Thesis on

The Origin of Ideas. April. 1854 A.D.
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Vitilest in intellectus quod non facie fuerit in sensu — nempe nisi intellectus ipse.
The word Idea, according to the Speculative Philosophy of the day, expresses the objects, notions, conceptions, &c. with which the Intellectual Power of Man, are exercised; whether they be those primitive ideas immediately presented to the Mind, or secondary ones produced by the complex actions of our Intelligence on its primary conceptions:—in a word, "whatever the Understanding may have for its object." An Essay on the "Origin of Ideas" is therefore an attempt to answer the question—Whence is it that the objects of the Intellectual faculty are derived? What is the source of the object of Perception, Attention, Memory, Reflection, Imagination, Reasoning, Judgement, &c. &c.? In other words, whence is it that we acquire an knowledge:—for all knowledge is the mass of notions, which the mind forms of Things, no matter what resemblance or not, there may be between the Thing conjoined to the notion or idea the intelligence has of it, or by what medium—where medium is at all granted—the communication is maintained, which induces the mind situated somewhere or another, to have a correspondent perception of things, with the senses, at the periphery. However boundless a complication the enquiry may appear to the uninitiated, we have only to approach it near to nearly, when we find it has a simplicity about it equal
to its interest. The issue incapable as it may seem of such a limitation is narrowed to the alternative—

innate or dependent on experience.

It would be as superfluous to work over the old problem, as an attempt at new argument would be presumption. The controversy is settled, therefore, without begging the question; it may be at once stated, that Ideas, as above defined, are derived from experience, are objects furnished to the intellect proper through sensation, and unanimous verdict of metaphysicians is aptly expressed in the celebrated maxim of the schools nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu. The task I wish to propose to myself is to try to show, that any opposition to this theory has been more apparent than real; that there has been a misunderstanding about words, not a difference of opinion; that it has never been held by any onethinkable to many, that Ideas, understood as objects existing of the intellect proper, are innate; that Plato and Locke so far from being opposed to each other, may be considered as a continuation of each other. The former professedly the true doctrine of the intellect proper, called it an idea or an idea of an idea of an idea, of a nearest; the latter the doctrine of the object of the intellect proper, of Ideas in one sense of the word; innate or innate dependent on experience.
the two both together, in first a second part of one volume as it were, unfolding to us the nature of the laws of the whole intellectual being of man — of intelligence and knowledge — our educated intellect properly may so speak. That those therefore who have arrayed Plato against Locke, in antagonism, must have mistaken the one or the other — perhaps both; those writing against the former from misusing his doctrine, putting their argument in ridicule, have cannon charged with the manner of brute acquaintance squading against an army of phantoms: those opposed to him from misusing Locke, committing a blind suicide, or else wilfully inverting the doctrine, have used his good name to fill suspicion against an incision, attempt to undermine religion, by substituting in all sorts of the same sort idea arguments against one meaning of idea, the same argument against another meaning of idea, thus endeavoring taking up this ground in a sliding mediate, they were able to support their argument, by a force of reasoning of accumulation of illustrative detail, by which all sound principles must be supported necessarily accused, but which if the general principle be false, it only makes its fall still more complete, as soon as discussion and analysis have been brought to test it. Thus
Descartes better read in Lockian than in Plato, forgetting the different signification which in the course of time came to be attached to the word "idea," expounds every clause of argumental evidence in demolishing Plato's innate ideas under the hallucination that he meant innate knowledge not intelligently, while Condillac on the other hand better read in Plato than in Locke. He misunderstands Locke (most likely never read him) supposing that he meant by "idea," the same as Plato, declare, that the "minds itself, the intellect proper independent in sensation in its being." Had he brought this forward as an independent, but many of his would have had simply to adopt it, but when he proclaims himself the disciple of Locke, "anti-didactic might justly mingle with our argument" because not all minor considerations yield to the dignified sentiment caused against the man who both the Encyclopedists and the followers of Locke into dispute, not only on the continent but even at home. And is not such a doctrine incompatible with a belief in the immortality of the soul, it is most invidiously, which, while by an abuse of the arguments of "the Essay on the Human Understanding," turned them against religion, used the name of Locke like Montaigne's silver veil to hide the hidous beneath
If then innate Ideas be not, one of the themes, on the Origin of Ideas, but a separate system of Ideas, is not their consideration included from this paper by the definition of Idea with which the paper commenced. We have by that definition to do with knowledge not Intelligence? The exclusion however, is only of definition, and not natural, as it was never meant to imply a specific signification, had gradually come to be attached to a word having a generic sense when first used. Ideas once meant the intellect itself, its objects. An essay on their origin would take both into consideration: and any one who would write the present would be presumed to do so still, although according to strict letter, the latter are only signified: to make the clear translate the title of this essay into French, "sur l'origine de nos connaissances," "connaissance," at once embraces the intellect itself, its objects, that is what our English in reality mean by that when we use it in reference to the "origin of Ideas," only on account of the specific sense attached to the word. Distinct from retaining the same connotation, by dividing it to discriminate it by a separate specific meaning, the use by the latter exclude the consideration of the intellect itself from an essay like the present. Keeping these facts, opinions in mind, as a companion to it...
I will now fairly start on my journey, to trace out the sources and history of the various theories, of ideas, or rather the primary developments of the same theory, beginning with an attempt to deduce from my notes, the essay mentally sublimed over into my own words, accompanied by a running commentary to enable me to interlace any opinion of my own that may be evolved, without interfering with those offending "Ts," which any other mode of procedure would necessitate.

