges. At Athens juries were drawn on a quorum basis from the Assembly, though the Areopagus Council dealt with homicides. Again, ancient City-states have no state prosecution service. Instead, while certain categories of cases can only be brought by those affected, others can be brought by any citizen — the citizen prosecutor (sometimes called an "informer"). This gives a distinction roughly equivalent to that between private and public law, or perhaps between civil and criminal law. I have mentioned earlier that a man who committed adultery could be prosecuted by any citizen. It might be added that Athenian law, though less sophisticated (and certainly less well known) than Roman, does undergo some systematic development, especially at the end of the 5th century, when a codification of the law is undertaken. But Athenian law is always much more under the influence of the forensic orator than of the jurisconsult.

Women had no capability to bring cases under this system, neither for themselves nor as citizen prosecutors. On the other hand, cases might be brought for them by a citizen prosecutor where appropriate, not only by their kyrios. The testability of women seems to be exceptional, although the testimony of female slaves — extracted, like all slaves' testimony, under torture — seems to have been accepted. As to the criminousness of women, in some cases at least this was for the jury-trial; there are certainly known prosecutions of hetaerae. But the usual penalties for crime, fines and exile (imprisonment was not used), do not seem appropriate to citizen women. Adultery seems to have been
dealt with privately, so far as the woman was concerned. Her public punishment is to be barred from the religious festivals and forbidden to wear ornaments in public, and she can be assaulted with impunity if she violates these restrictions. But although it is hard to be clear on this, even though women's conduct is expected to be controlled within the household, their menfolk do not seem to have had the right of life or death over them.

Athenian law involves elements of self-help, to bring an accused person before a magistrate, or to hold him while a magistrate is brought. This might involve entering another citizen's house by force - or forcibly preventing such entry. The role of the police (the Scythian archers) in this was very limited. Again, since the laws provided that a foreigner who stayed in the City longer than a month without registering as a metic and taking a prostates could be enslaved, or again, that anyone who exercised citizen rights without being a citizen could be enslaved, kidnapping in the streets was not uncommon. The laws against kidnapping and false enslavement were most severe, but there was a need for personal protection, in terms of citizens who were prepared to act for one's protection. This need might be met by friends, neighbours or kin; at Athens there is little scope for patron-client relations, due presumably to the democracy. But most important here were the phratries, especially as they kept records of births, marriages and comings of age, separate from the citizen rolls kept by the demes. But there would be little protection from these directions for women, of whatever status, and the streets of Athens were not safe for women, especially by night.

Rape in Athens is considered a crime against the kyrios, like seduction, from which indeed it is little distinguished: the woman is not exonerated for her lack of consent. However, there is also the law of hybris. This means something like "assault" or "arrogance" - "treating a free man like a slave" has been suggested, but this law protects slaves, and women, as well as free men. It is a crime for which any citizen can prosecute, and it carries the death penalty. This law is rather a 4th century invention, and convictions may have been difficult in practice to
get; perhaps it had a political purpose in curbing the arrogance of aristocratic youth. But it could be used for example to prosecute the rape of a metic woman. Probably however the Athenians would consider that a prostitute or a slave could not be raped; certainly these were sometimes temporarily abducted. (Yet as I have argued earlier, the Athenians looked for sexual consent in their partners. Abduction is not rape, though it is often the sense that "rape" is given in classical Antiquity.)

A man who committed adultery could be killed there and then by the kyrios if caught in the act. Otherwise the kyrios was entitled to physically abuse him, short of wounding him with a weapon, before the Assembly (pushing radishes up his anus was favoured). It is perhaps this that best shows the meaning of "hybris".

Sexual Divisions

Power

Throughout our period, Athens is a democracy, save for two brief oligarchic episodes during the Peloponnesian Wars that are too short-lived to require consideration. There are developments in the form of the democracy: after the Persian Wars, the older Areopagus Council and the archon magistrates are increasingly displaced in favour of the Proboula and the newer magistracies drawn from it and from the Assembly itself; moreover the magistracies become open to the zeugetes. Again, after the Peloponnesian Wars there is the rise of the "demagogues" - leaders who lead by speaking in the Assembly rather than by holding magisterial office. But regardless of these changes, it remains a constant factor that women are wholly excluded from the political system, Councils, magistracies and Assembly together. This indeed is probably universal to ancient City-states, and is a factor of the military character of citizenship. Yet the Athenians are remarkable in that they did comment on this and discuss it. I will return to this below.

The ancient City-state has no civil service: the magistrates
perform all such functions directly themselves, with the assistance of a handful of public slaves. Taxation is mostly in the form of leiturgies, that is, the rich undertake the relevant services. Actual money taxes are farmed (the Athenians say "sold"). Public moneys are deposited in the temples. A small force of slaves - the Scythian archers (theoretically 300) - comprise the police force; their main duty is to keep order in the Assembly.

At the level of private administration, there seems to be a clear-cut division that puts the woman in charge of the household, and the man in charge of everything beyond the household - most simply the fields, but also workshop or mining interests, rented property, and so on. Athenian estates are not typically very large or complex (nothing by Roman standards) and this, with a comparative absence of women's property and a strict system of guardianship of women, makes for a fairly straightforward situation.

However there is another dimension to the matter: the polis is a religious community. There is a religious dimension to citizenship, and so also there are priesthoods and priestesships. There are two levels here, though due to the democratic character of the City they are not wholly separated. There is the cult of the patroness of the City herself, Athene, and her closest associates, Zeus and Apollo; and there are the cults of salvation, of which the Eleusinian Mysteries are the most important. The festivals of Dionysus appear to link the two; these were the setting of the Attic drama. For the state cults, that Athene was female resulted in her having priestesses rather than priests, and in women performing certain rites for her. But the priestessships carried neither power nor wealth. For the Eleusinian Mysteries the position is similar; the cult centres on the two goddesses Demeter and Persephone, and they have priestesses, but without influence. All these priestessships seem to have been monopolized by certain eupatrid families. Generally, priestly office at Athens is part-time, amateur and unpaid, though the temples themselves have lands (rented out) for their upkeep. As to the festivals of Dionysus, their use as settings for the drama may have resulted in women being present at least for the tragedy, though the
issue is debated. The cult of Athene was for citizens only, but the Eleusinian Mysteries were open to all, including metics and slaves – and including women. The cults of other deities are followed electively by different categories of people, for example on the basis of craft, as Aphrodite for prostitutes. Artemis is followed by women generally. (However the functional division of the pantheon is only one aspect of the matter; the different gods are also, for example, the patrons of different Cities.)

The political exclusion of women at Athens is commented on both in drama and in philosophy. These are both directly political arts: drama as being performed at the City's religious festivals, under state patronage; philosophy as hostile (or at least sceptical) aristocratic commentary on the democracy. Both are inclined to look to Sparta. There is no point in trying here to identify the specific sympathies of individual intellectuals – Aristophanes seems particularly hard to classify. But what is interesting is the way that the issue of citizenship itself is seized as essential – whether for satiric, utopian, or serious policy purposes. Plato in particular focuses clearly on the question of military service, and the training for military service: he regards it as essential for his Republic that women should share these equally with men. It should be remembered here that background to this is the Greek experience of founding colony Cities; Plato is not just day-dreaming about impossible social change. In a world that is not politically closed, he intends a state not a commune. Again it is interesting that Aristotle responds to this in commonsense terms, and in terms of the concrete realities of actual City-states. That is, there is nothing of misogyny in his response to Plato's "feminism". There is certainly creative misogyny in earlier Greek culture, especially Hesiod, but in classical Athens the force of this seems spent. Again, though some see feminist sympathy especially in Euripides, I cannot see active misogyny in any of the Attic dramatists. Possibly what is most interesting of all is Aristophanes' treatment – which surely simply reflects that the citizenship of women is a matter for political satire. What he says about it is far less significant than the fact that he talks about it at all.
It is not obvious why women's citizenship should have been up for discussion in this way. Certainly it is not due to action on the part of women themselves, for at Athens (unlike Rome) nothing of the kind occurs. On the whole, one judges that the interest here, like the literature itself, is basically aristocratic: it looks to the role of (mainly aristocratic) women in legend and to Sparta, a comparatively aristocratic society where the role of women is far stronger than at Athens. And this surely is the point: a narrower political community must give a more positive role to its womenfolk, to compensate for its lack of numbers, and an aristocracy (or an oligarchy) is, simply, a narrower political community than a democracy.

Economy

The basis of the Athenian economy, as with all the Ancient Civilization, is the complex inter-relation of oikos and market in a context of non-peaceful economic action. The specific form this takes in classical Athens is conditioned by a number of factors. As a Plebeian City under democratic control, the oikos here is typically not the estates of the great but the property endowment of the ordinary citizen, especially in land, houses, livestock and slaves. This is compounded by the broad nature of the democracy, based on naval power, and the sharing of public wealth with the citizens among the urban poor, especially as pay for military service and civic duties. It is also compounded by empire: by Athens' income from tribute and booty; and by the fact that she imports rather than grows much of her foodstuffs. Like all ancient Cities, Athens is a consumer, not a producer, and while the securing of essential resources is a matter for foreign policy, there is no commercial policy, for trade and finance are in the hands of metics not citizens. In this situation, the ideal of the citizen remains economic self-sufficiency and a degree of leisure. Of this, the more substantial peasant may be the exemplary, but the urban poor of artisans, craftsmen and shopkeepers who sell their wares in the market are not wholly excluded, unless they are metics or slaves.
Against this background, the discussion of sexual divisions in the economy must start from citizenship: that is, from the guardianship of women. In principle, this simply restricts the field of competence of women's economic actions to the oikos. All property that she owns, including her dowry, is controlled by her kyrion (though not small personal movable property), and she is not permitted to transact beyond the oikos beyond one medimnos' worth - roughly a household's corn supply for half a week. That this is reckoned in natura rather than in money again indicates the restriction of women to the oikos, the realm of self-sufficiency. Yet the rule does not mean quite what it says, for women, at least thetes women, did transact on the market, and might well exceed this limit. The point seems to be, then, not that women are forbidden to transact beyond this value, but that the trans- action is not legally guaranteed: a woman cannot commit her oikos beyond this amount. The rule then is for the protection of the lineage's patrimony. There are similar rules permitting the public control of a spendthrift or a madman - or one under the influence of a woman (presumably a hetaera or concubine). Whether this is due to women's supposed incompetence, or to possible conflicts of loyalties between her husband and children and her kin is not clear. But the historical background of class conflicts and debt-slavery should be remembered.

As to property, for women this comes into three main categories. All are based on inheritance, for women's chances to acquire property by transaction are very limited. First, then, there is dowry; as indicated earlier, this basically takes the place of the woman's inheritance portion. But secondly, inheritances to women do occur; the rules of intestate succession give a hierarchy of degrees within the anchisteia, and although at each level the men come before the women, even so, in the failure of males females are considered before turning to the next level. (Succession however is agnatic, thus a woman's property will revert to her agnatic kin.) The ownership of property by women then is by no means unknown, though neither is it commonplace. Again, in all these cases, the property is controlled by the woman's kyrion, though she still has rights against it, and might expect
to be consulted in decisions affecting it. In particular, as indicated before, the woman has an inalienable and lifelong right to be supported from her dowry (or by the kyrios who controls it). The third category represents a further limiting factor: the epiklerate. Here, the property owns the woman, and although she transmits the ownership to her children she is not really its owner herself. It might be noted that in all these matters the metic woman may be in a slightly different case: if she has no male kin in Athens, then she may be "kyrios of herself". Moreover her ownership of slaves she has brought with her into Athens, and her right to sell or free them, is respected. (Slaves are of course an important category of property.)

Within the oikos, women's economic functions are basically focussed on the household itself, including basic household tasks such as cleaning etc. Childcare is women's work; so also is food preparation, though with the men eating publicly this will mostly be for the women, children and slaves. Bread, especially in the 4th century, tends to be bought in. Fetching water from the well is another important element of housework. And above all, spinning and weaving are women's household work. Of course, the bulk of all this will be done by slaves - most household slaves are female - and an important element of the citizen wife's work is to oversee this, and to control the materials and supplies. It is this, with spinning and weaving, that should be main occupations of citizen women.

In the country matters are probably not much different. Women's labour is not much used in the fields except perhaps at harvest time, and indeed slave labour is apparently not greatly used in agriculture; rather temporary paid labour would be taken on at need. The greatest bulk of male slaves is at the silver mines, or else practising crafts and trades in the city on a "living away" (i.e. from their master's household) basis.

In the market, most crafts and trades are male: work in metal, stone, ceramics, wood, etc. This indeed is common to all the Ancient Civilization. Women's work tends rather to follow the pattern of the household: textile work of all kinds, for example clothes-making and mending, laundering; or again the provision of
cooked food (including the baking of bread). Besides this, women appear as shopkeepers and vendors, selling such things as perfumes, garlands and garden produce - probably made or grown by themselves. They might also sell the craft products made by their menfolk. Women are café-keepers; also wet-nurses and mid-wives (so far as the latter is a paid craft). It should be noted that women in these functions might be citizen or metic, or (perhaps more rarely) slaves. It should also be noted that there appears to be virtually no scope either for women's entrepreneurship or for women's literacy. Against this, selling in the agora must have involved some direct contact with the City's magistrates. Again, as noted earlier, the limit on women's transactions to the value of one medimnos cannot have been observed in practice (especially not for wholesale purchases).

It is broadly against this background that prostitution has to be seen. Discussing this earlier, I have pointed to the two categories of hetaera and porne, though rather as poles of a continuum. The hetaerae are rather companions to the more substantial, receiving them at their own homes or accompanying them as guests, whereas the pornai are the girls of the brothels and inns, with a clientele of the urban poor, including slaves, and (especially in the Piraeus) visiting sailors. It is to be noted that neither category caters specifically for the young. In status, hetaerae were often metic; if slaves, they might be the slaves of metic hetaerae, brought in with them. Common origins were Corinth and Cyprus (incidentally, temple prostitution is not found at Athens and indeed is not a Greek practice, although it was apparently found at these two places). Pornai were more likely to be slaves from the uncivilized north and east, though they might also be poor Athenians. But these are only tendencies, not hard and fast rules. Again, as pointed out before, hetaerae as much as pornai sold sexual intercourse. Hetaera and porne are not discrete categories.

The organization of prostitution, like all crafts in Antiquity, is heavily conditioned by slavery. In this indeed it is an area of female entrepreneurship, especially at the level of the hetaerae, for these might take to raising and training girls for
sale, either to become hetaerae or concubines. Possibly the sources lay outside Athens, as I have discussed before. But indeed, the picture is broadly common to prostitution everywhere: the artisan's ambition is to buy a slave to take over his work and keep him in his old age — evidence of the general lack of families among the urban poor. This is general to classical Antiquity. But beyond this, owning brothels and owning prostitutes (i.e. pornai) are both recognized forms of investment — though possibly the latter is not wholly respectable. There were also state brothels at Athens. (Reputedly, these were created by Solon. The role of Solon in resolving the class conflicts at Athens, and the original location of prostitution in those class conflicts, should be remembered.) Most commonly, the girl would probably rent a room at a brothel or an inn, though in the latter case she might be attached to the premises. The girl could solicit in the agora or the streets; there is no reason to think there were closed houses. Again, direct supervision of labour is not characteristic of Antiquity; probably the slave-prostitute is "living away" from her master, and will pay body rent to him. She will then work independently under her own control on the same basis as the prostitute of citizen or metic status. Thus she will have some control over her times, frequences and choice of client. Again, the prostitute in Athens (as in Antiquity generally) is not apparently typically subject to exploitation by pimps or bullies. Of course, prostitution is not criminalized.

The hetaera will differ from the above mainly in working from her own or her "mother's" house. As to prices, this is always difficult for Antiquity (i.e. all prices), but it appears that sexual intercourse typically cost about the same as a day-labourer's wage — say 2 drachma. One might pay far more for an outstanding hetaera of course. Also, prostitutes were taxed, at the rate of one client's price per day. This tax was farmed. It was a common fiscal resource in Antiquity.

There are also flute-girls and dancing-girls. These were often foreign; troupes of them would travel the known world, often slaves. At Athens, they would display for hire in the agora; in the 4th century, their hire would be arranged by lot within a
maximum price, rather than by auction. Their skills were real and were valued; this too is general to Antiquity. Yet at Athens they do seem broadly assimilable to prostitution, probably in virtue of the similar skills of hetaerae. Even so, there could be a distinction: the price arranged with the owner is on the face of it the price for their skills, and if there are also sexual favours, these might have to be negotiated separately with the girls themselves. This is an aspect of the ancient economy that I suspect modernity regards too cynically.

Stratification

The complex inter-relation of oikos and market is again basic to the stratificatory order of the ancient City-state, giving on the one hand a range of political-legal statuses, on the other a market location which tends in itself to be undifferentiated, though this needs qualification. As to the status order, first is the distinction of free and slave, then of citizen and metic, and last, the grades within the citizenry. At Athens, this means the Solonic classes, but for general sociological purposes, the Roman terms, patrician, plebeian and proletarian, seem most useful. The last of course reflects the market location itself. As to the market, it has to be recorded that, while the market does not really differentiate life chances in terms of occupations, yet it may do so in terms of property or capital. Thus, ancient civilization does experience a phase of class struggle, in terms of the conflicts over usury and debt-slavery. But beyond this phase, the stratificatory conflicts of Antiquity are basically status conflicts, over closure of the political community. In these terms, as I have said, the proletarians - the market location - are one status.

Given this, the basic relationship between sexual divisions and stratification should be in terms of status, in which the central question is the citizenship - the political-legal status - of women as compared to men. Here clearly the difference between the two sexes is absolute, as I have shown: the status difference between male and female is comparable to that between
free and slave. In classical Athens, there is no development on this point: the situation stays constant throughout the period.

This difference of status clearly holds as much in the market as elsewhere, although as stated the market itself does not seem to generate class differences. With this, there appears to be a broad status-differentiation among women, in terms of the oikos location versus the market location. The interest of this focusses on its inter-relation with the status distinction among women in terms of sexual-reproductive career, between the wife and the prostitute or concubine. The question was: should the thetes woman selling her craft wares or garden produce in the agora be assimilated to the citizen wife in the oikos or to the prostitute selling herself? In the event, the former course was taken, but there was conflict over it at the Assembly (and in Aristophanes).

Although the Athenians gave critical consideration to women's rights and women's citizenship both in the drama and in philosophy, there was apparently no response to this on the part of women themselves. For this, the isolation of women from each other in the oikoi is one reason, but it does not hold for women in the market. Here it is surely the lack of common status that is the explanation: clearly the citizen shopkeeper would not make common cause with the slave or metic prostitute over the question of citizenship, and neither would the citizen and the slave wet-nurses do so.

Conclusion

Classical Athens is the great window through which we see Greek civilization and history, at least up to the end of classical times. Yet we have a wider and deeper awareness: some concrete knowledge and certainly some cultural material from other times and places. How then does the position of women in classical Athens fit generally with Greek civilization? The impression is that in Dorian states like Sparta, women were much freer. As to the Ionian states, the islands and Turkish coastline passed at least for a time under Persian rule, but we do not know the posit-
ion of women in Achaemenid Persia.* There is, however, a general impression that the aristocratic past was freer than the democratic present. With this also, there is a good certainty that the position of Greek women in the subsequent era of the Hellenistic World - seen mainly through Alexandria - was much freer than in classical times. In all, it is hard to avoid the view that classical Athens marks a low point in women's history, even by Greek standards. Why is this so?

The main points to make here are: first, the tightly integrated military-political character of the polis, which wholly excludes women from citizenship; second, that in the polis, women's position balances between the political community and the oikos, so that exclusion from the one can to an extent be compensated by the importance of the other. It is, then, the democracy and the empire of Athens, and the inter-relation between them whereby empire permits extreme democracy inclusive of the urban poor, that makes women's position in Athens so weak, for it is the military income from the political community rather than the domestic economy of the oikos that is the essential basis of citizenship and subsistence for much of the poorer citizenry. With this, the compulsion of the aristocracy to form a common community with the ordinary citizens, practising conubium with them rather than with the aristocracies of other Cities, yet a community exclusive of foreigners, metics and slaves, made for strong controls on women's conduct and freedom, extending even to actual seclusion. That is the price of a general citizenship.

As to development of women's position at classical Athens, there does appear to be a little movement in the 4th century, prior to the Macedonian conquest. This however centres not on citizen marriage but on a preference for concubinage. It should perhaps be considered with the characteristic 4th century developments: the increasing use of mercenaries in the army and the fleets, and the increasing privileges (or reducing disprivileges)

*It should certainly not be assumed that this will compare with the Greeks as the modern Middle East compares with the West. In Antiquity, the contrasts usually run the opposite way, as the studies in this thesis illustrate.
offered to metics. In short, it is a blurring of the boundaries of the political community. For this, the failure of Athens' wars—above all the Peloponnesian Wars—is probably the underlying cause. In the 4th century the polis survives, but it is overshadowed by neighbouring kingdoms.

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Chapter 10

The Roman Empire

Introduction

Roman history, after shadowy beginnings, comes in four main phases: the Early Republic (B.C. 510 - 202); the Late Republic (B.C. 202 - 31); the Principate (B.C. 31 - 235 A.D.); and the Dominate (284 A.D. onwards). Traditionally, we regard the Empire as the period of the rule of the emperors, that is, the Principate and the Dominate (and the 3rd century inter-regnum). However, the imperium of the Roman people, Rome's possession of overseas provinces, starts from the second Punic War (B.C. 218 - 202). In this chapter, it is the Late Republic and the Principate that are considered.

After periodization, it is necessary to consider East and West. In the East, Rome took over the Hellenistic kingdoms, Cities of Greeks with (mostly) surrounding Asiatist subject populations. Here, Rome enforced the separation of Greeks and Asiatics and progressively took the Greeks into partnership. In the West, Rome was mostly conquering barbarian lands, and settling them with new Cities of Italian immigrants. Here the barbarians were quickly incorporated and Romanized (as were also the few Cities of Phoenicians). The Greek and Latin halves of the Empire were always unalike, and though far less is known of the West in absolute terms, it is a much simpler and more unified situation. This chapter considers the Western Empire only: the arena for women in specifically Roman society.

Roman history is complex, and the inter-relations of East and West do have to be considered. Although the acquisition of provinces around the Mediterranean gathers pace through the 2nd century B.C., it is only in the 1st century B.C. that the provin-
ces in the East are finally institutionalized, and that the con-
quest of N.W. Europe is undertaken. Critical figures here are Pom-
pey and Caesar, circa B.C. 70 – 50. But it is the impact of empire on Italian society that has to be grasped. At the end of the Early Republic, Rome was a City-state, structurally Plebeian in type, though oligarchic in character, dominating an alliance of City-states that extended throughout peninsular Italy. The impact of empire was to destroy the balance between the social strata, the balance within the ruling stratum, and the balance between Rome and her Italian allies, leading to a century of political turmoil and civil war, from the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus (B.C. 133) to the final victory of Octavian/Augustus at Actium (B.C. 31). The processes are complex. On the one side, exploitation of the provinces brings the ruling stratum enormous wealth, with which they build up vast estates in Italy, worked by chained gangs of slaves; slaves made in the wars of conquest are brought into Italy in great numbers for this and other service; the citizen peasantry, ruined by constant military service and denied legal protection of their land rights, are expropriated and flee. On the other side, the expropriated peasantry come to the cities, especially Rome itself, where they become an urban mob supporting revolutionary politicians, or else raise war against Rome for the Italian cities, or else become the military following of popular warlords who promise them land. The resolution of these processes comes through a mixture of foreign and civil war. It takes the form of a massive emigration of Italians into northern Italy and the western lands together with a universal grant of Roman citizenship to all Italians, while the ruling stratum continues a more limited exploitation of the Eastern provinces and keeps a continued authority throughout the Empire; and all this under the supervision of the popular warlord turned emperor.

Understanding the creation of the Empire, it is possible to comprehend its fall, at least as a process centring on the Principate and the West. The inter-relation with the East is again complex, and accounts for the temporary revival of the Empire as the Dominate (this is further discussed in Appendix A parts i and
For in the 1st century A.D. the Empire in Europe is expanded, to natural frontiers on the Rhine and the Danube. This is the process of pacification and of movement inland, away from rivers and coastlines, which destroys the fundamental conditions of the Ancient Civilization, its basis in maritime trading Cities, and forces a change in character to a manorial system with a natural economy. Again, the processes are complex. On the one side, a crisis of agrarian labour as pacification erodes the slave supply leads to the decline of slave-worked ranches and the rise of share-cropping arrangements with semi-free tenant families - the colonate. On the other side, the practice of attributing the richest strata of the Empire (the senatorials and equestrians) to Rome itself, with exemption from local municipal burdens, leaves a relatively poor provincial patriciate (the decurions) to provide the finances of the Empire's Cities; becoming progressively more unable to do this, they withdraw from the cities to the country (eventually, country estates - manors - were to replace Cities as the basis of the Empire's administration). The consequences are the failure of the money economy and taxes, leading to a failure of both capability and loyalty in the army. This all develops during the 2nd century A.D.; the Principate collapses in the 3rd century, in 50 years of civil wars and barbarian invasions (235 - 284 A.D.), until Diocletian creates the Dominate.

The Roman Empire is a congeries of semi-autonomous Cities within a loose system of provinces. In the West especially this is in broad constitutional continuity with Rome's earlier expansion through Italy, and is accompanied by a steady expansion of the Roman citizenship, until the Edict of Caracalla (212/3 A.D.) gives the citizenship to all free persons in the Empire. But Italy itself is never a province: after Augustus, it becomes an extension of the City of Rome, with exemption from land-tax and poll-tax. In the Republic, the provinces were controlled by the Senate; in the Principate, there is a division between Princeps and Senate, under the Princeps' overall supervision. State bureaucracy is slow to develop, and makes little real distinction between imperial provinces, senatorial provinces, and the Princeps' personal estates (which might lie in either). Indeed, its
origins lie in the latter, and the Princeps' household slaves. Rather than bureaucracy, there is a hierarchy of magisterial jurisdictions. The Princeps' own role is basically supervisory and appellate in character — and he is commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

At its height, in the 2nd century A.D., the Roman Empire extends from lowland Scotland to the borders of Persia, about 1.6 million square miles. Its population is about 60 million, of whom 7 million (including 3 million slaves) lived in Italy itself, and perhaps 17 million in the Western provinces. The city of Rome itself held about 1 million; other very large cities include Antioch, Alexandria, and in the West, Carthage. But most cities were of the order 10 – 15,000. The degree of urbanization is usually given as about 10%, though in Italy itself at least it must have been higher — perhaps nearer 30% (guessing all other cities together to equal Rome). (See Christ 1984 App. 2.)

Finally, it should be realized that Roman historiography begins only at about the time of the Punic Wars; its view of the Early Republic is retrospective. Ancient writers always contrast the Early Republic, as an age of simplicity and Roman virtue, with the decadent and luxurious ages of Greek and Oriental influence that follow. The position of women, in all its aspects, is deeply part of that discourse.

The Position of Women

State and Family

Originally, Rome was a City-state (the Latin word "civitas" is equivalent to the Greek "polis"), with institutions broadly similar to those of Athens, though there are important differences. Rome was always oligarchical in character, patrician dominated though Plebeian in structure and, perhaps because of this, patron-client relations were always important. In particular, a freed slave became not a metic but a citizen, and his former master's client. Again, Rome developed a very distinctive system of alliances with neighbouring Cities, based on a kind of reciprocal
citizenship. This became basic to the formation of the Empire.

