Partnerships and communities of practice: a social learning perspective on crime prevention and community safety in Scotland

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For Malcolm and Frances
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Declaration

I declare that this thesis was composed entirely by me and that no part of it has been submitted to this, or to any other University, as part of a degree.

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Abstract

This social learning analysis of Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland will develop two sets of arguments – one empirical and one epistemological. The empirical argument is that the well-documented difficulties in partnership working (largely a result of the very different occupational cultures, structures, roles and functions of the agencies generally brought on board) are not only very much in evidence but that current ways of organising and structuring partnership working in Scotland are also very often not conducive to overcoming them. It will be argued that viewing partnership working through the lens of a relational social learning perspective (Etienne Wenger’s theory of communities of practice) provides a clear set of recommendations for resolving these problems. These empirical arguments shall form the main focus of the thesis but, given the theoretical perspective employed, a related epistemological argument also emerged and shall be developed.

It is generally accepted in theoretical criminology (and elsewhere in the social sciences) that the ideas and mentalities of the discipline have been shaped by the institutional contexts in which actors were doing criminology or criminal justice work (whether as practitioners or as scholars). Therefore, it will be argued that Community Safety Partnerships are important not only as sites of criminal justice practice but also as new institutional spaces in which ways of thinking about crime and community safety have the potential to be transformed. The empirical and epistemological arguments are interrelated because it will only be where the problems of conflict and communication within partnerships can be positively resolved that their potential to become sites of thinking that transcend traditional criminal justice mentalities will be fulfilled.
Chapter 1: Objectives, methodology and overview

Introduction

By the end of the 1990s there was an increasing expectation amongst policymakers that public services should be organised and delivered locally through multi-agency partnerships. It was envisaged that these partnerships should include relevant public sector service providers, private sector agencies and organisations, as well as representatives of local community interests (often via the voluntary sector). Partnerships were established in numerous social policy fields, many of them having potentially overlapping aims and objectives. There were urban regeneration partnerships, social inclusion partnerships and partnerships concerned with health issues and parenting. There were also partnerships that purported to reflect the interests of particular groups and constituencies in society, from young people and the elderly, to ethnic minority and gay and lesbian communities. In short, multi-agency partnerships had become, over a relatively short space of time, something of a ubiquitous feature of the social policy landscape throughout the UK (Crawford, 1997; 1998; Gilling, 1997; Hughes, 1998).

Multi-agency partnerships focusing on crime prevention, crime reduction and community safety (the favoured terminology changing from time to time) had been developing since the 1980s. They were given statutory force, in England and Wales at least, through the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. This Act placed a duty on local authorities and police forces to develop Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategies in partnership with other relevant local agencies and organisations. Although these sections of the Act did not apply to Scotland, where statutory responsibilities of this kind would be established later and under a rather different guise, multi-agency crime prevention and community safety work was already established and evolving, and would be given impetus by the 1998 Act and the activity it generated south of the border. By the turn of the century Community Safety Partnerships had been established in all 32 of the local authority areas in Scotland, albeit on a ‘voluntary’ basis.
One of the interesting, if quite obvious, features of the multi-agency partnership approach was that it actively and explicitly attempted to bring quite different agencies and organisations together, expecting them to communicate and cooperate with one another in formulating coherent initiatives that might produce more holistic solutions to the problem of crime. Indeed, the partnership approach was founded on the idea that no one organisation could activate all of the possible mechanisms that could be drawn upon in the name of crime prevention. Contributions from a diverse range of organisations were desired precisely because of the different perspectives and skills they could bring to bear on this complex problem. However, even before the statutory duty existed, research was raising concerns about possible problems and limitations of this approach in practice, in part because of this sheer diversity of the agencies to be involved (Blagg et al., 1988; Pearson, et al., 1992; Crawford and Jones, 1995). Organisations and agencies brought into criminal justice partnerships were potentially very different from one another in various ways. They varied in terms of the nature and level of their funding; their capacity to marshal resources and manpower quickly; the form and structure of their internal decision-making processes; their role within, and in relation to, the wider criminal justice system; and the values, training and occupational culture of their personnel. The last point proved to be particularly pertinent. It was understood that different organisations had different mentalities; different ways of thinking about crime, understanding what caused it, and what could therefore be done to prevent it (Gilling, 1994; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Crawford, 1997). Such fundamental differences were seen as a potential source of conflict and a barrier to the communication and cooperation that would be necessary for partnerships to work. This problematic – that differences in the occupational cultures, mentalities and organisational structures of prospective partners could prove fatal to partnership working – formed the starting point for the current thesis.

The thesis draws upon and develops a relational social learning theory to examine and understand the working of community safety partnerships in Scotland. Such a theoretical framework was suggested by this problematic aspect of partnership working precisely because it took account of these structural influences on actors,
and the ways in which they understood the world, without doing so in a manner that viewed such influences as absolute. In relational social learning theories structure does shape interactions, but interactions also have the potential to be creative and themselves constitutive of structures (Giddens, 1976; 1979; Lave and Wenger, 1991; Bandura, 1986; 1997; Wenger, 1998). Therefore, this perspective allowed the problematic nature of partnership members’ distinctive institutional backgrounds to be acknowledged while also demanding that the actual working of partnerships in practice be studied, because it stressed that the actual interactions of actors had the potential to be creative, and to contribute to how structures would develop and evolve in the future. It was a perspective that could at once acknowledge that participants in partnerships came to the table with particular and distinctive institutionalised mentalities, while at the same time allowing for the potential of creativity within partnerships that could ultimately transcend these organisational barriers.

Two sets of arguments emerged from this social learning analysis of Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland – one empirical and one epistemological. The empirical argument is that the documented difficulties in partnership working are very much in evidence and that current ways of organising and structuring partnership working in Scotland are not always conducive to overcoming them. It will also be argued that viewing partnership working through the lens of a relational social learning perspective provides a clear set of recommendations for resolving these problems. These empirical arguments shall form the main focus of the thesis but, given the theoretical perspective employed, a related epistemological argument also emerged. It had long been accepted in theoretical criminology (and elsewhere in the social sciences) that the ideas and mentalities of the discipline had been shaped by the institutional contexts in which actors were doing criminology or criminal justice work (whether as practitioners or as scholars) (Garland, 2000; 2002). Therefore, it will be argued that Community Safety Partnerships are important not only as sites of criminal justice practice but also as new institutional spaces in which ways of thinking about crime and community safety have the potential to be transformed. The empirical and epistemological arguments are interrelated because
it will only be where the problems of conflict and communication within partnerships can be positively resolved that their potential to become sites of thinking that transcend traditional criminal justice mentalities will be fulfilled.

This chapter shall give an outline of the objectives and methodology of the study itself, before moving on to provide an overview of the whole thesis and the way in which these arguments shall be developed throughout the discussion.

**Research objectives and methodology**

Research into community safety and partnership working has tended to fall into one of three broad camps – analyses of the social and political significance of partnership approaches to governance and the provision of public services in late modern societies (Garland, 1996; 2001; Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 1997; Hughes, 1998; 2004; 2007), evaluation of the outcomes of partnership activity, and their impact on local problems and anxieties (Ekblom and Pease, 1995; Tilley, 2001), and studies of the “processes” of multi-agency activity and how partnerships actually work in practice on a day to day basis (Blagg, et al., 1988; Sampson, et al., 1988; Pearson et al., 1992; Gilling, 1994; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Phillips, 2002). The current project falls into the latter camp, the focus of the research being the structures and practices of multi-agency partnerships themselves. There were four main objectives of the research:

- To provide an account of the development of multi-agency community safety partnership structures in Scotland, noting where such developments had taken a distinctive direction from those in England and Wales (see chapters 2 and 4).

- To examine the working of community safety partnerships from the perspectives of those participating within them, from a range of institutional backgrounds (see chapters 5, 6 and 7).
• To identify and develop a theoretical framework capable of acknowledging the influence of both structures and interactions on everyday partnership working (see chapter 3).

• To identify and develop a theoretical framework capable of furnishing a clear set of recommendations for improving effective partnership working (see chapter 8).

Given the relative paucity of literature on crime prevention and community safety in Scotland it was necessary that one of the objectives of the study should be to provide such an account, if only to contextualise the analysis of partnership work that would follow. The project was not however designed to provide a comprehensive study of all of the 32 partnerships in Scotland. From the outset the central focus of the project was how Community Safety Partnerships worked, not their Scottishness as such. It is certainly the case that some distinctive features of the development of community safety in Scotland were identified, and were relevant to the understanding of how partnerships work in this context, but the project was designed to be about partnerships and to generate insights about partnership working that would be relevant regardless of specific structural and cultural differences between jurisdictions.

The fieldwork was carried out between 2000 and 2004 and was organised as a case study of partnership working in Scotland. The research was primarily carried out in two distinctive Community Safety Partnerships, but also drew in national perspectives through The Scottish Executive’s Crime Prevention (latterly Community Safety) Unit and the Scottish Local Authorities Community Safety forum (later the Scottish Community Safety Network), which was set up as a national forum for community safety practitioners in which they could share their experiences.
A case study of partnership working: overview of the fieldwork

The fieldwork was primarily structured around a case study of two Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland. Selection of the research sites was informed by preliminary meetings with the Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) of The Scottish Executive, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (CoSLA), and the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations (SCVO). The Scottish Executive and CoSLA had recently collaborated, along with the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS), in producing a detailed set of guidance notes for Community Safety Partnerships, entitled Safer Communities in Scotland (1999). Representatives of the police, CoSLA and the Scottish Business Crime Unit were on secondment to the CPU at the time, allowing for a range of perspectives to inform development of the case study. The SCVO were actively involved in providing support to a wide range of voluntary sector agencies seeking to contribute to partnership work at this time, and also provided advice that shaped the choice of research sites.

The research sites were named Northside and Eastside. Both sites had quite well-developed Community Safety Partnerships by early 2000. Given that the objectives of the research were to examine the processes of working in partnership it was felt that it would be important for the fieldwork to focus on sites where partnership working was already established in a meaningful way and in which personnel already had some experience of it. This was not the case in all partnerships in Scotland at this time. Some of them were felt to be at a very early stage of development and some had not moved far beyond communications between the Local Authority and the police and had only begun to incorporate a wider range of partners. The decision to focus on partnerships that were reasonably well-established and actively engaged in implementing initiatives of course meant that the research did not really grapple with sites in which developments were slower, or in which there might have been even greater levels of local resistance to partnership working (although some anecdotal insight into these issues was obtained at national conferences and forums).

The timeframe of the fieldwork (over 4 years) did, however, mean that it was able to capture difficult moments in which partnerships had to evolve and deal with ‘new’
issues and structures (such as Community Planning and Antisocial Behaviour strategies). The case study sites were also chosen to be representative of experience throughout Scotland in other ways – such as in terms of the population coverage, geography and public service structure of the sites.

Scotland encompasses a diverse range of community structures, from densely populated urban conurbations to very rural, geographically isolated, areas of low population density. In choosing the research sites there was an attempt to ensure that, as far as possible, the diversity of the Scottish population and geography should be included – on the basis that population density and urban/rural distinctions in part shape local problems and anxieties, the ease or otherwise of delivering public services to deal with them, and the relative size of local networks of practitioners and policymakers. Northside was identified as a site in which both the police and the local authority covered a large geographical area which was, in the main, characterised by low population density. The site did, however, include one small city and multiple villages and towns of varying population. Eastside was one of Scotland’s main densely populated urban centres. The local authority in Eastside had responsibility over the city only, but the local police service had a rather wider responsibility that also took in much more rural communities. These two sites were the primary fieldwork sites for exploring perceptions of partnership working with practitioners. Additional insight into the experiences and perceptions of Community Safety practitioners around the country was obtained through attendance at local and national level conferences for practitioners, and at Scottish Local Authority Community Safety Forum meetings. The latter were attended by both Council workers (Council Designated Community Safety Officers) and police officers (the Local Authority Liaison Officers) who were working on secondment to Community Safety Partnerships (these officers were collectively referred to as ‘Designated Officers’ by practitioners). Interviews were also carried out with, and documentation obtained from, The Scottish Executive’s Crime Prevention/Community Safety Unit in order to include developments in national policy and changing approaches to performance management and funding within the case study. The intention was to design a case study that would capture some of the breadth of community safety
experience in Scotland – in order to explore that experience through the lens of a social learning analytical framework. The case study was thus not specifically set up as a means of conducting direct comparisons between the two research sites. In any case, the experiences of practitioners within them were generally found to be quite similar. However, there were some differences between the sites (in relation to the physical location of Community Safety Partnerships and the constancy of seconded personnel, for example) that raised important issues in relation to the analytical framework being deployed. These will be flagged up throughout the relevant fieldwork chapters (chapters 5, 6 and 7).

The fieldwork drew upon the following sources of data:

- Twenty-nine formal interviews. Interviews were conducted with personnel from different occupational backgrounds, working at different levels, and with different roles within partnership structures. Interviews were also carried out with individuals from agencies and bodies with a more national remit, unconnected with either of the research sites. A detailed breakdown of the interviews conducted is contained within the methodological annex.

- Attendance at and observation of three Community Safety Steering Group meetings.

- Attendance at and observation of two Scottish Local Authority Community Safety Forum meetings.

- Observation of the working of Council Dedicated Community Safety Officers and police Local Authority Liaison Officers throughout a five day period in 2000 and a four day period in 2004.

- Observation at two training conferences for practitioners on Communities that Care and on Anti-social Behaviour.
• Substantial documentary analysis was also carried out. This drew on Scottish Executive and Audit Commission reports (including guidance notes for partnerships, funding guidelines, and research into partnership working) as well as artefacts produced by the partnerships themselves (strategy documents and funding applications).

Overview of the thesis
The thesis will be structured around four main sections which are split into eight chapters. The first section provides reviews of the relevant literature on partnership working and the social learning perspective that will be used as the theoretical framework for the analysis of the fieldwork data. The second section shall outline the policy context of the research by reviewing the development of partnership working in Scotland. In the third section the fieldwork data will be presented. It will have been analysed through the lens of Etienne Wenger’s communities of practice perspective. The fourth section will bring the thesis to a conclusion by drawing out policy proposals and recommendations that stem from the analysis, and will also consider the wider consequences (empirical and epistemological) of this social learning analysis of partnership working.

Section I: Literature reviews and theoretical framework

Two literatures will be reviewed in this section of the thesis. In chapter 2 attention will be given to the standard crime prevention literature within criminology. The first sections of the chapter will review the development of crime prevention as a distinctive field of study within criminology from the late 1970s onwards, and will examine the different ways in which it could be conceptualised. This provides a background to the discussion of the implementation of crime prevention that follows. For many scholars these new conceptions of crime prevention decoupled its implementation from traditional criminal justice agencies (particularly the police), opening up the necessary space for the development of the multi-agency approach. The chapter will then move on to review the literature outlining the gradual shift
away from thinking about crime prevention partnerships towards thinking about community safety partnerships and the reasons and politics that underscored this change. Thus, the chapter will provide an overview of the development of the ‘preventative turn’ in criminal justice policy in which newly sharpened conceptions of crime prevention would be applied by multi-agency partnerships to locally defined problems. This ‘preventative turn’ is the background to the present thesis and helps to locate it within the criminological literature. However, it is in the latter sections of this chapter that the specific issues and themes that informed the focus of the present study are reviewed. Here I move on to review the literature that focused directly on the processes of working in partnership, i.e. on how structurally and culturally distinctive agencies worked in practice, whether their interactions were characterised by consensus or conflict, and whether they were ultimately capable of meaningful communication and cooperation. The inherent problems with partnership working identified in this literature (particularly those of the structural and cultural incompatibility of agencies) will be drawn out as they provided the starting point for the present study.

Chapter 3 shall follow directly on from these insights by introducing the theoretical perspective that allows partnership working to be interrogated and understood in a manner which recognises but does not overemphasise these structural impediments. The chapter introduces, contextualises, and reviews Etienne Wenger’s relational social learning perspective, giving specific focus to his concept of ‘communities of practice’ and how it might be used as an analytical framework through which partnership working can be critically examined. Wenger’s theorising has been greatly influenced, like much recent work in criminology, by Giddens’ work on structuration, although it will be argued here that his concepts are better disposed to being applied to the practical problems encountered in partnership working. The first half of the chapter will locate Wenger’s work within existing social theory (including but also going beyond Giddens) that will be familiar to criminologists, and shall thus aim to draw out the central ideas and assumptions which underpin and animate it. Wenger uses the concept of communities of practice to examine how people learn, give meaning to the world, and ultimately negotiate their own identities and world-
views through their participation in collective projects with others. In crude terms, Wenger espouses a social theory of learning which explicitly tries to focus attention on the importance of interactions and social engagement to learning, while at the same time recognising the ultimately social nature of knowledge - in that there must be commonly held frames of reference (language, shared understanding of concepts) for meaningful interaction to be possible. Wenger argues that these commonly held frames of reference (structures) and social interactions (agency) interact with one another and are not static – they are mutually constitutive of one another – social structures shape interactions and vice versa in a relational process of social learning.

It is through this process that knowledge or institutionalised ways of thinking can be seen to shape how people understand the world and how they interact with one another, but also how such interactions and local negotiations of meaning can be seen to themselves refine knowledge and institutionalised ways of thinking. This review of the ideas that have guided Wenger’s thinking will examine both sides of the coin – theories which demonstrate the social, collective nature of thinking and knowledge - and theories which emphasise the negotiated nature of meaning and knowledge through interaction (and thus the potential creativity of agency). It is through this review of Wenger’s theoretical assumptions that the epistemological argument of the thesis begins to emerge: might Community Safety Partnerships become an institutional space in which ways of thinking that transcend the boundaries of traditional criminal justice agencies evolve?

As well as aiming to locate Wenger’s work within a recognisable theoretical context, the contours of his own perspective will also be described in some detail throughout this chapter. Specific focus will be given to his concepts of ‘legitimate peripheral participation’ and ‘communities of practice’ and how the first articulates the breadth of his relational social theory, and the second its ready applicability to examining practical issues of communication and cooperation in organisations and in partnerships. The concept of communities of practice itself will then be broken down into its three inter-related components – domain, community and practice – that shall be used as the framework through which the fieldwork of this study will be
analysed. It will be through the use of these concepts as an analytical framework that the empirical arguments of the thesis will take shape.

Section I will, therefore, illustrate the nature of the central inherent problems with partnership working in Chapter 2, and describe the theoretical framework that, it will be argued, is capable of both enhancing our understanding of these problems while also suggesting means of overcoming them.

Section II: the policy context

This section will formally set the scene for this social learning analysis of community safety partnerships in Scotland. In many respects the development of crime prevention and community safety partnerships in Scotland will be a familiar tale to those who have followed the better-documented developments in England and Wales. However, it is by no means an identical tale. Chapter 4 will begin with an explanation of post-Act of Union Scottish distinctiveness that places great emphasis on the institutional separation that continued to exist between the governmental apparatus of Scotland and England and Wales. Through this institutional separation cultural differences have been capable of being sustained, although actual distinctiveness has varied throughout the period of the Union. This analysis of Scottish distinctiveness will therefore return to the some of the themes touched upon in the previous chapter – such as the importance of institutional support for ideas to flourish. Sentiments, ideas, values, and politics could have a distinctive flavour in Scotland precisely because the institutional complexes within which they could develop (law, church and education being central to this argument) remained structurally distinct from those in its larger neighbour. The chapter then moves on to specifically examine developments in crime prevention and community safety in Scotland, noting both distinctive features and similarities between these developments and those in England and Wales. Although both jurisdictions do share much in common there are some distinguishing features of the institutional architecture within which Community Safety Partnerships have been nested in each. Particular attention will be given to the statutory responsibilities in both jurisdictions.
In England and Wales local authorities and the police were given statutory responsibilities to create Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (quickly termed Community Safety Partnerships in many areas) under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. In Scotland similar responsibilities were formalised rather later, and not under the auspices of Community Safety. The Local Government (Scotland) Act 2003 created statutory partnership obligations under the broader auspices of Community Planning – a wider social policy agenda designed to coordinate public service provision through the diverse array of partnership structures that had emerged since the late 1990s. Again going back to the theoretical framework discussed earlier, it will be argued that because community safety partnership work in Scotland has been institutionalised within rather different statutory parameters than it has in England and Wales, it has the potential to develop with distinctive inflections. However, developments thus far show considerable similarities on both sides of the border and the analysis of partnerships that shall follow is one that will be just as relevant in either context.

Section III: partnerships and communities of practice: lessons from the fieldwork

In this section the analysis and findings from the case study fieldwork will be presented over three chapters, each focusing on an individual, yet inter-related, component of Wenger’s communities of practice: domain (chapter 5), community (chapter 6) and practice (chapter 7) respectively.

The domain of a community of practice is its object – the topic or practice upon which the members of the community share an interest, orientating their activities around the pursuit of it. In chapter 5 the capacity of ‘community of safety’ to act as an effective domain of practice will be critically examined. It will be observed that while the breadth of the concept could be viewed as a positive attribute, because it gave a wide range of possible participants an interest in engaging with the partnership, it was also a problem because it did not suggest a clear set of practical initiatives that flowed from it. It was within the ambiguity of the domain of community safety that conflict and inertia could be built into partnership working.
The effect of statutory requirements, centrally and locally set performance targets for partnership working, and the development of specific agendas within the auspices of community safety (such as anti-social behaviour and wardens schemes) will be examined as means through which the domain of practice encompassed by community safety could be sharpened up.

Chapter 6 moves the analysis onto the community: the members of a community of practice who share a common interest in its domain. The membership of the partnerships studied will be outlined and described, highlighting the breadth of agencies that have become associated with the activities of Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland. Reflecting back on the problems with partnership working identified in chapter 2, the compatibility (or perceived lack of) of members will be a recurrent theme throughout this chapter. Different agencies were found to accord community safety and partnership working different levels of status and this could be important in determining the extent to which their representatives would identify with and show a commitment to the partnership. Different agencies were also externally subjected to their own performance regimes that could be incompatible with those of the partnership (unsurprising given the diversity of their roles in relation to criminal justice). Internal structures of member organisations could also be incompatible, such as where decision-making mechanisms varied between hierarchical organisations (the police) and democratic organisations (the council). However, it will be argued that many of the problems identified thus far could be seen as stemming in part from the funding regimes adopted in relation to community safety, and could also, in part at least, be remedied through them. The chapter will then move along to look at the more difficult issues of community consultation and representation, how partnerships have sometimes inadvertently collapsed them (although they are not the same thing) and how it is difficult, at present, to see the ‘community’ as a meaningful member of Community Safety Partnerships. The chapter will conclude with some reflections on the issue of trust amongst partners, and the question of whether partners need to identify with the partnership over their parent agency, both of which are themes which in fact run through the entire discussion of community in this context.
The final chapter of this section will seek to do what very little of the criminological literature has tried to do – characterise what it is that Community Safety Partnerships actually do. Wenger’s understanding of practice is, however, a little broader than this, encompassing not only the activities of a community, but also the ways of thinking that underpin them and determine what ‘counts’ as good practice within it. The chapter will return to the ambiguity of the concept of ‘community safety’, and the diversity of occupational culture amongst members of Community Safety Partnerships, in order to identify and extract what the commonly understood and agreed-upon features of community safety might be. This will act as a starting point for an analysis of the work of the Partnerships in the case study and the contribution of the national forums towards articulating a clear set of community safety practices. A key point to note in this section is that it is arguable that what counts as community safety work is in fact what counts as the work of the Designated Officers (police and local authority) more specifically. Much of their role was administrative and managerial but was not, it will be argued, underpinned by purely technical considerations. That analysis of the practice of community safety indicates that it is synonymous with the work of those Designated Officers seconded to it, rather than with work of a wider partnership as such, raises questions about what it is that the wider partnerships are for (legitimacy?) and whether they can, or should, be more actively engaged with the practices of community safety.

A short concluding section will draw together lessons from the chapters on domain, community and practice. It will be argued that there is a need for greater clarity in the domain of community safety, but that this needs to be defined from the practices of existing Community Safety Partnerships, and through commitment to better sharing of those practices through national forums such as the Scottish Community Safety Network, not through a further raft of centrally-set performance targets. This section will also draw out the particular value of the theoretical framework to the present field of study. By giving emphasis to the multiplicity of social groupings and sites of interaction that exist in social life, communities of practice better captures the diversity of relations between members of partnerships than previous attempts to
characterise the working of partnerships. Meaningful relations can occur at different levels in the partnership (involving everyone or only some select members), and between members of the partnership and their own agencies, and these relations (which in some cases might be communities of practice) may either serve the objectives of the partnership or thwart them. It is a perspective that captures the complexity of the organisational arrangements being created in partnerships, but which also directs our attention to how they may be made to work in ways that we want them to, a point upon which the thesis will conclude.

Section IV: Conclusions

Chapter 8 will draw together the empirical and epistemological arguments of the thesis. It will open by acknowledging that making recommendations about how to improve the working of such a contested concept as community safety requires one to be upfront about one’s normative position and preferred definition of it. Here it will be argued that there are sound normative and empirical reasons to adopt a broad, social understanding of community safety (all the while acknowledging some of the difficulties inherent with broad definitions) in preference to a narrow definition where crime issues and crime prevention are given too great an emphasis. Drawing upon the analysis of the fieldwork through the lens of communities of practice the chapter will then present a series of recommendations designed to enhance the working of Community Safety Partnerships and to encourage the development of distinctive occupational identities and practices forged around the work of community safety. The recommendations highlight the fact that community safety does have real potential to act as a motor of change within the criminal justice field, but that this potential remains fragile. This point will be taken up in the final section of the chapter that will explore the question of whether community safety can be viewed as having the capacity to recast and transform predominant criminal justice mentalities. It will be argued that the story of community safety is, in that it challenges traditional organisational monopolies and institutional trammels, thus far, a story of potential change and transformation, but that continuity is also an
important and recurring dimension of the narrative that might ultimately, and regrettably, come to characterise it.
Section I: Literature reviews and theoretical framework
Chapter 2: Crime prevention and community safety in theory and in practice: review of the literature on crime prevention and partnership working

Introduction
Crime prevention has moved from being something of a footnote within criminology and criminal justice studies to being a substantial (if still rather open and contested) field within a matter of decades. The purpose of this chapter is most certainly not to attempt anything like an exhaustive review of this extensive terrain – that task being ably achieved by other commentators (Crawford, 1997; 1998; 2007b; Gilling, 1997; 2007; Hughes, 1998; 2007; Hughes and Edwards, 2002; Hughes et al., 2002; Pease, 1997; 2002). Rather, the aim of the chapter is to locate the present study within this literature, while drawing out, and giving emphasis to, the most salient issues and themes which prompted and have subsequently underpinned it.

The chapter will be structured into three main sections which shall review different relevant aspects of the crime prevention literature, broadly defined. It shall begin with a review of the literature on the contested nature of the concept of ‘crime prevention’ itself. The depth of this contestation serves to illustrate the different sets of values and assumptions that underpin different conceptions and understandings of crime prevention. Crime prevention is shown to be a political and moral issue that is not reducible to a normatively neutral definition. The fact that different people and different agencies can adhere to quite distinct ways of thinking about crime prevention makes this review highly pertinent to any analysis of multi-agency working. The second section of the chapter focuses on the implementation of crime prevention through multi-agency partnerships, and how this approach to implementation became a central aspect of crime prevention and community safety, and embedded into thinking about them. Theoretical analyses of the wider social and political significance of this ‘preventative turn’ within criminology, and many western criminal justice systems, illustrate the considerable importance of these developments. Within this context the extent to which multi-agency crime prevention and community safety amount to genuinely ‘new’ developments will be
explored. The final section of the chapter will review the literature focusing on the actual working of crime prevention and community safety partnerships, and what they do in practice. It is these analyses of partnership working, highlighting both the potential of partnerships, as well as the problems inherent within them, that raise many of the starting point issues that will be explored in the remainder of the present study of partnership working in Scotland.

Thinking about ‘crime prevention’: concepts, typologies and assumptions

Crime prevention is a ‘slippery’ concept that is capable of meaning very different things to different people. Contestation about its meaning and scope is not just a matter of pedantry amongst scholars but is the result of the fundamental differences in normative and empirical assumptions that underpin different understandings of human nature, the causes of crime, and the means to prevent it. The idea that different agencies brought into partnership with one another might nurture and sustain distinctive understandings of crime prevention is one of the central problems that the present thesis engages with. Thus, this section not only provides a ‘background’ to the present study by introducing some of the criminological literature within which it is located, it also begins to illustrate the nature of a central problem with partnership working: that different partners work with different understandings and interpretations of the problem.

One of the difficulties in structuring a review of the various typologies and definitions of crime prevention that have been explored over the last few decades is that many of them overlap and intersect with one another (see Crawford, 1998, chapter 1) – it is sometimes difficult to separate out the different typologies and to think about where specific examples of initiatives might sit, because they potentially fit simultaneously into different typologies (one of the classic examples of this is neighbourhood watch, which is understandable as either a situational or a social form of crime prevention). In the interests of clear exposition the section will be structured around some of the main influential typologies that have guided analyses of crime prevention and its development elsewhere (Crawford, 1997; 1998; Gilling,
1997; Hughes, 1998; Pease, 1997). Blurring between them will be noted where appropriate, the main aim of the section being simply to illustrate the fact that crime prevention is far from being a neutral concept with a broadly accepted meaning, but that it is highly contested and open to being understood in very different, and sometimes contradictory, ways.

**Law, criminal justice process and ‘crime prevention’**

Much of what has come to constitute the literature on ‘crime prevention’ has emerged since the 1970s and has actively sought to conceptualise it in ways that distinguish it from the workings of the traditional criminal justice system. In part this was a result of the perceived failure of the criminal justice model in the face of ever-rising post-war crime rates (Garland, 1996; Martinson, 1974). Crime prevention, in its various forms, was often viewed as a possible alternative to criminal justice, and so many of the approaches and conceptions that were to be developed or re-imagined would work with quite different assumptions about human nature and the mechanisms through which prevention would be achieved. This uneasy relationship between crime prevention and criminal justice is a theme that shall recur throughout this chapter and in the remainder of the thesis. However, given that the present review aims to draw out the different conceptions of crime prevention that representatives of diverse agencies bring to the partnership table, and that the police and other criminal justice agencies are often included in this group, these ‘traditional’ criminal justice conceptions of crime and crime prevention are a useful starting point.

The ‘traditional’ criminal justice conceptions of crime prevention in this context are those that underpinned, or were tacitly assumed to be produced by, the everyday activities of modern criminal justice process – rule of law, police presence and patrol, investigation, prosecution, punishment and rehabilitation were all assumed to prevent crime (Tonry and Farrington, 1995, 3-6). It was generally understood that these activities prevented crime through a mixture of deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation – assumptions bearing the imprint of both classical and positivist
criminological theorising (Gilling, 1997, 23-44) and generically understood as the ‘penal-welfare’ orientation of the modern criminal justice system (Garland, 1985). Despite the fact that empirical evidence of prevention through deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation tended to be varied at best (Von Hirsch and Ashworth, 1992; Tonry and Farrington, 1995, 3-6), such conceptions of crime prevention remain powerful today. They undoubtedly held considerable sway in the academy (Garland, 2000; 2002) and continue to inform the understanding of crime prevention amongst criminal justice practitioners (Crawford, 1997, 99-104; Zedner, 2004) and, probably, the general public.

The classical understanding that crime would be prevented through the imposition of certain and proportionate punishment flowed from the view of human nature of its adherents. Individuals were assumed to be rational calculators who would ultimately act in their own best interests, and thus would be deterred from committing crime if punishments were likely to be imposed, or if they were set at a level of severity which would outweigh the potential ‘benefits’ to be derived from criminal activity (Monachesi, 1960; Bentham, 1992, 62-66; Vold, 2002; 17-20). Where measures were focused upon encouraging particular offenders to desist from future law-breaking they could be understood as being predicated upon ‘individual deterrence’ – the idea that a specific individual could be, through the severity of punishment imposed, or even through the experience of criminal justice process itself (Feeley, 1979), deterred from repeating offending behaviours. The evidence for individual deterrence remains contested and is rendered all the more complex by the sheer variety of offending behaviours that one might wish to deter, as well as the variety of reasons that might draw offenders towards desistance (many of which may have little to do with deterrence as such, see: Maruna, 2001). In contrast to deterrence of individual offenders, deterrence can also be understood as being focused on the population at large – where measures, legislation, sentences or public campaigns are designed to discourage certain proscribed behaviours amongst the public as a whole. This is known as ‘general deterrence’, and although it is also difficult to empirically prove its effects (Beyleveld, 1979; Tonry, 1997, 136-142), it retains considerable power as an idea, and has influential proponents. For example, it has been argued
that the existence of criminal codes that demarcate the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behaviours in a society act to discourage and deter engagement in proscribed behaviours by the generally law-abiding (Hart, 1968). It might also be argued that in demarcating social boundaries the law symbolically communicates and entrenches the values and commitments of a society, both reflecting and shaping the orientations of its members (Durkheim, 1938). In short, the very existence of a system of criminal law and criminal justice could have some general deterrent and socialising effects, thus acting to prevent crime. This belief also extends to other specific activities and features of the criminal justice system, regardless of whether there is evidence to sustain their preventative credentials. Police officers, for example, continue to value patrol, fast response times and criminal investigation on the grounds that they prevent crime (Bayley, 1998; Crawford, 1997). Indeed, such activities have consistently been found to be understood and valued as ‘real’ police-work in contrast to other ‘soft’ types of work that often include crime prevention and community safety (Young 1991; Reiner, 2000) However, much of the research evidence suggests that the former two actually have little impact on individual crimes (Percy, 1980; Hough, 1996) and the latter has little bearing on crime rates which are shaped by factors largely out-with the reach of the police or the wider criminal justice system (Reiner, 2000, 77-78; Coleman and Moynihan, 1996). There is a similar belief in the capacity of the prison, and other custodial institutions, to prevent crime through the incapacitation of offenders. Obviously incarcerating individuals does prevent them from committing crime in the wider community for the duration of their sentence. To this extent, and quite crudely, incarceration can accurately be viewed as crime prevention, is quite necessary in relation to some categories of dangerous offender, and should be recognised as playing a limited role in crime control (Zimring, 1995). However, claims that incapacitation through wide-scale use of imprisonment can prevent crime at a level necessary to alter general crime-rates are, particularly given resource limitations in most jurisdictions, empirically questionable (Currie, 1998; 1988a, chapter 3; Smith and Young, 1999; Tonry, 1995, 173-179), as well as ethically problematic (Tonry, 1992).
The insights and assumptions of positivist criminology have also shaped the orientations of scholars and criminal justice practitioners (Garland, 1988; 2002). It is impossible to do justice to the complexity of the positivist project, and the breadth of ideas, theories and perspectives so often labelled positivist, within such a brief review. The key point to note about positivist criminology here, and what perspectives within it share, is its orientation of inquiry towards “criminality” and what made the criminal thus (Garland, 2000, 7; 2002; Gilling, 1997, 31-42). The search for the causes of crime and criminal dispositions brought with it different understandings of crime prevention. Once diagnosed, the causes of crime (whether nested in an individual’s psychology or in the social milieu in which they were brought up) suggested particular types of prevention – interventions which could potentially ‘treat’ these underlying problems and make offenders law-abiding once more. In short, positivism is associated with the belief that criminals can be changed if the correct interventions are made in their lives – they can be rehabilitated. Belief in the possibility of rehabilitation continues to underpin the thinking of many scholars and criminal justice practitioners, particularly within social work and in custodial institutions (Crawford, 1997, 101-104; Maruna, 2001; McNeill and Whyte, 2007). As a rationale of sentencing, and as an objective of the criminal justice system, rehabilitation has had its ups and downs, being highly influential for much of the 20th century until research began to consistently question its efficacy (Martinson, 1974). More recently, it has garnered renewed interest through the commitment of scholars and practitioners intent on demonstrating that rehabilitation can be achieved if programmes are designed, implemented and evaluated properly (McGuire, 1995; 2002; Maruna, 2001) - something that was demonstrated to often have been lacking in the past (Allen, 1981).

To summarise the above for the purposes of the present thesis - ‘crime prevention’ was by no means a new idea that emerged in the 1970s, even though it was given greater emphasis from this point onwards. Classical and positivist perspectives were underpinned with assumptions about the nature of crime prevention (crudely: deterrence of rational individuals in the former, rehabilitation of differentiated offenders in the latter) that continue to shape how criminal justice practitioners
understand and justify their work. Crime prevention was to be achieved through the
deterrent, incapacitative, rehabilitative and socialising capacities of the law, criminal
justice, policing and custodial institutions. The fact that these understandings of
crime prevention, which were part and parcel of penal welfarism (Garland, 1985),
were often built on slim evidence and contradictory assumptions and were, by the
1970s, increasingly viewed as having failed to stem the ever rising tide of crime
(Martinson, 1974, Garland, 1996; 2001; Hughes, 1998) became the starting point for
scholars seeking to consolidate, clarify and develop alternative ways of thinking
about ‘crime prevention’. It is to some of the most important of these attempts that
we now turn.

*Primary, secondary and tertiary crime prevention*

Brantingham and Faust’s (1976) application of the public health model of disease
prevention to the issue of crime is one of the best known and influential attempts to
provide an overarching typology of crime prevention. The three different levels of
prevention identified in the public health model relate to different stages of
development of illness and disease amongst the population. Primary prevention
strategies seek to identify causes of disease in the wider environment and reduce or
remove their effects before the onset of any symptoms in the population. Primary
prevention is applied to the social world at large and aims to modify it in ways that
prevent health problems emerging in the first place. Examples of primary disease
prevention might therefore include general health education programmes or
advertisement campaigns that encourage people to act in ways conducive to good
health. They could also include planned improvements to the physical environment
that are likely to have widespread health benefits, such as when developments in
sanitation and sewage systems in the 19th century improved the population’s health.
Thus, primary prevention focuses on the population at large, the environment in
which they live, and the earliest stages of development of disease (see 1976, 288-289
for more examples). Secondary prevention on the other hand focuses on identifying
those sections of the population who, for various reasons, are at the most risk of
developing illnesses or diseases, as well as people in the early stages of a condition.
Secondary prevention is therefore about the “early diagnosis” of health problems, followed by making interventions oriented towards “disability limitation” and, where possible, cure (1976, 289). Such interventions tend to be directed towards more specific categories of people (the authors give overweight businessmen and prospective mothers as examples) or groups (such as impoverished neighbourhoods) known or diagnosed to have elevated health risks. Tertiary prevention, in the public health model, focuses on identifying those individuals who are already at the stage where they are suffering from serious conditions. Here the aim is to prevent conditions from worsening (particularly where they might cause death or long term disability), to provide relief from pain and discomfort and, where possible, to rehabilitate patients completely (1976, 288-289). Examples given of tertiary prevention in this context range from invasive procedures designed to save patients’ lives, such as open heart surgery, to initiatives such as Braille training, which allows people who have gone blind to deal with some of the consequences of this incapacity (1976, 288).

When one applies this public health model of prevention to crime prevention it looks something like this:

- Primary crime prevention is directed towards the population and the physical environment at large. It endeavours to make interventions that either promote pro-social and non-criminal activities, or which remove features of the social or physical world which might act as inducements to engaging in such behaviour. Commonly given examples of primary crime prevention include: moral education in schools and churches; public education about the prevention of crime (e.g. educating the public not to drink and drive or to lock their car when they leave it somewhere); and the efforts of town planners and architects to design physical spaces in ways that are not conducive to criminal activity. For Brantingham and Faust the “general deterrence” provided by the articulation of moral boundaries in criminal codes, as well as police patrols and sentencing practices, is also a form of primary prevention (see 1976, 294-295).
• Secondary crime prevention is targeted towards more specific groups and individuals who can be diagnosed as being ‘at risk’ of becoming engaged in a criminal career. In practice this tends to mean that secondary crime prevention focuses upon young people (at peak ages of offending) and specific neighbourhoods and communities found to be blighted with social problems (such as poverty, high resident mobility, and low levels of employment) associated with the onset of criminality. Examples might include attempts by the courts to divert young delinquents from prosecution to avoid labelling, similarly focused education or counselling programmes, and efforts to make design modifications in ‘at risk’ neighbourhoods (1976, 294-295).

• Tertiary crime prevention is focused on those who have already embarked on a criminal career. It aims to curtail criminal careers or at least reduce the frequency or seriousness of the offending behaviour concerned. Much tertiary crime prevention takes the form of formal criminal justice punishments or rehabilitation programmes, but would also include social service provisions for ex-offenders and schemes designed to get ex-offenders back into work (1976, 294-294). The distinctions between being ‘at risk’ of offending, being an early stage delinquent and then being a recidivist offender are potentially ambiguous suggesting a blurring between secondary and tertiary crime prevention. For Brantingham and Faust the distinction is essentially a legal one. Prosecution defines the individual as an offender and attempts to prevent their future offending as tertiary.

This conceptual model of crime prevention was further refined by van Dijk and de Waard who were unsatisfied with its capacity to meaningfully organise and classify different forms of crime prevention initiative:

“We are not satisfied…with the lumping together of, for instance, the installation of high-quality locks in buildings and courses on ‘social
responsibility’ in primary schools. Both are examples of primary prevention, but otherwise seem to have little in common.” (1991, 484)

As well as making distinctions between the stages to which problems have developed (as in the public health model) van Dijk and de Waard argued that a typology of crime prevention should also distinguish more clearly between the target groups to which initiatives were to be applied. They drew upon insights from routine activities theory that criminal events generally occurred where there was a “convergence in space and time of motivated offenders and potential victims within an insufficiently guarded environment” (1991, 485) to conclude that preventative efforts needed to be directed at these three basic targets (offenders, victims and situations) as well as the primary, secondary and tertiary stages of development. Van Dijk and de Waard’s refinement of Brantingham and Faust’s typology creates nine different categories of crime prevention intervention (1991, 486-489), outlined in Table 1 below. The Table provided here is based upon van Dijk and de Waard’s own overview of their “two dimensional” model of crime prevention (see 1991, 489 for the original) but has been, for the purposes of the present review, expanded to include examples of criminal justice crime prevention that were included by Brantingham and Faust.
Table 1: A ‘two-dimensional’ model of crime prevention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target groups</th>
<th>Developmental stage of the crime prevention</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Primary</strong></td>
<td><strong>Secondary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Offenders</strong></td>
<td>Responsible parenting classes</td>
<td>Street-corner work with young people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General education (schools)</td>
<td>Youth clubs and youth cafes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral education (religious and social agencies)</td>
<td>Training and employment schemes for young people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Truancy prevention programmes</td>
<td>Foster parenting programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police patrols (deterrence)</td>
<td>Police community involvement work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exemplary sentences by the courts (deterrence)</td>
<td>Elevated police presence in high crime neighbourhoods (deterrence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information campaigns about drinking/drugs or domestic violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situations</strong></td>
<td>Target hardening</td>
<td>Redesigning high crime areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime prevention through environmental design</td>
<td>Caretakers and concierge schemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Town planning</td>
<td>Wardens schemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business security provisions (e.g. design of shopping centres)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Street lighting improvements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Product design</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victims</strong></td>
<td>Information campaigns to warn potential victims</td>
<td>Neighbourhood watch in high crime neighbourhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special advice for vulnerable victims such as children and the elderly</td>
<td>Provision of attack alarms to female students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police patrols (reassurance)</td>
<td>Police community involvement work (reassurance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elevated police presence in high crime neighbourhoods (reassurance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The activities of law enforcement and punishment were explicitly excluded by van Dijk and de Waard as they sought to develop conceptions of crime prevention that were alternatives to these traditional and ‘punitive’ forms of prevention (1991, 483). They did not however deny the potential for such measures to prevent crime. By including examples of criminal justice crime prevention (as well as the general activities of other social actors – from schools to businesses – that were also included by Brantingham and Faust, see 1976, 294-295) the sheer breadth of what might potentially be described as ‘crime prevention’ becomes clear. Even a cursory glance at Table 1 serves to illustrate this. General education programmes in schools (primary offender-orientated), town planning (primary situational), victim compensation schemes (tertiary victim-orientated), product design (primary situational) and the death penalty (tertiary offender-orientated) are all classifiable as crime prevention within this typology. The rather unhelpful conclusion that can thus be reached is that virtually any social policy directed at shaping people’s lives could potentially be described or justified in terms of ‘crime prevention’. This demonstrates the ambiguity at the heart of crime prevention – very different interventions in the social world, or in the lives of offenders and victims, can be understood as crime prevention. The picture is complicated rather further when it is noted that a single intervention can also serve multiple audiences for slightly different purposes. For example, police patrols can be categorised as either as primary offender-orientated prevention (on the grounds that they deter potential offenders) or primary victim-orientated prevention (on the grounds that they reassure potential victims). In reality they probably do both. Where targeted at high-crime neighbourhoods or estates police patrols could also be understood as secondary offender-orientated or secondary victim-orientated crime prevention. The point to note is that crime prevention not only encapsulates a potentially huge range of activities, but also that specific initiatives may, intentionally or unintentionally, in reality serve different audiences and purposes at the same time. Thus, the value of the primary, secondary and tertiary typology is that it illustrates the breadth, variety and fluidity of ‘crime prevention’, and the sheer confusion of ideas and perspectives that could be brought to the table in partnerships. However, one of its limitations is that it doesn’t get into explaining the mechanisms through which all of these types of
crime prevention actually purport to work (Ekblom, 1994). It is to the ‘strategic approaches’ to crime prevention that have actively sought to uncover these mechanisms, and the assumptions underpinning them, that we now turn (see Tonry and Farrington, 1995).

**Situation crime prevention**

The situational perspective on crime prevention was developed through the work of government researchers based in The Home Office Research Unit (later re-branded the Research and Planning Unit in 1981) throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. It grew out of the growing sense that traditional punitive and rehabilitative criminal justice measures had failed to control crime (Clarke and Cornish, 1983) and that policymakers required practical and effective alternatives to such measures. Ron Clarke, the Head of the Unit throughout this period, has documented the emergence of a situational perspective very fully (Clarke and Cornish, 1983; Clarke, 1992; 1995; 1997). He has indicated that there were a number of influences and important pieces of research that began to direct the thinking of the Unit away from criminality and the offender, and towards the offence and the criminal event. For example, research into the management and administration of custodial institutions (particularly those housing young male delinquents (including borstals and approved schools) that the Unit had been working on since the 1960s began to indicate that factors imbedded in the regimes and daily environments of institutions (including the effectiveness or otherwise of matrons and wardens) had a greater influence on regime discipline and rates of absconding than did the characteristics (in terms of age, disciplinary record and offending profile) of the inmates themselves (Clarke and Cornish, 1983, 32-35; Clarke, 1992, 4-5; Clarke and Martin, 1971). The importance of the characteristics of situations and of environmental contexts themselves, over those of specific types of disposition and motivation, was also drawn out in Clarke and Mayhew’s influential analysis of *The British Gas Suicide Story* (1988). Here they argued that the substantial drop in the suicide rate following the removal of toxic carbon monoxide from the gas supply between 1963 and 1975 provided a potent example of the fact that behaviour (even behaviour driven by strong
motivations, such as suicide) could be greatly altered through simple modifications of the, in this case, physical environment. Use of domestic gas appliances was a common and effective means of committing suicide (accounting for over 40% of them) because the gas was highly lethal (unlike many poisons or medicine overdoses which, unless you knew what you were doing, would be more likely to cause serious injury than death), readily available in virtually all homes, largely painless, and not symbolically associated with violent death (through use of knives or guns, which could, respectively, be difficult to use or difficult to obtain) or the execution of criminals (hanging). Therefore, when the toxicity of the gas supply was removed people didn’t just use other methods of killing themselves (the study is seen as a key critique of the idea that making situational changes to environments merely displaces crime, see Crawford, 1998, 85-86). In short, Clarke and Mayhew argued that The British Gas Suicide Story demonstrated that even an act such as suicide, which we assumed people to be deeply driven to, could be prevented through making modest modifications in the physical world that made it more difficult or less appealing (1988). A range of other studies (classically covering motorbike theft, use of steering locks to prevent car theft, prevention of robberies in post offices, clearing up subway graffiti, and regulating movement around theme parks – see, Crawford, 1998, 84-98; Clarke, 1992; Felson and Clarke, 1998) would also appear to confirm this insight: that crime was not merely the outcome of criminal dispositions being acted out, but that it was in large part shaped by the characteristics of specific contexts and environments. With the added influence and encouragement of concurrent American research into environmental criminology (see below, and Clarke, 1992, introduction; 1995) Clarke and his colleagues would move on to develop and refine these insights into the situational crime prevention perspective.

Situational crime prevention was first and foremost designed to be a practical, policy-orientated, and common sense approach to the problem of crime (Clarke, 1995). It was not intended to be about grand theorising but was about identifying problems and getting things done to remedy them. To this end it was designed around an ‘action research’ or problem-orientated model of implementation (Tilley, 2002; Wilkins, 1997; Goldstein, 1979), whereby systematic data collection and
research would be used to: 1. identify problems and their nature; 2. specify the most appropriate and cost-effective measures to implement; and 3. Evaluate the effects that these measures have on the problem (Clarke, 1992, 5; Ekblom, 1995). This orientation would shape the management of partnership working for years to come. The situational approach itself was underpinned by a number of inter-related ideas and assumptions that have been recast in numerous analyses of the field (Clarke, 1995; Clarke and Mayhew, 1980; Heal and Laycock, 1986; Felson and Clarke, 1998; Ekblom, 1994; 1995; Crawford, 1998; Hughes, 1998; Pease, 1997), but which also serve to provide a useful description of what it entails. The central ones can be summarised as follows:

- There is a focus on the specific criminal event in space and time (the situation), not on the dispositions of individual offenders and the ‘root’ causes of their behaviour patterns. Ekblom (1994) describes this as a focus on proximal causes of crime as opposed to distal causes.

- Measures are directed at the physical and the social environment and are intended to be relatively permanent changes, even though it is recognised that offenders may learn to work around these changes and that further ones may therefore be necessary. Crime prevention is an ongoing process within the situational perspective.

- Crime is largely opportunistic and opportunities are shaped by the social and physical environment. Individuals make decisions about whether to commit crimes in very specific contexts. Their decisions may be based on imperfect information, and a limited capacity to really analyse all of the pros and cons, but are nonetheless largely rational decisions in which the costs and benefits of engaging in crime are evaluated.

These ideas and assumptions are derived from, and are in turn nourished by, quite specific theoretical orientations that were developed around the same time as situational crime prevention and which are closely connected with it - rational choice
theory and routine activities theory in particular (Clarke, 1995; Felson and Clarke, 1998; Felson, 2002). Together these theories have been described as “criminologies of everyday life” (Garland 2000; 2001, 127-131) in that they both refute or de-emphasise the positivist focus on the offender and what causes them to offend, replacing this with an assumed rationality of individual behaviour (within certain constraints) in the former perspective, and a focus on the everyday organisation and flow of social life within specific physical contexts in the latter, to explain crime events. In a sense, situational crime prevention is neo-classicist in orientation, marking a return of the rational individual within criminology, but it also represents quite a radical change in thinking from positivism in that it almost excludes criminality from analysis altogether, instead directing attention towards the context of the offence itself: the criminal event (Garland, 2000).

Part of the appeal of the situational perspective has been its capacity to suggest a great variety of clear lines of intervention based upon its assumptions. One of the widest misconceptions about situational crime prevention is that it could ultimately be boiled down to basic target-hardening (Pease, 2002, 952). In fact its scope and the range of interventions suggested and underpinned by it were broad, as is well-illustrated by reference to Clarke’s own 12 point typology of situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1992; 1995), later expanded to a 16 and then a 25-point typology by Clarke and Homel (1997) and then Cornish and Clarke (2003) (see Crawford, 2007b, 872-875 and Table 2, below). Clarke has argued that the approach is applicable to all types of crime if one is imaginative enough about how it might be deployed (1995). For example, even violent crime is susceptible to it, through the use of gun control to limit the potential harms caused in confrontational encounters. Table 2 certainly illustrates the fact that situational crime prevention is about much more than target hardening and making changes to the physical world, also drawing attention to the ‘social’ contexts of criminal events. This might include the roles that peer pressure, perceived provocation and the apparent level of surveillance have in shaping situations (see ‘reducing provocations’ and ‘increasing perceived risks’, below). It also includes consideration of the extent to which expectations of behaviour are set, understood and acknowledged in given contexts (e.g. people’s
understanding of appropriate conduct when driving – see ‘removing excuses’, below).

**Table 2: Techniques of situational crime prevention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increasing the perceived effort</th>
<th>Increasing the perceived risks</th>
<th>Reducing the anticipated reward</th>
<th>Reducing provocations</th>
<th>Removing excuses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target harden</td>
<td>Extend guardianship</td>
<td>Conceal targets</td>
<td>Reduce stress and friction</td>
<td>Set rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. steering locks</td>
<td>e.g. baggage screening and automatic ticket gate</td>
<td>e.g. gender neutral phone directories</td>
<td>e.g. efficient bar service</td>
<td>e.g. harassment codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control access</td>
<td>Assist natural surveillance</td>
<td>Remove targets</td>
<td>Avoid disputes</td>
<td>Post instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. entry phone systems</td>
<td>e.g. street lighting</td>
<td>e.g. removable car stereo</td>
<td>e.g. fixed taxi fares</td>
<td>e.g. notices highlighting rules – ‘no parking’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen exits</td>
<td>Reduce anonymity</td>
<td>Identify property</td>
<td>Reduce temptation and arousal</td>
<td>Stimulate conscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. ticket needed for exit</td>
<td>e.g. taxi driver ID cards</td>
<td>e.g. property marking</td>
<td>e.g. control of violent pornography</td>
<td>e.g. roadside speed displays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deflect offenders</td>
<td>Employee Surveillance</td>
<td>Disrupt markets</td>
<td>Neutralize peer pressure</td>
<td>Facilitate compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. segregate football fans</td>
<td>e.g. park wardens</td>
<td>e.g. monitor pawn shops and licence street vendors</td>
<td>e.g. ‘Idiots drink and drive’ campaigns</td>
<td>e.g. provide ample bins and public toilets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling means and facilitators</td>
<td>Formal surveillance</td>
<td>Deny benefits</td>
<td>Discourage imitation</td>
<td>Control disinhibitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. gun control</td>
<td>e.g. speed cameras</td>
<td>e.g. graffiti cleaning and disabling mobile phones</td>
<td>e.g. rapid repair of damaged property</td>
<td>e.g. parental controls on the internet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Summarized from Crawford, 2007, 875 (further examples are provided in this text).

Volumes have been written about how situational crime prevention techniques can be applied in a host of ways to a great many problems (Clarke, 1992; 1995; 1997; Newman et al., 1997). What ultimately ties these initiatives together is their focus on the criminal offence in space and time, rather than on the criminal offender. Situational prevention is about changing behaviour through changing the situations and contexts, and how they are perceived, within which people live their everyday lives. It is notable that the means through which such interventions can be made largely (though not entirely) lie beyond the scope of the traditional criminal justice system and the police.
Environmental crime prevention

Environmental crime prevention is often discussed as an aspect of situational crime prevention and was, as noted, influential in its development. As with situational prevention environmental crime prevention and criminology was not primarily focused upon the offender and their dispositions, instead generally assuming that individuals with such dispositions did exist and that their behaviour could be modified by making changes to the environment. It is notable, however, that for many environmental criminologists, although there was a focus on the characteristics of the lived environment, and the ways in which people use and interact with spaces and buildings, that fits with the situational focus on the criminogenic event, there was also often an understanding that environments played a role in the socialisation of individuals and so did contribute to the development of pro-social or anti-social dispositions in the long-term (Coleman, 1989; Newman, 1972).

One of the interesting features of environmental crime prevention is that many of the initial influential voices were not those of criminologists but of architects and town planners. Jane Jacobs was interested in the planning, organisation and social fabric of American cities and urban spaces. She argued, in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961), that a tendency towards ‘zoning’, and an increasing lack of diversity in the use of public space, made urban environments more prone to crime because they allowed criminals to act in relative privacy and undermined citizens’ sense of territory and control over their environment. The ideas of ‘territoriality’ and ‘natural surveillance’ were developed further by Oscar Newman, with specific reference to the design characteristics of buildings (high rise apartment blocks being a particular focus of his attention) and estates in *Defensible Space* (1972). Newman argued that design features of buildings (such as walkways; darkened corridors, passages, and stairwells; and foyers and ‘shared’ spaces which had no single owner or responsible person in charge of it) could provide opportunities for criminals and could cumulatively erode residents pride in, and sense of control over, their environment. The objective of designers, according to Newman, should be to create
“defensible space” by opening up spaces to natural surveillance and encouraging residents to have a sense of ownership over them (e.g. by ensuring that windows looked out onto shared gardens and spaces and marking them out as the property of residents who should feel confident about using them). In turn this would encourage use of these spaces and a reduction in anonymity amongst residents, making them more aware when people entered those spaces that were not supposed to. These ideas would also influence the work of Alice Coleman who sought to apply and develop them within a UK context (1990; 1989). Despite the well-rehearsed methodological limitations of the work of all of these commentators\(^1\) their ideas were powerful, had a common sense appeal, and exerted an influence on social researchers and policy makers (Clarke; 1992; 1997; Gilling, 1997; Crawford 1998). They also chimed with the developing shift in thinking about crime prevention within criminology throughout this period – i.e. that it was easier, and potentially more fruitful, to target design features of the lived environment than it was to tackle deep-rooted motivations of offenders, and that, as such, crime prevention could not be monopolised by the police and the criminal justice system.

