Scottish Poetics and Literary Criticism
from James the Sixth to Francis Jeffrey.

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The middle of the sixteenth century was a time of ferment for English criticism. Men of letters were calling for new wine to savour the feast of literature. The rhetoric of scholasticism had gone stale. There was much stir about the vats as the poetasters prepared those early vintages of criticism which, insipid as they may seem to the modern palate, were experiments vital to later development. Thomas Wilson in his *Art of Rhetoric*, Sir John Cheke in his slender comments on Sallust and Hoby, Roger Ascham in *Toxophilus*, *The Schoolmaster*, and the *Letters* -- these, while keeping a timid eye on the classics, had begun to realize that there was such a thing as the English language and to formulate ideals for it. Through the furore over classical prosody instigated by Thomas Watson and Thomas Drant we reach Gascoigne's more native *Notes of Instruction* and the Correspondence of Spenser and Harvey, who have certainly come to grips with the concrete. There only wanted Gosson's *School of Abuse*, Lodge's *Reply*, and Sidney's *Defense of Poesy* for English criticism to be set in marching order if with rather thin ranks, general principles on one flank and technique on the other.
The beginnings of Scottish criticism (if we omit the commentaries of the schoolmen and such casual matter as Gavin Douglas' preface to his translation of the Aeneid) approximate in date as no doubt they are partly derived from these path-makings in more purely English criticism. For criticism by Scottish writers is given a royal send-off by James the Sixth, whose Reules and Cautelis of 1584 is the earliest of Scottish critical treatises. This is prefixed to the Essays of a Prentise in the Divine Art of Poesie. The full title of the Reules is "Ane Schort Treatise containing some reules and cautelis to be observit and eschewit in Scottish Poesie".

There is a sturdy national pride in the Preface to the reader:

"Therefor, what I speak of Poesie now, I speak of it, as being come to man's age and perfection, whereas then, it was but in the infancy and childhood. The other cause is, that as for them that has written in it of late, there has never one of thame written in our language. For albeit sundry has written of it in English, which is likest to our language, yet we differ from them in sundry reules of poesie, as you will find by experience".
James offers his reulis and cautelis with the warning that Nature is above these:

"For if Nature be nocht the cheif worker in this airt, reulis wilbe bot a band to nature, and will make you within short space weary of the haill airt: quair as, gif Nature be cheif, and bent to it, reulis will be ane help and staff to nature."

After some preliminary remarks on rhyme, and on syllables, which are to be judged by ear, he proceeds to set the limit of the line: four 'feet' and fourteen 'feet'; and always a Sectioun in the middle of the line.

There must be no stuffing of words....#bot that they be all as necessare, as ze sould be constrainit to use thame, in case ze were speiking the same purpose in prose". Long lists of names of men or cities are taboo; if enumeration be necessary, it should be dispersed among other matter. You must suit your words to the subject: in Flyting and Invective, "your wordis to be cuttit short, and hurland over heich". In Flyting, the poet would be justified in such a phrase as "I's neir cair"; but "gif your subject were of love or tragedies", he should say, "I sall never cair"!
Again, the poet must "tak heid... in ane heich and learnit purpose, to use heich pithie and learnit wordis... Gif your purpose be of love, to use commoun language, with some passionate wordis. Gif your purpose be of tragicall materis, To use lamentable wordis, with some heich, as ravishit in admiration. Gif your purpose be of landwart affairis, to use corruptit and uplandis wordis".

He advocates that verse be alliterative, or 'literall': "..that the maist pairt of your line it sail ryme upon a letter, as this tumbling line rymis upon F: - 'Fetching fude for to seid it fast furth of the Farie' " A distinctly prosy strain may be observed in James' illustrations.

There follows some discourse on suitability of comparisons, epithets, and proverbs. It is pointed out that the repetition of a word is sometimes advisable; but in the next section James shows the commonplace writer's fear of the commonplace:

"Ze man also be warre with composing ony thing in the same manner as has bene ower oft usit of before" - for example, praising the 'fairness' of one's love, or describing the rising of the sun. ..."Gif ye call the sun Titan, at a tyme, to call him Phoebus or Apollo the uther tyme".
Originality of invention is commended, but in the next breath James, being the philosopher made King, echoes Plato: "Ze man also be war of wrytting ony thing of materis of common weil...because...they are to grave materis for a Poet to mell in".

The general discussion ends solemnly with the repeated warning: "Airt is onely bot ane help and a remembrance to Nature".

In the remaining section he gives examples of the kinds of verse:

1. For long histories. ('nocht verse')
2. For description of heroique actes, martiaall and knichtly faiittis of armes. ('heroic verse')
3. For high and grave subjects. ('Ballat Royal')
4. For tragicall materis. ('Troilus verse')
5. For Flyting or Invectives. ('Rouncefallis or Tumbling')
6. For compendious praying of ony bukes or the authouris thairof. (Use Sonet verse of fourteen lynis)
7. For materis of love. (Common verse)
James' indebtedness to Gascoigne has been noted; but as Saintsbury remarks, it would be unfair to call him a mere copyist of Gascoigne. The combined shrewdness and naivete of the document mark it as the personal expression of a Prentice who has been at some pains to learn his craft.

Still, there is nothing of great original merit in the rules. We may group them with the contemporary mania for drawing up rules for verses which was occupying some of the minor spirits in England. They are notable only because in a desert any blade of grass brightens the eye.

At the risk of slighting James' rule that "Ze man also be warre with composing any thing in the same manner as has been ower oft usit of before", we may venture to remind the reader that the transition to Protestantism, accomplished in England with a comparative ease that was kindly to the accompanying renascence in literature, was in Scotland a bloody passover clotting the stream of letters. The struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism was followed by a contest as bitter between Freeby-terianism and Prelacy. Our next exhibit displays something of the religious temper that was to make Scottish culture arid for a hundred years.

It was while James was engaged in his controversies with the ministers that Alexander Hume, minister of Logie, near Stirling, wrote his (1) 

Hymnes or Sacred Songs;

(1) Wr. ca. 1594, p.1599, repr. Waldegrave ed. for Bannatyne Club, 1832.
"Hymnes or Sacred Songs, wherein the right use of Poesie may be espied...Be Alexander Hume. Whereunto are added, the experience of the author's youth, and certaine precepts serving to the practise of sanctification...Ephes.5.18. 'But be filled with the spirit, speaking unto yourselves in Psalmes, & Hymnes, and spirituall songs, singing and making melodie to the Lord in your hearts'. "
The Hymnes are preceded by an Address

"To the Scottish Youth", admonishing against the fleshly in poetry, and counselling the consecration of the poetic gift to the right use, "to wit, to the glory of God"

The flavour of the Address is worth reproducing:

"As it is a thing verie customary unto thee, O curious youth, greatly to delite in poesie, ather by playing the partes of a poet thy selfe, or by exercising thy spirit in reading and proclaiming the compositions of other men: So is it as common to thy indiscreit age to make a chuse of that naughtie subject of fleshly and unlawfull love. In such sort that in Princes courts, in the houses of greate men, and at the assemblies of yong gentilmen and yong damesels, the chiefe pastime is, to sing prophane sonnets, and vaine ballats of love, or to rehearse some fabulos faits of Palmerine, Amadis, or other such like raverries; & such as ather have the art or vaine poetike, of force they must shew themselves cunning followers of the dissolute ethnike poets, both in phrase and substance, or else they shall be had in no reputation. Alas for pittie! Is this the right use of a Christians talent to incense the burning lustes of licentious persons by such evill examples and allurements? Art thou (O miserable man) well occupied, that day & night busies thy braine to invent these things which may foster the filthie vice and corruption that naturallie is seased in the harts of all men? Was it to this end, that thy maker sent thee into the world, to be an instrument of wickeines? or has he given thee such gifts, and vivicitie of spirit, to be exercised in vanitie, and provoking others to uncleannes? Knowes thou not that thou must render account of everye idle word that proceeds out of thy mouth? And that thy ungodlie conversation banishes
-the Spirit of GOD from thee? suffocats thy gude giftes; rottis thy conscience, and makis thy GOD to become ans Enemie against thee...What count thinkes thou to give unto the just and fearfull judge of the world(who doubtles will crave it of thee, thou knowes not how suddenly) that hath employed thy time, and abused his good giftes after this manner? I think the consideration of it the more terrible, because sometime I delighted in such fantasies myselfe, after the manner of riotous young men: and were not the Lord in mercie pulled me a backe, & wrought a great repentance in me, I had doubtlesse run forward and employed my time & studie in that prophane and unprofitable exercise, to my own perdiction. For what seekes man by that kind of studie? nothing but a name, but a vaine praise, and an undeserved commendation. Why should thou not then (aspiring youth) rather bestowe thy gude giftes to the right use, to the glory of God, and to the well of thy brethen? which thou sall do when by thy poesie or prose thou declares the mercie; the justice, the power, the providence, the wisedom, the hollines, the gudenes, or wondrous words of thy God unto the world: whereof thou may have so large a field in the scriptures, that all thy pithie words, thy figures of Rhetorickes, thy subtle argumentes, thy skill in physicke, meta-phycike, mathematicke, or morall philosophie, shall not be sufficient to expres the dignitie thereof..."
There is a high nobility and purity in this devotional criticism (which, by the way, is accompanied in Hume's poems by a fine passion for nature). Had there been nothing worse to come, Scotland might in the next century have produced creators and critics of a high order; but fanaticism was to divert such powers. To press the point, I am tempted to borrow one of Pinkerton's purple passages. Recording the fact that manuscripts of Scottish poetry written in the sixteenth century remained unnoticed until the beginning of the eighteenth, he says:

"For the Seventeenth century, fatal to the good taste of Italy, threw a total night over Scotland: a night of Gothic darkness, haunted by the most shocking spectres of frenzy and fanaticism, mingling in infernal uproar with still more horrible phantoms of ecclesiastical vengeance, bigoted persecution, civil tyranny, slaughter and slavery. Passing, almost without respite, from the ecclesiastical daemonarchy of Laud to the civil daemonarchy of Lauderdale; from the rancour of a hot-brained priest, to the savage madness of a brutal peer; Scotland wept over her unhappy sons, who, having long maintained their liberties against tyrants, now lost them to the slaves of tyrants: and, overwhelmed with anguish, could never attend to science, nor the arts of elegance".

So devastating indeed was the effect of contemporary events that we find little of critical interest in Scottish letters in the seventeenth century, save what may be gleaned from the works of two poets: William Alexander, Earl of Stirling (1567 or 1590 -1640) and William Drummond of Hawthornden (1585-1649).

When William Drummond came to his majority, Scottish letters were a Dead Sea. The high tide of poetry on which had been launched the barques of Sir David Lyndsay, Henryson, Gavin Douglas and Dunbar, had long receded. The strong current of

(1) The Reformation had swept into permanent exile many distinguished scholars of the Church. In the sixteenth century no fewer than 12 Rectors of the University of Paris were Scots. (See Leith, Pre-Reformation Scholars in Scotland, p. 18.) Abroad the Scottish reputation for literary ability was of the highest. (See T. Bourchier: Historica Ecclesiastica, p. 273)
the Reformation which had carried the vigorous prose of Knox and Buchanan seemed to have spent its force, and the waters were stagnant. Presbyterianism, as we have observed it even in a relatively enlightened divine like Alexander Hume, was astringent rather than expansive of the emotions. You were less likely to be asked your opinion of a sonnet than whether you subscribed to the strict Genevan discipline.

Drummond seems to have felt keenly the isolation of Scotland from the world of letters. He refers to his countrymen as culturally "little better than the Americanes". In a letter to M.W.K., a cousin of George Buchanan, he writes: "Simonides the lyrick(poit) was wont to saue, That to a perfect civill happinesse, and to attaine glorie and fame, a Man for his Native soyle should have some renowned cittie or place. Alas, to what then can wee(obscure men) attaine? What can wee performe in this remote parte of the earth Extra solis lunaeque vias?".

(1) Archeologica Scotica v. IV, p.38.
(2) Ibid p.29.
His opinion of the literary times is melancholy: "This age hath rather slept away itself than lived. Wee shall be unworthy do naughts to Posteritye. It is a wonder to consider how some tymes kingdomes are governed by men, otherwhyles by dowagers, againe by children and babes: And all these tymes have their different humours; except men often turn babes, as dowagers (1) divells, age in dotage."

Nor does having a scribbler-king seem, in Drummond's opinion, to be an unmixed blessing for poets:

"I think Tasso had some raison of his madness, now in spending such tyme and labor, and riping nothing but 'O well done'. Great men in this age either respect not our toyes at all, or, if they do, because they are toyes esteme them onlye worthy the kisses of their hand: but especialye Princes, who are so inclined themselves. A Prince becomes zealous of possessors of those excellencies which he findeth in himself: thence it seldom falls out that learned princes advance learned men. Herefore Nero killed Lucan, and opned Seneca's veins; for (as Tacitus tells) it was a crime to make verse in that tyme. Wee admire those things wee want, and contemne what we possesse; Yet I must call these tymes abject, in which it is a more worthy exercise to be a ballader, studye to paint the face, or follow some wild beast, than have the most noble facultyes of wit" (2)

(1) Arch. Scot. IV, 33
(2) Ibid p 32.
At the same time, the rich contemporary literature of a language so kin to Scots as English could not but find some appreciative readers among cultured Scotsmen who deplored the sterility of the native Muse. As Masson points out, even had James not gone to London this must have been so. And when he did find the road to London a pleasing prospect, the small group of Scottish courtiers who accompanied him rapidly developed an interest in the English language and literature. The influence of this coterie—William Fowler, uncle of Drummond, Sir Robert Aytoun, Sir Robert Kerr, Sir David Murray of Gorthy and Sir William Alexander—together with the discouraging conditions in Scotland, served to divert attention from purely Scottish letters in favour of an imitation of English.

Drummond, through his friendship with Alexander and his correspondence with poets in England, belongs to this new group of Anglo-Scots; and it is in his relations with it that we find whatever he has to offer as critic.

(1) David Masson: Drummond of Hawthornden, p. 27. 1873.
Drummond was the man of the age in Scotland best fitted to function as critic: by nature a man of books, a faithful recorder of impressions, university-trained, a poet, able even in spite of the times to spend most of his life in rural reflection, and possessed of what was then a splendid library. But unfortunately he has left us little of actual criticism, unless Laing has overlooked much in the fifteen mss. volumes presented to the Scottish Antiquarian Society. This seems unlikely, as Professor Masson, who examined the mss. in preparing his life of Drummond, writes that he might (1) have spared himself the trouble.

(1) Laing's chief sins as editor seem to have been motivated by prudery. Compare his version of the Hawthornden Conversations with that of B. F. Patterson, Glasgow 1923.
By his contemporaries Drummond appears to have been regarded as a sympathetic informal critic. Alexander sent him his Anacreon and other pieces. Drayton in his letters seems to value Drummond's judgment. Sir Robert Kerr, whom Drummond stimulated in the writing of a volume of 'Psalms in English verses to the measures of the French and Dutch', (2) writes to him, "Every wretched creature knows the way to that place where it is most made of, and so do my verses to you".

Drummond's verdict on Drayton must be discounted as part of the correspondence between two mutually admiring poets. Elsewhere however he is almost as fulsome, although in his Characters of Several Authors he does charge Drayton with lack of passion in his love songs. He thought the Polyolbion "the onlye Epicke Poeme England(in my judgment) hath to be proud of". In another letter he says, "So farre as I can remember, of our vulgar poesie, none hath done better or can doe more".

(1) Letter 19, p. 36 Arch. Scot. IV.
(3) Letter 15, p. 34, Arch. Scot. IV.
(4) Letter 14, p. 34, Arch. Scot. IV.
More notable perhaps is a letter "To his much honoured Friend, Dr. Arthur Johnston, physician to the King" (and the chief Scoto-Latinist of his day), who had apparently solicited some general remarks on poetry.

"There is" he writes of poetry in general, "not any Thing endureth longer; Homer's Troy hath outlived many Republicks, and both the Roman and Grecian Monarchies; she subsisteth by her self, and after one Demeanor and Continuance her Beauty appeareth to all ages".

He is a staunch defender of a classic ideal of poetry:

"In vain have some Men of late (Transformers of every Thing) consulted upon her Reformation, and endeavoured to abstract her to Metaphysical Ideas, and Scholastical Quiddities, denuding her of her own Habits, and those ornaments with which she hath amused the World some Thousand Years. Poesy is not a Thing that is yet in the finding and search, or which may be otherwise found out, being already condescended upon by all Nations, and as it were established jure Gentium...What is not like the Ancients and conform to those Rules which hath been agreed unto by all Times, may (indeed) be something like unto Poesy, but it is no more Poesy than a Monster is a Man."

In the celebrated Conversations between Drummond and Ben Jonson at Hawthornden, in January, 1619, the dramatist's opinions and self-portrait have naturally received most attention. Many indeed have probably forgotten that it was a conversation and not a monologue. But for our purposes what Drummond said is of chief interest. Unfortunately, Drummond's part in the Conversations is not recorded. Perhaps he was too modest, or Ben talked him down, or was too ready in his cups to "let a frivolous jest go for a solid answer". At any rate, we have only Jonson's side of it, except for Drummond's barbed parenthesis that "All this" (Jonson's opinions of 'stranger poets') "was to no purpose for he neither doeth understand French nor Italianne", and Drummond's epilogue to the Conversations, which damn the man rather than the writer.
The editors of the 1711 edition of Drummond's Works (presumably Thomas Ruddiman and Bishop Sage) in a laudable effort to uphold Drummond's end of the Conversations, printed in the same section of the book, under the same heading as the Conversations and at the end of Jonson's remarks (pp 226, 227), Drummond's opinions of a number of poets on the subject of love. These remarks follow on the same page immediately after Drummond's criticism of Jonson, with the statement, "Mr. Drummond gave the following Character of several authors" interpolated by the editors.

Ruddiman and Sage obviously believed these remarks to have been a part of the Conversations; but the evidence is rather against this conclusion. The notes are all on one subject - love poetry - whereas had they represented Drummond's recollection of his remarks to Jonson, they would probably have been varied. There is no mention of Jonson's love lyrics, from which it may be presumed that at the time of writing Drummond did not know Jonson's work. Again, the latest work of Drayton in the possession of
-of Drummond (who might be expected to receive Drayton's volumes soon after publication; and Shakespeare (bracketed casually with Alexander) is referred to as if still alive and having only lately published.

Externally, there is the evidence of the Sibbald transcript (in the "Adversaria" collection) discovered by Laing. This ms., undated but apparently written between 1700 and 1710, yields nothing in point of date to Ruddiman and Sage's edition of 1711. Moreover, it has the original title (which alone, on an envelope, remained in the ms. presented to the Antiquarian Society) of "Informations and Manners by Ben Jonson to W.D. 1619". This ms. does not include the "Characters of several Authors".

(1) In 1519 there had been five editions of Lucrece, eight editions of Venus and Adonis, one edition of the Sonnets, three editions of the pirated Passionate Pilgrim.
It therefore seems improbable that this material represents Drummond's remarks to Jonson. Possibly it was an early contribution to the projected critical collaboration with Alexander, out of which proceeded the latter's Anacrisis. In any case, these fragmentary opinions are Drummond's only sustained critical essay, apart from the very general letter to Johnston.

The Characters of Several Authors may be allowed to speak for itself:

"The Authors I have seen on the Subject of Love, are the Earl of Surrey, Sir Thomas Wyat (whom, because of their Antiquity, I will not match with our better times), Sidney, Daniel, Drayton and Spencer. He who writeth the Art of English Poesy praiseth much Rawleigh and Dyer; but their Works are so few that are come to my Hands, I cannot well say anything of them.

"The last we have are Sir William Alexander and Shakespeare, who have lately published their Works. Constable saith, some have written excellently, and Murray with others, I know, hath done well, if they could be brought to publish their Works: But of Secrets who can soundly judge?

"The best and most exquisite Poet of this Subject, by Consent of the whole Senate of Poets, is Petrarch. S.W.R. in an Epitaph on Sidney, calleth him our English Petrarch, though his Delia be a Laura: So Sidney, in his Ast. and Steil. telleth of Petrarch, You that pure Petrarch long deceast Woes with new-born sighs."
"The French have also set him before them, as a Paragon; whereof we still find, that those of our English Poets who have approached nearest to him, are the most exquisite on this Subject. When I say, approach him, I mean not in following his Invention, but in forging as good; and when one Matter cometh to them all at once, who quintessenceth it in the finest Substance.

"Among our English Poets, Petrarch is imitated, nay surpast in some Things, in Matter and Manner: in Matter, none approach him to Sidney, who hath Songs and Sonnets in Matter intermingled; in Manner, the nearest I find to him, is W. Alexander; who, insisting in these same Steps, hath Sextains, Madrigals and Songs, Echoes and Equivoques, which he hath not; whereby, as the one hath surpast him in Matter, so the other in Manner of Writting, or Form. This one Thing which is followed by the Italians, as of Sanazarius and others, is, That none celebrateth their Mistress after her death, which Ronsard hath imitated: After which two next(methinks) followeth Daniel, for Sweetness in Ryming Second to none. Drayton seemeth rather to have loved his Muse than his Mistress; by, I know not what artificial Similes; this sheweth well his Mind, but not the Passion. As to that which Spencer calleth his Amoretti, I am not of their Opinion, who think them his; for they are so childish, that it were not well to give them so honourable a Father."
"Donne among the Anacreontick Lyricks, is Second to none, and far from all Second; but as Anacreon doth not approach Callimachus, tho' he excels in his own kind, nor Horace to Virgil; no more can I be brought to think him to excel either Alexander's or Sidney's Verses. They can hardly be compared together, trading diverse Paths; the one flying swift, but low; the other, like the Eagle, surpassing the Clouds. I think, if he would, he might easily be the best Epigrammatist we have found in English; of which I have not yet seen any come near the Ancients.

"Compare Song, Marry and Love, etc. with Tasso's Stanzas Against Beauty; one shall hardly know who hath the best.

"Drayton's Polyalbion, is one of the smoothest Poems I have seen in English; Poetical and well prosecuted; there are some Pieces in him, I dare compare with the best Transmarine Poems. The 7th Song pleaseth me much. The 12th is excellent. The 13th also: The Discourse of Hunting, passeth with any Poet. And the 18th, which is his last in this Edition 1614.

"I find in him, which is in most part of my Compatriots, too great an Admiration of their Country; on the History of which, whilst they muse, they forget sometimes to be good Poets.

"Silvester's Translation of Judith, and the Battle of Iugoey, are excellent. He is not happy in his Inventions, as may be seen in his Tabacco Batter'd, and Epitaphes: Who likes to know whether he or Hudson hath the Advantage of Judith, let them compare the beginning of the 4th Book, O Silver brow'd Diana &C. And the End of the 4th Book, Her waved Locks, &C. The midst of the 8th Book, In Ragau's ample Plain one Morning met, Etc. The 6th Book, after the Beginning, Each being set anon, fulfilled out, &C. And after, Judas, said she, thy Jacob to deliver, now is the Time, &C. His Pains are much to be praised, and happy Translations, in sundry parts equaling the Original."
Drummond, then, in his general attitude to poetry, is a follower of the ancients and strongly under the influence of the Italians. He is almost desperately anxious not to be provincial. One might conclude from his depreciation of nationalism and his references to the "vulgar" tongues, that he felt himself a Roman in an undisturbed empire. Yet he is capable of appreciating contemporaries so far as they are not rebels; and although usually his remarks about them do not go very deep, there are signs of a keenly discriminating mind at work.
Drummond's friend, William Alexander, Earl of Stirling and premier baron of Nova Scotia, managed in spite of a stormy life of political ambition to achieve some distinction as poet and poetic dramatist. He was a regular correspondent of Drummond. It was to the latter that in 1634, having "after a great travel both of body and mind" retired to his native place "to recreate myself with the muses", he sent his Anacrisis, or a Censure of Poets Ancient and Modern.

The accompanying letter is a somewhat complacent one:

"Neither have I went so through all, but that you (if you please) in that Solitariness and leisure which you enjoy, may proceed and spend some flying Hours upon this same subject. And I am assured, our pieces cannot but with applause and contentment be read and embraced by the thankful posterity, who after death shall render to every Man what is his due".

We prick up our ears at this promise of a critical partnership. But perhaps because of the fanfare of introduction, the Anacrisis, which is a very slight performance, disappoints more than it ought.

(1) Rogers: Memorials, II, 205.
(2) Drummond: Works, 1711, p. 158.
Alexander begins by telling us that he is not prejudiced against modern poets: "kindlying my fire at those fires which do still burn out of the ashes of ancient authors, to whom I find them" (the moderns) "in no way inferior, though like affectioned patriots, by writing in the vulgar tongues, seeking to grace their own country".

Then follow some general observations on the nature of poetry. He distinguishes between the substance and words, the medium:

"Language is but the apparel of poesy: which may give beauty but not strength. And when I censure any poet, I first dissolve the general contexture of his work in several pieces, to see what sinewe it hath, and to mark what will remain behind, when that external gorgeousness consisting in the choice or placing of words as if it would bribe the ear to corrupt the judgment, is first removed, or at least only marshalled in its own degree. I value language as a conduit; the variety thereof to several shapes, and adorned truth or witty inventions, that which it should deliver. I compare a poem to a garden, the disposing of the parts of the one to the several walks of the other; the decorum kept in descriptions and representing of persons, to the proportion and distances to be observed in such things as are planted therein, and the variety of invention, to the diversity of flowers thereof: whereof three sorts do chiefly please me - a grave sentence by which the judgment may be bettered; a witty conceit which doth harmoniously delight the spirits; and a generous rapture expressing magnanimity, whereby the mind may be inflamed for great things. All the rest for the most part, is but a naked narration or gross stuff to uphold the general frame; yet the more apt, if well contrived and eloquently delivered, to angle vulgar readers, who perchance can scarce conceive the other" (1)

(1) Rogers, Memorials, II, 206.
(2) Ibid, 206.
Even if derived from Vauquel in de la Fresnaye, this is a promising beginning; but the promise is not sustained. The Anacrisis amounts to only two or three pages: after the initial passages, Alexander's inspiration seems to have flagged. There are a few scattered appreciations of classic writers, a few more generalizations, and that is all. "I like" he says "the phrase, style, method, and discreet carriage of Virgil; the vigour and variety of invention in Ovid; the deep judgment and grave sentences of Horace and Juvenal; the heroical conceptions showing an innate generosity, in Statius Papianus and Lucan". He defends Lucan against the criticism of Julius Scaliger, and censures Virgil for robbing Aeneas of glory by making Turnus a coward in his death. Like Drummond he is a great admirer of Tasso.

(1) Saintsbury, Hist. & Crit. II, 196.
(2) Rogers, II, 207
(3) " " 208
(4) " " 209.
These comments end rather inconsequently:

"The treasures of poetry cannot be better bestowed than upon the apparelling of truth, and truth cannot be better appareled to please young lovers than with the excellences of poesy. I would allow that an epic poem should consist altogether of a fiction, that the poet, soaring above the course of nature, making the beauty of virtue to invite, and the horror of vice to affright, the beholders, may liberally furnish his imaginary man with all the qualities requisite for the accomplishing of a perfect creature, having power to dispose of all things at his own pleasure." (2)

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(1) I refer to Rogers' version of the Anacrisis. The Anacrisis as given in the 1711 edition of Drummond's Works, is longer. Alexander goes on (in the latter text) to say that it is best for a tragedy to be based on a true history, but that Fictions are not to be condemned, since they show things as they should be. He likes the Alexander of Curtius less than the Cyrus of Xenophon, "who made it first appear unto the World, with what Grace and Spirit a Poem might be delivered in Prose". (1711 Drummond Wks., p. 161) For the Arcadia of Sidney he is at a loss to find words of praise high enough, placing it far above Sanazaris' Arcadia in Italian, Diana de Montemayor in Spanish, or Astrea in the French.

(2) Rogers II, 209.
Like Drummond and James the Sixth, Alexander was preoccupied with Rules. In a letter enclosing a sonnet written by the King, he writes:

(1) "The last Day being private with his Majesty, after other things, we fortuned to discourse of English Poesy, and I told one Rule that he did like of exceedingly, which was this: That to make a good Sound there must still be first a short Syllable, and then a long, which is not long positively of itself, but comparatively, when it followeth a shorter; so that one Syllable may be long in one Place and short in another, according as it is matched, for a Syllable seems short when it is as it were born down with a longer".

Having a king with pretensions to the muse did not altogether make for freedom in criticism. In another letter from England, Alexander writes to Drummond, a fellow-victim of James' mania for revising the Psalms:

(2) "I received your last Letter, with the Psalm you sent, which I think very well done: I had done the same, long before it came, but he prefers his own to all else; tho' perchance, when you see it, you will think it the worst of the Three. No man must meddle with that Subject, and therefore I advise you to take no more Pains therein."

(1) Drummond, Wks., ed. 1711, p. 149.
(2) Ibid p 151.
Much as we should like to magnify these competent poets, in criticism we may credit both Drummond and Alexander only with good intentions.

On a lower level, the same is true of another Alexander Hume, Master of the Edinburgh High School and for some time a pedagogue at Bath, whose book, Of the Orthographie and Congruitie of the Britan Tongue, was published about 1617. This makes him perhaps the first of those many Scots who after the Union of the Crowns took upon themselves somewhat incongruously the task of putting the English to rights about their language.

In the dedication (to King James) Hume tells us that the King, on a visit to Scotland, had reproved the courtiers "qha on a new conseat of finnes sum tymes spilt (as they cal it) the King's language. Quilk thing it is reported that your majesty not only refuted with impregnable reasones, but alsoe fel on Barnet's opinion that you wald cause the universities mak an English grammar to repress the insolencies of sik green heades".

(1) p. 2
We need not examine very seriously the various observations of Hume on the Orthographie and Congruitie of the Britan Tongue. Like his Grammatica Nova, a Latin grammar (1612), the volume is intended for use in schools. In spite of his declared intention to establish regularity, he spells words in several ways, even in the same sentence, and mingles Scots with English.

But we might well wish to have more of such passages as the following, which draws a pleasing picture of the man and his scholarly preoccupations:

"To clere this point, and alsoe to reform an errorr bred in the south, and now usurped by our ignorant printeres, I wil tel quhwat befel myself quhen I was in the south with a special quhrende of meyne. Ther rease, upon sum accident, quhither quho, quhen, quhat, etc. sould be symbolized with a q or w, a noote disputation betwene him and me. After manie conflictes (for we oft encountered) we met be chance, in the city of Baeth, with a Doctour of divinitie of both our acquaintance. He invited us to dener. At table my antagonist, to bring the question on foot amang his awn condisciples, began that I was becum an heretik, and the doctour spering how, answered that I denied quho to be spelled with a w, but with qu. Be quhat reason, quod the Doctour. Here, I beginning to lay my grundes of labial, dental and guttural soundes and symboles, he snapped me on this hand and he on that, that the doctour had mikle a doe to win me room for a syllogisme. Then (said I) a labial letter can -

(1) Dedic. p. 18.
-not symbolize a guttural syllab. But w is a labial letter, quho a guttural sound. And therfoer w can not symbolize quho, nor no syllab of that nature. Here the doctour staying them again(for al barked at ones) the proposition, said he, I understand; the assumption is Scottish, and the conclusion false. Quherat al laughed, as if I had been driven from al replye, and I fretted to see a frivolous jest go for a solid answer".

Against such pedagogues as Hume with their earnest pretensions to English, we may set the gentility who had acquired some ease in the southern speech but retained an intelligent appreciation of the peculiar merits of Scots. Sir George MacKenzie, less celebrated as founder of the Advocates' Library than as a thorn in the flesh of the Covenanters, may stand as example.

A lawyer by profession, essayist and historian by avocation, MacKenzie is an early advocate of the rhetorical method. He comes to the defense of Scots as an instrument at the bar. (1)
In Pleadings, he remarks:

(1) Edin. 1672.
"It may seem a paradox to others, but to me it appears undeniable, that the Scottish idiom of the British tongue is more fit for pleading than either the English idiom or the French tongue; for certainly a pleader must use a brisk, smart, and quick way of speaking; whereas the English, who are a grave nation, use a too slow and grave pronunciation, and the French a too soft and effeminate one. And therefore, I think the English is fit for haranguing, the French for complimenting, and the Scots for pleading. Our pronunciation is like ourselves, fiery, abrupt, sprightly, and bold" (1)

MacKenzie was a man of some literary taste. (2)

Dryden, writing of the most noble kind of satire, acknowledges indebtedness to him:

"With these beautiful turns, I confess myself to have been unacquainted, till about twenty years ago, in a conversation I had with that noble wit of Scotland, Sir George MacKenzie, he asked me why I did not imitate in my verses the turns of Mr. Waller and Sir John Denham. I had often read with pleasure, and with some profit, those two fathers of our English poetry, but had not seriously enough considered those beauties which gave the last perfection to their works".

But having "bent himself to the law", like many other powerful minds in Scotland, there is little of critical interest in MacKenzie apart from these remarks on language.

In his essay called "An idea of the modern eloquence of the bar" he compares legal eloquence and poetry, to the disadvantage of the latter:

"Poetry is entirely made up of Flowers and Graces, and imitates the nature of Flowers in this, that it is neither lasting nor profitable: For after it has for some time agreeably flattered our Humour with its fleeting and inconsistent Pleasures, it suddenly disappears, and vanishes into that empty Nothing whence it came; neither procuring Riches to the Poet, nor affording Protection to his Friends."

In the same essay we find a hint of what may (1) have been a factor contributing to the infertility of Scottish letters toward the end of the century. Scotsmen had not yet learned English, and

"Books that are written in our native tongue, while they are yet new, are nipt by envy in the tender Bud; and when they are grown older, and have survived the malice of our contemporaries, our fleeting language instantly disappears, and entirely abandons them to eternal oblivion. So that we seem to be guilty of the same piece of folly and extravagance with those who erect monuments of weak and infirm materials and fondly write upon the sand what the next wave shall irrevocably wash away and deface."

(1) This feeling of course was not confined to Scots. Vide Waller's: Poets that lasting marble seek Must carve in Latin or in Greek; We write in sand: our language grows And, like the tide, our work o'erflows.
For this reason presumably he wrote his Pleadings in Latin.

MacKenzie may be taken as representative of the later decades of the seventeenth century, in which, though there is no lack of prose, it consists mainly of memoirs and histories of the recent disturbances, sermons and pamphlets, by-products of unliterary pursuits. The absence of a self-conscious group of men interested in letters is striking in contrast with its lively presence a hundred or so years later. The parochialism of the time is adequately explained by the causes already suggested: namely, the national weakness (or strength) of taking its theology too seriously, and the difficult transition into union, political and literary, with the Sassenach.
The restrictions upon publication must also be considered among the stumbling-blocks. As far back as 1551 censorship had been prescribed. In that year an edict was passed by the Scottish Estates that

"Na Pretar presume, attempt or tak upone hand, to pret or any bukis, ballatie, sangis, blasphemationnis, rymes, or Tragedeis, outhir in Latin or Inglis toung in ony tymes to cum, unto the tyne the samin be sene, venuit and examit be sum wyse and discreet personnis depute thairto be the Ordinaris quhatsoever".

(1)

Apart from this measure, the General Assembly also exercised the right of censorship. In 1563 for instance it ordered Thomas Bassandyne to withdraw some volumes from circulation.

During the Commonwealth matters were not improved. In 1651 the Commissioners of the English parliament sent to settle affairs in Scotland ordered a general suppression of the periodicals then circulating in Scotland. At the Restoration, the Scottish Privy Council prohibited the issue of any "bookes or papers whatsoever, unless permission had been obtained. In 1671 Charles II gave to Andrew Anderson a 41-year monopoly of printing.

(1) 5 Mary Cap. 27, passed Feb. 1, 1551.
The most capricious of these powers operating to destroy aspiration in the field of criticism was the Privy Council, which in 1688 killed, immediately after its birth, the first periodical in Scotland dedicated to critical comment.

John Cockburn, minister of Ormiston, late in 1687 obtained permission from the Council to publish a literary review. This was the Bibliotheca Universalis, "Or an historical accompt of Books and Transactions of the learned world. Begun anno 1688, Jan." Its avowed interest was in scholarship rather than in belles lettres, but the editor hoped to "awaken the genius" of the country. The Preface is worth quoting:
"As the Republic of Letters has flourished more in this last Age, than perhaps in any of the former; so such undertaking as this has contribute not a little to this, its advancement"

After pointing to the success of such periodicals in England, France, Germany and Holland, the Preface continues,

"Tho' it must not be said that Learning is totally a Stranger to this Nation; yet it were to be wished, that it were more universally spread. And if it get not as much footing here as it has done elsewhere through the world, must not be imputed to the coldness of our climate, the barrenness of the Soyl, or the want of Spirits, for cultivating it, but merely to the want of that General and public Encouragement which it meets with elsewhere...In former times this kingdom produced scholars, who were second to none of their contemporaries, and whose works are still admired by the learned world. And 'tis not to be doubted, but that our country could yet shew that they have a share of that reason and good sense, which this generation pretends to; if there were occasion for proving and exercising it. Now seeing works of this nature has contributed to awaken the genius of other nations, therefore zeal for the honour and good of this, has set us upon the present design, which if it meet with a suitable encouragement, shall be carried on with all the exactness that our ability and circumstances will allow. But if it meet with a contrary fate, it cannot be expected that we should be thus officious, to our own particular prejudice, when assistance and concurrence is denied...Our design is to publish monethly accompts of what is doing abroad, by the learned world, and also to report what the virtuosos and learned among ourselves are pleased to communicate."
This solitary issue of the Bibliotheca Universalis contains reviews of eight books:


2. An elegie on Father Rapin the Jesuite, with an account of some of his Works.

3. Comparison of Pindar and Horace, by M. Blondel. (The editor has contributed English translations of Blondel's French translations)

4. Four Dissertations by Thomas Smith, Master of Magdalen College, Oxford. 1686. (These are religious dissertations)

5. On the customs of Batavia: de nobilitate, de Principibus, de Ducibus, de comitibus, de Baronibus, de militibus...de comitatu Hollandiae & Diocesi Ultrajectina. (Antony Mattheus, 1686)

6. La Vanité des Sciences, 1687. ...The Vanity of sciences or reflexions of a Christian Philosopher on true Felicity. (Author apparently unknown)

7. An account of F. Mabillon's Travels to Italy. 1687.

8. The Present state of the Ottoman Power, with the causes of its Growth, and these of its Downfall. ...by the Seur du Vignau. 1687.
Of the reports on these books, four are acknowledged transcripts from the Histoire des Ouvrages des Scavans and the Bibliothèque Universelle. Four are not so acknowledged, and are presumably first-hand accounts. It will be noted that four of the books considered were written in French, and four in Latin, and that only one of the authors is English. The "reviews", where they are not mere quotations, are simply summaries; save that in the case of item 3 the editor speaks approvingly of Blondel's liberal quotations from Pindar and Horace, contrasting him in this respect with Rapin.

This laudable attempt to bring the best of European thought within reach of the Scottish reader ended abruptly. James II was on the throne; and "The Chancellor", records Fountainhall in his (1) Decisions, "thinking some passages of it reflected on the Popish religion, especially the Abstract of Smith's Dissertation and Mabillon's Museum Italicum, though he be a Jesuit; therefore he discharged him to print any more and by himself alone recalled the Privy Council's order, and said he would cause his own churchmen do it better".

(1)I, 502.
Thus Scotland's first attempt at periodical criticism (for with a little encouragement the Bibliotheca might have gone on to something more independent and characteristic than the quotation of continental journals) was ironically knocked on the head in the interest of the Roman faith she had been trying so hard to cast off.
A study of the period here outlined and illustrated does not lift one into enthusiasm, particularly if it be contrasted with developments abroad. By 1600 the Italians had definitely established criticism as a legitimate daughter of literature, if treating her too much as a stepchild of the ancients; the French had boldly made her the handmaid of their rich vernacular creations; in England too she had begun to come into her inheritance, though still relegated below the salt. The seventeenth century saw the brilliant if narrowing rise of neo-classicism in France. In England we may span the century with Jonson at its beginning and Dryden at its close — genuine critics both, classicists but with individual penetration that transcended orthodoxy. Dryden particularly, with what Saintsbury calls his "peculiar way of shaking different literatures and different examples together, of indicating the things that please him in all, and of at least attempting to find out why they pleased him" (1) — Dryden we may take as proof that criticism at last had begun to perform its

(1) Hist. Crit. II, 413.
-proper function, to "set free the lovely
prisoned soul of Eucharis". In Scotland,
however, we have very little to show, and that
little displays all the marks of derivation
rather than of indigenous rooting in the soil.
This is not surprising, in view of the peculiar
characteristics of the time. Of a small and
poverty-stricken country, relegated almost to the
status of a province, out of the beaten track of
contemporary thought, and preoccupied with civil
and religious affairs, little else could be ex-
pected. A nation must create literature, or at
least be a conscious member of a literary family,
before it can produce criticism of literature.
As Saintsbury puts it succinctly, speaking of
England by 1500, "The fact is that, not only until
a nation is in command of a single form of 'curial'
speech for literary purposes, but until sufficient
experiments have been made in at least a majority of
the branches of literature, criticism is impossible,
and would, if possible, be rather mischievous than
(1) beneficial". At both these points Scotland, two
hundred years later than England, is deficient; and
we must look to the eighteenth century for some kind
of awakening.

Chapter Two.

The Eighteenth Century.
Chapter Two.

The Eighteenth Century.

I. THEORISTS.

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I.

Theorists.
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I.A.

The Philosophical Background.
One's major impression after a study of eighteenth-century Scottish criticism is that the Muse did not bless her critics with a poet's fire, but rather cursed them with cacoethes philosophiae. There is a vast amount of philosophical speculation which strictly perhaps might be assigned to the department of aesthetics. But for our purposes this body of writing cannot be ignored. It attempts to discover the bases of our appreciation of all the fine arts; but literature is the art with which these Scottish aestheticians had most acquaintance, and the chief source of their illustrations. It may be true that much of this speculation is extremely vague, that its psychology is primitive, and that its generalizations make little contact with operative criticism. Nevertheless, any investigation which concerns itself with the emotional effect of literature upon its readers, with Imagination, with a Standard of Taste, is within our province. Eighteenth-century aesthetics may be "a swamp haunted by wandering fires, will o' the wisps"; but in following a will o' the wisp one may strike his head against hard facts before unobserved.
Some of the characteristics of Scottish philosophy should perhaps be noted here. It developed, if it did not originate, the idea that we should seek to establish the general laws of the human mind, which ought to govern all philosophy. It looked on criticism as one division of this project. "The sole end of logic", says Hume, "is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas; morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments; and politics consider men as united in society and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of logic, morals, criticism and politics, is comprehended almost everything which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind".