The ancient City-state, as discussed before, is a closed community of agrarian warriors, defined by its own law-code, membership - citizenship - in which comprises a nexus of political-legal rights and duties, property ownership especially in land, livestock, etc., and military service. There is a status-order grading the degrees of political-legal rights against the type of military service, in terms of the size of property holding - the soldiers being self-equipped. At Rome, there is the typical division of cavalry, provided by the richest stratum (the equites), heavy infantry, provided by the more substantial peasantry, and light infantry, provided by the poorer peasantry and perhaps the more substantial urban strata. The poorest citizens provided military artisans or did not serve at all - at Rome, naval service never became a factor. Broadly, the active political function, the magistracies and Senate, were monopolized by the cavalry class, the equites, the lower strata possessing voting rights in the Assembly and legal rights only. The system saw many developments, political and military, in the Early Republic, but it was still basically in place when the Late Republic begins.

But in the Late Republic and Principate all this changes. On the one side, the cavalry class becomes far richer, and ceases to provide cavalry service but only the upper military command. At the same time, this stratum disengages into two elements, senatorials and equestrians. The basic distinction is simply in degree of wealth, but a complex of rules linking the holding of magistracies to senatorial status, and forbidding senatorials to engage directly in commerce, creates an alternative commercial career for the richest equestrians, mainly in tax-farming and military provisioning contracts. In the Principate, two separate orders are institutionalized, with separate careers of administrative office and military command (now salaried) for each. On the other side, the legionary class of substantial peasants is very largely ruined, and the property qualifications for service become untenable. Military service then first becomes the personal followings of warlords, and then in the Principate a salaried profession open to all, though with a more privileged stream, the legions,
reserved for freeborn citizens. In between the richest strata (senators and equestrians) and the mass of the poor, there arises in the Principate a new class, the decurions, the provincial aristocracy. These are the "senatorials" of the provincial Cities, holding their magistracies and bearing their public burdens, for the senatorials and equestrians of the Empire are all held to belong to Rome itself. The decurions in the later Principate become an impoverished class. With these changes, the status-order of the later Principate comprises simply two basic grades: the honestiores ("more honourable") - senatorials, equestrians, decurions and legionary veterans - and the humiliores ("more base") - the rest.

Citizenship is hereditary: that is the basic relationship between state and family. But even in the Early Republic Rome is no simple City-state, but the mistress of an alliance of City-states that comes to extend throughout peninsular Italy. This has a complex history, but the basic conception is that while Rome controls foreign policy and military command, the Cities govern their own affairs, and there is a kind of reciprocal citizenship that depends upon residence. Although following the War of the Italian Allies Rome gave the Roman citizenship to all peninsular Italians, she also used the older conceptions in building up the Empire, especially in the west. As I have said, the Roman Empire was a congeries of Cities.

However, there is development, fragmentation and change of meaning in all the basic elements that I have outlined above: citizenship, political-legal rights, military service, property ownership - these and all their components. This is what has to be discussed in the present section.

By the beginning of the Principate, five different ways of acquiring the Roman citizenship have developed: birth, emancipation, military service, block grant to a community, and grant on individual merit (viritane grant). These will be discussed in turn.

Citizen birth is a factor of the parents' status, and of the nature of their union. This must be an iustae nuptiae (or iustum matrimonium - the terms seem to be indifferent); that is, a marr-
riage within the ius civile, the law of the Romans. The rules governing the iustae nuptiae require that the man have the Roman citizenship, and the woman have either the Roman citizenship or conubium, the right of recognized intermarriage. This point derives from Rome's relation to her Italian allies, though it comes to have a broader application, as will be seen. Given an iustae nuptiae, the child follows the father's status; otherwise, it follows the status of the mother. It should be noted that this controls whether the child is free or slave, as well as whether it has the Roman citizenship. It must be added that there is apparently a problem here with the question of illegitimacy and citizenship. It is surely the eligibility for iustae nuptiae, rather than the actual fact of marriage, that conveys citizenship to the child, the more so as marriage is a private compact between families, and not a state function. Certainly there are illegitimate citizens. Again, a further rule is that a citizen mother's child by a slave or an unknown father does have the citizenship. Probably the underlying issues here are the status conflicts over closure of the political community; iustae nuptiae must be contrasted with concubinage as well as with peregrine (foreign community) marriage. This will come up again later.

Emancipation: the freed slave of a Roman citizen acquires the Roman citizenship. As noted, this is a Roman peculiarity. The freed slave becomes the client of his master (or mistress), who becomes his patron. The status of freed slave, libertini, is distinguished from that of free birth, ingenui, and entails some disabilities. However the liberti do possess conubium, pace the Augustan laws.

Military service: from the time of Augustus, honourable discharge from the auxilia, the fleets, or other non-citizen military units brought the Roman citizenship. There is more to say on this below.

Block grant to a community: generally this means the recognition of a City in the Empire as municipium or colonia, terms coming from Rome's expansion through Italy in the Early Republic. It would usually accompany or follow settlement by veterans or Italian emigrants, and might come in two stages, giving the cit-
izenship first to the local magistrates or curia (senate), later to all inhabitants. It is largely by this means that the Roman citizenship in the Empire grows, especially in the West in the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D.

Viritane grant: this was often given to City magistrates in the Greek East. It was the main means of expanding the Roman citizenship there, until the Edict of Caracalla.

The Roman citizenship was extended to all Italians in the 1st century B.C., and grew steadily throughout the Principate, especially in the West; the Edict of Caracalla (212/3 A.D.) gave the Roman citizenship to all free persons in the Empire. Watson suggests that this may have mainly benefitted women (Watson 1969 p 136 - 7); at any rate, some of these routes to the citizenship, especially military discharge, certainly favour men. A regular census of citizens was held in the Republic, men registering at adolescence. From the time of Augustus, women and children may have been registered too - indeed, this may have started from the registration of the Italians after the War of the Italian Allies. Full revisions of the census ceased later in the 1st century A.D. However Augustus instituted a registration of births, and that continued throughout the Principate.

However, as it is expanded, the Roman citizenship becomes progressively emptied of content. Initially, citizenship involves the rights of participation in Rome's political affairs - voting in the Assemblies on laws, motions, and for the elections of magistrates - and legal rights in terms of the ius civile, the law of the Romans. This could be very exclusive: for instance, in principle only a Roman citizen can own property, or can marry. But this exclusivity was long compromised by relations with the wider world, and besides developing commercium (reciprocal economic rights) and conubium with her Italian allies, the Romans also began to develop the ius gentium - a sort of Romanized trans-communal law that recognized the de facto rights and customs of peregrines. This conception advanced tremendously during the Late Republic and especially the Principate. Citizenship also meant protection from the arbitrary power of Roman magistrates, the right to appeal to the Roman people or to another magistrate.
especially, for the lower strata, a tribune. In the Principate, this becomes the right to appeal to Caesar. But, St. Paul notwithstanding, this is neither restricted to the Roman citizens, nor is it guaranteed to all Roman citizens. Rather, there is a general tendency towards a less arbitrary and more humane use of power, extended to all. As to the political dimension, in the Principate this was overshadowed by the introduction of new institutions, especially for the administration of Italy and of Rome itself, and the Assemblies and elections fell out of use, though the magistracies and the curiae continued, especially in the provincial Cities.

In sum, with these developments the distinction between citizen and peregrine faded, and the broad status distinction of rich and poor progressively took its place, to be formalized in the 2nd century A.D. in the terms "honestiores" and "humiliores" — the honestiores were senatorials, equestrians, decurions and legiary veterans. The law-code prescribed different ranges of penalties for the two grades — for example, capital punishment for a humilior meant execution, but for a honestior, exile. Ultimately, the Roman citizenship for a humilior seems to have meant (eligibility for the legions aside) little more than the right to transmit the Roman citizenship to one's children — or at best to be a synonym for free.

The material basis of citizenship is the "familia", a term that should be considered with two others: "paterfamilias" and "patria potestas". Basically, these are the Latin equivalents of the Greek terms "oikos", "kyrios" and "kyreia". "Familia" then does not translate "family"; as with Greek, there is no Latin equivalent for this. Rather "familia" has various meanings: a lineage; or a whole household, including property and certain livestock; or a group of slaves. The paterfamilias is the head of the familia; potestas is his authority/ownership over its various components. But what is distinctive here is that, where the various senses of "familia" once lay together and implied each other, by the Late Republic they have already become separate things. To put the point another way, the term missing is "kleros" — the "share" or specific parcel of land. There is a Latin equivalent,
"fundus", but the familia is no longer tied to this. However, a legal distinction does still subsist, and persists throughout our period, between two categories of property: res mancipi and res nec mancipi. Res mancipi are: land and houses on Italic soil, slaves, and the traditional basic farming livestock. All other property is res nec mancipi. A point here is that a colony City in the Empire can have its soil declared Italic: the term is defined in terms of Italians not of Italy. But the basic issue is that res mancipi can only be alienated through a special legal process, whereas other property can simply be handed over in return for its price. It is only in regard to res mancipi that a woman's guardian (tutor) can intervene. It might be added here that in principle the familia should include funerary property also, but in practice this becomes a type of property sui generis by our period, with special problems as to its devolution. This need not detain us.

Patria potestas is a most distinctive feature of Roman customs, for this power is lifelong and absolute. Indeed, it extends to the power of life and death over all dependants, although this is not used arbitrarily. The key point here is that the Roman paterfamilias does not retire, and by the same token, his son's majority (or full citizenship) is not deferred. Instead, the paterfamilias retains his position until he dies, and his children remain in his potestas. This gives rise to basic legal categories: aliena iuris and sui iuris - under another's authority or under one's own authority. However the "other" may be a tutor or a husband; I will return to this later. An adult son in potestate might hold a magistracy or a military command; yet his paterfamilias still has full authority over him in all matters other than his public functions. Again, it is the paterfamilias who owns all his adult children's property, even the property they acquire themselves. However, in practice this is softened. Adult children are given a peculium, an allowance or interim possession of property, and typically set up their own households, in which they have (interim) authority themselves. From the Late Republic, this applies to adult daughters as well as sons. For daughters marry sine manu, that is, without passing into their husband's author-
ity, and their paterfamilias emancipates them into the control of a tutor—whose duties are nominal. These matters will be discussed more fully later on.

The Roman law of inheritance is very complex. Wills could apparently be made from very early times. A distinction is made between inheritance, the division of the estate between the heirs, and bequest, a specific gift taken out of the estate before division. But here it is only the most basic law, the law of intestate succession, that can be considered, at least so far as inheritance is concerned. Here, the basic law is equal division of the estate between the heirs, on the paterfamilias' death. The heirs will ordinarily be the children, sons and daughters alike. The position of the wife depends on the type of her marriage: if she is in her husband's authority, she ranks among the children, but if she is not, then she is not among her husband's heirs at all. In our period, this last was much the most common arrangement. The estate, after devolution, might continue to be administered as a unit, unless one of the heirs raised an action for division. But it should be realized that here, as at Athens (even more than at Athens), the tendency is for property-holdings to fragment over time. In a society oriented to farming and war, which lacked paid employment, and where trade is mostly handled by peregrines, the acquisition of new wealth to compensate for that fragmentation is always problematic.

This situation is typical of ancient City-state civilization, and it leads to typical consequences: a tremendous pressure on the property-owning strata to limit the numbers of their children. Since property controls the status-grading within the citizenry this applies at all levels: it is a question of relative rather than absolute scarcity. One common way of achieving this limitation is by exposure. This is not simple infanticide, for the children are often found and raised, either as free or as slave. There were customary places for leaving exposed children, and this is one of the sources of slaves. Exposure of girl children was more common, since they are of less economic use, and have to be dowered. Exposed girl-children slaves are often raised to become slave-prostitutes.
All this is hard to quantify. But in my introduction, I have outlined the history of the expropriation, emigration, and re-endowment of the Italian peasantry, and also of the rise and fall of the slave-trade. The demographic history of Rome is very much the history of the migration process, and that is also the history of the Roman Empire. This is the historical narrative into which the demographic mechanisms fit. True, the senatorial and equestrian orders are able to acquire new wealth, initially through the exploitation of the Empire, later through the career in the imperial service, which is salaried. To an extent this also applies to military, at least legionary, service, especially where promotion to the centurionate is achieved. But in sharp contrast to Athens there is little sharing of the profits of empire with the common people: the corn dole at Rome itself is the only exception, although there are various kinds of gifts from the Princeps or other rich individuals to certain categories of people. In particular, the decurions are involved in the costs of the Empire, rather than the profits. The capability of the peasantry to raise children at all is severely curtailed in the last 150 years of the Republic, though it recovers in the Principate, at least outside Italy. But the converse point is equally important: it is through migration, rather than by internal fertility, that the urban artisanate is reconstituted. This includes both expropriated peasants and incoming and freed slaves. The capability to raise children among the urban poor is very limited; this basically for reasons of poverty and squalor. Again, this is most severe in the Late Republic, and is ameliorated in the Principate, though possibly this amelioration holds for Rome and Italy as much as for the provinces. The decline of the Roman peasantry, later the freeborn citizenry in Italy, is a matter of explicit policy concern throughout our period, for these were the legionaries, the basis of Rome's military strength.

The conditions of military service are radically reformed twice in our period, by Marius circa B.C. 100 and by Augustus early in the Principate. Marius' reforms removed the property qualifications for military service, and also the property gradings for the different types of service. All citizens were now
concentrated in the heavy infantry, rank being awarded by ability and experience. Cavalry was no longer provided by citizens but by allies. The great power of the Roman legions came from their artisan skills, especially in siege-works and fortifications; it is Marius' reforms that are the basis for this. He also seems to have instituted the eagles, the focus of the legion's loyalty. Augustus' reforms divided the armies into two elements: the legions, for freeborn citizens and commanded by senatorials; and the auxilia, for freedmen and peregrines and commanded by equestrians. The fleets were on the latter basis also. There is a similar division of the units based at Rome or in Italy, such as the Praetorian Guard and the City Watch. Augustus also introduced fixed terms of service, salary, and gratuity on retirement from service; these were at rather higher rates for the legions than for the auxiliary units. Thus military service becomes a career, a chance to share in the Empire's wealth, and a chance too for social mobility, for promotion especially in the legions was quite open, and could lead on retirement into the decurionate or even to equestrian status. More than this, honourable discharge from the auxiliary units brought with it the grant of Roman citizenship. Thus it is now military service that brings property and status and even citizenship, though the citizen soldier receives preference.

From Augustus, all types of military personnel were forbidden to marry during their service - this includes matrimonium ex iure gentium among peregrine units. It is hard to say why this was done, but it was soon by-passed: soldiers began to form de facto marriages with women wherever they were stationed, marrying them formally after discharge. This became an area of development of the law: auxiliary veterans come to be given conubium for their wives as well as citizenship, so that their children will be Roman citizens. Initially, this granted retrospective citizenship to existing children at marriage, but in the later 2nd century A.D. this was restricted to children born after marriage. Oddly, this restriction was not extended to the fleets. Perhaps the reason here was a shortfall of recruitment to the auxilia. Again, soldiers' children, though illegitimate, were given inher-
itance rights; equally, the soldier's peculium became treated as his actual property, for him to transmit by will. It should be noted that the grant of conubium does not actually give the wife herself citizenship. Finally, soldiers were permitted to live with their wives, from the end of the 2nd century, though probably this does not in itself entail the grant of conubium. The anomalies of the area are only finally ended by the Edict of Caracalla and universal citizenship. But a point to note in all this is that the legionary veteran who marries a peregrine woman by matrimonium ex iure gentium does not get conubium for her, nor are their children citizens. The guiding principle seems to be that citizen men will marry citizen women (or at least women with conubium in their own right).

Towards the end of the Principate, a distinction arises between limitanei - fixed frontier units - and the mobile legions, and there is also local provisioning in kind rather than provisioning and payment through the money economy. Thus at the end, the soldiers, at least some elements, become a peasant militia again.

Concubinage requires consideration. It is a legally recognized relationship, and generally seems to parallel marriage, though the children are illegitimate and follow the mother's status (thus a slave-concubine's children are slaves). There are sanctions against bigamy and possibly also against adultery. Again, a slave-concubine and her children are not subject to seizure for a man's debts. Often concubinage occurs where there are legal barriers to marriage, for example if one partner is peregrine or slave, or if there are big status differences between the partners. Here it is not always the man who has the higher status. The soldiers' marriage discussed above is a special case. But concubinage can take numerous forms: de facto marriage among the lower orders (simple living together) for example, or the favourite household slave-girl or the freedwoman mistress of the rich. Often a concubine is preferred after widowhood or divorce, to avoid putting a step-mother over one's children, or conflict between half-siblings. The relationship and status were not stigmatized. Actual definition of concubinage is difficult, and in
probability (and on analogy with Athens) no hard boundaries with marriage ever existed (though absence of dowry might be indicative). This is probably so because of the earlier status conflicts between patricians and plebeians over closure of the political community, in which conubium is an issue. Patricians might try to reserve their status for patrician partners married by a special patrician rite; but plebeians would not accept that the child of a plebeian girl seduced by a patrician man could be denied citizenship, even if they could not compel him to marry her. It is surely because of this that marriage is a compact between familias only - there are ceremonies and rituals, but they have no legal status - and that illegitimacy is never highlighted in Graeco Roman-Antiquity. In Rome, as noted earlier, the child of an unknown father has citizenship. The three forms of Roman marriage seem to fit with this view - they will be discussed in a later section.

Augustus passed laws controlling marriage between the orders, and also controlling adultery and fornication (see Lefkowitz and Fant 1982 p 180 - 9; also Brunt 1971 App 9). These have many provisions, but centrally they forbid a senatorial to marry a freedwoman, actress, prostitute or ex-prostitute; they also forbid a senatorial woman to marry a freedman. Note that the bar is specifically on marriage. Single status and childlessness are also penalized (though the latter provision is soon repealed): such men and women are debarred from receiving inheritances. Remarriage must follow within a set time after widowhood or divorce. Conversely, the father of three children is given preference in his public career, and the mother of three children is exempted from guardianship. This provision extends to freedwomen or women in Italy with four children, or to women in the provinces with five, as well. The adultery laws interdict sexual intercourse with or by another man's wife: this now becomes a public crime, penalized with exile and partial confiscation of property. The husband must divorce his wife, or risk prosecution himself; and any citizen may prosecute if the husband fails to do so. This law takes the punishment of the wife's adultery out of the hands of the familia into the public courts, though it is not really clear what had
actually happened to the adulterous wife in the Late Republic. A later section will consider this. The law on fornication interdicts sexual intercourse with any free girl or widow who is not a recognized concubine or registered prostitute; the penalties are apparently similar to those for adultery. This law also covers homosexual intercourse with a citizen partner; this carries the death penalty. It should be stressed that these laws are kept in force throughout the Principate.

This is often referred to as Augustus' "moral" legislation, but its purpose is uncertain. It is surely not a matter of "free-floating" ethical or traditional values. It applies only to the citizenry, and most of it only to the upper strata, as the prescription of exile rather than death shows (the penalty for homosexual intercourse then is exceptional). Again, its focus is on sexual intercourse between citizens; it "protects" prostitution and concubinage as well as marriage. But coming after the civil wars, one guesses that the intended target is the factionalism of the upper strata rather than their licentiousness - though this seems evident enough in the last century of the Republic, as will be discussed later. Here one might point out that the original practices of the patrician stratum in the Early Republic were surely geared precisely to maintaining communal solidarity, and preventing the development of factions and the creation of marriage alliances between lineages: the wife and her children belong wholly to the husband’s familia and her kin have no interest in or protection over them. This remains a hostile environment for alliance by marriage. Perhaps the tremendous growth in the size of dowries among the upper strata in the Late Republic is intended to offset this - though even these dowries are not large by broader comparative standards (Saller 1984). But marriage as alliance at Rome never worked: marriages were made and broken so freely as to be meaningless. Moreover, in principle at least a man could disinherit the children he no longer favoured. It should be noted that Augustus was related to Julius Caesar by adoption: this was how durable alliances could be made. The purpose of Augustus' legislation, then, is perhaps to restore the communal solidarity of the upper strata, compelling them to marry
among themselves indifferently and not for advantage. That fathers could break up their sons' and daughters' marriages for their own political advantage may be part of the reason why so many had avoided marriage in favour of liaisons of various kinds. But above all, the purpose is to secure the relationship not between husband and wife but between father and children. It should be grasped that if Augustus' intentions were of the kind that I have tried to indicate, then he was quite successful. At least the factional conflicts are brought decisively to an end.

Augustus' purpose may also have been in part demographic, for the decline of the Roman peasantry was paralleled by a decline in the upper strata. Apparently this was at least partly voluntary, through avoidance of marriage and legitimate procreation, though there were also heavy losses in the political conflicts and civil wars of the 1st century B.C. If this was part of Augustus' intentions, however, then he was less successful, for the decline of the patricians continues under the Principate. But however this may be, in the 2nd century A.D. the emperors did create public support schemes for the children of poor citizens: the alimenta (see Duncan-Jones 1974 pp 288 et seq; see also Pomeroy 1975 pp 202-4, p 227 et seq). There is little question that the purpose was to build up the numbers of freeborn citizens, especially for the legions. These schemes came to extend throughout Italy; some small private schemes in the western provinces are also known. The surviving inscription at Veleia gives rates of support at 16 sesterces per month for a legitimate boy, 12 for a legitimate girl, 12 again for an illegitimate boy, and 10 for an illegitimate girl; the allowances apparently continued to age 18 for boys, 14 for girls. 300 awards are known, of which only 36 are for girls. It is thought that awards were given for one child per family only, and that the figure 36 represents the number of families with girl children only. If so, it can be calculated that 12% of families with only girls corresponds well with the binomial probability 0.125 for all girls where family size = 3, a figure that corresponds to what we know of the size of the Roman family. This is an unsophisticated calculation, but it does suggest that the sex-ratio is in balance here, and that practices
such as the selective exposure of girl children are no longer being used.* The field of application would be centrally Italy in the 2nd century A.D. - after this the collapse of the money economy overtakes the alimenta schemes. However, if one takes the alimenta schemes to be symptomatic rather than causitive, then the picture might be generalized more widely to the western provinces of the Principate and perhaps the 1st century A.D. too.

Some small alimenta schemes specifically for girls were created by the later 2nd century empresses.

**Family and Community**

The Roman familia is equivalent to the Athenian oikos in its political-legal bearing upon citizenship, but it does not have the same direct relationship to household structure. It has been suggested (Lacey 1986) that the underlying reason is that the Romans made patria potestas the key issue, rather than the oikos as the Greeks did. This might go with patrician interests and the continuing patrician dominance at Rome; arguing these matters above (ch 5), I suggest that Rome strikingly failed to develop practices for the protection of small plebeian property, whereas Athens quite successfully did so. At any rate, the differences in practices are striking.

Thus the Athenian father retires at age 60; his son, now 30, takes over the oikos, attains full Assembly rights, and marries, and his father becomes a dependant in his household. If the oikos is to be divided between sons, this happens now. At Rome, by con-

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*Significance testing would be the obvious development. But there are other points. Modern experience suggests that the sex-ratio is not naturally exactly equal: more boys are born but their mortality is higher. Another point is that family size = 3 is the upper end of the range 2 - 3 considered typical for Graeco-Roman Antiquity. Against this, if the allowance is the same for a legitimate girl and an illegitimate boy, and moreover continues longer for the latter, and again if there are other schemes specifically for girls, then the actual numbers of girls are likely to be greater than represented here. The numbers of claims for illegitimate boys and girls might help to assess this. But the whole issue really needs a lengthier, and deeper, treatment than it can be given here.
trast, patria potestas is lifelong; the familia is divided among the children of both sexes (and the wife if in manu) at the paterfamilies’ death, and each son becomes paterfamilias of his own familia. But the children do not wait for their father’s death before marrying or setting up their own households, or taking up their political rights. Rather the paterfamilias gives his adult children a peculium, an allowance or interim possession of property, on which basis they conduct their independent lives. In our period this seems to apply to adult daughters as well as to sons; the bearing of this will become clear in what follows.

The typical household structure then is a nuclear family plus a few slaves – similar to Athens, but not quite for the same reasons. The household does not usually run to three generations, for the grandparents continue in their own household. Marriage is generally made young, age 18 – 20 for boys and 14 – 15 for girls. There are in fact legal minima here: 14 and 12 respectively. Family size is small, 2 – 3 children; however sometimes there are slave children too.

Marriage is a compact between familias; it is not a state function. Originally there were two ceremonial forms: confarreatio, a ritual before priests; and coemptio, a notional sale. These appear to have been the patrician and plebeian marriage forms respectively. But there was also usus, cohabitation; apparently this was on analogy with ownership established not by sale but by simple possession. With this form, only after a year did the wife pass into the manus of her husband, and even then not if she spent three nights running away from his household. This was the origin of marriage sine manu. In the beginning, this may have been preferred in marriages between patrician and plebeian, to keep patrician property out of plebeian hands. But by the Late Republic this had become the commonest form of marriage for all strata, though the other forms did continue – in particular, certain priesthoods were tied to confarreatio.

It should be noted that all this bears upon the earlier discussion of concubinage, for all these forms of marriage are attested from the times of the status struggles quite early in the Early Republic. But marriage sine manu is the focus here; it is
the typical form of marriage throughout our period, and its meaning must be made clear. "Manus" is the husband's authority and control over his wife and her property, subject (notionally at least) to the potestas of his own paterfamilias. Married with manus, the wife passes from the potestas of her father to the manus of her husband. Inheritance rights are affected by this: she no longer ranks among her father's heirs, but is included among her husband's heirs as though one of his children. Marriage sine manus, then, means marriage without any of these consequences. The wife remains in her father's potestas, and continues to rank among his heirs. She has no inheritance rights from her husband and her own property devolves back to her family of origin — and indeed, husband and wife are forbidden to make gifts to each other. This again is to protect the property of the respective families. It is in view of this arrangement that the force of the adult daughter's peculium can be grasped, as also the practice, mentioned earlier, of the father emancipating his adult daughter to the control of a tutor. These things will come up again in later sections.

Marriages, at least first marriages, were made young, although remarriage after divorce or widowhood was common. Betrothals were also made, and a marriage below the legal age counted as a betrothal. The girl in this case might be taken to live in her fiancé's household. However, the vagaries of patrician or imperial practice should not be given too much weight (and this is surely not the place to find prepubertal sexual intercourse). Usually marriages were arranged between paterfamilias, though the man might act for himself, as might a woman remarrying. Consent to the marriage is required from both parties, although the girl has only restricted grounds for a refusal. More to the point is that a very young girl probably could not resist pressure. But by the same token, an older woman could expect to make her views heard. On the other side, a marriage initiated by the partners themselves must have the paterfamilias' consent, but refusal could be appealed to the magistrates.

The legal definition of marriage focusses on living together as man and wife, or later even on marital affection, though
there is apparently an older substratum of meaning in terms of the procreation of legitimate children. There would be a contract and inventory dealing with questions of property and compensation etc. There were also ceremonies and rituals. But nothing of this appears to be of the essence; nor does consummation seem to be required. Indeed, although secondary works give descriptions of a Roman wedding, they also admit that very little is really known about this. Earlier I have suggested that it was citizenship not marriage that was the ultimate criterion of rightful sexual and parental relationships.