Abstract questioning, like the present here conveyed, are recognized even in the mind of the child, as soon as the simplest modicum of culture has caused its latent consciousness to turn the mind in upon itself, with an unfailing curiosity. We may expect, then to find among the most ancient nations, even in their rudest conditions, some traces however vague, of the agitation of a metaphysical question like the present. India, however, is the only ancient nation of the first days of antiquity, from which we have been enabled to derive any confidence on that point. In their metaphysical works, Sir William Jones, Schlegel, Calef, and other Oriental scholars, tell us, that there are not the mere rudiments, but the perfectly elaborated and fully developed counterpart, of all the great systems.
of Philosophy, in latter times, successively formulated by Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Arcesilaus, De Carte, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, & the Scottish School of Common Sense. Thus in the Sankhya of Kapila, the head of the oldest sect of commentators on the Vedanta, we find according to Sir W. Jones, the metaphysical system of Plato. again; but as Conin says, that it exclusively develops the theory of Sensation, there was a lot to reconcile. Sir W. Jones could only have meant that part of it which bore on theology, which do not strictly teach the immortality & immateriality of the soul. This doctrine of Sensation there is the counterpart of Locke's, although Cousin seems to have viewed it in the same light as Condillac believed Locke's. He agrees with Rattray, as making the soul dependent on sensation. Therefore by implication finite, for in his words of that Epicurean joke Leo X: "redit in nihilum quod est. nusque facit nihil." The next founder of a philosophical sect in India is Goutama. His system is called the Gyana or logical, being a system of metaphysical logic, more in conformity with the common sense of mankind than any other of Indian growth. It admits the actual existence of material substances, in the popular acceptance of the word, which is a great point gained in the prosecution of this doctrine on the laws of ideas.
Besides comprising a body of sublime ethics & a refined psychology, Proclus applies the syllogistic method of reasoning
with distinct names, for the artificial divisions of a proposition. As this essay will avoid entering into the
discussion about the derivation of the civilization of Greece from the East, it might be thought out of place
to mention it at all, but there is a tradition connected
with Zoroastrianism so pertinent to the question that
before going any further I cannot refrain from giving it
a mention. By Prof. F. W. Doherty, "Not in the
Punjab & other Persian Provinces, it is commonly reported
that among the Indian barbarians which Paulinus, trans
mitted to his Uncle was a technical system of logic
which the Zoroastrians had communicated to the Persians,
Greek & which Mohammedan Writers suppose to have
been the groundwork of the celebrated Mediation.
Be this as it may, though it clearly shows that the Hindu
Mind is capable of attaining the highest realization of
Mental excellence, that if art & science were reached in
India, the perfection which it attained in Greece, it was
not that the Grecian Intellect was of a higher type than
in India, but that the free institutions & popular religion
of the Hellenic race were more conducive to the vigorous
enhancement of thought & the development of a refined
civilization, man the political and incidental despotisms of the East. With whatever natural capabilities reason may endow a race, it avails not, when overthrown by the double tyranny that India has ever been subject to, an immediate masterhood and satrapic independence of the central power, for such in fact the rapah nefs of India really were, despite the imposing sound of "The Mogul Empire" and the uncontrived power created by the Emperors Babar and Akbar. The root of the evil no doubt lay in the tyranny of the domestic relations, the father, as was the petty despot of the earth, to strengthen their authority, they concentrated in a single hand the power of joint consciences with the king and priest, but these again reacted on their suicidal catastrophe. More to quiver says, "Men first make the institutions, then the institutions make the man." Religion being administered by a caste, it was but in the natural course of things that immorality should result. When woman became an object of unbridled lust, it was a matter of a slave, detestable by nature, and sworn among men of all influences, tactics, that in the evils which result, it is not worse for these faith in God than in our fellow men. To seek the

luckily contingent conditions a not to a law of
nature must be attributed the inferiority of the Doctrine to the Greek. This development was arrested by a light from without, not from inherent weakness.

