Trinitarian Theology and Piety:
The Attributes of God in the Thought of Stephen Charnock (1628-1680) and William Perkins (1558-1602)

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Declaration

I hereby declare that I have composed this Ph.D. thesis by my own personal and independent study, and that it has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Hansang Lee

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Abstract

Stephen Charnock (1628-1680) is arguably remembered for his importance, at the zenith of Puritan or English Reformed scholastic divinity, in terms of the doctrine of God’s existence and attributes. He also contributed to Reformed orthodox or Puritan theology through his writings on the knowledge of God, the doctrine of regeneration, Christology, and the atonement. He wrote all these work in the midst of the theological turbulence of the later seventeenth century, with the underlying purpose of defending the inseparability of theological system and piety. His work, with its eclectic acceptance of medieval scholastic intellectual tradition as a tool, plays a significant role in the development of an historical phase of trinitarian and federal theology. However, The Existence and Attributes of God as Charnock’s magnum opus has been unexplored in terms of its view of the full doctrine of God in its trinitarian and covenantal dimensions. This is despite the fact that the Puritan concept of the divine attributes is the very doctrinal area in which the theological loci are concentrated into “a system” associated with the pursuit of piety in the period of high orthodoxy. This lack of a comprehensive overview concerning the Reformed orthodox system has brought about a misunderstanding of his theology. Charnock’s work has been regarded, even in recent scholarship, as the product of a mere scholastic rationalism.

William Perkins (1558-1602) is undoubtedly the “father” of the doctrine of God in the early Puritan or Reformed orthodox period. Although misunderstandings concerning his scholastic Puritan theology and its trinitarian system and piety have been successfully rectified by other previous researchers, a confirmation of it through an investigation of his idea of God’s attributes is necessary in our study. This is in order to prove the identity of Charnock’s doctrine of God with the Puritan Reformed orthodox theological system allowing, of course, for the development of the historical and theological context between these two periods.

In particular, Charnock’s understanding of the theological prolegomena, Scriptural foundations, and God’s existence and attributes is dealt with in this current study in comparison with Perkins’ work. Charnock’s work has been viewed in terms of a continuity between the early and high orthodox doctrine of God within the flow of English Puritan thought. During this examination, giving particular attention to Charnock’s treatise The Existence and Attributes of God, we have attempted to resolve the question of whether the past interpretation of Charnock’s theology or
doctrine of God as a rigid speculative doctrinal formulation of Protestant scholasticism beyond Scripture is reasonable or not.
Acknowledgement

The completion of this thesis involved enormous indebtedness to many individuals and church institutions. I now need to remember and list those who were of great help, and express my thankfulness. For the last six years of research studies in the US and UK, I have benefited from several respected teachers. My first special thanks should go to Dr. Susan Hardman Moore, my doctoral supervisor. She has been supportive as well as critical of my studies with her thoughtfulness and enthusiasm for the field of Puritan studies. I cannot forget Prof. David Steinmetz’s teaching and his scholarly influence on me as my Th. M. advisor at Duke. This was an excellent intellectual preparation for studying seventeenth century Puritan Reformed scholastic theology. Prof. David Fergusson and Prof. Carl Trueman also offered some significant observations and comments on this research. I would like to give my thanks to both of them. I also would like to express thanks to my external and internal examiner, Dr. Stephen Holmes and Dr. Paul Nimmo.

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Chapter One

The Context of the Doctrine of God in Charnock and Perkins

I. Reformed Scholasticism and Stephen Charnock

For several years now, the study of Reformed orthodoxy has been a controversial area in historical theology, particularly in relation to the question of how to grasp the identity of the relationship between Protestant scholasticism and “rationalism”. By definition, Reformed orthodoxy signifies a phase and development of post-Reformation theology from the later sixteenth to the early eighteenth-century on the continent and in the British Isles.¹ According to the older perspective, predating the rise of recent scholarship, the theologians of the Reformed orthodox period were uniformly regarded as representing a “discontinuity” between Calvin and the later orthodox Reformed theologians, including the English “Puritans”.²


English Puritan, moderate Independent, and Reformed orthodox divine, Stephen Charnock (1628-1680) was, of course, included in this scholarly assessment.  

Who was Stephen Charnock? Charnock was born in the parish of St Katharine Cree, London. He was admitted as a sizar at Emmanuel, the Puritan college, Cambridge in 1642. He studied under William Sancroft and seems to have experienced “true” conversion during the Cambridge days. Charnock seems to have been affected much more by the Puritan milieu of Cambridge than by either Anglicanism or Platonic philosophy although, it must be said, he had an extensive knowledge of philosophy in those days. After receiving his B. D. degree, he worked as a minister at Southwark and London. In 1650, he became a fellow of New College, Oxford, and was appointed Proctor of the university in 1654. While at Oxford, Charnock collaborated with Goodwin, Owen and Howe; he was respected as a very considerable scholar and an eminent divine. He accepted an offer to go to Ireland, and was appointed as one of the ministers for a weekly Monday lecture at Dublin in 1655 while keeping his fellowship at Oxford by Oliver Cromwell. He preached at St.Patrick’s and St.Catherine’s, and carried out his pastoral ministry as an Independent to English troops and civilian administrations with fervency. His audience regarded Charnock’s preaching as the best except for that of James Ussher, for his sermons were mostly practical, rational, and persuasive enough for them to understand it.

Charnock visited the continent several times after the Restoration in 1660. He


3 There has been a misunderstanding of Charnock’s denominational background that saw him as Presbyterian because he was a co-pastor with Thomas Watson at Crosby Hall from 1675 to his death in 1680. However, there is no literary evidence to support this assumption. According to Gribben’s and Seymour’s account of Irish Puritanism related to Charnock’s ministry in Dublin before the Restoration, he was arguably an Independent Puritan. See Crawford Gribben, *The Irish Puritans: James Ussher and the Reformation of the Church* (Darlington: Evangelical Press, 2003), pp. 110-5; St. John D. Seymour, *The Puritans in Ireland 1647-1661* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921).

traveled in the Netherlands and France for the study of divinity. After these fifteen years, he became co-pastor of a nonconformist congregation with Thomas Watson at Crosby Hall in London. He published only one book in his lifetime, *The Sinfulness and Cure of Thoughts* (1676). Charnock left voluminous writings originally given as lectures from the pulpit over three years on the doctrine of God, especially concerning the divine essence and attributes: *Discourses upon the Existence and the Attributes of God* (1682). This was published as his magnum opus with other works after his death. Although Charnock died on 27 July 1680 before the completion of the lectures on all the divine attributes and thus the detailed treatment of divine affections and virtues could not be written, our case in this thesis for the clarifying “theological matrix” of Charnock’s thought is not affected by this incompleteness because of his wide-ranging treatment of the doctrine of God throughout this work.

As Charnock’s theology has not been much studied, it has only been possible to find two recent commentators who relate it to the general characteristics of seventeenth century Reformed orthodox thought. Tudur R. Jones, who adopts the negative view that Protestant scholasticism represents a discontinuity with Calvin, asserted:

> Whereas most [Puritan] theologians were content to speak of two covenants, some posited three. Charnock is an example of one who took this view. He distinguished a Covenant of Grace and a Covenant of Redemption. … This elaboration of the theology of the covenants by Charnock exemplifies the tendency to move beyond the testimony of Scripture into the realm of *scholasticism*. It illustrates why some students of the period see the Federal theology as the intrusion of *rationalism* into Puritan thought.  

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6 Tudur Jones, “Union with Christ: The Existential Nerve of Puritan Piety,” *Tyndale Bulletin* 41/2 (1990), pp. 186-208. See esp. pp. 194-5. T. F. Torrance holds a similar viewpoint to Jones by seeing the development of the idea of the covenant of redemption in later Puritan theology as “becoming abstractive”: see his *The School of Faith: the Catechisms of the Reformed Church* (London: James Clarke, 1959), p. lxxix. However, within the wider context of the development of the later Puritan or
As we see above, Jones uses both “scholasticism” and “rationalism” without specific definitions as if there is already a tacit understanding of the two terms between himself and his readers. This statement de facto shows that the difference between the views of these two terms (that is, between the older view and the newer perspective) gives rise to a particular understanding of Puritan or Reformed orthodox federal theology.

We also see a similar perspective in Colin Gunton’s work (1941-2003). He argues that the overall traditional tendency of the treatment of God’s attributes, including that of the Reformed scholastics before the enlightenment, is the prolongation of so-called “negative theology” or “rationalism”. In other words, he

Reformed orthodox theology, the idea of the covenant of redemption was a necessary device for them to maintain their orthodox theological system on a scriptural basis as the cognitive foundation of our knowledge of God. In the case of Owen, this tendency is particularly well shown. Throughout the upcoming arguments in this thesis, we will examine whether Charnock corresponds to Owen and other Puritans’ cases. See Steve Griffiths, Redeem the Time: Sin in the Writings of John Owen (Fearn: Christian Focus Publication, 2001), pp. 26-9; Sinclair Ferguson, John Owen on the Christian Life (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1987), pp. 25-7; Richard Daniels, The Christology of John Owen (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2004), pp. 153-67; Carl Trueman, John Owen: Reformed Catholic, Renaissance Man (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 80-92.

We will investigate the problems of defining these terms later. Almost certainly, this error is due to the misinterpretation of the Reformed doctrine of predestination combined with both the balance and dynamics of the eternal and temporal dimensions as a rigid “predestinarian system” derived from — what is called — Aristotelian scholasticism. However, in fact, this was a “high Augustinian doctrinal conviction,” which, in fact, our research upon the Puritan doctrine of God’s existence should be based upon as a general assumption of the arguments following later on. Cf. Muller, “Calvin and the ‘Calvinists’: Assessing Continuities and Discontinuities between the Reformation and Orthodoxy, Part 2,” in After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 82-3.


considers that the traditional doctrines of the divine attributes, Charnock’s included, did not reflect appropriately the trinitarian revelation of God in the history of salvation. Sharing Jones’ assumption about the intrusion of scholasticism, he also argues that the (Reformed scholastic) “method” constrains the “content” of theology in Charnock’s *The Existence and Attributes of God*.10 According to Gunton’s view, therefore, the necessity of the close relatedness of trinitarian theology and the doctrine of God’s attributes (as the core of a theological system or of the doctrine of God) in Reformed orthodox or Puritan thought — Charnock’s in our case — became obscured. Of course this is against the view that the Puritan (and Charnock’s) emphases upon the *ad extra* dimension, in the account of divine attributes as our knowledge of God, could be seen as evidence of the following: that the Protestant scholastic doctrine of divine attributes was neither abstract nor speculative, but instead reflects faithfulness to the “exegetical tradition” of Scripture and to the piety associated with this line of thought since the medieval period.11 That is, Jones’s and Gunton’s assertions allege the existence of a “distorted” image of God in Charnock’s theology, and it is worthwhile examining whether this view is tenable or not. A closer study of Charnock’s doctrine of God — especially in *The Attributes of God* — would suggest that Jones’ and Gunton’s claims should be reassessed.

In a similar vein to the necessity of new investigation of Charnock’s doctrine of God, Stephen Holmes asserts that we can demonstrate the “comprehensibleness and usefulness” of the divine essence and attributes as long as there is no “failure to listen to the tradition”.12 Carl Trueman also describes the Reformed scholastic Puritan John Owen’s view on the divine attributes as follows:

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10 Gunton, *Act and Being*, p. 91. For example, Gunton criticises Charnock by saying that Charnock merely repeats the twofold approach of Wollebius (1586-1629) by dividing divine attributes into two rather loose groupings - a “negative” group (essence, spirit, eternity) and a more positive group. In chapters three and four, we will show that Gunton fails to fully consider the federal dimension of Charnock’s ideas. The point can also be made that in the *Attributes of God* Charnock, in fact, did not deal with the complete range of the divine attributes. However, this does not amount to any significant inconsistency between the “method” and “content” of his theology, as has been alleged.


Owen characteristically uses God’s attributes as a means of safeguarding the personal God of history and salvation, and he is able to do this because of the important relationship in which God’s attributes stand to the covenant of grace and thus to God’s saving purposes.\(^\text{13}\)

Although Charnock’s treatises upon the attributes of God along with his works on regeneration, providence, and atonement have been appraised as major works, few have researched his whole doctrine of God as a “system” at a scholarly level. Charnock has been a “forgotten man” in Puritan and Reformed scholarship.\(^\text{14}\) Some researchers have dealt only with his doctrine of regeneration. James Shields’ work displays weakness in that he only used a topical research method, examining Charnock in comparison with other Puritan divines, i.e., Perkins, Sibbes, Baxter, Owen, Goodwin, and Howe.\(^\text{15}\) E. F. Kevan cited Charnock’s work frequently but briefly, along with other Puritan works.\(^\text{16}\) F. K. Drayson dealt with Charnock’s doctrine of divine sovereignty, but without a scholarly level of analysis.\(^\text{17}\) A. T. B. McGowan only touched on Charnock’s doctrine of regeneration.\(^\text{18}\) Among more recent scholars, Trueman has spoken highly of Charnock’s literature on the doctrine of God as a “classic example” of “rhetorical persuasion to belief” in the Reformed orthodox period.\(^\text{19}\) Most of all, Richard Muller, in his multi-volume series Post-

Reformation Reformed Dogmatics (I-IV, 4 vols. 2003), dealt with the full doctrine of God of the Reformed orthodox comparing this extensively with the views of older scholarship. Muller’s point of strength lies in the fact that he clarified the importance of the role of the Reformed doctrine of the “covenant”. This consistently controls the whole theological system in relation to the other important theological loci within the context of a doctrine of God including the Trinity and the attributes of God.

In brief, on the whole, there have been, clearly, two mutually opposite (negative and affirmative) views concerning the Reformed scholastic doctrine of God, especially related to the attributes of God.

II. The Historical Background of the Relationship between the Trinity and the Doctrine of Divine Attributes

At this juncture, we need to discuss the “root” reason of divergent views about the seventeenth century orthodox doctrine of God in modern scholarship. Developing the brief comments made earlier, the key issue is how to view the relationship between trinitarian doctrine and God’s attributes in light of the history of Christianity. In relation to the pursuit of the historical roots of the seventeenth century doctrine of God, this also depends upon whether one sees the historical process of the formation of the doctrine of Trinity since early Christianity as “an undesirable Hellenization” of the teaching of the original gospel of Christ written in Scripture or not.

Let us summarise the general argument on the “negative” side. According to those who view the Hellenistic tendency critically, the influence of both Greek philosophy and Augustine’s psychological model of the Trinity dominated the history of the Western intellectual tradition, and produced a distorted image of God. This image was of an ontological, static, and metaphysical God as an unknowable

20 Muller clarifies the Reformed orthodox system of the doctrine of God from both theological prolegomena and the doctrine of Scripture to the doctrine of the existence, essence, and attributes of God and the Trinity, arguing that this is founded upon and developed from the initial structure of the medieval scholastic system of theology. Similar arguments are pursued in his After Calvin; Carl Trueman, The Claims of Truth; Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment, ed. Carl Trueman and Scott Clark (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999); Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise, ed. Willem Van Asselt and Eef Dekker (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001).
“essence” or “substance” far from the image of the biblical, dynamic, relational, and historical God as the three distinct “persons”. The way of explaining God’s attributes also went astray according to this “impersonal” or “modalistic” understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity. Such continuous currents in Western theology before the enlightenment are viewed as a type of “rationalism”, which is named “classical theism”. In addition, medieval scholasticism represented by Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa Theologica* added to this rationalistic tendency. Though the Reformation seems to have returned to the Scriptural God transiently, it was soon influenced by the ‘recurrent’ tendency of Protestant scholasticism towards rationalism.

This view — that Protestant scholasticism tends towards rationalism — basically stems from the interpretations of the nineteenth century church historians in Germany on the past history of the orthodox doctrine of God, especially in the work of Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) and Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930). Karl Barth developed his understanding of Protestant scholastic theology within the boundary of their influence, and the aforementioned T. F. Torrance, Colin Gunton, and Tudur Jones are not free from the legacy of Ritschl, Harnack, and Barth related to this point. At another level, the emergence of growing interest in trinitarian theology over the last several decades is partly related to the inheritance of Barthian theology. The overall tendency of the modern interest in trinitarianism is distinct from the radical “social” trinitarian theory that neglects the importance of the immanent Trinity. However, this is *de facto* located within the context of the tradition of the systematic theology of the “New Yale School” or “Yale post-liberalism”, associated with the thought of Hans Frei and George Lindbeck who are also affected by the method and framework of Barth’s theology.

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These theologians seek to integrate the unnecessarily divided dimensions of both trinitarian theology and the doctrine of divine attributes in terms of “being” (the ontological dimension) and “act” (the economic dimension) of God. They do this by way of adopting historical christocentrism (in a Barthian or ecumenical way); along with increased interest in the person and work of the Holy Spirit, which has been allegedly overlooked in the Western Augustinian tradition.\textsuperscript{26} In a similar vein, we have also seen a growing interest in the Eastern idea of the Trinity that lays emphasis on the concepts of “person” and the “communion” of the three persons in recent scholarship, especially in the work of Torrance and Gunton.\textsuperscript{27} At the same time they emphasise the aspects of theology or dogmatics as a kind of “narrative” second level system elicited from the Scripture under the authority of the church or communal background.\textsuperscript{28} Of course the influence of postmodern thought is not unrelated to this trend in the midst of the conflict between “foundationalism” and “anti-foundationalism” in theological methodology.\textsuperscript{29}

How could perspectives on the history of the Trinitarian doctrine and divine attributes be so divergent? How should we respond to the “negative” position concerning the relationship between the Trinity and the divine attributes in classical theism, particularly regarding the case of the Reformed scholastics? Although some theologians (e.g., Robert Letham and Stephen Holmes) have recently taken a middle or eclectic position between these two camps by regarding the importance of the role of “tradition” in this issue, the fundamental gap still remains.\textsuperscript{30} Did the seventeenth century Reformed scholastic doctrine of God fail to deal successfully with the prior limits of classical theism in Western theology?

\textsuperscript{26} The increasing interest of recent western researchers of the Trinity in the thought of the modern eastern theologian John Zizioulas is one of the examples of this trend: John Zizioulas, \textit{Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church} (New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985).
\textsuperscript{27} For a brief account of this tendency, see Brian Kay, \textit{Trinitarian Spirituality: John Owen and the Doctrine of God in Western Devotion} (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2007), pp. 9, 110.
\textsuperscript{28} For example, see \textit{Trinitarian Soundings in Systematic Theology}, ed. Paul Metzger (New York & London: T & T Clark, 2005).
As mentioned earlier, Richard Muller’s general argument concerning the seventeenth century orthodox doctrine of God shows its strength in reminding us of the importance of the historical context of theology. However, he does not mention or reflect on the discussion of this doctrinal area (trinitarian theology and the doctrine of divine attributes) in terms of recent development (regardless of whether they are against his argument or not) in the field of modern systematic theology. Therefore, in this thesis, based upon the recognition of the weak point found in Muller’s treatment of the Reformed orthodox attributes of God as well, we see the need to examine whether Jones’ and Gunton’s comments on Charnock indicate a lack of proper understanding of “Christian Aristotelianism” (against the negative nuances of the agnostic, Hellenized, or hybrid God of Christianity) and its significance in the Western intellectual tradition from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century.

III. The English Reformed Scholastic Doctrine of God: Charnock and Perkins

Now we need to think about the root of Charnock’s doctrine of God from the point of view of wider English Reformed theology. Did his ideas appear in a vacuum? No. To illuminate Charnock’s doctrine of God’s attributes, it is valuable to focus simultaneously on William Perkins’ (1558-1602) specific treatment of it as “the father” of English Puritan theology, in order to trace the antecedents of Charnock’s thought. Perkins was born in 1558 in Bulkington parish, Warwickshire, and educated in Christ’s College, Cambridge. After experiencing “true” conversion from a life of dissipation, he studied theology under Laurence Chaderton (1536-1640), and had fellowship with other early Puritans in a “spiritual brotherhood” at Cambridge. He became a fellow at Christ’s College in 1578, and also served as the dean of Christ’s College (1590-1591). From 1585 until his death in 1602, as rector of St. Andrews Church, Cambridge, Perkins’ pulpit ministry made him famous throughout Britain and the Continent for his highly influential, scholastic, Ramistic, and experimental Calvinistic preaching. After his death, his writings were collected and edited in the three volumes. Perkins was “a major English codifier” of the Reformed doctrine of God in early orthodoxy.31 Michael Jinkins describes Perkins’ powerful influence: “The list of students influenced by Perkins reads like a who’s who of

seventeenth century Calvinism”. He was also a highly influential figure in the “two-way traffic in theology between England and the Continent” which was made possible through the large translated publication of his works on the continent.

The case of Perkins evidences not only the initial aspect of the trinitarian emphasis in the seventeenth century Puritan doctrine of God, but also the balance between “efficacy” and “reliability” in the Puritan doctrine of God within the covenantal structure. In addition, although a few theologians have recently developed the study of Perkins’ doctrine of God from the new perspective of a larger Trinitarian context, yet there has been less focus on Perkins’ exposition of the attributes of God. There comes a need to investigate Perkins’ thought concerning trinitarianism in relation to the doctrine of the attributes of God, in comparison with Charnock’s work. In brief, the investigation of the coherence of the trinitarian system will be our methodological “key” for understanding the identity of Charnock’s idea of God’s attributes through the ongoing research. For this purpose, we need to set up in advance three parameters for our discussion in the later chapters, within the theological and historical contexts which inform Charnock’s The Attributes of God in the discussions of the later seventeenth century.

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A. Parameter One: Doctrinal System and Scripture in Reformed Scholasticism

To get a clear picture of the doctrine of God in Perkins and Charnock we, first, should make several points about the term “Reformed orthodoxy” within the context of intellectual history.\(^\text{36}\) Perkins’ work falls roughly into the first half of early orthodoxy, and Charnock’s, under the first half of high orthodoxy. A definition of the Reformed orthodoxy should be clearly given again: the “theological content of the Reformed tradition;” what was taken to be “right and correct teaching” in the Reformed literature of the seventeenth-century.\(^\text{37}\) In fact, Reformed orthodoxy left a diverse genre of literatures — confessions, catechisms, biblical commentaries, sermons, and treatises.\(^\text{38}\) To elaborate the theological system that correlates with orthodoxy (though the preliminary form of prolegomena had been seen in late medieval theology) the orthodox theologians needed a theological prolegomena dealing with \textit{principia theologiae} in the context of their era.\(^\text{39}\) They saw two ultimate principles of theology (the knowledge of God) — the Scripture as the \textit{principium cognoscendi} or cognitive foundation and God as the \textit{principium essendi} or essential foundation.\(^\text{40}\) For Reformed orthodoxy, the genus of theology was “science” in the sense that the knowledge of both God and Scripture as the revealed truth of God could be attained, and this, at the same time was “wisdom”, that is, the knowledge of final goals to which such knowledge pointed.

Second, post-Reformation orthodoxy cannot be understood without considering its relationship to “scholasticism”. Scholasticism in medieval perspective was a “school theology” in the university with various backgrounds of philosophy.\(^\text{41}\)

\(^{36}\) For a general survey of the terminologies, see Richard Muller, “Scholasticism and Orthodoxy in the Reformed Tradition: Definition and Method,” in \textit{After Calvin}, pp. 27-36.


\(^{39}\) \textit{PRRD} IV, p. 397. For the details of the history of theological prolegomena since Augustine, see \textit{PRRD} I, pp. 88-108.

\(^{40}\) See \textit{PRRD} I, pp. 108-22. For the doctrinal limitation of medieval scholastic forerunners of the Reformation on this point, see ibid., pp. 437-40.

It was also an objective method foreign to its content, as Van Asselt and Dekker define it, “a scientific method of research and teaching, and [scholasticism] does not have a doctrinal content, neither does it have reason as its foundation.” Muller’s definition of scholasticism as the “academic and often highly technical method for the definition and elaboration of this theological orthodoxy” also shows its relationship to and distinction from Protestant orthodoxy. Thus, a basic similarity can be found between Protestant scholasticism and, for example, the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas that used *disputatio* and *quaestio* in building the structure of its theological system. Like other Puritan theologians, Charnock seems to have used and cited plentifully scholastic materials of the medieval era, as well as Reformed material from the continent and Roman Catholic material after the Reformation, in his works.

What we need to note in the light of historical development, is that the medieval scholastic method was transformed into a “locus method”, which was a logic based on the “topical discussion of doctrine” regarding the interpretation of important biblical texts; “a Renaissance modification of the scholastic approach” also influenced the writings of the Reformers; a remodified form of the Reformers’ *locus* method appeared in orthodoxy as the “standard pattern of dogmatic exposition”

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42 *Reformation and Scholasticism*, p. 39. For example, see Muller’s comparison of Aquinas’ commentary on the Gospel of John with *Summa Theologica*, cited in Muller, “Scholasticism and Orthodoxy in the Reformed Tradition,” p. 27. Cf. Muller, ibid., p. 36.

43 Muller, “John Calvin and later Calvinism,” p. 140. For the four ways of distinction of scholasticism according to the standard of “looseness” and “strictness” in Voetius’ view, see idem, *PRRD* I, pp. 197-8.

44 On the concise explanation of the medieval *disputatio* and *quaestio*, S. Spencer, “Reformed Scholasticism in Medieval Perspective,” pp. 23-30; James Weispiel says: “The master’s exposition was… an intellectual grappling with real problems examined by the author. Recognition of a problem meant appreciation of all problems *sic et non*…. Such questions could arise from the text, conflicting interpretations, doubtful questions, or new insights; these gave rise to [disputatio],” in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, s. v. “Scholastic method”.

45 The most frequent examples are Aquinas, Bradwardine, Calvin, Beza, Zanchi, Amyraut, Turretin, Daillé, Cocceius, Suarez etc. The extensiveness of Charnock’s library (over 1200 items) was proved during its auction in October 1680: see *Bibliotheca Charnockiana Sive Catalogus Librorum* (London, 1680). Richard Greaves reports the wide range of Charnock’s library: “His reading included classical authors such as Plato, Ovid, Pythagoras, and the stoics; church fathers such as Tertulian; the medieval philosophers Boethius and Averroes; Catholic writers such as Cajetan, Savonarola, and Suarez; continental protestants such as Cocceius and Grotius; and English writers as disparate as Cartwright, Baxter, Preston, Ames, Stillingfleet, Fuller, Lightfoot, Davenant, and John Owen”, quoted from “Stephen Charnock,” in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (2004).
which was based upon a firm exegetical foundation. Reformed orthodoxy then used the *locus* method by the proper combination of an a priori and an a posteriori approach where necessary. Both of the approaches were significant for the characteristics of the Reformed orthodox doctrine of God. The *locus* method relates to the discussion of theology as a theoretical or practical discipline, that is, as theology for an academic context or for the churchly piety of orthodoxy. Scholastic orthodoxy can be characterized, therefore, as both a “fundamentally exegetical” and “profoundly traditional” theological system using the *locus* method as a bridge-builder between Scriptural exegesis and the construction of doctrinal articles, with a balance between revelation and a “rectified” reason, albeit sticking to the principle of the supremacy of the Scriptures over the “abuse” of philosophy.

These characteristics form the basic framework of Charnock’s and Perkins’ Reformed scholastic doctrine of God with the kinship between *sacra pagina* and *sacra doctrina* over against the suspicion of seventeenth century orthodoxy in modern scholarship. In other words, both Perkins and Charnock set forth a doctrine of God that regulates other theological *loci* within the tradition characteristic of Reformed orthodoxy, especially with regard to the relationship of Scripture and the fundamental articles. Moreover, as Muller puts it, Charnock’s *The Existence and Attributes of God* can be regarded as “an excellent example of the orthodox Protestant use of Scripture” in the way it moves from the Scriptural text to theological formulation by focusing on the “scope” of the words in the text and considers hermeneutical and theological concerns within the context of “a tradition of interpretation”.

In sum, this inseparability between exegesis and doctrine in

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46 Muller, *PPRD* IV, p. 398. There he adds, “Specific modification came to the method by way of Ramist logic [that] belong[s] to the late Renaissance recovery and modification of classical late medieval logical and rhetorical tools. [This model] carr[ies] over into the *scholastic* methods of the seventeenth-century Protestants”; idem, “Ad fontes argumentorum: The Sources of Reformed Theology in the Seventeenth Century,” in *After Calvin*, pp. 57, 78.

47 On the necessity and the way for such combination arranging topics and materials in seventeenth-century context, see Muller, “Ad fontes argumentorum,” p. 58.


49 *PPRD* IV, p. 392.

50 *PPRD* II, pp. 501, 518.

51 In the second chapter of this thesis, especially in case of Charnock, we will focus on *A Discourse of the Knowledge of God* and *A Discourse of the Knowledge of God in Christ* (in *Works* IV, pp. 3-163) that show Charnock’s idea of theological prolegomena in relation to the doctrine of the attributes of God.

52 See *PPRD* II, pp. 516-8. This point will be dealt with in detail in chapter two. For the meaning of pre-critical exegesis in this interpretive tradition, see Muller, *PPRD* IV, p. 405; on the monumental
Perkins’ and Charnock’s scholasticism will be the continuing ‘prop’ of our ongoing argument.

B. Parameter Two: Trinitarianism and the Divine Simplicity

Although Perkins does not give a fully extensive account of the doctrine of the attributes of God in separate books, within his works he nevertheless explains the entire list of divine attributes. Above all, Perkins focuses on the working of the divine will (voluntas Dei) within a Trinitarian dimension. Perkins combined the divine decree with Christology through the idea of Christ’s being the mediator, which means that predestination cannot be discussed extra Christum. He wanted to see the divine decree as “an essential act” belonging equally to the three persons of the triune God by way of correlating it with the doctrine of the Trinity. The system of Perkins has what appears to be an element of “speculative elaboration” for the clarification of the “logical ordering” of the decree, but this needs to be understood within the twofold context of divine will: an essential and causal dimension, and a temporal, covenantal and economic dimension.

In other words, according to Muller, Christology in Perkins’ system was structured in terms of “the economy of the divine will as it enters history” in the “line of the covenant-promise”. Lyle Bierma also, without breaking the tension and balance in this trinitarian background, showed that predestination in the decree and the nature of the covenant of grace can go hand in hand without a division of covenant theology in sixteenth-century Reformed theology into two traditions; that

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54 Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic. 1988), p. 163.

55 Christ and the Decree, p. 161.

56 Christ and the Decree, pp. 171, 173, 178.

57 Christ and the Decree, p. 172.

is, election and covenant do not exclude each other but are mutually related. The fact that the thought of “Christ the mediator” in this way originated in Calvin and produced its fruit in Perkins, of course, evidences a similar trinitarian understanding of the doctrine of God. In fact, Perkins’ supralapsarian tendencies in his christocentric understanding of election are moderated by his view of the covenant as “the means of executing the decree” that holds not only because of the blood of Christ on the cross, but because of the elect’s repentance and faith from the working of the Holy Spirit. This maintains a due regard for works of “preparation” due to the action of grace for the beginning of the ordo salutis. In short, these arguments of recent scholarship evidence that Perkins was the forerunner of the Puritan Reformed scholastic understanding of the attributes of God through an integration of both the ad intra and ad extra, though he explores the full doctrine of God primarily in light of the working of the divine will.

After Perkins, in the first period of high orthodoxy, British Puritan divines also wrote numerous works on the doctrine of God — especially on the divine attributes — in relation to God’s trinitarian working ad extra. Owen, Rutherford,

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and Twisse contributed to the doctrine of God, demonstrating mutual influences from the Reformed contemporaries on the continent, in a polemic style. William Bates and Ezekiel Hopkins offered expositions of the attributes of God from a more pietistic standpoint. Furthermore, Richard Baxter and Charnock were by far the most eminent English puritans who extensively dealt with the doctrine of the attributes of God “on a more technical level but remaining firmly within the genre of devotional and homiletical theologies”. In contrast to Baxter, however, Charnock united scholasticism and piety without a division between a “more scholastic model” and a “less scholastic model” from the point of view of literary genre. Muller notes the significance of Charnock’s work:

Also of considerable significance as both a contribution to the English Reformed theology of the seventeenth century and as a codification of doctrine evidencing the broad resources and major opponents of the Reformed position is Charnock’s *Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God*. … [It] certainly stands as one of the more elaborate and detailed treatises on the subject written in the seventeenth century and … partakes of the careful distinctions and definitions that belong to the scholastic theology of the era. It also evidences the exegetical and practical character of the Protestant theology of the era, with consistent references to the texts of Scripture on which its teaching is based and equally consistent attention to the churchly and pious “use” of each doctrinal point. Charnock’s work, remarkable for its grasp of the scholastic materials and for its ability to turn those materials to homiletical use, also invariably turns toward christological and soteriological issues.

This statement also shows that Charnock and some high orthodox Puritans felt obliged to give lectures on the existence and attributes of God in order to provide a

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65 PRRD III, p. 116. For the full list of Baxter’s works on this, see the list cited in PRRD III, p. 117.
66 PRRD III, p. 117.
67 PRRD III, p. 132. Muller also deals with Charnock in terms of the relationship between theology and Scripture within the later seventeenth century context in PRRD II, pp. 507, 516-7, and passim.
firm foundation for the life and piety of the saints as regenerated “new creature(s)”.

For instance (and this will be explored in detail in chapter three), the arguments for God’s existence worked not as a foundational proof for the loci system but rather through persuasive, rhetorical means. That is, the philosophical tools for such arguments were adopted only within an exegetical framework. For Charnock and several of the English puritans of high orthodoxy within the later seventeenth century context, the detailed explanation of the attributes of God offered a basis for the deeper knowledge of God in view of the doctrine of the Trinity. Owen also considers the doctrine of divine attributes to be the elements of “effective regulating” in the acts of the Triune God ad extra.

Therefore, most of all, as Amy Pauw argues, we should also consider the orthodox Puritan effort to explain consistently both “divine simplicity” and Trinitarian doctrine within the context of Christian Aristotelianism. That is, Pauw’s general analysis of the Puritan theology will also be verified through our case study of Charnock. The idea of divine simplicity was extremely important for the Reformed tradition in that it undergirds every other divine attribute. It is also critically important for the argument that the necessity of divine substance or essence is the “minimal device” for the ontological or immanent Trinity against Tritheism in the Western-Augustinian tradition including Perkins and Charnock. At the same time, such necessity was linked to the emergence of Arminianism, Socinianism, and the debate about “middle knowledge” especially in relation to the necessity of the

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69 For the differences in style among Aquinas, the Reformers, and the Reformed orthodoxy on the arguments over the existence of God, see Muller, “Ad fontes argumentorum,” pp. 54-5.

70 Muller points out the reciprocal effect between two areas of doctrine in the Reformed orthodoxy: “The Reformed orthodox were highly attentive to trinitarian issues in their discussions of divine essence and attributes, just as they were highly attentive to the issues raised by discussions of essence and attributes in their analysis of the doctrine of the Trinity,” in PRRD IV, p. 418. See also idem, PRRD III, pp. 129-32. However, the Puritans avoided using “abstruse trinitarian terms,” and discussed it in terms of explaining economic trinitarian working and piety. See Amy P. Pauw, The Supreme Harmony of All: The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), pp. 66-7.

71 Trueman, The Claims of Truth, p. 110.

72 Pauw, The Supreme Harmony of All, p. 64.

73 Ibid., p. 62. For Pauw’s excellent summary of the Reformed tradition on divine simplicity, see pp. 59-69.
incarnation and Christ’s atonement. This dimension is also deeply related to the Puritan Reformed scholastics’ defence of the traditional, orthodox idea of the knowledge of God as a “system” without inconsistency. This defence, furthermore, attempted to prevent the reduction or “wrecking” of the contents of the key biblical doctrines based upon both the divine simplicity and the Trinity.

Accordingly, we need to explore the doctrine of God in the work of Charnock and Perkins to assess whether their theological formulations were a defence of “divine simplicity” based upon their orthodox understanding of the Triune God in providence and the decree, or not. For example, even if Charnock and the high orthodox puritans basically added “rational argumentation” for both “support and elaboration” and more detailed discussions to “the biblical exposition in the initial place” written by the Reformers and Perkins, yet they were still aware of the importance of the work of the divine will as a major attribute, as Perkins indicated in light of the economy of salvation in time. At the same time, because of the continuous importance of trinitarianism and divine simplicity as the “pivot” of our discussion, we should make it clear later that Charnock’s discussions of the doctrine of the attributes of God did not depart from a focus on both the covenant of grace and Christology within the trinitarian structure ad extra, on which Perkins’ and the early orthodox Puritans’ theological systems had also been based.

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74 Muller, “Ad fontes argumentorum,” p. 54; idem, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1993). For a lucid exposition of the Jesuit view of divine knowledge in Molina and Suarez, see J. Coffey, Politics, Religion, and the British Revolutions: The Mind of Samuel Rutherford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 123-4; W. L. Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez (Leiden: Brill, 1988). Against their opponents, the puritans endeavoured to ward off the danger of both the conflict between divine will and divine knowledge and the arbitrary attributing of the acts of the whole Triune God to the act of one person of the Trinity. For a brief explanation of the characteristics of these controversies, see Muller, PRRD III, pp. 119-21. Muller sees that they had a similar origin and effect. For Arminians as the root of Socinians, see John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575-1650 (Leiden: Brill, 1982). For the medieval distinction between potentia absoluta Dei and potentia ordinata Dei in relation to these controversies, see Heiko Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 30-8. This theme (the power of God) will be dealt with in chapter six in detail.

75 According to Trueman’s understanding of Puritan theology from his study of Owen, divine simplicity basically signifies God as a “fully actualized being, so called ‘pure act’, with no potential to change”. Trueman also states that this terminology was common to both English Puritans and to orthodox scholastic theologians in the continent in the seventeenth century. See Trueman, Claims of Truth, pp. 111-2. For a detailed account of the “Reformed scholastics on divine simplicity,” see PRRD III, pp. 275-84.

76 The quotations are from PRRD IV, pp. 413, 415.

77 Although Charnock did not write on the Trinity as a separate subject in his system (probably because he died before the completion of his theology as a body of divinity), we will focus upon his treatment as it appears within his discussion of the existence, essence and attributes of God.
C. Parameter Three: Continuity and Development from Perkins to Charnock

We need a brief review of the history of writing about the attributes of God to place Charnock’s intellectual framework in seventeenth century context in terms of considering the wider tradition in this area. As mentioned earlier, in the medieval scholastic traditions represented by the *Summa Theologica* and *Summa Contra Gentiles* of Thomas Aquinas, the discussion of the existence and attributes of God has a considerable weight.\(^78\) In contrast with medieval scholastic systems, the relative scantness of Luther and Calvin’s discussion of the attributes of God arises out of a sixteenth century context that primarily deals with the Trinitarian debate. To some extent it also relates to the Reformers’ antipathy to what they saw as late medieval scholastics’ overuse of reason and philosophy in the exposition of the attributes of God.\(^79\) Nevertheless there were undeniable traces of interest in the discussion of the attributes of God among Reformers. Early orthodox theologians developed similar interests in this against a background of doctrinal debates and controversies with opponents, despite a developing diversity in the orthodox constitution of the list of attributes.\(^80\) Perkins’ writings on divine attributes also reflect such a tendency along with the influence of Ramism in its succinct way of presentation.\(^81\)

In high orthodoxy, particularly in Britain, as mentioned earlier, we note an extensive development in homiletical theology and commentary within “the field of dogmatic theology” in the doctrine of the attributes of God.\(^82\) This phenomenon also


\(^{79}\) *PRRD* I, pp. 99, 360-1.

\(^{80}\) See *PRRD* III, pp. 85-115.


correlates with the polemical doctrinal debates with opponents within the mid to late seventeenth century context conducted by orthodox Reformed theologians. Among several theologians in this category, Charnock has been assessed as the most outstanding theologian for his stress on “the practical use” of doctrines, especially the doctrine of God, in terms of seeking a “true religion” that both focuses on the sovereignty of God and the responsiveness of the covenant. If we can identify Charnock’s theology as the “summit of Puritan practical religion” in the later seventeenth century, this may help us to clear Charnock of the alleged charge that he allowed rationalism to condition his thought. The “pietistic” aspect of Charnock’s Puritanism, therefore, will also be investigated along with the structural, theological, and polemical developments of Charnock’s doctrine of God in the high orthodox period.

Specifically, based upon these historical and theological backgrounds, in creating the third parameter of our study, we can posit some points of both continuity and difference between the thought of Perkins and Charnock within the larger context of early and high orthodoxy.

First, both Perkins and Charnock appear to seek to set up the doctrine of God in their theological systems employing the locus method in a “synthetic” way based upon exhaustive explication of Scripture in an “analytic” way. Philosophy, logic, and rhetoric are integrated in the work of Perkins and Charnock within the context of this locus method. Both of them hold to a central idea of the relationship of Scripture and theology, affirming the role of Christ–focused Scripture as the cognitive foundation of the latter. Along with this aspect, dealt with in detail from the fifth to the seventh chapters concerning divine intellect and will, we will also need to focus upon the rise of Arminianism related to Molinism in the early orthodox period and upon the emergence of Socinianism in high orthodoxy. These were particularly a target for the critique of the Puritan and Reformed scholastic


83 For short explanation of the similarity and difference among those opponents between early and high orthodoxy, see *PRRD I*, p. 75.

84 *PRRD I*, pp. 170-1.

85 For the details, see *PRRD I*, pp. 110-1.

86 *PRRD I*, p. 398.

87 These points play an important role in the disputes with the various theological opponents of Perkins and Charnock in the orthodox period.
The opponents of orthodoxy seek to deny a “theoretical” aspect of theology by not acknowledging the elicitation of “the fundamental articles” in scriptural exegesis and exposition.

That is, the Reformed scholastic camp in early and high orthodoxy needed more polemic and disputative tools to fight diversity within Protestantism than they did to fight with Roman Catholicism in the Reformation era. Thus there comes a critical point to grasp for our following discussions about Charnock’s and Perkins’ doctrine of God — we need to see the merits of the scholastic method notwithstanding its demerits in the medieval period. Admitting that the contents of medieval theology, despite varying emphasis, were not accepted totally by Protestants, we ought to examine not only how the scholastic method was used, especially in Charnock, as an effective tool for the defence of his orthodox theological system, but also how it could help him to focus on a biblical exposition which was far from a “dogmatizing exegesis” and a doctrinal defence with “pre-critical” exegetical support. This, in addition, was in the context of a pastoral application that was distinct from the major interests of the medieval scholastics.

Second, both Perkins and Charnock emphasise the aspect of theologia regenitorum (regeneration) in the presentation of the doctrine of the existence and attributes of God. Both of them endeavour to explain the priority of “supernatural theology” based upon both faith and regeneration through “infusion of gratia” over “genuine natural theology” that necessarily receives the help of ancillary reason in the believer. In this respect both the Aristotelian model of faculty psychology and a range of scholastic terms, e.g. habitus, are widely used in continuity with the use of this instrument by the medieval scholastic theologians and the Reformers. For Perkins and Charnock, the stress upon piety despite a “scholastic” doctrine of God was possible only for the regenerated theologian infused with grace who can rationally worship God, and study the attributes of God at the level of confirmation of personal knowledge of God. In other words, particularly for Charnock, without “theology viewed as habitus,” there would be no “theology viewed as doctrinal

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88 How to understand divine foreknowledge in relation to divine intellect and will was the key to the controversy between the Reformed and the Arminians. Chapter five will deal with this in detail. For a recent brief sketch of Socinus’ idea of Scripture, the role of reason, and the theological “centre” of his doctrinal system, see Alan Gomes, “Some Observations on the Theological Method of Faustus Socinus (1539-1604),” Westminster Theological Journal 70/1 (Spring, 2008), pp. 49-71.
89 PRRD I, p. 351.
91 PRRD IV, pp. 405-7.
92 PRRD I, pp. 400-1.
systems”.93

The prerequisite of supernatural theology makes Perkins and Charnock deal with the genus of theology by way of stressing both a theologia nostra (our theology) and the ad extra dimension. While Calvin prefers to discuss divine essence and attributes within the context of God in relation to the ad extra, Perkins and Charnock maintain such a tendency within a more complex dialectic between Scotism, nominalism, and Thomism in the seventeenth century context. To be sure, both of them mainly prefer the Thomist pattern in the sense that they categorise divine attributes objectively according to the balance between the scriptural analogy of faith and arguments from ancillary reason.94 Added to this, we can see the crisis of “the traditional God-language” in the debate about predication, for example, whether the distinction of divine attributes in the Godhead ad intra is possible or not.95 It is undeniable that both Perkins and Charnock endeavoured to defend the orthodox doctrine of God within the early and high orthodox context respectively. Thus we should also investigate the controversial points between Perkins and Charnock and their opponents, especially concerning middle knowledge and divine concurrence in relation to the problem of predication.96

It is worth observing that such a point demonstrates the two aspects of continuity between Perkins and Charnock. They both appear to have a “Scotist overtone” that emphasises the aspect of theologia as both a praxis and “operative discipline” (totally practical and directed), which is deeply related to the pietistic dimension or spirituality of Puritan theology.97 Namely, neither Perkins nor Charnock has an interest in a purely theoretical dimension in their understanding of the genus of theology. From Perkins and the English Ramistic puritans Charnock

93 The quotations are from PRRD I, p. 356.
95 This point also correlates with the debate between Thomistic and late medieval nominalistic views. See PRRD III, pp. 136-7.
96 For the details, see PRRD III, pp. 107-15. This subject will be dealt with in depth in chapter five and six, on divine knowledge and power.
inherited a tendency to de-emphasise discussion of the difference between \textit{theologia archetypa} and \textit{ectypa}.\textsuperscript{98} Though there were three major tendencies in Reformed orthodoxy concerning the proper genus of theology,\textsuperscript{99} both Perkins and Charnock seem to reflect Scotist thought as well as an Augustinian perspective inherited from a late medieval trajectory. Yet this does not seem to be a preference for theology as “a purely practical discipline,” but rather indicates a serious emphasis on “the regenerated will” in view of a “soteriological voluntarism” that does not exclude the Thomistic intellectual dimension in the idea of the knowledge of God.\textsuperscript{100} Thus, based upon these preliminary assumptions, we should examine and find out exactly the relationship of Thomism and Scotism in the thought of both figures within the context of the understanding of the genus of theology among the orthodox.

At another preliminary level, although our study primarily deals with the investigation of theological or intellectual aspects, the formal or structural continuity, development, and difference between Perkins and Charnock is to be referred to as another important point underlying our research. This is necessary because the method and structure of the investigation of Perkins’ and Charnock’s ideas concerning the divine attributes in later chapters will be developed according to the pattern and order of the Puritan Reformed scholastic style of the threefold (exegesis-doctrine-practice) or fourfold (plus elenctic) division in argument. In particular, the development of homiletical literature among the orthodox also shows that their seeking of the knowledge of God was “a theology as a discipline directed toward the goal of salvation” that should lead to piety.\textsuperscript{101} As noted above, the homiletical

\textsuperscript{98} For the details, see \textit{PRRD} I, pp. 116-7, 157-8. On the significance of the relationship between the focus on the ectypal theology and the English Puritan doctrine of the essence and the attributes of God, see pp. 222-3.

\textsuperscript{99} For the details, see \textit{PRRD} I, pp. 352-3.

\textsuperscript{100} The quotations are from \textit{PRRD} I, p. 354; cf. \textit{PRRD} IV, p. 359. “Voluntarism” stresses the primacy of one’s will over one’s intellect, and “Intellectualism” \textit{vice versa}. However, in recent scholarship, there has been some disagreement about the definition of these terms. This will be discussed in detail in chapter six. Of course the fact that even Aquinas had voluntaristic elements in his thought shows the danger of dichotomy between these two terms: see Stephen Spencer, “Reformed Scholasticism in Medieval Perspective,” pp. 254, 260. Muller’s critique of Barth is also very suggestive for our study: “In view of this Protestant orthodox tendency to balance theory and praxis in definitions of theology, we must reject as a major misinterpretation Barth’s argument that the orthodox chose a Scotist definition of theology as a \textit{scientia practica} and tended to emphasize religiosity rather than objectivity in their view of theology,” \textit{PRRD} I, p. 344.

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{PRRD} III, p. 32. At another level, this point is linked to the relationship of Puritan doctrine and “the subjective religious experience in their internalization of those truths”, as Peter Lake argues in \textit{Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 155. Within the same context, David Como also writes that Puritan practical divinity worked as “the point of intersection” between these two points. See DavidComo, \textit{Blown by the Spirit: Puritanism and the Emergence of an Antinomian Underground in Pre-Civil-War England} (California: Stanford
commentary was in full bloom during the period of “the final codification of orthodoxy (1640-1685)” that Charnock comes under.\(^{102}\)

For the English Puritans’ scholastic sermons in the seventeenth century, theology as both a “theory” and a “practice” was well balanced by the combination of doctrine and “use” for application through the use of the \textit{locus} method.\(^{103}\) According to Muller, this homiletical characteristic also relates to the full fruition of the perspective of the “Perkinsian” doctrine of God and “practical” theology on the continent (especially in the Dutch Reformed theology) confirmed through the case of Petrus van Mastricht (1630-1706).\(^{104}\) Both Charnock and Mastricht’s works maintain not only the fourfold “exegetical, dogmatic, polemical, and practical” concerns along with a partly Ramistic framework, but also the identical movement in the order of the discussion, e.g. from scholastic through homiletical to christological and soteriological dimensions.\(^{105}\) To put it another way, if the international character of Reformed orthodoxy was acknowledged as Muller argued in the case of Perkins and Mastricht, we might be able to find traces of Perkins’ doctrine of God in Charnock’s homiletical writings on the attributes of God, with their “extended scholastic style”\(^{106}\).

At the same time, despite the presumed fundamental continuity of the contents of the orthodox doctrine of God between Perkins and Charnock, there may also be important differences in terms of style, method, and intellectual context. Perkins appears to show an “architectonic clarity” of Ramism in the period of early

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\(^{102}\) \textit{PRRD} II, p. 444.


\(^{105}\) \textit{PRRD} I, pp. 203-4, 217-9; \textit{PRRD} III, p. 132. Therefore, in chapters three to seven (concerning God’s existence and attributes), we will continue to scrutinise Charnock’s work especially according to this threefold or fourfold framework.

\(^{106}\) Quotation from \textit{PRRD} II, p. 507.
orthodoxy; Charnock, however, seems to opt more for “a more broadly developed and even discursive system” and “technical theological system” in high orthodoxy. In our study of Perkins’ and Charnock’s doctrine of the existence and attributes of God, we will see the change from the Ramistic early orthodox model to the “synthetic, teleological, and historical” outlook of high orthodoxy. It will be significant for us to demonstrate through the arguments that the latter was an approach that focused more on “the covenant as a focal point of system” than early orthodoxy. We will also find a difference of hermeneutical context between early and high orthodoxy that gives rise to “the difficulty of maintaining churchly doctrines” in relation to the debate with opponents.

**IV. The Methodology of Our Study**

Therefore, based upon these three parameters of research by way of using both the comparative and “linguistic” approach (in light of both the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of early and high orthodoxy), we will be able to examine whether the older scholarship’s negative appraisal of Charnock’s scholastic doctrine of God’s attributes (which was based upon different assumptions about rationalism) is coherent or not. This is necessary in order to clarify the relationship between Trinitarianism and divine attributes in Charnock’s doctrine of God and Perkins’ doctrine. At this point, therefore, we need to define in advance the four key terms.

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108 Quotations from *PRRD* I, pp. 78, 170-1.

109 Quotation from *PRRD* II, p. 523. This polemical dimension will be dealt with frequently in the later chapters. Such a phenomenon was partly due to the radical change of intellectual milieu in the later seventeenth century. See John Coffey, *Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England 1558-1689* (Essex: Longman, 2000), p. 213. For the details of this upheaval, see also Paul Hazard, *The European Mind 1680-1715* (London: Hollies & Carter, 1953); Michael Hunter, *Science and the Shape of Orthodoxy: Intellectual Change in Late Seventeenth Century Britain* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1995).

110 Carl Trueman names this new method a “linguistic approach” to Puritan texts that emphasises the role of the Aristotelian terminology of causality both as the common intellectual legacy of medieval scholasticism and as “the common linguistic basis of Puritanism and other seventeenth century theological movements.” For the details, see Carl Trueman, “Puritan Theology as Historical Event,” in *Reformation and Scholasticism*, pp. 253-75.

111 As Muller argues, we basically see in our study that the problem of “continuity” and “discontinuity” depends upon whether there was a “similarity of questions” raised between the two figures. See *PRRD* IV, p. 387. See *Reformation and Scholasticism*, ed. Van Asselt and Dekker, pp. 11-43; Martin I. Klauber, “Continuity and Discontinuity in Post-Reformation Reformed Theology: An Evaluation of the Muller Thesis,” *Journal of Evangelical Theological Society* 33 (1990), pp. 467-75. For a criterion of judgment on continuity and discontinuity in the study of intellectual history, see
that will be used frequently in the argument of this thesis (although these terms were briefly mentioned earlier). We first define “Christian Aristotelianism” as the product of the intellectual framework of Aristotle combined with the idea of Christian revelation from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries synthesized by Thomas Aquinas in particular. This term also implies the coexistence of reason and faith as well as philosophy and theology in the “hierarchical” system of the quest for human knowledge of God. In other words, “nature” and “grace” do not contradict each other on the basis of the priority of grace over nature. Second, the terms “Thomism” or “Thomistic characteristic” in this thesis indicate a balance of nature and grace, maintained especially in the medieval scholastic theological system of Aquinas. This more “optimistic” view of reason (rather than that of Scotism) necessarily emphasises the “intellectual” or theoretical aspect in the search for truth. Third, the terms “Scotism” or “Scotistic perspective” denote a stress upon the role of both the divine transcendence and practical human will, as represented by Duns Scotus, in the understanding of the knowledge of God or theology. Scotism, of course, is within the larger boundary of Christian Aristotelianism, which is also the “fruit” of the historical pursuit of “true” Augustinian theology. Fourth, Ramism is defined and used as “a method of logical discourse by means of partition or dichotomy which gave to Reformed theology [which was more prevalent in Perkins’ case in the early orthodoxy] an extreme clarity and conciseness of approach”.

In clarifying the identity of Charnock’s theology, we basically build on Muller’s comprehensive argument concerning the Reformed orthodox doctrine of God (including his partial analysis of Charnock’s thought). Muller is a pioneer in this field, despite the weakness of his work due to the absence of detailed reflection on trinitarian theology rediscovered in modern scholarship. Needless to say, the discussion of the inseparable relationship between the trinitarian system of theology and piety will necessarily be addressed within the context of supporting our approach. In doing so, we shall seek a fresh understanding of Charnock’s ideas in their context. That is, although Muller dealt with the Reformed doctrine of God in Britain and the continent in a broader international and historical context, yet at this

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112 PRRD I, p. 62.
113 See p. 19. This means that, for this case study of Charnock along with Perkins, we are indebted in many ways to the previous research and methodology of Richard Muller.
114 Although this aspect is one of the common subjects we need to note in each chapter, we will especially deal with it in detail in chapter seven on the holiness of God.
point we need a more focused study of the Puritan doctrine of God (especially God’s attributes) after Perkins, employing a “rectified” understanding of the preceding key terms we mentioned above — orthodoxy, scholasticism, Aristotelianism, and rationalism — through case studies of individual Puritan divines, in this instance Charnock.

For these discussions of God’s existence and attributes in our thesis, we will start to investigate as a preliminary Perkins’ and Charnock’s ideas of theologia and Scriptura in the second chapter. This is because of the necessity for discussion of theological prolegomena and the doctrine of the interpretation of Scripture prior to exploring the ideas of the existence and the attributes of God found within the work of Perkins and Charnock. This will follow the order of locus of the traditional scholastic doctrine of God within the Reformed orthodox dogmatic system. In terms of further exploring the work of Perkins and Charnock, in chapters three and four we will examine their ideas of God’s existence, essence, and essential attributes. In chapters five and six, we will focus upon the problem of divine knowledge, wisdom, power, and sovereignty within their thinking concerning the larger boundary of the relationship between the divine intellect and will. In chapter seven, we will examine the implications of their doctrine of God’s holiness and goodness as the outward manifestation of His will.

The focus of our discussions in the following chapters will thus lie in the exploration of Charnock’s The Attributes, along with the ideas of Perkins. Throughout all of the following chapters, as a prototype of the mainstream of Puritan thought, we will find and analyse Perkins’ account of theology, interpretation of Scripture, and God’s existence as well as attributes as a ‘foil’ for comparison with Charnock’s ideas. We will carry out this examination to discover whether the “negative” interpretations of Charnock’s “scholastic” doctrine of the attributes of God have correctly assessed the relatedness between Trinitarian theology and piety in Charnock’s thought, within the context of seventeenth century Reformed orthodoxy.
Chapter Two

The Knowledge of God: *Theologia* and *Scriptura*

In the orthodox understanding, the term “theology” could not be separated from the goal of establishing a theological system. Broadly speaking, Continental Reformed theologians were more consistent in this than the English Puritans. Nevertheless we can find systematic tendencies in the pursuit of soteriological coherence in theology both as praxis and discipline. This is evident in the Ramistic, architectonic character of Perkins’ work in early orthodoxy and in the extended scholastic style of Charnock in the period of high orthodoxy.\(^1\) The development of the role of the “prolegomena” as an important element in the theological systems which had developed since the medieval scholastic period is reflected in some particular concepts and forms of Reformed orthodox theology.\(^2\) In Perkins’ case, we see an initial stage of an English Reformed theological prolegomenon in his definition of theology as the “science of living blessedly forever”, located first in the order of discussion on “the causes of salvation and damnation”.\(^3\) For Charnock, in the context of his writing “a complete body of divinity” for his congregation, “the systematic exposition of the divine word” can be discerned even if it does not belong to the genre of typical systematic divinity in its style in the orthodox era.\(^4\) Though Charnock’s writings are not a full dogmatic system in character, still they show “the

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\(^1\) Perkins’ system, especially remarkable in his *Golden Chaine*, can be regarded as a systematic theology in terms of its genre. However, on account of its strong Ramistic characteristics, it remains somewhat distinct from the fully developed dogmatic system that was typical of the continental theologians.