To the Scottish school is generally accorded credit for being the first deliberately to employ the inductive method in psychological investigation. Its tool is not observation of the senses, but attempted analysis of self-consciousness. It holds that we can discover principles which are independent of observation and experience. These inner principles it calls "senses" or "intuitions" or, sometimes, "common sense". Looking inward, it thus emphasizes, in the field of aesthetics, the emotions aroused rather than the provocative stimulus offered by beautiful objects; the association of ideas created in the mind by beauty rather than beauty itself. Indeed, the study of beauty is identified with the study of the inner "taste" by which beauty is apprehended. Such a general attitude, adopted by many able minds from Hutcheson to Hamilton, could not but influence the intellectual life of the country. It is fashionable to assume that there is little connection between aesthetics and criticism, but the doctrine of the association of ideas, for instance, had a direct consequence in the Rhetoricians; and there are perhaps other effects which will appear later.

(1) Of course, not all the philosophers we shall consider belong strictly to this 'school'.
Hutcheson.
After the aridity of the seventeenth century, a fresh assertion of the claims of art was badly needed. The initial stimulus comes from Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow; Irish born, but of Scottish ancestry and as philosopher certainly of the Scottish School. To Hutcheson, Laurie awards "the distinction of being one of the earliest modern writers on the subject of the beautiful". (1) Others (Millar, for instance) are inclined to minimize his importance. Though he is not a major figure in the history of philosophy, he was of some significance in the Aufklärung of eighteenth-century Scotland.

(1) Scottish Philosophy, p. 17. Hutcheson's Inquiry (1725) preceded the treatises of Père André (1741) and Baumgarten (1750). Laurie adds (p. 33), "The attention thenceforward paid in Scotland to criticism and aesthetics, though far from satisfactory in its results, may be traced directly to him".

(2) Literary History of Scotland.
It may be worth while to note first two of Hutcheson's English predecessors to whom he was indebted: Addison and Shaftesbury. The prevailing idealism of Locke, denying to the external world those qualities with which the senses invest it, had directed attention to the process by which the beauties of the physical world and the beauties of art are apprehended. Addison, in the series of Spectator essays (411-414) dealing with the Pleasures of the Imagination, had accepted Locke's view, holding that "light and colours, as apprehended by the imagination, are only ideas in the mind, and not qualities that have any existence in matter". (1)

In philosophy Addison was an amateur, but the grace of his style and the adulation it received from all gave wide circulation to the doctrine. (2)

(1) Spectator 413.
(2) These essays of Addison, and Akenside's Pleasures of the Imagination are among the works most frequently quoted by Scots critics of the eighteenth century.
Addison divides the pleasure we take in the beautiful into two sorts: primary (that of the sense of sight in perceiving an object); secondary (coming from "ideas of visible objects"). The sense through which the imagination is supplied with its ideas is that of sight, though it may be assisted by another sense. In art, it is this stirring of the imagination that is the important thing, though in representative art there may also be experienced the simpler pleasure of comparing a piece of sculpture or a description with the original.

The pleasures of actual sight, he goes on, proceed from what is "great, uncommon, or beautiful". It is impossible to state the cause of the pleasures of the imagination, "because we know neither the nature of an idea, nor the substance of an human soul, which might help us to discover the conformity or disagreeableness of the one to the other". All we can do is "to reflect on those operations of the soul that are most agreeable, and to range, under their proper heads, what is pleasing or displeasing to the mind, without being able to trace out the several necessary and efficient causes from whence the pleasure or displeasure arises".

(1) Spectator 413  
(2) "  "  
(3) "  "  

But though we do not know the cause, we know that pleasure is intensified when the passions, particularly those of pity and terror, are affected:

"The more frightful appearance they make, the greater is the pleasure we receive from the sense of our own safety". (1)

A more certain influence upon Hutcheson was Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), whose Characteristics of men, manners, opinions and times was first published in 1711. This volume includes his Sensus Communis (on wit and humour, previously published in 1709, and the Inquiry concerning Virtue. Shaftesbury's aesthetics are to be found chiefly in his Notion of the historical draught or tablature of the Judgment of Hercules (included in the 1714 edition of the Characteristics) in which he anticipates Lessing's Laokoon. But apart from this and the Letter concerning Design we have in him a general aesthetico-moral theory.

(1) Spectator 418.
For Shaftesbury it is a Platonically unified world. Goodness, beauty, and truth are really one, consisting of harmony and proportion manifested in an ascending scale of Beauty, Morality, Religion. Thus moral beauty is a higher form than physical or artistic beauty, and religion or the sense of God is the highest of all. Shaftesbury draws an analogy between art and morality, and uses their terminologies interchangeably, employing the phrases, "moral sense" (adopted by the Scots philosophers), "moral beauty", "taste", "good taste", "relish", all in relation to a "natural sense of right and wrong," "a sense of just and unjust, worthy and mean", etc. "What is beautiful", he tells us, "is harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and proportionable is true; and what is at once both beautiful and true is, of consequence, agreeable and good". The principal end of his writings, we are assured, has been "to assert the reality of a beauty and charm in moral as well as natural subjects; and to demonstrate the reasonableness of a proportionate Taste, and determinate choice, in Life and manners".

Reflections of this sort, of course, are very vague and unsatisfactory so far as getting at concrete standards of criticism is concerned. But they are important as the adequate stimulus, through Huteson, of much of the Scottish aesthetics and 'philosophical criticism' of the eighteenth century. Shaftesbury insists that philosophy is indispensable to criticism:

"Where then is this beauty or harmony to be found? How is this symmetry to be discover'd and apply'd? Is it any other art than that of philosophy, or the study of inward numbers and proportions, that can exhibit this in life?...If no other, who then can possibly have a taste of this kind, without being beholden to philosophy? Who can admire the outward Beautys, and not recur instantly to the inward, which are the most real and essential, the most naturally affecting, and of the highest Pleasure, as well as profit and advantage?"

This is a recurrent note in the aestheticians whom we must examine.

(1) Characteristicks, III, 184.
Having paid due acknowledgment to the sources of some of Hutcheson's ideas, let us see what he himself contributed. It is not for originality as a philosopher that he is important to us, but for a shift of emphasis. In the generations immediately preceding, his countrymen had been facing life with grim earnestness. Hutcheson's is the first voice in Scotland to suggest that pleasure is legitimate, and that beauty as well as morality may be a source of it.

His Inquir[y into the original of our ideas of Beauty and Virtue was published in 1725; the Essay on the Passions in 1726.

(1) An inquiry into the original of our ideas of Beauty and Virtue, in two treatises, in which the principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are explained and defended against the author of the "Tale of the Bees", and the Ideas of Moral Good and Evil are established, according to the sentiments of the Ancient Moralists, with an attempt to introduce a mathematical calculation on subjects of morality.

(2) Essay on the nature and conduct of the Passions and Affections, and Illustrations upon the moral sense.
Hutcheson seems to turn rather wearily from purely intellectual investigations to speculation about beauty. "Late inquiries", he remarks, "have been very much employed about our understanding, and the several methods of obtaining truth". He directs attention rather to "the various pleasures which human nature is capable of receiving"; and to our various internal senses, perceptions and affections - particularly, the sense of beauty and the moral sense. He strikes a distinctly hedonistic note: "It must surely then be of the greatest importance, to have distinct conceptions of this end itself, as well as of the means necessary to obtain it; that we may find out which are the greatest and most lasting pleasures, and not employ our reason, after all our laborious improvements of it, in trifling pursuits".

(2) " " 2
(3) " "
He is not strikingly original in his remarks about beauty. It is to be found in nature, in art, in universal truths, in principles of action. It exists only in relation to the percipient mind. The sense of beauty is universal, but varies according to individual temperament and mental associations.

There are two sorts of beauty, original and comparative; and both depend upon the establishment of uniformity and variety. In original beauty, where the uniformity of bodies is equal, the beauty is as the variety; and where the variety is equal, the beauty is as the uniformity. Comparative beauty is "founded on a conformity, or a kind of unity, between the original and the copy. In works of art, there must be "some kind of uniformity or unity or proportion among the parts, and of each part to the whole". (1)

(1) Beauty, p. 33.
The physical senses alone are not enough to account for our pleasure in the beautiful:

"The only pleasure of sense, which our philosophers seem to consider, is that which accompanies the simple ideas of sensation. But there are vastly greater pleasures in those complex ideas of objects which obtain the names of Beautiful, Regular, Harmonious. Thus everyone acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine face, a just picture, than with the view of any one colour, were it as strong and lively as possible... So in music, the pleasure of the fine composition is incomparably greater than that of any one note, how sweet, full, or swelling soever". (1)

Hutcheson calls a sense "every determination of our minds to receive ideas independently on our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain". (2) He lists five "senses", including public sense, moral sense and the sense of honour. But the first two are: 1) the external senses; 2) "the pleasant perceptions arising from regular harmonious uniform objects, as also from grandeur and novelty. These we may call, after Mr. Addison, the 'pleasures of the imagination', or we may call the power of receiving them an internal sense". (3) He would like-

(1)Beauty p. 7
(2)Passions p. 4
(3)Passions p. 5.
apparently to enlarge the catalogue by assigning distinct senses to the various arts:

"The like difficulty attends several other perceptions, to the reception of which philosophers have not generally assigned their distinct senses; such as natural beauty, harmony, the perfection of poetry, architecture, designing, and such like affairs of genius, taste, or fancy". (2)

It will be noted that Hutcheson discusses beauty in universal truths, moral principles, etc., as well as in objects, in the same way as does Shaftesbury. But unlike Shaftesbury he distinguishes between the moral sense and the sense of beauty. The moral sense is still with him the most important, but he feels the need of a more precise classification, particularly for the fine arts.

(1) He did elaborate it, in the posthumous *System of Moral Philosophy* (1755)
(2) *Passions*, preface.
(3)
He is also an early associationist, noting that our sense of beauty is affected by "the disposition in our nature to associate any ideas together for the future which once presented themselves jointly". We have, he thinks, a power to perceive beauty per se. But this power is sometimes governed by association. "Association of ideas makes objects pleasant and delightful, which are not naturally apt to give any such pleasures; and in the same way, the casual conjunction of ideas may give a disgust, where there is nothing disagreeable in the form itself."

(1) Though developed to its fullest in connection with aesthetics by Alison and Jeffrey, the association theory is not modern. Coleridge (Biogr. Lit. ch. 5) traces it from Aristotle to David Hartley.
Hutcheson is hardly the answer to Addison's prayer for "authors ... who, beside the mechanical rules which a man of very little taste may discourse upon, would enter into the very spirit and soul of fine writing and show us the several sources of this pleasure which rises in the mind upon the perusal of a noble work". He is more a moralist than an aesthetician. Had he followed up Shaftesbury's studies in formal beauty rather than his 'benevolent' theories, his services to aesthetics might have been more conspicuous. But he does state with greater precision of philosophical language the theory of inner "senses" and the nature of our imaginative responses to beauty. He also goes a step beyond Shaftesbury in distinguishing, though he does not liberate, aesthetics from morality. Confused as his aesthetic is with ethic, there is nevertheless here an assertion of the right of art to a place in life. At another time and place this might be a slight service, but not in Scotland in 1725. And we may take it that Hutcheson's influence as a lecturer and a personality was perhaps greater than that of his writings on the rising intellectual generation, whose favourite vehicle of expression was literature.

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(1) Spectator 409.
(2) Vide Fowler, Shaftesbury & Hutcheson, p. 178
Dugald Stewart testifies likewise in his Account of the Life & Writings of Adam Smith.
Hume.
The most acute British philosopher of his time is less satisfying on aesthetics than in the other departments. Hume's general theory of beauty and taste (if the fragmentary remarks in the Treatise of Human Nature may be so described) is founded on the pain-pleasure hypothesis, and decidedly utilitarian. "Beauty is such an order and construction of parts, as either by the primary constitution of our nature, by custom, or by caprice, is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul". "Pain and pleasure, therefore, are not only necessary attendants of beauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence. And indeed, if we consider, that a great part of the beauty, which we admire either in animals or in other objects, is derived from the idea of convenience and utility, we shall make no scruple to assent to this opinion".

(1) First p. 1738.
(2) Tr. of H. N., Green & Grose ed. p. 95
(3) Ibid p. 96.
In a very casual way, however, Hume shakes the Pleasures of the Imagination down from their high contemporary pedestal and adumbrates the conception of a purely formal beauty. "I know not but a plain, overgrown with furze and broom, may be, in itself, as beautiful as a hill covered with vines or olive trees; though it will never appear so to one who is acquainted with the value of each. But this is a beauty merely of the imagination, and has no foundation in what appears to the senses". Here, of course, he is speaking of nature and not of a work of art. But he seems to make a clear distinction between a pleasure of the imagination, in terms of which alone most of his contemporaries conceive beauty, and intrinsic beauty of form. In spite of his utilitarianism he conceives (grudgingly) disinterested pleasure, thus anticipating Kant.

In the Essays, the first of which were published in 1741, Hume gives further attention to aesthetics. Hutcheson had little to say about a standard of taste. Hume tackles the problem. In the essay Of the delicacy of taste and passion, he notes the varying intensities of delicacy of taste in different persons. Just as some are more sensitive than others to moral values, so they differ in acuteness of perception of beauty and deformity. This is because beauty and deformity are "not really in the objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment of that mind which blames or praises". 

...Beauty and worth are merely of a relative nature, and consist in an agreeable sentiment, produced by an object in a particular mind, according to the peculiar structure and constitution of that mind".

(1) According to Grose, a large portion of the Essays was written before 1739: vide T.H. Grose, Hume’s Essays, Moral and Political, 1875 v.1 p. 75. The first ed. of Essays Moral and Political included Of the delicacy of taste and passion. The second ed., to which a second volume was added, contained the essays on Eloquence, on Essay Writing, on Simplicity and Refinement in Writing.


(3) Ibid p. 217.
But if the experience of beauty is relative and subjective, how are we to have a standard of taste? In the dissertation on the Standard of Taste, Hume notes that in criticism there is general agreement on principles and general disagreement when we descend to particulars. Though a follower of Locke, he disagrees with the extreme subjectivists who hold that beauty exists merely in the mind which contemplates it. With such a theory, no standard of taste could possibly be set up; each would be a law to himself. Hume brings common sense to demolish this view, with the remark (often noted for the reflection upon Bunyan) that no one would be thought sane who declared Bunyan and Addison to be equals, or Ogilby and Milton. It is true, he agrees, that beauty exists in the internal or external feeling exercised. But certain qualities in objects are calculated to produce the feeling, and others are not. It is here that criticism begins to function. Principles may be formulated to guide us in judging the efficiency of such objects.

These Rules of composition, says Hume, are not in existence a priori. They are "founded only on experience and on the observation of the common sentiments of human nature". Nor should they be dogmatic or rigidly intellectual: "To check the sallies of the imagination and to reduce every expression to geometrical truth and exactness, would be the most contrary to the laws of criticism". Writers who have not conformed to the commonly accepted rules, he adds, have been found to please despite their irregularities. The error here is obviously with the rules and not with the poets, for (and this is an important observation) what is found to please, cannot be a fault.

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(1) *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary*, G & G, 1875, p. 270
(2) *Ibid* p 269
Yet, though in the long run the Standard depends on individual tastes co-ordinated into a general Taste, poetry must have rules. Having rules, says Hume, is like Sancho Panza's kinsmen's being able to produce from the hogshead of wine the key with the leathern thong: it frees us from the anarchy of subjectivism, by supplying a sort of norm. The Rules again are useful because the normality required for good criticism is easily disturbed. "A perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object" - these are required to discern and judge "the catholic and universal beauty". This is a state hard to arrive at. Therefore general rules are helpful; without them we may have merely particular tastes in particular cases.
Is it possible to arrive at a standard of criticism? Hume thinks so. His requirements for a norm are interesting. For the simpler beauties of the natural world, mere natural sensibility is probably enough. But "with regard to the sciences and liberal arts, a fine taste is, in some measure, the same with strong sense, or at least depends so much upon it that they are inseparable". In the apprehension of artistic beauty, mere receptivity is not enough. Sound judgment is required. "No man, who is not possessed of the soundest judgment, will ever make a tolerable critic in such performances".

(1) Essays & Treatises, 1758, v.1. p. 5.
(2) Ibid p. 5.
Hume's insistence on good sense and judgment in criticism is consistent with his general theory of knowledge as expounded in the Treatise on Human Nature: that there are concurrently in the mind two distinct sources of knowledge: impressions, and ideas. It is the latter, impressions stored up by the memory and marshalled by reason, that should supply the guiding balance for criticism.
In the *Essay on the Rise and Progress of Arts and Sciences*, Hume shows himself partly a determinist in critical attitude. He is sceptical about the "divine fire" of inspiration. "There is not however anything supernatural in the case. Their fire is not kindled from heaven. It only runs along the earth; is caught from one breast to another; and burns brightest, where the materials are best prepared, and most happily disposed." But he would not go so far as Taine (or, earlier, his own countryman, Blackwell) and try to account for the existence of Homer at his particular time and place. This would be throwing oneself "headlong into chimaera". A great deal, he thinks, depends on chance.

Hume then requires the critic to be in a normal state of receptivity. His mind should be free from prejudice. He must consider the *ding an sich*. But he must also make allowance for the circumstances in which it was produced, putting himself in the place of the audience of a different period or race if necessary. A work of art is-

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(1) Essays, G & G, 1875, v. 4. p. 177
(2) Ibid p. 177
(3) Essays & Treatises, 1768, v. 1., p. 270
-to be judged in the light of its aim: is it well calculated to achieve it? The perfect critic has acute sensibility, which he has improved by practice; he develops his sense of values by comparisons with other objects; he is worthless unless through such discipline he has come into possession of 'good judgment'.

And it is in this norm of criticism that the Standard of Taste is to be found. "The joint verdict of such (true critics) is the true standard of taste and beauty". This is not, in his view, an esoteric standard, though his requirements for the critic are high; for "just expressions of passion and nature are sure, after a little time, to gain public applause, which they maintain for ever".

(1) Standard of Taste, G & G ed., p. 279.
(2) Ibid p. 280.
Though the principles of taste be uniform, they vary in operation with the peculiar circumstances of men and countries: a young man is more responsive to the amorous than an old man; a country is always prejudiced in favour of its own ways. Time brings changes of customs, of religious and speculative principles, and for these the critic should always make allowance. Hume is very liberal on this point— not surprisingly for one who set religious Scotland by the ears— but on the question of 'morality' he is more conventional:... "where the ideas of morality and decency alter from one age to another, and where vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper characters of blame and disapprobation, this must be allowed to disfigure the poem, and to be a real deformity." In this respect he finds the ancients sometimes deficient.

(1) Ibid p. 282.
David Hume is a study in contradictions. He tells us that beauty is a quality of feeling, not a quality of objects. But his own common sense makes him add that the nature of the object must have something to do with producing the feeling, or failing to produce it. He is an utilitarian, but he conceives a disinterested sense of beauty. He yields to the necessity of Rules; but he is also a libertarian: "what is found to please cannot be a fault".

We shall examine later some of his remarks dealing more particularly with literary criticism. It may be noted in passing, however, that in Hume, as in the other Scottish aestheticians, theories of art tend to become theories of the art of literature: the line between aesthetics and criticism is a wavering one.

(1) His logic, of course, led him to complete scepticism, and he seems to have exercised the right to ignore it when convenient.
By the middle of the century, keen interest had been aroused in Taste. In 1755 the Edinburgh Society for the encouragement of arts, sciences, manufactures and agriculture offered a gold medal for the best essay on the subject. No worthy entries apparently having been presented in that year, the proposal was repeated in 1756. This time the gold medal was won by Alexander Gerard, professor of natural philosophy at Marischal College. Gerard was a member of that literary and philosophical society in Aberdeen which included Campbell, Reid, Beattie, Blackwell and Gregory, and to whose stimulus we owe some writings of these authors which will be considered later.

(1) His Essay on Taste was published in 1759.
Gerard resumes the course followed by Hutcheson. Taste, he tells us, consists chiefly "in the improvement of those principles which are commonly called the powers of imagination". He analyzes these into the 'simple principles' of the inner senses of novelty, grandeur, beauty, imitation, ridicule and virtue. The sense of novelty makes us delight in whatever is new and strange. The sense of grandeur or sublimity is aroused by objects possessing quantity and simplicity in conjunction. This feeling, in the case of literature, arises entirely from association. The sense of beauty is susceptible to impressions of uniformity, variety and proportion. It may be partly dependent on association with other ideas and senses. Our sense of imitation allows us to take pleasure in a designed resemblance, and this pleasure may be enhanced by the difficulty of the performance. "In this view, poetry, imitating by instituted symbols, nowise resembling things, is, on most subjects, more imperfectly mimetic than the other arts: but this imperfection gives it a kind of merit, as that art is able, notwithstanding-,
-to suggest very lively ideas of its objects.

But what constitutes its unquestionable superiority to all its sister arts, is its peculiar and unrivalled power of imitating the noblest and most important of all subjects, the calmest sentiments of the heart, and human characters displayed in a long series of conduct". (p.55) The sense of harmony permits us to find beauty in sound, in the form of music and language. The sense of ridicule makes us aware of the incongruous, giving the pleasure of laughter.
To the moral sense, Gerard gives an authority superior to that of all the other 'senses'. "It renders morality the chief requisite, and where this is in any degree violated, no other qualities can atone for the transgression. Particular beauties may be approved, but the work is, on the whole, condemned". (p. 69)

In discussing the influence of taste on criticism, he tells us that it is not enough simply to be aware of pleasure or displeasure. "We must ascertain the precise species of either; and refer it to the sentiment, or the expression; the design or the execution; to sublimity or beauty; to wit or humour". (p. 183) The perfect critic must be a philosopher as well as a person of exquisite taste. (p. 184) For the union in their proportions of these internal senses is not all-
-that is required to form Taste. To these must be added Judgment, which "distinguishes things different, separates truth from falsehood and compares together objects and their qualities." (p. 83)

In criticism of 'poetry or eloquence', judgment is particularly important. "A critic must not only feel, but possess that accuracy of discernment, which enables a person to reflect upon his feelings with distinctness, and to explain them to others". (p. 173) "We must determine, whether the fable or design is well imagined in congruity to the species of the poem or discourse; whether all the incidents or arguments are natural members of it; which of them promotes its force or beauty, or which, by its want of connection, obstructs the end, or debilitates its genuine effect; what degree of relation is sufficient to introduce episodes, illustrations, or digressions, so that they may appear, not excrescences and deformities, but suitable decorations". (p. 86)
The ratio of sensibility and judgment in the critic's equipment determines the nature of his criticism. Longinus, for instance, is

"An ardent judge, who, zealous in his trust, with warmth gives sentence..."

Aristotle, on the other hand, is "cool and unaffected".

The chief function of criticism, says Gerard, is not (as some of his contemporaries seem to have thought) to assist the poet, but to inform the taste of the reader. (p. 132) "Corruptions of taste can be avoided only by establishing within ourselves an exact standard of intrinsic excellence, by which we may try whatever is presented to us. This standard will be established by the careful study of the most correct performances of every kind, which are generally indeed the most excellent". (p. 131) He does not seem to notice any fallacy here: by studying works which are, a priori, "correct", we are to "establish in the mind a criterion, a touchstone of excellence and depravity" (p. 125) on which we can test the correctness of other works.
Imagination, he goes on, plays a part in criticism: blending impressions, through the principle of association, into complex unities. But the critic need not have the fiery imagination of creative genius. Genius "may throw a peculiar brightness upon taste, as it enables one, by a kind of contagion, to catch the spirit of an author, to judge with the same disposition in which he composed, and by this means to feel every beauty with a delight and transport of which a colder critic can form no idea". (p. 169) Of this sympathetic power, Longinus may be taken as example. But soundness and strength of judgment are perhaps more essential in the critic. These made Aristotle, for instance, a better critic than Longinus, though he was not a poet. (p. 169)

Gerard tries to correct the idea that a Standard of Taste is intended to reconcile widely differing tastes. "It is only something by which it may be determined, which is the best among tastes various, contending, and incapable of coinciding perfectly". (p. 216) The Standard of Taste does not-
-consist in universal or general approbation. It is practically impossible to discover and apply such a standard, or to find any example of its application. Moreover, the "universal approbation" theory leaves unjudged for a long time new works whose merit is the same at their creation as it may later be discovered to be. In any case, general approval actually means an acceptance by the many of the judgment of the few who are capable of judging. The decisions of these few whose natural sensibility, exercised and controlled by judgment, enables them to estimate the value of works of art, are not arbitrary but rest upon general principles. Critical laws are founded on a study of what in the past has generally pleased; they are therefore in harmony with the 'sensible' part of our nature. And in these principles governing the sensible part of our nature, a standard of taste is to be discovered, insofar as it is possible to erect such a standard.
In an appendix to the Essay on Taste, Gerard considers the question, whether poetry be properly an imitative art? This appendix is perhaps more provocative than the Essay itself. So far as poetry is dramatic, he tells us, representing persons acting and speaking, poetry is imitative. But if the poet merely describes or relates, his poetry is not imitative in the sense that painting is imitative. It employs symbols which are purely arbitrary.

Poetry imitates nature, but not particular subjects in nature. History recounts real things; poetry recounts what is probable. "In a word, poetry is called an imitation, not because it produces a lively idea of its immediate subject, but because this subject itself is an imitation of some part of real nature" (p. 283). It is an imitation not because it copies realities but because it sets forth resemblances to realities. This he conceives to be the sense in which Aristotle describes poetry as an imitation.
In his *Essay on Genius* (1767), Gerard sets down invention as the distinguishing characteristic of genius. Homer is revered because without a model he raised primitive poetry to the dignity of epic through his powers of invention. Thus Virgil's *Aeneid*, though more 'correct', displays less genius. Milton he places above Virgil for inventive power, and Shakespeare above Milton. Chaucer may properly be considered the father of English poetry, "because he first displayed invention in any considerable degree". (p. 14)

The source of genius, he holds, is Imagination, which in the Essay is listed among the intellectual powers along with Sense, Memory, and Judgment. Genius is not independent of judgment, which "must constantly attend it, and correct and regulate its suggestions". (p. 37). Its characteristics are great activity, fertility and regularity in the association of ideas, so that these may be at the service of a fixed design.

(1) Edition used 1774.
If in Section I, part III of this Essay on Genius, which is a good study of the creative power at work in the artist, Gerard had thought through his terminology, he might have come near Coleridge's conception of imagination. He approves 'enthusiasm', which "like a divine impulse, raises the mind above itself, and by the natural influence of imagination actuates it as if it were supernaturally inspired" (p. 68); but he does not distinguish imagination from fancy.

In sections II and III, he develops still further his views on association and its relation to the inventive powers. He suggests a parallel between scientific genius, which addresses itself to the understanding, and artistic genius, which tries to please the taste. In the former, cause and effect are the associated ideas, co-existing in the mind. In the latter, resemblance between the imitation and the original have the place of cause and effect. Resemblance is the predominant principle of association in the arts. "In every good-
-picture, in every good poetical description, we perceive the influence of co-existence operating on the imagination, under the direction of resemblance: whenever it does not operate, precision is wanting, nothing is appropriated, everything is common and indeterminate; whenever it is not directed by resemblance, there are superfluous, useless, or ill-adapted circumstances" (p. 341) - Pope's Windsor Forest he suggests as an example of the former: it is too general; Cowley's On the Queen's repairing Somerset House illustrates the latter deficiency: it is too detailed, without selection.

We saw that Gerard considered judgment essential for the critic. For the artist, however, it may be a hindrance. It is needed for scientific genius, but "in genius for the arts, an uncommon strength of judgment is so far from being necessary, that a degree of imagination which would have produced genius if it had been joined to an ordinary judgment, may be rendered abortive, and unable to display itself, by being united to a very nice judgment." (p. 388)
For the artist, taste is rather more essential. It must be sufficiently acute to let him perceive beforehand how successful the promptings of the imagination will be when put into execution. It is always operating to restrain and direct the imagination and achieve regularity and correctness.

He notes that in the arts, executive as well as inventive power is requisite. A person may have the power of execution without possessing genius. But "in poetry, a power of execution separated from every degree of the correspondent invention, is perhaps more rare than in any of the other arts" (p. 418). The power of expression "consists perhaps entirely in a capacity of setting objects in such a light that they may affect others with the same ideas, associations, and feelings, with which the artist is affected".

It is plain from the above excerpts that in Gerard we make some slight advances towards our goal. He is more purely aesthetical than Hutcheson, and he knew more about the arts, particularly about poetry, than did Hume. The attention he pays to the creative process in the artist is valuable. His weaknesses are the weaknesses of the associational psychology of his period.
Alison.
Alison (1757-1839)

The theory of the pleasures of the imagination and the association of ideas is carried still further by Archibald Alison, Episcopalian clergyman in Edinburgh. His Essays on the nature and principles of Taste were published there in 1790. The Essays are divided into two parts: Of the nature of the emotions of sublimity and beauty; and Of the sublimity and beauty of the material world. The second of these does not concern us.

In the introduction to the first essay, Alison tells us that "Taste is that faculty of the human mind, by which we perceive and enjoy whatever is beautiful or sublime in the works of nature or art." His object is "to investigate the nature of those qualities that produce the emotions of taste, and to investigate the nature of that faculty by which these emotions are received." He does not regard these inquiries as mere philosophical gymnastics. He considers them fundamental to criticism. "They have an immediate relation to-
-all the arts that are directed to the production either of the beautiful or the sublime; and they afford the only means by which the principles of these various arts can be ascertained."(Intro.)

In the large, Alison's theory is that the emotions of sublimity and beauty depend on the association of material with mental qualities. Things are not beautiful in themselves, but they set up in the imagination agreeable trains of thought. Their mere sensory qualities leave us cold. It is only when our imaginations are kindled that we enjoy - even Milton's poetry.(p.3) The state of our imaginations(by which he means our associations of ideas) is therefore all-important: our sense of beauty or sublimity is in proportion to the exercise of the imagination.
He illustrates this enhancement of pleasure through the imagination: When a man first sees Rome, "it is ancient Rome which fills his imagination". When he sees a 'picturesque object' (such as 'an old tower in the middle of a deep wood'), it "suggests an additional train of conceptions, beside what the scene or description itself would have suggested". When he reads in *The Seasons*,

"...lead me to the mountain brow,  
Where sits the shepherd on the grassy turf,  
Inhaling, healthful, the descending sun,  
Around him feeds his many-bleating flock  
Of various cadence, and his sportive lambs  
Their frolics play; and now the sprightly race  
Invites them forth, when swift the signal given,  
They start away, and sweep the mossy mound  
That runs around the hill, the rampart once  
Of iron war, in ancient barbarous times...".

-the last circumstance, says Alison, greatly enhances the intrinsic beauty.

(1) Compare with Coleridge, who says (in a place which I cannot at the moment locate) that the plain of Marathon is but a simple plain to him.
The deepest effect of sublimity or beauty, it would seem, is thus produced when our imaginations are led away from the object itself. (p.42) The power of the arts to produce emotions of beauty and sublimity depends on the opportunity afforded the artist of adding "some interesting or affecting quality" (p.82). Like Gerard, Alison recognizes the advantages in this respect of poetry, which "can express every quality of mind as well as of body" and is therefore best qualified to appeal to the imagination. (p.82) The weakness of his argument is that while he shows that imagination intensifies the sense of beauty, he does not prove it to consist in this alone. Nevertheless he concludes that "the effect produced upon the mind, by objects of sublimity and beauty, consists in the production of this exercise of imagination".
Alison next turns his attention to the nature of those trains of thought which create the sensation of beauty. Not all trains of thought are of this kind, but only those which are composed of 'Ideas of Emotion'. The only subjects suitable for the arts are those productive of a simple emotion (p. 82), and unity of impression is created by the fact that each member of the train of ideas of emotion produces some simple feeling. There is "always some general principle of connection which pervades the whole, and gives them some certain and definite character". (p. 54)

This of course is a psychological attempt to explain the necessity of unity in any work of art, and typical of the obligation which these aestheticians felt, to reconcile the newer philosophy with classical criticism. It arrives at the same conclusion as the latter: "No composition of objects or qualities produces such emotions, in which this unity of character or of emotion is not preserved".
Alison gives a number of illustrations of failure in poetry to sustain unity in the object, thus disturbing the train of ideas. That from Shakespeare may be taken as typical. Quoting,

"The current, that with gentle murmur glides
Thou know'st, being stopp'd, impatiently doth rage,
But when his fair course is not hindered;
He makes sweet music with th' enamel'd stones,
Giving a gentle kiss to every sedge
He overtakest in his pilgrimage;
And so by many winding nooks he strays
With willing sport to the wild ocean,"

--"The pleasing personification", he comments,
"which we attribute to a brook, is founded upon the faint belief of voluntary motion, and is immediately checked when the Poet descends to any minute or particular resemblance". (p. 101.)

Alison makes a sharp distinction between Taste and criticism. The critical faculty is cold and analytical, and inimical to the Pleasures of the Imagination. "When we sit down to appreciate the value of a poem, or of a painting, and attend minutely to the language or composition of one, or to the colouring or design of the other, we feel no longer the delight which they at first produce. Our imagination in this employment is restrained, and--
instead of yielding to its suggestions, we studiously endeavour to resist them, by fixing our attention upon minute and partial circumstances of the composition. (p. 7) The arduous labours of the critic check the uncontrolled flight of the imagination, wherein artistic pleasure resides. "The mind, in such an employment, instead of being at liberty to follow whatever trains of imagery the composition before it can excite, is either fettered to the consideration of some of its minute and solitary parts; or pauses amid the rapidity of its conceptions, to make them the objects of its attention and review." (p. 8) By directing attention to particulars, rather than to the effect of a work of art, "the exercise of Criticism never fails to destroy, for the time, our sensibility to the beauty of every composition." (p. 70) "They" (critics of this kind) accustom us to consider every composition in relation only to rules; they turn our attention from those qualities upon which their effect is founded as objects of Taste, to the consideration of the principles by which--
-this effect is attained, and instead of that deep and enthusiastic delight which the perception of Beauty or Sublimity bestows, they afford us at last no higher enjoyment, than what arises from the observation of the dexterity of Art". (p.70)

This, in 1790, seems a perversely reactionary conception of criticism, for which some years before the new rhetoricians had set up very different claims; but it may be intended as a commentary on the latter. We may note here that directly through Alison, Jeffrey came under the influence of this sort of lugubrious view of criticism. Whether it affected not only his theory but his practice we shall see in another chapter.
Thomas Reid offers a suitable antidote to the excessive associationalism of Alison. As protagonist of the Commonsense School he had attacked the validity of the complete idealism on which Hume's system was founded, suggesting that perception of the object accompanies mere sensation and that every sensation is accompanied by a judgment. In his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, consistently with this attitude he asserts that there are intrinsic qualities in objects that appeal to our sense of beauty:

"When I hear an air in music that pleases me, I say, it is fine, it is excellent. This excellence is not in me; it is in the music. But the pleasure it gives is not in the music; it is in me. ... This ought the rather to be observed, because it is become a fashion among modern philosophers, to resolve all our perceptions into mere feelings or sensations in the person that perceives, without anything corresponding to those feelings in the external object". (2)

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(2) v.1. p. 490.
As a criticism of Hume this is not quite fair. See section on Hume.
He appeals to Common Sense for refutation of this latter view. "If it be said that the perception of beauty is merely a feeling in the mind that perceives, without any belief of excellence in the object, the necessary consequence of this opinion is, that when I say Virgil's Georgics is a beautiful poem, I mean not to say anything of the poem, but only something concerning myself and my feelings." (v.l.p.492)

Reid is also in conflict with Alison as to the relation of Taste and criticism. According to Alison, appreciation and judgment do not go together. According to Reid, taste and judgment go hand in hand, and "our judgment of beauty is not indeed a dry and unaffected judgment, like that of a mathematical or metaphysical truth"(492). Every operation of taste involves a judgment. "When a man pronounces a poem or a palace to be beautiful, he affirms something of that poem or that palace; and every affirmation or denial expresses judgment". (492)

(1) A point of view blandly admitted by some modern critics. Vide Anatole France's "I shall now talk about myself on the subject of so and so..." etc.
As to the Standard of Taste, says Reid, there is a perfect and a corrupt taste. Bad education, bad habits, etc. may produce deformed taste; but "every excellence has a real beauty and charm that makes it an agreeable object to those who have the faculty of discerning its beauty; and this faculty is what we call a good taste". (p.491)

Of the aestheticians we have considered, Reid is the first to remove Beauty from the mind and place it in the thing itself. "Beauty or deformity in an object", he remarks, "results from its nature or structure. To perceive the beauty, therefore, we must perceive the nature or structure from which it results. This would seem to promise something concrete in the way of an Anatomy of Beauty; but Reid shrinks from it: "a philosophical analysis of the objects of taste is like applying the anatomical knife to a fine face". (p.493)
He merely reviews the conventional divisions of Novelty, Beauty, and Grandeur. This is not without profit, however, for he puts Novelty in its place as not a quality of a thing nor a sensation in the mind, but "a relation which the thing has to the knowledge of the person". (p. 493)

With Beauty and Grandeur he does a curious thing. Having rejected them as qualities of mind of the perceiver, he tells us that they are after all qualities of mind - of the mind of the artist who creates beauty or grandeur. "A great work is a work of great power, great wisdom, and great goodness, well contrived for some important end. But power, wisdom and goodness, are properly the attributes of mind only. They are ascribed to the work figuratively, but are really inherent in the author; and by the same figure, the grandeur is ascribed to the work, but is properly inherent in the mind that made it...When we consider the Iliad as the work of the poet, its sublimity was really in the mind of Homer...When we consider the things presented to our mind in the Iliad without regard to the poet, the grandeur is properly in Hector and Achilles, and the other great personages, human and divine, brought upon the stage." (p. 496)
He has similar reflections to make on Beauty, which he divides into original and derived. By original or real beauty he means qualities of mind, and by derived beauty that which is found in objects of sense and which is "derived from some relation they bear to mind, as the signs or expressions of some mental quality, or as the effects of design, art, and wise contrivance". (p. 502)

This, slightly disguised, is really the Greek identification of goodness with beauty. He apprehends "that it is in the moral and intellectual perfections of mind, and in its active powers, that beauty originally dwells; and that from this as the fountain, all the beauty which we perceive in the visible world is derived". (p. 503)

At one point, Reid liberates aesthetics from the bondage of subjectivism. At another he leads us back almost to where we started with Shaftesbury. The foundation which he lays down for criticism is strongly moralistic: "Our moral-
-and rational powers justly claim dominion
over the whole man. Even taste is not exempted
from their authority; it must be subject to that
authority in every case wherein we pretend to reason
or dispute about matters of taste..."(p. 508)

Of creative imagination he has little to
say. He tells us that "every work of art has its
model framed in the imagination" (p.385); and
"everything that is regular in that train of thought
which we call fancy or imagination, from the little
designs and reveries of children to the grandest
productions of human genius, was originally the
offspring of judgment or taste, applied with some
effort greater or less". (p. 387)
Stewart.
Dugald Stewart, disciple of Reid and friend of Alison, in 1785 succeeded Adam Ferguson in the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh University. It is recorded that he was very 'eloquent' and that his lectures had great influence on the rising generation. In his Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1792) he touches on our province.

He distinguishes two sorts of appeal in objects of art. There are those "which are fitted to please by nature, or by associations which all mankind are led to form by their common condition; and secondly, those which please in consequence of associations arising from local and accidental circumstances". (1802 ed. p. 377)

There are likewise two categories of taste, applying-

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(1) Who dedicated to him the Essays on Taste.
(2) Cockburn tells us (in the Memorials) that 'there was eloquence in his very spitting'. Among his admiring listeners were Sydney Smith, Francis Horner, Henry Erskine, Brougham and Jeffrey.
(3) Editions used 1792 and 1802. vols. 1.
-to the universal and the accidental qualities
of beauty. This leads him to the observation that
"the works which continue to please from age to
age, are written with perfect simplicity; while
those which captivate the multitude by a display
of meretricious ornaments, if by chance they
should survive the fashions to which they are
accomodated, remain only to furnish a subject of
ridicule to posterity". (1802, p. 377)

Stewart insists strongly that pleasure
is the object of poetry:

"All the different arts which I have
hitherto mentioned, as taking rise from
imagination, have this in common, that their
primary object is to please. This observation
applies to poetry, no less than to the others;
nay, it is this circumstance which characterizes
poetry and distinguishes it from all the other
classes of literary composition. The object of
the Philosopher is to inform and enlighten
mankind; that of the Orator, to acquire an
ascendant over the will of others, by bending
to his own purposes their judgments, their
imaginations, and their passions: but the
primary and the distinguishing aim of the
Poet is, to please." (1792, p. 287.)
Stewart combats Burke's idea that the effect of poetry is not to raise images, but that the words employed have simply from use the same effect as the original when it is seen. (1802 ed. p. 499)

Against the famous "The river Danube rises in a moist and mountainous soil" citation of Burke, he sets fittingly Gray's:

"In climes beyond the solar road
Where shaggy forms o'er ice-built mountains roam,
The muse has broke the twilight-gloom,
To cheer the shiv'ring native's dull abode...";

concluding with

"Glory pursue, and generous shone,
Th'unconquerable mind, and freedom's holy flame".

(1802 ed. p. 505)

as examples of the different appeals of particular image and abstract idea.

He apparently does not fear that 'poetical diction' may become petrified; but values it because as "a set of words consecrated to poetry" it grows rich in association as the language ages.
Stewart, who is sometimes charged with carrying associationalism to excess, does not pursue it unreasonably with regard to taste. He deprecates the prevailing supposition that "association is sufficient to account for the origin of these notions (of beauty and deformity); and that there is no such thing as a standard of Taste, founded on the principles of the human constitution." (1802 ed. p. 371) This he thinks is pushing the theory too far: "The association of ideas can never account for the origin of a new notion; or of a pleasure essentially different from all the others which we know." (1802 ed. p. 371.)