In opposition to the statement that family tyranny is the great support of the despotism of government, let which Turkey, India, and China offer such palpable illustrations, the example of Rome may be cited; but could those Roman sons have become truly free, who so tamely betrayed their Republic to servile bondage to the imperial yoke of the Caesars.

To turn, however, to the Schools of India, the least of the famous of them is that of Nyasa and Janini whose several systems are distinguished by the names of the first being Mimanta, a word which like Nyaya, denotes the operation or conclusion of reason about its object, although Nyasa now is more commonly called the Vedānta, being composed of a series of acquisitions or texts, taken from the Vedas. The Vedānta furnishes a doctrine, analagous to those of China, or Plato among the Greeks, which have been elaborated in this country by Berkeley. Nyasa holds, perceptibility, existence as convertible terms, that matter is composed of figure and penetrability, and has no essence independent of mental perception and that all appearance is illusory.
But is the metaphysics of Pygmae erroneous from running into a wild spiritualism, the Buddhists have equally committed themselves to a false position by a diametrically opposite course. In saying the existence of Spirit altogether, a belief that Matter alone exists. Thus in the Six Philosophic Schools of India we find confused all the metaphysics of the old academy the Stoic & the Lyccean. Is it possible that they could have been independently evolved in Greece? It could be impossible without innate knowledge, but as innate knowledge could not err as we only out of these, the system can be the true one, five of them at least must have sprung from some other source. But from whence imported? from Egypt or Asia? Metaphysical philosophy never seems to have been indigenous to Egypt, was certainly never naturalized there. We must incline them next to India, through the channel of Persia & Assyria, the Greek architects. Sir W. Jones says "that it is not possible to doubt read the Vedanta without believing that Pythagoras & Plato derived their sublime doctrines from Eastern Fountain." An intimate communication through Assyria was of much later date than has generally been supposed, as shown in modern times, a commerce in their materials, always
the premiss of a commerce in the meditative idea or model of thought of nations. In fact, at least the influence was direct. Layard in his great work on Assyrian states, that it is related to Greece, that Seneca cheek actually built a temple at Athens in corroboration of his own mighty deeds. This is a most curious fact. Believing, then, that the Greeks received their first impulse from the Eastern Schools, let us proceed to record the development these systems underwent in their new conditions. It was a maxim of every sect of Ancient Philosophers that nothing could proceed from nothing—

"ex nihilo non stet nisi in quinque milia annis." Rhetoric, whichrosse

mean de velut, tum quad dequimur, jam est cuir societe perpetuam. To avoid therefore what they thought the absurdity of a creation from nothing, they were obliged to hold the eternity of matter, whether it were (a) an absolute or independent eternity of matter; (b) or an emanation from the essence of the Creator or taught by the Brahmins, Sphren or Pythagoras, or with any positive surely the Buddhists or (c) partly by a belief in the non-existence of a material world or idealism. But if matter be eternal is it also unintelligible? Epicurus was content with Chance—as an arranging force; but other ways, that intelligence being as demonstrable.
as matter itself, because without the former the latter could not be, were forced to admit a principle of intelligence. From the union of the Intelligent with Chaos, etc. the universe produced. The voidly passive matter being unfolded into all the variety of beauty, being, by the plastic energy of the Intelligent Agent. But is it not this a creation from nothing, in words only, does it differ from the Mosai tradition? The dogma gigni de nihil nihil shows its own falsity, by the absurdity of the self-contradiction to which it leads. Mythogurus say, That matter before acted on by the Intelligent Principle may be compared to the material numbers before they are turned visibly fique. Thus Unity — one — Unity an abstract conception resembling incorporeal matter or nothing, one a thing — capable of being numbered, judged or reflected on. Matter then is not, till acted on by intelligence, is not this simply creation from nothing? But that is a discussion alien to this path. I have only thus by circumlocution introduced it the more palpably than could have in any other way alone, what was ancienly meant by the Word Idea at this furnishing a key for the better understanding of their theories on the origin of Ideas. No one, not all
This means that Matter is the expression of the material expression of a spiritual intelligence or an idea. That idea must of course have been innate. Monad is the symbol of God. Nature is the expression of God in fact. According to the Platonist theology, 2, anticipated in some measure by Plato, Nature is created by the Word or Wisdom of God: for says Plato, the Universe was created by the Word or Intelligent Agent of God 60500 God. The Universe or Monad of Platonism, Plato called Ideas, & both were synonymous with the Intelligent Principle. Idea then with Plato had a very different meaning from that attached to it by us. His Idea was not derived from without, it was not an object of reception, it was the receivinor Intelligent Principle itself. He declared that our knowledge more depended on this innate intelligeence of Ideas. (776 Xr epr

Vor) than on the evidence of the senses, for of course the sense, were of no avail without a basis for our conceptions or innate Ideas. Whereas they in the contrary are quite independent of the sense, in fact, existence. Yet his opponents, arguing about these Ideas, say, they meant the sensible entities, the sum of which constitute knowledge. Have spared no effort to clear Aristotle and his Platonist predecessors of other in turn mis-
taking Plato's opposites, but not Plato's discovery with him, have used or rather abused all his arguments to uphold the Monas doctrine that the Intellectual is dependent on Sensation.