\(^2\) “Prolegomena” means a type of preliminary system that sets out principles and presuppositions in its etymology. For a detailed account of the historical development of theological prolegomena, see *PRRD* I, ch.2 (pp. 85-146).


knowledge of God” as a theological prolegomenon to the full doctrine of God which virtually regulates all of his works, especially *The Existence and Attributes of God*.

In addition, just as Scripture is the cognitive foundation of theology, the doctrine of both Scripture and the Word of God is to be found between the theological prolegomena and the doctrine of God in the Reformed scholastic system. We therefore need to examine both Perkins’ and Charnock’s views of the relationship of Christian doctrine and the interpretation of Scripture before approaching their doctrine of God. We will investigate continuities, developments and, if there are any, the differences in relation between theological prolegomena and doctrinal exegesis in the work of Perkins and Charnock within the context of both Reformed scholasticism and English Puritan theology in the early and high orthodox period. In short, in this second chapter we would hope to explore the doctrine of the knowledge of God in Charnock in terms of the relationship of the Triune God to *theologia* and *Scriptura* as a reciprocal foundation necessary to the Reformed orthodox theological system. The overall continuity of Perkins and Charnock would be confirmed in the fact that the Triune God and Scripture stand as “the twin foundations” of their theological system.

**I. The Nature and Necessity of Theology**

According to the early orthodox writers’ general understanding of the term *theologia*, teaching about God and the works of God (*opera Dei*) is conceived along the lines of the Augustinian and medieval tradition. In this etymology the creatures who rightly have the knowledge of God are “theologians”. Perkins’ treatment of the term theology in his *A Golden Chaine* illustrates this point well:

The principal science is *Theologie*. *Theologie* is the science of living blessedly forever. Blessed life ariseth from the knowledge of God. Ioh. 17.3. *This is life eternal, that they know thee to bee the only very God, and a Sonne thou hast sent, Christ Jesus*. Isa. 53:11. By his knowledge shall my righteous servant (viz. Christ) justifie many. And therefore it ariseth likewise from the knowledge of ourselves, because we know God by looking into ourselves.

Such a stipulation, the so-called Perkinsian definition of theology influenced by Peter

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Ramus, was popular in England and the continent, though the alternative term “divinity” was preferred to the term theology in English systematic works. As we see in Perkins’ case, the term theologia assumes the concept of “true knowledge of God” as a premise. In addition, theology as both science and discipline inherently assumes practical piety as the ultimate goal of this knowledge in — a blessed life.

In other words, Perkins primarily regards theology as a science that includes teaching or doctrines, which do not exclude the dimension of theology as an intellectual discipline. Later Ramistic Puritan theologians, however, generally sought to replace this with a view that saw theology as a doctrina or disciplina in itself, a view inherited from some strands of the theology of early orthodoxy.

This general tendency in the early orthodoxy of English Puritanism to see theology as a “totally practical and directed” discipline seems to affect Charnock’s view of the relation of theologia to the theoretical and practical in high orthodoxy. Charnock arguably inherited the Ramistic understanding of theology that sees theology both as “the art of living well” and as doctrine leading to “genuine godliness”. Thus, according to Charnock, the phrase “knowledge of God” leading to eternal life is no less than a definition of the term theologia. Following Perkins, Charnock not only cites John 17:3 (“And this is life eternal, that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent”) as a key verse for the explanation of this doctrine, but also gives a general exegesis based upon a doctrinal background in a trinitarian dimension. To explain the characteristics of a saving knowledge of God that leads to eternal life, he uses the image of pilgrimage in this life in contrast with “an intuitive knowledge of God” obtained in heaven.

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8 For example: Thomas Watson, A Body of Divinity (London, 1692); Leigh, A Systeme or Body of Divinity; James Ussher, A Body of Divinitie (London, 1653), John Downame, The Summe of Sacred Divinitie (London, 1630); Maccovius, Loci Communies (Franeker, 1650); Van Mastricht, Theoretico-practica (Amsterdam, 1685).


10 PRRD 1, pp. 325-6, 333-4.

11 Cf. PRRD 1, pp. 343-5.


13 Works IV, pp. 3-15.
Charnock, this *theologia viatorum* (as a *theologia ectypa* distinct from a *theologia archetypa*) being communicated to human beings from God as an infused grace, also relates to the understanding of both the human psyche and the attributes of God, though he does not use this scholastic term directly:

This knowledge of God is not only a knowledge of God and Christ in theory, but is a knowledge which is saving; joined with ardent love to him, cordial trust in him, … It is not only a knowledge of God in his will, but a knowledge of God in his nature; both must go together; we must know him in his nature, we must be obedient to his will. … It must be therefore such a knowledge which descends from the head to the heart, which is light in the mind and heat in the affections; such a knowledge of God as includes faith in him.\(^{15}\)

The character of theology should be both theoretical and practical in terms of both the internal and external economy of the Triune God and His divine attributes and will. The “true and saving” theology must produce faith and trust in God, nothing less than both “a fiducial knowledge” and “a certain, full, and persuasive assent” about the unity and the Trinitarian working of God the Father, Son, and the Spirit *ad extra*. Our understanding of God in His nature and perfections is not to be separated from that of Christ the mediator in His person and offices.\(^{16}\)

Within a Protestant scholastic background, Charnock then proceeds to a detailed doctrinal elaboration of theology as the knowledge of God in its “quality”. He demonstrates his grasp of *theologia* within the context of typical English Reformed spirituality. Of course the motive of theology for Charnock is also an attempt to build the full system of doctrinal exposition based upon Scripture according to theological *loci*. First, such a theology is neither a speculative knowledge that comes from creation or a partial revelation through the Jews in the


\(^{15}\) *Works* IV, p. 10.

\(^{16}\) *Works* IV, pp. 12-5.
Old Testament nor is it a natural or historical knowledge about the existence of God. Though natural knowledge of Christ the mediator is impossible for human beings, speculative theology (despite its insufficiency) is nevertheless useful to both salvation and piety as “the true end” of theology. This is because no spiritual understanding or principle can be obtained without the lower foundation. Second, this knowledge of God is practical in that it brings the rectifying and enlivening effects to the faculties of the soul (“the whole heart”) by grace. Thus it constantly produces both obedience and “an affectionate practice” that is lacking in a speculative knowledge of God. Third, Charnock points out that the experimental, spiritual and mystical dimension of this knowledge comes from the aspect of its being both an infused faith and grace in contrast with a speculative knowledge as a mere notional understanding: “Divine truth acted upon the heart, and felt in its influence, is more plainly known than by discourse and reason.” Fourth, theology gives a salvific interest that is the recovery of the relationship with God in covenant. Charnock emphasises that such a theology is the very knowledge of bliss of God and Christ our mediator due to its satisfactory effect upon fallen human nature. Nevertheless, although these four characteristics of knowledge of God are all necessary, each direction of importance among them differs according to their soteriological benefit:

The speculative is necessary as a foundation; practical, essentially necessary; experimental and interested, necessary to the comfort of knowledge. The two first are necessary to the being of a Christian; the two latter, to the well-being. The two first together, constitute our happiness; the two latter sweeten our imperfect happiness in the world. … Speculative, is knowledge received; practical, knowledge expressed; experimental, the relish of it; and interested, the foretaste of happiness.

Through this summary, we can see the basic characteristics of Charnock’s theological framework through all of his works. At the same time this gives a preliminary idea of his understanding of the scholastic discussion of whether theology is theoretical or

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17 Works IV, p. 16.
18 Works IV, p. 18: “Powerfully directive, conforming the soul, as it did the human nature of Christ, to the will and mind of God, when the understanding is not forced to comply with the corrupt appetite of the will, but the will conformed to the true notions of an enlightened understanding.”
19 Works IV, p. 21.
20 Charnock expresses such a usefulness of theology as “covenant mercy”, “covenant graces” and “covenant blessings”. See Works IV, p. 81.
21 Works IV, p. 22.
practical.\textsuperscript{22} To be sure, Charnock does not neglect any of the four elements of theology but deals with every soteriological point balanced by emphasising both nature and grace.

Then why does human understanding need \textit{theologia} as the knowledge of God? To answer this question, we need to be aware of the Thomistic ordering of intellectual framework in Charnock’s understanding of the human faculties. Charnock seems to prefer “knowledge” to “will” in the discussion of the knowledge of God.\textsuperscript{23} Of course, in Charnock’s view, such a priority of intellect over the will invariably entails ordering practical observance according to prior knowledge. Though he uses the term “religion” instead of “theology”, “religion” is, in fact, the “wisdom” that assumes the knowledge of God proceeding to the knowledge of the highest things in the state of blessedness in its character.\textsuperscript{24} We also find a similar tendency in his combination of the traditional Augustinian phrase of the enjoyment of God (\textit{frui}) with an account of the relationship between knowledge and love.\textsuperscript{25}

Such a goal-oriented understanding of theology as a discipline continues to operate in his explanation of the object of divine and human knowledge. The attainment of ultimate happiness in heaven communicated to us by God’s own happiness stemming from perfect divine knowledge comes to us only from the beginning of theology, which is the knowledge of God in this world. On the one hand, the stress upon the relationship of “knowledge” and “action” shows that Charnock considers the crucial role of theology to be a practical discipline as well as a theoretical one. This again echoes the Augustinian heritage of dialectics between \textit{frui} and \textit{uti} (use).\textsuperscript{26} On the other hand, this pattern of explanation is based upon both the Aristotelian faculty psychology and the following use of the scholastic term \textit{habitus}:

\begin{itemize}
\item For a similar idea of the knowledge of God in relation to both worship and true religion, see Turretin, \textit{Institutes}, vol. I. vii, p. 22.
\item For example, Charnock states in \textit{Works} IV, p. 24: “God has ordered knowledge to be the first step to salvation, … The gospel being nothing else but a manifestation of God in Christ, a knowledge of this precedes the application of salvation.”
\item \textit{Works} IV, p. 23.
\item \textit{Works} IV, p. 23: “Knowledge and love fits us for acquaintance with, and enjoyment of, God. We actually embrace him by love, after we perceive him fit for our embraces by knowledge. Knowledge imprints the similitude and \textit{idea} of the object upon the understanding; love draws out the soul to close with the object so understood. By knowledge, God conveys himself in his glorious perfection to our view; by love, we give up ourselves to him. By knowledge, we see God; by love, we enjoy him.” For a brief account of the Augustinian understanding of “use and enjoyment,” see Oliver O’Donovan, \textit{The Problem of Self-Love} in St. Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 24-9.
\item \textit{Works} IV, p. 26: “Without a natural knowledge of God we can never think of him, or have any natural motions in him; … Natural knowledge is necessary to natural actions, moral knowledge to moral actions; so supernatural knowledge is necessary to supernatural actions.”
\end{itemize}
As the mind is, so the nature is; corruption of nature began in wrong notions received in the mind, … There must be then other notions in the mind, and other principles in the heart, before we can be fit for recovery out of natural misery. … [Supernatural knowledge] must be in us as a rooted habit, a law in his heart, established as firm in his heart as it was in the sanction. Since, therefore, all our actions towards God are to be both a reasonable and a spiritual service, there must be a reasonable and a spiritual knowledge as the foundation, to raise up action as the building.  

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Charnock’s understanding of the nature of theology thus reflects not only the underlying structure of “faith” and “obedience” in Perkins and the Ramistic English Puritan theological tradition in relation to both worship and theology, but also the elements of continuity between himself and “the theologians of the heart,” the Spiritual Brethren after Perkins. Of course faith needs supernatural grace because natural theology cannot worship in a proper manner: “Without a knowledge, we cannot affect him; without a strong knowledge, we cannot love him ardently.”  

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Obedience is nothing less than the knowledge of both divine attributes and the law “digested into will, affections, and practice” and necessarily “quickened with grace.”  

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What we need to note is that Charnock frequently unfolds his arguments on the necessity of theology as the knowledge of God in terms of the knowledge of the attributes of God ad extra for both sanctification and the regeneration of the elect.  

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Therefore, Charnock extends the discussion of knowledge of God to the understanding of the term “grace” by using the terms from faculty psychology and the concept habitus. Grace in relation to the knowledge of God directing toward faith operates both upon the understanding and the will. It is this that causes the change of “the principle or habit”.  

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In the same regard, he notes the fiducial character of faith as both an assent in the mind and “a full assurance of understanding” of the knowledge of God — if it is to be “a Christian knowledge [theology]”.  

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27 Works IV, p. 26. We will address the term habitus in the third section of this chapter in detail.
28 Works IV, p. 27. Charnock also summarises the relationship of mind, affection, heart, and love in the believer in p. 32: “We cannot love God ‘with all our hearts,’ with the affective part, till we first love him ‘with all our minds,’ with our reason and intelligent part, Mark xii 30.”
29 Works IV, p. 29.
30 For example, Works IV, p. 35: “God abstracted from his perfections, his power, holiness, faithfulness, love, is not the object about which any grace can be conversant, but God as revealing himself, clothed with such excellency as suit and answer the creature’s necessities.”
31 See Works IV, p. 35: “There can be no form without the matter, nor any acting of that form but in the matter; no grace without knowledge, no acting of grace but in knowledge. The frame of grace is raised upon the infused notion of God.”
32 Works IV, pp. 31-3, 36.
Charnock, being faithful to the Reformed axiom, the ultimate end (*finis ultimus*) of our comfort and happy life as a “theologian” who has the knowledge of God is to glorify God.\(^{33}\) To put it another way, the discussion of the nature and necessity of theology presupposes the existence of a Christian theologian who knows this end. This presupposition lets us deal with the discussion of the properties of theology.

**II. The Properties of Theology as Theologia Nostra**

As noted earlier, the Reformed scholastic division of *theologia in se, unionis, visionis, revelata (viatorum, nostra)* has its theological background in the history of doctrine, especially in relation to the development of theological prolegomena in the later Middle Ages.\(^{34}\) The discussion of it is also related to its medieval scholastic antecedents. Although there is a distinction between the Scotist and Occamist understanding of *theologia in se* with difference in understanding of the term *theologia nostra* (in contrast to the somewhat Thomistic tendency which emphasises the importance of the intellectual element of *theologia* as “knowledge” in Reformed scholastic theology), both of these influenced the Reformed orthodox view of *theologia nostra* and revealed theology as both an ectypal and a pilgrim theology.\(^{35}\)

In fact, Perkins does not discuss the division of archetypal and ectypal theology. Rather he focuses on the aspect of *theologia* as a “praxis–oriented” interest. Theology has its significance only when it is dealt with as a revelation from God.\(^{36}\) For Perkins, this *theologia revelata* is at once an “accommodated human capacity” which is “communicated to human being(s)”, and is given as “a doctrine sufficient to live well”.\(^{37}\) Such an English Ramistic, Puritan reluctance with regard to the distinction of archetypal and ectypal theology seems to continue to affect the later English Puritan theologians including Charnock (who focuses only on the ectypal level of theology).\(^{38}\)

While contrasting *theologia nostra* as true theology with other unsaving knowledges of God, Charnock endeavours to show what level of theology ought to

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\(^{33}\) *Works IV*, pp. 37-8.

\(^{34}\) For details, see *PRRD I*, pp. 222-5.

\(^{35}\) To be sure, the distinction of *potentia absoluta Dei* and *potentia ordinata Dei* affects this discussion. For the details, see *PRRD I*, pp. 222-5. On the distinction between the Scotists and Occam on this point, see idem, pp. 227-8.

\(^{36}\) *PRRD I*, pp. 232-3. For the historical background of these terms, see pp. 225-38.


\(^{38}\) Muller cites works by John Stoughton (1593-1639), Ames, and Owen that can substantiate this generalization: *PRRD I*, p. 233.
be our aim. First, “our theology” is not an immediate or comprehensive knowledge of God: the *ad extra* dimension of the *opera Dei* is crucial for approaching this knowledge.\(^{39}\) We can sense that he reflects the traditional phrase *finitum non capax infiniti* in respect of the limitation of human capability in theology.\(^{40}\) Very meaningfully, at this point, Charnock thus elicits the significance of the attributes of God in our knowledge of God within the boundary of theological prolegomena: “We know God to be omnipotent and immense, but we cannot comprehend his power and immensity. … We should know what kind of God is — merciful, just, wise, holy, true — and how those perfections are manifested in Christ.”\(^{41}\) Although our theology cannot become perfect in this life, it should be aimed toward the full knowledge of God, the *theologia beatorum* in heaven.

Second, according to Charnock, our theology has certain characteristics in terms of both the “effect” and the “manner” of knowing. With regard to the effects, this knowledge is to be “the evangelical doctrine” internally and specially revealed to the heart resulting in conversion.\(^{42}\) In this definition of theology as *doctrina*, we also see that Charnock by no means neglected the intellectual element as Perkins does not in his view of the term *theologia*.\(^{43}\) At the same time the supernatural operation of God gradually causes a transformation in the soul’s faculties: “The forming of Christ in the head, changing the notions in the mind, is in order to a Christ formed in the heart, changing the inclinations of the will and the temper of the soul.”\(^{44}\) Charnock also lays stress on theology as an “affective knowledge” which is “full of sense”: natural knowledge only stays in the head as “a dead knowledge” with neither affections nor “a flame of love” as its warmth. Certainly his thinking here seems to reflect the influence of the Spiritual Brethren after Perkins in terms of the

\(^{39}\) *Works* IV, pp. 38-9: “It is more especially true of our knowledge of God, who is not known immediately in his nature, so much as by his excellent works of creation, providence, redemption, and the revelation of invisible mysteries in his word. The invisible things of God are understood, not by immediate speculations about the nature of them, but by the things that are made, Rom. i. 20. … We are not able to conceive of God as he is, because our apprehensions take their first rise from sense and sensible objects.”


\(^{41}\) *Works* IV, p. 41. In fact Charnock’s own statement justifies our investigation of his ideas of God’s attributes in trinitarian, covenantal, and christological dimensions in the later chapters.

\(^{42}\) *Works* IV, p. 42.


\(^{44}\) *Works* IV, p. 43. Cf. ibid.: “When this knowledge is *enlightening*, it is the image of God in the mind; when it is *enlivening*, it is the image of God in the heart, a picture of God and Christ, drawn in the understanding, which enamours the will, and assimilates the whole soul to God.”
relationship between constant divine love and our affections.\(^{45}\)

We are not changed into his image till we behold his beauty so as to love and adore him. It is not only a beam of his loveliness, but a ray of his love, that changeth the temper of the soul. Though the light of the fire attends the heat of it, yet it is not the light, but the heat, transforms combustible matter into fire. It was not Christ’s knowledge of us, but love to us, stooped the divine nature to assume ours; nor our knowledge, but faith and love, that elevates us to the divine. As Christ is a Sun of righteousness, not only shining, but warming, if we be like him, there must not only be light in our minds, but warmth in our affections.\(^{46}\)

Nevertheless true theology as a saving knowledge possesses both intellectual and affective elements.\(^{47}\) Charnock balances the importance of mind and affections while at the same time stressing the priority of the intellectual faculty because our theology is to be the form of “knowledge” of God. If so, what would the relationship of intellect and a will be in the believer if it is to be a genuine, true theology? Charnock’s view of theology as a directed discipline is well seen in this examination of the relationship of mind and will in soul’s faculties.\(^{48}\) He never loses the Perkinsian definition of theology as a whole perspective that leads the way to the enjoyment of God (\textit{fruitio Dei}), happiness, and a blessed life.\(^{49}\) The combination of intellect and will is essential to this goal of giving “the soul a full satisfaction”\(^{50}\).

When Charnock anatomises the faculties of the soul, especially will and


\(^{46}\) \textit{Works} IV, p. 46.

\(^{47}\) \textit{Works} IV, p. 45: “Both must go together; knowledge without affections is stupid, and affections without knowledge are childish. The diviner the light in the mind, the warmer will love be in the soul. … In knowledge, we are passive in the reception of the divine beams; by affection, we are active, and give ourselves to God.”

\(^{48}\) Of course we see his detailed understanding of the soul’s faculties in relation to this respect in \textit{Works} IV, p. 78: “The mind, the repository of principles, the faculty whereby we should judge of things honest or dishonest; the understanding, the discursive faculty and the reducere of those principles into practical dictates, — that part whereby we reason and collect one thing from another, framing conclusions from the principles in the mind; the heart, \textit{i. e.} the will, conscience, affections, which were to apply those principles, draw out those reasonings upon the stage of the life, all corrupted. …”

\(^{49}\) See Muller’s explanation of the common Scotist background of both Perkins, Ames, and Keckerman in early orthodoxy and Charnock, Baxter, Cocceius, Heidegger in high orthodoxy as to this respect: \textit{PRRD} I, pp. 343-4.

\(^{50}\) See \textit{Works} IV, p. 47: “The end of all the acts of the understanding is to cause a motion in the will and affections suitable to the apprehension. God hath given us two faculties: understanding, to know the goodness of a thing, and a will to embrace it. To content one faculty in contemplation, without contenting the other in embracing what we know, is to give a half satisfaction to the soul; it is to separate those two faculties of understanding and will, which God hath joined.”
understanding, as the seat of our theology in terms of its perfection and the relationship between God and man, he notes: “[Man’s] happiness must be placed in the exercise of those two about their proper object; the understanding, in knowing God as the object of happiness, and the will in willing to love him.” Thus we need to pursue theology “out of love to the perfection of our minds”.\textsuperscript{51} In this setting we see both elements of the intellect and the will solidly combined. Although Charnock shows a somewhat Thomistic tendency to emphasise the intellect (while not disregarding knowledge from reason and nature), he still affirms the importance of supernatural revelation as the basis of our theology.\textsuperscript{52} At the same time Charnock declares that our theology cannot be other than an “active and expressive knowledge” that moves one’s will to the fulfillment of it. Such a respect indicates that the term \textit{theologia nostra} necessarily connotes one’s piety and sanctification \textit{per se} beyond a mere noetic aspect of it. Actually, as the bridge between doctrine and actions, the Scripture offers a rule for this practice of piety.\textsuperscript{53}

At this juncture, Charnock refers to a critical difference of view on the property of theology between the Scotists and Aquinas with respect to its practical dimensions: “The Scotists defined divinity well when they made it \textit{practica}; better than Aquinas, who made it \textit{speculativa}. Every illumination of the mind is not to speculate, but to work by; every notion of God is a direction to some sphere of action.”\textsuperscript{54} As Muller puts it, the problem of whether theology is a speculative or practical discipline for Reformed orthodoxy certainly reflects the exquisite dialectics of the medieval background.\textsuperscript{55} In so far as Charnock deals with the term speculation somewhat negatively, he seems to follow the Scotist background of Calvin’s thought in contrast to Vermigli’s Thomistic Reformed tendency.\textsuperscript{56} In this respect he is totally

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Works} IV, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Works} IV, p. 97: “We have principles of the knowledge of him. We have sense to view the effects of his goodness, we have reason to draw conclusions from the excellency of creatures, to inform us of the transcendent excellency of God; and we have revelation, which surmounts the other two principles of sense and reason.”
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Works} IV, p. 50. Cf. ibid.: “The end of knowledge is to impress a sound image of the goodness of an object as well as the truth; the truth to be eyed, and the goodness to be imitated.”
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Works} IV, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{55} Note the important point made by Muller, \textit{PRRD} IV, p. 395: “The typical identification of theology by the Reformed [orthodoxy] as either a mixed theoretical-practical but primarily practical or as a purely practical discipline point toward the Augustinian and the Scotist definitions, respectively, and away from the Thomist (theoretical-practical but primarily theoretical) form of definition. ... This practical emphasis of the majority, moreover, coincided with the fundamentally voluntarist set of assumptions held by the Reformed, both concerning the divine will and the problem of human salvation — pointing again in the doctrine of God to an Augustinian or Scotist background.”
Scotistic. However, we cannot disregard the fact that Charnock quotes from Aquinas most frequently in his works whether the content of the citation is affirmative or not, although he still asserts the priority of the Scotists over Aquinas in the definition of theology (divinity).

Though it is somewhat early to draw a conclusion on this point, Charnock’s Scotism and Thomism appears in the context of Perkinsian or later English Puritan thought to lead to theology being an “operative discipline” (operatrix disciplina) in character. The influence of the Ramist dichotomy in both Perkins and Charnock is seen in the multiplied divisions and subdivisions of topic in the structure of their writings. This also contributes to a methodological ‘bridge-building’ between faith, doctrine, theory or speculation and obedience, practice, works or piety. What we also need to note is that the emphasis on both the absolute sovereignty of God and the human predicament of sin in Reformed soteriology in the Reformation and the orthodox era can be traced back to late medieval Augustinianism in the sense that the doctrinal solidity of traditional Augustinianism is safeguarded. On the other hand, Franciscan and Neoplatonic influence on Puritan piety within the boundary of Christian Aristotelianism in terms of personal and practical religion connecting doctrine with experience is another facet of the Augustinian heritage found in Perkins and Charnock in their idea of the property of theologia. This overlies the aforementioned dialectics of Thomism and Scotism. We will investigate these matters in detail in later chapters.

The “operative” dimension of Perkinsian theological prolegomena continues to operate in the rest of Charnock’s arguments for the knowledge of God. For instance, Charnock attempts to extend the discussion of the property of theology to Christ’s knowledge of God in view of the term theologia unionis (theology of union). As Christ’s knowledge cannot possibly be detached from his redemptive works, both

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58 Quotation from PRRD I, p. 344.

our theology and the theology of Christ have “directed” characteristics per se.\(^60\) We here find that a Christological dimension invariably plays an important role in Charnock’s theological arguments, which are based upon the frequent resorts to scriptural underpinning. Again, Charnock notes the relationship between the practice of piety for sanctification and the doctrine of the attributes of God in terms of theologia as a directed discipline:

The end of knowledge is directive; the proper effect of knowledge is the observation of the direction, to write after the copy, to work according to the pattern, to do what is agreeable to the perfections of God, to honour what we see honourable in God, and to disparage none of those excellencies we profess to know.\(^61\)

Accordingly, following the model of the attributes of God as revealed in Christ, a supernaturally enlightened reason and mind in humanity should result in a practice and action of obedience as the evidence of its stemming from vera theologia. Charnock also offers seven elements of theologia nostra — knowing Christ savingly, as a mediator, reconciler, redeemer, prophet, priest, and advocate — in terms of human knowledge of Christ.\(^62\) At the same time, although he stresses both the practical and directive character of theology, he does not lose the balance between intellect and will in the understanding of theological prolegomena within an understanding of the knowledge of God. That is, the property of our theology embracing both noetic and voluntary aspects as the true knowledge comes only from our union with Christ who is the basis of “direction”.

III. The Term “Habitus” & the Genus of Theology

In Puritan and Reformed scholastics in general, the discussion of the character of theology in relation to the definition of faith on the basis of faculty psychology relates to an inseparable relationship between theological prolegomena and the wider doctrinal system. It is this that guarantees their coherence with each

\(^60\) See Works IV, pp. 50-1: “The end of Christ’s knowledge of his Father must be the end of our knowledge, both of God and himself. He knows his Father’s secrets to reveal them, and he knows his Father’s will to perform it. … The incarnation of Christ was for action; the divine nature had not attained its end in the business of our redemption, without union to the human, as necessary to mediatory acts; nor doth our knowledge of God attain its end without union to the will, as necessary to all religious operations.”

\(^61\) Works IV, p. 51.

\(^62\) Works IV, p. 53.
other. For both Perkins and Charnock, faith, theology, and the knowledge of God are integrated, since the character of faith has the element of an act of the will as ‘the fiducial apprehension’. That is, our theology should be both “a fiducial knowledge” of God and “a knowledge of faith”. Charnock even contrasts theologia vera with theologia falsa in relation to whether it has a fiducial characteristic or not. The fact that Charnock stresses the “affective” aspect in the knowledge of God seems to be related to an understanding of such a fiducial character in true theology as well as to a Puritan practical religion that considers the whole change of the human soul as a “new creation”. In fact this dimension leads us not only to the importance of knowing God in covenant with us but also to the relationship of true theology and the assurance of salvation. The use of the scholastic key term habitus is placed in the centre of all the discussions of faith, theology and the knowledge of God in Perkins and Charnock.

To explore the significant role of habitus and faculty psychology, let us first turn to the noteworthy fact that Charnock combines the doctrine of faith with the doctrine of the attributes of God in the present discussion of theological prolegomena. Just as a clear theology produces stronger faith and confidence, so faith cannot work in a lively fashion without clear knowledge of the attributes of God. Therefore, according to Charnock, our theology ought to yield spiritual advancement because it was first “infused into us” as an “active principle”. Our theology proceeds to the perfection of a psychological faculty in heaven, although it cannot be attained fully in this life. What makes this itinerary possible is the fact that the first infused habitual grace (habitus gratiae) not only “breaks into the soul” but also “repairs the faculty,” and is no less than saving knowledge of God.

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63 Muller also notes this point in PRRD I, p. 162: “Theological prolegomena cannot be entirely vordogmatisch or predogmatic: they stand in dialogue with the system and, in fact, are a system in miniature, stand at the level of presupposition.”
64 Works IV, p. 57: “Faith is not one simple virtue, but compounded of the two, knowledge and trust. The common subject is the heart, the special seat of each part is the understanding and will (yet those two parts cannot be separated but the nature of faith is destroyed), …”; Perkins, A Golden Chaine, in Workes I, p. 79.
65 In fact the pursuit of the meaning of true theology has its origin in Augustine, various medieval Augustinians, and the Reformers: for example, see PRRD I, p. 344, especially the comment on the relationship between Puritans, Keckermann, and the Scotists. In some way, the affections and the will can be integrated as the inclination of the whole heart in the Puritan tradition.
66 Works IV, p. 59.
67 Works IV, pp. 61-2.
68 For the detailed historical background of the Reformed use of the term habitus: see PRRD I, pp. 355-9.
Growth in grace is not new graces (for they are all included in the habit of grace first put into the soul), but in a strength of each particular grace and the actings of it. … Though grace be not perfect, yet there is an habit of grace, and all the parts of grace in the soul of a renewed man.  

In other words, being faithful to the general tendency of Puritan Reformed scholastics including Perkins (which is based upon a Christian Aristotelianism that had been dominant from the high Middle Ages to the seventeenth century), Charnock makes good use of the traditional scholastic concept of habitus to explain the relationship between theology and sanctification. Undoubtedly, for Charnock, sanctification derives from the increase of knowledge of the attributes of God. The overall emphasis on the doctrines of both regeneration and perseverance in all of Charnock’s writings is also confirmed in the theological character and definition of the term habitus. This supernaturally granted “mental disposition” from God makes it possible for both theology and faith to grow in the believer as habitus theologiae and credendi. At the same time, this could be the reason why Charnock argues that our theology is to proceed to the theologia unionis that Christ had with God after the incarnation. For Charnock, this theology is communicated to all the faculties of the soul in a believer, in a process similar to the communication to the faculties present in Christ, e.g. mind, affections, and will. Theology as “a knowledge in the heart” should bring forth an act of one’s will accompanying love and affections as well as an act of understanding if it is to be the knowledge of ‘enjoying’ God. Thus, without the discussion of theology as a habit, there is no proper discussion of theologia as a doctrinal system that only such a habitus can develop. This point again confirms that Charnock is a figure who reflects both a Christian Aristotelianism and a particular Puritan spirituality, that of the theology of the Spiritual Brethren including Perkins.

The characteristic of our theology as a theologia revelata, which gives both

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69 Works IV, pp. 62-3. This description of grace in Charnock holds true of Muller’s analysis of the delicate distinction between medieval scholastics and the Protestant idea of gratia: “[The Reformed] had been to deny that grace is a habit infused into the sinner. Grace is a power of God which never becomes a property or predicate of human nature. The psychology of the middle ages and of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, depended on the language of habitus as a way of reckoning with the ability of the mind to know or do certain things. … Rather than to speak directly of a habitus infusa, the Protestant scholastics tend rather to speak of the divine act of infusing the habit in regeneration or in calling”: PRRD I, pp. 358-9.

70 Works IV, p. 67: “It is an habit: Heb. v. 14, ‘Who by reason of use;’ by reason of habit, in the Greek. The faculty is firm, and can never be totally vitiated:”

71 Works IV, pp. 65-6.

72 Works IV, pp. 85-6.
“full assurance” and a solid apprehension of God and Christ, leads Charnock to discuss the genus of theology. We can in fact trace the origin of the Reformed discussion of such a classification of theology in relation to human intellectual dispositions in the medieval scholastic tradition that it inherited from Aristotle. It is undeniable, as we see Perkins’ case in the Reformed systems, that the Thomistic influence that underscores theology as scientia is considerable. However, the influences of Scotus and later medieval theology made its character complex, so that the elements of all the distinct intellectual dispositions other than mere understanding are amalgamated. Therefore, the perspective on Protestant orthodoxy which identifies it as a derivation of strict medieval Thomism considering theology as a sheer “science” results from a lack of grasp of its nature as a complicated genus. On the contrary, a proper understanding of the genus of theology in Perkins and Charnock should see it as the product of the history of Christian doctrine within the context of Augustinianism, as we have seen it in line with Muller’s argument concerning the tendency of Reformed scholastics on this point.

In Charnock, we see traces of Perkins’ idea of theology influenced by both the Ramistic definition and a wider Reformed scholastic tendency. This idea lays emphasis on a balanced consideration of the aspects of theology as a mixed discipline of scientia, sapientia, prudentia and ars. Such a complex characteristic of theology necessarily leads Charnock to assert that our knowledge of God, which is infused by grace, has its foundation from “a scriptural light” given as “a special revelation” superior both to natural knowledge of God and to the one perceived from the law. Charnock even affirms: “[In our theology], the manner of revealing was most certain; the manner of knowing must be in some measure suitable to the object known, and the way of its manifestation: the principles of faith are more certain than those of any science.” Thus, without knowledge of Scripture as the cognitive foundation (principium cognoscendi) of our theology, there is no growth in piety: “The knowledge of the word is the entrance of life, the means of begetting is the

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73 For an outline of the genus of theology in intellectual history, see PRRD I, pp. 324-40; S. Rehnman, Divine Discourse, pp. 96-7.
74 PRRD I, pp. 326-7; S. Rehnman, Divine Discourse, pp. 98-104. Aristotle’s five categories of knowing are as follows: understanding or intelligence (intelligentia), knowledge or science (scientia), wisdom (sapientia), prudence (prudentia), art or technique (ars). Cf. Aristotle, Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. and trans. John Warrington (London: Dent, 1963), pp. 119-36.
75 For details, see PRRD I, pp. 324-7.
76 Cf. PRRD I, p. 339.
78 Works IV, pp. 79-80.
79 Works IV, p. 65.
means of nourishing the soul to eternal life.”

For Charnock, as theology is the highest science as a “tree of life”, the progress of theology comes only from deeper efforts toward the knowledge of Scripture:

Let us fetch the increase of this knowledge from the true principle, from the word. By the Spirit in the word it was first imprinted; by the Spirit in the word it is further enlarged. The improvement of a man in any science must be fetched from the principles of that science, not from the principles of another.

In short, in Charnock’s position, the discussion of the genus of theology cannot stand without linking itself with the doctrine of Scripture and biblical interpretation. Such a directive dimension — in which Charnock suggests principles for the progress of our theology — is particularly characteristic of the (English) Puritan theological system. We thus can further confirm the close relationship of theology and practice. For example, the emphasis on prayer shows the importance of the recognition of the sovereignty of God in the reception of the knowledge of God, i.e., we definitely need “an operation of God in us” no less than a divine communication toward us for obtaining such knowledge of God.

Charnock also points out the significance of the work of the Holy Spirit in the formation of our theology. This is clear evidence that his understanding of theologia is fundamentally trinitarian, especially in view of the operation towards our faculties. For Charnock, continuing purity of the whole heart accompanied by obedience and practice is essential for the increase of our theology. His interest in the faculties of the soul is also related to the growth of our knowledge of God gained by using the method of Christian meditation upon God and Scripture. To know God, the “senses of the soul” or psychological faculties are to be guided by meditation. Charnock uses the term “ascent” in the expression of our theology, which shows the influence of both the Augustinian-Franciscan and Puritan meditative tradition.

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80 Works IV, p. 88.
81 Works IV, p. 90.
82 Works IV, p. 104.
83 Works IV, p. 105: “The foundation was laid by Christ, but the consummation of this discovery, and the last line, was reserved for the Spirit. … The first work of the Spirit is that of knowledge. He communicates himself to our understanding, before he makes impressions to our wills, … he reflects it upon the will and affections, that the faculties may regularly follow one another in the order of working, and the soul, in turning to God, may act, and be acted, as a rational creature;” Cf. idem, Conviction of Sin, in Works IV, pp. 164-219.
84 Works IV, p. 108: “By meditation we enter within the veil and behold his glory. … The senses of the soul, which are as real and have as real operations about their proper objects, as the external senses of sight and taste have about sensible objects, are thus to be exercised; … Without this we cannot
the means of grace, in Charnock’s schema, should contribute to the substantial increase of our knowledge of God, as both the soul’s faculties and the whole heart that yield proper observances as the evidence of both regeneration and sanctification. In other words, the broadly integrated understanding of the genus of theology with its directive dimension (as part of the characteristic of English Puritan theological prolegomena following Perkins) is seen in Charnock, especially in the cogent arguments regarding ‘the knowledge of God’.

IV. Knowledge of God in Christ: The Limit of Natural Theology and Reason

The dialectic of “nature” and “grace” in our knowledge of God is another important topic we need to examine in the Puritan Reformed orthodox understanding of theological prolegomena. Both Perkins and Charnock reflect the theological elaboration of the Reformed tradition since the Reformation in this discussion. In the case of Charnock, he directly deals with this theme within the wider context of Christology in his treatise The Knowledge of God in Christ. First of all, we need to take note of the fact that Charnock categorises human knowledge of God into three groups according to medium: natural, legal, and evangelical. Though Charnock replaces knowledge in the Scripture with knowledge of the law, in line with the developing interest in the “salvation-historical approach” of covenant theology in the later seventeenth century, such a threefold model of the knowledge (natural, legal,
and evangelical) of God primarily reflects both federal thought and the influence of the idea of the *duplex cognitio Dei* in the Reformers. To be sure, we can find many exemplary figures besides Calvin and Charnock who use this concept of the knowledge of God as creator, which is one part of the *duplex cognitio Dei* in the Reformation era and the post-Reformation period. Both Musculus and Vermigli use the basic structure of Calvin despite additions of their own;\(^8^8\) Perkins uses the same structure in dealing with the theme of creation, providence, conscience, and the human faculties in relation to the knowledge of God in his works;\(^8^9\) James Ussher and Thomas Goodwin also adopt a similar structure to their seventeenth century contemporaries.\(^9^0\) At the same time, although we can trace back the history of discussion of natural theology pursuing “a middle path between rationalism and fideism” since the medieval scholastic period in relation to the dialectics between Thomism and Scotism, the Reformed orthodox idea of this issue correlates with the rise of Arminianism and Socinianism in the seventeenth century context.\(^9^1\) Thus, no matter how natural theology may be set up in its definition and extent,\(^9^2\) the focus of the Reformed orthodox Puritans like Charnock in this discussion was to reveal human sinfulness and inability to receive the saving knowledge of God.\(^9^3\) Of course the maxims of both *finitum non capax infiniti* and *finiti et infiniti nulla proportio* are still important to them related to this aspect.

At the same time, in Charnock’s schema, this threefold knowledge of God is to be considered in a Christological dimension. Thus the role of Christ as the scope of all the Scriptures (the cognitive foundation of our theology) is related to the meaning of the knowledge of God the Father in Christ the mediator. Both immanent and economic communications of the knowledge of God between the Father and the Son are also important in understanding theology as at once revealed and supernatural.\(^9^4\) Christ is the image of God the Father both as “the exemplar of his beauty and excellency” *ad intra* and as the person who shows the attributes of the


\(^{8^9}\) Perkins, *Workes* I, pp. 144 (on creation), 154-5, 158-9 (on providence), 517-8 (on conscience); *Workes* II, pp. 280-3 (commentary upon Gal. 4:8-11), 458-9.


\(^{9^1}\) See *PRRD* I, pp. 271, 279.

\(^{9^2}\) To be sure, such a characteristic is generally inherited from the major Reformers’ ideas in Bullinger, Calvin, and Vermigli despite the delicate differences among them. See *PRRD* I, pp. 278-84.

\(^{9^3}\) Cf. *PRRD* I, p. 283.

\(^{9^4}\) *Works* IV, pp. 110-1.
Father *ad extra*. Thus our theology should reflect “the vision of Christ”, since we know God through Christ “not immediately and directly, but mediately and consequently”. Even the knowledge of God obtained by reason and natural light comes from “the mediation of Christ”. The revelations of Christ consist of revealed theology given through “an intellectual or spiritual vision”. We see in this part that both natural theology and supernatural theology cannot be discussed without considering the office and works of Christ as the conferrer of both aspects of the knowledge of God. In addition, the negative assessment of Charnock’s theological system as a decretal Aristotelian scholasticism based merely upon the structure of the covenant of redemption (as Jones argues) becomes untenable in the light of the underlying Christological and soteriological foci found in Charnock.

After dealing with such a Christological framework of the knowledge of God, Charnock proceeds to set the boundary of a “natural” knowledge of God. Citing Rom. 1:19, Charnock demonstrates the existence of an “implanted notion” of God in the human mind as “a law of nature” that arouses the movings of conscience, yet such knowledge can have no soteriological effect upon the unregenerate sinner in such a human predicament due to original sin. In addition, Charnock provides another argument for the evidences of natural knowledge of God by anatomising our soul’s faculties. Given that the image of God is engraved in every human soul as a copy of the divine intellect and will, a natural knowledge of God exists in each human soul as the miniature of God. To put it another way, while Charnock affirms the reality of such a natural theology, he indicates the demerits of a “corrupted nature” (post-lapsarian state) in the human psyche on the basis of his Augustinian attitude in anthropology. Nevertheless one finds clear evidences of

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95 *Works IV*, pp. 112-3.
97 For the general survey of this term in the history of doctrine, see *PRRD I*, pp. 270-84.
98 Rom. i. 19: “That which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath shewn it unto them.”
100 The Reformed scholastics regard this knowledge as an “intuitive” knowledge (*cognitio insita*) that denies its innateness like the Platonic theory, its being infusedness, and a theory of a *tabula rasa*. E.g., F. Turretin, *Institutes*, vol. I.iii.2. See also *PRRD I*, pp. 284-5; Rehnman, *Divine Discourse*, p. 75. We will investigate this issue related to the Socinians and later Arminians in detail in chapter three.
101 *Works IV*, p. 118.
several divine attributes within creatures, even if some critical attributes are not seen without understanding the office and the work of Christ. Charnock points out both the benefits and the weaknesses of such knowledge that one perceives from the work of creation and providence:

Nature, therefore, can never teach men to worship God in images, unless they were able to frame one in which they could gather and store up the perfections of all creatures; … All this may be known of God by the creation, and it is a true (though not a full) discovery of God. It is called truth: Rom i. 18, 25, ‘Change the truth of God into a lie.’ … It is a rational way of arguing, from the excellency of the effect to the excellency of the cause, and from the perfection of the creature to the perfection of God. … Yet, because there is an imperfection in every creature, we must sift the flour of the creature from this bran, when we would frame any conception of the excellency of God by it.

In this comment, we see both the importance and the relationship of worship and the attributes of God in Charnock’s theological framework. This allows humans to receive the knowledge of God as true theology. Insofar as true worship of God is impossible without the proper knowledge of the attributes of God, both creation and providence cannot possibly provide such a level of theology: they lack the crucial attributes of God that can only be transmitted through the teaching concerning Christ the mediator. In other words, although natural knowledge of God is necessary as a foundation for theologia nostra in the sense that it is related to the discussion of the arguments of the existence of God (which we will deal with in detail in the next chapter), it cannot provide a full picture of all the perfections of God toward us.

That is, according to Charnock, we can prove the insufficiency of natural theology in three respects: first, knowledge obtained by way of induction from the effects to the cause cannot precisely explain the essence of objects. Second, the work of the Holy Spirit means that there is another necessary element for our theology distinct from a natural knowledge of God. Third, natural theology cannot explain qualis Dei, though it provides us with the recognition of a “supreme being” in this

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102 Thus Charnock does not forget anthropological considerations in explaining this knowledge. See Works IV, p. 115: “Though man hath not the knowledge which Adam had, since the flaw he contracted upon his understanding, yet there being some scattered relics of this knowledge, he may, by looking near to the creatures, discern, by his purblind and dim sight, something of the attributes of God, every creature being a glass which reflects some beams of God upon his mind;” Cf. ibid. p. 121.
103 Works IV, p. 117.
104 Works IV, p. 118: “The world is at best is but a shadow of God, … It discovers something of God, not so much of him as to give the soul a full complacency; the fruit of it is but a thirst without a satisfaction.”
world. The recognition of such failings could be the reason why Charnock reiteratively endeavours to show that the doctrine of God’s attributes and the atonement are connected with each other by way of the two routes of the knowledge of God: natura and gratia. Without considering Christology, this aspect of theology leaves no room for its being a supernatural theology explained only by virtue of the “infusion” of grace.  

Such a combination is dispersed over all of his writings as an underlying key idea, especially in The Attributes of God.

The discussion of the role of human reason is another theme that we need to investigate in relation to the limits of natural theology. As mentioned previously, this is linked to the assertion that the essential identity of Protestant scholastic doctrine of God is an arid rationalism or mere scholasticism. Arguably Protestant orthodoxy, including even the work of Ramistic Puritan theologians like Perkins, depends on an Aristotelian causal model for its theological logic, though this affirmative but ancillary use of reason becomes meaningful only within the boundary of theologia regenitorum. Indeed this view of the role of reason in theology can be traced back to Augustine, the Middle Ages, and the Reformation period. Philosophy, logic, and rhetoric, included as instruments in the wider category of human reason, contribute to the exegetical formulation of theology along with the locus method within the Reformed orthodox background. Perkins is no exception to

\[105\] See Works IV, pp. 119, 121: “Nature could discover no more than what was imprinted on it by the God of nature; the world stood in no need of redemption by virtue of its creation, but by virtue of its transgression and pollution. … The creation was but the first draught of God’s perfections, and came much short of the full declaration; … There was nothing in all their observation [on nature] that could discover anything of God in Christ, the union of two natures, the doctrine of the trinity of persons, which was necessary to the notion of redemption.”


\[108\] Cf. Rehnman, Divine Discourse, pp. 82-3.

this generalisation. He notes the paradoxical condition of human reason after the fall but before the new birth concerning the knowledge of existence of true God.\textsuperscript{110} Other English Reformed theologians are also faithful to this boundary.\textsuperscript{111} In the case of Charnock, reason without supernatural revelation merely attains “some dark shadows or notion of God”, since nature can offer neither a “doctrine of (the) saviour” nor “the necessity of faith”. This knowledge obtained from creation and providence based upon an unregenerate reason comes neither from a supernatural and special illumination nor from revelation but from God’s “common illumination”.\textsuperscript{112} The problem of Arminius and the Remonstrants arises from regarding the concept of natural knowledge of God before regeneration as a supernatural and prevenient grace of God universal to all humanity irrespective of the fall. In other words, they destroy the boundary between nature and grace by adopting a new definition of natural and supernatural revelation.\textsuperscript{113} Granted that “the innate ideas” of God and human conscience might, rarely, give some natural knowledge of God according to the view of “real” rationalists, the necessity of supernatural revelation coming from both Scripture and the work of the Holy Spirit cannot possibly be denied.\textsuperscript{114}

In other words, in contrast to the view of these groups, the idea of the limitation of reason in obtaining the saving knowledge of God leads Charnock to discuss the absolute necessity of supernatural theology. The external word of God should be internally revealed to the human faculties, including reason, by the work of the Spirit of revelation. Even so, an acknowledgement of the fundamental priority of revelation over reason in the matter of faith does not decrease the importance of reason for both the comprehension and examination of revelation: grace does not destroy nature but perfects it.\textsuperscript{115} Charnock also argues according to the Anselmic

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\item \textsuperscript{111} For example, see the excellent account of Owen’s use of reason in true theology in Rehnman, \textit{Divine Discourse}, pp. 114-8.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Works IV, pp. 154-6. This is the decisive factor of the difference between Aquinas and the Protestants’ camp in their understanding of a natural knowledge of God. See Rehnman, \textit{Divine Discourse}, p. 77; Erik Persson, \textit{Sacra Doctrina}, pp. 227-41.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Muller, \textit{God, Creation and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius} (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1993), pp. 243-6; Guy Richard, “Deus Qui Regnat in Excelso,” p. 35.
\item \textsuperscript{114} As mentioned earlier, we will examine this point in detail in chapter three in relation to the seventeenth century context and various rationalisms, including Socinianism. Cf. Rehnman, \textit{Divine Discourse}, pp. 119-28.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Being faithful to the seventeenth century Reformed scholastic tendency, Charnock frequently uses this traditional Thomistic axiom in his works. Similarly John Morgan also says that the Puritans combined faith and reason as long as they “subordinate human reason to the demands of an enthusiastic faith”: John Morgan, \textit{Godly Learning}, pp. 301, 309; W. Stoever, ‘A Faire and Easie Way
tradition of *fides quarens intellectum* (faith seeking understanding):

We ought therefore to submit our reasonings to God’s declaration. The rational creature was made to serve God. His reason, then, ought to be held in the rank of a servant; the light of reason ought to veil to the author of reason, … Reason ought to follow faith, not precede it. … Reason, indeed, may come in with an auxiliary force after a revelation is made, for the maintaining the truth of it, and clearing it up to the minds of others, and may be a servant to revelation now under Christ, as well as it should have been to any revelation in the state of innocence.\textsuperscript{116}

Moreover, in Charnock’s schema, the relationship between reason and supernatural revelation that yields faith cannot be explained without considering both the Christological and trinitarian dimensions and the acknowledgement of Scripture as the principle of knowing in our theology. This is the reason that both Scripture and God are the sole two foundations (cognitive and essential) of *theologia*. Just as our theology is communicated to the believer from the theology of union in Christ, so our reason is to be under the revelation of Christ who is the wisdom of God: “The knowledge of God in the gospel is more glorious than the knowledge of God by nature, as much as Scripture revelation is above natural reason.”\textsuperscript{117} As will be clearer later in the development of our thesis, an understanding of the immanent Triune God related to both the eternal decree and the covenant of redemption cannot be grasped without considering the external works of the Triune God in relation to creation, providence, redemption, and the personal execution of the covenant of grace in time. Even so, there is neither the knowledge of the Triune God in Christ nor a proper grasp of the limitations of natural theology without the existence of Scripture illuminating both of these points.\textsuperscript{118} Thus it becomes inevitable that our knowledge of God is to be a Trinitarian theology reflecting fully the attributes of God obtained both by reason from nature and by supernatural revelation of grace.\textsuperscript{119}

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\textsuperscript{116} Works IV, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{117} Works IV, p. 162.
\textsuperscript{118} For example, there are many scriptural proof-texts that Charnock and other Reformed theologians cite to show the reality of a natural knowledge of God. This means that Scripture functions as the “duplex foundation” of our theology to know both natural and supernatural theology.
\textsuperscript{119} Therefore, we see that negative views of the classical theism including those of Colin Gunton basically fail to grasp the importance of *theologia nostra* as the theology of the regenerate in the traditional orthodox doctrine of God, as well as in Reformed scholastic thought.
V. Supernatural Theology: Christ the Mediator & Trinitarian God

The discussion of “our” theology as a theologia supernatura in theological prolegomena encompasses various concomitant problems of the understanding of revelation in the Reformed tradition. In the case of Charnock, his account of the second medium of theology in humanity after God gave the law, known as “legal knowledge”, stands in the middle of natural and supernatural theology as the connecting link between them. Although knowledge obtained from Scripture itself can be included in this second category in terms of its being an objective, supernatural revelation, Charnock asserts the importance of the subjective dimension of the supernatural by dividing the Scripture into the law and Gospel in a threefold distinction. Even if the law reveals some of divine attributes, i.e. sovereignty, holiness and justice, it cannot grant “justifying grace” leading to Christ in spite of its sufficiency as a revelation, owing to human depravity since the fall. Nevertheless legal knowledge of God leads human beings to discover the attributes of God “more clearly than the works of nature” despite its inferiority to the third medium, theologia evangelica.

In contrast to the former two kinds of knowledge, evangelical knowledge of God as the third medium of theologia nostra solves the problem of the quals Dei to the fullest extent by introducing Christ to humanity: “The creatures tell us there is a God, and Christ tells who and what that God is.” We come to see “the transactions between the Father and the son” by Christ who provides the believers in the “gospel state” with a better theology: the covenant of redemption is revealed through Christ who accomplished and applied it in history through the covenant of grace by his works and the power of the Holy Spirit. At the same time the infallibility of evangelical theology is guaranteed through the integration of Christology, the doctrine of faith and the attributes of God in Charnock’s theological framework.

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120 In this section we do not deal separately with Perkins’ trinitarianism and federal theology. As mentioned in the first chapter, we generally adopt Muller’s recent study on Perkins in this area to find out Perkins’ idea of God’s attributes in order to explore the identity of Charnock’s doctrine of God. See R. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1988).
121 Works IV, pp. 123-4.
122 On the use of the term “theologia evangelica” in the early orthodoxy, see Rehnman, Divine Discourse, p. 84.
123 Works IV, p. 125.
124 Works IV, pp. 127-8: “The whole scope of the doctrine of Christ is to reveal God in his most illustrious perfections to man, and in the relation of a gracious Father to him. … The knowledge of
Evangelical theology also makes it possible for the elect to understand the meaning of both ‘true’ natural theology and the compatible relationship between nature and grace in the regenerate believer:

Natural and legal knowledge is clarified by the gospel, which is a comment to explain what was before but darkly understood, and a new revelation to elevate the soul to a greater understanding; it fortifies the light of nature, and frames in us more pure and significant conceptions of God.\textsuperscript{125}

Given that corrupted humanity cannot see God by way of natural knowledge of God (despite its appropriateness in the pre-lapsarian state) evangelical theology becomes much more necessary to the sinner after the fall. Thus \textit{theologia revelata} made by Christ is beneficial to us in the following respects: “By him, we have the illumination of our minds, as well as the justification of our persons, the sanctification of our natures, and redemption from our enemies.”\textsuperscript{126} For Charnock, this point is closely connected to the meaning of the concept of Christ the mediator. Only Christ who is the Son of God knows the mysteries of God — this is related to His own intimacy with the Father in trinitarian acts both \textit{ad intra} and \textit{ad extra}. Christ the mediator perpetually works with the Father in all divine acts including both creation and redemption as the second person of the Triune God through divine counsels and “eternal transactions”.\textsuperscript{127} We can also infer the relationship of Scripture and Christ in terms of the knowledge of God from Charnock’s comment in the following:

As the beautiful image of reason in the mind, breaking out with the discovery of itself in speech and words, is fittest to express the inward sense, thoughts, conceptions, nature, and posture of the mind, so the essential Word of God clothes himself with flesh, comes out from God to manifest the nature of God. The word in the mind of a man is insensible to others, but published with the voice is made sensible, and makes the person know whose word it is.\textsuperscript{128}

In short, Christ as “the essential Word of God” is the scope and centre of Scripture as

\textsuperscript{125} Works IV, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{126} Works IV, p. 130.
\textsuperscript{127} Therefore, we can affirm that Colin Gunton’s emphasis on the concept of the trinitarian “God in action” fails to notice the importance of this eternal “act” of the Father and the Son in the dynamics of trinitarian theology. See C. Gunton, \textit{Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes} (London: SCM Press, 2002), esp. pp. 139, 158.
\textsuperscript{128} Works IV, p. 132.
the written Word. By revealing Christ, Scripture exists as the cognitive foundation or principle of our theology. This indicates that the object of Charnock’s concept of *theologia* is the Triune God revealed in both Scripture and Christ. This becomes clearer when we consider the fact that Christ is both the “revelation” Himself through the incarnation and the “revealer” irrespective of the incarnation in temporal history. According to Muller, “Christ — the Revelation or the Revealer? Brunner and Reformed Orthodoxy on the Doctrine of the Word of God,” *Journal of Evangelical Theological Society* 26:3 (Sep. 1983), pp. 307-19.

Accordingly, without understanding Christ as our mediator, there is no saving or revealed theology that makes us sensible of the attributes of God. Moreover, our knowledge of God should be in the form of a clear trinitarian theology that integrates the word of God with Christ. Evangelical theology also confirms the doctrine of the Trinity through the revelation of Christ the mediator.

Of course Scripture introduces the role of Christ as the mediator, directing us to *theologia nostra* through the work of the Holy Spirit. As noted above, the theology of union that is Christ’s operates as the medium of our theology because he imparts “something of the mind and will of God” to the believer. The transmission of this theology can only be possible through both Christ’s atonement as the cause of our theology “under the new covenant” and his work of supernatural illumination in the spiritual faculty of humanity. The discussions of *theologia* and the doctrine of regeneration are thus connected with each other in the doctrine of Scripture. At the same time, in Charnock’s schema, such a doctrinally interwoven structure means that the discussion of *theologia* and the doctrine of the attributes of God overlap with a Christological dimension. Our theology allows us to see all the attributes of God glorified since they are “centred together” in Christ. As Christ our mediator participates in all of the divine acts of the Trinity as mentioned earlier, the glorification of divine attributes in terms of their richness becomes essential to the

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130 Again, losing the aspect of Christ as revealer in relation to the Scriptures (as is found in Gunton) by employing a Christocentric, Barthian way also, ironically, means one that loses the importance of trinitarian revelation.

131 *Works* IV, p. 133.

132 *Works* IV, p. 133.

133 See the excellent description of illumination on human faculty: *Works* IV, p. 136: “[Christ] has given us understanding, is not meant of the natural faculty, which is the gift of God in nature and creation, and which grace presupposeth, but of an enlightened and purified mind, which is operative upon the will and heart, and imprints so firmly the glory of God upon the mind, that the will is carried out to love and fear him which compliance of the will with an illuminated understanding is the formal act of our regeneration.”

sensibleness of our theology. Although these divine attributes in Christ are in a perfect “harmony of all”, the work of redemption has a special relevance in relation to our knowledge of God: “When he was set forth as a propitiation, it was not only to purchase our happiness, but to let into our knowledge the righteous and gracious nature of God thereby.”