Dowries, though traditionally quite small, grew to quite a fair size (of the order of 1 million sesterces) among the upper strata in the Late Republic. Above I have suggested that this might have been an attempt to secure factional alliances between lineages, the marriage practices themselves not much favouring this. Dowry does not remove the wife’s inheritance rights from her family of origin, and indeed is often not the whole of her property: she may have inheritances from elsewhere also. The dowry is administered for her by her husband, even if she is married sine manu. Typically it is invested in land, and the income used for her maintenance. A contract will be made at her marriage governing the amount and terms of payment, conditions of return, etc. (Augustus made laws settling the terms of return of the dowry.) Typically three years are allowed for payment or for repayment. In the event of divorce, the dowry is returned, but subtractions are made for the maintenance of the children (who remain with the father, as at Athens): ⅓ for each child up to 3 children; and moreover, the wife may be fined for misconduct, up to ⅔ in the case of adultery. Thus she can lose up to ⅔ of her dowry. The dowry remains important as a basis for remarriage. On widowhood, similar provisions would obtain (though presumably the question of misconduct does not arise). The wife’s personal movable property at marriage (her parapherna) would be protected from all this, by inventory and contract (though records of this from Roman Egypt might be due to older Egyptian practice). In our period, the husband does not give a gift to the wife at marriage.

Divorce seems to appear first not long before the end of the
Early Republic; it quickly becomes commonplace and legally unrestricted, although the woman's right to instigate divorce seems only to appear a few years before the Republic ends. Importantly, the paterfamilias of either partner can dissolve the marriage, and in the political maneuverings of the upper strata in the last century of the Late Republic this was commonly done. Eventually, a law forbidding a father to break up a happy marriage was passed, late in the 2nd century A.D. Surprisingly, Gardner holds that until late in our period, divorce in marriage without manus must be made through the father, especially for the wife; only those sui iuris could divorce for themselves (Gardner 1986 p 11, p 86 - 7). Other authorities do not appear to suspect such a restriction, and though Gardner's study is the most recent, this does seem out of keeping with the general pattern, at least as a real (rather than theoretical) practice. At any rate, no reasons for divorce needed to be given, and it could be by consent of the partners or unilateral by either of them. The Augustan laws required a divorce to have seven witnesses, but this was because of the adultery and fornication laws, to give proof of marital status. It was not a restriction on divorce as such.

On divorce, the children remained in the custody of the father; if the wife proved to be pregnant at the time of the divorce, the child would be handed over to the father some time after birth. In the event of widowhood, the wife might leave her husband's household under similar terms, his kin retaining the children, or she might remain and bring the children up, or rather oversee their upbringing, herself. Possibly the form of marriage would have some bearing on the course of action here. But whether she is married with or without manus, her children belong wholly to her husband's lineage, and the wife's part is traditionally to bear – not to raise – children. If she leaves her husband's household, for whatever reason, she does not keep access rights. With this, it is indicative that household furniture is a type of luxury possession favoured by men. Women by contrast favour jewelry.

Within the household, the wife is mistress. Although she is married young, the household does not run to three generations,
and though her first years of marriage might be in the nature of an apprenticeship, she is certainly not under the constant supervision of a resident mother-in-law. By tradition at least, she controls the workforce and holds the storeroom keys (though not perhaps those to the wine-cellar), allocating work and materials. This holds regardless of whether she is married with or without manus; that conditions her dealings beyond the household only.

The designations are different: married with manus the wife is materfamilias and matrona; married without manus she is filiafamilias uxor and puella.* But little seems to hang by this. She seems in any case to take part in her husband's household cult.

The traditional work of citizen women is spinning and weaving; the bulk of housework is seen to by slaves. This includes cooking. Childcare is seen to by slaves also, until the children (both sexes) are old enough to go to school. The wife then is neither housewife nor mother. In the Late Republic, the traditional picture is changed with the introduction of wet-nurses, the commercial making of clothes and baking of bread, and even the commercial provision of cooked food. (The Roman insulae—flats—have no cooking ranges.) But even more, it increasingly becomes the practice for women to pass control of their household affairs to a housekeeper, and to occupy themselves with their business affairs and their social lives.

The household has no women's quarters; the wife's place is in the middle of the house, with everything happening around her. Wives conduct business with their agents, wives receive visitors, both in their own right and jointly with their husbands, they are commonly present with their husbands at dinner parties, both as hostess and as guest. Otherwise the family eats together. The household then is central to social life, not separate from it as at Athens, and women play their full part. With this, wives are cognisant of their husbands' political and business affairs; they also share much the same education. The Roman wife is very much her husband's companion. This pattern becomes increasingly pronounced through the course of our period, but indeed it is estab-

* filia = daughter; uxor = wife; puella = girl.
lished quite early.

Women's social life and movements are basically unrestricted. Women walk in the streets (or are carried in litters), they go visiting, go to temples, shops and libraries. They go to the public baths, an important centre of social life. There are separate baths (often adjacent) for the sexes, or else different times, and there is also a somewhat different range of facilities: in particular the baths do not seem to provide the same sports areas for women as for men. But there are shops, cafes and libraries, as well as beautician and massage facilities. The main sports grounds seem to be largely for men only; an extension probably of military training. Women go to all the public entertainments: wild beast shows, the Games, gladiatorial contests, the theatre and the chariot races. At most of these the sexes are segregated; in the amphitheatres women are placed at the back, in the upper tiers. But at the chariot races (the actual "circus", and by far the most popular entertainment) the sexes sit together. Incidentally, all the public entertainments are free; also they have an important political dimension in the Principate that will be discussed in a later section. Roman cities have public toilets (Roman public engineering in water and sanitation is outstanding); oddly (to our eyes) these do not appear to have been sexually segregated.

Women are escorted in public by slaves, but usually female slaves, and this seems to be a mark of status rather than for chaperonage or protection. Clothing is usually differentiated. Women do not go veiled or (in the best) with their heads covered, but respectable dress is full-length. There is a distinctive dress for prostitutes: they wear the toga, often in bright colours and flimsy materials. Generally, a woman's social status in terms of her sexual career can be told from her clothing, though there is perhaps some room for statement of personal identity amid the conventions.

The picture that I have drawn in this section is centred on urban patterns and on property ownership. But it is not on that account the picture of an aristocracy; it is the picture of a citizenry. The City of Antiquity includes rather than excludes
the countryside, culturally as well as politically, and the ownership of property and of slaves both extend far down the social ladder, though on diminishing scale. There is certainly a fall and rise of the Italian peasantry in the Late Republic and the Principate, as I have described above. But broadly the pattern that I have outlined here seems to typify Roman civilization: all adhered to it who could, including Romanized barbarians and freed slaves from the East. Those who could not do so, the urban proletariat (partly comprised of expropriated peasants), could not maintain families at all; again a characteristic mainly of the Late Republic, ameliorated in the Principate. In the country estates, slaves did not have families, but were kept chained in barracks, though they might be given sexual access to each other. Any resulting children would add to the master's wealth; as slaves, they would be attributed to their mother only. Similarly, the slaves, male and female, who followed the herds would have sexual relations with each other, and bear children likewise. The bailiff however would have a wife; together they would run their household very much on traditional Roman lines. Then, as the Principate ends, families of share-cropping tenants come to make up the agrarian workforce.

Again, in urban households slave families are sometimes found; the marital relationship is called contemnubium. It has no legal status, and requires the master's permission. Here too the children are attributed to the mother only, and share her status. Yet the families here are apparently stable, and similar in pattern to those of the free. Often the partners would try to buy each other's and their children's freedom, or indeed, one partner might own the other as a slave.

But domestic slaves were often not living in their master's household but boarded out in lodgings, and so formed in effect part of the urban proletariat of free and unfree artisans and shopkeepers. The ability to maintain families here was limited above all by poverty: women were forced to live by prostitution and children were exposed, and thus recruited into the slave trade. Conditions had probably been less difficult in the Early Republic (though this too had its early phase of social con-
flicts), and were apparently ameliorated to an extent under the Principate. But the pattern here is general for Antiquity; it is Athens not Rome that is the exception, due to the democratic sharing there of the spoils of an empire based on naval power. At Rome, and only in the city of Rome itself, the corn dole echoes this, and it starts only as the Republic is ending.

The familia is an agnatic lineage, and in the background there are the structures of tribes, curia and gentes. But these are the political macro-structure of the early City; by the Late Republic even the gens seems to have lost any private function. Nor does there seem to be preferential marriage in terms of the degrees of inheritance to give an equivalent to the Greek anchisteia, at least not at plebeian level. (It is very general for aristocracies to have patterns of intermarriage and reciprocal property exchange.)

More to the point are patron-client relations: clientela. This is basically an exchange of loyalty for protection, through which the great families acquired their followings; more generally, a freed slave became his master's client. Patron and client cannot litigate against each other; they are on a basis of good faith. The relationship is similar to that between paterfamilias and adult child. Women can be patrons, though their tutor will be involved. Indeed, women can be patrons for associations such as collegia, the burial clubs of the urban proletariat, as well as for individuals such as their freed slaves.

There is then in Roman society an important division between public and private spheres. But as with the familia itself, it bears no straightforward relationship to the household - consider marriage sine manu - and women are certainly not simply kept in the private sphere of authority of their menfolk. In the Principate especially (e.g. the Augustan legislation) women increasingly come to be the concern, on precisely the same basis as men, of public law and the state. This will be discussed in a later section.
Sexual Polarity

Fertility and Maternity

The Roman wife married young, age 14 – 15. Pregnancy and motherhood would generally soon follow. The question then how far she would understand or be able to control these processes must be considered. In this, there is in the first place her background situation. Although she is brought up in a small nuclear family, this is set in a wider household of slaves, who may have families too. This is one possible source of knowledge. Again, the cultural environment for example in mythology and religion draws heavily on themes of sex and reproduction. Moreover, with marriage close to the age of menarche, there is no obvious reason to withhold knowledge from girls. Secondly, there is her current situation. She is mistress of her own household, with no resident female kin to supervise her, though she may have a continuing supportive relationship with for example her mother. Also, she has her own female slaves, possibly including some taken from her own household with her at marriage. This is a source of knowledge under her own control. For that matter, little bars her in practice from consulting her own gynaecologist. Broadly, then, the young wife's understanding of her own biology seems likely to be quite good.

Pregnancy and childbirth would be medically assisted. Gynaecology and midwifery were both recognized paramedical professions, though like all medical crafts in the Roman world they were not of very high standing. Gynaecologists were usually women – when women physicians are met with, this is usually what is meant. The main medical writers also discuss gynaecology; Soranus (2nd century A.D.) especially wrote a "text-book" for mid-wives. But as with contraception and abortion (to be discussed below), this literature has to be treated with reserve. Literature and medicine in Graeco-Roman Antiquity are quite distinct activities. Childbirth was usually accomplished seated on a special birthing stool, with a midwife and two assistants. In this position the woman herself is presumably not wholly passive. There will certainly
have been childbed mortality but, despite attempts to work with commemorative inscriptions, this cannot be quantified (moreover this data is urban only).

Children are born into their father's lineage, and they belong wholly to the father. It is he who decides whether to acknowledge the child, whether it should be raised or exposed; it is he who names it. (However the registration of birth introduced by Augustus might equally be done by the mother.) It is he who keeps custody of the children if the marriage is dissolved – the wife does not even keep a right of access. These practices surely condition the mother's degree of emotional involvement with her children – as Hopkins argues, this is not simply a factor of child mortality rates (see Hopkins 1983 p 222 - 6). In actuality, the raising of children up to school age (and looking after them outside school hours) is generally entrusted to slaves. Again, from early in the Late Republic women who could afford it increasingly preferred using wet-nurses to breastfeeding their babies themselves. The Roman wife's role (traditionally) is to bear children for her husband's lineage, not to raise them. As to wet-nurses, these might be slave or free, and might be hired or already in the household. Their contracts typically restrict their conduct, in terms of diet and sexual contacts. But the relationship created between nurse and charge was often close and enduring, as indeed were relations generally between children and the slaves who cared for them. So also were mother-child relations in slave families or families based on concubinage, for in both cases the children are legally attributed to the mother only, and the relationship is consequently more secure.

The Roman family is typically small, 2 – 3 children. The general reasons for this, in terms of the pressures of fertility on the property basis of citizenship and status, have already been indicated; they are general to ancient City-state civilization. So also has the typical absolute inability to raise children at the level of the urban proletariat, which likewise is general. At Rome in our period there is also a marked short-fall of children at the level of the richest strata; indeed, it has even been speculated as to whether some factor such as lead poisoning from
the water supply caused this. But generally it is considered that the outcome was willed. In considering this there are two things that have to be sharply distinguished: the man’s desire to limit the number of legitimate children he raises, and the woman’s desire to limit the number of children she conceives or bears. This last concern must always motivate for example prostitutes. But in the political manoeuvres of the Late Republic, upper strata women are often players rather than pawns, and it is quite probable that some of them tried to take unilateral control of their own fertility. But there is a reluctance in both sexes at this level to marry or raise legitimate children in this period, as I have indicated earlier in discussing the Augustan legislation. These matters will come up again later.

Exposure, infanticide, contraception and abortion are the main means of limiting the numbers of children. Of these, although outright infanticide is little attested, exposure is taken for granted throughout Antiquity. There were traditional places at Rome for leaving babies; they would be taken and raised either as slaves or free. This was a major source of slaves, especially slave-prostitutes, the exposure of girl-children being more common. If the child could later prove freeborn status it could reclaim its freedom; again, if the parents could later recognize their child they could reclaim it. Amulets left with the child often served these functions; possibly they were left with the child by (or on behalf of) the mother. Exposure was probably the resource of the poorest women; one guesses also that some wet-nurses might have exposed their own babies. But precisely for being taken for granted throughout Antiquity, all this is very hard to quantify. Even so, there is unlike Athens no doubt that exposure was common Roman practice.

Contraception and abortion are considered in Roman medical writings. Hopkins has discussed this in a classic article, arguing that this might have had some impact on the restricted fertility of the upper strata in the Late Republic (Hopkins 1965/6; see also Eyben 1980/1). But it is surely doubtful how far these medical writings can guide us as to the actual state of ancient knowledge. Indeed, the whole literary-philosophical character of
Graeco-Roman medicine is surely deceptive for, despite real progress at early Hellenistic Alexandria, this is not medical science. Rather these writings are merely compendia of lore culled from other sources, and they are primarily a contribution to literature rather than to medicine. Contraception and abortion technology are known from, for example, Pharaonic Egypt. Indeed, the best that can be said is that ancient technology was capable of contraceptive and abortifacient intervention, though never very disciplined about keeping sound knowledge and nonsense separate. The surgical means of abortion were certainly quite effective, and apparently were less dangerous than the drugs. The lore of contraception and abortion then would surely have been widely known to physicians and midwives throughout the Roman Empire, and these services would have been generally available to the population.

Abortion was always legal in Roman times. Although Septimius Severus (193 - 211 A.D.) passed a law against giving abortifacient drugs, this was apparently only to protect women against quackery. Surgical abortion was not similarly interdicted. The ancient texts indicate a lack of systematic distinction between contraception, abortion, and indeed natural miscarriage. In all cases, measures are typically taken by the woman. But rightfully, the decisions here should be the husband's, just as with the decision to raise or to expose the child. There is longstanding traditional condemnation of the woman who unilaterally acts to destroy her husband's child. Again, the husband acts not only for himself but has a duty to produce children for his lineage and for the citizen body. These things provide the setting for the social ethics of contraception and abortion. (Christian polemists indeed tend to give contraception the heavier condemnation. But that goes beyond our period and our area.)

Maturation

Children are brought up in the care of slaves, from the outset if a wet-nurse is used, and they are also often brought up together with slave children. The emotional relationships here,
including those between free and slave children, are commonly close and enduring - slaves raised in the household were thought to be specially amenable and loyal.

Apparently babies were swaddled as in Athens; here again this may say something as to cultural attitudes, for all its lack of direct bearing on personality development. Initially there seems to be little overt sexual differentiation of children. By tradition, they remain in the mother's care until age 7; the son enters his father's care from that time. Traditionally too the mother will teach her daughter household skills, especially in spinning and weaving. But by our period, the mother's direct involvement in childcare and housework were limited; she might not possess the skills to teach to her daughter herself. Besides this, it was long-established Roman custom to send children to school. This includes both sexes, and extends to a wide range of social levels.

Roman education has a complex history, marked in our period by an ambivalence towards Greek culture, which accordingly goes through a definite rise and fall. By the 2nd century A.D. education in the West has returned to being centred on Latin, and in this time too state support for schools becomes general. Education was at three levels. Primary school, teaching reading, writing and simple arithmetic, lasted about five years. Secondary school, teaching mainly syntax, grammar and literature, lasted about two to three years. These first two levels were shared by both boys and girls, learning together, though the teachers were apparently always male. The curriculum was very conservative. Tertiary education is for men only, and deals with public skills such as rhetoric. It is for young adulthood, and would often entail studying in a distant city such as Athens. Jurisprudence (as opposed to forensic oratory) was learnt in personal relationship to a jurisconsult. All this is closed to women, but they did occasionally study philosophy.

Physical training is not part of childhood but of adolescence; it relates to military training, and accordingly is rather for men. As noted earlier, the sports grounds were for men, and the baths gave different kinds of facilities to the two sexes.
Yet exceptional women athletes and even gladiators were known in Flavian times (69 - 97 A.D.), and there were also attempts to introduce girls' events in the Greek-style Games at this time (but the Romans never took to the Greek Games). Other physical recreations included dancing. But in all these matters the Roman ambivalence towards Greek culture must be noted. Generally, where the Greeks believed in participation the Romans believed in spectating; performance was unworthy of citizens. The Roman theatre too was professional.

For girls, childhood ends with marriage. This is timed to correspond roughly with the menarche, which is thought to have occurred about age 13 (Amundsen and Diers 1969). It is at marriage that the girl dedicates her toys and childhood clothes to the gods. As indicated, her training in traditional skills may have been limited. Her mother however will have taught her social skills, and possibly instructed her as to her own biology. But broadly, the Roman wife was expected to be a companion to her husband, not simply bearer of children and manageress of the household after the Athenian fashion. She has broadly the same education and interests, and indeed, failure of companionship is sometimes cited by men as cause for divorce. I have noted already the place of the household and the participation of the wife in social life at Rome. Rome has prostitutes but not hetaerae.

For boys, puberty begins a period of adolescence. The legal minimum age for this is 14. The father gives the boy his toga of adulthood, and registers him with the "tribe" as a citizen. The boy now begins to be introduced to public affairs, and to begin physical training preparatory for military training. He may also begin to go to brothels. Military service begins at age 17 - 18; the age of marriage is about the same. In the Principate, military service becomes a salaried career. It also becomes incompatible with marriage, though I have discussed the alternatives above. Augustus introduced a quasi-military youth organization, the Augustales, for boys. But the final age of adulthood for men is not until 25. It is at this age, for instance, that an orphan finally ends his guardianship, and it is generally only at this age that a man is considered capable of conducting his own - or
public- affairs.

As outlined in previous sections, the son does not finally inherit or become free of paternal authority until his paterfamilias' death. However his adulthood is not deferred on that account. Rather he is set up in his own household with an interim devolution of property or an allowance, at about age 18. It is on this basis that he marries. For the next few years he acquires increasing autonomy and involvement in public affairs, until age 25. In our period, the arrangements for daughters are not dissimilar, for the girl married sine manu does not pass under her husband's domestic authority. But typically neither does she remain under the authority of her father. Rather he will emancipate her to the control of a tutor, and he will also give her an interim devolution or an allowance in the same way as an adult son. However her husband will control her dowry.) The elements of control here are something of a formality, and she is given increasing involvement and autonomy in the management of her own affairs. The age 25 then has something of the same significance for a woman as for a man.

These comments focus on the citizenry. At the level of the urban proletariat, craft skills are reproduced at least partly by the influx (and freeing) of trained slaves. Beyond this, workshop and household are little differentiated, and training comes simply through inductance, whether as child, slave or apprentice. Household and farm slaves will have learnt their work in the same kind of way. Presumably this applies to prostitution also, for the brothel is simply a workshop (as an inn is a household). However, some girls were given a more sheltered and cultured upbringing, to fit them to be mistresses or concubines.

Slave-girls brought up in their masters' households are likely to have started their sexual-reproductive careers at puberty, either with the sons of the household or with other slaves. This would be favoured rather than controlled, since it increased the master's wealth, and made for a more amenable workforce. The arrangements of slave families and concubinage have already been discussed.
Sexuality

Discussing marriage above in relation to citizenship and legitimacy, I noted its character as a private compact between families, and also the lack of a clearly defined boundary with concubinage. In this discussion, the focus is on the marital sexual relationship, but these wider factors are still relevant. The traditionalist view of marriage as being for the procreation of legitimate children is at best obsolete by our period. Rather it is the companionship between husband and wife that requires to be stressed: they are educated into the same culture and share a common social life, there being no seclusion of women and the domestic household being used as a place of entertainment. Roman men would generally have sexual experience prior to marriage, with prostitutes and/or mistresses. But this would not continue during the marriage. Rather Roman men built sexual relationships with their wives and indeed, seem to have done this on the model of their relationships with their mistresses, stressing mutual emotional commitment and love. For their side, Roman wives seem to have responded by learning skills of lovemaking, and techniques of fertility limitation. When Roman wives are accused by the traditionalists of lasciviousness, it is probably this rather than actual adultery or promiscuity that is in question. The marital relationship however probably does remain coloured by the husband's greater age and experience.

Adultery and fornication I have already discussed in the context of the Augustan legislation. Broadly, this interdicts irregular sexual relations between citizen partners, while leaving sexual relations of whatever kind with (or between) non-citizen partners unregulated. Though citizen women's conduct is more narrowly controlled than men's, they are left free, for example, to take a male concubine, even one of low status. (They also have sexual access in practice to male slaves within the household, whatever the law may say.) The point here is that in the Late Republic, the Romans were no longer distinguishing between the various kinds of sexual relationship: marriage, adultery, love-affair with citizen or non-citizen, mistresses or concubines, etc.
Almost all of Roman love-poetry comes from this period; for a
time it becomes a typical face of Roman culture. Yet it is im-
possible to specify who it is and is not written for. As I have
noted, the character of the marital sexual relationship is per-
manently affected by this state of affairs.

Men also had concubines and mistresses. There are a whole
range of forms here: quasi-marriage with a non-citizen or a cit-
izen of very unequal status; an older man with a favourite slave-
girl in his household; a slave-prostitute rented on long contract
from her owner, or bought outright and set up in her own house-
hold, under the care of slaves provided by her lover; a love-
affair with an actress or mime in which economic exchange might
be more or less of a formal element, etc. Again there are other
forms: the soldiers' marriage discussed earlier, and indeed, sim-
ply informal unions between low status persons. All these rela-
tionships might be emotionally committed and lasting, and also
they might be productive of children. They remain a permanent
feature of Roman society. The Augustan legislation certainly had
no intention to eliminate them, only to keep citizen marriage
distinct.

Prostitution, like marriage, rather shades into the above.
Rome has no hetaerae, as I have commented before, but some slave
girl-children were brought up to become mistresses, given a cult-
ural education comparable to that of the citizen girl. If a rich
young man fell in love with such a girl, he could be made to pay
a high price to buy her. This is a common theme in the Roman
theatre, though it comes from Hellenistic and Athenian New Com-
edy. The situation however seems to have been common to both the
Hellenistic and the Roman worlds. More commonly, however, pros-
stitutes at Rome were the girls of the brothels; also inns, tav-
erns, cocked food shops, the baths, and simply the streets and
arches. Their clientele were mostly the poor, the young, and the
itinerant (e.g. sailors). The girls themselves were mostly slave-
es, freedwomen, and the poorest citizens. Although the sources
generally speak of Greeks and Orientals, it is possible that they
"protest too much"; in the Late Republic there was certainly an
influx of destitute Roman and Italian citizen girls to the cities,
and little other way for them to survive. Despite the squalor of their conditions - common to the urban poor in the Roman world - what impression we have, for example from the Pompeian graffiti, suggests robustness rather than misery (however this is somewhat later, 1st century A.D.). Prostitutes were registered with the magistrates (indeed, for a short period after the Augustan legislation was introduced, some high status women sought to evade it by registering as prostitutes). Prostitution will be considered again in the discussion of sexual economic divisions below.

Homosexuality is a matter which strongly illustrates Roman ambivalence towards Greek culture: initially it was very much condemned, though it came to be more accepted in time. In the Late Republic, the law basically forbade homosexual intercourse between freeborn citizens, but permitted it with a slave or freed partner. The Augustan legislation reinforced this by prescribing the death penalty - most exceptional, since "capital" punishment for those of high status was usually exile. In practice, however, homosexuality became openly practised by the 2nd century A.D., including apparently by certain emperors, for example Hadrian (117 - 139 A.D.). Male brothels and homosexual prostitution were always common, as were favourite household slave-boys. Eunuchs often were favoured; Domitian (82 - 97 A.D.) forbade castration within the Empire, but the importation of eunuchs (e.g. from Persia) continued. All this illustrates a lasting characteristic of homosexuality in Graeco-Roman Antiquity, that it was conceived not as physically mutual but as an active partner's use of a passive partner. This is in contrast to heterosexual intercourse: erotic art often shows the woman astride the man. Domitian also interdicted the prostitution of boys aged under 7. Inter alia, this suggests to me that sex with girl-children was not a Roman predilection. Again, I have not heard of cliterodectomy in the Roman world. Of lesbianism almost nothing is known.

The treatment of sex in Roman religion and culture has different levels, which are not always easy to identify and define. There are strong themes of sexuality, fertility and reproduction in the religion and mythology, and these also inform for example literature and theatre. This holds for the indigenous Roman forms
as well as for later imported Greek and oriental material. On the other hand, Roman monumental art tends to be rather sexually reticent, and this extends to comparable literary work, such as Virgil's Aeneid. Roman ambivalence towards Greek culture shows again here: for the Greeks, nudity was the mark of divinity, while the Romans were rather shocked and embarrassed by it. But the boundaries are hard to draw: drama, for example, turned increasingly from a performed to a written art as the Republic ended, though older plays continued to be staged, especially the comedies of sexual intrigue which I referred to above. Mime and farce became increasingly popular; they often used sexual and erotic themes. Love-poetry almost all comes from the last century of the Republic; I have outlined the context above. This in the end fell foul of Augustus' disapproval. In all this, the emperor's role as People's Tribune must be remembered: this dignifies the demotic arts such as mime and farce and makes them a state function, while rather keeping purely literary culture with its patrician overtones at arms-length. In private entertainment, the Romans enjoyed for example erotic dancing girls. Again, household artifacts such as lamps have paintings of lovers on them. On the whole, then, sexual themes, though deemed inappropriate to certain kinds of context, feature strongly in Roman culture.

Sexual ambience is hard to discuss without undue subjectivity. Nevertheless, some points seem clear: the Romans from the very beginning of the Late Republic developed a preference for emotionally committed and physically mutual heterosexual relationships, whether in marriage or out of it. They accepted an asymmetry of power - the slave or even the freedwoman was not really free to refuse her master - but they did not believe in absolute or arbitrary power, and I doubt that they would have valued an unconsenting partner. This probably applies even in homosexual relations. However it is very much to the point that the Romans preferred heterosexual intercourse because of its physical mutuality, and because a female partner was (for them) an active partner. (By they made of homosexuality what they did is another question.) It may be added that, though the Romans could be immensely cruel, they do not seem to have had a specif-
ically sexual cruelty. Cruelty is rather an outgrowth of their military and legal arrangements. Something on this can be said in the next section.