The word or conception of the One Cause of the Nature of these innate Ideas, the Intellectual Archetypes or patterns of all things, which with any part of incorporeal matter produced form, underlies what was previously an abstract conception an object of Receptivity contemplation.

Any Idea then is the intelligent agent, or unity or monad by the material expression of which form or one is produced. This Idea is of necessity innate, for it is simply the Intelligent Agent that called the Universe into being & intelligence itself being mental.

The Archetypal ideas composing it, must have been before experience, for experience being derived from without must necessarily have been subsequent to those objects, which were called into one being by the existent Ideas. Such innate Ideas we cannot deny, & as far as intelligence is innate in Man, they must be mediated by him, but in him they only constitute the foundation on which it is possible to build the temple of knowledge & not knowledge itself in that power which can enable a man to take advantage of the unalterable surrounding him in his natural state. These are truly Archetypal, innate Ideas of all Things,
according to which all things are, but according to the nearest signification of the word, expressing those notions, the elements of which constitute human knowledge, we must deny primitive ideas of such knowledge, for we do not profess the most dreamy unenunciances, an innate idea can so obscure, for not only is there no proof of such in man, but moreover there is no need of such ideas for man in his present state. While then Plato was right in teaching the doctrine of innate Ideas as the archetype of all things, he is said to have erred in making them the oriels of human knowledge as the elements of our intellectual reasoning, and practical conclusions. But he would never have been charged with this error if the modern use of the word had not been applied to the use Plato made of it, so that Plato was all along quite right, but it is only through ignorance that such sweeping condemnation has been passed on his doctrine. He employed it to denote the forms of the intelligible world in contrast to the unreal representation of the sensible. While he showed that the forms were the basis of knowledge, he seems never to have turned attention to the latter, as the element of knowledge itself. More as Locke did that they were dependent machinery. The to the candid reader it certainly does so by its inclusion. Sir Carter lowered the term by applying
it to the objects of our consciousness in general, but not till
it had been further delegated from the office of divine
intelligeie to the atmosphere of human sense, was Plato's
doctrine misconceived by many, condemned by some.
Locke employs it in its Cartesian sense, as the contraction
of its application, degeneracy of the spirit of the mind is every
all misunderstanding, which have made men who conceivably
aged opposite at most opposite sides, arrayed Plato's
lure in Antagonism. He must be careful not to de-
ominable these ideas, the aggregate of which constitute
our knowledge from those ideas, the archetype, flowing
from the eternal springs of divine intelligence. In speak-
ing of Plato I have continually used the word "divine intelligence"
but Plato's own expression is "divine reason," but that is obvi-
ously an improper combination. Intelligence itself cannot
reason with itself, and it may reason with another as "come let us reason together." Reason is a dialectic
rational faculty, by which the conception of the imagin-
ation of the discovery of the understanding receive a
definitive form. But to say of supreme intelligence
that it imagines — it must be sufficient to
every feeling understanding. But this peremptorily.
If Plato err'd in anything it was, he was not provoking against
the error, perfectly were likely to fall into in regard to his doctrine,
to himself discriminating for men, between the conceptions of the eternal mind itself of those acquired by us from experience, which, while it has brought ridicule on him from those who love still more, has given to the distinguished
recognition has too often run not where reason would not follow & a philosophic expression too often ended in a
dream of poetry, but at the same time it cannot be denied
that their "publicic speculations, stem from a battle fitted
to sustain a high tone of honour and sight, effecting, to elevate
the moral taste & to create the over the whole conduct of life
somewhat of a higher poetry of thought are feeling from
a Philosophy which addresses itself exclusively to the
colder principle of reason." It is mounting from the material
to the realm of the spiritual from "Nature up to Nature
God." There amidst the decline of freedom & the corruption
of manners, just before the date when with the fall of Milton,
the beautiful Ideal of human life faded motionfully away
true on that verge of time stand two involving Plato, Pythagorean
philosophy to receive the Eirenicon persuasion. By opening
the gates of the infinite, proclaiming the immediacy
of the soul, the Sphēra gloria, finally accomplishing its
mission as the invisible Empy, melted into the Never
now announcing a more sacred covenant of rain.
Aristotle was not satisfied with Plato's Ideas, as he sought to reconcile them to fact, conceiving all of them to be developed from experience. External objects excite the sense, like the mind like a looking glass, reflecting insubstantial or unreal images of their reflection, however being a real resemblance. The unreal image is called a phantom to distinguish it from the idea of Plato, as Aristotle believed in an intangible world as well as a sensible world. In this world, the mind must be invested with, as well as a sensory world, to show alike in the mind, the phantom of phantasm, as well as a sensory world. But still all knowledge, whether immediate or derived from experience, the latter by experience of particulars, medium, still by experience we acquire universals. Empirically, it is contended that these images, drawn off from external objects, are as real as the material objects from which they emanated, this theory he borrowed from Democritus; they were said to be like flying off from all bodies, like disease through the air, the film of theexcel, quality of matter sticking against their appropriate sense in the sense themselves. Perception, which correspond perfectly to the objects themselves, as well as to the representations of the imagination which are very subtle perceptions, a mere sensation in their combination, from those of...
to be convinced it has been obliterated.