Environmental crime prevention and criminology has continued to develop and has become a substantial field in its own right (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981a; Evans and Herbert, 1989; Bottoms and Wiles, 2002) - even if it is recognised that its focus on the offence, opportunity structures and routine activities does link it closely to the situational paradigm (see; Bottoms and Wiles, 2002, 623, 629-631). Some further examples of types of research categorised as environmental crime prevention include: research on the cognitive maps used by offenders to negotiate urban spaces, and how they shape patterns of offending (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981); “crime prevention through environmental design” (Jeffrey, 1971); studies of the impact of housing policies on local crime rates (Bottoms et al., 1981; Bottoms and Wiles, 1988); analyses of patterns of different types of offending in urban

\(^1\) Such as Jacobs’ “anecdotal” approach to the marshalling of evidence, and concerns that Newman had drawn his evidence very selectively and had relied too much on police statistics, largely ignoring other sources of data about the characteristics of estate populations that could have explained different offending and victimisation rates more effectively than apparent differences in the design features of estates - see Gilling, 1997, 47-55.
environments (Wikstrom, 1991); and the use of GIS systems in the analysis and mapping of offending patterns and distribution (Hirschfield and Bowers, 2001).

**Social crime prevention: community and developmental crime prevention**

Social crime prevention is a term often used in contrast to situational crime prevention (Bottoms, 1990; Crawford, 1998) but it lacks the latter’s specificity, and so can prove to be ambiguous and ultimately unhelpful. Less confusion occurs if it is remembered that situational crime prevention is not only concerned with making changes to the physical environments in which crimes take place, but that it also takes cognisance of the social dimensions of events in space and time. Surveillance, guardianship and territoriality are, for example, often provided through human relations and interactions and thus might be considered as ‘social’ dimensions of situations. When talking of ‘social crime prevention’ we are not referring to such matters.

It is more helpful, and more accurate, to think of social crime prevention as being distinguishable from situational prevention because it specifically focuses on the ‘root causes’ of crime (socially defined), not on the physical or social characteristics of criminal events. To use Ekbolm’s terminology, social crime prevention is concerned with the “distal” causes of offending (i.e. less directly linked to specific events and more likely to be characteristics of offenders’ backgrounds) and is imprinted with the thinking and assumptions of traditional, positivist criminology and penal welfarism (Garland, 2000). The potential scope of social crime prevention is therefore extremely broad, encompassing any aspect of social structure or organisation that might contribute to criminal behaviours. This might include consideration of all or some of the following in relation to the development of social crime prevention programmes: unemployment rates; availability and quality of social housing; welfare systems; changing family structures and supports; the nature and distribution of relative deprivation in a society; consumer culture; and the quality and accessibility of education and health services (Currie, 1985; 1998). In a sense, therefore, social crime prevention might be viewed as the most radical perspective on
crime prevention - potentially challenging fundamental social structures and inequalities in society, and orientating crime prevention firmly around notions of social justice (Hope and Karstedt, 2003). A less positive view of it, however, might argue that it runs the risk of becoming virtually indistinguishable from social policy in a very general sense. This is potentially dangerous where it creates expectations that social policies should be justifiable on the grounds that they prevent crime (something that is difficult to prove) rather than because they are worth doing in and of themselves - because they are necessary components of ordered democratic societies in which citizens have the right to expect a certain quality of life (Crawford, 1998, 120-122; see also Simon, 2007). ‘Social crime prevention’ is therefore another open-textured and ambiguous term - potentially referring to a huge range of interventions that do not necessarily even have crime prevention as a central objective. The term should be treated with some caution. Both ‘community crime prevention’ and ‘developmental crime prevention’ are more clearly specified and strategic concepts that can reasonably be subsumed within ‘social crime prevention’ (because they broadly share its focus on dealing with what are perceived to be the ‘root causes’ of crime in society – although in the former the focus is communities and groups, in the latter it is individuals) and should generally be used in preference to it.

Community crime prevention “refers to actions intended to change the social conditions that are believed to sustain crime in residential communities” (Hope, 1995, 21). This simple definition belies a complex and contested terrain (Hope, 1995; Hope and Shaw, 1988; Crawford, 1998, 124-160) that has its roots in the classic work of the Chicago School sociologists into the social ecology of crime (Shaw and McKay, 1942/1969; Sampson, 1995, 194-198). Shaw and McKay showed that certain neighbourhoods in the city had crime rates that were substantially higher than others, and that these crime rates tended to persist over time regardless of changes in the population occupying them. They argued that a combination of population turnover, ethnic heterogeneity and relative poverty in low rent urban neighbourhoods created “social disorganization” in which residents lost the capacity to exert informal social controls over one another, local social
institutions atrophied, and opportunities for young delinquents were rife (Vold, et al., 2002, 120-125; Sampson, 1995, 198-199). The Chicago Area Projects that they developed were designed to offset these problems and stimulate community organisation and have continued to influence the development of community crime prevention – not only in their focus on community institutions as mechanisms through which to prevent crime, but also in their promotion of communities themselves taking a part in projects (Hope, 1995, 25-29; Shaw and McKay, 1942/1969). Over the years community crime prevention projects have taken a variety of different forms, sometimes based upon different basic assumptions about the nature of the community’s problem. They have included, and this is by no means an exhaustive list: efforts to encourage volunteer and outreach work to get local people engaged with, and taking responsibility for, what’s happening in their neighbourhood; projects designed to establish or refresh local civic institutions (from churches to trade unions to more informal ‘friendship’ movements and youth clubs) through which people can participate in communal life and identify with its values; attempts to redress the physical and social decline of neighbourhoods brought about by long-term poverty and unemployment; neighbourhood watch initiatives designed to support local residents exercising surveillance and authority, in partnership with the police, over their streets; specific ‘community defence’ projects in extreme cases, where the aim is to restore a sense of order to communities on the cusp of decline; and even policy-level initiatives intent on using planning and housing policies to prevent the establishment of local areas with high-crime reputations (see Hope and Shaw, 1988; Hope, 1995, Sampson, 1995; Tonry and Farrington, 1995; Crawford, 1998, 194-140; Young, 2001; Kelling, 2001; Bottoms and Wiles, 1988). Such initiatives are broadly based on the assumption that communities have capacities through which they can exert informal social control over people within them (Sampson, 1995; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Hope, 1995) – either allowing communities to resist or control potential delinquents within their midst, or by drawing such people back into the community itself, giving them a sense of belonging and attachment to it, and an investment that ultimately outweighs any benefits to be derived from crime. Criminology did not, of course, have a monopoly over such thinking and community projects designed to halt urban decline, sustain
local institutions, and encourage the active participation and flourishing of local people within communities with which they closely identify have long been part of the urban regeneration initiatives within social policy that pre-dated the emergence of community safety (Hughes, 1998; 2007). Indeed, according to Hope, the commitment to the application and implementation of such ideas has drawn from the political and moral orientations of dedicated practitioners within this field, not from criminological theorising as such (1995, 22). This reminds us yet again that ideas around crime prevention are not mere technological fixes but are imprinted with political and normative values and commitments – which are explicitly or implicitly held by the very practitioners who have much to contribute to partnership working.

Developmental crime prevention “is largely based on the idea that criminal activity is determined by behavioural and attitudinal patterns that have been learned during an individual’s development.” (Tremblay and Craig, 1995, 151) As with other approaches to crime prevention it has drawn inspiration from out-with criminology (e.g. from public health and education) despite sharing a general positivist orientation toward focusing on identifying the ‘root causes’ of offending within offenders’ social and psychological development. The perspective has focused attention on young people and on the stages and processes of their development - specific attention being paid to young people who, because of factors characterising their social background, family or peer group, may be perceived to be at an elevated ‘risk’ of becoming engaged in delinquent behaviour (Farrington, 2002; Tremblay and Craig, 1995; Smith, 1997). The approach is often associated with early interventions with juveniles, but can equally focus on adolescents likely to be at peak ages of offending (Tremblay and Craig, 1995; Moffit, 1993). Given its focus it is unsurprising that examples of developmental crime prevention initiatives have tended to be implemented within the context of schools and youth groups, or have been directed at families with young ‘at risk’ children. Some initiatives have sought to improve parenting skills and the capacity (social and economic) of parents to bring up and support the positive development of their children. Others have focused on enhancing the attachment that young people feel towards their school, teachers and education in order to promote their participation and achievement within school and
the community, as well as prevent the emergence of risk factors of future
delinquency (such as truancy, bullying and school exclusions) (see Crawford, 1998,
109-120). In summary, as an aspect of social crime prevention developmental
prevention focuses on the social (and psychological) development of young people
(the very young and the ‘at risk’ adolescent) and how developmental processes of
parental upbringing, environment, education and socialisation can contribute to the
emergence of pro or anti-social tendencies. Proponents of the approach understood
that intervention in these developmental processes can promote pro-social
development and prevent anti-social behaviour in the first place, or can reduce its
long-term effects where it is already manifest (Tremblay and Craig, 1995).

Discussion

The purpose of outlining the various conceptions of crime prevention commonly
found in the literature has been, primarily, to demonstrate the sheer complexity and
confusion of crime prevention. It seems that activities as diverse as incarceration,
school education, target hardening, and housing policy can be, and have been,
justified on the grounds that they ‘prevent crime’. The list could go on. The point is
important in the context of the present thesis. Although it is true that many of the
strategic approaches outlined have attempted to sharpen and clarify what is meant by
crime prevention, and have sought to provide clear, evidence-based direction over
what could and should be implemented as crime prevention (this is especially true of
the situational approach – Gilling, 1994; Tilley, 2001; 2002), it remains the case that
the crime prevention landscape is littered with numerous (sometimes contradictory,
sometimes overlapping) ways of thinking about and understanding it. All of these
conceptions of crime prevention exist and underpin the thinking of scholars and,
more importantly, of practitioners increasingly required to work in crime prevention
and community safety partnerships. Understanding this emphasises the point that
whatever crime prevention is, it is not a politically neutral, technical solution to a
mutually agreed and uncontested problem. This has ramifications for how we might
expect partnerships to work.
However, the potential for partnerships to be reminiscent of the Tower of Babel (something of a purposeful overstatement) is by no means the sole point to be extracted from this review. Two recurrent themes – the blurring between conceptions of crime prevention and the degree to which they underscore the criminal justice system’s lack of purchase on it – merit brief discussion here before we look at partnerships themselves in greater detail.

• Categories of crime prevention and ways of thinking about it are not monolithic, nor do they amount to ‘silos’ beyond which their proponents cannot think. They only present a simplified way of categorising the world. This is perhaps best illustrated by looking at the potential blurring between situational (event-focused) and social (disposition-focused) crime prevention. These categories are discussed and described as being fundamentally different from one another, nurtured by epistemologically distinct disciplines of knowledge (Garland, 2000). Such distinctions are useful where one wishes to evolve and professionalize a field of knowledge (such as situational crime prevention – see Ekblom, 1995; Kuhn, 1969) but they are not necessarily a zero-sum game in reality. One of the major criticisms of environmental criminology was that of “architectural determinism” (Gilling, 1997, 54-55). Proponents, such as Newman (1972) and Coleman (1989), did not view their proscriptions as being solely about changing situational factors (proximal causes of crime) – they believed that changing the characteristics of the physical and social environments within which people grew up and lived their everyday lives would also effect their inclinations and dispositions. One of Coleman’s examples related to the design of the frontages of terraced houses in the UK – one of the “design villains” she identified (1989, 124-125). She argued that where front doors were set back from the road this offered parents greater control over the peer-group associations of their children (i.e. by not allowing other children to just knock on the window to attract their attention - they had to walk up the path, knock on the door and negotiate with the parents) - and that such design features would also constitute the social environment in which these children would learn about associations, privacy
and expectations of parental control (1989). The point is that changes to the social and physical environment in which people live (the social milieu) not only has the potential to effect short-term situational decision making, but also long-term learning processes about actions that are possible and/or acceptable in given contexts. This is a basic insight from relational social learning theory - individuals learn about the world from within their social and physical environments (and may in turn shape them with their subsequent behaviour) (Bandura, 1997; Wenger, 1998; Coleman, 1989; Smith, 2000). To paraphrase Coleman slightly: ‘disposition and situation may be two sides of the same crime prevention’. The fact that different conceptions of crime prevention may not be so completely unthinkable to one another (especially to practitioners less worried about methodological purity) suggests that there may be some scope for finding common ground.

- Spelling out the numerous ways of conceptualising crime prevention exposes the limited degree to which it might be argued that the criminal justice system has, or ever had, a monopoly over it. Many of the conceptions reviewed here have been inspired by areas of expertise out-with criminology (town planning, architecture, education, public health, urban development) (something that has been none too rare in the ongoing development of this “permeable” discipline – see Garland and Sparks, 2000, 15). It is also implied in these conceptions of crime prevention that these areas of expertise are necessary to its implementation. Thus the ways in which crime prevention has increasingly been conceptualised (situational, environmental, social, community, developmental) have, by characterising crime prevention as complex, multi-faceted and largely out-with the reach of traditional criminal justice agencies, suggested the need for a partnership approach to its implementation. They have ultimately provided (or at least contributed to) the basis and justification for the rise of crime prevention and community safety partnerships.
The rise of crime prevention and community safety partnerships

Involving non-criminal justice agencies in crime prevention and community safety might have been implied within emerging conceptions of crime prevention but the rise of the partnership approach was not made inevitable by this alone. Concurrent developments in the wider social world and in the discipline of criminology nurtured such conceptions, made them ‘thinkable’ again, and would eventually provide them with institutional support to flourish (Garland and Sparks, 2000; Garland, 2000; 2001). This section will do three things. Firstly, it will outline some of the drivers of the rise of the partnership approach – asking what made de-monopolisation of ‘crime prevention’ thinkable again? Secondly, it shall provide a very brief descriptive overview of key events in the institutionalisation of the partnership approach in the UK. These remarks will purposefully cover the material lightly as it is very well documented elsewhere (Crawford, 1997; 1998; 2007b; Gilling, 1997; Hughes, 1998; 2004; 2007) and because a more detailed outline of how things evolved slightly differently in Scotland will be provided in chapter 4. Finally, the section will review some of the ways in which the rise of the partnership approach has been understood and theorised – what does the rise of the partnership approach mean, if anything, in the grander scheme of things? To what extent is it symbolic of substantial transformations that are taking place in criminology and in the governance of Western societies? These are large questions, but it is relevant to touch upon them here to the extent that they indicate that an aspect of this transformation has been in relation to the mentalities that now underpin mainstream criminology and criminal justice. The change in mentality alluded to has already been identified within the previous discussion of different ways of thinking about crime prevention – the shift from penal-welfare mentalities focusing on individual offenders towards more actuarial mentalities focused on managing the risks posed by aggregate populations (Garland, 1996; 2001; Feeley and Simon, 1992; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Johnston and Shearing, 2003) - but it will be fleshed out a little here. The rise of the partnership approach is important in this context as it is through it that ‘new’ mentalities could be institutionalised and given direction (Hughes and Gilling, 2004; Hughes, 2004) –because it is within these structurally new multi-agency spaces that
groups of practitioners are (and probably in increasing numbers) going to learn about crime, its causes and how to prevent it.

One of the features of the modern criminal justice system that emerged in the 19th century was that its various components (police, courts, prisons) swiftly sought to establish monopolies in relation to their criminal justice functions (law enforcement, criminal justice process, incarceration and punishment) (Garland, 1985; Emsley, 1996; Reiner, 1988; Rawlings, 2002). It is questionable whether any of them ever actually achieved a full monopoly over such functions (see Johnston, 1992 in relation to the police and Shearing and Stenning, 1997 on the attribution of guilt and use of punishment within the private sector) but the idea that the state exercised such a monopoly of power through them remained symbolically potent throughout much of the 20th century (Reiner, 2000; Loader and Walker, 2001; 2007). The rise of the partnership approach, and thus the diffusion of responsibility for crime prevention and community safety beyond the criminal justice state, is an explicit challenge to the very idea of such a monopoly. Its emergence in the latter half of the 20th century coincides with, and is a consequence of, a perceived decline in the sovereignty of the nation state in general – brought about by the forces of globalisation and the related rise of popular neo-liberal politics which actively sought to reduce public sector state capacity – developments often termed to be aspects of ‘post-modernity’ or ‘late-modernity’ – where the institutions, politics and methodologies of the ‘modern’ period became obsolete or in need of revision in the light of profound structural transformation in the social world (see Giddens, 1990; Garland, 2001; Garland and Sparks, 2000; Bauman, 2001; Sheptycki, 1995; 2000; 2003; Hughes, 1998; 2004; 2007; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). The emergence of the partnership approach in the last decades of the 20th century thus reflects broader changes in the wider relationship between states and the populations they purport to govern and needs to be understood within this context (see Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Loader and Walker, 2007). However, some more specific drivers of the rise of crime prevention and community safety partnerships in particular can be readily identified and are summarised below:
Evidence was mounting that the modern criminal justice institutions that had emerged in the 19th century - imbued with the aspirations and ideas of both classical and positivist criminology - had failed to deliver the goods. Post-war crime rates had risen year upon year in most comparable western jurisdictions (Coleman and Moynihan, 1996). Additionally, social research was calling into question whether the activities of the criminal justice system – from police patrols, to incarceration to treatment programmes – did contribute much to the control of crime (Martinson, 1974; Clarke and Cornish, 1993; Garland, 1996; 2001; Bayley, 1998; Reiner, 2000). Such anxieties made alternative approaches, perhaps not implemented by the usual suspects, more thinkable.

Related to this of course was, as we have noted, the growing recognition that the levers of crime prevention (the levers that you could pull that would make things happen that would actually affect crime) simply lay out-with the reach of the traditional criminal justice system (see above).

Neo-liberal politics have played an important role in shaping social policy in both the US and the UK since the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, and continue to do so (Crawford, 1998; Gilling, 2007). Neo-liberal politics give pre-eminence to market forces and are wary of public institutions and intervention. Therefore, shifting responsibility for crime control and local safety away from the state, making communities, individuals and the private sector responsible for their own fortunes, fits within this style of reasoning (Garland, 1996). Put briefly, the popular right-wing politics of the late 20th century also favoured experimentation with non-state criminal justice – such as can be provided through partnerships.

Political influence did not only come from the right, however. Within left-wing politics, and certainly within criminology, the state was also viewed in a largely negative light – this time as a mechanism through which sections of the population, particularly along lines of race and socio-economic
disadvantage, were routinely oppressed by the state’s criminal justice system (Reiner, 1988; 2000; Rock, 1988). Therefore, some of the desire to decouple crime prevention from the activities of the police and the punitive criminal justice state also came from the left (Hope and Shaw, 1988; van Dijk and de Waard, 1991). This influence would be felt through the lobbying of (mainly Labour) local authorities for early experiments with community safety partnerships to be brought within their ambit and made a statutory part of their role (Gilling, 2007). The rise of the partnership approach could be supported, albeit for very different reasons, by both the right and the left.

Although there are earlier examples of partnership working in both Scotland and England and Wales (Mack, 1963; Schaffer, 1980) most commentators argue it was becoming a serious proposition, in relation to criminal justice at least, by the early 1980s. Crawford provides a detailed timeline of the most salient policy developments in crime prevention and community safety throughout this period (2007b, 890-891; see also Tilley, 2002, 14). The importance of nurturing ‘multi-agency’ crime prevention, as it was then known, was articulated by central government as early as 1984 - through a Home Office interdepartmental circular, the essence of which was copied by The Scottish Office and issued north of the border too (Bottoms, 1990; Monaghan, 1997). This was swiftly followed by various attempts to actively sponsor and support such working practices – for example, through the well-known Five Towns Initiative and the Safer Cities Programme which followed soon after (Gilling, 1997; Crawford, 1998, 52-58; Carnie, 1999). The report of the Morgan Committee in 1991 added impetus to the rise of the partnership approach, even if its full influence was only felt somewhat belatedly. The Committee had reviewed developments since the 1984 circular and made recommendations that were generally supportive of the ongoing development of crime prevention partnership working (Home Office, 1991). Two recommendations have been noted as being of particular importance (Crawford, 2007b, 892; Hughes, 1998, 81-86) – that ‘community safety’ should be used in preference to ‘crime prevention’ on the grounds that the latter’s perceived narrower focus on (situational) crime issues (rather than wider ‘social’ and community issues) could be off-putting.
to some agencies and communities who would otherwise wish to participate (see also Gilling, 1997; Carnie, 1999) – and that local authorities should be given primary responsibility for developing local community safety strategies, and that this responsibility should be given statutory force. The former recommendation seems to have been adopted quite quickly with ‘community safety’ rapidly becoming a favoured term of art, that was seen as more politically appealing to many practitioners, even if not necessarily to the Conservative administration of the day (Gilling, 1997; Crawford, 1997, 40). The latter recommendation fared even more poorly with a government that had assiduously avoided involving Labour controlled local authorities in the development partnership working (Carnie, 1999; Gilling, 1997). As a result the Morgan Report found itself “shelved”, despite chiming closely with the aspirations of local authorities and practitioners who supported there being a statutory duty of this kind (and who continued to develop partnership structures regardless of the government’s unwillingness to make them statutory) (Hughes, 1998, 82; Crawford, 1997; 39-44). When New Labour was elected in May 1997 they set about implementing the recommendations of the Morgan Report. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 did create a statutory duty but one that differed from Morgan’s recommendations in some important respects. It did not create Community Safety Partnerships but Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, reflecting the government’s commitment to harder, crime-focused, situational and measurable interventions over more ambiguous ‘social’ approaches (Gilling, 2007). Neither did it place the statutory responsibility on local authorities alone, instead placing it upon “responsible authorities” which would include both local government and the police (and which would require them to work with other local community-based, public and private agencies) (Gilling, 2007, 67-69; Crawford, 2007b). Interestingly, the term ‘community safety’ lingered within academic and policy discourse (Hughes and Edwards, 2002; Matthews and Pitts, 2001), and was not supplanted by ‘crime and disorder reduction’ (Gilling, 2007). In any case, by the end of the 1990s there was a reasonably well-established “infrastructure” of 376 statutory Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships throughout England and Wales (Crawford, 2007b, 894; Phillips, 2002). For the time being at least, the partnership approach to crime prevention and community safety had arrived and been formally institutionalised.
So what does the rise of crime prevention and community safety partnerships mean in the grander scale of things? Much contemporary criminological theorising has been preoccupied with trying to understand and characterise how, and in what ways, the apparent structural transformations and reconfigurations of late-modernity have been felt in relation to crime, criminology and criminal justice. In various ways the rise of crime prevention and community safety partnerships is alluded to within much of this extensive body of work. Some of the main issues and themes of what might be viewed as the ‘transformation of criminology’ literature are summarised below. Together they chart the series of complex, often overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, developments that characterise the contemporary criminal justice landscape:

- declining central state sovereignty and concurrent state responses which on the one hand deny the crisis (by continuing to place faith in traditional, often punitive, criminal justice strategies) and on the other adapt to it (by downplaying state capacity and diffusing responsibility for problems onto a wide network of state and non-state agencies) (Garland, 1996; 2001; Hughes, 2004; 2007; Fyfe, 2005);

- changing modes of governance which reflect this new position of the state and give greater emphasis to the importance of non-state actors, variously described as responsibilisation (Garland, 1996, 2001), the new regulatory state (Braithwaite, 2000; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), and nodal governance (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing, 2001). As an aside it needs to be stressed that changing modes of governance and the reconfiguration of the relationship between state and citizen do not necessarily indicate a diminution of state power. Indeed, some commentators argue that it has resulted in its extension into hitherto unregulated areas of social life - amounting to a ‘net-widening’ of state power (Hughes, 1998, 90-92; Pratt, 1989; Cohen, 1985)
• rising prominence of the private and voluntary sectors in the provision of security (Johnston, 1992; Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Loader and Walker, 2007), whether through the provision of products and services (Jones and Newburn, 1998), the taking over of functions traditionally carried out by the public police (Johnston, 1992), or the increased cooperation with the public police as part of an ‘extended policing family’ (Crawford 2007a; Crawford et al., 2005);

• growing awareness of the international and transnational dimension of both offending and crime control in an increasingly globalised world (Anderson, 1995; Sheptycki, 1995; 2000; 2003; Walker, 2003);

• increasing prevalence and speed of policy transfer between jurisdictions (often emanating from the US or the UK), displaying varying degrees of sensitivity to local traditions and customs and how they in turn adapt and reinterpret ideas and policies thought of in other geographical, political and cultural contexts (Newburn and Sparks, 2004; Jones and Newburn, 2002b; Crawford, 2002); and

• the growing centrality of crime, law and order as preoccupations of policy-makers and governments (where they were previously the domains of ‘experts’ – Garland, 2001), arguably contributing to a rise in punitive sentiments and sensibilities in the population at large (Pratt, 2005; Tonry, 2004; Bottoms, 1995), as well as re-orientating broader areas of social policy (including, for example, education, housing policy and family law) around their perceived capacity to have an effect on crime (Simon, 2007; Crawford, 1998)

A number of caveats should be borne in mind in relation to this literature on transformation. Firstly, it has been observed that much of it has been drawn from developments within the ‘Big 2’ jurisdictions (the US and the UK) that do not necessarily provide meaningful accounts of changes taking place elsewhere.
Although developments in other jurisdictions often do indicate that transformations are following not dissimilar directions they also suggest that the pattern of change is not even and that how transformations (such as the role of the state) shape the world depends on the peculiarities of the local political cultures and institutions that are being affected (McAra, 1999; 2004; Hughes, 2004; Crawford, 2002). Secondly, it is argued that some of the theories run the risk of over-emphasising the changes without giving due reference to important continuities that also characterise the world today (Jones and Newburn, 2002a). For example, emphasis might be given to the growth of the private security sector, but this should not blind us to the ongoing importance and symbolic power of the public police. On this general point, Crawford (2003, 136) also warns us that there are both “a new set of things to look at” and “a new way of looking at things” - genuinely ‘new’ structures or initiatives (such as wardens’ schemes), but also things that aren’t really ‘new’ but to which we’ve only just opened our eyes (such as the diverse forms of policing the private sector engage in). The danger is that once theorising challenges us to stop thinking about policing as an activity of the state alone we start to ‘see’ examples of non-state policing everywhere (in shops, shopping centres, clubs, work and leisure complexes etc.) – but this does not of itself mean that they are ‘new’ developments as such. This takes us directly onto the third caveat, and the one that is the most relevant to the present discussion. What is viewed as ‘new’ within criminology (or other fields and disciplines) is sometimes better understood as something that has just been ‘remembered’ (Douglas, 1986; chapter 3) or ‘reborn’ (Johnston, 1992) - something that has been around for a long time but which did not fit with institutionalised ways of thinking about things – such as the basic reasoning behind situational crime prevention that was forgotten by penal welfare institutions which could not think in those terms but which was remembered as those institutions and their penal welfare reasoning began to unravel and became the subject of challenge (Colquhoun, 1797; Garland, 2000). In fact, many features often characterised as ‘new’ – such as plural forms of policing and situational and community-based crime prevention – are anything but, pre-dating the establishment of the modern criminal justice system and rendered largely unthinkable by its institutions (Zedner, 2006). This point needs to be emphasised – the ideas and mentalities that will be given the greatest prominence
at any given time are those that marshal the necessary amounts of institutional support. Therefore, changing the nature of the institutions that make up a field, such as the criminal justice system, has the potential to change the mentalities and ways of thinking that come to prominence and are nurtured within that field (this is a crucial point to the thesis that will be developed, and more fully theorised, in chapter 3).

On that note, two related ideas cut across all of the examples of transformation in criminology outlined above – they relate to the institutional spaces in which ideas are supported, nurtured and developed, and the nature and texture of those ideas themselves. A key ‘transformation’ consistently alluded to in this literature is the changed role, capacity and symbolic power of the state in late-modernity (whether those changes have been brought about by a perceived failure of such structures, pressures to localise governance and accountability, or the rising influence of global capital and transnational political structures). It is well-documented within criminology how state organisations played an important role in institutionalising particular types of knowledge and ways of thinking about crime that fitted with their own functions, capacities and orientations (Garland, 1985; 1988; 2000; 2002; Emsley, 1996; 2002; Reith, 1956). The modern crime control machine that evolved from the 19th century onwards (built out of the police, the courts, law societies, prisons and other institutions of incarceration, psychiatric and medical services of these agencies, probation and social work services and latterly, criminologists in Universities and research institutes), has been characterised as forming “a hybrid, ‘penal welfare’ structure, combining the liberal legalism of due process and proportionate punishment with a correctionalist commitment to rehabilitation, welfare and criminological expertise” (Garland, 2001, 27). If the ‘transformation of criminology’ literature is correct then this is no longer an adequate portrayal of the institutional complexes that comprise and animate the criminal justice system – i.e. the institutions that are relevant to thinking about crime and criminal justice have changed. On the one hand international institutions beyond the state (such as the European Union, Europol and Interpol) have taken on more importance. On the other hand, a broader range of state services (health, fire services, housing, transport), as well as private, voluntary and community sector agencies have now
become more active contributors to local policing and justice issues. Crime prevention and community safety partnerships can readily be seen as an aspect of this institutional transformation of the criminal justice landscape. Partnerships formalise cooperation between criminal justice agencies and also involve them more directly with agencies and groups they previously only had limited and piecemeal contact with (i.e. private, voluntary and community sector groups) – they have created new and distinctive multi-agency institutional spaces.

The question then is – will they support and nurture the same sets of ideas and assumptions as did the penal welfare state institutions? It needs to be recognised that in a sense (and certainly in the short term) they probably will, given that they are largely (not entirely) comprised of actors who have themselves been imbued with these penal welfare values throughout their professional lives. However, much of the ‘transformation of criminology’ literature does imply that mainstream reasoning and thinking within criminology and criminal justice is changing. There is a well-established literature on the subject of how notions of ‘risk’ and the importance of managing it are changing multiple aspects of social life (Beck, 1992), including policy responses to problems of crime (as well as less serious forms of disorder and anti-social behaviour which nonetheless feed public anxieties) (Hope and Sparks, 2000; Hughes, 1998; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). Within the ‘transformation of criminology’ literature it is argued that the mentalities which shaped the penal-welfare state described by Garland (above) are increasingly being superseded by mentalities emphasising notions of risk and how to manage it – they are characterised as being actuarial (Feeley and Simon, 1992), economic (Garland, 2001, 188-190) and problem-orientated (Johnston and Shearing, 2003) styles of reasoning. Partnership working, and the strategic conceptions of crime prevention reviewed earlier, are certainly identified as embodying more problem-orientated, managerial reasoning to crime problems (Gilling, 1997; Crawford, 1997; Garland, 1996; 2001) although the reality of this characterisation in terms of practice in fact remains contestable (Hughes and Gilling, 2004; Phillips, 2002).
The argument that will be developed throughout the present thesis is that partnerships are important precisely because they represent a new institutional space that has been opened up by the decline in primacy of the nation state in relation to crime control. As such they have the potential to nurture creative and distinctive ways of thinking about crime that transcend the traditional occupational mentalities of the agencies which currently comprise them. Whether or not they realise this potential will depend to a large degree on how partnerships work in practice. This is the subject of the final section of this chapter.

**Working in partnership: prospects and problems identified in the research**

Earlier sections of this chapter have already alluded to the fundamental difficulty that faces partnerships from the outset – they are deliberately composed of agencies that are, by definition, very different from one another and expected to bring different things (skills, resources, community legitimacy) to bear upon the subject of the partnership. This is only likely to create tensions, as was summed-up by Pearson et al. in their groundbreaking, and still influential, analysis of inter-agency work in the late 1980s (see also Blagg et al., 1988; Sampson et al., 1988):

> “Tensions (in multi-agency work) indicate, as much as anything else, the scale of ambition involved in much thinking about multi-agency working: in that across the customary working practices and ingrained habits of different organisations it attempts to superimpose what are sometimes quite alien philosophies.” (Pearson et al., 1992, 51)

That working in partnership was difficult was, in various ways, recognised by all of the major influential studies of its early development – from the Morgan Group’s reviews of emerging experience and good practice in the field (Home Office, 1991; Nellis and Enterkin, 1991; Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994), to the well-known Kirkholt burglary project (Forrester, et al., 1990; Gilling, 1994; 1997), the Safer Cities programmes in both England and Wales (Tilley, 1994; Sutton, 1996) and in Scotland (Carnie, 1995; 1999), numerous analyses of the emerging voluntary partnerships and projects around the country (Crawford and Jones, 1995; Crawford, 1997; 1998; Hughes, 1998), and the subsequent auditing of statutory partnerships following the
Crime and Disorder Act in 1998 (Phillips, 2002; Phillips et al., 2002). This research did not, however, reach the conclusion that meaningful partnership working was impossible. Rather it indicated that although there were many structural and cultural impediments to it, practitioners could, and sometimes would, creatively negotiate and transcend these difficulties (albeit, as we shall see, in sometimes ethically problematic ways). This insight, captured in the quote by Adam Crawford below, would become the starting point of the present study of partnerships in Scotland, and the attempt to understand the complex interactions between structures and agencies in partnerships through a social learning perspective.

“Rather than differing organisational perceptions resulting in a situation in which ‘different interest groups pass each other like ships in the night’, our research suggests that there is great creativity among inter-agency workers in negotiating the deep structural conflicts and oppositions that exist.” (Crawford and Jones, 1995, 21)

The aim of this section of the chapter is to outline the key findings of the research into the working of partnerships in practice, identifying the points of conflict and the nature of conflicts observed, as well as the ways in which such conflicts have been found to be played out and/or managed, and what this means for thinking about partnership working in general. It will be structured around the following themes: the different ways of understanding the world that partners bring to their interactions; representation of different interests and constituencies in partnerships; the role of power differentials in shaping interactions; the distinction between inter and intra organisational conflicts and constraints; external pressures on partner agencies; and informality, “unity” and accountability in partnership working.

Different ways of understanding the world

Partnerships include members from agencies with very different roles in relation to crime and criminal justice, as well as very different occupational identities and cultures that stem, in part at least, from those roles. The potential for fundamental philosophical differences to exist between partner agencies has been particularly clearly demonstrated by studies of how the police and the probation service differ in
how they think about and understand both the causes of crime and the means of preventing it (Gilling, 1993; Crawford, 1997). Put simply, the police, whose complex role incorporates law enforcement (which also tends to be more valourised than other service or order maintenance roles), tended to view crime in terms of individual responsibility, and crime prevention in terms of punishment, deterrence and situational approaches to crime prevention (Crawford, 1997, 97-105). Probation officers, whose role relates to providing support and services for offenders in the community, were found to understand crime and crime prevention in altogether more positivist terms – crime being caused by problems in a person’s background, upbringing or environment, and crime prevention being achieved through addressing these problems or their manifestations (such as drink and drug problems) (Crawford, 1997, 97-105). This is but one example of occupational differences that could potentially make partnership working difficult. The first section of this chapter demonstrated that there are many more different conceptions of crime prevention that could potentially be introduced to a partnership meeting. Differences in how partners think about the world have the potential to create conflict in relation to a number of specific aspects of partnership working.

Phillips found that conflicts in partnerships were most likely to occur at one of three points of decision making: where the nature/extent of problems were defined; where decisions were made about the relative priority to be given to agreed problems; and where decisions were made regarding what the most appropriate or effective intervention was likely to be (2002, 169-170). The different ways in which partners understood the world shaped their decisions at each of these points. This was also noted by Sutton who argued that although the Safer Cities programme had been intended to promote rational (and arguably scientific) approaches to community safety, the variation in what projects did wasn’t just attributable to variation in the nature and/or extent of local problems but was also directed by the different understandings and agendas of partnership members (Sutton, 1996, see also Tilley, 1993). Some very good examples of this are to be found in the Lancaster University and Middlesex Polytechnic studies of inter-agency cooperation (Blagg et al., 1988; Sampson et al., 1988; Pearson et al., 1992). In one of their case studies it was found
that there was general agreement that ‘traffic’ was a local problem, but the nature of that problem was found to be less clear. Where the police felt that theft of and from motor vehicles was the most important issue local residents were more concerned with bad parking that blocked access and their perception that the police weren’t interested in this. Local businesses again differed somewhat in defining the key issue at stake. They perceived the most important traffic problem to be overly aggressive parking restrictions and regulation in the town centre because it kept customers away from their premises (Pearson et al., 1992, 56-58; Bottoms, 1990, 15). In another example Pearson et al. found that there was fundamental disagreement about whether a particular estate (Empire Gardens) constituted a problem at all. Local police officers argued that the estate was a low crime area and thus not a problem. Social services on the other hand argued that it was an area marked by very serious deprivation and related social problems – going as far to argue that the police view that Empire Gardens was a low crime area in itself reflected the extent of the problem because it showed how local people had “given up” on the police, hence making it a “low reported crime area” (1992, 59). Together these examples illustrate how different agencies and local constituencies can define problems and the priority to be given to them in very contradictory ways. For agencies this in part is shaped by how their role relates to a given ‘problem’, for local people and constituencies it depends on the particular ways in which ‘problems’ do or do not impact upon them.

Pearson et al. also found that where agencies shared similar theoretical orientations they were also more likely to share common ground in relation to the key decisions to be made in inter-agency crime prevention work. For example, they noted that the police and the housing authority both understood and drew upon ideas from environmental criminology, such as defensible space (Newman, 1972), and that this shared language allowed them to communicate and work with one another more readily (1992, 60). Thus it is unsurprising that the different theoretical orientations inscribed in situational and more ‘social’ approaches to crime prevention (see above) have specifically been identified as potential sources of conflict in partnerships (Bottoms, 1990). In the context of the Kirkholt evaluations Gilling found that the
more ambiguously defined social measures did not lend themselves to the problem-orientated action-research methodologies that were being promoted as good practice in relation to partnership work. He argued that much of the conflict that occurred throughout the project stemmed from the “woolly” nature of social prevention and the contradictory decisions it could inspire. As a result he argued that the social measures proposed in the life of the project had rarely been implemented or evaluated and that Kirkholt had been more of a “success” for situational prevention than it had for partnership working per se (Gilling, 1994, 240-244). That said, Home Office guidance continued to indicate that partnerships should aim to implement both short-term situational and longer-term offender-orientated measures (Home Office, 1998), despite this potential for conflict. Indeed, Sutton found that there was a tendency for projects to begin by implementing a larger proportion of short-term situational measures, but that as the life of projects continued there would be a shift towards more long-term offender-orientated measures (Sutton, 1996; Pease, 1997) – indicating that despite the potential for conflict broader social measures appeared to have the benefit of engendering longer term commitment to, and interest in, the aims of the partnership (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994; Carnie, 1995; Home Office, 1991). Recent progress reviews of the work of partnerships showed that partnerships continued to find a balance between implementing both situational and offender-orientated interventions (Phillips, 2002, 172; Phillips, et al., 2002). This does not of itself indicate that conflicts generated by different ways of thinking about the problem do not remain an issue, although it may suggest that they have had some success in managing these conflicts and avoiding them being made overt. Phillips identified a couple of mechanisms that were used by partnerships to “side-step” conflicts over the definition, prioritisation or intervention in problems: contracting out audits to independent researchers or Universities (thus allowing them to define the problem) and then drafting strategies with “deliberate vagueness” so that all partners would feel that they had been accommodated and could sign up to what was on offer (2002, 171).

That different agencies worked with different understandings of the world was not, however, only pertinent to the issue of decision-making about what the partnership
would do and in relation to what problems. Agencies could also work with quite different assumptions about who they were serving through the work of the partnership. The concept of community may have had an appeal to policy-makers and scholars on the grounds that it seems like a self-evidently good thing that strategies should serve the community, but it is in fact a complex and contested concept that can again be underpinned by different assumptions and definitions (Crawford, 1997; Bauman, 2001). Probation officers, for example, were found to view community in somewhat suspicious terms, believing that it was crucial to their role in the sense that it was something their clients were “estranged and disconnected from”, but also that it could be the source of hostility against their clients (Crawford and Jones, 1995, 23). The police on the other hand were found to have a strong and unambiguous belief in the idea that they served the community, although they could be unreflective about the fact that they in fact served only those particular elements of it that they defined as “deserving” (they articulated an us and them view of the community) (Crawford and Jones, 1995, 23; Shearing, 1992). Different conceptions of community could create difficulties for partnerships in a number of respects: structural problems where, for example, data collection tools of different agencies had been designed to capture data from specific geographical communities that were incompatible with those served by other members of the partnership; and problems of representation where the ‘community’ interests that were represented on the partnership only in fact represented the partial interests of some groups and not others (see Jones and Newburn, 2001). It is to this issue of representation that we now turn.

*Representation of interests and constituencies on partnerships*

Research into the working of partnerships did indicate that a diverse range of agencies were routinely involved in them and their development (Crawford, 1998; Phillips, 2002). However, the agencies that tended to be involved and well-represented were mainly state agencies and so there were emerging concerns that the representation of more diverse voices (particularly from the community and the private sector) was not always taking place. As noted above, in relation to
community representation a common finding has been that despite the big play of
making appeals to communities as part of the legitimation of partnerships (Crawford,
1997) the extent of community representation has in practice very often been limited
to the ‘usual suspects’ – typically white, middle class and middle aged citizens who
actively engage in a range of civic institutions but who do not represent all of the
interests in a given community (Jones and Newburn, 2001; Sutton, 1996; Pearson, et
al., 1992). It is certainly true that communities are complex and heterogeneous
(potentially defined in terms of locality, age, ethnicity, socio-economic status, or
through specific interests or identities of members), with many sectional interests
running through them (Sampson et al., 1988), and that ‘representation’ is thus very
difficult (Crawford, 1997, chapter 5). What the research on partnership working
highlighted, however, was the very real possibility for notions of community to
actively work in exclusive rather than inclusive ways – particularly where groups
defined by others as part of the problem (such as young people, prostitutes or people
form ‘problem’ estates) were noticeably absent from partnership structures
(Crawford, 1997). It was also envisaged that partnerships would derive experience,
resources and a new perspective from the inclusion of the private and business sector
in partnerships but this also turned out to be limited in practice (Liddle and

Power differentials in the work of partnerships

Much of the research found that issues of power were very often important in
shaping the working practices and activities of partnerships. According to Crawford
and Jones it was important to recognise the fluid and very often enabling nature of
power in partnerships which was rarely sited in one agency and the exercise of which
often took the form of managing and avoiding conflict rather than creating it through
obvious impositions of authority (1995, 20). There were, however, a number of
specific areas in which studies commonly found types of power to be important in
shaping the work of the partnership and the perceptions of partners towards it.
Perhaps quite obviously, different agencies involved in partnerships were more or
less powerful in terms of the resources at their command, whether in terms of staff to
second to partnerships, or take on work based upon partnership decisions, or in terms of other resources (including financial) that they could or could not commit to partnership activities (Phillips, 2002, 168-169). It was felt that some agencies, such as the police and the housing authority, could exercise much more “leverage” over the rest of the partnership and its direction because of their relatively substantial resource allocations compared with other partners (Pearson et al., 1992, 55-56). The issue of agenda-setting was of course central to discussions about the exercise of power in partnerships. In particular, there were concerns that the police, and other state agencies, would use inter-agency cooperation as the means through which to further their own repressive agendas. This perspective was famously characterised as the conspiratorial perspective on inter-agency work and was contrasted with the benevolent perspective in which inter-agency co-operation was uncritically and unambiguously viewed as a good thing in which the development of consensus between partners would be unproblematic (Sampson et al., 1988, 479-484; Crawford and Jones, 1995, 18-19). In fact, neither perspective was found to adequately describe the complex interactions that were found to characterise inter-agency activity (Blagg et al., 1988; Pearson et al., 1992; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Bottoms, 1990; Phillips, 2002; Phillips et al., 2002). That is not to say that different agencies did not appear to have different capacities to shape agendas to their liking. A number of studies have found, for example, that there was a widespread recognition that the police and the local authority were “lead” agencies on the basis of their resources, statutory duties, and because, in the final analysis, the buck did stop with them (Phillips, 2002, 168; Gilling, 1994; Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994). The absence of representation of many community groups and interests from partnership forums (see above) should also be understood in terms of power differentials. Some groups are consistently disempowered for a variety of complex reasons that include: they are defined out of the ‘community’ when perceived to be part of the problem; they lack the social, political and economic resources to form and develop the necessary structures (and organisation) that would lend them a voice and a mechanism through which they could be represented; they are unwilling to participate because they view other partners (usually state agencies) with suspicion (see Crawford, 1997; Sutton, 1996; Carnie, 1995).
Many of the studies found that problems and conflicts in the inter-agency setting in fact stemmed from problems and conflicts that were intra-organisational in origin (Pearson, at al., 1992, 65; Crawford and Jones, 1995, 28-29; Crawford, 1997, 123-127). Probably the most striking example of this was the gendered nature of relations between some of the key agencies (Pearson et al., 1992, 56). Organisations such as the police were found to be very male-dominated, expressing and giving status to what were perceived to be “macho” values (such as the importance of law enforcement, individual responsibility and the necessity of punishment). On the other hand, organisations such as social services and probation were found to be more female-dominated, expressing “feminine” values (such as duty of care, social responsibility and the potential of rehabilitation) (Crawford, 1997, 124; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Sampson et al, 1988). In a sense the gendered structure of these organisations was seen as supporting, reinforcing and even constituting the differences in their culture and values – adding another dimension to the barriers between them. Crawford observed that gendered assumptions could be used to belittle and marginalise inter-agency work – such as where police officers, already disinclined towards it, were able to confirm their view that such work was “woman’s work” and certainly not a core part of “real police work” (1997, 127; Crawford and Jones, 1995, 28-29; see also Young, 1991; Walklate, 1996). It was also noted in a number of studies that inter-agency work could also been seen as offering female police officers an opportunity to work in an environment where they were not marginalised as women and in which they could excel without facing prejudice (Pearson et al., 1992, 66-68; Crawford, 1997, 125), but until such work was given greater status as “real” police work it would be unlikely to improve the position of women in general within the organisation (Walklate, 1996; Newburn, 2002).

The core functions of partner organisations could also act as an intra-organisational impediment to partnership working. For example, concerns were expressed about the level of commitment of some agencies to crime prevention and community safety
partnerships. Health authorities, in particular, were regularly perceived to be reticent about taking an active role in the partnership because they did not see the objectives of the partnership as necessarily sitting comfortably with their own role (Phillips, 2002, 167). Apart from in relation to limited agendas coalescing around the themes of drugs and alcohol they simply did not identify with the broader aims of community safety partnerships. However, even agencies that did have a direct and core interest in the activities of the partnership could also find their commitment to it called into question as a result of intra-organisational issues. For example, police officers on route for promotion tend to be seconded to different specialisms for quite short periods, and generally a maximum of two years. In one of the projects studied by Crawford and Jones a popular and highly professional police officer who had been seconded to the partnership was swiftly moved on to other things in order to secure her internal promotion prospects (1995, 28). Although it is perfectly legitimate for the police, or any other partner agency, to wish to secure a broad base of experience in officers destined for promotion to senior ranks, it was nonetheless an internal policy that would cause problems for partnerships because by continually extracting officers from this work the development of sustainable and trust-based relationships was seriously undermined (Crawford, 1997, 126). Similar damage was found to be caused to partnership relationships, and the sense of its legitimacy for partners, when officers seconded to it simply lacked the authority or rank within their parent agency to actually make it act upon any partnership decisions (Pearson et al., 1992, 64). Intra organisational rank and decision-making structures could thus have an effect on the perception of other partnership members as to their commitment to the partnership project. By way of conclusion to this point, it is also worth noting that perceptions of commitment in this way could be inaccurate because the inter-agency work of some agencies might just have been less visible than that of others. Pearson et al. found that although probation officers were less often found around partnership tables with local authorities and the police, they were nonetheless heavily involved in a lot of work that did require inter-agency cooperation and coordination – such as child protection work (1992, 54). With the profusion of partnership agendas, and opportunities for inter-agency cooperation on the increase organisations will have to be selective about the commitments they give to different agendas and
apparent lack of commitment to one should not necessarily be read as lack of commitment to the ideal.

External pressures on agencies

External pressures on partner agencies, very often in the form of budget constraints and centrally-set performance targets, were also found to shape the day to day working of partnerships. In a climate in which the performance of criminal justice agencies in general is increasingly being subjected to central government “micro-management” such pressures show little sign of being eased (Newburn, 2007; Hough, 2007). Statutory agencies are increasingly under pressure to meet detailed performance targets relating to their core roles and functions even before they think about delegating resources and personnel to any partnership activities – although performance regimes increasingly do explicitly include partnership working as part of organisations’ core activity. The importance of “top-down” performance management and strategy setting was highlighted in Phillips’ review of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (2002; Phillips et al., 2002). Although the intention was that partnerships should stimulate “bottom up” policy development this was found to be a relatively rare occurrence in practice as agencies were reticent to proactively sign up to additional responsibilities when they were already stretched in trying to meet their own core business targets. As a result partnership strategies were generally drafted in a “top down” manner by community safety officers seconded to the strategic partnership in, as was noted earlier, broad-brush terms that would allow agencies to sign up to them without too much anxiety (Phillips, 2002, 172).

The proliferation of multiple partnership agendas by the end of the 1990s itself created external pressures on agencies who found themselves having to negotiate a complex and often overlapping array of partnership responsibilities. Some agencies and partnerships adopted different approaches in relation to this profusion of activity – some would seek to avoid overlapping with the work of other agendas for political reasons or because it was felt to be wasteful of scarce resources, whereas others felt that it could be a means through which to unlock or pool resources in a productive
manner (Sutton, 1996). In any case it was becoming an increasingly difficult terrain to negotiate. The fact that performance indicators were also applied to these different policy agendas also served to underline the confusion and complexity of the external environment in which specific partnerships were beginning to evolve. Phillips found that the community safety officers who were trying to make sense of this environment were frustrated at the proportion of their time spent on managing resources and strategies in which “everything was a priority” (2002, 176).

“Unity”, informality and accountability

Although all of the main studies of inter-agency working identified conflict as a key aspect of it they also tended to find that overt conflicts were surprisingly rare, rather indicating that conflict remained latent yet ever present within the structures and cultures of the partnership. Partners themselves tended to talk in positive terms about their experiences, adopting what Crawford and Jones would term an “ideology of unity” in which they would avoid articulating explicit criticisms or anxieties about the partnership for fear of undermining it (1995, 24). In a sense these partners were articulating and drawing upon the benevolent account of partnership working (Sampson et al., 1988) in order to avoid rocking the boat and in the hope that through unity the partnership would ultimately prove to be successful. How partners talked about their work, and the rhetoric that they would employ, was an important aspect of partnership working and a means through which partners could gloss over latent conflicts and present a united front to the world, and indeed themselves, about what they did. For Blagg at al. (1988) quite a lot of partnership work could in fact be thought of as “talk” and self-justifying rhetoric rather than genuine cooperation, engagement and action. Certainly talk was not always backed up by actions, or genuine understandings of what partnership was supposed to be about. A good example of this was found in an interview with a chief superintendent of the Metropolitan Police who had been newly appointed to an inter-agency role in one of the neighbourhoods studied by Pearson and colleagues. The researchers noted that the officer talked a good game about the importance and value of partnership working and the need to be sensitive and responsive to the needs of the local
community but that he almost immediately contradicted himself by then describing how he’d had no time to get a “sense” of his new role and that he’d just had to “take command” of the situation – i.e. in terms that were more akin to “quasi military” ways of thinking about policing (Pearson et al., 1992, 51).

A number of means through which partnerships sought to maintain an ideology of unity through the avoidance of overt conflict were identified in the research. The tendency to draft strategies in broad and ambiguous terms that everyone could sign up to, that we have identified earlier, was one of these. Some partners were found to favour more informal structures and relationships within partnerships, believing that they provided better forums for getting things done (in part because the informality ensured that only people who really wanted to be there were there). There was certainly some evidence that informal structures were useful in getting projects and initiatives established quickly and in the short-term – but this was offset by findings that such efforts also tended to be piecemeal, poorly coordinated and ultimately of some concern in relation to confidentiality and accountability (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994, 7-10; Bottoms, 1990). Particularity where decision-making and/or information sharing was taking place informally and without official scrutiny it was argued that existing power differentials within partnerships ran the risk of being widened (Crawford and Jones, 1995, 27). It tended to be lead or powerful agencies who were able to informally make decisions away from the partnership table (“over a drink”) and then present them to the partnership as a fait accompli to which they could just sign up - such as where senior police and probation officers in the Tenmouth projects studied by Crawford and Jones “transformed…a practical crime prevention initiative involving the implementation of locally researched recommendations into a research project alone, with no formal implementation stage” (1995, 21-22). The key danger of informality and the management of conflict was that it pushed decision-making and information sharing behind closed doors making them less transparent and accountable and ultimately more susceptible to unethical practices (Bottoms, 1990; Hughes, 1998; Crawford, 1998). Even by the time of Phillips’ research there were lingering anxieties over these issues, despite the development of formalised data sharing protocols that, despite creating some of their
own bureaucratic problems (it could take a long time to access quite routine data), had responded directly to these concerns (2002, 169). It has, therefore, been argued that there are some benefits to be derived from ensuring a basic level of formality in partnership working – including a formal recognition that different partners are working to different agendas and how that, in itself, might limit the extent to which they can ethically contribute to some areas of work of the partnership. It might be quite proper and legal, for example, for some agencies to refuse to divulge information to other partners, particularly where it relates to specific individuals. Far from being viewed as a threat this should be recognised as necessary in light of the distinctive roles and functions that partners have responsibility for. It should certainly not be circumvented through informal and unethical deals made in the name of securing partnership unity (see Bottoms, 1990). Thus, openness about the potential for conflict provides a good starting point for partnership working:

“Mutual recognition of difference represents a more preferable premise for inter-agency relations than either an assumed consensus or an ends-orientated ‘quest for unity’.” (Crawford and Jones, 1995, 31)

Conclusion
This chapter has provided a tailored review of the substantial crime prevention and community safety literature in order to identify some of the key themes that prompted, and which now animate, the present study of community safety partnerships in Scotland. It has been observed that crime prevention and community safety are complex and contested concepts that play host to a great variety of philosophical and political understandings of the world. This is important to any study of how partnerships work in practice because it illustrates the different, and perhaps even incompatible, views of the world that partners come to the table with, raising the question about whether partnerships can ever really cooperate. One current consensus about partnerships is that their emergence, development and import are closely tied up with the reconfigurations of state/citizen relationships that have characterised late-modernity. They are important because they represent a new institutional complex within which crime prevention and community safety, however
defined, will increasingly be done. Thus partnerships will ultimately play a role in institutionalising particular ways of thinking about and reacting to crime in the future – they have the potential to shape the mainstream mentalities that animate criminology and criminal justice and, it should be noted, could do so in ways which either promote or undermine notions of social justice. The extent to which partnerships become spaces in which alternative discourses about crime will flourish to a large degree depends on how they work in practice. The review has shown that there are many difficulties inherent in partnership working – difficulties which potentially constrain and undermine genuinely cooperative and creative activities in practice. A social learning perspective on partnership interactions provides a constructive means of understanding these impediments and proposing means of overcoming them, and it is to such a perspective that the discussion turns in the following chapter.
Chapter 3: Institutions, organisations and communities of practice: developing a theoretical framework for studying partnerships

Introduction

Partnership working is difficult. Crime prevention and community safety are, from the outset, ambiguous and contested terms and so there is always the potential for there to be uncertainty about what the aims, objectives and priorities of such partnerships ought to be. There are also many deep-rooted structural and cultural differences between the agencies and organisations that tend to be called upon to participate in crime prevention and community safety partnerships. These differences create a latent potential for conflict and miscommunication that can impede creative and inclusive working in a variety of ways, having unwanted effects on how partnerships work. They can, for example, lead to partnerships becoming ‘talking shops’, incapable of taking decisive action despite their rhetoric. They might also result in informal collaborations between some partners to the exclusion of others - particularly where it is felt that this is the only way to get things done. It has also been shown that partnerships sometimes become more focused upon bureaucratic requirements, such as producing strategic documents and meeting formal performance targets, than on actually implementing their aims and objectives. In this chapter it will be shown that impediments to partnership working, and their unwanted effects, can be explored and better understood when viewed through a relational social learning perspective. Such perspectives acknowledge the importance of structural, organisational and cultural influences on actors but do not understand them in overly deterministic terms. By also giving emphasis to the everyday interactions and activities of actors, social learning theories see them as being active and creative within these recognised structural constraints. Social learning perspectives therefore do not see structural, cultural and organisational influences as being absolute and unchanging, but as being in a constant dialogue with reflective actors engaged in activity with the world. Therefore, within a social learning perspective structural impediments to practice, such as those found in partnerships, are not insurmountable.
This chapter will introduce the work of Etienne Wenger and will argue that his relational social learning perspective provides a valuable lens through which to study and analyse community safety partnerships. Wenger’s work has thus far had very little, if indeed any, influence on criminology, but it has proved influential elsewhere in the social sciences. For example, his work with William Snyder and others, focusing on the application of the concept of communities of practice to the effective management of knowledge within organisations (see Wenger et al., 2002; Wenger and Snyder, 2000), has generated quite a significant literature within the fields of management, business and organisational studies (e.g. Hildreth and Kimble, 2004). There has also been a demonstrable interest in his ideas within the fields of education (Ellaway et al., 2004; Baron and Tusting, 2005) and literacy studies (Barton and Tusting, 2005). More recently his work has also been associated with the emerging ‘Communities and Technologies’ movement, in which the complex interfaces between information and communication technologies and communities (virtual and ‘real’) are explored from a diverse range of perspectives, including anthropology, art, information science and law (Huysman et al., 2003).