It is worth observing that Charnock addresses the implications of true “Christian religion”, in a restated version of the discussion on theologia in terms of emphasising both the cruciality of the trinitarian dimension and the directive characteristic of “religion” in this discussion. Namely, affirming the three levels of the knowledge of God (in nature, the law and the gospel) in history, he emphasises the fact that the history of theologia is no less than the development of a Trinitarian theology in terms of a revelational dispensation of God which is beyond human reason. To be a “true religion”, therefore, the authentic goal of our theology must be identified as a knowledge of God that yields consolidation of doctrine or faith and piety or observance. Thus the connection between true religion and worship of God also becomes an important theme for Charnock. In the same way, our theology is to endeavour towards a “union with God” in Christ because it stands as an ectypal theology in itself, which is communicated from God. Our theology must also pursue a piety which moves our will into action through spiritual impressions upon our affections. Once all of these aspects are considered properly, the necessary condition of our theology toward “life eternal” can be realised in Christ who has theologia unionis.

To summarise, Charnock’s idea of supernatural theology is seen in his account of the evangelical knowledge of God, which is based upon the saving, covenantal, and trinitarian revelation of God. That is, the examination above illustrates that Charnock has already clarified this relationship between divine attributes and trinitarianism on both christological and federal bases in his account of

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135 Works IV, p. 139: “Christ is the stage wherein all the attributes of God act their parts: in creation, he was a God of goodness and power; in providence, a God of wisdom; in the law, a God of justice; in Christ, a God of all, and a God of grace, a Father of mercy."

136 Works IV, p. 142.

137 Works IV, p. 157.

138 Works IV, p. 158.

139 Works IV, p. 158: “Religion respects God; it must have the knowledge of God therefore a foundation. … All true religion conduceth to the creature’s duty and happiness: our duty and happiness is to know and love God.”

140 Charnock deals with it in detail in the treatise titled Spiritual Worship as a part of The Attributes, in Works II, pp. 283-344.

141 Works IV, pp. 161-3.
theological prolegomena.

VI. The Interpretation of Scripture: Toward “Theological” Interpretation

If Scripture is the one of the two foundations of our theology as the “Word written” and given in both mediated and accommodated form, it must be rightly interpreted in order that its genuineness is inwardly testified by the Holy Spirit. In other words, for Puritans and the Reformed scholastic theologians, the problem of interpretation of Scripture is located at the centre of the identity of our theology (knowledge of God) which is to be elicited and revealed ultimately as a whole doctrinal system from the Scripture, the only cognitive foundation in light of the Christological dimension. To examine Perkins’ and Charnock’s ideas of biblical interpretation, we need to outline briefly the history of this doctrine. Scriptural interpretation ought to be incontestably the foundation of theological ideas. This was, without doubt, acknowledged in the exegetical traditions of both the patristic and the medieval period represented by the qudrigra. Yet the Protestant exegetical tradition needed other interpretive principles and tools in the course of the struggle with Roman Catholicism. Thus they defended the idea of sola Scriptura during the Reformation period, although such an idea was not completely new. Against the two extremes of Roman Catholicism and a radical insistence upon the unlimited freedom of private interpretation, the Puritans and the seventeenth century orthodox (as the successors of the Reformers) never ceased to forget the fact that the only two roots of the authority of Scriptural interpretation are the Word of God itself and the Holy Spirit who guarantees the veracity of the Word in a “single intention” within the scope of the text. Even the analogia fidei and the analogia Scriptura never deviated from the Reformed orthodox pursuit of the “genuine” sensus literalis distinct from the medieval quadrigra. Thus, the role of creeds and confessions in the Reformed and the Puritan tradition is also important for the biblical interpretation

142 For a succinct “fourfold” description of the Word of God, see PRRD II, p. 155.
144 Quotation from PRRD II, p. 474. For a detailed analysis of the meaning of both the narrow and the broader scope of the text, see pp. 488-9, 492-3. Cf. Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, ii, 14 (pp. 149-54).
145 The analogy of faith may be defined as follows: “[The rule] according to the fundamental articles of faith enunciated in the basic catechetical topics of Creed, Lord’s prayer, and Decalogue operate as interpretive safeguards upon the interpretation of particularly difficult texts,” in PRRD II, p. 493. For the general explanation of the two interpretive guidelines above, see PRRD II, pp. 493-7. Cf. Guy Richard, “Deus Qui Regnat Excelso,” pp. 70-1.
as *norma normata* in relation to the analogy of faith. Within the context of early orthodoxy, Perkins successfully deals with the problem of the interpretation of Scripture under the same title in chapter four of his *The Art of Prophecying*.\(^{146}\)

The establishment of the relationship of the Word, tradition, church, and doctrine to Scripture coalesces in the issue of the right method of the interpretation of Scripture. The relationship between elicitation of true doctrine and the subsequent right worship of God by the church can only be possible through an appropriate exegesis, which guarantees the existence of true theological formulation along with “the continued existence of Scripture”.\(^{147}\) Perkins and Charnock also reflect this point in general in terms of their continuity with the view of the Reformers. At the same time they developed the doctrine of the Word of God in a more practical direction in relation to preaching as the “instrument” of regeneration and sanctification in the English Puritan tradition. To be sure, this is related not only to setting the boundaries of the proper interpretation of Scripture as an external revelation, but also to an understanding of subjective revelation in the believer’s heart internally used as a “sacramental” means of “invisible” grace by the Holy Spirit. Most of all, we should focus on the Trinitarian, covenantal, and soteriologically Christocentric (not in the sense of neo-orthodox teaching on Christ as the dominating principle of all Christian doctrine)\(^{148}\) dimension of biblical interpretation within the context of both the eternal decree as the essential act of God and the temporal manifestation of redemptive and soteriological acts of God *ad extra* (which is a characteristic of Reformed orthodoxy in general). Just as we see the characteristics of the whole theological framework in the theological prolegomena, so the interpretation of Scripture is no different in this respect.

In the case of Perkins, such a dedication to the word of God with its zeal for piety, and such a Christ-focused understanding of theological interpretation is particularly remarkable in terms of his role as the ‘father’ of Puritan theology. Moreover, we find the Puritan pattern of exegetical pursuit from biblical text to

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\(^{147}\) Quotation from *PRRD II*, p. 175.

\(^{148}\) Cf. *PRRD II*, p. 212. This point arguably reminds us of the reason for Gunton’s emphasis on the gospel and the incarnation as an historical action of God and his criticism of the orthodox doctrine of God as one which excludes the temporal and personal dimensions of the Trinity. In Gunton’s view, based upon a tendency to Barthian Christocentric assumptions, the Puritan emphasis on the *ad extra* dimension fails to overcome the limitations of its belonging to the traditional orthodox system of the doctrine of God. See Gunton, *Act and Being*, esp. pp. 16-8.
doctrinal systems in Perkins’ extended theological commentaries along with polemical, theological pieces.\textsuperscript{149} For Charnock, the development of the genre of the homiletical commentary in the whole orthodox period in general is linked with his viewpoint of the doctrine of Scripture in continuity with Perkins. Both writers’ work is indisputably in the form of an exposition of Scripture taking the form of doctrinal sermons, a characteristically Reformed method, especially among the Puritans. It is therefore also important to understand this trait more clearly. The continuity and development of the style of biblical exposition between Perkins and Charnock is based upon the essential frame of the \textit{locus} method. At the same time there is an emphasis upon the “use” of the doctrines according to the Puritan tradition of practical divinity along with the scholastic method.\textsuperscript{150} Despite diverse patterns and emphases in their interpretations, what both the early orthodox theologians and high orthodox Puritans commonly endeavour to resolve is to set the boundary and the standard of the “literal meaning” of the passages against the abuse of this term in continuity with the Reformers.

To put it another way, theological systems or doctrines cannot be separated from right exegetical results; and such exegetical results can never oppose the fundamental doctrines of our salvation. Perkins, conversely, even points out the importance of basic doctrinal knowledge in that there would be no right biblical interpretation without it.\textsuperscript{151} The use of reason and logic in drawing doctrinal conclusions invariably moves within the boundary of both the Word and the Spirit that buttresses faith and regeneration. Certainly we also find a distinction of hermeneutical context between early and high orthodoxy — the increased interest in textual criticism and original languages — that presses upon the orthodox Puritans to develop more elaborate arguments to defend their own pre-critical exegesis thus preserving the key doctrines as “the core of the biblical messages” for churchly discipline and piety.\textsuperscript{152}


\textsuperscript{152} Quotation from \textit{PRRD} II, p. 455.
Let us turn more fully to Charnock’s view on Scriptural interpretation. In general, Charnock’s twofold understanding of the Word of God as the essential and written word shows that he takes a position in line with Calvin and early Reformed orthodoxy. Charnock does not allocate a specific section to the interpretation of Scripture on a systematic level, but rather he expounds the doctrine of the Word of God in one of the treatises primarily dealing with the grandiose theme of “regeneration”.

In Charnock, we see that the authority of Scripture as the word of God and its interpretation is directly linked with the Christological dimension of the Word of God in its content and efficacy. In other words, Charnock especially focuses on the gospel in Scripture as an instrument of the application of Christ’s redemptive works in the believer in a temporal dimension. Though he does not use the specific Greek words *endiathetos* (the word as the act of divine power) and *prophorikos* (Scripture itself) in his distinction of the word of God, such a characteristic shows that Charnock seems to stress the aspect of the word that manifests divine regenerative power. According to Charnock, the written Word of God is “the Word of truth” that shows the law and gospel both in the Old and the New Testaments. The scope of Scripture as the Word of truth is thus Christ, “the essential and uncreated logos, Word”. The gospel seen in the person and work of Christ the mediator between God and humanity is declared through preaching this written Word of God. Only this Word of God can substitute a habit of grace leading to new birth for the old sinful habit caused by the fall. The relationship of Scripture to the Holy Spirit in terms of the efficacy for both the begetting of the new creature and the quickening of the believer depends upon the redemptive works of the essential word, Christ.

Charnock also states:

As God will have the mediation of his son honoured in the whole progress and perfection of grace as the meritorious cause, the efficacy of the Spirit as the efficient cause, so he will have the word in every step to heaven honoured as the instrumental cause; that as Jesus Christ is all in all, as the chief, so the word may be all in all as the means. As God created the world by the word of his

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154 In what follows, we are indebted to Trueman’s discussion of Owen on this subject. See Trueman, *Claims of Truth*, pp. 68-9.
156 *Works* III, p. 317: “The word has this efficacy from the bleeding wounds and dying groans of Christ. … By his blood are all the promises of grace confirmed; by his blood they are operative. … the word shews the way, and the Spirit enables to walk in it.” The classic account of the Holy Spirit and Word in Puritan tradition is G. Nuttall, *The Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946), chapter I, esp. pp. 23, 33.
power, and by the word of his providence bid the creatures increase and multiply, so by the word of the gospel he lays the foundation, and rears the building, of his spiritual house.\textsuperscript{157}

Charnock considers the multi-faceted role of the Word in terms of both the intratrinitarian act of the eternal decree that appoints Christ as the mediator and the redeemer and the external works of the Triune God in the history of the creatures. Although the redemptive work is the most glorious one among the divine works \textit{ad extra}, the Scripture nevertheless ought to be appreciated as the only objective revelation of God that is to be read and preached with soteriological effect.\textsuperscript{158} The transforming power of the Word of God in conversion and sanctification links directly with the reason for the importance of the interpretation of the Scripture.

For Charnock, faithful to the tradition of Puritan theology, only the preaching of the Word of God accompanied by right exegesis is conducive to works of regeneration by the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{159} In short, we can see that Charnock’s doctrine of the Scripture is linked with his endeavour to expound “correctly” the various significant doctrinal areas in it, i.e., Trinity, Christology, Pneumatology, and Providence.\textsuperscript{160} Creation and providence is based upon the Trinitarian working of the word of God;\textsuperscript{161} the evangelical ministry of Christ as the Word \textit{agraphon} is founded upon the eternal covenant between the Father and the Son \textit{ad intra}, while at the same time it uses the means of the Word \textit{engraphon}, Scripture and the proclaimed word of the gospel \textit{ad extra} in time. All the divine acts according to His decree and will are executed by the word of God in the Trinitarian structure.\textsuperscript{162} Charnock also explains the divine economy of the covenantal structure in the progress of redemptive history written in the Old and New Testaments. Although a series of covenants converge on the covenant of grace, which reaches its zenith in the person and the work of Christ after the incarnation in terms of “the horizontal line”, according to Charnock, “the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[157] \textit{Works} III, p. 315.
\item[158] \textit{Works} III, p. 322.
\item[159] \textit{Works} III, p. 325: “The instrument of conversion is not barely the letter of the word, but the sense and meaning of it, rationally impressed upon the understanding, and closely applied to the conscience. The opening [of] the word is the life of it, and the true means of regeneration.”
\item[161] In the operation of the word of God, the Father acts “by the Son through the Holy Spirit”. See Trueman, \textit{Claims of Truth}, p. 73. For the details, see Owen, \textit{Works} 16, pp. 297-300.
\item[162] Trueman points out well through Owen’s case the grounds of argument on the role of the Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian dimension of \textit{opera Dei}: “All actions of God toward human beings, including the personal application of salvation [except the assumption of bodily form by the logos], must be the direct work of the Holy Spirit, although dual procession guarantees the overall Trinitarian nature of such actions,” in \textit{Claims of Truth}, p. 76.
\end{footnotes}
vertical line” of the divine will to save the elect is based upon His eternal decree of the covenant of redemption clearly seen in John 17. In fact such a tendency arguably echoes Perkins and previous orthodox Puritans in the relationship between the Scriptures and Christ.

What is also prominent in Charnock’s teachings on the word of God is his detailed analysis of the influence of the Word upon one’s soul in a practical dimension. He does not lose a balanced consideration of each faculty of the soul in receiving the word, while at the same time he reminds his readers of the importance of the discretion of the holy affections incited by the Spirit. Only the threefold work of the Holy Spirit upon the mind, will and affections in harmony can be the evidence of the operation of the word of God in individuals as “a genuine flame”, which can lead to a right interpretation of Scripture as objective revelation. As Trueman stresses, “rationality” in the Puritan understanding of human intellect in the believer is to be distinct from “rationalism” in terms of this balance of the soul’s faculty.

Furthermore the interpreter of Scripture ought to have both justifying faith and “experimental” knowledge of the word “heated with love” and prayer. Though such a Christian piety necessary for the interpreter as “the context of interpretation” had been stressed before Charnock and the Puritans, this point is especially related to their emphasis on theologia regenitorum in an exegetical dimension — the practice of exegesis cannot make progress without the practice of piety. In a sense, such characteristics are related to the broader Reformed tradition that emphasised interpretation as “a spiritual exercise”, which is to be traced back to Augustine. Certainly, it is related to an understanding of theology as a practical science or

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163 Quotation from Trueman, Claims of Truth, p. 74.
164 For example, Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins. See esp. pp. 164-171 (on Perkins); Trueman, Claims of Truth, pp. 74-5 (on Owen).
165 Works III, p. 333.
166 “As in regeneration the Holy Spirit does not oppose human rational powers, but rather restores and perfects them, … the truths of faith are not irrational but rather supraratural”: Trueman, Claims of Truth, p. 92. Contra Gunton and Jones, this point is also related to the whole argument of our thesis: Puritan Reformed scholasticism in Perkins and Charnock’s doctrine of God is not the product of rationalism, but is elaborated in order to defend the biblically elicited doctrines of both divine simplicity and trinitarianism.
167 Works III, p. 334.
We may also confirm the characteristic of Charnock’s biblical interpretation by investigating the organisational style of his writings. Although Muller selects Charnock’s *The Existence and the Attributes of God* as an outstanding exemplar of the Protestant use of Scripture, Muller’s analysis relates it to Charnock’s other writings within the larger framework of the doctrine of God:

Each discourse sets forth a single doctrinal point belonging to the dogmatic *locus* “God” — with the larger number of discourses focusing on an attribute as identified by a text from the bible. … Rather than simply abstract from the text the [doctrinal] idea … Charnock both examines the text and discusses the view of various commentators … prior to their application to the doctrinal problem at hand. … Charnock then proceeds to offer [doctrinal] statements, each with exposition, … which, he comments, is the “chief scope of the words”: … The reference to “scope” here is significant. The term indicates not so much a doctrinal or dogmatic as a hermeneutical concern. Charnock, like the Reformers and like various early orthodox exegetes, assumed that the fundamental issue to be addressed in identifying the meaning of a biblical passage was the focus, center, or “scope” of the passage, … Charnock was working in the context of a tradition of interpretation — a tradition that he referenced closely in his effort to grasp the meaning of the text … and to move from the text to theological formulation.\(^{170}\)

Therefore, the discussion of the doctrine of God found in Charnock and the orthodox Puritans, which we will deal with in the following chapters, whatever its specific literary genre and form, is based upon appropriate and coherent gatherings of biblical passages. From these they elicit doctrinal formulations without missing either the scope or the fundamental articles of the whole Scripture.\(^{171}\) Even the relatively philosophical arguments in relation to the doctrine of the divine essence are invariably based upon the exegesis of the specific passages as *sedes doctrinae*, which is not a mere “proof-texting” utterly apart from the exegetical result.\(^{172}\)

At this juncture, we again find the fallacy of Tudur Jones’ assertion (based upon a negative view of the “classical” doctrine of God) that Charnock moves


\(^{171}\) Muller explains this aspect of Reformed orthodoxy as follows in *PRRD* II, p. 502: “The exegesis, the larger framework of interpretation leading toward exposition, and the dogmatic methods advocated by Reformed orthodoxy were profoundly and organically interrelated. The assumption of the orthodox, much like that of the Reformers, was that exegesis functioned not as a disciplinary end in itself but as the ground and foundation for a path — a *methodus* — leading to theological formulation on all matters of doctrine and practice.”

\(^{172}\) *PRRD* II, p. 510.
beyond the Scripture into the area of scholasticism, which is “the road not [to be] taken” in Jones’ view.\(^\text{173}\) Apart from its form, the problem of scholasticism has nothing to do with this significant trinitarian structure of the doctrine of revelation — the interpretation of Scripture — in its content and background.\(^\text{174}\) On the contrary, the Arminians and various rationalist groups merely used the scriptural passage “segmentally” in order to diminish or deny the range of core biblical doctrines, especially in the doctrine of God. As the area of the doctrine of God was in the midst of this severe “hermeneutical struggle” in the early modern period,\(^\text{175}\) the understanding of the link between the interpretation of Scripture and the doctrine of God is critical, especially in Perkins and Charnock who \textit{de facto} adopt the doctrine of God as the central field of their theological discussion. Furthermore, both Perkins and Charnock show clear evidence of the flourishing hermeneutical and methodical connections between a biblical interpretation that uses the analytical method and a doctrinal formulation built on a system of theological \textit{loci} that uses the synthetic or compositive method.\(^\text{176}\) In short, the Puritan Reformed orthodox biblical interpretation, especially in Charnock within the context of continuity with Perkins, is based upon the twin foundation of the two objective revelations of God as the Word of God (Christ and Scripture) and as the subjective Word of God internally appropriated in the elect through the efficacy of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, to investigate their doctrine of God (as will be done in the forthcoming chapters), we need to bear in mind the intrinsic character of Scriptural interpretation in the Reformed orthodoxy, viz. “theological” interpretation amalgamating exegesis into a “system”.

\textbf{Conclusion}

We have scrutinised Charnock’s ideas of the nature, necessity, properties, and genus of theology as well as of natural and supernatural theology in terms of its Christological and trinitarian dimensions. Then we have also explored Charnock’s doctrine of the word of God and Scriptural interpretation along with the views of Perkins. As we have seen, Charnock’s doctrine of the knowledge of God reflected in


\(^{175}\) The quotation is from \textit{PRRD II}, p. 504.

\(^{176}\) For a detailed account of the distinction of these methods, see \textit{PRRD II}, pp. 504-5.
his view of *theologia* shows the typical dialectic of grace and nature as the medium of the human knowledge of God. At the same time, in terms of the history of theology, this indicates that Puritan Reformed scholastic theology had inherited the dialectic between Thomism and Scotism insofar as they acknowledged the priority of grace over nature as the root of supernatural theology. The plan of the revelation of such salvific knowledge of God to the elect is primarily founded upon the intratrinitarian act of the eternal decree, which then reaches its climax at the time of Christ’s incarnation and the fulfillment of redemption by the Father and through the Holy Spirit in time. According to Charnock and the Puritan reformed theologians of early and high orthodoxy alike, our theology is nothing other than to know the mind and the will of this Triune God who acts in both the eternal and temporal dimension.

Moreover, in Charnock’s system, the doctrine of the attributes of God is significant because the works of God *ad extra* provide humanity with such knowledge more clearly and sufficiently than the *ad intra* dimension, especially in terms of the person and the work of Christ. Charnock endeavours to show that only the knowledge of God “in Christ” can render a human approach ectypal, saving and our theology, while at the same time stressing that such knowledge can be provided only by the word of God given both as the objective and subjective revelation of God through the work of the Holy Spirit. The role of Scriptural interpretation is critical in that it connects the written Scripture as the objective revelation of God with the theological doctrines elicited from it — ultimately heading toward a theological system in a larger framework — as the subjective and applicatory teaching for our regeneration and sanctification.

Such a close relationship between the theme of theology and Scripture seen in Charnock’s intellectual foundations has much in common with the characteristics of both Perkins and the whole of Reformed orthodox theology. Though we have only investigated the area of theological prolegomena and biblical interpretation, it would be correct to sum up as follows. If Perkins’ theology can be represented as an early Puritan trinitarianism which does not deviate from Calvin’s own doctrine of the Trinity, as has been insisted in recent scholarship, then Charnock’s emphasis on the intratrinitarian dimension of God’s covenant is no less than the reaffirmation and magnification of such a fundamental theological framework for our knowledge of the trinitarian God within the later seventeenth century context. That is, Charnock never deviates from the common theological framework of Perkins and the earlier Puritan

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177 See p. 20 and the works cited therein.
theology or the understanding common to the mainstream of the Reformed federal tradition. His attempts to build a theological system loyal to the previous generation of Puritan theologians coalesce in the writing of his extended discussion of the theme, *The Attributes of God*. At this moment, then, the preparatory road is paved for our discussion of Charnock’s whole doctrine of God’s existence and attributes.
Chapter Three

The Existence of God and Divine Spirituality

It is critically important for our discussion of Perkins’ and Charnock’s doctrine of the existence, essence, and attributes of God in this and later chapters to keep the following statement in mind as the main argumentative point that we will demonstrate: both the Reformed scholastic and the English Puritan divines treat this doctrinal locus not as the area of a pure natural theology, but as that of supernatural knowledge of God in relation to the work of the Triune God ad intra and ad extra (the ontological Trinity and the economic Trinity). Accordingly, we will see whether the criticisms of the Reformed orthodox doctrine of God that see it within the larger perspective of “classical theism”, which point to a severance between God’s essence and attributes and the Trinity in the doctrine of God, without consideration of the context of faith, is a misunderstanding or not.2

Certainly this characteristic in the Puritan Reformed scholastic theology can be construed as an echo of the Reformers Musculus, Hyperius, and Calvin, in their arrangement of the order of the doctrine of God as “one doctrine of God distinguished but not separated.”3 This is to be found throughout the arrangement of their discussion, regardless of whether they are more systematic or not in their styles — ranging from the existence of God (An sit Deus) via essence (what and who is God, Quid et Quis sit Deus) and attributes (what sort of God, Qualis sit Deus) to the doctrine of Trinity.4 Perkins and Charnock, in fact, both seem to avoid dealing with detailed discussion of the divine essence (following the style of Zanchi), in contrast

1 To understand the role of the attributes of God in the whole span of the doctrine of God, despite the delicate differences in nuance in the Reformed tradition, the following distinction of theological terms is important. We might say there are two kinds of opera Dei interna: personal and essential. According to the Augustinian tradition, the decree (decretum) is an essential work of the Trinity ad intra in eternity based upon the equality of the three persons as “free and internal act of divine will”. In other words, the decree is an act of divine essence as “the work of the entire Godhead”. The divine decree is general or special: the general decree is the providence of God; the special decree (or special providence) is predestination. When considering this sequence, the eternal decree is revealed through the executions of the decree according to the divine will in an ad extra dimension. For the details, see Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1988), pp. 149-54, 160-71, which especially deals with Perkins’ doctrine of the decree.


3 PRRD III, p. 164.

4 For detailed explanation and related bibliography, see PRRD III, pp. 153-9.
to other Reformed orthodox theologians who define *essentia* in detail. The Reformed orthodox theologians *de facto* identify essence with the nature of God along with the consideration of its relationship to the Trinity, as Muller writes: “God is a most simple, immutable, immense, eternal, most living, wise, just, free, powerful, and blessed Spirit; and he is the father, Son, & Holy Spirit. … The essence of God is Deity itself or the divine nature”. In some way the Reformed identification of *essentia* (essence) with the *esse* (existence) of God is also significant for piety as it functions as a source of consolation.

From chapter three to seven of this thesis, in the case of Perkins especially, we will be able to establish that in each attribute, as well as in the doctrine of divine existence, Perkins follows the Ramist architectonic style of partition of the whole theological system into faith (*credenda*) and works (*facienda*). This takes place in terms of both the theoretical doctrine to believe and the practical doctrine to obey as an ethic of life based upon the larger framework of uniting each element into “the science of living blessedly forever” according to the early orthodox model. In the case of Charnock, we will also discover that Charnock develops a twofold analysis of faith and obedience into a threefold or even fourfold structure of exegetical, doctrinal, polemical, and practical elements. As mentioned earlier, these feature in his theological framework in a way similar to Mastricht’s work, within the historical context of the later seventeenth century.

In addition, from chapters three to seven, it will become clear that the understanding of “true religion” as a combination of the knowledge and worship of God is also essential to Perkins and Charnock. This emphasis united the Perkinsian or Spiritual Brethren and, for that matter, the wider circle of English Puritans who emphasised the act of the soul’s faculties (the whole heart). At the same time a

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5 Cf. *PRRD* III, p. 228; Neele, *The Art of Living to God*, p. 76.
7 *PRRD* III, p. 237.
8 Perkins, *A Golden Chaine*, in *Workes* I, p. 11; *PRRD* III, p. 159. According to Muller, this characteristic belongs to the category of *theologia ectypa* which is imperfect, which is clearly influenced by Franciscus Junius (1545-1602). For Junius and other styles of approach in the arrangement of the order of the doctrine of God in early and high orthodoxy, see *PRRD* III, pp. 159-64.
9 However, the elenctic dimension in Charnock’s overall work seems to be somewhat softened because of its characteristic as an English Puritan theology that avoids too speculative or abstruse points of argument for its hearers and readers.
10 Paul Schaefer defines this *spiritual brotherhood* as follows: “a group of men for whom the Cambridge of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries became a centre of reforming activity, teaching, and training that eventually sent many of them throughout the rest of England and even to the Netherlands and to the New World,” in “The Spiritual Brotherhood of the Habits of the Heart: Cambridge Protestants and the Doctrine of Sanctification from William Perkins to Thomas Shepard”
thread of connection will be found running through our investigation of the doctrine of existence and attributes of God between Perkins and Charnock. Both of them attach priority to the doctrine of God over other loci in their structures along with the consideration of both trinitarian and covenantal dimensions of theology. In brief, the continuities, developments, and differences between Perkins and Charnock will become much clearer according to the development of our investigation. For this examination, the views and influences of other Puritans and the Continental Reformed orthodox theologians, if necessary, will also be addressed. This will enable us to consider both the diachronic and synchronous dimensions of their theological ideas, and the dialectics between Scotism and Thomism that brought about modification in Reformed orthodox thinking.

When it comes to the taxonomy of divine attributes, as mentioned earlier, both Perkins and Charnock were influenced by the tradition of federal theology that continued to develop in both early and high orthodoxy. On the one hand, Perkins classifies the divine attributes into the attributes based upon the divine essence (simplesness, infiniteness, immutability, spirituality, eternity, and greatness) and the attributes of the life of God (intellect, will, and the affections). We see strong traces of the faculty psychology in this classification, reflecting the legacy of Aquinas and Scotus. On the other hand, Charnock virtually seems to use a threefold division of the attributes (without a separate topic on divine essence) following the scholastic division, as well as reflecting “the strong influence of federalism”: quid as essential property (spirituality), quantus as greatness (eternity, immutability, and omnipresence), and qualis as the attributes of life, intellect, will, and the affections (knowledge, wisdom, power, holiness, goodness, dominion, and

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(Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994), pp. ii, 6-7. This indicates that in some way both ecclesiastical reformation and the reforming of the heart are necessary. Following Schaefer, we also see that the core of Puritan thought is “the internal matters of the heart,” which will be dealt with throughout our thesis; cf. William Ames, *The Marrow of Theology*, trans. and ed. John Eusden (Durham: Labyrinth Press, 1983), p. 79 (I.ii.1-2).


14 For detailed presentation, see *PRRD* III, pp. 219-20. Muller also asserts a similarity between Cocceius and the Leiden theologians who use much the same style as Perkins despite Cocceius’ use of the distinction of incommunicable and communicable attributes. Since Cocceius influenced Charnock’s theological system, the reason for our comparative study of Perkins and Charnock on the attributes of God becomes more apparent; cf. Muller, *God, Creation, and Providence*, p. 123.
patience as divine affection).\(^{15}\)

As also mentioned earlier, Charnock’s structure is a basically threefold or mild fourfold theological enterprise developed and extended from the form and content of Perkins’ more compact Ramist system. This, however, is joined to a “hermeneutical principle” and “the use of reason” yielding a doctrinal formulation categorised as an English Puritan theology as well as a Reformed scholastic system.\(^{16}\) Our investigation following both the order and pattern of this mild fourfold structure (in the organisation of this thesis) from this chapter to the end will demonstrate the whole structural convergence of theology and piety at “the macro level” of the scholastic method in the seventeenth century, moving beyond the definitional and (typical) \textit{quaestio} style while at the same time remaining more focused on Charnock. In this examination the relationship of each section exegetical, doctrinal, elenctic, and practical is preserved.\(^{17}\)

In summary, throughout the following five chapters, we shall meet in Charnock (and Perkins) a solid combination of the trinitarian knowledge of God and the doctrine of God’s existence and attributes on the basis of a strong Christology and federalism, coupled with firm exegetical evidence and a more extended structure. We will see not only that this characteristic of their theological formulations was enhanced and developed from Perkins’ work in the early orthodox English Reformed doctrine of God to Charnock’s high orthodox theological system within the clear boundary of the tradition of Puritan piety, but also that the core framework or “matrix” of their system was not altered.

\textit{I. The Existence of God & Practical Atheism}

On the whole, the Reformed scholastic’s discussion of the knowledge of God’s existence is related to the problem of natural theology in its soteriological dimension. The problem of faith and the knowledge of God are closely related with each other in this context because only a “regenerate mind” can correctly understand

\(^{15}\) Cf. \textit{PRRD} III, pp. 222-3; Neele, \textit{The Art of Living to God}, p. 198. As mentioned in chapter one, the importance of the covenantal aspect is the key to understanding this categorisation of the divine attributes: contra Colin Gunton, \textit{Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes} (London: SCM Press, 2002), pp. 89-90.

\(^{16}\) Quotations from \textit{PRRD} III, p. 277; cf. Neele, \textit{The Art of Living to God}, p. 74.

\(^{17}\) On the three levels of scholastic method (micro, meso, and macro), see Neele, \textit{The Art of Living to God}, pp. 93, 128. In this respect there he also refers to Van Asselt and Rouwendal eds., \textit{Inleiding in de Gereformeerde Scholastiek}, (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 1998).
the Scriptural text that reveals the existence of God not as a Being in the purely metaphysical sense but as the living God who is the object of *theologia nostra*.\(^\text{18}\)

Since the return of the discussion of the existence of God in Melanchthon, from Calvin and the early Reformed theologians to the seventeenth century orthodoxy,\(^\text{19}\) the Protestant way of dealing with this theme lays emphasis on an evangelical persuasion aiming at the conversion of the atheist rather than on any speculative dimension. In other words, this is not the “demonstrative” approach that was a marked characteristic of medieval theologians, but a rhetorical and homiletical one aimed toward the congregation and the reader. Nevertheless, the necessary help offered by metaphysics in those days can be traced in the doctrines of the existence, essence, and the attributes of God, although their treatment of the divine virtues and affections and the doctrine of Trinity were based purely upon a soteriological framework alone.\(^\text{20}\)

In the case of Perkins and Charnock, neither of them uses purely logical and demonstrative arguments. As Muller argues, in the Reformed orthodox view especially in the English Puritan context, the question of *An sit Deus* (whether God exists or not) was not a problem of proof but a principle of presupposition for the persuasion of believers. This reflects a preference for Scotistic over Thomistic forms in the proofs, though the proof itself derives its identity initially from medieval Thomism. At the same time the Reformed orthodox sensitivity to the relationship between the knowledge of God’s existence and the problem of sin shows their continuity with the Reformers in terms of views of the knowledge of God.\(^\text{21}\) In short, especially in case of Charnock, the arguments for the existence of God are placed in the initial part of the doctrine of God as an independent theme related to the problem of atheism within the boundary of the whole theological system.\(^\text{22}\) Though Perkins, in the early orthodox context, deals with this theme to a lesser degree of detail than is the case in high orthodoxy, the general characteristic of the Reformed orthodoxy as a


\(^{21}\) Cf. *PRRD* III, pp. 171, 176, 179.

whole was maintained despite the differences of both the historical and theological contexts in each period.

A. Perkins on God’s Existence & the Problem of Atheism

Perkins does not treat the doctrine of God’s existence or the problem of atheism as separate sections in his works. Yet we can find several places where these issues are discussed within the context of the doctrine of knowledge of God. These are to be found throughout his whole works as a vital frame for his ideas. To begin with, Perkins speaks about the evidences for the existence of God in *A Golden Chaine* as follows:

That there is a God, it is evident, 1. by the course of nature: 2. by the nature of the soule of man: 3. by the distinction of things honest and dishonest: 4. by the terror of consciences: 5. by the regiment of civill societies: 6. the order of all causes having ever recourse to some former beginning: 7. the determination of all things to their severall ends: 8. the consent of all men well in their wits.  

We see Perkins places the proof of God’s existence in the initial part of the whole doctrine of God despite its simplicity and brevity. This arises because of the Ramist style of early orthodoxy: his comment on the Scripture and theology is followed by a succinct argument for the existence of God; he also directly goes on to the discussion of names (“Jehovah Elohim”) in Exod. 3:13-14 and the nature of God after this proof. It is notable that Perkins maintains a balance of arguments between the two major approaches (“testimony” and “reason”) to proof based upon the medieval Thomistic style of proof. In fact, among Perkins’ lists of proofs, the 2, 3, 4, 8th correspond to the area of testimony; the 1, 5, 6, 7th come under that of reason. As mentioned before, although he briefly lists the eight kinds of argument without detailed explanation, such treatment also reflects Perkins’ ideas concerning argument

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24 For the various styles of order, and whether they deal with the respective discussion about the existence, essence, names of God or not in early orthodox writers, see *PRRD* III, p. 178. Perkins’ exegetical analysis of such names of God *de facto* covers the whole doctrine of divine existence and the essence of God as well as the Trinity. This shows the importance of exegesis based upon the revealed name of Scripture as the foundation of the doctrine of God in early Reformed orthodoxy; cf. *PRRD* III, pp. 257-8.
25 For persuasion of God’s existence, Perkins refers to the Scriptures as the “testimony” and the frame of the world and a gripping of the conscience as “reason.” See Perkins, *The Foundation of Christian Religion*, in *Workes* I, p. 3. This also shows that Perkins attaches priority to the Scriptures as the primary testimony of God’s existence despite the importance of the role of conscience in this respect; for a detailed account of these two ways of testimony and reason, see *PRRD* III, p. 183.
for the existence of God as the presupposition for theological discussion. The fact that Perkins does not refer to the testimony of Scriptures in his arguments tends to confirm this assessment. We thus note at the outset the dialectics of Thomism and Scotism in both the form and content of the proof of God’s existence within early (and high) English Reformed orthodoxy, in the work of Perkins.26

Perkins’ more detailed dealing with the proof of God’s existence in The whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience (1606) confirms the points mentioned above: the knowledge of God’s existence is not a purely noetical matter but includes the problem of supernatural faith as “a maine ground and principle in all religions” as well as a “caveat premised” beyond nature and reason:27

For this cause I doe not meane to dispute the question, whether there bee a God or no; … but rather my purpose is, in shewing that there is a God, to remoove, or at least to helpe an inward corruption of the soule, that is great and dangerous, whereby the heart and conscience by nature denieth God and his providence.28

We can also appreciate this point in the fact that Perkins goes on to explain the threefold light of revelation (nature, grace, and glory) as the proof of the knowledge of God’s existence.29 From the light of “nature”, five arguments similar to those of the eight proofs in A Golden Chaine are elicited: the creation and frame of the world that had a beginning, the preservation and government of the created world, the soul of man and conscience, the consent of the human heart concerning divine existence, and a certain order of causes following naturally the cause of all causes. Perkins also makes a clear statement about the role of the light of “grace” in a supernatural dimension in relation to the evidences of Scripture. He writes: “This gives a further confirmation, then nature doth. For the light of nature in onely a way or preparation to faith; But this light serves to beget faith, and causeth us to believe there is a God.”30 Furthermore, from the light of “glory”, we receive a full and perfect vision

26 Throughout this thesis, the “dialectics of Thomism and Scotism” basically indicates (as we explained in detail in the second chapter) the balance of nature and grace or reason and revelation on the basis of the priority of grace and revelation over nature and reason in its salvific power.
30 The Cases of Conscience, in Workes II, p. 52. At the same time Perkins stresses the limit of the knowledge of the existence of God from both nature and grace in ibid., p. 53: “Such is our sight and
of God’s existence that allows us to see God face to face beyond the vision of grace and nature. In brief, for Perkins, the knowledge of God’s existence is also a concept that should deepen according to the increase of the knowledge of God in the believer within the context of faith and sanctification on the “pilgrim’s road” to heaven.

In addition to the characteristics mentioned above, the relationship between conscience and atheism is also noteworthy in Perkins’ idea of the proof of God’s existence.\(^{31}\) For Perkins, conscience has the two-fold role of giving testimony and judgment (Rom.1:15). Conscience also provides three points of knowledge in terms of testimony: God’s existence, the special providence of God, and God’s goodness and love to man;\(^{32}\) atheism maintained in the face of the witness of conscience is common to every sinful man as both a proneness, and the result of “the natural cogitations”. In *Mans Naturall Imaginations* (1606), Perkins investigates the reality of such atheism against conscience seen in the light of a hamartiology of the post-fall state. Referring to Ps. 10:4 and 14:1 exegetically, like Calvin,\(^ {33}\) he states:

> Wherby he gives us to understand, that the *foole* there mentioned, must be understood of every naturall man. But it will be said, that it is ingrafted in mans nature to hold & think there is a God, and therefore every man doth not deny God in his heart. Answ. Wee must know that these two thoughts, *There is a God*, & *there is no God*, may be, and are both in one & the same heart: the same man, that by the light of nature thinketh there is a God, may by that corruption and darknes of mind that came by Adams fall, think there is no God: … as light and darkness in the same house: heate and colde in the same bodie.\(^ {34}\)

The human paradox of such a double-faced attitude toward the existence of God in the natural imagination necessarily makes oneself transform the true God into an idol, otherwise this may result in a denial of providence or the attributes of God despite vague consent about absolute being. At the same time, according to Perkins, this atheism can be categorised as both “Atheism in practice” (an outward believer as hypocrite, Epicurism, and witchcraft) and “Atheism in judgment” (the religion of

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Concerning the “Romanists”, he criticises their doctrinal error as harmful, targeting them with depth and clarity as the main opponent of Christianity as true religion. Within a similar context, Perkins seeks to categorise in detail the practices of atheism: a sheer atheism against conscience, the people who worship a false God, those who worship the true God but in a false manner, and “Protestant Atheists” who deny God in their words and deeds. Accordingly, for Perkins, the examination of one’s heart for the mortification of sins is vital for spiritual health because such an atheistic attitude might emerge anytime, even in the Protestant believer. In fact he does not forget to emphasise the importance of the use of the means of grace to search the heart, ultimately pointing to the true faith at a more elaborate level in the existence of God.

In brief, in Perkins’ schema, the doctrine of conscience, faith, and the existence of God, and the problem of atheism are inextricably linked with each other. The practical true religion operates within the dialectic between natural knowledge of God and supernatural theology as well as that of Thomism and Scotism. The doctrinal matrix of God’s existence and the problem of atheism in Perkins are placed within such a context.

B. Charnock’s Exegesis regarding God’s Existence & the Problem of Atheism

Charnock unfolds his arguments on both God’s existence and atheism based upon Ps. 14:1 just as Calvin and Perkins had chosen it as one of the exegetical bases of their arguments. He thus attempts to clarify the meaning of this verse in a manner strongly reflecting Calvin’s exegesis of the same text. Charnock first

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35 Mans Naturall Imaginations, in Workes II, pp. 460-1; cf. Perkins, A Reformed Catholike, in Workes I, p. 618. Here Perkins divides atheism into both “open atheism” denying God as well as His word totally and “coloured atheism” that precisely corresponds to “atheism in judgment”. Again, for Perkins, these three opponents are no different from the atheists because they deny the fundamental articles of orthodox Christianity, e.g., Trinity and Christology (especially the Roman Catholics).

36 A Commentary upon the 11. Chap. to the Hebr., in Workes III (ii), pp. 30-1.

37 Perkins mentions three signs of such an evil atheism in the individual: a disordered life, not calling on the names of God by prayer, and condemning of trust in God, Mans Naturall Imaginations in Workes II, p. 462; cf. The Combate of the Flesh and Spirit, in Workes I, p. 472. Here he emphasises the same point in terms of the growth of godliness.

38 A Commentary upon the 11. Chap. to the Hebr., in Workes III (ii), p. 31: “Let us therefore goe to God by earnest prayer, to give us his Spirit to worke true faith in our hearts, and to make us of a true believe. … Let us all look narrowly to our selves, and join with our profession, conscience and obedience: for else the more we know God, the worse we are. … Wee want that true faith, which must proseff God, not in judgement alone, but in practice.”

39 “The fool has said in his heart, there is no God; they have done abominable works; there is none that doth good”; cf. Perkins, Mans Naturall Imaginations, in Workes II, p. 459.

40 PRRD III, p. 180; cf. Calvin, Commentay upon the Book of Psalms, 14:1.
maintains that Adam’s fall caused the corruption of the human soul’s faculties in the heart that results in the denial of God’s existence. Yet this corruption inherited from original sin does not preclude the function of human rational faculties but takes away “grace” in the faculties for the proper use of it against atheism.\textsuperscript{41} Citing Cocceius, Charnock then classifies this atheism into three groups exhibiting such deficiency in the faculties of the soul: \textit{quoad existentiam} (those who are absolute atheists), \textit{quoad providentiam} (those who deny divine providence), and \textit{quoad naturam} (those who deny divine attributes).\textsuperscript{42} At another level, along with the background knowledge of etymology and classical philosophy of both Diagoras and Protagoras, Charnock verifies that “God” as the object of atheism in the Ps. 14:1 does not indicate “Jehovah” as the supreme being, but rather “Elohim” as providential God.\textsuperscript{43}

Such exegetical observation shows that Charnock seeks to focus primarily on clarifying the identity of “practical atheism”, which is in the second and third cases of atheism according to his taxonomy, within both anthropological and soteriological backgrounds. In summary, while Perkins observes the paradox of the human state after the fall concerning the knowledge of God’s existence by pointing out the role of conscience, Charnock finds the same problem of practical atheism but bases his discussion upon richer exegetical, linguistic, and literary sources than Perkins in this section of exegesis.

\textbf{C. Charnock’s Doctrine of God’s Existence & the Problem of Atheism: Merely Scholastic “Rationalism?”}

As the arguments for the existence of God are used originally for the refutation of atheism in Charnock’s schema, we see that the discussion of the proofs and atheism frequently rotate and overlap with each other in this section within the

\textsuperscript{41} Charnock analyses the word “fool” etymologically in Hebrew affirming that the atheist is not the person lacking in reason but one who abuses it. Such an inconsistency between “head” and “heart” concerning the existence of God becomes an important feature of practical atheism for Charnock; cf. \textit{PRRD} III, p. 180; on the detailed accounts of the different state in human knowledge of God between the ante-fall and the post-fall, see John Owen, \textit{Biblical Theology: The History of Theology from Adam to Christ}, trans. Stephen Westcott (Morgan: Soli Deo Gloria, 1994).

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Works} I, p. 127. This shows that Charnock arguably has the Romanists, Socinians, and Arminians in his mind as the objects of his anti-atheism within the context of the metaphysical relationship between God and creatures. On Cocceius’ view of the arguments for the existence of God and the problem of atheism, see Willem Van Asselt, \textit{The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius} (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 145-55.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Works} I, pp. 126-7. This point also indicates that the Reformed orthodoxy used the various names of God in the Scriptures as doctrinal and polemical bases of the existence, essence, and attributes of God against theological opponents in their arguments. We have already seen the same tendency in Perkins earlier. For more general explanation of the names of God in the wider Reformed tradition, see \textit{PRRD} III, pp. 246-70.
context of the knowledge of God. Though it is distinct from a strictly logical form like that of Aquinas, Charnock at the outset affirms the value of proofs of the existence of God in three dimensions without losing the exegetical basis, especially against the various practical atheists:

first, knowledge of God obtained from neither nature nor reason can be denied; second, there is no “principium” of religion without the existence of God; third, the knowledge obtained by these demonstrations is useful for the growth of effectual belief and piety in a practical aspect.

There is a natural as well as a revealed knowledge, and the book of creatures is legible in declaring the being of God, as well as the Scriptures are in declaring the nature of a God; there are outward objects in the world, and common principles in the conscience; whence it may be inferred. … God, in regard of his existence, is not only the discovery of faith, but of reason. … Faith supposeth natural knowledge, as grace supposeth nature. Faith indeed is properly of things above reason, purely depending upon revelation. What can be demonstrated by natural light is not so properly the object of faith, though in regard of the addition of a certainty by revelation it is so.

Adding Scriptural testimony in Rom. 1:19-20 and Heb. 11:6 to the demonstration of natural revelation (as “a minimal sensus divinitatis”) in human existence as the evidences for the existence of God, Charnock seeks to explain both the tension and harmony between nature and grace in the knowledge of God. In fact the relationship of faith and reason as well as grace and nature in this understanding of the existence of God seems essentially Thomistic in its epistemology. He refers directly to Aquinas in his argument. Charnock’s comment on the compatible relation between philosophy and divinity also confirms this presumption. In addition, he even maintains that the Scripture supports the reality of natural theology by referring to Rom. 1:19, Act. 14:15-6, 17:27-29, and Job 38-40: the evidence of scriptural revelation must

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44 This fact can be also regarded as the double continuity and discontinuity of Charnock from both Aquinas and Calvin in the form and intention of proofs of the existence of God in terms of the use of scholastic tools for arguments. For the detail, see PRRD III, pp. 173-4.
45 Works I, pp. 129-30. At this practical point, Charlock again shows the influence of Cocceius in the Continent by referring to his Summa.
46 Works I, p. 130.
47 Quotation form PRRD III, p. 182.
48 Works I, p. 131: “It is but one truth in philosophy and divinity, that what is false in one cannot be true in another. Truth, in what appearance soever, doth never contradict itself. And this is so convincing an argument of the existence of God, …” However, he points out the limit of both human nature and the human predicament in their noetic dimension after the fall according to the anti-Pelagian tradition in soteriological view. See also p. 130: “Men, under the conscience of sin, … cannot act toward him [God] as an object of faith. … Nature does not shew any way to a sinner how to reconcile God’s provoked justice with his tenderness.”
presuppose the existence of a revealer who is God. This is consistent, of course, with the Reformed scholastic critique of the Socinians who denied any natural knowledge of God outside the revelation of the Scripture based upon a radical Biblicism.\textsuperscript{49} Apparently the “critical” adoption of both a medieval and Suarezian metaphysical framework was also necessary in Charnock’s discussions of the natural revelation of God.\textsuperscript{50} In short, as is the case with the overall tendency of Reformed orthodoxy, Charnock’s proof of God’s existence also takes on the role of a foundational assumption along with the discussion of theological prolegomena and the doctrine of Scripture. This is in order to accommodate the doctrine of God’s attributes and His trinitarian acts both \textit{ad intra} and \textit{ad extra} within the covenantal structure of his whole theological system.

Given the above, in Charnock’s schema, the proof of the existence of God moves forward in four directions: evidences of universal consent in history, arguments from Scripture as well as from human natural reason, anthropological analysis of human nature, and extraordinary events in the world beyond the understanding of human reason.\textsuperscript{51} According to the two major categories of proof mentioned earlier in the case of Perkins, Charnock’s first and third proofs (universal consent, human nature) are more rhetorical, and based upon “testimony”; the second and fourth (natural reason, miracles) are proofs from “reason”, though the second proof shows his view of the priority of scriptural testimony over reason by beginning the argument from scriptural evidences prior to that from reason.\textsuperscript{52} To be sure these four directions of proof do not belong to an a priori category but to that of “faith and doctrine” inferred from a posteriori results.\textsuperscript{53}

Let us proceed to the details of the proof. In the first proof, the existence of “the natural sentiment of a God” is illustrated by the fact that there has been no question about “the existence of a Supreme Being” as “a first cause”, but rather about \textit{what} it is: “It is impossible that nature can naturally and universally lie; … A general

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{PRRD} III, p. 182; Turretin, \textit{Institutes}, vol. I, pp. 6, 311-4.

\textsuperscript{50} The influence of the Spanish Jesuit thinker Francis Suarez (1548-1617) on later Reformed orthodox theology was very wide, in terms of his seeing divine attributes as divine “actions” in the created world: e.g., in the work of Charnock and Owen. For a detailed account, see Carl Trueman, \textit{John Owen: Reformed Catholic, Renaissane Man} (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 19, 38, 43-4, 46. In this respect, Colin Gunton’s failure to make a distinction between the traditional idea of God’s attributes in the category of negative theology and the Puritan attributes of God emphasising the \textit{ad extra} dimension becomes clearer again.

\textsuperscript{51} We need to investigate in detail the former three of them here related to the arguments of our thesis.

\textsuperscript{52} Cf. \textit{PRRD} III, p. 183.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{PRRD} III, pp. 170-1.
consent of all nations is to be esteemed as a law of nature.” Charnock also deals with the problem of whether innate human knowledge of God exists or not in the same context:

It is so natural that every man is born with a restless instinct to be of some kind of religion or other, which implies some object of religion. The impression of a deity is as common as reason, and of the same age with reason. It is a relic of knowledge after the fall of Adam, like fire under ashes, which sparkles as soon as ever the heap of ashes is open, a notion sealed up in the soul of every man.

At the same time it is noteworthy that Charnock shows a somewhat flexible attitude in his understanding of this “post-fall knowledge” of God, because it adds to the persuasiveness of his argument concerning God’s existence by reflecting some aspect of natural theology (which does not reach the salvific level), namely he appears to integrate the various ideas of post-fall knowledge of God. He acknowledges pre-existent notions in the fallen human heart but these are not “innate”, i.e. they do not precede all the ideas formed in the natural mind post factum, but are present as an “implanted inward principle”. In short, Charnock proves God’s existence through a combination of metaphysical argument with an understanding of the relationship between Creator and creatures and the undeniable evidences of ‘the seed of religion’ within human life in its post-fall state.

In the second proof, after a brief examination of the perspicuity of the scriptural evidences (Rom. 1:19-20; Gen. 1:24; Ps. 8:1, 104:2, 19:1-2; Job 31:25, 27), Charnock goes on to deal with the argument from natural reason concerning the existence of God. As Muller argues, within the overall tendency of the Reformed

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54 Works I, pp. 133-5. He refers to a French philosopher and scientist Gassendi (1592-1655) and Cicero (106 BC- 43 BC) in this argument, which shows that Charnock was conversant with philosophy, natural science, and classics as the inheritor of the intellectual milieu of the Renaissance in both content and rhetoric.

55 For the summary of the views of Aquinas, late medieval nominalists, Armniius, Suarez, and Vorstius on this point, see Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, pp. 90-1.

56 Works I, p. 137.

57 Works I, p. 137: “So that the notion of a God seems to be twisted with the nature of man, and is the first natural branch of common reason, or upon either the first inspection of a man into himself and his own state and constitution, or upon the first sight of any external visible object. Nature within man, and nature without man, agree upon the first meeting together to form this sentiment, that there is a God. … If this be not born with us, yet the exercise of reason, essential to man, settles it as a certain maxim;”

58 Works I, p. 138.

59 Cf. Calvin, Institutes, I, ch. 3-5.

60 In this argument we again note the influence of continental theologians (especially French and Dutch) on Charnock; seen in the reference of Jean Daille (1594-1670), Dionysous Petavius (1583-
orthodox proofs of God’s existence from “reason”, Charnock’s emphasis upon rhetorical persuasion is consistent, even if he exhibits an a posteriori style not strictly based upon Aquinas’ five ways. He focuses, above all, on drawing conclusions about God as “the first cause” on the basis of the traditional metaphysics of medieval scholasticism. The beginning of the world and its creatures ought to be explained by the structures of “cause” and “effect” as a chain of acts; there must be a “first way” in which matter is formed, without any relationship to other being. Needless to say, the creatures can neither make themselves and the world nor create any other creature without matter, which means that they are neither eternal nor perfect because “nothing can act before it be”. In addition, the post-fall state of depravity in human soul also demonstrates the falsity of the atheist who claims the spontaneous existence of it.

Therefore, according to Charnock, we need to postulate an “uncreated being” as “the cause of the matter.” The “eternally existent” is to be the first cause as well as the “cause of itself”. Such an “infinite, eternal, independent being” is called God who has “some nature above all those, of inconceivable perfection”: Even so, Charnock does not forget to refer to the fundamental significance of the aforementioned scriptural evidences that support a conclusion concerning God as the first cause. The theorem of the existence of God according to reason does not conflict with this. Moreover, the harmony and constant order of the created world in production and preservation reflects the existence of both the infinite wisdom and power of the Creator. He appoints them to move toward “some end” they do not know: “If nature be restrained by another, it hath a superior; if not, it is a free agent: it is an understanding being that directs them.”

In the third proof, Charnock seeks to illustrate the evidences of God’s existence in the human body and the psychological faculties. The argument from the analysis of the nature of the soul, i.e., “understanding, will, judgment, memory, imagination” as the light of the reflection of the image of God, is especially

1652), and Cocceius.
62 Works I, p. 146.
63 Works I, pp. 149-50.
64 See Works I, pp. 147, 151.
65 Works I, p. 160.
important for Charnock. The fact that he recounts in detail the relationship between
the reflections of human conscience and the existence of God in terms of the
knowledge of the law of nature in the post-fall state is also worth noting. For the
overall Reformed position, including Perkins and Charnock, the knowledge of God
obtained by the mind (as a faculty of the soul) and objective “natural light” affirms
the same knowledge as is obtained by conscience.\textsuperscript{67} The conscience builds a bridge
between the human heart and the saving knowledge of God: “Conscience is the
foundation of all religion; and the two pillars upon which it is built, are the being
of God, and the bounty of God to those that diligently seek him, Heb. xi. 6.”\textsuperscript{68}
Charnock even argues not only that the operation of conscience confirms the
characteristics of various divine attributes,\textsuperscript{69} but that human beings cannot limit or
control the acting of it by their own will because of its God-given authority.

In brief, Reformed orthodox and Puritan arguments for the existence of God
do not arise from the type of rationalism characteristic of the eighteenth century. This
rationalism attempted to replace “grace” and supernatural theology as the foundation
of theology with that of “nature” and natural theology as “a necessary prolegomenon
to revealed theology.” Instead, the Reformed approach which Charnock and others
adopt is a homiletical, exhortative, and rhetorical means of evangelical persuasion for
the believer who uses the resources of “nature” on the basis of “grace”.\textsuperscript{70}
Seventeenth century scholasticism was, then, not a mediate way towards a pure
natural theology based upon rationalism.

We can confirm this thesis by exploring Charnock’s second treatise on the
exegetical basis of Ps. 14:1, titled \textit{Practical Atheism}. In this work, he primarily seeks
to expand the doctrine of divine existence in relation to both hamartiology and the
doctrines of regeneration and sanctification.\textsuperscript{71} Charnock deals especially with the
practical dimension of the doctrine by calling attention to the sinfulness of the human
heart, which is the result of the corruption of the faculties of the soul. At the
beginning, like Perkins, he points out that the human being, after Adam’s fall, stands
paradoxically in an in-between state of “practical atheism”. This corresponds to both

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{PRRD} III, pp. 171, 186; Leigh, \textit{Treatise}, II.i , pp. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Works} I, p. 169.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Works} I, p. 169: “The accusations of conscience evidence the omniscience and the holiness of God;
the terrors of conscience, the justice of God; the approbations of conscience, the goodness of God. All
the order in the world owes itself, next to the providence of God, to conscience”; cf. \textit{PRRD} III, pp.
186-7; Leigh, \textit{Treatise}, II.i (p. 6); Turretin, \textit{Institutes}, vol. I, pp. 173-4; Calvin, \textit{Institutes}, I.iii.2 (pp.
44-5).
\textsuperscript{70} See also \textit{PRRD} I, p. 306; \textit{PRRD} III, pp. 192-3.
\textsuperscript{71} Cf. \textit{PRRD} III, p. 179.
the second and third position according to his taxonomy. This in-between state neither corroborates the inexistence of God nor naturally maintains “reverence of God” in the heart with the idea of God in the head.\textsuperscript{72} With regard to this practical atheism, Charnock goes on to examine the relationship in the unregenerate between sin, conscience, the law, and a secret atheism that neglects both the law and revelation as “the mind and will of God”. He makes it clear that, for the person in such a state of natural corruption, the “deep conviction” followed by the “quickening (of) their affections” penetrating the heart is totally impossible without the work of the Holy Spirit that ultimately ends the dominance of the carnal heart.\textsuperscript{73} For Charnock, there is no substantial cessation of the dominance of practical atheism in human life without regeneration. Within such a context Charnock’s contrast between justifying faith and the reality of atheism represented by the “contempt of God” and the law represents his attempt to relate the doctrine of the existence and the attributes of God to the problem of practical atheism:

Those graces [should be] in the heart, which most exalt God, debase man, and bring men to the lowest subjection to their Creator. Such is the doctrine and grace of justifying faith. … In the slight of his precepts, his essential perfections are slighted. In disowning his will as a rule, we disown all those attributes which flow from his will, as goodness, righteousness, and truth. … Every law, though it proceeds from the will of the lawgiver, and doth formally consist in an act of the will, yet it doth presuppose an act of the understanding.\textsuperscript{74}

In other words, only the grace of justifying faith can make an unregenerate discard contempt for God as well as gaining insight into the “spiritual sense” of the law. As shown above, Charnock verifies the significance of the law in a logical sense. The law acts upon the human heart in relation to the role of conscience regardless of whether one is in the state of regeneration or not, despite the different dynamics between them. Based upon the background of the idea of covenant of works in relation to the role of the law that shows the mercy of God in a soteriological dimension, Charnock also maintains that the original purpose of giving the law in a historical and relational sense was for communication between God as rule-giver and

\textsuperscript{72} For detailed discussion on practical atheists since the early Reformation and Renaissance, see Lucien Febre, \textit{The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century}, trans. Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); cf. \textit{PRRD} III, p. 171.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Works} I, pp. 194, 195.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Works} I, pp. 198-9.
humanity as obedient moral beings. On the one hand, (in a natural sense for the unregenerate), conscience sets up and evokes the boundary of natural law, which is the inexcusable evidence of the existence of God, in both our mind and in consequent actions. On the other hand, an evangelical sense of divine law is infused as a *habitus* into the heart of the regenerate, which means that the soul’s faculties are reset for the renewed self in order to live according to the spiritually ingrafted moral law by the grace of God. In brief, Charnock sets up an integral understanding of the law and gospel as the one necessary pivot for the believer. They point to the life of sanctification that mortifies the remnants of practical atheism after the new birth as well as producing regeneration according to the order of salvation.