Stewart's most interesting contribution is his distinction between Fancy and Imagination. It is wrong, he says, to describe as imagination "the tendency in the human mind to associate or connect its thoughts together". (1792 ed. p. 282) A train of thought about absent objects of sense he calls "merely a series of conceptions"; and to this power of associating ideas according to relations of resemblance and analogy he gives the name of fancy. (1792 ed. p. 305)
Fancy he declares to be subservient to poetical imagination, from which he clearly distinguishes it. (1792 ed. p.287) The office of Fancy is "to collect materials for the Imagination", which, thus served by Fancy, by a process of analysis and combination "creates the complex scenes he (the poet) describes, and the fictitious characters he delineates" (p.288) "The association of ideas, therefore, although perfectly distinct from the power of imagination, is immediately and essentially subservient to all its exertions". (p.283) A man of Fancy is merely one "whose habits of association present to him, for illustrating or embellishing a subject, a number of resembling or of analogous ideas; but for an effort of imagination, various other powers are necessary, particularly the powers of taste and judgment...To fancy, we apply the epithets of rich or luxuriant; to imagination, those of beautiful or sublime". (p.285)
To Imagination, Stewart gives quite definitely the creative power. "The power of imagination is unlimited. She can create and annihilate, and dispose at pleasure her woods, her rocks and her rivers". (1802 ed. v.2. p. 436)

He quarrels with Addison's and Reid's limitation of the province of imagination to objects of sight. "All the objects of human knowledge supply materials to her forming hand; diversifying infinitely the works she produces, while the mode of her operation remains essentially uniform". (1802 ed. p. 483)

Imagination includes Conception or simple Apprehension; Abstraction, "which separates the selected materials from the qualities and circumstances which are connected with them in nature"; Fancy, or the habit of association; Taste, which selects the materials and directs their combination. (1802 ed. p. 487)

The general function of the Imagination is "to make a selection of qualities and of circumstances from a variety of different objects, and by combining and disposing these, to form a new creation of its own". (1802, p. 481) And genius in the fine arts he defines as "a cultivated taste, combined with a creative imagination". (1802 p. 507).
This seems to me clearly an anticipation, generally overlooked, of Coleridge's "esemplastic" definition of Imagination and his distinction between it and Fancy. The first volume of the Elements, from which these remarks are taken, was published in the year that Coleridge, a lad of twenty, matriculated at Jesus College. Coleridge's clarification of the problem, and his brilliant application of the idea in actual criticism, make a much richer document than Stewart's bald statement; but some of the credit for trail-blazing ought to be transferre' to this 'eloquent' northern philosopher.

(1) Coleridge, though he believed himself "the first of my countrymen who had pointed out the diverse meaning of which the two terms are capable, and analyzed the faculties to which they should be appropriated" (Biogr. Lit. 1817 v.1. p. 39), must have read Stewart. See The Friend, Section II, Essay I.

Stewart presumably had caught the suggestion from Kant. For a further note on fancy and imagination, a problem which is important not only in this connection but in the relations of Jeffrey and the Lakers, see Appendix. No.3.
A sort of apology was offered at the beginning of this chapter for the inclusion of aesthetics in criticism; but I am not at all certain that any apology is necessary. It is possible to regard aesthetic theory simply as a philosophical exercise engaged in for the sake of knowledge and not as a guide to practice. Nevertheless, aesthetics and criticism approach along their parallel roads of abstraction and concretion the same fundamental object: the perception of art. The mathematician will object that parallel roads do not meet; but unless the hedges are very high, the critic must be aware of the aesthetician's conduct and may be influenced by it. The critic can scarcely avoid being affected by a change in the metaphysical atmosphere from the philosophical aesthetic of the eighteenth century to the intuitional aesthetic of Croce. A critic who feels philosophically justified in judging a work of art from the outside must be a different sort of critic from one who believes that—

(1) I refer the reader to W.J. Courthope's excellent discussion in *Life in Art, Law in Taste*, Lon. 1901.
-the creation of art and the criticism of art are almost identical in process. Coleridge himself thought that his distinction between Fancy and Imagination "would in its immediate effects furnish a torch of guidance to the philosophical critic, and ultimately to the poet himself"; and I hope to show that succeeding practice was affected by the aestheticians we have discussed. So far as the originality of their doctrines is concerned, it must of course be admitted that they bring out of the cauldron little more than they put in: their aesthetics is largely a rationalization of the classical point of view in terms of the new psychology.

(1) Biographia Literaria, ch. 4.
Chapter Two.

I.B.

Systems of Rhetoric.
Some indication has been given of the philosophical background of eighteenth-century Scottish criticism. The line between aesthetic and poetic sometimes eludes the grasp. There is in the aestheticians some literary criticism, for they had no wide acquaintance with other arts. There are often in the so-called "rhetoricians" confused essays in aesthetic which might well have been omitted. The term "rhetoricians" is apt to bemuse us. The school has been described as "an attempt, not uniformly successful, to elaborate from the associational psychology of the time a doctrine of taste and rules for its expression in the arts, particularly in the art of composition". (1)

But the first part of this project is also the concern of the aestheticians we have been discussing. The statement is almost entirely true of Kames, and partly true of Blair; but it has little application to Campbell. The latter more or less tacitly accepts -

-the current principles of association, but his hard-thought system of composition is hewn out of concrete example and independent thinking, and owes practically nothing to contemporary aesthetics or psychology.

The "rhetoricians" vary in their philosophical approaches to their subject. Blair is the least philosophical of the three, his general ideas being largely derivative and his work a symposium of what he considered the best thought of the time. Karnes is more clearly the connecting link between the aestheticians and literary criticism; and his philosophy has the weaknesses of their vague speculations on Taste and Beauty, though he does sometimes come to grips with criticism. He too often seems more interested in discovering the principles of human nature through a study of the elements of criticism than in using what he knew about human nature to set up principles for the creation of literature. Campbell is the most radical of the three, and in this sense the most philosophical. Though he avows the illumination of human nature as one-half his scheme, he does not let this lead -
-him far astray and is severely practical in laying down his principles of composition.

Again, we need to be clear as to the object of the rhetoricians. Rhetoric is the art of expressive speech, or, for our purpose, the art of composition. Saintsbury holds that, in Campbell at any rate, Rhetoric is become literary criticism. It is true that Campbell's comprehensive view of Eloquence provides a fresh starting-point; but in the main he is concerned with rules of composition. This is a useful preparation for criticism rather than the thing itself. The rhetoricians themselves are aware of the distinction. Blair separates in his treatment rhetoric from belles lettres. Kames, who sets out to explain the elements of criticism, properly treats the rules for the use of language merely as preparatory to this. And Campbell, who is trying to get at the philosophical principles of composition, is quite aware that he is not a literary critic. Nevertheless, these three all attempt to analyze laws for the use of language as an instrument of art, and may conveniently be considered together.
Blair.
Hugh Blair began in 1759 his lectures from the first regular chair of English literature in Scotland. They were published in 1783 as \textit{Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres}. Before publication he thus had access to Kames' \textit{Elements of Criticism} and Campbell's \textit{Philosophy of Rhetoric}. The Lectures give the impression of being a neat pastiche of 'the best that had been said' rather than wrought with much effort in his own mind. He may have owed a good deal to Adam Smith, whose lost lectures on the same subject he had seen and used. He gives Smith credit for some of his ideas on style; but there is some doubt as to whether this acknowledgment is adequate. He pays tribute to some sources of inspiration, but also sometimes presents as his own (possibly by oversight) material which is obviously borrowed. For instance, in Vol. II, p. 345, he says, dealing-

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(1)] \textit{I}, 331.
  \item[(2)] See \textit{John Hill: Life of Blair}, 1807, p. 266.
\end{itemize}
-with pastoral poetry, "The state of a Shepherd, or a person occupied in rural employments only, is exposed to few of those accidents and revolutions which render his situation interesting or produce curiosity or surprise. The tenor of his life is uniform. His ambition is conceived to be without policy, and his love without intrigue".

In a note, II, 351, he echoes William Richardson's defense of Tasso's Aminta, against Addison, without acknowledgment. In II, 436, he advocates in place of the Greek chorus for tragedy a chorus between acts, with music and songs related to the mood of the play. This is to be found in Kames' Elements, II, 410. But we should not look for originality in Blair. The texture of his thought is often very thin, and covered by an irritating "elegance" of style. Considered as lectures prepared for the classroom, they display wide reading, and, according to contemporary standards, good taste. It is as a-

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(1) See Johnson: Rambler, 360.
(2) Among the critics consulted by Blair are: Gerard, D'Alembert, Kames, Hume, Burke, Cicero, Addison, Webb, Hutcheson, Harris, Aristotle, Longinus, Dionysius, Campbell, Quintilian, Temple, Pope, Marfaix, Johnson, Monboddo, Crevier, Fontenelle, Warton, De la Motte, Hayley, Dryden, Montague, Voltaire, Shaftesbury, de Bos, Rapin, Penelon.
-norm or clearing-house where the changes are rung on the critical currency of the times that the Lectures are worth examination.

Blair's scheme is pretty conventional: Taste, criticism, genius, pleasures of taste, the sublime, beauty, the component parts of language, and so on. A great deal of the first volume is devoted to language. The second volume proceeds to the various sorts of composition, beginning with eloquence; history, philosophical writing, dialogue, epistolatory writing, fictitious history, poetry.

Like his contemporaries, he prides himself on his good sense, and promises to proceed on rational principles. "If the following Lectures have any merit, it will consist in an endeavour to substitute the application of these principles in the place of artificial and scholastic rhetoric; in an endeavour to explode false ornament, to direct attention more towards substance than show, to recommend good sense as the foundation of all good composition, and simplicity as essential to all true ornament." (Intro.1,3)
In contrast to Alison's lugubrious
pronouncement, Blair ranks criticism high as "a
liberal and humane art. It is the offspring of
good sense and refined taste. It aims at acquiring
a just discernment of the real merit of authors". (I,9)

He thinks criticism may do a service to authors.
"No observations can indeed supply the defect of
genius, or inspire it where it is wanting. But they
may often direct it into its proper channel; they may
correct its extravagancies, and point out to it the
most just and proper imitation of nature". (I,38)

He examines the pleasures of taste, attributing
to Addison the first attempt at analysis of them.
He reduces taste to Delicacy and Correctness, pro-
ceeding respectively from feeling and understanding.
Longinus and Addison are the best examples of
delicacy he can suggest; Aristotle and Swift(had
he written criticism) of correctness. In the judgment
of literature, emotion and not intellect is the final
arbiter. The foundation on which critical reasonings
rest is "what has been found from experience to
please mankind most universally". (I,31)
The fourth lecture is devoted to the sublime in writing. He thinks Longinus has often confused mere elegance with sublimity. His requirements for the latter are conciseness, simplicity, and strength. Blank verse is more conducive to an effect of sublimity than rhyme. His illustrations are drawn chiefly from the bible, and from Ossian.

On beauty of language he is not illuminating. Apart from the general meaning of the phrase, it denotes "a manner neither remarkably sublime, nor vehemently passionate, nor uncommonly sparkling; but such as raises in the reader an emotion of the gentle, placid kind, similar to what is raised by the contemplation of beautiful objects in nature; which neither lifts the mind very high, nor agitates it very much, but diffuses over the imagination an agreeable and pleasing serenity. Mr. Addison is a writer altogether of this character". (I, 91)
Blair discusses at some length the harmony and logical structure of sentences; then figurative language, which he defines as that "prompted either by the imagination or by the passions". (I, 275). His quotations from poets ancient and modern are copious and accurate.

Of style, perspicuity and precision are the sole qualities required. (184). He divides style in general into concise and diffuse, nervous and feeble. As to ornament, he has another classification:

- dry, plain, neat, elegant, flowery. Of the 'dry' style, Aristotle is an example; of the 'plain', Swift. The 'elegant' possesses "all the virtues of ornament, without any of its excesses or defects". (383) and includes "only the first-rate writers in the language; such as, Addison, Dryden, Pope, Temple, Bolingbroke, Atterbury, and a few more". (383) Still another sort of style is the 'simple'. In this shine Tillotson, and Temple, but particularly Addison, who "is, beyond doubt, in the English language, the most perfect example". (394)
The first volume concludes with critical examinations, sentence by sentence, of Nos. 411-414 of the Spectator, and of the beginning of Swift's A Proposal for correcting, improving and ascertaining the English tongue. Swift he admires less than he does Addison. These criticisms, which are of the pedagogic order, are sound but not particularly noteworthy.

Of the twenty-three lectures in the second volume, dealing with the various departments of composition, ten are devoted to eloquence. Blair's definition is almost as catholic as Campbell's (which by this time had been published): "to be truly eloquent, is to speak to the purpose" (II, 2)

"Whenever a man speaks or writes, he is supposed, as a rational being, to have some end in view; either to inform or to amuse or to persuade or in some way or other to act upon his fellow-creatures. He who speaks, or writes, in such a manner as to adapt all his words most effectually to that end, is the most eloquent man." But in his actual-

(1) Though later he uses the term 'eloquence' to mean prose as distinguished from poetry.
-discussion, 'eloquence' is restricted to the older meaning of the term. He gives an historical survey of Greek and Roman oratory, dwelling on Demosthenes and Cicero, and lamenting its decline in the moderns. His rules and admonitions for public speaking are rather obvious.

Lecture 35, an echo of the Battle of the Books, discusses the comparative merits of ancients and moderns, concluding that "among some of the Ancient Writers, we must look for the highest models in most of the kinds of elegant composition". (II, 257) The moderns are sometimes more distinguished for art and correctness, but the ancients have "more vigour, more fire, more enthusiasm of genius". (II, 254)

Blair then proceeds to the various kinds of prose composition. We may pass over the remarks on philosophical writing, dialogue, and epistolary writing. For history, clearness, order, due connection and unity are his requirements. In the last of these qualities, Polybius excelled; and Herodotus, though unreliable, is more pleasing than Thucydides because of his unity.
"Fictitious history" he refers to as comprehending "a very numberous, though, in general, a very insignificant class of writings known by the name of Romances and Novels". (II, 303) He divides the progress of this type into three stages: the romance of chivalry (e.g. Amadis); the renaissance romance (e.g. Sidney's Arcadia); and the familiar novel. He has read Gil Blas, Marivaux's Marianne, Rousseau's Nouvelle Héloïse. He has not a high opinion of English novelists, but has a good word to say for Defoe (his Crusoe only), for Fielding, for Richardson, "the most moral of all our novel writers". (309). On the whole, novels do not interest him greatly. They might be made profitable but "oftener tend to dissipation and idleness than to any good purpose". (319).

Poetry is not sharply separated from prose: "It is hardly possible to determine the exact limit where eloquence (prose) ends and Poetry begins". (313) He describes poetry as "the language of passion; or of enlivened imagination, formed, most commonly, into regular numbers". (312)
He discusses the various sorts of verse and their melodic qualities, making much of the caesura, as do Monboddo and Kanes. He agrees that English verse depends on accent, not quantity.

The Kinds next claim his attention. Most pastoral poetry he thinks unnecessarily insipid, its reiterated commonplace of shepherds and nymphs staling what Theocritus and Virgil handled freshly. Why may not pastoral poetry take a wider range? Human nature, and human passions, are much the same in every rank of life; and wherever these passions operate on objects that are within the rural sphere, (1) there may be a proper subject for pastoral" (II, 346)

He has not a high opinion of the pastorals of Pope and Phillips.

(1) Since this was written, he notes, he has discovered in translation Gesner's Idylls, in which his ideas for the improvement of pastoral are "fully realized." It apparently does not occur to him that his countryman Ramsay might be considered in this connection.
The characteristic fear of enthusiasm is displayed in his remarks on lyric poetry. The danger is that the poet, surrendering himself to the emotion, may disregard order, method, and connection. The license of the (to him) modern lyricists in their versification aggravates this disorder.

Pope he of course places high among the writers of didactic poetry. He is "a model, next to perfect" (368). Young and Boileau are also praised in passing.

Description he considers the great test of poetic imagination.

"To a writer of the inferior class, nature ...appears exhausted by those who have gone before him in the same tract... He gives us words rather than ideas; we meet with the language indeed of poetical description, but we apprehend the object described very indistinctly. Whereas, a true Poet makes us imagine that we see it before our eyes; he catches the distinguishing features; he gives it the colours of life and reality; he places it in such a light, that a Painter could copy after him." (p.371)

Thomson in this respect has merit; also Parnell in his Tale of the Hermit; and, of course, Ossian.

But the "richest and most remarkable" of all English poems are Milton's Allegro and Penseroso. (375)
All these are very scattered remarks. Lecture 41, on the poetry of the Hebrews, strikes one as being a more sustained effort of Blair's own thought.

On Epic he writes at greater length. He defines it as "the recital of some illustrious enterprise in a poetical form" (II, 400). He ridicules Bossu's idea of its being written to inculcate a moral, though of course it should be moral. It should be One, it should be great, it must be interesting. A modern subject is not suitable. Episodes must be introduced naturally and ought to be 'elegant'. An epic generally ends successfully for the hero, but need not: for example, Lucan's Pharsalia and Milton's Paradise Lost (for the de'il is not the hero!) He does not believe in a narrow restriction of form, and includes Glover's Leonidas, Wilkie's Epigoniad, Ossian's Fingal and Temora, in the company of Paradise Lost, Pharsalia, Statius' Thebaid.
His particular criticisms of epic poems are not remarkable. He approves Homer's simplicity and fire, Virgil's elegance and tenderness. Virgil he finds deficient in characterization, and the Aeneid do not well sustained towards the end. Tasso is "the most distinguished epic poet in modern ages" (457); though his romantic vein causes some uneasiness. He is "inferior to Homer in simplicity and in fire; to Virgil, in tenderness; to Milton, in daring sublimity of genius". (461) Nevertheless the Jerusalem Delivered he ranks third among epic poems, after the Iliad and the Aeneid. About Milton, Blair is enthusiastic. The Paradise Lost is "undoubtedly one of the highest efforts of poetical genius; and in one great characteristic of the epic poem, majesty and sublimity, it is fully equal to any that bear that name". (471) In sublimity he thinks Milton excels even Homer. But he is "too frequently theological and metaphysical; sometimes harsh in his language; often too technical in his words, and affectedly ostentatious of his learning". (476)
The remaining lectures are devoted to the drama. Tragedy Blair is at some pains to prove "a moral species of composition". (II, 479). He thinks it impossible to interest us in any character "without representing that character as worthy and honourable, though it may not be perfect" (473). His paraphrase of Aristotle, in eighteenth-century language, is that tragedy proposes to "improve our virtuous sensibility". (479) He regards the writer of tragedy as above all a moral agent: "Nothing indeed in the conduct of tragedy demands a poet's attention more, than so to describe his personages and so to order the incidents which relate to them, as shall leave upon the spectators impressions favourable to virtue and to the administration of Providence". (505) Modern tragedy, he says, performs this office better than the ancient, "pointing out to men the consequences of their own misconduct; showing the direful effects which ambition, jealousy, love, resentment, and other such strong emotions, when misguided or left unrestrained, produce upon human life". (505) The pathetic is "the soul of tragedy" (522) and if tragedy succeeds in warning by representation of the pathetic, it need not end unhappily.

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(1) A definition approved by Jeffrey.
E.R. vol. 37, p. 418.
Regarding the unities, Blair is not severely classical. There must be unity of action, certainly. He cites Addison's *Cato*, which is too episodic, and Congreve's *Mourning Bride*, which is too complicated, as violations of this principle of unity. But the unities of time and place he has come to regard simply as necessary conventions of the Greek theatre, and not essential when there is division into acts.  

He notes the suitability of blank verse in English tragedy, and its superiority over the rhyme of French tragedy; the deficiency of the French writers of tragedy in the language of passion; and Shakespeare's excellence in it. English tragedy is "more animated and passionate than French tragedy, but more irregular and incorrect, and less attentive to decorum and to elegance". (522)

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(1) This had been pointed out by Kames.
There follow thumbnail criticisms in traditional vein of Aeschylus, Euripides, Sophocles, Corneille, Racine and Voltaire. The last is set only a little lower than the angels, because of the impeccability of his religious and moral sentiments. As for Shakespeare, his "natural genius, both for tragedy and comedy, is altogether unrivalled". (523) But it is genius "shooting wild; deficient in just taste, and altogether unassisted by knowledge or art". (523) He complains that "there is hardly any one of his plays which can be called altogether a good one, or which can be read with uninterrupted pleasure from beginning to end". (523). Blair seems to be entirely ignorant of any English tragedy before Shakespeare, or after him until Dryden. Dryden and Lee have "much fire, but mixed with much jufstian and rant". (525) Otway has genius but is obscene, Rowe is elegant and moral but cold and dull except in Jane Shore and The Fair Penitent.
About comedy, Blair has the usual moral misgivings: comedy is likely to cast ridicule upon worthy persons and sentiments, and thus become unsocial. He favours French comedy because it is an excellent school of manners; while English comedy "has been too often the school of vice". (529) He welcomes the change that is coming over English comedy through the influence of the comédie larmoyante. He thinks comedy is at its best when the two sorts, of character and of intrigue, are blended. _The Provoked Husband_ (Vanbrugh and Cibber) he rates "perhaps the best comedy in the English language". (545)
The matter of the Lectures is in large measure a reflection of contemporary fashion in criticism. When Blair came to exercise his powers as critic off the beaten track where every mile was marked and elegant paraphrase sufficed, his success was not striking. He had become in his own Edinburgh sphere a species of minor — of very minor — Johnson, whose counsel weighed heavily in the arbitrament of taste. Thus when he hailed with enthusiasm the discovery of Ossian, his brief for authenticity assumed an important place in the controversy. His Critical Dissertation on the poems of Ossian was prefixed to an edition of the poems in 1763. Blair's solemnity in face of this phenomenon makes us smile today; but when we consider his almost total ignorance of philology, anthropology and archaeology, his lack of perspective in literary history, his 'classical' bent, and his pardonable inability to regard as special the literary characteristics of his own day, the Dissertation is not inexplicable.
Though not equipped for comparative studies of this sort, he does what he can.
Searching for parallels for Ossian, he quotes an Epicedium of Regner Lodbrog, which he had found translated by Claus Wormius in his De Literatura Runica. He contrasts its ferocity, its wildness, harshness, irregularity, with the Ossianic poems, naively wondering at the latter's combination of "the fire and the enthusiasm of the most early times, ...with an amazing degree of regularity and art.
We find tenderness, and even delicacy of sentiment, greatly predominant over fierceness and barbarity. Our hearts are melted with the softest feelings, and at the same time elevated with the highest ideas of magnanimity, generosity, and true heroism". (p. 11)

To account for this, he tries to show that the Celts were exceptionally poetic, that the poetic traditions handed down by their bards may have softened their manners, and that Ossian's period was peculiarly friendly to poetry, a sort of 'classical' age. The absence of religious ideas he explains by the supposition that Druidism had been extinguished about that time and no other faith had taken its place.

(1) This was already known to Dryden. See his Miscellanies, 1716 edition, vol. 6.
Blair is predisposed to find the poems consistently primitive. "The manner of composition bears all the marks of the greatest antiquity. No artful transitions; nor full and extended connection of parts"—(though later he finds in Fingal the unity of epic) — "such as we find among the poets of later times when order and regularity of composition were more studied and known; but a style always rapid and vehement; in narration concise, even to abruptness, and leaving several circumstances to be supplied by the reader's imagination". (p.18)

If the poems are an imposture, this must, he thinks, have been committed two or three centuries before, "as up to this period, both by manuscripts, and by the testimony of a multitude of living witnesses, concerning the uncontrovertible tradition of these poems, they can clearly be traced". (19) He has no suspicion apparently of an embossment upon tradition.
He enters upon an elaborate comparison of Ossian with Homer, not always in the latter’s favour. *Fingal*, he thinks, has the unity of an epic and entitles Ossian to be ranked the equal if not the superior of Virgil: “In the character and description of *Fingal*, Ossian triumphs almost unrivalled.” (30) In humanity, and in his treatment of the supernatural, Homer suffers by comparison; as apparently he does also in imagery and simile.

The one characteristic in particular which might have led Blair to suspect a contemporary hand, he delights in without question:

> “Ever fond of giving, as he expresses it, ‘the joy of grief’; it is visible, that on all moving subjects, he delights to exert his genius; and accordingly, never were there finer pathetick situations than what his works present”. (70)

He becomes almost maudlin over Ossian’s sensibility:

> “His poetry, more perhaps than that of any other writer, deserves to be stiled, The Poetry of the Heart. It is a heart penetrated with noble sentiments, and with sublime and tender passions; a heart that glows, and kindles the fancy; a heart that is full, and pours itself forth”. (21)

This is a melancholy triumph of sensibility over sense; but perhaps the patriotic weakness of Scotsmen for discovering that most great men have been Scots may be accepted as part excuse for Blair, as for others of his countrymen.
Kames.
Blair is of little significance, historically. Henry Home, later Lord Kames, is of genuine importance. Dr. Johnson said, "Keep him! ha! ha! ha! We don't envy you him!" But the truth is, we could hardly do without him, in this study. He provides the most satisfactory liaison between the aestheticians and literary criticism. His Elements of Criticism was first published in 1762. It may be well to reiterate that though we have discussed Blair first, his lectures were not given to the reading public until 1783, and that in revision of them he probably consulted the published work of both Kames and Campbell. Kames is thus the first to attempt a comprehensive system of principles for literary composition, bringing philosophical speculations down from universals to a particular art.

(1) But he also said, of the Elements, "Sir, this book is a pretty essay, and deserves to be held in some estimation, though much of it is chimerical. The Scotchman has taken the right method in his Elements of Criticism. I do not mean that he has taught us anything; but he has told us old things in a new way."

(2) Edition used the 7th, 1788, 2.v.
"The design of the present undertaking", says Karnes in his introduction, ". . . is, to examine the sensitive branch of human nature, to trace the objects that are naturally agreeable, as well as those that are naturally disagreeable; and by these means to discover, if we can, what are the genuine principles of the fine arts". (intro. p. 6.)

His scheme is thus not confined to literature, but literature is the art to which he gives most attention. His illustrations are drawn chiefly from Homer, Euripides, Virgil, Horace, Pindar, Terence, Shakespeare (of whom he has a much higher opinion than most of his contemporaries), Jonson, Pope, Addison, Congreve, Otway, Racine, Moliere, Corneille.

He regrets that criticism in his day remains "no less slavish in its principles, nor less submissive to authority, than it was originally", (intro. p. 12) binding itself to the practice of Homer and Virgil, and the authority of Aristotle. He proposes to make criticism a rational science based on the sensitive part of human nature; and he is a pioneer in regarding it as "the most agreeable of amusements".
The first volume is largely psychological, (1) and its scheme is hard to follow. An analysis is given of perceptions, the train of ideas, emotions and passions. Then follows a study of those mental sensations accompanying our appreciation of works of art: beauty, grandeur and sublimity, "motion and force", novelty, laughter; next uniformity and variety, congruity and propriety, dignity and grace, ridicule, wit, custom, habit, sentiments, the language of passion. The second volume deals with beauty of language, comparisons, figures, narration and description, epic and dramatic pieces, the three unities. He throws in at this point a section on gardening and architecture, and concludes with the standard of taste.

(1) Saintsbury suggests that it might be called 'Literary Illustrations of Morals'!
Karnes starts from the prevailing psychological point of view, making a good deal of the Association of Ideas. Our perceptions and ideas, he says, flow in at train. In a work of art we demand conformity to this train; regularity, order, and connection, please, their absence displeases. (I, 27) Then follows a long and not very satisfactory discourse (1) on emotions and passions, and their adequate causes.

His remarks on sublimity and beauty are not very fresh. He divides beauty into intrinsic and relative (by which he means useful). He does, however, take a sensible middle-of-the-road attitude on the nature of beauty, which "for its existence depends on the percipient as much as on the object perceived" and therefore "cannot be an inherent property in either". (I, 208)

(1) Bosanquet (History of Aesthetic, 1892, p. 203) gives him and Burke credit for initiating the idea that the exercise of any emotion may be agreeable - even of a painful emotion.
Regarding variety and uniformity he arrives at nothing more exciting than that "works of art admit more or less variety according to the nature of the subject" (I, 321). Ariosto is too varied; Ovid offends at both points.

In the section on Sentiments (by which he means "every thought prompted by passion" (I, 451), he begins to be more definite, distinguishing between the expression of emotion which is merely descriptive, and that which arises from the passion itself and rings true. In this connection he compares Shakespeare and Corneille, to the disadvantage of the latter, who describes as a spectator in a "pompous declamatory style", while Shakespeare writes from the heart. He gives many examples, from plays, of "sentiments" truly or artificially expressed. Corneille and Racine particularly are censured in the next section, on the Language of Passion (really the same subject as the preceding section). The supreme master in the expression of passion is Shakespeare (I, 500).

(1) The remarks on Shakespeare scattered throughout the two volumes form, as Saintsbury has noted, one of the most understanding appreciations of the period.
In the second volume, Kames goes more into detail concerning the effective use of language. Much space is given to syntax, the selection of words, and their arrangement in prose. This is followed by a close examination of metres, syllables, pauses, the different lengths of line in verse. He gives a good deal of attention to the sound of words, remarking that "this more perfect melody of articulate sounds, is what distinguisheth verse from prose". (II, 101).

But he also tends to confuse the double appeal of poetry to the senses and to the intellect. He thinks The Rape of the Lock "in point of versification is the most complete performance in the English language". (II, 104)

He holds that rhyme is not suited to elevated subjects (II, 172) but has its value: "it rouses the mind, and produceth an emotion moderately gay without dignity or elevation". (II, 170). Its value varies in different languages. The effect of rhyme is remarkable in French, "which, being simple, and little qualified for inversion, readily sinks down to prose where not artificially supported; rhyme is therefore indispensable in French tragedy, and may be (1) proper even in French comedy." (II, 173)

(1) But not in English drama. "Rhyme being unnatural and disgustful in dialogue, is happily banished from our theatre". (II, 403)
-exhaustive on the subject of comparisons and figures. His rules for narration and description are sound, and well documented from Homer, Horace, Shakespeare, Dryden and Pope.

In epic compositions, Kames makes a distinction between those with a moral and those which are merely pathetic. He justifies the latter, in which pity, aroused for an innocent victim, is the ruling passion. He is opposed to the use of celestial "machinery" as ridiculous. (II, 390)

The influence of contemporary 'pathos' is again evident in his discussion of the dramatic poem. He objects that Aristotle's prescription for tragedy is too narrow, excluding the pathetic. There should be a place for "innocent misfortunes which rouse our sympathy, though they inculcate no moral". (II, 380) The Aristotelian "catharsis" he believes himself to clarify by finding the terms perfectly simple: "our pity is engaged for the persons represented; and our terror is upon our own account". (II, 373)
To the unity of action he subscribes absolutely, banning mere conversation-scenes which add nothing to the action. He criticizes adversely in this respect The Old Bachelor, The Double Dealer, Love for Love, The Way of the World. (II, 409) The under-plot ought to be episodic but connected with the main plot, occupying the pauses of the latter and concluding at the same time. (II, 399)

As to them unities of time and place he has doubts. (II, 410) He points out that the Greek stage, with its convention of an ever-present chorus and one continuous action, was more restricted than ours, which has no chorus and divides a play into acts. It is therefore a mistake to found rules on the practice of the Greeks. Unity of time and place for each act is all that is required. Nevertheless, he does not justify unbounded liberty of time and place. He is not sure that the interruption caused by act-divisions is altogether an improvement — it breaks the illusion, though there is the advantage of reduced fatigue for the audience. He proposes a detached chorus of music, instrumental and vocal, of a nature in keeping with the play, to sustain an uniform impression.

(1) He anticipated Lessing's pronouncements on the same subject.
The last essay of the *Elements* deals with the Standard of Taste. *De gustibus non est disputandum.* How then are we to arrive at a standard for critical purposes? Kames' answer is that we have an innate conviction of a common nature or standard. But "common" does not mean vulgar. "Those who depend for food on bodily labour, are totally void of taste", is his rather arbitrary declaration. (II,499) Others are corrupted by voluptuousness and extravagance. The Standard is entrusted to those who are not thus excluded. Taste "must be improved by education, reflection and experience; it must be preserved in vigour by living regularly, by using the goods of fortune with moderation, and by following the dictates of improved nature, which give welcome to every rational pleasure without indulging any excess" (II,502)
A. F. Tytler in his Life of Kames credits him with being the inventor of "Philosophical Criticism" - i.e., the investigation of the basis provided for artistic pleasure in the nature of the human mind, affections, and passions. This is perhaps an over-statement. There are dim traces of the same point of view in Longinus and Aristotle. Besides, Kames owed much to Hutcheson, Gerard, Burke and others. He is a direct product of the aestheticians. He often confuses as they do morals with aesthetics and criticism. He sometimes forgets that he is writing Elements of Criticism and dwells rather on the elements of human nature. But the aestheticians, sticking to their last, remain on the whole in the aery clouds of abstract speculation. Kames brings their theories into direct contact with the arts, particularly with literature. His is perhaps the first systematic attempt to establish new Rules based on "human nature".

(1) See also Harris: Philological Inquiries.
This "philosophical criticism", though in part a rationalization of the classical point of view, induced revolt against the old authority, and this is something to be grateful for. It leads to such open defiances as Kames' contradiction of Aristotle: "of all the fine arts, painting and (1) sculpture only are in their nature imitative" (II, 3); and his recognition that the Greek unities of time and place depended largely on the physical conditions of the Greek theatre.

Like all "systematic" criticism, however, it may also lead to false or arbitrary conclusions, because its premises as to human nature are sometimes false or arbitrary. Kames' general method is to lay down a principle regarding a 'passion' - one that is simple and readily acquiesced in. Then, on the theory that art is an imitation of nature, he applies this principle as a canon of criticism to the work of a poet, judging it good or bad as it conforms (2) or fails to conform to the principle. But if he begins, as he does, for instance, with the law that humour "lessens the man in our esteem, and makes him in some measure ridiculous", he is beginning with a disputable premise and his conclusions may likewise be open to discussion.

(1) See also the appendix to Gerard's Essay on Taste.
(2) See for example Ch. II, sect. 6.
Theoretically, however, the system is less arbitrary than this. For Kames' hypothesis is that individual consciousness is the only test of the validity of a 'principle of human nature' and that the Elements are thus constantly subject to the revision of each reader.
Campbell.
George Campbell, Principal of Marischal College, whose Philosophy of Rhetoric was published in 1776, tells us in the preface that he began it in 1750, when the first two chapters were composed. Between 1757 and 1760 most of the first Book was read to that literary and philosophical society in Aberdeen which has before been mentioned, and of which Reid, Gregory, and Beattie were members. To the stimulation of this society we are apparently indebted for the completion of the Rhetoric, as for other philosophical works. A great deal of good sense thus emanated from Aberdeen. It gave us not only the distinctively Scottish School, but, in Campbell's work, what is by general subscription the most valuable Scottish critical treatise of the eighteenth century.
Mr. Saintsbury hails Campbell as the author of an improved Rhetoric which "new dubbed as Eloquence, becomes the art of Literature, or in other words Criticism". It may be worth while, however, to quote Campbell's own statement of intention:

"It is his purpose in this work, on the one hand, to exhibit, he does not say a correct map, but a tolerable sketch of the human mind; and aided by the lights which the poet and the orator so amply furnish, to disclose its secret movements, tracing its principal channels of perception and action, as near as possible to their source; and, on the other hand, from the science of human nature, to ascertain with greater precision, the radical principles of that art, whose object it is, by the use of language, to operate on the soul of the hearer, in the way of informing, pleasing, moving, or persuading". (Phil.of Rhet.Pref.p.7)

It will be observed that half of Campbell's project is, with the help of literature, to investigate human nature. This is justifiable, of course, because of the interdependence of the two studies. "Those arts which like poetry are purely to be ranked among the elegant, as their end is attained by an accommodation to some internal taste, so the springs by which alone they can be regulated, must be sought for in the nature of the human mind, and more especially in the principles of imagination". (Intro.p.12)

But the weight of his interest seems to be on the-
-psychological scale: "In this view it (the study of eloquence) is perhaps the surest and the shortest, as well as the pleasantest way of arriving at the science of the human mind. It is as an humble attempt to lead the mind of the studious inquirer into this track, that the following sheets are now submitted to the examination of the public". (Intro. p.16)

One of Campbell's criticisms of Kames, who in his opinion had done most to supersede classical criticism, is that he is too little interested in the mind. (Int. p. 19)

It should also be noted that in his catalogue of the objects of Eloquence, persuading comes last at the point of strongest emphasis: he seems to regard this as the highest aim of rhetoric - as did the ancients. It might be asked at this point whether after all this is so very different from the old rhetoric? Aristotle's Treatise of Rhetoric, which is instruction in oratory, includes likewise an attempt to analyze the passions, and uses poetry for purposes of illustration. Does Campbell, apart from the first two brilliant chapters, do more than this for users of English? The first Book deals with Eloquence, the finished product with which he is concerned; the other two with Elocution. It is true-
-that in Chapters 1 and 2 he defines Eloquence largely, to include poetry; but it seems to me that oratory occupies his mind most of the time, and not literature as we conceive it. It is difficult otherwise to explain away the large proportion of space devoted in the first Book to public speaking pure and simple. Saintsbury conceives the second and third Books to be entirely to the point. But that point, unless I am mistaken, is Composition and Verbal Criticism, not criticism of literature. It is with the "radical principles" of language or the "instruments employed by eloquence", to use his own words, that he is occupied. This is an anatomy of language used for artistic purposes, and highly valuable. But Campbell himself is not deceived as to the distinction between rhetoric and literary criticism. Remarking in his Introduction that the arts precede criticism of the arts, he continues, "so doubtless there were orators before there were rhetoricians, and poets before critics" (p.17)
The plan of criticism which he proposes to follow is strictly rhetorical: 1) classification of "modes of arguing or forms of speech"; 2) comparison of the effects of the various modes; 3) discovery of the principles of human nature which regulate their success or failure. The second gives us "rules of composition"; the third gives us knowledge of human nature. (Intro.) He does not leave his province of composition to consider the emotional effect of a particular literary form, except in his discussion of tragedy.

This is a pleasant change from the aestheticians, who wander rather vaguely in the field of associated ideas, and it is nearer to literary criticism than anything they give us. Campbell has scarcely anything to say about the association of ideas, or about the imagination as his contemporaries understood it. He seems in general to assume the validity of the principle of association (II, 230), with some reservations as to Hume's theory of resemblance, contiguity and causation. (I, 197) He accepts the current connotation of Fancy in discussing the effect of tropes in making a more vivid impression than "proper terms". (II, 212) This effect depends upon "certain original and essential principles of the human mind" (II, 227)
With all these reservations, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* is a very fine performance, closely reasoned and well-knit in style. Campbell is free from the besetting sin of 'eloquence'. His sentences are like the movements of an accomplished craftsman, economical and sure.

particularly interesting are the two first chapters, in which he sets forth his comprehensive definition of 'eloquence'. He begins by reducing all speech to four sorts, distinguished by their aims: to enlighten the understanding; to please the imagination; to move the passions; to influence the will. (I, 26) He regards all these as part of the orator's obligation and poetry (included in the second and third categories) thus becomes no more than "a particular mode or form of certain branches of oratory" (Intro. p. 14)

The most complex form of all in his hierarchy is persuasive eloquence: "as that kind...which is calculated to influence the will and persuade to a certain conduct is in reality an artful mixture of that which proposes to convince the judgment, and that which interests the passions, its distinguishing
-excellency results from these two, the argumentative and the pathetic incorporated together". (I, 33)
These impart the quality of vehemence, "the supreme qualification of the orator". He separates the vehement from the sublime, with which he thinks Longinus confused it.

This then is Eloquence in its highest acceptation. Chapter Two treats of a subsidiary (1)
field of oratory: wit, humour, and ridicule - directed, like their prototypes in the upper scale of Eloquence (for both have Understanding as common requirement) to the fancy, the passions, and the will. Wit delights the fancy, humour addresses itself to the passion of contempt; these, blended, produce ridicule, the equivalent on this lower (2) plane of the vehement.

(1) Cicero had followed the same plan (De Oratore, Bk. II)
(2) At the end of this interesting classification of the departments of speech, Campbell drifts into a discussion of Aristotle's and Hobbes' theories of laughter and the ridiculous, which for our purposes is a digression.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 all deal with Eloquence in the old sense: logic and grammar, evidence, syllogisms, and so forth. In section 2 of Chapter 7, considering the orator's audience as endowed with imagination, Campbell finds poetry to be useful because, appealing to the imagination by means of vivacity, beauty, sublimity and novelty, it fixes the attention. He does add that the imagery of poetry gives an additional pleasure of its own; but throughout he seems to regard the poetic and the engaging of the imagination as merely a subsidiary aid to rhetoric.

It is from this point of view that he discusses, later, in Book III, the function of Vivacity in pleasing the imagination. His introductory remark is, "I come now to those qualities of style by which it is adapted to please the imagination, and consequently to fix the attention". (II,157)

(1) The first section, Of Vivacity as depending on the choice of words, does include the discussion of tropes and the excellent chapter on words considered as sounds, and is nearest an appeal to the fancy. But the remainder of the Book is comprehended under Of vivacity as depending on the number of words (ch.2, tautology, verbosity, etc), Of vivacity as depending on the arrangement of words (ch.3, simple and complex, loose and periodic sentences, etc) and Of Connectives (ch. 4,5).
In the next section (3) of this same chapter, on the mainsprings of the passions, he comes a little closer to literature, and draws from it some examples.

The following chapters, 8, 9, 10, all deal with public speaking: at bar, in pulpit, or in "the senate".

The last chapter of the Book, however (ch. 11), deals with the "cause of that pleasure which we receive from objects or representations that excite pity and other painful feelings". Here tragedy comes under consideration, though the discussion is kept as much as possible on a metaphysical plane.

He rejects the hypotheses of De Bos (that human nature would rather be occupied by a painful emotion than by none at all); of Fontenelle (that pain and pleasure are not very different in their causes, and that pain slightly moderated becomes pleasure); of Hume (that delight in the eloquence of tragedy absorbs the pain of witnessing distress and converts it into pleasure); and of Hobbes (that we pity no longer than we fancy ourselves to suffer, and are pleased only by reflecting that our sufferings are not real.)
In his own theory, Campbell attacks the conventional attribution to tragedy of the production of pity and terror. "Under the name pity may be included all the emotions excited by tragedy... for what is pity but a participation by sympathy in the woes of others, and the feelings naturally consequent upon them, of whatever kind they be, their fears as well as their sorrows?" (I, 322) He thinks it absurd to suggest that we are in terror for ourselves.

The theory of the passions of which this definition of the function of tragedy is one step, is an interesting one, in which Campbell casually suggests that there is an association of passions as well as an association of ideas. He divides the simple passions into the pleasant and the painful. A passion rarely comes alone; grief especially, more than joy, has the power of attracting other passions. Pain makes a deeper impression than pleasure, and pleasure is heightened by being associated with pain, provided pleasure predominates. Pity is the sole passion raised by tragedy. Pity is not a simple passion but a group-
of passions. The sympathy from which it proceeds attracts benevolence, benevolence attracts love, "in which is always implied one of the noblest and most exquisite pleasures, whereof the soul is susceptible, and which itself, in most cases, is sufficient to give a counterpoise of pleasure to the whole". (I,326) Thus the purely painful commiseration for the characters of tragedy is associated with love for them, and the combination makes a deep impression which is more pleasant than painful. This of course is aesthetics rather than criticism.