This chapter will be structured into three sections. The first section will introduce and describe the key components of Wenger’s social learning perspective, and its empirical and theoretical foundations. The latter discussion, in particular, will help to illustrate Wenger’s affinity with theoretical perspectives already well-known within criminology (including Giddens, Douglas, Goffman and Becker) and will thus provide a useful background to his work. It will also flesh out aspects of the epistemological theme running throughout the thesis – that institutional architecture created through partnerships may have a profound influence on the development of criminological thought – and the relevance of Wenger’s perspective to this theme. The next section of the chapter will begin to focus upon the empirical preoccupations of the thesis by outlining the ways in which Wenger’s ideas have been used to characterise and understand how organisations function (and, indeed, some of the ways in which they might not function well). The section will begin with a cautionary note by outlining some of the difficulties and challenges associated with attempts to utilise communities of practice as a practical tool. It will then review
some of the main insights to be derived from examining organisations in terms of communities of practice and will begin to draw out how some of these issues might also be pertinent to the study of partnerships. This section will conclude by reviewing some real life examples of how Wenger’s ideas have been applied within organisations as a means of improving knowledge management and communication. Again, this section raises some questions that are of potential import to the present study. Indeed it goes as far to suggest that the present study provides a rather more challenging case study for exploring the application of Wenger’s ideas than his own examples have done. As such it potentially allows the scope of communities of practice as an analytical framework to be further extended. The final brief section will conclude the chapter by introducing three components of communities of practice – domain, community, and practice – that will act as the theoretical framework for analysis of the empirical data in this study.

Legitimate peripheral participation in communities of practice: Wenger’s relational social learning theory

“(A) theory of social practice emphasizes the relational interdependency of agent and world, activity, meaning, cognition, learning and knowing. It emphasizes the inherently socially negotiated character of meaning and the interested, concerned character of the thought and action of persons-in-activity. This view also claims that learning, thinking and knowing are relations among people in activity in, with, and arising from the socially and culturally structured world.” (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 50-51)

The above quote captures very well the essence, and the scope, of Wenger’s perspective on social learning. It is a perspective which emphasises the interdependence of structure and agency in determining what people know and how they understand and think about the world. Thus, unlike many other learning theories it does not view knowledge as some reified entity that exists somewhere out there, waiting to be ‘found’ and thus internalised by actors through socialisation, or prepared and packaged into readily digestible morsels to be delivered through formal education programmes (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 47-49). Rather knowledge, the meanings attributed to it, and the ways in which people shape their identities and
sense of themselves through it, is something that is constantly being “socially negotiated” by people engaged in practices (of all kinds, from work and hobbies to family relationships) in the everyday world. Where it is true that the everyday world is “socially and culturally structured” it is, for Wenger, how actors make sense of, draw upon, and use these structures in their activities that ultimately shapes their understanding of the world and of their own identity within it (1998, 51). The “relational” thus refers to the necessary and ongoing engagements created between social and cultural structures on the one hand and, through their activities, practices and interactions with the world, social actors on the other.

This section of the chapter will flesh out Wenger’s ideas in more detail, before later sections move on to the task of exploring how they might be applied to empirical questions about how organisations and partnerships work. The section will begin by briefly sketching the two concepts that are central to Wenger’s conception of social learning: legitimate peripheral participation and communities of practice. It will then outline both the empirical and the theoretical influences on Wenger’s work. This will help to provide a deeper understanding of these concepts and their intellectual heritage. The latter discussion will also make them more familiar to criminologists. The section will conclude with an overview of Wenger’s perspective and a fleshed-out characterisation of the concept which will ultimately provide the basis of the theoretical framework of this study: communities of practice.

Legitimate peripheral participation and communities of practice

According to Wenger, learning occurs through legitimate peripheral participation in communities of practice. This is true of all learning (not merely that which occurs in schools or lecture theatres). For Wenger, we understand and give meaning to the world (and our sense of self within it) through engaging in communities of practice. It is through communities of practice that meaning and identity are constantly negotiated and renegotiated and it is through communities of practice that people, organisations and institutions “know what they know” and also develop their knowing over time. According to Wenger, communities of practice are
“everywhere” – they are inevitable and essential aspects of our lives and of social existence (Wenger, 1998, 6-7; Wenger et al., 2002, 4-5). They are ubiquitous. We are members of a great variety of communities of practice in relation to different aspects of our lives – within our families and amongst our friends, as children and as parents, as part of our hobbies, in pursuit of political and cultural interests, and within our working lives. Although we might feel that our membership of some communities of practice is very intense, even defining our identity at certain points in our lives, we might also recognise ourselves as being members of other communities of practice in which our commitment and participation is lesser. Wenger also noted that the extent of our immersion and involvement in particular communities of practice will necessarily change and evolve over time. He argued that as we make new friends and acquaintances, take up new hobbies and pursuits, embark upon new training programmes, or become involved in new projects at work the communities of practice in which we are enmeshed change (Wenger, 1998, 3-9). We therefore belong to different communities of practice, and have a changing intensity of engagement with them, over time. Our shifting membership of communities of practice thus marks changes in our allegiances, priorities and commitments, characterising the course of our development (see Lave and Wenger, 1991, 52-54). In short, within Wenger’s perspective we are all members of a “constellation” of different communities of practice throughout our lives, and it is through them that we make sense of the world, define and transform our identity, and act on the world by participating in it (Wenger, 1998, 3-9 and 168-169; Lave and Wenger, 1991).

To help unpack this complex theory of knowledge, learning, practice and identity the concepts of legitimate peripheral participation and communities of practice will be outlined in some detail. It should be noted from the outset that they are closely interrelated concepts and cannot be fully understood in isolation.

“Legitimate peripheral participation is proposed as a descriptor of engagement in social practice that entails learning as an integral constituent.” (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 35)
Social practice – what we do, who we do it with, and the shared project entailed by it - is crucial to Wenger’s theory of social learning. Legitimate peripheral participation “characterises” that learning (Wenger, 1998, 11) by describing the relationships between the learner, the practice, and the communities in which such practices make sense. It is, in essence, a description of the nature and form of the membership of a community of practice in which learning takes place.

Legitimacy of membership refers to the extent to which an individual is accepted as a participant in a given activity. Someone who is not accepted as a participant (having low levels of legitimacy) is, according to Wenger, unlikely to enjoy the full range of learning opportunities within that community of practice (they may even be entirely excluded from it). Although communities of practice are themselves informal, spontaneous and ubiquitous in nature, emerging out of shared activities, responsibilities and interests throughout the social world (they exist within families, in playgrounds, workplaces, and in any context in which groups share a set of interests) (Wenger, 1998, 3-9; Wenger et al., 2002, 4-5), they nonetheless do have criteria by which legitimacy of membership will be determined. Very often such criteria will be very informal, such as where children deny access to their clique in the playground on the basis of personalities. A child who does not ‘fit’ will not, regardless of how fair or otherwise this is, be a legitimate member of any community of practice that evolves around the activities of this group - in negotiating their relationship with the formal school environment, for example (see Becker, 1972). Their opportunities for learning within this community of practice will thus be severely, if not entirely, limited. Of course many fields of activity do have more formal criteria that control access to the communities of practice within them (although they do not control access to communities of practice themselves, this remains informal) – such as required sets of qualifications and/or systems of professional apprenticeship. Someone without the necessary formal qualifications, professional status and institutional position could not legitimately be a member of a community of practice of senior surgeons, for example. That said, it should be noted that legitimacy of membership, even within such a prestigious field of practice is not, in Wenger’s terms, static. Over the course of professional lives people move through
and within many communities of practice, their legitimacy in relation to them also changing over time. A young doctor may not be a legitimate member of a community of practice of senior surgeons, but if placed upon the necessary professional trajectory (involving exams, increasing specialisation, and getting access to the right kinds of professional experience), they may be one day. As professional identities and competencies evolve in the course of professional life, new and different opportunities for legitimate engagement in communities of practice open up (on this point, see also Becker and Carper, 1956a; 1956b). However, it should be borne in mind that even where formal criteria are met one’s legitimacy and acceptance in communities of practice ultimately remains informal (a formally qualified surgeon may not be included in certain communities of practice—for reasons of personality, politics or prejudice) and so, difficult to prescribe. For the moment it should simply be noted that legitimacy relates to the level of entitlement to membership of a community of practice, and that high levels of entitlement open up opportunities for learning.

Peripherality of membership relates to the fact that membership of a community of practice is always fluid, in a constant process of negotiation and renegotiation, and to be balanced against membership of other communities of practice. Lave and Wenger use the term “peripheral” to imply that there are no bounded contours to learning communities in which a designated “centre” and “periphery” are to be found (1991, 34-37). There are no centres of communities of practice; all members are peripheral, although, to varying degrees some may be engaged in more or less “full” or “intense” participation than others. Central participation might be construed as mastery over a community of practice, but for Lave and Wenger there can be no complete mastery because a community of practice is too fluid to be mastered—it is constantly changing and being transformed through the practices of its members. The use of the term “peripheral” is thus part of the authors’ explicit intention to stress the fluid, changing, and overlapping nature of participation in communities of practice. In their own words:

“Peripherality suggests that there are multiple, varied, more or less engaged and inclusive ways of being located in fields of participation defined by a
Peripheral participation is about being located in the social world. Changing locations and perspectives are part of actors’ learning trajectories, developing identities and forms of membership.” (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 36)

Legitimate peripheral participation takes place within and characterises the nature of membership of communities of practice, a concept that itself needs some further introduction at this point. Wenger has argued that communities of practice is a concept that will be “familiar” to most people because what it intends to describe – individuals being members of, to varying degrees of intensity, a multiplicity of groups and associations orientated around specific forms of collective activity – is something that people can readily see in their own lives (Wenger, 1998, 6-7). One can recognise that family life involves collective endeavours and activities, and that mutually understood and accepted (but probably short-hand) ways of doing these things have evolved to cope with them. The same might well be true in relation to the workplace – people may recognise that they and their colleagues, with whom they share professional responsibilities, have collectively worked out ways of handling and talking about their work that allows them to get on with it effectively (even if in ways that don’t marry up precisely with how the organisation itself formally describes these tasks and how they should be done). Both of these are indeed examples of “familiar” and recognisable communities of practice in the everyday world, and, as we shall see, do provide helpful illustrations of communities of practice that can aid an understanding of them. However, as with the concept of legitimate peripheral participation, the concept of communities of practice is, at its heart, an analytical concept that makes fundamental claims about the nature of knowledge and learning.

“A community of practice is a set of relations among persons, activity, and world, over time and in relation with other tangential and overlapping communities of practice. A community of practice is an intrinsic condition for the existence of knowledge, not least because it provides the interpretive support necessary for making sense of its heritage. Thus, participation in the cultural practice in which any knowledge exists is an epistemological principle of learning. The social structure of this practice, its power relations, and its conditions for legitimacy define possibilities for learning (i.e., for legitimate peripheral participation).” (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 98)
“Being alive as human beings means that we are constantly engaged in the pursuit of enterprises of all kinds, from ensuring our physical survival to seeking the most lofty pleasures. As we define these enterprises and engage in their pursuit together, we interact with each other and with the world and we tune our relations with the world accordingly. In other words, we learn. Over time, this collective learning results in practices that reflect both the pursuit of our enterprises and the attendant social relations. These practices are thus the property of a kind of community created over time by the sustained pursuit of a shared enterprise. It makes sense, therefore, to call these kinds of communities communities of practice.” (Wenger, 1998, 45, emphasis in original)

Communities of practice evolve around spheres of collective endeavour and activity, whatever they may be. They are created by, and will continue to evolve through, ongoing "sustained" collective activity. As groups engage together in practices designed to achieve broadly shared goals they build up a shared appreciation of the endeavour itself, they formulate prescriptions of how best to do it, and they establish an understanding of the nature of relations between members of the community. These shared understandings in turn become the framework through which activities will henceforth be guided, structured and understood. Therefore, communities of practice arise out of social practices but also shape them in particular ways, act as suppositories of their knowledge, and give them meaning to members over time. Ultimately, Wenger is making an epistemological claim here about the fundamentally social nature of knowledge (see also Douglas, 1986; Kuhn, 1969; Becker, 1982; Goodman, 1978; and below), arguing that it only exists in and through communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 98). Communities of practice are, in summary, sets of relations between groups engaged in shared activities and constellations of collective knowledge and meaning – members being able to understand and give meaning to their activities through being able to draw upon shared meanings, symbols, knowledges and understandings of the world.

The aim of the discussion thus far has been to give a sense of the potential reach of Wenger’s social theory of learning, and to draw attention to some of the deep epistemological claims and assumptions that flow through it. Legitimate peripheral participation in communities of practice is a descriptor of learning as inherently social in nature, essential to the very existence of knowledge, and bound up with our
everyday existence through social practices. The discussion will now move on to
examine the empirical and theoretical influences that shaped the development of
these ideas – in order to flesh out some of the complexities raised in the discussion
thus far and so to provide a rounder understanding of the concepts.

Empirical influences on the development of communities of practice

Outlining the empirical influences on Wenger’s work not only helps to ground and
contextualise his ideas, it is also a means through which to take a step back from his
more epistemological theorising. The empirical studies drawn upon by Wenger (and
his colleagues, particularly Jean Lave) provide recognisable examples and
illustrations of aspects of the learning process (legitimacy of access to learning
opportunities, learning as everyday practice rather than instruction, learning as
entailing social and personal transformation) that would be drawn into, and which
would inform and shape, his perspective on communities of practice and social
learning. The purpose of this section is to tease out some of these illustrations in
order to sharpen the larger description of communities of practice provided
throughout the chapter. The main source of insight into the empirical influences on
Wenger’s work is *Situated Learning*, a book that he co-authored with Jean Lave in
1991. The context and genesis of the book is itself interesting. Lave and Wenger
argued that by the late 1980s the idea of apprenticeship had become debased within
scholarship and research on learning, in large part because it had become so widely
and uncritically accepted that learning “in situ” was a good thing. However, the
specific processes through which apprenticeship stimulated, shaped and supported
learning were, for Lave and Wenger, under-theorised and little understood, rendering
Their stated aim in *Situated Learning* was to “rescue” the idea of apprenticeship by
identifying, understanding and describing the mechanisms through which it worked,
and the variety of historical and cultural forms it took (1991, 29). The insights
derived from this study would lead them away from just thinking about
apprenticeship as a historically and culturally specific educational tool, and towards
their more general theory of learning through legitimate peripheral participation in communities of practice (1991, 31).

*Situated Learning* provided accounts of five different apprenticeships, drawn both from the research of the authors themselves and of others. Description of the informal processes through which the daughters of Yucatec Mayan midwives in Mexico gradually participated in aspects of their mothers' work and practices (1991, 67-69) was followed by an account of the somewhat more formal and structured arrangements through which the apprentices of Liberian tailors in West Africa built up competence in the numerous stages of producing garments (from initial cutting of cloth to the finishing of complete items) while living within the households of their master (1991, 69-73). A process of engagement in increasingly "key" tasks also characterised the formal, but on the job, training of naval Quartermasters in the plotting of a ship's position in the first explicitly "western" example to be described (1991, 73-76). The training of supermarket butchers followed (1991, 76-79). In part, this illustration drew upon Becker's *A School is a lousy place to learn anything in* - an article that shared Lave and Wenger's concerns about school-based learning as well as their resistance to uncritically viewing apprenticeship as a necessary antidote to them (Becker, 1972, 94-102). It is this example that brought some of the problems of an apprenticeship model of learning to the fore, showing how personal rivalries and the vagaries of the market, amongst other things, could result in newcomers (apprentices) being denied access to the full range of tasks involved in the job. For example, Becker found that when the market was less than buoyant and jobs were in decreasing supply it was in the interests of the journeymen to keep newcomers from high status tasks (such as butchering the finest cuts of meat), thus placing limitations on their opportunities for learning that would act as barriers to them becoming genuine masters of butchery in the future (Becker, 1972, 96-99). The final illustration of an apprenticeship approach to learning was perhaps the most unexpected of them all, focusing as it did on the “apprenticeship” of non-drinking alcoholics within AA meetings (1991, 79-84), in which participants would share testimonies and accounts of their behaviour with others as a way of defining and bolstering their newfound identity as a *non-drinking* alcoholic.
Lave and Wenger extracted a number of important lessons and insights from these examples of apprenticeship. Above all, they demonstrated the historical and cultural specificity of apprenticeship, and how it took many different forms. Apprenticeship could involve more or less structured approaches to teaching and learning (more structured for Liberian tailors than Yucatec midwives, for example) and more or less formal relations between master and apprentice (very informal for Yucatec midwives yet increasingly formal for Liberian Tailors and naval Quartermasters). On this point the authors noted that some iterations of apprenticeship involved aspects that were not socially or politically acceptable when removed from the quite specific contexts in which they were practiced - such as where children were sold to craft masters, or where the apprentice-master relationship could otherwise be viewed as exploitative (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 62-64 and 70). It was also shown that apprenticeships varied considerably in the extent to which they become a central and defining aspect of the apprentice's daily life. Where Yucatec midwifery was handed down within the family, and apprentice Liberian tailors became part of the household of their masters, supermarket butchery was merely a trade or a job which formed a less all-encompassing aspect of newcomers' lives. Despite the considerable variety of organisational and cultural form discovered amongst these different examples of apprenticeship, Lave and Wenger argued that they did appear to provide good opportunities for learning - with the supermarket butchers being something of an exception (see 1991: 65-67). They did not of course argue that apprenticeship per se was a necessary component of learning, but simply that lessons could be drawn from these disparate illustrations that could inform and help build their more general theory of learning. The key insights that Lave and Wenger drew from empirical studies of apprenticeship, that would guide the development of their own social learning perspective, and which can inform our understanding of it, can be summarised as follows:

- Learning occurred through everyday collective practices. In all of the examples learning was a social, not an individual, activity and there was little, if any, teaching as such. Learning occurred through newcomers participating
and being engaged in the social worlds of more experienced and competent members of those spheres of practice. Learning occurred through doing things with other people.

- Legitimate membership of spheres of practice was an aspect of learning within them. Criteria of membership could be defined in very different, and sometimes informal, ways – such as through family connections (Yucatec midwives) or master/apprentice relations (Liberian tailors). Access to opportunities for learning could be opened up by increasing levels of legitimacy, but were also closed down where legitimacy was relatively low (such as in the butchers example).

- Learning was also about changing identities. Learning involved developing a sense of belonging to, or affinity with, the tradition, trade, profession or group within which the practice was nested. The process of learning could thus be thought of as part of a process of becoming. Daughters of Yucatec midwives gradually became accomplished in the physical and cultural skills necessary to become recognised midwives (1991, 68-69). They became midwives not only in terms of the skills they learned but also in terms of how they identified themselves and were identified by members of their community. The idea that learning was also a process through which identity and the sense of self was transformed was most explicitly illustrated by the non-drinking alcoholics’ example. Through ongoing reiteration and sharing of oral narrative accounts of ones past and present states the AA twelve steps process actively sought to establish a trajectory of identity formation amongst participants – from ‘alcoholic’ to ‘non-drinking alcoholic’ (1991, 79-84).

Theoretical dimensions of communities of practice

The relationship between individual, social structure and practice is well-trodden ground in the social sciences. Wenger was very clear about this and documented very fully the diverse theoretical traditions (including education, psychology,
sociology, philosophy and social theory) which influenced his work and which, he claimed, shared an affinity with it (see Wenger, 1998, 279-285). This section of the chapter will not therefore attempt to provide anything like an exhaustive review of these influences, as this would necessitate a generic review of a substantial chunk of the social sciences. The section will instead extract and focus attention upon four interrelated theoretical influences and themes that underpin and recur throughout Wengers’ social learning perspective. Together they allow the broader theoretical dimensions of communities of practice to be explored, extended and placed within an intellectual context that will be recognisable to criminologists. They also present some of the tools through which the epistemological argument of this study will be developed. The four influences and themes to be reviewed are as follows: social theory and structuration (drawing primarily upon the work of Giddens); the social nature of knowledge and institutional trammels (introducing Mary Douglas’ analysis of institutions and the insight it sheds upon the ‘transformation of criminology’ outlined in the previous chapter); realised identities, performances and the social audience (developing the notion of the creative individual and how they have been understood with sociological – Goffman, 1959 – and various criminological analyses – e.g. Lemert, 1951; Sykes and Matza, 1957; Messerschmidt, 1997; Newburn and Stanko, 1994); and multiple associations and contingent valuation (emphasising the danger and limitations of viewing structures in universalising terms – Lemert, 1972; Becker, 1963).

1. Social theory and structuration

Despite drawing influences and reflecting traditions from throughout the social sciences Wenger argued that his perspective had the closest affinity with social theory, particularly that in the Marxist tradition (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 50). Although there was a recognition of the importance of structural determinants of social categories, systems, language and culture within such theorising, human interaction and participation in the social world was also emphasised as the mechanism through which human consciousness and ‘knowing’ of the world, and this social order, would be constituted (Bauman, 1973; Bourdieu, 1977; Lave and
Wenger, 1991, 37-39). This essential interconnectedness of structure, agency, meaning and practice would ultimately be developed by, and receive its most influential voice through, Giddens’ theory of structuration (1976; 1977; 1979), the perspective with which Wenger most specifically aligned his work (Wenger, 1998, 281). As such, it will briefly be outlined here.

Structuration theory emerged out of Giddens’ dissatisfaction with the determinism of functionalist theory on the one hand and the relativism of interactionist theory on the other (1979, 49-95). Neither perspective, for Giddens, seemed to properly characterise the relations between the individual and the social order, nor did they provide an adequate account of social action (1977, 86-87; 1979, 253-257). Where functionalist sociologies did provide some convincing accounts of socially and culturally constructed determinants of social life – through shared categories and systems of knowledge, meaning and understanding (social institutions) – they were unable to account for the motivated and active individuals inhabiting them (Giddens, 1976, 15-16). This, of course, was where interactionist sociology came in, giving emphasis to the “discreet universes of meaning” actors created for themselves through their engagements and associations with others (1976, 17-18). Although Giddens did recognise the value of such work, the danger here was that interactionist theorising had difficulty in joining up these discreet universes and recognising that they, in fact, shared much in common with one another (i.e. they used common social symbols and a shared language, for example). In short, functionalist accounts were overly deterministic and effectively denied individual creativity, whereas interactionist accounts were too relativistic and underplayed the importance of shared social institutions to social life. The very organisation of the field of sociology in the academy, its chosen “division of labour”, was part of the problem here (Giddens, 1979, 50). The tendency had been for scholars to specialise in either the “macro” functionalist sociologies (focusing on social structure, institutions and culture) or the “micro” interactionist sociologies (focusing on the creativity of social practices and associations) – leading to a blindness between the two fields of study. This had been a crucial problem as far as Giddens was concerned precisely because, for him, the solution to the weaknesses of each field lay in recognising the interconnectedness of
their subjects - structure and agency. This position – in which the individual could not be fully understood when separated from the social structure in which they were embedded; just as social structures, institutions and their historical development over time, could not be understood without reference to the active subjects that animated them – was described as “structuration” by Giddens. Its central idea, and the trick through which it resolved the seemingly intractable oppositions of functionalism and interactionism – the duality of structure – is summarised as follows:

"In place of each of these dualisms [subject/object, conscious/unconscious cognition], as a single conceptual move, the theory of structuration substitutes the central notion of the duality of structure. By the duality of structure, I mean the essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and 'exists' in the generating moment of this constitution." (Giddens 1979, 5, emphasis in the original)

The great affinity between Giddens’ position, and Wenger’s recasting of it, is clear. Lave and Wenger used the term "relational" to convey the sense of interconnectedness and mutuality of agency, structure and meaning (1991, 50), whereas Giddens wrote of the "recursiveness of social life" to get across the same idea (1977, 5). Both perspectives also emphasised the skilled actor who did not passively internalise the social scripts offered through structure and culture (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 47-49; Giddens, 1979, 128-130), but who was actively “interested” and “concerned” with the world (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 50-51) and capable of the “reflexive monitoring” of their interactions within it (Giddens, 1979, 53-59). The appeal of these ideas and insights to the present study – the duality of structure and the skilled individual –is that they allow the institutional, organisational and cultural differences between members of partnerships to be taken seriously without them being viewed as conclusive of the impossibility of partnership. Through reflexive and interested engagement in practice members of partnerships can be viewed as capable of transcending and transforming these differences. The potent influence of structuration, and the sense it gives that structure and agency need to be understood as interconnected and mutually constitutive of one another, if they are to be understood at all, needs also to be kept in mind throughout discussion.
of the remaining theoretical dimensions of communities of practice. The discussion of institutions that follows next will necessarily give some emphasis to the structure side of the equation. Latter discussions of identity and multiple associations will draw us back towards issues of agency and practice. All of the theoretical dimensions of communities of practice are distinctive yet overlapping.

2. The social basis of knowledge and institutional trammels

The social basis of knowledge and the closely related issue of institutional trammelling are important dimensions of Wenger’s perspective. Indeed, they are very much a part of communities of practice, and are central to understanding both their existence and their evolution over time (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 98). This discussion will begin by describing what is meant by the ‘social basis of knowledge’, noting en route how it relates to, and deepens our understanding of, communities of practice. It will then introduce the notion of institutional trammelling – the idea that institutions shape, and even place parameters on, what we know and how we think. The discussion will then move on to examine Mary Douglas’s analysis of institutional memory by scrutinizing the concepts of institutional remembering and forgetting (1986, 69-80). Her ideas have already been drawn into the critical analysis of the ‘transformation of criminology’ literature in the previous chapter, helping to stress the importance of institutional complexes to the development of ideas (see the rise of crime prevention and community safety partnerships section in chapter 2). This discussion will briefly be returned to here, but in the service of a different argument, more specifically focused upon the lessons to be drawn from understanding the theoretical dimensions of communities of practice. It will be argued that the institutional dimension of communities of practice should remind us that their potential as catalysts of creativity and change, although real, should not be overstated.

To talk about the social basis of knowledge (and here I specifically use the term as it is used by Mary Douglas, 1986, 12-19, 45-46) is, at a very fundamental level, to talk about the necessity of shared knowledge to cognition and to social life itself (see also
Lave and Wenger, 1991, 98). It is to talk about how thinking, cognition, understanding and interaction are all predicated upon there being a level at which individuals share common understandings of the world. It is to understand that individuals have to share certain ways of categorising and conceptualising the material world in order to be able to see and think about it in sufficiently compatible terms for there to be meaningful communication within it. It is thus to understand that knowledge is inherently social, an essential component of any meaningful exchange, and not the mere possession of individuals. Such an understanding of the social basis of knowledge and its necessity to human cognition is not new. Durkheim, for example, argued that the shared and socially constructed concepts of “time, space, and causality” (Douglas, 1986, 12) were requirements for even the most basic forms of human interaction.

“They represent the most general relations which exist between things; surpassing all our other ideas in extension, they dominate all the details of our intellectual life. If men do not agree upon these essential ideas at any moment, if they did not have the same conceptions of time, space, cause, number, etc., all contact between their minds would be impossible, and with that, all life together.” (Durkheim, 1915, 29-30, also quoted in Douglas, 1986, 12)

Without some shared categories, systems and models of classification (Giddens called this “mutual knowledge”, 1979, 58; Fleck described it as a necessary “existing fund of knowledge” where cognition could not exist only in relations between an individual subject and an object but must also draw upon the knowledge of a “thought collective”, 1935/1979, 38-51 and 158) there can be no communication, no social life. This is, as I have previously noted, entirely compatible with Wenger’s position where it is within communities of practice that the “interpretive support” for cognition and understanding is located (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 98). Further, it is important to emphasise that these insights are not only associated with the most rudimentary forms of cognition. There is a substantial body of literature which recognises that knowledge is sustained, nurtured and developed within different types of social institution and convention (including language, culture, social structures and hierarchies, professions and philosophies). To paraphrase Douglas somewhat: individual thinking in fact draws upon concepts, ideas and categorisations
which have evolved over (and through) millennia of human activity, and which have become inscribed upon social institutions:

“The whole approach to individual cognition can only benefit from recognizing the individual person’s involvement with institution-building from the very start of the cognitive enterprise. Even the simple acts of classifying and remembering are institutionalized.” (Douglas, 1986, 67)

The idea that individual thinking is shaped by institutions is not a new, nor is it Douglas’, idea. The expression “to stand on the shoulder of giants”, which has seemingly ancient roots (Merton, 1965/1993), alluded to the fact that individual originality within scientific and academic disciplines was somewhat misleading, in that great thoughts, insights and discoveries were built upon, fashioned by and justified through existing parameters of fields and disciplines that had evolved over a very long time (see Merton, 1965/1993). Interpretive supports of this kind have been characterised as “social groups” in society at large (Durkheim, 1915), “thought collectives” and disciplines in the sciences (Fleck, 1935/1979; Lakatos and Musgrave, 1972; Kuhn, 1996), “interpretive communities” within legal systems (Cotterrell, 1998; 2003; Fish, 1989; MacCormick and Weinberger, 1986), and other various “worlds” as diverse as art worlds (Becker, 1982; Goodman, 1978) and those of the science laboratory and literary criticism (Goodman, 1978). This is by no means an exhaustive list.

The point to be extracted from all of this is that social groupings, communities and/or institutions formed and orientated around the pursuit of practices create and reproduce interpretive supports, frameworks and conventions through which their activities are determined and understood by participants enmeshed within them. Through such interpretive supports they thus organise the direction, flow and character of thinking within them – they place structural parameters or institutional trammels on individual thinking. Institutional trammels can be seen at work in many contexts. They establish the contours of what ‘counts’ as classical music; its styles, its forms of accepted notation, the instrumentation to be employed, and the locations and setting appropriate to live performance etc. (Becker, 1982). They organise and underpin the methodologies through which scientists frame their experiments, view
their data and interpret their findings (Kuhn, 1996; Goodman, 1978). Closer to home, the effects of institutional trammelling can also be determined within organisations of all kinds. In the pursuit of specified goals and objectives organisations evolve certain ways of doing things, they establish their priorities and articulate particular sets of values – all of which become part of their culture and which orient the thinking and practices of individuals within them (Wenger et al., 2002; Chan et al., 2003). A recurring example that illustrates the importance of the idea of institutional trammelling to the present thesis has been Crawford’s demonstration that police and social work organisations have evolved distinctive (even conflicting) ways of thinking about the nature of crime, its causes, and the best means of preventing it (1997, 97-118; see also chapter 2, above). Although there is undoubtedly a danger that such analyses present too deterministic a reading of the effects of institutional trammelling – where Douglas, for example, described ideas as being “given” to individuals and “handed out as part of the social environment” (1986, 10) – it does nonetheless need to be recognised as a component of Wenger’s communities of practice. It is communities of practice that provide the necessary institutional trammels that allow participants to think and work in mutually coherent terms. This is not to imply that communities of practice or processes of institutional trammelling necessarily create or sustain institutional inertia (by continually channelling thinking in the same direction). Communities of practice are not static, and neither are institutions. It is with this in mind that the discussion will now turn towards the issue of institutional change.

The predominant conventions, symbols and theories articulated within an institution do not, according to Douglas, remain constant. They are continually modified as institutional remembering and forgetting works to ensure that institutionalised thought fits with the wider social and political climate of the day (Douglas, 1986, 69-90). I will now outline and explain what Douglas meant by “institutional remembering and forgetting” before moving on to argue that her analysis provides a useful lens through which to view continuities and changes in the criminological landscape over the last couple of centuries.
A useful starting point through which to begin to tease out the processes and effects of institutional remembering and forgetting in action is provided by the good old academic textbook. Textbook overviews of a field do not, according to Douglas (1986, 69), restrict the revisions made in updated editions to the simple documentation of new discoveries and findings, methodological developments, or theoretical advances. They are necessarily selective, and the processes of selection can give a sense of fluctuation in institutional memory. New editions of textbooks do document ‘new’ ideas, findings and insights, but they also make deletions and excisions, and not only where space demands it. Ideas may be cut or relegated to a footnote not only where they have subsequently proven to be methodologically flawed, but also where they have just fallen out of favour with contemporary styles of thinking – they no longer fit with the political or cultural environment in which the discipline finds itself. Similarly, other ‘older’ ideas might be rediscovered in new editions, or recast in ways in which they might not have not have been understood before, but which now seem to fit with current interests and preoccupations. Garland found, for example, that growing interest in situational crime prevention and criminal events resulted in something of a reconfiguration of the criminology textbook, where scholars who were never previously understood in such terms became labelled as rational choice theorists or early proponents of the situational perspective (2000, 2-3). Becker’s critique of standard characterisations of the Chicago School, and how the role and importance of quantitative methods was systematically downplayed, as well as his mentor Hughes’ reflections on his surprise at finding that the work of Tarde bore little resemblance to the crude characterisations of it that he had become accustomed to in sociology textbooks, are also interesting illustrations of the ways in which disciplines emphasise different aspects and versions of themselves at different points in their history (Becker, 1999; Hughes, 1971, 557-566; Chapoulie, 1996). Douglas’s point was that textbooks provided an illustration of the processes of institutional remembering and forgetting by showing how the past is constantly reconfigured and re-imagined as institutions ensure their fit with present interests, priorities and values:

“The revisionary effort is not aimed at producing the perfect optic flat. The mirror, if that is what history is, distorts as much after revision as it did
before. The aim of revision is to get distortions to match the mood of present
times.” (Douglas, 1986, 69)

Institutional remembering and forgetting is shaped, according to Douglas, by two
main factors: the functional necessity of ideas to social practices; and their
“coherence” within particular institutions’ interpretative frameworks, and within
wider social and political values (1986, 69-80). These factors are best illustrated by
outlining some of the examples Douglas described to explain them.

In the first main example of “structural amnesia” used to illustrate the working of
institutional memory Douglas drew upon Evans-Pritchard’s studies of the Sudanese
Nuer tribe (1986, 70-74). She demonstrated that the apparent capacity of Nuer
people to remember the names and affiliations of their entire ancestral lineage was
grounded in the functions and structures of Nuer society. They remembered around
four “remote” generations following the tribe’s founding, because links to particular
sons or grandsons of the founder continued to determine social and political
affiliations today. They also remembered five “proximate” generations through a
complex web of duties and responsibilities organised around weddings. Attendees at
a wedding would, depending on their relationship to the marrying couple, expect to
either provide a cow to the couple, or receive one based upon past family
contributions. Therefore, the Nuer remembered only those generations (up to eleven
in all) which had ongoing relevance to political affiliation or current private familial
obligations, consigning the others, despite protestations to the contrary, to historical
oblivion. For Douglas, this example emphasised the fact that institutional memory
was, in particular, shaped by what was functional to the practices and activities of
institutions: “thinking has more to do with intervening than representing” (1985, 50).

Coherence was best illustrated by an example that was rather closer to home and
which also, as we will see, displayed certain commonalities with remembering and
forgetting in the context of criminology. Douglas described how, within only a few
years of one another between 1948 and 1951, Kenneth Arrow and Duncan Black
independently published mathematical discoveries that demonstrated the limitations
of majority voting as a mechanism for effectively ordering preferences (1986, 77-
Their work showed that where there were multiple alternatives open to voters it “was possible to get a circular ordering, such that no alternative could satisfy the majority of the electorate” (Douglas, 1986, 79). Their findings would quickly become influential within democratic theory and political science, raising important and difficult questions about the very nature of democracy (Estlund et al., 1989).

The point of interest for Douglas was not that Arrow and Black had seemingly stumbled on the same discovery at the same time, but that, as Arrow himself quickly realised, that it was not a ‘new’ discovery at all, having actually been formulated in the late 18th century by the Marquis de Condorcet (Douglas, 1986, 78; Estlund et al., 1989). Douglas argued that de Condorcet’s earlier discovery of the “impossibility theorem” had been largely forgotten because it had lacked coherence with the predominant ideas and values of the period. It was a time in which nation states and democratic apparatus were evolving, and the political franchise was being extended as never before – de Condorcet’s theorem simply did not fit within a period of such institution building. It was only, according to Douglas, when the efficacy of nation state democratic structures themselves were being called into question by the mid 20th century that such a critique of the democratic ordering of preferences became thinkable again. In this example of institutional forgetting and remembering internal methodological coherence had been demonstrated by the fact that the mathematical tools necessary to develop and validate the theorem had existed both to Arrow and Black and to de Condorcet 160 years earlier (for an illustration of institutional forgetting brought about by an idea failing to find coherence with the methodologies of a given discipline see Douglas’ analysis of Bartlet’s failure to produce an institutional theory of memory and cognition within psychology, 1986, 81-90).

However, because the theorem had lacked coherence with the wider social and political environment at de Condorcet’s time his work had not been able to marshal the institutional interest and support necessary to draw it into the active memory of the discipline. Both internal methodological and external political and cultural coherence was required for ideas to be remembered. Douglas summed up coherence as follows:

“Only one term sums up all the qualities that enable a speculation to become established and then to escape oblivion; that is the principle of coherence. To
employ the same interlocking methodology that holds other clumps of scientific activity together is essential. With this secure, much else will be added; individual researchers will know how to ratify their private claims and how to attract collaborators to collective action; they will know what can be safely overlooked and what can be remembered.

The principle of coherence is not satisfied by purely cognitive and technological fit. It must also be founded on acceptable analogies with nature. This means that it needs to be compatible with the prevailing political values, which are themselves naturalized.” (Douglas, 1986, 90)

It has already been argued, in chapter 2, that Douglas’s conceptions of institutions and of institutional memory pose interesting and challenging questions for thinking about recent complex, overlapping and sometimes contradictory developments in criminology (which are described in what I have termed the ‘transformation of criminology’ literature, see chapter 2). It is worth returning to, and developing, the main contours of these arguments in the context of the present discussion, as they serve to emphasise and illustrate why the institutional dimension of communities of practice is so important. The main threads of argument, augmented here to give greater prominence to the institutional dimension, are as follows:

- **Practices and institutionalisation.** The institutional spaces in which criminology and criminal justice get done are important. They shape the development of thinking within the field, and the maintenance of particular ways of thinking over time. Histories of the development of criminology are littered with examples of how specific institutional locales developed specific ways of thinking (Garland, 2000; 2002; Emsley, 1996; Downes, 1988). Garland noted, for example, how early 20th century “criminology” in Britain was of a “psychiatric medico-legal” character on account of the fact that that it was borne out of the practical commitments and everyday preoccupations of psychiatrists and psychologists working within criminal courts and penal establishments (1988, 3). The subsequent influence of European positivism in Britain also grew out of institutions, this time the academy (Morris, 1988; Martin, 1988), and explicit efforts to establish criminological research capacity via the government-sponsored foundation of both the academic Institute of Criminology in Cambridge and the administrative Home Office
Research Unit in London have also been regarded as clear attempts at institution building (Garland, 2002, 39-41). It was also well-recognised that the various components of the modern criminal justice state (police, courts, social work, prisons) all, in various ways, sought to institutionalise particular ways of understanding crime over which they had a monopoly (Garland, 2002; Reiner, 1988; 2000; Emsley, 1996; Rawlings, 2002). It was these ways of thinking and acting in relation to crime that contributed to what Garland has termed the modern penal-welfare complex (which determined that the right way of doing things was through experts, with respect for legal process, and generally focussed on offender rehabilitation and/or punishment) that underpinned criminal justice process up until towards the end of the last century (Garland, 2001). The point is – the ideas that stuck, and which shaped the period, were the ideas that marshalled institutional support (Garland, 2000). Reconfiguring the nature of institutional supports and complexes (through partnerships, for example) may therefore have a profound effect on future developments.

- **Coherence and the changing role of the state.** The most important transformation to affect criminology was the changing perception of the efficacy and sovereignty of the nation state (Garland, 1996; chapter 2, above). Reiner has observed that throughout much of the modern period the state was largely invisible within mainstream criminology (1988). By this he meant that the state did not really feature in the analyses of crime and its causes that formed the basis of criminological theorising in this period. The existence of the state was rather neutrally assumed, along with the appropriateness of it being the central mechanism through which to respond to crime. It is interesting to note Reiner’s argument that the “blinders” of the state worked in the opposite direction on scholars interested in policing. Here the blinkers meant that scholars, with few exceptions (see Banton, 1964; Smith, 1983), assumed that only the roles and functions of the public constabulary were of importance, being largely unaware of, or uninterested in, other non-state forms of policing (Reiner, 1988; Johnston, 1992). The naturalness of these
assumptions about the position of the criminal justice state suggested it was, for a while at least, relatively successful in laying claim to a (symbolic) monopoly over crime control (Reiner, 1988; 2000; Emsley, 2002; Gilling, 1997, 71; Garland, 1985; 1996; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003). It was only when the state itself came under challenge – in terms of its capacity to control crime and provide security for its citizens (Garland, 1996) that such assumptions lost coherence. It was then that the idea that the state was part of the crime problem (Becker, 1963; Taylor et al., 1973; Hall et al, 1978; Reiner, 1988), or the notion that other forms of non-state policing could be important in the creation of social control (Reiner, 1988; Johnston, 1992; Johnshon and Shearing, 2003) could become thinkable again. The parallel with Douglas’ analysis of the forgetting and remembering of de Condorcet’s impossibility theorem is very clear. Linking the issue of coherence back to the previous point about institutional locale, it should also be noted that it was within the cadre of sociologically inclined criminologists, employed during the University expansions of the 1950s and 1970s (Downes, 1988; Rock, 1988) that the state began to be challenged in the academy – firstly with reference to the American sociology of deviance which saw crime as a product of state reaction and labelling (Becker, 1963; Lemert, 1951; Downes and Rock, 2003; Reiner, 1988), and then within more radical and Marxist analyses which portrayed the state as oppressive and politically partisan (Taylor, et al., 1973; Hall et al., 1978). Although it is not generally recognised as such in many of the standard institutional histories of criminology (see Garland, 2000) the championing of labelling theory and the emergence of radical criminology marked crucial points in which institutional blinkers (which had rendered the state invisible) began to break down. As such, this awakening to the state amounted to as significant an epistemological break from modern positivist criminology as was the later emergence of situational crime prevention (see Garland, 2000; 2002; chapter 2, above).
• *Continuity and change.* One of the effects of taking off the blinkers (Reiner, 1988), or of the institutional trammels of the state becoming somewhat (by no means entirely) incoherent, was institutional remembering to restore coherence. In the case of criminology there were certainly examples of ‘new’ phenomenon that were in fact good examples of institutionally remembered ideas - having been forgotten because they lacked ‘fit’ with the nation-state project and the monopolising tendencies of emerging criminal justice institutions, and remembered as this project was called into question. As was discussed in chapter 2, the work of Patrick Colquhoun and the report of the First Constabulary Commissioners are good and oft cited examples of this (Colquhoun, 1796; Lefevre et al., 1839) - their analyses of policing and crime prevention appearing to call for what, in contemporary terms would be understood as: situational crime prevention, community policing and partnerships between the police and the communities they served (see Reiner, 1988; Garland, 2000; Gilling, 1997; 2007; Zedner, 2006). This is not to argue that current commentaries on crime prevention, community policing, partnerships etc. are saying exactly the same things that have been said before – they bear the imprint of the modern understanding of state institutions, even if they are now critical of them (Loader and Walker, 2007). The point is that there is a continuity of thinking that stretches from before, through and beyond the period of symbolic state monopoly, but which is often overlooked or de-emphasised by scholars entranced by transformation (Jones and Newburn, 2002a; Crawford, 2003).

The social basis of knowledge and institutional trammelling are recognised elements of Wenger’s concept of communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998). Communities of practice provide the contexts within which knowledge and ways of thinking are sustained as well as created. It is ultimately through communities of practice that ideas are institutionalised. Recognising the institutional dimension of communities of practice, the power of institutional trammelling, and the continuity that characterises institutional developments as much as do changes, act as a corrective against overstating their transformative potential. The following
sections of this overview of the theoretical dimensions of Wenger’s perspective will highlight issues of interaction, creativity, performance and reflexivity – all of which give greater emphasis to individual capacities and their potential role in forging change (Douglas recognised the evolution of institutions but was silent on what the motor of change and creativity actually was). What needs to be taken and remembered from this account of the institutional dimension of communities of practice, however, is that such creativity is not unbounded – creativity happens within institutional constraints and draws upon shared knowledge – even reflexive, skilled and creative actors stand on the shoulders of giants.

3. Realised identities, performances and the social audience

Identity, and the ongoing negotiation and transformation of identity over time, are important themes that underpin Wenger’s understanding of learning in communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 52-54; Wenger, 1998, 207-213).

“Because learning transforms who we are and what we can do, it is an experience of identity. It is not just an accumulation of skills and information, but a process of becoming – to become a certain person or, conversely, to avoid becoming a certain person.” (Wenger, 1998, 215)

For Wenger, the trajectory of our learning and of our identity is negotiated through our movement within and between communities of practice. As we move towards fuller and more competent participation in a community of practice our identity as a skilled participant evolves accordingly. Similarly, as we become involved in new activities, or curtail our involvement in others, our commitments to different communities of practice, and so the contexts in which we shape our identities, also change. Therefore, according to Wegner, charting someone’s movement within and through communities of practice is to chart transformations in their identity, and to document the historical trajectory of their development as a person. This basic idea - that identities are not static, and are negotiated and accomplished through social interaction – is, of course, already familiar to criminologists (although it should be noted that it has also generated a broader literature in the social sciences, particularly in psychology, see Wenger, 1998, 282-283; Giddens, 1991; Bandura, 1986; 1997).
Reviewing some of the ways in which this dimension of communities of practice has previously been explored not only helps to remind us of the importance of practice, social action and creativity to Wenger’s perspective, but also serves to illustrate and tease out some aspects of identity that he does not give much emphasis to, but which raise questions that are likely to be pertinent when applying his ideas to partnerships.

Goffman’s notion of “performance” is a useful place to start, illustrating as it does, the fluid nature of social roles, the sense in which actors were often (although not always) aware of their performances, and the interconnectedness of actor, audience and shared social expectation implicated in the realization of an identity (1959, 28-82). Social roles, statuses and identities were not static entities to be grasped and internalised, according to Goffman, but were to be accomplished through actors’ knowing interaction within socially structured contexts.

“A status, a position a social place is not a material thing, to be possessed and then displayed; it is a pattern of appropriate conduct, coherent, embellished and well articulated. Performed with ease or clumsiness, awareness or not, guile or good faith, it is nonetheless something that must be realized.” (Goffman, 1959, 81)

“To be a given kind of person, then, is not merely to possess the required attributes, but also to sustain the standards of conduct and appearance that one’s social grouping attaches thereto.” (Goffman, 1959, 81)

What was important, yet too often neglected, about Goffman’s sociology, according to Giddens, was that it recognised the “practical consciousness, normally employed in an unacknowledged way in social life” (1979, 81). To use the language he (and Wenger) would subsequently employ, Goffman’s work gave a sense that actors were skilled, reflexive and knowledgeable about the social environments in which they were enmeshed, and creative about the identities that they would realise within them.

Identity has also been an important theme within sociological studies of professions, career development and occupational cultures (Becker and Carper, 1956a; 1956b; Hughes, 1945; 1971; Becker et al., 1968; Becker, 1970), often in terms that would be recognisable and largely acceptable to Wenger.
“...individuals identify themselves - answer the question ‘who am I?’ – in terms of the names and categories current in the groups in which they participate. By applying these labels to themselves they learn who they are and how they ought to behave, acquire a self and a set of perspectives in terms of which their conduct is shaped.” (Becker and Carper, 1956b, 341)

A good deal of this work focused on or drew attention to the ways in which roles, functions and occupational identities were not fixed (although Becker and Carper certainly noted that people could become stuck in a particular role which they would have difficulty in getting out of). It was understood that members of professions and occupations would move through different roles as part of the natural development of their careers. Such movement would shape the ways in which they identified with particular aspects of their chosen profession, and with the profession as a whole. Becker and Carper (1956a; 1956b) argued that it was through the gradual acquisition of specialised skills and knowledge, engagement with similarly orientated peer-groups, personal investment (not only of money but also of time) and the sponsoring and mentoring of more experienced members, that individuals would come to identify themselves with specific professions and the symbols and ideology embedded within them (their research looked at the experiences and professional careers of physiologists, engineers and philosophers between graduate school and their chosen working lives). In essence, their work, and that of their colleagues, is not inconsistent with Wenger’s insistence that learning entails a process of ‘becoming’ - through shifting associations, activities and roles young wannabe professionals gradually mould and negotiate professional, occupational identities (which, as the quote above indicates, are important, and sometimes defining, aspects of our sense of self, see also Hughes, 1945, and below). This notion of negotiated identity and of ‘becoming’ is, of course, also well documented in the sociology of deviance and within criminology more generally.

Much of the classic sociology of deviance that emerged in the US in the 1950s and 1960s took as its starting point a discomfort with the deterministic implications of positivist perspectives on offending, instead seeking to recast the offender (to varying degrees it must be said) as being skilled, reflexive, and capable of exercising
their “will” in social interactions (see Matza, 1964/1999; 1969). Rather than viewing offending as being purely the result of individual predisposition much of this work moved the focus onto the social interactions and contexts within which behaviour was meaningful to the actors themselves. In so doing it emphasised deviance as a process of ‘becoming’ (and of learning) in which people’s sense of self, self worth and moral character was moulded through ongoing interactions with peers and with social audiences (Lemert, 1951; Becker, 1963; Rubington and Weinberg, 1968; Matza, 1964/1999; 1969; Downes and Rock, 2003). It is pertinent to note that although some social audiences – such as state officials, the police and “moral entrepreneurs” - were recognised as having greater capacity to define the social acceptability of behaviour than others (and so, to a significant degree, the identity of those engaging with it), actors were nonetheless generally seen as being able to resist and recast the meanings to be given to audience reactions within their own peer groups and networks (Sykes and Matza, 1957; Becker, 1963). It was in this way that marihuana users could, for example, understand their actions as pleasurable and not really deviant despite the wider social condemnation of this behaviour (Becker, 1963). Of course, some identities and labels (including deviant labels) could stick and become defining of actors in the long-term (Hughes, 1945; Lemert, 1951), and it was certainly the case that there was a tendency to over-state the all-encompassing nature of deviant identities in some accounts of subculture (see Cohen, 1955). However, accepting that some identities can be powerful and relatively static is not, as more recent research into desistance has shown, to go back to claiming that they are monolithic or incapable of changing. Here it was shown that even identities that have become ingrained and seemingly defining of character can evolve and change over time – particularly as they cease to “make sense” to individuals at different points in the trajectory of their lives, and as their circumstances change (Maruna, 2001). Therefore, despite some tendencies towards determinism, the basic insights of much of this theorising are compatible with an understanding that individual identity is realised and negotiated through social practices, rather than being fixed and determined by social structures.
More recently such an understanding of identity has also been articulated by criminologists interested in exploring the complex intersections between gender, race, class and crime (Messerschmidt, 1995; 1997; Newburn and Stanko, 1994). Again, rather than understanding identity as being something that is fixed these scholars argued that it was something to be accomplished, albeit within structural constraints (Messerschmidt, 1997). For example, Messerschmidt showed that working and middle class boys achieved masculine gender identities by adopting different strategies according to the social resources that were available to them. Working class boys were more likely to “do gender” by engaging in delinquent or aggressive, macho behaviour with their peers because they lacked the social and economic resources to achieve masculine status through more socially acceptable, but also middle class, routes – such as through educational and financial success. This kind of analysis increasingly lead scholars to talk about masculinities and femininities, emphasising the multiplicity of gender identity and its socially negotiated character (it was also argued that racial and class-located identities were similarly negotiated and that gender, race and class identities were sometimes overlapping and interconnected with one another). Again, the idea that individuals build and construct their own identities through social interaction, that they can adopt multiple and even conflicting identities at any one time (see also Hughes, 1945), and that they will also construct different identities at different stages of their lives, can be seen to run through this body of theorising.

It is clear that this dimension of communities of practice – the socially negotiated character of identity – is familiar and well-developed within sociological and criminological theorising. However, thinking about communities of practice within this context has drawn attention to some issues and themes that are worth teasing out and reiterating when it comes to imagining how Wenger’s work might be applied in the study of organisations and partnerships (only the first of which was given much emphasis by Wenger himself):

- **Adaptability.** One of the conclusions that can be drawn from this work is that actors, in their performances and through the creative social interactions in
which they participate in shaping their identities, are potentially adaptable and capable of playing different roles. This means that members of partnerships need not be viewed as coming to the partnership with unshakeable occupational identities, and that the partnership itself might rather be understood as a site which offers opportunities for new occupational identities to be forged.

- **Superficiality.** The adaptability of actors, and their capacity to tailor performances of self to different audiences (Goffman, 1959), may also help to explain other features of partnership meetings – namely that they involve superficial interactions (see Crawford and Jones, 1995; chapter 2, above). Social actors can engage in performances and interactions to which they are not fully committed (Goffman, 1959; Matza, 1964/1999). They are generally aware of the expectations of the social spaces they inhabit and so are aware of potential sites of conflict that can be glossed over with superficial performances of unity.

- **Marginality.** Forging and negotiating identities through interaction with communities of practice is generally given a positive connotation in much of the literature – in that identity is seen as playing an important role as part of actors’ sense of belonging to, and membership of, the social groups in which they are enmeshed (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 53; Wenger, 1998). It is important to note, however, that notions of identity can also be linked with exclusions and marginalisation, especially where one pays attention to the role of social audiences in interpreting and giving meaning to the identities and status of others in social interactions. This point is best illustrated with reference to Hughes’ work on the “master status” and the “marginal man”, where he argued that some identities are more defining of your status than others, depending on societal assumptions and expectations about certain roles (his main example related to how in 1940s America being a doctor would be a master status for white males, but where a black man became a doctor, because it went against assumptions that doctors ought to be white,
his ethnicity would remain his master status – he would be identified as a black man before he was identified as a doctor) (see Hughes, 1945, 354). Where role-related expectations and assumptions created “dilemmas of status” for individuals Hughes argued that they would often become marginalised within that professional sphere - both by colleagues who were made uncomfortable by their presence, and by their own attempts to handle the dilemma (by, for example, becoming a doctor who specialised in the health care needs of the African American community, see Hughes, 1945, 357-359). There are numerous ways in which Hughes’ insights are relevant to the present study of partnerships. On the one hand it shows how social reactions to office holders can reflect more generalised assumptions and expectations about holders of that office. Therefore, a police officer, no matter how dedicated to the aims of partnership working, might find it difficult to shake off assumptions that are made about police officers (that they are controlling and focused on crime control through law enforcement) by other partners; their master status as a police officer itself creating cultural barriers to cooperation. It might also be the case that working in partnerships can be understood as a means through which some partners resolve dilemmas of status within their parent agencies – such as where female police officers strive to resolve dilemmas of status created by lingering assumptions about the maleness of police work (see Walklate, 2004; Pearson et al., 1992; Crawford, 1997, 123-125; chapter 2). The basic point to be noted for the time being, however, is simply that assumptions and expectations built into occupational identities can have negative connotations (as well as positive) for the bearers of those positions, and those connotations can also be difficult to shift. Identities can be associated with marginalisation, as well as with a sense of belonging.