Nevertheless, at this point, we find that Charnock designates the deviant act of “self-love” as the root of such practical atheism, which is contrary to true godliness and self-denial. It is thus worth addressing here his analysis of “a threefold self-love” to draw out the sin inseparable from atheism, which he understands on the basis of natural, carnal, and a gracious self-love. “Natural” self-love comes from the law of nature planted in humanity. This is necessary, as well as neutral, because we cannot love others without this essential love. “Carnal” self-love results from original sin causing all the descendants of Adam to “love himself above God” — focusing only on their own self-interest without considering the divine honour (this concept is similar to the Augustinian idea of *uti* — love of “use”). A “gracious” self-love arises from the divine grace of regeneration that makes human beings react to God’s original purpose of creation by giving priority to the honour of God over the self. Among them, of course, Charnock’s interest lies in providing both an exegetical as well as a doctrinal explanation about carnal, inordinate, and universal self-love in the post-fall situation, which exists *de facto* as “self-idolatry” and leads to practical atheism. In other words, in Charnock’s view, sin, self, and atheism are one in the hamartiological context.

At the same time, in the light of a rather pessimistic anthropology, he lists

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75 For example, *Works* I, p. 202: “Never did any law of God meet with so much opposition as Christianity, which was the design of God from the first promise to the exhibiting [of] the Redeemer, and from thence to the end of the world.”
76 *Works* I, p. 212.
78 *Works* I, p. 224.
79 *Works* I, p. 224: “No sin is committed as sin, but as it pretends a self-satisfaction. Sin indeed may well be termed a man’s self, because it is, since the loss of original righteousness, the form that overspreads every part of souls. … Sin and self are one. What is called a ‘living to sin’ in one place, Rom. vi., is called a living to self in another: 2 Cor. v. 15, ‘That they that live should not live unto themselves.’”
numerous, practical, atheistic misdeeds of believers based upon self-love. These operate mostly by way of changing the order of priority between God and the creature.\textsuperscript{80} According to Charnock, this tendency (not entirely free from practical atheism) in the believer, despite new birth, can only be overcome by the faithful practice of religious duties through the means of grace. This is another necessary practice to mortify the inner remnants of practical atheism, to be balanced by a fervent hope for the renewal of “spiritual communications” with God.\textsuperscript{81} This, of course, could also be construed as the necessity of human participation on a covenantal basis, though not in a synergistic way, in the God-decreed causal chains of being. These operate within the boundary of the metaphysical structure between the infinite Creator and finite rational creatures. As mentioned in the exegetical section, this also seems to indicate traces of both Thomism and a late medieval Scotism reflected here in the Reformed view.\textsuperscript{82} The contrast, however, between self-love as the representation of “the great Anti-Christ” and Christ’s self-denial in the work of redemption also shows Charnock’s Christ-centered understanding of the problem of practical atheism even though he uses both an ontological and noetical framework in doctrinal argument.\textsuperscript{83}

In brief, Charnock shows that the true knowledge of the existence of God comes only through the incessant subjugation of the practically atheistic attitude. This does not completely disappear even in the believer who is embarked upon a \textit{theologia viatorum} in this world. In this doctrinal section, we can preliminarily conclude that Charnock deals with God’s existence and the problem of atheism in a single context on the basis of soteriological, hamartiological, covenantal, trinitarian, and christological elements from the whole range of theological \textit{loci}.

**D. Charnock’s Praxis of God’s Existence & the Problem of Atheism:**

**Rhetoric in the Context of Faith**

In the practical part of Charnock’s arguments concerning God’s existence, it is notable that he asserts the perniciousness of atheism by various rhetorical

\textsuperscript{80} For detailed discussion, see \textit{Works} I, pp. 217-23, 229-46.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Works} I, p. 237: “If there be no delight in the means that lead to God, there is no delight in God himself, because love is \textit{appetitus unionis}, a desire of union; and where the object is desirable, the means that brings us to it would be delightful too.”

\textsuperscript{82} For example, \textit{Works} I, p. 216: “The honour of every rational creature consists in the service of the First Cause of his being; as the welfare of every creature consists in the orders and proportionable motion of its members, according to the law of its creation.”

\textsuperscript{83} See \textit{Works} I, pp. 211-2.
enunciations in continuity with the doctrinal part. For instance, we see this feature especially at the outset from the comparison between the atheist and the heathen:

Are not such worse than heathens? They worshipped many gods, these none; they preserved a notion of God in the world under a disguise of images, these would banish him both from earth and heaven, and demolish the statues of him in their own consciences; they degraded him, these would destroy him; they coupled creatures with him—Rom. i. 25, … And these would make him worse than a creature, a mere nothing. … Atheism is a persuasion, which finds no footing anywhere else.  

As mentioned earlier, such rhetorical and persuasive expressions apparently show Charnock’s fundamental purpose for using the proof of God’s existence: i.e., one should accept the existence, providence, and attributes of God (the three elements) properly based upon the “evangelical” proofs of the existence of God in order to be better than heathen. In so doing, to combat an unreasonable atheism “in a debauched and sceptic age”, Charnock stresses firm knowledge of the existence of God in its practical dimension. In fact true worship of God is impossible without this knowledge because it is the basis of “the whole frame of religion” leading to proper acts of piety. Furthermore, the knowledge of God’s existence is essential in that it is directly linked to the meaning of Scriptures as the noetic foundation of our theology.

At this juncture, Charnock reiteratively emphasises the necessity of obtaining knowledge of God through the creatures that provide the material for natural argument. The reason for this repetition seems to have come from his stress upon both the harmony of nature and grace in the knowledge of God’s existence and the priority of grace over nature practically. He identifies the relationship of nature and grace with that of “the book of creation” and “the book of redemption”: the latter element (grace and the book of redemption) of each relationship does not reject the former. According to Charnock, Scripture itself confirms this datum, e.g.: “That

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84 Works I, p. 176.  
85 Works I, p. 179.  
86 Works I, p. 180: “The belief of a God must necessarily precede the belief of any revelation; the latter cannot take place without the former as the foundation.”  
87 Works I, p. 181: “Had he not shewn himself in his creatures, he could never have shewn in his Christ. The order of things required it. God must be read wherever he is legible. … Though the appearance of God in the one be clearer than in the other, yet neither is to be neglected”; cf. Muller, PRRD III, pp. 180-1; Baxter, Divine Life, Lii, pp. 14-7.
whole psalm is a lecture of creation and providence”. Accordingly, the relationship between Scripture and nature is also to be viewed affirmatively in revelation. Scripture leads us to the knowledge of God’s attributes by “ beholding the glory of God with praise” in nature, as well as to the saving knowledge of God. While criticising “essential” atheism (denying the first element among the above mentioned three) concerning the denial of the existence of God, Charnock also argues that true religion, accompanied by both knowledge and the act of worship, is by no means contradictory to “reason”. In summary, Charnock explained our natural knowledge of God based upon the Thomistic understanding of the relationship between God and the rational creature — despite its absolute dependence upon God’s varied revelation as a noetic foundation of Puritan practical divinity focusing on the emphasis of spiritual worship in a supernatral dimension.

Nevertheless, as mentioned in the doctrinal section on practical atheism, such undeniable evidence of the existence of God in the human heart cannot dispense with the necessity of regeneration and sanctification. The indwelling of an atheistical nature in human life, within flesh not yet finally redeemed is also incontestable: Charnock seeks to give an expanded answer in the practical section. In fact, such an indwelling of atheism is the reason why both conversion and mortification are quite difficult. To release the faculties of the soul from ‘chains of darkness’ which holds the soul in a state of practical atheism before regeneration (this corresponds to the second and third positions – i.e. denying divine providence and the attributes of God), the infusion of “a supernatural principle” is necessary, i.e., the restoration of “the sanctifying Spirit” that enables us to live “a supernatural life” before God.

Of course Charnock stresses the sovereignty of God in each stage of the ordo salutis: for the human being living under the dominance of the practically atheistic nature, there is no justification before God without a monergistic operation of divine grace along with “the best and strongest works of nature”. At another level, practical atheism also confirms the doctrine of perseverance in the sense that apostasy occurs in an outward believer who is not of the elect but is, instead, a practical atheist. In many ways, the following summarises Charnock’s argument well:

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88 Works I, p. 181.
89 See Works I, p. 182: “He were not reasonable if he were not religious; because by neglecting religion, he neglects the chiepest dictate of reason.”
Man by nature would annihilate God and deity himself; the gospel glorifies God and annihilates man. … The gospel shews ourselves to be an object of humiliation, and God to be a glorious object for our imitation. The light of nature tells us there is a God; the gospel gives us a more magnificent report of him. The light of nature condemns gross atheism, and that of the gospel condemns and conquers *spiritual atheism* in the hearts of men.91

To put it another way, Charnock examines the relationship between practical atheism and “spiritual” atheism quoted above. He places them within the context of the relationship between the state of nature and the state of grace. Such a spiritual atheist was nothing less than the “protestant atheist” Perkins criticises. Our humiliation is necessary for the termination of the prevalent dominance of practical atheism; our imitation of the Triune God as His image is vital for sanctification since it mortifies the sins of spiritual atheism. If the regenerate infused by “grace” still has the traces of practical atheism, according to Charnock, “who is not so [a practical atheist] by nature?”92 As stated in the previous doctrinal section, he also presents the answers to the question as to the way of mortifying spiritual atheism through various means of grace God gives to us.93 This consists chiefly of the study of Scripture as the means both to know the divine will and mind in the revelation of God and to conform ourselves to it.94 Again, we see that this could be regarded as the substantial purpose of Charnock’s entire teachings on the existence of God and atheism practically applied in the sanctified life.

In summary, Charnock *de facto* has sought to explore the problem of practical atheism in relation to the arguments for the existence of God with that of mortification of sins in a more practically focused dimension within the boundary of the discussions of the knowledge of God. At the same time Charnock’s treatment of this theme has nothing to do with a rationalism like the Wolffian or Cartesian form of proof that depends on an innate idea of God.95 Charnock’s work here operates as the initial, rhetorical, and persuasive foundation for the arguments for the doctrine of the

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91 *Works* I, p. 251. The italics are mine.
92 *Works* I, p. 251. The italics are mine; cf. *Works* I, p. 254: “But what plea can man have for his practical atheism, who lives by his power, is sustained by his bounty, and solicited by his Spirit?”
93 *Works* I, p. 255: “Watch against this atheism, and be daily employed in the mortification of it. … Without some degree of the mortification of these, we cannot make profitable and comfortable approaches to God.”
94 *Works* I, p. 256: “We can have no delight in meditation on him unless we know him, and we cannot know him but by the means of his revelation. … Let, therefore, the subtleties of reason veil to the doctrine of faith, and the humour of the will to the command of the word.”
95 For a detailed explanation of eighteenth century rationalism in this respect, see *PRRD* III, pp. 182, 192-5.
essence and attributes of God that we will investigate in later discussions.

II. Divine Spirituality & Spiritual Worship

Before moving on to the discussion of the doctrine of God’s spirituality, we need to see the preparatory definitions by the Puritan and Reformed orthodox theologians of divine essence, perfections, properties, and attributes in relation to the way of “predication” in theological language. They endeavoured to avoid tension between revelation and metaphysics in speaking of God at the highest level. At the same time they kept in mind the axiom finitum non capax infiniti.96 Thus the divine attributes can be defined as “the perfections according to which God manifests himself to us and overcomes ‘the defect of our capacity, who are not able to understand that which is known of God under one name or act of understanding’”.97 Regarding the nuances of these terms, an “attribute” indicates a performance of a logical task regardless of one’s actual properties; “perfection” indicates that such predication corresponds to the very actual properties of it. While secular philosophy, focusing on “Being”, mainly assumes simple subjectivity and a logical dimension to this problem, Reformed orthodoxy sees no inconsistency between logical predication and real attributes by assuming “an intrinsic quality or property” in God.98

In other words, the assumption of a subject “materially the same” which has a “formal” difference in its predications (not in a merely tautological sense) was necessary for the Reformed orthodox discussions of the attributes of God.99 The purpose of this struggle in examining the attributes of God, despite a recognition of the imperfections of theological language, marked the growth of a deep piety: the “praxis” element of each attribute in their system was crucial in this respect.100 We thus need to perceive the simultaneous consideration of both “the transcendence and

96 PRRD I, p. 196. Muller paraphrases this axiom excellently as the “foundational distinction between the essential or necessary existence of God and the contingent, caused, and composite nature of creatures,” in ibid., p. 193.
97 PRRD I, p. 195, citing from Edward Leigh, A System or Body of Divinity (London, 1662), II. i. p. 160. Thus, the problem of divine accommodation becomes an issue to be dealt with in all the discussions of the doctrine of divine attributes because of this disproportionality between God and humanity.
99 PRRD III, pp. 197-8.
100 PRRD III, p. 205.
the relationality of God” in the discussion of divine attributes.\textsuperscript{101} This stress on the piетistic dimension in dealing with the attributes of God continued despite the diversity in enumeration of the attributes from the Reformers through early orthodoxy in Ramist form to high orthodoxy itself.\textsuperscript{102}

The importance of the spirituality of God lies in the fact that it is usually located as the first attribute in the light of God’s essence as both an incorporeal and invisible spirit. Although Perkins sees all other essential attributes of God derived from the arguments for the simplicity of God, many other English reformed theologians, including Charnock, deemed spirituality as the primary attribute for discussion.\textsuperscript{103} Nevertheless, as the relationship of divine simplicity, spirituality, and other essential attributes overlap in some way based upon the essential unity of God, the order of discussion in each individual theologian’s system is not so significant. Rather, what was more important than order is, arguably, the flexible adaptation of notions derived from divine aseity to a more practically and Scotistically focused treatment in “the working of God ad extra, in his self-revelation.”\textsuperscript{104} We will see that this was achieved without losing the balance of the knowledge of the Trinity ad intra and trinitarian theology ad extra. We will also examine the relationship of spirituality and worship in Perkins and Charnock as the hallmark of true religion. This relationship organically connects doctrine with praxis, although there are delicate distinctions in the respective arguments because of the change of both historical and theological circumstances between early and high orthodoxy.

\textbf{A. Perkins on the Spirituality of God & Spiritual Worship}

In his \textit{A Golden Chaine}, to begin with, Perkins explains the essence, perfection, and the nature of God before dealing with all the attributes of God respectively: the nature of God is “most perfect essence”; such perfection of His nature thus also signifies that divine nature is “simple”. This simplicity is depicted as follows: “Hee is voide of all logical relation in arguments. . . . Whatever is in God,

\textsuperscript{101} Quotation from \textit{PRRD} III, p. 212.
\textsuperscript{102} For the detail, see \textit{PRRD} III, pp. 205-16.
\textsuperscript{104} Quotation from Muller, \textit{God, Creation, and Providence}, p. 130; cf. \textit{PRRD} III, pp. 273-5. Nevertheless, we cannot totally disregard the Thomistic understanding, in Reformed orthodox thought, of an ad extra dimension that sees it as “the emanation of [divine] esse” in terms of the interrelatedness of creator and creatures. See also \textit{God, Creation, and Providence}, p. 125.
is his essence, and all that he is, he is by essence.” Then Perkins defines the spirituality of God concisely as being “incorporal, and therefore invisible” (John 4:24, 2 Cor. 3:17, 1 Tim. 1:17, Col. 1:15) after referring to the contrast between God’s simplicity and human inconsistency of essence and nature citing Augustine’s *De Trinitate* (book 6th, ch.4). Next he goes on to present “what God is” further in terms of an essence, spirituality and simplicity:

Againe, I say he is *an essence spirituall*, because he is not any kinde of body, neither hath the parts of the bodies of men or other creatures, but is in nature *a spirit invisible*, not subject to any mans senses. I adde also, that he is *a simple essence*, because his nature admits no manner of composition of matter or forme of parts. … he is the same by one & the same singular & indivisible essence.

For Perkins, in some way, God’s being as a Spirit and the invisibility consequent upon this is also a theme dealt with in the context of faith. An example is to be found in his exegetical commentary on Heb.11 (especially on verse 27). To put it another way, the Being Moses saw the back part of, and talked with (Exod. 33) was not the substance of God but the result of a divine accommodation. God revealed Himself in a manner familiar to human perception in terms of faith. Against Romanism, Perkins thus makes it clear that any form or image in our minds about the invisible trinitarian God as a Spirit is “idolatrous presumption”. The explanation of the relationship between divine simplicity and the Trinity can be read as an extension

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105 Perkins, *Workes* I, p. 11; cf. *An Exposition of the Creede*, in *Workes* I, p. 128: “God is an essence that he is a thing absolutely subsisting in himselfe, and by himselfe, not receiving his being from any other.” Perkins also defines God as “a most absolute perfect substance and essence” in *An Exposition upon the 1.Cchap. of the Revelation*, in *Workes* I, p. 218; *PRRD* III, pp. 266-7. For detail on the seventeenth century background to the importance of divine simplicity in relation to the doctrine of the Trinity, see *PRRD* III, pp. 275-84. Divine simplicity can also be defined in terms of Godhead as “the absence of real distinction or composition from the Godhead”: *PRRD* III, p. 286. For a detailed explanation of the various understanding of the meaning of “distinction” among divine attributes in relation to the essence in both the scholastic tradition and the Reformed orthodoxy, see *PRRD* III, pp. 284-98. Despite the delicate nuances which are derived from the dialectic of the various influences of Thomism, Scotism, Occamism, and nominalism, the Puritan and Reformed orthodox view clearly emphasises the role of an ad extra dimension. Only then do we know God’s properties in spite of the infinite gap between God and humanity. At the same time their views needs to be understood in contrast with that of Arminius on the created world ad extra in this respect. See Muller, *God, Creation, and Providence*, pp. 113-4.


of Perkins’ interest in the knowledge of essence and the nature of God in a trinitarian context: “The divine nature is the Godhead it selfe, simply and absolutely considered; & a person is that which subsisteth in that Godhead, as the Father, the Sonne, and the holy Ghost.”

Our knowledge of the Triune God as a spirit should engender personal devotional growth in us as spiritual men through regeneration and sanctification on the basis of the ‘golden chain’ in the order of salvation. Perkins notes that this is especially true in the case of ministers. Their responsibility as “spirituall phisitians” is crucial to the background of Perkins’ ideas on the spirituality of God.

The proper understanding of “spiritual worship” linked with the spirituality of God is another important theme to Perkins in terms of Puritan piety. In other words, the focus of the spiritual worship of God lies not in outward speech or actions but in an inward dimension of it:

Inward is the worship of the mind, the heart, the conscience, will, and affections: … [The inward worship] is the spiritual worship of the inward man, and the very ground and foundation of all true worship of God: for God is a Spirit, and therefore must bee worshipped in spirit, that is, in the minde, conscience, will, and affections. … For God is a Spirit, and therefore the true worship that is done unto him must bee performed in spirit and truth, John 4:24.

Perkins’ emphasis upon the inner working of the soul’s faculties in true worship can be considered as an integration of the doctrine of God and anthropology, or in other words, a soteriological dimension within a modified Aristotelian framework of faculty psychology. At the same time the spiritual worship of God is necessarily based upon the Trinitarian theology of the believer, to prevent replacing God with an idol. Especially in Of Divine or Religious Worship (1601), we can verify these elements by noting Perkins’ consolidated view of the knowledge of both God and

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110 A Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes II, pp. 326, 349, 394.
111 Cases of Conscience, in Workes II, pp. 62-3; cf. ibid., pp. 84-6.
112 For example, see A Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes II, p. 312: “The inward motions of the spirit, are of themselves the worship of God, whereas our words and deeds are not simply, but so farreforth as they are founded in the renewed motions of the heart.”
113 A Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes II, p. 162: “God is to be acknowledged and worshipped in the Father, in Christ, & in the Holy Spirit”; Cases of Conscience, in ibid., p. 61.
ourselves. This is the foundation of both the spiritual, as well as the true worship of God. On the one hand, concerning the knowledge of God, we first need to know God as a simple essence who is “the unitie of the Godhead in the Trinitie of persons, with the properties and workes thereof”. Second, the knowledge of God as the God, our God (theologia nostra) who extends mercy and providence over us is necessary. Third, Perkins stresses this knowledge as an “experimental” knowledge of our sense of the favour and goodness of God.

On the other hand, concerning the knowledge of ourselves, the knowledge of original sin, Scriptures, and the covenant of grace is necessary for spiritual worship. This foundation is engraved into the soul’s faculties (mind, conscience, and the affections of the heart) because they are “the first and principal seate of divine and spiritual worship” that move the body. Thus the relationship of regeneration (based upon these two dimensions of the knowledge of God) and spiritual worship is inseparable in Perkins’ schema: the divineness and spirituality of worship is to be examined necessarily in terms of regeneration in order to judge whether it is from the true religion or not.

It is also notable that Perkins especially requires an unequivocal knowledge of the role of Christ as mediator of spiritual worship. Such recognition of the significance of the Christological dimension also leads Perkins to see the role of the worship of God as a process of sanctification within the context of the imitation of Christ. The unremitting endeavour to be “renewed in the spirit of our minds,” and to present “the worship of our spirits” unto God is the key to the “spiritual service of God” which is as good as “the new creation in a pure heart, good conscience, and faith unfained”. Similarly, mainly in relation to the “Romanists” and in line with the Reformers and the Puritan tradition, Perkins also stresses the role of a special word for spiritual worship from the ministry of proclamation as an ordinance of God. The hearing of the word can make us “give credence to the whole word of God” through the work of the Holy Spirit. In addition, our faith, springing from the “Apostolical doctrine” of salvation and the word of God proclaimed in the sermon, is the foundation of our spiritual communion with God by grace. At the same time,

116 Of Divine or Religious Worship, in Workes I, p. 703: “The principal worship of God, is a worke of God in us, whereby wee are made conformable to him in holinesse and goodness: and whereby his image is renewed or restored to us.”
the emphasis on the practice of the means of grace (e.g. reading of and meditation on scriptures and prayer) for devotional life as an act of personal spiritual worship is closely related to the responsibility to present consistently our faith as the true religion to God who reveals His covenant to the elect.¹¹⁹

In summary, Perkins concentrates all of the doctrinal loci, e.g. soteriology, Trinity, Christology, the doctrine of faith, grace, and the Word of God on the relationship between the spirituality of God and true worship as the foundational section of the whole doctrine of the attributes of God in terms of true religion.¹²⁰ He achieves this by maintaining exegetical, doctrinal, and practical bases for his arguments regardless of the specific genre of his writing, as well as developing the Ramist style characteristic of early orthodoxy.

B. Charnock’s Exegesis of the Spirituality of God & Spiritual Worship

Charnock bases his teachings about the spirituality of God on John 4:24,¹²¹ which follows the typical style of the wider Reformed tradition as well as Perkins.¹²² From an overall viewpoint, similar to Perkins, Charnock mainly sees the spirituality of God as the principal nature of God in the sense that it leads a believer to the life of piety as well as worship of God. In the exegetical part, Charnock primarily analyses the meaning of the Greek text of “God is a Spirit” and “in spirit and truth”. He first defines the phrase “God is a Spirit” as follows by referring to Melanchthon: “That is, he hath nothing corporeal, no mixture of matter; not a visible substance, a bodily form.” Then Charnock adds some definition, “He is a Spirit, not a bare spiritual substance, but an understanding, willing Spirit; holy, wise, good, and just.”¹²³ This definition shows the reason that Charnock sets great importance on the attributes of God — he includes the divine will relating it to the worship of God as spirit.¹²⁴ For Charnock, “evangelical” worship, different from that of “Judaic carnal” worship, can only be guaranteed if God is spirit possessing His own attributes. At the same time,

¹²¹ “God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.”
¹²² For a detailed explanation of various use of this verse for eliciting the attributes of God, see A. Neele, The Art of Living to God, pp. 201-6; cf. PRRD III, p. 299.
¹²³ This also shows that Charnock does not merely use the way of negation based upon the classical theistic tradition since Pseudo-Dionysius (as Gunton argues), rather, he focuses upon describing His substance through the abundant _ad extra_ dimension which ought to be the basis of our knowability of God. See Gunton, Act and Being, p. 90.
¹²⁴ Workes I, p. 260.
he expounds Christ’ words, arguing that only the Triune God as the divine essence who commonly has the nature of spirituality in three persons can be the object of true worship. Of course this point also shows that Charnock’s primary interest concerning the attributes of God lies in Trinitarian theology.

In the exposition of “in spirit and truth”, Charnock makes the point that evangelical worship of God happens through the motion of the human faculties and the working of the Holy Spirit. In fact this motion of the human heart and conscience by the “operation of a supernatural grace” does not exclude the working of “true reason”. In doing so, Charnock balances the initiative of the administration of the Spirit as “the true sanctifier and quickener of the soul” and the human response as an element in worship. In short, Charnock expounds the text of John 4:24 literally by eliciting the significance of the spirituality of God in relation to other attributes and the Trinitarian knowledge of God. He also infers from the spirituality of God the idea of true worship in terms of regeneration and the operation of grace. Thus, as we have seen, the theological points Charnock argues in the exegetical section do not deviate from Perkins’ points of argument.

C. Charnock’s Doctrine of the Spirituality of God & Spiritual Worship: The Act of the Faculties of the Soul

In this section, Charnock attempts to clarify the way the spirituality of God is elicited as a doctrinal formulation on the basis of exegetical results. Charnock adds scriptural evidence to his arguments and quotes Johann Gerhard (1582-1637) on the two ways of knowing God by affirmation or negation. Charnock parallels God’s spirituality with invisibility in terms of the other essential attributes of God that guarantee His infiniteness. In the same regard, infinity, immensity, and immutability are also negative attributes. Thus, according to Charnock, “Scripture

125 Works I, p. 261: “Render a worship chiefly consisting in the affectionate motions of the heart. … [I]t meant such a worship as is kindled in the heart by the breath of the Holy Ghost.”

126 As mentioned earlier in the doctrine of God’s existence and atheism, Charnock repeatedly emphasises the relationship of reason and revelation while at the same time considering the disproportionality between the finite and the infinite.

127 Works I, pp. 267-8: “If God be infinite, then he can have no parts in him; if he had, they must be finite, or infinite: finite parts can never make up an infinite being. … Infinite parts they cannot be, because then every part would be equal to the whole, as infinite as the whole, which is contradictory. … If God were not a pure Spirit, he could not be omnipresent. … If God were not a spirit, he could not be the most perfect being.” Italics are mine.

128 Works I, p. 263. Charnock quotes Cocceius’ Sum. Theol. (cap. 8) on this point. In these two kinds of doctrinal argument, he also quotes intellectual sources of the sixteenth and seventeenth century plentifully, for example, Episcopius, Institutes, I, iv, c.8; Suarez, De Deo, vol. I, p. 9, col. 2; Amyraut, Loci.
and reason meet together to assert the spirituality of God”. At the same time God must be a “pure, entire, unmixed Spirit” without a body if He is to be “an independent being” as well as “the first being”. Most of all, divine simplicity necessarily requires God to be spiritual, otherwise God cannot be immutable:

His immutability depends upon his simplicity. He is unchangeable in his essence, because he is a pure and unmixed spiritual being. … God is immutable by nature as well as will; … He is as unchangeable in his essence, as in his veracity and faithfulness. They are perfections belonging to his nature; but if he were not a pure spirit, he could not be immutable by nature. … [He is to be] an infinite sublimity, a pure act, to which nothing can be added, from which nothing can be taken.  

Charnock also deals with the problem of divine accommodation in relation to the spirituality of God in scriptural phrases describing God as the “member” of the body (Ps. 34:15, Isa. 51:9). Citing Zanchi, he asserts that what is important to the interpreter is to understand “the true intent” of the expressions of divine accommodation as “condescension to our weakness (loquitur lex secundum linguam filiorum hominum)” just as we see God through the incarnation of Christ. That is, God should not be understood as a visible or corporeal deity but one who both acts according to His will and also communicates that will. Within the context of the relationship between creator and rational creatures God takes human limitation into account.

For Charnock, as with Perkins, the doctrine of the spirituality of God should lead us to spiritual worship with a practical dimension. In the second section of his exposition of the spirituality of God based upon John 4:24 titled On Spiritual Worship, he explicates the relationship between the inward operations of the human faculties of the soul and true spiritual worship. Citing William Ames, according to Charnock, all God’s attributes presuppose a spiritual nature in God and provide the motive of right worship of Him as the object of love and honour. The essence of true religion lies in “the work of the soul”, which is no other than the act of one’s spiritual faculties towards the spiritual God. The law of nature cannot provide more

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129 Works I, p. 268. The italics are mine.
130 Works I, pp. 269-70; Zanchi, De Natura Dei (Heidelberg: Jacob Mylius, 1577), lib.i. cap.4, thes. 9.
131 Works I, pp. 284-5; cf. Ames, The Marrow of Theology, II. iv. 20 (p. 238): “Religion is related to God through that divine excellency which shines forth in his sufficiency and efficiency. This is not one attribute, but a perfection arising from all attributes.”
132 Works I, p. 287.
clear knowledge regarding this point than the consequent knowledge of God. This point leads Charnock to deal with another special dimension of the *duplex cognitio Dei*:

He must know his faculties were given him to act, and to act for the glory of that God who gave him his soul and the faculties of it. … We cannot think of him but with our minds, nor love him but with our will; and we cannot worship him without the acts of thinking and loving, and therefore cannot worship him without the exercise of our inward faculties. … The excellency of God’s nature, and the excellent constitution of human faculties, concur naturally to support this [relationship].

Consequently, God requires spiritual worship based upon another dimension of the twofold knowledge of God: God who has “excellency” in all of His natures demands true worship from the believer according to the extent of the “excellency” of his own faculties of the soul. In other words, spiritual worship should accompany “gracious habits and affections working” in the soul pointing to the fact that “faith works by love”. Only this “sincere act of mind and will” can be the evidence of “true piety” and “true purity”. For Charnock, this distinguishes the Reformed understanding of worship, especially remarkable in the Puritan tradition, from the outward ceremonies of the Jews and the *opus operatum* of the papacy.

In brief, in the doctrine of God’s spirituality and spiritual worship, Charnock wanted to make it clear that it strengthens our knowledge of God as the object of true worship. This is increased only by the act of our soul’s faculties. We have seen that Charnock sought to provide philosophical, historical or bibliographical, and doctrinal backgrounds for this argument.

**D. Charnock’s Praxis of the Spirituality of God & Spiritual Worship: “Reasonable Service” in Trinitarian Theology**

In the practical section, Charnock elicits the importance of the human faculties of the soul as the subject of the restoration of the image of God in regeneration from the fact that God is a pure spiritual being. God stamped His image

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133 Works I, pp. 287-8.
134 Charnock adds to this idea according to the concept of a chain reaction within the psychological faculties: “Such a worship wherein the mind thinks of God, feels a sense of God, has the spirit consecrated to God, the heart glowing with affections to God,” in Works I, p. 289.
135 Charnock does not deny the necessity of bodily forms of worship because man consists of physical body and soul. For his detailed critique on the Spiritualists at that time about this point, see Works I, pp. 296-8.
on the spiritual faculties of the human soul rather than in the body. Consequently, although the worship of corporeal images of God is unreasonable, the practical error of such idolatry in worship occurs principally because of the depravity of human nature. Although there is no proportion between the most spiritual God and human beings, we nevertheless should seek after “a true notion” of God despite our weakness. In other words, Charnock puts an application of the spirituality of God to practical use within the context of the Reformed maxim finitum non capax infiniti, at the same time as maintaining a place for the anthropological predicament of humanity. For Charnock, again, the proper understanding of the usefulness of divine accommodation (Deus figuratus) in the Scripture is critical in a practical dimension because it can avoid polluted worship of God. As the representations of God in the Scripture are “accommodated to our weakness” as well as “the inward sense” of the soul’s faculties, we need to be careful in reflecting this accommodation in our understanding of God:

God accommodates himself to our contracted and tethered capacities, and uses such expressions of God as are suited to us, in this state of flesh wherein we are; and therefore, because we cannot apprehend God in the simplicity of his own being and his undivided essence, he draws the representations of himself from several creatures, and several actions of those creatures: … They are helps to our meditations, but ought not to be formal conceptions of him.

The theme of divine accommodation also makes Charnock consider seriously the problem of an individual struggle for piety. This can be based upon our capacities as well as on the limitations of communion with the spiritual God. For Charnock, a proper understanding of our anthropological status justifies such an endeavour towards purification and refinement in the soul’s faculties that makes higher communion with God possible to the fullest extent. On the harmartiological level, our resemblance to God in terms of the spiritual nature of the soul (imago Dei) is

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136 Works I, p. 271.
137 Works I, p. 273: “It is impossible to fashion any image of God. … No one knows him but himself, none can describe him but himself. … No corporeal thing can represent a spiritual substance; there is no proportion in nature between them; God is a simple, infinite, immense, eternal, invisible, incorruptible being.” In this argument, Charnock cites Cocceius, Summa, cap. 9, p. 47, sec. 35 and Amyraut, Moral., tom. I, p. 289.
138 Cf. PRRD III, p. 305. Certainly, Charnock’s repetitive interest in explaining divine accommodation is related to his emphasis upon the ad extra within the context of “our theology” that can draw us into appropriate worship.
139 Works I, p. 278.
140 Works I, pp. 278-81.
also a double-edged sword, for “spiritual sins divest us of the image of God for the image of Satan”.  

In short, for Charnock, we can have a firm basis for the growth of piety only when we have knowledge of the dilemmas and paradoxes of communion in the worship of God as a spirit arising from the faculties of the soul of the regenerate as the image of God.

Charnock even names such doctrinal foundations of spiritual worship “a reasonable service”. Spiritual worship as communion with God in Spirit through Christ the Son should be the service that is “evangelical” as well as “reasonable”. If it is true religious worship, an exercise of “the whole spirit”, then that will include an act of understanding and will based upon the knowledge of the attributes of God in terms of creator and the Redeemer. At the same time, Charnock points out the importance of christological and pneumatological elements in the concept of spiritual worship itself. He goes on to expound the comprehensive doctrinal background of spiritual worship in practice. For Charnock, spiritual worship is also linked with the “habits” of the whole human heart. He analyses in a very scholastic way the reason why the spiritual habits in one’s heart should act through the exercise of grace in spiritual worship:

A Christian endowed with grace must act suitable to that nature, and exercise his grace in his acting. … Reason is not the principle, for then all rational creatures would be Christians. They ought therefore to be acts of a higher principle, exercises of that grace whereby Christians are what they are; … Grace doth not exclude reason, but ennobles it, and calls it up to another form; … All worship must have the same spring, and be the exercise of that principle, otherwise we can have no communion with God.

According to Charnock, “supernatural principle” and “reason” are necessary in spiritual worship on the one hand; on the other hand, “nature” cannot prevent the Christian’s heart from becoming carnal if there is no proper exercise of “graces”. Thus Charnock gives a clear reason for one’s pursuit of holiness — in the struggle.

143 Works I, p. 298.
144 Works I, pp. 299-300: “As God counts not any soul living but in Christ, so he counts not any a spiritual worshipper but in Christ. … Our worship is then spiritual, when the fire that kindles our affections comes from heaven, as that fire upon the altar wherewith the sacrifices were consumed. God tastes a sweetness in no service, but as it is dressed up by the hand of the Mediator, and hath the air of his own Spirit in it. … We cannot mortify a lust without the Spirit, Rom, viii. 13, nor quicken a service without the Spirit.”
145 Works I, p. 304.
The “whole set of graces” must be in operation in all our faculties for the performance of spiritual worship: he even calls this process “the spiritual harmony” of worship: first, grace is to be exercised on our “faith” in worship as an evangelical confidence in God. As faith in itself cannot be considered without the relationship with Christ whose name is necessary as our pacifying intercessor, the exercise of faith spiritualises the act of worshipping God. Second, “love” is to be the object of the exercise of grace. Charnock also compares love with faith in terms of appetitus unionis (desire for union with God) through Christ the mediator. The heavenly affections are thus indispensable to spiritual worship because the word “love” encompasses all the pietistic devotions from us to be united to God. The delight, reverence, humility and holiness in our spirit towards God as “a sprout of habitual grace” become our duty in spiritual worship within this context. In brief, the theological virtues in the regenerate can grow only by the continuously infused habit of grace necessary for spiritual worship.

After the arguments for the necessity of the exercise of grace in spiritual worship, Charnock explores the fundamental reason for offering spiritual worship to God. On the one hand, according to the order of creation and providence in nature including human’s rational faculties, God as the most excellent being is to be served with the best of all that creatures have. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the similarity between God and humanity in the nature of spiritual faculties provides the basis of true religion in need of spiritual worship. In other words, only the human nature of the psychological faculties makes spiritual worship possible through knowledge and acknowledgement of the attributes of God. Charnock names such an engagement of the human spirit as “the concurrence of the powers of the soul” or “the exercise of the soul” in the act of religious services. To put it another way, for Charnock, the analysis of the human faculties of the soul in terms of the dialectic between sin and grace continues to be necessary in the advancement of the

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146 Works I, p. 304: “Though we may have the spiritual graces which compose in us a resemblance to God, yet for want of acting those suitable dispositions, we render ourselves unfit for his converse, and make the worship, which is fundamentally spiritual, to become actually carnal. As the will cannot naturally act to any object but by the exercise of its affections, so the heart cannot spiritually act towards God but by the exercise of graces.”

147 Works I, p. 305: “Without the habit of faith, our persons are out of Christ; and without the exercise of faith, the duties are out of Christ.”


149 See Works I, pp. 308-15.

150 Works I, p. 318.

151 Works I, p. 319. Charnock sometimes expresses it as “the acts of the soul” or “the internal speech, whereby we must speak with God”. See Works I, p. 333.
knowledge of the attributes of God. The concept of spiritual worship in this context operates as a positive motive towards a full anthropological recovery of the image of God in a trinitarian dimension, as he writes: “To have a spiritual worship is God’s end in the restoration of the creature, both in the redemption by his son, and sanctification by his Spirit.”

As much as spiritual worship contributes to one’s growth in piety in this world, there exist obstacles that cause spiritual distraction. For Charnock, as is also the case with Perkins, the Puritanistic focus on the “spiritual war” seen in the strong resistance to these obstacles seems to dominate his thinking regarding this respect:

There is natural corruption in us. … This corruption being seated in all the faculties, and a constant domestic in them, has the greater opportunity to trouble us, since it is by those faculties that we spiritually transact with God; … As the Spirit brings good thoughts and divine promises to mind, to quicken our worship, so the devil brings evil things to mind, and endeavours to fasten them in our souls to disturb us. … There is something of flesh that lusts against the spirit, so there is something of spirit in worship which lusts against the flesh.

While Charnock emphasises the importance of such spiritual vigilance, he never deviates from the Christ-centeredness of the doctrine of sanctification. Rather, what is crucial for Charnock is to know the principle of one’s “inward frame” for spiritual worship. This is given through the grace of regeneration, “animating and quickening” the religious acts of worship in practice for the glory of God as the ultimate end of all the opera Dei. Within the same context, he contrasts the repercussions of sin with that of grace in terms of spiritual worship by using the term habitus once again. In addition, spiritual worship is essential in that false worship without “the activity of our noblest [soul] faculties” is invariably against all the attributes of God as the archetype of our psychological faculties in the image of

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152 Works I, p. 320.
154 Works I, pp. 328-9, 332.
155 See Works I, p. 332: “Let us not be discomforted; for as the greatness of our sins upon our turning to God is no hindrance to our justification, because it doth not depend upon our conversion as the meritorious cause, but upon the infinite value of our Saviour’s satisfaction, which reaches the greatest sins as well as the least, so the multitude of our bewailed distractions in worship are not a hindrance to our acceptation, because of the uncontrollable power of Christ’s intercession.”
156 Works I, pp. 332-3.
157 Works I, p. 341: “As frequent sinful acts strengthen habits of sin, so frequent religious acts strengthen habits of grace.”
What is also notable is the fact that Charnock emphasises the exercise of our “love” as a holy inward affection in spiritual worship to God according to the tradition of Spiritual Brethren. Therefore, the usual conduct of duty in the act of worship as the means of grace should be daily examined in practice in terms of whether the blood and death of Christ is applied properly through the proper acts of the soul based upon this love.

In brief, Charnock opened a preliminary road for consequent discussions of all the other attributes of God by his insistence that there is no genuine knowledge of the doctrine of God’s attributes without the elements of spiritual worship in its practical outworking focusing on the act of the human faculties of the soul that make it possible. This particularly displays the Puritan pietistic background of Charnock’s trinitarian theology towards true religion in continuity with Perkins.

**Conclusion**

We have investigated the doctrine of God’s existence and spirituality in the work of Perkins and Charnock. The problem of atheism was examined in close relation to the doctrine of the existence of God; the theme of spiritual worship was also dealt with within the framework of the doctrine of God’s spirituality. The function of these two areas of theological loci was foundational for the later discussion of the doctrine of God’s attributes, which is relevant to the doctrinal (Trinitarian, soteriological, covenantal, and christological) concerns developed and expanded in their system. This is especially true for Charnock. This remains true despite the differences in the historical and theological context affecting the form and content of the two writers’ work.

In addition, Charnock seems to have inherited the emphasis upon the role of conscience from Perkins, while at the same time extending the account of it to the discussion of the relationship of both the soul’s faculties and the attributes of God to conscience. The fact that Charnock elucidates the relationship of human nature (psychological faculties) and divine nature (attributes of God) in terms of both

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158 Quotation from *Works* I, p. 335.
159 *Works* I, pp. 341-2: “Love is a commanding affection, a uniting grace; it draws all the faculties of the soul to the centre. … The happiness of heaven consists in a full attraction of the soul to God, by his glorious influence upon it.”
160 For example, Charnock’s detailed argument on the human being’s implanted knowledge of God’s existence in the natural state, which is not innate, is absent in Perkins’ writings. This indicates the difference of context in each period in relation to the emergence of Socinianism.
sanctification and spiritual worship shows a fundamental framework in our ongoing investigation. Arguably Charnock’s idea of God’s existence and His spirituality developed from a primary schema of William Perkins’ as the “theologian of the heart”.

Charnock’s continuation of the Puritan inheritance of Perkins’ emphasis upon the reforming of the heart (soul’s faculties) by supernatural grace was significant. Even his use of a modified scholasticism on the basis of the regenerate’s reason was influenced by it. Thus the continuity of form and content with the wider Reformed tradition from Perkins to Charnock is apparent. Their treatment of the doctrine of God’s existence and spirituality was totally practical as well as theoretical in that they geared the ideas of the true knowledge of God towards the circulation of both faith and obedience which arises through the mutual operation of the act of the faculties of the soul and the use of the means of grace. To put it another way, both emphasised the systematic coherence of doctrinal loci and the growth of piety, identifying it as true religion within the context of the theology of grace as a supernatural habitus. In other words, we might even be able to say that here the Thomistic basis of the form of argument was in harmony with a Scotistic interest in practical piety.

In conclusion, a fundamental point can be made which will be confirmed successively in the following chapters. The complexity of the threefold or fourfold structure in Charnock is not simply the product of a rationalism that collides with the Ramist and relatively more systematic structure of Perkins. Neither is it a breakaway from Calvin. Rather, the integrity of exegetical, doctrinal, and practical argument is maintained as well as developed. Above all, the significant theological bond between the doctrine of God’s attributes and trinitarian knowledge of God is the most obvious evidence of continuity between Perkins and Charnock. We will continue to unfold the validity of these points in the later discussions of other attributes of God.
Chapter Four

The Essential Attributes of God

Perkins and Charnock elicit three essential attributes of God based upon their discussion of the doctrine of God’s existence and spirituality. As they see it, the primary attributes of God are: eternity, immutability, and omnipresence. They both derive eternity in terms of time and omnipresence in terms of space from God’s infinity as do many Puritan and other Reformed scholastics.¹ Charnock interposes immutability between the two infinite attributes of God in order to emphasise the deductive relationship of eternity and immutability. As a matter of fact, for Perkins and Charnock, the double dimension (eternal and temporal) of the doctrine of the life, knowledge, and will of God can be properly represented only when the seeming inconsistencies of these essential attributes of God ad intra/extra are explained coherently. At the same time we will find traces of a dialectic between a Scotism that sees “infinity” as the ground of all divine attributes and a Thomism that prioritises “aseity” for the same reason. These are based upon the Puritan and Reformed scholastic’s pursuit of both dynamics and stability in their theological system, especially in the doctrine of the attributes of God Who is Triune.²

I. The Eternity of God

For the Puritan and Reformed scholastics, the proper understanding of God’s eternity not as an absolute attribute of timelessness but as “a successionless duration” related to the created orders in temporal dimension was critically important. Only then both the transcendence and the immanency of God ad intra/extra could be explained, maintaining both the sovereignty of God and human responsibility.³ To put it another way, God’s eternal duration is to be grasped not as a concept “without or outside” of time but as a “beyond time”.⁴ The Socinians and Vorstius had denied

¹ For example, see William Ames, Marrow of Theology, ed. and trans. John Eusden (Durham, Labyrinth Press, 1983), I, iv, 41, 43-4, 47-8 (p. 86); Leigh, Systeme, II, iv, pp. 170-8, 179-82 (on immutability); Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii, 8 (p. 194).
³ The quotation is from PRRD III, p. 350. Instead the Socinians and Conrad Vorstius (1569-1622) asserted God’s experience of temporal succession despite His aseity.
⁴ PRRD III, p. 355.
the concept of divine eternity and had affirmed only an everlastingness based upon their own arbitrary distinction of each concept. Against this, the Reformed orthodox divines sought to prove the consistent existence of God in eternity in terms of both His essential or intrinsic “Being” and His operational or extrinsic “Act”. Like other Reformed scholastics, both Perkins and Charnock sought to elaborate such a formulation through a significant dialectic between eternal and temporal dimensions even in the doctrine of God’s “eternity,” and in spite of the change of historical context between early and high orthodoxy.

A. Perkins on God’s Eternity

Perkins deals with divine eternity relatively briefly in comparison with other essential attributes. There had been relatively less debate or theological controversy, it seems, with opponents regarding the doctrine of God’s eternity in early orthodoxy. At the same time this also shows that the Boethian concept of the identity of time which regarded it as a “quality” rather than some kind of “substance” (like the rationalists would do afterward) already existed.

Thus, according to Perkins, eternity is one of the two-fold aspects of the infinity of God alongside omnipresence as “exceeding greatness,” as he writes: “that by which he is without beginning and ending (Ps.90:2, Rev.1:8)”. In fact God’s absolute eternity is distinct from other spiritual beings like angels because they are eternal merely “by participation” based upon a beginning of existence from God. Such an observation also indicates Perkins’ familiarity with the distinction concerning God’s eternity in both its ontological dimension ad intra and its relational and temporal aspect ad extra with creatures. In addition, Perkins’ deduction of eternity from infinity shows a Scotistic understanding of the doctrine of God’s eternity.

In brief, in Perkins, we trace the “beginnings” of the distinctive understanding of God’s eternity as both internal (essential) and external (operational) in its aspects, not as a merely transcendent or abstract attribute of God. We will find a development of the form and content of Perkins’ basic recognition of the dynamic balance in God’s eternity in the following examination of Charnock’s thought.

8 By contrast, Aquinas elicits eternity from God’s immutability. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 5 vols (1911); repr. (Westminster, MD: Christian classics, 1981), Ia. 9.2.
B. Charnock’s Exegesis & Doctrine concerning the Eternity of God:  
The Eternal Decree and Covenant

Although the Reformed orthodox theologians used various scriptural texts as the exegetical basis of their arguments concerning God’s eternity,9 Charnock chose Ps. 90:2 as the main text, like Perkins. He argues that Ps. 90:2, as an excerpt from Moses’ prayer, represents the eternity of God by observing both God’s redemptive history on earth and His everlastingness that transcends the history of creatures.10 This certainly shows that he is aware of the distinction (derived from Perkins) between the concept of everlastingness on the basis of an ad extra dimension and the concept of the eternity of God ad intra without considering God’s relatedness to creatures in a temporal dimension. He also contrasts creatures in their limited state arising from nothingness (which is extraneous to eternity) with God who exists in the unlimited extension of duration and possesses creating power.

From these two fundamental exegetical results, Charnock first attempts to derive the stability of God’s covenant with His people. Here, the eternity of God functions as the foundation of the covenant in terms of its essence and its “federal providence”.11 Second, the assumption of the existence of the eternal “wisdom” of God ad intra/extra is founded, of course, on the existence of the eternal “essence” of God possessing “the nature of eternity in an infinite immutable duration”.12 Nevertheless, citing Augustine’s Confessions, Charnock acknowledges the difficulty of presenting this attribute of God via eminentiae (in a positive way related to the creatures). This, in turn, demonstrates that the approach of Reformed orthodoxy on this point varies despite the common Augustinian basis of their understanding of eternity and time.13 In short, Charnock substantially inherited the exegetical and

9 For examples, see PRRD III, pp. 348-53.
10 “Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.”
12 Works I, pp. 348. He refers to the French Reformed thinker Pierre Du Moulin (1568-1658) for this argument; cf. Du Moulin, Cor. i., Ser 2, p. 52.
13 According to Muller, while Cocceius, Turretin, and many other Reformed theologians respond positively to this way of explaining the ad extra dimension, some other (Dutch) Reformed like Wilhelmus à Brakel (1635-1711) prefer a negative approach. In our view, Charnock seems to be located in the middle of these two positions. See PRRD III, p. 346. Accordingly, this point also evidences the unsuitableness of Gunton’s critique of Charnock as an example of negative theology without considering the eclectic aspect of his idea of God’s attributes: see Colin Gunton, Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes (London: SCM Press, 2002), p. 90. For a brief
hermeneutical traditions of the past but brought his own formulations to bear on the eternity of God, within a seventeenth century orthodox context.

In the doctrinal section, Charnock first seeks to explain how God is eternal by combining both exegetical and theological arguments. He presents the definition of eternity as one of negative attribution in comparison with the immensity of God.14 Charnock also refers to Abraham’s calling upon the name of the “everlasting God” in Gen. 21:33 in order to build an argument for the eternity of God, who is without beginning, in terms of the gospel based upon Christ and the eternal decree:

The gospel is not preached by the command of a new and temporary God, but of that God that was before all ages. Though the manifestation of it be in time, yet the purpose and resolve of it was from eternity. If there were decrees before the foundation of the world, there was a decreer before the foundation of the world. Before the foundation of the world he loved Christ as a mediator, John xvii. 24; a foreordination of him was before the foundation of the world, Eph. i. 4. A choice of men, and therefore a chooser before the foundation of the world; a ‘grace given in Christ before the world began,’ 2 Tim. i. 9, and therefore a donor of that grace.15

For Charnock, the eternity of the trinitarian God in terms of His immanency and economy is explicit. We can also sense that he seems to assume the intratrinitarian covenant of redemption as the basis of his argument for the eternity of God. In addition, God, who precedes the foundation of the world, can have no beginning in time because there is no proportion between creator and creatures in terms of cause and effect. In other words, God’s entire work ad extra — of creation, providence, and redemption — indicates that God is an eternal being without beginning.16

At the same time, the eternal God must be without end in both infinite simplicity and unchangeableness.17 The essence of God as “pure act” with no potentiality leads to three detailed characteristics of eternity in God: in the divine

14 Works I, p. 349: “As immensity is the diffusion of his essence, so eternity is the duration of his essence. … His immensity surmounts all places, so his eternity comprehends all times, all durations, and infinitely excels them.”
16 Cf. PRRD III, p. 357.
17 Works I, pp. 351-3: “Nothing first or last, [Eternity] notes rather the perfection of a being in regard of its essence. … God hath his whole being in one and the same point or moment of eternity. … God possesses a firm and absolute being, always constant to himself; … God possesses his being in one and indivisible point, having neither beginning, end, nor middle.”
mind, God sees and knows all things and their order by Himself. Charnock makes it clear that God’s eternity guarantees His omniscience without succession despite the differentiation of actual existence by the act of divine knowledge in time. In addition, he vindicates the coherence of the eternity of the decrees of God. These never collide with the omniscience of God in eternity. In other words, the divine knowledge and divine will are invariably consistent with each other in essence in the light of eternity. Charnock thus argues:

[God] doth not decree this now which he decreed not before, for as his works were known from the beginning of the world; so his works were decreed from the beginning of the world; as they are known at once, so they are decreed at once; there is a succession in the execution of them, first grace, then glory; but the purpose of God for the bestowing of both was in one and the same moment of eternity. … The redemption of the world is after the creation of the world, but the decree whereby the world was created, and whereby it was redeemed, was from eternity. Such a consistency between the divine will and knowledge comes from the divine essence that is eternal. The divine essence as “existentia durans” (enduring existence) without “prius et posterius” (predecessor and posterity) is not accidental but always and necessarily in existence. In the same way, according to Charnock, all the other perfections of God must also be eternal if divine essence is eternal by nature.

Second, Charnock discusses the reason for the necessity of God’s eternity in detail derived from a background of both the scholastic tradition and a firm exegetical basis. (Though mentioned earlier, we note that he never touches upon these points without presenting a corresponding exegesis.) To begin with, God’s eternity is proved by both the name of God (Jehovah, I am that I am) and the life of God in Himself as “a pure act, nothing but vigour and act” by His essence.

18 Charnock refers to Acts 15:18: “Known unto God are all things from the beginning of the world.” He also illustrates it by the example of Christ’s redemptive works: “The death of Christ as to precede his resurrection in order of time; there is a succession in this; both at once are known by God, yet the act of his knowledge is not exercised about Christ as dying and rising at the same time, so that there is succession in things when there is no succession in God’s knowledge of them”, in Works I, p. 353.
19 Works I, p. 353.
20 For detailed discussion through a scholastic example, see William of Ockham, Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, trans. with introductory notes by M. McCord Adams and N. Kretzmann (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983).
21 Cf. Exod. 3:14; John 5:26. Along with these two arguments, Charnock stresses that “chance” cannot explain the basis of the existence of both God and the world. See Works I, pp. 355-6.
Referring to Calvin, Charnock also argues that God’s immutability, infinite perfection, and omnipotence are only applicable in the context of a prerequisite eternity. Finally, we see the Thomistic proof of God as first cause in the light of the doctrine of eternity intensifies the coherence of Charnock’s reasonings:

If there be any existence of things, it is necessary that that which was the first cause should exist from eternity. Whatsoever was the immediate cause of the world, yet the first and chief cause, wherein we must rest, must have nothing before it; if it had anything before it, it were not the first. He therefore that is the first cause must be without beginning, nothing must be before him.

Such eternity is incommunicable to creatures. Thus Charnock’s argument on the necessary disproportionality of duration between God as the first cause and creatures as the effect in a Scotistic sense is noteworthy. To put it another way, despite his clear acknowledgement of the relationship between God’s non-successive duration and the temporal dimension as evidenced by the external work *ad extra*, yet the tension between the infinite and the finite is always maintained in Charnock’s schema.

In summary, Charnock demonstrates the doctrine of God’s eternity on the basis of the essential, intratrinitarian, and external works of God by drawing on exegetical results, theological formulations and the abundant resources of tradition. This includes arguments from reason within the boundary of revelation. These are based upon the dialectic between Scotism and Thomism stemming from the intellectual legacy of medieval scholastic theology within seventeenth century theological context. Charnock’s method of expounding God’s eternity within the balance of *ad intra* and *extra* is remarkable, especially in his underlying defence of divine simplicity (as the foundation of the whole doctrine of divine attributes) through the idea of the eternal covenant between the Father and the Son in his answer to the question of the problem of the eternity of the divine decree.

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22 *Works* I, p 357: “God argues [in Mal. iii. 6 and Job xxxvii. 23] here, saith Calvin, from his unchangeable nature as Jehovah, to his immutability in his purpose. … A finite duration is inconsistent with infinite perfection. … He could not be properly almighty, that were not always mighty.”


24 See *Works* I, p. 360: “No effect of an intellectual free agent, can be equal in duration to its cause. … A free act of the will is necessary to precede in order of time, as the cause of such effects as are purely voluntary.”
C. Charnock’s Praxis on the Eternity of God: The Trinitarian Basis of Piety

Charnock now further extends his doctrinal formulation on God’s eternity to christological, covenantal, trinitarian, and soteriological discussions at a more practical level. He first takes a christological turn in relation to eternity by elaborating the argument concerning the divinity of Christ. Having provided several exegetical evidences of Christ’s eternity as the Son of God in the New Testament, Charnock explores Christ’s own words in John 16:28 that suggest strongly His own eternity:

He speaks of a glory that he ‘had with the father before the world was’, when there is no creature inbeing; this is an actual glory, and not only in decree. … Christ speaks of something peculiar to him, a glory in actual possession before the world was. … There are two goings forth of Christ described, one from the Bethlehem in the days of his incarnation, and another from eternity. … If this going out from everlasting were only in the purpose of God, it might be said of David and of every creature.