In Book II, Campbell proceeds to verbal criticism. Language he tells us, takes its sanctions from Good Use—i.e., Reputable Use, National Use, and Present Use.

After two chapters (3 and 4) devoted to grammatical purity, he comes to criticism of a higher order. The rest of the Book is devoted to Perspicuity, which along with Vivacity occupies the remainder of The Philosophy of Rhetoric.
His "five simple qualities of style, considered as an object to the understanding, the imagination, the passions, and the ear" are perspicuity, vivacity, elegance, animation and music. (II,4) But he really groups them all under the two heads of Perspicuity and Vivacity, his excellent remarks on the intrinsic music of language, for instance, being included under the latter head.

On Perspicuity Campbell is very good indeed. His mind is extraordinarily clear, his illustrations are copious and always to the point. The divisions are the Obscure, the Double Meaning, the Unintelligible, and in each case the acid of his wit cuts through the dull metal until the idea is clearly etched. His impatience with muddy thinking and affectation makes particularly entertaining his remarks on the Puerile, the Learned, the Profound, the Marvellous.

In all these discussions, Campbell very rarely comments on complete works. He draws his illustrations from particular lines and sentences, he sometimes illustrates from 'dramatic composition' or 'a tale'; but extended criticism of wholes would be a digression.
Book II considers Perspicuity, by which speech is calculated to reach the understanding. Book III deals with those qualities which form style to please the imagination. The chains of the eighteenth century rattle here, for with Vivacity he includes, unfortunately, the word Elegance, which his contemporaries used with maddening frequency and which so often seems with them to be a substitute for thought. But all that he says from now on is really gathered under Vivacity.

His observations on the Choice of Words are very sound and often illuminating. He places heavy emphasis on the image. "The more general the terms are, the picture is the fainter; the more special they are, it is the brighter". (II, 159). "It ariseth from the same principle that whatever tends to subject the thing spoken of to the notice of our senses, especially of our eyes, greatly enlivens the expression". 'Special'-ness is again to be the principle governing our choice of tropes to increase vivacity: those are to be selected which substitute the less for the more general, which throw into relief the most interesting circumstance, which replace things merely intelligible by things sensible, or things lifeless by things animate.
In this same chapter he has a good section (3) considering words as sounds and therefore capable of imitating the things they symbolize. He illustrates by examples, chiefly from Pope and Milton, how the sound may conform to the sense; how by the variations of verse there may be suggested swiftness and slowness, vibration, intermission, inequality, difficulty and ease, the agreeable and disagreeable. He does not on the whole think this resemblance of sound to sense very important, except "the imitation produced by the different kinds of measure in poetry, which, I acknowledge, is sufficiently observable, and hath a much stronger effect than any other whereof language alone is capable". (II, 258)

The remaining chapters, on concision, sentence structure, and connectives, are merely elementary principles of prose composition.

............... Campbell, then, in his first two chapters does give us a new and comprehensive view of the arts which have language as their medium, including literature in the term Rhetoric. But when he comes to an examination of principles his point of view is that of the public speaker rather than of the man of letters. He is concerned with the principles governing the use of language, not with criticism of organic wholes. What he does is well done, and was to the eighteenth
-century a considerable service. But criticism begins where Campbell leaves off.
Chapter Two.

I.C.

More General Principles.
Hume.
Hume (1711-1776)

There are four writers who may be considered immediately after the trinity of rhetoricians. They did not contribute systems, but have something to say about general principles. These are Hume, Smith, Beattie and Monboddo.

Hume we have already discussed among the aestheticians. Some of his Essays, however, deal at least ostensibly with writing as a particular art, though the approach is aesthetic rather than poetic, and the observations made are not very helpful.

In Of simplicity and refinement in writing, Hume echoes Addison: "fine writing consists of sentiments which are natural without being obvious". Nature must be drawn "with all her graces and ornaments"; or, "if we copy low life, the strokes must be strong and remarkable, and must convey a lively image to the mind". Naturalness and simplicity-

(1) Essays and Treatises, 1768, I, 217.
-are not enough: "... if his (the writer's) language be not elegant, his observations uncommon, his sense strong and masculine, he will in vain boast his nature and simplicity". The merely surprising, which is not natural, is not pleasing, and excessive ornament is to be avoided. The middle way between excesses of either simplicity or refinement is not a fixed point. Hume considers Lucretius and Pope the norms of the two qualities. Corneille and Congreve are too refined; Sophocles and Terence too simple. Virgil and Racine strike the happy medium. Excessive refinement is more to be guarded against than oversimplicity, for the simple wears best. And so on. There is nothing very profitable in all this. A more important remark is that "no criticism can be instructive which descends not to particulars, and is not full of examples and illustrations".

The Essay on Tragedy is even more aesthetical, but since it deals nominally with a literary form is properly to be considered here. The enigma he faces is, the pleasure we receive from the performance of a tragedy. The more touching it is, the greater our pleasure. How is this to be explained? Hume has been-
-reading Du Bos, and admits that we like to have our passions engaged; but, he demurs, the spectacle of tragedy, if true, would merely give pain. He also notes Fontenelle's theory that pain and pleasure are related in their causes; that melancholy, softened, pleases; that in the theatre we have the requisite sub-consciousness of unreality. Hume's own view is that our uneasiness is effaced by the force of the eloquence. In tragedy, beauty of imagination or expression is joined to passion. The impression of beauty, which is predominant, subdues our sorrow. There mere imitation also pleases. Passion is thus "transformed into pleasure by the force of the prevailing movement". The sorrow is not diminished, but is softened by the infusion of a new feeling. "The force of imagination, the energy of expression, the power of numbers, the charms of imitation; all these are naturally, of themselves, delightful to the mind; and when the object presented lays also hold of some affection, the pleasure still rises upon us, by the conversion of this subordinate movement into that which is predominant". The writer of tragedy must-

(1) Ess. & Treat. 1768 I, 248
(2) Ibid I, 251.
therefore be careful not to let the subordinate movement, of pain, over-ride the other, of pleasure, by "shocking images" - as for instance when the old man in *The Ambitious Stepmother* dashes his brains out on a pillar.

We may as well complete here what remains to be said of Hume as critic. If some eminent minds are right, perhaps the less said, the better. Wordsworth ranks him only a little above Adam Smith, whom he calls "the worst critic, David Hume not excepted, that Scotland, a soil to which this sort of weed seems natural, has produced". Coleridge's opinion of Hume as a maligner of Shakespeare was that "Hume comprehended as much of Shakespeare as an apothecary's phial would, placed under the falls of Niagara".

Hume of course laboured under considerable difficulties, among them what he called "the mad and wicked rage against the Scots". His resentment of this he sometimes allowed to influence his critical judgments. He also suffered from a severe inferiority complex in the writing of English. The-

(2) Recorded by H.C. Robinson, Diary, I, 311.
-defects of his style seem to me to have been somewhat magnified by his opponents. But he was constantly labouring to free it from Scotticisms. He laments his misfortune to write in the language of "the most stupid and factious barbarians in the world" (by which he evidently means the Scots, not the English). He would much rather have written in French. In the writing of English he allowed himself to be insolently patronized by Mallet, who prided himself on having "cleared his tongue from his native pronunciation". As late as 1755 he submitted to two Scots lads, fresh from an English school, his account of Harold, for the detection of Scotticisms.

(1) See Letter 21, Birbeck Hill's ed. Hume, 1888, p.49. (2) In the fourth chapter of his History of England he refers to "that mixture of French which is at present to be found in the English tongue, and which composes the greatest and best part of our language" (1802 ed., I, 259) Johnson (Boswell I,439) and Jeffrey (rev. of Swift, E.R. Sept. 1815) have remarked on the French structure of Hume's sentences.
With these handicaps, which in a measure he shared with most Scots writers of the time, we should not expect too much of Hume as literary critic; but rather marvel that, a Scot writing in English, he was the most considerable philosopher of his day. His greatness as philosopher he does not, unfortunately, carry over into criticism. He falls into step with many prevailing conventions. But when he does bring his powerful intellect to bear on a particular critical problem requiring good sense (e.g. Ossian), it does not betray him.

Hume's letters show that his consciousness of his own defects made him specially interested in the style of others. From a letter to Reid in criticism of the latter's Inquiry into the Human Mind, it is evident that correctness, almost Frenchness, is what he approves. He is devoted to Eloquence, and therefore inappreciative of Swift. In a letter to Dr. Robertson on his History of Charles V, he offers some verbal criticisms..."But I know your-

(1) J.H. Burton: Life of Hume, Letters etc.
affection for wherewith proceeds from your partiality to Dean Swift, whom I can often laugh with, whose style I can even approve, but surely can never admire. It has no harmony, no eloquence, no ornament; and not much correctness, whatever the English may imagine. Were not their literature still in a somewhat barbarous state, that author's place would not be so high among their classics. (1) About Rousseau he is enthusiastic: "All the writings of that author appear to me admirable, particularly on the head of eloquence".

Of Hume as a practicing critic we have an example in Lounger No. 25, July 25, 1785, where under the signature "Theatricus" he is author of a "Critical Examination" of Rowe's The Fair Penitent, which had just been performed in Edinburgh. There is good sense in his review. Calista he considers 'unfeminine'; she is not a penitent; she is 'too fierce' to engage our sympathy. Sciolto he thinks "the most interesting as well as the most respectable person of the drama"; Altamont is 'insignificant'. He says that genuine pathos is lacking, that there are loose threads and padding, but the expression is 'rich and elegant'.

Hume's attitude to Shakespeare, which aroused Coleridge's ire, is severe. In an appendix to his *Reign of James I* (1754), he says, of Shakespeare:

"His total ignorance of all theatrical art and conduct, however material a defect, yet, as it affects the spectator rather than the reader, we can more easily excuse, than that want of taste which often prevails in his productions, and which gives way only by intervals to the irradiations of genius." He thought that John Home, in his early tragedy, *Agis*, "had corrupted his taste by the imitation of Shakespeare, whom he ought only to have admired". The classical and the French traditions are firmly rooted in Hume. He advises Home, "For God's sake read Shakespeare, but get Racine and Sophocles by heart".

The influence of Hume's strong patriotic prejudices is apparent in his critical treatment of Wilkie's *Epigoniad*. Some of Wilkie's countrymen believed that in him they had produced a great epic poet. Hume wrote to the *Critical Review* a letter excessively eulogistic of this now forgotten poem dealing with the second siege of Thebes. Homer was supposed to have written an epic on the subject; and, says Hume, "The whole turn of this new poem-

(1) Burton's *Hume*, I, 392.
-would almost lead us to imagine, that the
Scottish bard had found the lost manuscript of that
father of poetry, and had made a faithful translation
of it into English." He praises "the force of
the versification, the vivacity of the images, the
justness of the descriptions, the natural play of
the passions", and calls the author "inspired with
the true genius of Greece".

If Wilkie was the new Homer, John Home
was Sophocles redivivus. Hume was one of those
who assisted at the birth-pangs of Douglas.
Writing in deprecation of Home's earlier Agis,
which he thought too Shakespearian, Hume had said,
"...But the same author has composed a new tragedy
(Douglas) on a subject of invention; and here he
appears a true disciple of Sophocles and Racine.
I hope in time he will vindicate the English stage
from the reproach of barbarism". "When it
shall be printed", he says in a letter to Adam
Smith, "...I am persuaded it will be esteemed the
best, and by French critics the only tragedy of our
language".

(1) Burton II, 30.
(2) There is a legend that the play was rehearsed in
the quarters of Mrs. Sarah Warde, one of Digges'
company, by a cast including Principal Robertson,
Hume, Dr. Carlyle, John Hone, Dr. Ferguson(Lady
Randolph) and Dr. Blair(who played Anna, the maid.)
Burton I, 420
(3) Burton I, 392.
(4) " II, 17.
In a letter to Home, before he offered the play unsuccessfully to Garrick, Hume describes Douglas as "interesting, affecting, pathetic. The story is simple and natural; but what chiefly delights me, is to find the language so pure, correct and moderate". But, by request, he also finds some flaws. Glenalvon's character is 'too abandoned'; Lord Randolph's is "not enough decided" - he "hovers betwixt vice and virtue; which, though it be not unnatural, is not sufficiently theatrical nor tragic"; and too many incidents happen by chance. In a letter to Mme de Boufflers he admits that Glenalvon is a kind of diabolus ex machina; but "I cannot still but flatter myself that the tragedy of Douglas is a work of merit, from the sensible pathetic which runs through the whole. The value of a theatrical piece can less be determined by an analysis of its conduct, than by the ascendant which it gains over the heart, and by the strokes of nature which are interspersed through it".

(1) Burton, I, 419.
(2) Private correspondence of D.H. with several distinguished persons between the years 1761 and 1776. Lon. 1820. Letter 14, July, 1764.
However, patriotic fervour did not altogether blind Hume as critic. Of the Ossian poems he was at first sceptical, next convinced of their genuineness, and finally certain they were spurious.

In a letter he is surprised at their 'regular plan', which 'seems to be the work of a more cultivated age'. He reviews the circumstances in which they were obtained, and the fact the poems are well known in the Highlands. He seems to have complete faith in MacPherson. Later apparently he was persuaded to accept the poems as authentic.

But in a letter to Blair from London, where he has been in the hubbub of cries of "forgery", he writes, "I can foresee that in a few years the poems, if they continue to stand on their present footing, will be thrown aside, and will fall into final oblivion. It is in vain to say that their beauty will support them, independent of their authenticity." He refers to "the absurd pride and caprice of MacPherson himself, who scorns, as he pretends, to satisfy any body that doubts his veracity" - as confirming the general scepticism. In another letter to Blair he expresses open doubts as to authenticity, and demands-

(2) Burton app. vol. 1, 19 Sept. 1763.
-proofs. Finally, he wrote his Essay on the Genuineness of the Poems of Ossian, which was never published during his life. It will be found in the appendix to volume I of Burton's Life of Hume.

In this Essay he calls the poems "a tiresome, insipid performance" and the style of the 'translation' "harsh and absurd in the highest degree". His arguments against their antiquity may be summarized:
1) MacPherson tells us nothing specifically of where he got the poems; 2) Two whole quartos - and this only a part - all memorized uncorrupted for fifteen centuries by uncivilized highlanders! ; 3) The style betrays them by its 'insipid correctness, regularity, and uniformity'; the manners of the people are not savage but chivalric; 4) The 'marvellous' is absent. Ossian sings of nothing impossible; there are 'no giants, no monsters, no magic, no incredible feats of strength or activity' - in which the imagination of a rude people might be expected to delight; 5) There is no religious sentiment; 6) A much higher state of the-

(1) Burton suggests, out of kindness to Blair.
-arts is represented than was possible at that time;

7) How is it the Irish have none of these poems?

8) As an oral tradition the poems are too detailed.

9) Why have we heard nothing of these traditions until now? 10) The character of the 'translator' lays him open to suspicion of deceiving the public.

We have external testimonies - yes; "But", he concludes, "as finite added to finite never approaches a hair's breadth nearer to infinite; so a fact incredible in itself, acquires not the smallest accession of probability by the accumulation of testimony".

David lacks the delicate touch of the good critic; but for honesty and force it is hard to find his equal in the eighteenth century.
Of Adam Smith we have very little material to work on. This span may be a great loss, since he has already been made of philosophers to even the most hearing. But some had predicted he would have been better regarded than most of his contemperaries in the matter of who's and why. He has had a larger sense of literary work on them.

Unfortunately, his lectures on politics and political policies delivered by Charles Motley were destroyed before his death.

When the English philosopher, in the preface at the second edition in the original 1813 volume, 1777, in the middle of the century of public approval of the theory, he avoids the self-deception of a commonplace—that the ideas opinions are much influenced by authority. He was asked to think that they are not, in all principles of human nature for this all to exist upon. He further describes this view to Adam Smith, the hunter of American, etc.

Among the superior excellencies of this great philosopher, it is true to be forgotten that in his fear and flinching resolution to change the English frontier with a great hand and wish more nothing to the 1803 Athenian political science. Herein another instance of Smith that he found the English work not particularly influential in the main. His life, 1723-1790.
Of Adam Smith we have very little material to work on. This may not be a great loss - note has already been made of Wordsworth's remark that he was the worst critic Scotland had produced. He is thought by Sir James MacKintosh, however, to have been better equipped than most of his Scottish contemporaries in the matter of style, and may have had a keener sense of literary values than Hume. Unfortunately, his lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres delivered at Glasgow University were destroyed before his death.

(1) In the Essay supplementary to the preface to the second edition of the Lyrical Ballads. (Wks. 1857, VI, 367. He is speaking of the vagaries of public approval of the poet. "So strange are the obliquities of admiration, that they whose opinions are much influenced by authority will often be tempted to think that there are no fixed principles in human nature for this art to rest upon". In a footnote he ascribes this view to Adam Smith, "the worst critic..." etc.

(2) "Among the inferior excellencies of this great philosopher, it is not to be forgotten that in his full and flowing composition he manages the English language with a freer hand and with more native ease than any other Scottish writer. Robertson avoids scotticisms; but Smith might be taken for an English writer not peculiarly idiomatical." (MacKintosh, Wks., ed. 1854, II, 469)
In a letter to the first Edinburgh Review, Smith tells the editors what works he thinks suitable for criticism in their pages. They will do well, he says, to give most attention to French and English writers, above all to the French encyclopedists. He counsels them to enlarge their scheme to include European books, while still taking notice of "every Scotch production that is tolerably decent".

The only other periodical contribution I have found is a review of Dr. Johnson's dictionary (also in the first Edinburgh Review, I, 61). He praises Johnson's extraordinary accomplishment but thinks he is "not sufficiently grammatical" and that his synonyms are not clearly enough distinguished. He quotes Johnson's treatment of But and Humour, and then shows how he would have disposed of these words.

In his discussion of the imitative arts in *Essays on Philosophical Subjects* (1795), Smith has little to say of poetry, except that it is imitative and appeals to the ear. Of certain English and Italian verses (in the same work) merely sets down some of the characteristics of English heroic rhyme, alongside those of the Italian octave, terzetti, and sonnets, finding them very like.

(1) E.R. No. 2, July 1755, p. 63.
In the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) Smith has something to say about beauty, but purely from an utilitarian standpoint; nor has the dissertation *On the Origin of Languages* and on the different genius of those which are original and compounded appended to the second (1761) edition anything of special value. In the chapter on the influence of custom and fashion upon our notions of beauty and deformity, he observes that we have passed from the domination of ancient verse-measures supposed to be naturally appropriate to particular characters, sentiments and passions. "One verse, they said, was fit for grave, and another for gay works, which could not, they thought, be interchanged without the greatest impropriety. The experience of modern times, however, seems to contradict this principle. What is burlesque verse in English is the heroic verse in French... The burlesque verse in French, on the contrary, is pretty much the same with the heroic verse of ten syllables in English".

Dugald Stewart tells us that as regards aesthetics Smith adopted the French theory of the difficulté surmontée. He therefore held blank verse to be superior to prose, and rhyme superior to blank verse, in tragedy. He also preferred verse in comedy, and approved French comedy rather than English.

He is supposed (by Stewart) to have left for publication a dissertation on tragedy, but this I have not found. In the Theory of Moral Sentiments he considers the attempts to move to pity by representation of bodily pain in Greek tragedy "among the greatest breaches of decorum of which the Greek theatre has set the example".

Smith seems to have agreed with Hume in regarding Sympathy as the basis of the moral consciousness. If the lost documents he applied to criticism his doctrine of the "impartial and well-informed spectator" whose sympathy alone has ethical value, these may have been worth preserving.

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(1) Pref. to Smith's Philosophical Essays.
(2) D. Stewart, Life of Adam Smith, p. 71.
(3) Stewart: Pref. to Philosophical Essays,
(4) Bohn ed. 1853, p. 33.
Monboddo.

Monboddo's views about occupation are not extensive enough to warrant treating them exhaustively under that heading, but they are worth noting. He calls upon it as the intellectual and not only that specimens of occupation and hisses are qualified persons and allows me to observe simple things. It is not to say that combines and occupies the space the to that of occupation treatments as well as any combine to our minds. What we have seen, or a system to our attention are not beautiful but the simplicity to our minds. What is the foundation of all the mixture of the world? Our passions; benevolence, generally. Not that passion one affection which are the foundation of all the mixture of the world. Our passions; benevolence, generally.
Monboddo (1714-1799)

James Burnett, Lord Monboddo, the "Elzivir edition of Johnson", whom his contemporaries regarded with amusement and not too much tolerance, was nevertheless an independent thinker. Although eccentric in method, he produced results which are sometimes highly suggestive, for the literary historian no less than for the anthropologist. (1)

Monboddo's remarks about aesthetics are not extensive enough to warrant treating them separately under that head, but are worth noting. He tells us it is intellect and not sense that perceives beauty. Sensations and ideas are quite different: sense only allows us to observe simple things; it is the intellect that combines and connects. (2) His general attitude is a relapse to that of Shaftesbury. The sense of beauty, he says, consists in the intellect's finding uniformity, or a system, making one of many impressions. (3)

The beautiful is not confined to objects. It is the foundation of all the virtues - of love, friendship, compassion, beneficence, generosity. In fact, “every action and affection which are, properly-

(1) He advanced the idea that men were originally monkeys. (2) Ancient Metaphysics, V, 119. (p. 1779-99, 6 v.) (3) Ibid, V, 123.
-speaking, human, proceed from that source". He interprets Aristotle's 'greatness' to mean quantity: "The greater the things are in size or in number, the greater the beauty is, if it can be readily comprehended in our minds". (2)

Monboddo also stumbles over the same discovery as Hume, that matter and form are to be distinguished. He calls form "the essence of the thing". But he makes no serviceable use of the discovery. He even puts form one remove farther from us by speaking of it as "internal form" of which (since we cannot know either matter or form) we get only an idea. Although he identifies the beautiful with the good, he also distinguishes these from each other. The beauty of an object belongs to "the formal cause of everything"; the goodness of it belongs to "the final cause, being that for the sake of which everything is formed". An object may thus, apparently be useful--for something; good -- for the universe; and beautiful because it is good in itself as well as good for the final purpose of the universe.

(1) Ancient Metaphysics, II, 2 124.
(2) Ibid. V, 121.
(3) Ibid, I, 57.
(4) Ibid, V, 137.
In *The Origin and Progress of Language* Monboddo develops the novel idea that language suitable for literature is itself a work of art. His conclusion in the first volume, which discusses the origins of language, is that the first languages were without art. In volume two he tells us that at last a "language of art" was invented, to replace the first barbarous languages. This new language was the work of "men of art and superior abilities". (II, 483)

The requirements of a "language of art" are:

1) accurate and distinct expression of all the conceptions of the human mind; 2) the accomplishment of this in as few words as possible; 3) the marking of the connection that those words have with one another; 4) its sounds must be agreeable to the ear and of sufficient variety.

He then proceeds to an analysis of the parts of speech and their composition into artistic form. From his examination of words, sounds, composition into sentences, rhythm, accents and their effect on style, he sets the Greek language above all others as a language of art. It is the work-

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(1) P. in 6 v., 1773-1792.
"not only of grammarians but philosophers" (II, 513). The Greek artists in language "have had a proper regard to the ear, as well as to the understanding, and have employed the whole power of elemental sounds, to make their language both soft and manly in the pronunciation; and to so perfect an articulation they have added melody and rhythm, by which they have given their language all the music that a language ought to have; - in short, that the system of the Greek language is complete in every part, in sound as well as sense." (II, 421)

The "inventors" of modern language, he thinks, and particularly the "inventors" of English, have not wrought so well. The northern languages are "composed almost altogether of hard inflexible words, monosyllables for the greater part, and crowded with consonants that do not easily coalesce in sound"; these words are "unskilfully tacked together by ill-favoured particles constantly recurring and fatiguing the ear, without either melody or rhythm to soften the harshness of so rude an articulation" (II, 422).
English verse, he says, has no quantity, like Greek or Latin, "for by far the greater part of the syllables being all of an equal length, we cannot so mix long and short together as to make the rhythm of the antient poetry". (II, 325)

It has rhythm, nevertheless: "For rhythm, as we have seen, is a very general idea, comprehending every kind of motion in which the mind perceives any relation or analogy of parts, and is divided, as we have seen, into several species. But we need here take notice only of two of them; that which is produced by the mixture of loud and soft sounds, and that which arises from the distance or intervals betwixt such sounds. Of these two species of rhythm, if I am not mistaken, the music of a drum and the rhythm of our English verse is compounded." (II, 335)

Volume II has three appendices, in which Monboddo has opportunity to show his knowledge and appreciation of the Greeks: 1) Of the formation of the Greek language; 2) Of the sound of the Greek language; 3) Of the composition of the antients, and particularly of that of Demosthenes (whom he places highest).
Volume III is devoted to Style, which, he says, "consists of two parts; the choice of words and the composition of those words". (III, 11) In his own verbose way, Monboddo was protesting against the vagueness of contemporary "taste". He prides himself on having a scientific method, not of the sort of the aestheticians, but more objective, regarding language as the raw material of the art of literature. He throws some ridicule on "taste" and on "almost all our modern writers, who entertain us with a great many words upon the subject, which import that they have some confused natural feelings of what is beautiful or striking in composition, but give us no ideas, at least none which they have thought proper to explain or define". (III, 7) He admits that a natural sense of beauty is essential, but considers it only the basis on which is to be formed an art of criticism which will teach us "to distinguish accurately different styles and manners; to know what ornaments belong to each of them; and when these ornaments are properly used". (III, 9) This he proceeds to show in his discussion of words, figures of speech, and "figures of sense".
Style itself he divides conventionally into the simple, the highly ornamented, and the middle kind. Lysias, Menander, Terence and Swift are his examples of the simple style. The ornamented he separates into the austere (Thucydides, Sallust, Tacitus, and - Mallet in his Life of Chancellor Bacon!); and the florid (Sappho, Anacreon, Gorgias, Hippias, Shaftesbury). He thinks "the poetry of this age is almost all" of this latter sort, and a great deal of its prose. (III, 233) Half-way between the austere and the middle sort he places Dionysius the Halicarnassian; and "the best writers in English" - Milton, Clarendon, Bolingbroke, Dr. Atterbury.

Then follow the categories of the sublime (which "consists chiefly of the matter"); the mock-heroic, the ridiculous, the witty, the humourous, the sophistical.

He uses the phrase "ethic writer" to describe an author who introduces himself or other persons in a certain character. This he calls a "figure of style". Since poetry is an imitative art, poets ought above all others to excel in it. (III, 130)
He notes the recent rise of the comic epic. *Tom Jones* he approves as having "more character in it than any work, ancient or modern, that I know". (III,135). "I never saw any thing that was so much animated, and, as I may say, all alive with characters and manners". But he solemnly finds fault with the episode of the churchyard battle, because it is too great a change of style and lessens the probability of the narrative.

He reiterates his conclusion that the Greeks, who are our masters in the art of composition as in the art of language, should be imitated. Among the moderns, who are the best models? Not the French, whom he finds florid, atheistical, incoherent; but English writers who have most successfully copied Greek or Latin writers.

His plan in the next volume(IV) is confused and hard to follow. He surveys the excellencies and defects of different languages, and then returns to style. His general requirements are liberal. "What is fit, decent or proper-
in the practice of the writing art, depends upon three things: the nature of the subject, the character of the writer, and lastly, the character and disposition of the persons to whom he writes". (IV, 291) The "styles" he proposes to consider are: epistolary, dialogue, narrative or historical, didactic, rhetorical, poetical. His observations about these are very discursive. The poetical he never reached, even in the sixth and final volume.

Monboddo thus by a different route arrives at the same conclusion as his orthodox contemporaries: imitate the classics. But he sets up (in eccentric fashion) as critical historian of language, in its development as an instrument of art. This is comparatively novel and not without value as a stimulus to philological criticism.
Beattie.

Along with the observed physical evidence, Tarquin's writings on Beattie's life and work, along with the Time of Enlightenment, inspired the novel and biographies of various authors.

In 1790, he published his first printed work, his trials and triumphs as a translator of languages, an author and remained in the literary society of kinships (creation of the society). His prose on the role of the mountains are considered throughout his life and influence.
James Beattie, admired as poet by Dr. Johnson and coveted as spouse by Mrs. Thrale, is another Aberdonian who felt not quite at home in writing English. "We who live in Scotland", he says, "are obliged to study English from books, like a dead language, which we understand but cannot speak...I have spent some years in labouring to acquire the art of giving a vernacular cast to the English we write". To this end he compiled a volume of Scotticisms. (1811)

Along with the once-celebrated Essay on Truth, written to confute Hume, there were published in 1776 Beattie's essays On Poetry and Music as they affect the Mind; On Laughter and ludicrous composition; and On the Utility of Classical Learning. (2)

In 1783 he published his Dissertations moral and critical: on memory and imagination; on dreaming; the theory of language; on fable and romance; on the attachments of kindred; illustrations of sublimity. His views on aesthetics and poetics are scattered throughout these two volumes.

(1) Sir Wm. Forbes: Life of Beattie, 1824, p. 243
(2) Written, according to the Advertisement, in 1762, and read to that very productive Aberdeen literary society.
Beattie accepts Gerard ("for he was my master in philosophy") on taste and genius.

Poetical genius, he echoes, is not merely "a certain warmth of fancy, or enthusiasm of mind which is all-sufficient in itself", but must be directed by judgment. (Dissertations, p.146)

His inclusion of sympathy among the qualities necessary to good taste is worth recording. (Diss.166)

In the appeal to taste, moral sensibility must not be neglected. Though the object of the fine arts is to give pleasure, "it ought no less to be the aim of the artist, to promote the love of virtue". (Diss.173)

Poetry that is uninstructional or immoral "cannot please those who retain any moral sensibility, or uprightness of judgment; and must consequently displease the greater part of any regular society of rational creatures". (Essays, p. 356) This is the fate of Venice Preserved, because our sympathies are enlisted where conscience cannot follow. (Essays, p. 365).
He thinks Longinus in his use of the word Hupsos has sometimes confused the sublime with the elegant or beautiful. Poetry is sublime: when it elevates the mind; when it "conveys a lively idea of any grand appearance in art or nature"; when without any great pomp of images or of words it "infuses horror by a happy choice of circumstances"; when it awakens in the mind any great and good affection, as piety or patriotism; when it "describes in a lively manner the visible effects of any of those passions that give elevation to the character". (Diss. p. 505).

As for the duties and qualifications of the critic: the critic must have practiced the art he judges. "No person who has never composed in prose or verse, can be an unexceptionable critick in language and versification". (Diss. 189) The critic should not dwell on incidental faults. "If an author abound in beauties, let his blemishes be forgotten. If he give proof of good intention, and discover genius in any department of art or of science, he is entitled to honour". (Diss. 177)
Beattie divides poetic rules into essential and mechanical, the latter having "no better foundation than the practice of some great performer, whom it has become the fashion to imitate". (Essays, 349) This difference is in some cases more apparent than real. He maintains, for instance, that Homer wrought so well that to imitate him is at the same time to follow the essential rules of poetry. Governed by its essential rules, true poetry, though it may seem to be licentious, "is a thing perfectly rational and regular; and nothing can be more strictly philosophical, than that part of criticism may and ought to be, which unfolds the general characters that distinguish it from other kinds of composition" (Essays, 350)

(1) So also Pope.
As for the essential rules, Beattie does not get far beyond the favourite "Copy Nature!". Poetry must be "either according to truth or according to verisimilitude". (Essays, 373) It must be consistent with general experience, with popular opinion, or with itself. He quarrels with Swift's device of the Houyhnhms on the last of these grounds. Poetry is an imitation, but an imitation, he reminds us, is never an exact copy; if it were, it would not be an imitation. The poet may therefore improve on Nature in accordance with his purpose. "External nature must in them (poems) be more picturesque than in reality; action more animated; sentiments more expressive of the feelings and character, and more suitable to the circumstances of the speaker; personages better accomplished in these qualities that raise admiration, pity, terror and other ardent emotions; and events more compact, more clearly connected with causes and consequences, and unfolded in an order more flattering to the fancy and more interesting to the passions". (Essays, 389)

(1) He is drawing here on Bacon: De Augmentis Scientarum.
In the Dissertation on imagination, he gives further "essential" rules of composition, which must not on any account be violated: philosophy and history must be strictly true; fiction must be probable; fictitious characters must speak and act suitably to their condition; external objects in both history and poetry are to be described as they are in nature, the poet however selecting for his purpose; style must be perspicuous and please the ear; all compositions must have an end in view, and all their parts be disposed to promote that end; "every composition ought to have a moral tendency, or at least to be innocent"; 'discretionary' rules may in time come to be essential: e.g. hexameter in Latin or Greek epic, and the iamb of five feet in English epic or dramatic poems. (Diss. p. 182)
Among his "ornamental or mechanical" rules Beattie includes the five-act requirement for plays and the unities of time and place. The illusion of the theatre, he reminds us, is never complete, and as the unities of time and place are a severe restraint upon the author, they may be modified. On unity of mood in a play he is interesting. It is Shakespeare he has in mind. In other writers, he tells us, "a mixture of comedy might have as bad an effect, as if besiegers were to retire from the outworks they had gained, and leave the enemy at leisure to fortify them a second time. But Shakespeare penetrates the heart by a single effort, and can make us sad in the present scene, as if we had not been merry in the former. With such powers as he possessed in the pathetic, if he had made his tragedies uniformly mournful or terrible from beginning to end, no person of sensibility would have been able to support the representation". (Essays p. 495) This suggests reflections about Lear.
Beattie is very wordy about poetical characters, but says little. Concerning poetical language also he is weak and diffuse. Poetical language is "an imitation of real language raised to a state of perfection". (Essays, p. 512). Since poetry is an imitation of nature, poetical language should be 'natural'. It is natural when it is "suitable to the supposed condition of the speaker". (Essays, p. 505) He means, not only in drama but in all composition. The epic poet must always sustain his elevated rôle, and use "elegant and harmonious" language. The language of tragedy may need to be as elevated as that of epic. (Essays, p. 512) The language of comedy is "that of common life improved in point of correctness; but not much elevated". (Essays, p. 513). These remarks are followed by a section on Poetical Words. He recites approvingly a list of such words and phrases, to be used for imparting melody and solemnity: quenched of hope, shorn of his beams, destiny obscure, vale, drear, mead, anon, behest, smite, darkling, streamy, rose-fingered, incense-breathing, etc.
Beattie's observations about tropes and figures are obvious. Poetical harmony, of which he has little of note to say, is discussed under the heads of Sweetness, Measure, and Imitation. He does not believe that verse is essential to poetry. It is however "necessary to the perfection of all poetry that admits of it. Verse is to poetry, what colours are to painting". (Essays, p. 563)

The essay on laughter and ludicrous composition is mainly psychological. At the end he attempts to account for the superiority of the moderns in ludicrous writing, in which they are more copious and more refined. The developments of society - feudalism and gallantry for instance - he thinks have supplied more materials for ludicrous composition; and it is more refined than that of the ancients, because society has become more peaceful, religious, and polite.

(1) Beattie gives no extended criticisms of particular poets, except of Dryden, in a footnote covering nine-tenths of several pages. (Essays, p. 356) This is a good appreciation.
In the Dissertation on fable and romance, Beattie discusses at some length the history of 'fable', ancient and modern, from Aesop to Cervantes. This is an account historical rather than critical. Modern prose fable he divides into historical allegory (Argenis, John Bull,) and religious and moral allegory (Pilgrim's Progress, Gulliver, Tale of a Tub). He tries to describe the rise of chivalry and feudalism and the materials of the 'modern romance, or poetical prose fable'. The New Romance he divides into the serious and the comic: 1) serious and 'historically' arranged (e.g. Robinson Crusoe); 2) serious and 'poetically' arranged (Sir Charles Grandison, Clarissa); 3) comic and historically arranged (Gil Blas, Roderick Random); 4) comic and 'poetically' arranged (Joseph Andrews, Amelia). It will be seen that by 'poetical arrangement' he means beginning in medias res.
His strong moralistic tendency as critic crops out in the remarks on these romances. *Robinson Crusoe* "must be allowed by the most rigid moralist, to be one of those novels which one may read not only with pleasure but also for profit. It breathes throughout a spirit of piety and benevolence". (Diss. p. 566) Of Richardson, "his moral sentiments are profound and judicious"; but the prudery of his women, the priggishness of his men, does not encourage imitation, and Lovelace, whom we ought to abominate, should not be "adorned with youth, beauty, eloquence, wit, and every other intellectual and bodily accomplishment". His death is far too good for him. "Had his crime been represented as the necessary cause of a series of mortifications, leading him gradually down to infamy, ruin, and despair, or producing by probable means an exemplary repentance, the fable would have been more useful in a moral view, and perhaps more interesting". (Diss. p. 569)

Lesage he thinks may be read without much danger, but he "appears to have had a partiality for cheats and sharpers...nor does he always paint them in the odious colours, that properly belong to all such pests of society". (Diss. p. 570)
Smollett he admires for his energy and vivacity; but find his style often bombastic and his humourous pictures exaggerated unwarrantably. Of his morality Beattie cannot approve. "A duel he seems to have thought one of the highest efforts of human virtue; and playing dextrously at billiards a very genteel accomplishment"! (Diss. 571)

On the comic epic his remarks are confined to Fielding whom he ranks with Shakespeare for his wit and humour and knowledge of men. Parson Adams is "indeed a character of masterly invention, and next to Don Quixote, the most ludicrous personage that ever appeared in romance". (Diss. 572) Wilson of course should not have been awarded a tranquil old age, after all his errors. Tom Jones and Amelia he considers Fielding's best, admiring particularly their able construction:..."when we get to the end and look back on the whole contrivance, we are amazed to find, that of so many incidents there should be so few superfluous; that in such variety of fiction there should be so great probability; and that so complex a tale should be so perspicuously conducted, and with perfect unity of design". (Diss. 573)
Chapter Two.

II.

Practitioners.
Richardson.

The reader may well by this stage be asking if we are ever to have done with general principles and come to particular criticism. William Hare, a former professor of anatomy in Glasgow university, may be of some assistance to us as we are now out of the race of imposing.

In Short, regards in surgery, in botany, and on certain French and English writers, notably (1) Leon. 1774, and (2) H. de la Verterne, reports a point of view equally elegant. He noted in the spectacle against Mr. Johnson for his denial of the initiative in Johnson's report that "The objection arising from the improbability of finding the first hour of Alexandria and the last hour,垒omas, that when the play ended, he expressed himself as to mandarin and matter; that his name to the theatre has been a image to appal, and that in these he was of candor and character." Richardson realizes that "The spectator took notes..."
The reader may well by this time be asking if we are never to have done with general principles and come to particular criticism. William Richardson, professor of humanity in Glasgow University, may be offered as palliative, though we are not yet out of the maze of law-making.

In _Cursory remarks on tragedy, on Shakespearz and on certain French and Italian poets, principally tragedians_, (Lon. 1774, anon.), Richardson reveals a point of view mainly classical. He takes up the cudgels against Dr. Johnson for his denial of the unities. To Johnson's remark that "The objection arising from the impossibility of passing the first hour at Alexandria and the next at Rome, supposes, that when the play opens, the spectator imagines himself at Alexandria, and believes that his walk to the theatre has been a voyage to Egypt, and that he lives in the days of Antony and Cleopatra", Richardson replies that "the spectator does not-"

(1) Pref. Johnson's ed. of Shak.

(2) This work is generally attributed to Richardson. Its attitude to Shakespeare, however, makes it such a strange bedfellow for Richardson's _Essays on Shakespeare's Characters_ that I have serious doubts of his having written the _Cursory Remarks_.

-imagine that he is at Alexandria, he knows he is in a theatre; and whilst he is there, if he knows he is not at Alexandria, he must know a fortiori that he cannot be at Alexandria and at Rome too; if the stage cannot represent Venice, a fortiori, it cannot represent Venice and Cyprus too; if the stage is but one, the place cannot be more than one". In reply to Johnson's statement that no representation is taken for reality, Richardson asks, if scenery and costume are not calculated to have this effect on the audience, what is the use of them? Even if Johnson is right, he suggests, "a play is an imitation of nature, to resemble nature it must resemble truth, or the probability of truth". (Intro. Curs. Rem. p. 12) He ridicules Johnson's assertion that "we rather lament the possibility than suppose the presence of misery", and concludes that there must be a certain momentary delusion.

As we might expect, in Corneille he finds much to approve, setting him above Shakespeare as a writer of tragedy. His arguments in defense of Corneille's faults are often weak. He pleads the-

-taste of the times, and in extenuation cites similar errors in Shakespeare - although elsewhere he tries to persuade us that Shakespeare was not a good writer of tragedy! But Corneille adheres on the whole to the unities, and this is the main thing.

Racine he considers without a rival for "elegance, correctness, harmony of verse and beauty of sentiment". He defends his making love the chief passion, holding that love is a fit subject for tragedy. Voltaire likewise has his admiration for bringing French tragedy to its highest point of perfection. He analyzes in detail Voltaire's *Semiramis*.