4. Multiple associations and contingent valuation

We are not, according to Wenger, enmeshed in, or shaped and defined by, any single community of practice. We are members of multiple communities of practice at any
one time and in relation to different aspects of our lives (from family life, to hobbies and professional careers). Even the “social worlds” and organisations we inhabit within these spheres are themselves composed not of single communities of practice but of “constellations” of complex and overlapping communities of practice (Wenger, 1998, 126-128). As was noted in the previous section, it was our movement within and between multiple communities of practice that, for Wenger, marked the trajectory of our personal histories and development over time (1998, 86-87). Multiple associations thus need to be recognised as an important dimension of Wenger’s work.

This basic idea - that individuals are enmeshed in multiple associations - is not a new one (and was also alluded to in some of the perspectives outlined previously – see, Goffman, 1959; Matza, 1964/1999; Lemert, 1951). It was famously articulated by Lemert in his critique of Merton’s theory of anomie (Merton, 1957; Lemert, 1972) and it is in reviewing elements of this analysis that the importance of multiple associations to Wenger’s perspective can be appreciated.

Merton had argued that the cultural structure of society defined the legitimate goals and objectives that its members would strive towards (1957, 132), and what would be recognised as the acceptable means of achieving these goals (1957, 135). Anomie occurred because not all groups within the social structure of society had the same level of access to culturally approved means of achieving culturally defined goals. This was compounded by the fact that considerable emphasis was given to defining and articulating societal goals (which Merton assumed to be about the attainment of wealth and financial success) whereas there was no corresponding emphasis given to the importance of achieving them through institutionally prescribed means (1957, 137). The result, for Merton, was a series of now well-known adaptations through which individuals would deal with their inability to achieve societal goals through culturally accepted avenues (1957, 137-157). Lemert’s key problem with all of this lay in what he viewed as Merton’s overly general understanding of “culture”, his assumption that all members of society could, through it, be socialised with a shared and “standardised order of values” (1972, 28), and how this “strains credulity” in a
“contemporary, urban, secular, technologically based society such as our own” (1972, 34). For Lemert individuals in a modern society could not be understood as being socialised within a single universalising culture (on this point see also Lave and Wenger, 1991, 47-49; Giddens, 1976; 1979) – he saw society as altogether more pluralistic than this. Individuals were, in fact, “captured” within many different groups and “associational networks” which expressed different and even conflicting sets of values and objectives (Lemert, 1972, 35-36). It was in part because individuals were enmeshed in so many different associations, and were negotiating their interactions between them, that individual values were often likely to be distinct from group values:

> “Because of the disparity in individual members of associations the values which emerge as dominant therein may vary greatly from those of individuals considered distributively.” (Lemert, 1972, 35)

The work on subcultures and youth associations which demonstrated that the commitment of individuals to deviant groups was rather looser than had sometimes been assumed was, for Lemert, a good illustration of this point (see Lemert, 1972, 43-45). Lemert argued that individuals would engage in “contingent valuation” in their relationships with the different associational networks in which they were enmeshed in that they would negotiate their participation, or otherwise, with associations selectively and instrumentally to meet their own needs. Matza’a description of “drift” provides an example of this. Young members of delinquent gangs and groups reached points at which they evaluated the extent to which delinquent groups were meeting their adolescent needs and anxieties, and did so in the light of their experience and participation within other groups (such as the family, the school and the workplace). In Lemert’s terms, they made contingent valuations between the different associations in which they were enmeshed, and drifted between them instrumentally. This generally led them out of delinquent groups as work and family-related associations became more important to the development of their adult identities (see Matza, 1964/1999). It should be clear that contingent valuation essentially entailed an element of individual choice, and so the return of some (albeit constrained) rationality to individuals (when compared to the socialised individual in
Merton’s thesis anyway). Lemert’s individual, enmeshed in multiple associations, demonstrated a skill and reflexivity in their negotiation of the social words that they inhabited that would be recognisable to Wenger and Giddens (Wenger, 1998; Giddens, 1979). Contingent valuation could also, however, be seen as collective – a means through which groups accommodated one another. The notion of collective contingent valuation was used by Lemert to show how conforming behaviour on the part of minority groups in a society was not because they had, in Merton’s terms, somehow absorbed the universal values and aims of the larger society and now drew upon them in orientating their behaviour. Rather it was because they were able to instrumentally engage in accommodating relationships with majority institutions and associations in order to meet their own unchanged ends (Lemert, 1972, 33-34). For example, because a migrant community engaged with the money economy did not mean, according to Lemert, that they had wholeheartedly bought into the American Dream – it was possible they engaged with the money economy in order to meet different objectives of their own social group (i.e. it provided the resources for them to practice their faith and provide for their families, monetary wealth on its own having little cultural value). The point Lemert was ultimately developing here was that what would be viewed as “deviant” within Merton’s universalising perspective (such as the values and objectives of minority groups and associations) would be better understood as conformity to smaller group values and associations within his pluralistic perspective.

Highlighting some of the issues and themes that were raised within Lemert’s critique of homogenous understandings of culture helps to draw out and sharpen up our understanding of issues and themes that also need to be recognised as dimensions of communities of practice:

- **Individual creativity and multiple institutional trammels.** It was observed in the earlier discussion of institutions that the potential for individual creativity should not be overstated. Where this remains the case it should be noted from the present discussion that there is no single set of institutional trammels acting upon us – we are enmeshed in multiple, overlapping associations and
constellations and are constantly engaged in negotiating between them. Therefore, simplistic understandings of actors being socialised into particular occupational roles or cultures (police officer, local authority officer or social worker; for example), outside of which they cannot think, should also not be overstated.

- **Cultures are not monolithic.** This point flows directly from the one above. Thinking about the notions of multiple associations and contingent valuation between them acts as an antidote to thinking about cultures (whether in society or within organisations) in universalising terms. Even strong cultures like police culture contain different and distinctive associations within them (such as the cultures of the brass, the patrol officers, and the detectives etc. – Reiner, 2000; 1997). They are not monolithic and do not in any case necessarily articulate exactly the same values and interests that would be articulated by members individually. Individuals can be enmeshed in associations without being ruled by them in a deterministic sense.

**Overview: characterising communities of practice**

This section of the chapter has intentionally provided a quite full description of Wenger's social theory of learning as legitimate peripheral participation in communities of practice. In so doing it has actively sought to draw attention to the complexities that underlie what at first glance might appear to be a very simple ‘familiar’ concept. It is in understanding these complexities that the true nature and scope of the concept of communities of practice becomes apparent. To think about communities of practice is to think about the very nature of social life in its broadest sense – it is to think about the nature of knowledge, human cognition and the extent of individual agency.

“(L)earning is so fundamental to the social order we live by that theorizing about one is tantamount to theorizing about the other.” (Wenger, 1998, 15)
Wenger did not, however, intend communities of practice to be a concept of interest only to academics and social theorists. He intended that it also should be thought of as an analytical tool through which to critically examine processes of learning and knowledge management in practice. It is to practical applications of Wenger’s perspective that remaining sections of this chapter will turn. To this end this section will conclude with an overview description of communities of practice that, although it draws upon and does justice to the complexity of the concept already outlined, does so in more everyday terms that are suggestive of its practical over its philosophical value.

- Communities of practice are inevitable and they are everywhere. All social interaction and participation takes place within communities of practice – as family members engaged in organising daily routines and activities, in schools and playgrounds, as we pursue hobbies and pastimes, through civic work within the local community, and in the course of our working lives we are enmeshed within communities of practice.

- We are members of multiple communities of practice at any one time – we are enmeshed in a constellation of different, sometimes overlapping, communities of practice.

- We are more immersed in some communities of practice than we are in others. Some communities of practice are central to our identity and our sense of self. Others are more peripheral to us.

- Membership of communities of practice changes over time. We become fuller and more competent members of some communities of practice; we form or join new communities of practice as new opportunities for activity appear through social interaction; we curtail our membership of other communities of practice as our interests, competencies and associations change. It is movement through communities of practice that marks the trajectory of our development – our changing identities and competencies.
• Communities of practice provide the interpretive support for social interactions. It is within communities of practice that we know what we know – where shared meanings, values and categories shape practice and are in turn negotiated and renegotiated through it.

• Communities of practice arise informally in the course of everyday social interaction. They also exist within formal contexts (such as organisations) and can work alongside or against formalised structures designed to support practice.

Communities of practice in organisations: applications and illustrations
This section of the chapter will continue to draw the discussion back in the direction of the empirical preoccupations of the thesis by examining the ways in which Wenger’s ideas have, thus far, been applied to the study of organisations. There are three parts to this discussion. The first will draw attention to some of the perceived benefits to be derived from “cultivating” (Wenger et al., 2002) communities of practice within organisations, before introducing something of a cautionary note. The informal, spontaneous, even vulnerable, nature of communities of practice means that any efforts to cultivate them have to be handled with a deft touch. Attempts to create or shape communities of practice can all too easily undermine them, or create communities of practice that are problematic. Indeed, it will be noted here that communities of practice, as well as being the potential source of creativity and innovation in organisations, are also at the root of organisational inertia, power-plays and stilted knowledge exchange. The second part will move on to examine some of the insights into organisational structures and working that have been gleaned from viewing them through the lens of communities of practice. Wenger described organisations as “social designs directed at practice” (1998, 241) but demonstrated how the designed structures of organisations could, in some cases, inhibit the development of communities of practice, or create them in the wrong places for the wrong reasons. There are a number of lessons that community safety
partnerships could learn from this analysis and they will be noted throughout the discussion. The third part of the section will conclude by providing some illustrations of ways in which Wenger’s ideas have already been used to promote innovation and more effective knowledge management in organisations (see Wenger and Snyder, 2000; Wenger et al., 2002). These examples help to demonstrate the very practical import of these ideas – but also suggest that in being pragmatic Wenger has begun to blur the line between communities of practice and other forms of group association – something that will be avoided here. It will also be observed that, as sites in which highly distinctive organisations are brought together under the auspices of developing shared goals and agendas, community safety partnerships provide a rather more challenging case study for testing the value of Wenger’s ideas than do his own illustrations.

*Cultivating communities of practice in organisations: some general problems and challenges*

Individuals know what they know through the communities of practice within which they are enmeshed. Similarly, for Wenger, organisations know what they know through the constellations of communities of practice that are woven through their more formalised structures. Understanding how communities of practice fit within organisations, and how nurturing them can contribute to improving the learning experiences of the people that comprise them, has been a focus of Wenger’s more recent output (Wenger and Snyder, 2000; Wenger, et al., 2002). It has been argued that applying an understanding of communities of practice to the management of organisations has the potential to benefit them in a number of important respects. Through communities of practice professional people in organisations develop their skills; new employees receive mentoring and support for their learning; innovative approaches to getting things done evolve; knowledge bases and insights into best practice are created and shared; creative people are encouraged to work collaboratively on projects they care about, expanding the range of products and services within organisations’ portfolios; systems become streamlined and designed around practices; departments communicate and collaborate with one another (see
Wenger and Snyder, 2000; Wenger et al., 2002). Wonderful as all of this might sound, it should not be taken as an assertion that communities of practice are a rose-tinted easy solution to all organisational problems. On the one hand, the act of intervening in organisations with a view to manipulating the communities of practice within them is explicitly recognised by Wenger as a challenge that requires real sensitivity. On the other, it also needs to be remembered that if communities of practice are already woven through the fabric of organisations then they are as responsible for the problems within them as they are likely to be part of solutions to those problems. Each of these issues will be taken in turn.

“(It’s not particularly easy to build and sustain communities of practice or to integrate them with the rest of an organisation. The organic, spontaneous, and informal nature of communities of practice makes them resistant to supervision and interference.” (Wenger and Snyder, 2000, 3-4)

It should be clear from previous sections that communities of practice – as spontaneous, ubiquitous, generally informal social contexts of learning, knowing and practice – are not readily pinned down. Their boundaries (and they do have boundaries – Wenger, 1998, 103-121) are often not explicit, unambiguously defined, or necessarily obvious to an outsider. You don’t need a membership card for a community of practice (as we’ll see in a moment, it is possible for communities of practice to be closely aligned with formal organisational structures but this is not a necessary condition of their existence) even though you might need one for access to the social and professional spheres in which certain communities exist (see above). It can therefore be difficult to identify communities of practice and what organisational changes would, or would not, help to nurture them. Wenger uses the term “cultivate” to get across the idea that communities of practice cannot be manufactured as such, but that they can nonetheless be provided with the kinds of conditions in which they are likely to develop and/or flourish:

“Cultivation is an apt analogy. A plant does its own growing, whether its seed was carefully planted or blown into place by the wind. You cannot pull the stem, leaves or petals to make a plant grow faster or taller. However, you can do much to encourage healthy plants: till the soil, ensure they have enough nutrients, supply water, secure the right amount of sun exposure, and
protect them from pests and weeds. There are also a few things we know not to do, like pulling up a plant to check if it has good roots.” (Wenger et al., 2002, 12-13)

This highlights an important issue that is of pertinence when thinking about applying Wenger’s ideas to the study of partnerships. The point of Wenger’s work has never been about objectively identifying specific communities of practice with a view to holding them up for all to see and proclaiming them a ‘good thing’. Communities of practice are, by their nature, amorphous in character, borne out of interactions, associations and the social relations producing and produced by them. The perspective is best understood (as it was most emphatically in Wenger’s earlier work – Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998) as an analytical tool through which to understand learning, and through which to critically examine organisational and pedagogical designs and arrangements which purport to encourage learning and activity. Communities of practice will not necessarily be readily identifiable within the context of partnerships. The partnership could constitute one - relationships between particular members could constitute one - communities might evolve within and between partnership members and some of the participating agencies in a host of different and complex ways. It is in being sensitive to this likely complexity, and resisting a desire to place partnerships, or chunks of them, into boxes marked as ‘communities of practice’, that the perspective is likely to be of the most value. It can heighten awareness of likely structural impediments to the development of communities of practice, it can act as lens through which to understand conflict, power-plays and structural inertia, and it can draw attention to areas in which a partnership’s actual activities are not in line with its stated activities. All of these issues will all be developed in the following discussion. For the moment the point to note is that applying the communities of practice perspective to organisational working is not akin to working with a recipe book of ‘good practice’ – it is more akin to a lesson in critical thinking that will inform the sensitive cultivation of receptive and creative spaces for learning.

Before moving on to examine some of the specific ways in which organisational structures can be critically examined and better understood through Wenger’s
perspective, a final, brief caveat needs to be made. Communities of practice are neither a ‘good’ nor a ‘bad’ thing – they simply are. It is within and through communities of practice that we understand the world and develop our competencies and identities. This all sounds well and good but it needs to be remembered that for some people their understanding of the world becomes set and unchanging, they become stuck in a rut, and they feel constrained and frustrated by their lives. Communities of practice have the potential to nurture inertia as much as they to innovation. As much as they underpin interpretive communities through which individuals develop their knowledge, they also underpin interpretive communities that hoard and constrain knowledge. The point is that to recognise communities of practice as essential components of all social existence is to recognise them as part of both social problems and their solutions.

“They (communities of practice) are not a silver bullet. In fact, because communities of practice have always existed in organisations, they are more than likely to be part of the problems they are expected to solve.” (Wenger et al., 2002, 139-140)

“Like many human weaknesses, community disorders are frequently an extreme version of a community’s strength. The very qualities that make a community an ideal structure for learning – a shared perspective on a domain, trust, a communal identity, long-standing relationships, an established practice – are the same qualities that can hold it hostage to its history and its achievements. The community can become an ideal structure for avoiding learning.” (Wenger et al, 2002, 141)

Organisations as social designs directed at practice: communities of practice and organisational structures

The raison d’etre of organisations is to do things – whether that is to provide services, produce or sell goods, regulate the activities others, or whatever. They are “social designs directed at practice” (Wenger, 1998, 241) in that they try to organise activities in certain ways in order to direct it towards specific goals and objectives. Whatever structures they produce to this end they are ultimately made up of people, and these people are enmeshed within constellations of communities of practice within the organisation, and in relation to other aspects of their lives. Understanding
that organisations are comprised of multiple, often overlapping, communities of practice raises important issues about how they work, and about how their design and management can have various, sometimes unintended, consequences for the activities they produce. This section of the chapter will highlight four sets of issues that are derived from thinking about organisations in terms of communities of practice (see Wenger, 1998, 241-262), and will tease out some of the ways in which this analysis poses questions of particular interest for thinking about partnerships. The four sets of issues are: designed and emergent structures; interstitial communities of practice; identification and negotiability; and boundaries and brokering.

- **Designed and emergent structures.** Wenger argued that organisations were made up of both designed and emergent structures (1998, 244-246). Designed structures were the formally designed institutional structures of the organisation. They included the physical structures of buildings in which organisations did their business but also included things like departmental structures, job descriptions and hierarchies, strategic documents and business plans, contracts, accountability mechanisms and safety and good practice regulations. Emergent structures evolved within communities of practice in response to the institutional designs of the organisation. They included the ways in which formal designs were interpreted and understood and the evolving working regimes and routines through which the practices of the organisation actually got done. Although institutional designs did, for Wenger, provide the contexts and parameters in which emergent structures evolved they did not determine their content – that was negotiated through interaction in communities of practice. It was certainly possible for emergent structures to be closely orientated around the designed structures and prescriptions of the organisation, but it was not possible for them to be identical because they were “different entities”, the latter produced through practice and negotiation within the context of the former (Wenger, 1998, 245). By way of example, Wenger described how “working to rule” – where employees artificially align their practices to institutional designs –
demonstrated the difference between the institutional and the emergent. He described how Swiss customs officers’ working to rule showed how unworkable institutional designs were in practice. An example closer to home, which demonstrates how all of this chimes with similar sociological analyses of organisations, would be Blumberg’s study of criminal court process – where he showed that the legal rules, regulations, and formal procedures of the courtroom did not describe the more negotiated form of justice that was the reality in practice (Blumberg, 1967). Crudely, there is a gap between what people are formally permitted to do (and how they are formally expected to do it) in organisations, and what they actually in practice do. There are many potential lessons for partnerships that flow from this. The creation of partnerships has established new institutional designs. There will undoubtedly be emergent responses to these designs (which might also take different forms throughout the country) within partnerships themselves, and throughout the agencies and organisations expected to have an involvement with them. It is the character of these emergent responses that will tell us what partnerships do and how they do it. It is possible that emergent structures will resemble quite closely the formal institutional designs. It is equally possible, as we shall see below, that they will actively work against them.

- **Interstitial communities of practice.** Where institutional designs do not fit with existing practices, or where there are serious impediments to learning within communities of practice (or in organisations more generally) then it is possible for interstitial communities of practice to develop in response. The concept is more alluded to than fully developed in Wenger’s work but it is of great interest to the present study (see Lave and Wenger, 1991, 41-42, 64). Basically, interstitial communities of practice are unintended communities of practice that emerge in response to problems of (primarily) alignment or legitimacy. A problem of alignment occurs where institutional design either becomes stagnated or where forms of emergent practice are evidently out of kilter with what is actually the intention of the design. A good example of
institutional design that runs the risk of creating interstitial communities of practice is performance regimes and targets. Where the practices of personnel become orientated around meeting particular targets over fulfilling professional objectives – such as where police officers express the view “Everything that can be valued can’t necessarily be measured but we’re now a police service that subscribes to the philosophy that what gets counted gets done” (see Hough, 2007, 205) there is an indication that an interstitial community of practice has evolved – a community of practice that has responded to poor alignment between formal institutional design and the actual objectives of that institution. Another example of poor alignment between institutional design and emergent communities of practice is where forms of assessment encourage students to align their activities in strategic ways designed to get passes rather than, as educators purportedly want, to develop an understanding of a subject (see Becker, 1972, 91-94). Interstitial communities of practice also evolve in response to dynamics of power within communities of practice. Where, for example, members are denied access to the full range of activities in communities of practice (legitimate membership), or where they are working in coercive, aggressive or badly managed contexts, they may form interstitial communities of practice to deal with these problems (Lave and Wenger, 41-42). Interstitial communities of practice might involve members trying to get around access problems, or might involve them in practices of work avoidance where they lose heart. They may also evolve as mechanisms to avoid conflict or perceived threats (Lave and Wenger had noted that some of the examples of apprenticeship they looked at could involve exploitative relations between masters and learners, 1991, 64). In the context of partnerships it needs to be understood and reiterated that the institutional design – the partnership – does not necessarily describe the communities of practice within it. Where partnerships are subjected to rigorous performance regimes, and where there is clear potential for conflict between members (Crawford, 1997; Crawford and Jones, 1995) it is possible that interstitial communities of practice will emerge – communities of practice running within and through the partnership.
that might ultimately run counter to its goals by focusing on meeting targets rather than producing initiatives, or on making strategic associations that exclude or avoid members of the wider partnership.

- **Identification and negotiability.** Wenger described the process of identity formation as being shaped by a tension between identification and negotiability in communities of practice (1998, 188-213). Identification referred to the investment of self in particular roles and identities – processes through which people associated themselves with, and described themselves as having, a certain kind of belonging. Negotiability described the degree to which one had (or lacked) the capacity to shape and mould what it meant be a bearer of a given identity. To help explain this distinction Wenger described how identification and negotiability worked in shaping the identities of people who were in relationships (1998, 188). A couple identified themselves as being “a couple”, and were so identified by their friends and family, while still debating what it actually meant to be a couple. Their identification and investment in being a couple kept them together, but their ongoing negotiation of what this meant ultimately defined the contours of their relationship and how being a couple would be realised in practice. This distinction between identification and negotiability is important within the context of organisations, and will also be important in the study of partnership relations. Here identification is important because it relates to how personnel feel an investment to the broader aims of an organisation and to their particular role and function within it. A certain amount of identification is required for there to be cohesiveness and a sense of a shared project within an organisation and within the units that comprise it. Where there is a low level of identification with, or investment in, a particular role this can be problematic. Where a role is perceived to be of low status or priority then it will lack legitimacy within the organisation and personnel are unlikely to develop strong levels of commitment in relation to it. This is undoubtedly relevant to the present study as it has already been noted that priority being given to partnership working by member agencies has been
variable at best (Crawford, 1997; 1998; chapter 2, above). If there is little investment in the identities associated with community safety partnership working then it is unlikely that communities of practice that evolve within this context will be properly orientated around the aims and objectives of community safety. It is possible that interstitial communities of practice will evolve around, for example, mechanistically working to performance regimes or work avoidance. The field of negotiability is also very important when thinking about organisations (and partnerships). In this context the field of negotiability relates to the degree to which a community of practice can have an influence on its own work and also of that in other areas of the organisation (Wenger, 1998, 248). A community of practice will direct its attention to issues and areas in which there is a degree of negotiability – i.e. areas where it can actually shape things and where its activities can have an effect. As Wenger puts it:

“The field of negotiability will affect how communities of practice direct their allegiance. It will affect how their members perceive the scope of their influence and the purview of their contributions. It will therefore affect what they attempt to understand, what problems they try to address, and how to direct their inventiveness.” (1998, 248)

This issue can be directly related to the concerns of the present study. If, in partnerships, there is a sense that member agencies will not act upon their decisions, or unlock resources to provide for their activities, certain limitations will have been placed upon its perceived field of negotiability. Where the field of negotiability is narrow so too will be the focus of a partnership. Therefore, thinking about identification and negotiability in the context of partnerships draws attention to issues of their legitimacy, their coherence and the potential scope of their inventiveness.

- **Boundaries and brokering.** As communities of practice develop they create shared symbols, meanings and practices for those enmeshed within them. This establishes boundaries between those who have a sense of this shared history of practice (and who are thus “inside” the community of practice) and
those who do not. The growth of boundaries is, for Wenger, an indicator that communities of practice are “deepening” and evolving (1998, 253). Boundaries can of course be sources of exclusion and marginalisation – where, for example, potential new members are denied access to them, or where they act to prevent meaningful exchange between different communities of practice. An organisational example of this might be where different departments have difficulty communicating with one another because the shared, technical languages that they use internally are unintelligible to anyone on the outside. However, boundaries are, in the main, viewed by Wenger as sites of real potential in organisations (1998, 253-255). It is in the overlapping boundaries and intersections between communities of practice in organisations that information and knowledge is shared, and through which innovations and the emergence of new practices are possible. Of crucial importance to this is the idea of brokering – that it is possible (and desirable according to Wenger) for people to act as brokers between different communities of practice. This can be a very difficult and even marginalising role for people who tend to be peripheral members of many communities of practice (they need this basic legitimacy to be able to properly engage with and understand the community of practice) – although they might also become members of a more diffuse community of practice with other brokers (see Wenger, 1998, 108-110). It is, however, a crucial role through which the constellations of communities of practice in organisations are joined up and given coherence. The pertinence of the ideas of boundary and brokering to the study of partnerships is very clear. To some extent all members of partnerships will immediately be engaged in boundary work between the partnership and their own agencies, as well as potentially between any different communities of practice that grow up internally within the partnership. Thinking of partnerships, and the full-time Designated Officers within partnerships, as brokers across the boundaries of multiple communities of practice might be just as meaningful as thinking about them as a community of practice.
Illustrations: using communities of practice in organisations

Wenger has sought to apply his concept of communities of practice to organisations, stressing its potential value as a means of unlocking potential, promoting innovative practice and creative thinking, and enhancing the management of knowledge within them (Wenger and Snyder, 2000; Wenger et al., 2002). This section of the chapter will describe some of Wenger’s own examples of ways in which his ideas have already been applied within organisations. These examples highlight the pragmatic value of communities of practice in general, as well suggesting some more specific lessons to be noted. They are, however, in many respects quite conservative illustrations. It will be argued that applying communities of practice to the context of partnerships provides an altogether more challenging and stimulating prospect. Three illustrations of communities of practice in action will be briefly outlined:

1. Hill’s Pet Nutrition facility (Wenger and Snyder, 2000, 6-8). In this example line technicians in a facility that produced and packaged pet foods held weekly meetings to discuss their work and any problems that had come to light. Wenger and Snyder noted that members of this group had elected a “mayor” who had responsibilities for organising the group and ensuring that the necessary expertise was brought in to meetings where appropriate (2000, 6). In meetings attended by Wenger and Snyder the group worked to develop and install a new conveyor system that ultimately brought the company savings through minimising loss of food and reducing damage to packaging. It was through the support and shared expertise of the group that this innovation was possible in the face of scepticism from management, according to Wenger and Snyder. Those engaged in the technical practices of the system, when given basic opportunities to gather and communicate with one another, were able to deepen their collective knowledge and develop applied innovations that were of benefit to the organisation.

2. Hewlett-Packard (Wenger and Snyder, 2000, 8-10). The second example from Hewlett-Packard is interesting because it was about a community of
practice established through regular teleconferences. Product delivery consultants based all around the US, but who were all working with a particular product range held regular voluntary meetings where they talked about their work, identified problems with the product and their marketing of it to clients, and brought in relevant expertise to assist in dealing with these problems (a case in point being where one of the developers of the product was brought in to discuss a bug in the system). Again, it was a relatively simple case of “participants in these communities of practice…learning together by focusing on problems that were directly related to their work” (Wenger and Snyder, 2000, 10).

3. **Chrysler and the development of “Tech Clubs”** (Wenger et al., 2002, 1-4). The final example is also the most developed illustration. Wenger et al. described how the Chrysler motor company were in serious difficulties by the end of the 1980s because their development cycles - the length of time that it took them to get a new product onto market – were around two years longer than those of their competitors. The company had been organised around profession-orientated departments – there was a design department, and engineering department, a manufacturing department etc. – and this structure was found to be part of the problem. Boundaries between the different departments slowed and impeded communication between them, contributing to the lengthy development cycles to get new vehicles onto the market. The solution that Chrysler came up with was to reorganise the company around particular types of product. Rather than having specialist departments personnel now owed their allegiance to particular “car platforms” (big cars, small cars, trucks etc.) i.e. an engineer would no longer report to an engineering department but would belong to a specific car platform and would be working in that context with the other specialists (designers, manufacturers etc.) who were also focused on that product. Under this structure development cycles were slashed and the company quickly became competitive again, but other problems soon emerged. For example, as engineers now worked in different platform silos they started to produce
multiple versions of the same machine parts. Each platform also tried to negotiate different and uncoordinated arrangements with suppliers. In short: “the company had gained the advantage of product focus, but compromised its ability to learn from its own mistakes” (Wenger et al., 2002, 2). It was here that Wenger documented the emergence of Tech Clubs, and identified them as an illustration of how communities of practice could improve the management of knowledge within organisations. Tech Clubs evolved spontaneously, but were later supported by Chrysler, as specialists in different car platforms sought to get together with their opposite numbers to discuss their work and any problems that they were encountering in it. Through Tech Clubs the company again began to become more coordinated and did not think in car platform silos. Through Tech Clubs employees developed their professional skills and knowledge (as designers, engineers, marketing specialists), which they could then adapt and apply to the specific contexts of their own product platform.

There are a number of interesting insights and lessons about applying communities of practice which can be teased out from these examples. All of them do indicate that thinking about the lines of communication and interaction between people who work together can stimulate innovations and problem-solving that may otherwise be stifled through institutional boundaries. The Hewlett-Packard example stresses the important point that communities of practice are created through groups of people who share an interest in a common practice – it does not necessarily require them to be a ‘community’ in a local or spatial sense. Analysis of communities of practice should therefore not be limited to groups of people who work in the same office space – but might include a much wider constituency of members. On this point Wenger and Snyder observed that “a community of practice can exist entirely within a business unit or stretch across divisional boundaries. A community can even thrive with members from different companies; for example, the CEOs who make up the business Roundtable meet regularly to discuss relationships between business and public policy, among other things” (2000, 5). Communities of practice therefore have the potential to cut across and through the more formal institutionally designed
structures of organisations - such as is the case in community safety partnerships. Wenger’s examples are therefore a little more conservative that the perspective warrants. All of examples referred to groups that were organised around institutional designs (job descriptions – e.g. line technicians, product development consultants), and their working had, in fact, become quite formalised through weekly or monthly meetings and the election of representatives (although, as Wenger was writing for a practitioner audience in these works, it is perhaps not unreasonable for him to try to draw attention to more visible manifestations of communities of practice). The Chrysler example was potentially much more interesting because the Tech Clubs cut across the newly created car platforms – the communities of practice here thus demonstrated emergent structures that developed from practice is response to the silo effects created by institutional design. However, a more interesting analysis of communities of practice in the Chrysler example could have been undertaken. The car platforms were interesting precisely because they created new structures which drew members from disparate professional specialisms (in the same way that partnerships do). In the short term they were highly successful in working together to establish new product lines within a much curtailed development cycle – but where were the communities of practice within them? How did communities of practice contribute to this success, and how were they are part of subsequent problems? This would have been a more illuminating and challenging analysis of communities of practice than simply applying it to the easier example of the Tech Clubs which formed along pre-existing professional lines. That said there is an important lesson here for partnerships. The Chrysler example showed that although increased cooperation and communication within the multi-disciplinary car platforms was successful, it only worked where each specialism also retained coherence (it was when this coherence was eroded that the problems started – 2002, 2). The car platforms needed to create internal communication and cooperation, but were also reliant on the distinctive and specialist skills and knowledge of the professions that comprised them. The lesson for partnerships is the same – it is not only the communities of practice within the partnership that will be important, but also the ones (if indeed they exist) that stretch back into the partner agencies that animate them. Many of these themes and issues will shape and inform the analysis of
community safety partnerships that will follow (see chapters 5, 6 and 7), but will do so within a more coherent framework that will now be presented.

**Concluding remarks: moving towards a framework for studying communities of practice in community safety partnerships**

“(P)ractice defines a community through three dimensions: mutual engagement, a joint enterprise, and a shared repertoire.” (Wenger, 1998, 152)

This chapter has sought to introduce the concept of communities of practice, tease out its theoretical scope, and identify its relevance to practical issues about how organisations work. It has also begun to make connections between communities of practice, organisations and partnerships, suggesting some of the questions that jump to mind when such analyses are considered in the light of research into partnership working (chapter 2).

This short concluding section of the chapter will introduce the theoretical framework through which the empirical study of community safety partnerships in Scotland will be analysed. Belying the complexity of communities of practice are its three constituent components, mapped out in Wenger et al’s *Cultivating Communities of Practice* (2002): domain, community and practice. The domain of a community of practice refers to its area of interest – the topic, issues or problems that the community of practice will focus its attentions upon. The community refers to those who have a shared interest in this domain and who come together to engage in practices in pursuit of it. Practice relates, rather unsurprisingly, to the activities of the community in pursuit of the domain, but also to the shared knowledge, symbols, methodologies and tools that evolve over time as the community develops. The practices of a community not only refer to what it does but also to the shared knowledge and expertise it produces on the way. As is evident from these very brief introductions, domain, community and practice are closely interlinked and are never carved into stone. The shape of the domain will suggest the community, and the practices that develop will ultimately shape how members think about and
understand the domain. They nonetheless provide three frames of analysis through which to apply the communities of practice perspective to the complex web of organisational associations that are community safety partnerships.
Section II: The policy context
Chapter 4: The development of community safety partnerships in Scotland: autonomy and distinctive institutional architectures

Introduction
Much has been written about the development of crime prevention, community safety and the partnership approach in the UK (see chapter 2, above; Crawford, 1997; 1998; 2007; Hughes, 1998; 2007; Gilling, 1997; 2007; Tilley, 2002). However, very little of this literature has paid much, if any, attention to Scotland (or Northern Ireland for that matter) where it has seemingly just been assumed that any developments will have followed a similar trajectory to those in England and Wales. This chapter will demonstrate that such an assumption is problematic. Where it is true that developments in Scotland have often been similar to those that have taken place south of the border they, and the policy context in which they have evolved, have not been identical. Of particular importance to the present study is the fact that the institutional “infrastructure” that has been built up around community safety following the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 has been different in both nations (see Crawford, 2007, 893-895).

The chapter will be structured around three sections. The first will examine the argument that, following the 1707 Act of Union and the creation of Great Britain, Scotland nonetheless retained a degree of governmental and political autonomy. Important civil institutions within both Scotland and England and Wales remained separate under the Union and this allowed for (although it did not necessitate) Scottish affairs to be governed in a distinctive manner. In fact, it will be shown that by the 20th century Scotland had evolved quite a distinctive governmental apparatus of its own (McCrone, 2001). Politics and policy was very often similar in Scotland to that in England and Wales, but it had the potential to be different – and that is the main point to be emphasised in this part of the discussion. The section will conclude by noting some examples of ways in which the Scottish criminal justice system retained and evolved some quite distinctive features, and how recent decades have witnessed both divergence and convergence with policies and practices from England and Wales. The second section will appear to tell something of a
contradictory story, in that it will show how the development of crime prevention and community safety in Scotland followed a similar trajectory to that in England and Wales. Indeed, it will be noted that many of the other recent developments in Scottish criminal justice also chimed quite closely with the transformation of criminology literature, showing similar features to developments that have been identified throughout Europe and the US. However, the sections of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 that established the statutory infrastructure of community safety in England and Wales were not implemented in Scotland and so marked an important point of divergence between the systems. The third section of the chapter will describe the distinctive statutory infrastructure that has evolved in Scotland since 1998, giving some emphasis to the fact that community safety has been very firmly nested within a statutory agenda that explicitly expressed a broader social justice agenda than that of the Crime and Disorder Act.

Scotland within the United Kingdom: the potential for divergence and distinctiveness

“Scotland has been the anomaly that has made an ostensibly unitary state, an archetype of ‘nation state’ in certain political-theoretical terms, function internally in a markedly federal way. This has been hitherto a federalism of political management and judicial separation rather than a federalism of constitutional form.” (MacCormick, 1999, 60)

In May 1999 a newly elected Scottish Parliament sat in Edinburgh for the first time since the 1707 Acts of Union had established Great Britain, with its single parliament based at Westminster. The setting up of a parliament in Scotland had been a manifesto pledge of the incoming New Labour administration that took power in 1997. The subsequent referendum showed strong support for this formal devolution of government to Scotland, support which had been growing since the 1960s at least, and which seemed to have strengthened throughout the Thatcher and Major administrations between 1979 and 1997 (Hirst, 1989; Paterson, 1994; McCrone 2001). Nationalist sentiment and calls for ‘home rule’ were not, however, new to this period and can be spotted sporadically, albeit with different levels of support,
throughout the period of the Union (Donaldson, 1969; McCrone, 1992). What was new was the resounding support for formal constitutional recognition of Scotland’s status as a nation with the capacity to govern itself - demands that have been articulated within other nations within nation states (such as Quebec in Canada and Catalonia in Spain) over roughly the same period (Tierney 2005; MacInnes and McCrone, 2001). However, the reestablishment of a Scottish Parliament should not mask the fact that Scotland retained an important degree of autonomy as a country prior to this recent constitutional settlement. Although the United Kingdom may have been viewed as an archetype example of the homogeneous, unitary nation-state this was, in fact, something of a myth (Midwinter et al., 1991; McCrone, 1992; MacCormick, 1999). The purpose of this section of the chapter is to provide a brief account of Scotland’s long-term autonomy, as it is with this in mind that the potential for developments in community safety to have been distinctive from those in England and Wales can be understood. However, the wider relevance of the case of Scotland to current debates about policy transfer and the capacity of small nations to refract and re-imagine ‘external’ ideas in a globalising world will also be noted (see Crawford, 2002, 30; McAra, 2005).

The 1707 Treaty of Union was, from the outset, supposed to be “an incorporating but not an assimilating union” (Midwinter et al., 1991, 3). It was incorporating in the sense that it formally dissolved the old Scottish and English parliaments and created the unitary sovereign parliament of Great Britain (although arguably it was, in reality, the incorporation of the Scottish parliament into the ongoing English parliament) (Midwinter et al., 1991, 2; MacCormick, 1999, 57-58). It may also be thought of as incorporating in relation to marketplace activity, as it freed up economic exchange between the two nations, essentially creating a single British market with a single currency (MacCormick, 1999, 52), a development that should be acknowledged as having created substantial support for the Union in Scotland by the end of the 18th century (Paterson, 1994, chapters 3 and 4). However, although the Treaty did create a new British state architecture, it also retained important aspects of Scottish civil society, “those institutions which operate in the public domain but are not part of government” and which “include economic institutions,
professions and other self governing institutions” (Midwinter et al., 1991, 3). Three domains of civil society are given particular prominence in analyses of post-Union Scottish autonomy, identity and politics: the legal system, the church and education (see: Midwinter et al., 1991, 9-14; McCrone, 1992; Paterson, 1994; Young, 1996). Where it is true that all of these institutions would come under criticism for being Anglicised at various points, it remains the case that their organisational and institutional development, and the social and professional worlds inhabited by the people within them, remained, to varying degrees, separate from those of their counterparts in England and Wales. This institutional separation, which also applied to other spheres of central and local government and administration, would allow for the survival of distinctive Scottish values and traditions amongst those who were, to an important degree, governing the nation (McCrone, 1992, 23):

“If we ask why Scotland can still be recognised as distinct at the end of the twentieth century, the answer is much the same as would be given for any small European country: the character of a society is conditioned more by the daily interactions of human beings, drawing on a common history, than by the broad sweep of enabling legislation. If the state does have an influence in this respect, it is through the direct contact which people have with it – through its professional staff such as teachers or social workers or bureaucrats…in Scotland, these professionals operated according to Scottish traditions and rules” (Paterson, 1994, 130-131).

Thus, Scotland retained a capacity for distinctiveness because it maintained a distinctive institutional apparatus within which cadres of professionals and bureaucrats worked within, and continued to shape, Scottish traditions and ways of doing things. It is to the practices of government and administration in pre-devolution Scotland that we will turn, before moving on to characterise some of the ways in which Scotland could be characterised as distinctive.

Through the maintenance of key civil society institutions noted above, the ongoing influence of the Scottish nobility, and the development of local government and local business elites and institutions much of the day to day governance of Scotland would largely remain in Scottish hands in the decades immediately following the Union (see Paterson, 1994, chapter 3; McCrone, 1992; Phillipson, 1976). By the end of the
19th century contradictory pressures would see a further development in the institutional separation of government in Scotland in the form of the establishment of the Scottish Office (a civil service bureaucracy for Scotland), a development that, at face value, might have been seen as likely to erode Scottish autonomy. On the one hand the decision to create a Scottish Office was one part of a wider tendency towards centralisation of government on the grounds of efficiency, which would, if anything, gather pace as the solidarity project of the modern welfare state took shape in the 20th century (Paterson, 1994, chapter 6). But, on the other hand, it was also an explicit response to calls for ‘home rule’ that were emerging, and an acknowledgement that the Union settlement was a negotiated one in which it was legitimate, even necessary, for local traditions and values to be respected in policy implementation (Hanham 1969; Paterson, 1994). McCrone has gone on to argue that, particularly following the move of the Scottish Office to Edinburgh in 1939, there was a case to be made that Scotland incrementally evolved its own distinctive welfare state structures and that by the 1970s it could be characterised as a “semi-state with powerful administrative apparatus” (1992, 22). The architecture of government that had evolved was only scrutinized by parliament at Westminster to a limited degree (Midwinter et al., 1991, chapter 4) as much of its work was policy implementation rather than development. Government in Scotland had become a ‘technocracy’ run by Scottish Office civil servants and officials, interest groups and policy networks populated by members of Scotland’s separate civil society institutions, and the growing body of public sector professionals created by the welfare state (including doctors, teachers, social workers etc.) (Paterson, 1994, 103). By the time that formal devolution took place Scotland had, therefore, a well developed and semi-autonomous machinery of government, influenced and populated by local policy networks, elites and bureaucrats. Thus, Scottish autonomy survived the centralising and assimilating tendencies of the growing welfare state, but, in the process, created a “democratic deficit” that would animate future calls for devolution (Paterson, 1994, chapter 8) that would eventually come to fruition in 1999.
Finding that, despite a formal constitutional settlement to the contrary, Scotland had such well developed structures of autonomous government raises the question of distinctiveness. If Scotland was governed, largely, by local technocrats, to what extent and in what ways did they govern differently from their counterparts in England and Wales? One argument was that autonomy was, contrary to some of the arguments of Paterson and McCrone, really quite limited in its impact in practice. Michael Keating argued, for example, that Westminster’s sovereignty over setting the ‘goals’ of government was fundamental because Scottish autonomy in choosing the ‘means’ through which policy would be implemented would ultimately be limited by the parameters of these goals (Keating, 2001, 97-98; although see Paterson for a critique of Keating’s “narrow view” of politics, 1994, 116). It is certainly important to emphasise that none of the sociology of Scotland discussed here saw Scottish autonomy as unconstrained, even if there was some disagreement as to the degree to which it mattered. Ultimately though, it needs to be remembered that autonomy did not necessarily result in difference. One of the striking features of much of the twentieth century is that there was a high level of agreement about the fundamental objectives of government amongst politicians and bureaucrats in both Scotland and in England and Wales. The welfare state was an endeavour that rested on large amounts of political consensus about the role of the state in maintaining a healthy and active population, full employment, and political entitlements (a consensus Paterson called “middle opinion”, see, 1994, 104-106). There were examples of different approaches being taken in implementation even in this period of consensus (see below) but just because Scotland had developed some autonomy of government, this did not necessitate difference because the problems facing, and the political objectives of, government in both nations were, in essence, the same.

However, although difference is not a necessary outcome of autonomy, differences can provide evidence of it, and Paterson and McCrone, between them, do provide evidence of Scottish distinctiveness in a broad range of sociological and policy-related contexts, such as: voting patterns and party political affiliations (McCrone, 2001, 104-126), religion (McCrone, 2001, 55-64), economic development and planning (Paterson, 1994, 117-123), housing policy (Paterson, 1994, 123-125),
education (Paterson, 125-128) and national identity and sensibility (Midwinter et al., 1991, 1-20; McCrone, 1992; 2001; Paterson, 1994). The autonomy of Scotland was brought into stark relief throughout the period in which the Thatcher and Major administrations held power at Westminster. At no point did these administrations enjoy any kind of political mandate in Scotland (McCrone, 2001); suggesting that their free-market orientated reform agendas did not chime with Scottish sentiment. Calls for constitutional devolution were soon to become louder. Indeed, it has been argued that Thatcher was in many respects key to subsequent pressures for devolution as she had failed to grasp the hitherto accepted negotiated nature of the Union discussed above, and had actively sought to reassert the sovereignty of Westminster in order to push through her own reform agenda, doing so in a manner that could thus be interpreted as an attack on Scottish nationhood by Scottish elites and the public alike (see Hirst, 1989, chapter 2; Paterson, 1994). Indeed, McAra has argued that it was this period, in particular, that was characterised by policy divergence between Scotland and England and Wales in relation to a number of criminal and youth justice related issues (1999; 2004, 27-32). It is to how Scottish autonomy was manifested within the context of the criminal justice system that I now turn.

The Scottish legal system, as noted earlier, was one of the spheres of civil society that remained separate under the 1707 Treaty of Union. One important consequence of this was that it meant that Scottish lawyers tended to be educated within a different system, and that they pursued their careers within different social, professional and institutional environments from their counterparts in England (in the early days of the Union it is argued that this contributed to the development of a strong sense of Scottish identity amongst the profession, see Phillipson, 1976). But there were, and continued to be, important tangible distinctions to be made between the systems. It is worth just noting that the principles and jurisprudence of Scots law itself derived from civilian roots, in contrast to the common law roots of English law. Although there has been convergence of law in some areas (particularly in relation to economic and corporate matters where much law is UK law), there remain important differences within some areas of private, criminal and public law (see Himsworth,
2007, 36). The structure and organisation of the courts in Scotland also continues to differ markedly from that in England and Wales (see Young, 1997) and remains, largely, separate. Even though the House of Lords does act as a court of final appeal in Scottish civil cases, it has no such jurisdiction in criminal matters where the High Court of Justiciary acts in this capacity (Himsworth, 2007, 35). That said, this issue has recently been complicated by the Constitution Reform Act 2005 which established a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. The consultation on the proposal to create a Supreme Court had been contentious in that the autonomy of Scots law in general, and of the High Court of Justiciary in particular, were seen as having being placed under serious threat (Himsworth and Paterson, 2004). Although the 2005 Act subsequently aimed at providing a court of last resort on constitutional matters which was fully independent from the legislature (i.e. the House of Lords), and did not formally usurp the separateness of Scottish criminal appeals, the long-term influence of the Supreme Court on the three independent legal systems within the UK (Scotland, England and Wales, Northern Ireland) remains to be seen (Himsworth, 2007, 37-40).

Other commonly cited distinguishing features of the system include: criminal court procedure, prosecution, youth justice and criminal justice social work, the latter two being particularly germane to the present discussion. Despite criminal court procedure being formally adversarial, as it is in England and Wales (Gane, 1999), it also contains features, such as the intermediate diet at which the judge plays an active role in assessing the preparedness of council to proceed, that some commentators have considered to be more inquisitorial in nature (Young, 1996; McCallum and Duff, 2000). The Scottish system of public prosecution, through the independent office of the Procurator Fiscal, has been described as having rather more in common with prosecution systems on the continent than of England and Wales, even following the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service (Duff, 1999). However, it is in relation to youth justice and social work that most of the recent work on the character of criminal justice in Scotland has focused, and for good reason (McAra 2004; 2005; 2007; McNeill and Whyte, 2007).
The Children’s Hearings system is arguably the most distinctive feature of Scottish criminal justice process. Set up under the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, Children’s Hearings were based on the understanding that there was no difference between young people who offended and those who were in need of social support and/or intervention. Offending was simply a consequence or manifestation of wider social problems in the young person’s environment, and so addressing these problems was central to addressing offending behaviour. In short, Children’s Hearings eschewed the language of punishment and represented the institutionalisation of penal-welfare values at precisely the moment that those values were coming under direct attack south of the border (McAra, 2004, 27-32). The Kilbrandon Committee, upon whose report the aforementioned Children’s Hearing system was based, also made related recommendations about the delivery of criminal justice social work in Scotland that would further the divergence of the system from England and Wales in this period. Kilbrandon recommended that probation services should be provided through generic Social Work Departments organised through local authorities and orientated around the penal-welfare approach that would also animate Children’s Hearings. Again, these recommendations were enacted through the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 which controversially closed down the specialist Scottish Probation Service in favour of this generic approach (McIvor and Williams, 1999, 199-200; Schaffer, 1980, 40). Although there is evidence that criminal justice social work has become increasingly specialised within Social Work Departments (and so the personnel may have rather less generic social work experience than Kilbrandon would have envisaged) it remains the case that the personnel who undertake criminal justice social work services identify themselves as social workers, are educated as social workers, and generally espouse the outlook and penal-welfare values of social workers (even in the face of alternative discourses, such as public protection, see McNeill and Whyte, 2007, 21-30). In short, the reason that youth justice and social work have been seen as so important in discussions of developments in criminal justice in Scotland, and how they compared with those in England and Wales, is that they not only showed that the formal legal and institutional structures of the system in Scotland were distinctive, they indicated that the values and orientations of those professionals populating the system had become
distinctive too – in the sense that the penal-welfare project that had come under such challenge in most, if not all, late modern societies (Garland, 1996; 2001) managed to survive, albeit not unscathed, in Scotland (McAra, 1999; 2004). McAra argued that divergence between the two criminal justice systems was most pronounced between the Kilbrandon Committee report and the mid-1990s (2004, 27-32), when political sentiment in Scotland was out of kilter with the Thatcher and Major administrations at Westminster (McCrone, 2001, chapter 5), resulting in Scottish elites positioning themselves against developments down south. Once the political divide between Scotland and England and Wales narrowed, when New Labour took office with substantial levels of support in both jurisdictions, this “other than England” stance of Scottish elites became less tenable (McAra, 2007). Once government was formally devolved to Scotland in 1999 criminal justice policy development in Scotland would also come under greater levels of parliamentary scrutiny, and would be subject to more direct input from elected members of parliament than had hitherto been the case (McAra 2004; 2007). Since 1999 McAra has argued that penal ideologies in Scotland and in England and Wales have, if anything converged. Interestingly, she argued that penal-welfarism had suffered further erosion in Scotland (although it happened later than in England and Wales), but also that both jurisdictions could be characterised as articulating a complicated and very often contradictory set of rationales and values (“punitive, preventative, restorative, actuarial”), all of which were further justified on the grounds of, and underpinned by a commitment to, “scientific rationalism” and the value of evidence-led policy (McAra, 2004, 39-40).

In conclusion, there are a number of points to the discussion so far that provide a useful context for understanding developments in community safety in Scotland from around the 1980s onwards:

- Despite the UK’s formal status as a relatively homogenous unitary nation state Scotland retained a degree of autonomy and self government. This meant that it was possible (although not necessary) for policy to evolve differently in Scotland.
• The key to autonomy in Scotland, and indeed elsewhere, was the people – the bureaucrats, professionals, lobbyists etc. - who populated and animated the system and whose actions actually made things happen (Paterson, 1994, 131; chapter 3, above).

• Within criminal justice there were numerous examples of distinctiveness (subject to long-standing and ongoing anxieties about assimilation and convergence). Key to recent debates has been the argument that, especially in the latter part of the twentieth century we saw clear divergence between Scotland and England and Wales, characterised by Scotland’s greater reluctance to let go of the penal-welfare orientation of the system, even though there has been some convergence following formal devolution of government to Edinburgh.

The development of community safety and partnership in Scotland: a familiar tale?
The story of the development of community safety in Scotland since the 1980s is one that will be very familiar to those who have observed England and Wales over the same period (see chapter 2). Although the chapter will move on to identify and examine some features of the organisation and structure of community safety and partnership working in Scotland that are distinctive from how things have evolved south of the border, it is the similarities between the jurisdictions which will be emphasised in this section. In fact, events in Scotland also demonstrated striking similarities with developments that were occurring throughout Europe and the US (see discussion of the transformations of criminology, chapter 2). The “cluster of central themes” that Crawford saw as characterising policy responses to insecurity throughout Europe (the shift in priority from detection to prevention; the inclusion of social problems and harms that go beyond traditional definitions of crime; the championing of informal social controls, localised problem-solving and the partnership approach as the favoured model of implementation; and the ultimate objective of producing ‘holistic’ solutions to these often complex problems) (2002,
were all, as we will see, visible within the Scottish context. This section of the chapter will provide a short outline of the most important institutional and policy developments in crime prevention and community safety in Scotland over the last fifty years or so, before moving on to contextualise this within a broader discussion of the complex and contradictory state of criminal justice more generally over this time. The importance of partnership working to developments in Scotland, and its long history within other spheres of policy and government, will be noted throughout, and returned to in the final section which will reflect upon some recent developments which are illustrative of the ways in which developments in Scotland have been distinctive.

Recent accounts of the development of crime prevention and community safety within the Scottish police often take the setting up of Juvenile Liaison Schemes in the 1950s as their starting point (Schaffer, 1980; Monaghan, 1997; Fyfe, 2005). The first Scottish scheme was set up in Greenock in 1956 (it had been tried some years earlier in Liverpool), a force that quickly developed a reputation for innovative community policing (Schaffer, 1980, 68-72; Fyfe, 2005, 109-110). Further schemes were later set up in the towns of Coatbridge, Kilmarnock, Paisley and Perth (as well as in Stirling and Clackmannan police districts) (see Mack, 1963, 361) and they would soon form part of the work of all Scottish police forces. The Juvenile Liaison Scheme was undoubtedly interesting as it involved police officers working closely with a range of other local social services and community members (including schools, probation officers, ministers, local businesses and families themselves) in order to supervise and monitor young people who had been identified as being engaged in what would probably be described as ‘antisocial behaviour’ in modern parlance – problematic and disruptive behaviour that might be a minor offence in itself, or which could be viewed as evidence that the young person was out of family control and ‘at risk’ of engaging in future offending (Schaffer, 1980, 30-31; Monaghan, 1997, 25). As such, the Juvenile Liaison Scheme was both an early attempt to highlight the importance of multi-agency cooperation and an articulated recognition that the police alone did not necessarily control all of the means through which to prevent crime. It was also “part of a wider project of crime and
delinquency prevention” that, at this point, was particularly focused on the impact of urban decay on young people and crime rates (Mack, 1963, 367; Monaghan, 1997, 27), an area of concern that would continue to shape developments in the future.

The approach of the Juvenile Liaison Schemes would not, however, receive universal support within the Scottish police, mirroring debates about the role of the police and the meaning of “crime prevention” that have also been documented in England and Wales (Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 1994; Hughes, 1998). One of the aims of the Juvenile Liaison Scheme had been to keep young people out of formal criminal justice process (in this way it sat quite comfortably with the Kilbrandon philosophy discussed earlier), and there was evidence that it was quite successful in this respect (Mark, 1963, 367-368). The Royal Commission on Police in Scotland (which reported in 1962) would also give some thought as to what the nature of, and priority to be given to, crime prevention ought to be – was it to be achieved through effective detection and prosecution of crimes, through better community involvement and liaison, or with reference to proactive physical and social crime prevention measures (Monaghan, 1997, 27)? Basically, the Committee weighed up the relative value of proactive measures (such as juvenile liaison, community involvement etc.) against reactive policing (law enforcement and prosecution). Monaghan observed that the Commission did not come to any clear conclusions on this matter and defined the functions of the Scottish police in broad and encompassing terms that were interpretable either way (and enshrined in the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 as the prevention of crime, the protection of life and property and the detection and bringing to justice of offenders), but the Committee’s deliberations nonetheless provided valuable insight into the tensions that underpinned discussions about crime prevention in this period (Monaghan, 1997, 27). The point is that in large part the police themselves continued to give emphasis to the reactive role of police as crime fighters, and considered proactive and community-based work as being “social work” and certainly not “real” police work (Schaffer, 1980, 26). As in England and Wales, the Scottish public police emerged in the early 19th century with a broad “policing” role that encompassed the government of the population in a general sense (and so would see the police involved in, amongst other things, weights and
measures regulation and road building) (Walker, 1999; Dinsmor and Goldsmith, 2005), but that this was quickly reinterpreted into a narrower crime control role as the institution sought to focus on activities which were measurable and which could therefore be used to demonstrate their effectiveness and thus justify their ongoing existence (Reiner 1988; 2000; Emsley, 1996; Garland, 2000; 2002). Culturally this meant that the Scottish police (like their English colleagues, see Reiner, 2000) gave priority and status to work that produced “results” (in the form of arrests and/or convictions) and would come to think of crime prevention in such terms. The generally low numbers of police officers involved in specialist crime prevention work, despite it becoming a focus of policy, continued into the 1990s, and it was found to be a relatively marginal activity within the organisation by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary as late as 1995 (Monaghan, 1997, 31).