Aggression

All the Ancient Civilization is oriented to war, but at Rome in our period this has two contrasting phases: the expansions and conquests of the Late Republic, and the defensive consolidation of the Principate. Ultimately, as I discuss elsewhere (Appendix A parts i & ii below), this last is the pacification, and therefore the ending, of the Ancient World. The slave-trade rises and falls with these two phases; pacification is much of the reason why the slave-trade fails, starting with Pompey’s elimination of the Mediterranean pirates.

Warfare is an exclusively male domain, based on training above all in disciplined infantry formation movement, though also in weapon craft. Women are victims of war, especially through being taken and sold as slaves. They are also similarly victims of piracy and coastal raiding; these indeed are the major sources of the slave-trade. The pacification of the Roman World then is very much to women’s advantage, permitting greater freedom of movement as well as greater security at home. This develops progressively from the last half-century of the Republic, and peaks in the 2nd century A.D.

From the Late Republic, public entertainments came to have increasing importance at Rome, and in the Cities of the West. These are of various kinds: chariot-racing, theatre, wild beast shows, gladiatorial fights, etc. Of these, chariot racing was by far the most popular and frequent - this in fact is the Roman "circus". These public entertainments were free to all. Initially they were provided by the rich and powerful, later almost wholly by the Princeps himself, at least at Rome. They were sometimes used for the execution of criminals of lower status: by wild beasts, by fire or by weapons. Women were included in this, but specifically sexual cruelty does not seem to have been typical. However, bestiality is a theme in Graeco-Roman mythology, and
attempts might have been made to stage it. Besides this, voluntary women gladiators are exceptionally found in Flavian times (69 – 97 A.D.); they may have fought with dummy weapons. More significant than this is the attendance of women at the public entertainments, for the presence of the Princeps (or the provincial governor) was an opportunity for petitions and public demands. This is a growing dimension of citizenship in which women have a practical share. (Indeed, it is apparently - especially in the theatre - the origin of the later Blues and Greens of Byzantium.)

Citizenship as such, as noted earlier, is a complex of political-legal rights, property ownership, and military service, and in principle this is something that should, as at Athens, exclude women entirely. Indeed, in theory, women are subject to lifelong guardianship, of their menfolk or an appointed tutor, incapable of any legally valid act and answerable for their conduct to their families. In Rome, however, all this has already begun to erode by the start of our period. Marriage sine manu takes the wife out of her father's household without putting her under her husband's authority and again, most paterfamilias passed control of their adult daughter's affairs to a tutor. The tutor's duties are only to intervene in transactions affecting res mancipi; other transactions are at her own discretion. Besides, women soon acquire the right to approach the praetor to have their tutor's interdict over-ruled, or to have another tutor appointed. In time, the guardianship of women becomes an empty form; the jurisconsult Gaius, writing in the 2nd century A.D., derides it.

There is a corresponding development of legal personality. In the Roman Republic, as at Athens, there is little distinction of legal and political institutions. One brings a case by approaching the praetor, who legally defines the issues and appoints a panel of judges. There is no state prosecutor, and the difference between private and public law is rather that between the cases that one may only bring in one's own behalf, and those that anyone may bring "in the public interest", that is as citizen prosecutor. Sulla (circa B.C. 85) also introduced permanent (standing) jury courts for certain laws which any citizen prosecutor could
approach; the system was kept, and the Augustan laws were of this kind. Initially, women could not bring cases in their own person. But in time, this was softened: the principle became accepted that women could bring cases where the matter concerned themselves or their families, and indeed that women could even act as citizen prosecutors in certain matters such as treason. These developments come in the course of the Principate; some time before this, the testability of women seems to have been established. But most significant of all is the development with the early Principate of the "extraordinary jurisdictions": the hearing of cases by the Princeps, the provincial governors, or the new magistrate-administrators of Rome and Italy, the prefects. All this could be on appeal, on referral, or on first instance. Here women appear to have had just the same access as men, and on cases of all kinds, and they did in fact make up a very fair part of the business (see e.g. Millar 1977 p 546 et seq).

Corresponding developments can be seen in the matter of women's criminousness. Initially, this was a matter for the familia not for the state, not only in such matters as adultery but also in public crimes such as treason. The matter would be heard by a family council. Even if a public trial was held, the woman would still be handed over to her menfolk for punishment. But in the Late Republic this appears to become largely unworkable, presumably because of the changes in household authority and guardianship, and Augustus made no attempt to restore it: his moral legislation puts even women's sexual conduct into the public sphere. In the Principate, women generally faced the same courts and magistrates as men, and the same range of penalties - fines, exile, the mines (where they ground ore), the arena. Incidentally, the avoidance on shedding women's blood - execution by strangulation or starvation - also appears to become obsolete from this time.

Rape and abduction in Roman society are only considered a crime against menfolk where a slave is at issue - and this can entail a woman owner. It can also be a matter of the voluntary abscondion of a slave, for example to live with a partner. With a free woman however the charge for rape is vis, unlawful force.
The woman herself can bring the case, or any citizen prosecutor may do so. This is so at least since the time of Julius Caesar. However, it remains a fact that at Rome the small person needs a patron. There was also at least a legal argument of Republican times that prostitutes and actresses could be legally abducted. However the collegia of actresses and mimes acted here to protect their members' personal security.

Sexual Divisions

Power

As I have indicated earlier, the Roman Empire is basically a congeries of semi-autonomous City-states, within a loose overall provincial system, whereby the Roman military commander also has a supervisory jurisdiction over the local City magistrates. There is historical development. Sulla separated the provincial governorships from the Roman magistracies, creating proconsuls and propraetors. Augustus, while basically continuing this system, kept control of the frontier provinces, and the supreme military command, in his own hands - the office of proconsul, with the tribunate, is the constitutional basis of the Principate. He also, in effect, made Italy into the City-state of Rome, controlled through a small number of prefects under his own control, the Roman City magistracies becoming largely nominal. The Senate too becomes increasingly acclamatory rather than advisory in character with the development of the Principate. But the major point is the hierarchy of jurisdictions into which, as noted in the previous section, the new structure of the Principate became incorporated. This far more than bureaucracy typifies Roman administration.

The developments in citizenship I have outlined in the previous section. The process might be described as, on the one side, loss of the military and political dimension of citizenship for men, on the other side, gain of the legal dimension of citizenship for women. But here the rise of the extraordinary jurisdictions, and of the "extraordinary political expression" at the public entertainments, should be remembered. As to magistracies,
these apparently remained entirely male. A small number of women magistrates are known from the provincial Cities of the East, and this had also occurred in Hellenistic times, but our source of knowledge here is local coin issue, and we do not have this source for the West. Moreover in both their political location and their institutions and offices the Cities of the East are somewhat different: the Cities are initially at least islands of Greeks in seas of Orientals, and the gymnasiarch is (or was) central. It is this office that women sometimes held, apparently on the basis of their wealth. But with incorporation in wider kingdoms and assimilation to the surrounding peoples the Cities’ institutions often became empty forms, and the offices sinecural. By contrast, the Western Cities and their magistracies remain very much the basic legal and administrative structure for all the people of the Western Empire. The presence of women magistrates here would be remarkable.

The emperors themselves were invariably male, and their womenfolk had no political function as such, only religious functions. Again, intermarriage with imperial women apparently had no significance for the succession (nor was there intermarriage with foreign, for instance Persian, royalty.) The women of the Severan era (193 - 235 A.D.) are exceptional in their overt political involvement, but individual (historical) rather than sociological factors seem to be at work here. Again, the provincial governors and the prefects in Italy and Rome are invariably male. Here, as with the Princeps himself, these offices lie in a career structure that is interfused with the offices of military command. There is no specifically non-military administrative career — a heritage from the City-state, of course, though more widely a factor of the orientation of the Ancient Civilization to war and to non-peaceful economic activity. Thus there is no question of a participation of women.

Bureaucracy at Rome was slow to develop, and never becomes extensive during the Principate. The Republic, like Athens, had no bureaucracy. The beginning of the state bureaucracy was simply Caesar’s household slaves; later those of Augustus. In the time of Claudius, specific bureaus were developed for various state
functions, manned now by imperial freedmen. In the 2nd century, a career service manned at its upper levels by equestrians was instituted, but it remained tiny, a few hundred posts only. In all this, no systematic distinction was made between the imperial provinces and the Princeps' own private estates, and these in turn might lie in either imperial or senatorial provinces. The Princeps' officials then might be used as inspectors or be given special commissions within the senatorial provinces; this was part of the reason why the senatorials hated the imperial freedmen so much. But again, all these officials are invariably male. The underlying principle seems to be that estate supervision beyond the household is a male domain. Only household supervision, or supervision of a workshop of female labour, is the domain of women. This is a reflection of the sexual division of labour in the oikos. This principle would apply even when a woman was the estate owner.

Religion at Rome divides between state cult and popular soteriologies, though with the tribunary nature of the Principate the distinction becomes hard to maintain. But despite this, Rome never has a state-sanctioned soteriology comparable to the Eleusinian Mysteries at Athens. In fact, the Princeps was also chief priest of the Roman state cult: pontifex maximus. The priestesses of the state cult were originally the Vestal Virgins, Vesta being the hearth goddess of the City. Their status was quasi-magisterial (in some respects at least), though their sexual conduct was strictly controlled. In the Principate, the state cult was extended (in the West) by the cult of Roma and the emperor's genius, and also the cults of deified men and women of the imperial houses. This created priesthoods and priestesships at both City and provincial level. Besides this, there were also the soteriological cults. These tended to be Eastern imports, and they also tended to syncretize, broadly equivalent deities from different regions becoming equated and assimilated to each other.

Prominent here are the goddesses of sex, fertility, motherhood and agriculture: Magna Mater, Cybele, Isis, et al. For a time Isis becomes one of the most important deities of the Empire (favoured mostly by wives and mothers, incidentally, not by cour-
There are male equivalents, notably Mithras (favoured by soldiers and administrators, and largely exclusive of women). There is no Church here, only local cults (the Church is a Christian innovation, based probably on the Jewish Diaspora). All this has imperial acknowledgement, although it never becomes state religion – there is no such thing, until Christian times. But although even female deities tend to have priests as well as priestesses, there is something of an advance in female power here, until Christian times. But Christianity made no advance in the West within our period.

Economy

I present an outline of the basic structure of the ancient economy elsewhere (Appendix A part ii), and at the beginning of the present chapter I have given an outline of Roman economic history. In particular, I have pointed to the contrast of the expropriation of the peasantry and marginalization of the urban proletariat in Italy in the Late Republic with the re-establishment of the peasantry and amelioration of conditions for the urban proletariat throughout the West in the Principate, relating this to the rise and fall of the slave-trade and the slave-worked ranch, and likewise of Roman political capitalism. These things affected the position of women mainly in terms of demographic processes, and this I have already discussed in earlier sections. They also condition sexual economic divisions, which is the focus here: divisions especially in property and in labour. Here however it is the basic structural categories of oikos and market that have the greatest importance, and the fundamental changes (also outlined earlier) are the separation and disengagement of the several senses of "familia", and their remoteness from actual household structure. These changes are already in place when our period begins.

The first issue is the guardianship of women. This, as in all classical Antiquity, is a concomitant of a citizenship of military-political-legal character based on the property endowment (especially in farming property) of the lineage. Citizenship
is initially a sphere from which women are wholly excluded in their own persons, as I have already shown. Yet with this it should be noted that strictly the control of the lineage's economic affairs is solely in the hands of its head—kyrios or paterfamilias. Roman forms in particular highlight that it is not only women whose competence is restricted: so also is that of adult sons. But however that may be, at Rome from the beginning of the Early Republic the principle that a woman's economic actions are limited to the oikos, that she cannot transact between the oikos and the wider world, is progressively eroded. In the first place, it is only dealings in res mancipi that are so restricted—land and houses on Italic soil, slaves and some categories of farming livestock. All other transactions she can make at her own discretion, although again her dowry is always managed for her by husband, father or guardian. But this does not apply to property acquired by inheritance or through her own transactions. Secondly, the form of control, especially with the rise of marriage sine manu, is not direct constant supervision by husband or father, but only that a tutor is appointed who may intervene in her transactions when needful to protect her familias' property. With this, women soon acquire the right to appeal to the magistrates against their tutors' decisions, and also acquire a degree of choice and control as to who their tutor should be. Thirdly, the Augustan laws freed some categories of women altogether from guardianship, and other provisions and individual grants widened this. In all, then, as I have said before, by the 2nd century A.D. the guardianship of women is an empty form—although the form itself does persist.

Guardianship aside, the property rights of Roman women were little restricted. The basic Roman inheritance laws (intestate succession) divided the estate between the sons and daughters in equal shares, although marriage cum manu ended the daughter's inheritance rights in her familia of origin. Married sine manu, however, her dowry did not affect her inheritance rights, though it might have to be taken into account in the division of the estate. The equal inheritance of daughters was always Roman practice, and it is hard to say why; again, there was no epiklerate
at Rome. Possibly one should look at Greek practices as adjustments to the limited land supply and the pressures to equitable sharing. Roman expansion and continuing patrician-oligarchic dominance would make for a different outcome. At any rate, considerable fortunes began to come into women’s hands in the aftermath of the 2nd Punic War; a law restricting inheritances to women was only a brief and unsuccessful experiment. Wealthy women are common in Roman society throughout our period. As to the devolution of their property, the initial principle is agnatic inheritance: the woman's property goes back to her familia of origin. But in our period, both the woman's right to make a will and inheritance by cognates — her husband and children — come to be established, more particularly in the 2nd century A.D. when the process of making a will is simplified. In this century, inheritance even for illegitimate children (i.e. from their intestate mother) becomes established. Perhaps however we should see this as less a change from agnatic to cognatic principles than from collective to individual principles, in view of the wider pattern of changes in women's position.

Women's work within the household includes wet-nursing and child-care, kitchen help and general domestic service, care of clothes and personal attendance. All of this is typically done by slaves, and since an element of status and conspicuous consumption is involved, precise functions cannot always be identified. Public aqueducts limit the needs for water-carrying; again, bread and clothing are both produced in the market as well as in the household. Cook slaves tend to be male, though again cooked food is bought in the market by the poorer (whose flats typically lack cooking ranges). Literate slaves include secretaries and librarians. These might be female, especially for a woman owner; generally the sexual division of labour is cross-cut by the woman's preference for women slaves in certain functions. A large household might have its own midwives. In the country estates, the household functions are basically the same, while men do the bulk of the field-work. But women may do a limited amount of field-work too, and certainly women accompany the men who follow the herds, as their cooks and camp attendants.
Women in business on a large scale are known; they include a haulage contractor and a lead pipe works owner. Renting out property and money-lending at interest are also known, though women were forbidden to engage in large-scale banking. Claudius encouraged women to fit out ships for the Roman corn trade, offering freedom from guardianship to those who did so. All these cases are a matter of freedwomen (mostly) directly engaged in affairs, not citizen women merely investing in them.

In the market, women's work includes: spinning, weaving, dyeing, fulling, making and mending clothes. (An unanswered question, for all Antiquity, is: who made the sails for ships?) Women were also beauticians and hairdressers, midwives and physicians – the latter often specializing in gynaecology. (Physicians however do not have high status at Rome.) Women also ground grain; indeed they ground ore at the mines, though that is typically a criminal punishment. All of this is conditioned by work in the household, and often these are slaves "living away" and paying body-rent, or freedwomen practising the same crafts as they had as slaves in the household. Either way they are still part of the familia. Of all these crafts, only spinning, ladies' hairdressing and midwifery seem to be actual female monopolies. Workshops of mixed labour, apparently on a family basis, are known in for example textiles. Women in the market are also shopkeepers, selling clothing, fish, meat, vegetables, dyes and perfumes, sometimes nails and other craft products made perhaps by their menfolk; also cooked food, wine and girls.

Prostitution is simply part of this. The girls themselves might be slave, freed or free; girl children exposed by citizen parents were often taken and raised for prostitution. Again, in the Late Republic the women of the expropriated Italian peasantry must often have been forced into prostitution by lack of alternatives; the sources surely "protest too much" in insisting upon Greeks, Syrians and Egyptians, although slaves and migrants from the East certainly became common. Again, in the Principate slave-prostitutes were imported from Persia and India. As to work places, the prostitute might rent a room at an inn or a brothel, or she might be attached to the premises; again, she might work at
a tavern or cooked food shop, or at the baths, or simply in the streets and arches. She might either await custom or actively solicit: prostitutes wore distinctive clothing, the toga, often in flimsy materials and bright colours. The workplace itself is basically simply a household/workshop; there is nothing distinctive here except perhaps a demand for privacy. Direct supervision is not characteristic of Roman labour; probably the slaves here are "living away" and paying body rent, and thus are effectively on the same terms as the freed or free women. Again, the brothel seems to be a place of work rather than a place of residence, and there do not seem to be closed houses. There are also male homosexual prostitutes. Ancient prostitution is not criminalized and is not characterized by "protection"; rather at Rome clientela is very much part of mainstream society. Slave-prostitutes may be owned by women; indeed it is the common ambition of the artisan in classical Antiquity at least to buy a slave to take over one's work and retire.

Owning brothels was a recognized business investment, but owning prostitutes carried civil disabilities. Again, in the mid-2nd century A.D. a law was passed forbidding the sale of a slave-girl to a whoremaster without cause. Oddly, there are similar provisions in regard to gladiators, providing both civil disabilities for the owner and protection for slaves against sale to such without cause. Prostitutes were taxed, at the rate of one customer's price per day. This tax is known only from the time of Caligula, but a prostitutes' tax is a common fiscal resource in Antiquity. A register of prostitutes had always been kept at Rome by the magistrates. But the prostitutes' tax in the Empire was farmed, as was the usual ancient practice.

The prostitutes' register included mistresses, but not actresses, mimes, flute-girls or dancing-girls. These should not be assumed to be prostitutes in disguise: they might make love and they might accept gifts, but their own crafts were quite real and were valued, whereas sexual intercourse itself was quite cheap.
Stratification

The economic structural division of oikos and market is basic to the stratificatory system of the Roman world, the oikos grounding a set of status-categories and the market a basic class location. It is doubtful if there is a real differentiation of classes, in the sense of a real differentiation of life-chances in terms of market position. Rather success in the market leads to leaving the market, as when the profits from a successful trading venture are invested in land. The urban proletariat of Antiquity is basically one class, though divided by status considerations, in particular those between free, freed and slave. Against this, the market does create property classes, and with them class struggles over usury and debt-slavery and the expropriation of the peasantry. This has bearing for the Italian peasantry in the 2nd century B.C. But mostly stratificatory struggles in Antiquity are status struggles, over citizenship.

As to the status order, this in the City-state is firstly the divisions of free, slave, and foreigner, and secondly the grades of citizenship: equites, assidui and proles. (The terms I have used for general sociological purposes, patrician, plebeian and proletarian, actually derive from early Roman history; this is a source of potential confusion. The above are equivalents for the beginning of the Late Republic.) As the City-state develops to Empire however, the status system changes, as I have indicated before: equites separate into senatorials and equestrians, a provincial aristocracy of decurions emerges, and below this level, the distinction of citizen and foreigner largely disappears, except in regard to the legions. In all, the distinction that emerges in the Principate is that between honestiores and humiliores, the former comprising senatorials, equestrians, decurions and legionary veterans; the latter comprising the rest. This distinction, though perhaps not legally defined, nonetheless has legal consequences, for example in the forms of legal penalties: an honestior would be exiled where a humilior would be executed in the arena. More broadly, the honestiores are the political-military citizens of the Empire, although a purely legal cit-
izenship is now universal.

Relating sexual divisions to the above, it is perhaps hard to find class differences. Life-chances on the market do not seem to be much affected by sex, for all that there is a sexual division of labour. Prostitution and wet-nursing are the major exception to this, especially in the Late Republic, when they are located in actual processes of class-struggle. Rather it is status difference that is obvious: the exclusion of women in the Roman City-state from citizenship. Man and woman, then, like slave and free are statuses, and strongly differentiated as such. But it is precisely this that changes as the City-state develops into the Empire: on the one side, the political-military citizenship of men erodes; on the other side, women increasingly acquire legal citizenship. Thus status differentiation as between men and women is progressively dissolved. This is more true at the level of the humiliores, who have only a legal citizenship, and less true at the level of the honestiores, who still have some elements of a political-military citizenship. But the overall tendency is to status equality of the sexes.

Corollary to this is a change in the status distinctions specific to women themselves: those between the citizen wife and mother and the concubine, mistress and prostitute. This resonates with the distinctive class location of prostitutes and wet-nurses noted above. Again, it is this status distinction that the Augustan legislation is directed to preserving. Even so, it seems that the distinction very much dissolves into the broad distinction of honestiores and humiliores. Compounding this too, the resolution of the class struggles with the Principate tends to dissolve the distinctive class location of the prostitute and wet-nurse; they simply become humiliores women in the market.

It may be commented finally that political action in Antiquity, where it is not centred on land redistribution and the cancellation of debts, is very much focussed on political-legal status and citizenship. Women's liberation is always conceivable in classical Antiquity, though its touchstone, as Plato saw, is actually putting women in the army. Short of this, Rome in our period made a very fair and increasing range of concessions. This
(coming on top of the earlier status distinctions among women) is probably why there is no development of a women’s liberation movement in Roman history.

**Conclusion**

The position of women in Roman society is hard to evaluate, due to the depth and complexity of Roman history. The basic institutions are originally those of a City-state, but very little is known of the history of Rome at that time. When a secure history can be established, say from the 3rd century B.C., Rome has already become very much more complex. Again, the developing Empire is made up of diverse elements, and there is above all the difference of the Greek East and the Roman West, in social arrangements and in culture. And again, Roman history goes on beyond the period that I have considered here, into the Dominate and the Christian era. So far as this develops rather from the Greek East, and indeed from the preceding Hellenistic world, I have said little of it. Broadly, though, it appears that women’s position in the Dominate deteriorated, and that Christianity contributed to that deterioration.

But the main point that I want to make here is that it is possible to make a false evaluation of the condition of Roman women by comparing certain obvious factors of the 1st century B.C. – the prevalence of marriage sine manu, the love-poetry, the political activities of certain upper strata women – with the reconstructed early City-state, or simply with Roman historical-tradition on the Early Republic. Equally, it is possible to disillusion oneself by exposing the falsity of this evaluation. As against this, what I have tried to do here is to establish what were the actual basic institutions of the secure period of Roman history, the Late Republic and the Principate in the Roman West, especially as regards political, legal and military arrangements, citizenship, its property basis, its conditions of acquisition and transmission, etc. And I have tried to set this in the context of economic and demographic history.

Broadly, I find that the position of Roman women is not a
matter for scepticism. Especially contextualizing this study with studies of both Athens and Egypt, it can be seen that there is a pattern to the Roman developments – no question of "decadence". And it can be seen that the emancipation of Roman women is not located in an ephemeral superstructure that is contradicted by material realities. Very simply, it is a question of citizenship, and they got it.

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Conclusions

In a sense, this thesis does not reach conclusions: it is simply an exploration. Its project is to see what can be done in the way of gender theory using certain methodologies and resources, centrally the sociology of Max Weber. There is no claim that anything definitive has been achieved; on the contrary, this is only a preliminary reconnaissance within a restricted substantive arena. Still, for the sake of completeness something in the way of a conclusion should be provided.

Basically, then, what I have done is to propose two types of society, in terms of contrasting syndromes of gender arrangements: reproduction societies and procreation societies. In the first, the human biology of sexual polarity is made problematic, requiring to be controlled and contained; in the second, it is made unproblematic, taken as nature and accepted. I have traced these contrasting orientations through a wide range of social practices in regard to motherhood, childhood and adolescence, sexual relationships, etc. With this, there goes in the first case a sharp social differentiation of men and women, and women are kept within male domestic authority and dependence within the household and out of public life. In the second case, the social differentiation of the sexes is softer and women are more independent, and are citizens and participate in the community on much the same basis as men. The pattern of division of economic functions between the sexes is shaped to accord with these alternatives. But these are differences ultimately of degree: there is a universal exclusion of women from military and political affairs and from administration which underlies both patterns.

I have identified these two contrasting syndromes with two major contrasted types of historical society: the City-state and the Bureaucratic Kingdom. This is within the substantive limits
of Antiquity. But I have further identified the syndromes on theoretical grounds through these societal types with two broad streams of general societal typologization: polities of charismatically legitimated domination (charismatic polities) and polities of traditionally legitimated domination (traditional polities). I have given some indications as to how the structural conflicts of each of the two types City-state and Bureaucratic Kingdom lead over into each other, or into other types of society not yet studied. The implication is that the Weberian approach to gender should be pursued in terms of a general typology of domination systems - patrimonial states, feudal states, etc.

I have also considered the political conflicts within City-states of patrician and plebeian dominance - oligarchy and democracy. I have shown that patrician dominance makes for an informal political participation of patrician women with an attendant introduction into the community, and a permissive attitude towards sexuality centring on prostitution - a softening of the characteristic reproductive pattern.

As to the overall position of women in the Ancient Civilization itself, the basic point that I would make is that it all seems terribly familiar. The patterns of social arrangements, and their contrasts, developments and changes, seem to be broadly of the same order as those of the recent and modern world. I have discussed some of the methodological and theoretical issues entailed in this above (chapter 2); it is now possibly to be more definite. It is doubtful whether the position of women in modernity is unique. Women's emancipation occurs as a factor of bureaucratic domination, and this has arisen in various World-historical locations. If there seems to be anything distinctive about the modern case, this is surely because the rational-legal polity gives greater scope to bureaucracy than the traditional polity does, though bureaucratization may come as a fairly late development. It also gives less scope to charisma than does the charismatic polity, since the political community is now rational-legally defined, and again, since the political parties themselves tend to be bureaucratized. As against this, most of what I earlier termed the "cliche factors" of the sociological diagnosis of
modernity - democratization, industrialization, secularization, etc. - seem to have no fundamental bearing on the matter. This should be qualified: in view of the Judaeo-Christian tradition on women and sex (see Appendix A part iv above) it is reasonable to adduce secularization as a secondary factor in modern women's emancipation. But as to democratization, the comparative historical record indicates that of itself, democracy is inimical to women's autonomy. It appears rather that it is bureaucratization that has brought women's penetration of democratic structures in modernity, and this indeed is rather the trailing edge of modern women's emancipation.

As for Capitalism, this apparently has nothing to do with either women's emancipation or women's oppression: Capitalism is indifferent to patriarchy and will survive equally well in any gender environment. So also it is with the long term of socio-economic history: the position of women does not appear to be a factor of the mode of production. Nor can this be by-passed by invoking the realm of ideology.

It may as well also be spelt out that the traditional thesis that tries to locate a decisive moment in the history of women's oppression in terms of the transition from the primitive to the civilized appears quite nonsensical in the light of actual study of women's position in the Ancient Civilization. Egyptian women are not oppressed in that kind of way, and Athenian society is quite remote from the primitive; equally, the emancipation of Roman women shows that no moment was decisive. The thesis is pure speculation, and owes its survival entirely to the divisions between sociology and anthropology - that and sheer inertia. As an approach to the substantive record it is worthless.