Richardson's classical bias is even more apparent in his discussion of Shakespeare. He disputes the pre-eminent place given "of late" to Shakespeare as a writer of tragedy. He judges him by "the rules dictated by the wise, approved by the learned, and adopted by writers of judgment, genius and taste of all nations" (p.33) to be not even a good writer of tragedy. He breaks a lance with Pope-
-who has set Shakespeare above Aristotle's rules. He insists on trying Shakespeare's "preposterous magic", his "unpardonable audacity" in violating credibility, by the rules of common sense. "Let us allow him great merit as a comic writer, greater still as a poet, but little, very little, as a tragedian". (p.37)

He looks with approval on the current garbling of Shakespeare. The scene of the grave-diggers in Hamlet is "highly natural" but sadly misplaced. (p.40) He is glad that contemporary producers omit it. He does not like to see innocence suffer needlessly - as in Cordelia and Lear - and thinks it an improvement that nowadays, in the refined versions of Shakespeare, "ingratitude meets with its proper punishment, and the audience now retire, exulting in the mutual happiness of paternal affection and filial piety". (p.47) Such, if practicable, should be the winding-up of all dramatic representations, so that the moral of virtue rewarded may be pointedly drawn. Pathos should be created by "seeing the virtuous involuntarily led to the perpetration of some horrid crime, or in the dread apprehension of having already committed it, or tottering on the brink of perdition". (p.47)
Richardson however is not blind to some of Shakespeare's merit. He compares him with Tintoret, finding in both the same virtues and faults. "In our English bard, what a glow of fancy, what a rapidity of imagination, what a sublimity in diction, what strength, what a distinction of characters, what knowledge of the human heart! Yet how inattentive to propriety and order, how deficient in grouping, how fond of exposing disgusting as well as beautiful figures". (p.50) Thus though he would banish Shakespeare from the company of good tragedians, it is with high honours: "I too can feel with an equal degree of transport all his unrivalled strokes of nature, all his wonderful descriptive and creative powers; can love with Romeo, be jealous with Othello, can moralize with Hamlet, grow distracted with Lear; but I cannot talk bawdy with Mercutio, nor intoxicate myself with Cassio; I cannot play the fool with Polonius, nor the puppy with Oswald". (p.50) This blending of meanness and dignity, serious and dignified, apparently he thinks too literal an interpretation of "following nature".
Richardson's classical bias does not prevent him from giving us a group of essays which constitute one of the best appreciations of Shakespeare's characters written during the century, either in England or in Scotland. His Philosophical analysis of and illustration of some of Shakespeare's remarkable characters (Macbeth, Hamlet, Jacques, Imogen) was published in 1774. Essays on Shakespeare's dramatic characters of Richard III, King Lear, and Timon of Athens, with an essay on the faults of Shakespeare appeared in 1783; Essays on Shakespeare's dramatic character of Falstaff, and on his imitation of female characters, in 1789. These seem to have been popular, for second and third editions of the essays on Richard III, etc. were made almost immediately, and the whole series was united in one volume in 1797.
Richardson is the offspring of the marriage of classical criticism with the new "philosophical criticism" represented particularly by Kames. His critical attitude is revealed in the essay "on the objects of criticism in Shakespeare" (Essays on Falstaff, etc. p. 92) and deserves quoting at length:

"But if we consider the sentiments and actions, attributed by the poet to his various characters as so many facts; if we observe their agreement or disagreement, their aim, or their origin; and if we class them according to their common qualities, or connect them by their original principles, we shall ascertain, with some accuracy, the truth of the representation. For without having our judgments founded in this manner, they are liable to change, error and inconsistency. Thus the moralist becomes a critic, and the two sciences of ethics and criticism appear to be intimately and very naturally connected. In truth, no one who is unacquainted with the human mind, or entertains improper notions of human conduct, can discern excellence in the higher species of poetical composition".

... Feeling must not be trusted entirely:

"It is in morals as in criticism, our judgments and our conduct must be established upon those maxims that may have been suggested by feeling, but which must derive their force and stability from reason and deep reflection (123) ...It might easily be shown, that in the conduct of life, no less than in our judgments concerning fine composition, if we have no determined principles, independent of present emotions, our deportment will be capricious, unsteady and inconsistent". (125)
We have noted already that the rhetoricians are as much interested in deriving principles of human nature from literature, as in studying literature for its own sake. Richardson is an excellent example of this point of view applied in actual criticism. The attitude implicit in all three volumes of the essays on Shakespeare's characters may be taken as summed up in "Objects of Criticism in Shakespeare" in the 1789 volume: (p.38):

"In Macbeth, misled by an overgrown and perverted passion, we trace the progress of that corruption, by which the virtues of the mind are made to contribute to the completion of its depravity.

"In Hamlet, we have a striking representation of the pain, of the dejection, and contention of spirit, produced in a person, not only of exquisite but of moral and correct sensibility, by the conviction of extreme enormity of conduct in those whom he loves, or wishes to love and esteem.

"We observe in Jacques how

'Goodness wounds itself
And sweet affection proves the spring of woe'.

"We see in Imogen, that persons of real mildness and gentleness of disposition, fearing or suffering evil, by the ingratitude or inconstancy of those on whose affections they had reason to depend, are more solicitous than jealous; express regret rather than resentment; and are more apt to be overwhelmed with sorrow than inflamed with revenge."
"In contemplating the character of Richard III, we see, and are enabled to explain, the effect produced upon the mind by the display of great intellectual ability, employed for inhuman and perilous purposes.

"We are led, on the other hand, by an obvious connection, to observe in the character of Falstaff the effect produced on the mind by the display of considerable ability, directed by sensual appetites and mean desires.

"King Lear illustrates, that mere sensibility uninfluenced by a sense of propriety, leads man to an extravagant expression both of social and unsocial feelings; renders them capriciously inconsistent in their affections; variable, and of course irresolute, in their conduct".

(1) Richardson's essays are actually more subtle than this, and will repay reading. But here, surely, are "literary illustrations of morals"! It will be seen that Richardson is using Shakespeare's characters as a fixation of human nature, where it may be studied as in a laboratory better than from life itself. This compliment is ample penance for the derogatory remarks quoted earlier.

These essays, coming refreshingly in the midst of so much Shakespearian criticism of the 'beauties-but-faults' school, and ante-dating by three decades the studies of Lamb and Hazlitt, deserve more attention than they get from literary historians. His volume of 1774 is the first to be devoted entirely to Shakespeare's characters. Morgann's essay on Falstaff appeared in 1777; Thomas Whately's Remarks on some of the characters of Shakespeare was published in 1785, although it appears to have been written before 1770.
Among other contributions of Richardson were an article in the Mirror "on the advantage which the artist in the fine arts has over nature in the assemblage and arrangement of objects; exemplified in Milton's Allegro and Penseroso;" an essay on the ancient form of historical composition (an able argument in defense of the direct dramatic technique of Livy against the modern narrative style); and an early appreciation of Hamilton of Bangour in the Lounger.

He is wrong about Ossian, but ingenious. In "An Essay on the origin of superstition, illustrated in the mythology of the poems of Ossian" he surveys the rise of primitive peoples' belief in life beyond the grave, showing its simple characteristics. He then cites Ossian to show that the poems reveal this primitive attitude.

(1) He is also credited with being the author of The Philanthrope, a periodical essayist, 1797; and of having left a ms. essay on figurative language. I have found neither of these.
(2) No. 24, Apr. 17, 1779.
(3) Trans. Edin. Society, 1783.
(4) No. 42, Nov. 19, 1785.
Richardson rendered a service in calling attention to the merit of Italian poetry, which he thought had not received fair treatment from Addison and Warton. These two he thinks failed as critics by not taking into account the different characters and climates of nations. "To determine the merit of the compositions of foreign nations, it is not sufficient to be masters of their languages, even in the most perfect degree; but to be competent judges of them, as it is not possible to possess their notions and sensations, we should at least experimentally know in what degree and on what occasions they are moved and affected". He gives an appreciation of the Sophonisba of Trissino, the Rosmunda of Ruccelai, the Torrismondo of Tasso, the Merope of Maffei, and of the dramatic qualities of Metastasio's opera, La Clemenza di Tito. In the harrying of Tasso by Boileau and the English critics (e.g. the 28th Guardian) he is on the side of the poor hare. Tasso he thinks has been misread. Sylvia (in the Aminta) does not say she wears flowers to make them ashamed; but Daphne the 'antiquated coquette' merely supposes her to be saying so. (2)

(2) Ibid. p. 211.
Henry MacKenzie, novelist, essayist, and literary critic, was a prominent figure in the literary world of Scotland in the 18th century, in which much of the work was done. His articles on novels, particularly on Scott, are still appreciated rather than condemned. Without great praise he did literature considerable office service. In his belief in the beauty of literaryism, he gave an example of the unknown poet which historical conservative has accordingly modified. He was one of the first to be appreciative of Scott's. His critical review of the Scott's novels initiated the study of Scott's literature in Scotland. His student point made the way for success. He drew up the memoir of the Highland Society of London. As preliminary to the second edition of MacKenzie's Anecdotes and Prefaces, the first accurate opposition to Byron and Southey.

(1) I take it, Mr. Chalmers, no one discovered new and material in this host, for which we have not the affection MacKenzie.
Henry MacKenzie, novelist, playwright and essayist, is perhaps the outstanding Scottish man of letters of the century in which nearly all his work was done. His criticism has more urbanity and less dogmatism than that of most of the writers we have considered. His manner is gentle, his style appreciative rather than analytical. Without great pretence he did literature considerable critical service. In his brief review of Burns' Kilmarnock edition he gave an estimate of the unknown poet which historical perspective has not greatly modified. He was one of the first appreciators of Schiller. His critical account of the German theatre initiated the study of German literature in Scotland, and started Scott on his way as author. He drew up the report of the Highland Society on Ossian. He gave (according to Thompson: 

MacKenzie's Anecdotes and Egotisms) the first encouragement to Byron and Campbell.

(1) I take it Mr. Thompson has discovered some new material on this head, for which we must await his Life of MacKenzie.
The polite essay rather than literary criticism was the forte of the Mirror and the Lounger, in which MacKenzie had a considerable hand. But both contain some critical material from his pen. In Lounger No. 20, on novel writing, he is concerned, (as were Johnson and some of the Scots writers we have quoted) about the danger to morals from this type of literature. He suggests that the novel "surely merits a higher station in the world of letters than is generally assigned it". Unfortunately inferior writers have adopted this form, and it has become debased both in literary quality and in moral instruction. In the latter requirement even superior writers have fallen short.

"The principal danger of novels, as forming a mistaken and pernicious system of morality, seems to me to arise from that contrast between one virtue or excellence and another, that war of duties which is to be found in many of them, particularly in that species called the sentimental". He resents the overstrained delicacy of the characters and the "separation of conscience from feeling".

A considerable part of MacKenzie's critical writing deals with drama.

In Lounger No. 50, Observations on Comedy, he has moral qualms about comedy similar to those about the novel. "The subjects of comedy are often of a dangerous kind. They trench upon sacred ground". The vices which comedy depicts are exaggerated, and its resemblance to real life is only admitted by those whose weaknesses it flatters. Misers and usurers, for instance, are ridiculed. But "Alas! misers and usurers neither read nor see comedies; but the young and the thoughtless are taught to call prudence and economy, covetousness and avarice, to be dissipated and extravagant out of pure virtue". MacKenzie thinks recent comedies, which thus attack principles of conduct, more dangerous than the licentious drama of the Restoration, which merely violated decency. He seems to think even The School for Scandal immoral, in this sense.

(2) Ibid p. 4
(3) Ibid p. 7
In *An Examination of the moral effects of* (1) tragedy, he makes the same indictment of contemporary tragedy. It is proper, he says, for tragedy to exhibit the weaknesses of men; but it should also distinguish clearly vice and virtue, as did ancient tragedy. He attacks the "sickly sensibility" which attempts to dignify weak yielding to the passions, particularly the passion of love. He suggests that Aristotle's apothegm that "tragedy purges the passions by exciting them" (MacKenzie's version of 'catharsis') could scarcely have been meant to apply to the passion of love which had such a prominent place on the eighteenth-century stage, since in Greek tragedy it was almost unknown. The emphasis on love he considers debilitating... "Every species of composition, whether narrative or dramatic, which places the only felicity of life in successful love, is unfavourable to the strength and purity of a young mind". (2)

'Modern' tragedy, exhibiting "the fantastic griefs of a delicate and high-wrought sensibility" is too far removed from actual life to have a moral effect on the audience. The effect of this sort of thing is-

(1)Lounger No. 27, Aug. 6, 1785. *McK. Wks. vol. V.*
(2)Ibid p. 228.
to make us sorry for ourselves, without making us sorry for others. Castalio in The Orphan and Orosmene in Zayre, temporarily frustrated in sexual satisfaction, he gives as examples of fallacious distresses for which our sympathy is invited.

(1) In Mirror No. 54, the Conversation—Criticism on the tragedy of Zara (Voltaire's Zayre) gives an opportunity to air several views, none of them necessarily MacKenzie's. Sir H--, who admires Voltaire, suggests that admiration for Shakespeare has been carried to idolatry. There are some hits at "sentiments". Sir H-- objects to the "dark scene" in the last act: "We cannot possibly suppose, that two persons walking upon the same board do not see each other, while we, sitting in a distant part of the house, see both perfectly well". Mr. M. replies that the whole art of the theatre is an artificial one, that it is the business of the dramatist to overcome such inconsistencies by his poetry, and that the audience should assist by surrendering themselves to the illusion.

(1) McK. Wks. IV, 230.
(2) Ibid. p. 239.
In the controversy over Shakespeare, MacKenzie is on the side of the angels. "His departure from all the common rules which criticism, somewhat arbitrarily perhaps, has imposed, leaves no legal code by which the decision can be regulated". Unlike Richardson, he objects to the "improvement" of Shakespeare, such as Garrick's excision of the gravedigger scene in Hamlet. "Within the bounds of a pleasure-garden, we may be allowed to smooth our terraces, and trim our hedge-rows; but it were equally absurd as impracticable, to apply the minute labours of the roller and the pruning-knife to the nobler irregularity of trackless mountains and impenetrable forests". We are not to cavil at particular passages but to "look for the superiority of Shakespeare in the astonishing and almost supernatural powers of his invention, his absolute command over the passions, and his wonderful knowledge of human nature".

(1) McK. Wks. IV, 372.
(2) Ibid, p. 394
(3) Ibid, p. 373.
The Criticism on the character Of Hamlet

is approached from the point of view of a Man of Feeling. Hamlet is regarded as a man of extreme sensibility. "The basis of Hamlet's character seems to be an extreme sensibility of mind, apt to be strongly impressed by its situation, and overpowered by the feelings which that situation excites". From this sensibility, says MacKenzie, proceeds Hamlet's irresolution and the "majesty of Melancholy" which Shakespeare has thrown around him. His madness he thinks simulated throughout.

(1) Mirror Nos. 99 and 100, McK. Wks. IV, 371.
(2) Ibid. p. 375.

It is perhaps worth noting that these two numbers of the Mirror, Nos. 99 and 100, appeared in April 18 and April 22, 1780. Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahr was contributed to Schiller's Die Horen in 1795-96.
MacKenzie’s Critical remarks on the character of Falstaff are excellent. He tells us the character of Falstaff rises organically from the nature of the plays, in which Shakespeare had to make the knight attractive to the prince by his wit and humour, yet so gross that Hal could later cast him off. He agrees with Morgann so far as to say that in Falstaff cowardice is "not so much a weakness as a principle". He sees Falstaff as an inverted Don Quixote: "The ridicule in the character of Don Quixote, consists in raising low and vulgar incidents, through the medium of his disordered fancy, to a rank of importance, dignity and solemnity, to which in their nature they are the most opposite that can be imagined. With Falstaff it is nearly the reverse; the ridicule is produced by subjecting wisdom, honour, and other the most grave and dignified principles, to the control of grossness, buffoonery, and folly". He draws another parallel, this time-

(1) Lounger Nos. 68 and 69, McK. Wks. VI, 148.
(3) McK. Wks. VI, 161.
(4) Ibid. p. 165.
-between Falstaff and Richard III: "Both are men of the world; both possess that sagacity and understanding which is fitted for its purposes, both despise those refined feelings, those motives of delicacy, those restraints of virtue, which might obstruct the course they have marked out for themselves...Richard is witty like Falstaff, and talks of his own figure with the same sarcastic indifference. Indeed so much does Richard, in the higher walk of villainy, resemble Falstaff in the lower region of roguery and dissipation, that it were not difficult to shew, in the dialogue of the two characters, however dissimilar in situation, many passages and expressions in a style of remarkable resemblance".

(1) McK. Wks. VI, 167.
The Account of the German Theatre was read to the Royal Society of Edinburgh on April 21, 1788. At this time MacKenzie did not know the German language, and had read its drama only in French translations. The paper excited much interest, particularly that of Scott, who attributed to its stimulus the beginning of his own studies.

MacKenzie finds German drama to be lacking in regularity and decorum, in observation of the unities. But he does not believe in judging by absolute rules which would bind the wings of genius, and agrees with Johnson that the imagination is very accommodating about changes of time and place. The simplicity and diffuseness of plot of the plays, their emphasis of situation rather than of character, he allows to be natural in the beginning of a dramatic literature. Their weakness in motivation he attributes to the "metaphysical refinements of sentiment" to which the German dramatists are addicted: i.e., the feelings are created but not the characters who are supposed to experience them. In morals he finds them unexceptionable, but lacking restraint and delicacy in the representation of...

(3) The same point of view is expressed in his Life of Home, p. 93. He speaks of "the true inspiration of the poet, which gives to criticism instead of borrowing from it, its model and its rules, and which it is possible, in some diffident authors, the terrors of criticism may have weakened and extinguished."
-of passions and misfortunes. His ideal here is "the sorrow that melts, not the anguish that tears; the fear that agitates, not the terror that overwhelms the soul". We gather that although he surrendered to Shakespeare, some of Shakespeare’s contemporaries did not have his approval; for "like some Elizabethan drama", he says, the horrors of the German theatre "assault the imagination and the heart of the reader with unsparing force".

Most of the comedies he describes as "dramas", their characters belonging to comedy but the action and emotions rather to tragedy. Lessing’s Minna de Barnhelm he finds more deficient in comic humour than he had expected of the chef d’oeuvre of German comedy. He thinks Lessing’s tragedy of Emilie de Galotti has many faults of character, conduct and situation, but is skilful "in the development of the secret foldings of the heart". Goethe’s

(1) Trans. R.S.E. II, 167.
(2) Ibid. p. 177.
Goetz de Berliching is "highly irregular in its plan"; of Claviggo he approves only the last act; Stella, a 'drame', is full of refined sensibility and, he thinks, as immoral as the novel on which it is based. Brandes' comedies, Le Comte d'Olbach and L'hotel Garn are "highly interesting", "spirited and natural". But of all the plays discussed in The Account, MacKenzie is most struck by Schiller's The Robbers. He dearly loved to find genius sweeping aside all obstacles, and marvels that such a play should have been written at the age of twenty-three, "amidst the cloistered ignorance incident to his situation". He gives a long account of The Robbers, calling it "one of the most uncommon productions of untutored genius that modern times can boast".

(1) Trans. R.S.E. II, 191.
The only considerable work of MacKenzie (1) published in the nineteenth century was his Life of John Home, read before the Royal Society (2) June 22, 1812. Chambers tells us that "at the time he read this paper to the Society he also laid before them, in connection with it, some critical essays, chiefly relative to dramatic poetry, which have not been published." There is no reference to these critical essays in the minutes of the Society. The Life of Home prefixed to the 1822 edition of Home's Works, and the separate edition of the Life in the same year, are identical. Possibly what Chambers means is the second part of this Life, which contains some criticism. MacKenzie here surveys the state of the drama at the time Home began to write (1749). He reveals a thorough acquaintance with the plays of Otway, Rowe, Southerne, Congreve and Moore. He seems to have been unduly impressed by Home's dramatic efforts: the chief scene in Douglas (that between Lady Randolph and old Norval) he thinks "has no equal in modern, and scarcely a superior in ancient drama". It is perhaps of-

(1)The eighteenth century in Scottish literature is a natural, self-contained Period. MacKenzie and Dugald Stewart are the only writers of note whose work was not completed before 1800.

(2)Eminent Scotsmen.

(3)MacKenzie; Life of Home, 1822, p. 93.
-poetry rather than of drama he is thinking, for he agrees with Garrick that fine writing may retrieve the faults of a badly constructed play, and he is not enthusiastic about Home's powers of construction. MacKenzie's patriotism and his love of the poetry of pathos do not make him a blind partisan of Home. Of Home's last tragedy, Alfred, he says, "There was an uniform mediocrity in the language, an uniform tameness and want of discrimination in the characters, sufficient, without the national feeling of the debasement of the great Alfred into the hero of a love-plot, to tire, if not to disgust the audience". He likewise damns Home's comedy, Surprize, and Alma, another tragedy.

In The Anecdotes and Egotisms of Henry MacKenzie there is some comment on drama. He thinks his own play, The Prince of Tunis, "has many faults, particularly in the winding up of the plot; but it has some good poetry". He compares Shakespeare and Massinger: "Even in his higher ranks he(Shakespeare) often neglects the tongue to get at the mind. Massinger thinks of the expression in almost all situations, and sometimes weakens the outline of the character by the artificial colouring of the language". He thinks French comedy superior to-

(1) Life of Home, p.118.
(2) P. 1927. Probably written between 1822 and 1825.
(3) The Anecdotes, p. 208.
(4) Ibid. p.207.
English. But he deplores in French tragedy the tendency to long eloquent speeches rather than "incidents or short..." and striking traits of character, which distinguish British tragic writers. He does not like heroic tragedy in rhyme. He is of the old school as regards the dignity of tragedy, and is dubious whether a common sentinel is a fit person to be introduced into it.

(1) Anecdotes, p. 200.
Poetry.

Chapter 11 of the Anecdotes, on Poets and Poetry, contains some anecdotal comments on Burns, John Logan, Michael Bruce, Drummond, Chatterton, Lord Lyttleton, Cowley and Mrs. Rowe. The remarks on Pope, however, are more critical, and lead (in Thompson's arrangement) into a comparison of the poetry of Pope's period with that of more recent times; a comparison which is all in favour of Pope's concreteness and good sense. MacKenzie quarrels with the ultra-simplicity of the Lakers. "It will be admitted that everything that is natural is not poetry, of which the very essence seems to be a certain elevation and elegance of language above the standard of ordinary life. Nobleness and dignity are the attributes of poetry. These may belong to the feelings and the sentiments of inferior persons, but the language in which those feelings and sentiments are to be conveyed seems to require a certain degree of elegance and elevation if it is to be entitled to the denomination of poetry".

(1) Anecdotes, p. 160.
He notes the coincidental rise of German familiar poetry such as Gessner's at the same time as Crabbe's. "Both took the incidents of ordinary and often vulgar life for the subjects of their verse; but the Germans threw the drapery of sentiment over these common persons of the drama, which suited the wearers so ill that the combination became ludicrous... Crabbe shewed the very ragged clothing of his figures... He did not make them studies, but copied them as portraits. They were not therefore subject to that ludicrous contrast which was ridiculed in the German; but were still liable to the objection of being often something lower than poetry ought to deal in". With this point of view he naturally prefers Goldsmith's and Gray's treatment of rustic themes. He notes also the abstractness of Collins and the literalness of Cowper... "In expression Collins infinitely more rich and poetical: Cowper nearly prosaic, but strongly expressive and with words that if they do not burn, yet enlighten their subject".

(2) Ibid, p. 155.
More important than any of these pronouncements on poetry was MacKenzie's review in *The Lounger* of the Kilmarnock edition of Burns' poems, in which he rose to one of the highest offices of the critic by railing as a poetic genius "an Ayrshire ploughman". As critic, MacKenzie always had the courage of independent conviction. He does not call Burns a good poet for a ploughman, but judges the poems on their intrinsic merit. The introductory remarks on genius with which the essay begins, and the terms of the appreciation itself, seem to indicate that he gave to Burns without hesitation the place which both in popular and in scholarly opinion he has since occupied: "If I am not greatly deceived, I think I may pronounce him a genius of no ordinary rank". His quotations are discriminating. Of *To a Mountain Daisy*, he says: "I have seldom met with an image more truly pastoral than that of the lark, in the second stanza. Such strokes as these mark the pencil- (1)No. 97, Dec. 9, 1786. McK. Wks. VI, 378. (2)James Sibbald's review in the Edinburgh Magazine (Oct. 1786) preceded MacKenzie's by two months. (3)McK. Wks. VI, 391.
of the poet, which delineates nature with the precision of intimacy, yet with the delicate colouring of beauty and taste”. He ascribes to Burns also “that intuitive glance with which a writer like Shakespeare discerns the characters (1) of men” — in such poems as the Dialogue of the Dogs, the Dedication to G—H—, Epistles to a Young Friend, and To W. S——n. He defends Burns against the charge of libertinism and irreligion, reminding his readers of the ignorance and fanaticism of the lower class of people in the country where these poems were written. (2) He admits errors of taste, but “when we reflect on his rank in life, the habits to which he must have been subject, and the society in which he must have been mixed, we regret perhaps more than wonder, that delicacy should be so often offended in perusing a volume in which there is so much to interest and to please us”. (3)

Henry MacKenzie's wide knowledge, his sensitiveness to beauty, his "nose for genius", his balanced judgment, make him easily the best practicing critic produced in Scotland in the eighteenth century.

(1)Mck. Wks., VI, 363.
(2)Ibid. p. 389.
Classicists.
There were some critical writers who kept their eyes unwavering on classical literature. Of these one of the most interesting is Thomas Blackwell, the younger, whose Inquiry into the life and writings of Homer was published in 1735. In this volume Blackwell adopts the deterministic viewpoint, and attempts to explain Homer's greatness by reference to his environment. He is thus in a measure anticipating Taine at Taine's weakest point, namely genius.

Blackwell disagrees with the ancient critics who, marvelling at the power of Homer, thought he could not have been a man but a god. His explanation is naturalistic: "Whoever paints her (nature) true, or any part of her that is full of action; and applies that action to times, places, persons, and their signs, will include those proportions, and their measures, without intending it, almost without knowing it, but never without some perception of their propriety and truth".

(1) 1701-1757.
(2) It was probably Blackwell that Hume had in mind when he damned this sort of thing. (Vide Hume's Essays, G & G, 1875, I, 177)
He tells us it is "absolutely the conjunction and manners of the times that produce poets". Homer was fortunate: "He came into the world at a proper distance of time, after the expedition which he sung; not too near it, when naked truth, and the severe appearance of known facts, might quash enthusiasm, and render ornaments ridiculous; but when the circumstances of the story had sufficient time to ripen into fable, or at least be susceptible of it, from a skillful hand". (p.315) Homer wrote just when the Greek language had been "brought to express all the best and bravest of the human feelings, and retained a sufficient quantity of its original, amazing, metaphorick tincture". (p.46) Again, times of struggle he thinks favourable to poetry, especially to epic, and "it was when Greece was ill-settled, when violence prevailed in many places, amidst the confusion of the wandering tribes, that Homer produced his immortal poem". His poverty, and his being a "strolling indigent bard" were likewise among his good fortunes, allowing him to-

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(1) Inquiry, p. 70.
(2) Blackwell suggests that a polished language is not fit for a great poet. "What we call polishing diminishes a language; it makes many words obsolete; it coops a man up in a corner, allows him but one set of phrases, and deprives him of many significant terms, and strong beautiful expressions..." (p.59)
observe in his travels the life of poor and great. Thus everything in the nature of the times, and in Homer's personal circumstances, "was in the happiest temper for description and poesy." (p. 179)

Blackwell's opinion seems to be, not that Homer invented, which is his great merit in the eyes of most critics, but that he drew from life: "When we sit down to Homer, and hear him tell over the number of his ships, recount his auxiliaries, and produce as it were the muster-roll of the two armies, we can no longer defend ourselves; and in spite of all our precautions an opinion creeps upon us, 'That every tittle of what he says is true.'" By 'true' he does not apparently mean 'poetically true'. He thinks Homer's characters could not have been 'feigned': "it was truth and nature alone that could form those differences, so real and yet so delicate, and afterwards offer them to a representation." (p. 305)

He almost seems to think that the subject made Homer a present of the poem. Even in the selection of the point at which it should begin, it was "his subject which directed him of its own accord to make the choice." (p. 309)
Blackwell's conclusion is that "the fortunes, the manners, and the language of a people are all linked together, and necessarily influence one another". (p. 54) "It is the different periods, naturally succeeding in the progression of manners, that can only account for the succession of wit and literature. I have marked out those of Greece in the history of the language; they correspond with admirable niceness to the successive sets of poets, orators, and philosophers...For they are settled and uniform courses, and never fail to work their effect, unless when external violence hinders their operation". (p. 77)

He does not banish altogether the divine madness of inspiration, but altogether he is decidedly deterministic. He likens Homer to "some exquisite statue, the work of his country, and placed with judgment in a well regulated garden." (p. 300)
James Geddes' Essay on the composition and manner of writing of the Antients, particularly Plato (1748) is a discussion of some ancient writers of prose—Xenophon, Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato, Demosthenes. He attempts to show how they introduced into their prose, poetic effects. There is much talk of 'eloquence'.

The preliminary essay on composition is commonplace. "To give a right position to the words, a due harmony to the different members, and connect both in proper periods, is the business of composition" (p.2) "Every artist must be careful, first of all, to furnish himself with such materials as are proper for his work, and then consider how he is to adapt them to each other, how range and dispose of them, what shall be chosen, and what rejected". (p.4). As the architect selects and fits together his stuff, "thus also an author is to attend to the choice of his words, unite them in a friendly tye, use such as contribute to the majesty and beauty of his language, reject the ungraceful, and wind up the whole period to a true pitch of harmony" (p.4). He must imitate nature, and by "just numbers, accurate proportions, a musical symphony, magnificent figures, and that decorum which is the result of all these" create unity. (p.11.
In the discussion of Greek writers which follows, Geddes' critical method is simply:

How well turned this phrase is! How noble a simile!, and so forth. Xenophon is "smooth, sweet and elegant"; Herodotus, simple and unaffected, sometimes approaching the poetic; Thucydides "affects a grandeur of style". The remarks on Plato and Demosthenes are in the mode of the older rhetoric.
James Moor, professor of Greek in Glasgow University, editor of some of the Foulis's splendid editions of the classics, did not write much criticism. In an Essay on historical composition he tells us that the ancients regarded history as governed by the same rules of unity, harmony, and proportion, as epic or tragedy, although Aristotle makes no mention of this. He thinks the Expedition of the Ten Thousand, or the Conspiracy of Catiline "will stand the severest test of Aristotle's rules for the composition of an epic poem". (p.145)

Thucydides' History of the Peloponessian War he considers defective in the proportion and connection of its parts. Even in more general histories, artistic principles should operate. Polybius and Herodotus have succeeded, Diodorus Siculus has failed, in securing unity.

More important is his essay On the end of Tragedy according to Aristotle. Here he ridicules Dacier's idea that the passions are purged by our-

(1) Essays read to a literary society, 1759.
(2) 1759. Ed. used 1783, Glasgow.
(1-a) 1712-1779.
being made familiar with them. He also disagrees with Du Bos, who held that tragedy raises and cherishes good passions while creating horror of bad passions. Moor says, "...there is not in his (Aristotle's) words the smallest foundation for imagining he maintained that this purgation des passions was the proper effect intended to be produced by tragedy." (p.12). By an examination of the diction of Aristotle and Homer, he puts up a plausible demonstration that what the words actually mean is, that tragedy should "charm away like music", or "remove" the calamities of tragedy out of human life. (p.17.)
The principal claim to fame of the reverend John Ogilvie is that to him Dr. Johnson said, "Let me tell you, the noblest prospect which a Scotsman ever sees is the high road which leads him to England". Prefixed to his Poems on several subjects (1762) is a very dull essay on the lyric poetry of the ancients. He tells us that "the rules of Criticism are originally drawn, not from the speculative idea of perfection in an art, but from the work of that Artist to whom either merit or accident hath appropriated the most established character"! He therefore laments our lack of a pre-eminent lyricist from whom to draw rules for lyric poetry.

Ogilvie also wrote Philosophical and Critical observations on the nature, character and various species of composition (1774 2 v.), which I have been unable to obtain. If one may judge by the Essay referred to, this is not a serious hiatus. A great deal of worse than mediocre writing of this sort was done by eighteenth-century Scots; to read one is to have read all.

(1) 1773-1814.
When in 1779 Andrew Dalzell, son of a Linlithgow carpenter, came to the chair of Greek in Edinburgh University, Greek studies there were at their lowest ebb. Dalzell performed the task of reviving them, and bringing Edinburgh nearer the high level set at Glasgow by Moor and the Foulis.

In his *Substance of Lectures on the Ancient Greeks*, Dalzell is a teacher and popularizer of Greek rather than a critic. In volume I, part 3, he surveys Greek literature, which of course he regards as the model of elegance. Homer, Virgil and Milton are compared. Homer is placed first, but Milton, he thinks, surpasses both Homer and Virgil in sublimity. He makes a comparative criticism of Sophocles *Oedipus Tyrannus* and Otway's *The Orphan*. His attitude to the modern theatre is temperate, for a Greek. Similarly he discusses elegiac, pastoral and lyric poetry, and 'eloquence', the moderns being drawn in only for purposes of illustration.

Concerning taste and criticism he is –

(1) Posthu. p. 1821; Edin. 2 v.
(1-a) 1742-1806 (D.N.B. 1750-1806 (Chambers))
-sound but not exciting. "Elegant taste is nothing else than sensibility, directed by good sense". (II, 349) He tells us that criticism is the science of judging works of genius, and deprecates the abstraction of metaphysical critics:

"Whoever is well acquainted with the manner in which the productions of human genius affect the feelings of elegant and cultivated minds, may be pronounced well acquainted with the principles of good taste. Whoever would pretend to remount farther than this source, will soon find himself lost in a labyrinth of metaphysics, which has been the case with some late writers, who, wandering beyond the province of good taste, have bewildered themselves in a dark and abstruse search after remote first principles, to which criticism ought never to aspire".

(II, 358.)
Antiquaries.
The spade work done by antiquarians in bringing to the light neglected elder Scottish poetry ought to be included in services to the criticism which it necessarily preceded. In some cases selection is the only critical function performed.

(1) John Callander, who had begun his critical activities with voluminous Annotations on (3) Paradise Lost, largely borrowed without acknowledgment from Patrick Hume’s edition of the poem, published in 1782 Two Ancient Scottish Poems: The Gaberlunzie Man and Christ’s Kirk on the Green, with notes and additional observations. Callander is now regarded as more enthusiastic than reliable as an etymologist, but the Introduction is interesting for its philological point of view. The volume is-

(1) Vide such as Watson’s Choice Collection (1706-1711), Ramsay’s Evergreen (1724), Sir David Dalrymple’s Ancient Scottish Poems (1770), David Hurd’s Ancient and Modern Scottish Songs (1776).
(2) d. 1785.
(3) Nine volumes are in the possession of the Scottish Society of Antiquaries. A specimen was p. in 1750.
published, he says, "as a specimen of the advantages which etymology may derive from comparing those called original and sister languages, and their various dialects". He thinks it a pity that the Scots dialect has been neglected, for "it transmits to us many works of genius both in poetry and prose". He finds Dr. Johnson sadly deficient in etymological knowledge. An anonymous pamphlet, A Critical Review of the Works of Dr. Samuel Johnson (1783) is also attributed to him in the Edinburgh University library. This is a scathing attack on Johnson, in a spirit of petty cavilling, and might well be Callander's.
James Sibbald, at whose circulating library in Parliament Square Scott "fastened like a tiger upon every collection of old songs or romances", also helped to revive interest in Scottish vernacular poetry. He edited the *Satire of the Three Estates* (1802). He wrote a *Chronicle of Scottish Poetry from the thirteenth century to the Union of the Crowns*, which Scott valued most for the glossary to which the fourth volume is devoted. The first three volumes contain extracts from the poets, with biographical and critical notices. The Advertisement disclaims any "talent for critical disquisition"; the work is intended merely to "exhibit the progress of Scottish poetry". The chief concern of the notes is with the authorship and dates of the poems.

The *Chronicle* is Sibbald's best known work; but he is also entitled to credit for the first serious review of Burns' Kilmarnock edition, in the *Edinburgh Magazine or Literary Miscellany*, which he had initiated in 1785. The review of "Poems, chiefly-

(1) 1745-1803.
(2) 4 v. Edin. 1802.
in the Scottish dialect, by Robert Burns" appeared (1) in October, 1786, two months earlier than MacKenzie's review in The Lounger. Sibbald's review is neither so 'elegant' nor so discriminating as MacKenzie's. He prefers Burns' humourous to his serious poems; notes his sagacity as a judge of human nature; and approves the delicacy of his "softer scenes". Lengthy extracts, not so well selected as MacKenzie's, are given. Sibbald welcomes Burns with bluff heartiness. "Who are you, Mr. Burns? will some surly critic say. At what university have you been educated? What languages do you understand? What authors have you particularly studied? Whether has Aristotle or Horace directed your taste? Who has praised your poems, and under whose patronage are they published? In short, what qualifications intitle you to instruct or entertain us?" To which he makes Burns answer, "My good sir, I am a poor country man; I was bred up at the school of Kilmarnock; I understand no languages but my own; I have studied Allan Ramsay and Ferguson. My poems have been praised at many a fire side; and I ask no patronage for them, if they deserve none..."

(1)Edin. Mag. IV, 284.
(2)Ibid p 284.
Sibbald calls Burns "a striking example of native genius bursting through the obscurity of poverty and the obstructions of laborious life" and hopes the critics will not judge him too pedantically.
William Tytler, another miner of buried Scottish poetry, seems to have been chiefly intrigued by the problems of disputed authorship. He discovered in the Bodleian the manuscript of the King's Quhair, which was published in 1783 in Tytler's Poetical Remains of James I, King of Scotland, ascribing it to that monarch on grounds generally accepted. Christ's Kirk on the Green he likewise attributed to James I rather than James V. His reasoning is lucid. He makes use of comparative orthography to determine antiquity. But as philologist he is less well equipped than as historian. In his Observations on The Vision (1792) he is again occupied by the question of authorship, crediting this item of the Evergreen to Ramsay.

(1) 1711-1792.
Controversies.
Three critical controversies absorbed some energy during the century.

I.

In one a chief protagonist was Thomas Ruddiman, whose edition of Gawin Douglas' *Aeneid* in 1710 has the honour of being the first publication of literary interest in Scotland in the eighteenth century. George Buchanan was the pivot of the two-

(1) Ruddiman, who came to Edinburgh in 1700 and was for many years the Advocates' librarian, had a scholarly or editorial hand in some thirty volumes. Of these the most notable were his *Rudiments of the Latin Tongue* (1714), his edition of Douglas' version of the *Aeneid* (1710) and the first collected edition of George Buchanan's *Works* (1715). Apart from the controversy discussed above, there is some criticism in Ruddiman's work. Peter Burnan, the Dutch scholar, had in his 1725 edition of Buchanan's *Works* (which included Ruddiman's own preface but also some critical notes by Burnan) "spoken contemptuously of Scottish literature". Chalmers (Life of Ruddiman, 1794) attributes (p. 96) to Ruddiman the preface of *Selecta Poenata Archibaldi Pit carnii* (Edin. 1727) which replied to this slander, proclaiming the merits of Wilson, Blackwood, Dempster, the two Barcleys, and Arthur Johnston. Crighton is put up in the lists against Erasmus; "Cragius" against Grotius. Ruddiman also wrote *Critical Remarks upon Peter Burnan's notes on Ovid's Works* (not published). These, judging by the specimen given in Chalmers' *Life of R.* (p. 174) are corrections of Burnan's philology and geography.

(Ruddiman's dates are 1674-1757.)
-critical controversies which occupied a considerable portion of Ruddiman's literary life. Only one of these is within our province. It began in 1740 with the dispute of Lauder and Love over the relative merits of Buchanan's and Johnston's Latin translations of the Psalms. In 1741 William Benson supplied to a new edition of Johnston's paraphrase of the Psalms a prefatory discourse odiously comparing Johnston with Buchanan, much to the disparagement of the latter. Benson sent Ruddiman a copy of this edition, and Ruddiman, in-

(1) As for the first: to the 1715 edition of Buchanan's Works Ruddiman contributed a preface in which were some adverse comments on aspects of Buchanan's character and political career. This met with the disapproval of many Edinburgh scholars, including James Anderson the antiquary, the Rev. George Logan, and a number of professors of the university. There followed a long-drawn battle of pamphlets between Ruddiman, Logan, John Love and James Man, on Buchanan's merits as an historian, and the question whether he repented of his behaviour to his Queen. But this is not literary criticism.
the form of a letter to Benson, came to the
defense of Buchanan in his Vindication of Mr.
George Buchanan's Paraphrase of the Book of Psalms (1745)
... "together with some useful observations con-
cerning the Latin poetry and arts of versification".

The Vindication is a sustained comparison
of the two poets, and includes some interesting
remarks on the principles of such translations, and
on versification. Ruddiman displays rugged common
sense, and a solid acquaintance with the Latin classics.

He first approves Buchanan's choice of
the lyric form for rendering the psalms, rather than
the elegiac form adopted by Johnston, because of the
greater variety allowed in treating subjects, "whether
of the sublime, the middle or low character". He
cites specific examples of how the form chosen by
Johnston has caused him to be faithless to the
original.

His definition of "poetical diction",
in which also he finds Buchanan superior to Johnston,
is, "a kind of artificial language, consisting partly of words and phrases, invented by, and almost peculiar to poets; But chiefly in the frequent use of proper and expressive epithets, of strong and affecting figures and metaphors, of lively and natural descriptions, and as it were the very images and representations of the things spoken of; with all those agreeable turns of wit and fancy, and all other ornaments of language and thought, which are proper to work upon the affections of the reader, and to strike his mind with admiration and delight, which is the chief, if not the sole end of all true poetry". (p.57).

Ruddiman thinks Johnston's style "too gay and florid", and Buchanan's a model of masculine simplicity and harmony.

Benson had complained of a lack of rules by which to judge poetry. Ruddiman replies that the ancient critics supply ample guidance, and that some matters must be left to individual taste. His gorge rises at the rule-mongers. He has a great contempt for excessive emphasis on externals, "the bark and-
outside of poetry... the least essential to its inward worth and excellency: I mean the long dance you lead us, with your fanciful Alliterations, Assonantiae syllabarum, Rhimings, and the like; of which too much has been said already". (p. 165)

When Benson consigns to limbo one particular psalm of Buchanan because it lacks all the "embellishments" - proper mixing of singular and plural numbers, suspense, caesura, Ruddiman cries: "What! and must all these your embellishments be crowded together in the compass of 22 lines! This would make them resemble a cloak of patched up or parti-coloured pieces, or rather like an old Gothick Building, where the ornaments are straw'd so thick, that its other and more substantial beauties cannot be seen or attended to. That poetry, not in mine only, but the opinion of the best judges, is most agreeable which, like Horace's mistress, is simplex munditiis, i.e. neat and cleanly, but at the same time simple and plain; and not that which by a multiplicity of ornaments and gaudiness of dress, is apt to distract the thought, instead of delighting it". (p. 184)

There is here much vigour and good sense, and it is a pity Ruddiman did not turn his attention more to criticism of literature in English.
A great furore was created by the production at the theatre in the Canongate in December, 1756, of John Home's Douglas. In dramatic literature Scotland had been, as she still is, singularly deficient, and at this time there was among the new intelligentsia a keen desire that Scots should find their place in the sun in this as in other departments. There were, however, strong religious scruples against the theatre. Thus when a minister of the Kirk took to writing plays he was hailed by the Edinburgh critics as a greater than Shakespeare; and at the same time he was subjected to the abuse of those who regarded this alliance of the church with the theatre as an armistice with the devil. We have already noted some of the criticisms of the play, by Hume and others. Douglas also occasioned a flood of pamphlets, ballads, satires, critical attacks and defenses.
Alexander ("Jupiter") Carlyle, the genial minister of Cummertrees, came to Home's defence with *A Full and True History of the Bloody Tragedy of Douglas* (a one-page anonymous summary); and an ironic "Argument to prove that the tragedy of Douglas ought to be publicly burnt by the hands of the hangman." The vein of the Argument is: the author is a clergyman; therefore he must have wasted his time reading instead of drinking or begging favours; it is a good tragedy and an honour to Scotland; therefore let us burn it or the English will be jealous, and vent their spleen on us.