Despite this internal resistance within the police there would continue to be important developments that would give emphasis to more proactive and multi-agency forms of crime prevention. For example, the Scottish Home and Health Department’s 1971 circular (4/71) sought to develop community relations work through the recommendation that specialist community involvement branches be established (see Schaffer, 1980, 47-48). After the 1975 rationalisation of the Scottish police there were found to be community involvement branches in all 8 of the newly established forces (there had previously been 22) (Monaghan, 1997, 29). It remains unclear how active all of these community involvement branches actually were in practice, but there is evidence that some of them were active and that they took the role seriously. For example, the newly established Strathclyde police force set up a Working Party to develop the community involvement role (Schaffer, 1980, 48). It understood crime prevention in much broader terms than just law enforcement, distinguishing between physical measures (from target hardening to being involved in architectural design), social measures (with a particular focus on working with young people and the Children’s Hearing system, but also including working with schools and in deprived urban neighbourhoods) and community relations (which it described as being about maintaining good contacts with various local services and local government, noting, interestingly, that “race relations present no problem in
Similar themes were also found within the, often quite contemporary sounding, report of the Scottish Council of Crime from 1975. It was possible to argue that the report rather played down the potential role of opportunity reduction and physical crime prevention to act as anything other than a short-term solution (an example of the institutional blindness to such ideas at the time, see Garland, 2000, 6-7; chapter 3, above), but it was nonetheless interesting that such measures, coupled with the idea that they needed to be implemented by communities themselves, were well in evidence by this time (see 1975, chapter 4). It was also interesting that the report gave some emphasis to the importance of ‘social’ causes of crime (defined as poverty, bad housing, family upbringing and unemployment) as key to long-term crime prevention, even if it did so with a caveat that rising crime could not easily be attributed to social factors alone (see 1975, 22-23). Taking such an approach again meant that the Committee was inclined to conclude that crime prevention would ultimately require the cooperation of a wide range of social services, government bodies, community representatives and local people themselves – it was not a task for any single agency, including the police (1975, 22). Even though the report did move on to give some consideration to the potential role of penal sanctions and treatment-based disposals in crime prevention (doing so with quite a critical eye as to the efficacy of the latter, chiming with the emerging “nothing works” cynicism of this period, see para 53), it did not take too police-centred a view of crime prevention, seeing the police as but one element of a larger network of governmental and informal social control (see Banton, 1964, 1-11 and Smith, 1983, 10-13 as rare examples of research on the police that did not take too police-centred a view of social control). In short, the crime prevention prescription of the Scottish Council on Crime in 1975, was already bearing the marks of what Garland would later term ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996), in that the responsibility for crime prevention (at the level of official rhetoric at least) was being diffused throughout the social body and ultimately onto the individual. Alternatively, it might be argued that the prescriptions of the Council showed that, despite the efforts of institution-building scholars in the academy (Manheim, 1960; Radzinowicz, 1961; Garland, 1988; 2002), there was, in fact, continuity in such thinking that was never completely eclipsed by the positivist project (see chapter 3):
“In the final analysis the effectiveness of prevention depends on the public, on the training and upbringing of children, by parents and others, on the willingness of people to remove or reduce opportunities for crime, on the willingness of citizens to work with their neighbours in the community for a common goal . . .” (1975, 22)

By the early 1980s it would appear that there was quite a lot of multi-agency work going on in Scotland that saw the police working with schools, social workers, local businesses, churches, architects, town planners, local government and a developing network of local crime prevention panels (which were themselves populated by local interested parties) (Schaffer, 1980). Some of the problems inherent in multi-agency working, such as the difficulty in getting local people involved and taking ownership of projects, and the related problem of the same faces turning up to get involved every time, were already recognised (Schaffer, 1980, 74). As something of an aside, it should perhaps be noted that Scottish officials did historically have quite a lot of experience of working in partnership (albeit not in the field of criminal justice). Paterson’s analysis of Scottish autonomy in relation to economic development throughout the twentieth century showed that much of it was coordinated through what we would now call partnership structures which included both the private and public sectors (1994, 117-123). Membership of the Scottish National Development Council, and the numerous iterations and developments of it that would follow, was broad and included business people, politicians, church members, local government, trade union officials and politicians – a roll-call of partners that is similar to those called to participate in more recent appeals to partnership (see chapter 2). Coupled with this point, it has also been argued that the smaller scale of Scotland itself (and the networks of government) further contributed to the idea amongst Scottish officials that they already knew one another (McAra, 2005) and that they had somehow always been working in partnership with other agencies. However, despite some focussed strategies in the 1980s that would continue to emphasise partnership working (which will be outlined shortly), it remained uncertain as to how much, if at all, partnership working or crime prevention initiatives were having an impact on the ground. The Central Research Unit’s Directory of Crime Prevention Initiatives in Scotland (Valentin, 1995) showed that there was a lot of work out there, but that it
was developing sporadically, under different auspices (some were police-led initiatives, others were led by crime prevention panels, others appeared to be run by some form of partnership), and with different visions of crime prevention (there was a mix of situational and social projects). Very little of it appeared to have been evaluated and this makes it difficult to make anything but quite cautious claims about the extent to which crime prevention and community safety in practice in Scotland was different, if at all, from that in England and Wales. The coordination of these piecemeal developments would become all the more important over the 1990s as a potentially overlapping set of partnership structures evolved.

Not only did the Scottish Home and Health Department circular 6/84, much like its counterpart in England and Wales issued six months earlier, reiterate a commitment to the shared responsibility for crime prevention and the need, therefore, for a multi-agency response to it, it also indicated something of a shift in thinking about crime prevention towards the situational (Bottoms, 1990). By this time the influence of the Home Office Research Unit, and the powerful research that it was producing (Clark and Mayhew, 1980; Clarke and Cornish, 1983; Heal and Laycock, 1986; Clarke, 1995), was clearly being felt in Scotland. For Monaghan this represented an example of anti-welfarist sentiment having an impact upon Scottish policy (1997, 35). That said, the conception of crime prevention that continued to be articulated in Scotland throughout the 1980s also gave emphasis to the perceived link between the socio-economic decline of urban centres and housing estates (“impossible communities”), the rising crime problem, and wider concerns about problem young people (Schaffer, 1980, 78-80). The Safer Neighbourhood schemes organised by SACRO in 1986, although similar to earlier work conducted in England and Wales by NACRO (Bottoms, 1990, 5 and 9-10) reflected this, as did 1988s New Life for Urban Scotland, a partnership-based initiative which actively sought to involve local communities and the private sector in urban redevelopment (rather than parachuting in ideas from above). At this point in late-1980s Scotland “crime prevention ….was set within the wider context of urban regeneration” (Monaghan, 1997, 35). The next series of multi-agency initiatives, in the form of the Safer Cities projects, would
continue with this tendency to nest crime prevention within broader policy concerns, and would also see community safety emerge as a more widely used term.

The Scottish Office announced its Safer Cities programme in 1989, again following the lead of The Home Office which had announced its programme in March of the previous year. Four Scottish projects were initially set up in Central Edinburgh, Castlemilk (Glasgow), Greater Easterhouse (Glasgow) and North East Dundee, with a fifth project being added in Aberdeen in 1992 (see Carnie, 1995). All of the projects continued to be nested within the logic of urban regeneration to the extent that one of their objectives was to “create safer cities in which economic enterprise and community life could flourish” (Carnie, 1999, 76). However, the Safer Cities programmes, on both sides of the border, were also more explicitly focused on crime and fear of crime issues than previous initiatives, and had, from the outset at least, an orientation that favoured the use of situational crime prevention measures over more social (or welfare-based) measures (Pease, 1997; 2002; Carnie 1999). This orientation, despite being favoured by government officials and many Home Office researchers at the time (Clarke, 1995; Ekblom, 1995) would not be accepted unreservedly by the local practitioners who would end up running the projects. In Scotland, for example, Carnie found that the Castlemilk Safer Cities project had been able to negotiate a broad community safety agenda that clearly understood crime prevention in social welfare terms (1999, 77-78). It had been able to do this because the multi-agency group that would develop the agenda pre-existed its Safer Cities status and was already working with this broader perspective. This was not the case with the other projects but even there situational measures would be balanced with social initiatives (Carnie, 1999, 79-82). Indeed, as was noted previously, studies found that there tended to be a movement towards social measures, and away from purely situational ones, throughout the lives of projects (Pease, 1997, 982; chapter 2). The reason for this seemed to be that local practitioners, in both jurisdictions, favoured what they saw as more “holistic” and “long-term” solutions to crime prevention (i.e. social measures), and remained unconvinced that situational measures would produce much else other than displacement (Pease, 1997; Gilling, 1997). This was despite the fact that there was evidence that working with the less
clearly defined social measures was often the source of disagreement and conflict within partnerships, whereas situational measures were more clearly defined, their effects also being more readily measurable (see Gilling, 1994; chapter 2, above). The Safer Cities projects certainly suggested that ‘community safety’ seemed to be a more politically attractive rallying-call than ‘crime prevention’ despite its shortcomings (Gilling, 1997; Carnie, 1999). In any case the evaluations would prove to be sufficiently positive to ensure that the commitment to multi-agency work would not only continue, but would gather momentum.

The Scottish Office’s strategy document Preventing Crime Together in Scotland: A Strategy for the 1990s (1992) emerged just as internal developments within central government (including the setting up of a Crime Prevention Unit within The Scottish Office in the same year) were serving to underline the increasing importance being given to crime prevention (see Monaghan, 1997, 34-39 for a review of these developments). The document continued to extol the virtues of the partnership approach to problem solving that would be taken up, or would develop, in a range of social policy areas by the end of the decade. Interestingly, the document was quite clear about the importance of local government to the development of ‘holistic’ crime prevention strategies, in contrast to what Monaghan had seen as active attempts to exclude it throughout the preceding decade, and in the Safer Cities experiments specifically where appointed coordinators came from The Scottish Office or organisations such as Crime Concern, but not from local government (1997, 39; Carnie, 1995; 1999). It was also clear that the intention was that the resources to develop crime prevention partnership work would have to come from the reallocation or smarter use of existing local government funds, rather than from additional streams of funding (Scottish Office, 1992). As this was just prior to a substantial reorganisation of local government structures in both Scotland and in England and Wales (McCrone, 2001) it is perhaps not surprising that developments in partnership work were piecemeal through this uncertain period (Craig and Manthorpe, 1999). Partnerships would continue to receive core support through resource reallocation and “in kind” (i.e. through local authority and police commitments to provide designated community safety officers to develop strategies)
for around another decade, although additional pots of Challenge Fund monies would also be available through competitive tender competitions for specific initiatives (such as CCTV). More sustainable core annual funding for community safety partnerships was introduced in 2002 (Scottish Executive, 2002; chapter 6, above), but since the election of the Scottish National Party in May 2007 funding arrangements have again become uncertain with the end of “ring-fencing” of local authority finances (which means that local authorities will in all likelihood reappraise their commitments and priorities, which may, or may not, include community safety). Funding regimes are, as we will see, of crucial importance in shaping the sense of legitimacy and identity of such structures (see chapters 3 and 6) as well as whether they perceive that they actually have the necessary capacity to make a difference on the ground (see discussion of “negotiability” in chapter 3).

The turning point in England and Wales occurred when local authorities and the police were given statutory duties to develop local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, thus creating the formal “infrastructure” within which community safety would develop over the following decade (see Crawford, 2007, 893-895; chapter 2). These sections of the Act did not apply to Scotland, possibly because devolution was in the air and it was felt that the creation of such responsibilities should lie with a future Scottish Parliament. This is not to say, however, that the position in Scotland was necessarily so different in practice. The importance, and possible benefits, of working in partnership would be emphasised in a number of high profile documents produced in the late 1990s. *Community Safety: A Key Council Strategy* (1997) is of particular interest in that it was published by the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (CoSLA - a body that represented the interests of local government in Scotland), articulated a broad view of community safety partnership work (ranging from CCTV to youth cafes to intergenerational problems to fire and road safety), and, amongst others, gave the new administration’s manifesto commitment to community safety and its affinity with the Best Value agenda as key reasons for local authorities to engage with community safety. CoSLA also, along with the Association of Chief Police Officers Scotland (ACPOS), contributed to The Scottish Executive’s *Safer Communities in
Scotland (1999), which was designed to play a not dissimilar role to the guidance material for new CDRPs issued by The Home Office, in that it was about giving advice to the police and local authorities about how they should go about setting up partnership structures (it included sections on conducting community safety audits, monitoring programmes, evaluating initiatives etc.). So even though partnership remained non-statutory north of the border the level of encouragement to develop such strategies was such that it is questionable whether it actually remained genuinely voluntary. Certainly by the end of the decade all 32 of the Scottish local authorities were involved in some kind of community safety related multi-agency work. The basic structure, generally adopted (and certainly adopted within the two research sites) would see a Steering Group set up at a strategic level and issue-based Local Action Teams (LATs) at an operational level. The Community Safety Steering Groups were generally populated by senior office holders or Chief Executives from the main partners (Local Authority, Police Service, Fire Service, Health Board, Social Work and sometimes members of high profile voluntary sector agencies) and were serviced and supported by full-time Designated Community Safety Officers who were on secondment from the Local Authority, the Police Service and (sometimes) the Fire Service. Local Action Teams were organised around strategic themes (drugs, young people, fire safety etc.), were comprised of partners brought in for more specific, sometimes short-term projects, and were also serviced by the Designated Officers who would connect their activities and any community anxieties raised within them, to the Steering Group. More detailed descriptions of these structures and their status, funding, membership, and organisation will be provided throughout chapters 5, 6 and 7 (as such issues are very much embedded within, and a necessary part of, the analysis of Community Safety Partnerships as communities of practice). For the moment, the point to note is that although partnership structures had emerged throughout the country by the late 1990s they were, by all accounts, and despite official exhortations of the benefits to be derived from them, “at a very early stage of development” (Accounts Commission, 2000a, 2; Accounts Commission, 2000b; Hewitt et al., 2000).
It should also be noted at this point that partnership working in Scotland (and England and Wales too) was being extolled as a virtue in a wide range of other, often related, policy fields. One of the first things that Donald Dewar, the incoming Secretary of State for Scotland, did upon the election of the New Labour Administration in 1997 was issue a consultation paper on the problem of social exclusion in Scotland (Scottish Office, 1998). Social exclusion was defined to incorporate a wide social welfare agenda that made explicit reference to community safety, but which also identified poor housing and urban decay, unemployment and low levels of marketable skills, the lack of resources for children and young people, ill health and inequitable access to transport, as means through which citizens were effectively prevented from fully participating in public life. As with urban regeneration before it, crime prevention and community safety were being nested within a broader social welfare agenda. Social Inclusion Partnerships (SIPs) emerged throughout the UK in the late 1990s and a substantial amount of work continues to be done under its rubric (Scottish Executive, 2007), including the development of community based interventions that may impact on offending (see Bannister and Dillane, 2005). Without entering into a larger discussion of what is a substantial area of social policy in its own right, the central point to be made here is that by the end of the 20th century there were a plethora of partnership structures in Scotland (e.g. community safety, social inclusion, partnerships for parenting, lifelong learning partnerships etc.) many of which, potentially overlap in various ways. For example, if one took a broad enough view of crime prevention all of these partnerships could be deemed to have a role to play. The desire to coordinate the work of this patchwork of partnerships, and avoid overlap and duplication of effort, would find expression in Community Planning, the development of which has, more recently, defined the infrastructure of community safety in Scotland. The development of Community Planning will be outlined in the next section.

In summary, the development of crime prevention and community safety in Scotland has shown striking similarities with developments in England and Wales over the same period. There are arguments to be made that the size of the jurisdiction, the rural character of much of it, and the history of officials and community members
working in partnership in other fields (such as economic development and housing, Paterson, 1994, 117-125) gave developments something of a more consensual and social-welfare orientated edge than was the case south of the border, but in the absence of rigorous evaluation and research throughout much of this period such claims ought to be made with some degree of caution. Particularly since the 1980s Scottish government circulars, policy statements, and experiments had tended to follow those in England and Wales, and the influence of the research that was produced by the The Home Office Research Unit (e.g. Clarke and Mayhew, 1980; Hope and Shaw, 1988; Ekblom, 1995) was also apparent. It is fair to say that developments in community safety in both jurisdictions could be characterised as prioritising proactive action over detection; favouring multi-agency joined-up approaches to the implementation and management of initiatives; and emphasising the importance of local involvement, informal social control, and addressing problems and nuisances that go beyond what can strictly be defined as “crime” – just as Crawford had found throughout Europe (2002, 31).

If one looks at broader developments in criminal justice over the same period, the context within which all of the above took place, one also sees considerable similarities between what has happened in Scotland and in England and Wales. The complex, contradictory and often uneven developments that have been seen to characterise criminal justice systems in late-modern societies have been well documented (Garland, 2001; 1996; McAra, 2004; 1999; Crawford, 1997; 2007; Hughes and Edwards, 2002; Fyfe, 2005; chapter 2, above) even though greater emphasis is now being given to the ways in which they have been given specific inflections within different localities (Crawford, 2002), including Scotland (McAra, 2004). Scotland did see the emergence of policies and initiatives over the last quarter century or so that could be described as “state sovereignty” developments in that they were based upon the assumption that the state retained a monopoly over crime control and was effective at doing so (Garland, 1996; Fyfe, 2005). Such initiatives tended to be based upon a punitive rationale, but also included initiatives underpinned by more managerialist thinking where they were based upon the prediction of risk or the management of state agencies through performance-
management or target-setting. A less than exhaustive list of examples of such developments would include (see Fyfe, 2005, 114-116): zero tolerance policing initiatives (Operation Spotlight in Glasgow); the appearance of “two strikes” sentencing for certain categories of violent and sexual offence created in the Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997 but never implemented; the trumping of children’s needs by “public protection” concerns permitted by the Children (Scotland) Act 1995; Antisocial behaviour orders and curfews on young people; the growth in centrality of risk-assessment and risk management throughout the system (McAra, 1999; McNeill and Whyte, 2007); and an increased focus of centralised objective-setting and auditing of services (Normand, 2003; Audit Scotland, 2000a).

Contrary to such developments Scotland also saw numerous initiatives and changes within the system which are more akin to what Garland (1996) describes as “adaptive” strategies in that that they underplay state capacity to control crime, instead seeking to delegate or offload responsibility onto non-state actors, the private sector, communities and/or individuals themselves (Fyfe, 2005, 116-126). Again, a less than exhaustive list of examples of “adaptive” developments within the Scottish context would include: the rise of the partnership approach and muti-agency cooperation throughout social policy, as already discussed; the faith being placed in surveillance technologies, particularly CCTV; attempts to promote active citizenship in relation to crime prevention and social control, through, for example, Neighbourhood Watch Schemes and the Special Constabulary; the development of non-police functionaries who nonetheless have social control roles, such as the recently evaluated Community Wardens Scheme in Scotland (Hayward et al, 2007); and the growth of private sector input into crime control, whether in the form of taking over prisoner escort services and functions formerly handled by the state or in the form of security within mass private property or the night-time economy.

Therefore, it appears that similarities between Scotland and England and Wales in the development of crime prevention and community safety have taken place within a wider criminal justice context in which the picture has also been similar in important respects. However, it needs to be reiterated that developments in Scotland have not been identical to those in England and Wales and that there has been, and
continues to be (in the shape of the Scottish Parliament), space within which the
development of Scottish policy and practice remains autonomous and therefore
retains the potential to be distinctive. The following section will briefly outline some
very recent developments in community safety in Scotland. Typically in the current
climate, they do send out some complex and contradictory messages about the
current orientation of policy and practice in this field, but they also provide evidence
that the development of crime prevention and community safety in Scotland,
notwithstanding the similarities just outlined, does have some distinctive
characteristics. In particular, it shows that community safety in Scotland has been
nested within a different institutional complex, emphasising different values, than
that in England and Wales.

Developments in the infrastructure of community safety in Scotland: a
contradictory tale
The sections of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 that placed a statutory duty upon
local authorities and the police to set up and coordinate CDRPs did not apply to
Scotland. It is already clear that this did not mean that calls for partnership working
and multi-agency cooperation did not preoccupy Scottish policy makers throughout
the 1990s. However, it did mean that the infrastructure within which community
safety developed remained less formal for longer than it did in England and Wales.
Indeed, it is only in the last few years that what might be viewed as a statutory
infrastructure for community safety has been erected. There are three main pieces of
legislation that are of great importance to the current and future development of
community safety in Scotland. Taken together they have created a distinctive
partnership-based infrastructure within which community safety is nested. Whether
this infrastructure reflects a distinctive set of value commitments within criminal
justice and social policy in Scotland is an altogether more vexed question upon
which I will conclude. The discussion will be organised around the three statutory
obligations which have a bearing on the location and future development of
community safety in Scotland: community planning, antisocial behaviour and
community justice authorities.
Community planning

Community planning was first mooted in Labour Party policy documents on local government in the mid-1990s. The concept was closely linked with the then current thinking on the Best Value agenda, and the importance of improving local government efficiencies and performance through it. In Scotland five local authorities (Edinburgh, Highland, Perth and Kinross, South Lanarkshire and Stirling) voluntarily became Pathfinder projects in 1998 and developed and published their own Community Plans by December of that year. The Pathfinders were reviewed, in generally favourable terms, by a team from the University of Birmingham that identified four core components underlying the concept of community planning (see Rogers et al., 2000, 6-7):

1. “Strategic vision” – community planning was to be very much about emphasising “holistic” approaches to social policy. It saw that many of the needs of local communities were interlinked and, as we will see, would also come to be a model through which the existing patchwork of sometimes overlapping partnerships (including community safety and social inclusion as but two examples) could be subjected to increased oversight and coordination.

2. “Community consultation and involvement” – the views of the community itself and of local public, private and voluntary agencies were to be sought and, more importantly, they were to be actively involved in the process.

3. “Partnership” – both planning and implementation were, unsurprisingly, to be done in partnership.

4. “Community leadership” – it was interesting that, despite the emphasis on partnership working, there was nonetheless a view that local government had an especially important role to take in terms of initiating and “leading” the
Community planning process. Rogers et al argue that this idea came from the fact that local authorities tapped into local democracy through their elected membership and that they also had responsibility for the broadest range of social services, and so were best placed to take the lead (2000, 7).

The Birmingham team found that there was “no basic dispute about the fundamental value of community planning” (2000, 9) and that there were high levels of goodwill towards the approach from within local government and amongst partners. More specifically the team found that there was strong support within local government for community planning to be given statutory backing in a manner that would underline the commitment to be given to strategic planning (2000, 19-20). It is interesting to note that local government in England and Wales had been vocal some years earlier (following the influential Morgan Report in 1991) about the need for a statutory duty to underscore partnership commitments (Crawford, 1997; Hughes and Edwards, 2002; chapter 2, above), but in Scotland the pressure came in relation to broad and strategic partnership working and without much specific reference to crime prevention or community safety at all (amongst the Pathfinders only Stirling had community safety as a priority of the community plan – see Rogers et al., 2000, 15).

Community Planning was given statutory force in the Local Government (Scotland) Act 2003. The Act did articulate the community leadership role of local government through placing the duty to “initiate” community planning on it (s15), although it also placed a specific duty on a broad range of other agencies (including Health Boards, joint police boards, chief constables of the police, joint fire boards, and Scottish Enterprise) to “participate in community planning” (s16). Since the Act community safety has been placed within the framework of Community Planning as a strategic priority for many of the partners. It sits, therefore, nested amongst other partnership-based strategic priorities that vary in different community plans, but which include: social inclusion, partnerships for parenting, healthy communities, social justice, lifelong learning, economic development and sustainability, environmental planning etc.. It is of course the case that CDRPs in England and Wales also developed from and alongside other partnership structures that included
urban regeneration and social inclusion (Hughes, 2002a, 31) but in Scotland the statutory duty itself has given emphasis to the more holistic Community Planning over the potentially more crime-focused community safety.

**Antisocial behaviour**

The Antisocial Behaviour (Scotland) Act 2004 followed the lead of its English counterpart enacted around a year earlier. There was nothing in this Act that gave a nod to any residual commitment to welfare values. The Act extended the use of Antisocial Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) to young people between the ages of 12-16, gave the police increased powers to disperse groups of young people, created community reparation orders, extended the use of electronic monitoring in the community and created parenting orders for parents who were viewed as “failing” their problematic children (see McAra, 2004, 34, 38-9; Walters and Woodhead, 2007). Recent research has suggested that there was some resistance to the use of some of the orders provided for by the Act. Although use of ASBOs in Scotland has been on the increase since the Act the extent to which they were actually being used for under 16s, for example, remained unclear, possibly because local authorities were viewing them as a “last resort” for this group, and continued to favour the Children’s Hearings System where possible (Zuleeg et al., 2007). Walters and Woodhead’s study of the use of parenting orders also found local government resistance to what was perceived as the “punitive” language of the Act and its central government sponsors (2007).

Returning to the preoccupations of the present discussion, the 2004 Act contributed to the community safety infrastructure in Scotland by placing a statutory duty on local authorities and chief constables to develop and publish an antisocial behaviour strategy for their areas (s1(1)). However, in practice it was assumed from the outset that such strategies would be written using existing Community Planning structures, most likely their Community Safety Partnerships or members thereof (Scottish Executive, 2004, 6-7). In effect, the duty to draft antisocial behaviour strategies had become a means through which Community Safety and Community Planning could
be required to focus on more explicitly crime-related issues (although it must be noted that much antisocial behaviour is not itself a crime, even though breach of an ASBO is). There have long been tensions between The Scottish Executive and Community Safety partnerships about the degree to which broad social justice agendas should form the focus of their work, the former, unsurprisingly, showing a preference for the deployment of more measurable and “scientific” situational measures (Shiel et al., 2005). It is uncertain whether the focus on antisocial behaviour will generate a more “punitive” focus of partnerships in the long term but recently published strategies suggested that there was an ongoing resistance to placing reliance upon such rhetoric. For example, the Strategic Plan for 2005-2008 for Highlands and Islands observed:

“(W)hile the Council’s performance survey showed that respondents noted some concern about high spirits among young people, this was outweighed by a stronger feeling that young people are the lifeblood of our community and should not be blamed for social problems.” (Highland Wellbeing Alliance, 2005)

Community Justice Authorities

Since devolution there have been a number of long overdue reviews of different aspects of Scottish criminal justice (see Bonomy, 2002; Normand, 2003; McInnes, 2004) and an attempt to articulate a more coordinated and managerial approach to the problem of crime through, for example, publication of a criminal justice plan (Scottish Executive, 2004b). The plan gave particular focus to the vexed issue of recidivism rates and would open up discussion about the management of offenders in the community. There was considerable activity over the next couple of years, including the publication of a National Strategy for the Management of Offenders (Scottish Executive, 2006) and the passing of the Management of Offenders (Scotland) Act 2005. This Act established eight Community Justice Authorities (CJAs) around the country (McNeill and Whyte, 2007, 8-10).

In a sense CJAs represented something of a climb-down for the previous administration because it had actually been the intention of the Scottish Labour Party
to create a single-agency Correctional Service for Scotland instead (McNeill and Whyte, 2007, 8). The climb down is important because the creation of such an agency would have had the effect of removing Criminal Justice Social Work from generic social work practice (McNeill and Whyte, 2007; McIvor and Williams, 1999). This connection between criminal justice and generic social work remains a distinctive institutional characteristic of the Scottish system and so its survival is important.

However, the compromise that followed consultation on the matter, CJAs, became operational in April 2007. They were designed to provide a coordinated and strategic approach to the management and planning of services that were available to offenders in the community and were also required to coordinate the work of the Scottish Prison Service and local authority/community providers to ensure continuity between them, the belief being that better coordination of services would serve to reduce re-offending. According to McNeill and Whyte, both the list of partners (“the police, courts, prosecution, prisons, Victim Support Scotland, Health Boards and relevant voluntary agencies”) and the range of offender groups to be focused upon (“less serious/first-time offenders; offenders with mental health problems; offenders with substance misuse problems; persistent offenders, including young offenders coming through from the youth system; prisoners needing resettlement and rehabilitation services; violent, serious and sex offenders; and women offenders”) were broadly defined (2007, 9).

It was certainly clear that the creation of CJAs reflected ongoing tendencies felt around the world for there to be increased coordination, management and monitoring of criminal justice services (Crawford, 1997, 86-92; Normand, 2003). It was rather less clear how they would fit, if at all, next to Community Planning. There are undoubted differences between the objectives of the two partnership structures that are readily illustrated by reference to Brantingham and Faust’s classic typology of crime prevention approaches (see chapter 2). CJAs focus upon people who have already been identified as offenders and try to stop them re-offending. This is what Brantingham and Faust would call tertiary crime prevention. On the other hand,
Community Planning is a much more proactive enterprise that focuses on the social welfare of the population at large (primary crime prevention) and, potentially, on needy groups within the population who might be viewed as being at risk of becoming offenders (secondary crime prevention) (Brantingham and Faust, 1976; chapter 2, above). The distinctive objectives of the two structures may indeed keep them separate, in theory at least, but partner agencies may ultimately be placed in the position of balancing resources for one off against the other and it is possible in a political environment where anxieties about crime are politically potent that reactive, measurable and more explicitly crime-focused partnership work will prevail. Such balancing of objectives is of course not a new problem for local government, or for many of the partner agencies involved, but is nonetheless likely to be important for the future of both CJAs and Community Planning and the relative emphasis in practice given to them.

**Discussion and overview**

This chapter has shown that developments in crime prevention and community safety in Scotland have taken a similar, though not identical, trajectory to those in England and Wales over the same period. On the one hand this should not be surprising given the long history of Scottish autonomy that belied the constitutional settlement that established the United Kingdom. On the other hand it might be asked whether greater differences should have been expected given McAra’s analysis of policy divergence between Scotland and England and Wales over precisely the period in which contemporary thinking about crime prevention was developing (the 1970s to the mid 1990s). More specifically, it might be asked if crime prevention and community safety in Scotland, like its youth justice system, bore a stronger imprint of social welfare values than did developments in England and Wales.

Applying Paterson’s analysis of autonomy to the first question, it is clear that the relative similarity of developments in crime prevention and community safety on both sides of the border does not undermine either the belief in Scottish autonomy or McAra’s analysis of policy divergence in specific areas of criminal justice, notably
youth justice. Autonomy does not necessitate difference and in the case of the ‘preventative turn’ in thinking about crime (Garland, 1996; 2000; Hughes, 2002) there is no evidence to suggest that officials and practitioners did not agree on the basic idea that prevention would be a good idea (i.e. the goals of policy). There were of course debates in both jurisdictions about the relative merits of different approaches to crime prevention (Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 1997; Carnie, 1999) (the means of implementation) but the open nature of the concepts concerned allowed them to engender broad political appeal, ensuring that ‘crime prevention’ did not become the site of “other than England” politics that youth justice had (McAra, 2004; 2005). It should be recalled that situational crime prevention can be viewed as holding appeal for those on either the political right (because it assumes individual responsibility etc.) and for those on the political left (because it provides a pragmatic means of helping vulnerable and highly victimised communities) (see chapter 2). In any case, local implementation also gave practitioners a degree of discretion in terms of the approach to be taken, evidenced by the drift towards more offender-orientated over situational measures (Pease, 1997, 982) despite Home Office and Scottish Office exhortations to focus on the latter. Ultimately, the terms “crime prevention” and “community safety” were too politically vague and open to interpretation for them to be perceived as challenges to traditional Scottish ways of doing things. If anything, the preventive turn that was given such impetus by Home Office research in the 1970s and 1980s found very fertile ground in Scotland where community involvement (Schaffer, 1980), a belief in multi-agency cooperation (Paterson, 1994) and a none too police-centred understanding of social control (Scottish Council on Crime, 1975; Colquhoun, 1797) had long histories. Far from being a challenge to Scottish sensibilities developments in crime prevention and community safety fitted with them. Indeed, it should also be remembered that these developments were perceived as providing an alternative to the seeming rise of punitive, managerial and actuarial rhetoric within criminal justice policy in England and Wales i.e. their potential to promote social justice as well as technical crime prevention was understood in both jurisdictions.
This begs the second question: does community safety in Scotland bear a stronger imprint of commitment to social justice or penal welfare values than it does in England and Wales? This is a very difficult question to answer with certainty, largely because of the relative paucity of research into community safety in Scotland. There are certainly concerns that work in England and Wales, despite coming from a similar background in urban regeneration, became too narrowly focused on crime-control issues throughout the 1990s (Crawford, 1998; Hughes, 2002), quite probably because of central government attempts to micro-manage community safety through detailed performance measurement regimes (Edwards and Hughes, 2002). For the moment community safety partnerships in Scotland continue to articulate a broader commitment to social justice and welfare, despite Scottish Executive attempts to narrow the focus (Shiel et al., 2005). The fact that the statutory duty for partnership working was tied to Community Planning in Scotland also reinforces the impression that the broader vision has a stronger foothold. As was noted above, contradictory developments, particularly in relation to antisocial behaviour, may yet orient community safety more closely and explicitly around crime control but, for the moment at least, it is more accurate to think of crime prevention and community safety being nested within a wider patchwork of social justice strategies, rather than thinking of social justice having become an adjunct to crime control. Should this focus of the infrastructure be allowed to settle, develop and evolve then it is possible that as it institutionalises the thinking of practitioners within it over time we will witness the development of a yet more distinctive approach to crime prevention and community safety in Scotland.
Section III: Partnerships and communities of practice: lessons from the fieldwork
Chapter 5: The ‘domain’ of community safety

Introduction: thinking about community safety partnerships as communities of practice

Over the next three chapters Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland will be critically examined through Wenger’s communities of practice perspective. The study draws upon interviews, observation and documentary analysis conducted over a four year period (2000-2004) in two local authority areas (see chapter 1 and the methodological annex for a more detailed description of the fieldwork). The analysis will be organised around the three “structural elements” of communities of practice (domain, community and practice) identified and developed in Wenger’s review of how they might be applied and “cultivated” in organisations (Wenger et al., 2002, 23-47; chapter 3), although other aspects and dimensions of the perspective which cut across this framework (such identification and negotiability and interstitial communities of practice – see chapter 3) will also be drawn upon where appropriate.

The domain of a community of practice is the topic, problem or shared interest that its members orient their activities and energies around. The community refers to the members of a community of practice – those who share a common enthusiasm for the domain and engage in activities in pursuance of it. Practice, in this context, refers not only to the nature of those activities but also to the shared knowledge, understandings, and rules of thumb etc. that evolve within a community over time. Although they are explored within three separate chapters here (in the service of clarity of exposition) domain, community and practice should, from the outset, be understood as being interconnected and mutually constitutive of one another. For example, if there are changes in the contours of what counts as the domain of a community of practice, this will effect who becomes or remains interested in being a member of it. This means that some themes will cut across more than one chapter, necessitating a certain amount of cross referencing between them. In any case, the chapters should ideally be read alongside one another as together they provide a rare account of the working of Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland.
It will be argued that thinking about Community Safety Partnerships in terms of Wenger’s communities of practice perspective is illuminating because it really draws out the complexity of the organisational arrangements that have been created. It is clear from the fieldwork that communities of practice exist within multiple locations throughout the web of relations established within and between partnerships and the organisations that comprise their membership. However, not all of these communities of practice are likely to contribute towards the development of community safety, reflecting as they do responses of practitioners to serious structural and institutional barriers that continue to make partnership working difficult. The concluding part of chapter 7 will, drawing upon the insights of the preceding chapters, conclude this section by identifying the numerous possible locations of communities of practice within Community Safety Partnership structures. So doing serves to illustrate the ways in which communities of practice are both supporting and impeding the development of a professional identity of community safety that transcends existing criminal justice identities. The concluding chapter of the thesis (chapter 8) will draw upon this analysis to make a series of recommendations designed to promote the cultivation of communities of practice which will support such a development.

The ‘domain’ of community safety

“The domain creates common ground and a sense of common identity. A well-defined domain legitimizes the community by affirming its purpose and value to members and other stakeholders. The domain inspires members to contribute and participate, guides their learning and gives meaning to their actions. Knowing the boundaries and the leading edge of the domain enables members to decide exactly what is worth sharing, how to present their ideas, and which activities to pursue.” (Wenger et al., 2002, 28)

Every community of practice has to have a domain. The domain is the shared project that gives a community its purpose and its focus, making what it does meaningful for those who participate. In simple terms, the domain is the topic upon which the community will direct its practices. It marks out the boundaries of the enterprise and what ‘counts’ as relevant, in so doing influencing who might be considered as
valuable members of the community, and what might constitute valid knowledge and practices in pursuit of it. This is not to suggest that domain ‘defines’ these other components of communities of practice in a simple or mechanistic way – indeed, the domain itself can evolve and develop as changes in the membership of the community and/or its specialist knowledge and practice also evolve. In short, domain, community and practice are mutually constitutive of one another – there is no simple linear relationship between any of the structures of communities of practice (Wenger et al., 2002, chapter 2). However, Wenger’s insistence that domain is important for “affirming the purpose” of the community of practice, its value and legitimacy to members, and their “sense of common identity” does suggest that without a coherent and clearly-articulated domain (whether such a domain is externally imposed or internally developed, an issue that will be examined below) there will not be sufficient identification with a shared project for a community of practice to exist around it. Thus, domain is not only crucial because it suggests the necessary membership and the valid practices of a community of practice – it is also crucial because it provides the common purpose, orientation and commitment that will bind participants into a community of practice.

The key question which the present chapter will explore through the data is this: to what extent does community safety provide an adequate domain upon which a community of practice can develop? The short answer to this question is that it does not – although that is not to say that it cannot. Community safety is well-recognised as a vague and ambiguous term by practitioners, and it sits within a policy environment which is complex and populated by numerous, often similarly vaguely defined, partnership structures (see chapters 2 and 4). Community safety may thus mean rather different things in different contexts, or when articulated by different agencies, or through centrally or locally set performance targets. The very breadth of the concept may, however, also be one of its strengths in that it can encompass and give credence to a range of more specific and defined initiatives and projects. Indeed, it may be within such contexts that communities of practice are in fact more likely to evolve and require nurturing. But this returns us to our initial question and the many that flow from it. Is community safety itself a meaningful domain? If it is,
how might the domain of community safety be described? To what extent can community safety be thought of as genuinely creating common ground and a shared project? If community safety does not provide an adequate domain then can a community of practice emerge within community safety partnership structures (or to be more accurate: where will it emerge)? The interrelated nature of the structures of communities of practice means that these questions will run through all three chapters within this section, but we will begin by considering the domain in isolation.

**Ambiguity at the heart of community safety**

Commentators have been trying to pin down the concept of community safety, and how it might be distinguished from, or understood as inclusive of, similarly difficult to define concepts like crime prevention or crime reduction for at least the last twenty years or so (see: Crawford, 1998, 5-28; 2007; 889-893; Gilling, 1994; 1997; Hope and Shaw, 1988, 1-29; Hughes, 1998; 2007; Home Office, 1991; Pease; 1997; chapter 2). Such debates have often been highly charged and ideologically loaded as different understandings of the concepts are underpinned by fundamentally different perspectives on the nature of both social problems and crime. Sometimes these different, and essentially political, positions are reflected explicitly in different occupational cultures (Crawford, 1997, 99-105; see also chapters 2 and 3 above) and this is certainly an issue to which we will return in this chapter. However, one area in which there has tended to be some agreement is that community safety is generally recognized as being, for better or worse, “broader” in scope than the other concepts. In England and Wales the term community safety became widely (but not entirely) preferred to crime prevention following the 1991 Morgan Report precisely because it was perceived to be a more encompassing concept (Home Office, 1991; Gilling and Hughes, 2004, 134; Crawford, 2007, 889-893). Morgan argued that crime prevention had become too closely associated with the activities of the police (as had Home Office researchers intent on promoting an alternative to situational crime prevention, see Hope and Shaw, 1988) and was thus unlikely to activate community interest and participation around it (Home Office, 1991, 13). Scottish Safer Cities research did indeed find that broader “community safety” agendas had acted as better
catalysts for community involvement than narrower “crime prevention” agendas (Carnie, 1995; 1999; chapter 4, above), but elsewhere serious concerns about the ambiguity of “community safety” were also being articulated. It was argued that community safety (and other too broadly defined “social” approaches to crime prevention) were largely meaningless in practical terms because of their breadth - they could mean so many things to so many different people (and agencies) that they were more likely to create conflict in multi-agency partnerships than they were likely to generate practical initiatives that could be implemented (see chapter 2; Gilling, 1994; 1997; Pease, 1997). In a nutshell - on the one hand the open-textured nature of community safety was perceived as a potential strength because it would get people mobilised and round the table, on the other hand it was perceived to be a concept that was so open to interpretation, and so lacking in specificity, as to be of more symbolic than practical value.

There are many official and semi-official definitions of community safety provided throughout the various government reports, guidance documents, evaluation reports, community safety partnership strategies etc. that have been published in Scotland over the last decade or so. They are not, however, dissimilar in that they generally define community safety in quite open terms that explicitly stress the potential breadth of the enterprise. *Threads of Success* was an influential study of five Community Safety Partnerships throughout the country (in Angus, City of Edinburgh, East Dunbartonshire, Fife and South Ayrshire) (Hewitt et al., 2000) and its definition of community safety provided a good example of this.

“Community safety has different meanings to different people at different stages of their lives. From protecting children, keeping teenagers out of crime, protecting property to addressing fears in older years – community safety is an essential element. Although there is no universally agreed definition of community safety most partnerships have accepted, in broad terms, the CoSLA definition of ‘protecting people’s right to live in confidence and without fear for their own safety or other people’s safety’. This embraces a range of issues from crime prevention, domestic abuse, drug abuse, road safety, fire safety, accident prevention etc.” (Hewitt et al. 2000, 1)

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2 The CoSLA definition was published in *Community Safety: A Key Council Strategy* (CoSLA, 1997), CoSLA being the Convention for Scottish Local Authorities.
Not only did Hewitt et al. suggest that there can be a subjective element to any definition of community safety (and thus potentially anything that makes people feel ‘unsafe’ could be included within it) they also provide a useful starting point for describing the specific issues that might be included within Community Safety Strategies. The examples they give are, however, very much a starting point, as even a cursory reading of Community Safety Strategies reveals a really quite diverse, yet still not exhaustive, group of issues that have come under the umbrella of community safety in Scotland. This expanded list (incorporating the ones identified in Threads of Success) includes: developing and monitoring CCTV systems; domestic abuse; racial awareness and diversity; fear of crime; repeat victimisation; road safety; home and fire safety; accident prevention; drug and alcohol related crime; mediation schemes; environmental wardens; work with young people and work with the elderly; safety in schools; business crime; gay and lesbian issues; vandalism; water and mountain safety, home concierge schemes; and anti-social behaviour. As we will see below, some of these might amount to relatively specific domains in their own right, but taken together they cover a very broad range of social policy issues that are of differing priority to the various different agencies and service providers that have direct, indirect or sometimes very little interest in them.

The breadth of the concept of community safety, and its capacity to have some relevance to virtually all of the main service providers in a local authority area, was well recognised by practitioners in both research sites.

“Where community safety’s involved, and no matter what the project, we could all say ‘oh I have an interest in that’.” (Council Services Partner)

“The problem with the community safety agenda is trying to tie it down – what is it? We all like to feed off it – ‘that’s community safety’ – but when you actually get an understanding of it, you know that it encompasses everything that we do to keep the community safe, and that crime prevention is just part of that.” (Community Safety Officer 6)

Indeed, the fact that it could be identified as something of interest and relevance to a broad range of potential partners (thus inspiring a broad ‘community’ to become
involved in this domain, to draw in the language of Wenger) could be seen as one of the benefits of community safety, and it was viewed with some optimism by many of the practitioners because of this. It was also argued that the open nature of the concept made it accessible to local communities themselves, who could identify with it in different ways depending on their specific problems and needs. This point was made by one of the Council Designated Officers in Eastside:

“The fact that it’s open to interpretation allows it to mean different things to different local communities – which it ought to – it allows local need to determine the shape of CS in particular areas.” (Council Designated Community Safety Officer 4)

In fact, the extent to which local interpretations of community safety actually do determine its shape in practice is highly debatable (chapter 6) but the idea that its openness could help to give agencies and individuals a perceived interest in it continued to drive some enthusiasm for it. Such enthusiasm for a broad remit was also, to some extent, to be found within the police, although here there also tended to be some uncertainty about how community safety sat with, and could be distinguished from, the larger police role (something we will return to in the discussion of occupational cultures). We have already seen that Community Safety Officer 6 (above) found the concept of community safety to be so ambiguous that it potentially covered “everything we (the police) do”, a view reiterated by one of Northside’s Local Authority Liaison Officers who remarked that “every police officer, who is in fact a community safety officer, is working on the front line providing a service which should provide reassurance to the community, and provide safety to the community -and they’re giving the crime prevention message and the reassurance message”. The idea that community safety seemingly covered virtually anything that the police were doing also sat quite comfortably with the view that community safety wasn’t anything ‘new’ for the police, and probably says something about the occupational culture of the police in Scotland and their ongoing, if often symbolic, commitment to an idea of ‘community policing’ (Donnelly, 2005; Schaffer, 1980; chapter 7). However, much of the ambiguity of the term flowed from the extent to which it should be ‘crime-focused’ and hence police-led. Running counter to an interpretation of community safety as something synonymous with
what the police did was the view that, although community safety clearly did encompass crime issues, it should not be defined by them.

“(C)ommunity safety can mean all things to all people and I think that yes we want to have a broader outlook on quality of life and maybe steer away from just focusing on crime and fear of crime because we recognise here in Northside that, although crime is an issue for us, it’s not the biggest issue, and we actually should be drawing on the strengths and the good things that are actually going on and trying to sustain them better.” (Council Designated Community Safety Officer 3)

This is evidently an expression of what community safety should be about (incidentally, one that did not run counter to the views also expressed by many police officers in both Northside and in the more urban Eastside). It is the very fact that it can simultaneously be characterised as “everything the police do” and as a “broader outlook on quality of life” that is interesting and helps to illustrate its lack of specificity. We can see that for some practitioners’ community safety describes the multi-faceted roles of the police, whereas for others it describes a broader agenda in which crime and the police need to be considered as more peripheral. Although these positions aren’t entirely contradictory (rather depending on how policing is understood, see chapter 7) they are underpinned by different understandings of the relative priority to be given to different institutional responses to local community problems. Whether a concept which “means all things to all people” can provide an adequate domain through which different institutional positions can be reconciled, and orientated towards a set of shared goals, will be a question that underpins the rest of this chapter.

As a final point to note in this section, the ambiguity of terminology used will also have an impact on how initiatives and partnerships are likely to be perceived by the public. Although it may in part reflect their own occupational orientation, police Community Safety Unit Officers continued to question the value of the term ‘community safety’ well into the research. One reason for this, they claimed, was that when called the Crime Prevention Unit, as they had been previously, members of the public, and colleagues, had some idea (albeit imperfect) about what they did. Community safety might be a broad and inclusive term, but for some practitioners it
also lacked meaning. Community Safety Unit Officers observed that they continued to receive calls from the public asking to speak with the ‘Crime Prevention Officer’ and they continued to wish to speak to a ‘Crime Prevention Officer’ when told they’d got through to the Community Safety Officer (officers were ordered to answer the phone as the Community Safety Unit) because they had no sense what the latter was, or was about. A similar point about using ambiguous terminology (here about a different, albeit related, agenda), and how confusing it can be for the public and voluntary sector practitioners, was also made:

“It (social inclusion) is language that actually is quite excluding because if you use the word ‘poverty’ I think people would understand it - but we use this nice word called ‘social inclusion’ - ‘poverty’ is kind of not in our language anymore - if you say ‘poor’ then people understand - they might have slightly different understandings, but they know what you mean” (Voluntary Sector 4)

There is certainly very little evidence that the public in Scotland have much knowledge or understanding about the various partnership agendas that that been activated over recent years. If they are uninformed, but also confused by the terminology itself (which even practitioners disagree about the interpretation of), it makes their participation with such structures problematic. Following on from this, the very fact that there have been so many different, yet interrelated, partnership agendas emerging over the same period has itself contributed to the feeling of uncertainty about what the agendas are about, and where one stops and another begins. It is to this that we now turn.

An “overwhelming” patchwork of partnerships
By the end of the 1990s partnerships had become ubiquitous within Scottish social policy. The partnership approach had become the expected means through which a host of different policies would be developed and implemented at a local level. There were partnerships for parenting, social exclusion (swiftly renamed social inclusion) partnerships and partnerships for youth, urban regeneration, lifelong learning and community education (to name but a few - see chapter 4). This
patchwork of partnerships created problems for the development of a coherent and shared domain of community safety in a number of interrelated ways.

Continuing from the issue of ambiguity raised above, there was often no clear lines of demarcation between the different policy agendas, meaning that both policy makers and members of different partnerships were well aware of the danger of overlap between what they were doing and what other partnerships were doing. For example, the feeling of being “unsafe” in one’s own community was understood to be an aspect of social exclusion at the same time that it was understood that inclusive communities were more likely to be safe communities.

“(T)hose members of our society who feel ‘excluded’ are often those who feel unsafe within their own communities. The Scottish Executive, along with Members of the Scottish Parliament, local government and other public, private and voluntary agencies, have pledged to tackle social exclusion and work towards equality of opportunity and promote social justice with a vision of safer communities.” (Hewitt, et al., 2000)

All well and good, but where did social inclusion end and community safety begin? No practitioners or policy makers could answer this question without reference to the developing Community Planning agenda. They argued that it would be through Community Planning that each set of partnerships could work out their own demarcations between Social Inclusion and Community Safety, and that their activities would thus be coordinated. We will return to the Community Planning agenda as a means of structuring and coordinating multiple domains of practice, for the moment just noting the blurred and uncertain policy agendas that had been generating multiple sets of partnerships.

One of the consequences of having a patchwork of partnership structures is that it weakened partners’ identification within any one specific partnership (see Wenger, 1998, 191-192, 247-249; chapter 3). This happened because, particularly at a strategic level, it was the same people who would represent their agencies within the different partnerships and within different levels of the same partnership agenda.
Quite simply, this was disorientating and physically exhausting for many of the partners.

“I think that for a lot of us you can get ‘forum fatigue’ - we’re all being asked to get involved in partnerships and sometimes you can get a wee bit lost about where you are. That’s one of the downsides I would say - as fitting in all these meetings. It’s a great concept - partnership - but there’s so many of them going on it’s hard work.” (Council Services Partner)

“There’s so many groups, there’s so many different strategies and plans – at times you just feel overwhelmed. Slowly it sinks in – almost by osmosis – you just kind of…you’re just touching with them – you’re into these meetings and you don’t necessarily know where you fit into that area – but, it’s a gradual process of things sinking in – you just absorb it – what the whole thing’s about - it’s just about doing it.” (Local Authority Liaison Officer 2)

Suffering from “forum fatigue” and being “overwhelmed” by the sheer complexity of the structures that were evolving was found to be a common experience of partners. For voluntary sector partners with limited resources, or potential partners from the private sector for whom “time is money” and a clear sense of what they were going to get out of the partnership vital, such complexity was unhelpful. It did not readily allow members to get a clear sense of exactly what it was they were supposed to be doing – the topic upon which they were focusing their efforts – the domain they were working within. Through extended participation most partners did, however, express some identification with the community safety agenda (virtually all found some value in it) and an understanding of the network of partnerships within which it was nested (Community Planning probably helped this considerably), but it was something that they had had to work at. Again it was noted that even if practitioners themselves were getting a handle on this patchwork of partnerships, this was because they had to and not because the structures were very transparent and understandable by a lay audience. It was not clear that members of the public had a sense of these structures and, as we will see below, not much of a sense that, despite the rhetoric of community involvement, that they were being brought into them with much success.

“Now I’m not prepared to say that you could go out there in the street and stop somebody, a passer by, and ask how this all fits together, this complex
jigsaw. You wouldn’t find anybody who’d be able to understand that, but the fact is that amongst the people who have to make this work, this is understood. And as a result we have a handle on what otherwise would be a dizzyingly complex set of relationships.” (Enterprise Service Partner)

Defining from above, within and below: central policies, professional interests and local needs

Returning to the opening quote from Wenger, we have already observed that an effective domain is needed to provide a coherent shared project for a community of practice, the boundaries of which help to define for the community what will ‘count’ as valid activity within it. The preceding two sections suggest that, because of its ambiguity and the blurred edges around it, community safety may be problematic in this respect. However, the domain is also important for giving legitimacy to the enterprise at hand. Members of a community of practice need to feel that their endeavors are legitimate and valued if they are to feel genuinely committed to, and engaged with, the field of practice (Wenger, 1998, 247-249; chapter 3). In the context of partnerships the sense of legitimacy of the enterprise can be affected by circumstances, structures and relationships within the partnership itself or within the parent agencies that contribute members to the partnership. These issues will be examined in chapter 6. The legitimacy of a domain may also, however, be dependent on whether it appears to have been externally imposed (or “parachuted in”, see Carnie, 1999) on participants or whether it has evolved more organically at a “grass roots” level either within agencies themselves or the communities they serve. Here there is something of a mixed picture in Scotland, but there is some evidence that the domain of community safety does have (and has had for some time) certain legitimacy with practitioners of all stripes.

One way in which partnership working can be, and has been, externally imposed upon local agencies by central government is by making it a statutory obligation. In Scotland no such statutory duty was created by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, as it was in England and Wales - it came rather later in the guise of Community Planning, created under the Local Government (Scotland) Act 2003, and also through the Antisocial Behaviour (Scotland) Act 2004 (see chapter 4 for details). In England
and Wales it was argued that the creation of statutory Crime Reduction partnerships actually had quite a lot of legitimacy with practitioners as local authorities (in particular) had been calling for such a duty for some years (Crawford, 1997, 34-36). There were mixed feelings in Scotland about the potential costs and benefits of making partnership activity statutory. On the one hand some practitioners (in both research sites) had a sense that it was better where participation in partnerships was voluntary because this ensured that those who participated did so because they wished to do so, were committed to the approach, and had genuine enthusiasm for it. There is certainly plenty of evidence that voluntary partnership working, even if not at a strategic level, did exist in Scotland (see Valentin, 1995 and chapter 4), albeit in a piecemeal fashion. Even at a strategic level there was activity before any statutory duty came into force, with Community Safety Partnership structures of some kind or other (they were at different stages of development) established in all of the 32 local authority areas by the end of the of 1990s (Accounts Commission, 2000a). Some proponents of the voluntary approach to partnership working also argued that a statutory duty was simply unnecessary in Scotland because the policy networks in local authority areas were relatively small and the key players in the different agencies and throughout the different council services all knew each other personally anyway, and already had positive lines of communication with one another (McAra, 2005, 293). Related to this was the idea that once you made it statutory you made partnership a political football, emphasizing the formal interests and agendas of agencies that could undermine cooperation.

“It (partnerships) works because it’s voluntary. Were that statutory it would simply become another political battlefield and would absorb all of its time in its battles rather than simply getting on with it. So I’ve absolutely no illusions about that - it has to be exhortatory and not statutory to make it work.” (Enterprise Services Partner)

However, other practitioners pointed to how piecemeal developments in Scotland had been, arguing that many agencies and local authorities were paying “lip service” to the Scottish Executive’s “exhortatory” approach, and that this was seen, for example, in the lack of commitment that some local authorities were giving to developing national structures (such as the Scottish Local Authorities Community
Safety Forum – since disbanded and reconvened as The Scottish Community Safety Network, see chapter 7) designed to share best practice and what works insights about community safety. They noted that individual agencies were often struggling to meet their own statutory objectives and if partnership working was just seen as something “nice” to do on top of that then it simply would not get done. In essence it was argued that if you wanted to give partnership work sufficient legitimacy for it to actually get done then, at least in the short term - until it became an accepted way of doing things - it needed statutory backing.

“Perhaps through time we won’t need the statutory whip if you like – it’ll just be a natural occurrence for people to be thinking ‘who else can be involved in this project’ whatever project it is that they’re taking part in…Statutory gives a bit more weight to us . . . and also, for some of the agencies out there, making it statutory also gives them themselves more status because they’ve been brought in to a process they’d been excluded from before. It recognises their value.” (Council Designated Community Safety Officer 3)

The “value” that statutory status could confer on the work of the partnership was recognised as being important. This could particularly be the case for agencies that had previously been perceived to be largely invisible in central government policy. Statutory partnerships or duties that required local authorities and the police to identify and include appropriate partners in the voluntary sector and the community were seen as conferring status and legitimacy on the projects at hand and on some of these agencies. Voluntary sector agencies found that where agendas were voluntary they would have a particularly difficult time in having a voice – where statutory obligations raised the profile of issues this could change.