A series of diagrams, figures, and tables can be found on the next pages of this document.
to be found many persons of the most elevated moral nature, with conscience, alive to the most refined perceptions of right and wrong. No two of whom will yet agree on many a conceivable article of point of duty. That could not be if conscience were an in-plant to intelligence, faculty or sense; it must be the result of education, which is imperfect and liable to error. Sincerity of purpose is not sufficient to discriminate in the essence of conscience, as its olive bearing witness. But what are ideas of such things, or of anything, the office of things external to us, is another question. Here it so much in the case of imagination the powerful imagination of a fire would teach you as much, as a literally hot rehearsal itself. For to say that imagination is only a more subtle sensation of reality is to say that the direct perception of an external object, a sensation of imagination, of memory and belief are only different degrees of strength or vivacity in the idea. "Suppose" says, "read the idea like that of a future state after death — one man believe it firmly, which means no more than that he hath a strong or lively idea of it, another neither believe, or do believe, that it he has but a very slight or faint idea. Suppose now another firmly believe, there is no such thing. I am at a loss to know whether his idea be faint or lively; if it be faint, then there may be a firm belief where the idea is faint, if
the idea be lively, then the belief of a future state of the belief of no future state are one and the same. All
the illusionation is the more instructive combination of
perception differing from direct perception only in degree.
Then there is at once a future state of no future state,
and a heaven and no heaven, in earth to those who wish
the contrary no earth. Now in refutation of the dogma
that our idea of things are species of the things of reality,
in his delightful little book, has been so facetious in
attacking some for a similar doctrine (the human idea
it is an opposite purpose) that I cannot do better than
quote him: "If every idea be a copy of the object
where it is derived, then the idea of an apple should be an
idea, the idea of a roaring lion a roaring idea;
the idea of an ape a hairy long-tailed idea, not one of
which added to the other, the idea of extension would
be an extending idea, that of solidity solid i.e. Such
ideas in Neatville, "In the modality of scepticism!"
in concluding his lively dialogue of Homer, assumed there.
Wisth Plato, Aristotle & Epicurus, wise men endeavoring
to legimintly solve the problem of the origin of ideas,
another class of inquirers, not having patience enough to
unravel the entangled web, through all its darkened
mazes, or dissuaded by the depth of their argument, gave it
minds, pain not being able to see through the light of day. They resolved to doubt of its existence, preferring to walk only by the light of their own dark centers. Because they thought that to be well in the search of analysis and explanation they deliberately plunged into the great wave of Natural Suspicion. Having to satisfy curiosity at the expense of truth, some below the level of minds, of this sect. Papellos and Anselm are the most celebrated. Papellos, losing his wit in the atomic theory of Decameters, soon came to the belief that there was no such thing as reality or truth. To him the whole external world was a mere show, "built of such stuff as dreams are made on." Therefore says Mill if a cock ran against him or a dog attacked him, or if he came upon a piece of firewood, he would not stir a foot to avoid. The Anselm, seeing no credit to his theory, set this great Papellos, now seems to have been so anxious to circulate his doctrines, to the disciples, but that they were all ready to match him from the lecture, or on an occasion, himself to see forget his principles, and get into a passion with his own, who had not consented his change to his mind, that with the spit in his hand he threw upon it. He pursued him even into the market place. "I charged the offender home by his own which to have offended sufficient courage must have been a long
as Sennkenbergius even Reid say, he forgot his principles on "some occasions, but when we find that the great sceptic lived to the patriarchal age of four score years, no other comment was needed on his principles. This practice could have come from a but little with the philosophical doctrines he imitated for our guidance. But in every other aspect, it was a most true and accomplished understanding. Below the high point of his native town a so respected a citizen that he was exempted from all taxation. How very careful should we therefore be in criticizing the few flaws of great minds, the inconsistencies of which are ever the stumbling blocks of curious little minds understanding. The real cause of his scepticism was not founded on an examination of Nature itself, but taking the dogma of Aristotle as often. For the true solution of the problem in nature, he proved the falsity of these, but failing to distinguish between Aristotle and nature itself, because the former was an insurmountable concluded the other to be wrong.