The theoretical approach that I have developed works with the material triad of power, demographics and the economy. In this, the economy appears to play only the part of the anvil; it is not an active factor. Different power systems entail different demographic regimes, in accordance with their typical structural conflicts; that is the heart of the matter. Central here is the migration process, grounded in expropriation and itself the ground for prostitution. The most simple case is rural-urban mig-
oration, but there is equally colonizatory emigration, and again there is migrant including slave labour. The patterns of the two types of society are in contrast in these matters; reproduction societies emphasize the processes whereas procreation societies ameliorate them. But the processes themselves can occur at any level of economic development, at least wherever there are cities and stratification systems within the geopolitical arena. As to modernity, it is doubtful whether either the population explosion or industrial technology makes any fundamental difference. At least this should not be assumed, though further study might compel the modification of the views just expressed. The present study, being located in the arena of Antiquity, is bound by the category of non-peaceful economic action.

Even so, the overall orientation here as I have said is that the key to women's history lies in a general typology of domination. "Patriarchy" is part of the sociology of power, on both historical and analytical grounds. As I have said, there is a universal exclusion of women from military, political and administrative affairs. I have tried to make this basic to gender sociology. I have also tried to account for its origins, in terms of an embryonic conflict in the material triad: the economic, sexual and parental arrangements of military groupings. It is a conflict situation that Weber himself identifies, though he never tries to base gender theory on it (Weber 1978 p 1119 - 20).

All this requires World-historical study, and in that anomalies will certainly appear. The comparatively demilitarized, rational-economic character of the medieval European Cities, and the non-intensive character of the Imperial Chinese bureaucracy, are two probable cases in point (see Weber 1978 p 1348 et seq; Weber 1968 p 47 et seq). But staying here with modernity, the "power thesis" does suggest a comparative structure rather than a single category. For the typical Western polity of Rational Capitalism can be seen very much in the light of the City-state, which indeed comprises a distinctive and essential element (though not the only element) in its aetiology. With this, the political conflicts and the emergence of modern democracy itself can be seen in the light of the conflicts of oligarchy and democracy
in ancient and medieval City-states. Into this, bureaucracy enters as a late and intrusive element, with "Advanced" Capitalism. By contrast, the State Socialist societies of Eastern Europe are more comparable to premodern Bureaucratic Kingdoms; indeed many of them arose out of Bureaucratic Empires on the threshold of modernity (Austria, Russia). And with increasing bureaucratization Rational Capitalism too is developing in the same direction.

This structure then provides a "prediction" of the structure of the history of modern women. On the one side, there is a gradual long-term change from the reproduction to the procreation type in Rational Capitalist society on the time-scale of bureaucratization – about the last 100 years. Overlying this long-term development, there is an on-going cycle of oligarchic softening and democratic hardening of the reproductive pattern, reflecting the continuing political struggles of the strata. On the other side, there is a long-established though developing procreation-type situation in State Socialist society, characterized by the absence of overlying cycles and by greater stability. The reproductive type features the exclusion of women from public life to male domestic authority; the procreational type features women's citizenship and participation in the community. A point that might specially be noted here is the contrast of an exclusively male citizenship of political participation with a citizenship of legal rights and personality shared between the sexes. I would suggest that contrasts and transformations here can be seen in modernity much as in Antiquity. The cycle of oligarchic and democratic dominance has impact primarily for permissiveness and repressiveness towards sexuality, focussing especially on prostitution, pornography, etc. However the procreational type is also and more generally sexually permissive. The superimposition of short-term cycles upon longer-term development accounts for the difficulties in relating women's liberation and sexual liberation in Rational Capitalist society – this indeed can be projected back through all Western history. It should also be noted how both women's rights and sexual freedom, like bureaucratization itself, are only obliquely related to serious political discourse – though they are certainly all targets for polemic.
All this is very rough; it would have to be qualified at least by consideration of the differential impact of Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox Christianity, and indeed perhaps Islam, although most of the societies here would now be considered as secularized. But the overall picture has I think a certain prima facie validity — it seems to fit.

I leave the consideration of the "power thesis", and indeed of the "material triad", there. As to long-term cultural development, there is less that I can say. Women's oppression is not an ideological phenomenon and the Ancient Civilization is not ideologically determined. Consequently, there is little systematic consideration of ideological factors in the body of the above text. The studies I have presented here may be basic for the analysis of the development of the Judaeo-Christian tradition on women and sex, but they are not enough to generate that analysis. I have attempted a brief outline treatment of the issues in an appendix, however (Appendix A part iv). But the religious tradition has more bearing for medieval and early modern Europe than for secularized modernity.

What should be considered for modernity is the "rationalization and bureaucratization" thesis — the death of value-oriented politics. This indeed should be given fundamental reconsideration in the light of gender theory, for gender is an important dimension of social structure, and as such locates distinctive social groups which participate in the struggles for control of the state and for cultural presence (see above especially ch 7 Stratification). But while I can state this issue, I cannot as yet resolve it.

The above remarks, however, are of necessity provisional in character, for all that I have tried to give them clear and definite statement. For the present thesis is as I have said no more than a first exploration of the possibilities of gender theory in Weberian perspective. The study really needs to be carried through on World-historical scale. In terms of Max Weber's work, this comprises four major sectors: Antiquity, the Oriental civilizations, medieval Europe and modernity. (The project of expanding Weber's historical base is another, though quite valid, ques-
tion.) It is a basic methodological requirement that focussed studies must be made before the corpus of comparative historical statements can be built up: comparative historical sociology requires comparative historical study. A further point is that there is long-term sociological development to consider, as well as comparison.

My own judgement as to strategy for this is that, while further studies in Antiquity are essential, focussing especially on the Eastern region where Judaism and Christianity arose, the next major sector to be taken on should be the Oriental civilizations: India and China. The reasons for this are of a piece with those for which Antiquity was chosen here: the need to break through the limits of conventional scholarship. The first target is evolutionism. But an ethnocentric historical sociology of Western civilization is equally at all costs to be avoided. This could indeed all too easily be accommodated into a conventional evolutionism; whereas it is the ultimate methodological status of the comparative historical method, and the need to use this to theorize gender de novo, that must be insisted upon.

Bibliography


Appendices
Appendix A

The Sociology of Antiquity

i. Introduction

The comparative historical component of this thesis is restricted to the Ancient Civilization. In chapter 2 above, I explain the considerations underlying this and make some introductory comments, but for the most part the various aspects of the Ancient Civilization are dealt with piecemeal as the successive discussions of the various chapters require. It seems desirable, then, to supplement this with an appendix giving a more focussed discussion of the sociology of Antiquity. This is what is presented now.

It must be made clear that the overall sociological orientation here is drawn almost exclusively from Max Weber. The main texts are: "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations" (Weber 1976); "The City" (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 16); and passim "Economy and Society" (Weber 1978); also "Ancient Judaism" (Weber 1952), though I have no specific focus here on the Jews. In the background are the older "Roman Agrarian History" (Weber 1982) and the essay "The Social Causes of the Decay of Ancient Civilization" (Weber 1970a/1976). As against this, I have not involved myself in debate with attempts to build alternative sociological approaches. The basic reasons for this I have already set out (in ch 2): the lack of continuity of scholarship and of explicit debate with Weber, the rehearsal of familiar themes and topics, or their revision to fit with preconceived theses or preferred sets of values. If earlier I criticized Polanyi, here I would single out Anderson and the historian Ste Croix (Anderson 1974; de Ste Croix 1981; see also criticisms in Shaw 1984), my point being that the project of reconstructing a Marxist sociology of Antiqu-
ity really calls for evaluation by the criteria of Marxist reconstruction, and I am not interested in this. (Moreover neither author has any focus on the Ancient Civilization prior to Hellenic Greece.) My purpose is to use Antiquity as the arena for an innovative sociological enquiry: gender in Weberian framework. Granted this purpose, there is ample vindication for Weber's sociology of Antiquity from modern historiography.

On the other hand, as the comparative historical chapters above will have made clear, I have undertaken some reading in the modern historiographical (and other) literature; I have not simply stayed with Weber. Indeed, there are methodological problems here that again I have touched on earlier (ch 2), especially the discontinuities in both sociological and historiographical scholarship. In sociology, any concern with ancient history is fairly rare, and even Weber scholars have neglected "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations" and the older works on Antiquity (see Love 1984). In historiography, Weber has for most been a relatively recent discovery, and mostly only among classical historians. Besides, there is the more orthodox problem of genuine scholarly advance since Weber. This mostly concerns Egypt and the Ancient Near East (excepting possibly the Jews); the study of these was still fairly new in Weber's time. So far as Egypt is concerned, there has been a quite general re-evaluation: the civilization is now considered to have been much less death-obsessed and priest-ridden than was first thought. I have accordingly leant towards a more secular analysis of the Egyptian state, and a more materialist analysis of the Egyptian temples, than did Weber. (Indeed, it can be suggested generally that theocratic tendencies are more typical for the decayed kingdoms and the World Empires of the 1st millennium B.C. than for the strong autonomous kingdoms of earlier times.) And of course this has to be reflected in the general approach to Antiquity as well as in the analysis of Egypt itself. On the other hand, Egyptologists have never really discovered economic history: the only modern full-length study is in German (Helck 1975; though see also Janssen 1975). Here one is very much thrown back to Weber (though also to Heichelheim - Heichelheim 1958). These problems, orthodox in
themselves, compound those of the discontinuity of scholarship referred to above, and it has been difficult to know what to do. However, since my concern is above all with the ancient civilizations themselves, the course I have decided on is synthesis: to interpret the modern literature through Weber’s sociology (and add it to Weber’s history) except where clearly impossible. Basically that means: where the literature is consciously oriented to a contra-Weber purpose; where the literature leaves a lacuna that only Weber can fill; or where Weber is clearly wrong or misinformed.

It should be understood, then, that what follows is of the same general order as the comparative historical chapters above: a compound of Weber’s sociology with more recent scholarship. It is not simply an exegesis of Weber’s sociology of Antiquity, though it is I think very close to Weber for long passages and at most points.

It is correctly ancient civilization in the West that is in view: geographically centred on the great inland seas—the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and (perhaps less so) the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf—and with them, the great rivers, especially the Tigris, Euphrates and Nile. This is not intended inclusively, but of the Indus Valley civilization for example very little is known. However it does exclude the continental landmasses of Asia, Africa and Europe. In time, this civilization extends from before the rise of Sumer (the scholarship available to Weber overestimated the antiquity of Egyptian civilization) to the end of the Roman Principate—say roughly 3,500 B.C. to A.D. 250. As Weber early pointed out, the end of the Ancient Civilization and the fall of the Roman Empire are two different things, though historians may speak of a "Late Antiquity", running from say the end of the Principate to the rise of Islam. But it is the character of the Ancient Civilization that defines it and gives it its unity: a civilization based on cities located on (or near) coastlines and navigable rivers, each dominating a relatively compact agrarian hinterland, and engaging in trade by sea. War and non-peaceful economic activity are this civilization’s hallmarks. So also is the inclusion of the countryside in the city, which is
either an independent City-state or City-kingdom or the local administrative centre of a larger kingdom or empire. In the latter case the same formal political structures are often retained.\* The ending of this civilization comes when the Romans penetrate and settle inland away from coastlines and navigable rivers, especially in southern Europe; the Cities decay, and are replaced by a manorial system, the beginning of the medieval civilizations. More will be said on all these matters later.

The bulk of this chapter will be concerned with the general sociology of Antiquity. But first, some comments on the sociological location of Antiquity are required. It must be made clear that there is no intention either to define "civilization" or to account for its rise. It must be understood that Weber's approach to the Ancient Civilization is neither that of a developmental anthropologist nor that of an evolutionary sociologist; it is that of an ancient historian. As such, it is tied to the position that history begins with sources not with origins, and to the awareness that sources often come late in history, though they may speak (with greater or lesser comprehensibility) of earlier times. A degree of synthetic reconstruction of earlier periods is thus sometimes possible, though only where there are materials that will sustain it (see especially Weber 1976, especially p 77-9). Purely speculative reconstructions Weber refused, not certainly out of reluctance to consider ethnographic material, for he does so freely, but rather because he saw too many possibilities and no way to choose between them. That is, he saw no way to tell which had occurred in which situations: Weber was no unilinearist. It should be added that neither does Weber put any threshold between the primitive and the civilized as types of society. Rather he treats all of human history as a continuity, subject to

\*There is always confusion between the City-state - polis or civitas - and the urban centre - astoi or urbs. I have used "City-state" or "City" for the former, "city" for the latter. But in bureaucratic conditions or in complex empires, where the city is rather an administrative centre, with perhaps initially at least a population of immigrant conquerors, the distinction is less clear-cut and a consistent usage harder to maintain.
our knowledge of it.* As I have argued before (ch 2), Weber does not accept an institutionalized division of sociology and anthropology. It might be specified here that Weber does not seem to regard literacy as definitive or even symptomatic for civilization (c.f. Goody ed. 1968, especially articles by Goody and Wells and by Gough; c.f. also Street 1984), though of course it has tremendous significance in terms of historiographical resources. The point apparently is rather that literacy is of the essence of bureaucracy, whereas rhetoric is of the essence of the City-state. Literate culture in the City-state appears to be a factor of class-struggle: patrician closure in the face of plebeian pressures, after the concession of a written law-code. The patricians, that is, use the written word as an inner line of communication among themselves. But to draw the points together, what Weber gives us is, essentially, a broad-minded but cautious historian's approach to a universal sociology, in which he regards the pre-history of civilization, the millennia of the neolithic revolution, as discernible in broad outline but not recoverable in any detail. In face of this, he sets himself to lay down the analysis of the Ancient Civilization as the essential foundational strata for a consistent and coherent sociological treatment of World History.

The narrative of ancient history is far too complex for summary here; it is an immense sweep of time and space. But the point should be made that it is narrative; neither in itself nor in its place in World History does ancient history have a "meaning", in metaphysical or meta-ethical sense. There is a slow accumulation, of population, technology, secular knowledge and "spiritual knowledge". There is also the "decay of ancient civilization"; it should never be forgotten that, if there were a

*For this reason, there can be no "historic defeat of the female sex" in the Weberian universe. It might be added that, while we do not know the position of women in prehistory, their position in the earliest civilizations capable of study, Egypt and Mesopotamia, lends no support to that conception, especially when later ancient civilizations such as Israel or the Greek City-states, where women's position is much weaker, are considered. See Histoire Mondiale de la Femme vol 1.
metaphysical pattern here, it could as well be cyclic as evolutionary. However, Weber shunned all such conceptions. Perhaps the most fundamental question lies in the relation of Weber’s sociology of Antiquity to his enquiry into the Economic Ethic of the World Religions, and the bearing each has on modernity. For Weber approaches Antiquity mainly through the concept of non-peaceful economic action; but the Economic Ethic enquiry is mostly directed at the medieval civilizations of the West and the Orient, and the rise of modernity from the former. As such, it is oriented to a cyclic view of the World Religions, at least (or initially) in the West, their rise and fall; and this leaves, as I have argued before (ch 2), comparabilities between Antiquity and modernity as materialistic ages. I discuss these issues again below (section iv). But the point here is that, given this cyclic conception, it is hard to see how Weber’s overall strategy in World History can be equated with a unilinear progressive disengagement of societal sub-systems.

Finally, a comment might be made on the significance of the Greeks for the long-term development of secular culture. I doubt that Weber saw this as very significant, though he does note (as significant for lack of religious rationalization) the weakness of priesthoods in ancient City-states. But rational secular culture is more widely characteristic of the Ancient World: consider Hellenistic Alexandria. Again, there is no comparability with the European Enlightenment, for ancient religion is not organized in Churches possessing general cultural hegemony. Besides, there are more important cultural heritages from ancient times: Jewish (and Christian) religion, Persian theodicy, Roman law. In the matter of Greek secular rationality, we should beware of having our prejudices and ethnocentrisms flattered. (But I have noted my divergence from Weber on the importance of religion in the pre-classical civilizations.)

However, I turn now from introductory remarks to specific substantive issues, and this under three heads: economy, power and religion.
ii. Economy

The Ancient Civilization (see especially Weber 1976 part i; Heichelheim 1958; Finley 1973; Weber 1976 part i; Heichelheim 1958; Finley 1973) is as stated a civilization of coastal and riverine Cities, centring on inland seas and navigable rivers. It is a City-centred civilization: its basic macro-unit is the City and its agricultural hinterland — originally a coastal fortress and agricultural hinterland, as will appear in the next section. The characteristic settlement pattern is of a single city and surrounding villages; neither towns nor isolated homesteads are typical. The City dominates and politically and legally includes its hinterland; it is the nexus of agriculture, trade and war. Trade, transport and communications are maritime, not overland; the Ancient Civilization thus excludes the continental land-masses, though their barbarian peoples and later the Asian civilizations (e.g. Persia) are a constant background and conditioning factor. Economic activity is typically non-peaceful: that is, it is constantly conditioned by political — administrative, legal, and especially military — factors. On the basis of their political domination, over agrarian hinterland, other Cities and peoples, or overseas possessions, the Cities import, both luxury goods and essentials. They do not produce for export trade; they are consumer not producer Cities.

Overall, this macro-unit provides three basic class-locations. First, there is an urban patriciate, owning large rural estates but living in the city, where they control the political, legal and military institutions. This will include foreign trade, which may take the forms of piracy, slave-raiding, outright wars of conquest, or the collection of tribute and taxation. Second, there is a peasantry. This may be a class of free smallholders, who may share, though unequally, in the political-legal-military affairs of the City with the patricians; or it may be a semi-free serf population, share-cropping on the patricians' estates; exceptionally it may even be a work-force of imported slaves. A recurrent feature of all Antiquity is the expropriation and enslavement of the peasantry by the patricians through relations of usury and debt-slavery. Reaction against this may come either in
the form of class-conflicts or of a protective order imposed by a king; in either case, written law-codes seem typically to result. Lastly, there is the urban proletariat, a class of small traders, shopkeepers and craftsmen, whose origins are mostly in the expropriated peasantry, though their numbers may be swelled by imported and/or freed slaves. (Slavery itself is a legal status, not an economic class position.) A major divergence of type arises if there is a king: the patriciate will then be excluded from political dominance, and rule will be exercised through a bureaucratic apparatus, to the general protection of the lower orders. This will be taken up in the next section.

In all this, the basic micro-unit is the oikos. Fundamentally, this means the self-sufficient household, producing to meet its own needs. There are differences of scale, from the peasant's smallholding to the estates of a prince. The oikos can include economic assets of all kinds: land, workshops, mines, and equally livestock and slaves; the oikos is neither rural nor agrarian by necessity. But the basic orientations are always to wants-satisfaction and to self-sufficiency: excess production is sold for profit, but on a one-off not a continuous basis, and ideally nothing is bought that can be produced. Ultimately the guiding criteria for economic action are political: autonomy and leisure, rather than simple gain. In principle, even the artisan's or the shopkeeper's business seeks to be on this basis, as much as the peasant's farm or the patrician's estates. These things also hold for the estates and workshops etc. of the temples (more especially in bureaucratic conditions), the personal estates or indeed the whole realm of a king, or the communal affairs of a City.

As to the temples, Weber, as he himself admits, has initially no special focus on them (Weber 1976 p 78 - 9), though a later, historically more wide-ranging, discussion seems to cover the issues (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 15). Indeed, in strictly economic terms there is surely little to be said: the temple is simply an oikos. Its significance is rather on the political side: it is mainly in the preclassical civilizations of the Ancient Near East and Egypt that the temples have their full importance, and this is surely a factor of the king's bureaucratic domination and dis-
placement of the patricians. The temple is a bureaucratized patrician oikos, where the noble lineage has been replaced by an immortal deity with an appointed, salaried staff. This at least is the view that I have developed (see ch 4 & 8 above), and to me it does not suggest that these preclassical civilizations are in any real way incommensurate with Graeco-Roman civilization. Especially one should remember here the persistence of such temples in the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman East; and indeed the eventual economic endowment of the Christian Churches.

The oikos co-exists with the market, but in view of its own character gives it limited scope - the orientation of the oikos is to buy nothing that can be self-produced, and to sell off excess production only. Shop-keepers and craftsmen sell their produce on the market, but the strong tendency is for trade, especially long-range sea-borne trade, to be in luxuries not in essentials. Most especially, where the City cannot feed itself from its agrarian hinterland, the importation of corn will be made a matter of political action; it will not be left to the market. This may also hold for essential raw materials such as wood for ship-building: economic policy, so far as there is such a thing, is directed to acquiring raw materials not markets. As stated earlier, the Cities are consumers not producers. But the market itself has above all the character that it is a market for goods. It is not a market either for labour or for capital. Wage-labour is atypical in Antiquity; the typical forms are either self-employment or slavery. As to capital, the investment of this is above all in land. Where capital is invested in trade, it is done on a one-off basis, and the profits where possible are put into land. It is not done on a basis of continuous re-investment.

Slavery has two main sources: the expropriation of the peasantry, and capture in war - this includes piracy, coastal raiding etc. The two are inter-related, and the slave-trade was considerable (at least in most eras). Slaves were used to displace the free peasantry in agriculture, to work mines and quarries, in domestic service and in the urban trades; these last two are generally the most typical. They could also be used in administration, even imperial administration - a highly privileged position.
Often slaves were set up independently as craftsmen or shopkeepers in the market, "living away" from their owner's household and owning their own property, and paying a body-rent or a share of their income to their masters. A slave might use his savings from this or some other source to buy his freedom; possessed of freed status, he might continue in the same profession and in substantially the same relationship to his former owner. All this is still part of the owner's oikos; it is "selling off the excess", so to speak. But in agriculture especially, only a very rich slave-supply could support slave-gang worked ranches; this was only found relatively briefly at Carthage and at Rome. Otherwise, the tendency was for the slaves to become serfs, living semi-independently on a share-cropping basis on large estates, with their own families and some control in terms of traditional expectations over their own work contribution. The free peasantry also tended in bureaucratic conditions to fall to this level. The Roman Empire indeed ended on these terms (see Weber 1982 ch 4, Weber 1976 part ii ch 7, as well as Weber 1970a/1976).

Capital might be owned and invested by the patricians, but the active conduct of finance and trade in City-states at least was typically in the hands of resident foreigners. These in turn would be excluded from owning land, the most favoured form of investment. They were also excluded from political participation — one major reason why ancient Cities did not develop an economic policy, except in terms of military considerations. But investment in trading ventures was, as stated, typically "one-off", not continuous; the profits of the venture would be invested in land. However there is also "political capitalism": contracting to the state for road-building, supply of the army, tax-farming especially of a conquered province, etc. This would be restricted to patrician citizens. But as an adjunct of an imperialist policy, political capitalism would in time tend to lead to regulation or even outright replacement by a state bureaucracy. It is in this sense that bureaucracy stifled capitalism in Antiquity, especially at Rome. In bureaucratic conditions, kings and temples would conduct trade, through their own agents or foreign merchants, largely with each other. These transactions would be polit-
icized in accordance with geopolitical relationships: reciprocal gifts between equals, receipt of tribute from unequals, the relationships being constantly negotiated. I see no virtue, incidentally, in associating this, after Polanyi (Polanyi 1968, 1977), with an earlier stage or type of the economy; it is surely within the broad spectrum of politically conditioned economic activity.

Non-peaceful economic activity covers a spectrum, from piracy and coastal raiding to the outright conquest and sustained exploitation of foreign lands. Through slavery and booty, war could always be turned to gain, though wars did occur for other reasons, such as the encroachments of migrating barbarians. Again, the foundation of colony Cities by the Greeks and Latins (though possibly less so the Phoenicians) was not a matter of economics but of demographics: the numbers of citizens outrunning the land supply. But imperialism, war for profit leading to permanent domination and exploitation, was inherent in the character of the ancient City-state, above all in its stratificatory conflicts. Imperialism was a way of buying off the urban mob; of returning a degree of citizenship to the urban proletariat. This was seen variously at Athens and Rome, where the profits of empire were distributed among the poorer citizens in the form of payment for military service, performance of civic duties (e.g. attendance at the Assembly), etc., or simply the corn-dole.

Taxation in Antiquity (see especially Jones 1974a) again bears the mark of the political relationships of equality or subordination; the basic principle is that subjects are taxed, citizens are tax-exempt. For subjects, tax is basically tribute: it may take the form of poll-tax or land-tax or a fraction of produce. This is typical for bureaucratic conditions. In the City-state by contrast citizens are only taxed exceptionally, for example in a war emergency. Public burdens are rather met as a duty - leiturgy - imposed upon the rich, and this is supplemented by taxes on non-citizens: harbour dues, tax on goods sold in the market, poll-tax on foreign residents, etc. Typically these taxes are farmed. All this remains characteristic of "administrative" Cities within empires, for example in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds. In bureaucratic conditions, tax is often taken in kind.
rather than in money, and forced labour (corvee) is also typical practice. The collection, and organization, of this is of course a great part of the bureaucracy's function.

The history of the Ancient Civilization covers an immense sweep of time, of the order of 3,500 years, and at that, both Sumeria and Egypt seem to be well developed when we first get sight of them, though Egypt is still fragmented. There is development through Antiquity: even basic technologies such as building in stone or metal-working are still emerging, and the range of agricultural plants and domestic animals is still being built up. (However the introduction of more profitable forms of farming into the classical world - olives, vines, wheat, cattle-ranching - is due to political-economic not technical factors.) Again, means of exchange are still being developed: coined money only appears about the 7th century, although the measurement of value in terms of weights of various metals is far older. Indeed, in terms of trade and exchange methods, the economy of the 2nd millennium Near East especially seems well developed, even by the standards of later Athens and Rome. At any rate, Weber does not use a sequential classificatory system, such as Bronze Age and Iron Age, for Antiquity. Rather he uses the basic societal types City-state and Bureaucratic Kingdom, and although the City-state is best attested for the 1st millennium B.C. (but it is also hinted at in the 3rd millennium Near East), the overall impression is rather cyclic than developmental. The Roman Empire, and indeed the Hellenistic kingdoms before it, are Bureaucratic Kingdoms like those of earlier Egypt and the Ancient Near East.

As to the ending of the Ancient Civilization (see Weber 1982 ch 4, Weber 1976 part ii ch 7, as well as Weber 1970a/1976), this, though it may be associated with the end of the Roman Principate, is not the same thing as the fall of the Roman Empire. For this does survive into medieval times, especially in the East (see Jones 1966). The project of explanation is therefore complex and has to distinguish between different levels. But basically, what is in question is the ending of a City-based coastal and riverine (and maritime) civilization, and the rise of an inland rural (and land-bound) manorial civilization in its place. Many factors are
at work in this, but the most basic of them is simply the Roman military penetration inland, away from coastlines and navigable rivers, and the settlement of a mainland empire. With this also is the introduction of pacification and humane rule into the Roman World; this destroyed the main opportunities for exploitation and booty, and also the slave supply. Besides this, there is the continued attribution of the wealthiest strata to Rome itself rather than to the provincial Cities, whose poorer provincial aristocracy were forced to bear the provincial municipal burdens (or to put it another way, the rich opted out of the tax system). This is much of the reason both why the (relatively) wealthy left the cities to live on their estates, and why rural estates came of necessity to be used instead of the Cities as the local administrative units of the later Empire. Collapse of the money economy and taxation, collapse of the pay, morale and loyalty of the army, civil war and the military collapse of the frontiers (with great destruction to the cities) were the consequences, in the disastrous 3rd century A.D. Other factors can be mentioned: the rise of share-cropping serfs to replace chain-gangs of slaves on the great estates in face of the failure of the slave supply; the rise of taxation in kind and forced labour in face of the failure of the money economy; the binding of craftsmen to their fathers' professions; the imposition of leiturgies on the collegia, the binding of serfs to the estates of their birth. Apart from the first, these are mostly factors of the later Empire (the Dominate), and of early medieval civilization. But the questions, why Rome declined as an ancient civilization and why Rome transformed into a medieval civilization, do require a degree of analytic separation. So also do the questions why that civilization failed so soon in the West though it survived well in the East, and indeed, why it survived for so long in the North-East but failed with the rise of Islam in the South-East. But out of these questions, it is the decline of the Ancient Civilization that is the focus, both for Weber's sociology and for this thesis.