“This new legislation (the Antisocial Behaviour (Scotland) Act 2004 that extended the use of ASBOs to 12-15 year olds), because it’s a lot higher profile I think that the public will be demanding and saying ‘what’s happening with ASBOs?’ And that’s part of our role – giving out information about the process of actually getting these things done… again, for things to happen sometimes it needs legislative work otherwise voluntary codes of practice just sometimes don’t work.” (Voluntary Sector 3)

In short, there were mixed views in Scotland about the value of a statutory obligation in relation to partnerships, but there undoubtedly was a sense that it could help to
confer status or legitimacy upon an approach or a particular domain, encouraging participants to identify with it (Wenger, 1998, 247-249). Centrally imposed policies which might contribute to defining a domain of practice need not be derived only from statutes however. They may also result from centrally constructed performance targets or indicators, and through the setting of strategic goals and objectives for public agencies. Since devolution of government to Scotland there has been a lot of activity in this respect. Perhaps most illustrative of central government interest in performance management within the criminal justice field has been the setting up of a National Criminal Justice Board, and 11 Local Criminal Justice Boards, designed to monitor the activities of, and develop shared objectives for, the criminal justice system (see Normand, 2003; see also chapter 4’s description of Community Justice Authorities and their role in relation to the management of offenders). The membership of the Boards includes relevant personnel from the judiciary, the Procurators Fiscal Service, Scottish Courts and the police, and as such is much more focused on the activities of the formal criminal justice system than is community safety.

Within the field of community safety the influence of central government has primarily been felt through the issuance of guidance notes on partnership working (Scottish Executive, 1999; Hewitt, et al., 2000; Audit Scotland, 2000a; 2000b); the setting of criteria for Challenge Fund awards for specific projects and initiatives (see Webster, 2000 on the CCTV Challenge Fund); the creation of the Community Safety Partnership Award Programme, which replaced the Challenge Fund approach to funding community safety in 2002 (Scottish Executive 2002; 2003; 2004); and the funding of new initiatives (Community Wardens being but one example) through Community Safety Partnership structures (Hayton et al., 2007). The detail of the various funding arrangements for community safety, and how they have evolved over the last decade, will be covered in the ‘community’ chapter. For the moment it is simply worth noting that centrally set guidance and performance regimes, like statutory duties, have the potential to give a domain of practice (such as community safety) status and legitimacy by making it a necessary part of the work of agencies. On the issue of funding specific initiatives through Community Safety Partnerships
(which over the research sites included Wardens Schemes, Concierge Schemes, CCTV and youth justice funds) it was perceived that this gave a certain amount of legitimacy to the partnership as well as acting as a driver for further partnership work by requiring partner agencies to work together in this area.

“The Scottish Executive have, quite rightly so, put other funds through community safety partnerships, and they’ve done that because they see the value in it being delivered through the partnership approach. An example would be the local action fund for youth justice – it has come through us. Now that would have been money previously that would have gone either to the education service or would have gone to the youth justice team to allocate – but by putting it through the partnership they’ve actually forced people into working together to think about the best use of those funds- and that’s why they’ve chosen to do that.” (Council Dedicated Community Safety Officer 3)

Centrally imposed objectives and targets can, however, create other very important problems for the domain of a community of practice. Where such targets or performance measures are not sensitive to what an agency or partnership is actually equipped to do then they can have perverse results, or in Wenger’s terms, they may create interstitial communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 64; chapter 3). This occurs where members focus on an informal agenda in response to the pressures to achieve certain performance measures, and can result in such measures having quite unintended consequences. One example of this that had some influence on Wenger’s own work was described in Becker’s critique of how schools tried to structure and organize learning (1972). Becker argued that evaluations used in schools and Universities (such as exams and essays) were less effective than “on the job training” in promoting the learning of substantive topics because they had the indirect effect of encouraging students to focus their attention away from the topic and onto the method of assessment itself. Students essentially directed their learning towards developing effective techniques for getting through the evaluations, rather than towards the substantive subject that they were being taught (Becker, 1972, 91-94). Good recent examples of the potential unintended effects of monitoring and evaluation are to be found in Mike Hough’s analysis of the long-term effects of performance management on the Metropolitan Police (2007). Hough observed that performance indicators have a history of creating unexpected and sometimes
perverse outcomes where organisations became more focused on meeting their targets than they did on working towards their actual objectives. Schools under pressure to increase numbers of students achieving certain grades focused attention on borderline students, ignoring both weak students and high achievers; hospitals required to cut waiting lists simply focused resources on those who could be treated quickly, rather than those in real need of care; and the police, in order to meet clear-up rate targets, found themselves directing their attention towards types of crime that were amenable to being cleared up (for example, cannabis possession) and away from activities that could not readily be “counted”, such as order maintenance and service to the public (Hough, 2007, 204-206). There is evidence that much of the activity of partnerships has been internally directed towards the production of audits and strategies that met centrally set requirements (chapter 7). This may indicate that one of the effects of the performance regime has been to shrink the effective domain of community safety in Scotland towards performance management processes (such as data collection for strategic documents or specific initiatives) and away from any broader interpretation of partnership working or community safety.

“I still have my reservations about performance indicators – I think that they should be identified locally as opposed to nationally……the kind of things that The Scottish Executive are asking us to measure in community safety terms are…as an example, they have given us over the last two years £30,000 to introduce diversionary activities over the summer holiday period and one of the things that they’re asking us to measure is the number of call-outs to police about young people. Now, we have to say to ourselves, as we’ve got 8 different areas in Northside, and each of those is broken into multitudes of neighbourhoods, ‘is that realistic?’ - ‘is it measurable?’- ‘is it achievable?’ It’s not really. Yet we’re being asked for that information at a national level. That’s why I think that much more localised performance indicators are more appropriate to us. I’m all for them where they’re appropriate – and I think that they can be a driver towards us reaching a target – but they need to be realistic.” (Council Designated Community Safety Officer 2)

“We don’t have systems where you just press a button and it spits all of that out (performance management information) – you have to feed it all in, you have to manually look through incidents that occur and…I object to these short term initiatives generating so much work but which are entirely meaningless.” (Local Authority Liaison Officer 2)
It should be noted that the approach to performance management taken in Scotland had not been entirely centre-focused. The ‘balanced scorecard’ approach promoted by the Accounts Commission allowed each partnership to build its own set of local performance measures (its own scorecard - even though the parameters of what was to be considered important was largely set by the centre) which made reference to four aspects of partnership effectiveness: impact of partnership activity on the local community; external processes (i.e. community involvement and consultation); internal management of the partnership; and efficient and effective use of available resources (Accounts Commission, 2000, 4-8). Thus Community Safety Partnerships have had a certain latitude to shape their own agendas in ways that have sometimes placed them at odds with The Scottish Executive in terms of the emphasis being giving to ‘crime’ and ‘crime prevention’ issues (Shiel et al., 2005), the former favouring a broader, less crime-led agenda.

The final two points to be made in this section are for noting only and will be developed in the practice and community chapters respectively. They require mentioning here because they emphasise the point that the contours of community safety as a domain of practice have not only been shaped by externally imposed performance indicators (whether nationally or locally derived), but they are also derived from the professional interests of the partners involved and the potential of grass roots input from local communities themselves. The importance of professional interests of partner agencies is well-documented in the research from England and Wales where it has been observed that different occupational cultures have different understandings of community safety (Crawford and Jones, 1995; Crawford, 1997; 1998; chapter 2), and that lead statutory agencies (the council and the police) will often attempt to take over the agenda and shape the domain in their own interests (Pearson et al., 1992; Crawford, 1997; 1998; Phillips, 2002). It has already been noted that variations in the institutional priority being given to “crime” by different agencies has had a bearing on how the domain of community safety has been perceived in Scotland. The ways in which different occupational cultures and interests continue to shape community safety partnership working in Scotland will be examined in the practice chapter, below. The potential for grass roots community
input to add legitimacy to community safety should not be ignored. Although there is plenty of evidence of community level activity throughout the country (Accounts Commission, 2000a; Valentin, 1995) there is nonetheless an impression amongst practitioners that partnerships are actually not very good at bringing local community voices on board and that where community representation has been supplied by local politicians, this has in itself been problematic. The domain of community safety in Scotland, whatever it is, thus presently bears a larger imprint of externally set agendas and targets, and of deeply entrenched professional interests than it does of grass roots opinion and activity.

Specific agendas as specific domains within community safety

The chapter thus far has explored some of the problems with the domain of community safety – its ambiguity, its unclear relationship with other similarly ambiguous partnership structures, and its status as being ‘externally imposed’. In this section the various agendas which have come to sit within community safety will be highlighted and examined (taken together with the description of the tools and repertoires of community safety partnerships discussed in the practice chapter, this gives quite a full account of the breadth of community safety). If community safety and the various exhortations to work in partnership have been too broad-brush to provide a shared project that defines a domain of practice then the more specific agendas that have been rolled out under the auspices of community safety may provide the greater levels of specificity required – they arguably give partnerships a more focused domain of practice and a clearer steer on what it is that they have to do.

The need for partnerships to have clear goals was well understood by those working with their own quite specific agendas:

“Partnership working is not an aim in its own right - it is only useful for the things it can make happen…the Enterprise Project didn’t do much for 2, possibly 3, years and that’s because it was about itself - all it did was sit about and talk about ‘How do we be partners?’ - and it’s only when things came along for it to get its teeth into, like community safety, like the need for a youth strategy, social inclusion partnerships that…the Enterprise Project is not a thing in itself, it is only the things it does - it is the sum of the things it
does and if there were nothing for it to do it would not need to exist.”
(Enterprise Services Partner)

The Enterprise Project referred to here was actually organised more at the level of oversight and coordination of agendas that would subsequently be brought in as Community Planning under the 2003 Act (indeed this structure was explicitly recognised as a Community Planning partner in the legislation). That it required both time to bed in as a partnership, as well as specific agendas to get its “teeth into” and give it topics to focus on (a domain) is telling. For the moment it is important to recognise that as well as being perceived of as an agenda in its own right, community safety has also been used as an umbrella under which other, more specific, initiatives have been nested. This has happened both formally and more informally – as a means of drawing agencies and potential partners into the agenda.

“Partnership work only works if people within the partnership want to play. So you’ve got to make it interesting and viable for them to do something – whether that’s business, or whether that’s the Council, or whether that’s the Police Service, whether it’s individuals – they’ve got to see what’s in it for them.” (Safe Cities Partner)

The above quote, from a very active practitioner who sought to build his own specialist knowledge and “sell” his wares to other partners as a means of engaging and involving them, is a good description of an attempt to engender what Wenger termed as the commitment to the shared project – achieved through the community seeing the project (the domain) as valuable to them. The recognition that potential partners need to see something of value in the domain is crucial (Wenger and Snyder, 2000, 11-12; Wenger et al., 2002). Another partner, who perceived there to have been disappointingly little success in getting the private sector involved, also recognised that the specificity of the proposed domain was important, and that the vaguely defined ‘community safety’ would not suffice for a sector for whom “time is money” and “talking shops” a no-go:

“We’d like to have more strategic input (from the private sector) but the community safety agenda is so broad that it’s difficult to pin down what that would actually be – or for them to perceive what was going to be of benefit to them on that agenda.” (Council Designated Community Safety Officer 3)
The point that emerged from partners thinking about how to engage the private sector in particular was that if the open-textured topic of community safety didn’t get people round the table then a more specific agenda might be required. For example, Northside Safe City practitioners had been experimenting with a radio link between them and the security personnel of local businesses (or managers of businesses who had no designated security personnel) whereby businesses could warn one another about local troublemakers or known shoplifters moving around the city centre. This initiative was viewed by practitioners as being one of the products they could use to “sell” to the business community in the hope of getting them involved in a more diverse range of issues in the long term:

“The radio link was simply a means to, or an excuse to, get people round the table and talk. So we got that group going quite well and from that group we then invited (Council) solicitors in to listen to what our issues were – when they discovered what our issues were it was suggested that that this new thing – antisocial behaviour orders – may be something that we could look at using to deal with the most persistent and prolific offenders.” (Safe Cities Partner)

The importance of specific agendas extends far beyond attempts to interest the business sector in community safety. Over the last decade numerous initiatives have been introduced through, and under the auspices of, Community Safety Partnerships. They have included CCTV schemes, wardens’ schemes, housing concierge projects, anti-social behaviour strategies and youth justice projects – some of which might provide more coherent domains than the catch-all ‘community safety’. Taking wardens’ schemes as an example, it is certainly the case that there are potentially complicated questions and issues to be addressed in the implementation of them. Wardens may, in theory, be given different sets of objectives and tasks to achieve (environmental wardens, community safety wardens), they could be organised around such tasks or in terms of where they are to be geographically located (a city or a street or a housing estate), and they might be held accountable by different bodies (police, council, housing associations) for their activities (Hayward et al., 2007). Despite this complexity, and the potential for different agencies to have different views on all of these issues, wardens’ schemes are, at their heart, fairly
specific about what they entail – putting uniformed people in public places for specified purposes – and are thus much less ambiguous in what they require than community safety. Basically, wardens’ schemes are, unlike community safety, immediately suggestive of a specific kind of action, and thus might be viewed as providing a more coherent domain for a community of practice to emerge (even though the closed nature of the enterprise will probably have a more limited audience who identify with it and wish to become involved). It might, therefore, be necessary to think of community safety as containing a constellation of different and overlapping communities of practice, being itself too broad and complex to meaningfully be thought of as one (Wenger, 1998, 126-131; chapter 3) i.e. community safety is a community of practice around brokering functions (Wenger, 1998, 108-113; chapter 3 and 7). Alternatively the domain (the shared project) of community safety might be characterised as the coordination and implementation of these diverse projects and initiatives (including all of the above). For the moment it must be remembered that the picture thus far is somewhat partial, as the domain of an enterprise not only shapes, but is shaped by, the community and the practice within it. Therefore, it is only after consideration of the other structural elements of communities of practice that we will be able to properly conclude whether community safety offers a meaningful domain of practice in itself. Perhaps more importantly, it is after consideration of what the domain, community and practices of community safety are that we can move towards arguing what they ought to be.

**Conclusion**

The fieldwork indicates that community safety has both strengths and weaknesses as a domain of practice. Ambiguity at its heart has the positive effect of meaning that it is perceived as inclusive and of potential interest to a broad constituency of members, but it is also problematic because it is not suggestive of any particular forms of practice. The larger partnership agenda, externally imposed and internally produced conceptions of community safety and its value have contributed to this ambiguity, drawing it in different directions, often towards more specific, narrowly construed agendas (such as wardens’ schemes, business crime and anti-social
behaviour) that are understood to be more readily actionable. Thus, the domain of community safety remains, for the moment, open-textured and contested.
Chapter 6: The ‘community’ of community safety

“The community creates the social fabric of learning. A strong community fosters interactions and relationships based on mutual respect and trust. It encourages willingness to share ideas, expose one’s ignorance, ask difficult questions, and listen carefully. Have you ever experienced this mixture of intimacy and openness to inquiry? Community is an important element because learning is a matter of belonging as well as an intellectual process, involving the heart as well as the head.” (Wenger et al., 2002, 28-29)

The community of a community of practice is comprised of those who are engaged in the shared project, or the domain, that is of interest to them all. Some members may play fuller roles than other, more peripheral, members, and the membership of any community of practice need not be fixed, but in all likelihood will evolve and change over time (Wenger, 1998, 73-74 and 167; chapter 3). For a partnership to be a community of practice its membership must come together as a community in this sense – sharing a common commitment to the domain, being able to interact and communicate freely with one another (thus allowing the kinds of engagements through which members learn from one another), and ultimately enjoying a real sense of belonging within the community (i.e. membership of the community of practice becomes an aspect of members’ identities).

One of the challenging aspects of applying the concept of communities of practice to community safety partnerships is that there is a qualitative difference between the ‘community’ envisaged in the partnership approach and those in many of Wenger’s own examples of communities of practice (chapter 3; Wenger, 1998; Wenger and Snyder, 2000; Wenger et al., 2002). Although Wenger is explicit that communities of practice can, and do, cross organisational boundaries (Wenger, 1998, 118-119; Wenger, et al., 2002, 26) his own examples tended to be cases where people from similar professional backgrounds, but working in different organisations, formed communities of practice to keep up their existing professional skills (for example, engineers working in different oil companies shared the insights and problems of engineers in communities of practice of fellow engineers – see also Wenger’s Chrysler example, Wenger et al., 2002, 1-4, chapter 3, above). Viewing partnerships
through the lens of communities of practice is exciting precisely because the rationale behind the partnership approach has been to bring organisations with quite different professional skill-sets and perspectives on social problems together. In this sense partnerships provide a ‘difficult’ case study for the communities of practice perspective because, from the outset, the ‘community’ being brought together looks potentially problematic, with members being too different in their views on the world, their management structures, their funding and their status to provide the “social fabric of learning” envisioned by Wenger. This, however, is also part of the attraction of viewing partnerships through the lens of communities of practice. If the well-rehearsed problems with the ‘community’ of community safety partnership members (Bottoms, 1990; Blagg et al., 1988; Pearson et al., 1992; Crawford and Jones, 1995) can be eased or better managed through the insights of this social learning perspective, then there does seem to be real potential for this new institutional structure to forge a meaningful and distinctive way of thinking about crime that transcends existing traditional institutionalised and professionalized ways of thinking. Indeed, it is this potential – potential which is suggested by the communities of practice perspective - for partnerships to create a new cadre of criminal justice professionals who identify with community safety over traditional organisational affiliations (a “radical cadre of transformative power” in Hughes’ terms, 2002b, 137-138), that is quite central to this thesis. The analysis of the community dimension of Community Safety Partnerships that forms the focus of the present chapter will be structured around the following themes: membership of Community Safety Partnerships; the status and legitimacy of partnership work; compatibility of partners; funding of Community Safety Partnerships; consultation and representation of the local community; trust and communication as the basis of partnership work and community; and, identification with the partnership versus identification with the parent agency.

**Membership of community safety partnerships**

There is no required or set membership of Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland. It has already been noted that there is no statutory duty behind these
partnerships and so no statutory rules on membership which have to be observed (there are, however, statutory duties in relation to both Community Planning and Anti Social Behaviour, see chapter 4). Scottish Executive guidance over the years had, however, given a fairly clear indication of the agencies that have been expected to take the lead in establishing these structures, as well as the types of agency that might subsequently be brought into the fold (Scottish Executive, 1999). The Executive recommended that senior level officials in each local authority, and in the relevant police forces, should be involved, and that they would probably be the lead agencies (this is in line with guidance given to Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships in England and Wales, see Phillips, 2002; Phillips et al., 2002). Health Boards and the Fire Service were also identified as key, and potentially lead, agencies, and in Northside the Fire Service were taking a major role in the Community Safety Partnership throughout much of the period of the fieldwork by acting as its chair. Within local authorities a range of different service providers were recognised as having a potential role in community safety, and they have tended to be represented in Community Safety Partnerships around the country. They have included the Road Safety, Housing, Education, Recreation, Social Work, Finance, Environmental and City Development departments. In addition to public services partnerships have also been exhorted to involve the voluntary sector, the private sector and, where possible, representatives of local communities. The voluntary sector has been brought in to Community Safety Partnerships often on account of the specific issues that they purport to address, and sometimes only for the duration of a project connected with that issue (an approach that suited most voluntary sector agencies who might not feel that they had the resources to sit on meetings at which they did not have a direct interest – others did wish to contribute to strategic isssues, see below). The partnerships studied in the present research at one time or another counted representatives of the following agencies amongst their members: Women’s Aid, Victim Support, the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations, Lesbian and Gay Switchboard, Eastside Tenants’ Federation, Scottish Old Age Pensioners Association and the Northside Alliance for Racial Equality. Many other voluntary agencies were involved in the themed Local Action Teams but rarely, if at all, at the strategic Community Safety Partnership. Representation from
the private sector itself has, as was noted in the previous chapter, tended to be quite thin on the ground, although there have been some successes at a national level through the Scottish Business Crime Centre. Business and commercial interests have tended to be brought into Community Safety Partnerships through publicly funded enterprise initiatives such as Northside Enterprise and the Ethnic Enterprise Centre. Finally, there is representation of local communities. Again there is a sense that the public sector agencies have not been very successful in getting local communities directly involved, or even at getting the community safety message out to local communities in the first place. What representation there is has come through the voluntary sector interests represented and the imperfect mechanisms of Community Councils and elected council representatives. That said, it is clear from the above that Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland have, albeit to varying degrees, brought a broad range of public sector, voluntary, private and community-based agencies and organisations together in the hope of forging a shared agenda.

Arguably the most important members of the Community Safety Partnership are its Designated Officers. Each partnership has at least two Designated Officers working for the strategic partnership, sometimes in a Community Safety Unit. There will be a Council Designated Community Safety Officer from the local authority and a Local Authority Liaison Officer from the relevant police service. Northside also had a Fire Safety Officer dedicated to the Unit. The Designated Officers coordinated the general running of the partnership, prepared and wrote the audits, funding applications and strategic documents, and forged links with other partnership structures, providing the “backbone” and “driving force” of the partnership (according to a Community Safety Task Group member). Designated Officers were on secondment to the Community Safety Unit (the location of which is a topic to be discussed below), usually for periods of up to 2 years, although throughout the period of the fieldwork some officers stayed in post for longer periods (for example, to finish specific pieces of work, such as the drafting of the Anti Social Behaviour Strategy), whereas others were moved on more quickly (there was a period in Eastside between 2003-2004 when the partnership was perceived to be in “chaos” because of a number of changes in personnel in quick succession (Council
Designated Community Safety Officer 4)). It was also the Designated Officers, through their participation in the national Community Safety forums, who played a central role in sharing ideas and best practice about what ‘counted’ as community safety in Scotland (see chapter 7). Indeed, the extent to which the work of partnerships in reality actually amounted largely to the work of these few dedicated personnel is a topic of key interest that will be returned to in the ‘practice’ chapter.

Although it has been noted that the membership of a ‘community’ of a community of practice can and will evolve over time, for the types of mutual trust and understanding envisaged by Wenger to develop, there needs to be a degree of consistency of membership of the community. If partnerships lack this consistency of membership – something practitioners often referred to in terms of the partnership’s sustainability (a theme that also came up regularly in relation to any questions about funding) – then it is unlikely that a ‘community’ will evolve, and possible that the various members will informally work out their own affiliations that work for them. Particularly in the relatively early stages of partnership working in 2000, uncertainty over the likely sustainability of partnerships made it difficult for some partners to fully identify with the partnership.

“I suppose the worry is - is it (community safety) a fashion? How is it going to be sustained? We’re encouraging people to get community safety into their service…but…are people going to get fed up with it and say ‘come on, let’s just do it ourselves - let’s just do this.’ … will people get fed up and say ‘let’s do this ourselves’?” (Council Services Partner)

As we will see this concern was justified in that agencies sometimes did just agree to cooperate with one or two others in order to get things done without going through the partnership, something also well-documented in England and Wales (Crawford and Jones, 1995; Crawford, 1997; chapter 2).

For smaller agencies (such as those in the voluntary sector) an awareness of the need for sustainability of membership of partnerships was a source of pressure and anxiety. Where partners saw part of their role as representing the interests of particular groups (in this case ethnic minorities – a diverse group in any case not
easily “represented” by one person according to this voluntary sector partner) they could quickly feel under pressure to spread themselves too thinly by attending multiple partnerships in order to get this message across, but might also sense that, as they were the only person who had taken on this responsibility, there would be a problem if they moved on. Their role became too closely associated with them personally.

“I know that from my own side (voluntary sector) I’m very heavily involved in it, and if I was to go - who’s going to do it? That’s the importance of having the structures and the status sorted out because it has to be a sustainable structure and I’m just aware that I’m always the ‘race’ person. But if you have a structure it depersonalises it.” (Voluntary Sector 4)

Many partners talked of the need for more mentoring of new members of the partnership in order to ease them into the complex environment of partnership working. It was felt that members could “pass on” their experience to their replacement before their own secondment ended, ensuring a level of continuity for the partnership as a whole. This was keenly felt by the larger organisations like the local authority and the police but, although recognised as “ideal”, did not occur throughout the life of the fieldwork. Where the partner was not readily replaceable by someone else, such as the race relations expert quoted above, mentoring would offer no solution.

Continuity of membership could have its downside though – such as where the continuity was in relation to a member who had become a problem, or not been willing or able to develop with the rest of the partnership. In this kind of situation partnerships could find themselves waiting for personnel in agencies to be moved on, in the hope that their replacement would be more active. Here the benefits of having a fluid membership (“recycling of staff”) was also recognised – it would prevent personality issues building inertia into partnership working.

“Perhaps one or two of the things that have held Northside back in the past was that there wasn’t enough recycling of staff and it became too personality based. Nothing could happen until a particular individual moved on” (Enterprise Services Partner)
For the most part concerns about specific personalities creating inertia were found within the public sector agencies. However, for most of them, and for the voluntary and private sectors, the sense was that partnership working in both research sites was generally more characterised by the movement of members and of personnel in related agencies who would constantly have to be “brought up to speed” with what was going on. This is clearly described by one of the Safe Cities partners who had close links with the business sector.

“It is a long, ongoing process of education, education, education. The personalities with some of this...you might break the door down and get through and the personality there says ‘yeah, I’ve got it, I understand’ – then that personality moves to another job – and in retail there is constantly a massive movement of people. So it is – repeat, repeat, repeat.” (Safer Cities Partner)

Returning specifically to the membership of the Community Safety Partnership itself, a final issue worth noting at this point, is that of continuity of attendance of members at partnership meetings. The willingness of agencies to send designated people to the partnership meetings and for these people to consistently attend the meetings sent out important messages about their level of commitment to the partnership project.

“I do believe that the downfall in partnerships’ sustainability is when you don’t have clear commitment from a partner. If we have commitment from partners and they send the same person to the same meeting time and time again that’s when the work gets done. When they show partial commitment – saying ‘we will always send someone’ then that creates a wee bit of a difficulty in that you don’t have the confidence then that the work will be done, or that the message from the meeting will be passed to the relevant person.....or if they don’t turn up at all around the table. So I think there needs to be a clear commitment from the agencies that they will endeavour to send the same person to a meeting if they want the work to get done.” (Council Designated Community Safety Officer 3)

Therefore, one of the crucial aspects of the membership of the partnership was that there needed to be a consistency of membership. As the interviewee above also alluded, there also needed to be a perception that members valued the work of the partnership, would send people of sufficient authority to get that work done, and
would, as agencies, be capable of acting on what their representatives told them, where necessary. Where members worked in this way it might be argued that you had the levels of identification and commitment to an enterprise that suggested a legitimate ‘community’ existed.

The status and legitimacy of partnership work and of membership

“If it is not clear how members benefit directly from participation, the community will not thrive. Similarly, if the community’s value to the organization as a whole is not understood, it is difficult to justify investing resources in the community and to legitimize its voice.” (Wenger et al., 2002, 17-18)

The legitimacy of an enterprise affects how participants feel about their personal participation in, and membership of, a community that is directing its energies towards it. If parent agencies value what the partnership is about then this gives legitimacy to the people representing them in the partnership. In turn, these members of the partnership can then work with an understanding that what they’re doing is important and is worth something, to them and to their parent agency. Where members of a community feel that their practices have such status and legitimacy they are more likely to identify and engage with the enterprise at hand (Wenger, 1998, 247-249; chapter 3).

It has already been noted that partnership work had been given a certain amount of legitimacy through the creation of statutory duties that required agencies to work in this way (see chapter 5). Even central government exhortations to work in partnership, and funding procedures that strongly encouraged it, played an important role in creating expectations that agencies should, and must, work in partnership. In an environment where individual agencies were struggling to meet their own statutory targets anything that did not have to be done would not be high status work in the organisation, and would often not be done.
For some agencies, however, there was a sense that partnership work was, regardless of formal recognition in statute or exhortation (helpful though this was), absolutely fundamental to what they wished to achieve. This was found to be the case with several of the voluntary sector partners interviewed. Where a large part of the rationale of an agency was that it was there to change “societal attitudes” in the long term (whether they be attitudes towards victims, women or ethnic groups, for example) then a desire to work in partnership was seen as obvious and natural – they were not, by any stretch of the imagination, going to achieve such a goal other than in partnership with other agencies.

“The only way that that (our aims) can be achieved is not by (the work of this agency alone) but by working with the police, enforcement agencies, individuals, and the media etc….it’s a total partnership.” (Voluntary Sector 3)

Voluntary sector agencies often also felt that central government exhortations to the council and the police to involve them in partnership processes amounted to recognition of the important work that they did and conferred a certain amount of status on them. However, the issue of legitimacy could also work in the opposite direction and prevented voluntary sector agencies from becoming involved. For example, an Eastside social worker who had been hoping to involve local drug-outreach services in partnership working found them to be extremely unwilling to have any involvement. These agencies were staffed by ex-users and established much of their legitimacy with their client base because of this. They perceived that if they became formally associated with the official agencies of which partnership structures were generally comprised then they would forfeit the trust of their client base, and to all extents and purposes, cease to exist as a result. Where partnership work appeared to be obvious and central to the work of some voluntary agencies, conferring status on what they did, it was also very threatening to the very existence of others. It is clear that some agencies within the voluntary sector (unfortunately including those dealing with vulnerable populations such as drug users) are unlikely to be brought into any ‘community’ created through Community Safety Partnerships, because of their association with state agencies, authority and the police in particular.
Amongst other members of the partnership the contribution of the voluntary sector was undoubtedly recognised. Council Designated Officers and Community Safety Officers commented that there were some issues that they simply “couldn’t deal with alone”, and that they relied upon, to a fairly substantial degree, the expertise of the voluntary sector (particularly in relation to domestic abuse and racial awareness issues). That said, some interviewees (Local Authority Liaison Officer 2 and Community Safety Officers 5 and 6) did express doubts. They pointed out that the relative lack of resources of voluntary sector agencies meant that they would rarely do anything as a result of partnership meetings, and that they had plenty of “representation” on the partnership without taking any of the responsibility for it. In some cases this feeling added to a sense that what was taking place wasn’t really a partnership at all and that “we should just badge it ourselves next year because we don’t need partners to do this” (Community Safety Officer 6). Interestingly, voluntary sector partners also fully recognised the problem of them having limited resources, noting the feelings of “inferiority” this could generate, but also stressed the “contributions in kind” that they made, which probably included adding a certain legitimacy to the partnership as a whole.

“When you get around a table, often everything comes down to ‘what are you contributing?’ ‘Well, I can contribute £10,000 or £5,000’…and then it comes to us, and I think that’s when we feel that we’re investing in kind. ‘Cos we’ve got the time of the person being there and their expertise…we’re there (round the table) because we’re now recognised as making a contribution.” (Voluntary Sector 3)

The legitimacy of the police and the local authority as partners wasn’t really challenged. It was universally recognised that as the agencies with the largest pockets and reserves of personnel it was necessary and appropriate for them to be involved, and, in the main, to take the lead (although occasional doubts were cast on their style of leadership and decision making capacities – see below). For both police and local authority members of partnerships there were somewhat contradictory feelings about the status being given to partnership work in their parent agencies, although overall responses were reasonably optimistic.
Within the police there seemed to be a sense that the “old” way of thinking about crime prevention as low status work for officers “counting the days before they retired” (Local Authority Liaison Officer 1) had, to some degree at least, changed for the better.

“In the past I think it’s fair to say that the crime prevention officer was someone who was fairly close to retirement and who was really trying to get off operational duties – at the end of the day it’s a sort of Monday to Friday post. It certainly wouldn’t have been seen as a career move to go into community safety or crime prevention anything up to 5 years ago. I think that’s changed completely now and I see it as a very good route to highlight yourself as being go ahead.” (Community Safety Officer 4)

This officer felt that the emphasis being given to community safety was also helpful in “raising the profile” of the beat officer, whose everyday work was essentially all about community safety. If the rank and file had indeed developed a more positive perception of community safety this would be a most welcome shift (Crawford, 1997; Newburn, 2002) but it was not universally held, even though there was still a sense that police commitment to the endeavour had changed for the better:

“(Community safety is thought of as) Tufty Club. ‘You boys go out to speak to children about safety and stuff like that.’ We used to, but now it’s totally different. I think it’s very much a case of your own force don’t know what you do – even down at the local command area officers don’t know what their local crime prevention officer does. And it’s not from a lack of telling them. They’re just not interested because they have so many pressures themselves.”(Community Safety Officer 6)

One measure of the status of an activity within an organisation is how it is viewed in terms of promotion within it. It has long been the case that some specialist areas of police work (such as detective work, firearms etc. Young, 1991; Walklate, 1996) have been given more status than others, and that officers actively seeking promoted posts are well advised to seek to gain experience within these areas. The actual status being given to community safety in these terms was beyond the scope of this study (see methodological annex). However, many Scottish forces have formally included community safety within their stated strategic objectives throughout the last decade possibly suggesting that ambitious officers should gain experience in this
area. That said, the perceptions amongst officers working in the area were somewhat mixed regarding the value of their community safety experience to their future career development.

“I don’t know if it’s actually counted as being valuable in terms of promotion, but, because of the experience you’re exposed to it does give you that ability to have the necessary qualities and necessary information and knowledge that they’re looking for in promotion processes.” (Local Authority Liaison Officer 2)

“It (experience in community safety) helps because you’re more aware of the strategic thinking of the force – the strategies, the partnerships, the communication, that kind of stuff – so when it comes to your promotion you can answer questions on a strategic level and a tactical level – because you’re working with it all of the time. Saying that, the last officer who was working here – it took him twelve interviews before he got a job.” (Community Safety Officer 6)

The main benefit of community safety experience was perceived to be the insight it gave the officer into strategic issues, and working on policy issues within the Service. This was also perceived to be the main benefit of community safety experience for local authority personnel on secondment to it, or participating as members of the strategic partnership. The fact that it was the strategic roles and tasks that were mentioned as being of potential value in career development is quite telling in itself, as analysis of the actual practices of Community Safety Partnerships throughout the period of the research reveals them to be very much concerned with policy matters over project implementation (see chapter 7). Although the gaining of strategic experience was considered to be of some status within all of the organisations concerned, not all members of the partnerships necessarily felt such personal commitment to such roles, suggesting that there is a balance to be struck between what is valued by the parent organisations and what is valued by their representatives in partnerships.

“I’m implementer, I’m not a policy person – I’ve done the work but I would say that this type of job might be more suited to somebody who is comfortable being in an office environment and taking a strategic view on policy directions etc… whereas I find it difficult to let go – I want to implement as well.” (Council Designated Community Safety Officer 4)
Within local authorities particularly there were felt to be some important symbolic messages being sent out about the status, or lack of, community safety work within them. Firstly, it was found that the role of Council Designated Community Safety Officer, which had been established in most local authorities by the end of the 1990s, commanded very different levels of salary in different parts of the country (Community Safety Task Group interview). In some areas the post–holder would be someone of some seniority on a salary of over £30,000, whereas in others it was a more junior person on a salary of around £13,000. According to one of the interviewees working within the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities the different levels of salary reflected the varied status being given to community safety work in different local authority areas (Community Safety Task Group). This lack of status had both symbolic (the level of salary itself was seen to reflect the lowly status of the job) and real (someone so junior would be unlikely to be able to take meaningful decisions or have the “ear” of the Chief Executive) effects. Secondly, the participation, or otherwise, of elected representatives could send out symbolic messages about the legitimacy of community safety as an enterprise. Although a number of practitioners from different occupational backgrounds did express some misgivings about the helpfulness of, and motivations for, contributions from elected representatives, in Eastside the willingness of a senior councillor to chair the Community Safety Partnership, and take an active role within it, was seen as crucial to the growing status of the partnership and the “seriousness” with which it was being taken (Council Designated Community Safety Officer 1). Finally, the location of a Community Safety Unit could also add a symbolic credence to the enterprise. In Northside the joint Community Safety Unit (including Council Designated Officers, the Local Authority Liaison Office from the police and the Fire Service Officer) were all located in the open plan office of the Chief Executive of the Council in the Headquarters building of the Council. Not only was this perceived by the officers themselves to give them a certain legitimacy and clout within the Council, it was also seen as a way of communicating to their colleagues that cross-organisational working was taking place and that it had status. Put simply, Council personnel would see
Council staff and uniformed Fire and Police Service officers working together in the same office.

“I think actually basing us within the Chief Executive’s office is making a statement – it’s making a statement that the Chief Executive is taking this seriously from a partnership approach – he’s basically saying that ‘while you’re here you’re in my team and it’s my job to get it done through you’ – so I think giving that status . . . a number of colleagues that I know of throughout Scotland are based in different places – some in emergency planning – I can’t remember where some of the others are, but they’re not within the Chief Executive’s Office and I do think that - this isn’t a matter of snobbery - but perhaps it is a status thing within the council that we’re saying ‘if we’re writing the Chief Executive’s Office at the bottom of a piece of paper then it is something that is needed to be taken seriously’…..I think it’s helpful. It being a joint unit as well has given people a sense….they see the Local Authority Liaison Officer come in in his uniform and the Fire Service Officer come in in his uniform – there was a bit of debate about that – but it does then make it seem, even for the others in the office, that we are a multi-agency unit……other people within the council buildings can see their presence here and recognise that it’s a partnership.” (Council Designated Community Safety Officer 3)

The importance of the physical location of community safety personnel was also noted by one of the Community Safety Officers working on implementation issues in one of the Local Action Teams (i.e. not on strategic issues). For this relatively junior officer the physical proximity to his senior number was seen as being important in terms of shaping his capacity to talk about his work with a colleague and ultimately to get things done.

“So while we can’t make those decisions ourselves - we have a direct chain link with people who can. . . and, the likes of myself. I’m in the opposite office from my chief inspector and we’re talking every day so it would just be a case of saying ‘this is an issue which has been raised by the LAT - can you maybe highlight this to the other agencies and see if we can run with it?’” (Community Safety Officer 4)

Latterly the importance of location was also recognised in Eastside when Police and Council Officers were provided with shared premises in May 2007. Although physical co-location is not a prerequisite for the development of communities of practice (Wenger et al., 2002, 25) there are real and symbolic benefits where
partnerships are concerned. Specifically, it can help to foster the shared sense of identity so important for the development of a nurturing ‘community’, especially when other messages about the relative status of that community are mixed.

Compatibility of partners: external pressures on, and internal structures of, community members

Impediments to the development of a ‘community’ with commitment to a shared enterprise can emerge from the sheer incompatibility of proposed members. Partners might be, as we have noted before, incompatible on account of the divergent ways in which their occupational cultures work, and understand the nature of the shared problem (Crawford, 1997; chapter 2). This important issue will be examined in detail in the practices chapter. But there are additional impediments to the birth of ‘community’ that can stem from different external pressures and expectations placed upon organisations, as well as from differences in how they are structured internally. Here external pressures will be considered in terms of the ‘specialist role’ of agencies, the statutory duties and targets applied to them, and their own concerns about funding. Internal structures here primarily refers to the processes through which different agencies can make decisions and turn them into action on the basis of the recommendations of their representatives on partnerships.

The various member agencies of Community Safety Partnerships often have quite divergent roles and responsibilities. It is, in fact, the differences in their skills and capacities that can give them legitimacy within a partnership. The voluntary sector, as was noted earlier, can often benefit from the fact that they are perceived to have skills and networks to the community that other agencies do not possess. Although the differences between agencies can be the cause of conflict within partnerships (see chapters 2 and 7) they are also reflective of the varied specialisms that are valuable in and of their own right, regardless of the partnership. For those agencies who are expected or exhorted to join partnerships it is important to remember the value of their own specialism (indeed, it is the reason that they’ve been invited onto the partnership – see chapter 3 and the discussion of the Chrysler “Tech Clubs”) and the
fact that they will continue to be required to achieve their own professional objectives over and above any contribution to a partnership.

“It’s important, and increasingly I’m hearing people saying this, (that we) don’t lose sight of the fact that we are still here with specialist skills - each agency - the Health Board knows about health - we don’t know about health. The council knows about certain things, Enterprise Services knows a lot about economic development, and community development. Basically put - ‘It’s still OK to do what you do, and do it well’ - and it is still very important - partnership will only work if each agency retains its skills, maintains its skills, and maintains a responsibility for using those skills and putting them to the benefit of each agency - just because we’re in partnership it doesn’t now mean that we are all doing everything.” (Enterprise Services Partner)

Member agencies may, as the quote above attests, sometimes feel that they need to remind themselves of the importance and value of their core business to offset the constant pressures to work in partnership. However, just because an agency works in partnership this does not diminish the formal targets and expectations adhering to its core business. Social workers in Eastside, in response to claims that they had been less active partners than had been expected, felt that other agencies did not fully appreciate the extent to which their own work was being subjected to central government monitoring and budgeting that they were finding very difficult to work within. One social worker observed at a ‘Communities that Care’ conference in 2002 argued that the only way he could participate in partnership working was to do much of the work in evenings in his own time, he was so stretched during the day just to meet his own basic targets. This basic concern that partners were constrained in their capacity to participate in partnerships, because of the existing external pressures on them to meet their own core business targets, was also reiterated within the council:

“I suppose the likes of the police and the council, sort of bear the brunt of most of the resources that are being put into the partnership. But that’s not to say that isn’t what should happen because they do have that statutory duty - the responsibility, really, to set it up. And they have more staff to be able to cope with that. I would say that generally everybody around the table is willing to give their time and their expertise - when it comes to hard cash though it can be a different matter - because everybody’s scrabbling for their
There was considerable agreement amongst partners about what aspects of the internal dynamics of organisations (other than culture – dealt with later) created problems for partnership working – the processes through which different organisations could take action on the basis of partnership decisions. Some agencies, notably the police, were internally structured in a hierarchical rank-based fashion. Most of the officers interviewed agreed with the view that the police, on account of their rank structure, were more of a “can do” agency than other partners. They tended to be able to take decisions more quickly and decisively that other agencies (particularly the other large public sector agencies), and, because of this, often ended up taking the lead.

“The police is always seen as a ‘can do’ organisation – it gets things done – it’s just the mind set that we have. We’re ‘let’s go do it, let’s get a timeframe’…essentially policing is action-led – some of the other agencies are still getting to catch up with us as to how that if we’re going to do something - just let’s go and do it. The others just talk about it –sit down with an issue…We’re told that if we don’t have actions out of this meeting then we have nothing done. We’re not here to talk about things – we’re here to action things to take things along.” (Community Safety Officer 6)

The rank structure within the police was seen as beneficial by many of the officers who worked in the partnership because it meant that they had a certain amount of authority to command police resources in pursuit of proposals agreed in partnership meetings. One of the Inspectors acting as a Local Authority Liaison Officer in Northside summed this up when he observed that if he said “jump” there were people in his agency who would “jump”, but that partners in other agencies did not enjoy this luxury. Of course, this assumes that police officers assigned to partnership responsibilities are of sufficient rank within the Police Service to command this authority. Although it generally was officers of sufficient rank who were seconded to the strategic partnerships during the fieldwork there were instances where more junior officers had to attend meetings. Here the rank structure could work against the
police, creating inertia in the decision-making process as junior officers had to seek the support of more senior colleagues.

“I wouldn’t feel comfortable adopting a policy on behalf of the force without running it by the appropriate (senior officer) – because that’s what they’re there for – to support the operational staff.” (Community Safety Officer 5)

Coupled with their relative lack of resources some voluntary sector agencies perceived themselves to be lacking “authority” to make decisions that would really affect public policy or practice. As noted in relation to the police, this could sometimes be because the person sent to the meeting lacked the requisite authority to take a decision on behalf of their agency in a partnership meeting, but as will become clear, it could also be the direct consequence of the processes that have to be gone through with their agency to get a decision made – processes that create “inertia” in the partnership.

“I’m probably very typical of some of the people on that group (in that) we’re not empowered necessarily to make decisions that have financial and maybe legal consequences….That’s been part of the problem with the group - there are some people, like the Police Service who can come and the representative there is empowered to make some decisions. She can say ‘I can give you £1500’ and it’s OK to say that. But there are other people in the group who are not in a position to do that. So we have this issue where people come to these meetings but don’t have the authority themselves to make decisions…so it means they have to go back to the agencies and that’s got an inertia built into it.” (Voluntary Sector 4)

Primarily, however, it was other public sector agencies, not the police or the voluntary sector, who were seen as having internal decision making structures that militated against partnership working. According to an experienced Enterprise Service partner it was vital that members of the partnership were perceived as being able to give something of their agency to the partnership. If partnerships are to become ‘communities’ in the sense that Wenger uses the term then this point is of crucial importance because a perception that partners do not give anything of their agency undermines the mutuality of the enterprise and the sense in which it represents “genuine partnership”.
“Particularly in the bigger organisations, by which I mean the Health Board and the Council - huge by comparison to everyone else - the internal partnership is being exposed as being inadequate. I can go in to all these (meetings) and for the time I’m at that meeting I’m Enterprise Services. But when I come back, how much Enterprise Services have I actually delivered into that partnership? I’d like to think a fair bit because we’re a relatively small organisation and we can get our act together very well. But I’m always very dubious about my counterpart in the Council, or the Health Board, but particularly the Council - how much of the Council have they actually delivered to us? How much of the Roads and Transport department of the Council actually know about what the Head of Policy came and talked to me about? Very little. And that is an internal problem. It’s true of all of us as agencies - but the bigger the agency gets that pretends, or purports to be, a partner the bigger the problem. And we cannot go much further down the route of inter-agency partnerships without doing some work on, what I would call, ‘internal partnership’...We have to be able to be sure that our participation as a small group of officials does actually represent genuine partnership between the agencies.” (Enterprise Services Partner)

The Council perspective was unsurprisingly a little different, although Council partners did generally recognise that the decision making processes in their organisation could cause frustrations for other partners. The point that ultimately emerged from the Council perspective was that not only did the relative size of the Council go against them in terms of swift decision-making, there were also “hoops we have to jump through” that other, smaller agencies often did not have to take into consideration. Although many agencies also had statutory duties the Council often perceived themselves to be under particular pressure as the lead agency (which they often were on account of there size and resources). Additionally, Council partners often had to bring elected representatives around before decisions could be concluded (something that, in itself, could be politically fraught). In short, Councils are not hierarchical in the same way as the police, and so decisions of the partnership had to be taken to relevant Council committees and balanced against national priorities and the input of elected representatives. This tended to create a certain amount of the inertia which caused other agencies, and Council partners themselves, some frustration.

“Other problems would be in understanding the processes that each of us either has to go through, or doesn’t have to go through, in order to get decisions made. I think that maybe showed a bit at today’s meeting (about
the new antisocial behaviour agenda) where the voluntary sector sometimes get frustrated at the time it takes the statutory sector to action things – for actual implementation – when really they don’t appreciate the amount of hoops that we have to jump through – especially if we’re in the typical situation where we have to gain the hearts and minds of politicians in order to make things happen – or the other side of the coin is ‘well we are being thrust into something’ like the antisocial behaviour agenda, and that’s been driven from the highest level – but maybe they don’t appreciate the work that has gone on and that we can’t just turn something round within a month’s notice or something like that.” (Council Designated Community Safety Officer 3)

Therefore, over and above differences in occupational culture (see below), the compatibility of agencies was shaped by an interaction between the differential resources of agencies, the internal authority of personnel sent to represent agencies in partnerships, and the distinctive internal decision-making processes operating within different types of agency. Although these internal structures have clearly caused some friction within Community Safety Partnerships, and raised questions about the compatibility of this ‘community’, they had not prevented some shared sense of understanding between divergent agencies beginning to evolve. The extent to which this more optimistic appraisal of “realistic expectations” within partnerships can be viewed as the basis of a ‘community’ will be returned to in chapters 7 and 8.

“My expectations and my experiences from other agencies are: they’re in the same boat as us. They’ve got limited resources; sometimes what’s expected of them isn’t realistic and doesn’t fall within their ability to deliver whatever it is is asked. So, it can be very difficult for them to do that. But, all in all I’ve found that the agencies we do have working together usually work fairly well together – there’s an understanding of what can be delivered by each agency, so the expectations are pretty realistic.” (Local Authority Liaison Officer 2)

**From process to practice: funding community safety partnerships**

The way in which community safety is funded can have an effect on the cohesiveness of the ‘community’, and the sense in which it focuses on a genuinely shared project of some status. In the previous chapter we noted that The Scottish Executive’s decision to pass certain funds through partnership structures rather than particular departments of local government had the effect of forcing these
departments, and other interested agencies, to work together, while also giving some status to the domain of community safety. In this more detailed account of the ways in which community safety has been funded the focus is less on the degree to which funding arrangements can symbolically add credence to an enterprise (or domain), and more on the extent to which they can foster cohesiveness (or not) within a community of different agencies – although the discussion does serve as a reminder of the interlinked nature of domain and community.

As local authorities and the police were increasingly being encouraged to form Community Safety Partnerships by the end of the 1990s the much reiterated message on the issue of funding was that community safety was to be funded through the more effective management of existing budgets and resources (Scottish Executive, 1999; Scottish Executive et al., 1998). However, some opportunities were created for these developing partnership structures to bid for additional funding through Scottish Executive Challenge Funds. A CCTV Challenge Fund, designed to encourage local uptake of this technology was established as early as 1996, and by 1999 a Crime Prevention Challenge fund was also introduced (swiftly being renamed the ‘Make Our Communities Safer’ Challenge Fund) to allow partnerships to seek funding for specific projects. Both practitioners and Scottish Community Safety Unit personnel found this approach to be somewhat piecemeal and too focused on the development of short-term initiatives. In 2002 The Executive moved towards a system whereby a support package of core funding for Community Safety Partnerships would be provided on an annual basis. £4 million were made available through the Community Safety Partnership Award Scheme in the 2002-3, 2003-4 and 2004-5 financial years (Scottish Executive, 2002 and 2003b). Each of the 32 partnerships was allocated a share of the £4 million based upon 2 formulated award measures and 1 variable award measure. The formulated awards were allocated on the basis of the size of the population, and of the crimes per head of population, in each of the local authority areas. 40% of the £4 million was allocated on the first of these measures, and 40% on the second. The remaining 20% of the annual funding available was allocated on the basis of the “quality of the annual application” made by each of the Community Safety Partnerships (and was known as the “variable
award”) (Scottish Executive, 2002 and 2003). Applications for the variable award were assessed on a number of criteria that generally emphasised getting the ‘processes’ right – i.e. ensuring that the appropriate partnership structures were in place (see Accounts Commission, 2000b for details of the advice given to partnerships on this). They were assessed and awarded “points” on the basis of the following criteria (see, Scottish Executive, 2002, 4-8; 2003b, 4-8):

- Evidence that a strategic partnership, including all of the appropriate agencies, had been established had to be provided.
- A comprehensive “community audit” had to have been carried out and utilised to inform the resultant strategic document and action plan.
- A strategic document outlining the central priorities of the partnership, and informed by its community audit, needed to be published.
- An Action Plan that was aligned with the strategic document but which set out the specific targets to be achieved by the partnership over the coming financial year also have to be provided.
- Evidence that the activities of the partnership, and the aforementioned targets, were being effectively monitored and, where possible evaluated, was also a necessary part of the application.
- “Co-ordination arrangements” had to be made, whereby the partnership would show that its proposed activities would not overlap or impinge on the activities of other partnership structures, usually by demonstrating that it was “linked” with the local Community Planning Partnership.
- Presentation: the applications had to clearly expressed and presented.

After running the Community Safety Award Programme in this way for a number of years a number of recurrent concerns with the approach were emerging. Council Designated Community Safety Officers and Local Authority Liaison Officers, in particular, were finding that they were spending very large amounts of their time preparing the documentation required for the variable award application, again raising the spectre of the interstitial community of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 64; chapter 3) - short term funding cycles, coupled with extensive paperwork
regimes, could have the effect of orienting partnerships around the administrative process to a degree that meant they were not giving sufficient (if indeed any) attention to the development of imaginative community safety initiatives (i.e. the domain of their activity became skewed towards funding applications over community safety). This concern – that short term funding can lead to activity that becomes orientated around the need for funding rather than the enterprise the funding is supposed to be for – was recognised by practitioners, one arguing that it could result in agencies seeking funding for the sake of getting funding, rather than because it is required to specifically do something:

“With partnerships where some staff were on short-term contracts – staff on secondments – now, maybe it’s just me but I just wonder sometimes with that are you breeding a ‘justify yourself’ culture, a ‘let’s spin the job out’ culture, ‘I want this job permanently’ or is that being jaded?...I just wonder, it’s human nature if you’ve got a two year contract and you’re a year and a half into it and you’ve had no confirmation from human resources that your contract’s going to be extended or whatever else...you know, you want to justify yourself, you do want the job made permanent whether through an extension or whatever. Does that affect the decisions that are made? Or the views that are put across from that agency?” (Community Safety Officer 5)

The administrative burden created by the annual Partnership awards, and the limitations of short term funding cycles in general were, however, problems that were very keenly recognised by personnel working within the Scottish Executive Community Safety Unit. It was recognised that the Designated Officers were producing substantial amounts of material for their variable award applications (which in any case only accounted for 20% of the award) and that this was “detracting them from operational delivery” (Scottish Community Safety Unit 4) of community safety, while also encouraging them to focus on short-term (annual) planning rather than more ambitious long-term initiatives. Although it was argued that the annual awards had been successful in getting the necessary Community Safety Partnership structures in place throughout the country (Scottish Community Safety Unit 3) the Award Programme changed tack in 2005. The annual budget to be allocated remained £4 million but annual awards for each partnership would now be calculated from the “average” that they had received between 2002 and 2005 (Scottish Executive, 2005, 2). 90% of the £4 million would be allocated in this way,
with the remaining 10% being used to fund national initiatives designed to foster the sharing of ideas, experience and best practice (see chapter 7). Partnerships would receive the same “average award” every year between 2005 and 2008, the hope being that this consistency of funding over a three year period, and the fact that personnel would not be bogged down in the annual cycle of producing detailed applications for an unknown variable award, would allow Community Safety Partnerships to focus more on the development of practical initiatives. Practitioners welcomed this approach as it gave the Community Safety Partnership a known budget to work with and, alongside the tendency of the Executive to put money for projects such as CCTV, wardens schemes, anti-social behaviour and youth justice, through the Community Safety Partnership (Council Designated Community Safety Officers 3 and 4, Scottish Community Safety Unit 3), forced agencies to take the partnership seriously. The approach taken between 2005 and 2008 was, it will be argued, of potential benefit to the development of a community of practice in this field. However, at the time of writing the approach to funding community safety has changed yet again. In pursuit of giving local authorities more freedom in how they allocate resources The Scottish Government will no longer be “ring-fencing” monies for a number of social policy areas, including community safety. This means that the ongoing funding of community safety will be determined by local authorities themselves. The historical support for community safety from local government (CoSLA, 1997; Scottish Executive et al., 1998), and ongoing statutory duties under Community Planning and Anti-Social Behaviour, might give some room for optimism that it will continue to be nurtured, but this is by no means guaranteed, making an observation by a practitioner in 2004 all the more prescient:

“(I)t could be said (that) the only reason the Council are doing it (community safety) is because they are told to do it...but if the government said ‘do your own thing’ would they stop community safety? That would be a real test as to how they value it.” (Voluntary Sector 3)

To conclude, the funding regime for Community Safety Partnerships has been in flux over the last decade. Throughout the period of the fieldwork practitioners and Scottish Community Safety Unit personnel generally favoured funding that was put through the partnership itself (giving it a direct importance for the member agencies),
and which was increasingly to be awarded over three year periods (to reduce the administrative burden of annual awards and to allow for more long-term planning and monitoring), both of which were sensible in terms of fostering an established sense of ‘community’ in Community Safety Partnerships. The long-term effect of the end of “ring fencing” will depend on the extent to which community safety has already established itself as a meaningful domain of value to parent agencies.

**Consultation and representation: local communities and local democracy**

One of the objectives of the partnership approach has been to make crime prevention, and other areas of social policy, more responsive to local communities themselves (Hope and Shaw, 1988; Home Office, 1991; Crawford, 1997). In a real sense communities have been specifically identified as potential partners in Community Safety Partnerships, and so need to be considered also as possible members of the ‘community’ of partnership members. Of course the inclusion of communities within partnership structures has proved to be extremely difficult to achieve in practice, unsurprising given the great ambiguity of the very concept of ‘community’ itself (Bauman, 2001). The main ways in which it has been hoped that the voice of the community could be brought into Community Safety Partnerships is through the processes of community consultation or by having different communities (or different sets of community interests) represented on the relevant forums.

Consultation of the community had been required by The Scottish Executive Community Safety Partnership Award Schemes (2002; 2003b; 2005) and the process of carrying one out described for partnerships in their guidance notes for conducting good quality partnership working (Scottish Executive, 1999; Hewitt et al., 2000). However, despite there being some broad-brush reference to data from community audits included within published Community Safety Plans, there was a strong sense from interviewees that community consultation was something that they remained uncomfortable with. In practice, talk of ‘consultation’ was often blurred with talk of ‘representation’ i.e. it was understood that you were consulting the community if you had the necessary representatives on board. As in England and Wales, the
community safety audits that were carried out generally focussed on using existing data sets provided by key partners (Council, Police, Fire Service and Health Board) (see Newburn and Jones, 2002). This general approach was found to be problematic because it carried over into the ways in which partners thought about consultation, resulting, according to some practitioners, in just the same old narrow range of public sector voices being ‘consulted’.