Arcella was the founder of the Middle Academy. The spirit of which was, confidence "tending to circumcise the pretensions of philosophical reasonings, without denying the possibility of certain or at least of probable knowledge." Plato had always wished more on the evidence of his intellectual
archetypes, men in the evidence of the senses themselves, he ever trusted these, in reality forms of indistinctness in reference to the object of the external world, believed that what is conceived to be infinite intelligence, was liable to imposition from his internal senses. Matter, carrying with it necessarily the heart of Plato, it is to its legitimate extent, came like Pyrrho to doubt of the reality of the material creation at least. Doubtless of the evidence of this infinite intelligence itself. "No man can be certain of anything," is his great saying. Then certainly he could not have been certain of even this, for a person who says he knows nothing, negates a knowledge of something.

"If there be truth in nothing at all, how can he know what he has to be certain of? What uncertain of, can reason decide?" Those very senses, to which in our present state the over all operations activity, shall the very knowledge we achieve from experience consist those very senses, which gave it being to without which it could not have been doubted. If the sense from which we derive our knowledge of the knowledge we derive must also be wrong, to say they are false and not to be trusted in the case erroneous. The proposition undermine itself. So it is absurd to urge ought against the senses, without which we could be powerless to object.
in how can sweet water flow from a polluted fountain?

If the integrity of the several parts be injured, then must
the completeness of the whole be injured.

But such scepticism once took root, it flourished out its
entertainment. Spring, but having no real vitality, it clotted before
the rising truth and was worked up. Mankind was searching
for happiness, absolute quiet. They felt to be impossible,
they instinctively felt they were approaching a better era,
every experiment had withered failed, but now the time
had come for the realization of some they believed beyond
the present self, in their impatience the Romans actually
reached Aquarius, the year of whose death saw the birth
of our Saviour. History would have had our Saviour,
reached at Rome, but that is an incident more curious than
shocking, for it was only the result of Rome's natural policy.

It was the crisis between ancient and modern times, the
central point of our history as the old world was like
a lion not due to its fall. Above the ruin of the slavery.
a new light was seen to rise from the East. That last itself
the birthplace of precedent science and philosophy, which
the truth continued in which they contended, assimilated
the new, other. They became one with it, that in its
progress towards its culminating point, has been, the
perhaps unconscious by the forces of the modern nation.
The Roman world embraced the divine Plato as a matter of course, but during the dark age of the Church, Aristotle became the sovereign favorite; it was only after the revival of literature that any of his writings came in for a share of power over the understandings. Not a century after the somewhat rash reformation of Luther, Des Cartes was born. 1596, during the lifetime of the great Bacon, Galileo, Shakespeare, Descartes... a perfect galaxy of talent in every branch of then known science, literature & art, followed by equally great names in the following century Locke, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Malebranche, Berkeley, Voltaire, Rousseau, etc. These were the fruits of the Reformation. For although at first the boiling caldron brought nothing but steam to the surface, it was only to boil them it over with the fire, to release the good from the neutralizing influence of the evil.