Thus, according to Charnock, the going out of Christ from the Father in an eternal dimension on the basis of the intratrinitarian structure necessarily implies the eternity of Christ the Son who possesses divinity. To put it another way, the glory Christ possesses is not entirely related to the glory in God’s specific decree which will be fulfilled in time in the work of incarnation. Rather, this is the intrinsic glory that the Father and the Son have in common in the Trinity because of their co-eternity. For Charnock, the reason for the importance of this comes from the fact that the authenticity of the Christian religion can stand only on the assumption of the eternity of both God and Christ who provides the basis of the efficiency of redemptive works. Moreover, such appreciation of the importance of the atonement in terms of Christ’s eternity leads Charnock on to consider the consistency of divine knowledge in the light of eternity. The divine eternity guarantees omniscience without an alteration of the quantity of His knowledge since God knows all things “in his eternity in one simple knowledge”. As will be discussed later, Charnock hints that he objects to the concept of “middle knowledge” or an Arminian understanding of divine knowledge that would separate divine knowledge from the divine will.28

25 For example, Col. 1:16-7; Heb. 7:3, 13:8; Rev. 1:18.
26 Works I, pp. 360-1.
27 Works I, p. 361: “[In Isa.9:6, Christ] is particularly called the Everlasting, or eternal Father; not the Father in the Trinity, but a father to us; yet eternal, the Father of eternity.”
28 Works I, p. 361.
Charnock also discusses the issue of the covenant and the divine will in the light of the eternity of God: the covenantal God guarantees the eternity of the gospel in believers, based upon His eternal decree. The believers’ happiness and status in relation to “our God in covenant” is also eternal because only the eternal God has the power to fulfill His will regarding the promise in our trust. For this reason, citing Isa. 26:4, Charnock argues that divine eternity provides the basis for the consistency of all the attributes in the decree that evidences the trueness of His word:

‘Trust in the Lord for ever, for in the Lord Jehovah is everlasting strength’, … His name is doubled, that name Jah and Jehovah, which was always the strength of his people, … not a failing, but an eternal truth and power; … His wisdom, will, truth, have always been, and will to eternity be, the same. … As his word is the bottom of our trust, and his truth is the assurance of his sincerity, so his eternity is the assurance, of his ability to perform.

At this juncture, Charnock meaningfully considers the trinitarian dimension of the eternity of God. That is, he emphasises especially the role of the Holy Spirit in terms of the application of redemption as the “post-eternity of God”. For Charnock, the eternity of God should be explained in relation to the three persons of the Trinity. To apply the knowledge and theological virtues of the eternity of God in our growth in piety, the two dimensions of God’s eternity (“ante-eternity” and “post-eternity”) ad intra and ad extra should be explicated with a consistent understanding which is in harmony with all the attributes and the works of the Triune God.

In addition, we need to note Charnock’s enormous stress upon the practice of meditation on the eternity of God, which contributes to the increase of our

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29 Works I, p. 363: “The immutability of his counsel follows the immutability of his nature. Immutability and eternity go hand in hand together. The promise of eternal life is as ancient as God himself in regard of the purpose of the promise, or in regard of the promise made to Christ for us: … Therefore the gospel, which is the new covenant published, is termed ‘the everlasting gospel’, Rev. xiv. 6, …”

30 Works I, p. 366.

31 See Works I, p. 367: “Because [the Holy Ghost] is the strongest foundation of our faith and hope, which respects chiefly that which is future, and not that which is past, yet, indeed, no assurance of his after-eternity can be had if his ante-eternity be not certain. … But since all the resolves of God are as himself is, eternal, and all the promises of God are the fruits of his counsel, therefore they cannot be changed.”

32 It is notable that Charnock used covenantal expressions applying to the mediate work of the Holy Spirit in this argument. This makes it possible for us to understand his idea of the covenant of redemption in its more developed or elaborated form by consolidating the trinitarian basis of the redemptive works ad extra. Carl Trueman points to a similar line of argument in Owen’s work The Death of Death in the Death of Christ (1647). See Trueman, John Owen: Reformed Catholic, Renaissance Man (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 86-7.
devotion. He even asserts that the eternity, holiness, and power of God are the “fundamental articles of all religion” upon which all the other doctrines are based: our praise is worth giving to God when we meditate fully on “converting grace” in the light of the eternity of God in a soteriological dimension. The emphasis upon the refining of the faculties of the soul through this meditation shows clearly Charnock’s pietistic characteristics as a successor of the Spiritual Brethren.

In summary, all of Charnock’s practical arguments on divine eternity aim ultimately at the growth of piety by the increase of the believer’s faith, comfort, and assurance and the practice of meditation on doctrine in the light of those major theological loci necessary to explain the life of grace. For Charnock, the theological ‘lever’ for this practical application was still the covenant, Trinity, and Christology.

II. The Immutability of God

The concept of divine immutability is situated as one of the key essential attributes in relation to both the divine aseity or necessity and divine simplicity. These are primary divine attributes in the Thomistic perspective. How to understand the concept of God as the first cause, as the “unmoved mover” in the scholastic tradition, brings about a significant difference between Barthian views which see it as “inactivity” and the traditional one viewing it as a mere “immovability” from potency to actuality. In fact Barth’s assertion that the Reformed orthodox deviated from both the Reformers and the scriptures towards both scholasticism and rationalism originates to a large extent in this datum. In our case, as mentioned earlier, Gunton’s and Jones’ critique of Charnock’s thought are deeply related to this Barthian “reverberation”.

However, according to our viewpoint, and contra Barth, immutability has to

33 Cf. PRRD III, p. 362.
34 Works I, p. 372.
35 Works I, pp. 372-3: “Let us therefore meditate upon [the eternity of God], but not in a bare speculation, without engaging our affections, and making every notion of the divine eternity end in a suitable impression upon our hearts. … If God is eternal, how worthy is he of our choicest affections, and strongest desires of communion with him!”
36 Cf. PRRD III, p. 324; Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 132.
be distinct from the concept of “impassibility”, from a “Stoic notion of *apatheia*” because God continues to have a relationship with creatures *ad extra*. This obtains even if God effects actual change in them, though without losing His unchangeableness.  

Therefore, in this subchapter, we find the root cause of the misunderstanding of the Puritan and Reformed scholastics’ doctrine of God’s attributes through an examination of Perkins’ and Charnock’s idea of the divine immutability. The idea of divine immutability had been inherited from Augustine and passed via the medieval scholastics and the Reformers to the Reformed orthodox without radical change. That is, the alleged charge of the Hellenistic or monotheistic character of the “classical” doctrine of God since Augustine is also deeply related to this. The persuasive strength of the evidence against Barth increases, especially since Perkins and Charnock put such stress on showing the contrast between the immutable God and the changeable created orders *ad extra*, closely related to their discussion of “piety”.

**A. Perkins on God’s Immutability**

For Perkins, divine immutability is one of the two essential attributes (after spirituality) based upon the simplicity of God. This standard of classification indicates Perkins’ modified Thomistic style. He describes God’s immutability in both essential and economic respects: first, it is “that by which he is void of all composition, division, and change” (James 1:17, Mal. 3:6); second, scriptural expressions about the repentance of God (e.g. Gen. 6:6) do not mean a mutation in God’s will or nature literally but the change of divine actions “of mercy and love into effects of anger after the manner of men”.

Perkins also seeks to deal with the relationship between God’s external works and the immutability of His eternal decree in order to expound its apparent inconsistency from the point of view of human understanding. In fact the change of the Law and the abolition of ceremonies of the Old Testament has nothing to do with an unchangeable decree of God: “God can decree to change this or that, without change”. Such immutability also guarantees the firmness of perseverance of the elect who not only are known to God (and Christ) but also love Him (1 Cor. 8:3). In

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38 *PRRD* III, pp. 309-11.
39 *PRRD* III, pp. 308, 311-2.
40 For Aquinas, immutability is critically significant in that this attribute is the basis of divine aseity and eternity. See *Summa Theologica*, Ia, q.9, art.1.
its practical dimension, for Perkins, our zeal for the growth of theological virtues (faith, hope, and love) in terms of both the process of sanctification and “the maintenance of true religion” should thus also be unchangeable as a reflection of the immutability of God in our mind and attitude “semper idem”.42

In summary, Perkins investigates divine immutability explicitly in its exegetical, doctrinal, and practical aspects despite his narrower Ramist style of discussion, and achieves this while taking into account the disputable theological points of early orthodox English Puritanism. To be sure, we see that this still operates by focusing on the defence of the doctrine of divine simplicity, which is the foundational perfection of His nature, denying any “logical relation” with other beings regarding His existence.

B. Charnock’s Exegesis of Divine Immutability

Charnock bases his arguments of the immutability of God on an exegesis of Ps. 102:26-27 as did Zanchi.43 After noting that there are two possible ways of exegeting these verses in terms of both the historical “kingdom of the Messiah” and christological redemption, he broaches the importance of the refinement of mutable creatures pointing toward the restoration of goodness which was the original purpose of the immutable God, especially from verse 26. Then Charnock focuses on exegesis of verse 27 arguing that “Thou art the same” asserts God’s immutability in the eternal duration of God: “The same God, the same in essence and nature, the same in will and purpose” is “immutable in every respect”; His wisdom, power, knowledge and will are unexceptionally the same in this regard.44 According to this exegetical elaboration, Charnock thus derives the summary of the text both by contrasting God’s immutability with the creatures’ finitude and changeableness and by comparing it with the eternity of God at the same time:

Indeed true eternity is true immutability, whence eternity is defined the possession of an immutable life. Yet immutability differs from eternity in our conception. Immutability respects the essence or existence of a thing, eternity respects the duration of a being in that state; or rather, immutability is the state itself, eternity is the measure of that state. … A thing is said to be changed, when it is otherwise now in regard of nature, state, will, or any quality than it

42 Perkins, A Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Galatians, in Workes II, p. 247.
43 “They shall Perish, but thou shalt endure; yea, all of them shall wax old as a garment: as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed: but thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end.”
44 Works I, pp. 379-80.
was before.\footnote{Works I, p. 380.}

As we have seen in the order of Charnock’s discussions of God’s attributes (eternity-immutability-omnipresence), he deduces divine immutability from eternity within the Reformed orthodox tradition. This, in turn, is influenced by a Scotistic pattern which sees the priority of God’s infinity as the ground of all the attributes.\footnote{For the accounts of such a tendency in Scotus, see F. Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, 9 vols, vol. II: \textit{Medieval Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus} (London: Burns Oates & Washburn, 1946-75), pp. 524-7.} In the same regard, we can also see Charnock giving priority to exegetical arguments over rational or theological argument (emerging from the necessity for coherence in exegetical evidences) based upon the relationship between the creator and the creatures in that he places the latter two (rational, theological) arguments at the very end.\footnote{Works I, pp. 381-2; cf. \textit{PRRD} III, pp. 316-7.} In short, we find that Charnock sought to clarify the fact that the concept of contingency can be applied only to those things possessing the potency of actualisation effected by God’s work \textit{ad extra}, and not to God who immanently acts in the Godhead (\textit{ad intra}). The Scotistic tendency of emphasising the infinite gap between creator and the creatures is especially notable, while at the same time being faithful to the tradition of exegesis.

\textbf{C. Charnock’s Doctrine and Polemic on the Immutability of God: The Defence of Divine Simplicity}

In the doctrinal section Charnock seeks to investigate the specifics of this, like other Reformed orthodox theologians who had analysed divine immutability,\footnote{In some way this could be regarded as the expanded version of Zanchi who sees a twofold immutability of God (in essence or nature as well as will, decree, and counsels) according to his work \textit{De Natura Dei} (Heidelberg: Jacob Mylius, 1577). See \textit{PRRD} III, pp. 313-4; cf. Benedict Pictet, \textit{Christian Theology}, trans. F. Reynoux, (London: R. B. Seeley and W. Burnside, 1834), II.xii.3; Thomas Ridgley, \textit{Body of Divinity}, revised with notes by John Wilson (1855, repr. Edmonton: Still Waters Revival Books, 1993), I, pp. 88-90.} by listing four aspects: essence, knowledge, will, and place. First, God’s unchangeableness in “essence” is related to His being as “an absolutely simple Spirit”, who is “truly unum”, possessing no “particle of composition”.\footnote{Works I, pp. 382, 384.} Neither perfect blessedness nor full rejoicing in Himself is possible if a change of essence occurs: the change in a thing indicates its being finitude which has some kind of medium. For this argument Charnock stresses once again the disproportionality
between the infinite and the finite, as he writes: “There is no medium between finite and infinite. … For finite and infinite are extremes so distant, that they can never pass into one another.”⁵⁰ God’s immutability in essence also evidences His “aseity”, for He is from no other but from Himself. Thus, according to Charnock, God exists as both “first cause and chief good” as well as “efficient cause and last end”.⁵¹

Second, the immutability in God’s “knowledge” is another compelling subject for Charnock, though further detailed discussion concerning God’s intellect will be dealt with in our next chapter. Citing two scriptural references (Heb. 4:13, 1 Tim. 1:17), Charnock argues that there cannot possibly be any temporal ignorance in God who is wise, omniscient, and trustworthy. At the same time Charnock attempts to expound the relationship between divine essence and divine knowledge, which is the fundamental reason for the immutability of God’s knowledge. In the same regard, the radical difference in the way of obtaining knowledge between God and human can only be explained by consideration of the divine essence:

[God] doth not know as we do, by habits, qualities, species, whereby we may be mistaken at one time and rectified at another. He hath not an understanding distinct from his essence, as we have; but being the most simple being, his understanding is his essence; and as from the infiniteness of his essence we conclude the infiniteness of his understanding, so from the unchangeableness of his essence we may justly conclude the unchangeableness of his knowledge. … If his understanding and his essence were not one and the same, he were not simple, but compounded.⁵²

According to Charnock, such a simple divine knowledge in His essence is given through “one single act of intuition” that covers “the infinite spaces of past and future” (Ps. 147:5). In addition, he also contends reiteratively that divine knowledge is immutable as long as it is eternal because God sees “all knowable truth” just “by one glance”.⁵³ Subsequently, such a virtual identifying of divine essence and divine knowledge also prompts Charnock to proceed to identify divine knowledge and divine will as the cause of succession in creatures. Following the late medieval Augustinian tradition,⁵⁴ he demonstrates that divine knowledge and the divine will

⁵⁰ Works I, p. 383.
⁵¹ Works I, p. 384.
⁵² Works I, p. 385.
⁵⁴ Charnock supports his point with marginal quotations from Augustine and Bradwardine. See Works I, p. 386.
cannot work independently of each other since God “could not do anything ignorantly”. God does not have a lack of capacity between temporal events due to the inconsistency of knowledge that human knowledge has (Act. 15:18). At the same time, Charnock directly draws a conclusion from Aquinas to evidence the immutability of God’s knowledge, as he writes: “All things were all in their circumstances of past, present, and to come, seen by his understanding as they were determined by his will”.

Third, Charnock deals with the immutability of God’s will, purpose and the decree. Above all, divine wisdom and absolute power as the ground of this immutability guarantee the solidity of the fulfilment of the decretal will. The characteristic of divine simplicity also allows Charnock to construct an argument in a similar pattern on divine will in relation to the divine knowledge:

The will of God is the same with his essence. If God had a will distinct from his essence, he would not be the most simple being. God hath not a faculty of will distinct from himself. As his understanding is nothing else but Deus intelligens, God understanding, so his will is nothing else but Deus volens, God willing; … There is a concurrence of God’s will and understanding in everything. As his knowledge is eternal, so is his purpose.

Therefore, according to the nature of divine essence, as God knows everything “by one simple vision of his understanding”, so He wills everything “by one act of volition”. In other words, the unchangeableness of the divine will is confirmed by the immutability of His counsel (Heb. 6:17) because the will is conceived from eternity by His counsel as the “one will” (Eph. 1:11). Moreover, “the disorder of faculties”, i.e. in the case of will over against knowledge or wisdom, cannot possibly be expected of God when we consider the simplicity of God. Nevertheless the economy of the divine will in time produces an apparent change of dispensations in terms of the effect, albeit such a change is also based upon the eternal decree of God. With regard to this point, it is worth noting that Charnock endeavours to explain this distinction of the relationship between the decreer, the decree, and the decreed for clear understanding. As he once argued, concerning the treatment of divine eternity,

55 See Works I, p. 386: “[God] made them after he knew them, and did not know them after he made them. His knowledge of them made a change in them; their existence made no change in his knowledge. … God did not receive his knowledge from their existence, but his knowledge and will acted upon them to bring them into being.”
56 Works I, p. 386; citing Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia. 9.
57 Works I, pp. 387-8.
only the created order is variable while God and His decrees are unalterable.\textsuperscript{58} We also find his consideration of the problem of divine freedom in this immutability of divine will. According to Charnock, divine freedom should be considered not according to the state of the objects of the divine will, but to “the necessity of continuing His purpose” based upon divine wisdom.\textsuperscript{59}

Fourth, Charnock touches briefly upon the problem of the eternal ubiquity of God in relation to His immutability, irrespective of the existence of created space. Though this will be discussed in detail in the doctrine of divine omnipresence in the next subchapter, the problem of immutability related to space emerges as a refutation of the Socinians and Vorstius who asserted the special finitude of divine essence.\textsuperscript{60} Accordingly, for Charnock, the interpretation of “God’s drawing near to us” (James 4:8) shows well his point of argument emphasising both invisible spiritual power and the working of grace in our faculties of the soul, as he states: “[I]t is not so much his coming to us, but his drawing us to him.” To put it another way, Charnock asserts that God’s presence in the Scriptures is to be understood both theoretically and practically as a spiritual movement that quickens our zeal in drawing near to God “by a change of mind, will, and affections”.\textsuperscript{61}

After dealing with the four aspects of divine immutability as the specific contents of it, Charnock proceeds to argue several proofs demonstrating that the attribute is incommunicable to creatures.\textsuperscript{62} Moreover, we see Charnock’s rich intellectual resources inherited from the past in these proofs. To be sure, as mentioned earlier in the exegetical section, he again shows the priority of biblical evidence (Dan.6:26) in this proof along with the testimony of the classics from heathen sources, i.e., Plato and Pythagoras. In the proof from the name “Jehovah” based upon the essence of God as immutable and eternal in the “counsels and promises”, Charnock extensively quotes other Reformed scholastic writers: e.g. John Trapp (1601-1669), Amyraut (1596-1664), Spanheim (1600-1649), and Petavius.\textsuperscript{63}

Citing Augustine along with other exegetical evidences (Gen. 2:17, Rom.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Works} I, pp. 389-90: “As a decree from eternity doth not make the thing decreed to be eternal, so neither doth the immutability of the decree render the thing so decreed to be immutable. … The person decreeing, viz., God, is in himself immutable, and the decree is immutable, but the thing decreed may be mutable.”
\item\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Works} I, p. 390.
\item\textsuperscript{60} Cf. \textit{PRRD} III, p. 318.
\item\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Works} I, p. 391.
\item\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Works} I, pp. 395-7.
\item\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Works} I, p. 391; citing John Trapp, \textit{A Commentary on the Old and New Testaments} (On Exodus), (London: Robert White, 1662); Amyraut, \textit{De Mysterio Trinitatis} (Saumur: Isaac Desbordes, 1661), p. 433; Spanheim, \textit{Syntagma}, part i, p. 39; Petavius, \textit{Theol. Dogmat}. Tom. i. cap. 6, sect. 6, 7, 8.
\end{thebibliography}
6:11, Ps. 145:3), he also contends with a somewhat Thomistic nuance that God must be immutable if He is to be eternal, infinite, and almighty. At the same time God is the being who exists as the highest principle among other principles in both the order and government of creatures. On the one hand, the proof from the fact that God is “the most perfect being” is somewhat complex but worth noting. Charnock shows the illogicality of the assumptions of God’s either changing Himself to “a great perfection (mutatio perfectiva)” or “a less perfection (mutatio amissiva)” or being changed voluntarily or necessarily. On the other hand, Charnock proves divine immutability from the nature of divine simplicity, deriving this mainly from the ideas of Aquinas. Mutability cannot be consistent with God as “the most simple being” who does not have composition in His essence: the divine essence cannot possibly depend upon part of Himself that changes or is changed if such essence is divine.

In the polemical section (as the extension of the doctrinal treatment of divine immutability), Charnock examines several controversial points in relation to immutability. The key point Charnock argues in these polemics is as follows (and it is somewhat reiterative): there is no mutation in God, although God’s works of creation, redemption, and providence ad extra are executed in time according to His decretive will regarding creatures. In fact these elenctic propositions reflect the result of theological debates in the seventeenth century. First, Charnock argues that there is no alteration in God by the act of creation. Of course, as is certainly the case with the other part of the discussion, he proceeds to his arguments along with providing proper exegetical evidences (Eph. 1:4, 1:9, 1:11, Act. 2:23, Rev. 4:8). Charnock primarily follows Aquinas again in his understanding of the nature of creation in order to show the point of his argument:

Creation is considered as active or passive; active creation is the will and power of God to create; this is from eternity, because God willed from eternity to create in time. This never had beginning, for God never began in time to understand anything, to will anything, or to be able to do anything; but he alway understood, and alway willed, those things which he determined from eternity to produce in time. The decree of God may be taken for the act decreeing, that is eternal and the same; or for the object decreed, that is in time; 

Accordingly, there was neither a new will, nor a new power, nor a new relationship

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64 *Works* I, pp. 392-5.
that came into existence in God by the creation of the world. The change is to be attributed only to the creatures that are the objects of the act of creation. The eternity of the divine decree never fails to secure the immutability of God who created the world by the execution of His will and His power.\footnote{Works I, pp. 398-9; cf. PRRD III, pp. 317-8; cf. Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii, 8-10 (p. 206); Leigh, Treatise, II.v, pp. 46-8.}

Secondly, Charnock proceeds to a christological defense against the misunderstanding of the incarnation in relation to the immutability of divine nature in the Son of God. He generally seems to consult Zanchi’s De Natura Dei (1577) and Aquinas’s Summa Theologica in this argument. According to Charnock, on the one hand, hypostatical union as the union of the two natures nevertheless preserves each property with the\footnote{See Works I, p. 400: “[Christ] assumed our nature without laying aside his own. When the soul is united to the body, doth it lose any of those perfections that are proper to its nature? Is there any change either in the substance or qualities of it? No.”}\footnote{Works I, p. 405: “[Christ] came not to change his will, but to execute his will: ‘Lo I come to do thy will, O God,’ Heb. x. 7. And the grace of God in Christ was not a new grace, but an old grace in a new appearance; the grace of God hath appeared,’ Titus ii. 11.”} communicatio idiomatum between the two natures (Phil. 2:7).\footnote{Overall, this conforms to the second major area of discussion that Perkins dealt with, as mentioned in our previous investigation.} On the other hand, “the glory of the divinity” in Christ should be necessarily maintained insofar as we consider Christ’s role as a mediator (John 17:5). That is, the work of redemption along with the incarnation has nothing to do with mutability in the trinitarian God.\footnote{Works I, pp. 401-2.}

Thirdly, Charnock deals with the immutability of God in terms of the providential economy.\footnote{Works I, pp. 405-6.} As is the case with other essential attributes of God previously dealt with, Charnock lucidly explains the meaning of God’s repentance in the scriptures in view of the act of “divine accommodation”. At the same time he still maintains a firm emphasis upon the divine “infallible foresight and immutable will”:

Grief is not in God, but his repentance is a willing a thing should not be as it was, which will was fixed from eternity; for, God foreseeing man would fall, and decreeing to permit it, he could not be said to repent in time of what he did not repent from eternity; and, therefore, if there were no repentance in God from eternity, there could be none in time; \…\ As men when they repent alter the course of their actions, so God alters things\footnote{Works I, pp. 401-2.} extra se, or without himself, but changes nothing of his own purpose within himself;
fulfilment of some prophecies in the scriptures (e.g. 2 Kings 20:1, 5; Isa. 38:1, 5; Jonah 3:4, 10) and the outward change of divine attitude towards creatures need to be interpreted in light of the economy of God’s profound attributes which are “immutable”: e.g. justice, goodness, and holiness. As Charnock had mentioned in his discussion of the doctrine of divine eternity, the abrogation of the ceremonial law is also to be considered within the same context.  

In summary, in this doctrinal and polemical section, Charnock consistently holds to the Reformed orthodox understanding of God’s immutability. He invariably seeks to defend divine simplicity on the basis of a solid trinitarian and christological foundation of immanency (ad intra) and economy (ad extra) extending through all God’s decrees, and the acts of creation, providence, and redemption. In other words, he does so by applying all the sub-loci of the full doctrine of God to this defence on the basis of both the dialectical and paradoxical relationship between the infinite God and His finite creatures.


In the practical section of his work, Charnock presents several “lessons for faith” from God’s immutability as “a foundation for piety”. Despite being already treated in the doctrinal part, Charnock’s key interest in the application of this doctrine lies in the vindication of immutability in the divinity of Christ incarnate against the Socinians. While adding exegetical evidences (Ps. 45:6-7) that confirm Christ’s divinity in terms of both His mediatorial role and oneness with God the Father as creator and governor, he points out the contradiction in the exegesis of the Socinians who claim the loss of divinity in Christ in the incarnation. To be sure this shows that, for Charnock, the divinity of Christ is the basis of the link between trinitarian knowledge of God and the piety necessary for salvation.

In addition, interestingly, Charnock argues the groundlessness of the seeming conflict between the idea of prayer (as the practice of piety) aiming to change God’s previous will and the divine immutability. The divine will according to His decree

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73 The quotations are from PRRD III, p. 319, citing Mastricht, Theoretico-practica theol., II.vii.9-14; cf. Leigh, Treatise, II.v, pp. 47-8.
74 Works I, p. 406: “The Socinians say it is spoken of God, and that God shall destroy the heavens by Christ; if so, Christ is not a mere creature, not created when he was incarnate; for the same person that shall change the world, did create the world. … The person who is to change the heavens is said to be the same, or unchangeable, in the creation as well as the dissolution of the world.”
includes prayer as the means of expressing the grace of God in its execution. It is thus worth observing Charnock’s definition of prayer. In a sense, our proper knowledge of divine immutability can assist us in pursuing the right practice of biblical prayer:

Prayer is an acknowledgement of our dependence upon God, which dependence could have no firm foundation without unchangeableness. Prayer doth not desire any change in God, but is offered to God that he would confer those things which he hath immutably willed to communicate; but he willed them not without prayer as the means of bestowing them.

Charnock’s interest in immutability in terms of devotional practice then moves to an anthropological discussion within the context of the finitum non capax infiniti towards federal thought and soteriology. Charnock contrasts the changeability of humans with the immutability of God: viz., Adam’s fall caused fatal wounds to the mind, will and affections of his posterity. Even the regenerated believer cannot maintain constancy in knowledge of truth, will, affections, and religious practice, and is rather inclined to “levity of spirit”. Nevertheless, according to Charnock, it is our comfort that such a changeable and finite believer can find an “anchor” in the immutable God, in His unchangeable rule of the covenant of grace. Within the context of the understanding of such a covenant, Charnock integrates the discussions on election, sanctification, and perseverance into the doctrine of the immutability of God as the ground of practical consolation to the believer. Thus, on the covenant of grace, Charnock states: “The covenant of grace doth not run, ‘I will be your God, if you will be my people;’ but ‘I will be their God, and they shall be my people.’”

At the same time, for Charnock, such a fundamental acknowledgement of the

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75 See Works I, p. 408: “If we ask according to his revealed will, the unchangeableness of his nature will assure us of the grant; … God hath decreed to give this or that to man, but conditionally, and by the means of inquiring after him, and asking for it: Ezek. xxxvi. 37, Matt. vii. 7, … We must depend upon his immutability for the thing, and submit to his wisdom for the time.”

76 Works I, p. 408.

77 Works I, pp. 408-11.

78 Charnock also mentions the substantial influence of the covenant of works as well as the human condition of the covenant of grace in light of the immutability of God. See Works I, pp. 411-2: “Though the covenant of works was changeable by the crime of man violating it, yet it was unchangeable in regard of God’s justice vindicating it, which is inflexible in the punishment of the breaches of his law. … His will in the second covenant is as unchangeable as that in the first, only repentance is settled as the condition of the second, … and without repentance the sinner must irrevocably perish, or God must change his nature.”

79 See Works I, pp. 413-4. Charnock derives the content of his discussion on federal theology partly from Turretin and Cocceius in this argument.

80 Works I, p. 413.
sovereignty of “immutable” God in the covenant does not exclude the role of human participation in the execution of the “immutable” decree of election, as he states: “His everlasting purpose is to write his laws in the hearts of the elect. He puts a condition to his covenant of grace, the condition of faith, and he resolves to work that condition in the hearts of the elect;”

Therefore, as we see, Charnock regards both election and the covenant of grace as the “two immutable pillars” supporting the believer’s life of faith. The firmness of election and the covenant thus makes it possible for the believer to be the object of both “the seal of sanctification” and of perseverance by means of effectual calling (Eph. 1:13).

In the same way, knowledge of the immutability of God demands a proper obedience from the believer. Charnock seems to emphasise the role of the human response within seventeenth century context against the Antinomians. He does this, however, without losing sight of the sovereignty of God, while at the same time avoiding the radical Pelagian assertion of the free choice of the human will that would undermine the perfection of God. In other words, obedience as a response of faith is impossible until God infuses “an unchangeable disposition” or supernatural habitus.

As a result, according to Charnock, we should be patient, believing in God’s providential decree upon the promise based upon His immutable will, wisdom, and goodness (Eccl. 6:10, Heb. 10:36). At the same time, the divine immutability in both nature and will should be the foundation of our struggle to reach both “a steadfast obedience” (1 Cor. 15:58) on earth and “the beatific vision” in heaven, as those who know and love God. Even so, Charnock offsets the paradox of finitum non capax infiniti in our theology by affirming the solidity of the trinitarian structure that links the divine immutability with our unchangeableness as promised, within the “already-but not yet” context. By way of conclusion, Charnock thus remarks as follows:

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81 Works I, p. 413. In some way this can also be interpreted as a comment on the covenant of redemption as the ontological basis of the firmness of the covenant of grace through the eternal decree of “election” in the trinitarian God; cf. John Owen, The Doctrine of the Saints Perseverance, in The Works of John Owen, 16 vols. Johnston & Hunter, 1850-1853, repr. (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth, 1967), vol. 11.

82 We will speak about Antinomianism in more detail in chapter seven in relation to God’s holiness.

83 On the views of the Socinians, the Jesuits, and the Remonstrants in relation to this respect, see PRRD III, p. 323.

84 Quotation from Works I, p. 418.

85 Works I, pp. 416-7, 419: “Therefore we should not only acquiesce in what he works, but have a complacency in it; and by having our wills thus knitting themselves with the immutable will of God, we attain some degree of likeness to him in his own unchangeableness. … the nearer we come to him, the more stability we shall have in ourselves; the further from him, the more liable to change.”
The righteousness of Christ, that shall never wear out; and the graces of the Spirit, that shall never burn out. By this means, what God is infinitely by nature, we shall come to be finitely, immutable by grace, as much as the capacity of a creature can obtain.  

In summary, in this practical section on the immutability of God, Charnock makes an effort to let his readers know the error of both radical antinomian or deterministic views (seeing immutability as inactivity) and Arminian or Pelagian ways of reducing the predicament of human finiteness. The defence of the full doctrine of God as a system for the salvation of the elect is remarkable, especially in terms of its christological and federal dimensions.

**III. The Omnipresence of God**

The doctrine of omnipresence as a spatial aspect of divine infinity has been discussed from the patristic period onwards via medieval scholastics to the Reformers and the Reformed orthodox, without substantial change to its content. As we will see in this sub-chapter, in the case of the Reformed scholastics or Puritan theologians like Perkins and Charnock, the combination of “ontological” support with a “firm” biblical foundation was especially characteristic of a type of discussion in relation to doctrinal opponents in the seventeenth century. In other words, as is the case with divine eternity, the theological key point of omnipresence lies in how this “essential” attribute of God *ad intra* can be coherently explained in harmony with God’s works of creation, providence, and redemption *ad extra*. Therefore, in this doctrine of God’s omnipresence, we shall find out that orthodox theology and Puritan piety are invariably and exquisitely intertwined in Perkins’ and Charnock’s system.

**A. Perkins on the Omnipresence of God**

With a categorisation similar to many other Reformed theologians, Perkins defines omnipresence (exceeding greatness) as the latter of the two-fold natures of infiniteness of God: “that by which his incomprehensible nature is everywhere present, both within & without the world (Ps. 145:3, 1 King 8:27, Jer. 23:24)”. We

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see thus the concepts of both the infinitas Dei and the magnitudo Dei are used virtually interchangeably despite the delicate nuances in Perkins’ understanding of them as a negative or positive attribute. Perkins then explains the characteristics of this attribute in two respects: first, God is the only existence indivisible as well as infinite in His nature (Eph. 4:5, Deut. 4:35, 1 Cor. 8:4); second, this attribute is, in some way, the local basis of God’s omniscience of the human heart (1 King 8:39, Ps. 139:1-2). The infinite greatness of God is “in regard of his essence and Godhead”, which thus confirms that we are in God (Act. 18:27) because His essence is everywhere, along with His providential and decreeing power. At the same time the immensity of God is the “ground of true obedience in all estates” in trusting God’s will and pleasure. This clearly demonstrates Perkins’ understanding of omnipresence both ad intra and ad extra as including all the aspects of God’s essence, nature, works, and authority.

Accordingly, for Perkins, God’s omnipresence is also a confutation of the falseness of “Popish” pilgrimages to specific places for the worship of God. He points out, moreover that the personal persuasion of such a divine presence is certain to contribute to our growth in piety. In addition Perkins deals with the christological dimension in this understanding of divine omnipresence. In relation to our striving for piety and true religion he argues against the error of the idea of both ubiquity and the real or essential presence of the body of Christ in the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper. He does so by explaining the significance of the Ascension and Christ’s intercession at the right hand of the Father.

In short, though it is also the case with other English Puritan works, we see particularly in Perkins’ treatment of the divine omnipresence the prototype of Charnock’s fourfold (exegetical, doctrinal, elenctic, and practical) structure. The vindication of the doctrine of divine simplicity and the Trinitarian nature of God is still the underlying purpose for his argument in its pietistic dimensions.

B. Charnock’s Exegesis & Doctrine on the Omnipresence of God:

The True Meaning of the “Being” and “Act” of God

After an extensive investigation of the exegetical traditions concerning Jer.

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88 Cf. PRRD III, pp. 332, 338. With the same pattern, immensity and omnipresence can also be differentiated according to the same criterion of via negativa or via eminentiae.
90 Cf. PRRD III, p. 332.
92 An Exposition of the Creede, in Workes I, pp. 251-5.
Charnock assumes that the omnipresence of God in this verse refers not only to divine knowledge, authority, or power but also to the essence of God filling heaven and earth. For the right exegesis of the word “filling” in light of the divine presence, he explains the divine accommodation declared in this verse, and shows it to be affirmed in exegetical tradition by the medieval scholastic view. To be sure Charnock seems to keep the misunderstandings of the Socinians, Vorstius, Lutherans, and Cartesians on the essential presence of God in his mind. For Charnock, without the firm ground of essential presence, there is no proper understanding of the divine presence by power and knowledge inferred from the former: God’s omnipresence should be understood comprehensively in terms of His power, knowledge, and essence. According to the exegetical results he has derived, Charnock focuses on the vindication of the doctrine of divine omnipresence on the ground of divine simplicity. He develops this by treating the question of how the various aspects of divine presence are based upon the essential omnipresence of God at the same time. In doing so, against the assertions of theological opponents (the above mentioned Socinians, Vorstius, Lutherans, and Cartesians) who deny such an omnipresence of God, Charnock seeks to defend the traditional orthodox view of it within the later seventeenth century context.

To start with, he calls attention to the fact that only God, who is neither circumscriptively nor definitively present like a human being or angel is, can be the subject of “repletive” presence “above limitation by any place”. This immensity indicates a boundlessness in terms of place as well as an “influential omnipresence” with creatures by His authority, power, and knowledge ad extra. Charnock then endeavours to make a distinction in detail using these two dimensions of omnipresence, the “essential” and the “influential”. On the one hand, he explains

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93 “Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord: do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord.” For this examination, Charnock refers to Sebastian Muster (1488-1552), Franciscus Vatablus (1485-1547), Sebastien Castalio (1515-1563), and Johannes Oecolampadius (1482-1531) in Works I, p. 421; cf. Zanchi, De Natura Dei, II.vi.3; Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii, 9 (p. 197).

94 Works I, p. 422: “The Holy Ghost here accommodates himself to the capacity of men, because we know that a man sees and knows that which is done where he is corporally present; so he proves that God knows all things that are done in the most secret caverns of the heart, because he is everywhere in heaven and earth, as light is everywhere in the air, and air everywhere in the world. Hence the schools use the term repletive for the presence of God. …”

95 The Socinians and Vorstius asserted that God’s essence inhabits the heaven and can be omnipresent only by the extension of His power; cf. PRRD III, pp. 329-30, 338-42. This will be addressed in detail later.

96 Works I, p. 423.

97 Works I, pp. 423-4.
essential presence “in all places” and “with all creatures” by referring to Maimonides (1135-1204), Hornbeck (1617-1666), and Amyraut along with the Scriptural evidences (Ps. 139:7-9; Exod. 33:20, 23; Isa. 40:12; Acts 17:27) by saying: “God is totally everywhere by his own simple substance”. On the other hand, the first category of influential omnipresence is universal as the “virtual presence of God” to all the creatures through God’s “virtue” (power) of creation and preservation (Ps. 36:6, Heb. 1:3). Charnock explains it as follows:

There is a *virtue* sustaining every creature, that it may not fall back into that nothing from whence it was elevated by the power of God. All those *natural virtues* we call the principles of operation, are fountains spring from his goodness and power, all things are acted and managed by him, as well as preserved by him; and in this sense God is present with all creatures, for whatsoever acts another is present with that which it acts, by sending forth some virtue and influence whereby it acts. If *free agents* do not only ‘live,’ but ‘move in him,’ and by him, Acts xvii. 28, much more are the motions of other *natural agents*, by a virtue communicated to them, and upheld in them in the time of their acting.

Nevertheless, quoting Zanchi, Charnock asserts that God Himself and the indivisible divine essence exist at a distance from the creatures by the analogy of the relationship of soul and body. Charnock also explains another four kinds of presence as a second category of the “influential omnipresence” that makes the subject “be capacitated” for such a presence: a “special providential” presence to execute divine counsel (e.g. Nebuchanezzar, Judas), an “effective” presence to all the creatures, an “objective” presence with rational creatures, and the presence of a “gracious efficacy” by uniting the elect with Christ. That is, influential presence is known to our “senses” by God’s works *ad extra*; essential presence is known to our “reason” by His nature and essence *ad intra*. Let us see again the relationship of each presence in Charnock’s summary:

His essence is not straitened in the limits of any created work, he is not contained in the heavens, i.e. in the manner that he is there; but he is there in his essence, and therefore cannot be contained there in his essence. If it should be

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100 *Works* I, p. 426.
101 For the details, see *Works* I, p. 426.
meant only of his power and providence, it would conclude also for his essence; if his power and providence were infinite, his essence must be so too, for the infiniteness of his essence is the ground of the infiniteness of his power. … God is essentially in every part of the world, and essentially above ours without the world: Isa. lxvi. 1, …

It is not possible, of course, to communicate such immensity to Christ, even in His human nature, despite the hypostatical union. Emphatic on this point, Charnock also insists on the coherence of the theory of the extra Calvinisticum against the view of the Lutherans. As a matter of fact we can still sense that Charnock’s main opponents are the Socinians and Cartesians who affirm God’s presence as only a material extension, which inevitably denies the various kinds of the immaterial omnipresence of God.

As the acknowledgement of God’s essential presence was important to Charnock within the seventeenth century context, he proceeds to consider the five reasons (God’s infiniteness, the continual operation of God in the world, supreme perfection, immutability, and omnipotency) that prove the appropriateness of it. Particularly the first and second arguments are worth expounding here. First, the “greatness and excellency” (Ps. 145:3) of God indicates His infiniteness in both perfections and essence because there is no distinction between the two in God. In other words, the assumption of the relationship of the divine essence as the subject to the attributes as “faculties and qualities” is absurd because there exists a principle of “no proportion between finite and infinite”.

Second, according to Charnock, we cannot deny that God is in all creatures living, moving, and existing by giving “the impression of a seal” to them. We see that Charnock holds to the principles of both divine simplicity and divine concurrence in order to prove this argument by expanding his explanation of the essential presence.

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103 Works I, p. 432.
104 Works I, p. 433: “Some indeed argue that Christ, in regard of his human nature, is everywhere, because he sits at the right hand of God, and the right hand of God is everywhere.” For a brief account of the historical background of the term Extra Calvinisticum from the period of the fathers to seventeenth century, see Muller, “extra calvinisticum,” in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1985), p. 111.
106 Works I, p. 435: “Where God works by his power, he is present in his essence, because his power and his essence cannot be separated, and therefore his power, wisdom, goodness, cannot be anywhere where his essence is not. … For the power of God is nothing but God acting, and the wisdom of God nothing but God knowing. As the power of God is always, so is his essence; as the power of God is everywhere, so his essence. Whatsoever God is, he is alway, and everywhere.” Italics are mine.
107 The quotations are from Works I, pp. 434, 436.
previously stated. Such an essential presence continues in both the works of creation and preservation with no distinction;\textsuperscript{108} the understanding of the “virtue” (power) necessary for sustaining all the creatures based upon the idea of divine simplicity also leads us to accept the further argument concerning the essential presence of God.\textsuperscript{109} At the same time God’s own acts in using these creatures as second causes does not conflict with the \textit{Potentia Absoluta Dei}, but stands in harmony with the \textit{Potentia Ordinata Dei}.\textsuperscript{110} Charnock thus neatly sums up all the dynamics of the essential presence without losing sight of the doctrine of divine simplicity:

> And when he works by means, he acts with those means, in those means, sustains their faculties and virtues in them, concurs with them by his power, so that God’s acting by means doth rather strengthen his essential presence than weaken it, since there is a necessary dependence of the creatures upon the Creator in their being and acting; and what they are, they are by the power of God; what they act, they act in the power of God concurring with them. … Where the power of God is, his essence is, because they are inseparable; and so this omnipresence ariseth from the simplicity of the nature of God.\textsuperscript{111}

Obviously, other expressions in Scriptures that speak about God’s dwelling in heaven or the Temple and coming to or departing from us do not impair the doctrine of the divine essential presence. Rather, they confirm it by representing the varied attributes of God.\textsuperscript{112} At this juncture, Charnock sees the need to touch upon the problem of pantheism (we recall here Spinoza who asserts “the radical \textit{concurrus} of God with all things”) with regard to the proper understanding of the omnipresence of God.\textsuperscript{113} Given the above, God's essential presence everywhere cannot be regarded as either the identification of God with everything or His existing in materially actual

\textsuperscript{108} Works I, p. 436.
\textsuperscript{109} Works I, p. 436: “If his substance cannot be disjoined from his preserving power, his power and wisdom cannot be separated from his essence; where there are the marks of the one, there is the presence of the other; for it is by his essence that he is powerful and wise; no man can distinguish the one from the other in a simple being. … This virtue is therefore God himself, the infinite power and wisdom of God; and therefore wheresoever the effects of these are seen in the world, God is essentially present.”
\textsuperscript{110} Works I, p. 437. Cf. Muller, \textit{Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms} (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1985), pp. 231-2 (on the definition of these two terms in Protestant scholastic theology). We will expound these terms in chapter six especially in relation to the power and sovereignty of God.
\textsuperscript{111} Works I, p. 437.
\textsuperscript{112} See Works I, pp. 439-41.
\textsuperscript{113} The quotation is from \textit{PRRD} III, pp. 342-3. For the general thought of Spinoza concerning this point, see Baruch Spinoza, \textit{Earlier Philosophical Writings: The Cartesian Principles and Thoughts on Metaphysics}, trans. F. A. Hayes & introduced D. B idney (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).
relationship with the creatures. Rather, it should reflect cause and effect, as Charnock argues: “God is not in us as a part of us, but as an efficient and preserving cause. It is not by his essential presence, but his efficacious presence, that he brings any person into a likeness to his own nature.”

In summary, we note that Charnock’s awareness of this distinction (essential and influential omnipresence) leads him to clarify the relationship of God, divine essence, and creatures on the basis of the axiom *finitum non capax infiniti* along with firm exegetical evidence. Nevertheless Charnock emphasises the participation of rational creatures in the divine presence as secondary causes according to God’s will. This is a revealed attribute *ad extra* related to the finite, for the glory of God who is both infinite and essentially omnipresent. Charnock’s use of the abundant intellectual heritage of the scholastic tradition in the medieval and Reformation era and his own period are conspicuous. However, even philosophical arguments were only deployed within the boundary of the defence of divine simplicity to avoid inconsistencies or gaps between God’s essence and act.

C. Charnock’s Praxis on the Omnipresence of God: The Basis of Communion with God in Nature and Grace

As mentioned in the discussion of other essential attributes, Charnock also applies the doctrine of divine omnipresence to Christological, trinitarian, and covenantal levels in his practical thought. The divinity of Christ necessarily ensures His omnipresence anytime and everywhere in heaven and earth, regardless of both the incarnation, the hypostatical union and the Ascension after the resurrection (John 1:10, 3:13). What is especially notable is that Charnock stresses the trinitarian significance of Christ’s promise of presence to the church after the Ascension (Matt. 18:20, 28:20; John 10:30). That is, for Charnock, this promise ought to be interpreted not just as the sending of the Holy Spirit, but also as the persevering power of the Father and the Son regarding the elect in terms of the trinitarian consistency between divine essence and presence, as he notes: “Where there is a unity of essence there is a unity of presence”.

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114 *Works* I, p. 442.
115 See *Works* I, p. 442: “God is so in his essence with things as to be distinct from them, as a cause from the effect, as a Creator different from the creature, preserving their nature, not communicating his own. His essence touches all, is in conjunction with none. *Finite* and *infinite* cannot be joined. He is not far from us, therefore near to us; so near, that we ‘live and move in him,’ Acts xvii. 28.”
117 *Works* I, p. 446.
doctrine of spirituality, providential government, and omniscience. The relationship between providence, the omnipresence of all divine attributes and essence shows well the dynamics of all the divine acts and the divine presence as Charnock states: “[God] is not everywhere without acting everywhere. Wherever his essence is, there is a power and virtue worthy of God everywhere dispensed. He governs by his presence what he made by his power, and is present as an agent with all his works.”

At the same time Charnock refers to the incomprehensibility of God in His omnipresence by contrasting the hidden God and the revealed God. This is characterised by a paradoxical relationship in the divine attributes as the source of our knowledge of God, for at the same time our minds are inevitably limited in fully understanding Him. Charnock then proceeds to deal fully with the meaning of a “presence of grace” in the covenantal context. His view of the relationship of nature and grace is directly applied to the case of essential presence and the presence of federal grace. The acknowledgement of essential omnipresence is important in this respect, since there is no presence of covenantal grace without a natural foundation. Such a presence of federal grace to the elect also exists as the foundation of our acts of piety and worship because God promises His “dwelling in them by grace” and “walking in them by exciting their graces” in a supernatural dimension.

In addition, the doctrine of divine omnipresence should be both “a shield against all temptations” and a stimulus to our sanctification on the basis of keeping constantly in mind “the gracious presence of God” peculiar only to the believer. In other words, what is critically important for Charnock is the believer’s wholehearted knowledge of the relationship between the divine essence and all the attributes of God centering around His presence. This knowledge is oriented to the practical life of “communion with God” leading to a truly and fully restored image of Him. We can fully sense this by noting the fact that Charnock ends his discourse upon omnipresence by saying:

118 Works I, p. 446.
119 Works I, pp. 447-448: “Nothing is more present than God, yet nothing more hid; he is light, and yet obscurity; his perfections are visible, yet unsearchable; we know there is an infinite God, but it surpasseth the compass of our minds. … He is known by faith, enjoyed by love, but comprehended by no mind. God is not contained in that one syllable, God; by it we apprehend an excellent and unlimited nature.”
121 Works I, pp. 453-6.
122 Works I, pp. 453, 455.
Let it be therefore our desire, that as he fills heaven and earth by his essence, he may fill our understanding and wills by his grace; that we may have another kind of presence with us than animals have in their brutish state, or devils in their chains; his essential presence maintains our beings, but his gracious presence confers and continues a happiness.\textsuperscript{123}

In summary, Charnock sought to show how we should understand the divine (omni) presence for the growth of piety against the backgrounds of the \textit{ad intra} and \textit{extra} within the context of trinitarian, federal, and christological perspectives. Both nature and grace operate as the bases of our knowledge of God’s presence on the assumption of the priority of the “federal” or supernatural presence (in terms of practical piety) over the immanent or essential presence.

\textit{Conclusion}

As a result of this investigation of both Perkins’ and Charnock’s doctrine of the essential attributes of God, we can make an appraisal as follows. The problem of how to vindicate God’s transcendence and immanence at the same time (without damaging the divine simplicity as a foundational doctrine) was a matter of great account to Perkins and Charnock concerning the ideas of God’s essential attributes against various theological opponents in the early and high orthodox period. At a more specific level, especially in the case of scholastic Puritans like Perkins and Charnock, the Reformed orthodox doctrine of the “essential” attribute is not to be understood as a one-sided “static” concept depriving it of the dynamics of the eternal and temporal dimensions. That is, such a partial understanding (e.g. Barth, Gunton, and Jones etc.) can express only one dimension of “Being” \textit{ad intra}, which is a serious fault in that it cannot reflect the organic relationship and balance between ontological and economic trinitarianism in the Puritan and Reformed scholastic understanding of the attributes of God.

Certainly, such trinitarian thought stands on the firm basis of covenant theology developed in continuity from Perkins to Charnock, despite the emergence of the concept of the covenant of redemption in mid seventeenth century Reformed orthodox theology. In fact, the overall trinitarian structure of Charnock’s theological system is virtually the same as that of Perkins, the founder of it in the English Puritan

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Works} I, p. 456.
theology. Although Perkins based his federal theology more on a “logical” dimension rather than on a “historical” or dispensational dimension in God’s economy, it was de facto a fundamental framework of reference for Charnock in his understanding of divine eternity, immutability, and omnipresence.124

Nevertheless, in Charnock, the elaborate theological linkage between God’s external works (creation, redemption, and providence) in history and the eternal basis of them is clearly seen in his treatment of the essential attributes of God given through the expanded threefold or fourfold structures. In addition, the Puritan emphasis on the pursuit of piety and true religion especially found in the practical section increases the necessity for a revision of the views of previous scholarship concerning Charnock’s thought: no longer should it be seen as the by-product of speculative, philosophical Aristotelian scholasticism in relation to mere “negative” theology. We will find out more about the nature of Charnock’s theology, along with Perkins’, in more detail in the next chapter through the investigation of the doctrine of the divine intellect.

124 We have commented upon this point in chapter one by seeing the tendency of high orthodox federal theology as more teleological than that of early orthodox. Cf. Timothy Young-Jae Song, System and Piety in the Federal Theology of William Perkins and John Preston (Ph.D. Dissertation, Westminster Theological Seminary, 1998).
Chapter Five

The Doctrine of the Divine Intellect

As is well known, the Puritan and Reformed scholastics of the early and high orthodox period endeavoured to explain the relationship of the divine intellect and will in the doctrine of the divine attributes by using the Aristotelian model of faculty psychology. In this, of course Perkins and Charnock were unexceptional. In addition, this subject was basically “scholastic” for it had been handed down to the late sixteenth and seventeenth century from the thirteenth century development of modified Aristotelianism in Christianity based upon this faculty psychology.

Though there were variant formulations in the categories of the divine intellectual attributes in the Reformed position, they are basically divided according to whether “knowledge” is discussed within the same category as “wisdom” or not. The Reformers generally tended not only to define divine omniscience in terms of “direct understanding of all things”, but also to define divine wisdom in terms of providential counsel. The Reformed scholastics cautiously emphasised the point of distinction between knowledge and wisdom in terms of “causality” — first or final, while at the same time retaining the features of the Reformers’ distinction.

In this chapter, on the basis of this general background, we will examine Perkins’ and Charnock’s discussions of God’s intellect; ranging from its manner, objects, degree, and distinction, to both the problem of divine foreknowledge and the scientia media (middle knowledge) within the early and high orthodox context. In other words, we will see how Perkins and Charnock responded to the rationale of their theological opponents to vindicate the orthodox understanding of divine omniscience in pursuit of the defence of both divine simplicity and the trinitarian

1 We will also discuss the doctrine of the will of God (voluntas Dei) in detail in relation to the divine intellect in chapter six.
3 The distinction between scientia and sapientia in the divine intellect is also related to medieval scholastic discussion of whether theology is science or wisdom. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. i. vi; F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 9 vols (London: Burns & Oates, 1946-75): vol. I (Greece and Rome), pp. 287-8, 343-44; vol. II (Medieval Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus), pp. 494-5.
4 PRRD III, pp. 384-6. In our case, Perkins chooses not to make a distinction between divine knowledge and wisdom; Charnock deals with each intellectual attribute separately in depth in two distinct discourses (on knowledge and wisdom).
5 Though the Reformers seldom discussed the issue of divine omniscience in detail, both the early and high Reformed orthodox theologians endeavoured to defend it from the concept of middle knowledge and against the consequent limitation of divine knowledge.
knowledge of God. During this investigation, we will also discover that the dialectic of Thomism, Scotism and Augustinianism are arguably intertwined in both Perkins’ and Charnock’s elaborations of the doctrine of the divine intellect, leading towards a monergistic soteriology and doctrine of providence on the basis of the causal structure of ontology and action between God and creatures. Of course this examination will verify more clearly the identity of Charnock’s “scholastic” doctrine of God.

**I. Perkins on the Divine Intellect**

Perkins categorises the *scientia Dei* as one of the three attributes — wisdom or knowledge, will, and omnipotence — in the life of God (*Vita Dei*) as “a living God”. Perkins’ understanding of the *intellectus Dei* has elements of both *ad intra* and *extra* because he *de facto* identifies divine knowledge with the wisdom of God operating in the works of creation, providence and redemption. At the same time such a categorisation of the life of God is another indication of the “practical” characteristic in Perkins’ view of divine knowledge that emphasises the *ad extra* dimension.

For Perkins, the wisdom and knowledge of God also should be proved, as is the case in the general tendency among the Reformed scholastics, from biblical evidence within the boundary of the Ramistic framework. Though the Reformed orthodox found affirmative, negative, and figurative proofs in the Scripture, Perkins simply uses one affirmative verse (Ps. 147:5) and two negative arguments

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6 As outlined in chapter one, on the one hand, the opponents of Perkins in early orthodoxy were Arminius and Molinism; on the other hand, Charnock as a Puritan in the period of high orthodoxy mainly attacked the Socinian view along with a critique of former synergistic positions. We will deal with both of them in detail later on.


8 This classification of divine knowledge among the operations of God seems to follow the pattern of the Thomist tradition. See Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I. iii-xxvi. Ames, Leigh, Ussher and even Arminius also follow this style. See Ames, *Marrow*, I. iv, p. 87; Leigh, *Systeme*, II. ii, pp. 160-2; Ussher, *A Body of Divinitie*, pp. 30-75. However, though Arminius uses a structure identical to Perkins’ in his understanding of the *vita Dei*, he is distinct from Perkins in that Arminius shows a significant inconsistency among the elements (*intellectus*, *voluntas*, *potentia*) of the life of God in relation to the works of creation, providence and the application of redemption. See Muller, *God, Creation, and Providence*, p. 144.

9 See Muller’s definition of it in *God, Creation, and Providence*, p. 151: “Sapientia is typically defined by the scholastics in the Aristotelian sense of knowledge ordered toward a goal — that is, practical knowledge.”

10 *PRRD* III, p. 393.
Perkins defines the *scientia* or *sapientia Dei* as follows:

The wisdom or knowledge of God, is that by the which God doth, not by certaine motions abstracted from the things themselves, but by his owne essence: nor successively and by discourse of reason, but by one eternall and immutable act of understanding, distinctly and perfectly know himselfe, and all other things, though infinite, whether they have been or not.

First, this definition indicates that divine knowing is different from human knowing in terms of eternity, immutability, and infinite spirituality within the boundary of divine essence. Thus, the three distinctions of human knowing — *intellectus*, *scientia*, and *cognitio* — are meaningless in the act of divine knowing. Second, according to Perkins’ Ramistic categorisation, such divine knowledge consists of the two elements of “foreknowledge” and “counsel”. As he defines it:

The foreknowledge of God, is that by which he most assuredly foreseeth all things that are to come. … This is not properly spoken of God, but by reason of men to whom things are past or to come. … The counsell of God, is that by the which he doth most rightly perceive the best reason of all things that are done.

By excluding the possibility of the application of temporal knowing to God, Perkins leaves no room for a concept of divine foreknowledge (as the first element of divine knowledge) of future contingents. He reiteratively emphasises the radical difference between divine foreknowledge and human knowing in that the latter is necessarily related both to a temporal limitation and to fallibility along with ignorance. Equally, according to Perkins, what God foresees by all means eventuates in reality without error. The counsel of God (the second element of the divine knowledge) applies

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11 Perkins does not even try to prove the *scientia Dei* by using rational argument viz., *the via negationis*, *via causalitatis*, and *via eminentiae*. This recourse to Scripture alone for the proof of the divine knowledge appears to be echoing the Reformers’ *sola scriptura*. For a detailed account of these three ways, see *PRRD* III, p. 395
13 As an example of a similar case in the English Reformed scholastics, see Leigh, *Treatise of Divinity* (London, 1646), II. VII (p. 60, margin), cited in *PRRD* III, p. 397.
15 In the explanation of divine counsel in his *An Exposition of the Creede*, Perkins’ viewpoint is virtually identical: “The counsel of God is his eternal and unchangeable decree, whereby hee hath ordained all things either past, present, or to come, for his owne glory. … God’s counsel hath two parts: his foreknowledge, whereby he did foresee all things which were to come. His will, whereby in general manner he wils and ordaines whatsoever is to come to passe: and therefore such things as God altogether nilleth, cannot come to passe. Now these two parts of the counsel of God must be joined
mainly not to the divine knowledge but rather to the providential wisdom of God in terms of God as a “final causality” who immutably has a purpose in his works.16

In summary, under the larger category of divine knowledge that does not differentiate between *scientia* and *sapientia* according to the Thomistic pattern, we can perceive that Perkins simply defines divine knowledge, foreknowledge, and counsel without explaining other derivative terms of divine knowledge within the boundary of the early orthodox context. Although this is a consistently focused point in our investigation of the Puritan and Reformed scholastic attributes of God, we again see that Perkins tends towards a modified Thomistic tendency in his understanding of divine knowledge by stressing the importance of the divine will in terms of the *ad extra* dimension of God’s works that is a voluntaristic characteristic of Scotism.17 Of course, all of his arguments *de facto* converge on the vindication of divine simplicity.