Among pamphlets on the other side were "The Player's Scourge, or a detection of the vaunting prophanity and regnant impiety of stage plays and their wicked encouragers and frequenters"; an attack on the "idle, loose, useless cattives falsely called nobility and gentry, and especially those called judges and lawyers;" and the Second Part of the Players' Scourge, an attack on the stage and the supporters of "these wicked, hellish, cursed stage-plays".

(1) 1757, anon. 24 pp.
Adam Ferguson, in an anonymous pamphlet,
"The morality of stage plays seriously considered" (1757) attempted to justify the stage on economic grounds, and to show that in a good tragedy like Douglas there is a moral "from beginning to end". Our Saviour, he gravely remarks, said nothing against stage-plays; and although like anything else the theatre may become corrupt it is not so licentious as it was. Ferguson's pamphlet was replied to in "Some Serious Remarks on a late pamphlet entitled, 'The Morality of Stage Plays seriously considered".

"An Apology for the writers against the tragedy of Douglas" attempts some more particular criticism of the play. "The Philosopher's Opera" is a weak satire in play form, with such characters as Satan, "Mrs. Sarah Presbytery, relict of Mr. John Calvin"; etc. "Douglas, a tragedy, weighed in the balance and found wanting" finds Home's conduct inconsistent with his duty as a minister, and the play full of swearing and impious declarations. Other pamphlets were "The usefulness of the Edinburgh Theatre seriously considered" and "A serious enquiry into the nature and effects of the stage, being an attempt to show, that contributing to the support of a public theatre is inconsistent with the character of a Christian", by John Witherspoon.
The principal controversy of the century, and one which spread far beyond the border, was that over the poems of Ossian. The partizans were vehement on both sides. We have already noted the fervent advocacy of some of the Scottish critics. More rational was the report of the Highland Society, drawn up by MacKenzie. We have little doubt today—

(1) John Wodrow's preface to his version of Fingal in heroic couplets (1771) may be taken as representing the extreme of the attitude of Scots patriots: The opening sentence is, "To entertain any doubt of the antiquity or authenticity of the poems of Ossian, as some pretend to do, can flow only from an affected singularity of thinking, or from the mere wantonness of prejudice".

It would be out of place here to give an extended account of the controversy. The evidence adduced by Alexander Macbain (series of articles in Celtic Mag., 1866-67) may be taken as conclusive on the question at issue. He shows that the historical background of the poems was obviously invented by someone ignorant of early Celtic history; that the life portrayed is at variance with what we know of the Celts; that there is a deadly resemblance to The Highlander, published by MacPherson in 1753; that the mythology is absurd, the verse structure unconvincing, the language frequently Anglo-classical. His conclusion is that the Gaelic is the translation, and that perhaps a third has its counterpart in authentic ballads. (See also L.C. Stern's article, Die Ossianischen Heldenlieder, pub. in Koch's Zeitschrift.)

(2) "We are inclined to believe that he (the translator) was in use to supply chasms, and to give connexion, by-
that MacPherson embossed in a manner likely to appeal to contemporary taste the crude Gaelic metres with which his researches provided him. But even if "the phantom was begotten by the smug embrace of an impudent Highlander upon a cloud of (1) tradition", MacPherson, charlatan though he may have been, is entitled to credit for considerable poetic ability, and for some critical penetration. He was keenly aware of the prevailing love of the primitive, of "romantic scenery", of the morbidly sentimental - and he set out to satisfy those tastes.

He seems also to have made some attempt to (2) determine the antiquity of his material, a difficult task for the best critics, as Saunders points out.

With only MacPherson's critical equipment, it was an impossible task. Moreover, logic was not his forte. - He had a weakness for begging the question when the-

- inserting passages which he did not find, and to add what he conceived to be dignity and delicacy to the original composition, by striking out passages, by softening incidents, by refining the language; in short, by changing what he considered as too simple or too rude for a modern ear, and elevating what in his opinion was below the standard of good poetry". (Highland Society Report, 1805.)

(1) Wordsworth, Wks. 1857, VI, 374
(2) Highland Society report, p. 44; and M's notes to Fingal and Temora.
-honour of his foundling was at stake. He for instance denounced Irish "Ossianic" poetry, and rejected Highland fragments that savoured of the Irish, because Ossian was a Caledonian.

The controversy at any rate gave an impetus to a new sort of critical attitude, in the attempt to discover what sort of literature the primitive Celts might have possessed. Up to this time criticism was still very largely a criticism of "taste". Those who denied the authenticity of Ossian and those maintained it were obliged as the fires of controversy grew hotter to find reasons for their opinions or prejudices. The gain in historical method was not immediate, but a seed that grew.

(For miscellaneous minor critics and expatriates of the eighteenth century, see Appendix 1 and 2)
Conclusions.
In the first chapter we noted the various forces operating in Scotland in the seventeenth century to frustrate literature and criticism of literature. The eighteenth century witnessed the removal of some of these difficulties. In religion, relative calm prevailed. In politics, Jacobitism was to provide some excitement; but the rebellions were not so prolonged as to cause stagnation of more peaceful activities. In language and literature we are confronted by a peculiar problem in transition. Political developments moved in the direction of blotting out Scotland as a separate nation. The Union of the Parliaments in 1707 accelerated that exodus to the south of the noble and the cultivated which the Union of the Crowns had begun. It also pronounced doom upon the Scots vernacular as a vehicle of prose. The cultured who remained in Scotland (and these were numerous enough to make the eighteenth century in many respects Scotland's most brilliant century) definitely adopted English for speech and-
writing. To speak and write English gracefully—this was the counsel of perfection. The Doric accents clung for a century yet to the lips of the northern sages. In the written word, where provincialism may more easily be concealed, skill was attained hardly. Men of the stature of Hume and Beattie acknowledged a rather pathetic timidity about their style in a language which had been almost foreign and was now theirs by adoption. Beattie states well a lack more subtle than that of mere technical proficiency:

"The greatest difficulty in acquiring the art of writing English, is one which I have seldom heard our countrymen complain of, and which I was never sensible of, till I had spent some years in labouring to acquire that art. It is, to give a nervacular cast to the English we write. I must explain myself. We who live in Scotland are obliged to study English from books, like a dead language. Accordingly, when we write, we write it like a dead language, which we understand but cannot speak: avoiding, perhaps, all ungrammatical expressions; and even the barbarisms of our country, but at the same time without communicating that neatness, ease, and softness of phrase, which appears so conspicuously in Addison, Lord Lyttleton, and other elegant English authors. Our style is stately and unwieldy, and clogs the tongue in pronunciation, and smells of the lamp. We are always---
slaves to the language we write, and are continually afraid of committing gross blunders; and, when an easy, familiar, idiomatic phrase occurs, dare not adopt it, if we recollect no authority, for fear of Scotticisms. In a word, we handle English, as a person who cannot fence handles a sword; continually afraid of hurting ourselves with it, or letting it fall, or making some awkward motion that shall betray our ignorance. An English author of learning is the master, not the slave, of his language, and wields it gracefylly, because he wields it with ease, and with full assurance that he has the command of it". (1)

Making allowance for such uneasiness in the handling of their tools, we should not expect too much from Scotsmen in the criticism of English literature. It was perhaps this very timidity, operating as an inferiority complex, that caused so many Scots of indifferent qualifications to attempt something in the way of criticism, particularly of basic principles. Their own native literature, they felt, had run its course. In the raw material for a body of purely Scottish criticism - literature produced by Scottish writers - the century was certainly--

-richer than the preceding one. But this was not rich enough or varied enough to cause much attention to be devoted to it by Scottish critics. Its drama and fiction are negligible. It offers verse only. Of that written in English, much is weak imitation of English models; some of it is as good as those models. The vernacular poetry of Ramsay, Ferguson and Burns is its brightest jewel and worthy of serious attention. But though the vernacular did not go entirely unappreciated, Scots men of letters were chiefly preoccupied with English literature and actually little critical attention was given to the green shoots springing from the native soil. The eighteenth-century vernacular school perhaps also came to its peak too near the end of the century to be properly estimated within it.

The national sense of a separate literature almost gone, eighteenth-century Scottish critics strike one often as being dispossessed wanderers among literature. They are not at home in English literature, a

(1)In addition to what has been noted in this chapter, see the Appendix for a brief sketch of criticism in Scottish periodicals begun before 1800. (Appendix No. 4)
-prey too often, both in their own styles and in their taste, to the worst in contemporary fashion. They are slightly more at home in the classics. They are happiest in the categorical province of rhetorical principles and what they regarded as the philosophical bases of criticism. If the seventeenth century is definitely barren, Scottish criticism in the eighteenth century makes a curious study in philosophical fecundity. Into philosophy this century poured the inherent national passion for fundamentals which in the preceding century had been absorbed in religion. So far as critical philosophy is concerned, it may be doubted whether this was a profitable tendency; but it certainly was not an insignificant one. In the next chapter I hope to establish some sort of continuity between this body of philosophical and rhetorical principles, and Francis Jeffrey.
Chapter Three.

Francis Jeffrey.
(1773-1850.)

1. The man.
2. His critical principles.
3. What he demanded of poetry.
4. His reactions to contemporary poetry.
5. His limitations.
6. Conclusions.
1. The man.
It is not unique for a critic to provoke in his readers responses as various as their separate reactions to a poem or a picture; but estimates of critical meaning and value are rarely so irreconcilable as the conflicting opinions concerning Francis Jeffrey. We have been told that the Edinburgh Review was governed by mere caprice; (1) that Jeffrey had a well-defined critical theory; (2) that he embodied the decay of classicism; (3) that classicism was "revived in the cold and brilliant, formal and genteel criticism of Jeffrey"; (4)

(1) D. Nichol Smith on Hazlitt, Chambers CycL.Eng. Lit., 1922
(2) G. Gregory Smith on Jeffrey, Chambers CycL.Eng. Lit. 1922
(3) D. Nichol Smith on Hazlitt, Chambers CycL.Eng. Lit. 1922
(4) Gayley & Kurtz, "Methods in the Discourse of Literary Criticism" (1927), p. 120.

Literary criticism: epic, lyric and allied forms of Poetry, 1920, p. 120.
he belonged to the Age of Reason and was Gallic at the core; that he was enslaved to the romantic Elizabethans; that he was the bitter persecutors of the Laker, a kite to the romantic birds of passage; that he had a passionate love of the poetry of Wordsworth, Keats, and Shelley. In part of course these views are susceptible of rapprochement; but some of them will not come together into any conceivable sort of weird. General estimates of Jeffrey's worth, apart from his historical significance, provide similar variations. Some of his contemporaries certainly thought well of him. To Cockburn (not the best of judges, to be sure), he was flatly "the greatest of British critics"; Macaulay thought him "more nearly a universal genius than any man of our time"; even Carlyle, who considered him "by no means the supreme in criticism or anything else", could think of no later critic worth naming beside him. More recently the tendency has been to usher Jeffrey into a lesser niche where his thunderings rouse hollow echoes in rather constricted space.

(5) G. Saintsbury, Essays on Eng. Lit. 1922, I, 94.
(6) North British Review, I, 263.
(7) The outstanding tradition.
(8) Cockburn-Advocate Lib. mss. 9.1.10, p. 915. Also letter from Coleridge to D. Stewart, July 9, 1825.
It may be well to turn from this chaos of opinion and fortify ourselves with some sort of concrete picture. A study of Jeffrey reveals many contradictions. Not the least of these is the disparity between the physical and the intellectual man. This Thunderer, this Corypheus of Criticism, had the dainty figure of a maiden and was barely five feet tall. "Wee reiket de'il" strikes one as an apt description.

(1)

"He might", says Lockhart, "walk close under your chin or mine without ever catching the eye even for a moment". Conscious of this lack of height, Jeffrey, according to Lockhart, held his head too high. "The mouth", he goes on, "is the most expressive part of the face, as I believe it is of every face. The lips are very firm, but they tremble and vibrate, even when brought close together, in such a way as to give the idea of an intense, never-ceasing play of mind. There is a delicate kind of sneer almost always upon them, which has not-

(2) Ibid. I, 59.
-the least appearance of ill-temper about it, but seems to belong entirely to the speculative understanding of the man. I have said, that the mouth is the most expressive part of his face - and, in one sense, this is the truth, for it is certainly the seat of all its rapid and transitory expression. But what speaking things are his eyes! They disdain to be agitated with those lesser emotions which pass over the lips; they reserve their fierce and dark energies for matters of more moment; once kindled with the heat of any passion, how they beam, flash upon flash! The scintillation of a star is not more fervid.

"A delicate, attractive, dainty little figure", reflects Carlyle, "as he merely walked about, much more if he were speaking; uncommonly bright black eyes, instinct with vivacity, intelligence, and kindly fire; roundish brow, delicate oval face full of rapid expression, figure light, nimble, pretty though so small, perhaps hardly five feet in height".

This little man was not, we gather, distinguished in manly sports. Cockburn describes him as "a woeful equestrian; except that he never actually falls off. But how he keeps on, is not easily to be explained". He kept in the saddle, let me suggest, by a triumph of mind and will over matter which is one of the slender clues to the whole personality of Jeffrey.

Jeffrey's physical courage we suspect to have been less a matter of steady nerves than of grim determination. His letter to Bell after the abortive duel with Moore in 1806 is not that of a man who had taken the affair lightly. "I am glad", he writes, "I have gone through this scene, both because it satisfies me that my nerves are good enough to enable me to act in conformity to my notions of propriety without any suffering, and because it also assures me that I am really as little in love with life, as I have been for some time in the habit of professing."

(1) Cockburn's footnote to ms. letter from Rutherfurd to himself, Advocates' Lib. mss. 9.1.9., p.35

(2) Cockburn: Life of J. 1872 ed. p.167. This letter was written soon after the death of the first Mrs. Jeffrey.

The first edition of Cockburn's Life of Jeffrey was published in two volumes in 1852. It contains more letters than the later edition.
There is plenty of other evidence that Jeffrey's nervous system was sensitively organized. "There never was one who, from what he deemed a just estimate of its dangers", says his friend Cockburn, "but in truth from mere nervous horror, recoiled with such sincerity from all watery adventures". Yet he made himself go to America for his second bride, in 1813, when war had increased the dangers. He had also a "horror of popular commotion". His fear of Napoleon seems excessive even for those excited times: "My honest impression is, that Bonaparte will be in Dublin in about fifteen months; perhaps sooner". "A corporal's guard I verily believe, might march triumphantly from one end of the country to the other". "I am mortally afraid of the war". Nevertheless as an ensign in the militia he does his bit. He was not naturally a brave man, and was constantly striving to overcome his physical limitations; by taking thought, to add a cubit to his stature.

(2) Ibid p. 325.
(5) 1872, p.187.
In keeping with all this was his preoccupation with the state of his health. "No sensible man", writes Cockburn, "was perhaps ever so much in the habit of speculating on his own inside as Jeffrey".

The 'bold and defying front' which he put up as critic contrasts strangely with his extreme sensitiveness in private life. He not infrequently burst into tears. Coming home from the House of Commons after the first reading of one of his bills, "instead of being elated and relieved, I could not help feeling a deep depression and sadness, and I rather think I dropped a tear or two". He "burst into an agony of crying" when he received a fragment of Sydney Smith's letters after Smith's death. He writes to Dickens, about Dombey and Son, "I have so cried and sobbed over it last night, and again this morning; and felt my heart purified by those tears, and blessed and loved you for making me shed them". He approves-

(1) Cockburn Advocate mss. 9.1.11, 1007.
(2) Ibid. 9.1.9. p. 469.
(3) Letter to 'Saba', April 21, 1845. Smith Memoirs I, 416.
as "equally judicious and refined" Mrs. Barbauld's statement that "we feel it a relief to have our grief drawn off, as it were, by a variety of sluices, and we are glad not to be dismissed till we have shed tears, even to satiety". He reads Cockburn's description of a Craigcrook picnic (while he himself is in London) "with bursts of loud laughter, mixed up with some starting tears". He "cannot bear to stir without his wife and child; requires something living and breathing near him, and is miserable when alone". Cockburn's description of Jeffrey's "utter desolation" on the death of his first wife does not reveal a tough-minded man. Carlyle tells us that Jeffrey was "a thin-skinned sensitive man, with all his pretended procurantism and real knowledge of what is called 'the world'".

(1) Anent Richardson's picture of the triumph of mental chastity in Clarissa. - Rev. of Mrs B's ed. of Richardson's Correspondence. E.R. Oct. 1804.
(2) Cockburn Advocates' Lib. mss. 9.1.9., 466; 27 June, 1832.
(4) See also J's letter to his brother,- "I doted upon her. I believe, more than man ever did on a woman before". - Cockburn Life, 1872. p. 159.
(5) Carlyle: Reminiscences, II, 27. Another example of Jeffrey's nervousness: At the age of 45, after considerable practice in public speaking, he "stuck" a speech, on the occasion of having to present John Kemble publicly with a snuff-box (in Feb. 1818). He "found himself annihilated by the tall tragic god". - Cockburn Life, 1872. p. 247.
With such a temperament, it is not surprising to find that Jeffrey leaned heavily on the comfort of women. He wanted all his children to be girls - "I have a natural antipathy to boys". His attachment to his wives has already been noted. It would seem that he was also something of a flirt. Carlyle pictures him "tripping about, half like a lap-dog, half like a human adorer, with speeches pretty and witty, always of trifling import".

It is interesting to note here Lockhart's belief-

(1) It is only fair to add that he had many masculine friends, and never lost one.
(2) Moore's Journal, II, 40.
-that Jeffrey was "dissolute about women even down to his old age". But there is little evidence to support the charge. Lockhart had a weakness for malicious statements, especially of this sort. Beyond doubt Jeffrey was fond of dalliance. We hear of many ladies in the correspondence - Lady Blanches, Lady Georginas, Lady Stafford, Lady Lyndhurst, a Mrs. Norton - and Jeffrey often describes himself to Cockburn as "dissipated", a playful exaggeration.

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(1) Advocates' Lib. mss. A letter from Lockhart to Whitwell Ellwin of Bath, April 23, 1852, in connection with a forthcoming review of Jeffrey in the Quarterly. (This review appeared June 1852, v. 91. p. 105. art. 5.)

(2) In another letter to Ellwin, in the same mss. collection, Lockhart reports Wordsworth's having told him that Coleridge was "expelled from Grita Hall for getting Southey's maids with child one after another".

(3) Excerpts from the mss. letters, of amorous import:

"I continue tolerably well and very dissipated. I am on the list of Lady Lyndhurst's victims! Only I do not mean to ransom myself by gifts of price; ... we mean to end the year with Richardson, who has promised me a kiss of Joanna Baillie on the occasion" (ms. 9.1.8. p. 213, Adv.)

"She" (Lady Lyndhurst) "is certainly very pretty and clever too, and wicked enough I suppose for anything I want from her" (Adv. ms. 9.1.3. p. 212) "I am in no pet with you, nor in love much more than usual?" (Adv. ms. 9.1.8. p. 135) "But the star of all stars in my eyes is Lady Stafford; who wants nothing but wings and immortality to be an angel" (Adv. ms. 9.1.9. p. 581)

"In the meantime I have a thought more leisure to call on my lady friends and bring my head into train for flirting" (Adv. ms. 9.1.9. p. 513). Here Cockburn has a footnote, 'An enjoyment to which he was excessively and sometimes ludicrously addicted')... "I am something in love with Mrs. Norton at this present, and my dear..."
That this cold and often bitter critic was a warmhearted man is also suggested by his generosity to needy writers. He offered £500 to Moore, at a time when he was not excessively rich. He offered Carlyle an annuity of £100. He sent the dying Hazlitt £50. Jeffrey's will-

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Emmy Smith has come back to town"(Adv. ms. 9.1.9.p.513) "I have been very dissipated for the last week, and got several new loves - first the magnificent Sultana Mrs. Norton, with whom I have had much dalliance; and next a young daughter of Burdett's, who is full of nature and spirit and very pretty" (Adv. ms. 9.1.9.p.436. This is the Mrs. Norton whose husband prosecuted Lord Melbourne for criminal intercourse with her, and failed in the suit)... "I have seen my dear Lady Theresa Lister (and got two kisses) " (Adv. ms. 9.1.10.p.974)... "Though I have renewed my vows to my sweet Mary Cayley... have fallen dangerously in love with that beautiful Mrs. Davenport" (Adv. ms. 9.1.10 p. 984)...

There is nothing in all this to make it unlikely that his relations with women were quite platonic. Elsewhere(letter to Horner, No. 50, Cockburn vol.II) he speaks of "simple women, with whom I am intimate, and sweet children, by whom I am beloved, are the great instruments of my dissipation".

(1)A holograph written on two sides of two very thin sheets, at Maydaybury College, 23 March, 1848. Adv. Lib.
-also reveals the fact that he loaned money
to friends on generous terms.

The same dualism between public and
private life is marked in Jeffrey's attitude to
religion. He was commonly supposed to be an
atheist or a scoffer. "As for Jeffrey's religion",
writes Lockhart, "I find from friends of his now
here both Whig and Tory that he never professed
any and was never known to go to any church or
kirk in their day...The universal, as I think,
private opinion that he and his chief allies
(not excepting Sydney) were of the Voltaire Church-
bitterly as any expression of this used to be
resented - was I suspect very nearly true". By
the unco' guid Jeffrey was certainly regarded as
a sceptic, and earnest attempts were sometimes made
to convert him. Nevertheless his private letters
show frequent symptoms of piety. "God bless you
all", he writes Cockburn; "If His Spirit is as
much and as affectionately with you as mine, you
are sufficiently blessed". Though he did not
conform, yet he was "grieved to the heart at the
prospects of our church". I do not wish to-

(1) Advoc. ms. letter to Ellwin. 23 Apr. 1852.
(2) Advoc. ms. 9.1.9.4 Feb. 1833.
(3) Adv. ms. 9.1.11 p. 1049; 5 Feb. 1842.
(4) See appendix for letter to him from a clergyman
(from mss. in possession of Miss Rebecca Watt of
Peebles) (Appendix No. 7-f)
deny that there was a sceptical trend in Jeffrey. He was undoubtedly one of the group of Voltairians who held to only three points of certainty. But I rather think he perversely allowed the impression of infidelity to be exaggerated while retaining in private a good deal of his hereditary faith.

Another clue to Jeffrey's character may perhaps lie in what I hesitate (because of such theories we have recently had too many) to call his frustration as a poet. His youthful activities as versifier have not received much attention. Perhaps they deserve as little attention as most such youthful exercises. Cockburn discreetly failed to publish what came into his hands, and apparently the bulk of it is not extant in manuscript. We know that he translated into blank verse the Argonauticon of Apollonius Rhodius and part of Racine's Britannicus; that he also wrote a long poem on Dreaming, and a tragedy, "Virginia". Thomas Brown, in his Notes on the Life of Jeffrey, tells us that he once left a poem with a bookseller to be published but hastily retrieved it.

(1) "His poetry", says Cockburn (1872 ed. Life, p.69), "is less poetical than his prose". (2) Thomas Brown: Notes on the Life of Jeffrey (ms. in Adv. Lib.) (3) Ibid. (13, 2)
Most of the Jeffrey manuscripts in Cockburn's possession at the time he wrote the Life have apparently disappeared. In attempting to trace these documents I followed three trails: 1) Jeffrey's own family; 2) Cockburn's family; and 3) the family of John Hunter, Jeffrey's literary executor. The last direct descendant of Jeffrey, a grand-daughter, died about five years ago. I am assured by Captain Arthur Empson, M.C., of Yokefleet Hall, Yorks., the executor of her estate, that she left no Jeffrey manuscripts. The Cockburn trail ended in Mr. Harry A. Cockburn, grandson of Jeffrey's friend, who likewise has no knowledge of the early essays, poems, etc., referred to by Cockburn in his Life but not published. The search among relatives of John Hunter proved slightly more successful. Miss Rebecca Watt of Peebles informed me that her family had sold through Sotheby's a number of manuscript letters to and from Jeffrey. An examination of the papers still in her possession revealed some letters of interest, which will be found in an appendix. Among these documents were—

(1) Jeffrey's one daughter married William Empson, a Professor of Law at East India College, 27th June, 1833. (2) Appendix No. 7.
—two sonnets by Jeffrey. They are not written in Jeffrey’s hand; but the sheet is an ancient one, was found among his letters and the verses are plainly marked as his. There seems little reason to doubt that they are. The first is marked, "Craigcrook, 7th April, 1837":

Susan! light hearts which give themselves away At love’s first beck in childhood’s thoughtles prime Will reap repentance in an after time And rue through life their rash betrothing day. But fairer doom waits those which gently stay Till ripening years their life’s meridian climb And tried affections lend their force sublime To clear-eyed Judgment’s firm indulgent sway. And such thy heart and judgment well I know

Susan! in both unfaded and mature, Clear in discernment, — in love’s arbour pure,— Quick to catch joy and true to touch of woe, Therefore hold I thy wedded joys secure And augur fearless of thy life below.

I have been unable to identify the ‘Susan’ of this hymeneal. The other sonnet is dated 28th March, 1837:

The Spring’s bright sun shines on thy walls, Craigcrook! And violets blue are springing at their feet; But wintry blasts their gentle wooing meet And unthawed hailstones in each shady nook Dance to their music; while the building rook Shrieks at her cold tasks, and primroses sweet And hardy wall flowers scarce abroad dare look And muffling up their gentle odours cheat The season of its incense; yet the sun Soars fast and fearless on his summer way. The young lambs trusting in their Feeder run, The Blackbird cheerily trills his bridal lay; And man well knowing whose best will is come, Smiles at the threatening which must pass away.
These are not remarkable examples of poetic power - wherein may lie the tragedy - if this indeed be a case of a frustrated poet turning critic. There is reason to believe that with Jeffrey the longing to be a poet was deeper than sophomoric. "I feel I shall never be a great man unless it be as a poet", he writes from Oxford at the age of twenty-two. At twenty-six, when he is on the point of losing his poetic ecstacies, there is keen regret and a suggestion of defeat in his farewell: "This at least I am sure of, that these poetic visions bestowed a much purer and more tranquil happiness than can be found in any of the tumultuous and pedantic triumphs that seem now within my reach, and that I was more amiable, and quite as respectable, before this change took place in my character. . . . Within these few days I have been more perfectly restored to my poesies and sentimentalities than I had been for many months before". It is not until this-

(1) I also chanced upon another example of Jeffrey's verse, in a parody-symposium in the Bruce-Hamilton collection of the Register House, Edinburgh. For this see appendix: No. 5.


(3) Ibid. p. 97.
-time, when he has given up the hope of fulfilling himself as poet, that Jeffrey's intellectual ambitions begin to crystallize: "I should like, therefore, to be the rival of Smith and Hume, and there are some moments (after I have been extravagantly praised, especially by those to whose censure I am more familiar) when I fancy it possible that I shall one day arrive at such a distinction".

Some weight might be lent to the frustration theory by the extraordinary tirade against the fraternity of poets in the review of the Biographia Literaria: "They are dangerous leaders and treacherous followers... They are as perfectly indifferent to the consequences of what they write, as if the world were merely a stage for them to play their tricks on... always violent and vulgar in their opinions, they oscillate, with a giddy and sickening motion, from one absurdity to another and expiate the follies of their youth by the heartless vices of their advancing age".

(2) Although accredited to Jeffrey by Cockburn, this may have been written by Hazlitt. Vide Good Words, 39:563. The tirade is apparently directed against poets in general, though what the writer has particularly in mind is "our reformed Antijacobin poets", such as Coleridge.
I do not wish to emphasize this point unduly, but a remark of Carlyle may also be quoted for what it is worth: He saw in Jeffrey something of a lost soul: "I used to think to myself, 'Here is a man whom they have kneaded into the shape of an Edinburgh reviewer, and clothed the soul of in Whig formulas and blue and yellow; but he might have been a beautiful Goldoni too, or something better in that kind, and have given us comedies and aerial pictures true and poetic of human life in a far other way!'"

One result (or possibly one of the causes) of some such inner sense of defeat or futility in Jeffrey may have been his deep vein of pessimism, which was accompanied, according to contemporaries, by an appearance of gay vivacity. "My notions of philosophy", he writes, "rather lead me to consider a steady contemplation of the worst as the best preparation for its possible occurrence". This, at the age of twenty-one, might be passed over as juvenile affectation. But Cockburn tells us that Jeffrey's pessimism was genuine and not "a defensive principle". It is the gaiety that is forced. At the-

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(3) Ibid., p. 125.
-age of twenty-five Jeffrey confesses, "I have a kind of unmeaning gaiety that is fatiguing and
unsatisfactory even to myself"; and at thirty,
during his preliminary pessimism as to the success
of the Review, "For my own part, I am much inclined
to despair still, though I cannot help confessing
that I am as gay and foolish through the twenty-

(2)
four hours as I used to be".

Now there is nothing specially novel
about a man weighed down by despair within but ex-
ternally full of laughter. This stiffening of the
moral fibre is the commonplace of our lives. But
in the case of Jeffrey, I think, the phenomena of
conflict are more complex, and the forcing of a
consistent attitude in the face of the world is a
significant manifestation of his personality.

The fact noted by Lockhart, that Jeffrey was conscious-

(1) Cockburn: Life, 1872 ed. p. 96. (1798.)
(2) Ibid. p. 126. (1803)
(3) An interesting confirmation is to be found in
Carlyle's attitude to Jeffrey's offer of an annuity:
"...and though I could not doubt but Jeffrey had in-
tended an act of real generosity, for which I was
and am grateful, perhaps there was something in
the manner of it that savoured of consciousness
and of screwing one's self up to the point: less of
godlike pity for a fine fellow and his struggles,
that of human determination to do a fine action of
one's own.". (C Reminiscences, II, 43)
-of his small stature, and in consequence held his head too high, is worth noting. His nature was not one which could find complete expression while remaining natural. He was sensitive, poetic, over-introspective, sentimental, conscious of mental stature far beyond its embodiment in the flesh. He suffered the peculiar humiliations of the small man with a good deal of woman in him. This is not the sort of nature a man may indulge and yet impress a hard world; and Jeffrey was determined to leave his impression on that world. The result was an inner conflict of which Jeffrey, with his gift for analysis, was himself well aware. The mistrust and uncertainty within were manifest outwardly to those who knew him intimately. They knew that the front he offered to the world was not the real Jeffrey. Those who knew him not so well were inclined to suspect his sincerity.

(1) "My ambition, and my prudence, and indolence", he says, "will have a pitched battle". (Cockburn, 1872 ed. p. 99. Written in 1799, Jeffrey aet. 27.)

(2) Wrote Horner: "His manner is not at first pleasing; what is worse, it is of that cast, which almost irresistibly impresses upon strangers the idea of levity and superficial talents. Yet there is not any man, whose real character is so much the reverse". (Horner: Memoirs, Journal Nov. 20, 1902. I, 203)

(3) I have also the word of Mr. Harry A. Cockburn for it that his grandfather's family did not like Jeffrey and had all a peculiar distrust of him. - Letter to me, May 29, 1929.
The eighteenth century in Scotland, as we have seen, was marked by a passion for formulating principles. Francis Jeffrey is the legitimate offspring of this passion. He acknowledged the relationship, the Review aiming, as he tells us in the preface, "to go deeply into the principles on which its judgments were to be rested". In Jeffrey's criticism, then, we ought to find the aesthetical word made flesh.

It would be surprising if Jeffrey did not bear in some measure the stamp of the preceding age. He was born in 1773. His fourteenth year found him a student at Glasgow University, sitting at the feet of John Young, George Jardine, Archibald Arthur, Reid's successor in the chair of moral philosophy, and John Miller. He is at once deep in the study of metaphysics and criticism, already (in 1788) "unmercifully severe" as a critic of his fellow-students. Before the close of the century the mind of Jeffrey, rather priggishly mature, had received the mould of the time. The—

(1) See Lockhart, Peter's Letters, II, 228.
(2) Author of Outline of Philosophical Education, Glasg., 1818.
(3) According to Principal MacFarlane. (Cockburn, 1853 Life of J. I., 13.)
-germ of his essay on Beauty, for instance, later elaborated, was written by 1792 at Oxford, when he was 19. Cockburn refers to an even earlier essay on criticism, dated July 1789, which "explains the importance of the art, and the qualities of the sound critic". One could wish this had been preserved; but it is safe to assume that from a lad of 16 we should get little more than a résumé of the rather tedious matter through which the reader, if he be conscientious, has already waded in the last section.

Moreover, the intellectual influences to which Jeffrey was subjected in his young manhood even after the turn of the century, were characteristics carried over from the seventeenth-hundreds. The Scots, Hazlitt was still able to write in 1825, "criticize everything, analyze everything, argue upon everything, dogmatize upon everything". Sidney Smith found them "so imbued with metaphysics that they even make love metaphysically". And Jeffrey-

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(1) Oxford does not seem to have "taken". It may fairly be said, I think, that all Jeffrey's education was Scottish. After Oxford he studied at Edinburgh under A.F. Tytler and Dugald Stewart.
(4) Sidney Smith: a Memoir by his daughter Lady Holland, with a selection from his letters. Mrs. Austin's ed.; Lon. 1855, 2 v. -I, 15.
-felt himself to be definitely Scottish and a part of this tradition. "Indeed", he writes, "I believe I could not live anywhere out of Scotland. All my recollections are Scottish, and consequently all my imaginations; and though I thank God that I have as few fixed opinions as any man of my standing, yet all the elements out of which they are made have a certain national cast also."

So we find Jeffrey approaching criticism in the same manner as religion and philosophy, with definite a priori assumptions. "Poetry", begins the review of Southey's Thalaba, Jeffrey's first contribution to the Review,

"Poetry has this much, at least, in common with religion, that its standards were fixed long ago, by certain inspired writers, whose authority it is no longer lawful to call in question; and that many profess to be entirely devoted to it, who have no good works to produce in favour of their pretensions. The Catholic poetical church, too, has worked but few miracles since the first ages of its establishment; and has been more prolific, for a long time, of Doctors than of Saints; it has had its corruptions and reformation also, and has given birth to an infinite variety of heresies and errors, the followers of which have hated and persecuted each other as cordially as other bigots". (2)

(1) Cockburn, Life of J. 1853 ed. vol. II Letter 65, 20 Aug. 1813. This did not, however (although Sydney Smith accused him of it) make Jeffrey prejudiced in his judgments of Scottish works and authors.

(2) The Contributions, E, 63. Where no volume is mentioned, the reference is to Contributions to the Edinburgh Review (Jeffrey). 1 v., 1853.
In attempting to understand this dogmatic point of view, it may be well to consider some of the foundations of Jeffrey's moral-philosophical creed.

In the first-place, Jeffrey was an associationist. He held that beauty does not consist in the object itself, nor is it perceived by a special sense. "Beauty consists confessedly, in almost all cases, in the suggestion of moral or social emotions, mixed up and modified by a present sensation or perception". "...Poems and other compositions in words, are beautiful in proportion as they are conversant with beautiful objects - or as they suggest to us, in a more direct way, the moral and social emotions on which the beauty of all objects depends". He disagrees with Payne Knight, who had maintained in his Analytical Inquiry that there is beauty in sound and colour apart from association: "Beautiful sounds, in general, we think, are beautiful from association only - from their resembling the natural tones of various passions and affections - or from their being originally and most frequently presented to us in scenes or on occasions of natural interest or emotion."

(2) Ibid p 33.
(3) Ibid p 32.
This principle of association is implicit in Jeffrey's criticism. We find such remarks as this in the midst of a review: "There is something irresistibly pleasing in the faithful representation of external nature. All men have interesting associations with dawnsings and sunsets." It was natural that, making such associational demands of poetry, he should view with distrust the creation of beauty apart from the real and moral world.

It is from this associationism that Jeffrey's moral enthusiasm springs, for the associationist always demands, like Carlyle, not merely the thing itself, but an inner moral meaning. Jeffrey, reviewing his work, declared that he found most satisfaction in "having constantly endeavoured to combine Ethical precepts with Literary Criticism, and earnestly sought to impress my readers with a sense, both of the close connection between sound Intellectual attainments and the higher elements of Duty and Enjoyment; and of the just and ultimate subordination of the former to the latter". He-

(2) For the same reason did Carlyle, another associationist, detest Coleridge. (3) Contributions, p. 6.

(1-a) It constitutes one of the differences between him and the new criticism of Coleridge, and is one of the causes of his conflict with the Lakers. See appendix for note on fancy and imagination.
believed he had "more uniformly and earnestly than any preceding critic, made the Moral tendencies of the works under consideration a leading subject of discussion; and neglected no opportunity, in review of Poems and Novels as well as of graver productions, of elucidating the true constituents of human happiness and virtue; and combating those besetting prejudices and errors of opinion which appear so often to withhold men from the path of their duty". (1)

By 'morality' Jeffrey does not apparently mean a conventional standard but an ultimate standard of value. He expected poetry to arouse the associations of ordinary life; and he therefore demanded that the response to poetry be, like the response to life, a moral one.

Jeffrey, since he held that beauty consists in the suggestion of interesting conceptions, was compelled to admit that everything which does so is beautiful to the individual to whom the associations are suggested, and that "all tastes are equally just and correct, in so far as each individual speaks only--

(1) Contributions, Preface, p.6.
-of his own emotions". (1) It is "unreasonable
and absurd" he says, for an individual to suggest
that an object should be beautiful to all, and that
there is something wrong with others if they do not
find it beautiful. Nevertheless, in the practice
of criticism he is often less liberal. We are more
likely to find him holding to the view elsewhere
expressed, that there are "a few settled and per-
manent maxims, which form the canon of general
taste in all large and polished societies", and
which it is the duty of the poet to be familiar with.
He is well aware of subjective preferences in poetry.
"Even those whose taste is the least exclusive, have
a leaning to one class of composition rather than
to another; and overrate the beauties which fall in
with their own propensities and associations - while
they are palpably unjust to those which wear a
different complexion, or spring from a different
race". He admits "the almost inevitable partiality
of poetical judgments in general" ; and sees that --

(1) Contributions, p. 34.
(2) Ibid p. 34
(3) Ibid p. 586.
(4) Ibid p. 360
"successful poets have been but too apt to establish exclusive and arbitrary creeds; and to invent articles of faith, the slightest violation of which effaces the merit of all other virtues". (1)

But all tastes, he reminds us, are not equally good or desirable. His is best "whose affections are the warmest and most exercised - whose imagination is the most powerful, and who has most accustomed himself to attend to the objects by which he is surrounded". (2) As a matter of fact, then, he really falls back upon a fixed standard:

"In matters of taste, however, we conceive that there are no discoveries to be made, any more than in matters of morality. The end of poetry is to please; and men cannot be mistaken as to what has actually given them pleasure"...."The ancient and uninterrupted possession of the great inheritors of poetical reputation, must be admitted therefore as the clearest evidence of their right, and renders it the duty of every new claimant to contend with them as lawful competitors, instead of seeking to supplant them as usurpers". (3)

(1) Contributions, p. 360.
(2) Ibid p. 35.
(3) Edinburgh Review, VII, 2 (Review of Southey's Madoc)
In discussing taste, Jeffrey makes a distinction between the enjoyer of beauty and the creator of beauty. For the former, emotions suggested by accidental associations are as important as those that are "universal and indestructible". But as for the artist, "he must be cautious to employ only such objects as are the natural signs, or the inseparable concomitants of emotions of which the greater part of mankind are susceptible; and his taste will then deserve to be called bad and false, if he obtrude upon the public, as beautiful, objects that are not likely to be associated in common minds with any interesting impressions". The weakness here of course lies in the egocentric predicament, which will always tempt the critic (as it certainly persuaded Jeffrey) to believe that his own particular sets of associations are universal.

Thus Jeffrey actually falls back upon a fixed standard which the critic should have in mind: "a taste that is formed upon a wide and large survey-

(1) Contributions p. 35.
-of enduring models, not only affords a secure basis for all future judgments, but must compel, whenever it is general in any society, a salutary conformity to its great principles from all who depend on its suffrage." Jeffrey sees the office of the critic as a judiciary one, supported by a solid body of law which must be maintained against those who, like the Lakers, "wage a desperate war on the established system of public taste and judgment." From this attitude proceed his many arbitrary pronouncements of "Absurd!" and "False Taste!". He assures poets that the verdict of posterity will be substantially that of the small group of living judges who have Good Taste.

(1) Contributions p. 361.
(2) E.R., v. 17, p. 433.
(3) E.R. v. 16, p. 430; Contributions, pp. 361, 466, 467.
Jeffrey did not regard his own activities as belonging to the "off-with-his-head" school. He speaks of "the deliberate and indulgent criticism which we exercise, rather for the encouragement of (1) talent than its warning". He deprecates mere fault-finding: "There is nothing so certain, we take it, as that those who are the most alert in discovering the faults of a work of genius, are the least touched with its beauties. Those who admire and enjoy fine poetry, in short, are quite a different class of persons from those who find out its flaws and defects". In fact, he prides himself on having "shown more favour than any critics ever did (3) before us to faults if intentions were good".

(1) Contributions, p. 401.
(2) "
(3) E.R., v. 26, p. 453. He nevertheless contradicts himself in his review of Hogg's 'Queen's Wake' (E.R. No. 47, art. 8), saying that it is more important to point out faults than beauties. See also his review of the Lady of the Lake, Contributions p. 472.
Nevertheless Jeffrey's attitude in general is that of the judge and corrector: "We speak, of course, as judges"; "we who profess the stately office of correcting and instructing"; "we must abate something of our general asperity; but I think we should make one or two examples of great delinquents in every number".

His nature found, I think, a peculiar pleasure in exercising this magisterial function, in showing always "a bold and defying front to the enemy". "You will never understand", he writes to Moore, "what gratification this new vocation can give till you set about correcting some prevailing error, or laying down some original principle of taste or reasoning". The method appealed to his forensic powers, which were great.