“In a forum like this you can stand up and say: “Have you really consulted?”….because they’re great for talking about consultation, but when you actually find out “well, who did you consult?”…the standard line is “well, it’s very difficult to get people - how do you know you’ve consulted?”…etc. But it’s opened my eyes - in the Northside-town area I think they’re doing a marvellous job in consultation - but that has been consultation among the officials, like Housing and all that - but they haven’t consulted the community, they haven’t even consulted the Community Council. So they feel they’re doing a good job in the community, but they haven’t really gone out with their own permanent official structure and councillors.” (Voluntary Sector 2)

One of the many concerns that might be raised by consultation being too narrowly construed is that the voices of those groups that are very often perceived to be the ‘problem’ are likely to be routinely ignored (Crawford, 1998, 169), despite the fact that they may well have important contributions to make to any shared solutions to those problems. “Young people” were commonly identified by Community Councils and members of the public as being at the root of local problems but they were noticeable by the relative absence of their voice from the formal structures (although it should be noted that both Northside and Eastside did seek some formal representation of young people’s interests through voluntary sector agencies contributing to local action team initiatives). The officer quoted below was working within a Local Action Team and recognised that this assumption, that ‘young people’ were necessarily ‘the problem’, was too simplistic, and that that it was important to seek their input, even though this was done relatively informally.

“We spend an awful lot of time working with the youngsters. I think you can go to Community Councils and the problems that you’ll get…the people will say ‘well it’s kids who are doing this’, but at Community Councils you very seldom have a representation from the actual youngsters themselves which is
a bit harsh because 38 out of 40 of them won’t have done a single thing wrong, but they’re all targeted as being the cause of the problem and all they’re doing is meeting - and probably if they had better facilities they wouldn’t be hanging around the street. So we do a lot of work with the youngsters - youth cafes and that - just trying to find out what their views are” (Community Safety Officer 2)

Overall the sense was that consultation was not strong because it was largely done through the consultation of agencies deemed to represent particular constituencies of people and interests, and it was questionable whether there were the necessary representative structures throughout the community to facilitate this approach. This perception, shared by many practitioners, was clearly articulated by an Enterprise Services Partner with more extensive experience of partnership work than most.

“It’s (consultation) by far the weakest aspect of what we do, and there’s good and bad reasons for that. One of the reasons is that the community itself has not got the infrastructure to produce spokespersons that can participate in the structures. Partly because there are people there who have all the talent, skills, confidence, and articulacy to be able to do so - but there isn’t the infrastructure for mandating them…and, partly because I think there are still in-built resistances within the agencies to actually pursue this seriously. We all know that it’s required of us and we all make lip-service towards doing it.” (Enterprise Services Partner)

The “infrastructure” of the local community is an important issue for all communities of interest that one might wish to have a voice on Community Safety Partnerships. It raises the question of whether interest groups/communities have the necessary collective efficacy to participate in partnerships. It was certainly the case that plenty of such representative agencies had been identified and brought into partnerships in one way or another (see discussion of membership of partnerships, above), and since 2003 in Eastside, at the level of Community Planning, there have been representatives of ‘communities of geography’ (i.e. a representative from local community councils) and ‘communities of interest’ (i.e. a representative of the Community of Interest Support Network that includes the Women’s Equality Forum, the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Equality Forum, the Older People’s Equality Forum, the Race Equality Forum and the Eastside Youth Council as its members) included on the Strategic Partnership. However, despite such efforts to get
community voices into Community Safety Partnerships, the point that many of the most vulnerable or hard to reach groups lack the necessary capacities to contribute within such structures (Jones and Newburn, 2001) remains salient. Practitioners found that community representation, even where it could be found, could be of limited value where representatives lacked organisational resources, an understanding of how policy processes worked and the technical language used in meetings, and the resources to attend meetings without loss of livelihood (many of these representatives were not full-time officials like other members of the partnerships, they had day jobs too).

“The problem I find for community representatives on the groups is that unless they’re quite assertive, and unless they’re confident, really you just end up demoralising them by getting them involved in these committees. There needs to be some capacity building for community representation. I think this applies to any community - it doesn’t just apply to ethnic minorities. I think it applies to any individual from the community who’s suddenly asked to be among all these professional people who’re paid to be there, and using (technical) language etc. so that they don’t know what it’s all about.” (Voluntary Sector 4)

It is all very well identifying representatives of ‘communities of interest’, but their capacity to actually participate in meetings is not assured. This problem was also recognised by the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations which sought to provide some training and guidance to such representatives for this very reason (although much of their initial work was focused on Urban Regeneration and Social Inclusion Partnerships rather than Community Safety). However, even quite well-established figures in the voluntary sector could find their capacity to actually provide a meaningful voice for the community interests they represented limited by the power and resource differentials that characterised partnerships. Even though they might perceive themselves, and fellow voluntary sector agencies on the partnership, as actually representing pretty broad constituencies in the community, their input was limited by the perceived capacity of lead agencies in the public sector to direct things, regardless of whose interests they represented.

“If it comes to a partner - equality should rule. It’s a bit like a thing down at a local football club. There are six people controlling that football club
because of their shares, the number of their shares – but if you look at the number of shareholders that have got shares, and who are dead keen enthusiastic - real football fans….but they’re outweighed where you’ve got this minority controlling things.” (Voluntary Sector 3)

This is a striking point, made by a very active contributor to a Community Safety Partnership, as it illustrates the point that the actual work of partnerships could sometimes be perceived (by different agencies, not just from the voluntary sector) as the work of only a couple of the agencies, and less of a ‘real’ partnership (Crawford and Jones, 1995; chapter 3).

Problems of a slightly different nature emerged in relation to ‘communities of geography’, often seen to be represented through the network of Community Councils. Here the problem was perceived to be the partiality of individual Community Council voices; in that it was felt that there was a tendency for Community Council representatives to be too focused on problems in their own area (a problem with other elected officials), regardless if it could be shown that real need was actually in other areas. There was also a question about whether Community Councils should be brought into Community Safety Partnerships at all, as it was noted that they were in any case connected to the structures through the regular attendance of community police officers at their meetings (who would report salient issues to the partnership). In practice they had very little direct input into strategic Community Safety Partnerships during the fieldwork.

“We don’t have elected members coming along to our Community Safety Steering Group at a strategic level, but at a local level we do have some elected members who are keen on community safety. We also have some Community Council involvement at a local level ….what we do try to encourage is that a representation from Community Councils is around the table. Now that’s kind of difficult because, you’ll appreciate, if they are round the table it’s natural for them to be shouting for their own corner, therefore, we have to try and remember that if something is apparent or is a problem in one Community Council then we need to look at that reflective within that whole area rather than just focusing on a neighbourhood or a ward area. Yes we should take consideration of each of the wards actually saying ‘we have a problem here’ – but they have their own Community Council meetings at which they can raise community safety concerns as well, and I
Continuing with the issue of elected representatives and their possible contribution to the community safety community, it was noted earlier that such contributions may play a valuable role in giving community safety a prominent role within a Council. However, such contributions can also be problematic. The first problem here reprises the point made earlier, that the existence of elected members in Council can contribute to difficulties with their “internal partnership” by making decision making slower (while they are brought on board), or worse partial (in that decisions are skewed in favour of political interests).

“The council officers often have a very clear view of what they want to do to address a particular issue, but they are beholden constantly to councillors…it is an observable fact that frequently, before they can do anything, they (council officers) have to go through a committee - what comes out of the committee is not necessarily a clear decision, or the ones that the officers would have chosen. As a result they get very pissed off, I think, with us and the various other agencies in that we see a problem, say ‘We’ll do something about that’, we approve the money the next week, we start it the week after - we’re off and we’re running and it’s clear and it’s quick and very focused. And that can skew our relationship with our counterparts at officer level in the council who are still stuck back at the starting line. Still having to balance political consideration of one councillor against another, and that a particularly powerful councillor might say ‘Well, nice idea but I’d rather have it happening in my ward’ - and it’s not actually in that ward that the problem that they want to address is - so they end up struggling to keep up with us.” (Enterprise Services Partner)

A related, and even more controversial, point raised concerned the political mandate of these local representatives. This was a problem that was noticeably felt by various practitioners who worried that local politicians were only interested in projects that could be implemented in their constituencies (presumably because it was perceived that the existence of projects in their constituency would be good for their electoral chances in the future), even if the projects were objectively needed elsewhere (Local Authority Liaison Officer 1 and 2, Community Safety Officer 2 and 4). More recently this has led the police in Eastside to actively use the National Intelligence Model approach to get around such political expediency. By providing quite detailed
maps and indicators of the distribution of local crime problems, and being clear that this intelligence is the basis for their allocation of police resources, officers have felt in a much stronger position to challenge attempts to divert programmes to where there is less observable need for them (of course the extent to which the data used by the police does provide an adequate picture of community safety – as opposed to crime – ‘need’ that would be acceptable to the larger community safety community is open to question). This general concern about elected input, and the limitations of trying to achieve community representation through them, was most forcefully put as follows:

“A lot of the (council) officers have said to me that councillors feel that, having been elected, they are spokespersons for their community. Therefore, there is no requirement to go back and consult the communities separately - they speak for their community. But they get elected once every X number of years so this is a nonsense in their (the council officers’) view. A lot of younger councillors have understood that that is a misreading of democracy, but some of the older councillors feel that they are there as spokespeople...Straight away you fall into the political problem of…..quangos are not going to be told what to do by councillors. The quality of democracy, local democracy certainly, is such that many of these councillors are elected unopposed, or on tiny, tiny electorates or votes…and so their mandate is questionable to us. Now, I don’t question for one moment, and nor does my agency, the issue of the importance of public local democracy. I think we would simply question that the way in which it actually functions at present does not give a particularly strong mandate for us to allow ourselves to be impeded by it as a governmental agency. We get a very clear structure from the government - we’re here to do this, that, and the other and our job, our professionalism is delivering that. And if the other guys are reluctant to allow us a free run at it that can become a problem.”

(Enterprise Services Partner)

Community consultation and representation remained a difficult issue throughout the period of the fieldwork. Partnerships did seek to garner the views of local communities, and assess the nature of the problems faced by them, and also actively sought to have such perspectives represented through and within their membership. However, much of the consultation was conducted by consulting existing ‘representative’ agencies and there was an inherent weakness in this approach, in that it was likely to systematically miss less organised or resourced groups. There was also a real sense that many groups and individuals simply lacked the capacities to
meaningfully participate in partnership structures – improvements in community participation would thus come from investing in this infrastructure rather than Community Safety Partnerships necessarily adopting widely different mechanisms for capturing it. Although such mechanisms have undoubtedly been imperfect a very broad range of community voices have nonetheless been recognised by partnership structures, and given status and legitimacy by being included in them.

**Trust and communication as the basis of partnership work and community**

Ultimately this whole section of the chapter has been about trust and communication between agencies. Without trust and communication ‘community’, as envisaged by Wenger, is impossible. All of the issues discussed thus far – the membership of partnerships, their compatibility with one another, the mechanisms through which the shared enterprise of community safety was to be funded, the nature of community consultation and representation in partnerships - contribute towards how partners relate to one another and understand each other’s differences, and whether they have a sense of belonging to the same enterprise. They contribute to whether partners trust one another and can communicate with one another. This short section will not reprise these issues, merely note them. But it is worth reiterating that the need for ‘trust’ between partners is a connective tissue that runs throughout the discussion of ‘community’.

Many of the practitioners observed that it was important to trust the other members of the partnership. Although some of the agencies regularly came in for criticism concerning their contributions to partnerships (such as the Health Board), and others in relation to their ponderous decision-making structures (the Council) it was generally felt that the personalities concerned could be trusted. In both research sites personal relationships were stressed as being important for developing trust (even though in the same breath it was recognised that where relationships were personality-based this could cause serious problems for sustainability when particular individuals moved, or were moved, on), and the relatively small scale of the policy networks in Scotland seen as beneficial in ensuring that such cross-organisational
relationships developed as a matter of course. One area in which trust became a particularly important issue was in relation to data exchange between agencies working in partnership. In 2000 there was still uncertainty about how the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 applied to formal and informal data and information sharing amongst partners. As practitioners were concerned that infringements of the legislation would come back to haunt them they were careful about what they shared, and only did so where they knew, and trusted, their opposite number in the agencies making the request.

“It (information exchange) works very well in a small place where we know the people individually, you know you can trust them – you probably find that you’re giving out more information to them than you would in a larger situation where you don’t actually know the officers…and Data Protection … and then you have to be careful.” (Community Safety Officer 4)

Latterly, partners became more comfortable that they were complying with the 1998 Act, had produced the necessary data sharing protocols, and had taken due heed of central government guidance on data sharing in the public sector (Scottish Executive, 2004c), but the threat of being seen to infringe Data Protection had nonetheless highlighted the importance of trust to partnership working. Not only that, the sharing of information was a clearly identifiable example of mutuality (or lack of it) within partnerships. As a counter to an earlier observation that partnership members from the voluntary sector might feel that true partnership was being undermined by public sector agencies assuming the ‘lead’ status, these public sector agencies also perceived that the idea of partnership was lacking where they did the running and didn’t get much back from the voluntary sector (although most did note the value of their expertise). Where agencies such as the police often felt that they gave out “more information than we take back in”, even though it was recognised that “that’s just maybe the nature of the fact that we’re often first to deal with situations” (Community Safety Officer 4) there was a sense of some lack of mutuality – a sense that some agencies scratch the back of others more than others. This finding connects up a number of themes raised throughout the chapter – that it is what partners ‘do’, and are seen to do that will most likely shape perceptions about their agency’s, and their own, identification with the aims and goals of the partnership
(and so the trust that other partners can place in them). Levels of commitment that are perceived to lack a sense of mutuality can create a sense that partners are “performing” within the partnership – talking a good game about the benefits of joined up working but not delivering on the rhetoric (the source of this gap between talk and practice could be structural, as discussed throughout this chapter, or down to the lack of personal commitment of individuals, or a mixture of both – see chapter 3). This can create a general sense that partnership relations are largely superficial, and that engaging with them will have little impact on practice (thus implying that the partnership has a limited field of negotiability – limited scope to have a practical impact on the world - which of itself is likely to erode members’ interest in it). Partners trust in one another is thus shaped by perceptions about whether fellow partners share commitment to the goals of the partnership, and whether that commitment is real or superficial – i.e. is it a level of commitment that is likely to be productive and include a capacity to get things done. Overall the feeling articulated suggested that levels of trust between agencies, and personnel within agencies, was actually quite high, but it was not without its fault lines and fractures.

Concluding remarks: identification with the partnership versus identification with the parent agency

It is where genuine trust and communication cross organisational boundaries in partnerships that there is an argument to be made that its members have forged a ‘community’ and a distinctive identity around the goals of the partnership (see chapter 3). This reprises the discussion at the outset of the community section and so it is a good place to conclude it. For partnerships to forge new institutional spaces in which ways of thinking about crime and justice that transcend traditional institutional affiliations evolve, it is necessary for partners to mesh into a ‘community’ of trust and mutuality in which members identify with the partnership over the different parent agencies that comprise it. Arguably this has long been a goal of the partnership approach – to foster creative and “de-monopolised”, non state led approaches to crime prevention and community safety (Hughes, 2002, 129-130; Hughes, 2007; Bottoms, 1990; Crawford, 1997). If this was the goal it does not
appear to have been achieved quite yet in Scotland, community safety work at present being less of a recognised specialism in its own right (underpinned by distinctive cultural and professional values), and more of a mechanism through which “joined-up” co-operation and communication between agencies can be fostered to improve the individual services of each agency. A representative illustration of how partnership working is perceived in Scotland being:

“It (partnership working) improves your service...there are some situations that the police simply can’t solve...and simply saying to the person ‘Look I’m sorry – I can’t do anything for you’ - if you know what services are available...Housing can perhaps solve that problem – you put them in contact with them – you feel you’ve been of benefit to them – putting them in touch with the right people. I think it makes you more professional...it gives you more answers - because the police don’t have all the answers to all the problems – in fact – probably very few of them.” (Community Safety Officer 4)

That said, there are threads of a more fundamentally shared agenda emerging that can be discerned within the ways in which practitioners increasingly talk about their work. Moving towards the joined-up approach is a first step in that it requires a level of understanding between agencies and a sense that, at the end of the day, they are on the same side. Even though the agendas have been broadly stated (see discussion of the domain of community safety) they have nonetheless consistently articulated a commitment to good governance and social justice (embodied in Community Planning) that might have laid the seeds for an ongoing orientation of personnel towards these values. Many of the practitioners from different organisational backgrounds in Northside, for example, seemed to have bought into the ‘quality of life’ agenda of their Community Plan and the sense in which it cast community safety in broader terms than just crime prevention. The most important thread however is the very fact that agencies have now been working in partnership (at least in theory) for around a decade (more for some, less for others). Even if the context has not always been ideal, a cadre of personalities drawn from the public sector, voluntary sector and criminal justice agencies in the 32 local authority areas have been interacting with one another, communicating with one another, and very often spending time with one another in shared offices. There are now a substantial group
of people throughout the system who are having, or have had, this experience of working outside of the traditional organisational silos in public administration. The potential for this to create a radical “cadre” of officials was not lost on practitioners.

“It (partnership work) is personality based. But people do move on - we’ve been in this long enough now that in several cases there have been people who’ve moved on and it hasn’t proved much of a problem. I would like to think that as time rolls on, and we recycle officers in each of the agencies - and in some cases people will actually move between agencies….but… there are also conscious secondments which will, in the course of time, mean we develop in Northside, probably elsewhere in Scotland as well, a cadre of staff who are used to working in this fashion. It’s half a generation away in public administration terms yet, it probably won’t happen in my lifetime, but it’s moving in that direction, I think” (Enterprise Services Partner)

For the moment the climate in Scotland remains conducive to the idea that public agencies can, and must, share goals and objectives (see Normand, 2003) and this has continued to take institutional shape in the form of Criminal Justice Authorities and National and Local Criminal Justice Boards (Scottish Executive, 2006). Whether a cadre of staff capable of transcending traditional organisational boundaries will evolve is one question, whether it will evolve with an orientation around community safety is another.
Chapter 7: The ‘practice’ of community safety

“The practice is a set of frameworks, ideas, tools, information, styles, language, stories, and documents that community members share. Whereas the domain denotes the topic the community focuses on, the practice is the specific knowledge the community develops, shares, and maintains. When a community has been established for some time, members expect each other to have mastered the basic knowledge of the community, just as biochemists expect members of their discipline to understand basic chemistry. This body of shared knowledge and resources enables the community to proceed efficiently in dealing with its domain.” (Wenger et al., 2002, 29)

The ‘practice’ of a community refers not only to its activities per se (although these are important), but also to the ways of thinking that underpin them, and which make them accepted and meaningful within that community. Members of a community of practice develop a common language for understanding and thinking about the domain, and a shared repertoire of methodologies and tools for determining how they should act upon it. ‘Practice’ therefore refers to the knowledge and the competencies of members, as well as to the specific things that they do. Thinking about ‘practice’ in these terms, and how it guides the shape and the character of how communities of practice understand and relate to the world, underlines Wenger’s intellectual debt to the sociology of knowledge and institutions reviewed earlier (Douglas, 1986; Kuhn, 1996; Becker, 1982; Fleck, 1935/1979; Giddens, 1976; 1977; 1979; chapter 3). It is the ‘practice’ of a community of practice which determines what ‘counts’ as recognisable or meaningful activity within it (Douglas, 1986; Becker, 1982), which establishes the paradigms within which members make sense of the domain (Kuhn, 1996; Fleck, 1935/1979; Fish, 1989), and which ultimately constitutes the form and character of its memory (Douglas, 1986; Garland, 2000).

There is surprisingly little criminological research that focuses directly on the actual ‘practice’ of community safety in these terms (an important exception being Hughes and Gilling, 2004), much of it having been much more concerned with identifying the impediments to inter-agency working and the development of a shared identification with community safety (Bottoms, 1990; Blagg et al., 1988; Pearson et al., 1992, Gilling, 1994; Crawford and Jones, 1995; chapter 2), or the broader social
and political meanings and ramifications of the perceived responsibilisation of crime control and prevention through Community Safety Partnerships (Garland, 1996; 2001; Hughes, 1998; 2004; Hughes and Edwards, 2002; Crawford, 1997; 1998). Given the ambiguity of the ‘domain’ and the complexity of the membership of the ‘community’ already noted, it should come as no surprise that the ‘practice’ of community safety is also a contested terrain, unsettled in the minds of practitioners themselves, policy makers and academics. This chapter will, as far as is possible within the confines of the present study (see methodological annex), begin to tease out and identify what have been the ‘practices’ of Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland up until now, and in so doing will move us closer towards drawing some conclusions about whether a shared identification with the project of community safety is has begun to develop, and if it has, what it looks like (Gilling and Hughes, 2004, Wenger, 1998, 191-197; see also: Becker and Carper, 1956a; 1956b).

**What is ‘community safety’ anyway?**

In order to establish what the ‘practice’ of community safety is, or could be, it is pertinent to return to a question which animated earlier sections of this chapter: what is community safety anyway? It is not the intention to merely reiterate that which was discussed under ‘domain’, but it is necessary to briefly reprise that question here (thus again emphasising the interlinked, mutually-constitutive nature of the different components of communities of practice) precisely because the ambiguity over what the shared project is mirrors the ambiguity over what might be considered to be the most appropriate (or even ‘thinkable’) interventions (‘practices’) best suited to achieving it.

The breadth of what might be covered by the term ‘community safety’ has already been noted; as has the fact that such breadth has been considered both one of its strengths and one of its weaknesses. In part, the greater potential scope of ‘community safety’ over ‘crime prevention’ or ‘crime reduction’ was an intentional attempt to make it more politically appealing, and something more likely to stimulate the community themselves (Home Office, 1991; Gilling, 1997), but it was also
testament to the broader social justice agendas held by the local government personnel (as compared with central government) who pushed for it (Hughes and Gilling, 2004, 134; Shiel et al., 2005; Reece and Walters, 2007). It is telling that community safety had its roots and inspiration both in the urban regeneration work of the 1980s and 1990s (see Monaghan, 1997; Turok and Hopkins, 1997; Carnie, 1999; chapter 3) and in the re-emerging interest of researchers and academics in the prevention of crime (Clarke and Mayhew, 1980; Clarke, 1995; Garland, 1996, 2000; Hope and Shaw 1988; Hughes, 1998; Crawford, 1997; Pease, 1997) throughout the same period. Throughout its development the different influences on community safety (central/local interests, professional/community interests, social justice/criminal justice agendas) have made it a site of continual contestation in which it can mean different things to different actors and agencies. There are, however, some things which are reasonably clear about community safety:

- **Multi-agency.** Community safety has always been conceived of as a project that crossed existing institutional boundaries and could not be achieved by agencies individually.

- **Locally organised.** There have always been pressures from the centre about the form it should take, and how it should be funded etc. – but even so, community safety has been consistently understood as a project that has to be responsive to local needs and interests, and which has to be organised locally. For many scholars community safety provides a good illustration of what Garland termed “responsibilisation” (the process through which central government sought to off-load what were previously understood to be its responsibilities and duties onto local government, the private and voluntary sectors, and local communities and individuals themselves) (Garland, 1996; Crawford, 1997; 1998; Hughes, 1998; 2004; 2007).

- **Crime.** Although the relative emphasis to be given to crime over other types of safety and social justice issue has been an ongoing tension within community safety, there is no argument that crime is undoubtedly a part of it.
There might be disagreement about what else constitutes community safety but crime and the fear and anxieties about crime that beset some communities are universally understood to be key aspects of the community safety agenda.

- **Strategic governance and the preventative turn.** Community safety is nested within a broader governmental architecture of overlapping partnership structures, coordinated in Scotland through Community Planning (see chapter 4). It is part of a larger governmental agenda that challenges the traditional domains of existing professions and which seeks to make governance more evidence-led, risk-based, proactive, problem-oriented and joined-up (each of these terms being in favour with government at different points in the last decade). Community safety and crime prevention partnerships are understood to be examples of this “preventative turn” in governance, whereby activity is orientated towards the prevention of future harms, in stark contrast, for example, with the reactive orientation of traditional modern criminal justice agencies (Garland, 2001, 16-17; see also Hughes, 2007, chapter 2).

Bearing these common features of community safety in mind, the remainder of this chapter will, drawing also from previous sections, seek to characterise the ‘practice’ of community safety in Scotland, giving particular attention to how it is still shaped by pre-existing occupational orientations of members, and to the particular tasks which loom large in working lives of the personnel most closely associated with community safety - the Designated Community Safety Officers. Although the ‘practice’ of community safety remains, to some degree, characterised by ambiguity and contestation, there are nonetheless sufficient threads of a coherent ‘practice’ emerging to remain quietly optimistic about the potential transformative power of the new institutional space created within and through Community Safety Partnerships. What emerges from the discussion, however, is that there are multiple communities of practice within this institutional space, only some of which might be considered desirable. The concluding section of this chapter will draw from this, and the two preceding chapters, to identify the various locations of communities of practice within Community Safety Partnerships. Doing so allows one to explore the potential
of, and the barriers still facing, the development of communities of practice that will support and nurture a community safety practice that transcends and de-monopolises traditional criminal justice thinking.

**Diverse and conflicting agendas and occupational cultures**

The previous discussion of ‘community’ included reflections on the ways in which the internal design and politics of organisations, coupled with external pressures on them to perform certain roles, and in specified ways, sometimes made the numerous members of the partnership (or ‘community’) quite incompatible with one another. This discussion was underpinned by an implicit assumption that these incompatible agencies had different occupational cultures in line with their distinctive, and sometimes contradictory, roles (such as crime control versus social work), capacities (including manpower, resources and access to sources of power, such as the “ear” of the Chief Executive) and structures (e.g. rank hierarchies versus decision by committee). That the diverse and conflicting cultures of partnership members can make partnership working difficult is well-recognised in the literature and has already been documented here (Crawford, 1997, 97-118; chapter 2). However, it is pertinent to emphasise one aspect of this literature again here - different occupational cultures not only create problems in terms of cooperation (see ‘community’ chapter), they also promote different and potentially contradictory solutions to the problems at hand – they suggest and underpin different ‘practices’. Again, it is the tension over the emphasis to be given to crime that came to the fore on this issue.

The present study does not purport to provide a detailed analysis of the internal dynamics and cultures of all of the lead and peripheral members of Community Safety Partnerships, but in examining their interactions, and, in particular, how members have perceived their interactions, the effects of the different occupational structures and cultures, and the values and priorities of members, have been glimpsed. As noted, for the voluntary sector their priorities and objectives would sometimes make partnership working a clear and obvious focus for them. Their orientation towards contributing to broad attitudinal changes in other agencies, and in
society at large (for example, in terms of how ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians or victims of crime are thought about and treated), necessarily made them inclusive in approach. They actively understood that their own aims and objectives were only achievable by communicating with other agencies, getting them to change their practices and/or working with them collaboratively to make broader changes. Some of the other agencies, however, perceived voluntary sector contributors to partnerships to be rather too narrowly focussed on their own very particular concerns and, given their resource limitations, often only willing and able to participate when the agenda suited them, rather than strategically and consistently (although some members of the voluntary sector did make more long-term strategic contributions). The orientation of the local authority was more difficult to pin down and characterise in simple terms because of its sheer complexity. Local authorities varied in the degrees to which they symbolically gave status and priority to partnership working (see ‘community’) and the sheer breadth of departments involved (see discussion of membership) mirrored the breadth of perspectives contained within the local authority – each department traditionally working in a “silo” of its own, partnership working not only making them work and collaborate with other external agencies, but also forcing them to open up clearer lines of communication with other departments within the larger local authority. What did appear to be a fairly consistent orientation of local authority personnel, particularly those acting as Designated Officers, but also in some cases those acting as representatives of departments, was their commitment to what might be described as good, proactive governance – their activity focused on trying to ensure that things (the various public services) worked, and there was some understanding of the wide range of interconnected things that public services did (particularly amongst Designated Officers who had to have this overview). Their focus on planning and coordinating public services, and the structural need for them to seek agreement for decisions and strategies through committee procedures made them less structurally and culturally able to react quickly to crisis events (see discussion for the police below, and of compatibility of community members in chapter 6) but did mean that personnel were generally proactively inclined and adopted a wide understanding of community
safety (reflecting the wide range of possible contributors to it within the local authority).

In short, because of their roles and objectives local authorities and the voluntary sector quite naturally, and consistently, saw community safety in broader terms than “crime”, something that was less clear within the police. Historical accounts of the development of public policing in Scotland have highlighted the breadth of police role that developed from the outset and the perception that the predominant style of policing favoured was, broadly construed, a “community policing” style (Dinsmor and Goldsmith, 2005; Walker, 1999; Schaffer, 1980; chapter 4). Certainly the idea that Scottish police are close to their communities was a view readily expressed by many of the police engaged in partnership working. Especially in the more rural Northside this was felt to be a natural orientation in light of the relatively small size of the community itself, coupled with the sense that crime is not one of their main concerns anyway (although such views were also expressed by Eastside police officers). Whether such perceptions were expressions of rhetoric and mythology, or whether they reflected the reality of Scottish policing would require a detailed study of this, up until recently, largely “neglected” institution (Walker, 1999, Donnelly and Scott, 2005), but, what is clear, is that the importance of crime to the orientation and culture of the Scottish police is beyond doubt. The cultural orientation of the police towards ‘crime fighting’ (Reiner, 2000; Bowling and Foster, 2002) was certainly in evidence, even though community safety officers also showed a belief that such a reactive focus of policing increasingly needed to be more strategic, problem-orientated, and connected with their broader “duty of care” (the views of these officers did not necessarily represent the views of the rank and file, who they suggested were often resistant to ideas of community safety).

“The bottom line is to say that we (the police) are, first and foremost, investigators of crime – that’s the bottom line – but on top of that we have a duty of care – and we have a problem solving issue as well - we don’t want to be attending repeat calls. 1. Because it’s not good for the survivor or victim and 2. Because it’s not good for us.” (Community Safety Officer 5)
“Frontline police officers say that ‘we’re here to mop up bad guys and that’s our contribution to community safety’. Very hard to try to get them to think about that one extra step – you can lock up the bad guy but we all know that the next week you’ll be locking up the same bad guy. Why? It’s in your benefit to do that little bit extra – that step to say why are they coming back? Because if you can sort it then you don’t have to go back, you do something else.” (Community Safety Officer 6)

As noted in the domain section, the ambiguity of community safety to the police service could be seen in the fact that everything the police do could be, and sometimes was, justified in its terms – even the hard-edged crime fighting orientation could be justified as a contribution to community safety (see chapter 5). It would be tempting to argue that this aspect of police work does not contribute to the work of Community Safety Partnerships and requires to be thought of as a separate activity of the police (and other enforcement agencies). It was, for example, observed by officers that, at the end of the day, once a crime had been committed the police did retain a monopoly over the authority to respond to it, and so when it came to ‘crime’, this was not a multi-agency task, this was a police task.

“As far as crime is concerned, and policing is concerned, we do not have to deal with that in a multi agency approach – it’s quite clear that there is a solution – there is a wholly police solution. And if we do have tensions with another agency on how to deal with something then it’s really something that we’ll negotiate but – we’ll try to come to some kind of an agreement – but not necessarily surrendering our own position - obviously we have a strong view with crime.” (Local Authority Liaison Officer 2)

However, cases such as domestic violence (and also cases involving racial issues) serve to show that what the police do/do not wish to retain a monopoly over is more blurred than this statement suggests. The police do undoubtedly retain a monopoly over responding to crisis calls from the public in the here and now (Bittner, 1979), and the subsequent investigation of crime is also generally identified as being part of their core business alone. That said, in areas such as domestic violence the police have recognised that they require specialist input from other agencies – such as Women’s Aid and the Social work and Housing Departments - to deal with the complex issues involved. Although the multi-agency aspects of the policing of domestic violence might be argued to be proactive (providing training for officers
through other agencies, awareness raising campaigns) or about general victim support or the prevention of repeat victimisation, they are in fact less easy to cleanly disentangle from their ‘crime fighting’ and investigation orientations where it is recognised that contributing to holistic support of victims can contribute to their willingness and capacity to go through with a criminal prosecution of the perpetrator (Hoyle and Sanders, 2000). More recently, research on the policing of terrorism has also found that police work that contributes more generally to community relations is absolutely essential to this enterprise because to successfully ‘fight’ against terrorism the police require the trust of, and intelligence from, the very communities expected of producing the terrorists (Matassa and Newburn, 2003).

It has thus been very difficult for the police to ascertain where community safety begins and ends, if there are aspects of their role which lie out-with its remit (such as reacting to emergencies, crime fighting), or if all police work is essentially community safety. If community safety is to be established as a distinctive institutional and occupational space from the police then there needs to be greater clarity about this matter. There are police ‘practices’ which are not the ‘practices’ of Community Safety Partnerships, and, as we will see, describing the ‘practices’ of Community Safety Partnerships is not the same as describing the ‘practices’ of the police. What is important here, and what will allow greater distinction to be made between community safety and policing, is to move from talking about community safety as a broad catch-all concept, and to begin to talk about it as a field of expertise, and a set of occupational and professional tools and orientations that have a life of their own in their own institutional space (i.e. Community Safety Partnerships).
“(I)t is by its very practice – not by other criteria – that a community establishes what it is to be a competent participant, an outsider, or somewhere in between. In this regard, a community of practice acts as a locally negotiated regime of competence. Within such a regime, knowledge is no longer undefined. It can be defined as what would be recognised as competent participation in the practice.” (Wenger, 1998, 136-137, emphasis in the original)

If the concept of community safety is to be sharpened up, and if the work of Community Safety Partnerships is to become established as an occupational or professional identity that stands distinct from existing criminal justice and social service agencies, then the ‘practices’ of Community Safety Partnerships have to be more clearly articulated and, if necessary refined, in order to make this so. This section will draw upon interviews with Community Safety Partnership members and other interested practitioners and policy makers, observation of strategic partnership meetings, and analysis of the various artefacts of partnership working (including published community safety plans, Scottish Executive funding guidance and Audit Commission reports) in order to give some sense of what it is that partnerships have been doing, and what we might come to recognise as the locally negotiated regime of competence of Community Safety Partnerships. Much of the following discussion will focus on the tasks and activities of the Designated Community Safety Officers – the officers on secondment (usually for a period of 2 years) to the strategic Community Safety Partnerships from the Council, the Police Service and sometimes the Fire Service. It is these officers who were recognised as the core of partnerships – they coordinated things, kept the agenda of the partnership moving, and were the only ones for whom the work of the partnership was their full-time concern (this focus does, however, place a certain skew on the focus of this chapter – see methodological annex). On the face of it much of the work of Designated Officers is, like the work of their equivalents in England and Wales (Community Safety Managers - see Hughes and Gilling, 2004), of a technical, managerial and administrative nature. It will be argued here, however, that their ‘practices’ were not purely technical, and were also underpinned by particular ways of thinking about
social and criminal justice, requiring them to make constant value judgements about what counted as ‘community safety’.

Over the four years of the fieldwork the work of Council Designated Community Safety Officers and the Local Authority Liaison Officers on secondment from the police included:

- **Communication.** The ability to communicate with other individuals and agencies was seen as a major part of the job by all of the Designated Officers. It was through their communication skills that they would oil the wheels of the partnership and keep things moving. Communication between members of the partnership was necessary to keep everyone up to speed with evolving agendas and include them in the other aspects of the partnership’s work. Designated Officers were also required to act as liaison between the strategic Community Safety Partnership and the larger Community Planning network on the one hand, and their own Local Action Teams (see chapter 4) on the other – it was through the Designated Officers that Community Safety Partnerships would, in theory, ensure that their work did not overlap with the work of other partnerships and that it knew what initiatives were being developed on the ground under its own auspices. Designated Officers also represented all of the 32 partnerships at the national level structures set up to support the development of Community Safety throughout Scotland.

- **Identifying partners.** As partnership between the lead agencies bedded-in partnerships would sometimes need to identify new members to be brought into the fold – sometimes for relatively short periods to cover particular projects. Designated Officers took this role, which most usually involved them using their networks within the voluntary sector to identify potential new partners. For example, race relations expertise was only formally brought in to the Northside Community Safety Partnership following the publication of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report (Macpherson, 1999) when the profile of diversity issues was raised considerably.
• **Community safety audits.** Most of the work required for central government monitoring, putting together the strategic documents and action plans, and applying for funding was carried out by Designated Officers (in consultation with other members of the partnership) (Scottish Executive, 1999; 2002; 2003b; 2005; Accounts Commission, 2000b). Although the Accounts Commission found that Scottish Community Safety Partnerships were slow in getting their act together and actually carrying out full community safety audits (Accounts Commission, 2000a) this task would soon involve Designated Officers in a substantial amount of work, usually involving the collation and analysis of data from many of the partners (audits would include details of local crime rates, police performance, calls to the Fire Service, use of Accident and Emergency Services, surveys of young people’s use of alcohol and drugs etc. – for an example of a full community safety audit see: Edinburgh Community Safety Partnership, 2004). As advised by the Accounts Commission the appropriate data-sharing protocols would be set up to facilitate this process (and other intelligence needs of the partnership, for specific projects or initiatives, for example) and this would, again, be carried out by Designated Officers. Designated Officers in Northside were observed to be interested in conducting their own small-scale surveys and focus groups to inform the work of the partnership but, throughout the life of the fieldwork, the audits were largely conducted using existing data sets, although this could change as partnerships become more mature.

• **Writing strategic documents.** The strategic documents and action plans were written by Designated Officers in consultation with the partnership. These documents played an important role in the early stages of partnership development in mapping out what the partnerships were going to be about and who would be involved (Accounts Commission, 2000a) but were also required under The Scottish Executive’s monitoring arrangements (Scottish Executive, 2002; 2003b; 2005). Community Safety Designated Officers were
also given responsibilities to produce strategic documents under other policy headings that were implemented through the Community Safety Partnership, such as Anti-social behaviour strategies and neighbourhood awards (Shiel et al., 2005). In addition to such formal tasks, it would often be the Designated Officers who would keep internal partnership communication going through the production of internal memos, minutes and agendas of meetings etc..

- **Writing funding applications.** In the early years much of the work of Designated Officers was put into securing additional sources of funding for the partnership, which was formally supposed to be funded out of existing public sector resources and the input of members. Challenge funds for CCTV and then crime prevention and community safety initiatives were available in the 1990s, with more money latterly being made available for the development of partnership structures themselves in the shape of the Community Safety Partnership Award Schemes (Scottish Executive, 2002; 2003b; 2005). As noted in previous sections, it was recognised by policy makers themselves that the amount of work being put into these applications, when they were still running on an annual cycle (before 2005), was too onerous and was likely to be keeping Designated Officers from thinking about creative initiatives (hence the change to the three year cycle – Scottish Executive, 2005).

- **Allocating funding and coordinating initiatives.** Once partnerships had some level of annual funding through the Award Scheme Designated Officers also had to take responsibility for how this money would be spent in line with the strategic plan. Northside conducted their own internal ‘challenge fund’ whereby local action teams would make applications for a share of the money to conduct and monitor initiatives on the ground. The administration of this internal awards scheme (which was very important as it was all about getting resources to actual community activities) and the allocation of the funds themselves were largely carried out by Designated Officers, again under consultation with other members of the partnership. Following the 2005-
2008 Award Scheme, partnerships are being exhorted to focus more on initiatives themselves (the idea being that partnership structures are now reasonably well bedded-in) and a range of policies are being implemented through Community Safety Partnerships. These include Wardens schemes, concierge schemes, neighbourhood watch and antisocial behaviour. Designated Officers, in the current climate, are likely to be ever more involved in the administration, coordination and evaluation of these initiatives.

- Evaluating and monitoring initiatives. Tied in with all of the roles above is evaluation and monitoring, another crucial aspect of the ‘practice’ of a Designated Officer. Evaluation and monitoring had been built into partnership development from the outset, through the various guidance notes and funding mechanisms which exhorted or required it (Scottish Executive, 1999; 2002; 2003b; 2005; Accounts Commission, 2000b). Research from England and Wales which had sought to push for a ‘what works’, scientific approach to the development and implementation of crime prevention and community safety (Ekblom and Pease, 1995; Clarke, 1995; Tilley, 2001) had also been influential in Scotland. However, where a substantial body of published research on the mechanisms through which crime reduction projects could have an impact on the world was produced in England and Wales (Ekblom and Pease, 1995; Tilley, 2001; 2005; Hope 2004) there was, with the exception of the Safer Cities research, only limited similar output in Scotland (e.g. Carnie, 1999; Valentin, 1995; Bannister and Dillane, 2005). In large part this was probably because The Scottish Executive was working with a much smaller budget and research capacity than The Home Office, but the result has been that Scottish contributions to the ‘what works’ movement in relation to crime prevention have been modest at best. Throughout the period of the research practitioners and Designated Officers were well aware of their own limitations in terms of conducting evaluations, not only because funds were so tight, but also because few of them had any formal training in research design – although they did recognise the value of evaluating the
initiatives and projects that they developed, they also felt that they lacked the necessary skills to conduct proper evaluative research.

“To my mind, if we could measure that the work that’s done and the effect that that has on the community then that would be far better – but I’ve no idea how to do that, absolutely no idea.” (Local Authority Liaison Officer 2)

This is not to suggest that initiatives in Scotland have never been subjected to any kind of evaluation, but there is little evidence that they have been subjected to the kind of research that is really necessary to unpick the complex mechanisms through which crime rates change and the impact that interventions may have had on such changes (Ekblom and Pease, 1995; Tilley, 2001). Designated Officers have made efforts to identify the effects of what they’ve been doing (largely through monitoring trends in data sets recorded by partner agencies), and have certainly descriptively documented the work of partnerships very well, but they have lacked the necessary skills and support to be able to really make any meaningful contribution to the question of ‘what works’ in crime prevention and community safety.

Reprising an issue noted in relation performance management earlier, practitioners were also well aware of the potential for monitoring regimes to direct the practices of Community Safety Partnerships in unintended or surprising directions (see Hough, 2007; Becker, 1972) creating, in Wenger’s terms interstitial communities of practice (see chapter 3). In particular, the focus on ‘measurable’ or ‘quantifiable’ outcomes was itself seen as directing partners towards certain types of activity (such as trying to monitor local crime rates) and away from others (more general ‘safety’ and ‘quality of life’ issues). This was problematic for partners who ultimately came to feel that the monitoring wasn’t capturing what the partnership was actually about and trying to achieve – but that it was ending up subverting these goals by encouraging (even forcing them where funding was an issue) to give priority to that which was ‘quantifiable’.
“There’s always (pressure to get results) – it’s figures – it’s measurable things – ‘what can you tell us about this?’ – and that tends to take away from the stuff that you can’t measure. You get so involved in the ‘how can I measure that?’, ‘what do I measure?’ – you’ve got to measure it – unless you’ve got a measure you can’t do it. And I suppose in some respects things should be measured and we should try our hardest to measure things – but there are some things that you will just not be able to measure because of the nature of community safety and crime prevention.” (Community Safety Officer 6)

Therefore, evaluation and monitoring not only required certain skills and capacities that themselves, in theory at least, formed some of the ‘practices’ of Designated Officers, it also (potentially at least) shaped the larger ‘practice’ of the Community Safety Partnership by emphasising the ‘quantifiable’ work of the partnership as that which should ‘count’ as effective community safety. That said, The Executive have themselves noted the resistance of community safety practitioners to adopting purely quantifiable, crime-focused approaches to community safety (Shiel et al., 2005).

• **Problem-solving.** Throughout the study practitioners talked about partnership work as problem-solving. Although the argument here is that partnership should and could mean something more than problem-solving (through the emergence of a distinctive occupational identity around community safety), in practice problem-solving was something that Designated Officers and other partners saw as an important part of their work. Here Designated Officers saw themselves as lubricating communication between different agencies still sometimes working in “silos”, helping to promote intelligence sharing where specific problems came up, or acting as a go-between to connect different agencies. In its own way, this type of problem-solving work, which amounts to the adoption of a brokering role in Wenger’s terms (1998, 108-113; chapter 3), therefore had its own aspirations to being a specialist knowledge – practitioners had a specialist knowledge of the relevant networks and ‘who to ask’ if you have a problem.
“Go through me initially and if you need specialist help with it I will probably know someone who knows someone who can give you the answer.”
(Safe Cities Partner)

Although it should be clear that much of what Designated Officers did was largely administrative and managerial, their ‘practice’ was not underpinned by merely technical considerations. Particularly in the marshalling and allocation of funding to specific projects and policy agendas, and in relation to the definition of ‘good practice’ within evaluation and monitoring regimes, it was clear that Designated Officers were making value judgements about what counted as community safety, and thus what interventions in the social world were appropriate. What counted as community safety, and the numerous types of initiative that were implemented, is something that is increasingly being promoted at a national level, and it is within this context that the description of community safety practices in Scotland will be concluded below.

Community safety forums and sharing practice: a national identity for community safety practitioners?

National level structures designed to promote policy development and the sharing of good practice about crime prevention and community safety have existed since the early 1980s in Scotland (Monaghan, 1997, 34-39), although it was only by the late 1990s that they consistently included local Designated Officers from all of the Community Safety Partnerships. The Scottish Local Authorities Community Safety Forum (known as the SLACS forum) was set up through the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities to support the developing partnership structures within Councils. Following the changes to the Community Safety Award Programme in 2005 (Scottish Executive, 2005), this national forum, now renamed the Scottish Community Safety Network, was to receive some central government funding (a 10% slice of the 2005-8 funding for community safety was earmarked for national capacity building – which would also include the appointment of a National Community Safety Coordinator) in order to develop its work. The Scottish Community Safety Network aims to promote best practice, improve the sharing of
information between different partnerships, other national networks and The Scottish Executive, identify the training needs of practitioners, and explore funding opportunities for community safety. The Network now has a well-established website (which in conjunction with the Safer Scotland website run by the Executive provides a good source of information about national and local activity) and also organises local and national events and training sessions for Designated Community Safety Officers working at a strategic level. The Scottish Business Crime centre also provides a national repository of good practice that Designated Officers can feed into, but it is primarily focused on providing information and advice to directly to the commercial sector organisations.

The development of national forums for strategic Designated Officers was generally perceived in positive terms by practitioners. As well as providing a forum within which to talk about community safety, and share ideas about what were often found to be quite common problems, it was also felt that they were indicative of the status and priority being given to community safety. The commitment of the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities to a national forum in the early days was seen by Council Officers as one of the drivers of the policy within local government. The intention of The Executive to earmark some of the Award Programme funds for national level initiatives (2005, 2) was also viewed as a means of “raising the profile” of community safety. In fact central government acknowledgement of community safety through these national-level initiatives was probably particularly well timed in terms of its importance to the development of a community safety identity amongst practitioners. It was at this time that community safety had been subsumed within the Community Planning agenda and, arguably, the Antisocial Behaviour agenda (arguably because on the one hand it raised the profile of community safety by being implemented through Community Safety Partnerships, on the other hand there was much more money available for Antisocial Behaviour than there was for community safety, which could have been construed as a message about the relative political worth of the agendas). Symbolically, the commitment to a national forum and national coordination of standards and best practice was important for community
safety in that it was a formal acknowledgement that it remained a live area of concern for government.

For practitioners, however, participation in national level forums in which the topics for discussion were all around community safety, and the common difficulties associated with partnership working, also provided an important social space within which to foster an identity around community safety and the ‘practices’ which constituted it (see Becker and Carper, 1956a; 1956b), taking a role not unlike that of the Tech Clubs which nurtured professional skills, identities and practices within the Chrysler corporation’s reorganisation of the late 1980s (see Wenger et al., 2002, 1-4; chapter 3). As will be noted in the concluding discussion, national forums of this type have the potential to nurture local communities of practice, but may also be a valuable community of practice in their own right.

Undoubtedly one of the benefits of the national forums, and their websites, has been the collection and publication of information about some of the actual initiatives implemented under the auspices of community safety. In Scotland there has long been a paucity of such information, in part because of the smaller research infrastructure available to The Scottish Executive relative to The Home Office, although what there is has long suggested that, even if short-term and piecemeal, there has been substantial activity (Valentin, 1995; Accounts Commission, 2000a). The Safer Scotland website, run by The Scottish Government, includes over 100 examples of ‘good practice’ initiatives under the following headings, that themselves give some sense of the breadth of work covered under community safety: alcohol, antisocial behaviour, diversity, domestic housebreaking, drugs, environmental safety, fear of crime, fire safety, home safety, partnership business, personal safety, road safety, victims, violent crime, and young people. Throughout the course of the research a number of projects were in operation and were seen more first-hand. Even these by no means constituted all of the work that was being carried out under the auspices of community safety because, according to Designated Officers, quite a lot of it was still relatively informal and short term, being developed and carried out on the ground at Local Action Team level. If the structures are working as they should
much more of this work should be being documented by Designated Officers. Still, the following specific projects were running within Northside and Eastside during the research, some of them quite explicitly crime prevention programmes, others adopting a broader ‘quality of life’ outlook:

- **Fire safety awareness projects.** Primarily led by Fire Service officers, included working with children in schools and providing access to fire safety equipments (such as alarms) and how best to use it.

- **The anti-fraud thumbprint scheme.** A scheme inspired by a number of local credit card frauds whereby customers were asked to provide a thumbprint when making a transaction, on the understanding that the thumbprint would be destroyed when the transaction was completed.

- **Safe Young People.** This was a high-profile and well-established scheme involving all of the major service providers in the local authority area, as well as some contributors from the voluntary sector. All secondary school children were invited to attend an annual event at which there would be a range of talks and activities around various aspects of ‘safety’.

- **Safe Play Areas.** School-based awareness-raising around the problem of young people hurting themselves on building sites. Primarily about education of children but also involved local builders and council departments in thinking about making it more difficult for children to gain entry.

- **City Centre Radio Scheme.** This system was set up to connect up local businesses to warn one another, and where necessary contact the police, where known shoplifters or nuisances were in the vicinity.

- **Anti-graffiti project.** Led by the Safe Cities team, designed to coordinate council and business resources to ensure that city centre graffiti was immediately cleared up.
This list only reflects small-scale specific projects that occupied staff over the course of the fieldwork, over and above their contribution to ongoing areas of work or new policy areas that were later brought within the remit of community safety. Over the last decade or so Community Safety Partnerships in Northside and Eastside have been involved in the following areas: secured by architectural design, domestic abuse, diversity – race, ethnicity and sexual orientation, drugs and alcohol misuse, licensing, antisocial behaviour, CCTV, concierge schemes, environmental and community safety wardens, community schools, road Safety, domestic and fire safety, support for the elderly, schemes of young people, fear of crime, victim support and mountain safety.

Encompassing projects that are essentially about awareness raising and education, target hardening and design, coordination and better management of services, deterrence and control of offenders, reassurance and community engagement we return to the opening point about the domain of community safety and its ambiguity and its breadth. This is also reflected in the ‘practice’ of community safety which, although in reality largely of an administrative/managerial nature, also covers a very diverse range of activities requiring equally diverse sets of skills. Being clear about the ‘practice’ and knowledge that has been built up by Designated Officers and by Community Safety Partnerships is important, not only because participation in practice contributes to binding the community together, but also because it gives them something to sell to its constituent members and to the community itself. Ultimately it is through its ‘practices’ that partnerships can demonstrate that they have legitimacy and a meaningful knowledge and expertise of recognised value to sell. Achieving this perception will be crucial to the long term survival of community safety.

It might be argued that the key ‘practice’ of Designated Officers is the management of such a diverse range of agendas and initiatives (brokering), or indeed that it is possible to determine common features within them (they all require multi-agency input, they are all locally organised, and they are all proactive) that themselves define
a coherent set of practices. Alternatively, it could also be argued that many of the different agendas are themselves distinctive domains which suggest their own particular practices and knowledges, Designated Officers and Community Safety Partnership structures serving to coordinate this constellation of different communities of practice. The conclusion that is reached will depend on where communities of practice are to be found within the complex array of Community Safety Partnership structures and it is with this point that the chapter, and this section, will conclude.

**Discussion: community safety partnerships as communities of practice?**

Communities of practice emerge organically when a group of individuals become engaged in interactions and practices on a topic of mutual interest (Wenger, 1998). Some communities of practice will be short-lived whereas others may last for a long time. Some may be highly informal whereas others may be institutionalised and form important parts of organisations. Given this ubiquitous nature of communities of practice (discussed in more detail in chapter 3), it is less pertinent to ask *if* there are communities of practice within Community Safety Partnerships, than it is to ask *where* communities of practice might be located within Community Safety Partnerships. This short section will conclude the analysis of the fieldwork data contained within this and the previous two chapters, by suggesting a number of possible locations for communities of practice within Community Safety Partnerships, commenting on the likelihood of them flourishing in each location, but at the same time noting that as communities of practice are constantly evolving (they may change over time and in response to changes in the policy environment), coupled with the fact that they may also take different forms in different local contexts in which environmental pressures and organisational cultures have different inflections, there is no single answer to this question. All of the suggested locations are *possible* sites of communities of practice. However, not all of the possible locations of communities of practice are to be similarly preferred. Particularly where, as is the case here, the intention is to promote the development of community safety in a particular way – as a professional and occupational identity that
transcends the occupational identities of the agencies who participate in the partnership – it should be remembered that some communities of practice might be valuable in promoting this intention, whereas others might undermine it. This section will examine the extent to which the current organisation of community safety in Scotland promotes the development of communities of practice that will lead towards this preferred outcome. The concluding chapter will draw upon this analysis in order to fashion a set of recommendations that will help to support such development where it is lacking, and nurture it where it is emerging.

Social life is too complex and social interactions too numerous and interconnected for it to be possible to predict all of the possible locations and characteristics of communities of practice evolving within and around Community Safety Partnerships and their associated networks. The following are those that were suggested by the observations and interview data. Again, the focus will be on the strategic Community Safety Partnerships rather than all of the Local Action Teams coordinated by them. This is because it is the strategic partnerships that are the engine rooms of local community safety and if it is to develop more formally as a professional identity then it is at this level, in the first instance, that such a recognised identity would have to emerge (the work of LATs, when uncoordinated by a strategic partnership, being too piecemeal, short-term and rarely known of out-with the locality) (see methodological annex). However, some of the discussion (about specific agendas) will draw us back towards the work of LATs.

- **Community Safety Partnerships.** The data does not suggest that the strategic partnership itself works as a single community of practice at present, although it is by no means an impossibility for the future. Ambiguity of both domain and practice continue to suggest that different partners continue to understand the project in quite fundamentally dissimilar ways – although it was noted that a shared agenda around proactive good governance (almost certainly supported by the Community Planning agenda) was in evidence. Even though different partners questioned what was meant by community safety they rarely questioned the value in having better lines of
communication and cooperation with other agencies who shared a duty of care over the quality of life (broadly defined) of the local population. The finding that different members of the ‘community’ displayed different levels of commitment to the partnership (in terms of the resources they were willing to put into it and the status they were perceived to afford partnership working) was again not suggestive that a community of practice had evolved – although this in itself was inconclusive as it is possible for members of a community of practice to have different levels of commitment to it, some more or less peripheral than others. But coupled with the ambiguity of domain and practice the partnership, from the perspective of some agencies, looked rather more like a loose ‘community of interest’ (Wenger et al., 2002, 43-44) than a community of practice, in that there were interested parties in the broadly defined domain but little evidence that they were all actively involved in shared practices in pursuit of it. For Wenger, a community of practice does not exist where a group of agencies or individuals share an interest in something – they must also interact and participate together in doing something under the auspices of that shared interest. He gives an example of people sharing their interest of French cinema on a newsgroup not being a community of practice because they have not worked out a set of practices in pursuit of a shared interest – merely sharing an interest is not enough (although those who actively set up the newsgroup and coordinate it together would be a different story) (Wenger et al., 2002, 44). It was found that a set of community safety ‘practices’ are evolving (albeit with a potentially dangerously high focus on the meeting of performance targets, see below). If given the opportunity to do so, as the ‘practices’ of community safety evolve (and if they can be understood as a valued set of skills and knowledges that can be readily sold to partners), then they might serve to draw all members of the partnership into greater levels of participation with one another – moving what is currently more akin to a community of interest towards being a community of practice.
Informal single-issue communities of practice. Regardless of whether the whole strategic partnership can be viewed as a community of practice or not, it is possible that communities of practice will nonetheless emerge within it, not necessarily involving all members of the partnership. Existing research into partnerships has shown that, because of the inherent tensions and conflicts with partnerships of such diverse agencies, informal arrangements sometimes occurred between some member agencies whereby they would cooperate on issues of mutual interest out of view of the formal partnership (although sometimes getting it to rubber-stamp what they’d already informally agreed) (Crawford and Jones, 1995). This tendency was also found in the present study where partners became dissatisfied with the contributions of the whole partnership and felt that the real work was being done by only a couple of the agencies – here the partnership became more of a hurdle to be got over rather than a community with a mutual interest in what was being done. In relation to some of the initiatives partners felt that they should just “badge” events themselves and go round the partnership to avoid the hassle of the inertia built into the decision-making of some of its members. Where this happens it is likely that communities of practice (possibly quite short-term ones) evolve around the particular initiative concerned, involving the active participants in the community (but potentially actively excluding other members of the partnership). Such communities of practice might well produce creative and involving initiatives but can also underline the fractures within the Community Safety Partnership structure, further questioning its legitimacy both to partners not included and those partners who had participated in the informal community of practice. Much of the work of LATs had, historically at least, been informal and project-based (rather than strategic) like this – one of the problems being that its informality and lack of sustainability tended to mean that it was a one-off, and something that did not enter the institutional memory of any of the agencies involved, or of policy makers or commentators who rarely received much, if any, information about them (Valentin, 1995). It might be argued that one possible model of community safety that could be aimed for would
be to view Designated Officers and the partnership as coordinating, and brokering between, a “constellation of communities of practice” (Wenger, 1998, 126-133; chapter 3) within the complex terrain of community safety. This complex terrain could also include the more formally prescribed agendas that have come to be implemented under the auspices of community safety.