II. Charnock’s Exegesis & Doctrine of God’s Intellect

While making a distinction between *scientia* and *sapientia* in his view of the divine intellect, Charnock first draws several doctrinal propositions from his exegesis of Ps. 147:5.18 He writes: “God hath an infinite knowledge and understanding; all knowledge. … Omnisience respects his understanding, according to our manner of conception.”19 Admittedly the practical implication of Charnock’s understanding of this doctrine lies in the fact that the notion of *scientia Dei* was not obliterated in the human mind by the fall of man: viz., conscience and “universal notions of God” are none other than a “natural implantation” of God for the human knowing of *scientia* together, and not severed. Will without knowledge is impotent, and foreknowledge without will is idle”, in *Workes* I, p. 140.

16 Cf. Leigh, *Treatise of Divinity*, II. vii (p. 64), cited in *PRRD* III, p. 386. Perkins also points out the soteriological aspect of this by referring to God’s “perpetual, unchangeable, and special” knowledge of the elect in terms of both eternal and executive dimensions for their salvation. See Perkins, *A Commentarie upon the Epistle to the Galatians*, in *Workes* II, p. 283; idem, *A Treatise of Predestination*, in *Works* II, p. 607; *An Exposition of Christ's Sermon in the Mount*, in *Works* III (i), p. 250. At the same time, we find that the stress upon the pietistic aspect applied from the doctrine of God’s omnipotence itself is also maintained in his schema. E.g., *A Commentary upon the Epistle to the Galatians*, in *Workes* II, p. 384; *An Exposition of Christ's Sermon in the Mount*, in *Works* III (i), p. 109; *An Exposition upon the 2, chap. of the Revelation*, in *Works* III (ii), pp. 283, 292.


18 “Great is our Lord, and of great power: his understanding is infinite.”

According to Charnock, the variant categories of distinction concerning the divine intellect can be presented as follows:

In respect of present things, it is called knowledge or sight; in respect of things past, remembrance; in respect of things future, or to come, it is called foreknowledge, or prescience (1 Pet. i. 2); in regard of the universality of the objects, it is called omniscience; in regard of the simple understanding of things, it is called knowledge; in regard of acting and modelling the ways of acting, it is called wisdom and prudence (Eph. I. 8).

This shows that, under the larger category of the divine intellect, Charnock defines wisdom, knowledge, and foreknowledge according to their relations with creatures. That is, we see that he notes the importance of the divine will inasmuch as it constantly operates according to divine knowledge and wisdom. Thus he presents various scholastic divisions of the theological terms concerning divine knowledge reflecting the significance of the extrinsic or operative aspect of God’s work.

A. The Distinctions of the Scientia Dei: The Dialectics of Thomism and Scotism

Charnock offers three distinctions in the divine knowing in terms of its “objects”. First, there is a distinction between the knowledge of “simple” intelligence (scientia simplicis intelligentiae) and the knowledge of “vision” (scientia visionis). A knowledge of simple understanding or intelligence is, as Charnock defines: “The object of this [knowledge] is not things that are in being, or that shall by any decree of God ever be existent in the world, but such things as are possible to be wrought by the power of God, though they shall never in the least peep up into being, …” Thus this is the knowledge that exists in God as the total of “the entire realm of possibility” outside the act of the divine will towards His goals. At the same time Charnock identifies this knowledge with “necessary knowledge” of God (scientia necessaria), viz., it is a necessary knowledge to be allowed to God insofar as the power of God can work and produce more creatures than those that ever or shall be in reality. Charnock continues to explain the concept of “vision knowledge”. He

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20 Thus we sense that Charnock seeks to prove the divine omniscience both from the evidence of Scripture and from natural argument (despite its ancillary role). Such a tendency reflects the difference of intellectual atmosphere between early and high orthodoxy.
23 Works I, p. 462.
The point we should note is that, as was also the case among the Reformed orthodox theologians, the divine will and the divine knowledge are conjoined in Charnock’s idea of “vision knowledge”. At the same time this indicates that Charnock’s first categorisation of divine knowledge shows a preference for the tradition of Thomistic intellectualism. Yet we see at the outset that he explains this first distinction in a voluntaristic manner emphasising both the divine will and decree.

Secondly, according to Charnock’s distinction, there is a divine speculative (scientia speculativa) and practical knowledge (scientia practica). This distinction is no other than the subdivision of “vision knowledge”. Divine speculative knowledge is based upon both God’s “love of Himself” and “delight in Himself” that are necessary and natural. In other words, this knowledge is a scientia visionis that depends on “the eternal divine willing of actuality”; God possesses such knowledge as a result of the decree. Thus, even if God wills actuals, this knowledge exists immutably as a both “noncausal” and “possible” knowledge concerning God Himself and things. It is also “theoretical or contemplative” (theoretica sive contemplativa) in light of its characteristic. Yet again Charnock moves on to define the divine practical knowledge:

24 Works I, p. 461.
25 PRRD III, p. 407; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. xiv. 9; In the English Reformed position, see Leigh, System, II. vii, pp. 191-3. For a general explanation of the use of such a medieval scholastic distinction of a duplex divine knowledge in the Reformed orthodoxy, see Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources, trans. G. T. Thompson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950), pp. 72-5. The thought of Suarez in this respect is also applied to the modified Thomism. The equivalence of this distinction in the voluntaristic Scotist’s approach is the distinction between the necessary or natural knowledge (scientia necessaria sive naturalis) of God and the free or voluntary knowledge (scientia libera sive voluntaria) of God. Though Charnock refers to the scientia necessaria in a somewhat intellectualistic tone, the term free or voluntary knowledge appears to be left unmentioned due to the intellectualistic character of his scholasticism.
26 In light of this point, Charnock virtually indicates the corollary of a distinction between Potentia Absoluta Dei and Potentia Ordinata Dei in his distinction of divine knowledge. See Works I, p. 483: “His knowledge of possible things must run parallel with his power, and his knowledge of future things run parallel with his will.” For a similar style of argument in Owen, see Vindicae Evangelicae, in Works 12, p. 128.
27 PRRD III, p. 408.
28 This term is related to the Augustinian term: love of “enjoyment” (frui). See Augustine, Teaching Christianity: De Doctrina Christiana, trans. Edmimd Hill and ed. John Rotelle (New York: New City Press, 1995), 1.4.4; also see David Steinmetz, Misercordia Dei: The Theology of Johannes Von Staupitz in its Late Medieval Setting (Leiden: Brill, 1968), p. 35; Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 63.
A practical knowledge, which tends to operation and practice, and is the principle of working about things that are known, as the knowledge an artificer hath in an art or mystery. … The knowledge he hath of the things he hath decreed, is such a kind of knowledge, for it terminates in the act of creation, … but wholly free. … This is called discretion. … Practical knowledge is his knowledge of his creatures and things governable.29

This definition shows that Charnock appears to relate the scientia practica to the doctrine of creation and providence in terms of divine governance ad extra. As the scientia practica is, in the Aristotelian scholastic tradition, knowledge in pursuit of its goal,30 it seems virtually identical with the sapientia Dei, His discretion.31 Third, Charnock distinguishes “vision knowledge” again into both knowledge of approbation (scientia approbationis) and of apprehension (scientia apprehensionis). This distinction hinges upon whether divine love and affection exists or not toward the object of His vision knowledge. If God loves the object of knowledge, He then naturally approves it with “complacency and pleasure of the will”.32 By way of example, citing Mat.25:12 ( “I know you not”) and 7:23 (“I never knew you”), he notes the characteristic of scientia apprehensionis as a knowledge of reprobation (scientia reprobationis):

[The knowledge of apprehension] is not an ignorance of understanding, but an ignorance of will; … So he knows them, and doth not know them, in a different

29 Works I, pp. 462-3.
30 Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 151.
31 As is the case with Charnock, though the relation of the scientia Dei to practical knowledge is an overall characteristic of the Puritan and Reformed orthodox, Arminius also comments on this point. See Arminius, Disp. Pub. IV. xli, cited in God, Creation and Providence, p. 150: “[The divine] practical knowledge is that by which things are considered in terms of (sub ratione) the good, and as objects of the will and power.” The importance of ‘the good’ of the creatures in Arminius’ explanation is also present in Charnock. He states: “This is a knowledge whereby he knows the essence, qualities, and properties of what he creates, and governs in order to his own glory, and the common good of the world over which he [p]resides.” We can suggest that, even if Charnock stands in the Reformed scholastic position, the influence of Arminius and Suarez (perhaps an eclectic characteristic of Reformed scholastic theology in its high orthodox period) appears to be seen in his doctrine of the scientia Dei within the intellectual context of the seventeenth century. However, we should not forget that Charnock cites both of them mainly from a critical perspective. John Coffey notes the same point, particularly in the case of the citation of Suarez in the writings of Samuel Rutherford (1600-1661). See his Politics, Religion, and the British Revolutions: The Mind of Samuel Rutherford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 73: “Rutherford’s quotations from Suarez were numerous, but most of the time he was pointing out why Suarez was wrong. However, the large number of references to Suarez suggests that Rutherford was framing his own ideas in conscious opposition to the thought of the Spanish Jesuit, and reveals the importance of his influence, albeit a negative one.”
32 Quotation from Works I, p. 463.
manner; he knows them so as to understand them, but he doth not know them so as to love them.\textsuperscript{33}

This division is particularly significant to Charnock and the Reformed scholastics in relation to their efforts to defend the doctrine of divine simplicity by way of reflecting the dialectics between Thomism and Scotism in the seventeenth century context. Indeed Aquinas uses the term \textit{scientia approbationis} to define the knowledge placed between “simple knowledge” and “vision knowledge” in order to synthesize the determination of the divine will in terms of causality.\textsuperscript{34} Scotus also shows an affinity with the Thomistic categorisation of divine knowledge while at the same time being faithful to his own idea of “three instants” in the divine knowledge.\textsuperscript{35} However, the difference of view between the Thomists and Scotus and the Nominalists about the “pre-existent ideas” of God in the actual events makes the focus different in each. Aquinas considers it as the divine idea close to the divine simple knowledge; Scotus and the Nominalists — as the area of the divine vision knowledge.\textsuperscript{36} The Scotistic priority of the divine will over the divine knowledge within a boundary of the Thomistic intellectualism can be grasped in this explanation.\textsuperscript{37} What we need to observe is that Charnock seems to follow the Scotistic tendency in this distinction of divine knowledge in that he virtually regards \textit{scientia approbationis} as a type of vision knowledge. Therefore, by way of using the Thomistic concept \textit{scientia approbationis} in terms of the Scotistic understanding, Charnock permits no room for the conflict between divine will and divine knowledge. In other words, just as the two categories of \textit{scientia Dei} — simple knowledge and vision knowledge — can cover all the aspects of the divine knowing in Charnock’s schema, so there is no possibility of the existence of another category in the divine knowing: viz., the \textit{scientia media}.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{33} Works I, p. 463.  
\textsuperscript{34} Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologica}, I, xiv, 8.  
\textsuperscript{36} Whether “God the pure act” and “potentiality” in God can coexist or not is significant in this difference between Aquinas and Scotus and the Nominalists. For the details, see Hong-Gyu Park, “Grace and Nature in the Theology of John Gill (1697-1771)” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2001), p. 199.  
\textsuperscript{38} Muller defines the \textit{scientia media} as “a term used to describe a category in the divine knowing according to which God has a conditioned or consequent, rather than an absolute and antecedent, foreknowledge of future contingents”, in R. Muller, \textit{Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms} (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1985), p. 276. Hereafter \textit{DLGT} in this chapter.
B. The Problem of Middle Knowledge and Divine Foreknowledge

At this point, we also need to examine how the Puritan and Reformed scholastics, including Charnock, coped with the rise of the concept of middle knowledge from the early seventeenth century. Though Charnock does not directly explain this term in detail, we can be aware that he is thoroughly acquainted with the controversy about middle knowledge. Charnock’s comment shows similarities to Richard Baxter’s doubts about the above-mentioned dichotomous distinction — natural or simple knowledge vs. free or visionary knowledge — in God’s knowledge. Apart from free or voluntary knowledge based upon the decree of God, Baxter adds the concept of “knowledge of all things as Congruous, eligible and Volenda, fit to be willed” out of the “wisdom” of God to the two above-mentioned areas of divine knowledge. For Baxter, such divine knowledge can be placed between simple knowledge and vision knowledge in order to enrich the explanation of “possible” knowledge. Nevertheless Baxter’s contrivance of this concept was not for the approval of the scientia media but for the preclusion of “improper discussion of the way in which God knows”. Within the context of similar purport with Baxter — against the idea of the scientia media — Charnock supposes an “order” of God’s decree that assumes the operation of divine wisdom:

The knowledge of vision follows the act of God’s will, and supposeth an act of God’s will before, decreeing thing to be. (If we could suppose any first or second in God’s decree, we might say God knew them as possible before he decreed them; he knew them as future because he decreed them.)

39 We will continue to deal with this term in this chapter. On the general discussion of the middle knowledge and foreknowledge according to the Reformed scholastic viewpoint, see H. Heppe, *Reformed Dogmatics*, pp. 75-81; Turretin, *Institutes*, vol. I, pp. 212-28. For the intellectual origin of the concept of the scientia media in the sixteenth and seventeenth century in relation to the Remonstrants and Socinians, see *PRRD* III, pp. 417-20; Muller, *God, Creation, and Providence*, esp. pp. 154-66.
40 For the detail of Baxter’s idea, see *PRRD* III, pp. 414-7.
42 Quotation from *PRRD* III, p. 416. Cf. Muller’s summary of Baxter’s ideas on this issue shows clearly the viewpoint of the Reformed position. Muller insists: “To speak of a thing as possible or as future ‘is to say that now it is nothing.’ It is, therefore, an error and a confusion of meaning to claim that ‘God knoweth things to be future, because they are future; as he knoweth existents, because they exist.’ ‘Futurity,’ Baxter counters, ‘is Nothing; and Nothing hath no Cause’ or causal significance: God cannot be said to foreknew things ‘because they will be; but only that he forekneweth that they will be’ — given that God’s knowledge of things is not because of things, that is, not caused by the things as if they were prior to God. There can be, Baxter adds, ‘no effects in God.’ Of course, Baxter has already indicated that all things that were, are, or will be are known by God as volita, things willed by him: things are not, in themselves, the cause of God’s knowledge of things”: *PRRD* III, pp. 415-6. All the words in the quotation marks are Muller’s citations from Baxter.
Apparently Charnock also noted the importance of the wisdom of God closely related to the order of the decree that makes “possible” knowledge become “vision” knowledge through the intervention of divine will. In other words, in Charnock’s view, the possibility of the existence of the scientia media in God is precluded through the emphasis on the characteristic of the knowledge of vision that it spans from all the past to all the future in time. This shows that Charnock, following the general tendency of the Reformed orthodox defending the divine simplicity, did not want to allow room for “a quasi actuality upon the [area of pure] possibility” by way of using the concept of middle knowledge.44

Charnock moves on to the detailed discussion of the “objects” and the “range” of divine knowing. The basic objects of divine knowing are God Himself and all other things. Thus such knowledge of Himself accompanying His will is “the [very] cause of all other things that can fall under His cognizance.” As He is “a simple being” that does not need to operate His faculty for this knowing, God knows Himself perfectly and comprehensively by His own essence from eternity.45 For Charnock, all other things other than God necessarily ought to belong to the one area among the possible, past, present and future. This divine omniscience of “possible” things is related to His power, omnipotence, as he comments: “Possibles are infinite, that is, there is no end of what God can do, and therefore no end of what God doth know, otherwise his power would be more infinite than his knowledge.”46 At the same time, this omnipotence is distinguished from the potentia ordinata Dei that causes the operation of the divine will towards reality.47 God knows all things “past”; they are the “perpetual presence” before God since nothing is past to the divine omniscience in eternity.48 God also knows things “present”; He knows human actions, thoughts and all motions of the human mind and will that even lead to sin and evil in His own supporting act to the working of their faculty without infection.

Charnock then explores the problems of divine foreknowledge. Like other seventeenth century Reformed dogmaticians, he pointedly defends the traditional

44 The quotation is from PRRD III, p. 429.
46 Works I, p. 467.
47 See Works I, p. 469: “This knowledge is of another kind than his knowledge of things that are or shall be. He sees possible things as possible, not as things that ever are or shall be. … He knows them in his own power, not in his will; he understands them as able to produce them, not as willing to effect them. Things possible he knows only in his power, things future he knows both in his power and will.” Italics are mine.
48 Works I, p. 469.
understanding against the Socinian view concerning divine future knowledge. We can see Charnock’s idea of the basic relationship between foreknowledge and the divine will particularly in terms of the work of creation:

Certainly, if he knows all things possible, which he will not do, he must know all things future, which he is not only able, but resolved to do, or resolved to permit. God’s perfect knowledge of himself, that is, of his own infinite power and concluding will, necessarily includes a foreknowledge of what he is able to do, and what he will do. … [Creatures], therefore, must be known before they were made, and not known because they were made; he knew them to make them, and he did not make them to know them.49

The whole creation is both the object of futural knowledge to God and of present knowledge in terms of the eternity of God.50 Yet these duplex aspects ought not to be used for the insistence on the conjectural characteristic of divine knowledge.51 The Socinians insist that God knows the future things in terms of its “causes” exclusive of “effects”. Conversely, according to Charnock, the decree and the divine will that bring about both effects and permission in relation to the future cannot admit room for such knowing in itself.

C. Concursus Dei, Future Contingency, and Divine Causality

The divine providential willing also assumes divine foreknowledge. Charnock’s argument is performed through using the concept of the concursus Dei (divine concurrence).52 He describes: “As he decreed life to this or that things, so he decreed motion as the effect of life, and decreed to exert his power in concuring with them, for producing effects natural for such causes.”53 Apparently, the event of divine concurrence is also not an area outside the will of God. We thus can discern that the foreknowledge is virtually identical with divine free knowledge in relation to the voluntas Dei. Whether the creature’s reaction or choice as a second cause to the

49 Works I, p. 479.
50 Charnock cites the fifth book of Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy (Lib. V. prof. 6) on this. See Works I, p. 484: “God sees all things in one instant, scientia nunquam deficiens instantiae.” Muller notes that the reference to Boethius in the discussion over the absoluteness of divine foreknowledge was a common characteristic of Reformed scholastics. See PRRD III, p. 403.
51 Works I, p. 481: “If the conjecture of future things savours of ignorance, and God knows them only by conjecture, there is then no such thing in being as a perfect intelligent being, and so no God.”
52 Muller defines concursus Dei in the following: “[Divine concurrence means] the continuing divine support of the operation of all secondary causes (whether free, contingent, or necessary). For any contingent being to act in a free, a contingent, or a necessary manner, the divine will which supports all contingent being must concur in its act.” Muller, DLGT, p. 76.
53 Works I, p. 481.
providential willing of God the “first cause” is “necessary, contingent or free”, it is “fully compatible with the divine knowing” without exception.\textsuperscript{54}

In other words, both human freedom and the divine giving of direction based upon His immutability and infallibility towards second causes can be understood within the sense of the identity between His divine foreknowledge and His free will in creation and providence. At the same time we notice that the proper understanding of “causality” plays a key point in the appropriate understanding of the problem of foreknowledge: the causality of “existence” does not come from foreknowledge, but from the will of God. Charnock even writes as follows citing the late medieval Augustinian, Thomas Bradwardine (1290-1349): “The reason of the will of God that they shall be, was equally eternal with him [God].”\textsuperscript{55} Yet he rejects providing an answer for the manner of such perfect knowing of God for it is both unknowable and mysterious: we thus note that Charnock holds fast to the Puritan and Reformed orthodox watchward: \textit{finitum non capax infiniti}.\textsuperscript{56}

For Charnock, the discussion of future contingencies appears as an extension of the understanding of foreknowledge.\textsuperscript{57} According to his basic assumption, whether a contingent is accidental, purely contingent or mixed contingent partly depending upon the will of a free agent, it is fixed in the knowledge of God because “God does foreknow the free and voluntary acts of man”.\textsuperscript{58} The difference of understanding of future contingencies between the Jesuits, Arminians, and the Socinians and the Reformed depends on whether the concept of middle knowledge (as what Muller calls a “divine foreknowledge of future contingent or conditional acts or events lying outside of or prior to the divine willing”) is acknowledged or not.\textsuperscript{59} Against the Arminian way of understanding, Charnock argues that divine

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} The quotations are from \textit{PRRD III}, p. 402.
\item \textsuperscript{55} \textit{Works} I, p. 484.
\item \textsuperscript{56} For example, see \textit{Works} I, p. 485: “As our power is not the measure of the power of God, so neither is our knowledge the judge of the knowledge of God, no better, nor so well, as an irrational creature can be the judge of our reason. … Do we perfectly know the manner how we know? Shall we therefore deny that we know anything? … We know we have such a faculty which we call understanding, but doth any man certainly know what it is?”
\item \textsuperscript{58} \textit{Works} I, p. 488.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Quotation from \textit{PRRD III}, p. 418. However, we also see the distinctions of the view among them with regard to the understanding of the \textit{scientia media} in relation to the doctrine of predestination.
\end{itemize}
knowledge can hardly be lessened or increased by the motion of rational creatures as the second cause. The Socinians appear again as the object of his critique by way of abundant biblical references against their denial of divine knowledge of contingency.

What his opponents want to gain is what Muller calls “freedom at the expense of divine causality”. In contrast to both Arminians and the Socinians, Charnock asserts that both “necessity of [divine] immutability” as to future contingencies and human freedom are compatible with each other since the nature of such necessity is no less ‘compulsive’. Human voluntary actions (inclusive of sins in relation to providence, the divine decree and predestination) are only from one’s own free will excepting any necessity outside oneself. At this point, Charnock reaffirms the priority of divine will over the foreknowledge of contingency in causality:

Nothing is because God knows it, but because God wills it, either positively or permissively. God knows all things possible; yet because God knows them, they are not brought into actual existence, but remain still only as things possible. Knowledge only apprehends a thing, but acts nothing; it is the rule of acting, but not the cause of acting; the will is the immediate principle, and the power the immediate cause. To know a thing is not to do a thing.

As adumbrated earlier, Charnock’s understanding of both the divine will and divine knowledge also reflects the development of the theological prolegomena from medieval scholastic traditions to the Reformed orthodox, particularly in terms of the trajectory of both the Thomistic and the Scotistic late medieval background. To put it another way, from the statement above, we get the impression that Charnock emphasises more the soteriological, voluntaristic and practical aspects in relation to

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60 See Muller, God, Creation and Providence, pp. 161-5.
61 For example, see Works I, p. 492: “If Abraham had been a Socinian, to deny God’s knowledge of free acts of man, had he not had a fine excuse for unbelief?”
62 The quotation is from PRRD III, p. 425.
63 Works I, p. 493. See also p. 495: “The knowledge of God takes not away the nature of things. Though God knows possible things, yet they remain in the nature of possibility; and though God knows contingent things, yet they remain in the nature of contingencies; and though God knows free agents, yet they remain in the nature of liberty. God did not foreknow the action of man necessary, but as free; so that liberty is rather established by this foreknowledge than removed.” The italics are mine.
64 Works I, p. 493.
Scotism than the theoretical ones derived from the Thomistic and intellectualistic viewpoint in the genus of theology. At the same time such a theology as an “operative” and “directed” discipline should entail human voluntary action towards piety in a practical dimension if one’s knowledge of God in theory is genuine.

D. The Manner of Divine Knowing and the Significance of the Ad Extra oriented Arguments

In Charnock’s treatment of the “manner” of divine knowing, based upon the result of biblical exegesis, he again makes it clear that the divine understanding is not a psychological faculty in God as if human beings possess it, but is identical with His essential nature: i.e., divine simplicity. He remarks: “Since he knows by his essence, he always knows, because his essence never ceaseth, but is pure act.” Such a knowing, so-called “intuitive knowledge” in the medieval scholastic tradition, comes from His own “one act of intuition” without reasonings. For Charnock, this intuition exists in God both as “habit” and as “act” without an inconsistency between them (which is not the case for human beings). Without a discourse or succession, this divine knowing covers all things with both independency and distinctness. At the same time God knows all the means and effects conducing to the end of his will, as there is no “blind providence” in the world. This aspect is also directly connected to the relationship between the divine will and knowledge. Consequently, God “knows” all things infallibly and immutably within the context of the divine “will”:

Since God knows all things with a knowledge of vision, because he wills them, his knowledge must be infallible as his purpose; … God’s knowledge admits no more of increase or decrease than his essence doth. Since God knows by his essence, and the essence of God is God himself, his knowledge must be void of any change. … He knows what he can do, and he knows what he will do, and both these things immutable, his knowledge must consequently be so too. … Therefore it was not necessary that God should know this or that creature with a knowledge of vision; but after the will of God had determined the existence of

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65 For a general characteristic of the two camps, see F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. II: Medieval Philosophy, pp. 495-6.
66 In this respect we see that Charnock also shows the English Puritan tendency that focuses on the discussion of theologia ectypa.
67 Works I, p. 504.
68 Works I, p. 498.
69 Against Suarez’s view, Charnock denies the possibility of a so-called “virtual discourse in God” that insists on the divine knowledge coming from several distinct acts in God. However, for Charnock, divine knowing is the “one simple act” of knowing. See Works I, p. 499.
70 Works I, p. 503.
this or that creature, his knowledge being then determined to this or that object, did necessarily continue unchangeable.\(^71\)

The total amount of divine knowledge (though it is incalculable) is perpetually invariable irrespective of whether the knowledge is visionary or not. In other words, our God is, on the one hand, “perpetually in the act of knowing”; on the other hand, He has both essential and habitual knowledge with unchangeableness. This pursuit of the defence of the divine simplicity is \textit{de facto} the representation of the consistency of the intrinsic or \textit{ad intra} dimension with the extrinsic or \textit{ad extra} dimension in the Triune but “simple” and “one” God.

What we also need to note is the way of Charnock’s treatment of the rational argumentation of the doctrine of the \textit{scientia Dei}. To be sure this part shows that he adheres to a principle of the ancillary role of reason that merely confirms the result of scriptural exegesis. As mentioned earlier, there are three general patterns of organisation of such arguments in Reformed orthodoxy: the \textit{via negationis}, \textit{via causalitatis}, and \textit{via eminentiae}.\(^72\) Charnock offers five rational proofs based upon this general pattern despite the omission of the \textit{via negationis} type; perhaps because that he wanted to minimize the use of purely philosophical argument.\(^73\) First, God as wisdom must be omniscient for sustaining the basis of His wisdom. Second, we should acknowledge that all knowledge in creatures is from God by allowing the perfection of God in view of knowledge. In these \textit{via eminentiae} arguments, Charnock emphasises the practical dimension of the divine knowledge in close relationship with the divine wisdom that produces “actions” towards the objectives: “To act by knowledge is the most excellent manner of acting; God has therefore not only knowledge, but the most excellent manner of knowledge.”\(^74\) Third, the “accusations of conscience” in humanity evidences divine omniscience of their actions and thoughts. Charnock also adds another two arguments in terms of \textit{via causalitatis}: first, God the first cause as “a voluntary agent”, who wills everything, should be “an intelligent agent” who has a perfect knowledge.\(^75\) Secondly, the divine

\(^71\) \textit{Works} I, pp. 503-4.
\(^72\) For the details, see \textit{PRRD} III, p. 395.
\(^73\) This point is also evidence of Gunton’s critique of Charnock as a mere successor of ‘negative theology’. Charnock was aware of the limit of human language in expressing divine attributes, but did not abuse the \textit{via negationis}. Contra Colin Gunton, \textit{Act and Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes} (London: SCM Press, 2002), pp. 89-93.
\(^74\) \textit{Works} I, pp. 505-6.
\(^75\) See \textit{Works} I, p. 507: “The knowledge of God is to be supposed in a free determination of himself; and that knowledge must be perfect both of the object, act, and all circumstances of it. How can his will freely produce anything that was not first known in his understanding?”
omniscience should operate as the basis of divine providence that is the government of creatures. It is also worth observing that he stresses the importance of the theoretical aspect of divine knowledge while at the same time focusing on the practical dimension:

Knowledge is the basis of providence; to know things is before the government of things; a practical knowledge cannot be without a theoretical knowledge. Nothing could be directed to its proper end without the knowledge of the nature of it, and its suitableness to answer that end for which it is intended.\textsuperscript{76}

This statement again reminds us of the discussion of the genus of theology: the nature of theology as a “directive” knowledge in Charnock. Yet another, even if Charnock does not deal with the theologia archetypa directly, is the explanation of divine knowledge in light of a theologia ectypa which has a soteriological importance for humanity. This point shows his balance of theory and practice with more stress upon practical dimension. Charnock argues that a theoretical knowledge of God is essential in terms of its being a basis of faith to the believer, albeit the theoretical knowledge is meaningless without becoming a practical knowledge of God heading towards its purpose. That is, the balance of intellectualism and voluntarism seems to be maintained in Charnock’s schema, albeit he does not lose his focus on theologia praxis with a Scotist tint. In addition, we encounter evidence that the doctrinal dialogue between the doctrine of God and other theological loci is consistent even in Charnock’s rational argumentation of the doctrine of scientia Dei.

**E. Sapientia Dei: The Christological and Trinitarian Emphases in the Opera Dei**

With regard to God’s wisdom (sapientia), Charnock explains it as an extension of the doctrine of the scientia Dei, albeit both terms are distinguished in his idea.\textsuperscript{77} As indicated earlier, many Puritan and Reformed dogmaticians, including Perkins, do not make a distinction between divine knowledge and wisdom in their use of vocabulary as to the divine intellect in following the Thomistic Pattern.\textsuperscript{78} In contrast to them, Charnock compares the wisdom of God with the divine knowledge:

\textsuperscript{76} Works I, p. 507.

\textsuperscript{77} See Works II, p. 10: “That wisdom is a transcendent excellency of the divine nature. We have before spoken of the knowledge of God, and the infiniteness of it. The next attribute is the wisdom of God. Most confound the knowledge and wisdom of God together; but there is a manifest distinction between them in our conception.”

\textsuperscript{78} See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. xvi.
Knowledge hath its seat in the *speculative* understanding, wisdom in the *practical*. … Knowledge is an understanding of general rules, and wisdom is a drawing conclusions from those rules in order to particular cases. … The knowledge of God is his understanding of all things; his wisdom is the skillful resolving and acting of all things; … Men may have knowledge without wisdom, but not wisdom without knowledge; … All practical knowledge is founded in speculation, either *secundum rem*, as in men; or *secundum rationem*, as in God. … Knowledge is the apprehension of a thing, and wisdom is the appointing and ordering of all things. Wisdom is the splendour and lustre of knowledge shining forth in operations, and is an act both of understanding and will; understanding in counselling and contriving, will in resolving and executing. Counsel and will are linked together, … 79

He stresses the relationship of the divine wisdom and will as was emphasised in the case of knowledge and will. To put it another way, the *ad extra* operations of God in time connect the divine knowledge in eternity to the divine wisdom as God’s practical knowledge. In this statement, as was the case with his treatment of divine knowledge, we can also find Charnock’s voluntaristic stress upon the practical dimension of the divine intellect: Charnock does not simply follow Thomistic intellectualism but shows his strong Scotistic interest in the will and decree of God in close relation to the divine wisdom within the basic Thomistic structure. 80 At another level, when considering the “experiential” emphasis of Puritan spirituality within the seventeenth century background, we can estimate that such a combination of Thomism and Scotism seems to have been an inevitable eclectic elaboration for Charnock, particularly in the doctrine of the divine intellect and will.

Among the general doctrinal propositions about the wisdom of God, we need to note Charnock’s consideration of the two aspects of the wisdom of God including the christological: the “essential wisdom” of God no less than the divine essence and Christ as “a personal wisdom of God”. 81 Of course this also evidences well Charnock’s understanding of the characteristic of God’s attributes (particularly the intellectual attribute) as both an ontological “control tower” and a temporal “revelation” pointing towards a clear “signal post” in history. According to Charnock, all the operations of God come from this essential wisdom based upon “one simple essence.” This essential wisdom belongs to God alone originally; it also operates in

79 Works II, p. 12.
80 Edward Leigh (1602-1671) typically shows a similar tendency to Charnock in this point. See his *Systeme or Body of Divinity* (London, 1662), II. vii, pp. 194-200.
81 Works II, pp. 12-3.
harmony with His will and power. Charnock denies reiteratively the existence of inconsistency between the wisdom and the will of God based upon the doctrine of divine simplicity.\textsuperscript{82} By way of example, the divine sovereign election also evidences God’s infinite and infallible wisdom. Along with an attempt to prove divine wisdom based upon the priority of scriptural evidence and the ancillary role of rational arguments, Charnock affirms not only that wisdom is the greatest divine attribute of all, but also that God is “super-sapientem”, above all wisdom.\textsuperscript{83}

Let us examine Charnock’s demonstration of the doctrine of the divine wisdom from the external works of God: creation, government and redemption.\textsuperscript{84} We find that he seeks to expound the apparently “paradoxical” aspect of the whole ad extra dimension with his awareness of its importance as the source of our knowledge of divine wisdom. First, the wisdom of God is apparent in “creation”, particularly in the creation of man with the faculty of the soul. At the same time Charnock insists that the relationship of grace and nature in this discussion (of the “particulars” of divine wisdom) is to be rightly set up as follows: “As grace doth not destroy nature, but elevate it, neither should the fresher and fuller discoveries of divine wisdom in redemption, deface our thoughts of his wisdom in creation.”\textsuperscript{85} Second, the wisdom of God appears in the divine works of “government” of creatures. We see Charnock attempts to connect the doctrine of divine wisdom in these works of government with both Christology and the doctrine of providence. The problem of sin is also especially remarkable in this respect.\textsuperscript{86} He also applies the certain role of sin to the dimension of personal piety that can positively yield spiritual growth in grace through mortification and sanctification.\textsuperscript{87} Charnock notes the reason for such a contradictory result by saying: “Though God is not the author of sin, because of his holiness, yet he is the administrator of sin by his wisdom, and accomplisheth his own purposes by the iniquities of his enemies, and the lapses and infirmities of his

\textsuperscript{82} For example, see Works II, pp. 14-5: “All his decrees are drawn out of the infinite treasury of wisdom in himself. … His understanding and will are infinite; what is therefore the act of his will is the result of his understanding, and therefore rational; his understanding and will join hands; there is no contest in God, will against mind, and mind against will; they are one in God, one in his resolves, and one in all his works.”

\textsuperscript{83} Works II, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{84} Cf. PRRD III, pp. 388-91. In Reformed scholastics in general, this is called the “particulars” of the divine wisdom.

\textsuperscript{85} Works II, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{86} See Works II, p. 35: “God willed sin, that is, he willed to permit it, that he might communicate himself to the creature in the most excellent manner. He willed the permission of sin, as an occasion to bring forth the mystery of the incarnation and passion of our Saviour.”

\textsuperscript{87} Works II, pp. 38-43. We will deal with these concepts in detail in chapter six in relation to the holiness of God.
friends.”  

For a similar reason, based upon his understanding of the faculty psychology, Charnock can argue that the wisdom of God continues to work on the conversion of a sinner without destroying the faculty of the person but that it “changes the principle” in the human faculty.  

Third, the work of “redemption” also reveals the wisdom of God. By way of the orthodox Trinitarian perspective, Charnock shows that the “medium” of redemption combines divine justice and mercy through the incarnation and the work of Christ. The meaning of the union of two natures in Christ for redemption is also illustrated in terms of the doctrine of God’s wisdom.  

For the application of redemption that is established as “the condition” by the wisdom of God, one needs “faith” in both the mind and the will as the faculty of the soul.  

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F. Summary of Charnock’s Exegesis and the Doctrine of God’s Intellect

In these exegetical and doctrinal sections on the divine knowledge and wisdom, we have seen that Charnock sought to vindicate the Trinitarian God’s “simplicity” in His essence and works by demonstrating the consistency in the divine intellect and will through christological, federal, and providential arguments based on a firm scriptural foundation. The Socinian and Arminian idea of middle knowledge was a major target of Charnock’s critique, in order to guard the stability of the doctrine of God as a “system”, by way of connecting this system with the discussion of “piety”, without which the true knowledge of God cannot exist.

III. Charnock’s Praxis of the Divine Intellect:

Our “Trinitarian” Knowledge of the “Triune” God

In the practical section of the divine knowledge and wisdom, Charnock’s focus on the Trinitarian dimension in the doctrine of the divine knowledge is notable: i.e., the perfect knowledge of God identically belongs to the three persons of the Triune God. Of course, while seeing again the necessity of the intratrinitarian act

88 Works II, p. 43.
89 Works II, p. 46.
90 See Works II, pp. 56-61.
91 Works II, p. 69: “Faith is an act both of the understanding and will too, and principally of the will, which doth presuppose an act of the understanding, for there cannot be a persuasion in the will without a proposition from the understanding.”
92 Charnock particularly attempts to prove the divine omniscience in terms of Christology by depending on Scriptural evidence along with theological reasoning. See Works I, p. 509: “Finite is uncapable of being made infinite, and therefore incapable of comprehending infinite, so that Christ

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as a foundation for explaining this tight relatedness among doctrines, he also emphasises the absoluteness of a divine decree that is thoroughly controlled by infinite power and wisdom. Charnock also makes it clear that both revelation and grace have priority over reason and nature as the “way” to our knowledge of God, but the former do not exclude the latter. Therefore, for Charnock, the Socinian error is fatal in that it does not recognise the priority of revelation over a human reason which is merely ancillary.\(^93\) Likewise, the divine wisdom revealed \textit{ad extra} in “nature” should be meditated upon and contemplated for the growth of piety in “grace”.\(^94\) He also points out the role of Scripture between grace and nature: such piety cannot be produced without the study of the wisdom of God in the written revelation.\(^95\) In brief, Charnock touches upon the reciprocal intertwining of the whole related \textit{loci} of the full doctrine of God towards the advance of “our theology” in various dimensions, in his clear grasp of the trinitarian characteristic of divine intellect, which is the “centre” of his discussion in this section.

\textit{Conclusion}

As we have seen, the dialectic between Thomism and Scotism that is present in the background of the intellectual framework of Perkins and Charnock evidences most clearly the continuity of the doctrine of the divine intellect between the two. By combining Aristotelian faculty psychology with the Augustinian content of theology, they sought the integrated understanding of God’s intellect in three subjects: God cannot be \textit{deus factus}, made of a creature a god, to comprehend God, for then of finite he would become infinite, which is a contradiction.” In addition, interestingly, Charnock also applies such a doctrine to the pietistic dimension by a direct use of scholastic terms elicited from the doctrine of God’s intellect. See \textit{Works} I, p.520: “We pray because God knows, for though he knows our wants with a \textit{knowledge of vision}, yet he will not know them with a knowledge of supply, till he be sought into, …”. Italic is mine. Such a use of scholastic terms also evidences the close relationship between Reformed scholasticism and Puritan practical divinity in the thought of Charnock.

\(^93\) See \textit{Works} II, p. 84: “Hence it was that the philosophers in the primitive times were the greatest enemies to the gospel; and the contempt of divine wisdom, in making \textit{reason} the supreme judge of divine revelation, was the fruitful mother of the heresies in all ages springing up in the church, and especially of that \textit{Socinianism} that daily insinuates itself into the minds of men.” Italic is mine.

\(^94\) See Charnock’s excellent account of both this relationship of grace and nature and the significance of the \textit{ad extra} dimension for our knowledge of God: “Though God is principally to be praised in and for Christ, yet as \textit{grace} doth not raze out the law of \textit{nature}, so the operations of \textit{grace} put not the dictates of \textit{nature} to silence, nor suspend the homage upon our inspection of his works. … We cannot behold the wisdom of God in his own essence and eternal ideas, but by the reflection of it in the creatures, as we cannot steadily behold the sun with our eye, but either through a glass, or by reflection of the image of it in the water. … The contemplation of the reason of God in his works is a noble and suitable employment for a rational creature. We have not only \textit{sense} to perceive them, but \textit{souls} to mind them,” in \textit{Works} II, pp. 88-9. Italics are mine.

Himself, the elect, and the trinitarian theology as a whole system. Thus the identity of the divine knowledge in relation to the divine will had to be properly grasped. Both Perkins and Charnock wanted to protect the idea of divine simplicity and human freedom in disputes over the problems of foreknowledge, future contingencies and middle knowledge. At the same time such knowledge of God was to be the practical, operative, and directed knowledge that necessarily accompanied theoretical knowledge without which the foundation of practice could not exist. In other words, we see that Thomism and Scotism were idealistically conjoined in the notion of theology as a directed discipline in both Perkins’ and Charnock’s understanding of the divine intellect.

Of course the *locus* method (of organising each sub-locus of the full doctrine of God in order to elicit appropriate statements) played an important part in bridging frequent recourses to exegesis and doctrinal elicitation as to the doctrine of the divine intellect both in Perkins’ Ramistic structure and in Charnock’s discursive, scholastic, and extended homiletical commentary. Charnock developed the discussion of the divine knowledge through a detailed explanation that employed scholastic vocabularies based upon medieval scholastic theology. In some ways Perkins did not do so because of the architectonic brevity of his Ramism and the tacit influence on him (as an early orthodox Puritan divine) of the Reformer’s principle of *sola Scriptura*. There is arguably a tendency that the conceptual distinction of the divine knowledge and wisdom also makes it possible for Charnock to deal with the more extended discussion of the *ad extra* dimension of the divine intellect. The doctrinal control and dialogue between the divine intellect and christological, providential and soteriological dimensions were prominent in Charnock reflecting a characteristic of a more broadly developed high orthodox system.

In short, Charnock and Perkins’ pursuit of a “monergistic” theological system combined with a piety that accompanies operative and practical characteristics resulted in the development of various theological arguments in the doctrine of the divine knowledge and wisdom in early modern period. That is, these theological elaborations towards the defence of both orthodox trinitarianism and the divine simplicity, however, are the same in both content and method while distinct in structure and form.
Chapter Six

The Power and Dominion of God

We have investigated Perkins and Charnock’s doctrine of the divine intellect in the previous chapter. According to faculty psychology, the *voluntas Dei* is next in line to be addressed on the basis of the traditional system of the doctrine of God.¹ In addition, the Puritans and the Reformed scholastics also dealt with the outward manifestation of the *voluntas Dei* in the doctrinal area of various sub-categorical attributes of the divine will. Divine omnipotence and sovereignty, especially, were the important themes for Charnock in terms of rightly understanding the *voluntas Dei* (which had been principally revealed in the history of redemption) since these covered the whole theological areas of creation, providence, and predestination. Of course, as was the case with the previous chapter that dealt with the *scientia Dei*, the relation of the divine will and intellect is undoubtedly a further important consideration even in grasping the identity of the two attributes of omnipotence and sovereignty.

At the risk of being repetitive, it is necessary, initially, to say that the identification of both the divine will and power in God on the basis of the divine essence and simplicity is a fundamental premise of our discussion. This is, in fact, a general theological axiom from the medieval era to the Puritan and the Reformed orthodox period, despite fluctuations according to historical context.² That is to say, despite the fact that the merely *ad intra* dimension of the will of God belongs within the limits of the willing of Himself according to His nature,³ yet we find another formal distinction of the two in that the divine will is the source of “all actuality”, whereas the divine power is that of “all possibility” and is wider in its metaphysical

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¹ In the Protestant scholastic tradition, the *voluntas Dei* may be defined as “the attribute of God according to which God may be said to have a potency or, more precisely, an appetitive potency (*potentia appetitiva*) *ad extra* that operates to bring about the good known to and desired by God as the highest end or greatest good (*summum bonum*, q.v.) of all things,” in Muller, *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1985), p. 331. In some way, this definition itself denotes the relation between God’s will, power, and intellect that needs to be the primary subject of our discussion in this chapter.


³ See *PRRD* III, pp. 453-6. We will explain this again later in relation to the scope of the exercise of the divine power.
scope. These dual aspects of divine omnipotence serve to substantiate our argument concerning the intertwinement between omnipotence and sovereignty, as well as between so-called absolute and ordained power in this chapter. Both Perkins and Charnock also engaged in deeper investigation of the omnipotence of God within the context of early and high orthodoxy. This, of course, was based upon the intellectual heritage of late medieval and Reformation thought, yet at the same time both writers avoided the overtly speculative or logical discussion of this subject often seen in Occamistic late medieval theology.

From another angle, we discover that they were investigating how to defend God’s freedom, transcendence, and sovereignty without losing the idea of an adherence to the “appropriate” allowance of contingency in the created orders and the “whole covenantal” basis of God’s own restriction, decree, or ordination. This was, on the whole, the common pressing interest of all the theologians from the medieval period via the Reformation to the Puritan and the Reformed orthodox era. We will explore how this covenantal structure was developed as the underlying framework of Perkins’ and Charnock’s doctrine of God’s omnipotence and dominion within the context of both early and high orthodoxy. At the same time, we will also examine whether this covenantal identity — the trajectory of the medieval discussion

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4 The quotations are from PRRD III, p. 526. At another level, this distinction is related to the fact that the concept of omnipotence is divided into the two terms according to its etymological roots: potentia as power or potency and potestas as authority, rule, dominion, or sovereignty in relation to divine will. By reason of this, the order of our investigation in this chapter will also follow the direction of this distinction; cf. William J. Courtenay, “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” in The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, ed. C. Trinkhaus and H. Oberman (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), pp. 26-59, esp. pp. 39-43. In addition, we basically see that this distinction (possibility vs. actuality) consists with Scotus’ understanding of God’s absolute and ordained power that is distinct from each other but not separate reciprocally: see Richard Cross, Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 59. Though it is somewhat early to say this, this could be construed as the convergent tendency of the concept of God’s “capacity and volition” in an “operationalising” direction especially in the understanding of absolute power since Duns Scotus in the early fourteenth century. We shall continue to struggle with this troublesome notion in this chapter: see F. Oakley, “The Absolute and Ordained Power of God in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-century Theology,” Journal of History of Ideas, vol. 59, No. 3. (Jul., 1998), pp. 437-61.


of the distinction between the absolute and the ordained power of God — was maintained or not. As was the case in the preceding chapters, the dialectics between Thomism, Scotism, and nominalism in the formulation of their ideas will also be addressed in connection with this subject.

I. Perkins on the Power & Dominion of God

In Perkins’ schema, omnipotence is the third category of the “life” of God, which is one of the operative attributes ad extra along with the intellect and will (the first and second category).\(^7\) Indeed, he also maintains that the will of God consists of two elements i.e. His eternal counsel and decree.\(^8\) In A Golden Chaine, citing Mat. 19:26,\(^9\) Perkins defines omnipotence as “that by which hee is most able to performe every worke”. Of course we can infer the meaning of “every work” in this definition through the typical scholastic idea of omnipotence. This sees it as “the freedom of God in His works ad extra” in the area of both supernatural (soteriological and redemptive) and natural (e.g. creation and providence) theology.\(^10\) Yet, for Perkins, God is omnipotent in spite of a “possible” (imaginable but nonsensical) impotence which is against His nature or in contradictory things.\(^11\) In fact this reflects Perkins’

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7 On a similar pattern in other Reformed orthodox theologians, e.g. Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii. 21, p. 244; Leigh, Systeme (London, 1662), II, xiv, p. 236. Such a point of categorisation has to do with, to some extent, how to understand the character of the will of God. Some of the Reformed orthodox like Mastricht saw the divine will as a “propensity” or “active principle” of God. Yet Perkins and others regarded it as “a single, eternal, and immutable act” of God in relation to divine decree. See PRRD III, pp. 445-6; Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1988), pp. 160-2; Perkins, Workes I, p. 12. In fact the Puritan and the Reformed orthodox treated the doctrine of the omnipotence of God within the boundary of this larger discussion of the divine will on the basis of the scholastic tradition. Such an angle necessarily covers the whole area of God’s external works of creation, providence, and predestination in relation to the execution of the divine decree; on a concise summary of the difference of view about the numbers of divine will between Perkins (a single will) and Arminius (several wills) in relation to this point, see Christ and the Decree, p. 169. In addition, although Charnock’s work is not a typically systematic writing like theirs, it comes under the same category in respect of the divine will in that he deals with the omnipotence of God as an underlying attribute along with the divine intellect, affection, and virtues in terms of its operative dimension.

8 Perkins seems to argue the priority of His decretive will over counsel in a very Scotistic way. See Of God’s Grace and Man’s Free Will, in Workes I, p. 723: “Yet it is not counsel a rule to his will. For there is nothing higher than his will, and his counsel also is according to his will which is goodnesse itself.” This tendency hints at his attitude to the doctrine of God’s sovereignty that we will deal with later in this chapter; cf. Perry Miller, The New England Mind (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 39, 101.

9 “With men this is impossible, with God all things are possible.”


11 Perkins, Workes I, p. 13; cf. PRRD III, p. 530; Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 204.
combined postulation of both absolute and actual phases of divine power.\textsuperscript{12}

Contrarily, Perkins also makes a distinction of this omnipotence into both an “absolute” and an “actual” one. Absolute power is defined as “that by which he can do more, than he either doth or will do”; and actual power as “that by which he causeth all things to be, which he freely willeth”.\textsuperscript{13} In fact, as mentioned above, the trace of the Scotistic or nominalistic late medieval distinction of potentia absoluta and ordinata can be seen here.\textsuperscript{14} For instance, Perkins illustrates how the Catholic misunderstanding of the distinction between the two powers could result in a harmful doctrine of the Eucharist in \textit{A Reformed Catholike}.\textsuperscript{15} Since Calvin also seems to have critically used the idea of God’s absolute power without an outright rejection of it,\textsuperscript{16} this also needs to be investigated in terms of the continuity between Calvin and

\textsuperscript{12} Muller agrees on this by saying that Perkins’ view is “a more subtle assumption of an absolute power that transcends and is capable of abridging the order of things,” in \textit{God, Creation, and Providence}, p. 205. At the same time, this could be regarded as the sign of the extended development in the understanding of the term “absolute power” from a radically speculative dimension to an actual dimension (but God does it extraordinarily); cf. H. Oberman, “\textit{Via Antiqua} and \textit{Via Moderna}: Late Medieval Prolegomena to Early Reformation Thought,” \textit{Journal of History of Ideas} 48 (1987), pp. 38-9; W. Ames, \textit{Marrow of Theology}, trans. and ed. John Eusden (Durham: Labyrinth Press, 1983), I.vi. 16-20, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{13} Perkins, \textit{Workes} I, p. 13; cf. Mat. 3:9, Phil. 3:21, and Ps. 135:6.


\textsuperscript{15} Perkins, \textit{Workes} I, p. 591: “[T]he Papist] therefore that hold the body of Christ to bee in many places at once, doe make it no body at all; but rather a Spirit, and that infinite. They alleged that God is \textit{almightie}: that is true indeed, but in this and like matters we must not dispute what God \textit{can} doe, but what he \textit{will} doe. . . .” Italics are mine.

\textsuperscript{16} Turretin, \textit{Institutes}, vol. I, iii. 21.5, p. 245; Paul Helm, \textit{John Calvin’s Ideas} (Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 2004), ch. 11, esp. pp. 328-9. Contra Helm’s position (which is similar to the view Turretin expressed earlier), see Steinmetz, \textit{Calvin in Context}, pp. 41, 49-50. Here Steinmetz argues that Calvin has regarded the distinction between the potentia absoluta and the potentia ordinata as the distinction between “disordered” power (potentia inordinata) and “ordered” power necessarily
the later Calvinists. In any case, Perkins asserts that these two kinds of power are not distinguished in God Himself on the basis of divine simplicity:

That God is not onely powerfull, but even power it selfe in regard of his nature as he is goodnesse and wisedome, … That power and will in God are one and the same: for our better conceiving of them, they may be distinguished, but in themselves they differ not, God’s willing of a thing is the effecting and doing of it. It is not so in us, for we will many things which we cannot doe: but whatsoever God willeth that He doeth, and that which he cannot doe, he cannot will.17

In fact this has to do with the fact that Perkins gives priority to God’s intellect over His will, based upon the order of faculty psychology. At the same time he emphasises the absoluteness of His will in terms of an operative dimension that necessarily implies His power.18 We also see the trinitarian basis of omnipotence within the boundary of the doctrine of divine simplicity in Perkins in that he stresses omnipotence as the common property that God the Father communicates to the Son and the Holy Spirit. As was the case with his discussion of other attributes, Perkins elicits various doctrinal points of application from God’s omnipotence in pietistic, soteriological, and covenantal dimensions. For instance, a christological basis including the doctrine of incarnation is necessary for Perkins to explain the foundation of the execution of the divine decree by His power.19 Most of all, God’s omnipotence should be considered as the essential foundation of our belief in the fulfillment of all biblical revelation.20

In addition, we find Perkins’ discussion of God’s sovereignty overlaps with his treatment of the doctrine of providence which covers the whole area of God’s external works, according to his theological system.21 Perkins also points out various combined with His justice. Yet it seems to be also the case that both views on Calvin’s attitude do not seem to be substantially different when we consider the underlying pietistic aspect in Calvin’s thought; Rijssen, Summa theol., III.xxxvi, cited in PRRD III, p. 534; cf. F. Oakley, “The Absolute and Ordained Power of God in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-century Theology,” pp. 457-9.

18 For example, see Of God’s Free Grace and Man’s Free will, in Workes I, p. 724: “Indeed there is in God, a knowledge of things that possibly may be, though they never be: and this knowledge goes before God’s decree. Yet the divine knowledge of things that certainly shall be, follows the will and determination of God. … In that God willeth the being of all things, he makes them to be: for his will is operative, not severed from his power, but distinguished; & his willing of anything is his doing of it.”
19 For detailed contents, see Workes I, pp. 137-9; Muller, Christ and the Decree, pp. 165-9
20 Perkins, Workes I, p. 139. cf. A Treatise of Predestination, in Workes II, p. 630 on the power of God known to Gentiles at a distinct level in both creation and redemption respectively.
aspects of our duties, and the consolation we derive from this providential dominion of God in its practical dimension, just as he has done in the preceding case of omnipotence. According to Perkins’ definition, providence is “a most free and powerfull action of God, whereby he hath care” over all creatures. This necessarily means that, in Perkins’ schema, the dominion of God is mainly manifested in the execution of the “divine will” according to His decree of creation, providence, and predestination. In fact he sees the dominion, rule, or government of God as the second part (after dealing with the knowledge as the first part) of providence, “whereby he ordereth all things and directeth them to good ends”. Both good and evil are the objects of His government in diverse ways; God uses both an “operative permission” and a refraining from evil apart from the administration of actually good things. The distinction between general and special providence can be directly applied to the categorisation of God’s dominion into the executive part of such a concept of providence:

[General Providence] is that which extends it selfe to the whole world and all things indifferently, even to the devils themselves. By this providence God continues and maintains the order which he set in nature in the creation, and he preserves the life, substance, and the being of all and every creature in his kind. The special providence is that, which God sheweth & exerciseth towards his Church & chosen people, ingathering and guiding them and in preserving them by his mighty power against the gates of hell. And therefore God’s Church here upon the earth is called the kingdom of grace, in which he showes … the speciall operation of his Spirit in bowing and bending the hearts of men to his will.

We thus see that the sovereignty of God for Perkins is revealed in the execution of


24 An Exposition of the Creede, in Workes I, p. 155. For detailed arguments in relation to providential government, see A Treatise of Predestination, in Workes II, pp. 617-21; and on the distinction of God’s special will and general will within a similar context, see p. 613; and An Exposition upon the 2. chap. of the Revel., in Workes III (ii), p. 298. Perkins even categorises the divine will into three actions: positive willing, nilling, and the middle position between the two (e. g. permission of the evil etc.): see pp. 615-6.
the decree by His actual (ordained) power. Nonetheless Perkins *de facto* identifies this actual power (revealing His sovereignty) with God’s absolute power in the light of the doctrine of the divine will, as he writes: “In God’s will there is a sovereignty, that is, an *absolute power*, whereby he is Lord of all the actions that he willeth, willing of himself without dependance fro any, without impediment or controlement, what he will, when he will, & how he will.”

Since Perkins also accepts the division of God’s absolute will (of His good pleasure) in His eternal counsel and His revealed or signified will in the law and the gospel, this comment shows Perkins’ emphasis upon the “absoluteness” or sovereignty of the revealed will at another level. At any rate, the dominion known through God’s external works is not based upon a speculative determinism or mere causal structure but rather upon the manifestation of the “gracious will of the transcendent God”. Here, clearly, Perkins expounds both christological and trinitarian aspects of the dominion of God in relation to His power as follows: “Divine government is the absolute power of God, whereby he maketh lawes to binde the conscience, and that under paine of life and death eternall. This is the power of all the Trinitie; but the administration of it is given to the Sonne.”

In sum, the strong point of Perkins’ treatment of both divine power and dominion lies in the fact that he successfully combined the eternal and temporal aspects of God’s will and its exercise on a soteriological basis. Remaining within the Reformed tradition, he does this by integrating the underlying consolidated aspects of the traditional division of God’s power.

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26 Perkins, *Of God’s Free Grace and Man’s Free Will*, in *Workes* I, p. 723. Italics are mine. Again, this respect evidences the integrative tendency in seeing the divine will and power in the later Reformed tradition that reflected the development of the idea of power division since the late medieval period, while at the same time attaching serious importance to the doctrine of God’s sovereignty as their theological axiom.