(2) E.R. v. 17, p. 430.
(4) A phrase of 'Timothy Tickler' describing Jeffrey's method - Blackwood's, III, 75. April 1818.
(6) His power over juries - e.g. the Kate Kennedy case. Lockhart writes: "If he be not the most delightful, he is certainly by far the most wonderful of speakers". (Peter's Letters, II, 62.)
Jeffrey was aware of weaknesses in his method—"A certain tone of exaggeration is incident, we fear, to the sort of writing in which we are engaged"; but I doubt if he even glimpsed the possibilities of sympathetic criticism, reflecting "the colours, the light and shade, the soul and body of a work". His method is logical and external rather than sympathetic. He does not recreate the artistic process, but standing outside it regards the objective result. In this sense he is a 'philosophical critic'; and this particular item of his practice proceeds from his theoretical attitude that criticism is something apart from taste and enjoyment. He tells us quite often that the aim of poetry is to please, but he does not trust his own sense of pleasure as a guide to what is good. It is what has pleased in the long run of literature that is the standard. "We can assure our readers", he says, "that we frequently find it necessary to harden our hearts for the performance of our sterner duties, by the reflection of these maxims"; and "although we generally endeavour to read poetry in this indulgent humour, we cannot always afford to criticize it in the same amiable spirit".

(1) Contributions p. 374.
(2) Ibid p. 157.
(3) E.R. v. 26, p. 458.
Typical of this attitude are his remarks about Christabel, in a letter to Moore:

"I do not know exactly what to say of Christabel, though with all its perversity and affectation I read it with some pleasure. I do not mean the pleasure of scoffing and ridicule. Indeed I scarcely ever read poetry in that humour, and usually find something to love and admire in works which I could never have courage or conscience to praise. My natural foible is to admire and be pleased too easily, and I am never severe except from effort and reflection".

Such an attempt to achieve a detached point of view is admirable enough in its way; but it frequently led Jeffrey to damn poetry which he liked but felt that he could not publicly approve. His perverseness enters here: "I have a sort of consciousness", he writes Horner, "that admirers are ridiculous, and therefore I laugh at almost everything I admire, or at least let people laugh at it without contradiction".

(2) See also the review of Southey's Curse of Kehama, E.R. v. 17, p. 429, Nov. 1810.

Since he thus separated criticism from his real pleasure in literature, we find Jeffrey often affecting the attitude that he regarded criticism with indifference. "I care very little about the review" (Cockburn, Life, v. 2, letter 40) He says he is "sick of reviewing" (Cockburn letter 39, 1853 Life J. "I know that reviewing is not very pleasant to either of us" (Same letter, No. 39, to Horner).
This separation of criticism from enjoyment is thus an auxiliary cause of Jeffrey's 'corrective' attitude in the Review. His friend Sydney Smith, noting the tendency, stated it to him bluntly: "I exhort you to restrain the violent tendency of your nature for analysis, and to cultivate synthetical propensities...The whole effort of your mind is to destroy. Because others built slightly and eagerly, you employ yourself in kicking down their houses, and contract a sort of aversion for the more honourable, useful, and difficult task of building well yourself".

Jeffrey maintained, however, that the object of criticism was to keep the reading public faithful to well considered maxims, and that works must be condemned or approved in the degree that they fulfilled this requirement. This object, he said, motivated his selection of works to be reviewed: if a book were popular, and he thought the public opinion substantially sound, there was no need to review it. The critic should review only those works in connection with which the public needed guidance.

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(1) Lady Holland's Memoir on Smith, II, II.
(2) He gives this reason for not reviewing all of the Waverley novels. - Contributions, p. 639. See also E.R. v. 24, p. 157.
But although this is the primary aim of criticism, Jeffrey's attention seems often to be diverted to the secondary aim, of keeping authors in the right path. He adopts the rôle of a schoolmaster with his pupils, or a doctor with his patients, or a judge with his prisoners at the bar:

"The case of Mr. Wordsworth, we perceive, is now manifestly hopeless, and we give him up as altogether incurable, and beyond the power of criticism...we really think it right not to harass him any longer with nauseous remedies - but rather to throw in cordials and lentitives, and wait in patience for the natural termination of the disorder"; "Lord Byron has improved marvellously since his last appearance at our tribunal". He welcomes the prodigals when they have reformed as a result of his scoldings. But these latter he regards as incidental to fulfilling his function of middle-man to the public, whose taste must not be debased by-

(1) Contributions, p. 535.
(2) E.R. v. 19, p. 466.
(3) For one poet's response to this sort of treatment, witness Moore's epigram:

What thanks do we owe, what respects and regards,
To Jeffrey, the old nursery-maid of us bards,
Who, resolved to the last, his vocation to keep,
First whipped us all round and now puts us to sleep.

(Moore's Journal, v. 7, p. 367.)

(This, in connection with Jeffrey's: "...since the beginning of our critical career we have seen a vast deal of beautiful poetry pass into oblivion", etc.)
the quality of the poetry supplied it. Thus his method is often to expose the faults of a work; while he leaves untouched the more difficult task of appreciating it, or dismisses it with a grade of "substantial merit".

At strange variance with Jeffrey's confidence in apparently immutable axioms is his advice to poets to disregard models. He does not mean, however, that the standards which have been formulated from past performances are at fault; but simply that consciousness of models is bad for the poet, because it hinders natural self-expression on his part. On the one hand, he feels the obligation to copy from the models; and on the other, he tries to be different from them, in order not to be trite.

Jeffrey recurs again and again to this point. "We have already noticed, more than once", he writes, reviewing Alfieri, "the effect of early study and familiarity with the best models in repressing-

(1) Contributions, p. 361.
(2) Jeffrey's absolute integrity in refusing to be a publisher's hack of course made even this a refreshing change in periodical criticism.
-emulation by despair." He is delighted that Alfieri "in the outset of his literary career, ran his head against dramatic poetry, almost before he knew what was meant either by poetry or the drama; and dashed out a tragedy while but imperfectly acquainted with the language in which he was writing, and utterly ignorant either of the rules that had been delivered, or the models which had been created by the genius of his great predecessors". Again, in a discussion of Burns, he reverts to the disabling effect of literary knowledge and fear of criticism, on poets. The educated person is "perpetually haunted and depressed by the ideal presence of these great masters, and their exacting critics". He reminds the aspiring poet that Homer and Shakespeare were indifferent to praise or ridicule; ..."the charm of the thing is gone, I think, as soon as the poet allows any visions of critics or posterity to come across him."

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(1) Contributions, p.183.
(2) Ibid, p. 183.
(3) Review of Cromek's Reliques, Jan. 1809.
(4) Contributions, p. 424.
Here as elsewhere there are many contradictions in Jeffrey. Though he wishes "authors had oftener the courage to write from their own impressions, and had less fear of the laugh or wonder of the more shallow and barren part of their readers," - he dealt hardly with poets like Wordsworth who did just this. Though he fears the effects of models, yet in trying hard to find something good to say of Joanna Baillie's \( ^{(1)} \) Plays on the Passions, he approves her having had "good taste enough to keep her eye pretty constantly on the best models". And though in theory Jeffrey believes in rude genius expressing itself, he is not quite able to bridge the social gap between himself and Burns. He objects to Burns' invective, to the indelicate fervour of his amorous poetry, to his "contempt for prudence, decency, and regularity - his belief, in short, in the dispensing power of genius and social feeling, \( ^{(3)} \) in all matters of morality and common sense"; and his censure is rather more severe than it need be.

\( ^{(1)} \) Contributions, p. 516. \\
\( ^{(2)} \) E.R. vol. 19, p. 273. \\
\( ^{(3)} \) Contributions, p. 427.
3. What he demanded of poetry.
Leaving these, the philosophical bases of Jeffrey's critical attitude, let us turn to his theories about poetry.

Like his general approach to criticism, Jeffrey's conception of the nature of poetry is highly moralistic. The aim of poetry, he admits, is, to give pleasure..."but it has not, we think, been sufficiently considered, that its power of delighting is founded chiefly on its moral energies, and that the highest interest it excites has always rested on the representation of noble sentiments and amiable affections, or on deterring pictures of the agonies arising from ungoverned passions".

His review of Felicia Hemans contains one of his best statements on this subject:

"It has always been our opinion, that the very essence of poetry, - apart from the pathos, the wit, or the brilliant description which may be embodied in it, but may exist equally in prose - consists in the fine perception and vivid expression of that subtle and mysterious Analogy which exists between the physical and the moral world - which makes outward things and qualities the natural types and emblems of inward gifts and emotions, or leads us to ascribe life and sentiment to every thing that interests us in the aspects of external nature"

(1) M.R. v. 34, p. 349
This analogy, he perceives, operates in two ways:

"In the first place, when material qualities are ascribed to mind, it strikes vividly out, and brings at once before us the conception of an inward feeling or emotion, which it might otherwise have been difficult to convey, by the presentation of some bodily form or quality which is instantly felt to be its true representative, and enables us to fix and comprehend it with a force and clearness not otherwise attainable; and, in the second place, it vivifies dead and inanimate matter with the attributes of living and sentient mind, and fills the whole visible universe around us with objects of interest and sympathy, by tinting them with the hues of life, and associating them with our own passions and affections". (1)

There is little to quarrel with in this noble statement of the nature of poetry.

In this same review he speaks of "this harmonizing and appropriate glow with which they (Shakespeare and Milton) kindle the whole surrounding atmosphere, and bring all that strikes the sense into unison with all that touches the heart; "and he actually uses the phrase, "the predominant emotion of their minds overflowing spontaneously on all the objects which present themselves to their fancy". (2)

(1) Contributions, p.607.
(2) Ibid.
His associationism, carried over from aesthetics, leads him to conclude that "the highest delight which poetry produces, does not arise from the mere passive perception of the images or sentiments which it presents to the mind; but from the excitement which is given to its own internal activity, and the character which is impressed on the train of its spontaneous conceptions." "The object is, to awaken in our minds a train of kindred emotions, and to excite our imaginations to work out for themselves a tissue of pleasing or impressive conceptions".

Though Jeffrey believed that a great poet is necessarily a moral teacher, he did not wish the moral to be obtruded. He objected to didacticism in poetry, and disapproved of Wordsworth's tendency to preach: "Moral and religious enthusiasm, though undoubtedly poetical emotions, are at the same time but dangerous inspirers of poetry".

(1) Contributions, p. 439.
(2) Ibid p. 440.
(3) Ibid p. 555.
(4) Ibid p. 587. See also review of Byron's Cain, p. 413.
But a moralistic point of view colours most of Jeffrey's criticism. He demands that the implications of the poet be ethically sound. Byron, for instance, whom Jeffrey greatly admired, he considers guilty not only of bad taste but of perverting morality with his tiger-like men:

"-when he exhausts the resources of his genius to make this terrible being interesting and attractive, and to represent all the lofty virtues as the natural allies of his ferocity. It is still worse when he proceeds to show, that all these precious gifts of dauntless courage, strong affection, and high imagination, are not only akin to guilt, but the parents of misery - and that those only have any chance of tranquillity or happiness in this world, whom it is the object of his poetry to make us shun and despise". What he resents is, not Byron's voluptuousness and levity, but his "fierce and magnificent misanthropy and his junction of lofty sentiment with profligacy, his making lofty sentiments to flow from "lips that instantly open again to mock and blaspheme them". As an antidote against this-

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(1) "In force of diction, and inextinguishable energy of sentiment, he clearly surpasses them all" (his contemporaries). - Contributions, p. 553.
(2) Contributions, p. 555.
-distortion of moral values, he recommends Scott, with whom "the true end and result of all his trials and experiments...is the love of our kind, and the duty and delight of a cordial and genuine sympathy with the joys and sorrows of every condition of men". Jeffrey is equally severe on mere licentiousness -vide the review of Moore's Poems which resulted in the duel. Upon a reading of these poems today, they scarcely seem to deserve the castigation which Jeffrey, in his severe Calvinistic primness, administered. In the reviews he consistently held up for praise moralistic passages. "Some of the most interesting passages of the poem", he writes of the Lay of the Last Minstrel, "are those in which he drops the business of the story, to moralize, and apply to his own situation the images and reflections it has suggested". He approves Maria Edgeworth likewise, because "she has come nearer the tone of moral instruction than any other writer we are acquainted with". Admiring Samuel Rogers' "very sweet verses" in Human Life, he remarks, "The true character and poetical effect of the work seems, in this instance, to depend much more on its moral expression, than on any of its mere literary qualities."

(1)Contributions, p. 416.
(3)Contributions p.460.
(4)E.R., VIII, 211.
(5)Contributions, p. 535.
Jeffrey's demand for morality in poetry is, in theory at least, a demand for humanism. His moral values are human values; though by 'human' he sometimes appears (on account of his limited range of social sympathy) to mean a small class rather than humanity. He repeats frequently the statement that the valuable thing in literature is its revelation of human nature. His theory of association is almost Ruskinian:

"...all men's perceptions of beauty will be nearly in proportion to the degree of their sensibility and social sympathies; and...those who have no affections towards sentient beings, will be as certainly insensitive to beauty in external objects, as he, who cannot hear the sound of his friend's voice, must be deaf to its echo". Again, "There is nothing, after all, that we ever truly care for, but the feelings of creatures like ourselves; and we are obliged to lend them to the flowers and the brooks of the valley, and the stars and airs of heaven, before we can take any delight in them".

Thus he admired Crabbe in spite of his drab subjects, because Crabbe intends to extend the range of...

(1) Contributions, p. 35.
(2) Ibid, p. 572.
—our sympathies, and succeeds in doing so. Similarly he abhorred Swift for "degrading and vilifying human nature". Wordsworth, of course, was his blind spot. Instead of admitting any success on Wordsworth's part in expanding social horizons, he censures him for his ideal of seclusion, holding it "impossible that any one who had lived or mixed familiarly with men of literature and ordinary judgment in poetry" could have fallen into Wordsworth's errors.

(2) Contributions, p. 104.
(3) Ibid, p. 536.
Let us turn now from Jeffrey's moral demands of poetry in general, to his ideals of English poetry in particular.

The clue to Jeffrey, it has been suggested, lies in his "Gallicanism". Professor Saintsbury, in his essay on Jeffrey, makes out a good case for such an interpretation. One might, however, with equal ease marshal evidence to show that in his literary judgments Jeffrey was not "Gallic".

There is, certainly, a touch of Frenchness about him. He does conceive such a thing as Pure Taste. But actually Taste with Jeffrey is not an absolute. It is merely the faculty of receiving pleasure, from beauty. Even from the point of view of Taste, he thinks it sufficient justification of Shakespeare merely to state that the majority of his countrymen prefer him to Racine. He regrets "blemishes and excesses", but is willing to accept them if they proceed from a careless dashing spirit that enables the poet to reach the heights. A remark-

(1) Essays on English Literature, 1922, vol.I.
(2) See review of Mme. de Stael, E.R. No. 71, art.4.
about Scott, who seemed to him most like Shakespeare in his prodigal freedom, shows on which side Jeffrey is: "Thus, the very frequency of his deviations from pure taste, comes, in some sort, to constitute their apology; and the profusion and variety of his faults to afford a new proof of his genius".

One might compile a long anthology of Jeffrey's remarks to show that in spite of its irregularities he preferred English poetry to French. "Our poetry", he says, "derives its materials chiefly from nature, and theirs from art"...it is "their triumph to surmount difficulties and ours to give emotion"... "of all the nations of the globe, ancient and modern...there is not one that having any poetry at all, does not surpass the French in strength, originality, sublimity, invention". He speaks of the 'schoolboy task of classical imitation' as a mere episode in English poetry. He regretted the predominant French influence of the Restoration, and the fact that in Dryden, who might have carried on

(1) Contributions, p. 471.
(2) E.R. vol. 37, p. 402.
(3) E.R. vol. 37, p. 411.
(4) E.R. vol. 37, p. 417.
Soi—the older English tradition, "the evil principle prevailed". He thought Dryden, had he not been contaminated by the influence of the court, might have "built up the pure and original school of English poetry so firmly, as to have made it impossible for fashion, or caprice, or prejudice of any sort, ever to have rendered any other popular among our own inhabitants."... "But the Restoration brought in a French taste upon us, and what was called a classical and a polite taste; and the wings of our English Muses were clipped and trimmed, and their flights regulated at the expense of all that was peculiar, and much of what was brightest in their beauty." He describes this French taste as "more worldly, and more townish—holding more of reason, and ridicule, and authority—more elaborate and more unassuming—addressed more to the judgment than to the feelings, and somewhat ostentatiously accomodated to the habits, or supposed habits, of persons in fashionable life. Instead of tenderness and fancy, we had satire and sophistry—artificial declamation, in place of the spontaneous animations of genius—and for the—

(1) Contributions, p. 76.
(2) Ibid p 379.
(3) Ibid p. 378.
(4)
universal language of Shakespeare, the personalities, the party politics, and the brutal obscenities of Dryden". Speaking of Gray, he complains that he is far too artificial and elaborate, but "he had the merit of not being in any degree French, and of restoring to our poetry the dignity of seriousness, and the tone at least of force and energy". He thinks well of Pope, but he is "not to be compared with the masters - nor with the pupils - of that Old English school from which there had been so lamentable an apostacy". He welcomes the return to nature in Thomson and Young and Cowper, who "at last...threw off the whole trammels of French criticism and artificial refinement". He likes Hunt's Rimini because "it reminds us, in many respects, of that pure and glorious style that prevailed among us before French models and French rules of criticism were known in this country, and to which we are delighted to see there is now so general a disposition to return".

(1) Contributions, p. 379.
(2) Ibid p. 77.
(3) Ibid p. 380.
It is obvious from all this that Jeffrey's preference for pre-Restoration poetry was a powerful one. This conclusion is supported by the solid body of his approval of the Elizabethan dramatists. His praise of their excellence is one of the most recurrent notes in his criticism. In his review of Byron's Sardanapalus he puts them "in the very highest and foremost place among ancient or modern (1) poets". In his review of Ford, he declares that they (Beaumont and Fletcher, Shakespeare, Massinger, Jonson, Ford, Shirley, Webster, "Dekkar", Field, Rowley) are "more poetical, and more original in their diction, than the dramatists of any other (2) age or country". He places the Elizabethan age above those of Pericles, Augustus, Leo X and Louis XIV, "for in that short period, we shall find the names of almost all the very great men (3) that this nation has ever produced". He likes the Elizabethan dramatists' "gratuitous excursions of fancy", their variety and freedom, the apparently casual disorder of their dialogue, while admitting their "capricious uncertainty in-

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(1) Contributions, p. 400.
(2) Ibid, p. 382.
(3) Ibid, p. 376.
the taste and judgment”. In comparing English drama with classical drama (both Greek and French), he brushes the latter aside: “In this country, however, we are fortunate enough to have a drama of a different description - a drama which aims at a far more exact imitation of nature, and admits of an appeal to a far greater variety of emotions”. He tells us that English dramatic poetry soars above the Unities. Loudest of all, of course, is his praise of Shakespeare, whom he calls “the only true and lawful King of our English poetry”. He gives Shakespeare this rank apart from his supremacy as a creator of human nature. He makes a review of Hazlitt the occasion for a Rhapsody on “that fond familiarity with beautiful forms and images - that eternal recurrence to what is sweet or majestic in the simple aspects of nature - that indestructible love of flowers and odours, and dews and clear waters, and soft airs and sounds, and bright skies, and woodland solitudes, and moonlight bowers, which are the Material elements of Poetry - and that fine sense of their undefinable relation to mental emotion, which is its essence and vivifying Soul”, - which Shakespeare exemplified.

(1) Contributions, p. 333.
(2) E.R. vol. 19, p. 264.
(3) Contributions, p. 405.
(6) Contributions, p. 391.
It would thus appear that Jeffrey, so far from being 'classical', is decidedly 'romantic' in certain respects. With him indeed the classical period in English poetry is that romantic period of Wonder ending with Milton. His preference is for invention and fire rather than correctness. There is certainly nothing coldly classical about his aesthetical theory of poetry: the emphasis is not upon the image, but upon what the image suggests to the fancy; it "heats or inflames us less by the fires which it applies from without than by those which it kindles within, and of which the fuel is in our own bosoms". Again, in his insistence upon passion he is romantic. He regrets that in modern poetry there are "no sudden unconscious bursts, either of nature or of passion - no casual flashes of fancy, no slight passing intimations of deep but latent emotions, no rash darings of un-tutored genius, soaring proudly up into the infinite unknown". This desire for passion and a careless outpouring makes Jeffrey indulgent to Byron and enthusiastic about Scott; these two in their -

(1) "...having besides no enthusiasm about classical learning but rather a tendency to mock at its lofty pretensions", he writes Cockburn. (Adv. mss.9.1.11, p.115c, 25 Jan. 1849.)
(2) Contributions, p. 350.
(3) E.R. v. 48, p.51.
(5) Contributions, pp 470, 472.
(1-a) For Jeffrey's opinion of a Scottish classicist (Drummond) see note, in Appendix. No. 6.
—freedom and vigour seem to him to approach more nearly than other contemporaries to the Elizabethan standard.

Jeffrey does not, of course, hold consistently to this demand for a return to the spirit of an earlier, less sophisticated time. He hedges it about with limitations. He wants free creation, but not too much "brave neglect", which he censures in Scott. He wants to go back to the Elizabethans, but not too far back; and fears that Scott is copying "something a good deal older than what we consider as the golden age of English poetry".

He often retires behind the established barricades, and becomes a classicist again: "If we must renounce our faith in the old oracles of poetical wisdom before we can be initiated into the inspiration of her new apostles — if we must abjure all our classical prejudices, and cease to admire Virgil, and Pope, and Racine, before we can relish the beauties of Mr. Southey, it is easy to perceive that Mr. Southey's beauties are in some hazard of being neglected."

(1) Contributions, p. 459.
(2) He regrets Scott's "imitation and antiquarian researches". — Contributions p. 459.
(3) Contributions, p. 331.
(4) E.R., VII, 2.
Nor does Jeffrey's response to the romanticism of his own time dovetail neatly into his Elizabethan romanticism. To some of his pronouncements about the new movement we must give particular attention.
4. **His reactions to contemporary poetry.**
In the light of some of these articles of his professed creed, it is hard to understand Jeffrey's opposition to the group he called "the Lakers". It is true that he believed the lake-school derived from the new literature of Germany, (1) which he abhorred, and from Rousseau, with whom he had not much sympathy. But at several points Jeffrey's poetical ideals and those of the Lakers coincided. Wordsworth was for passionate imagination; Jeffrey also insists on passion. We have already noted his phrase about emotion "overflowing spontaneously". The chief object of poetry, he holds, is to kindle in the heart the "latent stores of light and heat"; and to accomplish this stimulation of emotion he believes in the poet's using common and familiar objects, "which fill every man's memory, and are necessarily associated with all that he has ever really felt or fancied". Give us lowly themes, he says, instead of castles, tyrants, banditti. He admits that the poet of humble life -

(1) See reviews of Goethe (E.R. No. 54, art. 7) and Lessing (No. 15, art. 11). Also Contributions p. 77.
(2) Rev. of Southey's Thalaba, E.R. I, 64.
(3) Contributions p. 607.
(4) Ibid p. 492.
(5) Ibid p. 492.
-must describe a great deal - and must even describe, minutely, many things which possess in themselves no beauty or grandeur". He tells us that "by far the most powerful and enchanting poetry is that which depends for its effect upon the just representation of common feelings and common situations". These ideals are surely not far removed from those of Wordsworth. Moreover, the Lakers were attempting what Jeffrey advocated, a reversion to the older tradition, and this ought to have won his approval.

The Lakers did, as a matter of fact, have his approval in a very large measure. His bitter attacks upon them seem to be an instance of his only hate springing from his only love. It is because Wordsworth's aims are so nearly his own that Jeffrey's resentment is so keen when Wordsworth fails to satisfy the expectations he has aroused. "Nobody", he writes, "can be more disposed to do justice to the great powers of Mr. Wordsworth than we are; and from the very first time that he came before us, down to-

(1) Contributions, p. 434. (But he is reviewing Crabbe, not Wordsworth!
(2) Contributions p. 440.
(3)
-the present moment, we have uniformly testified in their favour, and assigned indeed our high sense of their value as the chief ground of the bitterness (1) with which we resented their perversion". It is because Jeffrey thinks Wordsworth so nearly right, and so perversely wrong, that he erects him into a sort of whipping post to be belaboured whenever occasion offered. With Scottish relentless busy he wrings the last drop of criticism out of Wordsworth's obvious faults; and even cavils irritably at things in Wordsworth which he praises in others.

What Jeffrey objects to in the Lakers is less their object than their methods. He wants them to go back to the Elizabethans; but he thinks they have achieved only an affected aping of the masters, and given us rather "the fantastical oddity and puling childishness of Withers, (2) Quarles, or Marvel". He wants in poetry ordinary people and common situations, but he resents the-

(1) Contributions, p. 599.
(2) See Horner's Memoirs, II, 51,
(3) Contributions, p. 483.
disturbance of his own sets of associations, which he had come to regard as universal, by what he considers Wordsworth's "fantastical" characters and situations. "The gentlemen of the new school", he writes, "...scarcely ever condescend to take their subjects from any description of persons at all known to the common inhabitants of the world; but invent for themselves certain whimsical and unheard-of beings." Jeffrey cannot free himself from some of his eighteenth-century conventions: the choice of a Pedlar as a mouthpiece of wisdom and virtue he considers "the most abjectly wretched affectation, or provoking perversity of taste".... Wordsworth has "wilfully debased his moral teacher by a low occupation". He sneers at Wordsworth's "spades or sparrows' eggs - or men gathering leeches - or women in duffle cloaks - or plates and porringer - or washing tubs". He is willing to believe that these things actually suggested to Wordsworth the emotions he expresses; but he does not think they have-

(1)"...in consequence of associations that are now unalterable". E.R. vol. 35, p. 433.
(2)Contributions, p. 484.
(3)Contributions, p. 599.
(4)"

(1-a)Jeffrey calls passages "elaborate and fantastic" according to some quite personal vocabulary. His objection to the description of the ram reflected in the water, for instance, (Contribs.p.599) is hard to understand. Similarly, Jeffrey's range of experience was surely limited if he could not imagine such a person as "a captain of a small trading vessel, who, being past the middle age of life, has retired...etc". Yet(Contribs.p.492) he makes a great pother about this character.
-universal appeal. It simply won't do, he cries, to have a lad going to sea in a household tub. He does not wish Wordsworth to return to the 'correctness' of Pope, but he does want the nobler part of Wordsworth's poetry 'without the debasement of childish language, mean incidents, and incongruous images'.

It is apparent that Jeffrey here is objecting not so much to romanticism, as to some of the changes of poetic method that went along with it, particularly in Wordsworth. His grouping of the "Lakers" is of course an arbitrary one, a sort of journalistic head-line; and he has far less objection to Coleridge and Scott. He makes a bête noir of Wordsworth largely because, although nourished chiefly on eighteenth-century standards, he could not accept Wordsworth's "associations" as universal. He does not mind the "common feelings and common situations" of Campbell, because -

(1) "It is possible enough, we allow, that the sight of a friend's garden-spade, or a sparrow's nest, or a man gathering leeches, might really have suggested to such a mind a train of powerful impressions and interesting reflections; but it is certain that to most minds, such associations will always appear forced, strained, and unnatural." - E.R. vol 11, p.218.

Campbell employs the traditional symbols.

Apart from the upsetting of conventions in what may be called the matter of Wordsworth's poetry, Jeffrey objected to the new school's ideas about the language of poetry. He had approved Cowper, and ought therefore to have been friendly to a revolt against 'poetic diction'; but he thinks Wordsworth makes an unnecessary fuss about it. He admits that simple and familiar language is "the language of the best poetry as well as of the best prose". But the language which is peculiar to poetry is of another sort: this is poetic diction, to which Jeffrey clings. By 'poetic diction', he means "those flowers of speech, which, whether natural or artificial, fresh or faded, are strewed over the plainer ground which poetry has in common with prose; a paste of rich and honied words, like the candied coat of the auricula; a glittering tissue of quaint conceits and sparkling metaphors, crusting over the rough stalk of homely thoughts".

(1) Review of Biographia Literaria, E.R. vol. 28, p. 511. This review may have been written by Hazlitt. See J.H. Watt article, Good Words 39:563.

(2) E.R. vol. 28, p. 512.
Jeffrey does not apparently believe in the employment of poetic diction when it is desired to convey "the true touches of nature, the intense strokes of passion". He thinks it best suited to "descriptive or fanciful poetry, when the writer has to lend a borrowed, and, in some sort, meretricious lustre to outward objects, which he can best do by enshrining them in a language that, by custom and long prescription, reflects the image of a poetical mind". It is also to be used to cover up the commonplace gaps in any long poem - in those places, presumably, where in Wordsworth's theory and practice the language of poetry becomes "strictly the language of prose when prose is well written".

Jeffrey thinks common language is satisfactory in "familiar, lively, conversational poetry" such as Byron's Beppo, which he describes as an example, unique in the language, of "good verse, entirely composed of common words, in their common places; never presenting us with one sprig of what is called poetical diction, or even making use of a single inversion, either to raise the style or assist the rhyme".

But in the higher order of poetry he demands -

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(1) E.R. vol. 28, p. 513.
(2) " " "
(3) E.R. vol. 29, p. 303.
(4) " " "

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-decoration, dignity, elegance. He objects that Wordsworth's diction "has no where any pretensions to elegance or dignity; and he has scarcely ever condescended to give the grace of correctness or melody to his versification". He has little patience with Wordsworth's "ordinary language of conversation among the middling and lower orders of the people": "The language of the higher and more cultivated orders", he retorts, "may fairly be presumed to be better than that of their inferiors: at any rate it has all these associations in its favour, by means of which, a style can never appear beautiful or exalted, and is adapted to the purposes of poetry, by having been long consecrated to its use".

Some of Jeffrey's particular judgments-

(1) E.R. vol. 11, p. 217.
(2) " I, 66.
-on Wordsworth seem perverse, but at many points
his criticisms are sound. Wordsworth's eccentricities,
his exaggerations of theory, perhaps impeded the
new movement as much as they advanced it. Jeffrey
approved a great deal in Wordsworth's poetry; and
there is something in Coleridge's remark about the
Lyrical Ballads: "the omission of less than a hundred
lines would have precluded nine-tenths of the
criticism."

Jeffrey's reactions to the other literary-
phenomena of the time are mixed, and leave an -

(1) For instance: his citation from The Excursion
beginning, "But by the storms of circumstance unshaken"
is not the best example of perspicuity, but it hardly
merits Jeffrey's description of "rapturous mysticism
which eludes all comprehension, and fills the despairing
reader with painful giddiness and terror". (Contribs. p. 590)

Nor is there anything very obscure in
"Even in their fixed and steady lineaments
He traced an ebbing and a flowing mind".

There is surely also a lack of sensitiveness in his
failing to find tolerable the image of the bleat of
the lamb seeming to come from the heart of the mountain.
(Contributions, p. 593)
uncertain impression. His Elizabethan tendencies
did not make him feel kindly to the new German
literature (of which he had only a very partial
understanding). He resented the German influence
on Scott — for instance, in the complication and
unplausibility of plot in Marmion. He reverts
method
to the eighteenth-century of judging the poem
not so much on its own merits as by the rules for
at type: "The events of an epic narrative should
all be of a broad, clear, and palpable description".
He admires Scott's galloping measure, his careless
vigour; but he objects to his wealth of 'antiquarian'
detail. He prefers Scott's novels to his poetry.
He is glad he copies "from actual existences, rather
than from the phantasms of his own imagination",
preferring Waverley to Ivanhoe, in which "fancy
and romance" are given play. His admiration of-

(1) And also, of course, the 'German' mysticism in
the Laker.
(2) E.R. vol. 12, p. 8.
(3) Contributions, p. 671.
(4) Contributions, p. 692.
Byron's passion is profound, overcoming his horror at Byron's inhumanity: "Since the death of Lord Byron there has been no king in Israel".

He thinks Southey a poet but "not of the highest order": he objects to the irregularity of his verse, to his over-emphasis and pretension; he is "too monotonous - too wordy - and too uniformly stately, tragical, and emphatic".

Jeffrey cries for "plainness, simplicity, and repose". Campbell seems on the whole to come nearest to his ideal of "pure and perfect poetry".

He likes his "refined, deep and sustained pathetic", his "chastened elegance of words and images", and calls Gertrude of Wyoming "a polished and pathetic poem - in the old style of English pathos and poetry". Burns he gives "the rank of a great and original genius", making the conservative statement that his Scottish poems are superior to his English ones, and that the lyrics are surest of immortality.

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(1) L.R. vol. 48, p. 47.
(2) Contributions, p. 540.
(3) " "
(4) " P. 570.
(5) " P. 439k.
(6) " P. 463.
(7) " P. 449.
(8) " P. 439.
(9) " P. 427.
He is not hard on Keats, whom he finds to be in the genuine tradition of English poetry. In the review of August, 1820 (Endymion, Lania, Isabella, eve of St. Agnes) he is "exceedingly struck with the genius they display, and the spirit of poetry which breathes through all their extravagance". In this same review he prides himself on having helped to bring on "a second spring in our poetry; and few of its blossoms are either more profuse of sweetness, or richer in promise, than this which is now before us". Inconsistently with his professed ideals, however, Jeffrey quarrels with Keats because in him imagination is not subordinated to reason and judgment, but supreme: "his imaginations go rambling and entangling themselves everywhere, like wild honeysuckles; all idea of sober reason, and plan, and consistency, is utterly forgotten, and 'strangled in their waste fertility'". Of Shelley Jeffrey has little to say, although we are assured by Cockburn that for Shelley and Keats he had an "absurd passion". We may presume he endorsed the Review's comment: "Poetry, we grant, creates a world of its own; but it-

(1) Contributions, p. 527.
(2) " p. 526.
(3) " p. 527.
(4) " p. 527.
(4-a) And of Coleridge. He must be held to have partly acquiesced in such atrociously bad reviews as that of Christabel, Kubla Khan, The Pains of Sleep, - Sept. 1816. B.R. vol. 27.
-creates it out of existing materials. Mr.
Shelley is the maker of his own poetry - out of
nothing".

In his excellent surveys of cycles of
taste, Jeffrey seems to desire strongly a return
to the strong passions of more primitive poetry.
But in the celebrated swan-song at the close of his
review of Felicia Hemans we hardly know how to
interpret him:

"The tuneful quartos of Southey are
already little better than lumber; - and
the rich melodies of Keats and Shelley; -
and the fantastical emphasis of Wordsworth -
and the plebeian pathos of Crabbe, are melting
fast from the field of our vision...Even the
splendid strains of Moore are fading into
distance and dimness, except where they
have been married to immortal music; and the
blazing star of Byron himself is receding from
its place of pride...The two who have the
longest withstood this rapid withering of
the laurel, and with the least marks of decay
on their branches, are Rogers and Campbell,...
distinguished rather for the fine taste, and
consummate elegance of their writings, than
for that fiery passion, and disdainful
vehemence, which seemed for a time to be so
much more in favour with the public": --

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-It is not clear, however, that these are his
own opinions: he is speaking here of the public's
approval.

(1) Jeffrey also refers to Shelley (review of Atherstone,
Sept. 1828) as "a powerful, though...uncertain genius".--
(2) E.g. in the review of Byron's Corsair, April 1814.
E.R. vol. 23, p. 199.
With all these contradictions and hesitations, one retains the impression that Jeffrey, as a critic confronted by a new movement in literature, failed to rise to the occasion. His (1) 'romanticism' was limited to the decorative Elizabethan romanticism, which in spite of changes in taste had retained a high measure of public approval for some two hundred years without Jeffrey's assistance. When he faces a new romanticism which tries to express new social and moral ideals, Jeffrey is at a loss; for in spite of his liberalism he was largely circumscribed by the closed moral world of the eighteenth century.

(1) As expressed publicly.
5. **His limitations.**
In fairness to Jeffrey, some of the limitations under which he worked should be considered. He ought, for instance, to be judged as a reviewer rather than as a critical essayist. This sort of writing demanded perhaps an undue consciousness of his audience. He confessed to Horner that he wrote down to that audience. He had also the journalist's trick of non-committal: witness for instance his review of the third canto of Childe Harold, in which, by means of carefully guarded language, he manages to anticipate most of the views that could possibly be expressed. From his legal training comes the rhetorical method of the advocate. He seizes on salient points and exaggerates them in order to persuade the jury. He often seems more interested in doing this than in searching deeply for the truth. This is also the reason for his dislike of retraction, once he has put himself on record. He likewise feels the obligation of the advocate to go on and on, one theme sometimes succeeding another with little apparent connection. Again, as a student he was-

(2) See for instance his attempt to explain the superiority of Greek literature in the review of Mme. de Stael's , B.R. No. 71, art. 4.
-brilliant rather than deep. He was a rapid and perhaps superficial reader. In writing for the Review the pressure was not so much of time as of space, but this also he felt did not improve the quality of his work. These circumstances, I think, should be accepted in extenuation of some of the faults and contradictions of the reviews.

A more serious lack in Jeffrey, perhaps the more obvious in him because he lived in a time of social revolution, is the limited range of his sympathies. He proclaims himself a humanist, but -

(1) See mss. correspondence with Cockburn, Advoc. Lib., 9.111. p. 1102 and 1103. In a few days he had read a Life of Wycliffe, the memoirs of Selina Countess of Huntingdon, Pilgrim's Progress, Eldon's Life and Correspondence, "almost all Arnold's writings" .... "many French historical and philosophical works of Thierry, Mignet, Barante and others, most of Spenser's Faerie Queene, Raimundus and many biographies of missionaries, chancellors, and other worthies, together with some novels, English and French and (translated) German, "Iezii".  

(2) "...but what can a man do who is deserted by all his friends, and obliged to write against space by himself?" (letter to Moore. Moore Diary, II, 27).  

(3) For instance his superlatives, which must not be taken too seriously. Alternately it is Moore (Contributions p. 569), Crabbe (p. 482) Byron (p. 553) or some other who is being elevated above all other contemporaries.
actually he suffered from prejudices both severely national and aristocratic. He can see little that is good outside of Europe; and in European literature he has little affection for French, Italian or German. He cannot step out of his class to pity "the depraved, abject, diseased, and neglected poor - creatures in whom every thing amiable or respectable has been extinguished by sordid passions or brutal debauchery; - who have no means of doing the mischief of which they are capable - whom every one despises, and no one can either love or fear": in other words, although in his politics a liberal he could not achieve the sympathy which led Crabbe to portray these. Jeffrey could visualize intellectually the degradation of the poor which had come about as a result of the industrial revolution - his summary and prophecy of it in his review of Mme. de Stael is masterly - but his heart did not follow. His

(1)"...from all we have been able to gather from history or recent observation, we should be inclined to say that there was no sound sense, firmness of purpose, or principled goodness, except among the natives of Europe, and their genuine descendants". (Contr. p. 569)
Similarly he says the Hindoos, in their legends, "unite all the detestable attributes of obscurity, puerility, insufferable tediousness, and the most revoltling and abominable absurdity". (Contr. p. 50)
(2)Contr. p. 122.
(4)Contr. p. 125. With his usual keen eye for the undoubtedly good, however, Jeffrey seized on the parenthetical Hamlet essay in Wilhelm Meister as---
-sympathy with humble life, where this is expressed, is rather hollow and sentimental. He speaks himself of "a certain spice of aristocracy in my own nature". Consistent with this was his fear of falling out of the company of gentlemen by becoming an editor. His prejudices are those of the gentleman. Nigel's habit of decamping with his small winnings at the gaming-table rouses his ire. He speaks of Pepys' father's "ignoble occupation" as a blot on Pepys' scutcheon. He writes, "I could lie down in the dirt and cry and grovel there, I think, for a century, to save-

- as "the most able, eloquent and profound exposition of the character of Hamlet, as conceived by our great dramatist, that has ever been given the world". (Contr. p. 133)

(Incidentally, it may be noted that Jeffrey's copy of Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship is in the Barnbougle Castle collection of Lord Rosebery. It was presented by Jeffrey to Carlyle, and contains Jeffrey's note: "This is the copy which I used in reviewing this book for the Edinr. - and my marks are still on it". The "marks" might be interesting; but I was not successful in obtaining permission to examine them.)

(2) Ibid, letter 40.
(3) Contributions, p. 702.
(4) He was a tailor.
—such a soul as Burns from the suffering and
the contamination and the degradation which these
same arrangements imposed upon him; but this
feeling he does not extend to Burns' class, for
elsewhere he says, "...the love, grief, or indignation
of an enlightened and refined character, is not
only expressed in a different language, but is in
itself a different emotion from the love, or grief,
or anger, of a clown, a tradesman, or a market-wench".
He labels as "lively and impressive" Wordsworth's
description of the degradation of the poor by
factory labour, and his picture of nightworking
as "picturesque". He is surprised (and delighted)
to discover from an examination of Burns that
"not only good sense, and enlightened morality, but
literature, and talents for speculation, are far
more generally diffused in society than is commonly
imagined". This remoteness of Jeffrey from—

(1) Cockburn, Life of J., letter to Empson, 11 Nov. 1837.
(2) R.N., I, 56.
(3) Here again it is to be suspected that Jeffrey's
private feelings and public pronouncements were not
identical. The remark, "I could lie down in the dirt", etc.,
occurs in a private letter. The sneer about the
market-wench occurs in the Review.
(4) Contributions, p. 597.
(5) Contributions, p. 438.
-common humanity perhaps lies close to the root of Jeffrey's opposition to the "Lakers". He objects to their moral inspiration, to their "spleenetic and idle discontent with the existing institutions of society", which he himself did not share. It is to this deficiency, I think, that Wordsworth refers in his letter to John Wilson anent his poetic theory and methods: "...few ever consider books but with reference to their power of pleasing these persons (gentlemen, etc) and men of a higher rank; few descend lower, among cottages and fields and among children. A man must have done this habitually before his judgment upon "The Idiot Boy would be in any way decisive with me". If Wordsworth had Jeffrey in mind, his comment is I think a sound one.

(1) Lockhart notes it: "Whether from the natural constitution of Mr. Jeffrey's mind, or from the exercises and habits in which he has trained and established its energies, it would seem as if he had himself little sympathy for the more simple and unadorned workings of the affections." (Peter's Letters, II, 77.)

(1-a) E.R., I, 71.

(2) Grosart, Prose Works of Wordsworth, II, 208.
6. Conclusions.
Jeffrey's criticism, then, should be studied in the light of two considerations: first, the fact that he was a product of eighteenth-century solidity but worked amid the flux of the early nineteenth-century; second, his own peculiar temperament.