A note might be added on demographics. Weber has no formal treatment of this as such; what I have tried to develop in the
chapters above (especially chapter 4) is my own innovation. On the other hand, Weber does repeatedly give a good deal of consideration to demographic issues: the non-reproductivity of the city, especially the urban proletariat; rural-urban migration and the expropriation of the peasantry; the slave-trade and the large scale use of imported slaves in agriculture; the reproductivity of the agrarian workforce (see Weber 1982 ch 4, Weber 1970a/1976, Weber 1976 part i, Weber 1978 ch 16 "The City", p 1237 and passim). Most importantly, Weber builds these issues into his explanatory structures; he does not merely describe them. To my mind, all this is tremendously illuminating for all the Ancient Civilization, though the uptake of Weber's ideas, as I have noted before, has been mostly in Graeco-Roman historiography rather than the preclassical disciplines such as Egyptology. However it is really only with the Roman Empire that an empirical demographic regime and its transformations can be described (see especially Salmon 1974). Weber's focus is more on the migration process than on the processes of fertility and mortality, or on overall population increase or decrease, but this is to use migration as the key to the overall situation, not to beg the general questions. Fertility and mortality rates for the countryside in Antiquity are nowhere known. Nor indeed is there much known about changes in population level; a slow increase over the long term, though probably with significant reversals, seems most likely. The inadequacies of the data compel one to aduce a pattern on general considerations (c.f. McEvedy and Jones 1978 passim).

There is a thesis that the sex-ratio in Graeco-Roman Antiquity was out of balance, men outnumbering women by perhaps as much as 2 : 1 (Pomeroy 1975 p 227 – 8; Guttentag and Secord 1983 ch 2). Social practices favouring differential survival are adduced for this, especially female infanticide and exposure (though not forgetting child-bed mortality). The thesis cannot be empirically proven; notably, it seems to be argued more on consideration of Greece, although Roman data are far better. My own analysis of social processes suggests that the thesis might have some weight for City-states, especially at acute stages of class-struggle, but is contra-indicated for more settled periods of City-state
history and for Bureaucratic Kingdoms generally (see ch 4 above). Moreover at best the thesis confounds exposure with infanticide and forgets its relationship to slavery and prostitution, and indeed forgets the importation of slaves. A sex-ratio imbalance among the citizenry would be another matter.

iii. Power

In discussing the Ancient Civilization, it is always difficult to maintain the analytic separation between economy and polity. Following Weber (Weber 1976 part 1), the above outline has tried to give only the most generalized picture. Weber focusses this by identifying a number of types of ancient polity, each of which conditions the economy somewhat differently. More accurately, he identifies two trajectories of development, each of which has a number of possible stages. Their major types are the City-state and the Bureaucratic Kingdom. Both arise from a common origin, where a lord in a coastal castle engages in maritime trade and dominates the countryside, bringing in artisans to form a town. The trajectories then diverge according as the lord’s soldiers reduce him to their own level and constitute themselves an aristocracy, or as the lord suppresses his soldiers and rules, with the support of the rural folk, through an apparatus of dependent officials. This reveals Weber’s typical three-cornered power-struggle, between ruler, apparatus and subjects, and the beginnings of his systematic typology of domination; issues that are taken up and developed in "Economy and Society".

The methodology here might also be noted: it is to see the various substantive civilizations of Antiquity as developing on different time-scales, and thus showing different stages on a unified (though two-pronged) developmental pattern, according as the sources reveal them to us (Weber 1976 p 69 et seq). This is a synthetic approach; it is not a speculative reconstruction. (It may be pointed out that Weber was on the right lines as to the nature of Mycenaean civilization, long before the decipherment of Linear B – see Weber 1978 "The City" p 1282.)

The City-state and the Bureaucratic Kingdom are the major
types, and should form the major concerns here. But before pursuing them, there is another set of issues that require to be considered, though they are much more difficult and uncertain. These concern the relationship of the ancient polity to the antecedent and environing political arrangements, and the bearing of this for the ancient polity's own structure. This question is a lifelong concern of Weber's, from the "Roman Agrarian History" of 1891 (Weber 1982) to the "General Economic History" of 1920 (Weber 1981; see especially ch 2). The question is, what kind of parallels are there between, on the one side, the early history of the German peoples and their development from tribalism to medieval feudal and City civilization, and on the other side, the development of the City-civilization of Antiquity from its antecedent barbarism?* It might be added that Weber was also concerned, as any German of his time must be, with the question, what comprises national identity? The parallels here might be closest between the Germans and the Greeks, for the Greeks too have a legendary history of tribalism and migration (though the relation of this to Mycenaean civilization is not clear). One can ask "what is a Greek?" just as one can ask "what is a German?" (I speak of this briefly in ch 9 above).

The questions here (c.f. Poliakov 1974; see also Smith 1984, 1986) involve what might be termed continental as opposed to transatlantic issues: ethnicity in terms of nationalism rather than post-imperial immigration; race in terms of Aryan, Semitic and Altaic rather than white, black and brown. The point is that ancient history, like much of World History, commonly presents us with names attributed to collectivities of persons - e.g. Hyksos, Sea Peoples, Achaians, Etruscans - often telling us little or nothing about them. It becomes necessary to ask then not just who

*Weber's (untranslated) essay of 1905 on the Social Conditions of the Ancient Germans (Weber 1924) seems to mark a re-orientation from his earlier Roman Agrarian History (Weber 1982). From now on he disengages the problems of the early Germans from those of the early Greeks and Romans; he comes to include the preclassical civilizations in the Ancient Civilization; and he comes increasingly to disengage the City from tribalism, in both the ancient and the medieval West.
these people were, but what is the status of these names? What kinds of reality lie behind them? One obvious question is, who names? Is it the bearers' name for themselves, or a name that someone else gave them? If so, what did he, or they, know about them? Again, what is the relationship between people's name and place-name? Which is named for which? Are the people settled, nomadic, or in migration? If the latter, are they named for their place of origin, their final resting-place, or somewhere they passed through on the way? And again and not least, how and with what significance do these names change?

Clearly there are many possibilities here. But perhaps we can suggest two polar types: the self-identifying group of persons, and people merely living near each other and given a collective name by others. Of course, these things (especially the former) can make for a growing process of political closure. But perhaps the first point should be that it is the inherent tendency of scholarship, including ancient scholarship, to impose a coherence on the situation (whatever situation it is considering) that it does not necessarily possess of itself. With this, though I am not competent to judge questions of archaeological methodology, it could also be said that it is hard to see how assemblages of material culture can be related to sometime, transient, or even illusory political identities. It is hard enough relating them to forms of social organization (c.f. Binford 1983). This point might also be made in relation to linguistic archaeology (c.f. Littleton 1982). But it should be a familiar issue in social theory by now that polity is not to be confounded with society.

There are difficult, and probably unfamiliar, matters here, and Weber is both reserved and flexible in his handling of them (see especially Weber 1978 Part II ch 5, also ch 9). A key point is that he sees ethnicity, its putative grounding in common descent, and its relation to the premodern polity in essentially the same light as the nation, its putative grounding in the language community, and its relation to the modern polity. Both cases he regarded with some scepticism. Another key point is that Weber knew well that the original "tribes" were the sub-divisions of
the Roman City-state ("tribus" is Latin for ⅓), and nothing to do with primitive or barbarian conditions. He cannot have been happy with the way that contemporary anthropologists were projecting their classical educations onto the ethnographic record, far less with their reconstructions of prehistory. Yet another point is that Weber had some idea of the difficulties of reconciling Homeric society with Mycenaean society (see above ch 9).

In face of these issues, Weber makes two moves. First, he maintains a sharp distinction between society and polity and indeed, maintains a distinction too between the polity and the state. Second, he argues that political identity arises out of common political action, not out of common descent, shared customs, shared language, or physical characteristics such as skin colour. Ideas of race or nation arise on this basis of common action, and this includes the gamut of ethnic identifications - tribe, folk, people, etc. Such political identity remains a possible basis for future political action, and the memory of past political action may remain as a most persistent presence, but all this does not necessarily or even typically indicate active ongoing political organization, especially at any level of complexity. But this said, it must be added (see especially Weber 1978 Part ii ch 4) that household and kinship systems and also settlement patterns also inter-relate with these matters in ways that almost wholly escape historical interrogation. Military factors may enter into it, such as the prevalence of men's houses of warriors. In particular chariot warfare seems to have made for the universalization of patriarchal households across the Euras-african landmass in the later 2nd millennium B.C. - although such households might be found already among the older civilizations. But generally Weber finds the relationships between kinship and polity obscure, especially so far as common descent is an ethnic fiction.*

But what most needs to be grasped here is that Weber does not see the Ancient Civilization as "evolving" out of agrarian

*Discussing these matters above, especially in chapters 3 and 4, I draw attention to the somewhat similar views of A.L. Kroeber. See Kroeber 1952 a & b.
barbarism. On the contrary, he sees it as arising as a new and conflictual element: coastal trading war-lords. As I have said before, there is a distance between Weber's account and at least some anthropological theories of the state (e.g. Service 1975; Cohen and Service eds 1978; Krader 1968; see also Boserup 1965, 1981). Weber sees the antecedent conditions in terms of loose ethnic identities gathered, more or less, around patriarchal chieftains or perhaps aristocratic clans; but the developing Cities conflict with and absorb all such structures. Above all, for Weber the "tribal" arrangements of the ancient City-state - the phylum, genos and phratry of Athens, the tribus, gens and curia of Rome - are specific to the sociology of the ancient City-state and most certainly are not "survivals" from previous conditions, which they do not necessarily even much resemble. Here Weber stands in flat contradiction to the kind of evolutionism that must see the ancient City-state in terms of a progressive erosion of an older organized tribalism (see e.g. Gouldner 1967 part i). His two points are, first, that the older tribalism did not possess a comparable degree of organization, and second, that the structures in question do not erode during the course of the City-state's history. It might be added that these are urban not rural structures, and that besides, the ancient City includes the countryside. (See Weber 1978 Part ii ch 16 "The City" p 1253 et seq; Weber 1976 p 145 et eq; also previous references.) Classical scholarship has been slow to take up these points,* (see Finley 1985), and I do not know if sociological (or anthropological) scholarship has ever yet done so. But Weber combines great historical scholarship with great sociological acuity; he sees clearly that the history of the ancient polity is just as many-levell ed and deceptive as that of the modern polity, and he is determined to single out for attention those structures which actually were decisive in the event.

The argument is most easily made for the ancient City-state.

*There exists a modern study of this, Roussel 1976; however this could not be used for the present thesis. See review by Gauthier (Gauthier 1978).
This is formed through a fusion of neighbourhoods, and creates a new political community into which the existing tribes are dissolved and reformed – this indeed is decisive for the character of the occidental City. Initially, however, the City has the character of a consociation of aristocratic clans, whose members alone have full citizenship, and which each have their commoner followings. But on the other side, the Bureaucratic Kingdom too tends to dissolve rather than to generate both aristocratic clans and ethnic tribes, at least within the limits of geopolitics.

For the first, aristocratic clans will be suppressed as politically dangerous to the ruler; for the second, the extent of the king's authority, as I have argued earlier (ch 4), is not defined with reference to "natural communities" in ethnic or similar terms, but only pragmatically, though this itself might give rise to a sense of community in time. Outcomes here are negotiated, but the most powerful and centralized realms such as Egypt see the complete dissolution of all such structures. So far as local loyalties remain, it is the cities that are their bearers (local gods suggest this). I have already said (ch 4) that I see here, in the antithesis of the self-defined political community and the pragmatically defined realm, the basis of the types charismatic and traditional domination, although Weber does not spell this out. At any rate, both City-state and Bureaucratic Kingdom mark a discontinuity, and essentially the same discontinuity, with what has gone before.

I have considered these matters at some length because they are both unfamiliar and heterodox, and because my own theoretical explorations in gender above (especially chapters 4 & 5) have of necessity sought to look at the wider parameters of Weber's sociology of polity – especially issues of state and local community, public and private affairs. The "tribal" structures of the ancient polity are immensely confusing in their sociological location, especially if they are approached as "kinship" (compare Finley 1985 and Littman 1979). However, I return now, though in somewhat brief form, to the central ground of the ancient polity: the antithetical types City-state and Bureaucratic Kingdom.

The ancient City-state (see especially Weber 1978 Part ii
ch 16 "The City") is definitively a consociation of warriors; it should be noted that they are self-equipped warriors. As such, it retains and indeed sharply focusses the political-military structure of tribes and clans. Typically, this is given a threefold structure, though the relation between the elements is matter for interpretation, and varies over time and in different locations. The tribes (to use the Roman terms) seem to divide all the citizens, the gentes to be specifically patrician, and the curia to be of commoners only. But whether the gentes ever led the curia, and again, how far each structure functions in the political or the military fields (e.g. whether the curia was ever a purely military unit), are different questions, and the answers would not necessarily be the same for example at Rome and at Athens - or for that matter in different eras. (Weber came to consider the curia to be originally military, and to pre-date the City-state - see Weber 1978 Part ii ch 16 "The City" p 1286 - 7.) More to the point is that all political-military power is mandatorily relocated into the City, which dominates and includes the countryside, and a new political community is constituted. It should be noted that this process is not a fusion of tribes, but a fusion of neighbourhoods (synoikism) with a sub-division into tribes, however these may relate to older structures. In the course of political development, this constitution may be radically reformulated, as with Cleisthenes' reforms at Athens (see ch 9); this may well echo the process whereby the City was first founded, especially with a colony City. But it is with the Plebeian City that the tribes reach their full importance, as a territorial basis for all citizens.

The ancient City differs from the medieval City (especially of the inland North) primarily in military regards. In medieval times the militarily dominant lords remained in the countryside; the City excluded the countryside and was relatively de-militarized, and it organized itself on the basis of trade and craft associations - the guilds. Yet it is still a consociation: it still constitutes a new political community, in disregard or despite of the antecedent and environing arrangements. This is the common definitive characteristic of the occidental City - the
City-state. By contrast, the oriental city remains integrated into and divided among the tribes and clans of the countryside, or else is a military and administrative centre of the ruler. It has no separate identity as an autonomous political unit.

The ancient City-state is initially aristocratic: it is controlled by the patrician clans, whose members alone have full citizenship. These exercise control through a formal system of magistracies and assemblies, in which the ordinary citizens of the commoner followings may have a minimal participation. The relations between patrician clans and commoner followings is probably best seen in terms of clientage. There is a firm status division between patricians and plebeians and recurrent stratificatory conflicts between them, over patrician monopolization of power and the law, the reality of common citizenship and plebeian participation. In some eras these conflicts take the form of class-struggles, when the patricians use the devices of usury and debt-slavery, together with monopolization and manipulation of the law, to reduce the plebeians to proletarian or slave status. Otherwise, and more generally, they are status conflicts. The conflicts may be expressed through secession of the plebs as well as by insurrection; they may result in compromise and constitutional adjustment or in revolution, or both. The temporary handing over of power to a law-maker, or a period of popular tyranny, protective of and supported by the lower orders, is also typical. In particular, a written law-code is a characteristic consequence of the class-struggles. As against this, the purely economic demands for the redistribution of the land and the cancellation of debts are typically resisted.

Military factors largely control the City-state's political development. Just as the Patrician City is a factor of chariot and cavalry warfare, so the rise of hoplite infantry determines a development to democracy: the Plebeian City. It should be remembered that the citizen-soldier is self-equipped, and therefore must have the economic substance to maintain his citizen-soldier status. Of itself, the development of hoplite infantry most affects the plebeian peasantry; it has little impact for the urban proletariat. However, further military development in the direct-
ion of naval power can draw these into active citizenship also, through drawing them into military service as rowers in the galleys (the ships being provided for the state by the rich). Athens is the classic example of this. In constitutional terms, the magistracies and assemblies become more open to the participation of the lower orders, and in particular, protection is obtained from the patrician monopolization and manipulation of the law, though the patricians retain a political pre-eminence, even at Athens. With this, the system of tribes and clans is also affected, as indicated above: the patricians are compelled to join the tribes, which now provide a territorial basis for the state. The old personal clan state of the patricians is dissolved. The commoner followings disengage (if they were engaged) from the patrician clans, to become brotherhoods of the lower orders; and with this, clientage too becomes less pervasive. But while these things go their full length at Athens, at Rome they go only a moderate way, and then are contained. Paradoxically however it is at Rome that the territorially based state endures.

This outlines the basic City-state. It may be contextualized in wider diffuse ethnic loyalties or in inter-City alliances; it may develop through a policy of imperialism; but it remains always a basic political unit. But I turn now to the other main type, the Bureaucratic Kingdom.

In the ancient Bureaucratic Kingdom, it is patrimonial bureaucracy that is in view: bureaucratic administration in the context of traditionally legitimated domination. This is best understood not by insistence upon a single ideal type but through the consideration of typical structural conflicts (see Weber 1978 Part ii ch 12, but also ch 11 & 13). These can be taken in two main dimensions: the struggles between ruler and apparatus; and the geopolitical dimension - the extension in space of the ruler's power. Here it should be noted that simple size is not a criterion in distinguishing the Bureaucratic Kingdom from the City-state. The City-kingdoms of Mycenaean Greece are no larger than the City-states of Hellenic times, and such City-kingdoms are also found in the Ancient Near East and in the Intermediate periods (and probably in pre-dynastic times) of Egypt. On the
other hand there seem to be City-states at least in the Ancient Near East also.

But the point is, initially, monarchical rule through an apparatus of dependent officials, and here the conflicts are typical: struggles over the control of the means of administration. The officials try to appropriate their positions, to exercise authority unsupervised, and to take their living directly out of the resources they are in charge of, passing on the excess only to the king. Against this, the king tries to keep his officials dependent upon him, and to maintain overall control, on the basis of a centralized system of taxation and salaries with a career structure in terms of defined offices. It is of course very much to the point here that the appointments system of bureaucracy is specifically anti-hereditary, whereas the appropriation of position typically goes with its hereditary transmission. On the whole, outcomes in Antiquity favoured bureaucracy, and in Egypt especially this could present a highly rational character. As to the temples, I have argued that the king’s endowment of land and other wealth, and his appointment of priests to live off that endowment (and perhaps a distinct bureaucracy to administer it), is to be antithesized to an aristocracy with hereditary estates. It is the break-up of the nobility not in royal employment. It should be noted too that the army is bureaucratized: it is bureaucratically raised and commanded, with salaries and a career structure, and is equipped from the king’s armouries. This stands in sharp contrast to the self-equipped citizen-soldiers of the City-state.

As to the geopolitical dimension, these conflicts can be related to the initial conflicts between the castle-lord and his soldiers, where the trajectories of City-state and Bureaucratic Kingdom diverge; they seeking to reduce their lord to their own level and become an aristocracy, he seeking to suppress his soldiers and to rule through a dependent officialdom. The extension of the king’s realm in space basically recreates these conflicts at the margins of his realm: the king strives to bring the local lords into dependence upon him, to make them into or replace them with dependent officials; the local lords strive to assert their
autonomy and status equality as kings in their own realms (see here Weber 1978 p 1051 et seq). Unified kingdoms and congeries of petty princedoms may both result here, alternating or co-existing with each other. The former is more typical of Egypt and the latter of the Ancient Near East, though there are exceptions in both cases (including the Egyptian hegemony in the Near East in the New Kingdom). The situation differs from feudalism precisely in the absence of fealty, the relation of status-equal subordination. The geopolitical relationships are pragmatic and constantly negotiated; here again, scholarship must beware of attributing a coherence that the empirical situation does not possess. The different outcomes in the two regions are probably due to geographical factors: Egypt's strong natural frontiers and good internal communications on the river. As to structures of tribe and clan, as I have said, these tend to dissolve rather than crystallize in the conflicts just outlined, and in a strongly centralized realm such as Egypt, the dissolution is apparently complete. Weber cites bureaucracy as one of the great historical forces for destroying such structures (Weber 1981 p 46; see also Weber 1978 p 1044 - 51).

On the whole, the cities within a Bureaucratic Kingdom are simply administrative centres, similar to the City-state primarily in that the city dominates and includes the countryside, and is perhaps the bearer of local loyalties; at least, city gods seem to suggest this. In the Roman, and to an extent the Hellenistic, worlds however the situation is made more complex by the founding of Cities of Greeks and Romans. Partly this process is informed by the older practice of using cities as administrative centres in Bureaucratic Kingdoms, but partly too it is informed by the older practice of the City-state world of founding colonies, new and independent Cities of expatriates. The Cities of the Hellenistic and Roman worlds are semi-autonomous: within limits they conduct and control their own internal affairs, and they have their own institutions and citizenships. They are thus broadly assimilable to the occidental City at least for purposes of immediate analysis. But in the long run, the tendency is for these Cities to become simply administrative centres; for their
institutions to be eroded and their citizens assimilated to the broad mass of the people (this leaving aside the question of manorialism). In the case of the Roman world, however, this process works reciprocally with a universalization of the Roman citizenship. The Roman Empire is thus both a mixed and a transitional type. It is also a stage of World-historical importance in the development of the polity: bureaucratic monarchy working reciprocally with a self-defined political community surely marks the first experiment in rational-legal domination, though in the event it proved transitory.

iv Religion

I turn now to consider ancient religion. Here there are strategic issues that require consideration, as I have indicated before (section i above; also ch 2). Weber's overall concern in the sociology of religion is with the economic ethics of the Great World Religions; to a great extent, this provides his approach to the contrasting medieval civilizations of East and West, and the emergence of modernity out of the latter. But his approach to Antiquity is mainly through the concept of non-peaceful economic action. In keeping with this, his treatment of ancient religion is really only a condensed outline, except for ancient Judaism (the main text is "Economy and Society" Part ii ch 6, especially the opening sections; parts of ch 15 are also relevant). He treats it as a prologue to the Great World Religions rather than as an essential dimension of the Ancient Civilization itself.

This accords with Weber's conception of the changing sociological location of religion as religious conceptions and institutions develop. Weber sees religion as originating (Weber 1978 p 339 et seq) not in irrationality as such, but out of a combination of limited empirical knowledge and a sensitivity to the unusual - to what transcends the everyday routine. From this, religion develops in its initial character overwhelmingly as a collection of means: means to material, often economic, ends. Religion is a symbolic dimension through which action can be directed,
to the achievement of this-worldly ends. Only as a consequence of a further process of development, involving soteriological conceptions, prophecy and rejection of the world, does religion become a symbolic realm in itself, in which both the means and the ends of action are located - a process of "irrationalization" (see Weber 1978 p 424). This is closely associated with the Great World Religions, though it is a historical process, variously located and extending over time. Ancient religion is on the whole prior to this development; at least, it mostly takes place late in Antiquity (and much of it outside the West).

The rationalization and disenchantment thesis of modernity, then, can be interpreted at two levels: as annulling the Great World Religions, or as annulling religion as such. But there are two issues here: the rational pursuit of transcendent values, and the use of non-rational means to this-worldly ends. For the first, rationalization is always a function of priesthods and other intellectuals, who are thus in cultural dialogue with charismatic prophets. Modernity resulted from the creation of a form of theodicy which permitted complete rationalization, its own annulment - like dealing a hand of Patience and then resolving it. This results in the extinction of transcendent values. But as to the second, non-rational means to this-worldly ends, it is not that science gives us greater empirical knowledge, but rather that rational capitalism grounds a belief in the rational comprehensibility-in-principle of the world, that disenchants the modern world (Weber 1970b i p 139). In view of military and ecological developments since Weber's time, it might be worthwhile to keep the above issues separate, and to keep an open mind about them, especially the latter. As for comparative analytic purposes, it seems most useful to contrast the regimes of rational capitalism and of non-peaceful economic action, the essential predictability of the one and non-predictability of the other, as negative and positive cultural environments respectively for the employment of non-rational means, accepting that social action in both modernity and Antiquity is overwhelmingly this-world oriented. Antiquity and modernity (that is, bureaucratized "Advanced" Capitalism), then, are both to be understood primarily in terms of the economy
and power. Religion is a secondary factor in both.

This stated, it should be added that my own strategy towards gender theory has focussed on power, the economy and demographics — material issues. Against this, I have not seen great causal value in the ideological realm. Its greatest interest I see in the question how gender considerations have entered into and shaped the long-term development of culture, for example negative evaluations of women and sex in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Here indeed is a major reason for studying Antiquity. I will return to this. But in all that follows, the outlines can only be roughly drawn, and it has been necessary too to go beyond Weber rather more than in the previous two sections.

Religion requires to be considered in two aspects, the ideal and the material — or if you prefer, the "content" of religion, and its organizational basis. I will take the organizational side first. Here the most basic point is that religion in Antiquity is a matter of cultic communities, which are generally purely local in character. There are a few inter-local (i.e. shared) cult centres, for instance Delphi, and there are universal gods. But what is lacking is any kind of trans-local integration, even for cults of the same deity. Thus the cult of Athene at Sparta is quite separate from the cult of Athene at Athens — she was patroness of both Cities. This principle holds equally for widespread salvation-cults such as Mithraism in Roman times: the various cult centres are quite independent and unrelated. There is neither Church nor monastic order in Antiquity (that is, leaving aside the Jews).

As to priesthoods and temples, I have commented on these earlier (section ii above): the ancient temple is much better understood as a monastery than as a church. Basically it is a dwelling-place of the god; he may receive his clients there — individuals who approach him with sacrifice and prayer — but there is no regular collective act of worship within the temple. Annual festivals and processions are the closest analogues to this. The temple will have lands, livestock, perhaps slaves, and other such assets allocated for its upkeep; it is an oikos, and as such little distinguishable from the oikos of a mortal patriarch. In bureaucratic conditions the endowment of the temple may
be considerable, and there will be a bureaucratically appointed staff of priests in permanent attendance. In this, there may be a division between the lay administration that oversees the temple's material endowment and the priestly staff who actually attend the god - this is especially typical for Egypt. The relations between the priesthoods and the state may be various: the priesthoods may be appropriated and hereditary, or they may be assimilated to the patrimonial bureaucracy. Here exceptionally a degree of inter-local co-ordination may appear, but this is on analogy with the various departments of the state bureaucracy and is limited to the material administration; it does not extend to the priestly functions themselves. In the City-state by contrast the economic endowment will be more slight, and the priesthoods will be appropriated by an aristocratic clan, or else allocated among the citizens like a magistracy. In the latter case especially the priests are typically amateur, part-time and non-residential. But in all cases save the most strongly centralized Bureaucratic Kingdoms, the priests are purely local and have nothing to do with each other.

The cultic communities for the most part relate fairly straightforwardly to social morphology: wherever there is an association of some permanence, a common cult will be formed. The two most basic elements here are the household and the City. The household has its altars and its ancestor cult (or cult of the dead); it also marks the occasions of the life-cycle such as birth, death, coming of age and marriage. The City will have its patron, and other recognized gods in cohort with him (her); it will provide temples and priesthoods for them, and an annual cycle of festivals and processions in which all participate, and which comprises the City's calendar. This seems to hold broadly for "administrative" cities in Bureaucratic Kingdoms and complex empires as well as for City-states. There are other levels of cultic association, the tribes and phratries for example. Again, the various crafts and trades may set up their own cults, as may an army unit, or a group of immigrants may bring their god with them. Broadly, one can distinguish between state religion and private religion, or rather, between public compulsory religion
and private elective religion. However the gods of the citizen household and of the City will be basically the same. The state religion may include elements that reach beyond the City, the cult of the royal family for example, or of Rome and the emperor's genius. Again, private religion includes gods who are privately approached for help in the event of individual misfortune of a kind that precludes approach to the public gods (for example deformity).