28 According to Oakley, the tendency towards “full conflation” between the *potentia absoluta/ordinata* and the *voluntas Dei beneplaciti* (secret or hidden will)/ *voluntas Dei signi* (revealed will) by using the term *voluntas absoluta* in the created orders especially in relation to the redemptive works was already in Luther. See F. Oakley, “The Absolute and Ordained Power of God in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-century Theology,” pp. 454-5. This also generally speaks for the sixteenth and seventeenth century’s attitude toward omnipotence including Perkins and Charnock.

29 The quotation is from Muller, *Christ and the Decree*, p. 168; cf. *Of God’s Free Grace and Man’s Free will*, pp. 723-4: “The will of God is the beginning or first cause of all things without exception, and of all their motions and actions. … That all things in particular have their being from the will of God, as from the first efficient cause, …”; cf. P. Miller, *The New England Mind*, pp. 14-5, 19.


31 For example, see Muller, *Christ and the Decree*, p. 167: “Perkins clearly hopes to maintain the freedom of secondary causes while asserting the complete sovereignty of God in the work of salvation; and this sovereignty will appear a priori, beginning with the intra-trinitarian determination of the pattern of salvation and proceeding to the execution of the decree rather than as an a *a*
II. Charnock’s Exegesis & Doctrine of the Power of God

Charnock shows an “explicit and detailed balance” in linking his exegetical groundwork with logical or doctrinal concerns. This is especially prominent in his treatment of the power of God. He draws two doctrinal implications from the exegesis of Job 26:14 by contrasting Job’s idea of God’s omnipotence with Bildad’s rather inferior perspective: first, God’s power is infinite and incomprehensible in terms of both essence and nature; second, divine power appears in His works of creation, providence, and redemption. As Muller has argued, against the misunderstanding of the identity of high orthodoxy, the relationship between the biblical text and dogmatic formulation in Charnock’s treatment is a characteristic example of the later seventeenth-century Puritan or Reformed orthodox homiletical lecture that typified the whole theological genre of those days.

A. Potentia Absoluta Dei and Potentia Ordinata Dei

Then he goes onto expound the characteristics of divine power regarding the first point (in two directions). First, Charnock makes it clear that God’s power is distinct from authority and dominion in that it signifies real “strength to act” according to the etymological basis of the scriptural text. Of course this definitional problem is related to the term potentia itself. The appropriate understanding of the

See PRRD III, p. 527. Here Muller again ascribes the reason for such characteristics in Charnock to “systematic exposition of the attributes belonging to a series of technical sermons”.

“Lo, these are parts of his ways: but how little a portion is heard of him? But the thunder of his power who can understand?” cf. PRRD III, p. 528.

We find a similar analysis of the four ways of distinction of biblical presentation of the omnipotence of God in Leigh: essential power as “affirmative”, external power as “effective”, difficult or impossible power against His nature as “negative,” and metaphorical power as “symbolic”. For the details, see PRRD III, p. 527, citing Leigh, Treatise of Divinity, II, xiv, p.107; and Charnock, Works II, pp. 102-3.

See Muller’ excellent comment on Charnock about this point, PRRD III, p. 528: “The chapter [Job 26], therefore, in its own internal argument and in its distinctions, provides Charnock with the ideal locus doctrinae for his discussion of divine power. This is hardly a case of ‘proof-texting’ — rather it is a case of movement from exegesis to contemporary theological formulation on the grounds of the accepted hermeneutic of the day. ... The exegetical grounding of the doctrine is reflected in the systematic exposition, evidencing in the larger systems a fundamental interrelationship of the questions raised by the biblical text and various dogmatic questions.” For similar treatments, see Leigh, Treatise, II.xiv, p.106 and Turretin, Institutes, vol. I, iii. 21. 3, cited therein.

Muller also points out this problem in relation to the wider Reformed scholastic context, PRRD III, p. 529: “God is usually understood to be pure actus, fully actualized, having in him no potentia: strictly speaking, there is in God no passive potency (potentia passiva) or possibility. ... God must be said to have power distinct from its exercise. ... This is, moreover, an active power (potentia activa)
relationship of divine essence and power based upon the doctrine of divine simplicity is of significance here. We find Charnock regarding divine power as both “the unconceivable excellency and activity of His essence” and “the divine essence efficacious ad extra”: the identity of divine substance is, in essence, the most simple being who, at the same time, emanates power in external operations in relation to the creatures. 37 Only God as the greatest simple being of a pure spiritual nature, Charnock argues, can possess both the greatest unity in all perfections and the greatest power. 38 The Reformed orthodox theologians also generally agree on the understanding of this two-sided aspect of divine power. As Muller comments about this:

The divine omnipotence is not to be viewed in the rather restricted sense of “power” as a force exerted upon a thing but in the larger and more inclusive sense of an absolute and all-encompassing potency. … But if there is no potency in God for God to become, there is a potency in God for creatures to become, for creatures to be drawn from pure potentiality into actual existence. God’s potentia is, then, a potency or potential for the being of creatures exerted ad extra in view of the range of genuine possibility. 39

Accordingly, the fact that Charnock also directly uses the term ad extra in his definition of it is significant for the following discussions — this may be another clear evidence of Charnock’s lack of speculative interest in the doctrine of the attributes of God. This also shows that we need to grasp the appropriate meaning of infinity with regard to the power of God in its objects and external activity. 40 These virtually “restrictive” elements of external power, extraneous to His omnipotency, are necessary for a right understanding of the power of God in relation to the voluntas Dei. 41 In addition, Charnock mentions that this omnipotence does not even exclude the ceding of power to creatures, despite the infinite distance from God the first

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37 Works II, p. 110.
39 PRRD III, p. 529.
40 For the detail, see PRRD III, p. 531.
41 Muller also explains it in a similar perspective on the wider trend of Reformed scholasticism: “But, despite this primacy and all-inclusive extension of divine will even to unactualized possibilities, there is a sense in which the divine will must be described as having limits: … The identification of God as omnipotent never was taken to mean that God can, literally do anything. Since God can perform only possible acts and the omnipotentia extends only to possibles, even ‘miracles are possibles,’ not impossibles,” in PRRD III, p. 532, quoting Stapfer, Inst. Theol., I.iii, §396.
cause to the creatures as second causes. At the same time such power is clearly shown in God’s “immediate creation” from nothing, which is contrasted with a mediate one using matter. “All natural and rational agents” produce the latter.

Second, Charnock explores the concept of both the absolute and the ordinate power of God in depth, because for him this division of theological terms is critical for an understanding of divine power. Charnock defines them as follows:

*Absolute*, is that power whereby God is able to do that which he will not do, but is possible to be done; *ordinate*, is that power whereby God doth that which he hath decreed to do, that is, which he hath ordained or appointed to be exercised; which are not distinct powers, but one and the same power: his ordinate power is a part of his absolute; for if he had not a power to do everything that he could will, he might not have a power to do everything that he doth will.

The important reason for this distinction lies in the proper understanding of God’s decree that causes His will to act: the divine decree interlinks absolute power with ordinate power on the basis of the divine wisdom and will. Although there is no gap between the ability to bring about an act and the act itself in God, yet His absolute power as “the principle of the action” greater than the ordained power actually exists. God’s absolute power (to do everything that He could will) exists as no other than the divine essence, which is wider than actual willing in its scope. Yet all of His decretal will involves other attributes including wisdom. Accordingly, the identity of God’s power should be grasped in light of the relationship of the intellect and will of God as in the case of faculty psychology.

Such an attitude also reflects Charnock’s affirmative appropriation of the late medieval idea of *potentia absoluta* in a Scotistic direction: in pursuing the defence of both God’s “absolute” freedom from the created order and the “absoluteness” of the eternal decree. He does not, however, lose a proper balance with Thomistic elements

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42 *Works* II, pp. 110, 116; cf. pp. 121-3. This also reflects Charnock’s acceptance of Thomistic theology to a certain degree in that he sees God as the foundation of all power of creatures because of His being the first cause; cf. *PRRD* III, p. 525.
43 The quotations are from *Works* II, pp. 128, 129. Charnock explains such creative power in detail in pp. 125-32.
44 *Works* II, p. 105.
45 *Works* II, pp. 106-7. He also names absolute power “the essence of His power” and ordinate power “the exercise of His power”, in *Works* II, p. 116.
46 See *Works* II, p. 107: “In us there are three orders, of understanding, will, power; and accordingly three acts, counsel, resolution, execution; which, though they are distinct in us, are not really distinct in God.” On the Reformed orthodox’s overall Thomistic tendency in understanding the relation between the intellect and will in their orders in God as the Supreme being, see *PRRD* III, pp. 444-5; cf. *PRRD* III, p. 448.
in considering the basis of divine power by saying: “His wisdom is the director of his action. His will orders, his wisdom guides, and his power effects. … The will of God is the root of all, the wisdom of God is the copy of all, and the power of God is the framer of all”. This point brings out a similar answer to the problem of absolute power in the discussion of the term potentia, previously mentioned in both its intrinsic or essential and externally operative dimensions. At the same time we see Charnock, in his schema, maintains firmly the rule of disallowing any inconsistency in the area between divine knowledge and will. (We have seen that this was a key argument in his treatment of the divine intellect in the preceding chapter.) According to Charnock and the Reformed orthodox (despite the seeming discrepancies in the logical or literal dimensions of the statement itself), the proper understanding of “freedom” in divine omnipotence can stand only on the basis of the “eternal decree” — in a consideration of His relationship to the created world — irrespective of whether there is an acknowledgment of radical divine freedom in the late medieval sense or not: the extrinsic gap between divine power and knowledge de facto does not exist! Here we see that the importance of the doctrine of divine simplicity is once again manifest. The emphasis on the ad extra dimension in dealing with the doctrine of the attributes of God in Puritan theology seems, in fact, to encourage such a tendency.

Given the above, what would be the specific historical or theological factors in the re-emergence of the controversy over the term potentia absoluta in the Reformed camp of the seventeenth-century? According to Muller’s analysis of Mastricht’s comment on this matter, there were three erroneous ideas current among the various schools: the Socinians, who asserted the incapacity of God’s doing contradictory things because of the limitation of His essence; the Weigelian fanatics, who thought of God’s absolute power as quite literal (including contradictories); and the Cartesians, who imagined an extremely radical freedom of God (even beyond the Occamistic level) in this power — on the basis of the “eternal indifference of God”

48 Cf. PRRD III. pp. 533-4. Especially see this comment therein: “The object of His potency is the realm of the possible even as the object of his omniscience is the realm of the knowable.” Italics are mine; Leigh, Treatise, II. xiv, p. 108, also cited in PRRD III, pp. 534-5.
49 This does not mean that the medieval scholastic understanding of this distinction lacks in consideration of the ad extra dimension. Again, we see the danger of the simple categorisation of “negative theology”. Also for a summary of the medieval intellectual history since the beginning of this distinction in Hugh of St. Victor, see Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 203; Oberman, “Some Notes on Nominalism: with Attention to its Relation to the Renaissance,” p. 56.
to the previously created orders. The Cartesian view, especially, concerning God’s “impossibility” (not considering any nuances from God’s part or the creature’s) was a key target of attack for the Reformed because of its subtlety. We see that the Cartesian view seems to be subject to criticism in the following argument of Charnock:

The object of His absolute power is all things possible; such things that imply not a contradiction, such that are not repugnant in their own nature to be done, and such as are not contrary to the nature and perfections of God to be done. … God could have chose whether he would create the world, and after it is created he hath power to dissolve it; but after it was created, and when it is dissolved, it will be eternally true that the world was created, and that it was dissolved; for it is impossible that that which was once true should ever be false. If it be true that the world was created, it will for ever be true that God hath decreed, it is impossible in its own nature to be true that God hath not decreed.

Yet the meaning of the “possibility” of all things in this area of the definition of absolute power by no means reaches the extent at which the doctrine of divine simplicity could be impaired. The act of God in the temporal dimension is invariably to be considered in terms of the created world as the object of potency (against divine immutability) only on the basis of the eternal decree of God as pure act or simple being. In other words, the Puritan and the Reformed scholastics endeavoured to defend the absoluteness of divine omnipotence, not by its mere arbitrariness, but rather by His wisdom, will, and righteousness. Only then the meaning of divine freedom could be appropriately vindicated in the light of the harmony of all the divine attributes.

B. The Ordained Power in Providence, Creation, and Redemption

Therefore, thirdly, we need to explore Charnock’s account of the potentia ordinata Dei against the background of the previous discussions on absolute power. For Charnock, ordinate power means a divine omnipotence that is in relation to His creatures as the possible or factibile objects of the act of divine will ad extra. This approach resolves the problem of sin and evil, and the infiniteness of power from

50 For detailed explanation, see PRRD III, p. 535.
52 Cf. PRRD III, p. 536.
God as “most free agent” at the same time. Both providential and moral aspects are also implicated in the distinction between absolute and ordinate power.

At this point we especially need to note, then, the second direction of Charnock’s argument — concerning the power of God seen in the works of providence and redemption based upon the eternal decree that sets the scope of His ordination. For the Reformed orthodox and the Puritans, the term potestas ordinata is originally based upon a covenantal (including and also beyond the salvific level) understanding, derived from the Scriptural relation between God and all the created orders. To be sure, as has been mentioned before, this background in covenantal theory is not totally free from the trajectory of its late medieval treatment. Charnock also discusses this power in a providential and redemptive context within the boundary of the covenantal idea.

With regard to providence, Charnock first affirms again that all government of the created world is God’s “act of the understanding, will, and power”. Although he does not give priority either to the divine intellect or to the divine power in providential works, this subordination of power is to the will rather than to the intellect. This is because ordained power is, practically, “the constant efficacy of

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54 Van Asselt’s summary on the relation between sin and divine will in Cocceius’ view helps us to understand this point: “Cocceius Speaks of a divine decree to allow sin, yet it cannot be said of sin itself that God wills or commands it. Therefore one must distinguish between God’s positive will and his permissive will, or his decree of permission. ‘Willing’ means approving, concurring in something, and ordaining as a means or an end. But by no means can this be said of sin”, in The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 169, citing Cocceius, Summa Theologiae, cap. 10 §43.

55 See Works II, p. 116: “Although his absolute power could have made every creature better, yet his ordinate power, which in every step was regulated by his wisdom, made everything best for his designed intention;” and see also the detailed discussions of God’s impossibility because of both divine ordination and immutability in pp. 117-21.


57 The recent interpretation and revision of the ideas about late medieval Scotism and nominalism also confirms this point. For a good summary of the difference between the original interpretation and the revisionists, see Steinmetz, Calvin in context, p. 43. The problem of how to understand such covenantal basis in Scotus like Occamist yielded a difference in the views. Although Richard Cross states that there is no direct reference to the covenant (“the idea of pact between God and creatures”) in Scotus, Oberman and Steinmetz argue that Occamistic background of the view of the covenant includes a Scotistic aspect especially in relation to Scotus’ idea of the covenant in its soteriological dimension, e.g. habit, infusion of grace, and merit etc. See R. Cross, Duns Scotus, pp. 175-6; Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, pp. 166ff; idem, “‘Iustitia Christi’ and ‘Iustitia Dei’; Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of Justification”, Harvard Theological Review 59 (1966), pp. 1-26, esp. see p. 4; and David Steinmetz, Misericordia Dei: The Theology of Johannes Von Staupitz in its Late Medieval Setting (Leiden: Brill, 1968), pp. 52-3.

58 We have, in preceding discussion, already identified a similar tendency in Perkins.

59 Works II, pp. 132-3: “It is a hard matter to determine which is most necessary. Wisdom stands in as much need of power to perfect, as power doth of wisdom, to model and draw out a scheme; though wisdom directs, power must effect.”
omnipotent will". Such a relative priority of the will over the intellect in the doctrine of providence is justifiable in Charnock’s schema because providence is naturally intertwined with God’s dominion. Along with the results of our investigations in previous chapters, this points inevitably to Charnock’s inheritance of voluntaristic tendencies from Scotus or the nominalists at this juncture. Charnock then goes on to expound the appearance of ordinate power in providence. In dealing with “natural” government, especially, he touches upon the operation of divine power both as “sustaining power” in preservation and as “co-working power” in the motion of all creatures. He states:

[Preservation] is one and the same action invariably continued, and obtaining its force every moment. The same action whereby he created them of nothing, and which every moment hath a virtue to produce a thing out of nothing, if it were not yet extant in the world, it remains the same without any diminution throughout the whole time wherein anything doth remain in the world. … Whosoever nature works, God works in nature; nature is the instrument, God is the supporter, director, mover of nature; … They are our works subjectively, efficiently, as second causes; God’s works originally, concurrently.

As we have seen, God’s preservative power is named “a continual creation”. The influence of God the first cause upon creatures as second causes in their motions is called divine “powerful concurrence”. Yet both the causal schema and natural law in the created world are maintained along with this operation of ordinary divine power (potentia ordinaria), except in the case of the occurrence of extraordinary divine power (potentia extraordinaria) despite the fact that the latter is within the realm of the potentia ordinata. To be sure we can sense that Charnock also

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60 Works II, p. 107. We even find a very Scotistic characteristic in the following statement in ibid.: “His will is the supreme cause of everything that stands up in time, and all things receive a being as he wills them.”

61 Charnock divides providential works into three dimensions: natural providence, moral government of human heart and actions, gracious government upon the church. See Works II, p. 133. This also similarly corresponds to Perkins’ division of providence into both general and special the latter which includes a soteriological aspect.

62 Works II, pp. 135, 137.

63 Works II, pp. 135, 137. This doctrine of God’s causal priority in relation to the action of second causes is differently called depending upon whether one is Thomist (praemotio physica) or nominalist (the concursus Dei). The choice of the word also seems to reflect the Reformed orthodox and Puritan, including Charnock, general preference of Scotism over Thomism in this idea, despite the diversity of respective theologians. Cf. Steinmetz, Misercordia Dei, pp. 45-6.

64 Muller also notes this point in the wider Reformed literature. See PRRD III, p. 537. Interestingly, Charnock nevertheless asserts that we should remember that the ordinary power of God is in some way no less wondrous than His extraordinary power: “Miracles indeed affect more, because they testify the immediate operation of God without the concurrence of second causes; not that there is
displays a tendency to conflate traditional power distinctions with this division of ordinary and extraordinary power — especially in relation to providential works. In short, what Charnock and the Reformed orthodox Puritans wanted to emphasise in this argument is the fact that only a consideration of ordained power in creation and providence on the basis of the sovereignty of God’s will can yield an appropriate understanding of His absolute power, despite the existence of both causal schema and concurrence.

In contrast to the Reformed camp, Arminius regarded the work of creation as rendering God’s *summum bonum* on the basis of His intellect. In this, he is leaning towards a Thomistic position, which necessarily denies the existence of absolute power and accepts only the concept of ordained power. Thus we see Charnock and the Puritan or Reformed scholastic understanding of creation and providence shows a characteristically affirmative attitude (against the Arminian position) towards Scotistic or late medieval voluntarism despite the use of a Thomistic infrastructure as the foundation of its theological formulation. This difference, furthermore, has arguably much more to do with the disagreement over the concept of divine freedom between the Reformed and the Arminians: a difference derived from how each school grasped the identity of the psychological faculties and the dialectics between the intellect (which is wider in its scope than the will) and the will. Charnock and the Reformed orthodox, namely, argued that the divine freedom and sovereignty are certainly the foundation of contingency in the created order, which is evidence of the influence of the ideas of Scotus or late medieval Augustinian thought.

For Charnock, the redemptive works also need God’s ordained but infinite power, supported by His infinite wisdom. The trinitarian and pietistic emphases are

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65 Such a tendency was widespread in the sixteenth and seventeenth century in both the Protestant and the Catholic camp. According to Francis Oakley, the Suarezian view of divine omnipotence was also related to this tendency within the common scholastic background. For details, see F. Oakley, “The Absolute and Ordained Power of God in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-century Theology,” pp. 452-5.

66 For example, on the errors of Arminius and the Arminians with respect to this point, see Muller, *God, Creation, Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius*, pp. 228-9; idem, “God, Predestination, and the Integrity of the Created Order: A Note on Patterns in Arminius’ Theology,” in *Later Calvinism*, ed. W. F. Graham (Kirksville: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1994), pp. 431-46.

67 The Reformed orthodox position saw freedom as the faculties of the soul to do what one wants, whereas the Arminians regarded it as the ability to choose autonomously to do or not to do what one should do. For detail, see *PRRD* III, pp. 447-8.

68 Cf. *PRRD* III, pp. 449-50; and see the literature cited therein for details.
quite remarkable here, especially in Charnock’s treatment of the redemptive aspects, which he sustains on the basis of wide exegesis. Let us briefly explore his arguments on this side. In the christological dimension, we particularly need to note Charnock’s exploration of the divine power revealed in the person of Christ. Although the incarnation was a mediate creation distinct from creation ex nihilo, yet the manner of conceiving was supernatural through the operation of the Holy Spirit. The third person of the Triune God secures the holiness of Christ’s humanity by making it “supernaturalised and elevated” in spite of His assumption of our sinful nature by way of imputation. Divine power is also shown in the union of the divine and human natures in Christ by the “indwelling of the Deity in the humanity”. Nevertheless this union does not deviate from the axiom finitum non capax infiniti. At this point Charnock attempts to deal with the doctrine of redemption comprehensively in terms of the power of God. Above all, the reception of this doctrine of a crucified mediator is evidence for the operation of divine omnipotence on the believer’s heart, despite its paradoxical nature.

In addition, the application of redemption in time most clearly evidences the appearance of divine power. Here Charnock seeks to expound the whole process of the infusion of grace in the believer’s life through “the power of God to salvation (Rom 1:16)”. The combination of the gospel as instrument and the divine omnipotence as efficient cause for conversion is conspicuous because it is “the power above nature” as well as prevailing against corrupt habits in the human heart. It is also notable that Charnock puts emphasis upon the uniqueness of the divine power in the manner of conversion: the efficacy of divine power in salvation and the autonomy of the soul faculties in the reception of it do not conflict with each other. The powerfulness and “sweetness” of this divine power in the infusion of grace coexist without conflict despite its “irresistibleness”. In fact the divine power of preserving grace in the believer after “the first infusion” is critical. Only such an operation of grace can assist in our struggle to approach “a perfectly sanctified nature” through the life of piety. In other words, in Charnock’s schema, this power is

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70 Works II, pp. 147-8.
71 Works II, p. 150: “Finite can never by any mixture be changed into infinite, nor infinite into finite.”
72 Works II, p. 154.
73 Works II, pp. 159-60. Here in some way Charnock names this operation “the divine conquest”.
74 For example, see Works II, pp. 161-2: “The almighty virtue displays itself invincibly, yet without constraint, compelling the will without offering violence to it, and making it cease to be will: … making it will where before it nilled; removing the corrupt nature of the will without invading the created nature and rights of the faculty; not working in us against the physical nature of the will, but ‘working to will,’ Phil. ii. 13.”
necessary for the every stage of “a continued regeneration” in the believer. At the
time we see that the believers’ spiritual warfare in the midst of the dialectic
between indwelling sin and continuously infused grace is utterly impossible without
the continuing exertion of this divine power.\textsuperscript{75}

\textbf{C. Summary of Charnock’s Exegesis and Doctrine of the Power of God}

As we have seen in this section, Charnock’s idea of God’s omnipotence, with
its critical reception of the traditional scholastic distinctions regarding that power,
reflects a successfully combined formulation of “Reformed” scholasticism and
Puritan piety in the historical and theological context of high orthodoxy. That is, the
problem of how to understand the “almightiness” of God can only be resolved by the
vindication of the doctrine of divine simplicity coupled with a trinitarian theological
system particularly related to the \textit{ad extra} dimension.

\textbf{III. Charnock’s Exegesis & Doctrine of the Dominion of God:}
\textit{The Meaning of “Absoluteness” in the Decree of the Triune God & the Pactum
Salutis}

Within a similar context of the exercise of the divine will, the Puritans and
Reformed scholastics investigated the aspect of God’s omnipotence as \textit{potestas} (rule
or authority). Here we discover again that the traditional concepts of \textit{potentia
absoluta/ordinata Dei} are amalgamated within the underlying framework of divine
sovereignty. Based upon the exegesis of Ps. 103:19,\textsuperscript{76} Charnock derives the doctrine
of God’s sovereignty as a threefold dominion over the whole created world: “natural”
dominion over whole creatures as creator, “gracious” dominion over the elect as
redeemer, founded upon the covenant of grace, and “glorious” dominion over both
the elect and the damned on the basis of final judgment.\textsuperscript{77} As in the case of our
discussion concerning divine omnipotence, the foundation of this dominion lies in all
the aspects of covenantal relationship (of both nature and grace) between God and
the created world. That is, the sovereignty of God is not a metaphysical or
speculative doctrine operating in a vacuum but is substantial in that it reveals the will
of God through His temporal works that are the basis of it. At the same time the

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Works} II, p. 163.
\textsuperscript{76} “The Lord hath prepared his throne in the heavens; and his kingdom ruleth over all.”
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Works} II, pp. 406-7.
Puritans and Reformed orthodox sought to avoid treating this covenantal aspect in the dominion of God in a synergistic or semi-pelagian way. This is what the Arminians had done in using the concept of *scientia media* or in abusing the idea of divine concurrence.\(^{78}\) On the one hand, according to Charnock’s division, at a “gracious” level of dominion God’s sovereignty can be defined as an ordained dominion, which is a combined rule of the law and the Gospel revealed through the Scriptures. On the other hand, at a “glorious” level of dominion, God’s sovereignty may be defined as absolute, decreeing both election and reprobation.\(^{79}\)

Let us examine Charnock’s detailed account of this doctrine of dominion (sovereignty). He first contrasts dominion as God’s “moral power” with omnipotence as “physical” in the execution of decrees: i.e., sovereignty is the comprehensive authority of God to which ‘lawfulness’ is attributed. The whole aspect of God’s essence and nature, the results of divine external works, and the existence of humans as rational beings evidence the existence of this sovereignty.\(^{80}\) Both the excellency of His nature and the benefits given from creation, providence, and redemption as well as the divine acts themselves are the pillars that this doctrine is founded upon. The reason for this is that sovereignty is, ironically, a relative attribute that ought to be reflected through the relationship with creatures that God has made in His external works.\(^{81}\)

At the same time, in Charnock’s view, the characteristics of this sovereignty, focusing on its absoluteness, also require to be expounded, to make clear the concept of *potentia absoluta Dei* underlying it. God’s dominion is absolute in terms of freedom, law, supremacy, and irresistibleness.\(^{82}\) According to Charnock, although the ordained decretal will is the only cause of each event, there can be countless possible hypothetical alternatives in the dispensation of God because of the absolute aspect of this sovereignty. Yet this absoluteness is regulated according to His decree by other divine attributes. In other words, the concept of the *potentia ordinata Dei* is to be based upon the exercise of this dominion. The sovereign will, in harmony with the rule of wisdom, righteousness, and goodness, extends over the existence and operation of all visible and invisible creatures.\(^{83}\) Charnock points out that the

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\(^{78}\) See *PRRD* III, p. 538; cf. Muller, *God, Creation, and Providence*, ch. 12, esp. pp. 253-68.


\(^{80}\) *Works* II, pp. 407-10.

\(^{81}\) *Works* II, pp. 410-4.

\(^{82}\) *Works* II, pp. 414-8.

\(^{83}\) See *Works* II, pp. 418-24. Especially the problem of whether the result of God’s absolute sovereignty is invariably and absolutely righteous or not has also been a source of debate in relation to
creation of human beings as free agents does not conflict with the genuineness of divine sovereignty. He argues this persuasively in relation to the human faculties of the soul:

God only can infuse habits into the soul, to capacitate it to act nobly and generously. His sovereignty is seen in regard of the inclinations of men’s wills. No creature can immediately work upon the will, to guide it to what point he pleaseth, though mediately it may, by proposing reasons which may master the understanding, and thereby determine the will; but God bows the hearts of men by the efficacy of his dominion to what centre he pleaseth. … The second cause in every motion depends upon the first, and that will being a second cause, may be furthered or hindered in its inclinations or executions by God;84

This also shows that Charnock endeavours to defend thoroughly God’s “absolute” dominion while maintaining a balance with its character as “ordained”. That is, even the absoluteness of sovereignty is revealed to us, paradoxically, through each revelation of decretal ordination — along with the acts of second causes including the Scriptures. Only then we can approach the mind and will of God. Within the boundary of such a Thomistic causal scheme, the working of the human heart is no exception — both human autonomy and divine control are maintained regardless of one’s being a believer or a reprobate.85

After dealing with the dialectic of the absolute and relative dimensions in the sovereignty of God, Charnock goes on to investigate fully how the dominion of God is manifested in specific areas of divine acts. Following the account of the sovereign economy of God in respect of laws as both legislator and judge,86 he touches upon the doctrine of predestination in relation to the dominion of God as the proprietor of “spiritual” (as opposed to material) resources.87 From an exegesis of Rom 9:13-20, he argues that election and reprobation are the act of an absolute decretive will of predestination that belongs to God’s dominion. To illustrate the absolute sovereignty of God, Charnock continues to emphasise the priority of the decree of election over other decretal contrivances, especially over the christological dimension, in the

Luther and Calvin as well. For detailed discussion, see Susan Schreiner, “Exegesis and Double Justice in Calvin’s Sermons on Job,” Church History 58/3 (1989), pp. 322-38.  
84 Works II, pp. 425-6. Here he illustrates abundant exegetical evidences for this argument.  
85 Charnock stresses this respect reiteratively, Works I, p. 451: “[God] puts what inclinations he pleaseth into the will, stores it with what habits he please, whether natural or supernatural, … The will of man is a finite principle, and therefore subject to him who hath an infinite sovereignty over all things.”  
86 See Works II, pp. 427-33.  
87 Cf. PRRD III, p. 538; Leigh, Treatise of Divinity, II. vi, pp. 52-5.
logical order of salvation. This coincides with his criticism of the Roman Catholic view of the mass, which is founded on a different understanding of the causal mechanism of election in relation to both the merit and the work of Christ. At the same time, for Charnock, this discussion covers the relationship of foreknowledge, faith, grace, and works. It also clearly shows his critique of Arminian soteriology especially in the understanding of justification and sanctification. Consequently, we see that the appropriate establishment of the relationship among these mutual doctrines reinforces his argument for the absolute dominion of God as the single and “original foundation” of the acts of both election and reprobation. Equally, the necessity of growth in grace in the “pilgrim’s progress” towards holiness does not conflict with divine sovereignty, despite the fact that there is a necessary distinction of the extent of disposing sanctifying grace in the individual believer according to the providential governance of God.

Charnock’s investigation of the redemptive aspects of the dominion of God in terms of its trinitarian perspective is also remarkable. He emphasises the priority of God the Father over the Son in both the decretal foundation of redemption and the designation of Christ as the mediator. Yet this does not impair the divinity of Christ but rather evidences the trinitarian order of both the decree and the economy in the works of redemption that manifest His sovereignty. Charnock affirms the existence of the covenant of redemption as a transaction between the Father and the Son in eternity in relation to Christ’s role as both mediator and redeemer:

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88 E.g., Works II, p. 434: “The decree of sending Christ did not precede, but followed in order of nature, the determination of choosing some. When men were chosen as the subjects for glory, Christ was chosen as the means for the bringing them to glory.”
89 Works II, p. 434: “If the decree of election falls not under the merit of Christ’s passion, as the procuring cause, it cannot fall under the merit of any part of the corrupted mass. … The choice was not merely in Christ as the moving cause, — that the apostle asserts to be the good pleasure of his will, — but in Christ, as the means of conveying to the chosen ones the fruits of their election.”
90 Works II, p. 435-6: “Nor could it be any foresight of works to be done in time by them, or of faith, that might determine God to choose them. … God foresaw no rational act in man before the act of his will to give him reason, nor foresees faith in any, before the act of his will determining to give him faith: Eph. ii. 8, ‘Faith is the gift of God.’ … If faith be the fruit of election, the prescience of faith doth not influence the electing act of God:”
91 Works II, p. 435: “His choice of them was to a holiness, not for a holiness preceding his determination, Eph. i. 4. He hath chosen us, ‘that we might be holy’ before him; he ordained us ‘to good works,’ not for them, Eph. ii. 10. … Good works suppose grace, and a good and right habit in the person, as rational acts suppose reason”; see also ibid., p. 440.
92 See Works II, p. 457: “In redemption a sovereignty is exercised over the Son, the second person in the Trinity, one equal with the Father in essence and works, … The whole gospel is nothing else but a declaration of his sovereign pleasure concerning Christ, and concerning us in him; … God [the Father] is superior to Christ, and of a more eminent dignity; in regard of the constituting him mediator, Christ is subject to God, as the body to the head.”
93 Works II, p. 458.
It is not so clearly manifested when this command was given, whether after the incarnation of Christ, or at the point of his constitution as mediator, upon the transaction between the Father and the Son concerning the affair of redemption: ‘The promise was given before the world began,’ Titus i. 2. Might not the precepts be given before the world began, to Christ, as considered in the quality of mediator and redeemer? Precepts and promises usually attend one another; every covenant is made up of both. Christ, considered here as the Son of God in the divine nature, was not capable of a command or promise, but considered in the relation of mediator between God and man, he was capable of both.  

Such a view of the eternal pactum salutis, which was not widely prevalent in Perkins’ times, clearly demonstrates Charnock’s balanced understanding of both the immanent Trinity ad intra and economic Trinity ad extra on the basis of the covenantal and christological integrity that converge in the doctrine of God’s sovereignty. For Charnock, through theological inference from this, Christ’s kingly office is derived naturally after His office as priest because He is the redeemer possessing “sovereign dignity” Himself as the second person of the Triune God.

In summary, although the dominion of God is manifested in the whole area of nature, grace, and glory, we have seen that Charnock particularly concentrates upon the “gracious” (redemptive and supernatural) dimension that stands on christological, covenantal, and trinitarian foundations, in order to emphasise the “absolute” character of this sovereignty reflecting both His power and wisdom. Consequently, the doctrines of predestination and sanctification coexist without paradox on the basis of the “dual” soteriological schema in the Puritan and Reformed orthodox tradition. Against the synergistic schools, the role of the covenant of redemption in consolidating the trinitarian foundation of a monergistic doctrine of God can only be grasped through the “perception” of the “biblical” God who both exists and acts in both eternal and historical dimensions.

IV. Charnock’s Praxis concerning the Power & Dominion of God: Covenantal Faith and Obedience to the Triune God

Through investigation in the practical part, we discover that the whole discussion of divine power and sovereignty in Charnock take place in the light of the

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94 Works II, p. 460.
95 Works II, p. 460.
theme of our knowledge of God (theologia nostra and ectypa) as the unity of “doctrine” and “piety”. This is given only through revelation based upon His ordained power. He makes it clear that Christ as the second person of the Triune God is the subject of this omnipotence. All the works of God the Father ad extra (creation, providence, and redemption) are done with the Son who possesses “natural and essential power” in the same manner as the Father. Within the seventeenth century context, for Charnock, although Christ is certainly our mediator, His status as the creator and governor of the world who is possessed of an efficacious will was particularly important.96 Charnock’s emphasis upon the trinitarian aspect of divine power continues in the explanation of the deity of the Holy Spirit, who is another subject or person of this power in the Trinity. Along with providing abundant exegetical evidences of the omnipotence of the third person of the Triune God in all divine works ad extra, especially prominent in the peculiar act of “changing the heart, and sanctifying a polluted nature”, he sums up by declaring: “The Father, Son, Spirit, are one principle in creation, resurrection, and all the works of omnipotence.”97

Charnock also deals with various pietistic aspects of the doctrine of God’s power. He points out that, as omnipotence is one of the ‘two pillars’ along with goodness in religion and worship, we still need to strive to avoid neglecting the practice of the means of grace established by divine ordination — if we truly respect His omnipotence.98 The actuality of divine power mutually assisted by other attributes confirms our assurance of the solidity of both the covenant and perseverance based upon the unerring fulfillment of all His promises.99 Charnock also maintains that the doctrine of divine omnipotence is to be a “concurrent foundation” upon which our trust is placed, along with the Word of truth itself. At the same time the consciousness of such power as the basis of “the fear of God” contributes to the growth of the life of sanctification.100 That is, the true knowledge of God the almighty needs our faith and obedience.

In a similar pattern (of the above-mentioned faith and obedience), Charnock endeavours to elicit various doctrinal points of piety in the practical section concerning God’s dominion. He deals with the problem of sin as nothing less than

96 For detailed background and the related argument, see Works II, pp. 164-8; cf. PRRD III, p. 539.
97 Works II, p. 169.
98 Works II, pp. 171, 177-8; cf. PRRD III, p. 539.
99 For example: see Works II, p. 179: “This power in God is always awakened by goodness and conducted by wisdom; it is never exercised by self-will and passion, but according to the immutable rule of his own nature, which is righteousness.”
100 Works II, pp. 184-7.
injury to the dominion of God. With regard to this, he excoriates the Roman Catholics, Arminians, and Socinians for their fatal errors regarding the core biblical doctrines of grace. For Charnock, as the acknowledgement of divine sovereignty is the initial phase of practicing all the duties of creatures, the arbitrariness of religious practices which do not consider whether they are in line with the Scriptures becomes the object of his severe criticism. Contrary to these “sins”, in a way, the very sovereignty of God allows the federal relationship between Him and the elect at the same time, which is the basis of divine love and “grace”. Thus he particularly stresses comprehensive meditation on this doctrine to promote the growth of the theological virtues during life lived in covenantal union with the sovereign God.

Because of this federal relationship with the Sovereign God, Charnock summarises the glory we need to ascribe to Him through exegetical analysis of Rom. 11:36 (based upon the Aristotelian theory of cause) as follows: “For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things, to whom be glory for ever; of him, as the efficient cause; through him, as the preserving cause; to him, as the final cause.”

Thus the obedience of the believer is naturally demanded along with patience because of this glorious dominion of God. Furthermore, all the faculties of the soul should be dedicated to the sovereign God if the operation of them is to be a sincere, inward, and joyful obedience, as Charnock writes: “Our understanding must take pleasure in knowing him, our wills delightfully embrace him, and our actions be cheerfully squared to him.”

In summary, in this practical section, Charnock has shown that the doctrine of the absoluteness of power and sovereignty in the Triune God does not exclude human participation towards the growth of piety through a Scripture-based means of grace. In addition, during this process, knowledge of God as true religion should invariably

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101 See Works II, p. 464: “Why are the decrees of election and preterition denied? Because men will not acknowledge God the sovereign disposer of his creature. Why is effectual calling and efficacious grace denied? Because they will not allow God the proprietor and distributor of his own goods. Why is the satisfaction of Christ denied? Because they will not allow God a power to vindicate his own law in what way he pleaseth. Most of the errors of men may be resolved into a denial of God’s sovereignty.” cf. ibid., p. 475 on ‘merit’.

102 For example, Works II, p. 466: “To impose laws upon the conscience, which Christ hath not imposed, hath deservedly been thought the very spirit of antichrist; it may be called also the spirit of anti-God. …” In fact this seems to reflect the later seventeenth century English context that Charnock experienced: the period of Great persecution (1660-1688).

103 See Works II, pp. 484-7.

104 Works II, p. 490.

105 Charnock points out that the conscience of rational creatures (especially in the case of the regenerate) links the doctrine of sovereignty with obedience. See Works II, p. 492.

106 Works II, p. 497.
exhibit the movement or act of all the faculties of the soul to the glory of almighty God who is sovereign.

Conclusion

We need, first, to summarise again the trajectory of medieval scholastic ideas which lay behind the ideas of Charnock and Perkins concerning God’s power and sovereignty, in order to elicit some concluding remarks within the larger context of Puritan and Reformed orthodoxy. Duns Scotus acknowledged a distinction between absolute and ordained power without emphasising the further concept of “covenant” while at the same time denying the existence of a special, separate, or “literally” absolute power. Occamists accepted the concept of absolute power at a radical level beyond divine ordination, but at the same time they endeavoured to limit its arbitrariness by devising the idea of God’s own established covenant with the created orders. The end result of each of these positions does not seem, de facto, to be significantly different: both positions pointed to the understanding of divine omnipotence as “operationalising”, unifying, and single.

On the whole, the Reformed orthodox theologians seem to have taken up a position eclectically between the two (Scotist and Occammist). Undoubtedly they stressed divine sovereignty and freedom as well as human responsibility by using the Thomistic causal scheme along with the idea of contingency and concurrence as the underlying framework of these voluntaristic theological formulations. This shows their unbiased view of a voluntaristic approach without losing the corresponding intellectual priority in God. In other words, Charnock and Perkins as Puritan and Reformed orthodox theologians accepted neither the radical detachment of the relation of the transcendent God and the created orders nor the inevitable relatedness between the two to the extent of limiting divine freedom. They invariably wanted to perceive God’s hidden will within the boundary of the revealed will given only by the ad extra exercises.

107 Alexander Broadie has argued that Scotus’ Scotism should be viewed not as a pure voluntarism but rather as one located between intellectualism and voluntarism. Even if his analysis is correct, the eclectic characteristic of seventeenth century Reformed thought remains the same. See A. Broadie, The Shadow of Scotus: Philosophy and Faith in Pre-Reformation Scotland (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995).


At the same time our appraisal above in terms of the distinctions of power also confirms the underlying continuity of the core intellectual heritage of the doctrine of the divine will. This continuity is based on the “scholastic” framework of the medieval era coming via the Reformers (i.e. Calvin and even Luther) and inherited by the Puritan and Reformed orthodox. Especially in the English context of our cases, this continuity has flowed from Perkins in early orthodoxy to Charnock in the era of high orthodoxy. We basically need to consider the fact that this continuity in the doctrine of divine omnipotence and sovereignty stems from their effort to protect the fundamental postulation of the orthodox doctrine of God on an exegetical basis: God’s will is unchangeably “single” because His essence cannot be other than a simple one. The doctrine of the divine will along with a particular emphasis on soteriological concerns maintained a proper balance and tension in the dual aspects of the divine will in both its eternal and temporal dimensions. Furthermore, Charnock’s structural difference or complexity in comparison with Perkins on omnipotence and dominion was due to the additional emergence of various opponents (the Arminians and the Roman Catholics, plus the Socinians and Cartesians) in the high orthodox period. Overall, however, both had a similar content to their theology, as we have noted. Both Perkins and Charnock dealt with God’s creation, providence, and predestination ad extra in order to explain divine power and sovereignty. Suarezian influences on Charnock, in which he relates the concept of power especially to God’s dispensation of the law and Gospel might be presumed. This influence, however, is not full or decisive in explaining reasons for the “coalescing” tendency of the idea of omnipotence. Most of all, we have seen that Charnock accepted the idea of the covenant of redemption within a high orthodox context, which seems to have made it possible for him to stress God’s omnipotence and absolute sovereignty more fully. If we consider the underlying background of this tendency of Charnock’s, it can be interpreted as his pursuit of a more solid trinitarian system of theology by intensifying christological and covenantal concerns along with a deep interest in piety. Therefore, for Charnock, in inherent continuity with Perkins’ scholastic, Puritan, and orthodox trinitarian structure, the pactum salutis was arguably the key to resolving the tension and harmony of the ad

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110 We can even see this evidence beyond the level of individual work in The Westminster Confession (1647), ch.5 (Of Providence); cf. Miller, The New England Mind, pp. 102-6.
intraextra in relation to the revelation of God’s power, sovereignty, and His will. This pursuit, of course, was in no way a blind reception of Aristotelian philosophy or speculation based merely upon scholastic terminological devices.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{113} Cf. \textit{PRRD} III, pp. 524-5.
Chapter Seven

The Holiness, Goodness, and Patience of God

We need now, finally, to explore a further group of God’s attributes, i.e. those outward manifestations of the divine will other than in power and in sovereignty in Perkins’ and Charnock’s system. These doctrines of holiness, goodness, and patience, in fact, are also founded upon scriptural exegesis as well as an Aristotelian faculty psychology (especially in relation to the will and affections). Thus these kinds of attributes are “analogical” (distinct with the dispositions of the human will) to God Himself in terms of the doctrine of divine simplicity. Overall the Puritans and the Reformed orthodox viewed holiness, goodness, and righteousness as moral and essential virtues or as the dispositions of the divine intellect and will. At the same time they also saw divine affections (e.g. mercy, grace, love, wrath, anger, patience, and hatred etc.) as a kind of overlapped expression of those attributes towards the creatures in terms of the ad extra. The doctrine of divine essence and simplicity confirms the foundation and stability of the direction of these divine exercises — from God Himself to the creatures. This is opposite to the way that human beings engage in the operation of such affections.

When considering the Puritan Reformed scholastic pursuit of consolidating the inseparability of the orthodox theological system and its piety, these final categories of attributes were highly significant to Perkins and Charnock. This is especially the case in relation to their emphasis upon both the doctrine of sanctification and the theodicean defence against their opponents — allowing for the minor differences between the two figures due to the change of historical context between early and high orthodoxy. In this chapter, we will continue to explore Charnock’s idea by following his threefold or fourfold structure in order to clarify the development of the framework of discussion as well as its content. As Charnock dealt with God’s holiness, goodness, and patience under each title in his Attributes among the attributes of this category, we will also focus upon the investigation of these attributes in Perkins and Charnock. Of course this is in order to examine whether the charge of being “rigid Aristotelian scholastic orthodox works” (or a merely voluntaristic Puritanism without an elaborate doctrinal basis) is reasonable or not with regard to Charnock’s theological system.¹

¹ This point is again related to the problem of how to properly understand the combination of both the
I. The Holiness of God

The theme of the purity of God has been clearly inherent in the Reformed tradition since the Reformation era especially in relation to hamartiological or pietistic interests. Even so, for the Puritans and the Reformed scholastics, the idea of divine holiness became much more critical because of the development of the doctrine of sanctification at an exhaustive level as their primary theological emphasis. The development from the period of Perkins to that of Charnock (from early orthodoxy to high orthodoxy), especially, is deeply related to the problem of how to explain divine vindicatory justice as consistent or coexistent with His salvific mercy (in opposition to the contention of the Arminians and Socinians). To be sure the Reformed orthodox theologians endeavoured to provide the answers by demonstrating both the harmony and balance between each attribute and the close intertwining of all the loci as a theological system. To put it another way, the key solutions they invariably resorted to were the appropriate distinction between the ad intra/extra dimensions and the arguments concerning christological, covenantal, and trinitarian coherence as the foundation or causes of our sanctification. This also shows that the Barthian suspicion of the Reformed scholastic view of divine holiness as an ontological abstraction is groundless. We shall again see the necessity for the exquisite combination of Thomism and Scotism in their treatment of the holiness of God.

Thomistic and Scotistic elements in (Puritan) Reformed orthodox theology. In this chapter we shall confirm again the necessity of a balanced view to avoid a misunderstanding of the identity of Charnock’s thought. Though somewhat distinct in nuances, Gavin J. McGrath’s stress upon the “voluntarism” of Puritan spirituality (based upon his own definition of it according to the relationship between theology and piety) is notable to understand our point. He defines Puritan voluntarism as “the prominence, but not dominance, of the will’s response to God’s sovereign initiatives in the divine/human encounter”. See G. J. McGrath, “Puritans and the Human will: Voluntarism within Mid-seventeenth Century English Puritanism as Seen in the Works of Richard Baxter and John Owen” (Ph. D. Thesis, University of Durham, 1989), p. 3.

2 PRRD III, p. 497.


4 Cf. PRRD III, p. 492.

A. Perkins on the Holiness of God

In the first place, Perkins understands the concept of holiness in a two-fold way: God’s own “uncreated” perfection and the “created” holiness of the creatures. Following the general tendency of the Reformed tradition to emphasise the ad extra dimension in the attributes of God, Perkins also focuses on the explanation of this created holiness in terms of the communicating of divine holiness to His elect. Within the boundaries of an underlying Puritan and scholastic background, Perkins defines the created or derived holiness in human beings as qualities or habits in the soul’s faculties, especially in the will and affections. These lead one to perform all the duties of piety related to the first table of the Decalogue concerning God. Thus we see that the holiness in Perkins’ view remains consistently to be related to the supernatural infusion of grace from the time of its being created to the glorification in heaven. This holiness of heart as the image of God is restored only through the new creation that rectifies the disproportion of the human soul’s faculties. At the same time, a sanctifying operation as a “spiritualizing” or “illumination” takes place within the mind, affections, memory, conscience, the will, and even the body (to become a fit instrument for the holiness of the soul). Thus the antithetical characteristics of sin and holiness are necessarily emphasised in Perkins’ schema since, as he insists, the nearness of God’s presence to our soul depends upon the dialectics between these two natures within the believer.

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6 Perkins, *An Exposition upon the Epistle of Jude*, in *Workes* III (ii), p. 578: “Uncreated is the holiness of God, which is nothing else but the perfection of his properties and attributes: this holiness is incomprehensible, and infinite, yea the fountain of all other holiness. Created holiness is a certaine gift of God, which by some proportion resembleth this uncreated holiness of God; the subject whereof are Angels, man, & God’s ordinances, especially the written word.” For the importance of the Word and prayer as the means of sanctification of human works, see *Golden Chaine*, in *Workes* I, pp. 45-6; *A Treatise of Callings*, in *Workes* I, pp. 767-8; *An Exposition of Chriists Sermon in the Mount*, in *Workes* III (i), pp. 124-5, 138; *An Exposition upon the Epistle of Jude*, in *Workes* III (ii), pp. 509-10. According to Herman Selderhuis’ analysis of Calvin’s view of divine holiness in his theology of the Psalms, this linkage between uncreated and created holiness is obtained through one’s pursuit of honouring God on the basis of humility. In fact this point is closely related to the two phases of sanctification (e.g. mortification and vivification), which are continuous in Calvin and the later Reformed tradition including Perkins and Charnock. See H. J. Selderhuis, *Calvin’s Theology of the Psalms* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), p. 169.

7 Perkins, *A Commentarie upon Chap. 6 of the Epistle to the Galatians*, in *Workes* II, p. 421. Perkins also sees the content of the second table in the Decalogue as the object of the exercise of our derived “righteousness” to humans themselves.


9 Cf. Perkins, *The Second Treatise of the Duties and Dignities of the Ministrie*, in *Workes* III (ii), p. 451. At the same time the understanding of God’s justice is important for the way Perkins deals with the problem of sin against His holiness. Perkins defines divine justice as “that by which he in all things willeth that which is just” in His word or deed. There are two kinds of justice in deed: disposing justice in relation to providential act and rewarding justice in relation to predestination. See *Golden
As a way of cultivating holiness in the believer, Perkins depicts the effects of sanctification in two respects: purifying one’s corrupted nature on the one hand and receiving inward righteousness on the other.10 Thus, based upon a reading of 1 John 3: 9 and Rom 8:1, Perkins considers sanctification as a believer’s gradual growth in holiness and righteousness through the efficacy of the Holy Spirit. According to Perkins, the first part of sanctification is the mortification of sin “whereby the power of sin is abated, and crucified” in the believer by virtue of Christ’s death, and the imputation to Christ of the believer’s sin. The second part is vivification “whereby inherent holiness being begun, is still augmented and enlarged” by the merit of Christ’s resurrection which quickens and raises up the believer to “newness of life”.11 Within the context of this soteriologically focused interest in the holiness of the believer, Perkins articulates an inseparable relationship between saving faith, justification, sanctification, and assurance as follows:

Now this saving faith, laying hold on Christ’s righteousness, for man’s justification, is never severed from sanctification by the Spirit, with the fruits thereof, whereby the old man being mortified, and the new man in Christ’s renewed, according to his image, in knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, the whole person is turned into God, and made careful to please him, both in thought, word, and deed: and hereby do we receive assurance of our justification; for true sanctification is the earnest of the Spirit of adoption in our hearts, whereby we are sealed into the day of our redemption.12

In effect, Perkins de facto integrates regeneration and sanctification by understanding it as a divine operation both restraining and renewing the heart in the context of His effectual calling in the larger perspective of the believer’s “life eternall”.13 To put it
another way, Perkins’ idea of holiness corresponds with the entire scope of his theology of grace in which the believer lives a “wholehearted Christianity” by conforming to God.

In summary, Perkins focused on the account of how God’s holiness is restored in the elect through regeneration and sanctification through the work of the Holy Spirit in view of both christological and anthropological dimensions. In addition, we might say that the “supernatural” aspect of our trinitarian knowledge of God is well explained in Perkins’ schema of divine holiness in the context of the order of salvation.

B. Charnock’s Exegesis and Doctrine on the Holiness of God:
The Vindication of Holiness in Relation to His Righteousness

Based upon the exegesis of Ex. 15:11, Charnock initially looks upon God’s holiness in His essence, nature, and operations as a glorious perfection of honour, beauty, and life. The extensive nature of His holiness affects all the other attributes that are glorified, and without holiness the others cannot be. Charnock also defines holiness in a negative and positive direction: the former as freedom from evil and the latter as the full integrity or conformity of affection and action to the divine will. The former refers to the moral aspects; the latter refers to that comprehensive or foundational influence of unchangeable or absolute holiness upon the acts of the divine will and intellect.

At the same time, for Charnock, the concept of holiness is similar to righteousness but can nevertheless be distinguished according to the ad intra/extra distinction in God. As he puts it, “Holiness is a perfection absolutely considered in the nature of God; righteousness, a perfection as referred to others, in his actions of sinnes by his death, and justification by his obedience, are not put into us, but are only applied and made ours by imputation. Some other gifts there be, which are infused and put into us, as namely, sanctification, regeneration, the love of God and man.” Paul Schaefer depicts well about the relatedness between justification and sanctification in Perkins like this: “[We need to see] that fine balance between justification and sanctification that refuses to separate the two when speaking of the Christian life, but that also always distinguishes between them so that a true believer will not wallow in despair.” P. Schaefer, “The Art of Prophesying,” in The Devoted Life: An Introduction to the Puritan Classics (Downers Grove: IVP, 2004), pp. 49-50. As is known well, Calvin is also no exception to this position in this both distinction and the integrative understanding of the two in his soteriology. See Calvin, Institutes, III, esp. ch.14.

14 “Who is unto thee, O Lord, among the gods? Who is like thee, glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders?”
15 For general analysis of the tendency of Reformed orthodoxy on divine holiness, see PRRD III, pp. 498-503.
16 Works II, p. 194.
towards them and upon them.”\(^\text{17}\) To be sure, as Muller points out, this distinct but inseparable relatedness between the divine holiness and righteousness was important for the Reformed orthodox critique of the Socinians who claimed that the holy God cannot possibly exercise vindicative justice.\(^\text{18}\) Accordingly, while the acts of holiness *ad intra* are “necessary” according to the nature of God, yet those *ad extra* are “conditional” depending upon the existence of creatures and their sins. In other words, holiness refers to those acts of divine will that include the “moral and good” aspects of it stemming from the “free necessity” of its characteristics.\(^\text{19}\) Charnock thus continues to vindicate the reasonableness of this free necessity particularly in the sense that God is unchangeably holy as well as extraneous to responsibility for sin and evil. Both the voluntariness of the sinner and God’s abhorrence of sin in itself (not the sinner) show the necessity of a proper understanding of the relationship between the “goodness” of divine sovereignty and holiness.\(^\text{20}\) We can sense that Charnock wanted to make it clear that God only permits sin as an ‘observer’ of the spiritual combat between humanity and sin and evil. That is, Charnock’s intention to defend divine simplicity is revealed in this account of the relatedness of divine holiness, justice, and goodness centered in the single divine will.

Within this framework, Charnock examines specific proofs of the manifestation of God’s holiness. Based upon Isa. 6:3,\(^\text{21}\) he understands this holiness in a threefold way in terms of God as creator, lawgiver, and redeemer.\(^\text{22}\) With regard to creation, Charnock identifies the divine holiness in human beings with the voluntary part of the image of God implanted. As human reason reflects the divine intellect, so one’s righteousness or “necessary uprightness” in the will reflects His

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18 *PRRD* III, pp. 480, 491-2, 501.


20 See *Works* II, pp. 201-2: “There is no sin but is in some sort voluntary; voluntary in root, or voluntary in the branch; voluntary by an immediate act of the will, or voluntary by a general or natural inclination of the will. … If a man mistakes the object, it is his own fault; for God hath endowed him with reason to discern, and liberty of will to choose upon that judgment. … God would cease to be a rightful sovereign if he ceased to be good, he would cease to be good if he did command, necessitate or by any positive operation incline inwardly the heart of a creature directly to that which were morally evil, and contrary to the eminency of his own nature.”

21 “And one cried unto another, and said, Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts: the whole earth is full of his glory.”

22 *Works* II, p. 204.
holiness. By this argument Charnock elicits the foundation of God’s moral government of human beings through the law, rooted in this conformity of holiness between God and humanity. Thus we see that the divine holiness and righteousness are revealed in both the eternal law of nature and the ceremonial law. As mentioned earlier, in this judicial context, God’s holiness and righteousness are intertwined with each other because God vindicates His holiness by way of justice and penalty due to His intrinsic abomination of sin. As Charnock declares, “Divine holiness is the root of divine justice, and divine justice is the triumph of divine holiness.”

For Charnock, the holiness of God is also revealed in His redemptive works, which are both accomplished in a christological dimension and applied to each individual in time. Holiness and righteousness are distinct from both the divine intellect and power because the former two attributes can cause the human free will to imitate them. Thus Charnock emphasises the role of holiness and righteousness for our sanctification in that we can grow in these two aspects of the image of God. In fact this point leads Charnock to investigate more deeply the christological foundation of holiness in redemption that vindicates it in relation to sin and the “death” of sin by way of the death of Christ. Only Christ’s death as the sole possessor of perfect holiness can be the object of our justification by faith. For Charnock, the christological benefits aiding us in our pursuit of the grace of sanctification in the relation between the attributes of God and human nature are as follows — he remarks:

None are partakers of the divine blessedness that are not partakers of the divine nature; there must be a renewing of his image before there be a vision of his face. … He will not have men brought only into a relative state of happiness by justification, without a real state of grace by sanctification. … The whole design of it is to reinstate us in a resemblance to this divine perfection, whereby he shews what an affection he hath to this excellency of his nature, …

23 See Works II, p. 205: “The law of love to God, with his whole soul, his whole mind, his whole heart and strength, was originally writ upon his nature. All the parts of his nature were framed in a moral conformity with God, to answer his law, and imitate God in his purity, which consists in a love of himself, and his own goodness and excellency.”
24 Works II, p. 209.
25 Works II, p. 211.
26 For Charnock’s detailed argument, see Works II, pp. 212-3.
27 Works II, p. 214.
28 Works II, p. 214. In a similar Puritanistic and scholastic perspective, Owen also evidences a similar view of sanctification by defining it as “the universal renovation of our natures by the Holy Spirit into the image of God, through Jesus Christ,” in The Works of John Owen, vol. 3, p. 386; cf. ibid., p. 482. Owen deals with the massive doctrinal and practical points of sanctification in books III and IV of this volume titled Pneumatologia.
In one way, we might say that the relation of both communication and participation between God’s holiness and the purity of the new creature confirms the continuity of the series of creation, actual regeneration, sanctification, and perseverance.  