And it now began to acquire its widest influence in the vindication of its majority. Men began to acquire a laudable reliance on their own powers & wholesome discretion of the opinions. The dogmatizing opinions of the leaders, an honest independent house, which is not inconsistent with the greatest reverence. The claim of infallibility was done away with forever, Aristotle doubted as well as the Pope & what better foundation for
The latter, Bacon with, all the characteristics of the subtlety of Galen, accomplished in the Stagyrite this law. De Fichte taught that mere resemblance of external things are presented to the mind of those he called Ideas. He did not believe in an intellectual world like Plato but supposed the mind to have a large stock of innate Ideas of its own, influenced by the hand of Nature; not derived from the world without. Such Ideas are innate Ideas; knowledge not innate Ideas, constituting realities like Plato's. The principle innate Ideas are those of God, of matter, of consciousness, of thought. But in De Fichte, all these Ideas, on an equal footing and nature, he strangely confuses his system. Not contained as by course in innate Idea of Plato, Ideas, whereas necessarily of God, of matter are not universal. Locke used the word as De Fichte meant it, in reference to God, matter, etc. of course opposed to mind, as Hebbel's. Others used it in relation to De Fichte, application of it to consciousness a learned Locke's arguments against the one, wound against the other, denied innate Ideas as meaning innate knowledge, but also the uses of the error, being attended by De Fichte infusion of the term came to the conclusion that intellect itself is derived from experience. This is the school of Sensation Exclusive, the most opposed to Locke and to Plato.
The innate ideas, Locke and Leibnitz, agree in all to be acquired on as eternal and unchanging truths. These constitute real knowledge, they flow from the mind itself and they cannot be derived from the senses. According to Locke in reporting to the mind of the external world, these innate ideas are alone trustworthy. I must decide questions which can be reasoned on through means of the external sense alone. If De Caux could not trust his outward senses when he was going to get all the proofs that were to settle all the doubts of scepticism. He intended his rationalism for ever to remove all doubts zealously sought for proof for everything. He could find not for he could not trust his senses but was forced to fly to innate ideas, half of which instead of being really innate as Leibnizens, which is more than intelligence ever derived from the innate as the idea of God, Space, God. It was therefore a part of the system that his doubts should remain unless he could remove them by proving from naturalism. He could only appeal to the veracity of his Creator, thus giving to his enemies a great advantage, "God said He has given the innate ideas. This presence do not demonstrate the external world correctly, we have no need of them. Innate ideas are sufficient. The senses may deceive me, but God cannot." But as the senses are as much the gift of God as innate innate...
Dear, why should God have declined in the former man in the latter. But what Kensington his whole system is to consider as hoisted. Where are the group of innate ideal? You at once come forward to clear up all obstacles to settle all your points, you find no proof for them but instead of boldly declaring yourself an infidel as no, you invent innate ideas. I satisfy yourself with those that you are that there is a natural world that God is. But where are the group of innate ideas? This year Dexter to commence his whole system over again so that Malebranche the most correct of Cartesians was driven to the confession, that he doubted whether those innate ideas could extend to the knowledge of an external world or give anything beyond a knowledge of God own existence. Now the way in which Dr. Carter set about proving his own existence is a type of his whole modern reasoning. He begins by declaring his own existence, but settles the doubt thus "Cogito—ego sum"!

But Dr. Carter said he would doubt of everything till he could prove it. How then could he dedicate anyone? Yet he takes the first position "Cogito" for granted! Assuming the existence of God for granted makes it the proof of the second position. Thus, Mephistopheles a double error, but not the only one in his notorious enthymeme
The proof is not parallel with the medicals, because it
implies that when we cease to think, we are not free
observers. "We may as well have said 'I am doing nothing'
and therefore I am' as that when I was doing something I
had ceased to exist; the proposition moves nothing at all
except the perplexity. Nor do the rest, must have been in
his system surely, was entirely turned against religion,
for honestly though incorrectly having granted to the infidel
philosophers of the day, that the sinner could not be trusted
to invent any false idea to prove the existence of a
deity as soon as these were shown to be unfalsifiable the
infidels raised a shout of triumph— the sinner had done
all he could to prove God's existence, their last stronghold
is gone— this is therefore no proof of a God. An illogical
as well as an unprincipled conclusion. But infidels are
ever known to reflect that reason by which they propose
to test everything— if it be opposed to that notion, it is
not a truth that they care for, but belligerence against
its sensation. While they profess to find great difficulty
in coming to such a conclusion, if it be likely to
support divinity, graciously swallow the most absurd
monstrous lies, if there is any pledge of its being turned
against the Hebraic faith. "The text that rests not with his dwelling with
the Islamic to others is obscure to him."
And judgment shrank a little to look it way
Wakes hands, talk of darkness at noon day.

I said unphilosophically not only to a, it an error of the
mind — which let us charitably suppose, might have
been unsound, it was a moral alliquity — for they
made their unbelief a rule of practice, that they themselves,
might have been moral enough, they could not have con-
vinced the conduct of their fellow citizens, had they demanded
them to live without God in the world. And even if they
were not bad logicians to come to such a conclusion, they
were at least unpatriotic members of the commonwealth
not to promulgate doctrines so subversive of order and morality.

Lord Rolingbrooke strongly insists on this point: "That tho'
not to be allowed to abridge the liberty of private
judgment, the the consequences should be outlawed only, yet
we are bound to yield due deference to received opinion
and due compliance with received customs must be held,
especially with opinion, which it wise clarence, to oppose
customs from which we cannot deviate without doing
offence & doing hurt to society. In all these cases, our
speculations may indeed be free, in all others only, our
practice should be so." Yet Lord Rolingbrooke published
five volumes of imbecile scepticism — now in many
places, of positive blasphemy — under the name of Philo-
softhy. Indeed in every relation into which he was brought with external circumstances, his practice was consistently the opposite of his precepts. The authority of the "Patriot Prince" and the noble disposition of Patriot" was the most disloyal of subjects, and the most unprincipled of spirit of the faction which he lead.