As for the first of these: Jeffrey belongs less to the 'classical' school of the eighteenth century than to the 'aesthetical' school. The magisterial bench to which he summons authors is supported less by Rules than by Taste. He is a direct product of the metaphysicians, the Scottish metaphysicians particularly. From these he inherits his tendency to 'philosophical' criticism; his associationism; his moralism; his principle of the Standard of Taste of the Few. The classical code had for a long time been losing ground, and Jeffrey does not, in theory at least, defend it. He falls into step with the growing interest in the Elizabethans, and advocates a return to their romanticism. Yet the standards of pseudo-classicism had pervaded the eighteenth century too thoroughly for Jeffrey to be emancipated from them, and we find him often asserting their demands of formality, order, regularity, precision. A natural conservative, Jeffrey-

(1) And also, of course, from the 'rhetoricians', with their 'principles of human nature'.

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(1)
calls for discipline in the world of literature. This demand proceeds from a profound conviction of a morally ordered world, to which it is the privilege of poetry to give expression. He believes in an ultimate test of the worth of poetry through a criterion based on commonly shared natural emotion. But in practice this standard of 'universal' emotions tends to become a nebulous subjective standard, or falls back on 'what has been found to win lasting approval'. Jeffrey's approval as critic depends on his finding in poetry the satisfaction of long-established sets of associations, theoretically 'universal' associations, but actually determined by the circumstances of his period and training. If new poetry such as Wordsworth's does not cater to these associations, and still more if it appears subversive of established social institutions, it is suspect. We have thus in spite of elaborate philosophical liberality a closed circle into which it is virtually impossible to introduce new literary modes and values. As a custodian of Taste, guarding it in the interests of a public which must not be corrupted, Jeffrey feels obliged to be conservative. The traditional-
- defense of Scottish parsimony is that the Scot is not 'close' - he is merely careful.

So Jeffrey is not necessarily opposed to all change, - he is merely cautious about the new. Introducing fresh values, the new may upset a well-ordered world; it must therefore be carefully tested. One may enjoy it in private, but he will hesitate about publicly approving it.

To be a helpful critic in a transitional period full of literary innovation, a man must have wide sympathies and a flexible, forward-looking mind. Jeffrey's sympathies were decidedly limited, and his mind was fixed and legal rather than legislative. His criticism is mechanic, whereas what the times needed was the new dynamic of Coleridge.
Coming now to the second consideration:
The theory that separated enjoyment and criticism fitted well into the needs of Jeffrey's personality: as an individual, he felt obliged to conceal his timid, sensitive, pessimistic nature behind a façade of courage, hard intellectualism, and vivacity; as a critic, he need not display to the world his own enthusiasms. 'Entrenched behind a barrier of Good Taste, his nervous energy could safely be released in praise or disparagement proceeding from a trained mind and relatively undisturbed by his own emotions. It is partly for this reason, because Jeffrey's criticism did not proceed from the whole man but from a compartment of mind only, leaving many doubts and likings unexpressed, that it displays a spurious assurance: as Hazlitt put it, "too didactic, too pugnacious, too full of electrical shocks, too much like a (1) voltaic battery".

(1) Spirit of the Age, 1825, p. 321.
The key to Jeffrey's criticism, we have been often told, is his intellectualism; and this is near the truth. The point I wish to make, however, is that this is not intellectualism pure and simple, but intellectualism conflicting with other factors in Jeffrey's character. He seems to have developed an extraordinary distrust of his natural inclinations and feelings, and to have confided to rationalization the helm of his ship. I do not pretend to explain this distrust, but it certainly existed, creating in Jeffrey continual struggles between temperament and intellect or will. In these conflicts, temperament generally lost, and the weapon of intellect, in the employment of which he felt more secure, prevailed. Over-subtlety became a vice, and Jeffrey its victim. Distrusting himself emotionally, he aroused to redress the balance a will like steel, a mind lively and voracious if not profound. And it is this element of forcing, of grimly holding himself to an aim in which his emotions were possibly not enlisted, that may provide a clue—

(1) Cockburn describes him as "a mind addicted to more refined reasoning than plain men might relish". (Life of J, 1872 ed. p. 236)
to his criticism. He was continually suppressing his own instincts, or diverting them perversely into other channels. He was averse to the law, but having adopted it as a profession he drove himself on until he became a distinguished lawyer and jurist. He was naturally timid, but he nerved himself to a duel and to the perils of the sea. He was a kindly man, but he managed to attain (and, I think, to enjoy) the reputation of an ogre. He was a poet at heart, if not in power, and keenly sensitive to its beauty, but he brought to the criticism of poetry one of the coldest, most objective minds ever exercised in literary criticism. His natural bent in literature, I believe, was in the direction of the romantic; but his intellectual conviction of a need for order and rational standards made him historically a monstrous obstacle to a rebirth of Wonder.

(1) As an early instance of his doing what it was not his inclination to do, out of some sense of duty, or consideration for others, or mere distrust of himself: when Henry Erskine was deprived of his deanship of the faculty of advocates because of his political principles, Jeffrey, who was of Erskine’s political colour, absented himself from the ballot so as “not to shock the prejudices of his relations”. (Cockburn, 1872 ed. Life, p.91). Jeffrey suffered a keen moral conflict and always regretted his conduct on this occasion.
(2) Though here, to be sure, there was the emotional stimulus of a bride to be won.
I have tried to present the substance and spirit of the writing done by Scotsmen in the field of poetics and literary criticism, from James the Sixth down to Francis Jeffrey. In this body of material, as we have seen, investigation of principles bulks larger than actual practice of criticism. Possibly it appears sophistical thus to segregate Scottish criticism from the English critical literature of which it is a part. Yet separate treatment may assist comprehension by its emphasis on certain pervading national characteristics: the flair for rationalization, the insistence on morality, and the passion for fundamentals. Francis Jeffrey-
-is the chief practicing exponent in literary criticism of the Scottish aesthetical formulae of the eighteenth century, and no study of these formulae is complete which does not include him. In a fashion he completes the epoch, and with him we reach a natural halting-place.

Hardwick, Mass.
May 1, 1930.
Appendix

2. Emigrés.
3. Fancy and Imagination.
4. Periodicals published before 1802.
5. Jeffrey item in the Hamilton-Bruce collection.
6. Jeffrey's Drummond fragment.
7. Ms. Letters to Jeffrey.
8.
Appendix

I.

*Minor eighteenth-century critics.*
Appendix

I.

"The laborious employments of his profession", wrote Henry MacKenzie of his friend Alexander (Lord) Abercrombie, "did not so entirely engross him, as to preclude his indulging in the elegant amusements of polite literature." The description fits many amateur critics who are worth a passing glance.

In the quiet of country manses, in the merrier relaxations at taverns in the Edinburgh wynds, literature was a favourite avoacaion of the cultivated. It does not seem to have been too difficult to find a publisher or editor who was willing to give one's musings to the world. If there were difficulty, new periodicals could be launched to publish the essays which had been admired in one's select circle.

Among judges of the law who in their leisure hours aspired to become judges of literature may be noted Alexander Abercrombie; MacLeod Bannatyne; Robert Cullen, all members of the Mirror-Lounger groups. Another, William Craig, who is supposed-

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(1) Address to the Royal Society of Edinburgh, on Abercrombie.
(2) In an essay (Lounger No. 5, Mar. 5, 1785, on the writing of history, he distinguishes two sorts: 1) primitive, poetic, personal - e.g. Caesar, Xenophon, Thucydides; 2) Philosophical history, with an attempt to discover the reign of law - e.g. Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume.
to have suggested the publication in what became the Mirror of the essays read at the Tabernacle literary society, contributed to that periodical more than anyone but MacKenzie. These contributions however contain little of critical importance. The essay in Mirror No. 31 "on the art of drawing characters in writing" is slight. That on "the effects of the introduction of ancient mythology into the poetry of modern times" (Lounger No. 37) is a protest against this practice. Craig deprecates it because it prevents our poets from studying nature directly.

"Observations on Comedy" (Lounger No. 49) is a rather insipid sketch of the rise of comedy from the Greek to the modern. More important is Mirror No. 36, one of the earliest appreciations of Michael Bruce.
Alexander F. Tytler (Lord Woodhouselee) inherited his father's interest in literature but discovered no King's Quhair. He is indeed rather dull. His *Historical and critical essay on the life and character of Petrarch* (1810) contains some acute examination of the sonnets for internal evidence as to Petrarch's life. In his *Essay on the principles of translation* (1790, anon) he takes some four hundred pages to tell us that the translator should give a complete transcript of the ideas of his original; that he should imitate its style; that a lyric poem cannot be translated into prose. The *Essay on the genius and writings of Allan Ramsay* (who had not had his due from Scottish critics) is better. He does not think Ramsay had much skill in the ancient Scottish dialect, but is appreciative of his merits as poet, which he feels have been overlooked because of his use of the vernacular. He makes-

(1) 1747-1813
(2) Ed. used the second, 1797.
(3) Pref. to Ramsay's Works, 1800. Ed. used 1851.

(A) Mostly pub., says the adv., some years before. Part of it may be found in a pamphlet of the same title, 1784; another part in Trans. of the Royal Soc. of Edin., *vol. IV*, as "Dissertation on an historical hypothesis of the Abbé de Sade".
particular comments on the poems. He rates The Gentle Shepherd "one of the most perfect pastoral poems that has ever appeared" (p. 88), comparing Ramsay with Tasso and Guarini; and puts Ramsay high among "our classical poets" for his originality and humanity.

The essay on Ramsay ends with a fling at the metaphysical critics:

"I must at the same time observe, that in the preceding observations, the admirers of theoretic and metaphysical criticism will find but little to gratify their prevailing propensity. In judging of the merits of poetry, and of its power to please the imagination or to touch the passions, I cannot help thinking that an appeal to the feelings of mankind is a more sure criterion of excellence or defect, than any process of reasoning, depending on an abstruse analysis of the powers of the mind, or a theory of the passions. We may admire the ingenuity displayed in works of this nature, but we cannot make use of them to regulate our taste. In our judgment of poetry, as of all works of genius, there is a natural and instantaneous feeling of excellence, and a disapprobation of defect or impropriety, which outruns all reasoning... If I feel no pleasure in the perusal of a poem, I cannot be persuaded by an subtletly of philosophical argumentation that I ought to have been pleased; if I do feel pleasure, that argument is unnecessary. In a word, that species of abstract reasoning may amuse and even improve the understanding, and as fitted to do so it is a laudable and a manly exercise of our faculties, but it cannot guide the taste". (p. 116)

(1) Later, in his Life of Kames (1807), Tytler has become more 'philosophical'.
Thomas Blacklock, the blind poet (1721-1791), who may have written the article on poetry in the Encyclopedia Brittanica (1783) and whose poetic images as those of a blind man raised interesting questions in the minds of Burke and other aestheticians, may be passed over with grateful recollection of the letter which kept Burns from exile.

(1)

The Letters of John Brown, the artist, upon the poetry and music of the Italian opera (1739) are thoughtful but deal with music rather than poetry. 

(2)

The essays of D. S. Erskine, Earl of Buchan (1742-1829), the blundering patron of the arts who was rebuffed by Burns and tried to force his way into Scott's deathbed to tell him of the funeral plans, are not very important.

Other miscellaneous writers were Robert Heron (1764-1807), who brought out in 1789 an edition-

(1) Written to Monboddo.
(2) Essays on the Lives and Writings of Fletcher of Saltoun and the poet Thomson (1792); and Anonymous and Fugitive Essays collected from various periodical works. (v. I 1812)
of Thompson's *Seasons* with a critical essay, and in 1797 a *Life of Burns*; James Currie (1756-1805), (1) another biographer of Burns; John Moore, editor (2) of Smollett; Alexander Campbell, who taught Scott music and flogged him frequently. The editorial (3) labours of Robert Anderson (1750-1830) were done mostly in the next century. The Essay on Original Genius (1767) of William Duff, minister of Glenbucket (1732-1815) and his Critical observations on the writings of the most celebrated original geniuses in poetry (1770) may be taken as representative of a large body of mediocre dissertations on these subjects.

(1) He wrote a critical introduction to *Burns' Wks.* (1800.)
(2) The Works of Tobias Smollett, with memoirs of his life, to which is prefixed a view of the commencement and progress of romance. (1797)
(3) His *An Introduction to the history of poetry in Scotland* (1798) is of most interest for its anecdotal information about contemporary poets.
(4) Anderson's edition of *The British Poets* (13v. 1792-95) made generally available for the first time many of the Elizabethan poets. It includes 49 poets not in the last previous edition of Johnson's *Poets*, and 45 presented for the first time in any collection. The prefaces are biographical rather than critical. Anderson brought out in 1794 *Works and Life of Robert Blair*; in 1796 and 1795 respectively, separate biographies of Smollett and Johnson. He was also among the first to recognize the worth of Thomas Campbell and secured a publisher for *The Pleasures of Hope*. 
Appendix

II.

Enigres
In this study we have confined ourselves to Scotsmen writing in Scotland. During the century many Scots were voluntary exiles in England. Some of these emigrés, like John Pinkerton, William Shaw and George Chalmers, retained a particular interest in Scottish letters, but for the most part they fit into the continuity of English rather than of Scottish criticism. (2) Their place in it is (with one or two exceptions) not very high. It will be enough to mention them briefly.

There is the versatile Dr. John Arbuthnot, principal author of *Scriblerus* (1741) and perhaps of *Critical Remarks on Captain Gulliver's Travels*.

Of less credit to his native land was—

(1) And sometimes involuntary exiles elsewhere. Alexander Cunningham (1655?-1730) belongs to the fine tradition of pure classical scholarship. Ousted in 1770 from the chair of civil law in Edinburgh University, he studied at the Hague as pensioner of the Duke of Queensberry. In *Alexander Cunninghamii Animadversiones in Richardi Bentleyi Notas et Emendationes ad Q. Horatii Flacci* (1721) he disputed ably with the great Bentley. In the same year he published his own edition of Horace. Editions of Virgil and Phaedrus were published in Edinburgh posthumously. (2) Such as Smollett, who demands separate study. We may note his connection with the Critical Review, *The Briton, The British Magazine*. The Critical Review especially contains much criticism from his pen, written with a vigour and good sense relatively rare in periodical criticism in 1756.
-William Lauder. (– d. 1771) A good classical scholar, his ambitions were frustrated in Scotland and he went to London. He issued a collection of sacred poems, _Scotorum Musae Sacrae_ (1739 2v), with a Latin preface and a Latin life of Johnston. He engaged in the Johnston-Buchanan controversy, on the side of Johnston. In reply to John Love's _A Letter to a gentleman in Edinbourgh_ (signed 'Philo-Buchananus') he wrote _Calumny Display'd, or Pseudo-Philo-Buchananus couch'd of a Cataract, being a modest and impartial reply to an impudent and malicious libel_. (1741)

Lauder's prime achievement, however, was the Essay on Milton's use and imitation of the moderns in his _Paradise Lost_ (1750), elaborated from an article in the Gentleman's Magazine (1747) where he had attempted to show that Paradise Lost was largely composed of paraphrases of Sarcotis, a Latin poem by Jacobus Masenius (1654). In the Essay, Lauder tries to demonstrate that Milton had plagiarized some nineteen Latin works. His conclusion is that "from every author who wrote anything before him, suitable to his purpose either in prose or verse, sacred or profane", Milton had borrowed without acknowledgment.
Milton was not long without a champion. (1) Warburton suspected Lauder from the first. Richard Richardson, in *Zelomastix*, "or a vindication of Milton from all the invidious charges of Mr. William Lauder" (1747) was the first to show that Lauder's quotations were *exspectrabilis* unreliable. The most decisive retort was that of John Douglas, another Scotsman ("Milton vindicated from the charge of plagiarism...in a letter to the Earl of Bath, 1750), who showed that Lauder had garbled the quotations and had inserted in them extracts from William Hog's Latin version of Paradise Lost.

For once Dr. Johnson had not been alert to forgery. He had written the prospectus of Lauder's proposed edition of Grotius' *Adamus Exsul*, supposed to contain some of the passages "imitated" by Milton. He had also appended to Lauder's *Essay* an appeal for the relief of Mrs. Elizabeth Foster, Milton's granddaughter. Johnson now obtained an abject signed apology and confession of guilt from Lauder. This was published as "A Letter to the reverend Mr. Douglas,..." occasioned by his *Vindication of Milton*, by William Lauder, A.M." (1751), but Lauder tried to pass the matter off as a joke. In *Delectus Auctorium Sacrorum* -

(1) Nichols, Litt. Illustr., II, 177.
(2) 20 Dec. 1750.
Miltono facem praelucentium (Ev. 1752-53) he reiterated his charges against Milton, raising the number of plundered authors to 97.

Lauder seems to have been a contemptible character, with an insatiable desire for notoriety at all costs. No wonder Dr. Johnson detested the Scots! But Judas Lauder's discovery, had he let it stand at its own value without "cooking" evidence, would entitle him to honourable mention as the first to show that Milton had studied modern Latin versifiers, and sometimes made use of them in his own work.

The name of William Guthrie (1706-1770) (1) was affixed to many books which according to Anderson he had little to do with writing. Dr. Johnson thought well enough of him to wish his Life had been written. Among his works were Orations of Cicero, with criticisms (1754); and Marcus Fabius Quintillianus his Institutes of Eloquence (1756). More to our purpose is An Essay upon English Tragedy, with remarks upon the Abbé de Blanc's observations on (2) the English stage. Here he gives a historical-

(1) The Scottish Nation.
(2) 1757? Signet Library copy n.d.
-survey of English drama from the time of Henry VIII and displays a fine sense of proportion. He rebels against the classical unities. He laments the exaggerations of the "heroic" drama and puts up a good case for Shakespeare and Otway. He wants passion rather than correctness.

James Elphinston was another of those annoying expatriate Scots who made the English doubtful about the advantages of Union. He illustrates at its worst the singular passion of eighteenth-century Scots writers to become authorities on an English language to which they were almost strangers.

Said Dr. Johnson (with whom he was on friendly terms), "He has the most inverted understanding of any man whom I have ever known". Among his works are:

- *An Analysis of the French and English Languages* (2v. 1753);
- *Principles of the English Language* (2v. 1765);
- *Anecdotes upon Elements of Criticism*;
- *Propriety ascertained in her picture, or English speech and spelling rendered mutual guides* (1786). The *Principles* is dull stuff. *Propriety Ascertained*... offers an eccentric system of quasi-phonetic spelling -
-(die for the; which for which; portion for portion; occasion for occasion, etc.) His **Fifty Years' Correspondence**, "Inglish, French, and Lattin, in prose and Verse, between geniusses ov boath sexes, and James Elphinston" (1794) is eight volumes of letters, mostly from and to nonentities, spelled in this manner.


George Chalmers had a chequered career. He distinguished himself in America as a loyalist and opponent of Patrick Henry; at home, as antiquary, he was an antagonist of Herd and Malone. He did some research among the older Scottish poets. Most of his work belongs to the next century.

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(1) Life of Defoe (pref. to History of the Union), 1786; Life of Thomas Paine (1793); Life of Thomas Ruddiman (1794); Apology for the Believers in the Shakespeare Papers which were exhibited in Norfolk St. (1797); Supplemental Apology for the same (1799); appendix to the above (1800); The Poetical Works of Sr. David Lindsay of the Mount, with a Life of the Author; Prefatory Dissertation and an appropriate glossary (1806, 3v.); The Poetical Reviews of some of the Scottish Kings (1824); edition of Robene and Makyne, and the Testament of Cresseid by Robert Henryson (Bannatyne Club) (1824)
John Pinkerton, who moved from Edinburgh to London in 1781, published in 1783 "Select Scotish Ballads. Hardy Knute: an heroic Ballad, now first published complete; with nine other approved Scotish Ballads and some not hitherto made public, in the tragic style". This includes his Scotish Tragic Ballads, published 1781. To the latter were prefixed three dissertations: on the oral tradition of poetry, on the tragic ballad, on the comic ballad. These prefaces are not remarkable.

Forgery and misrepresentation would seem to have been the besetting sins of some London Scots. After an attack by Ritson in the Gentleman's Magazine (November, 1784, pp 312-314), Pinkerton admitted, in a preface to Ancient Scotish Poems, that he had written the second part of Hardy Knute and several other of the ballads himself. He demurred that he had never asserted their antiquity.

(1) So says the writer of the D.N.B. article on Pinkerton; but I find no trace of this in the copy consulted (1786, Lond. 2v.)
Like Elphinston, Pinkerton also advocated, in his *Letters of Literature* (1785, under the pseudonym, "Robert Heron") a new method of orthography.

In *Ancient Scottish Poems*, "never before in print, with an essay on Scottish poetry" (1786, 2v) Pinkerton did a valuable piece of work. The Poems, which are taken from the Maitland mss., include *King Hart; The Two Mariit Wemen; and the Wido*; and *The Freirs of Berwik*. Attached are a Preface, an essay on the origins of Scottish poetry, and a list "of all the Scottish poets, with brief remarks". The List, which includes Latinists, extends from Thomas Lermont (ca. 1270) to Alexander Ross (1768). The 'brief remarks' are sometimes acute.

From the Preface it is clear that Pinkerton does not choose to be thought merely "an hoarder of ancient dirt" but prides himself on his taste in selecting and rejecting. He asks for the elder Scottish poets the same attention as was now being given to early English poetry. "As long as Chaucer -
is read, therefore, and he will be read till the English language perishes, so long may we hope for equal attention to Barbour and Dunbar. He advocates strongly the philological background: "Knowledge of the primitive and progressive powers of words", he tells us, "is the only solid foundation of that rich and terse style which posterity pronounces classic".

The essay on the origin of Scottish poetry naturally is history rather than criticism. He seems to have considerable knowledge of Celtic tribes and tongues. He ridicules MacPherson’s confused historical prefaces to the Ossian poems. He is astute in reasoning and a clever phrase-monger.

Pinkerton also brought out an edition of The Bruce (1789) and Scottish Poems reprinted from scarce editions (1792,3v), and was for a time editor of the Critical Review. A Critique upon Ritson’s Scottish Songs written by him is to be found in J. Ritson: Letters (1829)

Another prolific Scot, who left Aberdeen for London at the age of 18 and never returned, was Alexander Chalmers. He is said to have edited more books for London publishers than any other man. He contributed to the Analytical Review and the Critical Review. Apart from the History of England in Letters (1793), most of his work belongs to the next century.
Appendix III

Fancy and Imagination
Coleridge's theory of fancy and imagination (1) seems to have come to him as a sort of revelation; a spiritual experience; and the conception of Imagination as he developed it became almost a religious one. This development begins about 1796, or earlier. He had accepted Hartley's theory of knowledge, which was in effect associationism, with the mind a passive spectator of a mechanical world. He suddenly becomes aware of a deeper reality underlying experience, abandons intellectualism as inadequate, and seeking some vital creative principle to fill his new need, finds it in Imagination as distinguished from fancy.

Thus fancy becomes merely "the faculty of bringing together images dissimilar in the main by some one point or more of likeness"; while Imagination is "the power by which one image or feeling is made to modify many others, and by a sort of fusion to force many into one". Fancy is "the aggregating faculty of the mind"; Imagination is "the modifying and -

(1) See Biogr. Lit., I, 53.
(2) See introduction to J. Shewcross' ed. of Biogr. Lit., Oxford 1907, 2 v., esp. XIX.
(3) Biogr. Lit., I, 53.

Later, Coleridge may have been indebted to Kant, Fichte and Lessing; but in its inception the idea seems to have been his own.
Fancy is 'the arbitrary bringing together of things that lie remote, and forming them into a unity'; but Imagination 'under excitement, generates and produces a new form of its own'. The difference between the two is the difference between Cowley and Milton. "The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space; and blended with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word Choice. But equally with the ordinary memory it must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association". Imagination however is the 'esemplastic' power: "...the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and...a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I am. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or, where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects as objects are essentially fixed and dead". He felt -

(1) Coleridge, Letters, I, 428 (to Sotheby, Sept. 1802)
(2) Henry Crabb Robinson, Diary, Dec. 11, 1811.
-Imagination operating when Wordsworth read his poem, - "spreading the tone, the atmosphere, and with it the depth and height of the ideal world around forms, incidents, and situations, of which, for the common view, custom had bedimmed all the lustre, had dried up the sparkle and the dewdrops".

Wordsworth's conception of the two functions is substantially the same as Coleridge's, though he quarrels with some of his terms and gives to Imagination as well as to fancy "the aggregative and associative power". He emphasizes the capriciousness and transitoriness of fancy as contrasted with the deeper and more lasting creations of Imagination.

This distinction between fancy and Imagination is important, particularly as it throws light on the conflict between Jeffrey and the Lakers. Jeffrey was an associationist of the old school. Wordsworth and Coleridge were aware that old associations must be broken down, and that the new poetry demanded a new aesthetic justification.

(1) Biogr. Liter. ch. 4.
(2) Grosart, Prose Works of Wordsworth, II, 135 etc. (3)
Appendix IV

Periodicals published before 1802.
A large number of periodical were published in Scotland before 1802, but in few of them is there criticism of high value.

The authors of the Letters of the Critical Club (begun Jan. 2, 1738) "profess to be true Critics, and therefore our Body is called the Critical Club; the false critic's character we hate as we hate the devil. We are friends to mankind, and love to encourage Virtue and Merit wherever it is found". But the Letters are very general and in the mode of the Spectator. The Scots Magazine, started in 1739 and modelled on the Gentleman's Magazine, contains a good many extracts but little criticism. The short-lived first Edinburgh Review of 1755 includes only one article on pure literature, a review of Dodsley's fourth volume of poems published in 1755. The criticism is very general and rather weak.

The Edinburgh Magazine and Review, begun in 1773 "By a Society of Gentlemen" proposed as a major part of the its project "an account of the more capital literary performances which appear in-
-England, and of every new production which is produced in Scotland". The editors promised impartiality, and candour without ill-nature; but under the leadership of Dr. Gilbert Stuart the Magazine indulged in caustic personalities. Through successive issues it made violent attacks on Monboddo's theories about the origin and progress of language, and the resentment aroused cost it some popularity. It gave a good deal of attention to Scottish books, and a fair amount of space to poetry and novels. Its judgment is often good — it applauded warmly for instance William Richardson's poems and his essays on Shakespeare's characters; but it also gave undue praise to many worthless things.

The criticism in the Mirror and Lounger we have already noted in our consideration of MacKenzie, Richardson, Hume, and William Craig. The Aberdeen Magazine, Literary Chronicle, and Review (1788-1791) contains short but seldom penetrating reviews. In The Bee or Literary Intelligencer (1790-1794) poetry, drama, and novels are "noticed" liberally, and there are some competent reviews.

In The Edinburgh Magazine or Literary Miscellany (1785-1803),
the first numbers contain little criticism; but reviews later became a regular feature. We have already noted our obligation to it for the first estimate of Burns (October, 1786). The Scottish Register or general view of History, Politics, and Literature (No.1, 1794) was an attempt to give adequate attention to purely Scottish events and interests. It proposed to include reviews of new publications; but those it selected were chiefly of historical or antiquarian interest.
Appendix V

Jeffrey item in the Hamilton-Bruce collection.
The Jeffrey item in the Hamilton-Bruce collection (No. 99) of the Register House, Edinburgh is written in a clear hand, not Jeffrey's, on paper watermarked "A. Cowan & Sons" (an Edinburgh firm), "1835". It is a large double sheet. On the outside is written "Helvellyn and its parody". On the inside, the left page contains a transcription of Scott's poem Helvellyn. The right side, under the title, "Parody - by Mr. Richardson/2/ and by Lords Jeffrey, Cockburn, and Lord Advocate Murray - one stanza each", contains the following:

1.
I climbed the High Street as nine was just ringing,
The Macer to three of his Roll had got on,
And eager each Clerk on his Counsel was springing,
Save on thee, luckless Lawyer, who fee had got none.
On the right Nicodemus(1) his leg was extending,
To the stove I---y W---t(2) his brown visage was bending,
And a huge brainless Judge, the fore bar was ascending,
When I marked thee, poor O---o(3), stand, briefless, alone.

2.
How keen did'st thou gaze, as the agents moved past thee,
How oft when the Macer bawl'd loud, didst thou start,
Aloes! thy thin wig not much longer will last thee,
And no fee will the hard-hearted Writer impart.
And oh! is it meet that a student of Leyden,
Should hardly have whole coat or breeches to stride in,
While home-bred and blockheads, their carriages ride in,
Who can't tell where Leyden is placed on the chart?

3.
Dark and green is that spot, by thy love still distinguished,
Twixt the stove and the side bar, where oft thou didst stray,
Like the ghost of a Lawyer, by hunger extinguish'd,
Who walks, a sad warning in crowds at bright day:
Nor yet quite deserted, though poorly attended,
For see his right hand Y---n(4) S---h has extended,
And H---t's (5) strong breath thy retreat has defended,
And chas'd the vain wits and loud scoffers away.

(continued, next page) -
When Balmuto or Barny, the Bench has ascended,
The former to bellow, the latter to sleep,
And Hernando, as fierce as a tyger offended,
Is muttering his curses, not loudly, but deep:
Then are all the fee'd Lawyers most anxiously waiting,
Some ready to prose, and some ready for prating,
While some for delay are all hotly debating,
Lamenting a Cause through their fingers should creep.

But meeter for thee far, with Th---s McG---r(6)
Thy heart's dearest friend, in condolence to sigh,
And some idle question, in words sweet as sugar,
To urge, in soft answer and gently reply.
For fitter, I ween, than for gowns idly hoping
With the Corsican Fairy(?) your way darkly groping,
To spend the dull hours in John Dowie's(3) deep toping
And revel on Herrings and hot penny pyes.

(XXX)

(The inference from the title is that Jeffrey wrote the third verse.)

Marginal notes by the copier [initials, J.N.?] :

(1) Mr. Edward McCormick, later sheriff of Ayr.
(2) Johnny Wright, an eccentric counsel of his day.
(3) Otho Nemyse, who lately died. Sheriff. Sub. of Selkirk.
(4) Virgin. Smith, C. of Balhary in Angus.
(5) Edw. Magart, an offensive man who insulted the Lord President.
(6) Thos. McGregor, a vulgar but very learned man and an author.
(7) Geo. Sandy, a learned and eccentric W.B. now Sec. of the Bank of Scotland.
(8) A noted strong ale Ho. in Libberton's Wynd.
Appendix VI

Jeffrey-Drummond Fragment.
According to Cockburn (Advocates’ Library mss. 9.1.3, p. 196) Jeffrey contributed to the Maitland Club edition of the works of Drummond of Hawthornden (1832) a fragment of comment on this poet. Cockburn’s brother-in-law was printing this edition for the Maitland Club and apparently Cockburn had solicited a contribution from Jeffrey. Jeffrey writes, “I enclose a scrawl about Drummond, which I fear Maitland will think vituperative. Certainly it is not ethereal, any more than I think him. He was a stick after all - alter it at your pleasure”. Cockburn’s note says that the comment as published begins at “It may seem absurd” (introduction, p. 15) and stops at “humour” (p. 16).

Although Jeffrey fears he is “vituperative” he does find in Drummond “a striking resemblance in the general style of his sonnets to those of the great dramatist, and there are some which we should not hesitate to call superior to any of Shakespeare’s”.

This fragment I think has not before been identified as Jeffrey’s.
Appendix VII

Ms. Letters to Jeffrey.
Ms. letter from George Crabbe, addressed "for the Author of the 6th article in the Edinburgh Review of April, 1808". (Peebles mss., property of Miss Rebecca Watt)

"Whatever Dr. Johnson might assert or might believe, an author may surely be thankful to the Reviewer of his publication, though there should be no Deviation from the Truth in favour of the work since there are certainly different Modes of conveying Truth, and to speak nothing of Candour and Liberality one may have beyond comparison an Advantage over another in the great articles of Good Taste and sound Judgment as well as other qualities of a good Critic.

"I have therefore no doubt of my Obligation to you, Sir, nor of the Favour you have done me in your late Remarks upon my Verses, for the Truth might have been delivered, had you so pleased, without such Display of Talents, as have contributed to give me Honour and my Book circulation. Accept then Sir my best thanks and be assured that the present Edition of the work should have been made more worthy your Acceptance had Mr. Halehard (or 'Halchar?)-'allowed me time sufficient for the Correction of general defects, whereas he scarcely gave me enough for the Removal of particular Blemishes. It would have given me great Pleasure to have ordered this Proof of my Gratitude to you in a direct Manner, but I have no Right to act upon conjecture, nor except allowed to do so, upon Proof itself: in this way then I repeat my acknowledgment. I am with much Respect, Sir, your very obedient and obliged servant,

George Crabbe.

(a postscript):-

Though I be sufficiently gratified by the manner in which I am treated in our monthly Reviews, yet I would not Sir lead you to suppose that I abound in Acknowledgments: nor will you, after the flattering opinion I trust you have formed of my Talent for Selection, believe me incapable of distinguishing upon this occasion. I must take leave to add that this large copy of my Book is valued by Mr. Halehard not by me.
Appendix VII - (c)

Ms. letter to Jeffrey from Richard Woodhouse.  
(Peebles mss., property of Miss Rebecca Watt)

Sir,

When I was in Rome in the Summer of 1832, my friend Mr. Severn the artist, was so kind as to assist me in superintending the moulding of a large medallion likeness in clay of our mutual and much lamented friend, the late John Keats the Poet. It was completed greatly to the satisfaction of ourselves, as well as of all who knew Keats and have seen it, by Girometti the first cameo cutter in Rome, who transferred it to Plaster of Paris, from which he subsequently engraved for me a small cameo in oriental stone. I have since obtained the original mould from which the plaster cast was made, and I have had a few impressions taken. Mr. Severn particularly wishes I would send one of these to yourself; - a request I have much pleasure in complying with.

I have the honor to be,  
Sir,  

.................... (illegible)  

Richard Woodhouse.  

Temple, 14 Jan'y, 1834.  

P. Jeffrey, Esq.
Appendix VII -(b)

Ms. letter to Jeffrey from Horatio Smith.
(Peebles mss., property of Miss Rebecca Watt)

* * * * * * * * * * *

Brighton, 5 Hanover Crescent, 28 January, 1828.

Sir

In all probability you will not notice Mr. Hunt's most indiscreet book about Lord Byron, but should you determine otherwise I wish to put you in possession of information which may possibly have some influence upon your remarks. Mr. Lockhart, as is sufficiently evident in the Quarterly, stands very ill affected towards me, a circumstance which I cannot altogether attribute to my literary incapacity. In his unfortunate difference with John Scott in January 1821 I refused to let Scott meet him upon grounds which I considered to be well warranted by the interests of literature, and of society at large. These gave him a great offence at the time, and I fear he has never forgotten or forgiven them. It is possible - I have no reason for entertaining the supposition, - but still it is possible that in addition to the ridicule he may very excusably heap upon my head on account of Hunt's preposterous bedawbing, he may attempt to raise a religious war-whoop against me on the score of my friendship for Shelley. To this I am the more open as Hunt has contended himself with ambiguously saying that I differed from Shelley "upon some points"; whereas he well knows that it amounted to a total dissent from all his religious notions; and this I have formally called upon Mr. Hunt to declare in a letter to the Morning Chronicle. I have no doubt he will do so, and I will take care that Mr. Lockhart shall see it.

I am quite sure that you would not fall into any illiberal misconstruction of Hunt's words even as they now stand, for the context and spirit of his remarks, and I trust my own life and every page of my writings, will utterly absolve me from any such imputations; but it may be right nevertheless to explain to you that at the time I became acquainted-
-with Mr. Shelley he had discontinued those inexcusable excesses of his boyhood, both as to thought and action, which I believe originated in a partial aberration of mind, aggravated and inflamed by the proscription, calumny, and outrage which had hunted him out of society like a Pariah. I found in him a morbidly sensitive, but exquisitely poetical mind - he was unhappy - he was living respectably with his wife, but embarrassed from romantic donations and generosities quite inconsistent with his income, and which sufficiently betray'd his want of mental ballast and judgment - under these circumstances I did what I would do again tomorrow, tho' no longer so young as I was then - I broke thro' the line of circumvallation that had been drawn around him - I assisted him with my purse and my counsel - I tried to reconcile his family to him - in this object I fail'd. Mr. Shelley went abroad, and I never saw him again. I continued, however, to receive from Sir Timothy and to remit to him the money upon which he subsisted, and I corresponded with Shelley to the time of his death. My friendship for him proved in every way injurious to me, but I have the consolation of believing that it was useful to him. He was affectionate and grateful to the last degree. I believe my influence over him was very great, and let it be observed that whatever opinions he entertained in the latter part of his life, of which I know nothing for we were many years separated, he never again obtruded anything offensive upon the world, and when I knew him his conversation was equally free from reproach - so was his moral conduct. I believe they had been much otherwise at a previous period, but Good God! is there to be no end to our hatred even when all excuse for it has ceased - are boyish errors of thought or action to be visited with rancorous proscription throughout a whole life - is mental aberration, or even sane eccentricity, which ought to be compassiated as a misfortune, to be persecuted unrelentingly and for ever as a crime? The moment that Mr. Shelley ceased to fly in the face-
Ms. letter from Allan Cunningham to Jeffrey.
(Peebess mss.)

Sir,

I have the honour of sending you my little book of verse of which Col. Napier spoke - it contains a few Scottish songs and something resembling a dramatic Poem.

I had no thought of attempting the composition of a regular drama. My chief wish was to tell a Scottish story in a homely and natural way. A regular Poem seemed to require a sustained stateliness and polish of diction which I had not to bestow, and I thought the imperfections of my education would be less visible in the familiarity of dialogue and casual remissness of numbers which belong to the drama. I have sought to see human nature for myself and conceive something in the rustic spirit of the literature of the lower orders in Scotland - which contains a singular mixture of the humorous and pathetic the merry and the devout. I have already said more than I ought perhaps to say.

I remain Sir
Your very faithful servant
and admirer,

Allan Cunningham.

Eccleston Street Pimlico
20 April 1822.

To Francis Jeffrey Esq.

(Traditional Tales of the English and Scottish Peasantry, (2 v. 1822)? - or Sir Marmaduke Maxwell, (1822)-?.)
Ms. letter to Jeffrey from Benjamin Robert Haydon, the historical painter. (Peebles mss.)

Nov. 7 1827
London.

My dear Sir

Your letter was a great balm to me, and I am sure the hopes it contains, will be the greatest comfort to the Author of the Poem: I do not overrate it; there are passages of exceeding power; and conscientiously I know nothing like it save the "London" - and I will venture to say, you will think so.

I have reason to know for certain that Mr. Macaulay thinks so highly of it, as readily to undertake its review and I have written to beg he will write you - I quoted a passage of the letter to the Author, who is a delicate mind: a young man, ambitious of fame and apprehensive of Notice - and his heart will beat high with hope when he reads it. Your letter was a great balm, because to find kindness, still alive, when a man has suffered bitter humiliations, and agonizing sorrows, is a great pleasure.

My Life has been a whirlwind of brilliant Victory, & bitter defeat - one week dining at the tables of the Great, and sleeping in Velvet Chambers and Regal Beds, and the next, herded with Gamblers and Demireps, and crawling to a ______ mattress on the dirty floor of a Prison! - and why is this? - Because in my early and ardent aspirations after excellence I told truth to Power! - What you said once in the Review should be the motto of all men of Genius - There is no "hatred like that hatred with which weak men hate a man of Genius". This is a saying which should be cast in iron! - It would be cant to say I despair, for I do not. My afflictions have exerted to the great object of my life, attention and sympathy; and if by any suffering I can at last realize it; without affectation I shall die happier.

Hoping my Friend and the Poem will meet your decided approval, with kindest respects to Mrs. Jeffrey
Believe me my dear Sir,
with great regard faithfully your sr.

B. R. Haydon.
Excerpts from a long letter to Jeffrey from Samuel Smith. (Peebles mss. in possession of Miss Rebecca Watt)

In this letter, which is dated Edinburgh, December 17, 1833, the reverend gentleman tells of having recently called on a dying friend, a young man, who appeared to be departing this life in an irreligious state of mind and was relatively indifferent to the hereafter.

"In this Frame of Mind my Friend was avowedly encouraged to remain at ease from the opinion that the most talented, enlightened, and ingenuous men of this or any age are well known to hold similar views.

"In a Jeffrey cannot find evidence of the reality of what the Scriptures would have us believe, if we see clearly by his practice and may infer from his writings that he neither conceives a belief of the Doctrines, nor a conformity to the Ordinances of Christianity to be necessary for our present or our future happiness; are we to be blamed, if with our feeble capacities we find nothing to convince and satisfy our minds and relieve us from the mazes of uncertainty and vague conjecture, when we turn our thoughts to a Future World or dip into the dark mysteries of Revelation.

"Sir, it was not for the first time, after the unhappy conversation to which I have referred, that I have felt a deep anxiety to know the real state of your opinions; and that I have come to something like a resolution of beseeching, imploring you to consider this matter. Many a year since I have wished, as I felt the light bursting upon my own mind, that Sir Walter Scott or Jeffrey could be induced to institute an earnest, heartfelt, prayerful investigation into the Truth of Christianity - not the general Truth of its Evidence merely - but to the actual statement which it propounds of its one great question, How is the soul of man to be saved. - The amiable and generous spirited Scott is no more. His tongue can now testify to no one whether he received or despised the Message of the Lord and whether he proposed to stand before the throne of the lamb, in the covering of his own righteous acts, or--
in the robe made white by the Righteousness of a Redeemer.

"You, Sir, are still in the midst of us and you know it well that now there is not in Scotland one who has such power over the minds of your countrymen. I am far from thinking as you do on many questions of civil policy, but notwithstanding I sincerely believe that your mind has ever been actuated by a warm love of your country and that it is the highest wish of your heart to benefit your fellowmen. Now - is yours the understanding to dispute that if there be an Eternity in which we are all to exist our present condition sinks into utter unimportance when compared with it except in as far as its influence extends beyond this world - or will you deny that if you should be the means of adding vastly to the temporal happiness of millions, but of leading one soul to everlasting destruction, a far greater amount of evil than of good must result from the influence of your powers.

"Were the voice of Jeffrey uplifted in the strenuous and zealous defence of the Gospel - were your gifted mind, actuated by the holy fears of suffering the souls of your fellow sinners to be held captive in the chains of Satan, to testify aloud that God's Word is True, and Christ alone can save us; - Thousands, - tens of thousands, who have scoffed at Religion, would pause in their career and enquire if this is indeed true...."

(The writer then proceeds to give his religious arguments, and apparently also encloses a tract on "the essential features of Practical Religion").
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(The three greatest aids to pathfinding in this study have been Professor Saintsbury's History of Criticism, his History of English Criticism, and J. Hepburn Millar's Literary History of Scotland. I wish to acknowledge these here assistance sometimes not avowed in the text.)
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