Sanctification is considered in the same light as justification within the context of the whole *ordo salutis* as both “union and communion” with God, despite the distinction between the two.  

Furthermore, Charnock relates the trinitarian structure of this supernatural operation of divine holiness to the recreated image of God in the believer. The Holy Spirit, in particular, breaks the dominance of sin through the individual application of divine holiness to the regenerate soul.  

Namely, the holiness revealed in redeeming grace through redemptive work points to our struggle for the perfection of the restored divine nature, which is beatitude.  

This is a spiritual battle in which a choice is made for the way of holiness by conforming oneself to God’s will revealed in the Scriptures. It is also a choice against unholiness in so far as divine nature is continuously infused into the believer’s nature by His grace.  

Based upon the examination of the threefold manifestation of divine holiness, Charnock goes on to develop fully a series of defensive arguments concerning God’s holiness in providential acts in relation to human sin. Citing Suarez, he makes it clear that the fault does not lie with God’s first creation of the human being as a mutable rational creature, in contrast to the immutable God *per essentiam*.  

According to Charnock, the “natural” (not supernatural) faculties human beings received from God were sufficient to allow Adam the ability to act freely in choosing his future between the ‘stand’ and the ‘fall’. This balance in Adam’s faculties of the soul before the fall is no other than “a harmony between his reason and affections” as an original righteousness that makes it possible for him to love God as the chief good.  

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29 Here we also find a common characteristic Charnock shares with Perkins.  
31 See Works II, p. 215: “As [the Father] sent Jesus Christ to satisfy his justice for the expiation of the guilt of sin, so he sends the Holy Ghost for the cleansing the filth of sin and overcoming the power of it. Himself is the fountain, the Son is the pattern, and the Holy Ghost the immediate imprinter of this stamp of holiness upon the creature.”  
33 The Reformed scholastics including Owen saw that both grace and holiness are infused into each believer in this process of sanctification as *habitus*. To be sure they prefer the term “imputation” to “infusion” in speaking of justification in terms of the distinction with Roman Catholics. See Kapic, *Communion with God*, pp. 51-2  
God created humanity in a “righteous state”, yet Adam voluntarily gave himself to a “forlorn state”.

As was the case with the flexibility of the result in his free choice, so God’s command to obey the law was not against His holiness because of an original righteousness given to Adam. In addition, divine foreknowledge of the human fall did not necessitate Adam’s will to commit sin. Human free will has nothing to do with foreknowledge because the entirety of temporal events in the created world is foreknown to God without encroaching upon the freedom of the rational creature. To put it another way, in Charnock’s view, Adam’s original righteousness given as the balance and harmony of his faculties of the soul reflects the very holiness of God who is not responsible for his fall: our God is the creational, providential, and redemptive trinitarian God who acts only according to a single decreptive will, which is based upon His infinite wisdom.

In these circumstances Charnock also argues that the eternal decree of reprobation is not against the divine holiness but rather reasonable to His righteousness. We need to be clear about this point of argument (by further examination to follow) in order to grasp the relation of divine holiness and righteousness. In this argument Charnock particularly defends the traditional doctrine of double predestination. As the divine operation towards the sin of the reprobate is merely negative, it is, in fact, a denial or cessation of action that cannot be the cause of sin in a positive way. Accordingly, Charnock endeavours to solve the problem of the coexistence of both God’s secret will in permitting sin and His perceived will in forbidding sin in man. Is the divine concurrence with sin possible or not? For Charnock, to maintain the appropriate idea of the holiness of God, this kind of divine willing in the permission of sin is to be grasped cautiously. It is only an efficacious willing “not to hinder” sin as well as “not to give” the grace to prevent it based upon a privative or deficient decree of God — the foundation of this decree is in both the infinite wisdom and sovereignty. Citing Bradwardine, Charnock also elaborates the principle in this way: “God doth not will sin simply, for that were to approve it, but he wills it in order to that good his wisdom will bring forth from it.

36 See Works II, p. 220: “If God’s prescience takes away the liberty of the creature, there is no such thing as a free action in the world, … nor ever was, no, not by God himself ad extra.”
He wills not sin for itself, but for the event.’”39 At the same time, we also find that Charnock develops his rationale further from the Thomistic perspective by citing Aquinas who prioritises the goodness of the infinitely wise God.40

Thus the object of God’s positive willing is not sin itself, but rather the permission of sin despite “some sort of concurrence with sin” in God’s position, as Charnock insists again: “Though the will of God about sin was permissive, yet the will of God about that glory he would promote by the defect of the creature was positive.”41 Such permission itself is also the object of the divine eternal decrees that guarantee the certainty of temporal events. Consequently, at this juncture, we might sense that the problem of the causality of original sin in relation to human free will is a difficult question for Charnock. He describes the initial appearance of God’s permissive will before the fall as follows:

The first object of this permissive will of God was to leave angels and men to their own liberty and the use of their free will, which was natural to them, not adding that supernatural grace which was necessary, not that they should not at all sin, but that they should infallibly not sin; they had a strength sufficient to avoid sin, but not sufficient infallibly to avoid sin, a grace sufficient to preserve them, but not sufficient to confirm them.42

Thus it follows that the causal subject of original sin was Adam who had the free will to choose his own status regardless of the orientation of God’s permissive will. Permission is neither action nor the cause of the permitted result of Adam’s choice, but rather the cause of not hindering sin.43 As Charnock says, quoting from Bradwardine again, this does not encroach upon His holiness but reflects both “His own glory and a greater good (majus bonum)” in the wisdom of God.44

If so, then how can we defend God’s holiness in relation to His undeniable concurrence with the creature in the “material part of a sinful act”?45 Charnock continues to elaborate the answer to this troublesome issue in a very casuistic way.

39 Works II, p. 223, citing Bradwardine, lib. i. cap. xxxiv.
40 See Works II, p. 223: “Much more is this from God, who being infinitely good, cannot will evil as evil, and being infinitely knowing, cannot will that for good which is evil. Infinite wisdom can be under no error or mistake. To will sin as sin would be an unanswerable blemish on God, but to will to suffer it in order to good is the glory of his wisdom.”
41 Works II, pp. 222, 224.
43 Thus Charnock presents this relation between sin and permission succinctly: “Sin may be said to be committed not without God’s permission, rather than by his permission,” in Works II, p. 225.
45 The quotation is from Works II, p. 229.
The creature cannot operate without the help of divine “preserving and concurring” power in acting, because God the first cause is co-working with every act of the creature as the second cause. This means that no one can blame God on the basis of concurring in the event, since God would then be the responsible subject (apart from creatures) if one were to follow such a one-sided logic. To defend divine holiness, Charnock points out the critical fact that action is the reflection or efficacy of the soul’s faculties. As the faculties are corrupted after the fall, according to Charnock, one cannot expect divine concurrence from God in the human act to be purely or necessarily good in the light of the human predicament. For this reason, the judgment of moral goodness or badness against His holiness depends not upon the material part of the act, but rather upon the motive, circumstance, and mind of it.

To sum up, the entire attribution of the responsibility for the result of sin to human beings is consistent with God’s concurrent causation of the sinful act based upon the infinite wisdom and goodness that conform to His eternal decree. What is to be blamed is the misuse of Adam’s free will (not for frui but for uti) and the resultant corrupted nature in his descendants: this unholiness of the human heart does not come from the holiness of God! At the same time, in opposition to the Socinian view, Charnock’s successful defence of God’s holiness frees Him from responsibility as the author of the result of sins. This also guarantees the rightness of His exercise of punitive justice upon sinners. All these defences are, in Charnock’s work, theological devices which ultimately contribute to an argument for the necessity of the incarnation and atonement as the basis of our sanctification in the orthodox theological system (against the Socinians — and even the Arminians). That is, in Charnock’s work, we again confirm that both the divine simplicity and unity of the Triune God in all of His acts along with the participation of the creatures as the secondary cause of events constitute the fundamental doctrinal foundations for the defence of the orthodox doctrine of God.

C. Charnock’s Praxis concerning the Holiness of God:
The Trinitarian Basis of Sanctification towards “Union with Christ”

In the practical section, Charnock seeks to show that our practical holiness,
especially in worshipping God, cannot exist without a right appropriation of His essential and externally revealed holiness. This, of course, is on the basis of Scripture as the cognitive foundation of our knowledge of God. 49 Thus he accentuates the significance of our holiness as the extension or reflection of the divine “eternal fountain,” which is His essential holiness. Within the context of stressing the necessity of our unremitting sanctification by this divine holiness, Charnock also expounds the critical relationship between the divine holiness and glory in relation to the restoration of the image of God in humanity from the angle of the history of redemption. He comments:

By the glory of God is meant the holiness of God; as 2 Cor. iii. 18, ‘Beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, we are changed into the same image from glory to glory;’ that is, the glory of Lord in the text, into the image of which we are changed; but the scripture speaks of no other image of God but that of holiness. We are come short of the glory of God, of the holiness of God, which is the glory of God; and the image of it, which was the glory of man. By sin, which is particular in opposition to the purity of God, man was left many leagues behind any resemblance to God; he stripped off that which was the glory of his nature, and was the only means of glorifying God as his creator. 50

Such a perception of the compatible or harmonious relationship between “our glory” and “glorifying God” leads Charnock to address the doctrine of sanctification (as the gradual restoration of the original purity in humanity before the fall) on a full scale from christological, covenantal, soteriological, and trinitarian perspectives. As to the christological dimension, he addresses the importance of sanctification as follows. Charnock contends that the honour of the infinite purity of God had been impaired by human sin but was compensated through the full atonement of a fit mediator who possessed “efficacy and exact congruity” to the work of redemption. 51 Then, according to Charnock’s rationale, a justified sinner by the sacrifice of the mediator should grow in the knowledge of the holiness of Christ who is everlastingly righteous because of his equality with the Father. Namely Charnock again pays attention to the glory (of Christ) with His possession of holiness as a “glorious perfection of the

49 Charnock develops his argument by severely criticising the various sins of infringement upon divine holiness, especially in the Roman Catholic ideas of merit, venial sins, supererogation etc. See Works II, pp. 242-50.
50 Works II, p. 250.
divine nature”.

Clearly we have the sense that he is defending the deity of Christ (as the orthodox foundation of the Christian religion) in this argument — the basis of the struggle for conformity to Christ in terms of the restoration of our glory is nothing less than the glorious holiness of the God-human.

In dealing with the covenantal background of sanctification, Charnock discovers the holiness of God in the dispensations of both the covenant of works and the covenant of grace — the latter covenant shows His will to communicate to “a covenant soul”, who is a partaker of this new covenant. At another level, the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son is the perpetual foundation of this holiness as well. In addition, the supernatural infusion of grace in time through the work of the Holy Spirit on the basis of the eternal decree concerning the federal relationship between God and the elect rooted in the pactum salutis reveals the very image of God’s holiness. That is, God delights in this holiness in the regenerate life of “every upright soul” because of “His own stamp on the godly” that will renew, preserve, and perfect the image of Himself. For this reason, according to Charnock, God’s will to communion with the elect in this holiness is more prominent than any other attribute of God. In other words, as we have seen, the will of the Triune God to sanctify the elect through a continuous, supernatural re-creation has a firm christological and soteriological foundation.

In touching upon this trinitarian background of sanctification, Charnock particularly stresses the role of the Spirit in enabling us to be patient during various divine dispensations. These are the trials of the believer, as he notes: “[God] melts us down as gold, to fit us for the receiving a new impression, to mortify the affections of the flesh, and clothe us with the graces of his Spirit.” At the same time, on our part, only a deep sense of the glorious holiness of the relation between God and the believer can yield true conviction and humbleness, a fear of God, vigilance over sin.

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52 Works II, p. 255. A good summarised example of Puritan thought about both the blessing of union with Christ in terms of sanctification and the purity of Christ in a similar vein is J. Stephen Yuille, The Inner Sanctum of Puritan Piety: John Flavel’s Doctrine of Mystical Union with Christ (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2007), pp. 48-50, 59; on Owen’s similar treatment of holiness and righteousness within the larger Reformed scholastic context, see K. Kapic, Communion with God, pp. 137-45, 168-9.

53 Works II, p. 256.

54 Works II, pp. 258, 259.

55 See also Works II, p. 259: “As it is a part of the holiness of Christ to sanctify his church, Eph, v. 26, till not a wrinkle or spot be left, so it is the part of God not to leave that work imperfect, which his holiness hath attempted a second time to beautify his creature with. He will not cease exalting this attribute, which is the believer’s by the new covenant, till he utters that applauding speech of his own work, Cant. iv. 7, ‘Thou art all fair, my love, there is no spot in thee.’”

56 Works II, p. 263.
and temptation and the desire for the imitation of Christ in us.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, according to Charnock, we should consistently honour the holiness of God in the struggle for the growth of holiness in a conformity to the law and a looking to Christ as the “ultimate pattern” of holiness.\textsuperscript{58} In other words, the law and Christ are the two key axioms in increasing our communion with God based upon His “covenant mercy” in the process of sanctification. Accordingly, we find that Charnock emphasises the necessity of human voluntary participation in this sanctification (through the work of the Holy Spirit) in the means of grace as a “tool” for enhancing the federal relationship between God and the elect.

Why, even so, is our pursuit of holiness critically important? Charnock goes on to argue this point from anthropological, aesthetical, and teleological perspectives. Above all, sanctification is the “prime way of honouring God” because God is glorified only when “unstained spirits” endeavour to “live to Him in living like Him”.\textsuperscript{59} Charnock reiteratively stresses the inseparable relationship between glorifying God and our sanctification based upon a background exegesis. He writes:

\begin{quote}
God seems to accept the glorifying this attribute, as if it were a real addiction to that holiness which is infinite in his nature, and because infinite, cannot admit of any increase; and therefore the word sanctified is used instead of glorified. Isa. viii. 13, … This sanctification of God is by the fear of him, which signifies in the language of the Old Testament, a reverence of him, and a righteousness before him. He doth not say, when he would have his power or wisdom glorified, ‘Empower me,’ or ‘Make me wise;’ but when he would have holiness glorified by the creature, it is ‘Sanctify me;’ that is, manifest the purity of my nature by the holiness of your lives.\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

That is, our holiness is consequential in that only this attribute can demonstrate both the glory and reliability of divine holiness to the world. At the same time, in Charnock’s view, such holiness in the believer is “the excellency and beauty” of the rational creature in terms of the image of God, reflecting faithfully the original purpose (especially with regard to humanity) of God’s creation. The “beauty” of the faculties of the soul in human life lies in nothing less than a supernatural elevation to

\textsuperscript{57} Works II, p. 261.
\textsuperscript{58} Works II, pp. 266-8. Note especially in p. 266: “When we honour him by acknowledging his purity, he will honour us by communicating of it us. This is the way to derive a greater excellency to our souls. … No creature can be essentially holy but by participation from the chief fountain of holiness, but we must have the same kind of holiness, the same truth of holiness;”
\textsuperscript{59} Works II, p. 268.
\textsuperscript{60} Works II, p. 269.
the original divine excellency intended by God. He addresses the concept of this beauty in relation to sanctification in this way:

The beauty of every copied thing consists in its likeness to the original; everything hath more of loveliness, as it hath greater impressions of its first pattern; in this regard holiness hath more of beauty on it, than the whole creation, because it partakes of a greater excellency of God than the sun, moon, and the stars. No greater glory can be, than to be a conspicuous and visible image of the invisible, and holy, and blessed God.

Within this aesthetic context, Charnock again notes the role of the Holy Spirit, who assists us to become more beautiful and fit to reach the original beauty of God. This “beautification” is not only the “quintessence” of sanctification as the life of communion with God, but also the “glory of the Holy Spirit” that operates in our faculties of the soul in the light of a “moral and becoming” change rendering us fully able to enjoy God. He thus emphasises, in the Augustinian sense, that the full enjoyment of God (frui) cannot be given without an endeavour to resemble the image of His holiness and righteousness that points to this “spiritual beauty”. Of course Charnock does not forget to refer to the necessity of the purification of our soul also in terms of the visio Dei (Heb. 12:14, 1 John 3:2-3).

Clearly this shows that sanctification necessarily correlates with or refers to the soteriological element in Charnock’s schema. Therefore, at this point, he asserts that there is no evidence we can find of divine election without a mark of sanctification as the fruit of the believer’s struggle for “conformity to God in purity”. Specifically, as holiness in us yields “acts of love to God”, the phase of

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62 Works II, p. 269.

63 The quotations are from Works II, pp. 269, 270. Interestingly, in a similar aesthetical vein of Puritan theology, Stephen Holmes describes the idea of Jonathan Edwards on the believer’s holiness as follows: “True holiness is nothing but superlative love for God’s beauty, so the creature who loves God is also participating in God’s holiness, and so is the recipient of the communication of God’s holiness,” in God of Grace and God of Glory: An Account of the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), pp. 56, 178-9.

64 See Works II, pp. 270-1: “Divine fruition is not so much by a union of presence as a union of nature. …Unless we be of a like nature to God, we cannot have a pleasing fruition of him. … Were we partakers of a divine nature, we might enjoy God with delight;”

65 Works II, p. 271.
holiness progresses in these acts by changing our faculties of the soul into a better or more beautiful image of God than previously. As Charnock states, “The will in loving is rendered like the object beloved, is turned into its nature, and imbibes its qualities. The soul by loving God will find itself more and more transformed into the divine image.”\textsuperscript{66} Such an awareness of the relationship of nature and works in God and the elect leads us to acknowledge more readily the necessity of a continuous supernatural infusion of grace for the growth of holiness. For this purpose, the supreme harmony of the work of each person of the trinitarian God in this whole process of the restoration of His image is invariably fundamental, as Charnock emphatically remarks:

There is no fear of our sanctification, if we come to him as a God of holiness, since he is a God of peace, and the breach made by Adam is repaired by Christ: … He restores the sanctifying Spirit which was withdrawn by the fall, as he is a God pacified, and his holiness righted by the Redeemer. The beauty of it appears in its smiles upon a man in Christ, and is as ready to impart itself to the reconciled creature, as before justice was to punish the rebellious one. He loves to send forth the streams of this perfection into created channels, more than any else.\textsuperscript{67}

In summary, in this practical section on divine holiness, Charnock has shown us the aesthetical, redemptive (teleological), trinitarian, and Christ-centered aspects of sanctification in terms of the relationship between God the creator and the elect. The rational creature should point towards the perfection of the image of God and so glorify Him (according to the end of God’s creation). That is, the original divine holiness is to be reflected unremittingly in the soul’s faculties of the regenerate through sanctification. This is God’s most wondrous work \textit{ad extra}, beautifying human being. “The dynamic aspect” of the divine “loving holiness” in His action is a significant element in Charnock’s trinitarian account of holiness.

\textbf{II. The Goodness and Patience of God}

While the focus of the previous discussion of the holiness of God (especially in the case of Charnock) was to demonstrate that God is not the efficient cause of sin

\textsuperscript{66} Works II, p. 272. Thus, in Charnock, we see that the love for God, the fear of God, piety, and sanctification converge upon this pursuit of holiness in the believer; cf. S. Yuille, \textit{Puritan Spirituality}, pp. 93-4.

\textsuperscript{67} Works II, p. 274.
and evil, and then to consider the doctrine of sanctification, here we shall deal with
the subject of His being the efficient cause of all the goodness in the created world.
In this sub-chapter, we will discover that the denotation of God’s goodness is broader
in Charnock’s work than in that of Perkins, especially in relation to the development
of federal theology in the high orthodox period. At the same time we will also see
that Charnock nevertheless still maintains the tension and harmony of nature and
grace as the axiom of Reformed soteriology, against the arguments of the Arminians
and the Socinians that sought to modify or transform the underlying structure of the
knowledge of God. 68 To put it another way, it will be shown that all of Charnock’s
discussion can be traced back to his aim of developing a knowledge of the trinitarian
God which would embrace both theology and piety in terms of the whole works of
God’s creation, providence, and redemption ad extra.

A. Perkins on the Goodness and Patience of God

In contrast to his treatment of the other attributes of God, Perkins did not deal
much with God’s goodness in all his works. Yet, in Perkins, we can sense an
indication of the later development of the discussions in Charnock’s era. Let us
briefly examine Perkins’ statement of goodness in Golden Chaine and Cases of
Conscience. On the one hand, Perkins defines the goodness of God as “that by which
he being in himselfe absolutely good, doth freely exercise his liberalitie upon his
creatures”. 69 In the same context with this definition, he also explains the concept of
goodness in a twofold way. While “uncreated” goodness is God Himself as the
“absolutely and perfectly” good being, “created” goodness is “that whereby the
creature is made good” as the mere ‘fruit’ of essential goodness in God. 70 In a
Ramistic way, Perkins continues to divide this goodness in the creatures into a
“general or natural” and a “special or moral” goodness. The former is based upon
God’s goodness in His acts of creation, providence or in the ordination of it. The

68 Cf. Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids: Baker
69 Perkins, A Golden Chaine, in Workes I, p. 12. Perkins bases this definition upon Mat. 5:45 (“He
maketh Sunne to shine upon the good and bad, and he raineth upon the just and unjust”) and 19:17
(“Why callest thou mee good? There is none good but one, even God”).
70 Being similar to, but distinct from the way of the Reformed orthodox, Arminius focused more upon
the communication of goodness between God and the creatures within the background of a Thomistic
position. It is also notable that the Thomistic perspective emphasised the role of divine “love” as the
basis of His will for communicating goodness. See Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 192.
However, Perkins seems to be both Scotistic and Thomistic when we see both his definition of God’s
goodness in a voluntaristic way and the emphasis upon the characteristic of creatures’ goodness as
derived from his essential goodness.
latter is revealed in God’s moral law (given to the rational creature) that reflects His “eternal and unchangeable wisdom”.\(^71\)

On the other hand, in dealing with God’s patience with respect to His providential goodness, Perkins emphasises the fact that this cannot be explained without considering God’s demand for “true repentance” from all men (including practical atheists) within the English context of those days.\(^72\) That is, His long-suffering, especially seen in the remembrance of the life of the incarnate Son, should not be abused by our sins.\(^73\) Perkins also succinctly presents the relationship between His patience towards our sins and the moderation of anger in our deepening piety as follows: “So often as he sinneth hee provoketh God to cast him away, and to confound him eternally; yet the Lord is mercifull and long-suffering. … [Thus] we must do as God doth: not be angry, but fight against our affections, …”\(^74\)

In summary, we see that Perkins discussed God’s goodness and patience mainly within the boundary of the doctrine of creation and providence (without dealing with the supernatural dimension of God’s works ad extra). Nevertheless, he did not lose the major focus on the ad extra dimension in the explanation of these two attributes. In the following discussions, we will show the significance of this characteristic in Perkins more clearly by investigating Charnock’s idea of goodness and patience.

B. Charnock’s Exegesis: The Characteristics of the Summum Bonum

On the one hand, in approaching the scriptural basis of divine goodness, Charnock draws out four characteristics of goodness — as original, infinite, perfect, and immutable — by investigating the history of the exegesis of Mark 10:18.\(^75\) He asserts the importance of this essential goodness of God in that neither the notion of

\(^71\) Perkins, *Cases of Conscience*, in *Works* II, p. 2. Musculus similarly sees this division as to all creatures and to His elect in *Commonplaces of Christian Religion*, p. 953, cited in *PRRD* III, p. 505. However, despite this similarity with Musculus, Perkins seems not to view this goodness as literally extending to salvific or redemptive grace.


\(^75\) “And Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is, God.” For details, see *Works* II, pp. 275-7.
God nor His existence can be maintained without confessing it (Rom 1:20, Ps. 145:6-7). It is at once “the end of the creation” and thus the efficient cause of goodness in all creatures as the resemblance of God “the highest good” (summum bonum). That is, according to Charnock, the value of the doctrine of divine goodness lies in the fact that all of the loci — existence, nature, and works — of the doctrine of God should be founded upon this “captain attribute” as primary among the other attributes. As Muller points out, these “two corresponding systematic functions” of God’s goodness as both an essential attribute and “the primary affection of the divine will” ad extra are the important general bases of the Reformed idea of it since the Reformers.

On the other hand, in dealing with God’s patience as part of His goodness, Charnock bases his arguments upon the exegesis of Nahum 1:13. By way of definition, he makes it clear that God’s patience is the power of controlling His anger towards sin in relation to His justice — “a willingness to defer, and an unwillingness to pour forth his wrath upon sinful creatures, he moderates his provoked justice, and forbears to revenge the injuries he daily meets with in the world”. Thus we sense that this patience in Charnock’s scheme is related to the whole providential work of the righteous God prior to redemption and judgment, despite the distinction between His mercy and patience.

In brief, we have seen that the double function of divine goodness (and patience) in its essential and extraneous directions de facto represents both the Thomistic and Scotistic characteristics reflected in the Puritan and Reformed scholastic understanding of God’s attributes with firm exegetical bases. We shall frequently deal with the dialectics between the two ways in the ongoing doctrinal and

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76 Works II, pp. 280-2.
77 Works II, p. 285; see p. 282: “His wisdom then steps in to dispose the methods of what he resolved, and his power follows to execute what his wisdom hath disposed, and his goodness designed. His power in making, and his wisdom in ordering, are subservient to his goodness;” see also p. 284: “All are streams from this one fountain; he could be none of this were he not first good.”
78 PPRD III, p. 503. Nevertheless, according to Muller, although the definition of divine goodness (mentioning both essential and external dimensions) is similar between Aquinas and the Reformed orthodox, the clear tendency of emphasis upon the ad extra — “affective or volitional understanding of divine goodness” — in the Reformed also reflects a Scotistic influence on their ideas. See also ibid., p. 506. Arminius’ idea of divine goodness is much closer to the Thomistic position than the Reformed orthodox in that he stresses the “communication” of this divine goodness by our “participation”. See God, Creation, and Providence, pp. 137-8.
79 “The Lord is slow to anger, and great in power, and will not at all acquit the wicked; the Lord hath his way in the whirlwind and in the storm, and the clouds are the dust of his feet.” cf. PPRD III, p. 574; Leigh, A Systeme or Body of Divinity, II. xii, p. 299. Here Leigh also uses the same scriptural text as Charnock in examining the divine patience.
80 Works II, p. 504.
81 For example, Works II, p. 506: “[God’s patience] differs from mercy in the formal consideration of the object; mercy respects the creature as miserable, patience respects the creature as criminal.”
practical discussions of the divine goodness and patience.

C. Charnock’s Doctrine of the Goodness and Patience of God: The Integrative Understanding of the Ad Intra/Ad Extra in the Triune God and His Works

In the initial paragraph of the doctrinal section, Charnock seeks to examine the nature of this goodness on a full scale. He first notes that all creatures have a “natural” goodness, despite the fall, as the reflection of God’s goodness due to the works of creation itself. For Charnock, this shows that the motive of the divine acts of creation and providence does not stem from His mercy (to all the miserable creatures) or grace (to the rational creatures only), but rather from a goodness that is wider in its scope. He defines this goodness as the “inclination to deal well and bountifully with His creatures”. Charnock also notes that God is the only essential, supreme, and necessary good in nature and essence because of the simplicity of God Himself who diffuses it to the created world. That is, God does this as the ultimate cause of their derivative goodness to enable them to participate in His primary good.

Starting from the goodness of God, Charnock elicits various propositions. These develop his ideas concerning the doctrine of creation, citing abundant scholastic resources. He holds that the communicated goodness seen in the ad extra dimension shows particularly the “love” or affection of God emitted to all creatures, without reaching the soteriological or redemptive level. At the same time, citing the Catholic theologian Thomas Cajetan (1469-1534), Charnock insists that this divine love to the goodness of creatures evidences the intratrinitarian love of God Himself. At this point, in Charnock’s view, the relationship of goodness and love

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83 Works II, pp. 283-4.
85 Puritan and Reformed orthodoxy frequently dealt with the love of God within the boundary of His goodness, in a discussion more developed than that of the sixteenth century Reformers. This is shown in their general definition of divine love as God’s movement towards goodness or union-oriented inclination (in terms of the ad intra or extra). See PRRD III, pp. 561, 564-5. On the general tendency of Reformed orthodox thought about God’s voluntary love to the creatures divided into three dimensions (all creatures, rational creatures, the elect), see PRRD III, pp. 566-8.
86 Works II, p. 284, citing Cajetan, in Secund secundae, qu. 34. art. 3. Although it has been traditional to distinguish three kinds of intratrinitarian love in God (the love between the Father and the Son, the love of the Holy Spirit emanating both from the Father and the Son, and the love of the Father to the Son as the basis of pactum salutis), Calvin and the later Reformed orthodox theologians focused more upon the love of the trinitarian God ad extra, because of their reluctance to deal with the somewhat speculative discussion (which was frequent in the medieval scholastic treatment of it) of the ad intra
lies in the context of the relation between the divine intellect and will in His essence. In other words, we see that Charnock unfolds his argument by being clearly aware of the Thomistic position which gives priority to the intellect and goodness over the will and love. We may sense that his understanding of the divine wisdom and power in connection with the divine goodness displayed in the works of creation and providence would be located within the same context. That is to say, goodness should be grasped as the highest reason that leads divine wisdom and power to operate upon His act towards its end.

In addition Charnock stresses the fact that His necessary goodness does not conflict with His freedom, based upon the division of essential or ad intra and external or ad extra dimensions. Likewise, other attributes of God harmoniously support the outward operation of the divine will:

God is necessarily good, affective, in regard of his nature; but freely good, effective, in regard of the effluxes of it to this or that particular subject he pitcheth on. … He is an understanding agent, and hath a sovereign right to choose his own subjects. It would not be a supreme goodness, if it were not a voluntary goodness. It is agreeable to the nature of the highest good to be absolutely free, to dispense his goodness in what methods and measures he pleaseth, according to the free determinations of his own will, guided by the wisdom of his mind, and regulated by the holiness of his nature. … As it is the perfection of his nature, it is necessary; as it is the communication of his bounty, it is voluntary.

In fact this could be also construed as a delicate combination of Thomism and Scotistic voluntarism following in the general tendency of Puritan and Reformed orthodox theology. In the same way, the reason for His communication of goodness to creatures is founded upon His pleasurable will. To put it another way, God cannot be the summum bonum unless He is voluntary love or lover.

With these points in mind, Charnock defends the goodness of God (in a similar style to the discussion of the holiness we dealt with in the previous section of this chapter) at a somewhat polemical level, related both to the problems of sin and dimension of trinitarian love. We see Charnock also shows this tendency to prioritise the ad extra dimension in the love of God without missing out the importance of intratrinitarian love also.

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87 See *Works II*, p. 289: “As God is necessarily mind, so he is necessarily will; as he is necessarily knowing, so he is necessarily loving. He could not be blessed if he did not know himself, and his own perfection; nor good if he did not delight in himself and his own perfections.”
88 *Works II*, p. 292.
89 *Works II*, p. 290.
to the notion of God’s vindicative justice. In some way, this could be regarded as another of Charnock’s exquisite formal combinations of Thomism and Scotism since it addresses the divine wisdom and will in Christ’s atonement as a necessary way of penal substitution for our sins in terms of the goodness of God. If we are to sum up — on the one hand, original sin and unbelief cannot lessen the goodness of God in creation because the voluntary state of Adam and the angels before the fall was due to the very goodness itself that fully expected a “voluntary obedience” from them. God’s redeeming grace certainly reinforces the authenticity of this goodness. On the other hand, God’s justice and judgment are part of His goodness since the necessity of the law as the truth of God is confirmed and vindicated by demonstrating His will to punish sin. Furthermore, we might say that all divine attributes are also part of His goodness only on the condition of this penalty for sin. Therefore, we can say that Charnock seeks to expound divine goodness, love, and justice together by integrating all the loci of the doctrine of God in view of His trinitarian acts.

Following his own typical style of examining other attributes under the larger category of the divine intellect and His will, we meet again Charnock’s exploration of the divine exercises of this goodness according to the three dimension of His works ad extra: creation, redemption, and providence. In dealing with the goodness in creation, he first makes it clear that the end of the whole creation was not just the existence of being itself, but the goodness of the created being. In particular, the creation of humanity as spiritual beings who possess soul’s faculties is related to the higher intention of communicating His goodness to the rational creature. For Charnock, this integrity or excellency of human nature is nothing less than the image of the holy and blessed God as creator. This is especially shown in the soul’s

91 For details, see Works II, pp. 294-306. On the error of the Arminians’ idea of the general atonement against the Reformed doctrine of double predestination, based upon their own understanding of the relationship between divine justice and goodness, see PRRD III, p. 510; Muller, God, Creation, and Providence, p. 196.

92 The quotation is from Works II, p. 295; cf. ibid., p. 312.

93 See Works II, p. 302: “All of his attributes, which are parts of his goodness, engage him to punish sin; without it, his authority would be vilified, his purity stained, his power derided, his truth disgraced, his justice scorned, his wisdom slighted.” At the same time this could be inferred from Charnock’s argument concerning divine love mentioned earlier, which should be considered distinctively depending upon whether God is the creator of all creatures or the redeemer of the elect. In addition, we can sense that Charnock’s argument shows that he emphasised the characteristic of vindicatory justice as an essential attribute along with the ad extra dimension. When we consider the fact that Arminians and Socinians were criticised by Owen because of their radical Scotistic view (seeing it as the mere attribute of the ad extra) of vindicatory justice, Muller’s appraisal of Owen’s criticism as an attempt at Thomistic “neutralization” also corresponds to Charnock’s case here. See PRRD III, pp. 490-1; Owen, Dissertation on Divine Justice, in The Works of John Owen, vol. 10, pp. 481-624.
faculties of clear understanding and free will. Human beings are the only dually characterised creatures located between the creator and other creatures.\footnote{Works II, pp. 308, 310.} Despite being mentioned earlier in a similar pattern in relation to other attributes, the goodness of God is also seen in the fact that God has made human nature “naturally righteous” enough for man to obey the law engraved in his/her heart at the time of creation. This is in order to give the reasonable condition of “eternal happiness” to humanity through the covenant of works.\footnote{See Works II, pp. 310-6.} Nevertheless, at this point, Charnock clearly asserts the limit of God’s “natural goodness” after the fall since it cannot give a “supernatural happiness” but merely a “natural happiness”.\footnote{Works II, p. 317.} As has been usual with his basic attitude, this shows that Charnock emphasises the radical gap between nature and grace in the level at which true felicity is enjoyed. At the same time he does not devalue the work of creation in that it is the foundation of the larger goodness of God based upon His eternal decree.\footnote{E.g. Works II, p. 317: “God might have created man only for a natural happiness, according to the perfection of his natural faculties, and dealt bountifully with him, if he had never intended him a supernatural blessedness and an eternal recompence; but what a largeness of goodness is here, to design man in his creation for so rich a blessedness as an eternal life, with the fruition of himself!” To be sure the grace of God was also dealt with in the Puritan and the Reformed scholastics as one of the branches of His goodness. Broadly speaking, the Protestant camp saw the concept of gratia not as some kind of quality (despite that grace changes the quality of the faculties of the soul in relation to the concept of habitus), but as the supernatural favour of God irrespective of human merit, against the view of medieval scholastics. At the same time seventeenth century orthodox theologians also possessed the idea of the objects of the wider coverage of God’s grace (beyond the elect). See PRRD III, p. 570. On the detailed treatment of this grace in relation to the law and the covenant of works, see Won Taek Lim, The Covenant Theology of Francis Roberts (Chungnam: King & Kingdom, 2002); E. F. Kevan, The Grace of Law: A Study of Puritan Theology (London: Carey Kingsgate Press, 1963). Thus, although Charnock here contrasts nature and grace, yet it also reflects his underlying idea of nature as a kind of “grace” in all of His works, which is the prerequisite of larger grace based upon His infinite goodness and wisdom.}

In approaching the doctrine of divine goodness in redemption, Charnock sees the need to underscore the fact that it stems from the goodness of the whole Trinity — i.e., he observes that the office and the work of each person in the trinitarian God are more clearly revealed in the work of redemption.\footnote{See Works II, p. 319: “In this [goodness of redemption] there are distinct functions: the grace of the Father, the merit of the Son, and the efficacy of the Spirit. The Father makes the promise of redemption, the Son seals it with his blood, and the Spirit applies it.”} Charnock also holds that the goodness of the redemptive work is higher than that of creation because the whole human being is restored by the sacrifice of the Son, through the operation of the renewal of the soul’s faculties of intellect and will. With this in mind, Charnock focuses on explaining the relation between the goodness of God and the merit of
Christ as the means of redemption. He states:

Divine goodness only, without the association of any merit, not only of man, but of the Redeemer himself, begat the first purpose of our recovery. He was singled out and predestinated to be our redeemer, before he took our nature to merit our redemption. … The love of God to the world was first in intention and the order of nature, before the will of giving his Son to the world. His intention of saving was before the mission of a Saviour, so that this affection rose not from the merit of Christ, but the merit of Christ was directed by this affection.99

To put it another way, although Christ’s dying was voluntary, it was subordinate to the eternal good will of the Father in the light of the order of the intratrinitarian relationship among the divine persons. This also shows that Charnock thinks that the Father’s will to predestinate Christ as our mediator and redeemer evidences the priority of the goodness of God over the merit of Christ obtained by atonement.100 Therefore, for Charnock, God’s goodness is the foundational attribute for understanding the work of redemption. Even so, in this goodness shown in redemption, God reveals much more of His image than He does in creation by giving Christ the Son to us, as Charnock writes: “[God] gave himself in creation to us, in the image of his holiness, but in redemption he gave himself in the image of his person.”101 In some way, there is a sense in which Charnock stresses the fact that the incarnation has de facto implications for both the creation and the redemption of human being — the sanctification of our nature in the imitation of the God-human. Therefore, as was the case where he deals with the other attributes, we find that Charnock firmly maintains his interest in the trinitarian and christological backgrounds (of the goodness of God in redemption) in terms of both the ad intra in its eternal dimension and the ad extra in its temporal dimension.

Above all, in considering the balance of his discussion, Charnock seems to

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99 Works II, p. 323.
100 How one understands the meaning of the “necessity” of the incarnation and Christ’s atonement differs within the Reformed camp, depending upon whether one accepts Anselmian theory or not. For instance, according to Muller’s view, Scotus, Calvin, Twisse, and Rutherford opposed the “ultimate necessity” of the Anselmian view by way of prioritising the sovereign will of the Father or the absolute freedom of God. Yet Owen and Turretin regarded this necessity as ultimate, based upon its significance as the soteriological assumption for the arguments. See PRRD III, pp. 494-5; cf. Owen, Dissertation on Divine Justice, in Works 10, pp. 586-607; Turretin, Institutes, vol. 1, iii, 19, pp. 234-41. Charnock seems to take an eclectic position between the two views, but is at the same time closer to the Scotistic position that emphasises the intratrinitarian order. See Charnock, The Knowledge of Christ Crucified; idem, Christ Our Passover; idem, The Voluntariness of Christ’s Death; idem, The Acceptableness of Christ’s Death, in Works IV, pp. 494-586.
101 Works II, pp. 326-7. Italics are mine.
regard the covenant of grace as the most outstanding benefit for the elect as the manifestation of divine goodness in its redemptive aspect. The goodness of God in the new covenant, founded upon “the firmness of divine love” and the merit of Christ, makes it possible for Him to imprint a “gracious heart” in the sinner in his/her conversion.\textsuperscript{102} Even so, this evangelical covenant necessarily needs the conditions of both faith and repentance. On the basis of this assumption, it is notable that Charnock seeks especially to account for faith as the condition of entering the covenant, viewed in terms of a relationship made between God and the elect through the goodness of God. Only faith as a “full submission” can link us with the Son who is the object of that faith, because divine goodness appointed Christ as the mediator between God and the elect.\textsuperscript{103} As a matter of fact, this displays Charnock’s balanced understanding of the divine goodness in the new covenant by considering its bilateral aspects.\textsuperscript{104} Of course we find, once again, Charnock stressing that only the person who possesses trinitarian knowledge of God in faith and repentance can receive the covenantal benefit of His goodness.\textsuperscript{105}

Similarly Charnock examines the significance of the sacraments, especially the Lord’s Supper, as the visible element of divine goodness within the context of the covenant of grace.\textsuperscript{106} Above all, Charnock relates the value of the Eucharist to the sanctification or “beautification” of the soul’s faculties as well as to the strengthening of our faith. He comments, “Neither of [Bread and the wine] lose their substance, but both acquire a sanctification by the relation they have to that which they represent, … In those God offers … a blood that can wash away our sins, and beautify our souls.”\textsuperscript{107} Specifically, God shows His goodness by giving the Eucharist as a means of sanctification, which is also a “dual sealing” of the new covenant. First, such sealing is given to those who receive it “by the efficacy of the Spirit”, to their consolation, assurance, and confidence in God on the condition of faith in the merit

\textsuperscript{102}Works II, p. 332.
\textsuperscript{103}Works II, p. 338.
\textsuperscript{104}E.g. Works II, p. 339: “The new covenant is a marriage covenant, Hosea ii. 16, 19, 20, which implies a consent on our parts, as well as a consent on God’s part; that is no marriage that hath not the consent of both parties.” For a representative analysis of this area in the Anglo-American Puritan context especially related to the bilateral aspect of Reformed covenant thought, see John Von Rohr, The Covenant of Grace in Puritan Thought (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), esp. pp. 1-33, 53-85.
\textsuperscript{105}See Works II, p. 336: “He hath revealed a trinity of persons in their distinct offices in the business of redemption, without which revelation of a trinity we could not have a right notion and scheme of redeeming grace.”
\textsuperscript{107}Works II, p. 342.
of Christ’s blood.\textsuperscript{108} Second, according to Charnock, we can consider this sealing in the light of the \textit{pactum salutis} along with a trinitarian background as well. He states:

The articles of the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son, agreed on from eternity, were accomplished on Christ’s part by his death, on the Father’s part by his resurrection; … The covenant of grace, founded upon this covenant of redemption, is sealed in the sacrament. God owns his standing to the terms of it, as sealed by the blood of the Mediator, by representing him to us under those signs, and gives us a right upon faith to the enjoyment of the fruits of it;\textsuperscript{109}

Therefore, in Charnock’s view, God’s goodness in this covenantal or sacramental sealing also leads us to a “union and communion with Christ” as the object of our “justifying and sanctifying” faith through the work of the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{110} There then follows the goodness of the believer, superior to that of Adam — and the believer is now responsible for seeking to realise God’s original motive of creation by his own pursuit of holiness.\textsuperscript{111} In other words, in Charnock’s schema, our holiness and goodness coalesce in the doctrine of sanctification based upon redemptive works accomplished and continuously applied to the life of faith and repentance. The enactment of the sacrament based upon His covenantal relationship with us confirms the divine goodness both hidden in the eternal decree and revealed in the extraneous acts of the trinitarian God for the fulfillment of redemption.

Also in considering divine goodness in providence (somewhat repetitive of previous discussions related to the government of God) Charnock concentrates on the aspect of God’s being “the Saviour of all men (1 Tim. 4:10)” who maintains the “beauty” of the creatures as the cosmos, “a comely world”.\textsuperscript{112} Within this context, goodness is also seen in His permission of temptations, sin, and evils as the governor of them. This ultimately guides us to victory in spiritual struggle, which yields a better faith, a renewed heart through the means of grace, “the greatest communion with God”, and “the service of God” as the very end of human creation and our own goodness devoted to this end.\textsuperscript{113} At the same time, God’s long-suffering towards

\textsuperscript{108} Quotation from \textit{Works II}, p. 343.
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Works II}, p. 343.
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Works II}, p. 344.
\textsuperscript{111} See \textit{Works II}, p. 347: “Man hath not yet enjoyed the creature in the first intention of them; sin made an interruption in that fruition. As redemption restores man to his true end, so it restores the creatures to their true use.”
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Works II}, pp. 348, 352.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Works II}, pp. 360-4. On the general tendency of the Reformed orthodox idea of this providential
transgressors is also related to His providential goodness. Thus, in the doctrinal section concerning God’s patience, Charnock focuses on His goodness in this hamartiological aspect. While noting the nature of the divine patience revealed in the christological manifestation as our mediator, Charnock defends God’s patience in relation to its harmony with the other attributes. This harmony is founded upon the soteriologically oriented providential wisdom of God, as Charnock says:

Since God hath glorified his justice on Christ as a surety for sinners, his patience is so far from interfering with the rights of his justice, that it promotes it. It is dispensed to this end, that God might pardon with honour, both upon the score of purchased mercy and contented justice; that, by a penitent sinner’s return, his mercy might be acknowledged free, and the satisfaction of his justice by Christ be glorified in believing.

That is, for Charnock, the idea of goodness in creation and redemption is amalgamated in the wider discussion of the providential goodness of the Triune God as both governor and the judge of the universe and history.

In summary, we have seen that Charnock’s doctrinal formulation of divine goodness is basically oriented ad extra. Nevertheless, for Charnock, the goodness of the Triune God from eternity to the end of history is immutable in every respect because the christological foundation of both the decree and its execution penetrates the centre of the federal relationship between God and the elect.

D. Charnock’s Praxis concerning the Goodness and Patience of God:
The Pursuit of the Knowledge of the “Prime Attribute”

In this section, Charnock again endeavours to expound both the harmony of the divine attributes and the primacy of goodness as the ground of true religion. In other words, he argues that only a clear knowledge of the importance of God’s goodness can bridge doctrine or theology and practice or piety by way of drawing each doctrinal locus into our true knowledge of God as a consistent system. He thus initially notes the importance of the goodness of God. It is an interposed doctrine between God’s existence (as the initial doctrine of the theological system) and

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114 Works II, p. 509: “God discovered not his grace but in Christ, and therefore discovered not his patience but in Christ; it is in him he met with the satisfaction of his justice, that he might have ground for the manifestation of his patience.”

115 Works II, p. 512. Also see ibid., p. 524: “He is solicited by his justice, directed by his omniscience, and armed with judgments to vindicate himself, but his arm is restrained by patience.”
Christ’s second coming (as final or eschatological), which saving faith rests upon. Charnock also elaborates the relation between the necessity of the Triune God’s self-love in terms of the *ad intra*, which is founded upon His own goodness, and the “powerful and free” emission of it to the created world *ad extra*. Therefore, conversely, this divine love and goodness based upon both the intratrinitarian and the external dimension demand our faith and obedience, that is, as *fides caritates formata* within the covenantal union of goodness between God and the elect. To be sure, in Charnock’s view, this covenantal obligation is not a speculative, but a practical knowledge of divine goodness accompanied by the operations of the understanding, affection, and will. In some way, the goodness of God is related to the problem of assurance because goodness also provides the pre-cognitive (next to His existence but prior to Scripture) foundation of our theology as the knowledge of God. Charnock states:

> The principle foundation of faith is not the word of God, but God himself, and God as considered in this perfection. … If God be not first believed to be good, he would not be believed at all in anything that he speaks or swears. … The divine perfection gives credit to the divine promises; they of themselves would not be a sufficient ground of trust, without an apprehension of his truth; nor would his truth be very comfortable, without a belief of his good will, whereby we are assured, that what he promises to give he gives liberally, free, and without regret.

That is, Charnock seeks to show the character of the goodness of God as the object of our pursuit of the knowledge of God by the motion of both intellect and will — God as the supreme good should be the “object of [our] desire” and we ought to use all our faculties of the soul in order to know and to love Him. Thus, both the frequent meditation on His goodness through the Word and the imitation of it through the

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117 *Works* II, p. 379: “His goodness is his Godhead, Rom. i. 20. By his Godhead is meant his goodness: if he loves his Godhead for itself, he loves his goodness for itself. He would not be good if he did not love himself; … Self-love upon this account is the only prerogative of God;” also p. 387: “God’s loving himself doth not make him good, but supposeth him good. He was good in the order of nature, before he loved himself, and his being good was the ground of his loving himself, …”
118 *Works* II, p. 384.
121 *Works* II, p. 392.
example of Christ are indispensable to this quest of piety. In a similarly pietistic context, Charnock also stresses the danger of humanity’s abuse of God’s goodness and long-suffering patience regarding our sin, because the federal relationship between God and the elect can only be maintained through repentance as the result of His long-suffering.

In brief, for Charnock, the pursuit of the knowledge of the divine goodness is closely related to the growth of theological virtues that necessarily accompany the act of all the faculties of the soul. The dual emphases of both the Thomistic aspect of His goodness as the middle term of our theology (between the existence of God and Scripture) and the Scotistic or voluntaristic aspect of human participation confirm Charnock’s eclectic combination of theology and piety without losing both the balance and tension of our trinitarian knowledge of God as a “system”.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the doctrine of God’s attributes as the exercise of His will was consistently important to Perkins, in the period of early orthodoxy, and to Charnock, in the period of high orthodoxy. This is especially true in terms of providing a moral basis of coherence for Puritan piety and its theological system within the boundary of the discussion of the true knowledge of God. The continuity of the emphasis upon the doctrine of sanctification was maintained from Perkins to Charnock, although Charnock developed the doctrinal or polemical discussions for the defence of the orthodox theological system as unified loci, against the challenge of the new intellectual milieu in the mid and later seventeenth century. Yet both Perkins and Charnock pursued arguments resisting the dissolution and reorganisation of each doctrinal locus. The critical reason for this pursuit in Perkins and Charnock is that the orthodox theological framework, particularly in terms of its anthropological, christological, covenantal, and trinitarian coherence, was important to them — it was, indeed, for them the very foundation of the grace of our sanctification. Charnock did not lose the Puritan characteristic of a “heart theology” pointing to the beautification or purification of the psychological faculties or, for that matter, the scholastic or traditional background of these discussions.

We also have discovered that the doctrine of God’s goodness and patience

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122 See Works II, pp. 392-9, 538-44.
was extended to redemptive or supernatural considerations in Charnock, although Perkins confined it to the area of creation and providence. This could be interpreted as another developed or eclectic way of combining Thomism and Scotism in the dispute with the Socinians related to the appropriate distinctions within the essential and external dimensions of God’s goodness. Yet the traditional scheme of nature and grace based upon the trinitarian foundation remains the same. According to the result of our investigation, this phenomenon was arguably due to the development of federal theology in later Puritan and Reformed orthodox thought that sought to consolidate the relationship of the eternal or *ad intra* and the temporal or *ad extra* dimensions as the foundation of our knowledge of the Triune God, which ought to be the true worshipping of God. That is, we can conclude that this final chapter (directly related to the doctrine of sanctification) confirms, in fact, the statement that Charnock’s fourfold structure of high orthodoxy — irrespective of the aspect of theological content — is not the result of scholastic speculation deeply influenced by Aristotelian philosophy. The essential “ontological or metaphysical” basis of trinitarian theology should not be regarded as “impersonal abstraction”. There is much clearer evidence to suggest that it is representative of the inseparability of a Trinitarian system of theology and piety (based upon the important relationship between faith and obedience), along with the defence of divine simplicity so characteristic of later Puritan and Reformed orthodox thought.
Chapter Eight

Concluding Remarks

We need, now, to return to the comments of Colin Gunton and Tudur R Jones cited in the first chapter of this thesis, concerning Stephen Charnock’s thought, in order to draw some conclusions. Using a “negative” understanding of the relationship between the Trinity and the divine attributes in the “classical” doctrine of God (as explained in our introductory investigation of the historical background) Gunton has argued that Charnock’s account of the divine attributes does not reflect a dynamic relationship with the “act and being” of the Trinitarian God: that is, the God Who is the revealer of the gospel as the story of the history of salvation in Scripture. This, in Gunton’s view, was because Charnock was unable to overcome the limitations of a traditional “negative theology” influential since Pseudo-Dionysius. Gunton even argued that Charnock’s work was based upon a structure of “metaphysical causality” with “Neoplatonic and analogical rather than biblical” tendencies which do not explain the positive or personal relationship between the Triune God and creatures.\(^1\) Jones criticised Charnock’s work because it had moved away from pure Puritan thought towards the realm of rationalism and scholasticism by conceiving the covenant of redemption without an adequate Scriptural basis.\(^2\)

However, according to the findings of our investigation into Perkins’ and Charnock’s ideas of theological prolegomena, Scripture, and the doctrine of God’s existence and attributes in the foregoing chapters, these criticisms turn out to be seriously problematic. This has been clearly shown, in the basic unfolding structure of our thesis, by a comparative examination of the doctrinal loci used by Charnock and Perkins in terms of continuity, difference, and development. We have seen that Perkins’ idea of these doctrinal areas \textit{de facto} provides the form and content of trinitarian theology and piety on the basis of the doctrine of divine simplicity. In other words, we have affirmed how the scholastic background was amalgamated into


Charnock’s Reformed orthodox theological system of the trinitarian knowledge of God as a tool or method, along with a “Puritan” piety that emphasised the regeneration and sanctification of the elect. Clearly this trinitarian system has a biblical foundation in terms of covenantal and christological foci in eternal or ad intra and temporal or ad extra dimensions.

As was the case with Perkins, the role of both the Scripture and its interpretation was consolidated in Charnock’s work through arguments involving a tension and harmony between subjective revelation (knowledge of Christ as the object of our saving faith) and the role of ancillary reason in eliciting doctrinal conclusions from it. This is evidence that Charnock’s thought was neither rationalistic nor unscriptural, but rather established a vital tension and harmony of grace and nature as was the case in wider Puritan and later Reformed scholastic theology. In addition, we have seen that the use of the scholastic term habitus based upon the theory of faculty psychology and the dialectics of Thomism and Scotism was remarkable in Charnock’s work. The relationship of intellect and will, essence (being) and act, eternity and time, and theology and piety are complex but can be understood against the background of their scholarly context. He also appropriated the traditional faculty psychology as a necessary means of explaining aspects of the whole of “eternal life,” while at the same time maintaining the tradition of Perkins and the English Puritan “heart” theology. For Charnock, this was nothing less than the believer’s incessant pursuit of the true knowledge of the Triune God Who wants His creatures to desire to worship and communicate with Him.

In effect, the development of the fourfold structure (exegetical, doctrinal, polemical, and practical) of Charnock’s writings, from Perkins’ Ramistic frame of faith and obedience, was related to the pursuit of a more solid “trinitarian” theological system. This, in turn, maintained the doctrine of divine simplicity and a defence of the merit of pietistic efforts against the attempts of the Socinians to dissolve the interconnectedness of each doctrinal locus related reciprocally as part of the wider trinitarian “system” of the full doctrine of God. In other words, the formal or structural developments in Charnock’s works are, rather, the evidence of a fundamental continuity with Perkins’ thought. This, in turn, has already been verified as being in continuity with Calvin’s thought as the prototype of Reformed theology. Above all, Jones’ criticism of Charnock’s work on the covenant of redemption is undoubtedly due to his failure to notice the mid or later seventeenth century orthodox theologians’ dual efforts: Charnock and the Reformed scholastics sought to reinforce
both the ontological and economic (creation, providence, and redemption) bases of the orthodox theological system along with a characteristic of Puritans’ profound interest in the doctrine of God’s attributes in terms of both piety and sanctification. The development of federal theology beyond Perkins in Charnock’s work in terms of a greater attention to the historical dimensions (i.e. focusing on the history of redemption) is further evidence of the high orthodox Puritan effort to reinforce the theological bases of the intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions.

Furthermore, contra Gunton’s criticism of Charnock, Charnock’s discussions of God’s attributes were not a mere speculation engrossed in the ad intra dimension of negative theology, but rather reached the “theological zenith” of the English Puritan elaborative genre in the later seventeenth century by concentrating all of the doctrinal loci into the locus de Deo. This means that the Puritans’ doctrine of the attributes of God focusing rather upon the ad extra dimension effectively dispels the suspicion that Reformed scholasticism is a derivative of rigid Aristotelian rationalism. The defence of God’s sovereignty, freedom, and the monergistic soteriological framework in the trinitarian system of our knowledge of God was carried on in Charnock’s thought. The role of human freedom and contingency along with the appropriate recognition of divine causality was not neglected.

Therefore, we would conclude this thesis by saying that the key point to notice in our research is the “historical or intellectual” context of Charnock (and Perkins) in the Reformed orthodox period in terms of the development of the history of theology. The Barthian or “postliberal” interpretation of the “classical” doctrine of God, including that of the Reformed scholastics, is based upon the legacy of Harnack’s view of the history of doctrine, and so seems to miss the point. Contrary to the contentions of Gunton and Jones, in their theology Charnock and the later Puritans in high orthodoxy resisted the intrusion of “rationalism”. Charnock’s “scholasticism” should not, in fact, be a barrier to our understanding the essence and content of his theological system as Scripture-based. At the same time, especially in the case of Charnock, there is instead a consolidation of the “systematic” relatedness

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3 J. I. Packer also rightly comments as follows: “Charnock displays God’s attributes as qualities observable in the concrete actions of the living God of which the Bible speaks. The technical terms, and sometimes, arguments of scholastic theology are employed, but always with a biblical orientation. Charnock has no desire to speculate but only to declare the works and ways, the nature and character, of the God of the Bible,” in Joel Beeke and Randall Gleason, Meet the Puritans: with a Guide to Modern Reprints (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2006), p. 145, cited from The Encyclopedia of Christianity, ed. Erwin Falbusch and Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), vol. 2, p. 411.
of trinitarian theology as our knowledge of God and the doctrine of God’s attributes. This was in order to expound more clearly the essence and act of the three persons of the Trinity in the unity of the Divine nature within the context of the rational creature’s communion with the creator. The theological struggle towards full salvation through “wholehearted Christianity” was the “vision” of Charnock (and Perkins) as Reformed “scholastic” Puritans. This should not be considered as mere “Hellenized theism” simply because it rests on the basis of the inheritance of an Augustinian “content” and a Christian Aristotelian “method”. Through our case study of trinitarianism and the doctrine of the divine attributes we have uncovered a sophisticated and comprehensive understanding of the relationship of historical theology and Christian doctrine as a core “system” of faith based upon the original gospel.4

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