Communal activity comprises festivals and processions, typically held annually for each deity. Everyone will take part within certain restrictions - foreigners or slaves might be excluded. Omens are taken for the community, for example before the start of a campaign. There is also the individual approach to the gods. This typically takes the form of sacrifice and prayer. The approach is made for material wants: wealth, victory, harm to an enemy, or an omen for affairs in prospect. The transaction is seen as an exchange, a gift for a favour, requested courteously but confidently. This is far from abasement before an absolute god, or again from the quest for spiritual benefits such as grace or the forgiveness of sin. Indeed, though the displeasure of the gods is feared, and even their laws may be kept, a strictly ethical content to the god's character, or to one's relationship to the gods, is a gradual development of ancient religion. Rather the relationship is seen pragmatically, very much in terms of clientage upon a patrician. At any rate, the categories "belief" and "worship" are probably generally inappropriate to ancient religion. One might better talk in terms of knowing about the gods and acknowledging them; perhaps choosing one or two for special patronage, or being exceptionally driven to approach another for some special need. But the gods of the polity must be acknowledged by everyone; there is a communal responsibility to see that the community's patrons are not offended.

The plurality of cults and deities is subject to a process of rationalization, in terms of integration into a pantheon with differentiated functions and attributes. This is an early process, and is the work of intellectuals. The principles involved are various, and often involve the inter-negotiation of cultural
symbols between conflicting groups. A continuing underlying equivalence of deities should then be kept in view. Thus the Greek Cities acknowledge the same gods but choose each different patrons from among them. So also it is with the various elements of the social order: patricians, peasants and proletarians each favour different gods, while the City publicly acknowledges all of them. But again, there is protection of human activities: the various crafts; sea-faring and travelling; war, political debate, legal proceedings, peace-making and alliance; agriculture and stock-breeding; sex and love; childbirth; marriage and motherhood; etc. There is also a more purely cognitive content, in terms of for example cosmology, the natural environment, and the origins of humanity. All these different aspects are inter-woven together, and it should be realized that the pattern is constantly changing: different deities are syncretized into one; syncretized deities are re-differentiated; foreign deities are imported and given new functions; and so on. All this will include the reflection of changing political hegemonies. Here again is an area where scholarship must beware of imposing more coherence than is there. It should be realized too that the debate of intellectuals with ancient religion - whether as individuals or within organized priesthods - is a long-standing characteristic of the Ancient Civilization.

All this has taken us well into the ideal, content, side of ancient religion. But there are difficulties. Ancient religion does not have written dogmas or scriptures, though it may have magical texts. Even the books of the Jews are only canonized at the end of Antiquity. Prophecy (and its social reception) change the whole character of religion. The written material that we have is the work of intellectuals, whether within or without the priesthoods. Even the versions we have of ancient myths are of this kind. As I have said, intellectuals are in constant debate with religion, rationalizing its contents whether before or after prophecy; but the definition and closure of dogma entail developments in the organizational basis of religion, in terms of Church and Church/state relations, which only emerge as Antiquity ends. The work of intellectuals does not in itself define an orthodoxy.
- at least, not a compulsory orthodoxy. (An added problem is that modern scholarship even from the side of Religious Studies seems somewhat lacking in synthetic accounts of ancient religion, and appears still to be influenced by obsolete works such as Frazer's "Golden Bough". See e.g. Eliade 1958; James 1958, 1968; also Frazer 1963.)

It is more the sociological basis that throws light on the content of ancient religion. Thus different strata differ not only in their chosen gods, but in how they conceive and relate to them, and what (if anything) they want from them. For example, bureaucratic and military aristocracies are unlike in their ideas, as indeed are rural and urban strata (it is the former that are most concerned with agriculture, weather, etc.). With this, there are the different and contrasting needs of privileged and disfriviledged strata: the former want legitimation of their privil¬
eged, the latter compensation for their disprivileges. But it is the loss of political centrality on the part of the privil¬e¬ged that makes for spiritualized soteriologies: receptiveness to prophecy and a turning away from the world. Of themselves, the orientations of all strata remain materialistic and this-world oriented.

Taking these elements together, it is possible to identify two broad streams in ancient religion: political cults and pop¬ular soteriologies. The first comprises the public religion of the polity, the gods whose temples and priesthoods the state provides, and whose festivals and processions make up the civic calendar. The second concerns the pursuit of "salvation". This should not be understood in the purely spiritual sense developed in Christianity. The conception is rather material, and might include relief from illness or misfortune - though these are matters rather for individual than communal pursuit. But the communal cults of popular soteriology were mostly concerned with death, and apparently with some conception of life after death. This seems to be conceived after this-worldly fashion, and was based simply on initiation and cult-membership, without mastery of dogma or ethical requirements. (However it is no concern of mine to prove Christianity, especially early Christianity, super-
ior to this.)

The two streams, political and soteriological, are not necessarily separate: indeed, one should rather see them as respectively the public religion of the citizens and the elective religion of the urban proletariat. Where these coalesce, the religious streams will coalesce also. The main case is the Bureaucratic Kingdom, which both proletarianizes and gives citizenship to all the people, as I have tried to show above (see especially ch 4). Indeed the impact of the World Empires towards the end of Antiquity was to universalize the popular soteriological stream of religion as the citizen-strata of the Cities were de-militarized and depoliticized. But a Plebeian City of radical democracy too will merge the streams: Athens gave state recognition to the Eleusinian Mysteries. It might be added that the migrant nature of the urban proletariat and their lack of funerary property or of heirs to maintain their funerary cult seem to be the probable reasons for their demand for such soteriological cults. Again, the Egyptian cult of the dead can probably be seen as a compromise between the (political) ancestor cults and (soteriological) salvation cults of the Greeks and Romans: an ancestor cult that would be maintained only for a generation or two by the descendants, and would then be entrusted to the gods.

Some classification of cognitive and ideal content is possible on the basis of the above analysis. Popular soteriologies typically use agriculture, especially grain, for their symbolism, and centre on a mother-goddess, identified with the earth, together with a male consort who passes through an annual cycle from son to lover through death to son again - a dying corn-god. There are variations on this, and inter-fusions with other meanings. In particular, Osiris in Egypt, with his son Horus, is equally involved in the this-worldly problem of succession, especially royal succession, and the widow Isis, who secures the succession, is as much hero as mother.

But to turn to the other side, political cults cannot simply be concerned with public affairs such as war, politics and law, nor simply with the legitimation of authority and privilege. As the religion of estate-owning patricians and of peasant citizens,
it must concern itself with agriculture too; and again, it must concern itself with the perpetuation of the lineage through marriage and procreation. For this last, stock-breeding provides the typical symbolism, especially the bull, at least at the levels of aristocracy and royalty. The phallus is also typically and more generally found as a symbol. Against this, the concern with agriculture is simply a concern with agriculture, though sexual intercourse and human fertility will still be associated with it, in a form superficially similar to the popular soteriologies. But again, late in Antiquity there appear soteriological cults that include bull symbolism: Cybele and Attis, Mithras; or again, where the dying god appears without a mother-goddess: Mithras, Jesus. Meanings here as I have said are shared and negotiated on a basis of social conflict; moreover the patterns change.

These remarks go somewhat beyond Weber, but it is germane to this thesis to ask how sex and gender appear in ancient religion. This again has to be answered in the light of the sociological basis; one cannot proceed directly to the ideal realm. The most basic point is that women have their specific deities, patronesses and protectresses of the various activities and aspects of women's lives. These include the hearth, spinning and weaving, marriage and motherhood; also such matters as virginity, menstruation, pregnancy, child-birth, the passage from maiden to womanhood; and also sexual intercourse and love. It is notable that, where the City-state tends to separate out the three sectors here - the patronesses of the citizen wife and matron and her activities; the protectress of female biological functions; and the patroness of prostitutes and protectress of sexual intercourse - Bureaucratic Kingdoms tend to fuse them together, and moreover to fuse them with the soteriological mother-goddesses and agricultural cults. Temple prostitution was at least partly a factor of this, though also of course of the economic location of the temples and seemingly also of sociodemographic factors - it was mainly a practice of the Ancient Near East. With this, the tendency for the political and soteriological streams of religion to merge in conditions of bureaucracy should be recalled. In Egypt, the patroness of sexual intercourse and love bears the name "Hat-
hor", which means "the mother of Horus"; the soteriological mother-goddess Isis' name means "the throne". Both goddesses, and especially Hat-hor, commonly appear in cow form or cow-headed; indeed cow symbolism is common in ancient Egyptian religion, answering the bull symbolism discussed above. Again, at Athens where the streams are merged for a different reason, the Eleusinian goddesses reflect the passage from maiden to womanhood, as well as relating to the agricultural soteriology. However, it should be noted for City-states generally that the protectresses of female biological functions as well as the patronesses of the citizen wife and matron are included in the pantheon of the City's political gods.

But it is difficult to go beyond this. Most male activities have male patrons - the crafts, the conduct of public affairs - although abstractions such as justice or victory may be personified as female. But it should be noted that the patron of the polity can as well be female as male; the warrior goddess (e.g. Athene) is a very common figure in ancient religion. Beyond this, there are probably no inherent requirements, of cosmology (the Egyptians made the sky female and the earth male), political life, farming, human biology, or anything else, that absolutely demand or forbid expression in terms of each other in particular ways, though there may be some common tendencies. Moreover ancient religion has no "original form"; it is what it is when it is. Too, it must be remembered that ancient religion is located in a cosmopolitan world, and moreover is constantly subject to rationalization by intellectuals. All in all, it seems to me that one must look at this question of sex and gender in ancient religion not in terms of a set of statements but as a language, in which a very wide range of things might be said.

To conclude, the ancients made full cognitive use of sex and gender in their religious thinking, and did so with enough flexibility to accommodate a wide range of variation and change in conditions. But their conceptions always remain personalized: the ancient West never developed an impersonal cosmological conception like the Chinese yin and yang. Such conceptions however are conscious and rational developments; they are neither unconscious
nor pre-civilized. I have stated earlier (ch 2 & 3; see also Appendix B) that to me, the whole picture suggests a cultural text co-written and read by the two sexes together, rather than women living under male cultural hegemony.

Finally, I turn to the Judaeo-Christian tradition. I have no specific focus in this thesis on the Ancient or indeed the Hellenistic or Roman Near East, and so only some notes can be given here. The beginning is the exclusive orientation of the early Jews to a political god, the patron of their military confederation, and the refusal to acknowledge other deities. This is monolatry not monotheism incidentally: an elective relationship in a context of polytheism. The Jews, like the Greeks and for similar reasons, excluded women from political life, and their cult was part of this of course. Following this is the Jews' conflict within Palestine with their gentile neighbours: their rejection of any assimilation, and constant conflicts with the cults and adherents of agricultural and soteriological goddesses, and the "whoredom" associated with them. This features in the activities of the prophets. In due time, the vicissitudes of the Jews in conflict with more powerful realms brought them to develop soteriological conceptions themselves, but always exclusively in terms of their own god and their relationship to him. Early Christianity is a part of this - though it is hard to be clear what "salvation" meant in Judaeo-Christianity even at this stage. Protection from magic and demons seems to have been at least one element in it.

Christianity spread first in the Greek East, and there is an increasing Greek contribution to its content, especially as the theological debates begin in the 2nd century. But Christianity's early success is probably due more to organizational factors than to doctrinal content: the trans-local integration of cultic communities into a Church with a centralized priesthood. Presumably this was modelled on the Jewish Diaspora and its continued orientation to the Temple at Jerusalem, in the face of the vicissitudes of the Jewish state. Women were excluded from active participation, as with public affairs among both the Jews and the Greeks. With this, there enters a specifically Greek misogyny, originat-
ing in the sociodemographic pressures on the peasantry at the
time of the class-struggles – the situation of Hesiod. This
indeed has some parallel in Jewish history. But there is also a
more formal contribution of Greek, especially Platonic, philoso-
phy to Christian theology, including importantly Mind/body dual-
ism. This came to be synthesized in due course with Persian dual-
istic theodicy: the conception of the World as the arena for the
conflict of two creator gods, one good, the other evil. Thus came
the eventual superimposition of the divisions good/evil, spirit/
flesh, and man/woman of Christian theological tradition.

As to the equation of sex with sin, this seems to be logically
entailed. There is certainly an ample tradition of polemic
for it to draw upon, not only from the Jews’ detestation of the
"whoredom" of alien soteriological goddesses, but also from the
status conflicts in City-states, over patrician men trying to
take plebeian girls as concubines but refusing them marriage, and
equally over citizen men preferring concubines to citizen-wives
(a factor especially of the City-state’s decline). I have dis-
cussed these things in the chapters above. Notably they are all
factors of the City-state – at least, the Jews as a political
community are broadly assimilable to the City-state type. There
are no equivalents from Bureaucratic Kingdoms. However, as such
they are contextualized with a distinction between marriage and
prostitution, and are basically concerned (the latter two cases
at least) with the balance between these two kinds of sexual
relationship. There is no condemnation of sexuality as such. In-
deed it is rather love that is problematic, and sexuality is
problematic only indirectly for the risks it entails of inapprop-
riate and anti-social love (or over-reproduction, of course).
Christian theology is basically in the City-state plebeian trad-
ition, then, as favouring a dispassionate partnership in marriage
and an orientation of sex to procreation. Its major difference is
the condemnation of prostitution, and exclusion of prostitutes
themselves. Probably a major factor here is that the Churches
were engaged in an attempt to create a kind of quasi-citizenship
among the urban poor, whose material situation simply would not
support it. Prostitutes were both compelled and enabled to have
both material and ideological independence; the latter especially would re-awaken the old polemic against "whoredom", of course. At least the failure of Christian compassion towards prostitutes does require some explanation. The theological condemnation of sexuality however was worked out over a period of some centuries, and is an intellectual response to the problems rather than a simple reflection of them.

This provides no more than a thumbnail sketch. But the point I want to make is how far the Judaeo-Christian tradition on women and sex is made up of a cumulation of often contingent factors - not least the personal idiosyncracies of individual intellectuals. It was by no means the inevitable, or even the natural, outcome of Antiquity. The character of Roman culture in the Western Principate is proof enough of that.

We should remember here Weber's views on the role of cultural factors in sociohistorical causation (Weber 1970b ii p 280). Weber sees the material and the ideal as opposed realms, without causal interlinkage and each subject to independent development through rationalization and creative innovation, and yet drawn constantly towards inter-correspondence, to mirroring each other. Social actors, placed between these realms, act in terms of their material and ideal interests. Against this, an idea is an exceptional innovation in the ideal realm, which, in Weber's metaphor, can serve as a railway points, diverting the train of history and sending it down a new course. The Judaeo-Christian tradition on women and sex should surely be seen in this light. But women and sex in ancient culture itself are very much as in ancient material social arrangements. Only in the context of the long-term development of culture does this acquire special sociological significance.

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Appendix B

Analytical Psychology

In chapter 3 of this thesis, I introduce Analytical Psychology, the depth psychology of Carl Jung, together with some critical comments on the Freudian tradition in social theory. I proceed to develop the conception of sexual polarity that is central to this thesis very much in the light of Jungian insights. Yet as I remark, the issue is presentationally very difficult, for Jung's thought is probably quite unfamiliar to most sociologists. Accordingly, I now present as an appendix a short account of the Jungian system, and a discussion of the social-theoretical issues involved, to supplement the necessarily restricted comments made in the body of the text.

It must be understood that what follows is based almost entirely on secondary literature. Jung's Collected Works run to eighteen volumes, plus two volumes of collected letters and some oddments; Freud is even more prolific, and there are others to consider. Moreover their thought is highly complex and ramified. A full treatment of these matters would be a major undertaking, and would require a thesis to itself. All that is undertaken here is to provide a sketch of the central elements of Analytical Psychology, with some comments on its location in the history of depth psychology and its potential for social theory; this specifically in relation to the sociology of Max Weber and to gender theory.

Criticizing the Freudian tradition in social theory, I remarked earlier that social theory has favoured Freud above all because he fits: he provides certain types of social theoretical construction with logical closure of their explanatory structures. These are theoretical syntheses tending towards grand or over-
arching theory, and they are quite various, even opposed, in character: Frankfurt School Marxism, Althusserian Marxism, Levi-Strauss' anthropology, Parsonian systems theory, Habermas' Critical Sociology, the feminist theory of for instance Juliet Mitchell. Yet the Psychoanalytic contribution is always in the same area and with the same force: ideology, consciousness, socialization, childhood, the family; social continuity and reproduction. The cost of this deployment of Psychoanalysis is that its central ground, in the family, childhood, socialization and consciousness, becomes closed off from sociological exploration and enquiry. It is a purely explanatory project, directed as I have said to providing the logical closure of theory. With this, the strategy is self-perpetuating: so long as Psychoanalysis can provide this closure, social theory at this level will formulate - and re-formulate - itself to achieve closure through Psychoanalysis; so long as social theory at this level requires closure in this area and of this kind, Psychoanalysis will be used to provide it. The lock is built to fit the key, and the key is chosen to fit the lock. Against this, much of what is done in social theory does not aspire to this kind of overarching level, and ignores Freud completely. But it seems to be accepted that this entails settling for a reduced level of explanatory power (though perhaps actually attaining a more solid explanatory achievement), and it seems rarely to be asked whether both the lock and the key could be changed - that is, whether the problem of closure could be shifted and a system other than Psychoanalysis used. (Consider for example Collins 1975 p 225 et seq; also Mitchell 1975 p 137 et seq, p 227 et seq.) In this sense, Freud's position in social theory is hegemonic.

However, the impact of using Weber's sociology to theorize gender appears to be to dissolve the sociological context for Psychoanalysis, replacing the focus on consciousness, socialization, childhood and the family with an Interpretive conception of social reality and a focus on the migration process; together with a strategic orientation to change not continuity. The first concern with Jung then is simply as a counter to theoretical inertia - to answer the question, "But what about Freud?". This
raises two sets of questions. First, does Jung actually have a critique and alternative to Psychoanalysis, on its own ground and in its own terms? Does this enable us to explain in the areas of culture, ideology and consciousness without tying us down as Freud does in the areas of socialization, childhood and the family? Second, can Jung positively help us to develop an orientation to gender questions, for example to masculinity and femininity or to childhood, such as will open them up to sociological exploration? In the body of the text, most weight was given to the second of these questions, but it is the first that carries the real challenge to the Freudian hegemony in social theory, and that therefore most needs to be considered here. But first of all, an account of Analytical Psychology and its location in the history of depth psychology must be given.

It is not easy to define "depth psychology". Indeed, though I use the term as a generic this is by no means universal: often "psychoanalysis" is used as the generic term. But then as I have indicated above, Freudian Psychoanalysis is commonly treated in social theory as sui generis, the existence of non-Freudian cognates being basically ignored. For a working definition, it can be said that depth psychology is the theory and study of the psyche, this being a concept of the mind that provides both conscious and unconscious aspects. It should be stressed that depth psychology is neither academic psychology nor psychiatry, although in modern times both take some account of it. Depth psychology is ancestral to personality theory; indeed it can be fairly and usefully described as personality theory at the level of grand theory, that is, ramified into the fields of art, religion, and culture generally. One might call this the sociological dimension.* Even so, depth psychology largely originated, and still tends to be pursued, as a sui generis activity, whose practitioners are typically of general education biased strongly towards medicine. Its basic methodology is a mixture of case history and

*Here again one could raise the question of the social science and cultural science perspectives. However this cannot be systematically explored here; it is rather the growing edge of my thinking as this present thesis reaches finalization.
introspection, and its psychotherapeutic pretensions are always central. With this, there are problems as to its scientific status, and problems too of where to draw the line: depth psychology can and always could look eccentric, and some of its offshoots, derivatives and imitations are pretty weird even by the standards of social theory. Consider Scientology for example. This point will be taken up again later.

For present purposes, however, the issues can perhaps be clarified by an insistence on the notion of grand theory, and a historical approach. Grand theory I have defined above in terms of ramification into the sociological dimension—a theory of culture. On the historical side, the pivotal figure remains that of Sigmund Freud. Freud indeed has precursors and contemporaries of a kind; Pierre Janet is perhaps the most important. I do not propose to go into that kind of question here. The essential narrative that needs to be put across is as follows: Freud's own intellectual career is very lengthy, extending from the 1880s to the end of the 1930s, but within this one can distinguish two crucial phases, one in which Psychoanalytic theory was given its first definitive formulation; the other in which it was recast and reformulated in a second definitive form. The first of these phases runs from circa 1900–1914; this is called the phase of Id-psychology. The second runs from circa 1914–1930, and is called the phase of Ego-psychology. It may be noted that both phases end with "sociological" works: the first with "Totem and Taboo"; the second with "Civilization and its Discontents". But that point is deceptive: following "Totem and Taboo" what Freud wanted was to pursue the grounding of Psychoanalytic theory in the biological and medical sciences. This aspiration he appears to have abandoned permanently with the reformulation of Psychoanalytic theory as Ego-psychology. The crucial events which compelled Freud to abandon his program, and to undertake the reformulation, were unquestionably the defections of Alfred Adler and Carl Jung, in the years 1911–13. (I am aware that the carnage of the First World War is often cited as the real cause—though I am not clear what bearing this has on the purposive nature of the psyche. See below.) The definitive formulation of Psychoanal-
ytic theory as Id-psychology had excluded their ideas; reformulation as Ego-psychology tried to incorporate them. In the meantime, both men developed their ideas into their own systems: Individual Psychology (Adler) and Analytical Psychology (Jung). Adler and Jung then have an importance in the history of depth psychology that later schismatics such as Reich and Fromm do not have—especially since Ego-psychology never in fact received such a clear-cut and definitive form as Id-psychology had, and further of course in view of Freud's eventual death and the subsequent development of his work by others.

I do not want to try to give an extended account of Psychoanalytic theory here—it would take too long, and in any case it should be familiar enough (see e.g. Fine 1962; Stafford-Clark 1965). Some of the main points of difference between Id-psychology and Ego-psychology should however be indicated. Id-psychology centres on the notions of the unconscious, libido and infant sexuality. This last includes a first account of the Oedipus conflicts, as well as the stages of infant sexuality: oral, anal and genital. Ego-psychology brings in an aggressive instinct as well as the sexual instinct, and centres on the notions of id, ego and superego. The Oedipus conflicts are developed into the Oedipus complex, a crucial process in the formation of personality (the superego) rather than simply a cause of neurosis. With this, the stages of infant sexuality are given further elaboration. For present purposes, there should be no need to say more than this here, although the continuing grounding in the biology of sex and reproduction and in family structure should be noted. But to get a clearer idea of the Psychoanalytic system than this, I want to turn to the alternatives to Psychoanalysis, and first to a brief consideration of the ideas of Alfred Adler.

It should be stated at the outset that Adlerian Individual Psychology (see Way 1956; Brown 1963) is not really grand theory in the way that Psychoanalysis (and Analytical Psychology) is. That is, it attempts no systematic exploration of the sociological dimension, although it does have manifold implications for social policy. Indeed it is a definitive characteristic of Adler's work that it is directed primarily at the educator and the
social worker and above all, the child-counsellor, rather than the professional intellectual. It is to the former rather than the latter that the psychotherapist is to be associated. Adler is no intellectual lightweight, but neither is he a compulsive theorist: he is a practitoner. As such, he could very much be termed the father of permissiveness.

As a theorist, Adler’s contribution to Psychoanalysis, which later became his own system, centres on three notions: individuality, the aggressive instinct, and purposiveness. By individuality is meant the variation between individuals. This can be grounded in physical, perhaps hereditary, factors: it was with the notion of "organ deficiency" that Adler started, a congenital weakness, deformity, or predisposition to illness centring on one of the body’s organs or systems. Later, he added a consideration of environmental factors, especially family constellation: the make-up of the family in terms of age and sex, and the child’s position in it. These factors provide the individual situation in which the psyche is formed. But it is the child that forms its psyche, through the process of exploration and mastery of its world. That is, the child not merely explores but constructs its world, and in doing so constructs itself. This is a process of trial and error, in which the errors have as much significance as the successes. The basic point is that the child mythologizes its own situation of helplessness and dependence in terms of an inferiority that has to be overcome or compensated for. (This of course is the location of the notion of the inferiority complex.) The striving for superiority, for mastery, for perfection, is constant; this is the expression of the aggressive instinct. But the terms in which the myth can be expressed are infinite, in terms of the individual situation as the child constructs it. Yet the myth is organizatory in its functions: the whole personality is integrated around it and illuminated by it. This fact defines the ultimate nature and location of neurosis. It follows then that each person is unique, and must be understood in his/her own terms and as a whole.

This gives only a most cursory statement of Adler’s central ideas, but from it it can be seen that, although Adler shares
with Freud an emphasis on early childhood, and a conception of conscious and unconscious elements in the psyche, he does not really share much common ground with Freud. Rather he seems to have tried to approach the whole matter from a different angle. Initially this was intended to fill out Psychoanalysis; later it became an alternative system. To Adler, it seems to have made little difference. However, there are some critically important underlying differences between Freud and Adler that should be spelt out. Freud was trained in a school of medical and biological science which dealt purely in causal terms, and which moreover took its own philosophical status for granted. Adler (who was 15 years younger) had a somewhat different intellectual background, which included on the one side, functionalist approaches in the biological and medical sciences and on the other, German philosophy, especially Kant and Nietzsche. From these came the notions of purposiveness and the aggressive instinct - the former especially being a fusion of functionalism and Intentionality, the integration of the psyche around an unconscious purpose. It is here that the great importance of Adler as a thinker lies; although not a grand theorist himself, he was a catalyst both for the reformulation of Psychoanalysis as Ego-psychology (in which the aggressive instinct and the theory of the ego seek to accommodate his central insights - although the Freudian aggressive instinct is never realized in the way that the sexual instinct is), and also for Analytical Psychology and the work of Carl Jung. It is to this that I now turn.

On Carl Jung, something of a biographical note should first be given (see Brome 1978). Jung, 20 years younger than Freud, was a German Swiss of Protestant background, working in Zurich. He was thus quite remote from the Freud circle in Vienna, who were mostly Jews. But even more than this, Jung was something that none of the Freud circle were: he was a psychiatrist - also in due course a university lecturer in psychiatry. This gave him extensive contact with psychotics, especially schizophrenics (the condition was then called dementia praecox), which the members of the Freud circle (including Freud himself) could not have. The Freud circle at this time were mostly dealing with hysteric...
obsessional neurotics, and it was in terms of these conditions that Psychoanalytic theory was being developed. It was in this situation, then, in the years following 1900, that Jung first encountered Psychoanalytic literature. He started trying to apply its insights to his own cases, and published some papers on it and eventually a book, "The Psychology of Dementia Praecox". It was through this that he finally met Freud, in 1907. Although the intellectual maturity of Freud at this time is undoubted, even so the independence of Jung's thought should be realized, and how much he had to contribute (politically as well as intellectually): a completely independent figure, within the psychiatric establishment (and the university establishment), creatively developing Psychoanalytic theory into important new areas, the theory of psychosis. The split with Freud five years later was very bitter, and it is still difficult to get a clear account of it. But although Jung seems to have tried to subordinate his genius to that of Freud for a while, he broke away not long after Adler, and between 1914 and circa 1922 - 23 founded the basic system of Analytical Psychology, which he continued to develop until his death in 1961.