Besides, because we cannot admit innate ideas, must be therefore reject a Deity as laws of right existing that experience sufficient. "for the invisible things of him from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, even his eternal power and Godhead" and no argument have has yet been brought against the credit due to our sense, which a child could not refute. Thus it is said, a circle at a little distance appears oval, but this is not a deception of the sense, but a law of nature, showing to the medium of the atmosphere, the effect of which they seem to ignore as much as the Peripatetic. I far from proving the fallacy of the evidence of our senses, it is one of the strongest proofs of their trustworthiness. To diminish the sense in a palpable absurdity is a Philosophy, which seeks to establish scepticism by doubting such obvious truths can be supported by sophisms alone. While it may seem to exhibit the excellence of the sceptic, it does so at the expense of despising reason and human nature.
makes man kind "sensible" if a man's mind is not sufficiently bound to discriminate when his ideas of external objects are true or liable to an error, let him not run the risk of getting entangled in metaphysical toils, if he can find no other way of escape, let him bravely cut the knot he cannot unloose. Damn Metaphysics, & disband all others from meddling with it. For continue Priest, said I have been lead into bogey-visions by following an ignar. future: what can I do better than warn others to beware of it."

But even supposing that innate ideas & influence alike are rejected as worthless, there is still revelation. The belief of a God is not innate, because it is not universal. Some may not be able to trace an intelligent cause from intelligent effects, but still revelation remains. We cannot disbelieve that, for the difficulties which hamper it, disbelieve are greater than those which attend a belief that fact: "Revelation is not abstrac, it is impossible nor so improbable, as to beggar credulity, or it, cannot be supposed that an all wise Being would create intelligent agents, then turn them loose, without a hint ever so slight as to his will & their duties.

The need the notion of right & wrong be innate if we have not acquired them by revelation & primitive
tradition, we can learn them from experience. For if
the effects of two sets of actions, according as they are hurtful
or beneficial, we can come to a knowledge of good and
evil, what which was beneficial in its effects to all would
be called good. Private gain, at the expense of public
sacrifice, would be a vice. Individual suffering or
sacrifice for the public good would be virtue. This would
be an instinctive appreciation, then philosophy would come
d by its refining process advance these, escaping instinct,
into abstract principles, into abstract thoughts,
in harmony with the archetypical ideas of them, which
have been like all other men from eternity. Thus
the appreciation of Beauty, first instinctive, but the
man not yet generalized in experience, sufficiently
yet to know what it is, that influence, as they have
seen the various false theories of appreciation; moreover
are all the while eternal laws of beauty or of morality
by which the world was moulded from an organizing
order of chaotic elements into the likeness of God, when
our instinctive sensations have been analyzed, them we
principle of beauty has been established derived by an exclusively
from intelligence and yet in every way parallel to the
archetypical Ideas of beauty inherent in the Eternal Intelligencia
In the elements of our knowledge there is no need of
 innate Ideas: we must agree with Locke that Ideas
 which constitute the elements of our knowledge doth which
 words are the circulating medium are all derived from
 experience. "The simple Ideas are the work of Nature, the
 understanding being passive in receiving them, the complex
 formed by the understanding itself, which being once stored
 with simple Ideas of sensation & reflection, has the power
 to repeat, to compare & to combine them in an infinite
 variety so as at pleasure can make infinite complex
 ones. And it is not in the power of the most exalted
 wit or enlarged understanding, by any quiddity or beauty
 of thought to invent or frame one new or simple Idea
 not received by our senses from external object."

How different is this from the Encyclopedists' doctrine of
 Sensation. Locke admired, as innate, the power that
 Understanding, they believed, that the understanding itself
 defended in sensation for its being. So while we admit
 that there were no innate Ideas in the Cartesian sense,
 we must also admit that there were no Ideas, defined
 in Experience in the sense "as by Cudworth, of the
 Origin of all our Ideas (held) that these meant by
 Plato, were as truly demonstrably innate, as those
 signified by Locke were derived from Experience exclusively.
Condillac holds, that our "connaissances," subjective or objective are dependent on inferences. Descartes held, that they are both innate; both are equally wrong. Plato held that our subjective ideas are innate, I, though not the objective. Locke demonstrates that our objective ideas are dependent on sensation. I admit the subjective to be innate, but only by implication. I declare Plato and Locke right. He each confined himself to half the subject, the subject thus grafted onto a perfect system on the union of ideas. These erroneous labours, might be better expressed in the pertinent language liberty, that "there is nothing in the intellect, but what is derived from the senses — except the intellect itself." 

"While est in intellecte quod non facit sensus — semper nisi intellectus ipsius."

George C. M. Kidwood.