• **Specific agendas.** It was argued that many of the more formally developed agendas being coordinated through community safety (such as antisocial behaviour, wardens’ schemes, concierge schemes, youth strategies etc.) might provide more coherent domains and suggest more obviously relevant practices, on which communities of practice might be likely to grow around, than the vague and ambiguous concept of community safety. Some of the partners working on these specific agendas certainly seemed to have greater confidence that they had a valuable expertise to offer the community (such as the Safe Cities and the Enterprise Partners working with the business community). In part the perceived value of this expertise was related to the fact that there was clarity about what was being offered, or sold, to the community. A clear set of practices and a focus for shared participation are crucial elements of communities of practice that might be better found within the more specified agendas within community safety. Again, the partnership might be viewed as coordinating, and brokering between, this constellation of communities of practice.

• **Interstitial communities of practice orientated around performance, administration and monitoring.** Other communities of practice which are likely to evolve within Community Safety Partnerships are those which evolve around the performance, administration and monitoring regimes that have been designed around partnerships. This is not, of itself, to suggest that performance management is necessarily a ‘bad thing’. The fieldwork has demonstrated that centrally set targets and exhortations, as well as monitoring regimes and funding requirements, were sometimes perceived as helpful and important because they acted as “drivers” – they encouraged, and sometimes
forced, partnership working and helped to create this way of thinking within member agencies. However, performance indicators and monitoring regimes need to be in the service of what the partnership does – it must not become the case that the partnership (or communities of practice within it) becomes orientated around the service of performance and monitoring regimes to the detriment of its own objectives (Hough, 2007; Becker, 1972; chapter 3). It was found in the fieldwork that partnership contributors were anxious that it was only that which could be “counted” that would end up being done, even though they felt that much of what community safety was actually about was not amenable to being readily quantitatively measured. Such interstitial communities of practice move practitioners away from the objectives (however loosely defined) of community safety onto a narrow ‘domain’ orientated around performance management, and are thus not be conducive to the development of a professional identity orientated around community safety. Performance regimes have an undoubted role to play in shaping the domain of community safety and maintaining its status as a task that agencies must be engaged with, but they need to be treated with some caution and respect to ensure that they do not subvert the practices of Community Safety Partnerships by creating interstitial communities of practice within them.

**Designated Community Safety Officers.** The full-time personnel who service the strategic partnership are a likely site of a community of practice. The organisation of full-time community safety personnel worked a little differently in the two research sites and there are likely to be other examples of how they have been organised around the country. In Northside there were three Designated Officers (one from each of the Council, the Police Service and the Fire Service) on secondment for two years (although all had their secondments extended in practice) who worked full-time on the partnership and took responsibility for the administrative running of the partnership. They were co-located in an open-plan office in the Headquarters building of the Council and so worked and socialised together on a day to day basis. The Police Service also had established their own Community Safety Unit within
Police Headquarters that provided some additional capacity (but these officers did not directly service the strategic partnership). In Eastside both the council and the police provided Designated Officers to the partnership but they have only been co-located more recently (2007) after the period in which the fieldwork was carried out. The Council did employ two other Community Safety Officers over and above the Designated Officer (latterly described, as in England and Wales, as a Community Safety Manager) to work on community safety issues and the work of the partnership within the Council’s own Community Safety Unit. The local Police Service also had a well-established Community Safety Unit with a designated Local Authority Liaison Officer who worked closely with the Council. The emergence of a community of practice around the work of Designated Officers was likely because it was these personnel who were actively engaged, on a day to day basis, on the work of the partnership – the practice of community safety that was seen to be emerging was largely the practice of Designated Officers (and, where relevant, staff who were employed to support them). Although close-proximity of members is not a prerequisite of communities of practice it can help to forge the shared interest in participation and the sense of community so necessary. As has been discussed above, it might be possible to argue that the practices of Designated and full-time personnel are largely administrative and about coordinating a wider constellation of communities of practice under the umbrella of community safety. However (and this is by no means an either/or scenario), it may also be the case that the community of practice of Designated and full-time personnel does become orientated around substantive notions of what is emerging as a professional identity of community safety.

- **National community safety forums.** There are a number of possible locations of communities of practice within the national forums. Certainly, any personnel who become focused on the role of organising such forums may evolve a community of practice around this particular domain. The larger forums themselves may, however, work themselves as a community of
practice where they do become orientated around ‘best practice’ in community safety – the networks have the potential to become the repositories of the knowledge-base that will underpin the practice of community safety in Scotland and which will ultimately provide it with an institutional memory. Here there are resonances with one of Wenger’s own examples of how communities of practice can help in the effective management of knowledge and learning in complex organisations. The “Tech Clubs” in his Chrysler example provided a context in which professional people working in diverse roles in the organisation could connect with others from their own professional background to work on ideas and problems that were common to them all and which were part of their professional community of practice (Wenger et al., 2002, 1-4). If national forums could foster a community of practice amongst the Designated Officers throughout Scotland, by giving shape to the specialist knowledges that were evolving, and fostering a sense of community amongst those engaged in a mutually recognise project of community safety then they will play an important role in galvanising a professional community safety identity.

What is clear from the fieldwork outlined throughout the three chapters of this section is that communities of practice already and inevitably exist within multiple locations throughout the complex web of Community Safety Partnerships. How these communities of practice might be carefully nurtured (and attempts to engineer communities of practice are fraught with danger) in ways that help to define community safety as a meaningful institutional space in which a distinctive occupational identity flourishes becomes the next question. In the final chapter which follows some of the practical lessons that can be taken from this social learning perspective on Community Safety Partnerships will be mapped out, as will the broader ramifications of the development of community safety for criminology as a rendezvous subject and discipline.
Section IV: Conclusions
Chapter 8: Institutionalising community safety: proposals, consequences and conclusions

Introduction

There are two interconnected arguments to be drawn together and outlined in this concluding chapter. The first set of arguments I have termed the ‘empirical’ arguments as they flow directly from the findings of the empirical study of Community Safety Partnerships. It was demonstrated throughout the social learning analysis of the fieldwork in chapters 5, 6 and 7 that partnership working in Scotland displayed many similar features (and problems) to those that had been identified in previous research conducted in England and Wales (chapters 2 and 4). Examining Community Safety Partnerships in terms of domain, community and practice served to uncover the various ways in which structural, cultural, organisational and personal impediments to partnership work could be manifested. It also drew attention to the importance of recognising the fact that partnerships are themselves not monolithic or universalising structures, and that it was possible to think of personnel as being engaged in multiple associations between and across partnerships in ways that could be both productive and problematic in relation to the development of community safety (chapter 7). Here the emphasis will be on outlining the practical recommendations and proposals that flow from these empirical insights – the underlying argument being that a social learning analysis of partnerships, although it most certainly does not provide a simple recipe book for reform, nonetheless does offer guidance for thinking about how creative, innovative and engaged activities within and between organisations can be better nurtured and supported. The second argument – the ‘epistemological’ argument - again flowed from the analytical framework adopted throughout the study (chapter 3), but was also informed by research on the development and ‘transformation of criminology’ (chapter 2). It was shown that the nature and character of institutional spaces shaped and directed the particular styles of thinking that were possible within them. This was seen within criminology where its dominant discourses over time were found to have reflected the institutional complexes which supported them in any given period – whether they were state criminal justice institutions, governmental research units, or the academy
(chapter 3). Here, the potential for community safety to be viewed as a new and distinctive institutional complex within which ways of thinking about crime and justice can develop in ways that transcend the institutional trammels of traditional ‘modern’ criminal justice institutions will be explored. It will be argued that Community Safety Partnerships do have such potential. They have established (or at the very least formalised) new institutional spaces within which criminal justice and non-criminal justice personnel increasingly work, participate, communicate, argue, cooperate and learn with one another. Whether or not they will become institutional spaces in which a cadre of personnel will actually evolve identities and knowledges that transcend existing silos ultimately depends on the extent to which they are cultivated as spaces in which this is possible – returning us to the empirical arguments and recommendations already made. However, before embarking upon these concluding observations a brief aside is necessary. Making recommendations about how to promote community safety raises questions about the meaning that you ascribe to this contested concept. As discussed, neither crime prevention or community safety are technical or value-free terms – they are underpinned by potentially quite different sets of values and assumptions about the world and can mean different things to different people (chapters 2 and 5). Thus, to make recommendations about promoting community safety begs a number of questions that need to be considered first. What do we mean by community safety? What values are being promoted through community safety? What do we want from community safety? Answering these normative questions necessarily underpins any proposals that one might make.

Normative commitments, politics and the role of community safety partnerships: what do we want?
Regardless of one’s take on community safety, the social learning analysis presented in this study can still provide valuable insights into how organisations and partnerships work (and why they sometimes don’t). However, in order to make specific recommendations about how Community Safety Partnerships might be rendered more effective, or conducive to the production of innovative and creative
practice, one’s ‘take’ on what community safety is, and on what the role and function of such partnerships ought to be, does become of great importance (because it determines the forms of practice that you will wish to create, promote or sustain). The fact that community safety and crime prevention are both open-textured and ambiguous terms that can encompass a broad range of interventions underpinned by very distinct political and philosophical assumptions has been noted throughout preceding chapters (see chapters 2 and 5 in particular). The result of this ambiguity is that the domain of community safety is contested and so there can be different assumptions about what ought to be done under its auspices. Although it is generally recognised that community safety is a broader, more encompassing, term than crime prevention (Home Office, 1991) there is still debate about whether partnership work should be focused on the more pragmatic, measurable, situational interventions of what has become known as the ‘crime science’ movement (Pease, 1997; 2002; Tilley, 2005), or whether they should be part of more ambitious ‘social’ strategies focused on wider social problems and the capacity of local communities to participate in contributing towards their own security (Hughes, 2007; Hope and Karstedt, 2003). This is a vexed question that gets to the very heart of debates around the nature of security and the role of communities, markets and public officials in producing and directing it (and whether any of them can ensure fairness of form and equitable distribution of it) (see Loader and Walker, 2001; 2007; Shearing, 2001; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Bayley and Shearing, 1996). For present purposes it should simply be stressed that the position that one adopts (and it is essentially a political position, a taking of ‘sides’ and an acknowledgement of value-commitment, see Becker, 1967) will determine the content of community safety to a very substantial degree, thus having a strong bearing on the types of recommendation that one would make in the name of supporting it.

Thinking about Community Safety Partnerships in terms of communities of practice demonstrates that there is potential appeal in both narrow crime prevention orientated understandings of community safety (in that they provide a clearer, more actionable, domain) and in broader social conceptions of it (in that they establish a domain that is of more interest to a wider and more diverse community) (see chapter 5).
However, I will argue here, drawing from the present study and existing research on crime prevention and community safety, that there are good practical and normative reasons for adopting the latter, broader conception of community safety, and seeking to cultivate it in those terms. These reasons are as follows:

- Practitioners in Scotland generally understood community safety in the broader sense. They recognised that this could create ambiguity over what should get done under its auspices (chapter 5), but nonetheless viewed ‘community safety’ as a concept that went beyond ‘crime prevention’ (encompassing things like ‘quality of life’; ‘safety’ that went beyond safety from criminal victimisation, including road safety, safety in the home, the workplace and in schools, safety in the countryside and in the urban environment; and the sense of safety that comes from economic and social ‘well being’). This was also reflected in the statutory infrastructure that has developed in Scotland, where community safety has been explicitly nested within the broader social agenda of Community Planning (chapter 4). To try to recast community safety in narrow crime prevention terms would be to falsely restrict the domain that had brought partners together and to unnecessarily exclude the development of practices that went beyond crime prevention. Communities of practice are more readily cultivated around networks and associations that are already emerging (you don’t create them out of a vacuum) and partnership work in Scotland has long had broader interests than crime prevention (chapter 4; Paterson, 1994). Assuming a broader understanding of community safety thus recognises that the domain of community safety is something better shaped and developed by those who practice it. However, the domain of community safety should not be viewed as something that is set in stone. Rather, it is something that members of communities of practice orientated around it will negotiate and renegotiate over time. It should therefore be recognised that Scottish practitioners’ orientations towards broad social agendas could yet be superseded by narrow crime-focused or actuarial agendas if not properly cultivated, or if actively undermined. I will return to this point in the final section of the conclusion.
• The tendency for situational or crime science approaches to exclude social approaches as irrelevant, or at best too “distal” to be a meaningful point of intervention (Ekblom, 1995; Hope and Karstedt, 2003), is less pronounced the other way around. Adopting a more social understanding of community safety does not exclude development and deployment of situational or explicitly crime-focused initiatives within this broader agenda – it just means that such approaches are not defining of the agenda. This fits with understanding community safety as a domain that is orientated around brokering between a constellation of overlapping communities of practice (chapter 7). More narrowly construed crime prevention projects can still be accommodated as specific domains (and communities of practice) within community safety (and currently are in Scotland) and can indeed form an important and valuable part of them.

• The term ‘community safety’ was originally coined as an alternative to ‘crime prevention’ (Home Office, 1991). It was also understood by many commentators to be a potential alternative to coercive state crime control and a means through which to de-monopolise crime prevention and take it out of the hands of the police and state functionaries acting alone. As such it was viewed with some optimism for much of the 1990s (Hope and Shaw, 1988; Crawford, 1997; 1998; Hughes, 1998; 2007). It is within this spirit that the broader conception of community safety is preferred here. Where partnership work that explicitly draws on non-criminal justice agencies and community resources becomes too focused on crime to the detriment of other issues and concerns there is a danger that generic social policy becomes recast in terms of its potential contribution to crime control, rather than understood as being of intrinsic value and as a necessary aspect of a fair, equitable and well-governed society (Crawford, 1998, 103-104; Simon, 2007). Where this happens partnership working between criminal justice and other sectors can be understood not as de-monopolising formal social control, but as an attempt to embed it ever more deeply into all areas of social life. Here it is assumed
that crime prevention should be in the service of, and subordinate to, wider issues of social justice and organisation, and that part of community safety is the de-monopolisation of safety and security issues away from criminal justice agencies and the police and towards a broader range of public, private and voluntary agencies as well as communities themselves. Again, I would reiterate that this position also better reflects the institutional locale of community safety in Scotland – nested within a broad framework of social service provision and governance (chapter 4). It is worth noting that, if measured in terms of crime control alone, state criminal justice agencies were, in any case, not renowned for having done a very good job (chapter 2; Garland, 1996; 2001; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). They were, in fact, rather more successful as mere components of the broader drives towards social ordering, social justice and political emancipation that characterised the onset of modernity (Reiner, 2000; Emsley, 1996; 2002).

Where community safety is viewed in this way (different from crime prevention and absolutely not to be viewed as a mechanism through which criminal justice agencies simply extend their reach) it becomes clear that it does not comfortably sit within any pre-existing institutional box (police or local authority, for example). It has the potential to be understood as an enterprise that genuinely crosses traditional organisational boundaries, and as such is a new, or formally new, institutional complex which has the capability to generate skills, knowledge, expertise and cultural values that are distinctive to it. The potential for community safety to create the space for such cross-organisational thinking was a driving interest behind the epistemological preoccupations of this study.

In conclusion, the recommendations that are outlined below assume community safety to be: broader in scope than crime prevention; of interest to a broad range of agencies, organisations and community members; nested within, and subordinate to, a wider social agenda; and having the potential to become a distinctive professional identity in its own right.
Enhancing community safety partnerships through communities of practice: proposals and recommendations

A key insight of the empirical study was that communities of practice exist within and through Community Safety Partnerships in different, sometimes overlapping, spaces (see chapter 7). Some communities of practice might serve the development of innovative practices and initiatives (such as youth cafes and business radio schemes) whereas others might stifle them (where they become orientated around bureaucratic regimes and targets, or where they develop interstitially as a response to inertia or conflict among partners). In any case, there is no straightforward thirty-minute recipe book for cultivating communities of practice (Wenger et al., 2002) – certainly not within Community Safety Partnerships. However, there are practical and pragmatic things that can be done to promote communities of practice in the right places. Basically, the cultivation of communities of practice is about creating an environment in which people with common goals and objectives can come together and work with one another, all the while perceiving that their activities in pursuit of these shared interests are valued by those around them. It is also important that communities of practice actually have the capacity and resources to pursue their objectives effectively. Given sufficient stability the shared knowledge, competences and identities that will sustain and give shape to such enterprises on an ongoing basis will have the opportunity to develop. The following recommendations are designed to promote community safety and the development of productive communities of practice under its auspices. They will be organised under five themes which reflect key dimensions of communities of practice that were drawn out in Section III: a shared interest; a valued enterprise; a capacity to do things; the right community; sustainability and memory. As with all aspects of Wenger’s perspective, these themes are interlinked and impossible to completely disentangle (for example, if community safety is a highly valued enterprise it is also likely to be sustained in the long term). They should ideally be read, understood, and implemented together, not in isolation.
A shared interest

Communities of practice evolve around interests that people have in common. It was demonstrated in chapter 7 that communities might evolve in a number of different locations in and around Community Safety Partnerships (see also chapter 5). These recommendations will bear these facts in mind in order to propose ways of nurturing and sustaining different shared interests (domains) at different levels within the partnership structure. It is argued here that it has been appropriate and sensible for community safety to be conceived in broad terms by policy makers in Scotland, as this reflects and encompasses the different levels of shared interest in community safety within partnership structures – at the level of the Steering Group, the Designated Officers and the Local Action Teams.

- A shared interest within the Steering Group. The shared interest in community safety within the Steering Group will only be maintained as long as it remains a part of Community Planning responsibilities. Key member agencies (such as the public service providers and the police) are under multiple statutory and financial pressures and are likely to lose interest (this also relates to the issue of value) in any agenda that falls by the wayside. The fact that community safety is nested within this broader umbrella of activities has already been acknowledged as a good thing, in that it gives community safety the breadth of focus that attracts and interests a broad range of partners, and which can encompass a diverse range of more specialised domains within it. It is recommended that this infrastructure remains. It is further recommended that at Steering Group level the broad conception of community safety (that reflects existing interests) is clearly and consistently articulated within all community safety documentation and any performance targets or auditing applied to it. It is good and proper for more focused domains of practice to be coordinated through community safety (such as Antisocial Behaviour or wardens schemes) but there is a danger of community safety collapsing into a narrower focus if it is not clearly understood that these are initiatives within community safety but not defining
of it. The capacity of community safety to draw on the existing interests and orientations of a diverse range of partners (including the community) and to realise its potential as an ambitious cross-organisational complex depends on the retention of Steering Group interest in this broad project.

- **A shared interest among Designated Officers.** The shared interest of Designated Officers is a complex issue. It was argued in chapter 7 that much of the emergent practice of Designated Officers is essentially a brokering role – brokering between the constellations of communities of practice that in fact populate Community Safety Partnership structures (from the Steering Group through to the Local Action Teams and between partner agencies and community representatives). Their role should not be mistakenly thought of as a purely technical and value-neutral role within this recognisably value-laden complex. It does involve administrative, auditing and coordinating functions but also requires an understanding of, and a sensitivity to, the complex and contested nature of community safety (particularly in relation to the allocation of partnership resources and the assessment of the value of, and priority to be given to, different projects). Key to the development of Designated Officers’ competence and expertise will be continued support from their parent agencies (see ‘valued enterprise’) - and the creation of opportunities to reflect upon and consolidate their practices through sustainable national structures such as the Scottish Community Safety Forum (see ‘sustainability’). Activities designed to promote knowledge transfer between and amongst Designated Officers around the country will play a vital role in nurturing them as a distinct community of practice.

- **Shared interests within Local Action Teams.** There is space for there to be a broad collection of shared interests within different Local Action Teams. This is not a problem as community safety should not be thought of as a universalising agenda – it can encompass difference and is stronger and potentially more ambitious where it does. Local Action Teams tend to work around more specific domains of practice – wardens’ schemes, business
crime, domestic violence, youth services, minority interests – some of which might have quite a short lifespan (i.e. it’s a particular initiative that’s been coordinated with and sanctioned by the Steering Group). Brokering between Local Action Teams is important and necessary if there is to be the development of a shared knowledge base and professional identity throughout the country. The key recommendation, therefore, is that professional development and knowledge transfer resources should be made available for personnel at this level (it should not just be assumed that Designated Officers can, by themselves, ensure that good practice and knowledge is shared throughout the different associations within the partnership – as it generally is at present). This recommendation does need to be implemented with a light-touch, and should preferably be demand-led – as there is little to be gained from taking up time and commitment from already stretched practitioners for activities they deem of limited value (it could result in the emergence of resistant interstitial communities of practice as a response). It is also recommended that where resources allow (this is always a difficulty) it should be ensured that some capacity is there for Local Action Teams to be responsive to issues that are emerging in the course of their activities. Local Action Teams that can quickly adapt to developments in their local communities (and are also perceived to have such capacity) are more likely to engage the interest of agencies and actors in the community. The shared interests of Local Action Teams should be able to evolve within the parameters of community safety, and are more likely to evolve in ways that represent genuine community interests than if they are imposed or recommended from above (again, emphasising the importance of a broad domain for community safety as a whole). Ultimately it might be hoped that, given appropriate capabilities, communities will eventually become the initiators of more community safety practice, but this is probably some way off (see capabilities, below)
A valued enterprise

There are different ways, some of them symbolic, for demonstrating that an activity is viewed as valuable and worth pursuing. There are also different audiences from whom an appreciation of value might be sought. But if an activity is not valued, or recognised as valued, commitment to the pursuit of it is likely to be limited at best. The following recommendations primarily reflect upon the importance of member agencies, auditing processes and the community themselves to how community safety personnel perceive their value and the value of their enterprise.

- *A valued enterprise to partner agencies.* The extent to which it was perceived that the agencies contributing to partnerships viewed community safety as something serious, something of value, and something to which they were committed played an important role in shaping how community safety personnel perceived the value of their own endeavours. If community safety is going to develop as a meaningful and recognised set of practices it is essential that is not perceived to be a marginal, unimportant and low-status dimension of the work of the agencies expected to support it. Where community safety *is* a domain that cuts across, but is not central to, the roles and objectives of partner agencies then this is a real threat. There are three main recommendations here. Firstly, community safety should be recognised as relevant to promotion prospects of personnel. Given its complex nature and interaction with policy, strategic and joined-up thinking, and project implementation it is reasonable to argue that experience of community safety *should* be recognised as valuable for candidates for senior positions in the police and public service agencies more generally. It is more difficult for agencies to marginalise activities that are not perceived to be part of their ‘real’ work where promotion criteria send out a contrary message. Marking activities as training grounds for promotion, and thus designated for capable and ambitious members of staff, identifies such activities as important and ‘real’. This could, of course, have wider ramifications for the cultures of agencies, such as the police, which have hitherto defined valued tasks in ways
that have actively marginalised community safety (Newburn, 2002; Walklate, 1996). Secondly, community safety should be recognised as a potential role only for members of staff that are of sufficient rank, experience or status to be capable of the tasks that will be asked of them. If community safety personnel cannot get their parent agencies to act upon, or at least respond to, decisions of the partnership then they will quickly be viewed as reflective of that agency’s lack of commitment to the partnership. There is also a symbolic dimension to this, in that seconding people of relative seniority in an organisation to a particular task marks that task as being one of some value and importance. Thirdly, partner agencies should be required to make secondments to community safety for consistent and adequate periods of time. The fieldwork indicated that local authority and police secondments of two years provided adequate time for personnel to get to grips with partnership working and then be in a position to actively contribute to it (mentoring will help this further – see sustainability). Secondments also require consistency. Where partners are drawn back to their parent agencies for other tasks, or get in the habit of delegating their partnership-related tasks to other (more junior) colleagues, this will quickly create a perception that the partnership is not valued by that agency.

- **Auditing, performance regimes and the status of enterprises.** The processes through which community safety was audited, made subject to performance regimes and acknowledged within official government policies and exhortations should be recognised as having played a role in defining it as a valued activity of some status (chapter 5). It is therefore understood that The Scottish Government will continue to play a role here. It is recommended, however, that auditing and performance management should be conducted with a light touch and should avoid the imposition of too specific quantitative targets. Experience suggests that attempts to micro manage organisations by such means can create interstitial communities of practice around the bureaucratic tasks associated with conforming to such regimes, drawing them away from what should be their core interests and objectives. This is,
however, a difficult balance to strike. On the one hand it is important for Community Safety Partnerships to be held accountable for what they do - and mechanisms for securing this accountability at the same time symbolically contribute to the recognition of their status. On the other hand accountability and auditing structures should not be such that they become the focus of Community Safety, ultimately undermining it.

- **Valued by the community.** A sense that community safety is valued by the community itself can also give practitioners a real sense that what they are doing is worthwhile. It was found in the fieldwork that community consultation was recognised as being one of the weaker aspects of community safety to date (chapter 6). It was understood that local people probably didn’t understand much about what community safety was about, or what practitioners did under its banner. If the community are to value community safety then, in the first instance, they need to have some awareness of what it is. This is, however, a complex issue that should be treated with some caution. Where it is recommended that public awareness of community safety should be raised it is extremely important that this does not go hand in hand with raising public expectations in unreasonable ways (community safety will only fail if marketed as a panacea for social problems and anxieties about crime and safety). The police are already facing problems of legitimacy created, in part at least, by rising public expectations (Hough, 2007; Smith, 2007). For the time being existing structures such as Local Action Teams, voluntary sector agencies and representatives, and Community Councils represent good mechanisms for publicising what community safety is about in realistic terms and in a contexts in which those members of the public can engage with it and become involved with it (the truest test of it being of value to the public). Of course, they all represent existing community networks and ones that are prepared to become involved with authorities only – they do not necessarily represent the community more objectively defined. On this point - although Community Councils have generated little criminological interest in Scotland, and are generally thought
of as forums for representing the ‘usual suspects’ involved in community activities (i.e. the elderly and the middle class) they nonetheless do form an important infrastructure for community involvement and should be looked at more seriously in the future. Ultimately the goal will be for communities themselves to demonstrate the value they place in community safety by actively coming forward to participate in it. This has long been the bane of community involvement work and will be explored further under the capacity heading (below).

**A capacity to do things**

Without adequate capacity to actually engage in activities, make a difference, or have an impact on decision making of partner agencies, Community Safety Partnerships will become the talking shops their detractors sometimes describe. For any community of practice a lack of capacity to have an effect on the wider world – a lack of negotiability – is likely to be of corrosive of its members’ interest in, and commitment to, the shared project. There is little reason for people to remain committed to an agenda that doesn’t do anything. The following sections explore this issue and make recommendations designed to ensure that Community Safety Partnerships are about practice, not talk.

- **Designated officers as the backbone of Community Safety Partnerships.**
  Much of the work of Community Safety Partnerships is actually the work of the Designated Officers. They organise Steering Group Meetings, liaise with Local Action Teams, design project specifications, conduct or commission audits, draft reports, and share good practice tips (amongst other things – see chapter 7). It is therefore essential that they remain in place and of the status and seniority discussed earlier. It is also recommended that their skills and competences will be greatly enhanced through extension of the work of the Scottish Community Safety Forum and through the development of mentoring schemes for new office holders. These recommendations will be outlined in the sustainability section.
• **Funding community safety.** The approach to funding Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland was moving in the right direction when three year funding cycles replaced annual funding cycles in 2004 (chapters 4 and 6). This allowed partnerships to focus attention upon the development and implementation of initiatives rather than on the development of partnership structures and processes themselves (which although necessary, and the focus of previous funding cycles, could become self-serving, leading to partnerships becoming orientated around what they are rather than what they do). Maintenance of this funding structure would be recommended. At the time of writing the funding of community safety under the SNP administration remains uncertain.

• **Running agendas through community safety.** Using Community Safety Partnerships as the framework through which to deliver other, more specific but clearly related, agendas (such as Anti-social Behaviour and wardens’ schemes) is to be recommended, albeit with some caution. Running agendas through community safety has already played a role in marking out the status and recognition being given to community safety. It also orients community safety around specific domains of practice and provides them with resources for initiating programmes of work – in other words, for doing things. The cautionary note that needs to be sounded, however, is that running agendas through Community Safety Partnerships could become construed as a mechanism for re-directing them towards a more narrow crime-centred focus. The danger of this will be less where Community Safety Partnerships start generating initiatives from the ground upwards, and it is to the difficult and vexed question of community capacity that I now turn.

• **Community capacity.** Community safety and other partnership agendas have been predicated upon the idea that communities themselves can, at some point, become meaningful partners and participants within them. This has, of course, proved to be difficult to achieve in practice (chapter 6) and the
reasons for this difficulty are really rather beyond the scope of this study (being as it is more focused upon the institutional structures of community safety). However, community capacity is ultimately so closely intertwined with the future success, or otherwise, of community safety that some comment is appropriate here. The conditions of late-modernity (long working hours, ontological insecurity, fractured families and the growth of small and single person households) are often not conducive to making people feel that they have capacity to give of themselves to community-based activities (the growth of an aging and retired population may well off-set some of this, but raises additional problems of community representation, particularly where the largely unrepresented interests of young people are concerned). This is despite the fact that refreshing community capacities and the informal controls embedded with them might just offer the best prospects for counteracting some of the problems associated with atomised and fractured late-modern societies (Currie, 1988a; 1998; Bauman, 2001). It is certainly the case that community safety will be most successful where it draws inspiration and direction from communities themselves so the issue of capacity is important. Consideration should be given to moving funds/grants through communities themselves (Bayley and Shearing, 1996), starting with existing and recognised community structures, but with sufficient flexibility to involve new or previously difficult to reach groups (Jones and Newburn, 2001). Such grants should not just be directed through Community Safety Partnership structures, although they might play a valuable coordinating role in the first instance, but could also involve existing voluntary sector structures and Community Councils (for example, as mechanisms for ensuring that funds are adequately accounted for). The point would be to create negotiability for the communities of practice enmeshed within communities themselves – giving them a sense that they have capacity to effect change in their collective experience, a sense that they have collective efficacy (Bandura, 1986; 1997; Sampson, 1995). It is of course recognised that moves to stimulate community capacity in this way would be politically ambitious, not to mention controversial. Although this is only a superficial
comment upon the recurrent and entrenched problem that communities themselves often lack the capacity and resources to participate in the very structures designed to draw upon their capacities, it has served to highlight the fact that communities of practice is an analytical framework that could also very readily be applied to this problem.

The right community

If Community Safety Partnerships are to work effectively then they need to have the right people on board. They need to have participation from the relevant public sector agencies, private sector agencies if possible, and from the voluntary sector and the community itself (chapter 6). The members of community safety partnerships also, as has already been outlined, have to feel that they, and their activities, are valued and that they have the necessary capacities to achieve their common goals. Two additional dimensions of having the right community will be outlined here: the democratic dimension of community safety and the issue of trust between members.

- A democratic dimension of community safety? The fieldwork showed that democratic input into community safety has been variable and sometimes problematic. It was recognised that having elected representatives (usually local councillors) taking an interest in community safety has played a role in raising its profile and giving it some status. However, it was also observed that in some instances elected representatives were perceived to have little mandate and yet could effectively skew the work of partnerships by trying to have promising projects implemented in their constituencies rather than in the places in which there was the greatest objective need. The police had, through the National Intelligence Model, developed an effective means of preventing such problems – by providing an evidence-based rationale for where activity ought to be targeted (chapter 6). It is recommended that this approach be developed – but that it also be extended by other contributors to community safety to ensure that crime-data is not the only evidence used for this purpose. Community Safety Partnerships should thus establish evidence-
based criteria for targeting resources. It is also recommended that efforts be made to develop the democratic credentials of Community Safety Partnerships in general. Relationships with elected representatives remain important mechanisms for establishing some lines of communication with the public, and should be encouraged under the understanding that initiatives will not be targeted according to political expediency (this should be clear if the relevant criteria have been established). Democratic accountability is not, however, achieved purely through the activities of elected representatives. In publishing details of their work, the resources they deploy, and the outcomes they achieve, and through striving to create lines of communication with community groups and representatives, and mechanisms through which such individuals can have a voice and potential means of participating in the practice of community safety, partnerships can still render themselves open, accountable, responsive and democratic (see Jones et al., 1996). Making community safety democratic is about making it responsive to local communities which, it is hoped will, in time, increasingly shape its practice.

- **Trust amongst members of communities of practice.** It was noted that trust was an issue that ran throughout section III. Communities of practice of the kind envisaged by Wenger only really emerge where there is a level of trust between its members. In part trust flows from whether there is evidence that all other members are committed to the partnership, share its vision and view it as something to be valued and so supported (therefore previous recommendations also have a bearing on trust). The additional main recommendation to be made here is that formal protocols should be used to make relations and responsibilities between agencies clear where this looks like being a problem (as it was when there was ambiguity about Data Protection – chapter 6). Ambiguity is corrosive of trust. It is also recommended that Crawford and Jones’ (1995) proposal that partnerships should be upfront about the occupational differences that exist between them should also be taken seriously. The ideology of unity they found - superficial platitudes proclaiming commitment and unity but offering little to back it up
(found here where partners would be seen to demonstrate interest but would offer little mutuality – they would not decisively act upon what partnerships decided or take a lead where relevant – see chapter 6) undermine the belief in mutual commitment and corrode mutual trust. Partnerships should be upfront about recognising that conflict is a possible, even likely, dimension of its existence. Being upfront can allow problems to be aired and dealt with rationally rather than being hidden behind veils of growing mistrust.

Sustainability and memory

Sustainability of course begins with many of the issues already discussed – proper and ongoing streams of funding and ensuring that the right people are available to contribute to partnerships on an ongoing and consistent basis. There are another couple of recommendations to be made here that will shore up the sense of community safety being an ongoing and valued enterprise. One of the reasons for being interested in sustainability, of course, is that it is over time that institutions and communities of practice really evolve a sense of themselves - a shared history and identity, and a shared memory.

- **Mentoring.** A recurrent theme in fieldwork interviews was that partnership working could initially be “overwhelming” for the newcomer (particularly for new Designated Officers). There was a complex array of structures and relationships that newcomers had to understand before they could begin to make a contribution to the partnership. When secondments ended the knowledge and understanding of these structures, and of the policies and strategies that had been developed through them, tended to be lost time and time again as experienced partnership workers were replaced with newcomers just stepping onto this very steep learning curve. The problem was that there was rarely, if ever, any overlap between the outgoing and incoming member of the partnership meaning that the latter could not benefit from the mentoring of the former. This is easily rectified with a little additional commitment from partner agencies (particularly the police and local
authorities who tend to supply the Designated Officers). With a little mentoring, newcomers could be guided through the early “overwhelming” stages of partnership work allowing them to quickly adapt to their role and develop a feel for what the partnership is in the process of doing. Through mentoring newcomers can also develop a sense of the partnership’s history – what has and has not been tried and what has and has not appeared to work – allowing the institutional memory of the partnership to cross secondments more readily.

- **Co-location of Designated Officers.** Communities of practice do not need to be located in the same physical space. However, a clear finding of the research was that co-location of Designated Officers could be of great value in helping to foster a sense of purposeful identity among them. Co-location has the potential to send out symbolic messages about the reality of partnership working (where colleagues see partners from different agencies collaborating with one another) and the value of partnership working (such as where it was located next to the Chief Executive’s office in the Northside Council Headquarters) (chapter 6). Co-location allows Designated Officers greater opportunities for identifying with one another – rather than with the agency they are seconded from. Co-location also creates an identifiable institutional location for the practice of community safety – again helping to make it seem more ‘real’ rather than some passing notion of policymakers. Co-location of Designated Officers is therefore recommended although it should be noted that it also runs certain risks. Where locating Designated Officers in the Chief Executive’s office sends out one message locating them in a cupboard next to the photocopier sends out quite another. In trying to nurture a sense of value and identity around community safety sensitivity to such issues matters.

- **Institutional identity and memory.** The practice of community safety – which in Wenger’s terms includes not only the activities carried out under its rubric, but also the shared ways of thinking and talking about community safety that
underpins them - constitutes its memory. Providing communities of practice orientated around community safety with active means of storing, documenting, and sharing their developing experience, competence and knowledge is to support the deepening of their boundaries, and to nurture their emergence as clearly discernable and distinctive practice-based identities. If community safety is to become a distinctive occupational or professional identity (distinctive from the partner agencies that contribute to community safety) then its practices, its ways of understanding the world, and thus its memory, must be supported in this way. Long-term secondments and mentoring will already contribute to this. Establishing a full-time cadre of community safety personnel may naturally hold some appeal in this respect but is not recommended here. Potential gains in occupational identification would have to be balanced against the loss of partnership and the likelihood that creation of a separate community safety organisation would allow existing institutions to wash their hands of it. Community safety is more ambitious where it draws upon and crosses different institutions – in the process offering something of a challenge, through its distinctive vision, to them all. There are some more basic recommendations that can support what is essentially a process of institutionalising community safety. Firstly, it is recommended that the work of the Scottish Community Safety Network be expanded. Through providing a national forum for Designated Officers to come together, share experiences, and explore the effectiveness of practice, a sense of common identity and purpose can be cultivated. At the same time a bank of knowledge (through documentation of what Community Safety Partnerships have been doing) can also be brought together, stored and disseminated through the work of the Network. This type of activity is already ongoing. What is less clear is the degree to which such activity has been extended to practitioners working on specific programmes and initiatives in Local Action Teams. These personnel also need to be brought into a web of knowledge transfer and networking opportunities with similarly motivated people. Certainly such activities should not be organised for the sake of it, and should not be allowed to create an onerous set of commitments
that take personnel away from their practices, but there should nonetheless be
greater store placed on forging links, connections and lines of communication
between community safety practitioners, working at different levels, around
the country. Through such activities a sense of shared identity and common
practice can be nurtured – both of which feed into a growing institutional
memory over time. The final point to note here is that the academy can
potentially play an important role in the development of such a community
safety identity – in contributing to community safety knowledge transfer, in
developing much-needed research into community safety practice, in
expanding research capacity through training of practitioners in project
design and evaluation, and through raising awareness of it as a field of
enterprise. Ultimately though, the development of a community safety
identity is quite fragile, as it is dependent on all of the issues outlined
throughout this section. It requires that interest in community safety be
maintained, that its value be continually asserted, that it is resourced to do
things, that it draws in the right people and eventually stimulates community
activity, and that it is supported to be a sustainable and ongoing concern. The
fragility of community safety will also be a theme in the concluding section.

Institutions, mentalities and the ‘transformation’ of criminology through
communities of practice
A story about the development of community safety as an idea, and about
Community Safety Partnerships as an ambitious means of implementing that idea is,
when viewed through the lens of communities of practice, ultimately a story about
the potential for change. Here we are not talking about superficial changes in
criminal justice or criminology brought about by everyday policy pronouncements,
system tinkering or the publication of research reports. We are talking about
fundamental changes in the very ways in which crime, justice and control are to be
understood – we are talking about fundamental transformation of the mentalities that
animate criminal justice and the discourses and analyses that surround it.
Three interrelated arguments flow from the epistemological issues that have been highlighted by studying community safety through Wenger’s relational social learning perspective (chapter 3). They will be sketched here to draw the thesis to a conclusion, but also as part of a broader contention that the value of communities of practice as an analytical tool extends far beyond the focus of the present study. The first argument is that Community Safety Partnerships do have the potential to become motors of real and lasting institutional change. Studying them in terms of communities of practice shows that the challenge they present to existing institutionalised knowledges and practices is, at least in theory, a genuine one. However, returning to the empirical arguments just outlined, it will also be argued that the realisation of community safety’s potential is fragile and in the balance – it remains a potential rather than a reality. The third and final point to be made is something of a reiteration of a cautionary note raised in an earlier chapter (chapter 3). The transformative potential of communities of practice, although real, should not be overstated. They may also furnish us with a means of understanding institutional inertia and continuity – which unfortunately may come to characterise the story of community safety.

Community Safety Partnerships (and other partnership structures) are of potential importance beyond what they do, symbolically and actually, in the short-term. They reconfigure the institutional spaces within which criminal justice-related work gets done. They formalise connections and communications between organisations and institutions that have quite distinctive ways of viewing the world, giving them joint responsibilities, at the same time creating an institutional space that transcends all of them – the partnership. The partnership transcends its constituent members in terms of its role and functions, in terms of its personnel, and ultimately, all going according to plan, in terms of what it does and how it does it. The value of the concept of communities of practice in this context is that it connects up what people do with the institutions, associations and networks that shape what they do, and which give meaning to what they do. It is a perspective that draws attention to the fact that the institutional spaces where people work have a role to play in shaping their understandings of that work (it is also, of course, a perspective which sees practices
as constitutive of institutions, see chapter 3). The development of criminology is readily understood in terms that are close to this. The ideas and mentalities that have been understood as defining of criminology in any given period are the ideas that have marshalled the necessary institutional support to be nurtured, developed and, as Douglas would put it, “remembered” (Douglas, 1986; Garland, 2000). Garland has shown how early British criminology bore the imprint of the intellectual disciplines that shaped it (primarily psychology and psychiatry) and the institutional spaces in which it was used (as evidence in the criminal courts and as means of treating inmates in penal establishments) (1985 1988; 2002). It was further institutional developments that would also refine the contours of what was to become acceptable within the discipline – such as the establishment of government funded criminological research capacity (Garland, 2002) and the expansion of British Universities with positions in criminology and sociology in the 1960s and 1970s (Downes, 1988; Rock, 1988; see also chapter 3). Different ways of thinking about crime and justice, different mentalities, have also been identified within the institutions and organisations that have comprised the machinery of the system itself (Crawford, 1997; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). It is unsurprising that the mentalities that evolved in different elements of the system, engaged in different functions in relation to it, reflected what those agencies did (or the story they told themselves about what they did – such as where the police rather over-stated the law enforcement dimension of their role but in so doing made it synonymous with ‘real’ police work, Reiner, 2000; Rawlings, 2002). The point is that the mentalities that have shaped criminology and criminal justice practice are primarily those that have had an institutional locale. In altering the configuration of criminal justice agencies through establishing joint partnership objectives community safety creates a new and distinctive institutional locale – in crude terms: a new space with new functions capable of generating new mentalities. This is important. As practitioners do things within these new locales, as they cross previously quite robust institutional boundaries, they will establish and evolve mentalities and practices that will reflect (and be capable of shaping) this new and distinctive locale. Community Safety Partnerships have the potential to be transformative because they move people out of the traditional institutional trammels of the police, social work, local government,
housing departments etc. and place them in a context in which there is real potential for them to build new institutional trammels around the shared enterprise of community safety. In the process they will be learning within these new institutional locales.

This is, of course, an optimistic and theoretical account of community safety’s potential. The reality is that partnership working is difficult, beset by uncertainty, anxiety over status and very real structural impediments (chapter 2 and section III). Although the fieldwork did uncover evidence of good practice, enthusiasm, and commitment to the idea of community safety it also showed that, institutionally, it remains fragile. Community safety has laid roots throughout the Scottish social policy field, but these roots are not, as yet, very deep. As policy agendas move on and are recast the question remains as to whether community safety has laid sufficiently strong roots for it to continue to grow organically if political support for it becomes eroded. My view is that if glossed over and starved of resources under ever-changing funding regimes the fate of community safety will be patchy around the country. Partnership working of this kind is well established in Scotland (chapter 4; Paterson, 1994) and has been shored up and encouraged over the last couple of decades, so it would not simply disappear overnight. But it would, in all likelihood, revert to being a more piecemeal and patchy activity of small groups of charismatic practitioners on the fringe, rather than being something that could seriously be considered a challenge to the well-entrenched vested interests of the criminal justice system as presently constituted. Where the recommendations outlined above are acted upon community safety may yet be considered an agenda of some potential transformative power (Hughes and Gilling, 2004), but this potential is quite fragile and should not be overstated. The story of community safety from only a slightly different angle is in any case one characterised by as much continuity as it is transformation. Given its fragility it might also be characterised as a story of inertia and resistance to change.

Chapter 3 examined the issue of continuity in relation to debates around the ‘transformation of criminology’ in some detail. It was argued that many of the ‘new’
developments identified as illustrations of fundamental change in criminology and criminal justice (such as appeals for crime prevention and partnership working and the broadening role of the private sector) were actually things that had long been there but which had just been given little (or no) attention because they had not been coherent with the predominant ways of thinking about crime that had been institutionalised in the modern era (Douglas, 1986; Johnston, 1992; Jones and Newburn, 2002a; Crawford, 2003; chapters 2 and 3). Once the efficacy of these institutions themselves came into question alternative modes of thinking and acting in relation to crime became ‘thinkable’ again – one of which was that the police and the criminal justice system could not control crime unless they worked in partnership with the public (Colquhoun, 1797; Reiner, 1988; Garland, 1996; 2000). In a sense, therefore, community safety looked like a transformation in terms of the modern infrastructure of crime control, but actually demonstrated quite a lot of continuity with the past when observed through a longer timeframe (Zedner, 2006). But this is only one way of thinking about continuity in relation to community safety. As argued above, the fact remains that community safety did create an important institutional upset to the established infrastructure of criminal justice – it did formally transform the institutional spaces in which some practitioners (albeit a small group of people) would practically engage with issues of safety and security. Continuity remains a part of the story however because these personnel would inevitably bring the institutional trammels of their previous roles and functions to these new institutional spaces. The thinking of partners brought together in Community Safety Partnerships bore the imprint of modern institutions (the police, social work, local government). Therefore, Community Safety Partnerships are different from anything in the pre-modern era because the people within them, and the environment in which they are nested (the political, social, economic landscape,) have been shaped by modern institutions, ideas and practices. Continuity is discernable in terms of both the social welfare orientation of Scottish partnership working and the lingering (and arguably monopolising) influence of traditional criminal justice mentalities. Taking these points in turn, if community safety is cultivated and allowed to take root in Scotland then there is every reason to believe, particularly given the nature of the institutional infrastructure that surrounds it
(chapter 4), that it will develop with a broad understanding of the project that is imprinted with notions of welfare and social justice. This is because such ideas still have purchase within Scottish civic culture (Paterson, 1994; McCrone, 1992; 2001; McAra, 2004; 2005; chapter 4) – these ideas are still imprinted upon the practitioners (including many of the police officers) who have become immersed in the practice of community safety. This illustrates the fact that even if community safety was able to develop in this radical form (and there is certainly evidence that such values are increasingly under challenge – see McAra, 1999; 2004; 2005; Garland, 2001; Hughes, 2007) there would still be as much continuity as change running through it. Like community safety, however, these values need to be nurtured. Continuity of Scotland’s welfarist civic traditions is by no means guaranteed and could easily be lost in a generation where the sometimes fragile institutional spaces that support it are (see above) allowed to atrophy.

The other thread of continuity (one that I would view with rather less optimism than the survival of Scottish welfarism, but which nonetheless reflects some of the same processes) running through community safety is the continuity of modern criminal justice mentalities. The trammels of these institutions have continued to play a role in shaping the dimensions of how Community Safety Partnerships work, and even how they conceive of their role (chapter 2). Ultimately the story of community safety might come to be recognised as one of potential thwarted by institutional inertia and the power of these vested interests. Wittingly or unwittingly the potential for community safety to act as a motor of innovation has been impeded by organisational structures and cultures. Although these impediments in no way make partnership working impossible (chapter 2; section III) they have contributed to its fragility and may yet contribute to its demise. The story of community safety may yet be the story of successful institutional resistance to it – a tale of the capacity of modern institutions to make modest adaptations to the environment, all the while being relatively successful in thwarting challenges to their institutional monopoly. Studying Community Safety Partnerships in terms of communities of practice has highlighted their potential capacity to act as motors of change, but in also drawing out the fragility of communities of practice - how they can be prevented from
growing, and how they can be directed away from creativity - it has also shown that institutional inertia and continuity of the old ways of doing things are just as likely to be the reality. Whatever happens to community safety – an agenda that is still worth pursuing but which needs to be cultivated with sensitivity and urgency – it is nonetheless clear that the institutional influences on criminology and criminal justice are being reconfigured in interesting and potentially very important ways from multiple directions following the decline of national state sovereignty (globalisation, private sector influence, mass media etc.). Communities of practice are a valuable analytical tool for studying the effects of these reconfigurations. New institutional structures create new spaces in which communities of practice will evolve. It is through these communities of practice that individuals will make sense of these changes and orient their energies and practices in response to them. But communities of practice never occur in a vacuum, the imprints and continuities of the past being as important as their transformative potential.
Methodological Annex: Critical reflections on the research process

This short annex will critically reflect upon the process of conducting the empirical case study of Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland. It will seek to highlight both some of the strengths of the approach taken as well as some of its methodological limitations - some of which emerged on account of the design of the study; others became apparent in light of its findings and through the analytical framework that was developed. Where appropriate, the discussion will also reflect upon what lessons future studies of partnership working utilising a similar analytical framework might learn from this study, and what further areas they might be advised to focus upon. A table detailing the interviews carried out for the case study is included at the end of the annex.

Chapter 1 should be referred to for a description of the case study fieldwork and its objectives. These critical reflections on the research process will be structured around the following issues: a case study of well-established partnerships; access, Designated Officers and Local Action Teams; intra-organisational dynamics, cultures and structures; external perceptions of partnerships – the community; and, understanding the practice of community safety.

A case study of well-established partnerships

It was noted in the introduction that the case study included two Community Safety Partnerships, as well as various personnel, agencies and forums operating with a national remit (see chapter 1). The partnerships were selected, in part, because they were already reasonably well-established and ongoing. This was not true for all partnerships in Scotland at the time, many of which were felt to be in very early stages of development, or even paying lip-service to Scottish Executive and CoSLA exhortations about partnership working. One of the benefits in focusing upon two well-established partnerships for the case study was that personnel within them already had some experience of partnership working and thus had had an opportunity to reflect upon its potential benefits as well as its potential pitfalls. It was also
recognised that partnerships took time to develop structures and ways of working and that it was only where they had been through this process that they were likely to start focusing on the actual work to be done under the auspices of the partnership (chapter 6). Focusing on partnerships that were reasonably well-bedded-in meant that it was more likely that they would be fully operational (in fact they were also still working out their structures and working practices to some extent). Of course, a limitation with this approach was that it meant that some of the problems, conflicts and teething troubles of early stage partnership development were not included in the study’s design and they might have been informative. To some extent this limitation was off-set by the fact that, given the period over which the fieldwork was conducted (2000-2004) the study was able to garner insights into how partnerships dealt with, accommodated and resisted new partnership agendas and responsibilities (such as community planning and antisocial behaviour).

Access, Designated Officers and Local Action Teams

The key access point to the partnerships was through the Designated Officers of both the council and the police. This made sense given their crucial role in servicing the Steering Group of senior officials and in providing links between this policy-level group and the thematic Local Action Teams on the ground. The work of Designated Officers is undoubtedly crucial to the development of community safety partnership working (see chapters 6 and 7). Given the limited resources available focusing on the Designated Officers also provided the best means of getting an insight into the working of the various aspects of the partnerships. However, the social learning analysis of Community Safety Partnerships has served to highlight the importance of not viewing them as universalising or monolithic structures and has shown that the practices of community safety get done in different contexts within and through partnership structures. Future studies should continue to examine the work of Designated Officers but would also be advised to give greater emphasis to the working of Local Action Teams and the short-term, often single-issue, projects that develop in and around them. Much of their work was described as being quite “piecemeal” in the present study, and not all of it appeared to be very well
documented. Thus, there remain amorphous and sometimes quite informal areas of partnership work being developed and implemented under the banner of community safety and further research would be required to properly do their contributions justice. The experience of Local Action Teams is included within the present study (through interviews with personnel who were still part of them or had former experience in this context, through observations of Designated Officers’ visiting projects, and through attendance at conferences where such personnel were active participants) but it should be acknowledged that, through the need to understand the complex structures that were evolving, and to get good access to them, the present study was somewhat skewed towards the functions of the Designated Officers.

**Intra-organisational dynamics, cultures and structures**

Occupational cultures and structures emerged as important issues within the study – given that partnerships were, in theory, made up of members of different agencies shaped by potentially quite distinctive (even oppositional) occupational cultures and subject to different regimes, hierarchies and decision-making processes, this was expected. In the present study analysis of occupational cultures and structures is done from the perspective of practitioners working within the partnerships, and how they perceived the cultures and structures of their own, and other member agencies, to be affecting the working of the partnership. A fuller and more detailed understanding of the variety of occupational cultures and structures brought together under partnership structures would ideally include separate studies of the different member organisations and a variety of personnel within them. What the present study has not been able to observe is the perception of community safety amongst personnel within partner agencies who do not work in the partnership (i.e. the personnel who form the wider culture of member agencies). It has also not been able to study the distinctive structures and decision-making apparatus in different agencies in much depth. Separate studies of member agencies suggest different methodological approaches to the ones taken here. For example, although use of interviews was appropriate in the present study, because it allowed practitioners to talk quite freely about what they perceived to be the potential of, and the potential
problems with, partnership working to be, use of methods such as surveys would capture a much broader range of views, including those of personnel external to the partnership. Such an approach would allow future studies to explore the differences between members of partnerships more fully and more deeply.

*External perceptions of partnerships – the community*

Partnerships generally recognised that they had not been very good at community consultation, or at getting communities proactively involved in their work. This is a recurrent finding of research in this field. It was argued that much of what partnerships did in relation to community consultation was actually consultation with specific representatives of organisations and agencies already engaged within partnership structures. It was recognised that this meant that the community interests that would be heard by partnerships would, in all likelihood, be partial ones that would not ‘represent’ the community objectively defined. Similarly, the case study also gleaned its insights into community representation and involvement through the perspectives of *existing* partnership members. Many of these personnel were reflective about the limitations of partnership working in this area but these limitations were ultimately reproduced by the research to some extent. The present study does raise important questions about the nature of relationships between partnerships and local communities but, given that it was about the perceptions of personnel enmeshed *within* Community Safety Partnerships, it was not in a position to explore them in much depth. However, in common with the previous discussion of intra-organisational dynamics, some of the issues raised in the fieldwork (such as the legitimacy of community safety in the eyes of partner agencies, and the community’s knowledge of community safety and interest in participating in it) suggested lines of inquiry that would require research into the views of people who were *external* to the partnership itself.
Understanding the practice of community safety

In Wenger’s terms the practice of a community of practice is something that is quite complex. It is not only constituted by the particular activities of the community but also includes the categories, methods, rules of thumb and ways of talking through which the community thinks about its practice and understands what does, and what does not, ‘count’ as practice within it (see chapter 7). The present study has gone some way towards characterising the ‘practice’ of community safety in Scotland through interviews with personnel, analysis of the documents and artefacts they produced, and some observation of their working days and their interactions with others. Although future studies of the practice of community safety should continue to seek data from multiple sources in this way I would argue that greater emphasis and greater resource should be placed upon observation and ethnographic research methods than was feasible within the present study. The nature of practice is that it is something accomplished through interaction and communication amongst groups of people. It is not something readily written down in documents and reports produced by practitioners, nor does it necessarily comply with any formal attempts to define or regulate it through job descriptions or stated organisational objectives (what Wenger calls organisational designs – see chapter 3). Taking the findings of the present study seriously suggests that there is a need for future research to focus on community safety in this way – as a category of work through which identities are shaped and negotiated and through which people make sense of the world, and also act upon their sense of the world (see Becker, 1970; Becker and Carper, 1956a; 1956b).
Case study interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation/role of interviewee</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime Prevention Unit (Scottish Executive)</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council Designated Community Safety Officers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authority Liaison Officers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Community Safety Officers</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire Service Designated Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council service provider partners</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Sector representatives</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Convention of Scottish Local Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scottish Local Authority Community Safety Forum (chair)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of interviews</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>
Bibliography


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