The influence of Adler on Jung is hard to evaluate, not least because of the elements of intellectual background they shared - in particular, functionalism in the biological and medical sciences, and German philosophy, Kant and Nietzsche. On the other hand, Jung unlike Adler was a compulsive intellectual. Again, his clinical experience was completely different, although he did begin treating neurotics in private practice after about 1909. Also, Jung had a compulsive interest in religion which Adler did not share (nor did Jung share Adler's socialist sympathies). But however this may be, the decisive work with which Jung broke away from Freud, "Two Essays in Analytical Psychology", consists essentially of a single case-history told twice, once in Freudian terms and once in Adlerian. This illustrated the risk of the analyst constructing his patient in his own image - it was Jung who insisted that the analyst's training must include being analysed himself, to protect against this - and it is basic to Jung's psychology that introversion and extraversion are respect-
ively the Adlerian and the Freudian personality. That is, Jung's system is fundamentally a simultaneous critique and synthesis of the systems of Adler and Freud. In this, if Jung so far as he is a grand theorist necessarily leans towards Freud, the contributory and catalytic role of Adler should not thereby be forgotten. But this stated, a more full account of the Analytical Psychology of Carl Jung should now be given.

Jung considers the psyche in terms of three levels: consciousness, the personal unconscious, and the collective unconscious. It is the last of these that is most distinctive, therefore it should be taken first. The collective unconscious is the oldest and most primitive level of the psyche, out of which consciousness forms. In a sense then it corresponds to the Freudian id. But it is not a location of instinctual impulses; its character is rather cognitive. It can be described as an innate propensity for concept formation, in terms of a specific range of strongly emotionally coloured concepts relating to Man's evolutionary biological and cultural experience. These concepts, or rather the specific propensities for the formation of these concepts, are called the archetypes. In terms of the individual psyche, the innate propensity can only be actualized (or "filled") through contact with specific culture; the conception here is structuralist, and is similar to Chomsky's ideas on language acquisition. But equally the archetypes are implicated in the creation of culture: they inform and give their significance to symbols, rituals and myths, through which psychic energy is diverted from immediate instinctual or material needs to cultural purposes, or through which culturally entailed energy is redirected. The creation of culture is of the essence of humanity, and is an essentially arational process; in all this, religion is central. It is important to grasp at the outset the conception of psyche and culture mutually created in the interaction of the collective unconscious and its cultural environment, and indeed ultimately of Man creating himself in the interaction of collective unconscious and material environment. It can be seen then that Jung's conception is ultimately sociological, rather than biological like Freud's.

Against this background, consciousness emerges, centred on
the ego, and also there emerges the personal unconscious. This last is perhaps rather an Adlerian than a Freudian unconscious: it comprises repressed and forgotten material from the unconscious but not a primordial id. It rises, or falls, from consciousness then, rather than rising from the collective unconscious. It has to be realized here that Analytical Psychology is not articulated as a theory of childhood. What is central is a notion of an inner reality, the reality of the psyche, and an outer, cultural and material, reality; both these realities present their demands to the individual, who must balance between them. Here Jung makes his fundamental distinction between the introvert and the extravert: these are habitual modes of orientation of the individual, the former to inner rather than outer reality, the latter to outer reality rather than inner. Here also Jung provides the basic conception of libido — psychic energy — as flowing between opposite poles but alternating in direction, thus progressing to satisfy the needs of the conscious and adapt to the outer world, regressing to satisfy the needs of the unconscious and adapt to the inner world. Sleep and dreams exemplify the latter: regression is a normal not a pathological function. Moreover libido has a rhythm, turns naturally from one thing to another: it is tidal rather than current-like in character. It should be stressed that for Jung libido means only psychic energy. This has two main instinctual channels, sex and aggression, seen basically in Freudian and Adlerian terms respectively.

Jung's views on the pathological are above all an integrated approach to the neuroses and the psychoses. In this, the anchor, so to speak, of his thinking is not as with Freud hysteria, but dissociation, the extreme state of which is multiple personality. In Jung's view, neurosis is to be seen in terms of frustrated libido expressing itself by re-activating significant repressed childhood memories. But the cause of the neurosis is the present frustration; the past only provides a vocabulary of symptoms. This is very typical of how Jung "depth-reverses" Freudian insights. Thus he also says that dreams are coded to express not to conceal their meanings, and, unanswerably, that the free association process only leads away from the dream — the dream itself is
the true meaning. But more than this, the neurosis is to be understood in terms of expression rather than repression: it acts as the psychic equivalent of pain, to warn us of an inadequacy in our adjustment, a frustration of libido that must be dealt with. Thus the psyche is self-regulating; its tendency is to function, not to malfunction. This conception distinguishes Jung from Adler as well as from Freud, and indeed perhaps from most who have worked in this area.

But to return to dissociation, Jung very early noted how in word association tests, a number of words could be found which were linked for the given person by a common feeling-tone. To this he gave the name "complex" - this is apparently the origin of the word in psychology. Further, he noted how these complexes could apparently carry on a life of their own within the psyche, almost as independent personalities. It was these that provided the vocabulary of symptoms for neurosis; in the extreme forms of dissociative neurosis actual realized alternative personalities would appear, and take over the person in turn. Psychosis, at least schizophrenia, could also be understood in these terms, as the personality fragmenting into a number of such elements, the point being that sense of identity is lost: the ego becomes only one fragment among many. Yet even here there could be an attempt at adaptation and recovery. Psychotic delusions can have a mythological quality, representing a drama of self-rescue (successful or unsuccessful) through which the individual tries to resolve his/her situation, to reconstruct his/her personality and world.

Again it is to be noted here that Jung's views of the psyche and of culture are integrated. The capability to create autonomous personalities within ourselves informs literature and mythology and religion - and normal inter-personal relations - as well as neurosis and psychosis. Actual cultural creation aside, both empathy and the appreciation of culture depend upon this. Thus we all carry a conception of say Hamlet within us, or our parents or the Virgin Mary, which is directed by the logic of its "own" character, not by our consciousness or will. It was precisely in consideration of this, and because it is cultural as well as individual, that Jung held that explanation solely in terms of an
individual unconscious was inadequate: a collective unconscious must be proposed. It should be clearly realized that the alternative to this is to propose the universality and ultimacy of the Oedipus complex— which is sociologically disastrous. As I have said earlier, Jung's system is ultimately sociological in its grounding.

Jung associated neurosis with extraversion, and failure to adjust to the outer world. Psychosis he associated with introversion, and failure to adjust to the inner world. But the problem of psychosis was one of adjustment: the difficulties of satisfying the needs of the psyche on the basis of the available cultural material. In a secularized, rationalized and disenchanted age this difficulty accounts not only for schizophrenia as the psychic disease of our times, but also for the eccentricity, instability and lack of restraint in our religious, political and cultural affairs. It should be stressed that here Jung, for all that I can establish, is paralleling Weber not quoting him. The index of his collected works gives no mention of Weber at all (there is only one late reference in the Collected Letters), and these ideas seem implicit in Jung's thought from an early time.

Again, Jung associated extraversion with sexuality and introversion with aggression—these being the two primary instinctual channels of libido. He saw them in terms of the survival of the species and the survival of the individual respectively. Aggression he conceived in basically Adlerian terms, as a will to power, to independence and control over one's own life. It is thus basic to growing up, to growing away from parental dependence. Jung does then provide a biological dimension to his theories. Sex difference however he treats more as an explanans than an explanandum: the biological difference— or complementarity—between the sexes is psychologically reflected in a complementarity at the level of the archetypes. This I will take up below.

There is however a secondary level. Jung identifies four psychic functions, grouped in two pairs of opposites: thinking and feeling (better, valuing); sensing and intuition. He holds that individuals are typically strongly developed in one of these functions and correspondingly weakly developed in the opposite
function; this is not simply a question of how much libido the functions attract but also of whether their operation is conscious or unconscious. Many commentators find this a problematic element of Jung's psychology, and I have not stressed it. But Jung does argue that the cultural environment may decentralize the two sexes in opposite directions at this level, as a factor of its general construction of sex difference. Thus men in our culture tend to have strongly developed intellects and weakly developed feelings; they are subject then to moods, the irrational expression of the unconscious function. Women by contrast tend to have strongly developed feelings but weakly developed intellects; they are then, provocatively, subject to opinions. Again, modern culture directs some women to take the male path instead of the female — in Jung's view this was to invert the problem while doing nothing to create whole, balanced persons. But it must be repeated that all this is a secondary level. Just as Jung's psychology is not a theory of childhood, so also it is not a theory of sex difference. Jung is interested in the consequences and cultural implications of sex difference, especially how culture acts back on the psyche. But he tends to regard sex difference as ultimately given.

Jung's concern with the psyche and culture focuses ultimately on the cultural understanding of the psyche. That is, he considers that his own psychology has predecessors, though perhaps of less rational kind, among what could be termed religious and quasi-religious intellectuals. (This of course is simply the projection in the field of culture of a view of self-awareness as man's highest function.) The medieval alchemists were one example of this that he studied; another was Chinese Taoist thought. The concomitant of this is that ultimately Jung saw his system in terms of a secular religious philosophy, rather than as a medical therapy. (The treatment of neuroses especially was always a minor part of his career, and he tended to treat it in Freudian or Adlerian terms.)

This brings us, then, to the final issue, the consideration of the individuation process. By this, Jung means the process of becoming separate and distinct individual persons. This implies a degree of self-awareness and of inner and outer adjustment; it
also implies a certain distancing of ourselves from those around us and from our cultural environment. Generally this means a movement away from the outer towards the inner world; the process is psychotherapeutically at least more one for the second than the first half of life. Yet Jung saw childhood in terms of individuation too: the developing internal differentiation of the personality, and the movement of the child away from parental and family dependence towards personal autonomy. This is a growing towards the outer world, especially to the formation of adult sexual and parental relationships. The individuation process then has two reciprocal movements, in the kind of tidal relationship that is characteristic of Jung’s thought. (Incidentally Jung also saw human history in these terms, the development from primitive to modern being one of increasing differentiation and individuation. At this level, Jung was much influenced by the ideas of Lucien Levy-Bruhl.) Individuation, then, is the opposite of a number of familiar concepts: identification, empathy, participation mystique, socialization. In regard to the last, it answers a sociological question, though one not often asked: why are we ourselves, and not mere social artifacts, and why are we all different? But as I have said, Jung’s psychology is not centrally a theory of childhood (and his views on child-therapy were that you should treat the parents), and his main concern with the individuation process is with its second movement, the growing away from the world and into oneself.

Ultimately, then, Jung’s account of the psyche centres on a number of archetypes that relate to the psyche itself. These archetypes are encountered both in dreams and in cultural, especially religious, symbolism. They include: the ego, the persona, the self, the Shadow, the animus and anima, the Wise Old Man, the Earth Mother, and also such symbols as mandala. These last are symbols of wholeness or unity, the reconciliation of opposites, and stand for the psyche itself. The question here of course is the ultimate location of "identity": the ego is the centre of consciousness but the self is the centre of the psyche, poised between conscious and unconscious, between the inner and the outer worlds. This is a distinctive Jungian conception of the self:
thus where Freud says "where was id, there shall be ego", Jung rather says "where was ego, there shall be self" — though equally, where was a confusion of contradictory elements, there shall be self, reconciliation and wholeness. The self is often symbolized in dreams and in culture as a child. The persona is a social mask for non-intimate dealings, an identity from which we would all expect to distance ourselves. The Shadow is an unconscious counter-ego, made up of unacceptable elements and impulses which we repress; characteristically, Jung holds that these do not exist piecemeal in our unconscious minds, but come together to form a coherent sub-personality. The Shadow is the unconscious shadow of the ego. It is commonly symbolized as a devil-figure. The animus and anima are internal images that each sex carries of the opposite sex, generalized images which mediate all our significant dealings with the opposite sex, especially in terms of sex and love. But they also mediate our dealings with our unconscious (in opposition and balance to the persona); for Jung, sexuality was ultimately to be seen in terms of the reconciliation of opposites (male and female), rather than simply as a biological drive related to reproduction. That is, sex is a psychic, not an animal, function. Lastly, the Wise Old Man and the Earth Mother (the former for men, the latter for women) represent an unconscious force of inner wisdom and compassion.

It is ultimately in terms of these archetypes that sexual differentiation is articulated, especially in regard to the Wise Old Man/Earth Mother and the Shadow, which each sex holds in its own image, and the animus/anima, which each sex holds in the opposite sex image. These images have perhaps a specific basis in the experiences of childhood: thus the Wise Old Man is a father figure. On the other hand, they also have autonomy as cultural figures: the Wise Old Man is God. Their role in the psyche is somewhere intermediate between these two things, and the family is not the "cause" of them, but only the typical arena in which the collective unconscious is "filled" and the archetypes receive their specific contents. The role of the family in the formation of the psyche is only that of mediator of the cultural environment, and this holds in the ultimate as well as the immediate
sense.

There is very much more that could be said on Jung's psychology than I have given here. There are his views on history, for example, for Jung proposes a psychological history of culture, especially in terms of religion and the development of the World Religions out of ancient polytheism. Here Christian apologists commonly distort Jung's views, for his respect for religion is not specifically a respect for Christianity; indeed, he criticizes Christianity bitterly for its lack of a feminine principle. Beyond this, there are questions such as the theory of synchronicity, which I cannot go into. The account I have given, however, should serve its present purpose, which is to ground a brief critical discussion, especially in relation to social theory and gender.

In terms of evaluation, it could be argued that, where Freud's work is grounded in no-nonsense terms on a concrete material reality, Jung's work is a lot of mystical nonsense. I would guess that this is in fact a common reaction (see e.g. Brown 1963 p 42 et seq). But there is an answer. Firstly, Freud and Jung use exactly the same methodology, a mixture of case-history and introspection, the former centred on psychopathology. With this, however, Jung is mostly dependent on the experience and consciousness of adulthood, to which there can be some secure access, rather than engaging in speculative reconstructions of the experience and consciousness of babyhood and young childhood like Freud. He is also much warier of the risks of constructing his analysands. Secondly, Jung grounds his work on an integrated account of the neuroses and the psychoses, whereas Freud basically deals in terms of the neuroses only—surely a strong point in Jung's favour. Thirdly, where Freud takes the philosophical status of his enterprise for granted, Jung grounds his explicitly in Kantian philosophy, and he faces up to the questions of Intentionality and Mind where Freud does not. Fourthly, Freud is capable of tremendous nonsense too—for example, the "psychoanalysis" of Leonardo da Vinci. Indeed, all Freud's sociology is nonsense, especially his speculative anthropology. Against this, Jung's views on say alchemy are very sane.
There are other points that could be made. Freudian Psychoanalysis does, as outlined above, come in two phases, and the definitive and clear-cut nature of Id-psychology is not combined with the complexity and flexibility of Ego-psychology. With this, Jung's concern to reconcile the approaches of Freud and Adler surely deserves respect, though it can be protested that he took no account of the development of Ego-psychology. But beyond all this, we have to face ourselves: any analytic account of the psyche is out of accord with our commonsense everyday understanding of ourselves; on the other hand, we do rather live off sleeping pills, tranquilizers and psychiatrists. An honest evaluation of any depth psychology should try to bear this point in mind. These are not just intellectual toys; their practitioners' claim that they cannot be really understood without undergoing analysis oneself is a fair one. Ultimately, then, I can only say that I myself find Jung's account intuitively attractive in its basic outlines; I find difficulty in going all the way with some of it, but my experience is limited. Freud by contrast I find to be not only superficial but also destructive, and I believe that that is not an unusual experience (see e.g. Faraday 1972 p 113 et seq, p 187 et seq). I would also be quite categoric that the view that prefers Freud to Jung on "commonsense" grounds is merely a preference for the 19th century over the 20th. Better flying saucers than universal stages of totemism!

However, I want to turn now to the sociological questions that I identified for discussion at the beginning of this appendix. Does Jung offer an alternative to Psychoanalysis? Does this decouple the theory of culture and consciousness from the theory of sex and reproduction? Does it have sociological competence in either or both these areas?

On the first of these questions, I think that the above exegesis clearly justifies a simple "yes". The Jungian system is a very powerful and impressive intellectual construction. I do not know why, in historical terms, social theory has not taken account of it, but in effect this has been arbitrary and cannot be defended. So far as Freud was ever considered in social theory, Jung should have been considered too.
Beyond this, it should also be clear from the account above that Jung does indeed decouple the theory of culture and consciousness from the theory of sex and reproduction. In this regard, the collective unconscious has taken over the role of the Oedipus complex, and the family, as I have said, is no more than the typical arena in which the archetypes are filled with specific cultural content. This leads us, then, to the question of what sociological competence Analytical Psychology has in the area of culture and consciousness. But in order to pursue this, it is necessary first to ask what general sociological compatibility Analytical Psychology has — how its methodological foundations relate to those of social theory.

This is a difficult question, with several aspects. On the face of it, the Kantian philosophical input into Jung's thought should put him into the same methodological universe as Interpretive sociology: both are centred on Intentionality. This is one cardinal respect in which Jung's account of the psyche differs from the purely causal account of Freud. I am not competent to discuss whether there are problems at the level of philosophical ultimates here. The point is that, for all that psyche is not Mind, the notion of the (personal) unconscious itself should not be problematic for Interpretivism; it simply feeds into the complexities of motivation and limitations of self-awareness which Interpretive methodology already knows (see e.g. Weber 1978 p 9–10). (Besides, Jung's personal unconscious is an Adlerian rather than a Freudian unconscious, as discussed above.) Again, although Jung conceives the individual in terms of a psychic apparatus possessing a history and continuity, his conception nonetheless remains basically existential: the individual lives in the here-and-now and his past is subject to his present. Like socialization in Interpretive theory, childhood plays a very subordinate role in Jungian psychology.

A more profound issue is the collective unconscious. As I have said, Jung's ultimate conception is of the collective unconscious in transaction with the material environment, the process in which psyche and culture and therefore Man are created. The more immediate transaction of psyche with cultural environment
in the existential world is set against this background. It should be stressed that Jung envisages here a psychological history of culture, not a closed theory of culture. It is the World-historical scale on which this is conceived that puts Jung above all into the same universe as Max Weber of all Interpretive sociologists. It seems to me that Jung's ideas here are basically compatible with Interpretive theory, at least in regard to the conception of a psychic construction of the material environment. It is true that Jung would stress the irrational, unconscious side of this process, where Interpretive sociology would stress the rational, conscious side, but this is in both cases an inbuilt bias that each system is aware of and wishes to correct. It seems to me that there is a genuine complementarity here (and one should remember Jung's basic orientation to the reconciliation of opposites). What is problematic is that Jung organizes his psychological history of culture on the lines of Levy-Bruhl's cognitive anthropology: an evolution from the primitive irrational collective mind to modern rational individuality. I do not know how intractable this problem would be. It may be that Jung's interest in Levy-Bruhl is more inspirational than committed, and that his conceptions could be brought into line with Weber's more disciplined comparative historical approach - Jung himself is a rather undisciplined historian. It may also be that Levy-Bruhl's thought is more complex and flexible than it might appear. But I am frankly less familiar with this side of Jung's thought (and indeed with Levy-Bruhl).

Methodological questions such as these require extensive consideration, and this I cannot undertake here, even if I have the skill to resolve them. But so far as I can see, the above are the central issues, and on the face of it it seems to me that there is a basic compatibility, even a complementarity, between Analytical Psychology and Interpretive, especially Weberian, sociology. I come then to the question of culture and consciousness, where it seems to me that there are a number of issues on which Jung's thought resonates most strikingly with that of Weber. First, however, it should be reiterated that Jung's basic theory of culture is simply that Man is a culture-creating animal.
Although this entails the redirection of libido from primary instinctual purposes, it is not really a "repression theory" of culture, for Jung does not consider that sexual and personal relationships can contain all one's psychic energy. Again, there is nothing of the pathological here: indeed, if the threefold problem of depth psychology is insanity, art and religion, then it could be said that, where Freud makes art and religion forms of insanity, Jung makes insanity and art forms of religion. But more profoundly, the point is that Jung does not try to account psychologically for why Man creates culture. Rather he is interested in what is entailed in the process, and in how psyche and culture shape each other. In no sense does Jung derive society from the family, nor does he tie cultural analysis (e.g. of myths) down to childhood experiences. Rather the whole repertoire of the existential experiences of the life-cycle is reflected in culture. With this, although the analysis of culture is on a psychological basis, the cast of that psychology is cognitive. Jung's basic vision is of a non-rational creativity in dialogue with a drive to rationalization - manifestations presumably of the sexual and aggressive instincts. Strikingly, this is Weber's vision too.

Given these basics, it is most arresting to find in Jung's thought a theory of rationalization and disenchantment in relation to modern consciousness and culture. I do not know the history of this idea, or how far Weber developed it for himself, but as I have said, Jung does not appear to have derived it from Weber, and in any case it is so far grounded in his own thought that it must be regarded as a convergence. Jung's idea here is that the conditions of modern culture provide an impossible environment for the psyche, whose natural creativity never receives consistent or authoritative cultural validation and accordingly becomes either frustrated or delinquent. This produces exaggerated, eccentric and unstable political and religious movements, and insubstantial and transitory fashions in the arts, as well as schizophrenia and other psychic disorders and a general sense of existential meaninglessness. Jung here certainly seems to be providing a psychological complementation of Weber's thesis of the end of transcendental values and value-rational action in an age of
ends-rationality. Indeed, Weber tells us much more about rationalization than he does about disenchantment. To my mind, this issue alone is sufficient reason why social theory should know about Jung.

Beyond this, there is perhaps also a complementarity between on the one side, Jung's ideas on the roles of the introvert and the extravert in history, on the other, Weber's ideas on the roles of the charismatic figure and the intellectual. This is more difficult to elaborate. But it seems to me that Jung's conception of the individual as poised between the outer and the inner worlds, and Weber's conception of the social actor as poised between the material and the ideal realms, mirror each other, and that indeed both thinkers implicitly share both conceptions. The individual has biological needs which require him to deal with the material world, and an innate psychic propensity for the creation of culture; from these things, patterns of social action and meaning arise, the material and ideal realms mirroring each other. Equally, the psyche both forms the process and is formed by it, rational and irrational, conscious and unconscious, sides alike. The charismatic and the intellectual courses are the introvert and extravert modes respectively of manipulating the cultural environment. The extravert is oriented to immediate cultural validation, and works consciously and rationally, whereas the introvert works irrationally and unconsciously and is far more radical. He finds cultural validation problematic and may well not receive it — this indeed is much of the reason he takes the charismatic course. It seems to me that here again Jung and Weber are complementary of each other's thinking. Indeed, they seem to share the opposite halves of the same universe and to an extent even to envisage each other. But perhaps I am too close to this and cannot see the problems. (The four psychic functions of Jungian psychology might also be drawn into the above account, the intellectual and the charismatic relating to the functions of thinking and intuition respectively.)

There is a further sociological insight in the area of consciousness and culture that I have drawn from Jung, and which has been mentioned in the main body of the text. This is the idea
that a constellation of symbols can be assembled in different psyches in different and complementary ways, thus providing for a differential and complementary reading and writing of the same cultural text. The division of the archetypes between the two sexes discussed above is an obvious, and perhaps the most important, case in point. The conception does perhaps have some parallel in Weber, in terms of the mirroring in the ideal realm of the different elements of the social structure. In both cases, it seems to me that there is provided a conception of the cultural realm as pluralistic, fragmented and negotiated, especially in Antiquity and modernity when there is no cultural hegemony of the Great World Religions. This conception seems to me to be quite at variance with that of the Durkheimian conscience collective, including its Parsonian and Western Marxist versions, and also it seems to me to set limits to the notion of women living in a man-made world, under male cultural hegemony. It should be noted that Jung considered Christianity to be crippling of women's psyches, through the absence and denial of the representation in culture of the feminine archetypes (with the limited exception of the Virgin). But this is a historically specific theory; it is quite exceptional for the cultural realm to be organized in this way. (I discuss these issues also in Appendix A IV - Religion.)

All this said, I have to add that I have a basic scepticism about sociological theories of consciousness. I do not believe that sociology can do more than to specify the sociological context of consciousness, and make heuristic approximations as to its average contents - this on both the theoretical-predictive and the empirical-investigative sides. Individuality is always there as an unaccountable factor (Weber's theory of charisma is very much a theory of the individual in history). With this, I am equally sceptical as to the analysis of culture, whether from sociological or psychological resources;* this seems to me to be one of the most unsatisfactory and uncertain - and pretentious -

*Indeed, I would hold that the cultural science perspective must be taken into account. Here I find great interest in the ideas of A.L. Kroeber (esp. Kroeber 1952); but there has been no time for systematic development of this here. Incidentally, Kroeber had an early training in Psychoanalysis.
areas of modern intellectual enterprise. Any prospect for synthesizing major sociological and psychological systems must be very exciting, but it must be clear that my own interest would not be in the logical closure of explanatory structures but in new equipment for exploration. My own base is after all in the comparative history of women, where there is no question of consolidating what we already know; it is all to find out. I would extend this to all society: high level explanation is not necessarily secure explanation.

However, I leave these matters here, and turn to the other of my basic questions: Analytical Psychology and the theory of sex and reproduction. Granted that Jung has disengaged the general theory of consciousness and culture from this central Freudian problematic, it can still be asked, how well does he handle these matters themselves? What does he offer to social theory in this area? This I have dealt with at length in the body of the text (chapter 3), and I only repeat it here to complete this discussion. In evaluating what Jung has to offer here, it is not sufficient simply to ask, what does Jung tell us? The problem with Freud is that he tells us everything. The question should rather be, what does Jung open up for us to enquire into? And the answer, I think, is that, without reducing everything to a dogmatic formula, Jung does seem to give us the basic conceptions with which to create the methodological foundations for a specifically sociological enquiry into the social relationships, practices and meanings arising from our sexual-reproductive biology. He gives us the overall conception of our natures as entailing both material survival and the creation of culture; within this he gives us the conception of sex and reproduction in terms of a psychological apparatus that matches and complements our biological apparatus. And, precisely because he does not argue that this specific aspect of our psychological apparatus is ultimately responsible for the creation of all culture, Jung unlike Freud stays within the realm of common sense. He frees us to enquire into social actions and relationships, instead of trapping us in the maze of consciousness and ideology.

Thus he gives us the basic instincts of sex and aggression;
love and desire for the opposite sex; a cycle of growth and maturation from babyhood to adult autonomy and independence; propensities for the procreation and raising of children; and a fundamental division of masculinity and femininity that cross-cuts all other personality structures and processes, thus giving in principle the full range of personality variation to both sexes, with a secondary level of culturally determined variation. So far as this psychic apparatus inter-relates with Intentionality, it can be inter-related to the conception of social action; seen as the apparatus with which the individual approaches social reality, it is a conditioning factor upon social reality not a determinant. The rest is for us to find out.

It is on the basis, or at least in the light, of this that I have developed my own methodological foundations, in terms of the concepts of sexual polarity and its four component elements: fertility and maternity, the maturational cycle, sexuality, and aggression. The basic methodological discussion of each of these is again illuminated by Jungian insights. Moreover, the basic dimension of sociological variation that I have identified is that in City-states the attempt is made to control these things, while in Bureaucratic Kingdoms they are accepted as nature. Whether I could have achieved these foundations without Jung is another question of course. But the fact remains that, whatever their originality and worth, it is through Jung that I came to them.

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